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# The Material-Weight Illusion disappears or inverts in objects made of two materials

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Vivian C. Paulun<sup>1,2</sup>, Gavin Buckingham<sup>3</sup>, Melvyn A. Goodale<sup>2</sup>,

7

& Roland W. Fleming<sup>1</sup>

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## Affiliations

10

1) Department of Psychology  
University of Gießen  
Otto-Behaghel-Str. 10F  
35394 Gießen  
Germany

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16

2) The Brain and Mind Institute  
Western Interdisciplinary Research Building  
Western University  
London, Ontario N6A 3K7  
Canada

17

18

19

20

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3) Department of Sport and Health Sciences  
College of Life and Environmental Sciences  
University of Exeter  
Heavitree Road  
Exeter EX1 2LU  
UK

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29

## Corresponding author

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Vivian C. Paulun

31

E-mail: Vivian.C.Paulun@psychol.uni-giessen.de

32

Phone: +49 (0) 641 99 26 232

33

Fax: +49 (0) 641 99 26 119

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**Abstract**

35 The Material-Weight Illusion (MWI) occurs when an object that looks heavy (e.g. stone) and  
36 one that looks light (e.g. Styrofoam) have the same mass. When such stimuli are lifted, the  
37 heavier-looking object feels lighter than the lighter-looking object, presumably because well-  
38 learned priors about the density of different materials are violated. We examined whether a  
39 similar illusion occurs when a certain weight distribution is expected (such as the metal end  
40 of a hammer being heavier), but weight is uniformly distributed. In Experiment 1,  
41 participants lifted bipartite objects that appeared to be made of two materials (combinations  
42 of stone, Styrofoam, wood) but were manipulated to have a uniform weight distribution. Most  
43 participants experienced an inverted MWI (i.e., the heavier-looking side felt heavier),  
44 suggesting an integration of incoming sensory information with density priors. However, a  
45 replication of the classic MWI was found when the objects appeared to be uniformly made of  
46 just one of the materials (Experiment 2). Both illusions seemed to be independent of the  
47 forces used when lifting the objects. When lifting bipartite objects, but asked to judge the  
48 weight of the whole object, participants experienced no illusion (Experiment 3). In  
49 Experiment 4 we investigated weight perception in objects with a non-uniform weight  
50 distribution and again found evidence for an integration of prior and sensory information.  
51 Taken together, our seemingly contradictory results challenge most theories about the MWI.  
52 However, Bayesian integration of competing density priors with the likelihood of incoming  
53 sensory information may explain the opposing illusions.

54 *Keywords: grasping, weight perception, grip force, load force, Bayesian integration*

55

**New & Noteworthy**

56 We report a novel weight illusion that contradicts all current explanations of the  
57 Material-Weight Illusion: When lifting an object composed of two materials the heavier-  
58 looking side feels heavier, even when the true weight distribution is uniform. The opposite  
59 (classic) illusion is found when the same materials are lifted in two separate objects.  
60 Identifying the common mechanism underlying both illusions will have implications for  
61 perception more generally. A potential candidate is Bayesian inference with competing  
62 priors.

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## Introduction

64 A lifetime of experience has taught us about the typical properties of objects and materials.  
65 Thus, only by looking at a brick, we expect it to be heavy, even though *weight* is not per se a  
66 visual property. This enables us to adjust our behavior in an anticipatory fashion (Westling  
67 and Johansson, 1984): we use more force to lift a stone brick than one made of Styrofoam,  
68 and choose appropriate points on the objects to grasp them (Paulun et al., 2016). The  
69 Material-Weight Illusion (MWI) is a striking example of how visually evoked expectations  
70 about material properties can influence heaviness perception in a top-down manner. The  
71 MWI can be experienced when lifting objects of equal size and shape that visually appear to  
72 be made of materials that substantially differ in density, such as brass and Styrofoam (but  
73 which have been manipulated to have the same mass). Although their mass is physically  
74 identical, these objects feel as though they differ in weight when lifted one after the other: the  
75 heavier-looking object feels lighter, whereas the lighter-looking object feels heavier. This  
76 illusion is known at least since the late 19th century (Seashore, 1899; Wolfe, 1898) and it has  
77 been replicated multiple times in various versions (Baugh et al., 2012; Buckingham et al.,  
78 2009; Buckingham et al., 2011; Buckingham and Goodale, 2013; Ellis and Lederman, 1999;  
79 Vicovaro and Burigana, 2017).

80 A key component of the illusion is strong *prior expectations* about the density of  
81 different materials, e.g. stone, metal, wood, or Styrofoam. If a material is known only to a  
82 specific population, a weight illusion will be experienced only by that group of participants  
83 (*golf-ball illusion*; Ellis and Lederman, 1998). Weight expectations that lead to an MWI can  
84 be evoked through touch alone (Ellis and Lederman, 1999), vision alone (Buckingham et al.,  
85 2011), or a combination of both (Ellis and Lederman, 1999). These expectations are related to  
86 (implicit) long-term priors and are not altered during an experiment. Thus, the MWI occurs  
87 not only when an object is lifted for the first time, but repeatedly over the course of many  
88 trials (Buckingham et al., 2009). In other words, even after lifting a ‘heavy’ Styrofoam object  
89 several times, participants neither adjust their expectations nor their long-term prior, it  
90 continues to feel *even heavier* than an equally weighted stone object. This leads to another  
91 key component of the MWI, the *violation of weight expectations*: the weight force of a  
92 material is *larger* or *smaller than expected*. Interestingly, this violation of expectations leads  
93 to a perceptual *contrast effect*: A heavy piece of Styrofoam is not only perceived as  
94 unexpectedly heavy, but *even heavier* than an equally weighted object of a different material.  
95 This is in stark contrast to a large body of research on cases in which prior knowledge and

196 sensory information are *integrated* by the perceptual system (e.g. Adams et al., 2004; Ernst  
197 and Bühlhoff, 2004; Kersten and Yuille, 2003; Körding et al., 2004; Körding and Wolpert,  
198 2004; Langer and Bühlhoff, 2001; Sun and Perona, 1998; Weiss et al., 2002). Bayesian  
199 integration would predict that contradicting prior and sensory information (e.g., a heavy  
200 object with a Styrofoam surface) would be integrated to a perceived weight that lies  
201 somewhere between the two. Even ‘robust estimation’, when the cue conflict is large (Landy  
202 et al., 1995), would predict that observers would rely solely on the more reliable modality  
203 (i.e., either the felt weight, or the visually expected weight), rather than a contrast effect in  
204 which the perceived weight is *outside* the range between the prior and the sensory  
205 information. As a result, weight illusions like the MWI or the related *Size-Weight Illusion*  
206 (SWI) have been termed ‘anti-Bayesian’ (Brayanov and Smith, 2010). What is the advantage  
207 of such anti-Bayesian behavior? Baugh and colleagues (2012) speculated that if an object  
208 strongly contradicts the prior expectation about a material class, this object is not  
209 incorporated into the prior but marked as an outlier by the perceptual system (hence it is  
210 contrasted and feels *even lighter/heavier*). Incorporating outliers into the prior, by contrast,  
211 would make the prior more unreliable. Only long-term exposure to unexpectedly weighted  
212 objects/materials—when they become the rule, not the exception—may lead to an adjustment of  
213 the long-term prior (and can even invert a weight illusion, as has been shown for the SWI;  
214 Flanagan et al., 2008). The ‘anti-Bayesian’ view on weight illusions has been challenged by  
215 Peters, Ma and Shams (2016), who argue that the SWI can indeed be explained by Bayesian  
216 integration if one incorporates the possibility of multiple competing density priors and by  
217 Wolf et al. (2018), who argue that the SWI can be explained by maximum-likelihood  
218 integration of mass and density estimates with correlated noise.

219 In contrast to the unchanging perceptual illusion, the motor system adjusts grip and  
220 load forces quickly to the actual mass of the objects within few trials (Buckingham et al.,  
221 2009). This dissociation between perception and action shows that the MWI cannot purely be  
222 the result of a *sensorimotor mismatch* between the applied force (scaled according to the  
223 expected weight) and the true physical weight. It has been suggested that long-term priors  
224 and short-term sensorimotor memories interact when lifting equally weighted objects made of  
225 different materials resulting in the MWI (Baugh et al., 2012).

226 Unlike some experimental settings, our world is not filled with homogeneous objects  
227 made from pure metal, wood or Styrofoam; rather, objects are often composed of multiple  
228 materials, such as hammers, scissors, and lollipops. In this case, the mass will not be equally  
229 distributed within the object. If all of the materials comprising such an object are familiar, we



130 can presumably infer the likely weight distribution. For example, we would expect the metal  
131 end of a hammer to be much heavier than the wooden end, and thus for its center of mass  
132 (CoM) to be closer to the head. Indeed, Crajé et al. (2013) showed that humans can  
133 accurately judge the CoM location from visual density cues in asymmetric objects. However,  
134 knowledge of the CoM location in objects with non-uniform density did not enable  
135 participants of that study to anticipatorily scale the initial fingertip forces in order to prevent  
136 object tilt. Instead, participants required lifting the object several times to learn how to  
137 prevent an initial tilt. Thus, there seems to be a dissociation of how a mass distribution is  
138 represented in the perceptual and motor system. Do violations of an expected weight  
139 *distribution* also lead to an illusion, much as unexpected weights result in the MWI? For the  
140 MWI, the relevant sensorimotor information originates from the mass of the object and the  
141 force required to lift that mass. In contrast, differences in mass distribution would be signaled  
142 through other types of information, such as a torque (the rotational equivalent of force), that  
143 rotates the object towards its heavier side. Weight perception not only depends on the mass of  
144 the object, it also varies depending on the first moment of mass (Kingma et al., 2002). Here  
145 we ask whether sensorimotor information, such as torque, lead to weight illusions localized to  
146 specific parts of the object. We systematically investigated these questions by violating the  
147 expected mass distribution in bipartite-looking objects (composed of two materials), and  
148 asking participants to report their apparent weight and CoM before and after lifting them. In  
149 **Experiment 1** the mass distribution was manipulated to be uniform in objects for which  
150 participants expected a non-uniform mass distribution. This led to an unexpected inversion of  
151 the MWI. **Experiment 2** was conducted to confirm that this effect was due to the violations  
152 of expected mass distribution and corresponding sensory information (torque, more  
153 specifically its absence) and not to other features of the objects used in **Experiment 1**.  
154 **Experiment 3** tested whether judging the overall weight (instead of the weight distribution)  
155 of bipartite objects would elicit an inverted or classic MWI. We found that in this case,  
156 participants do not experience any weight illusion. Finally, in **Experiment 4** we used objects  
157 with a non-uniform mass distribution to test whether the effects observed in **Experiment 1**  
158 were related to the lack of any torque signal. More specifically, we tested weight perception  
159 in objects that appeared to be uniform visually, but were manipulated to have a non-uniform  
160 mass distribution, as well as in objects that were expected to have non-uniform mass in a way  
161 discrepant from the visual appearance. Thus, unlike **Experiment 1**, there actually was a  
162 torque signal present in **Experiment 4**.

