“That most useful body of men”: the Operational Doctrine and Identity of the British Marine Corps, 1755-1802

Submitted by Britt Zerbe to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Maritime History in September 2010

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Abstract

The Corps of Marines 1755-1802 (after 1802, Royal Marines) was the smallest of the three military services of the late eighteenth century British Armed Nation. Because of this, their history has largely been marginalised - or if dealt with, only in broad three hundred year studies. However, their importance has been largely underestimated. With the rise in the late eighteenth century of a more coherent ‘Blue-Water Strategy’, classified later by some historians as a uniquely ‘British Way in Warfare’, there was a need to have an operational organisation from which to implement Britain’s grand strategy. The two other contemporary military organizations (Army and Navy) were too large, had internal resistance to, or simply had one-dimensional geographic identification which prevented the full pure operational implementation of British amphibious power. With the dawn of the Seven Years War the government gave this operational priority to the Navy, which began in earnest with the formation of the British Marine Corps. The Navy, and Marines, were able to do this by constructing an operational doctrine and identity for its new Marine Corps. With the forty-seven year construction of its operational doctrine and identity, the Marines not only assisted in the implementation of British grand strategy, but also were pivotal in the protection of the empire.

This dissertation is separated into two distinct parts. The first part outlines the skeleton of the Marines; their past formations, administration and manpower construct. The second part outlines the trials and tribulations of construction and institutionalisation of the Marine Corps within the British nation of the late-eighteenth century. This part reveals the non-combat usage, operational development and imperial rapid reaction force aspects of the Marines. Marines were to carry out many protection and security related duties on land and at sea. Because of this they were given direct access to weapons which in the unfortunate event of mutiny might be used against the men. Naval and amphibious combat were the main justifications for why the Marine Corps existed to begin with. Marines were to develop their own special ‘targeted’ suppression fire and a reliance on the bayonet for both of these operations. Importantly Empire; its maintenance, expansion, and protection was an essential element of the Marines existence. Marines were to become an imperial rapid reaction force that could be sent anywhere a naval ship was and used to suppress disorders. Identity was the tool of three powers (Public, Admiralty and Marine Corps) in their construction of this body of men. Marines’ identity allowed them to be relied upon for a multitude of duties, including the basic protection of order on ship. By understanding all of these areas not only will it expand historical scholarship on how the British state constructed and implemented its policy decisions, but also how an organisation creates and validates its own purpose of existence.
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Note on Terms and Acknowledgements

The Corps of Marines and Marine Corps were terms of contemporary usage for the British Marines of this period. I have therefore used these terms throughout my paper to refer to the British Marines exclusively; all other countries have their names before their service (i.e. US Marine Corps or Dutch Marines). As for capitalisation and lower case I have always capitalised Corps or Division unless it is directly inappropriate. Marines are to be capitalised when I am referring to them as the institution or the term of descriptive (i.e. the Marines or Marine officers). When the discussion changes to the marines themselves as men it shall be kept in a lower case. Finally, I have maintained the original authors’ capitalisation practices when it comes to all direct quotes.

I would first like to thank the librarian of the Royal Marine Museum, Mr. Matt Little for all of his help with the museum’s manuscripts. I also would like to pass on my thanks to two people who have laboriously gone over this paper in its many draft forms. Without their help most of the research for this paper would not have been possible. For any defects in the text I am the sole responsibility. Mike and Stacey, thank you from the bottom of my heart.
Introduction

‘Lord Spencer’s augmentation of that most useful body of men [my emphasis], the Corps of Marines, is, like every measure of his administration, dictated by the most earnest desire to promote the good of the Service, and the consequent welfare of his Country.¹ The statement about the Marines being ‘that most useful body of men’ was a very common one in the press and literature in the second half of eighteenth century Britain. The British Marine Corps while a branch of the Royal Navy, and subject to its control and pay, was also to have many independent elements. The size of this junior service (the Army and Navy were always much larger) in voted strength was to hover between 3,600 to nearly 30,000 men in its forty seven year period from its reformation in 1755 as the Corps of Marines till its formal acceptance by the King in 1802 by being made the Royal Marines. Marines also consisted of between eleven to thirty percent of the overall voted strength for the Navy in this period.²

Marine forces are not unique to Britain and in many ways are as old as warfare at sea. For example, in 256 B.C. the Roman Republic was able to station between 120 to 200 Marines (a larger complement than a 1ˢᵗ rate ship-of-the-line in the eighteenth century) on the upper-decks of their largest ships. These marines were little more than regular legionaries who would fight their battles at sea similar to those on land, hence the development of the *corvus* in the First Punic War.³ The usage of marines as an extension of land warfare tactics would continue for nearly the next eighteen-hundred years unchanged until the mid-seventeenth century. This tactical homogeneity would correspond with naval warfare at large, which began its own dramatic changes in the seventeenth century.⁴ On 28 October 1664 an Order in Council called for the raising of 1200 soldiers to man the newly established Duke of York and Albany’s Maritime Regiment of Foot, the date which the modern Royal Marines mark as their birth. This was a prestigious beginning because of its association with the Lord High Admiral (later James II) and the regiment was to be known as the Admiral’s Regiment. However this regiment while officially assigned to service at sea was still largely administered and functioned like the Army’s other foot regiments. These Marine regiments were additionally to be disbanded at the end of every war and re-established with each succeeding one.

¹ *True Briton* (1793) (London), Thursday, March 3, 1796
² See Appendix Chart 1
⁴ The weight of the ships and therefore the ability to maintain larger cannon encouraged the new line-ahead tactics that were to transform fleet tactics J. Glete, *Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500-1860*, Vol. 1, [Stockholm Studies in History] (Stockholm, 1993), p. 178-184
Then in 1755 a new organisation was founded to be known as the Corps of Marines or Marine Corps whose existence would continue uninterrupted until the present day. My thesis is not just a study of the British Marine Corps over an important forty-seven year period; rather it is an examination of an eighteenth century military force’s creation of an operational doctrine, which would justify its purpose for existence and its place in the British military pantheon. It also examines how an organisation creates its own identity and how this identity is shaped by others (Navy, Army and public). The thesis further examines how the country policed its navy but more importantly its empire. The majority of imperial policing duties were done by the Army which had garrisons throughout the empire; however these units were consequently wedded to these same garrisons and could not move rapidly to handle various disturbances. The Navy on the other hand could patrol the coastal waters of the Empire but had problems with projecting its power ashore. There then was a need for a force that could move rapidly and provide an experienced land-based military presence when and where needed. The Marines were to fulfil this function for Britain. They were stationed onboard nearly every naval warship down to ships as small as sloops. These ships were stationed in foreign or colonial waters and could be used, with their marines, at a moments notice and depending on the marine complements size and the amount of present on naval ships in the area could exert a dramatic influence on the local area.

Why Study the British Marine Corps?

It could be observed that the Marine Corps, of the second half of the eighteenth century, was a subordinate branch of the Navy and therefore should be studied as an small aspect of this context. While this argument has validity it does denote a sense of intellectual malaise; as ships, seamen, officers, naval finances, and the Admiralty have all received a certain level of academic and popular discussion over the last fifty years. However there is still a great lack of work on the Marine Corps of this period. In N.A.M. Rodger’s masterful work on the Royal Navy of this period, *Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815*, he mentions marines only twenty separate times, for a total combined content of around 5 pages of text in his 580 plus pages of work. The low incidence of discussion is common to many of the other works on naval history in the eighteenth century. This would be understandable if the Marines had not been nearly a fifth to a quarter of the voted naval strength, and therefore also a substantial portion of finance for the Royal Navy throughout most of the 1755-1802 period.

However, part of the problem with marines being seen purely though a naval lens is that their purpose and existence is lost by their parent organisation’s primary seaborne

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mission. To do an adequate assessment of the Marine Corps, they should not be separated from their parent organisation but instead understood in the full context of their multi-dimensional doctrine and identity. Think of a frog, it exists equally on land and in the water yet to understand its existence it needs to be studied in both of these environments. The Marines, unlike the other two British military services, were expected to act operationally equally on both land and sea, even within the same day. The Marines were additionally given the responsibility to provide a security or police presence on board ship and in the dockyards. One of their most important, and consistently overlooked, duties was to act as an imperial rapid reaction force. This force could react quickly to any imperial issues that needed a direct military presence on shore or at sea.

The majority of studies done on the eighteenth century armed forces of Britain have largely been on either the tactical level (battles or commanders) or the strategic level (fleets, armies, administration or government decisions). One area that has largely been overlooked is the ‘operational art’ aspect of eighteenth century warfare. However, this should not be seen as a historiographic mistake, as it was not until the 1920s to 1930s that this concept was even developed as a military theory of warfare, begun by the Soviet Union. While there have been works of late that have looked at the operational sphere these have largely been about land forces and in the twentieth century. The only scholarly work to look at the eighteenth century is Claus Telp’s PhD and eventual book *The Evolution of Operational Art* but this only focuses on the armies of Frederick the Great and Napoleon. There is no scholarly work on the eighteenth century operational aspect of the war at sea or, even more importantly, amphibious warfare. Part of the problem is that the Soviets themselves muddied the water by developing the term ‘naval operations’ at the same time their army was developing operational art. These two terms are very nearly the same aspect of warfare and are separated mainly by their geographical differences. There is only one full-length academic study on operational art in the naval sphere, *Operational Warfare at Sea: Theory and Practice* by Milan Vego. Unfortunately, Vego only looks at the period after the Napoleonic Wars as his starting-off point for this dimension in naval warfare.

The operational sphere of military theory is seen as the link between the tactical and strategic elements of the battle-space. Tactical decisions are largely made by commanders on the ground and are usually the concern of only a battle or two, whereas strategic decisions are largely done on the campaign scale or even longer terms with many decisions that would

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directly affect these decisions (logistics, administration, etc.). Operational decisions are those in-between the two, the fleet or army scale, with a combination of the strategic and tactical issues and approaches. The operational dimension can further be seen in a military organisational aspect as well. On the strategic level there is the Navy or Army as an institutional whole operating to achieve the strategic goals of the British nation. On the tactical level there are the regiments, ships and specific small group organisations to handle the immediate pressing concerns of battles. However, operational organisations exist as well, with the British Marine Corps providing a wonderful example of just this sort of organisation. The Marines when called upon had to act in small and large group organisations to accomplish tactical goals but their continued existence also helped facilitate the Navy’s and the nations’ strategic goals as well.

As an operational level military organisation the British Marine Corps had to develop a doctrine and identity to secure their purpose of existence. Marines further demonstrated how a military unit on this level was able to develop a doctrine and identity of it own, so strong it would get both popular public and official approval by being made ‘Royal’ in 1802. Because of the bridge between the strategic and tactical implementation of ideas in war the Marine Corps as an operational organisation can reveal many things about eighteenth-century military, navy and the country’s grand strategy. These issues alone would warrant their study but marines also demonstrate the ways that Britain in the eighteenth century could implement ‘gunboat diplomacy’ or the problems and solutions of policing her empire during this period. Wherever there were Royal Navy warships, and many times even sloops, in peace or war, there was a Marine presence on hand to be used in any appropriate method deemed vital by the ship’s or fleet’s commander.

The study of the Marine Corps can also reveal many things about military identity. Understanding the breakdown of identity reveals some of the reason for marine involvement in ship’s mutinies. This was especially the case in the vast success of the Great Mutinies of 1797. Marines by their very presence could assist in the Navy’s retention and recruitment methods for sailors. They additionally guarded naval assets on land; a detachment was to patrol each of the royal dockyards and the naval hospitals in England. These and many other non-military related activities were to bring marines further into the fold of naval command and the institution as a whole but it further highlights their importance as a semi-autonomous service. In a day and age when the ship captain’s authority was to reign supreme, the Admiralty continually made suggestions and orders about how marines and their officers could and should be handled. In some ways the Marine Corps was just a continuation of the policy of centralisation of command through the Admiralty that had been picking up steam.
throughout the eighteenth-century navy. Importantly, marines’ interactions with their sailor counterparts can be seen as reflecting similar interactions with authority and uniformed power that were affecting the larger British society in this period. These reasons among others are just some of the important issues about why there needs to be some extensive research into the British Marine Corps, especially for this forty-seven year period.

**Historiography**

The Royal Marines have a very long and proud tradition that has been written about by only a few historians and usually within a broader general narrative of their entire history. Nearly all of these historians, until the last thirty years, were former members of the Royal Marines. “To drag from the land of forgetfulness, actions, long lain in oblivion; to place the revolutions and the achievements of a corps, endeared to its Country by a train of loyalty and valour, in one connected and analysed point of view, were the leading motives which urged the Author to essay a history of its origin and progress.” This was the way that the first historian of the British Marine Corps Major Alexander Gillespie would write about his Marine service. While Lt. Paul Harris Nicolas, in his 1845 book *Historical Records of the Royal Marine Forces* cites what was to be a similar line of reasoning for writing his work. Nicholas exclaims:

…influenced by a strong attachment to the welfare and reputation of the corps, in which I had the honour to serve, I felt persuaded that an impartial account of the services of the Royal Marines would not only reflect additional lustre on their distinguished character, but encourage a spirit of emulation, which is the strongest impulse to great and gallant actions; and as nothing can so fully tend to this desirable object as a faithful record of their glorious career.

Major L. Edye in his work written in 1893 would almost parrot this response. He felt that the compilation of a history of the Marine Forces ‘was urged upon him that it was his duty to go back to the earliest times, and, taking the widest possible view of his subject’. He was to record ‘everything that in the slightest degree possible’ and thereby illustrate the services of soldiers on shipboard. But ultimately he was writing this history to ‘rescue from forgetfulness the origin, the changes, the trials and the triumphs of a corps to which he is proud to belong, and which should be endeared to his countrymen by its unfailing loyalty and

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12 A. Gillespie, *An historical review of the Royal Marine Corps: from its original institution down to the present era, 1803* (Birmingham, 1803), p. ix
the valour of its deeds’. His history like others was meant to revive the glorious past and ‘inspire the unknown future’. The theme of writing a work on Marines’ history to ‘inspire the unknown future’ of the Corps was to be one of the primary reasons for the next influential book on Marine history in the early twentieth century. Colonel Cyril Field’s Sea Soldiers in two volumes published in 1924. Field’s prime rational was to emphasise the importance of the Royal Marines to the post-First World War environment. Field even got a friend of his, Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty, to write the forward to his book. By having the Admiral of the Fleet write the forward, Field was attempting to emphasise the utter importance of the Marines to the Navy and even the nation itself. The tradition of histories being written by former Royal Marines continues up to the present day; those of General Herbert Edward Blumberg (which though written in the early twentieth century was not published until the end of it), Major General Julian Thompson and Lt. Colonel Brian Edwards being just a few. These officers’ works are largely very good about the basic aspects of the Marine Corps in the eighteenth century. The only issue with them, however, is that they have been written under the guise of continually justifying to the military and public at large why the Royal Marines should continue to exist today. Some of the more unpleasant aspects of marines in actions against sailors or in the Great Mutinies themselves are largely glossed over. There is also no real analysis about how or why the Marine Corps existed at all in the eighteenth century.

Purely scholarly works on the Marines of this period are very slow in coming and it has not been until recently that any have even appeared. Alfred James Marini in his 1979 University of Maine PhD Thesis on the British Corps of Marines and their US counterparts was the catalyst for this small body of academic work. Marini’s work is largely concerned with administration and its comparative elements for these two services. Marini’s dates for the British Marines, especially on an administrative basis are a bit problematic. He begins his study with 1746 when the Marines were first brought back under the Admiralty control since the War of Spanish Succession as a defining moment of their existence. Yet, he even admits that with the reestablishment of the Marines in 1755 ‘upon a permanent footing, each part of

16 Blumberg’s account is a compilation of the notes and manuscripts he put together about the Marine history. He died before they were published in H. E. Blumberg, Royal Marine Record, Part I: 1755-1792, Part II: 1793-1836, Part III: 1837-1914, A. J. Donald & J. D. Ladd (eds) (Eastney, 1982); General Thompson is largely concerned with the Royal Marines post 1914 in J. Thompson, The Royal Marines: from sea soldiers to a special force (London, 2000); Colonel Edwards has focused on a small time period to coincide with the bicentenary of Trafalgar in B. Edwards, Formative Years 1803 to 1806: a perspective of the Royal Marines in the Navy of John Jervis, Earl of St. Vincent and Horatio, Lord Nelson, [Royal Marines Historical Society, special publication 31] (Southsea, 2005)
the Marine Corps administrative system began to perform its duties on a day-to-day basis.\textsuperscript{18} He gives even more validity to the argument that 1755 not 1746 was truly transformational to the Marines and their structure. ‘In 1755 they “reappear” with a totally new organization. This establishment proved so workable that it was not materially changed until 1947.’\textsuperscript{19} His main defence of this is that they inherited many of the institutional legacies of the Marine Regiments from the 1746-1748 period. Most of his efforts are spent in making administrative comparisons between the British and American Marines of this period. Marini’s end date of 1771 for administrative purposes on the other hand is very well made. This was the last truly formative change with the establishment of the Colonel-Commandant system and the relegation of the ‘Blue Colonels’ to a purely sinecure position. Marini’s work does deserve special mention because it was the first work to academically tackle many of the issues and demonstrate the uniqueness of the thinking behind the structuring of the British Marine Corps of this period.

Another more recent scholarly account of the Marines has been by Donald F. Bittner, unfortunately his concern is with the 1790s to 1850s periods with the vast majority of it after 1802.\textsuperscript{20} This work is largely a collection of correspondence and diaries from five Marine officers he chooses to study in this work. Bittner’s work is an excellent source of primary materials which are largely published and discussed for the first time within this work. Richard Brooks’s work, while a general survey of the entire Marines history, has also tried to take a somewhat scholarly approach.\textsuperscript{21} Unfortunately Brooks’s discussion on the eighteenth century, while more extensive then most, leaves a good amount of room for more in-depth discussion on a range of issues he is forced to leave out. His study is heavily dependant for the majority of his sources on those solely in the Royal Marine Museum in Eastney. While this archive has many valuable manuscripts, it is lacking many sources about administration, pay, discipline and operational use that can be found in other archives. There have been more specific studies of the Marines usually centred on a person’s correspondence or history of certain division’s records.\textsuperscript{22} There have even been some on specific wars or very narrow time periods.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{18} A.J. Marini, ‘The British Corps of Marines, 1746-1771 and the United States Marine Corps, 1798-1818’, p. 3
\textsuperscript{19} A.J. Marini, ‘The British Corps of Marines, 1746-1771 and the United States Marine Corps, 1798-1818’, p. 163
\textsuperscript{20} D. F. Bittner, Officers of the Royal Marines in the age of sail: professional and personal life in His and Her Majesty’s soldiers of the sea, [Royal Marines Historical Society, special publication 26] (Portsmouth, 2002)
\textsuperscript{21} R. Brooks, The Royal Marines: 1664 to the present (London, 2002)
\textsuperscript{22} A. Petrides and J. Downs (eds), Sea Soldier: An Officer of Marines with Duncan, Nelson, Collingwood and Cockburn (Tunbridge Wells, 2000); J. A. Lowe, Portsmouth Record Series Records of the Portsmouth Division of Marines, 1764-1800 (Portsmouth, 1990)
\textsuperscript{23} T. Boaz, For the glory of the Marines: the organisation, training, uniforms and combat role of the British Marines during the American Revolution (Devon PA, 1993); B. Edwards, Formative Years
In direct contrast there has been a plethora of writing on the Royal Navy concerning the eighteenth century over the past forty years. These works have grappled with administrative, social, cultural and combat issues of the Navy in this period. When it comes to discussions about marines these have been examined only in very brief terms. The works which discuss marines over this period in any detail and their relationship to the Navy are few but important. Social histories have been one of the few areas to give any extensive recognition of the Marines within the Navy. In Michael Lewis’s book A Social History of the Navy, 1793-1815 he discusses marines in the fleet, but the majority of his work is linked to the Navy’s overall voted strength and how marines fitted into these numbers.\(^24\) While there are many problems with Lewis’s book including some questions about his lack of utilising primary sources, it is still invaluable as one of the earliest social histories of this period. The second book with more primary research, and mention of the Marines, is N.A.M. Rodger’s The Wooden World. This book is a masterful work of social history of the eighteenth century British Navy. Unfortunately most of the discussion about the Marines is very brief and largely drawn from naval sources. ‘They were taught to handle a musket, and expected to fight ashore if landing parties were needed, but they were certainly at least as ill-trained as the average British foot-soldier of the day.’\(^25\) This statement exemplifies many of the discussions of marines and their functions by other naval historians. These statements are very simplistic and just re-state many of the same naval sentiments of the eighteenth century without real in-depth investigation of the Marines.

One of the most often overstated assumptions about the Marine Corps was that the incentive was for them to be ‘encouraged to learn seamanship and some left the corps to become able seamen; earning not only higher pay but a much higher social standing aboard ship’.\(^26\) This assumption is one left over from the eighteenth century when the Marines were declared by parliament as a nursery of seamen. This sentiment is nearly echoed completely by the next book, Brian Lavery’s Nelson’s Navy. This is probably one of the most extensive in its treatment and discussion of marines in this period. It’s also one of the few works to use Marine sources from letters and correspondence. This book is further accented by Lavery’s later Naval Records Society volume which produces some very good documents about marines.\(^27\) Unfortunately this work only parrots many of the assumptions and statements of Wooden World in regards to marines. Lavery states that the large reason for the Marines continued existence was to serve as a nursery for seamen, as ‘there is no real reason to believe

\(^{24}\) M. Lewis, A Social History of the Navy, 1793-1815 (London, 1960)


\(^{26}\) Rodger, The Wooden World: An anatomy of the Georgian Navy, p. 28

that marines were particularly effective at this [repealing boarding parties]. He like others is plagued by trying to fit marines into a social system they never really were intended to belong to, that of the lower decks. By dividing marines from the men physically and visibly, by berthing and messing marines together in the aft and by their requirement to continually wear their red uniform jacket, such policies were to make marines less susceptible to the sailors’ influences and more loyal to their officers. However, this is not purely the historians’ fault as there are many ambiguities with the Marines, none more so then the simple question of where geographically they exist whether as a sea or land combat and organisation. Nor is this an issue that is even solved to this present day as in a recent newspaper article which called for ‘folding the Royal Marines into the infantry would remove a lot of duplication in terms of research and development budgets and also training’. The writer did, however, admit that such a move would ‘obviously be a sensitive and potentially unpopular move’.

There are a very limited number of books of any consequence about the British Army for this period. The only mention of the Marines in this period are largely within studies concerned with the early eighteenth century period during the Marine regiments existence. These works are largely concerned with the administrative structure of the regiments and how they fitted into the larger Army’s command network. The only work to give any discussion of the Marine Corps in the post 1755 period is J.W. Fortescue’s multi-volume work A History of the British Army. However, Fortescue only mentions the Marines in passing and only when they served as part of larger army operations. There is a real need for more writing and understanding of how the Marine regiments worked operationally, how they manned themselves and where they sat in the Army’s pantheon of regiments. Another place for future Army historiography could be on how the Marine Corps and Army worked together on ship and operationally on shore.

Amphibious warfare is another area that has received even less scholarly attention then the Army or Navy of this period. There were two short studies penned during the Second World War that had elements of the eighteenth century history of amphibious warfare published in them. Admiral Lord Keyes’s Lee Knowles Lectures at Cambridge, was largely concerned with the command and control issues of amphibious operations. His work, though, used the 1759 Quebec operation as his only eighteenth century example. Whereas, Admiral

28 B. Lavery, Nelson’s Navy, p. 145
30 One of the best and quickest to read is H. C. B. Rogers, The British Army of the Eighteenth Century (London, 1977)
31 R. E. Scouller, The Armies of Queen Anne (Oxford, 1966); A. Guy, Oeconomy and Discipline: Officership and Administration in the British Army, 1714-1763 (Manchester, 1985)
32 H. Richmond, Amphibious Warfare in British History (Exeter, 1941); R. J. B. Keyes, Amphibious Warfare and Combined Operations (Cambridge, 1943)
Herbert Richmond’s small pamphlet on *Amphibious Warfare in British History* was a more sweeping survey of British amphibious operations from the 1700s to 1918. Both these works were more commentaries about their contemporary period and how effective amphibious operations could be, but they were some of the first serious look at this form of warfare. Probably the two most significant works on amphibious warfare in the eighteenth century are those by Professor Richard Harding and Dr. Michael Duffy.\(^{33}\) Harding’s investigation of what could be considered the greatest failure of eighteenth-century amphibious warfare and combined operations gives some interesting insights into the problems and issues of carrying out these operations. However, this work is concerned with the period of the last Marine regiments and therefore only discusses marines solely in these terms. His work unfortunately did not foresee the full usage of the Marine Corps in the second half as a mobile reserve or shock force in operations or even as a tactically knowledgeable amphibious force as a whole. Still this is by far the best work about the period, the debate it sparks over the need to study amphibious and combined operations overwhelms many of these minor issues. Duffy’s work masterfully lays out the various operations against the West Indies in the French Revolutionary Wars. He highlights many of the command and control issues for amphibious operations along with the broader impact of these operations on the British war effort. Unfortunately, he does not distinguish the Marine contingents landed in support of the expeditions or as emergency reinforcement of beleaguered colonial garrisons during the rebellions of 1795-6. This work is still a masterpiece about the upper command issues and the contextualisation of amphibious operations in wartime. Recently there have been two books of collected articles about amphibious operations but they centre purely on events or people and there are no conclusions about the eighteenth century itself.\(^{34}\) There is still a vast array of material and discussion that can be done on these topics. This thesis will try and answer some but additionally show where in between there is compromise.

**Sources**

Nearly all historians suffer from the various problems of archival survival, and the study of the Marines is no different. However, there is a real lack of correspondence from Marine enlisted men or their officers. Lt. Nicolas when writing his book in 1845 lamented the lack of firsthand accounts from Marine commanders. He felt that his fellow officers’ negligence was to prevent the recording of many ‘gallant achievements that would have


added to their personal reputation, and redounded to the honour of the corps.’ He goes on to chastise many of the naval officers in their correspondence as they were ‘generally so limited in their mention of officers of marines’ to do them a great disservice.\textsuperscript{35} This issue has been one of the largest weaknesses for this dissertation or any other that will set out to give voice to marines over this period. That said the few sources that are left, largely in officers’ diaries or correspondence, have been used throughout this thesis to accent and validate points that are made from a variety of other sources.

The few sources of personal letters and diaries are scattered around Britain in a variety of small collections. Some of these correspondence and diaries are located in museum archives like the National Maritime and Royal Marine Museums. While the majority are outside our immediate period they do add some important insights into the service, including the only surviving unpublished memoir for this period of an enlisted Marine (RMM 11/13/93, Memoir of Sgt. John Howe, 2 Vol.). There are also a few letters of correspondence in the various national libraries, like the British Library and the Scottish National Library, which contain information of a more personal nature. Personal family correspondence is largely found in local archives like the Warwickshire Record Office and the West Devon and Plymouth Record Office.

The vast majority of primary sources have come from the official correspondence located in the Admiralty collections at the National Archives, Kew. While most of this material is located in the ADM series, it is scattered throughout this series with the most continuous and full collection being in the Marine Department out-letter books (NA ADM 2 series). These sources give a wonderful insight into the administrative and structural aspects of the Corps. Unfortunately, these are largely one-sided dialogues which give little or no idea of what the other side of the dialogue is about. These letters were orders from the Admiralty, through the Marine Department, and were concerned with many larger aspects of daily operation for marines.

The next two large sections of surviving material, but unfortunately not complete, are the Marine Pay-office records (NA ADM 96 series) and the Divisional order books (Chatham NA ADM 183, Plymouth NA ADM 184 and Portsmouth NA ADM 185 series). The Pay-office records are largely concerned with the issues of finance. While these sorts of documents can give some interesting insights into the issues of pay and finance of the Marines, who had their own paymaster-general that reported directly to the Admiralty and Treasury, they are very patchy before 1778 where most of the ledgers and books are lost. Most of the correspondences for this missing period have to be extrapolated from other areas, i.e. Marine Department, Treasury and Admiralty out-letters. There is a collection of in-letters

that have a wealth of information but unfortunately these are erratic records spanning from 1689-1790. The Marine Divisional order books are full of the day to day operational orders. These give a wonderful illustration of duties and responsibilities of small and large units of marines in the royal dockyards and Marine barracks. These documents are further plagued with incomplete records especially the Portsmouth and Plymouth Divisional books. Another divisional source that has proved invaluable is the description books (NA ADM 158 series). These books describe the individual Marine upon his entry into the service. It gives a description of height, place of birth, place of recruitment, reason for discharge among other things. Chatham division is the most complete as they are with all of their divisional records, Plymouth is next for this period with Portsmouth having the sketchy records of all for the entire period.

There is other correspondence about marines from naval and army officers who were engaged with them in daily operations. These can be found in a variety of Admiralty, Colonial Office and War Office series. While these documents discuss marines and their deeds, it is usually very brief as their priority is usually with their own service and helping their own officers with promotion. They do give a sense of how marines were used by both military and naval commanders in battle. Other documents, like ship’s logs, courts-martial documents and Secretaries of State correspondence which have corroborated or contextualised many of these issues. There needs to be a level of cautious interpretation of all of these documents since as they are official the writer may have left out more troubling problems or issues. But if utilised with this understanding then all of these papers, and others not mentioned here, provided the structuring of my thesis argument about the construction and importance of the Marine Corps in this forty-seven year period.

Another source of material is newspapers, printed books and pamphlets. Newspapers of the eighteenth century can be excellent sources about public perceptions of Marine identity. Newspapers throughout this period were used by some Marine officers and those concerned about the Marine Corps continuance, to voice their grievances or ideas. However these were not the only people to utilise the name of marines in newspapers of this period. Many Whig writers would demand their continued existence as a justification that they (along with the navy and militia) were the only constitutionally constructed military forces in existence. One must always be sceptical when drawing materials from newspapers and be understanding of their sensationalism and biases. The other source of material that has proved invaluable is printed material from this period. These materials have included some written from military, naval and marine officers. Officers’ publications were largely advice and instructions for the proper deployment and exercise of marines. These are largely training manuals which describe proper usage of the men and their arms. Theoretical writings about warfare and amphibious operations are a useful source. There are many others from the
public at large who continue the discussion of the constitutional and organisational nature of marines in this period. These works have a very clear agenda but they are still very useful as their messages resonate throughout this forty-seven year period. They are largely concerned with showing how and in what way Marine identity throughout this period was shaped. There is a modern impression in public press and literature that Marine Forces are an elite organisation, the modern US Marine Corps and Royal Marine Commandos are classic examples of this, and this has been largely perpetuated in the public and the other military services. This was a practice that was beginning in the eighteenth century even though some of the terms and descriptions were different, the intention of separating them from the military as a whole was still the objective.

Chapter Plan

My thesis investigates and analyses the British Marine Corps in two distinct segments. Part One of this work outlines the ‘skeleton’ structure of the Marine Corps; their basic structure, background and demographic construct. The first chapter in this segment outlines the development and formation of the Marine regiments from 1664-1749. It charts some of the administrative and operational structures of these units and how some of these things would affect the future Marine Corps. It lays out some of the key moments for discussing the differences and similarities between these regiments and their later progeny. Chapter two investigates the administration of the new Corps and where it was formally placed within the naval structure. This chapter investigates why the 1755 establishment of the Corps of Marines demonstrates something new had been created. It shows how administration was centralised in many aspects with the Marine Department and Pay-office who were continually giving orders to the three divisions. Further, it demonstrates that, like its naval counterpart, there were many decisions which were further delegated to local area commanders. These commanders had to deal with the interference of naval officers from 1763-1770 with the ‘Blue-Colonel system’ but this was largely solved with the Colonel-Commandant system in 1771. This chapter also discuss marines and their barracks administration.

The last chapter of this section is concerned with Marine manpower. Manpower was a critical issue for all eighteenth century military forces throughout Europe. Marines were plagued with many of the same problems as the other services when it came to recruitment. Criminals and the very poor entered their ranks similar of all the services and the Marines were no different. However, the Marines also had a large proportion of tradesmen and semi-skilled labourers to join the ranks as well. What is more pronounced is the near ethnic homogeneity of the Corps, which was made up of between three-fourths to four-fifths men born in England. This is very high for the period as the Navy and Army would not see equal
ethnic homogeneity levels. Marines were to have similar pay, allowance and uniform yearly allotments as the Army in this period. However, one important incentive for Marine recruitment over the Army was the ever present hope of prize money. This section explores all of these issues in more depth and shows that the Marines while similar to the other services were different to them in some aspects. The Marine Corps even during some periods in wartime were so successful at getting their primary recruits that they even ran a surplus that had to be made supernumerary until the next year’s establishment was increased by parliament, e.g. 1778.

Part Two of this work is concerned with the ‘muscle and skin’ of the Corps. This section outlines the trials and tribulations of constructing and institutionalizing Marine Forces within the late-eighteenth century British nation. It is divided by three chapters; the first chapter investigates the internal policing function of marines. These functions took place on both land and sea, and were oriented more towards control and protection rather than a more modern investigative police function, causing marines to develop a stronger identification with naval officers. One of the key reasons for continuing marines was not always the protection of officers but the retention of sailors on board ship. When a ship was in harbour or at anchor, near land, the Marine guard details were doubled. They provided guard details at all of the royal dockyards and naval hospitals. Yet Marine loyalty to their officers and the service should not be taken for granted. They were to show on occasion, never more so then the Great Mutinies of 1797, that they could also identify with and join the sailors in their grievances. The mutinies have been well studied by scholarship, unfortunately the role of the Marines in them has either been diminished or downplayed. One possible reason for this is that for contemporaries and historians alike it has been difficult to come to terms not only with the non-revolutionary nature of these mutinies but also the extent of the sailors’ and marines’ influence in the delegate committees. My argument in this chapter is that without marines, more importantly their non-commissioned officers, help or complacency these mutinies would never have been as wide spread or become as large as they were to be in the end.

The next chapter in this section examines the operational doctrine of the Marines and reveals how marines developed the purpose and training regime to solidify their very existence. This operational doctrine was never to be placed in one document nor done by a single person. Instead the doctrine was an amalgamation of ideas, published materials, training strategies and combat experiences throughout this period. A system does show over the period in a growing development of an overarching doctrine for action on land and at sea. Marines, for the eighteenth century military institution, were to possess an incredible amount of operational flexibility. In battles or campaigns marines could be formed into special battalions for key land operations or the units on various naval ships could be used in a
variety of mixed sized force operations. They were used as a mobile reserve force that could attack strategic areas or work as a tactical diversion before the main strike on another area. Ultimately, this flexibility and multi-dimensional aspects of their operational doctrine was additionally to enhance the Marines’ own sense of their amphibious military identity.

The final chapter is concerned with the Marines as an imperial rapid reaction force. This force could move quickly and operate in a multi-dimensional sphere when and where the British government and Navy required. Marines were used throughout peace-time as a unit that could enhance the British nations growing ‘gunboat diplomacy’ in the second half of the eighteenth century. The Navy’s ships, with their marines, could exert influence overseas by either showing the flag as they did in the Indian Ocean or landing and establishing a foothold as in the Falkland Islands. However, empire was a key catalyst for the construction and continued the need for the British Marine Corps; particularly the constant need for maintenance, expansion, and protection of the Empire. Marines could be deployed to help prevent smuggling in the colonies. They helped maintain British governance as in Florida, but they could also protect government employees as happened in 1768 Boston. Marines were to be used as a rapidly deployable force to enhance the Army units similar to what happened in 1774-1775 Boston. It is generally overlooked that the first shots of the American Revolution were fired at Marines! The Marine command was established as a cooperative but separate entity in these operations. Major Pitcairn’s troubles and successes were to show how this semi-independent Marine command functioned under the Army and Navy.

Marine identity was ultimately shaped by its duality of geography (amphibious) and responsibilities, as these chapters show throughout this thesis. The conclusion examines the question of identity and how the public perceived their Marine Corps. It ends with the official and public sanction of the Marines’ operational doctrine and identity, when the honorific title of ‘Royal’ Marines was conferred upon them in 1802. The Marines by their very nature were different from any previous military organisation. The other military organisations were defined by geography; the Army defines itself by its existence on land while the Navy defines itself by its existence at sea. Marines, who lived and operated in both geographical areas, however defined themselves instead institutionally. The Marines’ continued existence was incumbent upon the needs of the Navy and Government but the Marines were responsible for the creation of their own doctrine and identity. The Marines served as the vital bridge across the gap of the operational needs of the Navy, Army and government. The Marine Corps was small, quick and powerful, something that would shape their very doctrine to this day even in many different countries’ Marine Forces. Yet all of this was started and developed in a forty-seven year period from 1755-1802 and it is something this thesis will show in the following chapters.
PART I
Chapter I: What Came Before

1.1 1739 House of Commons Debates

1739 saw war with Spain the order of the day, this war was destined to be seen as a largely colonial affair by its proponents. On 16 November 1739 during King George II’s address to parliament he outlined his desire for the creation of six new Marine regiments. He proclaimed; ‘And as in the prosecution of this War, a number of Soldiers, to serve on board the Fleet, may be requisite; I have judged it proper, that a body of marines should be raised, and have directed the Estimates for this purpose to be likewise prepared and laid before you’. 36 These debates had a very political bent to them. Some politicians and the crown saw the vote for six new regiments as a way to subvert the standing army controversy. Others felt marines by being used overseas would then be unable to ‘terrorise’ the British at home. Importantly for this dissertation, the debates also dwelt on the very nature of the need, structure and operational use of the Marine regiments, ideas that would continue to affect their later progenies the Corps of Marines in the latter half of the century.

Samuel Sandys, when introducing the bill in the House that November was determined to make the main reason for raising the six Marine regiments to be for the ‘sake of supplying our Men of War with all thorough-bred Seamen’. Sandys here was articulating the concepts of others, about marines being a nursery for seamen thus preventing the disruption of trade due to the excesses of the Press Gangs. Samuel Sandys, like the King, went further stating that the best method for raising marines would be to pilfer men from other line regiments. He felt that Marines by being such men as ‘bred to military discipline, they will be better, and more useful for making Invasions and Incursions upon the Enemy at land, than the most expert Seamen’. 37 Sandys also felt that if Marines were raised from the other regiments, they ‘will be more useful against the Enemy, and not only less expensive, but more convenient to ourselves, than a Body of raw, undisciplined men, newly raised for that purpose.’ 38 Sandys like others was envisioning this new body of Marine regiments by using army regulars would just be similar to a normal British expeditionary force rather than a newly constructed force to service the amphibious needs of the nation. The raising of the Marines would also alleviate some of the more menial tasks on ship and therefore help prevent the excesses of the press gangs which infamously ‘put an entire Stop to our Trade, which ought never to be done, but in the Case of imminent danger from an impending Invasion’. 39 Philip Gibbon, another MP, rejected any idea of the men of the ‘six Regiments of

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36 George II in HCP, Speeches and Debates 1739, p. 88-89
37 Mr. Samuel Sandys in HCP, Speeches and Debates 1739, p. 154
38 Mr. Samuel Sandys in HCP, Speeches and Debates 1739, p. 154
39 Mr. Samuel Sandys in HCP, Speeches and Debates 1739, p. 153-154
Land-Forces, all to be new raised, and to consist mostly of men never trained to any sort of martial discipline either at Land or Sea’. He, like Sandys, felt ‘we ought to employ our oldest and best Corps in the prosecution of it [the war], and keep our youngest, or new-raised Regiments at home’. 40 Here was another voice calling for a special, experienced expeditionary force whose presence would be replaced by the newly raised men to fill their place in the regiments they left behind.

Many MPs and those in the public also voiced a belief that if the Marines were raised from the existing regiments and used overseas for imperial conquests, they would reduce the risk of a home-grown military coup d’état. Some of these men were taken from Foot-Guards regiments but they would not loose their status as they were allowed to ‘wear Caps [grenadiers also wore caps], and use the Grenadiers march’ (a practice continued even in the eventual Marine Corps). 41 Others like Sir William Yonge criticized the need for using experienced men in the Marines as a waste of talents. For these ‘new-raised troops are as good on board a Man of War, as well-disciplined soldiers. In fighting a ship, there are no marches, or counter-marches: there is no part of the land-discipline required, but that of loading and firing the musket’. 42 This was to be a familiar criticism of the Marines made by other contemporaries and historians down to this very day. 43 Instead, he used the fact that denuding the regiments at home would work as an incentive for the Spanish and those ‘disaffected at home, might stir up a dangerous conflict in the very bowels of our own Dominions’ to invade (an interesting foreshadow to 1745 and mindful of the 1718 Spanish invasion attempt). 44 He was also adamant that this request for six new regiments was only a sleight of hand, as the King would maintain these units in Britain after the war, where they would act as a deterrent to any proposed ‘stirring up [of] a Civil War’: a euphemism for political repression. 45

These debates also took up the issue of what the nature of the Marines was to be. George Lyttleton said that these new Marine regiments were ‘neither Soldiers nor Sailors and to make them either, will take up a great deal of time’. 46 Joseph Danvers felt: ‘They are, in my opinion, Sir, so necessary, that I shall be not only for raising, but keeping them.’ After explaining that the Marines would need to be trained and ‘season them to the climate’ of a ship of war, he outlined some of the ways they were to be different from soldiers. ‘A soldier, therefore, let him have been trained to military discipline as long as you will, is as unfit for being a marine, as any fellow just taken from the plough, or as the merest vagabond that can

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40 Mr. Philip Gibbon in HCP, Speeches and Debates 1739, p. 157
41 London Evening Post (London), Thursday, December 20, 1739
42 Sir William Yonge in HCP, Speeches and Debates 1739, p. 161
44 Sir William Yonge in HCP, Speeches and Debates 1739, p. 163
45 Sir William Yonge in HCP, Speeches and Debates 1739, p. 161
46 George Lyttleton in HCP, Speeches and Debates 1739, p. 164
be picked up in the streets." He went on to give a familiar emphasises about the very natural difference of marines and soldiers, for they were as different as ‘an otter and a fox’. Henry Fox furthered this notion; ‘No Gentleman, I find, Sir, has questioned its being necessary for us to raise or form a Body of Marines.’ Fox admits that if this were truly the case then why had the government in previous years not formed a Marine Force. An earlier formation of the Marines would have allowed the estimates to be voted on earlier, saving the country the large expenses derived from their start-up costs. William Pulteney theorised that the Marines were a ‘support force of shock troops which could be used in assaults upon fortified positions’, truly a vision of things to come. Pulteney and others felt that the Marine regiments instead of being founded upon the regimental structure should instead utilize the flexibility and rapidity of independent companies when in overseas operations. At this time they were the only voices calling for such a radical change in the structuring of this new force, as even in the past marines had functioned on the Army’s regimental system. The debates did officially resolve one important issue that would directly affect the future of all Marine Forces, that of being classified solely as an amphibious force. For marines were ordered to ‘know how to behave by sea as well as by land’.

The debate about the purpose and function of these Marine regiments was to spill out into the press and public at the same time. One newspaper proposed making one corporal in every company of the first and second foot-guards regiments a sergeant, along with one private from the same companies to be made corporal in the new Marine regiments. As ‘such of the 1800 Men as are to be taken out of the standing Regiments for the Marine Service’ this would establish a certain level of experience within these new Marine regiments. Other authors wrote in a veiled way about the constitutional questions concerning standing armies. ‘Our Land Army cannot be employ’d in this Quarrel, unless a few should be sent on board the ships by way of Marines; if they should, the common Soldiers will fight, provided their Officers will head them.’ Another writer stated ‘since our Naval Power is not only superior to that of Spain, but perhaps to the whole Naval Forces of all Europe’ marines and sailors were the only thing necessary to fight the war. Marines were ‘force enough to bombard and destroy most of their Maritime towns’. There was also an inherent constitutionality in the Navy and Marines as institutions, marines would prevent the ‘occasion to augment our Land Forces for a Naval War.’ These would also be recurrent themes

47 Joseph Danvers in HCP, Speeches and Debates 1739, p. 171
48 Henry Fox in HCP, Speeches and Debates 1739, p. 167
50 Marini, ‘Parliament and the Marine regiments, 1739’, p. 64
51 Read’s Weekly Journal Or British Gazettemer (London), Saturday, December 22, 1739
52 Common Sense or The Englishman’s Journal (London), Saturday, April 22, 1738
53 L. D., Reasons for a war against Spain. In a letter from a merchant of London trading to America, to a Member of the House of Commons. With a plan of operations, and a true Copy of Queen Elizabeth’s
throughout the eighteenth century for why the Marines should exist and lead to some men publicly stating so. One writer, styling himself ‘Merchant and citizen of London’, accented the repeated notion about why marines were seen to be so important.

If we had begun about the end of March last raising 5 or 6000 Marines, I mean Marines designed for Sea Service [author’s emphasis], and not marching Regiments under the Name of Marines, I believe it would have…raised by degrees the additional number of seamen we stood in need of, without preventing the usual supply of coals for the city of London and Embargo upon our trade, without much Pressing, and without making any such Fracas, as might give a real Alarm to Spain.54

One aspect of all of these constitutional arguments was that by forming the Marines the country could eventually abolish the Press Gang system. According to this idea, marines would eventually learn the trade of sailors and hence entirely remove ‘our being under a necessity of drawing too many Seamen away from our trade’.55 In one last note on the 1739 debates there were some in the House of Commons, Sandys among them, who felt the great expansion of the Marine regiments under the Army establishment would be very bad for the country. They felt that these regiments, as they had in the past, would become ‘a hotbed of corruption and political sinecures.’56 The importance of the 1739 debates was in the way they were to shape the political thinking about the need for marines. These debates dealt with everything from overall administrative control, whether under Admiralty or War Office, to the operational needs of any amphibious force. While it would take a further sixteen years until the new permanent establishment in 1755 the roots were beginning to take place along with the demand for radically new thinking about their inherent purpose.

1.2 The Structure of Marine regiments

The first time that Army regiments were raised for the direct purpose of serving at sea as marines, in England, was in 1664 with the raising of the Duke of York and Albany’s Maritime Regiments, disbanded by 1689.57 With the raising of new Marine regiments in 1690 a tradition, was established, of raising new Marine regiments during war and disbanding then them shortly after the conclusion of hostilities. This section is concerned with the structure of these Marine regiments during this period and particularly with the structural issues found problematic with the regimental formation for Marine service. Admiral Arthur Earl of Torrington in his 1690 Memorandum on the Marine regiments outlined that of the two

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54 Merchant and citizen of London, Britain’s mistakes in the commencement and conduct of the present war. By a merchant and citizen of London, (London, 1740), p. 10
55 Merchant and citizen of London, Britain’s mistakes in the commencement and conduct of the present war. By a merchant and citizen of London, p. 16
57 Manning Seamen and Marines, NRS Vol. 103, Queen Anne’s Navy, R.D. Merriman (ed.) (London 1961), p. 177
newly raised regiments should be sub-divided into three battalions of five-hundred men each. The ‘first [battalion] of each regiment to be left on board the fleet or to be disposed into such quarters near the sea’; this was done in the hope that the fleet could be quickly manned as needed. Torrington also felt that it was the inherent duty of marines to police seamen in the fleet. Torrington saw the seamen as ‘a loose collection of undisciplined people and sufficiently inclined to mutiny’. Admiral Torrington was to discover, before the battle of Beachy Head, that the normal regimental structure was too slow and cumbersome for the needs of a rapid mobilisation in the fleet.

One of the important structural problems marines were to deal with throughout this period was where and how they should be quartered when they were not on ship. They would be quartered in a variety of port towns from Deptford to Plymouth. This would later be reduced to the three royal dockyard towns of Chatham, Portsmouth and Plymouth by the 1740s. Within these three towns the men were spread out in small detachments of a dozen to just a handful, quartered in public houses similar to their Army counterparts. This was a recurrent reason as to why it was so hard to embark marines on board ship quickly. There were also advantages for positioning marines within these royal dockyards. ‘It was only by pressing all the workmen that they could lay hands on and by employing as many Marines as could be quartered near the dockyard towns’ that the fleet was kept at sea in the winter of 1691-1692. John Ehrman believed this to be one of the primary reasons for the British fleet’s success in 1692. Unfortunately, Ehrman does not mention the policy, newly enacted, of paying the Marines to be used in dockyard work at 6 pence a day. This pay was to be on top of their military income, a potential ploy to maintain marines close to the docks for quick mobilisations and provide supplemental income.

There were various tensions during this period over how the Marine regiments should be viewed in comparison with their foot regimental counterparts. One document dated 8 June 1702 draws the questions of their equality with their foot regiment siblings to the fore. ‘We say, when we reflect upon this, and add thereto the general dissatisfaction found among the officers and the misery of the poor soldiers…[that] the Marine regiments should be placed upon the same foot with the rest of her Majesty’s Army, with respect to their pay, clothing, subsistence, and other matters’. An interesting side note is an order made by William III that every company of marines on board a ship were allowed to bring three women upon

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59 J. Ehrman, Navy in the War of William III, 1688-1697 (Cambridge, 1953), p. 344
61 Ehrman, Navy in the War of William III, 1688-1697, p. 446
63 Navy Board to Secretaries of the Admiralty, 8 June 1702, NRS Vol. 103, Queen Anne’s Navy, R.D. Merriman (ed.), p. 211
boarding the ship. These women should receive the same amount of victuals as the ships company; this was an order that put marines on parity with foot regiment soldiers serving on ships in this period.\textsuperscript{64} The practice of mustering and victualling women who followed the Army regiments when they served as marines on ship would continue throughout the eighteenth century. However, when the Marines came under full Admiralty command in 1755 the practice would follow the naval one of not officially recognising their existence on ship.\textsuperscript{65}

The Army’s influence over the structure and ethos of the early Marine regiments of the 1740s was strongly due to the mass influx of their own personnel within its structure. The Army influence within Marine personnel is simple to see with nearly all officers coming from the army half-pay lists or from existing regiments, while nearly thirty-five percent of the Marine regiments’ rank and file were made up of men from existing Army regiments, and nearly all of these were to be the non-commissioned officers.\textsuperscript{66} While these Army personnel were serving in active units many of them had no experience in warfare, and so their true effectiveness in operations were dubious at best.\textsuperscript{67} This inexperience is typified in the example of Edward Wolfe, father of the later famous General James Wolfe, colonel of the 1\textsuperscript{st} Marine Regiment and adjutant general to the West Indies expedition. Wolfe had been a marine lieutenant in the previous war and resided at Greenwich, but from 1717 until the raising of the new regiments he was a captain of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Footguards.\textsuperscript{68} Because of these close ties with the army structure there have been some contemporaries and historians alike who saw these Marine regiments as purely a land and not an amphibious force.

…in truth, these were Marines in name only. The essential of a Marine was and always had been that he was borne principally for manning and fighting on board the ships of the Fleet. These Marines were not to be in any way allotted to the squadron, but were to be an expeditionary force…\textsuperscript{69}

The Navy’s control of the Marines in the War of Spanish Succession was a little more ambiguous than it may sound at first. In 1701 the Admiralty had requested the establishment of Marine regiments for the next year in which to prepare the fleets for the upcoming war with France. However, with their formation the Army was still given control over certain

\textsuperscript{68} S. Reid, \textit{Wolfe: The Career of General James Wolfe from Culloden to Quebec} (Staplehurst, 2000), p. 19, 40-41
aspects of the structure including the account books, which went through the War Office. These ambiguities of administration were to force large portions of line regimental men upon ship in the first years of warfare, something not unusual to this overall period. This has led to some confusion, by various historians, about the difference between marines and line regiment men serving in the sea service of the time. One continuing issue of administrative dispute during the regimental period was with the regimental colonels and their controlling/owning of their own individual regiments. The practice of the colonel’s personal possession of the regiment was a direct adoption from the Army, a practice continued even when under Admiralty control. Marine regiments continued to be referred to by their colonel’s surname and not their established port location, as would happen after 1755. Another area of uncertainty over command and control is illustrated by Mr. Walter Whitfield, Paymaster of the Marines, when petitioning the House of Commons to pass a bill authorizing him to pay the receipts given by the Colonels for their private regimental expenses from 1703 to 1706. The Army and War Office had issued him one set of commands about the expenses while Lord High Admiral Prince George and the Admiralty provided a vastly different set. Eventually the House did pass a bill requesting him to pay the Colonel’s accounts but this was only passed after a full day’s heated debate and discussion. Unfortunately Whitfield died before the passing of the bill and the ownership of debts threw the issue into further difficulties until after many years of petitioning it was finally resolved. These simple disputes go to the heart of the ambiguities with command and control of the Marine regiments throughout this period.

An issue that repeatedly cropped up concerning the Marines between 1664-1749, whether they were under Admiralty control or not, is best enunciated by the then Secretary of the Admiralty Josiah Burchett in his book *A Complete History of the Most Remarkable Transactions at Sea* (1720). Burchett commented that marines were no longer actively encouraged to be ‘enter’d on the Ships Books as foremast men, when they had qualified themselves to serve as such’. This was a travesty according to Burchett because the Marine regiments were to be a ‘nursery for seamen which was one of the principal motives for the first raising such a body of men’. The labelling of Marine regiments, and later the Corps of Marines, in parliamentary voting as ‘a nursery of seamen’ would be a constant theme.

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70 HCP, Journal of the House of Commons, The Second Session of King William's Third Parliament, p. 28
72 HCP, List Accounts, lists of Colonels, etc., p. 49-54
73 HCP, Journals of the House, 24 March 1712, p. 240-241;
74 HCP, Journals of the House, 9 June 1713, p. 409
75 J. Burchett, *A Complete History of the Most Remarkable Transactions at Sea from the Earliest Accounts of time to the Conclusion of the Last War with France* (London, 1720), p. 615
throughout the 1664-1802 period for the Marines, and was sometimes hotly debated - as shown in the 1739 debates. The parliamentary issue about moving marines off their own muster and making them seamen was to plague the Navy throughout this period. As the abuses of the press gang gained greater attention at the beginning of wars this demand from parliament also increased.

The regimental system that marines were formed around did fairly well for land forces of the day, but it was appallingly inflexible for an active sea service. Part of the problem was pay; marines were paid as the land forces from the paymaster assigned by each colonel of his respective regiment. This meant that the paymaster had to keep a vast array of accounts because of the very nature of a regiment’s entanglement amongst the fleet, scattered among many ships in several locations. The paymaster was required to return these accounts to the Treasury and the Marine Paymaster-General in London. After both of these agencies reviewed the accounts they could then be passed and the paymaster would receive his money similar to regimental pay at the time.76 This chaotic administrative structure eventually led to many disputes over pay and reimbursement issues and was of primary concern in the ‘Committee Report of 1746 on the State of His Majesty’s Land Forces and Marines’. The committee’s report is a vast catalogue of the pay and mustering problems for the Marine regiments. The report itself explicitly outlines the basic problem ‘the circumstances of the Marine Corps [this form is used for size not organisational terms] being so different from those of the Land Forces, and the evidence so various, and so perplexed and complicated a nature’.77

One of the issues to receive particular attention by the Committee was the regimental pay accounts for the regiments involved in the 1742 West Indies expedition. The issue that parliament took up and one that would plague the Marine regiments throughout their existence.

That, in October 1742, the Men belonging to this Regiment, were incorporated into other Regiments at Jamaica; and the Officers returned to England, to raise the Regiment anew; and that he [the paymaster] received only the Pay of the Officers, Serjeants, Corporals, and Drummers, who came home, to December 1742.78

The scattered nature of the account books and the inability of the paymaster to pay off many of the accounts along with the Colonel’s frustrations were hotly in dispute by 1746. This is the main reason why the committee was assembled, in order to address them. The central complaint from the Colonels’ agents was that from 1742 to 1744 they were only paid for a total establishment of 400 men and officers instead of the 800 that parliament voted for from

76 ‘Rules and Instructions for the better Government of the Marine Forces’ 7 May 1740, NA ADM 2/1151, p. 7-9; ‘Rules and Instructions for the better Government of the Marine Forces’ 7 May 1740, NA ADM 96/3, p. 1-3
77 HCP, Report from the Committee, 6 June 1746, p. 107
78 HCP, Report from the Committee, 6 June 1746, p. 109
1739-1742. The ten regiments’ returns for 1745 were shown to have no fewer than 784 and no more than 945 in each regiment with a mean of 860 men. Part of the reasoning behind the Pay Office’s payment for only 400 was because of their ‘want of muster-rolls’ for these years. These were a requirement under parliamentary legislature for the Paymaster-General to pay off these accounts. The committee was very sympathetic to the Paymaster-General (helped by his being a fellow MP) and because he justified his hard-line decisions as the best way to economize expenses since without the musters the Colonels could not prove their case. The loss of the muster-rolls should not be considered as negligence on the part of the regimental Colonels, for even the committee understood this to be ‘peculiar to the Marine Service’ and its cumbersome administrative structure.

Pay and subsistence issues were further complicated by the Marines’ dual operational nature. As one historian has put it; ‘when Marines embarked as ship’s company their regimental organization practically disappeared.’ There were also issues about how musters should be returned as the men were discharged from the ships upon entering the docks to their regiments whether or not they were stationed in that dockyard. One of the problems that continued to be a troublesome issue was who had authority over marines while on ship. The ‘Rules and Instructions for the better Government of the Marine Forces’ on 7th May 1740 made no mention to this quandary. The government was also mute when it came to who had authority over marines when they were in amphibious operations. The Admiralty felt that at least while on ship marines were fully under the authority of the ship’s captain, who should reign supreme. This was clearly expressed in a Admiralty Minute from 1745, which delved into this very issue regarding soldiers on board their ship and who had authority over them.

…the for though on shipboard they [Marines] are equally subject to discipline with seamen, yet it is imprudent for a sea officer to upbraid them with it; and as these soldiers are not Marine, but men lent for the present occasion, moderation in language should therefore have been used…

The regiments throughout this period were also continually plagued with severe problems of being seriously under-manned. It was so bad in the 1690s that the regiments were only able to raise half of their full complement of 3000. The only time the issue of under-manning was not a concern was in 1740 when the attractions of vast prize money in the West Indies and the harsh winter of 1739/40 overwhelmed any issues of under-recruitment.

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79 HCP, Report from the Committee, 6 June 1746, p. 112, 233
80 HCP, Report from the Committee, 6 June 1746, p. 163-164
81 D. Baugh, British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole (Princeton, 1965), p. 188
82 Rules and Instructions for the better Government of the Marine Forces, 7 May 1740, NA ADM 2/1151, p. 7-9; Rules and Instructions for the better Government of the Marine Forces, 7 May 1740, NA ADM 96/3, p. 1-3
83 NRS Vol. 120, Naval Administration, 1715-1750, D. Baugh (ed.) (London, 1977), p. 139-140
84 Letter from Danby and Killigrew to The Rt. Hon’ble the Lords Commissioners of their Majesties’ Treasury, February 1691/2, NRS Vol. 89, The Sergison Papers, R.D. Merriman (ed.), p. 318

One area the War Office and the Admiralty did agree on was in regards to marines’ duties; while at sea and on land, concerning their use as a disciplinary force. This was highlighted by marines’ actions taken against ‘mutinous’ shipwrights in Portsmouth Harbour during January 1742. Marines were ordered ashore from the ships and marched toward the shipwrights’ barricades. Taking marines off of the ships was potentially an admission that these men were either more trustworthy than those on land or it was the only way that Commissioner Hughes could form-up the necessary numbers to suppress these riots. Ninety marines were eventually detached from the ships and given explicit instructions not to fire on the crowd. The primary purpose for rushing marines into the disturbance according to the commissioner; ‘was the security of the magazines, which are of so much importance to the service, should the rioters have made any attempt on them’. However, the Admiralty chastised Commissioner Hughes for calling out marines to actively suppress the shipwrights. The reason for this chastisement probably had more to do with the ships in harbour being immobilised because of their lack of marines rather then their use as a deterrent force. Hughes strongly defended his actions and mentioned Colonel Edmonston, commander of the local Marine regiment who had written to the Secretary of War also explaining the necessity for these actions. In the end Hughes was not punished, but he had to repeatedly justify his need for marines to put down a riot to both the Admiralty and the War Office. Presumably Commissioner Hughes saw marines as serving in the equivalent capacity of the army in riot control ashore. The Admiralty’s eventual inability to officially fault Hughes demonstrates some of their inabilitys to fully command marines, as all decisions were conveyed through both departments of government.

This furthered the Admiralty’s, and the ships’ captains, demand to have complete control over the Marine regiments. The War Office and the Colonels who commanded the regiments felt this was too much a loss of personal control. While they might have tacitly agreed with the importance of the ship captain’s need for overall authority to effectively operate the ship, they were in dispute over who had authority to meet out punishments and even sentry duties on ship. Most importantly the issue’s real friction was about the command structure of the officers on ship and who could issue orders to marines. This issue would continue to plague the service throughout the regimental period. One of the reasons for transferring the Marine regiments from the Army to naval control in 1747 was to alleviate some of these problems. However, the colonels still owned their regiments and the basic

85 Portsmouth Commissioner and the Commander of the Ships at Spithead to Admiralty Secretary 14 January 1742/3, NRS Vol. 120, Naval Administration, 1715-1750, D. Baugh (ed.), p. 305
86 Portsmouth Commissioner and the Commander of the Ships at Spithead to Admiralty Secretary 14 January 1742/3, NRS Vol. 120, Naval Administration, 1715-1750, D. Baugh (ed.), p. 306
87 Article 3, ‘Draft of Regulations and Instructions relating to the Regiments of Marines’, NA ADM 2/1151 p. 324
structure was still based on the regiment these issues would not be completely resolved until the creation of the Marine Corps in 1755.

In 1702-13 and 1747-48 the Marine regiments were under the direct command of the Admiralty and moved out of the War Office. The Admiralty was given explicit instructions to ‘prepare and publish such Rules and Ordinances as are fit to be observed by our said Marine Forces’. As with all large inter-institutional changes the Admiralty spent the first few months trying to create a bureaucratic account of their Marine regiments. They requested a list of the commissioned officers in the regiments, the process of raising recruits and the care of supplying the Regiment with new clothing. The Admiralty began to try and reshape the Marines with the issuance in early 1747 of their ‘Regulations and Instructions relating to the Regiments of Marines’. The first draft was a combination of instructions to the Marines both on-shore and on-board ships. This draft for the first time formalised Marine compliments on ships from 1st to 6th rates, in an establishment that with some fluctuation would not change dramatically throughout the rest of the eighteenth-century. The Navy made a poignant statement about some of the previous Army personnel they had received as marines. ‘And no Marines are to be received on board but such as are able men, fit for service, and have no distemper upon them; and they are to bring with them all accoutrements proper for Soldiers, except arms.’

Marine officers were also given a clear idea of where they belonged in the command structure on ship. ‘All Marine officers are to obey the orders of the Captain or Commanding Officer of the ship, and also the Commanding Officer of the Watch’. The Navy also understood the need for Marine officers to be given the authority and recognition of their rank. They were to be treated by the Captain of the ship and all other men ‘with decency and regard due to the commissions they bear’ and furthermore, while Marine officers were doing their duty they should be ‘considered and treated as Gentlemen’. A fateful decision was taken in regard to the Marine officers; one that would plague their claims of professional equality with commissioned naval officers, concerning their share of prize money. A Captain of Marines was given a prize share equal to the sea lieutenant, but a marine lieutenant was given the equivalent to the warrant officers. Yet the Admiralty quickly commented that this

88 28 February 1747 Chesterfield, ADM in NA ADM 2/1151 p. b1
89 30 March 1747 letter form Admiralty to various commanders of the Marine regiments, NA ADM 2/1151, p. 10-11
90 19 February 1747 letter to the Duke of Bedford, NA ADM 2/1151, p. 322
91 Draft of Regulations and Instructions relating to the Regiments of Marines 1747, NA ADM 2/1151 p. 323-324
92 Article 3 & 4, Draft of Regulations and Instructions relating to the Regiments of Marines 1747, NA ADM 2/1151 p. 324-325
was not supposed ‘to degrade their rank’ but justified it because their sea pay was equivalent to the warrant officers rank.\textsuperscript{93}

When it came to enlisted marines the Admiralty began to take some measures to transform them into something different from regular soldiers. Marines were directed to be trained in the use of small arms ‘as often as possible’ and employed as sentinels around the ship under the ship captain’s authority. Marine sergeants were given a special privilege while at sea. They were not to be either ‘ill treated’ nor ‘to be struck, on any account’ by any of the seamen, petty officers or even officers of the ship; a sign of their rank being officially recognised. As with all past regulations marines were given freedom from being ordered to work aloft in the rigging of the ship, but they should not be punished or prevented in any way from wanting to do so.\textsuperscript{94} The Navy of the 1740s along with the Parliament wanted to utilize marines as another potential pool for the training and retention of seamen. The ‘Regulations and Instructions’ spend an article and a half on the implicit instruction to ships’ captains, on how to encourage marines to learn the trade in order that they furthermore are qualified as able seamen. Upon standard qualification any marine that chose to be transferred and rated able seamen was to have deducted £4 out of this new sea pay so that his old officer commanding the Marine complement on ship would be able to use this money to raise his replacement.\textsuperscript{95} This appeal of becoming a seaman was an incentive for many marines of this war, especially with the looming regimental disbandment after the war. Captain Howe, who commanded HMS Cornwall (80) at the time, was said to have allowed 76 of his marines to be transferred on the book to seamen. This is extraordinary because it means that all but twelve of the Cornwall’s establishment of enlisted marines were therefore transferred to the seaman’s role. Rear Admiral Knowles furthermore approved this measure to enhance recruitment.\textsuperscript{96}

As the war was coming to a close in the autumn of 1748, the Navy was preparing to economise on expenditure. Part of this economy was the paying off of the Marine regiments. A problem cropped up that as the fleet was spread out all over the world and ships were usually to be paid off in the home port of nearest convenience, this did not always corresponded with the home of the particular marine’s regiment. So the Admiralty decided on a method of flexibility by giving marines a certificate from their respective ship’s captain;

\textsuperscript{93} Article 4, Draft of Regulations and Instructions relating to the Regiments of Marines 1747, NA ADM 2/1151 p. 325; Article 6, ‘Regulations and Instructions relating to Marines serving on board His Majesty’s Fleet’ 1763, NA ADM 96/3 p. 1
\textsuperscript{94} Article 8, Draft of Regulations and Instructions relating to the Regiments of Marines 1747, NA ADM 2/1151 p. 326
\textsuperscript{95} Article 8 & 9, Draft of Regulations and Instructions relating to the Regiments of Marines 1747, NA ADM 2/1151 p. 326-327
\textsuperscript{96} I never found this same amount repeated throughout the 47 year period of the Marine Corps. ADM to Colonel Selwyn 7 July 1749, NA ADM 2/1151 p. 516
marking their regiment name, the ship’s name and date of landing. They were also given an allowance of money to travel to London to finalise their accounts on their own with the Paymaster-General. This allowance money was variable, based on the individuals rank; with £2-2-0 for subalterns, £0-15-0 for sergeants, £0-12-0 for corporals and drummers and finally £0-10-0 for privates. The officers and sergeants who were landed with these men were expected to give them this money and draw a receipt from the payee in order to reclaim it from the paymaster when they arrived in London for their arrears. This process seems simple, but it ultimately had knock-on effects by subverting the Marine regimental system. The traditional regimental system held the power over pay for the individual, with his consequent identification and loyalty, to the regiment’s colonel. This new action subverted the system by placing their loyalty and identification with the central authority of the Navy. Unfortunately this came at the end of their existence and hence it had no discernable effect on either institution. While the 1747-1749 period never saw the complete demise of the regimental system, this example gives insights into how the Navy did operate the Marines on a more fluid structure.

Another area of repeated administrative dispute was with the issuance and payment of yearly uniforms. The government never made it clear about whom or from what budget the issuance of uniforms to marines should be made from. One demonstrable example of this was that in the 1740 ‘Rules and Instructions’ there was no direct statement about Marine uniforms and their supply. Regimental subsistence and clearings were handled by War Office and Exchequer and paid through the Navy Office, but these substances were mandated to be no more than the usual for ‘Land Forces’. The War Office stated that the regiments in Britain were given uniforms yearly but it also supplied those overseas with yearly money or uniform shipments. One is example is with the regiments that were serving in the Americas, 1740-1742, as they were clothed twice from Britain in the two years they were overseas. However, the real conflict over the uniform issue between the War Office and Admiralty ultimately rooted back to the simple issue of money. The Admiralty wanted to use this subsistence money for clothing as a form of expanded payment for the Marines. It was felt that through the use of larger Navy Board contractors they could get the uniforms cheaper then the regiments themselves and use the rest as supplemental Marine income. Henry Legge, a member of the Admiralty and Treasury boards, goes on to emphasise that any change in status would breed disagreement among the Army units which also had to serve on ship. This could further lead to problems of mutiny among the Army units, even those in Britain, because of this increase of pay to only one unit. The War Office saw this as a ploy

97 Admiralty to Paymaster General Marines 28 November 1748, NA ADM 2/1151, p. 494-496
98 HCP, Report from the Committee, 6 June 1746, p. 107
99 HCP, Report from the Committee, 6 June 1746, p. 113
stating; ‘upon considering the article of Deductions for Clothing with the Secretary at War, we were both of opinion it would be impossible to make any alteration from the present stated sum of offreckonings’. 100 While Legge recognised that the Admiralty, in short order, would be in control of the Marines as it was in ‘the last war’, this did not mean that they would be able to make independent decisions concerning this matter. 101 Eventually the Navy Board were to concede to the War Office demand and Marine uniforms were ordered to be provided to all marines by the 11 June 1747, the same date as the yearly Army allowance. 102

The Navy’s long correspondence over uniform issues seems pedantic and bureaucratic, but it gives interesting insights into the unprepared state of the Admiralty to take on the ten Marine regiments totalling nearly 12,000 men. The Navy Board understood the art of using contractors, and especially on short notice, but the Admiralty was not sure how best to handle uniforms on such a mass scale. They had no recent experience in supplying large scale uniform orders and then providing them to the various individual marines. 103 The bureaucratic under-preparation is shown in a letter dated 3 April 1747 which only provides vague references to uniforms being red in colour and nothing else. It would not be until 17 April that they issued any specific instructions regarding what was to be included and how the men should appear in their uniform. They were to be provided with a pair of ‘strong Kersey’ Breeches, stockings, cap, etc. were to be allocated to each private. 104 This fourteen day lack of precise information was a startling admission of administrative naivety. The navy only had till June, when uniform issuance was ordered by parliament to be finished, to provide and distribute the issuance of roughly 11,500 uniforms so every day counted.

In February of 1748 John Montague, the earl of Sandwich was to replace the Duke of Bedford as the First Lord of the Admiralty. Sandwich was very young and inexperienced, and was eventually saddled with the responsibility of being Britain’s representative at the signing of the treaty of Aix-La-Chapelle on the 30 April 1748. 105 In his absence during the treaty negotiations in Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen) Admiral Anson carried on as acting head of the Admiralty. In a 7 August 1748 letter, Sandwich outlines to Anson some of the contemporary thinking about the Marine regiments.

