Peggy Combellack’s conundrum: locating the Cornish identity

Over a decade ago David Cannadine warned that a potentially “excessive concentration on ‘Britishness’” ran the risk of ignoring the “many alternative, individual identities, sometimes complementary, sometimes contradictory, which are more locally - but no less purposefully – articulated”.¹ Since then the flood of writing on Britishness has continued unabated.² It has been more recently joined by a growing literature on Englishness, some of which has explored the relationship between English and British identities.³ Indeed, since the turn of the century Cabinet ministers have made speeches about Britishness and journalists have written about Englishness. An end-of-century angst about Britishness has joined with the insecurities of an English intelligentsia made uneasy by post-colonialism, devolution to Scotland and Wales, the European project and globalisation as commentators have sought to locate themselves in a changing landscape.⁴ However, whereas Englishness has now become a fit subject for polite conversation the further scales of identity that can in turn be found within England are less explored, despite the observation that unevenness at the regional scale “will continue to complicate the collective representation of England”.⁵ Now that Britishness and Englishness are firmly ensconced in academic consciousness and political debate, we might go beyond them, to the localities and regions of England (and Scotland and Wales) in order to explore the way in which those scales of identity interact with the nations of Britain.

This article pursues the issue of identity onto an apparently sub-national terrain, investigating the rarely addressed case of Cornwall. Cornwall makes intriguing though fleeting appearances in the literature on British history and nationalism.⁶ Its small size, only 1.5 percent of the land area of the UK, has ensured its lack of visibility. Yet scale has not been the only factor. Tom Nairn, in his excoriating polemic After Britain, points out how “beyond the familiar Scotland-Ireland-Wales triad there now lies the question of Cornwall, and of the very small territories, the Isle of Man, Jersey and Guernsey, which were simply ignored by traditional all-British political reflection – too insignificant to figure, as it were, in its dazzling image of greatness and global reach”.⁷ But Cornwall has not been consistently ignored. Rather, its categorisation within Britain seems to present a
puzzle. In the 1920s A.K. Hamilton Jenkin, Cornwall’s mining historian, recounted an apocryphal story from the nineteenth century:

“Hes Coornwall a nashion [nation], hes a a Hiland [island], or hes a ferren [foreign] country?” an old school dame, Peggy Combellack, would ask.

“He hedn’t no nashon, he hedn’t no highlan, nor he hedn’t no ferren country,” the brightest of the scholars on one occasion answered.

“What hes a then?” asked Peggy.

“Why, he’s kidged [joined] to a furren country from the top hand”, was the reply.  

Peggy Combellack’s conundrum is, according to modern Cornish historian Philip Payton, “as significant today as it was in Peggy’s time”. For Payton, Cornwall and the Cornish “remain together an enigma – not falling neatly or happily into the new categories that are appearing, a battleground perhaps for conflicting visions, constructions, imaginings of Cornishness, Celticity and Britishness”.  

If this is the case, it is somewhat surprising that Cornwall has been largely ignored in the academic literature on Britain and Britishness. Here is an instance of an identity from within which some people claim national status, but, uniquely, from a marginal location at the edge of Englishness. This emplacement guarantees Cornwall’s categorically uncertain place in academic discourses. Both “of England” and “not of England”, it defies easy analysis. Cornwall and the Cornish teeter on the brink of a conceptual and historiographical crevasse, neither county nor nation. As a result of this conceptual indistinctiveness, its identity remains unfathomed. The intention here is to restore Cornwall and Cornishness to a more visible place in the British mosaic, both as a unique case in its own right and as a useful comparator for work on other British regions and nations. In order to do so I first trace the parameters of Cornishness. The article then moves on to review how Cornwall and its identity is addressed within various categories,
before concluding that only a historically sensitive account fully explains the case of contemporary Cornishness. Finally, it outlines a more nuanced historical narrative of the formation of the Cornish identity and its relation to Englishness and Britishness.

Identity in Cornwall

Richard Jenkins reminds us that social categorization is enormously influential in reproducing social identities. Boundaries are drawn and those who live inside them are defined and categorized mainly via an externally located process and the exercise of power. Cornwall’s category is often taken for granted. Its administration as one of England’s 42 historic counties reinforces an uncritical view of Cornish identity as one of those “local identities … [that] reflect administrative [and socio-cultural] divisions which go back one thousand years”. But external processes of categorization and differentiation exist in conjunction with internal processes of group identification and integration and the two may at times be in tension.

In order to grasp the Cornish case properly a distinction has to be made at the outset between place and people and between image and identity. In this respect Anssi Paasi usefully distinguishes the “identity of a region” from “regional identity or consciousness”. The former relates to the images used in the discourses and classifications of politics, marketing and governance. These act to “delimit, name and symbolize space and groups of people”. But the “identity of a region”, perhaps better described as the regional image, co-exists with “regional consciousness”, the multiscalar identification of people with practices, discourses and symbolisms in order to express an idea of “region”. In Cornwall, these two aspects, the regional image and regional consciousness, can diverge. Territorially, Cornwall is imagined as an integrated part of England but culturally, the Cornish identity shows disturbing signs of being something else. For example in 2005 a campaign was begun to allow Cornwall to enter a team in the Commonwealth Games of 2006. Claiming that Cornwall was a “dependent or associated territory” of the Commonwealth and thus entitled to a separate team in line with Article 11 of the Commonwealth Games Constitution, the campaigners were disappointed to be bluntly informed by the Commonwealth Games Federation that “Cornwall is no more
than an English county”. Despite this rebuff, there was evidence that Cornwall was becoming more central to metropolitan imaginations in the first decade of the twenty-first century. In 2000 Tony Blair included the Cornish as an example of the multiple political allegiances of the modern Union: “We can comfortably be Scottish and British or Cornish and British or Geordie and British or Pakistani and British”. In an uncanny echo, the other twin peak of New Labour, Gordon Brown, repeated this formula four years later. It was possible, he was reported as saying, to be “Scots or Cornish, Muslim or English and still celebrate a British identity which is bigger than the sum of the parts”. By bracketing the Cornish with British nations, regions and cultural minorities in this way these politicians were hinting at its ambivalent status.

