CHAPTER 1
IDENTITY AND TERRITORY

In this dissertation we identify and pursue the formation of identity in one sub-state ‘region’ – Cornwall – in one particular period. But, before setting out on this quest, there are three conceptual tasks. First, we need to establish what exactly we mean by ‘identity’. Five core elements are proposed in a definition of identity, these elements recurring across a broad multi-disciplinary spectrum of writing on the subject. The work of geographers provides a sixth element to add to our definition of identity, that of scale. After reviewing key historical and geographical literature on identity formation in the past we discuss the second conceptual tool used in this dissertation, the dynamic model of regional identity formation proposed by the Finnish geographer, Anssi Paasi (1986, 1991, 1996). In chapter 2 we review how social scientists and historians have written on Cornwall and reach the third and final aid to our understanding of identity formation in eighteenth and nineteenth century Cornwall. This is the interdisciplinary field of enquiry termed here ‘new Cornish Studies’. Once armed with a clear definition, a dynamic model and a disciplinary perspective, we are prepared to embark on the historical and geographical terrain.

The elements of identity

At the core of identity is a personal identification with a group or a community. Identity thus has both an individual and a collective aspect, referring to the identity of the individual or the identity of the group. Although the topic under study here is
a collective identity, there are, nevertheless, consistencies across the multi-disciplinary work on identity. Certain elements recur in a broadly social constructionist perspective on identity, whether the writer is concerned with the moment of identifying or the formation of group identities such as ethnicity. It might be useful at this stage to divide the discussion of identity into five aspects: distinction, integration, process, narrative, and context.

The idea that identities involve a search for individuality, for what makes people ‘different or worthwhile, or, at least, peculiar’, is common to most writings on the subject (the quote is from Nairn, 1997, 183. But see also sociologists Eisenstadt and Giesen, 1995 on codes of distinction). But difference can only be claimed in relation to something else. Distinction necessarily entails a comparison with that which has been excluded. Each cultural identity presupposes a relationship with what is often termed ‘the Other’, those identities that are not one’s own. In turn, the concept of ‘the Other’ contains two implications. First, it suggests that identities are never formed or lived in isolation. The external, which Laclau calls the ‘constitutive outside’ (Laclau, 1990, 33), helps to structure the internal. Thus, identities are mutually constitutive. But this mutual constitution does not occur in a context of equality. Dominant identities can impose definitions on subaltern identities. Thus Said (1985) argues that Orientalism tells us much more about the dominant West than it does about the subaltern East. However, in practice the focus of study has been in practice subaltern rather than dominant identities and rarely the two together, despite the mutual and interdependent ways identities are reproduced.

Secondly, images of ‘the Other’ suggest a liminal zone or boundary across which identities are produced. Indeed, some have maintained that identities are created
almost solely through boundary establishment and maintenance (Barth, 1969. See also the work of social anthropologists such as Cohen, 1986; and sociologists such as Bourdieu, 1991). Such a sharp delimitation between identities is, however, difficult to maintain. More often there is a shifting marginal zone. Margins, moreover, can also be places of resistance to dominant identities (Philo, 1999).

‘Integration’, as an essential feature of identities, is less prominent than distinction in the literature. But identities involve a search for sameness as well as individuality (see Wiley, 1994). The boundaries that symbolise distinction from others are also ‘means of securing sociospatial and ethnic homogeneity’ (Newman and Paasi, 1998, 195). All collective identities involve some conception of ‘common origins or shared characteristics’ (Hall, 1996, 2). Integration and distinction, while separated here to aid analysis, are, thus in practice, linked. Indeed, we may expect to find a positive correlation between the two (see Simon et al., 1995).

On the other hand, distinction and integration are never fully secure (Preston, 1997, 32). Self-hood, despite vigorous bolstering of borders and assertions of homogeneity, remains tentative, never achieved but always prone to dissolution, on a ‘terrain of uneasy collectivity’ (Nairn, 1997, 183). This is to be explained by its relational character. Located in ‘connections between individuals and groups rather than in the minds of particular persons or of whole populations’ (Tilly, 1995, 5), identity is not fixed. As relationships shift, then identity itself shifts. In consequence, many observers have seen identity as a construction, ‘in process’ (Hall 1996, 2), a ‘project’ (Calhoun, 1994), or ‘variable’ (Jenkins, 1997, 40). Despite the apparent fixity of binary oppositions and codes of distinction that mark specific identities off from ‘the Other’, the construction of distinction is itself part of an open process and in this way must be seen as contingent (Laclau and Mouffe,
1985; Tilly, 1995, 6). If identity is a ‘process’ or a ‘project’, then it is constantly being reproduced over time. However, its malleability and the active role of agents in the reproduction of identities suggest two distinct ways of looking at the history of identities. First, we can study the history of identity creation, how the identity takes shape, how it amplifies and proliferates, how it is reproduced over time. And second, we must be alert to the way in which identity projects themselves transform the past by creating histories of their own to reflect and justify the present.

This issue reminds us of the role of language in the making of identity. ‘Identity is not fixed, it has no essence, it does not reside in any given body of texts or symbols or sacred sites. It is carried in language and made and remade in routine social practice’ (Preston, 1997, 49). Symbols of identity are given meaning within narratives. Somers has emphasised the role of narrative in reintroducing concepts of ‘time and space and analytical relationality’ to more categorical or essentialist approaches to identity (Somers, 1994, 620). Actors are embedded in shifting stories and relationships and struggles over narratives become struggles over identity. Such a view emphasises the importance of studying the linguistic representation of identities. For instance, work on national and regional identities reminds us of the active role of elites in reproducing, re-inventing and manipulating narratives of identity (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983; de Planhol, 1988, 313-326).

And yet memories and narratives are not created in a vacuum. Stories are told and re-told within a social context. Wiley (1994), noting that identity involves self-concepts, suggests such concepts are re-worked from within that identity but also from without by social processes. Hall notes that identities are reproduced within narratives but also ‘in specific historical and institutional sites’ (1996, 4). Recently,
there has been growing emphasis placed on the role of administrative and political institutions in the formation and reproduction of group identity (Lecours, 2000). For example, Jones (2000, 917) has argued that ‘maturing territorial institutions’ were linked to the growing coherence of ‘ethnies’ in thirteenth century Wales. At the same time, others have emphasised the role of local contexts and local social relations in lending shape to a sense of belonging (Thompson and Day, 1999, 46).