163

## Experiment 1

### 164 **Methods and materials**

#### 165 *Participants*

166 Fifty-three students (39 females, 14 male) from the University of Western Ontario  
167 took part in **Experiment 1**. All were right-handed by self-report and the average age was 21  
168 years ( $SD = 4$  years). All participants were naïve with regard to the aims of the study and  
169 gave written informed consent prior to the experiment. The procedure was approved by the  
170 ethics board at the University of Western Ontario and in agreement with the declaration of  
171 Helsinki. Students were compensated with 10 CAD for their participation. Two participants  
172 were excluded from the analysis because of missing data, and two other participants were  
173 excluded because they did not understand the instructions and were hence unable to complete  
174 the task properly. More specifically, one participant did not understand what the CoM of an  
175 object is, which was a pre-requisite for performing the task, and one participant did not  
176 always use the right hand as instructed. Thus, data of 49 participants was used for data  
177 analysis.

#### 178 *Stimuli*

179 Three bipartite objects served as stimuli in our first study, see **Fig. 1A**. All had the  
180 same size ( $4 \times 4 \times 10$  cm) and looked as if their two halves were made of different materials:  
181 stone and wood; wood and Styrofoam; or Styrofoam and stone. The objects were carved out  
182 and partially filled with lead, and their base coated with fleece to reduce auditory cues when  
183 placing the objects. Thus, they all had the same mass (400 g), which was evenly distributed  
184 around the geometric center of the objects. A small handle was attached centrally on top of  
185 the objects, onto which the force transducers could be mounted and removed on every trial. A  
186 pair of six-axis force-torque (F/T) sensors (Nano17 F/T; ATI Industrial Automation, Garner,  
187 NC) were built into a small handle with opposing grip pads, see **Fig. 1B**. These grip pads had  
188 a diameter of 2.5 cm that were covered with black sandpaper and thus allowed a comfortable  
189 precision grip of index finger and thumb. The handle with the transducer added another 50 g  
190 to the weight of the objects. The configuration of the grip pads and thus the force transducers  
191 was such that the index finger would be on one half, i.e. one material, of the object and the  
192 thumb would be on the other side, i.e. the other material, see **Fig. 1C**. For the practice trials

193 we used an object with the same dimensions, weight and mass distribution as the bipartite  
194 objects but with uniform dark wood appearance.

### 195 *Set up and procedure*

196 Participants were seated in front of a small table which was covered with black cloth.  
197 All objects that were used in the task were placed on the table before the experiment. On each  
198 trial, participants were instructed to place their right (dominant) hand on the table and close  
199 their eyes while the experimenter placed one of the objects in front of them. The objects were  
200 placed with one of the short sides facing the participants, i.e. one material was closer to them  
201 than the other one. The orientation of each object was kept constant within participants, and  
202 counterbalanced between individuals. However, a given participant did not always face the  
203 heavier (or lighter) looking material for all three objects. On each trial, a computer generated  
204 ‘beep’ signaled to the participants to open their eyes and start the movement. Their task was  
205 to grasp the object at the grip pads with a precision grip of index finger and thumb, lift the  
206 object to a comfortable height (approximately 15-20 cm above the table), and hold it stable,  
207 without hefting it or letting it rotate or fall. After three seconds, another ‘beep’ occurred,  
208 which was the signal to place the object back onto the table. Forces and torques were  
209 measured during the three seconds between the two signals at 1000 Hz. The movement was  
210 performed at a self-chosen natural speed. A perceptual measure of the weight of both halves  
211 of the object was taken after each lift. Importantly, a perceptual judgment of the weight of the  
212 objects’ halves was also acquired before each object was lifted for the first time, i.e. based  
213 solely on the visual appearance of the objects to gain insight into participants’ prior  
214 expectations.

215 The type of perceptual judgment was varied between participants. Twenty-four  
216 participants were asked to give a numerical rating of how heavy each half of the object felt  
217 after each lift, in addition to how heavy they thought it would feel before the experimental  
218 lifting trials. We counterbalanced across participants which half of each object they rated  
219 first. Participants were asked to give their rating on an arbitrary scale, with the only constraint  
220 that larger numbers should represent heavier weights (absolute magnitude estimation;  
221 Zwislocki and Goodman, 1980). The other twenty-five participants were asked to indicate the  
222 perceived CoM of the objects as a more implicit measure of the perceived mass distribution.  
223 It has been shown that observers can accurately judge the CoM of two- and three-dimensional  
224 objects using symmetry (Bingham and Muchisky, 1993a, 1993b) or density cues (Crajé et al.,  
225 2013). If they perceived both halves of the object to be equal in weight, they should report the

226 CoM to be at the geometric center of the object. If they perceived one or the other side to be  
 227 heavier this would result in a shift of the perceived CoM toward that side. To obtain the  
 228 perceived CoM, participants pointed with the sharpened end of a wooden stick (like a pencil)  
 229 to the perceived CoM along the elongated side of the object, similar to the task by Crajé et al.  
 230 (2013). The experimenter recorded this measure by using a small ruler that was placed next to  
 231 the object as soon as the participant had made his/her judgment. Every participant completed  
 232 five practice trials with the uniform wooden block (more if necessary) followed by 30 trials  
 233 with the bipartite objects. Objects were presented in one of six different pseudorandom  
 234 orders, so that each object was lifted 10 times and all three objects were lifted before any  
 235 were repeated.

236

### 237 *Data analysis*

238 The numerical heaviness ratings were transformed into z-scores based on the mean  
 239 and SD of each individual participant (practice and main trials). The CoM judgments  
 240 provided one number instead of a separate rating for each material. Thus, we used the judged  
 241 CoM (in cm) as a rating for one material and subtracted the judged CoM from 10 cm (the  
 242 length of the object) to gain a rating for the other half of the object. This was done so that the  
 243 larger number resulted for the material at the side where the CoM was perceived, i.e. as in the  
 244 other group of participants, the larger the number, the heavier that material was perceived.  
 245 The resulting CoM judgments are inherently on the same scale (between 0 and 10) for all  
 246 participants, but to compare these judgments to the ratings of the other group we also  
 247 transformed these values into z-scores (based on the mean and SD of each individual). These  
 248 z-scores were used in our statistical analysis. The core question of this experiment was  
 249 whether there were differences in the expected as well as perceived weight of the differently  
 250 looking halves of the objects. We therefore averaged the ratings of the perceived weight for  
 251 each participant and material, to calculate a *material* (stone vs. wood vs. Styrofoam)  $\times$  *lift*  
 252 (before vs. after)  $\times$  *task* (numerical rating vs. CoM judgment) mixed-design ANOVA across  
 253 all participants. We corrected for violations of sphericity where necessary and report the  
 254 Greenhouse-Geisser corrected values. Pairwise post-hoc comparisons were Bonferroni  
 255 corrected.

256 To determine the strength of the illusion on an individual basis, for each participant  
 257 we calculated the average rating for Styrofoam and stone *after* lifting and subtracted the  
 258 resulting Styrofoam value from the stone value ( $Idx_{MWI} = \Psi_{\text{Stone}} - \Psi_{\text{Styrofoam}}$ ). The same was

259 done for the individual ratings *before* lifting, i.e. their priors. Positive values of this index  
 260 indicate that stone is perceived/expected *heavier* than Styrofoam, whereas negative values  
 261 indicate that stone was perceived/expected *lighter* than Styrofoam. A two-sided t-test was  
 262 performed to test whether the illusion index was significantly different from zero after lifting.

263 Data of the F/T transducers were first transformed into one common coordinate  
 264 system (see **Fig. 2A**) such that the long side of the object corresponded to the  $x$ -dimension  
 265 (i.e.,  $x$  is normal to the grip surfaces), the short side of the object corresponded to the  $y$ -  
 266 dimension, and  $z$  was orthogonal to the  $x$ - $y$ -plane. Furthermore, data from one group of  
 267 participants was rotated and relabeled so that the force data could be analyzed irrespective of  
 268 the orientation of the objects (which we had counterbalanced between participants).

269 When lifting an object with one heavy and one light side, there are at least four  
 270 strategies to prevent the object from tilting: (1) Increasing the grip force (GF) at the heavy  
 271 side, (2) increasing the load force (LF) at the heavy side, (3) keeping forces the same but  
 272 applying the center of pressure at different heights (higher on heavier side) or (4) any  
 273 combinations of these. All strategies can counteract a torque emerging from a non-uniform  
 274 weight distribution or, in turn, can cause a torque if there is no weight difference between the  
 275 two halves (as in our experiment). If participants employ such strategies in an anticipatory  
 276 fashion, we expect to find an initial torque when the objects are lifted.

