The Role of the Special Constabulary within Contemporary Policing

A qualitative study into the role and use of Special Constables during a period of fiscal constraint and organisational adaptation.

Volume One

Submitted by Ashley Jean Frayling to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Law in November 2018

I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University.

Signature: Ashley Frayling

<ins>Abstract</ins>

The Strategic Management of the Special Constabulary in 2018

The central contention of this thesis is that the recent budgetary cuts and associated developments within policing in the UK challenge the historically voluntary nature of the Special Constabulary. This thesis developed the existing literature which has focused almost exclusively upon the regular paid police officers engagement with the policing frontline by the extensive examination of Special Constabulary recruitment, retention, training, duties and deployments, leadership, relationship with paid officers and changes associated with the budgetary cuts. The role of citizens within policing is nothing new; however recent economic necessity and paid workforce reductions mean the use of unpaid volunteers in providing policing services has substantially increased and has been widely promoted by police leadership and government.

Drawing upon numerous semi-structured interviews with serving members of the Special Constabulary across four police forces within England and Wales; members of three Police and Crime Commissions, representatives of the National Crime Agency, the South West Police Federation, the Home Office, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabularies and high ranking paid police officers, this thesis highlights how the role of the Special Constabulary has changed substantially in the last eight years. The interplay between police leadership and Government messages of the Special Constabulary being a supplementary rather than replacement force, the everyday operational accounts of Special Constables are in stark contrast. Increasingly used as frontline response officers without adequate training or supervision, this raises critical debate about the position of police as policing experts, when unpaid, volunteers with limited training are fulfilling the same role. To use a voluntary force in a reservist capacity amounts to a misuse of these volunteers with inherent risks and vulnerabilities being exposed. This thesis concludes by critically exploring the future of this voluntary police workforce in the context of profound and ongoing organisational reforms.

Table of Contents

List of Acronyms

ACPO   Association of Chief Police Officers

ANPR   Automatic Number Plate Recognition System

ASCO   Association of Special Constabulary Officers

BCU   Basic Command Unit

BME   Black or Minority Ethnicity

CID   Crime and Investigative Department

CIPFA   Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy

CNC   Civil Nuclear Constabulary

CPS   Crown Prosecution Service

EAT   Employment Appeal Tribunal

HMIC   Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabularies

NAO   National Audit Agency

NCA   National Crime Agency

NPIA   National Police Improvement Agency

PACE (1984) Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984)

PACT   Police and Community Together Meetings

PAF   Police Allocation Formula

PCC   Police and Crime Commissioner

PCSO   Police Community Support Officer

PEEL   Police Efficiency, Effectiveness and Legitimacy Assessment

PFEW   Police Federation of England and Wales

PSU   Police Support Unit

PSVs   Police Support Volunteers

PTU   Public Protection and Youth Offending Team

SLP   Senior Leadership Programme

SPR   Strategic Policing Requirement

Declaration and Acknowledgements

There are many people to whom I owe thanks for helping me to complete this thesis.

First and foremost, I would like to thank my first supervisor Professor Jenny McEwan who helped me through the early stages of solidifying my ideas and topic. I would also like to say a huge thank you to Professor Tamblyn for providing true guidance regarding structure, and writing style, always providing me with prompt and extensive feedback.

This thesis literally would not have been possible without the support and participation from a long list of people. A huge thank you to all the individual Specials for giving up some of their precious time to answer my questions and to provide their experiences and opinions. I would also like to thank Devon and Cornwall Constabulary, Avon and Somerset Constabulary, the City of London Police, Dorset Police, the Home Office, the HMIC, the National Crime Agency and Police Crime Commissioners from Thames Valley, Surrey and Devon and Cornwall. I cannot name the individuals who have helped, but I am very grateful for all who shared their perspectives with me.

On a more personal level I would like to say a massive thank you to my family who has had to listen to my stressing, my endless typing and hair pulling while I wrote this up over many years. Thank you for all your support, love and endless cups of tea to keep me going. Thank you for nagging me into finishing this and reading my many many drafts. Love you loads.

Chapter One: Introduction

The public police within the United Kingdom have long been an area of productive and extensive academic research investigating and uncovering the day to day realities, experiences and cultural meanings of police work, offering valuable contributions to the broader literature of the social sciences (e.g. Holdaway, 1983; Reiner, 2000; Rowe, 2014). Despite the extensive research on the public police providing cultural insights and contributions, this thesis recognised that there was an area with the little academic examination, offering a broad scope for further analysis and methodological progress, the Special Constabulary. The re-emergence of this police workforce, the Special Constabulary and the role of the citizen within policing has been driven predominantly by economic necessity created by financial constraints have implications for policing effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy (e.g. Bullock, 2014; Britton & Callender, 2016). The majority of existing research directly examining the experiences of the Special Constables have been mostly historical (e.g. Seth, 1961; Mawby & Gill, 1990; Leon, 1991; Mirrlees-Black & Bryon, 1994; Gaston & Alexander, 2001). There has been some additional research investigating their motivations for joining and leaving (e.g. NPIA, 2010; Strickland & Lalic, 2010; Whittle, 2014) and the role of employer-based support for Special Constables (see Smith & Rankin, 1999; Millie & Jacobson, 2002). Some academic commentators such as Millie and Bullock (2013), Bullock (2015) and Callender and Britton (2016) emerged during the completion of this thesis, supporting the argument raised by this researcher, that the Special Constable is not only a topic of academic value but of relevance within contemporary policing. Through the interrogation of the existing literature and research, the originality of this thesis contributes to the advancement of knowledge by focusing upon the experiences of these voluntary officers during a period of fiscal constraint and adaptation, and exclusively reconsidering the underpinning premise of them structurally continuing as a voluntary unpaid police workforce within the context of modern policing.

Why Now?

Today the modern police forces bear little resemblance to the idyllic image of the British "bobby" from the so-called *"golden years"* of the 1950s walking around their local communities (e.g. Cooke, 2005). Instead, officers are now dressed in all black, military-style uniforms with stab vests, responding to calls in high

powered cars and carrying equipment for different levels of force, which for some officers includes tasers and firearms. The development of individual radios, means that police officers are no longer independent while out on patrol instead being viewed as agents of central authorities and leadership (e.g. Monjardet, 2000). Modern policing is once again evolving in response to external influences, the most significant being the financial constraints impacting upon all aspects of the police organisation themselves and therefore policing in the 21st century.

The United Kingdom entered a period of the economic crisis created predominantly be the financial banking recession in 2008 (e.g. Valdez & Molyneux, 2015) forming wide-scale public sector funding reductions and constrictions (e.g. Gravelle & Rogers, 2009). As a consequence of these constrictions, in 2010 the Liberal-Conservative coalition Government of the time outlined their Comprehensive Spending Review which announced a twenty per cent reduction in central government funding for all public police forces (Home Office, 2010). Before this, the public police have enjoyed a long period of unprecedented increases to their funding (Kirkup, 2008b), creating little incentive for self-analysis or review of internal processes, procedures and demands. The ongoing financial challenge created by austerity has impacted meaningfully upon the availability of policing resource and in turn upon the delivery of policing on a local, national and international level (Gravelle & Rogers, 2009). Fiscal constraint and contraction are the usual although debatable responses or remedy to the financial crisis (e.g. Davidson, 2009; Krugman, 2012). These austerity measures have not affected the public police in insolation, as all associated public sector and voluntary organisations operating within the criminal justice system also face similar financial difficulties and constraints (Butler, 2008). This systematic difficulty, in turn, has created new pressures upon demands for services and solutions to societal issues. Police forces ability to develop long-term strategic plans will impact their ability to cope with demands for service and to continue to provide the current levels of policing services expected by the public.

Throughout the history of the Special Constabulary, the protection of the police frontline reactive resources has been a priority for both the public and police themselves and a clear justification for the development of the Specials as an additional operational policing resource (Leon, 1991). The link between wide-scale use of volunteers for cost savings initiatives is controversial often viewed

with cynicism by the regular paid police forces as a threat to full time policing jobs, positions and the availability of overtime pay. Indeed members of the paid police forces have long stressed that the only role of volunteers within policing should be one of complement, not a replacement (e.g. COI, 2001). Within the criminal justice system, there has long been a *"…deep seated suspicion that volunteering is really about job substitution"* (Neuberger, 2009, p.10) and previous attempts to recruit large numbers of Specials have been abandoned due to vocal opposition from the paid police force (e.g. Gravelle & Rogers, 2009). At various times throughout history, the Police Federation, the union for the paid police force, has vocally called for the disbandment of the Special Constabulary. However since 2010 and the effects of austerity measures the NPIA (the National Policing Improvement Agency) argued that the Special Constabulary is a highly cost-effective workforce, a view supported by ACPO (Association of Chief Police Officers) who stated that the voluntary force *"…is embedded within the police service providing efficient and effective policing to support achievement of force priorities"* (ACPO, 2011, p.7). Larson et al. (2008) furthered this dialogue by stating that the use of voluntary police officers and citizens has become increasingly important as the national funds are reduced, and there is an ever greater need for the more effective use of taxpayer's money.

Research Aims and Objectives

This thesis sought to address the following research question:

What role should the Special Constabulary take within contemporary policing?

To answer this research question, the research within this thesis addressed the following objectives:

(1) *To critically explore the influence of austerity upon the nature of the roles, deployments and experiences of the Special Constabulary.*
(2) *To critically examine the relationship between the Special Constabulary and paid police forces, and in doing so, to explore the issues surrounding Specials recruitment, retention, leadership, feelings of being valued and training.*
(3) *To develop an insight into the future trajectory of the Special Constabulary and their position within the wider policing organisation.*
(4) *To critically examine whether the voluntary nature of the Special Constabulary is still appropriate in the context of modern-day policing.*

The thesis's contribution to the existing policing literature is through enhancing the broader understanding of the role that the Special Constabulary currently

perform and the potential role they could play within policing, during a period of fiscal constraint. The findings from this study have implications for both policing literature, policy and practitioners whose approaches and organisational decisions impacting upon the voluntary workforce. The ability of these voluntary unpaid officers to be an effective policing service could have a significant impact upon the provision of the policing service to the public and the public's perceptions of the police as they become utilised more as a policing resource.

Methodology

This section provides a reflexive account of the chosen methodology and various research processes adopted for this study. Drawing upon the limited previous research carried out on the Special Constabulary, in particular, the research conducted by Gill and Mawby (1990) as one of the most comprehensive studies into the voluntary workforce at the time.

Access to the Police

One of the most substantial barriers to police research has been obtaining access to the police as an organisation (e.g. Weatheritt, 1986) and despite improvements in the relationship between the police and academic organisations, the police remain primarily closed to *"outsiders"* (e.g. Brown, 1996). Some researchers such as Duke (2002) have argued that that governmental organisations and institutions deliberately make it difficult for researchers to obtain access as they are reluctant to be the subject of scrutiny with certain topics being of a sensitive and controversial nature. There are formal procedures through which research must go through to obtain forces permission to proceed (e.g. Reiner & Newburn, 2008). Without the co-operation of the police research within this area is almost impossible due to their ability to remove access to data and officers. (e.g. Holdaway, 1989). This need for co-operation and permission means that research often emerges through pre-existing relationships that academics and officers have within those types of organisations which can be beneficial for obtaining access (e.g. Duke, 2002) something which was utilised for this research also. Reiner (2000) argued that the majority of police research is outsider research with continuing problems with achieving and maintaining formal access often dependent upon the subject matter and the political landscape at that present time. Reiner (2000) also suggested that although forces have displayed an increasing openness to researchers, the results have tended to be of a

"…pragmatic kind, governed by the overriding goal of crime reduction" (p.220). Some research acknowledged the effects of the police occupational culture, especially regarding the group solidarity that it fosters and the *"hazards faced by whistleblowers"* such as the cold shoulder treatment (Chan, 1996, p.121). Chan (2006) argues that this means that it is potentially difficult to get any answers outside that of the occupational accepted group norms. Loftus (2009) also indicated that the police are particularly cautious about allowing researchers in to observe and document police-public relations and encounters, and found even greater resistance if the study was equipped with a digital Dictaphone, an effect encountered with this current study as well. This cynaism means that as Reiner (2000) concluded that most studies are merely the *"replication of the classic observational studies of routine police work"*(Reiner, 2000, p.225-6) rather than genuinely uncovering the nature of police work and experiences. These observation level studies have contributed to the number of researchers immersing themselves some way into the police, such as those involved in the police culture, e.g. ethnographic research or being police officers themselves. Reiner (2010) also categorised five stages of policing research within the UK: consensus in the 1960s (where studies were celebratory of policing); controversy in the 1970s (studies were critical); conflict emerging in the late 1970s; the contradictory stage of the late 1980s (involving new realism) and a final fifth stage of crime control. Indeed historically as Perry et al. (2016) pointed out most researchers, practitioners and policymakers worked separately from each other, and it is only recently that various academics have focused upon building effective collaborations with the police (e.g. Fleming, 2012; Wood et al. 2008).

Evidence-based policy and practice have become a dominant discourse within policing in the UK (Lumsden & Goode, 2018) coinciding with the broader rhetoric for the professionalisation of policing, the financial challenges to policing post-2008 and the changing nature of crime. Evidence-based policing and the What Work's movement has seen the development of a dialogue between the police and academic institutions. Evidence-based policing has been promoted as the use of research, evaluation, analysis and scientific processes within law enforcement decision making (Lum & Koper, 2015) and has been gaining momentum since the early 1990s (Dixon-Woods et al., 2006). The approach emerged from the medical industry, spreading across education, management

and social care before moving into policing and criminal justice over the last decade (Lumsden & Goode, 2018). This approach means that various crime types, interventions, tactics and internal management structures are being analysed and evaluated through academic means. A key figure in the establishment of evidence-based policing as an approach and term is Dr Lawrence Sherman, who posited in a 1998 speech Ideas in American Policing (p.2) that *"police practices should be based on scientific evidence about what works best"*. Sherman (1998) mainly focused upon the utilisation of results of scientific evaluations of law enforcement strategies and tactics to guide their decision making, and secondly upon generating and applying analytic knowledge from their analysis of their internal issues and crime problems.

The College of Policing, established in 2011, builds upon this change in the relationship between academic and policing organisations. The professional body of policing within the UK, the College of Policing has the task of providing an authoritative voice on policing aiming to achieve chartered status. The College of Policing has been presented with the mandate of setting the standards to the professional development of the police including codes of practice, regulations and to set the standards on training, development, skills and qualifications. Therefore the College is at the forefront of this recent derive for an evidence-based approach to policing, and are the hosts to the What Works Centre for Crime Reduction which involved the collaboration of academics and a university consortium, coordinating and commissioning research. As part of this, the College has also created regional university networks, between various academic organisations and police forces, resulting in a fundamental change in the relationship between the two institutions.

This thesis argues that the Special Constabulary need to be included within this evidence-based approach and that there is a current and relevant need for research into their role and position within policing, with reviews of how and if they can meet the contemporary demands of policing in the UK. Indeed Sherman (2011) emphasised the importance of this type of approach stating that *"…it is therefore essential that our society constantly improves the competence of its police not merely with our opinions, but primarily with facts derived from objective knowledge"*. By adopting this approach towards the Special, Constabulary could

potentially provide rewards for forces as harmful or ineffective policies could be discarded saving time, money and risk (Lum & Koper, 2015).

Methodological Choices

Traditional police research has a long history of utilising ethnographic studies as the method allowed researchers to *"…observe, participate in and come to understand the social work (they are) studying from the vantage points of as many persons who belong to it as possible"* (Fox, 2004, p.234). Some of the most significant work employing this research method, including Herbert (1997); Chan et al. (2003); Wakefield (2003) and Marks (2004). These studies include participant observations, historical archives, textual analysis of official documents with focus groups, oral histories and recorded interviews (e.g. Shore, 2000, p.7-11) while other studies went for the *"total immersion"* approach such as that used by Goffman (1989) or Brewer (2000). More recently however in line with the evidence-based policing strategy, the majority of police literature is based upon quantitative survey or secondary data analysis (e.g. Verriale et al., 2007) with some still placing emphasis on observational methods for data collection (e.g. Rhodes, 2002, 2005; Bevir & Rhodes, 2006). Verriale et al. (2007) argued that police research had become increasingly focused upon the formation and administration of managerial policies within the police with other researchers such as Flemign and Lafferty (2000) viewing the police as a business or corporate entity.

The study within this thesis is based upon a situative program which while not itself a distinct theory but a collection of theoretical approaches with an aim to investigate knowledge within its natural context by examining the occupational environment as well as the social environment in the study of philosophy or experiences (e.g. Jarvela, 2001; Greeno, 2006; Lobato, 2006; Jarvela et al., 2010). This approach argues that human learning is a complex phenomenon and that the social values and contexts in which experiences are obtained all play a role (Jarvela, 2001, p.3). Due to the nature of the knowledge needed to answer the proposed research question for this study, qualitative methods were chosen as the techniques focus on obtaining an awareness of lived experiences, listening and understanding while allowing participants the space to voice their own opinions and experiences (e.g. Pope & Mays, 1995). Qualitative research methods have a long history in the social sciences, and the focus of this study is

to understand the perceptions of Special Constables about their role in policing during this broader context of austerity and drawing inferences about their continuation as an unpaid voluntary police force. Mason (2002) outlined three principles to qualitative research; firstly that it is interpretive (concerned with how the social world is interpreted, understood, experienced or produced). Secondly that it is less structured, relating the data to the context in which it was collected while affording a degree of flexibility not provided by more fixed methods such as surveys (Mason, 2002). Thirdly that qualitative research aimed to produce data in-depth, and this requires content analysis rather than statistical (ibid).

Qualitative interviewing is a technique in which the interaction between researcher and participant assists with the generation of knowledge about the social world, and for the context for this thesis, it was essential to explore the perceptions of Special Constables in depth. An active interviewing approach was taken as this took into account how the information was given and the manner in which the interviewees respond, rather than just looking at what had been said (e.g. Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Rabionet, 2011). This thesis, therefore, adopted qualitative interviews methods as the most appropriate method and providing the opportunity to investigate the underlying meanings and a more in-depth understanding of Special Constables experiences and opinions (e.g. Miller & Glassner, 1997; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). These qualitative interviews covered the key themes selected to answer the overarching question by obtaining an understanding of the meaning that Special Constables attach to their experiences to uncover the complexities of policing within austerity. Semi-structured interviews were employed since they were advantageous for acquiring an in-depth knowledge of the critical topics while still having the flexibility in the questions asked and allows the conversation to be focussed on the chosen topics (e.g. Holstein & Gubrium, 1997; Barbour & Schostak, 2005). A completely un-structured interview has the risk of not eliciting the issues or themes most closely related to the research question (e.g. Rabionet, 2011). Semi-structured interviews were also chosen as they allow for the necessary flexibility for questions to be introduced within and following participants responses and the opportunity for unanticipated and unsolicited information to be produced in the context of a conversation. Davies (2000, p.86) stated that semi-structured

interviews demonstrate an awareness of the subjective nature of knowledge and treat respondents as individuals with valuable insight.

The interviews conducted were organised around a schedule or list (see appendix A) of various topics which were to be covered within every interview. The specific questions or follow up points moved with the flow of the conversation rather than being predetermined, leading to the least interruptions possible. The topics that were outlined within the schedule included recruitment, training, leadership/rank structure and the effect of the budgetary reductions. Before every interview, participants were given a brief verbal opening introductory explanation of the research, outlining what was being investigated and what the data was going to be used for, i.e. a PhD thesis. Participants were then asked to provide verbal and written consent that they wished to take part while being informed that participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw at any point, and were entitled to answer the questions which they were comfortable. At the end of the interview, participants were then thanked for their participation and reminded that their data was anonymous and confidential before being provided with the researcher's contact details if they had any further questions regarding the study. The intention had been to carry out all interviews face to face however due to the distances involved across the four police forces involved, combined with organising times around participants employment, home life and police duties, many of the interviews were conducted over the phone, thus changing the dynamics of the conversations.

Selection of Data Sources and Subjects

Social research is often carried out with individuals who could be classified as vulnerable such as prisoners, victims of crime or children (e.g. Jupp et al., 2000; Mauthner, 1997). However, the focus of this study was individuals not classified as vulnerable but rather in a position of power in society as warranted police officers with sworn powers of a constable. There was an interesting dynamic between the researcher and participants in respects to the fact that the researcher herself is a Special Constable with approximately twelve years' experience and a ranked position. Participants were informed of this position to make sure that individuals did not feel hijacked by that information, and had the added advantage that the researcher already understood the dynamics of the role, the police jargon and processes. At the same time, this information could

have influenced the data collected as individuals may have changed their opinions expressed or provided especially regarding leadership although the data collected seems diverse enough to suggest that this did not happen.

Before any individual interviews were organised, the regular Chief Constable for each force was approached for permission to contact their Special Constabulary for interviews. It should be noted that at the beginning of the research period for this study, the Police and Crime Commissioner Office was created meaning that for many forces this request was initially pushed aside understandably as Chief Constables had to re-apply for their jobs after the PCC's elections. Therefore although permission was granted by all the police forces approached, the delay did mean that the interview period took longer than initially planned. Nevertheless, the data was gathered from all forces approached for Special Constables interviews. The four forces approached were selected mostly through the researchers own personal contacts within those forces and through the snowball technique (e.g. Atkinson & Flint, 2001). The four forces involved were Devon and Cornwall, Avon and Somerset, Dorset and the City of London Special Constabulary. Other organisations approached and whom all agreed to assist and participate within the study were the Home Office, National Crime Agency, Police Federation (South West), Association of Special Chief Officers, HMIC, PCC for Devon and Cornwall, PCC for Surrey and PCC for Thames Valley. Only one PCC office approached chose not to take part because they were already involved in some other academic studies and projects.

Setting up Interviews

Once permission had been obtained from the various Chief Constables for the Special Constabulary to be approached for interviews, the researcher provided a summary of the research and the reasons behind why it was being conducted for forces to distribute to their Special Constabularies within their internal communication systems. This way, data protection laws were upheld as the researcher did not need any access to officers information and provided the opportunity to participate in all Specials across the forces. However, it should be noted that those who self-selected themselves by coming forward to take part, could potentially be those with something to say either positive or negative, and does not access those groups who are perhaps more challenging to engage with or less willing to come forward.

Interviews were then scheduled to be conducted within police stations or public places of work at times convenient to the researcher and participants. Interviews held within the various other organisations approached to take part were organised through various gatekeepers either with key personnel identified or contacted by the researcher. These interviews were also held face to face at various headquarters or offices around England and Wales. All those who participated in the research did so voluntarily, so there has to be some recognition that the sample was dependent upon who wanted to join. Self selction means that in general, the sample contained more men than females as there were no controls over the demographic proportions. However, there was a good mixture of varying lengths of service and ranks.

Ethical Considerations

Procedural ethics relates to the formal guidelines necessary for carrying out any social research (e.g. Guillemin & Gillam 2004) and was obtained via the University of Exeter Law Schools ethics committee before any interviews were carried out. Obtaining informed consent is a fundamental ethical practice demonstrating that participants have volunteered to take part in the research and to understand their role within the study. Informed consent was obtained through a consent form signed by all participants (see Appendix B). As the interviews were not digitally recorded as initially planned as participants were reluctant to discuss specific topics on a Dictaphone, the consent to record in that manner was not sought. Also essential to all social research is to avoid any repercussions or harms being caused to the participants either through the questions themselves or through leaked information having the possibility to jeopardise their position within their organisations or employment for example (e.g. Williams, 1989). Therefore every measure was taken to ensure the confidentiality of all participants both during and after the fieldwork was maintained, with all bar the researcher herself, being unaware of the individuals taking part, especially in the cases where gatekeepers were utilised for recruitment. All interview notes were headed under selected numbers used throughout the analysis and writing up stages to ensure anonymity. Ranks were removed where necessary due to the limited numbers of high ranking officers in certain national positions which would undermine their anonymity. The interview data was then stored upon a password

protected computer, which in turn was locked away with the researcher being the only one with access.

Collection of Data

As in most qualitative research approaches, the quality of the data, which in this case are the interviews, depends upon the skills of the researcher involved, and the participant's willingness to discuss their experiences. The capabilities of the interviewer play an essential role in allowing the participants the space to open up and to elaborate upon their responses (e.g. Mason, 2002). The researcher for this study has carried out multiple interviews previously so was comfortable with the data collection fieldwork, although all skill such as these can be further developed over time and experiences. The interviews themselves varied in length ranging from forty-five minutes to an hour and a half, dependent upon how much the participants had to say, the depth they were willing to go into those topics and their other commitments for that day. All Special Constables spoken to were very willing to take part and welcomed the opportunity to have their opinions collected. Participants were relaxed in general, and the interviews themselves took on the context of an informal conversation rather than some form of interrogation. While the researcher took a relaxed approach regarding the feel of the interview, the researcher did decide to dress smartly in a suit to add professionalism and respect to the researcher, especially as she has been told at some points that she looks particularly young. It should be noted that just because participants were willing to take part and discuss various topics through the duration of the interviews, this does not necessarily reflect the quality of the data collected with some using the experience to air grievances regarding their force. It was, therefore, essential to make the role of the academic research clear to clarify that this study was not being carried out on behalf of the police although many participants hoped that forces would read and reflect upon the various issues and topics raised by participants within this thesis.

Role of the Researcher

To ensure best practice was maintained, the research process was reflected upon, and the impact of the researcher had upon the data generated and collected is often unavoidable. Coffey (1990, p.70) argued that difficult decisions are made despite the *"…physical and bodily, as well as intellectual and methodological"* immersion in the research site. Research bias is difficult to

remove from any piece of research but necessary to recognise. Despite the theoretical framework used throughout the analysis stages, the study was designed with certain assumptions been made regarding the Special Constabulary and the role within policing. These assumptions will have been influenced to some degree by the relevant literature and through the researchers own personal experiences as a Special Constables herself. Every attempt was made to ensure research questions appeared objective yet it is worth noting that there were some obvious similarities between the researcher and participants, and this baring this has had upon the quality of the data collected. However, a strength of these similarities meant that the researcher was able to challenge various points and did not need any clarification as to the police processes and abbreviations being mentioned.

Analysis of the Data

The initial phase of data analysis was the codifying of the interview notes taken at the time of the interview into broad categories, which in turn was guided by the main topics selected from the existing literature. This stage of coding is regarded as deductive, given that the research questions directed the initial coding of the data. The main themes were developed from the data examined the definitions, perceptions, experiences and responses from the Special Constabulary given the main topics outlined. These broad categories were then searched for critical concepts and explored any links between the themes, lead to the inductive stage of analysis by contextualising the data on a more theoretical level. These themes were chosen in order for the findings obtained to be considered in terms of the collected information itself rather than by any pre-existing hypotheses. Once this broad analysis had been written up, it became apparent that certain key concepts and themes were running through the interviews and this was the final data transformation stage (e.g. Miles & Huberman, 1994) whereby the analysis moved from being descriptive to be more explanatory.

Some researchers argue that qualitative research and data could be interpreted in a theoretically endless number of ways (e.g. Dey, 1993) however this is why research biases and the methodological framework of the studies must be explicitly referenced (e.g. Chenail, 2011). Research bias, as mentioned in the context of this thesis, was also the reason for the author's interest in the subject and awareness of the issues. The researcher's prior experiences and contacts

with the police forces meant that there was an overall willingness from both the forces and the Special Constabularies themselves to be involved, making the recruitment process relatively easily obtained. The researcher's experiences with police activities should not be viewed as a negative impact upon the data, instead of resulting in the researcher having a more detailed understanding of the pressures, positions and challenges that can arise from being a Special Constables. Another issue which occurred during the primary data gathering process was the recording of the data. Despite an earlier intention to record all interview conducted, the majority of the participants did not wish to be recorded, and all were more comfortable about written notes being taken at the time. Therefore the quotes may not be as accurate as if they had been transcribed from audio recordings; however, they were as close as possible, written down by the researcher at the time they were being said. Participants reluctance to be recorded does, however, highlight the worry and concern of the Special Constables felt in expressing their opinions and experiences, and how forces would or may react to the points or positions, they were communicating. These concerns suggest that despite relations between the two police workforces having improved, there is still a long way to go.

Thesis Structure

Chapter two in this thesis provides a historical overview of the Special Constabulary tracking their developing from establishment to their modern form. By exploring the beginnings of the police and policing within the United Kingdom, this chapter describes the evolution of the voluntary police force and their historical role within law and order. The chapter also explores the diversity of the voluntary forces membership, regarding age, socio-economic background, gender and ethnicity. These factors aid in the more in-depth understanding of the types of individuals who choose to join the Special Constabulary as volunteers as the role is an unusual and demanding type of volunteering imposing strict stipulations upon its members.

Chapter three introduces the historical information and previous literature connected to the qualitative research data collected and described later within chapter five. These critical themes selected for the study within this thesis include the recruitment of Special Constables, retention, ranks and leadership within the Special Constabulary and their deployments and duties.

Chapter four outlines the key issues and challenges facing policing within the 21st century, in particular, the changing nature of policing, recent police reforms are all considered in the wider context of the recent financial challenges, and the effects of austerity have had upon the police in the UK. The chapter reports on how the police have adapted to these various challenges and therefore, how this affects the overall role of the Special Constabulary within policing and the dangers of continuing as before.

Chapter five covers the main qualitative findings obtained from the data collected during the primary research portion of this project. The interview data covered the key themes and topics previously outlined in chapter three. These key themes included the recruitment of Special Constables, any retention issues they still face, the duties and deployments they are currently fulfilling and any changes seen since the budgetary constraints took effect, the relationship between paid regular force and voluntary workforce and the use of volunteers within the ranked positions.

The concluding chapter six summaries the research findings and how they relate and inform the overall research question in addressing the voluntary nature of the Special Constabulary and whether this was still adequate in meeting the demands of the role they play within the broader policing context. The chapter also addresses the real-world relevance of the research and reflects upon the potential areas for improvement.

Chapter Two: The Special Constabulary

This chapter critically analysed the definition of the public police as a public sector organisation which is essential as to the context in which the Special Constabulary evolved from and in which they are operating today. There is a long tradition of citizen participation within law and order in the United Kingdom, and within this chapter, the establishment and early history of the Special Constabulary will be outlined. Finally, the chapter ends with the demographic and underpinnings of the modern day Special Constabulary, the focus of this thesis.

2.1 The Public Police

"The civil police is a social organisation created and sustained by political processes to enforce dominant conception of public order."

(Skolnick, 1972,p.4)

The public police are defined within the academic literature as the body or institution which provides the social concept of policing in turn viewed as a social necessity for the maintenance of social order within human society (e.g. Reiner, 2000). The police, as an institution or organisation, exist in different forms and carry out a variety of various social functions within different societies and cultures. Legitimately state-sanctioned, the police are formally distributed along a hierarchal structure influenced by rank covering a range of core functions within the social process of policing (e.g. Atkinson, 2013). The police stand distinct from other law and order agencies and organisations in their state-sanctioned power to exercise coercive power or violence over the populace (e.g. Mawby, 2003). There is a fragility to this legitimate monopoly over the use of force, with money breaking down the barrier between private and public interests, blurring the distinction between the police and private security, the pluralisation of the policing service. Indeed the role of the police within society is often taken for granted by both the public and academics. A dominant public sector organisation within the United Kingdom, the public contribute significantly to the criminal justice system process from attending and recording crime, investigating and processing suspects, to preparing cases for court. However, state organised police forces are just one modern-day form of policing (Reiner, 2000).

Indeed more recently, Rowe (2014) argues that there are at least four definitions of the police. The first traditional viewpoint is that the police are crime fighters enforcing the law, preventing and protecting the public from the crime being

committed. The Government consultation document *Policing in the 21*st* Century: Reconnecting Police and the People* strongly stipulated that this was the core function of the public police within the United Kingdom, yet within academic and the growing body of evidence-based policing research suggests that this definition of the police is far too simple. Various pieces of research have now argued that a low percentage of calls to the police are related to crime (e.g. Becker & Stephens, 1992, p.2) with Reiner (2000) claiming that this traditional, instinctual definition of the public police fuels this law and order myth. There is a significant body of empirical work that demonstrates that the police role is far more complex than merely seeking to control crime (e.g. Flanagan, 2008). Waddington (1993, p.5) acknowledged that it is a *"…cliché of police research that only a small proportion of public demands on the police are directly and unambiguously concerned with crime".* Another viewpoint is to define the police by their ability to use force upon the populace when enforcing the law legitimately. Bitter (1994) argued that a key message projected is the ability of the police to use force to achieve the desired objective and therefore the police are nothing more than a social mechanism for distributing situationally justified force in society. This viewpoint of the police links to Weber (1918, Politics as a Vocation) definition of the state as *"…a human community that successfully claims the monopoly on the use of legitimate physical force within a certain territory".*

Others argue that the police should be defined by what they do in practice (e.g. Bittner, 1994; Waddington, 2010). The police are often seen today as a generalist service providing a multipurpose service to the public (e.g. Monjardet, 2000; Bittner, 1970) that than one that is crime-specific both in times of emergency and as part of more comprehensive social processes. Police cover everything from keeping the peace between family members, dealing with night time economy issues, VIP protection, traffic collisions to terrorism. This empirical evidence suggests that policing and the police need to be conceptualised on a broader spectrum from the 1970s onwards the criminalisation or the *"policification"* of a more extensive range of aspects contained within social policy with the police taking on roles previously provided by social or welfare agencies (e.g. Bullock, 2013; Crawford, 1997; Kemshall & Maguire, 2001). The police could also be defined as bureaucrats with Ericson and Haggerty (1997) conceptualising the police as knowledge workers in a risk-based society, supplying information about

the dangers to other agencies, with multi-agency partnerships, insurance companies and financial institutions. Record keeping, form filling public servants whose role within the criminal justice system is to provide intelligence and information on individuals for courts to decide on both their guilt and risk to society. Reiner (2000) argued that there is no way to establish empirically to what extent to which these characterised police work in general.

The final view expressed by Rowe (2014) was that the police could and should be understood as the institution that they are, and how that institution fits within the wider criminal justice system as a gateway agency. The organisational structure of police forces is important to understanding them as it is the formal decision-making framework by which jobs tasks are divided and coordinated (e.g. Birkinshaw et al., 2002; Markides & Williamson, 1996). The purpose of this structure is to make the best use of the organisational resources to achieve the organisational goals (e.g. Gottschalk, 2008) explicitly defining that organisation through its policies, procedures and objectives. Forces have a command structure, hierarchical rather than a knowledge structure (e.g. Collier et al., 2004). A command structure the higher ranking officer is right, resulting in a quasi-military structure (Kelly, 2005) wherein a knowledge structure the knowledge is correct, creating a barrier to innovation and creatively. However, lately, there has been a change with the introduction of evidence-based policing approaches within forces highlighting the need to challenge current tactics and thoughts with regards to policing (College of Policing, What Works, 2018).

Wechsler and Backoff (1986) outlined that public organisations operate within a governmental authority system, rather than a market system seen in the private sector. The governmental and therefore political authority system means that they must operate and adapt within a relatively complex, multilaterally powered, influenced system with bargaining, voting and exchange relationships at work (Wechsler & Backoff, 1986). Public organisations also have various external influences and variables such as constitutional arrangements, legislative and judicial mandates, governmental rules and regulations, client and constituent factors and interests (Wechsler & Backoff, 1986). Reviewed within this context, the actions of the individual agencies and other organisations transformations must be considered in conjunctions to these external influences and factors. Gottschalk (2008) also proposed that the police could be viewed both as a

bureaucratic and functional organisation with the two elements often working against one another. A bureaucratic structure contains a degree of standardisation while a function structure seeks to create specialised groups such as homicide, drugs and organised crime (Gottschalk, 2008). Such structures, therefore, create barriers to inter-organisational knowledge being shared (ibid). Any organisation, therefore, is a combination of its various parts, with all components being of importance to the effective functioning and efficiency of that organisation (e.g. Scott, 2003). Mawby (1990) proposes that the police as an organisation can, therefore, be distinguished in terms of their legitimacy, structure and function. The structure of the police is based upon features such as the level of specialism, codes of practices and functions relating to the maintenance of social order, prevention and detection of crimes and criminals, and to the extent to which other duties are assigned to the police such as welfare, politics as examples. Police organisational structure relates directly to the role of the Special Constabulary as a component of the police organisation and their importance to the overall effectivity and efficiency of the policing services being provided to the public.

Policing itself is often defined as the social process through which social order is maintained although it is not provided by the public police exclusively with law and order being produced by an ever-widening body of organisations. Policing, in its contemporary form, affects the lives of everyone living in the various states and police legitimacy is bound to the relationship between the public and their police through the social process of policing. Jones and Newburn (1998) outlined that the public or state police are but one of the many individuals and organisations that may undertake some policing activities within different societies and cultures. Michael Banton (1964, p.1) stated that *"A cardinal principle for the understanding of police organisation and activity is that the police are only one among many agencies of social control"*. Others argued that policing in many respects has become an attempt to maintain security through surveillance and oversight, with the deterrent threat of sanctions and prisons (e.g. Shearing, 1992) through various policing activities aimed at preserving this social order (e.g. Reiner, 1990). Rowe (2014), however, stated that the purpose of policing is political and that it is a means of governance for the city or state to enforce their political stance. Waddington (1986) also proposed that policing is essentially

reacting to unpredictable demand rather than the pursuit of goals set out in advance, making policing principally *"unmanageable"*. Policing, by its very nature, does not lend itself to performance measurements.

 The literature has long stipulated that the police cannot hold a monopoly over policing in modern democratic society and indeed, the pluralisation of policing is a much debated and researched topic. This growing contemporary body of law and order organisations include those ranging from private police forces such as contract security, citizens in a voluntary capacity within existing organisations such as the Neighbourhood Watch Schemes, Police Support Volunteers and the Special Constabulary, to volunteers in independent schemes outside the public services. Most recently, there has been the creation of various *"hybrid"* policing bodies such as Park Constabularies and the Atomic Energy Authority Police (Johnston, 1992, p.102). Economic necessity has led to various aspects of the policing process being contracted out such as the Highway Agency to deal with broken down vehicles and protecting sites of accidents, thus releasing police officers from the scenes earlier. In some forces, aspects of the custody process have been contracted out to security companies and call centres have also been contracted out, with G4S launching UK's first privately owned and operated police custody suites however already in 2012 there was an investigation over a prisoners collapse and a crucial record being falsified (e.g. IFSEC Global; Guardian, 2013). For many this remit of policing has become far too wide, and that the key functions of the police service need to be reviewed for the potential for certain aspects to be provided by other, something particularly poignant at times of economic constraint (e.g. Bullock, 2013). Given the austerity measures and economic constraints, the police are currently facing the more jobs that the police could potentially move to other sections of the criminal justice system and social process, the better. However, the public services throughout the criminal justice system are all experiencing budgetary cuts resulting in many struggling to meet the public demands upon them; this is not necessarily possible. Indeed there are already signs that police forces are experiencing this with officers taking individuals to the hospital as ambulances are unable to respond, and individuals with mental health issues being held in police custody due to there being no mental health beds available (e.g. Express, 2015; Police Federation, Telegraph, 2013 etc.).

2.2 The Historical Evolution of the Police in England and Wales

The UK police were never explicitly designed but rather evolved, either as the result of a specific policy initiative or as the pragmatic response to changing social and economic situations (Reiner, 2000). Reiner (2000) argued that the police carry out a special social function stated by Wilson (1993) as the *"…function of maintaining social control in society"*. Within democratic societies, the public police is a public social organisation fulfilling this social function with the consent of the populace in which it exists, while in many non-democratic countries, the police exist as a para-military organisation with close ties to the Government and military.

"Professional police forces, operating within the law, and at the service of the citizen, are a hallmark of any decent, peaceful, civilised community."

(Ashdown, 2003)

There are varying police models existing within Europe with some countries having a single police force (e.g. Norway and now Scotland) while others have more (e.g. Belgian police with two levels: the Federal Police and the Local Police, plus those working across Europe, e.g. Europol etc.). Some countries have a purely civil police force (e.g. the UK and the Netherlands) while others have both a civil and para-military police (e.g. France, Spain, Italy etc.). Waddington (1999) expressed the view that the establishment of a police force in the UK was an expression of the development of citizenship, as it separated the state's monopoly of force into civil and military realms. The civil force does not confront an *"enemy"* but their fellow citizens, making the police's position acutely marginal, having to exercise coercive authority while retaining at least grudging acquiescence from those over whom they use this authority. The public police cannot be realistically considered to be independent or isolated from the political and social environment in which they operate and therefore when considering changes being made to the police as an organisation, the environment and context in which these changes are being made must be mentioned. Throughout history, the police have been obliged to adapt their structures and resources, both human and material to the given situations and contexts.

Law Enforcement Before the Professional Police Force

The maintenance of law and order has always been the responsibility of the community, tracing back to Alfred the Great during the 9th century, when if an individual was found to have committed a crime, then it was the responsibility of their family to bring them to justice (Gill and Mawby, 1990). If they failed to comply with this obligation, then a local man who was made responsible for law and order in the local community could be called upon, and he, in turn, could call upon members of the community to help him bring that individual in (ibid). It was not until the Anglo-Saxon period that a more formal system of law and order was organised, with the creation of *Tythings*, which was a formal grouping of ten households obliged to produce any individuals from those households who had committed an offence to court (Gill and Mawby, 1990). These *Tythings* themselves were then overseen by a *Hundremen* (a formal grouping of ten *Tythings*) formally controlled by the local *Sheriff* (Critchley, 1987, p.2). The arrival of the Normans in 1066 brought about the higher level of formality to this informal policing system, introducing the concept of a "*constable*" although this position remained an informal arrangement and nothing like the modern position of a constable within policing existing today (Gill and Mawby, 1990). Over time the Normans went on to create five tiers of hierarchy within the concept of "*constable*" with the apex of this hierarchy being the Constable of the Baste, working within the Royal Court (Gill and Mawby, 1990). The Statue of 1252 then established the role of the constable as one of equal authority to that of the local mayors and bailiffs (Critichley, 1978, p.5).

The Statute of Winchester in 1285 saw a fusion of both these Saxon and Norman influences bringing about rationalisation and extension of the administration of law and order within local areas, confirming the duty and obligation places upon all within communities to help maintain the law and arrest any offenders (Gill & Mawby, 1990). The Statue of Winchester 1285 also outlined that every sizable town had to establish a Night Watch and Parish Constable. The night watch consisted of sixteen local unpaid, part-time male members of the community who were obliged to patrol the town walls and gates during the night hours. Any offenders found during those hours were handed over to the parish constable the next day, a vital member of the community who held the post for a year, unpaid (Gill & Mawby, 1990). The Statue of 1285 established the requirement for every

man to serve their King in the case of foreign force invasion or internal revolt. A subsequent Justice of the Peace Act of 1361 led to the creation of the *Justices of the Peace,* who were to enforce the law on the local level alongside the constable. Due to these new Justices being drawn exclusively from the higher social circles, the position soon becomes more formally aligned to the crown, the Justices became seen as superior to the office of constable (ibid). Ultimately this new hierarchy led to the parish constable becoming the local law enforcement agents, appointed annually to implement the policies of the local Justices (Gill and Mawby, 1990). This concept of a part-time constable spread out into the rural areas of England, where the principle of the *Yeomanry* developed and formally recognised in 1794 (Emsely, 1983). The *Yeomanry* were an armed and trained local voluntary force which was *"…served by tenant farmers and small landowners and officered by the landed gentry and aristocracy"* (Mather, 1959, p.149). They were well received and thought of considered as the *"…pinnacles of country society"* (Emsley, 1983, p.47).

By the mid-20th century, the police had achieved a level of acceptance within all sections of the populations at the centre of the criminal justice system. The public police constabularies known today are less than two centuries old. In the UK the first established police forces were the City of Glasgow Police back in 1800, followed by the Royal Irish Constabulary in 1822. Back in England and Wales, it was not until 1829 with the establishment of a professional paid full time uniformed police force by Sir Robert Peel, the creator of the Metropolitan Police (Shpayer-Makov, 2002). With a long-standing suspicion of the army by the English populace, there was open opposition to the creation of a police force, who were seen as covert and overt agents of the state (Chapmen, 1970). To combat this public suspicion, the police force deliberately disassociated itself from the military by making their uniforms blue with top hats and remained unarmed but for discreet truncheon (e.g. Reith, 1943; Ascoli, 1979; Waddington, 2000). In the beginning, officers were predominantly made up of working-class labourers due to the physical demands of beat patrol, with gentlemen and commissioned officers being actively discouraged from joining by the low level of pay, to avoid any taint from the military (Emsely, 1992, p.116). However, several reforms to the material benefits of being a police officer opened up the force to the lower middle classes (Ewen, 2006). These benefits included sick pay, job

security with a socially accepted employer, a guaranteed pension from 1890 and improved real wage by the 1920s, all which made the role of the police constable highly respected within society. Also noteworthy at the stage of establishment of the professional police was for officers to maintain a high moral standing within society and therefore stringent rules about behaviour were imposed upon officers. These included not being allowed to vote in elections to preserve their political impartiality, requiring permission to get married, not being allowed within an alehouse unless in the execution of their duty and being duty bound to wear their uniform both on and off duty (https://www.historic-uk.com/HistoryUK/HistoryofEngland/Sir-Robert-Peel/).

The industrial revolution and widespread migration of people towards the major cities during the Victorian period, lead to many at the time to view the police as agents of the state, created to enforce the working class to conform to middle-class images of respectability of the time (Storch, 1975). The creation of civil society was a common objective in the 19th century uniting the land-owning middle classes looking to protect both their social and economic infrastructures (Ewen, 2006). Some historians to argue that police forces were created as a rational response to rising crime and social disorder during this period of industrialisation and urbanisation (Ewen, 2006). Most areas continued to resist the implementation of an organised police force, fearing that it would be used to arrest opponents of the Government, stop protests and undermine free speech. The Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 allowed Borough Councils to organise a local police force, but few were eager to implement the law so that by 1837 only 93 of the 171 boroughs had police forces. By 1840 there was still great disparity between different areas of the country with no single style of policing so in 1856 the Government implemented a system for government inspections, audits and regulations for the first time and a County Borough Police Act forced the whole of the country to establish police forces, in response to political unrest. After various grants and Acts were implemented to merge smaller forces into larger ones based on effectiveness and value for money, amalgamations as the result of the 1964 Police Act resulted in the 43 counties or area police forces found today.

Today there continues to be no unitary policing body across England and Wales. While there has been an international mixture of decentralised and centralised models of policing emerging (e.g. Mawby, 1990; Loveday & Reid, 2003), England and Wales have retained their decentralised character with each county force having its individuality, evolved from its history, geographical and demographical differences. Responsibility for policing across England and Wales is held by the Home Office while policing within Scotland is the responsibility of the Scottish Government. The recent move from eight regional forces into one national force within Scotland is an exciting progression in the wake of austerity measures and consolidation of resources across the UK police forces. Devon and Cornwall Police and Dorset Police are consulting the Government presently as they are considering a historical voluntary merger into one force. All current forces are mergers of smaller parish constabularies, however, never before have these mergers been proposed by the police forces themselves, instead historically being the result of governmental county line changes. This merger was offered as a possible solution to resource and funding issues (Devon and Cornwall Police, 2018 News). Austerity measures appear to be driving more police forces to consider either collaborations and alliances especially with regards to back office delivery of service such as call centres but of frontline specialist forces such as firearms officers as well.

"The police alone cannot solve many crime and order problems, but the …in partnership with others who have…time, money, expertise, ideas, energy, equipment and more, perhaps they can"

(Kennedy, 1993)

However, to work in partnerships with other agencies both from the public and private sectors, the police would have to give up some of their monopolies over law and order issues (a monopoly implied rather than actual), under the umbrella of public safety. Within the last decade, there has been a move towards having specialised units monopolising certain crimes such as modern slavery, which has removed both some of the strength, skill levels and creativity from the geographical commands, i.e. at the local, regional common level.

Accountability and oversight of the public police within the UK is carried out by a number of key agencies and organisations. The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) oversees the police complaints system within England and

Wales, investigating the most serious complaints and allegations of misconduct with certain types of incidents being automatically referred to them such as the death or serious injury of a person following direct or indirect contact with the police. Such incidents included death in police custody, road traffic incidents involving police vehicles, firearms incidents where a police firearm has been used, restraints and self-defence incidents and any allegation of corruption or racism (IPCC, 2018). Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) is the body with the statutory duty for independently assessing police forces performance and activity across England and Wales. HM Inspectors are appointed by the Crown, meaning that they are neither employees of the police service or government thus remaining impartial. Reporting to Parliament they also inspect and regular other policing bodies such as the National Crime Agency. A new layer of democratic accountability was recently included with the creation of the publicly elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, with responsibility to ensure that community needs are being met and making sure the police are answerable to the communities they serve (Association of Police and Crime Commissioners, 2018). Therefore PCC's are involved in setting the police and crime objectives for their area and the force budgets and appoint the Chief Constable, with the position and power to dismiss them if necessary (ibid).

