COUNTY, NATION, ETHNIC GROUP? THE SHAPING OF THE CORNISH IDENTITY

Bernard Deacon

If English regionalism is the dog that never barked then English regional history has in recent years been barely able to raise much more than a whimper.¹ Regional history in Britain enjoyed its heyday between the late 1970s and late 1990s but now looks increasingly threadbare when contrasted with the work of regional geographers. Like geographers, in earlier times regional historians busied themselves with two activities. First, they set out to describe social processes and structures at a regional level. The region, it was claimed, was the most convenient container for studying ‘patterns of historical development across large tracts of the English countryside’ and understanding the interconnections between social, economic, political, demographic and administrative history, enabling the researcher to transcend both the hyper-specialization of ‘national’ historical studies and the parochial and inward-looking gaze of English local history.² Second, and occurring in parallel, was a search for the best boundaries within which to pursue this multi-disciplinary quest. Although he explicitly rejected the concept of region on the grounds that it was impossible comprehensively to define the term, in many ways the work of Charles Phythian-Adams was the culmination of this process of categorization. Phythian-Adams proposed a series of cultural provinces, supra-county entities based on watersheds and river basins, as broad containers for human activity in the early modern period. Within these, ‘local societies’ linked together communities or localities via networks of kinship and lineage.³

But regions are not just convenient containers for academic analysis. As early as the 1960s Finberg urged local historians to study those ‘social entities’ that were ‘so far united in thought and action as to feel a sense of belonging together, in contradistinction from the many outsiders who do not belong’. This was later echoed by Alan Everitt who distinguished the regions that existed in the analyses of historians and geographers from those ‘conscious regions’, whose inhabitants possessed a sense of their own identity. By
the 1980s regional historians were beginning to probe this third strand of regions, their self-awareness, or identity, encouraged by a more general shift in the social sciences towards the study of identity. This was showcased in Edward Royle’s edited collection of work on regional identity in 1998. For Royle the historian’s concern should be ‘from the bottom’, addressing the issue of ‘what a region means (if anything) to the person who lives there’. The region was ideally neither an administrative unit nor a term of convenience; instead it was a ‘sentimental attachment to territory shared by like-minded people’. Nonetheless, the actual work of British regional historians still tended towards an empirical description of regional structures and a vaguely economically determinist explanation of the emergence of regional identities, reflecting the work of economic historians and historical geographers on the industrial region. The ‘empiricists of imagination’ that Marshall had called into existence did not emerge and the ‘historical growth of regional consciousness within many parts of Britain remains almost unexplored’. Furthermore, there was little sustained attempt to explore whether regions had meaning for those who lived in them or analyse the process whereby the regional ‘community’ was imagined. As Castells and Walton pointed out, regional identities were ‘discursive products’ but regional historians in Britain have been reluctant to pay much attention to the discourses involved.

In an overarching review of the state of regional history in Europe and North America Cynthia Applegate has drawn attention to work in three areas – societies, territory and identities – that closely mirror the three aspects introduced above - social containers, boundaries and identity. Applegates’s own preference is for a greater engagement with territory, meaning a sense of place. This may be seen as a reaction to the work of regional geographers that has left regional history, or at least English regional history, far behind. For some regional geographers regions are now no longer bounded to territory but are viewed as a ‘complex and unbounded lattice of articulations’. Even when engaged in reconstructing processes of regional integration and differentiation the writings of historical geographers reflect this concern with hybridity and flux, itself a product of the pervasive influence of post-modernist ideas on human geographers. Yet, surprisingly, Applegate’s otherwise comprehensive review fails to cite the work of the regional
geographer Anssi Paasi, who draws more widely from across the social sciences.\(^7\) Paasi’s theoretical work on the historical formation of regional identity is now *de rigueur* for the geographer but has rarely influenced historians.\(^8\) Yet Paasi’s distinction between the ‘identity of a region’, perhaps better described as the regional image, and its ‘regional consciousness’, the multiscalar identification of people with practices, discourses and symbolisms in order to express an idea of ‘region’, is an essential heuristic device for elucidating regional identities and a reminder that such identities are the product of both internal and external factors. Since his original work Paasi has added discourse to his panoply of concepts, highlighting the role of narratives in the symbolic shaping of regions.\(^9\)

Historians more generally have been slower to accommodate discourse, suspicious of its roots in post-structuralist thought. Yet the concept is inescapable if we really wish to pursue a historical analysis of those ‘discursive products’ that were regional identities. Geographers’ greater willingness to embrace the intangibilities of poststructuralism has allowed them to open up potentially new avenues into the regional past. As an example Matthew Kurtz’s notion of the dialectic of double time, drawn from Homi Bhabha’s work, provides an intriguing insight into the connections between history and identity. For Kurtz, ‘double time’ results from a dialectic between history as the ‘real past’, a pedagogy that situates peoples in narratives of linear progress, and identity as present performance, whereby subjects make history in the present. History and identity are therefore both presumed, as the past works in the present, but also performed as the present works on the past. This elaboration of the instrumentalist stance of Hobsbawm and Ranger towards ‘invented traditions’ serves to remind us of the role of historical agents in the constant re-shaping and re-negotiation of ‘regional’ (and other) narratives of identity.\(^10\)