277 Torque ( $\tau$ ) is the cross product between a force vector ( $F$ ) and a distance vector  
 278 connecting the CoM and the point of force application ( $r$ ). We calculated the cross product  
 279 between the applied force of the thumb and the distance between its Center of Pressure (CoP)  
 280 and the CoM ( $\tau_{\text{thumb}} = F_{\text{thumb}} \times r_{\text{thumb}}$ ) and likewise for the index finger ( $\tau_{\text{index}} = F_{\text{index}} \times r_{\text{index}}$ ).  
 281 The vertical CoP of each digit was calculated following Zhang and colleagues (2010) and  
 282 adapted to the orientation of the sensors in our setup. Furthermore, we calculated the cross  
 283 product between the weight force of each objects' half and its distance to the CoM ( $\tau_{\text{half1}} =$   
 284  $F_{\text{half1}} \times r_{\text{half1}}$  and  $\tau_{\text{half2}} = F_{\text{half2}} \times r_{\text{half2}}$ ). The overall torque is simply the sum of these four cross  
 285 products ( $\tau = \tau_{\text{thumb}} + \tau_{\text{index}} + \tau_{\text{half1}} + \tau_{\text{half2}}$ ). Central for our investigation was the torque around  
 286 the  $y$ -axis, see **Figure 2A**. Again, we would only expect a torque around  $y$  in the initial stage  
 287 of the movement, because there was no actual weight difference within the objects ( $\tau_{\text{half1}} +$   
 288  $\tau_{\text{half2}} = 0$  in **Experiment 1**) and a resulting overall torque should thus be corrected. We  
 289 therefore analyzed torque only during the *loading phase* of the movement. The beginning of  
 290 the loading phase was determined by combining multiple criteria (similar to the MSI method  
 291 proposed by Schot and colleagues (2010)): We selected the first time point at which the GF  
 292 of at least one finger and the LF of at least one finger were above a threshold (0.01 N) and the

293 torque around the y-axis exceeded 1.5 N·mm. The GF of each digit was the force measured in  
294 the x-dimension, with the finger's GF multiplied by -1 (because the two digits act in opposite  
295 directions), see **Fig. 2A**. The LF was defined as the force in the z-direction, see **Fig. 2A**. The  
296 end of the loading phase was defined as the first point in time after the initial peak in which  
297 the total LF (sum of both digits) fell below the weight force of the object or (if not reached)  
298 below the median LF.

299 The torque signal was smoothed with a fourth-order, zero-phase lag, low-pass  
300 Butterworth filter with a cut-off frequency of 50 Hz. We used the first local extremum during  
301 the loading phase as our dependent variable, see **Fig. 2B**. Its sign tells in which direction the  
302 object was rotated initially (i.e., towards the heavier- or lighter-looking material), and its  
303 value indicates the amount. To simplify interpretation, we aligned the torques across different  
304 orientations of each object, such that positive torques always corresponded to rotations  
305 towards the heavier looking side and negative torques, towards the lighter. If participants  
306 expected one half to be heavier and modified their grip in an anticipatory fashion, we would  
307 expect an initial torque in the direction of the lighter looking side.

308 We calculated an *object* (stone-wood vs. Styrofoam-stone vs. Styrofoam-wood)  $\times$  *lift*  
309 (first vs. subsequent lifts) - repeated-measures ANOVA for the peak torque. We corrected for  
310 violations of sphericity where necessary and report the Greenhouse-Geisser corrected values.  
311 Data from all experiments can be downloaded here: <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1345746>.  
312

## 313 **Results and Discussion**

### 314 *Perception*

315 **Figure 3A** shows the averaged standardized numerical ratings for the different  
316 materials and objects, respectively. Unsurprisingly, and irrespective of the object, stone was  
317 expected to be heavier than wood and wood heavier than Styrofoam. Interestingly, and in  
318 contrast to the standard MWI, even after participants had lifted the objects, they on average  
319 continued to experience stone as feeling heavier than wood, and wood as feeling heavier than  
320 Styrofoam. In fact, all materials had the *same* weight so any perceived differences were  
321 illusory. This illusory weight difference was smaller than the difference in participants' pre-  
322 lift expectations, but remained present over the course of the experiment.

323 A similar pattern of results was observed for the group of participants judging the  
324 perceived horizontal CoM location. **Figure 3B** shows a sketch of the side view of each

325 object. The veridical CoM was always at the geometric center of the object. The dotted lines  
326 show the locations where the CoM would lie if the materials were real granite, oak wood and  
327 Styrofoam. Interestingly, participants (on average) expected the CoM of each object (grey  
328 thick line) to be very close to the CoM of real materials, suggesting they have good  
329 internalized representations of the relative densities of materials. After lifting the objects, the  
330 perceived CoM shifted towards the veridical CoM, but still remained on the side of the  
331 heavier looking material (i.e., the heavier looking material was reported to be heavier).

332 **Figure 3C** shows the average expected and perceived weight of the three materials  
333 from all participants. The *material*  $\times$  *lift*  $\times$  *task* mixed-design ANOVA confirmed the above  
334 observations with a significant main effect of material, statistics can be found in **Table 1**.  
335 Styrofoam was rated significantly lighter ( $-1.21 \pm 0.09$ ,  $M \pm SEM$ ) than stone ( $0.96 \pm 0.10$ )  
336 and wood ( $-0.04 \pm 0.07$ ), and wood significantly lighter than stone (all  $ps < .001$ ; adjusted  
337 alpha = .0167). Ratings before lifting were significantly lower ( $-0.31 \pm 0.06$ ) than after lifting  
338 ( $0.11 \pm 0.03$ ). Even though all materials had the same weight they were not only expected but  
339 also perceived to differ in their weight. That means our objects induced a weight illusion but  
340 in the *opposite* direction of the classic MWI. The ANOVA also revealed a significant  
341 interaction such that the difference between the materials was larger before than after lifting,  
342 i.e. the weight difference was expected to be larger than it felt.

343 Since we used two different perceptual measures, we were interested in whether we  
344 would find a difference between the two groups, and introduced this as a third between-factor  
345 in our ANOVA. We indeed found a main effect of judgment type. Numerical ratings resulted  
346 on average in smaller values ( $-0.22 \pm 0.44$ ) than the CoM judgments ( $0.03 \pm 0.04$ ).  
347 Furthermore, we found a significant interaction between task and lift: The difference between  
348 expectation and perception was larger for the group that gave a numerical rating. There was  
349 no interaction between material and task, and no three-way interaction between all factors.  
350 Whether the differences between the two tasks are related to perceptual differences, to the  
351 different response format, the different judgment type (e.g. judging a ratio or two independent  
352 judgments), or simply due to the fact that the response range was limited in one (CoM  
353 judgment) but not the other task, is not clear from our data.

354 To determine the strength of the illusion on an individual basis we calculated an  
355 illusion index for each participant. **Figure 3D** shows this index before and after lifting for  
356 each participant. The overwhelming majority of our 49 participants both expected and  
357 perceived stone to be heavier than Styrofoam, i.e. they experienced an *inverted* material-

358 weight illusion (their points lie in the upper right quadrant of the plot). Some participants  
 359 experienced no illusion after lifting (points that lie on the horizontal axis), only one  
 360 participant had a negative illusion index after lifting. A two-sample t-test showed that overall,  
 361 the illusion index after lifting was significantly larger than zero ( $t(48) = 8.03, p < .001$ ).

362 In sum, our results show that bipartite objects that appear to be made of different  
 363 materials, but which in reality have a uniform mass distribution, elicit a strong weight  
 364 illusion. In contrast to the well-known MWI for uniform objects, bipartite objects lead to an  
 365 inverted illusion in which heavier-looking materials feel heavier and lighter-looking materials  
 366 feel lighter. Thus, prior expectations and sensory information about weight seem to have been  
 367 integrated into a common heaviness percept.

**Table 1.**

Measure	Factor	$df_1$	$df_2$	$F$	$p$
Heaviness rating	Material	1.52	71.23	122.10	< .001*
	Lift	1	47	26.01	< .001*
	Task	1	47	17.18	< .001*
	Material × Lift	1.33	62.41	38.34	< .001*
	Material × Task	1.52	71.2	0.42	.656
	Lift × Task	1	47	19.07	< .001*
	3-way interaction	1.33	62.41	1.28	.283
Heaviness rating	Object	2	46	77.24	< .001*
	Lift	1	23	24.98	< .001*
	Object × Lift	1.31	30.09	45.42	< .001*
Peak torque Y	Object	2	96	0.82	.442
	Lift	1	48	0.69	.410
	Object × Lift	1.51	72.24	0.22	.736

368

369 *Torque*

370 Previous studies on the material- (Buckingham et al., 2009) and size-weight illusion  
 371 (Flanagan and Beltzner, 2000) found differences in load or grip force measures based on  
 372 objects' visual appearance only in the first trial (not subsequent trials), because the motor  
 373 system must rely on prior expectations based on the visual appearance of the object in the  
 374 first but not in later trials. We were thus expecting a similar pattern for the measured torque.  
 375 More specifically, we would expect a negative torque in the first trial and no torque in later  
 376 trials. However, we did not find an effect of object, lift or their interaction on torque, see  
 377 **Figure 4**. An additional one-sample t-test showed that the net torque was not significantly  
 378 different from zero ( $t(48) = -0.35, p = .731$ ).



379 Thus, contrary to the perceptual illusion, there was no effect of the visual appearance  
380 of the objects on the motor system. There are several possibilities for the discrepancy  
381 between perceived weight and weight expectations as measured through applied forces and  
382 resulting torque. The two systems could rely on different types of information, whereby the  
383 motor system seems to have access to more accurate information in this case. Another  
384 possibility is that materials are not an effective cue for producing an anticipatory torque.  
385 Salimi and colleagues (2003) investigated how well lifting forces could be adjusted in  
386 response to different types of information signaling an objects' CoM. They found shape and  
387 size to be good cues to the CoM whereas a verbal instruction or an artificial visual cue  
388 (colored dot) are less effective cues. It is, however, difficult to explain why materials should  
389 be an effective cue to the overall mass (Buckingham et al., 2009) but not to mass distribution.  
390 In this regard, it is interesting to note that a study by Crajé and colleagues (2013) found that  
391 participants could not adjust the initial torque based on visual information about density.  
392 Lastly, we cannot exclude the possibility that the measures we used were not sensitive  
393 enough to capture the effects of expected material differences on the motor system.

