The Historical Development of the Doctrine of Original Grace in Church History and Its Viability in the Context of Stone-Campbell Movement Soteriology

Submitted by Brian David Smith to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Theology
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this project is to investigate the historical and theological origins of the doctrine of Original Grace and test its viability within Stone-Campbell soteriology. Chapter 1 seeks to provide an exhaustive literature review of those works of the proponents of Original Grace in which they discuss the doctrine in order to demonstrate the place of Original Grace within each tradition, and to make specific connections from the ideas of each writer to their respective theological, philosophical, and historical influences. Chapter 2 explores the exegetical basis for the doctrine of Original Grace. The bulk of attention is given to Romans 5:12-21, as the principal passage cited in discussions of the subject, and to the exegesis of Jack Cottrell, who displays the most current and developed version of the doctrine of Original Grace. I seek, primarily, to delve deeply into the text to gain a deeper understanding of the ways in which the doctrine of Original Grace has been extracted from this text, explore the most detailed textual justification that has been provided for the doctrine, and ultimately determine what is at stake in the unique reading of the text that brings out Original Grace. Secondarily, I seek to assess whether the Original Grace interpretation of the passage is successful on its own terms. Chapter 3 aims to make a significant contribution to Stone-Campbell Movement theology, and also contribute to wider contemporary theological conversations from within the Stone-Campbell Movement. Specifically, I seek to discover how the doctrine of Original Grace fares in conversation with other accounts of grace and salvation, both as a potential contribution, and by running the gauntlet of critique within that conversation. The chapter makes this contribution by discussing the theological and practical implications of Original Grace, identifying and analyzing both the doctrine’s theological strengths and weaknesses, describing and evaluating the theological contribution of the doctrine of Original Grace in regard to the three most critical exegetical issues, and assessing the viability of
Original Grace as part of the traditional and contemporary Stone-Campbell soteriological system.
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0.1.0 INTRODUCTION

0.2.0 PURPOSE

The purpose of this project is to explore the historical and theological origins of the doctrine of Original Grace and test its viability within Stone-Campbell Movement (Restoration Movement) soteriology. This exploration is done from within the boundaries of that theological tradition in which Original Grace is presented as a serious option for consideration. Specifically, there are three major aims of the project, which correspond to the three chapters: (1) explore, historically, how the doctrine of Original Grace originated and developed in different Christian traditions, especially the Anabaptist, Wesleyan, and Stone-Campbell traditions, (2) explore and test the biblical justifications provided for the doctrine from within the Stone-Campbell Movement, and (3) discuss the theological and practical implications of Original Grace in a wider conversation of Christian soteriology in order to account for the contributions of the doctrine, to subject it to critique, and ultimately, to determine the viability of that doctrine as a coherent part of Stone-Campbell soteriology.

0.3.0 SIGNIFICANCE AND VIABILITY

Since the Protestant Reformation, there has been a shift away from dominant soteriologies heavily influenced by Augustinian theology by several Protestant movements, specifically concerning the effects of Adam’s sin on his posterity—original sin and guilt. Some Protestant movements held, and still hold, largely Augustinian views on such issues, i.e. Calvinist and Lutheran groups. However, others have either softened or completely dismissed the validity of original sin or guilt by varying means, i.e. Anabaptists, Wesleyans, and eventually the Stone-Campbell (Restoration) Movement. These particular movements or denominations have uniquely responded to the concept of original sin, yet still remain indebted to the influence of Augustinian
soteriology by employing terms, assumptions and categories established by that theological framework. Specifically, they have each developed a doctrine sometimes unnamed, sometimes called “prevenient grace” (using that term in a specific way), or sometimes later using the term ‘Original Grace’, coined in the late 20th Century by the Stone-Campbell theologian, Jack Cottrell.

Original Grace is a response to original sin usually related to the exegesis of Romans 5:12-21. In this context, proponents contend that Paul is writing to say that Christ has counteracted any effects of Adam’s sin on humanity, contra the majority opinion that chooses positions on the spectrum from outright denial of original sin altogether, or to the other extreme where original sin leads to total depravity and condemnation. Such a unique reading of this controversial passage deserves substantial attention. If such a reading of the passage and doctrinal formulation finds merit, it would certainly have implications for the wider areas of Christian theology and ministry. Although the explicit support among theologians for Original Grace in each movement is significant, as they are usually prominent in their respective movement, it is certainly not pervasive. Thus, the significance is in the innovative nature of the doctrine, despite its lack of widespread acceptance. In fact, only a relatively small minority actually discusses the doctrine with any detail.

It is my intention to engage theologies that have a stake in the original sin debate, in order to encourage those traditions to ask questions concerning their assumptions and conclusions in regard to original sin, especially in relation to the text of Romans 5:12-21. Original Grace is significant because it provides a fresh approach to both the text and the overall discussion concerning original sin. Even if Original Grace does not prove convincing, it could be instructive to theological traditions that align themselves either positively or negatively with the concept of original sin. The proponents of Original Grace generally allow for the potential reality of original sin
through Adam, yet contend that the work of Christ has nullified it. I intend to show how this theological claim made by Original Grace has implications for how sinful nature is understood and its wider practical implications, which may be informative to a variety of theological traditions.

0.4.0 PRESUPPOSITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS

I am working within a particular historical theological conversation, in which, for all sides directly concerned, the terms of argument assume that the Bible is the ultimate authority, and thus the source and judge of theological ideas and doctrine. The Stone-Campbell Movement aligns with the wider evangelical landscape on this point. As we will see in a subsequent section, the Movement agrees with the vast majority of mainstream evangelical doctrinal positions. Where it claims distinctiveness in doctrine and practice, it does so on biblical grounds. The hermeneutical differences from the larger evangelical framework are not of particular salience in the case of this particular debate. Instead, the debate can genuinely be advanced on those terms, so for the task at hand it is not necessary to step beyond them. I am, in particular, not asking whether these positions might be critiqued or supported on fundamentally different grounds. So, even a non-evangelical audience, who may not necessarily hold to such a view of the Bible, can still imaginatively enter this tradition of argument. These limitations are primarily determined, not by my theological convictions or preferences, but by the theological context of the subject matter.

This has a particularly strong effect on Chapter 2, where we will be exploring the biblical justification for Original Grace through exegesis and interpretation of biblical passages are the primary methods for determining the viability of the doctrine. This assumption also affects Chapter 3, where we grant, for the sake of theological discussion, that Original Grace may have exegetical merit, and explore how it fits in the
context of reliable Protestant theological conclusions, which are built upon the assumption of biblical authority in such matters.

0.5.0 SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

Chapter 1 seeks to provide an exhaustive literature review of those works of the proponents of Original Grace in which they discuss the doctrine in order to demonstrate the place of Original Grace within each tradition, and to make specific connections from the ideas of each writer to their respective theological, philosophical, and historical influences. This body of literature represents a minority of both the works of each tradition and the works of each writer, and is therefore very limited. The majority of the writers are influential in their respective traditions, and thus have a significant impact on that tradition’s theology. Works surveyed to present the overall theology of each tradition are not exhaustive, but instead representative.

Chapter 2 explores the exegetical basis for the doctrine of Original Grace. The bulk of attention is given to Romans 5:12-21, as the principal passage cited in discussions of the subject, and to the exegesis of Jack Cottrell, who displays the most current and developed version doctrine of Original Grace. I seek primarily to delve deeply into the exegesis of the text that is presented by Cottrell to gain a deeper understanding of the ways in which the doctrine of Original Grace has been extracted from this text, to explore the most detailed textual justification that has been provided for the doctrine, and to ultimately determine what is at stake in the unique reading of the text that brings out Original Grace. Secondarily, I aim to assess whether the Original Grace interpretation of the passage is successful on its own terms.

Chapter 3 aims to make a significant contribution to Stone-Campbell Movement theology and also contribute to wider contemporary theological conversations from within the Stone-Campbell Movement. Specifically, we seek to discover how the doctrine of Original Grace fares in conversation with other accounts of grace and
salvation, both as a potential contribution and by running the gauntlet of critique within that conversation. The chapter makes this significant contribution by discussing the theological and practical implications of Original Grace, identifying and analyzing both the doctrine’s theological strengths and weaknesses, describing and evaluating the theological contribution of the doctrine of Original Grace in regard to the three most critical exegetical issues, and assessing the viability of Original Grace as part of the traditional and contemporary Stone-Campbell soteriological system. Chapter 3 includes a subsection which clarifies four vital theological terms: original sin, grace, justification and freedom. Each term has a range of meanings in the history of Christian theology. We identify the main options in Christian tradition, identify similarities and differences with the predominant Stone-Campbell position, and define the sense in which we will be using the term throughout the rest of Chapter 3. The Chapter also consists of conclusions offered by the author, drawing from the previous two chapters, which are both theological and practical in nature. It reveals paths of further research and implications for the Christian theological community to consider.

0.6.0 BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE STONE-CAMPBELL MOVEMENT

Since this thesis is an exploration of the doctrine of Original Grace from the perspective of the Stone-Campbell Movement, it is necessary to understand the fundamental historical and theological underpinnings of the Movement. It is given special attention for two reasons: the doctrine of Original Grace is most thoroughly developed within the Stone-Campbell tradition and is far less likely to be familiar to readers than the Anabaptist and Wesleyan traditions.¹

0.6.1 Historical Context

Late 18th and early 19th century frontier America was home to many separate denominations, the largest being Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians. The fractured

¹ A brief introduction to the soteriological systems of all three traditions is offered in Chapter 1.
Church experienced periods of great revival and cooperation, but also rivalry. Out of this disunity came the Restoration Movement, which began about 1800. The Movement understood itself as a unity Movement in a disunited environment. However, it believed, and continues to believe, that unity may only be realized if there is unity on the truth of Scripture. A modern Restoration Movement historian interpretatively explains these two points as primary to the Movement both past and present: “... the Restoration Movement is built upon two key concerns: the concern for the unity of all Christians in the one body of Christ, and the concern for the Bible as the only authority for the faith and practice of Christians.”² A modern Catholic historian agrees: “The Restoration Movement in a very literal sense has sought to restore the faith and practice of primitive Christianity. The uniqueness of the Restoration Movement lies in the attempt to utilize the truth motive of primitive Christianity as a means of uniting all Christians.”³

We must go back to the founders of the Movement, however, to show that these ideas were central ideology from the beginning of the Movement. Thomas Campbell’s words represent the view of both he and his son, Alexander:

Our desire, therefore, for ourselves and our bretheren would be, that, rejecting human opinion and the invention of men as any authority, or as having any place in the Church of God, we might forever cease from further contention about such things; returning to and holding fast by the original standard; taking the Divine word alone for our rule; the Holy Spirit for our teacher and guide, to lead us into all truth; and Christ alone, as exhibited in the word, for our salvation; that, by so doing we may be at peace among ourselves, follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see the Lord.⁴

Early American movements toward ideals that became core to the Restoration Movement come from such men as James O’Kelly (1735-1826) and William Guirey (1773-1840), Methodist ministers from Virginian and North Carolina, and Elias Smith.

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(1769-1846) and Abner Jones (1772-1841), Baptists from New England. Major similarities with the later Restoration Movement include the convictions that the Bible should be the Christian’s only creed and that Christians should be united, not holding to any sectarian label. These movements influenced Barton W. Stone (1772-1844), who went on to become a leader in the Great Western Revival or Second Great Awakening (c. 1800-1830), at his congregation of Cane Ridge, Kentucky. The Second Great Awakening itself was a period in American history that involved interdenominational revivals, joining Presbyterians, Methodists, and Baptists in efforts to reach the American frontier with the Gospel. He eventually broke with Presbyterianism, and was the first to stress the use of the precise name “Christian” for the congregations he influenced.  

