Investigating the Subject’s Identity:
The Critical Treatment of the Lacanian-Althusserian Dialectic and
Subjectivity Formation in James Joyce’s *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*

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as a thesis for the degree of
**Doctor of Philosophy** in English
In June 2010

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Abstract

Critically examining the Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject, this thesis explored the theoretical problems and methodological premises of a converged version of both theories. The central argument the present thesis seeks to demonstrate is that the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic provides a more comprehensive and effective account of the process of the subject formation than a purely psychoanalytical or structuralist Marxist analysis of the term. After a critical study of the way the subject is positioned between language and ideology in contemporary critical theory the thesis proceeds to investigate the subject-object relation in the Cartesian and Hegelian subjects.

Conceived of as the convergence of lack and material, the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic focuses on the close affinity between the Lacanian notion of linguistic alienation and the Althusserian concept of ideological interpellation. The subject’s alienation with what is called in the thesis ‘ideological signifier’ is considered as the result of direct and dramatic modes of interpellation in both language acquisition process and the mature phase. The major theoretical premises of this model include the following: first, identity functions through, and because of, the ‘inter-subjective dialectic’ and an ‘intra-subjective lack.’ Identity is never fully constituted because of this antagonism, and thus remains ‘incomplete.’ Secondly, the subject is ideologically constituted through language. The mechanism through which both language and ideology construct a subject never permits the subject enjoying a state of full identity with ideological signifiers. Thirdly, the subject’s identity is represented in the language exposed to and, later, reproduced by him/her.

In order to demonstrate a practical reading of subjectivity formation in terms of this critical approach the present research applies it to James Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916). The process of the subject formation has been analysed through the subject’s alienation/interpellation by the ISAs. Also, the inter-subjective dialectic between different subjectivities of the subject’s identity has been investigated. The thesis demonstrates that identity reconstruction represented in the novel is a complicated and ongoing process, which begins with disillusionment, goes through materialization of epiphany, and ends with inventiveness in language. This process has been represented as a move from ideological to non-ideological subjectivity through artistic creativity. The exploration of the aesthetics of language is crucial to the analysis of the reconstruction of Stephen Dedalus’ identity in that it happens in and through language.
Acknowledgements

I should express my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr Alex Murray, for his corrective comments, invaluable suggestions, and inspiration. I will be forever influenced by his persistence and clarity of thought. I also offer my sincere thanks to Dr Anthony Fothergill for his comments and pragmatic advice. My thanks also go to Professor Ashley Tauchert who I owe a debt of gratefulness. I also appreciate the friendly environment of English Department of the University of Exeter and I am thankful to the academic and administrative staff of School of Arts, Languages and Literatures. Finally, very special thanks go to my family whose encouragement never faded.
Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to my mother and my father, who, from a long distance, provided me with an effective motivation to complete this research project.
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Chapter One:
The Problem, Argument, and Framework:
An Introduction

1.1 General Overview

If we review the major developments of what is generally referred to as literary theory in the past few decades, we will immediately find out that there has occurred a major change in our attitude towards the concept of ‘the subject.’ Different approaches in literary theory, such as psychological and sociological, are widely concerned with the definition of ‘the subject.’ Having grammatical, sociological, psychoanalytical and political meanings, ‘the subject’ is distinctly considered in contemporary literary theory from myriad critical points of view. Julian Wolfreys in his *Critical Keywords in Literary and Cultural Theory* (2004) writes:

Regardless of its function within particular discourses, it has to be admitted that the idea of the subject is immediately complicated, irreconcilably doubled in any initial utterance, if one acknowledges that by this word one indicates either oneself or another (singly or collectively) … It is possible, for example, to speak of the psychoanalytic subject, the individual subject, the subject before the law (and by which laws one becomes subjected), or the national, supposedly collective subject.¹

The definition of the subject becomes more “complicated” when we consider the distinguishable treatment of the term in the sub-categories of a particular discipline or different socio-political systems. For example, different schools of psychoanalysis demonstrate different definitions of the term and, hence, provide a wide range of examples of and approaches to ‘the psychoanalytic subject.’ Furthermore, as far as the political designation of the term is concerned, one can grasp the different definitions of the subject in that each political system has its own particular version of the subject. For example, the rights of an Iranian citizen in the Iranian Constitution are manifestly different from those of a British subject in the context of the British juridico-political system.

A major part of the significance of the subject in critical theory goes back to Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytic analysis of the term. A devoted follower of Freud, Lacan, however, tried to deprive Freudian psychoanalysis of any humanistic designation. The humanist assumptions that underpin such common phrases as “the free will of man,” “my independent thought” and “he has a stable character” were called into question by those indebted to his Structuralist reading of Freudian psychoanalysis. Lacan’s frequently-quoted “the unconscious is structured like a language” is often used as a short-hand for his re-valuation of the unconscious as a system based on and according to which the subject thinks, acts, and fancies in a determined way.

Applying an anti-Cartesian approach, Jacques Lacan further sought to develop a new approach towards the concept of the subject as split by the entry of the child into the Symbolic order by means of language. Lacan’s theoretically designed and experimentally based account of the ‘subject’ has proved central to critical theory. His idiosyncratic treatment of such terms as the unconscious, desire, and the Name-of-the-Father has paved the way for a genuine understanding of the structure of the unconscious of the subject.

The infant, in Lacanian psychoanalysis, experiences the first recognition of itself when it looks at its image in the mirror. The ‘mirror stage’ in the development of the unconscious mind provides the infant a false conception of its self in that the infant imagines that the image it sees in the mirror is its other. The subject thus enters the Imaginary, which is a psychic phase in which the subject begins to falsify his ‘self’ simply because he/she identifies it only by and through the ‘other.’ Lacan writes:

> the mirror stage is a drama whose internal pressure pushes precipitously from insufficiency to anticipation—and, for all the subject caught up in the lure of spatial identification, turns out fantasies that proceed from a fragmented image of the body to what I will call an “orthopedic” form of its totality—and to the finally donned armor of an alienating identity that will mark his entire mental development with rigid structure.2

Therefore, the subject’s first identification of him/herself is based on an “assumption” that will mark his/her “entire mental development.” Such a development is later more determined by the Symbolic order to which the subject is exposed. Language plays the instrumental role in the Symbolic, and the unconscious mind becomes subjected to it.

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On the other hand, borrowing the term ‘subject’ from Lacan, Louis Althusser presented a new approach towards the constitution of ‘the subject’ that was based on the immanent relationship between the subject and ideology. For Louis Althusser, the subject was located within the framework of different ideologies that determined his/her identity. He presented a new definition of ideology that critically rejected our long-believed understanding of ideology as ‘a set of abstract beliefs and ideas.’

In his classic essay, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” a frequently discussed chapter of his *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* [1969] (1971), he pointed to the concrete existence of the ideas and ideology in different economic systems. The economic system of a capitalist state, Althusser maintained, reproduced its own conditions of production, and in order to fulfill such a condition, throughout its produced ideologies, reproduced subjects who will ultimately participate in the processes of production.

Althusser’s essay was an attempt to explore the process in which the subject became subject to ideology. Human beings, in Althusser’s opinion, become repressed by different ideologies of the state from an early age. Ideology, which is present everywhere in such a system, plays its decisive role in the formation of the subject’s beliefs, actions and practices. Althusser argues that where only a single subject is concerned,

> the existence of the ideas of belief is material in that his ideas are his material actions inserted into material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatuses from which derive the ideas of that subject.³

These *material* ideologies that dominate the subjects of a capitalist state are, according to Althusser, permanently produced by two main apparatuses of such a state: the ISAs, Ideological State Apparatuses, and the RSA, that is Repressive State Apparatus. The ISAs include the family, the school, the church and the media, and the RSA embodies such institutions as the police, the prison, and the court. The individual in a modern capitalist state is subjected to these two apparatuses. The subject, from this point of view, is constituted and reproduced by these ideological and repressive apparatuses.

The essay was highly influential in the development of theoretical explorations of both the ideologies of the modern socio-political system and the mechanisms behind the

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constitution of subjects. Althusser’s essay, as Andrew Bennett and Nicholas Royle argue in their Literature, Criticism and Theory (2004), seeks to demonstrate that “ideology is bound up with the constitution of the subject.”\(^4\) Furthermore, Terry Eagleton, explaining the theme of Althusser’s essay in his Literary Theory: An Introduction (1983), writes: “How is it, the essay asks, that human subjects very often come to submit themselves to the dominant ideologies of their societies – ideologies which Althusser sees as vital to maintain the power of a ruling class?”\(^5\)

Offering genuine and influential investigations into the identity of the subject, both Lacanian and Althusserian frameworks of thought were significant developments in critical thought from the mid 1950s to late 1970s. Whereas the psychoanalytical theory of the Lacanian school is mainly concerned with the identity of the subject through the analysis of language and the unconscious, the structuralist Marxist theory, particularly in its Althusserian form, is critically involved in the question of the constitution of the subject by ideology. An investigation of the construction of identity through an exploration of the interrelationship between and among language, ideology, and the subject is still a major concern, and disputed problem, of contemporary critical theory.

1.2 Statement and Development of the Problem

Critically studying the Lacanian and Althusserian conceptions of the subject, I will investigate their treatment of and relation to the major manifestations of the modern subject including the Cartesian and Hegelian subjects. I will then explore the question of the possibility of the convergence of the Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject as well as the theoretical problems involved in any unified version of the two. Considering the ‘Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic’ as providing a model in the analysis of the subject’s identity, the thesis argues that the exploration of this dialectic provides a more comprehensive account of the process of the subject formation than a purely psychoanalytic or structuralist Marxist analysis of the term.

The thesis approaches this dialectic as a critical perspective for the analysis of subjectivity construction and representation. This dialectic is, first of all, applicable to different phases in the development of subject including both the infantile and mature years. Furthermore, it investigates the subject from two different aspects that are its relation to both language and ideology. Also, it brings into consideration the relation of

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the subject to both the individual and the social and, thus, focuses on language as the realm where they meet.

Apparent similarities of both Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject constitution have led a number of scholars to simply combine them. On the contrary, recent studies and theories on the relation of the Symbolic to ideology, and the lack both language and ideology are based on, have raised some challenging questions for Lacanian-Althusserian approaches to the identity of the subject. Exploring examples of simplistic combinations of the Lacanian and Althusserian models of subjectivity, the present research also evaluates those theoretical treatments that have critically approached the question of the convergence of both models.

There are frequent references to the similarity of Lacanian and Althusserian theories in a great deal of introductory work on literary and cultural criticism. A recent example is Leigh Wilson’s “Psychoanalysis in Literary and Cultural Studies” in *Modern British and Irish Criticism and Theory* (2006) in which she refers to the significance of language to both Lacan and Althusser:

… what both Lacan and Althusser focus on their structuralist rereadings of Freud and Marx is the determining function of language in creation of the subject. Whereas previous cultural criticism from the left struggled with the notion of subjectivity, a renewed psychoanalysis and renewed Marxism seemed to offer a coherent theory of the relation between the individual and the social.⁶

Being part of an introductory essay, the above quotation does not provide an investigation into the problems and concerns regarding the immanent relation of ideology to language. As I shall demonstrate, this is the salient limitation observable in most introductory guides to contemporary theory and criticism in that they simply refer to the similarities of both Lacanian and Althusserian theories, sometimes simply conflating the two, without critically investigating the problems involved in drawing them together.

In addition to the simple unification of Althusser and Lacan’s models of subjectivity in introductory work, there have also been more in depth attempts at classifications and comparisons of both models. For example, both offered radical critiques of modern capitalist system. Althusser criticized the way a capitalist State makes us subject to the

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ISAs and RSAs, and Lacan had the same attitude in the sense that he was influenced by Kojève whose reading of Hegel was itself influenced by Marx’s materialist critiques of capitalism. Another manifest similarity is Althusser’s usage of the term ‘overdeterminism,’ which is reminiscent of its Freudian designation. This term was first used by Freud to describe the representation of the dream-thoughts in images in two different ways: condensation and displacement. Althusser, too, employed the same term to describe the effects of the contradictions in each practice on the social formation as a whole.

While Lacan considered the unconscious as a structure, Althusser considered social formation as a structure consisting of a number of other structures. The structuralist foundations of both Lacanian and Althusserian models of subjectivity have caused reductionist comparisons. Moreover, both Lacan and Althusser presented their model of the subject as not only different from but also in direct opposition to the Cartesian subject. Whereas the Cartesian subject was centred, coherent, and certain, Lacan and Althusser provided an account of the subject that considered it de-centred and fragmented. The subject, in Lacan and Althusser, is no longer an autonomous decision maker as it was believed to be in Descartes.

However, these apparent similarities are misleading in that they give birth to problematic critical responses and may make the scholar ignore the essentially different bases on which they are established. Some scholars have consequently interpreted both Lacan and Althusser’s critical perspectives in parallel lines. These scholars have actually presented an oversimplified version of the problem mainly because their aim has been merely the classification of critical perspectives. These works, though seemingly helpful for new readers, are really generalizing and oversimplifying the problem.

A good example of such treatment is that provided by Mary Klages’ *Literary Theory: A Guide for the Perplexed* (2006). She believes that the “acquisition of language is the process of becoming a subject, for both Althusser and Lacan.”[7] Furthermore, whereas Klages considers Lacan as a Post-Structuralist, Andrew Bennett and Nicholas Royle in their edited *Literature, Criticism and Theory* (2004) classify Althusser as a Post-Structuralist, too.[8] In contrast, Leigh Wilson, as seen above, regards the works of both of Althusser and Lacan as “structuralist rereadings.” The easy conflation of Althusser and Lacan is symptomatic of a broader attempt to divide

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theoretical positions into neat compartments, often with a limited exploration of the foundations and structures of competing positions. Althusser, for example, is variously categorised as a Structuralist Marxist,\(^9\) a revisionist Marxist,\(^{10}\) a Post-Structuralist,\(^{11}\) and a Neo-Marxist. These competing classifications allow critics to make analogies between theorists, yet in doing so produce radically compromised accounts of each theoretical position.\(^{12}\) While many have been happy to conflate these two theoretical positions, other critics have been more circumspect in their analysis. In an interview with David McInerney on her book, Caroline Williams refers to Althusser’s relation to Lacan and Lacanianism as a “complex matter.” She states:

Althusser clearly recognised a certain affinity between Lacan’s own project to read Freud and his own symptomatic reading of Marx, as well as the former’s own intellectual marginalization and his own. His published correspondence with Lacan (1963-1966) is certainly indicative of this. Althusser even offered a seminar on Lacan in 1963-4 and was actively involved in Lacan’s arrival at the Ecole Normale. He was deeply interested in the latter’s work at this time.\(^{13}\)

As Williams goes on to say, “Althusser’s distance from Lacan” was to be “strongly marked” in the latter phase of their intellectual life. Apart from this later ‘distance,’ Althusser’s framework of thought was epistemologically different from Lacanian theory in that while Lacan was influenced by Hegel, Althusser attempted to purify Marx from all Hegelian colours.

As I shall demonstrate later in the thesis, a number of critics attempted to employ both theories in their analysis of the subject. Early applications include the readings presented by Terry Eagleton, Stephen Heath, and Colin MacCabe. Whereas they have

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\(^{12}\) Another example of approaching Althusser and Lacan in the same vein happens in Hans Bertens’ *Literary Theory: The Basics* (2003). Here he not only argues that there is a similar methodology followed by both Lacan and Althusser but also attempts to read one of them based on and by the help of the other. Attempting to solve the questions posed in Althusser’s attitude towards the origin and ‘influence’ of ideology, Bertens simply refers to the Lacanian idea that “the processes that we go through when we grow up leave us forever incomplete.” More interestingly, while elaborating on ‘Lacan’s psychoanalytic model’ in another part of his book, he refers to Althusser’s view that “ideology gives us the illusion that it makes us whole.” Hans Bertens, *Literary Theory: The Basics*, London: Routledge, 2003, p. 163.

pointed to the impact of both Lacan’s and Althusser’s theories and the similarities of both theories, they have not particularly focused on the possibility of a unified adoption of both theories and their accounts hardly unified. For example, whereas Terry Eagleton appears much influenced by the Althusserian theory of ideological subjection, Stephen Heath and Colin MacCabe, though focusing on ideology, are more concerned with the Lacanian premises in their references to the Symbolic and the Imaginary. However, it should be mentioned that discussing the similarities of Lacan and Althusser’s theories on the subject is different from presenting a unified theoretical approach based on the two. Terry Eagleton, for example, merely points to the parallel lines of these two theories and is not concerned with a new approach based on them:

The relation of an individual “subject” to society as a whole in Althusser’s theory is rather like the relation of the small child to his or her mirror image in Lacan’s. In both cases, the human subject is supplied with a satisfyingly unified image of selfhood by identifying with an object which reflects this image back to it in a closed, narcissistic circle. In both cases, too, this image involves a misrecognition, since it idealizes the subject’s real situation.¹⁴

On the other hand, Stephen Heath and Colin MacCabe have been calling for a Lacanian-Althusserian approach in their studies on literary and, especially, film theory since the 1970s. This led to a theoretical debate over the legitimacy of such an approach between them and their critics, notably Carroll Noel and David Bordwell. As I shall demonstrate in the next chapter, ‘LAP,’ that is ‘Lacanian-Althusserian Paradigm,’ was radically criticized particularly in the field of film theory.¹⁵

Although this problem has not been explicitly discussed in contemporary literary theory, one can observe its manifestation in a number of recent critical works. There are more sophisticated models of drawing Lacanian and Althusserian theories together which I will critically engage in the next chapter. I shall thus discuss the work of Fredric Jameson, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Slavoj Žižek, and Judith Butler as far as their parallel employment of both theories is concerned.

There are certain differences in Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject that need more attention. For example, a major criticism of the philosophical validity of Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic is that the Lacanian and Althusserian accounts cannot be presented in the form of a unified theory since they are dealing with two essentially

¹⁴ Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction, pp. 172-3.
different objects of study. Whereas Lacan was concerned with the unconscious and language as based on ‘lack’, Althusser considered ideology as having a ‘material’ existence. Therefore, in order to argue for Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic one should also demonstrate the conditions of the convergence of ‘lack’ and ‘material.’ Moreover, while Althusser related the subject to ideology and the social, Lacan contemplated on its relation to the unconscious and the individual. In addition, each one of these theories is concerned with a particular stage of the development of the subject; whereas Lacan dealt with the formation of the subject’s unconscious through language acquisition in the oedipal period, Althusser worked on the role of ideologies in the latter life of the subject.

The problem here is not a matter of ‘simple combination.’ There emerge a number of theoretical problems not only because both were of different disciplines but because each is concerned with a particular aspect and period in the development of the subject. On the other hand, a theoretical approach that is based on two accounts will be illuminating in that it provides new insights in the identity and construction of the subject. My analysis thus contributes to the theoretical studies on identity construction in several ways. First, in attempting to bring together both Lacan and Althusser’s theories on the subject, a more comprehensive theoretical approach for the analysis of the subject is provided. However, if simplistically developed, as demonstrated above, the similarities of both accounts will result in misunderstanding and misclassification. Moreover, if applied without a critical investigation of the incongruity between the two theories, the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic will suffer from certain theoretical weak points, some of which were highlighted above. Secondly, this thesis critically addresses this gap in the available literature by presenting an analysis of the theoretical problems and premises of a unified version of these two theories of subjectivity.

Finally, in order to demonstrate a practical reading of the formation of the subject in terms of a Lacanian-Althusserian critical approach, the present research proceeds to apply it to James Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916). I shall explore the ideological languages that both alienate and interpellate the subject; in addition, I focus on the inter-subjective dialectics involved in the process of identity construction and reconstruction with reference to otherness in the subject’s identity. I shall also demonstrate the way subjectivity, in both its ideological and non-ideological forms, is represented in the novel by examining the ideological Symbolic exposed to the protagonist. My analysis of the novel thus demonstrates how the subject goes on a
process of identity reconstruction through the materialization of the spiritual experience of epiphany and his obsession with the aesthetics of language.

1.3 Research Questions

Research questions, developed throughout the thesis, are divided into two major groups: preliminary and central. The preliminary questions are concerned with how modern conceptions (Hegel and Descartes) of the subject are related to each other and paved the ground for the emergence of Lacan’s and Althusser’s highly critical treatment of them. What the Cartesian subject was and in what ways German Idealism constructed a new concept of the subject are thus examined. They also include questions concerning the way the Lacanian and Althusserian models of the subject, while anti-Cartesian and critical of its rationalism, tended to be in congruity with Hegelian theorization of the Romantic subject.

Likewise, the central questions of this thesis focus on the problems and premises involved in a combination of the psychoanalytic and structuralist Marxist approaches to the subject. The central questions, each developed in a separate chapter, include the following:

1. How is the subject positioned between language and ideology in recent critical theory?
2. How did the Lacanian perception of the subject ultimately consider it as the subject of language whose identity is based on lack?
3. How is the subject ideologically constituted in the Althusserian account and what are its limitations?
4. What are the salient features of the methodology and the theoretical lapses and premises of the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic?
5. In its application to a literary text, how does the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic demonstrate the process of subject formation and the representation of subjectivity?

As observed, the central questions are concerned with the hypothesis of the present thesis that there can be not only a convergence of both Lacan and Althusser’s theories of the subject and that this allows for a more comprehensive means of analysing the subject that each position can provide alone.
1.4 Rationales

Two sets of rationales should be discussed concerning the employment of the term ‘Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic’ and the selection of James Joyce’s *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* as the novel to be read from this critical perspective. First, I have not used the term ‘Lacanian-Althusserian paradigm,’ which is used by a number of critics, mostly in the area of film studies. The rationale for this is that while the Lacanian-Althusserian paradigm designates a simply coherent approach without any critical attempt to show the theoretical problems involved in combining them, the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic points to the gap between the Lacanian and the Althusserian conceptions of the subject.

Furthermore, based on Hegel’s dialectical mode of thought, the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic considers the Lacanian as the thesis, the Althusserian as the antithesis, and the Lacanian-Althusserian as the synthesis. Earlier I briefly pointed to the opposition between the Lacanian concept of the unconscious as based on lack and the Althusserian perception of ideology as having a material existence. The synthesis, thus, remains itself part of a dialectical process and not an already-constructed paradigm.

Secondly, the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic in the analysis of the construction of the subject provides a critical approach that finds its best manifestation when applied to a *bildungsroman* for the following reasons. First, the text under the examination of a Lacanian-Althusserian approach should be a work that represents different subjectivities. In other words, the familiar Bakhtinian concept of the ‘polyphonic’ is considered here as a novel of multi-subjectivity. However, there are two significant differences between Bakhtin’s methodology and the present approach. While in Bakhtin the ‘voice’ signifies the identity of the subject, this approach does not take subjectivity as demonstrative of the whole identity of the subject. For example, three different ‘voices’ of *The Brothers Karamazov* (1880) are really expressive of, and have been considered as, three independent manifestations of the identity of the subject. That is to say that whereas each ‘voice is taken as an identity, it is and should be regarded as only one constituent subjectivity of the identity of the subject. Considering the ‘voice’ as ‘identity’ sounds similar to the common view that a particular subjectivity becomes so dominant that it would define and determine the whole identity of the subject.

Whereas in the Bakhtinian account of the polyphonic novel each phone/subjectivity has equal significance and finds equal expression, there is a presiding voice in any autobiographical novel that comments on other subjectivities. While the author’s voice is only a constituent voice of the polyphonic novel, in an autobiographical-
developmental novel there is one dominant voice/subjectivity in the process of construction. As for James Joyce’s *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* (1916), there are not only different ideologies and subjectivities in the novel but also different languages. What is of significance is that the particular language of each one of these ideologies is represented to the reader by Joyce’s stylistics. Furthermore, this novel includes a number of motifs with which the modern subject has been obsessed.

The second major reason for choosing *A Portrait* is that an educational novel demonstrates the process of the development of the protagonist. A *bildungsroman*, *A Portrait* shows the subjective formation of the identity of Stephen Dedalus. The protagonist in *A Portrait* is first a small child whose process of identity construction and, later, re-constitution is observed in the novel. Likewise, apart from being a *bildungsroman* that is concerned with the formation of the subjectivity of the protagonist, *A Portrait* is the novel where there is a correspondence between subjectivity and language. It is a collection of not only subjectivities but also of languages. This is manifestly observed in Stephen’s obsession with words and language. The last, but not least, rationale is that there is an interesting relationship between this novel and the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic: the stylistic treatment of language in this novel is not only in parallel with the mental development of the subject but also expressive of the ideological subjectivities of the context in which the protagonist grows up. Moreover, the ultimate re-constructed form of the identity of the subject is represented in the language of the last chapter of the novel.

### 1.5 Objectives

The Objectives of the present research are twofold. First, this thesis aims to demonstrate the possibility of the convergence of the Lacanian and Althusserian models of subjectivity. The thesis thus elaborates a significant problem in critical theory that is, as Frederic Jameson calls it, the position of the subject in both psychoanalytical and Structuralist Marxist approaches. However, theoretical problems involved in this dialectic also go back to the distinguishable treatment of identity in Hegel and Marx. I shall explore this part of the problem by providing a Hegelian reading of the Althusserian model of the ‘subject/Subject.’

Demonstrating a model for subjectivity construction provided by the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic does not merely mean arguing for a simple matter of comparison or casual relationship. It becomes more significant when one considers the large number of disciplines – literary and cultural theory and criticism, gender studies, semiotics, and
film theory, to name only a few – that have been influenced by Lacanian and Althusserian theories. Therefore, the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic critically approaches the simplifications, generalizations, and classifications of similarities in both Althusser and Lacan.

A parallel evaluation of these two theories of subject formation leads to the consideration of the identity of the subject from a one to one relationship between the subject and the other to a more complicated dialectic between constituent subjectivities of the identity of the subject. The Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic demonstrates that subjectivity plays the role of the other for other subjectivities within the identity of the subject. Apart from this inter-subjective dialectic, the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic brings into consideration the intra-subjective lack over which subjectivity is based. Therefore, the discussion of the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic results in the re-conceptualization of the process of identity construction.

The second major objective of the present research is to show how the application of this critical perspective to reading a work of art is illuminating in a better understanding of the construction and representation of identity. How do interpellation and alienation operate in the subject formation? How are ideological subjectivities represented? Is it possible for the subject to undergo a process of reconstructing his/her identity? How does language function in both the construction and reconstruction of identity? The application of Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic as a critical approach to Joyce’s novel will provide these questions with illustrated answers.

1.6 The Organization of the Thesis
The present thesis consists of eight chapters. The next chapter provides a critical review of the Lacanian-Althusserian models of subjectivity in contemporary theory and criticism. It first presents an account of early examples of a parallel application of Lacanian and Althusserian theories to the analysis of the subject in the area of film theory and cultural studies. Then, it provides an exploration of more recent theoretical treatments that have either offered a critical reading of both theories or attempted to develop one by utilising elements of the other. Thus, I will explore Frederic Jameson’s treatment of the position of the subject in psychoanalysis and Marxism. I shall focus on the gap he identifies in the moment of transition from the Imaginary to the Symbolic and his claims that the inexpressible character of History in Althusser is analogous to the Lacanian Real. I shall also study Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s attempt to reconcile Marxism and psychoanalysis. Next, I seek to investigate Žižek’s contribution
when he provides the Lacanian perception of the subject with Althusserian designations. Finally, I shall examine Judith Butler’s attempts to combine elements of these two positions in order to provide an inclusive perspective for the analysis of the subject.

Chapter Three, providing an investigation of the construction and consequences of the Cartesian and Hegelian subjects, is concerned with the way the subject-object relation is treated in both early modern Rationalism and German Idealism. The chapter first argues that the Cartesian notion of the subject provided it with an ‘objectified’ character in a way that it ultimately changed from its apparent form of the subject of knowing into the object of knowing. Then, the Cartesian subject’s contribution to the subject-object separation is examined. As I shall demonstrate later in the thesis, a close study of the Cartesian subject is illuminating in exploring the Lacanian and Althusserian conceptions of subjectivity in that both were anti-Cartesian in their critique of the autonomous, rationalist, and centred character of the Cartesian subject.

As for the Hegelian subject, I seek to present a study of German Idealist treatment of the subject and its close affinity with nature. I shall demonstrate that Hegel’s perception of the subject, while regarded as a theorization of the Romantic subject’s obsession with nature and arguing for the subject-Spirit identity, ultimately resulted in an ongoing incomplete subject-object identity. The Hegelian subject is thus marked by an incompleteness that I shall later bring into consideration in my analysis of the subject’s incompleteness in both Lacan and Althusser. This study proves to be central to the present thesis in that, on one hand, the Lacanian theory of the subject was highly influenced by the Hegelian concept of the subject and, on the other hand, I seek to investigate critically the Althusserian model of subjectivity in the coming chapter through a Hegelian approach to the subject’s identity.

In Chapter Four, my analysis of the Althusserian reading of modern subjectivity and the construction of ‘the subject of ideology’ is in parallel to the following chapter where I shall deal with the Lacanian perception of ‘the subject of language.’ Addressing the process of the materialization of ideology, this chapter re-examines the Althusserian model of the ‘subject/Subj ect’ based on the condition of non-identity between them. I shall also explore the Althusserian approach to ideological interpellation in order to evaluate it later through a dialogue with the Lacanian concept of linguistic alienation. Identifying a theoretical problem in the Althusserian ‘the subject/the Subject’ model, this chapter argues that a Hegelian reading of this theory solves the problem of non-identity of the subject and the Subject.
Chapter Five demonstrates that Lacan’s conception of the subject is based around the idea of being ‘the subject of language’ the identity of which is constructed over lack. The chapter thus investigates the significant role played by the unconscious, language, and the Other in the process through which the subject is formed. Lacan’s parallel employment of both Jacobson’s linguistic theories and Hegel’s philosophical doctrines are also examined in the present account of ‘the structure of the Symbolic.’ Then, I shall investigate the two modes of alienation, imaginary and linguistic, that effect the emerging subject in the mirror stage and language acquisition process. The problem of ‘lack’ in Lacan’s approach to the subject’s identity will be examined with reference to Hegel’s concept of self-consciousness and the lack that always exists in the condition of the subject-other identity. The last section of the chapter, while presenting the definition of the Lacanian subject, considers it as an ‘Anti-Cartesian Other in the Imaginary.’

Chapter Six presents the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic as a more inclusive critical perspective for the analysis of subjectivity and the exploration of the subject’s identity than a strictly Lacanian and Althusserian approach can provide. There is, despite certain theoretical problems, a dialectic between language and ideology in identity construction process that is manifested in both interpellation and alienation of the subject. Referring to the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic as the convergence of lack and material, the chapter presents a discussion on the Lacanian concept of ‘alienation’ as a dramatic mode of the Althusserian interpellation. I shall attempt to draw into dialogue the Althusserian concept of ideological interpellation with the Lacanian concept of linguistic alienation. The chapter then proceeds to explore the premises of the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic as a model for the analysis of the subject through focusing on the ‘inter-subjective dialectic’ and ‘intra-subjective lack’ in the subject’s identity, ‘the ideological constitution of the subject,’ and ‘the representation of identity in language.’

Chapter seven, the practical analysis of the thesis, presents a reading of James Joyce’s *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* according to the critical perspective offered in its preceding chapter. Elaborating on ‘ideological languages’ of the ISAs and how they interpellate and alienate the subject, the chapter also concentrates on the way both modes of constructive and destructive inter-subjective dialectics operate in the construction of identity with reference to otherness in the subject’s identity. Also, the ideological subjectivities of the identity of the subject are studied as representations of the ideological Symbolic to which the subject is exposed. Subsequently, an analysis of identity re-construction and representation in the novel will be presented with reference to the protagonist’s disillusionment with ideology and obsession with artistic language;
the protagonist, as I shall demonstrate, undergoes a process of identity reconstruction through the materialization of spiritual and aesthetic experiences.

The last chapter, while summarizing the findings of this study, provides a concluding discussion of the analyses presented in the thesis. This chapter, focusing more on the problems and premises of the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic as a model for the analysis of subjectivity, demonstrates the advantages of applying this approach to reading a work of art.
Chapter Two:
Language, Ideology, and the Position of the Subject:
A Critical Review of Lacanian-Althusserian Models

2.1 Introduction
This chapter seeks to address the question of the position of the subject in relation to language and ideology as examined in contemporary critical theory and practical readings. My analysis first focuses on those works that have applied both Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject to the same work of art. Then, I will study major theoretical treatments that have offered a critical reading of both theories and have presented a reconciled version of them. I shall also examine how recent criticism has attempted to develop the Lacanian theory of the subject through Althusserian insights.

The application together of Lacanian and Althusserian theories on subjectivity first began in Britain in the 1970s and there were, afterwards, a number of harsh criticisms of such parallel employment. A few major contemporary critics have examined the problems that emerge in a possible convergence of both theoretical models of subjectivity. I shall thus investigate the way Frederic Jameson, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Slavoj Žižek, and Judith Butler have dealt with the problem of positioning the subject either between both language and ideology or within a Lacanian-Althusserian understanding of the term. More precisely, they are the critics who are particularly involved in a parallel employment of both the Lacanian and Althusserian readings of the subject and have theoretically responded to it. Although they have not explicitly argued for such a problem in their works, their treatments of both Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject provide an illuminating perspective for the potential difficulties in creating a convergence between the two.

This chapter includes the following main sections: first, I shall demonstrate the early examples of the parallel application of Lacanian and Althusserian theories to the analysis of the subject in the area of film theory and cultural studies. This section will also examine examples of those works that were highly critical of such application. Then, I will study Fredric Jameson’s work on the problem of the position of the subject in psychoanalysis and Marxism. Focusing on the gap he identifies in the moment of transition from the Imaginary to the Symbolic, this chapter seeks to discuss his approach to the analysis of the inexpressible character of both the Lacanian concept of the Real and Althusser’s notion of History. Next, I explore Ernesto Laclau and Chantal
Mouffe’s attempts at reconciling Marxism with psychoanalysis. I will then turn to Žižek’s use of both Lacanian and Althusserian models of subjectivity and his development of the Lacanian perception of the subject through the Althusserian conception of ideology. I will conclude the chapter with a study of Judith Butler’s Hegelian interpretation of the Althusserian concept of interpellation as well as her employment of different theories in order to provide an inclusive perspective for the analysis of the subject.

In exploring these critical efforts I seek to outline how the subject is positioned between language and ideology and how its identity is analysed in contemporary theory and criticism with reference to Lacanian and Althusserian approaches. None of these models, however, achieve a synthesis of the two models, or arguably set out to do so. In outlining the various models this chapter presents a literature review of the most well known theoretical positions that draw on both the Lacanian and Althusserian theorisation of the subject. In doing so it seeks to highlight the various difficulties in drawing the two approaches together, difficulties this project seeks to overcome.

2.2 ‘Lacanian-Althusserian Paradigm’:

Applications and Objections

A noticeable battlefield for the opponents and proponents of following a ‘Lacanian-Althusserian model’ has been the area of film theory and criticism. Although there have emerged a number of harsh criticisms of this model in recent literary and film theory, there are also a number of critics that have argued for the possibility of such a convergence and applied it to the reading of literary texts and films. A famous example is the conflict that appeared on both sides of the Atlantic between British experts in literary and film theory and a number of American Film critics.

The first examples of the Althusserian readings in film studies appeared in the early 1970s in France as a response to serious political issues surrounding the events of May 1968 and the struggles in Vietnam and China. This was a time when, instead of a merely structuralist outlook, the direction of critical readings of film changed, developing explicitly political preoccupations. The articles of Cahiers du Cinema reveal how dominant Althusserian ideas were during this period. The major concern was with identifying which films were in the service of the transmission and reproduction of the dominant ideology and which films served to demonstrate the mechanism behind the transmission of ideology. Another influence on the reading of films was that of Lacanian psychoanalysis, especially in its exposition of the subject’s unconscious
desires and conflicts. A Lacanian-Althusserian model for the analysis of subjectivity emerged in this time in France. This influence spread to Britain and the result was the publication of *Screen*, a journal clearly influenced by *Cahiers du Cinema*.

A Lacanian-Althusserian approach towards film studies was employed in Britain from the 1970s onwards. It was most evident in the works of Stephen Heath and Colin MacCabe, with Stephen Heath’s *Questions of Cinema* (1981) in particular a pioneering study. As mentioned in the preface to his book, most of the articles of the book are those of *Screen* in the early 1970s. The first chapter, “On Screen, in Frame: Film and Ideology,” makes use of both Althusserian and psychoanalytic approaches towards the “construction of the subject.” Heath’s concept of “cinematic apparatus” is manifestly Althusserian in that it considers cinematography as an ideological apparatus. Moreover, his idea of “the structure of the subject” with reference to ‘the symbolic’ is based on his readings of Jacques-Alain Miller, Lacan’s most original disciple. In the concluding remarks of his “Language, Literature, Materialism,” Heath argues that the formulation of “a sociology of literature” is instrumental in further investigations of “the problem of language.” He writes:

The point is not to add linguistics to literature but to arrive at a linguistics capable of including the specific-material-effects of (literary) texts and extending the historical and political implications of those effects. It’s here that I’d come back to the importance of psychoanalysis again, to the way in which Lacan has developed Freudian theory in the direction of ‘a materialist theory of language’; a theory that poses just that question of the construction of the individual as subject in the symbolic.

The ‘linguistics’ Heath argues for paves the way for a further development of a materialist theory of language, one that explores both the construction of the individual psyche and the formulation of ideology. As far as the development of the ‘individual psyche’ is concerned, Heath considers the Lacanian notion of the triplet orders of subjectivity to be of high merit, and, for the formulation of ideology, Heath refers to both classical Marxist doctrines and Althusser’s conception of ideology as present everywhere. On the other hand, Colin MacCabe’s work in reconsidering the ideological functions of cinema was also among the first attempts to develop film theory and criticism. Influenced by the cultural and literary theories of the 1960s and 1970s, MacCabe attempted to read film according to Althusser’s Lacanian-coloured definition.

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of ideology as the ‘imaginary relation to the real conditions of existence.’ MacCabe argued the consideration of film as a representation of contradictory discourses and not as a window that opens up to the real. In his “Theory and Film: Principles of Realism and Pleasure” (1976) MacCabe dealt with the relationship between ‘contradiction’ and ‘the real’:

… I argue that film does not reveal the real in a moment of transparency, but rather that film is constituted by a set of discourses which (in the positions allowed to subject and object) produce a certain reality. The emphasis on production must be accompanied by one on another crucial Marxist term, that of contradiction.18

Thus, for MacCabe, film’s paradoxical relation to the representation of the real, a Lacanian term, should be considered through contradiction, a manifestly Althusserian concept. Later in the same article MacCabe talks of the relation of the Symbolic to the Imaginary. Here however, he seems to solve the problem by referring to Lacan’s idea of the dominance of the phallus. He also interprets Lacan’s theory and contends that the lack is filled by phallus. He writes:

As speaking subjects we constantly oscillate between the symbolic and the imaginary – constantly imagining ourselves granting some full meaning to the words we speak, and constantly being surprised to find them determined by relations outside our control. But if it is the phallus which is the determining factor for the entry into difference, difference has already troubled the full world of the infant … The phallus becomes the dominating metaphor for all these previous lacks.19

MacCabe’s approach to the Althusserian subject is that it is one without an unconscious because it is not being subject to the signifier. MacCabe, though referring to the essential differences between Lacan and Althusser, applies a Lacanian-Althusserian pattern in his criticism of film and made this method a dominant trend in Screen.20

Dealing with the problems involved in any critical attempt that seeks to bring Althusser and Lacan’s theories together, Celia Britton focuses on, like other critics, the

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20 For MacCabe’s account of the politico-psychoanalytical backgrounds of Screen and its engagement with Althusser and Lacan’s thought see Colin MacCabe, Theoretical Essays: Film, Linguistics, Literature, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985, pp. 4-17.
Althusserian concept of interpellation and argues that it happens when the subject is already a subject in Lacan. As Britton states:

In practice, critics who have worked on the basis of a conjuncture of Althusser and Lacan have tended to ignore the specifically specular features of interpellation. The closeness of the two theories on a more global level has meant that a great many Althusserian critics have incorporated some Lacanian ideas into their work... in Britain this project has been carried on above all in the pages of Screen, in the mid- to late seventies, while its impact on literary studies has been rather less.\(^\text{21}\)

Britton considers the Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject as two theories that were most significantly influential in the transition of structuralism to post-structuralism. She contends that both theories challenged the idealist perception of the subject as free, decision maker, ad autonomous, and, hence, they presented an anti-humanist notion of the subject. For her, the affinity between the theoretical developments that Lacan introduced into psychoanalysis and Althusser into Marxism is categorized only in the realm of their incredible criticism of structuralism. As for the impact of Screen that sought to deal with the closeness of these two theories, Britton believes that this critical effort had a rather little influence on literary studies.

Both Heath and MacCabe’s intellectual contribution to Screen and their evaluations of film studies according to Lacanian and Althusserian theories on the subject aroused a number of critical responses. David Bordwell and Carroll Noel were among those who responded critically to this theoretical orientation and criticized its consequences for film studies. ‘LAP,’ as Bordwell christened the Lacanian-Althusserian paradigm, was charged with being a “monolithic theoretical entity” that was attractive to critics because of its claims of “systematicity and comprehensive.” He also argued that the proponents of LAP later “began purging their shelves of Althusser and Lacan” and, then, turned to “cultural studies.”\(^\text{22}\) Bordwell’s views concerning LAP and his perspectives on film studies later motivated severe replies.\(^\text{23}\)


\(^{22}\) David Bordwell, On the History of Film Style, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997, pp. 140-1

Stephen Heath’s *Questions of Cinema* (1981) gave birth to a heated debate between Heath and Noel Carroll. Among his criticisms of Heath, Carroll pointed to the foundation to Heath’s program as being “too Althusserian.”24 Carroll’s criticism of Heath goes back to his long paper entitled “Address the Heathen” (1982) and followed by a number of books such as *Mystifying Movies: Fads and Fallacies in Contemporary Film Theory* (1988) and *Philosophical Problems of Classical Film Theory* (1988). Heath/Carroll debates in *October* and other journals such as *Post-Theory* gained a significant attention in the period 1982-3. In his later works, Carroll particularly criticised the theoretical formulations of the “Parisian” traditions in general and Lacan and Althusser in particular. He harshly criticised the preoccupation of British critics with these theories, and, finally, renounced the post-structuralist theories in film studies. Criticising Kaja Silverman’s *The Subject of Semiotics* (1984) mainly because of her concern with a Lacanian-Althusserian model in her book, Carroll wrote:

… there is a presumption among Althusserian-Lacanians that if human actions have certain structural conditions, they constrain human action in a way inimitable to autonomy. Languages have both syntactical rules and semantical rules. But it is strange to think of these as constraints that preclude autonomy. For these very features of language are what enable the speaker to speak—to, for example, denounce capitalism. If the language lacked these structural conditions, nothing could be said, which would in fact be a real blow to the possibility of human autonomy.25

Noel Carroll’s criticisms of Lacanian-Althusserian model merely focuses on the mechanical applications of these theories in the area of film studies. He does not present a critical investigation into the nature of these two theories or their limitations. His responses are general in the sense that he joins the mainstream criticism against post-structuralism and attempts to link Althusser and Lacanian thought to the now dominant post-structuralist criticism in the States. Moreover, he does not provide his readers with a thorough philosophical reading of the limitations any attempt to converge these two theories might face. Instead of presenting a detailed reading of Lacan, he simply expresses his uneasiness with and scepticism towards psychoanalysis. Carroll is thus mostly critical of a mechanical application of these theories to film studies. As Vernon Shelty writes in his review of Bordwell and Carroll’s *Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film*

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Studies (1996), “read Lacan on the Mirror Stage and Althusser on Ideological State Apparatuses, and the theoretical foundations of mainstream film study were yours in an afternoon.”

Apart from film studies, Althusser’s idea of the relation of ideology to subjectivity has been also re-examined in the area of cultural studies. Stuart Hall is a renowned example of such critics. Commenting on the relation of ideology to subjectivity, Hall refers to those moments that the subjects are located in new ideological “positions” in the following way:

People with identities and relations to language already secured nevertheless can find themselves repositioned in new ideological configurations … ideologies have to struggle to recruit the same lived individuals for quite contradictory subject places in their discourses. I want to ask how people who already have an orientation to language nevertheless are constantly placed and replaced in relation to particular ideological discourses that hail and recruit them for a variety of positions.

He critically reads Althusser’s theory of subjectivity arguing that the subjection to ideology may also have an opposite direction; this happens when the subject may influence the ideology. Therefore, the subjection to ideology has a twofold designation: although ideology hails the subject, the subject is consciously aware of being hailed by ideology. Moreover, there is always an internal dialectical process at work that is in parallel to what happens outside. As for these two external and internal processes, Hall seems to ‘reconcile’ Lacan with Foucault. In his response to the theoretical limitation posed in Althusser he finds a solution by combining an “external” discursive realm and “psychic” acts of identification. For Hall, identity is “the meeting point” between

on one hand, the discourses and practices which attempt to ‘interpellate’, speak to us or hail us into place as the social subjects of particular discourses, and on the other hand, the processes which produce subjectivities, which construct us as subjects which can be ‘spoken’. Identities are thus points of temporary attachments to the subject positions which discursive practices construct for us.

Hall also criticizes Althusser for providing a theory of subjectivity that has resulted in the “two sides of the problem of ideology.” ²⁹ A similar treatment regarding theoretical limitations in Althusser can be observed in Michele Barrett’s *The Politics of Truth: From Marx to Foucault* (1991). She criticises Althusser’s attempt to develop Marxism through Lacanian terminology. She writes: “Althusser’s substantive contribution to the theorisation of subjectivity – his development of the concept of ‘interpellation’ – attempts the impossible task of integrating Marx and Lacan.” ³⁰

However, the contribution of Althusser’s thought not only to Marxism but also to cultural studies should not be underestimated. Althusser also enjoys a wide popularity among media and film studies. His concept of Ideological State Apparatus has been far influential and subject to further theorizations. For example, Michael Sprinker names “a number of distinctively Althusserian themes that have achieved general currency” and have been later “subject to development and refinement.” ³¹ A quick look at the eight Althusserian theses mentioned by Sprinker in his paper would be illuminating in reconsidering Althusser’s influence in other areas of the human sciences such as aesthetics and politics. ³²

There are also a number of works that have argued against any convergence of Lacan and Althusser. These objections have a long history that first began with attempts to reconcile Freud and Marx. With this dissertation, the reconciliation further complicated in that it goes back to the debates over whether Marx and Hegel can be unified, largely as a result of Lacan’s obvious Hegelianism and Althusser’s insistence on Marx’s rupture with Hegel. This dissertation’s focus then is not simply on a twentieth-century problem; it originally goes back to the nineteenth-century sharp epistemological division that happened between Hegel and Marx. ³³

Althusserian Marxism and Lacanian Psychoanalysis have had a long history of incongruity that not only originated from Freud’s inventive method at the beginning of twentieth century but also began with Marx’s criticism of the German idealist tradition.

³² The Althusserian theses that are in close affinity with my analysis, to be fully elaborated later in the thesis, are: 1) the relative autonomy of the superstructures and the reciprocal action of the superstructures on the base, 2) the permanence of ideology, and 3) the specificity of art in relation to ideology. See Ibid., p. 204.
³³ I shall discuss Althusser’s attempt in removing from Marx all Hegelian impacts later in the thesis. However, concerning Marx’s difference from Hegel see Andrzej Warminski, “Hegel/Marx: Consciousness and Life,” in *Yale French Studies*, No. 88, Depositions: Althusser, Balibar, Macherey, and the Labor of Reading (1995), pp. 118-141.
in the mid nineteenth century. I shall return to this theoretical problem fully in the next chapter, but now I shall examine how some recent major critics have responded to it. As discussed in this section, although there are attempts in the areas of film and cultural studies to bring Lacan and Althusser together, they rarely explore the theoretical problems that emerge in such combination. Although all of the figures I will analyse are critical of both Lacan and Althusser, none of their works present a unified version of both theories. Whereas the present thesis aims at presenting a Lacanian-Althusserian model for the analysis of the subject, these critical attempts apply the Lacanian and Althusserian theories to reading the texts as discrete approaches. In addition, they investigate neither the close affinity between the Lacanian and Althusserian conceptions nor the theoretical problems that emerge in such convergence.

**2.3 Fredric Jameson and Identifying a New Gap**

A major critical investigation into the problem of the subject in both psychoanalysis and Marxism is Fredric Jameson’s “Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan: Marxism, Psychoanalytic Criticism, and the Problem of the Subject.” This paper was first contributed to one of the volumes of *Yale French Studies* on ‘Literature and Psychoanalysis’ (1977). Exploring Jameson’s identification of the gap in the transition from the Imaginary to the Symbolic, I shall also consider the way Jameson considers Althusser’s reference to “the absent cause” as equivalent to Lacan’s conception of the Real in his *The Political Unconscious*.