The unending dialectic between the ‘real past’ and a ‘renegotiating present’ guarantees that ‘regions’ are malleable, if also grounded on actual territories and histories, the language of hybridity being in tension with a tendency to closure. Attention needs therefore to be transferred from the region itself to the processes through which regions
are created, to the ‘regimes of regionalities, ways of making and unmaking the peripheral relative to the core’. For regions are the product of ‘power geometries’, part of those ‘struggles over classification … to impose the legitimate definition of the divisions of the social world’, the outcome of which is never finally achieved but always subject to revision.\textsuperscript{11} If regions obtain their identity as named places through the contingency of history, then a historical perspective is necessary if we wish to unite the changing construction of regions with the bounded part of the world to which the regional description refers, combining the historical contingency of regions with their discrete material making and unmaking.

So how did the dialectic of double time operate in a specific region? Here, I take the example of Cornwall to explore the construction and reconstruction of historical narratives. But, critically, this is not an example of an unambiguous ‘regional’ identity in the making. For Cornwall is unique in that it serves as an exception to the general rule that counties cannot be cultural regions in their own right.\textsuperscript{12} For example, Phythian-Adams, despite lumping Cornwall in with Devon in his ‘South British Sea’ cultural province admitted that it must ‘clearly must be distinguished’ from its eastern neighbour for ‘obvious cultural reasons’, while Barry Cunliffe and David Hey, in the general preface to Longman’s \textit{Regional History of England} series also admitted that ‘in many ways, historically and culturally, the River Tamar divides the [south-west region] into two’. This echoes the remark of Hobsbawm that ‘the Cornish are fortunate to be able to paint their regional discontents in the attractive colours of Celtic tradition, which makes them so much more viable’. From this viewpoint the survival of a Celtic-speaking population until the end of the eighteenth century guaranteed that Cornwall ‘remains the one part of England where not all indigenous inhabitants automatically describe themselves as “English”’.\textsuperscript{13} Yet genuine uncertainty can be provoked by the lack of common markers of Celtic ethnicity – such as a widely spoken Celtic language or highly visible nationalist political activities. Even those academics who equate the Cornish with the historic nations of Europe tend to view ‘the Cornish problem’ as one of explaining the absence of nationalism rather than the presence of a distinct identity.\textsuperscript{14}
Administratively an English county, culturally sometimes seen as a Celtic nation, Cornwall has an identity unique in ‘England’. This emplacement guarantees it a categorically uncertain place in academic discourses. Both ‘of England’ and ‘not of England’, it defies easy analysis. Cornwall and the Cornish teeter on the brink of a conceptual and historiographical crevasse, neither county nor nation. As a result of this conceptual indistinctiveness, its identity remains unfathomed. For Philip Payton, Cornwall and the Cornish ‘remain together an enigma – not falling neatly or happily into the new categories that are appearing, a battleground perhaps for conflicting visions, constructions, imaginings of Cornishness, Celticity and Britishness’. The roots of this lie deep in its history. But the past in isolation cannot explain the modern hybrid Cornish identity, part English, part non-English. This particular combination was created in time, or in double time. Cornwall’s ambiguous spatial location – simultaneously English county and Celtic nation but at the same time not quite a proper English county nor a Celtic nation, results from the intersection of past and present, pedagogy and performance, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Moreover, while Cornwall may in many ways be unique, its experience also allows us to seek the general by isolating those factors that have been absent in more quintessentially ‘English’ regions.

**Territory or people? County or nation? Historical perspectives on the Cornish identity**

While for many Cornwall’s administrative location as a county makes the classification of its identity a simple matter, others argue its contemporary geo-political status masks the presence of the Cornish as a distinct people in the past. Mark Stoyle is most persistent in arguing that they were important actors in the seventeenth century British wars, the last episode in a process whereby Cornwall’s medieval cultural distinctiveness was erased. Stoyle works within the paradigm of the ‘New British History’, which aims to open up the space for a less Anglo-centric perspective on the past of the British Isles. Thus, intrigued by the motivations of the Cornish participants in the civil wars of the 1640s, John Pocock called for a ‘Cornish history (as well as a Welsh, an Argyll or an Ulster history) of the War of the Three Kingdoms’. Other proponents of the New British History are more wary. John Morrill, for example, adopts a holistic view of British history as the
story of ‘four or more peoples’, though it is clear the ‘or more’ does not include the Cornish. On balance, it remains unlikely that calls for the New British History to avoid the perspectives, periodisation and problems of English history by adopting a ‘multivocalic’ and ‘multiperspectival’ history, where for example Scottish or Welsh-centred British history would be equally as valid as an English-centred British history, would extend so far as a Cornish-centred British history. James Vernon rightly concludes therefore that the ‘four-nations’ model of British national identity … ‘ignores Cornwall or conflates its alterity with Englishness’.