Culturally, the twenty-first century Cornish identity is allowed to take its place in the tapestry of British multiculturalism. However, political recognition is another thing altogether. In 2005 the UK Regions Minister, Jim Fitzpatrick, rejected calls for a Cornish regional assembly in the words “we are saying that Cornwall is a county; it is a separate entity and not a region, and it does not fit our plans for regional devolution”. A campaign for an elected regional assembly for Cornwall had been launched in 2000, supported amongst others by Mebyon Kernow (MK), a political party that has campaigned for measures of devolution to Cornwall since 1950. Although struggling to attain a visibility outside (and sometimes inside) Cornwall, the existence of an autonomist party, its continuous presence for half a century and its scattering of elected local government councillors reveals an identity that goes well beyond the run of the mill English county or region. But MK’s presence also serves to obscure the Cornish identity. Unable to distinguish between Cornish nationalism and Cornishness, there has been a tendency for observers to conflate the two. MK’s inability to poll more than 4 percent in any Parliamentary election must be proof that the Cornish identity is weak or even that there is “no distinctive Cornish identity”. In a mirror image, native scholarship within Cornwall reverses this conclusion. Writers within the field of Cornish Studies respond that work on Cornwall has “led to serious underestimation of the strength of Cornish ethnic identity (and the factors that have led to its perpetuation)”.

This perspective argues for a “strong” Cornish identity based on a heightened sense of “difference”
accompanying rapid social change since the 1960s. But shared assumptions that identities are either “strong” or “weak” are mistaken. For identities cannot be easily captured in an absolute sense; instead, they are relational and contextual, fluid and malleable rather than fixed and essential.

Rather than existing as a single identity to the exclusion of others, it is now generally accepted that identities can “nest” one within another. Identifying with local, regional or national identities depends on circumstances. Thus, when the Cornish rugby team was winning championships in the early 1990s people in Cornwall were more likely to feel Cornish, wave the black and white St Piran’s flag and adopt other symbols of Cornwall. But all the while the flag of England remained in the background, to be unfurled whenever an English football team competed in an international football championship. Quantitatively, the relational aspect of territorial identities is recognised in the growing application of the survey question sometimes termed the Moreno identity scale. This interrogates the degree of allegiance to dual identities and has now been used extensively across western European regions. Interesting differences have emerged between regions such as Brittany and Galicia, where expressions of dual identity (region and state) are most common, and Scotland and Wales, where identities are more likely to cluster at the ends of the spectrum with considerably fewer seeing themselves as both Scottish/Welsh and British. However, the meaning of such surveys is rendered problematic by the considerable fluctuations they display over time, a warning that identities are more malleable than we might assume.

No similar quantitative data exist for Cornwall. Moreover, there are in the Cornish context not just two identity allegiances within the nation-state to consider but three, Cornish, English and British. Nonetheless, ethnographic and survey work undertaken in Cornwall provide glimpses into the Cornish identity. A study of people in west Cornwall in the late 1980s concluded that “most Cornish people were very sure of their Cornish identity”, although less sure about what to term it, some asserting it was a national identity, others a local identity. In 2004 a survey by Morgan Stanley asked people across Britain which level of identity they considered most relevant to them: European,
British, English or county. Cornwall recorded the highest proportion stating that the local identity was the most important with 44 percent of Cornwall’s residents feeling more Cornish than English, British or European. In the 2001 Census people had the opportunity to identify themselves as Cornish, but to do that they had to deny they were British, tick the “other” box and then write in “Cornish”. The proportion undertaking this complex route was low at 6.8 percent of the total population in Cornwall. Nonetheless, the almost 34,000 in Cornwall people who felt sufficiently impelled to write in their identity as Cornish were supplemented by a further 3,671 in the rest of the UK, implying that this was not just identification with a place of residence. A major postal survey conducted by Cornwall County Council in 2004 resulted in 35 percent of the 4,052 respondents opting for Cornish as their ethnicity (48 percent declared themselves to be English and 11 percent British). However, the resident population of Cornwall has risen by 46 percent since 1961 as a result of in-migration, one of the fastest growths in the UK. As a result it is likely that now only around a half of the present population of Cornwall were actually brought up in Cornwall. Thus “ethnicity” responses of 35 percent may equate to up to 70 percent of the native-born population defining their primary identity as “Cornish”.

But it is important “to ask not what regional identities are but what people mean when they talk or write about regional identities”. Qualitative evidence suggests the meaning of the Cornish identity differs markedly from that of local identities in other counties administered as part of England. For example, in 1991 the Presidents of the Yorkshire and Cornwall Rugby Football Unions both provided messages before the County Championship final of that year between Cornwall and Yorkshire. The Yorkshireman saw county rugby as a stepping stone to English rugby success. But the Cornishman was moved to refer to Bishop Trelawny’s imprisonment in the Tower of London in the seventeenth century, arguing that “the Cornish have the additional motivation of a Celtic people striving to preserve an identity”. The Cornish can imagine their identity as either a local identity within England, or as an identity which is something other than English, or sometimes both at the same time.
Territory or people? County or nation?

While for many Cornwall’s administrative location as a county makes the classification of its identity a simple matter, others argue its contemporary geo-political status masks the presence of the Cornish as a distinct people in the past. Mark Stoyle is most persistent in arguing that they were important actors in the seventeenth century British wars, the last episode in a process whereby the medieval cultural distinctiveness of Cornwall was erased. Stoyle works within the paradigm of the “New British History”, which aims to open up the space for a less Anglocentric perspective on the past of the British Isles. Indeed, intrigued by the motivations of the Cornish participants in the civil wars of the 1640s, John Pocock called for a “Cornish history (as well as a Welsh, an Argyll or an Ulster history) of the War of the Three Kingdoms”. Other proponents of the New British History are more wary. John Morrill, for example, adopts a holistic view of British history as the story of “four or more peoples”, though it is clear the “or more” does not include the Cornish. On balance, it remains unlikely that calls for the New British History to avoid the perspectives, periodisation and problems of English history by adopting a “multivocalic” and “multiperspectival” history, where for example Scottish or Welsh-centred British history would be equally as valid as an English-centred British history, would extend so far as a Cornish-centred British history.