In the beginning of his article Jameson considers the major problem in the coordination of Marxist and psychoanalytic criticism as the dilemma of “the insertion of the subject:”

The attempt to coordinate a Marxist and a Freudian criticism confronts—but as it were explicitly, thematically articulated in the form of a problem—a dilemma that is reality inherent in all psychoanalytic criticism as such: that of the insertion of the subject, or, in a different terminology, the difficulty of providing mediations between social phenomena and what must be called private, rather than merely individual, facts.34

Mentioning that this problem was first keenly observed by Freud, Jameson points to some Freudian-Marxist attempts including the “psychobiographical method” of the

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latter Jean-Paul Sartre and the “mechanical” character of Frankfurt school thinkers in general and Theodore Adorno in particular. Jameson’s argument focuses on “whether the hypothesis of a dialectically distinct status for each of these registers or sectors of experience [i.e. Lacanian triad others] can be maintained within the unity of a single system.”

He first begins with an elaboration of the relation of the Imaginary to the Symbolic, and, then, focuses on the different aspects of alienation. A major section of his article is dedicated to the problem of the convergence between the Imaginary and Symbolic, and, accordingly, he returns to the Real in the last part.

Language and the Other, Jameson maintains, are major factors in Lacan’s view of the alienation of the subject upon its entry into the Symbolic, while it is already in the Imaginary. He mostly focuses on the transition of the Imaginary to the Symbolic. He comes to the primary conclusion that although the Imaginary and the Symbolic are not fully separated or matched, this hypothesis “has the merit of allowing us to conceive the possibility of transforming the topological distinction between Imaginary and Symbolic into a genuine methodology.” Moreover, he regards Lacan’s “Kant avec Sade” as another manifestation of this transition. He believes that here we can see the transformation of “the very project of a moral philosophy into an insoluble intellectual paradox by rotating it in such a way that the implicit gap in it between subject and law catches the light.”

He studies this gap in the rest of his article in the realm of aesthetic theory and literary criticism in order to examine “a similar use of the distinction between Imaginary and Symbolic.”

Jameson argues that Lacan, in his discussions concerning the affinity between the Imaginary and the symbolic, is not merely “substituting linguistic for classical psychoanalytic concepts;” he is rather “mediating between them.” Here we are reminded of his famous concept of the ‘mediator,’ which is of great importance here. Formulated in his other works, a mediator is a concept, or context, that exists between two opposing ideas when there is a transition between them. In Hegelian dialectics the mediator between thesis and antithesis vanishes because of the emergence of a new entity that is the synthesis. But in the transitional point of both the Imaginary and the Symbolic the mediator never vanishes since there is here no synthesis emerging out of the transition of the first to the second.

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35 Ibid., p. 349.
36 Ibid., p. 371.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., p. 372.
Jameson shows that Lacan’s “Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter’” is a good example of a literary criticism in which the Symbolic, the signifier, becomes manifested in a dominant way and, accordingly, the imaginary is marginalized. Referring to Derrida’s criticism of Lacan’s reading of Poe’s short story, Jameson, too, believes that it is the “work” of the text itself that transforms “Imaginary elements into the closed Symbolic circuit.” Mentioning that Lacan’s reading of Poe’s short story is not a model for a criticism in which both imaginary and Symbolic are investigated without a gap between them, Jameson writes:

The distinction between the Imaginary and the Symbolic, and the requirement that a given analysis be able to do justice to the qualitative gap between them, may prove to be an invaluable instrument for measuring the range or the limits of a particular way of thinking.  

A highly illuminating work that Jameson refers to in his paper is one that talks of an “excellent formula” regarding the imaginary and symbolic characters of a given object. This doctrine was first presented by Edmond Ortigues in his *Le discours et le symbole* (1962). According to this formula, the same term may be considered “imaginary if taken absolutely and symbolic if taken as a differential value correlative of other terms which limit it reciprocally.” Jameson goes further to examine the question of the possibility of the full identity between Imaginary and Symbolic in the area of art and aesthetics maintaining that “this is not simply a question of method or theory but has implications for aesthetic productions.” The example he points to is Brecht’s anti-Aristotelian theatre, where there is a refusal of an empathy or full identification between the spectator and the character in the play, or between the actor and the role he/she is playing.

Towards the end of his paper Jameson focuses on the Real. But what is interesting here is that Jameson’s discussion of the Real is in the service of the major thesis of his paper that is “the problem of the insertion of the subject.” Jameson refers to the Real as History, and because the Real is, in Lacan’s words, “what resists symbolization absolutely,” language, too, cannot be fully identified to it. History thus is that cannot be expressed in language. There is always a gap between History and its narration. History, for Jameson, is an “absent cause” since it remains, in its totality, inexpressible. History

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39 Ibid., p. 373.
exists but cannot be fully expressed. The Real, too, exists, but cannot be expressed. The inexpressibility of the Real in its totality, in Jameson’s view, is another reason for the lack of a full identity between Imaginary and Symbolic. Language may rebuild the ‘imaginary relation’ of the subject to the ‘real conditions of existence;’ the problem, however, is that these ‘real conditions of existence’ cannot be experienced and even understood since they happen to be outside of language.

Considering the Lacanian concept of the Real as equivalent to Althusser’s notion of History, Jameson turns to the Althusserian theory of ideology. On one hand, he employs Althusser’s definition of ideology and, on the other hand, criticises Althusser’s specific use of Lacan. He argues that Lacanian theory does not seem to be profitable to Althusser’s reading of Marxism. It is a matter of surprise for Jameson that Althusser, while involving in the “outmoded antimony of that opposition between ideology and science,” makes use of Lacan’s scheme:

> It is all the more surprising the he [Althusser] should not have profited from a scheme [Lacan’s] in which knowledge and science, the subject and his or her individual truth, the place of the Master, the ec-centric relationship both to the Symbolic and to the Real, are all relationally mapped.\(^2\)

Jameson is not dealing with combining Marxism and psychoanalysis; what he seeks to accomplish is to make use of psychoanalysis for his version of Marxism. Jameson’s argument regarding Lacan’s theory of the triad orders arrives at a point where he calls for further investigations into the problem over the subject in both psychoanalysis and Marxism. A formula or methodology that simultaneously emphasizes the two different aspects of the subject is what Jameson seeks to expand.

Referring to this question in his other works, Jameson has attempted to present a methodology that is a “reconciliation” of apparently dissimilar approaches. *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act* (1981) approaches the problem of the convergence of both Lacanian and Althusserian models of subjectivity in two ways. First, Jameson here returns to his earlier argument that Althusser’s employment of the term the “absent cause” for the analysis of History can be regarded as equivalent to Lacan’s consideration of the Real in that both History and the Real cannot be fully expressed and comprehended in language. Althusser employed the term when he expressed his anti-teleological criticism of Hegel’s notion of history in order to

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 390.
present his critique of the ‘expressive causality.’ There is always something lacking in History, an absent cause, which avoids any complete account of it. Jameson states:

[The] analysis of the function of expressive causality suggests a provisional qualification of Althusser’s antiteleological formula for history (neither a subject nor a telos), based as it is on Lacan’s notion of the Real as that which “resists symbolization absolutely” and on Spinoza’s idea of the “absent cause.”

Jameson’s consideration of the Althusserian adaptation of Spinoza’s term of the “absent cause” is followed by his reference to the misleading results that might be caused by the “sweeping negativity of the Althusserian formula.” Jameson argues that this formula might lead to the consideration of History as “a text among others” in contemporary post-structuralism. Hence, he presents a revised form of the formula in this way:

that history is not a text, not a narrative, master or otherwise, but that, as an absent cause, it is inaccessible to us except in textual form, and that our approach to it and to the Real itself necessarily passes through its prior textualization, its narrativization in the political unconscious.

Secondly, The Political Unconscious can be considered as an attempt in bringing together the individual subjectivity and collective history. The Real as inherent in the individual subjectivity and the absent cause in History are both inexpressible in their totality and do not allow for a complete expressive and comprehensible account of both the Real and History. As Jerry Aline Flieger in his review of Jameson’s book maintains, “the whole of Jameson’s critical project…may be considered an example of ‘transcoding’ the ‘twin, apparently incommensurable demands’ of individual subjectivity and collective history.”

However, although the exploration of the gap in the Lacanian concept of the Real appears to be similar to Althusser’s exploitation of the “absent cause,” Althusser employed the term in his discussion of History and did not consider it in his theory of the interpellation of the subject. As I shall demonstrate in Chapter Five, whereas Lacan explored the gap in his analysis of the Real, Althusser approached it in his reading of

44 Ibid., p. 21.
History and its inexpressible character in language and, hence, the Symbolic. Althusser’s concept of the absent cause in History bears similarities with Lacan’s idea of the lost desire in the unconscious in that both cannot be completely experienced by the subject. If there is an absent cause that gives rise to the incomplete nature of the expression of History, there is also a desire lost in the unconscious and thus never fulfilled by the subject.

The gap Jameson identifies in the moment of transition from the Imaginary to the Symbolic is actually a matter of epistemology and not of methodology. I agree with Jameson that the real conditions of existence cannot be expressed in their totality; I also agree that this proposition can serve as a rationale for the impossibility of a full identity between the Imaginary and the Symbolic since the real conditions of existence are symbolically presented in language. What makes my analysis different from that of Jameson can be outlined in the following points:

First, I consider the rise of this gap not only between the Imaginary and Symbolic but also between language and ideology, which are two constituent parts of the Symbolic. That is to say that there is a gap within the Symbolic itself. This gap is distinguishable from the Lacanian argument that the Symbolic includes a lack in that it is constituted by language that is itself based on lack. As I demonstrate later in the thesis, the negating feature of language, however, both creates and covers this lack. I shall also discuss Jacques-Alain Miller’s consideration of ‘suture’ as both creating and filling in the lack between the Subject and the Other. Jameson’s discussion of the gap between the Imaginary and the Symbolic, though original and thought provoking, does not directly concentrate on the gap between language and ideology and the ideological dimensions of language.

The Symbolic includes a gap that emerges because of the essentially distinct character of language and ideology, both constitutive of the Symbolic. Based on their opposition in substance, language is abstract and ideology, in the Althusserian sense, has a material existence. Moreover, while psychoanalysis is dealing with the lack in language and the ‘lost desire’ in the unconscious, structural Marxism is concerned with the material representation of ‘the structure’ and the concrete existence of ideology.

Secondly, there exists a moment in which the subject may be analyzed from both Lacanian and Althusserian perspectives. This moment happens when ideology transits into language and, subsequently, when language becomes ideological. Furthermore, focusing on the moments and ways psychoanalysis and structural Marxism meet, one can consider language as both the medium and the converging point of individual and
social features of the subject. The subject, because of both acquiring and producing language, thus embodies both the individual and the social in that language includes both the particular and the universal. Language, from this view, is the site where both psychoanalytical and structural Marxist insights on the subject come together.

2.4 Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, and Marxism/Psychoanalysis Reconciliation

A key attempt to bring together Psychoanalysis and Marxism that demonstrates the possibility of a theoretical reconciliation between them is found in the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Their publication of *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (1985) marked a considerable development in the history of Marxism as a result of its explicit turn to psychoanalysis and post-structuralism.  

Laclau and Mouffe first begin to apply the psychoanalytical concept of ‘suture’ to the field of politics. Referring to Jacques-Alain Miller’s discussion of the double role played by ‘suture’ in creating a lack and standing in between the subject and the Other, they argued that void appears in the form of a dualism: “its founding discourse does not seek to determine differential degrees efficacy within a topography of the social, but to set limits on the embracing and determining capacity of every topographical structuration.” Their conception of “the hegemonic suture” thus brings into consideration “the double void” that emerged in the essentialist discourse of the Second International. They argue that this dualism should be observed within the context of the limits it offers. In other words, this dualism is a relation of frontiers in that “entities which escape structural determination are understood as he negative reverse of the latter.”

Later Laclau and Mouffe seek to elaborate two “very different problems” of the subject, which are “the discursive or pre-discursive character of the category of subject” and “the relationship among different subject positions.” As for the first problem, they briefly refer to three classical critiques of the subject by Nietzsche, Heidegger, and

46 However, Laclau’s affirmation of post-structuralism does not necessarily mean that he is completely at ease with the postmodern points of view that are sometimes congenial to the post-structuralist thought; throughout his works he has recurrently pointed to the contradictory logic behind some of the postmodern features. For example, he has critically approached the postmodern notion of refusing the grand narratives. See Ernesto Laclau, “Politics and the Limits of Modernity,” in Social Text, No. 21, Universal Abandon? The Politics of Postmodernism (1989), pp. 63-82.


48 Ibid.
Freud that radically criticised the conception of the subject as “an agent both rational and transparent to itself”, “as origin and basis for social relations,” and “the supposed unity and homogeneity of the ensemble of its positions” respectively. However, concerning the second problem they present a developed discussion where they first state that by the category of the subject they always mean “subject positions within a discursive structure.” They closely examine two examples of the subject of ‘Man,’ as defined in humanism, and the subject of feminism. After demonstrating how they are discursively constructed subject positions, they come to this conclusion that

the specificity of the category of subject cannot be established either through the absolutization of a dispersion of ‘subject position’, or through the equally absolutist unification of these around a ‘transcendental subject’. The category of subject is penetrated by the same ambiguous, incomplete and polysemical character which overdetermination assigns to every discursive identity.\(^{49}\)

The “incomplete” and “polysemical” character of the subject mentioned above is in close affinity to Laclau’s later analysis of the impossibility of a full identity both in and within itself. His reference to ‘dislocation’ of identity and his concept of ‘empty signifier’ are among his major contributions to the understanding of the impossibility of a full identification of and within ideology. Laclau relates the antagonism of identity to not only its negativity and dislocationism but also to the function of what he calls ‘empty signifier.’ Elaborating on the universal incompleteness of emancipatory projects, Laclau writes:

…any identity is ambiguous insofar as it is unable to constitute itself as a precise difference within a closed totality. As such, it becomes a floating signifier whose degree of emptiness depends on the distance that separates it from its fixedness to a specific signified.”\(^{50}\)

Laclau’s reference to the empty signifier is reminiscent of the significance of the term in structuralist linguistics as well as Lacan’s consideration of the relation between the signifiers in the unconscious. However, what makes his argument salient is that the idea of emptiness in the signifier further causes the incompleteness of identity and, thus, ideological claims. Laclau’s consideration of the empty signifier as “a signifier without a signed” in his *Emancipation(s)* (1996) is Lacanian in that the signifiers in the

\(^{49}\) Ibid., p. 121.

\(^{50}\) Ernesto Laclau, “Politics and the Limits of Modernity,” *Social Text*, No. 21, 1989, p. 80.
unconscious are without signified and it is only the floating of signifiers in the unconscious that produces a dream-work.

On the other hand, while demonstrating the relation of empty signifiers to politics, Laclau mentions the Saussurean perception of language and other signifying systems as a system of differences and then concludes that “the totality of language is involved in each single act of signification.” He argues that if the system was not constituted by the differences, there would no possibility of any signification. Declaring that the very possibility of the signification is the possibility of its limits, he employs the Hegelian notion that to think of the limits of something is the same as thinking of what is beyond those limits. Laclau thus comes to the conclusion that “what constitutes the condition possibility of a signifying system – its limits – is also what constitutes its condition of impossibility – a blockage of the continuous expansion of the process of signification.” Later in the same passage Laclau argues that to signify the limits of signification is like facing the Lacanian concept of the Real in that in both instances there is a subversion of the process of signification. The subversion of the differential nature of the signifying units is, however, in parallel to the process where the signifiers empty themselves of their attachment to signifieds. The system can signify itself as totality only if the signifiers are regarded as emptying of their differential and relational nature.

Laclau’s philosophical expansion of the relation of psychoanalysis to Marxism is observed in the context of the ‘post-Marxism’ he is advocating. Laclau is aware of the different bases and concerns of both psychoanalysis and classical Marxism; hence in the beginning part of one of his papers called “Psychoanalysis and Marxism” (1987) he thus refers to these “different theoretical fields”:

To think the relationships which exist between Marxism and psychoanalysis obliges one to reflect upon the intersections between two theoretical fields, each composed independently of the other and whose possible forms of mutual reference do not merge into any obvious system of translation… no simple model of supplement or articulation is of the slightest use. The problem is rather that of finding an index of comparison between two different

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theoretical fields, but that, in turn, implies the construction of a new field, within which the
comparison would make sense.\textsuperscript{53}

This “new field” Laclau is talking of is post-Marxism, which is, in his view, “the result
of a multitude of theoretico-political interventions.” Later in the paper he refers to the
Lacanian theory on the subject and argues that “the hegemonic subject is the subject of
the signifier.” Laclau acknowledges his debt to Lacanian psychoanalytic thought when
he argues that it is “only from this logic of the signifier that the hegemonic relationship
as such may be conceived.” Marxism in the present time, in Laclau’s opinion, must
bring into consideration a number of psychoanalytic doctrines. Laclau argues for a
reconsideration of Marxism’s relation to psychoanalysis in that the latter provides the
logic for questions concerning identity in different levels. On the other hand,
psychoanalytic theory’s emphasis on language should be also followed in Marxism.
Laclau believes that “a confluence of (post-)Marxism and psychoanalysis” does not
merely mean “the addition of a supplement to the former by the latter” or the
introduction of “the unconscious instead of economy.” He argues that the coincidence
of Marxism and Psychoanalysis is “grounded on the fact that the latter is the logic
which presides over the possibility/impossibility of the constitution of \textit{any} subject.”\textsuperscript{54}

The impossibility of a full constitution of identity and, also, of a full identification in
different subject positions is further investigated in Laclau’s conception of the subject of
politics. Politics always embodies a number of terms and claims which it never
accomplishes. These ideological terms are established by antagonistic political forces
and continue to operate through political means. Terms such as the ‘freedom of the
people’ and ‘welfare of the country’ are empty signifiers in that they are permanently
detached from what they really signify. These terms, as Laclau and Zac argue in their
“Minding the Gap: The Subject of Politics”, need to be “empty in order to constitute the
aims of a political competition.” They write: “a series of signifiers of the lack, of the
absent fullness, have to be constantly produced if politics – as different from sedimented
social forms – is going to be possible.”\textsuperscript{55}

The gap between politics and what it calls for is the very reason for the continuity
within that politics. The subject of politics is, first of all, the subject of incompleteness
not only because of its constitutive lack but because the subject is always wanted by the

\textsuperscript{53} Ernesto Laclau, “Psychoanalysis and Marxism,” trans. Amy G. Reiter-McIntosh, in \textit{Critical Inquiry},
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., p. 333.
\textsuperscript{55} Ernesto Laclau and Lilian Zac, “Minding the Gap: The Subject of Politics,” in Ernesto Laclau (ed.),
corresponding political system to meet what that system wants it to meet. The interesting point is that the system itself cannot reach a state of totality and full identification. Furthermore, the subject of politics, Laclau and Zac argue, cannot experience a state of full identification with what that political system manifests. Demonstrating the relation of the identity of the subject in a politically managed society to different forms of identification, Laclau and Zac believe that any identification always fails to achieve a fully fledged identity.

The subject of politics is analysed in Laclau’s further investigations of his concept of dislocationism, which focuses on the constitutive lack of the identity of the subject. His analysis is influenced by the Lacanian perception of the subject’s identity in that it brings into consideration Lacan’s approach to subjectivity as constituted by language. The negativity of language and its consequent constitutive lack are central to Laclau’s notion of dislocationism.

However, there have emerged a number of critiques of Laclau’s idea of making psychoanalysis vital to Marxism. The major question moves around the relation of the subject to ideology: Does a political psychoanalysis exist? The question originally goes back to the inability of psychoanalysis to thoroughly elaborate those moments in which, on one hand, ideology becomes psychic and, on the other hand, the unconscious becomes subjected to ideology. Elizabeth J. Bellamy, commenting on the conditions in which psychoanalysis becomes political, criticises the lack of a minute analysis on the relation of the social to the individual in Laclau ad Mouffe’s work:

… Laclau and Mouffe would need to be more specific about the precise nature of the intersection between the social (as that which has no “essence”) and the psychic, which however fragmented, alienated, and deconstructed, is surely a major factor in the implementing of political actions … [they] would have to pursue further the ideological implications of what it means, in an “antagonistic” society, for the (political) subject to receive no response from the Other of ideology except a signifier that represents that subject for another signifier.56

Some parts of the above criticism may be approached based on the proposition that language always includes ideology and this is the linking point between the social and the psychic. If language includes ideology, the psychic should have thus been ideological too. What brings together the social and the psychic and what makes the

psychic “a major factor in the implementing of political actions” is language that has already embodied ideology. Hence, a theoretical solution to the problem of the link between language and ideology is provided if one considers the formation of an ‘ideological unconscious.’ Laclau’s concept of the ‘empty signifier,’ though original in its formulation, emphasises the political connotations of the subject’s identity rather than bringing into consideration the ways language converges with ideology. I shall later examine how ideology enters language and how language itself becomes ideological.

Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s reconciliation of Marxism and psychoanalysis is considered as a development of Marxism and not as an approach for the analysis of the subject that brings together both models. Furthermore, this theoretical effort is a development of Althusser’s model of ‘the subject/the Subject.’ As I shall fully discuss in Chapter Four, Althusser proposed a model according to which the subject is always determined by ideology to meet the potentialities of the Subject. However, Althusser did not contemplate on the gap this model creates for the subject; accordingly, Laclau’s exploration of the gap within the subject can be taken as a development of the Althusserian model.

2.5 Slavoj Žižek and the Ideological Barred O

A major theme in Slavoj Žižek’s theoretical project has been an investigation into the philosophical validity of a critical theory that attempts to intertwine both Marx and Hegel. Lacan provided an influence on Žižek and it is through his sophisticated reading of Lacan that he has succeeded, arguably, in presenting a reconciliation between Hegel and Marx. Although most secondary works seek to relocate Žižek within a Lacanian framework, the present study is mostly interested in his treatment of Althusser in his Lacanian readings. This section thus evaluates Žižek’s implicit and explicit references to Althusserian notions in his manifestly Lacanian approach to the analysis of the subject and concentrates on Žižek’s concepts of the ‘ideological fantasy’ and ‘ideological barred O’ that include manifest Althusserian-Lacanian designations.

Considered as a Lacanian scholar significantly influenced by Hegel, Žižek is also referred to as a Marxist. For example, Glyn Daly considers Žižek as one of the true contemporary Marxists and evaluates his contributions as a ‘return to Marx.’

the difference between Althusser and Žižek in their return to Marx should be explored in the context of their relation to Hegel. Whereas Althusser attempted to remove from Marx all Hegelian traces, Žižek has particularly focused on the virtues of Hegel’s philosophy.

Žižek’s concern with Althusser, a Marxist whose version of Marxism was completely anti-Hegelian, is an interesting question to focus. It might first appear that Althusser has no relation with Hegel, Lacan, and even Žižek because whereas they were involved in the analysis of the Real, Althusser was mostly concerned with the Symbolic. In other words, while Hegel, Žižek, and even Lacan, as philosophers, are obsessed with the Real, Althusser was a Marxist whose main interest was on the formulation of what he called the social complex. Althusser thus had little to say on the Real. Instead, he explored the mechanism of the changes in all levels of practice in what he called the ‘social complex.’

Whereas Žižek is mostly interested in Lacan’s shift of concern from the Symbolic to the Real in the last phase of his intellectual career, Althusser might be said to be one who was mostly concerned with the Symbolic. However, as I shall demonstrate in Chapter Four, the only place he appeared to face the Real is the last part of his famous essay on the Ideological State Apparatus where he discusses the dialogue between Moses and God. Here, as in other places, Althusser employs the situation in order to express his perception of ideology and the subject. Thus, Althusser’s concept of ideology is in affinity with Lacan’s the Symbolic and not the Real.

A decisive point in any attempt to bring together Althusser and Lacan is their contrary treatment of Hegel. Žižek is Hegelian because, as a philosopher, he is concerned with “interrogating the real.” The term the Real, though of Lacanian origin, may also be, in a Hegelian sense, the subject of philosophy. As I shall fully explore in the next chapter, Hegel believed that the subject of philosophy was the Absolute Spirit, which could be, in a Lacanian sense, located in the realm of the Real. Thus, if I want to present a very short interpretation of Hegel in Lacanian terms, I should say that for Hegel the identity of the subject and the Spirit is ‘the real’ in that it is either a rare moment or a non-experienced one because of the lack of perception in it. As Žižek maintains, we should not think of Lacan as Hegelian only because of the influence of Kojève’s seminars on Hegel that provided an intellectual background for Lacan. On the contrary, Lacan is Hegelian in those places that even he himself did not recognize. The second chapter of Žižek’s Interrogating the Real (2005) is entitled “Lacan – At What Point Is He Hegelian?” He writes:
Lacan is fundamentally Hegelian, but without knowing it. His Hegelianism is certainly not where one expects it – that is to say, in his explicit references to Hegel – but precisely in the last stage of his teaching, in his logic of the not-all, in the emphasis placed on the Real, and the lack in the Other.\textsuperscript{58}

Žižek also discusses the three stages of subjectivisation of the subject when s/he is a child; these three stages happen when the child is exposed to speech, language, and the barred Other.\textsuperscript{59}

Another example of Žižek’s twofold relation to Althusser can be observed in his references to Althusser in \textit{Interrogating the Real} (2005). Commenting on Lacan’s position in western academia, Žižek employs the term “Theoretical State Apparatuses.” This phrase is a clear allusion to Althusser. An ideological State apparatus such as a university becomes, for Žižek, a theoretical apparatus. Žižek argues that universities, though apparently an open place for discussions, display a resistance to Lacanianism in favour of cognitivism. This resistance also goes back to Lacan’s discourse of the universality; Lacan’s theories, like other structuralist treatments, are based on and, hence, call for universalist claims.

Žižek has also referred to Althusser’s ISA in his discussion of contemporary approaches on theories on ideology in \textit{Mapping Ideology} (1994). Establishing his idea on ideologies based on Hegelian three axes – doctrine, belief and ritual, Žižek classifies them into three groups. They are:

- ideology as a complex of ideas (theories, convictions, beliefs, argumentative procedures);
- ideology in externality, that is, the materiality of ideology, Ideological State Apparatus; and
- finally, the most elusive domain, the ‘spontaneous’ ideology at work at the heart of social ‘reality’ itself.\textsuperscript{60}

As observed, Žižek’s consideration of Ideological State Apparatuses as the ideology in externality already shows his affirmation of Althusser. But what is interesting is that he critically engages Althusser while exploring the concept of fantasy. A significant concept in Lacanian psychoanalysis, fantasy has been thoroughly analysed by Žižek through discussing its different designations. In one of his elaborations on the term

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., pp. 28-9.
Žižek considers fantasy within the Althusserian framework of ideological interpellation. He talks of ‘social fantasy’ and considers it to exist before the Althusserian process of interpellation:

Fantasy is then to be conceived as an imaginary scenario the function of which is to provide a kind of positive support filling out the subject’s constitutive void. And the same goes, *mutatis mutandis*, for social fantasy: it is a necessary counterpart to the concept of antagonism, a scenario filling out the voids of the social structure, masking its constitutive antagonism by the fullness of enjoyment (racist enjoyment, for example). This is the dimension overlooked in the Althusser’s account of interpellation: before being caught in identification, in symbolic (mis)recognition, the subject is trapped by the *Other* through a paradoxical object-cause of desire.61

Žižek, though agreeing with the process of ideological interpellation, criticises Althusser’s ignorance of considering the social fantasy as “filling out the voids of the social structure,” which is the factor behind the permanent function of the interpellation. That is to say, interpellation operates through fantasy. Moreover, Žižek criticises the Althusserian concept of interpellation because the subject in Althusser, even before the moment of interpellation, is already a subject by being “trapped by the *Other*.” Žižek’s criticism of Althusserian interpellation has been also mentioned by a number of other critics such as Anthony Elliot.62

A clear example of Žižek’s conspicuous and acknowledged use of the Althusserian term of interpellation is observed in his definition of the ‘ideological fantasy.’ Here fantasy, the term Lacan exploited to describe the subject’s imaginary story when he/she wants to meet his/her desire, is provided with the Althusserian designation of ideology, that which exists everywhere and includes most of our acts. Žižek’s discussion of ideological fantasy in *The Sublime Object of Ideology* is illuminating here in that it demonstrates his development of both Lacanian and Althusserian terms. Dealing with the classical Marxian formula that ‘they do not know it, but they are doing it,’ Žižek explores the “place of ideological illusion” in the acts of ‘knowing’ and ‘doing.’ He argues that ‘what they overlook, what they misrecognise, is not the reality but the illusion which is structuring their reality, their real social activity.” He states:

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61 Ibid., p. 254.
They know very well how things really are, but still they are doing it as if they do not know. The illusion is therefore double: it consists in overlooking the illusion which is structuring our real, effective relationship to reality. And this overlooked, unconscious illusion is what may be called the *ideological fantasy*.  

Rex Butler and Scott Stephens, too, in their glossary to Žižek’s *Interrogating the Real* (2005) define fantasy as: “that which covers up inconsistencies within the symbolic order and that by which ideological interpellation works today in our seemingly ‘post-ideological’ times.”  

The above examples clearly show Žižek’s attempt to apply Lacanian conceptualizations to Althusserian terms.

However, Žižek’s achievements in this regard have been considered by many as going ‘beyond Althusser.’ For instance, the editors of Žižek’s *Interrogating the Real* write that Žižek, in his “decisive innovations” concerning fantasy, “moves beyond someone like Althusser.” Although this proposition is true as far as Žižek’s idea on the function of ideology is concerned, one should not consider Žižek’s relation to Althusser merely as thus. Žižek’s work in going ‘beyond Althusser’ also reminds us of his concept of ‘beyond interpellation,’ which first appeared in *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. It was in this book that Žižek talked of the psychic and ideological outcomes that emerge “beyond interpellation.” He wrote:

Althusser speaks only of the process of ideological interpellation through which the symbolic machine of ideology is “internalized” into the ideological experiences of Meaning and Truth: … this “internalization,” by structural necessity, never fully succeeds … there is always a residue, a leftover, a stain of traumatic irrationality and senselessness sticking to it.

Later in the same work Žižek proceeds to talk of the always already barred Big Other of the Symbolic. What is of the most interest here is that Žižek regards the barred O as ideology. It is “a fundamental impossibility, structured around an impossible/traumatic kernel, around a central lack.” For Žižek, this ‘central lack’ is what ideology embodies. But the crucial point to make here is that while Žižek identifies the barred O of the symbolic as ideology, he does not acknowledge his debt to Althusser in that it

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65 Ibid., p. 364.
67 Ibid., p. 122.
was Althusser who referred to almost every activity of the Symbolic, unless real art, as ideology. This example is clear enough to demonstrate that Žižek’s manifest debt to Althusser has been mostly neglected in the studies of the former.

Apart from Žižek’s attempt to read interpellation through a psychoanalytic lens, there is another clear convergence of Lacan and Althusser in his works. In the remarks above Žižek brings together three critical concepts and, through developing all three, presents his thesis on the function of social fantasy. These three concepts are interpellation, fantasy, and antagonism. More precisely, Žižek approaches Althusserian interpellation through considering it within the Lacanian sense of fantasy. Žižek has developed Lacan in that he talks of social fantasy instead of the simple Lacanian fantasy’ also, he has developed Althusser since he is talking of the function of ideology in regulating itself and covering up the inconsistencies within the Symbolic order instead of merely using the Althusserian concept of interpellation.

Although this marks the point where Žižek may seem congenial to a Lacanian-Althusserian framework, it is a rare instance in Žižek’s works. Žižek’s twofold response to Althusser as well as his development of the “Lacanian-Althusserian framework” has been thus described by Anthony Eliot:

Reconceptualizing the Lacanian-Althusserian framework, Žižek looks at the ambiguous realm of unconscious fantasy as manifested in the social and ideological forms of modern culture. For Žižek, as for Althusser, ideology is an imaginary field which always implies a shared relationship to socio-political form, such as class, race, gender, and the like. In contrast to Althusser, however, Žižek contends that ideology can never be reduced to the cultural reproduction of meaning as such – to the signifying network of language alone.  

Žižek, according to Eliot, agrees with and develops Althusser at the level that fantasy is connected to the ideological. That is to say, fantasy can also be a scenario produced in, and after, ideological interpellation. What makes Žižek different from Althusser is the former’s concern with the pre-ideological lack of ideology that provides its character of permanent functioning. Moreover, what Žižek adds to both Althusser and Lacan is the connection fantasy has to the pre-ideological. That is to say, Žižek considers fantasy in a pre-ideological form too, where it operates before or away from interpellation. In a categorization provided at the end of his chapter on “Poststructuralist Anxiety” Elliott demonstrates Žižek’s development of both Lacan and Althusser. Accordingly, while

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Lacan was dealing with “self as narcissistic misrecognition, represented through symbolic order of language” and Althusser was concerned with “individual as subject of ideological misrecognition,” Žižek comes up with a thesis that considers the “self decentred through pre-ideological lack of desire.”

What I want to add to Elliott’s elaboration of Žižek’s thought is that the latter’s thesis can be examined from two more angles: first, Žižek’s argument focuses on the phase before the subject’s entry into the Symbolic, or during the process of the entry of the subject into it in which s/he has not still become ideological and, hence, desire at this level is not ideological either; secondly, the same thesis also includes the phase before and even after interpellation; that is to say that somewhere between the Lacanian symbolic order and Althusserian ideological interpellation a pre-ideological desire operates at the level of subjective enjoyment through filling out the desire’s pre-ideological lack. This pre-ideological desire is in charge of the subject’s enjoyment in fulfilling its void always everywhere in the life of the subject.

What Žižek has achieved is a major contribution to philosophic thought by critically developing and genuinely combining thoughts from different areas of study, from Marxism and psychoanalysis to film and popular culture. He is manifestly politicising psychoanalysis, on one hand, and offering ideology a psychoanalytic designation, on the other. As demonstrated above, he has attempted to explore the identity of the subject through both Althusserian and Lacanian insights; however, what is lacking in his account of the subject is the theoretical incongruity between the Lacanian unconscious as the site of the lost desire and Althusserian ideology as a concrete entity that is tangibly found everywhere in the life of the subject. Again here this is the significant role of language that should be more elaborated. I shall study the mediating role of language in Chapter Six; however, another recent critical effort in this area should be first studied that is Judith Butler’s attempt in providing a Hegelian reading of the Althusserian concept of interpellation.

2.6 Judith Butler and Hegelian Interpellation

Another major recent critical voice that has critically responded to the Lacanian-Althusserian framework of thought is Judith Butler. Early in her intellectual career, she explored Hegel’s thought and his influence in the intellectual discourses of the mid-twentieth century in her first book, *Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France* (1987). This Hegelian influence continued to be developed

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69 Ibid., p. 113.
in her later works. As she later wrote in the introduction to a reprint of the same book, “all of my work remains within the orbit of a certain set of Hegelian questions.”

Butler’s position, most famous for her concept of ‘performativity,’ should be studied in relation to the context of Lacan, Foucault, and Derrida. However, a close reading of the concept of performativity reveals that it is also in affinity with, and influenced by, the Althusserian version of ideology. In Althusser, it is the performance of our relation to others and especially to ideological institutions that permanently reproduces the condition of subjecthood. Butler’s evaluation of Althusser’s theory on ideological interpellation is observed in *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative* and, particularly, *The Psychic Life of Power: Theories of Subjection* both published in 1997.

Butler, like Žižek, is critically engaged in the Althusserian concept of interpellation. But what makes the present thesis closer to Butler’s reading than that of Žižek is that she introduces Althusser’s theory while at the same time providing an account of language. In *Excitable Speech* Butler is interested in the power language exerts on the subject. She begins her book with an investigation into those moments in which the subject is “injured by language.” “When we claim to have been injured by language,” she asks, “what kind of claim do we make?” Believing that we all ascribe an agency to language and become “its injurious trajectory,” Butler argues that not only there is a close relation between language and power but also language is itself the power we are speaking of. That is why she presents her argument of the “‘linguistification’ of the political field” with references to both Althusser and Foucault.

In her evaluation of the Althusserian “scene” of interpellation she employs key Hegelian insights. Hegel’s discussion of the emergence of self-consciousness in the identity of the slave implied an inter-subjective opposition. That is to say, the master/slave dialectic always includes a struggle in the slave’s identity between two subjectivities before and after the rise of the self-consciousness. Therefore, ideological interpellation does not necessarily need two people to be manifested. It could be a self-reflexive phenomenon.

The same treatment of Althusserian theory is also observed in *The Psychic Life of Power*, where she dedicates a chapter to ‘Althusser’s subjection.’ In the beginning of her discussion Butler mentions that the Althusserian concept of interpellation, albeit with “objections,” is a doctrine that “continues to survive its critique.” Butler focuses on the Althusserian moment of interpellation, in which the individual turns his/her head to

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the call of the police. Her treatment, however, is different in that she considers the Althusserian scene to be “exemplary and allegorical.” She presents an analysis of the different aspects of the act of “turning round,” and even connects it to Nietzsche’s perception of ‘conscience’ and the question of ‘guilt.’ Believing that “the mention of conscience in Althusser’s “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” has received little critical attention,” Butler contends that “the theory of ideology is supported by a complicated set of theological metaphors.” Butler writes that the example Althusser brings of the constitution of the subject by God in the story of Peter clearly shows the ‘power’ of ideology in Althusser’s account. Thus,

the divine power of naming structures the theory of interpellation that accounts for the ideological constitution of the subject. Baptism exemplifies the linguistic means by which the subject is compelled into social being. God names “Peter,” and this address establishes God as the origin of Peter.72

In the Althusserian scene of interpellation, however, we face a different narration because there are already a police and an addressee present in the scene. We cannot say that the addressee, before being addressed by the police, was not a subject. The act of submission to the police call, the ‘turning round’ itself, presupposes a grammatical subject. Consequently, Butler writes:

If that submission brings the subject into being, then the narrative that seeks to tell the story of that submission can proceed only by exploiting grammar for its fictional effects. The narrative that seeks to account for how the subject comes into being presumes the grammatical “subject” prior to the account of its genesis.73

She argues that there should also be a grammatical subject that first “turns back on itself” and then on the call from the police. “Considered grammatically,” Butler contends, “it will seem that there must first be a subject who turns back on itself, yet I will argue that there is no subject except as a consequence of this very reflexivity.”74

This is the moment when interpellation finds an inter-subjective form. That is to say, interpellation happens, but first in the identity of the subject and then as a response to the call from the police. This Butlerian notion is illuminating in that it provides the

73 Ibid., p. 112.
74 Ibid., p. 68.
Althusserian term with a Hegelian inflection. Butler’s Hegelian reading of Althusser appears to be innovative if one reviews Althusser’s denunciation of Hegel in the former’s whole critical project.

Butler demonstrates her difference from Althusser in that she argues that language should not be confined to speech as it is understood in Althusser’s example of hailing. In *Excitable Speech* Butler believes that language should not be thought of merely in the form of language. Although “the inauguration of the subject” according to most theories of subjection, and also that of Butler, is “linguistic,” we should also note that “the constitutive modality of ‘language’ need not be confined to speech as Althusser implies.”

What is of central interest is that Butler, too, believes that the subordination of the subject takes place through language. That is to say, language is not only the medium but also the context in which ideological interpellation happens.

In her development of the ‘iterability’ of the subject, a concept coined by Derrida and later developed throughout his intellectual career, Butler is directly involved in the expansion of a number of other concepts from Althusser, Lacan, and Foucault. Though influenced by Derrida, Butler is actually dealing with what is unrealized in Foucauldian account of the discursive constitution of the subject by Foucault. Hence, although she has been widely referred to as a critic working within a Foucauldian paradigm, Butler’s position should be assessed as a critical development of Foucault by using, among other influences, Lacanian psychoanalysis. In other words, she first considers identity as a politically oriented question and, then, interprets it through psychoanalysis. Believing that there is a connection between power and the psyche, Butler is explicitly combining Foucault and Lacan.

However, Butler’s emphasis on a radical constructivism separates her from that branch of contemporary critical theory that calls for linguistic determinism. Here she seems to be also different from Lacan whose emphasis on language, as a major constituent part of the Symbolic, allows no space for the autonomous acts of the subject. Butler’s ‘agent’ seems to more freely act in the context s/he is located whereas there is almost no chance for the Lacanian subject to come out of the framework language has created for him/her. This is where Butler distances herself from the essentially determinist character of structuralist theories, and comes close to a post-structuralist

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76 Iterability can be defined as the possibility of repeating utterances and writings over and over again in different contexts, which allows them to be interpreted differently. Derrida develops the term in the essays of his *Limited Inc*; for example, see Jacques Derrida, “Signature Event Context,” in *Limited Inc*, ed. Gerald Graff, trans. Samuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988, pp. 1-25.
standpoint where, particularly in Derrida, the subject has the ability to deconstruct. However, Butler’s favourite term in this regard is ‘de-institutionalize,’ which is arguably of Foucauldian origin.

Of all the critics examined in the present chapter Butler, along with Laclau and Mouffe, are the only figures that do not seem to be highly critical of post-structuralism. In Bodies That Matter (1993) Butler considers the possibility of agency in a consistent process of reiteration. For her, recitation can be re-signification as well. The process of reiteration can be both reinforcing and undermining signifying conventions. Veronica Vasterling points to Butler’s view on the relation of the subject to language, stating:

The trouble with Butler’s account of the relation between language and subject is … that almost invariably the subject is cast as being constructed and reconstructed by the signifying chains of language. The subject is not completely passive, for its activity of citing is a necessary condition of its (re)construction. Therefore, Butler legitimately can claim that the subject does not simply undergo the process of (re)construction. 77

The subject always already finds itself in a language with more or less established signifying conventions. Yet, there is room for inventiveness here: we can, intentionally, try to redirect the signifying conventions we are already positioned in. The subject, in Butler, can aim to re-signify the conventional form and content of the language he/she has been already constituted by.

Butler’s consideration of the subject is like the Aristotelian idea of the soul, one that forms and frames the body. As I shall explore later in the thesis, Edmund Ortigues in his Le discourse et le symbole (1962) sharply differentiated the ear from the eye and related them to the different realms of the Symbolic and the Imaginary. We encounter and enter the Imaginary through our eyes and become aware of the Symbolic through our ears. Thus, the person we see is nothing but an entity, a body, whereas what we speak to is the subject.

The present thesis bears similarity to Butler’s critical project for two major reasons. First, whereas she reads the Foucauldian concept of power using Lacanian psychoanalysis, the present study has attempted to approach the Althusserian concept of ideology through a Lacanian emphasis on language. Butler does not specifically talk of a Lacanian-Althusserian framework; however, her argument on ‘the linguistification of the political field’ is following a Lacanian-Foucauldian framework; her concept of the

Performative is based on approaching the Foucauldian concept of power through Lacanian psychoanalysis. Foucault’s concept of discourse functions on the way ideology, in its Althusserian sense, creates subjects out of individuals. What links ideology to discourse is Foucault’s concept of ‘dispositif’ that bears similarities to the Althusserian concept of the Ideological State Apparatuses. The discursive constitution of the subject can be thus examined also in the context of the ISAs.

Secondly, what appears to be highly important for Butler, that is the relation of the agent to language, is of central interest here. Butler’s approach to language is one of the rare examples of contemporary critical thought that bears resemblance to the way language is exposed in my analysis. Moreover, her exploration of the struggle between the individual agent and institutionalization is reminiscent of the conflict between Lacanian emphasis on the subject’s language and Althusserian focus on the ideologies interpellating the subject. Butler’s discussion of the relation of the agent to language, which is either undermining or reinforcing the conventions, is instrumental to my reading of inter-subjective dialectic between the subjects in a novel especially when a character faces the other languages exposed to him/her.

2.7 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has examined those critical and theoretical works that have attempted to make a parallel use of both the Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject and to discuss the position of the subject between language and ideology. In its early applications, the ‘Lacanian-Althusserian paradigm’ was both employed and harshly criticised in the area of film theory and criticism. Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject were also applied in cultural studies without a deep investigation of the problems that emerge in such convergence.

I also demonstrated that Fredric Jameson developed the problem in the Lacanian model of subjectivity by referring to the gap emerging in the transmission from the Imaginary to the Symbolic. He also commented on Althusser’s relation to Lacan by relating the Althusserian ‘the absent cause’ to the Lacanian ‘the Real.’ Though original in his findings, Jameson’s response to a Lacanian-Althusserian framework needs two reconsiderations: first, although he analyzes the Althusserian concept of ‘the absent cause’ in History, he does not consider it as instrumental in the Althusserian analysis of subjectivity constitution through ideological interpellation; secondly, although he concentrates on the gap that is formed in the transition of the subject from the Imaginary
to the Symbolic, he does not directly focus on a Lacanian-Althusserian critical perspective.

Laclau and Mouffe’s critical project, which brings together both Marxism and Psychoanalysis, has provided an ingenious notion of the subject of politics with reference to the Lacanian insights concerning the constitutive lack of the subject and its identity. Laclau’s concept of ‘empty signifier’ is innovative in that it explores how the impossibility of society and other signifying systems continue to exist through the impossibility of a full identification within both identity and ideology. Laclau’s concept of ‘empty signifier’ tends to bring both Lacan’s emphasis on language as constructing the subject’s identity and Althusser’s perception of the impossibility of the Subject. However, as I shall demonstrate later in the thesis, the Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject can be also evaluated though the exploration of what is called in the thesis as ‘ideological signifier’ that demonstrates the close association between the Lacanian concept of linguistic alienation and the Althusserian concept of ideological interpellation.

As for Žižek, I showed how he provides a twofold response to Althusser. Žižek criticises Althusser’s overlooking of seeing the social fantasy as “filling out the voids of the social structure.” Moreover, he criticises the Althusserian concept of interpellation because the subject in Althusser, even before the moment of interpellation, is already a subject by being “trapped” by the Other. However, Žižek’s concept of ‘the ideological Barred O’ appears to be an explicit affirmative response to the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic in that it brings together both the Althusserian definition of ideology as present everywhere and the Lacanian perception of the barred Other as constitutive of the Symbolic. However, as I will explore in the thesis, language-ideology relation creates challenging problems particularly as far as it is considered as the convergence of lack (language) and material (ideology).

Judith Butler, though not explicitly considering the problem, has critically confronted Althusser’s concept of interpellation while still remaining loyal to him. Her reference to interpellation as happening within the subject’s identity and, thus, having an intersubjective character, proves to be of close affinity to what the present thesis aims at demonstrating. Interpellation does not always need two persons to happen; it can take place within the identity of the subject. If we consider language as the battlefield of ideologies and the context in which the subject is interpellated, then, Butler’s concept of ‘the agent’ and its relation to language provides a relative freedom for the agent in reconstructing his/her identity. Butler’s idea of the agent, as distinguishable from the
Lacanian concept of the subject, is crucial to my argument concerning Stephen Dedalus’ act of reconstructing his identity in the penultimate chapter of the present thesis.

Employing both Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject in their works, the above critics have not focused on the problems and principles of the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic as a model for understanding subjectivity. As demonstrated in the chapter, none of these critical efforts achieve a synthesis of the two models. As I shall discuss later in the thesis, language/ideology, lack/material, and alienation/interpellation relations as well as other ways in which these two theories directly come across each other should be investigated more thoroughly. I shall first study the subject-object relations in rationalism and romanticism, which provided two distinguishable conceptions of the subject for both Lacanian and Althusserian models of subjectivity. In the following chapter I will present a study of the Cartesian and Hegelian subjects and will examine both the identity and non-identity of the subject-object dual pair. I shall focus on the incompleteness and alienation of the Hegelian subject in order to further investigate the subject’s identity in both Lacanian and Althusserian theories.
Chapter Three:
The Cartesian and Hegelian Subjects:
The Subject-Object Separation and Identity

3.1 Introduction
Demonstrating the salient features of the Cartesian and Hegelian subjects, this chapter concentrates on their approach to the subject-object relation and its affinity with the subject’s identity. As I shall argue in Chapters Four and Five, a close study of the Cartesian subject is illuminating in exploring the Lacanian and Althusserian conceptions of subjectivity in that both were anti-Cartesian in their critique of the autonomous, rationalist, and centred character of the Cartesian subject. Furthermore, a study of the Hegelian perception of the subject-object identity proves to be illuminating in a further exploration of Lacan’s perception of the subject as well as in developing the Althusserian model of the ‘subject/Subject.’

This chapter thus attempts to categorize the classical modern treatments of the subject into two major groups of the Cartesian and Hegelian subjects. I shall closely study these two conceptions of the subject in that they provided a major philosophical background for both the Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject. As far as the early modern rationalist perception of the subject is concerned, I shall outline major features of the Cartesian subject as well as the consequences of the Cartesian perception of the subject that played a major role in the theorisation of the subject prior to German Idealist philosophy. As for Romantic doctrines of the subject and its identity, I seek to present a study of German Idealist treatment of the subject and its close affinity with nature. This study proves to be central to the present thesis in that, on one hand, the Lacanian theory of the subject was highly influenced by the Hegelian concept of the subject and, on the other hand, I seek to critically investigate the Althusserian model of subjectivity in the coming chapter through a Hegelian approach to the subject’s identity.

This chapter consists of two major sections: first I study the Cartesian subject as both rationalist and objectified. Following this, I will outline the mind/body dualism that resulted in the further establishment of the subject-object separation and the rise of other binary oppositions. The study of the Cartesian subject is vital in a further exploration of the subject/object binary opposition that was later criticised not only in the Hegelian perception of the subject but also in both Lacanian and Althusserian models of subjectivity.
Secondly, a discussion will be presented on the Hegelian subject with reference to the significance of Nature in German Idealism. I shall explore how the subject-object relation in German Idealism was treated in the context of the subject-nature identity. Accordingly, I shall also discuss Hegel’s perception of the subject-nature identity with reference to the Romantic signification of the concept of Nature. The Hegelian subject is marked by an incompleteness that I shall later bring into consideration in my analysis of the subject’s incompleteness in both Lacan and Althusser. Finally, I shall outline the major key points in my analysis of the Cartesian and Hegelian subjects that are important to my later discussion of both Lacanian and Althusserian concepts of the subject.