We now move to those leaders who contributed to the European origins of the movement. The first includes the Church of Scotland minister, John Glas (1695-1773), and Robert Sandeman (1718-1771), his son-in-law, who would largely be responsible for the spread of Glas’ ideas in Scotland, England, and the North American colonies. Glas’ most important idea concerned the nature of the Church. He rejected the concept of a state church as being supported or instituted by the New Testament. Instead, he saw the individual congregation as the correct form: “It is my opinion: for I can see no churches instituted by Christ, in the New Testament, beside the universal, but congregational churches.” Sandeman is largely responsible for defining saving faith as essentially synonymous to intellectual belief, rather than faith being a gift from God. Practically, this means that a person demonstrates saving faith by merely believing in the historical facts of the Gospel. This tendency toward a very rational faith manifested itself in the theology of Alexander Campbell.

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5 Ibid., 49.
Robert (1764-1842) and James (1768-1851) Haldane, along with their associate Greville Ewing (1767–1841), all broke from the Church of Scotland and began to stress the need to return to primitive Christianity, looking at the early Church represented in the Book of Acts and other New Testament books, rather than Church tradition, as the framework for Christian practices. They rejected Sandeman’s purely intellectual view of saving faith, but preserved the view of congregational church government from Glas and Sandeman. Additionally, they took to practicing the Lord’s Supper every Sunday and refused to baptize infants, but instead baptized adults only. They rejected Sandeman’s purely intellectual view of saving faith, but preserved the view of congregational church government from Glas and Sandeman. Additionally, they took to practicing the Lord’s Supper every Sunday and refused to baptize infants, but instead baptized adults only.8 Several leaders of the Restoration Movement, such as Walter Scott the evangelist and Isaac Errett, had indirect connections to this movement, and Alexander Campbell had direct contact with congregations associated with it.

From this European context, Northern Ireland specifically, came the Campbells, Thomas (1763-1854) and his son Alexander (1788-1866), who would become the most prominent names, alongside Barton W. Stone, in the newly formed Restoration Movement, although not explicitly called by that name early in the Movement’s history. They moved to America as Presbyterians. Through many years of spiritual and intellectual turmoil, both decided to separate from their denominational roots. Both continued attempts to work through Presbyterian and Baptist groups, with varying degrees of success, until Alexander finally decided that the congregations he associated with identify themselves as “Disciples.” He was primarily driven by the desire to be a “Christian only,” rather than identify with a particular sect or denomination, and for Christians to be identified by a biblical label.

By the 1830s, various strands of the fledgling movement, including the Campbells, were beginning to suggest, and even attempt, unity. Some attempts had relative success while others failed. For example, congregational unity between

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8 Tristano, p. 61.
Campbell’s and Stone’s people failed due to mutual mistrust and some issues of doctrinal emphasis. However, followers of Stone and Campbell eventually united in some of their individual congregations. The 1840s and 1850s mark a period of time when the Movement became much more coherent and united. Congregations from Virginia, Kentucky, and Ohio, especially, lead in the formation of several cooperative societies, such as the American Christian Bible Society, the American Christian Publication Society, and the American Christian Missionary Society. Several Bible colleges and seminaries were started, such as Bethany College and Butler University. Mark Noll provides a thorough summary of the 19th century development of the Restoration Movement, as well assessment from an evangelical perspective outside of the Movement:

Throughout the nineteenth century the Stone-Campbell movement grew rapidly, especially in the lower Midwest and the upper South. Straightforward preaching, a frequent willingness to extend practical aid, full empowerment of the laity and vibrant attachment to the Bible were attractions that drew many to the movement. At the same time, the movement was regularly driven by contentious debate over what exactly the Scriptures required by way of specific beliefs and practices. Inevitably such discussions set Restorationists to quarreling with each other about what “the Bible only” had to say. Although the “Christians” refused to organize as a traditional denomination, powerful editors, preachers and college officials came to exert a quasi-denominational power among their followers, as they mobilized for their various tasks and from time to time engaged each other in no-holds-barred controversy.9

During the last half of the 19th century, three major strands formed within the Movement: Christian Churches (Independent), Churches of Christ (non-instrumental), and the Disciples of Christ, the latter of which would eventually move into biblical and theological liberalism. In 1906, the split between instrumental (Christian Churches) and non-instrumental (Churches of Christ) churches became concrete, and in 1926, a further split occurred between the conservatives (both Christian Churches and Churches of Christ) and liberals (Disciples of Christ). These divisions exist to the present.

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The Restoration Movement finds itself firmly in the reforming Protestant tradition, and more specifically, within the evangelical theological framework.

From the angle of the early twenty-first century, the founding practices of the Restorationist churches look like a combination of ordinary Protestant belief, a purebred republican paranoia about concentrations of ecclesiastical power, and supreme Enlightenment self-confidence in the human ability to discern the simple meanings of the Bible.10

There is certainly truth in these charges. However, positively, the Restoration Movement has sought, along with other evangelical Protestants, to reform and restore the Church by looking to the Bible as the supreme guide in such attempts. Additionally, the Restoration Movement reflects evangelical commitments like a vibrant, personal faith in Jesus Christ, and the vital importance of evangelism. In short, biblical authority in all matters of faith and life is the foundational commonality between the Restoration Movement and evangelical Protestantism. We now turn to explore the doctrinal distinctives of the Movement.

0.6.2 Theological Distinctive

The Restoration Movement, as its name suggests, has as its main aim the restoration of the primitive New Testament Church as described in the book of Acts and the Epistles. In fact, Acts may fairly be compared, from a Restoration Movement perspective, to a blueprint of sorts in terms of not only doctrine, but practice also, such as in the cases of church polity and ministry. Thomas Campbell explains the importance of the New Testament in this regard, in his Declaration and Address:

“Nothing ought to be inculcated upon Christian as articles of faith; nor required of them as terms of communion, but what is expressly taught and enjoined upon them in the word of God . . . the New Testament is as perfect a constitution for the worship, discipline and government of the New Testament church.”11  This view of Scripture necessitates the rejection of creeds as statements authoritative in the life and theology of

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10 Ibid.
11 Thomas Campbell, The Declaration and Address, p. 16.
the church. Instead, *sola Scriptura* is taken literally. In fact, a common axiom of the Movement, made popular by Thomas Campbell, is, “Where the Bible speaks, we speak. Where the Bible is silent, we are silent.” The first half of the statement has been rarely controversial, whereas the second half has been the main source of conflict between instrumental and non-instrumental churches. Noll describes how this approach played out in the Campbells’ ministry: “. . . both Campbells preached the need to dispense with the historic Christian creeds, what they called philosophical speculations (like Calvinism) and what they termed unbiblical practices (like the baptism of infants) in order to recover the primitive, nonsectarian, immersionist faith of the New Testament.” Such influences further contributed to the view of the Bible as a book written in plain language that may be interpreted by any reader, most correctly without reference to any human opinion. Thus, the Bible, interpreted objectively, would reveal the intended truth of both the author and God through him.

In keeping with its core values, the Movement affirms several practices regarded as faithful to the New Testament: (1) the frequent participation in the Lord’s Supper—normally interpreted to be weekly on the first day of the week (Sunday) or as part of the regular meeting together of believers, no matter the actual day, not as a sacrament, if that is taken to mean that there is actual grace imparted to the Christian through the emblems, but as a point of obedience to the example of the early Church, (2) adult baptism for the remission of sins, not supporting water regeneration—the approach that

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12 Many in the modern Restoration Movement see historical and theological value in creeds, but they are still not treated as authoritative.
13 It is not obvious that Thomas Campbell says this in any written work. It gained popularity through verbal transmission.
14 The instrumental Christian Churches rationally believe that this concept allows freedom of opinion, whereas the non-instrumental churches sometimes treat it as prohibitive. Case in point, instruments are not allowed in a worship service by many of the non-instrumental Churches of Christ because the New Testament does not mention it ever being done. At its heart, it is a hermeneutical issue.
15 Noll, *Evangelicalism*, p. 10. The Foreword of this work provides a concise history and theological position for the Movement as a whole.
16 The fact that the Bible was viewed as being written in plain language should not mislead anyone to think that the Movement was anti-intellectual. Actually, the opposite is true, as the Movement was, and still is somewhat, dependent on the historical-grammatical method.
17 Recent scholarship within the Movement has considered a modified sacramental view to be interesting at the least, and acceptable at most.
the water itself washes away sin, but instead promoting baptism as a necessary part of
the salvation process along with faith, confession and repentance, (3) the priesthood of
all believers, and (4) the independent governance of each congregation by a plurality of
Elders. The Movement also rejects several beliefs and practices: infant baptism,
charismatic gifts of the Holy Spirit,\textsuperscript{18} a Calvinistic soteriology,\textsuperscript{19} neo-orthodox and
liberal perspectives on Scripture, and denominational hierarchies for local church
governance. In broad, and sometimes ambiguous, terms the Restoration Movement may
be generally considered to be conservative and evangelical in its theological
perspective. For example, those in the Movement would hold to the Doctrinal Basis of
the Evangelical Theological Society: \textit{“The Bible alone, and the Bible in its entirety, is
the Word of God written and is therefore inerrant in the autographs. God is a Trinity,
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, each an uncreated person, one in essence, equal in power
and glory.”}\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{0.7.0 BRIEF DEFINITION OF ORIGINAL GRACE}

One of the distinctive doctrinal developments within this movement is the
doctrine of Original Grace, which is herein defined only briefly. Chapter 1 will provide
a detailed literature review, including articulations of the doctrine by its proponents.
This section is designed to give the reader enough foundational information to proceed,
and to distinguish this doctrine from others that are similar or perhaps appear to be
similar.

\textbf{0.7.1 Original Grace Within Christian Soteriology}

The most developed version of Original Grace can be found in the writings of
the contemporary Stone-Campbell theologian, Jack Cottrell (b. 1938). Cottrell offers a

\textsuperscript{18} The list of gifts that are usually thought to have ceased are healing, prophecy, and tongues.
\textsuperscript{19} The Restoration Movement spans two rather comparable main perspectives: semi-Pelagiansim
and Arminianism.
\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Constitution of the Evangelical Theological Society} (Evangelical Theological Society, 2008), III.
concise, yet thorough definition of Original Grace that comes out of his exegesis of Romans 5:12-21:

In the final analysis it does not matter what content anyone feels compelled to pour into the concept of “original sin,” because Paul’s main point is this: whatever the whole human race got (or would have gotten) from Adam has been completely canceled out for the whole human race by the gracious atoning work of Jesus Christ. Make the Adamic legacy as dire as you want: physical death, total depravity, genuine guilt, and condemnation to hell. The whole point of the passage is that Christ’s “one act of righteousness” (5:18) has completely intercepted, nullified, negated, cancelled, and counteracted whatever was destined to be ours because of Adam. All the potential spiritual consequences of Adam’s sin are intercepted even before they can be applied. The only consequence that actually takes effect is physical death, and it is countered with the promise of resurrection to eternal life.21 [emphasis original]

Even from this brief definition, Cottrell makes it clear that the primary impetus behind this doctrine, other than perhaps objective exegetical reasons, is the denial of original sin.