Other agencies of significance within policing include the College of Policing which was established in 2012 as the professional body for the police service and policing. The College of Policing was created to provide a professional framework for operational and training standards, professional development and knowledge base (College of Policing, 2018). Operating independently from the Government, the College of Policing is ultimately striving to be established as a statutory body once the necessary legislation is in place (ibid). This move to establish a College of Policing could be seen as a shift in providing research and evidential grounds and qualifications to the profession of policing with recent moves by forces to employ university graduates with direct entry and accelerated promotion schemes being introduced (College of Policing, 2018). There are also talks to include a policing foundation degree apprenticeships (PCDA) which will be a requirement for becoming a police officer both for recruits and those already working within forces (ibid).

The National Crime Agency is a newly created crime-fighting agency operating within the legal framework on Part One of the Crime and Courts Act 2013. The NCA consists of police officers and other professionals all working under the direction and control of a Director General with functions exercisable on behalf of the Crown. The NCA works in partnership with the police and other law enforcement organisations both within the UK and Internationally to fight serious and organised crime. This agency was included within this research due to their recent introduction of Specials within the organisation although while named the same, their function within the NCA is not the same as explored further later.

2.3 Police Occupational Culture

"Police culture is extremely powerful and overlooking its importance is frequently the cause of failed attempts at organisational change."

(Police Review, 1994, p.13)

Police culture has been widely covered within the academic literature and includes the attitudes, values and norms created within the organisational occupational environment (Reiner, 2000). However, this is but just one of the many definitions of police culture with Handy (1993) arguing that culture is something perceived and hence not precisely definable. These norms, values and attitudes found within this occupational culture are in turn shaped by aspects of the polices role within society itself, such as officers isolation from the general public through shift patterns and the nature of the incidents to which they respond (Klackars, 1985). Not only that but police culture can influence how initiatives and reforms are relieved and interpreted by the organisation and individual officers on the street (Kiely & Peek, 2002). If the role of the Special Constabulary is to change then, it is necessary to consider how they are positioned and operate within this entrenched occupational culture as it has implications as to how they are deployed and integrated within the wider police force. Historically police forces have been viewed as particularly resistant to change due partially to this *"…co-existence of formalised bureaucratic and standardised working practices, with a deeply entrenched and pervasive occupational culture"* (Fleming & Rhode, 2004). Some academics have argued that despite literature based upon the democratic mythology and Peelian principle that police officers are citizens in uniform; the reality is that they are set apart by the very authority they use (e.g. Bullock, 2015). For some this occupational culture and subcultures are deemed necessary for

officers to function in a job considered to be dangerous, unpredictable and alienating. Manning (1977, p.143) referred to police culture as the *"core skills, cognitions and affect"* that define *"good police work"* and includes the *"…accepted practices, rules and principles of conduct that are situationally applied and generalised rationale and beliefs* (Manning, 1989, p.360). Police culture, however, can be functional to the survival of police officers in an occupation considered to be unpredictable and alienating. The created bond of solidarity *"…offers its members reassurance that the other officers will "pull their weight" in police work, that they will defend, back up and assist their colleagues when confronted by external threats and that they will maintain secrecy in the face of external investigations"* (Goldsmith, 1990, p.93-4).

The concept of a police culture originally emerged from the early ethnographical studies of routine police work, which uncovered a layer of informal occupational norms and values operating under the rigid hierarchical structure of police organisations (e.g. Cain, 1973; Manning, 1977; Holdaway, 1983). Researchers indicate that police culture includes a distrust and suspicion of the public (e.g. Skolnick, 1994; Westley, 1970; Sparrow et a.., 1990); a tendency to assess both people and situations in terms of the threat; a lay low and cover your ass orientation; a very strong emphasis upon peer loyalty and the law enforcement elements of policing (Paoline, 2003). This strong internal loyalty and camaraderie are similar to that seen within other disciplined organisations such as the military (e.g. Demaan, et al., 2017; Gipson, 2017, etc.). This work-based personality also includes a cynical, machismo and conservative political outlook among officers (e.g. Skolnick, 1996; Manning, 1989; Reiner, 1992). In general, there is a glorification of the action and excitement elements in contrast to the majority of routine police work which is often boring, with few jobs involving any arrest (e.g. Southgate & Ekblom, 1986; Skogan, 1994; Sykes & Brent, 1983).

Manning (1977) suggested that the police's ability prevent crime and induce a sense of public wellbeing functions to maintain police officers morale and sense of personal efficacy rather than being representative of actual police goals and achievements. Waddington (1999) also argued that these publicly expressed police attitudes bear little relationship to the privately expressed views of individuals bears little relation to the privately expressed opinions of the individual officers or their actual behaviour on the street. Instead, many officers

demonstrated views in line with those shown in that occupational cultural merely for the benefit and approval of fellow officers in their publicly expressed banter and frustration, rather than from an actual belief in those stances (Waddington, 1999). Indeed today it is argued that it is far too simplistic to assume that all police officers think alike, that they are all paranoid and intolerant of the public or that they are intrinsically opposed to all change (e.g. O'Neill & Mark, 2007). Any occupational environment has its own development culture, and when investigating any aspect of an organisation and attempts to introduce various reforms, this culture needs to be considered.

It has been argued by some, such as Kakar (1998) and Reiner (1998) that uniformed police work is unlike any other type of work, requiring officers to draw upon a broad and diverse set of cognitive and physical capabilities.

"They are very often dealing with very difficult people, those who might be anti-police, those that are violent, those that are drunk or on drugs and that makes it (quality of service) difficult."

(Deal & Kennedy, 1982)

The unique nature of the role is why it is argued that police officers derive a large part of their organisational identity from the work that they do and from the qualities of the work such as physical demands, unpredictability, and their routine exposure to the darker side of human nature. As Westley (1970) argued, the police should be investigated *"…as a social and occupational group"*. However the modernisation of the police over the past few centuries (e.g. White, 1972) the police have been changed with respect to their role, tactics, supervision, procedures, rules and regulations and demographics with a fragmentation between new and old styles of police officers, ever more so than before (Haarr, 1997). It has been argued within the literature that gender balancing within the police force was one of the most significant reforms regarding influencing police occupational culture (e.g. Benson, 2001) especially regarding aspects such as the masochism or hyper-masculinity value systems (e.g. Franklin, 2005). This value system values physical strength, aggression, violence, competition and dominance highly (e.g. Reiner, 2000; Loftus, 2009, etc.). Officers were distinguished through their involvement in hostile confrontation within their brotherhood, and this male-dominated culture has often been an obstacle to the successful implementation of other policing philosophies such as community

policing, as they were viewed as soft and the work of social services (e.g. Sadd & Grinc, 1994; Fielding, 1994; Clear & Karp, 1999). The all white and all male departments of the 1950s and 1960s have been replaced by every increasingly diverse workforce including not only females and minority officers, but openly gay and lesbian officers as well (e.g. Sklansky, 2006a). Another change is the number of higher educated officers within the workforce (e.g. Carter & Snapp, 1990) something to only increase with the strategic plans of the College of Policing.

As part of new approaches to police management, there was a particularly strong drive for *"civilisation"* accelerated by the Governments refusal at the time to fund a bigger workforce when police officers were occupying posts which could arguably be more economically filled by civilians (Home Officer, 1983; 1988). This drive continued throughout the 1990s as a method of improving the quality and cost-effectiveness of the police service as a whole (Mawby, 1988). This resulted in civilians, who were once strongly resisted by the police themselves are now being unexceptional and present in most police forces (Walker, 2001). This increasingly diverse workforce has also seen the police associations becoming more like labour unions (Delaney & Feuile, 1987) suggesting that police officers sense of identity within the workplace and organisation as a whole is far more complex and varied than ever before, with historical work and assumptions made about police occupational culture less applicable. With the movement towards police professionalism, police solidarity has declined (Conlon, 2004, p.9) with ethnographic researchers reporting a marked movement towards *"…segmentation and division"*(Haar, 1997, p.66; National Research Council, 2004, p.80-82). Mobilising this increasingly diverse workforce is essential as it is the workforce which provides the police service on the street to the public, and the drive to win the hearts and minds of their local communities (Skogan & Hartnett, 1997).

Philosophies such as community policing have historically not been regarded as real police work with cultural research arguing that officers focus mainly on the crime-fighting activities of police work (e.g. Kelling & Kliesmet, 1996; Sparrow et al., 1990; Van Maanen, 1974) with the notion of fighting crime and locking up criminals remaining central to the idea of good policing (Holdaway, 1989). Militarism (Benson, 2001) has often been found within the police service, referring to the changing equipment and uniform worn by officers. Police research has long

indicated the symbolic power of the police uniform (e.g. Bickman, 1974a; Young, 1999) of power and authority (Cooke, 2005). This visibility of the British police officer has long become linked socially to security and reassurance, a point utilised by forces to argue for the protection of the police visible frontline.

Another significant aspect of police culture has been a sense of mission (Reiner, 1992), a mission to serve the public so that the police are *"…there to help, no matter who or what the problem is…"* (Deal & Kennedy, 1982). While it would be understood of a member of the public ran away from a fight, a police officer could be condemned for leaving another in need. Reiner (1992, p.112) argued that police officers regard their work as a mission as it *"..reflected in their sense of themselves as "the thin blue line" performing an essential role in safeguarding social order which could lead to disastrous consequences if their authority was threatened".* Chan (1996) also argued that changing police culture requires changes to the field of both management and street-level decisions. McConville et al. (1991,p.193) questioned the utility of law reforms as a method of changing police practice since the occupational subculture of the police appeared to resist any change and suggested that to change police practice, an attack on police occupational culture would be necessary.

The development, transmission and maintenance of police culture are related to the demands and nature of police work itself (Reiner, 1992,p. 109). Indeed for some academics police culture works as a collective construction of social reality, ideas and theories employed by officers to make sense of their social and physical reality (Sackman, 1991, p.21). Officers, therefore, play an interpretive and active role in shaping this culture, influencing their understanding of both the organisation and the environment in which they work (Sharing & Ericson, 1991). Skolnick (1966) proposed that police officers need to be understood as craftsmen rather than bureaucrats as they develop skills from their social environment and experiences, learning from their colleagues' practices around them. Westley (1970) also believed that the key to understanding the police is to investigate them as a social and occupational group, united by their work. In particular the bond of solidary between officers *"…offers its members reassurance that the other officers will "pull their weight" in police work, that they will defend, back up and assist their colleagues when confronted by external threats and that they will maintain secrecy in the face of external investigations"* (Goldsmith, 1990, p.93-

94). As Rowe (2007) argued it is the officers at the street level, carrying out their day to day duties, who exercise considerable discretion meaning that their informal working rules can subvert or even obstruct various police reforms (Reiner, 1992,p. 231-2). Chatterton (1979) supported this view by finding that constables created their structure of "*real policing*" and displayed a level of autonomy regarding how they interpreted their beat and police duties. This *"real police work"* was the subject of exaggerated stories and bravado among officers (Kiely &Peek, 2002). The more officers identify with their peers rather than the organisational rules and policies, the more this could occur. Punch (1983) suggested that police culture has its primary allegiance, not to the organisation, but the job and peer group.

Organisational culture can operate as an anchor during times of wide-scale change (e.g. Lewin, 1951) while dysfunctional cultures are often the catalysts for these changes (e.g. Osborne & Gaebles, 1992). Police culture, in particular, has long been successful in resisting and defeating attempts to implement changes and has contributed to longstanding criticisms of the public police being ineffective, inefficient and insensitive to changes (Chan, 1999). Public sector agencies regularly face cycles of planning and goal setting with little time to implement much of these plans (e.g. Wechsler & Backoff, 1986). The police service as an organisation operates within a hierarchical structure, yet there is operational discretion at the lower levels, with a response reactive rather than strategic, functional viewpoint making it considerably different to other agencies within the public sector regarding their inter rank culture (e.g. Savage & Leishman, 1996). The public sector has more complex goals and is strictly influenced by the political environment and faces continuous accountability and increasingly fragmented authority over the allocation of money and resources (e.g. Alford, 1995). Police occupational culture therefore often refers to street level cop culture, rather than management cop culture (Reuss-Ianni & Ianni, 1983) and the practices resulting from the interaction between the socio-political context of police work and the various dimensions of police organisations knowledge (Chan, 1996). The persistence of police culture can be a serious obstacle to any reform or change (Chan, 1996). Cop culture (Reiner, 1999) does vary from force to force, shaped by that forces particular crimes and diversity of those communities. These subcultures have shown remarkable tenacity to

remain, despite various reforms and reorganisation of patrol work (e.g. Holdaway, 1983). Police culture is not entirely negative however and should be considered an essential function to the survival of police officers in an occupational considered particularly unpredictable and uncertain (e.g. Symonds, 1970; Schaible & Gecas, 2010).

Research indicates that *"…overtime and in the main, cops tend to think like other cops"* (Conlon, 2004, p.320) and this aspect may have held the police back from being as inventive and innovative as it could be in the face of organisational change and restructuring. Beck and Wilson (1997) reported a long-lasting destructive effect of the socialisation process within police culture where recruits are paired with older, experienced, more cynical officers, resulting in their *"minds being dyed blue"* (O'Neill & Marks, 2007). In a follow-up study, Beck and Wilson (2000) reported a degenerative nature to police commitment essentially meaning that the longer an officer services, their strength of identification and involvement within the organisation decreases (e.g. Mowday et al., 1982; O'Rilly & Chatman, 1986). In contrast, Shearing and Ericson (1991) argued that rather than being socialised into and guided by the police cultural aspect of their work activities police officers are constructing and making references to the culture as a guide to their actions. Corresponding with this ongoing drive for police professionalism, police solidarity declined (e.g. Conlon, 2004), with ethnographic researchers reporting a marked movement towards *"…segmentation and division"* (Haar, 1997, p.66; National Research Council, 2004). Mobilising this diverse workforce is increasingly important as it is the frontline staff who delivers the policing service, and the fact that much of police work, relies on this localised street level of officers gathering intelligence (Goldstein, 1990). When the police forces are making decisions, the lower ranks should have a mechanism for input, as it will be these officers who ultimately need to win the hearts and minds of their local communities (e.g. Skogan & Hartnett, 1997).

Police culture remains an inherently strong thread within the police as an organisation and one that has to be considered when looking at the integration and relationship between the Special Constabulary and their regular colleagues. Resistant to some degree to change, police culture has long held the police back in marketplace terms in efficiency and effectiveness but a the same time creating a professional environment in which members belong to robust, hardworking and

loyal teams. The Special Constabulary is in a unique position of having the same powers and duties as regular officers but not being regular officers who are immersed within the culture, the Specials remain as outsiders. Some Special Constables as Mawby and Gill (1990) reported absorbed the police culture with respects to its language, dress code and attitude, but essentially they do this on a part-time basis, coming in and out of it, working within their other occupational culture and family life. The fact that the Special Constabulary cannot join the unions such as the Police Federation which protects officers from outsiders and external threats, this is another way in how they are not truly immersed or members of the same organisation. The lack of union support for volunteer police officers is something discussed in more detail later within this thesis, as another example of how the Special Constabulary could be better integrated within the police organisation and culture.

2.4 The Role of the Citizen within Policing

"Country's social problems are well beyond the ability of the police to deal with on their own"

(Webber, 1990)

The Special Constabulary is not the only group of volunteers operating within the criminal justice system or even within the police service themselves. There is a long tradition of public participation in maintaining local peace and order as old as English Common Law. In recent years across most Western-style democratic countries, there has been a general shift in responsibility for crime prevention and justice from the State to citizens (Uhnoo & Lofstrand, 2017). The effective participation of volunteers in government, public and the non-profit sectors are essential issues within democratic governments (e.g. Choudhury, 2010; Vigoda, 2002). Local crime prevention partnerships between the public police and their communities have now become common (e.g. Garland, 1996; Crawford & Lister, 2007) alongside the growing pluralisation of policing with a variety and mixture of public, private and voluntary actors engaging in policing activities (e.g. Loader, 2000; Rogers, 2017). Rhetoric and focus remain upon the paid regular police force, leading to the role of the volunteers within this extended policing family being little scrutinised (e.g. Bullock, 2017; Dobrin & Wolf, 2016). Increasing citizen participation within policing has been marked by the idea that there is strong public concern about crime and that as the capacity of the formal criminal

justice system becomes every more limited the public need to experience crime in a new way (e.g. Garland, 2001; Persson, 2014).

Today the benefits of volunteers working within the public police are being rediscovered, with volunteer recruitment being a common element to a number of policing programs and initiatives such as Community Policing. As austerity measures are felt throughout the criminal justice system, many agencies and bodies within the welfare state and community now depend upon some voluntary sector involvement (Bussell & Forbes, 2002). The volunteer sector now provides a sizable part of the UK economy, providing assets of around £40 billion (Palmer & Hoe, 1997). In 2000 it was estimated that half of the UK population volunteers some time to a community activity (Palmer, 2000) providing vitally important resource especially within human service organisations providing an essential link between the organisations and the communities they serve (e.g. Ellis, 1996). For example in some situations volunteers have been found to be better at reaching some socially excluded groups for example in distress youths, who were seen to trust volunteers more than paid staff as more likely to be there for the sole purpose of helping them rather than being paid to (e.g. Ronal et al., 2008). The results of this research suggest that the giving of your time for free can lead to people viewing individuals as more altruistic and therefore trustworthy although it is questionable whether this can be related to the context of the Special Constabulary, who while volunteers operate in the same way as their paid colleagues.

As the economic landscape has become increasing restraint, there has been a corresponding response from the Government in calling upon more individuals to become involved in their local communities (e.g. Ackerman & Fisher, 1998) by volunteering their time and expertise. Volunteering itself is defined as a social and communal activity based upon the idea of enhancing social capital; strengthening the community and supporting the continuation of services that would otherwise have been more expensive or underprovided (e.g. Putnam, 2000). The notion of volunteering is not a new one, with Routh (1972) nothing that *"…throughout history, there have been individuals willing to give themselves in time, effort, resources and money to help their fellow man".* This contribution varies from blood donors, victim support groups, Samaritan's phone helplines and the Special Constabulary. Marx (1999) remarked that volunteers constitute *"…a*

big unrecognised army" and that a failure to manage these resources effectively could result in missed opportunities, inefficiencies, increased costs and a potentially dysfunctional relationship between volunteers and the paid workforces (e.g. Johnson, 1981; Twelvetrees, 1991).

The study of volunteerism has always attracted a multi-disciplinary approach (Smith, 1994) as volunteers vary from providing a service to help individuals and communities through improving the quality of life, campaigns to change laws to working within various organisations (e.g. Courtney, 1994). Volunteering at its most basic forms is *"…any activity in which time is given freely to benefit another person, group or organisation"*(Wilson, 2000, p.215). This can range from someone staying late after work unpaid to help a colleague, to that of institutionalised unpaid helping behaviours such as volunteering in a hospital, charity shop, or church, used to benefit another (e.g. Hodgkinson, 2003; Wilson, 2000) and usually *"…involves contributions of time without coercion or remuneration"*(Dekker & Halman, 2003). Volunteering can vary from a single act to the systematic pursuit of a volunteering activity which individuals can enjoy to such as degree that they launch themselves on a career centred around that voluntary experience. There are no standard practices within volunteering, and the diversity of those who choose to volunteers means that they cannot be considered as one homogenous group; instead of including a vast range of experiences and skills across an equally wide variety of ages and backgrounds (Bussell & Forbes, 2002). Indeed the type of person who volunteers can change in connection to the institution, group, organisation or form of volunteering that they are completing.

Driven by motivation outside that of financial gain, the sociological literature suggests that there are a wide variety of factors which can affect volunteers motivation. These factors include building their self-esteem, obtaining new skills and experiences, for the role itself with the potential of a paid job in the same field, and building a social network around that volunteering activity (e.g. Rotolo & Wilson, 2006). Becker & Forbes (2001, p.230-329) argued that it is this obtaining of a social network which is a dominating mechanism leading to volunteering. Regarding volunteering within policing, Lowery et al. (1992, p.71) suggested that its roots lie in the *"…Greek conception of prideful participation in community to achieve self-realisation and collective goals"*. The more that the

public becomes involved within policing, the deeper their understanding of what the police do and the corresponding demands and conflicts which they face. Osborne and Gaebler (1992) suggested that volunteering and public participation in crime prevention and social issues empower the local community to solve some of their problems and to facilitate their efforts to be more committed and creative in supporting the police in their work. This voluntary community involvement can range from being more active in neighbourhood watch, school interventions for youth anti-social behaviour to reporting non-police issues to other agencies such as the local council. It has been acknowledged within the academic literature that the police themselves cannot control crime by themselves, and public participation could be used to enhance police functions. Public participation ranges from providing local intelligence to solve crimes, getting involved in community-based initiatives to prevent crime such as community-based social groups for identified at-risk groups and putting in more preventive measures on homes and business for example; volunteering for charities providing services to crime victims e.g. witness care (e.g. Ren et al., 2008; Sadd & Grinc, 1994). With law enforcement agencies facing ever declining budgets and diminishing resources, volunteer participation within the criminal justice system such as the Special Constabulary could become an effective means of compensating for the scarcity of police financial and workforce resources available to meet the incoming demand (e.g. Zhao et al., 2001).

With regards to volunteering in the broader sense of community support for policing, the Neighbourhood Watch Scheme continues to be one of the most well-known and largest schemes running, with 7.5 million members of 3.5 million households being involved in 150,000 schemes across the UK. Public-led patrols are also an increasing element of active community support ranging from very locally based schemes, e.g. resident and tenant associations who patrol their estates to those covering a wider area which an organised, structured model for examples the street pastors and street watch. The Street Watch Scheme was introduced by Home Secretary Michael Howard in 1994, an official element of the Neighbourhood Watch Scheme, although they often operate independently (Williams, 2005). The Home Office recorded 20,000 in existence with members of the community "…*walking with a purpose*" (Home Office, 2000, p.4). These individuals voluntarily patrol their local areas in small groups and report anything

suspicious to the police. They have no police powers and are not police run, instead of working in partnership with the locally based police teams, with the direct purpose of being the police's *"…eyes and ears"* (Home Office, 1994). The Home Office (2000, p.2) argued that this Street Watch Scheme in conjunction with the wider Neighbourhood Watch Scheme was *"…one of the biggest and most successful crime prevention initiatives ever. Behind it lies a simple idea and a central value shared by millions of people around the country: getting together with your neighbours to take action and cut local crime"*. There were some reservations about the success of this scheme; however, with Laycock and Tilley (1995) argued that while it may improve police/public relations, little was being reported or known. Such schemes do effectively transform active citizens into responsible rather than autonomous citizens (Johnston, 1996, p.226) by providing their actions with legal validity (Beetham, 1991). Bennett et al., (2008) and the College of Policing What Works (2018) states that the evidence suggested that neighbourhood watch can reduce crime, however, there is a considerable variation in practice across schemes and therefore differences regarding observed reductions. The systematic review conducted estimated that overall for every 100 crimes, an average of 26 crimes were prevented (based upon 18 studies, Bennett et al., 2008) although it is hard to empirically measure the impact especially as most are often implemented alongside other measures such as property marking and security measures (College of Policing What Works, 2018).

More recently there has been a move to have a structured form of volunteering within the police organisations themselves in the form of the Police Support Volunteers (PSV) programme alongside the Special Constabulary. The PSV programme has gained considerable momentum over the past ten years, set up to provide additional capabilities to the existing service delivery. As of 2012, there were 9,700 PSV programmes across England and Wales (HMIC, 2012). In contrast to the Special Constabulary, PSVs have no policing powers instead of being civilian volunteers with no stipulated hours required. PSVs are now performing over 100 roles within the police service, and a conservative estimate in 2012 was believed to be contributing around 800,000 hours in support of policing activities often in back office positions (HMIC, 2012). Approximately 45% of all PSV activities were linked to neighbourhood policing teams, where Special

Constables also operate (Home Office, 2012). Some forces are also utilising PSVs in a front office capacity, for example, Thames Valley Police used 124 of their 640 PSVs at the time in front counter roles in 31 of their stations (HMIC, 2012). Other roles include watching CCTV for significant cases, monitoring social media dies during operations/events and in general for forces, and obtaining feedback from users of the police service.

In summary, it can be seen that there are many ways in which volunteers can become involved within the broader criminal justice system and in policing itself, whether this is within the police themselves or in related and connected charities. However, in turn, the range of roles, approaches and philosophies involved under the umbrella of policing means that there is no co-ordinated approach and large areas of overlap. With uncertainty as to the core role of the police themselves, these volunteer roles are equally generic and multi-purpose with no structure. Where and what role the Special Constabulary play within this huge ranging context and landscape needs to be reviewed and specified.

2.5 The Special Constabulary

The Special Constabulary has been involved in UK policing for years (Carrad, 2006) Yet Leon (1991) acknowledged that many of these accounts surrounding the creation and development of the force are open to interpretation. The term Special Constabulary being formally introduced by an Act of Parliament in 1673 by King Charles the Second (Seth, 1961). Alarmed by the rising threat of public disorder, brought about the Crowns attempt to enforce religious conformity, King Charles the Second extended the existing duty of every citizen to assist with law and order by ruling that citizens could be sworn in as temporary constables for specific occasions (Seth, 1961; Leon, 1989). Citizens could be summoned by local magistrates and justices to be sworn in as Specials yet this was not a voluntary position, with a refusal to serve to incur a hefty fine or potential jail time (Seth, 1961). This Act of 1673 remained and was enforced on several occasions noted to call upon citizens as Special Constables, although nearly exclusively within the North of England (Seth, 1961). The next legislation pertaining to the appoint of Special Constables appeared in 1820, nine years before the Metropolitan Police Act (1829) and 27 years before the County and Borough Police Act 1856 which saw the formation of the modern day police organisations (Emsely, 1996; Taylor, 1998). With the renewed threat of a French invasion in

1803 the British Government called upon the public to enlist into the Special Constabulary (Leon, 1987, p.5) and the Act of 1820 clarified the powers in order to grant magistrates the power to compel members of the public to become Special Constables in times of public disorder.

While created as an incidental police force to be called upon in times of tumult and riot (Radzinwizc, 1956) the demands placed upon the small early modern day police force meant that by 1923 the Special Constabulary had been established as a permanent police reserve (Leon, 1991). The Special Constabulary Act of 1831 became the basis of the constitution for the contemporary Special Constabulary, allowing them to act in adjoining counties in times of extraordinary circumstances. The Act of 1831 formally outlined that they should be issued with any articles or weapons deemed necessary for the execution of their duties with local authorities allowing an expense of five shillings per day although very few actually received this (Gill & Mawby, 1990). The Special Constabulary were utilised in various roles ranging from assisting forces at fairs and guarding poll booths in the 19th century Wales to policing the riots of Carmarthen and Merthy in 1831 (Seth, 1961). These events saw the Special Constabulary being singled out for particularly hard treatment by the crowds as many were from the same communities as the rioters and therefore viewed as traitors (Seth, 1961). It was a further Special Constabulary Act of 1835 which introduced the principle of a voluntary Special Constabulary.

The Special Constabulary continued to be called upon by various governments in times of need, for example, historical reports of 170,000 Specials being deployed in Kennington Common in London during the Chartist movements of the early 1840s by the Victorians (e.g. Mather, 1959; Smith, 1985). However, after the late 1840s, there was little call for Special Constables until the outbreak of the first World War in 1914-1918. It was during this period that the Special Constabulary was organised into a body of organised, and structured volunteers with roles being to protect the nation's water supply from any German infiltrators and to fill in any policing gaps left by the subscription of young men into the army. Indeed after this, the Special Constabulary were deployed regularly, so that an Act of 1923 which allowed local magistrates to appoint Specials for preventative measures rather than only in times of emergencies, creating the Special Constabulary as a permanent body of volunteer officers. Around 130,000

Specials were active as a wartime police force supplemented by retired police officers recalled to duty during the Second World War of 1939-1945 while maintaining their full-time employment responsibilities (Gill & Mawby, 1990) until there became a need to invest in a full-time post-war constabulary (Gill and Mawby, 1990). Since the establishment of the regular, paid professional police force, there have been calls from the regular force and federation for the abolition of the Special Constabulary whose re-emergence within policing after World War II was predominantly down to pressure from the Home Office (Carrad, 2006). Other legislation of note with regards to the Special Constabulary was the Police Act of 1964 which officially cemented the basis of the Special Constabulary in its modern form (Mawby & Wright, 2008) when the Special Constabulary became subject to the same rules of conduct and disciplinary procedures as the regular paid full time force (ibid). The Special Constables Regulations of 1965 produced guidelines for the recruitment and management of the Special Constabulary while the Police Act (1996) provided Chief Constables with official responsibility for the direction and control of the Special Constabulary.

Despite this history, there is a very brief mention of the Special Constabulary within modern criminological literature, in many areas a total deficit in knowledge. Most research specifically covering the Special Constabulary is historical, with only a few recent studies emerging investing issues such as recruitment and retention (e.g. Gaston & Alexander, 2001; Bullock, 2014). The English Historical Review (COL.CXXII, 497, 2007) acknowledged that the Special Constabulary had mainly been neglected in general by historians as well as a criminologist, especially within the literature surrounding the period of the new police being created, despite the large numbers of Specials being enrolled to assist them. Historians John Saville (1987) and David Goodway (1982) shed some light upon the extensive use of the Special Constabulary between 1839 and 1842; however mostly regarding noting their use, rather than their experiences. Likewise, historians of the early Victorian provincial police reform (Municipal Corporations Act of 1835, the County Police Act of 1839 and the Country and Borough Police Act of 1856) also neglected the Special Constabulary within their accounts of the new regular paid police force. While the academic literature around the role of the Special Constabulary is particularly sparse what little does exist highlights the problems of marginalisation of the Special Constabulary from the regular police

force, which tended to dismiss them as hobby bobbies (Leon, 1989). More recent research has also highlighted various organisational problems arising from the rapid implementation of different paid civilian support roles such as the Police Community Support Officer programme (Johnston, 2006) upon the role of the Special Constabulary.

The most substantial study to emerge after the last this was the conducted by Gill and Mawby (1990) who covered their historical establishment and a number of qualitative interviews and observational investigations of the Devon and Cornwall Special Constabulary during the 1980s. Gill and Mawby (1990) highlighted at the time, that there was a lack of previous research, and that this absence in knowledge had been the driving force behind their study. Gill and Mawby (1990) argued that this lack of research had encouraged speculation about the Special Constabulary and that they instead should be considered as unique volunteers in that they have an expressed specific interest in the organisation in the first place, and that the work of the police was their motivation for volunteering. They also raised an interesting point that while the Special Constabulary allows members of the public to become directly involved within the policing of their local communities; they are also formally tied to the police forces rather than being merely affiliated, therefore allowing police forces control over these volunteers while gaining some cost-saving benefits (ibid). Gill and Mawby (1990) argued that how much training Special Constables needed was entirely dependent upon what they were expected to do, and therefore, as applicable within this study, if they are to assume more policing responsibilities, then they will need the skills to do so. However, if they are to remain an emergency force carrying out marginal tasks within policing, it is doubtful if much training would be necessary. The key to effective volunteer use is, therefore, effective policies (ibid). Overall Gill and Mawby (1990) found that the Special Constables within Devon and Cornwall Police felt that they were not used enough, with incidents of Special Constables turning up to go on duty but not being used, sitting in the police station or being told to go home. There was an acknowledgement from the Special Constabulary that the role of the Special Constable fit well within neighbourhood policing, few claimed that they actually favoured or would favour accompanying a community constable or being the liaison with Neighborhood watch due to a strong desire to be within response policing (Gill and Mawby, 1990). The public perception of the

Special Constabulary is an essential factor to include when considering the role they should ultimately fulfil. Indeed attempts within some police subdivisions to use Specials instead of regulars as the liaisons with the Neighborhood watch schemes had been met with hostility from the scheme itself, which saw Specials as an inferior alternative to the local involvement of paid regular officers (Gill and Mawby, 1990).

The Special Constabulary Today

Despite their deep historical roots (e.g. Gill & Mawby, 1990; Emsley, 1996) within policing as established above, Britton and Callender (2017, p.149) argued that the Special Constabulary "*…represent one of the most promising and potentially radical areas of innovation within policing".* A unique form of volunteering when considered in conjunction with traditional acts of volunteering, today the Special Constabulary continue to be a workforce of part-time voluntary unpaid police officers with the same powers, uniforms and equipment as that of their regular paid colleagues, working under the same conditions, legal requirements, force polices and oath (Strickland and Lalic, 2010; Caless et al., 2010). The condition of service now includes sixteen hours duty a month, equating to around 200 duty hours commitment a year in assisting their regular police force, leading the Special Constabulary to be a vital manpower resource, producing greater workforce flexibility.

Special Constabulary Demographics

While the regular force was historically drawn from the working class labourers, Bunyan (1971) suggested that the Special Constabulary were recruited from the petit bourgeoise. There is some evidence that the background of Specials bears a close resemblance to that of regular officers (e.g. Gill, 1987; Hope and Lloyd, 1984) but more recently Leon (1989) results showed a more significant proportion of professionals and non-manual workers within the Special Constabulary. Calass (2015) argued that in 1856 the catchment group from which the newly established paid police and Special Constabulary were mainly drawn the same, agricultural labourers who in 1830 had enrolled in large numbers within the Special Constabulary. However by the end of the end of the nineteenth century, the Special Constabulary moved towards those who could afford to volunteer, and these were shopkeepers and the industrial class who had a self-motivation for joining, in protecting their areas and communities. Volunteers have

increasingly become something that those with the time and moral commitment deciding to volunteer in this way. Volunteering can expose social divisions as volunteers are typically found to come from a higher educational, higher income bracket, with the social resources to help others (e.g. Wilson, 2000).

Governments and the police service have long argued that the Special Constables increase the diversity within the police service in terms of characteristics and life experiences of officers (Leon, 1991; NPIA, 2008; Neuberger, 2009; Home Office, 2010; Bullock, 2015) with proportionally more officers of minority groups and terms of genders. Gill and Mawby (1990) also argued that traditionally the Special Constabulary had been advertised as being more representative not only by gender and ethnic background but by socio-economic background as well. However, more recent research (Bullock, 2015) argued that while the Special Constables does include a potentially more diverse group of people regarding skills and life experiences, there are variations between the forces, and are rarely as diverse as the communities they represent come from and represent. It could be argued due to the nature of the volunteering within the Special Constable there is a tendency to attract those who have an interest in policing regardless, especially those with interest in joining the regularly paid police force. The academic knowledge about the relationship between volunteers and ethnicity has increased recently (e.g. Rochester et al., 2010; Bullock, 2014) however it does remain that for some reasons certain minority ethnic groups are harder to draw into voluntary work in the police context with cultural tensions between the two communities.

Overall the Special Constabulary also presents a younger volunteer profile to that seen within the paid ranks with 44% of Special Constables being aged under 26, which is considerably higher than the next youngest worker type (PCSO at 11%) (Hargreaves et al., 2017). These recent findings, therefore, reflects a profile from the recruitment of younger individuals joining the Special Constabulary with the view of applying for a regular police position in the future. The recruitment process and profile will be critically explored in more depth within chapter four, but due in part to austerity closing regular recruitment for a number of years, and individuals trying the role before committing full time. The proportion of Special Constables aged over 40 during this period has also fallen from 24% to 18%, despite this age

bracket rising for all other police worker types (Hargreaves et al., 2017). These findings fall into place with those found by Gill & Mawby (1990) that in general, they are significantly younger than volunteers drawn from other samples. Leon (1991) noted that career orientation as a stated reason for joining the Special Constabulary diminished as seniority (and age) increased. It is clear that expressing both highly 'instrumental' and highly 'tangential' motivations, special constables are not a homogenous group and are differently motivated to volunteer.

The Special Constabulary is an attractive proposition for police leaders and policymakers as fully warranted uniformed officers costing a fraction of the hourly rate of regular officers (NPIA, 2008). Since 2008, corresponding with the financial crisis, the NPIA has argued that the *"Special Constables are highly cost-effective"* and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO, 2011, p.7) supported this view, stating that the Special Constabulary *"...is embedded within the police service providing efficient and effective policing to support achievement of force priorities".* The total cost per duty, per hour of the Special Constabulary, is estimated to be around £3.40 for the first two years of service (including training and equipment) which then reduces to less than £3.00 an hour after that (National Strategy for the Special Constabulary, 2008). This means that even at the highest cost of a Special Constable, it is one around one-eighth of the Home Office estimated cost of a regular police officer, and around one-seventh of the cost of a PCSO (National Strategy for Special Constabulary, 2008). This cost is also the full cost, and does not at the time; take into account of any other funding provided by the Home Office, meaning that the actual cost to the individual forces could be even lower. A survey completed for the National Strategy for the Special Constabulary in 2008 indicated that the average Special at that time, provided approximately 171 hours duty, excluding hours of training per annum, with the average basic training period being 90 hours, however there were wide variations between forces, ranging from 45 to over 200 hours per Special.

Historically the Police Federation has always viewed the Special Constabulary as a threat to the full-time force. The 1986 deputy secretary of one Joint Branch Board wrote to the Police Review about the use of Specials as a means of policing on the cheap, fuelling the debate still further by referring to them as *"public*

spirited but completely misguided people" (Gill & Mawby, 1990). This concern from the Police Federation has assumed greater significance as the role of the Special Constabulary has expanded (Gill & Mawby, 1990). One area of particular friction is the rank structure within the Special Constabulary, with the First Police Advisory Board (1976) suggesting a separate grading system, as it alienated regular officers. When a representative from the Southwest Police Federation was interviewed (Police Fed 1), it became clear that while Specials Membership into the Federation was not seen as a negative, the rank structure was. The Police Federations Representative argued that regular officers had to go through a promotion process including written exams and an interview before a panel plus once they were promoted they had to take on responsibilities legally and professionally on incidents and welfare which no Specials Sgt would have to. Therefore the ranks within the Special Constabulary could be hindering their integration fully into the force and Federation.

Gill & Mawby (1990) found that on consultation with the Police Federation in the late 1980s, that members felt that Special Constables work should be restricted so that they would not impede the increase in numbers of regular officers, or threaten the amount of available voluntary overtime. However despite this, Gill & Mawby (1990) found little evidence that the Specials themselves perceived their organisation as a threat to the regular force, instead of defining their role as one of support with many stressing that they would refuse a duty which they believed was depriving a regular of overtime. Legal representation is one of the critical issues for Special Constables and under the current status quo, volunteers who find themselves in trouble are more likely to be given legal representation by the Federation if they were with a regular colleague at the time of an incident, especially if called upon as a witness during the proceeding. However, if they were on their own, Special Constables are entirely dependent on the legal assistance scheme backed by the Home Office. A survey in 2013 run by the Police Federation of England and Wales (PFEW) found that 94% of members of the Special Constabulary who responded wanted to join the Federation. However, the Home Office advised in 2016 that this should not be the case and consultation is ongoing. Now a new survey commissioned by the National Police Chief's Council lead for the Special Constabulary ongoingly intending to ask the Special Constabulary whom they would like to represent them on a national level.

Despite the challenges, the Federation Vice Chair Simon Reed did not believe that the issues surrounding the membership of Specials into the Federation as insurmountable. A working party had been exploring the issues surrounding this move from potentially changing the Federation legislation to accommodate the volunteer officers and crucially; they also examined how this move could be funded. The fact that the Federation is looking and investigating into Special Constabulary involvement has been welcomed by senior Special Constables, who believe that giving the volunteers the same standing as the regulars would be a significant step forward. Martin McKay, Chief Officer for Cumbria Special Constabulary recalled how *"…specials were called on to provide support during the flooding last year and the Derrick Bird shootings in the summer"* and believed that this would happen more and more with declining resources and that membership would be welcomed, although the cost will be the key issues. Whether Special Constables will be accepted into the Police Federation and exactly what form their membership would take remains to be seen, but the proposition is being taken seriously and thoroughly investigated. Ultimately with Specials likely to take on an increasingly responsible role in the future and with them becoming a feeder force for the regulars, giving them the same rights and benefits does make sense. If they have the same powers and increasingly carry out the same duties, why should they not have equal protection? Specials, therefore, do not have equal access to useful tools such as the specialist legal cover provided by the Police Federation.

Governance

The Special Constabulary is governed by a number of different policies and regulations including but not exclusively: the Special Constables Regulations 1965; Special Constables (Pensions) Regulations 1973; Health and Safety Act 1974; Special Constables (Injury Benefit) Regulations 1987; the Working Time Regulations 1998; Special Constables (Amendment) Regulations 2002; NPIA Circular Special Constables; Eligibility for Recruitment and the Police Complaints and Misconduct Regulations 2004. Special Constables are held to the same standards of conduct as regular police officers, and these are set in the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012 (which do not apply to police staff, i.e. those on civilian employment contracts) and the College of Policing's Code of Ethics. The

Standards of Professional Behavior (The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2008) of which all Special Constables must uphold are:

Honesty and Integrity

That officers are, to be honest, act with integrity and not to compromise or abuse their position of power.

(2) Authority, Respect and Courtesy

That officers are to act with self-control and tolerance while treating members of the public and force with respect. To not abuse their powers or authority and respect the rights of all individuals.

(3) Equality and Diversity

That officers act at all times with fairness and impartiality and will not discriminate unlawfully or unfairly.

(4) Use of Force

Force is to be used only to the extent that it is necessary, proportionate and reasonable in all circumstances.

(5) Orders and Instructions

Police officers are only to give and carry out lawful orders and instructions while abiding by police regulations, force policies and legal orders.

(6) Duties and Responsibilities

That police officers are to be diligent in the exercise of their duties and responsibilities.

(7) Confidentiality

Officers must treat information with respect and access/disclose it only in the proper course of police duties.

(8) Fitness for Duty

Police officers when on duty or presenting themselves for duty are to be fit to carry out their responsibilities.

(9) Discreditable Conduct

Officers are to behave in a manner that does not discredit the police service or undermine public confidence while on or off duty. They must reform any action taken against them for a criminal offence, any condition imposed on them as a receipt of any penalty notice.

(10)   Challenging and Reporting Improper Conduct

Officers must report, challenge or take action against the conduct of colleagues which falls below these standards.

Across the forty-three territorial police forces in England and Wales by the end of March 2016, there were 43,827 cases involving officers (and Special Constables) that related to complaints or conduct matters of which 3,945 cases were finally assessed as relating to misconduct or gross misconduct (Hargreaves et al., 2017). Of these 3,945 cases were investigated as misconduct or gross misconduct and proceedings were brought in 1,844 of those cases (ibid). Following hearings/special case hearings, there were a total of 359 dismissals, 259 relating to officers and 100 to staff. Separately 100 officers and 27 staff members were found guilty of a criminal offence during this same period of time (Hargreaves et al., 2017). This is an increase on the 2015 figure of 37,105 complaints recorded by Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) only of which 1% of which was against Special Constables (IPCC, 2015a, p.32). However, with the nature of policing has changed dramatically since the establishment of the Special Constabulary, the environment in which they are operating is also rapidly evolving. With the overall number of complaints against officer increasing, this could be an area of concern for the Special Constabulary, especially as they are asked to take on more policing responsibility. It of particular notes that Special Constables are being called upon to account for their behaviour whether it is on or off duty for any conduct or actions which could be seen to discredit the reputation of the police service (Beggs & Davies, 2009). With budgetary changes, force restructuring and the introduction of new entities such as the PCSO (Police Community Support Officer, a civilian role with no power of arrest), Highway Agency, Vehicle Inspectorate Staff taking on functions traditionally performed by police officers, the role of the Special Constabulary needs to be reassessed.

A new Disapproved Register was established by the College of Policing to prevent officers from re-entering the police service if they have been dismissed, or resigned/retired while being subject to a gross misconduct investigation where there would have been a case to answer. The register becomes effective from the 1st December 2013 and forces voluntarily provide the College with the details of those officers. A total of 833 officers appear on that register ranging from constable to chief superintendent with the overwhelming majority of those on it being reported by colleagues. This means that those who are found guilty as Special Constables would find themselves barred from ever being hired within a

police force across the UK, a significant move in ensuring the Special Constabulary is accountable and professional as their regular counterparts.

Summary

With an established long history alongside the regular paid police force, the Special Constabulary are now on the frontline of policing in the UK. Made up of young individuals seeking a career within the regular police force the Special Constabulary have a better blend of the genders and minority groups than that seen within the paid police force. However, with the nature of policing changing, there is a considerable risk for any young volunteer facing a conduct investigation as despite carrying out the same duties, they are not afforded the same protection or support. Special Constables should be fully aware of this risk and provided with the same legal support and protection, especially due to the implications for both their current paid employment or any future career within policing.

Chapter Three: The Themes

This chapter outlines and introduces the historical information and academic literature connected to the key themes selected for the qualitative research later seen within chapter five. These themes were chosen due to their link to the role and experiences of these voluntary officers. The critical themes within this thesis investigating the role of the Special Constabulary within policing include the deployment of Special Constables, their recruitment, training, retention, their value within the wider force and ranks and leadership.

3.1 The Role of the Special Constabulary

Policing strategies were historically stable until the 1960s when rafts of initiatives were introduced to improve the effectiveness of the police to reduce crime including community policing with a particular focus upon the relationship between the police and their public after several highly public scandals (Rosenbaum, 1994). The use of volunteers in various capacities within policing and especially the Special Constabulary has long has been promoted as a bridge between constabularies and citizens. The Special Constabulary is involved in a wide variety of duties ranging from reactive and proactive policing, neighbourhood/community based policing, assisting with public events, and national emergencies (Mirrlees-Black and Byron, 1994; Caless, 2010). Special Constables provide local police managers with greater workforce flexibility, making considerable contributions to visible policing and reassurance within the communities. A national data benchmarking exercise for forces within England and Wales undertaken in 2016 found the majority of forces projecting growth targets for their Special Constabularies (Britton et al., 2016, p.23). Indeed national strategic projections indicate that PCCs and forces were planning a significant increase in the number of Special Constables, especially in the early years of the austerity measures 2009-2012. Overall figures projected were for there to be 24,500 by March 2015, an increase of 58% (HMIC, 2012). Particularly within this context of austerity measures, the Special Constabulary were viewed as a way to increase policing capacity while reducing demand upon the regular police forces (e.g. Bullock & Leeney, 2016; APCO, 2013, p.4). However, the arguments for the increased use of volunteerism within policing are much broader with potential for local empowerment and engagement with the local communities, a

key point behind their use within neighbourhood policing (e.g. Johnston, 2003; Ren et al., 2006; Gravelle & Rogers, 2009; Bullock, 2014a).

The role of the Special Constables has traditionally been within neighbourhood support teams, working local fetes, parades and providing visible community-based foot patrols. Special Constables have long been deployed as Specials events, and to provide additional police workforce at a busy period, for example on weekend evenings. Leon (1991) found that such deployment was valued by senior police officers, who argued that they would struggle to resource such periods (Bullock, 2014). The use of volunteers within back office duties to allow for the police officers to be released for frontline duties (e.g. PSVs) has also be cited as allowing officers to be utilised on the front line, although the effect of this has not been proven. However as Whittle (2017, p.136) also argued that *"…the roles and responsibilities of special constables have changed dramatically since the days when volunteer officers were just expected to turn out in an emergency, police the village fete or direct traffic"* instead becoming utilised at the hard end of policing (e.g. HMIC, 2012; Bullock & Leeney, 2016).

 The Government National Policing Strategy in 2008/2009 projected and argued that the special Constabulary could still have the most significant impact upon policing within this capacity. While Bullock & Leeney (2016) found that most Special Constables generally patrolled on foot and provided additional cover at labour intensive events, making them a more visibly deployment. These duties are not on the hard end of policing such as rapid response, therefore carrying little risk of injury, being heavy in manpower use, rarely make arrests and are little involved in the investigation of crime. With over 90% of the Special Constables who participated in the present study stating that they had conducted a high visibility foot patrol in the previous six months, and almost 80% indicating that they had attended community events, providing a visible presence remains a staple of the Special Constable remit. Indeed, with 28 of the respondents reporting that they were working for 'Neighbourhood Command' (neighbourhood and community policing), the majority of special constables are organisationally allied to community policing in this constabulary, something which reflects wider government and police service discourses and something to which we return to in the discussion of the paper. Indeed the National Strategy for the Special Constabulary in 2008 identified five specific areas within neighbourhood policing

objectives where they believed the Special Constabulary could make a difference. These included:

(1) *Crime Reduction* – the use of Special Constables in carrying out uniformed patrols as a deterrent, to cover any police response to minor offences, to check persistent offenders were complying with their bail conditions, gathering vital local intelligence and to help trace and arrest offenders wanted on a warrant.

(2) *Public Reassurance* – the traditional role of the constable, carrying out street patrols, with group deployments to known problem areas based upon gathered local intelligence. However, there is some overlap here with the primary duties of the PCSOs and could be seen as an under-utilisation of the added policing powers of the Special Constables.

(3) *Attendance at and the Investigation of Minor Crimes* – while the general public generally understands the need for prioritisation of policing resources, there is no doubt that police failings to visit scenes of minor crimes and to actively investigate them, is a significant source of public dissatisfaction.

(4) *Anti-Social Behaviour* – if the Specials were used in deployable groups, the natural priority for the Special Constabulary would be mass deployment in areas of anti-social behaviour. Some forces are making even more specialised use of the Special Constabulary within this area, with some forces now training and using Specials for Level One Public Order Deployments.