3.2 The Cartesian Subject as the Objectified Subject: Rationalism, Centrality, and the Subject-Object Separation

Descartes’ approach to the ‘subject’ is regarded as a decisive shift in the prehistory of the term. Descartes’ famous cogito argument is considered as his most significant contribution to the definition of the ‘subject.’ The Cartesian subject is also widely referred to in modern criticism and theory particularly when the aim is to trace the origins of the modern subject. However, the term owes a major part of its significance to Descartes’ involvement and inventions in natural philosophy, which, in the seventeenth-century context, was the familiar term for what we now call “science.”

Arguing that the Cartesian notion of the subject provided it with an ‘objectified’ character in a way that it ultimately changed from its apparent form of the subject of knowing into the object of knowing, the present section seeks to demonstrate how the centrality of the rational subject in Descartes resulted in the further establishment of the Cartesian binary oppositions. Hence, an analysis of the certainty and centrality of the Cartesian subject will be presented, which I shall later refer to in my discussion of the Lacanian and Althusserian anti-humanist perception of the subject as not a free and decision maker individual.

My analysis of ‘the Cartesian subject as the object of knowing’ includes a discussion of the mind/body pair as the major binary opposition in Descartes. Descartes’ idea of the independence of mind and the consequent subject-object separation was later criticised in both the Hegelian and twentieth-century theories of subjectivity. Therefore, drawing out the major features of the Cartesian subject is necessary in my analysis of

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the Lacanian and Althusserian theories of subjectivity in that both sought to reverse the strict foundations of the Cartesian concept of the subject.

3.2.1 “Cogito ergo sum”:

Certainty and Centrality of the Rational Subject

The Cartesian cogito argument brings into consideration the certainty of the subject’s existence. Descartes first referred to this argument in *A Discourse on the Method*. Elaborating on the errors of those who “make mistakes in reasoning, even about the simplest elements of geometry” and considering the thoughts in our dreams as “illusions,” he wrote:

> I noted that, while I was trying to think of all things being in this way, it was necessarily the case that I, who was thinking them, had to be something; and observing this truth: *I am thinking therefore I exist*, was so secure and certain that it could not be shaken by any of the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics, I judged that I could accept it without scruple, as the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking.\(^79\)

The frequently-quoted proposition “I think, therefore I am,” was first expressed by Descartes in French as “je pense donc je suis.” Its Latin equivalent, “cogito ergo sum,” however, has come to be universalized because Descartes used it in Latin later in both his *Principles of Philosophy* and the Latin version of *A Discourse on the Method*. The cogito argument is the first modern philosophical argument concerning the subject’s certainty of his existence and consciousness, one that was later radically criticised in German Idealism and both the Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject.

Although both the English “subject” and French “sujet” refer to the grammatical function of the “I” used in the above proposition, the term has come to denote in Descartes a person who, by the means of his/her reasoning mind, overcomes his/her doubts. The first doubt that is resolved for the Cartesian subject is thus its own existence. This state of certainty, according to Descartes, is and should be met in facing other philosophical questions. Certainty, regarded as one of the major characteristics of the Cartesian subject, is in close affinity to the subject’s self-consciousness.

Descartes’ criticism of the subjectivity provided by scholastic philosophy is clearly observed in his attitude towards the subject and its abilities. While the human being was thought of as a determined ‘microcosm’ in scholasticism, for Descartes s/he was

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considered as free and capable of autonomous decision-making. The human being, by which it is meant here the mind of human being, was regarded in Descartes as a ‘macrocosm’ that was both free and truth-seeking. A major part of the Cartesian philosophy, especially in *Meditations on First Philosophy*, was dedicated to arguments on the human being’s search for truth through the help of her/his independent and free thinking mind. The famous first lines of his *Meditations* clarify such a view:

Some years ago I was struck by the large number of falsehoods that I had accepted as true in my childhood, and by the highly doubtful nature of the whole edifice that I had subsequently based on them. ... it is necessary ... to demolish everything completely and start again right from the foundations if I wanted to establish anything at all in the sciences that was stable and likely to last.\(^{80}\)

While man’s ability in coming up with a clear independent understanding of himself was degraded and even sometimes rejected in Scholasticism, Descartes believed in the power of man’s mind in finding answers for the still unanswered, or forbidden, philosophical questions. Descartes’ philosophical career was, in essence, contradictory to one of the premises of scholasticism, which was the belief in the microcosmic character of man. However, any attempt to violate the understanding of mankind based on Christian teachings provided by such ‘Schoolmen’ as Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus was formally condemned by the Church.

The scholastic philosophy, the philosophy of the ‘Schoolmen,’ was officially taught in the early seventeenth century. Descartes became acquainted with the scholastic philosophy when he was a student in the Jesuit College of La Fleche in Anjou. Later in his *A Discourse on the Method* (1637) he criticized the foundations of scholastic philosophy. Reviewing all the materials he had been taught at college, Descartes wrote of the philosophy courses he attended:

I shall not say anything about philosophy except that, when I realized that it had been cultivated by the best minds for many centuries, and that nevertheless there is nothing in it that is not disputed and consequently is not subject to doubt, I was not so presumptuous as to hope to succeed better than others… As for the other disciplines, in so far as they borrow

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their principles from philosophy, I concluded that nothing solid could have been built on such shaky foundations.\textsuperscript{81}

Clearly expressing his critical view on the scholastic philosophy, Descartes here argues that “nothing solid can have been built on such shaky foundations” of the philosophy that everything in it is “disputed” and “subject to doubt.” Descartes continued to criticize different aspects of scholasticism in his other works. As Roger Ariew has observed, almost every subject related to scholastic thought was criticized by Descartes. “He rejected the four elements,” Ariew states, “and held that there was only one kind of matter, and that all its varieties could be explained as modifications of extension.”\textsuperscript{82} Descartes was also highly critical of Aristotle’s idea of the triad principles of matter, form, and privation. Scholastic philosophy was also criticised by Descartes particularly when he rejected the Aristotelian doctrine of the substantial forms that was dominant in the middle Ages.

Descartes’ insistence on reaching the state of certainty in natural philosophy highly influenced the scientific developments of modern times. Descartes’ aim, as mentioned in \textit{A Discourse on the Method}, was to make use of the certainty of mathematics, which he largely contributed to, in other fields of study in order to promote them:

\begin{quote}
I was most keen on mathematics, because of its certainty and the incontrovertibility of its proof; but I did not yet see its true use. Believing as I did that its only application was to the mechanical arts, I was astonished that nothing more exalted had been built on such sure and solid foundations.\textsuperscript{83}
\end{quote}

As observed, Descartes here focuses on the necessity of scientific developments in his own time as compared to that of the “ancient,” later on referred to in the same passage. The characteristic feature of Cartesian philosophy is its close association with Cartesian mathematics and logic. Such a relation between philosophy and science paved the way for the contribution of Cartesian philosophy to the scientific developments of modern times. Consequently, we can propose that Descartes attempted to resolve the doubts existing in the natural sciences based on the method of arriving at truth in mathematical sciences. As Anthony Kenny writes:

\begin{flushright}\textsuperscript{81} René Descartes, \textit{A Discourse on the Method}, p. 10. \\
\textsuperscript{83} René Descartes, \textit{A Discourse on the Method}, p. 9.\end{flushright}
The pursuit thus far of the method of doubt would lead to the conclusion that the natural sciences are doubtful, while the mathematical sciences have an element of indubitable certainty. For example, astronomy, and medicine deal with composite objects, while arithmetic and geometry treat of very simple and very general objects without worrying whether these objects exist in nature or not.\(^\text{84}\)

Descartes was so certain of the truth of his philosophical project that he refused to consider his cogito argument as being influenced by classical logic. He believed that the cogito argument was intuitively felt and not deduced from two other elementary sentences, as it was the case in the syllogistic logic of Scholasticism. For example,

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Everything having large extremities is strong  (all B is A)
All lions have large extremities                (all C is B)
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All lions are strong                        (all C is A)
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Based on this syllogistic logic the cogito argument might have been deduced as follows:

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Whatever is thinking exists
I am thinking
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Therefore I exist

Relying on the above proposition in his philosophical career, Descartes refused to accept that it was deduced from such a logic, which was followed in scholastic philosophy. He rather argued that the proposition “I am thinking therefore I exist” was so self-evident that needed no such logic behind it. This, however, is a demonstrative example of Descartes’ firm belief in his cogito argument as well as the truth behind it.

The Cartesian subject resolves the doubts and arrives at the state of certainty by his rational thinking. Descartes was one of the first modern philosophers that emphasized the significance and functionality of man’s reason. He ironically mentions at the beginning of *A Discourse on the Method* that everyone thinks that he has what is called “good sense,” which has come to be the equivalent of reason:

Good sense is the most evenly distributed thing in the world; for everyone believes himself to be so well provided with it that even those who are the hardest to please in every other way do not usually want more of it than they already have. Nor is it likely that everyone is wrong about this; rather, what this shows is that the power of judging correctly and of distinguishing the true from the false (which is what is properly called good sense or reason) is naturally equal in all men.\(^85\)

The question of the presence of “reason” in human subjectivity is not important for Descartes merely because he argues that, as it is the case, everyone is endowed with it. The real question, as later developed by Descartes in the same work, is that one should be aware of how he is to educate and employ his own reason. Man’s reason should be critical in self-overcoming and the resolving of doubts in order to arrive at truth. Reason, “the power of judging correctly and distinguishing the true from the false” was the most significant and spectacular feature of the Cartesian subject. Descartes argued for the distinguishing power of reason that was not observed in imagination and the five senses:

For after all, whether we are awake or asleep, we ought never to let ourselves be convinced except on the evidence of our reason. And it is to be noted that I say ‘our reason’, and not ‘our imagination’ or ‘our senses.’… for reason does not dictate us that what we see or imagine in this way is true. But it does certainly dictate that all our ideas or notions must have some foundations in truth.\(^86\)

Descartes’ frequent references to the significance and capabilities of reason and his emphasis on the role played by rationality in the establishment of a new framework of thought was, to a large extent, influential in the emergence of rationalism in the latter part of the seventeenth century. The certainty of the Cartesian subject is in parallel to its centrality. The cogito argument provides the rational ‘I’ of the proposition with a centralized position where it is viewed as the opposite of the emotional ‘I.’ The certainty and rationality of the Cartesian subject separate it from its emotions, illusions, doubts, and, as later discussed, body and nature. The ego of the Cartesian subject is thus consciously aware of itself and becomes a centred part of the subject; whatever in opposition to it is regarded as

\(^{85}\) René Descartes, *A Discourse on the Method*, p. 5.  
\(^{86}\) Ibid., p. 34.
supplementary and marginal. This is where the first example of the subject-object opposition emerges in Descartes.

The Cartesian subject required a state of certainty in order to resolve his doubts and arrive at truth. In mathematics, too, certainty is a fundamental principle that provides a basis for the other practices. This principle, followed in both mathematics and Descartes’ concept of man, endows the Cartesian subject with a ‘centred’ characteristic. The idea of the centrality of the Cartesian subject can be interpreted in two ways: first, the rational mind is the centre of the Cartesian subject, and, second, the Cartesian subject has a centralist tendency in its projects. Both, however, can also be seen in the context of Descartes’ affinity with humanism, according to which man became the centre.

The centrality of the Cartesian subject should be also viewed in relation to nature and other subjects. The Cartesian subject is centred and foregrounded in comparison to its surroundings. Whereas man was conceived of as the micro-cosmos in scholastic philosophy, it was the macro-cosmos itself in both humanism and Cartesian philosophy. The Cartesian conception of the subject did not consider it as the micro-cosmos subject; on the contrary, the subject was here provided with an autonomous and rational feature. Hence the idea of the subject as independent decision maker originality goes back to the centred position of both the reason, in opposition to emotions, and the rational subject, in contrast to nature.

Exploring the Cartesian subject’s character of certainty and centrality is instrumental in my later analysis of both Lacanian and Althusserian concepts of the subject in that they were both fundamentally critical of these characteristics of the subject. As I shall return to this in Chapters Four and Five, the Althusserian theory of the subject criticised the certainty of the subject in that it was not free and autonomous because of its ongoing subjection of/to ideology; also, the Lacanian perception of the subject deprived it of its certainty because of the inevitable consequences of the constant presence of the Other. Moreover, as I later demonstrate, the Althusserian concept of the subject considered it as de-centred when positioned in the levels and practices of the social formation; the Lacanian perception, too, approached the subject as de-centred in that it is not only subject to the Other but also to its own unconscious.
3.2.2 The Cartesian Subject Objectified:

Mind/Body Opposition and the Subject-Object Separation

The Cartesian subject, by which I mean not only the subject as manifested in Cartesian philosophy but also the modern subject that was characteristically Cartesian in view, was an anti-sceptical and truth seeking subject who attempted to understand all objects and phenomena by the power of his/her reasoning mind. Descartes emphasized the major role of the rational mind in arriving at truth throughout his entire philosophical career. What I want to demonstrate is that the Cartesian subject, considered as the knowing subject, transmitted to a stage of objectification caused by the mind/body opposition.

The knowing of the mind of the subject by the mind itself resulted in a double attitude towards the mind as both the subject and the object. By mind Descartes meant the reasoning mind, that which embodies the ‘intellect’. As it is observed in the above extracts from his works, Descartes believed that our mind might sometimes provide us with a false understanding of the world around us. For example, he argued that while we are asleep, we do not have true distinguishing reason. Moreover, he maintained that our true reasoning mind is not found in what we perceive by our senses.

In Descartes’ philosophy the body and mind were considered to be of two different essences. Accordingly, one should also differentiate between the mind and brain. The mind, in Cartesian philosophy, was attributed a characteristic that made it come close to soul. Descartes thus argued the distinguishable feature of mind:

> What else am I? … I am not the structure of limbs which is called a human body. I am not even some thin vapour which permeates the limbs – a wind, fire, air, breath, or whatever I depict in my imagination; … I know that I exist; the question is, what is this ‘I’ that I know? If the ‘I’ is understood strictly as we have been taking it, then it is quite certain that knowledge of it does not depend on things of whose existence I am as yet unaware… The mind must therefore be most carefully diverted from such things if it is to perceive its own nature as distinctly as possible.87

Whereas the significance of the reasoning mind is always repeated in Descartes’ works, he renounced the body of the subject, which, he believed, was the mind’s counterpart. Hence, the mind/body dualism is one of the conspicuous characteristics of Cartesian philosophy. Subsequently, the Cartesian subject is a mind-directed subject

87 René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, pp. 18-19. (Bolds mine)
that seems to neglect his body. The Cartesian subject relies on the power of his reasoning mind firmly and without any doubts common to the sceptics.

A major point here is that the Cartesian subject’s trust in his rational mind was in a way that he contemplated all aspects of his life by the help of the power of his reason. Descartes was so certain of both the necessity and truth of such a practice that he called man’s mind a “thinking thing.” He wrote:

At present, I am not admitting anything except what is necessarily true. I am, then, in the strict sense only a thing that thinks; that is, I am a mind, or intelligence, or intellect, or reason – words whose meaning I have been ignorant of until now. But for all that I am a thing which is real and which truly exists. But what kind of a thing? As I have just said – a thinking thing.  

Considering the mind as a “thinking thing” can be interpreted as Descartes’ method of, and contribution to, the idea of ‘objectifying the mind.’ By this phrase I mean two apparently distinct views on the mind: first, the mind is here considered as an object, a “thing,” and not an object of study. That is to say the mind is an object per se, a thing in itself. The immediate consequence of such a view is the concretization and materialization of the mind. On the other hand, as mentioned above the subject is thought of in Cartesian philosophy as nothing but “the mind, or intelligence, or intellect, or reason”. As a result, objectifying the mind virtually means objectifying the subject. In consequence, the subject is objectified in the philosophy of Descartes.

Secondly, objectifying the mind can also be interpreted as considering the mind as an object for study, something man wants to explore and ultimately take control of. The objectified subject thus means the subject that is objectified by his own rational mind. That is to say that the rational and thinking Cartesian subject takes control of not only his own body but also mind. The mind, as well as all the other objects around us, becomes the object of study in Cartesian philosophy.

My approach to the objectified mind of the Cartesian subject is distinguishable from other accounts of Descartes that have discussed the idea of objectivity in his philosophy. Descartes. For example, Hiram Caton, in his The Origin of Subjectivity: An Essay on Descartes (1973), has elaborated on the concept of objectivity in Cartesian philosophy based on Descartes’ theory of sensation. Dealing with the differences between the Aristotelian and Cartesian theories of vision, Caton points to Descartes’ attempts in

88 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, p. 18.
considering the mind as a machine. He believes that Descartes ultimately came up with a “mechanistic theory on sensation,” and his theory on vision led to “remarkable discoveries” that are all standardized in “contemporary physiological optics.”

Reviewing the present analysis of the Cartesian subject, one can come to the conclusion that Descartes’ knowledge of natural philosophy on one hand and his belief in the unshakeable foundations of mathematics on the other hand had inevitably coloured his views on subjectivity. The development of science, as Descartes called for, was a process in parallel to the development of man. The principles of the process of scientific development should be followed in the process of man’s development too. Presenting the project of Rules for the Direction of the Mind in 1628, Descartes attempted to establish a new set of rules for the development of science and the emergence of a new subject.

The Cartesian subject owns a rational and ‘ordered’ mind according to which he thinks, acts, and arrives at truth. As it is explicitly seen in the three maxims of A Discourse on the Method and the order of the rules in his Rules for the Direction of the Mind, the Cartesian subject is supposed to go through different ordered rules in order to grasp a scientific or philosophical truth. The Cartesian subject was supposed to follow and rely on mathematical principles, which include certainty, rationality, centrality, and order. The Cartesian subject was an objectified subject in that it was not only considered as a “thinking thing” but also was both taught and made to follow these principles.

Cartesian philosophy, in its emphasis on the rational and detached character of the mind, tends to consider it as an object, a thing. In addition, the mind/body dual pair presupposes a centred position for the mind and a marginal role for the body. The mind is to be examined by reason that constitutes the mind itself. The Cartesian subject, in its transformation into the object of knowing and through its emphasis on the centred position of the mind resulted in the establishment of the separation of the subject from the objects including both its body and the surroundings.

The subject-object separation, in parallel to other Cartesian binary oppositions that played a major role in the direction of modern philosophy, was one of the first consequences of the original mind/body dualism discussed above. The subject/object

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90 To create order out of chaos was a major characteristic of the Cartesian subject. Although some of early researches such E. M. W. Tillyard’s The Elizabethan World Picture maintained that there was already an order in the Renaissance, this idea was later criticized by the proponents of Cultural Materialism in Political Shakespeare: Essays in Cultural Materialism, Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield (ed.), 2nd ed., Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996. My analysis of the Cartesian subject does not consider Descartes’ philosophy as emerging out of order; it rather aimed at creating order.
split was fundamentally emphasized in Cartesian philosophy and it caused the subject to objectify its self by the rational mind.

The centred position of the Cartesian subject’s mind in comparison to both the body and nature considered them as material and inanimate. The subject/nature diversity in Descartes led to a complete the subject-object non-identity which ultimately made the subject the master and observer of nature. The subject-object separation in Descartes is in close affinity to his doctrine of the mind/body duality. Apart from this, this duality is also based on the distinction Descartes made between thought and extension. Whereas mind is what generates thoughts, body is considered in the realm of the physical extension. Dedicating the most part of the Fifth Meditation to an argument concerning the existence and attributes of God, he first demonstrated that ‘quantity’ was the essence of material things. He wrote:

I distinctly imagine the extension of the quantity (or rather the thing which is quantified) in length, breadth and depth. I also enumerate various parts of the thing, and to these parts I assign various sizes, shapes, positions and local motions; and to the motions I assign various durations.  

Thought/extension dualism was influential in that it ultimately led to a new relationship between man and nature. “The result of Descartes’ dualistic separation of mind and matter,” John Cottingham argues, “led to a twofold alienation of man from the natural world.” Nature was to undergo changes as a result of man’s alienation from it. Considering man as subject and nature as object of study for the rational mind of man resulted in man’s complete separation of nature, which was later to be manifested as man’s domination over nature. According to Descartes’ proposition in the last part of A Discourse on the Method human beings were supposed to become the “masters and possessors of nature”:

It is possible to attain knowledge which is useful in life, … it can be turned into a practice by which, knowing the power and action of fire, water, air, stars, the heavens, and all the other bodies that are around us as distinctly as we know the different trades of our craftsmen, we could put them to all the uses for which they are suited and thus make ourselves as it were the masters and possessors of nature.  

91 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, p. 44.
93 René Descartes, A Discourse on the Method, p. 51.
This relation between man and nature along the idea of centrality of man, discussed earlier in the present section, led to the emergence of a group of binary oppositions in the philosophy, literature, arts, and even politics of modernity. The characteristics of the Cartesian subject constituted the centred part of these binary oppositions. The phrase ‘rational self of the thinking man,’ which sums up all the major characteristics of the Cartesian subject, produced the following binary oppositions respectively: the subject/object, reason/emotion, self/other, thinking/imagining, centre/margin, and man/woman.

If we review the history of modernity, we will see that the first part of the above binary oppositions has been considered prior to the second part. The two parts of these Cartesian binary oppositions are ‘the other’ to each other not only in their designation but also because of the contradictory function each one conveys. One part of these dual pairs is always considered as the centred while the other one is conceived of as having a supplementary and marginal role. The centred part is the privileged while the marginal part is generally overlooked in ego-oriented philosophical positions.

Whereas contemporary theories of subjectivity follow Hegel in his emphasis on the role of the other in the rise of the self-consciousness of the subject, in Descartes it is the subject itself that is conceived as constructive of itself. The rational ego of the Cartesian subject, being the centre, defines and investigates the subject and its others including nature and other subjects. Thus, in Descartes, unlike what we observe in contemporary theory, it is the subject that determines the other. The Cartesian subject is autonomous, free, coherent, and decision maker. It is the cause and not the effect of the other.

Further establishment of these binary oppositions is better illustrated if we refer to the significance of Descartes’ concept of mankind that was highly influential in the development of modern philosophy and science. His contribution to most of the scientific fields was based on a new practice of mathematics, often called the Cartesian mathematics, in which a new logical method for arriving at truth was introduced. Likewise, the Cartesian philosophy was influential even in other areas such as linguistics. Analysing the influence of Descartes’ rationalist philosophy, Noam Chomsky writes in his *Cartesian Linguistics* (1966):

> It seems to me that there is a coherent and fruitful development of ideas and conclusions regarding the nature of language in association with a certain theory on
mind and that this development can be regarded as an outgrowth of the Cartesian revolution.94

The idea of the Cartesian subject was so influential in modernity that we can think of this proposition that all major characteristics of the Cartesian subject are those usually mentioned whenever we want to talk about the principles of modernity. The Cartesian subject was influential in modernity’s focus on centralisation, rationalism, logicality, order, and scientific development. More significantly, the Cartesian perception of subjectivity established and developed a number of binary oppositions in modern philosophy. What is interesting is that the hierarchy in the Cartesian binary oppositions remained the same for a long period of time until it was radically criticised by the critics of modernity.

The subject-object separation in Descartes gave birth to a number of challenging questions the most significant of which were posed by German Idealist tradition of philosophy. Whereas nature was completely objectified and controlled by the Cartesian subject and remained objectively external to it, in Hegel it is not only part of the subject’s consciousness but also that which determines its identity.

The objectification of the subject in Descartes is essentially distinguishable from the analysis of the subject in both Lacan and Althusser. Whereas Descartes contended that the subject could succeed in knowing and overcoming his mind as an object of study, I shall deal with the Althusserian and Lacanian considerations of the subject’s acts as determined and governed by ideology and the Other. The Cartesian treatment in this regard is also considered as positivistic and simplistic in that human subjectivity, as both Lacanian and Althusserian models suggest, is conceived of as constructed and functioning through a complicated process that I shall discuss later in the thesis.

Although the Cartesian concepts of mastery and progress were widely influential in later periods,95 the subject/nature relationship was reconsidered in Hegel and Romanticism. Whereas the subject is always considered to be in a state of non-identity with object, German Idealism approached the subject through its identity with object that was nature in its Romantic sense. Also, both Lacanian and Althusserian theories analysed the subject in an anti-Cartesian way through emphasizing the role of the Other and ideology respectively. Investigating key characteristics of the Cartesian subject

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discussed above is central to my thesis of bringing the Althusserian and Lacanian theories of subjectivity together in that they were, as I shall return to them in the coming chapters, highly critical of the Cartesian subject and radically reversed its standpoints and features.

3.3 The Hegelian Subject and Nature:

Romantic Subjectivity and the Subject-Object Identity

Hegel’s idea of the rise of self-consciousness in facing ‘the other’ has been commonly emphasized in discussing his influence on Lacan. However, the study of the subject-object relation in German Idealist philosophy also proves to be illuminating in evaluating the Lacanian perceptions of the subject. This study is also crucial in investigating the Althusserian theory of subjectivity that I shall analyse in my Hegelian reading of the Althusserian model of the ‘subject/Subject’ in the following chapter.

The Hegelian concept of the subject provided it with a feature of incompleteness. I shall return to this in Chapters Four and Five where I present an analysis of the ongoing identity of the subject in Althusser and Lacan respectively. The present account of the key points in the subject-object relation as conceived of in German Idealism plays a central role in moving into my coming analyses of both Lacanian and Althusserian notions of the subject’s identity. For example, the Lacanian reference to the lack in the subject’s identity, to be discussed in Chapter Five, can be further explored through the employment of the Hegelian idea of the internal dialectic within the subject’s identity; also, the limitations in the Althusserian theory of subjectivity, to be discussed in Chapter Four, will be removed when applying a Hegelian approach to the subject-nature non-identity.

This section consists of two sub-sections: first, a study of the subject-object relation in German Idealist philosophy is presented that concentrates on the analysis of the subject according to the role played by Nature in its Romantic sense. Secondly, demonstrating that the Hegelian perception of the subject-nature identity can be regarded as a theorization of Romantic subjectivity’s obsession with Nature, I seek to demonstrate that the Hegelian conception of the subject-nature non-identity provided the Hegelian subject with an incomplete identity, one that always undergoes an ongoing process of identity construction.

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96 As I shall demonstrate in Chapter Five, Hegel’s influence on Lacan was mostly through Alexandre Kojève’s emphasis on Hegel’s idea of the rise of the subject’s self-conscious in facing ‘the other’ in his reading of Phenomenology of Spirit.
3.3.1 Nature and the Subject-Object Identity in German Idealism

German Idealism offered a view of the subject that was in manifest opposition to its treatment in rationalism. Whereas the Cartesian subject followed a dualist vision that ultimately resulted in the subject-nature separation, German idealist philosophy, particularly in Schelling, Novalis, and Hegel, approached the subject based on its relation to and identity with Nature. What I want to demonstrate here is that the German Idealist philosophy, influenced by the Romantic conception of nature, ultimately approached the subject-object relation in the form of the subject-Nature identity. As it will be demonstrated in Chapter Five, the exploration of subjectivity in German Idealism provided the philosophical foundation of the Lacanian theory of the subject. Also, as I shall demonstrate in the following chapter, reading the Althusserian concept of the subject through this approach proves to be illuminating in removing the limitations in the Althusserian theory. Therefore, an investigation into Romantic subjectivity as theorised by Hegel is central in bringing the Lacanian and Althusserian theories together in that both can be examined and developed through the Hegelian concept of the subject.

German idealist philosophy shared with literary Romanticism similar features such as emphasizing the spiritual aspect of Nature and a criticism of pure rationalism. This proximity is particularly observable in the philosophy of both Schelling and Novalis. Schelling’s references to Schlegel, a Romantic poet, and Novalis’ lyrical poems are manifestly in parallel to the Romantic spirit of the period. As Frederick Beiser suggests, Hegel’s philosophy and his “basic values” will not be understood unless we see him as influenced by Romanticism. He goes further to claim that early German Romanticism provided the most elements for Hegel’s early ideals:

Hegel’s early ideals grew out of early German romanticism, the period sometimes called Fruhromantik. This intellectual movement flourished from 1797 to 1802 in Jena and Berlin … it is a mistake to treat Hegel as a figure apart, as if we can understand him without the romantics, or as if he were fundamentally opposed to them. This would be anachronistic for the early Hegel; but it would also be inaccurate about the later Hegel, who never entirely freed himself from romantic influence.97

Apart from this “romantic influence,” the idea of Nature proves to be central to Romantic movements in both literature and philosophy of the late eighteenth and early

nineteenth century. A major part of the subject-object relation in Romantic subjectivity originally goes back to the treatment of Nature as primal, spiritual, and inspirational in the literature and philosophy of the period. Romanticism provided the subject with a special relation to Nature that was in manifest contradiction with the Cartesian subject’s rationalist treatment that sharply separated the subject from the surrounding objects. On the contrary, Nature in its Romantic sense is conceived of as that which the subject moves towards in order to reach a state of unity.

Nature, as a major Romantic keyword, was conceived of in the literature and philosophy of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century as untameable and untouched by the rational intellect of the civilised man. Primal and powerful, Nature was not that observed in a city park and the garden of a palace; it was rather the original, not corrupted, and pure nature that stood against the artificial nature of the cities and domestic life. The elements of nature in its romantic sense were spiritual and inspirational. One can conveniently observe several references to the names of different geographical locations, old buildings now left in nature, flowers, clouds, the sea and rivers, and the birds in Romantic poetry. John Laughland thus refers to this designation of nature in Romanticism:

Romantics in Germany and England from Schlegel and Goethe to Keats and Wordsworth were notorious for communing with nature and having intimations of the sublime in the process. They admired in nature that sense of organic unity which, they felt, Enlightenment mechanism had stifled: they preferred apparently untamed English gardens to geometrical French ones – or, better still, a forest.98

German idealist philosophy, too, approached the subject-object identity with especial reference to the high significance of Nature in forming the subject’s identity. Schelling and Novalis, as discussed below, were obsessed with spiritual character of Nature and its inevitable influences on the subject.

The German Idealist critique of the subject began with a criticism of British empiricism and its perception of the subject. Kant’s idea of transcendental idealism was a departure from George Berkeley’s subjective idealism and, particularly, David Hume’s bundle theory. Objects in Hume’s theory merely consist of their properties and they are nothing more than collections of our sensual perceptions. Accordingly, Hume

considered the self as nothing but a unified collection of sensual perceptions functioning through similarity and causal relations.\textsuperscript{99}

Kant developed this doctrine when he emphasized a distinction between the things as they appear to an observer and the things in themselves. The basis of Kant’s transcendental idealism is the distinction between phenomenon, the thing as appearance, and noumenon, the thing in itself. “I call all knowledge transcendental,” Kant wrote in the introductory chapter of his \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} (1771), “which is occupied not so much with objects, as with our \textit{a priori} concepts of objects.”\textsuperscript{100} \textit{A priori} concepts of objects which are apprehended through human sensibility are transcendentally ideal while the objects outside this mode of cognition are things in themselves, what Kant called transcendentally real. Subsequently, the thinking subject in Descartes became the transcendental subject of thought in Kant, one that thinks through thoughts that are predicates. Later in the chapter on ‘The Transcendental Doctrine of Elements’ Kant wrote:

\begin{quote}
Objects are given to us through our sensibility. Sensibility alone supplies us with intuitions. These intuitions become thought through the understanding, and hence raise conceptions. All thought therefore must, directly or indirectly, go back to intuitions, i.e. to our sensibility, because in no other way can objects be given to us.\textsuperscript{101}
\end{quote}

Believing that our conceptions are originally based on the first ‘intuition’ we have of the objects, Kant goes further to consider space and time as “two purely forms of sensuous intuition.” They are neither things in themselves nor empirically mediated appearances. They are subjective preconditions of any object when conceived of as appearance and not as a thing in itself. Human consciousness deals with objects only when located in time and space and this is a necessary condition to cognize an object.

This transcendental trend of German Idealist philosophy was developed by Johann Fichte who sharply rejected the Kantian dualistic treatment of the subject and object. Criticising Kant’s pure and rigid distinction of noumenon and phenomenon, Fichte argued that there exists no noumenal world and, consequently, consciousness is not grounded in anything outside of itself. Hegel thus referred to Fichte’s thought: “The foundation of the Fichtean system is intellectual intuition pure thinking of itself, pure

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., p. 42.
self-consciousness, “I = I, I am.” The Absolute is Subject-Object, and the I is this identity of the subject and object.” Examining this statement under the light of both ordinary and empirical consciousness, Hegel proceeds to explore Fichte’s third’s axiom of his *Wissenschaftslehre*, “I posits in the I a separable not-I over against the separable I.” Hegel wrote:

In this synthesis, the objective I is not equivalent to the subjective I. The subjective is I, the objective is I + not-I, and the primordial identity does not present itself in this. The pure consciousness I = I and the empirical consciousness I = I + not-I, along with all the forms into which this is constructed, remains opposed.

The identity of the subject and object in Fichte in both its pure and empirical forms constituted the foundation of Schelling’s nature philosophy. Schelling sought to approach the subject-object identity through his elaborations on the object, which was for him nothing but nature. Emphasizing the role of nature in the subject construction, Schelling finally argued that the Fichtean distinction between subject and object (I and not-I) is a distinction that can be made only by and within subjectivity itself.

A good way to grasp Fichte and Schelling’s treatment of the subject-object relation is to refer to Hegel’s work on the differences between Fichte and Schelling’s philosophical systems. Hegel argued that the principle of identity was the absolute principle of Schelling’s entire system. Hegel believed that philosophy and system shall coincide and the absolute identity, while becoming the principle of an entire system, should posit both the subject and object as Subject-Object. As a result, the Schellingian conception of identity constitution considered it as a subjective Subject-Object, which in order to become complete needed an objective Subject-Object. As far as the subject-object relation is concerned, Hegel argues that one can find both concepts of separation and identity in any given the subject-object relation. However, one should not overlook the fact that, on one hand, abandoning separation is conditional and, on the other, identity is relative. Hegel thus stated:

The separation must be asserted just as much as identity is asserted. To the extent that the identity and the separation are opposed to one another, both are absolute; and if diremption is

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103 Ibid., p. 41.
negated, they remain opposed to one another...the Absolute itself is therefore the identity of identity and non-identity; op-positing and being-one are in it equally. 104

The German idealism’s consideration of nature in relation to Spirit and the divine found its climax in Schelling’s nature philosophy. For Schelling, nature and the spirit were like two sides of a coin; they were considered by him as the complementary parts of the whole: “Nature is visible Spirit; Spirit is invisible Nature.” This famous announcement in Schelling’s first book, *Ideen*, refers to Schelling’s later division of the Absolute into both Nature and Spirit. However, Schelling’s approach to Nature should be also observed in the context of the Romantic movement he was part of and through his belief in the Christian metaphysics he sought to reconcile with his nature philosophy. 105

Apart from Schelling’s critique of Fichte, there simultaneously appeared another critique of the latter’s notion of the subject-object identity by German mystic, poet and philosopher, Novalis (Georg von Hardenberg). A major figure of romanticism, Novalis significantly contributed to the idealist tradition of philosophy through his *Fichte-Studien* [Fichte Studies] (1802). He criticised Fichte’s perception of I as the subject-object and of consciousness as including both the subjective and objective I. In the fifth remarks on Fichte, Novalis asked: “Has not Fichte too arbitrarily packed everything into the I? ... Can I posit itself as I, without another I or Not-I -/How are I and Not-I opposable?” 106 Mentioning that there has to be a Not-I for the I’s act of positing I as I, Novalis wrote:

“The act by which the I posits itself as I must be connected with the antithesis of an independent Not-I and of the relationship to a sphere that encompasses them – this sphere can be called God, and I.” 107

Novalis thus expresses his idea of the existence of an independent Not-I, one that is not only entirely outside I but also determining it through the sphere it inevitably causes along with I. Novalis’ emphasis of the divinity of nature makes him further distinct from Fichte and closer to Schelling. In addition, unlike Fichte, he believed that art was

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104 Ibid., p. 73
105 Schelling’s essay *Philosophy and Religion* (1804), part of the idealists’ attempts to reconcile religion and philosophy, provides ingenious thoughts into this problem. Also See John Laughland, *Schelling versus Hegel: From German Idealism to Christian Metaphysics*, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007, pp. 56-60.
107 Ibid.
superior to philosophy and it was only the poetic imagination that could explore the realm of the absolute. Hence, a major point of criticism in Novalis’ reading of Fichte is the significant position he gives to feeling. Although Fichte, too, agreed that feeling marked the limits of all philosophy and it was undeducible, Novalis argued that feeling exists in self-consciousness itself. It means that we cannot think of feeling without presupposing it.\textsuperscript{108}

Novalis’ concept of nature should be considered in parallel to Schelling’s nature philosophy. Novalis presented a new approach to nature that was different from both Fichte and Schelling’s conception of it. Whereas nature in Schelling had been “treated as a self-sufficient realm,” Novalis argued that nature was not a self-sufficient whole. In Novalis nature was nothing but “an emanation of the divine.”\textsuperscript{109} Although this approach is manifestly under the influence of the pantheist tradition of late eighteenth century, it is distinguishable from it in that Novalis made a distinction between the natural and the divine. Originally descended from Neo-Platonic philosophy and later developed in Islamic mysticism, pantheism was concerned with the idea that the divine exists in nature. Pantheism, in its highly developed form, believes in the unity of the Creator, God, and the Created, that is either nature or mankind. This complete identity of the subject-nature and the subject-spirit is what is referred to in the Hegelian perception of the subject-object full identity as the Absolute.

3.3.2 The Hegelian Subject and Incomplete Subject-Nature Identity

The Hegelian idea of the subject can be considered as a major attempt in the theorization of Romantic subjectivity, also explored in the post-Kantian tradition of German Idealist philosophy. Briefly demonstrating the affinity between Hegel’s philosophy and Romantic ideals, this section argues that the subject-object identity in Hegel, which was ultimately manifested for him in the form of the subject-Nature non-identity, provided the subject’s identity with a feature of incompleteness. Although Hegel’s philosophical system has been referred to as a major influence on Lacan as far as the significance of ‘the other’ in the rise of self-consciousness is concerned, I will concentrate here on how his notion of the subject-object identity can be also regarded as illuminating in a further investigation of the subject’s identity.

Hegel’s profound responses to his contemporary ‘spirit of the age’ can be argued to be in parallel to the Romantic ideal of freedom. Highly influenced by the French

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., p. 67.
Revolution, Hegel founded a major part of his philosophical system based on his contemplations on the Romantic ‘spirit’ after the Revolution. As far as the question of the relation of freedom to the French Revolution is concerned, Hegel believes that the Revolution was the phase in which the subject realised himself because he was then self-conscious of his freedom. Going back to the role played by Martin Luther in the realization of freedom, Hegel considered the Reformation as one of the major phases in the history of the west. Reformation was the freedom from the authority of the Church and the late eighteenth-century struggle for freedom had its origins in the Reformation. Hegel thus wrote of the significant role of the Reformation in the freedom of the spirit:

Each has to accomplish the work of reconciliation on his own self. With this, is unfurled the new, the last standard around which the peoples rally—the banner of free spirit … Time, since has had, and has now, no other work to do than the imbuining of the world with this principle … This is the essential content of the Reformation: man is destined through himself to be free.\(^\text{110}\)

Hegel’s focus on the Reformation was not merely because of its relation to the freedom of the spirit but to the role it played as an antithesis to ancient Greece, taken by Hegel as the thesis. The French Revolution, which was, in Hegel’s idea, the consequent synthesis of the two, regarded freedom as its central ideal.

Furthermore, Hegel’s view of art is indicative of the parallel lines of his philosophy to its contemporary Romanticism. Although Hegel also dealt with different manifestations of ‘the work of art’ towards the end of *Phenomenology of Spirit*, his significant work in art criticism is *Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics*. Refusing the “false position … that art has to serve as a means for moral ends,” Hegel believed that a work of art should not be regarded merely as an instrument in the realisation of an end. This definition includes whatever end is presupposed for a work of art. Thus against such perception of art he wrote:

It is necessary to maintain that art has the vocation of revealing the truth in the form of sensuous artistic shape … and, therefore, has its purpose in itself, in this representation and revelation. For other objects, such as instruction, purification, improvement, pecuniary gain,

endeavour after fame and honour, have nothing to do with the work of art as such, and do not determine its conception.\textsuperscript{111}

Art is not considered as a means for expressing the truth. It is the end in-itself; that is to say that art is itself a mode of truth. Hegel’s notion of art reminds us of Keats’s definition of beauty in his “Ode on a Grecian Urn” where beauty is regarded as the truth.\textsuperscript{112}

As far as the Hegelian treatment of the subject-object identity is concerned, one should notice that it was under the influence of Schelling who was not only a major philosopher in German Idealist tradition but also involved in the Romantic movement in art and literature. As discussed above, Schelling tended to approach the subject-object relation based on the determining feature of nature. Hegel’s ultimate estimate of the possibility of the subject-object identity was also influenced by the spiritual power of nature represented in the pantheist principle of Romanticism. Whereas pantheism was concerned with a state of complete unification between God and Nature and, also, Nature and the subject, German ‘absolute idealism’ movement believed in oneness of the opposing elements. The I/Not-I identity in Fichte, the subject/nature identity in Schelling, and the divine/the natural identity in Novalis all happened to be posited in the realm of the absolute.

The Hegelian concept of the Absolute brings together the subject and object in an identical sense. The subject-object identity, if we think of the object as nature and of the subject as human being, is possible only in the realm of the absolute. Although Hegel talked of the existence of a state in which there might be a subject-object identity, he also argued that this state, only if identical with its opposite that is subject-object non-identity, could constitute part of the realm of the absolute. The subject was able to experience this state only if there was also a non-identity at work. In other words, there is no single complete manifestation of the subject-object identity in that it is, even in the realm of the absolute, accompanied with the subject-object separation.

The object in these formulations was considered to be Nature, which included, apart from the Kantian concepts of space and time, a spiritual aspect maintained by Schelling and Novalis. Hegel’s obsession with the spiritual aspect of Nature was influenced by Schelling’s nature philosophy. Subsequently, Hegel dedicated the second part of his


Reading Hegel’s notion of the Philosophy of Nature, we come to this conclusion that his discussions of nature are philosophical elaborations on the same doctrines one may come across in religion. Hegel’s philosophy of nature is a philosophical contemplation on the common saying “nature is the manifestation of God.” The spiritual power assigned to nature by Hegel refers to his evaluation of nature as a scene where the “Spirit,” or, according to religion, “God,” is manifested:

If God is all-sufficient and lacks nothing, why does He disclose Himself in a sheer Other of Himself? … The Philosophy of Nature itself belongs to this path of return; for it is that which overcomes the division between Nature and Spirit and assures to Spirit the knowledge of its essence in Nature.\(^\text{113}\)

Hegel’s philosophy of nature is not only a theorization of the Romantic notion of nature but also an explanation of the pantheist view towards nature. Hegel believed that religion and philosophy are similar to each other because the subject matter of the two is God, the Absolute Spirit. Nature, for Hegel, is the realm where the Absolute Spirit dwells. Investigating the characteristics of the Spirit, Hegel stated that the Spirit “shapes itself to the forms of Nature.” He wrote:

In the immediate, first diremption of self-knowing absolute Spirit its ‘shape’ has the determination which belongs to immediate consciousness or to sense-certainty. Spirit beholds itself in the form of being, though not of the non-spiritual being that is filled with the contingent determination of sensation…the difference which it gives itself does, it is true, proliferate unchecked in the substance of existence and shapes itself to the forms of Nature.\(^\text{114}\)

The Spirit gives shape to itself in the form of Nature. Also, Nature becomes spiritual because of the presence of the Spirit. It should be mentioned that the term spiritual, besides its common designation in spiritualism, also means that which is in relation to the spirit. Hence, the Hegelian perception of the subject relates it to the spiritual in two senses: first, the subject is spiritual because of the Romantics’ concern with spiritualism

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that included concepts of freedom, purity, and innocence; also, most significantly, the subject is spiritual because of the determination of its identity by the Spirit.

The significance of Nature in Hegel’s notion of the subject-object identity is directly related to his idea of negativity in self-consciousness. The awareness of the self arises from the awareness of two modes of negativity: the negation of another object and of the objective mode of self-consciousness itself. Hegel wrote:

The presentation of itself, however, in the pure abstraction of self-consciousness consists in showing itself as the pure negation of its objective mode, or in showing that it is not attached to any specific existence.¹¹⁵

As for the negation of the object, Hegel believed that self-consciousness “exists only if being acknowledged.”¹¹⁶ In other words, self-consciousness negates the object in its self-affirmation. However, “if its [self-consciousness’s] self-affirmation demands the negation of the object, Quentin Lauer writes, “then the object must negate itself.”¹¹⁷ The only kind of object which can negate itself is another consciousness. Therefore, self-consciousness in affirming itself should be related only to another consciousness. This can be considered as the emergence of alienation in the process of the construction of subject’s identity.

Nature is not negatively related to the subject in that its consciousness, particularly when conceived of as the Spirit, is unknown and absent to the subject. Nature is not only negated but also always present to the subject. However, although nature is not negated, the subject cannot be in identity with it either. Hegel believed that no subject could enjoy the state of complete unification with nature as the absolute. The subject-object identity is possible only in the realm of the absolute. Hence, there always remains a gap between the subject and nature albeit the intense spiritual correspondence between Man and Nature in Romanticism.

The subject is thus left with a lack of that identity. Hegel’s notion of the subject-nature non-identity provided his conception of the subject with two lacks: the lack of a complete state of unity with nature and the lack caused by the gap between it and nature. These two manifestations of lack provided the Hegelian concept of the subject with an incomplete character.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p.113.
¹¹⁶ Ibid., p.111.
The frequent and intense representation of nature in Romantic literature demonstrates the subject’s unconscious desire to reach a state of unity with nature caused by the subject-nature non-identity. However, the subject never can be in a state of full identity with nature and this is what causes the ongoing function of the desire for unity. The subject functions through, and is based on, these two modes of lack in its identity. The first lack is what the subject desires to ultimately arrive at, and the second is what makes the subject desire. However, as I shall refer to in my discussion of Lacan, the desire of unity is never fulfilled by the subject, and desire, thus, continues to be.

The Hegelian concept of the subject roves to be central to the exploration of the Althusserian and Lacanian theories of subjectivity in that both argue for the incomplete nature of the subject’s identity. Lacan has also been interested in the lack the subject’s identity is constructed over. As I shall later demonstrate, Lacan explored the problem through emphasizing the negativity of language. However, as for Althusser, his anti-Hegelianism caused a limitation for his theory in that he overlooked the function of this lack in the ongoing subjection of the subject by ideology. Also, the alienation of the subject because of the determining role of the other in Hegel shall be further examined in my analysis of the Lacanian concepts of imaginary and linguistic alienations later in the thesis.

3.4 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has discussed the major features of the Cartesian and Hegelian conceptions of the subject with emphasis on the subject-object relation in both rationalism and romanticism. Considering the Cartesian subject as an objectified subject, I explored the certainty and centrality of Descartes’ rationalist treatment of the subject. The mind/body dualism in Descartes resulted in the construction of a number of modern binary opposition such as the subject/nature, the subject/object, and centre/margin. The subject-object separation as well as the superiority and centrality of the subject established the hierarchy of these binary oppositions in a way that the first part of them was considered to be superior to the ‘other.’

On the other hand, the Hegelian perception of the subject is based on the treatment of the subject-Nature identity in German Idealist philosophy. Romantic subjectivity was explored in German Idealist philosophy through references to the inspirational and spiritual character of Nature. I also demonstrated the way Schelling and Novalis’ nature philosophy were in congruity to the pantheist principle of Romanticism.
In Hegel, however, the subject-object identity ultimately became the subject-nature non-identity. This non-identity with nature causes two lacks in the subject’s identity that are the lack of a state of complete subject-nature identity and the lack caused by the gap between the subject and nature. Also, the construction of the subject based on the other resulted in the alienation of the subject that was later further investigated in the Lacanian concepts of imaginary and linguistic alienations. The Hegelian subject was thus provided with a feature of incompleteness because of these lacks and the consequent alienation.

As I shall outline later in the thesis, both Lacanian and Althusserian concepts of the subject radically criticised the humanist designations of the Cartesian subject’s characteristic features of certainty and centrality that resulted in the consideration of the subject as free and autonomous. I shall also demonstrate that the exploration of the subject in the identity philosophy of German idealism provided a philosophical background for the Lacanian notion of the subject-language identity. This approach can be also employed if we analyse the Althusserian model of the subject/Subject according to the Hegelian notion of the subject-Nature identity. Furthermore, the incompleteness of the subject in both Lacanian and Althusserian accounts of the term can be further understood through the lack that is an essential feature of the Hegelian subject.
Chapter Four:
The Subject of Ideology:
Materialization of Ideology and the ‘subject/Subject’ Non-Identity

4.1 Introduction
The present chapter, while examining the Althusserian reading of modern subjectivity and considering it as a theory on ‘the subject of ideology,’ seeks to explore the close affinity of the concept of ‘the structure’ with ideology. Addressing the process of the materialization of ideology, this chapter re-examines the Althusserian model of the ‘subject/Subject’ based on the condition of non-identity between them. Identifying a theoretical problem in the Althusserian ‘the subject/the Subject’ model, this chapter thus argues that a Hegelian reading of this theory provides further investigation into the problem of the non-identity of the subject and the Subject in the Althusserian model.