0.7.2 Original Grace, Not Universalism

Within the context of Romans 5:12-21, the principal biblical passage for both original sin and Original Grace, it may be possible to conclude that proponents of Original Grace promote universal salvation, or universalism.22 Cottrell anticipates this charge and provides a direct rebuttal to this claim:

Romans 5:12-19 does not teach universal salvation, and taking the “all” and “many” who receive Christ’s grace to refer to the whole human race does not entail such universalism. Why not? Because the primary focus of the passage as a whole and of these words specifically is how the work of Christ counteracts and cancels in their entirety the consequences of the one sin of Adam for every single individual. This is not a matter of possibility or potentiality; it is not just something Christ is able to do, or something that is offered to all and accepted by some. No, this is a reality; it is an accomplished fact; it has been done and will be done for the entire race; it is a sure thing.23 [emphasis original]

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21 Ibid.
22 John Stott, for example, articulates this danger. “All” would imply “everybody without exception,” and therefore “universal salvation.” See John Stott, Romans: God’s Good News for the World. (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1994), p. 159.
23 Jack Cottrell, The Faith Once All (Joplin: College Press, 2002), p. 188.
Thus, to be clear, effects of Original Grace do not extend to personal sin and, therefore, cannot provide salvation from it. The grace offered for personal sin and its acceptance by humans is a completely separate issue.\textsuperscript{24}

0.7.3 Distinguishing Original Grace From Other Concepts

0.7.3.1 Matthew Fox’s “Original Blessing”

Matthew Fox’s highly influential and controversial works, \textit{Original Blessing} and \textit{Natural Grace}, sometimes refer to the primordial goodness of creation as “original blessing,” “original goodness,” “original wisdom,” or even “original grace.”\textsuperscript{25} These terms have little parallel with the doctrine of Original Grace that is the topic of this project. For example, the death and resurrection of Christ are the agency for original sin to be counteracted by Original Grace. In contrast, Fox places the cross in a quite different role: “Clearly the cross as a symbol of the ultimate letting go, that of death and death as an outcast and misunderstood criminal, has no parallel for its remarkable power to awaken and to bring about healing and redemption.”\textsuperscript{26}

There seems to be a slight, yet superficial, similarity between these concepts. Each of them denies the ultimate reality of original sin. Fox accomplishes this by an outright denial of the entire “fall/redemption” scheme of salvation. Thus, children enter “a broken and torn and sinful world,” yet not “as sinful creatures, we burst into the world as ‘original blessings.’”\textsuperscript{27} A German Catholic whom Fox quotes prolifically, Herbert Haag, makes the claim that, “The idea that Adam’s descendants are automatically sinners because of the sin of their ancestor, and that they are already sinners when they enter the world, is foreign to the Holy Scripture.”\textsuperscript{28} Instead, “As the creature and image of God he is from his first hour surrounded by God’s fatherly love.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., pp. 188-189.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., p. 166.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
Consequently, he is not at birth, as is often maintained, an enemy of God and a child of God’s wrath. A man becomes a sinner only through his own individual and responsible action.  

This is certainly no different from many theological traditions that deny original guilt, but stress personal responsibility for sin instead.

As briefly introduced above, traditions that propose the doctrine of Original Grace also deny the ultimate reality of original sin. However, the mechanism is quite different. Instead of original sin/guilt being a complete fabrication on the part of Augustine and those that followed his thought (as Fox proposes), it has potential existence and is only counteracted by the redemptive work of Christ. In contrast, Fox is operating completely outside the fall/redemption theological motif, while proponents of Original Grace are operating within. However, at least at the point of the reality of original sin, they both deny its affects on humanity. The rest of Fox’s system is outside of the overall aim of this project.

0.7.3.2 The Latter-Day Saint (Mormon) Concept of Grace

Latter-Day Saint Theology has a similar doctrine to Original Grace. Christ’s death alone provides forgiveness for Adam’s sin, enabling humans to be part of the resurrection. Bruce McConkie describes the mechanisms involved in this process:

Two events of transcendent importance make possible the resurrection: 1. The fall of Adam; and 2. The redemptive sacrifice of the Son of God. Adam's fall brought temporal or natural death into the world; that is, as a result of Adam's fall mortality was introduced, and mortality is the forerunner of death. Christ's redeeming sacrifice ransomed men from the effects of Adam's fall in that mortality is replaced by immortality, or in other words in that the dead come forth in the resurrection.

The Book of Mormon also promotes this doctrine:

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30 Fox openly expresses a panentheistic view of God, which leads him into syncretism of many “pagan” and New Age spiritualities with Christianity. Hence, he, in most fundamental ways, steps outside of orthodox Christianity, which puts his ideas beyond the scope of this project.

31 The Jehovah’s Witnesses also believe that the death of Christ, who is a creature of God, nullifies the sin of Adam, but there the similarities stop.

32 Bruce McConkie, *Mormon Doctrine* ([Salt Lake City]: Bookcraft, 1958), p. 638. It must be pointed out that McConkie is not advocating original sin, for Mormon doctrine does not advocate it. They do believe, however, that Adam’s sin stops humans from being physically resurrected, except for the death of Christ. So, original sin is reduced to physical death.
"Behold, the day cometh that all shall rise from the dead and stand before God," Amulek said, "and be judged according to their works. Now, there is a death which is called a temporal death; and the death of Christ shall loose the bands of this temporal death, that all shall be raised from this temporal death." (Alma 11:41-42)

Clearly, the death of Christ alone frees every person from death, the consequence of Adam’s sin. However, the passion does not determine the level of exaltation (determined by human works) that will be reached by an individual; it merely guarantees life after death. Jesus’ death, therefore, guarantees universal salvation, but only in terms of negating the effects of Adam’s sin. The Book of Mormon tells what would occur to people if they were not resurrected as a result of Jesus’ death:

Wherefore, it must needs be an infinite atonement--save it should be an infinite atonement this corruption could not put on incorruption. Wherefore, the first judgment which came upon man must needs have remained to an endless duration. And if so, this flesh must have laid down to rot and to crumble to its mother earth, to rise no more. O the wisdom of God, his mercy and grace! For behold, if the flesh should rise no more our spirits must become subject to that angel who fell from before the presence of the Eternal God, and became the devil, to rise no more. (Nephi 9:7-8)

Resurrection is vital to attaining exaltation. Without a resurrected body, there is no vessel by which a person may be exalted to a level of glory. This interim body enables a person to be a god and have spirit children. Thus, Jesus’ death is important to one portion of the exaltation process.

The implications of this doctrine are certainly different from that of orthodox Christianity, the most vital of which is the idea that once a person is “saved” from Adam’s sin, he must perform good works to be exalted to godhood. Thus, “grace” does not extend to personal sin as well.

The fact that the Latter-Day Saint Church begun its development in a similar context as the Stone-Campbell Movement, makes it possible that it developed its
doctrine in much the same way. There is no apparent evidence to suggest this; however, it would be a task for future pursuit.\textsuperscript{33}

0.7.3.3 Prevenient Grace

The term “prevenient grace” may be used in at least three main ways, the third of which matches Original Grace. The first is the one proposed by Augustine. He derives the term prevenient grace from Psalm 59:10, which says “His mercy will go before me.” The word “before,” in Latin, is \textit{praeveniet}. Thus, we have grace given “before.” This is God’s first step in bringing the sinner to salvation. He gives the ability to think and do good, within the sinfully depraved state. For the elect, this is usually followed by cooperating grace and efficient grace, which, in succession, bring the sinner to salvation and allow him to be holy before God.\textsuperscript{34}

The second definition comes from the majority Wesleyan opinion. It is similar to the Augustinian/Calvinist approach, yet different on crucial points. First, prevenient or “preventing grace” includes,

\dots the first wish to please God, the first dawn of light concerning his will, and the first, slight, transient conviction of having sinned against him. All of these imply some tendency toward life, some degree of salvation, the beginning of a deliverance from a blind, unfeeling heart, quite insensible of God and the things of God. \dots Afterwards we experience the proper Christian salvation, whereby ‘through grace’ we ‘are saved by faith,’ consisting of those two grand branches, justification and sanctification.\textsuperscript{35}

In this way, the Augustinian and Wesleyan perspectives are similar: it is necessary for a measure of grace to come upon the human in order for him to have the capacity to respond to the Gospel. However, the Augustinian view stresses the condemned state of the man in a state of total depravity and guilt and that grace is only bestowed on the elect, whereas the Wesleyan view stresses that all men are dead in the sin of Adam, yet

\textsuperscript{33} Additionally, the author assumes the LDS church is not part of Christian orthodoxy. This is largely because they stand quite differently on certain key doctrines: the nature and work of Christ, the nature of God, etc. Therefore, the theological context is irrelevant to the project at hand, although it may be a worthy project for another time.


not guilty and condemned, and also that all men have access to “preventing grace”: “... all the souls of men are dead in sin by nature,” but, ‘No man living is entirely destitute of what is vulgarly called ‘natural conscience.’ But this is not natural; it is more properly termed ‘preventing grace.’ Every man has a greater or less measure of this . . . Every one has some measure of that light . . . So that no man sins because he has not grace, but because he does not use the grace which he hath.”36

The third definition is the one proposed by the few Anabaptists, Wesleyans (minority), and the Stone-Campbell theologians surveyed in this project. In its fully developed state, it is called Original Grace. Essentially, it is the view that the total work of Christ, the incarnation, death, and resurrection, with emphasis on His death, intercepts or counteracts the effects of Adam’s sin on his posterity.37

In each case, God performs an act of grace upon sinners, which removes the effects of Adam’s sin. There are at least four differences. First, the condition removed in both the Augustinian and Wesleyan versions is the depraved mind, and thus the ability of the sinner to accept the grace of God and become a Christian. The third version removes all effects of Adam’s sin, including guilt, depravity, and even physical death through the eschatological resurrection of humanity. Second, the Augustinian version only applies to those divinely elected to be saved, whereas, the second and third versions extend the effects of the death of Christ to all of humanity, whether they have been exposed to the Gospel or not. Thirdly, the Augustinian and Wesleyan versions usually apply to those that have reached the age of accountability, contra the third version that applies even to infants. Fourth, the Augustinian and Wesleyan versions are intimately involved in the salvation process of the individual, but the Original Grace

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36 Ibid., p. 207. Another example of the position, sometimes called Arminianism would be from H. Orton Wiley, who described prevenient grace this way: “Man is not now condemned for the depravity of his own nature, although that depravity is of the essence of sin; its culpability, we maintain, was removed by the free gift of Christ.” See H. Orton Wiley, Christian Theology, 3 vols (Kansas City: Beacon Hill, 1958), II:135.
37 See section 0.7.1 for a complete definition.
version, although loosely involved in God’s overall redemptive scheme, is removed from the process of the individual’s salvation from personal sin. We will give a more extensive historical treatment of the relevant terms, original sin and grace, by surveying major positions in church history, and clarifying the terms as they will be used in the project, at the beginning of Chapter 3. We now turn to trace the historical development of Original Grace throughout Church history.
FORMULATIONS OF ORIGINAL GRACE:
A LITERATURE REVIEW OF THE PROPONENTS OF ORIGINAL GRACE

This chapter seeks to provide a survey and an analysis of a set of doctrinal formulations that resemble Original Grace. The survey will include writers expressing the doctrine at varying depth and clarity. I have sought to include all of the major contributors to the discussion at hand. Theologians are categorized according to theological traditions to facilitate clear connectivity between theological positions and a clear view of similarities inside theological traditions. Jack Cottrell’s work will be covered thoroughly in Chapter 2.

Doctrinal formulations that resemble Cottrell’s mature doctrine of Original Grace appear to arise independently of one another within each movement. Each is either an explicit or implicit response to the dominant Augustinian heritage, present in the Roman Catholic tradition, as part of the overall Protestant Reformation. No common thread appears that leads us to believe that each of these theologians actually worked from ideas expressed previous to their work. For example, none of the Wesleyan or Stone-Campbell writers surveyed in this chapter ever mention drawing their ideas from the three Anabaptist writers. Only Jack Cottrell purposely recognizes and cites the work of these theologians in support of Original Grace. In that regard, he departs from the general motivation of the
other writers, and his context differs from the contexts of the others. It does appear, however, that the doctrine flows from generally agreed upon theological positions within each movement, yet there does not seem to be concerted effort to draw together anything like Original Grace as a coherent doctrine. It would seem highly probable that among theologians within a specific movement, especially the Stone-Campbell Movement, because of its relative coherence of theology and the chronological proximity between the writers, that perhaps the writers did draw upon ideas of the others. However, this simply cannot be proven from the available evidence. In short, there appears to be no direct connection between the developments of Original Grace across the movements. As we will briefly discuss in the next section, the Anabaptist movements are not to be understood as one holistic, organized movement with a central leadership and goals. In fact, each of the three representatives comes from different trajectories of the movement. Both the Wesleyan and Stone-Campbell movements began with more coherent organization and leadership, but each section contains writers that express their early formulations of Original Grace later in the movements when each had become more diverse, excepting John Wesley himself. The common denominator in that regard is the rejection of Augustinian original sin as formulated by Roman Catholicism and/or Protestant traditions that continue that trajectory, i.e. Calvinistic movements, in favor of man being free from guilt caused by Adam’s sin and of man being sufficiently free of depravity to respond to the Gospel freely, even if subsequent to a direct act of divine grace. Some of the writers do not state this intention obviously, but several specifically battle practical and theological issues arising from the belief in Augustinian original sin, such as infant baptism and its theological causes and implications.
1.1.0 ANABAPTISTS

1.1.1 BREF INTRODUCTION TO ANABAPTIST SOTERIOLOGY

1.1.1.1 HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Of these movements that began in the early 16th century, Anabaptism is the focus of this section, since each of the three writers surveyed come from that general movement. Anabaptism can be identified by several names and movements. It is usually named under the broader designation, the Radical Reformation, also known as the Left Wing of the Reformation or the Third Reformation. Ideologically, this Reformation may be divided into three strands: Anabaptists, spiritualists, and evangelical rationalists.