(5) *Roads Policing* - Special Constables can also be utilised to take part in checking vehicles for defects and association with crimes, preventing and prosecuting traffic offences. Some police forces provide Special Constables with both ANPR (Automatic Number Plate Recognition) and Speed Detection training.

Therefore the 2008 National Strategy for the Special Constabulary suggested that the natural operation place for the Special Constabulary is within neighbourhood/community policing. They also argued that the Special Constabulary could meet the needs and policing objectives outlined by their strategy (National Strategy for Special Constabulary 2008) yet as can be seen by the data collected within this thesis. However, this research, set out in detail, later on, suggested that this is not where the Special Constabulary is performing the majority of their duties. With over 90% have conducted a stop and search, 80% reporting that they had been deployed on mobile response and two-thirds having made an arrest there is undoubted evidence that Special Constables are involved in reactive response (Bullock & Leeny, 2016). With 40% of special constables reporting having attended a crime scene or taken statements and one-third

having conducted interviews with victims, witnesses or suspects, there is some evidence of deployment in the more specialist arena of a criminal investigation, somewhat deviating from the findings of earlier studies. Indeed the research discussed further within this thesis, also suggests that increasingly Special Constables have a more significant role within reactive, response based policing, rather than within neighbourhood, community-based positions.

What Special Constables 'do' has been viewed as important within police service and government discourse for some time, primarily because of the implications for wastage (Leon 1991). Indeed, demonstrating a certain caution in their position that neighbourhood policing should be the focus for Special Constables seemingly recognising the importance of deployment in motivating and (especially) in retaining Special Constables the NPIA (2008, p. 13) noted '*that Specials deployed in challenging specialist or responsible roles have longer service than those deployed in less demanding tasks'*. This, they suggest, indicates that 'increasing the sense of "*added value*" encourages Specials to stay longer' (NPIA 2008, p. 13). The need to give consideration to Special Constables 'undertaking a wide range of tasks' (ACPO, 2011, p. 3) has been recognised. While wide-ranging experience has been viewed to be important for retaining officers; it is worth remembering that special constables are not a homogenous group.

If volunteers are to demonstrate higher levels of dedication and professionalism, there is a need to ensure that they are supported and continually developed, keeping them up to date with the methods and challenges faced by modern policing. Special Constables ultimately need to feel valued, and their "*…fantastic commitment to the force and the communities their serve"* needs to be recognised (Special Constabulary Recruitment: Marketing and Retention Survey Report Findings, July 2010 NPIA). There seems to be an established need for the Special Constabulary within modern policing, and there, therefore, needs to be a framework within which forces use the Special effectively and efficiently, focusing them on areas of policing where they could add the most value (National Strategy for Special Constabulary, 2008). If this professionalism of the Special Constabulary regarding their role, policing purpose, uniforms and training than forces need a long-term strategic plan with respects to how forces recruit, train and develop the voluntary force.

The Special Constabulary is unique in that they provide volunteers with legal authority and powers that come with the office of constable, and therefore, the expectations and regulations that come with that power. Volunteers have long been viewed as a way of facilitating civic and neighbourhood renewal and should be viewed as a way of regenerating pride and responsibility within the community (e.g. Home Office, 2001, 2004a; HMIC, 2004). However, as this chapter has highlighted the proposed role for the Special Constabulary within neighbourhood policing has a long and researched history yet both the police service and Special Constabulary have moved away from this role. Instead, neighbourhood policing is being dropped in favour of cheap manpower gap filling, frontline response policing, despite strong denials from forces that this is happening. While this may be an immediate short-term solution to keep the police frontline working and a favourite of young police paid career orientated Specials, is this the most effective use of the voluntary constabulary?

The National Strategy for the Special Constabulary 2011-2016 aims to continue the professionalising of the development of the Special Constabulary and to build upon the progress already made by forces on the previous national strategies (i.e. the National Strategy for Special Constabulary 2008 as previous mentioned). The principal aims outlined bear little relation to the findings of the current research. They are necessary for the Special Constabulary to be more effectively led, delivering policing and community safety in support of force priorities (National Strategy for the Special Constabulary, 2011-2016). Interestingly the new National Strategy does acknowledge that none of the strategic objectives and aims is currently being delivered, with minor delays in being able to evidence the Specials additional skills, providing them with a broader range of duties, sharing good practice between forces or making the Special Constabulary more diverse (ibid). The National Strategy also acknowledged that there had been problems delivering common standards across forces, making sure the Special Constabulary's contribution was marketed and rewarded, and in developing the leadership skills within the Special Constabulary leadership. Areas, where significant resistance was encountered, were when balancing operational needs with Special Constable availability and having effective performance management in place. The SC National Plan (2011-2016) also highlighted issues when making sure that the voluntary nature of the role is both respected and

understood by forces and striving for automatic consideration of the Special Constabulary in any police decision making.

Another critical development within forces which has directly impacted upon the Special Constabulary was the establishment of Citizens in Policing who in turn released the Citizens in Policing National Strategy for 2016-2019, a living document adapting to various needs, demands for example. (Citizens in Policing Community of Practice, 2016). Citizens in Policing was created to increase the support for the Special Constabulary, Police Support Volunteers and Police Cadets within each police force locally and nationally (CoP, 2018). Citizens in Policing have therefore been involved in the creation of the Special Constabulary National Strategy of 2018-2023 developed to fit within the Policing Vision 2025, the policing plan for the next ten years, shaping decisions around forces transformation and how police resources are used. The Special Constabulary is part of this vision contributing as part of the police plan. This National Strategy highlighted the need to support and develop career Specials while acknowledging the legitimate pathway of Specials into the regular police service (Special Constabulary National Strategy of 2018-2023). The Strategy outlined that forces need to continue to be imaginative and innovative in how they utilise the Special Constabulary within their forces. The National Citizens in Policing Strategy for 2018-2023 Priorities outlined were to raise the profile of the Special Constabulary, to widen the opportunities for the Special Constabulary while developing the force. The introduction of Force Management Statements which emerged from a recommendation of the Winsor Report requires forces to report their planned strength and activities, raising the opportunity to raise the profile of the Special Constabulary (ibid). The strategy states that while the Special Constabulary has its own needs, full operational effectiveness can only be achieved through a blended management approach and closer integration with the regular paid force. Therefore forces should factor in both the current and potential contribution of the Special Constabulary as part of their overall workforce rather than an addendum. Citizens in Policing also suggested that HMIC should factor in the Special Constabulary and that they should be evaluated on more than their number alone. The introduction of a national competency framework for the Special Constabulary also ensures that all Specials will be signed off on fundamental core skills of police officers (ibid).

With the police service changing to reflect the wider contextual social, cultural and political landscape, against the backdrop of every aspect of policing being challenged and tested for its relevance and value for money, the Special Constabulary have the opportunity to pay a valuable, cost-effective and differentiated role. While it remains clear that there are a role and place for the Special Constabulary within modern policing, in what capacity they should be remains to be seen. Police forces need to provide a framework within which the Special Constabulary could be utilised, so that they could become ever more effective and efficient in their deployment and role, focusing them upon the areas where they would add the most policing value. As the Special Constabulary grew, as indicated by the long-term financial reductions and outlined PCC plans, there will be an increasing pressure from Specials to get more exciting and varied roles that could fit their unique capabilities. Therefore there needs to be a strategy aimed at gaining these roles while ensuring that the Special Constabulary are not in competition with other members of the policing family. Simple strategies such as having a great structure to their deployment, and position within the force could have a meaningful impact upon the Special Constabulary as research indicating that the willingness to volunteers can be influenced heavily by whether that volunteering is perceived as rewarding and worthwhile (e.g. Handy et al., 2000).

3.2 Deployment and Role

Research has revealed two primary concerns about the deployment of special constables within contemporary police practice. First, there is a divergence between Special Constables' expectations of their role and reality. Reflecting the often discussed police constable's 'cultural' preference for 'crime-fighting' (see Reiner 2000), Special Constables state a preference for deployment within what they perceive to be the realm of 'real' police work. This perception of real police work includes responding to emergency calls, driving police cars and pursuing criminal investigations – rather than 'mundane' foot patrol (Gill and Mawby 1990, Leon 1991, Mirrlees-Black and Byron 1994, Gaston and Alexander 2001). Indeed one-third (12) stated that they were content with conducting high visibility foot patrol and allied tasks in the community. However, the majority indicated a preference for roles in rapid response teams, criminal investigation and areas of specialism (such as roads policing). At the very least, responses demonstrated a longing for variety. '*I would like*', one respondent stated, '*opportunities to engage*

with residents but also the opportunity to get involved in more operations, response, [targeted patrol], traffic attachments'. More generally, a strong desire to '*to give support to the regulars*', '*to be treated as a regular*' and '*to be operationally competent*' was revealed.

Second, Special Constables report that they do not feel that their deployment is appropriate. Special constables give significant amounts of time and comprise a sizable resource. Indeed, respondents in this study gave, on average, 32 hours per month to this constabulary. However, that Special Constables feel that they are under or inefficiently used is a theme common in the extant literature (Gill and Mawby 1990, Gaston and Alexander 2001). Gill and Mawby (1990) noted that special constables regularly complained that they were under-used by the police service. Gaston and Alexander(2001) found that about half of serving special constables thought that the police service used them effectively all or most of the time, just over 40% thought that they were used some of the time effectively and 10% stated that there were never or seldom deployed effectively. Special Constables have also reported poor administration, the pressure to work inconvenient shifts and a lack of understanding of the constraints posed by their full-time jobs (Mirrlees-Black and Byron 1994, Leon 1991). While Leon (1991) found examples of senior regular officers, who took a flexible view towards how much duty should be performed by Specials Constables and were appreciative of any efforts made by Special Constables, who are after all volunteers. Leon (1991) also found examples of senior regular officers who demonstrated anxiety to prove that all officers were competent, highly active and disciplined and so displayed little patience for special constables who did not report for duty frequently. In light of these findings, special constables participating in this study were asked their views on deployment and duties they completed.

There is something of a schism in experiences. On the one hand, the responses indicated that the organisation of the shifts of special constables was well managed. Most reported flexibility in the shift patterns that they were offered agreed that the police provide convenient shifts, agreed that they were offered worthwhile duties and that they were fully occupied. On the other hand, responses suggest that the skills of special constables are not well used. While opening up the police service to a more diverse group of people with different skills and life experience is a theme within contemporary government discourse

(Home Office 2010), with just under 60% of special constables agreeing that their skills and experiences were put to good use. With just over 40% agreeing that their interests were matched to their role and one-third agreeing that their skills and experiences were matched with their role, there would seem to be something of a mismatch between skills, experiences and interests and the nature of the opportunities offered to special constables. In practice, there are very few restrictions on the use of Specials with the Police Advisory Board (1976) recommending that they should not be included in industrial disputes (Gill & Mawby, 1990) something which they were predominantly used for during the Chartist Movement and Industrial Revolution. The range of duties involving specials also varies between forces, with the traditional roles being routine patrolling and special events such as carnivals, fun runs, and fetes. (Gill & Mawby, 1990). *"(B)oth assisted and spread the resources of the regular force. They also enabled the force to reward its experienced and longer serving specials with interesting work. It all helped to retain enthusiasm and keep specials in the force"* (Home Office, 1987, para 60).

A key factor in maintaining the enthusiasm of those volunteers without financial remuneration is the provision of exciting work (Gill & Mawby, 1990). Gill & Mawby (1990) also found that where a scheme emphasises maintaining specials interest by making them an integral part of the venture with benefits to the police, public and individuals specials (Home Office, 1987; Newton, 1987; also Veater, 1984). Gaston & Alexander (2001) looked to identify the extent to which the Special Constabulary were performing tasks which they enjoyed most, looking at the match between the individual and organisational needs (e.g. Herriot & Pemberton, 1995). On average they found that foot patrol (67.1%), mobile patrol (60.2%) and special events (37.3%) were the most liked duties irrespective to gender or if they were serving or former Special Constables (Gaston & Alexander, 2001). There was a noticeable difference when the length of service was investigated with regards to the popularity of the three duty types mentioned above. The popularity of foot patrol rose from 54.7% for officers with 2-3 years of duty, to 84.7% for those with 15 years plus service (Gaston & Alexander, 2001). The popularity of mobile patrols decreased from 63.2% to 38.5%, for the same length of service groups, while policing special events also increased from 42.1% to 84.2% (Gaston & Alexander, 2001).

Gaston & Alexander (2001) then investigated the difference between serving Special Constables and former Special Constables. For serving Special Constables, the most significant gap between duties most enjoyed against most performed, were between the policing of special events (36.9% most enjoyed compared to 66.3% most performed), plain clothed observations (27.6% compared to 5.1%) and traffic patrol attachments (23.4% to 1.0%) (Gaston & Alexander, 2001). While foot patrol duties were the most performed and most enjoyed by both serving and former Special Constables, former Constables had performed this duty most frequent at 57.7%, they only rated this most enjoyable 34.1%, compared to 42.1% and 38.4% respectively for those still serving (Gaston & Alexander, 2001). The length of service also had a large impact upon the difference between enjoyment and frequency for serving Special Constables with less than a year of service, who rated foot patrol as most enjoyed by 70.7% of respondents with this duty also being performed the most frequently by 90.3% (Gaston & Alexander, 2001).

Across the various forces, Police Constabularies have been making very different uses of the Special Constabulary. Herefordshire Police, for example, allocated a Special Constable to each of their ten crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPS) who were given the responsibility of raking through elimination prints. Herefordshire Police also had a Specials Sgt who supported the police scientific services team by taking over 400 sets of elimination fingerprints within the space of a year. Some forces set up regional operations, such as Operation Surrender, which involved Special Constables from six forces, (Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire, Essex, Cambridge, Suffolk and Norfolk), sent out 150 valentine cards to people wanted on warrant for failing to appear at court, resulted in 14 individuals voluntarily handing themselves in or being arrested. Mark Hopkins, the ACC for Cambridgeshire Police, said that *"…specials are a vital part of the law-and-order frontline performing key tasks, often in additional to demanding full-time jobs"*.

The relationship between the regulars and the specials is very important in maintaining Specials interest in completing hours, for example, East Dorset Police have a team of ten to twelve active specials which give nearly 30 hours duty a week, providing a clear picture of a team spirit between the two at that particular station. The Camden patch in London has been piloting a new local recruitment scheme for the Metropolitan Specials, in which the Camden patch

activity recruited individuals who lived and worked within the borough to join their local Specials unit. The aim is to raise the number of Specials from around 143 to 300 by 2012, with people from the local area tackling local community issues. Some forces acknowledge and pride themselves on having no fixed strategy for the Special Constabulary instead departments come forward strategically, asking if they need specials. Each role is then reviewed whether or not that voluntary role requires a warrant card and if not, then the role is that of a civilian volunteer post and the department then adversities the position. Most forces want the specials on the frontline, and some forces have principally said yes to having Specials on PSU, but they are struggling to get the regulars all trained so are holding off on specials for the moment. With Cybercrime becoming a significant area of criminal activity and thus police investigation, many forces are looking into targeting recruitment of specials from companies where the Specials could come with the skills.

The National Crime Agency

The National Crime Agency replaced the NPIA in investigating complex, serious and organised crime, which impacts upon the UK and internationally (NCA, 2015). The National Crime Agency uses a mixture of staff from police, non-police, customs and immigration (NCA, 2015). They have recently introduced *"Specials"* into their organisation through the Crime Courts Act of 2013; however, these Specials are essentially different from the Special Constabulary in most forces. A high ranking member of the National Crime Agency with the lead in creating the new Specials was interviewed for this thesis. That individual stated that their Specials are seen as unpaid employees, who sign a contract and mayor may not be given the powers of a constable to arrest etc. as it would be dependent upon the role they are performing, and as such there will be no ranks. They had only been introduced in the previous 12 months before the interview, so they were in the very early stages in the establishment of the role. They were looking to recruit 30 individuals within their first year, which should have taken place. The National Crime Agency hoped to recruit individuals who could bring niche, high level skills to the agency; and at that point, they had ten individuals with skills such as cyber-crime, forensic accounting and an academic specialist in counterfeiting and data management as just some of the example skills. The recruitment of Specials with regards to the NCA is business led, meaning that first, the gaps are identified

requiring niche skills, and then the recruitment begins. The NCA plans to start, therefore small, and to do it well, choosing whom they want to recruit when a gap in knowledge or expertise is identified.

All NCA Specials are to be managed by the NCA Specials Coordinator, and all have enhanced security clearance due to the level of data protection, and the nature and severity of the crimes. There are no distinctions between regular NCA officers and the NCA Specials in providing them with the appropriate assets to conduct their roles; however, they will obviously not be paid. As unpaid employees, the NCA Specials are not entitled to holiday pay, pension or sick pay. However, they do get reimbursement for any reasonable expenses they incur in the course of their duties, and they were to be provided with all the training necessary for their role. They will also be compensated for any loss in the event of injury or death resulting from their activities as an NCA Special. The Crime and Courts Act of 2013 allowed for the NCA Specials to hold the powers of a Constable in England and Wales, providing the Director-General is satisfied that they are suitable and capable, and have the adequate training to exercise those powers. However, they will only be provided with these police powers to assist operational teams in instances where their background, knowledge and expertise would add specific value to operational activities. Their hours of duty are when they are needed, rather than in general; and they are then required to complete their duties within a reasonable period of time as requested by their manager, but primarily their hours worked will vary according to the business needs of the NCA from time to time.

3.3 Special Constabulary Recruitment

As the Special Constabulary has not always been voluntary, the recruitment process has also changed throughout history. In the beginning, the Special Constabulary were drawn nearly exclusively from the working middle classes those with property and a way of life to protect, in direct contrast to the regular police force (Gill and Mawby, 1990). The popularity of these groups of law-abiding members of the local communities becoming Special Constables led to the 1840 Police Act, which allowed private organisations to appoint "*additional Constables*" who focused their duties around those organisations and areas (Steedman, 1984). In the rural areas, Special Constables were workers and tenants put forward by their landowners for protection. For example, the Thames River Police

began as such a privately paid for police force until the Government took over funding (Radzinowicz, 1956a). Today there are still several Employer Support Schemes, for example, shop assistances joining as Special Constables patrolling the shopping areas where they work to assist those employers.

During the late 18th and 19th centuries, there was open public hostility in the UK towards the establishment of a permanent paid for police force, especially as many witnessed the use of the police as instruments of state oppression during the French Revolution. When the Metropolitan Police was established in 1829, there was a conscious decision to minimise any parallels between the police and army. Policy decisions at the time were to avoid a two-tier system of recruitment like that which exists within the army, with a clear divide between officers and men and rank. Therefore the police force recruited men who were literate but *"…who had not the rank, habits or station of gentlemen"* (Gill and Mawby, 1990) with an extremely high turnover of initial officers for insobriety. From the 1930s to 1950s there as the slow introduction of various recruitment processes with officers required to pass tests of general knowledge, reasoning, and numeracy.

In direct contrast the Special Constabulary Act of 1831 allowed magistrates to appoint magistrates to appoint members based on recommendations from two reputable referees leading many being viewed as the most trustworthy, highly respected members of the local community. This led to the recruitment of Specials being primarily drawn from local traders, store owners, members of the middle classes with the money to volunteer (Gill and Mawby, 1990). From the 1900s onwards Special Constables were still being appointed temporarily with annual ceremonies and additional enlistments if necessary for any emergencies (ibid). Post-war the Home Office set up a Committee in 1944 to outline the Special Constabulary post-war structure (Home Office and Scottish Home Department, 1949). The committee at the time stressed that there was still a strong need for a reserve force post-war, and made case law by defining the role of the Specials more widely (ibid). The committee also made recommendations regarding the entry requirements such as a maximum age while during the war period those too old or young to serve in the army were sworn in as Specials; the process of appointment; the appointment of female Special Constables and the desirability that all Specials should be issued with free uniforms (Gill and Mawby, 1990). When the voluntary nature of the Special Constabulary was confirmed, it was still

possible to use compulsory enrolment with the example of William Lant of Hartlepool being appointed as a Special in1937 despite not having agreed to his nomination (Gill and Mawby, 1990). Overall the committee stressed that outside war conditions the Special Constabulary was a voluntary one and should not be regarded as a cost-saving resource away from the established paid police force.

The Recruitment Process

Today the recruitment process for those wishing to join the Special Constabulary is a lengthy selection process similar to that undergone by potential recruits to the regular police force, although there is some variation between forces. The national selection process includes a paper sift or online screening process for suitability before individuals are invited to attend a recruitment awareness event or straight through to an assessment day. The national assessment centre includes writing examples such as report writing, verbal and non-verbal exams, and interview and scenario role-play exercise. If a recruit is successful through all of these stages, they then undertake the medical and fitness test which sends the selection process, although a couple of forces still include a swimming test as well. Once arriving in their force areas before initial training begins all recruits are drugs tested, and DNA and fingerprint samples are taken as part of the overall vetting process, with some individuals, therefore, being precluded at this stage. Historically the Special Constabulary senior management team played a significant role in the recruitment of Specials such as sitting on interview panels; however, this has become no longer tenable due to time constraints and numbers. Most forces are looking to centrally manage the recruitment process automating the application process to increase efficiency and reduce costs. However, there is a risk that this move to make the process as similar to the regular police force will result in the same type of individuals joining as those who enter the regular force and exclude more individuals who could have joined the Specials uniquely in comparison to the paid police force.

Recruitment drives for Special Constables have ebbed and flowed over time with various large-scale drives being launched by various Governments. For example, Labour in its 2001 White Paper *Policing a New Century: A Blueprint for Reform* acknowledged that there had been a significant fall in the number of Special Constables and that they planned to reverse this decline (Strickland and Lalic, 2010). In December 2003 the Home Office announced that the police forces were

to get a £2.5million governmental cash boost to recruit an extra 3,000 Special Constables with all forces receiving up to £70,000 per force for initiatives which were aimed at recruiting, training and managing their Special Constables (Strickland and Lalic, 2010). In 2008 the Home Secretary announced a further £2.25 million funding package to assist in the recruitment of 6,000 more Special Constables over the next three years to get a total of 20,000 Specials (Home Office Press Release, 2008). The recruitment of Specials is predominantly done at the local level, except when the Government requires a significant number of Specials for large-scale emergencies. In 2008 nine Special Constabulary Regional Co-ordinators were put in a post with a primary goal for putting into practice the Green Paper requirements to increase the number of Specials across England and Wales with each position being funded by the Home Office for two years (NPIA, 2010). Despite this national initiative recruitment has primarily been done through local stands at fetes and local events, local advertisement in the newspapers and radio, however; most recruits are initially attracted through meeting another officer, Special Constable or regular police officer (Leon, 1989). After 1949 a large number of female recruits into the Special Constabulary lessened the consistent decline in numbers post-war. Recruitment during this period suggested that the middle classes were still the predominant recruitment ground with Seth (1961) noting that very few of London Specials at the time came from even the most respectable working-class areas. This means that when large numbers of Special Constables were later mobilised during industrial action and strikes, there appeared to be a class aspect to governmental action.

In 2002 changes were made to the Special Constables (Amendment) Regulations meaning that recruits no longer have to be British, Irish or resident Commonwealth citizens to apply for the Special Constabulary. Now nationals from the EU with the right to stay in the UK without any restrictions can also apply (NPIA, Circular (WSU) (SC) (07)1). The effect of Brexit and the separation of the UK from the rest of Europe again may impact upon these recruitment regulations and is a future consideration within the research. There are those who by the nature of their full-time employment cannot serve as a Special Constable precluded by a conflict of interest. These include those working within the criminal justice system such as magistrates, justices, justice's clerks and members of the Crown Prosecution Service and those working within licensing and security such

as clubs door staff. Other individuals may be precluded from the voluntary force due to personal circumstances or associations with various individuals through the vetting process.

The Winsor report Part One (2011) suggested that forces should review how they process regular police officers who have retired, arguing that they could potentially join the Special Constabulary. Officers who had recently left the force could join without going through the full recruitment process; however, the previous service would not mean automatic entitlement, as forces may wish to interview individuals for suitability. Comprehensive training for these individuals would also be unnecessary, although it was recommended that they undergo a medical and fitness test (Winsor, 2011). Where necessary appropriate vetting checks should be done, and all officers would have to re-join the force as a Special Constable with forces considering whether they re-join the force at the same or equivalent rank/grade. However, this should not be presumed as skill and knowledge do not necessarily equate to rank or grade. The Winsor Report (2011) argued that fast-tracking experienced police officers into the Special Constabulary represent a valuable additional resource for both the Special Constabulary in terms of skills and the broader force as good return on investment, contributing overall savings in terms of recruitment and training (NPIA, 2012). These former regular officers would also significantly increase the number of Special Constables holding independent patrol status without the need for further training investment. This scheme, when suggested, was made against the background of budgetary cuts and some forces utilising Regulations A19 to retire officers with 30 years' service forcibly and therefore was not well received by many.

Mark Heard (Former PC) "*It was a bit of a kick in the teeth really…I was shocked. On the one hand, they're saying they don't want me and then they're asking me to come back in the same role for free*" (Durden, 2011)

Tony Fisher (Former PC) *"It's a bit of a slap in the face to get rid of you and then say do you want to come back for nothing…It was adding salt to the wound"* (Durden, 2011)

While this did stop forces from publicly advertising the scheme, there have been examples across England and Wales of some individuals choosing to make this move.

Some forces are investigating inventive and innovative ways of recruiting different types of individuals into the Special Constabulary, for example, some forces are designing and funding Special Constabulary pop up shops for each local policing area to support future recruitment drives and target hard to reach communities. Other forces are developing and producing ways to capture volunteering good news stories centrally to review so that it can be released both within the outside the organisation to be used as a recruitment incentive and raise general awareness. In 2009 a recruitment marking and retention sub-group formed a list of objectives which identified the market for Special Constable recruitment to support forces in their recruitment activity, identified blockages to recruitment in order to allocate funding to forces and alleviate any blockages found, and to research retention issues and activity (NPIA, 2010). This was obtained through an online recruitment marketing survey sent to all 43 police forces. The survey found that the most commonly used form of recruitment was through the police forces' website (96.3%), word of mouth (85.2%) with only 11.1% of those recruited through modern media such as Facebook, YouTube or Twitter (NPIA, 2010). Blockages identified were found within HR support, training, uniform, equipment and resources needed (NPIA, 2010) meaning that forces infrastructure was struggling to train and equip large scale increases in Special Constables physically. Therefore the NPIA (2010) argued that Special Constables should be internally marketed through the forces own intranet, aware nominations, internal force publications, senior officer reports and being included within the policing plan. It was argued that internal marketing would enable police staff and officers to obtain a greater understanding of the Special Constabulary role, ultimately adding to integration and organisational support. This could improve the Special Constables impression of feeling valued by forces, impacting upon retention rates (NPIA, 2010).

Pay Incentive

Payment has been considered at various stages in history as both a recruitment and retention took. Special Constables do not receive payment for their duties although they are eligible for reimbursement of legitimate expenses. In 1992 the regulations were changes with the Special Constables Amendment Regulations allowing forces to pay Specials a bounty payment of up to £400 providing they fulfilled certain strict criteria; however, this *"fell out of use"* (Home Office Circular

10/2003, paragraph 3). A 1997 review by the HMIC considered whether Special Constables should be paid and agreed with the conclusions of an earlier Home Office report that they should not (HMIC, A Special Relationship: Police Forces, The Special Constabulary and Neighbourhood Watch, 1997). Due to declining numbers, the Labour Government did change the rules with effect from the 10th of January 2003. The Special Constables (Amendment) Regulations SA 2002/3180 allowed police authorities, following a recommendation from the Chief Officer to make proposals to pay a locally funded allowance to Special Constables within their force, however according to a Prime Ministers questions in March 2005 there had been little take-up of this scheme.

The Special Constables (Amendment) Regulations of 2002 introduced a more concerted and deliberately innovative attempt to incentivise Special Constables to volunteer more often. Police Authorities were empowered to pay their Special Constables an allowance with the amount being decided upon locally subject to the agreement of the Home Secretary. A small number of forces implemented this scheme, namely Durham, Humberside, Cumbria and West Midlands Police. For example Durham Constabulary introduced a bounty scheme in 2004, costing £127,000 in 2010 where Special Constables were paid an annual bounty in return for agreeing to work 50% more than the nationally accepted 16hrs per month. In 2010 the payments followed according to rank; Special Constables (£1,650), Special Sergeant (£1,900), Special Inspector (£2,200) and Special Chief Inspector (£2,500). Evaluation of the bounty payment regime was valued by participating Special Constables and contributed significantly to the number of hours for which they volunteered. However when compared with neighbouring forces, Special Constabularies which had no bounty scheme, no marked difference was found in the number of hours for which Special Constables volunteered. Therefore the evaluation concluded that such as scheme did not deliver value for money (Durham Constabulary Scheme Evaluation, S.C. Burn, 2010) however it would have been interesting to consider the scheme in terms of Specials feeling valued and invested in by the force.

The Increasing Use and Recruitment of Special Constables

With the incoming role of Police Crime Commissioner in local election areas, nearly all those obtaining the office outlined large-scale recruitment drives, and the use of Special Constables across forces to alleviate decreasing resources

and funding. As highlighted above, the challenge would be to train and deploy these officers properly. As the Special Constabulary increase in numbers, there will be increasing pressure for Specials to be given more interesting and varied roles within the police service to fit their capabilities. An interesting point to consider that the National Strategy of Special Constabulary (2008) argued that it should be ensured that the Specials were not in competition with other members of the policing family. One issue facing the extensive scale recruitment of Specials has been the opening of recruitment for the regular police force after a four-year recruitment freeze. Both recruiting and training new Special Constables will become increasingly challenging as forces turn their attention to taking on regular officers with resources such as assessment centres being used once again for regular recruitment, although with regular officer numbers being much reduced overall. Speaking to the Police Oracle, ACC Michael Banks (the ACPO Lead on the Special Constabulary) stated that the same would become true for the professional development resources, adding that a way of keeping the flow of Specials coming through the ranks needed to be found (http//touch.policeoracle.com/news/article.html?id+61434). As the Special Constabulary becomes an increasingly desirable resource as budgets are squeezed, ACC Banks acknowledged that there were significant opportunities for the Special Constabulary in the current policing landscape including the chance to specialise but admitted that *"the real difficulty we have at the moment is focused on throughput".* One example ACC Banks gave was that he was aware of a force with some 700 people wanting to become Specials and the challenges the forces found getting those applicants actually through the door. A larger Special Constabulary does have its advantages with volunteer officers providing some 2.5 million hours in 12 months, which would have cost the taxpayer approximately £38 million (http://touch.policeoracle.com/news/article.html?id=55982).

Recruitment has been aided by the Coalition Government's consultation paper calling for greater individual involvement in the public sector and in particular policing, including the promotion of volunteering opportunities including the Special Constabulary (Home Office, 2010:25). The eagerness from forces to expand their volunteer forces corresponds with the budgetary cuts with a national recruitment target of 24,000 for 2015, however after an increase until 2012, this

growth proved to be unsustainable with figures falling ever since. Most forces are undergoing a review of their Special Constabulary recruitment and retention processes, especially after the most recent recruitment drives failing to provide a significant increase in numbers. Forces need to ensure efficiently and cost-effective, seamless recruitment processes with identified ownership at each stage so that outcomes can be mapped and published. By designing a Special Constabulary pathway programme and providing information, general awareness within the police organisation would increase and consideration being made to take accredit of any prior learning for Specials with independent patrol status when and if they apply to be a regular officer providing potential cost savings. While there are operational and financial costs associated with high volunteer turnover and wastage rates (Watson and Abzug, 2010), traditional volunteer management practices tend to concentrate on recruitment rather than retention. The consistent need for recruitment highlights the failings of voluntary organisations to successfully deal with retention issues through managerial practices (e.g. Brudney and Meijs, 2009). Despite the development of better work environments being proven to influence the retention of volunteers (e.g. Waikayi et al., 2012) few organisations have devoted resources or monetary funds towards the management and retention of volunteers as they do paid staff (e.g. Mook et al., 2007). Recognising some of these issues, Brudney and Meijs (2009) highlighted the need for organisations to move away from traditional volunteers' management practices to those which would sustain engagement and encourage retention rates.

During the Comprehensive Spending Review, the majority of forces froze their recruitment of regular paid officers so that when recruitment began again, forces looked to the Special Constabulary as a recruitment pool for new regular police officers. In September 2010 the Metropolitan Police Authority endorsed a new approach to recruitment where the focus was on Special Constables who had already achieved independent patrol status. This meant that they would have a ready supply of recruits who already had some training and on the street training, knowledge and experience. The Police Advisory Board endorsed this approach to recruitment viewed as significantly reducing the time required for initial training, lowering training costs by approximately £12,000 to £20,000 per recruit. Information from 2009 suggested that those who had previously been Special

Constables had the highest success rate in passing the regular police force assessment process than those recruits who had not. In 2009/10 9% or 1,758 candidates stated that they had previously served or were serving as Special Constables (Winsor, 2011) and these candidates had a higher success (72.5%) than the 17,674 candidates who had not served as Special Constables (64.3%). Professor Disney as part of the Winsor Report Part One evaluating the average success rate for the national assessment process between 2006 and 2011 finding that those with previous experience of policing such as being a Special Constables, performed better with an increased probability of success of between 7% and 10% (Winsor, 2011).

The Metropolitan Police Authority recruitment process also made it beneficial for individuals interested in a regular police career to serve as Special Constables or PCSOs while also requiring participating in passing a course of accredited learning, police law and community certificate a national vocation level 3 qualifications. The qualification covers topics such as communities, legislation, and policing before they become regular police officers remaining valid for three years. Metropolitan Police personnel would be eligible for the internally delivered course while external applicants would be required to finance the course themselves. The Metropolitan Police Authority believed that this shift away from the traditional recruitment process to one focusing upon learning before the application process reducing training costs, improving operational capability and reducing turnover of new officers by asking recruits to prove and invest in their development. The Police Federation while recognising the value of recruiting regulars from the Special Constabulary argued that it reduces and restricts the potential applicant pool and would ultimately have an adverse effect upon police workforce diversity (Winsor Report, 2011). This recruitment process would also have long-term effects upon the Special Constabulary retention rates with recruits joining with the sole purpose of becoming regular police officers, therefore, providing only a rolling short-term service for the voluntary force. Since this thesis began, however, this recruitment route is not being enforced with it not being an actual requirement although a large number of Specials were successful in obtaining a job within the regular police force.

The use of the Special Constabulary as a career stepping stone is not new, with Gill and Mawby (1990) demonstrating that from the 1980s the Specials have been

viewed as a career step. Most recruits were initially attracted to the role by another officer, regular or Special (Leon, 1989 Scottish Police Advisory Board, 1975) and reliance on word of mouth recruitment strategies had consequences for the type of people who got selected (Gill and Mawby, 1990). ACPO supported the steps being taken by the Metropolitan Police in recruiting future candidates from the Special Constabulary and further suggested that police staff should also be encouraged to volunteer within the PSVs and Special Constabulary (ACPO, 2010). The Police Federation cautioned against the overuse of this approach as it would reduce police forces operational resilience, especially for critical police staff roles. ACPO also noted that the aims and attributes of the Special Constabulary affiliate with the governmental objective of increasing volunteers in general and that forces should encourage a national strategy for the recruitment of Special Constables (ACPO, 2010). The Winsor Report (2011) stressed that it should be borne in mind that the Special Constabulary was to be used in support of regular police officers and should not be seen as a replacement for regular police officers.

As Special Constabularies contribution to policing becomes more in-depth, these volunteers will need to maintain a high level of dedication and professionalism to meet various targets which forces must support and continually develop if they are to keep up with the contemporary challenges of policing. With the growing complexity of policing, one of the challenges facing the Special Constabulary is how they are to cope with the full range of duties and expectations. Both the force and Special Constabulary need to be realistic about what can be expected and what role the Specials should play within the force and community should be. The National Strategy for the Special Constabulary (2008) made it clear that the core role of an officer is to patrol and reassure the local community, arguing that the Special Constabulary should play to its strengths, becoming embedded as a key element of neighbourhood policing to provide a consistent and visible presence within the community. If forces are to expect more from their increasing Special Constabularies, then they must be sure to value this voluntary force by including them within the wider policing plans and providing them with the equipment and training necessary.

Northamptonshire Review (2014) found the same results with the primary motivation for people joining the Special Constabulary in Northamptonshire was

for a career in the regular police force, especially those of a younger age. They also found that advertising played a minimal role in encouraging people to become Specials. Indeed the review acknowledged that the pressure to increase the number of Specials in the short term had not been reflected in the long-term retention of Specials due in part to the motivations of those who are joining (Northamptonshire, 2014). A corresponding variable to motivations for joining is the age of those joining. Gaston and Alexander's (2001) study indicated that the younger age group (those aged 18-21 and 22-25 years of age) joined with the primary reasons for becoming a regular police officer (62.5% and 30.3%). None of those aged 41 years and over and less than one in five (19.2%) of those between 36-40-year-old category gave this motivation for joining (ibid).

In contrast, the older age group gave more altruistic reasons for joining, such as wanting to help the community, doing something worthwhile and concern for law and order. This data suggests that the motivation and age of the recruits have significant implications for the length of service provided and is another reason why Specials recruitment if they remain voluntary, should target an older recruit with a more stable family and work life. Gaston and Alexander (2001) stated that 31.8% of officers who gave their main motivation for joining as helping the community were still serving, compared with only 5.7% of those who joined with an interest in policing or becoming a police officer.

"I feel, having spoken to several Special Constable colleagues, that the main reason for leaving is that they tend to join the Specials as a way of gaining valuable experience in police work and social skills for when applying to join the regulars. When they are turned down, and when they see the majority of people getting in who have no experience of police work, they are disappointed and frustrated and very often feel that all their hard work and commitment has been a waste of time…"(Free text comment, Gaston and Alexander, 2001)

Research, therefore, indicated that unmet expectations develop in the initial stages of employment and can result in a lack of commitment and increased staff turnover (e.g. Hiltrop, 1995; Louis, 1980) making it an essential factor in both police recruitment and retention. Regarding Special Constabulary recruitment and retention, forces need to make sure that applicants have the right motivations and expectations about what the role involves and can offer.

3.4 Specials Training

A prominent themes within any research upon the Special Constabulary is training, with a number studies demonstrating that the training provided does not equip Specials with the know-how and skills needed to conduct their role (e.g. Leon, 1991; Mirrlees-Black and Byron, 1994; Davis, Smith and Rankin, 1999; Gaston and Alexander, 2001; NPIA, 2010; Whittle, 2014). One respondent in Mirrlees-Black and Byron (1994, p.18) noted '*And the training I found to be quite unsatisfactory (dangerously so) Specials should at least know the basic law before they are lobbed out on to the streets*' and another '*My expectations of the training have not been met. I do not feel confident to go out on the streets as a member of the constabulary*'. Studies have also indicated that special constables are ignorant of basic administrative procedures, such as how to claim expenses (Mirrlees-Black and Byron 1994). Whittle (2014) found that almost 40% of the special constables who participated in his study reported that they did not feel ready for unaccompanied patrol after training and 46% did not believe the transition from training school to becoming operationally independent was well handled. Regular officers too are sceptical about whether special constables are adequately trained. Nearly 80% of the regular officers who participated in Leon's study believed that the training of special constables was inadequate (Leon 1991). The implications are potentially quite significant. It raises questions about the ways that special constables can judiciously be deployed within the service, it feeds the perception, held by some regular officers at least, that special constables are 'amateurs', and it is resented by special constables themselves because they do not feel operationally competent and they are unable to participate in all roles in the service.

The suggestion is that the initial generic training provides a useful overview of the role but insufficient detail on the legal and practical matters that Special Constables find themselves dealing with due to the wide range of incidents and jobs they could be potentially facing. Indeed, it was common for special constables to state that they needed 'better initial training on practical skills'. However, as well as drawing attention to the limitations of their initial training, special constables participating in this study drew attention to the need for continuous ongoing training, something that was not being given. The link between job designs, content and personal satisfaction have been investigated

within the literature and is an important factor when looking into wastage (e.g. Hackman et al., 1975). Training is a particular area which has been highlighted as very important to serving Special Constables with only a slight majority of (57%) reporting being satisfied or very satisfied with the training they were receiving with almost a quarter (23.7%) reporting being dissatisfied or very dissatisfied (Gaston & Alexander, 2001). When former Special Constables were asked the same questions, these figures declined with only 52.5% being satisfied and almost a whole third 32.8% reporting some degree of dissatisfaction.

". . . It would have been nice to have had things explained instead of just being thrown into the deep end and told to get on with it. When you have never done anything like it before, you are worried sick because it is other people's lives you are dealing with, and you don't know if you are doing the right thing" (Free Text Comment, Gaston & Alexander, 2001)

Hiltrop (1995) remarked that "*The organisation should be a vehicle with which individuals can develop personal pride and express important values about their work to their friends, family and relatives".* However within the Special Constabulary less than half (47.7%) of serving Specials and only 38.9% of former Specials believed that the police service are using them effectively all or most of the time (Gaston & Alexander, 2001). Instead with 43.3% of both groups asked felt that they were being used effectively, 10.3% of serving and 16% of former Special Constables stated that they were never or seldom deployed effectively (Gaston & Alexander, 2001). There are genuine dangers here of Special Constables further development not being utilised and with many force using Specials as instructors who have not been prepared for the role, ultimately meaning that competency could be affected although Gill & Mawby (1990) argued that this would be eventually reflected in the type of people becoming Specials.

Overwhelmingly Special Constables surveyed in previous literature, placed enormous value on being adequately trained, not only in initial training but in terms of continuous development (e.g. NPIA, 2009; Gaston & Alexander, 2001). One of the most significant changes which Specials believed would make a difference, was *"to have more training"* and in particular further and developmental training (NPIA, 2009). All this evidence indicates that a more structured and frequent training for the Special Constabulary could have the desired effect upon their level of confidence and competence, significant especially if forces are looking to improve their professionalism. Indeed, this is

one area in which forces have tried to make some progress. However, most improvements have been made in terms of training provided within the probationary period of a Specials' career. This helps them to gain independent patrol status (at which point they become most useful to the police force) with little or no improvement in the further development of Special Constables once out of probation.

3.5 Specials Retention

The high levels of attrition within the Special Constabulary is not a new area of concern and indeed has been the focus of recent projects including Mirrlees-Black and Byron (1994); Alexander (2000); Gaston and Alexander (2001) and Whittle (2014). These very findings, however, suggest that forces are still failing to understand the nature of the problem or put in any measures in place to counteract these attrition issues. Literature on the retention of volunteers, often cities negative experiences within organisations rather than personal factors, as being behind the reasons as to why individuals choose to leave, such as a lack of relevant training, inadequate supervision, uninteresting duties (Alexander, 2000) and feelings of being overburdened and undervalued (Locke, Ellis & Davis-Smith, 2003). For the Special Constabulary in particular retention issues, lead to problems in costs, training and equipment and is one area which is very important in respect to the Special Constabulary getting a better long-term investment for their officers. Some evidence point to the majority of Special Constables serve for only two years or less (e.g. Whittle, 2014; Britton, 2017b) creating value for money issues for forces. Indeed Britton (2017b, p.7) found that attrition rates for the Special Constabulary have actually increased over the past five years.

Neyroud (2001) stated that the Special Constabulary has long been a neglected dimension of public policing with governmental and police support being lukewarm, despite various series of relaunches and working parties. The Special Constabulary is a demanding form of volunteering, and legal changes such as the introduction of health and safety legislation have made it even more so by requiring higher standards of fitness and training (Neyroud, 2001). These increasing demands have meant that the Specials are attracting those individuals with interest in a career within policing and as a result, this has led to very high turnover and wastage rates. Factors often cited as reasons behind these high attrition rates include joining the regular force, updating of records, the domestic-

work life balance, moving and changes in work commitments (e.g. Alexander, 2000; NPIA, 2010). With these rates not only continuing but increasing it would appear that little has been done to prevent this loss. While all volunteer organisations experience *"involuntary turnover"* over which they have very little control (e.g. Jamison, 2003), there is also evidence to suggest that internal factors are also leading to Specials decision to resign. This could create a severe problem for police forces because the Special Constabulary is a significant part of police visibility.

All voluntary organisations are investing and investigating ways to retain their volunteers, and the Special Constabulary is no different. Some of the predominant reasons why Specials decided to leave is seen as *"…beyond the control of the police force itself…"* such as work or study commitments, joining the regular force and for domestic reasons (Gaston & Alexander, 2001). Mirrlees-Black and Byron (1994, p.51) did remark that*"…it may be difficult for those resigning to identify one particular reason for leaving and, indeed the ultimate reason given may not be the original cause of the process of deciding to leave".* Presently police forces are attempting to improve their retention rates, through obtaining information from the Specials who exist or leave the force, through questionnaires designed to identify any reasons or problems behind their decision to leave. Then from these questionnaires, the forces could either deal with these issues or address them in order to stop other Specials leaving as a result. However, an NPIA survey (2009) of 13 forces which were using this method as a retention strategy stated that proactive intervention at a much earlier stage should be considered by forces, to negate these issues and to improve their retention rates further. By relying upon leavers' questionnaires, forces are waiting until they are effectively losing staff before addressing any problems. In the specific literature on the Special Constabulary, Gaston & Alexander (2001) found that the most frequent reasons provided for resigning from the Special Constabulary were work/study commitments (22%), joining the regular police force (19%), domestic reasons (15%), inadequate supervision by Specials supervisors, a lack of training, not feeling valued, uninteresting duties and not being deployed in a worthwhile manner.

Special Constables indicated that Specials wanted to be more effective at carrying out their duties and fulfilling their role. However, various constraints were

working against them, achieving this. These constraints included not being able to drive the police vehicles, a lack of training, a lack of equipment available, a lack of meaningful deployments and a generally negative attitude towards the voluntary force from within the organisations (Dash-O'Tool & Fahy, 2010). Other factors identified by Special Constables as having a particularly negative impact upon their volunteer experience and likely to make them consider leaving were negative attitudes from police colleagues, a lack of meaningful deployment and regular supervision, a lack of equipment and welfare support (Dash-O'Tool & Fahy, 2010). All of these factors impacted upon their impression and feeling of being valued by the force.

Therefore in order to retain their voluntary officers, Hedges (2000) reported that police forces should: say thank you and give recognition for their contribution to policing, to provide a clear role definition, to provide continuous training and further development, meaningful deployments and effective management, to ensure their integration into the wider policing family through the monitoring of regular officers attitudes towards them and ensure that their supervisors had the skills to lead. Dash-O'Tool & Fahy's (2010) findings also supported these points, with 19% of the Specials reporting a clear definition of their role as most important in feeling valued by their police force, relating to the original statement of this thesis that police forces need to clarify what the role of the Special Constabulary actually is.

As already acknowledged within Special Constabulary recruitment, the blockages to their numbers are not limited to the marketing tactics but also their other internal processes such as training, equipment, uniform and HR (Specials NPIA, 2009). Indeed most of these blockages are named as reasons for leaving by most Specials. Therefore forces should ensure that their retention strategies are also designed to resolve these issues within their internal processes as well. It has been suggested that forces should consider an internal Special Constabulary survey to help identify areas that could be contributing their retention rates, and which could be used to enhance their retention strategies in the long term (Specials NPIA, 2009). Gaston & Alexander (2001) asked former and serving Specials to choose from a list of 19 options for the three main reasons for resigning. While these reasons remained the same as seen in the previous research, the five other most frequently cited reasons revealed a very different

picture. In Gaston & Alexander (2001) both former and serving Special Constables indicated that poor supervision, a lack of training, not feeling valued, uninteresting duties and not being deployed in a worthwhile manner, were all major factors in them either resigning or considering resigning. All of these factors are ones which senior police management do have a degree of control over. Gaston & Alexander (2001) also found that of those who had resigned from the Special Constabulary, over one-tenth (11.6%) had resigned within one year of joining. The number of Special Constables who had resigned then rose to one third (31.1%) within the first two years and with almost half of those resigning (49.2%) having gone within three years (Gaston & Alexander, 2001). When those who looked at the Special Constables as a stepping stone into the regulars found that this did not materialise, they became disillusioned and subsequently resigned.

There were also some interesting gender differences within the data on former Special Constables. Female Specials, in general, were found to join at a younger age than male Specials, with 29% of females serving as Specials having joined aged 21 years or younger compared with 22.9% of men (Gaston & Alexander, 2001). Female Specials were significantly more likely to have resigned within five years of joining than their male counterparts (ibid). There was also a significant difference for both males and females, across the former and serving Special Constables with regards to their marital status. Gaston & Alexander (2001) found that almost half of the men (47.3%) were married at the time of joining the Special Constabulary, compared with one third (33.3%) of women, and that women who joined were more likely to be single or divorced. While the marital profile for men was similar across both serving and former Special Constables, for women there were significantly more married and cohabited serving female Specials then those in the former Special Category (Gaston & Alexander, 2001). It was also established that females who were married or co-habiting on joining the Special Constabulary were more likely to serve for longer while over half of all divorcees (55.5%) had left before completing two years' service, and 42.1% of those who were single had also left within this same time period (Gaston & Alexander, 2001). The majority (52.9%) of female Special Constables who were married on joining gave more than four years' service before resigning (Gaston & Alexander, 2001).