Cornwall’s role in medieval England receives attention in Hastings’ discussion of the making of Britain. For him Cornwall is an “interesting but little considered case … fully integrated into England despite its different language” from a relatively early date. It was “quietly absorbed more than it was conquered” by pre-1066 English rulers and, because England was still then in an “embryonic” state, its various peoples, including Danes and Cornish, were able to participate “in the institutional development of England at every point” as groups with a clear identity but absorbed into a multi-ethnic state. The Reformation challenged this status and was followed by the decline of the “singularity of the Cornish ethnic identity within England. The springboard for any pursuit of independent nationhood was effectively removed”. However Hastings immediately qualifies this by asserting that “nevertheless, there remained a stronger sense of separate identity and common purpose … among the people of Cornwall than in any other
southern shire … such politicisable identity could hardly be found elsewhere”. Hastings’ account allows that the legacy of the Cornish past still colours a more modern Cornish identity, although its separate nationality merged into Englishness during and after the sixteenth century. 38 His interpretation is echoed by Michael Hechter who focuses on the trading links of the Cornish economy in the sixteenth century as proof of the early integration of Cornwall into the English economy before 1600. 39 Occurring in a context of the “relative absence of cultural discrimination”, this led to a diffusion process that undermined a separate sense of Cornish ethnicity. Hechter may, however, overestimate Cornwall’s early economic integration. Mark Overton et al conclude that its integration into the English economy took place later, in the seventeenth century, and that this was associated with deepening relative, and even absolute, poverty. “Cornwall experienced relative deprivation and exploitation more reminiscent of the Irish than the English experience in this period”. 40

In contrast, for other more idealist historians, political and economic integration did not result in a loss of identity. On the contrary, they were the cause of a heightened sense of cultural difference. Here attention focuses on the making of Cornish identity at the period Krishan Kumar identifies as a “moment of English nationalism” at the end of the nineteenth century. 41 This also opened up the space for non-English imaginations and Cornwall was constructed as “Celtic”, an example of the “bestowal of identity by the core on the periphery”. 42 Specifically, artists attracted to west Cornwall by its accessible remoteness “helped to give Cornwall a visibility and representational identity … creating its iconography”. 43 This argument is echoed by Jane Korey who saw a “semantic space” opening up with the decline of Cornwall’s staple industry – metal mining - after the 1860s. 44 This vacuum was promptly colonised by the romantic representations of outsiders who viewed Cornwall as a primitive and liminal place, the opposite of and antidote to urban civilisation. 45 But what might be termed a “discovery school” of historical writing on late Victorian and Edwardian Cornwall contains a strong dose of that “sentimental imperialism” that has been seen as accompanying the romance of area studies. 46 From such a perspective continuities of regional consciousness and the agency of the Cornish themselves are suppressed in a focus on the regional image and the
representations of artists and novelists. Nonetheless, this approach opens up a more social constructivist, less materialist understanding of the re-formation of identity, one where memories and imaginations of the past are as important as shared experiences of the present. Moreover, it highlights the volatility of identities and the two-way traffic between Cornish and English identities. James Vernon tellingly remarks that “it may be more productive to examine the internal relationships of the inherently unstable ‘British self’ than to assume that ‘the Other’ is always overseas” and that the “four-nations’ model of British national identity … ignores Cornwall or conflates its alterity with Englishness”.

This fluidity is also apparent in the work of Robin Cohen, who has made a strong plea for the contingency of identities, constantly created and re-created along their “fuzzy edges”, where the self meets the “Other”. For him, “the shape and edges of British identity are thus historically changing, often vague and, to a degree, malleable”. One of the fuzzy frontiers of Britishness is the “Celtic fringe … a familiar but inexplicit internal boundary. For the English, the boundary is marked by irresolution, uncertainty, incongruity, derogation or humour”. This irresolution can be illustrated by Bernard Crick’s reaction when discussing foreign hotel registers and their meaning for the concept of nationality. Crick wrote “once I read ‘Cornish’ but I suspected, correctly, that it was a wag and not a nut”. Cornish claims for national status cannot be conveniently squared with a categorical closure that views Cornwall as a county. Internal self-representations simply become mistaken in the face of external images; counties just cannot be nations. Cornwall thus becomes an “inconvenient periphery” like Northern Ireland, or even an embarrassing periphery, repudiating its apparently clear contemporary categorisation.

But for many historians it is the Celtic dimension that makes Cornwall different from English regions - “the Cornish are fortunate to be able to paint their regional discontents in the attractive colours of Celtic tradition, which makes them so much more viable”. From this viewpoint the survival of a Celtic-speaking population in the south west until the end of the eighteenth century guaranteed that Cornwall “remains the one part of England where not all indigenous inhabitants automatically describe themselves as
Yet genuine uncertainty is provoked by the lack of the common markers of Celtic ethnicity – such as a widely spoken Celtic language or highly visible nationalist political activities. Even those academics who equate the Cornish with the historic nations of Europe tend to view “the Cornish problem” as one of explaining the absence of nationalism rather than the presence of a distinct identity. To sum up, neither Anglocentric nor Celtic historical perspectives adequately distinguish between the articulate expression of a minority twentieth century Cornish nationalism and a less articulate popular Cornishness. Moreover, the adoption of over-simplistic binary county/nation, nationalism/Cornishness approaches to Cornwall prevent a fuller understanding of the identity of this British region.

Transcending the county/nation binary? A regional perspective.

If neither county nor nation offer entirely convincing categories within which to read the Cornish identity, is “region” a more helpful concept? Kevin Morgan argues that through a regional perspective we can better understand “the manifold landscapes of culture and society [and] the divergent economic fortunes, which constitute the fractured character of England today”. However, if British regionalism has been “the dog that never barked” then British regional history has been barely able to raise a whimper. Marshall’s call for “empiricists of imagination” to write a new regional history in Britain has not struck a chord as British regional historians remain overly focused on an empirical description of changing patterns of life rather than the more discursive formation and re-formation of regional identities. Nonetheless, regional historians now accept the conclusion long reached by geographers that regions are not pregiven; instead they are “condensations of nations, institutions and objects that are constantly shifting in response to internal and external forces and to their changing construction in geographical imaginations”. This leads to a recognition that regions can be recast according to the definitions adopted and scales preferred. Yet there remains a tension in practice between a theoretical recognition of diversity and empirical studies of English regions, which almost invariably adopt as their template the English planning regions, now home of the peak regional institutions - Regional Development Agencies, Regional Assemblies and Government Offices. Cornwall, containing around a tenth of the
population of the English “South West” region, is usually ignored in such analysis. The actual English regionalist project does not just reinforce Cornwall’s lack of visibility in the British mosaic: it presents a considerable challenge to those who insist on defining their Cornish identity as a national one.\(^6\)

Celia Applegate, in her wide-ranging and comprehensive synthesis of the regional historiography of the late twentieth century, identified three directions for regional research; work that gives priority to society, to identity and to territory.\(^6\) But, while there has been an explosion of work on national identities within the UK little has emerged on regional identities and what has emerged is significantly confined to the north of England.\(^6\) Applegate’s main insight is to reinstate the role of territory. Pointing out that regions are not things but “sets of practices” or “cognitive structures”, they are nonetheless related intimately to place and geography. Regional historians therefore need “to incorporate considerations of space and scale, of the physicality of places, in our attempt to understand the role of regions”. Regions are malleable but also grounded on actual territories and histories, the language of hybridity being in tension with a tendency to closure. If regions have their history then attention ought to be transferred from the region to the processes through which regions are created, to the “regimes of regionalities, ways of making and unmaking the peripheral relative to the core”.\(^6\) This approach links back to the role Jenkins gives to categorization, regions being seen as the product of “power geometries”, part of those “struggles over classification …to impose the legitimate definition of the divisions of the social world”, the outcome of which is never finally achieved but always subject to revision.\(^6\) If regions obtain their identity as named places through the contingency of history, then a historical perspective is necessary if we wish to unite the changing construction of regions with the bounded part of the world to which the regional description refers, combining the historical contingency of regions with their discrete material making and unmaking.