The Radical Reformation was quite different from some of the other reformatory movements. It was less organized, having many different leaders and ideologies that developed rather separately. There are general similarities that allow us to loosely categorize them together, but their differences are pronounced. So, there is really no responsible way to identify a “Radical Reformation theology.” Instead, one must look at individual movements under specific leaders to get a real sense of what they believed. Even this effort is difficult because of fairly immense diversity even within those small movements. We will be able to identify enough similarities between the Anabaptist movements, especially in regard to original sin, to move forward with our analysis of the three writers.

The spiritualists would include such leaders as Kasper Schwenckfeld and Sebastian Franck (1499-1542). This movement rejected external forms of the church and ceremonies,

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1 There are examples of Protestant movements that are both highly organized, at least at first when one leader was present, such as Luther or Calvin, and those that are very unorganized. However, each movement has a certain level of organization that needs to be viewed on its own merits. If a spectrum could be used, the Radical Reformation would fall on the end of being highly disorganized, whereas Lutheranism would be comparatively organized.
claiming that the church was invisible, scattered until Christ came back in the second coming to gather the believers.2

The evangelical rationalists included men such as Michael Servetus, an outspoken antitrinitarian, who was executed in 1553 in Geneva. This movement’s ideas influenced, and ultimately lead to, Unitarian belief in the Polish Brethren and other Unitarian churches in Lithuania and Transylvania by providing a fundamentally different approach to Theology Proper by denying the Trinitarian existence of the Godhead.

The Anabaptists may be divided geographically: Swiss, South German, and Low Countries. The groups are culturally diverse, yet similar in doctrine. They can usually be identified with four major ideological commitments: discipleship, biblicism, adult baptism/rebaptism, and pacifism. The Swiss movement, which developed alongside and in the midst of Ulrich Zwingli’s reformation, wanted to separate into free congregations instead of reforming the existing church. The South German and Swiss movements3 thrived under such leaders as Pilgram Marpeck and Balthasar Hubmaier, and the Low Countries Anabaptists under Melchior Hofmann (ca. 1495-1543), the brothers Dietrich and Obbe Philips, and Menno Simons (1496-1561).4 It is significant that it was among people willing to undertake a more radical reshaping of church life on biblical grounds (rather than primarily on rational or experiential grounds), that doctrines similar to Original Grace emerge (i.e., a context where scripture is being read with a conscious willingness to rethink the rule of faith, the narrative or doctrinal frame used to hold exegesis together).

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3 See also, Snyder, pp. 305-350.
1.1.1.2 SOTERIOLOGICAL DISTINCTIVES

Anabaptist theology is not highly organized, so presenting generalized and accurate views on many issues is difficult. Anabaptist origins are geographically and theologically diverse. A contemporary assessment of the situation says that, in fact, “Any attempt at constructing a comprehensive Anabaptist theology runs the risk of imposing foreign structure and foreign criteria on Anabaptist thoughts . . . Anabaptists had little use for ‘idea-ism,’ placing the emphasis instead on discipleship, faith lived. In other words, Anabaptists were more concerned with orthopraxis than orthodoxy.”\(^5\) However, there seems to be a fairly unified consensus on matters of sin and salvation.

1.1.1.2.1 ORIGINAL SIN AND HUMAN FREE WILL

There is no evidence that original sin and its consequences were discussed much by the earliest Swiss Brethren that developed their theology alongside interaction with Zwingli. However, subsequent to the period parallel to the Zwinglian reformation, original sin became widely viewed among the Anabaptists as a tendency toward evil and an illness, best seen in the Hutterite phrase “the human heart is bent toward evil from its youth on.”\(^6\) Its only sure consequence to mankind is physical death.\(^7\) Sebastian Franck, an early spiritualist writer, in his 1531 *Chronica, Zeytbuch un Geschychtsbibel*, gives his take on the general consensus of original sin among Anabaptist theologians, “Concerning original sin nearly all Anabaptists teach as follows: Just as the righteousness of Christ is of no avail to anyone unless he makes it part of his own being through faith, so also Adam’s sin does not impair anybody except the one who makes it a part of his own being and brings forth fruits

\(^6\) Ibid., p. 205.
\(^7\) Ibid., pp. 203-204.
of this sin.” So, humans are only responsible for sin committed, not inherited. Children are, therefore, innocent, according to Franck: “Nearly all Anabaptists consider children to be of pure and innocent blood and they do not consider original sin as a sin which of itself condemns both children and adults. They also claim that it does not make anyone unclean except the one who accepts this sin, makes it his own and is unwilling to part with it. For they claim that foreign sin does not condemn anybody . . .” [emphasis original]. In essence, when one sins personally, he takes upon himself the consequences of his own sin and the sin of Adam. Adam’s sin was “foreign” and therefore did not apply any consequences to the innocent. Instead, one makes Adam’s sin his own when he “accepts” it by sinning himself.

Although original sin brings the tendency toward sin, it does not affect the free will of the human to obey God or respond positively to the Gospel. Friedmann gives a summary of the Anabaptist position as evidenced by Hubmaier’s original words: “The ‘freedom of the will,’ which Hubmaier, and all the Anabaptists, taught, is only the freedom of the ‘reborn man,’ the freedom under divine grace . . . Our inborn sinfulness is no unconquerable barrier to this task; for sin—that is, original sin—must never be understood as a kind of fate. Something in man has remained unspoiled and good, and ‘the fall of the soul is remediable through the Word of God.’” Anabaptist thought on this issue opposed any doctrinal form of total depravity or original guilt. Although the individual may be prone to sin (a version of partial depravity), his will and reason are not marred enough to make him unable to act righteously or choose to be redeemed. Practically, this means that Anabaptism does not engage in infant baptism because there is no original sin or guilt to be

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9 Ibid.
removed, nor does it require any kind of external supernatural act to remove total depravity. Instead, central to Anabaptist life is the philosophy that one’s nature is enough like God’s original creation, rather than marred by sin, to allow for freedom of the will when under any kind of depravity, whether due to Adamic or personal sin.

To avoid confusion, we will attempt to summarize the Anabaptist position. The sin of Adam brings a kind of partial depravity, which includes a tendency toward personal sin, but no guilt or condemnation. This depravity does not act as an insuperable barrier to human volition, because “Something in man has remained unspoiled and good.”11 In fact, the one who has also fallen into personal sin is still “remediable through the Word of God.”12 Thus, the freedom extends even to those that sin themselves. The next level of freedom, “the freedom of the will,” is bestowed on the “reborn man,” which frees him from his depraved state. This is a freedom experienced by one that has had divine grace applied to free him from any effects of both Adamic and personal sin, i.e. one who has become a Christian.

1.1.1.2.2 JUSTIFICATION AND SANCTIFICATION

The Anabaptist tradition has, as one distinctive, a very intimate relationship between justification and sanctification. Packull says it succinctly:

Anabaptists generally accepted justification by faith, crudely directed against an assumed Catholic works righteousness, but they added that saving faith must manifest itself in discipleship and good works. They joined the chorus of criticism that those claiming to be justified by faith alone produced no visible fruits . . . Such a faith could not be a true faith . . . Saving faith, according to [Thomas] Müntzer, was born through an inner cross-experience, a dying with Christ to self and sin and a rising to new life with him. True faith born in this cathartic experience bore fruit by transforming the inner person and his or her outer behaviour.13

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11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Packull, pp. 205-206.
The rebirth of a person dead in sin, then, must include a transformation of behavior resulting in good works, rather than a view proposing that salvation is obtained by forensic justification alone. This rebirth takes place in adult baptism (actual immersion into water), and “signifies that a man is dead or ought to be dead, to sin and is walking in the newness of life and spirit. Such a one shall certainly be saved if, according to this idea, through inner baptism he lives his faith.”

The rebirth of a believer to a new Christian life, in contrast of the emphasis in other strands of Protestantism, is not an individual affair in the final analysis. The individual makes the choice to become a disciple, but salvation is obtained as a whole Body of Christ. It is said that “man cannot come to God except together with his brother.” This concept is called Gemeinde or “the brotherhood-church.” “Only here can the believer realize his convictions that he cannot come to God in good conscience except with his brother.”

It would be difficult, and perhaps unfair, to conjecture the motivations of individuals, and the movement as a whole, in regard to original sin and freedom. It would, however, seem reasonable to think that Anabaptism, as both a holiness movement and a movement reacting against opposing Catholic and Protestant ideas, especially on matters of salvation, and concerned with visible righteousness and the restoration of the human will, could be clearing the way, so to speak, for the free choice of the adult unto salvation and righteousness, rather than a situation of total depravity and condemnation where free will is diminished and salvific destiny is determined outside of human volition. In other words, it seems that the Anabaptists desire that values such as adult decision and commitment be

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14 This is from the earliest Anabaptist document, which is an epistle written by Conrad Grebel to Thomas Müntzer on September 5, 1524, in Spiritual and Anabaptist Writers, ed. by George H. Williams (Library of Christian Classics, XXV, 1957), p. 80.
15 Friedmann, p. 81.
16 Ibid.
preserved. Thus some motivation for denying original sin may flow from such theological assumptions.

1.1.2 DIETRICH PHILIPS (Dutch Anabaptist)

1.1.2.1 BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Dietrich (Dirk) Philips, and his older brother Obbe, were leaders in the Dutch Anabaptist movement in the midst of a much more fanatical movement led by Thomas Münster that escalated even to armed rebellion. Obbe would be the leader of the new pacifist, anti-Münsterite movement, and ordained two of the most influential Dutch Anabaptist leaders and theologians: his brother Dirk, and Menno Simons. The brothers were children of a Dutch priest of Leeuwarden, Friesland, and received thorough, formal education. Obbe was trained in medicine and Dirk in theology. Dirk’s education included a thorough knowledge of several languages: Latin, Greek, Hebrew, German, possibly French, and also perhaps a French dialect called Brabants.

Dirk was a very influential theologian in the movement, although less so than Menno Simons, largely due to Simons’ leadership abilities. Together, they provided effective leadership within the Dutch Anabaptists. Estep gives an interesting description of Dirk and his contributions:

Dirk was a typical Frisian by nature, somewhat cold and austere. He moved through life a somber shadow dressed in black, Calvinistic in temperament if not in theology. He wrote well by not voluminously. No Anabaptist work of the sixteenth century surpassed the influence of his *Enchiridion* . . . Together, the selections of the *Enchiridion* form one of the most systematic presentations of Anabaptist theology of the sixteenth century. These works also reveal Dirk’s rather thorough knowledge of the writings of the Fathers and his apparent independence of Luther.

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17 “Dirk” is sometimes spelled “Dirck,” and “Philips” is sometimes spelled “Philip.”
18 The man whose name still labels the “Mennonites.”
20 Ibid., pp. 159-160.
Dirk’s *Enchiridion* will serve as our source for discovering his view of the consequences of Adamic sin, Christ’s atoning work, and the implications for the innocent.

**1.1.2.2 FORMULATION OF THE DOCTRINE**

Philips formulates his doctrine in a question and answer format while contesting the validity of infant baptism, and more specifically, the condemning effects of original sin on infants. First, he seeks to show that infants are innocent by nature, but still “partakers of the transgression and sinful nature of Adam.” Second, he seeks to show that the atoning work of Jesus Christ takes away guilt, and therefore condemnation, from Adam’s sin.