The data collected by Gaston & Alexander (2001) suggests that those recruits, who were settled in their personal lives, and with fewer life choices still to make, were more likely to provide a longer length of service. Older and married recruits have much lower wastage levels than young and single recruits (ibid). This data needs to be considered by forces, especially in terms of Special Constabulary recruitment, as by repeating the same recruitment strategies as before, they will continue to recruit young individuals resulting in a high turnover and wastage rate. This data should instead be taken into account by police forces when they are planning their advertising and recruitment campaigns with more being done to attract the older (over 30 years) recruits with the aim of being a Special Constables, rather than joining the regular force.

A sense of emotional attachment, of being *"part of the family"* is fundamental in terms of retaining volunteers and making volunteers fell satisfied in their role (e.g. Galindo-Kuhn & Guzeley, 2001). Emotional and task-orientated support are two of the most important factors for volunteers (e.g. Fuller et al., 2003) and corresponds to the reasons given by Specials Constables in their leaving questionnaires. Volunteer organisations lack the usual instrumental means to motivate and engage their staff such as wages (e.g. Pearce, 1993), and this means that there are on-going issues of attracting, motivating and retaining volunteers. Without these financial motivations, police forces must take into account why people are choosing to volunteer in the first place in order to maintain their interest in continuing service. As discussed in terms of recruitment, a large proportion of those joining the Special Constabulary are young and using the voluntary workforce to obtain a career within the regular police force. This means that they did not join the Special Constabulary to volunteer. Therefore it could be argued it will be largely unaffected by any means to promote their attachment and loyalty to the Special Constabulary. Instead, they are merely in transition onto a career within the regulars.

Research has already indicated that when unmet expectations develop in the initial stages of employment, the result can be a lack of commitment and increased staff turnover (e.g. Hiltrop, 1995; Louis, 1980). Therefore it is important from police recruitment and management perspective, that applicants for the Special Constabulary have the right motivation and realistic expectations about what the role involves and can offer. The literature refers to this as the

"psychological contract" which Rousseau (1990) defines as the "…set of expectations held by the individual employee that specifies what the individual and the organisation expect to give and receive in the working relationship". These contracts are dynamic and open-ended and are concerned with the social and emotional aspects of the employer-employee communication, not revolving around the money, and therefore apply to both volunteers and paid staff. Poor psychological contracts consequently lead to premature wastage with Sparrow (1995) saying "poor contracts act as demotivators and are reflected in higher withdrawal behaviour (lower commitment, absenteeism, turnover).

Special Constables Numbers

Despite large-scale recruitment drives across the police forces in England and Wales, the number of Special Constables in 2016 is lower than ever. This reduction continues with 16,042 Special Constables nationally at the end of September 2015 and only 14,864 by the end of 2016 (Hargreaves et al., 2017). Outside of PCSOs, the Special Constabulary had the largest reduction percentage of all types of police workers during this time period. When Gill & Mawby (1990) investigated Special Constabulary retention rates, they concluded that Special Constables stayed because they enjoyed the work and that the uniform provided them with an identity. Based on a small scale survey within the Metropolitan Police of those choosing to leave the Special Constabulary (Hope & Lloyd, 1984) Gill & Mawby (1990) suggested that these were those recruits who were more welfare-oriented and that they were leaving due to the priorities made on *"real"* police work. In that survey 42% of those who left suggested that it was certain features of the work that they saw as coming unpleasant, e.g. *"Yes when I was doing police type work and no because I was asked to do some ridiculous hours on some mundane jobs that the regular police didn't want to do"* (Gill & Mawby, 1990).

In 2013 after police forces outlined their planned responses to the Comprehensive Budget Review (2010), the HMIC (2012) reported that there was a planned sharp increase in the number of Special Constables with some suggestions that the national figure could rise to 24,800 by March 2015, which would be the highest figure for almost 40 years. This increase was to be achieved with an increase from just under 15,000 Specials in 2009 to just over 20,000 by 2012 (Home Office, 2015). However Special Constable strength had decreased

year on year (2.1% rate) previous to 2004, then there was an increase until a peak figure was reached in 2012 of 20,352 (9.4%) (Allen & Dempsey, 2016). This corresponds with the various continued recruitment drives. However after this initial peak in 2012, despite the continued recruitment drives, the number of Special Constables has actually declined. In 2013 there were 19,011 Special Constables a 6.5% reduction on the previous year and a wastage rate of 25% (Berman & Dar, 2013). This decline continued into 2015 with the statistics indicating there were 16,101 Special Constables by the 30th March 2015, a 9.4% reduction on the previous year and a wastage rate of 31% (Home Office, 2015). However, in the 12 months leading to 31st March 2016, 4,606 Specials joined while 4,138 left (Allen & Dempsey, 2016). It should be noted that 10% of police officer joiners in the year to March 2016 were previously Special Constables. Hargreaves et al. (Home Office, 2017) reported there being 14,864 Special Constables by the end of September 2016, a decrease of 7.3% from 2015.

3.6 Feeling Valued

Feeling under-valued will undoubtedly have an impact on how volunteers experience their roles and are closely associated with retention numbers (Rochester et al. 2010). A simple thank you, the NPIA (2010) suggest, might be enough for special constables to feel valued. However, they also note that meaningful deployment and integration with regular officers foster feelings of being valued (NPIA 2010). Having dealt with the former, "*we focus on the latter view the Specials were more of a liability than an asset'* (Seth 1961, pp. 83–84), views which are evident in more recent research. Gill and Mawby (1990, p. 131) drew attention to an *'undercurrent of scepticism amongst the police themselves'*. With Special Constables reporting that they were not integrated into the regular service, were ridiculed by regular officers and felt unwelcome, Mirrlees-Black and Byron (1994) found that the attitude of regular officers was a matter of disappointment for some. The NPIA (2010) also asked Special Constables who had negative experiences working for the police to describe those experiences. Almost a half referred to the attitude of regular officers and police staff (NPIA 2010). Similarly, Whittle (2014) found that 20% of respondents to his survey felt that a divide between regular officers and Special Constables still existed, and a further 44% stated that there was a partial divide. While an undercurrent of

scepticism may remain, there is certainly some complexity to the relationship between the paid and voluntary police workforces.

Special Constables report variable experiences from highly positive ones to highly negative ones (Leon 1991; Mirrlees-Black and Byron 1994). This variance might result from the nature of the personal relationships forged between special and regular officers. Research has revealed a distinction between regular officers' generalised, sometimes negative, attitudes towards the Special Constabulary as a collective body and officers' specific attitudes towards the individual special constables with whom they work which are often much more positive (Gill and Mawby 1990, Leon 1991, Mirrlees-Black and Byron 1994, Gaston and Alexander 2001). While over 90% agreed that they felt accepted by the regular officers that they worked with, this fell to just under 60% and 65% when considering the extent to which special constables felt accepted by regular officers on the whole and by the organisation as a whole, respectively. While the special constable may be more likely to feel valued at the micro-level than at the macro-level, free text responses, nevertheless, demonstrated that there is a minority of regular officers who hold pejorative attitudes towards the Special Constabulary. One stated that 'on the whole, the majority of regular officers are accepting and welcoming, but there a few who have an openly hostile attitude towards specials', and another 'sometimes [regular officers] can come across derogatory against specials although this depends on Rota'.

Gaston & Alexander (2001) found that 75.1% of serving Special Constables asked, did believe the police service valued them, all or some of the time, correlating with 64.1% of former Specials. Gaston & Alexander (2001) argued, however, that the group that believed they were being deployed ineffectively and were feeling undervalued should be considered with concern, and seen as a priority for forces. 33.4% of serving Specials asked, stated that they had occasionally or frequently considered resigning within the previous 12 months and 69.2% of respondents felt generally undervalued or never valued (Gaston & Alexander, 2001). Other studies have demonstrated that sizable minorities of special constables do not feel valued by the police service as an organisation. NPIA (2010) found that about a quarter of special constables did not feel valued by the organisation, a similar proportion to that found some years earlier by Mirrlees-Black and Byron (1994). Whittle (2014) found that almost 40% of special

constables surveyed did not feel valued or only felt appreciated to an extent. With half of the respondents in this study agreeing that they were personally valued and just over half that the Special Constabulary was valued by the police service as an organisation, a similar theme was evident here.

An example of how forces are trying to acknowledge the role and work done by Special Constables to demonstrate value would be that it is only in 2017 that the work and in some cases sacrifices made by Special Constables throughout history were acknowledged. On the 20th January 2017, a plaque was placed at Howard Street police Station to commemorate the deaths of five Special Constables who were killed during one of the worst air raids on Great Yarmouth during the Second World War. It was the first dedication by Norfolk Police to officers killed while on duty or serving. At 5.02 am two parachute mines fell one exploding close to a Special Constable's sub-station where give Special Constables were trapped and killed inside.

Many Specials argued that to feel valued forces only needed to receive a thank you, support and integrate them with the regular officers, be provided with responsibility and regularly communicated with. The factors which had a negative impact were negative attitudes from police colleagues, a lack of meaningful deployment and lack of regular supervision, a lack of equipment and a lack of welfare support (Dash-O'Tool & Fahy, 2010). When asked about what the force could do for the Special Constables to feel valued, 19% stated that a clear definition of the role as most important, followed by more support from the force, training provision and integration into the police family (all at 14%) (Dash-O'Tool & Fahy, 2010). Hedges (2000) reported that in order to retain the special constables, police forces should: say thank you and give recognition for their contribution, provide a clear role definition, provide continuous training and development, remote IT access, meaningful deployment, monitor the attitudes towards the specials from regular officers and police staff, provide effective management, ensure their integration into the policing family, and to ensure the supervisors have the skills to lead.

3.7 The Integration of the Special Constabulary within the Wider Policing Family

Despite a long history alongside the professional police force, and the Governmental White Paper "Building Communities, Beat Crime" championing a

model of an extended policing family (Mawby & Wright, 2008), on the whole, the Special Constabulary remain distinct outsiders within the force. It has been suggested that this could be partially due to a problem of integration and communication with regular officers (e.g. Berry et al., 1998, p.241), the structure of the Special Constabulary and the fractured relationship between the two, especially in times of regular police job losses. Parodied as "hobby bobbies", traditionally the relationship between the regular officers and Special Constables has not been a good one, and in many ways, this will conflict with any force plans for greater productivity, efficiency and the effectiveness of the Special Constabulary and police as a whole. Although they frequently work in tandem, attending the same jobs, performing the same duties, not all "real police" are automatically respectful of their voluntary counterparts (N. Duerden, 2010, The Independent). Gill & Mawby (1990) noted that despite all the studies into the police subculture the specials are not mentioned within this context, surprising and inexplicable omission since the specials has access to the stations and police cars, interviews and social clubs.

The relationship between the regular force and the Special Constabulary historically has been problematic, with the motives, competency and effectiveness of the Specials being called into question by regular officers (Gill & Mawby, 1990). There have been persisting myths within the regular constabulary about the qualifications and experiences of the Special Constabulary, which tend to be based upon a stereotypical view of the volunteer force (ibid). Carrad (2006) stated that the police service frequently misrepresents policing as being a specialised occupation for which the Special Constabulary are inadequately trained or insufficiently experienced. Any shortfall in training Carrad (2006) argues, is the responsibility of the force itself, not a justification for treating all Special Constables as substandard officers. Carrad (2006) also claimed that the perception among regular officers that volunteers complete a small number of duty hours and consequently have a lower level of experience is often inaccurate with many Special Constables undertaking a substantial number of duty hours per year. Indeed many long-serving Special Constables are well-educated individuals with successful careers and have largely chosen not to join the regular police force because of financial disadvantages (ibid). These individuals often have experiences of law or allied fields which if utilised correctly could be a

tremendous asset to police forces especially if working within more specialist fields such as forensic computing or forensic accountancy (ibid).

An example of the common attitudes of regular officers towards their Special Constabulary colleagues, PC Ellie Bloggs (a PC blogger turned author) in her published book Diary of an On-Call Girl (2007) wrote about the Special Constabulary: *"Most of them work just one day a week so how could they be anything else? To be completely and brutally honest about it, there is sometimes the perception within the regular force that a lot of them have just joined up solely to swan about on their days off in uniform and have a bit of power. That's not necessarily a negative, though. A lot of real officers also joined for that very reason"*.

Ultimately PC Ellie Bloggs argued the Special Constabulary are rarely cut from the same cloth, and therein lies the problem common to all TV police dramas: an assumed superiority vs presumed inferiority. "*Not all police like them, no, it's true. Special Constables cannot follow cases through to court, for example, and so they cannot really help with investigations. And many specials can't even take statements properly because they don't know how to. If you can't take a statement, then you don't fully understand the law".* (PC Ellie Bloggs, 2007)

Often because volunteer officer can only work one day a week at most, or even a couple of duties per month, they obviously cannot carry the same workload or in most cases develop the same expertise as a regular officer. This means that often the results of an arrest done by a Special Constable will result in work for a regular colleague instead which could result in strained relations between regulars and Specials. PC Ellie Bloggs (2007) had to admit however that: *"They are unfailingly enthusiastic. And they do like to arrest. And because the job is voluntary, there is no shirking among them. Would I be happier to see more of them out on the street doing just that? Why not? The more, the merrier, I say."*

The same type of problems could be seen during the workforce modernisation move of civilisation, with the introduction of both civilian support staff and paid PCSOs (Police Community Support Officers). When the PCSOs were introduced, (regardless of views about their viability or the necessity of the role) they were met with wide spread reluctance and sometimes open hostility and some civilian support staff report being treated as second-class citizens (e.g. Loveday, 1993;

Berry et al., 1998; HMIC, 2004). However, it should be noted that due to having civilian occupational contracts, police support staff and PCSOs can be made redundant like in any other profession, while police officers cannot be due largely to their lack of rights such as the right to strike. Resulting in police forces making their manpower reductions largely from within their civilian support staff as a means of cutting costs, due partially to the difficulties with reducing police officer numbers through anything but normal wastage and retirement. Several police forces across England and Wales did use the A19 process, which means that those officers who have completed their 30 years duty can be forcibly retired. However, officers from a number of forces have taken this decision to court and have won the first round, arguing it is age discrimination. This means unfortunately that these forces, if forced to pay compensation will be facing more staff cuts, and arguably the only people these officers have impacted are those who will lose their jobs as a result of this court action.

In 1991 the National Association of Special Constabulary Officers (NASCO) was formed by two Merseyside sub-divisional Special Constables, was there was no national organisation of any sort specifically for the Special Constabulary. The NASCO offered discounted police equipment, hotels; shops run by members, legal advice and produced the bi-annual magazine "The Reservist" which aims to promote the work and role of the Special Constabulary. One of NASCO's most significant achievements was the cataloguing of all reservist police officers killed on duty since 1801 accounting for all 529 Specials, reserve and parish constables. The NASCO was met with heavy opposition from within the police service, and particularly from Chief Commandants and other senior specials. The Merseyside police force circulated a memo to all police forces stating that NASCO had not been officially sanctioned by Merseyside, meaning that many senior specials took this as active disapproval and Special Constables were asked not to join.

While the relationship between the Special Constabulary and regular police has always been traditionally "precarious", there has been some progress to improving this with Special Beat, a magazine reporting in 1993 that "…relations between volunteer officers and Regulars have historically been steeped in animosity and distrust. That ill feeling is now well on the way to becoming a thing of the past". When Gaston & Alexander (2001) investigated that overwhelming

majority of both serving and former Special Constables felt that they were personally accepted by the regular officers (with 89.5% and 79.9% reporting being generally or fully accepted). However when the question was changed to how in general are the Special Constabulary accepted, 26.1% of serving and 41.6% of former Special Constables stated that they were either not accepted or were neutral, as one respondent commented "The general attitude of Regulars towards Specials is not acceptable. We are generally regarded as being in the way rather than utilised as a resource" (Gaston & Alexander, 2001).

Most telling perhaps was regular officers attitudes towards Special Constables something which even the Home Office acknowledged was important: "…the attitudes of Regular Officers towards Specials at all levels of a force are fundamental" (Home Office, 1996). When Gill & Mawby (1990) asked regular officers their personal attitudes to Special Constables, while very few would admit to a negative attitude personally, only 60% claimed they were personally positively disposed to Specials and when asked about regulars' attitudes in general only 15% claimed regulars were positive in outlook. Gill & Mawby (1990) noted that their findings painted a depressing picture with Specials underestimating the hostility towards them. Gaston & Alexander (2001) also found that when regular officers were asked why they believe Special Constables joined their answers differed significantly from those given by the Special Constables themselves, signalling a gap in the attribution of motives between them. From the regular officers perspective, 73.1% joined the Special Constables as a stepping stone to join the regulars, and while the altruistic reasons such as helping the community (28.1%) do feature prominently, many self-centred motivations were also attributed to the Specials (Gaston & Alexander, 2001). These included such as to improve their social life (9.8%) and to gain status (23.8%), to gain power (17.2%) or to wear a police uniform (20.1) (Gaston & Alexander, 2001) and these figures stood in stark contrast to the responses given by former and serving Specials.

With the Special Constabulary becoming more involved in a wider range of duties, there are many more opportunities for Specials involved in their scope to become more knowledgeable and capablities should a crisis warrant their wide-scale deployment. However, this does mean that there are also more opportunities for the Specials to appear as a threat to the regulars overtime and perceptions of

their professionalism. Therefore the evidence from Gill & Mawby (1990) and Gaston & Alexander (2001) hinted at an undercurrent of antipathy or even hostility of some police officers to their Special Constabulary counterparts. Gill and Mawby (1990) were surprised that despite the huge collection of academic literature and studies into police subculture, the Special Constabulary is not mentioned within this context, a surprising and inexplicable omission since Specials have access to the stations, police cars, interviews and social clubs.

The results were considerably different when they sent out a questionnaire to regular officers with a number of informal interviews, all confirming a caucus of scepticism. While not many regulars were ready to admit a negative attitude towards the Special Constabulary personally, only 60% claimed they were positively disposed to Specials. When asked about regular officers attitudes towards Specials in general, only 15% claimed they were positive in outlook, half were indifferent and over a third unfavourable (Gill & Mawby, 1990). Regulars tended to stress that they could not understand Specials' motives.

One Chief Superintendent interviewed stated that *"As a policeman, I find it difficult to understand why they do it for nothing. I have been paid well in my career, and it just seems incredible that someone should want to do it for nothing. I suppose it must be the excitement of doing something different"* (Gill & Mawby, 1990). While a group of regular officers in an urban force lamented the role of the Specials as *"depriving policemen of bread and butter"* one also added *"We can't think of any logical reason why someone should want to be a special…if the rules say, they are too young or too fat to be a policeman they shouldn't be a policeman (via the Specials)…They're nice people, but they're a pain in the arse, they're an embarrassment"* (Gill & Mawby, 1990).

While perhaps it is not unusual for professionals to view volunteers as a threat to overtime and their professional status, nor for them to see volunteers as well-meaning but mostly ineffective amateurs, Gill and Mawby (1990) stated that this paints a rather depressing picture with Specials underestimating the hostility of the regular force. There would appear to be an undercurrent of scepticism sometimes build upon ignorance or misinformation, although there was considerable recognition for the advantages of having a Special Constable particularly when they were performing duties that the regulars would prefer to avoid.

For the integration of Special Constables into the broader police subculture, Specials are trained by regular officers, learning the police vocabulary, a taste of real police work, meaning that some aspects of police subculture such as racism and sexism are also not uncommon within the voluntary police force. Gill and Mawby (1990) found that some male regular officers commented that females only joined the Special Constabulary because they were attracted to men in uniform, an observation unsubstantiated by the study. When asked one female special said: *"You hear about sexist professions, but the police have got to be worst. I nearly left at one point because it was so bad. Still, it does not worry me so much now"*(Gill & Mawby, 1990). These views are sexist and reflect a clear lack of imagination (Gill & Mawby, 1990) since women specials can be involved in at least as many tasks as men (Leon, 1989).

Gill and Mawby (1990) also concluded that the regular police act as gatekeepers to what the Specials can and are working. This means that for the Special Constabulary to be deployed more effectively, regulars must be encouraged to appreciate the role and value of the police volunteer. Specials are playing a much more significant role as the modern police force develops and to a large extent, they could be seen to be a microscopic version of the police. Interestingly, however, the more professionalised they become and higher standards are put in place, the more people will ultimately be excluded. Instead, Gill & Mawby (1990) argued that there was a much greater scope for integrating specials within the present structure, through the effective deployment of specials. The Police Federation's narrow perspective of Specials means that they will continue to view the Specials as a threat which will only inhibit their integration into the force. Regular officers, Gill & Mawby (1990) suggested should receive information about Specials concerning their role and powers, within their initial training as Gill & Mawby (1990) *"…many will be surprised by just how much a simple "thank you" can do for specials moral"*. They also argued that that Specials themselves need to consider the advantages of having a national machinery in place to represent Specials views and interests, which would become all the more important as their role expands, as at the time there was very little liaison between the forces and opportunities for consultation on learning from various ideas was extremely limited. Gill & Mawby (1990) also stated that as the regular professional police forces were finding it difficult to demonstrate effectiveness or efficiency, the

Specials achievements could only at best be modest. However, they argued that the existence of the Specials has more justification than merely those focussed on crime and that the potential value of this volunteer police force may be quite marked. The Special Constabulary remain outsiders due to the fundamental fact that they are not regular officers. Not only is their existence deemed a threat, but volunteer literature recognises the benefit of volunteers being in an ideal position to publicise any misdemeanours within professional bodies or agencies (Gill & Mawby, 1990).

3.8 Leadership and Ranks

The Institute for Public Safety Crime and Justice published a critical review of the Specials "experience" in Northamptonshire in December 2014. This review found that the promotion structure was not well known, well understood or well marketed within the force, ultimately impacting upon the promotion opportunities found by Special Constables. Gaston and Alexander (2001) argued that detailed formation about the experiences of Special Constables is essential and will ultimately enable police managers to identify any shortcomings within their training, inappropriate deployment and unfulfilled individual potential. Indeed they proposed that with more informative understanding, policies and practices could then be developed and put into place, to create and sustain a positive contribution for the volunteers while meeting the needs and demands of the organisation (Gaston & Alexander, 2001). Suitable training, deployment, supervision and recognition are all vital components to increasing an organisation's effectiveness and are equally as necessary within the police service and Special Constabulary (ibid). They stated that the relationship between the Special Constabulary and regular force staff needed to be further developed to have an impact upon the organisational functioning, through the education of regular officers about the roles and motives of Specials to help reduce any negative perceptions and poor working relationships (ibid). Through the integration of these two working groups, the activities of both would only improve both the efficiency and effectiveness of the police service as a whole (Gaston & Alexander, 2001). The net effect of the changes within the management of the regular police is that the Special Constabulary while retaining its fundamental constitution has been much altered in nature and function, by its interaction within the regular police force.

Specials Leadership

In 2008 a Home Office Green Paper, provided fledging funding for a leadership training program to develop and enhance the capabilities of the Special Constabulary. A Senior Leadership Programme (SLP) was therefore designed and delivered, specifically tailored for the Special Constabulary (College of Policing 2016). The aim for this course was to improve the Special Constabulary's understanding of leadership and to provide delegates with the ability to establish a clear set of values, ethics and standards while being able to deal with a range of differing and often competing standards. The overall object for the Specials' SLP was to increase the capability of the Special Constabulary's senior leadership by equipping them with the skills and knowledge to support their Specials Chief Officers in relation to performance and value for money (College of Policing, 2016). The course featured six areas of particular focus including emotional intelligence, negotiating and influencing, values and ethics, performance management, organisational change and public confidence (ibid). However, this course was not compulsory and in many forces did not take place or even offered. The fact that forces were considering proving such leadership training suggests that they had realised that there were some issues in relation to Specials leadership.

Summary

Almost all forces recognise the advantage of having ranks within the Special Constabulary as a form of showing value; however, there are varying levels of success and implementation. This thesis argues that force needs to make a decision in terms of ranks for the Special Constabulary in line with the decision about the very nature of the workforce. For example, if the force is to remain voluntary, is there any real need for ranks within the voluntary force or should instead they be placed under the supervision of a regular sergeant. If however, they are to become a reservist force then they should retain those ranks, but there should be a proper promotion process in which they sit the same exams, interviews and procedures as the regular paid officers, and the ranks would, therefore, have the same operational and organisational standing.

Chapter Four: Policing in the 21st Century

This chapter covers the vital issues and challenges facing the public police and policing within the 21st century, in particular, the changing nature of policing with the recent reforms and austerity measures being implemented within the UK. The chapter reports on how the police are adapting and coping with these various challenges and how they all affect the overall role and experience of the Special Constabulary within policing.

4.1 Policing Today

The provision of sovereign security and the maintenance of peace may be one of the oldest functions of civil society; however, the public police and policing have dramatically changed since their conception. Policing in the 21st century has become increasingly complex, with greater accountability, political and media scrutiny, all within a landscape of constantly changing trends and policy (Home Office, 2011). Modern policing within the UK is facing a period of transformation and adaptation, in a climate of diminishing resources and funding, combining with a period of ever-increasing public demand and expectations, sociological changes and ever real threat of national security. The social, cultural and political landscape in which the police operate is fluid with the trends and thoughts of the time, especially in a time of recession. The market in which the police operate has to adapt to accommodate changes within society, new service providers, new approaches/thoughts on law and order, new laws and acts of Parliament (usually the product of a social crisis, e.g. the riots of 2012) and the development of new technology. The law and order market continuously change to accommodate deviations within society, new service providers, new laws and Acts of Parliament, and the development of new technologies. With the Criminal Justice System stretched beyond its means (Bottoms, 1995), the old traditional justice system is struggling to cope with and to adapt to these changes within the UK culture, society and politics. Despite the fact that recorded crime continues to decrease, the demand upon the police service has not reduced in the same way. The other two prominent emergency services have seen changes to their demand, with fire and rescue services experiencing a long-term downward trend while there has been an ever-increasing demand upon the ambulance service (Knight Review, 2013). This led to proposals such as the Knight Review: Facing the Future (2013) which proposed a merger of fire and rescue services with one

or more of the blue light services and sharing governance structures which could result in considerable monetary gains. However, this idea has not yet been put into action and was largely hindered by local relationships between the organisations, but remains a future potential. The Government has already invested over £81 million since 2013 to help drive these blue light collaboration projects, and while there are some good local examples, the overall picture remains varied (Policing and Crime Bill: Emergency Services Collaboration; Home Office, 2016).

Powerful public agencies such as the police and social service, each have their agendas, aims and goals (e.g. Crawford, 1998) creating issues of ownership and accountability for aspects of public life. The lack of shared data and knowledge has made public organisational reform particularly difficult and time-consuming. Throughout the years, the public police have become more isolated from their public, largely due to operational advancements such as mobile vehicle units, centrally controlled radios and constant supervisory accountability (Chan, 1997). These operational changes combine to move them further away from the romantic image of the local bobby walking their local beat.

This chapter will have a look at some of the aspects of policing which have changed and how this has affected the role of the police officer before taking a detailed look at the financial challenge which the police service is facing and how they are adapting to austerity measures.

4.2 Nature of Policing in the 21st Century

Multiculturalism is now a daily reality for the frontline police officer, especially within certain forces areas and towns, for example, the Metropolitan police serve a London populace with under half being white British as of 2012 (Swindon, 2012). This means that officers must now more than ever be attuned to an ever increasing range of expectations from a variety of people and cultures, from the individuals they meet on their beat to the representatives of local agencies and groups. Multicultraism creates various pressures upon the police service such as ethnic diversity and cultural differences (Chan, 1997); a loss of respect for authority a threat to their very legitimacy (e.g. Peterson, 2008) and terrorism (e.g. Innes, 2006) which affect some aspects of everyday policing for officers.

Ultimately police forces are adapting their policing service to meet the demands of these diverse communities that they serve, a challenge which remains a number one priority for the public police (e.g. Kennedy, 1993; Bucker, 1973). With available police resources undergoing wide scale reductions, the departmental workload continues to increase (e.g. Kennedy, 1993) steadily.

One of the challenges facing the police is the wide variety of incidents, situations and contexts to which they can be called upon to respond, regardless if the primary responsibility for that emergency lies with another emergency service, as there can be some aspect to public safety to be maintained. For example maintaining the scene of a house fire in case of arson even though the primary responsibility of dealing with the immediate incident first lies with the fire service, or for many mental health incidents even though ambulance may also attend. Due to this factor, Loader (1997) has questioned whether the police could ever be able to satisfy public demand given the range of contexts to which the public may assume the attendance of a police officer.

Bittner (2005; 1967) emphasised that despite crime fighting being a traditional defining feature of policing, actual crime-fighting accounts for only a fraction of what the public police do. For example, Kennedy (1993) estimated that around 50-90% of all emergency calls to the public police have nothing to do with a crime having being committed, with officers only making an arrest or intervention in about 5% of the calls to which they are dispatched. Instead, officers perform many hidden activities within the community. These activities range from playing an informal role in resolving conflicts and providing psychological security in the community by being a visible symbolic figure, returning stray animals, mediating quarrels and providing direction (e.g. Lipsky, 1980). Recently there is research to suggested that police officers within the UK spend approximately 40% of their time dealing with incidents triggered by mental health issues (these may be crime-related or not), against the backdrop of corresponding cuts in social and healthcare services. Between 2011 and 2014, the overall number of incidents recorded in the police logs relating to mental health rose by a third (Quinn et al., 2016). Actual crime rates across England Wales have been consistently falling according to both recorded crime figures and the British Crime Survey (e.g. Simmons et al., 2002). This has led to reformers of the police to state that the re-

evaluation of the police was needed especially in reference to the amount of money being spent on law and order.

HMIC (2017) report outlined the current state of policing in England and Wales, drawing attention to the material pressures being put upon the public police forces, and the strain that this is creating. HMIC (2017) stated that the police could not continue to fill in the gaps being left by the failings of other public services especially those within children and adolescent mental health care that were too often using the police as a service of the first resort. This report also highlights the huge increase in online fraud, increased awareness of crimes against the vulnerable (e.g. the sexual exploitation and abuse of children), and the fragmented state of the police information and communications technologies leave them vulnerable (HMIC, 2017). Overall this report indicated that in comparison to the first PEEL inspections, 18 police forces now required improvements in at least one of the inspection themes. While providing some examples of excellence found in the recent inspections, the HMIC (2017) stressed the need for police leaders to priorities, and to put into place long-term strategic plans by ensuring that their staff are properly trained, supported and equipped to carry out their job and to overall increase the pace of this improvement. Historically the police have always been less developed regarding their use of technology, and this report again emphasised how far behind other organisation the police. Modern technology could give the police more adaptability and enhance their ability to exchange, retrieve and analyses the intelligence gathered.

In 2012 Theresa May, the Home Secretary, issued the Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR) to ensure that the police forces could deliver a robust national response to any threats to public safety on a national dimension (Home Office, 2015), a need highlighted by the recent terrorist activity in Europe. These national threats include terrorism, civil emergencies, serious and organised crime, public order and domestic cyber security incidents. These threats are highlighted as they would place unforeseen demands upon the local resources, and therefore, could only be addressed by police forces acting together and mobilising their resources across boundaries (Home Office, 2015). Crime and terrorism have no frontiers, so the SPR looks to provide an effective framework to inform the strategic assessment of these threats and risks for cross county capabilities (ibid).

During this period the College of Policing and National Crime Agency (NCA) have been established, and the PCC officers have come into effect meaning that consistency among forces on specific key specialist capabilities and resources can be arranged and directed across forces more effectively (Home Office, 2015). The SPR is something which the Special Constabulary should take note of, considering if any of these big national treats do materialise, the Special Constabulary will be needed particular at the local level to meet and maintain operational needs.

Demand for Policing Services

"Policing has reached a watershed in its modernisation programme, attempting to change its value discipline from operationally excellent to customer intimate. Operational performance needs maintaining, and yet there is an expectation on us to not only engage with our customers but understand their needs, motivations, and what they value most from the services they receive. Our drive to improve confidence and satisfaction may have led to us creating an "emotional bond' between the public and police and consequently this may explain why the public contact the police first rather than a more appropriate organisation."

(Then Assistant Chief Constable of Norfolk and Suffolk Constabulary Sarah Hamlin, 2012)

The provision of high-quality police service to the public against a backdrop of budgetary constraints is an ongoing challenge for the police (Bradley, 1998). Bradley (1998) argued that to provide this service, the police needed to have a better understanding of public expectations and the underlying attitudes and motivations for those expectations. Public perception and concern regarding crime and the police vary across different socio-demographic groupings (ibid). Bradley (1998) carried out group discussions with a broad cross-section of the general population, with a research design to ensure socio-economic and demographic variations between the groups selected. The report suggested that the police were more likely to influence the public's view and demand for policing if they established a strong working relationship between them (ibid). The research also found that while the police often had a good working relationship, some social groups particularly young people and ethnic minorities believed that the police failed to address their concerns and perceived threats (Bradley, 1998). The report, therefore, proposed that the police service see the public not as a single entity but as a number of distinct publics, through segmented policing with different styles but not standards. This customer segmentation is a common

marketing approach. Therefore there would be anticipated practical difficulties implementing such an approach within a policing context (Bradley, 1998).

Law and order, including the police, are all issues in which the public take an interest and are invested in, therefore making it important to consider the public experiences of the police service and how both can shape their views on police fairness and courtesy. The *"new visibility of policing"*(Goldsmith, 2010) has been brought about by the widespread availability of mobile recording devices, citizen journalism and online 24-hour news outlets, meaning that evidence of everyday police activity is now more immediately and widely available. The Criminal Justice System is remaining a topic of popular fascination (Reiner, 2000) and a central theme within the mass media (e.g. Ericson et al., 1991; Sparks, 1992; Reiner, 1997a). Reality shows and crime dramas centred on the Criminal Justice System and emergency services continue to dominate ratings. Even the rising profile and importance of the Special Constabulary can be seen reflected within the mass media, with a recent TV reality series centring upon the Special Constabulary exclusively and their role within policing (BBC First Time on the Frontline Documentary). This media attention can also shape public opinion and knowledge, with specific issues being prioritised by the media as necessary, initiating a media agenda which can ultimately generate or shape public policy agendas (e.g. Rogers & Dearing, 1988). This is important as police strategies do not exist within a vacuum. Instead, they are shaped by the legal and political attitudes, and the local resources available (e.g. Cox, 1990). A very small proportion of the general population has any direct contact with the public police or the Criminal Justice System and therefore gains their knowledge of these organisations and processes from the media and other individuals (Dowler, K. (2003).

Early literature indicates that the police are viewed positively (e.g. Black, 1970) despite some suspicions about state power and authority (e.g. Bayley, 1979; Lipset and Schneider, 1983). Perceptions of the Police (Office for National Statistics, 2015) indicates that in 2013/14 63% of adults on the Crime Survey for England and Wales, rated their local police as good or excellent, a small increase on 2012. Overall 76% had confidence in their local police for 2013/14 even though the proportion of adults having reported seeing a police officer or PCSO on foot patrol in their local area once a week or more was only 32%. This is a continued

downward trend since 2010/11 despite high police visibility being associated with positive ratings for the police. For example, adults would report high police visibility, 71% gave the police a positive rating (Office for National Statistics, 2015). In 2013/14 victims in 74% of incidents reported being very or fairly satisfied with how police handled their case (ibid). The HMIC (2011) report *Police Integrity* found that the general public has a favourable view of the public police and that the majority trust them. The HMIC report *Without Fear or Favour* (2011) also found no endemic corruption within the UK public police. Most significantly the HMIC (2013) report *Adapting to Austerity: Rising to the Challenge* found that despite the considerable budget cuts, the police were continuing to make performance improvements, and that victim satisfaction levels remain high, which the HMIC (2013) acknowledged as impressive given that over 90% of the total staff reductions had been achieved by March 2013. The literature indicates, in general, the public has subjective feelings towards police performance while maintaining objectivity about the reality (Orr & West, 2007). In comparison to their international counterparts the UK populace have a positive view of the police and policing (HMIC, 2011) with good levels of trust and legitimacy (e.g. Bradford & Jackson, 2011; Loader & Mucahy, 2003; Walker., et al., 2009) despite declines in public confidence since the 1950s following various scandals and criticisms over excess use of force, sexism, racism and homophobia (e.g. Sheeny Report, Macpherson Report, 1999; Nash & Savage, 1994; Chan, 1997; Holdaway, 1997). These figures suggest that despite the budgetary cuts and difficulties the police are facing, these are not affecting public opinion currently.

With public expectations of the public police growing (HMIC, 2015) and policing itself becoming more complex and challenging, police forces need to adapt to these changes while still protecting their communities. Force is being expected to achieve this while being every more accountable to both Government and their public while coping with fiscal austerity, structural reforms and the job of anticipating any threat to social order (HMIC, 2015). With the whole public services sector being to show the strain of austerity and limited resources with examples such as police officers transporting patients to hospitals as there are no ambulances available (HMIC, 2015) becoming more common, meaning that individual organisation are going to have to become more innovative and potentially rely upon their voluntary sectors more.

Demand

"There is no doubt that demand is changing in nature and much of it as a result of our revised approach to risk, threat, harm and vulnerability…understanding demand across the breadth of our business is critical. In recent years the Police Service has seen change on an unprecedented scale and is striving to transform in ways that will enable us to meet new types of demand with fewer resources…".

Chief Constable of Lancashire Constabulary Steve Finnigan (NPCC, 2017, p.3)

A recent demand analysis conducted by the College of Policing (2015) indicated that the traditional downward trend in recorded crime might be changing. While police recorded crime and incidents, in general, have continued to decrease, that trend has now slowed, with some types of crime appearing to increase, e.g. rape and stabbings (CoP, 2015). While there was a 21% fall in crime from 2008/09 to 2013/14, between 2012/13 and 2013/14, there was no change in recorded crime (CoP, 2015). Indeed corresponding with the fall in police officer numbers, police recorded crime has risen by 10% across England and Wales in 206/17, an increase which is accelerated, with a 3% increase in recorded crime to March 2015, followed by a 8% rise by March 2016, and then a 10% increase to March 2017 (Office for National Statistics, 2017). The 2017/18 Home Office of Crime Statistics also indicated that while lower-harm violence offences have stabilised higher harm violence has not. A 16% rise in offences involving knives or sharp weapons, 2% rise in firearms offences, 12% increase in homicide, 17% increase in vehicle-related thefts, 30% rise in a number of robberies from 2015/16 (Home Office, 2017). It is worth noting that some of these rises are focused within certain forces and that an increase in the number of police recorded crime does not necessarily mean a corresponding rise in the level of crime. Forces are also increasingly dealing with more costly crimes such as child sexual exploitation cases which involved a large number of specialised officers over a long period. The College of Policing also stressed that there were two indicators that the emerging pressures upon police forces, and the long-term effects of the budgetary cuts are starting to affect with decreased levels in police visibility and increasing request for mutual aid between forces (CoP, 2015). These figures could suggest, however, that with the number of police officers decreasing due to budgetary constraints, crime could be on the rise again.

A significant challenge for the police has been the shift from supply (service led) improvement to a demand side (citizen-driven, customer-led). Understanding police forces demand is crucial to the design and delivery of policing services, for the effective and efficient management of resources and is linked to capacity, capability and productivity (NPCC, 2017). It should be noted that demand upon police services are not always legitimate demand, instead of being displaced from other agencies or bodies or as the result of inefficiencies and ineffective use of resources. Policing services needs to be considered in part of the whole system in the provision of public services. The nature of police demand is complex with forces looking to understand, manage, and where possible to reduce it. Demand has been broadened out beyond calls for service to everything that the police service does (CoP, 2015) and therefore, there should be a reconsideration as to the role and scope of the service. Indeed demand is not just complex, it is also dynamic and varies with time from the baseline (demand for the police which always exists), to cyclical (regular events such as Christmas and acquisitive crime), seasonal (interchangeable demand varying with events or seasons e.g. peaking in summer months with tourism), surge (unexpected or one office incidents creating sudden increased demand) to various trending demand (localised problems, or trends) (NPCC, 2017). NPCC (2017) identified three forms of demand influencing the public police; public, protective and internal. Public demand is often seen as the number of incidents and reports of crime, very obvious and relatively easy aspects to count, although a large proportion of calls received by the police do not translate to incidents or crimes yet nevertheless utilised resource time. Protective demand relates to that created by needing to react to intelligence and act proactively in dealing with crime types, volume etc. Internal demand is the self-generated demand created by organisational processes, protocols, administrative tasks and bureaucracy.

Police Reform

The public sector regularly undergoes a cycle of planning and goal setting (e.g. Wechsler & Backoff, 1986) with usually little time to implement any of these plans. The police operate differently than most within the public sector in that it operates within a hierarchical structure with greater discretion within the lower ranks, often reacting to crime (e.g. Savage & Leishman, 1996). Recently there has been an emphasis upon the police to fulfil their role as a public service to the public rather

than their law enforcement role (Mawby & Worthington, 2002). This, in turn, leads to the introduction of various business and economical techniques for measuring costs and outputs, emerging under the rhetoric of new public management (e.g. Lane, 2000; McLaughlin et al., 2002; 2001). These initiatives led to police performance being measured in terms of the number of crimes being solves, tickets being issued, and arrests made. However, academics and practitioners alike argued that there were many aspects of policing which are difficult to measure due to their very hidden nature as discussed in earlier chapters. Many unobservable factors could potentially be connected to good police performance, such as taking the time to talk to a victim of a crime.

4.3 Modern Recommendations and Changes to the Police

Since the start of this thesis, there have been changes made both within law and policy, which has affected the police and policing within the UK. For example, the Policing and Crime Act 2017 received Royal Assent on the 31st January 2017 containing a wide range of measures aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of police forces. This was done by allowing closer collaborations with other emergency services, enhanced democratic accountability for the police, fire and rescue services, increasing public confidence in policing, strengthening the protection of people under investigation, while ensuring the police and others have the powers necessary to prevent, detect and investigate crime, particularly to safeguard children and young people from sexual exploitation (Home Office, 2017). The HMIC also gained more powers to respond to emerging risks and concerns in policing allowing them to serve notice on forces to provide them with access to all information and premises for the purposes of the inspection (Home Office, 2017).

In 2010 Lord Winsor of the HMIC, carried out a review of police pay and remuneration conditions, which until then had remained mostly untouched for the past 30 years. With Part One of the report published in 2011, the Winsor Review was hugely controversial and resulted in strong opposition from the police themselves, leading to the biggest demonstration by police officers in England and Wales on the 10th Mary 2012. More than 30,000 officers marched through London in protest against both the budgetary cuts and Winsor recommendations. Some officers were particularly angry that a civilian would decide their future; however, it must be noted that these recommendations came against a backdrop

of budgetary and workforce reductions. The Winsor Report sets out recommendations for the reforming and establishment of an improved system of pay and conditions for police officers and staff, in line with the three-year pay settlement ending that September 2011. Winsor saw these reforms as ultimately affecting the calibre of people joining the police, and therefore, the overall efficiency and effectiveness of policing. The reforms recommended equipping police forces with the steps necessary to provide higher quality public protection while still respecting the value and unique nature of policing. In the present conditions of financial restraint and the rigidities of the conditions applying to police officers and how their numbers can be reduced (through performance, misconduct or retirement or if in probation), this has placed the burden of job losses unduly upon police staff. This history of police pay reforms is a long one, usually provoked by the crisis.

Winsor acknowledged that the most challenging aspect facing police management was changing the organisational culture (Winsor, 2011) and while some elements of that culture should be recognised for their strengths such as determination, courage when dealing with challenges and the danger of the job, and in general a hard work ethic, there are also less worthy aspects. Winsor (2011) argued that these weaknesses such as the way in which officers and staff are managed, needed to be corrected and that the notion that every officer does work of equal value, irrespective of hours worked and duties performed is unsustainable and should be discarded. The police pay remains based upon a scheme devised nearly 30 years ago, and since 1978 the society in which the police operate, and from which they draw their personnel has dramatically changed. Police officers are no longer underpaid in comparison to the average pay within the private or public sector with their pay scale rates typically 10-15% higher than some other public sector workers (ibid). In some regions, officers are paid nearly 60% more than the median local earnings (Winsor, 2011). Not only has their pay kept pace with the average rates of pay, but in relative terms, they are paid the best they ever have been, and the overall calibre of officers is at its highest point.

The office of police constable is considered the bedrock of UK policing. Therefore Winsor (2011) outlined that the demands of policing should be acknowledged in the pay and conditions such as the risks, public responsibility and scrutiny, the

unsociable hours and absence of the ability to withdraw their labour. Winsor also recommended that a new system of determining differential pay within each rank or job category should be implemented. These recommendations could enable the police service to work within their reduced means for the short term, while implementing further reforms in line with long-term aims, giving an overall estimated saving of £217 million by April 2014 (Winsor, 2011). This means that if Winsor's recommendations (2011) are implemented, it will concentrate the highest pay to those on the frontline and in the most demanding roles within the police service. This is a particularly salient point with regards to the use of Special Constables upon the frontline. If the HMIC is stating that frontline policing is one of the most demanding roles within policing, and frontline staff should be paid the most, then how can unpaid voluntary officers be used in such a capacity? The Special Constables now face the same dramatic social challenges as their regular colleagues yet within out the same support (e.g. Federation membership) or training. Police forces have recently outlined an aim to provide more of their officers with tasers as protection. However, forces stated that they would not be arming their Special Constables despite them attending the same jobs, and dealing with the same incidents as their regular colleagues. This statement was criticised by the Special Constabulary (Telegraph, Brooks-Pollack, 22nd July 2014). Back in 2012, a paper was presented to ACPO Cabinet Officer regarding the issues of a taser being issued to Specials which was declined at the time for a variety of reasons (NPCC, 2012 ref: 000179/15). At the time it was argued that they would not receive the same level of training as regular officers, that in the last two years since joining they are unlikely to have developed the equivalent depth and breadth of conflict resolution experience as regular officers. Therefore with the added scrutiny and political interest in the subject matter, giving taser to Special Constables would be deemed controversial (NPCC, 2012 re 000179/15). However, this new decision has had support from current Chief Constables, and high ranking profiled Specials also pushing for a decision to be made. Policing as this research indicates for Specials has changed due to these voluntary officers now completing more and more frontline policing.

The Winsor Reports and particularly Report One (2011) included a list of various recommendations for the Special Constabulary, in recognition of the growing role of the voluntary police workforce. As the National Policing Improvement Agency

already indicated the Special Constabulary's profile within the police service should be raised, so that police officers have greater confidence in their ability to rely upon Special Constables services and assistance. A key issue with concerns with Specials being able to assist those first two years are a probationary period for Special Constables and dependent upon how many hours they can commit to will make a difference to how capable they will be. In those first two years they cannot work alone so could be a hindrance to the regular officer working rather than assistance. The NPIA also indicated that financial incentive should continue to be considered for the Special Constabulary but that the present schemes had never been well assessed. The NPIA also stated that employer-supported policing (whereby a private or public sector employer encourages its employees to act as Special Constables, usually allowing some paid or unpaid leave) should be actively encouraged (Submission To the Review, NPIA, 2010).

During the review's seminar, Mr Blair Gibbs (Head of Crime and Justice at the Policy Exchange) argued that the police services needed to examine three areas with regards to the Special Constabulary. Namely, whether the responsibilities of the Special Constabulary were sufficiently rewarding, how forces could increase their commitment so they could be relied upon as a regular deployable force, and how to improve their incentive to work, with considerations being given to the provision of council tax reductions and travel subsidies or concessions. A key point here for this thesis is that if they want the Special Constabulary to become a regular deployable force, the re-imaging them as a reservist force would be best suited. The Winsor Report Part One concluded that the Special Constabulary is to be commended highly for the public service they provide and that police services should develop additional incentives and rewards to encourage Special Constables to increase their duty hours, and recruit more significant numbers. Winsor (2011) argued that recognition may be more important than rewards and suggested that Special Constables be eligible for all new police medals and police team recognition awards alongside regular officers and police staff. Winsor also recommended that Special Constables long service medal be moved from 10 years to 5 years' service. This last point, however, seems to highlight that volunteers are no longer providing the same length of service as they did once before and that this may be down to the recruitment of those wishing to become regular officers.

Annual fitness testing was also proposed for all deployable police officers (Winsor, 2012). This has had a direct effect upon the Special Constabulary with an annual fitness test being introduced with mandatory completion being necessary for remaining operational. This has particularly affected those Special Constables who have been in for a long time, with no previous fitness test being necessary or particularly part of the role. Historically working local parades and fetes these older officers who have made a career being the quintessential community-based officer, walking the beat in their local areas, without needing to meet the higher fitness demands of frontline policing. Some of these officers have left before having to pass, such as fitness test, and others have struggled to pass. In a time when the relationship between the public and police could be affected by the move of using limited resources on the frontline then a similar move of the Special Constabulary could leave a void within community-based policing. There is some argument that this void would best fit the Special Constabulary if they are to remain voluntary. Winsor (2012) also recommended a requirement for applicants to have some policing qualification, whether that be A-levels or relevant experience as a PCSO or Special Constable before becoming a police officer. This would have significant implications for Special Constabulary recruitment and retention, as most joiners would only be passing through the Special Constabulary in order to obtain the necessary experience before becoming a regular officer. These officers provide high duty hours when they first join; however, they only offer a short-term service to the voluntary force.