Cornwall’s role in medieval England receives attention in Adrian Hastings’ discussion of the making of Britain. For him Cornwall is an ‘interesting but little considered case … fully integrated into England despite its different language’ from a relatively early date. It was ‘quietly absorbed more than it was conquered’ by pre-1066 English rulers and, because England was still then in an ‘embryonic’ state, its various peoples, including Danes and Cornish, were able to participate ‘in the institutional development of England at every point’ as groups with a clear identity but absorbed into a multi-ethnic state. The Reformation challenged this status and was followed by the decline of the ‘singularity of the Cornish ethnic identity within England. The springboard for any pursuit of independent nationhood was effectively removed’. However Hastings immediately qualifies this by asserting that ‘nevertheless, there remained a stronger sense of separate identity and common purpose … among the people of Cornwall than in any other southern shire … such politicisable identity could hardly be found elsewhere’. Hastings’ account suggests that the legacy of the past still colours the modern Cornish identity, although its separate nationality merged into Englishness during and after the sixteenth century. His interpretation was echoed by Michael Hechter who focused on the trading links of the Cornish economy in the sixteenth century as proof of the early integration of Cornwall into the English economy before 1600. Occurring in a context of the ‘relative absence of cultural discrimination’, this led to a diffusion process that undermined a separate sense of Cornish ethnicity. Hechter may, however, overestimate Cornwall’s early economic integration. Mark Overton et al conclude that its integration into the English economy took place later, in the seventeenth century, and that this was
associated with deepening relative, and even absolute, poverty. ‘Cornwall experienced relative deprivation and exploitation more reminiscent of the Irish than the English experience in this period’.  

More idealist historians adopt a different stance on the Cornish identity. For them political and economic integration did not result in a loss of identity. On the contrary, it produced a heightened sense of cultural difference. Here attention focuses on the making of Cornish identity at the period Krishan Kumar identifies as a ‘moment of English nationalism’ at the end of the nineteenth century. This also opened up the space for non-English imaginations and from this perspective Cornwall was constructed as ‘Celtic’, an example of the ‘bestowal of identity by the core on the periphery’. Specifically, artists attracted to west Cornwall by its accessible remoteness ‘helped to give Cornwall a visibility and representational identity … creating its iconography’. This argument is echoed by Jane Korey who discerned a ‘semantic space’ opening up with the decline of Cornwall’s staple industry – metal mining - after the 1860s. This vacuum was promptly colonised by the romantic representations of outsiders who viewed Cornwall as a primitive and liminal place, an opposite of and antidote to urban civilisation. But what might be termed a ‘discovery school’ of historical writing on late Victorian and Edwardian Cornwall contains a strong dose of that ‘sentimental imperialism’ that has been seen as accompanying the romance of area studies. From such a viewpoint continuities of regional consciousness and the agency of the Cornish themselves are suppressed in a focus on the regional image and the representations of artists and novelists. Nonetheless, this approach opens up a more social constructivist, less materialist understanding of the re-formation of identity, one where memories and imaginations of the past are as important as shared experiences of the present.

But if regional identities are volatile and if discourses are constantly reshaping both the identity of a region and its consciousness then can any symbols be appropriated and attached to any place? Are there constraints to the invention of tradition? In this respect we need to supplement the insights of Kurtz and Paasi with a more historically sensitive approach. Such is provided by Anthony Smith’s ethno-symbolism, which allows us to
pay more attention to the ‘cultural stuff’ – the historical myths and memories - involved in identity formation. Smith states that before nations there were *ethnies* or ethnic communities, defined by him as ‘named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity’. These arose out of ethnic categories through the construction of ‘ethno-histories’, cultural resources that included a matrix of myths of ancestry, symbols and memories associated with a particular territory. Ethno-histories provide the cultural resources out of which modern nations are imagined and from which traditions are ‘invented’. Although Smith’s concern is with the long roots of modern nations and nationalism a host of *ethnies* existed in the past that never acquired the status of nation. It is my contention here that the Cornish can best be viewed as an example of a people who created their own ethno-history but were unable and/or unwilling to transform themselves into a nation, partly because of the claims of a competing English ethno-history. Others have pointed out how historical memories structured contemporary imaginations in Cornwall; in the nineteenth century ‘the Cornish … could recall that they were descended from Celts’.

The remainder of this article explores how such memories arose and the implications they have for the modern Cornish identity. Adopting Paasi’s concepts of territorial and symbolic shaping, I will first outline how Cornwall and the Cornish were named. Then, borrowing from Smith, I propose that myths of origin and sacred places combined with golden ages to provide the raw material for a non-English ethno-history that has been constantly re-worked in the period since the mid-seventeenth century. In this re-membering both historical memory and identity have altered, centred around key periods of the past – the tenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. But the Cornish ethno-history produced in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been unable to make the transformation from ethnic history to national history. The prime factor in this failure was the tenacious yet ambiguous shadow of Cornwall’s links to the English, then British, Crown. A ‘Cornish Royalist tradition’ thus produced powerful constraints that, together with Cornwall’s institutional vacuum and the longstanding cultural pluralism of its past, has created a complex, hybrid contemporary identity.
Myths of origin and sacred places