### 1.1.2.2.1 THE INNOCENCE OF INFANTS

Philips begins his argument with an example from God’s covenant with Israel. The adults of Israel had rebelled against God, and in their disobedience they would not inherit the Promised Land. However, the “children who do not yet know good from bad—they will enter the land . . . But as for you, turn around and set out toward the desert . . .” (Deut. 1:39-40, NIV) He infers, from this example, that children inherit the promises of God by his grace, because they have not sinned, and in fact, know no sin:

Thus also the children of the true Israel, that is, of Christian believers, obtain and inherit the true promised land (Heb. 4:9)—that is, the kingdom of heaven—by grace through Jesus Christ that the promise of God, regarding the seed of Abraham, the children of the heavenly Sarah (who are included under the promise, Gal. 3:29), may be established by the grace and election of God through the merits of Jesus Christ, and not by the works or merits of men (Eph. 2:7).

Thus, children being innocent because of their lack of responsibility for sin, and by the grace extended to them through Christ’s work, through no agency of their own, may inherit the same promise—eternal life—as that of adult believers.

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22 Ibid., p. 43.
23 Ibid., p. 42.
He then enhances the argument by using the example of Jesus’ treatment of children in the Gospels, namely His promise that they will inherit the kingdom of heaven (Matt. 3:4; 19:14). This promise was not contingent on the baptism of these children, “for Christ accepted the children, and through grace and mercy promised them the kingdom of heaven, and not on account of or by baptism; for he neither baptized them nor commanded them to be baptized, but laid his hands upon them and blessed them.”24

1.1.2.2.2 THE PAYMENT OF ORIGINAL SIN

Flowing from the previous argument, he blatantly states that it is absurd to baptize infants for salvation, and equally absurd to condemn them when they die “unbaptized.”25 Philips supposes, based on John 1:29, that the sins of the world, which Jesus would take away, includes Adam’s sin, not just personal sin for the penitent believer, especially in the case of children since, “. . . no sin can be imputed to infants except that which comes from Adam,” so, “how then can infants be damned on account of the sin of Adam?”26 He applies two Pauline passages to support his interpretation of John: “. . . the sin of Adam and of the whole world is taken away, and that the handwriting which was against us has been blotted out and nailed on the cross (Col. 2:14), so that grace abounded more than sin (Rom. 5:20), and life has conquered death through Jesus Christ our Lord and Savior.”27 If the work of Christ does not conquer original sin, thus condemning innocent infants, “then Jesus Christ died in vain for them,” because, “grace has not become mightier than sin.”28 Instead, “original sin has been paid and taken away by Jesus Christ.”29

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24 Ibid., p. 43.
25 Ibid., p. 44.
26 Ibid., p. 44.
27 Ibid., p. 44.
28 Ibid., pp. 44-45.
29 Ibid., p. 45.
So, what effect does Adam’s sin have those who are innocent? Children “have become partakers of the transgression and sinful nature of Adam,”30 but, “that the tendency of the child’s nature is toward evil, does not damn them (Gen. 6:5; 8:21),” until that child loses innocence and sins willfully within the knowledge of good and evil.31 Philips, therefore, proposes that this payment of original sin is applied to the guilt that would bring condemnation and wrath, not to the tendency toward sin.

1.1.2.2.3 ANALYSIS

Three major issues emerge in the context in which Philips makes his argument, a rejection of the necessity of infant baptism due to the lack of condemning guilt on infants because of Adam, the necessity of voluntary adult baptism for the remission of personal sins, and perhaps a bit farther into the background, an emphasis on the faith of an individual adult being the agency by which one receives saving grace.

Philips supports the concept that children inherit something from Adam, namely a tendency toward sin. The focus of the grace provided by Christ to counteract Adam’s sin is on the aspect of guilt, which is arguably the most severe portion. As demonstrated above, he bases this conclusion on passages from the book of Genesis, finding his authority in Scripture, primarily. However, considering the context in which he is writing—where infant baptism is the controversial issue at hand—his most crucial point to make is that infants will not suffer an eternity in hell caused by guilt inherited from Adam.

The opposite issue of infant baptism is adult baptism, which Philips has already taught extensively in the previous pages of *Enchiridion*. His statement of the contrast is instructive:

... baptism is shamefully misused by those who baptize infants. They abuse this baptism (which is a sign and testimony of the true, penitent faith) by administering

30 Ibid., p. 43.
31 Ibid., p. 45.
it to ignorant children, even though all scripture on baptism unanimously shows that those of old who heard and received God’s word, yea, who from the law learned to know God’s wrath, his stern and righteous judgment of sin, and repented before the Lord, and moreover from the gospel learned, by the enlightenment and power of Holy Spirit, to know God the Father in his grace and mercy, Christ Jesus the only begotten son of God in his atoning merits (John 1:14; 3:16), and who lay hold of this confession with firm faith and confidence and believe with their hearts and confess with their mouths (Rom. 10:9), and present themselves a living sacrifice; holy, and acceptable unto God—that such were proper subjects for baptism, and should receive it, that they might show and prove their faith in God, their sorrow for sin and all that pertains to baptism.32

He then proceeds to explain that the Bible never mentions infant baptism at all, neither mentioning it as doctrine, nor as a practice of the apostles and early church. Additionally, infant baptism is not efficacious for salvation. Philips’ contrast is important, because it stresses the fact that infants, not being able to choose between good and evil, nor salvation and condemnation, must have some way to be saved. In other words, adults have the ability to choose to accept salvation from personal sin, but by what mechanism may infants be saved? The answer is, the grace given by Christ to the whole world to counteract Adam’s sin.

Implicit in Philips’ soteriology is the rejection of doctrines normally included in the broad category of Reformed or Calvinist theology. First, original guilt is defeated in Philips’ unnamed doctrine which allows for the grace of Christ to apply to Adam’s sin. Philips’ solution to original guilt, along with many other writers surveyed, is actually parasitic on original guilt.33 In other words, original guilt must exist, at least potentially, for it to be counteracted by the death of Christ. Second, he rejects the notion that Christ only died for the elect, i.e. limited atonement.34 Instead, all people are freed from Adam’s

32 Ibid., pp. 32-33.
33 We revisit this idea in much more detail in Chapter 2 and 3.
34 The controversy over the doctrine of limited atonement continues today. It comes out of the implications of the doctrine of election and of the satisfaction theory of the atonement. The Synod of Dort made a statement in response to the controversy, that Christ’s death was “sufficient for all but efficient for the elect.” W.A. Elwell, ‘Atonement, Extent of the’, in Evangelical Dictionary of Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001) pp. 903-906. Even if not in its most mature form, Erickson claims that limited atonement
sin. Third, he rejects the notion that this election is irresistible. Instead, the older child or adult who is responsible for their own sin must voluntarily respond to the Gospel.35

Philips’s presentation of this doctrine is relatively well-developed. However, it is certainly not as well developed as it would become later in writers like Cottrell, for instance, who have the advantage of building atop Anabaptist, Wesleyan, and earlier Stone-Campbell writers. So, the relative underdevelopment is likely due to two major factors. First, the Anabaptist writers, Philips included, appear to be among the first to challenge Augustinian assumptions about original guilt and original sin during the Reformation in this way. Thus, the doctrine is in its infancy. Second, Philips is narrowly focused on the validity of infant baptism, and original guilt by which it is necessitated, on biblical grounds. He does not attempt to tackle every possible question and implication related to the topic, but only the one at hand.

began with Augustine . . . the doctrines of atonement and election have historically been linked together. Augustine taught that God had elected some persons to salvation and has sent Christ in to the world to die for them. Since Augustine, these two teachings, limited atonement and the election of the individuals to salvation, have been affirmed or denied together. Throughout the Middle Ages, whenever the church affirmed special election, it also maintained that the atoning death of Christ was only for the elect. Further, it was only when the Remonstrants rejected the other points of Calvinism . . . that they also rejected limited atonement. These historical considerations suggest that being a consistent Calvinist requires holding to a particular or limited atonement.” Millard Erickson, *Christian Theology*, 2nd edn (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005), p. 845.

35 Ibid., p. 32.

36 I use the term “Augustinianism” to refer to the broad body of thought, specifically soteriological concerns, that derive from the writings of Augustine and have had dominant influence in the Church until the Reformation at which time much of the thought was adopted and adapted in the Lutheran and Reformed (Calvinist) traditions, for example. Augustine’s writings are numerous on original sin and surrounding topics, but his mature doctrine of original sin can be summarized by the following four points: “(1) Adam’s sin and its punishment (concupiscence) are inherited; (2) the infant soul is guilty; (3) infant sins are real (not just sins by analogy), severe, and inherited by way of generation; (4) baptism is the necessary means of salvation for all, including infants.” Paul Rigby, ‘Original Sin’, in *Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999). For a thorough history of justification and surrounding topics like original sin, see Alister McGrath, *Iustitia Dei* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). McGrath presents a convincing picture of Augustinianism as a system with a complex and fairly heterogeneous history. Augustinianism has been adapted and even misinterpreted by theologians and theological traditions from the time of Augustine’s writing until the present. The Anabaptist writers were dealing with a received version from the Roman Catholic Church and adaptations from Reformers approximately a thousand years after Augustine lived. For the sake of this discussion, the four points above will serve as core points with which Anabaptists would be in conflict.
1.1.3 PILGRAM MARPECK (German)

1.1.3.1 BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Pilgram Marpeck was born in 1495, by best estimates, to a noble family in Rattenberg on the Inn River in Tyrol. He served as the director of mines in that city, a prominent political position which required that he be a Roman Catholic, until he was forced out in 1528 for refusing to help authorities identify Anabaptists. It is not clear when he became an Anabaptist, but he first turned away from the Roman Catholic Church, converted to Lutheranism, then to Anabaptism between the years of 1525 and 1528. After leaving his post, he moved to Strasbourg where he became a prominent leader of the Anabaptist movement. Between 1529 and 1532, he created much strife there by stressing that adult baptism, not infant baptism, is the only Christian baptism with Scriptural support.

Little is known about Marpeck’s work between 1532 and 1544, except that he worked in Switzerland and Moravia. His contributions include working to unite the South German and Swiss Anabaptist groups. His concern for unity resulted in the publication of one of his major works on doctrine, *Vermanung*. He finally settled at Augsburg where he continued to write for the Anabaptist movement. He had much less pressure from authorities, as his professional services were invaluable to helping Augsburg with its wood shortage. However, his movements among the Anabaptists were still watched and somewhat controlled by the local government. He died in Augsburg of natural causes in 1556.

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38 Ibid., pp. 25-32.
39 Ibid., pp. 32-34.
40 Ibid., p. 34. The director of mines was also responsible for managing the forests, so Marpeck has considerable experience in this industry. Augsburg eventually hired him full-time to perform these services.
41 Ibid., p. 36.
1.1.3.2 FORMULATION OF THE DOCTRINE

Marpeck’s basic position concerning Adam’s sin is contained in his response to Caspar Schwenckfeld’s *Judgment*. Schwenckfeld was a fellow reformer that shared the Anabaptist vision with Marpeck, yet disagreed on several main points. The topic of original sin is one such point of contention. Marpeck reports that, “Schwenckfeld writes that our view of original sin is not that of the Christian church and Holy Scripture and accuses us of the Pelagian error.”\(^{42}\) It is in the context of this response that one finds his discussion of the state of children with regard to Adam’s sin.

1.1.3.2.1 The Origin of Sin

Marpeck’s view of the fall of Adam and Eve follows an orthodox framework:

Through the fall of Adam and Eve the devil took root in flesh and blood through the serpent . . . She ate the forbidden fruit, Adam followed and both of them lost their created simplicity (Gen. 3; 2 Cor. 11). The wicked little seed was sowed into the human heart from the beginning (4 Esd. 4). The very form of human morals, with which we were created, was destroyed. The thoughts that came to people were in danger (4 Esd. 9) through the poison of corruption . . . Through it sinful lust and desires entered human flesh to its ruin and it became a dwelling place of sin. In its deranged mind human flesh fell in to death and enmity with God. Henceforth, whoever lives according to the corrupted flesh must die (Rom. 8) . . . this happened to all flesh on earth (Gen. 6).\(^{43}\)

Marpeck has made clear that the personal sin of Adam and Eve corrupted both their flesh and the flesh of all people. He hints at what he will describe later, namely that one must live according to the corrupted flesh in order to deserve death. So, corruption should not be equated with guilt.