Finally, the issue of identity is of interest precisely because it lies across some crucial borders. It is located between the present and the past: ‘identity marks the conjuncture of our past with the social, cultural and economic relations we live within’ (Rutherford, 1990, 19). But it also inhabits critical borderlands between structure and agency and between materialist and idealist approaches. For people do not adopt identities passively. Even ‘a dominant or hegemonic culture is rarely passively internalised; commonly it is negotiated, resisted or selectively appropriated by people in everyday life’ (Duncan and Ley, 1993, 11). Thompson’s call for a greater sense of human agency when studying the maintenance of national identities is a timely reminder of this location between structure and agency (Thompson, 2001). Perhaps the most sophisticated rendering of this is via Hall’s concept of ‘suturing’. People are summoned to take up positions through ideology. But the subject actively takes up and invests in those positions in a manner which involves the unconscious as well as discursive formations and practices and language as well as social context (Hall, 1996, 5/6). Indeed, Nairn suggests that approaches to one lived form of identity, nationalism, are likely to adopt a new synthesis, both a fusion and a transcending of materialism and idealism (Nairn, 1997, 12).
**Territory and identity: nation and ethnicity**

National and ethnic identities are the most frequently written about forms of territorial identity. Most accounts of nationalism agree that it was a product of modernity. Materialist writers stress the role of communications, print media or the growth of fiscal-military states (Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1991; Hroch, 1985). Meanwhile idealist writers are more likely to look to the influence of the French Revolution, the counter-Enlightenment or eighteenth and nineteenth century German philosophers (Berlin, 1991; Kedourie, 1960; Kamenka, 1976). But while there is scholarly consensus about the link between nationalism and modernity there is less consensus about ethnicity. Smith (1991) makes the case that nationalism could only be constructed on the basis of pre-existing ethnic groups, or ‘ethnies’, a position finding some favour amongst historians of the early-modern and mediaeval periods. However, it is not clear how far such groups were ‘ethnic categories’, groups whose members shared some objective features, or ‘ethnic communities’, groups with a self-consciousness (Brass, 1991, 22).

Recent empirical work by Kidd on British identities before modernity suggests that ethnic consciousness played a minor role before the eighteenth century. It was only with the rise of Romanticism and a racialist ethnology that more clearly distinguishable ethnic categorisations took shape (Kidd, 1999, 209). Ethnic identities, he concludes, were only of ‘second order’ importance in the early modern period: indeed, the ‘very notion of “identity” … might itself be anachronistic’ when applied to the period before 1700 (Kidd, 291). What Kidd’s conclusions reinforce is the critical watershed of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, that period bridging a world with few nationalisms and a world dominated by nationalist imaginings. It is exactly this crucial period of change that we focus on here.
But how, exactly, do places and territory relate to identity? Carter et al. (1993, xii) define place as ‘space to which meaning has been ascribed’, spaces that are named. This naming is important as it provides the nominal aspect crucial to all group identities (Jenkins, 1997, 72). We might identify three other ways in which places relate to identity. First, places provide contexts in which identities are played out and in which they have meaning. For Kaplan (2000) territory provides the actual space inhabited by a group, the particular terrain that defines a group and the locational context vis-à-vis other groups. Second, places provide representations of identity. The historic legacy of a specific area becomes part of the cultural resources of the group inhabiting that area. Territory thus adds an ‘additional layer of meaning’ to ethnic and cultural identities (Herb and Kaplan, 1999, 2). Shields (1991, 6) points to the empirically specifiable discourses about space and places that are central to everyday understanding. In these discourses we invest places with stories. Smith (1991, 64, writes of the ‘poetic spaces’ of the nationalist, imagining certain parts of the national territory as sacred territory, symbols of collective salvation or redemption. In this way territorial identities ‘are inextricably bound up with particular townscapes and landscapes’ (Urry, 1995, 27).

Place is thus intimately connected to two of the elements in our earlier definition of identity, context and narrative. But places are more than merely passive and inert containers in which things happen and about which stories are told. They are connected to identity formation in a third form, linked to process.

The humanistic geographer, Relph, distinguished the identity of a place from identity with a place (1976, 195). One reading of this identity of a place could approach older ‘residualist’ views of place identities as remnants of traditional society, remnants that may disappear as modernisation proceeds and places are
transformed and homogenised. Identities can therefore be linked to ‘the motivational power of tradition’ (Harvey, 1989, 303). However, others have convincingly contested this position. Territorial identities are actively constructed and reconstructed and evolve over time, interacting with changing material circumstances (Kaplan, 2000). Territorial identities are, in consequence, ‘multilayered’ and ‘complex’, ‘embedded in their particular historical contexts and material circumstances’ (Hakli, 1999, 123. See also Massey, 1995). Identities of places are therefore marked by process. And in the course of this process there is a transformation: ‘instead of the group defining the territory, the territory comes to define the group’ (Kaplan, 2000, 45). Identities are embedded in specific places but places help to re-affirm and shape the construction of identity.

A further point may be made. It should not be inferred from this that a transparent relationship exists between changing places and changing identity. Such transparency falters in practice because place identity is bound up with memory. Urry (1995, 27) notes that the ‘social practices of memory are embedded in place’. May (1996), in a study of place identity in Stoke Newington, London, notes that different rememberings of one place co-exist, with conflict between the nostalgia of the ‘old’ white population of the area and the imaginings of the ‘new’ white gentrifying population. Different groups can thus possess different memories of the same place and these multiple place identities intersect with other group identities based on class and race. While memories are constantly being re-worked they also have a stability and an inertia that makes the remembering of a place to some degree autonomous of that place.

Finally, the discussion of territorial identities adds another element to our five point definition – that of scale. Scale gives rise to qualitatively different kinds of
identity. Shared activities in places help to produce small-scale territorial identities, identification with the locality. But territorial identities are by no means restricted to the small-scale locality. And, as we move to a larger scale, the role of narrative and imagination arguably becomes more important than integration via shared attributes. Therefore, territorial identities can co-exist at widely varying scales and have different bases. Such co-existing identities have been viewed as ‘nested’ identities, providing a choice of identity constructs depending on the context (Herb and Kaplan, 1999).