You don’t tell me whither [sic] the Marines are to be continued or not. I should think it will be proposed to break them at least the greatest part. The Duke of Cumberland dropped something when I was at the army that makes me think so, and he added that one

100 Henry Legge to the First Lord of the Admiralty 28 September 1746, NRS Vol. 120, Naval Administration, 1715-1750, D. Baugh (ed.), p. 144-145
101 Henry Legge to the First Lord of the Admiralty 28 September 1746, NRS Vol. 120, Naval Administration, 1715-1750, D. Baugh (ed.), p. 145
102 3 April 1747 letter form Admiralty to Navy Board, NA ADM 2/1151, p. 19-20
103 4 January, 1747/8 Navy Board to Admiralty Secretary, NRS Vol. 120, Naval Administration, 1715-1750, D. Baugh (ed.), p. 113-115
104 17 April 1747 letter form Admiralty to Navy Board, NA ADM 2/1151, p. 37
reason why he thought it would be right to do so was that they were upon a bad footing, and neither sea nor land forces; that whenever they were appointed again the establishment should be changed, and the Marines be entirely in our jurisdiction. The letter goes on to ask Anson if it would be more prudent to take action in transforming the structure of the Marines now or more prudent in a future conflict. Anson advocated for their complete disbandment, maybe because he felt the current structure was too difficult to manage. By 1749 every regiment was disbanded and the last of these units to arrive from overseas stations were also disbanded by 1751. All Marine officers were put on the Army’s half-pay list along with their widows receiving compensation if they were deceased, similar to the Army. A few invalided marines were formed into four invalid companies, under the War Office, as a type of pension for those of good service history. This was purely a pensioners’ formation as they were never to be used on the Navy’s ships during the peace-time period of 1749-1754, but were used in some land capacities like guarding dockyards. When the need for marines in this period arose the Navy was provided with Army units when possible or if not then they were responsible for training their own seamen to act in this capacity.

Another potential reason for the disbandment of the Marine regiments was their fairly expensive nature, compounded by a growing governmental desire to economize the armed forces expenditure in peace-time. To keep one Marine regiment at its full complement would have cost the Navy £20,175-7-6 per year or nearly the cost of building a new third-rate ship-of-the-line at about £37,218-5-1. The Navy was always in need of more ships whereas in their eyes ‘unskilled’ manpower was fairly easy to enlist. This point is struck home more with the aspect that the entirety of the ten Marine regiments cost £206, 253-15-0 (11,500 personnel) at a time when the entire navy’s net expenditure for 1749 was £1, 586, 953. Or to quantify it more in the 1750 estimate the entire pay and victuals for 10,000 seamen along with the wear and tear cost of all ships in commission was roughly double that of having the Marine regimental system during one year of war. There was also a feeling amongst many contemporaries that the Marines’ current establishment was more expensive then ever before. ‘Sum to be added the increase of the charge of the present ten regiments of Marines, beyond what ten regiments of the like numbers would have cost the publick, during all the last war…£15,086-13s-4d’ However in the War of Spanish Succession there were only 6

107 24 January 1750, HCP, Journals of the House of Commons, p. 15
108 This is from the cost of HMS Polyphemus (64) but it is roughly equivalent to other ships of its size, P. Goodwin, The Ships of Trafalgar: The British, French and Spanish Fleets October 1805 (London, 2005), p. 131
110 Order in Council 4 December 1749, NA ADM 1/5163
111 National oeconomy recommended, as the only means of retrieving our trade and securing our liberties; occasioned by the perusal of the late report of a committee of the House of Commons relating to the army (London, 1746), p. 11
regiments whereas by the War of Austrian Succession there were ten regiments even though these six regiments were established with larger numbers then the later ten regiments. The writer goes on ‘our present Corps of Marines are under better Management, or are rendered more useful to the nation then those in that victorious Princess’s days [Queen Anne]; but [I] am sure the nation is at present in a worse condition to bear this additional expense.’ There was a real understanding of the great expense incurred by Marine forces but many in Parliament felt these expenses justifiable. Another writer supposedly speaking to seamen, but really using this as a veiled allegoric way to talk-up the constitutional elements within parliament enunciated it this way: ‘After this they came again to Parliament, and desired now really a Body of Marines, which they intended should serve on board the Fleet; we laughed at them for exposing their former conduct, when we had declared, that all the Foot Regiments in England should be looked upon as Marines, and liable to serve on board the Navy’. In the end the demand for economy from Parliament and the Navy’s ability to build and maintain ships in peace-time was deemed more important than the continuation of the Marine regiments.

1.3 The Operational Use of Marine regiments

Operationally marines were used as they would be throughout the eighteenth century as an amphibious fighting force. The War of Spanish Succession was to see the only large scale use of a combined amphibious operation utilising two different Marine forces in the eighteenth century, the British and Dutch. The Gibraltar Expedition of the 21-22 July 1704 was a rare amphibious operation in the period before the Corps of Marines. It was completely unplanned being simply a target of opportunity, after the earlier failed operation against Cadiz. The Anglo-Dutch fleet was originally sent to the Mediterranean to help assist the Duke of Savoy in his attack against Toulon. This attack was eventually called off and the fleet’s secondary priority became helping Charles III’s cause in any way possible. Dutch and English Marines were landed under the command of Prince George of Hesse-Damstadt on the 22 July whereupon they quickly captured ‘the Rock’, while sustaining three hundred casualties. The reason for highlighting this operation is the rapidity of action or opportunism taken by the naval command in theatre. The Marines of 1755-1802 would show this to be an important operational aspect of the new Marine Corps.

Another operation influenced in the operational theatre, but this time by external influences, (the American colonial governments) was the April-October 1711 Walker

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112 National oeconomy recommended, as the only means of retrieving our trade and securing our liberties, p. 39
113 Original letters to an honest sailor (London, 1746), p. 22
114 Hattendorf, England in the War of Spanish Succession, p. 110
Expedition against Quebec. The British government in London during this period was instead concerned that any operation in the colonies would remove precious resources of men and material from the European and Mediterranean theatres of conflict. This pressure on British government for action was further increased when the Port Royal (Nova Scotia) expedition, consisting of 400 marines and six colonial regiments, was successful in 1709.\textsuperscript{116} This operation highlighted the need of a mobile rapid reaction force which could react to changing circumstances in overseas contexts. After finally spurring the government into action, an expedition was decided upon and placed under the command of Admiral Sir Hovenden Walker to take Quebec. The expedition after much delay was finally formed in spring of 1711 in the American colonies. This expedition was to consist of 5,000 troops, of which there was one battalion of marines from Colonel Charles Churchill’s regiment, various foot regiments and another 2,500 colonial troops along with nine ships-of-the-line.\textsuperscript{117} An ill-omen of things to come was when the vast majority of marines in this operation were permanently folded into the ship’s crew as a manpower multiplier. This was done by Walker in order to correct his fleet’s naval manpower deficiencies even before the operation could begin. Subsequently this would mean that the few marines who could potentially be released by Walker in the assault on Canada were to be considerably smaller than originally intended. Otherwise their release would have potentially threatened the safe operation of the ships. This would be a scenario almost directly repeated nearly 30 years later in the West Indies. In the end, Walker’s expedition was an utter failure and the ships were not even able to make their landings.\textsuperscript{118}

During the West Indies expedition of 1740-1742, Admiral Edward Vernon Commander of the West Indies Fleet and General Wentworth commander of the Army were to show the same lack of ingenuity in utilising their marines as a mobile operational asset just as Walker had done in 1711. Admiral Vernon, also like Walker, was to seize the Marine regiments during the expedition as a device to raise his fleet’s own manpower. This was to have a toxic effect on Wentworth’s ability to successfully carry out some of his land operations. Manpower became the overriding concern for both the Navy and Army commands because of the climatic drain from diseases in the West Indies in 1740-1742. It would also become the most venomous issue between both of these commanders.\textsuperscript{119} This is exemplified by the request in November 1741 by Vernon to Wentworth for a loan of 350 marines to use on his ships in order ‘to go out and meet the reinforcements expected from

\textsuperscript{116} Hattendorf, \textit{England in the War of Spanish Succession}, p. 233 \\
\textsuperscript{118} Letter to Secretary Burchett to Walker, 17 April 1711, NRS Vol. 94, \textit{The Walker Expedition to Quebec, 1711}, G. S. Graham (ed.), p. 168-9 \\
\textsuperscript{119} D. Crewe, \textit{Yellow Jack and the Worm: British Naval Administration in the West Indies, 1739-1748} (Liverpool, 1993), p. 101-103
The problem with this was that as soon as Vernon received these marines he never relinquished them back to the Army, as was seen at Panama and Guantanamo in 1742. Vernon would justify his use of marines in this way by returning to the old axiom of their being a ‘nursery for seamen’, as seen in his 1 October 1742 ‘Resolutions of a Council of War’. According to Vernon, ‘as many of them are seamen, that their enlisting as such on board his Majesty’s fleet would be likewise greatly for his Majesty’s service, if at their own free choice’. Unfortunately there is no evidence that either he or his other naval captains truly gave their marines any ‘free choice’ in this matter.

Vernon should not be seen as an advocate for the marines’ cause or even a supporter of the establishment. To him they were purely a means to an end, as would be shown two years later in November 1745. Vernon requested that the Navy endorse his decision to send his marines on shore to secure ‘his Majesty’s castles’ serving in the role of pure garrison duty. He went on to further request his ships be fitted out with seamen from three-decker ships in Portsmouth harbour in their place. The Admiralty quickly rebuked him for this action but it is a telling episode for how Vernon and other naval officers felt about their marines’ abilities and functionality in this period.

Yet all of these administrative and inter-service conflicts should not be seen as the only catalyst for the lack of British success in overseas operations for this period. While the operations in the West Indies were an utter failure and the Battle of Toulon 1744 was a draw at best, these were just symptoms of more systemic problems. The lack of a clear command and control structure, while visible in all eighteenth century conflicts, was never as pronounced for the Marine regiments as in the Wars of 1739-1748. With the constant conflicts demonstrated above, marines were left in an ambiguous state over their authority, autonomy in action and existence. Marines were to demonstrate that they were not only involved in failures; as their presence at one of Britain’s greatest victories in this war, the 1745 capture of Louisburg, demonstrated. During a pivotal period of this operation 400 marines of Admiral Warren’s fleet were used as a mobile attack force when they captured the Island battery. Unfortunately with the 1747 Order in Council which made the transfer of authority for the Marine regiments back to the Admiralty, many of the operational command issues remained to be addressed.

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120 Crewe, Yellow Jack and the Worm, p. 101
121 Harding, Amphibious Warfare in the Eighteenth Century, p. 141
123 Vernon to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 2 November 1745 and the Secretary of the Admiralty to Vernon, 4 November 1745, NRS Vol. 99, The Vernon Papers, B. McL. Ranft (ed.), p. 507, 511
After every war throughout the 1664-1754 period the Marine regiments were disbanded. This created an interesting dilemma for the Navy and the State concerning how it could effectively project power in periods of peace. The Navy in these periods of peace was involved in many actions from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. Because of this the Navy had to create a method to fulfil the marines’ duties in peace-time. There were two options. The first option was to use the small number of existing foot or guards’ regiments still in establishment in peace time for short term operations. This was the case in 1719 when Admiral Byng landed army grenadiers to attack the tower of the Phare, outside Messina, which he directly handed over to Imperialist forces. However the Army was never large enough to maintain its garrison requirements and provide for the complete establishment of marines within the fleet with its peace-time establishment numbers. The second option was for the Navy to train its own seamen to perform these duties. As stated by one publication, ‘Should the plan take place, our sailors, when disciplin’d in Arms, setting aside their native and superior excellence of spirit, would far excel the Marines of France, for other obvious reasons.’ On 28 March 1720 an Order in Council agreed that the Navy should do just this and ordered the creation of a new lieutenant on all ships fourth-rate and larger with orders that among his other duties he would ‘train up and exercise the seamen in the use of small arms’. The council went on to directly explain why this should be so, ‘which is the more necessary to be done since there are not now any Marine regiments subsisting’. However with any large scale mobilisation the Navy understood it would still need Marine forces to free up the limited number of seamen in the fleet to perform their primary duty of operating the ship.

1.4 Summary

This chapter has shown the progression of the Marine regiments from 1664-1749, through an outline of some of their structural and operational functions. Marine regiments should not be seen as some great unbroken tradition up to the present moment, as alluded to by some general histories of the Royal Marines. Alfred James Marini in his 1979 PhD dissertation states:

After 1746, when the marine forces were transfered [sic] to Admiralty jurisdiction, and particularly after [my emphasis] 1755, when the Marine Corps was re-established upon a

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126 The army had an establishment of 18,226 in the 1720s and 26,314 by the 1730s, Guy, Oeconomy and Discipline, 1714-63, p. 9
127 J. Moncreiff, Camillus. A dialogue on the navy. Proposing a plan to render that wooden wall, by Means which will both ease and extend our Commerce, the firm and perpetual bulwark of Great Britain (London, 1748), p. 53
128 NRS Vol. 120, Naval Administration, 1715-1750, D. Baugh (ed.), p. 49
permanent footing, each part of the Marine Corps administrative system began to perform its duties on a day to day basis. Marini goes on to state that the 1747-1749 period was the real moment of importance for the construction of the Corps of Marines of 1755 who ‘inherited, a genuine institutional legacy’. Marini and others gloss over the constant inter-service (Army vs. Navy) rivalry concerning these Marine regiments. There is also a tendency to overlook the aspect of the destructive nature behind the lack of central authority or clear administrative guidelines for these regiments.

It should be stated that not all in the public felt that Marine regiments existence was fundamental. In one published letter to Parliament in 1699 the writer called the regiments a ‘useless Charge to the People, a Nusance [sic] to the Navy, and dangerous to the Kingdom’s Liberties.’ This letter sees the regiments as a subversion of the Standing Army issues. The author continually highlights the nautical illiteracy of these men to the Navy and that they were placed under the Army’s establishment numbers ‘thought sufficient to have enslaved the Nation.’ He even rejects the importance of keeping the Marine regiments in peace time to prepare for any occasion. Large establishments of seamen in the fleet and merchant marine are his answer to this question. The importance of this open letter is the voice it gave to those in the House who felt that eliminating marines in peace-time was acceptable because they were potentially a greater threat to the state and economy.

There were three institutions all with similar and conversely also dissimilar views on what the need for a Marine Force was and how it should operate. The first institution with its own vision for the practicality of the Marines was the Army. The continual disbandment of the Marine regiments and re-establishment with its inherent recruitment from the army ranks fundamentally maintained the perception of the Marines as an extension of the foot regiments. This identification with the Army is not too far fetched, for the run up to both the Nine Years’ War and the War of Jenkins’s Ear saw Marine regiments swallow up many of the line regiments’ personnel in order to bring their own respective numbers up. These men, like Edward Wolfe, might have served in Marine regiments in the past but they perceived themselves as part of the Army’s structure and not the Navy’s. Edward Wolfe used his connections as a serving Captain in the 3rd Foot Guards and not his limited naval connections

131 Anonymous, A Letter to a Member of Parliament Concerning the four Regiments commonly called Marines (London, 1699), p. 3  
132 Anonymous, A Letter to a Member of Parliament Concerning the four Regiments commonly called Marines, p. 7  
133 Anonymous, A Letter to a Member of Parliament Concerning the four Regiments commonly called Marines, p. 8
to secure the beginnings of his son James Wolfe’s career. The public also recognised the Marine regiments as part of the Army establishment and not a unit under Navy command. In 1698 when asked to vote on 10,000 seamen and 3,000 Marines the parliament instead voted for 15,000 seamen. The members of parliament felt that the Marines were part of the Army and to attack them ‘was to humiliate William [III]’. But the primary reason for this identification with the Army was that all Marine regiments from 1664-1749 were still based on the existing model of the foot regimental structure.

The second institution with influence on the character of the Marine regiments was the Navy itself. The two times the Admiralty controlled the Marine regiments, both the War of Spanish Succession and later in the War of Austrian Succession, should be considered largely as failures. The first failure was the inability to break the inflexibility of the regimental structure. There were many reasons for this; the complexity of its passage through parliament, the lack of foresight into what structure was to replace it and finally the vested interests of the Marine officers who owned their respective ranks. What the Navy needed was institutional flexibility possibly with the use of the independent company formation or a large loose divisional system with greater fluidity for its personnel. This way marines could be easily moved from one ship or unit to another without the worry of them staying in homogeneous groupings for accounting and other administrative concerns. Accounting and pay issues were very problematic for the Navy as the Marine mutinies of 1708 over non-payment were to demonstrate. This had a corrosive affect for a generation upon the Navy’s mistrust of the Marines.

The second reason for the Admiralty’s failure to effectively utilise marines was because naval officers purely envisioned the marines’ primary function as a reserve of manpower for their ships. Walker and Vernon infamously pilfered from their Marine forces to such an extent that they directly affected the operational outcomes of their respective expeditions. The idea of seeing marines as purely a reservoir or nursery of future seamen is something that has even been grandfathered down in the historiography. It has led many naval historians to erroneously see the Admiralty as actively supporting this idea even into the later periods of the eighteenth century. They usually cite pay and higher position in the shipboard social hierarchy as being the additional catalyst for the encouragement of marines into sea service. However as latter chapters will show this was not the policy of the Admiralty in the future especially by the 1760s when there begins a fundamental shift in the ideas behind what it mean to have a Marine force.

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134 Reid, Wolfe, p. 19, 40-41
135 Rodger, Command of the Ocean, p. 183
136 This mutiny and others are dealt with in more depth in Chapter IV
The third institution with a conflicting vision of what Marine forces should be, was Parliament. Parliament concurred with the Navy, that the Marines were a significant pool for potential seamen but they also had an ulterior motive in this proposition. As demonstrated above, by the 1739 debates, MPs felt that the use of marines as extra manpower for the fleet would relieve some of the more unsavoury excesses of the press gangs. To Parliament, marines were just another step in the great game of protecting merchant shipping as a revenue stream in wartime. But subsequently some of the MPs began to see the Marines in the more radical constitutional sense of replacing the standing army. This was not to be the last time marines were used in governmental circles in these ways. The difference is that by the 1760s the Navy and Marines were also utilising these concepts in their attempt to move more money into the service. This was one of the reasons for the continuation of the Marine Corps after the conclusion of the Seven Years’ War after 1763. While the following chapter will discuss issues with similar features of the Marine regimental period, it will also discuss the various differences between the Regiments and Corps. One important comment during the government’s hopes of disbanding the Marines in 1748, illustrates the continuing importance of Marine units to the military forces of Britain.

Camillus: The French model might serve as a ground-work for large and proper improvements, better suited to the genius of our Navy…You will, I presume; ask, what is to become of our Marines? When I said that Thirty thousand Sailors should be the lowest complement of our fleet, I did not mean to stint it exactly to that number. Should the government think fit to keep up the Marines also, they would doubtless be no small addition of strength, and might perhaps with ease be put on a more serviceable footing. As fast as their officers could be provided for otherwise, persons regularly bred to the sea might succeed in their room; and thus the whole Corps would by degrees grow maritime. Mixing them, in the mean time, with the Sailors at first, would have a good effect towards introducing Land Discipline, and the knowledge of arms.\textsuperscript{138}

\textsuperscript{138} Moncreiff, Camillus., p. 62
Chapter II: Administration

2.1 1755 Corps of Marines and Marine Department

On 23 January 1755 the government issued a mobilisation of the fleet in preparation for war with France by ordering a general press.\(^{139}\) With this mobilisation also came a movement for the re-establishment of a Marine Force as had been the case in all previous wars since the Second Anglo-Dutch War. But the government and Admiralty were slower then the public in the anticipation of this new Marine Force. By January the press was beginning to report about the reestablishment of ‘a regiment of Marines is to be raised directly’ later it was even stated that there were to be ‘four regiments’\(^{140}\). Other papers speculated that the ten regiments from the last war would be re-raised.\(^{141}\) This was not an unreasonable speculation as all previous marines had been formed into regiments and there was no public consideration of something different. However there were also beginning to be rumours that something new was being thought about as ‘4000 Marines are to be raised, and that they are to be formed into Companies of 100 Men each, and to be under the Command of Majors on Half-Pay; and the other Officers are likewise to be taken from among those who are upon Half-Pay.’\(^{142}\) These companies were to also have ten men out of each company taken from Guards regiments to be made sergeants and corporals. This was a direct connect with previous formations and the order was later confirmed by the Admiralty in May. But the Admiralty was clearly ending the policy of regiments of marines and instead looking for something new, possibly even ‘independent companies’\(^{143}\). Rumours persisted that ‘constables in the several counties of England, have received warrants to impress persons, either for sea or land, the latter as marines.’\(^{144}\) The intensity of this press speculation between January and the official announcement of the Marines’ new establishment in April saw over thirty different newspaper articles written speculating on these new marine forces. The importance of this is not with how correct the reports were but the fact that marines were obviously locked into the public psyche. Marines were deemed so important by the public that they received more than half the number of articles speculating about their formation than the land forces about their increased establishment.

By March the Marine establishment had become a priority for the government. On the 27 March 1755 a letter was sent to the Admiralty from Sir Thomas Robinson, on behalf of

\(^{140}\) *Read’s Weekly Journal Or British Gazetteer* (London), Saturday, February 8, 1755; *Public Advertiser* (London), Friday, February 14, 1755
\(^{141}\) *Whitehall Evening Post or London Intelligencer* (London), Thursday, March 13, 1755
\(^{142}\) *London Evening Post* (London), Tuesday, February 11, 1755
\(^{143}\) *London Evening Post* (London), Saturday, April 5, 1755; NA ADM 183/121 11 May 1755
\(^{144}\) *Read’s Weekly Journal Or British Gazetteer* (London), Saturday, February 22, 1755
the King’s Council, requested the Admiralty to make a proposal for the re-establishment of a new Marine Force.\textsuperscript{145}  The new establishment from the beginning was seen as the sole privilege of the Navy and theirs alone. By 29 March the Admiralty gave a speedy reply with an outline for the preliminary formation of a ‘Corps of Marines’. This formation and the drawing up of names for the officers’ ranks at the same time demonstrate that the Admiralty was prepared for the request.\textsuperscript{146}  The new formation was officially sanctioned on the 3 April 1755 at Court in St James when the Council agreed to the full request of the Admiralty and thus the modern British Marine Corps (later Royal Marines) were born.\textsuperscript{147}  The new ‘Corps of Marines’ had some distinct variations from its ancestry, the Marine regiments and as this forty-seven year period progressed the British Marine Corps slowly solidified their transformation into a permanent organization. Solidification is first distinguishable in the administrative structures of the new Marine Corps. The Marines’ new administrative structures from the top level (Admiralty offices) to the local level (each of the three divisions) were created in 1755, with only minor variation as the period progressed.

The officers, especially the Lieutenant Colonels, were the first to be given their orders by the Admiralty. The first three Lieutenant Colonels were to be James Paterson (a Lt. Colonel in Henry Cornwallis’ former Regiment of Marines) to the command of the Portsmouth Division on 23 March, Theodore Drury (Lt. Colonel in John, Lord Loudoun’s Regiment of Foot) to be commander of the Chatham Division on 24 March and Charles Gordon (Lt Colonel in John Laforey’s former Regiment of Marines) to be commander of the Plymouth Division on 25 March. Paterson (made Lt. Colonel 1741) was senior in commission to both Drury (Lt. Colonel 1742) and Gordon (Lt. Colonel 1745) and therefore given what was to be the senior division at this time.\textsuperscript{148}  Two of the newly appointed majors Richard Bendythe (a Major in Cornwallis’ Regiment) and Charlton Leighton (Major in Laforey’s Regiment) were to serve once again under their respective Lt. Colonels while James Burleigh (Major in Falmouth’s Regiment of Foot) like Lt. Colonel Drury was brought in from the Army. However both Drury and Burleigh had extensive prior naval contacts throughout the 1740s.\textsuperscript{149}  The new structure was largely constructed and instituted by these three men, but Lt. Colonel James Paterson was to have the most influence so much so that he should be considered the father of the modern Royal Marines (discussed in detail below). In the initial months of March through till May the Admiralty called together all the Lieutenant Colonels and Majors to discuss with the Board the new structure of the Corps. They were to

\textsuperscript{145} 29 March 1755 Proposal of an Establishment of Marines in NA ADM 2/1152 p. 1; See Appendix 1
\textsuperscript{146}  List of Officers 1755, NA ADM 1/5116/1 p. 29-36
\textsuperscript{147}  29 March 1755 Proposal of Establishment of Marines in NA ADM 2/1152 p. 1-5; 3 April 1755 Order in Council for the Marine establishment in NA ADM 2/1152 p. 6-7
\textsuperscript{148}  List of officers to be appointed to the new Marine Divisions, NA ADM 1/5116/1, p. 34
\textsuperscript{149}  They were either related to naval officers and/or had served in Marine regiments at one time in the past. List of officers to be appointed to the new Marine Divisions, NA ADM 1/5116/1, p. 34
discuss uniforms, unit command and structure along with ‘the most expeditious method for raising them [Marines].’\textsuperscript{150} These discussions were to eventually form the Marines into something truly new from their previous formations.

The central administrative structure was to be run by two separated departments: the Marine Department and Marine Pay Department. Both were to be located within the Admiralty building near Whitehall. These two departments, and their duties, would remain fairly constant throughout this period with only fluctuations in their respective sizes.\textsuperscript{151} The Marine Department was constructed around a secretary, a first clerk and a second clerk (in the 1770s a third clerk was also established but eventually abolished). The Marine Department’s function was to coordinate the administrative and logistical concerns of the three Marine divisions with the Admiralty. The Marine Department was to be the conduit from which orders would pass from the Admiralty to the Marines on shore, at sea or on overseas stations. The department handled various issues concerning the Marines; from uniform contracting and distribution, placement of the marines in the fleet, to issues of officer leave requests. The Marine Department was also the conduit through which all external administrative correspondence to/from the various governmental and naval departments would interact with the Marines; for example the Board of Ordnance with munitions and barrack issues, Navy Board regarding ship quarters and uniforms and on occasion the War Office on the formation of special battalions. Ultimately it had centaauthority, which it preciously guarded, over the Marine Divisions and their commanders. This was a practice made clear from the very inception of the new Marine Corps. One way was by using a basic financial distinction made in this period. In 1747 when the Marine regiments were placed under the command of the Admiralty they were ordered that ‘provision is made for such contingent charges as may arise in this service’.\textsuperscript{152} However, during this period the voted establishments of the Marine regiments were combined with the Land Forces as they had been since 1664. However in 1755 that all changed. ‘That the said Marines be esteem’d part of the men to be employed in your Majesty’s Sea Service & that their Pay & all Charges whatsoever relating to them, be defray’d out of money granted for the said Sea Service.’\textsuperscript{153}

Outside of these strictly administrative functions the Marine Department served another invaluable function for the Marines, as a formal/informal link with the Admiralty in regards to grievances or simply personal requests. This allowed Marine officers who felt that their concerns were not heard through the normal chain of command or via naval and army officers, a way to be heard. These officers voiced their concerns over issues of treatment on

\textsuperscript{150} Methods for Raising Marines, 5 April 1755, NA ADM 2/1152 p. 9
\textsuperscript{151} See Appendix 2
\textsuperscript{152} Order in Council, 28 February 1747, NA ADM 2/1151 p. 1
\textsuperscript{153} 29 March 1755 Proposal of the Establishment of Marines in NA ADM 2/1152 p. 2; 3 April 1755 Order in Council for the Marine establishment in NA ADM 96/3 p. 2
ship or their dismay at not being consulted over operational issues. One example comes from Major Pittcairn the highest ranking Marine in the American colonies in 1775 to Lord Sandwich, First Lord of the Admiralty, concerning the Marine battalion under his command in Boston. Pittcairn had originally been ordered by the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for the Colonies to proceed to America with a special battalion of marines which were to be used as reinforcement to the Army forces in Boston. But as soon as Pittcairn arrived in Boston there were a mountain of unanswered command problems, between Admiral Graves and General Gage, due to the ambiguous nature of his command. Pittcairn outpoured upon Sandwich through the Marine Department his laments. As, ‘I have but a small battalion on shore: there are still fifty of the supernumeraries that were ordered out on board ship, this hurts the appearance of the battalion greatly’. He goes on, ‘I have spoken often to the Admiral about this, but to no effect; it was much against his inclinations that he landed any of us’. His purpose in writing to Sandwich was the hope that the First Lord could personally clarify any command ambiguities.

The head of the Marine Department was the Secretary of the Marine Department who was given a variety of both formal and informal powers. The Secretary of the Marine Department, received a salary of £300 per annum and was placed ex officio among the duties of the Secretary to the Admiralty. The first Secretary John Clevland would in addition to his pay also receive all fees arising from the Marine Department. John Clevland was something of a collector of fee paying offices for himself and his family so his possession of this office is nothing unusual. However the chance for a new fee paying office should not be seen as the only reason for combining these two offices. The Admiralty was potentially trying to prevent rival empires from being formed within the Admiralty’s bureaucracy. Officially the Secretary of the Marine Department had the same administrative powers that the Admiralty Secretary had over the naval administrative system. He was in charge of all correspondence that reached the Board of Admiralty and he directly controlled the departmental clerks. However, it was the unofficial powers of the Secretary to the Admiralty and Marine Department that gave him his real power. He had personal access to the First Lord of the Admiralty and the rest of the Board where he could bring matters of concern to

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154 The interesting thing is this was not the first letter that he sent concerning this issue for he first sent this letter to Colonel Mackenzie in Portsmouth who used the Marine Department to encourage Sandwich to also help the situation. This is the Sandwich letter 14 February 1775 Major Pittcairn to Lord Sandwich in NRS Vol. 69, The Private Papers of John, Earl of Sandwich, Vol. I, G. R. Barnes and J. H. Owen (eds) (London, 1932), p. 57-58; this is the Mackenzie letter 20 December 1775, BL Add. MSS 39190 p. 207-8
155 Marine Department and Pay Office Staff are all listed in Appendix 2; J. C. Sainty, Admiralty Officials, 1660-1870, [Volume IV of Office-holders in Modern Britain] (London, 1975), p. 34-35
them in an informal capacity if need be. Ultimately all orders passed from the Admiralty Board to commanders on the spot, both naval and marine, were written from him.

The other salaried administrators in the Marine Department were the first clerk who was paid £100 per annum, quickly increased to £200 in 1756. The first clerk as with the secretary had other duties within the Admiralty; like George Jackson who was also Deputy Secretary of the Admiralty from 1766-1782. In 1782 this was formalized when the title of first clerk was changed to Deputy Secretary of the Marine Department, and this new titled office was formally given to the Deputy Secretary of the Admiralty. The next administrator was the second clerk, who was paid £70 per annum, which eventually rose in 1778 to £100 and finally to £110 in 1790 (when the third clerk was abolished). In 1755 the initial, second clerkship, was given to Secretary of the Admiralty John Cleveland’s son, John who served in that office till 1760. The salaries for clerkships were fairly comparable to their Admiralty counterparts who were earning £200 for first clerk and £150 for the second clerk and £120 for the third clerk. With two of the head officers (secretary and first clerk) entrenched within the bureaucratic structure of the Navy this can be seen as a potential measure to ensure their vested interest in the long term co-operative existence of the Marine Department and consequently stop the Marines from forming a separate vested interest. A centralised system had been produced that left the Admiralty/Navy firmly in charge.

The public did not see the Navy using their own bureaucrats always as a good thing. As one writer styling himself ‘An Old Tar’ made a criticism of the Navy using Marine money on Admirals, Captains (who were given the most senior Marine commands) and naval bureaucrats instead of on the service itself. ‘Too much praise cannot be given to the Marines, why then are they to be dupes to the Navy, and all the savings of it charged to the Marine Department; surely the Public must see this in a proper light.’ By 1779 the full cost of the Marine Department and all of the seventeen civilians who worked in it and out in the Royal Dockyard towns were costing the government £2187-18-4 per annum, all classified as expenses of the Marine Department. While at the same time to pay all of the arrears for the 1200 Marine officers both active and on half-pay was costing the government £13,525-5-2 per annum. In other words it cost the government roughly one-sixth the amount for paying all Marine officers just to pay seventeen civilians.

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157 Sainty, Admiralty Officials, 1660-1870, p. 82-83
158 Sainty, Admiralty Officials, 1660-1870, p. 39
159 Morning Post (London), Saturday, September 28, 1793
160 Pay-Office accounts, NA ADM 93/13 07 July 1781 p. 1-3
2.2 The Marine Pay Office

When the Marines were reformed in 1755 one of the primary clauses written into their formation was ‘that their pay, and all charges whatsoever relating to them be defrayed out of money granted for the said Sea Service’. 161 This led directly to the formation of the second bureaucratic office of significance, the Marine Pay Office which lasting throughout this period with only minor alterations. This office’s sole concern was with issues relating to the payment and expense of money upon marines. The Pay Office’s primary concern was with Marine pay. However it was also involved with any repayments concerning the recruitment service, levy money, and the Marine Department’s salaries. 162

With the creation of the Marine Pay Office the Navy was signalling that it recognized this separate office could handle all payment issues more expeditiously than the larger naval administrative apparatus. The importance of keeping it a separate institution from the Navy’s Pay Office is hinted at in a letter from the Admiralty to the Navy Board in 1755. The letter’s overall concern is with levy money used to raise the 5000 Marines who were to fill the fleet. The Admiralty felt it important that the money, £15,000 or £3 per marine, be drawn from the Treasury ‘to such person as shall be appointed Pay Master of the Marines’ so that it would duly ‘enable him to perform this Service’. 163 What is telling about this is that even before the Office was officially created the Navy knew the importance of placing this level of authority in the hands of a solitary separate pay officer which could make these payments in a timelier manner. Another way to see the importance of maintaining separate pay officers for the Navy and Marines was that in effect it physically enshrined the separate nature of the Marines from their naval counterparts. Ensuring that finances were entangled with the Navy then it would be harder to disband them than if they were to be carried on separate account books.

At the head of this department, with complete authority and responsibility for all pay accounts, was the Paymaster of Marines. He would be responsible for vast sums of money, the extent of which has recently been commented on by historian Roger Morriss; ‘During the first 20 years as paymaster of marines, 1757-77, over two and a quarter million pounds was imprested to John Tucker’. 164 The Paymaster was in personal command of these vast sums of money; the only other person in the naval administration in direct command of more money was the Navy Treasurer. Unfortunately there are no figures on the administrative costing before Gabriel Steward was Paymaster in 1778, due largely to the loss of the account-books by Steward’s predecessor. This was potentially very convenient for Mr. Tucker as there is no way of tracking his honesty when he dealt with such large amounts of money in his own

161 29 March 1755 Proposal of an Establishment of Marines in NA ADM 2/1152, p. 3; See Appendix 2
162 The various pay books in existence show you the wealth of pay issues in NA ADM 96/13-20
163 4 April 1755 Admiralty to Navy Board concerning levy money in NA ADM 2/1152, p. 7-8
personal accounts as that stated above. The Paymaster of Marines was given a salary of £800 per annum with a possible £200 extension in times of war. This figure can give some validation of the importance placed on the office of Paymaster, for the Paymaster of the Navy Pay Office only earned £500 per annum. However, with this money the Paymaster was also responsible for personally paying the wages of any clerks employed to work in his office. Therefore it is no surprise that the Paymaster only provided money for one clerk from 1755-1795. However after 1795 the work became too much and Paymaster Steward was forced to provide for two clerks. Over our forty-seven year period (1755-1802) the Pay Office saw only five Paymasters of Marines, with three of them changing in the two year period of 1755-1757, thus demonstrating the lucrative nature of the posting.\(^{166}\)

The Agent of Marines is the last officer within the Marine Pay Office bureaucracy for discussion. When this office was first established in 1756 three Agents of Marines were created, one to be assigned to each of the three divisions. The creation of this office coincided with an increase in the Marine establishment by twenty more companies in 1756 (This enlarged the Marines over night by one-fifth). With this increase in personnel there were many who voiced concerns over the ‘great difficulty, and trouble’ inherent in making sure marines received their pay in a timely manner.\(^{167}\) In order to reach this timely manner of payment the Agents were to be:

> Appointed to act under him [Paymaster of Marines], one [Agent] for each division of the Marine Companies, that the Paymaster do receive from the Treasurer of the Navy, all monies payable in relation to the Marines, and pass a regular account for the same with the Navy Board, that he issues such of the said money as there may be occasion to pay, for the Marines of each Division…\(^{168}\)

This demonstrates the concern of the Navy with the prompt payment of marines. Prompt payment was also a device to prevent mutinies similar to the ones in 1708, which were a direct consequence of long overdue pay. The Agent of Marines was paid £300 per annum.\(^{169}\) It was quickly raised in 1763 when the three Agents were condensed to one at the peace under the younger John Clevland, who would serve as Agent from 1763-1767, with a salary of £500 per annum. When Clevland was made the sole agent he was informed that he was to use this extra £200 per annum to pay for any ‘additional number of clerks’ along with any other of the expenses of his office.\(^{170}\) With the Agent ‘on the ground’ this would ensure that Marine pay issues theoretically could be handled with more expediency than the central Pay Office. The Agent, the Paymaster and the autonomy of Marine Pay Office were direct signs that the
Admiralty understood the importance in the eighteenth century of prompt payment of wages to their marines.

However this is not to paint too rosy a picture as prompt payment was still an issue at various times throughout this forty-seven year period. The Marine Divisional officers like their other military counterparts were many times in arrears over pay especially in wartime or during the start of peace.\footnote{Pay-Office accounts, NA ADM 93/13 07 July 1781 p. 1-3} Not to lessen this point but to show where both the Admiralty and the Marines felt the importance of pay should be directed, in 1756 there were defined rules and regulations about how to pay marines on shore and on land (dealt with in more detail in a later chapter). After ‘the paymaster having set forth that he has been under difficulties from the delay of the issues of money for the marine service’ the Admiralty ordered him to maintain two months subsistence in cash on hand.\footnote{Admiralty to Paymaster, NA ADM 96/3 07 April 1756 p. 1} This was to allow him to make prompt payment of any pay issues that were to arise from Marines on shore or those being transferred off ship. So while officers at sometimes had to be in arrears of pay their subordinates were well maintained with ready cash by the paymaster.

2.3 Divisional Structure

The formation of the British Marines into a Divisional structure was a divergence from the previous Marine regimental structure of the pervious wars. The 3 April 1755 Order in Council called for the raising of fifty companies of marines (5,700 officers and men), these companies were to be divided into three Divisions located in the three major naval dockyards. ‘That Chatham, Portsmouth and Plymouth be the established Head Quarters of the Marines or such of them as shall be from time to time on shore; and that they be quartered at these [dockyards] and the adjacent places.’\footnote{29 March 1755 Proposal of tan Establishment of Marines in NA ADM 2/1152 p. 4} Portsmouth and Plymouth were to receive an equal amount of seventeen companies each, while Chatham was to have only sixteen. The favouring in parity of numbers for Plymouth and Portsmouth, the two main operational bases of the Navy, over Chatham was to be maintained throughout this period even as the Corps expanded and retracted. This created a new formational and administrative system centred on the concept of static Divisions subdivided into mobile/independent companies. This was an important improvement on the rigidity and inefficiency of the previous regimental system because of its decentralised mobile company units.

The Divisional structure was not a wholly unique concept to the eighteenth century British military. There were two different types of divisions throughout the eighteenth century within the British Army; however both were largely tactical terms. There was a battalion division with ‘parcels into which a battalion is divided’; and a battalion usually had
about nine to ten companies. The other term was Army division: ‘the division of an Army is the Brigade’, a Brigade was usually made-up of four to six battalions. This concept of Army Division, or Brigade, is the nearest contemporary structure to what the new Marine Corps Divisions were to look like. The ambiguous nature of the Division allowed the Marines an amenable administrative and command structure, which could be continually manipulated to meet any duty deemed necessary at any particular time. The reasoning behind the Navy and Marines’ desire for such structural flexibility was because of the amphibious nature of marines. Depending on the scale and importance of the amphibious operation and the stationing of marines on board ships from 1st to 6th rate they could be formed into large formations, a battalion, or small formations, a couple of dozen men, based on the particular operational needs of the time.

One main reason for structural flexibility is that during war two-thirds of all marines were to be stationed within the fleet while the other third functioned in various duties on land. Every structural company in the Marines was designated by a number and then its Division’s location; like 4 Company Portsmouth Division, 25 Company Chatham Division or 74 Company Plymouth Division. However due to the ever fluid needs of the Navy in manning it ships, marines were formed around a tactically flexible company based on the ship’s size. On 1st to 6th rate ships Marine tactical company formations were commanded, similar to Army company formation, by one captain who then had at least one or more subalterns and a number of NCOs and privates. The amount of marines on the various ships were to vary substantially; from a first rate which carried a complement of as large as 165 officers and men to a sloop which carried as little as 20 officers and men. To administer what company a marine was in it was required of every ship’s muster to document the individual marine’s name and company number. However because ships were in constant flux with issues of manning and orders; these tactical companies were made up of men from the various established companies within a Division and even sometimes from the other Divisions. While on ship these marines no matter what their original company were required and daily drilled to function as a single tactical company formation. When on land in their various Divisions the men were either reassigned to new established companies who needed the manpower or returned to their original company. The tactical formation while on land

174 Under ‘Battalion’, ‘Brigade’ and ‘Division’, T. Simes, The military medley, containing the most necessary rules and directions for attaining a competent knowledge of the art: to which is added an explication of military terms, alphabetically digested (Dublin, 1767); H. Bland, A treatise of military discipline; in which is laid down and explained the duty of the officer and soldier, Thro’ the several Branches of the Service, [Second Edition] (London, 1727), p. 216
175 J. A. Lowe, Records of the Portsmouth Division of Marines, 1764-1800, [Issue 7 of Portsmouth Record series] (Portsmouth, 1990), p. xx
176 Regulations and Instructions relating to Marines Serving on Board His Majesty’s Ships 1759, NA ADM 96/3, p. 2
177 Rule and Regulations for Marines Ashore 1759, NA ADM 96/3, p. 2
was not centred on the company however but instead on the battalion. This battalion formation was similar to the tactical battalions within the army’s regiments of this period, which were usually the largest tactical unit formation within the army structure. The importance of this battalion formation was to give the Marines experience in large formational movements. This was something they would need if they were to operate with army units in eventual combined amphibious operations. By utilising these two tactical formations the Navy and Marines demonstrated their clear hope of having a formation which could meet the changing demands put on a multi-dimensional military force.

The divisional administrative structure and its flexibility allowed for a dual structure between central and local command. Centrally pay, uniforms and ordnance stores among other things were handled by the Marine Department and Pay Office. Orders for marines to be dispatched and to what ships also came from the Admiralty down through the Marine Department. Divisional commanders, however had a large amount of command decisions decentralised to them as well. The Division commander, like his army regimental equal, could order more uniforms or arms, and administer which specific marine went on ship. This is an important distinction as it shows a certain level of autonomy in the Marines for their commanders concerning various command decisions. The Admiralty in a letter to Captain Schomberg, commander of HMS Richmond (32) who had requested Lt. John Brown transferred to his ship, preserved the special command authority of the Divisional commanders. ‘I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you [Captain Schomberg], they never give any directions relating to Marine Officers’. Hence the only person with the authority to order marines into a ship was the Divisional commander. This was a unique form of patronage since certain ships would have a better chance of prize money or action than another, breeding loyalty to their commanders first and the Navy second. Commanders were also ordered to ‘employ any surgeon that may be proper to take care of such Marines at quarters’. Another area where Divisional commanders showed their structural independence in administration was over various issues concerning small arms. In 1769 Captain Forrest of HMS Dunkirk (60) wrote the Admiralty about marines now on board his ship who ‘are only supplied with old insufficient arms, unfit for service’. He said they had raised the complaint with the Colonel but he retorted that he had no replacements to send, ‘not having receiv’d said arms properly’. Captain Forrest was imploring the Admiralty to usurp the Colonel’s command decision. Unfortunately for Captain Forrest the only reply the Admiralty gave was that they would order more muskets

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179 Admiralty to Capt. Schomberg, 5 May 1757, NA ADM 2/1154, p. 40
180 NA ADM 183/121 13 May 1755
181 Captain Forrest to Admiralty, NA ADM 1/5114/17 28 April 1769
from the Ordnance Board whereupon they would be sent to the Colonel in the hope he would then provide them to the men. What is telling is that there is no harsh reply or order to the Marine Colonel about the provisioning of arms in subsequent correspondence. Unlike their regimental counterparts in the Army they didn’t have complete control over pay issues, as these were handled entirely by the Pay Office. To regimental colonels these powers over pay and deductions were seen as part of their property rights and even a source of supplemental income. The Admiralty felt that by making all Marine officers purely dependent on their salary and not able to receive more from privileges would prevent what they saw as some of the excesses in expense and the delayed payment of colonels’ accounts from earlier wars.  

In fact the Admiralty was so rigid in taking this line that they would fully prosecute any Marine if there was even a sense of impropriety, as Colonel Commandant Innes found out in 1802.

Lieutenant General Harrie Innes was the Colonel Commandant of the Chatham Division of Marines in 1800 when a Sergeant James McGuire deserted from his duties while in the recruiting services of the Division. The Admiralty charged General Innes with continuing Sergeant McGuire on the establishment for three more weeks after he was informed of this desertion. Innes’s court-martial took place on the 5 to 8 June 1802 to much coverage in the press. As the court-martial continued it was discovered that General Innes had done something similar in the past, this time with a Sergeant Pain. The difference is that Sergeant Pain had ‘a long service and meritorious conduct’ and by continuing him on the books Innes was able to provide a pseudo-pension to Sergeant Pain. This was an act for which the court agreed with Innes actions and made a special point of it in their proceedings. General Innes was eventually acquitted of all charges but the mark upon him for the court-martial led to him to being encouraged by the Admiralty to retire on half pay. This court-martial revealed the heavy handed nature the Admiralty would take against a field officer for just the rumour of him taking money from the Division for his own uses. The Admiralty’s actions were to also put the final death nail in the complaints about the inherent corruption of Marine Forces from 1699.

When first established in 1755 each Division was originally to have one Lieutenant Colonel with direct command, one Major to act as his second in command and an adjutant to fulfil the more bureaucratic needs of the division. By the autumn this was augmented by one

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182 NA ADM 2/1151 28 November 1748 p. 494-6
183 The Morning Post and Gazetteer (London), Thursday, June 10, 1802; Hampshire Telegraph & Portsmouth Gazette (Portsmouth), Monday, June 14, 1802
184 Court Martial of Lieutenant General Innes 5 to 8 June 1802, NA ADM 1/5492 p. 39-40
185 See Chapter I
more Major, another adjutant and a quarter-master for each division. They then on the 19 December 1755 Lt. Colonel Paterson was promoted to Colonel in Town or in effect commander of all Marines. He was to hold this position until his retirement in 1760 when he was replaced by the ‘Blue Colonels’ system. This was to stay as the basic command structure of the Marines until 1771 when there was to be a new shift in the field rank administration (discussed in more detail below). With this change each Marine Division was given a full Colonel (subsequently made Lt. General in the Army) with the title of Colonel-Commandant, two lieutenant-colonels and two majors. The average Colonel-Commandant could not attain his position without serving at least thirty years in the Marines and, with special exception, Army time could not count toward this. Therefore, by the time someone had attained Colonel-Commandant rank he would have considerable experience in a plethora of personnel and administration issues. Then in 1783 the old office of Commander in Town was re-established and renamed Colonel-Commandant in Town once again enshrining the principle of all Marine command under one Marine officer. The rest of the Divisional structure consisted of a first lieutenant on full pay who would act in the capacity of Quartermaster for the Division. Other administrative positions allotted to each Marine Division were drum-major, surgeon, deputy-paymaster, a squad officer and an assortment of other permanent positions for officers and non-commissioned officers.

The stationary divisional formation (located permanently in the dockyards) and the tactical company formation (for deployment on ship) allowed marines to be rapidly deployed to any pressing need of the Navy or Nation. These dual formational developments reveal a certain level of experienced planning about the potential structural and operational needs of the Marine Forces. First Lord Admiral George Anson has historically been viewed as having the primary influence over this new formational structure of the Corps. Anson was an important member of the Admiralty Board when the Marine regiments were disbanded in 1748. He was also to be First Lord during their reformation in 1755 so he had the power to influence these administrative and strategic decisions. One of Anson’s early biographers explicitly gives all of the credit of the Marines formation to him alone.

Lord Anson therefore considered the time now come for placing the marines on a different and better footing; and, with this view, he matured a plan for the establishment of this excellent body of men as a separate corps, entirely distinct from the army, to act

186 29 March 1755 Proposal of an Establishment of Marines in NA ADM 2/1152 p. 2; NA ADM 96/3 21 November 1755; See Command Tree in Appendix
187 This is confirmed in a letter to Lord Barrington one year later, 10 December 1756 in NA ADM 2/1153, p. 332; Admiralty to General Paterson, NA ADM 2/1156 18 February 1760 p. 285
188 Lowe, Records of the Portsmouth Division of Marines, 1764-1800, p. xx-xxi
189 Lowe, Records of the Portsmouth Division of Marines, 1764-1800, p. xxv-xxviii
with the navy, when afloat, and to be regulated by a Marines Mutiny Act, when on
shore...  

Barrow in placing this reference to the Marines where he does in his text is trying to show the
parallels with the Marines’ establishment and the ever increasing Navy’s overall ‘preparations
for war’. This line of reasoning would have strong resonance throughout the eighteenth
century as it was felt that the establishment of the Marine Corps aided in the rapidity of the
fleet going to sea. Other historians have shown that Lord Anson while only one member of a
seven person Board of Admiralty was the one who truly exerted the majority of the control
over its decision making processes on the naval administration. While Anson was
definitely a prime mover in the establishment of the Corps of Marines, he was however
neither its sole architect nor the significant influencer on its structure.

James Paterson is a little more of an ambiguous figure to history, as there is no direct
evidence of Paterson’s influence or ability to ‘have the ear’ of Anson. However, there is
plenty of circumstantial evidence leading to such a conclusion. One of these pieces of
evidence is the high rank and relatively rapid nature by which Paterson attained it. The
earliest about Paterson can be found is when he purchased a Lieutenant’s commission on 6
May 1709, then Captain on 6 May 1719 and finally promoted to a major in Colonel
Alexander Irwin’s regiment of Foot on 1 January 1735/6. This regiment was on the Irish
establishment throughout the 1730s, similar to Ligonier and Amherst. Then in 1740 with the
raising of Colonel Henry Cornwall’s Marine Regiment (Lt. General from 4 February 1742) he
was made a Lt. Colonel which rank he held until its disbanding in 1749. Henry Cornwall was
a Hereford MP throughout most of the 1740s till 1756 when he died. By 1754 James
Paterson; like Drury, Gordon and even Jeffery Amherst for that matter were Lt. Colonels on
half pay. Lt. Colonel James Paterson was made divisional commander of the senior
Division then at Portsmouth on the 23 March 1755 by special order of the King’s Council.
Then on the 19 December 1755, with the ever growing size and demand for marines, he was
made Marine Colonel in Town (London) informally a command level position over all
Marines. On 25 June 1759 he was promoted to Major-General and on 19 January 1761 he

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190 This is drawn largely from inference of wording in the 3 April 1775 Order in Council, J. Barrow,
The life of George, Lord Anson: admiral of the fleet, vice-admiral of Great Brittain, and first lord
commissioner of the admiralty, previous to, and during, the seven years' war (London, 1839) p. 234
191 Barrow, The Life of George, Lord Anson, p. 235
192 N. A. M. Rodger, ‘George, Lord Anson, 1697-1762’ in P. Le Fevre & R. Harding (eds), Precursors
193 A list of the colonels, lieutenant colonels, majors, captains, lieutenants, and ensigns of His Majesty's
forces on the British establishment: with the dates of their several Commissions as such... (London,
1740), p. 71
194 Court and city register. For the year 1755 (London, 1755), p. 144, 146
195 NA ADM 6/406 23 March 1755; NA ADM 6/406 19 December 1755
was made a Lieutenant General upon his retirement. While these are not exceptionally fast appointments as per regular army officers, Paterson was a Marine officer who had not purchased a single command since the 1730s. Like most officers promoted to field ranks this meant that he had a certain level of political influence in order to assure this leap in the command structure. His political influence is hinted at when the Order in Council of 1 February 1760 was issued that established the ‘Blue Colonel’ system. After outlining how this new command structure would exist the Order goes on to directly speak about James Paterson. The new system would make him ‘superceded [sic]; and as his conduct, whilst under our directions [Admiralty], has been to our satisfaction…we pray leave to intercede with your Majesty that he may be allowed a pension of Seven hundred and thirty pounds a year on the Ordinary of the Navy’. This was a substantial pension to be paid out of the yearly ordinary estimates to continue till his death in 1771. To give this some context a full Admiral on half pay (the usual method of retirement) would receive roughly £650 per annum whereas Paterson was still making £70 per annum over that sum. Another indicator that he had some level of political influence is from his will. He entrusted £12,300 for his widow Sarah and their five children (his eldest William was a Marine officer), £565 to his doctor and executors (one being his doctor), £52 to the widow of his nephew Evan Paterson and their daughter, but his final bequest is £21 each to ‘my friend Colonel Amherst and Lieut. Colonel James Paterson of the 63rd Regiment’. The Amherst referred to is most likely Jeffrey Amherst, eventual Commander-in-Chief during the War for American Independence. It is curious however that he refers to him as Colonel and not General which he had been since the Seven Years’ War. Paterson had interactions with both of these men at various times in his career, first potentially in Ireland in the 1730s when Amherst was a Cornet in Ligonier’s Horse and James Paterson (possibly a kinsman) an ensign in St. Clair’s 1st Regiment of Foot. As an interesting side-note Ligonier made Jeffrey Amherst the executor of his will and left him £100, but other than this coincidental aspect there is no direct evidence of Paterson and Ligonier’s partnership on any level.

More evidence illustrating the influence that Paterson held in the Admiralty, is the informal way in which the Admiralty treated him from day one (3 April 1755) as a pseudo-

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196 These last two were Army commissions but in all correspondence he is referred to with these ranks, *The military register; or new and complete lists of all his Majesty’s land forces and marines for the year 1770*, p. 4
197 See Appendix 3
198 Order in Council 1 February 1760, NA ADM 2/1156, p. 275-6
200 Will of James Paterson, Lieutenant-General of Richmond Surrey, NA PROB 11/965 15 March 1771
201 A list of the colonels, lieutenant colonels, majors, captains, lieutenants, and ensigns of His Majesty’s forces on the British establishment, p. 65, 70
commander of all Marine Forces later officially confirmed in December. In these early days Paterson received not only orders concerning the structure and administration of the Marine Corps, but also as ‘the Senior Field Officer of the Marines’ he was commanded to inspect all issued ordnance stores and uniforms before they were issued to any marines.\textsuperscript{203} Another very powerful statement of Admiralty confidence in him is the level of patronage given to him over all other Marine officers. Paterson was ordered by the Admiralty ‘to signify…those and such other officers as do not appear in Town [London] either to recruit or to repair to their head quarters [Chatham, Portsmouth and Plymouth] as you shall find necessary, they being directed to follow your Orders[my emphasis]’.\textsuperscript{204} This order was given to him months before he was officially given the title of Marine Colonel in Town and the official capacity to make orders that came with this title. The level of influence over the designation and promotion of officers was usually held within the strict authority of the Admiralty or the two senior Admirals on the Board, Anson and Boscowen.

2.4 Marines Barracks

One area where the naval administration showed an ever increasing willingness to expend large sums of money was with the creation of Marine barracks in each of the three royal dockyards. The importance of Marine barracks demonstrated many times in the past the Navy’s disappointment over slow mobilisations in prior wars. In 1740 the Navy had ordered Colonel Wolfe’s 1st Marines to be quartered in the Hilsea barracks in Portsmouth. Unfortunately the Hilsea barrack were unable to house all of the marines due to the very poor state they had been kept in by the Board of Ordnance. Therefore marines had to be billeted in ‘public houses’, similar to their Army counter-parts, this was also a practice that was continued during the early stages of the Marine Corps period.\textsuperscript{205} Unfortunately this dispersion meant Marines would be scattered throughout their respective dockyard cities and consequently it took longer for them to form up for speedy embarkation on ships. Also dispersing forces throughout these public houses facilitated desertion, ill-health (possibly pox) and disturbances due to over-intoxication. This was not all done because of unscrupulous publicans or the need for military mobility; it was also about protecting the public as a whole. As late as the 1770s complaints were streaming into the Admiralty about marines ‘make[ing] a practice to break the windows, damage and destroy beds, bedding in their quarters, and as it unavoidably happens that several men are lodged in the same room, it is found difficult to discover the offender’.\textsuperscript{206} A self contained gated barracks could make some of these problems

\textsuperscript{203} Ordnance inspection request 19 April 1755, NA ADM 2/1152, p.23-24; Marine Clothing inspection order 12 May 1755, NA ADM 2/1152, p. 40
\textsuperscript{204} Admiralty to Lt. Colonel Paterson 22 April 1755, NA ADM 2/1152, p. 25
\textsuperscript{205} Houlding, \textit{Fit for Service}, p. 39-40
\textsuperscript{206} NA ADM 183/2 13 May 1772
less systemic. The Admiralty hence felt that a barracks construction project should be undertaken, ‘having appeared to us to be of the utmost importance to the service in point of discipline and good order’. These issues made the Navy’s primary importance the construction for the Marines of their own purpose built barracks to ensure they could be easily centralised and monitored while awaiting their embarkation orders.

As the Seven Years’ War came to a close in 1763, the Admiralty ordered the three dockyards to begin looking for land upon which to start building barracks for their respective Divisions. Like most eighteenth century projects the bureaucracy of the Navy and Ordnance Boards took nearly twenty years before completing the last barracks. The first Division to have its barracks purpose-built by these two Boards was the Portsmouth Division. The Admiralty, which ‘very much wanted’ the barracks, proposed to the Privy Council ‘that the old cooperage, so soon as it can be conveniently spared, may be fitted up for barracks for the Marines doing duty at Portsmouth’. However the conversion was not fully completed until 17 January 1769, almost three years after the barracks were officially approved. A great part of the delay was due to the barracks designs continually being upgraded in order to provide more room to house the men and provide better officer accommodation. The completed project provided accommodation for 564 marines and five rooms for officers amounting to the hefty sum of £3198-14-6. The Chatham Division of Marines was largely saved from this expense at the time because they were allowed to take over the largest proportion of the old Army Barracks in Chatham. These barracks built in 1750 were some of the largest in England at the time thus giving the Marines plenty of room until marine numbers eventually grew too large and the Army reclaimed them in the War of American Independence. The Chatham Marines therefore had to build their own barracks, not far from their previous army ones, to be completed in 1780. The Plymouth Marines were the last of the three to receive barracks and they were not completed until 1783, at Stonehouse. The Plymouth Division, like Chatham Division, from 1763-1778 occupied a portion of the army barracks but, also like Chatham, were expelled in October 1778 ‘to make room for a Regiment of Foot and a Regiment of Militia’. So the Admiralty requested the then staggering sum of £16,680 in order that the Marines ‘be accommodated with barracks from whence they might not be liable to be removed on like occasions’. These barracks to be built larger then Portsmouth’s were to accommodate 612 officers and men. The cost of building barracks

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207 Request for Money for Plymouth Barracks 2 May 1779, NA ADM 2/1171, p. 438
208 Admiralty to Principal Officer of Ordnance 3 October 1763, NA ADM 2/1159, p. 388
209 Admiralty to Privy Council about Marine Barracks Portsmouth 20 May 1765, NA PC 1/7/54, p. 3-4
210 Lowe, Records of the Portsmouth Division of Marines, 1764-1800, p. xviii
211 Lowe, Records of the Portsmouth Division of Marines, 1764-1800, p. xviii
212 Request for Money for Plymouth Barracks 2 May 1779, NA ADM 2/1171, p.438-440
was not the only expense as they also had various equipment and provisioning needs that amounted to £5030-13 per annum by 1784. \footnote{NA ADM 96/13 21 February 1784}

The Ordnance Board was charged with the basic management, supply, construction and maintenance of every barracks and fort in the United Kingdom. \footnote{Houlding, \textit{Fit for Service}, p. 40} While their provisioning was standard the Navy recognised that a Barrack Master, usually an officer on half-pay, was needed to provide for the administrative and logistical needs of the men when in the barracks. The Barrack Master was to take ‘into your care & charge, together with the Bedding Furniture & Utensils therein…to take care that the rooms…be constantly supplied with Beds Bedding & such Furniture Utensils & Necessaries as are usually & customarily allowed’. \footnote{Lowe, \textit{Records of the Portsmouth Division of Marines, 1764-1800}, p. xxiii} He would make all orders of these basic necessities through the Marine Department who would then make its request to the Ordnance Board or sometimes even the Navy Board. Many of the duties within the barracks were eventually entrusted to non-commissioned officers and senior privates as these were duties that required certain ‘capacities’. In total there were anywhere between 30 and 40 enlisted men fulfilling the duties of everything from clerks, barbers to even schoolmasters. \footnote{NA ADM 1/3290 02 September 1787, p. 1-3} In the end the Marine barracks were depending more and more upon the self-sufficiency its men could bring to the service and further removing them from the day to day contact with the Navy and British society as a whole.

\section*{2.5 Naval Sinecure or Marine Command?}

By 1760 with the ever growing size of the Navy there was a real need to retain good naval officers that could not be given flag command due to their low level of seniority. Therefore the Navy devised an idea to utilise its Marine Corps as a place to retain these exceptional officers. This idea was expressed clearly in the 1 February 1760 Order in Council concerning ‘Captains of His Majesty’s Ships of War, having the rank of Colonel, but whenever it shall happen that the said three captains, or either of them, shall be promoted to the rank of Flag Officers, they are not to continue to act as Colonels of Marines, but in the Superior rank of Admiral’. \footnote{Order in Council 1 February 1760, NA ADM 2/1156, p. 276; See Appendix 3} The problem was brought to the forefront by the ever growing age and eventual retirement in 1761, of General James Paterson. The Admiralty’s theory of the basic Marine command problem being that ‘from the present low establishment of Field Officers, each of those stations can only be put under the immediate care of an officer of no higher rank [than] that [of] a Lieutenant Colonel’. \footnote{Admiralty to Privy Council, 29 January 1760, NA ADM 2/1156 p. 252} The Admiralty requested that three new
colonels be appointed, paid forty shillings a day and ordered them to maintain ‘the care, inspection, and command of the three established head quarters’. They then referred to a regulation from the ‘ancient establishment of Marine Forces’ (the Colonel of the first Marine Regiment of 1664 was none other than Lord High Admiral James, Duke of York) that ‘Colonels but none of the other officers might be Sea Commanders’.\(^{219}\) The Admiralty felt that it would be advantageous for the Maritime services if sea officers were given these three appointments. These three colonelcies were given to three naval captains, Richard Howe (Chatham), Thomas Stanhope (Portsmouth) and Augustus Hervey (Plymouth), and these three officers would have theoretically direct control over their respective divisions. These officers were eventually known as the ‘Blue Colonels’ because of their naval blue coats. The senior of these three officers was placed in Chatham thus creating a visible statement concerning the transfer of power over the senior marine division from Portsmouth to Chatham.\(^{220}\) Taking command right away, Captain Richard Howe sent a letter to his Division in June, stating that his long absence in Bath was to be at an end and to prepare for his return. Upon his return he wanted a full accounting of all the men, to review their guard rotations and for them to be paraded before him. He did add ‘in respect to the several other points concerning which I should wish to be instructed by you at a more convenient opportunity’.\(^{221}\) This admonition is not just politeness for its own sake but instead a statement recognising the extensive command experience of Lt. Colonel Richard Bendyshe. However the practice of the Blue Colonels to try to take active command of their Divisions, when around, was well entrenched throughout this 1760-1770 period.

The illuminating aspect of this Blue Colonel establishment is not the actual action but the firestorm it caused among Marine officers. These officers felt their grievances were not being heard through the proper lines of command therefore they took them into the public arena instead. The North Briton was the first publication to field the anger of Marine officers. The North Briton was an interesting choice as it was a notorious anti-government newspaper which continually attacked the Scottish Earl of Bute and the King’s government throughout this period. The first officer taking up the Marines’ cause, prefaced his argument with ‘the Marines are a very brave and useful body of men, their behaviour, in the late war has amply testified.’ He went on to sing the praises and accomplishments of ‘this deserving corps’ before he got into the meat of his argument.

The mal-treatment they have, nevertheless, met with, is almost inconceivable; and, less the measure of their grief should not be full, their most humble remonstrances [sic] have lately been branded with the hated epithet of mutinous… What crime had all the old

\(^{219}\) Admiralty to Privy Council, 29 January 1760, NA ADM 2/1156 p. 252
\(^{221}\) Howe to Bendyshe, NA ADM 23 June 1760
experienced officers, the lieutenant-colonels and majors of the marines, committed, that they were thus deprived of all hopes of future preferment? Lost to ambition, that soul chearing [sic] balsam, which stimulates a soldier to encounter the dangers of war, and supports him amidst all its fatigues? The patriotic minister, Mr. Pitt, had resolved do something for the officers of this much deserving corps (to whose services he was no stranger) but the important negotiation…and his removal from power succeeding, utterly prevented it.

Another author took up where the other left off, emphasising the stop of ‘preferments’ by Admirals and Sea Captains taking the senior ranking field commissions of the Marines, even if they were purely sinecures. ‘There is not a corps in his Majesty’s service, except this most unfortunate one, but has ever had some friend, or some protector, to whom, upon occasion, it could unburthen [sic] its grievances…Rights were not infringed, or its Privileges trampled upon. –Where had the marines such a patron?’ The ideas of loss of preferment were a continual complaint in the North Briton along with other publications. ‘Why, the benefits of his Majesty’s most gracious indulgence were enjoyed by every corps but the marines. They alone were refused them; by which flagrant act of partiality, an opportunity of preferment was lost, which might never be retrieved.’ There was some feeling among others that the Admiralty was using the Marine officer commissions as a place purely for political sinecures. One writer commented that ‘commissions were reserved for a set of wretches, who had no other qualification to recommend them but the fortune name of Scotchman, or a lucky connection with those public nuisances called Admiralty Boroughs’. The Marine field officers were ‘senior to most of those who were preferred’ and to their great surprise and mortification, ‘found themselves totally omitted, by the administration, in those promotions’. While the retort by naval officers was that “field officers or Marines had no more right to think they had injustice done them, in not getting their rank, or to complain, than Masters and Commanders in not being made Post-Captains.” One Marine wrote that ‘the impossibility of rising in the Marine service was cruel, as it must be to see a general officer with only the pay of Lieutenant Colonel of marines, while three Captains of the navy have 40s a day as Colonels, though the eldest was not born when he was supposed to be made an officer’.

‘The humble Representation of the Officers of the Plymouth Division of Marines’, also written to The North Briton, concerning some other grievances about the Marine Corps position. They claimed to be writing ‘in hopes [that] the exposing to the public a few of them, would have shamed the oppressors of the marines into a full removal’ along with stating that ‘Sea Captains sent to all the Marine Division to superintend the proposed

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222 The North Briton, [No. 47] (London), Saturday, June 4, 1763, p. 11-13
223 Lloyd's Evening Post (London), Friday, June 17, 1763
224 The North Briton, [No. 49] (London), Saturday, June 18, 1763, p. 32; Gazetteer and London Daily Advertiser (London), Tuesday, June 14, 1763
225 The North Briton, [No. 47] (London), Saturday, June 4, 1763, p. 14
226 The North Briton, [No. 49] (London), Saturday, June 18, 1763, p. 32
227 Gazetteer and London Daily Advertiser (London), Tuesday, June 14, 1763
One of their main complaints was over a perceived injustice in issuances of leave for Marine officers. Their complaint was that officers were only allowed ‘two months leave of absence’ but there was no exception even for those who had a ‘thousand miles or more to travel’. ‘Nor was even this leave granted by it, but under the following restrictions; they must be the last for sea duty; and if they staid beyond the limited time, their pay to be respited [sic]; and at last, at the will of their superiors, they were to be put upon half pay. A gentleman of the army, would naturally ask here, What! Without a court martial?’ They later give an interesting set of rhetorical questions.

Upon all applications for redress, the Admiralty have constantly returned for answer, “they intended to put the marines as much as possible, on a footing with the navy” I would therefore ask –Are marine officers, on the ladder, climbing to the top of sea preferment? Are lieutenant colonels of marines made captains of men of war? On the contrary, are not admirals and sea captains (equally incompatible!) at the head of the marines? Is this placing the marines as much as possible, on a footing with the navy? O order! O Discipline!...If these just representations have not effect enough to raise a protector to the marine corps, they have yet one dawn of hope left [appeal to the charity of the public].

‘Amicus’ writing about the naval captains’ preferment in an open letter to Lord Sandwich published 1772 in the press stated; ‘my Lord, what I have been told, that you lean all your provident attention to the side of the marines, and that honest useful Tars shall be totally neglected this might, my Lord, be a most luxuriant stroke of politics, but is exceeding far beyond the reach of my comprehension.’

However there were those voices within the press who felt the Navy had taken the right method by appointing naval officers to these posts. These writers were discussed by the pro-marine writers as scurrilous and a ‘ministerial wretch, a tool of despotism [my emphasis]’. This specific writer goes on to state ‘Facts are stubborn things…to every mean insinuation that may tend to discredit them…the total stop put to all hopes of preferment, by the appointment of Admirals to be their Generals, and Sea Captains to the command of each division, another method was found to contribute to the same righteous purpose of preventing the promotion of every Officer.’

In A short account of the naval actions of the last war most likely written by a naval officer who served during the War of American Independence, the author made a close description of the Marines and their position on ship. He outlined what he felt were some of the weakness of the Navy in the War of American Independence. ‘I cannot help noticing the manner in which the Marine Corps are attached to the service, or perhaps with more propriety, I might say, detached from it. Marines as they are situated will
ever remain dissatisfied with the naval service, and being so, will break in upon that harmony which is so essential to good order and discipline, unless some alteration be made in their establishment, to render them of more use when embarked.’ He goes on to state that the reasons for some of the disconnect with the Navy was that the Marines were ‘regarded merely as idlers’. Because of this ‘their pride as men is often wounded; they of course become captious, and susceptible to the slightest inattention’. He advocates establishing all Naval officers as Marine officers, since the Marine officers being a separate body, ‘As it is, there are constant heart-burnings.’ Dining in any wardroom of a man of war, ‘you hear the Marine Corps described as useless passengers; and if you dine with the Marine Corps at their Barracks, you will be entertained with a description of the Officers of the Navy, not calculated to exalt them in the opinion of the world’. Finally before outlining his full plan he lays out the problem as he sees it for Marine Officers currently in the fleet.

How mortifying must it be for such characters [Marine officers] to see themselves considered as mere cyphers [sic]!” ‘It matters not how gallant a Captain of Marines may be in battle; his name is not known. He stands upon the poop to be shot at; but cannot receive that fame which his feelings tell him he would acquire, were he placed in a responsible situation, or could he look up to such a one.”

The writer’s plan was when a Midshipman had served his time; he should be permitted, if he had no interest in obtaining a commission as a Lieutenant in the Navy, to serve as a Lieutenant of Marines. As a Marine officer, the former midshipman could also actively ‘assist the Lieutenant of the watch as a seaman’. But by going into the Marines he was not to give up his career in the Navy; as he could ‘return to the Navy whenever, from his merit or interest, he is able to obtain a commission’. Again as the Naval Lieutenant could give up his command for one as a Captain of Marines and his ‘duty should be, when all hands are upon deck, to assist in the business of the ship’. This plan was in other words taking the Blue Colonel system to its fullest existence and adopting it for lower commissioned ranks as ‘the Marine uniform should be blue.’