1.1.3.2.2 The Inheritance for Children


\(^{43}\) Ibid., pp. 88-89.
Two essential reasons are given for the innocence of children in regard to Adam’s sin: (1) their ignorance and simplicity, and (2) the reconciliation of Christ. First, we turn to the simplicity of children. “Our witness is that for children neither inherited nor actual sin counts before God because a child remains in ignorance and in created simplicity (schoepflichen einfalt) until it grows up into understanding (in die vernunft erwachst) and the inheritance is realized in and through it. Before that, sin has not damning effect; neither inherited nor actual sin is counted against a child before God.” Adamic sin may take affect on the child if he chooses to sin: “When children come to a knowledge of good and evil, that is, when they reach understanding, then the inheritance which leads to damnation becomes effective in them. Then inherited sin become inheritable . . . This happens to all people in their youth as soon as they reach understanding and their created simplicity dies off. Heretofore, the child is reconciled and excused for all things; hereafter it may still hold onto the simplicity of faith in which understanding is taken captive through faith in Christ. As long as this simplicity continues, no sin is counted before God until we fall again out of simplicity into the understanding and sin and grow in them.” Marpeck implies an interesting hypothetical situation. There could be a child that is innocent, then perhaps puts faith in Christ, thus becoming a Christian, and that child would never realize guilt from sin. In other words, the child would transfer from sinlessness through innocence to another kind of simplicity, which is child-like faith in Christ. Marpeck does not claim that this does happen, but that it could. Perhaps Marpeck is imagining a gap where the child sins personally, but then becomes a Christian shortly after, although he does not explicitly explain his point. Either way, the child is innocent of sin because he does not understand good and evil. Marpeck reiterates his point with greater clarity by saying that

44 Ibid., p. 89.
45 Ibid.
people experience the inheritance of Adam when they sin through their fallen nature and through the work of the devil, as they “grow out of their created simplicity.” They obey the sinful flesh and ignore their knowledge of good, which is the “light of nature.”

Marpeck then reveals an even deeper reason that young children are to be considered innocent: “We excuse young, innocent children from guilt and the remnants of their inheritance through none other than Christ. There is no condemnation for them through Adam and Eve’s fall. Nor do they have an inheritance which leads to condemnation; the wrath of God is not upon such children until they reach understanding, that is, the common knowledge of good and evil.” He does not first explain by what mechanism Christ is invoked against the effects of the fall on children, but he continues his explanation: “These same descendants of Adam are absolved, graced, and declared innocent before God again through the word of promise, without their own addition of faith or law. In their loins they all shared this inheritance with Adam, an unwitting comfort, an heirloom, and grace: it is the future death of Christ, as the reconciler of all who need reconciliation. The children of the old age, like those of this age, have the advantage of the promise of long ago and the grace it afforded, Christ’s reconciliation.” He describes a direct counteraction in the sense that children did inherit the effects of Adam’s sin through their “loins,” which seems to be a reference to seminal headship, except that Christ’s death caused the reconciliation for children both before and after His coming.

1.1.3.3 ANALYSIS

Marpeck’s early version of Original Grace is not very different from the positions of others. There are a couple of minor differences, however. First, he does not explicitly say

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46 Ibid., p. 90.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., p. 91.
that physical death is an effect of Adam’s fall. Second, he places a large emphasis on the innocence of children due to their simplicity, along with the reconciliation from Christ, rather than just focusing on the redemptive act of Christ. Thus, he categorically removes the possibility of guilty children, even if there was no reconciliation of Christ. How could they be guilty when they do not understand good and evil? It seems that Marpeck is giving two independent, yet complete, defenses against the guilt of children because of Adam’s fall.

1.1.4 PETER RIEDEMANN (German Hutterite)

1.1.4.1 BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Peter Riedemann finds his theological heritage in the German Hutterite Anabaptist tradition. This orientation places him, geographically and ideologically, in the controversial environment of the Lutheran reformation. Relevant to this project is the contrast between the Anabaptist and Lutheran views of original sin and redemption. We find Riedemann’s view on only three pages of a 130 page tract called *Account of our Religion, Doctrine and Faith.*\(^5\) Apparently, Anabaptist writings on original sin are rare. In fact, most Anabaptist writers never mention original sin at all.\(^5\)

1.1.4.2 FORMULATION OF THE DOCTRINE

1.1.4.2.1 DEFINITION OF ORIGINAL SIN

Riedemann’s view of original sin lacks the concept of guilt and condemnation, but remains quite severe: “. . . the inheritance . . . is the inclination to sin; that all of us have by nature a tendency toward evil and to have pleasure in sin.”\(^5\) The sin, “. . . removeth, devoureth, and consumeth all that is good and of God in man; so that none may attain it

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51 Ibid., p. 211. Robert Friedmann makes this claim by way of justification for his article and the reproduction of the section of Riedemann’s writings. See the footnote at the bottom of the page.
52 Ibid., p. 212
again except he be born again.” By saying that one must be “born again” to escape original sin, he appears to imply that guilt is involved. This is not the case. He explains that, “. . . original sin is also the cause of eternal death to man, in that it leadeth, guideth, and bringeth man into all sins, and through it we do much sin.” This corruption of human nature is quite relentless, sometimes described as “corrupting poison,” but it does not bring guilt by itself. It leads to the choice of sin, although Riedemann treats it as nearly guaranteed. Although only understood implicitly, this tendency applies to children and adults.

More than producing the tendency toward personal sin, original sin is “the cause of physical death for men, for originally they were created and placed in life, so that there was naught corrupt in them. For God did not make death. Since, however we all inherited sin, all, both young and old, we must taste of death.” So, just like the tendency toward sin, both adults and children are subject to physical death.

2.1.4.2.2 RECONCILIATION OF ORIGINAL SIN

Riedemann’s account of man’s reconciliation with God in terms of original sin is brief and rather easy to overlook. Yet, he is clear that eternal death does not come from Adam’s sin, and certainly does not apply to children.

. . . it [Christ coming into the world] was planned from the beginning by the Father, and because Christ hath come into the world and become the reconciliation not only for us but also for the whole world (I John 2:1,2), we believe that he hath brought it about that original sin before it stirreth within man leading to further sin now causeth physical death only and not eternal, that the word might be fulfilled: The children shall not bear the iniquities of the fathers (Ezek. 18:20, also 33:10-19), but he who sinneth shall himself die. Accordingly, we say that God also accepteth little children, as such, for indeed Christ is also their reconciler. (I John 2)
Riedemann clearly refutes any concept of original guilt, especially in children. However, he states that, by saving the whole world from sin, including original sin, Christ counteracted original sin “before it stirreth.” This suggests that Christ’s work takes away the tendency toward sin, thus stopping the inevitable move toward personal sin. This is partially true, as we can see in Riedemann’s statement juxtaposed to the previous one: “...original sin is also the cause of eternal death to man, in that it leadeth, guideth, and bringeth man into all sins, and through it we do much sin.”\(^{58}\) The reconciliation between these two statements is not clear. The only significant clue lies in another statement above: “The children shall not bear the iniquities of the fathers (Ezek. 18:20, also 33:10-19), but he who sinneth shall himself die.”\(^{59}\) Perhaps he is proposing that Christ’s work in removing the tendency toward sin only continues until the person commits personal sin, thus awakening the sinful nature or reactivating original sin, which in turn, leads to eternal death.

Despite the lack of clarity on this particular point, Riedemann applies the redemptive work of Christ to the elimination of the effects of Adamic sin, except physical death, on all of humanity. The annihilation of personal sin, following the usual Anabaptist position, requires a personal response to the Gospel, preceding a life of discipleship.\(^{60}\)

1.1.4.3 ANALYSIS

In contrast to his Dutch Anabaptist brother in the faith, Dirk Philips, Riedemann is not directly dealing with infant baptism. Instead, he confronts the topic of original sin head-on, which was quite a necessity within the context of the strength of the German Lutheran reformation.\(^{61}\)

\(^{58}\) Ibid. Riedemann echoes his conviction that Christ’s atonement cancels the penalty of spiritual death for every human in Riedemann, *Peter Riedemann’s Hutterite Confession of Faith*, p. 93.

\(^{59}\) Ibid.

\(^{60}\) Ibid., pp. 213-214.

\(^{61}\) Ibid., p. 211. Robert Friedmann explains the situation: “The doctrines of original sin and of justification by faith along, pillars of Luther’s theological edifice, find their main roots in a particular interpretation or emphasis of parts of the Epistle to the Romans and related Pauline writings. It is therefore of
Dirk Philips suggests that Adam’s sin may be imputed on children, because they are not eligible to commit personal sin. Of course, Christ eliminates this sin.\textsuperscript{62} In contrast, Riedemann does not allow for Adamic sin to be imputed as guilt, and therefore, Christ’s work removes the tendency in children, leading to personal sin, rather than guilt itself. There is an important distinction, yet it does not prevent each theologian from coming to the same essential conclusion: guilt inherited from Adam, directly or indirectly, is still removed by Christ.

1.1.5 ANALYSIS OF ORIGINAL GRACE IN ANABAPTIST SOTERIOLOGY

Each of these Anabaptist theologians agrees on the basic nature of original sin: it is sin inherited from Adam that brings both physical death\textsuperscript{63} and the tendency toward sin. If any guilt is potentially imputed, it is removed by the redemptive work of Christ.

As with the Wesleyan and Stone-Campbell writers surveyed, the concept of Christ’s redemptive work counteracting Adamic sin for all people, apart from personal salvation in Christ, is certainly a minority position. To repeat Sebastian Frank, most Anabaptists did not believe in original sin, since it was “foreign” sin, nor would they ever apply consequences to the innocent: “Nearly all Anabaptists consider children to be of pure and innocent blood and they do not consider original sin as a sin which of itself condemns both children and adults. They also claim that it does not make anyone unclean except the one who accepts this sin, makes it his own and is unwilling to part with it. For they claim that foreign sin does not condemn anybody . . .”\textsuperscript{64} So, if original sin does not condemn the

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\textsuperscript{62} Philips, p. 44.
\textsuperscript{63} Marpeck is not explicitly clear on this point.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
innocent until it is combined with one’s personal sin, is Christ’s work in counteracting Adamic sin necessary? Logically, it is not necessary in order for the Anabaptist system to be coherent and consistent. What is necessary is the denial of original guilt, and of original sin that takes away human free will. These positions are foundational for how an individual may be redeemed from sin. Although original sin brought a tendency toward sin, it brought no condemnation or level of depravity (i.e. total) that would prevent a person from responding to the Word of God and the Gospel.65

Just as we will see in the Stone-Campbell writers, the conclusion that original sin does not bring guilt or total depravity is central to Anabaptist theology, while the avenue to this conclusion is not necessary. Thus, one may remain consistent either by holding to the fact that Christ counteracted the consequences of original sin, or that original guilt, by its nature, is simply never applied to the innocent.

1.2.0 WESLEYANS

1.2.1 BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO WESLEYAN SOTERIOLOGY

1.2.1.1 ORIGINAL SIN AND HUMAN FREE WILL

Human freedom exists in Wesleyan theology, but not in the same way as in Anabaptist and Stone-Campbell thought, which states that humans are free to choose sin or good, salvation or condemnation, by their nature as humans. Wesleyan theology begins with the assumption that all of humanity is totally depraved due to Adam’s sin: “Total depravity means that sin’s harmful consequences reach into every aspect of our nature and taint human intellect, emotion, and will.”66 This total depravity derives from original sin: “Original sin . . . is the corruption of the nature of every man, that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and of

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65 Friedmann, p. 60. See also Hubmaier, p. 120.
his own nature inclined to evil, and that continually . . .

In this state, man has no ability to do good: “In his own strength, without divine grace, man cannot do good works pleasing and acceptable to God.”