At a macro-level of identity Richmond argues that nationalism depends on a territorial base; for nationalisms ‘an historical association with a certain place is a *sine qua non*’ (Richmond, 1987, 4). Williams and Smith echo this. Underlying national identity there is an intrinsic notion of territory. ‘Whatever else it may be, nationalism is always a struggle for control of land’ and ‘a mode of constructing and interpreting social space’ (Williams and Smith, 1983, 502). Billig (1995) points out that the national organisation of space is a continually flagged dominance. Nationalism, for Billig, is deeply embedded in the ‘embodied habits of social life’ especially in the West. It has become ‘banal’, in that it is the taken for granted way that space is divided up. And yet there is also a potential disjunction here. As Billig points out, the ideological project of nationalism ‘entails the binding of the name of the nation-state to the collective name of the people’ (Billig, 1995, 78). This binding then appears natural, an example, according to Billig, of ‘semantic cleansing’. For nation-states rarely coincide with homogenous cultural groupings.

Sub-state cultural groupings, with notions of shared ancestry produced and sustained by characteristics such as language, religion or more subjective imagined factors, are often described as ethnic groups. The relation between ethnic groups
and territory appears less certain than that between nationalism and territory. For some writers ‘a territorial base is not a precondition for the existence of ethnic groups’ (Richmond, 1987, 4). Furthermore, there can be a perceived continuum from the ethnic group to the nation. Smith (1991) proposes that ethnies of the pre-modern period were transformed, or had the opportunity to transform themselves, into nations during modernity. Smith’s ethnies, tied together by the concept of descent, underwent a territorialization in their demand for bounded space associated with their transition to nations. As part, therefore, of this proposed continuum from ethnic group to nation, we might note an associated spatialisation of group identity.

But is this the case? Bourdieu, in contrast, argues that all ethnies are territorial (1991, 220-229). This is also the position of Jenkins (1997). He suggests that the sheer ubiquity of nationalism in the modern world has led observers to prioritise this level of territorial identity. However, nationalism is a historically specific ideology. Indeed, he turns the notion that there is a continuum from a (pre-modern) ethnicity to a (modern) nationalism on its head. It is ethnic affiliation and classification which is ubiquitous, whereas nationalism (and racism) are ‘historically specific allotropes’ of ethnic identity, a second order cultural notion, as opposed to the ‘first order dimension of human experience’ that is ethnicity. Jenkins’ model has the advantage of incorporating territorial ideologies that are not nationalist. In demonstrating this he shows that different bases of identity are associated with different territorial ideologies as in Figure 1.1 below.
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<th>Basis of identity</th>
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Figure 1.1: Territorial bases and ideology. Adapted from Jenkins, 1997, 85.

Jenkins proposes that concepts of ethnic nationalism and ethno-regionalism are thus redundant, as all nationalism and regionalism is ethnic (Jenkins, 1997, 85). However, while this may be the case for nationalism, it may not be the case for regionalism, which, according to his own model, is generated by co-residence as well as ethnicity. For empirical validation of this we need look no further than Europe, where older ethnically based regions co-exist with a regionalism generated by co-residence and the contingency of administrative boundaries (see Harvie, 1994 and Keating, 1998). Nevertheless, Jenkins’ model reminds us that ideologies are linked to territorial bases and that these bases differ in terms of scale.

**Sub-state identities and the region**

The subject of this dissertation is a specific meso-level territorial identity, situated between locality and nation-state. The term ‘region’ is one of a number, along with ‘county’, ‘district’, even ‘nation’, that might be applied in everyday discourse in the UK to this intermediate spatial level. In its more common usage as a description of a block of territory between locality and state, ‘region’ can be defined in two ways.
First, it refers, functionally, to blocks of territory carved out of a state for the purposes of administration or tracts of territory influenced by and looking towards a central place. Second, ‘region’ can be used in the sense of cultural regions, based on shared social communications or the sense of identity of their inhabitants (Keating, 1998, 9; Jordan-Bychkov and Domosh, 1999, 7). Wagstaffe thus distinguishes between a ‘territory given the status of a region for administrative purposes’ and a ‘territory having a claim to a cultural and political individuality of its own, marked out by ethnic, historic, linguistic features, moulded by shared myths and traditions’ (Wagstaffe, 1994, 4). In practice, of course, these are not binary categorisations, but best seen as overlapping. For example, Wagstaffe goes on to suggest regions may be both administrative and cultural; and Keating argues that regions are ‘strong’ when ‘economic cohesion, cultural identity, administrative apparatus, popular identity and territorial mobilisation coincide in space’ (Keating, 1998, 10).

The consensus is that regional identities remain generally weak. Keating, while noting that territorial identities are a widespread and malleable part of the world-view of individuals, concludes that ‘popular identification with regional units of government and administration is rather weak except in historic nationalities like Scotland, Wales, Catalonia or the Basque Country’ (Keating, 1998, 94). Such a generalised European conclusion is mirrored in the UK. Here, devolution of (differing) levels of meso-government to Scotland and Wales in 1999 reflects a historic sense of sub-state/national identity in those territories (and perhaps reflects differing strengths of that identity – see Taylor and Thomson, 1999). In contrast, English regionalism ‘appears to lack political salience. On the surface at least, there are no strong regional cultures which would provide the political
demand and support for new democratic institutions’ (John and Whitehead, 1997, 7).

But perhaps the consensual view on the absence of English regional identities is over-determined by a dominant elite political culture that idealises parliamentary sovereignty. Taylor, in arguing the case for a northern (or rather a north-eastern) English political identity, cites Robert Key, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Environment, as replying in 1991 to the call for English devolution with the statement that ‘regional government is un-English’ (Taylor, 1993, 144). Yet, despite the disdain of the political classes, there may exist territorial regional identities not stitched into the top-down planning regional paradigm that characterises English governance. Thus Sharpe has asserted that ‘strong regional identities existed, but they seldom found political expression’ (Sharpe, 1997, 121). Sharpe’s conclusion is heretical among those writing from a political science disciplinary perspective. However, some sociological research might offer support. Devine, in a study of class identities in Luton, found that regional identities were significant: ‘one of the social identities which was frequently mentioned by all the interviewees was their identity with a place’ (Devine, 1992, 234. And see Emmison and Western, 1990, 249). However, on closer inspection we find that Devine’s interviewees were not expressing an identity with the region they lived in but with the regions they came from. This might suggest that regional identities exist in England but have a nostalgic dimension that cannot easily be linked to pro-active contemporary economic and social projects.