394

395

## Experiment 2

396 In **Experiment 1** we found a new and unexpected inversion of the MWI. Is this  
397 illusion down to something unique about how we deal with bipartite objects? Or rather due to  
398 some trivial properties of our stimuli, e.g. their specific shape, or the lifting task?  
399 **Experiment 2** was conducted to test whether we could replicate the classic MWI (e.g.  
400 Buckingham et al., 2009) using the same materials, weights and shapes as in our first  
401 experiment but in uniform objects. More specifically, we wanted to exclude the possibility  
402 that any of the objects' properties, except for the fact that they are bipartite, could explain our  
403 results of the first experiment.

404

### Methods

#### *Participants*

407 Twenty-four students (6 male, 18 female) of the University of Western Ontario  
408 participated in **Experiment 2**, none of whom had participated in **Experiment 1**. They were  
409 on average 20 years old ( $SD = 3$  years) and right-handed by self-report. All were naive to the  
410 aims of the study and gave written informed consent prior to their participation. Students

411 received 10 CAD for taking part in the experiment. The experimental procedure was  
412 approved by the ethics board at the University of Western Ontario and in agreement with the  
413 declaration of Helsinki.

414

#### 415 *Stimuli*

416 Three objects served as stimuli in **Experiment 2**, see **Figure 5A**. They had the same  
417 shape, size and weight as the ones in **Experiment 1** but here, they were appeared to be made  
418 from only one of our materials (Styrofoam, wood, granite-like). The same central handle  
419 containing the force/torque transducers as in **Experiment 1** was attached to these objects.

420

#### 421 *Set up and procedure*

422 Set up and procedure were mostly the same as in **Experiment 1**. The main difference  
423 was that participants did not have to rate the heaviness of the individual halves of the objects  
424 but each object as a whole. Thus, no group of participants performed a CoM judgment; all  
425 gave numerical ratings of heaviness. In short, participants were instructed, then they rated the  
426 weight of each object based on visual information alone, then completed five practice trials  
427 with the wooden object and finally ten pseudo-randomly interleaved trials with each object,  
428 i.e. 30 trials.

429

#### 430 *Data analysis*

431 As in **Experiment 1**, perceptual ratings were transformed into z-scores, post-lifting  
432 scores were averaged for each participant and material. Data were then analyzed with a  
433 *material* (stone vs. wood vs. Styrofoam)  $\times$  *lift* (before vs. after) - repeated-measures  
434 ANOVA. Additionally, we calculated an illusion index for each participant as in **Experiment**  
435 **1** and used a one-sample t-test to test whether it was significantly different from zero after  
436 lifting.

437 Preprocessing of the data from the F/T transducers was done exactly as in  
438 **Experiment 1**. Instead of torque, we were interested in the effects on GF, LF and their rates  
439 of change. The GF of each digit was the force measured in the  $x$ -dimension, with the finger's  
440 GF multiplied by -1 (because the two digits act in opposite directions). We used the mean of  
441 both GF signals. As dependent variables we determined the first peak of GF as well as its  
442 peak rate of change. In order to determine the first peak, we used the derivative of the

443 smoothed force signal (smoothed with a Gaussian filter,  $\sigma = 30$  ms) to identify the first local  
 444 extrema. More specifically, we determined the point in time at which 70% of the maximum  
 445 of the derivative was reached, and the first point in time at which the signal became negative  
 446 after this (or the end of the trial, if it never became negative). In the period between these two  
 447 time points, we determined the first local maximum and minimum. We then determined the  
 448 maximum of the original force signal in the time between the first local maximum and  
 449 minimum; this was the peak GF used in further analysis. We determined the GF rate of  
 450 change by smoothing the force signal with a fourth-order, zero-phase lag, low-pass  
 451 Butterworth filter with a cut-off frequency of 50 Hz and then differentiating the signal. As a  
 452 dependent variable we calculated the peak of this function, i.e. the maximal slope of the  
 453 original force signal.

454 The LF was defined as the force in the  $z$ -direction. We used the mean of LF of both  
 455 fingers and determined the first peak and its peak rate of change with the same method as for  
 456 the GF. We calculated a *material* (stone vs. wood vs. Styrofoam)  $\times$  *lift* (first vs. subsequent  
 457 lifts) repeated-measures ANOVA for these four measures. We corrected for violations of  
 458 sphericity where necessary and report the Greenhouse-Geisser corrected values. Pairwise  
 459 post-hoc comparisons were Bonferroni corrected.

460

## 461 **Results and Discussion**

### 462 *Perception*

463 We were able to replicate the classic MWI with the objects used in our experiment.  
 464 Results of the perceptual rating are depicted in **Figure 5B**. Before lifting the objects,  
 465 participants expected the Styrofoam object to be lighter ( $-2.93 \pm 0.17$ ,  $M \pm 1$  SEM) than the  
 466 wooden object ( $-1.22 \pm 0.16$ ) and the wooden object to be lighter than the stone object ( $0.60$   
 467  $\pm 0.34$ ; all  $ps < .001$ ; adjusted alpha = .0167). After they had lifted the objects this pattern  
 468 reversed, stone was on average perceived to be lighter ( $-0.03 \pm 0.06$ ) than Styrofoam ( $0.34 \pm$   
 469  $0.06$ ,  $p = .001$ ) and wood ( $0.25 \pm 0.05$ ,  $p < .001$ ). The difference between the latter two was  
 470 not significant ( $p = .335$ ). Besides the significant interaction between material and pre vs. post  
 471 lifting (for details see **Table 2**), the ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect of the  
 472 material and a significant main effect of lift. They were presumably driven by the fact that the  
 473 *expected* differences between materials were much larger than the *perceived* differences  
 474 reported after lifting. As in **Experiment 1** we calculated an illusion index for each subject.  
 475 Results are shown in **Figure 3D**. The majority of participants lie in the lower right quadrant,

476 i.e. they experienced the classic MWI; a few participants lie on the horizontal axis, i.e. they  
 477 did not experience an illusion; and one participant experienced an inverted MWI. A one-  
 478 sample t-test showed that the illusion index after lifting was significantly smaller than zero  
 479 ( $t(23) = -3.74, p = .001$ ). This figure also shows that the classic MWI seems to be smaller in  
 480 size than the inverted MWI we found in bipartite objects. This observation was confirmed by  
 481 a two sample t-test which showed a significant difference ( $t(70.87) = 3.69, p < .001$ ) between  
 482 the absolute values of the illusion index in the two groups of subjects (Experiment 1 vs.  
 483 Experiment 2).

484 Taken together, the results of the perceptual ratings suggest that the findings of  
 485 **Experiment 1** cannot be explained by the specific shape, weight, or materials we used here.  
 486 When appearing to be made of one uniform material (**Experiment 2**) the same objects  
 487 elicited the classic MWI, where heavier-looking materials (here stone) are perceived lighter  
 488 than lighter-looking materials (here Styrofoam). This perceptual illusion was experienced by  
 489 the majority of participants and lasted throughout the experiment. Thus, the inverted MWI in  
 490 **Experiment 1** is presumably related to the fact that the objects appeared bipartite.

**Table 2.**

Measure	Factor	$df_1$	$df_2$	$F$	$p$
Heaviness rating	Material	1.52	34.99	54.36	< .001*
	Lift	1	23	53.09	< .001*
	Material × Lift	1.36	31.26	75.32	< .001*
Peak GF	Material	2	46	9.58	< .001*
	Lift	1	23	0.51	.484
	Material × Lift	2	46	7.90	.001*
Peak GFR	Material	1.53	35.08	10.41	.001*
	Lift	1	23	0.00	.969
	Material × Lift	2	46	9.44	< .001*
Peak LF	Material	2	46	2.25	.117
	Lift	1	23	1.64	.214
	Material × Lift	2	46	0.82	.447
Peak LFR	Material	2	46	9.40	< .001*
	Lift	1	23	3.62	.070
	Material × Lift	2	46	8.12	< .001*

491

492 **Forces**

493 In accordance with previous literature (Buckingham et al 2009; Flanagan et al 2000)  
 494 we analyzed the peaks of GF, LF and their rates of change to test whether they would be  
 495 scaled to the expected weight in the first lift and then adjusted to the actual weight (i.e. no

496 difference between materials) in all subsequent lifts. Such an effect could show up as an  
497 interaction between material and lift in the ANOVAs. This is indeed what we found for three  
498 of the four variables (all except LF), see **Figure 5C-F** and **Table 2**. More specifically, for the  
499 peak GF (**Figure 5C**) we found a significant main effect of material: GF was smaller overall  
500 for the Styrofoam object ( $7.14 \pm 0.68$  N,  $M \pm 1$  SEM) than for the wooden ( $7.89 \pm 0.83$  N,  $p =$   
501  $.012$ ) and stone objects ( $8.62 \pm 0.82$  N,  $p = .001$ ). This difference was present in the first lift  
502 (Styrofoam vs. stone:  $p = .001$  Styrofoam vs. wood:  $p = .010$ ) and only for the stone-  
503 Styrofoam comparison also for later lifts ( $p = .010$ ; all other  $ps > .0167$  (= adjusted alpha)),  
504 i.e. there was a significant interaction effect. There was no main effect of lift on the peak GF.  
505 A similar pattern was also observed for the peak rate of change of the GF (see **Figure 5D**).  
506 We found an interaction between material and lift: the rate of change was lower for  
507 Styrofoam ( $47.96 \pm 5.64$  N/s) compared to stone ( $78.86 \pm 8.83$  N/s,  $p = .001$ ) and compared  
508 to wood ( $63.64 \pm 7.90$  N/s,  $p = .007$ ) in the first lift, but not in later lifts ( $ps > .0167$  (=   
509 adjusted alpha)). Thus, the significant main effect of material was only due to the differences  
510 in the first lift. There was no main effect of lift. We found the same pattern of results for the  
511 peak LF rate, a main effect of material and an interaction effect, see **Figure 5F**: the rate of  
512 change was lower for Styrofoam ( $44.80 \pm 3.67$  N/s) compared to stone ( $60.16 \pm 4.64$  N/s,  $p =$   
513  $.002$ ) and compared to wood ( $59.91 \pm 4.77$  N/s,  $p < .001$ ) in the first lift, but not in later lifts  
514 (all  $ps > .0167$  (= adjusted alpha)). For the peak LF we found no significant effect of  
515 material, lift or their interaction, presumably because the variation was overall very small, see  
516 **Figure 5E**.