The divine grace that allows all humans, whether saved or not, to do good works is called prevenient or preventing grace. “No man living is without some preventing grace,” and “every man has a measure of free-will restored to him by grace.”

Human nature, then, does not include free will as long as it is totally depraved. Any measure of free will is a gift of God for all of humanity.

Original sin, for Wesleyans, does not include guilt or condemnation. John Wesley believed that both physical and spiritual (depravity) death were consequences of Adam’s sin. However, he openly declared that eternal death could not result from Adam’s sin: “I believe none ever did, or ever will, die eternally, merely for the sin of our first father.”

This is still a central tenant held by other Wesleyan theologians.

### 1.2.1.2 JUSTIFICATION AND SANCTIFICATION

Wesleyans follow the Reformers’ tradition in regards to justification. Wesley describes justification as a purely divine action where God chooses to “remit the punishment due to our sins, to reinstate us in his favour, and to restore our dead souls to spiritual life, as the earnest of life eternal.” God’s prevenient grace restores human free will, thus enabling him to respond to the salvation offered. One’s continued justification is

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68 Ibid., p. 71.

69 As stated in the Introduction, this is to be distinguished from Original Grace.


assured if one continued in faith, rather than because God elected to save the individual (i.e. Luther and Calvin).

Reminiscent of the Anabaptist perspective is the Wesleyans’ close relationship between justification and sanctification. Sanctification is absolutely vital to continued justification. The Methodist *Book of Discipline* describes sanctification thus:

“Sanctification is that renewal of our fallen nature by the Holy Ghost, received through faith in Jesus Christ, whose blood of atonement cleanseth from all sin; where by we are not only delivered from the guilt of sin, but are washed from its pollution, saved from its power, and are enabled, through grace, to love God with all our hearts and to walk in his holy commandments blameless.”

John Wesley held to a view of entire sanctification, where gradually or immediately, God could bring a believer to perfect love and obedience. Some in the Wesleyan tradition still hold to this concept, but many have rejected it.

### 1.2.2 CHARLES CURTIS

#### 1.2.2.1 BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Charles Newman Curtis was a Wesleyan theologian who published his only known work, *An Epoch in the Spiritual Life*, in 1908.

#### 1.2.2.2 FORMULATION OF THE DOCTRINE

##### 1.2.2.2.1 INBRED SIN

Curtis defines inbred sin as an “innate tendency or bent to self-will” and “evil effects in the disordered nature at birth and all weakness and defects of mind and body due to the transgressions of our first parents and of the race to the present time.”

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76 *Discipline*, p. 68.
77 I have been unable to find additional biographical information.
78 Curtis, p. 80.
sin does not include original guilt. Instead, it is the accumulation of sin throughout the ages, including that of Adam, which causes the corruption of humanity. This may be seen in “social institutions developed by sin-corrupted man . . . as in slavery, in some relations of the sexes in and out of wedlock, in caste, and in some of his legal and educational systems.” Curtis admits, however, that, “it is often impossible—but not always—to draw exact lines of demarcation between what is depraved inheritance and what is natural or normal.” In any case, inbred sin is still responsible for a somewhat loosely defined depravity. Curtis supports this conclusion by referring to the seventh article in the Articles of Religion of the Methodist Episcopal Church: “Original sin standeth not in the following of Adam (as the Pelagians do vainly talk), but it is the corruption of the nature of every man, that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and of his own nature inclined to evil, and that continually.”

1.2.2.2.2 ATONEMENT FOR INBRED SIN

The depravity derived from inbred sin does not bring guilt. Instead, Christ covers the guilt for all humans: “This depravity or inbred sin does not bring guilt at birth, since the irresponsible evil state is covered by the atonement made for the whole race.” It is not that inbred sin could not bring guilt, for Curtis implies that it could have but for “the atonement made for the whole human race.” Like many other proponents of this doctrine, guilt is potential, but in the face of the redemptive act of Christ, it is not actualized.

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79 Ibid., pp. 85-86. Curtis makes a more lengthy argument regarding the distinctions between the Augustinian concept of original sin and the Wesleyan perspective.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid., p. 81.
83 Curtis, p. 81.
1.2.2.3 ANALYSIS

Curtis finds himself in the Wesleyan-Arminian tradition. It does not appear that he is in a combative situation that would necessitate his writing on this topic. Instead, his analysis of inbred sin and its atonement comes as one piece of his overall treatment of soteriological concerns in his book *An Epoch in the Spiritual Life*, which is a work focused totally on matters of sin, salvation, and living out the Christian life.

Curtis does not treat original sin as a divine judgment in the form of the imputation of Adam’s sin on mankind. Instead, original sin is quite natural. It is the cumulative effect of all of mankind’s past and present engagement in personal sin that brings a depraved nature upon each generation. Thus, original sin’s primary power is in its influence exerted from sinful humans to their children. It is not passed down through biology (Adam’s seminal headship), nor by judgment of God upon humanity on behalf of its representative (Adam’s federal headship). It is unclear how such a version of original sin could bring guilt in the first place. Original guilt is normally deemed possible because of a divine judgment of God. In Curtis’ system, there is none. Why, then, is it necessary for there to be an atonement to remove the possibility of guilt? Curtis does not answer the question.

In the end, original guilt is not a viable option for Curtis. Instead, this atonement by Christ is given preeminence over Adamic sin, at least as it affects guilt and condemnation. Curtis finds himself stressing that corruption brought on by Adam’s sin is quite severe, however. In fact, he devotes the rest of the chapter to this very topic. 84 This corruption must be removed from the life of the believer through the “promise and the power” of the “Saviour.” 85 This step in the process of salvation comes during the Christian life, whereas

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84 See Curtis, pp. 82-121.
85 Ibid., p. 119.
the removal of guilt imputed due to Adam’s sin is done for all people, before and/or apart from any choice to receive salvation through the Gospel.86

1.2.3 WILLIAM WILLIAMS

1.2.3.1 BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

William G. Williams played several roles at Ohio Wesleyan University, but is best known as a Greek professor. His contributions include *An Exposition of the Epistle of Paul to the Romans*. An official history of the State of Ohio gives the following account of his service:

Rev. William G. Williams, LL. D. Prof Williams graduated at Woodward College in Cincinnati in 1844, and the same year was appointed to a place in the new faculty of the university as Principal of the Preparatory Department. In 1847, he was promoted to the adjunct professorship of Ancient Languages, and, in 1850, to the full chair of Greek and Latin Languages. This appointment be held until 1864, when his chair was divided, and he became Professor of Greek Language and Literature. This chair was endowed in 1867, by John R. Wright, Esq., and, in honor of his father (the venerable Dr. John F. Wright), was named the Wright Professorship. In 1872, Prof. Williams was appointed the acting Professor of Hebrew Language and Literature. In 1856, he became a member of the Central Ohio Conference, of which body he has for twenty years been the Secretary.87

1.2.3.2 FORMULATION OF THE DOCTRINE

Williams develops his doctrine of original sin on the basis of his exegesis of Romans 5:12-21. First, he states that the federal headship of Adam, and all that it brings upon the human race, is a “monstrous absurdity.”88 Instead, “it was in his paternity only that he entailed upon us the awful inheritance of sin and death, not by any incomprehensible representative headship.”89 Thus, God is not imputing Adam’s sin and its consequences to humanity. Instead, only consequences, not direct responsibility, come upon humankind by natural means, through biological descent. Williams says, “There is

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86 Ibid., pp. 118-119.
89 Ibid., p. 179.
nothing mystic or transcendental about it. It is in the ordinary line of nature.”

Secondly, he stresses that the dogma of original sin expressed in this passage, “is, at the most the taint entailed from a corrupt origin . . . and it is not guilt.” Further, he states that, “. . . our corruption does not need God’s pardon or forgiveness, but only God’s pity, and forbearance, and remedial measures; not justification (except constructively): but only regeneration.”

Thirdly, when speaking of death as the consequence of “inherited corruption,” he states that it is a “penalty” or a legal result of our situation, whereas if guilt were imputed, it would be “punishment” or “administrative retribution.” This distinction is confusing, mostly due to the fact that the contemporary usages of “penalty” and “punishment” are normally synonymous. Williams is using “penalty” to refer to the passive or natural consequences of Adam’s sin, namely a corrupted nature. “Punishment” is being used to refer to a reactive response from God in judgment on sinful humanity entailing condemnation for Adam’s sin. With this understanding in view, we can see that Williams means to make man responsible for personal sin, not original sin. Although this version of original sin does not include the guilt or condemnation brought on the human race by personal sin, it is still severe, and needs to be remedied.

Williams focuses the remedy on infants, as most adults have the more severe problem: personal sin. Using infants and saved adults as examples, he describes the application of the remedy for original sin, in the context of Romans 5:12-21:

Through the redemption of Christ, every infant is born justified from constructive condemnation; and is born regenerate by the blood of sprinkling; and therefore every infant dying is saved. And every infant that lives to grow up, starts with a justified and regenerate nature; and every adult, who, by backsliding, has lost his infant innocency, and becomes a conscious and willful transgressor (as practically all adults do), may nevertheless, under the same ample provisions of the Gospel,

90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., p. 178.
93 Ibid., p. 177.
repent of his personal sin, and again find abundant forgiveness, and regeneration of his nature and final deliverance from death. This is the sole teaching of this vexed passage. [sic]94

Thus, the work of Christ in relation to original sin is continuous. It does not suddenly stop when one is under grace for personal sin. The effects of regeneration, or the reversal of the “inherited corruption,” remain in force when a sinner accepts the Gospel, but it is bound together with justification from guilt before God. Put rather more succinctly, Williams states, “Born with a corrupt nature, by natural propagation, from Adam, we are nevertheless born under an economy of grace, as well as of law.”95 He then translates and interprets Romans 5:20 to support his point in the following fashion: “Where sin [sinfulness, not sins] abounded [in human nature], at the same instant, grace superabounded [in the provisions of the Gospel].”96

1.2.3.3 ANALYSIS

Williams begins with the assumption that original or inherited guilt are not even potentially the case. So, Christ’s grace does not remove guilt, since it does not exist. His take on the consequences brought on by Adam’s sin is unique among the other writers surveyed. For example, God does not cause any consequence by divine decree. Original sin’s consequences are not God’s judgment. Instead, they are natural and biological. It is strange that Christ’s atonement and the resulting justification and regeneration derived from it for infants (“every infant that lives to grow up, starts with a justified and regenerate nature”),97 are seemingly spiritual solutions to physical problems. There appears to be a misalignment of the problem and the solution. Put more plainly, Williams claims that

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94 Ibid., p. 178.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
original sin “is, at the most the taint entailed from a corrupt origin . . . and it is not guilt,” and yet, “through the redemption of Christ, every infant is born justified from constructive condemnation; and is born regenerate by the blood of sprinkling; and therefore every infant dying is saved.” On the one hand Williams says that imputed guilt is not a consequence of Adam’s sin, and on the other, he says that the redemption of Christ justifies the infant “from constructive condemnation,” which would only be necessary if guilt was imputed to humanity because of Adam’s sin. There seem to be three possible resolutions to this apparent inconsistency: (1) there is an inconsistency in Williams’ argument, (2) Williams really means that the redemption of Christ is necessary to remove potential guilt, but presents it unclearly, or, (3) is covering all of his bases by saying that if there is perhaps any kind of guilt imputed to infants, Christ’s atonement would counteract that as well. Williams does not give enough information to lead to a definite conclusion.

Williams does, however, arrive at a similar conclusion with the other proponents. The infant, having never committed personal sin, is still under some measure of grace for whatever he did inherit from Adam, and therefore cannot be condemned to hell. He adds an important component, however. This sort of grace is still available to the adult that has committed personal sin, in that it allows the adult to respond to the Gospel.