Ambiguous regional identities in England partly explain the lack of empirical work on contemporary sub-state regional identities (see Barter, 2000). It also serves to obscure the cases of regions that do have a relatively more pronounced
regional consciousness. Cornwall is one of these. Although Guibernau (2001, 17) cites Cornwall (along with Brittany) as a region which has a ‘rather weak sense of identity’ this ‘weak’ identity can still give rise to exactly those contemporary economic and social projects rarely fuelled by English regionalism. As a recent example, the 50,000 signatures raised in 2000-01 for a petition calling for the establishment of a regional assembly for Cornwall suggests a certain level of contemporary regional identity (www.senedhkernow.org.uk). But this is the identity of a ‘historic’ region. Cornwall ‘remains the one part of England where not all indigenous inhabitants automatically describe themselves as “English” ’ (Ward-Perkins, 2000, 521). Such an observation suggests that Cornwall, while technically an ‘English’ region, is also an exceptional one, a point to which we will return.

We can at this stage summarise what the literature on territorial identities tells us. Nationalism provides an integrating story but co-exists with diverse territorial identities at differing scales. These identities may or may not be in competition with the nationalist meta-narrative. Second, sub-state identities, like all identities, are contested. Top-down administrative and functional versions of regions compete with more vernacular culturally based notions of regions. Bourdieu (1991) reminds us that struggles over regional and ethnic identities are struggles to establish meaning. In these struggles groups and classes may use territory for different purposes, attempting to establish their hegemonic definition over the social construction that constitutes the region. Such a contestation again implies that regional identities, like all identities, are neither fixed nor static. In contrast, they are open to change.

Williams (1997, 17) points out how regional identity can be recognised prior to its active promotion through nationalism. But Keating also notes that the new
regionalisms do ‘not so much hark back to pre-modern forms of territorial identity, as reinvent the notion of territory in ways consistent with contemporary experience’ (Keating, 1996, 47). Regional identities, therefore, like state nationalisms, to some extent write their own histories and create their own pasts. But how have historians written the past of regions and regional identities?

_Historians and past territorial identities_

The focus of historians’ work on past identities in the British Isles has been on national identities (Newman, 1989; Colley, 1992; Bradshaw and Roberts, 1998; Brockliss and Eastwood, 1997; Grant and Stringer, 1995; Langlands, 1999; Robbins, 1998; Langford, 2000; Ferguson, 1998; Pittock, 1991 and 1999). But, as Radcliffe finds in her study of identity on the Ecuador-Peru frontier, there is a ‘multifaceted and complex affiliation to places within and beyond the nation. ... the nation is only one space onto which senses of belonging are mapped’ (Radcliffe, 1997, 289-290). And it may not be the main place. Colley suggests that an ‘intense localism and regionalism’ was more powerful in eighteenth-century England, Scotland and Wales than allegiance to nation (Colley, 1992, 373). Similarly, Joyce argues that industrialism was more likely to forge a regional than an English sense of identity (Joyce, 1991, 279-292). Returning to Jenkins’ schema (1997, 85) ethnicity could give rise, in the British context, to national ideologies of identity, but either ethnicity or co-residence could also give rise to regional or local identities. In addition these identities ‘nested’ at different scales. As Smith points out in relation to Spain, ‘most members of the minority ethnic communities also share an overarching Spanish political loyalty, in addition to their often intense ethnic sentiments. But, then, this is the norm in most Western states today’ (1991, 59).
Wagstaffe claims that 'in England ... [there exist] ... age-old local identities rooted in administrative and socio-cultural traditions which can be traced back for a thousand years' (Wagstaffe, 1994, 11). The study of localities and regions over vast periods of time is the province of the local historian as well as the historical geographer. Local historians have always been interested in the particular, and place is central to their work. Finberg (1952) and Hoskins’ (1955) preferred theme of the local historian, the development of a community through time, enthused a generation of local historians. But, in practice, this usually meant the study of a single, normally rural, parish. However, since the 1970s some local historians have turned their attention to the regional level.

Local historians adopt two broad approaches to the history of regions. The first stresses elements of continuity over very long time periods. Phythian-Adams (1991) has drawn a framework of ‘cultural provinces’ based on river drainage systems. These provincial settings provide a ‘meaningful context for its inhabitants and with which may be associated a set of distinguishable cultural traits’ (Phythian-Adams, 1993, 9). For Phythian-Adams, industrialisation intensified sentiments of regional identity that were already very deeply based. The second approach, in contrast, emphasises change rather than continuity. Everitt has noted that different types of region – for example ‘pays’, ‘county communities’, ‘craft regions’, industrial regions’ – co-existed alongside each other, ‘each with its own independent life span, each at any one time at a different phase in its evolution’ (Everitt, 1979). To some extent these contrasting views can be reconciled. For Phythian-Adams’ continuity focuses on continuing local differentiation and uniqueness whereas Everitt’s regions identify the local response to changing economic and political contexts.
But local history suffers from a number of drawbacks when studying regional identities. The first is the lingering geographical determinism that hovers over Phythian-Adams’ ‘cultural provinces’, defined as they are ultimately by physical features of river basins and watersheds. While medieval and early modern farming regions may be linked to discernible cultural differences (for agricultural regions see Thirsk, 1967 and for cultural differences see Underdown, 1995), this physical basis becomes more questionable as we move into the modern period.¹ Second, regions are not, for most local historians, the preferred scale: they are seen as secondary, almost epiphenomenal, to the primary scales of locality and nation-state. Thus, in this approach, the region becomes the ‘critical cultural intermediary between its constituent local societies and the level of the nation’ (Phythian-Adams, 1993, 18). Such an approach tends towards a conservatism that produces an uncritical acceptance of the nation-state, a functional approach to the region and a failure to appreciate the group-specific and contingent dynamics of either regional or state formation.