Winsor's (2012) most controversial recommendation in Part Two of the report, was for a direct entry scheme to enable high achieving individuals to join at the rank of a superintendent with the appropriate training and development, to bring with them their skills and experiences from other industries (Winsor, 2012). These recommendations have now mostly been implemented despite considerable resistance by the police forces themselves since this thesis began. Savings made through these recommendations are to be reinvested back into policing, reducing the need for forces to find savings from other avenues and to assist in protecting the frontline services. At present, it is not fully known the effects that Report Two will have as they are primarily long-term aims.

4.4 The Financial Challenge

Before 2010, the police within the UK had enjoyed a period of unpressured financial funding, with a sustained increase in central Government funding starting from the Edmund Davies reforms of the 1980s. Indeed the money being spent upon policing in the UK had doubled since 1994 from £6.45 billion to £13.7 billion by 2008/09 (HMIC, 2010). Local taxation across all police authority areas also increased by a significant 236% from 1994 to 1996/97 (HMIC, 2010) with general funding increasing by 73% during that same time period (HMIC, 2010). Modern police forces have not had to manage their finances or workforces resources, particularly efficiently and never within a sustained period of restrictions or reductions. Until the financial crisis of 2008, the public police have always been viewed as a public and political focal point and financial priority.

The financial crisis of 2008, which saw the near collapse of the Banking system had a significant impact on public service spending. It cannot be assumed that central police funding will ever return to pre-2010 levels after 2018 and indeed there are signs that fiscal uncertainty will continue for the foreseeable future alongside the additional complexity and uncertainty of Brexit. The Independent Office for Budget Responsibility estimated in 2010 that public sector net debt (PSND) could potentially rise from 77.7% Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2015/16 to 107% by 2060/61 (Winsor, 2010). This could mean that public sector finances are likely to remain under restraint, although recent terrorist activity may result in some increase in certain aspects of the police budgets.

The Comprehensive Spending Review (HMIC, 2010) announced in June 2010, outlined an average cut of 20% cut in the Central Government Budget to the public police. This funding reduction did vary across the different forces from 14% to 22% of their overall income. Forces across England and Wales estimated a cut of approximately £2.1 billion by 2014/15 (HMIC, 2010) with non-pay related savings also being estimated to be around £0.1 billion. This Central Government funding represents around 50-90% of all funding received by the police (HMIC, 2010) and running alongside this funding reduction, the Government proposed a local taxation freeze for a year, so that forces could not offset these cuts through the rising of local taxation (ibid). Before this emergency budgetary announcement in 2010, the money being spent on policing had been steadily increasing, having doubled since 1994 from £6.45 billion to £13.7 billion by 2008/09 (HMIC, 2010).

During this same time period, the local taxation funding across all police authorities has also increased by a huge 236% by 1996/97 (ibid). Seen as a public and political priority, the public police had enjoyed a period of huge budgetary increase, but no more, with savings of nearly £2.2 billion to find, every police force started to form a different place. However, with varying contracts in place, for example on land and histories which did not make it easy for them to achieve these reductions in spending.

Police Funding

In England and Wales, the public police are funded through three main routes, the main route being through the Central Government funding which is received through various grants including the Home Office Police grants, Specific Grants, National Non-Domestic Rates (NNDR) and the Rate Support Grants. The rest of the polices financial funding is made up through Local Council Taxation and by the forces themselves through sales, fees, and reimbursed services, special police services and funding through the local authorities for some aspects of policing such as for local PCSOs. There is controversy about a public service being able to raise funds by being paid for their services however it should be noted that the majority of these funds are raised through charging football clubs for the policing of matches.

The HMIC Police Grant (England and Wales) for 2013/14 is paid by the Home Secretary to the local policing bodies to be spent on various areas of policing, although these local policing bodies have now been replaced by the Police and Crime Commission. The aggregated amount of these grants as outlined by the report for 2013/14 for police purposes was £7,792,585,520 made up from the £4,725,433,50 in Home Office Police Core Settlement and the £3,067152,019 in DCLG formula funding. The Greater London Authority is separated for their funding, as they receive additional funding in recognition to the distinct, national, international and capital city functions that the Metropolitan Police provide. This additional special payment is over what the formula funding allows, and therefore the separate National, International and Capital City Grant were created of £185,000,000. In 2013/14 nationally total government funding dropped for policing by 1.9% taking into account all various police grants and funding, including £161 million for the Welsh Government. However, that drop is in line with the 20% funding cuts announced in the first Comprehensive Spending

Review of 2010. In total policing in England and Wales received £8.66 billion in 2013/14. Chancellor George Osborne announced that the Police Service would be spared further cuts in 2013/14 but could potentially face an extra 2% in 2014/15. In 2013/14 it was announced that the counterterrorism funding would continue to be ring-fenced throughout the CSR as it was deemed critical and a total of £563 million had been allocated for that year.

The current Chancellor Philip Hammond presented his Spring Budget on the 8th March 2017 stating that there was a need to protect public services better; however, there was no specific mention of emergency service finances. Brandon Lewis the Minister of State for Fire and Policing on the 1st February 2017 provided a written statement (HCWS446) in which it stated that the final police funding settlement for 2016/17 (HCWS510) would be protected at flat cash levels compared to 2015/16 assuming that precept income is increased to the maximum amount available in both 2016/17 and 2017/18. The Police Grant Report (England and Wales) for 2017/18 outlined the grants allocated to policing by the Home Secretary although it does not set out central Governmental funding to local policing in its totality. The report does not cover police grant for capital purposes or the safeguarding of national security nor any grants paid to local policing bodies by the Welsh Government. The aggregate amount of grants for police purposes made under section 46 of the 1996 Police Act is determined as £7,509,016,194 for 2017/18. Funding allocations for both financial years are based upon the Police Allocation Formula distribution from 2013/14. Moreover, obviously, vary for each force dependent upon that formula.

The Police Allocation Formula is used by the Home Secretary to decide how much each police force receives, and has various stages. The first stage of the formula is to divide the funds between the different activities that the police undertake, broken down into five key areas: crime, incidents, traffic, fear of crime and special events. The proportion of total funding is then distributed according to the population scarcity, taking into account the particular needs of the rural forces. The second stage then involves dividing the funding for each of these activities in the context of the workload indicators for each police force. These workload indicators are calculated to estimate the work each force is expected to have in each key area compared to the other forces, and are calculated using socio-economic and demographic indicators correlated with each workload point.

The workload indicators are used rather than data on the actual crime levels to account for the known variations between the different forces recording practices and to avoid any perverse incentives. The formula consists of a basic amount per resident, with a basic amount for special events, and top-ups for the five key areas, population scarcity and the area costs (taking into account the regional differences in costs).

For the 2013/14 year, the Government decided to apply "*damping*" to each pot of money a force receives in the financial year, keeping the reduction in cash terms to 1.6%. This method has proven controversial in some forces because where the police funding formula determines a more significant financial need; damping seeks to take away some of that money to ensure other forces, which get less from the formula, have a minimum funding level and are therefore topped up. Forces which get more of their funding from Central Government that the council tax precept also stated that they were suffering more as a result of damping because it is being applied while government funding is being decided.

4.5 Adapting to Austerity

The UK police face a difficult task in absorbing the savings required without a resulting reduction in their overall effectiveness, in particular to their frontline services. It has been estimated that approximately 81% of force budget goes on workforce costs and staffing, with a further 10% on supply and services costs, 2% on transport costs, 5% on-premises costs and 1% on capital financial costs and 1% on capital financing costs (CIPFA, 2010/2011). Many forces sought to find these savings from infrastructure reforms and collaborations with improvements to their IT systems, reforms for efficiency within the wider criminal justice system and their internal processes; however, these savings have their limitations. Police forces had to take immediate and substantial steps to reduce their biggest category of costs, namely pay.

If police forces were to rely upon the turnover of officers only to achieve the necessary cuts, it would take over seven years to achieve the required levels rather than within the expected four years as outlined by the Government (HMIC, 2010). Forces had only four years to achieve the desired budgetary cuts, and therefore in order to achieve the financial reductions required, forces have to reduce their workforce by 16,200 police officers, 1,800 PCSOs and 16,100 police

staff between March 2010 and March 2015 (HMIC, 2010). The total projected police workforce reduction across England and Wales (excluding Scotland) of 34,100 personnel, bring police officer numbers back to 2001/02 levels (HMIC, 2011). In 2011 the HMIC (2011) reported that around a third of reduction had already taken place, with numbers falling by 11,200 between March 2010 and March 2011 leaving approximately 23,000 to go within March 2011 and March 2015 (HMIC, 2011). HMIC (2011) warned that forces would find it very hard to maintain the current level of officer availability with these projected reductions.

"Force's capacity to cut crime and ensure officers are visible and available to the public can only be sustained if the proposed workforce reductions are balanced out by compensating improvements in efficiency. The challenge for forces isn't just to balance the books, but to transform the way they deliver policing services."

(HMIC, 2012, Adapting to Austerity, p.29)

The National Audit Office (2012) argued that there are three phases to the organisations approaches to budget reductions which are; tactical efficiency savings (quick wins, prioritising localised cost savings by making various processes more efficient), strategic operational realignment (better utilisation of the people, processes, technology, procurement and capital, changing customer expectations and alternative service delivery models) and sustainable cost reductions (structured cost reduction plans/transformational changes embedding cost management and continual improvements). These changes can potentially cost regarding time and initial costs; however, they may be crucial to the sustainability of the police service (HMIC, 2012). For example, the National Audit Office (2012) reported that shared services in practice increase cost in that they add more complexity and often are tailored to local requirements. Despite this, they stressed that shared services as one of the way forward for dealing with reduced budget and workforce while maintaining a high level of service.

An example of this would be the National Police Air Service. This saw the consolidation of individual forces air support units into a national service provides helicopter support to all forces, 24 hours a day, for 365 days a year. 97% of England and Wales population would not be more than 20 minutes flying time away, and when fully operational is estimated to save forces around £15 million a year (HMIC, 2012).

Both the police services and Government have made a push for efficiencies in procurement expenditure in particular with the amount spent on ICT systems. Various approaches have been investigated, including creating a framework on which all forces could purchase as one customer to obtain maximum savings possible with new contracts, making them between 4-6%cheaper overall. Other options being considered was the creation of an online purchasing portal (the National Police Procurement Hub) where forces could buy from the top 500 policing suppliers, reducing their costs on transactions and allowing individual forces to control the scale of economics on basic commodities by limiting the range of suppliers used (HMIC, 2012). Other individual forces have developed their approaches such as Lincolnshire Police working with G4S Security Company to allow officers to remain on patrol after an arrest, saving an estimated 350 police hours by utilising security personnel to convey prisoners to custody. While there could be contention about the use of non-police powers to convey individuals to custody especially when considering the health and safety risk for the detainee while in custody, the decisions about their actual detention remain with the custody sergeant.

In 2011 the HMIC carried out an initial review of police forces to investigate how well they were coping and adapting to the financial challenge set out by the Comprehensive Spending Review (HMIC, 2011). Overall this review found that all forces had identified how they intended to make or in some cases exceed the required savings, or wherein the stage of doing so (ibid). The consensus was that forces were planning well. However, the report expressed concern about whether forces could transform their efficiency to enable them to sustain their current level of service while reducing overall costs (HMIC, 2011). The Central government Capital Grant was reduced from £200 million at the start of the Comprehensive Spending Review (2010/2011) to just £87 million for 2011/12 (HMIC, 2012). Forces had an estimated savings of £2.1 billion to find by 2014/15, and by 2011 around £1.6 billion were to be met through proposed workforce reductions leaving £0.3 billion to be found through non-pay costs (HMIC, 2011). Indeed a third of the proposed workforce reductions had already taken place by 2011, with it transpiring that those forces which planned the most significant reduction proportionately of police officers were not necessarily those forces which faced the biggest budget cuts (ibid). Data submitted by 42 forces in 2011, suggested

that by March 2015, police frontline would reduce by 2%, while non frontline personnel would fall by 11% (HMIC, 2011). Some forces had already seen their budgets reduced during the Comprehensive Spending Review and were therefore already operating with a moderately low proportion of their officers in non-frontline positions, meaning that they were going to struggle to protect their frontlines. As argued by Bradford (2011) frontline police officer numbers are viewed as one of the important factors in governing a force's ability to fight crime; meaning that these forces, in particular, would have to improve their frontline officer efficiency more than others.

Based upon the supplied data and proposed plans outlined in 2011, 22 of the 42 forces (who supplied data) would have to cut more than 30% of their non-frontline workforces to protect their frontline (ibid). HMIC identified ten forces in particular who would have to reduce their non-frontline forces by more than 50% to protect their frontlines, with a further 12 forces having to make reductions between 20-49% (HMIC, 2011). There were also eight particular forces highlighted where the number of officer positions being proposed to be cut was higher than the number of officers they had in non-frontline roles. This means that these forces would be unable to achieve the necessary savings simply by redeploying these officers into frontline roles. These large-scale reductions would be extremely difficult if not impossible, to achieve without it affecting the service provision being offered to the public.

The majority of forces planned to reverse the trend of civilianization from the previous years, to meet the proposed workforce reductions with a 19% reduction in police staff numbers (HMIC, 2011). A consequence partly of employment contracts, as there is no provision to force the redundancy of police officers unless they had served their full 30-year contracts (A19 policy) while civilian workers can be made redundant. Police officers can only be removed through underperformance regulations or misconduct proceedings, and retirement at 30 years' service. With wide-scale manpower resources reductions, all forces undertook demand analysis in 2011 to ensure these resources were directed both efficiently and effectively. This means that forces were reviewing various means through which to improve their efficiency with a mixture of national and locally led programs (HMIC, 2011). Data supplied by all 43 forces indicated that: 19 were remodelling their neighbourhood teams, 23 looking into shared service centres,

24 considering certain outsourcing aspects of their organizations, 28 were creating new local policing models, 29 considering inter-force collaborations, 31 reallocating their workforces, 34 remodelling response teams, 37 remodelling middle management, 38 reviewing their shift patterns, 39 remodelling their back office positions and all 43 were undergoing demand analysis.

HMIC (2011) did warn that police forces must ensure that they safeguarded their service to the public while effectively reducing costs, and to achieve this, they must be making informed decisions about where and how to achieve these savings. Throughout all the budgetary reductions, it will be vital that police forces contain the effects of any inflation upon their costs, especially with regards to workforce salaries and fuel. The scale of these measures will vary from force to force, depending upon what the money is spent on, for example, a force covering a large geographical area can expect higher fuel costs (HMIC, 2011). With few incentives within the policing system for police leadership to drive these changes, there is a danger that it could lead to increased fragmentation between forces, therefore to counteract this, forces need to share quality checked information which the HMIC (2011) stated required reduced bureaucracy between forces, joint ventures and a common language. Through measures implemented such as the Police and Crime Commissioners and Chief Constables being held to account for the performance of their forces maintaining a well-performing frontline service to the public is a key factor for police leadership in this time of austerity.

The Home Secretary in 2011 announced a program to reduce police bureaucracy with the aim to save time equivalent to 1,200 police officer posts. This program consisted of measures such as simplifying personal appraisals; more efficient emergency call handling and an ACPO led review on the guidance and doctrine so that the majority of charging decision would be moved from the CPS back to the police (HMIC, 2011). HMIC (2011) stated that 22 of the 43 forces supplying data reported having benefited from various improvements to their business processes such as the introduction of an appointment system for non-urgent calls. With the current Government ruling out any changes to police forces boundaries or potential mergers between forces as a means of achieving economies of scale, such as considered under the previous Labor government, some forces have organised their collaborations. 28 of the 43 forces reviewed, reporting planning to reduce or eliminate their number of BCUs (HMIC, 2011). An

example of these collaborations is Project Athena, which involved ten different forces who have aligned their business processes and combining to sources their crime, intelligence, custody, case preparation and IT systems. While some forces have entered into collaborations, nearly all forces reviewed had considered the possibility in order to achieve cuts, with 29 having identified cashable savings to be made through collaborations and 23 considering implementing shared service centres (HMIC, 2011). There has been a proposed merger between Devon and Cornwall Police and Dorset Police however after consultation with the public the PCC for Devon and Cornwall has publicly declared that the business case does not have her support, on consideration of council tax differences between the two forces (PCC Devona and Cornwall, 2018). However, it could also be argued that as the merger would mean only one PCC and one Chief Constable that there is also a political motive to remain separate.

The HMIC (2011) reported that 24 forces were considering outsourcing some aspects of their practices, something not uncommon in policing, with ten forces already outsourcing elements of their custody process which do not require police powers. Some examples of outsourcing including South West One, a joint venture company established in 2007 between Somerset Country Council, Taunton Dean Council, IBM with Avon and Somerset Police joining in 2008. This joint venture has the aims to improve the services and save money by providing back office and customer services (HMIC, 2011). Other examples include Cleveland Police who in June 2010 entered a ten year outsourcing arrangement with private sector provider Steria, whose services cover information technology, call handling finances, human resources, estates and procurements. Most forces are already outsourcing their forensic service (HMIC, 2011). The HMIC (2011) review advocated the standardisation of firearms, ammunition and public order equipment across the forces, which would make it easier for officers to work more effectively together during major incidents.

A further HMIC review in 2012, reported that the police had risen to the financial challenge, and had largely reduced their spending while maintaining their level of service. The overall crime levels during this period continued to fall by a further 3% between December 2010 and December 2011, although there were rises in some offence categories (HMIC, 2012). Overall levels of public satisfaction increased from 83.4% to 83.9% during this time same period (ibid). The HMIC

(2012) report surveyed approximately 1,322 members of the public and found that the majority had not noticed any changes in the level of police officer visibility or availability within their local areas during the period of 2010/2011. A sample of 999 calls indicated that the majority of forces were no slower in responding to emergency calls despite smaller workforces. What had dramatically changed, however, was the way in which the public could gain access to the police. Between March 2010 and March 2015 around 260 police station, front counters were due to be closed with these closures being offset by the opening of 140 front counters in different locations, e.g. libraries and supermarkets (HMIC, 2012).

Police forces were looking to achieve £0.5 million in revenue savings through changing and ultimately shrinking their estates in 2013/14, further rising to £1.6 million in 2014/15, the traditional public interface of the police are disappearing. When surveyed 57% of the general public stated that they would never support the closure of their local police counter with a further 29% indicating that they would support closure if the building remained in police use (HMIC, 2012). This is an important factor considering the traditional position of the police front counter as the physical mainstay of the public police presence within the community as an iconic system. With the visible police presences disappearing and the front counter, there is a risk that the police become more distant and out of touch with their public. This is where the Special Constabulary could have a significant impact if a large proportion of community policing were given to the Special Constabulary to take ownership of. However, at this point, this was seen as a theoretical risk since public satisfaction remained high throughout this time period.

HMIC (2012) Concerns

Some concerns were raised in 2012 as to how long the current level of police service could be maintained, with some forces having gaps within their funding plans. HMIC (2012) highlighted that fact that most forces still needed to transform their efficiency in preparation for further future spending reviews, with the key finding being that forces were balancing the books through workforce cuts and reduction in spending on goods and services. While frontline staff had been protected so far in 2012, the nature of the frontline had been altered in most forces, leading the HMIC (2012) to express major concerns about the

sustainability of this level, although they do note that at that stage the level of service had been so far maintained.

Despite being largely protected, the police frontline had not been completely preserved with indications of an average planned frontline service reduction of 6% (HMIC, 2012). Forces were planning to increase the proportion of their total workforce working in frontline positions by March 2015 (HMIC, 2012) with nearly half of forces planning to have 90% in frontline roles. Frontline positions remain defined as where the officer is responding to 999 calls either in a response role or neighbourhood policing position reactively dealing with calls for service. This means removing officers from any non-frontline roles although some officers in specialist and key positions would remain such as firearms, criminal investigation and intelligence work. As police officers can be called in at any point, they are more resilient to fulfil critical roles, especially as they are prohibited from any industrial action. With all of these changes and influences, it appeared that in some areas the police staff redundancy schemes were actually oversubscribed and governmental changes to the pension and pay arrangement from the Winsor report (2010; 2011) led to some police officers being more willing to leave (HMIC, 2012). This has led to some police forces be ahead of their outlined 2011 plans especially with regards to the required headcount and are therefore projecting greater savings.

With cultural changes and frontline workforces reducing, forces are adapting to changes within political, societal and cultural of the UK. However, as forces look to fill in the manpower gaps within key areas of both frontline and back office processes being produced by decreasing officer numbers, the distinction between response, investigation and neighbourhood policing teams has become less distinct. This means that officers are carrying out an increasingly wide range of activities within their respective roles to allow for the more effective management of peak workload times, especially within rural areas. By 2012, there were already 5,600 fewer police officers and PCSOs fulfilling response functions than in 2010 (HMIC, 2012). With around 2,300 officers within neighbourhood policing roles, some forces have merged their response and neighbourhood teams, while widening the scope of those neighbourhood teams to include a supporting or backfilling role for their response functions (ibid). This shift away from clearly defined functions fulfilled by distinctive teams, towards a

more fluid system of multi-skilled officers, has allowed forces to be more flexible with a smaller workforce. However, this does mean that the respective teams and in particular, neighbourhood teams are being pulled away from their day to day responsibilities to meet the more immediate demands. This means that the police have become ever more reactive to crime, rather than having any proactive, intelligence gathering local basis. This is particularly dangerous in these times where intelligence gathering and local intel could play a role in counter-terrorism (e.g. Innes, 2006) and disrupting locally based organised crime, e.g. county lines drug supply (National Crime Agency, 2017). This means that there is an opening for the Special Constabulary to take on a more significant role within neighbourhood policing and to take control in driving neighbourhood initiatives forward. Local restrictions also mean that forces are potentially planning to put a further 6% of their budget into investigation teams, who are even less visible to the public (HMIC, 2012) leaving a potential void in visible policing at the local level, of importance to the public in maintaining that high level of public satisfaction.

Another key change occurring in nearly all police forces across England and Wales was the planned increase in the use of the Special Constabulary to extend forces' frontline capacity. HMIC (2012) reported that nearly all forces had outlined plans to recruit around 9,000 Special Constables by 2014/15., which would be an increase of 58% from March 2010. However, the HMIC (2012) reported that the Special Constabulary were already being used in a frontline capacity such as on response at peak or busy times, and agreed that the Special Constabulary could provide forces with further flexibility and reliance during the periods of workforce reductions. However, a key question here needs to be asked. Should they be used in this way? What is the purpose of the Special Constabulary as this would translate to policing on the cheap?

It should be noted that policing has on *"one-size-fits-all"* answer and various police forces are deploying their frontline resources in different ways. The way in which resources are deployed depends upon the professional threat assessments particular to those force areas. While policing activities remain fundamentally unchanged, the traditional descriptions and distinctions, such as between response, investigation and neighbourhood, as mentioned earlier, has less resonance with how local policing is now being structured (HMIC, 2012).

With a reduced workforce available, forces are implementing more efficient work practices with a more fluid workforce to ensure police tasks expected by the public such as visibility patrolling and responding to emergency 999 calls can still be fulfilled.

Just fewer than 20% of police budgets are spent on goods and services, which include their IT systems, facility management, plus uniform and equipment costs (HMIC, 2012). In 2012 forces were aiming to make approximately 24% of their savings from these non-pay costs although this varied across forces from 8% to over 50% (ibid). This variations between forces with regards to these non-pay costs are largely due to the fact that they are all started from different places. Some forces had already slimmed down their spending before the review period, while others are tied into existing contracts, and some have already made savings through collaborations with other forces (HMIC, 2012). These savings were to lessen the reductions required from pay-related savings.

HMIC (2012) acknowledged that it was difficult to predict the overall effect that these changes being made by the various police forces, driven by economic restrictions, would have upon the existing police operational model or how this model may ultimately have to change with the likelihood of an extended period of austerity beyond the immediate spending review. It was this extended period of austerity which was of major concern for the HMIC in 2012, stating that while most forces had met their budget reductions required, other forces were deliberately choosing to drive a more radical restructuring of their forces rather than simply balancing the books in anticipation of this extended period of austerity.

The National Audit Office (2015) report *Financial Sustainability of Police Forces in England and Wales* stated that by the end of 2014-15 police forces within England and Wales had been successful in reducing their costs since the beginning 2010/11 stage. Crime levels had also reduced over this same time period suggesting that those forces were continuing to achieve their aim in tackling crime. However, NAO (2015) maintained that crime statistics are limited measures of the actual demands being placed upon the policing services. The NAO (2015) report also states that overall, many of the savings which the police forces had achieved were through tactical or efficiency savings, rather than through any transformation of their service, something which they warned would

need to be done, if forces were to meet the long-term financial challenge, and to fully address the changing nature of policing.

Police forces across England and Wales have made savings of £2.5 billion since 2011, and there has been a real term 25% reduction in central government funding to the PCCs from 2010-2011 to 2015-16 (NAO, 2015). Police forces reported plans for 96% of their savings with the remainder to be met through the use of reserves, however from 2015 to 16, forces also estimated needing to make a further £656 million in savings (NAO, 2015). To achieve these reductions, forces would be reducing their workforce by more than initially planned, with a reduction in workforce of 37,400 (Johnston and Politowski, 2016) resulting in an approximate decrease of 16,659 police officer (NAO, 2015). It has not only been police officers, as there has been a significant reduction in police staff and PCSO figures. By March 2015 there was a fifth fewer police staff (nearly 16,000 rather than the original 12,500 planned) and a reduction of a quarter of the PCSO numbers (initial plans outlined a cut of 2,000, actual figures more than 4,500) (Johnston and Politowski, 2016). As with all of these reductions, the percentages varied between forces and ultimately will have a different impact upon those forces. For example, Surry Police lost 1% of their police officer numbers, but Cleveland Police lost around 23% (Johnston and Politowski, 2016). These figures correspond with the fact that Surrey Police rely the least upon central government funding and therefore took a 12% real term financial reduction (ibid). This increased workforce reduction was a concern previously mentioned by the HMIC (2012) and the NAO (2015) reported that forces had a poor understanding of the demands for services within their force areas. NAO (2015) also argued that they had insufficient information to determine how much further police funding could be reduced before policing services became degraded, or when individual forces may need support.

4.6 Assessment and Review

The College of Policing carried out the first estimated national analysis into the breadth and complexity of the work undertaken by the public police, assessing the incoming and ongoing work that officers are carrying out. The Estimating Demand on the police service report (2015) indicated that after a decade of decreasing police recorded crimes and incidents, that trend had now slowed and some types of crime and incident in particular rape and public safety and welfare

are now on the increase. Over the past five years, police officer numbers have been failing so that by 2014 there was one police officer for every 445 members of public an increase of 50 plus people per officer since 2010 (College of Policing, 2015).

Over the last year, certain crimes, especially violent crimes, have seen a significant increase. The Office for National Statistics state that there has been a small but genuine increase in murder and other violent crimes, including a 13-14% increase in gun and knife crimes in 2016. Overall there has been a 9% rise in overall crime in police recorded crime figures while the Crime Survey for England and Wales indicated a 5% fall over the same time period. However, even within the Crime Survey for England and Wales, there was an increase in violent crime including a 10% rise in robberies, 35% increase in public order offences and a 12% rise in sexual offences including rape (Home Office, 2017). For example, the Metropolitan Police release figures for 2016, indicating that gun crime was up 42% and knife crime rose by 24%. The HMIC inspection (2017) highlighted some areas of serious concern such as a shortage of detectives and the quality of the initial stage of investigations. This means that despite a stable level of crime at the beginning of the budgetary cuts, as time has gone on significant crimes are starting to increase, suggesting that the police are no longer coping to maintain crime levels.

Also highlighted within the report (College of Policing, 2015) is the factor that the public police deal with a wide range of non-crime incidents which are not captured in police recorded crime. These non-crime incidents account for around 83% of all Command and Control (C&C) calls to the police. These means that the police are having to respond to demands which are not recorded in their statistics overall, suggesting an unknown demand overall upon forces (College of Policing, 2015). Police unknown demand is those who will not necessarily result in an arrest or conviction but are those involving safeguarding and the protection of vulnerable individuals. Other non-crime incidents that police are frequently required to attend are suicides, missing persons, mental health incidents (the number of sections orders for mental health has risen over the last five years. This is something which concurs with HMIC (2017) report that failings in the mental health services have led to police becoming the first resort in such

incidents), and various protection demands (child protection and safeguarding, multi-agency protection arrangements, domestic violence etc.).

The College of Policing also states that due to the changing types of crimes over the last decade means that the cost of crime for police has not fallen like the official crime numbers have (2015). Indeed the increase in some particularly complex crimes such as child sexual exploitation has incurred increased costs. Overall demand upon the police has increased in some areas especially those associated with protective statutory requirements such as Multi-Agency Public Protection Panels with increasing incidents with vulnerable populations especially those with mental health issues, a finding that concurs with the HMIC State of Policing report (2017). Overall the College of Policing provided two indications for the emerging pressures on public police resilience, the decreased level of police visibility within their local communities (a threat to the relationship between the police and the public, the underpinnings to policing by consent) and the increasing requests for mutual aid between forces (College of Policing, 2015). Mutual aid calls, in particular, had increased substantially over the past few years, for example, in 2012, there were 20 requests, and in 2013, there were over 80 (College of Policing, 2015). While this may signal better efficiency in the sharing of resources, it could also signal that forces are no longer able to maintain both the baseline demand and any surge demands brought about by particular events or incidents.

Recently the Government increased the budget of the HMIC (Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabularies) by nearly 66% for the period 2014/15 (NAO, 2015) with a remit to provide more substantial evaluations of police forces performance during the budgetary restrictions. It had become clear from previous HMIC inspections that forces had little understanding of their service demands and that there was insufficient information to determine when forces might or could run into difficulty. As part of this wider Government remit, the HMIC announced in 2013/14 a new inspection programme called the Police Effectiveness, efficiency and Legitimacy assessment (PEEL) intending to provide a clear, annual evaluation for the public to review how well their local police force was performing (HMIC, 2015). These annual reports would provide a better understanding about the financial sustainability of forces, covering aspects of policing and the police organisation such as criminal investigations, resources

allocation, which could then be compared year on year, and with each other. Each year these inspections will introduce new aspects such as the planned 2017/18 assessments to include how well forces would manage their response to a terrorist threat (HMIC, 2017). The HMIC (2015) stated that the police could not become complacent or be adequately assessed in terms of performance by those limited figures. The HMIC (2015) maintained that the crime threat continues to evolve and develop, meaning that police forces need to constantly look for new innovative ways in which to adapt and improve their capabilities.

In the first year of PEEL inspections, the majority of police forces were graded at least "*good*" on a range from inadequate, requires improvement, good and outstanding, and in that first inspection, forces were given six graded judgements out of the overall assessed 13 questions (HMIC, 2015). However, with the minimum standard required being good, most forces had much work to accomplish before they were to attain an outstanding grading. In terms of efficiency, only five forces were graded as outstanding, and three were found to require improvements, suggesting that there were some signs that forces were starting to struggle long term with the financial reductions and changes been made. Overall forces had achieved the savings required of them by the budgetary cuts, the difficulties faced by individual forces to accomplish this had varied widely, depending largely upon their underlying financial resilience and their understanding of their cost bases (HMIC, 2015). With no indication that things will become easier financially for forces, the police have to assume future cost savings will be needed and while most have protected their frontlines so far, there were signs that this had been to the cost of neighbourhood policing in particular. Evidence obtained by the HMIC (2015) indicated that neighbourhood officers were increasingly being asked to cover other duties, outside of their dedicated duties tackling and identifying local problems and priorities. HMIC (2015) expressed concerns about the potential erosion of neighbourhood policing teams, as while these teams still existed on paper, their workloads and remits continued to be increased and broadened. This highlights the particular importance for the future role of the Special Constabulary within neighbourhood policing in particular, as a sustained and proactive neighbourhood policing team could ultimately counteract the adverse effects of reduced workforces in their local areas, and help maintain the public confidence. The HMIC (2014) report *Policing*

in Austerity: Meeting the Challenge already indicated that some forces, and in particular the smaller forces and those with less financial movement to manoeuvre were beginning to show the strain in providing their core public policing services.

There has been a long debate within police force effectiveness, with the focus often being on their workforce capacity, i.e. the number of police officers, the proportion of those officers on the frontline, and the overall size of their budgets. However, HMIC (2015) in their establishment of the new PEEL assessments, emphasised the importance of other issues such as the skill level and quality of these officers, the technology and equipment available to officers and police leadership. Due to the recruitment freeze of the regular police force, some forces risk an ageing and relatively expensive workforce with decaying skill levels (HMIC, 2015). HMIC (2015) judged 18 forces as requiring improvements in the way in which they investigated crime, in particular burglary and assault, with the quality of initial investigations being below that the public could reasonably expect. This could be argued to be due to a deficit in the skills and experiences of the investigating officers and a lack of appropriate supervision. HMIC (2015) found that officers in some forces did not have the skills, training or access to specialist support or equipment that they needed to conduct thorough investigations. Officers within 42 of the forces told HMIC (2015) that the online learning packages did not meet their needs, and that they had limited opportunities for officers to talk to one another during training and to challenge each other's views. The HMIC (2015) reported that some forces had become over-reliant upon online training packages.

A significant finding from HMIC (2015) found that while historically measured crimes are falling, this did not necessarily mean that all crime is reducing but rather adapting and changing. Cybercrime and cyber-enabled crime are not an emerging threat, but the reality of modern crime. While traditionally crimes such as frauds, harassment and the sexual exploitation of children may have happened within the everyday space of the community and therefore been affected by police officers carrying out patrols within the community, now modern technology means that these crimes can happen in far greater numbers within cyberspace. HMIC (2015) reported that the police are already failing to combat these crimes, and specifically cybercrime and cyber-enabled crime, and there is

little evidence to suggest that they have a proper understanding of the capacity necessary to deal with these modern types of crimes. This opens the possibility for forces to follow the lead of the National Crime Agency, who already recruit skilled specialists in a voluntary capacity as "*Specials*" to assist on a case by case basis. Austerity is set to continue, so forces will have to make the shift from merely surviving the budgetary reductions to thriving in a world of sustained cost reduction (HMIC, 2015). This means they must achieve efficiency within all aspects of their organisation and practices, especially if they are to remain smaller workforces for the future, so this must ultimately become a smaller, more effective innovative workforce. The Special Constabulary could be an avenue through with the police forces obtain highly skilled experts in a voluntary capacity to assist on major cases and when needed. This would appear to be a logical step forward; however, police forces continue to fail to make effective use of Special Constables other/everyday skills. Therefore this move would take a significant push from the regular forces themselves. This would mean that forces could utilise volunteers more effectively; however, in many respects, this is not the role of a volunteer to fill these manpower gaps.

With public expectations of the public police growing (HMIC, 2015) and policing itself becoming more complex and challenging, police forces need to adapt to these changes while still protecting their communities. Force is being expected to achieve this while being every more accountable to both Government and their public while coping with fiscal austerity, structural reforms and the job of anticipating any threat to social order (HMIC, 2015). With the whole public services sector being to show the strain of austerity and limited resources with examples such as police officers transporting patients to hospitals as there are no ambulances available (HMIC, 2015) becoming more common, meaning that individual organisation are going to have to become more innovative and potentially rely upon their voluntary sectors more.

In the first year of PEEL inspections, the majority of police forces were graded at least "*good"* on a range from inadequate, requires improvement, good and outstanding, and in that first inspection, forces were given six graded judgements out of the overall assessed 13 questions (HMIC, 2015). However, with the minimum standard required being good, most forces had a lot of work to accomplish before they were to attain an outstanding grading. In terms of

efficiency, only five forces were graded as outstanding, and three were found to require improvements, suggesting that there were some signs that forces were starting to struggle long term with the financial reductions and changes been made. Overall forces had achieved the savings required of them by the budgetary cuts, the difficulties faced by individual forces to accomplish this had varied widely, depending largely upon their underlying financial resilience and their understanding of their cost bases (HMIC, 2015). With no indication that things will become easier financially for forces, the police have to assume future cost savings will be needed and while most have protected their frontlines so far, there were signs that this had been to the cost of neighbourhood policing in particular. Evidence obtained by the HMIC (2015) indicated that neighbourhood officers were increasingly being asked to cover other duties, outside of their dedicated duties tackling and identifying local problems and priorities. HMIC (2015) expressed concerns about the potential erosion of neighbourhood policing teams, as while these teams still existed on paper, their workloads and remits continued to be increased and broadened. This highlights the particular importance for the future role of the Special Constabulary within neighbourhood policing in particular, as a continued and proactive neighbourhood policing team could ultimately counteract the adverse effects of reduced workforces in their local areas, and help maintain the public confidence. The HMIC (2014) report *Policing in Austerity: Meeting the Challenge* already indicated that some forces, and in particular the smaller forces and those with less financial movement to manoeuvre were beginning to show the strain in providing their core public policing services.

There has been a long debate within police force effectiveness, with the focus often being on their workforce capacity, i.e. the number of police officers, the proportion of those officers on the frontline, and the overall size of their budgets. However, HMIC (2015) in their establishment of the new PEEL assessments, emphasised the importance of other issues such as the skill level and quality of these officers, the technology and equipment available to officers and police leadership. Due to the recruitment freeze of the regular police force, some forces risk an ageing and relatively expensive workforce with decaying skill levels (HMIC, 2015). HMIC (2015) judged 18 forces as requiring improvements in the way in which they investigated crime, in particular burglary and assault, with the

quality of initial investigations being below that the public could reasonably expect. This could be argued to be due to a deficit in the skills and experiences of the investigating officers and a lack of appropriate supervision. HMIC (2015) found that officers in some forces did not have the skills, training or access to specialist support or equipment that they needed to conduct thorough investigations. Officers within 42 of the forces told HMIC (2015) that the online learning packages did not meet their needs, and that they had limited opportunities for officers to talk to one another during training and to challenge each other's views. The HMIC (2015) reported that some forces had become over-reliant upon online training packages.

Policing Vision 2025

At its second joint conference, police chiefs and PCC's launched a vision for policing in 2025 in which police made better use of digital technology, were more integrated with other agencies preventing crime and delivering effective service at the best value for money to the public (Policing Vision, 2025). This Policing Vision 2025 set out a future for policing over the next decade and will shape decisions about how police forces use their resources. Developed by the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC) and the National Police Chief's Council (NPCC) in consultation with the College of Policing, National Crime Agency, staff associations and other policing and community partners. All chief constables and PCCs then signed the vision.

The five priorities outlined by this vision for reform are: firstly that local policing remains the bedrock of British policing but overall becomes more integration with other health, educational, social services and community projects. This would allow for earlier intervention in resolving issues which later cause crime and anti-social behaviour, therefore in the long term reducing demand on policing and other services. The overall ambition of this priority is to have more multi-agency teams or hubs which will pool funds rather than individually addressing the problems. That specialist policing capability such as armed policing, surveillance and major investigations will be delivered through a network, making them more affordable with surplus costs being made available to reinvest into other priorities. In response to the dramatic increase in criminal activity online, police officers will be trained and equipped to respond to these new crimes. To save resources processes for sharing evidence will become completely digital, and the public will

have the option of contacting the police and reporting crime directly and easily online. The College of Policing would work alongside forces to enhance the skills and powers needed to meet the challenges with a focus on making policing more representative of the communities while building a better balance between personal accountability and the bureaucratic fear of making mistakes (NPCC, 2016). Finally, business support functions such as IT and human resources will be consolidated into cross force or integrated with local authorities and other emergency services to reduce costs.

Back when she was Home Secretary Theresa May approved the purchase of a £1.2bn emergency services network (ESN) to be a cheaper option in replacing the Airwave communications system currently used by police, fire and ambulance services. However, now the Commons public accounts committee found out that ESN will be delayed for nine months, which could leave emergency services without a proper means of communication for nearly half a year. Questions were asked at the time as to why a system was bought which the National Audit Office found to be inherently high risk as it had never been implemented anywhere before. Brandon Lewis, the minister for policing and fire service, has stated that there would be no gap with the existing Airwave system continuing until the transition could be completed.

Summary

The recent budgetary restrictions have forced the public police within England and Wales to become a more efficient and effective service while managing their reduced workforce. There is some argument that these changes are not necessarily negative, as it has forced the police to conduct long-overdue reviews of their processes and expenditures after having enjoyed a long and sustained period of increasing budgets and manpower increased. Public services, including the police, have long argued that more staff equals a better service; however, there is limited evidence that this is the case. In many ways, these financial reductions and constraints are forcing the police to become more innovative and forward thinking than ever before, and to collaborate between themselves to achieve the same level of service to the public. However, there are some concerns that while the public police appear to have achieved the short terms goals of reducing their spending, this is being done through the most obvious means such as manpower reductions, the selling of land and property, and

moving public access to the service online. There is a risk that the long-term consequences of these immediate reactionary decisions could lead forces into difficulties later on such as if there are any further budgetary reductions there are no other areas other than manpower for them to find these reductions.

Police forces are forging ahead with changes both operationally and structurally with the long-term policing landscape remaining uncertain. As other public services also retreat within their own tightening budgets, demands upon the police may increase, and public confidence so reliant upon the visibility of the police and their community relations, there is a significant risk to these relationships. Most forces innovation so far whether in terms of collaborations between forces, outsourcing or personnel reductions have been implemented within the existing models of policing, making that any further reductions may need to be more innovative or radical. Wide-scale financial reductions have resulted in corresponding decreases in police workforce numbers across England and Wales, forcing police services to adapt both how they operate and how they are delivering the overall public policing services. However, recent assessments have raised concerns that forces are no longer coping with the restrained budgets and may be unable to protect their frontline officer numbers any further. Not only will it become financially unsustainable at some point, but in the context of reduced budgets, the police risk defaulting to a wholly reactive model of policing, that can only respond to a crime, rather than having any proactive or deterrent factor upon crime.

If the police are to continue to have any meaningful impact on crime levels, these reduced resources must be directed more efficiently and effectively. One strategy would direct resources into preventative strategies to reduce the demand for police services in the first place. In the next few years, the shape and agility of the police forces will be what matters, not the size of their budget. In many ways, the black and white discussions focusing upon police numbers, have obstructed the debate about how and when officers and staff will be deployed, and the ability of the Chief Constable to alter either. To enable forces to adapt and deal with the challenge ahead, they must be empowered to fulfil and drive it themselves. With reforms and recommendations being proposed for the complete overhaul of the police from their workforce numbers, pay and conditions and operational structures, many of these changes have direct implications for the Special

Constabulary and how they operate as a workforce. The role of the Special Constable, in a mirror move to that seen within the regular paid workforce, has become increasingly frontline. Not only is this the most demanding type of police work as highlighted by Winsor (2011) which makes it questionable how volunteers with limited training should or could be expected to meet the same demands and expectations. If the Special Constabulary is to remain a voluntary force rather than reservists, then the position in which they can logically make the greatest impact remains within neighbourhood/community initiatives.

Chapter Five: Study Findings

This chapter outlines the key findings which emerged from the qualitative interviews conducted for this thesis under the context of the selected themes already presented earlier within chapter three.

5.1 Specials Recruitment

When interviewed the ACPO member acknowledged that a large proportion of the newly recruited Special Constables joined with the intention and inspiration of joining the regular paid police force and that overall the recruitment drives had failed to produce career Specials. Therefore some forces are reviewing the prospect of having more targeted recruitment for harder to reach communities and the potential to introduce a minimum length of service when joining the Specials; however, both of these have ethical issues.

ACPO Member *"It makes sense to recruit from the specials however it needs to be made clear to the specials that it does not mean that they will be recruited into the regulars…one matter of difficulty is the recruitment of career specials…this is something which is a problem…looking into targeted recruitment…maybe having a minimum time to serve within the Specials…being clear about the reality of the role."*

The ACPO member also stated that it was important that the Special Constabulary should be installed within the wider policing family, integrated into everyday policing.

ACPO Member *"The specials are part of the policing family…what duties they fulfil will differ between forces, but we need to avoid them being seen as "spare parts"…specials should be involved in neighbourhood policing, public events and within road policing for example…"*

The ACPO member had a strong belief in the voluntary nature of the Special Constabulary and that rather than the payment they should be well deployed and briefed. While agreeing that there were issues that needed to be addressed achieve this, they also argued that the structural model of the Special Constabulary did not need to change.

ACPO Member *"I believe that the volunteer model is the best model…they should remain a volunteer force and not a reservist…the specials don't want payment…what they want is to be well briefed and well tasked, to feel like part of the team…these are the important issues…."*

It could be argued that those in leadership roles have an invested interest in the Specials remaining a voluntary unpaid workforce, especially in terms of budgetary restrictions.

The Association of Special Constabulary Chief Officers encouraged the increased use of a national strategy for the recruitment of Special Constables. They also stated that Special Constables should not be seen as a replacement for paid police officers, rather that they should continue to support officers as volunteers (Submission to the review, Association of Special Constabulary Chief Officers, 2010). The views expressed by the Special Constabulary Chief Officers asked fell in line with those outlined by the ACPO member spoken to, with all acknowledging the very high turnover of Specials and corresponding wastage rate was a considerable issue.

SC Chief Officer 1 *"It's a logical step that many specials allied, and indeed many have joined…and that actually this has resulted in a recruitment problem for the Special Constabulary resulting in a very high turnover."*

SC Chief Officer 2 *"…have obviously lost a lot of specials to recruitment…turnover is very high…having to add in extra recruitment courses to try and catch up…"*

SC Chief Officers argued that the large-scale recruitment driven by forces had been undermined by the lack of infrastructure in place to cope with the number of recruits being processed and with turnover being so high, the numbers were not sustainable. Unlike that proposed by the Metropolitan Police, they highlighted that there were no plans to make service within the Special Constabulary a necessity for regular recruitment. In line with the opinion expressed by the ACPO member, they also recognised that one of the biggest issues facing the Special Constabulary was the need to recruit career Specials.

SC Chief Officer 1 *"We are looking into targeted recruitment for career specials…cannot prescribe anything though…"*

SC Chief Officer 2 *"The chief is very keen to target and reach those with skills and from areas not traditional reached though…"*

The main recruitment issue raised by serving Special Constables themselves was the increasing lack of "c*areer specials"* joining the forces. Career Specials are defined as those who join with the apparent purpose of remaining as a Special Constable with no significant objective for joining the regular force. Without a core body of career Specials, the Special Constabulary will struggle to have the

infrastructure in place to deal with a significant increase in Specials something raised by Special Constables Chief Officers.

SC Inspector (7 years duty, rural) interviewed stated that forces "…*need more career specials.*"

Specials interviewed made it very clear that they believed that the Special Constabulary should not be viewed by forces as a recruitment pool instead forces should be utilising targeted recruitment with it being made clear to those joining that it was not a route into the regular police force in direct contrast to what forces are proposing.

SC 1 (2 years duty, urban) *"The specials are letting anyone in…there is a lack of people staying and doing a good job."*

SC 2 (13 years duty, urban) *"There has been a steady trickle of recruitment…but this seems to be all younger specials who all want to get into the regulars…they see the specials as the means to get into the regulars…misguided…need to recruit more career specials…instead in the long term it would be a better investment with a better return to look into the problem of recruiting and keeping career specials…"*

Many of these individuals joined the Specials to await regular force recruitment as this was halted across many forces in the initial stages of the budgetary cuts. Others join the Specials first to get a sense of what police work is and if it is for them. Due to recent reductions to the starting salary of police officers those who had prior training and experience within the Specials could achieve a higher starting wage. There also seemed to be an issue with the type of individuals being recruited, with it being argued that forces were largely recruiting very young recruits despite better retention rates for older specials. These young recruits were not always seen to have the right attitude within the Special Constabulary.

SC Superintendent (7 years, urban) *"we need the right people in the volunteers…"*

SC temporary Inspector (4 years duty, urban) *"…we have had a steady number of specials in the force around the 500 mark, but there are plans to increase this up until 750…we have a mixed broad of ages, although I believe there is better retention with the older specials…"*

SC 3 (1-year duty, rural) *"people think the specials are the easy way in…this is not the case…"*

These findings fall in line with Harron (2005), who outlined the Motorway Syndrome in which different types of recruits were identified, resulting in different

Special Constabulary careers. Harron (2005) argued that land one is those slow (disciplined) Specials who joined out of a desire to provide a service to the community. These would be the career specials that interact with the service performing duties, ultimately providing the foundations of the Special Constabulary with an average service lifespan of 3-15 years (Harron, 2005). Lane two is described as the erratic Specials who join with ulterior motives of joining the regular force within a short period (usually 6-18 months). These Specials make a significant impact in their short Specials careers by performing lots of duties and having a high arrest rate however if they do not obtain entry to the regular force, the cost to the force is high as they are usually gone within 12-36 months (Harron, 2005). Lane three is, therefore, those demanding Specials who joined the force with enthusiasm and commitment; however, they are also the hardest to manage due to their desire to develop further. If they are supported, they will usually move into managerial positions; however, they are also most likely to leave with feelings of discrimination or underdevelopment if they are not. It would appear from the data gathered that forces are predominantly recruiting lane two Specials who are around for a very short period of time and making no lasting long-term impact for the Specials. Lane three specials which are also leaving with a certain level of negative feelings and experiences, suggesting that a targeted more strategic long-term Special recruitment plan is needed by forces.

