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Universality of Nash components

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posted on 2025-08-06, 14:47 authored by Dieter Balkenborg, Dries Vermeulen
We show that Nash equilibrium components are universal for the collection of connected polyhedral sets. More precisely for every polyhedral set we construct a so-called binary game-a game where all players have two pure strategies and a common utility function with values either zero or one-whose success set (the set of strategy profiles where the maximal payoff of one is indeed achieved) is homeomorphic to the given polyhedral set. Since compact semi-algebraic sets can be triangulated, a similar result follows for the collection of connected compact semi-algebraic sets.We discuss implications of our results for the strategic stability of success sets, and use the results to construct a Nash component with index k for any fixed integer k.

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© 2014, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Notes

Journal Article. This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Games and Economic Behavior. A definitive version was subsequently published in Games and Economic Behavior, July 2014, vol. 86, pp. 67-76 doi:10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.010 Earlier version published as Economics Department discussion paper and available at http://hdl.handle.net/10036/4318 There is another ORE record for this item in ORE at https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/handle/10036/4318

Journal

Games and Economic Behavior

Publisher

Elsevier

Language

en

Citation

Vol. 86, pp. 67 - 76

Department

  • Economics

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