517 Overall, we have replicated Buckingham and colleagues (2009), showing that the  
518 perceptual illusion appears dissociated from the forces applied when lifting the objects. Initial  
519 forces in the first trial are scaled to the expected weight of the object based on prior  
520 assumptions about material properties, i.e. more force is applied faster to objects that appear  
521 to be heavier (here stone) than to ones that appear lighter (here Styrofoam). After the first  
522 trial, forces are adjusted to the actual mass of the object, which was the same for all materials,  
523 i.e. there were no differences between materials in the later trials. There were two exceptions:  
524 We did not find an effect for the LF (nor did Buckingham and colleagues)—this measure  
525 might simply not be sensitive—and we found a difference between the peak GF for  
526 Styrofoam and stone objects not only for the first but also later lifts. This is surprising, given  
527 that that the actual mass of the object was exactly the same.

528

529

### Experiment 3

530 In **Experiment 1** we found an inverted MWI when participants judged the masses of  
531 each half of bipartite objects. In **Experiment 2** we found the classic MWI when participants  
532 judged the entire mass of uniform objects. In **Experiment 3** we asked participants to lift  
533 bipartite objects (as in **Experiment 1**) and estimate the weight of the entire object (as in  
534 **Experiment 2**). With this manipulation we aimed to test whether bipartite objects would  
535 invert the MWI when participants were not explicitly required to make judgments of the mass  
536 distribution, but of the overall mass instead.

537

#### 538 **Methods**

##### 539 *Participants*

540 Twenty-four students (5 male, 19 female) of the University of Gießen participated in  
541 **Experiment 3**. They were on average 22 years old (SD = 3 years). Three participants were  
542 left-handed by self-report, all participants used their dominant hand for the task. All  
543 participants were naive to the aims of the study. They gave written informed consent before  
544 the experiment and received 8 € per hour for their participation. **Experiment 3** was approved  
545 by the local ethics committee and in agreement with the declaration of Helsinki.

546

##### 547 *Stimuli*

548 The same objects that were used in **Experiment 1** served as stimuli in **Experiment 3**.

549

##### 550 *Set up and procedure*

551 Set up and procedure were almost exactly as in **Experiment 1** (numerical heaviness  
552 rating group) with two differences: 1) Participants were never asked to rate the weight of the  
553 halves of the objects. Instead, they were asked to rate the apparent weight of each object as a  
554 whole. 2) In this Experiment we did not collect force and torque data, but instead used a sham  
555 version of the handle that did not contain the F/T transducers. This was done because we had  
556 not found any effect on the F/T data in **Experiment 1** when participants were lifting the exact  
557 same objects.

558

559 *Data Analysis*

560 Data analysis was done in the same ways as in **Experiments 1** and **2**. Perceptual  
 561 ratings of each participant were transformed into z-scores, post-lifting scores were averaged  
 562 for each participant and object. Data were then analyzed with an *object* (stone-wood vs.  
 563 Styrofoam-stone vs. Styrofoam-wood)  $\times$  *lift* (before vs. after) - repeated-measures ANOVA.  
 564 We corrected for violations of sphericity where necessary and report the Greenhouse-Geisser  
 565 corrected values. Pairwise post-hoc comparisons were Bonferroni corrected. To determine the  
 566 strength of the illusion on an individual basis, for each participant we calculated the illusion  
 567 index similar to the previous experiments. Instead of calculating it by subtracting ratings for  
 568 the lightest-looking from the heaviest-looking *material* (stone – Styrofoam), here we  
 569 subtracted the ratings of the lightest-looking object from the heaviest-looking *object* (stone-  
 570 wood – Styrofoam-wood). Thus, interpretation of the resulting indices is in line with the  
 571 illusion index in the previous experiments. A two-sided t-test was performed to test whether  
 572 the illusion index (after lifting) was significantly different from zero. Two independent t-tests  
 573 were performed to test whether the illusion index in **Experiment 3** was different from the  
 574 illusion index in **Experiment 1** and **2**. Alpha levels were adjusted for multiple comparisons.

575

576 **Results and Discussion**577 *Perception*

578 The expectations of the participants were in line with what we found in **Experiment 1**  
 579 and **2**, see **Figure 6A**: The stone-wood object was expected to be heavier than the other two  
 580 objects and the Styrofoam-stone object was expected to be heavier than the Styrofoam-wood  
 581 object. Differences between all objects were significant prior to lifting (all  $ps < .001$ ; adjusted  
 582 alpha = .0083). These large differences were also responsible for a main effect of *object* in  
 583 the repeated-measures ANOVA ( $F(2,46) = 62.64, p > .001$ ). After lifting the objects they  
 584 were rated heavier overall (main effect of *lift*:  $F(1,23) = 70.43, p < .001$ ). In addition to the  
 585 main effects, we also found a significant interaction between the factors *object*  $\times$  *lift* ( $F(2,46)$   
 586  $= 53.73, p < .001$ ): After participants had lifted the objects, they were not perceived as  
 587 varying in weight (all  $ps > .0083$  (= adjusted alpha)). Thus, when lifting bipartite looking  
 588 objects (like in **Experiment 1**) but rating the overall weight of the objects (like in  
 589 **Experiment 2**), participants experienced no weight illusion, neither the classic, nor the  
 590 inverted MWI. **Figure 6B** shows the illusion index before and after lifting for each

591 participant. Most participants lay on the horizontal axis, i.e. experienced no illusion, while  
 592 some individuals experienced an inverted MWI (upper right quadrant) or classic MWI (lower  
 593 right quadrant). A one-sample t-test confirmed that on average the illusion index after lifting  
 594 was not significantly different from zero ( $t(23) = 0.15, p = .89$ ). We conducted an additional  
 595 Bayesian one-sample t-test using JASP (JASP Team, 2018) in order to confirm this null  
 596 effect. Indeed, we found that the data is 4.61 times more likely under the null hypothesis  
 597 ( $BF_{01} = 4.614$ ). The illusion index was significantly different from the illusion index in  
 598 **Experiment 1** ( $t(71) = 5.13, p > .001$ ; adjusted alpha = .0167) and **2** ( $t(46) = -2.83, p = .007$ ).  
 599 This result is very interesting because the same objects led to a strong weight illusion in  
 600 **Experiment 1**. The only difference between the two experiments was that here, instead of  
 601 judging the mass distribution, participants had to judge mass. Remarkably, this same task of  
 602 judging mass, on the other hand, also led to a weight illusion in **Experiment 2**, but in the  
 603 opposite direction. It almost appears as if the two illusions canceled each other in  
 604 **Experiment 3**, resulting in an average of no illusion. It might also be that separate  
 605 mechanisms are responsible for the diverging effects in the three experiments, or that there is  
 606 a fundamental difficulty in integrating multiple weight or density estimates within a given  
 607 object. Whatever the cause of the discrepancy of results, they suggest that the classic MWI  
 608 diminishes in bipartite objects and that the inverted MWI seems to be related to judgments of  
 609 mass distribution.

610

611

### Experiment 4

612 **Experiment 1** demonstrated an inverted MWI illusion for bipartite objects when there was  
 613 no real difference in weight between the two halves. In **Experiment 4**, we sought to measure  
 614 how this illusion interacted with real differences in mass, both in the expected and  
 615 unexpected direction. More specifically, **Experiment 4** complements **Experiment 1** in two  
 616 ways. First, in **Experiment 1** the objects had a uniform mass distribution but were expected  
 617 to have a non-uniform distribution, whereas in **Experiment 4** the opposite was the case:  
 618 Objects had a non-uniform mass distribution, but were expected to have either a uniform  
 619 distribution or a non-uniformity in a different direction. Second, **Experiment 1** was  
 620 characterized by the absence of an expected torque signal, whereas in **Experiment 4** there is  
 621 a torque signal present (in most cases). This allows us to test whether the inversion of the  
 622 classic MWI observed in **Experiment 1** is due to the lack of torque-related sensory signals.



623 **Methods**624 *Participants*

625 Twenty-four students (15 male, 9 female) of the University of Western Ontario  
626 participated in Experiment 4. They were on average 25 years old (SD = 7 years). All were  
627 right-handed by self-report and naive to the aims of the study. Students gave written informed  
628 consent before the experiment and received 10 CAD afterwards for their participation.

629 **Experiment 4** was approved by the ethics board at the University of Western Ontario and in  
630 agreement with the declaration of Helsinki.

631

632 *Stimuli*

633 Five objects served as stimuli in **Experiment 4**, four of which included a weight  
634 difference of 100 g between the two halves. We chose a weight difference of 100 g because  
635 this is similar to the difference that participants perceived on average in **Experiment 1**. For a  
636 400g object, a CoM shifted 0.82 mm to one side (as we found for the Styrofoam-Stone object  
637 in **Experiment 1**) transfers to a weight difference of 128 g between the two halves. We  
638 therefore wanted to test how participants would perceive a weight difference of 100 g within  
639 one object.

640 Three of the objects were bipartite; they appeared to be made of stone and Styrofoam.  
641 In one of these the Styrofoam-side was artificially made 100 g heavier than the stone side  
642 (250 g vs. 150 g), i.e. the weight distribution was in the *unexpected* direction. In another  
643 bipartite object the weight distribution was in the *expected* direction (although the difference  
644 was not as large as it would be for real materials), i.e. the stone side was 100 g heavier than  
645 the Styrofoam side. To be able to make within-participant comparisons we additionally used  
646 the stone-Styrofoam object from **Experiment 1**, i.e. with an *equal* weight distribution. We  
647 also had one object that appeared to be uniformly made of stone, but contained a weight  
648 difference of 100 g between the two halves, as well as one object that appeared to be  
649 uniformly made of Styrofoam, but contained the same weight difference. We chose only to  
650 use stone and Styrofoam in **Experiment 4** to reduce the number of objects and because they  
651 produced the largest effects in **Experiments 1 and 2**.