Surprisingly, Applegate fails to cite Anssi Paasi’s model of the institutionalisation of regions. Paasi offers a diachronic model, proposing that territories are categorized in four, overlapping stages.\(^6\) They are named and given boundaries in the first stage, that of
conceptual shaping. During the second, symbolic shaping, symbols are attached to places. Thirdly, institutional shaping endows places with institutions. Finally, a territory takes its place in turn in the wider society’s regional understanding, obtaining its status in a spatial categorization. At various points in this process narratives and discourses come into play. Thus for example, narratives of the region emerge during its symbolic shaping, while territorial discourses, perhaps having their origin in other places, are a constraining factor in the fourth stage. Paasi’s model allows us to think through both the formation of regions as named, bounded territories and the meaning that places have for people. It brings together issues of socio-economic power with narratives of place. Nonetheless, it has only rarely been adopted explicitly in work on British regions. But Paasi says little in practice about how symbols become linked in identity discourses and how discourses and narratives of the region relate to other territorial discourses at other scales. This is particularly problematic during the stage of symbolic shaping. Can any symbols be appropriated and attached to any place? Are there constraints to the invention of tradition? In this respect Paasi’s approach needs to be supplemented by a more historically sensitive approach.

Such an approach is provided by Anthony Smith’s ethno-symbolism, which allows us to pay more attention to the “cultural stuff” – the historical myths and memories - involved in identity formation. Smith states that before nations there were ethnies or ethnic communities, defined by him as “named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity”. These arose out of ethnic categories through the construction of “ethno-histories”, cultural resources that included a matrix of myths of ancestry, symbols and memories associated with a particular territory. Ethno-histories provide the cultural resources out of which modern nations are imagined and from which traditions are “invented”. Although Smith’s concern is with the long roots of modern nations and nationalism a host of ethnies existed in the past which never acquired the status of nation. It is my contention here that the Cornish can productively be viewed as an example of a people who created their own ethno-history but were unable and/or unwilling to transform themselves into a nation, partly because of the claims of a competing English
ethno-history. Others have pointed out how historical memories structured contemporary imaginations in Cornwall - in the nineteenth century “the Cornish … could recall that they were descended from Celts”. The remainder of this article explores how such memories arose and the implications they have for the modern Cornish identity.

Shaping territory and people
Cornwall acquired its territorial shape early. Place names suggest the presence of a cultural border near the River Tamar, approximating to the modern eastern boundary of Cornwall, “probably at about the eighth to the tenth or eleventh centuries”. The name the English first used for this territory was West Wales but by the ninth century “Cornwall” had come into use. Meanwhile it was known to the Welsh as Cerniu, a name that in Cornish had become Kernow by the medieval period. But peoples acquire names as well as territories. As R.R.Davies states names are “basic to a sense of communal identity; they are redolent of memories and aspirations”. In the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle the relentless catalogue of battles speaks of skirmishes with the Britons. The adjective “Cornish” for the people living in the territory of the West Welsh must have been adopted somewhat after “Cornwall” had become the preferred name, possibly in the tenth century. Whatever their precise genealogy, both territory and people were named relatively early and not much later than the naming of the English who had “sorted out their nomenclature earliest”. What is less certain is whether the descriptor “Cornish” was applied to all those who lived in the territory of Cornwall or just to those who spoke the Cornish language. A greetings clause at Truro in 1173 implies the latter, referring to “all men both Cornish and English”, while in the 1150s Earl Reginald at Launceston was addressing his men as “French, English and Welsh [i.e. Cornish]”. This is evidence that the Cornish were seen as historic kin of the Welsh and as a distinct people into the later twelfth century, at a time when R.R.Davies has claimed that the English no longer needed multiple address clauses, having succeeded in making England the “land of the English”. If this was so then Cornwall and the Cornish were still regarded as something other than English at this point.
Myths of origin and sacred places

Once equipped with a name, Cornwall could begin to be shaped symbolically. In addition to the acquisition of a collective name, Smith describes the main components of this shaping as a myth of ancestry, tracing the collective group back to a single origin, and historical memories. In the myth of origin popularised by Geoffrey of Monmouth’s *Historia Regum Britanniae* in the twelfth century, Britain was settled by Brutus, who arrived from Troy and divided the island between his three sons who ruled what later became England, Scotland and Wales. However, Brutus was also accompanied by his kinsman Corineus who was given the land of Cornwall. In Geoffrey’s account, Cornwall therefore possessed a distinct location, outside the tripartite realm of Britain. By the nineteenth century Corineus had been supplanted in the popular imagination by a different myth of Mediterranean origins: from the Phoenicians, who were attracted to Cornwall by the lure of tin.

This co-existed with a self-image as “Britons” or “ancient Britons”. While the Welsh remained conscious of their British inheritance into the seventeenth century, there is less evidence for a similar belief in Cornwall. Such an understanding may well have been current within a Cornish language culture. However, in a somewhat obscure process, the Cornish language had disappeared from eastern Cornwall before the Black Death. It then stabilised for two centuries or more, with a north-south dividing line in mid-Cornwall between mainly Cornish and mainly English-speaking areas. But the number of Cornish speakers declined after the Reformation and any awareness of British origins within that culture was then lost to the historical record. Written evidence for a pride in a British background first appeared in the manuscript compiled by the east Cornish landowner, William Scawen, completed late in his life around 1685. That he may not have been a lone voice is suggested by a letter from William Borlase, Cornwall’s pre-eminent eighteenth century naturalist and antiquarian, to Thomas Tonkin in 1730. Borlase warned Tonkin that his belief that he had found Roman remains in Cornwall led him to run the risk he “will incur the severe censure of some Antient Britons who value themselves above all things, like their brethren in Wales, upon their never having been overcome by the Romans”. In the nineteenth century, we have more evidence for the adoption of the
title “Britons” or “ancient Britons”. By the 1850s some were prepared to describe the Cornish as “Cornu-Britons, that small but strongly characterised Celtic people”.\(^{85}\) Tellingly, reports of the Cornish asserting their superiority as “sons of ancient Britons” and pub names such as “The Ancient Briton” in South Australia in the 1850s imply the strength of this myth, transplanted to Australia by the emigrants.\(^{86}\)

