posted on 2025-08-06, 14:47authored byDieter Balkenborg, Dries Vermeulen
We show that Nash equilibrium components are universal for the collection of connected polyhedral sets. More precisely for every polyhedral set we construct a so-called binary game-a game where all players have two pure strategies and a common utility function with values either zero or one-whose success set (the set of strategy profiles where the maximal payoff of one is indeed achieved) is homeomorphic to the given polyhedral set. Since compact semi-algebraic sets can be triangulated, a similar result follows for the collection of connected compact semi-algebraic sets.We discuss implications of our results for the strategic stability of success sets, and use the results to construct a Nash component with index k for any fixed integer k.
Journal Article.
This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Games and Economic Behavior. A definitive version was subsequently published in Games and Economic Behavior, July 2014, vol. 86, pp. 67-76 doi:10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.010
Earlier version published as Economics Department discussion paper and available at http://hdl.handle.net/10036/4318
There is another ORE record for this item in ORE at https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/handle/10036/4318