This publication was quickly followed by a scathing response from a Marine officer writing in the Whitehall Evening Post. He first explains that ‘being absent from England at the time your pamphlet first made its appearance, I had not an opportunity of persuing [sic] it’. He stated that the author’s work struck him ‘in so very extraordinary a light, that I cannot consent to pass it over in silence’. His main complaint about the work is directed at the author’s ‘propose to reform the Marine Corps’. ‘You set out, Sir, the disunion and jealousies

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234 Officer, A short account of the naval actions of the last war; in order to prove that the French nation never gave such slender proofs of maritime greatness as during that period; with observations on the discipline, and Hints for the Improvement, of the British navy, [The second edition] (London, 1790), p. 134-136
235 Officer, A short account of the naval actions of the last war, p. 136
236 Officer, A short account of the naval actions of the last war, p. 137-138
237 Whitehall Evening Post (1770) (London), Tuesday, September 21, 1790
you say subsist between the Naval and Marine services, and express a wish to put the Officers of the latter corps upon a more respectable footing, and to render these gentlemen and the corps they have the honour to belong to respectable, and do away every appearance of jealousy and disunion.’ In his response to the pamphlet’s account of how the Marines should be reformed into one service ‘in short, the idea of incorporating the two services seems to me to be as great a piece of absurdity and Quixotism [sic], as to think of uniting the two possessions of a Judge and Dancing Master’. He wanted to ‘combat the very argument upon which you found your plan of reforming the Marine Corps’ and that the ‘jealousy between the Seamen and Marines is of no prejudice to the service’. Instead, this prejudice was a check upon the two services and created a ‘strict discipline’. He goes on ‘the Marines were scarcely ever known to join the Seamen in cases of mutiny; on the contrary, they have quelled many very dangerous ones’. There was also never an instance he knew of where ‘the jealousy you speak of hindered the two corps from uniting in time of action, and combining their utmost efforts to repel the enemy.’ A 1794 article in the Sun went further with a call for dissolution of the sinecure post for naval officers and the establishment of one more division located in Woolwich. ‘By this adoption; a grievance which the Marine Officers have long laboured under, will be done away, and the most useful Corps His Majesty has, will reap many advantages, as there are several old and very deserving Officers in that Corps, who have been many years waiting for preferments, and which could only be had either by augmentation or deaths.’ Interestingly enough there was a new division established in 1805 at Woolwich, however, there is no link between the article and this establishment. Woolwich being the home to another large Royal Dockyard probably had more to do with this. It is, however, an interesting statement demonstrating the Marines themselves were potentially pushing for these reforms, as the article does mention Colonel Bowater specifically by name to lead this new Division.

There were many problems from 1760-1770 with command and control issues between the Colonels and Lieutenant-Colonels of the Marine Divisions. One of the largest problems was that naval officers by their very nature were rarely in one place at any one time and even rarer if this place was the dockyards. Howe who was in the most contact with his Lt. Colonel was rarely in Chatham to observe his Division so its operations were still fulfilled by Marine Lt. Colonels in the end. This system worked while there was little need for quick decisions on the size and movement of marines in peacetime but they were the cause of great inefficiencies during mobilisation. There is no clearer example of this than shown

238 Whitehall Evening Post (1770) (London), Tuesday, September 21, 1790
239 Whitehall Evening Post (1770) (London), Tuesday, September 21, 1790
240 Sun (London), Tuesday, December 2, 1794
during the 1770-1 Falkland Island crisis. In its aftermath, the Admiralty realized that the Marines’ command structure needed to be updated in order to rapidly enlarge the service to keep pace with the naval mobilisation. The main problem and one even the Admiralty recognised about the Blue Colonel system was the Colonel’s ongoing absence from the Divisions. Therefore ‘it unavoidably happens that the care, inspection and command of the said head quarters is often left to officers of no higher rank than a Lieutenant Colonel’. 242

Thus serious command decisions were confused and not consistent, since in practice to get things done meant subverting the chain of command. To fix this problem and bring the command of Marine Divisions back under their umbrella the Admiralty created the Colonel-Commandant rank.

Before more explanation, a definition of what a Colonel-Commandant is should be established. According to Thomas Simes, a Captain in the Queen’s Royal Regiment of Foot, in his dictionary of military terms a ‘Colonel, or commandant of a corps, commands it in chief, is answerable for the cloathing [sic] and other appointments of it, that they are good and conformable to his Majesty’s royal intention…he is supposed to be well acquainted with the strength of the battalion, and master of all manoeuvres, &c.’ 243 The Marine Colonel-Commandant was to be colonel of his respective Division with sole command. They were to concurrently also be ‘appointed general officer of your Majesty’s forces’ as this would assure them a Flag rank equivalent and give them equality with most senior naval officers. The Colonel-Commandant was also told that he was to answer directly to the Marine Department and Admiralty with no one else in his chain of command. A second Lieutenant Colonel was appointed to each division along with the creation of a Captain-Lieutenant who was to give daily operational command to the Colonel-Commandant’s personal company within the Division. 244

This new structure was to be very popular among marines and First Lord Sandwich was seen as the personal catalyst for this reform. ‘Lord Sandwich has lately made himself very popular among the marine officers’ and had finally corrected the concerns of the Lieutenant-Colonels. These issues were seen as ‘left over from Lord Anson’ and ‘their Colonels being all appointed from the lists of Admirals, who enjoyed a sinecure in their offices and were utterly unacquainted with the service’. Lord Sandwich’s order had abolished the system of ‘partiality for the Admirals, and put the marine officers very properly on a footing with the rest of the King’s troops, by which means they have equally a chance of

242 Admiralty to Privy Council 4 April 1771, NA ADM 2/1165 p. 484; See Appendix 4
243 Under ‘Colonel or Commandant’, Simes, The military medley, containing the most necessary rules and directions for attaining a competent knowledge of the art...
244 Admiralty to Privy Council 4 April 1771, NA ADM 2/1165 p. 485-6; Admiralty to Hector Boisrond, Colonel-Commandant of Portsmouth, NA ADM 6/406, 15 April 1771
becoming Lieutenant-Generals. There were also calls by some to give even more preferment to some Marine officers. It needs to be noted that naval officers still kept the Colonel of Marines, and later General of Marines, titles and pay but they were clearly sinecure posts after this time. One author when talking about the service only having three field officer ranks for the entire Marine Corps, saw this as ‘a mark of extreme economy’ as these men earned their rank ‘generally considered as the reward of bravery’. However with there being only a narrow window of promotion, this led to ‘many worthy officers deservedly valued and distinguished, but forgot and deserted by that country which the force of their valor [sic] has defended’. So why not appoint the commanding officer of Marines, ‘Lieutenant Governor of the sea port garrisons…and old officers in the same corps, to the little forts, as a reward for past services? –At present they have none.’

2.6 Summary

With the onset of war with France in 1755 there was a renewed need once again for Marine forces. The unique feature about the Marine Corps of this period was that upon the coming of peace in 1763 they were continued in their establishment. In the past, ‘the navy department had to complain of in former wars: I mean the regular payment of the ships, which could not have been done without this marine redundanty [sic], and therefore we may reckon it a national benefit’. There is some validity to this as the cost of 4287 Marines; including their administrative and support cost for 1765 cost the government £84, 208-9-11 whereas during 1747 it had cost £80, 700 (£20, 175-7-6 per regiment) for the rough equivalent number of marines. Unfortunately these costs grew even more in wartime as the addition of 1400 more men, like in 1755, made a total cost of £95, 046. The Navy however was willing to accept this expense even if it meant potentially fewer ships could be constructed.

One of the most important reasons for keeping the Marine Corps in peace-time even with these costs was their potential to act as a manpower supplement for the Navy. With the Marine Corps in place during peace-time, if the fleet was called upon to rapidly mobilise then they could react faster then in the past. Also with the greatly expanded Empire after the Seven Years’ War there was even greater demand put upon the military services (especially the Marines) of Great Britain. The reoccurring narrative of this chapter is the ever-developing interconnectivity of the Marines and Navy on a fundamental structural basis. With this interconnectivity it would have been difficult to end the Marine Corps as it would

245 London Evening Post (London), Tuesday, May 7, 1771
246 Oracle and Public Advertiser (London), Monday, January 15, 1798
247 Diary or Woodfall’s Register (London), Friday, July 30, 1790
248 Gazetteer and London Daily Advertiser (London), Tuesday, June 14, 1763
249 1765 Estimates for the Sea Service, NA ADM 7/703 p. 3; Establishment of Marines, 29 March 1755, NA ADM 2/1152 p. 2; Establishment of Marine regiments, NA ADM 2/1151 p. 3
250 See Chapter VI
have to be rooted out of the Navy’s establishment on nearly every level. For the first time, the entire Marine establishment was placed under the direct command of the Admiralty; with Marine manpower voted through the Navy’s yearly ordinary estimates, similar to naval manpower. The Marine bureaucratic office personnel salaries are illustrative of this interconnectivity of the Marine Department and Pay Office within the Admiralty. The clerks were paid on par with their Admiralty administrative counterparts. However, the Paymaster of Marines was paid more than his closest counterpart in the Navy Pay Office, he was also entrusted with vast sums of money. It is not just an issue of money and salaries though but also one of permanency. With two offices directly located within the top two positions in the Admiralty itself, the Secretary of the Admiralty and the Deputy Secretary, this created a vested interest about the continuation of the Marines by these two top level bureaucrats. Familial ties in the administrative structure also helped this vested interest; for example the two John Clevlands, father and son, who both held various post within the Marine bureaucracy.

Another important function of this centralised bureaucratic office was its ability to work outside of the chain of command. With issues of pay or command authority the marine officers could utilise the link to the Board of the Admiralty and send correspondence through these auspices in order to have their request heard. Major Pitcairn is one of many officers who used not only personal ties with superiors but also this informal conduit to have his concerns addressed. This system would be very beneficial in other ways outside of administration like training, fear of mutiny or even grievances concerning punishment. The other major administrative structure to be created and solidified over this period was the divisional structure. This structure allowed marine tactical companies to be formed into various small or temporary large sized formations which could then carry out a variety of assignments. In the previous wars as the naval service got bigger and demanded larger numbers of marines the only way to meet this demand was the cumbersome method of forming more regiments, ten by 1747. With the new divisional structure it allowed the Marines greater flexibility concerning the services continually expansion and contraction over our period the Corps would fluctuate from a low point of 50 companies to well over 200 companies in war and peace without there being any need of forming new divisions. This formational flexibility allowed for quicker mobilisation of marines into the fleet. The new establishment needed to maintain only three divisions and even after 1771 when the upper-level officers were doubled (15 field officers) this total was still a more streamlined structure then the thirty field officers that ten regiments had required.

Another area of interconnectivity in the early formation of the Marine Corps was the two men who had the most influence on it eventual structure, Admiral Lord Anson and Colonel (later General) Paterson. Anson’s control is clearly recognisable as he was at the top
of the administrative structure of both the Navy and Marines. He had been on the Board of the Admiralty when the last Marine regiments were disbanded in 1749 and he was the First Lord at their re-establishment in 1755. It was largely due to his foresight that the foundations for their permanency were constructed so that upon the conclusion of the war they were able to easily be continued, unlike their disbandment in all previous wars. Under his administration all administrative measure were implemented which, as shown above, entrenched the Marine Corps into the British naval structure. Colonel Paterson is also an interesting character and potentially carries a greater amount of influence within the early Marine Corps structure. The recognition of Paterson’s influence was rewarded throughout his tenure with higher promotions and greater command authority. He was entrusted with inspecting marines, along with assigning and recommending officers to the various Marine Divisions. This gave him a large amount of personal patronage and power for an individual in any military force in the eighteenth century.

With the constructions of barracks, the Admiralty (and the government for that matter) demonstrated a certain level of continual commitment and investment in the Marine Corps after the end of the Seven Years’ War. These barracks were not only the first purpose built structures solely to house Marines; they were also representations of the perceived importance of marines to the Navy. The Navy recognised by 1763 the need for constructing purpose built barracks in close proximity to the Royal Dockyards. With this proximity the Marines could be used in guard duties of naval property but also were easily accessible for quick deployment on ship in any eventuality. That the barracks would take nearly twenty years to complete (Plymouth finally finished in 1783) is a visible recognition by the Admiralty of the investment it was willing to make to continue the permanency of the Marine Corps. The barracks could also act as a physical structure of isolation for marines. Unlike the sailors or soldiers in a dockyard town, marines were locked into their barracks at night and did all daytime drills also around them. Importantly this physical isolation also removed the Marines from the populace at large by concentrating them in this one localised location and out of the public houses.

Finally area, demonstrating this interdependence is also something Marine officers hated the most, the ‘Blue Colonels’ system. The importance of the Blue Colonels, was by giving the highest ranks to naval officers it further encouraged naval officers who wanted these sinecure posts to naturally protect the existence of the Marine Corps. If anything was to happen to the Corps’s continued establishment then these officers would have the right to demand restitution from the government for lost wages.251 Especially when the left over command disputes over these posts were solved in 1771 with the Colonel-Commandant

251 Chatham Order Book, NA ADM 183/121 26 April 1763
system, which made the Blue Colonel system official sinecure posts. The Colonel-Commandant system further secured the integrity of the Marine chain of command as this integrity would prove invaluable operationally and for their identity over the next thirty-one years. When in 1763 reductions of the fleet and army came to the fore of parliament there was no strong advocacy for the disbandment of the Marine Corps. Surprisingly there were no debates on the floor of the House of Commons about this situation. It was seen as a natural course of action to continue them on the naval estimates on a reduced establishment. The Marine Corps while continued throughout this period without any real structural change after 1771 was to mature and develop its operational doctrine and identity as areas of significance.
Chapter III: Marine Corps Manpower

To understand the identity of the Marine Corps and how it was constructed there needs to be some discussion of who, how and why men joined to serve in the British Marine Corps. Recruitment provides an important insight into the construction of Marine manpower. Manpower would shape the Corps’s identity but it would also impact on the ability of marines to fulfil their operational doctrine. This chapter looks at the manpower of the Marines over the forty-seven year period of 1755-1802. Throughout this period, marines were to be recruited from the same pool of potential recruits as the Army, Militia, Ordnance service (i.e. Artillery and Engineers) and Navy’s recruitment services drew upon. This meant that the potential pool of quality recruits was quite shallow and the Marines had to consequently incentivise their service. The subject of manpower can be separated into four main areas: the ‘recruiting service’: pay, social background, desertion and retention for both the enlisted men and officers of the Marine Corps. The Marine ‘recruiting service’ gives some insight into what type of recruit the Navy felt made the best marines. The recruiting service’s structure was to change over time as expectations and demands upon the Marine Corps also changed with time. Their basic recruitment structure had some similarities with those of the other military branches but differences were to also emerge. The passing of the various recruiting acts during wartime were to tie the land and marine forces’ recruiting services into closer working relationship with the civil authorities to gain recruits. The historiography is plagued with many assumptions about the type of recruit received from Justices of the Peace. Recruits sent from the Justices of the Peace were usually ‘undesirable’ elements from that society; people like the destitute or criminals. However there are real questions about the actual impact of these recruits on the overall Marine Corps manpower. Not to be diminished is the fact that throughout this period recruiting parties utilising a variety of methods (both honest and nefarious) were to meet most of the Admiralty’s manpower requirements.

Exploring the Marine Corps demographic data reveals the effectiveness of the ‘recruiting service’ at meeting some of its manpower goals. The statistics for this section are largely drawn from Chatham Division description books for a sampling of companies in service continuously from 1755-1802. The Chatham Division, like the other two divisions, recruited from all over Great Britain and Ireland. Each company would receive recruits based purely on their company manpower requirements. I have supported the Chatham information, where it can be done, with a sampling of the description books which survived from the

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252 Chatham Division Description Books, 4, 7, 13, 22, 25 & 31 Companies which were sampled because they were some of the few that were in existence throughout this period and never disbanded in peace-time. These books are also the only complete series of works in NA ADM 158/1-5, 1755-1803
Portsmouth and Plymouth Divisions. This comparison shows a near symmetry with the data for the Chatham sample. The statistics derived from this sample reveal many things about the country, county, age, height and location of recruitment for every newly enlisted marine. The books also mark down what each recruit’s previous trade was upon entering the Marine Corps and this among other data provided gives us some insights into the recruits’ social backgrounds. When this is compared with, say, an Army Line Regiment, it shows that the men were nearly all from labouring-class backgrounds. There were also some marines who had a dual-use profession in military service like gunsmiths, armourers and even tailors: professions which could be utilised by the Corps to enhance its daily activities. In contrast Marine Corps officers, unlike their Army and Naval counterparts, were recruited into the service via a different method. Marine second lieutenants did not purchase their commissions like their Army counterparts, nor did they have to take an examination like their Navy counterparts. The Marine Corps, because of its new and socially inferior status, was unable to commission a large proportion of officers from high gentry or aristocratic backgrounds, like the other two services. Instead marines relied heavily on middle-class and merchant families for new officer recruits. However, by the end of this period even this was beginning to change, for an increasing number of potential officers began to be drawn from families with service backgrounds in the Navy or Marines.

One incentive established to encourage men to enlist in the Marines, and not join the other services, was the financial reward. By the civilian employment standards of the day, Marine pay was not highly competitive. However, when other factors like prize money, clothing, victuals, etc. are considered their pay was very competitive compared to same level entry posts in the Army and Navy. When these are added into a marine’s pay his gross earnings they give him a close parity with the most skilled entry level posts in the Navy, an able seaman. Pay did not only indicate how valuable marines were to the Navy, it also provided an incentive for the loyalty and quality of manpower. The last area to consider is the desertion and retention of marines. Desertion was one of the greatest plagues upon military efficiency for any eighteenth century military force. By assessing what the rate of desertion for the Marine Corps was it can be judged if this affected their trustworthiness by the Admiralty. The second factor, retention, is linked with desertion. By looking at how long marines stayed within the service, and also if they changed services, an understanding about how marines identified themselves can begin to be uncovered. Finally, throughout this period marines were seen by some in the Parliament as a nursery for seamen, but an analysis of the available information will prove that the Admiralty had no interest in using its Marine Corps in this capacity.
3.1 Recruiting Service

With the formation of the Marine Corps on 3 April 1755 the Admiralty had to establish a method for recruiting marines in order to fulfil their establishments. Recruitment for the Marine Corps would be a vitally important issue as their voted strength in this period would fluctuate between a low of 3,620 (1785) and a high of 30,000 (1801). The Marine Corps consisted of between eleven percent (1793) and thirty percent (1755) of total voted manpower strength for the Navy throughout this period. Therefore, because marines existed on land as at sea, their recruitment was regulated by legislation voted on by Parliament; the various Recruiting Acts (1755-1757 and 1778-1779) and Regulations and Instructions relating to the Marine Forces when on shore were yearly voted on (similar to the land forces). These documents, more so the Recruiting Acts, dictated who and from where the Army and Marines could recruit. One of the most influential Recruiting Acts in this period was An Act for the more easy and better recruiting of His Majesty's Land Forces and Marines (1778), which gave very explicit instructions to the Justices of the Peace of the various ‘county, shire, stewardry, riding, liberty, or place, within the Kingdom of Great Britain’ to if necessary conscript the men into service. This Act also outlined who were the optimum recruits for the two services:

…all able-bodied idle and disorderly Persons, who cannot, upon Examination, prove themselves to exercise and industriously follow some lawful Trade or Employment, or to have some Substance sufficient for their Support and Maintenance, to serve His Majesty as Soldiers…[this term also implied Marines]

The Justices were to consider all smugglers and other petty criminals for possible recruits. The recruitment was to be held in ‘open court’ and before any decision was officiated on the responsible parties they were to ‘be allowed to employ counsel if they chuse [sic]’. The wordings of these Acts are part of the reason why contemporaries and the historians have perpetuated the concept of the optimum recruit being swept up from the streets or out of prisons. This pervasive influence upon the contemporary idea about these men in the British military service is summed up by ‘Lentia’ writing in The Gentleman’s Magazine. ‘Lentia’ argued that those of ‘least use at home, are the fittest to be employed in the service of their country abroad’. He defined these ‘least use[ful]’ at home as including idle wretches, criminals, gypsies, beggars and debtors who could be better used if sent to battle to ‘stop a

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253 Appendix Chart 1
254 HCP, A Bill To Repeal an Act, made in the last Session of Parliament, intituled, “An Act for the more easy and better recruiting of His Majesty's Land Forces and Marines;” and for substituting other and more effectual Provisions in the Place thereof (1779), p. 2
255 HCP, An Act for the more easy and better recruiting of His Majesty's Land Forces and Marines (1779), p. 7
256 J. Dewar, Observations on an Act for the more easy and better recruiting His Majesty's land forces and marines, commonly called the Comprehending Act. By a Justice of the Peace, a freeholder of Mid-Lothian, and a Commissioner of Supply (Edinburgh, 1778), p. 3
ball, and prevent the loss of better men’. 257 Another commentator took this even further and explicitly outlined whom marines should recruit and why.

…support of a continual formidable Navy [author’s emphasis], composed of ‘Volunteers of Free Men, and not of Slaves’…scheme for purging the nation of its nuisant [sic] Vermin…therefore, I am for having all Actors, Stage-Players, Pantomimicks, without exception, press’d for Marines; and the Patentees and Supporters of Playhouses and Masquerades, made Corporals and Serjeants over them: and that Gamesters and gentlemen Gamblers (if Gentlemen can be such) together with the Maintainers of Gaming-houses, be added to the Muster; for surely these Bloods and Smarts, these Dammees and Bullies will fight like Devils. 258

‘Bretonicus’ writing in the Morning Chronicle in 1782 felt that the use of criminals in the Marines would be a benefit to society. He saw the service acting as a type of reform institution while at the same time helping the state with its overall seamen manpower issues. ‘My reason for preferring their being sent as marines, is, the greater difficulty of deserting the service, and in a short time of service on board they will be in general nearly as useful as an ordinary seaman.’ 259 This perception was not only held by contemporaries though, as some historians have also made this very same claim. One historian accentuated this point by stating, ‘the policy of this country was to fill the ranks of the Army with the cheapest labour, and at the lowest cost to the State’. 260 The Army should be seen in this statement as interchangeable with the Marines. In 1757 a detachment of Foot Guards was sent to Savoy Prison to escort twenty to thirty prisoners who were newly ‘impressed for the Marine Service’, but this case is the exception and it is not indicative of the overall manpower of the Marines. 261 While some Army regiments potentially took a larger proportion of criminals than others, there was in fact no ‘wholesale transfer of the prison population into the army’. 262

There were those in public at the time who spoke out against using criminals in the military service, especially the Marines. William Morton Pitt when writing his Thoughts on the Defence of These Kingdoms discussed the corrosive effects on morale that this practice had on the services. ‘The practice of draughting [sic] from the gaols and hulks, to recruit regiments, should be for ever abolished; for how can it be expected, that a soldier or seaman...should consider himself as a member of an honourable profession, when convicts are placed

258 London Evening Post (London), Thursday, March 13, 1755
259 Morning Chronicle and London Advertiser (London), Friday, April 5, 1782
261 NA ADM 2/1154, 09 April 1757, p. 1
in the same situation with him, and he is obliged to associate with them.'  

This idea was akin to the perception that the Marine Corps had about this practice. Out of a sampling of four thousand eight hundred and sixty enlisted men taken from over our forty-seven year period only one recruit was drawn directly from the courts. This man was Private Richard Griffin of the 22nd Company, who was pressed from the assize courts on 14 September 1781 and would eventually desert the service. 

This data is similar to the findings of Clive Emsley who showed that in the 1793-1815 period there were only a ‘small number of convicted, petty offenders sent into the armed forces during the wars’. While Emsley was trying to figure out why crime statistics went down in war he still demonstrates the overhyped about a large criminal element in the services; there was never a significant element within the military recruitment structure. This is not to say that some companies may not have received more criminals then others, it is just an example of how few of these men made up the overall manpower totals.

Some of the issues discussed above are why historians and contemporaries have largely misunderstood the purpose and reason for the Recruiting Acts. The purpose of the Acts was only to help give the potential for a supplemental stream of manpower upon which to draw upon for the services as it was never to be their sole or even primary basis of recruits. Secretary of War Charles Jenkinson (later Earl of Liverpool) stated upon the repeal and augmentation of the Act on 21 January 1779; ‘the chief advantage arising from them [the articles in the Act], was the number of volunteers brought in, under the apprehension of being pressed, if they did not enter voluntarily’ and Jenkinson felt that ‘every possible encouragement should be held forth to volunteers’. In other words criminals and the unemployed were not to be the prime choice of the recruiting parties but instead just another potential stream of recruits. Many labouring-class men of this period were day labourers. Therefore, these labourers were not employed on a continual basis and may have looked to service in the Marines as an advantage because of its relatively constant pay and provisions. This Act among others from Parliament also gave advantages to apprentices and new craftsmen who were promised upon leaving military service that they would be made full members of their respective trades. Other Acts were to give recruits other incentives like land in the Americas to settle on after the end of the Seven Years War. Parliament and the military services felt that these Acts would provide the enticement needed to bring in

263 W. M. Pitt, *Thoughts on the defence of these kingdoms* (London, 1796), p. 32
264 Chatham Division Description Books, 4, 7, 13, 22, 25 & 31 Companies in NA ADM 158/1-5, 1755-1803: Chatham Division Description Books, 22 Company in NA ADM 158/3, 1772-1783
266 HCP, House Debates, Mr Jenkinson, 21 January 1779, p. 220
potential recruits and therefore rushed these newly passed acts to their district recruiting commanders.\textsuperscript{267}

Helping the recruiting services of the Army, Navy and Marines was not something new to the Justices of the Peace as they had been active participants in military recruitment since before the Glorious Revolution. This process was formalised and extended in 1757 with the various militia reforms since they were to be a part of the apparatus of militia recruiting after this date.\textsuperscript{268} The government gave direct importance to Marine recruitment by placing it specifically in the Act:

\textit{…if such Commissioners shall judge such Persons to be more proper for His Majesty’s Service by sea than by Land, then it shall be lawful for such Officer to cause such Man or Men to be delivered over to any Commission Officer of His Majesty’s Fleet, to be appointed for entering such Persons to serve as a common Soldier in the said Fleet…}\textsuperscript{269}

This hoped-for discretion by Justices of the Peace for picking quality men to be marines was to be made even at the detriment of the Army if necessary. This was largely due to the public perception of the Marine Corps ‘that most useful body of men’ being a constitutional force and therefore free of the ‘Standing Army’ controversy still raging in the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{270}

Justices of the Peace were required to inform the person that if they were ‘draughted as marines, in which case they cannot be discharged sooner [than five years or end of war]’ without the consent of the Admiralty thus, in the words of one writer, making it ‘no easy matter for a poor marine to obtain access’ to a profession.\textsuperscript{271} Ships, due to their nature, could be away from Britain for years after a war ended before they could return home to be paid off. Justices of the Peace’s help should not conversely be overstated for in the end recruitment was not their primary role in their respective communities and hence was only a side note. Understanding the potential of the Justices of the Peace for disposing of their socially ‘undesirable’ elements, the Admiralty gave overall authority to the recruiting officers to accept or decline these men. Recruiting officers were to ‘receive such Recruits as shall appear fit to serve his Majesty as Marines’. Fitness was determined by instructions to ‘examine such Recruits and see that they are free from ruptures, and every other distemper, or bodily weakness and infirmity which may render them unfit to perform the duty of soldiers’.\textsuperscript{272} However, just in case this local officer was influenced by the JPs, final acceptance of all recruits (regardless of how they were recruited or by whom) had to be

\textsuperscript{267} NA ADM 2/1171, 16 April 1779, p. 415-416
\textsuperscript{269} HCP, \textit{An Act for the more easy and better recruiting of His Majesty’s Land Forces and Marines} (1779), p. 12
\textsuperscript{270} Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser (London), Tuesday, March 5, 1765
\textsuperscript{271} Dewar, \textit{Observations on an Act for the more easy and better recruiting His Majesty's land forces and marines}, p. 10
\textsuperscript{272} NA ADM 2/1171, 18 July 1778, p. 39-40
confirmed by each Division’s Commanding Officer and Surgeon. This same level of double and triple checking of recruits’ potential ‘fitness’ or appropriateness was not always followed in the Army, barring the cavalry.273

The Navy’s policy of recruitment while similar in some methods with land-based recruitment was more centralised in other methods such as press tenders. These tenders would come from all over the United Kingdom and deliver their recruits to three different depots, Plymouth, Portsmouth and the Nore and then from there recruits were placed into the fleet as needed.274 Marine recruits were also delivered to their Divisions by tenders if they had been recruited in Northern Britain or Ireland but that was about the extent of their similarity with the Navy. The Navy’s coercive press gang tactics are suggested to have provided as many as fifty percent of naval manpower numbers during the height of wartime demands.275 Because of their very nature these coercive recruitment methods caused violent conflicts between Naval Press Gangs and the local populace.276 The Army adopted an impressment service in periods of great demand during wartime as well. The Army’s method used private hire men called crimps to impress these recruits. Crimps used a number of legal but largely nefarious methods in order to fulfil their recruit numbers. Unfortunately there are no comprehensive numbers or comparison about the effectiveness and numbers that these two methods of recruiting brought to these two services, but it was not fully satisfactory because both services continually raised their recruitment bounties throughout the wars of this period.277 There were rare occasions when pressed men were brought into the Marines by naval press gangs and the Horse Guards (from crimps or JP’s) but their numbers were never larger than one percent of Marine manpower.278 Sixty-five percent, of this one percent impressed, were enlisted into the Marines in 1762 alone after the partial demobilisations of 1761 and then the rapid start of the Spanish phase of the Seven Years’ War. The need for marines was especially pressing because of the amphibious nature of the conflict in the Caribbean. This is in direct contrast to historiographical contentions reflected by one naval historian who clearly stated, ‘a considerable number of whom [marines] were recruited in this way [impressment]’.279 Marines therefore were heavily dependant on volunteers to justify their manpower requirements. This made the Marine Corps a unique military organisation

277 Houlding, Fit for Service, p. 118-119
278 6 Recruited from Horse Guards and 36 Naval Press out of 4860 enlisted Marines in ‘Chatham Division Description Books, 4, 7, 13, 22, 25 & 31 Companies’, NA ADM 158/1-5, 1755-1803
within eighteenth century Britain and especially the Navy. The appeal of the Marine Corps to volunteers was openly commented about in one report from Chatham dated 4 July 1755. ‘Men are daily coming from Scotland (as well as other Places) to serve his Majesty as Marines; ’tis not doubted but they will again shew [sic] their Valour, and distinguish themselves like True Britons…this body of people will prove themselves to be of infinite service to the nation.’

The basic structure of the Marine Corps recruiting parties in Great Britain did not change from 1755-1802. Each of the three Divisions were to send out recruiting parties throughout all of Great Britain. Each of these recruiting parties were to consist of one officer (who could be any one from a Major to a 2nd Lieutenant usually on half-pay), a sergeant, a corporal, a drummer and at least one private marine. These numbers did fluctuate depending on the Colonel of the Division and availability of manpower to be used in the recruiting service but this is the basic establishment. These recruiting parties, similar to the other services, set up outside public meeting houses, banged their drums and called for all men to come forward to ‘take the King’s shilling’.

The growing fees and complaints about non/under-payment of publicans in the 1790s forced the government to act. In its newly passed ‘Act for the Relief of Publicans’ it established a new set fee publicans could charge to recruiting parties and conversely the amount of money the officer could ask for in reimbursement. This Act was the public recognition of an attempt to ease some of the tensions between the recruitment services and the public. The Act was not specific about where the Marines fit into all of this as it never specifically mentioned them by name. The Admiralty’s Judge Advocate even stated ‘the said Act does not appear to me to extend to His Majesty’s Marine Forces.’ This is an interesting legal dilemma for the Admiralty but importantly it indicates that by the 1790s the idea of the Marines as something completely separate from the other Land Forces was taking root even within the government.

England and Wales were divided into four districts by the 1790s and another district was added for Scotland. This corresponded with the Navy’s recruiting districts but was in direct contrast to the Army’s fifteen recruiting districts in England, four in Scotland and five in Ireland. The Marine district commanders were usually of a Lieutenant-Colonel’s rank and were required to inspect every recruit before they were sent on to the Divisions. During the Seven Years’ War, in a policy that would be followed in every later war, the Admiralty set up

280 London Evening Post (London), Thursday, July 3, 1755
281 Rules and Instructions to Captains of Marines employed Recruiting in NA ADM 2/1152, 12 April 1755, p. 14-15
282 NA ADM 1/3683, 12 September 1795
283 Glover, Peninsular Preparation, p. 219; Instructions for the Divisions of Marines, hereby appointed to raise Recruits, NA ADM 1/3246, 1804, p. 5; B. Lavery, Nelson’s Navy: The Ships, Men and Organisation, 1793-1815 (Annapolis, 1989), p. 146-147
another district of recruitment in Ireland. These recruits were then sent on board tenders for ‘bringing them to Plymouth as often as a sufficient number shall be collected’. These parties were also to draw money on local officials in Ireland who had prior dealings with the Admiralty, but all payments of impress moneys were to be made in ‘English Money’. This integration of the Marines into the prior naval recruitment structure is further proof of the growing integration of both these organisations structurally. These district commanders could also act as a centralised hub for equal distribution of recruits to the three Divisions, regardless of recruiting party, if a certain Division’s recruitment needs were more pressing than the others.

The expenses incurred by these Marine recruiting parties however reveal some of the differences between the Marine Corps and Navy. The officer of the recruiting party was to receive two guineas for every recruit from London and three pounds for every recruit from elsewhere upon the recruit’s acceptance by the Commanding Field Officer of each Division, in ‘lieu of all charges whatever’. Whereas the naval recruiting service officer was allotted ten shillings for every able and ordinary seaman raised and five shillings for every able-bodied landsman during the Seven Years War. Also every Marine officer was required to be involved in the recruiting service at least once in their career. Major General Andrew Burns was to serve in the recruiting service at five separate times in his fifty-three year career (he was not unusual in this). This was one method for Captains, who could not be promoted any higher in rank to maintain employment and potentially extra income. The Marine recruiting officer was further obligated to use some of the enlisted men’s ‘Inlisting Money’ to provide the recruit with the necessary ‘linnen [sic] and shoes’ which he was to be clothed in before reaching their respective Division.

Lieutenant William A Bell who was on the Marine recruiting service, from 12 October 1793 till 8 May 1794, was able to recruit seventy men for his Division. His total expenses, while on service were to be £489-18-3 roughly or £6-9 per recruit including their levy money and expenses. At roughly the same time another recruiting officer, Major Biggs, spent £804-3 on finding one hundred and four recruits for a cost of £7-7 per recruit. Some of the reason for this added expense in Major Biggs’s account was that he had to pay for the expenses of a surgeon for inspecting his recruits. Most field officers on the recruiting service were allowed this privileged additional expense for a

284 NA ADM 2/1155, 16 December 1756, p. 198; Instructions to Recruitment in Ireland in NA ADM 2/1168, 15 July 1775, p. 524-525
285 NA ADM 2/1155, 26 March 1759, p. 379
286 Rules and Instructions to Recruiting Service in NA ADM 2/1160, 1764, p. 136
288 A. Burn (et al), Memoirs of the life of the late Major-General Andrew Burns, of the Royal Marines (London, 1815)
289 Rules and Instructions to Captains of Marines employed Recruiting in NA ADM 2/1152, 12 April 1755, p. 16
surgeon because of their larger party sizes and to expedite the recruit’s acceptance. 290 The average cost of recruiting a Marine and his expenses in the eighteenth century was between five to eight pounds depending on the overall military demands upon the local population. This was roughly around the time when it cost over ten pounds for pressed seamen but under three pounds for volunteers. 291 The consistency of this total cost for recruits was exactly that estimated by the Admiralty in 1804. They calculated the party, officer’s and surgeon’s cost and approval at £8-8.292 To give some perspective, by 1807 it cost the government to raise 16,000 recruits which were to fill out the Army’s establishments ‘an extra £55 per recruit’. 293 Marine recruits were then cheaper to come by than some army and naval recruits but this was largely determined, as all of these services, upon the accessibility of recruits in wartime.

Sometimes Marine recruiting parties were so successful in generating new recruits for the service that they found more men then their parliamentary established numbers would allow. In 1778 the Colonel Commandant of Plymouth informed the Admiralty that he not only had enough recruits to fill his companies but was even contemplating sending away these extra recruits. The Admiralty quickly replied to this stating that the commandant should put these men on their muster lists as supernumeraries until the Admiralty could make the government increase the Marine establishment. 294 Interest in the Marines could also cause the Admiralty to act as it did in 1793 when it sent out two new recruiting parties from Chatham and Portsmouth to ‘Manchester and its surrounding neighbourhood’ because of the wealth of local interest about serving in the Marines. While Manchester in this period was a high area of recruitment for both the Army and Marines, the reason for this particular high interest in the Marines alone is unknown. 295 However, the Marines like all of the services also had moments of low recruitment in wartime as well. Take 1795 for instance; the Parliament voted for there to be 15,000 marines and the number borne on the books would seem to confirm that this number is reached however our data sample shows something different. 296 During that year the Chatham Marines were to see their lowest number of new recruits 37 for the six companies this is in direct comparison to 1794 (121) and 1796 (182). While there is no

290 Expenditure of Lt. William A. Bell, NA ADM 96/6, 15 October 1794; Expenditure of Major Samuel Biggs, NA ADM 96/6, 15 November 1794
291 According to Gradish this is the average for 1757 in Gradish, The Manning of the British Navy during the Seven Years’ War, p. 215
292 Instructions for the Divisions of Marines, hereby appointed to raise Recruits, NA ADM 1/3246, 1804, p. 2
293 Linch, ‘The Recruitment of the British Army 1807-1815’, p. 78
294 NA ADM 2/1171 21 July 1778, p. 22
296 See Appendix Chart 1 and 2
official reason for this fall in recruits it most likely has to do with the 1795 Quota Acts and the increased fervour for naval and army enlistment but it is short lived.

Recruitment booms were even in spite of the strict guidelines the Admiralty put on the Marine recruits. The mandate on recruits was:

No Man is to be Inlisted under the Size of Five Feet Five Inches without Shoes nor above Five Feet Eight Inches: and none to be under the Age of Eighteen, nor above Thirty Five Years unless such as shall have been formerly in the Service, and are still fit for it; but in that Case they are not to be inlisted without producing Discharges from their former Corps, or good Recommendations from some Officer under whom they have served. And particular Care is to be taken, not to inlist any Man but such as shall have broad Shoulders shall be strong Limb’d and free from Rupture and from any other bodily defect. Like Care is also to be taken, not to inlist any Roman Catholic.

Marine fitness standards were fairly similar to the Army’s; except for the maximum height and after the 1778 Catholic Relief Act the Army accepted Catholics, whereas the Marines were still officially prevented from taking them well into 1804. But not all was perfect and these strict guidelines also retarded Marine recruitment as in the start of the Seven Years War and French Revolutionary War when they were at first to lag far behind their voted numbers. It normally took the Corps two years before they reached a figure of eighty-percent or more mustered compared to their voted numbers. Another reason for this lag in numbers was the Admiralty’s intense concentration on naval manpower numbers. However, these provisions continued unabated throughout this period even when there was increased demand for marines.

The only official area which the Admiralty would make any exemption in was the men’s height. The Admiralty at especially needy times of manning would lower the minimum allowable height of entry to five feet four inches. Marines enlisted under five feet five inches made up thirty-three percent of total recruits, but of these twenty percent were five-four while the other thirteen percent were five-three and under. The vast majority of this five-three and under percentage were to consist of drummers, who entered as young boys of between eight to thirteen years old but were not resized over their service career unless they were transferred or promoted to a different rank. A revealing analysis of this undersized thirty-three percent is to take their enlistment date in conjunction with their size. The data is very revealing about the Admiralty’s desperate need for recruits during large scale mobilisations. The four years with the largest percentages of undersized recruits were 1771,

297 Rules and Instructions to Captains of Marines employed Recruiting in NA ADM 2/1152, 12 April 1755, p. 16
298 Size of Recruits, NA ADM 2/1156, 30 June 1759, p. 3; Linch, ‘The Recruitment of the British Army 1807-1815’, p. 121
300 Chatham Division Description Books, 4, 7, 13, 22, 25 & 31 Companies in NA ADM 158/1-5, 1755-1803
What is telling about this data is that in two of these four years (1771 & 1790) Britain was not engaged in open conflict but purely in political muscle flexing with naval mobilisations. Therefore, during these two years the Marines were receiving increased pressure from the Navy to rapidly increase their numbers in the shortest amount of time possible. Whereas during open conflicts line regiments could be used in the initial stages of conflict until the Marines built up adequate strength. During purely fleet mobilisations they were needed right away and without delay to build up the fleet’s capacity. The other two years can be explained by the strenuously increasing operational involvement of the Marines and hence the Navy was forced to make exemptions to complete the desperately needed manpower numbers. Upon the conclusion of hostilities after each conflict some of the first recruits to be disbanded were the undersized ones in the hope of maintaining the exacting standards of the Corps in peacetime.

One area where no official Admiralty exception was made, was in the enlistment of Catholics even after the Catholic Relief Act (1778). Even well into 1804 the ‘Instructions for the Divisions of Marines, hereby appointed to raise Recruits’ still explicitly called for no Roman Catholics to be enlisted. This policy many times was strictly adhered to as in the court martial of Privates Thomas McArdel and Patrick Lonone on 8 July 1758. These two men were Irish recruits, who were charged with ‘fraud by enlisting with Lt. Savage as Protestants and declaring themselves Papists afterwards’ when they reached the Chatham Division. Thomas McArdel upon enlistment declaring himself a Protestant was asked to question Patrick Lonone who ‘could not speak English’. They made the same declaration to the Justice of the Peace and his clerk. It was not until their third inspection at the Divisional head quarters in Chatham, before the Commanding Officer, that the truth began to come out. Patrick Lonone was asked by Sergeant Maghlin ‘who speaks Irish’ if he was a Catholic, upon which Lonone declared himself a Papist and he was forthwith dismissed by the Divisional Commanding officer. Upon hearing Lonone’s answer McArdel quickly ‘declared himself a Roman Catholick [sic]’. McArdel further claimed that the reason he joined was because one Sergeant Cameron drew his sword and forced Lonone and himself to enlist. Sergeant

301 Appendix Chart 4 & 5; Kenneth Wachter’s graphical estimations taken from a sampling of 327 Chatham Marines for 1750 to 1759, his small set shows a very similar data set for men from 5’4” to 5’6” with mine. However there are some problems with his data for one he says his sample comes from 1750-1759 yet there was no division in Chatham till 1755. Also it is perplexing why he compares these men over 21 years old who he then matches with 247 14 year old boys in the Marines Society from 1825-1835. K. W. Wachter, ‘Graphical Estimation of Military Heights’, Historical Methods, Vol. 14[1] (1981), pp. 31-42
302 Total Army establishment was 45,000 men but most of these were dedicated to foreign or Irish duty in Fortescue, A history of the British Army, Vol. III, p. 10-11
303 Instructions for the Divisions of Marines, hereby appointed to raise Recruits, NA ADM 1/3246, 1804, p. 3
304 Court-Martial of Privates McArdel and Lonone, NA ADM 1/5489 8 July 1758, p. 1
305 Court-Martial of Privates McArdel and Lonone, NA ADM 1/5489 8 July 1758, p. 1
Cameron was called before the court and admitted he drew his sword but only because McArdel ‘was very abusive to him Damning him and his Corps’. The court eventually found Privates McArdel and Lonone guilty of openly defrauding the Marine service. Private McArdel was sentenced to receive two hundred lashes for his deception and drummed out of the service but interestingly enough Patrick Lonone, who ‘could not speak English’, was simply drummed out.\footnote{Court-Martial of Privates McArdel and Lonone, NA ADM 1/5489 8 July 1758, p. 2} What is interesting is the light punishment by eighteenth century standards as in civil court fraud was punishable only by death. Thus these Catholics while in violation of their oaths were given a lighter sentence than death.\footnote{F. McLynn, Crime and Punishment in Eighteenth Century England (London, 1989), p. 14} This court martial also reemphasised the importance of the multiple inspection process of the Marine Corps. But most importantly it demonstrates a pseudo-‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy in regards to Irish Catholics. For some recruitment parties might look the other way when it came to questions of religion in order to complete their overall numbers. There are a number of cases where Catholics were clearly accepted into the Marines throughout this period.\footnote{S. Conway, ‘Scots, Britons and Europeans: Scottish Military Service, c. 1739-1783’, Historical Research, Vol. 82[215], (2009), p. 119} Officially the Admiralty’s policy was clear for the Marine Corps; Catholics were never allowed to openly serve throughout this period.\footnote{The only time the Catholic aspect of Marines comes out is in Court Martials like that of three of the Mutineers at Plymouth in 1797 who asked for a Catholic Priest before their execution on the Hoe. The Star (London) Saturday, July 8, 1797} With the ever growing pressure on the Marine Corps to bring in quality recruits there were bound to be some unscrupulous practices, like recruiting apprentices which was considered illegal. The recruiting officers were forced to ask any young man to show his apprentice’s credentials before being allowed to enlist. They were not always particularly diligent as there were thirty-three marines discharged in the sample because they were apprentices or about half a percent of overall manpower. Another potential reason apprentices were not too large a problem is their age, for of all the recruits, those 17 years old and under only made up sixteen percent of total Divisional manpower numbers. What is even more compelling is more in-depth analysis of this sixteen percent, nearly fifty-three percent of which were 17 years old and if 16 year olds are added to this it increases to eighty-three percent of the underage manpower total. On the other side of the spectrum those thirty and over in age made up around eleven percent of total manpower. This meant that in our forty-seven year period nearly sixty-five percent of recruits were in the prime recruitment age of 18-26 years old.\footnote{Appendix Chart 5} One type of recruit that was actively sought after by the recruiting services of all the military branches were men with past military experience. The Marine recruiting services
were no different in this matter. About eleven to twelve percent of all newly recruited marines had a prior service background of some type. Of these prior service background men the majority, forty-three percent, came from the militia, thirty-four percent came from the Army emphasising that prior land service was important to the Marines. But sea service could also be invaluable as ten percent had a prior Marine Corps background while four percent came from the Navy itself. The remaining nine percent coming from foreign service, East India service, fencibles, artillery and the volunteers.\footnote{Chatham Division Description Books, 4, 7, 13, 22, 25 & 31 Companies in NA ADM 158/1-5, 1755-1803} Unfortunately because these men were so desirable this was to lead to another unscrupulous practice, that of actively poaching members of the Army, Militia or Navy. In our sample there were forty-seven marines (one and half percent) were discharged because they had not yet properly left their former service.\footnote{Chatham Division Description Books, 4, 7, 13, 22, 25 & 31 Companies in NA ADM 158/1-5, 1755-1803} These cases illustrate that like the other services the Marine recruiting parties, in the hope of increasing their numbers, would be less than diligent in fully questioning their potential recruits. This is not to say that all of these illegal acts were done for nefarious purposes, for it is very likely that many of these men were runaways (in the case of apprentices) or deserters trying to get out of the area or felt ill-treated by the prior service.

3.2 Demography and Social Background

When a recruit was enlisted into the Marines by the recruiting parties, they were grouped together with others from the party’s area. These men were then inspected by a Justice of the Peace and a surgeon before being allowed to take their oath, whereupon they were then sent to their corresponding Division to be examined again. Upon arriving at the Division the Commanding Officer and Divisional Surgeon inspected them to confirm their acceptance in the Corps. They were then entered into the description books and the recruiting party would receive its due pay for each recruit. The description books are a wealth of information: about every individual marine’s company, full name, age, size, date attested, hair, eyes and complexion, trade, where born, place of enlistment and by whom, former service, and even their eventual discharge reason. This data creates a wealth of information, not only about the Marines, but also as a social database of people with lower class backgrounds in Britain and Ireland in the period of 1755 to 1802. Just to give some examples of the level of descriptive social data available; James Aspinalls and Thomas Pendergrass, aged 28 of Lancaster and 19 years old of Dublin respectively, both labourers by trade were enlisted in the 71st Company where both were noted in the description book as
‘marked with smallpox’. Alexander McIntire of the same company, aged 35 of Inverness and a labourer, was described as having black hair and only one eye.\(^{313}\)

One of the first statistics to emerge from the Chatham sample is that Marine Corps personnel consisted of 97 to 98 percent men born within the British Isles.\(^{314}\) This confirms that the Marines manpower structure, like the British Napoleonic-era Army, was a very homogenous one.\(^{315}\) Many of the foreigners in the Marines were German and a few of these men even had past military experience serving within the French army. During the Siege of Louisburg in 1758 a sergeant and five soldiers, who were Germans, deserted to HMS Orford (70), and ‘they were very good men and desire to be Marines’. Naval Captain Spray commented that he told the sergeant he would ‘recommend him to their Lordships to be continued in the same station he was when in the French Army’. The interesting thing to note is that while these Germans were interested in becoming Marines they were ‘very averse to be seamen’.\(^{316}\) Among home recruits by far the largest number of marines came from England which is surprising since England, the most populous of all the four countries in the British Isles, was overly well represented. The 1801 census found that the breakdown of population in the United Kingdom: England 52.2%, Ireland 34%, Scotland 10.1% and Wales 3.8%.\(^{317}\)

Exact proportions overall may be distorted in the records of the Chatham Division due to its distance from Ireland and proximity to shipping routes with Scotland so it potentially saw a different manpower demographic than the other two Divisions. Nearly eighty-three percent of all recruits in the Chatham Division during the forty-seven year period were born in England. This was followed by the second largest nine percent Irish, four percent Scottish, two percent Welsh for the other three British kingdoms and two percent from foreign countries. The non-commissioned officers’ countries of birth were as follows: seventy-nine percent were English, nine percent Irish, six percent Scottish and two and half percent each for Welsh and foreign countries. This highlights that there was no undue favouritism to Englishmen over all other marines for non commissioned officer promotions.

The data can be focused in other sociological ways besides that of in what countries they were born. The majority of marines who enlisted in the Chatham Division were not born in the county from which they were enlisted. In fact nearly forty-eight percent of all recruits were recruited in only four counties; Kent (26%), Middlesex (11%), Norfolk (6%), and Essex (5%). If London (5%) is added to this prior number then it means over half of all recruits in Chatham Division came from just these five areas. This data is revealing, in that like the

\(^{313}\) Chatham Division Description Books, 71st Company in NA ADM 158/1 1755-1763
\(^{314}\) Chatham Division Description Books, 4, 7, 13, 22, 25 & 31 Companies in NA ADM 158/1-5, 1755-1803
\(^{315}\) Linch, ‘The Recruitment of the British Army 1807-1815’, p. 178
\(^{316}\) Captain Spray to Admiralty, NA ADM 1/2473 14 January 1759
\(^{317}\) Cookson, The British Armed Nation, 1793-1815, p. 96-100, 126-127

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other services the Marine recruiting service was most affective closer to its base of operations. However the forty-seven percent of all recruits coming from the various other counties of Great Britain and Ireland should not be minimised. When men who were recruited in Ireland (5%), Scotland (2%), Wales and Foreign Countries (less than 1%) are removed then we are left with forty percent of recruits coming from the other thirty-five counties of England. From these other English recruits nearly fifty-five percent of them came from southern English counties, forty percent from the Midlands, and five percent from the northern counties.\footnote{Chatham Division Description Books, 4, 7, 13, 22, 25 & 31 Companies in NA ADM 158/1-5, 1755-1803; The Irish 5% recruitment was the same for the Army only in the Seven Years War in S. Conway, \textit{War, State, And Society in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Britain and Ireland} (Oxford, 2006), p. 209} This is not too surprising as the British population was considered to be highly mobile in the eighteenth century. That said the shortage of recruits from the northern counties is still very surprising. Depending on the area, mobility was thought to have been as high as one-third to a half of all lower class people.\footnote{I. Whyte, \textit{Migration and Society in Britain, 1550-1830} (London, 2000), p. 59} At first glance the data appears to reaffirm the idea in the historiographical argument that the Marines took their recruits largely from the vagrant population. The debate over the purpose of the Poor Laws was considered by some to have been a device put into place in order to restrict the ever larger flows of migration and vagrancy upon a local community.\footnote{A. Hinde, \textit{England’s Population: A History Since the Domesday Survey to 1939} (London, 2003), p. 159} However, it has also been seen that with the introduction of the Poor Laws there was a subsequently greater increase in the growth of seasonal labour migration. As shown below, the recruits’ trade backgrounds would reinforce the idea that a significant proportion was tied into this seasonal labour migration market.

Based on the limited data that has survived from the other two Divisions there is no strong evidence to suggest that these numbers were not drastically different to those other Divisions. Plymouth would see a larger increase of Welsh and Irish recruits, due to its proximity to these areas, with potentially as much as four percent Welsh and nearly twenty percent Irish for its total manpower numbers. Whereas Scottish recruits made up only a little less than one percent for total manpower numbers for the Plymouth Division. The Portsmouth Division fairly bisected the variations of the other two Divisions’ numbers.\footnote{The Plymouth and Portsmouth Divisions description books are broken up and some missing so not giving a continuous stream of data like the Chatham division. Various Plymouth Description Books, NA ADM 158/250 Letter N 1772-1836; NA ADM 158/256 Letter P 1755-1796; NA ADM 158/243 Letter L 1776-1836; NA ADM 158/231 Letter H 1776-1838; Various Portsmouth Description Books, NA ADM 158/158 Letter N 1780-1815; NA ADM 158/168 Letter P 1780-1815; NA ADM 158/147 Letter L 1778-1814; NA ADM 158/131 Letter H 1776-1815} There is more evidence to support this conclusion about the overall Marine manpower numbers. First all the three Divisions sent the same number of recruitment parties to Ireland and Scotland. Secondly Ireland (Scotland in 1790s) was run as a military recruiting district with one field officer in command who could selectively distribute recruits if one Division’s need was greater then the
other two for new recruits. Therefore the rough numbers for the overall Marine Corps manpower nationality demographic was probably eighty percent English, fourteen percent Irish, two and half percent Scottish and Welsh respectively, and finally one percent coming from either foreign countries or the colonies. These are especially striking when the total population numbers were compared to these totals with the English proportionally being over represented by nearly twenty-eight percent, the Irish seeing an under-represented total of twenty percent, Scottish under-representation being a little over seven and a half percent and the Welsh closest to parity with an under-representation of a little over one percent of it population. Irish recruitment was low because of the continued Marine discrimination against recruiting Catholics and the Scottish numbers may have been because they were susceptible to ‘clannish’ loyalties leading them to join Scottish Army Regiments where they could serve with kin.

These proportions are further confirmed by the nationality numbers in the fleet as well where all the Marine Divisions were represented. HMS Caledonia (120), under the command of Admiral Pellew, which had marines on board from the various Marine Divisions had a national composition of eighty-two percent English, ten percent Irish, seven percent foreigner and one percent Scottish, just to name one example. The important number here is the eighty-two percent English which is similar to all the divisional national demography figures. To further this point about the ethnic background of the Marine Corps is to look the fleet at Trafalgar. There were nearly 3000 marines in the fleet at the time of the battle; the highest were English (78%), then Irish (12%), Welsh (4%), Scottish (3%) and (the remaining were foreign at 3%). Whereas in the fleet at Trafalgar of the nearly 16,000 seamen the largest were then English (58%) and then the Irish (28%) with Welsh, Scottish and foreigners making up the rest. Therefore marines were greatly over represented by Englishmen within their ranks (see Table 3.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>1801 Census</th>
<th>RN at Trafalgar</th>
<th>RM at Trafalgar</th>
<th>Marine Corps Sample</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>52.2</td>
<td>58.02</td>
<td>78.19</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
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<td>Ireland</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>28.4</td>
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<td>2.64</td>
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<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Sources taken from J. Cookson, The British Armed Nation, 1793-1815, p. 96-100, 126-127; Ayshford, Ayshford Complete Trafalgar Roll, CD-ROM; Chatham Division Description Books, 4, 7, 13, 22, 25 & 31 Companies in NA ADM 158/1-5, 1755-1803


325 Ayshford, Ayshford Complete Trafalgar Roll, CD-ROM
As shown above, marines national manpower numbers were to be different from the Army and Navy of this period. The Army had only sixty percent of its total manpower coming from England, with some regiments receiving even less than fifty percent. The Navy saw about sixty-three percent of its manpower numbers, and on some ships as low as fifty percent, coming from England. The reason for such a visible discrepancy between the Navy and Marines was the intense desire of the Navy to find a specialist recruit, i.e. an able seaman. So it could be seen that the percentages in the Navy were more indicative of the overall seafaring population of the British Empire rather than matched to its population. The Army’s reasons were potentially more geographical as they needed larger numbers of men then the Marines and many of the army’s regiments continually being stationed in Ireland in peacetime they could draw upon this source. According to Cookson in 1792 a third of the regiments totalling under a quarter of the Army were stationed in Ireland. The Navy on the other hand would consist of a close symmetry in the percentages of its manpower to the overall ethnic population of the British Isles (except Ireland) during this period. Whereas in the Army in this same period things were to be different with their numbers in near parity to the overall ethnic population except for Scotland which contributed a much larger percentage of its male population in this period.

Comparing the country of birth and the year of recruitment for the Marine recruits can provide some ideas about when and how nationality in recruitment played a role. The percentage of recruits to come from outside England increased at the end of wars but there was a marked expansion in non-English recruits during the 1790s. With the largest military mobilisation to date the Marines were in constant competition between all of the various armed forces for recruits. One of the telling statistics is the relative overall ineffectiveness of the Irish recruiting parties in the mid-eighteenth century. Fifty-five percent of Irish recruits came from the thirty-eight year period of 1755-1793, but the eight year period from the 1794-1802 was to see the other forty-five percent of all Irish recruits. This was the overall trend in all of the Marine Divisions during the French Revolutionary Wars. This should not be seen as a unique to the Marines of this period as Irish recruitment increases in this period was a similar trend in the other military services as well.

327 Cookson, *The British Armed Nation, 1793-1815*, p. 153
328 Cookson, *The British Armed Nation, 1793-1815*, note 3 p. 126-127
329 Appendix Chart 5
One of the last major demographic pieces of data to analyse is the labour/social background of the recruits sampled. The largest proportion of marines who gave their background profession, near forty-three percent, classified themselves in the description books as labourers. Labourers of this period would consist of both agricultural and urban, but the largest proportion of marines probably came from the former. This is affirmed by the largest proportion of labourers coming from Suffolk and Norfolk which were renowned for their agricultural productivity throughout the eighteenth century. 431 Forty-three percent labourers compares favourably with the fifty-two percent who classified themselves as labourers in the 96th Regiment of Foot during the American Revolution. There were also many examples of Army regiments having around thirty to fifty-five percent of their manpower being classified as labourers. 432 The second largest labouring-class area from which Marine recruits were drawn was the various weaving industry trades (hand-loom, frame-work knitter, etc.) which made up thirteen percent of the total manpower numbers. 433 The weaving industry during the various wars and economic downturns throughout this period would have fluctuation in long-term employment and even periodic rashes of unemployment. The largest amount of weavers came from Norfolk, Warwickshire and Lancashire counties which experienced great fluctuations throughout this period. With the volatility in the cloth industry it would have had knock on effects upon the other cloth related industries, such as tailors, wool-combers, button-makers and etc. who made up another six percent of the total establishment. Marines also recruited from many other trades such as the various types of smiths, peruke-makers, bakers, bookbinders, and masons just to name a few. There were even some fairly unusual trades: Henry Howson of Middlesex, upon enlistment in the 22nd Company of Marines in 1764, stated his trade background as a ‘Gentleman’. 434 There were also many recruits from trades that denoted a certain level of higher education like apothecaries, surgeons, attorneys, and a variety of clerks. There were also those trades that would be useful to any military profession like armourers, gunsmiths and gun-locksmiths who could repair the equipment if need be, and even some recruits who labelled their profession as soldiers.

There were some policies, whether official or unofficial, that made it clear the Marines looked upon some men with certain trade backgrounds as advantageous to the Division as a whole. They particularly looked for musicians, tailors, carpenters, barbers and schoolmasters. These men would be given special extra pay to provide those duties while at

333 Chatham Division Description Books, 4, 7, 13, 22, 25 & 31 Companies in NA ADM 158/1-5, 1755-1803
334 Chatham Description Book, NA ADM 158/2, 22nd Company
sea or in the barracks. For example, one private was employed as a Carpenter in order to mend the bedsteads along with any other necessary work for the barracks. Tailors, who made up three percent of total manpower, were also very important. These men could earn extra money by converting the Marines’ old coats into waistcoats or mend marines’ uniforms. The Admiralty gave every Marine one shilling in subsistence extra a year to pay for this specific purpose. When in 1798 the Mediterranean Fleet, then under Admiral St Vincent’s command, received their yearly uniform issue for the Marines of the fleet, each ship was ordered to send its commanding Marine officer, ‘an intelligent sergeant and their master tailor’ to inspect and be prepared for the change. This shows that finding specifically trained men like tailors could be of prime importance to the maintenance of the basic element of Marine identity at sea, their uniform.

Marine officers were never recruited like their men and therefore entered the service by another method, commissioning. When the first two-hundred and ten marine officers were commissioned in April 1755 they were made up largely of Army officers off the half-pay list. Almost all of these officers had served in one of the ten Marine Regiments during the War of Austrian Succession. These were officers like James Paterson, who was eventually to become the first Lieutenant-General of Marines and John Mackenzie, of Belle Isle fame and one of the first Colonel-Commandants of Marines, among others. These men all had years of experience in the Marine Regiments commanded by the Army, and from 1747 the Admiralty, and of these a large portion held a variety of combat experiences. The major difference between these officers in the new Marine Corps as opposed to those in the Marine Regiments, was that this time their commissions were not purchased. The purchase of commissions was ended when the Marines were reconstituted in 1755 and placed under Admiralty control. One of reason for this was the Admiralty’s fear about external influence through patronage on the Navy’s new branch of service. The Admiralty felt that only men of inexperience who were politically and financially connected would advance in such a system. This was a fear that both George I and George II shared with the Navy, and both monarchs continually put restrictions on the Army’s purchase system throughout the first half of the eighteenth-century. The fear of undue external influence on the Marine officers’ hierarchy was clearly demonstrated in 1755 when the new establishment was created. Jack Fletcher writing to the

335 NA ADM 1/3290, 02 September 1787, p. 2
336 Rules and Regulations from Marines on Shore NA ADM 96/3 1759, p.10; NA ADM 2/1152, 30 June 1755, p. 113
337 St Vincent’s Orders for the Mediterranean Fleet, 18 August 1798, NRS Vol. 138, Shipboard Life and Organisation, 1731-1815, B. Lavery (ed.), p. 221
338 List of new officers to be appointed, NA ADM 1/5116/1, 2 April 1755, p. 30-36
Duke of Newcastle in 1755 asked for a Major’s commission in the new Marine Corps and stated that he had clear experience for he had ‘served in the last war’. But the request was rejected by the Admiralty and Admiral Lord Anson, while other officers with more experience and closer ties to Naval patronage were given the first field officer posts. All of these field officers were men of the same rank from the old Marine Regiments of the previous war, and their names were presented to the King on the day he was to officially re-establish the Marines on 3 April 1755. However, as these two hundred and ten officers began to die, be promoted, go on half-pay or get discharged from the service for other reasons, there needed to be a new method of finding potential Marine officers.

The new recruits were to be drawn from a different social background than their predecessors. This was largely due to Marines not being considered a prime place in the military pantheon for aristocratic or upper-gentry sons. These upper-class boys who were interested in military service would instead join the Navy or Army because of their superior social and political status. The other two services also had the further incentive of quicker and more readily available chances for advancement, especially to flag rank. Marine Captain John Maitland, who lost one of his arms by cannon shot in the battle off Lagos in 1759, was one of the few to come from an aristocratic background as his brother was the Earl of Lauderdale. Another was Sir John Dalston, Baronet and Captain of Marines of HMS *Conqueror* (74) who died in 1778 at the Battle of Ushant. One historian noted that ‘of the 523 marine officers recorded as serving in 1759, a mere seven bore titles’. This ratio was not to change much throughout the forty-seven years till the making of the Royal Marines in 1802.

Like the other services, the Marines still needed a relatively educated pool from which to draw upon for potential officers. The main area from which they could draw their recruits from was the sons of the lower-gentry and merchant classes. Henry Norton Gamble, the son of a Leicester alderman and grocer, who received his commission in the Marines during the War of American Independence is just one example. Another officer of a similar background who received his commission was Andrew Burn (eventually made Major-General of Marines), this time in the Seven Years War. Burn’s grandfather was a ‘pious clergyman of the church of Scotland’ and his father, who drew ‘his fortune at sea’ was a merchant with various shipping concerns. Burn had a somewhat different background from

340 Jack Fletcher to Newcastle, BL Add. MSS 32861, f. 518
341 List of new officers to be appointed, NA ADM 1/5116/1, 2 April 1755, p. 29, 34
343 Conway, *The British Isles and the War of American Independence*, p. 36
other marine officers, for he had various careers at sea including being a purser—the clerk on a ship—on a ‘Man of War’. Finally in May 1761 he received his commission in the Marines. One officer that highlighted this educated social middle class was Watkin Tench, who would eventually become an author of various religious, political and travel books. Tench was commissioned in 1776 as a second lieutenant, his father ran a ‘dance academy’, and he was well versed in Latin, French and English literature showing at least a grammar school level of education.

The heavy reliance on officers with non-nobility backgrounds was recognized by various contemporaries throughout this period. George Farquhar, in his play The Recruiting Officer, wrote a dialogue in which two recruiting officers are boasting of their successes in finding men:

*Plume:* Well, what Success?
*Kite:* I sent away a *Shoemaker* and a *Taylor* already; one to be a Captain of Marines and the other a Major of Dragoons... [347]

The Dragoons, while more prestigious than the foot, were considered in the early eighteenth century to be of a lower social standing than their sister cavalry regiments because they were intended to fight dismounted as well as mounted. [348] While Farquhar wrote this play nearly fifty years before our period, it does have resonance with the contemporary opinions of this period as it was continually reproduced up to the 1790s. While this play was a satire about the entire military recruiting system, it does show that the impression about Marine officers at this time was of lower stock than that of the other military services. Another literary example this time from Jane Austen’s book *Mansfield Park* puts Marines in this same social status. ‘But Miss Frances married, in the common phrase, to disoblige her family, and by fixing on a lieutenant of marines, without education, fortune, or connexions, did it very thoroughly.’ [349]

Mr. Price, Fanny’s father, because of his low status was unable to get his son William any influence in gaining a Lieutenant’s rank and it was not until Henry Crawford used the influence of his uncle Admiral Crawford that William was able to secure his commission.

Another potential way Marine officers were brought into the service was through the practice of Army and Marine officers trading their respective commissions for one of equal stature in the opposite service. Marine officer Lt. Charles Shearer is just one example of such a trade. Shearer gave up his commission in the Marines so that he could join one of the Army units, then forming under Lord Loudoun’s command, which was ordered to Portugal

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345 O. Gregory et al. (eds), *Memoirs of the Life of the Late Major-General Andrew Burn, of the Royal Marines* Vol. I (London, 1815), p. XIV, 15
during 1762-1763. Lt. Shearer’s military career is fascinating, for he served various military units in actions all over the world; initially he served with General Whitmore’s Regiment, then transferring his commission to the Marines he served in the Senegal and Guadeloupe operations. Unfortunately as there was no purchase system in the Marines; Army officers, unless given special permission by the Admiralty, had to take their new commissions at the bottom of the seniority list.

None of the above should minimize the importance of the most valuable element of officer recruitment in all eighteenth century military and civil promotions—that of patronage. While the Admiralty actively tried to minimize most forms of external influence, this did not conversely mean that they did not exert their own internal influence on who was commissioned. The members of the Board of Admiralty were one area of potential patronage for young men awaiting a Marine commission. Thomas Marmaduke Wybourn, an orphan, was nineteen in 1795 when he received his commission in the Plymouth Division. Wybourn was able to secure his commission with the help of his powerful patron, the Earl of Spencer, who was First Lord of the Admiralty at the time. Naval officers were another group with a certain level of leverage over Marine commissions, and men like Nelson and Collingwood (both held sinecure post as Marine officers) among others, used the system to put their people into open placements. In addition to the Board of Admiralty and Naval officers, Marine officers held a tremendous amount of power over the patronage for new commissions. Division commanders and those senior Marine officers in operations overseas regularly had their appointments of new officers confirmed by the Admiralty. Marine Major Mason in Senegal was promised his choice, in his case Mr. Eagle, for a commission. Unfortunately Mr. Eagle was too late to be on the list for that year but was promised to be the first name on the list for the following year. Officer confirmation in overseas operations had always been a privilege of naval commanders-in-chief within their stations, so the practice was not completely unique.

This is not to say that external people didn’t have any recourse to get their protégés commissions in the Marines. Andrew Burn, for example, was given his commission due to the influence of Sir Henry Erskine, an army commander and MP for Ayr. Some nobles, who possessed significant influences within the Admiralty, were able to utilise this influence to get their favourites commissions in the Marines. Basil Feilding, 6th Earl of Denbigh, had

\[\text{350} \text{ Lt. Charles Shearer to Lord Loundoun, BL MSS Add. 44068, ff. 153, 155, 161} \]
\[\text{351} \text{ A. Petrides and J. Downs (eds.), } \text{Sea Soldier: An Officer of Marines with Duncan, Nelson, Collingwood and Cockburn} \text{(Tunbridge Wells, 2000), p. xi} \]
\[\text{352} \text{ Collingwood to his sister, 17 February 1793, NRS 98, } \text{The Private Correspondence of Admiral Lord Collingwood, E. Hughes (ed.)} \text{(London, 1957), p. 34} \]
\[\text{353} \text{ NA ADM 2/1155, 27 October 1758, p. 126; NA ADM 2/1156, 15 January 1760, p. 233} \]
\[\text{354} \text{ Gregory (et al), } \text{Memoirs of the life of the late Major-General Andrew Burns, of the Royal Marines, Vol. I, p. 71} \]
influence within the Admiralty of 1774-1784, largely due to his close friendship with the then First Lord the Earl of Sandwich. The Earl of Denbigh was able to get commissions for an array of family members and friends such as John (Marines) and Edward (Navy) Bowater and William Fielding (Marines), among many others. The process through which the Earl of Denbigh was patron to these men receiving their commissions only reaffirmed the solidity of the Admiralty’s control. Each request was directly sent to the First Lord or the Secretary of the Admiralty, and was then reviewed before being accepted. Denbigh’s family was seen at the time to possess a suitable military heritage, and their local political power was also of great help.

As the service matured, a large number of Marine officers increasingly began to come from family backgrounds steeped in naval service. William Paterson served as a Volunteer during the operations against Belle Isle and received a commission after this action. Paterson was also the son of the first Colonel in Town of the Corps, General James Paterson. William Pitcairn was the son of Marine Major John Pitcairn, who gained fame during the War of American Independence, and William was at Bunker Hill when his father was killed. Another example is Lt. Richard Caunter, who died in 1795 from ‘complications of disorders’, and who had one of his sons commissioned as a lieutenant in the Marines at the time serving in the East Indies. There were also men whose fathers were Navy Officers, such as William Feilding, the son of Admiral Feilding. Others such as Cuthbert Collingwood were able to get relatives like his cousin a commission, which was also a common practice with Marine officers.