An alternative method prioritises regional history as synthesis, combining levels of analysis in one territory. Marshall has been most persistent in calling for a synthesised regional history, a project that might avoid the over-specialisation of much academic history but at the same time, not replicate the ‘effete and disorientated’ nature of much local history. Instead, he calls for ‘empiricists of imagination’ to write the new regional history (Marshall, 1981, 228-229). But the actual output of the ‘new’ regional historians has been more limited. Studies of regional history still too often result in an over-focus on the empirical description of

¹ Historical geographers and historical sociologists of the pre-modern period have linked arable regions with institutional complexes, attitudes to political rights and marriage patterns (Homans, 1969; Somers, 1993; Hopcroft,
changing patterns of life, failing to link these to the more discursive invention and re-invention of tradition (For an example see Swan and Foster, 1992. For an exception see Castells and Walton, 1998).

It may be significant that in Marshall’s own writings on regional history there is a detectable shift away from identifying empirical patterns towards issues of regional identity. In 1986 he was arguing a pragmatic approach: regions would ‘take shape as a consequence of the developing investigation’, although ‘however broadly and vaguely [they would] carry the hallmark of tradition and even self-awareness and identity’ (Marshall, 1986, 2). His own work on the Lake District had pre-disposed him to accept that a ‘deep local and regional patriotism’ could exist, at least in the modern period (Marshall and Walton, 1981, x). In later writings Marshall expanded on this. In a study of the ‘habitual territory’ of the inhabitants of Furness, he called on local historians to ‘attempt to find out how contemporaries formed their allegiance to particular districts’ (Marshall, 1996, 39). More recently, he has asserted that attitude to place should be the ‘first and most basic theme of the local historian’ (Marshall, 1997, 98), a considerable modification of the traditional local historian’s concern with the observable and material traces of the past.

The strength of the regional history approach lies in its emphasis that regions are ‘historically … not a fixed concept, but a feeling, a sentimental attachment to territory shared by like-minded people’ and that the meaning of a region resides in ‘the view from the bottom’ (Royle, 1998, 4). In drawing attention to the lived experience of regions the regional historian is sympathetic to Thompson’s view that social science accounts of nationalism and regionalism have been too top-down, too concerned with notions of ‘homogeneity at the expense of recognising difference’

1995; Kussmaul, 1990). Jewell (1994, 212) also links north-south differences within England to a long history of
Regional historians, in their focus on difference and their sensitivity to scale, are able to deconstruct regional identities. Thus, in a recent study of northern identities in the nineteenth century, Kirk concludes that detailed historical investigation indicates that intra-regional identities were much more important at this time than a sense of either northern or north-eastern identity (Kirk, 2000, xii). Yet, an over-concern with difference could also be seen as a weakness of this approach.

Overall, therefore, local history as a discipline, whether in the guise of a concern with very long term continuities or of a detailed holistic reconstruction of a region in one given time period, has failed to produce a convincing model for studying regions or regional identities. In this it shares the more general drawbacks of other historical approaches to territorial identity. The descriptive and inductive methods of historians have led them to focus on the integrative and contextual aspects of identity, describing the institutions and traditions associated with regional identities but failing to provide convincing analysis of two other aspects. The first relates to the narrative dimension of identity. Easthope (1999, 12) has pointed out how social scientists generally ‘feel inhibited’ about investigating a primarily subjective phenomenon like identity and this prevents them from analysing the narratives and discourses of identities. The second, somewhat paradoxical, problem is that historians have focused on describing the attributes of identities and their contexts but failed to deliver a more diachronic model of the formation and emergence of territorial identities. Their concentration on the particular and their distrust of social theory has militated against a general explanation of the formation of territorial identity.

differentiation rooted in a pastoral/arable divide.
However, more recently, a few historians have adopted a different position on theory. Joyce takes his cue from a particular reading of post-modernist theory. For him identities 'are not the product of an external “referent” which confers meaning on them .... if gender cannot be derived from an external referent, then the same follows for class’ (Joyce, 1995, 82). What applies to gender and class identities presumably applies, also, to regional identities. Following this approach, then, regions are a product of regionalism and not the other way around. The object of study then becomes the meanings through which the region is understood and constructed by contemporaries, rather than the social or material forces that formerly were thought to produce the regional consciousness. Furthermore, for the postmodernist, regional identities, and regions too, are very unlikely to be uniform, coherent or homogenous entities but will be ‘marked by conflict ... plural, diverse and volatile’ (Joyce, 1995, 82).

The move of postmodern historians to explore issues of ideology and narrative also provides an unintended bridge to those regional geographers who, similarly, criticise the fundamental concepts of their colleagues. Of particular relevance, Murphy (1991) provides a useful critique of the way other geographers (and social scientists more generally) use the term ‘region’. He points out how the concept is used as an umbrella term for their more central concepts of place and locale. Place is often defined as a set of attachments for individuals whereas locale is a setting for interaction, a space through which individuals move. In contrast, regions are seen both as sets of attachment and settings for interaction. But this ignores the role of regions themselves as institutional (and ideological) constructions, ‘why the region came to be a socially significant spatial unit in the first place, how the region is understood and
viewed by its inhabitants, or how and why that understanding has changed over time’ (Murphy, 1991, 24). For Murphy, some geographers, like regional historians, still tend to take the regional context for granted, focusing on the attributes of regions rather than the way they are produced. They adopt regional frameworks without recognising the significance of the regionalisation process.

Towards regionalisation: geographers and the region

The concept of the region in geography has changed over time. As western nation states consolidated themselves, a parallel interest emerged in their sub-national components. Claval, in a wide-ranging survey of the regional concept, identified the work of eighteenth century geologists and cartographers, particularly in France, as first investigating ‘objective’ regions, based on similarities of subsoil, climate, vegetation and bounded by detectable physical barriers (Claval, 1987, 160-161). During the nineteenth century geographers and anthropologists extended this approach, in particular focusing on the landscapes produced in and by particular regions, and on the folk culture and ‘character’ of the people who inhabited them. Such a discourse flowered in the French school of regional geographers and historians around the turn of the century. French regional geography took as its central concept the ‘pays’, an area of countryside determined usually by a particular farming system and by a specifically recognisable landscape. Regions could arise from either shared or polarised activities, as long as these activities gave rise to active links and relationships, and their inhabitants could then proceed to imagine themselves as possessing a shared history. Such a view of regions linked itself to the regionalism that emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century which
focused on preserving those aspects of cultural expression – language, dialect, folklore – seen as threatened by modernity.