652

653 *Set up and procedure*

654           Set up and procedure were the same as in **Experiment 1** and participants had to give  
655 numerical heaviness ratings of the halves of the objects. Different to **Experiment 1**, not all  
656 objects were placed on the table before the experiment, but only the object that was judged  
657 during a given trial. Before the experiment, participants rated the expected heaviness of the  
658 halves of the two uniform-looking objects and of one bipartite object. Because the three  
659 bipartite objects were visually identical, we did not obtain separate ratings of the prior  
660 expectations for them. We counterbalanced between participants which bipartite object was  
661 rated before lifting. In short, participants were instructed, then they rated the weight of the  
662 halves of two uniform and one bipartite object based on visual information alone, then  
663 completed five practice trials with the wooden object and finally ten pseudo-randomly  
664 interleaved trials with each object, i.e. 50 trials.

665

666 *Data analysis*

667           As in **Experiments 1** and **2**, perceptual ratings were transformed into z-scores. In this  
668 experiment post-lifting scores were averaged for each participant, object half and object. In  
669 order to determine whether participants expected and perceived a weight difference in each of  
670 the objects, we calculated a paired-sample t-test for each object to compare the ratings of both  
671 halves. We compared the strength of significant effects in different objects by determining  
672 the average difference score (between object halves) for each participant and calculate paired-  
673 sample t-tests. Bonferroni correction was applied in case of multiple comparisons.

674           We used the same set up with the F/T transducers in this experiment as in the other  
675 two in order to keep everything as comparable as possible. Here, however, we were mostly  
676 interested in the perceptual effects. Unlike the other two experiments, in which the motor  
677 system could in principle learn the weight (distribution) over the course of the experiment  
678 due to a fixed association between a given material and its weight, the material was not  
679 diagnostic for the weight in **Experiment 4** because identical-looking halves varied in weight.  
680 We therefore did not predict any specific effect on the initial force measures. We were,  
681 however, interested in how participants would counteract real weight differences when lifting  
682 the objects. We therefore investigated the initial torque during the loading phase as well as  
683 the median of the torque signal during the holding phase. Preprocessing of the F/T data was  
684 carried out in the same way as in **Experiment 1**. To simplify interpretation, we aligned the  
685 torques across different orientations of each object, such that positive torques always

686 corresponded to rotations towards the heavier side and negative torques, towards the lighter  
687 side. In case of the bipartite object with a uniform weight distribution, i.e. where no side was  
688 heavy, we aligned the torques measures so that a torque towards the heavier-*looking* side is  
689 positive. For statistical analysis we used one-sample t-tests to test whether the mean was  
690 different from zero for the torque measures. Alpha levels were adjusted for multiple  
691 comparison following the Bonferroni method.

692

## 693 **Results and Discussion**

### 694 *Perception*

695 As in **Experiment 1**, participants expected the Styrofoam half to be significantly  
696 lighter ( $-3.13 \pm 0.21$ ;  $M \pm 1 SEM$ ) than the stone half ( $0.50 \pm 0.30$ ;  $t(24) = -9.01, p < .001$ ) in  
697 bipartite-looking objects, see **Figure 7**. In contrast, participants did not expect a difference  
698 between the halves of uniform-looking objects, see **Figure 7**. Because there was no  
699 difference in the ratings of any individual participant, we did not calculate the statistics on the  
700 group level for this comparison. These results confirmed that the appearance of the objects  
701 induce the expectations we intended.

702 Central to our research questions were the heaviness ratings *after* lifting the objects on  
703 each trial. For bipartite objects with a weight difference in the expected direction, i.e. stone  
704 heavier than Styrofoam, participants also perceived the stone half to be significantly heavier  
705 ( $0.46 \pm 0.05$ ) than the Styrofoam half ( $-0.22 \pm 0.07$ ;  $t(24) = -7.102, p < .001$ ), see **Figure 7**.  
706 If, however, the weight difference was in the unexpected direction, i.e. Styrofoam was  
707 physically heavier than stone, both halves were perceptually equal ( $t(24) = -0.72, p = .476$ ).  
708 Thus, making the Styrofoam half 100 g heavier than the stone half seemed to cancel out the  
709 inverted MWI that we observed in **Experiment 1**: heavy Styrofoam was perceived as heavy  
710 ( $0.19 \pm 0.05$ ) as light stone ( $0.24 \pm 0.06$ ). This is similar to an experiment by Buckingham et  
711 al. (2009) in which making the heavier-looking object physically heavier (720 g) than the  
712 lighter-looking object (680 g) canceled out the classic MWI. Interestingly, in our experiment  
713 the perceptual difference between two identically weighted halves of a bipartite object was  
714 smaller than can be expected based on the results of **Experiment 1** and did not reach  
715 significance ( $t(24) = -1.637, p = .115$ ). Styrofoam was perceived not to be significantly  
716 lighter ( $0.14 \pm 0.05$ ) than stone ( $0.24 \pm 0.06$ ). This indicates that not only the weights of the  
717 two halves of the object lifted in a given trial, but also the weight of the comparison objects

718 lifted in previous trials were integrated into the heaviness percept. Participants reported a  
 719 perceptual difference within the uniform-looking objects after lifting. For both objects the  
 720 physically heavier side was also perceived to be heavier (stone:  $0.31 \pm 0.07$ ; Styrofoam:  $0.35$   
 721  $\pm 0.07$ ) than the physically lighter side (stone:  $0.03 \pm 0.06$ ;  $t(24) = -3.43$ ,  $p = .002$ ;  
 722 Styrofoam:  $0.09 \pm 0.05$ ;  $t(24) = -3.43$ ,  $p = .002$ ). When comparing the perceived weight  
 723 difference in the uniform-looking objects to the object with the expected difference in paired  
 724 t-tests, we found that the expected weight difference was significantly larger than the  
 725 unexpected weight difference (both  $p < .001$ ; adjusted alpha = .025).

726 In sum, we found the largest perceptual difference when participants expected a  
 727 difference, i.e. in bipartite objects with a heavy stone and a light Styrofoam half. Smaller, but  
 728 significant weight differences were perceived in uniform-looking objects, for which  
 729 participants did not expect a weight difference. However, when a weight difference was  
 730 expected (i.e. bipartite appearance), but it was either absent or in the opposite direction,  
 731 participants did not perceive a weight a difference. Our results are in support of the theory  
 732 that weight perception is an integrative process, in which prior expectations, incoming  
 733 sensory information from lifting the target object, as well as an anchor from the comparison  
 734 objects lifted in the previous trials are integrated into a weight percept. Other studies show  
 735 evidence that the perceived weight of an object is modulated by the weight of the object lifted  
 736 in the previous trial (Maiello et al., 2018; van Polanen and Davare, 2015). This might also be  
 737 true for the perception of different weight distributions in consecutive trials where the overall  
 738 weight is constant as in our experiment. Such trial effects are likely the explanation for why  
 739 we don't find an inverted MWI for the bipartite object with uniform weight distribution.  
 740 However, we cannot exclude the possibility that we would have found an effect with a larger  
 741 sample size (although the same sample size had sufficient power in the first two  
 742 experiments).

743

#### 744 *Torque*

745 The initial peak torque during the loading phase was completely driven by the weight  
 746 differences between the two object halves in the first as well as all later trials, see **Figure 8A**.  
 747 Each object was initially tilted towards its heavier side (all  $p$  values  $< .001$ ; adjusted alpha =  
 748 .005). Only the bipartite looking object with a uniform mass distribution showed no  
 749 significant torque in the first ( $t(24) = 1.74$ ,  $p = .095$ ) or later lifts ( $t(24) = 1.36$ ,  $p = .187$ ).  
 750 Visually, all three bipartite objects have the same appearance, but there was either no torque,

751 torque in the direction of the Styrofoam half or torque in the direction of the stone half. Thus,  
 752 the visual appearance had no influence on the initial torque. Results were the same when only  
 753 considering the first bipartite looking object that each participant lifted for the analysis.  
 754 Whether this was due to the fact that the appearance of our objects was not indicative of their  
 755 weight distribution, or whether participants were more generally unable to counteract an  
 756 uneven mass distribution in an anticipatory fashion is not clear from our data. Results from  
 757 Crajé et al. (2013) suggests that participants can learn to adjust their grasp to reduce the  
 758 initial tilt of objects with non-uniform density within few trials.

759 After the initial torque towards the heavier side of the objects, participants corrected  
 760 their movement and reduced the torque during the holding phase of the movement, see  
 761 **Figure 8B**. Only for the object that appeared to be completely made of Styrofoam and the  
 762 bipartite object with the unexpected weight distribution was there still a significant torque  
 763 towards the heavier side (Styrofoam:  $t(24) = 4.10, p < .001$ ; Unexpected:  $t(24) = 4.64, p <$   
 764  $.001$ ; all other  $p$  values  $< .01$  (= adjusted alpha)). This indicates that after the initial error  
 765 signal, participants were able to adjust their grip to counteract the non-uniform density at  
 766 least partly. Because we did not measure object tilt directly, however, we cannot say how  
 767 strongly the objects were tilted during the holding phase.