In the 1860s the Cornish middle classes rediscovered their Celtic roots. An archaeological paper in the *Journal of the Royal Institution of Cornwall* led to a communication from the Cambrian Society in Wales. Enthused by this, the members of the Royal Institution, Cornwall’s major literary institution, rushed to sign up as Celts: “we are here at the utmost verge of the Celtic system; we want to connect our local antiquities with the antiquities of other Celtic tribes” stated their President, Charles Barham.\(^{87}\) But not everyone was so keen. Unsure about being classed with Welsh and Bretons, another President in 1863 re-affirmed that “it was from contact and communication with Phoenician civilisation, then the most advanced in the world, that the ancient inhabitants of Cornwall were raised above the level of other Celtic tribes”.\(^{88}\) However, whether ancient Briton, Celt or from Mediterranean influence, the myth of origin remained one that set the Cornish in a non-English frame and emphasised their separate origins.

Myths of origin are one resource for an ethno-history; others include the role of “sacred places”, places that hold a special memory for the *ethnie*. One such sacred place in Cornish memory has been the River Tamar, with its boundary function between Cornwall and not-Cornwall. Another is Tintagel, taking on new meaning in the post-Galfridian era, after Geoffrey of Monmouth made Cornwall the land of Arthur.\(^{89}\) But Arthur was already an entrenched part of Cornish folklore before Geoffrey’s “Matter of Britain” and Arthurian references informed Cornish culture for hundreds of years, the recently re-discovered Cornish saints” play of the early sixteenth century, *Bewnans Ke*, containing within it an Arthurian theme.\(^{90}\) What Geoffrey of Monmouth did was attach the Arthurian myth more securely to the site of Tintagel, which archaeological research reveals as a power centre of sixth century and possibly Roman Cornwall.\(^{91}\) It was the lure
of Arthur that provoked Earl Richard of Cornwall to build a grandiose castle there in the 1230s to symbolise his association with this sacred place. The appearance of Geoffrey’s Historia may also have caused Cornwall’s elite to re-assess their British origins. This at least is the opinion of Hugh Thomas, who notes that John of Cornwall, author of an independent version of the prophecies of Merlin, had a sense of being a Briton, distinct from the English.92 “Only in Cornwall, where there were linguistic and perhaps other cultural features that made British identity and a connection to Geoffrey’s past believable, did Geoffrey have any influence on identity, by shoring up and reshaping an ethnic identity that already existed”.93 Geoffrey’s work may thus have stimulated a late twelfth century Cornish elite to re-identify themselves with their Britishness in a similar way to that in which an elite Scottish identity appeared in the aftermath of the battle of Bannockburn.94

Golden ages and historical memories
Other memories sustained a Cornish sense of difference after the tenth century. In late medieval Cornwall, saints’ cults were unusual in their origin. Considerably more saints in Cornwall were unique Brittonic figures (either Breton, Welsh, Irish or local saints). As late as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Irish rather than English context of saints’ lives indicated a persisting “consciousness of a separate Celtic heritage”.95 Even after the Reformation, the tradition of the saints lingered on “more tenaciously” in Cornwall, even into the eighteenth century. With the decline of the Cornish language after the mid-sixteenth century such historical memories faded, but they were never entirely eclipsed, and remained as resources to be re-appropriated by the antiquarians of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Historical memories were by then being replenished by the shared experience of industrialisation. In the eighteenth century rising demand for Cornish copper inaugurated a precocious early industrialisation.96 Within half a century west Cornwall had been transformed into one of Europe’s early industrial regions, by the 1780s capable of spawning “one of the most heavily capitalist enterprises [the Cornish Copper Metal Company] in the whole of the eighteenth century economy”.97 During the first half of the
nineteenth century the mining economy spread its tentacles into mid and east Cornwall so that at its height in the 1860s the industrial region was virtually synonymous with the historic territory. The critical role that Cornwall had played at the forefront of modernity as a testbed for the early development of steam engine technology before the 1840s added to a renewed regional pride. \(^{98}\) Meanwhile, industrialisation reinforced the geography of Cornishness, at its most intense in the formerly Cornish-speaking west. It was here where, in the 1850s, “the thorough Cornishman’s respect for his own shrewdness and that of his clan is unbounded, or only equalled by his profound contempt for ‘foreigners’ from the east … this feeling increases ludicrously as we advance further west”. \(^{99}\) It was here too that visitors observed that “a man speaks of himself as Cornish in much the same way as a Welshman speaks of himself as Welsh”. \(^{100}\) The contingent factor of mineral geology underpinned the moral geography of Cornishness, while simultaneously reshaping the shared experiences of the Cornish.

Cornwall’s maritime location and its leading role in metal mining meant that its labour force was in demand on the mining frontier of the New World. The emigration that had begun by the 1840s turned into a mass exodus when the mining industry began to contract after the 1860s. An emigration culture in the British Isles second only to the Irish and the Scots Highlanders produced a brief period of international Cornishness in the last quarter of the century as people moved freely between North America, South Africa and Australia. \(^{101}\) But pride soon gave way to mounting doubts. In 1900, J.H.Collins, a prolific writer on mining affairs, reported gloomily that “a Cornish correspondent in Colorado suggests that the Cornish character is itself deteriorating … owing to the fact that her more enterprising sons have been emigrating for many years past”. \(^{102}\) Simultaneously, a regional literature began to associate emigration with loss and nostalgia. \(^{103}\) A sense of industrial pride was soon overlain by memories of industrial dereliction, shattered communities, poverty and an unstoppable haemorrhage of young migrants. But even in the heyday of the industrial region, when the scale of emigration and the collapse of the mining industry were unforeseeable, Cornwall’s de facto nineteenth century anthem preferred to look away from its staple industry and back to earlier historical memories. In 1825 Robert Stephen Hawker’s “Song of the Western Men”, popularly known as
“Trelawny”, was published, its words linking the imprisonment of Bishop Jonathan Trelawny by James II in 1688 to contemporary anti-Catholicism. Within a generation “Trelawny” was being described as “a soul stirring patriotic and favourite song”, while the Cornish were claimed to revere Trelawny as a “demigod” on a par with King Arthur. Fuelled by a context of industrial pride, “Trelawny” resonated with other golden ages. As the “golden age” of Cornish mining turned out to be disappointingly transient, a local intelligentsia wishing to foster a Cornish national pride turned instead to earlier defeats and setbacks.