Cornwall acquired its territorial shape early. The name the English first used for this territory was West Wales but by the ninth century ‘Cornwall’ had come into use. But peoples acquire names as well as territories. As R.R.Davies states, names are ‘basic to a sense of communal identity; they are redolent of memories and aspirations’. The adjective ‘Cornish’ for the people living in the territory of the West Welsh must have been adopted somewhat after ‘Cornwall’ had become the preferred name, possibly in the tenth century. Whatever their precise genealogy, both territory and people were named relatively early and not much later than the naming of the English who had ‘sorted out their nomenclature earliest’. What is less certain is whether the descriptor ‘Cornish’ was applied to all those who lived in the territory of Cornwall or just to those who spoke the Cornish language. A greetings clause at Truro in 1173 implies the latter, referring to ‘all men both Cornish and English’, while in the 1150s Earl Reginald at Launceston was addressing his men as ‘French, English and Welsh [i.e. Cornish]’. This is evidence that the Cornish were seen as a distinct people into the later twelfth century, at a time when Davies has claimed that the English no longer needed multiple address clauses, having succeeded in making England the ‘land of the English’. If this was so then Cornwall and the Cornish were still regarded as something other than English at this point.

Once equipped with a name, Cornwall and the Cornish could begin to be shaped symbolically. In addition to the acquisition of a collective name, Smith describes the main components of this shaping as a myth of ancestry, tracing the collective group back to a single origin, and historical memories. In the myth of origin popularised by Geoffrey of Monmouth’s Historia Regum Britanniae in the twelfth century, Britain was settled by Brutus, who arrived from Troy and divided the island between his three sons who ruled what later became England, Scotland and Wales. However, Brutus was also accompanied by his kinsman Corineus who was given the land of Cornwall. In Geoffrey’s account, Cornwall therefore possessed a distinct location, outside the tripartite realm of Britain. By the nineteenth century Corineus had been supplanted in the popular imagination by a
different myth of Mediterranean origins: from the Phoenicians, attracted to Cornwall by the lure of tin.32

This co-existed with a self-image as ‘Britons’ or ‘ancient Britons’. Like the Welsh, the consciousness of a British inheritance was fostered within a Cornish language culture.33 In a somewhat obscure process, the Cornish language had largely disappeared from eastern Cornwall before the Black Death. But it then stabilised for two centuries or more, with a north-south dividing line in mid-Cornwall between mainly Cornish and mainly English-speaking areas.34 However, the number of Cornish speakers declined after the Reformation and any awareness of British origins within that culture was then lost to the historical record. Written evidence for a pride in a British background first appears in the manuscript compiled by the east Cornish landowner, William Scawen, completed late in his life around 1685.35 That he may not have been a lone voice is suggested by a letter from William Borlase, Cornwall’s pre-eminent eighteenth century naturalist and antiquarian, to Thomas Tonkin in 1730. Borlase warned Tonkin that his belief that he had found Roman remains in Cornwall led him to run the risk he ‘will incur the severe censure of some Antient Britons who value themselves above all things, like their brethren in Wales, upon their never having been overcome by the Romans’.36 In the nineteenth century, we have more evidence for the use of the title ‘Britons’ or ‘ancient Britons’. By the 1850s some were prepared to describe the Cornish as ‘Cornu-Britons, that small but strongly characterised Celtic people’. Tellingly, reports of the Cornish asserting their superiority as ‘sons of ancient Britons’ and pub names such as ‘The Ancient Briton’ in South Australia in the 1850s imply the strength of this myth, transplanted to Australia by emigrants.37

In the 1860s the Cornish middle classes rediscovered Celtic roots. An archaeological paper in the Journal of the Royal Institution of Cornwall led to a communication from the Cambrian Society in Wales. Enthused by this, the members of the Royal Institution, Cornwall’s major literary institution, rushed to sign up as Celts: ‘we are here at the utmost verge of the Celtic system; we want to connect our local antiquities with the antiquities of other Celtic tribes’ stated their President, Charles Barham. But there was
still some uncertainty about being classed with Welsh and Bretons. Two years later Barham re-affirmed that ‘it was from contact and communication with Phoenician civilisation, then the most advanced in the world, that the ancient inhabitants of Cornwall were raised above the level of other Celtic tribes’. However, whether from ancient Britons, Celts or Phoenicians, the myth of origin remained one that set the Cornish in a non-English frame and emphasised their separate origins.

Myths of origin are one resource for an ethno-history; others include the role of ‘sacred places’, places that hold a special memory for the *ethnie*. One such sacred place in Cornish memory has been the River Tamar, with its boundary function between Cornwall and not-Cornwall. Another is Tintagel, taking on new meaning in the post-Galfridian era, after Geoffrey of Monmouth made Cornwall the land of Arthur. But Arthur was already an entrenched part of Cornish folklore before Geoffrey’s ‘Matter of Britain’ and Arthurian references informed Cornish culture for hundreds of years. Significantly, the recently re-discovered Cornish saint’s play of the early sixteenth century, *Bewnans Ke*, contains within it an Arthurian theme. What Geoffrey of Monmouth did was attach the Arthurian myth more securely to the site of Tintagel, which archaeological research reveals as a power centre of sixth century and possibly Roman Cornwall. It was the lure of Arthur that provoked Earl Richard of Cornwall to build a grandiose castle there in the 1230s to symbolise his association with this sacred place. The appearance of Geoffrey’s *Historia* may also have caused Cornwall’s elite to re-assess their British origins. This at least is the opinion of Hugh Thomas, who notes that John of Cornwall, author of an independent version of the prophecies of Merlin, had a sense of being a Briton, distinct from the English. ‘Only in Cornwall, where there were linguistic and perhaps other cultural features that made British identity and a connection to Geoffrey’s past believable, did Geoffrey have any influence on identity, by shoring up and reshaping an ethnic identity that already existed’. Geoffrey’s work may thus have stimulated a late twelfth century Cornish elite to re-identify themselves with their Britishness, just as an elite Scottish identity appeared in the aftermath of the battle of Bannockburn.