As the Corps aged, this pool of potential officers unofficially became the main area from which they were drawn. First Lord of the Admiralty, Admiral St. Vincent, re-emphasized the point of using sons of former officers and enlisted marines, in a letter to Sir William Heathcote in 1803:

I fear your application in favour of Mr. Steel for a Commission in the Royal Marines is too late, the list having been made out some time and chiefly composed of the Sons and near Relations of Officers, who, I am persuaded you will agree with me should be preferred to all others.

This practice, an unofficial policy, is further confirmed in the same year by a Marine officer writing to the Naval Chronicle. In his letter he discusses how upon recently looking at a new list of Marine officers, he saw many ‘gentlemen so appointed were relatives of some of the brave men of that corps who fell gloriously during the late war’. He continues on to justify

357 NA ADM 1/3337, 12 Feb. 1804, p. 324
this in the same manner as St. Vincent did; ‘and where could we expect to find better Officers than the sons of those heroes who has [sic] so nobly shed their blood for their country’s cause’. 360 This should not be seen as an alien practice, for the monarchs many times tried to follow the same policy by filling many non-purchase Army commissions from military families, but the scale was never to be as significant as that in the Marines. 361

Another area that was a pool for Marine officers was the enlisted ranks. These men had progressed through the non-commissioned officer ranks and were usually given the commission in recognition of heroic action in battle or in providing security to the state. John Hardy was promoted to a second lieutenant in the 2nd Marine battalion in North America after the Battle of Bunker Hill, but he had nearly twenty years of experience before the battle. 362 As stated above, battle was not the only way to promotion. Preventing mutiny was another area in which promotion to officer could be gained. Two sergeants from the Plymouth Division were promoted to second lieutenant for their loyalty in helping to prevent the Plymouth Marine Barracks mutiny on 28 May 1797. 363

The government tried to force upon the Marines one last potential method of officer recruitment, recruiting for rank. The Marine Corps were to attempt the practice of giving commissions to local men of stature who could bring in a set amount of men upon their entry. However, this potential pool was doomed from the start as it was seen as overt external influence, but they were still required to try as it was a governmental decision. This strict control by the Admiralty, maintained over its Marine Corps was to be a final departure from the Army model used by the old Marine Regiments. Major-General Simon Fraser, of 71st Highland regiment fame, offered to raise a battalion of Marines for the King if his own chosen men were given the officership of this battalion. These men were to be given four months’ leave from their Army units, during which they were to recruit a set number of men. This was a common practice in the British Army of the eighteenth century; whereby entire companies, battalions and occasionally regiments were raised with the understanding that the men raising them would be made Lieutenant, Captain, Major or Colonel of their respectively sized units. This practice of recruiting for rank was especially common in times of emergency or at the beginning of war when the need for troops was great, many of the Highland regiments were raised via this method. While the King granted the request, the Admiralty put up various roadblocks to prevent this loss of patronage over its Marines. First the Admiralty denied leave to Lt. Duncanson of the Marines, who was a friend of Fraser’s and

360 ‘To the Editor of the Naval Chronicle’, 22 July 1803, The Naval Chronicle, Vol. 10, (July to December 1803), p. 67-68
362 Chatham Description Books, NA ADM 158/3, 4th Company
was due to receive a Lieutenancy in his new battalion. Then, after the four months were up and the officers were unsuccessful in raising their allotted numbers, the Admiralty had a second excuse to refuse General Fraser’s battalion. Finally, to allay any complaints from the King, the Admiralty mentioned ‘that since the late augmentation of the Marines to Eighty Men a Company the number of Officers allowed to each have not been sufficient to carry on the service in the manner they are desirous of’. \[364\] Therefore, instead of forming new external units the Admiralty made the argument that it would be better to increase the officer establishment of each company.

### 3.3 Pay and Subsistence

In April 1755 with the Marine Corps establishment, the Marines were to be paid at 8d *per diem* with a subsistence pay of 6d *per diem*. This was the same rate as their army counterparts in the regiments of foot for 1740-1797. \[365\] Out of this every marine was required to pay £3-17-5 *per annum* for uniform, clothing, bread, Chatham Chest, and other daily needs. In other words a Marine Private’s net pay *per annum* was £11-13-7. This is more dramatic when we consider that an able seaman’s net *per annum* pay was £14-12-6, an ordinary seaman’s pay was £11-7-6 whereas a landsman’s was £10-11-6. This highlights that while able seamen were paid more than Marines the latter were still the second highest paid entry-level enlisted man on ship. \[366\] This deduction money like the seaman’s, was set at prices determined by the Admiralty and was very slow to change. By contrast in the Army the regimental Colonels owned their regiments and could deduct various expenses from their men for a variety of reasons in order to recoup their own personal purchase costs. \[367\] In 1795, due to the increased prices of food in England, the Army, Militia and Marines on land were given a temporary increase in subsistence wages called consolidated allowances. \[368\] This consolidated allowance was originally a temporary supplement to the pay of the Army, Militia and Marines in order to help with the high prices of food during the 1795 food crisis, but moved into permanency by 1797. However, unlike their 6d subsistence the Marines were required to give up these consolidated allowances when they entered the ships’ books. Marines would have to be discharged from their ships before they began to receive the full consolidated allowance again. The issue of the consolidated allowance was going to appear

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\[364\] Admiralty to Lord Barrington, NA ADM 2/1169, 6 January 1776, p. 152-153  
\[365\] Order for the Establishment of Marines in NA ADM 96/3 03 April 1755, p. 2-3; A. Guy, *Oeconomy and Discipline: Officership and administration in the British Army, 1714-1763* (Manchester, 1985), Appendix 3  
\[367\] Bruce, *the Purchase System in the British Army, 1660-1871*, p. 9  
as a main issue in the Great Mutinies of 1797 (Chapter IV). Part of the parliamentary concessions to the mutineers and directed solely at marines was:

That the allowances usually called consolidated allowances made to Marines when serving on shore; viz – to Serjeants, Corporals and Drummers at the rate of two pence, and to privates at the rate of two pence farthing per diem, be continued to be made to them when embarked and serving on board your Majesty’s Ships.\footnote{Order in Council in NA PC 1/38/117 02 May 1797, p. 3; later confirmed in HCP, Journal of the House of Commons, 9 May 1797, p.556}

This was confirmed on 25 May 1797, with an Order in Council which gave an increase in pay of the Army, Militia and Marines to one shilling per diem. It was stated that this was due to the ‘extra price of bread and meat now paid by the public which at present amounts upon an average to the daily sum of one penny three farthing’. This would thus leave the men with a net increase of ‘two pence per diem’. When added to the Marine private’s wage, it would mean that on ship he would receive £1-8-0 per lunar month, which would compare very favourably to the £1-9-0 per lunar month that an able seaman earned after the mutiny.\footnote{Order in Council in NA PC 1/38/117 02 May 1797, p. 3; Rodger, Command of the Ocean: A naval History of Britain, 1649-1815, p. 624-5; Order in Council NA PC 1/38/123 26 July 1797, p. 4-5}

Another area that was to incentivise recruits into the Marines was in the realm of extra pay, such as levy money and prize money.

The use of levy money to encourage recruits into the military was a common practice in the eighteenth century. Levy money was deemed by the Admiralty ‘to use their utmost Endeavours to enlist: Men, and Compleat [sic] the Companies as soon as possible’.\footnote{NA ADM 2/1152, 04 April 1755, p. 8}

The rate of levy money was set at three pounds when the Marine Corps was first established in 1755 and this amount would eventually be raised to five guineas by the end of the Seven Years War where it would stay until the end of 1802. However the levy money rate was not the same in Ireland and Irish recruits’ levy would not match that of the British until the War of American Independence, but this money was paid in British pounds and not Irish an added bonus.\footnote{NA ADM 2/1155, 26 March 1759, p. 379}

Levy money was given to the Marine recruit after his two inspections by the recruiting service and by the Divisional command, and when he was finally registered in the description books, similar to the Army’s method. One difference between these two services was that the Army through government action could raise their levy money rate higher then the Marines who had to receive permission from the Admiralty. This is the reason why the Army’s levy money would never be less than Marine bounties and sometimes even double or treble their rate: in 1804 the Army levy for foot recruits was sixteen guineas while the Marines continued at five guineas.\footnote{‘Recruiting Instructions’, NA ADM 1/3246, 1804, p. 10; Fortescue, A history of the British Army, Vol. IV Part 1, p. 211}
The potential rational for this lack of fluctuation in the levy money was that there were other incentives to encourage men to join the Marines. During 1771 at the height of the Falkland island crisis, the Admiralty refused to increase the levy money stating:

Officers of the Army who are employed on that service being allowed more Levy money and not limited as to the size of their Recruits; I am in return commanded to acquaint you that as their Lordships look upon the Marine Service as a much more desirable one for Recruits than the Army, they do not think proper to augment the Levy money…

Another supplemental form of bounty came for towns or societies who would give an additional bounty on top of the government’s bounty. John Howe when he was recruited received his government bounty but before he was sent to the Plymouth Division he and others were marched to Bath to be given ‘three Guineas Kings bounty and three more from the Citteys [sic] of Bath or Bristol and to be Sworn in for three years or dureing [sic] the American War’. However city or organisation bounties for marines did not always match the other services. Also during the American War, London offered a bounty of £5 for able seamen, £2-10-0 for ordinary, £1-10-0 for landman, three guineas for land service but only two guineas for Marines. This discrepancy in rates of bounty could have been because the City felt the Marine Corps was potentially not as important as the others. However a more probable answer was that the City felt the Marines, by 1778 having such a wealth of recruits that the Marines were even thinking of turning some away, so that more money spent on them would be a waste of valuable resources.

Another incentive for men to join the Marines was prize money, which in the eighteenth century was an effective lure for bringing men into the sea service. The tales of the expeditions of Drake and Hawkins were continually in the minds of British boys who saw this as a quick way to make one’s fortune. This perception was not far from the truth, for some expeditions like Havana or ship captures like Anson’s Manila galleon capture in 1743, could be very lucrative to those who were lucky enough to live through them. There were also many stories of successful frigate or cruiser captains who made a tidy sum in capturing enemy shipping also increasing the potential payout for the lower decks and marines on this ship. The enlisted men’s share of prize money was vastly smaller in comparison to their officers and has led some historians to question the importance of this as an incentive to recruitment. This was not the contemporary perception of many young men who were directly drawn into the service by the allure of making their riches. John Howe, who enlisted in 1778, when recounting why he enlisted stated: ‘at Last I thought I would go for a Soldier

374 NA ADM 2/1165, 04 February 1771, p. 396
375 Memoirs of Sergeant John Howe, Royal Marine, RMM 11/13/93, Part 1, p. 3
376 Lloyd’s Evening Post (London, England), Monday, March 30, 1778
378 Rogers, The Press Gang: Naval impressment and its opponents in Georgian Britain, p. 117
and hearing Some Marines had receivd [sic] five hundred Pounds a man Prize money’. 379
Marine privates were entitled to one and a half share each of all prize money, this put them on the same level once again with ordinary and able seamen. As a Marine reached a higher level in rank; he also subsequently earned a higher rate of prize money, eventually culminating in Marine Captain, who earned the equivalent proportion of the prize money to that of sea lieutenants and ships’ masters in the Navy. 380 The Marines were considered the equals of their skilled shipmates in the Wooden World, and the Admiralty reemphasized this point with its distribution of prize money.

There were other financial benefits, not as direct, that should also be considered as a potential incentive to joining the Marines; a yearly uniform allowance, similar to the Army’s allowance. Every year each Marine enlisted man received a new uniform or if on foreign station was given money (sergeant £2-2, drummer £1-10, corporal and private £1-1) to purchase a new uniform. The uniform of each private consisted of a cloth coat, pair of breeches, one shirt, one neckcloth, pair of stockings, pair of shoes, a hat and a cloth cap. 381 This was part of the yearly deduction of wages from the men mentioned above, another cost was the issuance of sea necessaries for when marines newly embarked on ship. These sea necessaries would include bedding, a red cloth jacket, pair of stockings, pair of shoes, two chequered shirts, a leather cap and a haversack, which could fluctuate in price depending on how much the contractor charged the Marine Office, but it was never to exceed twenty-five shillings. While all of these supplies cost the individual they had the right to retain all of them if they were discharged from the service. 382 In a day when clothes were a fairly expensive commodity this could be seen as an item of some value to those discharged. Marines were not required to return their old uniforms when they received the new yearly ones and could if they wanted to sell them. It seems likely that most kept these cloths as their older uniforms were converted into jackets for use at sea. 383

3.4 Desertion and Retention of Marines
Desertion and retention of manpower was a problem that was to plague all military forces in the eighteenth century. The Chatham Marine Division was to have marked in its books seventeen-percent of its men as run, fifteen-percent discharged dead, nearly fifty-one percent discharged and about eighteen percent not having any comment about their discharge

379 Memoirs of Sergeant John Howe, Royal Marine, RMM 11/13/93, Part 1
381 NA ADM 2/1152, 20 June 1755, p. 113; Rules and Regulations while on Shore, NA ADM 96/3, 1759, p. 7
382 Rules and Regulations while on Shore, NA ADM 96/3, 1759, p. 13-15
383 NA ADM 2/1152, 30 June 1755, p. 113
from 1755-1802. To quantify this more, on average three marines deserted each company per annum. Chatham potentially had a higher desertion rate than the other two Divisions because of its proximity to London and readily accessible access to transport. Marines were not the only service to be continuously plagued by problems of desertion. Desertion was known to be so bad in the Army stationed in Ireland that it lost one-sixth of its manpower yearly to desertion. ‘The root of all the evil in the Army, and, it should be added, in the Navy also was that the pay of the men was insufficient and the stoppages excessive.’ Statements like this have coloured the earlier historiography on reasons for desertion in the British eighteenth century military. More recent research, looking at desertion advertisements in contemporary newspapers have emphasised other reasons from love, to friendship or even malfeasance. Other men deserted because they were afraid of impending legal actions for crimes they may or may not have committed in the area. In fact we know of nineteen Marines from Chatham Division sample companies who were discharged into the hands of the civil power for various criminal reasons. Therefore it is not too much of a stretch to assume some deserters followed this Army practice of fleeing before civil powers snatched them up.

When Marine deserters were caught, the Marine Department and Admiralty were notified by the civil authorities to obtain these deserters from their local gaols. The Marine Department passed on the deserter’s name and company to the appropriate Division with the orders to return them to the Division. The commanding officer of the Division upon receipt of this would then send out a party of men under the command of an NCO to pick up these Marines from the various gaols and return them to their respective Divisions. When a deserter was eventually apprehended, he was sent before a senior commander in the local barracks, where his punishment would be meted out to him. Marine Captain T. Marmaduke Wybourn lamented the fact that deserters were not always new recruits but ‘trustworthy men & against whom for 7 years no crime had been attached’. He personally believed it was the influence subversive forces like an ‘old Irish rascal who had been a labourer 14 years among the Yankees’ that convinced these four men (two of whom were Irish) to desert. The punishments for desertion in the Marines were no different from the Navy of this period. One punishment commonly used for new recruits, other than corporal or financial punishments,

384 Chatham Division Description Books, 4, 7, 13, 22, 25 & 31 Companies in NA ADM 158/1-5, 1755-1803
385 Fortescue, A history of the British Army, Vol. III, p. 525, 527
387 NA ADM 2/1168 23 May 1775 p. 461; NA ADM 2/1169 20 April 1776 p. 285
388 A. Petrides & J. Downs (eds), Sea Soldier: An Officer of Marines with Duncan, Nelson, Collingwood, and Cockburn (Tunbridge Wells, 2000), p. 181
was to assign them to the crew of the next ship out of harbour. DeserTERS from the other services would sometimes be picked up by Marine recruiting parties, either intentionally or without their knowledge, who enlisted these deserters into their service. When those services came to collect their men the service which just enlisted them was forced to hand them over. The Chatham sample companies had twenty-seven army personnel, seventeen militiamen, two from the other Marine Divisions and two from the navy who were claimed deserters.

There were Marine deserters that would also take advantage of being overseas, like a carpenter’s mate and five marines who deserted off Portugal in 1759. Captain Archibald Kennedy recounts that these men ‘took the opportunity to run away in the night, three of the Marines being centinels, and took with them two musquets [sic], two cartouch [sic] boxes and several swivel shott [sic]’. The next morning Captain Kennedy and a landing party made up of his other marines began hunting for the deserters on land. They found three of them ‘dead drunk’ in the streets and threw them into the local guard house. However, he and his officers found the town’s people and their officials unwilling to help him round up his deserters. ‘I find it’s a practice here to intice [sic] the seamen to change their religion’ they were to be hidden until ‘their Indiamen or Cruizers go’. The interesting thing about this case is that marines, similar to seamen, could help each other in their desertion from the sea service. This identification with the seamen and the willingness to join them against the authority of the ship would be very problematic in the Great Mutinies of 1797 (Chapter IV). There were also men that were notorious for deserting from one unit, joining the next unit and then deserting to another unit. In 1778 there was a soldier that had deserted from the Army and wanted to be entered on the ships books as a Marine and given the King’s pardon. After a few weeks he deserted from the Marines and joined a regiment stationed at the time in Gibraltar. However, the Governor of Gibraltar—General Elliot—said any transfer of men from the Army to Navy (or Marines) was not legal or within the intention of the pardon. They requested legal advice from the Admiralty about this question but it does give an interesting detail that some of these men were looking for profit from bounties of the other services.

The retention length of marines is a fairly difficult number to derive but from our sample for this forty-seven year period it was to average about 5.6 years. This number is nearly seven years when you remove the mobilisations of 1770 and 1790 which distort the numbers because of the quick increase and reduction in manpower after hostilities. When we

389 PWDRO 1/686/62, Desertion of James Rendal
390 Chatham Division Description Books, 4, 7, 13, 22, 25 & 31 Companies in NA ADM 158/1-5, 1755-1803
391 Captain Kennedy to Admiralty, NA ADM 1/2010 2 June 1759
392 Captain Kennedy to Admiralty, NA ADM 1/2010 2 June 1759
393 Commander-in-Chief of Mediterranean Fleet, NA ADM 1/387 01 October 1778
look into the NCOs it is even longer as the average retention rate for them was nine years. Two men like Sergeant William Cocker, of Aberdeen, and Sergeant Thomas Hall, of Yorkshire, both served twenty-eight years in the Marines and both were eventually discharged for being unfit. Peter Turtle a weaver from Norfolk and enlisted in 1773 as a 17 year-old made it to Sergeant and although reduced to Private in 1802 he was still in the service even after our sample. The longest serving Marine in our sample had served thirty-seven years and was Corporal Christopher Coulthurst, a labourer from Lancashire who joined at 27 years old and was finally discharged in 1793 at sixty-four years old.\footnote{Chatham Division Description Books, 4, 7, 13, 22, 25 & 31 Companies in NA ADM 158/1-5, 1755-1803}

One very important issue that was to crop up throughout the eighteenth century about marines was over their being made sailors. From the 1739 House of Commons debates till their formal establishment as Royal Marines in 1802, the matter of the Marines being a nursery of seamen was continually discussed in public. One writer highlighting the constitutional argument put it this way:

> If each county, &c. were to supply the navy yearly so long as the war lasts, with so many able bodied landmen to serve as marines, as may be judged necessary in the same manner and proportion as the militia law authorities. If, when a marine has served a certain time on board, he had liberty to serve as a seaman; if the militia or any foot soldier had liberty to serve as a marine…\footnote{Morning Chronicle and London Advertiser (London), Friday, April 5, 1782}

There was also some idea about a dual usage of the Marines for economy purposes in both peacetime and war, ‘the Admiralty are to cloath [sic] and station them at the Dock-yards, to serve as sailors in an Emergency [my emphasis]’\footnote{Whitehall Evening Post or London Intelligencer (London), Saturday, February 15, 1755} William Morton Pitt when writing his Thoughts on the Defence of These Kingdoms stated, ‘Able sea officers have given it as their opinion, that a much larger number of marines might, with advantage to the country, be employed on board our ships of war, to the extent probably of one-third, or even perhaps one-half, of their complement.’ These marines according to him and his sources already performed a large part of the duties of seamen, and some very inconsiderable indulgence granted them, would induce them to ‘serve cheerfully in any station on board’. Further these marines, together with the seamen on the peace establishment, would half man ‘the largest navy the country could require’ without having recourse to the ‘unpleasant’ but ‘necessary expedient of impressing’.\footnote{W. M. Pitt, Thoughts on the defence of these kingdoms (London, 1796), p. 46-47} He also repeated the old constitutional adage that the Marines could replace most of the Army, subverting any fears about the Standing Army issue. It was known that some officers were to have given their opinions directly to certain politicians on these matters. The constitution was invoked again with the question of what could be done with Greenwich and Chelsea Hospitals and their pensioners who might ‘advantageously be
thrown on the poor rates’. The country could settle these pensioners around the parishes, ‘to act as drill sergeants, to train up men for the marine and land militia’. At the same time the old sailors might teach their ‘pupils to knot, splice and manage a rope, and the use of great guns.’

Not all the people in public saw the purpose of the Marines as a nursery of seaman. A military man Joseph Robson, an engineer, gives a lengthy appendix to his work *The British Mars* to a theory about how the British fleet could be better manned. He felt that seamen and their children should resign themselves to being impressed into the service. Merchant seamen who were paid; ‘such extravagant wages, have a right to their service in the Navy, according to custom prescriptively established’. While this is an interesting justification for impressments, it is also insightful in what it does not say particularly about marines. In his eighteen pages of theorizing on the manning of the Navy, he never once mentions using marines as a possible supplemental area from which seamen could be drawn from. This goes counter to some contemporaries and historiographical ideas that the importance of the Marines was in filling up the manpower of the fleet. Robson by neglecting marines as a potential pool of seamen is validating their need to stay as a separate entity.

The Admiralty’s official policy, due to parliamentary pressures, was that all marines who wanted to be seamen should be discharged from the service and written into the books as able seamen if they passed a seamanship examination. The captain of the ship was to gather his first lieutenant, master and boatswain to examine the marine; all of this to be done in the presence of the commanding Marine officer. If found to be qualified he was to be discharged and entered as a seaman, whereupon three pounds were charged to him that was to be used to raise a recruit to replace him. The interesting thing about this order is that by 1763–1804 it was modified by an important caveat that all marine changes had to have the final approval of the Admiralty. For an organisation that was to be a nursery of seamen this caveat seems strange as the time involved would be very lengthy. The numbers themselves bear out that marines were not actively encouraged to join the Navy as only two-percent of our sample from Chatham left the Marines for naval service. But conversely about one percent of all new enlisted men from our sample came from the Navy and of these the vast majority were

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399 J. Robson, *The British Mars. Containing several schemes and inventions, to be practised by land or sea against the enemies of Great-Britain* (London, 1763), p. 183
400 As seen in Chapter I
401 Article X, Regulations and Instructions relating to Marines serving on board His Majesty’s ships established in April 1759; NA ADM 96/3, p. 6-7; Article X, Regulations and Instructions relating to Marines serving on board His Majesty’s ships established in July 1763; NA ADM 96/3, p. 6; Article X, Regulations and Instructions relating to Marines serving on board His Majesty’s ships established in July 1804, NA ADM 106/3089, p. 6
between the ages of eighteen to twenty-four.402 This shows that the seamanship policy was either a complete failure or more likely by making the process so laborious and time consuming the Admiralty was hoping to suppress this movement of marines to seamen. A further substantiation of this point comes from 1782 when the First Lord of the Admiralty was Admiral Augustus Keppel. Nearly fifteen percent of all men discharged from the Marines for naval service did so in 1782 alone. Keppel in his short stay as First Lord was to send out many orders to the Marine Divisions encouraging them to have their men discharged to become seamen. However even with this intense pressure the Admiralty still, within its correspondence, was to maintain the tough examination policy established in 1759.403 So even with the heavily increased interest in 1782 the numbers were still small and the examination and clearing process took time. Never again was the Admiralty so interested in converting marines into sailors in this period.

Marine manpower was made up from diverse sources. The recruiting system looked for recruits with certain physical and associational aspects many of which were similar to the Army’s prime recruits. Consequently, the Marines were in constant competition with the Army over recruits. Even with this competition they were still able to draw a large proportion of Englishmen into their ranks, nearly eighty percent of their total manpower throughout our forty-seven year period of study. This could lead to a large homogeneity of identity but there is no direct evidence of any institutionalised pro-English or anti-English feeling, as NCO promotion was similar to the overall enlistment numbers. While most marines, like their Army counterparts, came from labouring class backgrounds there were still a large number from artisan backgrounds as well. In fact there was even some consideration to prefer certain trades for their particular important usage like armourers, gunsmiths, carpenters and tailors. While Marine pay was similar to that of the foot regiments the chance for prize money was always a powerful incentive to any potential Marine recruit. A marine could be fortunate enough to be stationed on a ‘lucky’ frigate captain’s ship and receive a fair amount in prize money.

While marines were logged on the ship’s books and paid when the ship was paid off they were not discharged, as were their naval counterparts, but instead marched back to quarters for another assignment. Most ships when they came into one of the three royal dockyards were to discharge their marines back to the Division’s quarters and pay them off before they left the ship. In theory marines were getting paid faster than most sailors who had to wait for the ship itself to be paid off. This distinction was to be one of the multiple methods used to shape and maintain the divergent identity of marines and sailors. While

402 Chatham Division Description Books, 4, 7, 13, 22, 25 & 31 Companies in NA ADM 158/1-5, 1755-1803
403 NA ADM 2/1174 21 May 1782, p. 49-50; NA ADM 183/122 15 August 1782
desertion was an ever present fear for all services there is no evidence to suggest it was particularly rampant in the Marines. Company rate desertion fluctuated between two to six percent of the total annual manpower for the company. So while desertion was a problem it was in no way crippling to the combat effectiveness of the Marine Corps. Identity in any institution takes time to build and the Marines were no different. The retention rate for privates averaged 5.6 years and NCOs averaged nine years service for this entire period. This large amount of time together and at sea potentially built up the shared identity of the Marines. William Morton Pitt summed up the perception of the population about this Corps and who they identified with:

The marine corps is the favourite with the inferior classes of the people; it is always good policy to take advantage of such a prejudice, and it is immaterial whether it arises from a propensity for the sea service, which, more or less, operates on the minds of all the inhabitants of these islands, or whether the hope of prize-money is the temptation. The marines will obtain many recruits, paying little or no bounty, whilst recruiting parties of regiments of the line offering much greater advantages, get few men.\(^{404}\)

\(^{404}\) Pitt, *Thoughts on the defence of these kingdoms*, p. 44–45
PART II
Chapter IV: Policing Functions and Mutiny

Marines spent most of their service life onboard ships of His Majesty’s Navy. Also, like British military units in the eighteenth century marines spent most of their time not engaged in combat. Marines therefore needed other duties to carry out while they were not actively engaged in combat. The Wooden World, it has been argued, can be seen as a microcosm of the larger British society and like all societies, there was a need for the state to project its power within the domestic arena. On land, in the eighteenth century, the Army and Militia were the force of the state’s power projection and control. At sea and in the dockyards there needed to be a force which could protect the Navy’s assets both in material and personnel. The Marine Corps was to become this tool of power projection and control, a ship-protection force. Their duty as guards from the start was to follow the similar pattern of their operational nature as an amphibious force. Their policing duties, while neither investigative nor disciplinary by nature, worked on the principle of projected uniformed state control.

On land the Riot Act was primarily concerned with how magistrates, sheriffs and other public servants should handle the issue of deploying force against the populace. ‘The extraordinary effect of the [Riot] Act was to convert, by mere command, every person who chanced to be in the vicinity of the reading after the expiry of an hour, into a felon’, but more importantly than a felony, the law saw these actions as treason and ‘outside the King’s Peace’. By placing the ‘felon’ in this context then the state could utilise its instruments of implementing order, the militia or the army. However, as George Rudé lamented in the 1960s, there has been no work done on this state tool of oppression within its policing context. ‘It is evident that in strikes, riots, or revolutionary situations the success or failure of the crowd’s activities may largely depend on the resolution or reluctance of magistrates or on the degree of loyalty or disaffection of constables, police or military.’ Historians of the eighteenth century army and militia have only concerned themselves with issues of policing and riot control as a side note to their greater work. One of the first scholars to take a more defined look at the Army as a tool of social order was Tony Hayter in The Army and the

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406 S. G. Redburn, Remarks on the Riot Act, with an application to certain recent and alarming facts (London, 1768)
407 R. Vogler, Reading the riot act: the magistracy, the police, and the army in civil disorder (London, 1991), p. 2
Hayter’s concern is centred on the overall structure, legality of riot control and implementation in domestic disturbances. Unfortunately, Hayter does not concern himself with what happens when military members participated in public disturbance or mutinied.

Unlike on land, direct authority for the use of violence at sea came solely from the Captain (or commander of the watch) of the ship. Marines were a force consisting of between thirteen to twenty percent of total ship’s crew numbers (depending on the ships-rate) and were such a bulwark against disturbances and desertion by the crew. While there were limited restrictions on the use of force against seamen, marines were able to fire upon them if given the order by their officers. They were the only men on ship to have daily access to, and practice with, firearms. Because of this privilege mutiny among marines had to be treated even more harshly than others. ‘On Friday I was sent with a party of marines and the barge to attend the execution of the marine of the Acasta [sic], who, had it not been for this late mutiny, would most probably not have suffered. It has had a wonderful effect on the prisoners.’ This chapter examines how the Marines protected the Navy’s assets in men and material on land and at sea but it also examines what happened when called upon in times of mutiny.

4.1 Policing Duties on Ship

Lieutenant John MacIntire, in his military treatise on marine forces while serving on land and at sea, spent nearly a tenth of his work discussing what duties marines were to carry out when they were not engaged in training or combat. Emphasising the Wooden World as a microcosm of society, he saw the Marines’ duty as linked with that of the Army’s on land. MacIntire introduced this section as, ‘I shall here treat of the duty which Marines are to perform on board as Soldiers’. He does add the caveat that these were only suggestions to help Marine officers for ‘it being out of my sphere to meddle with other duties, which fall under the inspection of the Sea Officers.’ Lt. MacIntire, a Marine officer, was not alone as even naval officers emphasised the potential importance of marines in maintaining discipline on ship. Admiral Keith, like many naval officers, felt there should be one marine to every four seamen ratio on board ship in order to help the officers ‘form the strongest possible

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411 Section V, NA ADM 48/58 01 August 1785 p. 3
413 J. MacIntire, *A military treatise on the discipline of the marine forces, when at sea: Together with short instructions for detachments sent to attack on shore* (London, 1763), p. 122
barrier against internal irregularity’. This one-fifth figure was never attained nor actively pursued by the Admiralty. The one-fifth number itself, potentially had more to do with the idea of making the Marines a nursery for seamen. The Navy at the time felt ideally that one-fourth landsmen was the adequate number allowable on board ship in which to maintain its peak operating efficiency without substantially disrupting the ship’s daily sailing operations. So marines as one-fifth could carry out their duties and those of the ship concurrently while at the same time improving their seamanship skills. The only time marines were to make up one-fifth of the crew however was on the largest ships-of-the-line. They would usually be smaller as the size of the ship was smaller. Actual manning numbers in the fleet would stay fairly consistent with ships of first to third rate had Marine complements of between twenty to seventeen percent of ships total complement. While the other ship sizes from fourth to sixth rate would carry between sixteen and twelve percent (corresponding) marines to their total complement.

The proper places to police these ‘internal irregularities’, as stated by Admiral Keith, were considered to be the officers’ quarters, the magazine, the food stores, the scuttle-butt and along the deck to deck access points like gangways (explained in more detail below). Marines were to guard these important areas of the ship from thieves, miscreants and mutineers. However, one of their primary duties and most corrosive of the internal irregularities, and one overlooked in the historiography, was the prevention of desertion, something against which marines were intended to act specifically as a bulwark.

Demonstrating the importance of marines in preventing desertions, the non-commissioned officers were responsible for the additional guard consisting of a sergeant and twelve men to be added to the normal detail when the ship was in port. ‘If any person jumps overboard to swim on shore, or on board of another ship, the centries [sic] are to fire upon him immediately and oblige him to return’ but they had to be cautious with the level of force used. If a sentry fired and killed the deserter then he had to face a court-martial for murder. 

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415 Sailor, An address to the Right Honourable the lords commissioners of the admiralty; Upon degenerated, dissatisfied state of the British Navy; with ways and means to put the Navy upon a formidable and respectable footing, both as to ships and men (London, 1783), p. 63-64
416 Rules and Instructions relating to Marines serving on board His Majesty’s Ships April 1759, NA ADM 96/3, p. 2
417 Muster Book HMS Sandwich, NA ADM 36/800 1778-9; Muster Book HMS Sandwich, NA ADM 36/12398 1797; Muster Book HMS Robust, NA 36/8497 1780-1; Muster Book HMS Leopard, NA ADM 36/15207-8 1796-7; This data is confirmed by the Trafalgar fleet as well where the most complete material has been collected. Ships like Victory, Royal Sovereign, and Temeraire had between 17-19%, the rest of the ships of the line carried 15-12% descending with the ship size. Ayshford Complete Trafalgar Roll, [CD-ROM], muster data for each ship
418 Charles Townshend to Admiralty, 3 August 1771 in NA ADM 1/4129, p. 2
419 MacIntire, A military treatise on the discipline of the marine forces, when at sea, p. 140
Newham a marine on a watering party in Ocoa Bay was court-martialed for firing upon and killing John Sweeny, a sailor on HM Sloop *Diligence*, when he tried to flee ‘into the woods’. Private Newham was eventually acquitted of the charge because he was given clear orders to fire from his superior officer. But this should not be seen as always the norm as a court could find either for or against.\footnote{Court-Marital of Private Newham, NA ADM 1/5492 7 July 1798 p. 1-3}

Throughout this period the Army, on various occasions, would act in the place of Marines on board naval warships during wartime. There was always a certain level of friction between these naval and army personnel when serving together. This friction was further heightened in the 1790s when the Duke of York as Army Commander in Chief issued his ‘regulations’ for army units serving at sea asserting the independent judicial authority of their officers over their own men on disciplinary matters.\footnote{Rowbotham is one of the only people to try and discuss the use of soldiers on board ship as marines however he never gives a real reason for why they are removed from the ships after 1796 in W. B. Rowbotham, ‘Soldiers in Lieu of Marines’, *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, Vol. 33 [133] (1955), p. 34}

The naval flag officers quickly made their own ‘strong remonstrance’ about losing their sole authority of command on ship. The then First Lord the Earl of Spencer felt marines ‘assisting the preservation of discipline and order on board’ should be used in place of soldiers at all times possible.\footnote{Sidney Smith to Spencer, NRS Vol. 46, *The Spencer Papers*, Vol. I, J. S. Corbett (ed.) (London, 1913), p. 200} This demand for purely Marine Corps sentinels was to resonate with many of the naval officers throughout the period of its existence. Captain Henry Speke of the 6th rate frigate *HMS Mercury* (20) felt, ‘The Marines, though few in number yet at present, with those I have belonging to the *Mercury*, suffice for centinels [sic] and are of so much use in that capacity’. He goes on to implore their Lordships about the absolute need to keep marines on his ship until its eventual arrival in the Nore. Captain Speke explains his dire need for maintaining his marines is predicated on the fear of a repeat of an incident which had already happened due to the lack of a full Marine complement on ship. ‘I am sorry to be obliged to mention on this occasion, that I have already felt the want of good Marines, by 4 men having last Sunday night found means to escape, by cutting away the longboat.’\footnote{Captain Speke to Admiralty, NA ADM 1/2473 31 May 1759}

Captain Evelyn Sutton of the newly commissioned frigate *HMS Proserpine* (28), emphasises Speke’s point, requesting the Admiralty to expedite the transfer of marines to his ship with ‘all possible dispatch’. Marines were the best ‘centinels [sic] being much wanted to keep the seamen onboard particularly in the night time’.\footnote{Captain Sutton to Admiralty, NA ADM 1/2483 4 September 1777}

Every individual captain of a ship was responsible for making their own sentry posting assignments for marines when on board ship. Every Marine officer was to be given
these rules and assignments upon his entry into the ship’s crew. These orders clearly and explicitly stated that all marines were to be ‘placed immediately under their own officers’ care’. It was the Marine officer’s responsibility to see to their good behaviour, cleanliness in their berths, care of their hammocks and bedding, regulations of mess, and the Marines’ prompt obedience and dispatch in coming upon deck and performing the public duty of the ship. It was therefore the ‘most positive order that no improper interference on the part of the naval officers of the ship shall take place, as they have only to acquaint the officer of marines upon duty what neglect he discovers and what is necessary to be done and he will order his sergeant etc to see it executed’. The Captain’s Orders for HMS Pegasus (28), 1786-1788, Order 16 stated: ‘All orders respecting the marines to be given by the lieutenants to the commanding marine officer.’ If the officer was not on duty then the naval lieutenant was to inform him by either a sergeant or corporal. At the same time the Marine officer should not think that he was in sole command of these marines or even that his authority was outside the ship’s chain of command. None of these provisions ‘authorise any marine officer, non-commissioned officer or private marine to disobey or neglect any order given by any of their superior officers in the ship.’ The interesting aspect of all these orders is that they repeatedly assert that the Marine officers is an equal officer but still under the usual chain of command.

The power of the enlisted men’s identification with their officers was very important and even recognised by some in the Navy as well as the Marine Corps.

The marines are apt to look up to their officers as protectors, when beat or ill used by the midshipmen, or boatswain’s mates; but do not interfere, if you wish to avoid the being always, as they call it, in hot water, and your quietness will not only please the officers of the ship but you will escape all reproach of partiality of your corps.

Another aspect of identity was that Marine officers were expected to wear their uniform at all times and to keep a ‘neatness in their dress’. The reason for this was that it ‘may lead their men to follow their example, and to pay the most ready obedience to their orders.’ Another way the Admiralty hoped to improve the identification of the men and officers in the Marine Corps was by making all officers serve fairly regularly sea service duty. Officers from Captains rank to Second Lieutenant were to ‘take their Tour of Duty at Sea, in as constant

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428 Anonymous, Advice to the officers of the British navy (London, 1785), p. 70
regular Rotation as possible’. The only reprieve from these duties was if they were sick or on duty with the recruiting service, but as soon as they returned to the Division they were to be assigned to the next ship for sea. This policy was not always carried out to the letter.

Molesworth Phillips, a Marine officer, who had commanded the Marine detachment sent with Captain Cook on his last voyage of exploration, on two occasions in the Napoleonic wars paid fellow officers ‘to embark for him’. Because of this he was to be known throughout the service as a ‘complete shuffler from all Duties’. In defence of Molesworth there was no regulation, only a suggestion, on Sea Duty for field officers and at the time of these incidences he was a Lieutenant Colonel.

The non-commissioned officers were to have very frequent and personal contacts with the men giving them a high level of trust among their marines. However, there were fears that some non-commissioned officers might abuse this level of trust with the men under their command. ‘No non-commissioned officer shall take any money or gratuity whatsoever from the privates under any pretence.’ Non-commissioned officers were also ordered to have their men assist the sailors in the cleaning of the ship along with the constant maintenance of the ropes and sails. There were other nautical duties explicitly ordered to be carried out by marines. They were responsible for ‘attend[ing] the log reel and haul[ing] the line in.’ When sailing out of Portsmouth harbour to Spithead one sailor in writing an open address to the Admiralty talked about how marines were able to help in getting newly-commissioned ships underway. This had been done ‘with about twenty seamen, assisted by the complement of marines, without whose assistance the ships would have remained mere hulks, until the seamen could have been raised to equip them for sea, which probably would have required many months’. However, there were strong feelings among some in the public that all of these sailing duties were at the most a distraction. As it was ‘impossible for them [marines] to learn the duty of a soldier, whilst they are employed and worked like slaves on board; for by the want of seamen they are obliged to work both day and night, and do such hard duty that many desert the service, by which means the government is at the expence [sic] of raising more in their room’. These were really continuations at sea of the debates as to whether the Marines were something different or just seamen in training.

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430 Article 35 in Rules and Regulations while on Shore, NA ADM 96/3, 1763, p. 24-25
432 NMM WEL/8, Regulation for HMS Dreadnought, Section 10 Article 4; NMM WEL/8, Regulation for HMS Dreadnought, Section 17
433 Captain’s Orders HMS Amazon, 1799, Article XXVIII in NRS Vol. 138, Shipboard Life and Organization, 1731-1815, B. Lavery (ed.), p. 147
434 Sailor, An address to the Right Honourable the lords commissioners of the admiralty: Upon degenerated, dissatisfied state of the British Navy, p. 62-63
435 London Chronicle (Semi-Annual) (London), Thursday, September 6, 1764
The Marine officer on watch, when the guard was called out (changed) was responsible for inspecting the arms, accoutrements, ammunition and observes that the men were properly dressed. Upon completion of his inspection the officer was to directly order the sergeants and corporals to post sentries according to the daily orders received from the ship’s captain. 436 An interesting aspect of this military formality is the autonomy of action the non-commissioned officers were given in which to carry out these orders. They could select the men, when they were posted and if necessary whether they should receive cutlasses or muskets for certain details. The non-commissioned officers detached the men from the guard detail upon orders received from his officer. He would then relieve the furthest post toward the bow and proceeded backwards until eventually placing the last sentries doing duty at the stern of the ship. Upon assigning the new sentry to his post the non-commissioned officer would give the man his orders and order him to fix his bayonet. While on duty all sentries who carried a musket were to have a bayonet fitted to it, making them quite an imposing figure. This process was a very formalised one with a specific and detailed order for each step which the non-commissioned officer and sentry had to perform upon changing each posts. Only a non-commissioned officer, or officer, could relieve any sentry. 437 Finally at night, a Marine officer was required to lock all weapons in specially made chests and leave the keys in the captain’s cabin. 438

Whilst on duty, marine sentinels were required to stand or walk briskly around their posts backwards and forwards. They were forbidden to ‘sit down, read, or sing, whistle, smoke, eat or drink, but be constantly alert and attentive’. 439 Officers of the Watch were instructed to continually keep in contact with their sentinels, question them about their orders, and see if they were doing their duty ‘in a soldier like manner’. All marines who appeared on deck first thing in the morning were required to report to the sergeant of his unit, who would make roll-call. The privates and non-commissioned officers were also required to appear with their hair combed and tied, and clean hands and face, along with their uniform as clean as possible. 440 Well maintained appearance was continued in the hopes of making marines appear as professional a body as possible on ship.

436 MacIntire, A military treatise on the discipline of the marine forces, when at sea, p. 126
437 MacIntire, A military treatise on the discipline of the marine forces, when at sea, p. 133-137
438 NMM WEL/8, Regulation for HMS Dreadnought, Section 2 Article 3 & Section 2 Article 9
439 NMM WEL/8, Regulation for HMS Dreadnought, Section 6 Article 1
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* From chart in back of book in NMM WEL/8, Regulations for a Detachment of Royal Marines on Board HMS Dreadnought, 27 Aug. 1803

Sentry duties on a seventy-four gun ship-of-the-line (outlined in Table 4.1) give some revealing details about what the Navy felt were vital areas on ship and why. These points not only held purely military purposes, but also provided easy access to protect the ships’ vital areas and respond to any ‘lower-deck’ rumblings. Marines were posted on gangways, in the galley, and around the fresh water stores. The Marine guard watching over the ‘scuttle-butt’ was to monitor the amount of water drunk by sailors, and not allow any water to leave the area unless given permission from the commanding officer. The Marine corporals of the watch were to visit ‘all the sentinels every half hour, to see that they are alert upon their posts.’ One of the most heavily guarded areas of the ship was the captain’s cabin, where no one was allowed to enter ‘upon pain of death’ unless the captain expressly said otherwise. The sentry was to be alert on his post and if he ‘sees any part of the ship on fire, or hears of any mutiny, or conspiracy, he, in that case, is permitted to quit his post for a moment, and go to the officer of the watch to acquaint him of it privately’. They were also not to allow anyone to touch or handle their Arms or during night-time to come within their reach. The duties of the Marine on sentry duty were therefore very explicit but not always very active. Sleeping on duty was always a fear and one helpful suggestion was to always keep moving about ‘if the weather will allow of it’. Sleeping while on duty was considered the ‘most heinous offence’. If a sentry at night did not make his report of ‘All’s Well’ and was not...

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441 NMM WEL/8, Regulation for HMS Dreadnought, Section 10 Article 4, last page of book
444 MacIntire, A military treatise on the discipline of the marine forces, when at sea, p. 141
445 MacIntire, A military treatise on the discipline of the marine forces, when at sea, p. 136
impaired in some way, then he should expect to be severely punished.\(^\text{446}\) Finally every man that went upon deck, unless otherwise ordered, was to consider himself on watch.

Another task in which marines were responsible for keeping a watchful eye was to prevent the sailors from bringing their own liquor onboard ship. The Order Book of HMS \textit{Mars} (74) outlines the duty as such: ‘For preventing excess in the use of Spirituous Liquors, the Master at Arms and the Corporals under him are hereby strictly enjoined and directed to be exceedingly attentive to this very essential part of their duty, by preventing at all times any Spirituous Liquors being brought on board’.\(^\text{447}\) One of the most dangerous points for liquor being brought on board was when boats were along side the ship. During these moments the sentries were to keep ‘a very strict eye upon them taking care that nothing is put in, or taken out, but by leave from the Quarter Deck.’\(^\text{448}\) This obsession with liquor was not purely for disciplinary reasons, but also because intoxicated sailors onboard ship could be a danger to themselves and others. The scuttle-butt was also where the men would receive their alcohol ration. With such easy access to alcohol, this would lead some marines to abuse their station. If they were found to have compromised their station then they were quickly and severely punished.\(^\text{449}\) The marines were to be particularly circumspect in regards to women, as they were considered the most ‘suspected to conceal liquor’. It was the duty of the sentries at the gangways to see ‘such persons examined before they permit them to pass their posts.’\(^\text{450}\) Additionally, one of the greatest fears on any ship at sea was fire, and there was no greater flammable liquid on ship than alcohol. So marines acted as a constant and diligent wall of protection for the ship and its company.

Appearance was an important aspect of the Marine privates as well as their officers and Non-commissioned officers on board ship. Many of the Marine’s orders spent a great amount of time on outlining this principle. Marine officers were not the only ones to receive special instructions and orders from the ship’s captain as non-commissioned officers were to play a predominant role in them as well. The ‘sergeant major’ or senior sergeant on board was ordered to make sure that ‘the strictest order and regularity in all the soldiers’ berths, to see that they are kept clean, and that no dirt or rubbish is thrown upon the decks.’\(^\text{451}\) He was also ordered to go below after lights out in order to make sure marines were in their hammocks and refrained from making any further noise. In fine weather the men were

\(^\text{448}\) MacIntire, \textit{A military treatise on the discipline of the marine forces, when at sea}, p. 139
\(^\text{449}\) Byrn Jr., \textit{Crime and Punishment in the Royal Navy}, p. 128
\(^\text{450}\) MacIntire, \textit{A military treatise on the discipline of the marine forces, when at sea}, p. 139
allowed to wear white jackets and trousers from eight in the morning to eight at night. The non-commissioned officers were to keep a constant eye that these jackets were constantly kept clean and ‘that they all put on clean trousers every Sunday and Thursday.’

Non-commissioned officers were considered upon all occasions, as answerable for the appearance of every man upon deck. By maintaining this dress and composure the ‘duty required of the marines may be preformed with advantage to the King’s service and with credit to themselves.’ In particular no non-commissioned officer or private was ever to appear upon deck ‘without his hair being properly combed and tied, his hands and face clean, and his dress as much so as possible.’ This was a direct appeal to the Marines’ ideas of identity as a professional organisation. The sentinels when at sea were to make the best appearance in their ‘second clothing or jackets’, but the men who were sentinels at the cabin door were to appear in their best clothing. If these cloths should be too much worn out then they were to make a proper military appearance. During daytime duties at port all Marine sentries were to wear only their full proper Marine clothing, but at night and at all other times they were allowed to wear their sea clothing but without trousers replaced by breeches when under arms similar to their practice at sea. A fundamental importance of Marine clothing and uniforms was there function as a visual devise of separation between the marines and the sailors. The sea necessaries issued to every marine upon entry unto the ship would include; bedding, red cloth jacket, pair of stockings, pair of shoes, two chequered shirts, a leather cap and a haversack this was in conjunction with their yearly uniform. Therefore the red jacket whether the uniform or the sea necessaries were a constant visible divider from the sailors who had no uniform or explicit clothing colour. While the chequered shirt was worn on ship like the sailors it was usually only seen when marines were assisting in manning the great guns or cleaning the ship. Chequered shirts were explicitly never to be seen on deck or while on duty. Uniforms also acted as an agent for the development of a separate esprit de corps from the rest of the naval service. With marines were always in a state of ensured tidiness, cleanliness and smartness of their uniforms this was to assure a sense of collective appearance setting them out from others in the naval service.
The discipline or punishment function which marines carried out onboard correlated closely with their sentry duties. This included standing to arms in company, in full uniform and bayonet ready, on the quarter-deck while all floggings and punishments were carried out onboard. This was a direct reminder and symbol to the crew about who maintained the monopoly of force aboard and that all officers’ orders were ‘like that of God’s own word’, otherwise they were answerable to the Marines.\footnote{C. Lloyd, *St. Vincent & Camperdown* (London, 1963), picture and caption p. 107; Bryn Jr., *Crime and Punishment in the Royal Navy*, p. 69, 71} Marines were also placed around prisoners at all times. Sentries to be posted to guard prisoners were commanded by a Marine corporal who was to regularly check upon and ‘find everything in order’. The corporal was also answerable if there were any altercations with the prisoner or if the sentry could not answer for his duties.\footnote{MacIntire, *A military treatise on the discipline of the marine forces, when at sea*, p. 128} William Robinson’s story about another sailor’s punishment (called Gagging) for talking back to an officer, illustrates the marines’ duty:

The man is placed in a sitting position, with both his legs put in irons, and his hands secured behind him; his mouth is then forced open and an iron bolt put across, well secured behind his head. A sentinel [marine] is placed over him with his drawn bayonet, and in this situation he remains, until the captain may think proper to release him, or until he is nearly exhausted.\footnote{W. Robinson, *Jack Nastyface: Memoirs of a Seaman* (Annapolis, 1973), p. 148-149} Therefore, marines became not only symbols of authority and punishment, they were also seen by some in the crew as symbols of oppression and brutal discipline. This responsibility could also be a two-edged sword for if marines were to loose their prisoners then the senior marine non-commissioned officer to the detail was answerable to a court-martial. John Nicol, in his memoir, recounts on instance were a sergeant of marines who was leading a prisoner detail which was to take two prisoners from the ship to Mill Prison had one of the prisoners escape. The sergeant was court-martialed and sentenced to hang, but luckily for him he was pardoned before his sentence was carried out.\footnote{J. Nicol, *The life and adventures of John Nicol, mariner* (London, 1822), p. 34}

Discipline issues like these were to be another catalyst for the divide between naval personnel of the ‘Lower-Decks’ and marines. Another area upon which sailors found marines troublesome on ship, was their nautical illiteracy. Marines, upon entering the service, rarely had any nautical experience, and were therefore seen as a burden on a Navy with skilled manpower shortages already.\footnote{N. A. M. Rogers, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815* (London, 2004), p. 489-490} Another practice of visible separation was in the billeting and messing location on ship of marines. There were in the aft of the ship which acted as a physical barrier between the sailors and their officers.\footnote{Royal Marine Regulations at Sea 19th July 1804, NA ADM 106/3089, Article XXXII, p. 22} One last area of separation of marines from the seamen was their duties in as the firing squad detail in officer executions.
This is highlighted in the naval song ‘Admiral Byng and the Brave West’. In this song marines were used as an allegory for the power of the state. ‘It’s decreed by the King, [his execution] I’ll be shot by my marines[,] For the misdeed I have deen| On the seas.’

William Spavens in his autobiographical *The Seaman’s Narrative* also accented the divergence in punishment between hangings for the lower-decks and the treatment of officers. The officers were given the honour of death being inflicted ‘by a file of marines discharging their loaded pieces at the breast of the unhappy object, who receives it on his knees.’

Some historians have claimed that marines were nearly universally loved by the officers of the Navy. Michael Lewis stated, ‘many an officer must have slept the sounder at night for the presence of these trusty and well-armed men between himself and some of the quota-gentry on the Lower Deck!’ However, some naval officers who considered themselves men of ‘nautical talent’ resented the fact that these men were nautically inexperienced. Naval officers also resented not being allowed to have complete and utter command over everyone on ship. Marines could not be ordered into the rigging and the Admiralty clearly wanted them used in sailing only with restraint. The vast majority of the time, the only function on ship marines carried out was turning the capstan, handling the ropes and sails from the deck, and other menial labour oriented jobs on departure or coming into port.

Naval officers who disliked marines would use any pretext they could to take out their profound dislike on any marine that failed in his duty. Samuel Leech tells a story about the Captain on board the *Macedonian* who had a ‘profound hatred of marines’. The captain after long discussion was eventually convinced by the good graces of a Mr. Scott to commute the poor marine’s sentence of flogging. In the anonymous *Advice to the officers of the British navy* this dislike was taken one step further: ‘whenever any marines are shares in a scrape, be sure to let the principal part of the punishment fall on their backs. During the infliction of the lashes, do not forget to reproach them with their being marines.’

This hostility to marines could also be why they proportionally suffered more corporal punishments than the average seaman. However, marines being seen as an example of discipline on ship should not be discounted either hence why they needed to be punished.

Admiral Patton went further and questioned if the Marines really were the best force for

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465 W. Spavens, *The seaman’s narrative; containing an account of a great variety of such incidents as the author met with in the sea service* (Louth, 1796), p. 119
469 Anonymous, *Advice to the officers of the British navy*, p. 22
quelling seamen on board ‘let us suppose the officers of this ship depending on the marines for protection from irritated seamen; where is the security? In such a case, it is well known that three seamen are absolutely superior in force to ten landsmen, whatever the colour of their coats or their state of discipline on shore.’

4.2 Policing Duties Ashore

Following the Treaty of Paris (1763) ending the hostilities of the Seven Years’ War there was no unanimous ideal about how marines were to be used in peacetime. There were some in the press, hoping for better ‘oeconomy’, who had specific ideas about the purpose and use of marines in peace-time. One author highlighted that with the Marine Corps being put on the sea service allowance it cost the country £4 per lunar month. He therefore felt that if the Marines were moved to a land establishment and placed upon the Army’s expense it would cost the country instead £1 per lunar month. In other words this would lead to saving the country’s coffers of £186,000 per annum. He also felt another method of economy for the government was to use marines in the royal dockyards. ‘I am for dismissing the 30 l a year watchmen, and having at least a Captain’s guard of the marines mounted daily at every Dockyard in England, and thereby give them an opportunity of learning the shore discipline’. However, he did admit that: ‘The Captains of men of war, I believe, may object to the want of marines, the centry [sic] in red being the more respectable appendage to their dignity’. This is an admission of the power of the uniform to the identity of the Marines but the author felt this should be overcome in times of peace, ‘however, I am for the short jacket, trowsers, and cutlass’.

In 1764 the Dockyard Commissioners agreed with this author and made a formal request of the Admiralty to transfer Marine detachments to do guard duty in the dockyard to replace the civilian watchmen. It was felt that marines would ‘contribute greatly to the security of His Majesty’s magazines and stores, as well as to the safety of the ships of war which now are or may hereafter be, refitting, building or repairing’. The civilian watchmen who were to lose their jobs because of this change were to be financially compensated for this loss. They were to be given half of their watchman’s pay along with full pay as dockyard labourers per annum until they left the yards. Dockyard Commissioners were placed in overall command of the Marine guard similar to the role of a ship’s captain. However they were not to ‘interfere in the discipline of the Marines doing duty in the dockyards’ also similar to ship duties. If Marine guards had any conflict with the artificers or other

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472 Gazetteer and London Daily Advertiser (London), Saturday, January 14, 1764
473 Admiralty to Commissioners of Dockyards 13 October 1764, NA ADM 2/1160, p. 375
474 Admiralty to Commissioners of Dockyards 13 October 1764, NA ADM 2/1160, p. 376, 378
dockyard workers relating to their daily duties they were to immediately make it known to the Marine guard’s commanding officer. This officer was then to report the incident directly to the commissioner, who could assure ‘due satisfaction may be obtained’. He would also make sure, ‘all subject of personal abuse and enmity between the parties in the civil and military service of the crown [is] guarded against, and prevented as much as possible’.\textsuperscript{475} Marines doing guard duty as a detachment were to stand guard in the dockyards for a twenty-four hour rotation until the next day’s relief arrived. Marines were given the responsibility over control of the key to the fire engine and stores. They were also to be very diligent in their responsibility of preventing anyone’s entry into the magazine with a flame or pipe, a similar job to their duty of fire prevention and detection on the navy’s ships. There were more royal dockyards than the three at Chatham, Portsmouth and Plymouth and by November 1764 the Marines were to form special companies to do guard services in Deptford, Woolwich and Sheerness dockyards as well. These special companies were to be drawn solely from the adjacent Chatham Division, which had to request of the Admiralty the authority to remove marines then doing duty on the guardships to fulfil this order.\textsuperscript{476} The reason for this was that the guardships were under naval and not Marine command so the transfer of men would have to be authorised by the Admiralty in order to have the guardship captain’s acquiescence.

The importance placed in these guard duties is telling when the numbers of men involved is examined. The combined Marine guard detail for the three largest royal dockyards – Chatham, Portsmouth and Plymouth – consisted of a force totalling about 330 men from which the daily and nightly guard details were taken. This would provide at each dockyard a minimum of ten marine guards doing continuous duty at any one time. This was further expanded to a total force of 954 men in 1803 with the enlargement of the guard quarters in each yard.\textsuperscript{477} In peace-time with the heavily diminished numbers of marines in the barracks it was increasingly difficult to man the dock guard and supply ships then fitting out for duty overseas. \textit{Per Mare Per Terram} lamented the Admiralty’s lack of foresight and ‘hope[d] in future that useful corps will never again be reduced to the very low state’. The Admiralty should understand that marines were ‘not sufficient to supply even the guardships with their proper compliment, and do the duty that was allotted them on shore’.\textsuperscript{478} He called for doubling the number of marines in time of peace asserting that it would be attended with no great additional expense to government. A writer in the \textit{Morning Chronicle} agreed: ‘As this is a duty [guard duties] much wanted at present, to whom can it, with equal propriety, be

\textsuperscript{475} Admiralty to Commissioners of Dockyards 13 October 1764, NA ADM 2/1160, p. 378-9
\textsuperscript{476} Admiralty to Navy Board 5 November 1764, NA ADM 2/1160 p. 421, 434
\textsuperscript{477} R. Morriss, \textit{The Royal Dockyards during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars} (Leicester, 1983), p. 96
\textsuperscript{478} \textit{Diary or Woodfall's Register} (London), Friday, July 30, 1790
entrusted as to the marines, who, as it were, are the natural guardians of all that relates to the Royal Navy.\textsuperscript{479}

The lack of marines on land was to be an ever growing concern of the Divisional commanders in peace-time, especially with the ever growing naval demand made upon their men. In August 1787 the Colonel-Commandant of the Portsmouth Division having been ordered to supply HMS \textit{Bedford} (74) and \textit{Magnificent} (74) with marines lamented just this: ‘…the present number of men at quarters fit for duty including officers’ servants is one hundred and ninety two’. With this force sixty-nine had to be detached daily for guard duties so that ‘we have therefore at present little more than three relieves or two nights in bed for the men’.\textsuperscript{480} However the guard detail of sixty-nine in August had already been reduced from the ninety-one in January of that year due to other fleet requirements like the Botany Bay expedition.\textsuperscript{481} If the requirements of these two ships were met then the Marines would no longer be able to maintain their full guard duties. The Marine Corps guard duties on land consisted of a dockyard guard (1 subaltern, 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, 1 drummer and 36 privates), Haslar guard (1 sergeant, 1 corporal and 12 privates), barrack’s guard (1 subaltern, 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, 1 drummer and 6 privates) and infirmary guard details (1 corporal and 3 privates).\textsuperscript{482} There were some fears that because of their close proximity to the materials lying around the yards marines might be tempted with theft. It had been reported to the officer of the watch that ‘some old rope or old cordage has been stolen from off the anchor wharf in the dockyard near the sentinels [sic] post No 17’. This theft had caused ‘suspicious reflections upon the Marine Corps’. The Commanding Officer was so concerned with any diminished image of the Marine Corps that he offered a reward. ‘One Guinea to any person that can make a probable discovery of the same and another guinea on finding the offender or offenders out.’\textsuperscript{483} The fascinating thing is how quickly the commanding officer reacted to any impression of his Corps’s image having a bad mark upon it.

Marines because of their duties ashore in the three royal dockyards and surrounding area would necessarily come into contact with the civilian population. The regulation of Marine behaviour on land was the yearly parliamentary vote on \textit{Regulations and Instructions relating to the Marine Forces when on Shore}, akin to the yearly passage of the Mutiny Acts which controlled the other land forces’ interactions with the public. These regulations made it explicitly clear that marines must settle cases of criminality or misconduct between themselves and the civilian population within the civil court system. The case of Private Philip Watkins in 1803, is an example of these sorts of criminal cases. Private Watkins was

\textsuperscript{479} \textit{Morning Chronicle and London Advertiser} (London), Monday, October 5, 1778
\textsuperscript{480} Colonel-Commandant Tupper to Admiralty, NA ADM 1/3290 12 August 1787
\textsuperscript{481} Colonel-Commandant Tupper to Admiralty, NA ADM 1/3290 17 January 1787
\textsuperscript{482} Colonel-Commandant Tupper to Admiralty, NA ADM 1/3290 16 August 1787
\textsuperscript{483} Chatham Order Books, NA ADM 183/1 17 July 1768
accused of stealing from his ‘master’ (uncertain who this was) some ‘boots, a coat, and clothes’. The case was brought before the Mayor by Simeon Busigny, a Captain in the Royal Marines attached to the division in Plymouth.  

The Solicitor of the Admiralty was commanded by their Lords of the Admiralty to handle all cases for the Admiralty adjudicated in civilian courts. These cases would consist of everything from press gang disturbances to naval and marine personnel’s public debts. Unfortunately, the historical record of the Solicitor’s duties in prosecuting offending civilians has been more muted. This should not be seen as a sign of the Admiralty’s unwillingness or inability to prosecute such civilians. In August 1794 seven young Marine drummer boys, not one over fourteen years of age, were walking about the area of the Chatham barracks. Whereupon these boys were confronted by a farmer, John Bell, who happened to live near to the place where they had been recently walking. Bell accused the boys of ‘having his hedges broke and drove them into a field, made them strip to their shirts and beat them with a hedge stake, in a most unmerciful manner’, two of the boys in particular. The Admiralty dispatched their Solicitor to investigate; he found that Mr Bell did assault the boys and called for him to be prosecuted. The Solicitor went one step further and asked the Admiralty ‘to direct me not only to carry on the prosecution already commenced [William Wolsten vs Bell], but also such others [my emphasis]’. The ‘others’ talked about were to be the six other boys for each of whom he wanted Mr. Bell tried independently, thus receiving the maximum amount of punishment possible. While marines were capable of causing problems within the local community the Admiralty also wanted it known to all that their men could not be abused freely by members of the public.

One important duty of marines ashore or at sea was to be present as an honour guard when dignitaries like the Monarch or military commanders were present. At sea when a General, Admiral or Commodore was to be received on board ship then a guard detail (varying in size according to the officer’s rank) of marines in their best uniforms were to meet him. When a General or Admiral came on board ship then ‘the officer commanding the Guard, gives the word, Present your Arms! [author’s emphasis] And when the men come down to their rest, the drum beats, and the officer salutes with his fusee [sic]’. When the Danish King came to Chatham in 1768 a Marine guard detail of all their grenadiers were in ‘place in order to pay all military honors [sic] to His Danish Majesty on his arrival’. The remainder of the Division was to march from the common to the strand and ‘to line the street

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484 PWDRO 1/695/11, Indictment and Deposition of Pvt, Philip Watkins  
486 Colonel-Commandant Tupper to Admiralty, NA ADM 1/3683, 10 August 1794  
487 Solicitor to Admiralty, NA ADM 1/3683, 28 August 1794  
488 MacIntire, A military treatise on the discipline of the marine forces, when at sea, p. 122-123
Marines even formed detachments for funeral parades for gallant marines just deceased. Private James Rembda a musician in the 25th Company for his funeral parade, to be held in the local commons, was given a marine detail of one sergeant, one corporal and twelve privates. All marine honour guards were to be detailed with arms, accoutrements and three rounds of ammunition for ceremonial firings.

Another duty while ashore for marines throughout this forty-seven year period was their assistance in the navy’s recruiting services. Marines were to serve in a variety of functions for the naval press gangs and tenders. This was to be the first rude awakening for many of the seamen to marines and their duties on ship. William Robinson explains his first experience and feelings: ‘Upon getting onboard this vessel, we were ordered down in the hold, and the gratings put over us; as well as a guard of marines placed round the hatchway, with their muskets loaded and fixed bayonets, as though we had been culprits of the first degree, or capital convicts.’

But this had not always been the case for as late as 1758, three years after their establishment, marines were forbidden from being sent on board a tender, they were ‘only to be sent in Ships [ships-of-the-line and frigates] and Sloops that are allowed by the Establishment [Rules and Regulations for Marines at Sea].’ These press ships worked both at sea and in port to impress naval recruits. Yet, within one year the Admiralty quickly saw the folly of this policy and the ready need of preventing pressed men from deserting when they were on the tenders awaiting transportation to a dockyard or ship. These Marine detachments were to consist of a sergeant, corporal and twelve men (the standard for sloops). This policy coincided with the Admiralty’s decision, taken from the Navy Board, to control the protections for seamen on board the tenders, boats, armed vessels and troop transports.

John Howe, a Marine on board HMS Serpent (16), reminisced about one of many times when he was put on the impress service in 1790. ‘We fited [sic] out and went to Sea on the impress Service May the 16th there being Some Disturbance between the British Court and that of Spain – having Got a few men from the Different Ships we met with at Sea we Put in to Liverpool on the 20th where we got 60 men from the Perveous [sic- Perseus] frigate.’

With Admiralty control of the pressing system their usage of marines was not coincidental for it gave them the ability to utilise precious resources on finding more men and prevent those on board the tenders from deserting. This was one of the only cases where marines alone served and were never supplanted by soldiers. This can be seen as a reinforcement of the concept of complete Admiralty control.

489 Order Book of Chatham Division, NA ADM 183/1, 12 October 1768
490 Chatham Order Book, NA ADM 183/1 22 June 1768
491 Robinson, Jack Nastyface: Memoirs of a Seaman, p. 26
492 NA ADM 2/1155, 20 July 1758, p. 12
494 Memoirs of Sergeant John Howe, Royal Marine, RMM 11/13/93, Part 6, p. 42
Marines were also used on land to help press gangs especially during hot presses. Marines were used to ring a city or a town on the turnpikes and roads before the press began, where they could be in place to catch any fleeing seamen. Unfortunately large naval ships were rare in most of the regions of Britain where pressing took place, and a ship-of-the-line was the only ship big enough to have a substantial Marine establishment to be utilised in this pursuit. Therefore the more frequent use of marines in hot presses occurred in towns sufficiently close to the Marine Divisional barracks where they could utilise their battalion strength formation (about 600 men) to help in the hot presses. One story from Plymouth in 1803 exemplifies the process:

Yesterday, at 4 a.m. an Admiralty Messenger arrived express in 32 hours from London, with important dispatches for the Port-Admiral, Rear-Admiral Dacres. In a few minutes orders were sent to the Colonel Commandment of the Marines, at Stonehouse and Mill Barracks, on the receipt of which the Barrack gates were immediately shut, and no person permitted to go in or come out of the Barracks. About 7 p.m. the town was alarmed with the marching of several bodies of Royal Marines, in parties of 12 and 14 each, with their officers, and a naval officer, armed, toward the Quays. So secret were the orders kept, that they did not know the nature of the service on which they were going until they boarded the tier of colliers at the New Quay, and other gangs the ships in Catwater, the Pool, and the gin-shops. A great number of prime seamen were taken out, and sent on board the Admiral’s ship. They also pressed landmen of all descriptions; and the town looked as if in a state of siege. [it was estimated that 1000 men were pressed on this night]495

While this story took place a little after our period it is a detailed example of what the order books for the three Divisions reaffirm. This led some within the public to most exuberantly suggest that this assistance to the Press Gang system was the main reason for the Marine Corps existence. In one article a year after the Corps was founded it decried the use of marines in this way. Parties of marines at Ware had chased bargemen along the river, ‘the poor fellows are almost starved, being afraid to come on shore for victuals for fear of being pressed’.496 However the Admiralty was very reluctant to use hot presses and so the use of marines in this way should not be overemphasised but just numbered among the ways they could help the impressment service in dockyard communities.

Marines and sailors had other tensions on land that would cause problems for them. In Plymouth on 6 February 1763 one report read: ‘Our town swarms with Marines; here is a report that a sailor has been killed, and that a bayonet was found sticking in his throat. It were greatly to be wished that no Marine or Soldier was suffered to wear a sword or bayonet unless upon duty.”497 Not all interactions between these two groups was violently hostile as some saw the influence of sailors as more mischievous then maliciousness. After getting paid in October 1783 Marine John Howe ‘was to Provide Lodgings for my Self and other Necessars [sic]…but this Proved very hurtfull [sic] to me for two Sailors Coming in who had a Deal of

496 Read’s Weekly Journal Or British Gazeteer (London), Saturday, March 13, 1756
497 Public Advertiser (London), Friday, February 11, 1763
Money and spent very freely stayd [sic] there three days and keept [sic] me drinking with them all the time’. 498 These tensions as shown above were many times stimulated by the Marines’ very separate institutional construction. The overriding fear of the Admiralty was with their marines beginning to identify with the sailors. It was felt that if this happened then the marines would not support their naval officers in disputes between them and the sailors. Mutinies were a constant fear throughout this period and there was never any guarantee how marines would react if they happened.

4.3 Mutinies at sea

Roger Wells, when focusing on the militia mutinies of 1795 attempted to demonstrate that military units, like the militia, would rebel over wage and living issues like food prices. However one of Wells’s more fanciful points was that most of these military units in the 1790s, when acting in mutinies and popular disturbances, were tied into a proto-‘peace movement’. 499 Another historiographical argument for why military units mutinied was because it was the only way they could voice their grievances as a mass labour organisation. 500 Peter Way outlines this idea when discussing the 1763-1764 American mutinies:

This mutiny reveals much about how regular soldiers viewed their job, being a rare time when the usually historically silent and anonymously massed ranks recorded their grievances in word and deed…its [the mutiny] primarily economic motivation, the threat of collective violence, and the soldiers’ withholding of labour, this “rebellion” echoed the plebeian crowd actions and early workplace disputes of the eighteenth-century Anglo-American world. 501

Way’s argument, somewhat overstates at times the ‘plebeian’ camaraderie, and at other times smacks of an old tired Marxist approach to labour disputes. However, none of this should lessen the understanding of how military units voiced their concerns. The Navy has received little interest in being viewed as a large homogeneous labour institution. However, sailors and marines used the same vehicle, mutiny, for voicing their grievances as land forces did. The main difference was that marines were to be a bulwark against this sort of response.