Althusser’s academic influence reached its zenith in the 1960s and 1970s. In the past two decades, however, Althusser’s theoretical works have diminished in popularity and influence in most fields of academic debate. As Fredric Jameson mentions in the introduction to a recent edition of Althusser’s *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (1970) [2001], “the Althusser we reread today is no longer the centre of those heated polemics and ideological battles that characterized the Marxisms of the 1960s and 1970s.” Both the fortunes and misfortunes of Althusser’s thought should be considered in the context of the specific version of Marxism he sought to theorize: Structuralist Marxism. As I shall demonstrate in this chapter, his redefinition of the concept of ideology was based on a model that had close affinity with the structuralist wave of the middle part of the twentieth century in France.

The sections of the present chapter cover the following: first, I will outline Althusser’s conception of ‘the structure’ as a central theme in structuralist Marxism. This section is vital to the thesis in that it is in parallel to my discussion of Lacan’s structuralist approach to the analysis of the unconscious that will be presented in the next chapter. Secondly, studying Althusser’s efforts in redefining the concept of ideology, the chapter seeks to examine his viewpoints on the way the State, through its ideological apparatuses, constructs the subjects of/to ideology. Then, an exploration of

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the Althusserian theory of ‘the subject of ideology’ is presented, which is in parallel to the Lacanian theory of ‘the subject of language.’

Moreover, I shall explore the Althusserian concept of ideological interpellation in this chapter since I will attempt to draw it into dialogue with the Lacanian concept of linguistic alienation in the following chapter. Finally, a Hegelian analysis of the Althusserian model of the ‘subject/Subject’ is presented that seeks to further investigate the impossibility of the transition of the subject into the Subject. A Hegelian reading of Althusser is of high importance to the present thesis in that it could be regarded as a step in approaching the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic.

4.2 Structuralist Marxism and the Althusserian Concept of ‘the Structure’

Althusser dedicated a major part of his work to rejecting the early ‘Humanist’ Marx. His reading of Marxism was thus dominated by an analysis of Marx’s mature works. The reading Althusser provided, however, included a model that had similarities with the structural model of the nature and mechanism of system as a structuralistic concept. Although major developments had already happened within Marxism by, for instance, the radical reworking of Marxism by members of the Frankfurt School, it was Althusser who successfully introduced a more sustained version of what is now called structuralist Marxism.

A notable study that has minutely analysed the structuralistic characteristic of Althusser’s work is Miriam Glucksmann’s *Structuralist Analysis in Contemporary Social Thought: a Comparison of the Theories of Claude Levi-Strauss and Louis Althusser* (1974). If the work of Claude Levi-Strauss is to be taken as a touchstone for a structuralist study, Althusserian Marxism is structuralist in that it includes resemblances to Levi-Strauss’s. Analyzing different cultural phenomena including mythology, kinship between the members of a community, and serving rituals in different cultures, Levi-Strauss argued that culture is a self-contained system of signification the constituent parts of it are in direct relationship with each other. This approach to culture has analogies with the structuralist consideration of language that regards it as a self-referential and self-reflective system. Glucksmann has pointed to similarities treatments between the theoretical views of Levi-Strauss and those of Althusser. However, as

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Glucksmann argues, the works of these two social thinkers are different from each other as far as their account of history and the structure of thought is concerned.\(^{120}\)

Althusser’s structural approach to Marxism was one of the most disputed discussions for the New Left thinkers of the 1960s. The main conflict centred on Althusser’s call for a re-reading of Marx based on the differences between two major phases in Marx’s oeuvre. This new interpretive reading, Althusser maintained, would free Marxism from not only its idealist origins but also from political dogmatism and humanistic interpretations. Accordingly, a major aspect of his work should be seen as an attempt to reject any Hegelian influence in Marx. Althusser sought to provide Marxism with a truly ‘scientific’ basis. It was Althusser’s interpretation of this aspect of Marxism that made him a forerunner of Marxist thought. As Simon Clarke argues, Althusserian interpretation became so dominant that it was no longer considered as an interpretation of Marxism and but as Marxism itself:

At the time, it seemed that Althusserianism was merely a passing phase, a stop on the way to Marx himself. However the Althusserian enthusiasm has lasted just long enough to leave a generation who had come to read Marx through Althusser, to Substitute For Marx for Marx, Reading Capital for Capital.\(^{121}\)

Marxism, in an Althusserian sense, was regarded as science and not as ideology. He believed that historical materialism was a science of history. He demonstrated that Marx’s thought had been fundamentally misunderstood in this regard. Althusser’s reading of Capital, Marx’s most important work according to Althusser, gave birth to a number of structuralist readings and redefinitions of the concepts generally used in Marxism. The first English translation of Reading Capital (1965) [1970] included essays by Althusser and his student, Étienne Balibar. This work is an inventive re-reading of Marx’s most influential work. Althusser argued that Capital was the outcome of Marx’s mature thought that was markedly different from that of young ideological Marx. Marxism was not for Althusser an ideology or world-view but a revolutionary science, ultimately the science of society. Althusser believed in Marxist philosophy as one the three major scientific revolutions human beings have ever achieved; in the introduction to the English translation of For Marx (1965) [1969] he wrote:


I should add that, just as the foundation of mathematics by Thales ‘induced’ the birth of the Platonic philosophy, just as the foundation of physics by Galileo ‘induced’ the birth of Cartesian philosophy, etc., so the foundation of the science of history by Marx has ‘induced’ the birth of a new, theoretically and practically revolutionary philosophy, Marxist philosophy or dialectical materialism.¹²²

Althusser’s Marx was not influenced by Hegel and Feuerbach. Likewise, Marx, for Althusser, was not a philosopher in the tradition of German Idealism. The mature Marx, as Althusser argued, came out of an epistemological break that happened for Marx in 1844-5 when he was writing his *The German Idealism*, a work that critically investigated the works of the young Hegelians, and the nature and outcomes of the long philosophical tradition of German Idealism. Therefore, Althusser’s Marxism was not in parallel to the dominant trends of Marxism of the first half of the twentieth century. These trends were vulgar Marxism, which included a number of young revolutionary poets, writers, critics, and intellectuals, and the orthodox tradition in Marxist philosophy. The “orthodox” tradition, as Ted Benton demonstrates in *The Rise and Fall of Structural Marxism: Althusser and His Influence* (1984), allowed only three basic options for philosophy that were:

- first, to take Marx and Engels in the *German Ideology* at their word, and abandon philosophy in favour of the science of history. A second alternative, given that historical materialism presents itself as science, is to abstract from the great scientific works of the tradition, especially *Capital*, their distinctive logic and methodology … third, to continue the tradition established in Engels’s later work on philosophy and the natural sciences.¹²³

One of the reasons behind Althusser’s distance from the “orthodox” tradition and intellectual discourses of the 1970s goes back to the publication of a number of books that severely criticized him. The argument common to some of these books was that Althusser had violated the main ideas in classical Marxism and had led it towards a new direction that was different from its origins. A good example of these critiques is E.P. Thompson’s *Poverty of Theory and Other Essays* (1978). Thompson sought to argue for the following propositions:

1) Althusser's epistemology is derivative from a limited kind of academic learning-process, and has no general validity; 2) As a result he has no category (or way of handling) ‘experience’ (or social being's impingement upon social consciousness); ... 3) In particular he confuses the necessary empirical dialogue with empiricism, and consistently misrepresents (in the most naive ways) the practice of historical materialism (including Marx's own practice); 4) The resultant critique of ‘historicism’ is at certain points identical to the specifically anti-Marxist critique of historicism... 124

Thompson thus recalled for the significance of ‘socialist humanism,’ ‘historicism,’ ‘empiricism,’ and ‘moralism’ as followed in classical Marxism. Later he proceeded to demonstrate that the Althusserian model was nothing less than the wildest form of idealism. Thompson believed that Althusser’s project was an effort to make the Communist Parties protected from the criticism which was coming from libertarian communists. Althusser, Thompson argued, ignored Marx’s concepts of alienation and reification and, therefore, attempted to reconstruct Marxist science as a philosophy of structures. Correspondingly, as for Althusser’s structuralist approach, he wrote that “Althusser’s structuralism, like all structuralisms, is a system of closure.” 125

Thompson’s book, though offering new insights and considered as one of the notable critical readings of the Althusserian views, criticised Althusser’s emphasis on the theoretical practice and his academic treatment of Marxism. Thompson stated that Althusser enjoyed a high popularity only because of the elitism peculiar to the leftist middle class intelligentsia. “Isolated within intellectual enclaves,” Thompson wrote, “the drama of ‘theoretical practice’ may become a substitute for more difficult practical engagements.” 126 Moreover, Althusserianism, as Thompson argued, was entirely compatible with recognition and promotion in the world of the colleges and universities. He wrote: “it allows the aspirant academic to engage in a harmless revolutionary psycho-drama, while at the same time pursuing a reputable and conventional intellectual career.” 127 Thompson’s view here was obviously a reductionist evaluation of Althusser’s theoretical works. Althusser’s structuralist Marxism challenged this orthodoxy by arguing for Marx’s scientific achievement and investigating into the epistemological break in Marx’s thought.

Dealing with the epistemological break in Marx’s thought in several essays, Althusser specifically explored this break in “On the Young Marx” (1960), “Elements of Self-

125 Ibid., p. 98.
126 Ibid., pp. 376-7.
127 Ibid., p. 378.
Criticism” (1974), and “On the Evolution of the Young Marx” (1974). However, he had already paved the ground for the emergence of these positions in *Reading Capital* (1965). In *Reading Capital*, Althusser differentiated Marx and Hegel concerning their attitude towards dialectics. It was in *Reading Capital* that Althusser, for the first time, criticized the common misunderstanding that had regarded Marxism as a kind of historicism. Correspondingly later on, while separating the thought of mature Marx from Feuerbach, he wrote: “between the *1844 Manuscripts* and the Mature Works Marx discovered his definitive terminology.” Also, in “Elements of Self-Criticism” (1974) he explored “The ‘Break’” he had recognized in the process of development of Marx’s thought: “[W]ith *The German Ideology,*” Althusser argued, “something new and unprecedented appears in Marx’s work, something which will never disappear.”

Although the major subject of this essay was to criticize Marx’s own ideas regarding the relation between two breaks, the break in Marx’s thought and Marx’s break from bourgeois ideology, Althusser still had belief in the magnificent outcome of the epistemological break in Marx’s thought while revising a number of his early propositions.

The “epistemological break” in Marx happened while he was transforming his early intellectual framework of thought to a mature theory. Mature Marx, in Althusser’s view, worked on what was significant for a truly Marxist philosophy: dialectical materialism. Althusser borrowed the concept of the epistemological break from Gaston Bachelard, the philosopher of science. Bachelard introduced this concept in his *La Formation du l’esprit scientifique* (1967), by which he meant a shift from non/pre-scientific ideas to the scientific. Using a number of other terms in the works of Gaston Bachelard underpins Althusser’s ‘scientific’ method in arguing for the differences between the mature and scientific Marx as opposed to the young and ideological Marx. Discussing “Marx’s scientific discovery” in his latter essay “On the Evolution of the Young Marx” (1974), Althusser again referred to his dichotomy of “scientific” and “ideological.” He presented the conclusion of his thesis on the epistemological break in Marxism in this

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130 What was still unsolved for him was the relation between the break in Marx’s thought and Marx’s break from bourgeois ideology. Criticizing himself in “Elements of Self-Criticism” (1974), Althusser evidently rejected the logic behind the first propositions he had made regarding the relation between these two breaks in this way: “Thus in fact I reduced the break between Marxism and bourgeois ideology to the “epistemological break”, and the antagonism between Marxism and bourgeois ideology to the antagonism between science and ideology.” Ibid., p. 123.
way: “the appearance of a scientific theory of History in a domain hitherto occupied by conceptions which I called ideological.”

Another part of Althusser’s critical exploration of classical Marxism included his rejection of the simplistic belief in a strict economic determinism. The determining role of the economic was one of the most familiar theses in classical Marxism according to which it was the economic mode of production, the base, which determined both law and ideology, the superstructure. Marx’s well-known argument regarding the economic mode of production clearly implies the marginalization of other elements:

The specific form, in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of direct producers, determines the relationship of rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of production itself and, in turn, reacts upon it as a determining element … it is always the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers – a relation always naturally corresponding to a definite stage in the development of the methods of labour and thereby its social productivity – which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structural, and with it the political form of the relation of sovereignty and dependence, in short, the corresponding specific form of the state.

Marx places most emphasis on the role played by the economic mode of production in determining the “specific form of the state.” It is the “hidden basis of the entire social structural.” This thesis suffers from a one-dimensional determinism that neglects all other elements involved in the social formation. Engels soon recognized the weakness of this argument in that it might be considered as an example of absolutism in Marx’s framework of thought. Subsequently, he tried to defend Marx against this criticism in those letters he wrote after the death of Marx. In one of his letters Engels considered “the various elements of the superstructure” to be determining:

The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure: political forms of the class struggle and its results, to wit, constitutions, established by the victorious class after a successful battle, etc; juridical forms, and then even the reflexes of all these actual struggles in the brains of the participants, political, juristic, philosophical theories, religious views and their further development into systems of dogmas, also exercise their

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131 Ibid., p. 153.
influence upon the course of the historical and in many cases preponderate in determining their form.\textsuperscript{133}

Although Engels did his best to remove this theoretical inadequacy from Marxism, economic determinism had been already established as one of the characteristic features of Marxism. In fact, it was Marx’s argument in \emph{Capital} that was the core of attention for both traditional Marxists and their critics. Althusser, too, criticized this classical Marxist view that called for a one-to-one relationship between economy, on one hand, and ideology and political system, on the other. Rejecting the simple cause and effect relationship between them, Althusser presented a more complex model to show the relationship between these components.

Althusser’s argument looked at each one of these components, later called by him ‘practices,’ as relatively autonomous. The concept of “relative autonomy” was Althusser’s solution for this classical Marxism problem. He believed each practice in social formation enjoys a relative autonomy and is relatively independent from other practices. He expanded his views on the condition of the “practices” in his “On the Materialist Dialectic” (1963). This essay, later included in \emph{For Marx} (1965), is one of the highlights in Althusser’s critical study of Marxist philosophy. Althusser dedicated the first part of the essay to “Practical Solution and Theoretical Problem” where he defined what he meant by ‘practice:’ “any process of \emph{transformation} of a determinate given raw material into a determinate \emph{product}, a transformation effected by a determinate human labour, using determinate means (of ‘production’).”\textsuperscript{134} In addition, he regarded ‘theory’ as “a \emph{specific form of practice}, itself belonging to the complex unity of ‘social practice’ of a determinate human society.”\textsuperscript{135} Althusser thus added a new practice, theory, to the classic three practices, economics, politics, and ideology.

This argument had three results: providing a new rationale for Althusser’s high evaluation of Marx’s “Theoretical Revolution,” emphasizing the role played by theory as a practice in the social formation, and, accordingly, providing Marxism with a theoretical character and not with, for example, a political revolution. Althusser was, in consequence, criticized by traditional Marxists; they believed Althusser had violated the real path of Marxism that was supposed to lead to a universal proletarian revolution and not a theoretical practice.


\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., p. 167.
Althusserian structuralist Marxism was concerned with the role and interrelationship of the practices in what he referred to later in the same essay as “structure in dominance.”136 ‘Structure’ is Althusser’s term for the classical Marxist concept of the ‘base.’ All other practices are, in Althusser’s view, part of the superstructure. Therefore, Althusser, instead of remaining loyal to the classical Marxist terms of base and superstructure, referred to them as structure and superstructure. He explained this by identifying economics, politics, and ideology as three ‘levels’ of practice. Whereas the structure includes the first level of practice, which is the economic mode of production, the superstructure consists of a vast number of levels of practice, the Law and ideology being only two of them. There is no strict base/superstructure correspondence any longer because the structure is determined and regulated by both the structure itself and the other practices. Correspondingly, each one of the practices has a relative autonomy and can be either determinant or determined. The economic practice, therefore, determined the structure and was determined by it. However, the structure was, in the last instance, the determinant.

Each practice, as a part of social formation, influences and is influenced by social formation as a whole. Then, social formation, in turn, influences not only the same practice and contradiction but also other practices and contradictions. All this functions in a “structured unity” and not in what classical Marxism regarded as an object. Althusser writes:

That one contradiction dominates the others presupposes that the complexity in which it features is a structured unity, and that this structure implies the indicated domination-subordination relations between the contradictions. For the domination of one contradiction over the others cannot, in Marxism, be the result of a contingent distribution of different contradictions in a collection that is regarded as an object.137

What happens to a contradiction within the structured unity determines the pattern of dominance and subordination of all contradictions because social formation has a structured character. In order to demonstrate the relations between the contradictions in the social formation’s structure in dominance, Althusser made use of the Freudian concept of ‘overdeterminism.’ Freud exploited the term to explain his idea of the representation of the dream-thoughts in images through two psychic mechanisms, condensation and displacement. Althusser, on the other hand, wanted to show the

136 Ibid., 200. 
137 Ibid., p. 201.
complex nature of the relation of the practices to each other and to the structure in dominance. He used this term to show the effects of the contradictions in each practice on the social formation: “the reflection in contradiction itself of its conditions of existence, that is, of its situation in the structure in dominance of the complex whole.”

One of the implied meanings of overdeterminism is that all effects in the complex whole arise from several causes. This concept thus rejects the old one-to-one casual relationship between base and superstructure. There are, Althusser maintains, a number of contradictions in all practices that are overdetermined in the sense that each one of them effects and is affected by both the structure in dominance and other practices of the complex whole. Overdetermination, for this reason, was used by Althusser to show his critical reading of Marx’s thesis of economic determinism; it also shows Althusser’s structuralist method of discussing the complex relationships of the practices of social formation, which was accordingly called by Althusser ‘the complex whole.’

Moreover, Althusser was a structuralist in that he approached what he called the complex whole not only as a structured unity but also as determined by its structure in dominance. The object of study, in structuralism, is regarded as a system, and it is the structure of the system, the difference and relation between its units, which is analyzed. To investigate the relations and differences between the units of a system is the task of the structuralist critic. Thus Althusser argued for a structural relationship between the contradictions in each practice. More importantly, the economic mode of the production in classical Marxism was, for Althusser, the structure that is always determining at the last instance. This is the theory in which Marxism and structuralism meet.

Although Althusser always responded critically to those views that considered him a structuralist, his version of Marxism, as I have demonstrated, is structuralist. Furthermore, Althusser comes closer to structuralism as far as his anti-humanist account of Marxism is concerned. Althusser’s re-reading of Marx demonstrated that Marxism was deeply anti-humanist in its definition of the subject. Although I will discuss Althusserian Marxism’s anti-humanist idea of the subject later in this study, it would suffice now to say that whereas the human being was at the centre of attention for humanism, in Marxism it was the social formation that was regarded as a whole and not the subject. Similarly, while the humanist tradition dealt with and believed in the freedom of humans, Marxism held the argument that being human is itself determined by, for example, the economic.

138 Ibid., p. 209.
4.3 Materialized Ideology: A Non-Ideological Definition

Althusser’s discussions of the concept of ideology provided a new and unorthodox definition of the term. This redefinition of ideology critically rejected the long-believed perception of the concept, from Marx onwards, as ‘a set of abstract beliefs and ideas.’ Althusser’s revolutionary view on ideology appeared in “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” (1969), which is published with a number Althusser’s other essays in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (1971).

Althusser’s essay consists of three major parts: “On the Reproduction of the Conditions of Production,” “Infrastructure and Superstructure,” and “On Ideology.” It is in the second part that Althusser begins to explain his concept of ideology by referring to the classical Marxist notion of a strict relationship between ideology as the superstructure and the economic mode of production as the base. Elaborating on the implications of “Infrastructure and Superstructure” in Marxism, Althusser pointed to Marx’s view on ideology as one of the levels of social formation in this way:

... Marx conceived the structure of every society as constituted by ‘levels’ or ‘instances’ articulated by a specific determinism: the infrastructure, or economic base (the ‘unity’ of the productive forces and the relations of production), and the superstructure, which itself contains two ‘levels’ or ‘instances’: the politico-legal (law and the State) and ideology (the different ideologies, religious, ethical, legal, political, etc.)

Whereas the Marxist doctrine of economic determinism believed that it was the economic that determined ideology and, thus, regarded ideology as always dependent on the economic factor, Althusser looked at the constituent parts of, what he called the “complex whole” or “social whole” from another perspective. For him, ideology was a practice that enjoyed a relative autonomy. Hence, contrary to what was already thought of in Marxism, ideology affects the structure, which is Althusser’s term for the Marxist ‘base,’ while itself being affected by the change in the structure that it has caused. This change would also affect the other levels of social formation in two ways: first, the change in ideology would influence other practices in that the complex whole is itself a structured unity and any change in one of its levels affects the other levels; secondly, the complex whole, affected by ideology, is to affect other practices because of the changes in its structure in dominance. Therefore, whereas classical Marxism considers ideology

to be ‘determined’ by the economic base, it is relatively autonomous in the Althusserian model.

Apart from this, in the same essay Althusser presented his view of the functions of ideology in the form of two theses. The first thesis is “ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.” This thesis is to some extent an expansion of the classical Marxist concept of ideology as ‘false consciousness.’ It means that ideology does not represent the real condition of existence; it represents our imaginary relationship to it. Therefore, ideology is the imaginary relation between the human consciousness and his/her world; it is imaginary in that it is represented to the subject by the subject’s imaginary relation to the world. Althusser had already mentioned that ideology was different from science in that it was not based on knowledge. However, it should be mentioned that ideology is different from science not by its falsity, but because it is the social that predominates in it and not, as in science, the theoretical.

The second thesis, which included a revolutionary proposition, argued for “the material existence” of ideology. The materialization of ideology is one the most persuasive arguments in Althusser. However, it should not be taken as an abrupt declaration. He had already implied such a doctrine while discussing the characteristics of all the levels of practice in social formation. As Tony Lovell shows in his *Pictures of Reality: Aesthetics, Politics, Pleasure* (1980), one can feel the materialization of ideology in the Althusser’s early works:

In his substitution of this ensemble of practices, under the delegatory guidance of the economic, for the base/superstructure hierarchy, Althusser breaks with the dualism of ideas/material forces. What distinguishes one level from another is not its materiality. All levels are constituted by practices, and all practices are material, just as all are informed by ideas … Both the ideological and the theoretical are redefined as practices which produce particular products and, as such, are as much material forces as are economic and political forces.142

It was, however, in “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” that Althusser explicitly talked of the material existence of the ideas and ideologies. Ideology was here regarded as a material practice within “the material existence of an ideological

141 Ibid., p. 109.
apparatus.” For example, concerning the existence of the ideas of a single subject’s belief, he stated that his belief was material because

his ideas are his material actions inserted into material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatuses from which derive the ideas of that subject.¹⁴³

Althusser’s materialization of ideology was in close affinity with his conceptualization of ‘ideological State apparatuses.’ In the Althusserian theory, ‘State apparatus,’ which is a classical Marxist term, also includes a set of ‘ideological State apparatuses.’ This is what Althusser added to the Marxist theory of the State. He wrote:

In order to advance the theory of the State it is indispensable to take into account not only the distinction between State power and State apparatus, but also another reality, which is clearly on the side of the (repressive) State apparatus, but must not be confused with it. I shall call this reality by its concept: the ideological State apparatuses.¹⁴⁴

Althusser referred to the Marxist concept of the State apparatus as ‘the Repressive State Apparatus’ since, according to Marxist theory, it contained, such apparatuses as the Courts, the Police, the Prisons, and the Army. On the other hand, the Ideological State Apparatuses included those institutions that they may first seem “distinct and specialized” to the observer while they are part of the State apparatus. Althusser provides a relatively long list of the ISAs. The Church, the School, the Family, and the Arts are among the ISAs, which were described by Althusser as ‘religious,’ ‘educational,’ ‘familial,’ and ‘cultural’ ISAs respectively.

On the other hand, ideology gains a new significance for Althusser in his critical reading of Marx. That is to say that the complex whole, containing several ideologies, is itself determined by ideology. Thus, there are ideology and ideologies for Althusser. Ideologies are historical and specific; we can name them; they include, for example, religious ideology, intellectual ideology, political ideology, and so on. However, ideology is different from ideologies in that it is what governs the structured complex whole. It is thus structural. It is a structure with no history or end. Althusser’s attitude

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 96.
towards ideology reminds us of Lacan’s idea on the unconscious in that Althusserian ideology, like the Lacanian unconscious, is structural and dominates the structure.

4.4 Interpellation and the Subject of Ideology

Although the title ‘theory of the subject of ideology’ appears neither in Althusser nor in secondary criticism, the present section, while outlining the principles of this theory, considers Althusser’s ideas on the constitution of subjectivity as a theory that believes the subject to be predominantly the subject of ideology. The immanent relationship between the subject and ideology was what Althusser sought to explore in the mature phase of his intellectual career. In Althusser’s theory the subject in a modern capitalist state becomes subjected to the ideological State apparatuses. The conditions in/through which an individual becomes the subject to the State are reproduced by both the ideological State apparatuses and the Repressive State Apparatus, which are Althusser’s terms for the major divisions of the classical Marxist concept of the State apparatus.

The last part of Althusser’s well-known essay, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” (1969), provided an inquiry into how ideology works in order to reproduce both itself and its subjects. The essay, as Andrew Bennett and Nicholas Royle have demonstrated, seeks to argue for this proposition that “ideology is bound up with the constitution of the subject.” Althusser’s view of “the constitution of the subject was highly influential in that it critically explored both the reproduced conditions of becoming a subject and the role played by ideology in the constitution of the subject. The subject, from Althusser’s perspective, is constituted by ideology:

I say: the category of the subject is constitutive of all ideology, but at the same time and immediately I add that the category of the subject is only constitutive of all ideology insofar as all ideology has the function (which defines it) of ‘constituting’ concrete individuals as subjects.

He then goes on to explore how the subject becomes constituted by ideology and what mechanism is behind the subject’s obedience and his/her surrender to ideology. The argument presented here is one of Althusser’s most influential theses. Terry Eagleton, pointing to this theme of the essay, writes: “How is it, the essay asks, that human subjects very often come to submit themselves to the dominant subjects of their


societies ideologies which Althusser sees as vital to maintain the power of a ruling class?”

Although Althusser had provided an answer to this question in his early works, it was in this essay that he formulated the way ideology made an individual become a subject. Having already talked of the reproduction of the conditions of production of the subject, he presented his theory on the individual’s subjection in this essay in a more concrete way. In Althusser’s theory, individuals are born into ideology and immediately become subject to it. Individuals are called to participate in the practices of some particular ideologies that are the product of the ISAs. The subjects suppose that they have their own personal ideas and act according to them. However, what really happens is that they are “always already subjects.” The subjects do not realize their subjection to ideology and consider themselves to be free and independent individuals. On the contrary, ideology is prior to the subjects and makes them feel recognized: “you and I are always already subjects, and as such constantly practice the rituals of ideological recognition, which guarantee for us that we are indeed concrete, individual, distinguishable and (naturally) irreplaceable subjects.”

A major mechanism behind the individual’s subjection to ideology is what Althusser called interpellation. Interpellation is the process through which ideology addresses an individual upon its arrival to society and, in this way, makes him/her the subject to that ideology. The main thesis here is that “ideology interpellates individuals as subjects.” The way ideology makes an individual a subject happens through interpellation. It is through interpellation that the subjects are constituted as the effects of pre-given structures. Ideology, which is a pre-existing structure, interpellates the individual and thus constitutes him/her as a subject. Interpellation deals with the moment and process of recognition of interaction with ideology. This process shows how the subject recognizes his/her relation to reality and it is also a confirmation of the subject’s ideological position:

I shall then suggest that ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or ‘transforms’ the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called

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interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: ‘Hey, you there!’

This ‘hailing’ is a call for participation in the practice of an ideology. It is through hailing that ideology ultimately meets its objective: “recruiting subjects from among individuals.” Successful hailing occurs if the subject recognizes that the hail is really addressed to him/her. If a hailing is successful, the individual becomes a subject to that particular ideology, and hence interpellated. When the hailed individual in the street turns round because of the hailing of police, “he becomes a subject.” He/she turns round because he/she has recognized that “the hail was ‘really’ addressed” to him/her.

Ideology thus functions to constitute individuals as subjects. Individuals are interpellated primarily through the first “ideological state apparatuses” they are exposed to including the family, the school, and the church. These are institutions that exist before the entry of the individual into them. Althusser finally presents an expanded version of his earlier thesis. According to this developed thesis,

ideology has always already interpellated individuals as subjects, which amounts to making it clear that individuals are always-already interpellated by ideology as subjects, which necessarily lead us to one last proposition: individuals are always-already subjects.

Althusser, at the end of the essay, expands his views on the subject by presenting his classification of the subjects and the Subject. This reminds us of his idea on the difference between ideology and ideologies. There are ‘subjects’ and ‘the Subject’ in the way ‘ideologies’ and ‘Ideology’ exist. The subject is the individual who becomes interpellated while the Subject required by ideology; ideology, like structure, requires a Subject.

Referring to the biblical story of the dialogue between Moses and God, Althusser emphasizes the moment Moses was hailed by God. God hailed Moses in his name, and Moses replied: “It is (really) I! God says to Moses “I am what I am”. This proves God to be the Subject and Moses to be the subject in that he obeyed God:

God thus defines himself as the Subject par excellence, he who is through himself and for himself (‘I am what I am’), and he who interpellates his subject, the individual subjected to him by his very interpellation, i.e. the individual named Moses. And Moses, interpellated-

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149 Ibid., p. 118.
150 Ibid., p. 119.
called by his Name, having recognized that it ‘really’ was he who was called by God, recognizes that he is a subject, a subject of God, a subject subjected to God, a subject through the Subject and subjected to the Subject.\textsuperscript{151}

Therefore, there are two implications of the subject whenever the term is used: the subject through ideology and the subject to ideology. There also exists in this process a guarantee that says “every thing really is so.” Althusser thus summarized what he had discovered about ideology in the form of these four premises: the interpellation of individuals as subjects, their subjection to the Subject, the mutual recognition of subjects and Subject, and the absolute guarantee that every thing will be all right if the subjects recognize what they are and have accordingly.

Althusser’s perception of the way the subject is constituted is demonstrative of his idea of the anti-Humanist Marxism introduced in his previous works. While Humanism regarded the human being as free and self-conscious, for Althusser s/he is considered as the agent of ideology and participates in the reproduction of the conditions of his/her being subjected. Moreover, whereas the classical concept of the subject commemorates the idea of the subject being the ‘cause,’ for Althusser the subject is the ‘effect’ because the situation into which an individual is born precedes him/her and the subject is the effect of it. Therefore, s/he as subject is “always-already interpellated.”

The subject is the effect of the ideological structure into which he/she is born, and by which s/he is immediately hailed. In both ways, being an agent and an effect, the subject loses its humanistic designations as autonomous, self-conscious, and free. Althusser rejected the humanist notion of the individual as a self-conscious and autonomous being whose actions could be explained in terms of personal beliefs, intentions, and preferences. However, Althusser’s analysis of the subject did not allow for the possibility of individuals resisting the process of interpellation.

4.5 Critical Evaluation of the Althusserian Model of the ‘subject/Subject’:

A Hegelian Reading

Althusser’s attempt to remove all Hegelian traces from Marx resulted, arguably, in a limitation for his theory of the subject of ideology. This limitation, frequently neglected in the literature available on Althusser, resulted in the lack of the exploration of the impossibility of the transition of the subject to the Subject and its consequences in the Althusserian theory. For Althusser, the subject is the individual who becomes

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., p. 121.
interpellated by ideology and the Subject is what is required by ideology. Althusser, however, did not investigate the ‘lack’ that always exists between the subject and the Subject. In this section I seek to explore this theoretical limitation in Althusser through employing a Hegelian approach. Providing a Hegelian reading of Althusser is of significance to the present project in that it is considered as a step in approaching the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic.

Althusser’s theory of the subject of interpellation has attracted extensive critical attention. I discussed Judith Butler’s Hegelian approach in developing the Althusserian concept of interpellation in Chapter Two. I also referred to Slavoj Žižek’s criticism of the term from a psychoanalytical approach. What is noticeable here is that Žižek, too, attempts to develop the term through Hegelian terminology. Žižek argues that the Althusserian theory of interpellation is “more complex than it may seem” and considers some parts of this theory as “unthought.” He analyses the Althusserian concept of interpellation in the following way:

What remains ‘unthought’ in Althusser’s theory of interpellation is thus the fact that prior to ideological recognition we have an intermediate moment of obscene, impenetrable interpellation without identification, a kind of ‘vanishing mediator’ that has to become invisible if the subject is to achieve symbolic identity – to accomplish the gesture of subjectivization. In short, the ‘unthought’ of Althusser is that there is already an uncanny subject that precedes the gesture of subjectivization.”

Žižek’s reference to the ‘vanishing mediator’ demonstrates his Hegelian approach to the analysis of the Althusserian interpellation. However, engaging Althusser’s theory of interpellation on several occasions in his works, Žižek explores the term, like most other problems, from a Lacanian perspective. For example, although Althusser acknowledged the influence of both Freud and Lacan in the formation of some of his ideas, Žižek believes that the Althusserian term of interpellation itself is an “implicit reference to Lacan’s thesis on a letter that ‘always arrives at its destination’” because: “the interpellative letter cannot miss its addressee since, on account of its ‘timeless’ character, it is only the addressee’s recognition-acceptance that constitutes a letter.”

Similarly, a reconsideration of the Althusserian model of the ‘subject/Subject’ through the Hegelian doctrine of the non-identity of the subject-the other can be illuminating in investigating the problem of the lack between the subject and the Subject. Discussing

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153 Ibid., p. 60.
his model of the ‘subject/Subject’, Althusser used the concept of the Absolute Subject, which is reminiscent of Hegel’s notion of the Absolute Spirit. Althusser wrote:

We observe that the structure of ideology, interpelling individuals as subjects in the name of a Utopia and Absolute Subject is speculary, i.e. a mirror-structure, and doubly speculary: this mirror duplication is constitutive of ideology and ensures its functioning. Which means that all ideology is centered, and the Absolute Subject occupies the unique place of the Center, and interpellates around it the infinity of individuals into subjects in a double mirror-connection such that it subjects the subjects to the Subject.\(^\text{154}\)

Althusser was not interested in exploring the question of the impossibility of any meeting between the subject and the Subject. Although he mentioned that the subject would never become the Subject, he did not explore two serious consequences that this non-identity would bring to the subject: its ongoing subjection and incomplete identity. As I demonstrated earlier in the thesis, Ernesto Laclau has investigated the ongoing subjection of the subject when he is dealing with the role of ideology’s immanent lack in the constant political subjection of the individual.\(^\text{155}\) As for the incomplete identity of the subject, a Hegelian reading will further explore the Althusserian model.

What I want to suggest is that this limitation of the Althusserian theory of the subject can be removed by what he was originally critical of. The limitation in ‘the subject/the Subject’ model proposed by Althusser is solved by the Hegelian perception of the subject-object non-identity. As I demonstrated in details in Chapter Three, Hegel was predominantly concerned with the conditions in which the subject was in a condition of either identity or non-identity with the object, Nature, substance, or God. The Hegelian condition of the subject-object identity, known as the Absolute, was thus in close affinity to the Romantic notions of nature and pantheism. If pantheism meant the manifestation of the Spirit in Nature and, hence, the unification of the Spirit and Nature, the German ‘absolute idealism’ movement, too, believed in the oneness of the opposing concepts in the realm of the Absolute.

Hegel claimed that a complete identity of the subject and object is only one of the important and rare moments of the Absolute. As Frederick Beiser states, Hegel “declared that the absolute is not only the subject-object identity but the identity of

\(^{154}\) Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation),” in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, p. 122.

\(^{155}\) Laclau’s concepts of dislocation and empty signifier appear to have solved this problem in Althusser by shedding light on the impossibility of a full identity of and within ideology. For Laclau’s position see Chapter Two of the present thesis.
subject-object identity and subject-object non-identity."\textsuperscript{156} Subsequently, although arguing for the existence of a condition in which there might be the subject-object identity, Hegel also stated that such a condition could only constitute a part of the realm of the Absolute.

The subject-object identity in Hegel bears resemblance to the Romantic subject’s desire of unity with Nature. In my analysis of the German idealism’s notion of nature I demonstrated the Romantic subject’s desire for a state of complete identity with Nature. This desire, as Hegel claimed, could not be fulfilled in that no subject could reach the state of complete unity with Nature.

As I shall demonstrate in the next chapter, the Hegelian conception of the Absolute and the pre-mirror stage in its Lacanian sense are similar in that there is a state of non-identity in both conditions. While in Hegel this state happens between the subject and the Spirit, in Lacan this state comes to existence between the subject and its mother. There always remains a lack between the subject and Nature in Hegel, the subject and its mother in Lacan, and, the subject and the Subject in Althusser. Demonstrating the process of the interpellation of the subject by ideology, Althusser was not concerned with the impossibility of the full identity between the subject and the Subject. However, Althusser could have observed this lack in the story of Moses he referred to at the end of his well-known essay on Ideology, where he refers to God as the Subject:

Moses asked several times to see God, but when he was summoned to meet Him, he could not see Him and fell unconscious. What happened to Moses is reminiscent of the Romantic subject’s incomplete unity with nature. The Romantic subject’s desire of unity with Nature, represented in the Romantic poetry, was due to fail in that the pantheist desire of unity with Nature was never to be experienced. Moses, too, could not fulfill his wishes of seeing God. Moses, the subject, can thus be characterized as an unfulfilled Romantic subject who could not succeed in seeing God, the Subject.

If we have a Hegelian treatment of the story, we will find out that the impossibility of seeing God by Moses originally goes back to the impossible full identity of the subject and the Spirit. According to Hegel, the identity of the subject and the Spirit is merely the identity of the subject/ the Spirit identity and the subject/the Spirit non-identity. Therefore, a full identity between Moses and God could not happen because of the ongoing non-identity at work.

This biblical story provides a good example of the essential difference between the acts of seeing and hearing. As I referred to in Chapter Two, Edmund Ortigues

\textsuperscript{156} Frederick Beiser, \textit{Hegel}, London: Routledge, 205, p. 61.
demonstrated the differences between the significance of eye and ear in the Symbolic and the Imaginary in his *Le discoure and le symbole* (1962). Ortigues believed that whereas the act of hearing is in relation to the Symbolic, the act of seeing is observed in the realm of the Imaginary. The Symbolic is exposed to the subject in the language s/he *hears*, while the Imaginary begins when s/he *sees* her/his image in the mirror.

This difference between the acts of hearing and seeing leads us to think of the difference between the subject and its manifestation, that is its body. What we speak to in our conversations is the subject and not its body. What we are speaking to and hearing from is thus the subject and not the person, individual, or the body. Also, the predominance of the Symbolic order that is created by language further confirms the presence of the subject and the consequent absence of the body.

Moses, in his talk with God, was located only in the Symbolic in that he could not see God. That is to say, Moses could not see God because he was not positioned in the Imaginary. The gap between Moses and God can be defined as, to use the Lacanian terminology, the Real. The Real, that which resists being expressed in language, could not be touched, comprehended, and experienced. What happened to Moses was the Real. The subject, however, is the conveyer of all Lacanian triad orders at the same time whereas the Imaginary is lacking in this biblical story. Moses cannot even imagine the image of God when he does not see Him. What happens here is the impossibility of the subject/the Subject identity since one of the triad orders is missing. Towards the end of the story we are told that Moses falls unconscious when God manifests Itself. When he wakes up, God has already left the scene.

Furthermore, there are two lacks in the ‘subject/Subject’ model of Althusser: the lack in the Symbolic engendered by the negativity of language and the lack in the Subject in that it is not materialized and observable. While the first lack happens in language, the second cannot be included into the realm of language and understanding; that is why, as Althusser mentioned, God answers Moses’ question in this way: “I am what I am.” The Subject can also be conceived of as the model ideology wants its subjects to follow. The subjects never become the Subject in that if it happens, they are no more subjects to the Subject and, in turn, become the Subject. Ideology always presents a subject model to its subjects and this model is never completely touched by the subject.

What is notable is that the more a subject attempts to cope with the model, the more s/he is required by ideology to follow it. This is an endless chain of subjectivization. This mechanism acts exactly the way superego functions in its Žižekian terms: it is like a bank to which we can never pay off our debts. Based on this theory, the more pious
one is, the more fearful s/he becomes of committing sin; the more committed to ideology one remains, the more subjected and alienated s/he will become. Consequently, the subject is permanently subjected by the Subject and both mentioned lacks are behind this mechanism.

In conclusion, Althusser’s failure in theorizing the gap between the subject and the Subject should be considered as the result of his anti-Hegelianism. Althusser’s major attempt to purify Marx from Hegel is thus regarded as the major criticism of his theory of the subject of ideology. The Althusserian model of the ‘subject/Subject’ needs reconsideration in that the impossibility of the transition of the subject into the Subject should be analysed through exploring the lacks that exist both in the subject and between the subject and the Subject.

4.6 Concluding Remarks

Although the Althusserian concept of interpellation ultimately considers the subject as the subject of ideology, this theory faces challenging questions. The Althusserian concept of ‘the structure’ is central in that it not only determines the subjectivity of the subject but also the structure in dominance of the social formation. Also, Althusser’s redefinition of ideology, as having a material existence, proves to be in close affinity with ‘the structure.’

The preceding sections provided an investigation into the notion that ideology is also constituted by lack. Likewise, the Althusserian model of the ‘subject/Subject’ needs reconsideration in that the state of non-identity between the subject and the Subject should be examined. Althusser’s attempt to remove Hegel from his version of Marxism led to ignoring the lack that always exists between the subject and the Subject. A Hegelian-Lacanian reading of this model is illuminating in removing its shortcomings in that such reading investigates into the character of this lack and the reasons for its permanent existence and ongoing function.

While the Althusserian concept of the subject tends to be the subject of ideology, Lacan’s concept of the subject, as I shall study in the next chapter, considers it as the subject of language. Having critically studied the Althusserian concept of ideological interpellation in this chapter, I shall attempt to evaluate it through the Lacanian concept of the linguist alienation later in the thesis. I shall also refer to the Lacanian concept of desire and consider it, in an Althusserian sense, ideological. Then, I will argue for the impossibility of a complete identity between the subject and what it desires, or between the subject and what ideology requires it to desire.
Chapter Five:
The Subject of Language: The Unconscious, Otherness, and the Problem of Lack in Identity

5.1 Introduction
Although Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytical treatment of the subject has been variously referred to as ‘the subject of desire,’ ‘the subject of fantasy,’ and the subject of the triad orders of the Symbolic, Imaginary, and Real, the present chapter seeks to demonstrate that the Lacanian conception of the subject ultimately tended to consider it as ‘the subject of language.’ My discussion of the subject of language here is in parallel to my study of the Althusserian perception of the subject as the subject of ideology that was critically evaluated in the previous chapter. Emphasizing the negativity of language, this chapter investigates the formation of the lack over which the subject’s identity is established. The significant role played by the unconscious, language, and the Other in the process through which the subject is formed is thus discussed while studying Lacan’s parallel employment of both Jakobson’s linguistic theories and Hegel’s philosophical doctrines concerning the formation of subjectivity.

The exploration of the Lacanian perception of the subject as ‘the subject of language’ is central to the present thesis in that I will attempt to draw it into dialogue with the Althusserian concept of the subject as ‘the subject of ideology’ in the following chapter. In establishing the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic as a model for the analysis of the subject I investigate both Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject through focusing on the relationship between the subject, on one hand, and language and ideology, on the other hand. This chapter thus focuses on those aspects of the Lacanian subject that directly link it to the Symbolic and, accordingly, the language that the subject is exposed to.

Lacan’s frequently-quoted statement, “the unconscious is structured like a language,” will clearly be central to the development of the discussions of the present chapter; however, my analysis expands to include the ways in which the subject acquires language and the transmission of the ‘lack’ within language. I also seek to demonstrate that the reappearance of this lack in the Other further makes the identity of the subject built on lack.
The present chapter includes four main sections. First, Lacan’s development of the Freudian theory of the unconscious is studied since there is a close affinity between the Lacanian conception of the unconscious and his approach to the analysis of the subject’s identity. Secondly, the core of the chapter is Lacan’s consideration of the subject as ‘the subject of language’ and the linguistic alienation of the subject. I shall discuss the Lacanian perception of the linguistic alienation in that I aim to compare it with the Althusserian concept of ideological interpellation in the following chapter. An attempt is made here to assess ‘the structure of the Symbolic’ through studying the significant role of the Other in its construction.

Then, the analysis of the chapter is presented that is an investigation into the problem of ‘lack’ in Lacan with reference to Hegel’s concept of the self-consciousness and the lack that permanently exists in the condition of the subject-other identity. My reading of Lacan’s centres on the Hegelian idea of the incomplete subject through emphasis on the negativity that language includes and which further establishes the subject’s identity on lack. Finally, the chapter, while attempting to outline the major features of the Lacanian subject, considers it as an ‘Anti- Cartesian Other in the Imaginary.’

5.2 The Unconscious: Freudian or Lacanian?

Illustrating Lacan’s perception of the unconscious that was widely distinguishable from that of Freud, this section seeks to address the ‘structured’ and, hence, ‘ordered’ character of the Lacanian concept of the unconscious. I shall go through Lacan’s concept of the unconscious in order to demonstrate the structural affinity between the ordered character of the Lacanian unconscious and the structured feature of language, particularly with reference to Jakobson who was instrumental in Lacan’s theories on subjectivity and the subject’s identity.

Although Freud’s exploration of the unconscious provided Lacan with a thorough investigation into the hidden mechanism and the problematic nature of the unconscious, the concept was re-defined by Lacan. However, Freud’s influence was so tangible that Lacan, at the climax of the conflicts that gave birth to different splits in psychoanalytical theories, chose the title ‘Freudian’ for his newly founded Ecole Freudienne de Paris in 1964. Likewise, in “Beyond the ‘Reality Principle’” Lacan declared that his major objective was to investigate “Freud’s Revolutionary Method.”

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Likewise, as Shoshana Felman has demonstrated, we can see “originality” not only in his spectacular theories but also in his “return to Freud.”

Although the much quoted ‘iceberg analogy’ is the most frequent metaphor for the unconscious in Freudian psychoanalysis, one of the less taken but ultimately useful ways to investigate the unconscious is to discuss it within the context of the interaction between two Freudian terms: the “pleasure principle” and the “reality principle.”

Analyzed in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920) and expanded on in *The Ego and the Id* (1923), the concept of the “pleasure principle” was employed by Freud in his analysis of the nature of human mind, culture, and even civilization. Freud thus explained the interaction between these two principles:

…what decides the purpose of life is simply the programme of the pleasure principle. This principle dominates the operation of the mental apparatus from the start. There can be no doubt about its efficacy, and yet its programme is at loggerheads with the whole world, with the macrocosm as much as with the microcosm. There is no possibility of its being carried out through; all the regulations of the universe run counter to it.

The conflict between pleasure and reality principles was what predominantly effected, Freud maintained, the “developmental process of the individual.” It is this conflict and its ultimate consequences that form the mentality, way of life, and attitudes of the individual. The pleasure principle, as the name implies, is that which generally makes human beings feel good. This principle stands against the reality principle that drives what is supposedly more ‘important’ in the course of our life. Regarding such conflict and its role in “the development of the individual” Freud stated:

In the developmental process of the individual, the programme of the pleasure principle, which consists in finding the satisfaction of happiness, is retained as the main aim. Integration in, or adaptation to, a human community appears as a scarcely avoidable condition which must be fulfilled before this aim of happiness can be achieved… the development of the individual seems to us to be a product of the interaction between two urges, the urge towards happiness, which we usually call ‘egoistic,’ and the urge towards union with others in the community, which we call ‘altruistic.”

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160 Ibid., p. 105.
If one considers the immediate, always present and most affective consequence of the conflict between pleasure and reality principles, or between “egoistic” and “altruistic” urges, s/he will grasp a fruitful perception of what the unconscious is and how it works. In other words, the desire for pleasure that cannot be fulfilled because of the reality principle is repressed in a place in the mind that can be referred to as the unconscious mind. According to Freud, “under certain conditions,” a drive impulse that has faced resistances that seek to put it out of action “enters the state of repression.”\footnote{Sigmund Freud, \textit{The Unconscious}, trans. Graham Frankland, London: Penguin, 2005, p. 35.} One should note that although the unconscious is the space for the repressed wishes, it is partly constituted by them:

We have learnt from psychoanalysis that the process of repression essentially consists in the idea representing a drive being not removed or destroyed, but prevented from becoming conscious. We say then that it exists in an ‘unconscious’ state and we have strong evidence that it also remains unconsciously active, even in ways that ultimately reach consciousness, but let us state from the very outset that the repressed does not constitute the whole of the unconscious.\footnote{Ibid., p.49.}

The Freudian unconscious is thus like a storeroom in which we may find those parts of our wishes, feelings, memories, and urges that are outside of the domain called the conscious. This storeroom, however, is not passive and inanimate. It is alive, always present, energetic, and far more affective than we usually think of. Therefore, the unconscious domain is the place where unfulfilled desires not only dwell but also assert influence on our character and life. The unconscious, furthermore, is both determining and out of control. In other words, it is determining in the sense that it urges us towards the fulfillment of our repressed desires, and it is out of control in that it is manifested and realized beyond our conscious control.