Creating an ethno-history

Smith has distinguished different types of ‘golden age’. For example some may be “ages of heroism”, some “ages of creativity”. The eighteenth and early nineteenth century industrialisation was an “age of creativity”, although it also produced its heroes, such as the engineer Richard Trevithick. In contrast, the historical memories that were dusted down after the civil wars of the seventeenth century centred on the tenth and sixteenth centuries, both periods of heroic defeat. In 1685 William Scawen contrasted the British with their pagan “oppressors”, the former “forced … to fly into Wales and Cornwall”. Almost a century later Borlase echoed this by remembering Cornwall’s status as “a distinct principality until the tenth century”, when Athelstan’s political changes marked “so considerable an alteration in the circumstances of Cornwall … from this time therefore we are to consider Cornwall under the Saxon yoke … after the Cornish Britons had maintain’d a perpetual struggle against the Saxons, for the full space of 500 years”. Samuel Drew, the son of a tinner/farmer from mid-Cornwall and Cornwall’s first Methodist historian, constructed a recognisably proto-national history out of this in the 1820s. Athelstan had finished

the conquest of Cornwall … This was a stroke which proved at once both fatal and final to the independence of the Cornish. This, amidst all the struggles that Cornwall made to preserve her liberty untainted, and that her enemies made to rob her of that inestimable jewel, this was the first subjugation of the Cornish by the English.
While the events of the tenth century were reconstructed unambiguously as a “conquest”, there was more difficulty dealing with a second “golden age”, that of the risings of 1497 and 1549. Scawen was ambivalent about 1497, when a rising had begun in west Cornwall and reached the gates of London to meet its nemesis at Blackheath, only to be followed within months by a second rising in support of the Pretender, Perkin Warbeck. Scawen expressed his shame to think of the Cornish siding with a “counterfeit”, but nevertheless claimed that “in their march (which was a long one) to Black-heath, there was no spoil done, nor any complaint made”.110 Drew linked this struggle back to their British inheritance: “The Cornish, who had not yet wholly lost that spirit of daring independence which their British forefathers had transmitted to them”.111 There was considerably more hesitation, however, about the Prayer Book rebellion of 1549, one “instigated by the priests”, the result of “ignorance and superstition” and a “fury of bigotry”.112 Opposition to the Prayer Book and by implication the Reformation were not to the taste of Protestant nineteenth century Cornish writers. And yet the echoes of 1549, when a largely Cornish force laid siege to Exeter for several weeks, could later be heard in the words of “Trelawny”.

In the late twentieth century there was more willingness to link 1549 to the earlier risings and to Cornwall’s British heritage in order to create a more unambiguous golden age, to re-root the Cornish in their own historic space.113 Cornish nationalists have been eager to re-interpret 1549 as a national uprising rather than a conservative religious rebellion.114 And they have not been alone. In a series of articles and books Mark Stoyle has argued that both the 1549 rising and the enthusiastic Cornish involvement on the Royalist side in the seventeenth century was the continuation of the “old Cornish dreams of autonomy and semi-independence” and part of a “quasi-national struggle for their own defence”.115 Here is a more explicit interpretation of a “golden age” of heroic resistance to English cultural domination.

However, notions of “quasi-national struggles” and “old dreams of autonomy” owe more to modernist assumptions about nations and nationalism than to actual evidence from the early modern period. No explicit demands for independence or autonomy appeared in the
risings of 1497 or 1549 and even the complaint that many Cornish could not read the English of the new Prayer Book was relegated to a minor place in the list of demands made by the Prayer Book rebels, while an earlier call for a Cornish liturgy seems to have disappeared. Rather than opposition to the association with England, the Cornish reaction in the first half of the Tudor century has been read as “arguments about the terms of association”, arguments eventually settled on the terms of the royal government. There were in any case many other factors involved in the Tudor risings - anger at taxation, dynastic issues, squabbles between local gentry, religious conservatism - as well as many other actors from beyond Cornwall. While the construction of an ethno-history demands these are seen as a “golden age” of the defeat of a whole people, there is a high probability that they were not seen as such at the time, when ethnic identities may well have played second fiddle to other identities, especially religious ones.

The work of the militant antiquarian localists of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries forged the resources for a rich ethno-history for the Cornish, fusing a set of myths and symbols with selective historical memories. However, three factors help to explain why this ethnie did not become a nationality. First, the ubiquitous presence of the monarchy across the centuries goes a long way to explain the paradoxes and uncertainties of the Cornish identity. The majority of the Cornish gentry threw their support behind the Crown in 1642. This developed into what Stoyle terms the “Cornish Royalist tradition”, full-blown by the later seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, when the events of the 1540s were erased from the historical memory and those of 1642-46 put in their place. But the presence of the royalist tradition was not the only factor. The two other elements that explain Cornwall’s ambiguous location within the British territorial system - something more than a county, but not yet a nation – were the institutional context of Cornwall’s regional formation and its longstanding cultural pluralism, home to two vernacular languages – Cornish and English – and two cultural traditions.

The Cornish Royalist tradition

Susan Reynolds’ concept of “regnal solidarity”, an identity looking towards a royal authority, is useful in unravelling the relationship in medieval Cornwall between
(Cornish) people and (English) Crown. A regnal sentiment grew early in England, one of Europe’s most centralised states. The Cornish, although a distinct cultural group, were contained within this, sharing a consciousness of being a part of the same kingdom as the English. The contrast with the other “Celtic” lands is instructive. In Scotland, as in England, a regnal sentiment matched crown, territory and peoples and was one of the factors producing a Scottish identity. In Wales and Ireland, on the other hand, there was no such symbiosis between king and people, as fragmented political structures failed to produce such an outcome. But attitudes to the Tudor monarchy in early modern Wales show that the Crown was flexible enough to encompass different languages and able to command the allegiance of non-English ethnic communities. In Cornwall this was also the case – but it happened earlier.