Evidence about direct Marine involvement in shipboard mutinies is obscure due in part to the ambiguous nature of how Marine court-martials were carried out. If an incident happened on land, then it was tried by a Marine Divisional Court-Martial (held at one of the three Marine Divisions) on the same model as the Army’s General Courts-Martial, which

498 RMM 11/13/93, John Howe Biography, Vol. 1, p. 36
501 Way, ‘Rebellion of the Regulars’, p. 761
were presided upon by thirteen officers.®

The Army’s Courts Martial divided into General to decide ‘capital offences’ and Regimental which decided on only criminal offences, but the Marine Divisional Courts-Martial were to decide both types of cases similar to the Naval Courts-Martial.® If the incident happened at sea, then it was adjudicated by a naval court-martial. Naval Courts-Martial were held for a variety of reasons, capital and lesser, but they could consist of anywhere from five to thirteen officers depending on how many could be mustered on station.® It needs to be stated that no capital sentences could be passed on any sailor, soldier or marine unless they had an opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses themselves at a court-martial.®

A second reason is the difficulty in defining mutiny as the official definition itself is ambiguous. The ‘Articles of War’ gave a variety of definitions for mutiny; there are five different articles of the thirty-six that deal with mutiny alone. Section II, Article III is of the highest importance as it would be used against the perpetrator[s] of a ship-wide mutiny. This article punished all men, regardless of rank, who ‘excite, cause, or join in, any Mutiny or Sedition’ with death.® However this never truly defined what the term mutiny meant and the Navy was in no rush to change this very loose interpretation of it themselves. This is one of the reasons why ‘mutiny’ was the word of choice for any offence, from insubordination of a single man to the rising up and seizure of an entire fleet. To narrow the focus, my concern is only with rare but very serious ship-seizing mutinies, of which there were less then a hundred from 1692-1802.

One of the largest mutinies of our period occurred among Admiral Thomas Graves’s squadron (nine ships) in 1780. When, on 7 April 1780, Admiral Graves ordered the fleet to set sail for the Americas, the captains of HMS Shrewsbury (74), America (64) and Invincible (74) came onboard the flagship HMS London (90) to inform him that their ships’ crews would not obey his orders. The men had not received their pay upon leaving Portsmouth, as was normally the case, and this was the sailors’ main grievance. Admiral Graves, “strongly recommended to them [the captains] to arm their marines and officers and such people as would join them to force their men up into daylight, they having shut themselves up betwixt decks with the ports all down [a typical sign of mutiny]”® By the twelfth, all ships except

® All marine court-martials from 1755-1802 are held in NA ADM 1/5489-1/5491
® S. P. Ayde, A treatise on courts martial. To which is added, an essay on military punishments and rewards. The third edition, with additions and amendments (London, 1785), p. 207
® Byrn, Crime and Punishment in the Royal Navy, p. 38
® J. McArthur, A treatise of the principles and practice of naval courts-martial, with an appendix, containing original papers and documents illustrative of the text (London, 1792), p. 46
® Rules and articles for the better government of His Majesty’s horse and foot guards, and all other his forces in Great Britain and Ireland (London, 1749), p. 5-6
HMS *Invincible*, had joined Graves in setting sail for America. Captain George Falconar of HMS *Invincible* was to experience one of the more violent mutinies. The actions on this ship would foreshadow those of HMS *London* incident in 1797.

The Marines were ordered on the quarter-deck, and being drawn up, commanded to fire on the crew, who were on the main deck in force; the Marines answered, by laying down their firelocks, and running off the quarter to the main deck, where they joined the seamen, notwithstanding every effort of the officers to prevent them. 509 Captain Thomas Boston of the *Sulpher* fireship, commanded the thirty boats from various ships in harbour which were sent to help Falconar put down this rebellion. Boston put in his boats ‘a party of marines, consisting of one or more marine officers, two sergeants, two corporals, and a proper number of private marines, to consist of those who have been longest in the Service and can be best depended upon’. 510 These men were to be fully armed, with bayonets fixed and muskets loaded. By calling upon the use of other ships’ marines to help, Captain Falconar was hinting that his own Marines were either not enough in number or were too complacent with the mutineers. 511 This was eventually confirmed on the eleventh when Admiral Thomas Pye, Commander-in-Chief Portsmouth, wrote to the Admiralty about the mutiny. He stated that of the total complement of 600 (420 seamen, 120 marines), two hundred sailors and twenty-six marines refused to come up on deck. 512 This event was to foreshadow the 1797 mutiny, and how marines could become complacent, or even active with the sailors in their grievances. The twenty-two percent of marines, on board HMS *Invincible*, exemplified that a sizable proportion of marines could identify with the seamen and work against their own and naval officers. The punishment meted out to the Marines who took part in this mutiny, is illustrative of the quick reaction by the Admiralty to make an example of them. Four Marines were ‘ordered to be shot at Portsmouth for the mutiny on board the *Invincible*’. These were men who had, ‘left their posts as centinels [sic] to join the rest of the crew, and by whose harangues the sailors became at last so very outrageous’. 513

Another mutiny, this time on board HMS *Culloden* (74) which took place in December 1794 was important for two reasons. It was one of the few successful mutinies that did not have the support of any marines on board. The crew is stated to have gone so far as to have ‘flogged several marines because they would not join them’. This was seen in the service and publicly as to the ‘honour and credit of the marine corps, there never was one of them concerned’. 514 *HMS Culloden*’s Captain Troubridge’s account gives a somewhat

509 *Morning Chronicle and London Advertiser* (London), Monday, April 24, 1780
513 *Morning Post and Daily Advertiser* (London), Wednesday, April 26, 1780
514 *Morning Post and Fashionable World*, (London) Saturday, 13 December 1794
different story about the action stating that six of his marines were with the mutineers. However, it is unclear if they were with the mutineers or cowering below like some of the midshipmen. The second important aspect of this mutiny was that the Captain Pakenham (senior naval officer of the area) had promised the seamen leniency. However, the Admiralty went back on this promise, and hanged five men, which was to have dramatic effects upon the future of the service. One historian went so far as to state, ‘After this no seaman would believe an officer’s word of honour. An essential bond of trust had been severed’. The Great Mutinies of 1797 are potentially the most written about event in the age of sail, excluding battles. These mutinies have been debated and analysed, with a great wealth of diverse opinions from contemporaries down to modern historians. Their interpretation has followed trends and thoughts more telling of the writers’ own times and personalities than the actual events of the mutinies themselves. Unfortunately one group to go largely overlooked in the historiography of these mutinies is the Marines. The only serious study to ever be written exclusively about the Marines’ involvement was a 1917 article ‘The Marines in the Great Naval Mutinies, 1797-1802’, by Lt. Colonel C. Field of the Royal Marine Light Infantry. Field was also the first historian to examine the personal correspondence of Marine officers who witnessed these mutinies first hand. Field’s work (and his later excellent book) is, however, clouded by his personal bias and agenda. Field understood that the Marines in the twentieth century needed to reinvent themselves to maintain their existence and the best way to do this was by showing their historical mission. Field’s agenda was clearly stated in a series of question and answer letters published in the *Mariner’s Mirror* in the 1920’s. A correspondent, going by H.R.H.V., asked a question about whether there was any truth in the ‘popular story that the Marines are carried in the Navy as protectors of the officers’. The writer challenges this concept by pointing out that ‘Marines took as active a part in them [the mutinies] as anyone else’. Field quickly fired back a response in the next publication: ‘H.R.H.V. seems rather to confuse the present with the past…coerced into the services by the Press Gangs [the sailors], the Marines were carried for the protection of the officers, or rather, to enable them to maintain discipline’. He goes on to blame the few reported cases of active mutinous marines on outsiders, foreigners, prisoners of war or a few raw recruits who had no loyalty to the ‘Corps’. He reinforced this statement with quotes from

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518 C. Field, *Sea Soldiers*, two volumes (Liverpool, 1924)
naval officers like St. Vincent and Brenton, who were renowned for making repeated statements highlighting the Marines’ loyalty. Lt. Edward Pelham Brenton stated; “The Corps of Marines maintained its good character to the last, and had they been supported, would have infallibly quelled the mutiny in the North Sea Fleet”.\textsuperscript{521} This line of argument was further advanced by Admiral St Vincent, who never had any doubt about the Marines’ loyalty, for he felt the whole problem was due to external threats like the Irish.\textsuperscript{522}

Unfortunately, these two quotes are misleading: Brenton who only saw the Yarmouth aspect of the Nore mutiny and St. Vincent who was in the Mediterranean were both men that had little or nothing to say about experiences in the Great Mutinies. Field’s agenda was to help promote ‘the Corps’ and demonstrate through its loyalty that it can be seen as an effective tool of British military policy, even in contemporary times.\textsuperscript{523} The only other historical work to look at the mutinies from the perspective of the Marines is Richard Brooks’s general survey of the Marines from 1664-2002.\textsuperscript{524} Brooks is constrained by the needs of making his book a general survey of the Marines’ 338 year history, in only 289 pages, and this means he only allocates four pages of text to discuss the mutinies. Brooks does state though that the situation was more complex than just a simple issue of loyalty. He unfortunately gives few examples of disturbances and no real analysis of what the situation or activity of the marines were in the mutinies.

These were the same arguments as those of contemporaries who questioned whether or not the Marines were actively involved in these mutinies. Lady Spencer in a letter to William Windham on 20 April 1797, stated just this:

They [the mutineers] at first agreed to be satisfied with Lord Spencer’s concessions, and then got off again by insisting on including the Marines—a most artful subterfuge! [emphasis added] making this hitherto useful body of men a party in their demands, they ensure their concurrence in all of them. Thus situated, what can be done to reduce this rebellious Spirit I cannot foresee.\textsuperscript{525} However, the facts don’t quite add up to such a conclusion. Even Colonel Field recognized that this constructed history of the Marines’ involvement in mutiny was not supported by the evidence. ‘It is, however, to be feared that this tradition is not entirely correct, though it may be considered to be true of the Corps in general, the exceptions being merely sufficient to prove the rule.’\textsuperscript{526} Still many contemporaries and historians were to believe that the Marines purely joined the mutinies to protect themselves from reprisal by the mutineers.

\textsuperscript{523} Field, \textit{Sea Soldiers}, Vol. I, p. i
\textsuperscript{524} R. Brooks, \textit{The Royal Marines: 1664 to the present} (London, 2002), p. 127-130
\textsuperscript{526} Field, ‘The Marines in the Great Naval Mutinies, 1797-1802’, p. 720
The narrative of the Great Mutinies usually begins with the petition sent to Lord Howe from the Queen Charlotte on 28 February 1797. This petition asked for an increase in food allowance to allow the ‘Seamen and Marines to provide better for their Families than we can now’. This demand set the tone, for throughout all of the mutinies, when petitions were either sent to the government, Admiralty or newspapers; they always stated clearly that ‘Seamen and Marines’ were the source of the grievances. This line of reasoning was further reinforced when both the Admiralty and government responded to the ‘Seamen and Marines’ in their ongoing negotiations with them. Some newspapers when reporting the sailors’ grievances sent to Lord Bridport had separated the issue of Marine pay from the seamen’s lack of increased pay. However, two days later a delegate committee’s petition sent to the newspapers never once mentioned this separation of grievance. Their grievance was largely concerned with fact that pay had not changed since the time of Charles II. A pay increase would allow ‘Seamen and Marines [emphasis added] to provide, better for their families, than we can now do’. When the seamen sent their reply to the Admiralty’s response to their demands, one of their reasons for rejecting the Admiralty’s offers was that the Marines had not been included. ‘As a further proof of our moderation, and that we are actuated by a true spirit of benevolence towards our brethren the Marines who are not noticed in your Lordship’s answer.’ Thus this reply demonstrated the Delegate Committee’s continued hope to keep the seamen and marine alliance strong and resolute.

Contemporary accounts further substantiate this point as many officers had lost faith in their marines’ loyalty. Captain Payne of HMS Russell (74), writing to First Lord of the Admiralty Earl Spencer, felt that the reason for the marines’ involvement in the mutinies was that they ‘are recruits, and never had any habits of military life or discipline [to divide them] from the seamen, [who] are one class with them’. Payne goes on to explain that this was largely, ‘one of the evils of keeping the establishment of that corps so low in peace’. Colonel Field over 100 year later was to agree with Payne’s idea that the Marine mutineers were largely raw recruits. There is some evidence for this raw recruits’ explanation. The total Marine complement voted in 1792 was 5, 573, of these roughly 3, 385 were mustered. But by 1797 20,000 marines were voted for with around 18, 000-20, 000 of these mustered. At first glance this huge jump in numbers does demonstrate the Corps to be full of relatively raw recruits. However, it should be taken into consideration that by 15 March 1794 alone, the

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528 Evening Mail, (London), Monday, 17 April 1797
529 Evening Mail, (London), Wednesday, 19 April 1797
530 Lloyd’s Evening Post, (London), Friday, 21 April 1797
number of marines was 7,908 mustered. These men that entered the service in 1794, or potentially even 1795 (around 8,000 mustered), would have nearly two years of service before the mutinies and can not be justifiably considered as new recruits. Unlike a sailor, the job of a marine was relatively quick to learn and did not require years of experience to be proficient. As Marine numbers quadrupled from 1792 to 1797, this was largely due to the new intakes of privates. Marine privates stationed in home waters’ ships were largely made up of fairly new recruits but their non-commissioned officers would still have served sometime in the service. As in every peace-time transition to war, the 1792 3,385 number was largely made up of non-commissioned officers, or men who would be quickly made non-commissioned officers when the mobilisation began.

Marine non-commissioned officers were not only the maintainers of Corps identity; they were also involved in the recruit’s initiation into the organisation’s larger identity. The majority of non-commissioned officers came from a trade or craftsman background, and were literate (a requirement to fill out musterbooks and other paperwork). So they could understand the class and social background of the men they were in charge of. With non-commissioned officers involvement in these mutinies was to take on a new dimension. These men held a lot of sway with their subordinates and could directly influence their loyalty in any mutiny. The general weekly returns for the Marine Barracks in Portsmouth around May 1797 reveal some interesting statistics about potential non-commissioned officer involvement in the mutinies. At the conclusion of the Spithead mutiny there was a massive discharge of non-commissioned officers from ships in the area. The Admiralty demonstrating their fear of Marine loyalty, ordered Lt. Colonel Macdonald of the Portsmouth Division of Marines to discharge twenty-one marines ‘who upon examination are found unfit for service’. It is highly likely that the reason for labelling these Marines unfit was because they were determined to have ‘behaved ill’ in the mutinies. Then, in the second half of May, another twenty-four Marine non-commissioned officers were sent ashore. Indicating that as the Captains of the ships returned to their respective commands after the mutiny they were attempting to rid themselves of untrustworthy Marine non-commissioned officers. What is telling is that upon the conclusion of the mutiny a Royal Pardon was granted for all involved yet these non-commissioned officers were still punished in the only method

533 This is exactly the same argument that other naval historians have used in the realm of seamen as in N. A. M. Rodger, ‘Mutiny or subversion? Spithead and the Nore’ in T. Bartlett (et al), 1798: A Bicentenary Perspective (Dublin, 2003), p. 559
534 Admiralty to Lt. Colonel Macdonald, 03 May 1797, NA ADM 185/83
535 Admiralty to Lt. Colonel Macdonald, 01 May 1797, NA ADM 185/83
available to secure their discharge from the fleet. It is true that being sent ashore was not only for cases of mutiny, as a man could be transferring to the recruiting service, another ship or potentially even being discharged for whatever reason not related to insubordination. However when examining a normal month like August 1797 the figures show a marked difference. In August only seven Non-commissioned officers were sent ashore, a number consistent with nearly all other months of 1797. So even if ten (of the above) non-commissioned officers, granted an incredibly high number, were removed for say normal administrative related reasons, this would still have left a staggering total of thirty-five non-commissioned officers discharged. In other words this would be the entire complement of non-commissioned officers for one first-rate and four third-rate ships-of-the-line, a massive number of skilled positions that had to be replaced. The vast majority of these non-commissioned officers were the most experienced non-commissioned officers, sergeants. 536

This demonstrates that not only did officers feel that their non-commissioned officers were untrustworthy enough to remove them from their ships, but also indicated that a majority of mutineers were very experienced men. Admiral Duncan spoke of the disappointment many Admirals felt about their marines, in a letter to First Lord Spencer. ‘He (Captain Scot) got his officers together and, though the marines left him, they got the better of those, cut down some, and reduced the rest to obedience, and is this day gone to sea. I am sorry to find the Marines are not in many of the ships so steady as they should be.’ 537 He continues his lament, ‘I am sorry to find the marines in most ships have joined the seamen and those on board HMS Standard (74) who behaved so well have turned their captain out of the ship’. 538

Unfortunately, due to the clandestine nature of the mutinies themselves, we do not have a clear picture of who the active participants were or what their backgrounds might have been. The only lists of delegate committees’ names still left are those of the Spithead mutiny, as they had attached them to their petitions after their seizure of control of the fleet. However this committee list shows no clearly discernable names of marines upon it.

The Admiralty was informed by Colonel-Commandant Innes at Chatham about some of Standard’s mutineers consisting of one sergeant, two corporals, one drummer and thirty-four privates who were brought to the barracks. These men were later to be transferred to a prison ship which housed ‘seamen mutineers’. What is really telling is that the sergeant, corporal and drummer alone (with one private), are named for ‘having remarks made against

536 General Weekly Returns RM Portsmouth May and August in NA ADM 185/38 3 May 1797 – 26 May 1797 & 4 August 1797 – 22 August 1797
their names’ a clear sign they were ringleaders. The first lieutenant of HMS Standard gave an account of the outbreak: ‘at length the Marines gave in to the wishes of some of our men, the flag was hoisted, the arms chests taken from the Quarter Deck, and the keys of the magazine demanded from my cabin’. Sergeant Dunn was another example this time on HMS Monmouth (64), whom the mutineers ‘call Captain of Marines’. He was not only active as a committee member but also actively punished officers whom he felt were a threat to the mutiny, as well as a fellow sergeant for the same reason. Another sergeant, William Winter, recently demoted to Corporal 18 May 1797 for drunkenness, was a radical member of HMS Inspector’s delegates committee. Winter not only called for the men to flee to France, but upon hearing the King’s Proclamation he ‘damned the King & said it was the Country he looked to, he said they were sticking out for Liberty & Liberty they would have’. HMS Inflexible (64) had sixteen marines named as mutineers with one sergeant on that list as well and he was also labelled as a member of the delegate’s committee. There is evidence that lower level non-commissioned officers were also active members of some of the delegate committees. One instance was in July, when HMS Saturn (74) returned to Plymouth ‘in a mutinous state’. A corporal, drummer, two privates and ten sailors were taken off the ship on the 5 July 1797 for ‘being considered the principal ringleaders in the mutiny which has existed on board the Saturn, for the last seven weeks that she has been at sea’. What is interesting was that this was one of the few successful mutinies to happen at sea, and once again integrated active marine support. Not all were entirely loyal to the delegates committee either, for at least one Marine sergeant, who was a committee member, was continually keeping the Marine officers informed about the movements of the committee.

Not all non-commissioned officers were active or compliant with the mutinies. There are also examples of non-commissioned officers standing up against the mutineers and paying the consequence for these actions. A corporal refused to take the delegate’s oath and was sent on shore after being ducked twice. Another, Sergeant Jenkins of Monmouth, received three dozen lashes and had his hair shaved off for ‘conspiring against the ship’s company’

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539 Major General Innes to Admiralty in NA ADM 2/1186, p. 446  
542 Hawkins and Watt, “‘Now is Our Time, The Ship is Our Own, Huzza for the Red Flag’: Mutiny on the Inspector, 1797”, p. 160-161  
543 A list of mutineers on Inflexible in NA ADM 1/728 15 June 1797, p.1-4  
544 London Evening Post, (London), Tuesday 4 July 1797  
545 Morning Post and Fashionable World, (London), Saturday, 8 July 1797  
was reported on 29 April, in a request from Admiralty, that two unknown corporals were sent on shore ‘from one of the ships at Spithead then in a state of mutiny for refusing to join in the measures then pursuing’.  

The Admiralty’s interest in who was still loyal to the government was also seen in their rewards to men for their loyalty. Various sergeants and corporals were later promoted for their loyalty, and in February 1798 a ‘committee of Merchants’ set up a fund of £300 to be distributed amongst “the fifty-four non-commissioned officers of this (Chatham) Division who particularly exerted themselves upon that occasion”. These rewards could also be an indicator of the Admiralty potentially trying to sweep the disloyal actions of the mutinous non-commissioned officers and men in the fleet under the rug. It does seem that the Marine non-commissioned officers while not punished corporally or capitally were none the less removed from the ships or even removed from the Corps as a whole. The Navy, while welcoming of those who would return to duty, did not easily forgive Marine non-commissioned officers who it seemed in their eyes should have behaved in a more becoming manner. The mutinous non-commissioned officers, most of them sergeants, also reveal that these mutineries were not influenced from outside the naval service but within. While marine mutineers were tried after the Nore mutiny like their sailor counter-parts it is hard to tell if there was an equal exodus from these ships. The general weekly returns for Chatham in this period are a little sketchy but the Admiralty may have felt since they could prosecute these men, unlike at Spithead, the necessity to remove them was implicit in their Court-martials.

Why would marines join in these mutinies and what advantage would they seek from it? Issues over pay were to be the reoccurring complaint for marines during these mutinies. As shown earlier, marines were on a very different pay scale than their naval counterparts. Naval personnel would not receive their pay until the ship was eventually paid off, however long that might take, whereas, by March 1797 marines were being paid at two different rates; one while they were ashore within their divisions and another rate while at sea. A Marine private’s salary whilst on land had not changed since they were first established in 1755, at 8d per diem with a subsistence pay of 6d per diem. In 1795, due to the increased price of food, the Army, militia and marines on land were given a temporary increase in subsistence wages called consolidated allowances. Unfortunately for the Marines, they were required to give up these consolidated allowances upon entering ships’ books. The men would have to be discharged from their ships before they began to receive their full subsistence pay again. This would directly affect the Marine Corps as an institution, for the longer a Marine on ship

549 Field, ‘The Marines in the Great Naval Mutinies, 1797-1802’, p. 730
550 Order for the Establishment of Marines in NA ADM 96/3 03 April 1755, p. 2-3; A. Guy, *Economy and Discipline: Officership and administration in the British Army, 1714-1763* (Manchester, 1985), Appendix 3
stayed in Home Waters, he daily had to witness his fellow Marine brethren on shore getting paid more for the same work. This would be an immense strain on the unity of the Marines as one homogenous group. This was prevented on foreign stations such as the Mediterranean, because the men were not in daily contact with other marines receiving more and regular pay. This could possibly be one of the reasons why marines in the Mediterranean did not follow their fellow marines in England and instead were an active bulwark against mutiny.552

In the Delegate committee’s petitions, marines, unlike their naval counterparts, never asked for a direct increase in their pay as such, but instead asked for a levelling of their pay. The sailors all asked for an increase in their pay which had not changed since Charles II. The Marines’ wages on land being continued at sea were therefore deemed as a justifiable demand to the sailors.553 While on ship, marines received the same ‘victuals and wages; and with regard to provisions and short allowance-money they are to be in all respects upon the same footing with the Seamen’.554 When the government eventually conceded to the mutineers’ demands, parliament ensured:

That the allowances usually called consolidated allowances made to Marines when serving on shore; viz –to Serjeants, Corporals and Drummers at the rate of two pence, and to privates at the rate of two pence farthing per diem, be continued to be made to them when embarked and serving on board your Majesty’s Ships.555

When added to a Marine private’s wage, the consolidated allowance money would mean that on ship a marine would receive £1-7-0 per lunar month, which would compare very favourably to the £1-9-0 per lunar month that an able seaman earned after the mutiny.556

More quickly followed the government was conscious of the adverse affect this would have on the Army if increased pay only went to Marine and Naval personnel.557 This was corrected by the Order in Council of 25 May 1797 to increase the pay of Army and Militia units to one shilling per diem due to the ‘extra price of bread and meat now paid by the public which at present amounts upon an average to the daily sum of one penny three farthing’. This increase, by 26 July 1797, was also given to the Marines non-commissioned officers and privates of, meaning that a Marine private would earn one shilling less per lunar month than an able seaman (the most skilled entry level job in the Navy).558 By convincing the seamen mutineers they only wanted to earn at sea what they did on land, the seamen did not realize that they were giving marines such a potentially high pay increase. Marines were also active

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552 A good account of St. Vincent and the Marines in the Mediterranean is in O. A. Sherrard, A Life of Lord St. Vincent (London, 1933), p.120-123
553 Able seamen was paid £1, 4s, 0d per lunar month and an Ordinary Seamen £0, 19s, 0d per lunar month in Rodger, Command of the Ocean, p. 624
554 Rules and Regulations for Marines ashore, NA ADM 48/58 01 August 1785, Section I, p. 1
555 Order in Council in NA PC 1/38/117 02 May 1797, p. 3; later confirmed in HCP, Journal of the House of Commons, 9 May 1797, p.556
556 Order in Council in NA PC 1/38/117 02 May 1797, p. 3; Rodger, Command of the Ocean, p. 624-5
558 Order in Council NA PC 1/38/123 26 July 1797, p. 4-5
in their support for other grievances; such as wives receiving pay, increased quality of victuals and sick pay. All of these were eventually granted in the 9 May 1797 Act of Parliament.  

Not all marine demands were granted though. A group of marines had sent a letter to Admiral Lord Howe complaining of “the unnecessary trouble of the cloaths we weare [sic] at present”, and wanted a new uniform issue to be made.  

This was not a common complaint as it can not be found elsewhere but it is an interesting indication as to the very nature of these mutinies. As stated in earlier chapters, marines received a completely new uniform annually. While the new uniforms did not always arrive in the new year, they can still be seen as a tool of group identification for these men, and one they wanted to maintain. If the marines’ demands were purely for government reform or revolution then why were all of their complaints about labour conditions, supplies and personal wellbeing.

There was an opinion gaining strength around this time among officers in the navy and marines that if they would have remained loyal, the mutinies would have failed. One naval officer put it: ‘If the Marines remain firm to their duty, a mutiny, though almost general, may be quelled; but even then it requires much determined resolution’. Unfortunately, ‘As the Marines had likewise caught the spirit of rebellion, replacing them with some regular regiments whilst discipline was restoring, might be attended with many advantages’. This statement is later confirmed by the government’s unwillingness to use marines in the barracks (accommodating around 750 for each Division) to quell the mutinies, but instead called in extra foot regiments to guard the cities and stop any spread upon land of the mutineers from their ships. If the government or the Admiralty had not been worried about the loyalty of their marines, then those shore-based forces could have been very helpful in any suppression of the mutiny. But their removal is an indication of the Admiralty and government’s fears regarding their loyalty.

There were many in the Marines though who did stay loyal to the service and paid the price for this loyalty. Lt. Fred Waters, who served in the Marines for nine years, complained to the Admiralty about his treatment by the mutineers. He said that he was ‘treated in a most inhumane manner by the mutineers at the Nore 1797’ but adds that later on he served with these same sailors at the ‘Dutch Action on the 11th of October [Camperdown]’, which was common among the North Seas’ Fleet. Many of the other marines also

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559 HCP, Journal of the House of Commons, 9 May 1797, p.556
560 C. Gill, The Naval Mutinies of 1797 (Manchester, 1913), p. 101
561 Naval Officer, A letter from a naval officer to a friend, on the late alarming mutiny aboard the fleet, (London, 1797), p. 8
562 Naval Officer, A letter from a naval officer to a friend, on the late alarming mutiny aboard the fleet, p. 25
563 Gill, The Naval Mutinies of 1797, p. 24
564 PRO ADM 1/3338, Memorial of Lt. Fred Waters
condemned the sailors for their mutiny and were somewhat disgusted by the ineffectiveness of the Marines in preventing these mutinies. When the frigate Virginie’s Marine officer John Robyns arrived at Portsmouth on 22 May 1797, the mutiny there had just finished. He wrote in his journal, ‘we have had the Mortification [author’s own emphasis] of witnessing the state of Anarchy and Confusion of the fleet in the Disgraceful mutiny which has now happily subsided’. Robyns’ ship would later be used in the Downs to act as part of the screen that prevented ships in the Nore from slipping out and possibly heading to France.

Some of the enlisted men also were against the mutineers and worried about the black mark it would cause upon the service. Seditious handbills were passed around the Army and Marine units in England during May 1797. In one of the replies by Marines to the Seditious handbills in Chatham, they use the language of gender to respond.

You say, Are we not Men? We are Men; we know it; and should the Enemies of our King, our Country or Constitution (either Foreign or Domestic) ever oppose us, we will prove ourselves as such, we should only lose our natural Claim to the Name of Man did we swerve from that Fidelity and Attachment which we owe to our beloved Sovereign and to our Country. You ask us, Are we anywhere respected as Men?

In the marines’ reply to the authors of the Sedition handbills they presented their cause as just and offended that anyone would even question their loyalty. They go on: ‘Cease therefore your vile Endeavours to poison our minds, for we are too steady attached to our Country, to our King, and to our Constitution, ever to be led astray by such absurd and wicked attempts’. The Marine officers at Plymouth could not understand how ‘a British Soldier will designedly be so forgetful of his own honor and of everything that he owes to himself and to his family, as basely to desert his country’s cause at any time but much less at a moment when Frenchmen boast of an intended invasion.’

Marines overseas and those working with Army detachments stayed loyal throughout the Great Mutinies. Around the time of the Great Mutinies Captain Shuldham Peard of HMS St George (98), which was part of Admiral John Jervis’s Mediterranean fleet, had two men under arrest waiting court martial. The ship passed forward a request for their release to the Captain, who refused their request. Upon this refusal the men began to plot a mutiny which Peard was able to receive word about before the men could enact it. Peard quickly doubled his marine guard (at the time a mixture of 25th regiment of foot men and marines) and stationed a large detail under arms on the quarter deck throughout the day. The pivotal point came when he called upon Captain Hinde of the 25th Regiment of Foot to investigate the

565 RMM 11/13/61, Journal of John Robyns 1796-1834, 22 May 1797, p. 2
566 RMM 11/13/61, Journal of John Robyns 1796-1834, 12 June 1797, p. 3
568 Diamond, ‘Royal Marine and Army Reaction to Seditious Handbills in 1797’, p. 219
569 Order Book Plymouth Division of Marines, NA ADM 184/3 24 May 1797
marines’ and soldiers’ loyalty under his command. Hinde assured him of ‘the steadiness and good disposition of the detachment’ under his command.570 With this reassurance Captain Peard called his officers and loyal men together and decided to remove the two prisoners from the ship thus ending the mutinous demands of the sailors on board ship. Captain Hinde was given a special commendation from Captain Peard and Admiral Jervis for ‘preventing this dangerous conspiracy from being carried into effect’.571

One of the bloodiest ship mutinies in British naval history happened on the 22 September 1797 onboard the frigate HMS Hermione (32) seized by its crew. Captain Hugh Pigot whom many contemporaries and historians have ‘assigned as the cause for the mutiny’ due to his ‘great severity’ in punishments was murdered along with nine other officers, one being the Marine lieutenant, McIntosh.572 McIntosh was at the time dying from Yellow Fever. Marine Sergeant John Place had been looking after the lieutenant when the mutiny broke out. Sergeant Place was one of the few loyal men left alive to testify at the eventual courts-martial for the mutineers.573 According to Sergeant Place, John Pearce was the only Marine to be active in the mutiny and stated that he observed him joining the Spanish artillery when the mutineers took the ship into Havana. On the day after the mutiny it was also stated that Private Pearce, ‘who had spent the forenoon drinking, heave into the sea his red, blue and white uniform, complete with pipeclayed cross-belts and gaiters’574 What is interesting about this mutiny is the way it was presented in the public domain. First it was stated that the mutineers had executed most of the marines, non-compliant seamen and even some women, in all about forty people were said to have been killed.575 This was an exaggeration. Then there were comments that marines had not been stationed outside the captain’s door on sentry duty. However the court-martial showed this report as well was untrue as there was a sentry at the door.576 The public clearly felt that the reason the mutiny was successful was not because of marine complicity but instead negligence of naval officers in their usage of marines to help stop the mutiny.

The last shipboard mutiny to discuss is that in HMS Danae (20) which happened on 10 March 1800 which had sighted the recently captured British ship HMS Plenty just off Ushant which they were eventually able to recapture. After the capture Captain Proby was critically short of manpower having a complement of less than twenty marines and eighty-one

570 Captain Peard to Admiral John Jervis, NA ADM 1/396 05 July 1797 p. 6
571 Admiral Jervis to Commander of 25th Regiment, NA ADM 1/396 06 July 1797
572 Under the January entry in Annual Register for the Year 1798 (London, 1800), p. 5
575 Whitehall Evening Post (1770), (London), Thursday 14 December 1797
officers and seamen left on board. Proby was therefore only able to maintain three of the four continuous marine sentries. It is also worthy of note that it was reported that of the forty-nine mutineers three were marines, potentially his three sentries that night but this is unknown. This meant that there was no marine sentry outside his own cabin. This has been considered by one historian of the mutiny, to be one of the primary agents in making this mutiny successful. This is an interesting assessment, for if the marines were weakened in numbers or were not on continuous sentry duties at their regular posts then it would give the mutineers a greater chance of success. This should not be seen as a catalyst of mutiny but rather an enhancement of its potential success.

4.4 Great Mutiny on Land?

Not all mutinies during 1797 happened on ship or at sea there was also one, very unique to the Marines, that happened on land. The only previous organised large-scale mutiny on land among marines before 1797 was in 1708. A recurring complaint during the War of Spanish Succession concerned the then Marine Regiments under Admiralty control, and their reputation for mutinous behaviour. In 1708 during that year’s French invasion scare a large group of marines refused to march to the embarkation point in order to board their warships. In another incident thirty-nine marines from Portsmouth laid down their arms in a public demonstration over prompt payment of their arrears in pay before they would move anywhere else. One historian has noted on this subject, ‘the physical act of embarkation provided for all soldiers a sort of Rubicon which it became the tradition not to cross until some arrears of pay were eliminated’. The Admiralty felt the best way to quell this sort of disturbance in the future was to assure prompt payment of the Marines while on land. This is part of the reason why the Paymaster General of Marines office was to be so important in Corps of Marines period.

The Plymouth Barracks mutiny, on Sunday 28 May 1797, had many similarities to the overall fleet mutinies of 1797. The reason for looking at this mutiny is two-fold; first while a small event it generated a large amount of concern not only by the Navy but also by the local government. This mutiny caused a flurry of newspaper articles, correspondence and fear from both the officials and the military as a whole. Second, this mutiny gives some greater understanding of how and why marines joined, carried out, organised or stopped mutinies. However, it is one of the most overlooked events in this period because of where it fits in the timeline, right between Spithead and the heating up of the Nore mutinies. The

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578 *General Evening Post* (London), Saturday, March 29, 1800
military authorities took great pains to investigate and prosecute the four mutineer ringleaders, so much so that there are over a hundred pages of court-martial testimony. Few historians have examined this mutiny, even then never in-depth, and no historian has looked at the court martial documents themselves. When discussed in the historiography this mutiny is seen only as an aspect of a greater United Irishmen involvement within the mutinies themselves and the military as a whole. When the full story of the event is brought into light, it reveals many things but about how these mutinies were organised and implemented but also the threat they posed to Marine identity.

Every Sunday within the Marine barracks, at Stonehouse in Plymouth, things were very quiet and the men who were not on watches tended to mill around town until they were required to return to the barracks at six o’clock in the evening. Somewhere between 5:30 and 6:00 pm on the 28 May 1797 a party of marines grouped together outside the gates on the hill, which the Marines referred to as their ‘exercise ground’. On the exercise ground were an estimated 25-150 marines, in all probability the number was 50-60 men who were drawn from the various companies of the Division. The men were called together to form a circle whereupon they discussed their grievances. After their discussion the assembled men took an oath whereby they picked up a prayer book, which lay at their feet, kissed it, then threw it on the ground next to the marine standing beside them, upon which he was to follow the same procedure. The oath called for the mutineers, on the next morning to step out of the ranks, lay down their weapons and demand a ‘shilling a day’. Robert Lee, the head ringleader, had promised that men from the 58th Regiment of Foot, then stationed in Plymouth, and two ship’s crews would join in the mutiny as soon as the Marines had acted. Before the mutiny could be carried out, the plot was discovered by Sergeant Andrew Gilborn who quickly informed the Marines’ officers, the Sergeant-Major, and the other non-commissioned officers who then promptly loaded their weapons. The officers and non-commissioned officers ordered the men to assemble on the parade ground and to lay down their arms, whereupon they were then marched back into the barracks. Upon the marines’ return to their quarters, the gates were quickly locked and arms securely stowed. This allowed time for the officers and non-commissioned officers to investigate who the ringleaders were and within the next few days the culprits were apprehended. After the arrest of the first three ringleaders, who were Irish, another Irish marine was over-heard trying to attempt to reignite the mutiny and free the three prisoners. He was quickly arrested before he could carry out this act. The four court-martialed mutineer’s ethnicity has been seen as proof of a purely Irish or even United Irish

rebellion. During the eventual court-martial the prosecution’s case attempted at the beginning to prove just this sort of idea. The four Marine privates; Lee, Coffee and McGinnis from the initial investigation and Branham for his later mutinous act, faced a full divisional court-martial which lasted from 23 to 26 June 1797. The court-martial was presided over by a Lieutenant General, with the rest of the board including a Major General, two Lt. Colonels, four Majors and seven Captains drawn from the Marines, the 25th Regiment (recently arrived in Plymouth to quell the mutiny) and Royal Artillery officers. The interesting aspect of the board was the multitude of senior officers sitting upon it. This demonstrated the serious nature of this potential mutiny and the fear it caused to the military command of Plymouth area. In contrast, during Marine Private James Thomas’s court-martial on 4 September 1797 charged with attacking four marines with a knife including two non-commissioned officers, a very serious crime, the court’s panel consisted of only five of its thirteen officers with a Majors rank or higher. There was even one Second Lieutenant to sit on this court’s panel.

So why did this mutiny fail where the others succeeded? Particularly, if as the court-martial purported, that anywhere between eight to twenty percent of all marines in Plymouth at the time had sworn the oath. The reason this mutiny failed where the others succeeded was due to one fatal flaw that even the mutineers on ship understood. The non-commissioned officers, or at least a proportion of them, needed to be on the side of the mutiny. During this mutiny not only did the non-commissioned officers stay loyal to the government but they were also active as a group in helping to suppress and investigate it. Sergeant-Major Charles Goldsmith, senior non-commissioned officer in the Plymouth Division, made a published proclamation the day after the mutineers meeting was discovered and quashed. Within this proclamation a statement about the non-commissioned officers continued loyalty to their country and king was made explicit. ‘That diametrically opposite to every Diabolical effort of French Jacobinism [author’s emphasis], we feel it our Duty and Interest to support our King, Country, and Constitution.’ The proclamation goes on to state that ‘a reward of Ten Guineas’, out of the non-commissioned officers’ joint subsistence, to be paid to anybody who would reveal the names of any ‘person or persons, who have, or may hereafter endeavour to sow the seeds of discord [author’s emphasis] among us, by instilling those false principles of

583 Letter informing the acceptance of the Duke of York to use officers for a general court-martial in NA ADM 1/1186 6 June 1797, p. 425
584 Court-Martial of Private James Thomas in NA ADM 1/5491, 4 September 1797, p. 1
585 It having been represented by the commander in chief of the western district, that some wicked dissaffected [sic] persons are endeavouring to seduce the soldiers from a sense of their duty... (Plymouth, 1797)
French Liberty’.\textsuperscript{586} A copy of this public proclamation was also sent to the Lords of the Admiralty. In a letter from them to General Bowater, on 1 June 1797, they commented that they were ‘grateful in finding that so much loyalty and zeal prevails amongst the non commissioned officers of your division’.\textsuperscript{587} The non-commissioned officers not only offered money to help in collecting evidence, they also actively helped by questioning their own subordinates and others within the division to find out more information for the upcoming investigation. The mutineers also understood the threat non-commissioned officers posed if they were not active participants in the mutiny. During the trial of Robert Lee the mutineers were said to have taken as part of their oath not only to fall out for a shilling a day, but most importantly ‘to destroy Serjeants and Corporals’.\textsuperscript{588} Contemporaries also recognized the importance of loyal marine non-commissioned officers in maintaining discipline. Henry Woollcombe II of Plymouth mentions in his diary that ‘before evening parade sergeants not corrupted [my emphasis]’ seized the privates’ side-arms, all muskets in the armoury and mounted a guard around the Marine Barracks.\textsuperscript{589} While this suggests that some of the non-commissioned officers’ potentially might have been ‘corrupted’, the act of others actively working against the mutiny was seen as the reason for its successful suppression.

The interpretation of United Irishmen involvement in this mutiny is at first concurrent with the initial reports and evidence for this assumption. When the incident was first reported in the papers it was seen as a conspiracy of 150 marines, who had assembling on ‘Stonehouse Hill’ outside the barracks. It was stated that the mutineers were even to be joined by sailors and soldiers ‘better to conceal their intention’. While this reporting is very close to the actual proceedings it never once mentions the ethnicity of the men who were ‘separately sworn by a private marine’.\textsuperscript{590} The first time the Marines’ ethnic identities were revealed, was in a letter from Colonel-Commandant Bowater to the Admiralty on the 29 May. In their reply letter, the Admiralty, confirmed and commended the actions taken by Colonel-Commandant Bowater, his officers and non-commissioned officers.

Your letter dated 29 Instant stating the particulars of a seditious and mutinous meeting of a number of Irish recruits belonging to your Division for the purpose of swearing the Privates to redress grievances, to get additional pay and to stand by each other ‘til they had made this like France and America, a free Country…\textsuperscript{591}

Their Lordships also commended the quick thinking of Colonel-Commandant Bowater, when he ordered the ‘Deputy Paymaster to pay the men the additional allowance ordered [this is the parliamentary increase after the Spithead Mutiny] to the Non-Commissioned Officers and

\textsuperscript{586} It having been represented by the commander in chief of the western district, that some wicked dissaffected [sic] persons are endeavouring to seduce the soldiers from a sense of their duty…\textsuperscript{587} Letter to Maj. General Bowater from Admiralty in NA ADM 2/1186, 1 June 1797, p. 416
\textsuperscript{588} Court-martial of Robert Lee in NA ADM 1/5491, 23 June 1797, p. 22
\textsuperscript{589} Diary entry for 27 May 1797 in PWDRO 710/391, Henry Woolcombe II diary, 1796-1803
\textsuperscript{590} Evening Mail, (London), Wednesday, 31 May 1797
\textsuperscript{591} Letter to Maj. General Bowater from Admiralty in NA ADM 2/1186, 31 May 1797, p. 414
This is a significant declaration by Colonel-Commandant Bowater that while marines had been awarded a pay increase it was too slow in being delivered. Therefore the quickest way to ensure the loyalty of those who were the most risk to the corps - the non-commissioned officers - was to give them their pay increase as rapidly as possible. This letter is also another confirmation about the importance of loyal Marine non-commissioned officers on the identity and loyalty of the men under their command. In a letter Bowater sent the Admiralty on the 30 May, he got to the reasons he felt the mutiny existed and that it was ‘entirely confined to the Mob Recruits’ which he had received in the past few months from Ireland. On 17 June 1797 the Admiralty informed Bowater that they had received from one Colonel Varls at Dublin a letter informing them of the transfer of more Irish recruits to Plymouth on the last tender. They were all ‘united Irishmen’, and though Bowater must take them in, the Admiralty had informed all in Ireland involved in the Marine Recruiting Service ‘to receive no more of that description’. While this demonstrates the concern of the Admiralty and Bowater concerning the ethnicity of potentially hostile recruits and if this were the end of the story then the historians would be very correct in their assumption of mutineers’ potential United Irish sympathies. However, the court-martial and all the subsequent information tell a more complex story of the events.

The first court-martial began with the trial of Private Robert Lee, of 51 Company, who is considered by all (except for himself) to have been the ringleader of the mutiny. Throughout all of the various testimonies and witnesses there was only one statement concerning the ‘principals of Republicanism’ attempting to being instilled in the men. This statement came from only one source Private Hutchinson. While potentially a very credible source it was one of only two sources (the other was Pvt. Divine) to give evidence about the Marine mutiny only after hearing about a monetary reward being offered. Therefore his testimony could have been potentially tainted by sensationalism in order to receive the reward of twenty guineas and their immediate discharge (something not promised in the proclamation). As an aside these two informers both refused the discharges. Potentially this was because these men were hoping to receive preferment in the next round of promotions to non-commissioned officer’s rank. If, as historians have stated, Irish mutineers were so unhappy with service then these informers (both Irish) would have been happy to take the bounty and discharges offered. This causes some problems with the historical notion that mutinies were demonstrations against the treatment of recruits. If the recruits, especially Irish, felt there was no chance for advancement or that punishments were too excessive then

593 Letter to Maj. General Bowater from Admiralty in NA ADM 2/1186, 1 June 1797, p. 416
595 Court-martial of Robert Lee in NA ADM 1/5491, 23 June 1797, p. 5
596 Court-martial of Robert Lee in NA ADM 1/5491, 23 June 1797, p. 7-8
they should have jumped at this easy outlet. Also just because the Marines in Plymouth had a high proportion of new recruits, these recruits should not been seen has having a high propensity to mutiny or more importantly success. This is confirmed by the testimony of one witness, who asked Robert Lee how he would support his mutiny with such ‘a parcel of very young recruits in the barracks’.597

External conspiracies whether United Irish or Republican have repeatedly been mentioned as being catalyst to or helped with the success of the Great Mutinies. Yet the evidence for these conspiracies is hazy and long in its inference.598 Most of the men who were to testify against the mutineers were Irish, so were most of the non-commissioned officers who were so active in cracking down on this mutiny. Also, the men who gathered at the oath taking on the exercise grounds were said to have been drawn from all the various Marine companies in the Division including the grenadier and light companies.599 As with all Marine division these men would have been drawn, not singularly from Ireland, but from all over the British Isles and various foreign countries. There was also no request by the mutineers for those who joined in the oath to be Irish or even have any Republican sympathies. Another telling aspect of the mutiny is that Private Lee claimed to have the support of seamen from HMS Powerful (74) and soldiers from the 58th Regiment of Foot. There is no evidence that the men with whom Lee was in communication in these various military units were Irishmen. The Powerful had an ethnically diverse crew, like many naval ships, and the 58th Regiment was largely drawn from Northamptonshire and Rutlandshire. This casts doubt on there being any large sympathetic appeal for a broader Irish cause. A more logical radical cause could have been that the men were looking for a reform or ‘Republican’ overthrow of the British government and not a separate Irish rebellion. Private Lee did show some comprehension of gaining popular military support for their cause, for when asked about the Militia’s potential response to their mutiny, he stated that the Militia would realize their demands were universal. But he later soundly dismisses the Militia’s importance by stating, ‘I would trust my life in the Devil’s hands, as soon, as I would in a Militia Man’s hands’.600 The Lord Mayor of Plymouth instead of calling on the Militia to mobilise at the height of the tension instead requested a reinforcement of the 25th Regiment to be marched from Somerset. The movement of an entire regiment shows the paranoia of all officials in Devon concerning the loyalty of the Army and Militia units currently in the area.

597 Court-martial of Robert Lee in NA ADM 1/5491, 29 June 1797, p. 49
598 One of the best looks at this is Elliot’s work but it is still plagued with the same problems as other accounts in M. Elliot, Partners in Revolution: The United Irishmen and France (New Haven, 1990), p. 134-144
599 Court-martial of Robert Lee in NA ADM 1/5491, 29 June 1797, p. 49; Court-martial of John McGimnes in NA ADM 1/5491, 26 June 1797, p.14
600 Court-martial of Robert Lee in NA ADM 1/5491, 29 June 1797, p. 50
Part of the United Irishmen conspiracy hinges on some conflicting and ambiguous information about Robert Lee’s background. While this might seem somewhat pedantic, his past and familial connections are used by some historians as the direct source of his United Irish linkage. The assumption about Lee’s background, in the past historiography, is from one Home Office letter written from Edward Cooke, under-secretary for the civil department in Ireland, to the Duke of Portland, then Home Secretary. According to the letter Lee was an ‘apprentice’ to Bush, a Dublin lawyer ‘who is also of Republican Principles’. Also according to this letter Lee’s brother was named Edmund, a Dublin Music seller, who was known for being ‘violent in his language and politics’. According to historian R. B. McDowell, Edmund Lee was one of the original Dublin United Irishmen, joining in 1792. Lee, according to this Castle intelligence document, ‘…was in Dublin a few Months ago and probably enlisted with a view to create the Mutiny’. Once again none of this information adds up to what transpired in the court-martial. Lee’s brother is mentioned only once in passing and even then he is only a side note of conversation; there is no evidence that his name was even Edmund. But even if Edmund is his brother, this is still not a ‘smoking gun’ indictment of Robert. There is no doubt Lee was Irish or from Dublin, he even stated that he had talked with many of the recruits about life in Dublin. He even once used his knowledge of the town, during his court-martial, to question the potential Catholic background of one of his accusers. As a potential radical he does admit to a bit of a travelling spirit, for he admitted that he had lived in London, Dublin and the United States. However, the impression he gives throughout the trial is that it has been a very long time since he was last in Dublin, something in direct conflict with the Home Office letter mentioned above. It is also unlikely that he was ‘in Dublin a few months ago’ because he admits that he was actively considered for a promotion to corporal before the mutiny. Most promotions to non-commissioned officer’s rank, while not always, were largely based on seniority and competency indicating that he had potentially more longevity in the Corps than just a few months prior to the mutiny. This is further confirmed by the fact that most of the men which had come from Ireland with him had already been promoted non-commissioned officers. There is one more point that potentially shows his length of time in the service being more than a few months. He was in the 51st Company of Marines as they say in his court-martial, however this company was stationed not at Plymouth but instead Portsmouth. This means he was initially inducted into the Marines in Portsmouth (could have even been shaped by the Spithead Mutiny) and was in

601 Cooke to Cavendish in NA HO 100/70, 4 July 1797, p. 7-8
603 Court-martial of Robert Lee in NA ADM 1/5491, 23 June 1797, p. 24
604 Court-martial of Robert Lee in NA ADM 1/5491, 23 June 1797, p. 4, 44
Plymouth probably awaiting reassignment to a new ship.\textsuperscript{605} Hence he had to have spent sometime in Portsmouth training and then on ship before he was in the barracks at Plymouth and with his disputes with Sergeant Aldsworth over the state of his arms.\textsuperscript{606} His character and family are never brought into question by anyone in the court-martial. The local newspapers even reported that he ‘is said to be of respectable connexions’ and his behaviour was ‘genteel, and superior to the common style’.\textsuperscript{607} Edward Cooke was no fool and his intelligence was usually good; but if there were serious issues with Lee’s background or familial connections then there should be more evidence of this from the various witnesses that mention they knew him on his voyage to Plymouth barracks.

When the court-martial documents were received, the Admiralty and King both approved the sentences that were passed by the courts-martial. Privates Lee, Coffee and Brenan were sentenced to death by firing squad, while John McGinnes was given a thousand lashes and transported to New South Wales. The King was gracious enough to lower McGinnes’s sentence to 500 lashes and transportation, but the others were still to be shot.\textsuperscript{608} The sentences were carried out at ten o’clock in the morning on 6 July 1797 on the Hoe at Plymouth to an audience estimated to be around 30,000 (Georgian numbers are always tricky). It was stated that 3,500 military personnel were also assembled on the day of execution, no doubt to control any further disturbance, and also to witness this example to any further military malcontents. The military personnel attending were made up from units of the 25\textsuperscript{th} Regiment of Foot, Lancaster, East Devon and East Essex Militias, several companies of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, Plymouth Volunteers and finally marines from the barracks. Private Lee was given spiritual advice from the vicar of Charles Church while the other marines were serviced by a ‘Romish Priest’. This mutiny should have been a perfect example of potentially containing a greater conspiracy. Barracks, unlike a ship, were not isolated from the civic community and therefore could be influenced by the broader civil debates. Yet when the only case of a mutiny took place on land in this period there was no evidence or even hint of influenced by the outside population. The mutineers did not go to the public for help but instead to their military brethren the local soldiers and sailors.

4.5 Summary

The policing duties of marines at sea and on shore were a key element to their non-combat related duties and hence their identity. These functions were to act as a mode of

\textsuperscript{605} Court-martial of Robert Lee in NA ADM 1/5491, 23 June 1797, p. 3; Table of the Quarters of the Marine Companies in NA ADM 118/232
\textsuperscript{606} Court-martial of Robert Lee in NA ADM 1/5491, 23 June 1797, p. 8
\textsuperscript{607} Court-martial of Robert Lee in NA ADM 1/5491, 28 June 1797, p. 34; London Chronicle (London), Thursday, 29 June 1797
\textsuperscript{608} Letter from Admiralty to General Bowater in NA ADM 1/1186, 3 July 1797, p. 480-481
control for the captains’ of the ship over their men. Marines were berthed in the aft of the ship and by their physical presence acted as a divide between the officers and seamen. They were also to wear red jackets and carried small-arms during their duties onboard ship which was another visible divider. By marginalising them from the crew, the Admiralty was attempting to prevent any fraternisation or identification with sailor grievances, a policy that failed during the Great Mutinies.

On land marines were deployed to protect the dockyards by standing watch over them twenty-four hours a day. The importance of the dockyards was so great that many times during peace, keeping a guard detail fully manned prevented battalion drills. 609 By being in contact with the civilian population and dockyard workers sometimes caused moments of friction but, as on ship, marines were to be strictly controlled and supervised by their officers and non-commissioned officers. While naval officers or Commissioners of the Dockyards could punish marines they were encouraged to do it through the proper Marine chain of command.

The Great Mutinies were the sole instance when the identity between a large portion of the Marines and Admiralty broke down. This breakdown in identification acted as a catalyst for the success of the fleet-wide mutinies. The Marine enlisted ranks’ growing disenfranchisement over not being treated equally with their brethren on land was made worse by the close proximity to land that the Channel Fleet was forced into during 1797. In other words the more marines on ships stayed close to those on land the greater the communication between the two and therefore the growing grievances over unequal pay. Naval historians have repeatedly emphasized the importance of seeing this event as arising from labour or trade concerns. It was estimated that the mutinies caused huge fiscal troubles for the hard-pressed British government and some even feared about the troubling precedent they set for the future. Edmund Burke accented this belief when writing to William Windham on 16 May 1797:

It has happened as I long feared it would that the danger has commenced in the very foundations of our false security. We have paid near £600,000 [author’s emphasis] A year for the destruction of our Naval discipline and Naval fidelity for ever: and this unfortunate measure of buying mutiny and unsubordination [sic] in the Navy, has been followed by a beginning in the Army, which will run through the whole, and as most certainly it will be the measure on such a peace as they will make, to keep up a great Military and Naval establishment, the will be enormous. 610

While Burke always feared that the Revolution in France would spread, it is telling that even contemporaries classified this as a purely industrial disturbance. While some of the historiography still looks for outside radical influences, the demands of the sailors and

609 Colonel-Commandant Tupper to Admiralty, NA ADM 1/3290 16 August 1787
marines were largely concerned with purely fiscal issues. If these mutinies were concerned with radical issues, then there should have been more radical demands inherent in the marines’ and sailors’ many grievances. The centrality of the pay issue is ultimately why the King, although begrudgingly, gave his initial pardon to the mutineers of the entire navy and marines after the Spithead mutiny. But when these mutineers took further steps, they were severely punished, as evidenced by the executions after the Nore and Plymouth uprisings.

Marine non-commissioned officers were the direct shaper and maintainers of Marine identity, and so if they choose sides in an issue then they usually could sway the majority of privates as well. While there is no doubt that most privates were fairly inexperienced men they would consequently look up to the non-commissioned officers to establish discipline and influence their actions. The non-commissioned officers were in direct daily contact with their men and were berthed and messed with their men. Their influence either for or against the mutinies was demonstrated time and again. If there were enough non-commissioned officers in support of the officers, then they could potentially be used to quell a mutiny, as Plymouth demonstrates. But if they were against the officers then the mutineers tended to be successful such as Spithead or Nore. These sergeants and corporals not only took part in the mutiny, but also became members of the various Delegate Committees.

It is also remarkable that as extensive as these mutinies were, violence was a rarity. The Gordon Riots of 1780 and their eventual repression were to see thousands of pounds in damage and over four hundred people killed or wounded. The overall discipline shown, a possible reflection of non-commissioned officer’s involvement, during the Great Mutinies (especially Spithead) gives further credence to the concept that these mutinies were not radical movements, but instead orderly trade disputes. HMS Hermione and Danae, two of the most violent mutinies, reinforce this point more so. On these two ships the officers and crew, including marines, who did not joining in the mutiny were to be violently mistreated.

Marines felt that by being left on ship and not rotated on land where they could not only receive regular pay, but also their full subsistence, they were being unfairly marginalised by the Admiralty. This led to a growing sympathy with the sailors’ plight and soon a national strike was held that could not be easily suppressed. This put the government in a very difficult position because the one force they could utilise on ships to suppress such a disturbance could no longer be trusted. So the Navy needed to ‘forgive and forget’ quickly and rebuilt the image of the Marines as a loyal force of the government and Navy. This was seen with the mutiny of the HMS Castor (32), in the West Indies, a potential mutiny in December 1801. Captain Fanshaw, captain of the ship, ordered Lieutenant J. S. Smith and his marines into quick action. The court-martial made it a direct point to commend him: “Your

611 Rude, The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England, 1730-1848, p. 59
prompt and spirited execution of Capt. Fanshaw’s orders, appears to the Court to have stopt [sic] a very dangerous mutiny; and this token of their approbation of your conduct will be transmitted to the Commander in Chief”.  

But more importantly the article was prefaced with the powerful statement that, ‘we feel great satisfaction in every opportunity of doing justice to this meritorious Corps’.  

This is interesting, for not only was this intended to be broadcasted throughout the fleet but it was also published in the Naval Chronicle. On one last note, when it was first formed the Metropolitan Police in the nineteenth century were to see about a quarter of all its manpower to be drawn from ex-service members. Of these ex-service members forty-six percent were ex-soldiers, thirty-eight percent were ex-sailors and thirty-seven percent ex-marines. The vast majority of sailors (78 per cent) and marines (66 per cent) respective, who stated so had chosen the Metropolitan Police as ‘first choice of employment’. The ex-sailors and ex-marines were more successful in gaining promotion to constables and were ‘regarded as prize recruits’.

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Chapter V: Operational Doctrine

The operational doctrine of the British Marine Corps would not only influence the Marines’ identity but also be influenced by that very identity. Operational doctrine would shape not only how marines fought but what their very purpose for existence was to be. It would take forty-seven years to codify this doctrine into a set policy but when it did it would shape the Marines for the rest of their history. This operational doctrine would prepare marines, through constant training, for amphibious operations. The value of the Marines’ existence in this dual world of sea and land were eventually recognised with the bestowment of the title of ‘Royal’ in 1802. Before discussing the training and implementation for sea and land battle-space there needs to be a definition of the terms that will be used throughout this chapter.

Operational doctrine is a term that is composed of various elements. Operational in modern military theory consists of the second part of the battle-space triumvirate of military theory (i.e. strategic, operational and tactical). The military study of the operational perspective of warfare has recently been classified as operational art. Operational art theory was first formulated by Soviet military planners in the 1920s and 1930s. Krause and Phillips in their work on this subject, define operational art as ‘the middle ground that linked national strategic goals with tactical objectives’. They go on: ‘It is more than large-scale tactics, but it is not small-scale strategy either. It has both a tactical and a strategic dimension, because it must create a vision of unity of action of the battlefield that ultimately achieves a strategic objective.’ Therefore, the operational side of warfare, sits like amphibiousness, in a duality of existence between two other worlds. So for strategy to translate to tactics, and vice versa, in the field there needs to be another level as well but there also has to be a clear doctrine of action.

Doctrine is a term more difficult to place within the context of military theory and thought. It is also considered by many in the naval profession as anthemia to the very nature of naval warfare. The US Department of Defence Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines doctrine as: ‘Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives.’ They add the caveat that ‘it is

616 M. D. Krause, & R. C. Phillips (eds), ‘Preface’, p. vi
authoritative but requires judgement in application'. 618 Jan Glete has taken this one step further and places doctrine within the broader historical naval context.

In order to attain efficiency in warfare some kind of coherent relationship between the military and political goals of the state is necessary: the way to fight the war, the characteristics of the materiel [author’s emphasis] used and the recruitment and training of the personnel... A doctrine has both strategic and tactical elements. 619 This is very similar to the concept of operational art as a concept that bridges the gap between two larger concepts. When placed into the more malleable context of the institutional realm the two combine into operational doctrine.

Operational doctrine represents the basic military combat potential of the British Marine Corps from 1755-1802 and hence its prime purposes for existence. The Marine Corps’s operational doctrine while never clearly written out in one document can be seen through the foci of various operations at sea and on land. By their very nature marines had to be prepared to carry out a multitude of specific functions in sea and land combat, even in the same day. The first section of this chapter looks at the marines in sea-based combat. This section is divided into two separate, yet very cooperative, sub-sections. The first part examines marine aspects of training for sea-based actions. Marines were trained, continuously while at sea, to serve out defined roles when involved in sea combat. This is something historians have overlooked or even misinterpreted. The second aspect is the tactics implemented in battle itself, for training and implementation are many times two different things. Marines were forced to fight squarely within the tactical limitations of sea combat, i.e. limited space. While their most important function in a naval action was to be a device of continuous ‘targeted’ fire suppression support.

The second section of this chapter is concerned with the Marines in amphibious or combined operations. Amphibious operations were to have one of the largest impacts and implications upon the Marines operational doctrine. These operations gave the Marines one of many justifications for their continued existence as they would directly enhance the amphibious combat ability and strength of the British nation in this period. This section is divided into two sub-sections with the first concerned with training for land-based operations and landings. The second is concerned with large and small scale amphibious operations where Marines played distinct but important elements. Large-scale operations were to consist of large elements of Army, Naval and Marine personnel attacking strategically important targets. In these operations marines played a small but vital part in the amphibious operations strategy, as a mobile reserve force. In small-scale operations, while never intended to seize

618 Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defence Dictionary of Military Associated Terms (Washington D.C., 2001), p. 171
and garrison territory marines were an important element in overall British national strategy by diverting enemy resources. The Marines over this forty-seven year period trained and implemented many tactical strategies in order to attain the broader British strategic goals. They were able to do this by amalgamating all their training and practical knowledge into an operational doctrine, codified in the very nature of the Marine Corps as an institution.

5.1 Marine Training and Tactics for Sea Combat

Brian Lavery has suggested that ‘a ship of 74 guns, with about 120 marines, used only about a dozen of them as small-arms men in action’ (Table 2). He goes on to chastise marines in relation to their more traditional role in boarding actions, ‘there is no real reason to believe that marines were particularly effective at this’. 620 I will show in this section that this is a misunderstanding of the changing importance of marines in sea engagements by highlighting, below, how marines utilised their abilities in concentrated firepower to great affect during ‘pistol shot’ actions. Their role in boarding parties have also been largely misunderstood as they were more effective in repulsing enemy boarding attempts and in providing vitally important suppression fire for the naval boarders.

Table 3 Marine Distribution in War-time Fleet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guns</th>
<th>Captain</th>
<th>1\textsuperscript{st} Lieut.</th>
<th>2\textsuperscript{nd} Lieut.</th>
<th>Sergeant</th>
<th>Corporal</th>
<th>Drummer</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100 guns</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90 guns</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80-74 guns</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-66 guns</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64 guns</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 guns</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 guns</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44-38 guns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-32 guns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 guns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-20 guns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-14 guns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 guns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 guns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Training instructions and manuals of the period were of two different types, official and private. The official instructions were sent by the Secretary at War or Admiralty but these instructions always carried the distinct recognition that they were approved of by the King, whereas private instructions were published by individual authors and had to be purchased by the individual service member. Unfortunately, marines were given only very limited official instructions especially concerning their duties and training for sea engagements. The only documents given to a ship’s captain to discuss fleet tactics and the responsibilities of the ships in action were the issued fighting instructions. These instructions were very vague in their tactical principles and many times added to by individual Admirals like Hawke, Howe and Nelson before they went to sea or into action. The only guidance the Admiralty issued to individual Marine and Naval officers for training concerning individual ship tactics was the *Regulations and Instructions relating to Marines serving on board His Majesty’s Ships*. These regulations were renewed periodically throughout this period, but only Article IX, was specifically concerned with training at sea. Its statement of responsibility was brief, ‘Marines are to be exercised by the Marine Officers in the Use of their Arms, as often as possible, to make them expert therein’. This left many issues unanswered; like where marines should be stationed, how they should fight and what their duties during a sea engagement were. One reason for this lack of specific instruction was the fear of the Admiralty’s encroachment on the ships’ captains, or fleet Admiral’s, ability to plan and dictate his own ship’s tactics in an engagement. This simplicity and decentralisation of naval tactical training further accented the responsibility of each naval captain to prepare his own ship for any upcoming action.

Some Admirals felt it important enough of an area to issue, limited, instructions to their fleet’s marines, similar to Rear Admiral George Berkeley on HMS *Mars* (74) in 1799. However, while longer then the Admiralty’s instructions, it was still less then two hundred words and primarily concerned with adequate preparation of ammunition before action. Most of the instructions to Marine officers were given by the individual ship’s captains. When a Marine officer entered a new command he was issued with a set of the *Captain’s Orders*. These orders were concerned with a wide range of issues from discipline to hygiene but they also gave instruction about the practice of great guns and small-arms drill. The

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621 The 1691 Instructions by Admiral Russell were in general were used throughout the eighteenth century in NRS Vol. 29, *Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816*, J. S. Corbett (ed.) (London, 1905), p. 175
622 Regulations and Instructions relating to Marines serving on board His Majesty’s Ships in NA ADM 96/3, 1759, p. 5-6; Regulations and Instructions relating to Marines serving on board His Majesty’s Ships in NA ADM 106/308, 1804, p. 5
perceived need, by the naval captains, to issue these instructions was not only in the desire to create a cohesive tactical doctrine for the ship in action but also to educate and instruct the young inexperienced Marine officer. It was felt that young Marine officers needed to be instructed due to their inexperience, illustrated in one published pamphlet of advice to naval officers. It exclaimed, ‘if the marine officer is a raw lad, and therefore troublesome, as [then] no one can dictate to you what steps you ought to take in carrying on service’. Many newly commissioned Marine officers in wartime were young, between 16-19 years old and fairly inexperienced in tactical thought and training. This led to the ship’s captain needing to be forceful in giving instruction and tactical structure to these young inexperienced officers. The Commanding Marine Officer in Portsmouth, in 1775 when representing these problems to Admiral Sir James Douglas, was in complete agreement and felt it was vital that these young officers be ‘disciplined’. Admiral Douglas replied: ‘several parties of Marines on board His Majesty’s Ships at this port have been much neglected with respect to their discipline, arms and clothing by reason that the Marine Officers belonging to the said parties are so seldom on board their respective ships.’

These problems however should not be overstated as in wartime 1st to 6th rate ships had at least one senior marine officer on board. These senior officers would either be of Captain or 1st Lieutenant’s rank and usually had prior sea experience, due largely to the slow promotion and gerontocracy of the Marine officers’ ranks. The ship’s captains own instructions were usually as vague, if not purely repetitious, of the Admiralty’s Regulations and concerned themselves purely with the need of small-arms drill and placement of ammunition. The Admiralty, Naval Captains and Marine Officers did understand the importance of training and the amount of time it took to make men fully prepared as all of these orders called for the men to be ‘exercised daily’.

This did not lead to a complete lack of thought about tactics for marines engaged in combat at sea. There were a few private manuals devoting a large portion of their overall work to this topic. These private manuals were to have a dramatic impact on the proper use of marines during sea engagements. One of the first writers to tackle this topic was Lt. John MacIntire in his 1763 work *A Military Treatise on the Discipline of the Marine Forces When at Sea*. While this work has been quoted by many historians as a piece on training and theory for amphibious warfare, it was specifically directed at marines. He demonstrates this in his preface to the work by stating that it was gathered from various foreign military maxims and

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had been thoroughly ‘examined, and approved, by many [Marine] Officers of superiour [sic] Rank and Experience’. 627

MacIntire admits that his section on sea engagements is made up of ‘knowledge I have acquired of this subject’ and ‘is more from Theory than practice’. 628 However, there is strong evidence to suggest that his theories did directly influence Marine officers. These theories were to transform the way in which marines did their training and performed these tactics in the acid test of battle. Marines performed various duties during ship to ship engagements. At the start of the battle when the ships were well outside of musket range marines acted as part of great gun crews. Interestingly this was discussed in a manner not of theory but instead of common practice by MacIntire. In his work he matter-of-factly stated that Marines were employed ‘at the great guns, to assist the Seamen’. 629 There was even some demand from naval officers that great gun training continue for marines when they were even on land. Charles Middleton advocated, ‘it would be of great service to the navy by rendering the corps of marines much more useful, if they were trained to the management of artillery when ashore, as in action it is generally necessary to quarter the greatest part of them to the great guns’. 630 The navy feared that while marines were taught these skills at sea they would be too rusty if stationed on land for any length of time. This would be one of the primary reasons for the eventual creation of the Royal Marine Artillery in 1804.

At sea marines were to join in with the seamen in being ‘frequently exercised at the cannon’. 631 One of the reasons for using marines to help man the great guns was the smaller size of overall crew numbers onboard Royal Navy ships in this period, as opposed to their opponents in the French and Spanish Navies. With marines filling out the gun crews they could help in their gun crew’s overall firing speed. Marines were to be a very small number of the overall gun teams and even then they were to fill the lowest level of their respective gun crew’s hierarchical command structure. Examining the placement of a gun crew onboard a 74-gun ship-of-the-line, like HMS Goliath from 1805, gives some good illustrations of these concepts. There was at least one marine in every six members of an 18-pounder gun crew, meaning that no more than twenty-eight marines were on the main-deck of HMS Goliath (74) during action. The lower-deck which held the largest guns, 32-pounders, would have one or two marines assigned to each gun crew, hence placing roughly forty-two marines on the lower-deck. This gun crew placement was the same on the smaller ships as well as larger

628 MacIntire, A Military Treatise on the Discipline of the Marine Forces, When at Sea, p. 109
629 MacIntire, A Military Treatise on the Discipline of the Marine Forces, When at Sea, p. 118
ships-of-the-line in this period. On the big guns (32-pounders and above) a maximum of two marines were stationed to each crew while for all smaller weight guns only one marine was assigned to each crew. The scene upon these decks during action was described by one Marine Lieutenant as: “every man appeared a devil...all were working like horses” as “in their checked shirts and blue trousers, there was no distinguishing Marines and seamen” as the Marines performed their duties without their red jackets. Finally, one Marine private was stationed in front of the fore magazine and passage way to act as a sentinel to prevent anyone from entering the magazine with any flame or ember. In total, roughly eighty-five percent of marines on board Goliath would be in the lower-decks during the initial stages of an action. The fifteen percent left were assigned to do duty on the poop and forecastle. Within this fifteen percent, were concentrated the majority of Marine officers and non-commissioned officers (only one Marine corporal was below decks on 3rd Rates and larger). These men were the most experienced marines (in the case of non-commissioned officers) and, in the case of the officers, a certain standard of bravery was expected from them in combat. Marines were becoming so integrated into the workings of the great guns that some of their officers were even proficient enough to give instruction. Marine Lieutenant George Crespin of HMS Russell (74) was known to continually be ‘on the poop instructing the Marines in the use of the great guns’. While many of these were the carronades it still represents an example of Marines and their officers’ growing abilities with artillery.