Dreams are the veiled manifestation of the wish fulfillment. Like neurotic symptoms, dreams are the effects of compromises in our psyche between desires and the prevention from their realization. Dreams disobey logical principles and narrative coherence because they mix together the residues of immediate daily experience with the deepest and often most infantile wishes. The interpretation of dreams, Freud stated, was “the royal road” to our understanding of the unconscious. Nonetheless, we should note that the “Dreams are one way in which the unconscious speaks.”\footnote{Anthony Easthope, \textit{The Unconscious}, London, Routledge, 1999, p. 13.}
In order to understand dreams we need to decode them. The decisive point here is that the manifest content of the dream, the part which is remembered and narrated by the dreamer, must be differentiated from the latent dream thoughts, which uncover the hidden meaning of the dream. For a psychoanalyst it is the latent meaning that really matters because, as Ruth L. Munroe explains in his discussion of Freud’s *The Interpretation of Dreams*:

Discerning the *latent* meaning of the dream requires special familiarity with the language of the unconscious and, almost always, supplementary materials, such as the patient’s associations, or an intimate knowledge of the patient’s experience and way of reacting. It requires a dynamic theoretical orientation—that is, a capacity to perceive patterns from a few disjoined fragments.  

In order to explore the latent meaning of the dream Freud introduced a revolutionary approach to the “dream-work” in his *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900). According to this theory dreams are supposed to function by four major mechanisms: condensation, displacement, representation, and secondary revision. The first two operations of the dreams, condensation and displacement, are of central importance to the present analysis in that they are the major points in Lacan’s development of Freudian psychoanalysis. Condensation happens when a whole set of different ideas is pressed and packed into one image. Condensation, therefore, operates through the fusion of several different elements into one. On the other hand, displacement is that function in the dream-work that substitutes one image or symbol with something associated with it. Displacement thus means the associative substitution of one signifier in the dream for another.

The characteristics of the ‘id’ in Freud are so closely in affinity to his concept of the unconscious that they are also the characteristics of the unconscious in the later Freudian theory. The id is in charge of primitive instincts. The id’s only mission is to fulfill the pleasure principle. Maintaining that the id had an entirely free and fearless character, Freud mentioned its complete lack of anxiety in this way:

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The id knows no precautions to ensure survival and no anxiety; or it would perhaps be more correct to say that, although it can produce the sensory elements of anxiety, it cannot make use of them.\textsuperscript{165} 

The instinctual gratification for pleasure is the only occupation of the id. The id is irrational, lawless, and essentially disjoined from social and moral rules. It is the locus of sex, violence, and delinquency. The id is the only component of mind that is present from birth and does not care about reality and the needs of anyone else. An illustrated example here is a newly born infant. When it needs something, is hungry, or in pain, the need must be fulfilled otherwise it continues to cry regardless of time, place, or the wish of others.

On the other hand, Lacan’s perception of the unconscious diverges clearly from that of Freud. If the unconscious was, for Freud, characteristically close to id, it was, for Lacan, as I shall demonstrate, close to superego. Lacan had already demonstrated his antagonism to most of the then dominant psychoanalytic approaches in his doctoral dissertation, the only published work by him before \textit{Écrits} (1966), entitled \textit{On Paranoid Psychosis in Its Relation to Personality} (1932). Edith Kurzweil, while mentioning such conflicts, outlines the close connection between Lacan and Freud:

\begin{quote}
Ever since Jacques Lacan published his doctoral thesis in 1932, \textit{On Paranoid Psychosis in its Relation to Personality}, he has "reinterpreted" Freud, and has mercilessly attacked the medicalization of American psychoanalysis, American empiricism, behaviorism, psychology, scientism, and the American domination of the International Psychoanalytic Association. His sweeping challenges have frequently been nasty, personal; they range from theory to clinical practice, from culture to politics.\textsuperscript{166}
\end{quote}

Lacan, remaining faithful to Freud, broke the ground of the psychoanalytic road by rejecting the bureaucratically imposed convention of the International Psychoanalytical Association. Instead, he contributed theoretically to the development of knowledge concerning the still shadowy concept of the unconscious.

Lacan’s perception of the unconscious, which was manifestly distinguishable from the Freudian approach to the term, was fully developed in his 1964 seminars, later compiled as \textit{The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis} (1973 [1978]). In a


preliminary seminar called “The Freudian Unconscious and Ours” Lacan referred to the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss and suggested that it was Nature that provided signifiers and they provided human relations with structures. Later in the seminar he mentioned that, before any formation of the subject, the subject was already included in the level at which there was counting and things were counted. This was apparent, as Lacan maintained, in the naive words of the little boy who declared: “I have three brothers, Paul, Ernest and me.” For Lacan, “he who counts is already included,” and it is only later that the subject has to “recognize himself as he who counts.”

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The linguistic structure thus gives both shape and status to the unconscious. “It is this structure,” Lacan wrote, “that assures us that there is, beneath the term unconscious, something definable, accessible and objectifiable.”

Later in the same seminar Lacan contended that Freud’s followers had misunderstood the latter’s concept of the unconscious. “The Freudian Unconscious,” Lacan stated, “has nothing to do with the so-called forms of the unconscious that preceded it, not to say accompanied it, and which still surround it today.”

Lacan believed that Freud’s concept of the unconscious included neither “the romantic unconscious of imaginative creation” nor “the locus of the divinities of night.” Lacan argued that Freud was attracted by slips of tongue in spoken sentences and the stumbled words in written language. Freud, in Lacan’s view, sought the unconscious in these phenomena and the discovery was what was produced in this gap. Towards the end of the seminar Lacan concluded that:

“Thus the unconscious is always manifested as that which vacillates in a split in the subject, from which emerges a discovery that Freud compares with desire—a desire that we will temporarily situate in the denuded metonymy of the discourse in question, where the subject surprises himself in some unexpected way.”

The Lacanian unconscious is formed through language acquisition that is in parallel to the oedipal phase. The chaotic nature of the Freudian unconscious is thus ordered by the acquisition of language. Lacan’s famous announcement of the unconscious that considered it to be structured like language appeared in his seminar entitled “Sexuality in the Defiles of the Signifier” (1964):

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168 Ibid., p. 21.
170 Ibid., p. 28.
The unconscious is constituted by the effects of speech on the subject, it is the dimension in which the subject is determined in the development of the effects of speech, consequently the unconscious is structured like a language.\textsuperscript{171}

Lacan’s formulation of the unconscious as linguistically structured and ordered was later manifested also in his \textit{Écrits} (1966), where he wrote:

… the unconscious has the radical structure of language and that a material operates in the unconscious according to certain laws, which are the same laws as those discovered in the study of natural languages—that is, languages that are or were actually spoken.\textsuperscript{172}

Such close affinity between the unconscious and language was so significant in Lacan’s thought that he referred to it on several other occasions. For example, discussing the way the unconscious functions beyond our control and common mode of signification, Lacan, while discussing his concept of desire, mentioned the identity of the unconscious and language:

The unconscious exists, not because there is unconscious desire, in the sense of something impenetrable … which emerges form the depths of all its primitiveness, in order then to raise itself to the higher level of consciousness. Quite the contrary, if there is desire, it is only because there is the unconscious, i.e., a language, whose structure and effects escape the subject: because at the level of language, there is always something that is beyond consciousness, which allows the function of desire to be situated.\textsuperscript{173}

Furthermore, discussing the consideration of the symptoms in psychoanalytic psychopathology in his “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis,” Lacan again reminds us of the structured character of the symptom when he maintained that it “is itself structured like a language: a symptom is language from which speech must be delivered.”\textsuperscript{174}

However, the Lacanian Symbolic also includes the Freudian superego that also functions like a language. The Superego knows no limit as far as its desire of finding us guilty is concerned. Žižek argues that:

\textsuperscript{171} Ibid., p. 149.
The Superego draws the energy of the pressure it exerts upon the subject from the fact that the subject was not faithful to his desire, that he gave it up. Our sacrificing to the superego, our paying tribute to it, only corroborates our guilt. For that reason, our debt to the superego is unredeemable: the more we pay it off, the more we owe.\(^\text{175}\)

Hence, the superego’s endless desire for confirming our guilt, if we sacrifice to it, is like the endless chain of signifiers, which is made possible both in language and the unconscious. The structure of the superego is, too, like that of language: on one hand, it can be grammatical, which reminds us of our traditional view of the superego, and, on the other hand, it can be like a long non-grammatical sentence, which it knows no rule and limit. Moreover, the way the superego is established is similar to the way we master our native language. The regular and permanent practice of acquiring a native language ultimately results in the emergence of a structured superego.

The Lacanian treatment of the unconscious, which considered it as “structured,” was distinguishable from Freud’s designation of it as disordered and chaotic. However, Lacan’s idea on the unconscious was also different from that of Freud in another sense. The unconscious in its Lacanian sense constituted just another realm of the unconscious. Whereas the instincts of/in the unconscious come from, as Freud maintained, the innate id, Lacan pointed out that they were not only structured like a language but also might be driven by the language the subject acquired. Thus, although the id is disordered and chaotic, its manifestations are structured like a language.

Moreover, in another one of its realms the unconscious hosts the language we acquire. As Lacan writes at the beginning of one of his papers, he seeks to “alert prejudiced minds from the outset that the idea that the unconscious is merely the seat of the instincts may have to be reconsidered.”\(^\text{176}\) This new attitude towards the contents of the unconscious has been ever since instrumental to the development of the psychoanalytic thought. In other words, the unconscious is no longer manifested merely in the animal principle. It has rather a character both much closer to, and influenced by, language. The result of my analysis, at this point, comes close to Bruce Fink’s evaluation of Lacan; for Lacan, the unconscious is not only structured as a language but also is itself language.\(^\text{177}\)

The crucial point, however, is that the unconscious is not only formed and structured by language but also its formation is in parallel to the construction of the identity of the


subject. Lacan’s concept of the subject of the unconscious, as Lorenzo Chiesa suggests, can designate two different meanings: ‘the unconscious subject’ and ‘the subject of the unconscious.’ “The subject of the unconscious is, for Lacan,” he writes, “both the unconscious subject, a psychic agency that is opposed to the agency of consciousness (or, better, self-consciousness), and the subject of the unconscious, the subject subjected to the unconscious.”

Therefore, the subject that is subjected to the unconscious is also subjected to the language he/she is exposed to. I shall examine the relation of the subject’s identity to language, and, particularly, to language signifiers in the coming section.

5.3 The Structure of the Symbolic:

The Other, Identity, and the Subject of Language

This section attempts to outline the formation and constitution of what is called throughout the thesis ‘the subject of language.’ The section first seeks to examine ‘the structure of the Symbolic’ that is explained with reference to Lacan’s employment of structuralist linguistics. The present study demonstrates how Lacan’s employment of Jakobson’s linguistic theories in reading Freud results in the similar structure of both the unconscious and the Symbolic. Then, the role of the Other is investigated in the construction of the subject of language; this is studied through dealing with the Other and the structure that it creates for the subject. What is of central interest to the present research is that ‘the subject of language’ can be similarly treated as the subject of the Other; subsequently, the paradoxical relation of the subject to language will be studied: whereas the subject conventionally thinks that s/he owns it, s/he is actually constructed by it. The emerging subject thus undergoes an alienation that happens in the language acquisition process. The crucial point that will be addressed is that the acquisition of language, which is based on lack because of its negativity, results in the construction of a subject whose identity is thus based on lack.

A study of the close association between the subject and language in Lacan is crucial in the further exploration of the subject’s identity that I aim at analyse in parallel lines with the Althusserian theory of the subject of ideology in the coming chapter. As I shall demonstrate in the following chapter, the Symbolic in Lacan is what determines the structure of social formation in Althusser. Whereas I examined the Althusserian concept of the structure in the previous chapter, I now seek to outline the Lacanian concept of

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the Symbolic and the correspondence between it and the subject. Also, the lack in the subject’s identity in the Althusserian model of the ‘subject/Subject,’ which I critically investigated in the previous chapter, can be more scrutinized with reference to the problem of the lack over which the subject’s identity is constructed in the Lacanian theory of the subject.

5.3.1 Language and the Structure of the Symbolic

Lacan’s consideration of the unconscious as structured like a language demonstrates the influence of structuralism on his thought. Structuralism tended to approach the object of study as a system, be it a language, myth, or cultural phenomena. When the unconscious is regarded to be ‘structured,’ it means that it is a system of signs operating according to its particular codes of signification. The unconscious – not including the Freudian id, which is chaotic, lawless, and, hence, unsystematic – is regarded as a structured system with its own internal rules that create its self-regularity and autonomy. Ian Parker has argued for the significance of structuralist approaches to exploring the Symbolic as follows:

Structuralism does help us to capture something of the nature of symbolic order as the overarching system of signs which includes the language we learn to be recognized as human and which governs social identities in culturally specific versions of the reality principle.179

This structuralist mode of approaching the object of study is manifestly observed in the areas of the humanities of the mid-twentieth century. Lacan went further to argue that Freud was a pioneer of the then dominant structuralist’s “terrain” when he asked: “Isn’t it striking that Lévi-Strauss—in suggesting the involvement in myths of language structures and of those social laws that regulate marriage ties and kinship—is already conquering the very terrain in which Freud situates the unconscious?”180 Structuralism, in addition, played a major role in the development of Lacanian category of the Symbolic.

Language, in Saussure’s view, is nothing but a system of signs governed by its internal rules. While the earlier linguists had been working only on the history and characteristics of different languages, Saussure was interested in the study of linguistic

structure. “The linguist,” Saussure wrote, “must take the study of linguistic structure as his primary concern, and relate all other manifestations of language to it.” Hence, he coined the terms langue and parole to point to two essentially different notions of language: parole or speech is the individual utterance and the language used in performance, and langue or language system that consists of the structure, internal rules and those principles that enable a language to function. Whereas the earlier linguists mainly focused on parole, Saussure was concerned with the analysis of langue.

“A language as a structured system,” Saussure maintained, “is both a self-contained whole and a principle of classification.” Considering language as a “structured system,” Saussure argued that the words were only ‘signs’ that are made up of two parts: a written or spoken mark that is called signifier and the concept of and the thought behind this mark in our mind that is called signified. These new attitudes towards language met their climax when he asserted that the relation between the signifier and signified was arbitrary and conventional. The startling implication here was that meaning was relational and based on the difference between the signifiers. Therefore, it is the difference and the relation between and among the signifiers that is of high importance in structural linguistics. Emphasizing the role of the difference in the creation of meaning, Terence Hawkes, provides the following example:

It is clear that what makes any single item ‘meaningful’ is not its own particular individual quality, but the difference between this quality and that of other sounds. In fact, the differences are systematized into ‘oppositions’ which are linked in crucial relationships. Thus, in English, such an established difference between the initial sound of tin and the initial sound of kin is what enables a different ‘meaning’ to be given to each word.

Consequently, it is the idea of ‘difference’ and its role in making things meaningful that needs central attention. Structuralism, as Jeremy Hawthorne puts it, is “interested rather in that which makes ‘meaning’ possible than in meaning itself: even more crudely – in form rather than content.”

Although Lacan explicitly demonstrated his homage to Saussure in his “The Insistence of the Letter in the Unconscious,” he presented a new perspective to our perception of the sign, be it a word or image. He brings this interesting story in order to

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182 Ibid., p.10.
challenge Saussure in that not only two signifiers sometimes happen to have one signified but also the sex of the subject determines his/her entry into the Symbolic order, created by language:

A train arrives at a station. A little boy and a little girl, brother and sister, are seated across from each other in a compartment next to the outside window that provides a view of the station platform buildings going by as the train comes to a stop. “Look,” says the brother, “we’re at Ladies!” “Imbecile,” replies his sister, “Don’t you see we’re at Gentlemen.”

As observed in this story, whereas there was a signified for each signifier in Saussure, Lacan believed that there was not a particular and one-to-one relation between the signifier and the signified in that sometimes two signifiers might refer to the same thing. Moreover, whereas Saussure argued it was the relation between the signifier and signified that was behind the process of the generation of the meaning for a sign, such relation is considered by Lacan to happen between the signifiers. There is a changing movement through one signifier to another in the realm of the unconscious. These signifiers create the signifying chain. Thus, while in Saussure a sign is what it is because it is not another sign (negative differentiation), in Lacan it is the signifier that is what it is because it is not another signifier. Thus, as Martin Thom states:

He [Lacan] rejects the Saussurean illustration of the relation existing between signifier and signified because it suggests to us that ‘the signifier answers to the function of representing the signified’. Lacan would hold, rather, that meaning springs from (metonymic and metaphoric) relations between signifiers. Rather than being a ‘representation’, meaning in Lacanian psychoanalysis is a question of production.

Lacan’s argument here is closely related to Freud’s concepts of thing-presentation and word-presentation. Freud had already attributed the presentation of the word to the conscious and that of the thing to the unconscious. Hence, in order to focus on the Lacanian concern with the mechanism of the production of the meaning in the unconscious we should, as Martin Thom demonstrates, refer to language’s metonymic and metaphoric functions, which happen “between signifiers.”

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Furthermore, Lacan saw in Jakobson what proved to be revolutionary in the former’s development of the subject formation. Jakobson had already talked substantially of the “bipolar structure of language,” the ultimate function of which was to select and to combine the linguistic signs in “Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances” that contained Jakobson’s most influential argument in which he expanded his views of the “metaphoric and metonymic poles” of language. Exploring aphasic disturbances, he maintained that they “lie between two polar types”:

Every form of aphasic disturbance consists in some impairment, more or less severe, either of the faculty for selection and substitution or for combination and contexture. The former affliction involves a deterioration of metalinguistic operations, while the latter damages the capacity for maintaining the hierarchy of linguistic units. The relation of similarity is suppressed in the former, the relation of contiguity in the latter type of aphasia. Metaphor is alien to the dissimilarity disorder, the metonymy to the contiguity disorder.  

Language has two modes of arrangement in our verbal behaviour: the selective and the combinative. Jakobson considered metaphor and metonymy to be the binary opposed poles that carried the two-fold process of selection and combination of linguistic signs. Language, consisting of two vertical and horizontal axes, operates based on two functions: the selective function, happening in the paradigmatic axis, is close to what is referred to in literary terminology as metaphor, and the combinative function, happening in the syntagmatic axis, is almost the same as what is called metonymy. Metaphor is the technique of a complete substitution of a semantic unit with another while metonymy is the technique of placing a semantic unit in relation to another. Jakobson conceived of metaphor and metonymy as binary opposed poles that carried the two-fold process of selection and combination of linguistic signs. Therefore, in his study of aphasic disturbances, he argued that in the patient who suffered from dissimilarity disorder it was only the combinative aspect that functioned. Correspondingly, the selective function of language does not operate in the patient who suffers from contiguity disorder.

Importantly Jakobson referred to Freud and argued that his own findings were in parallel to Freud’s mode of the interpretation of dreams. However, we should note that

Jakobson takes both Freudian ‘displacement’ and ‘condensation’ for the metonymic function, and considers the metaphoric function as close to Freudian ‘identification and symbolism.’ This is one of the most misunderstood parts of Jakobson’s influence on psychoanalysis because most suggest Jakobson linked the metonymic pole of language to Freudian ‘displacement’ and the metaphoric pole to ‘condensation.’ Jakobson, but, presented the argument in another way:

A competition between both devices, metonymic and metaphoric, is manifest in any symbolic process, be it intrapersonal or social. Thus in an inquiry into the structure of dreams, the decisive question is whether the symbols and the temporal sequences used are based on contiguity (Freud’s metonymic ‘displacement’ and synecdochic ‘condensation’) or on similarity (Freud’s ‘identification and symbolism’).

As we see in the above extract from his discussion on “the metaphoric and metonymic poles,” Jakobson considered the Freudian ‘displacement’ to be “metonymic” and ‘condensation’ to be “synecdochic.” Therefore, Jakobson believed that both ‘displacement’ and ‘condensation’ happen within the same pole—synecdoche and metonymy are closely related. On the other hand, he maintained that the metaphoric pole, the selective function of language, was close to Freudian ‘identification and symbolism.’

Lacan’s most significant work includes mingling Freud’s method of the interpretation of dreams with Jakobson’s structural linguistics. He analyses Freudian ‘condensation’ and ‘displacement’ in the light of Jakobson’s metaphoric and metonymic poles:

*Verdichtung,* “condensation,” is the superimposed structure of signifiers in which metaphor find its field; its name, condensing in itself the word *Dichtung,* shows the mechanism’s connaturality with poetry, to the extent that it envelops poetry’s own properly traditional function.

*Verschiebung* or “displacement”—this transfer of signification that metonymy displays is closer to the German term; it is presented, right from its first appearance in Freud’s work, as the unconscious’ best means by which to foil censorship.

However, we should note that Jakobson regarded both Freudian ‘displacement’ and ‘condensation’ as the metonymic function, and took the metaphoric function as close to

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188 Ibid., p. 95.
Freudian ‘identification and symbolism.’ Such difference between Jakobson and Lacan’s consideration of Freudian terms has been overlooked by most of the scholars in this area. David Lodge notices the difference in a short note to Lacan’s paper.\(^1\) This is one of the most misunderstood parts of Jakobson’s influence on psychoanalysis in that he did not link the metonymic pole of language to Freudian ‘displacement’ and the metaphoric pole to ‘condensation’: he rather considered both Freudian terms to be metonymic.

Paying homage to Jakobson in one of the endnotes to his paper, Lacan explicitly talked of the high importance of linguistics to the psychoanalysts.\(^2\) Lacan’s attempt to re-formulate the unconscious was thus in parallel to his employment of structural linguistics. The close affinity between the unconscious and the Symbolic becomes more significant if one considers the role of language in constituting both. The Symbolic order opens when the subject acquires language. The unconscious is structured and formed when the subject acquires the subject. Therefore, language plays the instrumental role in both the formation of the unconscious and the construction of the Symbolic. As I shall demonstrate in the next section, both the unconscious and the Symbolic are structured through and similar to language.

5.3.2 The Other and the Subject of Language

The present section seeks to address the Lacanian perception of the subject as the subject of language with particular emphasis on the significance of the Other in the construction of the subject. Early stages of the emergence of the idea of ‘the Other’ are important in the formation of the subject’s subjectivity. Also, the Other appears to be inevitably functioning in the construction process of the subject of language in that it is manifested in the language exposed to the subject.

The other, distinguishable from the Other, is for the first time manifested to the child in the mirror stage. Lacan’s paper “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function,” contributed to the Sixteenth International Congress of Psychoanalysis in 1949, is his most well-known and significant contribution to the then small body of knowledge of both the development of the unconscious of the human subject and his/her recognition of consciousness. The paper, however, had its nucleus in one of his earlier papers contributed to the fourteenth Congress in 1936. Lacan here focuses on the behaviour of the six to eighteen-month old infant. The infant, in this stage, while looking at its image

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in the mirror, becomes aware of, for the first time, the existence of the other. The infant takes its image in the mirror to be an other’s image. Having no idea of its self, the infant immediately comes up with a false conception based on which it imagines that the image it sees in the mirror is its other. The mirror stage is regarded as the first phase in which the idea of the other rises in the unconscious. Dedicating the beginning part of his paper to a discussion of Baldwin’s work, Lacan thus provides the reader with his idea on the mirror stage:


the mirror stage is a drama whose internal pressure pushes precipitously from insufficiency to anticipation—and, for the subject caught up in the lure of spatial identification, turns out fantasies that proceed from a fragmented image of the body to what I will call an “orthopedic” form of its totality—and to the finally donned armor of an alienating identity that will mark his entire mental development with its rigid structure.\footnote{Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function,” \textit{Écrits}, p. 78.}

This small quotation suffices to demonstrate the existence here of the keywords that were to become a major part of Lacan’s psychoanalytic thought: internal pressure, anticipation, identification, fantasies, fragmented, totality, and alienating identity. Lacan’s style of writing should be also noted. He is cautious not to fall in the rhetorical trap that may lead his readers to come up with a false understanding of his ideas. For example, discussing the mental development of the infant when it recognizes its body as a totality, Lacan argues that by totality he means the “orthopedic” form of it, or naming the “alienating identity,” he refers to it as a “finally donned armor.”

The infant first becomes aware of the other and then of itself. Moreover, the idea of the self rises after the first phase of mirror stage when the infant experiences the other. A psychic phase emerges here in which the infant begins to falsify its ‘self’ simply because it identifies it only by and through its ‘other.’ The infant is subjected to a falsified conception of itself that is based not on its self but rather on the other. That is why what happens afterwards is, according to Lacan, the Imaginary, which is a level that exists in the whole course of the subject’s life.

The mirror stage, furthermore, is instrumental in the formation of the subject. This stage is the first phase in which the child is separated from mother. It is interesting to mention that what replaces mother in the child/mother identity formula is the other. Afterwards, the child experiences the first moments of the recognition of him/herself as a separate self. It is in the Imaginary that the child shapes its self. As Jacqueline Rose
argues, the mirror stage is “the focus for the interdependency of image, identity and identification.” She writes:

As a result of identifying itself with a discrete image, the child will be able to postulate a series of equivalencies between the objects of the surrounding world, based on the conviction that each has a recognizable permanence.\(^{193}\)

This is the moment when the child is developing an ego for his/her self. Immediately afterwards, the ego creates the ideal ego, which is both one of the manifestations of the superego and also an unconscious drive for the ego’s identifications with a narcissistic character. However, we should notice that the ideal ego is different from what Lacan called the “ideal-I” in his mirror stage paper. Moreover, as Mikkel Borch-Jacobson suggests, the terms ego ideal and ideal ego are also different in Lacan in that he attempted “to distinguish the ego ideal, understood as an agency for symbolic law, from the ideal ego, understood as an agency for imaginary captation.”\(^{194}\)

The following constituent parts of the human subject come into being after the mirror stage: the other, ideal-I, self (I), ego, ideal ego, and superego. Although I have attempted to put them in chronological order, they might overlap. The infant becomes the subject immediately after it sees the other in the mirror. The infant recognizes itself for the first time because of and based on the other. Jacqueline Rose has remarked that the child’s image sends back to it “the message of its own subjecthood.”\(^{195}\) The self is, thus, subject to the other.

The Symbolic order is that which surrounds the subject; it exists before the entry of the subject into it. Language plays the determining role in the Symbolic order in a way that the unconscious mind becomes subjected to it. The infant, after becoming the subject in the mirror stage, is again subjected when it acquires language. While the first stage of the subjecthood results in the Imaginary, the second stage begins with and continues in the Symbolic order. In these two stages, there are two others that come to existence. The other that emerges in the Imaginary is considered by Lacan as the ‘other’ whereas the other constructed in the Symbolic is spelled with the capitalized O: the


Other. The subject can be also an Other to others. It means that the subject, too, plays a role in the Symbolic order by which others also construct their subjectivities based on it.

The relation between language acquisition processes and mental development concerning the rise of the unconscious desires happen in the Symbolic. While the unconscious in the Imaginary is dealing with the demand of recognition, in the symbolic it is desire that the subject desires. Such desire is outside. It is the desire of the Other desired for us. It is present in the language of the others, the language we unconsciously learn when we are a child. In order to study the major role played by language in the mental development process of the subject an expansion of the term ‘desire’ sounds helpful to a great extent. Lacan in his mature “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire” argues:

Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand rips away from need, this margin being the one that demand—whose appeal can be unconditional only with respect to the Other—opens up in the guise of the possible gap need may give rise to here, because it has no universal satisfaction.196

Thus, desire comes into being, or “take[s] shape,” after the already existing demand and need. ‘Demand’ is the characteristic feature of the Imaginary and ‘need’ is found in the Real; however, ‘desire’ rises in the Symbolic. Not to forget, the Symbolic is where the big Other is present and it also includes language. Thus, it is the language of the big Other that brings the subject desire. To demonstrate what language brings to the subject’s subjectivity is of great significance to the perception of the idea of the subject of language. The subject is subjected to this desire. The source of desire is the unconscious. The unconscious in the Symbolic subjects the subject to its own desire that is the desire of the Other. Lacan framed the interdependence between the unconscious, the Other, and desire as follows:

…the unconscious is (the) discourse about the Other [discours de l’Autre]…in which the de should be understood in the sense of the Latin de (objective determination)… but we must also add that man’s desire is the Other’s desire [...] in which the de provides what grammarians call a “subjective determination”—namely that is qua Other that man desires (...)197

197 Ibid., pp. 689-90.
Lacan argued for the inevitable effect of the Symbolic order on the formation of the subjectivity. Lacan’s argument is here patriarchal in that his theory considers the Symbolic to be governed by the Name of the Father. This theory, moreover, regards language, a major constituent part of the Symbolic, to be masculine. In Lacan, the subject goes through a mental development in the outcome of which is the establishment of phallus as lack since the subject should be subjected to what Lacan called the law of the “Name-of-the-Father,” which is manifestly patriarchal. Subsequently, there emerged a number of critiques of the Lacanian theory of the Symbolic.198

The term ‘the subject of language’ needs more elaboration in that a number of terms such as ‘the subject of desire’ and ‘the subject of fantasy’ are usually employed in the literature available on Lacan and his psychoanalytic thought.199 First, the process of child language acquisition is instrumental in the transformation of the child as the mother’s object of desire to the subject. In other words, after the mirror stage it is language that is chiefly responsible for shattering mother/child identity. Language is of great concern to Lacan when he discusses the construction of the subject’s identity. The subject is now in the Symbolic order that is provided and determined by language.

Secondly, the way the child acquires language affects both the rise and formation of the superego. It is the process of the formation of the superego that plays a major role in the way the subject’s unconscious operates. Language is thus in close association with the superego.

Thirdly, the establishment of the other in the unconscious happens when the subject is exposed to the Symbolic through language. The subject, from this view, is a subject of language in that not only its unconscious is structured through language acquisition but also the Symbolic exposed to him/her is itself regulated by language.

Finally, the term ‘the subject of language’ has been employed throughout the thesis in that, as I shall emphasize in the following chapter, language contains a number of signifiers that, as argued by Lacan, play a decisive role in the formation of the unconscious and, hence, the identity of the subject. These signifiers, that I will refer to


199 For example, Lorenzo Chiesa discusses the Lacanian subject in four different areas that are ;the subject of the Imaginary,’ ‘the subject of the Real,’ ‘the subject of the Symbolic,’ and ‘the subject of the Fantasy.’ See Lorenzo Chiesa, Subjectivity and Otherness: A Philosophical Reading of Lacan, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2007.
in the following chapter as ideological signifiers, act as the subject’s object of desire in the whole course of the subject’s life. The term ‘ideological signifier’ is crucial to my coming analysis of the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic in the next chapter in that it includes designations from both Lacanian theory of the subject of language and the Althusserian conception of the subject of ideology.

5.3.3 Lack in the Identity of the Subject
Exploring the ‘lack’ in the unconscious, the Other, and desire, in what follows I seek to investigate the ultimate constitutive lack over which the identity of the subject is established. However, the main argument of this section is that the lack in the subject’s identity, while created by language, is also negated by it. Therefore, an investigation into the close affinity between the subject and the identity language constructs is crucial in establishing the core of Lacanian subjectivity that I will draw into dialogue with the Althusserian subject of ideology in the following chapter.

What makes the unconscious, the Other, and desire different from what they appear to be is that they share a common feature: they are based on lack. As far as the lack in the unconscious is concerned, Lacan argued that the unconscious had a “pre-ontological” gap. The gap of the unconscious is made when the idea of the other rises. It is more shaped when the big Other emerges. The Other is itself a gap in which it is never fully experienced by the subject. The other, desire, and even objects of desire always remain distant from the subject. Žižek provides us a good analogy in this respect:

The great counterpoint to quantum physics, Einstein’s theory of relativity, also offers unexpected parallels with Lacanian theory. The starting point of the theory of relativity is the strange fact that, for every observer, no matter in what direction and how fast he moves, light moves at the same speed; in an analogous way, for Lacan, no matter whether the desiring subject approaches or runs from his objects of desire, this object seems to remain at the same distance from him.  

As for desire, there is always misrecognition of fullness in desire. Lacan argues that when somebody makes her/his fantasy version of reality, s/he creates coordinate for her/his desire. It means that s/he positions her/himself, her/his objects of desire and the relation between them. Desires hence are based on lack. It is this loss in desire that is

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the cause for our permanent desire of desiring. Hence, the concept of ‘lost desire’ in Lacan does not mean that desire is lost and one should go to find it; rather, it means that desire exists in the unconscious and one seeks to touch it but it is not only based on lack but also never fully touched.

To bring another example, it will be interesting to compare the lack in the unconscious, desire, and the Other to the open space within the letter O. It exists but never completely touched. This figure of the open space within the letter O is exactly like the object of desire in the unconscious. It exists but it cannot be touched. It is this loss the subject is searching to find and seeking to experience in the whole course of his/her life. Another interesting example is the act of sex, in which although the male subject is filling a gap, both male and female subjects are really filling their unconscious gaps through it. The sexual desire never ends; therefore, lack is never removed. Hence, the Lacanian formula that ‘the real is the impossible’ is employed to describe that which is lacking in the symbolic order. The real is that which may be approached, but never grasped.

Lacan was particularly interested in those moments and instances that further demonstrate the lack within the realm of the three orders the subject dwells. For example, his discussion of ‘suture’ at the end of the seminar of “What is a Picture?” clearly refers to another instance of lack that is resulted because of the gap between the symbolic and the imaginary. According to him, suture is “a conjunction of the imaginary and the symbolic.”

Here Lacan refers to the sharp distinction between seeing and the gaze that the subject experiences. Suture is a dialectic of the two, one that brings together both the imaginary and the symbolic. Jacques-Alain Miller has further analysed this Lacanian term maintaining that it is “the relation of the subject to the chain of its discourse.”

Miller’s definition points to the lack that happens within the realm of the symbolic order and is produced when the subject experiences the gap between the imaginary and the symbolic in his/her different acts of seeing and the gaze.

Moreover, the Other, the unconscious, and desire are also based on lack since they are formed and constituted by language, itself characterised by lack. In addition, Lack of the mother for the newly emergent subject is going to shatter the state of mother/infant

identity that once, in the Real, it enjoyed. It was first in the mirror stage that the infant, because of the other and the consequent construction of its self, contributed to the deterioration of the identity state it enjoyed. When language is acquired, the subject soon enters the state of mother/subject non-identity that gives rise to the subject/other supposed identity. Consequently, the subject will be involved in a number of identifications, the ideal ego, the model for the subject’s narcissistic manifestations, being one of the first. Thus, acquiring language and the disunity of infant mother are two other major reasons for the emergence of lack in the identity of the subject.

Lack, however, is negated via language. If there is lack in the Other, desire, and the unconscious, it is language that negates it and makes it present. The Freudian ‘fort-da game’ is a good example. Closely related to the function of language for the subject, ‘fort-da game’ provides an ingenious example of the role of language in creating ‘presence’ for the newly-formed subject when it encounters the idea of ‘absence’. In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920) Freud narrated a story about his grandson playing while his mother is away from home. Whenever the child threw away a wooden reel, he uttered the German *fort*, which means “gone” or “far.” The child really said ‘o’ by which he meant *fort*. Whenever he made it reappear, since the reel had a string attached to it, he happily said *da*. This common happening was to be interpreted by Freud as the moment when the child enters human culture. In other words, the child begins to speak; that is to say that he is entering the Symbolic. But what is highly important is that Freud recognized that the child was doing so whenever his mother was not at home.

Although the observation of this game has given vein to several different interpretations, what is of high significance to the present discussion is that the absence of the mother was to be negated by the presence of language. Freud in his “Negation” paper of 1925 argued that there was a dialectical relationship between presence and absence on one hand, and confirmation and negation, on the other. He wrote: “the content of a repressed image or idea can make its way into consciousness, on condition that it is negated. Negation is a way of taking cognizance of what is repressed.” Hence, the child was confirming the absence of his mother by negating her presence. The absence of the mother led to her presence for the child via language. In the Symbolic the non-present becomes present by negation. Furthermore, as we see,

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203 Lacan also interpreted this story from another point of view. For him, the reel can be taken as object petit a, and the act of repetition symbolizes the repetition of the mother’s departure, which also demands the return of the mother. See Jacques Lacan, “tuché and Automaton,” in *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, pp. 53-63.

two major language functions happen here. The selective function operates when the absence of the reel is substituted by the word, *fort* (not to forget that the mother is also gone), and the combinative acts when both separate *fort* and *da* are uttered as *fort da*. Therefore, although the other or the reel is not present, they are manifested for the subject in the word *fort*. This is what language does for the subject: making present whatever is not present.

In language, too, there are a number of signifiers the subject seeks to identify him/herself with. The identity between the subject and these lacking signifiers are taken as a remedy in that it functions, at least as far as the state of ‘identity’ is merely concerned, like the original identity the infant had with its mother when it was born.

The most famous signifier of lack for Lacanian psychoanalysis is the phallus; while both phallus and penis stood the same for Freud, Lacan refers to phallus as an effective signifier in the unconscious, which is responsible for both lack and sexual difference. Phallus dwells in the unconscious and it is not the male sexual organ. The subject’s unconscious and desire are both based on the most significant lack that is the absence of the phallus. This lack is to play the most significant role in life. The subject’s desire of identification with someone or something is under the impact of such lack. It is the fear of its lack in the phallic phase that creates its lack in the unconscious when the subject faces threats of castration. The Phallus is, as Lacan shows, a ‘privileged’ signifier in that:

One could say that this signifier is chosen as the most salient of what can be grasped in sexual intercourse […] as real, as well as the most symbolic, in the literal (typographical) sense of the term, since it is equivalent in intercourse to the (logical) copula. One could say that, by virtue of its turgidity, it is the image of the vital flow as it is transmitted in generation.

The subject goes through a mental development in the outcome of which is the establishment of phallus as lack since the subject should be subjected to what Lacan called the law of the “Name-of-the-Father.” Language acquisition is nothing but submission to the rules of language. Becoming a speaking subject, s/he is subjected to the rules of the language. Thus, the Name-of-the-Father law is also the big Other.

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205 The signifieds the subject seeks to identify him/herself with are similar to Derrida’s concept transcendental signifieds in that both supposedly demonstrate a truth in language. See Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974, p.49.

The desire to reach a state of complete union between the subject and the non-present concepts that are present in language comes from the very language the subject acquires. These signifiers once supposedly filled the unconscious gap for the subject in the phallic phase. Lacan employed the term ‘alienation’ for the process in which the subject faces and identifies him/herself with small and big Others; correspondingly, two different modes of alienation happens: imaginary alienation that is the result of the subject’s identification with the small other in the mirror stage and linguistic alienation that happens when the subject is exposed to the big Other. Therefore, as Lacan argues, a “twofold alienation” happens to the subject. Lacan thus referred to the other and the Other that cause two different modes of alienation in the third series of his seminars:

There is the other as imaginary. It’s here in the imaginary relation with the other that traditional Selbst-Bewusstsein or self-consciousness is instituted....There is also the Other who speaks from my place, apparently, this Other who is within me. This is an Other of a totally different nature from the other, my counterpart.

Alienation is one of the major characteristics of the Lacanian subject. Linguistic alienation happens when the subject enters the symbolic; that is, when he/she acquires language. The emerging subject is alienated in that he/she has not been the main cause behind the construction of his/her identity. Instead, the subject’s identity is the result of his/her identification with the signifiers. It is these signifiers that form the subjectivity, and thus determine the future identity, of the subject. The Lacanian subject is the subject of the language he/she is exposed to in the Symbolic. The subject, from this point of view, seeks to remain identical to language signifiers, as he/she began to try to do so when s/he leaned language, but he/she can never experience the state of full identity between him/herself and those signifiers. In all his/her life, the subject attempts to fulfill this desire. However, the desire is never fulfilled and the gap is never filled.

Desire of the Other in the Symbolic, which is manifested in the alienation process, is behind the formation of the subject’s identity and his/her attitude towards the identity of the other. The subject does not exist in the pre-mirror stage since the infant feels no other. What happens in the complete mother/infant identity is the Real. There is no loss, no language, and no others in the realm of the Real. There is only fullness. The Real is also the manifestation of complete identity with nature. My earlier discussions on

Hegel’s concepts of the absolute and the subject-object identity along with the Romantic subject’s obsession with nature can be illuminating in a better understanding of the Real.

Experiencing a gap between him/herself and his/her mother in the language acquisition phase, the subject seeks to fill the gap by unconsciously clinging him/herself to a number of signifiers. Language thus is predominantly responsible for not only filling the gap that has occurred because of infant/mother non-identity, but also because it is based on lack. In other words, lack is filled by lack. The first lack is not touched. The second lack is responsible for the new identity of the subject and is negated by language. Whereas the first lack belongs to the realm of the Real, the second is constitutive of the Symbolic.

5.4 Identification of/with the Other:

Self-Consciousness and Lack in Lacan’s Hegel

Although Hegel’s exploration of the way in which the subject recognizes his/her consciousness provides an important philosophical background for any discussions of the subject/the other relationship, this section aims to argue for the influence of another aspect of Hegel’s philosophy on Lacan’s psychoanalysis that has been often overlooked by the Lacanian scholars. Dealing first with the idea of the other in Hegel and its influence on Lacan, I will thus attempt to demonstrate the similar aspects between Hegel’s idea on the rare moment of a full subject-object identity and Lacan’s idea on the impossibility of subject-desire complete unification. The study of Hegel’s concept of the absolute Spirit can be illuminating in the perception of Lacan’s idea on the way the subject becomes aware of his/her identity.

Elaborating on the relevance of the Romantic subject’s desire to be in identity with nature to Hegel’s idea on nature earlier in the present study, I also referred to Hegel’s theory of the absolute Spirit and his view towards the Absolute. As it is known, there is a sharp difference between the absolute and the subject concerning their being and the way they are. Therefore, in order to discuss what the subject is it would be of great help if one refers to the definition of the absolute.

Hegel never presented an explicit definition of the term for ‘the absolute’ was regarded as the subject of both philosophy and religion. The absolute, in Hegel, tended to be synonymous with such terms including God, nature, or the Spinozan ‘substance.’ In addition, the definition provided by Schelling seems to be illuminating here. As discussed in Chapter Three, there are differences between Hegel and Schelling.
regarding the definition of the subject; however, the definition provided by Schelling of ‘the absolute’ played an important role in Hegel’s perception of both the subject and his self-consciousness. Schelling argued that the absolute was “that which is in itself and through itself.” He further stated that the absolute was “that whose existence is not determined through some other thing.”²⁰⁸

Therefore, if the existence of the absolute “is not determined through some other thing,” the subject must be and is that whose existence is determined through some other thing. The “other thing” for the subject, is, in Hegel, nothing but another subject. The subject is that which is not in itself. Accordingly, we come to this conclusion that the subject is that whose existence is determined by another subject. In other words, the subject’s perception of his/her being is made by the other subject. As Hegel articulated on the subject’s perception and awareness of him/herself:

Self-consciousness has before it another self-consciousness; it has come outside of itself. This has a double significance. First, it has lost its own self, since it finds itself as an other being; secondly, it has thereby sublated that other, for it doesn’t regard the other as essentially real, but sees its own self in the other.²⁰⁹

Hegel’s dialectical mode of philosophy manifests itself again. It is the dialectic between the self and the other that creates the self-consciousness of both of them. Such an argument is the opposite of what was earlier thought of the subject’s recognition of his/her self-consciousness. Whereas the ego-centred philosophers, particularly Descartes, had already emphasized the central role of the rational ego in the subject’s self-consciousness, Hegel believed that the subject both “finds itself as an other being” and “sees its own self in the other.” As Wilfred Ver Eecke suggests:

Hegel points out that to “come outside of” oneself in order to see another as a self-consciousness means two things. It means that the other is not constituted as another self-consciousness. The other is only constituted as a projection of the self-consciousness that the first consciousness has not yet become aware of in itself … Hegel also points out that to

“come outside” means that the first does not know itself, but on the contrary it has falsely discovered itself in another being and therefore has found itself as another being.210

On the other hand, Lacan’s theory on the subject’s grasp of his/her identity in the mirror stage, too, emphasizes the role of the ‘other’ in the construction of the subject’s identity. Lacan was informed of the significance of this part of Hegel’s philosophy when he attended Alexandre Kojève’s seminars in the 1930s. Kojève is considered, along with Hippolyte, as key in introducing Hegel’s philosophy to twentieth-century French intellectual thought. A materialist philosopher, Kojève was, in his readings of Hegel, influenced by existential phenomenology. Kojève was interested in Hegel’s idea on the subject’s process of being recognized through the eyes of the ‘other’ that would ultimately lead to the recognition of self-consciousness.

Hegel’s “Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage,” from which the above extract was quoted, contains an imaginary story about the moment the subject obtains his self-consciousness. This frequently narrated tale, called the ‘Master/Slave dialectic,’ is employed in order to clarify Hegel’s view of self-consciousness. The Master and the Slave are two subjects whose existence is dependent on each other. In other words, the Master remains a master as far as there is a Slave, and vice versa. Therefore, the Master, in the recognition of his self-consciousness needs an other subject that finds itself in the character of the Slave. The Slave, too, recognizes himself as a slave when an other subject, the Master, exists. Thus, the emergence of the subjectivity of one of them is pre-conditioned with the existence of the other subjectivity.

It was the dialectic between Master and Slave and its ultimate result that was of high significance for Kojève. The looser in the Master/Slave relation is ultimately the Master in that he identifies himself only through the Slave, and therefore, he is not, as we might think, free. The Slave, on the other hand, while gaining recognition from the Master, is not dependent on him since he has already another source of self-affirmation, which is his work. It is the Slave that becomes free now. Subsequently, we have a reversal of roles; the Master becomes the Slave, and the Slave becomes the Master. Kojève was particularly interested in this part of the story:

If man is nothing but his becoming, if his human existence in space is his existence in time or as time, if the revealed human reality is nothing but universal history, that history must be the history of the interaction between Mastery and Slavery: the historical ‘dialectic’ is the ‘dialectic’ of Master and Slave.\(^{211}\)

Therefore, according to Kojève, the subject’s desire for recognition in the subject-other dialectic, illustrated in Hegel as the Master/Slave dialectic, is manifested in the historical dialectic, one that creates history. It means that it is a dialectic that is operating in all human relations as well as revealing “human reality.” Being either the Master or the Slave, the subject may change in the course of time; it is through, and because of, this change that history proceeds. The manifestation of this dialectic is observed in most of human conditions such as the subject/the other, mother/infant, and even lover/beloved relations. Lacan developed such relations through elaborating Hegel’s thought:

The subject’s desire can only be confirmed in this relation through competition, through an absolute rivalry with the other, in view of the object towards which it is directed. And each time we get close, in a given subject, to this primitive alienation, the most radical aggression arises – the desire for the disappearance of the other in so far as he supports the subject’s desire.\(^{212}\)

Hegel’s emphasis on the role played by the other in the process of the emergence of the self-consciousness on the subject provided Lacan with an insight into the role of the image for the subject in the mirror stage. Furthermore, whereas Kojève considered Hegel’s Master/Slave dialectic as the historical dialectic, Lacan not only discussed the way the subject becomes the subject of desire for the other but also dealt with the aggression emergent in the subject while the subject’s desire is confirmed by competition or rivalry with the other.

The other part of Hegel’s philosophical system that is of significance for investigating the lack in the identity of the subject is his ideas on the subject/object non-identity. Although there are similar treatments here by both Hegel and Lacan, this aspect of Hegel’s mark on Lacan is often neglected in the studies in this area. As I discussed earlier, Hegel’s ultimate estimate of the possibility of the subject-object identity, which


was under the partial influence of Schelling, seems to be like pantheism. Whereas
pantheism’s only aim was to reach the state of complete unification between the creator
and the created, German Idealism, too, believed in oneness of the opposing concepts in
the realm of the absolute.

Consequently, although Hegel argued for the existence of the state in which there is a
subject-object non-identity, he later came to this conclusion that such a state, only if
identical with its opposite that is subject-object identity, could constitute part of the
realm of the absolute that the subject was able to experience. Hegelian notions of the
absolute are in close affinity with the Romantic doctrine of pantheism. If the Hegelian
concept of the absolute brings together the subject and object in an identical sense, the
originally theological Romantic doctrine of pantheism deals with the oneness of nature,
the creator, and man, the created; it also points to the oneness of God, the creator, and
nature, the created. The subject-object identity, if we think of the object as nature and of
the subject as human being, is possible only in the realm of the absolute. However,
Hegel and Schelling believed that no subject could enjoy the state of complete
unification with nature or the absolute. The subject-object identity is possible only in the
realm of the absolute.