Of the actual recruitment process, most Specials interviewed across the forces were impressed with the higher standards and were keen for the entry process to move towards that of the regular police force process and that the standards should not be dropped. However, as the literature has already outlined, the higher these standards get, the more people will be excluded. If one of the Special Constabularies main strengths being the link with the community with regular officers being drawn from all across the nation to a greater degree than the volunteer force, surely forces should be looking to include individuals from social groups, socio-economic and ethnic minorities who otherwise might not apply to the regular force due to either life situations or jobs that already pay more than that received by police officers. These individuals would not apply to the regular force as they could have small children and be unable to work shift patterns all the time. This is where forces should make a decision about the aim and role of the Special Constabulary as it will ultimately impact on whom they should recruit.

In recent years the recruitment process for Special Constables has come into line with that of the regular police forces. This means there is are interviews, scenarios and fitness testing. With every stipulation, police forces risk excluding certain groups of individuals, reducing their diversity and representation of the local community, undermining the unique strength of the Special Constabulary. Socially excluded groups are those who are harder to reach, and by making the process the same as the regular force, forces will ultimately receive the same type of recruit as they do for the regular force, i.e. young, white males wishing for a career within the regular force. Again this a key point for police forces, what is the purpose of the Special Constabulary? If it is to be a reservist force, then yes, the same type of recruit is the ideal candidate. However, if they are to remain a voluntary part-time police workforce whose unique selling point is that they are members of the local community working within policing then that should be utilised and strengthened by the inclusion of all members of that community. There would be no requirement for the recruitment process to be precisely the same, and therefore the purpose of this voluntary workforce should be changed to that of one based within local, neighbourhood/community based policing.

SC 4 (7 1/2 years duty, urban) *"I am the twitter ambassador for my force…there has been a recent push for specials recruitment and twitter is being used as part of this…I talk to those who are interesting in applying…in the last few weeks recruitment has opened and the process has changed…higher standards…more discriminating…I think it should be more towards the regular process…entry standards shouldn't drop…should be at the same bar."*

Overall it would appear that Special Constables themselves want to be held to a higher standard like their regular counterparts as considered combined with the issues around integration with the wider force, as it could improve their status with their regular colleagues.

SC 5 (23 years duty, rural) *"We need to be localised or sector recruitment…at the moment it is centrally organised at HQ…in competition with other emergency services to gain volunteers…"*

SC 3 (1-year duty, rural) *"The recruitment process was very good…the old system you went for open evening station visits to talk with other specials…now there is a fitness test, an online test plus an interview…"*

SC Superintendent (7 years duty, urban) *"we have dedicated rural recruitment evenings…with the local areas being targeted through the local newspapers…"*

Specials interviewed did raise the point that as recruitment has become more centrally controlled by force HR, those working in the rural areas, in particular, were not seeing many recruits with arguing locals are unlikely to travel far for recruitment purposes yet may be more interesting in locally held events.

Types of Recruits

The Special Constables interviews for this study across the four forces, raised concerns about the calibre of individuals being recruited and in particular the types of recruit even though they were for the majority positive about the recruitment process. Many indicated especially early after the budgetary cuts that forces were in such a rush to increase the number of Specials that some were recruiting those they might not previously have considered. With regards to the types of recruits, the majority of Specials older Specials have been shown to have a better retention rate (e.g. Gill and Mawby, 1990).

SC 6 (13 years duty, urban) *"in (force)there were attitude issues especially in the younger Specials, but I haven't found this a problem in (force)…as there is a higher level of training and specials work well as a team…"*

It, therefore, could be argued that large numbers of young recruits need more management and where this is lacking, can produce more personnel issues. This is an interesting point to consider, especially if the core body of career Specials is not being developed; the management of these recruits will become harder.

SC 7 (1-year duty, rural) *"…people think the specials are the easy way in…this is not the case…"*

The above quote from a Special was a sentiment commonly heard, and corresponds with the motivations for joining the Special Constabulary that these recruits have. Just because someone has served as a Special Constable does not guarantee them a position within the regular police force with them still having to go through the full recruitment process for the regulars.

In order to maintain volunteers' interest, there needs to be some understanding as to why they joined in the beginning. A 2010 survey of Special Constables found that the following reasons provided for why they joined to volunteer: to improve their interpersonal skills, gain transferable skills and experiences, build their self-confidence, make a difference in their community and gain a better understanding of police work (Dash-O'Tool and Fahy, 2010). These findings agree with previous surveys conducted (e.g. NPIA, 2010). The motivation of

volunteers is essential when considering how to both recruit and retain volunteers when financial motivation has been removed. Sociological literature suggests that there are a wide variety of factors which can affect volunteer motivation from their sense of identity, the attitudes within the organisation, the education and training that they receive, role/jobs that they are deployed/did and social networks (e.g. Rotolo and Wilson, 2006). Becker and Forbes (2001, p.230-329) argued that it is these *"…social networks, rather than beliefs, dominate as the mechanism leading to volunteering…"*.

Overwhelmingly the main motivation for joining for current Special Constabulary recruits is as a means of obtaining a career within the regular police force or because they found it interesting and was considering a career within the police at a later stage. It could, therefore, be argued that those joining the Special Constabulary do so with a distinctive purpose and reason for them selecting that particular voluntary organisation rather than the act of volunteering itself.

5.2 Specials Training

Initial Training and Probationary Period

Within the study findings, it appears that police forces have taken on some of the criticism raised within the previous literature, with new longer and more in-depth initial training packages. It came clear from those interviewed that many Specials approved of the new longer initial training weekends and that Specials were starting active duties with a much greater grounding in law.

Temporary SC Inspector (4 years duty, urban) *"Our initial training is ten modules, covering two days every other weekend…after that you attend mandatory first aid and PE which is one day…then we have district training which is four days a year…we are asked what is a need, or we ask around as to what it will be on for example drink driving, public order, statements…"*

The probationary period and procedure for Special Constables did differ depending on the force, ranging from a year to two years. However, all forces did have some type of probationary booklet of skills which Special Constables have to fulfil to be granted independent status. In some forces, this booklet was called a SOLAP while in others it was a PDP. The content varied between forces and could change depending on the year. There were some suggestions that the longer probationary period could be counter-productive as individuals could lose interest and quit during the process.

SC Inspector, (7 years duty, rural) "*We have a one year probation period in which you complete you Solap (probation booklet of skills)…we then complete four separate training modules a year usually on a Saturday and Sunday every two to three months.*"

SC 2 (13 years duty, urban) "*We have the SOLAP which is the probation period and booklet process in Avon and Somerset which can take from 2-4 years…it can be onerous…tutor officers are approved by the regulars…and it is signed off by the regulars, not specials…it takes too long and it a very difficult and long process….taking too long…*"

SC 5 (23 years duty, rural) "*Our initial training…when I joined, it was a six consecutive weekend course…now they are doing more training, but it is spread over months…usually takes seven months to get them through the training…far too long…people are losing interest and are quitting during the process…*"

SC 7 (1-year duty, rural) "*We have a SOLAP…which is a booklet which has to be completed for probation…takes about a year to complete…I got it completed a long time before this and had it signed off and everything…yet I had to wait two months to have it signed off…*"

SC 8 (1-year duty, rural) "*Initial training is about 16 weeks long from August to December…every another weekend…it covers most things although there does need to be more thought put into it…for example, there was no basic training on drink driving…*"

Gill and Mawby (1990) argued that there is a danger that police forces are relying upon Special Constables being in the main very committed and enthusiastic volunteers, in order to withstand very long recruitment and training process. Many of the Specials were indicating that the initial training was particularly long for a volunteer to commit to weekends and evenings. For regular officers training, they receive weeks of training, full time and are obviously paid for that time as well. Volunteers are being asked to obtain a certain level of training around all of these other commitments and responsibilities. Then once out of the frontline, these volunteers are being asked to deal with the same types of incidents etc. as these regular officers despite this difference in training.

The type of trainer being used was also not identical with some forces using Specials to train other Specials during their probationary period while others are using force trainers. Other forces are employing regular officers to be Specials tutors either in an official or unofficial capacity. Specials trained and mentored by regular officers did report a higher level of integration into the regular officer teams and a higher level of competence.

SC 2 (13 years duty, urban) *"….are far more professional, where specials are tutored by regulars which means you're learning curve is much greater and you can gain knowledge from the regulars… are less competent to deal with jobs, are tutored by other Specials…it was a culture shock moving forces…there was a huge difference…"*

SC 7 (1-year duty, rural) *"My probation period is served on response…so I am based on response working within a village…I work with "my team"…I have a regular tutor…"*

SC 8 (1-year duty, rural) *"My tutor is a spotter at football, and experienced SS and op support…It is really good system…you can benefit from their experiences and knowledge…"*

These findings, therefore, suggest that the use of regular officer as tutors for Special Constable recruits is the advantageous way forward for both the skill level within the Special Constabulary and for their integration within the police force on the whole.

Continual Development and Training

An area where the majority of concern was raised by nearly all Specials interviewed was further development or continual training, and the general lack of consistency and direction of this training across forces.

SC 9 (2 years duty, urban) "*We have one-day training…four training days over the years…covering nine compulsory modules…*"

SC 2 (13 years duty, urban) *"We receive training every month which is mandatory…not compulsory what it is on…what is needed, or practical…this training is very good and of a high calibre…"*

In some forces, this additional developmental training was compulsory while in others Specials are running it themselves, based upon practical operational needs.

SC 4 (7 ½ years duty, urban) *"The training…rubbish training…second Tuesday of every month…always on stuff, you don't need to know like terrorism, or it is repetitive, and useless…there is a missed opportunity…need the space for feedback on the knowledge gap…need a wish box of core skills, law changes…"*

Specials indicated that they do not mind giving up a weekend or day for training but only if it was worthwhile.

SC 4 (7 ½ years duty, urban) *"In the northern district…every station or group come together all day on a Saturday…claims yet another weekend on useless training…need a social life away from the specials…if I felt like I learnt something, it would be worth it"*

Other Specials reported that now regular officer recruitment has re-opened and forces are preoccupied with providing their training and CPD for the Special Constabulary has been placed last on the list.

SC 7 (1 year duty, rural) *"We do have some training…it is completed by a regular but there are only limited trainers available and regulars training comes first…"*

In other areas, the Special Constabulary has taken over providing their further training.

SC 5 (23 years duty, rural) *"We run our own in-house training by appropriate trainers brought in…we are left to decide if we need training and what we need it on…we are left to organise it…while this is good in that we can ask for training, it does mean that sometimes people can go a long time without training…do have mandatory training, for example, the PPT and first aid which we do with the regulars…"*

While it would appear that there are many courses available to the Special Constabulary within forces, it would also appear to be incredibly difficult to get onto these courses. The level of training available to Special Constables also varies considerably from force to force. Some forces, for example, provide blue light response driver training to their Specials while others are only allowed up to compliant stop. Driver training, in particular, was mentioned by multiple Specials wanting more availability and access as it directly impacts their ability to complete duties. It was noted that rural stations managed to get more of their Special Constables onto driving course with regular officers directly pushing for them to get the training. This may be because it would directly impact the Specials ability to support their regular colleagues while on duty from rural, large geographical stations.

SC 10 (2 years duty, urban) *"…there are courses available to specials however you have to fight for these courses…it's very difficult to get on…"*

Temporary SC Inspector, (4 years duty, urban) argued *"We get driving only once on solo patrol…but compliant stop training hard to get on…some have response driving course…but it's extremely hard to get on but possible."*

Across forces, there was inconsistency as to the training that Specials could get and skills they could be utilised. For example, response driving was made available to Specials in some forces but not many. Often those within rural stations had been granted places on more training as due to the low number of regular officers working in their area it was cost-effective for forces to utilise Specials to a much higher degree.

SC 2 (13 years duty, urban) said that *"There are a few specials who get response training, the blue and twos …it are a three-week course, but a very privileged few get on the course…something like one or two a year…"*

SC 4 (7 ½ years duty, urban) *"There are courses out there…but it is very difficult to get on courses such as PSU or the driving courses…there are no special provisions made to let specials do the courses such as the response course which is three weeks long…"*

SC 5 (23 years duty, rural) *"I am semi-unique in that I have got a response driving course…these are available to specials but are very difficult to get on…however, due to their being very few regular officers in my station, I can usually always get a car…"*

SC 5 (23 years duty, rural) *"I also do training alongside other agencies due to the variety of duties such as training with the coastguard and mountain rescue…"*

While Specials technically have access to the same training as regular police officers; however, the majority of these courses are not for Specials and therefore do not make it easy for Specials to gain access logistically. For example, regular officers will get paid time to attend training, while Specials would have to take unpaid leave from their other occupation.

5.3 Specials Retention

The Special Constables interviewed in the course of this thesis, expressed concern about the incredibly high turnover of the Specials, especially when forces are looking to increase their value for money and efficiency.

SC 1 (2 years duty, urban) stated *"…the turnover of specials is very high…why pour money into recruitment when you are not keeping people...."*

Some explained how they had very few Special Constables within their small rural station, yet very few were of independent status and others who were, were choosing to leave.

SC 7 (1 year's duty, rural) *"We have eight specials in our station…one in training…one HR section officer, two probationers and one special is leaving to be a PCSO…we are losing a lot at the moment…"*

The aspirations of those who join with the Special Constabulary were also cited as affecting their retention rates in two ways. Those who were successful in becoming a regular officer would leave to start their new career, while those who were unsuccessful would see no point in continuing as a Special Constable as they never intended to volunteer. Specials management are then expected to manage these officers.

SC Temporary Inspector, (4 years duty, urban) explained: *"…retention is a very important issue however…we have had a double hit with those getting into the regulars and those leaving because they are hacked off…"*

The link with the age of the recruits was also apparent and rose as an issue with regards to the type of applicant coming through recruitment.

SC (7 ½ years of duty, urban*) indicated that as the *"…age has dropped and as such duration has dropped as well…the young get bored…there are more young than ever before…need career specials…it is a shame that the force is not targeting areas and individuals…"*

In the absence of a coherent retention plan which could target these young recruits who fail to join the regulars combined with the continued recruitment of the younger age group makes little sense in the long term for forces. With a lack of Special Constables with longer lengths of service and independent patrol status, the Special Constabulary as a whole are becoming concentrated with probationer Specials making it difficult for Specials to manage themselves. In some forces where Specials are being left to train probationer Specials, this imbalance could mean that single management Specials are looking after multiple probationers. Given the large-scale recruitment drives across the police forces nationally, with hundreds of applications, forces are not making the best use of their recruitment resources.

While ACPO praised the Association of Special Constabulary Officers (ASCO) for their work in devising and introducing a national strategy to increase the number of Special Constables in 2008, the actual effects of this are yet to be seen. A number of forces acted on a suggestion from ACPO by trying to use financial incentives to increase the retention of Special Constables, but on the whole, these failed. More recently Winsor (2011) raised the suggestion that Special Constables should instead receive recognition for service, with the eligibility for the long service medal being reduced to five years from ten, and that Special Constables should qualify for police awards. However, it could be argued that all these suggestion will ultimately fail to improve retention rates because the underpinning problems are that the wrong individuals are being recruited. It could also be suggested that those who are receiving the long service medals were going to provide long service in any event because they were the individuals most likely to stay although no less commendable. The reason that police forces are still experiencing a very high turnover among their Special Constabulary and poor

retention rates (something found in most volunteer organisations it must be noted) is because they are recruiting, on masse, young recruits with many life decisions to make, who will understandably move on very quickly either into the *"job"* or as their circumstances change. Until recruitment changes, retention rates will not change either.

Another illustration of the gap between policy and empirical information is that despite one of the most common reasons given for resigning form the Special Constabulary are the pressures of work or study commitments, forces still appear to make it difficult for Special Constables to transfer between forces. If Special Constabularies are to become more professional and meet the designated standards, there should be no reason why a Special cannot transfer between forces easily. Indeed this should be actively encouraged, especially for those with long service and rank.

SC 5 (13 years' duty, urban) interviewed stated: *"…transferring between forces was very difficult…"*

The retention of Special Constables has been historically very poor with a very high turnover rate, as in any volunteer organisation; however, for the Special Constabulary, in particular, this causes problems in costs, training and equipment etc. The key point to recruitment and the retention of Special Constables is whether they should remain, volunteers or reservists. This factor would play a role in what type of individual they should be targeting for recruitment and that in turn could lead to better retention rates as recruits would have a clear idea of what they are signing up for and to. Overall forces need to have some long-term strategic plan in place when it comes to recruitment and retention as both will have an impact upon the training, costs and capability of the part-time workforce. Most responses by police forces tend to be immediate and short-term, to deal with the problem at the time, rather than having a long-term agenda in place. Targeted recruitment and a minimum length of service within the Special Constabulary before an application can be completed for the regular force may be beneficial.

5.4 Feeling Valued

The Specials interviewed reported feeling that there was a lack of recognition for all the work and hours that Specials were providing to the forces and their public. They felt unappreciated by both the police forces and by the wider public. There was in their view, a marked discrepancy between the kind of work they are completing, such as dealing with frontline incidents and the perception that the public has of them, is that Special Constables only deal with local events such as local parades. As can be seen from the data gathered, while that may have been the case, it certainly is no longer the case.

SC Inspector, (7 years duty, rural) stated *"I believe that the Special Constabulary should be recognised more…we are never mentioned in the news etc…just not recognised really that there are 1000s of volunteers putting their lives on the line in their communities…"*

SC 5 (23 years duty, rural) proposed that *"It would be nice to get more PR…there is an attitude that specials just do fetes…"*

Special Constables also reported not being thanked for their input by police forces and generally had the impression that they were considered last by those making the wider policing decisions. They also believed that those making an important policing decision such as the PCCs had very little understanding of what and who the Special Constabulary are. Instead, they merely saw them as a source of cheap police labour, and a means to reduce costs. Rather than being seen as a voluntary force helping their community, they had become a body of unpaid regulars.

SC Inspector, (7 years of duty, rural) stated that *"Our PCC didn't know anything about the specials…when thanking all the police…included the regulars, staff and PCSOs but not the specials."*

SC Superintendent, (7 years duty, urban) believed *"We are losing our identity…now just unpaid regulars…"*

SC (7 ½ years of duty, urban) becoming *"Specials are second class citizens…in the pecking order, we come below PCSOs…"*

The issue for the Special Constabulary is not a matter of being paid. Interviewees just wanted to be treated well, to be provided with interesting shifts, and that if these basic requirements were not met, then Special Constables would vote with their feet. Something which the recent retention figures suggest has already started.

SC (7 ½ years duty, urban) stated: *"Specials are a gift not free…"*

SC (7 ½ years duty, urban) explained *"…we are a motivated free force…Gucci courses are what keeps us…I use to be in the military, and I've worked with the TA…it's about how you treat them…forces want us but don't want to pay…need to spend money to keep us otherwise specials will vote with their feet…need to spend smart money on future deployments…keeping motivated specials…cheaper to keep people in the long run."*

The ACPO member interviewed did acknowledge that it was very important that the Special Constabulary was not treated as a *"spare part"*, only to be used when needed by the regular police force, but instead, they should be installed as part of the wider policing family, becoming integrated into everyday policing.

ACPO member *"The specials are part of the policing family…what duties they fulfil will differ between forces, but we need to avoid them being seen as "spare part"…Specials should be involved in neighbourhood policing, public events and within road policing for example…"*

However, this would not appear to be how the Special Constabulary feels that they are viewed. Instead, the data gathered suggested that the Special Constabulary believe that they are considered at the bottom of the policing family, an after though used when the regular force needs something.

5.5 Integration of the Special Constabulary: Relationship with Regular Officers

Within this study, the response of the Special Constables asked was in line with the previous literature and research into this area. They reported very good personal relationships with the regular officer teams that they worked within. There were hints from those who had been in place for a while that there had been some resentment from the regular force and that in others areas the general relationship was perhaps not as good. The connection between Specials and response was pointed out as particularly good, especially in areas where regular response officers were acting as tutors for Special Constables. For some Special Constables in small rural stations, the relationship was also very good due to the lack of regular colleague resources, meant that Specials played a significant part in making their regular colleague's jobs easier and carrying some of the workloads.

SC Inspector, (7 years duty, rural) *"The relationship with the regulars is brilliant…there used to be a bit of resentment, but you get what you put in….it's built on trust, once they know that you will muck in and get the job done they are really good…I have heard that in Bath itself it is a bit more them and us."*

SC Temporary Inspector (4 years duty, urban) *"I enjoy response…response are much happier to allow specials to fit in…"*

SC 5 (13 years duty, urban) *"The relationship between the regulars and specials is very good, brilliant…work alongside them and the regular tutors help the specials fit in…"*

SC, (23 years duty, rural) *"My relationship with the regular officers is very good…I hang out with them socially…"*

SC, (1-year duty, rural) *"The relationship between the specials and regulars is very good…you are straight into the team…always been welcomed…"*

SC, (1-year duty, rural) *"I feel like part of the team…if they are short on a section they call in a special…"*

SC Superintendent, (7 years duty, urban) *"We now have a regular Sgt who comes to the specials senior management meetings…"*

However, this did not stop some Special Constables reporting that while in general, the relationship was good there was still a small minority who openly made it clear they did not like working with Special Constables, and would be particular grumpy about working with Specials and were therefore widely avoided by Specials.

SC Temporary Inspector, (4 years duty, urban) *"In the main relationship between specials and the regulars is good…there is a small minority who have either had a bad experience with specials before or dislike working with specials…some are grumpy about working with specials…you usually know who these are and avoid working with them…"*

Others stated that it could be variable and that the Special Constable had to prove their worth and that they were not going to be a hinder for the regular and nearly all had heard of other Specials who had not had a good experience with regulars. These findings are in direct support of the previous findings by Gill & Mawby (1990) suggesting that despite some improvements, nothing much has changed between the two forces.

SC, (7 ½ years duty, urban) *"The relationship with the regulars is variable…need to show that you are keen to learn, that you ask questions and are proactive…not just there to ride shotgun…if you contribute…I feel part of the team, but I have heard of some specials having had a hard time…some choose to work with other specials because of this…up to the individual and their attitude… the regulars see this…usually pro special though...."*

Some Special Constables did, however, give some bad personal experiences of working with regulars, and that these experiences also greatly affected their desire to volunteer.

SC, (2 years, urban*) "…specials are not being able to get cars…which is causing arguments between the regulars and specials…"*

SC, (2 years, urban) *"When I had been for barely a month…I hadn't done many duties…I was asked by the regular Sgt if I was independent patrol…when I said that I was not… he said, "oh for fuck sake now I have to change all the teams"…I never wanted to work there again…"*

It seems that despite attempts to make them more integrated as part of the policing family, the Special Constabulary still appears to be on the outside of the police force. With regular officers jobs under threat through budgetary cuts, the very fact that special constables are actively recruited and pushed towards frontline policing the relationship between the two could become tense, even if it is not seen at the individual level. This is one particular area for further research, especially as previous research hints, Special Constables seem to underestimate the regulars' actual feelings of hostility towards them; therefore, this is where future research should go.

5.6 Deployment and Role

The new development which is addressed here is that the proposals to further increase the number of Special Constables coincide with reductions in the numbers of regular police officers and other budget cuts. This raises the question of whether the role of the Special Constabulary has changed. The interview data collected through for this research project tests the hypothesis that the Special Constables are being asked to perform duties as if they were regular officers.

 SC (2 years of duty, urban) stated that *"The force is trying to push the special constabulary to do more and more as the budgets cuts hit…the turnover of specials has been affected considerably by this…"*

As some Specials noted the forces are asking more of the Special Constabulary, and as a result, the retention rate of Special Constables has decreased with an ever-increasing wastage rate, something further supported in the police strength figures (HMIC, 2015). Specials should not be asked to attend or deal with any incidents beyond their training or competency. However, a policy to ensure that this does not happen relies upon Specials being open and honest about their limitations and to ask for additional support. Some forces have tried to ensure

that their voluntary officers were used appropriately by making sure that their call management centres were aware of whom the Special Constabulary were and that they could not be expected to attend all incidents.

SC, (13 years duty, urban) however stated that *"In (force) we take on a callsign like all regulars which mean control don't know it's a specials team…we are expected to do everything including all the paperwork and files…"*

This illustrates how many Specials are out on duty in the same capacity as their regular officer colleagues, and are being deployed and utilised in the same way as the regular officers. This suggests that the Special Constabulary are moving from being supplementary officers, who are merely backing up regular officers at jobs, to being frontline units performing the same job as their regular colleagues, essentially as *"policing on the cheap"*.

SC Temporary Inspector (urban) said *"…the cuts have not necessarily pushed specials towards response, but many are already there…we can double the numbers of officers on duty…"*

This move of the Special Constabulary towards the frontline, response duties may not be the direct response to the budgetary reductions, but a slow move that way within the forces anyway, as Special Constables could double the number of officers available. However, it could be suggested that with the reduced police strength available to police leadership, the Special Constabulary could be seen as a considerable increase in manpower available. Some Specials suggested that police forces have made their uniforms closer to those of their regular colleagues to create the impression that there are twice the numbers of regular officers available and on duty to the general public.

SC (7 ½ years duty, urban) argued that the Special Constabulary were being *"…moved towards response due to the drop in frontline numbers…politically used to make the figure numbers look good…push for the specials to impact on the frontline…"*

SC (23 years duty, rural) who stated that *"We have moved to wear custodians…the same uniform as the regulars…it looks like there are more regulars around…"*

This, therefore, suggests that despite the strong messages from police leadership that the Special Constabulary is not being used as policing on the cheap to fill the manpower gaps, that is exactly what is happening on the ground.

An SC (13 years duty, urban) suggested that this change in the role had been done through "*…there have been subtle changes with the cuts…slow changes,*

not sharp…more is being asked of the specials…well, it is a huge resource available to the force but have they utilised them properly…"

Special Constables who have been in for a long time stated that Special Constables are now being sent to ever more serious jobs, including threats to kill. They can be asked to do the job completely by themselves, and are often the first police officers on the scene. Some Specials are feeling the pressure.

SC (13 years duty, urban) stated that *"In () we get sent to everything, for example threats to kill, teenagers with drugs…sometimes I am on my own…I have to do everything…being the first response, gathering all the information…being treated as a response officer…"*

SC (13 years duty, urban) went on to say that, *"…expect a lot of their specials which is very scary and challenging…huge responsibility…"*

This "*policing on the cheap*" has put considerable pressure upon a group of volunteers who instead of being supplementary officers helping out their regular colleagues, are being asked to be free police officers. This is now what the Special Constabulary was created for. We see, therefore, a voluntary force being used in a reservist capacity. One of the dangers associated with this is that it opens both them and the police service up to criticism and possibly to legal action. With Specials performing across a wider range of duties there are more opportunities for the public to log complaints against them or for them to get something wrong through a lack of experience, training or knowledge and there is a question whether they feel that the police forces would support them. Apart from the concomitant paperwork, these responsibilities may represent exciting possibilities for the Special Constabulary but are rightfully the province of the full-time regular officers with the greater training background. Although it could be argued that the Specials who once joined in order to be involved in the fetes and parades within their communities as the local Bobbie, no longer exist, this is the area in which there is the greatest potential for Special Constables' to get into trouble, a risk having implications not only for the individual but for the police forces as a whole.

SC (2 years duty, urban) "*My partner is a regular officer…so I know that people in the force are down and lacking management…they are feeling really unsupported so that morale in the force is at an all-time low…the HR department is doing nothing in the face of the threat of complaints…there is no backup from the force whether you are a regular or special…"*

With regards to specialist roles, some forces have trained teams of SC's who can be deployed as and when for specific tasks in support and guided by a smaller number of regular officers. For example, prisoner handling teams for football matches/public order, car boot raid teams working with training standards, part of teams executing warrants and licensed premises checks, ANPR/drink driving campaigns, house to house enquiries/elimination fingerprint and DNA teams. Some forces are even using the skills of specials from their non-policing backgrounds with some allocating specialist roles/activities to individuals who have skill e.g. mechanic as vehicle examiner, accountant as a fraud investigator, technology specialist fitting covert surveillance equipment, farmer as a wildlife officer, gym instructor as personal safety trained, polish speaker as in interpreter. This provides an opportunity to motivate SC's and provide a greater sense of the value of their role.

From the data collected during this thesis, across the four different police forces, it would appear that forces are providing the Special Constabulary with different opportunities to move into specialist roles ranging from CID:

SC Superintendent (7 years duty, urban) provided an example of specialist roles within their force "*A role outline for specials to work in CID has gone out…the PCC is also looking into having a mounted section of specials…not started but looking into…also, there are specials working PSU at football events…gone down really well as it leaves the regulars PSU free…*"

SC Inspector (7 years duty, rural) stated that "*We have Specials who work in CID…covering everything from child protection to domestic violence…*"

There did appear to be a difference between rural and urban forces as to the likelihood of Special Constables obtaining some skills. For example within rural areas in particular due to the geography and nature of the locations, it would appear that Special Constables are much more likely to be able to obtain their driving qualifications than those within the urban forces.

SC Inspector (7 years duty, rural) from a rural area acknowledged "*We still have road policing units…and specials are members of this…all of our specials are able to drive…all have E grade driving at least…some have been able to get blue light training…regulars are actually pushing for us to get it.*"

So not only are Specials able to be part of the road policing units (units no longer existing in some forces) in rural forces, but the regulars are supporting the Special Constabulary gaining more vital skills to be able to work at full capacity and back up the regular officers.

SC Superintendent (7 years duty, urban) stated that *"I did two and a half year on traffic as one of four specials…I still do the odd op with traffic…operational two or three shifts a month…"*

However, while these opportunities are becoming available, they are still rare with one Special stating that their career in CID has been unique:

SC, (2 years duty, urban) *"My route into the Special Constabulary has been fairly unique…I spent around three months in uniform after my attestation when I then moved into CID…I did a CID course and took care of my own workload including prisoners, interviewing, putting together files and attending court…now the CID section which I was part of merged into the PTU …Public Protection and Youth Offender team…which is not really working and they have a lack of money and people…one problem is that the team have to cover such a large area covering Bristol, South Gloucester and Bath…three enquires can take a full day due to having to travel everywhere."*

In some police forces, the Special Constabulary are being used to provide specialist services which otherwise would not be available to the public. Some Specials interviewed provide unique examples to their areas where the Special Constabulary were being used to provide a service which otherwise would no longer be able to exist for example marine patrol.

SC Superintendent (7 years, urban) stated that *"Due to the cuts…the marine patrol was gone completely…now we have a team of 12 specials who provide a marine patrol on one boat on which the crew is provided…The PCC is very interested and keen to continue these marine patrols run by volunteers…the specials are filling in the hole…"*

While not specialist roles in the long term there were examples of Specials being able to move around different types of shifts ranging from the dog unit, police helicopter to custody and even run their own ops such as undercover plain clothes operations.

 SC Inspector (7 years duty, rural) stated that within their force there *"…have a lot of plain clothes ops which specials can join in…actually run them ourselves…begging ops etc.…"*

SC (7 ½ years duty, urban) said that *"I have worked as part of the same team since I joined…I've tried everything from the dog unit, traffic and I've been up on the police helicopter…"*

SC (1-year duty, rural) stated that *"I have worked in custody…as a requirement of probation…it really helped so that I have now helped out on two shifts on the weekend if they are short we can be called in to help…"*

One significant discovery related to a *"resilience op".*

SC Superintendent (7 years duty, urban) *"We run a resilience op every three months when specials take over all patrol duties from the regulars with specials crewed with specials…on a Sunday morning...we can use it as a training op…"*

This kind of police exercise is a training operation to see if the Special Constabulary could take over all policing duties within an area if the regulars were unavailable. In the context of budgetary cuts and high terrorism alert, this should be a source of alarm for both the Special Constabulary and to the public. Although it might suggest a potential for more aspects of the policing service to be run in their entirety by the Special Constabulary to show what they are capable of, it does not mean that this is an appropriate use of the Specials. An alternative interpretation would that that some individuals within the Special Constabulary leadership are carving out areas in which they can *"empire build"* rather than integrate their volunteers within the regular force. Regulars could well see this as an area where the Special Constabulary is stepping in on regulars' roles and jobs. While these are exciting roles for volunteers to provide there are other activities such as community policing or neighbourhood policing (as it is sometimes referred to) where the strength of the Special Constabulary could be more gainfully utilised.

Most forces are not utilising the skills or expertise which Special Constables bring to the force from their everyday jobs. Some forces are now allocating specialist roles/activities to individuals who have skills which the force can make use of, e.g. mechanic as vehicle examiner, accountant as a fraud investigator, technology specialist fitting covert surveillance equipment, farmer as a wildlife officer, gym instructor as a personal safety trainer, Polish speaker as an interpreter. These are all opportunities for motivating specials and providing a greater sense of the value of their role. This is one area in which the National Crime Agency to striving to achieve best practice.

Working Time Regulations

Interestingly there has been one obstacle to the Special Constabulary increasing their hour's duty, the Work Time Regulations (see Home Office, 2014). The effect was most noticeable in one force in particular.

SC Temporary Inspector (4 years duty, urban) stated *"…another area really affecting the specials are the work time regulations…which say we cannot work past 0300…Avon and Somerset have interpreted this as absolute…if you are working past 0300 on a regular basis you are seen as a night worker…and we*

cannot opt out of this…this is majorly affecting specials hours and in reality, most ignore this."

SC (1-year duty, rural) also said how *"We are not allowed to work past 3 am now…we use to be able to do…did something happen?"*

This enforcement of the Work Time Regulations had not been explained to the Special Constabulary within that force, with some Specials believing that the ban was a punishment for a particular Special who must have done something wrong. On other forces, Special Constables were opting out of the Work Time Regulations in order to get around it and work past 0300am. However, this raises questions around how many hours in a day some Specials are completing, bearing in mind the demands of their full-time employment. Police forces do need to make sure that some Specials are not at risk if they are completing far more hours than they should be. There will be questions asked if, for example, a Special Constable falls asleep at the wheel when driving home after working for the police until after 0300am, following a full day of employment. This will be particularly controversial of other members of the public are involved.

The fiscal deficit for the UK means that the rising cost of living and food is impacting upon the Special Constabulary members within their everyday jobs and lives, which has in turn impacted upon the hours they have available to volunteer.

SC (7 ½ years duty, urban) detailed that *"During the cuts…last year saw the most significant change…people cannot commit the hours due to the pressures of work…these extra issues have impacted on the specials…in the last three months, a canvas showed a significant drop in specials hours…from HR at HQ"*

This combined with more being asked of the Special Constables when they are on duty, means that the morale of the Special Constabulary has also been affected, especially with some Specials indicating in the course of this research, that since the budgetary cuts and reductions, the relationship between the regulars and Specials have become increasingly tense. This has led to some Specials not wanting to continue to volunteer anymore. A lot of the Specials interviewed during this thesis stated that the police forces needed to define exactly what they want or expect from the Special Constabulary because this, in turn, would have an impact upon how they are viewed and treated by forces as a whole and their regular colleagues.

SC (2 years duty, urban) indicated that *"My hours have dropped so that I am barely doing the minimum…I don't feel thanked or feel particularly welcome…"*

SC (7 ½ years duty, urban) also detailed how "*We have plugged a few gaps, but we are a long way off from being a useful officer…force needs to define what they expect or want from the specials…hit morale within the specials…only the goodwill of people gets us through…need to damage control…*"

SC (1-year duty, rural) argued that *"There has been a huge recruitment drive for more specials…the force wants it to be 800…this is good, but they should be recruiting more regulars not specials…"*

Some Specials argued that although on paper, things might be looking good to the police forces top management; in fact, this leadership is out of touch with how things are really on the frontline. In particular, they argued, they may be unaware of just how much the frontline is being propped up by the Special Constabulary.

SC (2 years duty, urban) argued that *"…the force's top management needs to be in touch with how it runs for specials on the ground…what is actually happening…"*

SC (1-year duty, rural) also stated that "*The force is getting something for free…doing a regular officers job…feel bad about it…*"

5.7 Leadership and Ranks

Police Leadership Opinions

When investigating the management of the Special Constabulary, it is necessary to consider the voluntary forces internal management system and leadership. One area of potential friction between regular officers and the Special Constabulary is the effect of a rank structure within the Special Constabulary, with even the First Police Advisory Board in 1979 suggesting a separate grading system, as it antagonised regular officers. At the moment, a regular, probationary officer would be viewed as of higher rank than a senior ranked Special with years' experience. Although the rank hierarchy is present within the Special Constabulary, it is not viewed as having any value within the regular police force, therefore raising the question as to whether there is any point in having the rank structure at all. Therefore another way of acknowledging experience and skills could be presented, such as a different title for various roles or experience. For example, there could be administrative titles for those looking after welfare etc. while experience could be acknowledged by a title or purely via years duty served. However, if the Specials move towards being a reserve force, then obviously those ranks can remain and become meaningful with a promotion process behind them.

The ACPO Member interviewed did not believe, however, that there should be exams imposed for the Special Constabulary rank structure instead arguing that while there should be standards:

ACPO Member: *"Need to have standards, but we must be careful not to overregulate the Special Constabulary, they are volunteers…but we do need some level of process…they need to say when they are coming in etc.…"*

There is given that there should be a clear understanding that the similarity does not make them operational leaders like their regular ranked colleagues. Therefore even ACPO has taken the value of the rank away, a making it merely a token for Specials. Instead, those Specials with ranks are given all administrative and welfare duties to look after within the Special Constabulary. It could, however, be argued that the welfare of the Special Constabulary should be the duty of the regular force, not passed off onto the voluntary rank structure.

Senior Police Office: *"Have clarified specials leadership role…been very clear…specials leadership roles are primarily admin welfare and leadership support…command and control come under the regular sergeant…"*

However, even Special Constabulary Chief Officers interviewed acknowledged that their ranks mean nothing on the street. This again highlights the controversial issue of what is the true function of the Special Constabulary rank structure. Indeed it could be argued that policing on the cheap could be a reason as to why forces are continuing with the rank structure as they could pay for an administrative team to look after the Special Constabulary, whereas the ranking system allows them to ask volunteers to do this on top of their volunteering for nothing. This is not only a politically divisive issue but also runs the risk of the purpose of these ranks within the Special Constabulary being misunderstood.

The Police Federation has always been against the rank structure in the Special Constabulary. The Police Federation argues that regular officers have to go through a promotion process which includes exams on the law and an interview before a panel to obtain any ranked position. Additionally, once they are promoted, they have to take on the responsibilities legally and professionally in relation both in terms of jobs/incidents and issues of welfare in a way no Special rank would have to. Therefore for many regulars, the introduction of a ranked position within the voluntary force has hindered their integration into the force and Federation.

To counteract these negative views, some forces have introduced a promotion process into the Special Constabulary. Some forces have introduced an application and interview process while others are considering introducing a pared-down version of the regulars' exams. This idea was not supported by the interviewed ACPO member who instead argued that

ACPO Member *"…need to have standards but we must be careful not to overregulate the Special Constabulary, they are volunteers…but we do need some level of process…they need to say when they are coming in etc.…"*

Senior Special Constables felt that the rank structure was working well. However, this might be expected as they are in the position themselves.

One Senior Ranked Special Constable *"…feel like the structure works very well…we have the right people at the right level…having a similar structure is complimentary…"*

Another Senior Ranked Special Constables *"Not looking into creating exams for promotions…are looking into a matrix style …showing experiences, range of things…update PDP, use of force etc…a possibility."*

The Special Constabulary for the City of London was a very interesting case in that they are looking into making their promotion process like that done by regular officers in order to make the ranks of more value, although they would still not hold operational power. The city of London was investigating into providing a version of the exam in which the regulars take (e.g. to lower the number of questions or topics). Other forces while reviewing their promotional process for the Special Constabulary are not looking to include exams.

There was some acknowledgement among the senior regular officers that there was some individual Special within ranked positions, who misunderstood their role and had attempted to view themselves as a ranked individual with regards to operational matters as well.

Senior Regular Officer: *"There could be some misunderstanding of the role and responsibilities…"*

Specials with Rank

Specials Constables from across four forces were interviewed in relation to their opinions and experiences of holding ranked positions (for a few) and of those in ranked positions. Those Special Constables who held a ranked position at some point in their police career or were currently within a role did have a clear understanding of what the role meant. They all realised that the position was for the welfare and disciplinary issues within the Special Constabulary rather than for any operational decision making at incidents.

As one SC Inspector, (7 years duty, rural) indicated *"As an Inspector, I have responsibility for everything from hours, training, welfare, operational tasks and disciplinary issues."*

It is interesting that the above Specials' Inspector does state that they were in charge of some operational tasks, including Specials, only events and operations. So despite what regulars are stating there is some operational value to the ranks, just with Special Constabulary events only, nothing to do with the regular force. This again means that the police force has created a rank structure which means something operationally when it is useful for the force but is second class when compared to a non-ranked regular officer.

Another SC Superintendent (7 years duty, urban) even argued for a harder promotional process *"Specials ranks are understood to be based around welfare…should be aligned with their regular counterparts…there also should be exams to move up the rank structure…"*

This suggests that those Specials ranks who do take their position seriously want the process to be harder and more aligned to the regulars promotional process so that their ranks positions would hold more value and worth with the regular force.

A non-ranked SC (13 years duty, urban) who had held a rank previously was very positive about the fact that they "*We have an area officer who is an ex-regular officer who was in the force for 45 years, retired and then came back as a special…"*

It could be that this former officer who holds a ranked position within the voluntary force does hold a valued ranked position taken seriously by the regular force because they were once a regular officer with many years of experience. This supports the idea that by introducing ex-regular officers into the voluntary force,

the attitude and value of those ranked positions would increase in the viewpoint of the Special Constabulary and most crucially within the regular force.

One SC (23 years duty, rural) said that "*I did become an area officer for a bit…inspector level for three years but I then handed it back as I wanted to be back out on the streets…*"

This was another common theme that some Specials Constables had obtained ranked positions but at some point had decided to hand away from the rank due to the fact that the positions had become so administrative heavy and that had not been what they joined and volunteered for. This supports a previous statement that forces are getting volunteers to administratively look after their voluntary force for free, however, that it largely not what people joined to do.

Non-Ranked Specials Opinions on the Ranks

This was one of the most interesting and unexpected findings of this thesis that it was clear that the non-ranked Special Constables had a very negative perspective of the rank structure and those within the ranks. This is, therefore, something which police force and the Special Constabulary management, in particular, need to review and consider. The ranked Special Constables were incredibly unpopular, and the reason for this needs to be ascertained. From the interviews gathered, it would appear that this unpopularity to due to the attitude of those in ranked positions. The majority of Specials interviewed argued for not having any ranks within their organisation, indicating that instead, they would prefer to work underneath a regular sergeant.

One SC (23 years duty, rural) argued that there was no need for ranks and that instead, it puts the huge burden upon volunteers *"We don't need ranks…it puts a very big burden on volunteers…there is no real need for them…should just be placed under the regular response Sgt…"*

Another SC (2 years duty, urban) indicated that posts were not being filled because even Specials did not want the role or burden *"The Specials management…there is no management…nobody wants the positions either…there was an area officer position empty for six months…they can't fill the positions because no one wants it"*

It could be that some Specials are choosing not to apply for a promotion because they are aware that the regulars do not like their rank structure and that this could change their relationship with the regular teams.

As SC (13 years duty, urban) said: *"…the regular officers don't like the rank structure in the specials…"*

164

However, other Specials were very blunt about the style of management that they experienced from the Special ranks.

One SC (7 ½ years, urban) argued that all that Special management did was send emails *"Specials management…send authoritarian emails…rude emails…shitty emails…"*

While another SC (7 ½ years duty, urban) *"…there has been talking about the specials moving to ranks rather than titles in the force…I use the term "management" loosely…it is more of dictatorship…building empires…the requirements needed are too easy, and the bar should be much higher…the rank structure doesn't work…the Scottish don't have any…instead the regular management should be used…we should be managed by the regulars…be more effective…volunteers can't do it…flawed…there needs to be a degree of commitment…lacks credibility…"*

It is not necessarily the case that the pool of potential managers offered within the population who volunteer to serve as Specials Constables is very large. If they have had no management training for the purposes of their own professional careers, then the level of competence of these more senior Specials may be low. The designated purpose of their promotion to higher ranks, in terms of management and welfare, may be beyond their abilities or level of training. Therefore in 2008, a Home Office Green Paper pledged more than £2 million worth of funding, directed towards the Special Constabulary leadership. It was to include provisions for a leadership training program to develop and enhance the capabilities of the Special Constabulary. A Senior Leadership Programme (SLP) was therefore developed and delivered specifically for the Special Constabulary (College of Policing, 2016). It was developed with the aim to improve their understanding of leadership and provided delegates with the ability to establish a clear set of values, ethics and standards. It also was intended to enable Specials to deal with a range of differing and often competing standards. The objective of the Specials' SLP was to increase the capability of the SC senior leadership by equipping them with the skills and knowledge to support and influence their chief officers concerning performance and value for money. The SLP featured six areas of focus: emotional intelligence, negotiating and influencing, values and ethics, performance management, organisational change and public confidence (College of Policing). It outlines and explained the current styles of strategic leadership, the implications of the current police reforms, responsibility, leadership development and management techniques. However, this course was not compulsory and in many forces was not provided or even

offered. The quality and nature of the management of the Special Constabulary are of crucial importance as they attempt to professionalise themselves and to prove that they can stand alone as a volunteer force. Effective leadership is a goal of the Special Constabulary National Strategy Plan of 2011-2016, but currently, there is potential for huge improvement. The findings reported here call into question whether or not the Special rank structure should continue. Not only is it apparently a source of dissatisfaction, but it places great pressure upon those within the rank structure to only volunteer their hours' duty but to supervise others as well. The recent rapid and large scale recruitment of Specials by the majority of police forces has left Special infrastructure unable to cope with the structural imbalance between having too few officers out of probation to supervisory those still within their first two years probationary period.

An example of this is Northamptonshire Police who had over 462 Special Constables by the end of 2015, but only 124 were of independent patrol status (Freedom of Information Act Request Response No. 03072015-1). Therefore once these new Special Constables are out of their initial training period, the pressure to get them through their probationary period is placed upon their voluntary part-time supervisors, of whom there are far too few. This could be contributing to the number of Special Constables leaving forces or declining the opportunities for promotion. Some of those who were interviewed stated that they had reached a ranked position but then decided to hand it back, largely to the pressure of the work involved becoming too much.

Overall some forces are investigating the possibility of developing a course providing Specials with leadership and supervisory skills. The aim would be to improve their understanding of leadership and provided delegates with the ability to establish a clear set of values, ethics and standards while being able to deal with a range of differing and often competing standards. The objective of the Special's SLP was to increase the capability of the SC senior leadership by equipping them with the skills and knowledge to support and influence their chief officers in relation to performance and value for money. The SLP featured (1) emotional intelligence, (2) negotiating and influencing (3) values and ethics, (4) performance management, (5) organisational change and (6) public confidence. It outline/explain the current strategic leadership's styles, the implications of the current police reforms, responsibility, leadership development, techniques.

However, this course is not compulsory, and many forces do not have something like this in place.

ACPO researched whether the Special Constabulary should have ranks and if so, what the structure should be. In 2005 ACPO voted to endorse the adoption of a common rank structure using the same ranks as the regular system but without the regular insignia, retaining instead the Special Constabularies own widely used bar system, however, many forces are only now implementing this in 2013/2014. Each force still has the decision whether to put in place this rank system despite the ACPO vote in 2005 and so far the landscape has been mixed. The findings from this study demonstrate some evidence that there are differences between the urban and rural stations in terms of the speed at which Special Constables are being developed within the promotional process. For example, Specials with fewer years' duty were being promoted quicker within the smaller rural stations as they had fewer Specials Constables and fewer to supervise. In the bigger urban-based stations, fewer Specials were being promoted, meaning that those within supervisory positions had a large number of probationers to supervise. This has led to inconsistencies in the experience in terms of years of service and expertise, leadership skills and different levels of expectations and responsibilities in terms of supervisory duties.

Summary

The key findings from the interviews obtained during this study were that Specials Constables reported being utilised by multiple forces in a frontline capacity and that they felt pressure from the level of responsibility in upholding the law especially in terms of their own level of competency. Despite the rhetoric of police leadership surrounding the Special Constabulary not being used as policing on the cheap, this was how the Special Constabulary themselves felt they were being utilised. Some within specialist roles were feeling that they were being utilised well and deployed effectively.

Training continues to be a significant issue for Special Constables in terms of their own level of confidence in being able to deal with multiple types of incidents on their own, and how their level of competency affects their relationship with their regular counterparts. The more competent they are, the more value they provide to their regular colleagues and therefore are more welcome because of

it. While the initial training and recruitment process had improved significantly, there were still significant issues. Specials reported that for the long-term strategic management of the Special Constabulary, the recruitment process needed to widen in its remit in terms of the types of recruits. It is suggested that recruitment could be targeted out to the wider community to really utilise the role of the Special to draw in individuals who might not apply for the police force. For example those of an older age 35-45 bracket with a more settled job, life balance, or a well educated person in a high paying job not looking for an employment change or a single mother looking to do something around childcare. All of these individuals would be looking to volunteer within the Specials and therefore stay for a longer time period adding stability to the Special Constabulary management structure.