**Golden ages and historical memories**
Half a millennium or more later, historical memories were being replenished by a shared experience of industrialisation. In the eighteenth century rising demand for Cornish copper inaugurated a precocious early industrialisation.⁴³ Within half a century west Cornwall was transformed into one of Europe’s early industrial regions, by the 1780s capable of spawning ‘one of the most heavily capitalist enterprises [the Cornish Copper Metal Company] in the whole of the eighteenth century economy’.⁴⁴ During the first half of the nineteenth century this mining economy spread its tentacles into mid and east Cornwall so that at its height in the 1860s the industrial region was virtually synonymous with the historic territory. The critical role that Cornwall had played at the forefront of modernity as a testbed for the early development of steam engine technology before the 1840s added to a renewed regional pride.⁴⁵ Meanwhile, industrialisation reinforced the geography of Cornishness, at its most intense in the formerly Cornish-speaking west. It was here where, in the 1850s, ‘the thorough Cornishman’s respect for his own shrewdness and that of his clan is unbounded, or only equalled by his profound contempt for “foreigners” from the east … this feeling increases ludicrously as we advance further west’. It was here too that visitors observed that ‘a man speaks of himself as Cornish in much the same way as a Welshman speaks of himself as Welsh’.⁴⁶ The contingent factor of mineral geology underpinned the moral geography of Cornishness, while simultaneously reshaping the shared experiences of the Cornish.

But even in the heyday of the industrial region, before mass emigration set in from the 1840s and mining began to contract after the 1860s, Cornwall’s *de facto* nineteenth century anthem had preferred to look away from its staple industry and back to earlier historical memories. In 1825 Robert Stephen Hawker’s ‘Song of the Western Men’, popularly known as ‘Trelawny’, was published, its words linking the imprisonment of Bishop Jonathan Trelawny by James II in 1688 to contemporary anti-Catholicism. Within a generation ‘Trelawny’ was being described as ‘a soul stirring patriotic and favourite song’, while the Cornish were claimed to revere Trelawny as a ‘demigod’ on a par with King Arthur.⁴⁷ Fuelled by a context of industrial pride, the song resonated with other golden ages. As the “golden age” of Cornish mining turned out to be
disappointingly transient, a local intelligentsia wishing to foster Cornish pride turned instead to earlier defeats and setbacks.

**Creating an ethno-history**

Smith has distinguished different types of ‘golden age’. For example some may be ‘ages of heroism’, some ‘ages of creativity’.\(^4^8\) Eighteenth and early nineteenth century industrialisation in Cornwall was an ‘age of creativity’ and also produced heroes, such as the engineer Richard Trevithick. In contrast, the historical memories that were being dusted down concerned periods of heroic defeat: the tenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In 1685 William Scawen contrasted the British with their pagan ‘oppressors’, the former ‘forced … to fly into Wales and Cornwall’. Almost a century later Borlase echoed this by remembering Cornwall’s status as ‘a distinct principality until the tenth century’, when Athelstan’s political changes marked ‘so considerable an alteration in the circumstances of Cornwall … from this time therefore we are to consider Cornwall under the Saxon yoke … after the Cornish Britons had maintain’d a perpetual struggle against the Saxons, for the full space of 500 years’.\(^4^9\) Samuel Drew, the son of a tinner/farmer from mid-Cornwall and Cornwall’s first Methodist historian, constructed a recognisably proto-national history out of this in the 1820s. Athelstan had finished

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\textit{the conquest of Cornwall ... This was a stroke which proved at once} \\
\textit{both fatal and final to the independence of the Cornish. This, amidst all} \\
\textit{the struggles that Cornwall made to preserve her liberty untainted, and} \\
\textit{that her enemies made to rob her of that inestimable jewel, this was the} \\
\textit{first subjugation of the Cornish by the English.}^{5^0}
\]