A growing common tactic of the British fleets in the eighteenth century during actions was to wait till their targets were within the distance of ‘pistol shot’ before engaging. This was usually a tactic synonymous with Admiral Nelson. However, Admiral Hawke in 1757, and possibly 1747, specifically ordered his naval captains to “on no account to fire until they shall be within pistol shot”. There is further evidence to suggest this was becoming a fairly common practice for sea engagements throughout the foundation period of the Marine Corps within the mid-eighteenth century. This tactic led to the changing importance of Marines in sea combat from just boarding party experts, one as old as antiquity, to a targeted fire support and suppression force. Private manuals reveal the growing importance of this area’s theorisation and discussion of a training routine that would prepare the men for these changing needs of in-close action. As ships moved to within ‘pistol-shot’ marines began to innovate their tactics.

be brought from the lower-decks to the upper-deck to serve two important functions, that of fire suppression and the repulsion of boarders. Marines being used as a tool of fire suppression or support, is potentially their most overlooked duty, by historians, within eighteenth century sea combat. Fire suppression was not a tactic wholly concerned with killing or immobilising one’s opponents upon their upper-decks but was also intended to kill gun crews as well. A platoon of the best marksmen ‘should be picked out, and ordered to take aim, and fire at the enemy’s port-holes: two or three expert men killed at a gun may silence it for half an hour’. Targeted fire or marksmanship in sea battle was not a uniquely important trait of the British, as the French and Spanish used snipers or marksmen in their fighting tops during action. The usage of snipers was made infamous by the shot that killed Nelson during the battle of Trafalgar. Sniping from the fighting tops was not a practice adopted by the British Marines; as the fighting tops in action are unwieldy and the sway of the ship would have made it difficult for them to give any accurate fire. Nelson and others was also against this practice because of the risk of the gunfire setting fire to the ship’s own sails. Instead Marines could be more effectively used in ‘parapet firing’ on the solid wooden decks. Parapet firing was when the ship’s men would lash their hammocks to the side of the ship’s upper deck in order to act as a barricade in action. Behind, but close to, this barricade marines were to form two lines in depth (three on the larger ships); the first line fired then it knelt down to reload, then the second line fired and knelt down to reload and finally the first line stood to start the process all over again. By creating a constant wall of fire, marines could sweep the upper-deck of personnel and hamper the gun crews by firing through the enemy gunports. To maintain the great volume of fire necessary to make this tactic useful, marines would lash arms chests to the gratings full of ammunition. There was also consideration given to the idea about bringing up spare arms with which to exchange if another became defective in action. Emphasising the importance of concentrated suppression fire, Marine officers were instructed that their men ‘must never be suffered to fire at random or in a hurry’. Marines were to practice constantly so that they could ‘be accustomed to fire frequently with ball on board a ship at a mark, hung for the purpose at the extremity of the fore-yard arm’. By preparing marines for firing at sea it would allow them to become accustomed to the motion of the ship when at sea. It also helped train them in being able to direct their fire in order to sweep clear the enemy’s decks or suppress specific parts of the enemy’s ship.

637 O’Loghlen, *The Marine Volunteer*, p. 113-114
638 O’Loghlen, *The Marine Volunteer*, p. 115
639 MacIntire, *A Military Treatise on the Discipline of the Marine Forces, When at Sea*, p. 113; O’Loghlen, *The Marine Volunteer*, p. 113
Marines were to be in a constant state of readiness made possible by their training schedules. As discussed above marines at sea were continuously drilled but this was to be continued even when they were at anchor. St. Vincent’s Standing Orders for the Mediterranean Fleet of 22 June 1798 clearly laid out this drill practice. When the fleet or ship was at anchor the ‘whole party of marines in the respective ships of the fleet is to be kept constantly at drill or parade under the direction of the commanding officer of marines’ and they were not to be ‘diverted there from by any of the ordinary duties of the ship.’ The need for repeated live fire exercises with small-arms could also be quite dangerous, as the HMS Boyne (98) case in 1795 would demonstrate. ‘Thus was I situated on this day when this unfortunate accident happened, and when I lost all my clothes, books, charts, instruments, and weapons of every description, to the amount of at least four hundred guineas.’ The accident happened:

…from the marines exercising on the poop, by a cartridge having been blown into the admiral's quarter gallery, which, lodging in some packages in the cabin, caught fire at half-past eleven in the morning, and in five minutes ran up the rigging, and put it out of human power or ability to extinguish it; she broke adrift, from the cables burning, and obliged the fleet at Spithead to get under way and move to St. Helens; and having at last grounded on the Spit, there blew up.

All of this drill and practice did pay off when marines were called upon to do their duty in action. During a fight with the French ship Royal Sovereign [sic] the marines of Admiral Boscawen’s fleet were openly commended for their action. Captain John Scaife of HMS Chesterfield (60) stated, ‘the fire of the English Marines was so hot, they [French] were obliged to fight [from] their lower deck guns only’. John Howe, a Marine on HMS Robust (74) during another action stated ‘we were now drawn up across the Ardent [French ship] to fire with our small-arms into her’. Robust’s fire suppression was so great that they were able to fight off two French ships giving them enough time till Admiral Graves could offer his assistance. In 1795 when HMS Blanche (32) was engaged with a French frigate La Pique the British marines kept up such ‘a constant fire of musquetry [sic] into her’ that they were able to sweep the decks and quiet down La Pique guns. After the action the marines’ action was further explained. ‘The Marines under Lieutenant Richardson keeping so much directed and constant a fire that not a man could appear upon her Forecastle until she struck, when the

640 St Vincent’s Standing Orders for the Mediterranean Fleet of 22 June 1798 in NRS Vol. 138, Shipboard Life and Organization, 1731-1815, B. Lavery (ed.), p. 219
642 This was most likely a misidentification by Captain Scaife as the only there was no French ship at the battle of Lagos in 1759 called Royal Sovereign the nearest name is the 74 gun Souverain
643 Captain John Scaife to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/2473, 24 September 1759
645 Proceedings on board His Majesty’s Ship Blanche in NA ADM 1/317, 05 January 1795
second Lieutenant and ten men swam on board and took possession of her.

These are just a few examples of how the theories in private manuals and drills were to be put into great affect by the Marines in action.

As discussed above all officers and nearly all non-commissioned officers were stationed on the upper-deck from the very onset of the engagement. By stationing these men here they were able to coordinate the actions of marines coming from below and give them appropriate formation and targeting instructions throughout the battle. The commanding Marine officer was to be posted near the Captain of the Ship, from where ‘he may sooner receive his orders’ and relay them on for appropriate action. The Captain (or commanding officer) of Marines had a secondary task and a most important duty of guarding the ship’s colours. He was requested to, ‘keep a watchful eye on them, that all accidents may be speedily repaired’. The protection of a ship’s or regiment’s colours in action was considered one of the most honoured positions in battle. The officers and non-commissioned officers by being on the upper-deck during battle were, like their naval counterparts, to carry out another function by their very presence in the thick of the action.

The Officers are to shew [sic] a good example, and appear cheerful, it being remarked that the private soldiers [marines], form their notions of the danger, from the outward appearance of their officers: and, according to their looks, apprehend the undertaking to be more or less difficult.

This meant that like the naval commanding officers on the quarter-deck, the Marine officers were exposed to some of the most unmerciful aspects of battle at sea and would consequently pay for this honour in higher casualties as well. Marine Captain John Hopkins was to die after suffering from wounds received after the action at the Nile. He was one of the five officers on the ship to be wounded or killed. Marine officers were to suffer casualty rates of one in sixteen killed and four in thirty-seven wounded during the battle of the Nile. The total casualties of marines in proportion to naval personnel in this action were 124 of the 895 total casualties. This number of casualties is roughly equivalent to an entire Marine compliment onboard a 74-gun ship-of-the-line. When considering this number of casualties in proportion to the amount of marines on board all the ships in the action were roughly 1600. So about thirteen percent of all marines engaged in the battle were casualties whereas of the navy’s 5708 only eight percent were to be casualties. This was to be near the exact proportion of

646 Captain Caldwell to Admiral Jervis in NA ADM 1/317 11 January 1795
648 MacIntire, A Military Treatise on the Discipline of the Marine Forces, When at Sea, p. 111
casualties in the 1805 battle of Trafalgar.\textsuperscript{650} The heavy casualties of marines are further confirmed in other smaller battles throughout this period. A marine on the Robust at the battle off the Virginia Capes on 16 March 1781 recounted the heavy casualties suffered on the upper-deck. ‘I was stationed on the forecastle with twelve private[s] 2 corporal[s] 1 serjeant and one Lieutenant of Marines and at this time they were all killd [sic] and wounded’.\textsuperscript{651} These casualties would represent nearly all of the marines on the forecastle of a 74-gun ship in the initial stages of the action.

Boarding during the eighteenth-century was a rare occurrence; most battles saw ships slug it out with their main guns until one of the ships had enough and struck its colours. As this period continued on there was beginning to be a drastic change in French tactics which thereby changed British tactics as well.

Since the French revolutionaries were indifferent to the useless sacrifice of life, and refused to surrender when their position was hopeless, British officers had to get into the habit of boarding the undefeated enemy. It became necessary for officers, sometimes even senior officers, to lead boarding parties in person…\textsuperscript{652}

One of the best, remaining, descriptions of British boarding parties is outlined in the watch book of HMS Indefatigable, a razeed 38, from 1812.\textsuperscript{653} Even though this watch book was several years after our period, it seems to be indicative of common practice rather than something radically different for the late eighteenth century. Boarding parties were separated into four groups each consisting of different men and weapons. The first boarding party consisted of fifty-two seamen and officers, thirty-five of which were men rated as able seamen or petty officers. In other words, sixty-two percent of the first boarding parties were made up of highly experienced seamen with years of sea service and who could sail the ship if it was captured. Over the next three boarding parties this trend of experienced seamen decreases to twenty-six percent (second boarding party), twenty percent (third), and thirteen percent (fourth). It is not until the fourth and final boarding party that marines were to be used.

The examination of the boarding parties’ weapons is telling. The first boarding party was armed with swords and drawn from men of the upper-deck. The second party was armed with a mixture of half swords and half pikes, with these men coming from the remainder of the upper-deck (with swords) and the other from men on the middle-deck (half pikes). The third party was a mix of half pikes and half tomahawks, and once again these were split like the second boarding party, with half from the middle and half from the lower-decks. The

\textsuperscript{651} RMM 11/13/93 in John Howe Biography, Vol. 1, p. 23
\textsuperscript{652} N. A. M. Rodger, ‘Honor and Duty at Sea, 1660-1815’ Historical Research, Vol. 75 [190], 2002, p. 445
\textsuperscript{653} Watch, Quarter and Station Bills in HMS Indefatigable, 1812 in NRS Vol. 138, Shipboard Life and Organization, 1731-1815, B. Lavery (ed.), p. 300-315
final party, and the one marines were attached to, were armed with half tomahawks and half small-arms (all marines were armed with muskets and bayonets). The importance of this is two-fold; when boarding an enemy ship, there was not a terrible amount of room to move due to the confined space of the upper-decks on enemy ships. Therefore, the smaller the weapon the easier it was to wield. Secondly, marines were better trained in small-arms, and therefore fired more rapid shots than the seamen who had limited training in comparison. Ergo, it was more prudent to have marines continue their withering fire upon the enemy from their own ship, which provided supporting fire for the navy’s boarding parties.

Placing marines in the last boarding party group gives credence to the suggestion that marines’ responsibilities in action had changed from their ancient character as boarding party experts. Marines were to be utilised in the more valuable position of repelling enemy boarding attempts. To prepare Marines for this repelling duty they were to practice bayonet drill daily in conjunction with their small-arms drill. The practice began with the men forming up on the poop deck in formation, they fired one shot then charged with their bayonets, when they reached the end they halted in order to recover their arms, they then followed the same procedure on the quarter-deck and finally again on the forecastle. By practicing this drill every day on the upper deck of the ship the men would have great familiarity with where an enemy might attempt to board but also familiarity with the best methods in repelling them from these areas. The bayonet throughout this period was to be seen as a symbol of the Marines’ martial spirit. The bayonet exercise also ‘will be of great service to young soldiers, as it warms their blood, and roused them to ardour and intrepidity’. In battle when this practice was implemented it created a veritable wall of steel with which marines repulsed the enemy boarding parties. Marines would be called upon to practice this same process of forming up and repulsing the enemy’s boarding parties multiple times throughout a battle. The pivotal point of a boarding was when a marine was called upon to repulse their ‘assailants upon the points of his [marine] bayonets’ as they started to board the ship. Bayonet drill was more important then just in the help of sea assault, as it was seen as a broader marker of professionalism. ‘The bayonet, in the hands of men who can be cool and considerate amidst scenes of confusion and horror, is by far more safe to those who use it, as well as more destructive to those against whom it is used, than powder and ball.’ After years of training and usage marines were beginning to develop a

654 Watch, Quarter and Station Bills, HMS Indefatigable, 1812 in NRS Vol. 138, Shipboard Life and Organization, 1731-1815, B. Lavery (ed.), p. 300-315
655 MacIntire, A Military Treatise on the Discipline of the Marine Forces, When at Sea, p. 7
656 Proceedings on board His Majesty's Ship Blanche in NA ADM 1/317 05 January 1795; O’Loghlen, The Marine Volunteer, p. 115
657 T. Mante, The history of the late war in North-America, and the islands of the West-Indies, including the campaigns of MDCCLXIII and MDCCLXIV against His Majesty's Indian enemies (London, 1772), p. 215
certain level of unique professionalism in their handling of the bayonet. By the Napoleonic period one Army officer writing in the 3 May 1811 *Edinburgh Annual Register* commented on just this sort of thing. ‘The Royal Marines, however, frequently called upon to board enemy ships or to repel boarders, had long been noted for close attention they paid to bayonet exercises, and had developed by experiment a more individual style.’\(^\text{658}\) The bayonet was becoming a favoured weapon of marines not only at sea but in land battles as well. ‘The bayonet is the only thing to convince them [the enemy] and I think in the course of this week a great number will know the grand secret.’\(^\text{659}\) Marines also began to judge their opponents not on their musketry but on their bayonet competence. This sentiment was confirmed by Lt. Wybourn who was part of the 1799 expedition against Holland. Wybourn stated that the Dutch ‘immortalized themselves, never were braver men, they disputed every inch of ground by the bayonet’.\(^\text{660}\)

These two tactics of marines during sea battle, providing targeted suppression fire and repulsing boarding parties, were to demonstrate the growing flexibility inherent in their operational doctrine. Marines were able to work in close coordination with their naval counter-parts throughout every stage of battle from the operation of the great guns to supporting naval boarding party attempts. Marines were an ever increasingly important aspect of the eighteenth century Royal Navy’s ability to win battle successfully at sea. Through cooperation and their ability in small-arms they were to become a growing key to success in the sea engagements of the period.

One last point to emphasise the growing professionalism of the Marine Corps and their non-commissioned officers is to discuss their being utilised in a wider training role. Marines were not the only people on ship to be trained in small-arms drill. Seamen were trained in the use of small-arms by the Master at Arms and his Corporals. Each naval ship was to provide a set amount of landsmen or seamen, depending on the rate of the ship, who were to be trained in small-arms drill. These men were to act as a supplement to marines in actions on ship and on shore. Whereas marines were exercised everyday in small-arms, the Master at Arms was ordered to exercise the naval men only once, every sixth day in the week.\(^\text{661}\) As a sign of the ever growing confidence, by naval officers, in the Marine non-commissioned officers’ expertise in small-arms drill, by the 1760s there was an increasing number of ex-Marine non-commissioned officers serving on board ships-of-the-line as Master at Arms (warrant officer)


\(^\text{659}\) Captain Bowater to Earl of Denbigh, WRO CR 2017/C 244, 15 August 1776, p. 27


or Corporals (petty officer). Captain Gidoin of the frigate HMS *Richmond* (32) needed a new Master at Arms and personally requested ‘James Dunn, late a Serjeant in the Marines, from which service he produces an excellent character having applied to be employed in that station’. 662 There were some in the Navy who also began to see the Master at Arms and Marine sergeants as carrying out similar responsibilities. This led to the practice by some ship’s captains of utilising their sergeants of marines in order to fulfil both responsibilities when on board the ship. 663 The interesting aspect is that these men would be paid both rates of pay while performing these functions at sea, providing many with a nice supplemental income.

### 5.2 Marine Training and Theory for Land Combat

Amphibious operations or the ability to strike at one’s opponents from the sea in a variety of places and at the time of ones choosing was a basic tenant to the so called ‘British way of warfare’. 664 This tenet during this period would be termed the ‘blue-water’ strategy. Amphibious warfare was defined by some contemporaries as ‘expeditions carried on jointly by the fleet and army…a littoral war, which in its nature partakes of both sea and land’. 665 This has led later historians to even assert that this process of warfare could be considered as an ‘active defence’ policy of the country and not one of offensive power. 666 Land combat through amphibious operations was one of the areas to have the greatest impact on the operational doctrine of the Marine Corps over this forty-seven year period. Marines, operationally, were expected to fight in a variety of amphibious engagements both large and small scale. Throughout this period they were trained in and developed theories for how to fight on land. The late 1750s and early 1760s was a period of highly increased theorising about amphibious operations. 667 These works were published with a very specific audience in mind, the military professional of all three of the service branches. They all clearly marketed their works in order to give a ‘means that may render attacks at sea or on the enemy’s coast,

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662 Captain John Gidoin to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/1837, 12 April 1776
665 T. Molyneux, *Conjunct expeditions: or expeditions that have been carried on jointly by the fleet and army* (London, 1759), p. iii
666 H. Richmond, *Amphibious Warfare in British History*, [Historical Association Pamphlet No. 119] (Exeter, 1941), p. 3
667 Molyneux, *Conjunct expeditions: or expeditions that have been carried on jointly by the fleet and army*, Part 1-2; J. Robson, *The British Mars. Containing several schemes and inventions, to be practised by land or sea against the enemies of Great-Britain* (London, 1763); MacIntyre, *A Military Treatise on the Discipline of the Marine Forces, When at Sea*
more probable of succeeding’. It is also no coincidence that the vast majority of these works were published at the height of the Seven Years’ War or right after its successful conclusion. This war was to see the greatest amount of colonial conquest in the eighteenth century the majority carried out through amphibious operations.

The two-part book by Thomas Molyneux, probably an army officer who served in the Rochefort expedition, was a historical observation on the multiple ‘conjunct expeditions’ from ‘the decent of Caesar to the affair of Rochfort’. While this work did deal with historical examples it was also the first work to outline the concept of a British Way of Warfare. Molyneux’s work gives some limited theories about the usage of large scale amphibious operations. He felt there was a fundamental importance in constructing a theory that could be effectively combined with practice in warfare. ‘Thus to make practice go before theory, which should be its consequence, and so they be[t]ray [sic] their insufficiency, by busying themselves out of season, in what, at a proper time would have been their best employ.’ Molyneux’s work, by being largely a historic work, conceptualised the Marines largely in their historical context as purely soldiers who served on ships. He does, however, continuously separate the Marines from the Army in his discussions of the various operations in his work. This may be an effect of Molyneux’s contemporary setting but at the minimum it shows a difference of their perception in the public’s imagination. Unfortunately, Molyneux’s work is largely a critique of past operations hence preventing him from posing a central amphibious theory. The importance of this work is that it lays the foundation for the eventual thinking about amphibious warfare theory and training that was to come.

Training and theory are largely addressed in two other works; one by Joseph Robson and the other by John MacIntire. Joseph Robson’s work is largely that of an engineer, his trade, and so its theories are directed in this aspect of amphibious warfare. The work is largely centred on how best to protect British fortifications or conversely the best method of effecting an attack on the fortifications of an enemy. The last work written, and the most profound, John MacIntire’s, has the most to say about the Marines and their amphibious operational context. Marine field officers, similar to some of their Army counterparts, had a minimum fifteen years experience in the Marines, or Army, and hence were greatly experienced in this type of operation. MacIntire’s purpose in writing his treatise was instead for the benefit of the platoon level officers. These officers many times were ‘young, and unexperienced [sic]’ and would probably ‘meet with many obstacles an old officer would

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668 Robson, The British Mars. Containing several schemes and inventions, to be practised by land or sea against the enemies of Great-Britain, p. i
669 Molyneux, Conjunct expeditions: or expeditions that have been carried on jointly by the fleet and army, Part 2, p. 200
670 Robson, The British Mars. Containing several schemes and inventions, to be practised by land or sea against the enemies of Great-Britain, p. i
surmount’. Hence these young officers needed theory and instruction in order to lead their men properly in the field. MacIntire’s theories were developed from personal experiences and military treatises (even foreign ones). He admitted that the ‘quotations from foreign authors only contain general maxims’ and were written by him to ‘assist officers that are not so well versed in the French Language [author’s emphasis]’. Its scholarly and theoretical appeal to John MacIntire’s work made it very influential in shaping the theories of marine’s duties in amphibious operations. These works and others were to shape not only the amphibious warfare theory of the British state throughout the eighteenth century, but also the operational doctrine of the British Marine Corps.

Training was a continual issue in the daily lives of marines whether they were in the barracks or on ship. This training can be broken down into three different levels, all interdependent, but distinct for their size and importance. The first level of training which Marines were required to do, every day, on a personal level was small-arms drill (discussed above). Small-arms drill had a dual function at sea and on land but its primary importance was in allowing the Marines to be effective as a land fighting force. Marine small-arms drill on land followed the Army’s and Militia’s drill exactly. The important aspect of the small-arms drill to the development of the Marines’ operational doctrine and identity is the role played by non-commissioned officers. Sergeants in the barracks were to work with small squads of men to observe and maintain proper exhibition of drill. The corporals were utilised as assistants to the sergeant in this manner, whereas the officers were to oversee the operation of the drill and gave orders to the platoon or company as a whole. Non-commissioned officers were pivotal to an effective presentation of platoon fire and were placed on the flanks in combat and parade, with sergeants in the front and the rear ranks filled by corporals. In fact non-commissioned officers, both in the Army and Marines, were so renowned for their knowledge of drill that they were some of the first to perform the new regulations as they became available. As shown above, at sea the men could have occasion to practice their musketry with gun powder but usually no balls. This was the case when marines were in the barracks as well. Live fire was not always important for musketry training of this period. Muskets were highly inaccurate and formation firing was not greatly concerned with accuracy but volume. The use of ball and powder could be quite dangerous when in proximity to the civilian population. Doctor Blackett of Plymouth in 1763 made an official complaint to the

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671 MacIntire, A Military Treatise on the Discipline of the Marine Forces, When at Sea, p. vii
672 MacIntire, A Military Treatise on the Discipline of the Marine Forces, When at Sea, p. vi
673 Chatham Division Order-book in NA ADM 183/1 03 May 1756; Chatham Division Order-book in NA ADM 183/1 22 May 1770
commander of the Plymouth Division. He warned of ‘a Marine firing a ball across the water from Stonehouse which entered at one of his windows’. The officers and non-commissioned officers were given strict orders to ‘inspect into the men’s arms before they go to exercise [and] are to be sure that every piece is unloaded’.\(^675\) So by repeated practice marines would be able to effectively maintain their place in the line of battle on land, by their increased ability at rapid formation fire.

The second level of training for marines was in detachment or platoon size formations. One reason for the platoon level of training was that this level could give greater enhancement to the men’s martial discipline. Discipline in the eighteenth century was considered one of the most important aspects of any military unit. Discipline had two different but interconnected meanings; the first meaning, and its more traditional usage, was as a type of punishment or restriction of behaviour. The second meaning, more martial in its connotation, is that of instruction and education in the ways of warfare. MacIntire outlines the more martial side of this relationship. His instructions, ‘begin with the practical part of discipline, and divide the men into small squads, two deep, in close ranks and files, with firelocks on the shoulders’.\(^676\) When on ship these platoons or detachments were to be made up of men from the various companies of the three Divisions in the Marine Corps. This was the case for ships that were moored for an extended period near one of the three naval dockyards. For example, in 1797 the HMS Sandwich (90) a guardship at the Nore, mustered 50 marines, of these men no more then five were from the same company and while a little over half were from Chatham Division the rest were from the other two marine Divisions. This is confirmed in other time periods and in ships serving in both home waters and in overseas stations.\(^677\) On land these smaller detachments, of platoon size, were routinely exercised outside the barracks. These detachments were divided and ‘exercised as usual after roll call, and fire powder every morning the weather will permit, and to be under the immediate care, and inspection of the officers of the detachment’.\(^678\)

However, there was a feeling that Marines were not receiving enough large scale detachment training on land. In an article in 1790 a writer titling himself *Per Mare Per Terram* was in favour of:

…allowing half to be on shore and half on board, which always ought to be the case, in order to keep up the discipline of the corps; by which means the regiments would never be interrupted in their regular rotation of shore-duty, and there would be a sufficiency of marines for any fleet that could be fitted out upon any emergency such as the present.\(^679\)

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\(^675\) Plymouth Division Order-book in NA ADM 184/1 27 April 1763  
\(^676\) MacIntire, *A Military Treatise on the Discipline of the Marine Forces, When at Sea*, p. 3  
\(^677\) Sandwich Muster Table in NA ADM 36/12398 1 July-28 September 1797; this is similar to other ships on active duty like Robust Muster Table in NA ADM 36/8497 1 January-29 February 1780  
\(^678\) Chatham Division Order-book in NA ADM 183/1 25 January 1775  
\(^679\) Diary or Woodfall’s Register (London), Friday, July 30, 1790
The final level of training for the Marines was the battalion formation which was the largest effective tactical formation of the eighteenth century. J. A. Houlding put it that the battalion was the place where ‘tactical theory and drill regulations were scored’ or practiced and implemented. Battalio

formation drill and training could only be carried out on land due to issues of space and numbers of men used. Battalion drill was considered by the Marines as their most important training formation for those marines serving ashore. MacIntire showed that by utilising all three levels of training the Marines could succeed. He felt it was important, ‘to prepare young soldiers to join in Battalion on their Landing [author’s emphasis], where they will soon fire regularly, having first been accustomed to fire in small platoons on board’. By practicing in these small grouping marines could become interchangeable parts in the operational sphere. Marine Captain Gardiner, describing the preparations before the Martinique operations in 1759, explains just this idea, ‘on board the several Men of War the Marines were augmented to the number of 800, and were intended to be formed into a Battalion under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel and Major, in order to land with the Troops, and to do duty in the line’. Unfortunately the only time marines could train in battalion formation was either in the barracks, when a special battalion was formed for a specific operation or if a large enough number of marines were landed from the fleet for that purpose. Battalion training was a weekly duty for the men left in the Division and not on assignment. These men would form an ‘exercise’ battalion in which they could practice on the parade grounds and exercise fields. This exercise battalion followed the formation establishment set up by Humphrey Bland in his seminal work, *A treatise of military discipline*. As Bland described, ‘when the companies come to the parade, or place where they are to form into Battalion, they are to draw up according to seniority, thus: the colonel’s company on the right, the lieutenant-colonel’s on the left…’ and back and forth till they get to the youngest in the centre. This was why the Colonel-Commandants and other field officers of the Divisions were ordered to maintain control of one company while still fulfilling their other administrative duties. This exercise battalion was an excellent opportunity to train new recruits to the Division while they were awaiting assignment into a ship. The battalion would also consist of men just landed off the ships and so large scale

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680 Houlding, *Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715-1795*, p. 94
681 MacIntire, *A Military Treatise on the Discipline of the Marine Forces, When at Sea*, p. 73
682 R. Gardiner, *An account of the expedition to the West Indies, against Martinico, Guadalupe, and other the Leeward Islands; subject to the French King, 1759* (London, 1759), p. 8
683 Plymouth Division Order-book in NA ADM 184/1 21 March 1763
685 See Chapter III
formation drill could be a vitally important refresher course to help the more experienced marines so they could be suitable in battalion-sized actions in the future.

The second area where marines were to have battalion formation training was when units were formed into special battalions to be used in specific operations overseas. These battalions were usually drilled as a single formation before they left Britain but sometimes due to their importance in the area they were to be drilled on site. A significant demonstration of this was the Marine battalion[s] deployed in Boston 1774-1775 under Major John Pitcairn. Major Pitcairn felt that unless his men were drilled in battalion formation and removed from the ships over the winter of 1774-1775 they would be useless in upcoming operations.

I have but a small battalion on shore: there are still fifty of the supernumeraries that were ordered out on board ship, this hurts the appearance of the battalion greatly, as they are the best of our men and ten of them belong to our light infantry company. I have spoken often to the Admiral about this, but to no effect; it was much against his inclinations that he landed any of us. 686

Commander-in-Chief of the Army in America General Gage, like Pitcairn, felt his marines would be useless unless they were disciplined that winter ‘in a manner to enable them to act on shore with the rest of the King’s troops’. 687 Eventually the Admiralty agreed and forcibly ordered Admiral Graves ‘to cause not only supernumerary Marines but as many of those who are born as part of the ships complements that can be spared’ to receive battalion training. 688 These special detachments, excluding the Boston battalions, were usually desperately needed in upcoming amphibious operations and so their time to drill together was very limited. Marines never had enough men in one area to use in a battalion formation therefore a special battalion by its very nature consisted of drawing them from a variety of the divisions and the fleet. Many times these special battalions were made up, like the exercise battalions, of veterans and recruits so there was some level of training inherent in their structure.

The final area of discussion about battalion formations is of those consisting of men drawn from the fleet or ships at anchor in which to practice formation drill. This practice was coordinated by either field officers sent out from the Divisions or if a field officer was serving in the fleet then he would lead this formation. This type of battalion drill could even be requested by a naval commanding officer. ‘I shall upon application from the Commanding Marine Officer at the port give leave for a Field Officer of Marines from the Division to go on board in order to review and exercise the Detachments embarked in the different Ships, or shall cause the Marines of the several Ships to be landed in order to be reviewed and

687 Admiral Graves to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/485, 08 January 1775, p. 3
688 Admiralty to Admiral Graves in NA ADM 2/1168, 20 February 1775, p. 326
exercised in the Field. 689 This battalion formation practice was largely instituted in peacetime or where there was a large enough conglomeration of ships to be employed in a battalion formation.

5.3 Amphibious Assault: Large and Small-scale

Amphibious assaults before 1755 had been carried out largely by Army and Navy units work in conjunction with one another. Large scale amphibious operations were not something new for the long eighteenth century and consequently historical works have reflected some of this ever since. 690 However, at no time was the primary operational doctrine of either the British Army or Navy defined by amphibious operations. These two organisations saw their operational doctrines defined by the geographical conditions in which these respective groups normally existed. The Army saw its operational doctrine defined by participation in home defence and continental warfare either in Europe, America or in Asia. The Navy saw its operational doctrine as to command the seas around the British Isles and to control overseas sea lanes. The Marine Regiments of the past largely followed the Army doctrine of attack and holding territory as it unsuccessfully attempted in the Cartagena operation of 1741. This disaster was to affirm that newly-raised regiments should ‘not form the core of an amphibious force again’. 691 These marine units were made up of drafts from other army regiments with no experience in cooperation before this action and it showed in their failure.

Before discussing the operational doctrine of the Marine Corps in the second half of the eighteenth century it is appropriate to discuss the strategy of the government. This has been termed by some historians as the ‘blue water strategy’, and is considered to have reached its height in the three wars spanning our period. George III, unlike his two previous predecessors, was less heavily influenced by the secondary ties of monarchical rule on the continent 692. This should not be seen as a lack of interest or turning away from the continent, baring only the American War, Britain was heavily invested in the continent. 693 The Seven Years’ War, which began in America, saw Britain with allies in Prussia and with the vast

690 Molyneux, Conjoint expeditions: or expeditions that have been carried on jointly by the fleet and army, Part 1-2; R. Harding, Amphibious Warfare in the Eighteenth Century: The British Expedition to the West Indies, 1740-1742 [Royal Historical Society Studies in History 62] (Suffolk, 1991); P. Hore (ed.), Seapower Ashore: 200 Years of Royal Navy Operations on Land (London, 2001)
691 Harding, Amphibious Warfare in the Eighteenth Century: The British Expedition to the West Indies, 1740-1742, p. 70
majority of the active operational British Army units tried down there or upon the American continent. There needed to be a force that could act as a supplement to boost the number of men in large operations and make strategic raids in the hope of diverting French attentions. The Marines were to fulfil these requirements which directly shape their operational doctrine.

Large scale operations were to be one of the two areas (the other small scale operations discussed below) where Marine operational doctrine was to be directly shaped in this period. Marines would act as a force multiplier or mobile manpower reserve to the main Army led assaults. In nearly every major amphibious operation over our forty-seven year period were to see some level of British Marine Corps participation. One of the first large scale operational uses of the British Marine Corps was the attacks on Rochfort and the various French West African trading posts. The West African expeditions give some illumination about how the Marines would be utilised in the strategic, operational and tactical context of the British State. On 12 January 1758 the Secretary of the Southern Department, William Pitt issued a direct order to the Admiralty about the seizure of territory in Africa along the River Senegal. Pitt ordered two ships of the line, one frigate and one sloop to also be manned by ‘200 Marines with proper Commission and Non Commission Officers over and above the full complements of the said ships to be embarked on board’. Pitt went on to specifically order that marines when landed should ‘attack if it shall be judged practicable any French forts or forts and settlements on the River Senegal or the Coast of Africa’. The 200 supernumerary marines were to act as a garrisoning force in the seized forts until the government relieved them. The Admiralty put Captain William Marsh in charge of the naval contingent and Major John Tufton Mason was to command the Marine battalion on shore, to sail from Plymouth on 9 March 1758. On 23 April 1758 the expedition arrived off the mouth of the Senegal River and the landings began with ‘hoisting the Union Flagg on St Lewis Fort’. By the 27 April all material and ordnance had been transferred to smaller ships and the sloop to prepare for landing. It took till the 29 April before the ships could find a way past the bar and throughout this time they were harassed by ‘the Natives, who kept up continual fire with small arms’. The problems with traversing the bar were to be the same problem of the Rochfort expedition and one of the main causes for the construction of new flat-bottom boats. After some shore bombardment and a diversionary landing, led by Major Mason of the Marines on the opposite shore, the governor of St. Lewis Fort surrendered and that evening the British entered the fort. This did not end the fighting with the local tribes for they continually harassed marines who were part of the diversionary force until these were eventually able to enter the fort. French soldiers were put on the ships to prevent them from becoming a subversive element against Major Mason’s 200 Marine garrison force. With these men in place Marsh proceeded to sail

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694 William Pitt to Admiralty in NA SP 44/229, 12 January 1758, p. 1
695 Captain Marsh to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/2110, 7 May 1758, p. 1
on to Goree. Unfortunately his Marine force was much denuded because of the demands of the garrisoning of Fort Lewis. The remnants of the expedition made it to Goree on 21 May 1758 but reported that it was too strongly defended stating, 'the castle on the hill, with two batterys [sic], which never fired after we anchored, but must of course [have] prevented our men from making any approaches'. He was fired upon by some of the other forts and suffered about twenty casualties before he left. Marsh would write an extensive four page report on the island's defences and landing beaches which would provide detailed intelligence eventually used by Commodore Augustus Keppel in his successful invasion of Goree on 29 December 1758.

After Marsh’s decision to leave without landing he decided to return to the Senegal River to re-provision and water his ships. Marsh upon anchoring off the Senegal River ordered a linguist ashore to talk to two of the ‘native chiefs’ of the area. Unfortunately a midshipman misunderstood the order and informed Captain Campbell to begin the landings. By not being fully prepared for the landing the men sent ashore were to be affected by command problems and logistics problems. The men killed some of the local people’s livestock, ‘upon which they [local people] seized the Lieutenant of Marines which occasioned the Hostages [tribal chiefs] to be delivered up in Lieu of the Lieutenant’. The idea that marines needed strong leadership, especially when led by inexperienced young officers, ashore was something that would be a continual problem for the service. Two days later Marsh, while watering his ships, landed 211 seamen and marines under the command of Marine Captain Campbell (who had been commissioned in the previous war) which were landed to attack the local tribes inland. They received such a heavy fire that they were eventually forced to retreat to the waterfront for re-embarkation. The tribal chiefs eventually made the hostage exchange but the British were not to relinquish their presence in Africa. They established a base of operations on the Senegal River that would be maintained even after the war. John Entick in his book on the Seven Years’ War explained the benefit of the conquest of Senegal River. ‘The benefit arising from this conquest to England is manifold. It puts us in possession of the gum trade, and makes us the merchants of that drug, at our own price, to all Europe…The loss to France was very great. It deprived her of the means of supplying her colonies with slaves.’ This action would become a type of template for future Marine operations both combined and independent throughout the rest of this period.

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696 Captain Marsh to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/2110, 28 May 1758, p. 1
697 Captain Marsh to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/2110, 24 July 1758, p. 1-5
698 Captain Marsh to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/2110, 11 June 1758, p. 1
699 List of Marine Officers in NA ADM 1/5116/1, 2 April 1755
700 J. Entick, The general history of the late war: containing it's rise, progress, and event, in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America and exhibiting the state of the belligerent powers at the commencement of the war, Vol. 3, (London, 1763), p. 65-66
valuable assets. Consequently, they were also a raiding force that could exert the broader pressures of British seapower ashore when and where needed. It also demonstrated that marines could carry out the strategic needs of the government rapidly and without Army help if need be.

Before any landings were carried out, amphibious operations councils or Councils of War were set up between the naval and army commanders. These councils were invaluable places for information and views to be shared between the two commands. These councils were structured on a forum basis. The council was to make quick decisions briefly before the enemy could recover from the shock of seeing the invasion fleet off their shores.\(^{701}\) In the early part of our period Marine officers were at times excluded from these gatherings. The only real exception was if a Marine of field officer rank was present, usually because he was in command of a special battalion, then he would always attend. As our period progressed, the experience and expertise of the Marines in this form of warfare became more accepted by army and naval commanders the senior Marine officers were also being brought into these councils. On the night before the landings at Tenerife on 21 July 1797 Rear-Admiral Horatio Nelson held his war council where Captain Thomas Oldfield of Marines was to be one of the attendees. In Nelson’s ‘Detail of the Proceedings of the Expedition,’ he stated that before the landing he called together ‘Captains Troubridge and Bowen with Captain Oldfield of the Marines…to consult with me what was best to be done and were of opinion they could possess themselves of the heights’.\(^{702}\) Of the one thousand men assembled by Admiral Nelson for the next day’s operations the core unit was based around the two hundred and fifty marines placed under the command of Captain Oldfield.\(^{703}\) Oldfield had been a Marine Officer since the War of American Independence, and by the time of Tenerife had nearly twenty years experience in amphibious operations throughout the world.\(^{704}\) He had been very active in the American War and served at Charlestown and was taken prisoner at Yorktown with Lord Cornwallis and had extensive amphibious service in the French Revolutionary War as well. Nelson felt Captain Oldfield ‘is a very worthy man’ and declared Oldfield’s Marines as ‘a most excellent body of men’.\(^{705}\) This is a fundamental shift in perception and is a clear


\(^{704}\) *A list of the officers of the army, and marines; with an index*, (London, 1785), p. 163

sign of the growing interdependence of the two services to carry out quick amphibious operations. Calling a Marine officer into the Council of War along with two other ship’s captains demonstrates the navy’s growing level of confidence in the Marines as a professional body. Captain Oldfield was to die in 1799 at the siege of Acre when he was in command of the column on the initial breach of the walls.\footnote{R. Cock, ‘Thomas Oldfield’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/20682?docPos=8: Accessed on 20 July 2010]}

Preparation for operations usually began on board ship before the landings began. Before the landing, marines were ordered to make ‘readiness for landing’ and were to be supplied with two flints, a bayonet, full Cartouche box (about 60 rounds), canteen, three days supply of bread and cheese.\footnote{Commodore Keppel’s Orders, 31 March 1761, NRS Vol. 77, The Barrington Papers, Vol. I, D. Bonner-Smith (ed.), p. 298} This was to provide for the men’s needs until a logistical apparatus could be set up on land to supply the landed forces if a siege took longer than the initial three days’ allotments. After these men received their supplies they would then begin boarding the flat-bottom boats or if the operation was too small for that then the ships long-boats. These boats were carried into theatre upon the decks of the transports and warships whereupon they could be lowered into the water and the men embarked on them. Rochefort, infamous as a combined-operations failure, was to spur on the creation of a newly designed flat-bottomed boat, as Robert Beatson claimed, which were constructed and in operational usage by 1758. This newly-designed flat-bottomed boat was in response to one of the main problems of the Rochefort expedition, getting as many men ashore in the first wave of the assault as possible. These new boats were to be ‘rowed by twelve oars, contained seventy soldiers, and only drew two feet of water’; these boats could vary in size and number of men but this was to be the basic design template for them throughout our period.\footnote{R. Beatson, Naval and military memoirs of Great Britain, from the year 1727, to the present time, Vol. II (London, 1790), p. 256} Once the marines or soldiers were embarked in the boats they would move to a designated assembly point where they would reform into their place in the landing formation.\footnote{D. Syrett, ‘The Methodology of British Amphibious Operations During the Seven Years and American Wars’, Mariner’s Mirror, Vol. 58 (1972), p. 274} When embarking into the flat-bottom boats the naval personnel were to enter first then the right-hand platoon followed by the left. The men were to observe silence and keep to constant attention, ‘as false alarms are hurtful to a battalion, and a disgrace to those that make them.’\footnote{T. Simes, A Military Course for the Government and Conduct of a Battalion (London, 1777), p. 206-207} The utmost care was to be taken that these boats maintained their intervals as they began their landing, ‘as companies do theirs upon the march’.\footnote{Simes, A Military Course for the Government and Conduct of a Battalion, p. 207} The reason for this was that it was felt if they landed in this formation then whole battalions could effectively be moved ashore quite rapidly.

\footnote{708 R. Beatson, Naval and military memoirs of Great Britain, from the year 1727, to the present time, Vol. II (London, 1790), p. 256}
\footnote{709 D. Syrett, ‘The Methodology of British Amphibious Operations During the Seven Years and American Wars’, Mariner’s Mirror, Vol. 58 (1972), p. 274}
\footnote{710 T. Simes, A Military Course for the Government and Conduct of a Battalion (London, 1777), p. 206-207}
\footnote{711 Simes, A Military Course for the Government and Conduct of a Battalion, p. 207}
Upon the landing the grenadier and light companies were to make feints, ‘when and where the enemy least expects it’. This was in order to make ‘good their landing and drive the enemy from little posts they may occupy’. Some naval officers felt it was their place to instruct the Marines, before they disembarked, on their fire discipline. Like Admiral Hawke who was commander of naval forces at Rochefort in 1757, ‘it is earnestly recommended to all the marines and soldiers, when directed to attack, to march up vigorously, preserving their fire till they come very near’. Hawke almost as a side note ordered ‘no marines to be landed that have been in French service’. This was more in the fear of desertion rather than about their loyalty as a whole.

Sometimes the Admiralty showed their absolute lack of logistical experience during long-term Marine landing operations. The Admiralty would repeatedly forget important parts of camp equipage ordered for their marines. The Belle Isle operation is just one example, ‘as there was tents but for a Corps of eight hundred men’, Keppel informed their lordships, ‘and the Army had many spare tents General Hodgson has ordered the Marines to be supply’d with the number they wanted’. These same problems would reoccur throughout this period, infamously so at Boston with Major Pitcairn’s battalion in the winter of 1774-1775. Another preliminary problem was the provision for clear command structures. The Navy had very limited understanding of Army command structures and hence did not understand the need of various Marine officers to serve in positions similar to staff officers. On 9 May when ‘Major General Hodgson having represented to me [Augustus Keppel] the necessity of a proper person to act as Brigade Major to the Corps of Marines’, Keppel quickly appointed Captain Chalmers to fill the job. It took outside influence upon the naval command to make these changes in order to facilitate the Marines’ proper operation on land.

Despite the misconceptions, the twentieth century was not to see the first usage of pre-invasion bombardment or ship-to-shore close in fire support. During amphibious operations in the eighteenth century the Navy would use their greatest asset, the heavy massed fire power of the great guns against fixed enemy targets on land. Commodore Augustus Keppel, who led over 420 marines in seven ships-of-the-line and three sloops, in the expedition against Goree in 29 December 1758 was to prove the invaluable nature of pre-invasion bombardment. Keppel used his ships-of-the-line and frigates to soften up the hard targets of the enemy ‘the Nassau lead [sic] the large ships to the attack of the batteries’. Goree surrendered after only a few hours bombardment and before the first spearhead of the

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712 Simes, A Military Course for the Government and Conduct of a Battalion, p. 209
714 Commodore Keppel to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/91, 9 May 1761, p. 2
715 Commodore Keppel to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/91, 9 May 1761, p. 1-2
716 State and Condition of the Fleet in NA ADM 1/54, 2 January 1759, p. 1-6
assault led by marines even made it to land. Before operations against New York in August 1776 Admiral Howe moved in two ships-of-the-line ‘to lay one at each side of New York neck in going up above 100 shot were fired at the forts’. Unfortunately, this in close heavy artillery support was not always effective in silencing their objectives, as there was no serious damage done to the forts in New York even after these shots were expended on it. Instead, this close fire support could be seen as more of a psychological weapon for after the vast attack it ‘made some of them [the Americans] run’. This initial bombardment also acted in the role of fire suppression while the men were landed. The ships ‘kept up a most tremendous cannonade, by which means the troops did not loose a man’. Furthering this role of close support, ships of frigate size or smaller were placed around the long-boats and transports to protect them from enemy raids or gunfire from the coastline. The great guns were not the only close fire suppression to soften up a target, marines not active in the landings could offer fire suppression support. During the Martinique operation of 1759 when HMS Rippon (60) was attacked by cannon and musketry of the batteries of the Citadel of St. Pierre the stern chase guns along with ‘a brisk fire was likewise kept up by the Marines upon the Militia on shore’ causing many casualties for the French and silencing the artillery.

The first echelon of the landing force was usually composed of the ‘elite’ forces of the eighteenth century military, the flank companies. The flank companies of battalions in the line of battle consisted of the grenadiers, who were chosen because of bravery and strength, and the light infantry, who were chosen for their ability and aim. Men in them were known to be the ‘most fiery spirits [who] were likely to be drawn to the flank companies which were most involved in the continued skirmishing or petite guerre’. By 1775-1802 the majority of operations saw marines, along with their flank companies, in the first echelon of these landings. Marines could help secure the beach but quickly after that they would move to a reserve position on land or more commonly be sent back to the ships. The practice of moving marines back unto the ships was to help the Navy when it was unsure of their continued naval dominance over the area of operations. The failures in the West Indies in 1740-1742 had demonstrated the inability of the Navy to relinquish any marines off their

717 Lt. Fielding to Earl of Denbigh in WRO CR 2017/C 244, 17 August 1776, p. 27
718 Lt. Fielding to Earl of Denbigh in WRO CR 2017/C 244, 17 August 1776, p. 27
719 Major Bowater to Earl of Denbigh in WRO CR 2017/C 244, 26 September 1776, p. 40; NA ADM 1/311, 22 December 1780, p. 3
720 Gardiner, An account of the expedition to the West Indies, against Martinico, Guadelupe, and other the Leeward Islands; subject to the French King, 1759, p. 20
721 Light infantry tactical thinking began to change and so did light infantry units during the French Revolutionary and especially the Napoleonic wars of this period.
723 Letter to a gentleman in Reading in Lloyd’s Evening Post (London), Friday, July 28, 1775
ships if they felt a general action at sea was eminent. Therefore, by moving marines back into ships they could be used in this capacity if called upon or as a tactical mobile reserve force against the enemy’s land positions.

Special battalions were to be formed to assist in large scale combined amphibious operations. They were operationally different from other marine units, as they were specifically placed under army command until the end of the operation. In 1761 the attack against Belle Isle would see one of the largest special battalions in the period. A marine force which would land ashore consisting of over 1,000 marines all under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel John Mackenzie. Of this thousand about forty percent came from the various ships of the fleet while the rest had been formed from the three Divisions in Britain to complete the special battalion’s numbers. The campaign against Belle Isle would last nearly two months and throughout marines would play a pivotal role. When preparing for the landing operations, General Hodgson and Commodore Keppel travelled “to the Northern Part of the Island, to be as well informed of the strength of the Enemies works”. The next day, Captain Stanhope led battalions from the Greys and Stuarts along with five hundred Marines in the initial landings. Their objective was to ‘drive the Enemy from the principal object’. Marines quickly began to show their eagerness to prove themselves as they would continually lead assaults on forts and redoubts throughout the island, famously so on 13 May when they assaulted the redoubts on the outskirts of the city. This attack was particularly bloody and would see nearly half of all marine casualties. Marines, because of this, would be given the high honour of leading the assault on the key redoubt of the citadel of Palais on 7 June before its eventual fall. The Belle Isle operation would cost the Marines dearly; their casualties consisted of ten percent of the 303 total men killed, and thirteen percent of the 523 wounded. These statistics are more striking considering that only a tenth of the total forces were comprised of marines. In other words the marines were seeing an equal amount of the action as the Army units throughout this campaign. Unlike other operations where marines were to be used as a tactical mobile reserve force, this time marines were used on land throughout. In his after action dispatch, which was quickly made public, Keppel devoted it entirely to the Marines’ actions. Interestingly he reveals where pressure to do so was coming from: ‘Major General Hodgson, by his constant approbation of the behaviour of the battalion of marines…gives me the pleasing satisfaction of acquainting you of…the goodness and spirited

724 Harding, Amphibious Warfare in the Eighteenth Century: The British Expedition to the West Indies, 1740-1742, p. 171
726 Commodore Keppel to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/91, 13 April 1761, p. 1-2, 5
727 Commodore Keppel to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/91, 8 June 1761, p. 1
behaviour of that corps’. This demonstrated that while still a relatively new organisation, they needed advocates to the public, government and naval officer corps from external sources.

Marine detachments on shore could work as a special unit detached from the main amphibious or land-forces body. In the relief operations of Fort Cumberland, which at the time was under siege by 600 American rebels during 1776, a detachment of two light companies of marines, grenadiers and various army light infantry and militia companies, in all about 300 men, left Fort Edward in Windsor Nova Scotia to help? This relief force arrived just in time to help relieve and repulse the rebels who were thrown into total disarray. Another marine unit, this time in the 1799 operations in Holland, were to be a further example of special detachment operations. Lt. Wyburn, in a letter to his sister on 24 October 1799, spoke with glee about ‘my sword till now has been a maiden one’ and how he was hoping to distinguish himself in the upcoming action. Wyburn was to command a force of 80 marines against 350 French and Dutch. He acted with great ‘rashness’ when he ordered his men to attack ‘so great a body when we were only acting on the defensive’. However, it was a stellar success. Later on 11 October 1799 during the same campaign a force of 670 French and Dutch began an attack on the British force then consisting of 157 marines and about 100 seamen at Lemmer. The British forces, which were under the command of Naval Captain James Boorder, ‘fought them [French and Dutch] for four hours and a half, when the enemy gave way in all directions’. The fighting was very heavy and they ‘expected to have been made prisoners before night’. Lt. Wyburn, once again in a moment of rashness, begged the Naval commander ‘to allow me to charge the enemy with the bayonet’ for his ‘men were desperate’. The French and Dutch line broke and they began to retreat so the Marines were ordered to pursue them. Upon their retreat the enemy began breaking down the bridge into town to prevent their colours and two field pieces from falling into the Marines’ hands. However, ‘before this was effected [sic] the heavy fire from the marines had killed 18 of the enemy, and wounded about 20’. Captain Boorder, showing a change in the Navy’s attitude about its marines since Belle Isle, spoke in high praise of the officers and men. He gave

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728 Commodore Keppel to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/91, 17 May 1761, p. 1; General Evening Post (London), Saturday, June 13, 1761; Officer, An Impartial Narrative of the Reduction of Belle Isle (London, 1761), p. 41-42
729 Lt. Fielding to Earl of Denbigh in WRO CR 2017/C 244, 19 November 1776, p. 61-62
730 Petrides and Downs (eds), Sea Soldier: An Officer of Marines with Duncan, Nelson, Collingwood and Cockburn, p. 19
732 Petrides and Downs (eds), Sea Soldier: An Officer of Marines with Duncan, Nelson, Collingwood and Cockburn, p. 21
special attention to Lts. Wyburn, Gardiner and Higgins of the Marines who along with the others ‘behaved with honour to themselves and credit to their country’.  

One of the most important and continually employed operational uses of marines during large scale combined amphibious assaults, were a mobile reserve force. This formation allowed them to have a free flowing independence of command and movement on the battlefield. Naval and army commanders due to the slow communications of the age, could not directly converse with one another about the need to take quick action with the changing nature of a battle. Marines by their very nature, working in varying sized groupings, could be landed anywhere possible at short notice during an action. Admiral Pocock when writing to General Albemarle during the Havana campaign in 1762 stated, ‘we keep them [the Enemy] upon the alarm as much as possible to the westward, had our marines in the boats ready for landing by way of a feint’.  

Requests for assistance could also come from Army officers like Major General Bruce in his 1793 operation against Martinique. Bruce requested the assistance of all marines that could be spared from the ships then under Admiral Alan Gardner’s command in order to strengthen his own forces. Admiral Gardner gave direction, ‘for a battalion to be formed from the Marines of the ships of the line, amounting to three hundred and ninety six, and to be kept in readiness to land, should there be occasion.’  

The Long Island and New York operations in 1776 would see some of the largest long-term deployments of Marines in this period. The Howe brothers had over 2000 marines under their command which they utilised in various diversionary landings throughout the 1776-1777 operations. Another example, this time during the 1801 British invasion of Alexandria under General Sir Ralph Abercromby and Admiral Lord Keith, the main army invasion force was to attack from Aboukir to Alexandria but needed some protection on their flank. So while this was happening, marines were landed from the fleet to attack and capture the castle of Aboukir by land ‘the only post in that peninsula occupied by the enemy’.  

Even before the beginning of a major operation, marines were used to capture strategic areas vital before the full scale operations could begin. In June 1776 a party of marines and sailors were sent ashore at Sandy Hook in New York harbour to secure the lighthouse there, whereupon they even beat off a counter-attack by a numerically larger local rebel militia. This lighthouse was vital to getting ships into and out of New York harbour. Marines as a mobile reserve could also take advantage of key moments in a battle to seize important ground or attack a strongpoint when the enemy was distracted. 

735 Admiral Gardner to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/316, 25 June 1793, p. 2  
736 Caledonian Mercury (Edinburgh), Saturday, May 2, 1801  
Martinique found themselves in just such a situation on 13 February 1759. During the attack on Fort Louis at Martinique and away from the main area of operations, ‘when after a severe cannonading which lasted six hours, the Marines and Highlanders were landed, who drove the Enemy from their Entrenchments with bayonets fixed, and hoisted the English Colours at the Fort’. Gardiner, An account of the expedition to the West Indies, against Martinico, Guadelupe, and other the Leeward Islands; subject to the French King, 1759, p. 37

There were other times when marines were quickly landed to take possession of a fort when the enemy was temporarily disorganised or left them. Landings could also secure strategic choke points on land before the Army was able to march on them. This happened during the 1762 Siege of Havana. Augustus Keppel landed his marines to take the fort of Coximar and the ground around it, ‘by which the army was allowed to pass the river unmolested.’ In one such case at Martinique in 1759 after the initial bombardment started at ‘about nine the Rippon anchored astern of her, when the Battery being silenced, at ten the Marines from both ships [Rippon and Bristol] landed in the flat-bottom’d boats, and climbing up the Rock enter’d in at the Embrasures with bayonets fixed, but found it entirely abandoned by the enemy.’ The Marines because of their mobile reserve force formation could also act in ‘cleaning up’ operations after the main Army assault. John Peebles in his diary talks about just these sorts of operations. ‘Tuesday 8th [September 1778] last night a Gally & Detachmt. of Marines in boats went up to Bedford to burn the remainder of the shipping in the harbour where they met with some opposition –there was a good deal of firing between 12 & 2 of Canons & Small arms & I hear some kill’d & wound’d.’

Sometimes Naval and Marine commanders had to usurp the decisions of the Army commanders in order to utilise the marines for their own objectives. Admiral Arbuthnot during the campaign against Charleston South Carolina was to be continually frustrated by General Clinton about the expulsion of American forces from Mount Pleasant which covered the entrance of Charleston Harbour. Admiral Arbuthnot took matters into his own hands and on 29 April 1780 landed 500 seamen and marines from his ships who secured three different positions around Mount Pleasant. A similar example, this time from Admiral Rodney, would reemphasise the operational importance of the Marines as a mobile reserve force especially when the Army was tied down in other operations. In December 1780 Admiral Rodney was to make an attempt upon St Vincent, which intelligence said had suffered severe damage to its forts and earthworks after a hurricane. ‘As few troops could be taken from the

738 Gardiner, An account of the expedition to the West Indies, against Martinico, Guadelupe, and other the Leeward Islands; subject to the French King, 1759, p. 37
739 Keppel to Pocock 7 June 1762 in NRS Vol. 114, The Siege and Capture of Havana, 1762, D. Syrett (ed.), p. 167-8
740 Gardiner, An account of the expedition to the West Indies, against Martinico, Guadelupe, and other the Leeward Islands; subject to the French King, 1759, p. 13
defence of St. Lucia, I consented that the Marines of the Fleet should be employed in conjunction with those few upon this expedition. 743 Unfortunately, when the soldiers and marines arrived at the fort they found that the intelligence had been faulty and quickly beat a retreat back to the beaches where they were re-embarked without any losses.

Navy and Marine Officers many times felt that to work with the Army was more of a hindrance rather than a benefit. Writing about the 1779 expedition to Omoa Lieutenant James talked about how marines and sailors could effectively work together when others would not. ‘Why, then, surely this boasted army, which has deceived all Europe from the letter of Captain Dalrymple, appears to be seamen and marines only!’ Lt. James saw the Army units as more useless and an overall hindrance to operations. ‘An hour before break of day I marched the seamen and marines down the hill, flanked by the Loyal Irish. How very probable it appears to those who were there that three hundred men should be flanked by six, and how certain it is that not a red coat was seen that morning, except his own, Lieutenant Garden’s, and the marines!’ 744 Another example is Admiral Samuel Hood during operations in the West Indies in the American War had a reserve force of 1, 400 marines separated into two battalions and 500 soldiers from the 69th Regiment upon his ships. Hood wrote to General Prescott who at the time was looking to relieve the fortress of Brimstone Hill on St. Kitts from a French siege. Hood felt it would be prudent to use this reserve force in an attempted tactical feint as ‘it would certainly…make a diversion in favour of Brimstone hill, and very much distress, puzzle and embarrass the enemy’. General Prescott felt it would be a waste of men and material because Brimstone Hill was ‘so completely invested’ by the enemy that it would be impossible for reinforcements to reach it. 745 In the end Hood potentially had no real intention of landing these men and had hoped their presence alone would distract the French from the siege. The importance of this example is the operational flexibility that the marines offered to naval commanders for independent action. In 1794 Navy and Army hostility was going to hit a breaking point, especially during the operations to capture Corsica. Nelson who would lead the naval contingent ashore during these operations at first saw the operations in a somewhat satirical light. ‘Army go so slow that seamen [or marines] think they never mean to get forward, but I dare say they act on a surer principle, although we seldom fail. St. Fiorenza at last was carried by the seamen but being out of proper form has given great offence to the army, the colours being carried to Lord Hood.’ 746 This began to change with Nelson’s growing frustration with the slow progress of the Army in attempting to

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743 Rodney to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/311, 22 December 1780, p. 2
744 NRS Vol. 6, Journal of Rear-Admiral Bartholomew James, 1752-1828, John Knox Laughton (ed.), p. 78
746 Nelson to Fanny, 28 February 1794 in NRS Vol. 100, Nelson’s Letters to His Wife and Other Documents, 1785-1831, G.P.B. Naish (ed.), p. 103
take Calvi. In fact on at least three occasions to Lord Hood Nelson questions General Dundas’s strategies about securing the lower town first.\textsuperscript{747} Army-Navy relations were to be further strained over Corsica and the Caribbean expeditions. The disconnect in strategies was one of the large reason why there was a continuing demand for more Marines by 1795. The various officers who felt the Duke of York’s order was an attempt to ‘impose the authority of the Duke of York on the navy in contradiction to that of an Act of Parliament (as it was a direct threat to the ship captain’s authority).\textsuperscript{748} Spencer clearly took the naval officers concerns seriously as the Corps would dramatically increase its dismal manpower numbers with renew vigour, a sixty-two percent increase over its next highest number in 1794.\textsuperscript{749}

As stated above, one of the reasons why marines were to be utilised as a mobile reserve force was because of the ever present need to fulfil their more traditional maritime role as well. As with the Wentworth and Vernon fiasco of the 1740s in the Caribbean, this was especially the issue if there was no clear control of the seas by the British. Unlike in the past the new Marine Corps was clearly under the command and authority of the Navy unless otherwise explicitly directed by the government. Major General John Vaughan at St. Lucia requested marines from the fleet to be landed to support his supply lines and haul up provisions to his men. Admiral Rodney quickly rejected this, ‘as landing the abovementioned number of marines which might in great measure incapacitate the fleet from putting to sea in proper force which I hope very shortly to be able to do and thereby more effectually to contribute both to the safety of this island’.\textsuperscript{750} This was not a far stretch from the truth for at times marines were to be used in both amphibious and sea warfare within the same day. Admiral St. Vincent ‘landed the marines of the Leviathan, took possession of two forts of four guns each, and one of six’ he then within the same day ordered the men to embark and make sail in order to engage enemy shipping.\textsuperscript{751} This was the main reason why marines were not to be kept off the ships for too long during most long-term amphibious operations. Sometimes naval commanders understood the primary importance of the operation as more pressing than having his full complement of marines at sea and so gave into Army requests. General Stewart applied to Admiral Caldwell at St. Lucia in 1795 to help his troops move cannon ‘as negroes could not be procured’ and Caldwell quickly sent twenty seamen and marines to help.\textsuperscript{752}

\textsuperscript{747} Nelson to Lord Hood 22 July, 1 August and 8 August 1794 in C. White, Nelson: The New Letters (Woodbridge, 2005), p. 162-164
\textsuperscript{749} See Appendix Chart 3
\textsuperscript{752} Admiral Caldwell to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/317, 23 April 1795
The real importance of the operational concept of the Marines as a mobile combat reserve force is best seen during raiding operations. Raids were carried out to restore manoeuvre on the tactical or strategic level; as a deception, as effecting the destruction of military equipment and communications or for more economic/political gains. The British Marine Corps were distinctly able to fulfil the growing needs of the state’s strategic aims through raiding operations. By their very amphibious nature of existence on naval ships, marines were prepared to take any action necessary upon the enemy’s coasts if the captain or admiral thought it necessary. The policy of raiding was made famous by Lord Cochrane in his various single handed attacks along the Catalonian coast in his frigate during 1808. However Cochrane was not novel in this approach nor was he an innovator of this tactic. Instead he followed a long line of other naval commanders who utilised their sailors and marines in this fashion. Writing in April 1758 about operations off Aix, Hawke discussed his usage of marines in a quick raid. ‘I therefore sent him (Captain Ewer of Marines) on shore again with twenty marines from each of the line of battle ships to destroy these new works, which he by night effectually did, both what was finished and unfinished, besides a great quantity of large oak beams, 2\(\frac{1}{2}\) inch plank, picketts, fascines, gun carriages, mortar beds, working tools, bridges, and the only well in the fort.’ As an aside Captain Ewer was sent ashore before the action under a flag of truce with orders to inform the townspeople that they would not destroy the town but only destroy the fort of Aix. Another commander to utilise his marines to strip forts of their attacking potential, was Commodore Warren. Warren on 3 July 1795 disembarked his men, ‘about 250 marines of the squadron, and landed them on the east side [end of the Quiberon Peninsula and under Fort Penthievre], having stationed the frigates and gunboats, so as to cover the disembarkation’ of the two regiments of foot. The fort attacked on all sides, quickly surrendered, and thus a strong base and point of retreat was secured. Raiding could also seize strategic territory to inhibit the enemy’s movements against the main army force or to secure them a supply depot, as when marines were landed off the warships, currently sailing off North Carolina, 12 miles from Wilmington and on the ‘next day marched and took possession of Willmington [sic] in conjunction with the gallies [sic]’. This was done in order to help Cornwallis’s troops with necessary supplies from the sea after the battle of Guilford Courthouse.

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754 Richmond, Amphibious Warfare in British History, p. 26
757 Major James Craig to General Cornwallis in NA PRO 30/11/5, 4 February 1781, p. 1
As a mobile reserve force sometimes marines were called upon to help procure vitally important logistical supplies for the military. Captain James in operations to assist the British Army with foraging sent a Marine detachment ashore. ‘I was directed on the morning of the 3rd [January 1781] to take command of a hundred seamen and marines from the different ships of war, and land and forage for the squadron.’ At about eight o’clock in the morning they began to march to Newport. They had to retreat after their raid and their party carried ‘six butchers with their professional instruments, as an advanced guard; the cattle drove by thirty negroes; two carts with dead hogs, and one with poultry; the seamen in the centre, and the marines in the rear to cover our retreat; with four marines on each flank, occasionally relieved from the rear.’

The Marine officer’s advice was not always the best nor led to a positive outcome. Lieutenant Tulloch, the officer of the Marine detachment, had advised Captain James that the ship’s lieutenant should only take forty marines, which Tulloch assured James would be sufficient to defeat any number the enemy that could assemble to attack them. This is an interesting admission about the growing importance of marine opinion to the naval commanders.

…landed and pursued the same road we had been before, and in the evening was returning, with a considerable quantity of forage, divided and scattered about the woods in keeping the cattle together. In this situation they were attacked by an inferior force of horse and foot well acquainted with the country, who, in short, defeated them, mortally wounding Lieutenant Brown (who died the following day) and nine marines, who with eleven more (exclusive of the wounded) were taken prisoners.

Lieutenant Tulloch, ‘to his great credit’, fought as long as the people had ammunition and eventually retreated safely on board with the remaining few marines he had left, ‘himself having several shots through his clothes,’ Marines could also be used as a mobile rapid reinforcement for defence against attack or rebellion. When HMS Quebec (32) arrived at St. George’s Bay, Grenada in 1795 the captain quickly responded to the insurrection there on the night of the 6 March by landing his seamen and marines to be ‘employed in the redoubts on Hospital Hill’.

Sometimes marines could act in support of foreign governments the British felt needed the help. In these situations their ability to be a mobile reserve force could be very useful in either supporting weak allies or in bringing them to ‘their senses’. Marines moved with greater freedom than their land-based counterparts, therefore seizing the important ground and holding it till they were relieved by a foreign government’s troops. Captain Troubridge, under Nelson’s command in 1799 in the Mediterranean, ‘took possession of Civita Veechia, Cometa and Solfa [sic] on the 29th and 30th [September] with two hundred

760 Admiral Caldwell to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/317, 15 March 1795, p. 2
Marines and Seamen’. These victories were won in the name of Naples, as marines of these raids were ordered to hoist the colours of the King of Naples and await his army to take over command of these forts. Nelson, like other naval commanders, saw the importance in using marines to take advantage of any strategic chaos in the enemy’s territory. Their very presence could also calm the nerves of foreign citizens by making a physical presence of British power on the ground. In a letter from Ambassador Hamilton to John Francis Edward Acton on 28 June 1799 he stated that the landing of the ‘British marines to garrison the castles of Nuovo and Uovo has had a very good effect in calming the minds of the people of Naples’. Some officers felt that the use of foreign troops to help their marines could also be more of a hindrance then a help. Sidney Smith in 1799 talked about just such a problem when having to work in conjunction with Ottoman Turkish troops against Napoleon’s Army. ‘I have my doubts of the Turkish troops promised arriving in time, or being efficient and active when they do; besides I can only expect to influence them by example, and our own marines are too essential to a cruising ship to be detached for anything but a coup de main.’

A policy of raiding should not be seen as the proof of the ineffectiveness of seapower to affect the overall strategic situation. Russell Weigley remarked, ‘it was Bonaparte’s land power that by depriving the Royal Navy of its bases and allies undermined the workings of sea power’. However, this is to misinterpret the strategic ability of the Royal Navy in this period. The Royal Navy in 1796 was greatly overextended on all fronts with large West Indies expeditions, convoy escort and the need of protecting Britain itself against invasion. To make matters worse, the Army itself was greatly diminished due to the large amount of losses sustained during the prior West Indies expeditions. Therefore the government had to make the difficult decision about where would be the best place to recede from and as had been done in 1757 and 1778 it was to be the Mediterranean. As soon as the strategic situation became more relaxed the British re-established their presence there in 1798-1799. This did not mean that seapower was ineffective in bringing pressure to bare on a foreign enemy it just meant that it had to be flexible and adapt to the ever changing resources of the state.

As show above, the Marines’ operational doctrine in this period was changing from land-forces on ship to a truly amphibious shock attack force. Part of this development came from the changing nature of Marine command in these amphibious operations over this

\[\text{Capt. Troubridge to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/2599, 5 October 1799, p. 1}\]
period. At first marines when on land were placed under the nominal command of the Army (e.g. Belle Isle and Havana). This was taken to its fullest extent at Belle Isle where General Hodgson was to praise the Marines under his command even imploring Commodore Keppel to specially write to the Admiralty about their valour. While this practice would not necessarily end, special battalions similar to Pitcairn’s at Boston or even Lt. Colonel Smith at Alexandria in 1801 were placed under overall Army command for the duration of the operations on land. In fact, during the St. Lucia expedition of 1796 General Sir Ralph Abercromby recommended to his naval counterpart Admiral Hugh Christian that the marines receive special mention (e.g. Hodgson and Keppel). During the landing ‘it became necessary to detach the 14th regiment to the support of the troops employed at that post [Morne], in consequence of which 320 marines were landed to take the ground occupied by the 14th. The conduct of the marines upon this, as upon all other occasions, was most perfectly correct.’

Also shown above marines were to be deployed on land for extended periods whereupon they would be supplied largely before they left England, but if the need arose they could be supplemented by army stores. When in command of these units Marine officers’ ranks were considered equivalent to their Army counterparts and their years of experience also counted to prevent them being placed under younger equal men. However, they could be faced with the possibility of being commanded by a younger more inexperienced superior Army commanding officer, similar to Major Pitcairn in Boston.

As the Corps began to mature over this period so too did the Navy’s every growing control over the Marines operationally. With the persistent need of fully manned ships’ crews, in the event of sea engagements, naval commanders were very reluctant to relinquished rights to their marines to army commanders on land. However, if marines were specially designated for special battalion duty then Army commanders would fight with great intensity to get these marines off the ships (e.g. General Gage at Boston). Highlighted above, as the period progressed joint command amphibious operations saw marines utilised as shock troops or mobile reserve forces rather then serving in the line for battle. This flexibility in operations and command was usually given to the most experienced units in the Army, the flank companies who also carried out shock attack work in battles. Marines were allowed more and more to operate under an independent command structure like during raiding operations or under purely direct naval command similar to Holland in 1799. The Navy’s power over the Marines was so complete that they could even employ their marines as they saw fit (Charleston and New York in the American War, Corsica in the French Revolutionary War) with or without the agreement of Army commanders on the ground.