Whereas I have so far discussed the influence of Hegel on Lacan, Slavoj Žižek
elaborates the relationship in the opposite direction; he attempts to read Hegel through
Lacan. For instance, in The Metastases of Enjoyment, he dedicates a part of the
discussion to read Hegelian ‘substance as subject’ according to the Lacanian concept of
the subject. Moreover, towards the end of the book he answers the imaginary
interviewer’s questions regarding the relation between Hegel and Lacan. Žižek’s
elaboration on Hegel’s idea on “the passage of consciousness to self-consciousness”
reminds the reader of Lacan’s view regarding mental developments and, particularly,
the notion of the construction of an independent, self-contained ego. He argues:

The passage of consciousness to self-consciousness thus involves a kind of failed encounter:
at the very moment when consciousness endeavours to establish itself as ‘full’
consciousness of its object, when it endeavours to pass from the confused foreboding of its
content to its clear representation, it suddenly finds itself within self-consciousness – that is
to say, it finds itself compelled to perform an act of reflection, and to take note of its own
activity as opposed to the object.213

213 Slavoj Žižek, The Metastases of Enjoyment: On Woman and Causality, p. 188.
As for Lacan, the subject goes through a number of phases before becoming exposed to the Symbolic; there emerges, from the beginning, a false perception of such concepts as self, rational cogito, and ego. Moreover, the identity of the subject and a number of others in the Symbolic is almost impossible. Any attempt to reach a state of complete union between the subject and those other signifiers is itself a desire that comes from and is made by the other. This desire is almost lost since it exists only in language, and, furthermore, it has been immediately repressed. The subject, in Lacanian terms, seeks to identify him/herself with a number of signifiers in the language that he/she acquires when he/she, for the first time, experiences the state of diversity from his/her mother. In all his/her life, the subject attempts to reach a state of complete unification and identity between him/herself and those signifiers that once, when he/she acquired language, filled the unconscious gap for him/her; this gap came into existence because of the deterioration of the unity of the mother and child. However, although the newly born baby is in a state of complete union and identity with its mother, we should not forget that it has not become a subject yet.

There rises a lack when the mother/infant non-identity is to be replaced by language that is also based on lack because of the negating feature of language. Interestingly, the lack is replaced and supposedly filled by lack. What can solve the problem is that these two processes happen simultaneously and they are in the form of one unified lack. Whereas the first lack is not experience by the subject, the second lack, filled by language, is responsible for the constructed identity of the subject. The subject thus forever carries a lack of full identity between itself and the mother, nature, God, substance, or the other be it language or ideology.

The subject-Nature non-identity in Hegel, which is, as demonstrated above, similar to the subject-mother unity in Lacan, causes a lack in identity in that it makes it incomplete. There is always a lack in the subject that causes this incompleteness and, in turn, there is always a lack caused by this incompleteness. Thus, there can never be a full identification of/with the Other. The subject-Nature non-identity in Hegel is thus in parallel to the subject-Other incomplete identification in Lacan.

This conclusion is central to my analysis of the problems emerging in the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic in the following chapter in that if one can also apply a Hegelian approach to the Althusserian theory of the subject, what I sought to present in the previous chapter, then the Lacanian and Althusserian theories can be converged regardless of Althusser’s non-Hegelian reading of his version of Marxism. In addition, both theories have been thus demonstrated as Hegelian in their treatment of the subject.
Therefore, referring to Hegel on both occasions is of high significance to what the present thesis seeks to present: the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic as a model for the analysis of the subjectivity.

5.5 The Lacanian Subject:

An Anti-Cartesian Other in the Imaginary

The idea of the ‘Lacanian subject’ provides an understanding of the subject that is not only different from but also in manifest opposition to the Cartesian subject. Whereas the Cartesian subject believed in the coherence, certainty, and centrality of himself, the Lacanian subject is a split and de-centred subject that is driven by the contradictory parts, orders and drives of his/her unconscious.

It was Freud who for the first time theoretically damaged the modern subject’s illusion of free will, unity, and a rational ego. Lacan, too, contributed to Freud’s attitude towards the human subject by expressing his revolutionary mirror stage theory according to which the subject, from the very beginning, constructs an imaginary and, thus, not true concept of his/her own self. The Lacanian subject is also similar to the Freudian subject particularly as far as the idea of the mental fragmentariness and instability of the subject is concerned.

Such a falsified notion of the self is also in contradiction with the Cartesian subject in that while Descartes considered self in terms of its free and decision-making character, the Lacanian subject is not free; he/she is subject to the Symbolic, and thus subject to language he/she learns in the phallic phase. This is Lacan’s most severe critique of the liberal-humanist post-Renaissance doctrine of the human subject as autonomous, consciously coherent, and free. The Lacanian subject, on the other hand, is not only determined but also subject to the Symbolic order. It is driven and determined not by his/her rational ego but by, for example, the Other’s desire when he/she enters the Symbolic and learns language.

Lacan was highly critical of the Cartesian subject’s assured confirmation of himself as a rational and existing cogito because of its act of thinking. He frequently repeated this criticism in his papers and seminars. For example, immediately after presenting his vague formulas on the mechanism by which the unconscious operates, Lacan once more refers to Descartes and his famous “I think, therefore, I am:”

“I am thinking, therefore I am” (cogito ergo sum) is not simply the formulation in which the link between the transparence of the transcendental subject and his existential affirmation is
constituted, at the historical apex of reflection on the conditions of science. Perhaps I am only object and mechanism (and so nothing more than phenomena), but assuredly insofar as I think so, I am—absolutely.\textsuperscript{214}

Lacan presented his critical reading of ‘cogito’ and believed that the main difference between Descartes and Freud begins with their different usage of the word. Freud’s term for ‘cogitatio’ was ‘psychical’ that did not mean consciousness whereas the term came close to such meaning in Descartes.

In a seminar entitled “Of the Subject of Certainty” Lacan first stated that “Freud’s method was Cartesian”; however, immediately afterwards he mentioned that it was only “in the sense that he sets out from the basis of the subject of certainty.”\textsuperscript{215} After elaborating on the question ‘of what can one be certain?’ Lacan analyzed Descartes’ cogito argument in this way:

\begin{quote}
Descartes tells us—\textit{By virtue of the fact that I doubt, I am sure that I think}, and—I would say, to stick to a formula that is no more prudent than this, but which will save us from getting caught up in the \textit{cogito}, the \textit{I think}—\textit{by virtue of thinking, I am} ... in avoiding the \textit{I think}, I avoid the discussion that results from the fact that this \textit{I think}, for us, certainly cannot be detached from the fact that he can formulate it only by saying it to us, implicitly—a fact that he forgets.\textsuperscript{216}
\end{quote}

Then, Lacan pointed to the differences between the Cartesian and Freudian concepts of the subject of certainty. Mentioning that Freud declared the certainty of the unconscious, Lacan believed that Descartes had to re-assure himself about whose existence he had just re-assured himself because there was always “an Other that is not deceptive, and which shall, into the bargain, guarantee by its very existence the bases of truth.”\textsuperscript{217} Towards the end of the seminar Lacan thus concluded:

\begin{quote}
Descartes did not know, except that it involved the subject of a certainty and the rejection of all previous knowledge—but we know, thanks to Freud, that the subject of the unconscious manifests itself, that it thinks before it attains certainty.\textsuperscript{218}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{216} Ibid., pp. 35-6.
\textsuperscript{217} Ibid., p. 36.
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid., p. 37.
Lacan’s criticism of the Cartesian subject has been critically investigated in a number of recent readings. One of the most critical readings of Lacan is that provided by Alain Badiou who, aware of the significant influence of Lacanian psychoanalysis, refers to it in the introduction to his Being and Event as one of the major trends in the “global state of philosophy.” However, Badiou does not apply a strictly structuralist treatment of the philosophical problems, and he is not interested in the Lacanian and Althusserian anti-humanist doctrines such criticising the possibility of metaphysics and replacing ontology for structuralist concerns. Whereas the subject in Lacan tends to be the subject of the unconscious, for Badiou the subject is conscious in its engagement in the acts of decision and fidelity. In the last ‘meditation’ of Being and Event entitled ‘Descates/Lacan,’ Badiou argues that Lacan is categorized in the Cartesian epoch of science in that Lacan still advocates the thought that “the subject must be maintained in the pure void of its subtraction if one wishes to save truth.” Accordingly, we should not think of Lacan as an absolute opposition to Descartes:

When Lacan writes that ‘thought founds being solely by knotting itself within the speech in which every operation touches upon the essence of language,’ he maintains the discourse of ontological foundation that Descartes encountered in the empty and apodictic transparency of the cogito.

Badiou’s meditations are clearly reminiscent of Descartes’ meditations and the philosophical tradition he is part of. The particular feature in Descartes, and also in a number of other philosophers such as Plato, that is of high significance to Badiou is mathematicism. Badiou can be considered Cartesian in that his philosophy emphasises the significance of mathematical to ontology: “mathematics is ontology.” This philosophical proposition is, in Badiou, concerning the new mathematics of set theory that is concerned with unpredictable and unimaginable quantities, and deals with new infinities that transform our previous modes of thinking.

On the other hand, Badiou is not Cartesian in that he criticises the Cartesian binary oppositions including mind/body, the subject/object, and world/representation as enemies of ontological philosophy. He offers a post-Cartesian perception of the subject in that for him there are no philosophical events per se; on the contrary, he

220 Ibid., p. 432.
221 Ibid.
222 See Chapter Three of the present thesis, where I have presented a discussion of the consequences of the Cartesian subject including the emergence of a new set of binary oppositions.
argues that there are only four conditions that are themselves in the non-philosophical realms including art, science, politics, and love. Correspondingly, there are only four truth procedures that are artistic, scientific, political, and amorous subjects.

However, the Lacanian subject, as exposed above, remains the antithesis of the Cartesian subject, especially as far as the idea of the credibility and authenticity of the ego is concerned. Moreover, the Cartesian subject’s certainty of his self-consciousness is, for Lacan, a mere illusion. It is based on shaky foundations since Lacan believed the subject was seeking ‘the lost desire’ and he/she did not know it was lost. Even if the subject supposes that he/she has experienced desire, it will be soon lost since it is essentially based on lack.

The Lacanian subject’s fragmented character is in close affinity with man’s fragmentation in modernity. Ego, from a Lacanian view, is unstable and uncertain, whose integrity is constantly under the threat of both external and, particularly, internal forces. As I demonstrated in Chapter Three, modernity, in its first phases, was built on the Cartesian subject’s certainty, centrality, and unity of consciousness. However, both modernity’s dreams and Cartesian wishes turned out to be lacking in the twentieth century. As Charles Larmore argues, the Lacanian subject appears to be highly critical of not only Cartesian subjectivity but also of the modern philosophical trends, especially Kant, that have attempted to present their ideas of the constitutive subject. Lacan’s understanding of the subject was not only critical of Kant but also of the philosophy founded on the idea of the free and rational acts of a purely epistemological ego.

5.6 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has outlined the identity of what I call the subject of language. The study first demonstrated the structured character of the Lacanian unconscious as the result of the acquisition of language. Secondly, it was argued that Lacan’s notion of the subject can be considered as the subject of language. This study paves the way for my following discussion of the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic as a model for the analysis of subjectivity in that whereas the subject in Althusser is determined by the structure and its identity is formed through ideological interpellation, the identity of the Lacanian subject is in direct association to the language he acquires. Therefore, the convergence of these theories can result in a more inclusive model for the analysis of the subject’s identity.

Demonstrating that the Other, desire and the unconscious all are based on lack, this section focused on how lack is both created and negated by language. Language is not only responsible for the formation of the unconscious and the Symbolic but also for negating the lack it and its ultimate identity include. Similarly, language belongs not to the subject; it belongs to the Other. Consequently, I argued that the Lacanian subject of language is really the subject of the Other. Otherness thus was explored in the present analysis of the subject with reference to the position of language between the subject and the Other. It is represented in the language the subject embodies; although s/he speaks the language, it is the language that determines and shows his/her identity. The alienation of the subject occurs when it is exposed to language.

In order to understand the lack over which the identity of the subject is based one should first refer to Hegel’s discussion of the subject-object non-identity in which he argues that a full identity of the two is almost impossible. The subject-other non-identity in Hegel is reminiscent of the mother-subject non-identity. If the other in Hegel’s doctrine of the Absolute can also be conceived of as Nature, it was for Lacan either the image in the mirror or the big Other of the Symbolic. Likewise, both referred to the gap between the subject and the other. Lacan explored this lack in the realm of what he called the Real. For Lacan, the lack also exists in the Symbolic because it is constructed by language. In addition, the Lacanian subject was considered as an anti-Cartesian subject in that the former showed that the subject is falsified by the other in the Imaginary and hence his claims of self-autonomy and establishment are all refused. The subject of language, situated in the symbolic, is falsified by the other in the Imaginary and determined by the Other in the symbolic that is language.

Throughout the next chapter I seek to demonstrate that the Lacanian subject and the Althusserian subject, which was analysed in the previous chapter, play a supplementary role to each other in that each one of them focuses on a particular aspect of the subject’s identity; whereas the Lacanian subject tended to consider the subject as the subject of language, the Althusserian subject considers it as the subject of ideology. Consequently, my analysis will focus on the subject as positioned between language and ideology, or between linguistic alienation and ideological interpellation.
Chapter Six:
The Lacanian-Althusserian Dialectic as a Critical Approach: Problems and Premises

6.1 Introduction
This chapter seeks to outline the major problems and theoretical premises of a critical approach to the analysis of the subject referred to throughout the present thesis as ‘the Lacanian-Althusserian Dialectic.’ As its name implies, this critical perspective includes the application of both Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject to the same object of study. The central thesis of this chapter is the development of, despite certain theoretical problems to be discussed, the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic as a critical model for the analysis of the subject’s identity. This dialectic is also demonstrated between the language and ideology to which the subject is exposed and, correspondingly, occurs between the linguistic alienation and ideological interpellation of the subject in the realm of its unconsciousness.

This critical model does not simply draw together similarities between both the Lacanian and Althusserian perceptions of the subject. In the first chapter of the present thesis I referred to those apparent similarities between the Lacanian and Althusserian conceptions of the subject that have caused misunderstanding for a number of critics in putting them into a particular category. These similarities could be misleading in that they lead scholars to overlook the incongruities at work. The Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic as a critical approach faces a number of theoretical problems in that it not only embodies two different systems of thought with different disciplinary backgrounds but also deals with two different phases in the construction of the identity of the subject.

The present chapter includes three major sections. First, I present an account the apparent paradox within the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic that is considered as ‘the convergence of lack and material.’ Then, I approach the question of the construction of the identity of the subject through following the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic by studying the association between the Lacanian perception of linguistic alienation and the Althusserian concept of ideological interpellation. I shall thus present an analysis of ‘linguistic alienation as dramatic interpellation.’ The third section examines the construction of ‘the subject in the ideological Symbolic.’ This section seeks to face the major theoretical premises and problems of the critical methodology of the analysis of the identity of the subject called the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic. The first
theoretical premise includes the exploration of two major questions: ‘inter-subjective dialectic’ and ‘intra-subjective lack.’ The second premise focuses on ‘the ideological constitution of the subject,’ where an analysis will be presented on the process the subject goes through while ideologically constituted. Finally, ‘the representation of identity in language,’ is studied where the identity of the subject is investigated as represented in the ideological language s/he is dramatically exposed to both in infantile and mature years.

6.2 The Lacanian-Althusserian Dialectic:  
The Convergence of Lack and Material  
Providing a more inclusive perspective for the analysis of both the formation of subjectivity and the determination of the subject, the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic is concerned with two essentially different constitutive parts of identity: language and ideology. As I explored in the previous two chapters, whereas language, because of its negativity, is based on lack, ideology, in its Althusserian sense, has a material existence. The Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic thus provides a critical perspective that is involved in the convergence lack and material. Bringing other examples of the apparent incongruity of this convergence, I seek to demonstrate that the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic, though having an ostensibly paradoxical feature, is not only a more wide-ranging model in analysing the construction of the subject’s identity but also offering a critical approach to a strictly Lacanian and Althusserian conception of the subject.

As demonstrated earlier, the similarities between the Lacanian and Althusserian conceptions of the subject have led some scholars to categorize them in the same group. Criticising those responses that are based on an exploration of these apparent similarities earlier in the thesis, I shall now discuss the problems facing the critic whenever the term ‘Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic’ is applied. I shall later argue that these two theories of the subject are supplementary to each other in that each focuses on a constitutive part of identity, that is language and ideology, and also each is concerned with a particular phase in the development of the subject, the infantile and mature years.

A major theoretical problem in bringing together Lacan and Althusser in the form of a unified theory is that they are dealing with two essentially different realms: the unconscious and ideology. ‘Where do the unconscious and ideology meet?’ This is a question that is, first of all, preceded by another question regarding the possibility of

224 For an account of the common classifications of the Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject see Chapter One of the present thesis.
any meeting between the two. An immediate answer to the first question based on my earlier exploration of Lacan and Althusser’s theories of the subject is that they meet in language. Concerning the construction of the unconscious through language I presented a discussion in Chapter Five. However, what remains unsaid is an exploration into the possibility of any meeting between the unconscious and ideology:

The unconscious, in Lacanian psychoanalysis, is built on lack. A preliminary hypothesis concerning the convergence of the unconscious and ideology is that ideology, too, should have been based on lack. As I showed in my Hegelian reading of the Althusserian model of the ‘subject/Subject’ in Chapter Four, the Subject is the model ideology presents to its subjects and there always remains a gap between the subject and the Subject.\(^{225}\) I also demonstrated in Chapter Two the way Laclau has explored the gap between the subject and what ideology requires it to be, that is the Subject. Laclau argues for the impossibility of a full identification in different subject positions. In their conception of ‘the subject of politics’ Laclau and Zac investigate how politics functions through a number of terms and claims which it never accomplishes. These terms need to be “empty in order to constitute the aims of a political competition.”\(^{226}\) However, besides the gap between the subject and the Subject that both Althusser and Laclau refer to, there is also a lack in the Subject itself in that it is never materialized. The Subject which ideology presents to its subjects as a model to cope with is never completely fulfilled by the subjects of that ideology. The Subject itself is thus based on lack.\(^{227}\) The Subject, the ideal political subject required by ideology, is itself conceived of as ideology for the political subject and is never fully realized. Therefore, if the Subject, which is based on lack, is considered as a manifestation of ideology, it can be thus argued that ideology, too, is based on lack.

As for language/ideology relation, it should be mentioned that the abstract character of language and the concrete existence of ideology provide the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic with a major problem that is the incongruity of language and ideology, abstract and concrete, and lack and material. Analyzing language/ideology relation, one should note that while language is abstract and negative, ideology, in its Althusserian form, is conceived of as concrete and material. Moreover, the Lacanian perception of the

\(^{225}\) Althusser did not explicitly refer to this gap; however, it is implied that he had considered it when he argued that the subject of ideology could never become the Subject. See Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation),” in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. Ben Brewster, New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001, p. 121.


\(^{227}\) These two lacks, that between the subject and the Subject and that in the Subject itself, cause the permanent operation of ideology in the further subjuction of the subjects.
unconscious, which is constructed through language acquisition process, considers it as incomplete and dislocated; on the contrary, according to Althusser, ideology has a concrete entity, a material existence, one that can be touched and felt everywhere.

The Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic might be thus conceived of as the convergence of lack and material. However, this incongruity appears to be vital for the permanent functioning of the dialectic between language and ideology. This dialectic is manifested in what has been called in this thesis ‘the ideological signifier.’ I refer to the dialectical association of language and ideology in the construction of the subject’s identity as the ideological signifier. As I shall argue later in this chapter, the ideological signifier, the realm which brings language and ideology together, plays a central role in the construction of identity through the alienation and interpellation of the subject both in language acquisition process and mature years. The study of language/ideology relation is not merely concerned with the combination of the Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject; it is crucial in the understanding of identity in that the subject can, and should be, simultaneously analyzed from these two approaches.

Lacanian psychoanalysis, though focusing on the individual, is also involved in the social for two major reasons: first, Lacan considered the Symbolic to be the determining factor in the construction of the unconscious when he argued that “the unconscious is structured as a function of the symbolic.” The Symbolic, as the social, is what the subject, as the individual, is exposed to. Secondly, the Lacanian unconscious can be considered as not having only an interior life within the subject; it also has a life outside the subject. It is formed by the Other and comes from the Other: “the unconscious is the Other’s discourse.” The unconscious is thus not limited only to the psychic and the individual; it is trans-individual and concerned with the social.

As far as the position of language is concerned, it embodies both the individual and the social. Language is a site where the individual and the social, the particular and the universal, meet. The subject, as the site for the individual and the particular, is thus constructed by language that not only includes the social and the universal but also constitutes the ideological symbolic. Although of different origins and dealing with different objects of study, Lacanian and Althusserian theories provide a sophisticated critical methodology in their present converged form. Applying the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic to the analysis of the representation of the subject’s identity in a novelistic work of art could prove illuminating in that it brings into consideration the

individual and the social, the particular and the universal, and the psychic and the symbolic in its focus on language/ideology relation. If Lacan argued for the construction of identity through the alienation of the subject by language, the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic demonstrates the construction of ideological identity through the alienation of the subject by the ideological signifier.

This critical model also examines those aspects and phases of the construction of the identity of the subject that are neglected by either Lacanian or Althusserian notions of subjectivity. If Lacan was mostly concerned with subject formation in the oedipal period and Althusser was involved in the ideological interpellation of the mature subject, the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic presents a model for the analysis of the subject that emphasised both the language acquisition period and the mature years of the subject. Elaboration on this theoretical convergence is not an argument regarding a simple matter of comparison or a casual relationship. This convergence, however, provides a theoretical framework for the analysis of the subject. The Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic becomes more significant when we bring into consideration the large number of disciplines – literary and cultural theory and criticism, gender studies, semiotics, and film theory, to name only a few – that have been influenced by Lacanian and Althusserian theories on the subject.

The critical methodology offered by the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic does not merely give the Althusserian concept of interpellation a psychoanalytic character; it also aims to add to the Lacanian perception of language and the unconscious the concept of ideology. What should be noted is that if one of these two perspectives alone is applied to reading literary texts, the study would not be inclusive in that each merely focuses on one particular aspect and phase in the construction of the subject. Furthermore, whereas the Lacanian subject is analyzed through his/her desire and fantasy, the Althusserian subject is considered to be subjected to ideology. The Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic, however, studies the ideological fantasies of the subject and the way they have been formed through the unconscious interpellation of the subject.

**6.3 Linguistic Alienation as Dramatic Interpellation**

To begin with, I consider the close affinity between the Lacanian concept of ‘alienation’ and the Althusserian perception of ‘interpellation’ and the role they play in the construction of the subject’s identity. The section argues that the alienation of the subject by language in infantile phase is a dramatic process of interpellation while the interpellation of the subject by ideology in mature years causes his/her further
alienation. I shall also demonstrate that both processes take place in the subject’s unconscious.

By ‘alienation’ Lacan meant the process in which the subject identifies himself/herself with a signifier in the language he/she is exposed to. Alienation is a major characteristic of the Lacanian subject: the subject is first alienated through identification with the other in the mirror stage; later, it is alienated through identification with the language he or she acquires.230 The subject, therefore, cannot construct its own identity. The subject’s identity is the result of the subject’s identification with the signifiers. On the other hand, ‘interpellation,’ in Althusser’s view, is the process through which ideology addresses an individual upon its arrival to society and, in this way, makes him/her the subject to that ideology. Althusser’s main thesis here is that “ideology interpellates individuals as subjects.”231 The way ideology makes an individual a subject happens through interpellation. It is through interpellation that individuals are turned into subjects. In Althusser’s theory, individuals are born into ideology and immediately become subject to it. The subjects do not realize their subjection to ideology and consider themselves to be free and independent individuals.

There are two implications of the subject whenever the term is used: the subject through ideology and to ideology. In Lacan, too, the subject, after the mirror stage, becomes a subject through language and becomes a subject to a number of signifiers that alienate him/her. Subjection in Lacan happens through language and to signifiers. Language acquisition process happens when the subject becomes alienated by the signifiers. Linguistic alienation can be thus referred to as a dramatic mode of interpellation, one that the subject is not aware of. The concepts that alienate the subject, which I call ideological signifiers, exist in the language the child unconsciously acquires.

Apart from this common feature of the terms alienation and interpellation, one should also point to those characteristics of language and ideology that provide a common context for the subject. First, both language and ideology are pre-existing structures in which the subject is positioned. It means that they always already exist before the subject’s entry into them. “[T]he notion that the human subject is constituted by pre-given structures,” Robert Lapsley and Michael Westlake maintain, “is a general feature

of structuralism, according to which subjectivity is determined by structures such as language, family relations, cultural conventions and other social forces.²³² On the other hand, Althusser’s thesis, “individuals are always-already subjects,”²³³ can be observed also in Lacan when he demonstrates that the Symbolic order exists before the entry of the subject into it. Language plays the determining role in the Symbolic order and the unconscious becomes subjected to it.

Secondly, while ideology interpellates the individual and thus constitutes him/her as a subject, language, too, includes a number of signifiers with which the individual seeks to be in state of identity. In other words, the subject is both the subject to/of language and ideology he/she is exposed to. Moreover, if interpellation deals with the moment and process of recognition of interaction with ideology, alienation designates the moment and process of the formation of the subject based on language. Both processes show how the subject recognizes his/her relation to reality, which is, in this regard, constructed through language and ideology.

The Lacanian subject is the subject of the language he or she is exposed to in the Symbolic. The Althusserian subject is the subject of/to the ideologies that interpellate him/her. Thus, the Lacanian-Althusserian subject is subject to both language and ideology. The ideological signifier interpellates the emerging subject in a dramatic way through language acquisition, and, accordingly, the subject is alienated; it also alienates the mature subject through a dramatic interpellation. The crucial point to make here is that ideology is manifested in language, and, also, the subject is interpellated through language. This leads us to contemplate more on the relation of ideology to language and the ways and moments in which language embodies ideology. Towards the end of the present chapter I shall elaborate more on this question when I attempt to analyse the ideological character of the Symbolic.

The Lacanian-Althusserian subject, though seeking to remain completely identical to signifiers, cannot enjoy a state of full identity between him/herself and them. Whereas the Lacanian subject always fails in his/her attempts of fulfilling this desire, the Althusserian subject, likewise, cannot become a Subject. In other words, a state of complete identity in both cases is impossible. The result is a ‘gap’ that is never filled. This gap is shaped in the subject’s unconscious while he/she enters the Symbolic. That is why the Lacanian/Althusserian dialectic is to be mostly conceived of in the

²³² Robert Lapsley and Michael Westlake, Film Theory: An Introduction, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988, pp. 10-11
exploration of the Symbolic. If we categorize the complete mother/infant identity into the realm of the Real, there is no loss, no language, and no ideology in this state of identity. There is, instead, only fullness and complete identity between the infant and the mother, or, as in Hegel, between the subject and Nature.

The mechanism through which both language and ideology construct a subject never permits the subject enjoying a state of full identity between him/her and the signifiers. The more a subject attempts to cope with the model presented by ideology, the more he/she is required by ideology to follow the model. As in language, the endless chain of subjectivization happens because these signifies have in their essence a gap in that they are only to be found in language and not in reality. There is, therefore, a lack in both ideology and language on which they are constructed. In order to discuss the function of both ideology and language in the subject’s identification with them it is illuminating to refer to the way superego functions in its Žižekian terms: it is like a bank to which we can never pay back the whole of our debts; the more we pay off, the more we are in debt.

The concepts of ‘ideological interpellation’ and ‘linguistic alienation’ contribute to this anti-humanistic view that the subject is not the cause and creator; he/she is, however, the effect and created. The subject is the effect of both language and ideology into which he/she is born, and by which he/she is both alienated and interpellated. Both language and ideology are structures. Language, in structuralism, is conceived of as a ‘structure,’ and ideology, in Althusser, is referred to as ‘the structure.’ My argument here is that the language that alienates the subject is manifested in the ideological structure by which the subject is interpellated. While the subject participates in the construction of his/her false sense of completeness in the mirror stage, he/she participates in the reproduction of the conditions of his/her subjecthood. The close affinity of Althusser’s theory of the subject to that of Lacan concerning the relation of the subject to both ‘society’ and ‘mirror-image’ has been thus mentioned by Terry Eagleton:

the relation of an individual subject to society as a whole on Althusser’s theory is rather like the relation of the small child to his or her mirror-image in Lacan’s. In both cases, the human subject is supplied with a satisfyingly unified image of selfhood by identifying with

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an object which reflects this image back to it in a closed, narcissistic circle. In both cases, too, this image involves misrecognition, since it idealizes the subject’s real situation.235

More interestingly, one can observe in Althusser’s definition of ideology implicit echoes of Lacan’s concept of the Imaginary. Whereas Lacan believed that the subject immediately after the mirror stage lived in the Imaginary, Althusser, too, argued for the “an imaginary relation” of the subject to “the real conditions of existence.” This ‘imaginary relation’ is what Althusser calls ideology. Moreover, Althusser’s proposition that ideology is “an imaginary relation to the real conditions of existence”236 is also in parallel to the Symbolic in that it is represented in language; it is language that constructs, maintains, and changes the imaginary relation of the subject to the real conditions of existence. In addition, the relation of the child to the image in the mirror is ‘imaginary’ in that the child imagines that the other is complete and identifies itself with the supposedly complete image of the other in the mirror.

Ideology, according to Althusser, does not reflect the ‘real’ world; what ideology misrepresents is itself one step far from the Real. Lacan’s concept of the Imaginary is distinguishable from the Real as far as language is concerned. Anthony Elliott has described this relation in the following way:

For Althusser, there is a duplicate mirror-structure at the heart of the ideological process, a structure which possesses all the unity and plenitude of Lacan’s imaginary order … what the mirror of ideology essentially does is to implant received social meanings at the centre of the imaginary relationships of individuals to their real conditions of existence. Thus, in constituting the self in relation to discourses of class, race, sexuality, nationalism, and the like, the individual comes to misrecognize itself as an autonomous subject, believing itself to be legally free and self-legislating.237

Although Elliott’s approach in this regard appears to be illuminating in a further investigation of the association between Lacanian and Althusserian theories, he does not work on the problems emerging in the process of the development of a critical perspective based on both theories.

While the Lacanian alienation happens in an indirect way in the infantile phase of the development of the subject, the Althusserian interpellation takes place directly for a

mature subject. However, the Althusserian concept of interpellation can happen dramatically both for the emerging and the mature subjects. Consequently, each one of these theories focuses on one aspect of the process of subjection. If Lacanian theory is concerned with the formation of the subject in infantile phase, Althusserian theory is dealing with the subjection of the individual in mature years. The Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic thus brings into consideration both infantile and mature years in the development of the subject.

Secondly, whereas alienation in Lacan is an unconscious process of which the emerging subject is unaware, and interpellation in Althusser happens directly to the mature subject, the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic regards interpellation as also taking place dramatically. For instance, when the subject is watching a programme on TV, he/she is indirectly interpellated by not only the ideological framework the programme is part of but also by the ideological signifier reproduced there.

Moreover, language acquisition process can be also considered as a dramatic interpellation. Likewise, alienation, too, is not merely confined to infantile years. The grown up subject is also alienated by the ideology that interpellates him. Thus, alienation is the immediate consequence of interpellation in both infantile and mature years.

The Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic thus provides a model for the analysis of the subject’s identity that pays attention to two different modes of the alienation of the subject through bringing into consideration two different phases in the development of the process of the construction of the subject. Also, it is not only concerned with the direct way of interpellation, as in Althusser, but also explores the dramatic ways of interpellation in both infantile and mature years that cause alienation. The common medium in both processes is what I refer to as ideological signifier. I shall further explore the language/ideology relation in the following sections.

6.4 The Subject in the Ideological Symbolic:

Towards a Critical Methodology

Although the ‘Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic’ provides a more wide-ranging critical methodology for the analysis of the subject, it faces certain theoretical problems. Any attempt to bring together the Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject inevitably faces a number of theoretical problems. While I referred to some of these problems in Chapter Two in my evaluation of recent theoretical treatments of the Althusserian and Lacanian concepts of the subject, I aim here to scrutinize the problems
emerging in, as well as the methodological premises of, the Lacanian-Althusserian
dialectic.

This section consists of three main subsections: first, an exploration of both ‘inter-
subjective dialectic’ and ‘intra-subjective lack’ in the identity if the subject will be
presented. Referring to the unconscious character of inter-subjective dialectic, I shall
analyse two modes of this dialectic that I refer to as constructive and destructive inter-
subjective dialectics. Then, I will explore the intra-subjective lack with reference to my
earlier study of the constitution of the subject over lack in Lacan with reference to
distinguishable conceptions of lack in Hegel and Althusser.

Secondly, ‘the ideological constitution of the subject’ will be discussed with
reference to the ideological Symbolic that the subject is exposed to and that ultimately
alienates the subject through an unconscious act of interpellation. And finally, the
question of the ‘representation of identity in language’ will be examined with reference
to the ideological languages that bring about ideological subjectivities. The exploration
of ideological signifier will thus be crucial to this section in that it plays a central role in
the constitution and representation of the ideological identity of the subject in the
language exposed to, and produced by, the subject

6.4.1 The Inter-Subjective Dialectic and Intra-Subjective Lack
The inter-subjective dialectic and intra-subjective lack play a significant role not only in
the construction of the identity of the subject but also in causing the incompleteness of
identity and the impossibility of the subject. I will first demonstrate that there is always
an inter-subjective dialectic at work in the ongoing process of the construction of
identity. Then, I will argue that the intra-subjective lack is what causes the ongoing
changes in the identity of the subject, on one hand, and results in the incomplete nature
of identity and the impossibility of the subject, on the other hand.

The terms identity and subjectivity, though theoretically distinguishable in definition,
are often used interchangeably. However, I shall consider identity as an umbrella term
which includes and brings together different subjectivities within the subject. Thus,
whenever I refer to the identity of the subject, I am really talking of all the constituent
subjectivities of the subject. That is why the general terms of national identity and
religious identity are considered in the present thesis as merely national subjectivity and
religious subjectivity. When the term national identity is used for national subjectivity
widely in media and mass culture, a particular subjectivity of the subject’s identity has
been regarded as the most dominant constituent part of that identity; that is to say, these
general terms are used whenever a particular subjectivity is considered as the whole identity. This usage of the term identity has enjoyed a wide popularity in media and mass culture whereas the term subjectivity is the scholarly term to denote only a constituent part of the subject’s identity.

As demonstrated earlier in the thesis, Hegel’s dynamic of inter-subjectivity with intra-subjectivity in one separate and autonomous entity is considered to be one of the first attempts that dealt with the internal dialectics between subjectivities in the same identity. The dynamic of inter-subjectivity is what exists between different subjectivities inside the subject’s identity. This dynamic has also an external manifestation that exists between the subjectivities of different subjects.238

There are different approaches to what the inter-subjective dialectic within the subject’s identity causes for the subject in contemporary theory; these approaches can be generally divided into the constructivist and linguistic determinist. The structuralist tradition of the humanities argues for the self-regulatory character of the systems and, correspondingly, the restricting power of the structures. Structuralism believes in the subject’s lack of freedom from the structures including language and ideology. Structuralist approaches thus employ a determinist approach to the subject, which is primarily linguistic. On the other hand, post-structuralist thinkers have given more freedom to the subject in its encounter of the structure. Can the subject overcome the inter-subjective dialectics within his/her identity by constructing a new subjectivity? Whereas a constructivist standpoint would agree with the possibility of constructing a new mode of identity for the subject, a linguistically deterministic answer to this question would argue for the impossibility of a complete re-construction of the identity of the subject that is distinguishable from its original identity in every aspect.

An illuminating response based on both constructivist and linguistic determinist approaches can be observed in Judith Butler whose concepts of ‘performativity’ and ‘the agent’ have further explored the inter-subjective dialectic.239 However, her concept of ‘the agent’ comes out of the power that has enabled it. Butler’s analysis of the struggle between the agent and all-including power can be read as her interest in inter-subjective dialectic. What is notable is that this struggle first happens in language and has a ‘psychic’ aspect. No subject invents by itself the language he/she speaks; speaking a language is rather like borrowing it; it is a citing from an already existing vocabulary.

239 For an account of Judith Butler’s parallel employment of structuralist and post-structuralist approaches in developing her concepts of ‘performativity’ and ‘the agent’ see Chapter Two of the present thesis.
The individual subject does not, and cannot, decide the meaning of words in that the subject always already finds itself in a language that has established signifying codes. When we learn to speak, we learn to use those codes; even when we become proficient speakers, our speech still has to follow those codes and rules.

There is, for Butler, always a negative power at work that does not let the inter-subjective dialectic result in a new subjectivity. On both sides of the dialectic there is an attempt of subjection. Subjectivity is always exerting subjection through power. Thus, there are always at least two powers at work in the dialectic between two subjectivities. For Butler, as in Hegel, this dialectic happens in the psyche of the subject. That is why Butler approaches any inter-subjective dialectic through emphasis on the subjection that any subjectivity exerts. She writes:

Subjection is a kind of power that not only unilaterally acts on a given individual as a form of domination, but also activates or forms the subject. Hence, subjection is neither simply the domination of a subject nor its production, but designates a certain kind of restriction in production.240

There is a struggle between different modes of subjection in that subjection is itself ‘a kind of power.’ As demonstrated earlier in the thesis, Butler seeks to present a theory that provides more freedom for the subject in comparison with other structuralist theories. Whereas Lacan’s emphasis on the Symbolic results in the impossibility of any constructivist attempt of the subject, Butler’s concept of the agent and his/her performativity allows more freedom. While the Lacanian subject is linguistically determined, Butler’s agent can be conceived of as constructivist.

A similar account of the internal dialectic within the identity of the subject has been mentioned by D. E. Hall. Referring to the ‘meta-awareness’ of the subject when facing any internal dialectic, Hall argues that “the possibility that one can gain control over that which has controlled one’s consciousness by becoming conscious of that dynamic of control is the premise of most twentieth-century theories of politicized subjectivity.”241

What Hall is concerned with happens only when the subject differentiates him/herself both as the knowing subject and the object of study. ‘Meta-awareness,’ the term employed by Hall, is the awareness of the conflict between our self and the other

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subjectivities of our identity. ‘Meta-awareness’ thus points to the self-reflexive nature of
the dialectic between the constitutive subjectivities of the subject’s identity.

The inter-subjective dialectic in the identity of the subject can be considered as
having constructive and destructive modes. Constructive inter-subjective dialectic
happens when a new subjectivity emerges out of the dialectic between opposing
ideological subjectivities. This newly-formed subjectivity is distinguishable from the
other subjectivities in that it is conceived of as a synthesis, in the classical Hegelian
sense, which emerges out of the conflicts between the existing subjectivities. The other
subjectivities, such as those formed in the process of language acquisition, are the result
of the subject’s mental attachment to the signifiers. What is notable here is that this
emerging subjectivity is not fixed and stable; it rather undergoes an ongoing process in
that there are always a number of other subjectivities in the subject’s identity to which
this new subjectivity is the other. There is constantly an inter-subjective dialectic
between the constituent subjectivities of the identity of the subject. Even if an existing
subjectivity becomes the dominant in the subject’s identity, it is still conceived of
having undergone a constructive dialectic in that what ultimately occurs is the
foregrounding of a particular subjectivity.

The deconstructive inter-subjective dialectic, on the other hand, occurs when the
conflicting subjectivities don’t give birth to the rise of a new subjectivity. The subject
here is dangling between ideological subjectivities. This mode of the inter-subjective
dialectic can cause psychological disorder for the subject. The frequently quoted term of
‘shattered personality’ can be applicable to the subject when the deconstructive inter-
subjective dialectic affects his or her identity. This mode of the inter-subjective dialectic
is what is generally referred to as identity crisis. The significant point here is that this
mode of inter-subjective dialectic has often an unconscious feature, one the subject is
unaware of.

There is often an intra-subjective dynamic at work within the subject’s identity, one
that exists within the subjectivity itself. Subjectivity always includes a lack since it is
constituted by language. Language negates what it signifies, and it is thus based on lack.
Subjectivity also includes the subjectivity against which it defines itself. This
characteristic is generally referred to as antagonism. Identity is thus never fully
constituted and has an ‘incomplete’ character. The ‘incompleteness’ of identity does not
merely go back to the inter-subjective dialectic inside it. It is also essential to the
function of identity in that there is always an intra-subjective lack at work that produces
the impossibility of the subject. For instance, a new social movement cannot claim it has
completely fulfilled its purpose since identification with a particular subjectivity or doctrine is not ‘reducible’ to identity. There are always other subjectivities in the same identity and, furthermore, identity always fails to fully embody what it says it includes. Butler, Laclau, and Žižek in their collective ‘introduction’ to *Contingency, Hegemon, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left* (2000) have argued for the ‘incompleteness’ of identity when they are dealing with the ‘identity-claims’ of the present day social movements. They write:

…‘identity’ itself is never fully constituted; in fact, since identification is not reducible to identity, it is important to consider the incommensurability or gap between them. It does not follow that the failure of identity to achieve complete determination undermines the social movements at issue; on the contrary, that incompleteness is essential to the project of hegemony itself.242

Even if we say that identification may be reducible to a particular subjectivity it is a not well-founded proposition in that subjectivity itself functions exactly in the same way identity does. Subjectivity, like identity, always negates itself.

Investigation into the lack upon which identity is established has been examined in contemporary philosophy, psychoanalysis, and post-Marxism. Again here Hegel is important. He was specifically concerned with the gap between the subject and the absolute Spirit, and his notion of the incompleteness of identity has given rise to the contemporary idea of the impossibility of the subject. A major question in critical evaluations of identity is the investigation into the lack identity embodies and is built on. As Lacan demonstrated, there forms a gap in the identity of the subject immediately after the mirror stage.243 Also, as Jameson suggested, there remains a gap in the moment of the transition of the Imaginary to the Symbolic.244 Žižek, too, is obsessed by the lack the barred O, ideology, is based on.245 However, what makes Althusser subject to further criticism is his ignorance of the lack that identity is based on. In other words, Althusser did not argue for the existence and operation of an intra-subjective lack within identity.

As I demonstrated in Chapter Four, a mythical example of the existence of the intra-subjective lack could be observed in the story of Moses’ encountering of God. Althusser did not deal with this problem from this view; he was not part of the Hegelian tradition of analysing inter-subjective dialectic and intra-subjective lack. Althusser renounced Hegel when, dealing with Marx’s epistemological break, he attempted to purify the latter from the former. As Judith Butler notes in her first book, there were two different readings of Hegel in the mid-twentieth-century France: the first reading was that provided by Alexandre Kojève and influenced such figures as Lacan and Bataille; the second was that presented by Hyppolite and influenced such figures as Althusser and Foucault.\(^{246}\) Althusser, in his criticism of the Hegelian influence in Marx, did not bring into considerations those parts of Hegel’s arguments that had influenced Lacan. However, we should note that the Hegel Lacan was influenced by was not the Hegel Althusser tried to separate from Marx: the Hegel Althusser criticised was the philosopher who was devoted to the analysis of metaphysics and the Absolute Spirit, and the Hegel Lacan followed was the philosopher who was devoted to the analysis of the subject’s identity with reference to the idea of otherness.

The subject always carries a lack of full identity between itself and the other, be it the mother, Nature, God, substance, or language and ideology. The interesting point is that the subject always fails in seeking to reach a state of full identity between itself and the other. The non-identity of the subject and the other also goes back to the intra-subjective lack that exists in identity. The subject thus cannot be completely identifiable with the ideological language it both acquires and, consequently, reproduces. The intra-subjective lack avoids any full identity between the subject and what the ideological language requires it to be. This causes the always ongoing functioning of all ideologies. Both inter-subjective dialectic and intra-subjective lack generate the always incomplete nature of identity.

Therefore, the identity of the subject is considered as constituted by different subjectivities, themselves formed by ideological languages. The subject always fails in its attempts to be in a state of complete identification with what ideological language wants it to be. There is thus a permanent state of incompleteness in identity, one that causes non-identity of the subject and the other. The subject hence does not experience

a stable and fixed condition of identity and it is permanently positioned in an ongoing process of change.

6.4.2 Ideological Constitution of the Subject

Based on its sameness to that which has created it, subjectivity can be considered as identical with the ideology that has produced it. Subjectivity first exists in the Symbolic, and then becomes part of the identity of the subject. Referring to the Althusserian definition of ideology, one can propose that subjectivity, except for that produced by art, has an ideological character.²⁴⁷ Approaching the Symbolic as ideological, we are explicitly providing the Lacanian concept with an Althusserian signification.

Language, Lacan argues, is the most significant constituent part of the Symbolic. It is also the medium through which the ISAs and, especially the RSAs, exert their power and influence. Language, in my argument, remains ideological in that the subject is primarily exposed to it through familial and educational systems, which are the ideological State apparatuses. Language can be regarded as ideological also because it is the medium through which we define our “imaginary relation to the real conditions of existence.”²⁴⁸ Likewise, there is no relationship between language and reality in structuralism. Language, in this sense, is not the reality but a window through which reality is represented.

Apart from the function of the ISAs, Language itself reproduces the conditions in which the Symbolic becomes ideological. Thus, subjectivity takes on an ideological function not only because of the ideological character of the Symbolic but also because of the representation of the ISAs in it. Also, the Symbolic is ideological since there always exists a ‘problematic.’ Althusser used the term to demonstrate the ideological burden of the words and the context in which we are located. Problematic means that a word or concept cannot be considered in isolation; it only exists in the theoretical or ideological framework in which it is used.

Subjection to a number of signifiers in the process of linguistic alienation is a dramatic unconscious interpellation. This is manifestly an Althusserian reading of the Lacanian concept of alienation. Lacan employed the term ‘alienation’ for the process in which the subject identifies him/herself with a signifier. The subject’s identity is the result of the subject’s identification with the signifiers. Therefore, it is these signifiers

²⁴⁷ Althusser did not rank art among ideologies. I shall refer to Althusser’s notion of art/ideology relation later in this chapter.
²⁴⁸ Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation),” in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, p. 109. For a full account of Althusser’s perception of ideology see Chapter Four of the present thesis.
that determine the identity of the subject. The Lacanian subject is the subject of the language he/she is exposed to in the Symbolic. The subject, from this point of view, seeks to remain identical to linguistic signifiers. Signifiers are conventionally loaded with ideological designations. The unconscious becomes, through language, the site of these signifiers.

The subject’s mental attachment to these signifiers fills for the subject the unconscious gap that appears when the unity between the subject and its mother is shattered in the process of language acquisition. Here two points should be clarified: first, by signifiers I do not merely mean the Lacanian phallus; there are also a number of other signifiers that the subject unconsciously seeks to identify him/herself with. Secondly, although the phallus has been considered as the dominant signifier in Lacan, a signifier that both fills and creates the gap in the unconscious, it also fills the gap that emerges in the mother/subject disunity.

Lacan’s frequently quoted “the unconscious is structured like a language” considers the formation of the unconscious according to the structure of language. This proposition points only to the formation of the structure of the unconscious. If we bring into consideration Lacan’s other proposition that “the unconscious is the Other’s discourse,” we find out that the relation between the unconscious and language is not merely a matter of structure; it is also a matter of content. I want to contend that the unconscious is ideological in that the discourse of the other is, in an Althusserian sense, most often ideological. The Other is always already ideological and in close affinity with the ideological feature of the Symbolic. The subject, then, is exposed to an ideological Other, and its subjectivity becomes ideological. However, the subject’s identity is not entirely identical with the Other. There is always an ego that considers itself to be different from the Others. The ego, however, is only a small part of the subject’s identity. Thus, apart from that, the other subjectivities in the subject’s identity are identical with the ideological Other. I call these subjectivities ideological.

The second exception that remains outside the realm of the ideological subjectivity, besides the ego, is ‘real art.’ Althusser’s famous declaration on art is illuminating here. In “A Letter on Art in Reply to André Daspre” he wrote:

The problem of the relations between art and ideology is a very complicated and difficult one. However, I can tell you in what direction our investigations tend. I do not rank real art

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among the ideologies, although art does have a quite particular and specific relationship with ideology. 251

A significant question to ask here is ‘what is ‘real art’ is by definition?’ Or, what did Althusser mean by it? Answering this question leads us to the area of aesthetics and Althusser’s relation to literary and artistic criticism. The immediate answer is that we refer to any classic work of art as real art. What a classic work of art is would be relevant to the philosophy of aesthetics. I will shortly contend that ‘real art’ is that which, although including ideologies and being produced in an ideological framework, distances itself from ideology and the ideological context in which it is produced. A work of art is here considered as having a distance from the ideologies it represents; this distance is created by criticising, satirizing, or simply deliberately ignoring the ideologies that create a context for the text. What is of interest to me is first how these ideologies are represented in the text, and, then, how they have transited into the language which carries them.

An Althusserian reading of other Lacanian concepts gives birth to similar results. For example, fantasy in Lacan is generated because of the desire that comes from the Other. What I want to show is that fantasy can be an ideological narrative because it comes from the Other that is already ideological. Although Lacan considered fantasy to embody a sexual narrative, it can also include the fulfilment of those non-sexual repressed desires that have been generated by the ISAs. Fantasy, the manifestation of the unconscious desires of the subject, is the story we narrate about our desires. The desires of the subject are not always sexual.