Similar motives may be seen in the work of American cultural geographers of the middle decades of the twentieth century. This body of work was heavily influenced by Carl Sauer and the ‘Berkeley School’. Sauer’s innovative concept was that of the ‘cultural landscape’, arguing that landscapes were transformed by culture and could be read as records of human activity (Sauer, 1925). Out of this emerged the later concept of a formal culture region, an ‘area inhabited by people who have one or more cultural traits in common’ (Jordan-Bychkov and Domosh, 1999, 7. See also Zelinsky, 1975; Jordan, 1973). However, the Berkeley School has been subjected to a considerable barrage of criticism from cultural geographers, especially in Britain, since the 1980s. These revolve around two connected points. First, the approach of culture regions is said to reify culture, shifting attention from the individuals and groups who produce culture to a ‘super-organic’ culture (Jackson, 1989, 114; Duncan, 1980). Second, the concentration on the mapping of cultural traits in the landscape is argued to be unduly restrictive and atheoretical, leading to a neglect of wider political, economic and social structures (McDowell, 1994, 148).

In Britain the Berkeley School’s concept of the cultural region was always more marginal, with the interesting exception of Wales. It is perhaps significant that Sauer was influenced by H.J. Fleure (Jackson, 1989, 11), this providing the link to the later ‘Aberystwyth School’ of Welsh geographers. This group was concerned to map and understand a Welsh ‘culture region’ based on the strikingly exceptional (in the British context) cultural trait of the Welsh language (Bowen, 1959; Carter and Thomas, 1969; Pryce, 1975, 1998). Like the work of regional historians, this
provides useful insights into regional differentiation as well as a set of conceptual tools for discussing areal patterns, such as the notion of cultural zones of core and periphery (see also Meinig, 1965. For a description of the approach see Pryce, 1982). However, also like the regional historians, the predominantly descriptive approach is strong on establishing patterns but less willing to provide a diachronic explanatory, as opposed to descriptive, model for the emergence and reproduction of regions and regional identities.

Dissatisfaction with what some saw as the descriptive empiricism of traditional regional geography combined with reaction against the positivist ‘objectivism’ of the regional and spatial science of the 1960s to produce a move to another regional geography discourse in the 1970s. For Gilbert (1988) this was a ‘social scientific’ regional geography with three strands, the ‘region as a local response to capitalist process’, the region ‘as a medium for social interaction’ and ‘the region as a focus of identification’. The first of these is most associated with the ‘new regional geography’. From this perspective, places are consequences of a complex interaction between global processes of uneven development within capitalist accumulation and local uniquenesses (Massey, 1978, 115-16). The strength of this approach is that it explains the combination of a changing economy and the continuities of spatial divisions. New products emerge, new techniques are applied but unique places remain. Each round of capitalist investment produces not homogeneity, but a re-formed heterogeneity. The continuing uniqueness of place is always subject to change, ‘always already a product of wider contact’ (Massey, 1995, 183). Yet, despite these insights, in practice the new regional geography has focused its empirical gaze on localities rather than on regions (Jonas, 1988; see
Harloe, Pickvance and Urry, 1990). In addition it says little about the issue of regional identity.

The second strand, the ‘region as a medium for social interaction’ is heavily influenced by Gidden’s structuration theory. This shifts the focus away from the visible attributes of a region towards the relationship of agents within it, away from structures and towards networks of interaction. Such an approach has obvious affinities with the contemporary ‘associationalist’ analysis of European regions, which emphasises networks of regional level actors as a possible alternative to hierarchies or markets (for a critique see Amin and Thrift, 1995). But structuration theory and interactionist perspectives still do not clearly conceptualise the region itself either as an institutional or symbolic context or an agent in its own right. In contrast, it is Gilbert’s third strand of social scientific regional geography, the ‘region as a focus of identification’, that brings us closer to the issue of regional identity. As Gilbert perceives, regions are the result of process, whether socio-economic or cultural.

The role of process in the construction of regions suggests a particular place for historical geographers. However, outside Wales, British historical geographers tended to concentrate on studies of the landscape and its material objects, the geography of field systems rather than class or cultural structures. And in this project of explaining the landscape British historical geographers adopted a method that its leading exponent, H.C.Darby, described as a ‘pragmatic British empiricism’ (Darby, 1953 and 1983). However, while interest in landscape remains strong among historical geographers, that interest has changed shape (see McQuillan, 1995, 273). No longer confined to material structures, geographers have moved into the political and cultural domains to explain the reproduction of landscapes as
symbols and meanings for groups and individuals in society (Daniels, 1993). The agenda of historical geography, even in its traditional guise of a concern with landscape, now, therefore, clearly overlaps with that of cultural geography.

At the same time historical geographers spread their nets wider than landscapes. A recent introduction to historical geography indicates the eclectic mix of enquiry that now passes for historical geography (Butlin, 1993). Similarly, historical geographers of nationalism have studied how contested narratives of place construct ‘particular geographies of belonging’ (Graham, 2000, 71). Historical geography has thus been represented as a ‘discipline in midstride, between empirical tradition and epistemological innovation, between the rock-ribbed world of materiality and the elusive worlds of representation’ (Earle, 1995, 455). Clearly, ‘much of what currently passes for historical geography no longer respects the older closures’ (Philo, 1994, 259). Welcoming this, Philo puts the case for a ‘geographical history’, one that ‘brings a geographical sensitivity to bear upon the study of all those past phenomena – economic, social, political or whatever - that are the very “stuff” of history’ (1994, 253). This brings historical geography closer to the concerns of historians, producing a potentially fruitful convergence of disciplinary perspectives.