766 St. James’s Chronicle or the British Evening Post (London), Tuesday, July 5, 1796
5.4 Summary

The operational doctrine of the Marines, encompassing both actions at sea and on land, was developed in the context of their amphibious identity in this forty-seven year period. Marines were move to beyond the historic context of soldiers on board ship or previous marine regiments as a purely boarding force. The Seven Years’ War was a pivotal moment for the development of the British Marine Corps’ operational doctrine and would be the reason why after this war ended, there would be a wealth of writing by marine officers on half-pay and the public about the effective usage of marines. The theorisation about the usage of marines in both maritime and land-based operational spheres was never laid down in formal instruction from the Admiralty. Instead the theory had to be made by officers in active service with the help of a few private published works. This was to be a continual issue for the Corps, as they would be expected to maintain a great amount of responsibility while at the same time they received very little or no central instruction on operational or tactical issues. Therefore the influences of the private works were to be immense. These works had longevity and a large distribution, especially John MacIntire’s work, but they also provided a basic theoretical context which could help newly commissioned officers. In sea engagements marines were to maintain operational flexibility by caring out various roles, most importantly as a fire suppression force. However they also helped in the manning of the great guns and in repealing enemy boarding parties. These duties further highlighted the changing demands for marines in sea actions. All of these duties were meant to be used to help reduce the French and Spanish manpower advantages during close in actions rather than purely boarding and seizing operations.

On land the British Marine Corps was expected to achieve or help facilitate what Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond’s called the seven principle objectives for a successful ‘overseas expedition’. The Marines’ operational doctrine made them particularly well equipped to carry out four of these seven principles; directly disable or destroy an enemy’s naval forces, to effect a diversion of enemy strength, to expel an enemy from a particular territory and to hamper an enemy by support of local rebellions. Their first major solo operation at Senegal would not only reveal some problems with amphibious warfare in general but it would also demonstrate that marines could fulfil the operational needs of the state. The operational doctrine of the British Marine Corps repeatedly emphasised flexibility. Operational flexibility for the Marines was seen at its full fruition during amphibious operations. If called upon, marines could form special battalion sized detachments made up of men from the various divisions to fight alongside the Army, as at Belle Isle. They could also be brought together from various ships sailing together and utilised as a mobile reserve.

767 Richmond, Amphibious Warfare in British History, p. 4
force that could attack points of interest or weak targets. Marines could also be used as a
diversionary force which could relieve pressure on the main Army attack elsewhere.

Their flexible operational doctrine allowed marines to raid the enemy’s coastline either to destroy strongholds or to seize land before the main Army force, either British or foreign, took control. The Navy could strike at various targets wherever there was a naval ship or fleet from which a marine force of corresponding size could be used in conjunction with sailors. Marines were able to fill the important gap between the strategic needs of the government and the tactical desires of local commanders. By continually maintaining flexibility in their operational doctrine they were able to meet any strategic and tactical needs of the British state in the late eighteenth century. Unfortunately they could not seize or control large areas of continental land mass but they could facilitate the Army in these needs. This independence of movement of battalions in battle was considered by some historians as an invention of the French Revolutionary Armies.\(^{768}\) Over the years their expertise as amphibious warrior began to be demonstrated by their growing acceptance into the War Councils before operations, e.g. Nelson. Throughout all of this the Marines had to develop their own doctrine, like their identity, while being pressured by the other services and government to carry out more operations. This would be the foundation that would shape the Royal Marine operational doctrine till the adoption of the commandos in the Second World War. Making them experts in limited scale operations but also maintaining the skills which were utilised, at strategic moments, in long-term amphibious combined operations helped the British maintain, and be masters of, their way of warfare for the next hundred fifty years.\(^{769}\)


Chapter VI: An Imperial Rapid Reactionary Force

The forty-seven years covered by this thesis, 1755-1802, saw Britain at war for just over half of this period. Unlike the previous brief periods of peace-time, this time the Marines were to maintain their establishment, yet like the other services, with significantly reduced manpower numbers. The reason for maintaining the Marines in peace-time, as opposed to disbanding them, is due in some part to the malleability of the operational doctrine of the Marines. The Admiralty and the Marines created an operational justification in order to continue the Marine Corps’s existence throughout the various peace-time economy drives of the period. This led to a rebranding of the Marines as a vital tool in the state’s (and Navy’s) ability to project its power in broader foreign and imperial policy forays. A definition of the terms of foreign and imperial policy in the eighteenth century is necessary, as these can, on occasion, be ambiguous. For the purpose of this chapter, the term ‘foreign’ is focused on any actions the British took against continental powers like France, Spain and Russia. Alternatively, the term ‘imperial’ is defined in the broader sense of a ‘Greater Britain’, encompassing India and the various American colonies. Throughout this time the Navy was considered as the primary tool of both foreign and imperial policy in peace-time. Conversely, the Army was largely preoccupied with land-based imperial policing actions in Ireland or the Colonies. The Army was hence largely used as a static garrison force to maintain the imperial possession of territory in peace-time. This policy made the Army very slow to mobilise and could not rapidly respond to situations upon request, whereas the British Marine Corps could be a rapid reaction force that could be quickly deployed to any ‘hotspot’ around the world.

The first area of operational need for the Marines was foreign policy power projection. For this, a Marine force was required for two convergent needs: first, to help the fleet by acting as a tool of coercive maritime policy; second, to facilitate the rapid mobilisation of the fleet. As will be shown, the first demonstration of this use by the Navy of the Marines as a tool of coercive maritime policy or naval power projection is exemplified by the Turks Island and Honduras incidents of 1764. The one critical incident of this entire period to combined both coercive maritime policy and rapid fleet mobilisation as tools of foreign policy power projection was the Falkland Islands Crisis of 1770. This was a critical moment for the Marine Corps and its after-effects would reverberate throughout the Corps’s structure. It would also influence the operational development for the remainder of the period 1755-1802.

The second area to influence the Marine’s operational doctrine was their usage as a tool of imperial power projection. The operational needs of imperial power projection can be separated further into two different operational areas. The first area concerned marines in imperial defence or the use of the fleet to ward off any unintended interventions from foreign
powers within Britain’s area of influence. This was exemplified by the quick increase in naval power within the Indian Ocean in the early 1770s. The second area of imperial power projection was the use of marines in imperial policing – or the use of the fleet and marines to suppress rebellion, smuggling, piracy and in other maritime policing roles. This role was particularly strong in the Caribbean, where marines were heavily used in these operations. However, the main arena to utilise operational imperial policing was in the North American colonies; initially by helping the customs service, and then later in their active role in suppressing rebellion in the 1770s. It should be noted that at no time were the Marines the primary weapon of the state; as the Navy and Army were primarily intended to fulfil those roles. However, because of the amphibious nature of the Marines, they could provide the ever increasingly important operational bridge for these two organisations upon sea and land.

Military, naval and colonial historiography about the eighteenth century is utterly mute when it comes to the peace-time operational role of the Marines or how this affected the Empire and military as a whole. This is unfortunate for the Corps’ role demonstrates how an eighteenth century military organisation could utilise its operational doctrine after wartime in order to maintain its relevance in a peace-time environment. Many of the examples and discussions used below come from the period 1763-1775, as this was a truly developmental period for the operational peace-time doctrine of the British Marine Corps.

6.1 Foreign Power Projection

Following the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1763, the clear victor to emerge was Britain which gained vast territories in the Americas, India and along the West African coast. However, there was a great uneasiness about the victory and peace treaty within the British government as there were growing fears of a Bourbon révanche. As a result, unlike the conclusion of previous conflicts, the country maintained both a naval and army peacetime establishment well above that of any previous post-war reduction. For 1763-1775, the amount of total voted naval manpower numbers fluctuated between a maximum of 31,927 men in 1771 and a minimum of 11,713 men in 1768. In comparison to this, 4,284 officers and men were voted for the Marines, which remained a constant, with the exception of the fluctuation during the Falkland Islands crisis of 1770-1771 when the number nearly doubled to 8,073. Combined the naval and marine numbers would see a mean number of 21,679 men borne on the ship’s books. The Marines numbers were distributed relatively evenly

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770 For the Army look in J. Shy, Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution (Princeton, 1965); and for the Navy in N. Tracy, Navies, Deterrence, and American Independence: Britain and Seapower in the 1760s and 1770s (Vancouver, 1988)
771 ‘An account of the number of seamen voted, borne, and mustered in every year since the revolution’ in NA PRO 30/8/248 p. 29
amongst the 69 companies and could be increased or reduced as circumstances required.\textsuperscript{772} Marines were to be stationed on ships throughout the empire, in home waters (on ships of first to sixth rate in size) and with all remaining men stationed in the three marine barracks and royal naval dockyards of England. However, like their naval counterparts, the numbers of men voted and borne on the books did not always correspond with the actual number of men mustered. For example, in 1766 only 1,396 marines were actually mustered as opposed to the 4,284 voted for that year. Marines should not been seen as exceptional in this policy. The general figure of roughly three thousand less men than were on the books can also be found in the figures of the Navy.\textsuperscript{773} Even with these low figures (1766 was particularly a low point for the Marines’ mustered numbers) the Navy’s prioritisation of the fleet is demonstrated by the manning accounts of Commissioner Hughes at Portsmouth in 1766. This period, with a minimum amount of marines mustered, was to see nearly all ships around the Royal Dockyards closely manned to their full Marine complements.\textsuperscript{774} The Navy during the same period were manning the ships in harbour with only a third complement of their seamen. By having their full Marine establishments on ship the Navy could utilise these Marines as a mobile reserve which could quickly fill ships complements and speed up preparation for sea. So why would the Navy and the government not disband the Marines as they had done following each previous conflict? In past conflicts, the Marine establishments had suffered from demobilisation and the peace-time economy drives to lower overall government spending. There were also political reasons for this; even after the 1757 Militia act and the end of the war, the Standing Army debates were still a politically sensitive subject.\textsuperscript{775} Carrying this logic to its eventual conclusion would mean that if the Marines were truly just another army regiment, albeit one that served exclusively at sea, they should continue to be considered expendable as in all past end of war periods. There was no direct political decision, as such, to keep the Marines in their current establishment. With the previous Marine establishment, the cost of disbandment was intensified because of the Regimental structure. These structural problems were one of the main reasons why there were still complaints about non-payment of expenses for the Marine Regiments of 1739-1748 well into the 1760s.\textsuperscript{776} Instead, what the Admiralty ultimately did was continue the Marines upon their yearly ‘sea service’ estimates, as had been the case since 1755. As a result, when the Navy was required to make their yearly estimates to Parliament about projected manpower, they simply continued their normal wartime practice of adding

\textsuperscript{772} Voting estimates for the House of Commons from 1763-1775 in HCP, Journals of the House of Commons, George III year 3 – George III year 15
\textsuperscript{773} Navy Office to Liverpool, 17 Jan. 1767 in BL Add. MSS 38340, ff. 11
\textsuperscript{774} List of Ships in Vessels at Spithead in NA ADM 1/1899, 1June 1766
\textsuperscript{775} The standing army debates during the eighteenth century are briefly covered in Schwoerer, “No Standing Armies!”: The Anti-army Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Baltimore, 1974), p. 195
\textsuperscript{776} As shown in Chapter I and II
This illustrates one of the advantages inherent in having the structure of the Marines absorbed into the Navy from the start of the war, unlike previous times, and the administrative flexibility gained by maintaining the Marine establishment as three Divisions, which could therefore be quickly expanded or decreased as the needs of the service required. However, trying to continue the Marines without a parliamentary discussion did not escape the notice of all. In a letter dated 3 December 1763, ‘Save-All’ from Greenwich, writing in the *Gazetteer and London Daily Advertiser*, called for the Marines to be removed from the Admiralty and placed back under Army control—or possibly to be disbanded:

I cannot approve of keeping so many thousand marines, as they are useless at sea in time of peace, and deprive us of the chance of having so many seamen at the breaking out of a war, when it is well known that one sailor is worth three marines, fewer days being necessary to qualify the marine for his duty, than months to make a sailor. The writer goes on to claim that he is only concerned with ‘economy’ but understands the importance of ‘keep[ing] up a respectable navy for the protection of our extending commerce’. However, it does not seem that this opinion had any traction within government circles, for there is no repetition of these concerns outside this one author.

The primary concern of the Admiralty, and to some extent the government, was the need for Marine presence in any rapid mobilisation of the fleet. This was clearly demonstrated by the Navy’s structuring of the Marines during peace-time deployment on ships. At the beginning of 1763, as stated above, the Marines’ establishment was created so that it would maintain 69 companies of 4270 officers and men, a reduction from the 1762 wartime height of 135 companies and 19,061 officers and men (Table 6.1). This remained the structure of the establishment until 1771, when the hierarchical structure changed and the Marines were among other things given three Colonel-Commandants for the three Divisions.

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777 ADM to King’s Councilin NA PRO 30/47/23/5, 19 Jan. 1763
778 *Gazetteer and London Daily Advertiser*, (London), Wednesday, 13 December 1763
779 *Gazetteer and London Daily Advertiser*, (London), Wednesday, 13 December 1763
Table 4 Marine Establishment Numbers in Peace-time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company Numbers</th>
<th>Senior Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Captain</td>
<td>1 Lt. General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 1st Lieut.</td>
<td>3 Colonels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 2nd Lieut.</td>
<td>3 Lt. Colonels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Sergeants</td>
<td>3 Majors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Corporals</td>
<td>3 Quarter Masters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Drummers</td>
<td>3 Adjutants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52 Privates</td>
<td>16 Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>61 Total of One Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4209 69 Companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4270 Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figures taken from Council to ADM, 21 January 1763 in NA ADM 2/1158 p. 475-7

The Navy understanding that the Marines were to be reduced in overall size appropriately set the establishment of the peace-time numbers of marines to crew each rated ship as well (Table 6.2). These numbers were the established complements for each ship, though they were not always maintained to listed capacity due to shortages of marines in the area or from deaths and desertions. These numbers also reflect the Navy’s concern to have the fleet ready in the eventuality that it might be called upon to rapidly mobilise in preparation for war. The first line of preparation in any rapid mobilisation would be the guardships on station in England. These guardships were usually large ships-of-the-line, from fourth rate and above fitted out with a complement of sailors and marines to help make the ship ready for action as soon as possible. Guardships also acted as a deterrent to any foreign fleet as they could make the British fleet ready for action in very short notice. Sandwich put it succinctly when he stated about guardships that ‘there are twenty of the best ships in England ready to be sent to any part of the world at the shortest notice’. Marines stationed on guardships could also be utilised in helping the seamen and the dockyard workers prepare ships for sea in short notice if called upon. On occasion, marines in the barracks were commanded to get some ships prepared for sea. In his 1791 work on the Navy, Sir John Borlase Warren stated: ‘When a ship is commissioned, it is usual for the contract riggers to begin her, who, aided by a party of marines from the barracks, proceed to rig her as fast as possible.’

possible. Warren was actually calling for this practice to end and wanted increases in dockyard workers to fill this deficiency in manpower.

Table 5 Marine Distribution in Peace-time Fleet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Captain</th>
<th>1st Lieut.</th>
<th>2nd Lieut.</th>
<th>Sergeant</th>
<th>Corporal</th>
<th>Drummer</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guardships</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+ guns</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 guns</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44-36 guns</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 guns</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 guns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-20 guns</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Sloops</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures taken from ADM to various commanders, 14 April 1763 in NA ADM 2/1159 p. 11

Throughout this period, whenever naval ships were sent to overseas stations, for either foreign or imperial concerns, the Marine Divisions of Chatham, Portsmouth and Plymouth were required to bring their Marine complements up to full peace-time numbers before sailing out. The Admiralty gave explicit instructions to each commander of the Marine Divisions about what was necessary to fulfil this requirement, even if it meant taking some marines off the guardships (reemphasizing their importance as a manpower reserve pool). Even in 1767, when the Marines were having a difficult time just maintaining their voted establishments, the commander of Plymouth was instructed to do everything possible to have the Scarborough brought up to her ‘established proportion’. This emphasis was illustrated by the Admiralty’s postscript, ‘It is their Lordships direction that you discharge Seamen to make room for the above mentioned Complement of Marines.’ This is strongly indicative of the importance to the Admiralty of having full complements of marines on ships being made ready for overseas duty—so much so that if necessary they would remove seamen in order to fill their complement. This is a setback to the argument that any landsman or sailor could fulfil the duties of a Marine at sea.

Times of peace in the second half of the eighteenth century were not necessarily times of foreign policy inactivity. While colonial and domestic affairs consumed the majority of governmental concern there were still many instances where British coercive maritime

781 J. Warren, A view of the naval force of Great-Britain: ...To which are added observations and hints for the improvement of the naval service, (London, 1791), p. 18
782 Admiralty to Capt. Gregory of Scarborough, 20 March 1767 in NA ADM 2/1162, p. 364
policy was needed.\(^{783}\) One of the first incidents where it was put into effect was in the two disputes over Honduras and Turks Island. These two disputes set the pattern for all future coercive maritime policy actions against the Bourbon powers of Spain and France. There will be a general refrain from any in-depth discussions of the Honduras and Turks Island incidents, as they have been sufficiently covered in other works. More importantly the concern over diplomacy is not the central focus of this dissertation.\(^ {784}\) Instead, the greater significance here is the use of marines acting as the state’s tool for power projection. On 12 June 1764, a letter arrived from Governor Lyttleton of Jamaica reporting that Philip Remirez de Esterios, the governor of Yucatan, had prevented the English logwood cutters from arriving at Rio Nuevo and Rio Hondo. Then on 20 June 1764 the Commander-in-Chief of the Jamaica station, Sir William Burnaby, wrote to the Admiralty informing them that the governor of Dominica, the Comte d’Estaing, had forcefully expelled some salt pan workers from Turks Island.\(^{785}\) In consequence, on 17 August 1764, the Royal Navy sent out two ships-of-the-line HMS Africa (64) and HMS Essex (64). This was quickly followed on the 3 September by the dispatch of HMS Thunderer (74) and HMS Edgar (60) which significantly increased the amount of force under William Burnaby’s command. Burnaby at the time had only the fourth-rate HMS Dreadnought (60) and eight fifth-rates along with various other smaller ships, such as sloops. In fact, these reinforcements gave him a larger force in the Caribbean at that time than both of the Bourbon powers’ navies in theatre combined.

Burnaby had orders from Secretary of State for the Southern Department, the Earl of Halifax, to monitor the French in their compliance with the Turks Island settlement but also to take a firmer stance with Spain. Burnaby was given the power ‘to land such force, and to give the said Logwood Cutters such protection, as shall be necessary for their reestablishment, and future security’.\(^ {786}\) To carry this out Burnaby received a detachment of troops from Jamaica but more importantly he also had the option of using his marines to exert this influence. The ships sent out to reinforce Burnaby’s force were to have their full complement of Marines, 228 officers and men. When added to Burnaby’s already sizable Marine complement he would command well over 600 marines within his fleet. By utilising this large force along with the detachment of soldiers from Jamaica, he would be able to intimidate the Yucatan governor into any proposition the British government might demand. Burnaby was explicitly

\(^{783}\) Nicholas Tracy handles this from a purely Naval perspective in Tracy, *Navies, Deterrence, and American Independence: Britain and Seapower in the 1760s and 1770s*; whereas H. M. Scott looks at this period as a continental realignment of power in H. M. Scott, *British Foreign Policy in the Age of the American Revolution* (Oxford, 1990)


\(^{785}\) A good study of the diplomacy of this incident is in N. Tracy, ‘Gunboat Diplomacy of the Government of George Grenville, 1764-1765’, p. 712-714

\(^{786}\) Halifax to Admiralty in NA SP 44/231, 23 September 1764, p. 243
ordered to ‘refrain from any Act of hostility, other than such as shall be absolutely necessary for the defence of His Majesty’s subjects’.\footnote{Halifax to Admiralty in NA SP 44/231, 23 September 1764, p. 243} For some, like Bedford, this was cause for concern: ‘For God’s sake take heed, not to hurry ourselves precipitately into a War, in order to gain a popularity, which must I fear be the inevitable ruin of this Nation, and bring vexation and distress on the King our Master’\footnote{Bedford to Sandwich in NMM SAN/V/14, 7 September 1764}. In the end, the Bourbon powers gave in to the demands of the British government, in large part due to the deployment of this naval strike weapon and its dominance of the Caribbean area. Marines were a component in this, for they not only allowed the ships to be a seaborne deterrent, they were also a necessary bulwark of men to use in landings, as envisioned at Honduras.\footnote{Tracy, ‘Gunboat Diplomacy of the Government of George Grenville, 1764-1765’, p. 722} With the Admiralty so insistent about having marines on all of its overseas ships it could assure them of their capability if a sea battle did happen. If this crisis, or other for that matter, did escalate into open conflict then the British would be at a dual advantage. The British would have more ships ready for action quicker than their French or Spanish rivals’ navies but more importantly British marines would be better trained in sea combat than their French or Spanish Army counterparts.

The second big event of this period in foreign affairs, and one that would not only tax the Navy but also the Marines to their breaking limits, was the 1770-1771 Falkland Island crisis. The Marines had a history of involvement in the Falkland Island going back to Captain Macbride’s expedition to build a settlement at Port Egmont in April 1766. Macbride was ordered to take HMS Jason (32) to the Falkland Islands to make a base for future operations into the South Seas.\footnote{Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, 1763-1793: Discovery and Revolution, Vol. I (London, 1952), p. 25-26} Macbride lamented the inhospitable environment on the island, describing it thus: ‘the soil of the whole is bog, and totally destitute of wood, your Lordships will easily conceive what a dreary prospect a range of creggy[sic], barren mountains afford, hightend[sic], by almost constant gales of wind’.\footnote{Capt. Macbride to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/2116, 6 April 1766, p. 5} Macbride sent twenty marines on shore to be the garrison of a newly constructed blockhouse and wharf. Before Macbride left them, they were given various ordnance stores, cannons, animals, and helped in making gardens. Macbride wondered if it would not be better for the government to send out ‘able farmers…to make anything of it’ rather than having to leave his own men.\footnote{Capt. Macbride to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/2116, 6 April 1766, p. 9} The Marines once again showed a level of their operational flexibility by being able to maintain a small garrison of British power until they were relieved by a larger, more permanent force.

The importance of the Falkland Islands to the British was largely logistical. Captain Macbride stated it as just this, ‘there are many good harbours amongst these Islands, a squadron of ships bound into the South Sea’ could replenish their stores in order to pass the
Straits of Magellan at ‘the proper season of the year’. The Spanish also understood the potential danger of this and therefore took very aggressive action against the garrison at Port Egmont. On 10 June 1770, a Spanish force under Ignacio Madariaga forced the British garrison into surrendering, thus setting in motion the biggest build-up of British naval and marine forces in the pre-American War of Independence period. Despite this, the effect of the Marines in the mobilisation has not been taken into account nor has there been research into the subsequent reforms of the service, for which the mobilisation would act as a catalyst. The Falkland Islands crisis was not only an example of the potential of rapid mobilisation; it also effectively used a coercive maritime policy to accomplish its objectives and thus crystallised the Marines as having a place in foreign policy doctrine.

On 11 September 1770 the First Lord of the Admiralty, Admiral Hawke, responded to Lord Weymouth’s letter of 7 September by quickly ordering the mobilisation of sixteen ships-of-the-line. This was to be rapidly followed by nearly twenty more being ordered to commission in the next few weeks. All of these ships were intended to be fully manned; not at peace-time, but instead at war-time levels, thus effectively doubling each ship’s complement of marines over the peace-time establishment. ‘Orders are come down for all the Marine Corps at this port [Portsmouth] to hold themselves in readiness to embark on board the fleet; and we hear that a marching regiment will be here very soon, to do the duty in the dock-yard, in the room of the Marines.’ With the continued establishment of the Marine Corps they were able to fulfil their primary role of helping to rapidly prepare the fleet for action. However, as shown in the ‘manning abstracts prepared for Sandwich’, the Marines were under complement by September 1770 and could only muster around 2,000 men. Vice-Admiral Geary, in writing to the Admiralty, warned them: ‘that there are no more marines on shore at Portsmouth than what are absolutely necessary for doing the duty in the dockyard and on shore; resolved that he be directed not to demand any more marines, but complete the ships with seamen and volunteer landmen [sic]’. This would delay until November 1770 24 ships which were to be fully fitted out. Further illustrating this shortage was that it eventually took the use of ‘three regiments of foot’ to be ‘ordered on board the fleet as marines’ to have these ships underway. We should not view this as an admonition

793 Capt. Macbride to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/2116, 6 April 1766, p. 9
796 Middlesex Journal or Chronicle of Liberty (London), Thursday, September 20, 1770
797 Tracy, Navies, Deterrence, and American Independence: Britain and Seapower in the 1760s and 1770s, p. 95
799 London Evening Post (London), Saturday, September 22, 1770
that the Navy and Marines were not pulling their weight; for as soon as the Admiralty ordered the ships ready, they also issued press warrants to be used throughout the country to bring in seamen and marines. ‘Saturday, there was a general Press for recruiting his Majesty’s Marines in the Borough of Southwark [London area], when upwards of two hundred persons were impressed for that purpose; and yesterday 150 of them were returned as fit and able men to serve their country.’

It was considered by many in the public during these naval mobilisations that marines were always better than soldiers even if it cost the government more in voted establishments. In 1790 during the Parliamentary debates around the time of the Nootka Sound mobilisation of the fleet, once again against the Bourbon Spanish, Mr. Rolle, MP for Devon and colonel of the South Devon militia, rose on the floor of the House upon hearing of the recent increase in Marine establishment to say that ‘The Marines were beyond dispute as fine a body of men as any in the kingdom, and far more useful on board our men of war than soldiers from a marching regiment.’

An addition to the Admiralty and government’s broader understanding of the importance of marines to the fleet was that even well into 1771, recruiting was still being carried out throughout all of the British Isles. The press in this period made many reports about the effectiveness of recruitment drives throughout the country. One account stated, ‘we hear they have begun to raise the Marines in Ireland, and meet with very great success, and that they will be raise [sic] in a very short time’. This was confirmed by George Townshend, Baron Bayning, when he called for more ‘recruiting parties’ to be sent ‘to this Kingdom [Ireland] to raise men towards completing the Marine Forces to their present establishment’ and he also called for these recruiting parties ‘to raise men in the provinces of Leinster, Munster, and Connaught’. Townshend went further, outlining the best method to administer the recruitment:

…it if your Lordships will send over two Field Officers one to be stationed at Dublin and the other at Waterford to superintend the embarkation of the recruits, as it will save a great deal of marching and expence [sic], and perhaps prevent some desertion, by having the recruits march’d to the nearest port, for embarkation, from their respective recruiting stations.

This would become the same policy used to raise Marines in Ireland throughout the War of American Independence, French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The Marines were able to substantially increase their numbers as they went from a near 2,500 man deficit on their voted strength before the crisis to just under a thousand less than their new voted

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800 It should be stated that impressments of marines was vary rare. There are almost no reports of it in the 47 year period of study and only happened in dire emergencies. *Middlesex Journal or Chronicle of Liberty* (London), Saturday, September 22, 1770
801 *Diary or Woodfall’s Register* (London), Tuesday, December 7, 1790
802 *General Evening Post* (London), Thursday, May 2, 1771
803 Townshend to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/4129, 3 August 1771, p. 1
804 Charles Townshend to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/4129, 3 August 1771, p. 2
numbers before 1772. What is more amazing is that this was done even when the overall voted strength of the marines had more than doubled its 1770 establishment. They would maintain a high mustered amount in comparison to their voted establishment well into the American war.\(^{805}\)

As shown above, on 29 November 1770 the Government ordered a doubling of Naval and Marine forces and this was considered to be of the utmost priority to the country.\(^{806}\) The concern about having the appropriate marine force available was a real issue to the public. One newspaper account alarmingly stated, ‘no augmentation of the Marines has been yet planned, or proposed, though it will be absolutely necessary to increase the present numbers of that very useful Corps, should the present great Naval Armament end in any thing more than a mere shew [sic]’.\(^{807}\) By January, the government took a publicly visible step of giving the Marines an ‘augmentation of one first lieutenant to each of the 70 companies [an increase from the previous 69 companies] of marines…each company is augmented with one serjeant, one corporal, one drummer, and fifty private men; and one major and one adjutant appointed to each division of that corps.’\(^{808}\) There was also an early augmentation in the administrative and command hierarchy which would be made permanent after the Falklands crisis had ended. Three Colonels, three Lieutenant Colonels, and six Majors were added to superintend ‘that useful Body of Men’, which was seen as not only bringing the Marines up to ‘their full establishment’, but also making it possible for a more rapid expansion.\(^{809}\) With the permanent establishment of so many active senior officers (none being naval sinecures) it would make sure that the structure at the top was in place when the order for mobilisation came from the government. The new commander of each Marine Division received the title Colonel-Commandant, and his duties were outlined as:

You are therefore to take into your care and charge as Colonel Commandant such part of our Marine Forces as shall be put under your direction by Our High Admiral or Commission for executing the Office of High Admiral for the time being; and also to take the said company [division of marines] as Captain into your care and duly to exercise the officers and Marines thereof in Arms and Charge and to use your best endeavours to keep them in good order and discipline and we do hereby command them to obey you as their Colonel Commandant…\(^{810}\)

This new position was important for one main reason; it eliminated any ambiguity left from the past about the ‘blue colonels’ control over Marine Division administration. While the ‘blue colonel’ posts would continue, with the eventual creation of a ‘General of Marines’ in the 1770s, these were now solely sinecures posts for those Admirals and Captains of the Navy

\(^{805}\) HCP, Journals of the House of Commons, George III year 12, 4 March 1772, p. 551
\(^{806}\) HCP, Journals of the House of Commons, George III year 11, 29 November 1770, p. 31
\(^{807}\) Public Advertiser (London), Thursday, November 1, 1770
\(^{808}\) Middlesex Journal or Chronicle of Liberty (London), Thursday, January 3, 1771
\(^{809}\) Public Advertiser (London), Thursday, September 27, 1770
\(^{810}\) Admiralty to Col. Commandant Hector Boisrond in NA ADM 6/406, p. 15 April 1771, 1-2
lucky enough to receive them while awaiting higher command level.\textsuperscript{811} So the Falkland Islands were to have a lasting and pronounced affect on the administration and authority of the British Marine Corps

Ultimately, marines showed themselves to be very effective in helping the Navy in its rapid mobilisation of the fleet. In comparison to 1755 when 146 ships were commissioned with a complement of 45,055 seamen and marines; yet in 1770, there were to be more than 175 ships commissioned with 64,865 seamen and marines to man them. This is only more telling when it is considered that of this number, in 1755, 55 were ships-of-the-line with 28,420 seamen and marines, while by 1770 this had increased to 86 ships-of-the-line with 49,930 seamen and marines.\textsuperscript{812} Marines were eventually able to generate so many recruits by the end of 1771 that they raised an establishment equalled only by that of 1759 (four years after the start of the Seven Years’ War). Marines also directly helped with the increase in the number of ships being ready to put to sea so quickly. With the continued maintenance of the Marine Corps in peace-time this would allow the Navy to quickly mobilise an ever larger number of ships more rapidly and thus allow Britain to continue to use coercive maritime policy as an effective foreign policy tool.

\section*{6.2 Imperial Power Projection}

There is currently much debate among historians concerning the relationship of the Empire to the State and the broader populace. Some historians have looked at the relationship of the State and local actors to the concept of broader ‘Great Britain’.\textsuperscript{813} Others, like Kathleen Wilson and Eliga Gould, have emphasised the binding agency of popularism and cultural understanding to creating a broader public consciousness to the British Empire.\textsuperscript{814} Marie Peters however has been more hesitant to claim that popularism and cultural understanding had much impact on the Empire. One area however in which there has been surprisingly little interest is the usage of the military as a tool of imperialism.\textsuperscript{815} Recently, blue-water policy and commerce have been seen as having enjoyed a greater cooperative relationship in catalysing the growth and expansion of empire.\textsuperscript{816} Yet, the little amount of research focusing

\begin{footnotesize}
\item[811] See Chapter II
\item[812] Tracy, Navies, Deterrence, and American Independence: Britain and Seapower in the 1760s and 1770s, p. 85
\item[816] B. Harris, Politics and the Nation: Britain in the Mid-Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 2002)
\end{footnotesize}
on the area of the military as tools of imperialism has been mostly focused on particular geographical areas, especially North America.\textsuperscript{817} There has yet been no work to see how the military, mainly the Navy, acted as a greater tool of imperial defence and policing in this period.

There is a fine line between what can be considered imperial and foreign, and this can create problems when trying to define where the Empire sits within this realm. One of the most powerful tools of imperial power projection was the Navy and its amphibious arm, the Marines. One of the main overriding concerns of imperial power projection throughout the inter-war years was its actions as an imperial defence force or deterrent to the other European powers trying to exert their own influence. The Navy and Marines as a deterrent force could also be used against Asian powers in order to exert the Crown’s and East India Company’s authority. The various affairs in the Indian Ocean from 1771 to 1774 between the Royal Navy, the East India Company, French East India Company and other various ‘country powers’ on the Indian sub-continent are one strong example of deterrence in the Empire

Marines had served in many of the East India Company’s conflicts on land. Their last major combat was at the battle of Buxar in 1764, where the Company eventually gained the right to collect the \textit{diwani}. Major Carnac, after Buxar, stated: ‘I propose keeping the Marines, and taking this opportunity of separating our people, amongst many of whom the seeds of discontent still remain, which it has required my utmost care to prevent from breaking forth’.\textsuperscript{818} One of the problems with maintaining the Marines in India was the delay in receiving replacements:

The Earl of Egmont this day signified to the Board the Kings pleasure, that in consideration of the necessity there was for Officers to command the Marines in the East Indies as they frequently landed and co-operated with the troops ashore, and the impossibility of sending officers from England to supply vacancies that happened in those parts in less than twenty months or two years, the officers appointed or promoted by the Admiralty in the East Indies shall take rank from this day, according to the commissions they received from those Admirals and be placed on the half pay list accordingly.\textsuperscript{819}

This was to rubber stamp the local naval commanders’ decisions on the spot, similar to their authority overseas for naval promotions. However this was an exception given only in the most extreme cases but it does illuminate the growing Marine integration with the Navy. After all was said and done, two 1\textsuperscript{st} Lieutenants were promoted to Captain and two 2\textsuperscript{nd} Lieutenants to 1\textsuperscript{st} Lieutenants.


\textsuperscript{818} Letter from Major Carnac to the Committee of the East India Company, 10 May 1764, HCP, \textit{Third Report from the Committee Appointed to enquire into the Nature, State, and Condition, of the East India Company, and of the British Affairs in the East Indies}, George III year 13, 8 April 1773, p. 370

\textsuperscript{819} Sandwich correspondence, 6 June 1765, NMM SAN/F/35, no. 35/1
By 1770, the East India Station had only one ship-of-the-line with marines stationed aboard it. The Admiralty made an increasingly concerted effort to give Admiral Robert Harland full complements of marines when it then expanded his squadron. Eventually by 1771 the Admiralty was to provide Harland with over 200 marines on the four ships-of-the-line recently arrived in India. This substantial increase came at the height of the Falkland Islands crisis, when manpower was essential, and shows the importance of the squadron as a deterrent force in the government’s eyes.\textsuperscript{820} Before Admiral Harland left Britain, he felt it was vital to the appearance of his command for his marines ‘being supplied with two suits of new clothing each man, in addition to what they may have when they go out, to be issued to them as it shall become due, as from the uncertainty of the India Ships arriving, the Marines may be left in want of all their necessaries.’\textsuperscript{821} This request was not only for utility reasons, but also to help maintain an active physical and visible presence in the East—and he also did not want his marines in any way to be lacking. The Admiralty agreed, and four hundred uniforms were sent out on the East India Company ship London on 20 March 1771, which were to be delivered into the charge of Mr Arthur Cuthbert, Naval Storekeeper.\textsuperscript{822}

Admiral Harland was given instructions to maintain a close eye on the French colonies, especially Mauritius but also to be careful about the Company’s actions as well. “The great objects of your instructions,” wrote Lord Rochford, “are the reconciliation of the unhappy differences between the Nabob and the Company’s servants as far as lies in your power, and the transmitting to His Majesty the fullest information of the transactions in India, with your own opinion both with regard to the internal economy and administration of the Company’s servants and their dealing with the Country Powers.”\textsuperscript{823} This was part of the growing strategy of monitoring the ever-growing power, perceived by many in British government circles, of the East India Company. Some Members of Parliament had been advocating just this sort of policy in the Commons by 1772.\textsuperscript{824} Anxieties were further excited when issues arose over the Company’s attempted seizure of deserters (from the Company) who were found serving as marines on Royal Navy ships. In the end, the Company had to admit they acted inappropriately in seizing some of the men, stating ‘no proof was offered of the supposed desertion’. This was not always a two way street though, as the Company was also not pleased when Captain Napier of the Marines sent his Marine NCOs on shore to look for their deserters within the Company’s forces.\textsuperscript{825} While officially this was an illegal move by Napier it did not stunt his promotion aspects. By October Napier was promoted to Major

\textsuperscript{820} H. Richmond, \textit{The Navy in India, 1763-1783} (London, 1931), p. 52\textsuperscript{821} Harland to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/163, 10 March 1771\textsuperscript{822} Harland to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/163, 20 March 1771, p. 1-2\textsuperscript{823} Richmond, \textit{The Navy in India, 1763-1783}, p. 56\textsuperscript{824} Marshall, \textit{The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India, and America, c. 1750-1783}, p. 210\textsuperscript{825} East India Company to Harland in NA ADM 1/163, 29 July 1772, p.1-3
by Harland following Major Benelyshe’s death.\footnote{Harland to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/163, 02 October 1772, p. 1} This episode reveals some of the complacency Harland had towards actions like Napier’s. Harland felt it was more vital that the fleet maintain its full complement of marines while on the East Indies station, no matter what actions the Company might take. Eventually the French began to reduce their forces by the end of 1772 but the government, even with this reduced foreign threat, maintained its naval and marine strength within the East Indies squadron. However, the government ever tired of the increased spending in India and its own limited resources of marines in India instructed the Company to form its own marine force. By 1772, the East India Company had created their own Marine Corps to serve upon their ships. The Company began with the raising of two battalions of marines, to be called ‘India Marines’, who were ‘maintained and trained in arms’ all in the same manner as the British Marine Corps.\footnote{Clause I in Middlesex Journal or Chronicle of Liberty (London), Thursday, January 23, 1772; Unfortunately there is no evidence of any Indian Marines being formed up until 1777 during the fear of a war with the French. J. Biggs-Davision, ‘Marine and Marines in India’, \textit{Contemporary Review}, Vol. 240 [1393] (1982), p. 77} This ‘India Marine Corps’ was intended to allow greater operational flexibility to the Royal Navy. It was felt that if the need for marines in India increased then these Indian Marines would be folded into the Royal Navy until the danger passed. The large presence of marines in the Indian Ocean indicates the importance placed on this theatre by the government and Admiralty. Marines, due to their amphibious nature could project power, though limited, upon land and at sea. They were an active deterrent to any European or Local power and their use shows the government’s active desire to maintain the status-quo overseas.

The second, and by far the most used aspect of imperial power projection in our period, was in the realm of imperial policing. Two areas of primary concern for the British during the two inter-war periods were the Caribbean and North America. America was to be key to the Marines continued existence. One author stated this concept clearly in the 1740s: ‘I forget not our American possessions, but for their Guard I hope a sufficient body of Marines may be kept at the peace, the recruit of which may be left to the drum; that body suits this service best, because they have the best chance of being brought home for recruit and review.’\footnote{Anonymous, \textit{Thoughts occasion'd by the bill printed last sessions, [sic] for the better regulating of the militia: with a proposal for recruiting the infantry in pay} (London, 1747), p. 19} Large internal disputes of the islands and continent were to be handled by Army garrisons stationed in the area. This was particularly exemplified during this period with the Army’s use to quell the various slave and native revolts in the Caribbean Islands of Jamaica and St. Vincent among others. However, if the need arose for the Navy to assist, then it could help by transporting soldiers and, if requested, by landing marines ashore.\footnote{M. Craton, \textit{Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies} (Ithaca, 1982), p. 193}
The 1763-1775 and 1783-1791 periods saw an average decrease in the profitability of the sugar islands in British possession from what it had been from 1749-1762. There are a variety of reasons for this from the cheap sugar of French Saint-Domingue to the over used soil on some British islands like Barbados. Despite this decrease, sugar was still profitable in the British West Indies, for as J. R. Ward has stated, ‘it seems that sugar planting in the British West Indies was profitable throughout the years of slavery’. This profitability gave the planters a strong colonial lobby within Parliament—one that was far better organised than the North American lobby. This also made the concern over customs revenue and receipts of primary importance, especially its trade with the North American colonies. However, their interest did not always usurp that of others, as the reduction in the Molasses duty proved in 1764. The power of the West Indies lobby, though diminishing by the later eighteenth century, could still demand the use of the Navy and Marines to protect their mass influx of revenues to Britain. One historian noted, in ‘1784-6 Britain’s West Indian colonies exported products worth £4\(\frac{1}{2}\) million annually to Britain alone, at a time when Britain’s own domestic exports were no greater than £14 million’.

This commercial protection created a greater need for marines to be stationed in the West Indies. The marines’ role in imperial policing was also recognized by the press: ‘We hear a regiment [detachment] of marines will speedily embark for Jamaica; to be added to the military establishment thereof, and for the better supplying his Majesty’s ships of war on the West India Station, with fresh detachments from that useful corps.’ This came at the height of a slave revolt scare and reflected the panicked reaction of some of the planters regarding their ability to maintain control. Indigenous populations were also an element the Navy could help restrain with the use of their marines as well. West Florida, which had only recently been acquired from the Spanish after the victories of the Seven Years’ War, was known for its cocoa. This cocoa which was ‘imported by the way of Jamaica’ was ‘esteemed by good judges equal to the best Spanish cocoa in the West-Indies’. Lieutenant Governor Montfort Browne was emphatic when he said, ‘we presume to think that government never intended abandoning so promising a colony, the trade of which [cocoa] now begins to flow.’ Governor Browne and merchants of Pensacola were afraid, after the 21\(^{st}\) and 31\(^{st}\) Regiments were sent to St. Augustine (East Florida), that they were to be ‘ravaged’ by the Indians of the

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833 Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser (London), Tuesday, March 5, 1765  
834 *London Evening Post* (London), Tuesday, February 14, 1764  
835 Lt. Governor Browne to Parry in NA ADM 1/238, p. 1
area. They therefore requested the Commander-in-Chief of the Jamaica station, Admiral William Parry, to provide them with marine assistance. ‘I am sure the addition of another frigate with some Marines would be of the highest utility at this time, to the province, as I shall be thereby instilled to keep possession [sic] of the fort at the Natchez…’. Admiral Parry sent two ships, HMS Renown (32) and HMS Jamaica (14), to cooperate with the two armed schooners already in Florida to help protect the colony. The Navy and Marines were best suited for this sort of operation because of their inherent mobile status provided by naval ships.

This was only one part of the Marines’ imperial policing duties in the Americas. Another very important duty for the Navy and Marines was to act as active protectors of the seas, against smugglers and other maritime crimes. One of the continual problems to plague the Marines and Navy was the ambiguity of the laws of the seas about peace-time interdiction operations. Admiral Parry expressed his concern when commenting about reports coming from Honduras concerning the lawlessness of the area in the late 1760s.

A Frigate at least ought always to be down in the Bay of Honduras to prevent as much as possible murders, frauds and confusion, which are notoriously practised amongst the Baymen, and which cannot be checked by military force; -and there we seem to be defective likewise; for the Commander of any ship that inflicts a punishment, seizes a delinquent to bring him up to Jamaica to be tried for his offence, lays himself open to a heavy action at Law.

Parry goes on to implore that parliament pass laws giving these powers directly to the military so that he can implement the government’s orders. This remained a continual complaint, as will be shown, of all naval commanders who were to act in the roles of customs agents and police. However, these interdiction operations did not end with the loss of the thirteen colonies in 1783, as historians have shown.

While the purely customs related aspects of their jobs did end after the loss of the American colonies, these operations did not comprise the entirety of their duties in the Americas, as other maritime policing functions continued. In fact with the anti-slavery operations in the nineteenth century they just changed the type of cargo to be inspected by the Navy and Marines. When Admiral Philip Affleck, Commander-in-Chief Jamaica, wrote in 1791 that he was ‘furnishing the Hound Sloop with a detachment of Marines from the Juno, which was founded on the supposition that peace would have been established with Russia’, this transfer of marines would help bolster Affleck’s anti-smuggling operations.

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836 Lt. Governor Browne to Parry in NA ADM 1/238, p. 2
837 Parry to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/238, 12 December 1768, p. 1-2
838 Parry to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/238, 12 December 1768, p. 3
840 Affleck to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/244, 18 July 1791
North America was one of the most active areas of imperial policing for the Marines for the entirety of the 1755-1802 period. The maritime policing policy used in the North American station was the same as that used in the Caribbean but with the added duty of the customs service. This was not the first time that colonial governors had asked for active revenue-raising help from the Navy. The Navy had occasionally played a role in customs seizure cases in the past but their relationship with the customs officers was never very cordial.\textsuperscript{841} With the reforms and acts of 1764, this would change for now naval officers in America were to do duty as deputy customs officers as well. The Navy also began stationing cutters off the American coast to prevent any clandestine landings of smugglers in the various rivers and bays.\textsuperscript{842} Tensions were high between the governors and the naval captains, a topic which has been covered extensively by other historians, but the use of marines as a tool of these interdiction missions has been largely overlooked.\textsuperscript{843} The use of marines on sloops in North America from 1764-1775 and the Jamaica station 1783-1793 demonstrates the awareness to the Admiralty and ‘commanders at sea’ of the importance of marines in maritime policing functions. By being well armed and trained in musketry, marines, like their army counterparts, were the only small-arms disciplined force available for active policing. With this active knowledge of how to use muskets and bayonets marines could enforce any order of the naval officer, and consequently the State, at the point of the bayonet if called upon. This is further accented by the practice of placing marines on sloops something strictly forbidden in European waters. Marine complements were never very large, usually a sergeant, a corporal and fifteen privates but they could be an effective tool if used properly.\textsuperscript{844} Captain James Hawker, commander of the \textit{Sardoine} sloop, was one of the more active commanders upon station in North America. With his small ship he could gain access to most of the rivers and bays popular to smugglers along the American coast. From June to September 1764 the \textit{Sardoine} examined nearly two hundred ships but of these only five were seized for various customs infractions.\textsuperscript{845} On 30 January 1766 at the height of the Stamp Act crisis, in Wilmington Delaware, Captain Hawker was attacked by a mob of colonists trying to ‘force the Stamps out’ of his ship. Hawker explained the precarious situation the ship was in and the potential threat of the crowd in his letter to the Admiralty. ‘She [\textit{Sardoine}] was then alongside the wharf and hauld [sic] as high up as possible, on account of the Ice, and only floated at high Water – Spring tides’.\textsuperscript{846} He prepared the ship and its marines to defend

\textsuperscript{841} Barrow, \textit{Trade and Empire: The British Customs Service in Colonial America, 1660-1775}, p. 156  
\textsuperscript{842} Barrow, \textit{Trade and Empire: The British Customs Service in Colonial America, 1660-1775}, p. 191  
\textsuperscript{843} C. Ubbelohde, \textit{The Vice-Admiralty Courts and the American Revolution} (Chapel Hill, 1960), p. 77; Stout, \textit{The Royal Navy in America, 1760-1775}  
\textsuperscript{844} Hawker to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/1899, 3 March 1766, p. 4  
\textsuperscript{846} Hawker to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/1899, 3 March 1766, p. 1
themselves, and made the ‘Chief Magistrate of this place’ warn the mob that anyone who did attempt action would be treated as a ‘Rebel’ and fired upon by his marines.\textsuperscript{847} In addition, Hawker received word that the people of Philadelphia were planning to attack a ship which was at that moment bringing them their stamp papers. Hawker was therefore forced to sail up river with his ship in order to protect her. Marines, even small detachments of them, could offer a certain level of protection to the King’s property or protect the officers tasked with carrying out unpopular duties. Finally in 1767, Sardoine sloop was now in Charlestown, South Carolina and Hawker sent a party of men, including marines, on board a schooner at the wharf that was suspected of smuggling. The town’s people came out, and the situation quickly turned into a disturbance like that at Wilmington the year before, but this time the people threatened to use the batteries of Fort Johnson against the Sardoine. ‘I could sincerely wish that the Mob consisted only the lower class, or an idle unthinking rabble, but it was quite otherwise, people of no small repute appeared as the ring leaders’.\textsuperscript{848} Hawker went on to mention that ‘the light infantry militia drums beat to arms, not to quell the mob, collected in defiance of all law and allegiance to their sovereign but to increase it’.\textsuperscript{849} Once again, Hawker had heavily relied on his small complement of marines to protect him and act as a physical barrier of well trained men with small-arms and bayonets. Marines were able to protect Hawker and prevent the matter from quickly getting out of control.

From 1767-1771, Commodore Samuel Hood was the commander of the North American squadron. Hood’s continual problems originated from Boston, which by 1768 was near the point of open rebellion. By 24 October 1767, the Navy had seven ships on the North American Station. Of these, only three ships had a permanent complement of marines, so there were only 110 marine officers and men in the total fleet.\textsuperscript{850} By March 1768, the rumblings were turning into full hostilities against customs agents. The customs officers wrote in desperation to Hood. ‘We are now to acquaint you sir, that from the conduct and temper of the people of this town, and the adverse aspect of things in general, the security of the revenue, the safety of its officers, and the honour of government require some immediate aid’.\textsuperscript{851} They felt that the assistance of just ‘two, or more ships of war should be imployed [sic] on this station’ in order to protect them so that they would not be so overtly threatened.\textsuperscript{852} But by June 1768, the American board of customs’ officials in Boston were

\textsuperscript{847} Hawker to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/1899, 3 March 1766, p. 1-2
\textsuperscript{848} Hawker to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/1899, 2 June 1767, p. 2
\textsuperscript{849} Hawker to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/1899, 2 June 1767, p. 2-3
\textsuperscript{850} State and Condition of His Majesty’s Ships in NA ADM 1/483, 24 May 1767
\textsuperscript{851} Customs Officials, Boston to Samuel Hood in NA ADM 1/483, 4 March 1768
\textsuperscript{852} Customs Officials, Boston to Samuel Hood in NA ADM 1/483, 4 March 1768
forced to flee to a British warship then in the harbour, to protect them against the riotous mobs.\textsuperscript{853} The customs officials, in a letter to Hood, outlined the events that happened: it was …impossible to carry on the business of the Revenue in the town of Boston, from the outrageous behavior [sic] of the people, who grossly abused and wounded the collector and comptroller and other officers, in the execution of their duty…we took shelter on board His Majesty’s ship Romney and desired Capt. Corner to put us on shore at Castle William, where we now are , and at our request Capt. Corner will continue near to the Castle for our protection…the very alarming state of things at Boston, and to desire you [Hood] will give us such further protection as you may be able to afford in the present emergency…\textsuperscript{854}

HMS Romney (50) was the largest ship of the fleet with two marine officers and fifty-three marines.\textsuperscript{855} This, and the eventual incident with HMS Liberty, made marines as much a target of the populace’s ire as the customs agents. All were forced to stay upon ship and could only foray into town in large numbers.\textsuperscript{856}

Some officials, like Joseph Harrison, Collector of Customs in Boston, felt that the fleet was able to be more intimidating to inhabitants in the town than the 1,000 soldiers that were also stationed there.\textsuperscript{857} This sort of reasoning further demonstrates the perceived success of Commodore Hood’s use of larger ships, whose guns could be trained on the city, and the Marines who through their amphibious nature could provide protection for the customs officials. His Majesty’s Ships were fortresses upon the sea bristling with heavy large guns which in conjunction with their amphibious arm could project power upon land. This was part of the attempt to overawe the Bostonians and extract compliance from them.\textsuperscript{858} Hood even went so far as to state: ‘the Kings ships are in constant readiness to give the Lieut. Governor and other civil officers of government and magistrates, every aid and assistance which they shall require and shall be in my power for preserving the public peace’.\textsuperscript{859} Hood understood that it would take more than just naval ships ‘to check further violence, prevent illicit trade, and to defend and support the officers of the revenue in the execution of their duty, and the magistrates in the enforcement of the Laws’.\textsuperscript{860} It would also mean the use of larger numbers of marines. That is why, by 1771, eight out of twenty-two ships of the largest sizes in the North American squadron were stationed in Boston and of these six had their complete complement of marines. To get a grasp of the true numbers, of the 186 Marine officers and men, all but fourteen were stationed in the Boston area. Those fourteen were on

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\item \textsuperscript{853} Barrow, \textit{Trade and Empire: The British Customs Service in Colonial America, 1660-1775}, p. 227
\item \textsuperscript{854} Customs Officials, Boston to Samuel Hood in NA ADM 1/483, 15 June 1768
\item \textsuperscript{855} State and Condition of His Majesty’s Ships in NA ADM 1/483, 30 May 1768
\item \textsuperscript{856} Barrow, \textit{Trade and Empire: The British Customs Service in Colonial America, 1660-1775}, p. 233
\item \textsuperscript{857} P. Thomas, \textit{The Townshend Duties Crisis: The Second Phase of the American Revolution, 1767-1773} (Oxford, 1987), p. 193
\item \textsuperscript{858} Thomas, \textit{The Townshend Duties Crisis: The Second Phase of the American Revolution, 1767-1773}, p. 210
\item \textsuperscript{859} Hood to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/483, 29 October 1770, p. 1
\item \textsuperscript{860} Hood to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/483, 29 October 1770, p. 2
\end{itemize}
HMS *Deal Castle* which was stationed a short distance away in New York. ⁸⁶¹ Hood and his fellow sea captains understood the importance of having marines as a visual presence as well as a physical one. In 1770, when he was building up his forces in Boston, he sent a worried letter to the Admiralty:

> The Commanders of His Majesty’s ships here have represented to me that their Marines are totally debilitated from acting as such for want of their clothing, not being qualified to mount guard, or do duty as centinels [sic], the two ships at present with me, the *Rose* and *Boston*, the former, having near two years and a half clothing due, and the latter above one year and a half… ⁸⁶²

The purpose of this and other correspondence give an impression that policing was more than just presence, it was also representation. The Admiralty understood the importance of appearance, for as soon as the next ship left for America they sent out full sets of uniforms for 200 marines. The Navy was an active member in imperial maritime policing but most importantly they were a physical deterrent to any mob or group that may want to inflict harm on a government official or naval officer. His Majesty’s ships could be the last safe-haven for the Crown’s officers and when marines were projected on shore they could also provide a level of protection as well.

The final area of imperial policing of the Marines in North America was in the active repression and coercion of the people of Boston during 1774-1775. These operations would illuminate the full flexibility of the marines within their peace-time operational duties. The demands of Boston would require them to act in both a seaborne and land-based capacity and at continual demand. During the Boston troubles for the first time, large numbers of Army and Naval forces were permanently deployed for both imperial defence and policing. The annual spending on all military forces in the Americas, while dropping by forty percent from the wartime levels of 1756-1763, had increased sixty-five percent from the previous peacetime levels of 1749-1755. This includes the nearly sixty-five percent increase in naval spending alone for this period, up from £220, 136 (1749-1755) to £671,835 (1764-1775), or a yearly average of £31, 448 as compared with the later yearly average of £55, 986. This was at a time when the trade deficit, for the first time, went markedly against the British Isles and so the perceived importance of the American colonies to the broader British Empire was also increasing. ⁸⁶³ By 1774, Boston was the hot bed of rebellious activity in the colonies which had seen the chasing out of customs officers in 1768 and the Tea Party of 1773 which began the embargo of Boston Harbour. Boston was to draw ever greater resources of repression and, therefore, be the place for the first large scale active use of marines in coercion throughout any of the peace-time periods.

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²⁶¹ State and Condition of His Majesty’s Ships in NA ADM 1/483, 24 March 1771
²⁶² Hood to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/483, 29 October 1770, p. 3
In September, General Thomas Gage sent a concerned letter to the government warning that Boston’s ‘civil government is near its end’ and the military was the only remaining option. Then on Monday 3 October 1774 the Admiralty was consulted on whether two or three ships of war, with as large a detachment from the Marines as can be conveniently accommodated’ could be sent immediately to Boston. The ships to be sent out were to be loaded ‘with as many Marines from the several quarters as can possibly be spared; and as there may be a probability of their landing, to order a Major to command them’. This was not a completely unique idea. In a letter to the London press from Boston, one colonist wrote that ‘the Marines in England are of no use in time of peace but to occupy their barracks, or to take an airing in the guardships’. Instead in America they could be ‘of real and essential service’, for with them and the line regiments to be sent to America they could form a rapid reaction force. This force, ‘which would be received with the utmost joy by the friends of government in the country; and such a detachment would confirm and strengthen the associations for defence that are now forming in Worcester and other parts of the province’.

The battalion of Marines that was formed for this expedition to Boston would be placed under the command of Major John Pitcairn. Pitcairn, originally commissioned on 30 April 1746 in Corwallis’s Marine Regiment, promoted to first lieutenant in the reformation of the Marine Corps in April 1755, then made a Captain in 8 June 1756 and finally a Major 19 April 1771 and was personally named by the Admiralty to be the commander of this battalion. Understanding that there was need for greater flexibility whilst in America, the Admiralty ordered that all ships sent to convoy the battalion to America be given their full complements of marines as well. The battalion arrived six weeks after leaving Portsmouth in October 1774. At first Admiral Graves did not want to land marines but after Major Pitcairn’s constant requests to be allowed to land his men, and informing Graves that if his men were not landed for training they would be completely useless to the Army in the following spring, Graves relented. General Gage was eagerly anticipating the extra battalion of Marines under Pitcairn and their deployment on land to help in his various disarming operations. Upon

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866 Sandwich to Dartmouth in NA CO 5/120, 5 October 1774, p. 273
867 Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser (London), Tuesday, January 24, 1775
868 Admiralty to Mackenzie, 8 October 1774, NA ADM 2/1168, p. 230-231
869 Extract of a Letter from Honourable Governor General Gage to the Earl of Dartmouth, dated Boston, December 15th, 1774 in HCP Debates Geo. III yr 15, 19 January 1775, p. 57
the battalion’s landing, General Thomas Gage ordered the immediate construction of barracks for the marines and ordered them put on the same pay and subsistence as the army.  

Pitcairn was so concerned about his command authority ambiguities that he personally requested Col. Commandant Mackenzie, Chatham Division, to petition the First Lord of the Admiralty, the earl of Sandwich in the hope of promoting him to Lt. Colonel. Pitcairn felt that this promotion ‘would have saved me the mortification of being commanded by several majors that are much younger officers than I’. He never received this promotion, but General Gage promised to never place Pitcairn under the command of anyone below a Lt. Colonel’s rank, an interesting testament to Gage’s trust in Pitcairn. This was not a unique fear as one writer lamented the slow promotion of the Marine officers and their fears about having to operate with Army units in land operations. He stated, ‘great must be their mortification, to witness the rise of young men in the Army, who were not in existence when they got their commissions, but who now become their Commanding Officers’. 

One of the problems associated with the very nature of the Marine Corps was keeping it all under the direct and sole command of its senior officer, like Major Pitcairn. Pitcairn felt Admiral Graves, whom he described as ‘but a weak man with infinite pride’, was constantly trying to undermine his command authority. Graves had kept a large body of marines on his ships so that he could use them in his enlarged ship-searching operations in Boston harbour. Pitcairn tried to extract his men from these ships to complete his battalion but ‘you may easily immagine [sic] his behavior [Graves] on this occasion was not the most polite’. One issue used by the Admiral to keep marines under his direct command was his concerns regarding who should victual the battalion while ashore. By now, even General Gage was getting tired of requesting the supernumerary marines on board the squadron to be landed at Boston. Gage, like Pitcairn, felt they would be useless unless they were disciplined ‘this winter in a manner to enable them to act on shore with the rest of the King’s troops’. Graves only relented after Pitcairn said his men would welcome being equal with the army, and released the 390 Marines. This episode should not be seen as active identification of the Marines and the Army over the Navy, for even Pitcairn admitted he was ‘saying everything I could to the Admiral’.

Admiral Graves however was not keeping the Marines under his command as a personal whim. When Graves had arrived in America in the spring of 1774, he quickly asked for reinforcements to be sent out. On 5 October 1774 Sandwich told him that he had

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870 Pitcairn to Mackenzie, 5-10 December 1774 in BL MSS Add. 39190, f. 204-206
871 Pitcairn to Mackenzie, 5-10 December 1774 in BL MSS Add. 39190, f. 206
872 Sun (London), Saturday, June 18, 1796
873 Pitcairn to Mackenzie, 20 December 1774, BL MSS Add. 39190, f. 207
874 Graves to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/485, 08 January 1775, p. 3
875 Pitcairn to Mackenzie, 20 December 1774 in BL MSS Add. 39190, f. 208
‘thoroughly considered the practicability of sending a reinforcement of ships and Marines to North America, and am satisfied that measure may be executed without any material inconvenience’. Grav... had actually arrived on the ships did not match the numbers he was told would be on these ships. Therefore, the removal of marines off his ship, Graves feared, would affect the ship’s operational effectiveness. There is justification for this as Admiral Graves worried about the potential spring operations. He stated, ‘what ships and vessels can be spared will be doing considerable service by being spread along the coast to the eastward at places either notorious for smuggling, or where arms and ammunition are most likely to be thrown in during the winter’. He goes on, ‘I apprehend, the knowledge of their [navy’s] being on the coast may prevent considerable importations of smuggled goods and arms and ammunition.” It was seen by some that marines had a unique advantage to preventing smuggling and were particularly diligent as they could personally benefit from it. ‘The marines may be put under such well-appointed regulations, that they could be made essentially useful, in the suppression of smuggling; at least they could be as watchful, and diligent, in apprehending smugglers, as the heavy cavalry; who, notwithstanding their diligence, and formidable appearance, share very little in the seizure of smuggled goods.’

This confusion was only compounded by the orders that were given to the Ordnance Department for ‘tent & camping equipage’ to be used by marines in Boston. While none of these stores were for a permanent establishment of marines on land, it infers an intent by the Admiralty of having them stationed on land for a lengthy period. It is easy to see the potential misunderstandings about how marines were to be used when in the Americas. To Pitcairn, the orders were very clear; he had command of the battalion and landed them as soon as possible. This was reinforced in his instructions regarding the purchase of marine winter wear, ‘the Marines under your command [my emphasis] should be landing in the Winter’. Pitcairn also understood the political and command minefield he was navigating, and tried to stay in Admiral Graves’ good graces no matter how ‘absurdly he behaves’. This problem was still not fully resolved by February, for when writing to Sandwich he states:

I have but a small battalion on shore: there are still fifty of the supernumeraries that were ordered out on board ship, this hurts the appearance of the battalion greatly, as they are the best of our men and ten of them belong to our light infantry company. I have spoken

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876 Sandwich to Dartmouth in NA CO 5/120, 5 October 1774, p. 273  
877 Graves to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/485, 15 December 1774, p. 2  
878 Graves to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/485, 15 December 1774, p. 3  
879 Sailor, An address to the Right Honourable the lords commissioners of the admiralty; Upon degenerated, dissatisfied state of the British Navy; with ways and means to put the Navy upon a formidable and respectable footing, both as to ships and men (London, 1783), p. 61  
880 Lieut. General Ordnance to Admiralty, 17 October 1774 in NA ADM 2/1168, p. 238-239  
881 Admiralty to Pitcairn, 28 November 1774 in NA ADM 2/1168, p. 278
often to the Admiral about this, but to no effect; it was much against his inclinations that he landed any of us. 882 This was eventually followed by the order from the Admiralty on the 20 January which explicitly told Admiral Graves to ‘cause not only all supernumerary Marines but as many of those which are born[e] as part of the ships complements and can be spared from the duty of the ships to be landed’. 883 The Admiralty also wanted to clear up all issues of subsistence and pay by reaffirming Pitcairn’s request that marines on land be ‘paid subsisted in the same manner as the other Troops, as their being on any other footing in these respects than his [Gage] Army, might occasion discontents’. 884 The Admiralty also understood that to quell any further discontent, a Deputy Paymaster, to receive a salary of £100 per annum, had to be sent to settle all the Marine Corps fiscal issues. In addition, Captains of the Marine Companies in America were given an allowance of one shilling per day, being equal to the pay of two men per company, for paying the companies’ expenses ‘during their continuance on shore in North America’. 885 This order shows the operational command flexibility of the Navy, by allowing the Captains on the spot to purchase stores for their men this would be a clear sign that the Marines were to be thought of as an operationally cohesive element alongside the Army, as Gage and Pitcairn had been calling for. This policy prevented any hardship between Army and Marine personnel for they would receive the same pay and victuals thus making them seamless within the broader logistical structure.

There were few desertions following the landing of marines, which was to be a subject of pride for Major Pitcairn. However, this could not last and in May two Marine privates, Charles Rishman and Thomas Buck, of HMS Falcon (14) deserted while ashore doing duty at Elizabeth Island. It was stated that they had the full ‘intent to go over to the Rebels’. 886 These two men were eventually captured and court-martialed, receiving a sentence of two hundred lashes around the fleet each. Pitcairn was most troubled by the complacency of the American colonials to thieves and deserters. Pitcairn recounted how once an attempt to catch one thief, for whom Pitcairn offered a ten guinea reward for his arrest, failed because the ‘deluded people of this country will not give him up’. 887 Major Pitcairn was having growing problems maintaining the operational effectiveness of his men due to the cheap and ready accessibility of rum in the Boston area. The rum had a coercive effect, for it ‘debauches both navy and army’ eventually killing many, including six marines. By March things were improving, and the battalion was ‘getting the better of their drunkenness’.

883 Admiralty to Graves, 20 January 1775 in NA ADM 2/1168, p. 326
884 Admiralty to Pitcairn, 20 January 1775 in NA ADM 2/1168, p. 323-324
885 Admiralty to Major Pupper, 25 July 1775 in NA ADM 2/1168, p. 544-545
886 Graves to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/485, 06 June 1775
887 Pitcairn to Mackenzie, 16 February 1775, BL MSS Add. 39190, f. 209
Pitcairn decided that close access to his men could improve this situation as he was living ‘almost night and day amongst the men in their barracks for these five or six weeks past, on purpose to keep them from that pernicious rum’. 888 This closeness of quarters with one’s men was not too unusual for a Marine officer, as he would be required to live in continual close proximity to his men on ship. However the Army was not used to this practice and officers maintained their distance from their men. Pitcairn felt operational exercises were imperative and would ‘march out with our battalion six of seven miles into the country’ continually.

During these exercises Pitcairn exclaimed:

The people swear at us sometimes, but that does us no harm. I often wish to have orders to march to Cambridge and seize those impudent rascals that have the assurance to make such resolves. They sometimes do not know what to think of us; for we march into the town where they are all assembled but have no orders to do what I wish to do, and what I think may easily be done, I mean to seize them all and send them to England. 889

This was not an unusual statement for Pitcairn had many personal animosities against the Americans (mainly against Bostonians). He considered them to be extremely ungrateful to the King and the military’s sacrifices in the last war (in which Pitcairn served from beginning to end).

More reinforcements were on the way by 13 January 1775, as the Cabinet had decided, “that the army under General Gage should be reinforced by sending as soon as possible two Regiments of Infantry and one of Light Cavalry from Ireland and also a further detachment of 600 marines”. 890 The reinforcement to the Marines by a second battalion and other Army regiments was a sign of growing concern, coming from Gage and the government, about containing the Bostonians and New Englanders by putting more ‘boots on the ground’. 891 The eventual number of marines sent out to Boston on 2 March 1775 in order to make up the 2nd battalion included: two majors, ten captains, twenty-seven subalterns (1st & 2nd Lieutenants), twenty-eight sergeants, twenty-five corporals, twenty drummers and fifers, two adjutants, one surgeon, two surgeons mates, and six hundred privates. 892 This further battalion was also under the nominal command of Major Pitcairn. With this new reinforcement nearly a third of all the Marines in the entire establishment for 1775 were now stationed in North America. However, this full reinforcement would not arrive in Boston until May 1775, after the battles of Lexington and Concord.

891 P. Thomas, Tea Party to Independence: The Third Phase of the American Revolution, 1773-1776, p. 166
892 Admiralty to Graves and Pitcairn, 2 March 1775 in NA ADM 2/1168, p. 375
On 15 April 1775, General Thomas Gage received an order from the earl of Dartmouth to destroy all strongholds, arms and ammunition of the Americans. At midnight on the eighteenth, Gage ordered 700 men, made up mostly of foot regiments along with marine grenadier and light infantry companies, under Lt. Colonel Francis Smith and Major Pitcairn to march upon and seize all military stores in Concord. The men of the flank companies were renowned for abilities and experience, not men that would panic quickly. These men were split into two different units, one under Pitcairn to go to Lexington and then meet up with the larger column for the march upon Concord. At Lexington, 130 militia men, under Captain John Parker, met the British force on the Lexington green. Pitcairn ordered that the formed up militia lay down their arms and to disperse. One newspaper account claimed, that when Major Pitcairn demanded the dispersal of the militia, one of the men struck him and then a shot rang out. Quickly action ensued but the engagement ended shortly thereafter. This was the final catalyst and the beginning of the War for American Independence. Major Pitcairn then moved on to Concord where fighting became more heated. The Marines in the day’s actions; had two officers wounded, one missing (Second Lt. Isaac Putter), 1 sergeant killed, 2 wounded and 1 missing, 1 drummer killed, 25 privates killed and 36 wounded and 5 missing. When the King received the dispatch from Pitcairn about the action he wrote:

Your letter accompanying those received from Major Pitcairn is just arrived: that officer’s conduct seems highly praiseworthy. I am of his opinion that when once those rebels have felt a smart blow, they will submit; and no situation can ever change my fixed resolution, either to bring the colonies to a due obedience to the legislature of the mother country or to cast them off!

The Marines were not only used on land in America but also fulfilled their more traditional maritime role as well. Admiral Graves, who had received similar orders to those of General Gage, used marines still within his fleet to go after more potentially important military material storage locations. On the 22 April Governor Lord Dunmore of Virginia ordered a large quantity of gunpowder to be removed, at night while people were ‘sleeping in their beds’, from the public magazine of Williamsburg and ‘conveyed under and escort of marines, on board one of his Majesty’s armed vessels, lying at a Ferry on the James River’. Lord Dunmore eventually requested further assistance from the schooner HMS Magdalen’s Captain Montagu to protect him against the riotous colonists. Montagu sent forty men: which included a naval lieutenant, a party of seamen, a Marine lieutenant and all of the ship’s crew.

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894 Lloyd’s Evening Post (London), Monday, June 26, 1775
895 Public Advertiser (London), Monday, June 12, 1775
897 Middlesex Journal and Evening Advertiser (London), Tuesday, June 27, 1775
marine detachment to guard the Governor’s mansion at Williamsburg.\footnote{Graves to Admiralty, 16 June 1775, NA ADM 1/485, p. 6} Once again this threw the marines into their more traditional role of a physical deterrent force with authority to prevent any damage to the King’s property. This physical deterrent was demonstrated by another incident when a mob had threatened to tar and feather Captain Wallace of HMS *Rose* (24) who at the time was ashore at a friend’s house. Captain Wallace received advanced notice of this and had twenty of his marines sent to guard the house. This convinced the rebels that ‘the Captain was a damned fighting fellow, upon which they unanimously resolved, that he was not worth their notice, and dispersed’.\footnote{Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser (London), Saturday, February 11, 1775} The very presence of marines signified to a belligerent that the naval officer or government official was serious about using force if called upon.