While the events of the tenth century were reconstructed unambiguously as a ‘conquest’, there was more difficulty dealing with a second ‘golden age’, that of the risings of 1497 and 1549. Scawen was ambivalent about 1497, when an insurgency had begun in west Cornwall and reached the gates of London to meet its nemesis at Blackheath, only to be followed within months by a second rising in support of the Pretender, Perkin Warbeck. Scawen expressed his shame to think of the Cornish siding with a ‘counterfeit’, but
nevertheless took pride in the claim that ‘in their march (which was a long one) to Black-
heath, there was no spoil done, nor any complaint made’. Drew linked this struggle back
to their British inheritance: ‘The Cornish, who had not yet wholly lost that spirit of daring
independence which their British forefathers had transmitted to them’. There was
considerably more hesitation, however, about the Prayer Book rebellion of 1549, one
‘instigated by the priests’, the result of ‘ignorance and superstition’ and a ‘fury of
bigotry’.51 Opposition to the Prayer Book and by implication the Reformation were not to
the taste of Protestant nineteenth century Cornish writers. And yet the echoes of 1549,
when a largely Cornish force laid siege to Exeter for several weeks, could later be heard
in the words of ‘Trelawny’. By the late twentieth century there was much more
willingness to link 1549 to the earlier risings and to Cornwall’s British heritage in order
to create a more unambiguous golden age, to re-root the Cornish in their own historic
space. Cornish nationalists have been eager to re-interpret 1549 as a national uprising
rather than a conservative religious rebellion. And they have not been alone. In a series of
articles and books Mark Stoyle has argued that both the 1549 rising and the enthusiastic
Cornish involvement on the Royalist side in the seventeenth century was the continuation
of the ‘old Cornish dreams of autonomy and semi-independence’ and part of a ‘quasi-
national struggle for their own defence’.52 Here is a more explicit interpretation of a
‘golden age’ of heroic resistance to English cultural domination.

However, notions of ‘quasi-national struggles’ and ‘old dreams of autonomy’ owe more
to modernist assumptions about nations and nationalism than to actual evidence from the
early modern period. No explicit demands for independence or autonomy appeared in the
risings of 1497 or 1549 and even the complaint that many Cornish could not read the
English of the new Prayer Book was relegated to a minor place in the list of demands
made by the Prayer Book rebels, while an earlier call for a Cornish liturgy seems to have
disappeared.53 Rather than opposition to the association with England, the Cornish
reaction in the first half of the Tudor century has been read as ‘arguments about the terms
of association’, arguments eventually settled on the terms of the royal government.54
There were in any case many other factors involved in the Tudor risings - anger at
taxation, dynastic issues, squabbles between local gentry, religious conservatism - as well
as many other actors from beyond Cornwall. While the construction of an ethno-history demands these are seen as a ‘golden age’ of the defeat of a whole people, there is a high probability that they were not seen as such at the time, when ethnic identities may well have played second fiddle to other identities, especially religious ones.\(^{55}\)

Despite some ambiguity about the 1549 rising, the work of the militant antiquarian localists of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries forged the resources for a rich ethno-history for the Cornish, fusing a set of myths and symbols with selective historical memories. However, three factors explain why this *ethnie* did not become a nationality. First, the ubiquitous presence of the monarchy across the centuries goes a long way to explain the paradoxes and uncertainties of the Cornish identity. In particular the third Cornish golden age harked back to the civil wars of the 1640s, when the majority of the Cornish gentry threw their support behind the Crown. This deepened into what Stoyle terms the ‘Cornish Royalist tradition’,\(^{56}\) full-blown by the later seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, when the events of the 1540s were erased from the historical memory and those of 1642-46 put in their place. But the presence of the royalist tradition was not the only factor. The two other elements that explain Cornwall’s ambiguous location within the British territorial system - something more than a county, but not yet a nation – were the institutional context of Cornwall’s regional formation and its longstanding cultural pluralism, home to two vernacular languages – Cornish and English – and two cultural traditions.

**The Cornish Royalist tradition**

Susan Reynolds’ concept of ‘regnal solidarity’, an identity looking towards a royal authority, helps us to unravel the relationship in medieval Cornwall between (Cornish) people and (English) Crown. A regnal sentiment grew early in England, one of Europe’s most centralised states. The Cornish, although a distinct cultural group, were contained within this, sharing a consciousness of being a part of the same kingdom as the English. The contrast with the other ‘Celtic’ lands is instructive. In Scotland, as in England, a regnal sentiment matched crown, territory and peoples and was one of the factors producing a Scottish identity. In Wales and Ireland, on the other hand, there was no such
symbiosis between king and people, as fragmented political structures failed to produce such an outcome. But attitudes to the Tudor monarchy in early modern Wales show that the Crown was flexible enough to encompass different languages and able to command the allegiance of non-English ethnic communities. In Cornwall this was also the case – though it happened earlier.

However, the vehicle for an English regnal solidarity in Cornwall was not the Crown directly, but the institution of the Duchy of Cornwall, established in 1337 and granting the title of Duke of Cornwall to the monarch’s eldest son. The Duchy played a Janus-like role, linking Cornwall intimately to the Crown yet at the same time providing a seductive hint of special treatment. The presence of the Duchy has taken on special significance for twentieth century nationalists, desperate to discover an institutional template for Cornish ‘difference’. This has been echoed by some historians. Taking his cue from A.L.Rowse, who characterised it as ‘a little government of its own’, Payton claims that the Duchy was one factor in creating ‘a certain aura (and indeed reality) of territorial semi-independence’, although Julian Cornwall more cautiously described the Duchy as fostering only ‘the illusion of autonomy’. The view of the Duchy as a significant constitutional presence clashes with an alternative view of it as basically a royal estate. From this perspective the actual power of the Duchy seems more muted. Unlike the Earldom of Chester (or the Principality of Wales) Cornwall was subject to the king’s courts and common law and returned MPs to the House of Commons as early as the late thirteenth century. If quasi-palatine status is to be accorded to medieval Cornwall, it is the twelfth century earldom, when no accounts were rendered to the Royal Exchequer and royal officers were excluded, that deserves it rather than the fourteenth century Duchy.