However, the vehicle for an English regnal solidarity in Cornwall was not the Crown directly, but the institution of the Duchy of Cornwall, established in 1337 and granting the title of Duke of Cornwall to the monarch’s eldest son. The Duchy played a Janus-like role, linking Cornwall intimately to the Crown yet at the same time providing a seductive hint of special treatment. The presence of the Duchy has taken on special significance for twentieth century nationalists, desperate to discover an institutional template for Cornish “difference”. This has been echoed by some historians. Taking his cue from A.L.Rowse, who characterised it as “a little government of its own”, Philip Payton claims that the Duchy was one factor in creating “a certain aura (and indeed reality) of territorial semi-independence”, although Julian Cornwall more cautiously described the Duchy as fostering only “the illusion of autonomy”. The view of the Duchy as a significant constitutional presence clashes with an alternative view of it as basically a royal estate. From this perspective the actual power of the Duchy seems more muted. Unlike the Earldom of Chester (or the Principality of Wales) Cornwall was subject to the king’s courts and common law and returned MPs to the House of Commons as early as the late thirteenth century. If quasi-palatine status is to be accorded to medieval Cornwall, it is the twelfth century earldom, when no accounts were rendered to the Royal Exchequer and royal officers were excluded, that deserves it rather than the fourteenth century Duchy. Moreover, the Duchy regularly reverted to the Crown in the absence of a Duke, for
example from 1413 to 1453, 1509 to 1537 and 1547 to 1603, administered as a de facto department of the Exchequer, even as it retained its own structures in Cornwall. Surviving the constitutional reforms of the Tudors itself suggests that it posed no threat to the centre and, indeed, the Duchy was exploited more ruthlessly as a source of royal revenue from the 1610s onwards.

The closely connected institution of the Stannaries had a greater role in reproducing the Cornish Royalist tradition in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This had regulated tin mining from early times and arose out of customary practices. A series of royal charters from 1201 guaranteed its liberties in return for a regular flow of income to the Crown, via the Duchy, from the coinage of tin. The granting of a Charter of Pardon in 1508 and the right of the tinners to govern themselves, even extending so far as legislative powers and the right of veto over legislation from the centre, has been seen as another example of “semi-independence”. However, theoretical rights were not exercised in practice, the full Stannary Convocation only meeting on six occasions over two and a half centuries. There was one intriguing hint in 1750-52 that the Convocation might have become something else, when it demanded the right to adjourn itself. Yet the demands reflected more the complex political disputes of the Westminster Parliament than explicit calls for Cornish sovereignty.

Like the Duchy, it is the myths and historical memories around the Stannaries rather than its actual practice that are more relevant to the issue of identity. Cooper points out that the “perception of the western miners that their liberties descended directly from the Crown”, together with the pervasive and overt royal symbolism of coinage days and coinage halls, produced a class of tinners in Cornwall loyal to the Crown but lacking deference towards the local gentry. This was a perfect seedbed for the conservative rebelliousness of the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries. Nevertheless, although both Duchy and Stannaries served to buttress the Cornish Royalist tradition, a tradition that then generated its own “golden age” in the early years of the Civil War of the 1640s, the precise meaning of a royalism mediated through Duchy and Stannaries may still elude us. The subtle distinctions involved enabled the Cornish Royalist tradition to integrate the
Cornish politically but pose as the defender of a particular territory, its customs and, by implication, its people. Furthermore, while the Cornish Royalist tradition explains the conservative rebelliousness of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it also to a degree underlay the conservative rebelliousness of the early twentieth century Cornish cultural nationalist movement. The Cornish identity as it had emerged by the nineteenth century resembled contemporary English regional identities in that it was politically conservative. More like the pearly kings and queens of London than the angry Fenians of Ireland, it posed little threat to existing institutions. Cornish antiquarian investigations into the state of the relatively recently deceased Cornish language and its associated folklore were enquiries heavily coloured by the tropes of Britishness, a “relational” nationalism that perfectly mirrored the contemporary situation in another small “Celtic” country, the Isle of Man.

**Institutional shape and hybrid narratives**

John Breuilly argues that outside institutions, identity is “fragmentary, discontinuous and elusive”. From the early modern period onwards the major institutions transmitting identity in Cornwall – local government, the courts, schools, literature, media – have been in the main carriers of an English ethno-history. The Cornish identity was relegated to the domestic sphere in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, while in public an English identity dominated. The contrast with Scotland and Wales is again marked. Scotland’s Presbyterian Church and its separate legal structure, its monarchy before 1601, and the threat from England in the early fourteenth century all guaranteed the maintenance of a distinctly Scottish identity. In Wales a cultural sense of Welshness was kept alive through the survival of the language. But in the long term it has again been the role of institutions – the Welsh Office and now the Welsh Assembly - that has provided the Welsh identity with a new-found confidence. In Cornwall neither the institutional nor the cultural resources existed for its people to resist the externally imposed category of “county”. Its institutional shape was more comprehensively structured by processes at the heart of the English and then British state.
Moreover, in Cornwall claims to non-Englishness have always been contested. Unlike Wales, where the Welsh language predominated as a vernacular into the nineteenth century, Cornwall was a land of two tongues from an early date, with English being the language spoken by the majority of its inhabitants from perhaps as early as the fourteenth century. This produced understated internal cultural divisions within Cornwall. For example, in west Cornwall surnames were not unambiguously hereditary until the sixteenth or seventeenth century, much later than in east Cornwall but mirroring the practice in Wales.\textsuperscript{138} In similar fashion, the presence of British saints was more common in the Cornish-speaking west than in the east. In the latter districts Cornwall was much more like Devon, with a far lower frequency of Brittonic saints.\textsuperscript{139} This cultural pluralism reinforced its multiple identities. John Trevisa, originally from mid-Cornwall and famed for his translation into English of Ranulph Higden’s \textit{Polychronicon}, felt the need as early as the 1300s to argue that Cornwall was firmly part of England.\textsuperscript{140} Trevisa, with his special interest in the English language and from a vantage point as Vicar of Berkeley in Gloucestershire, may have been atypical. But half a millennium later Francis Harvey, a Methodist lay preacher from the engineering centre of Hayle in the heart of Cornwall’s industrial region, wrote a rambling eulogy to his homeland after emigrating to South Africa in the 1850s. Harvey’s polemic displayed a passionate pride in his Cornishness, but at the same time firmly rejected statements that Cornwall was “not of England”. This he claimed was a slander put about by Cockneys: “Cornwall may justly be proud … in the glorious elements with which she has served and aided, and honoured every valuable interests of the nation; of being in truth if ‘not of” yet superior by far to England, if really ‘not of it’”.\textsuperscript{141} From Harvey’s perspective whispers of “non-Englishness” were tantamount to a conspiracy that denied Cornwall the recognition it so richly deserved at the forefront of English history, because of its role in industrialisation.