768  
 769

## General Discussion

770 The main finding of this study is that the violation of an expected weight distribution  
 771 leads to a novel weight illusion. In **Experiment 1** we found that in bipartite objects, for  
 772 which one half looks significantly heavier than the other half, the heavier-looking side is  
 773 perceived to be heavier when lifted, although the true mass of both sides is the same. This  
 774 effect was robust over the whole duration of the experiment, in a large group of participants,  
 775 and across two different perceptual judgments. Strikingly, this illusory effect in the opposite  
 776 direction to the well-known MWI, in which equally-weighted but heavier-looking objects feel  
 777 lighter. **Experiment 2** ruled out the possibility that this inversion of the MWI was due to any  
 778 other object property of our stimuli than their being bipartite. We replicated the classic MWI  
 779 for uniform objects of the same size and weight and materials as in **Experiment 1**. When  
 780 combining the bipartite stimuli of **Experiment 1** with the perceptual task of **Experiment 2**  
 781 (estimating weight of entire objects) in **Experiment 3** we found that no illusion was  
 782 perceived (i.e., neither the classic nor the inverted MWI). Finally, in **Experiment 4** we tested  
 783 whether prior expectations are integrated (as suggested by **Experiment 1**, where the

784 perceived weight lies in between prior and sensory estimate) or contrasted (as suggested by  
785 **Experiment 2**, in which the perceived weight lies outside the range between prior and  
786 sensory estimate and in opposite direction of the prior) with sensory information if objects  
787 have a *non-uniform* weight distribution. Interestingly, and consistent with an integrative  
788 process, we found that the same weight difference of 100 g between the halves of an object  
789 can subjectively feel absent, small or large depending on the prior expectations of the weight  
790 distribution. A discrepancy between expected and actual weight distribution in opposite  
791 directions induced the illusion of a *uniform* weight distribution. In other words, making the  
792 lighter-looking side of a bipartite object 100 g heavier cancelled out the inverted MWI so  
793 both sides felt equally heavy. If the discrepancy between expected and actual weight  
794 distribution was smaller, i.e. when a uniform distribution was expected, the perceived  
795 difference between the sides was small. If, on the other hand, there was no discrepancy  
796 between expected and actual weight distribution (or at least both were in the same direction),  
797 the same 100g difference was perceived to be very large. In comparison to the four objects  
798 with a non-uniform weight difference, a bipartite-looking object with equally weighted halves  
799 was not perceived to differ in weight (unlike **Experiment 1**). This suggests that the weight  
800 distributions of reference objects experienced in the same context also affect subjective  
801 ratings, presumably by anchoring the range of the rating scale. In **Experiment 1** and **4** the  
802 scale was presumably anchored to the visual ratings as well as the weight of the wooden  
803 object used in the practice trials, which would predict no difference between the scales. In  
804 **Experiment 4**, however, the rating scale may have additionally been anchored to the weight  
805 differences in the other stimuli. Specifically, although the *absolute* sensory reliability of the  
806 ‘no weight difference’ judgment should be the same in both **Experiments 1** and **4**, in the  
807 context that includes large real weight differences (i.e., **Experiment 4**), the *relative* size of  
808 the sensory uncertainty distribution would be small compared to the total range of sensory  
809 signals experienced across objects. In contrast, when the same ‘no weight difference’  
810 judgment is compared across a set of objects all without any weight difference (as in  
811 **Experiment 1**), the relative size of the uncertainty distribution of the ‘no weight difference’  
812 judgment would be large compared to the range of experienced sensory signals. When  
813 combined with the same prior, the narrower sensory estimate (in **Experiment 4**) should lead  
814 to an overall estimate that is shifted further towards ‘no weight difference’.

815         The main question that arises from our results is why seemingly similar tasks  
816 (estimating weight in bipartite vs. uniform objects) lead to opposing perceptual estimates: the  
817 inverted MWI, the classic MWI or no illusion (as in Experiment 3). Our results challenge

818 existing theories of weight illusions. Not unexpectedly, the findings speak against the  
819 *sensorimotor mismatch* hypothesis, i.e., we did not find any systematic coupling between  
820 perception and action. Instead, for uniform-looking objects we replicated earlier findings  
821 (MWI: Buckingham et al., 2009; SWI: Flanagan and Beltzner, 2000) that forces are tuned to  
822 the expected weight of the objects in the first trials and then adjusted to the actual mass, even  
823 though the perceptual illusion persists. In case of bipartite objects, we found no effect in the  
824 first or later trials. Taken together, these findings do not support the sensorimotor mismatch  
825 hypothesis, but instead suggest that the perceptual illusion is independent of the motor  
826 system. Results from **Experiment 4** suggest, that even on the first lift, the grip is not scaled  
827 to counteract an anticipated torque; instead a torque emerges (in case of an uneven mass  
828 distribution) and is then corrected. Presumably, participants followed the same strategy in  
829 **Experiment 1**, with the only difference being that there was no torque signal to counteract.  
830 This might explain why we did not find the expected effect on the motor system in  
831 **Experiment 1**. Alternatively, it might be that the differences between the forces applied by  
832 each finger dominated the differences between materials. Similarly, we cannot exclude the  
833 possibility that there was an effect, but our measures were not sensitive enough to capture it.

834         The classic MWI is often explained with a perceptual contrast resulting from the  
835 *violation of expectations*, e.g. a Styrofoam object is heavier than expected and thus feels even  
836 heavier than the same object with a stone appearance. If the expectations for bipartite objects  
837 are weaker than for uniform objects, one may expect to find the MWI to disappear, like we  
838 found in **Experiment 3**. However, the same *violation of expectations* was present in  
839 **Experiment 1**, yet this led to a percept shifted in the opposite direction of the classic illusion.  
840 *Violation of expectations* alone can therefore not explain the occurrence and direction of the  
841 classic and inverted MWI. Refining this theory by differentiating between violations of  
842 expectations about *weight* and expectations about a *weight distribution* may formally close  
843 that gap, but such an account lacks explanatory depth, however, as it remains unresolved *why*  
844 there should be differences between the two. It might be that expectations are stronger in one  
845 case than in the other (weight vs. weight distribution) or that the violation is stronger in one  
846 case. We do not see evidence for either in our data and it is questionable how such theory  
847 would account for the outcomes of all three experiments. However, a more systematic test of  
848 exactly that question is required. The classic MWI has been suggested to be an ‘*anti-*  
849 *Bayesian*’ mechanism that marks outliers in the environment (Baugh et al., 2012). This idea  
850 would need to be refined for it to be able to explain why the anti-Bayesian mechanism does  
851 not apply in the case of *weight distribution* outliers. For example, it might be the case that the

852 distribution of *weights* in the environment is much narrower than the distribution of *weight*  
853 *distributions* (or CoM positions); therefore, the experimentally modified uniform stimuli of  
854 the classic MWI fall far outside that range and will be marked as outliers, whereas the  
855 bipartite stimuli fall within the broad distribution and will be integrated with the prior. It is,  
856 however, unclear why the bipartite objects would neither be marked as an outlier, nor be  
857 integrated with the prior in case of weight judgments. Future studies should aim to test this  
858 refined theory.

859 In sum, potential explanations of the classic MWI in their current form fail to explain  
860 the inverted MWI in bipartite objects as found in **Experiment 1**. At the same time, the  
861 standard *Bayesian integration* framework can presumably account well for the inverted MWI  
862 in bipartite objects and the results of **Experiment 4** (although we did not test this idea  
863 specifically), but fails to explain the classic MWI in uniform objects.

864 However, a modification of the standard Bayesian framework has been shown to  
865 successfully predict the related SWI: Peters et al. (2016) proposed a model that predicts the  
866 illusion as the result of Bayesian integration in a framework of multiple competing density  
867 priors (as proposed by Yuille and Bülthoff, 1996) and the likelihood of incoming haptic  
868 information. The same authors recently proposed a similar mechanism underlying the classic  
869 MWI (Peters et al., 2018). Within this framework the classic and inverted MWI may reflect  
870 two different estimates resulting from the same basic mechanism. Specifically, under normal  
871 circumstances and the assumption of uniform density there is a strong relationship between a  
872 material's appearance and its weight, leading to a strong expectation that stone is heavier than  
873 Styrofoam by a specific amount. However, we might also experience a significant number of  
874 counterexamples such as objects that *mimic* a certain material, e.g. light objects with a fake-  
875 stone veneer, or objects covered with a different material, e.g. heavy objects covered in  
876 Styrofoam to protect them during transportation. Such alternative relationships between  
877 material appearance and weight could have distinct 'atypical' priors, each representing  
878 competing expectations about the density relationships. Each of the competing expectations  
879 has an individual a priori probability and hence results in a different likelihood of the  
880 incoming sensory information. As a result, there would be multiple competing posterior  
881 probabilities (one for each expected density relationship), of which the maximum will be  
882 selected to produce a final weight estimate within the competitive prior framework. This is  
883 fundamentally different from the standard Bayesian explanation in which only one prior  
884 ('stone is heavier than Styrofoam') modifies the likelihood of the incoming sensory  
885 information and results in just one posterior probability. Only Bayesian integration of the



886 likelihood of incoming sensory information given competing expectations and their prior  
887 probabilities can result in a percept shifted towards an a priori unlikely expectation, as Peters  
888 and colleagues (2016) have shown for the SWI.

889 Applied to our study, we may assume the same a priori probabilities of the different  
890 density relationships, because the expectations about materials were the same no matter  
891 whether the objects were bipartite or uniform. The fundamental difference between the two  
892 experiments was the type of sensory estimate required to make the perceptual judgment: an  
893 estimate of mass or an estimate of mass distribution. While both mass and its first moment  
894 (distribution) contribute to the perception of weight, their sensory estimates may differ in  
895 reliability. For example, it may be that the haptic estimate of mass is more reliable than the  
896 haptic estimate of its distribution or vice versa. Our second assumption is therefore that the  
897 sensory estimates of mass and mass distribution vary. Importantly, this refers to the reliability  
898 of the estimate by the sensorimotor system, it is therefore unrelated to the force and torque  
899 measurements we took. Although both sensory estimates may influence perception in  
900 **Experiment 1** and **2**, it is likely that their influence varies depending on the task: The sensory  
901 estimate of mass distribution presumably has greater influence when judging object parts in  
902 **Experiment 1**. Given the same competing prior expectations (assumption 1), but differences  
903 in the reliability of the incoming sensory information (assumption 2), the likelihood of the  
904 sensory information will vary between **Experiment 1** and **Experiment 2**. Thus, the same  
905 Bayesian integration mechanism could result in different final weight estimates: it could be  
906 shifted towards the a priori more likely expectation that stone is heavier than Styrofoam in  
907 one case (**Experiment 1**) and shifted towards the opposite (and a priori less probable)  
908 expectation that Styrofoam is heavier in **Experiment 2**. A final weight estimate that falls  
909 somewhere between the opposing percepts could result if the relative influence of the two  
910 sensory estimates changes. This could happen, for example, when participants are asked to  
911 judge the weight of entire objects that appear to have a non-uniform weight distribution as in  
912 **Experiment 3**. In this case the sensory estimate of mass distribution might have a larger  
913 influence than when judging the weight of uniform objects. The results of **Experiment 3** are  
914 in line with this idea.