One area to benefit from this convergence was the study of regional identity in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Marshall has suggested that ‘it is much easier to think of regions as resting on a foundation of social groups based on industrial and other occupations’ and that the ‘development, density and shape, of an industrialising region may be fairly easy to trace’ (Marshall, 1992, 20 and 22). Therefore, it is no coincidence that the clearest account of the reproduction of regional consciousness in the past has been produced by historical geographers and
economic historians working on the relatively contained period of the Industrial Revolution.

The implicit traditional view of social historians was that territorial diversity gave way to class homogeneity during industrialisation (see Thompson, 1968; Perkin, 1969). The economic historian Sidney Pollard was already challenging this orthodoxy in the early 1970s. He claimed that economic specialisation produced regional societies ‘with identifiable features appropriate to a certain stage of the industrial process differing from the stage reached by other regions’ (Pollard, 1973, 638). Later, he added more flesh to his concept of industrial regions. The industrial process in the eighteenth century, he argued, was marked by the emergence of a regional system, albeit unstable, containing specialised production regions based on comparative cost advantages (Pollard, 1981). The implication of Pollard’s work was that industrialisation could co-exist with heightened regional identities, rather than replace regional with class identities.

Langton, in an important contribution in 1984, picked up on Pollard’s concept of the industrial region and proceeded to set out the logic of the causal process through which industrialisation led to differentiated regions. Furthermore, he crucially linked this to the production of regional consciousness (Langton, 1984, 145-167). Langton’s argument was that the process of industrialisation intensified the regional differences of pre-industrial England. It was the industrial revolution that led to regionalism. In particular, it was, according to Langton, the emergence of waterway based communications networks in the later eighteenth century that produced ‘more specialised, more differentiated ... and more internally unified regions’ (Langton, 162).
The central thrust of Langton’s view of industrial regions was that economic specialisation was accompanied by the rise of consistent regional cultural identities. Langton argued that industrial regions gained internal coherence and consistency as their local economies integrated around great provincial cities such as Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, Newcastle, Leeds and Bradford. An increasing sense of shared regional economic interests led to an emergent regional consciousness, fostered by provincial newspapers, clubs and societies. The regional novel, working class dialect literature, and antiquarian interest in folk customs all burgeoned in the first half of the nineteenth century and were symptoms of these new regions. At the same time local customs were being synthesised regionally by the emergence of intra-regional specialisms. To sum up, economic specialisation produced increasingly internally integrated yet externally differentiated regions, economically, socially and culturally, during the classic period of the Industrial Revolution.

In parallel with historical geographers some economic historians were also re-discovering the region. In 1989 Pat Hudson claimed the region was the ‘really important spatial unit’ of the early nineteenth century (Hudson, 1989). Hudson’s work synthesised that of Langton and Pollard. In the eighteenth century distinct, specialised, internally cohesive industrial regions emerged, linked to national and international markets. ‘Sectoral specialisation by region’ occurred as a growing export trade helped create integrated transport, commercial and financial links within the industrial region, these resting, in turn, on dense social, family and business networks. Thus, regions were the important spatial unit for capital, labour and information flows and intra-regional markets and networks for these complemented the extra-regional commodity flows. Industrial regions were ‘freer of metropolitan economic, social and political influence than they had been in the late
seventeenth and or early eighteenth centuries or were to become from the later nineteenth century’ (Hudson, 1992, 105). Exports went directly from the region rather than through London and regional lobbying and regionally based protest movements indicated growing regional consciousnesses with their epicentres in the larger provincial cities.

However, while providing a temporal framework for the emergence of regional identity, the industrial regions model remains tantalisingly silent on the causal links between economic and social change and the rise of regional consciousness, other than asserting an association between the two. Recognising this, Marshall has called for ‘detailed examinations of the growth of regional consciousness’ based on Langton’s ideas (Marshall, 1996, 47). Nonetheless, such examinations have been slow to appear. Kirk points to the ‘considerable gaps in the historical literature dealing with regional and local identities’ (2000, x), and, in the same volume, Hewitt and Poole suggest that regional identities ‘remain a neglected topic’ while, in particular, the period before 1860 ‘remains something of a wasteland for students of the development, persistence or transformation of regional identities’ (Hewitt and Poole, 2000, 112).

Meanwhile, work by social and political historians adds other dimensions to this picture of eighteenth and nineteenth century regions. Wahrman distinguishes between two cultures in late eighteenth century England, and in doing so he sets debates on the cultural history of this period within a territorial dimension. He suggests there was a distinction between those attached to ‘national’ society, a ‘gentlemanly bourgeoisie’ with London-oriented cultural tastes, and an ‘independent bourgeoisie’ attached to their communal-provincial culture, valorising local traditions, customs and practices (Wahrman, 1992, 54). There was thus a ‘rift
within the elite’ as some reacted against the more ostentatious, London-orientated values of their neighbours to renew an interest in local, more puritan values, especially in the second half of the eighteenth century (Wahrman, 1992, 50-51). This was precisely that period when the contours of industrial regions began to be more clearly perceived.

Wahrman’s ‘independent bourgeoisie’ crystallised around the appropriation and adaptation of the press, associational culture, commercialised leisure activities and around the value of ‘independence’, asserting their local identities vis-à-vis national society, an assertion that cut across other divides, such as religion. Wahrman claims to detect growing tensions between the two types of ‘middling sort’ by the 1770s. It was the ‘independent bourgeoisie’ that provided the basis for the past-oriented, oppositional, Wilkite radical English, cultural nationalist ideology of the time (Wahrman, 1992, 59-61). This group, more a ‘coherent idiom’, according to Wahrman, than a class, can also be seen as inhabiting the heart of those regional cultures deploying themselves around the centres of eighteenth century regional specialisation. Enlarging on this cultural perspective, Sweet (1998) has also pointed to the role of the rhetoric of ‘independence’ and ‘local tradition’ in the reproduction of provincial loyalties. Concepts of ‘civic pride, identity and historical consciousness’ were used to maintain and to mobilise local loyalties in borough politics (Sweet, 1998, 115). What her work emphasises is the role of culture and political rhetoric in the reproduction of sub-state identities (see also Money, 1977). The work of cultural and political historians therefore re-inserts a sense of contingency and the role of rhetoric and local agency into the formation of regional identities.