Marines were to take part in all inspections of questionable ships who might be smuggling weapons or supplies to the colonies. HMS *Falcon* when in Boston on the 2 June, commanded by Captain Linzee, sent out its gunner, surgeon’s mate, a midshipman, eight seamen and three marines into a sloop to seize the *Champion*, a smuggler, which was carrying flour and corn in Buzzard’s Bay.\footnote{Graves to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/485, 16 June 1775, p. 5} Admiral Graves in lamenting the difficulty of his job stated: ‘I find the Rebels have seized and carried into their ports several vessels laden with fuel...provisions coming to Boston and being informed that they [Americans] have retaken two vessels seized by the *Falcon* and made the men prisoners’.\footnote{Graves to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/485, 19 May 1775} He requested the Admiralty approve of his plan to use ‘a serjeant, corporal and ten private Marines in addition to the present establishment’ on all armed schooners on the North American station. This increased establishment, ‘would make these vessels very formidable, and enable them to do very considerable service during the Rebellion’. Most importantly the Admiral saw marines as an ‘excellent guard to prevent the seamen deserting’.\footnote{Graves to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/485, 19 May 1775} The reason he was asking for the Admiralty’s approval is not because this was a radically new use for the Marines but because it would allow him to keep all of his marines that were on ship there without having to provide any more to the land battalions. If the Admiralty felt his mission was important enough then they might even call back a few from the land battalions to assist him in his duties.

Marines were involved in one of the largest amphibious interdiction missions to date in the inter-war period, in the early months of 1775. This operation was against Noddle and Hog Islands which are both located in the modern state of Rhode Island. Noddle Island was a major storehouse for agricultural products in the New England colonies. At the time of the operation it stored above six hundred sheep, several milk cows and a number of horses.
These were invaluable stores in the early stages of the conflict and it was absolutely necessary to prevent the destruction or seizure of these stores. The Americans, under Colonel Israel Putman soon to be of Bunker Hill fame, landed on Noddle Island forcing Graves to order the schooner HMS Diana to sail immediately to prevent their escape. Graves directed, ‘a party of Marines to be landed for the same purpose...there was no time to be lost, and assistance from the Army could not immediately be had’.  When Diana entered the river between three and four in the afternoon at low water it proceeded to Hog Island. There were a number of Americans on Hog and Noddle Islands ‘by all accounts [they] were computed at seven hundred men’. Unfortunately Diana beached herself on a shallow part of the river and had to await help to tow it out. When things calmed down a little bit at evening the boats of the squadron proceeded to tow the Diana out.

General Putnam had brought, I am told full two thousand men with two field pieces from Cambridge with which he lined the shore and greatly annoyed the Diana...The Marines from the squadron were landed on the island with two three pounders from the Cerberus and the General sent two pieces of artillery, but it was impossible though in sight of the fleet to give the schooner any other assistance than by boats to tow her out... The Americans eventually were able, at about midnight, to set HMS Diana on fire and entirely destroyed her. As an aside, five swivel-guns from Diana would be found at the redoubts at Breeds and Bunker Hill in June when they were recaptured with the help of marines. In all occasions of ship loss a court martial was held against the ship’s commander, but Graves reported ‘the very honourable acquittal of the commander of Diana by the court, [which] I make no doubt will be satisfactory to their Lordships’.

What this incident does demonstrate is operationally how Admiral Graves felt about fighting the American rebel was different from General Gage. Gage felt in these early days that maintaining Boston and sending strikes inland was the best option. Graves would utilise the operational flexibility of his marines in lightning raids to either protect valuable stores or prevent them falling into the rebels hands. This could potentially have been why Graves was so hesitant about giving up his marines for with them on land they were to be used up in costly land campaigns, as opposed to what he considered as more important interdiction operations.

The growing rebellion in America started to show signs of heating up by June and there was great demand for more marines, so the government increased their establishment

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903 Graves to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/485, 07 June 1775, p. 3
904 Graves to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/485, 07 June 1775, p. 3
905 Graves to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/485, 07 June 1775, p. 4
906 J. Clarke, An impartial and authentic narrative of the battle fought on the 17th of June, 1775, between His Britannic Majesty’s troops and the American provincial army, on Bunker’s Hill (London, 1775), p. 5
907 Graves to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/485, 07 June 1775, p. 5; London Evening Post (London), Tuesday, July 4, 1775
from 4284 men to 6665 men: over a fifty percent increase (the same level of increase also seen in the navy as well).\textsuperscript{908} One of the costliest land battles for the Marines was fought on 17 June 1775. This was also the largest single operation in peace-time in which marines were operationally deployed, and one of the Royal Marines ten most remembered dates to this very day.\textsuperscript{909} On the night before, the Americans had fortified Breed’s Hill on the Charleston neck just north of Boston. Colonel Putnam would lead the Americans from his headquarters on Bunker Hill, from which the battle would take it name. The British planned to land 2, 400 British marines and regulars and retake the heights that commanded Boston Harbour.

Admiral Graves began the operation by ordering his ships to set fire to the deserted settlement of Charlestown in order to cover the landings. The land forces would be landed by noon of the seventeenth from across the Charles River in Boston, under the command of General William Howe.\textsuperscript{910} One naval officer recounted the early stages of the fighting as, ‘The light infantry and grenadiers received the first fire, just as I was landing Major Pitcairn and the Marines about two hundred yards off the spot where the engagement began’.\textsuperscript{911} The battle progressed all day with repeated frontal attacks on the American redoubts. ‘They attacked the rebels and after a very obstinate defence carried their entrenchment and drove them with great slaughter’ wrote another observer.\textsuperscript{912} Major Tupper, who commanded the detachment of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Battalion of Marines, in his after action report to Admiral Graves stated:

I have the honor to inform your Lordships that the Officers and Men of the Marines Corps shewed [sic] on their occasion greatest intrepidity, for notwithstanding the incessant [sic] fire from the Rebels they surmounted every difficulty that is utmost in this inclosed [sic] country and were some of the first that goes into the Rebels tho [sic] they were opposed by a great body of men and a heavy fire from the place, the taking of which decided the affair in our favour, as they were obliged to retreat.\textsuperscript{913}

The Marines lost one major, two captains, three lieutenants, two sergeants, one corporal, and twenty-one privates killed and three captains, three lieutenants, two sergeants, two corporals, and seventy-seven privates wounded, with the majority of casualties coming from Marine flank companies of grenadiers and light infantry.\textsuperscript{914} One sailor would note: ‘At the battle of Bunker’s-Hill, the Marines acquired immortal honor [sic]; they sustained the heat of action during the whole of that fatal day –the aera [sic] of which day can never be forgotten in the annals of Great Britain.’\textsuperscript{915} This battle demonstrates that the Marines, in the eyes of some in

\textsuperscript{908} Order in Council, 5 July 1775 in NA ADM 2/1168, p. 500-501
\textsuperscript{909} ‘Corps and Unit Memorable Dates’ in \textit{Newsletter}, [Royal Marines Historical Society] (Spring 2009), p. 8
\textsuperscript{911} Letter to a gentleman in Reading in \textit{Lloyd’s Evening Post} (London), Friday, July 28, 1775
\textsuperscript{912} Graves to Admiralty in NA ADM 1/485, 22 June 1775, p. 5
\textsuperscript{913} Tupper to Graves in NA ADM 1/485, 21 June 1775
\textsuperscript{914} Tupper to Graves in NA ADM 1/485, 24 June 1775, p. 2
\textsuperscript{915} Sailor, \textit{An address to the Right Honourable the lords commissioners of the admiralty: Upon degenerated, dissatisfied state of the British Navy}, p. 65
the Army staff, were seen as akin to the flanking battalions in amphibious operations as this was the position they shared in the line of battle. This battle also reinforced the operational doctrine of the Corps by their being used in the initial stages of any amphibious landing.

Major Pitcairn’s loss would be especially traumatic for the Marine Corps. Major Tupper spoke of the loss of Major Pitcairn: ‘the honor the Corps acquired in that day, was very much damaged by the loss of many brave Officers and then fell in particular that of the Major Pitcairn, who was wounded minutes before the attack was made on the Redoubt and he died about two or three hours after, his loss is greatly regretted by the whole Corps who hold him in very great estimation’. 916 Major Pitcairn had four lead balls lodged in his body at the end of the day and he would be taken off the field ‘upon his son’s shoulders’. 917 It was said that when news of his death arrived in Chatham it was the ‘chief topik’ of discussion. He was reputed to be a ‘Gentleman of a universal good Character, and beloved by his Officers and Men, and much esteemed by all ranks of people here for his Affability and genteel Address’.

The account goes on to mention that he was a tender husband, and a very affectionate father of eleven children. It was further mentioned that; ‘On the News being brought to his Lady last Tuesday evening, she immediately dropped [sic] down, and for several hours it was thought she was dead; she has not spoke since, and her life is not expected; their mutual happiness were beyond conception’. 918

Major Tupper, third in command before the battle, took command upon the death of Major Pitcairn and Major Short, who died of his wounds on 23 June; Tupper was eventually relieved later in the year by the arrival of Lieutenant Colonel Collins. When Lt. Colonel Collins arrived he was accompanied by two 2nd Lieutenants that were also to be replacements. 919 The Admiralty in their letter to Tupper ‘express their concern for the loss of the Officers who fell on that occasion [Bunker Hill]’ and wanted to assure all Marines of their entire satisfaction ‘of the gallant behaviour of the Marine Corps and the honor [sic] they have acquired in the defeat of the Rebels on that day’. 920 But the one thing to taint all of this honour was the loss sustained by the Marines of their tents which were plundered while they were engaged in the battle. The Admiralty were in utter ‘astonishment’ that it could have happened, for the largest portion of the Army as well as a large portion of the 2nd Battalion of Marines had remained in camp during the attack. The Admiralty felt that they could not ‘consent to the introducing a precedent for charging the public with the expense of making

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916 Tupper to Graves in NA ADM 1/485, 21 June 1775
917 London Evening Post (London), Tuesday, July 25, 1775
918 St. James’s Chronicle or the British Evening Post (London), Saturday, July 29, 1775
919 Admiralty to Collins, 27 July 1775 in NA ADM 2/1168, p. 539; Tupper to Graves, 24 June 1775 in NA ADM 1/485
920 Admiralty to Major Tupper, 3 August 1775 in NA ADM 2/1168, p. 546
good such losses’. With the conclusion of the battle of Bunker Hill the American Revolution was kicked into high gear and the Marines would be used in the more traditional wartime operational sphere of combined operations and raiding.

6.3 Summary

The Marines during this 1763-1775 peace-time period showed that their operational doctrine was malleable to the changing nature of circumstances during peace. As a policy this would give them validity in preventing their disbandment as had happened in the past. It should be noted that the two operational aspects of foreign and imperial power projection which were developed in this period were used again in the return to peace in 1783. The Marines in conjunction with the Navy could be tools of a coercive maritime power projection policy against the Bourbon powers, as happened in the Turks Island and Honduras incidents. By manning the Navy’s ships, marines were able to bring their experience of sea battle to act as a weapon, ready to strike at the various French and Spanish colonies at a moments notice. The Marines showed during the Falkland Islands crisis that they could be actively used in manning and preparing the fleet for conflict much quicker then in the past. As a tool of foreign power projection the operational doctrine of the Marines allowed Britain an edge in its policy of maritime intimidation. In the past the British had been unable to deploy its naval power faster than its opponents but with marine help now they could increase their fleets’ readiness quicker (though sometimes they were still behind their opponents as the 1790s would show).

Where the British Marine Corps showed the greatest flexibility and validity though was in the field of imperial power projection. Imperial defence was a concern of all peace-time British governments, and the Marines provided a tool of active support on the Navy’s ships in the Indian Ocean. This policy allowed the Navy to be an effective deterrent, as with foreign power projection, against foreign and local powers. These men could also be used in conjunction with the East India Company’s forces to secure a decisive battle like Buxar. Admiral Harland considered his marines such a vital tool that he ignored any perceived infraction on their part against the Company’s sovereignty, putting the Marines in a delicate position of being torn between two different political bodies as would be repeated again in Boston in 1774-1775. If the best form of flattery is emulation then this should apply to India for in 1772, the Company was required by the government to form its own Marine Corps to man the East India Company’s Bombay Marine. In the realm of imperial policing the Marines were very active during the inter-war periods.

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921 Admiralty to Major Tupper, 3 August 1775 in NA ADM 2/1168, p. 546
Working with naval officers and seamen in all interdiction missions in the Caribbean and American waters, the Corps showed it could be a helpful tool of physical coercion and protection to His Majesty’s officials. Marines could operate on land, as in Boston, in quelling rebellious sentiment or they could be used at sea to board ships, as in American and Caribbean waters. The Marine’s operational doctrine, time and again proved that they could be more than just a war-time ship and amphibious force. They were an active and important element in the policy of imperial retention and protection of the British Empire in this period. As shown above it is no coincidence that marines were to be involved repeatedly in all major imperial duties of the inter-war periods. The Navy and Army filled most of the primary roles in the empire; however their large structures and geographical traditions prevented them both from moving easily between the two worlds of sea and land. However, the British Marine Corps was different, for by existing in an amphibious world it could constantly make compromises between the two worlds and be used to fill these gaps.

Boston did show that marines even in peace-time could be used in large formations and work as a supplemental to the Army on land if the need arose. By using marines on land the government would not have to worry about depleting it’s already overtaxed Irish garrisons and it would not have to call on parliament to raise more regiments. This policy was a way for the government to skirt the standing army debates as well as carry out its objectives. The Admiralty jumped at the idea of using its marines on shore. The Admiralty minutes of 3 October 1774, the day after the government received General Gage’s request for more support were to clearly outline this hope. Importantly the Marines, who felt they had something to prove, could demonstrate to all parties involved that operationally they were the force necessary for imperial policies. The Marines proved once again that they could operate on land in conjunction with the Army but still fulfil their maritime role in conjunction with the Navy. Major Pitcairn was probably one of the most influential shapers of Marine operational doctrine in the 1763-1775 peace-time period. He was a product of the various costly amphibious operations of the Seven Years’ War and knew that the Marines, if maintained together, could be flexible in any operational environment. Pitcairn repeatedly worked between the forces of government, army and navy, to at all times kept his marines together and under his personal command. Pitcairn’s diligence and experience was rewarded with being made second in command during the operations against Lexington and Concord. This was to be reaffirmed with the position of the Marines in the battle line at Bunker Hill, next to the light and grenadier battalions holding the flanks. One last example typifies this point; on 24 September 1754 Major-General Edward Braddock was commanded to take two regiments of foot from Ireland, the 44th and 48th, roughly 500 men who were not to arrive in Alexandria,
Virginia until the 14 March 1755, nearly five months from their initial orders. In contrast Major Pitcairn was ordered to Boston on 3 October 1774, with roughly 500 men and they arrived in Boston Harbour eight weeks after the first orders were given, clearly demonstrating how the Marines even in peace-time were acting as an imperial rapid reaction force.

This chapter has not had much in the way of discussing the Marines in peace-time operations during the 1783-1793 peace-time period. The reason for this is that while they were continually carrying out operations in foreign and imperial service they were not too different from their duties of this earlier period. At the conclusion of hostilities they were reduced once again to between 3600-5000 officers and marines throughout this later peace period. They would also serve the same functions as an imperial rapid reactionary force. The importance of the earlier period is that it was a time of great unknowns during which the marines constructed their operational doctrine and identity in relation to their various duties. While the later ten year period of peace is important and does warrant a fresh look for the purpose of this chapter, it only confirms the structure and practices put in place by the Marine Corps by 1775.

923 House of Commons debate 19 November 1783 in HCP, Debates of the House of Commons, George III year 23, p. 57
Conclusion: The construction of a Marine identity

Sociologists since the 1960s have seen ‘Military organisations represent a specific occupational culture which is relatively isolated from society.’ This specific organisational or military culture, as it is now termed, has been largely neglected by historians until the last ten to fifteen years when they have begun the a broader analysis of this field of military history. Military organisations not only develop their own culture but, even with some conflict, their own homogeneous identity. It is with this aspect of culture, identity, that this thesis has been most concerned and how it is constructed and shaped by internal and external influences. Military identities have slowly been coming to the fore in recent historical works. Unfortunately there are very few looking at the eighteenth century British Navy, its problems and development of organisational identity. One important aspect that shapes identity is an institution’s mission. ‘A mission provides an institution with a common purpose that justifies its existence and claim on resources, as well as the self-worth, rewards, and privileges of its members.’ With the formation of the Marine Corps in 1755 the Admiralty set the mission for the Marines but left to them their own development of culture. In the past many various armies and navies had problems with control over amphibious units like marines, one reason for this was these units’ inherent conflict of identity. The Admiralty’s method of tackling these problems of identity was to clearly define the basic structure of the Marines (officer appointments, official regulations, purpose built barrack, etc.). But they allowed the Marine Corps to develop its own unique operational doctrine and identity within their amphibious context. This identity was to be continuously shaped by various groups such as the public, the other military services and even the Marine Corps itself.

Soldiers in many societies during the eighteenth century were seen to exist on the margins of society; by some, even as a social pariah. In Britain, the Navy however was considered, by many, to be a socially more acceptable force. The public perception of the Royal Navy was as a constitutional military force, akin to the militia. These ‘constitutional’ military forces were used throughout the later seventeenth and early eighteenth century in public debates about the potential unconstitutionality of having a ‘Standing Army’. By the

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927 Wilson, ‘Defining Military Culture’, The Journal of Military History, p. 18
1750s the standing army debates of the previous eighty years were not as heated but they were still on the surface of the public consciousness. Throughout the first half of the eighteenth century there were to be many reprints of these earlier pamphlet debates, including John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon’s critiques on the standing army. All of these works reinforced the perception that the Navy and militia were the protectors of the constitution and the people, especially in peace-time. The Marine Corps, because of their basic association with the Navy, took on the trappings in these public discussions of a constitutional corps. Succinctly put by one newspaper, the Marines ‘are by all allowed to be the most constitutional Corps, as being Part of the Navy, the Bulwark of the Nation’.

Many times the use of the term constitutionality was couched with another term: usefulness. Throughout the 1760s marines in the press were continually referred to as that ‘most useful body’ of men. However, this began to change by 1783 when the public started to refer to them in terms of ‘truly valuable and useful corps [my emphasis]’. There were around twenty usages of the phrase ‘useful corps’ in the London press from 1783 till 1798 when mentioning the Marine Corps directly. Some newspapers even remarked that politicians could utilise patronage of the Corps to improve their own political careers. ‘Lord Chatham has acquired much popularity by his affable and friendly attention to the representations of that useful corps, the Marines.’ This was during the period of Chatham’s role as First Lord of the Admiralty, but it still is a revealing representation of effecting popularity by exalting in public the gloire of this constitutional organisation. This was further represented when marines marched in the public sphere ‘with their colours,’ they were perceived by many to have ‘an honour they were justly entitled to’ and ‘with some advantage to the whole of that deserving body of men.’

The press in the 1760s furthered this point, ‘the Marines are a very brave and useful body of men’ and by showing that ‘their behaviour, in the late war has amply testified’ to this claim. ‘Every person who was present at the reduction of Belleisle can best speak the merits of this deserving corps’ so even their battlefield glories were presented as proof of their honoured position. The reference to the Marines and their actions in the Seven Years’ War were to resonate throughout the early Marine Corps’s history.

They were the only people employed upon the batteries and posts of honours at Louisbourg [sic] and Quebec. Their firmness at Belleisle (where, for some time, they bore

930 St. James’s Chronicle or the British Evening Post (London), Thursday, November 21, 1782
931 Parker’s General Advertiser and Morning Intelligencer (London), Monday, August 11, 1783
932 Oracle Bell’s New World (London), Tuesday, November 10, 1789
933 Oracle and Public Advertiser (London), Monday, January 15, 1798
934 The North Briton, [No. 47] (London), Saturday, June 4, 1763, p. 11-12
almost the whole shock) is too notorious to repeat. And at Guadaloupe and Martinique their behaviour was so truly intrepid...935

These were just a few of their public exaltations. The purpose for prefacing their arguments with these exaltations, at least in the *North Briton*, was in order to set the stage for the marine officers’ grievances to be heard. The gross ‘mal-treatment they [marines] have, nevertheless, met with’ was a public indictment of the Admiralty’s treatment of this Corps. The clearness and articulation of many minute command problems suggest correspondents to the *North Briton* were Marine officers. In fact, many of the articles written in the *North Briton* of this period were signed by ‘Officers of the Plymouth Division of Marines’. These officers felt marginalised because their latest and ‘most humble remonstrances [sic] have lately been branded with the hated epithet of mutinous.’936 These officers were very upset with the newly established ‘Blue Colonel’ system which subverted the upper-echelons of Marine command. Without the visible show of support by the Admiralty for these ‘old experienced officers, the lieutenant-colonels and majors of the marines, committed, that they were thus deprived of all hopes of future preferment?’ These men had been at the forefront of marine actions during the Seven Years War ‘to encounter the dangers of war’ with the hope that preferment would later ‘supports him amidst all its fatigues!’937 Others in the public with no clear military relationship also repeated many of these same claims. As the ‘marine officers, conscious of having ever done their duty with alacrity and vigour in the different parts of the world, where the British arms have extended our conquest…cannot help expressing their alarming concern at being the only visibly neglected part of his Majesty’s forces.’938 Unfortunately, it would be another eight years before the demands of Marine officers and their supporters among the public were fully recognised with the formation of the Colonel Commandant system.

Another term that was to go hand in hand with constitutionality and usefulness was one that goes to the very root of the Marines’ purpose for existence, amphibious. Many eighteenth century Britons considered England and later Britain as an ‘amphibious’ nation. Daniel Defoe in one of his satires mocks the English people as an ‘Amphibious Ill-born Mob’. In his response to this satire, William Pittis, accepts the idea of the English being seen as amphibious because they ‘live in an Island, where the Sea is its defence’. Pittis’s real objection however is with the description of the English being an ‘ill-born mob’.939 The nation throughout the eighteenth century was continually to be seen in this guise, as an ‘amphibious animal’. This animal should either attack colonies and overseas territories or

935 *The North Briton*, [No. 47] (London), Saturday, June 4, 1763, p. 17
936 *The North Briton*, [No. 47] (London), Saturday, June 4, 1763, p. 11-12
937 *The North Briton*, [No. 47] (London), Saturday, June 4, 1763, p. 13
938 *Lloyd’s Evening Post* (London), Friday, August 19, 1763
strategically attack the continent, but at all time maintain the ‘amphibious’ nature of the nation.\textsuperscript{940}

A second usage of amphibious as a continuous whole was seen through the institution of the Marine Corps. ‘That which partakes of two natures, so as to live in two elements’, was how Dr. Johnson in his famous dictionary defined ‘amphibious’. Whereas, ‘A Soldier taken on shipboard to be employed in descents upon the land’, was how ‘Marine’ was defined by Dr. Johnson.\textsuperscript{941} This was the extent of Dr. Johnson’s work on the subject and is somewhat plagued with a conceptual limitation since he ignores the duties of marines in preparing and fighting on warships. Johnson, it should be mentioned, compiled his dictionary before the Marine Corps was founded and hence missed the development of its doctrine which later writers took up. James Edward Oglethorpe’s short work \textit{The naked truth} published in 1755, while using the facade of classical warfare, was really a critique on a potential conflict with France in which he describes Marines in these terms:

\begin{quote}
Soldiers are not Seamen; so Soldiers can have no Share in the [Merchants] War, unless they be amphibious Soldiers; your amphibious irrational Animals are Otters and Beavers; and your amphibious rational Animals are Marines; therefore no Land Soldier can wish for a War in this Circumstance, but [one] who wishes to be a Marine…
\end{quote}

Oglethorpe’s work like Dr. Johnson’s was also written before the founding of the Marine Corps. By 1757 there is clear evidence that the Marines themselves, began identifying themselves as ‘amphibious Marine[s]’. They were also actively taking on the trappings of a dual-life in combat and everyday activities on both shore and at sea.\textsuperscript{943} By the 1760s the public at large was beginning to also see the Marines as a truly amphibious force. When the Marine Corps was discussed in public they were continually classified as ‘our amphibious warrior[s]’.\textsuperscript{944}

So, by this period the term was largely developing the notion that it could be used to label a country or an institution and not just purely organic or inorganic characters. Another article clearly set out the duality of existence for the Marine Corps and their overall usefulness to the navy and country as a whole. ‘Respecting the usefulness between a seaman and marine on board ship, there is no difference after the marines had been on board for a few months and though worthy of double honour, as he serves his country in a double capacity, either by sea or land.’\textsuperscript{945} Some authors took the very amphibious nature of the Marines and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{940} ‘An Eulogium on the Earl of Chatham’ in \textit{The Westminster Magazine}, [vol. 11], (February, 1783), p. 93
\item \textsuperscript{941} Amphibious and Marine in S. Johnson, \textit{A Dictionary of the English Language}, Vol. I-II, [second edition] (London, 1756)
\item \textsuperscript{942} J. E. Oglethorpe, \textit{The naked truth} (London, 1755), p. 17
\item \textsuperscript{943} Officer, \textit{A letter, to the Right Honourable the Lords of the Admiralty; setting forth the inconveniences and hardships, the marine officers are subject to…} (London, 1757), p. 19
\item \textsuperscript{944} Craftsman or Say’s \textit{Weekly Journal} (London), Saturday, July 24, 1773
\item \textsuperscript{945} \textit{Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser} (London), Wednesday, March 7, 1770
\end{itemize}
combined this with the notions of them as constitutional body, to see marines as the ultimate protectors of the Britain: ‘It is a maxim that can never be too often repeated, that the greater part of the standing armies of Great Britain and Ireland should be amphibious, or, in other words, composed principally of marines’.  

Marines throughout this period were also to be characters in various plays and literary works of the day. Some of these works were to construct the Marine and his officer in the light of masculine terms, while others discussed their social origins. Lieutenant Nicholas Bacon Harrison, a Marine officer, in his comedy *The Travellers*, exudes this masculinity of the military and especially the Marines with his character Charles Manly. Manly was a Marine officer who was in pursuit of a merchant’s daughter. One night he was in ‘a pretty situation, if the old father should stumble upon me in his daughter’s apartment. The good man has taken every precaution to prevent my access to his daughter; but love in a shower of gold defies the father’s vigilance.’ This statement is not only about the conquest of a merchant daughter’s virtue but also about how a Marine officer, like his naval counterpart, had access to wealth from success in prize money.

Marines and their officers while seen as symbols of sexual prowess were still seen by some as social pariahs. Oliver Goldsmith’s book *The Vicar of Wakefield: A Tale* concurred with this ideal: ‘A captain of marines, who seemed formed for the place by nature, opposed me in my patron's affections. His mother had been laundress to a man of quality, and thus he early acquired a taste for pimping and pedigree.’ He really hammers this home when he says, ‘this gentleman made it the study of his life to be acquainted with lords, though he was dismissed from several for his stupidity’. This statement reemphasises that while the Marine Officer may have come into immense wealth, like Charles Manly, they were still of relatively low birth. Anna Maria Bennett’s *The beggar girl and her benefactors* was another work to highlight the low social standing of the Marine officer. Her character Lady Gertrude Montreville whose parent were nobles of proud stock, accepted after her parents death ‘the hand of a superannuated Colonel of Marines, which corps, at that period, were in the habit of looking up to the naval officers as a race of superior beings’. Therefore ‘Colonel Herbert’s son was destined, from the hour of his birth, to be an Admiral [an improvement on his father’s station]; he was accordingly sent to sea as soon as Lady Gertrude chose to emancipate him from the nursery.’

The narrative of marines’ social standing while never disappearing fully started to dissipate over time as marines began to be seen more as experts at their profession in arms. 

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946 *The Crisis: A Collection of Essays Written in the Years 1792 and 1793*, [Issue 22], p. 126  
one of Samuel Foote’s plays *The mayor of Garratt*, he was to demonstrate this growing impression. At one moment in the dialogue between Major Sturgeon, a fishmonger of Brentford and a Major in the Middlesex militia, and Sir Jacob Jollup at Sir Jacob’s house in Garrat the Marines come to the fore. The two were drawn into a discussion about the recent rapid rise of Major Sturgeon in the militia ranks. The major said he learned military practice from ‘Our porter at home [who] had been a serjeant of marines; so after shop was shut up at night, he us’d to teach me my exercise; and he had not to deal with a dunce, Sir Jacob.’ Sir Jacob then asked if his progress had been great. ‘Amazing. In a week I could shoulder, and rest, and poize [sic], and turn to the right, and wheel to the left; and in less than a month I could fire without winking or blinking.’ Small-arms drill and its proper movements was a sign of experience and professionalism in this period. Accuracy of musketry was never that important because of the poor quality of muskets at long range so the ability to perform the manual at arms quickly and succinctly was of great value. The old sergeant, while a fictional character, shows that marines were more and more considered as very skilled in their trade. So throughout their early establishment the contemporary public viewed marines as men of sexual prowess and technical proficiency but their social background was never forgotten. This ‘stain’ of class would follow them throughout this period but as the Marines got closer to 1802 and being made Royal they were more frequently recognised as professionals.

Historians recently have come to see military uniforms as giving certain reaffirmations of class and social status. Quinton Colville declares that the naval uniform ‘both reflected and consolidated the linkage of the institution to far wider socio-cultural worlds.’ He went on to state, ‘The identity of the Jack Tar, too, had much in common with civilian working-class culture.’ While Colville was critiquing a period in the twentieth century Navy where uniforms distinguished sailors from other labouring-class professions, his statement is still an interesting point about the institutional impact of uniforms. One contemporary eighteenth century commentator on the power that uniforms had on the identity of a group, was Captain Elzear Blaze. Blaze was an officer in the Napoleonic French Army who commented about the fighting ability of the Polish peasants when given a uniform.

In the cantonments occupied by the French army, the inhabitants were compelled to clean the streets, and it was the most vexatious task one could give them. Still these peasants, dirty, indolent, became very fit and brave soldiers. In their peasant clothes they look beastly, stupid, dull, but as soon as they have put on a uniform and they have been limbered

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up in the regiment, they are different beings. From beasts they become men, proud, fit, intelligent, and they are not one bit inferior to the soldiers of the most civilised nations.

Both of the works, cited above, are commenting on the power of the uniform for identification of classes and even ethnicity into a unified military body. The idea of the uniform creating a common or uniform identity is helpful especially for marines of this period. They were the only lower-deck men on ship to receive a yearly standard uniform, to be made to very strict specifications of the Admiralty. This is highlighted by just a quick thumbing through the out-letters of the Marine Department for any date from 1755-1802, where nearly a quarter of all documents are concerned with issues about Marine uniforms. These uniforms were owned by their men and they were allowed to retain them upon honourably leaving the service. The uniform was a symbol of pride for many in the Marine Corps and they would attack any criticism levelled, even if it was against their uniform allotment. In an article retorting ‘Agricola’ earlier letter to the St. James’s Chronicle, ‘Per Mare Per Terram’ attacked some of the former’s principles of economy and effectiveness.

Your informer is mistaken; there are now near two thousand [marines] at sea, and the remainder are employed in guarding the three principal dock-yards in the kingdom, who at this period do more real duty than any other troops belonging to his Majesty [my emphasis]. The real use the marines forces were of at Be Lisle [Belle Isle], the Havannah, &c. in the late war, is a full confutation of the base assertion, that they are kept merely for the emolument of their cloathing...953

One of the most recurrent themes throughout this period, and one potentially begun by Marines themselves, was that the Marines were so important that they could even replace the Army. The idea of replacement had direct overtones of the constitutionality questions, inter-service rivalry and the implicit reasons for the continuation of the Marine service. Major John Pitcairn writing to Lord Sandwich in 1775 stated clearly that, ‘I have a great desire to convince everybody of the utility of keeping a large body of marines, who are capable of acting either by sea or land as the public service may require.’954 This concept was eventually taken to its ultimate degree when Arthur Tooker Collins, a lieutenant-colonel of Marines, eventually made a Colonel-Commandant in 1779, took it one step further. When writing to Lord Sandwich about the two marine battalions in America in 1776, he stated; ‘I can with pleasure assure your Lordship that the Marines on this service have proved beyond a doubt that every soldier should be a marine’.955 These ideas were starting to be repeated in this period in the popular press as well. One article in a paper before the French Revolutionary War was drawn into advocating greater economy within the British military. It

952 E. Blaze, Recollections of and Officer of Napoleon’s Army, E. J. Meras (trans.), (New York, 1911), p. 80-81
953 Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser (London), Wednesday, March 7, 1770
stated: ‘that a proportionable [sic] reduction of our land forces, upon the increase of our marines, would render this plan more economical [sic]; and that it might be rendered more useful, if a permanent principle should be adopted in future treaties, to contribute our quota of aid, not in land, but in maritime assistance.’

One of the last groups to fully accept the wider importance of the Marines and to advocate its primacy was the Navy itself. In a letter from St. Vincent to Lord Spencer in 1797 he stated that the: ‘Marines. A very considerable corps should be kept up, and I hope to see the day when there is not another foot soldier in the kingdom, in Ireland, or the Colonies, except the King’s Guards and Artillery. The colonels of regiments might be provided for during their lives by annuities equal to their present pay and emoluments.’

Sentiments about the Marines bravery and honour were to be very public throughout, even in the fleet, before the formation of the Royal Marines in 1802. This developing perception can be seen in Joshua Larwood’s *Erratics: by a sailor*:

Your and my long and intimate acquaintance and connection with our army and navy, enables us to judge from experience on this point; that experience justifies my asserting, that in both services I have seen no greater examples of a habit so salutary in regiments, and so indispensable in ships; more cleanly, more active soldiers and sailors, and consequently more healthy ones, I have never seen; and that very useful corps, whose gallant services we have witnessed on repeated occasions, the brave, alert amphibious marines, has been most liberally recruited with excellent men from this quarter of the kingdom.

Even in certain naval songs like ‘A New Song on the Engagement Fought Between the Mars and La Hercule [sic] April 21, 1798’ the Marines have an honoured place. The song lays out the two hour course of the engagement between these two ships: ‘Yet see, see Britannia with sorrow is fill’d,| For brave Captain Hood in the action was kill’d;| Likewise the Marines lost their captain so bold,| His name it was White, worth his full weight in gold.’ It is revealing that the Marine officer is mentioned but even more importantly the Marines are seen as a separate yet integral whole to the ship in action.

By the late 1790s there was beginning to be an ever growing chorus of demands about honouring the Marine Corps with the ‘Royal’ title. One newspaper writer in 1798 styling himself ‘Veteran’ called for just this sort of honour.

As they [Marines] are part of the *Naval Establishment* of this island, and have ever conducted themselves with striking instances of loyalty, courage, and good conduct, whether on Board or on shore…why they are not *Royals* as well as the *Navy* to which they...

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956 *The Crisis: A Collection of Essays Written in the Years 1792 and 1793*, [Issue 22], p. 136
958 J. Larwood, *Erratics: by a sailor; containing rambles in Norfolk, and elsewhere. In which are interspersed, some observations on the late attempts to revive the Cromwellian observance of the Sabbath* (London, 1800), p. 16
belong? How many new insignificant corps, who were only half formed, and reduced before they were ever brought into the field of action, have been distinguished with blue facings, and made Royal regiments? In fact this writer called upon all Naval officers to advocate in favour of the Marines being made 'Royal'. Formation of Marine identity was solidified with the eventual royal approbation of 29 April 1802. 'His Majesty has also been graciously pleased to signify his commands that, in consideration of the very meritorious services of the Marines during the late war, the Corps shall in future be stiled [sic] the Royal Marines.' The order signifying the creation of the Royal Marines was immediately sent to all Divisions. 'The Earl St. Vincent having signified to my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that his Majesty, in order to mark his Royal approbation of the very meritorious conduct of the Corps of Marines during the late war, has been, graciously pleased to direct that the Corps shall in future be styled the ROYAL MARINES [author’s emphasis]' When the news of the Marines’ promotion was made public, many newspapers stated their ‘very peculiar gratification’ in announcing this confirmation of this ‘gallant and useful Corps, the Marines’ was finally being made a Royal unit. When the new finally reached the Marines in the various Divisions there was much celebrating. On 2 May 1802 at Plymouth: ‘The King's most gracious warrant, constituting the marines of Plymouth, Portsmouth, and Chatham, his Majesty's royal corps of marines, for their eminent services during the late war’ was received by Major General Bowater, and then communicated in general orders. A grand dinner was planned to be given at the marine mess on the occasion, and in the evening the marines at quarters fired three ‘excellent vollies [sic]’ and the barrack were ‘beautifully illuminated in one instant, by the tap of the drum, which had a very fine effect.’

With the public announcement of this honour bestowed on the Corps, came instruction to the various Divisions about the change in uniform that was to follow. ‘In consequence of this highly honourable distinction their uniform will be altered from White to Blue Facings.’ These facings were to be made ready for the King’s Birthday on 4 June 1802 as a public acknowledgement of thanks to the King. A description of the events at Plymouth on 4 June 1802 recounts the public jubilation. The King’s birthday was to be celebrated by all of the military units in Plymouth, at that time, along with musical accompaniments. Salutes were to be fired into the air and upon their cessation the crowd would give three cheers to the King. It was stated in the local papers that the populous were

960 Oracle and Public Advertiser (London), Monday, January 15, 1798
961 E. Johnson's British Gazette and Sunday Monitor (London), Sunday, May 2, 1802
962 NA ADM 2/1191, 29 April 1802, p. 66-67; See Appendix 5
963 Caledonian Mercury (Edinburgh), Monday, May 3, 1802
964 Trewman's Exeter Flying Post (Exeter), Thursday, May 6, 1802
966 NA ADM 2/1191, 29 April 1802, p. 67
also said to have especially cheered on the new styled Royal Marines.  ‘It was altogether a most animating scene, as the Royal Corps of Marines, both in war and peace, have ever been considered by the nation at large as a family and constitutional corps.’ This time the Marines were not only publicly celebrated as a constitutional corps but also one full entrenched into the public psyche. Coinciding with this period, all debates in the House of Commons spoke of Marines not in subordinate terms but that of near equal with the Army and Navy. By the King granting his royal favour on the Marine Corps, their permanency was assured for it was now very difficult for them to be disbanded as a unit. If they were disbanded it could only be on the explicit instruction of the Monarch, akin to the Royal Army Regiments and the Royal Navy.

The importance of identity has been an underlying theme throughout this dissertation. Its importance was not just to define who and what the Marines were to themselves but also their place within the pantheon of the British Military. Over their forty-seven years’ formation before being made Royal, marines came to be seen as a vital constitutional element by the public. They were also the ideal symbol of amphibiousness even taking it to its fullest extent, making them identifiable with the nation as a whole. In the end the Marine Corps and many of its personnel were no longer to be seen as inferiors or hindrances to the Navy and its personnel but instead as a vital aspect of the Navy’s abilities to project power. By 1802 the establishment of the ‘Royal Marines’ signified that this forty-seven year process of construction was finally complete.

The stages towards the establishment of a permanent corps of Royal Marines

The creation of an operational doctrine and identity would take the British Marine Corps forty-seven years, from 1755-1802, to fully formulate. The first half of this dissertation showed how the skeletal structure of the Marine Corps was developed in this forty-seven year period. It has also shown that the Marines were not just a creation out of thin air. They did inherit many personnel and structural elements from their predecessors the Marine regiments. These Marine regiments were constructed on the Army line infantry regimental model which existed from their first establishment in October 1664 till their final disbandment in 1749. The 1739 House of Commons’ debates raged about what the needs and intents of a Marine Force was to be, and this established the basis for the State’s needs for Marines. While the Marine regiments were a prelude to the eventual Corps of Marines they should not be seen as the same for many reasons. Their rigidly centralised command hierarchy, while workable for land combat units was highly problematic for long-term amphibious and sea services. Their command structure was also expensive to maintain, especially since officers owned their

967 Trewman's Exeter Flying Post (Exeter), Thursday, June 10, 1802
commissions (i.e. a type of property), and there was great cumbersomeness in the regimental structure when it came to the expansion or contraction of the Marine Corps in wartime. However there were similarities between the regiments and the Corps in their use of operational structures. These early regiments were to tackle many of the doctrinal and organisational problems and would shape the eventual officers that were to consist of the later Marine Corps after 1755.

By looking at the basic structure and formation of the new Marine Corps a better understanding of the Marines skeletal construction is presented. The Marines for the first time were formed round a few radically new principles. The new units would be centred on a divisional structure with three divisions, one in each of the three primary royal dockyards of Chatham, Portsmouth and Plymouth. The new Corps was to be directly subordinated to the Admiralty from the beginning of its creation with the Marine Department and Pay Office located within the naval administrative apparatus itself. What is truly telling is that these two offices were autonomous within this apparatus with direct authority coming solely from the Board of Admiralty itself. This administrative structure was a microcosm of the Marines as a whole. As on ship where Marine officers were under the direct command of the senior naval officers, like the captain of a ship, they still operated with near autonomy within the functions and activities of the naval senior officer’s orders. This subordination to senior naval officers also took more troubling avenues for the development of Marine identity with the ‘Blue Colonel’ system. The naval officers that were given these promotions in the Marine hierarchy were an affront to many senior marines. These debates were to be publicly played out in the press of the 1760s. While the ‘blue colonel’ system would continue throughout this period after 1771 it was officially a sinecure post with no command authority.

While no institution is solely created by one individual, there are those that have very important influences on their institutions, and for the Marine Corps James Patterson was one of these men. While there is no direct evidence of the Corps structure being his idea there are many circumstantial hints in this direction, most importantly his £700 per annum pension upon retirement. He was also the highest ranking Marine officer upon his retirement, until eleven years later when the Colonel-Commandant system was created. The British Royal Navy was an organisation forced to think in long-term dimensions. This was largely due to the large capital investments that were necessary for construction and maintenance of ships-of-the-line. The Navy’s ideas of long-term planning therefore also affected the Marine Corps, especially with regards to the construction of independent (i.e. not shared with Army units) barracks. These buildings took up large amounts of investment capital but they allowed marines to be concentrated and easily monitored so that they could be utilised rapidly for fleet or operational deployments. It also gave the Marines an opportunity to construct a separate identity from that of the Army due to this isolation. The Marine Corps structure being located
within the Navy’s allowed them the flexibility and capital investment to fully develop the administration necessary for a new military force.

Lastly in completing this skeletal structure of the Marine Corps were the issues of manpower. Marine recruits were similar to their counterparts in the land forces of the day but more specifically to the regular Army’s recruits. Marines were to follow many of the same principles of the other two services when it came to recruiting, recruiting parties and bounty money. But in competing for similar manpower the Marines had to establish their separate identity and attractiveness as a military unit. This identity was created from adopting various policies from both the Army and Navy. Marines received better pay and benefits than their army counterparts, similar to the Navy. But they also received a yearly issuance of a uniform, which was a visible symbol of pride and something of their own. When the service was made Royal in 1802, as shown above, the Marine Corps had a new level of identity, official acceptance and professional/honourable equality with the Royal Navy and the Royal regiments of the Army.

The Admiralty set out very stark guidelines on who could and who could not be a Marine with many of these strictly maintained even in wartime. One of the officially prohibitive guidelines throughout this period was that of recruiting Roman Catholics. While there were Catholics in the service, they were discouraged from professing to be so in public as it could mean punishment and a discharge. This policy continued even after the 1778 Catholic Relief Act but there is some evidence that this restriction was beginning to be lightened up in the 1790s. During the execution of the three mutineers on the Plymouth Hoe after the unsuccessful barracks mutiny, two of the three Irish Marines were allowed a catholic priest for their final rites. With the large amount of Irish recruits even some from Catholic areas (i.e. the five largest areas of recruitment were Dublin, Cork, Down, Kildare and Tipperary where there were substantial Catholic populations in each) the likelihood of Catholics in the service was great. However, the 1790s should not be seen as anything but an exception as this was a period of ever greater demands from all of the services for recruits. The Admiralty demonstrated their clear hope of preventing Catholics entering the Marines even into 1804 still officially banning them. There was also no official policy that allowed Catholics into the officer ranks but this could have been more in line with the Test Acts which prevented Catholics from being general officers. One potential reason could have been that the Admiralty felt any Catholic’s loyalty could be questionable and consequently would make any marine’s loyalty also questionable. A ship’s captain had to feel confident that he could call upon his marines at anytime to serve in any capacity, even if needed to put down a mutiny on ship where there potential could be a substantial Catholic contingent among the seamen.
Another way of assuring the loyalty and creating a separate identity for the Marine Corps was the fairly high rates and frequency of pay in comparison to their naval counterparts. They were to be paid about one shilling a month less than an able seaman, considered the most skilled lower rank in the Navy, and yet more than an ordinary seamen (semi-skilled). While this was the same rate of pay for their counterparts in the line infantry, the difference between these two services was when it came to net pay. Marines’ pay deductions were strictly outlined by the Admiralty, whereas the Army was more decentralised with the colonel of each regiment setting out his own deductions on top of the centralised requirements from the War Office. While on ship the Marines’ food prices were also rigidly set by the Admiralty, so when prices spiked on land a soldier was at the mercy of the market, demonstrated by the 1795 food riots, while the Marine on ship were sheltered by the Admiralty’s set food rates. Therefore, it is not too far of a stretch to state that an entry level Marine private would receive some of the highest net pay than any other basic entry level service member in the British forces (barring possibly the Horse Guards). While Marine bounties were small in comparison to the other two services they were still able to largely maintain their strength throughout this period, and even sometimes as in 1778 were able to have more then their voted establishment. A proportion of this was potentially due to prize money and the idea of making rich captures.

Marine Corps recruits were to be largely homogeneous in their ethnic make-up with only between one-in-four and one-in-five of all men not having been born in England itself. The majority of these men not born in England were largely from the other three ethnic groups in the British Isles but noticeably less from Scotland and Ireland than the Army. Other historians have discussed the largely homogenous ethnic construction of the other military services during the three wars of the later eighteenth century with only around ten percent of their manpower numbers coming from foreigners. However, none of these historians have shown that either of the other two services had quite as large a proportion of Englishmen to their overall manpower numbers for this period. The economic background of these men was more diverse then their ethnic background, with marines from all walks of the lower-classes. Marine officers had a different social background then their counterparts in the Navy and Army, which had significant proportions of men from more upper-class or titled backgrounds. Most Marine officers’ backgrounds were to be from the bourgeoisie but as time went on there was a growing preference to take sons of former marines or naval personnel. By 1802 with the crystallisation of their force with the title Royal, new officers were coming

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from the son’s of past service officers which created a more homogeneous identity even within the officer ranks.

The first three chapters of this dissertation considered the skeletal structure or foundation of the Marines while the last three chapters explored the muscle and skin of the force. These three chapters are very inter-related by showing the day-to-day activities and capabilities of the Marine Corps. These chapters also emphasised the service’s overall utility to the Royal Navy and British Nation. The Marines’ various non-combat duties at sea and on land were to reinforce the idea of them as a type of policing force. These duties were in line with those of the Army’s and Militia’s on land when it came to maintaining public order. Marine sentry duties when at sea were located at various strategic points on ship. When on duty, or even appearing on the upper-deck, they were required to wear their red uniform jackets at all times, reemphasising their physical divide with the sailors while maintaining their separate identity. One of the most overlooked duties of the Marines was to assure that the sailors were secured and stayed on ship, this was to act as another divide between the two. These divisions were further reinforced by berthing the Marines with their non-commissioned officers in the rear of the ship to act as a visible and physical barrier between the sailors and the officers.

Non-commissioned officers were to be a pivotal element in the maintenance of enlisted marines’ capabilities and identity. When non-commissioned officers were in agreement with the officers then order would be maintained even if force was required whether in combat or during shipboard disturbances. However if these same non-commissioned officers felt marginalised or aggrieved they could also convince many of their fellow enlisted marines to act against the officers. This was to be a main reason why marines joined in during the Great Mutinies of 1797. The concept of non-commissioned officers being the pivotal element to the identity of men in a military unit was not something exclusive to the Marines, as the Army mutinies of the French Army in the early Revolution were to demonstrate clearly.970 One reason non-commissioned officers had such influence over their subordinates was because they were had more direct daily contact with the men then even Marine officers. They were responsible not only for the men’s appearance but also various aspects of their training and combat efficiency as well. Marine non-commissioned officers in battle were to be as much an exemplar as the Marine officers; for they were stationed alongside them on the upper-deck throughout the battle. These areas of the ship were to be involved in the deadly scenes of eighteenth-century sea battle.

Battle was an important element for the Marines’ development of operational doctrine and identity. Theorisations about the best methods of effectively utilising this amphibious

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force were most active in the later 1750s and early 1760s. Marines built their operational doctrine on two basic but dependent pillars; flexibility and suppression. Marines were to be a highly flexible force from their largest structure organisationally into Divisions and operationally into battalions down to their ability to form small platoons for extended duties on sloops. Marines in amphibious operations could be a pivotal force projector, as at Belle Isle or Bunker Hill, or they could be used as a mobile reserve ready to strike at opportune moments of the battle, as at Havana. Marines were flexible enough to work when necessary in conjunction with army or purely naval units depending on the scale of the operation. This flexibility made them ‘a very useful force’ and would be one of their greatest operational assets and assure them public recognition with the King himself in 1802. It was part of the reason for the King’s recognition ‘of the very distinguished services of that part of his Forces [Marines] to which you belong’ which was high enough to make them Royal.\(^\text{971}\)

Their flexibility to change with operational necessity was a key element to the Marines role as an imperial rapid reaction force. The early period of peace between 1763-1775 was to see the most decisive development for their peace-time operational doctrine. Their role in peace-time imperial duties was part of the reason why for the first time they were not disbanded upon the conclusion of hostilities. From smuggling interdiction operations, to quelling rebellions on shore, marines were utilised in a variety of new reasons. Marines’ flexibility allowed them to react to problems as they arose throughout this period. They were but one element in the growing ability of the Navy in this period to mobilise the fleet quickly. They rapidly mobilised from their own barrack at the royal dockyards, could be used to bring the fleet’s manning numbers up quickly and to assist in the process of getting ships ready for sea. The Corps, as in war-time, used flexible structures to form special battalions which provide enhanced rapid security within the empire. The Marine battalions in America in 1774-1775 were an example of this policy. In time, thanks to the diligence of Major Pitcairn and others, marines were able to become a semi-independent force in their own tactical decisions. Marine officers could, because of their long service and experiences, help the commanding officers of the other services in their upcoming military decisions; Pitcairn, Mackenzie and Oldfield are just a few examples. Individuals played an important role in the development of the Marine Corps but ultimately this was an institution that was able to fill a void in capability between the naval and land forces of the period.

Suppression was the second pillar of the Marines operational doctrine and identity. Suppression was to work in two ways; suppression fire and the bayonet. Suppression fire allowed marines to be utilised in clearing or suppressing the enemy’s upper-decks or even their crews of the great guns below. Like all of their military purposes there was a duality to

\(^{971}\) NA ADM 2/1191, 29 April 1802, p. 66-67
the usage of suppression fire. By being skilled in suppression fire marines could also take their place in the line of battle during a land action. Though there was a subtle but an important difference which perhaps made them more valuable for their flexibility – shooting down gun crews required expertise in individual aimed fire as sharpshooters whereas land battles required unit volley-fire. The bayonet, which was more synonymous with the French Army of the Revolution, was the second tool of suppression for the marines. Many French military manuals and theories prior to the Revolution felt that the proper use of élan and the bayonet were pivotal in any engagement. However historians have felt that it was not until the Revolution that there was a concerted adoption of this principle in battle.\textsuperscript{972} There has been some recent work calling this notion into question especially the continual use of the bayonet in the American War of Independence, famously around General Charles Grey or ‘no flint Grey’.\textsuperscript{973} So the growing competence and expertise of marines with the bayonet should be seen within this new historiographical context.

However, the tactical use of the bayonet by marines had been well developed by this time. The bayonet’s usage as a vital tool of suppression was because of its duality at sea and on land. Marines had to be experts in bayonet drill to prevent enemy boardings at sea or in order to break the back of the enemy on land. The bayonet also had a more nefarious but strategically important use in operations which needed to be carried out in quiet. In 1777, 300 marines and seamen were sent ashore to attack about six hundred rebel Americans outside Philadelphia. They crept up on them while they were asleep and before dawn they attacked. ‘Well fell upon them instantly with the bayonet, according to the orders we had received before we left the ship: and of all the cries to excite pity in mortals, the like to theirs I never heard.’\textsuperscript{974} These two pillars of the Marine’s operational doctrine not only directly affected them as an operational unit but also their identity. Marines were to grow increasingly flexible in their various duties whither in combat or not. But they could also be used as tools of suppression either against the Royal Navy’s sailors themselves or against the enemies of the British nation.

This dissertation has demonstrated time and again that the British Marine Corps was one of the most misunderstood and overlooked institutions in the eighteenth century military pantheon. Their importance had been repeatedly declared throughout this period by the military, government and public at large. While all of these groups had different ideas about what was the role of the Marine Corps, they reached a type of agreement by 1802. The historiography of the Royal Navy and the British Armed Nation by overlooking the Marine

\textsuperscript{972} J. Lynn, \textit{The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France, 1791-1794} (Urbana, 1984), p. 186-189
Corps has therefore been an incomplete story. The study of the Marine Corps of this period demonstrates that the British government and Navy were not static monoliths that were hard to change but inherently understood the principle of flexibility. Flexibility is definitely an undertone of this work. Marines and consequently the naval hierarchy were able to utilise the benefits of centralised administration and strategic orders. At the same time the Navy gave a huge amount of leeway to decentralised structures like divisional officers and local commanders. Recognition of this, needs to be added to the reasons for British success in its wars of the ‘long’ eighteenth century.

Whereas the Navy had been utilising the practice of centralised structure and decentralised operational decisions, it had been achieved piecemeal and over a lengthy hundred year or more process. Marines on the other hand were to institutionalise these concepts within their basic operational doctrine. Therefore the importance of this thesis is in demonstrating that the eighteenth century understood that the more breadth and flexibility created within the very nature of an institution, the more it could adapt to the changing demands of the world around it. The Marine Corps were an organisation had to exist and fight in a multi-dimensional arena. They were called up to act on shore and return to ship many times within the same day and still seamlessly carry out their duties. They were forced by their very nature to be a combined arms operational force, giving it a few parallels to modern military services.

The Marine Corps was not an organisation that existed in its own world. It was directly affected by both the Army and its parent organisation the Navy. The British Army of this period was an effective tool of the state and utilised in many places throughout the world like the Marines. The Army higher command while largely aristocratic was still a fairly professional organisation when called upon to act. Their men, like marines, were not the scum of the earth but instead many freely choose that life and stayed in it. The Navy probably had the greatest effect on the Marines as they were not a separate organisation from it but an invaluable arm of its military capability. The Navy could have survived, and many times did, without the Marine Corps, but the Corps could not exist without its parent service. This said, the Navy would not have been as capable in its various international operations without its Marine Corps. As the Royal Navy and Marines grew over time they become viewed more and more as the natural order of things. With the newer generation of Naval and Marine officers that were to be so successful in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, there was a sense that this was the way things had always been. This is one of the reasons that Nelson, for example, would call on Captain Oldfield to consult with in his council of war before Tenerife. More importantly by 1802 the marines had fought and died next to their naval counterparts in countless engagements on both land and sea. The identity
of these two units was becoming shaped more and more by each other as the comments of St. Vincent and Joshua Larwood showed.

My dissertation in no way is the final or definitive word on the Marine Corps of this period. There is still more work to be done on manpower, combat, command and control, administration, officer’s backgrounds, among other things. This leaves a real measure of topics that will hopefully be studied in the future. There could also be a lot more said about the inter-relationships between the Marines, Navy and Army and how these affected the operations of the British Armed Nation. The focus of this dissertation while looking into many of these fields has been centred on the creation of the Corps operational doctrine and identity. These two elements were inter-related: as one developed so did the other and these elements still affect the modern Royal Marines to this very day. The Marines were unique in many ways but one of the most important is they were the only service that needed to define their role. There are specific geographic reasons for a Navy or an Army and therefore their doctrine and identity is shaped by this. However there is no direct specific need for a Marine Force, in other words the Marines had to create their own purpose for existence. Their doctrine was shaped by capability, geography and finance among other things but it was still something of pure construct. The Marines’ identity and doctrine was built at its core on the inherent flexibility of amphibiousness. The Marine Corps could change rapidly to any strategic needs of the country because there was no overriding single purpose for their existence. This rapidity of change is something Marines to this day are still known for in modern operational demands. When the 3 April 1755 Order in Council came for the formation of a Corps of Marines no one had this in mind but by 29 April 1802 this amphibious body was perceived as a vital arm of the British strategic military capability. Marines’ operational doctrine and identity directly facilitated this organisation with the ability to constantly adapt to the growing demands of the Navy and Nation.
May it please Your Majesty…

In pursuance of your Majesty’s Pleasure, signified to us by Sir Thomas Robinson in his Letter of the 27th Instant. We do humbly propose to your Majesty…

That the Five Thousand Marines which Your Majesty has thought for the Good of Your Service to be now raised by us, be formed into Fifty Companies and together with any others that shall hereafter be raised be put under the entire and immediate Command of Your High Admiral or Commissioners for executing the Office of High Admiral for the time being; and that the establishment of commission officers, non commission officers and private men, and their pay with an allowance for the Widows, for the said Fifty Companies, be as follows and Commence the 25th Instant to wit…

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishment for Fifty Companies of Marines</th>
<th>Per Diem</th>
<th>For 365 Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field and Staff Officers</td>
<td>£  s   d</td>
<td>£  s   d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Lieutenant Colonels at 17s each</td>
<td>2 11</td>
<td>930 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Majors</td>
<td>2 5</td>
<td>821 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Adjutants</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 8</td>
<td>1,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Company</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Captain</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>182 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 First Lieutenant</td>
<td>4 8</td>
<td>85 3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Second Lieutenants at 3s 8d</td>
<td>7 4</td>
<td>133 16 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Serjeants</td>
<td>6 4</td>
<td>109 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Corporals</td>
<td>4 4</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Drummers</td>
<td>2 6</td>
<td>36 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 Effective Private Men 8d</td>
<td>3 6 8</td>
<td>1,216 13 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 8</td>
<td>1,837 3 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowance to the Widows</td>
<td>1 4</td>
<td>24 6 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 2</td>
<td>1,861 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forty nine Companies more of the like number and at the same rates and like allowance to the widows</td>
<td>249 18</td>
<td>91,213 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In all 50 Companies containing 5,700 men, Officers included</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>93,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of the Charge including the nine Field and Staff Officers</td>
<td>260 8</td>
<td>95,046</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That the said Marines be esteemed Part of the Men to be employed in Your Majesty’s Sea Service, and that their Pay and all Charges whatsoever relating to them be defrayed out of Money granted for the said Sea Service.

That a Deduction of one Shilling in the Pound be made out of the Money to be issued in Consequence of the aforesaid Establishment, as a Fund for paying the Contingent Expences [sic] attending the said Marine Forces.

That a Deduction of one Day’s Pay in a Year be made from each Man for the Use of the Royal Hospital at Chelsea.

That the Regulation of Subsistence, to be paid to every Officer and Marine while on Shore, be as follows, to wit…

| Per Day | £  s   d   |
|---------|----------|-----------|
| To a Lieutenant Colonel | 13       | 0         |
and that the Remainder of the Commission Officers Pay be accounted for and paid to them, in the same manner as is practised with regard to the Commission Officers of Your Majesty’s Land Forces.

That no Subsistence Money be allowed to the Marines while they shall serve on Shipboard. But that whatever wages shall grow due to them while they shall be borne upon the Books of Your Majesty’s Ships, be adjusted and paid at such times and under such Orders and Regulations, as shall be given for that purpose from time to time by Your High Admiral or Commissioners of the Admiralty.

That while they shall be borne on board any of Your Majesty’s Ships, the like Deduction be made from their pay as from the Wages of the other Men belonging thereto for the use of the Chest at Chatham the Royal Hospital at Greenwich and for the Chaplains and Surgeons of the respective Ships.

That a number of experienced Soldiers be assigned from other Corps, to be appointed Serjeants, Corporals, and Drummers in the Marine Companies to be raised as is usual in new Levies.

That we may order the Marine Officers to different parts of the Kingdom, with directions to use their utmost Endeavours to enlist Men and compleat [sic] the Companies as soon as possible; and, to enable them to do so that we may cause Levy Money to be issued for the Five Thousand Private Marines at the rate of Three Pounds a Man.

That Chatham, Portsmouth and Plymouth be the established Head Quarters of the Marines or such of them as shall be from time to time on Shore; and that they be Quartered at those and the adjacent places.

That they be appointed to serve on board Your Majesty’s Ships and Vessels at such times in such Proportions and under such Orders and Regulations, as Your High Admiral or Commissioners of the Admiralty shall judge proper.

That upon the Desire of Your High Admiral or Commissioners of the Admiralty to be Master General or to the Lieutenant General and Principal Officers of the Ordnance, the Corporals and Private Men be furnished with Firelocks and Bayonets, and the Serjeants and Drummers with Halberds and Drums, from that Office; and when any of them shall be damaged spoilt, or lost, that the same be repaired, exchanged or replaced; and that powder and ball be also supplied for training and exercising the Marines when on Shore.

That Cloathing be provided for the use of the Non Commission Officers and Private Men or such Nature, in such manner; and under such Regulations, as Your High Admiral or Commissioners of the Admiralty shall find advisable.

That when any Marines shall be on Shore at Quarters and no present Call for them on board Your Majesty’s Ships, they may be employed on such Services as they shall be capable of, in, or near any of Your Majesty’s Dockyards and have such Allowances for the same, as shall be judged reasonable.

That the Marines be Mustered the Muster Rolls made up and the respective Companies cleared in such manner and at such times as Your High Admiral or Commissioners of the Admiralty shall judge to be most convenient and best for the Service.

Lastly, that Your High Admiral or Commissioners of the Admiralty, do give from time to time such Orders and Instructions as may be requisite for the due Execution of the foregoing [sic] Establishment Rules and Ordinances; and also for carrying on and executing
all other matters relating to the said Marines, in such manner as shall appear to be best and most advantageous for Your Majesty’s Service.

Which is most humbly Submitted.

Admiralty Office 29th March 1755

Anson
Duncannon
W. Ellis
Will Rowley
Edward Boscawen
Charles Townshend

[Confirmed on 3rd April 1755, NA ADM 2/1152 p. 6-7]
Appendix 2

**Marine Department**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marine Dept. Secretary</th>
<th>Marine Dept. Under/2nd Secretary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Clevland 1755-1763</td>
<td>John Ibbetson 1783-1795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Stephens 1763-1795</td>
<td>William Marsden 1795-1804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evan Nepean 1795-1804</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First Clerk

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Charles Fearne 1755-1766</th>
<th>John Bindley 1778-1782</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>George Jackson 1766-1782</td>
<td>George Coombe 1782-1784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Madden 1782-1789</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Coombe 1789-1809</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second Clerk

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>John Clevland 1755-1760</th>
<th>Burchett Rogers 1755-1770</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>James Madden 1760-1782</td>
<td>James Madden 1755-1760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Bindley 1782-1784</td>
<td>Harry Parker 1760-1782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Coombe 1784-1789</td>
<td>David Forbes 1770-1778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basil Maxwell 1789-1796</td>
<td>George Coombe 1778-1782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Moss 1796-1809</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Marine Pay Department**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paymaster of Marines</th>
<th>Agents of Marines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>William Adair 1755-1756</td>
<td>Maynard Guerin 1756-1760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Plymouth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Campbell 1756-1757</td>
<td>J. Winter 1756-1763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Portsmouth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Tucker 1757-1778</td>
<td>James Baird 1756-1763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Chatham)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabriel Steward 1778-1792</td>
<td>John Clevland 1760-1763, (solo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Plymouth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Villiers 1792-1810</td>
<td>Griffith Williams 1767-1791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First Clerk

| James Madden 1755-1789    | Charles Cox 1791-1800    |
|                          |                          |
| Edmund Waters 1795-1797   |                          |
| Daniel C. Webb 1798-1807  |                          |

Second Clerk

| Daniel C. Webb 1795-1797  |                          |
| Thomas Waller 1797-1807    |                          |

Appendix 3

To the King’s Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

May it please your Majesty…

We having taken into our consideration the present State of Your Marine Forces, which you have been graciously pleased to put under our immediate direction, beg leave humbly to observe, that since the first Establishment of Fifty Companies of One hundred private Men each, they are augmented to One hundred and Thirty Companies consisting of One hundred and twenty three private Men in each. This great Body of Marine Forces, amounting to upwards of Eighteen Thousand Men, are directed to be quartered, when on Shore, at the established Head Quarters at Portsmouth, Plymouth and Chatham, or in the neighbourhood of those places: and tho’ we apprehend, that the proper direction and superintendency [sic] of those Head Quarters are of the greatest Importance to the discipline and good Government of those Forces, yet from the present low Establishment of Field Officers, each of those Stations can only be put under the immediate care of an Officer of no higher Rank than a Lieutenant Colonel; We therefore humbly submit to Your Majesty, whither, instead of having One Colonel of Marines resident in London, as at present, it will not be for the advantage of the Service to have Three Colonels of Marines with the Pay of Forty Shillings a Day to each, in lieu of all other Profits or Allowances, and to allot to them severally, the Care, Inspection and Command of the three established Head Quarters.

And if Your Majesty shall be pleased to appoint Officers of the Rank and Authority of Colonels. We also beg leave to suggest, that it appears from the ancient Establishment of Marine Forces, and particularly from certain Regulations made in Council soon after the Revolution, that the Colonels but none of the other Officers might be Sea Commanders. We therefore humbly submit to Your Majesty whither it may not be for the Advantage of your Maritime Service, and likewise a just and well timed Encouragement to Your Sea Officers, so far to revive the ancient Establishment as to appoint Three Captains in Your Majesty’s Navy to be Colonels of Marines at the beforementioned [sic] established head quarters, and that whenever the said three Captains, or either of them, maybe promoted to the Rank of Flag Officers, other Captains in Your Navy be appointed Colonels of Marines in their Room, and the said Flag Officers not to be permitted to continue in their Station after such the Promotion; but to act in their superior Rank of Admirals.

If this Plan which we have most humbly submitted, should take Place, We beg Leave to lay before your Majesty, that Major General Paterson (the present Colonel of Marines) will be superceded [sic]; and as his Conduct, whilst under our directions, has been to our Satisfaction, and his honour. We pray leave to intercede with Your Majesty, that he maybe allowed a Pension of Seven hundred and Thirty Pounds a Year, on the Ordinary of the Navy, till otherwise provided for, being equal to the Pay proposed for the Colonels of Marines.

Which is humbly submitted

Admiralty Office 29th January 1760)

Anson
G. Hay
Gilb. Elliot
J. Forbes
H. Stanley

[Confirmed 1st February 1760, NA ADM 2/1156 p. 274-276]
Appendix 4

[NA ADM 2/1165 p. 484-487]

May it please Your Majesty…

Having taken into our consideration the state of your Majesty’s Marine Forces, We beg leave to observe that this Great Body, consisting at present of upwards of Eight Thousand men, and which in time of War would probably be augmented to more than double that number, as has formerly been the case; are directed to be quartered when on shore at the established head quarters at Chatham, Portsmouth, and Plymouth, or in the neighbourhood of those places, and that although we apprehend that the proper direction and superintendency [sic] of the Head Quarters are of the greatest importance to the Disciplining and good government of those forces, yet, from the various avocations of the Colonels appointed to the said Forces, under an Establishment made by His late Majesty’s order in Council on the 1st of February 1760, it unavoidably happens that the Care, Inspection, and Command of the said Head Quarters is often left to Officers of no higher Rank than a Lieutenant Colonel, and sometimes even to a Major, for a considerable length of time. We therefore humbly submit to Your Majesty whither the enlarging the present Establishment of Field Officers by the addition of a Colonel Commandant and a Lieutenant Colonel, to each of the said Head Quarters or Divisions, with pay equal to Officers of the same Rank in Your Majesty’s Regiments of Foot may not be for the advantage of your Marine Service and likewise a just and well timed encouragement to the Officers of Your Marine Forces.

And if Your Majesty should be graciously pleased to approve thereof, We would in that case, beg leave humbly to propose,

1st…That if the Colonel Commandant shall at any time be appointed to the rank of General Officers of your Majesty’s Forces, they shall nevertheless continue to do the duty of Colonels at the Head Quarters to which they respectively belong, or that they do retire upon Half Pay, and other Colonels Commandant be appointed in their room

2nd…That the Colonel Commandant, the Lieutenant Colonels, and the Majors of the several Divisions, have each a Company of Marines (making in the whole fifteen Companies) conformable to the practice of the Army, and with the same pay as Officers of the like Rank in the Foot Service.

3rd…That fifteen of the First Lieutenants be appointed Captain Lieutenants, that they have the care and management of the Field Officers Companies and that in consideration of their extraordinary trouble, their pay be increased to Six Shillings a day.

And we beg leave to observe that the carrying into execution this Plan, so encouraging to a meritorious Corps of Officers, by opening to them a larger Field for Promotion and a Rank to which they are at present totally excluded, will not be attended with any additional Expence [sic], but on the contray be a saving to the Publick [sic] as will appear by the Estimates hereunto annexed.

Which is nevertheless most humbly submitted

Admiralty Office 4th April 1771

Sandwich

J. Buller

A. Hervey

[Confirmed on 15th April 1771, NA ADM 6/406 1771]
A State of the difference of Expence [sic] between the present, and proposed Establishment for the Marines Forces with respect to Commission Officers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Present Establishment</th>
<th>Proposed Establishment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td><strong>Quality</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Colonels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Majors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Captains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>First Lieutenants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Second Lieutenants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Adjutants</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Quarter Masters</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total per day</strong></td>
<td>£104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

246
Appendix 5

[NA ADM 2/1191 65-66]

29th April 1802

Sir,

The Earl of St. Vincent having signified to My Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty that His Majesty in order to mark His Royal Approbation of the very Meritorious
Services of the Corps of Marines during the late War, has been graciously pleased to direct
that the Corps shall in future be styled the Royal Marines.

I have great satisfaction in obeying Their Lordships’ Commands to communicate this
intelligence to you and in offering Their Lordships’ congratulations on this testimony of the
opinion His Majesty entertains of the very distinguished services of that part of his Forces to
which you belong.

I am, Sir
Your most obedient humble servant

Evan Nepean

[NA ADM 49/58 p. 35-36]

8th May 1802

Gentleman,

The Earl of St. Vincent having signified to my Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty that His Majesty in order to mark His Royal Approbation of the very meritorious
services of the Corps of Marines during the late War has been graciously pleased to direct
that the Corps shall in future be styled the Royal Marines, and that the Clothing hereafter to be
provided for them shall be faced with Blue, the Serjeants to have Yellow metal buttons &
Gold laced Hats instead of Silver, I am commanded by their Lordships to send your pattern
Coats as approved by His Majesty, and Sealed with the Seal of this Office for a Serjeant a
Drummer & a Private and to signify their direction to you to cause a sufficient quantity to be
provided conformable thereto for the use of the three Divisions and sent thither in due time to
be worn on the approaching anniversary of His Majesty’s Birthday

I am, Sir
Your most obedient humble servant

Evan Nepean
Appendix Chart 4: Marine Height & Year of Enlistment
Appendix Chart 6: Marines Country of Birth
Bibliography

Primary Sources

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