915 An integration mechanism is in line with previous literature (Adams et al., 2004;  
916 Ernst and Banks, 2002; Ernst and Bühlhoff, 2004; Kersten and Yuille, 2003; Körding et al.,  
917 2004; Körding and Wolpert, 2004; Langer and Bühlhoff, 2001; Sun and Perona, 1998; Weiss  
918 et al., 2002) and in agreement with our data from the four experiments presented here.  
919 However, because this model is only a post-hoc explanation of our results, future studies

920 should test it systematically. If the Bayesian account proposed by Peters et al. (2016) can  
921 explain the SWI (Peters et al., 2016), the classic MWI (**Experiment 2** and Peters et al.,  
922 2018), the inverted MWI (**Experiment 1**), the absence of an illusion (**Experiment 3**) as well  
923 as weight perception in objects with a non-uniform weight distribution (**Experiment 4**), one  
924 might also expect to find an inverted SWI in bipartite objects with unequally sized halves but  
925 equal weight distribution. While it is technically challenging to produce objects that have a  
926 different volume but the same rotational momentum and the same mass in each half, this  
927 would be a powerful test of a shared underlying process. If there is an inverted SWI in  
928 bipartite objects, this would speak in favor of a common mechanism underlying different  
929 weight illusions and will potentially provide insights into weight perception in general.

930         Although only behavior was measured in this study, one can speculate about the  
931 neurobiological mechanisms underlying the findings. In order to make the visual judgement  
932 before the first lifting trial, prior knowledge about material classes and their associated  
933 properties needs to be activated. Classification of materials and their properties progresses  
934 along the ventral visual stream (Cant and Goodale, 2007, 2009; Cavina-Pratesi et al., 2010a,  
935 2010b; Hiramatsu et al., 2011). When lifting the object, this visual information about  
936 materials needs to be transformed into motor commands. A whole network of brain areas is  
937 involved in even a simple two finger grip to lift and hold an object as in our experiments.  
938 Gallivan and colleagues (2014) identified brain areas from whose activation pattern the  
939 texture and/or weight of an object can be successfully decoded during or before lifting the  
940 object. Their results suggest that premotor and primary motor cortex encode weight during  
941 planning and execution of lifting movements, whereas the somatosensory cortex represents  
942 weight information only after an object is touched. Interestingly, if the weight of an object  
943 could reliably be derived from its visual texture (either through knowledge about materials or  
944 associations between an object and its weight learned during the experiment) ventral texture-  
945 sensitive regions appeared to code information about the weight of the object. Thus, it seems  
946 likely that both dorsal and ventral visual networks are involved in the visuomotor  
947 transformations that anticipate the forces required to lift a heavy or light object. In our study  
948 we found strong evidence that grip and load forces were scaled according to prior knowledge  
949 or sensorimotor memories in **Experiment 2**. However, there may be differences in how well  
950 the forces can be adjusted to the overall weight or the distribution of weight. If the forces  
951 were not sufficiently adjusted a priori or such adjustment was not possible, e.g. because the  
952 texture was uninformative about the weight (as in **Experiment 4**) grip force will be corrected  
953 online through cutaneous feedback. Such correction is very fast (< 100 ms; e.g. Johansson

954 and Westling, 1984) and presumably highly automatic, though the underlying neural  
 955 mechanisms are not yet well understood (for a review, see Johansson and Flanagan, 2009).  
 956 Future research is required to better understand the underlying neurobiology.

957

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968

969 **Author contributions**

970 V.C.P., G.B., M.A.G. and R.W.F. conceived and designed research; V.C.P. performed  
 971 experiments; V.C.P. and G.B. analyzed data; V.C.P., G.B., M.A.G. and R.W.F. interpreted  
 972 results of experiments; V.C.P. prepared figures; V.C.P. drafted manuscript; V.C.P., G.B.,  
 973 M.A.G. and R.W.F. edited and revised manuscript; V.C.P., G.B., M.A.G. and R.W.F.  
 974 approved final version of manuscript.

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1081

**Figure Captions**

1082 **Figure 1.** Stimuli used in Experiment 1. **A)** The three bipartite objects, with halves which appeared to  
 1083 be made of different materials: granite, Styrofoam and wood. **B)** Two six-axis force-torque  
 1084 transducers were attached centrally to the objects on a small handle. **C)** An object as grasped with a  
 1085 precision grip as in the experiment.

1086 **Figure 2.** **A)** Sketch of a bipartite object in the 3D coordinate system.  $LF$  was calculated for each  
 1087 sensor (i.e. finger) as force in the  $z$ -direction, and  $GF$  as force in the  $x$ -direction. Torque was  
 1088 calculated as rotational force around a pivot point at the CoM of the object. **B)** Filtered torque data  
 1089 around the  $y$ -axis from one example trial (thumb side had stone appearance, finger side had wood  
 1090 appearance). The white area indicates the loading phase. We used the first local extremum as  
 1091 dependent variable, indicated by the small arrow. This object was initially rotated towards the  
 1092 lighter looking side. The vertical dashed line shows the moment of lift-off (when  $LF >$  weight force of  
 1093 the object).

1094 **Figure 3.** Perceptual results of Experiment 1. **A)** Mean standardized heaviness ratings for each  
 1095 material (color) before lifting (shaded area) and after each subsequent lift in separate plots for each  
 1096 object. Data is averaged across participants, who gave a numerical heaviness rating; error bars  
 1097 show 95% confidence intervals. **B)** Side views of the three objects together with the horizontal  
 1098 position of the veridical CoM (thin black line), the position at which the CoM would be if the  
 1099 materials were real (dotted line) as well as the mean expected CoM position (as rated before lifting,  
 1100 grey line) and perceived CoM position (after lifting, thick black line). Data were averaged across  
 1101 trials and participants, who were asked to judge the CoM. Error bars show 95% confidence interval  
 1102 between participants. **C)** Standardized ratings averaged for each material across all participants,  
 1103 trials and objects before lifting (shaded area) and after. Asterisks indicate significant differences  
 1104 between the perceived heaviness of the materials as well as between the perceived heaviness before  
 1105 and after lifting. **D)** Illusion index before vs. after lifting (perceived heaviness of stone - Styrofoam)  
 1106 for each participant in Experiment 1 (black dots) and Experiment 2 (white dots), in which uniform-  
 1107 looking objects with a stone or Styrofoam appearance were used as stimuli to induce the classic  
 1108 MWI. Please note that the  $x$ - and  $y$ -axis are scaled differently here. This was necessary because the  
 1109 perceived differences ( $y$ -axis) are smaller than the expected differences ( $x$ -axis). Participants in the  
 1110 upper right (and lower left) quadrant experienced the inverted MWI (grey fields), whereas  
 1111 participants who experienced the classic MWI (white fields) fall in the lower right (and upper left)  
 1112 quadrant.

1113 **Figure 4.** Mean peak torque around the  $y$ -axis in first (shaded) and subsequent lifts. An initial  
 1114 rotation towards the lighter-looking side is indicated by negative values; positive values indicate a

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1115 rotation towards the heavier-looking side. No rotation would result in a torque of zero (dotted line).  
1116 Error bars show 95% confidence intervals

1117 **Figure 5.** Stimuli and main results of Experiment 2. **A)** The three objects used to test the classic  
1118 MWI. All have the same mass, size and shape, but appear to be made of different materials (stone,  
1119 Styrofoam, wood). **B)** Results of the perceptual rating. Bars on the left (shaded area) represent prior  
1120 expectations, i.e. ratings before lifting; bars on the right represent reported heaviness, i.e. ratings  
1121 after lifting. Y-axis shows mean ratings in z-scores—the lower the score, the lighter the object  
1122 appeared and the higher the score, the heavier it appeared. Bars show mean across participants;  
1123 error bars, 95%-confidence intervals. **C)** Mean peak GF for different materials in first and  
1124 subsequent lifts. **D)** Mean peak rate of change of GF for different materials in first and subsequent  
1125 lifts. **E)** Mean peak LF for different materials in first and subsequent lifts. **F)** Average peak rate of  
1126 change of LF for different materials in first and subsequent lifts. All error bars show 95% confidence  
1127 intervals.

1128 **Figure 6.** Results of Experiment 3. **A)** Standardized ratings averaged for each object across all  
1129 participants and trials before lifting (shaded area) and after. Asterisks indicate significant  
1130 differences between the perceived heaviness of the objects as well as between the perceived  
1131 heaviness before and after lifting. Error bars show 95% confidence interval between participants. **B)**  
1132 Illusion index before vs. after lifting (perceived heaviness of stone-wood object minus perceived  
1133 heaviness of wood-Styrofoam object) for each participant in Experiment 3. The axes are scaled as in  
1134 Figure 3 to facilitate comparison. Note, however, that here we compare the heaviest- to the lightest-  
1135 looking object, whereas in Figure 3 the index is based on comparing the heaviest- to the lightest-  
1136 looking material. As in Figure 3, participants in the upper right (and lower left) quadrant  
1137 experienced the inverted MWI (grey fields), whereas participants who experienced the classic MWI  
1138 (white fields) fall in the lower right (and upper left) quadrant.

1139 **Figure 7.** Perceptual results of Experiment 4. Perceptual ratings of the halves of each object before  
1140 and after lifting for the three bipartite-looking objects (left) and the two uniform-looking objects.  
1141 Results of the perceptual rating. Bars in the shaded areas represent prior expectations, i.e. ratings  
1142 before lifting; bars in the unshaded areas represent reported heaviness, i.e. ratings after lifting. Y-  
1143 axis shows mean ratings in z-scores—the lower the score, the lighter the object appeared and the  
1144 higher the score, the heavier it appeared. Bars show mean across participants; error bars, 95%-  
1145 confidence intervals.

1146 **Figure 8.** Torque measurements. **A)** Mean initial peak torque around the y-axis during the loading  
1147 phase in first and subsequent lifts. An initial rotation towards the heavier side is indicated by  
1148 positive values; negative values indicate a rotation towards the lighter side. No rotation would result  
1149 in a torque of zero. In case of the object with equally weighted halves positive torque values indicate



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- 1150 *a rotation towards the heavier-looking side. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. Asterisks*  
1151 *indicate the average value to be significantly different from zero. **B)** Mean of the median torque*  
1152 *around y during the holding phase of the movements in all lifts. Same notation as in A.*
- 1153

