The geographical and historical insights of Langton, Hudson, Wahrman and Sweet identify some of the factors at work in the process of regional creation in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. But to take us further we need to locate these within an explicit model of the regionalisation process.

**Regionalisation: a dynamic model**

Anssi Paasi provides a model of both the institutionalisation of regions and of the formation of regional identity (Paasi, 1986; 1991; 1996, 31-37). He criticises geographers for regarding regions as categories used as instruments of classification and historians for neglecting the wider context of the development of regional systems and not conceptualising the emergence of regions. Instead, they too often provide just a ‘detailed and illustrative discussion of the practices occurring in a region during a certain period’ (1991, 242). In lieu of this, he offers us the concept of spatial socialisation, ‘the discourse in which inhabitants become members of specific products of social spatialisation – that is territorially bounded spatial units – and adopt specific modes of thought and action’ (1996, 54). Spatial socialisation introduces a concept of culture as central to regional production. Regions are the condensation of ‘a whole complex of economic, political and social processes into a specific cultural image’ (1991, 241). This connects the two dimensions of the material basis of regions and the representational role of regions as ‘mediums’ of social reproduction. For Paasi, the construction of territoriality involves both mental representations and material practices, discourses as well as divisions of labour.

But central to his understanding is a diachronic approach to regional institutionalisation. This takes place in four stages, not necessarily consecutive, during which everyday experiences are given institutional form and result in collective portrayals of a regional territory. The first stage is the development of
territorial awareness and shape. Here, the territory is identified as a distinct spatial unit, a process in which power relations play a crucial role in defining boundaries. The second stage is the formation of conceptual or symbolic shape. During this stage territorial symbols are established, giving the inhabitants a means of distinguishing the territory from others and embodying the history and traditions of that territory. But this second stage can only occur alongside the third stage, the emergence of institutions. For Paasi, formal and informal political, legal, educational and cultural institutions are ‘the most important factors as regards the reproduction of the region and regional consciousness’ (1986, 121). Institutions reproduce territorial symbols and they also reproduce economic and social structures such as the division of labour. Finally, there is the establishment of a territorial unit in the wider regional structure and social consciousness. In this fourth stage the region is widely accepted as having a status in the spatial structure of society, most formally, though not necessarily, through possessing an administrative shell.

During the process of institutionalisation a region achieves an identity. However, Paasi distinguishes between the ‘regional consciousness’ of the inhabitants of a region and the ‘identity of a region’, both of which come together to make up a ‘regional identity’. Regional consciousness is produced in what Paasi terms ‘structures of expectations’. This is a concept close to Raymond Williams’ ‘structures of feeling’ or Pierre Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’, that taken for granted context of everyday experience (Williams, 1961, 48-71; Bourdieu, 1977, 71-79; Paasi, 1986, 122). Structures of expectations can arise from ‘factual’, face to face relations within communities or from ‘ideal’ relations, mediated through local or non-local newspapers, political institutions and discourse. Structures of expectations give rise to collective portrayals of place, portrayals that might be ‘real, imagined or even
mythical’ (Paasi, 1986, 122). These usually look to the past, towards the history and tradition of that region. In contrast, the ‘identity of the region’ is more directed to ‘becoming’ than to the past. Images of the region may be produced either by insiders or outsiders and combine to make up the ‘identity of a region’. Figure 1.2 illustrates this framework.

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Figure 1.2: Paasi’s model of the formation of regional identity. Based on Paasi, 1986.

Over the course of his writings Paasi has added two further concepts to his model of the institutionalisation of regions. First, he points to the importance of generation in mediating between regions and place. Generations ‘provide people’s spatial consciousness with common cultural elements, identity and frames for interpreting experiences’ (Paasi, 1995, 55). The second concept is that of boundaries. Borders are ‘manifestations of socio-spatial consciousness’ (Paasi, 1995, 43) and Paasi’s own empirical work on the Finnish-Russian boundary focuses on the iconography of boundaries and the social construction of this by groups and classes. Boundaries and territorialisation are seen as ‘two sides of the same coin’,
reproduce the spatial limits of identity and construct a ‘them’ in opposition to ‘us’ (Paasi, 1996, 27-28). However, boundaries are also relational; they mediate contacts between social communities and cultures as well as mark the edges of those cultures (Paasi, 1996, 213).

Paasi thus provides a rich set of concepts and a broad framework with which to work through the formation of sub-state territories and their identities. Of particular use is his view of regional identities as the product of historical contingency, the role of institutional construction in this history and the emphasis on discursive as well as material practices, and culture in addition to economics. Together, these provide a much more dynamic and less narrow approach to regional identity formation than the industrial regions model.

However, it still has problems. In one of the few attempts to operationalise Paasi’s approach in a British context Macleod has applied it to issues of governance in twentieth century Scotland (MacLeod, 1998. See also Deacon, 1998a for a preliminary application to Cornwall). For MacLeod, while Paasi’s model can help develop ‘comparative studies of particular places’ its main weakness is its ‘relative silence on the territorialization of social and political life into two distinctive geographical scales: the regional and the national’. As he points out, the identity politics associated with these scales use differing discourses. He feels, as a result, that there is a lack of theoretical guidance from Paasi as to how competing narratives of place can ‘vie for hegemony within any given space’ (MacLeod, 1998, 839-40).

But there remains another problem with such a project. This is the problem of representing this complex spatial and temporal process, of invoking the national and local perspectives that constitute and are constituted by each other in practice
Put simply, in what form does the author write up this complexity? Paasi himself adopts historical layers in his study of the institutionalisation of Finnish territory, investigating temporal cross-sections of territorialisation (Paasi, 1996). This dissertation takes an alternative approach, discussing a series of thematic geographical layers of Cornwall over the period 1750-1870.

In this chapter we established the components of a working definition of identity. We also reviewed some influential approaches by historians, geographers and others to territorial identity, focusing on approaches to the regional scale. In the course of this review we have emphasised the particular salience of Paasi’s work on regionalisation in providing a framework for understanding the emergence of regional identity. Both the components of our definition of identity and Paasi’s model will re-appear later in this study to help give shape to our discussion of Cornish identity. However, first, we need to ask how Cornwall has been imagined hitherto by historians and social scientists.