A clear example of the ideological fantasy happens when a smoking teenager dreams of buying cigarettes. This fantasy has been created by the ideological rule that bans the selling of tobacco to anyone under eighteen. Another good example is a poet’s fantasy of receiving the Nobel Prize for literature, a desire generated by educational and cultural institutions. It is propagated by ideology, and the institution that awards the prize is itself an ideological State apparatus. Other ideological institutions such as TV channels, radio stations, newspapers, and websites are all contributing to its ideological establishment. Ideological apparatuses such as universities and academic centres invest in this poet by, for example, inviting him/her to deliver lectures. Therefore, a discourse, which is ideological, is created. The desire of the poet for the Noble Prize is thus ideological and determined and reproduced by the Symbolic.

However, as Lacan maintained, in the realm of the unconscious the signifier lacks any signified. Ideology thus exists in the unconscious in the form of a signifier, a letter, word, phrase, or statement: the signifier has an ideological burden. It is this very ideological burden of the signifier that makes us think of it as a signified. Moreover, language is the most significant constitutive part of the Symbolic. The ideological dimensions of language are thus reproduced every day.

Commenting on ‘discourse,’ Julian Wolfreys considers the relationship between language and power and maintains that language is not “merely an adjunct to forms of power,” it is rather “the articulation of that power.” Referring to Foucault’s view on relations between the subject and discourse, he goes further to argue that there are always a number of other elements present:

… human subjectivity and identity itself is produced out of various discursive formations as a result of the subject’s entry into language shot through and informed by figurations and encryptions of power, politics, historical, cultural and ideological remainders organized through particular relationships and networks.252

Formation of subjectivity thus begins with “the subject’s entry into language.” As I discussed earlier, language is a battlefield of ideologies. The subject’s initiation with language creates an ideological interpellation of which he/she is unconscious. Language embodies ideological features and elements; it absorbs and reproduces them, and ultimately makes them constructive of the subject’s subjectivity.

There are two different phases in the subject’s exposition to language: infantile and mature years. I elaborated on alienation in infantile years earlier in the thesis. As for the mature years, the subject is alienated through the ideological interpellation that has both direct and dramatic modes. An example of direct interpellation is Althusser’s story of a police calling an individual in the street; the example for indirect and dramatic interpellation, which happens through language, is when the subject watches a movie, serial, or news on TV. The subject is here dramatically interpellated through ideological language. What is of importance here is that ideological interpellation and its consequent linguistic alienation often happen in the unconscious.

In both phases the ideological constitution may happen both consciously and unconsciously. An example for the conscious ideological constitution of the oedipal period is those moments when the child is frequently asking questions. What is

operating here and needs to be analyzed is the language the subject acquires, learns, or is exposed to. The language the subject encounters in both the oedipal and mature phases interpellates the subject. What seems most notable is that, in Althusser, ideology and interpellation not only consist of but also constitute each other. Thus, wherever there is ideology, we can see interpellation at work. The subject is ideologically constituted in that the linguistic signifiers s/he is unconsciously alienated by are already ideologically designated and, hence, loaded with an ideological burden. Thus the Symbolic the subject is exposed to is itself predominantly ideological in that most of the subjectivities are ideological. Moreover, there are different ideological subjectivities in the identity of the subject and the subject functions according to the ‘dominant’ one.²⁵³

6.4.3 Representation of Identity in Language

Subjectivity, especially when ideologically constituted, is represented in the language of a text. The question of the relation of a text to ideology has been of high interest to any Marxist literary criticism. However, what makes the present methodology distinguishable is its focus on the representation of ideological subjectivities in language. ‘Ideological language,’ a key concept in my analysis of the identity of the subject,’ is not responsible for the subject’s whole identity. It represents only a particular subjectivity that is itself permanently changing because of the changes in the framework and extent to which the subject is exposed. Ideological constitution of the subject happens when the ideological signifier is established in the subject’s unconscious. Investigation into the ideological language is a complicated process in that each ideological aspect of language is itself influenced by a vast number of ideologies in the same language. What are the characteristics of an ideological language? The origin of the answer goes back to what ideology itself is. In Althusser, except for real art and science, everything may be categorized into the realm of ideology. More specifically, ideology is that which is found in and produced by the ideological State apparatuses: the language in domestic, educational, religious, and political systems is ideological. If we consider their mode of language reproduction with especial reference to their mechanism of ideological production, we will succeed in determining a moment when Marxism and psychoanalysis meet in language.

²⁵³ I have borrowed the concept of ‘the dominant’ from Roman Jakobson. See Roman Jakobson, Language in Literature, Krystyna Pomorska and Stephen Rudy, eds., Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1987, pp. 41-6. Accordingly, there is always a dominant subjectivity among the constitutive subjectivities of the identity of the subject.
If, for Althusser, everything except for real art and science is ranked among ideologies, therefore, language, in most instances of its usage is provided with an ideological character. Therefore, the process of language acquisition includes ideology acquisition too. The subjection of the subject to ideology happens through language dramatically. Language makes us the subject to ideology from an early stage of life sometimes even without our perception of it. Language is a pre-given structure to the subject, and it thus plays the role of the Other for the subject. On the other hand, every subject uses and expresses language in its particular way, and, accordingly, it is also a belonging of the subject. Then, language is both the other and the self to the subject.

Furthermore, language can be conceived of as the converging point where both the universal and the particular come together. Language, as the other, is the site of the universal. It is, as what the subject owns, the site of the particular. The identity of the subject is thus characterised by its distance from the universal and the particular. What happens to the subject when positioned in the particular in opposition to the universal has been the subject of a substantial philosophical debate. A recent contemplation on the struggle between the two is Laclau’s “Universalism, Particularism, and the Question of Identity.” He argues that “pure particularism is self-defeating.”

... the argument for pure particularism is ultimately inconsistent. For if each identity is in a differential, nonantagonistic relation to all other identities, then the identity in question is purely differential and relative: it presupposes not only the presence of all the other identities but also the total ground that constitutes the differences as differences. ... if a particularity asserts itself as mere particularity, in a purely differential relation with other particularities, it is sanctioning the status quo in power relations between the groups.254

If the Other is considered as the universal to which the subject is exposed and if the self is taken as the particular which the subject produces, language will become the terrain where both are manifested. Bringing into consideration Laclau’s remarks on particularity, one can propose that language is functioning on its universal feature, which comes from the Other.

Artistic language – produced by the persona of lyric poetry or manifested in a poetic novel, to name only a few – often represents the particular and not the universal. Whereas language is closely related to the universal, it becomes the site for particularity in some inventive styles of composition. However, there is still a conflict between the

universal and the particular in the creative style of writing: any invention in language is
in opposition to the Other from which language has been obtained. Therefore, there is
always a struggle with the Other in artistic works. Reviewing my argument concerning
the consideration of the Other as constitutive of the ideological Symbolic, I want to
contend that artistic invention in language is in a profound conflict with the ideological
Symbolic that has already constituted the subject.

The subject’s relation to language in the above examples reminds us of the famous
Lacanian idea of ‘the wall of language.’ Language is that which keeps the subject from
the Other. Language, on one hand, divides the subject and the Other, and, on the other
hand, divides the subject itself. In a seminar Lacan pointed to the wall of language as
the factor behind the separation of the subject from the Others:

So there’s the plane of the mirror, the symmetrical world of the egos and of the
homogeneous others. We’ll have to distinguish an other level, which we call the wall of
language… The subject is separated from the Others, the true ones, by the wall of
language… In other words, language is as much there to found us in the Other as to
dramatically prevent us from understanding him.255

Lacan’s consideration of language, like Laclau’s emphasis on universality, is in favour
of the Other. In both accounts, although an individual ego exists and particularity is at
work, it is the Other that exerts its influence at the last instance. Language,
consequently, becomes the site for dialectics between ideological subjectivities.

Yet, the subject can succeed in affecting the Other, the structure, if we agree with the
Althusserian model in which every change in a practice results in a change in the
structure to which that practice belongs. The Althusserian model of the position the
subject provides, in comparison with Foucauldian and even Lacanian approaches, a
‘relative freedom’ for the protagonist of a literary text in his/her acts of identity re-
construction. Ideology is regarded by Althusser as having no beginning and end. It is
part of human existence. The subjects need ideologies in that they need to explain
themselves, even in their sexual and non-sexual fantasies. But what makes the
Althusserian model different is that while in Lacan the subject is doomed to be
governed forever by the desire of the Other, and also while in Foucault the subject’s
psychic identity is marginalized in favour of the discourse that has already produced

Norton, 1991, p. 244.
him/her, in Althusser the subject can affect the structure and ideology. The Althusserian subject, because of his/her practices, including the theoretical practices, can affect not only the other levels of the social formation but also the complex whole itself.

As far as the subject’s act of the development of language in his/her mature years is concerned, the Althusserian model also provides a relative freedom for the literary protagonist of a given text in facing the conflicts between the his/her linguistic inventions and the ideological subjectivities that surround him/her. The Lacanian subject is always doomed to be determined forever by the Symbolic. This theoretical feature has been ignored in both Žižek and Butler’s evaluations of Althusser. However, Butler’s concept of the agent is similar to the Althusserian model in that it seeks to come out of a linguistically determinist framework and deals with the complicated process of de-institutionalization and the rise of new subjectivities within the subject’s identity.

As noted, the representation of identity in language is mostly analysed throughout this thesis through focusing on the realm of the Symbolic. However, the relation of language to the Imaginary and the Real has also aroused challenging critical evaluations. In his paper on Freud and Lacan Althusser demonstrated how the Imaginary itself is structured and determined through the order of language. Examining Lacan’s psychoanalytical concepts of the triad orders that the subject is positioned in, Althusser argued that “the moment of the imaginary itself ... is marked and structured in its dialectic by the very dialectic of the Symbolic Order, that is, of the human order, of the human norm ... in the very form of the Order of the signifier, that is, in the form of an Order formally identical to the order of language.”

Concerning the relation of language to our understanding of the Real, I demonstrated earlier in the thesis that Lacan approached the Real as that which is not expressed in language and, hence, which the subject cannot experience. However, the problem here is that the Real, though inexpressible, exists. As I demonstrated in Chapter Two, Jameson argues that Lacanian theory of the triad orders is notable in that it investigates these three different orders in the same subject. For him, the transition of the Imaginary into the Symbolic is important, an approach observed in Lacan’s reading of Poe’s “The

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Purloined Letter.” Also, as discussed earlier, Žižek employs both Lacan and Hegel in order to deal with the relation of language to the Real.

What is important here is that the conception of the Real is made through the Symbolic. In other words, there is nothing outside the Symbolic that can deal with the Real. In our perception of the Real we use language that is a major constituent part of the Symbolic. Even philosophers, who are obsessed with the investigation of the Real, inevitably explore it through the sign system of the Symbolic, language. Therefore, any discussion of the association of language to both Real and Imaginary orders is itself determined by the Symbolic.

The question of the construction and representation of identity is also crucial in Critical Discourse Analysis. Norman Fairclough’s work provides a classic example here. He focuses on the way language regulates, and also changes, the social order. In Language and Control (1989) he deals with the instrumental role of language in maintaining and changing ideology and power relations. Demonstrating the way language contributes to the domination of some people by others, Fairclough argues that the aim of CDA is “helping people to see the extent to which their language does rest upon common sense assumptions, and the ways in which these common-sense assumptions can be ideologically shaped by relations of power.” Later dealing with the relationship between language and ideology in Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language (1995) Fairclough seeks to develop a theoretical model for the analysis of language in relation to ideology and power. However, the main project of CDA, as Fairclough maintains in Analyzing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research (2003), is concerned with the analysis of linguistic categories including the relationship between the structure of the text and the agent of the text, which he refers to as “structure and agency,” and the linguistic elements of networks of social practices, what he calls “orders of discourse.”

The critical model provided by the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic, though apparently similar to CDA, is distinguishable from it in several ways. First, there is here an emphasis on the Lacanian concept of the unconscious and the process that makes

261 Ibid., p. 24.
ideology part of language and, accordingly, the unconscious. CDA, however, is not involved in the process of the formation of the unconscious as far as the linguistic alienation of the subject in the oedipal phase is concerned. Secondly, the ideological interpellation of the subject is central in the present methodology in that it produces ideological subjectivity within the subject’s identity. As for CDA, while it is concerned with ideological discourses, it does not focus on the direct and dramatic ways of the interpellation of the subject as far as the role of ideological signifiers in constructing identity is concerned. Furthermore, a major shortcoming in the methodology followed by CDA is that it emphasises the concept of discourse to the extent that the subject itself is marginalized. Dealing with the construction of a particular discourse in a Foucauldian paradigm, CDA approaches subjectivity through the analysis of the texts and not in the identity of the subject. This is a paradoxical consequence of Foucault’s work: whereas Foucault’s project was to bring into focus the marginalized subjects and minority groups, CDA, on the contrary, tends to ignore the analysis of the subject in favour of representing the foregrounded discourse.

The Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic, however, is concerned with the analysis of the subject itself and the way the subject is constructed by the ideological Symbolic manifested in the language the subject is exposed to. It also focuses on the way the subject’s identity is represented in the language he or she acquires and later reproduces. In addition, the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic considers the ideological language reproduced by the subject as representing only a particular subjectivity within the subject’s identity. Ideological language that represents the subject’s identity undergoes an ongoing state of changing in that there is always a change at work in the structure in which the subject is positioned.

### 6.5 Concluding Remarks

The present chapter investigated the major theoretical problems and premises of any critical attempt that applies both Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject to the same work of art. A summary of the arguments of this chapter includes: first, although the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic as a critical approach to the analysis of the subject might be conceived of as the convergence of lack and material, this incongruity appears to be vital for the permanent functioning of language/ideology relation that is manifested in what I referred to as ideological signifier. Secondly, it was argued that the

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Lacanian formulation of linguistic alienation and the Althusserian concept of ideological interpellation are closely related in a way that both dramatic and direct ways of ideological interpellation in infantile and mature years, as two distinguishable phases in the development of the process of identity construction, cause linguist alienation for the subject. Consequently, the subject undergoes two modes of linguist alienation that occur in language acquisition process and the mature years respectively.

The chapter, then, concentrates on the theoretical premises of the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic as a critical perspective for the analysis of the identity of the subject. First, considering the concept of identity as an umbrella term that brings together different subjectivities within the realm of the same subject, I explored the ‘inter-subjective dialectic’ and the ‘intra-subjective lack’ in the process of identity construction. Secondly, I discussed the ideological constitution of the subject with reference to the ideological character of the Symbolic and subjectivity. Approaching the Symbolic as ideological, this thesis explicitly provides the Lacanian concept with an Althusserian treatment. Thirdly, the representation of the identity of the subject in language was explored while focusing on ‘ideological signifier,’ a key concept in my analysis of the subject’s identity, and the role it plays in alienating the subject.

However, ideological language is not responsible for the subject’s whole identity. It represents only a particular subjectivity that is itself permanently changing because of the changes in the framework and extent to which the subject is exposed.

In my study of the process of subject formation in Joyce’s novel in the following chapter I shall thus focus on the two modes of ideological interpellation and the consequent linguistic alienations. Elaborating on the identity construction of the subject, I shall explore the relation of language to the Symbolic through exploring the moments in which ideology transits into language. This approach shall also foreground the ideologies that existed in the context in which the text was produced. The text’s strategy towards these ideologies is determined by the way in which these ideologies are represented in the text. Considering the self-consciousness of the subject not as a fixed state but as an ongoing process that always remains incomplete, the following chapter also deals with the role of language in the re-construction of identity through investigating the inter-subjective dialectics between ideological subjectivities.
Chapter Seven:
The Ideological Symbolic and Aesthetics of Language in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*:
A Case Study in Subjectivity Formation and Representation

7.1 Introduction
This chapter demonstrates how the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic can be applied as a critical approach to reading a literary work. First, I shall interpret the process of subject formation in the protagonist of James Joyce’s *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young man* (1916), Stephen Dedalus, through both the Lacanian idea of linguistic alienation and the Althusserian concept of ideological interpellation. Investigating the ideological signifiers in Stephen Dedalus’ language acquisition process, I shall examine the role they play in the construction of an ideological subjectivity for the subject. Language acquisition process in the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic is not only studied in parallel to the process of the identity construction of the subject but also examined with reference to those ideological signifiers to which the subject becomes mentally attached.

I shall also argue that the ideological character of the subjectivities represented in the novel can be read through an attentiveness to their ideological language. Dealing with the inter-subjective dialectic between the ideological subjectivities in the identity of the other characters of the novel, I shall also examine both constructive and deconstructive modes of the inter-subjective dialectic in the identity of Mr Casey and Dante, two major characters in the novel.

The Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic is also crucial to the exploration of the re-construction of identity in the subject’s mature years. I shall therefore outline the reconstitution of the ideological subjectivities of Stephen’s identity through focusing on the new artistic language of the last parts of the novel that he attempts to replace for the language he has been using throughout the novel. The Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic is instrumental in showing how the employment of this new artist language is in parallel to the construction of a new artistic subjectivity in Stephen Dedalus in that it focuses on the representation of identity in language through dealing with the complicated process of identity re-construction and the internal dialectics among the constituent subjectivities of the subject’s identity. Otherness within the subject’s identity is thus studied here with reference to the different languages of the
ideological subjectivities. The aesthetics of language in the novel is then examined in parallel to the aesthetic theory that the protagonist constructs his new artistic subjectivity on.

7.2 The Ideological Other of the Symbolic:

**Language and the Constitution of the Subject in *A Portrait***

The subject is split by the Symbolic order in that the Other he or she is exposed to consists of different ideological languages. As argued in Chapter Six, the ideological signifiers dramatically interpellate and, then, linguistically alienate the subject in language acquisition process. The formation of subjectivity through the unconscious acts of identification with the ideological signifiers of the Symbolic is thus conceived of as the first major stage in the process of the construction of the identity of the subject.

The present section first seeks to demonstrate how ideological signifiers dramatically interpellate and linguistically alienate Stephen Dedalus, the protagonist of *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*. Family and school, as two significant ISAs, provide the contexts where ideological languages function in order to construct the identity of the subject. Then, I shall analyze the inter-subjective dialectics between the ideological subjectivities and focus on their consequences for the characters of the novel. Otherness within the subject’s identity is studied here through exploring the difference between the ideological subjectivities provided by religion and nationalism. The deconstructive mode of the inter-subjective dialectic is here demonstrated through concentrating on its negative mental consequences for some of the characters of the novel.

7.2.1 Linguistic Alienation and Ideological Interpellation:

**Language, the ISAs, and the Subject Formation***

The infant, throughout the process of language acquisition, is unconsciously alienated by language signifiers and, thus, becomes a subject of that language. The exploration of the Lacanian concept of alienation is essential to the analysis of the subject formation. This section attempts to demonstrate how the identity of the subject, Stephen Dedalus, is constructed through both mechanisms of alienation and interpellation. My analysis focuses on the role of the language employed by the major ISAs, family and school, in the subject formation of the protagonist of the novel.

As I demonstrated earlier, alienation can be considered as a dramatic mode of interpellation. It is dramatic in that it takes place unconsciously and it is a mode of interpellation since linguistic signifiers are ideological. I already argued that besides the
phallus, which is the most significant signifier in the subject’s unconscious according to Lacan, there are other signifiers with which the subject seeks to be in identity. These signifiers are loaded with ideological designations and already defined by ideology.

The identity of the subject, in Lacan, is constructed when the subject unconsciously seeks a unity between itself and the signifiers. These signifiers alienate the subject in an unconscious way. These signifiers are supposedly filling the gap that emerges after the mother/infant disunity. This new unconscious unity between the subject and signifiers takes place when the mother/infant identity is shattered first because of the emergence of the other and then as a result of the subject’s acquisition of language.

The novel opens with a tale the protagonist’s father is narrating to him. The diction and style of the first two pages of the novel, which deal with the early years of the protagonist’s life, have been clearly chosen. They contain the protagonist’s account of the first experiences of his life and the tale his father narrated to him:

Once upon a time and a very good time it was there was a moocow coming down along the road and this moocow that was coming down along the road met a nicens little boy named baby tuckoo….263

Although the repetition of such words and phrases as ‘time,’ ‘the moocow coming down the road,’ the ‘and’ between “once upon a time and a very good time,” and ‘the road’ is a characteristic feature of the tales parents read for their children, the act of ‘repetition’ itself in language acquisition process is instrumental in giving an ordered shape to the infant’s chaotic unconscious. The unconscious is thus ‘structured’ according to the structure of the language the subject acquires. As demonstrated earlier, the Lacanian account of the unconscious is in sharp contrast to the Freudian consideration of the term as ‘disordered.’ This change in the unconscious from disordered to ‘structured’ is in parallel to the process of subject formation. As Colin MacCabe argues, the very story of the beginning of the novel also determines the structure within which the subject is positioned:

If we refer back to the opening section of A Portrait we can find that the interplay between narrative and discourse is dramatized in the opening few lines. The narrative told by the father produces the structure through which identification will determine discourse. The

position of baby tuckoo within the narrative is the starting-point for the subject’s discourse.264

The signifiers, which are themselves based on lack because of language negativity, seek to become unified with the subject’s unconscious. The language exposed to the small children also determines the structure of their unconscious. For example, the way the infant is dramatically entertained and educated through fairy stories depicts a world that is based on the binary opposition of good/bad, human being/animal, small/big, and children/grown ups. The tale usually told to infants by their parents follows a certain narratological pattern that plays a significant role in the subject formation. Furthermore, even such childish use of language has a decisive role in interpellating the child dramatically; that is to say, the child, through this style and a kind tone, is positioned in a context in which he/she will face a number of universal truths and simple divisions of good and bad. The narration continues:

His father told him that story: his father looked at him through a glass: he had a hairy face.265

His father had a hairy face in contrast to that of his mother. Apart from the father/the mother and hairy/hairless binary oppositions and the structural construction of the mind, one of the elements of binary oppositions is always the centred. The father is the privileged element of the father/the mother binary pair in that the first lines of the story open with references to father. As I demonstrated earlier, in Althusser the child has already the name and, hence, the identity, of the father, and in Lacan the ‘name of the father’ is also considered as the ‘no’ of the father. In both accounts the father’s authority is manifested along with the language the subject is exposed to. Language, which includes the symbolic rules and the ‘no’ of the father, provides the Other upon which the identity of the subject is formed. The Symbolic is both interpellating and alienating the subject through language. The family is the first ISA to which the subject is exposed. If we regard the family as an ISA, then, we should analyze the interpellation happening there. However, interpellation occurs indirectly in the family and the subject is not aware of it.

265 Ibid.
Language in Lacan is thought of as having a masculine character. Stephen, as we recognize later, cannot communicate with his father. This rebellion against the father changes into the form of rebel against language. His treatment of language later in the novel and, especially, in the other two novels by Joyce, shows this influence. Thus, in the same page he refers to his mother as having “a nicer smell than his father.” While father/mother is a binary opposition, there is also a contradiction between Uncle Charles and Dante. Dante’s two brushes, the one with the maroon velvet back for Michael Davitt, and the one with green velvet back for Parnell, are symbols that go throughout the novel. Throughout the novel Stephen links these two colors to the way his family members deal with Irish politics. The very signifier ‘green’ is symbolically repeated in the first poem:

O, the wild rose blossoms
On the little green place.\(^{266}\)

It is interesting that in the beginning pages he also mentions the Vances, who can be conceived of as the ‘other’ of their family, the way Uncle Charles is the ‘other’ to Dante and green to maroon for the little child. These are different binary oppositions at work. These ‘others’ are behind the formation of the identity of the protagonist. Other important binary oppositions are hot/cold and light/dark, the latter implied in the following poem. Eileen, the Protestant girl to whom Stephen wishes to get married is the other to him in that while he is a Catholic, she is a Protestant. Stephen thus has to apologize because of such a wish:

His mother said:
—O, Stephen will apologise.
Dante said:
—O, if not, the eagles will come and pull out his eyes.

Pull out his eyes.
Apologise,
Apologise,
Pull out his eyes.

Apologise,

\(^{266}\) Ibid.
Pull out his eyes,
Pull out his eyes,
Apologise.  

This part should be considered from different views. First, Stephen is asked not to name Eileen because she is a protestant. This is the first moment when Stephen as the subject, is requested to remain subject to the ideological framework of the family, represented primarily in his mother and aunt. Secondly, this is the first time both in the novel that the subject is informed and aware of the punishment of ideology. Thirdly, these motifs are included in a language that expresses kindly and in the form of a poem. The ‘O’ uttered by both his mother and aunt is apparently a kind feminine one, but it has really a harsh religious consequence: the eagles will come and pull out his eyes. Here ideology begins to repress. The eagle here acts like an ideological and repressive State apparatus, be it the Catholic Church or the law subject to it. It is a good example of impeachment, where the subject is also castrated by the symbolic order.

Stephen is made a subject through a poem, a rhythmical one, one that the subject is interpellated by dramatically. Both fairy tales and nursery rhymes can be considered as means of structuring the child’s unconscious through indirectly interpellating it with their signifiers and concepts. Moreover, we see the repetition of certain words in the poem. Repetition especially here in this poem is a means to create a pleasant rhythmic beat in order to softly and dramatically subject Stephen.

The next significant stage of Stephen’s mental development and formation happens when he is learning the names, the signifiers. Later we are reminded of the significance of the names for him:

She had taught him where the Mozambique channel was and what was the longest river in America and what was the name of the highest mountain in the moon. 

Children have a passion for knowing names. They do not know where the longest river in America is but want to utter the name of it, which is the word, the signifier. These names, here symbols for general knowledge, do play a decisive role in the child’s alienation. These words alienate the subject in the Lacanian sense of the term. Later he begins to identify himself with these names:

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267 Ibid., p. 4.
268 Ibid., p. 7.
These are the words, the signifiers, which provide Stephen with his identity. These signifiers are alienating the protagonist of the novel through creating an identity between Stephen and them. Thus, Stephen’s identity is formed by his identification to them that is in parallel to his alienation in that they are forming him and he himself forms himself. Afterwards in his thought, he comes to the major signifier, God. He contemplates the different words used for God. This is another example of his obsession with the signifiers.

The word ‘name,’ in ancient Greece, was the word used for the ‘word’. It is the same with the Holy Scriptures, when God taught Adam all the names, which is all the words. As Maud Ellmann has pointed out, the same function of the words can be seen in the character of Wondjina in Homer’s The Odyssey. The mythical story of Wondjina refers to the relationship between naming the things and their creation. There is always a relation between the names and the knowledge they convey and the reality they create. This process is later reversed in the novel when Stephen coins a number of words through processes of portmanteau and neologism.

On the other hand, the school, as another major ideological State apparatus, plays a significant role in the interpellation of the subject. Stephen’s first experience of the school is mentioned immediately after the end of the first two pages of the novel. The style abruptly changes from a simple and dramatic style of a small child to a mediocre and descriptive style of a school boy:

The wide playgrounds were swarming with the boys. All were shouting and the perfects urged them on with strong cries. The evening air was pale and chilly and after every charge

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269 Ibid., pp. 12-3.
270 Ibid., p. 13.
and thud of the footballers the greay leather orb flew like a heavy bird through the grey
like. 272

Although this style is not highly figurative, it is clear that Stephen has an artistic
concern even from this beginning because he uses a number of similes and images for
his descriptions. At school Stephen remains an outsider in that he does not take part in
the activities done by the other students. Here, as in the family, his egoism is evident.
From the beginning he divides the world into two, the world of others and the world of
the self. Although this is common to autobiographical novels, what makes A Portrait
distinct is that whereas the protagonist of a typical bildungsroman is influenced by the
society’s conventions, Stephen remains detached from his surroundings from the
beginning to the end.

Clongowes Wood College gives Stephen his first experience of going from an
ideological apparatus to another one, from family to school. What is of interest here is
the change in language; in other words, there is an abrupt change between two different
types of language the subject is exposed to. Whereas the first style of language is
characterised with a soft tone and kind treatment, and it dramatically brings to the
subject a structural and linguistic alienation through nursery rhymes, the second mode
of language includes a harsh tone and directly interpellates the child.

The students are ordered what to do and what not to do. Stephen is punished by
Father Dolan for not working hard; Stephen is not lying and it is because of his broken
glasses. But the perfect of studies does not believe him. The other events in the school
make it a place similar to a prison or police headquarter:

The door opened quietly and closely. A quick whisper ran through the class: the
perfect of studies. There was an instant of dead silence and then the loud crack of a
pandybat on the last desk. Stephen’s heart leapt up in fear.

—Any boys want flogging here, Father Arnall? Cried the perfect of studies. Any
lazy idle loafers that want flogging in this class? 273

This is an indirect criticism of the traditional system of education, where the teacher
was supposed to be of absolute power to do whatever he wants to the students. The
Lacanian concept of the Symbolic is the realm in which Althusser’s ideological State
apparatuses find their vein in language. Interpellation of the subject through language is

272 A Portrait, p. 4.
273 Ibid., p. 49.
observed in the words of the perfect of studies. The description of the aches of the beaten hands of Stephen by Father Dolan shows not only Joyce’s uses of different imagery and his mastery to represent the act but also the bitter memory of the experience:

…the swish of the sleeve of the soutane as the pandybat was lifted to strike. A hot burning stinging tingling blow like the loud crack of a broken stick made his trembling hand crumple together like a leaf in the fire.\footnote{274}

The educational system, especially in its traditional mode, provides the context in which the subject faces direct interpellation and alienation. Studying the role of schools in the making of middle-class identities in Victorian Britain while referring to Robert Graves’ experiences at school, Regenia Gagnier suggests that “as a schoolboy one had no content but rather only relative value in the hierarchy until one finally assumed one’s privileged position in society or the empire.”\footnote{275} The school here becomes a repressive apparatus, a place for punishment. Conceived of as a significant ISA in the Althusserian theory of ideology, the school now becomes an example for the RSA, where both ideological interpellation and physical repression come together.

The other significant scene in which ideological language is strongly felt and affective is the famous sermon in the third chapter of the novel. Father Arnall delivers a sermon that marks the day of St. Francis Xavier. This passage begins with: (dramatic interpellation)

—\textit{Remember only thy last things and thou shalt not sin for ever}—words taken, my dear little brothers in Christ, from the book of Ecclesiastes, seventh chapter, fortieth verse. In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. Amen.\footnote{276}

This is the beginning of Father Arnall’s sermon on “last things,” which are Death, Judgment, Hell, and Heaven. Although the first sentence of the extract is directly from \textit{The Bible}, the style of the rest of the paragraph, except for archaism, is like the first sentence. First, he uses the common catholic phrase of “my dear brothers in Christ”; however, the tone of his speech, which is initially kind and generous, later becomes frightening.

\footnote{274} Ibid., p. 51.  
\footnote{276} Ibid., p. 116.
The repetition of the word ‘God’ brings to our mind that Father is the representative or spokesman of God. He gives himself the right to talk to people of God. Father Arnall uses other characteristic features of religious language such as is the usage of different binary pairs: this world/that world, life/death, Pious/Evil, heaven/hell, Adam/Eve. These binary oppositions determine the structure of the mind of the subject.

Father Arnall’s account of the beginning of the world emphasizes the story of Lucifer’s pride and the famous motif of the novel: “non serviam: I will not serve.”

After the break, Father Arnall delivers a sermon and this time focuses on the story of the original sin of Lucifer and his fellow angels who fell from heaven at God’s command. After describing the hell and its fire, he says:

> The horror of this strait and dark prison is increased by its awful stench. All the filth of the world, all the offal and scum of the world, we are told, shall run there as to a vast reeking sewer when the terrible conflagration of the last day has purged the world. The brimstone too with its intolerable stench; and the bodies of the damned themselves exhale such a pestilential odour that as saint Bonaventure says, one of them alone would suffice to infect the whole world.

The structure of this part of the sermon is based on *The Bible* and Giovani Pietro Pinamonti’s *Hell Opened to Christians, to Caution Them from Entering into It* (1688), which was translated and published in Dublin in 1868. This passage explains the horrors of the Hell such as the boiling of the blood and brains of the sinner. Father Arnall also says that the worst horror of the Hell is the presence of the devils. Religion that was supposed to be compassionate in the beginning of the passage now transforms into a source and means of torture.

What is of significance is that the aim of this passage is not on spirituality; it is rather to evoke fear and to make them frightened. This is the way ideology plans to make people become subjected to them. Interestingly, it is ultimately successful. It makes Stephen repent; he is paralyzed by fear and then repents. The repetition of prayer of the church at the end of this section is considered as the complete establishment of Stephen’s complete repentance.

The church, as an established ISA, like the school, employs a method that is characteristic of the RSAs. The language it employs evolves fear and thus ideological institutes become a place to create Repression.

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277 Ibid., p. 126.
278 Ibid., p. 129.
280 Ibid., p. 146.
Stephen becomes so affected by this sermon that he thinks of the rich meal he has just eaten, and thinks it has made him into a brutish creature. Stephen listens to the rain falling on the chapel and imagines another biblical flood coming:

Rain was falling on the chapel, on the garden, on the college. It would rain for ever, noiselessly. The water would rise inch by inch, covering the grass and shrubs, covering the trees and houses, covering the monuments and the mountain tops. All life would be choked off, noiselessly: birds, men, elephants, pigs, children: noiselessly floating corpses amid the litter of the wreckage of the world. Forty days and forty nights the rain would fall till the waters covered the face of the earth.²⁸¹

He becomes calm; the language in the last part of this chapter is full of bright and spiritual imagery. The air is clean; he is calm and asks God to forget him. He wants his lost innocence back. Stephen is seeking an identity between himself and religious faith. In other words, the religious subjectivity now pervades his identity. He confesses to a priest that he has had sexual relations with a woman and that he is only sixteen. The priest offers forgiveness and Stephen heads home feeling filled with grace.

Stephen’s confession makes him feel that he is again in full identity with those signifiers that have already constituted his/her identity. Stephen is now at complete mental balance. He is calm and even surprised when he finds that the rain is over and the sky is all open and blue. The other example of ideological language happens at the beginning of Chapter Four when Stephen is reviewing his religious orders:

Sunday was dedicated to the mystery of the Holy Trinity, Monday to the Holy Ghost, Tuesday to the Guardian Angels, Wednesday to Saint Joseph, Thursday to the Most Blessed Sacrament of the Altar, Friday to the suffering Jesus, Saturday to the Blessed Virgin Mary.²⁸²

Joyce has here taken the list from a book of order to capture Stephen’s complete adherence to the regulations of the church. Except for the only verb of the passage and the prepositions all other words are religious. This marks the moment when Stephen’s subjectivity is in complete identity with religious concepts and terms. He is now completely subject to religious faith. Stephen’s ideological subjectivity, though

²⁸¹ Ibid., p. 125.
²⁸² Ibid., p. 159.
including the lack that paves the way for later antagonism, is now so dominant that is considered as his identity at this part of the novel.

Therefore, the family and school provide the contexts where the subject is both alienated and interpellated through language. This mode of alienation happens not only in Stephen’s infantile phase but also in his later life. Whereas infantile ‘child language acquisition’ provides a process through which the child is linguistically alienated by ideological signifiers, the grownup subject, too, is dramatically interpellated when, for example, he/she is educated at school. Both examples of direct and dramatic interpellation occur in *A Portrait*.

### 7.2.2 The Inter-Subjective Dialectic:

**Religion, Nationalism, and Otherness**

Language, as the realm of otherness, provides the subject with different ideological subjectivities. The ideological constitution of the subject is dependent on the inter-subjective dialectic of the Symbolic. This section, demonstrating the inter-subjective dialectic between religious and nationalistic subjectivities, seeks to argue this dialectic can act either as constructive of a new subjectivity or further subjection to previously-formed subjectivities.

Religious faith is one of the most wide-ranging influences on subjectivity in the identity of the subjects in *A Portrait*. As a young boy, Stephen is early exposed to Catholicism through Dante’s symbolic maroon velvet brush. Even his name has a religious connotation that refers to St Stephen, the first Christian martyr. Catholic terminology and references litter the novel from start to end, whether through the obvious repetition of prayers or obscure references to Catholic theology and history. To take the formal language of religious adherence first, when Uncle Charles asks Stephen to recite the prayer before the meal, it is the first time that Stephen has been allowed to eat dinner with the elders. Stephen says the prayer:

\[
\text{Bless us, O Lord, and these Thy gifts which through Thy bounty we are about to receive through Christ Our Lord. Amen.}^{283}
\]

This is the establishment of Stephen within the religious context in which the Christmas dinner is to be served, featuring the traditional form of Catholic blessing, a language

\(^{283}\) Ibid., p. 28.
both archaic and perfectly at place at the family table. However, it is clear that Stephen
is not comfortable at the occasion. This is obvious from the way he is dressed: “The
deep low collar and the Eton jacket made him feel queer and oldish.”

At the Christmas table, Catholicism and nationalism, as two major ideological subjectivities,
come across together. While Catholicism is in possession of a number of established
apparatuses and institutions, nationalism remains as a discourse without a formal
apparatus or established institution in the novel. Stephen becomes familiar with the Irish
nationalism through the family. His father has patriotic tendencies. Stephen takes
weekend walks through the town with his father and uncle, listening to their political
discussions and their stories about the past. Stephen does not understand many of their
references. Pericles Lewis points to Stephen’s relation to the political events of the day
in this way:

A portrait tells the story of Stephen’s emergence into consciousness as an emergence into
Irish history. Political events that play a crucial role in Stephen’s conception of his place in
history, such as the fall of Parnell, precede Stephen’s conscious understanding of Irish
politics, and Stephen’s attempts to understand such events are part of the novel’s drama …
As a child, Stephen cannot solve the problems that theology and politics raise for him …
Stephen is conscious of growing up in a world in which politics and story weigh upon the
brains of the living.

The first significant discussion regarding Irish nationalism happens when Stephen
returns home from the college. It is the time of Parnell’s death:

—Parnell! Parnell! He is dead!
They fell upon their knees, moaning in sorrow.

The family tensions run high when discussing the death of Parnell. Whereas Dante later
says that the church had done the right thing to condemn Parnell, Mr Casey considered
Parnell a hero and blamed the church for his death. A significant event of the novel
happens here when a debate rises between Dante and Mr Casey. This sensitive subject
becomes the topic of a furious, politically charged argument over the family’s Christmas
dinner. When Mr Casey criticizes the negative impacts of the Catholic Church in Irish

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284 Ibid., p. 29.
286 *A Portrait*, p. 25.
politics, Dante gets angry and says that nobody should criticize the church. “It is religion,” Dante says, “[t]hey are right. They must direct their flocks.”

This disagreement finally becomes a furious argument. Dante quotes *The Bible*, saying that priests must always be respected. She believes that the church should be more respected than politics. What is interesting is that Dante answers Mr Casey by quoting from *The Bible*:

“—Woe be to the man by whom the scandal cometh! Said Mrs Riordan. It would be better for him that a millstone were tied about his neck and that he were cast into the depth of the sea rather than that he should scandalize one of these, my least little ones.”

As observed, Mrs Riordan’s answer to Mr Casey is completely borrowed from *The Bible*. Interestingly, sometimes it is Dante herself that becomes the manifestation of that faith. Here the normal words and those from *The Bible* have been mingled together in a way that they seem to be of the same origin. She shows her disapproval of Protestantism again when she says: “The blackest Protestant in the land would not speak the language I have heard this evening.”

Both Catholicism and nationalism attempt to make the Irish subjects subject to them. In the debate, Mr Casey is for Irish nationalism and Dante for Catholicism. It is clear that both attempt to make the poor Stephen subject to the corresponding ideology. Stephen is thus located in a position that two different ideologies are clashing, each one attempting to use the language he likes: while Dante uses the language of *The Bible*, Mr Dedalus, another patriotic present at he scene, uses the language of an Irish parody:

\[
O, \text{ come all you Roman catholics} \\
\text{That never went to mass.}
\]

When Mr Casey talks about Parnell and the woman he had an illegal affair with, Dante gets infuriated clearly because religion would not permit such affairs. Mr Casey believes that politics and Irish nationalism are what matter and Catholicism has nothing to do with nationalism. There is no resolution between them, as there is none between

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287 Ibid., p. 30.
288 Ibid., p. 31.
289 Ibid., p. 34.
290 Ibid.
Dante and Mr Casey. Both insist on their own standpoints. These two discourses here prove to be contradictory. The result is such a hot debate:

—God and religion before every thing! Dante cried. God and religion before the world!

Mr Casey raised his clenched fist and brought it down on the table with a crash.

—Very well, then, he shouted hoarsely, if it comes to that, no God for Ireland!  

The above dialogues manifest an inter-subjectivity dialectic between these two subjectivities. This dialectic, though taking place between two subjects, has in internal form too. In other words, each one of the subjects is constituted by the opposite of what s/he attempts to take side with. However, one side of the dialectic is so powerful that it results in disordered behaviour. As for Mr Casey and Dante, this dialectic is destructive in that it creates mental imbalance, manifested in the act of crying and the trembling of the body. It is also destructive in that it does not result in a synthesis, which is the logical outcome of a dialectic in a purely Hegelian sense. Both subjects, Dante and Mr Casey, are subjects of a specific ideological language. The inter-subjective dialectic here is not constructive of a new subjectivity; it is rather a means to further subjection to the already dominant subjectivity of the identity of the subject. The alienation in Dante and Mr Casey is the result of their being ideologically interpellated by Catholicism and Nationalism respectively.

What is observed in both characters is what is commonly referred to as the crisis of identity. Each one of them thinks that he/she is threatened by a subjectivity opposed to his/her own. They cannot create reconciliation between the two, or choose one of these two subjectivities, or develop one by the other. That is why sometimes we see them in the novel acting in another way. For example, Dante, who is religious, hits “the gentleman on the head with her umbrella because he had taken off his hat when the band played God save the Queen at the end.” The same happens to Mr Casey because when he says no God for Ireland it does not mean that he is atheist; he is a nationalist who believes that the Irish people, because of their involvement in strict religiosity, have neglected their cause: “We have had too much God in Ireland.”

291 Ibid., p. 38.
292 Ibid., p. 37.
293 Ibid., p. 39.
The nationalist Mr Casey believes in Parnell and thinks of him as the savior; the religious Dante thinks of Christ as the savior; these are two ideologies and each need a messiah. The intra-subjective lack that I discussed in the preceding chapter creates a gap that has to be filled by such a messiah. Ideological subjectivity includes and needs a telos. This is the promise of ideology. Parnell was supposed to realize Irish independence. The same is right concerning Dante and her belief in the Christian idea of the utopia. However, as explained earlier, ideology never fulfils the utopia it depicts and this is itself one of the reasons behind the permanent functioning of ideology. On the other hand, the inter-subjective dialectic can be constructive of a new subjectivity. Here the term dialectic remains loyal to its Hegelian usage in that if the two sides of inter-subjective dialectic are considered as thesis and anti-thesis, the new subjectivity constructed out of this dialectic is a synthesis, one that is different from the two.

Later at school, Stephen discusses with other students Irish nationalism. There is also inter-subjective dialectic between the students with nationalist aspirations and Catholicism that is what the school stands for. What is interesting concerning the educational system in *A Portrait* is that it is so much blended with the religious system that is hard and even sometimes impossible to separate them. The Catholic nature of the educational system represented in the novel is so marked that the school can be mostly considered as a religious institute. Clongowes Wood College is primarily a religious institute, and the education there is heavily marked by religious doctrines. Religious education is so important that even when Stephen is forced to leave Clongowes because of financial problems of the family, he attends Belvedere, a Jesuit school. Although there are signs of the religious system everywhere at Belvedere, he develops, after several ups and downs, a passion for writing and artistic activities; what is of interest here is that even the play in which he is supposed to act is for a religious occasion, the Christian feast of Pentecost.

A major ideological subjectivity present in the identity of a number of the characters of the novel including some of the students is vulgar or orthodox nationalism. This popular form of nationalism plays the role the ‘other’ for the aesthetic ego of Stephen. For example, later at the school Stephen is asked by two students, Davin and McCann, to develop a more serious interest in politics regarding Irish issues. Davin, a manifest Irish patriot, clearly expresses his passion for Irish nationalism in the university: “Vivre
L’Irlande!”294 “Try to be one of us,” Davin says to Stephen, “[i]n your heart you are an Irishman but your pride is too powerful.”295

This mode of nationalism is expressed in journalistic discourse; it is idealist, “schoolboyish”, and concerned with slogans than hard work. Seamus Deane argues that both Joyce and Yeats are marked by a rejection of traditional nationalism:

Despite the differences which separate them, Yeats and Joyce repudiate the more pronounced forms of political nationalism – those associated with Pearse and with the journalism of newspapers like D.P.M Moran’s The Leader – on the same grounds. It is, in effect, too crude, too schoolboyish, too eager to demand a spirit of solidarity and service that has more in common with propaganda than it has with art.296

However, as Deane later argues, if Yeats’ Ireland was one in which the Celtic past was to be embraced, Joyce’s Ireland was one in which spiritual reality did not yet exist. It was Joyce’s aspiration and ambition to create it in his works. Thus, if Yeats was disappointed with the present Dublin, Joyce’s Dublin was to form anew in his works. “It is well known,” Seamus Deane argues, that Joyce “repudiated Irish literary revival,” but unlike Yeats he “remained faithful to the original conception of the Revival.” If Yeats talked of and indeed gave up “the deliberate creation of a kind of Holy City in the imagination” Joyce’s “Dublin became the Holy City of which Yeats had despaired.”297

Stephen, instead of becoming a subject to this dominant mode of Irish nationalism or to what the educational system calls for, develops a new subjectivity that is neither religious nor nationalistic. This new subjectivity is non-ideological and based on art and aesthetics. Jean-Michel Rabaté in his James Joyce and the Politics of Egoism (2001) argues that Stephen, as the ego, was in conflict with the idea of the nation. However, this does not mean that he was not a political writer; on the contrary, his treatment of politics is one of the most complicated:

To say that Joyce should be called an “egoist” is not just flippant provocation or personal accusation but an effort to link his literary and political position to a much older debate

294 Ibid., p. 199.
295 Ibid., p. 220.
hinged around the claims of the “individual” fighting against repressive systems, claims that were often refused as being either “egoistic” or “anarchistic.”

There is also a conflict between the rational ego of the Irish subject and British Colonialism, Catholicism, and even vulgar nationalism. The rational ego of Stephen as a modern Irish subject is in conflict with two sets of others that I call Big External Other and Big Internal Other. The identity of the Irish subject is not only host to these ‘others,’ but also constructed by them. Whereas British colonialism and the Roman Catholicism are the Big External Other to the Irish Subject, the ideological discourses within Irish identity such as nationalism are the Big Internal Other. Both are represented in the identity of the Irish subject. Big External Other is the target of the rebels of the Big Internal Other, and Joyce’s egoism, manifested in his egoistic aesthetics, is rebelling against both.

The rational ego of the Irish nationalist subject thus occupies only a small space in Irish subject/ivity. The two sets of others are so powerful that have given an ideological character not only to the Irish subject but also to the Irish rational ego that calls for independence and freedom. Ideological subjectivities thus play the role of the other for the rational and aesthetic ego of the subject. They give an ideological character to the ego itself that supposedly sought to rebel against them. In other words, there is always a clash between the rational ego of the Irish nationalist subject, and the other discourses that have created the same subject. This clash results in the victory of the others within the identity of the Irish subject, and thus the rational ego cannot succeed in its aspirations. That is why the vulgar mode of nationalism becomes a dominant subjectivity for the characters of the novel.

The ideological realm in which the Irish subject is located provides a realm of ‘otherness’ for the study of Irish identity. The ideological ‘other’ has given birth to an ideological ‘ego,’ and the dialectic between these two constructs what is called the ideological identity of the Irish subject. In A Portrait, the rational ego also becomes ideological. It is this simplistic, arrogant, and ideological rational ego of Irish nationalist subject that Joyce criticizes and satirizes. Davin is a good example of an Irish subject with such rational ego.

Joyce’s response to this ideological ego may be called, as Jean-Michel Rabaté has done, ‘negoism.’ Joyce’s ‘egoistic estheticism’ transforms into ‘esthetic negoism.’

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299 See Ibid., pp. 75-7.
Stephen’s “ego nego,” first seen in the 1904 text of *A Portrait*, appeared as “egoism” in *Stephen Hero*, and, then, completely developed as “negoism” in *Finnegans Wake*. Rabaté’s discussion is an attempt to separate the ideological rational ego from the aesthetic ego in Joyce. The same negoism can be symbolically seen in the famous quotation from *Ulysses* where Stephen says to Bloom “we cannot change the country. Let us change the subject.”

Joyce’s response to ‘the ego/the subject’ dialectic is observed in the establishment of the esthetic negoism in his works.

Joyce’s consideration of the British colonialists can be called, according to Derek Attridge and Marjorie Howes, a mode of semicolonialism. They discuss Joyce’s relation to Irish politics in their introduction to the book through reference to the following quotation from *Finnegans Wake*:

> Gentes and laitymen, fullstoppers and semicolonials, hybrids and lubbers!

Here Joyce, using his portmanteau method, turns the distinction between full stops and semicolons into, they argue, “the opposition between permanent and temporary inhabitants of a colonized country, or ‘stoppers’ and ‘colonials.’” In another essay of the same book Marjorie Howes argues that Stephen deliberately leaves out Great Britain in order to narrate his nation. However, whereas Stephen omits the name of Great Britain in the diagram he draws at school, he is rather innovative in his aesthetic employment of English language and leaves out the native language of his nation, Gaelic. Therefore, Stephen’s treatment of Irish nationalism has provided contradictory critiques because his response is paradoxical. As I show later in the present chapter, the idea of beauty in the aesthetic ego of Stephen becomes so dominant that it takes the place of such concepts as religion, nation, and home, to name only the most significant.