Moreover, the Duchy regularly reverted to the Crown in the absence of a Duke, for example from 1413 to 1453, 1509 to 1537 and 1547 to 1603, administered as a de facto department of the Exchequer, even as it retained its own structures in Cornwall. Surviving the constitutional reforms of the Tudors itself suggests that it posed no threat to the centre and, indeed, the Duchy was exploited more ruthlessly as a source of royal revenue from the 1610s onwards.
The closely connected institution of the Stannaries played a greater role in reproducing the Cornish Royalist tradition in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This had regulated tin mining from early times and arose out of customary practices. A series of royal charters from 1201 guaranteed its liberties in return for a regular flow of income to the Crown, via the Duchy, from the coinage of tin. The granting of a Charter of Pardon in 1508 recognising the right of the tinners to govern themselves, even extending so far as legislative powers and the right of veto over legislation from the centre, has been seen as another example of ‘semi-independence’. However, theoretical rights were not exercised in practice, the full Stannary Convocation only meeting on six occasions over two and a half centuries. There was one intriguing hint in 1750-52 that the Convocation might have become something else, when it demanded the right to adjourn itself. Yet the demands reflected more the complex political disputes of the Westminster Parliament than explicit calls for Cornish sovereignty.

Like the Duchy, the myths and historical memories around the Stannaries are more relevant to the issue of identity than its actual practice. Cooper points out that the ‘perception of the western miners that their liberties descended directly from the Crown’, together with the pervasive and overt royal symbolism of coinage days and coinage halls, produced a class of tinners in Cornwall loyal to the Crown but lacking deference towards the local gentry. This was a perfect seedbed for the conservative rebelliousness of the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries. Nevertheless, although both Duchy and Stannaries served to buttress the Cornish Royalist tradition, a tradition that then generated its own ‘golden age’ in the early years of the Civil War of the 1640s, the precise meaning of a royalism mediated through Duchy and Stannaries may still elude us. The subtle distinctions involved enabled the Crown to integrate the Cornish politically but pose as the defender of a particular territory, its customs and, by implication, its people. Furthermore, while the Cornish Royalist tradition explains the conservative rebelliousness of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it also to a degree underlay the conservatism of the early twentieth century Cornish cultural nationalist movement. This reflected the popular Cornish identity of the nineteenth century which resembled contemporary English regional identities in that it was politically conservative. More like
the pearly kings and queens of London than the angry Fenians of Ireland, it posed little threat to existing institutions. Cornish antiquarian investigations into the state of the recently deceased Cornish language and its associated folklore were enquiries heavily coloured by the tropes of Britishness, a ‘relational’ nationalism that perfectly mirrored the contemporary situation in another small ‘Celtic’ country, the Isle of Man.64

**Institutional shape and hybrid narratives**

John Breuilly argues that outside institutions, identity is ‘fragmentary, discontinuous and elusive’.65 From the early modern period onwards the major institutions transmitting identity in Cornwall – local government, the courts, schools, literature, media – have been in the main carriers of an English ethno-history. The Cornish identity was relegated to the domestic sphere in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, while in public an English identity dominated. The contrast with Scotland and Wales is again marked. Scotland’s Presbyterian Church and its separate legal structure, its monarchy before 1601, and the threat from England in the early fourteenth century all guaranteed the maintenance of a distinctly Scottish identity. In Wales a cultural sense of Welshness was kept alive through the survival of the language. But in the long term it has again been the role of institutions – the Welsh Office and now the Welsh Assembly - that has provided the Welsh identity with a new-found confidence.66 In Cornwall neither the institutional nor the cultural resources existed for its people to resist an externally imposed category of ‘county’. Its institutional shape was comprehensively structured by processes at the heart of the English and then British state.

Moreover, in Cornwall claims to non-Englishness have always been contested. Unlike Wales, where the Welsh language predominated as a vernacular into the nineteenth century, Cornwall was a land of two tongues from an early date, with English being the language spoken by the majority of its inhabitants from perhaps as early as the fourteenth century. This produced hitherto understated internal cultural divisions within Cornwall. For example, in west Cornwall surnames were not unambiguously hereditary until the sixteenth or seventeenth century, much later than in east Cornwall and echoing the practice in Wales. In similar fashion, the presence of British saints was more common in
the Cornish-speaking west than in the east. In the latter districts Cornwall was much more like Devon, with a far lower frequency of Brittonic saints. This cultural pluralism reinforced its multiple identities. John Trevisa, originally from mid-Cornwall and famed for his translation into English of Ranulph Higden’s *Polychronicon*, felt the need as early as the 1300s to argue that Cornwall was firmly part of England. Trevisa, with his special interest in the English language and from a vantage point as Vicar of Berkeley in Gloucestershire, may have been atypical. But half a millennium later Francis Harvey, a Methodist lay preacher from the engineering centre of Hayle in the heart of Cornwall’s industrial region, wrote a rambling eulogy to his homeland after emigrating to South Africa in the 1850s. Harvey’s polemic displayed a passionate pride in his Cornishness, but at the same time firmly rejected statements that Cornwall was ‘not of England’. This he claimed was a slander put about by Cockneys: ‘Cornwall may justly be proud … in the glorious elements with which she has served and aided, and honoured every valuable interests of the nation; of being in truth if ‘not of’ yet superior by far to England, if really “not of it”’. From Harvey’s perspective whispers of ‘non-Englishness’ were tantamount to a conspiracy that denied Cornwall the recognition it so richly deserved at the forefront of English history, because of its role in industrialisation.