The rank structure within the Special Constabulary was of particular concern for the Special Constabulary, especially those not in a ranked position. The findings suggest that those who have been promoted have no management training instead of poorly managing officers through emails which were often authoritarian and rude. This suggests that there needs to be management training and a proper promotion process in place to improve the quality of the leadership with more responsibility being placed upon Specials their welfare and support are even more important as they are utilised in a frontline capacity.

Chapter Six: The Future of the Special Constabulary

As this thesis has established throughout history in times of financial constraint and social unrest, various governments have sought to utilise the Special Constabulary within policing of the United Kingdom. A key factor used to promote the Special Constabulary has been their position as a cost-effective resource available to police leadership (HMIC, 2002) although the appropriateness of volunteers being used as such is called into question within this chapter narrative. This has often been done in the context of the government seeking to reconfigure the relationship between the state and citizen to facilitate the pluralisation of public service delivery and by encouraging citizens to become more active within their local communities, thereby reducing some of the demand being placed upon the public services (e.g. Home Office, 2010; Bullock, 2016). The lack of research carried out exclusively upon the Special Constabulary in the United Kingdom means that overall there is a lack of clarity around the position of these voluntary officers by the police themselves and within the academic literature. The ongoing ambiguity and interchanging ways in which the Special Constables are being utilised within policing makes it problematic to define. Therefore this current study embarked on an investigation to uncover Special Constables perceptions and experiences of their role within policing in a time of austerity and financial constraint.

A key question for the public sector organisations, including the police since the comprehensive spending review of 2010, has been how to maintain their current levels of service during the deep funding cuts. Bullock (2014) argued that it has increasingly become clear that volunteers are being used to fulfil the workforce gaps left within the forces through reorganisation and redundancy, raising the question about the nature of that voluntary role. Back in the 1980s academics declared that there was potential for the Special Constabulary to be a dynamic force capable of making a significant contribution to the range of policing mechanisms available to police leadership (e.g. Leon, 1989). As this thesis illustrated historically, there was an argument that as the regular paid police force became more prominent and more professional, there was less and less need to have a voluntary unpaid police force. The development of the Special Constabulary alongside the regular force has been used to justify their continued existence as one of additional support for regular officers. However, there has

been no clear investigation or consideration of this continued existence and demand for the Special Constabulary, and indeed the debates surrounding their merits and disadvantages as solutions to various policing problems has had minimal contribution to their actual historical use. There has been so little investigation and research into the Special Constabulary that their very establishment is open to interpretation.

Today the Special Constabulary has become an integral part of the police service and such it has had to adapt and change to continue to meet the various internal and external demands and expectations of policing in modern day UK. It could, therefore, be argued that the Special Constables who once joined to be involved in policing local fetes and parades within their local communities no longer exist, and instead, Specials are being utilised nearly exclusively across forces in a response reactive frontline capacity. A key finding highlighted within chapter five was that Special Constables reported a shift in deployment and roles, from community or neighbourhood policing roles, to nearly all being deployed in some response capacity. This reflects the same movement of the regular paid workforce, with officers in non-frontline roles being redeployed back to frontline positions to protect forces reactive 999 response capacity as overall workforce resources available decline. This change to the role and duties of Special Constables has led to officers feeling significant pressure from the level of responsibility being placed upon a voluntary unpaid part-time position, in upholding the law. This, in turn, has to lead to many questioning their level of competency and ability, especially in conjunction with the lack of continual development or training being provided by forces. This increasing mobilisation and utilisation of the Special Constabulary upon the policing frontline during a time of economic constraint and declining paid full-time resources, has led to questions as to whether police leadership are using the voluntary force as a means of policing on the cheap. Others such as Bullock and Leeney (2016) proposed that the Special Constabulary is merely becoming embedded into the mixed economy of policing and present a practical response to fiscal constraint, with volunteers long having been used in times of need throughout their history.

The Special Constabulary provide forces with over 3.5 million hours of volunteer contribution within policing, which is an estimated cash value equivalent of between £50-100 million (Britton et al., 2016). Police forces would struggle to

maintain certain aspects of the policing service if these hours were no longer available, so it makes operational sense that they should develop, maintain and invest in this voluntary workforce. In order to impact upon the experience of these voluntary officers both organisationally and operationally, a cultural change within forces in which there are greater appreciation and understanding of the motivations, experiences and ability of these volunteers is necessary if forces are to make full advantage of this pluralised approach to delivering a policing service to the public (e.g. Stenning & Shearing, 2015, p.7). Police forces should be more innovative and visionary in re-imagining policing especially in terms of the role that the Special Constabulary can fulfil (Britton & Knight, 2016) which in turn would shift them from their peripheral position within the extended policing family. Police forces could be far more flexible and imaginative in utilising the range of skills, opinions and experiences that the Special Constabulary bring from outside policing something which the organisation are traditionally have failed to do. Rather the organisation tends only to appreciate skills, training and experience developed and accredited to policing, perpetuating the cycle of police thinking like the police. Some sporadic progress has been made as can be taken from the research carried out that Specials are being engaged in specialist areas of policing (also see Britton et al., 2016; Johnson et al., 2018) yet this continues to be ad hoc and merely slotting volunteers within existing roles rather than thinking differently. The unsustained growth surge of the Special Constabulary is evidence that both nationally and locally police forces have failed to to manage their voluntary forces both operationally and organisationally. With the already high attrition rates of Special Constables before austerity measures changed the nature of the role, rising as forces ask more and more of their voluntary workforce, suggests that they have failed to support, develop and build the infrastructure necessary to maintain their expectations and experiences. This is supported by Whittle (2017, p.137) who argued that forces have focused on recruitment while the rate of departures has remained poorly understood or tackled. This preoccupation with the number of Specials rather than the overall experience, ability or management of them, has resulted in poor levels of feelings of being valued, supported, invested in and overall morale.

For this thesis, and as can be seen in chapter five, a high ranking member of ACPO with specific national interest and position with regards to the Special

Constabulary was spoken to about their view on the future role of the Special Constabulary within policing. This ACPO member was clear when asked directly, that the Special Constabulary are not a version of policing on the cheap and that they would never be used to fill any workforce gaps as the result of paid workforces reductions. This individual also highlighted that an HMIC report in 2012 outlined how Special Constables were already being used in a frontline capacity on response sections during peak or busy periods allowing for greater flexibility and resilience during a period of high demand. The findings from this current study illustrate clear discrepancies between the rhetoric of police leadership and the Special Constables serving upon the policing frontline. Despite those within police leadership positions being clear that the Special Constabulary is not being used as a form of policing on the cheap, fulfilling workforce gaps left by austerity measures, that is precisely how the Specials themselves reported and felt that they were being used. Not only this but the Specials interviews within this study highlighted that there had been a significant shift in Specials being used in times of high demand to nearly exclusive use in a frontline capacity.

This thesis argues that the contribution of Special Constables to policing in the 21st century is significant, even more so than the police service would acknowledge. Specials interviewed illustrated high levels of dedication and professionalism in supporting their regular paid colleagues in frontline policing, and indeed in many areas Specials were providing that service without any support of paid staff. This thesis, however, strongly advises that the Special Constabulary must be consistently and continually developed so that they can continue to meet the challenges and demands of contemporary policing in the UK. The growing complexities of modern day policing is a crucial challenge for the Special Constabulary so that these voluntary unpaid part-time officers are equipped with the ability and skills to cope with the full range of duties undertaken by officers in the course of everyday policing. As those interviews illustrated there is almost a complete lack of continued development of Special Constables outside of their probationary period, and it is predominantly those within specialist roles who feel that they have been trained to a standard to which they can be most effectively deployed. Therefore police forces must ensure that the continued development of the Special Constabulary is both invested in and prioritised within

forces for both non-ranked and ranked Specials. It would also be advised from the key findings of this current study that bespoke leadership training for those in and going into supervisory positions was provided. To achieve this forces would need to reconsider the overall purpose and role of the Special Constabulary within policing and the police organisation itself.

O'Reilly (2016) argued that volunteering within the policing context raises significant questions about police legitimacy and accountability, especially regarding the pluralisation of the police services. Volunteering in the emergency public services has long been a contentious issue, especially with regards to the governmental austerity agenda, police budgets and reforms. Unison (the public sector union) also drew attention to how police services are quietly retaining some volunteers within key roles once performed by salaried staff and the implications that may have with replacing employed, highly trained, vetted and skilled police employees with volunteers (Unison, 2014). The role of volunteers within both the criminal justice system and policing itself means considering the appropriateness of using part-time volunteers with limited training to carry out the same function as paid regular trained staff, who might be regarded as professional police experts. It has been long presumed within the criminal justice system that the police are experts in their field on topics such as crime types, crime prevention, case investigations etc. yet there is some debate within the contemporary literature as to how their obtain this expertise. This debate surrounding police expertise is especially timely given that the College of Policing seeks to achieve chartered status as the professional body for those working in policing services across England and Wales. The purpose of the College as established already within this thesis is to provide standards to the professional development of the police including codes of practice, regulations and training standards of the training itself, development, skills and qualifications held within the police service (College of Policing, 2018). The College of Policing is therefore at the forefront of the recent drive for an evidence-based approach to policing, and are the hosts of the What Works Centre for Crime Reduction, involving the collaboration of academics and university consortiums, coordinating and commissioning research. The College of Policing has also created regional university networks between various academic organisations and police forces, leading to the two

working together to provide theoretical and empirical underpinnings to what is policing and what they should be doing.

Research such as that conducted by Collins and Evans (2007) argue that expertise is socially constructed while others such as Carr (2010) are outlining multiple ways in which individuals can obtain expertise. Carr (2010) for example argues that apprenticeship could apply directly to policing as a critical method of knowledge being exchanged within the police as novices or recruits being initiated into the skilled practice by their peer groups and that peer group, therefore, defines the boundaries of that practice. This approach promotes the traditional form of learning with expertise being exchanged to novice police officers through the police occupational culture and practices with a large proportion of their training taking place in practice upon the street and everyday aspects of the job itself rather than the classroom. This model of learning enables individuals to share the collective understanding of the group and therefore develop the tactic skills to apply to any new settings they find themselves in (e.g. Collins, 2010; Collins & Kusch, 1998; Dreyfus, 1979). Tacit skills are those deemed to be vital elements of mastery where experienced workers draw upon everyday activities and extend that knowledge to tackle new or unexpected situations (e.g. Evans, 1997). However the College of Policing aims to include policing qualifications into the recruitment requirements, this would mean a move away from such socially constructed expertise, towards being in line with other institutions where skill is examined and tested such as that found within technical, medical and law professions. In these cases, the expected standards are codified, and entry is via formal examinations, and work is therefore likely to maintain the appropriate levels of competence (e.g. Ericsson, 2006, p.3).

This thesis, therefore, raises the point that if the police are to be seen as experts of contemporary policing practices and knowledge, that how can volunteers with limited training be ever expected to carry out the same role. In some respects, the very fact that volunteers are fulfilling the same position challenges this concept of police professionalism and expertise. Historically the police have had limited if any link to any formal education or qualification as there has been no educational requirement for joining the service, and years of experiences have been seen as a critical measurement of expertise. Over time various examinations were introduced for promotional processes, something still not

included within all Special Constabularies with the odd exception, for example, the City of London Specials who had a variation of the same promotion process and exams as their regular colleagues undertake. Interestingly there has been very little academic attention to how individuals obtain expertise in policing despite a general assumption, for example, in courts of law of them being experts. If this expertise is to become more quantified, then how can Specials continue to exist in their voluntary form?

As demonstrated in chapter five, the management of the Special Constabulary specifically regarding their management by the Special Constabulary rank or leadership structure is an area of tension. Many volunteer organisations experience issues regarding voluntary management with the contrast between the need to develop a systematic structure of management to promote accountability, particularly important within policing, and the need to avoid bureaucratic and inflexible systems which are often viewed as inappropriate for volunteers. A simple example of this tension is that fact that as a matter of course within the criminal justice system a Special can be called to testify at court either as the arresting officer or as a witness, during a time of their paid employment. This can result in volunteers having to take a day off work to attend court, and if court overruns etc. this can have a significant impact on their employment. The day to day supervision and management of Special Constables serves to strengthen their position within the organisation, offering a way in which there can be communication between the two forces, better deployment and effective use of volunteers when they are on duty and a method for managers to show their appreciation for the time and support given. Management structures also provide a way through which to distil information about the organisational values, the priorities and accepted standards of behaviour, while also providing a mechanism through which concerns can be voiced, and opinions can be heard. A well organised and run management structure should enable the opportunities for Special Constables to reflect upon and develop their performance. Supervision is essential especially regarding accountability for the action of these voluntary officers while on duty, as the office of constable and powers of arrest etc. that come with it are especially powerful making the voluntary position barely distinguishable from that of the regular officers. Indeed the only difference is pay.

This means that the findings of the current study are of particular significance. A key unexpected result regarding leadership and supervision for the Special Constabulary, serving Specials interviewed had a very negative perspective of both the rank structure and those individuals who hold ranked positions. Those within ranked positions were incredibly unpopular, and the reasons for this need to be further examined by the Special Constabulary and police forces themselves. Some argued that it placed an incredible burden upon a volunteer to maintain and meet all the welfare and administrative needs of other volunteers when the very nature of volunteering means they have competing demands for their time. Due to the nature of being on duty when people have some free time available, supervisors often will not be in the station or on duty with those they are supervising for months unless they are working the same events etc. It can be challenging to keep a proper channel of communication opens between the two parties, to be kept up to date with what has happened to that individual, for example, do they have any welfare needs after a particularly traumatic incident. Instead the person most likely to deal with that Special on the day will be the regular supervisor of the response teams on which they are working, so many have a better working supervisory relationship with the regular sergeant than their Specials supervisor. The extra workload and responsibility of these posts have led to many being unfilled in various forces as those volunteering their time either do not have that extra time or wish to take on a promotion.

Other Specials interviewed were unusually blunt and frank about the style of management that they were experiencing from those within supervisory or leadership positions. Management within the Special Constabulary as illustrated in chapter five was described as rude, empire building and done through authoritarian emails. Both this and the above paragraph present forces with two ways forward for the future. One that they remove Special Constabulary ranks altogether as they have done within the Scottish police, or if the rank structure is to remain as a source of reward for those putting in the hours and duties, to put some promotional process and training in place. If the Special Constabulary is to remain the voluntary unpaid policing workforce that they currently are, then this promotional process and training will have to take that into account. The time that these individuals may have to accomplish all that is being expected of them should be acknowledged, and they should be provided with the necessary

support to take on the extra responsibility as well. However, if they were for example to become a reservist paid part-time force, then they could and should be expected to sit the same exams and promotional process as their regular colleagues, this would also mean that their ranks mean the same unlike at present where even a regular PC rank overrules a Special Constabulary rank. This is a critical finding and unique to this study, if the quality and integrity of the management structure are not improved then the welfare of these voluntary officers could potentially be compromised and their experience of being a Special not a predominantly positive one, feeding into the continual retention issue faced by the Special Constabularies.

Failure to manage the Special Constabulary could ultimately lead to inefficiencies, increased costs and an increasingly dysfunctional relationship between the volunteers and members of the paid workforce (e.g. Johnson, 2018; Moynes, 1966; Twelvretrees, 1991). Indeed it is maintained by this thesis that police forces need to decide on exactly what role they are to maintain (voluntary or reservist) so that a new model of policing inclusive of all the policing family can be developed and sustained (Britton & Callender, 2017). In many aspects, the professionalisation of the Special Constabulary has already proven that they are going beyond that which should be expected of a voluntary workforce and suggests a slow development towards becoming a reservist police workforce. By becoming a perhaps a reserve paid workforce, the Special Constabulary could request that forces provide a monetary investment into resources and training for the Special Constabulary, especially in leadership and management skills. It is submitted by this thesis that police forces are currently operating haphazardly on the basis that they are utilising the Special Constabulary in a reservist manner, yet without the protection, training or support that a paid reserve force would. This very fact is becoming counter-productive regarding Special Constabulary recruitment, retention and deployment, and exposing Special Constables to legal and psychological and physical dangers. The general public sees no distinction between the regular paid police force and the voluntary Special Constabulary and indeed regarding uniform and powers, there is none, meaning they will place the same demands and expectations upon volunteers as those who carry out the role as a profession. However, if the Special Constabulary is to remain voluntary, then there is a strong argument for complete removal of the ranked positions

within the Special Constabulary. Instead of like that seen within the Scottish police, Specials are alternately placed in teams under the supervision of regular sergeant as part of their usual regular paid teams, making Specials ultimately more integrated as part of the regular police force. There would, therefore, be a full-time supervisor who could work with them on a consistent basis and be a single point of contact for those Specials. If the voluntary ranks hold no operational standing or authority and they are having, as the current research attests, a negative impact upon Specials experiences of volunteering, then they should be removed. Other means of reward and development would, therefore, need to be provided such as further specialist training, greater integration and involvement within policing that they wish to be part of. As volunteers, then less pressure should be applied, instead of more opportunities and experiences provided if they so want.

A vital contribution of this thesis is recognising the fact police forces need to provide the framework or infrastructure through which the Special Constabulary can be utilised effectively and efficiently while being focused in areas where they could be used to add the most value. As the Special Constabulary grows, there will be increasing pressure for Specials to get more varied roles to fit their unique capabilities, meaning that there needs to be an overall strategy to ensure Specials are not in competition with other members of the policing family. Integral to the professionalisation is the continued development of their skills and knowledge (ACPO, 2011, p.3). Training continues to be a significant issue for Special Constables, suggesting that not enough has been learnt from the limited literature available on the Specials. However, they did acknowledge that that initial training and that provided within the probationary period had improved significantly and that they were overall happy with the standard of recruits' ability. However, nearly all Specials across the four forces interviewed stated that continual professional development such as they may receive in their paid employment had fallen away and indeed in some areas was utterly non-existent. Indeed it is the lack of this type of continual training that led to Special Constables having a lack of confidence in their level of competency and the level perceived by their regular colleagues. The Specials interviews argued that a significant change had been felt and observed since austerity measures began, is that Specials are being expected to attend a vast range of incidents on their own

without the support of regularly paid colleagues, without any means of knowledge checking their skills, ability and law knowledge since probation, leading many to feel under pressure. It should be considered here that while Specials themselves may question their ability to attend and deal with such incidents, their actual ability has not been investigated. Overall Specials stated that if they were provided with ongoing training, they would be more competent and therefore be of better or more value to their regular colleagues, helping them to be made more welcomed because of that ability. Specials reported feeling like a burden upon regular colleagues when they were unable to do certain aspects of the job, through lack of training and felt that regular officers would be less inclined to work with a Special because of that fact. Indeed the only Specials who reported being trained and kept up to date regarding their knowledge and ability where those in specialised roles. This suggests that when forces have a reason and priority to invest in a Special, then that training is and can be made available. This highlights the importance of forces investing in and prioritising the Special Constabulary regarding preparation for them to become more effective overall.

This thesis found that for police forces to develop an effective long-term strategy for the deployment, management and motivations of Special Constables, they must clarify the nature of the role within policing and the police organisation. Special Constables are a form of volunteering with amateur, part-time voluntary officers giving up their free time against the rigour, regulations and professionalism of police work itself. The Special Constabulary themselves outlined that they must continue to adapt and change to meet the internal and external demands and expectations being created by contemporary policing (National Strategy for Special Constabulary, 2008). The National Strategy for Special Constabulary (2008) established that there is a need for the Special Constabulary within modern policing, arguing instead that forces needed a framework to ensure that they were being utilised effectively and efficiently so they could be focused in areas where they could add the most value. With the service changing rapidly reflecting the various changes happening within society and with new approaches and technologies being created, every aspect of policing is being challenged and tested for its relevance and value for money; the Special Constabulary must define their purpose. The Special Constabulary needs to find an opportunity to play a valuable, cost-effective and differentiated role

integrated with and alongside the regular force. With Special Constables contribution to policing demonstrating the high levels of dedication and professionalism already present, they need to be supported and developed to ensure that they can face the challenges of modern policing. This means that police forces need to value their voluntary forces not only regarding the commitments they provide the force and their communities but in investment terms as well (e.g. NPIA, 2010).

It has been demonstrated throughout this thesis that contemporary police forces are operating in a competitive, performance-driven field with rising demands created by both the public and budgetary constraints. Besides some local variations, the Specials need to have a clear and unambiguous role, as Specials need to be able to understand what is expected of them and also where they stand within the force as a whole. This clarification could result in greater integration as both the regular officers and Specials would be aware of the boundaries of each other's role and what could and should, therefore, be expected of them. While they carry out the same duties and hold the same legal powers as regular police officers, Special Constables remain outsiders in the *"police family"*. The concept of a police family was initially used in the late 1990s in England by Sir Ian Blair in a speech to the Association of Chief Police Officers (Where do the police fit into policing, Blair, 2007, p.176). While the concept of an extended policing family has remained central to debates around the future direction of policing, the term itself remains ambiguous (Johnston, 2007, p.134). This lack of integration has been seen with other groups such as Native American police officers in America never being fully integrated into the police society or occupational group (e.g. Gould, 1999). Atkinson (2013) also found that the "*them and us*" culture existing within the police organisation (see police occupational culture) reflects the asymmetric distribution of power in the service. Special Constables have been excluded from membership of the unions such as the Police Federation, who have historically been vocal opponents to the continuation of the voluntary force, especially on the frontline. However, as a sign of the changes taking place within policing in the UK, the Police Federation did acknowledge more recently that due to the difference in the role of the Special Constabulary that it would be appropriate for the Specials to have some membership within the Federation or at least the option. However, in 2016, the

Home Office ruled out changing the law to enable them to join the Federation. This is significant regarding the support available for Special Constables as they, therefore, do not receive the same access to legal representation, advice and support both legally and welfare wise that a regular police officer would in the same situation. Instead Special Constables are covered by an insurance deal between forces as Arc Legal for some issues relating to on-duty incidents, however only to a particular monetary value and not if the matter about them being suspended was not in the course of being on duty as a Special Constable. This is a significant point for Special Constables and one which should be made incredibly clear to all joining their ranks, especially when specific incidents or rulings could have an impact not only on their continued role within the police but potentially their paid employment as well.

Back in 1990, Gill and Mawby (1990) argued that the Special Constabulary needed to consider the advantages of having national machinery in place to represent the views, experiences and interests of Special Constables. This has become increasingly important as their role has expanded upon the frontline of policing, yet there is incredibly little consultation by forces with the Special Constabulary on various ideas, policies and strategies which affect all. Recently the formation of a limited company called the Association of Special Constabulary Officers seeks to provide and become a national voice for Special Constables across the UK with the SC Chief Officers and others from each force being involved. ASCO was established in 2005 to represent all Special Chief Officers yet in 2018 they elected to become the representative organisation for all Special Constables regardless of rank. The various stakeholders involved with ASCO include the Home Office, College of Policing and ACPO who work alongside ASCO to allow for some consultation and informed impact upon different policies etc. Within the context of this thesis, ASCO could potentially become an active voice for the increasingly frontline position of the Special Constabulary within policing of the UK and as such all the challenges and impacts that those types of roles and incidents play upon officers. There is a real opportunity for the voices and needs of the Special Constabulary to be heard at the top level of policing and police organisations something historically not achieved. ASCO also presents an opportunity for various Special Constabularies from across the UK to compare

and learn from each other, obtaining greater consistency, transparency, overall sustainability and professionalism to the Specials across the country.

The Special Constabulary is the only group outside of regular officers who hold the full powers associated with the office of constable and therefore can be deployed to have a significant impact upon a broad area of public concern (National Strategy for Special Constabulary, 2008). Special Constables are in general competent and willing policing resources which if used effectively and efficiently could potentially increase the effectiveness of the police service overall. The data from previous exit questionnaires and limited academic research all indicated that general underutilisation and a lack of variety regarding deployment had led to Special Constables leaving or reducing their duty hours. Interestingly in the context of this current study, it would appear that Specials are now being utilised in a response reactive capacity through which they are experiencing a wide variety of incidents and jobs yet are not being provided with the skills or training necessary to feel competent to deal with. Some expressed concern over the responsibility and pressure being placed upon Specials in this time of austerity to match the performance of regularly paid colleagues without the same support, guidance, training or management. This suggests that things have changed since the previous research, yet the infrastructural issues remain to place voluntary officers in a, particularly vulnerable and precarious position especially legally.

These findings contribute new insights into the management and deployment of Special Constables illustrating that fact that the planning, management and support of Specials activities could enhance their fulfilment from the role and overall feelings of being valued. For Specials to be utilised and deployed as part of the whole police service rather than on an ad hoc basis, there needs to be reliable, adaptive information about the availability of Specials so that when they come onto duty, they can be briefed and deployed efficiently and effectively. Special Constables duties are primarily shaped by their availability with peak times for Specials availability centred on standard working hours, so particularly around the weekends and evening hours. This, to some degree, coincides with peak demand for forces surrounding the late hours of the weekend, which is an apparent significant advantage to police forces. Some forces are utilising IT/online internet based systems where Special Constables can log on from at

home to define their duty hours and the ability to send out text/email alerts to ask officers to come in on duty/task specific duties and events. For example, when there have been significant public emergencies and natural incidents such as the recent flooding and snow when Special Constables specifically turned out during the working week to assist. As Specials often start at different times to regular paid officers, meaning that briefings are often missed or not completed leaving out relevant information. Facts such as these are essential for Specials to feel valued as those in charge of that shift need to take on the responsibility for managing the Specials when they are on duty, to ensure that their welfare and value is upheld such as thanking them for their work. It is therefore vital that the activities of the Special Constables are planned and managed as a means of enhancing their fulfilment of the role.

"…there is a need to ensure a more consistent, national approach to special constabulary recruitment, induction, training and development practice to help professionalise the role and to further enhance their mobility and flexibility as a resource."

(HMIC, 2003, para 7, p.101)

What the Special Constabulary do is of significance to the police service and government discourse primarily because of the implications for officer wastage (Leon, 1991). Indeed the focus upon their potential position within neighbourhood policing seemingly recognised the importance of deployment in motivating and retaining Special Constables (NPIA, 2008, p.13). As subsequently found within this current study, the NPIA (2008, p.13) also noted that *"Specials deployed in a challenging specialist or responsible roles have longer service than those deployed in less demanding tasks"*. This corresponds with the findings for this thesis with those working in specialist positions reporting having a higher level of training and support which in turn made them feel valued, yet those working in the heavy demand frontline are not feeling the same. It would appear that specialist roles make Specials feel like the force was investing time and training into Specials allowing them to obtain the skills to feel like a useful resource.

A critical overarching theme within this thesis is that police forces need to clarify the role of the Special Constabulary within policing and to do this forces must decide whether they should remain voluntary or move towards becoming a paid reservist force to meet the 21st-century modern day challenges facing policing in the UK. Currently, as this thesis illustrated, Special Constables are being

expected to carry out the same duties as regular police officers and are subject to the same sanctions in the event of their failure to carry out those duties correctly, without the benefit of the full training available to regular officers. This is further compounded by the fact that they cannot, in the event of being subjected to disciplinary action, access a level of support equivalent to that available to regular officers by reasons of their being denied membership to unions and other groups such as the Police Federation. Due to this, it could be proposed that the Special Constabulary should become a paid, part-time reserve force with force investment into their training and membership like any part-time regular officers to such unions. The nature of policing has changed since the establishment of the voluntary force, and therefore, this is a time to reconsider. In the context of the growth of the Special Constabulary in recent years, this has not been matched by any increase or reform of the organisational or support infrastructure (Whittle, 2014, p.37).

Historically in the UK, there has been a consideration for different operational models for the Special Constabulary, for example, Gill and Mawby (1990) exploring the possibility of dividing the Special Constabulary into two tiers. The Scottish Police Advisory Board in 1975 suggested the idea of creating a two-tier approach within the Special Constabulary with the first reserve being trained and available for a range of police duties under the guidance of a regular officer and could involve retired regulars returning in a voluntary capacity as Specials. The second reserve would then be more limited with less complicated, less varied and arguably less difficult duties with the focus being on those who are unable to offer a consistent commitment (ibid). A similar two-tier structure was also advocated by former Metropolitan Specials in a Bow Paper (Peterson & Axworthy, 1983).

"A case can be made for the splitting of Special Constabularies into two branches and rationalising training accordingly. The first would set out to attract young careerists and concentrate on policing skills, being mainly deployed on Friday and Saturday night shifts, with as close an integration with the regular force as possible-a slightly older but the unpaid form of police cadet. The second could concentrate primarily on the community orientated role, attracting older candidates, and could be deployed on Neighbourhood Watch, property-marking fairs and fetes and other public relation initiatives."

(Leon in 1989, p.15)

However, ultimately this two-tier structure was rejected due to concerns that any restructuring would lead to the formation of a second class Special from the

viewpoint of the regulars, Specials and the public. The creation of a two-tier structure would also require separate administration and management structure, which would seem to be an unnecessary burden on forces (Gill & Mawby, 1990). Instead, Gill and Mawby (1990) argued that there was much greater scope for the integration for Specials within the present structure through the effective deployment of Specials. More recently, Harron (2005) also argued that police forces needed to move beyond the historical view of the Special Constabulary and that means placing them where they could work at the most effective level. For example, very few Specials throughout most force areas are authorised to drive police vehicles over and above the basic driver classification, leading Harron (2005) advising forces to train a minimum of one Special Constable as driver trainers cutting costs in the long term. This could lead to better use of resources, and increase police profiles with the possibility of traffic sections capable of being self-sufficient (Harron, 2005).

The proposal to move the Special Constabulary from that of a voluntary workforce to a reservist one has been proposed at various times during history, more recently by the PCC of Northamptonshire Adam Simmonds in 2013. PCC Simmonds suggested that having reservist who could work at least 20 days a year alongside police officers and could be expected to be called upon at a moments notice, based upon models in Northern Ireland and the Territorial Army. This proposal, however, was never put into motion after some resistance from the force both regular and Specials. The Special Constabulary has long been a voluntary unpaid police workforce, and if they remain as they are, then there is an argument for their embedment within neighbourhood policing such as the Special Constabulary Strategic plan (2008) argued. Their core role in the past could be to provide a visible local reassurance link between the police, the public and local businesses and communities. With the removal of regular police officers away from community-based initiatives onto the frontline, then there is a significant gap opening up at the local level for the Special Constabulary to have a substantial impact. The National Strategy for the Special Constabulary (2008) argued that Specials could utilise their local knowledge and experiences and provide a key element to policing by strengthening the local intelligence gathered and provided the public with the public reassurance and visible patrols that they demand. Neighbourhood policing is a manpower-heavy function requiring officers

to be very visible within the local community, and with funding and resources, both declining this remains an area where the Special Constabulary could become the critical visible presence.

An example of a force utilising the Special Constabulary in this function is West Mercia. West Mercia decided to outline clearly that the Special Constabulary are volunteers who with training had a primary role in assisting and supporting their local divisional policing teams, and with some local exceptions, they would be posted and deployed as members of the Local Policing Teams. As identified through the National Intelligence Model and priorities created through PACT community engagements Specials will be deployed alongside the local policing teams under the leadership of the on-duty regular sergeant. Any Specials in supervisory positions are then expected to assist the sergeant in the supervision and coordination of the Special Constables in their teams. West Mercia force was also evident that Special Constables are not deployed on independent patrol until a minimum level of training had been completed and other training such as data protection, IPCC complaints system and victim care for examples. West Mercia police do not expect their Specials to attend or deal with any incidents beyond their training or competency. However, this relies on Specials being open and honest about their limitations and asking for any additional support. Members of the call management centres were also made aware that Specials were a volunteer force who do not have the same level of training as regularly paid officers and therefore should not be expected to attend all incidents. By acknowledging the voluntary nature of the role, West Mercia had decided to have a clear neighbourhood based part where the voluntary role can be protected and developed. However, it would be interesting to see since the austerity measures have been in place for some years now, whether this is still happening within West Mercia.

By keeping the Special Constabulary in their voluntary capacity, there still needs to be a clear and differentiated set of responsibilities identified within this thesis if the proper value of the Special Constabulary is to reached and the volunteer's motivation is maintained and developed. If forces are to continue to utilised the voluntary force as they currently are, then the ambiguous role of the volunteer backfilling the resulting workforce gaps with no clear agenda will result in them continually being underutilised and their full capability never being reached. Other

public providers such as the National Crime Agency are already making use of particular Specials with expert skills, with volunteers being targeted recruited for those skills, for example, financial experts, cybercrime. Harron argued back in 2005 that there is ultimately little point in spending public money on recruitment if forces are unable to provide suitable training, development and management, all problematic yet operationally essential issues for the Special Constabulary. The findings from this current study highlight that these continue to significant problems for the Special Constabulary and indeed forces have failed to make any improvements in this area, suggesting that perhaps the Special Constabulary's voluntary capacity needs to be reconsidered.

Public participation within policing is not unique to the UK, and there are many variations of volunteers working within police organisations often referred to as auxiliaries, reservists and even Specials in the British colonies (e.g. Button, 2012). Some key examples of the two can be seen within the United States of America who have both reservist and auxiliary police officers. Auxiliary police are unpaid, uniformed volunteers like Special Constables yet they do not possess any policing powers, while reserve officers are paid, wearing police uniforms, carry firearms in many states and possess the full police powers (Larson et al., 2008). British influences within the many American States, even after independent was obtained meant that many local based initiatives survived (Gill & Mawby, 1990) with for example Boston establishing a mixture of the night watchmen and daytime constables being introduced in 1823 (Lane, 1967). Today the USA retains its mixed police force with variations and differences across the individual states with Federation, National and local police forces. These variations can also be seen within the reserve forces, for example, St Louis reserve police having full police powers and the power to carry firearms, while in New York they have no policing powers (e.g. Johnston, 1992a). Research into such police forces has recently raised concerns over reserve forces carrying firearms with various examples of reserve officers overwhelmingly using them in the course of their duties (e.g. Guion, 2015).

In the UK some of the vital volunteer reservist forces include the Royal Naval Reserve, the Royal Marines Reserve, Territorial Army Reserve and the Royal Air Force Reserves (Derbyshire Police Volunteer Reservist Force Guidance, 2018). The Ministry of Defence (2014) indicated that the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve

and Territorial Force saw active service as far back as World War I with members of both being deployed at home and overseas, playing a significant role in some of the most famous battles including Gallipoli (1916) and Ancre Valley (1916). By the end of the First World War saw approximately 70,000 Navel Reservists and 1,000,000 Army Reservists being called to service (MoD, 2014). The successful use of volunteers in support of the armed services saw the creation of the Auxiliary Air Force between World Wars I and II, with all three services being deployed all around the world. Indeed like the Special Constabulary, the uniform of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve officers was modified to match that of their Royal Navy counterparts due to their contribution by 1942 (MoD, 2014). The Auxiliary Air Force formed in 1924 was responsible for the first German aircraft being shot down over British waters and over the mainland (ibid). Today there have been many large-scale mobilisations of all three services with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan by 2004. The reservist also assisted and supported on the mainland with 2,100 reserve personnel supporting the police for the 2012 London Olympic Games. Corresponding with the austerity measures being felt by the police and other public services, plans were announced in 2013 to have 3,100 Maritime Reserves, 30,000 Army Reserves and 1,800 Royal Auxiliary Air Force Reserves by 2018 (MoD, 2014).

Many of the issues facing the Special Constabulary are also things for consideration regarding the reserve military service, with Basham and Catignani (2016) examining the factors that shaped and influenced the commitment of military volunteer reservists, in particular, those which also affect their family lives and the pressures of their civilian employment. Reserve soldiers taking part reported that they were receiving increased training of a better standard, with less repetitive and boring classroom-based training (Basham & Catignani, 2016). Basham and Catignari (2016) also found from their interviews that the missing and critical variable to sustaining the reserve forces into 2020 was their family. The fact was for many volunteers, it was becoming increasingly difficult for them to separate their voluntary role from the other significant life commitments, and this was having a substantial impact on their family life. This could also be a variable impacting upon Special Constabulary retention figures, with volunteers perhaps choosing to leave due to the difficulties with juggling multiple commitments and the impact that can have upon both their family/personal life

and their paid employment. This could be proposed as a strength of moving to a reservist force, as this paid time volunteering would allow for more balance against the paid employment, but the above findings suggest that this would not solve all issues such as family life balance, especially with a higher demand in the level of service for those in a reserve. The current study did not delve into the family balance for Special Constables, and this would be an area of interesting further investigation.

The Keeping Enough in Reserve project (2018) key findings suggest that the cost of maintaining a reserve identity needed full recognition while the Negotiating Civilian and Military Lives (2018) study also found that reservists capacity to serve is dependent upon their time and energy. Some Special Constables in previous studies such as Gaston and Alexander (2001) indicated that Specials were worried that being paid would take away from the nature of them giving their time up to do some good within their community and that it would change the way others thought they were motivated. It would appear though from the research around paid military reserves that while the pay was a consideration, it was not a major motivational factor for volunteers to continue to give up their time. It was, however, the motivation for their negotiations with their families, and the pay for some members allowed them to shape their civilian careers around their military service (Negotiating Civilian and Military Lives, 2018). This means that police forces by changing the nature of the Special Constabulary into that of a reservist force and providing them with a level of pay; this would allow individuals greater flexibilities as to the time of the duty hours and types of duties they can do. This would be beneficial for forces in having more flexibility to utilise this part-time workforce at other times during the weeks other than key weekend evening slots.

Interestingly the reasons provided as to why individuals chose to volunteer within the military reserves are incredibly similar to those given by Special Constables such as *"In my daily line of work I would never be in a situation where I have to think that quick(ly) on my feet and have to be so physical…This is why I'm enjoying the Reserves; this is the kind of thrill that I don't get in my day to day job"* (Reservist Motivations to Serve, 2018). Although a critical difference between the military reserve and the Specials regarding motivations are the number of statements provided by Special Constables with altruistic motives such as giving back to the community or making their communities a safer place.

Volunteer reservists are committed and motivated to serve, with the military experiences a wide range of people in a variety of different career trajectories form employed to unemployed, singe/in a relationship, or children/no children (Reservist Motivations to Serve, 2018). This again could be of advantage for the Special Constabulary as by providing a level of pay, this could allow some individuals the opportunity to become involved in policing which otherwise they could not have. For example, a single mother may be able to provide time as a Special Constable reserve as the pay would allow her to pay for childcare. Someone unemployed may be able to commit lots of hours duty to the reserve police due to receiving a pay incentive when otherwise they would need to spend all their time findings paid employment. This could, therefore, allow the police to tap into specific pools of potential recruits or individuals who previously would not have joined, increasing their diversity. Overall retention rates are police forces biggest problem with regards to the Special Constabulary, with the scale of departures recently leading to some forces abandoning their recruitment drives as there have been no overall voluntary workforce increases. Nationally the police forces have purged Special Constables at a higher rate than they can recruit them, leading to an overall decline in the numbers across nearly all forces. For example, in 2017, there were around 13,502 Special Constables nationally, now by March 2018, there are only 11,690 (Home Office, 2018).

Another possible reason for why the national large-scale recruitment drives by forces have been so inadequate in increasing the overall number of Special Constables could potentially be an insufficient consideration to the views of the Special Constabulary themselves. The National Strategy for the Special Constabulary (2011-2016) reported that there is still a lot of work to be done to make sure that the Special Constabulary is part of the overall police decision making process. A one Special who spoke to the BBC on the guarantee of anonymity stated *"There are so many unhappy and unsupported and rarely valued officers…the lack of help and support for the special constables is mind-boggling…who would want to stay and volunteer in an organisation that shows no respect or helps their volunteers"* (BBC Report, 2017). Therefore there could be some reasons as to why these numbers have fallen so dramatically. It could also be suggested that as budgets across the sectors have become more restricted, including the commercial industry, Special Constables feel obliged to

give their paid employment priority. However, this thesis suggests that these reductions are primarily down to infrastructural issues outside of career change, such as recruitment into the regular force. Despite large numbers of Specials being processed through the recruitment and training across the police forces, there has yet to be an investment into the creation of a sufficient infrastructure to manage and support those within the forces. Once out of initial training at force headquarters and move out into their local stations, there have been issues with an imbalance in numbers between those out of probation and able to supervise those in probation. This has created some situations where recruits are unable to go out on duty because there is nobody availability for them to crew with, and this imbalance has placed enormous pressure upon the Special Constabulary management rank structure. The responsibilities being placed upon them is the management of high numbers of trainees, training requirements while on duty, welfare and expectations of those recruits, a pressure that should arguably not be placed upon unpaid volunteers.

To remedy this, reserve police forces could propose a minimum length of service required before people can move on to join the regulars paid forces; for example, this would be a suggested two years minimum. This would also allow for the creation of a higher skilled, motivated force being available to police leadership and could make it easier to move individuals back and forth between the regularly paid force, and paid part-time reserve as the training and standards would be the same. This means forces have a more versatile, flexible workforce to meet the variations in modern-day policing demands. This ability to move between the two forces could also produce a higher degree of integration of officers, by increasing their knowledge base, experience, training capabilities and most importantly their social, occupational standing as regular officers would also be working within the reserve. This would force regular officers to re-evaluate the Specials as a policing workforce. To achieve this, however, would require a change in the law to enable a paid reservist police force, something which many of those interviewed in the course of the current thesis though would highly unlikely to ever happen. As one interview senior regular police officer (4) stated *"The law doesn't allow them to be a reservist force at the moment…cannot demand people to come out…have to ask…would have to be a fundamental change and the government doesn't have the appetite for it"*. The ACPO member interviewed also firmly believed that the

Special Constabulary should remain a voluntary organisation arguing that when asked Specials had not wanted to be paid, but instead rewarded for the work that they were doing. However it could also be argued that it is in the interest of police force to maintain the status quo as they are currently getting policing on the cheap, with Specials providing the work of a reserve force, but without the investment and cost from the forces. It could also be argued that Specials are not being rewarded for what they are doing despite rhetoric from police leadership as the interviews from the current study highlighted and that if a paid reserve at least some monetary acknowledgement of that work would be available to them.

However, in the course of this researcher's experiences and opinions, this move is already starting to happen just in the very nature of the professionalisation of the Special Constabulary in its voluntary form. Policies are being proposed that would see Special Constables carrying Tasers, meeting specific requirements in fitness alongside their regular colleagues, and a growing movement for them to specialise within specific needed roles in forces. All of these moves suggest that even if not strategically planned, in the long term, this move from voluntary to reservist would not be so significant. Police forces need to consider an overall plan within policing both organisationally and structurally regarding the Special Constabulary to provide a clear description of their role and what duties they are expected to perform. A more explicit structure would then shape what educational standards are required to fulfil that role, with a comprehensive level of awareness of the knowledge and expertise already present within the Special Constabulary. The level of skills available could then be increased if recruitment could become more targeted like that of the National Crime Agency. As the access to training continues to be a particular barrier to Special Constables and aggravating feelings of being undervalued

Driven largely by economic necessity, the public services are all striving to do more with less, less money and fewer resources. Each represents a various component of the criminal justice system, with their definitions of demand and organisational goals which they are striving to achieve all affecting each other's austerity plans and reorganisations. The corresponding connection between these different criminal justice nodes has led to the development of responsibility for crime prevention (Bullock, 2015) with public services, non-state agencies and individuals to become the co-producers of crime control (Garland, 1996). As a

critical example of the public becoming involved in the criminal justice system is the role of the Special Constabulary, a role adapting to the circumstances of modern day policing. Special Constables are exposed to the same organisational, operational hazards and occupational stresses that are an unavoidable aspect of police work (Hart & Cotton, 2003; Zhao et al., 2002). While historically the Special Constabulary has been a voluntary unpaid police workforce, it did not start as such and by what means does not have to continue, if it was not the best structure for modern day policing. If the police are to keep having a meaningful impact on crime levels, these reduced resources must be directed more efficiently and effectively. One strategy would be to lead resources into a preventative approach to reducing the demand for police services in the first place. In the next few years, the shape and adaptivity of police forces to deal with these changes will be what matters, rather than the size of the budget provided. With reforms and recommendations being proposed for the complete overhaul of the police from their workforce numbers, pay and conditions and operational structure, many of these changes have direct implications for the Special Constabulary. If the Special Constabulary is to remain a voluntary force rather than reservists, then the position in which they can logically place to have the most significant impact would be within neighbourhood policing. However, it has been demonstrated throughout this thesis that the Special Constabulary should become a reservist force to protect these part-time officers within the context of contemporary policing. This research highlights the importance of obtaining the perspectives of the Special Constabulary as they have much to offer within criminological research, raising awareness that the opinions and experiences of these voluntary officers should be considered regarding how policing and the police are evolving and adapting to modern-day challenges. This thesis demonstrated the willingness of Special Constables to contribute to academic literature and studies, with them demonstrating how open and eager to share their experiences, however, the fact that they were unwilling to be recorded suggests that the relationship between the voluntary force and regulars is not as friendly as stated. To end this chapter and thesis, this study illustrated the role that the Special Constabulary are now fulfilling calls for a change into the fundamental nature of the part-time police officer, and it is the stance of this thesis that they should become a reservist force to ensure the training, support and investment into these officers occurs.

References

Ackah, Y (2000), Fear of crime among an immigrant population in the Washington, D.C, *Journal of Black Studies, 30, p.553-573.*

Alexander, R.H., & Fisher, J (1998), "The effects of recognition and group need on volunteerism: a social norm perspective", *Journal of Consumer Research, 25(3), pp.262-75.*

Alexander, J.A (2000), *An investigation into the premature wastage of special constables,* Development and Statistics Directorate, Home Office Research, London.

Alexandrou, A., & Davies, J.D (2002), Partnership, Continued Professional Development and the Police Service. *Journal of In-Service Education, Vol. 28, N.3, p.447-458.*

Allen, G., & Dempsey, N (2016) *Police Service Strength*, House of Commons Briefing Paper.

Ankama, S.K.(1983) *Police History: Some Aspects in England and Ghan*a, Excel Press, Ilford.

Arkin, W., & Dobrofsky, L. R. (1978). Military socialization and masculinity. *Journal of Social Issues*,*34*(1), 151-168.

Armstrong, M., & Baron, A (1998), *Performance Management Handbook*, IPM, London.

Ascoli, D. (1979), *The Queen's Peace: the Origins and Development of the Metropolitan Police, 1829-1979*, Hamish Hamilton, London.

ASCCO (2014) *Federation Vote Yes To Specials Membership*, News.

Atkinson, R., & Flint, J (2001), Accessing hidden and hard-to-reach populations: snowball research strategies, *Social Research, 33*

Audit Commission, *"Sustaining Value for Money in the police service",* London Audit Commission (2010).

Bailey, H (2014) Investment and Performance Board, *Manifesto Commitment-Special Council Tax Rebate*, 16th October 2014.

Banton, M (1964), *The Policeman in the Community*.

Barnard, C (1939). *The function of the executive.* Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University.

Barlow, D.E, & Barlow, M.H (2000), *Police in a multicultural society* An American story. Waveland Press Inc.

Barton, H (2003), Understanding occupational (sub)culture- a precursor for reform: The case of the police service in England and Wales, *The International Journal of Public Sector Management, 6(4/5), p.346-359.*

Bass, S (2000), Negotiating change: Community organisation and the politics of policing. *Urban Affairs Review, 36, p.148-177*.

Bayer, L (1990), *The Logistic and the possibilities of "wholistic" community policing*, A paper presented to the Police and the Community Conference, 23-25th October Australia Institute of Criminology, Canberra, ACT.

Bayley, D.H (1976), *Forces of Order: Police Behaviour in Japan and the United States*, University of California Press, Berkeley.

Bayley, D.H (1994), *Police For The Future*. Oxford University Press. New York: NY.

Bayley, D.H., & Shearing, C.D (1996), The Future of Policing. *Law and Society Review, p.585-606.*

Bayley, D.H., & Skolnick, J (1986), *The new blue line*: Police innovation in six American cities.

Beck, K., & Wilson, C (1997), "Police Officer's Views on Cultivating Organisational Commitment: Implications for Police Managers". Policing: *An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, Vol. 20, N.1, p.175-195.*

Beck, K., & Wilson, C (2000), Development of Affective Commitment: A Cross Sectional Sequential Change with tenure". *Journal of Vocational Behaviour, Vol. 56, N.1, p.114-136.*

Benkhoff, B (1997a), "Distangling organisational Commitment: the dangers of the OCQ for research policy". *Personnel Review, Vol.26, N.2, p.114-131*.

Bennett, J (2008). They Hug Hoodies, Don't They? Responsibility, Irresponsibility and Responsibilisation in Conservative Crime Policy, *The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, 47(5).*

Berman, G.,& Dar, A (2013) *Police Service Strength*, Social and General Statistics, Home Office.

Bevir, M. & Rhodes, R.A.W (2006). *Governance Stories*. London: Routledge.

