What is social constructionism about race? A reply to Hochman

<p dir="ltr">This paper reconceptualizes social constructionism about race (hereafter SCR). While SCR is considered a hegemonic view in philosophy and academia more broadly, Hochman (<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10539-025-09995-z#ref-CR40" target="_blank">2022</a>) argues that this hegemony is illusory. He identifies different versions of SCR in the literature, showing that race constructionists do not share a single, common view. For him, race constructionists are not even united in rejecting biological race realism, and the label “social constructionism about race” is so inclusive that it has become almost useless. I identify what is missing in Hochman’s analysis, namely, the recognition that SCR is an <i>investigative practice</i> (Brigandt <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10539-025-09995-z#ref-CR11" target="_blank">2012</a>; Brigandt and Love <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10539-025-09995-z#ref-CR11" target="_blank">2012</a>; Neto <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10539-025-09995-z#ref-CR60" target="_blank">2020</a>). This recognition demands shifting focus from what race constructionists claim to what they do. By operating this shift, I explain why SCR remains an alternative to biological race realism in a important and specific sense, and why the label “social constructionism about race” is still useful.</p>