\textit{Conclusion}

Harvey shows that it was quite possible to express an intense Cornish identity but speak from within an English ethno-history. Within one discourse the territory of Cornwall was “of England” but from the other the Cornish people were a Celtic nation and “not of England”.\textsuperscript{142} The Cornish identity is the outcome of a historical process which has both
generated a distinct ethno-history for the group but also located the territory solidly within the institutions and narratives of England. Its modern identity draws from two traditions and two discourses. In this sense it might be viewed as hybrid, as something deriving from heterogeneous sources or made up of incongruous elements, producing pluralist and ambivalent identities within Cornwall. Not only the regional consciousness partakes of this hybridity, but also the regional image, with the consequence that simplistic assumptions of Cornwall as either (English) county or (Celtic) nation render the more subtle nature of its identity opaque. To some extent, a “regional” perspective allows us more easily to grasp the elements producing Cornwall’s hybrid identity, and also echoes recent attempts to re-locate Cornwall as a “European region”. However, the ambivalent place of the concept “region” in British spatial discourses and the strength of Europhobia in Cornwall and Britain make the success of this strategy questionable. Nonetheless, projects to re-define Cornwall as a “region” prefigure attempts to escape previous categorisations. If the Cornish identity is hybrid then this also suggests flux and an unfixed identity position. Reflecting on this, Homi Bhabha sees hybridity as a form of “in-between space”, something he terms a “third space”, from where essentialist ideas of cultural identity can be challenged and criticised. Regional projects in contemporary Cornwall might be seen as a way of seeking this “third space”. Meanwhile, there are suggestions that the identity itself is undergoing a similar re-articulation, as imaginations of the Cornish as something other than, or more than, English began to burgeon after the 1960s, triggered by the social changes associated with the onset of counterurbanisation. As an example, a view of Cornish heritage has emerged that moves it beyond the castles and the country houses of the ruling elite and the standing stones and monuments of the distant past and promotes an industrial heritage that is in Cornwall more than the re-assertion of an overlooked working class culture. It entails a hybrid view of the Cornish as “industrial Celts”, possessing an ethnicity distinct from the English, crossing the boundaries between Celtic nation and English mining county and joining the two hitherto separate myths of industrial decline and national decline. Perhaps in this re-located “third space” of Cornishness lies the basis for finally resolving Peggy Combellack’s conundrum.


5 Christopher Bryant, “These Englands, or where does devolution leave the English?,” *Nations and Nationalism* 9 (2003), 393-412.


21 Fredrik Barth Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference (Oslo, 1969).
23 This is an example of the “banal nationalism” posited in Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London, 1995).
29 Office of National Statistics (ONS), 2001 Census, Table CO235. The proportion in Wales following the same procedure to define themselves as Welsh was only 14%, despite more publicity for the option (ONS, 2001 Census, Table KS06A).
30 Research and Information Unit, Cornwall County Council, Quality of Life Study (Truro, 2005), 12-13.
31 Paasi, “Region and place,” 481.
33 Mark Stoyle, Soldiers and Strangers: An Ethnic History of the English Civil War (New Haven, CT, 2005).
38 See also A.L. Rowse, Tudor Cornwall (London, 1941).
40 Mark Overton, Jane Whittle, Darran Dean and Andrew Hann, Production and Consumption in English Households, 1600-1750 (London, 2004), 177.
50 Cohen, Frontiers of Identity, 12.
52 Payton, A Vision of Cornwall, 176.
53 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, 178.
54 Bryan Ward-Perkins, “Why did the Anglo-Saxons not become more British?” English Historical Review 115, no.462 (June 2000), 521.
58 John Marshall, “The study of local and regional “communities”: some problems and possibilities,” Northern History 17 (1981), 228-29. For an example of the traditional local history approach see Philip Swan and David Foster (eds), Essays in Regional and Local History (Beverley, 1992).
63 Helen Jewell, the North-South Divide: The origins of Northern Consciousness in England (Manchester, 1994); Neville Kirk (ed.) Northern Identities (Aldershot, 2000).
64 Rafael, “Regionalism”.


Davies, “Peoples of Britain”, 6.


Davies, “Peoples of Britain”, 12.

Smith, *Ethnic Origin of Nations*, 22-32


Charles Barham, “President’s Address,” *Journal of the Royal Institution of Cornwall* 45 (1863), 21.

Padel, “Geoffrey of Monmouth”.


94 Bruce Webster, Medieval Scotland: The Making of an Identity (Basingstoke, 1997)
95 Nicholas Orme, The Saints of Cornwall (Oxford, 2000), 44. Other memories were more likely to have been confined to the Cornish speaking area. Oliver Padel notes that, in addition to the Arthurian legends, two other Brittonic themes – the Tristan and Isolde tale and the legend of a drowned land - were found in the oral culture of Cornish-speaking medieval Cornwall (“Oral and literary culture in medieval Cornwall,” in Medieval Celtic Literature and Society, ed. Helen Fulton (Dublin, 2005), 95-116).
99 Merivale, “Cornwall”, 316.
100 Wilkie Collins, Rambles Beyond Railways (London, 1852), 70.
103 Henry Harris, The Luck of Wheal Vor: And Other Stories of the Mine, Moor and Sea (Truro, 1901); Charles Lee, Paul Carah: Cornishman (London, 1898).
106 Smith, Chosen Peoples, 174-75.
107 Cornwall Record Office (CRO), F2/39.
108 William Borlase, Antiquities Historical and Monumental of the County of Cornwall (London, 1769), 44.
109 Fortescue Hitchins and Samuel Drew, The History of Cornwall (Helston, 1824), 206-07.
110 CRO, F2/39.
111 Hitchins and Drew, History of Cornwall, 480.
114 John Angarrack, *Our Future is History: Identity, Law and the Cornish Question* (Bodmin, 2002); Pol Hodge, *Cornwall’s secret war: The true story of the Prayer Book War* (Grampound, 1999).
115 Stoyle, *Soldiers and Strangers*, 187 and 49. The articles have been reprinted in Stoyle, *West Britons*.
121 Davies, “Peoples of Britain,” 19.
131 Cooper, *Propaganda and the Tudor State*, 199 and 204.


136 Webster, *Medieval Scotland*.


139 Orme, *Saints of Cornwall*, 45.


143 Homi Bhabha, *Nation and Narration* (London, 1990), 211.