**Conclusion**

Harvey shows that it was quite possible to express an intense Cornish identity but speak from within an English ethno-history. The Cornish identity is thus the outcome of a historical process which has both generated a distinct ethno-history for the group but also located the territory solidly within the institutions and narratives of England. Its modern identity draws from two traditions and two discourses. Within one discourse the territory of Cornwall was ‘of England’ but from the other the Cornish people were a Celtic nation and ‘not of England’. In this sense Cornish identity might be viewed as hybrid, as something deriving from heterogeneous sources or made up of incongruous elements, producing pluralist and ambivalent identities within Cornwall. Not only the regional consciousness partakes of this hybridity, but also the regional image, with the consequence that simplistic assumptions of Cornwall as either (English) county or (Celtic) nation render the more subtle nature of its identity opaque. To some extent, a
‘regional’ perspective allows us more easily to grasp the elements producing Cornwall’s hybrid identity, and also resonates with recent attempts to re-locate Cornwall as a ‘European region’. However, the ambivalent place of the concept ‘region’ in British spatial discourses, its appropriation by powerful ‘regional’ institutions such as the South West Regional Development Agency and the South West Assembly, and the strength of Europhobia in Cornwall and Britain make the success of this strategy questionable.

Nonetheless, projects to re-define Cornwall as a ‘region’ prefigure attempts to escape previous categorisations. If the Cornish identity is hybrid then this also suggests flux and an unfixed identity position. Reflecting on this, Homi Bhabha sees hybridity as a form of ‘in-between space’, something he terms a ‘third space’, from where essentialist ideas of cultural identity can be challenged and criticised. Regional projects in contemporary Cornwall might be seen as a way of seeking this ‘third space’. Meanwhile, there are suggestions that the identity itself is undergoing a similar re-articulation, as imaginations of the Cornish as something other than, or more than, English began to burgeon after the 1960s, triggered by the social changes associated with counterurbanisation and large scale in-migration from the south east of England. As an example, a view of Cornish heritage has emerged that moves it beyond the castles and the country houses of the ruling elite or the standing stones and monuments of the distant past and promotes an industrial heritage that is in Cornwall more than the re-assertion of an overlooked working class culture. It entails a hybrid view of the Cornish as ‘industrial Celts’, possessing an ethnicity distinct from the English, crossing the boundaries between Celtic nation and English mining county and joining the two hitherto separate myths of industrial decline and national decline.

The Cornish case shows how territorial identities cannot escape the influence of external factors. More than that, they are fundamentally shaped by them. Cornwall’s location within the boundaries of the English/British state has, for a millennium, interacted with a past that contains the raw material for non-English narratives. Over the centuries these countervailing influences have been in tension; at some points and in some places English imaginations predominate, at other times and in other contexts non-English
discourses. But these are also inherently unstable, with Kurtz’s ‘double dialectic’ between history and identity constantly at work undermining and re-forming historical narratives. The Cornish example also carries lessons for studies of English regional formation. In the former the presence of an ‘other’ in the form of England and the English together with myths of origin as a separate people have provided the grit around which the (albeit imperfect) pearl of ethnic identity has cohered. The lack of this grit in English regions may go some way to help explain why studies of English regional identities in the past are so fitful and also imply that they may well remain in practice elusive and insubstantial.

NOTES


52. John Angarrack, Our Future is History: Identity, Law and the Cornish Question. (Bodmin, 2002); Pol Hodge, Cornwall’s secret war: The true story of the Prayer Book War. (Grampound, 1999); Stoyle, Soldiers and Strangers, op cit. pp. 187 and 49. The articles have been reprinted in Stoyle, West Britons, op cit.


63. Cooper, op cit. pp.199 and 204.


67. Bernard Deacon, *The Cornish Family*. (Fowey, 2004). pp.56-90; Nicholas Orme, *The Saints of Cornwall*. (Oxford, 2000). p.45. Other memories were more likely to have been confined to the Cornish speaking area. Oliver Padel notes that, in addition to the Arthurian legends, two other Brittonic themes – the Tristan and Isolde tale and the legend of a drowned land - were found in the oral culture of Cornish-speaking medieval Cornwall (‘Oral and literary culture in medieval Cornwall,’ in Helen Fulton (ed.) *Medieval Celtic Literature and Society*. (Dublin, 2005). pp.95-116.