In conclusion, religion and nationalism provide two major subjectivities for the context in which inter-subjective dialectic rises. The internal dialectic between these nationalism and religious subjectivity is destructive for both Dante and Mr Casey because it creates mental imbalance and psychological disorder. What is significant is that this destructive dialectic functions in the unconscious, of which the subject may not be aware of. Although the nationalist discourse represented in the novel is successful to

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303 Marjorie Howes, “Goodbye Ireland I’m Going to Gort:” geography, scale, and narrating the nation,” in *Semicolonial Joyce*, p. 71.
subjectivate a number of characters, it is not able to meet its ideals. This dialectic is constructive for Stephen. It results in the synthesis of a new subjectivity, one that is non-ideological and based on art.

7.3 Identity Reconstruction and Representation: From Ideology to Artistic Subjectivity

Stephen Dedalus, alienated with ideological signifiers and interpellated in domestic, educational, and religious contexts, undergoes a long process of re-constructing his identity. He moves from ideologically constituted subjectivities to a new subjectivity that is creative and artistic, revolutionary, and highly critical of conventions. How Stephen re-constructs his identity should be investigated in the analysis of this new subjectivity. Stephen’s particular perception of art, manifested in both his aesthetic theory and the novel itself, is in close affinity to the construction of this new subjectivity.

This section consists of two major parts: first, I shall present an argument on the materialisation of epiphany that Stephen goes through after he is disillusioned with the ideological subjectivities. The materialized epiphany as experienced by Stephen results in the emergence of a particular mode of artistic subjectivity, one that is based on language and that is to replace the already constituted ideological subjectivities within his identity. Secondly, I examine the instrumental role played by language in the reconstruction of the identity of Stephen with reference to art/ideology relation in this newly-formed artistic subjectivity.

7.3.1 Disillusionment and Materialization of Epiphany

The transition from the protagonist’s disillusionment with ideological subjectivities to the ultimate artistic creativity goes through a materialized experience of epiphany. This section, while referring to examples of disillusionment in the novel, provides an analysis of the rise of illusions and their consequent change to disillusions in Stephen’s identity. Considering Stephen’s experience of epiphany as a decisive moment in his act of identity re-construction, the present section seeks to argue that the particular materialized character of Stephen’s experience of epiphany is in close affinity with both the aesthetic theory and artistic creation of the novel.

*A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* is a novel that contains several instances of disillusionments for the protagonist. Stephen’s engagement in an illusion clearly manifests his unconscious identification with the corresponding heroes involved in that
illusion. As demonstrated earlier, identity is not reducible to a mere act of identification; however, investigation of subjectivity by elaborating on its identification to its corresponding external manifestation is illuminating in the analysis of identity. What is crucial here is that the ideological discourse or the image with which Stephen identifies ultimately plays the role of the ‘other’ to him. It means that the identification with a character transforms into diversity from him.

Stephen first identifies himself with the hero of *The Count of Monte Christo*; at home, while reading Alexandre Dumas’s novel, Stephen is deeply affected in its adventure and romance. Stephen imagines himself as the lover of Mercédès, the novel’s heroine. Later throughout the novel he identifies himself with a number of other figures such as Parnell and Jesus Christ. He also thinks of the real designations of his name, St. Stephen, the first Christian martyr. His identification with Napoleon and Lord Byron is another example of his illusion of becoming the national hero of his country. And finally, at the last line of the novel, he identifies himself with Dedalus, both as the father and the son.

Stephen’s mental acts of identification are the immediate result of his seclusion both at home and school. When his father says that his son is a “lazy bitch,” Stephen leaves the house and wanders through the rainy Dublin landscape, quoting poems to himself. Disillusionment with the family reaches its height when he and his father are in Cork. He escapes from it by reciting poems on solitude and thus entertains himself with art. The other example of disillusionment with the family is that he is not happy at a birthday party of another child. After a set of misunderstanding with his aunt, he sings a song with the others, but he mostly enjoys his feeling of being separated from them.

Disillusionment is a significant cause for the alienation of the protagonist. The term alienation can be widely used in two different contexts. First, there is the Lacanian understanding of the term that I discussed at the beginning of this chapter, when I outlined the role of language acquisition in the mental development of the subject. The second is the general designation of the term that such terms as self-alienation and alienated character are its derivations. There is always the dissociation of self/other in both modes of alienation. If the subject/other dialectic is what constructs the subject, its dissociation brings about alienation. In its general meaning, alienation is used when the subject consciously recognizes the limitations and weak points of an ideological discourse or an ideal image; the subject becomes alienated here because he/she has no firm belief in what he/she used to rely on. Both designations are manifested in *A Portrait*. 
Stephen, as a result of alienation, first suffers from moments of psychological imbalance that are reflected in his behaviour. He is visiting the prostitutes, and yet knows that it is a sin and the source of other sins such as gluttony and pride. He knows that he should not be sinful, but he cannot help it since he is motivated to commit sin by the power of the flesh. His thoughts here are the immediate example of his Catholic faith. When contemplating his several acts of sex with a prostitute, he says to himself:

At most, by an alms given to a beggar whose blessing he fled from, he might hope wearily to win for himself some measure of actual grace. ... A certain pride, a certain awe, withheld him from offering to God even one prayer at night though he knew it was in God's power to take away his life while he slept and hurl his soul hellward ere he could beg for mercy.  

This quotation, which sounds like the speech of a clergyman, shows that Stephen is now deeply influenced by a constituent subjectivity of his identity. If he wants to be free, he should flee; flight is regarded as disobedience. It is interesting to know that it is exactly at the time of his becoming a priest that his departure from religious faith begins. He thinks that instead of finding the wisdom in the church he should find it in himself and his wanderings:

His destiny was to be elusive of social and religious orders. The wisdom of the priest’s appeal did not touch him to the quick. He was destined to learn his own wisdom apart from others or to learn the wisdom of others himself wandering himself wandering among the snares of the world.

The novel thus traces the protagonist’s growing disillusionment with such ideological apparatuses as the family, the school, the church, and orthodox nationalism. In *A Portrait* we see ideologies loosing colour. The movement of the novel, too, is in a way that each chapter closes with a synthesis of triumph which is destroyed in the next chapter. In each chapter Joyce repeats the same pattern of showing Stephen embracing a dream in contempt of reality, then seeing that dream destroyed.

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304 *A Portrait*, p. 111.
305 Ibid., p. 175.
306 The conflict between the subject and the mentioned ideological apparatuses has been also discussed by Regenia Gagnier when, dealing with the literary subjectivity of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, she refers to “the institutional apparatuses of church, family, and school or State against which in the Victorian period ‘the self’ formed and opposed itself.” Regenia Gagnier, *Subjectivities: A History of Self-Representation in Britain, 1832-1920*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 223.
These instances of disillusionment ultimately lead to an experience of epiphany for Stephen. Of theological and metaphysical origin, the term epiphany is used by Joyce to point to an earthly moment in the life of Stephen when a deep and abrupt change happens to him. It is believed that St Stephen had experienced an epiphany in the last moments of his life by seeing God and Jesus. Epiphany is, however, changed in Joyce to an earthly experience. His works are full of these earthly epiphanies. In *Dubliners* he had already demonstrated some examples of epiphany. A good example is that which happens to the protagonist in the short story *Araby*. Joyce defined it in *Stephen Hero* in the following way:

By an epiphany he [Stephen] meant a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether in the vulgarity of speech or of gesture or in a memorable phase of the mind itself. He believed that it is for the man of letters to record these epiphanies with extreme care, seeing that they themselves are the most delicate and evanescent of moments.\(^\text{307}\)

If epiphany in religion has positive consequences for the subject and moves him from scepticism to faith and from darkness to light, in Joyce’s usage of the term it does not always result in hope. Whereas in theology epiphany comes close to the idea of revelation, when a divine truth is manifested to the prophet, in Joyce epiphany has an earthly nature, one that reveals a truth to the protagonist about the real life and relations between human beings. That is why the description of his experience of sex, which ultimately disillusioned him, finds a divine language that almost seems like a religious epiphany:

*It was too much for him. He closed his eyes, surrendering himself to her body and mind, conscious of nothing in the world but the dark pressure of her softly parting lips.*\(^\text{308}\)

This style of language brings to mind the language he had already employed to describe Mary when he said “The glories of Mary held his soul captive... symbolizing the preciousness of God’s gift to her soul...”\(^\text{309}\) He describes the woman he has an affair with the way he later describes Mary. The above quotation is close to a theological language and is in contrast to the language that he later uses for the first true love in his

\(^\text{308}\) *A Portrait*, p. 108.
\(^\text{309}\) Ibid., p. 112.
life. Whereas the description of Mary is foreground with a religious mark, the
description of the girl he sees on the shore is characteristically literary:

She stood before him like one whom magic had changed into the likeness of a strange and
beautiful seabird. Her long lender bare legs were delicate as a crane’s and pure save where
an emerald trail of seaweed had fashioned itself as a sign upon the flesh. Her thighs, fuller
and softthued as ivory, were bared almost to the hips where the white frings of her drawers
were like featherings of soft whit down.\textsuperscript{310}

The style of this passage is highly figurative. There are several examples of imagery at
work. There is visual imagery in ‘the likeness of a strange and beautiful seabird’ and
‘ling lender bare legs.’ There is also tactile imagery in ‘a sigh upon the flesh.’ In
addition, there are several similes and metaphors at work. The tone of the passage,
because of the zealous expression of sensual similes, is passionate and refreshing. This
tone reminds us of the fact that he is describing a beautiful girl and that this beauty
proves an inspirational source for him. The style of the above quotation is analogous to
the Latin paragraph on Mary earlier mentioned. Stephen likes the musicality of the Latin
phase and here he attempts to create a musical rhythm for his description. The beauty he
recognizes in the girl and, correspondingly, the language that is involved in that beauty
are what significantly matter to him. He sees this young girl on the beach when he is
waiting for the news about his acceptance to the university. Being struck by her beauty,
he realizes that he is not to be constrained by the boundaries of his family, his nation,
and his religion. The most significant epiphany in the novel occurs here.

Epiphany, though having a religiously spiritual designation, is here given an earthly
character. The language describing the moment of epiphany is profane and the object of
description is the sexualized body of a girl. Instead of a spirit, it is the physical body
that is manifested to Stephen. Whereas the revealed spirit is regarded as truth in the
theological conception of epiphany, it is the beauty of the earthly material that is
regarded as the object. In addition, there is an interesting similarity between the
materialization of epiphany in Joyce and the materialization of ideology in Althusser.
As I demonstrated in detail in Chapter Four, whereas ideology was predominantly
described as a set of ideas and, hence, an abstract entity, it was provided with a material
and tangible existence in Althusser’s definition of the term. Althusser’s idea of the
materialization of ideology can be applied to Joyce’s attempt in materializing epiphany.

\textsuperscript{310} Ibid, p.185.
Epiphany, which had been already defined as a spiritual and heavenly experience of the manifestation of the truth, was given a materialized characteristic by Joyce. Stephen’s experience of the materialization of epiphany is the climax of the transformations he went through in the course of the novel. For example, the movement from ‘jupe’ to ‘skirt’ in his conversation with the director is expressive of a manifest movement from religion to art, from heavenly concepts to materialist perception of beauty. Stephen finds beauty in art and realizes that the strictness of the priestly life does not go with his love for sensual beauty.

Stephen’s movement towards artistic subjectivity, however, should not be conceived of as a simplistic and clear-cut process. For example, when he goes to the rector’s office to report on Father Dolan, he sees the portraits of saints and “great men of the order.” The emergence of artistic subjectivity is thus in parallel to Stephen’s rebellion against his religious faith. In rebelling against his religious faith he is really rejecting his mother and aunt, and in rebelling against Irish orthodox patriotism he is really rejecting his father, uncle, and Mr Casey. Furthermore, Stephen, in re-constructing his new identity, should also rebel against the constitutive ideological subjectivities of his identity. Stephen, in his movement toward establishing an artistic subjectivity, manages to concentrate on his materialist notion of art. Thinking of Yeats’ hero, Stephen writes in his diary records of the last section of the final part of the novel:

Michael Robartes remembers forgotten beauty and, when his arms wrap her round, he presses in his arms the loveliness which has long faded from the world. Not this. Not at all. I desire to press in my arms the loveliness which has not yet come into the world.

As noted earlier, Joyce rejected Yeast’s mode of nationalism. Although Yeats was also criticized by his contemporaries, the true rebellion for Joyce was a rebellion in art through the medium of language. The rebellion towards political independence becomes rebellion towards artistic inventiveness in A Portrait. Europe was at war at that time and Michael Collins had been taken prisoner during the Easter Rising in Dublin. His rebellion needs sacrifice and Stephen accepts that. Lucifer’s “I will not serve” becomes illuminating for him. In his dialogue with Cranly towards the end of the novel, Stephen, referring to his refusing of his mother’s request to make his Easter duty, says:

311 Ibid., p. 57.
312 Ibid., p. 273.
I will not serve that in which I no longer believe whether it call itself my home, my fatherland or my church: and I will try to express myself in some mode of life or art as freely as I can and as wholly as I can, using for my defence the only arms I allow myself to use—silence, exile, and cunning.\(^{313}\)

Stephen thus rejects being interpellated by religion. There is here the rational ego of Stephen that should take arms against ideological subjectivities within the same identity. The rational ego of Stephen, being revolutionary, is in conflict with religious, domestic, national, and traditional subjectivities in Stephen’s identity. Hence, there are intersubjective dialectics at work in this phase of his mental development. Early manifestations of this new subjectivity are seen in his elementary poetical compositions. Now it is this new mode of language that replaces the early use of language and forms the artistic subjectivity.

7.3.2 Ideology, Art, and the Aesthetics of Language in \textit{A Portrait}

The process of the reconstruction of identity is a complicated and ongoing one. As I showed in Chapter Six, whereas the constructivists argue for the possibility of identity reconstruction, linguistic determinism demonstrates the subject’s failure in reconstructing its identity because of the inevitable influence of the Symbolic and the unconscious/language unity. The representation of identity in language is not a clear-cut and simplistic act in that identity, consisting of different subjectivities, does not have a fixed state and a simplistic manifestation. This section attempts to demonstrate the representation of the reconstruction of the identity of the subject in \textit{A Portrait} with particular reference to the language of the novel. I also seek to explore the opposition art manifests to ideology while investigating both ideological and artistic subjectivities constituting the subject. The protagonist in this novel critically approaches the ideological subjectivities that had already constituted his identity. The artistic subjectivity the protagonist seeks to convey is based on the particular aesthetic theory of art presented in the novel. The investigation of the conflict between ideology and art, their role in constructing their consequent subjectivities, and their representation in language of the text is thus instrumental in providing a better understanding of the process of the reconstruction of identity in this novel.

\textit{A Portrait} does not serve any particular ideology, but it includes different ideological subjectivities and languages of the context it represents. As I discussed earlier in the

\(^{313}\) Ibid., p. 269.
thesis, Althusser did not rank art among ideologies. Art resists subjection to ideology and it is, thus, a refusal of ideology. However, art, while being disobedient to ideology, includes it. Ideology is sometimes satirized and, thus, criticized, sometimes refused, or simply neglected. If the text is to commit itself to one of them it would itself become an ideological product; art has been always in conflict and in a complex relation to the ideologies of the context in which it is produced. There is always insubordination to ideology in art. Trevor Williams in Reading Joyce Politically (1997) argues that:

...Joyce’s work contains ideology: most of his characters misperceive reality and appear to be suffused with false consciousness. But this is not to say that the novel’s effect is ideological. There are characters in Dubliners… who briefly show signs of resistance to false consciousness, and in A Portrait it is clear by the end that Stephen has escaped the dominant ideologies of church and state.314

I ideologies interpellate Stephen in language from a young age; what happens to Stephen is what happens to almost every one: being exposed to ideology, both directly and dramatically, through language. Towards the end of the novel Stephen has participated in a definitive refusal of ideologies. He expresses his aesthetic theory and decides to become an artist after his epiphany. Artistic subjectivity is what that replaces the former ideological subjectivity.

Although A Portrait represents ideological subjectivities, it is does not take side with them and dissociates itself from them. Refusing the interpellation of ideologies, the protagonist seeks to achieve a mature artistic subjectivity. Sean P. Murphy in James Joyce and Victims: Reading the Logic of Exclusion (2003) points both to the text’s relation to ideologies and the way Stephen confronts them:

Joyce testifies in both Stephen Hero (1904) and A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916) to the ways ideology, while often employed in the service of disempowering colonial subjects, can empower individuals who elect to resist occupying the places dominant ideologies carve for them in the totality. ... The act of resistance, a potentially empowering use of agency within the systems that enable (and disable) subjectivity, necessarily points to a context, to that which the resister resists, namely ideology.315

315 Sean P. Murphy, James Joyce and Victims: Reading the Logic of Exclusion, Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2003, p. 73.
Stephen’s resistance to ideology should be examined through focusing on the way he employs language. Whereas *A Portrait* manifests a glossary of ideological languages including familial, religious, educational, and even nationalistic modes of language, the protagonist of the novel is not interpellated and alienated by these languages and their ideological signifiers. Sean Murphy’s work on Joyce does not provide a study of these different modes of languages. Also, he does not demonstrate the tensions within Stephen’s identity that are created because of the conflicts between these modes of language, on one hand, and Stephen’s inventive approach to language, on the other. A good example to show how Stephen dealt with ideologies in his time is observed in his conversation with nationalist Davin. Here his ideas are in close affinity to the aesthetical theory he attempts to follow:

—This race and this country and this life produced me, he said. I shall express myself as I am.
—Try to be one of us, repeated Davin. In your heart you are an Irishman but your pride is too powerful.
—My ancestors threw off their language and took another, Stephen said. They allowed a handful of foreigners to subject them. do you fancy I am going to pay im my own life and person debts they made? What for?
—For freedom, said Davin.\(^{316}\)

The internal inter-subjective dialectic within the identity of such characters as Dante now becomes an external conflict between Davin and Stephen. On one hand, there is Davin, a manifest Irish nationalist, and, on the other hand, there is Stephen, who wants to fly from those nets such as nationality. Joyce’s word ‘net’ reminds us of the restrictions of ideology. As observed, the word ‘subject’ appears here; Stephen does not want to become subject to these ideologies. He says:

—The soul is born, he said vaguely, first in those moments I told you of. It has a slow and dark birth, more mysterious than the birth of the body. When the soul of a man is born in this country there are nets flung at it to hold it back from flight. You talk to me of nationality, language, religion. I shall try to fly by those nets.\(^{317}\)

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\(^{316}\) *A Portrait*, p. 220.

\(^{317}\) Ibid.
Whereas in Davin’s view freedom is to be free from the authority of the English, for Stephen freedom is to be free from such nets as nationality, language, and religion. These three nets provide three ideological subjectivities from them Stephen “shall try to fly.” Art provides the wings for such a flight. Later in chapter five Stephen thinks of ‘flight.’ He watches birds fly. Here flying is a means to be free, which is reminiscent of the freedom of Icarus and his son from the prison in Ancient Greek mythology. He thinks of the opening lines to the farewell speech of the countess in Yeats’ play *The Countess Cathleen* (1892), where, the swallow is here the symbol for freedom. Stephen’s decision “to fly over by those nets” is accomplished through an artistic creativity, one that is not bound to ‘nets’:

His soul had arisen from the grave of boyhood, spurning her grave-clothes. Yes! Yes! Yes! He would create proudly out of the freedom and power of his soul, as the great artificer whose name he bore, a living thing, new and soaring and beautiful, impalpable, imperishable.318

The idea of artistic creativity finds its proper vein in the last pages of the novel. On 27 April, the last date in his diary, he says to himself: “Old father, old artificer, stand me now and ever in good stead.”319 The last line of the novel thus heralds the beginning of the inventiveness. But what should be of concern here is that there is again the clash between religion and art even at the last lines of the novel; for example, his reference to his mother’s words: “She prays now, she says, that I may learn in my own life and away from home and friends what the heart is and what it feels. Amen.”320 Immediately after this thought he says: “Welcome, O life! I go to encounter for the millionth time the reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race.”321

Stephen’s idea of artistic creativity is based on his aesthetic theory that is involved in the properties of beauty according to his discussion of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. In his dialogue with Lynch, he argues that a work of art, an artistic object that has beauty, should achieve integritas, consonantia, and claritas, which he translates into “wholeness, harmony, and radiance.”322 These are, in terms of Thomas Aquinas the three qualities or conditions of beauty which correspond to the three stages of apprehension.

318 Ibid., p. 184.
319 Ibid., p. 276.
320 Ibid., p. 275.
321 Ibid., pp. 275-6.
322 Ibid., p. 229.
After his long discussion of his aesthetic theory Stephen defines three forms of art, the lyrical, the epic, and the dramatic. In the lyric there is the presentation of the image of the artist in relation to himself, in the epic, to both himself and others, and in the dramatic to others, and “The artist, like the God of creation, remains within or behind or beyond or above his handiwork, invisible, refined out of existence, indifferent, parting his fingers.”

References to Byron in the novel are in direct relation to Stephen’s aesthetic theory. When asked in Belvedere school about the greatest English poet, he refers to Lord Byron. As it is known, Byron went to Greece to fight for the independence of the Greek from the Ottoman Turks. Byron can be regarded as a typical example of the Romantic subject whose idea of independence sounds similar to that of Stephen. Hence the idea of love, freedom, and heroism with no respect for ideology re-appears. Seamus Deane, while arguing for the significance of the idea of independence in Joyce, thus refers to Stephen’s act of re-constructing his identity out of what have already constituted him:

Joyce’s repudiation of Catholic Ireland and his countering declaration of artistic independence are well-known and integral features of his life-long dedication to writing. Yet he was formed by the Ireland he repudiated and his quest for artistic freedom was itself shaped by the exemplary instances of earlier Irish writers who had, in his view, failed to achieve that independence which he sought for himself, an independence which was at once the precondition and the goal of writing.

Stephen’s refutation of Tennyson and his reference to him as a ‘rhymester’ in his long debate with his friends at Belvedere College is also in close affinity with his aesthetic theory. Tennyson was the most famous poet of the Victorian age; he was referred to as poet of the people and was Poet the Laureate from 1850 after the death of Wordsworth until his death in 1892. Tennyson was a master of versification, but he is considered only as a rhymester by Stephen. Stephen’s modernist creativity was not what the nineteenth-century philistines could have possibly appreciated.

Stephen’s modernist creativity can be clearly seen in this symbolic contemplation after being forced to compete in an academic contest in which the opposing teams wear badges with red or white roses—emblems of the York and Lancaster families of the fifteenth-century English history:

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323 Ibid., p. 233.
White roses and red roses: those were beautiful colours to think of. And the cards for first place and second place and third place were beautiful colours too: pink and cream and lavender. Lavender and cream and pink roses were beautiful to think of. Perhaps a wild rose might be like those colours and he remembered the song about the rose blossoms on the little green place. But you could not have a green rose. But perhaps somewhere in the world you could.\footnote{A Portrait, p. 9.}

Here the possibility of the existence of a green rose shows Stephen’s artistic imagination and modernist creativity that finds its vein in language. The depiction of a green rose is a symbol for Stephen’s creativity, one that is not a completely objective and realistic representation of the reality as it is. Hence, although there white and red roses, Stephen thinks of the creation of a green rose in his art. This colour is also demonstrative of the green place that is Ireland since green is traditionally the colour of Ireland. This green rose of the child’s initial imaginative creation acts as a symbolic foreshadowing of the young man’s final devotion to artistic subjectivity.

Language is the most significant point of concentration in Stephen’s aesthetic theory. Language also provides the context and medium of Stephen’s act of reconstructing his identity through the establishment of an artistic subjectivity. One observes in Joyce the representation of different languages, parodying different styles of composition, and using different languages and particularly Latin. A good example of Joyce’s parodying of different languages of the history of English prose is in \textit{Ulysses}.\footnote{For Joyce’s relation to and obsession with language in \textit{Ulysses} see Stephen Heath, “Joyce in language,” in \textit{James Joyce: New Perspectives}, pp. 129-148. Joyce’s obsession with language has been mentioned by Joyce’s scholars of different intellectual backgrounds. For example, whereas MacCabe in his \textit{James Joyce and the Revolution of the Word} (1978) applies a structuralist reading, Derek Attridge presents a poststructuralist reading in his \textit{Joyce Effects: On Language, Theory, and History} (2000).}

Throughout \textit{A Portrait} Stephen develops a particular concern for words including jupe, skirt, tundish, and even his name. He also remembers the words in his father’s tale when he was a little child. A good example in his mature years is when Stephen and the Dean of the university speak about aesthetics; Stephen is disappointed by the older man’s incomplete knowledge of English. When Stephen uses the word ‘tundish,’ referring to a funnel for adding oil to a lamp, the dean does not know the meaning of this word. In his conversation with the dean, his obsession with and significance of language appears:
—The language in which we are speaking is his before it is mine. How different are the words home, Christ, ale, master, on his lips and on mine! I cannot speak or write these words without unrest of spirit. His language, so familiar and so foreign, will always be for me an acquired speech. I have not made or accepted its words. My voice holds them at bay. My soul frets in the shadow of his language.\textsuperscript{\textcopyright{327}}

Stephen’s “consciousness of language” is in direct relation to both his consciousness that was made by the language he acquired and the consciousness of a new language. Stephen reflects that English will always be a borrowed language for him, an “acquired speech.” He is aware of the ideological connotations of the words and consciously aims at using a non-ideological mode of language to represent his artistic subjectivity. The following extract from the novel is demonstrative of Stephen’s involvement in artistic language:

—A day of dappled seaborne clouds.

The phrase and the day and the scene harmonised in a chord. Words. Was it their colours? He allowed them to glow and fade, hue after hue: sunrise gold, the russet and green of apple orchards, azure of waves, the greyfringed fleece of clouds. No, it was not their colours: it was the poise and balance of the period itself. Did he then love the rhythmic rise and fall of words better than their associations of legend and colour? Or was it that, being as weak of sight as he was shy of mind, he drew less pleasure from the reflection of the glowing sensible world through the prism of a language manycoloured and richly storied than from the contemplation of an inner world of individual emotions mirrored perfectly in a lucid supple periodic prose?\textsuperscript{\textcopyright{328}}

This passage is evoked after his obsession with the phrase ‘dappled seaborne,’ an inaccurate quotation from a book by Hugh Miller.\textsuperscript{\textcopyright{329}} It demonstrates the power of the words upon him. Stephen wonders how this line could affect him to that extent. He is touched by both the iambic tetrameter rhythm and the sophisticated diction of this line. He feels these characteristics since he is living among the words. Another example of Stephen’s obsession with words is the polygluttural techniques he uses. Neologism demonstrates Stephen’s love of language; it does not signify merely a new concept

\textsuperscript{\textcopyright{327}} A Portrait, p. 205.
\textsuperscript{\textcopyright{328}} Ibid., pp. 180-1.
\textsuperscript{\textcopyright{329}} Stephen’s reference is inaccurate; Miller (1805-56) refers to ‘breeze-borne’ in The Testimony of the Rocks; or, Geology in Its Bearings on the Two Theologies, Natural and Revealed (Boston, 1857). See Chester G. Andrson’s note quoted in Seamus Deane’s edition of A Portrait, p. 306.
introduced through language, it also brings to mind the idea of introducing a new reality in a lexical way.

The last chapter is then the most difficult chapter of the novel. It is full of Latin phrases, allusions, grammatical and philosophical terms and Stephen’s theory of aesthetics. The style is here that of a mature writer. The last part of *A Portrait* is similar to the first parts of *Ulysses*. He is not any more the baby tuckoo of the first page but a promising artist, one that is aware of aesthetics and philosophy of art. He is writing his diaries and talking of forging the uncreated conscience of his race.

There is a connection between Stephen’s style and his subjectivity. The development of language and subjectivity are in parallel to each other. Moreover, attempting to compose in a highly artistic style is expressive of the process of the re-construction of the already ideologically constituted identity. John Paul Riquelme deals with the relation of the styles of *A Portrait* to the character:

His constructing styles in *A Portrait* present a character whose experiences regularly involve opposing forces that seem irreconcilable, such as the violent political and religious antagonisms that Stephen witnesses during the Christmas dinner in part I. The strongly divergent aspects of the book’s language pertain simultaneously, though in different ways, to the writer who has learned to work with contrasts and to the character whose life and social context are filled with them.\(^{330}\)

The “violent political and religious antagonisms,” which Riquelme refers to, find a language for themselves throughout the novel. I referred to these antagonisms as ideological subjectivities with which Stephen’s artist’s subjectivity is in a constant dialectic and opposition. As I showed in this chapter, each ideological subjectivity has its own ideological mode of language and these languages have been, as I showed, represented in this novel. Language is the battlefield of ideological subjectivities. There exists a permanent struggle throughout the novel between being ideological subjectivities and the subject’s rebellion against them. But what is crucial is that this rebellion happens through language; the rebellion against ideological subjectivities is a rebellion against language not only because language is mostly ideologically designated but because language is the medium that his identity was already constructed by.

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As demonstrated earlier, Language is the space where the universal and the particular come together. The identity of the subject is characterized by its distance from the universal and the particular. However, there is still a conflict between the universal and the particular in the creative style of writing. That is to say, any invention in language is really in opposition to the Other from which language has been already obtained. Artistic invention in language is, thus, in a profound conflict with the ideological Symbolic that has already constituted the subject.

If we consider the universal to be found in the subjectivities already constituted the identity of Stephen and if we take the particular as the newly constructed artistic subjectivity Stephen seeks to arrive at, then, Stephen’s act of reconstructing his identity through language first appears to be impossible in that language is closely related to the universal than to the particular. Stephen’s answer to this problem should be observed in the context of his ‘aesthetic negoism.’ Referring to Rabaté’s ideas above, I discussed that the egoistic esthetics of Joyce thus led to the rise of an aesthetic negoist, one that is aesthetically inventive in language. Language thus becomes the site for particularity in inventive styles of composition. The contradiction between the aesthetic ego of Stephen and the ideological subjectivities that have already constructed him is manifested in the language he employs towards the end of the novel.

Stephen’s aesthetic negoism in language is in parallel to the resistance of his artistic subjectivity to ideological subjectivity. Stephen is against being determined by ideologies; he is constructivist of a new subjectivity through art. However, determinist theories of identity argue that it is impossible for the subject to change the Symbolic and language s/he is first alienated with. If we consider Stephen as an agent, in the Butlerean sense of the term, then he may partly succeed in re-signifying the chain of signification. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, according to Butler’s constructivism, although the subject is determined by the Other and language, the agent can succeed in its acts of identity reconstructing. A good example is the colour of the rose. Roses are not green in the real world, but they can be green in art. The art that portrays the roses as green is a non-conventional art that does not go with the common understanding of the objects.

The ideological constitution of Stephen is interrupted by art. However, even the reconstruction itself is an ongoing process that is open-ended. Stephen himself is a part of a new dialectic; he is not complete in subject formation and undergoes an open ended process. Stephen becomes a non-ideological subject who rejects ideological interpellation and is thus linguistically not alienated. It is the artistic subjectivity of his identity that becomes the dominant through inventiveness in language.
7.4 Concluding Remarks

The present chapter has sought to analyze the construction and re-construction of the subject’s identity in James Joyce’s *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* according to the critical approach of the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic. The ideological subjectivities of ‘the Other’ to which the subject is exposed in the novel were first investigated while analyzing both alienation and interpellation of the subject formation through the language of the major ISAs. Then, the study showed that while the tension between religious faith and nationalistic aspirations provides a deconstructive inter-subjective dialectic in the identity of the characters of the novel including Dante and Mr Casey, it results in the construction of artistic subjectivity for the protagonist.

‘Otherness’ in this reading was studied within the realm the language creates for the subject.

The chapter, then, focused on the process of the re-construction of the subject in the novel. A complicated and ongoing process, the reconstruction of identity in Stephen begins with disillusionment and ends with inventiveness. This process includes epiphany, which I argued had a materialized experience. The movement throughout the novel is thus from ideology to art; whereas it first begins with the ideological interpellation of the protagonist, it ends with a call for an artistic creation that goes beyond the ‘nets’ surrounding the protagonist.

The exploration of the aesthetics of language as represented in the novel in instrumental in the analysis of the representation of identity in that whereas Stephen attempts to reject ideological subjectivities, his artistic subjectivity is both constitutive and critical of these subjectivities. Therefore, this the process of identity reconstruction is represented in the language of the novel in a way that it includes not only the various forms of ideological languages but also the new artistic language Stephen ultimately employs. However, the inter-subjective dialectic in the identity of Stephen is not destructive in that it creates a new subjectivity, one that creates art based on the same aesthetic theory he himself has developed in the novel. This newly constructed non-ideological subjectivity is itself dialectic and, thus, open-ended. The analysis of Stephen’s identity reconstruction is thus re-conceptualized from a simplistic and one to one relationship between ideological and artistic subjectivity into a complicated process in which several ideological subjectivities are involved and the new artistic subjectivity is itself conceived of as an ongoing process.
Chapter Eight: Discussions and Conclusion

Critically examining the Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject, this thesis explored the theoretical problems and methodological premises of a converged version of both theories. The central argument the thesis sought to demonstrate was that the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic provides a more comprehensive account of the process of the subject formation than a purely psychoanalytical or structuralist Marxist analysis of the term. In order to demonstrate a practical reading of the formation and construction of the subject’s identity in terms of the critical approach of the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic the present research also proceeded to apply it to James Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916).

Concentrating on the Lacanian-Althusserian models of critical theory, the thesis studied language/ideology relations through investigating those critical and theoretical works that have attempted to make a parallel use of both Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject. As demonstrated, the ‘Lacanian-Althusserian paradigm,’ was practically employed, and harshly criticised in the area of film theory and criticism. I also showed that Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject as applied in cultural studies suffer from a deep investigation into the problems that emerge in such convergence.

A notable study of the position of the subject in psychoanalytical and Marxist approaches was provided by Fredric Jameson who developed the problem in the Lacanian model of subjectivity by referring to the gap emerging in the transmission from the Imaginary to the Symbolic. He also commented on Althusser’s relation to Lacan by relating the Althusserian perception of the ‘absent cause’ to the Lacanian concept of ‘the Real.’ Though original in his findings, Jameson’s response to a Lacanian-Althusserian framework faces two essential reconsiderations: first, although he analyses the Althusserian concept of the ‘absent cause’ in History, he does not consider it as instrumental in the further exploration of the Althusserian analysis of subjectivity constitution; secondly, although he concentrates on the gap that is formed in the transition of the subject from the Imaginary to the Symbolic, he does not directly focus on the other theoretical problems emerging in a Lacanian-Althusserian model of analyzing subjectivity.
Laclau and Mouffe’s critical project, which brings together both Marxism and Psychoanalysis, has provided an ingenious notion of the subject of politics with reference to the Lacanian insights concerning the constitutive lack of the subject and its identity. Laclau’s concept of ‘empty signifier’ is innovative in that it explores how the impossibility of society and other signifying systems continue to exist through the impossibility of a full identification within both identity and ideology. Laclau’s concept of ‘empty signifier’ tends to bring both Lacan’s emphasis on language as constructing the subject’s identity and Althusser’s perception of the impossibility of the Subject.

However, instead of employing Laclau’s concept of empty signifier I used the concept of ‘ideological signifier’ that not only manifestly refers to language-ideology relations in the identity of the subject but also demonstrates the close association between the Lacanian concept of linguistic alienation and the Althusserian concept of ideological interpellation.

As for Žižek’s study of the problem, I showed how he provides a twofold response to Althusser. He criticises Althusser’s overlooking of seeing the social fantasy as “filling out the voids of the social structure.” Moreover, he criticises the Althusserian concept of interpellation because the subject in Althusser, even before the moment of interpellation, is already a subject by being “trapped” by the Other. On the other hand, Žižek’s concept of ‘the ideological Barred O’ appears to be an explicit affirmative response to the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic in that it brings together both the Althusserian definition of ideology as present everywhere and the Lacanian perception of the barred Other as constitutive of the Symbolic.

Judith Butler, too, has critically confronted Althusser’s concept of interpellation. Her reference to interpellation as happening within the subject’s identity and, thus, having an inter-subjective character, proves to be of close affinity to what the present thesis aims at demonstrating: the inter-subjective dialectic between ideological subjectivities of the subject’s identity. Interpellation does not always need two persons to occur; it can take place within the identity of the subject. If we consider language as the battlefield of ideologies and the context in which the subject is interpellated, then, Butler’s concept of ‘the agent’ and its relation to language provides a relative freedom for the agent in reconstructing his/her identity. In my analysis of Stephen Dedalus’ act of reconstructing his identity in the penultimate chapter of the present thesis I referred to Butler’s idea of the agent as providing a better theoretical framework for my argument that that observed in the Lacanian theory of the subject. The Lacanian concept of the subject
emphasizes the subject’s inability in reconstructing his/her identity because of the inevitable influence of the Symbolic.

Employing both Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject in their works, the above critics have not focused on the problems and principles of the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic as a model for the analysis of subjectivity. As demonstrated in the thesis, none of these critical efforts achieve a synthesis of the two models. Therefore, the present thesis proceeded to investigate the language/ideology, lack/material, and alienation/interpellation relations in the process of the subject formation by first studying the subject/object relations in rationalism and romanticism, which provided two distinguishable conceptions of the subject for both Lacanian and Althusserian models of subjectivity.

Considering the Cartesian subject as an objectified subject, I explored the certainty and centrality of Descartes’ rationalist treatment of the subject. The mind/body dualism in Descartes resulted in the construction of a number of modern binary oppositions such as the subject/nature, the subject/object, and centre/margin. The subject/object separation as well as the superiority and centrality of the subject established the hierarchy of these binary oppositions in a way that the first part of them was considered to be superior to the ‘other.’ As demonstrated in the thesis, both Lacan’s and Althusser’s concepts of the subject radically criticised the humanist designations of the Cartesian subject’s characteristic features of certainty and centrality that resulted in the consideration of the subject as free, autonomous, and decision maker.

On the other hand, the Hegelian perception of the subject is based on the treatment of the subject-Nature identity in German Idealist philosophy. Referring to the inspirational and spiritual character of Nature, I demonstrated the way Schelling and Novalis’ nature philosophy were in congruity to the pantheist principle of Romanticism. In Hegel, however, the subject-object identity ultimately became the subject-Nature non-identity. This non-identity with Nature causes two lacks in the subject’s identity that are the lack of a state of complete subject-Nature identity and the lack caused by the gap between the subject and Nature. The Hegelian idea of the construction of the subject based on the other, which causes the alienation of the subject, was further investigated in my analysis of the Lacanian concepts of imaginary and linguistic alienations.

The exploration of the subject-Nature identity in German idealist philosophy thus provides a philosophical background for investigating the Lacanian notion of the subject of language and the corresponding subject-language identity. This approach can be also applied to the study of the Althusserian model of the subject/Subject. Furthermore, the
incompleteness of the subject in both Lacanian and Althusserian accounts of the term can be further explored through investigating the mentioned lacks in the Hegelian perception of the subject.

I referred to the challenging questions the Althusserian theory evokes in my study of the Althusserian concept of the subject of ideology. The model that ideology requires its subjects to cope with, that is the Subject, is never materially realised by the subject. I have elaborated on the gap that exists between the subject and the Subject according to Hegel’s idea of the subject-other non-identity. Suggesting that the Subject is itself based on lack in that it is never materialized, my analysis provides further investigations into the constitution of ideology by lack. Althusser’s attempt to remove Hegel from his version of Marxism led to ignoring the lack that always exists between the subject and the Subject. A Hegelian-Lacanian reading of this model is illuminating in removing its shortcomings in that such reading investigates into the character of this lack and the reasons for its permanent existence and ongoing function.

Highly critical of the Cartesian subject and influenced by Hegelian treatment of the subject-other identity, the Lacanian perception of the identity of the subject as constructed by the other was in congruity with Hegel’s understanding of the significant role played by ‘the other’ in the rise of the self-consciousness of the subject. The thesis demonstrated that the Lacanian discussion of the mother/infant non-identity in the mirror stage is reminiscent of the subject-other non-identity in Hegel.

Language, in Lacan’s concept of the subject of language, determines not only the formation of the unconscious but also the structure of the Symbolic. It also negates the lack it includes. The unconscious is thus based on lack. Demonstrating that the Other, desire and the unconscious all are based on lack, the thesis examined how lack is both created and negated by language. Whereas Lacan talked of the phallus as the most important signifier in the unconscious, there are other signifiers in language that the subject seeks to identify him/herself with. Therefore, language acquisition process exposes a number of what I called in the thesis ‘ideological signifiers’ to the subject that determine his/her identity. The alienation of the subject through the ideological signifiers thus provides the subject with ideological desires that are distinguishable from the sexual desires.

After critically studying Althusserian and Lacanian theories of the subject, the thesis investigated the major theoretical problems and premises of any critical attempt that applies both Lacanian and Althusserian theories of the subject to the same work of art. The Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic can be also conceived of as the convergence of lack
and material in that these two theories deal with two essentially different objects of
study: language as based on lack and ideology as having a material existence. However,
as demonstrated throughout the thesis, ideology is also constituted by lack. The
constitution of both ideology and language on lack is not only represented in the
development of the unconscious but also appears to be vital for the permanent
functioning of the desire of the subject.

Furthermore, the close affinity of the Lacanian perception of alienation to the
Althusserian concept of interpellation has been studied in the present thesis. I
demonstrated how the subject’s alienation with ideological signifiers in the language
acquisition process can be regarded as a dramatic mode of interpellation. Likewise, I
elaborated on the alienation that results in the subject’s identity after being interpellated
both directly and dramatically in his/her mature years.

Although the subject seeks to remain completely identical to the ideological signifiers,
there is always a gap between him/her and what the ideological desires depict as the
objects of desire. I argued that the mechanism through which both language and
ideology alienate and interpellate the subject never permits the subject enjoying a state
of full identity between him/her and the signifiers. The Lacanian and Althusserian
subjects are then two sides of the same coin: while in Lacan the subject becomes the
subject to the Other’s desire, in Althusser it becomes the subject of/to ideology; whereas
in Lacan the Symbolic exists before the entry of the child into it, in Althusser, too,
ideology exists before the entry of the individual into it; the result of both entries is the
birth of the subject. Both concepts of interpellation and alienation contribute to this
view that the subject is not the cause and the creator; s/he is, however, the effect and the
created. The subject is the effect of both the language and ideology into which s/he is
born. Consequently, they are both anti-humanistic theories of the subject. Both ideology
and language are pre-existing structures to which the individual is exposed. Also, it is
significant to note the parallel made between the unconscious and ideology: Both are
open-ended, having no beginning and end except as they relate to the human existence.

I sought to demonstrate that the Lacanian subject and the Althusserian subject play a
supplementary role to each other in that each one of them focuses on a particular aspect
of the subject’s identity; whereas the Lacanian subject tended to consider the subject as
the subject of language, the Althusserian subject considered it as the subject of
ideology. Also, whereas the Lacanian theory is concerned with identity construction
through imaginary and linguistic alienation in the infantile phase, the Althusserian
theory is involved in the ideological interpellation of the subject in its mature years. I
also referred to the Lacanian concept of desire and considered it, in an Althusserian sense, ideological. Then, I demonstrated how there is the impossibility of a complete identity between the subject and the lost desire in Lacan and between the subject and what ideology requires it to be in Althusser.

The Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic thus provides a more comprehensive critical perspective for the analysis of the subject. However, if simplistically developed — I referred to a number of examples in Chapter One — the similarities of both accounts will result in misunderstanding and misclassification. Moreover, the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic will suffer from certain theoretical weak points if applied without a critical investigation into the incongruity between the two theories.

The theoretical premises of my critical approach include the following: first, considering the concept of identity as an umbrella term that brings together different subjectivities within the realm of the same subject, this critical approach focuses on the ‘inter-subjective dialectic’ in the identity of the subject and considers it as having constructive and deconstructive modes. Identity always functions through and because of the inter-subjective dialectic and intra-subjective lack within it. Identity is never fully constituted and has an ‘incomplete’ character. The ‘incompleteness’ of identity does not merely go back to the inter-subjective dialectics inside it. It is essential to the function of identity in that there is always an antagonism at work motivated by intra-subjective lack.

Secondly, the ideological constitution of the subject that happens through language gives an ideological character to the Symbolic. Approaching the Symbolic as ideological, we are explicitly providing the Lacanian concept with an Althusserian signification. Subjectivity first exists in the Symbolic, and then becomes part of the identity of the subject. Based on its sameness to that which has created it, subjectivity can be considered as identical with the ideology that has produced it. Therefore, the ideological subjectivities of the Symbolic are manifested in the identity of the subject.

Thirdly, the identity of the subject is represented in the language exposed to and reproduced by the subject. ‘Ideological language’ thus becomes a key concept in my analysis of the identity of the subject. Investigation into the ideological language is a complicated process because each ideological aspect of language has been itself influenced by a vast number of ideologies in the same language. However, this ideological language is not responsible for the subject’s whole identity. It represents only a particular subjectivity that is itself permanently changing because of the intra-subjective lack and its inevitable dialectic with other subjectivities.
This critical methodology concentrates on the individual and the social as well as the particular and the universal in that it deals not only with the language as coming from the Other but also with the language as acquired by the subject. Although the language acquired by the subject comes from the Other and is reproduced by him/her, there can also be instances of the subject’s re-signification of the signifiers. As I explained in the thesis by referring to linguistic determinist and constructivist theories, there is a pale constructivism at work for the subject’s attempt of reconstructing his/her identity. The examples of identity reconstruction of the subject are rare and they involve a long complicated process of internal conflicts between subjectivities.

In order to demonstrate a practical analysis of the theoretical premises of the Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic the present thesis has applied this critical approach to reading James Joyce’s *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young man*. In my study of the subject formation in Joyce’s novel I focused on dramatic and direct modes of ideological interpellation and their consequent linguistic alienation. Elaborating on the identity construction of the subject, I explored the relation of language to the Symbolic through exploring the moments in which ideology transits into language. Considering the self-consciousness of the subject not as a fixed state but as an ongoing process that always remains incomplete, the thesis dealt with the role of language in the reconstruction of identity through investigating the inter-subjective dialectics between ideological subjectivities.

I also referred to the ideological subjectivities of ‘the Other’ to which the protagonist is exposed to. I have studied the subject formation by explaining how language, including ideological signifiers designated by the ISAs, alienate and interpellate the protagonist of the novel. Then, the inter-subjective dialectic between religious faith and nationalistic aspirations were explored. ‘Otherness’ in this reading was studied within the realm the language creates for the subject. Subjectivity plays the role of the other for the other subjectivities. As demonstrated, the inter-subjective dialectic within the identity of the subject is not constructive of a new subjectivity for some characters including Dante and Mr Casey.

A complicated and ongoing process, the reconstruction of identity of the protagonist is manifested in forming a new subjectivity that begins with disillusionment, goes through an experience of the materialization of epiphany, and ends with inventiveness. Epiphany is materialized in the novel not only because it has been experienced by the protagonist but also because it gives a material existence to that which causes it. The revealed truth here does not come from a divine source; it is the body of a girl.
Materialization of epiphany by the protagonist is in parallel to the materialization of ideology in Althusser because in both cases a set of beliefs are materialized.

Whereas the novel first begins with the process of subjectivity formation of the protagonist, it ends with a call for an artistic creation that goes beyond the ‘nets’ surrounding the protagonist. The process of the reconstruction of identity through a move from ideological to non-ideological subjectivity happened for Stephen Dedalus through artistic inventiveness. My analysis is here dependent on the Althusserian view of art as not ranked among ideologies. The exploration of the aesthetics of language as represented in the novel is instrumental in the analysis of the representation of Stephen’s artistic subjectivity in that the artistic language of the novel is itself based on and constituted by a criticism of ideological languages of the novel. Thus, even in its reconstructed form, identity is still constituted by ideological subjectivities.

The internal inter-subjective dialectic is, however, constructive for Stephen in that it creates a new subjectivity. This new subjectivity is based on the aesthetic theory Stephen has developed in the novel and it is to replace the already constituted ideological subjectivities of his identity. The dialectic within Stephen’s identity first occurs between the existing ideological subjectivities and the newly formed artistic subjectivity. But what is notable is that even this new artistic subjectivity, as a result of its antagonism, is in a permanent dialectic with other artistic languages available to Stephen. That is why there are frequent references to Yeats and his mode of art towards the end of the novel. The result of this dialectic can be observed in the style of language used by Stephen in the last pages of the novel.

The Lacanian-Althusserian dialectic thus provides a critical perspective for the analysis of subjectivity construction and identity re-construction that can be applicable to different phases in the development of the subject including both the infantile and mature years. In positioning the subject between both language and ideology it investigates the relation of the subject to both the individual and the social and, correspondingly, focuses on the particular and the universal in language as the realm where they meet. This critical approach is concerned with exploring ideological languages in a given text and how they represent ideological subjectivities. Examining the way an ideological subjectivity is formed, reproduced, and represented, this approach demonstrates how linguistic inventiveness plays an instrumental role in the re-construction of the subject’s identity, which remains, even in its synthesized form, incomplete and undergoes an ongoing inter-subjective dialectical process.
Bibliography