Biggam. F.H., Power, K.G., Macdonald, R, R., Carcay, W.B.,& Moodie, E (1997), Self-perceived occupational stress and distress in a Scottish police force, *Work & Stress, 11(2), p.118-133.*

Billingham, Z (2014), Speech to ACPO Conference, 17th June 2014.

Bittner, E (1967), *The police on skid-row*. A study of peace keeping, American Sociological Review, Great Ideas Today.

Bittner, E (1970). *The functions of the police in modern society*. New York: Aronson.

Bittner, E (1974), Florence nightingale in pursuit of Willie Sutton: a theory of the police. In H. Jacob (ed) *The potential for reform of criminal justice, p 17-44*, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Bittner, E. (1975). *The Functions of the Police in Modern Society*, Aronson, New York.

Blau, G (1985), "The Measurement and Prediction of Career Commitment". *Journal of Occupational Psychology, Vol. 58, p.277-288.*

Bottomley, K., Coleman, C., Dixon, D., Gill, M., & Wall, D. (1991). THE DETENTION OF SUSPECTS IN POLICE CUSTODY The Impact of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. *British Journal of Criminology,31*(4), 347-364.

Bradley, R (1998). *Public Expectations and Perceptions of Policing*. Home Office.

Brewer, A (1993) *Managing For Employee Commitment*. Longman, London.

Brooks-Pollack, T (2014), *Special Constables should be armed with Tasers, says leading officer,* The Telegraph, 22nd July 2014.

Brown, J., Cooper, G., & Kirkcaldy, B (1996), Occupational stress among senior police officers. *British Journal of Psychology, 87 (1), p.31-41.*

Brown, K., & Coulter, P.B (1983), Subjective and objective measures of police service delivery, *Public Administration Review, 43 (1), p.50-58.*

Bullock, K. (2014a) *Citizens, Community and Crime Control*. Basingstoke. Palgrave McMillan.

Bullock, K (2014b), Diversity in the Special Constabulary Policing. *A Journal of Policy and Practices, 9(1), p.46-55.*

Bullock K., & Leeney, D (2014) On matters of balance: an examination of the deployment, motivation and management of the Special Constabulary. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 16(3), p.43-53.*

Bullock, K (2017) "Shoring up the Home guard?" Reflections on the development and deployment of police support volunteer programmes in England and Wales. *Policing and Society, 27(4), p.341-357.*

Bunyan, T (1971), *The Police State of Britain*. London: Friedman.

Butterfield, R., Edwards, C., & Woodall, J. (2005). The new public management and managerial roles: the case of the police sergeant. *British Journal of Management,16*(4), 329-341.

Burke, R.J (1994), Stressful events, work-family conflict, coping, psychological burnout, and well-being among police officers. *Psychological Reports, 75(2), p.787-800.*

Bussell, H.,& Forbes, D (2002), Understanding the volunteer market: The what, where, who and why of volunteering, *International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing 7(3), pp.244-257.*

Butler, A (1984) *Police Management*. London: Gower.

Butler, A.J.P (1992). *Police Management*. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Co. Ltd.

Button, M (2012), "Cross-border fraud and the case for an "Intrafraud", *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 35 (2), p.285-303.*

Cain, M. (1973), *Society and the Policeman's Role*, Routledge, London.

Caless, B., Brownas, J., Simpson, M., Spruce, B., & Underwood, R (2010). Blackstone's Handbook for the Special Constabulary. *Oxford: Oxford University Press.*

Callendes, M., Cahalin, K., Cole, S., Hubbard, L & Britton, I (2018). Understanding the motivations, moral, and retention of special constables. Findings from a national survey. *Policing, pp.1-16.*

Callendes, M., Pepper, M., Cahalin, K., & Britton, I (2018) "Exploring the police support volunteer experiences: findings from a national survey". *Policing and Society. DOI: 10.1080/16439463.2018.1432613*

Carrad, N (2006), *Modernising the Scottish Special Constabulary* Regulations 2006.

Carr-Hill, R (2000) Developing a robust resources allocation formula for police. Policing Society*: An International Journal 10 (3), p..235-261*

Citizens in Policing Community of Practice (2016) *Citizens in Policing National Strategy 2016-2019. London: national Police Chiefs Council.*

Cnaan, R.A., Handy, F., & Wadsworth, M (1996), "Defining who is a volunteer: Conceptual and Empirical Considerations", *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quartly, Vol 25, N.3, p.364-383.*

Chambre, S.M (1987) *"Good deeds in old age*. Volunteering by the new leisure class", Lexington Books, Lexington, MA.

Chan, J (1996) "Changing Police Culture", *British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 36, N.1, p.109-34.*

Chan, J (1999), *Police Culture*. A culture of Corruption.

Chan, J., Devery, C.,& Doran, S, (2003), *Fair Cop: Learning the Art of Policing*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Chan, J., & Dixon, D. (2007). The politics of police reform Ten years after the Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service. *Criminology and Criminal Justice*, *7*(4), 443-468.

Chenail, R.J (2011), *Interviewing the investigator*: strategies for addressing instrumentation and research bias concerns in qualitative research.

Clary, E., Snyder, M., & Stukas, A (1991), "Volunteer Motivations: Findings from a National Survey" *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quartly, Vol 25, N.4, p.485-505*.

Clary, E. G., Snyder, M., & Ridge, R. (1992). Volunteers' motivations: A functional strategy for the recruitment, placement, and retention of volunteers. *Nonprofit Management and Leadership*, *2*(4), 333-350.

Cnaan, R.A., Goldberg-Glen, R.S (1991) "Measuring motivation to volunteer in human services", *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 27(3), p.269-284.*

College of Policing (2015), College of Policing Analysis, *Estimating Demand on the Police Service.*

Collier, P.M., Edwards, J.S., & Shaw, D (2004), Communicating knowledge about police performance. *International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management 53(5), p.458-467.*

Conlon, E (2004). *Blue Blood.* New York: Riverhead Books.

Cope, S., Leishman, F., & Starie, P (1997), "Globalisation, New Public Management and the Enabling Future of Police Management". *International Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol.10, N.6, p.444-460.*

Courtney, R (1994), "Directions in Voluntary Sector Management", *Management Development Review, Vol. 7, N.3, p.33-36.*

Cox, S (1990), Policing into the 21st Century, *Police Studies 168 (13*) HeinOnline.

Crank, J., & Crank, J.P (2014), *Understanding Police Culture.* Routledge.

Crawford, A. (2008). Plural policing in the UK: Policing beyond the police. *Handbook of policing, 2.*

Critchley, T.A. (1978), *The History of Police in England and Wales*, Constable, London.

Cropanzano, R., Rupp, D.E., & Byrne, Z.S (2003), The relationship of emotional exhaustion to work attitudes, job performance and organisational citizenship behaviour, *Journal of Applied Psychology, 88, p.160-169.*

Dandeker, C., Greenberg, N., & Orme, G (2011). *The UK's Reserve Forces*: Retrospect and Prospect. Armed Forces & Society

Dash-O'Toole, T (2010) *Special Constabulary Recruitment, Marketing and Retention Surveys*, Report of Findings, NPIA.

Deal, T.E., & Kennedy, A (1982). *Corporate Cultures- The Rites and Rituals of Corporate Life.* Reading MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.

Delaney, J.T & Feuille, P (1987), *Police.*

Demerouti, E., Bakker, A.B, Nachreiner, F., & Schaufeli, W.B (2001), The job demands model of burnout, *Journal of Applied Psychology, 86, p.499-512*

Dey, I (1993), *Qualitative Data Analysis*, Routledge

Dhani, A (2012), *Police Service Strength*, England and Wales, Home Office Statistical Bulletin.

Dixon-woods, M., Borias, S., Booth, A et al., (2006). How can systematic reviews incorporate qualitative research? A critical perspective. *Qualitative Research 6(1), p.27-44.*

Dobrin, A., & Wolf, R (2016). What is known and not known about volunteer policing in the United States. *Police Science & Management, 18(3), p.220-227.*

Dowler, K. (2003). Media consumption and public attitudes toward crime and justice: The relationship between fear of crime, punitive attitudes, and perceived police effectiveness. *Journal of criminal justice and popular culture*, *10*(2), 109-126

Eckstein, S (1981), The Impact of Revolution on Social Welfare in Latin America, *Theory and Society, Vol 11, p. 17-42.*

Ellemers, N., Gilder, D., & Haslam, S.A (2004), Motivating Individuals and Groups at work: A Social Identity Perspective on Leadership and Group Performance. *Academy of Management Review, Vol. 29, p.459-478.*

Elliot, N, (1989) *Streets Ahead*, Adam Smith Institute, London.

Emsley, C. (1983), *Policing and its Context 1750-1870*, Macmillan, London.

Emsley, C. (2009).*The great British bobby: a history of British policing from the 18th century to the present*. Quercus.

Ericson, R.V (2007), *Crime in an insecure world*, Polity Press, Cambridge.

Fielding, N.G. (1988), *Joining Forces: Police Training, Socialization and Occupational Competence*, Routledge, London.

Fielding, N (1988), "Competence and Culture in the Police". *Sociology, Vol. 22, N.1, p.45-64.*

Fielding, N.G (1994), *Cop Canteen Culture*. In T. Newburn & E.A. Stanko (eds). Just Boys Doing Business: Men, Masculinities and Crime, p. 46-63, New York: Routledge

Fleming, J (2008). "Observation, The Police, and Public Administration: Introduction", *Public Administration, Vol. 86, N. 3, p.621-628.*

Fleming, J (2012). Changing the way we do business: reflecting on collaborative practice. *Police Practice and Research, 13(4) p.375-388.*

Fleming, J. & Lafferty, G (2000), ' New Management Techniques and Restructuring in Police Organisations', *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategy and Management, 23, 2, June, 154 – 68.*

Fleming, J., & Rhodes, R (2004), *It's Situational: the dilemmas of police governance in the 21st century*, Refereed paper presented to Australasian Political Studies Association Conference.

Fleming, J., & Rhodes, R. A. W. (2005). Bureaucracy, contracts and networks: the unholy trinity and the police. *Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology*,*38*(2), 192-205.

Foster, J. (1989). '*Two Stations: An Ethnographic Study of Policing in the Inner City'*, in D. Downes (ed), Crime in the City: Essays in Memory of John Barron Mays. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Fox, R.C. (2004). ' *Observations and reflections of a Perpetual Fieldworker*', The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 595-1, January, 309 – 26.

Freeman, R (1997). Working For Nothing: The Supply of Volunteer Labor. *Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 15, p.140-167.*

Fuller, J.B., Barnett, T., Hester, R., & Relyea, C (2003), A Social Identity Perspective on the Relationship Between Perceived Organizational Support and Organizational Commitment. *The Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 143, p.789-791.*

Galindo-Kuhn, R., & Guzley, R.M (2001), The Volunteer Satisfaction Index: Construct Definition, Measurement, Development and Validation. *Journal of Social Service Research, Vol. 28, p.45-68.*

Garland, D (1996), The limits of the sovereign state strategies of crime control in contemporary society, *British Journal of Criminology, 36 (4).*

Gaskin, K. (1998), "Vanishing Volunteers: Are young people losing interest in volunteerisng?" *Voluntary Action issues 1, p.33-43.*

Gaskin, K (1999) "Valuing Volunteers in Europe: A Comparative Study of the Volunteer Investment and Value Audit. *Voluntary Action, Vol 2, N.1, p.33-49.*

Gaston & Alexander (2001). Effective Organisation and Management of Public Sector Volunteer Workers. Police Special Constables. *International Journal of Public Sector Management, vol.14, No.1, p.59-74.*

Gibson, A., & Villiers, P (2007). *Leading for those we serve.* London: NPIA/Home Office.

Gill. M. L. (1987), *The Special Constabulary: Community Representation and Accountability*, in Mawby (ed) op cit, pp 52-66.

Gill, M.L. & Mawby, R.I (1987), *The Special Constabulary: Community Representation and Accountability*, in Mawby (ed) op cit, p. 52-66.

Gill, M.L. & Mawby, R.I. (1990), *Volunteers in the Criminal Justice System: A Comparative Study of Probation, Police and Victim Support*, Open University Press, Milton Keynes.

Gill, M.L., & Mawby, R.I (1990). *Special Constables: A Study of the Police Reserve. Gower*, London.

Goldstein, H (1990), *Problem Orientated Policing*, McGraw-Hill: New York.

Goffman, E (1989). 'On Fieldwork', *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, Vol.18, N.2, p. 123 – 32.*

Gottschalk, P (2008), *Organisational structure on predictor of intelligence strategy implementation in policing.*

Gordon, P. (1980), *Policing Scotland*, Scottish Council for Civil Liberties, Glasgow.

Gravelle, J., & Rogers, C (2009), Your county needs you! The economic viability of volunteers in the police, *Safer Communities, 8 (3), p.34-38.*

Gravelle, J., Rogers, C (2009) "The Economy of Policing-the Impact of the Volunteers". *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Pratice, 4(1) p.56-63.*

Greene, J.E., & Mastrofski, S.D (eds) (1988). *Community Policing: Rhetoric or reality,* p.195-224, New York: Praeger.

Hager, M. A., & Brudney, J. L. (2004). *Volunteer management practices and retention of volunteers.* Washington, DC: Urban Institute.

Handy, C (1988), *Understanding Voluntary Organisations*, Penguin, London.

Handy, C (1993), *Understanding Organizations.* London, Penguin.

Hayward, K.J., & Young, J (2004), Cultural Criminology, some notes on the script. *Theoretical Criminology, 8, p.259-274.*

Hedges, A (2000) *"Attracting and Keeping Special Constables"*

Hendrick, C., & Hendrick, S (2000). *Close relationships: A Sourcebook.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Herbert, S (1997), *Policing Space: Territoriality and the Los Angeles Police Department.* Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Herbert, S (2001), *From spy to okay guy: trust and validity in fieldwork with the police,* Geographical Review.

Herbert, S (2001), Policing the Contemporary Cities: Fixing Broken Windows or Shoring up Neo-liberalism.

Highmore, S (1993), *The Integration of Police Officers and Civilian Staff.* Home Office Police Research Group. Home Office Police Department. London.

HMIC (1997) *A Special Relationship: Police Forces, The Special Constabulary and Neighbourhood Watch.*

HMIC, (2004), *Modernising the Police Service*: A Thematic Inspection of Workforce Modernisation- The Role, Management and Deployment of Police Staff in the Police Service of England and Wales, London: HMIC.

HMIC (2007a) *Lessons Learned.* London: Home Office.

HMIC (2010) *Adapting to Austerity,* Home Office

HMIC (2011) *Police Integrity*: in the opinion of the general public. Home Office.

HMIC (2011), *Adapting to Austerity: A Review of Police Force and Authority Preparedness For the 2011/12-14/15 CSR Period*

HMIC (2012) *Policing in Austerity: One Year On,* Home Office

HMIC (2013) *Policing in Austerity: Rising to the Challenge,* Home Office

HMIC (2014), *Policing in Austerity: Rising to the Challenge Compendium,* Home Office

HMIC (2014), *Policing in Austerity: Meeting the Challenge,*

Hobbs, D (1989), Doing the Business: Entrepreneurship, the Working Class and Detectives in the East End of London. Oxford University Press.

Holdaway, S (1977), *"Changes in Urban Policing".* British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 28, N.1, p.119-137.

Holdaway, S. (1983), *Inside the British Police: a Force at Work*, Blackwell, Oxford.

Holdaway, S (1989), *"Discovering Structure: Studies of the British Police Occupational Structure"*, in M. Weatheritt (eds) Police Research: Some Future Prospects. Aldershot: Gower.

Home Office (1983), *Manpower, Effectiveness and Efficiency in the Police Service Circular* No.114/83. Home Office. London.

Home Office (1987), *Report of the Conference on Special Constables*, HMSO, London.

Home Office (1988*), Criminal Statistics for England and Wales*, HMSO, London.

Home Office (1988). *Civilian Staff in the Police Service*. Circular No.105/88. Home Office, London.

Home Office Circular 10/2003, *Amendment of Regulation 5A of the Special Constables Regulations 1965 Relating To the Local Payment of An Allowance To Special Constables.*

Home Office (2005) *Police: Serving the Community*

Home Office Press Release 359/2003

Home Office Press Release, *Home Secretary announced 6000 new Special Constables*, 20th August 2008.

Home Office (2016) *Reforming the Powers of Police Staff and Volunteers* (Summary of Consultation Responses and Proposals for Legislation) Jan 2016

Hope, A & Lloyd, T. (1984), *Increased Recruitment to the MSC*, unpublished paper, Metropolitan Police.

Hughes, G., McLaughlin, E., & Muncie, J. (Eds.). (2002).*Crime prevention and community safety: new directions*. Sage.

Humphrey, C., Miller, P., & Scapens, R. W. (1993). Accountability and accountable management in the UK public sector. *Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal*, *6*(3).

Innes, M (2003) *Investigating Murder. Detective Work and the Police Response to Criminal Homicide.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Innes, M (2006). Policing uncertainty: Countering terror through community intelligence and democratic policing. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *605*(1), 222-241.

Innes & Fielding (2002), *From Community to Communicative Policing: "Signal Crimes" and the Problem of Public Reassurance*.

Jackson, R (1999), *Establishing and Developing New Local Groups, Recruiting and Training Volunteers*, Conference Proceedings, Henry Stewart Conference Studies, London, October.

Jackson, S.E., & Maslach, C (1982), After-effects of job-related stress: families as victims, *Journal of Organisational Behaviour 3(1), p.63-77.*

Johnston, L (2003), From "pluralisation" to the "police extended family": discourses on the governance of community policing in Britain. *International Journal of the Sociology of Law 31(3), p.185-204.*

Johnson, N (1981), *Voluntary Social Services*, Basil Blackwell Oxford.

Johnston. N., & Politowski, B (2016*), Police Funding, Briefing Paper No.7279*

Jones, S. (1986), *Policewomen and Equality*, Macmillan, Basingstoke.

Jones, T (2008), *The Accountability of Policing*, In Newburn, T (ed), Handbook of Policing, 2nd edition. Cullompton: Willan, Chapter 26.

Jones, T.,& Newburn, T (1998), *Private security and public policing.* Clarendon press.

Kakar, S (1998), "Self-evaluations of Police Performance. An Analysis of the Relationship Between Police Officers and Education Level and Job Performance". *Policing: An International Journal of Policing Strategies and Management, Vol.21, N. 4, p.632-647.*

Katz, D., & Kahn, R. L. (1978). *The social psychology of organizations.*

Kelling, G (1988), *Police and Communities*: the Quiet Revolution.

Kelling, G.L., & Kliesmet, R.B (1996), Police unions, police culture and police abuse of force. In W.A.Geller & H.H.Toch (Eds). *Police Leadership in America: Crisis and Opportunity (p.309-321),* New York: Praeger.

Kelley, T.M (2005) Mental health and prospective police professionals. *Policing: An international journal of police strategies & management 28 (1), p.6-29.*

Kennedy, D.M (1993), *The Strategic management of police resources.* US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programmes, National Institute of Justice.

Kemshall, H., & Maguire, M (2001). Public protection, partnership and risk penalty: The multi-agency risk management of sexual and violent offenders. *Punishment and Society 3(2), p.347-264.*

Kiely, J.A., & Peeks, G.S. (2002), The Culture of The British Police: Views of Police Officers. *The Service Industries Journal, Vol.22, N.1, p.167-183.*

Klockars, C.B (1985) Order maintenance, the quality of urban life and police: a different line of argument. In W.A. Geller (Eds), *Police leadership in America: Crisis and Opportunity (p309-321)*, New York: Praeger.

Kop, N., Euwema, M., & Schaufeli, W (1999), Burnout job stress, and violent behaviour among Dutch police officers. *Work and Stress, Vol.13, p.326-340.*

Kotter, J.O (1996), *Leading Change*. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

Lane, R (1967), *Policing the City: Boston 1822-1885*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA

Lane, J. E. (2000). *New public management*. Taylor & Francis US.

Lee, R.T., & Ashforth, B. E (1996), A meta-analytic examination of the correlates of the three dimensions of job burnout. *Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol.81, p.123-133.*

Leishman, F., Cope, S., & Starie, P (1995), "Reforming the Police in Britain: New Public Management, Policy Networks and the Touch "Old Bill". *International Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol. 8, N.4, p.27-37.*

Leishman, F., Loveday, B., & Savage, S (1996), *Core Issues in Policing*. Pte publishers, London.

Leon, C. (1987), The Special Constabulary: A Historical View, *Special Edition, Vol 6.1, p 5-8.*

Leon, C. (1989), *From Dad's Army to Cinderella Service? The Recruitment and Deployment of Special Constables*, Paper to British Criminology Conference, Bristol.

Leon, C (1991), "Surprise and sense-making: what newcomers experience and how they cope in unfamiliar organisational settings", *Administrative Science Quarterly, 25, p.226-51.*

Leon, C (1991). Special Constables: An historical and contemporary survey, unpublished PhD. *Bath: University of Bath.*

Lipsky, M (1980), *Street Level Bureaucracies: Dilemmas of the Individual in public services*, New York: Basic Book.

Livingston, D (1997), *Police discretion and the quality of life in public places: courts, communities and the new policing*, Columbia Law Review.

Loader, I (1996), *Youth, Policing and Democracy*, Macmillan.

Loader, I (1997), Policing and the social: questions of symbolic power. *British Journal of Sociology, 1-18.*

Lock, J (1986), Pioneer of Women Police, *Police Review, 28th November, p. 2400-2401*

Locke, M., Ellis., & Smith, J (2003), "Hold on to what you've got": the *Volunteer Retention Literature "Voluntary Action, 5(3), p.81-99.*

Loftus, B. (2010). Police occupational culture: classic themes, altered times. *Policing & society,20 (1), 1-20.*

Loftus, B (2012), *Police culture in a changing world*, Clarendon Series in Criminology, Oxford University Press.

Loveday, B (1997), Challenges and changes. Police Authority and Chief Officer Responsibilities under the Police and Magistrates Court Act 1994, *Local Government Studies 23 (1), p.76-87.*

Loveday, B (1999), "The Impact of Performance Culture On Criminal Justice Agencies in England and Wales". *International Journal of the Sociology of Law, Vol. 27, N.4, p.351-377.*

Loveday, B. (2008). Workforce modernisation and future resilience within the police service in England and Wales. *The Police Journal*, *81*(1), 62-81.

Loveday, B., & Reid, A (2003) *Going Local: Who should run Britain's police?* London: Policy Exchange.

Lum, C (2009), *Community Policing or Zero Tolerance?* Preferences of Police Officers from 22 Countries In Transition.

Lumsden, K., Goode, J (2018). Policing Research and the rise of the "evidence-base". Police Officers and Staff Understanding of Research, its implementation and "what works". *Sociology, 52(4), p.813-829.*

Macpherson of Cluny, W (1999). *The Stephen Lawrence Enquiry.* HMSO, London.

Manning, P.K. (1977), *Police Work: The Social Organisation of Policing*, MIT Press, Massachusetts.

Mather, F. C (1959), *Public Order in the Age of the Chartists*, Manchester University Press, Manchester.

Marks, M. (2004). 'Researching Police Transformation: The Ethnographic Imperative', *British Journal of Criminology, Vol.44, p.866 – 88.*

Martinussen, M., Richardsen, A.N., & Burke, R.J (2007) Job Demands, job resource and burnout among police officers, *Journal of Criminal Justice,35, p.239-249*

Marx, J.D., Lovrich, N., & Gaffney, M (2006) Participation Community Crime Prevention: who volunteers for police work? *An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, 29 (3).*

Maslach, C., Schaufeli, W., & Leiter, M.P (2001) Job burnout, *Annual Review Psychology, 52, p.397-422*

Mathieu, T., & Hamel, D (1989), "A Cause Model of the Antecedents of Organisational Commitment among Professionals and Non-Professionals". *Journal of Vocational Behaviour, Vol. 34, p.299-317.*

Mathieu, J.E., & Zajac, D.M (1990). A Review and Meta-Analysis of the Antecedents, Correlates, and Consequences of Organisational Commitment, *Psychological Bulletin, 108 (2), p.171-194.*

Markus, M. L., & Robey, D. (1988). Information technology and organizational change: causal structure in theory and research. Management science,34(5), 583-598.

Mawby, R.I. (1990), *Comparative Policing Issues*, Unwin Hyman, London.

Mawby, R (1998), *"Managing Civilians",* in Berry, G., Izat, J., Mawby, R., Walley, L., & Wright, A (eds). Practical Police Management. Police Review Publishing, London.

Mawby, R.I. & Gill (1987), *Crime Victims: Needs, Services, and the Voluntary Sector*, Tavistock, London.

Mawby, R.C., & Worthington, S (2002), Marketing the Police-From a force to a service. *Journal of Marketing Management, 18(9-10), p.857-876.*

Maynard-Moody, S., & Leland, S (2000), *Stories from the frontline of Public Management: street level workers as Responsible Actors*. Brudney (ed) Advancing Public Management: New Developments in Theory, Methods and Practices.

McLaughlin, E (2005) "Forcing the Issue: New Labour, new Localism and the Democratic Renewal of Police Accountability" *Howard Journal, Vol.44, N.5.*

McLaughlin, E (2007). *The New Policing*. London: Sage.

McLaughlin, E., & Murji, K (1997), The Future Lasts A Long Time: Public police work and the managerialism paradox. In *Policing Futures, p.86-103, Palgrave Macmillan UK.*

McLaughlin, E., Muncie, J., & Hughes, G. (2001). The permanent revolution: New Labour, new public management and the modernization of criminal justice. *Criminology and Criminal Justice, 1*(3), 301-318.

McLaughlin, K., Osborne, S. P., & Ferlie, E. (2002).*New public management: Current trends and future prospects*. Psychology Press.

Meijs, L.C.P.M (1997) *Management of Volunteers Organisations*. Utrecht: Nov Publikaties.

Meyer, K., & Labao, L (2003), Household, Gender and Political Responses to Economic Downturn. *The Sociology Quarterly, Vol.44, p.159-179.*

Millie, A., & Bullock, K (2013). Policing in a time of contraction and constraint: RE-imaging the role and function of contemporary policing. *Criminology & Criminal Justice, 13(2), p.133-142.*

Mikkelsen, A., & Burke, R.J (2004), Work-family concerns of Norwegian police officers antecedents and consequences. *International Journal of Stress Management 11(4), 429.*

Millie, A., & Jacobson, J (2002), *Employee Volunteering and the Special Constabulary: A review of employer policies*, London: Police Foundation

Mirrlees-Black, C., & Byron, C (1994), *Special Consideration: Issues for the management and organisation of the volunteer police*, Home Office Research and Planning Unit, London.

Mohren, D.C., Swaen, G.M., Kant, J., van Amelscoort, L.G., Borm, P.J., and Galama, J (2003). Common injections and the role of burnout in a dutch working population. *Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 55(3), p.207-208.*

Monjardet, D (2000). Police and the Public. *European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research, 8(3), p.353-378.*

Mowday, R., Porter, L., & Steers, R (1982), *Organisational Linkage: the psychology of commitment, absenteeism and turnover,* Academic Press, New York, NY.

Moynes, A (1966), *Volunteers in development*, Oversee Development Institute, London.

Mustillo, S., Wilson, J., & Lynch, S (2004). Legacy Volunteering. *Journal of Marriage and Family, Vol. 66, p.530-541.*

Mwita, J (2000), Performance management model: a systems-based approach to public service quality. *International Journal of Public Sector Management, 13 (1), p.19-37.*

National Strategy For The Special Constabulary, March 2008.

Neuberger, J (2009), *Unkind, Risk Averse and Untrusting* in Contemporary Social Evils, Utting, D., Joseph Rowntree Foundation.

Newburn, T (2008), *Policing after 1945*. In T. Newburn (ed), The Handbook of Policing, Cullompton: Willan.

Newman, D.W., & Rucker-Reed, M.L (2004), Police Stress, state-trait anxiety and stressors among US Marshals. *Journal of Criminal Justice 32(6), p.631-641*

Neyroud, P (2001). *Public Participation in Policing*. London: Institute for Public Policy Research

Neyroud, P (2010). Protecting the Frontline: The Recessionary Dilemma? *Oxfor University Press.*

NPIA (08.08.12) Guidance on Fast Tracking Police Officers into the Special Constabulary

NPIA Circular: Guidance on Fast Tracking Former Police Officers into the Special Constabulary, Workforce Strategy Unit, 8th August 2012.

NPIA 03/2011 The Working Time Regulations 1998 And The Special Constabulary 22nd September 2011

Olins, W (1988) *A Force for Change*, London Metropolitan Police.

O'Malley, P (1998), Crime and the Risk Society, Dartmouth Publishing Co Ltd.

O'Neill., Marks, M., & Singh, A (2007), *Police Occupational Culture*: New debates and directions

O'Reilly, C., & Chatman, J (1986), "Organisational Commitment and Psychological Attachment; the effects of compliance, identification and internalisation of pro-social behaviour". *Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 71, N.5, p.492-499*.

Orr, M., & West, D.M (2007), Citizen Evaluations of Local Police Personal Experiences or Symbolic Attitudes? *Administration & Society, 38 (6), p.649-668*.

Painter, K (1988), *Lighting and Crime Prevention*: The Edmonton Project.

Paoline, E.A (2003). Taking Stock: Towards a Richer Understanding of Police Culture. *Journal of Criminal Justice, 31(3), p.199-214*.

Paton, D., & Flin, R, (1997) "Disaster Stress: An Emergency Management Perspective", Disaster Prevention and Management: *An International Journal, 8 (4), p.261-267*

Pearce, J.L (1993) *Volunteers: The Organisational Behaviour of Unpaid Workers*. London/New York: Routledge.

Peterson, T., & Axworthy, R (1983*), Extra Specials: Proposals to Strengthen the Special Constabulary*, A Bow Paper.

Persson, M (2014). The dynamics of policy formation: making sense of feelings of public unsafety. *Doctoral dissertation. Orebro University.*

Perry, B., Perry, J., Schweppe, J., et al. (2016). Introduction: Understanding hate crime: Research, policy and practice. *Criminal Justice Policy Review, 27(6), p.571-576*.

Pines, A.M., Keinan, G (2005). Stress and Burnout: The significant difference, *Personality and Individual Differences, 39 (3), p.625-635.*

Police Advisory Board (1976), *Report on the Working Party on the Special Constabulary*.

Policing Chartism, 1839-1848: The Role of the "Specials" Reconsidered. (2007) *English Historical Review, Vol. CXXII, N. 497.*

Police Grant (England and Wales) (2016) *The Police Grant Report (England and Wales) 2016/17 (Home Office, 2016).*

Police Review (1994). *London: Police Review* Publishing Company, p.13.

PoliceOracle (2014) *Federation "Is not for Special Constables",* Caswell, 7th Aphlril 2014

Porter, L., Steers, R., Mowday, R., & Boulian, P. (1974) Organisational commitment, job satisfaction and turnover among psychiatric technicians. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 59, p.171-194.*

Posen Inquiry (1995). *Home Office Review of Police Core and Ancillary Tasks*. HMSO, London.

Puonti, A (2007). *Foreword*. In Gottschalk, P (eds) Knowledge Management Systems in Law Enforcement. Idea Group Publishing, Hershy PA USA.

Radzinowicz, L. (1956a), A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750, Vol 2:The Clash Between Private Initiatives and Public Interest in the Enforcement of Law, Stevens and Sons Ltd, London.

Rainnie, A (1994), Trade Union Organisation and the Restructuring of Local Government, Conference paper. Labour Process Debate, April.

Ranson, S., & Stewart, J (1994), *Managing for the Public Domain*: Enabling the Learning Society. London: Macmillan.

Reiner, R (1991) Chief Constables: Bobbies, Bosses or Bureaucrats? Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Reiner, R (1992), *The Politics of the Police*. Oxford University Press.

Reiner, R (1992), Policing a post-modern society, *Modern Law Review, 55, p.761-781*

Reiner, R (1998), *"Problems of Assessing Police Performance"*, in Brodeur (eds) How to Recognise Good Policing. Police Executive Research Forum. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA.

Reiner, R. (1999). *Cop Culture*. From Reiner, The Politics of the Police, p.85-107. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Reiner, R (2000) *The Politics of the Police* (3rd edn) Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.112.

Reiner, R (2002), *The organisation and accountability of the police*, in McConville, M., & Wilson, G (eds). The Handbook of the Criminal Justice Process. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.

Reiner, R (2003) *Policing and the Media.* In Newburn, T (2012) Handbook of Policing, Routledge.

Reiner, R. (2010).*The politics of the police*. Oxford University Press.

Reiss, A. J. (1971), *Police and Public*, Yale University Press, New Haven.

Ren, L., Zhao, J., Lovrich, N., & Gaffney, M (2006), Participation Community Crime Prevention: who volunteers for police work? *An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, 29 (3).*

Reuss-Ianni, E. (1993).*Two cultures of policing: Street cops and management cops.* Transaction Publishers.

Reuss-Ianni, E., & Ianni, F (1983), "*Street Cop and Management Cops: two cultures of policing*", In M. Punch (ed) Control in the Police Organisation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, p.251-74.

Rhodes, R.A.W (2002). 'Putting the People back into Networks', *Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol.37, N.3, p. 399 – 415.*

Rhodes, R.A.W (2005). 'Everyday Life in a Ministry', *The American Review of Public Administration, Vol.35, N.1, March, p.3 – 25.*

Ricucci, N.M (1995), *Unsung heroes*: federal executives making a difference. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

Rotolo, T., Wilson, J (2006), *Substitute Or Complement?* Spousal Influence on Volunteering.

Routh, T.A (1972), *The volunteer and community agencies*, Charles Thomas Press Chicago, IL

Rowe, M (2006) "Following the Leader: Front-Line Narratives on Police Leadership", Policing: *An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, Vol 29, N.4,* p.757-77.

Rowe, M. (2007). *Rendering visible the invisible: police discretion, professionalism and decision-making. Policing & Society, 17(3), 279-294.*

Sadd, S., & Grince, R (1994) *"Innovative neighbourhood oriented policing: an evaluation of community policing programs in eight cities",* in Rosenbaum, D (Ed), The Challenge of Community Policing, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, p.27-52

Savage, S.P (2007), Neighbourhood Policing and the reinvention of the constable. *Policing, 1(2), p.203-213*

Savage, S (2007a), *Police Reform: Forces for Change.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sackmann, S (1991) "Uncovering culture in organisations", *Journal of Applied Behavioural Science, 27 (3), p.295-317*

SC Recruitment Marketing and Retention Surveys, Report of Findings, July 2010.

Scarman, Lord (1981), *The Brixton Disorders 10-12 April*, HMSO, cmnd 8427, London.

Schaible, L. M., & Gecas, V. (2010). The impact of emotional labor and value dissonance on burnout among police officers. *Police Quarterly*, *13*(3), 316-341.

Scottish Police Advisory Board (1975), Report of the Working Party on Special Constables.

Seth, R (1961) The Specials: The Story of the Special Constabulary in England, Wales and Scotland. London.

Shearing, C.D., & Stenning, P.C (1985) Private Security, implications for social control. *Social Problems, 493-506.*

Shearing, C.D., & Stenning, P.C. (1987) *Private Policing.* Newbury Park, CA: Sage

Shore, C. (2000), *Building Europe: the Cultural Politics of European Integration*. Routledge: London.

Skogan, W.G (1976) Efficiency and Effectiveness in Big-Cities police departments, *Public administration review, p.278-286.*

Skogan, W.G., & Hartnett, S.M (1997), *Community Policing*, Chicago Style NCJRS

Skogan, W.G., & Maxfield, M. G. (1981). *Coping with crime: Individual and neighborhood reactions.*

Skolnick, J (1966), *Justice Without Trial*. Wiley, New York.

Skolnick, J (1972) *Changing Conceptions of the Police*, Great Ideas Today.

Skolnick, J.H (2008) "Enduring Issues of Police Culture and Demographics", *Policing and Society, Vol.18, N. 1, p.35-45.*

Smith, D.H. (1994), "Determinants of Voluntary Association participation and Volunteering: A Literature Review", *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quartley, Vol 23, N.3, p.243-263.*

Smith, D. J., & Gray, J (1983), *The Police and People in London*. London: Policy Studies Institute.

Smith, D.J(2007) *New Challenges to Police Legitimacy*, In a Henry and J.Smith, (eds) Transformations of Policing, Aldershot: Ashgate.

Smith, T. (1985), *Policing Victorian London*, Greenwood Press, Westport.

Sparks, R (1992) Reason and unreason in left realism: social problems in the constitution of the fear of crime. *Issues in Realist Criminology. London Sage, p.119-35*

Sparrow, M.K., Moore, M.H., & Kennedy, D.M (1990), *Beyond 911: A new era for policing*. United States: Basic Books.

Stead, P.J. (1985), *The Police of Britain*, Macmillan, London

Stebbins, R (1997) *"Serious Leisure and Well-Being"* in Haworth (ed) Work, Leisure and Well-Being. Routledge, London, p.117.

Steedman, C. (1984), Policing the Victorian Community: The Formation of English Provincial Police Forces, 1856-80, Routledge, London.

Stenning, P., & Shearing, C (2015). "Privatisation, Pluralisation and the Globalisation of Policing". *Australian Institute of Police Management Public Safety Leadership Research Focus, 3(1), p.1-8.*

Stephens, M., & Becker, S (1994) (eds) *Police force, police service: care and control in Britain*. Macmillan.

Storch, J.E., & Panzarella, R (1996), "Police Stress: state-trait anxiety in relation to occupational and personal stressors", *Journal of Criminal Justice, 24 (2), p.99-107*

Straits, B (1990), The Social Context of Voter Turnout. *Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 54, p.64-73.*

Strickland, P., & Lalic, H (2010) Special Constables, Home Affairs, *SN/HA/1154*

Sundeen, R ., & Siegel, G (1987). The community and departmental context of volunteers use by police. *Nonprofit and voluntary Sector Quarterly, 16(3), p.43-53.*

Symonds, M.(1970). Emotional hazards of police work*. American Journal of psychoanalysis, 30(2), 155-160.*

The Special Constables Amendment Regulations *S1 1992/1641*

The National Strategy for Specials, Special Magazine, March 2008 p.3.

Trojanowicz, R.C., & Bucqueroux, B (1990) *Community Policing: A Contemporary Perspective*, Anderson Publishing, Cincinnati, OH

Twelvetrees, A (1991) *Community Work,* Macmillan London.

Tyler, T.R., & Blader, S.L (2000), *Cooperation in Groups: Procedural Justice, Social Identity and Behavioural Engagement.* Philadelphia: Psychology Press.

Tyler, T.R., & Blader, S.L (2002), Autonomous Vs Comparative Status: Must We Be Better Than Others to Feel Good About Ourselves?, *Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 89, p.813-838.*

Tyler, T.R., & Blader, S.L (2003), The Group Engagement Model: Procedural Justice, Social Identity and Cooperative Behaviour. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, Vol. 7, p.349-361.*

Uggen, C (2000), Class, gender, and arrest: an intergenerational analysis of workplace power and control. *Criminology 38 (3), p.835-862*

Uhnoo, S.,& Lofstrand C (2018) Voluntary policing in Sweden: media reports of contemporary forms of police-citizen partnerships. J*ournal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention, 19(1), p.41-60.*

Unison (2014) *Home Guard of Police Support Volunteers to Fill in For Staff Cuts.* London: Unison

Ursin, H.,& Eriksen, H.R (2004). The cognitive activation theory of stress. Psychoneurocrinology 29 (5) p.567-592

Valdez, S., & Molyneux, P (2015), *An introduction to global financial market*, Palgave Macmillan.

Van Maanen, J (1978), "The Asshole" in J. Van Maanen & P. Manning (eds) *Policing: A view from the streets. New York: Random House, p.302-28.*

Varriale, J.A., Gibbs, J.C, Ahlin, E.M, et al. (2007), 'Trends in Police Research: a Cross-sectional Analysis of the 2004 Literature', *Police Practice and Research, Vol. 8, N. 5, p. 461 – 85.*

Veater, P (1984) *Evaluation of Kingsdown Neighbourhood Watch Project Bristol*, Bristol: Avon and Somerset Constabulary

Vick, C (2000), *"Aspects of Police Leadership"* Police Research and Management, Vol. 4, N.2.

Waddington, P (1986), "Defining Objectives: A Reply to Tony Butler" *Policing, Vol. 2, N.1.*

Waddington, P (1993). Calling the Police: the interpretation of and response to call s for assistance from the public. *Aldershot: Avebury.*

Waddington, P (1999), *"Policing Citizens: Authority and Rights"*, London: UCL Press, p.242.

Wakefield, A (2003) *Selling Security: The Private Policing of Public Space.* Cullompton: Willan Publishing.

Wallace, Joseph, James Hunt, and Christopher Richards. "The relationship between organisational culture, organisational climate and managerial values." *International Journal of Public Sector Management* 12.7 (1999): 548-564.

Walker, S (1984) "Broken windows" and fractured history: the use and misuse of history in recent police patrol analysis. *Justice Quarterly 1(1), p.75-80*

Walker, S (2001). *Police Accountability: Current Issues and Research Needs.* Paper presented at the National Institute of Justice (NJS) Policing Research Workshop.

Walton, R (2005), Social Work As A Social Institution. *British Journal of Social Work, Vol.35, p.587-607.*

Wechsler, B., & Backoff, R (1986), Policy Making and Administration in State Agencies: Strategic Management Approaches. *Public Administrative Review, 46 (4) p.321-327*

Westley, W.(1970), *Violence and the Police*, A sociological study of law, custom and morality, MIT, Cambridge, Mass.

Westmarland, L (2001a), *Gender and Policing: Sex, Power and Police Culture.* Cullompton: Willan.

White S10(1972) A Perspective on Policing Professionalisation. *Law and Society Review, 7, p.61-85.*

White Paper: *Policing a New Century* (2001)

White Paper: *Building Communities, Beating Crime-A Better Police Service for the 21st Century* (2004).

Whittle, J (2014. "The rise of the Special Constabulary: are forces getting value for money from their voluntary officers?" *Police Journal: Theory, Practices and Principles, 87(1), p.29-40.*

Whittle, J (2017). "Increasing value for money through reducing premature wastage in the special constabulary". *In Bullock, K., & Millie, A (eds) The Special*

Constabulary: Historical context, international comparisons and contemporary themes. Abingdon: Routledge, p.134-148.

Wilson, J. (1968), *Varieties of Police Behaviour*, Harvard University Press, Harvard.

Wilson, J (2000), Volunteering. *Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 26, p.215-240.*

Wilson, J., & Kelling, G (1982)," The Police and Neighbourhood Safety: Broken Windows", *The Atlantic Monthly, 249 (3) p.29-38.*

Wilson, J., & Musick, M (1999), "Attachment to volunteering", *Sociological Forum, 14 (20), p.243-72*

Wilson & Pimms (1996) Op cit Harris (1989), Op cit D. Morris (1999), "Volunteering: The Long Arm of the Law" *International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing, Vol 4, N.4, p.320-326.*

Wilson, J., Simpson, I.H., & Jackson, D (1987), Church Activism Amongst Farm Couples. *Journal of Marriage and The Family, Vol.49, p.847-882.*

Wood, J., Fleming, J., & Marks, M (2008) Building the capacity of police change agents: The nexus policing project. *Policing & Society, 18(1) p.72-87.*

Young, M (1991), *An Inside Job*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Young, M (1993) *In the Sticks*. Culture Identity in a Rural Police Force. Oxford: Clarendon

Zhao, J., Lovrich, N., & Robinson, T (2001) Community Policing: is it changing the basic functions of policing? Findings from a longitudinal study of 200+ municipal police agencies. *Journal of Criminal Justice 29(5), p.365-377.*

CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEWS

Project Title

The Strategic Management of Special Constables: The Future of Policing**.**

Details of the Project

These interviews are being conducted as part of a scholarship funded doctorate thesis for a PhD at the University of Exeter. The final thesis will be held by the University.

This study is investigating the developing role, function and personnel who make up the Special Constabulary. The Special Constabulary is a volunteer force of part time police officers who work alongside their regular colleagues since the beginning of the public police as we know it. In the current economic and political environment that Britain finds its self, the public police are facing massive changes to their organisation, and as part of this, the role of the special constable could also be about to change.

My interest in this subject is driven from my own experiences from being a special constable for nearly five years in Exeter. I myself am interested in the direction that the special constabulary is going to go.

Contact Details

If you have any further questions with regard to the project, your interview or feel that there is something which I should know, please do not hesitate to contact me or my supervisors.

Researcher: Ms Ashley Frayling, Law Department, University of Exeter, Devon, UK.

 Email: ajf218@exeter.ac.uk: Phone: 078********.

Supervisor 1: Professor Jenny McEwen, Law Department, University of Exeter, Devon, UK.

Email:

Supervisor 2: Dr Liz Trinder,

Email:

Confidentiality

At all times your interview data will be kept confidential both in audio and transcribed form. The data will be used for the use of the project detailed above, nothing more and no third party will have access except where the law requires. The interview data will appear in the final thesis in quote form.

If requested you can have a copy of your transcript which you can comment on and edit if you so wish (for this please supply your email address). At the end of the process you are also entitled to a copy of the finished thesis if you so wish.

All data will be stored in accordance to the Data Protection Act and will be destroyed after five years. It will be kept on a private, personal password protected laptop and personal password protected university files.

Anonymity

At all times, the interview data will be held and used anonymously. Within the final thesis it will be seen in quote form with reference to rank or title from a certain force or area, expect when the title can be used to identify the person.

Consent

I voluntarily agree to take part in and provide my consent for my data to be used for the purpose outlined above. I have the right to withdraw this consent at any point during the study by contacting the researcher.

TICK HERE: ☐   **DATE…………………………......**

Note: Your contact details are kept separately from your interview data

Name of interviewee:..

Signature: ....

Email/phone:..

Signature of researcher………………………………………………..

2 copies to be signed by both interviewee and researcher, one kept by each

SCHOOL OF LAW

Amory Building
Rennes Drive
Exeter
EX4 4RJ

Telephone   +44 (0)1392 263365
Fax   +44 (0)1392 263196
Web   www.ex.ac.uk/law

<Name>

<Address>

<Address>

<Address>

<Address>

02 September 2019

Ref: <Ref>

RE: The Strategic Management of the Special Constabulary: The Future of Policing.

Dear

I am a Criminologist currently researching a PhD at the Exeter University Law School. The research is titled ***The Strategic Management of the Special Constabulary: The Future of Policing***. I am investigating the role of the Special Constabulary within the changes that are currently being made to police forces across the country. Government cuts to the policing budgets will make the role of the Special Constable key in the allocation of front line resources.

I am seeking your help to contact the relevant people within your force to interview Specials about the role they are currently fulfilling and what role they may play in the future. Key individuals involved in the leadership and management of your Specials will be of special interest. I would also like to interview you as well, as to your personal vision for the Special Constabulary within your force.

My passion for this subject has come from my role as a Special in Devon and Cornwall Constabulary where I have served for the past 6 years. I believe that it is a very important aspect to policing and one which has been almost completely overlooked in the academic circle. I will be producing observations and recommendations from the evidence and information gathered and all forces involved in the study will get a copy of the final research.

I look forward to your response,

<Yours sincerely>

Ashley Frayling, BSc, MSc (Edinburgh Law)

ashley.frayling@*******.co.uk

LinkedIn Profile

If you have any further questions about the study please contact me or my research supervisor from the University. Contact details are below.

Jenny McEwan

Professor of Criminal Law

(01392) 263162

j.a.mcewan@exeter.ac.uk

<u>**INFORMATION SHEET FOR INTERVIEWS**</u>

<u>The Project</u>

These interviews are being conducted as part of a doctoral thesis called ***"The Strategic Management of Special Constables: The Future of Policing".***

The public police in the United Kingdom are currently undergoing major changes to their organisation in terms of structure, organisation, operations and personnel. Brought about by the current economic and political environment these changes could mean significant changes to a small group of officers within the police force.

The Special Constabulary is a volunteer force of part time police officers who have worked along regular officers since the beginning of the public police as they are today. Recently brought to public attention through various recruitment drives, the Special Constabulary has previously been largely unknown, and in terms of research this is still so.

The aim of this study is to investigate the role and function that the special constabulary could play in the police force with these changes in place, and how these changes will affect the Special Constabulary itself. By understanding these factors, this study proposes to provide some recommendations on how best to manage the use of Special Constables within the criminal justice system.

<u>Your Participation</u>

As a voluntary participant in this study you retain the right to withdraw at any point during the interview or study. To do this tell or contact the researcher by the contact details provided.

Your interview will be confidential and anonymous. The audio recording is for my use only and will be transcribed under an anonymous number. At all times rank/position/title within a force area will be the method of reference, except if this could identify an individual. In this incident only rank/title/position would be referred to.

All data gathered will be kept on private, password protected computer systems including the University system and the researcher's personal laptop. This data will be kept for 5 years anonymously under the Data Protection Act when it will then be destroyed.

The information gathered from the interviews will then be used anonymously in quite form within the final written text of the final doctoral thesis.

Thank you very much for taking part in my study, your time and opinions are greatly appreciated. If you have any further questions please do not hesitate to contact me.

Ms Ashley Frayling (Law Department, University of Exeter, Exeter, Devon)

Email: ajf218@exeter.ac.uk

Phone: 0787*******