1.2.4 JOHN WESLEY

1.2.4.1 BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

John Wesley was born on June 17, 1703 and died March 2, 1791. He earned an M.A. from Lincoln College, Oxford, England. He was elected a fellow in 1726. He is best known for playing the principal role in founding Methodism. He wrote some 233 books, and is said to have preached over 42,000 sermons in Wales, Ireland, Scotland, England, and

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98 Ibid.
99 Ibid., p. 178.
America. On May 24, 1738, Wesley had his famous conversion occur where his “heart was strangely warmed” and realized that salvation was by faith in Christ alone. In 1784, Wesley gave the Methodist societies a legal constitution, which played a vital role in Methodism’s eventual separation from the Anglican Church.

1.2.4.2 FORMULATION OF THE DOCTRINE

1.2.4.2.1 ORIGINAL SIN

Wesley wrote his longest treatise on a single subject in 1757, titled The Doctrine of Original Sin, According to Scripture, Reason and Experience. It was written in a ten week period in response to Dr. John Taylor’s, The Scripture Doctrine of Original Sin Proposed Free and Candid, in which he taught that, “No other evil or death came upon mankind in consequence of Adam’s first transgression, besides that death from which mankind shall be delivered at the resurrection.” Wesley believed that such a position attacked at the very core of Christian doctrine, specifically justification and sanctification. Wesley describes his view of the consequences of original sin in stark contrast to Taylor:

The only true and rational way of accounting for the general wickedness of mankind, in all ages and nations, is pointed out in those words: ‘In Adam all die.’ In and through their first parent, all his posterity died in a spiritual sense; and they remain wholly ‘dead in trespasses and sins’ till the second Adam makes them alive . . . And through the infection which they derive from him, all men are and ever were, by nature, entirely ‘alienated from the life of God’ The state of all mankind did so far depend on Adam, that, by his fall, they all fell in sorrow, and pain, and death, spiritual and temporal.

Wesley’s view is essentially total depravity. Sin has destroyed all of the good in man so that he cannot glorify God in any significant way.

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101 Wesley, Works, 9:258.
102 Ibid., 9:332.
1.2.4.2.2 FOUNDATIONS OF PREVENIENT GRACE

Wesley’s doctrine of original sin left man sinful and helpless to receive salvation. Wesley, however, believed that God’s grace was available to all people. So, to every person, prevenient grace is available, prompting them to do good deeds and receive salvation. This is accomplished by the work of the Holy Spirit:

There is more of power than of merit in man; but as all merit is in the Son of God, in what he has done and suffered for us, so all power is in the Spirit of God. And therefore every man, in order to believe unto salvation, must receive the Holy Ghost . . . Sometimes he acts on the wills and affections of men; withdrawing them from evil, inclining them to good . . . It is certain all true faith, and the whole work of salvation, every good thought, word, and work is altogether by the operation of the Spirit of God.

Wesley makes clear that this working of the Holy Spirit is beyond “natural conscience” or any intact part of man’s nature, if there is any. Man is sick with sin, and needs the grace of God in order to be transformed.

This grace offered through the work of the Holy Spirit is not offered arbitrarily. Instead, prevenient grace is founded upon the work of Christ, namely his incarnation, death, and resurrection. It is also not merely the influence of the Holy Spirit in the lives of the totally depraved, but far more. First, Christ’s work counteracts Adam’s: “By the merits of Christ all men are cleared from the guilt of Adam’s actual sin.” This includes the innocent: “Therefore no infant ever was or ever will be sent to hell for the guilt of Adam’s sin, seeing it is cancelled by the righteousness of Christ as soon as they are sent into the world.”

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103 My aim is to treat the foundational portion of prevenient grace, not the working out of the doctrine through the Holy Spirit. Such coverage would necessitate the allocation significant space to discuss Wesley’s Anthropology and Pneumatology at length, which is beyond the scope of this project. Therefore, this section is necessarily focused and brief.
104 Ibid., p. 8:49.
105 Ibid., 8:277.
106 Wesley, Letters, 6:239.
Wesley believed that Adam had the law of God in his heart, but through sin it had been nearly removed.\textsuperscript{107} However, prevenient grace, “in some measure re-inscribed the law on the heart of his dark, sinful creature.”\textsuperscript{108} This leaves humans without excuse for doing evil and not responding to God’s grace. Every person is given prevenient grace that cancels any guilt that comes by Adam’s sin, and gives their will the ability to do good works and see the truth.

1.2.4.3 ANALYSIS

Wesley’s system is ingenious. He is able to retain an explanation for the pervasiveness of sin in the world and in individual lives, yet avoid limiting the efficacy of Christ’s work to a few elect. In other words, he simultaneously supports a sober view of sinfulness and a God-honoring view of Christ’s \textit{unlimited} atonement, as all people are given the opportunity to do good works and respond to the Gospel.

Wesley begins from total depravity, unlike the Anabaptist and Stone-Campbell writers, so he must provide prevenient grace as a solution to human helplessness. In other words, he goes beyond ascribing to the results of Christ’s work only the cancellation of Adam’s guilt. Instead, upon foundation of Christ’s redemptive act, the Holy Spirit continually works in sinful hearts to bring about both good works and salvation.

The foundation of prevenient grace is congruent with all of the other writers. Christ’s work cancels Adam’s guilt, thus the innocent cannot be condemned. He is dissimilar in that his prevenient grace makes salvation directly possible for all people by reinstating free will. Many of the others assume that free will is intact, since man is in a state of partial depravity at most. Some of these same writers do not claim that this grace counteracts depravity, whereas Wesley does provide a solution where one’s depravity is...

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\textsuperscript{107} McGonigle, p. 21.
combated by the work of the Holy Spirit in providing prevenient grace. Cottrell, for example, who we will treat more completely in Chapter 2, says that all affects of Adam’s sin are potential, and that only physical death will be experienced, but even that will be eventually counteracted by the resurrection. In short, Cottrell sees depravity cancelled, along with guilt, before it actually affects anyone. Wesley’s solution is a gradual process that occurs during life, which will hopefully lead to salvation.

1.2.4 ANALYSIS OF ORIGINAL GRACE IN WESLEYAN SOTERIOLOGY

Wesleyan soteriology generally emphasizes a couple of doctrines not held to by the Anabaptists and Stone-Campbell Movement, namely total depravity and the corresponding action of God to bring man to salvation, prevenient grace. In other words, Wesleyans begin with a more dire assumption of total depravity, and therefore need some action of God to give the person the will to choose salvation. In contrast to the likes of Luther and Calvin, this provides for the involvement of human volition in salvation. In this sense, Anabaptists, Wesleyans, and the Stone-Campbell Movement agree. However one arrives at the point of choosing salvation, because they are only partially depraved or prevenient grace has acted upon them after being totally depraved, it is ultimately human choice that allows for the reception of salvation. Thus salvation has intimately related elements of humanity and the divine, both of which are necessary to the process. In other words, the Wesleyans must “go further” with the effects of Christ’s atoning work on Adamic sin because they believe it brought more dire consequences (total depravity) upon mankind. The Anabaptist and Stone-Campbell Movement see Christ’s work counteracting guilt, at minimum, and even depravity (i.e. Cottrell) before it ever came upon humanity. The positions of the Wesleyan writers surveyed support the belief that guilt was counteracted, or never part of

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109 Cottrell is not sure whether depravity was ever a consequence of Adamic sin, but, if it was, it is counteracted.
the consequence of Adamic sin at all, and propose that total depravity still affects the human until prevenient grace breaks through and allows for the person to receive salvation. Despite the difference in timing for this process, all three traditions pull from the same foundation, namely that any guilt brought on all of humanity due to Adam’s sin is counteracted, and thus, not imputed to anyone.

Specifically, this position fits very well with Wesleyan soteriology for essentially the same reasons as it does within the other two traditions: original guilt is assumed to be untrue and human free will is a necessary part of the salvation process. Additionally, this allows for Wesleyans to take inherited sin seriously in the form of total depravity, and yet have a remedy available in the process, namely prevenient grace, derived from the foundation of Christ’s redemptive work.

**1.3.0 STONE-CAMPBELL MOVEMENT**

**1.3.1 BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO STONE-CAMPBELL SOTERIOLOGY**

This section will briefly introduce general views on the given topics. Focus will be on Alexander Campbell as a representative of the early leaders of the Movement, instead of later views as taught in each of the three strands.\(^\text{110}\) Each of the writers surveyed in the next section would find their greatest influence from Campbell and his fellow leaders with which he has agreement on these issues.

**1.3.1.1 ORIGINAL SIN AND HUMAN FREE WILL**

The Stone-Campbell Movement rejected, and in fact still rejects, original guilt. However, many of the early leaders held to the view that Adam’s sin altered the nature of man. They usually distinguish between the “natural state,” in which man is righteous, pure, and innocent, and the “preternatural state,” in which man lost immortality and the direct

\(^\text{110}\) See the Introduction for explanation. In short, the three strands are the Christian Churches (instrumental), Churches of Christ (non-instrumental), and the Disciples of Christ (usually identified as the theologically liberal wing).
knowledge of God. In this fallen state, only faith can allow one to encounter God. The fall did not cause man to lose the freedom of will, including the ability to respond to salvation. However, it certainly caused the person to be depraved (not all early writers used this term). The level of depravity varies by writer. Alexander Campbell describes the consequences of the fall:

We all inherit a frail constitution, physically, intellectually, but especially morally frail and imbecile . . . In Adam, all have sinned; therefore "in Adam all die." Your nature, gentle reader, not your person, was in Adam when he put forth his hand to break the precept of Jehovah. You did not personally sin in that act; but your nature then in the person of your father, sinned against the Author of your existence. In the just judgment, therefore, of your heavenly Father, your nature sinned in Adam, and with him it is right, that all human beings should be born mortal, and that death should lord it over the whole race as he has done in innumerable instances even "over them that have not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression" . . . Now this reward of sin is at present inflicted upon at least one fourth of the human race who have never violated any law, or sinned personally by any act of their lives. According to the most accurate bills of mortality, from one third to one fourth of the whole progeny of man die in infancy, under two years, without the consciousness of good or evil. They are thus, innocent though they be, as respects actual and personal transgression, accounted as sinners by him who inflicts upon them the peculiar and appropriate wages of sin. This alarming and most strangely pregnant of all the facts in human history, proves that Adam was not only the common father, but the actual representative of all his children.111

Campbell also purports that Adam’s sin brought physical death on all mankind, even innocent infants.

Despite this depravity, Campbell makes it clear that man is not totally depraved. He still has the freedom to avoid sin, and eventually accept the Gospel message: “Still, man, with all his hereditary imbecility, is not under an invincible necessity to sin. Greatly prone to evil, easily seduced into transgression, he may or may not yield to passion and seduction. Hence the differences we so often discover in the corruption and depravity of man. All inherit a fallen, consequently a sinful nature; though all are not equally depraved . . . But until man in his present preternatural state, believes the gospel report of his sins and

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submits to Jesus Christ as the only Mediator and Saviour of sinners, it is impossible for him to do any thing absolutely pleasing or acceptable to God.”

However, this, in no way, makes mankind guilty of Adam’s sin: “Condemned to natural death, and greatly fallen and depraved in our whole moral constitution though we certainly are, in consequence of the sin of Adam; still, because of the interposition of the second Adam, none are punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, but those who actually and voluntarily sin against a dispensation of mercy under which they are placed: for this is ‘the condemnation of the world, that light has come into the world, and men choose darkness rather than light, because their deeds are evil.’”

In summary, humanity suffers under a partial depravity because of Adam’s sin, where sin is not necessary, but likely. Human free will is not so marred that one cannot respond to the Gospel or avoid sin. Above all, guilt is not imputed to humanity for Adam’s sin.

1.3.1.2 JUSTIFICATION AND SACTIFICATION

Opinions vary slightly on the exact nature of justification and sanctification in the Stone-Campbell Movement. Views are essentially parallel to a traditional Protestant view. There is normally an emphasis on the point that justification is intimately involved with sanctification, as part of the overall salvation process. Campbell describes this intimate relationship: “Sin, then, condemns, pollutes, alienates, and destroys its subjects. Grace justifies, sanctifies, adopts, and saves its subjects in reference to these points. Pardon has respect to guilt; justification, to condemnation; sanctification, to pollution; adoption, to

112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
alienation; and salvation, to destruction. Those out of Christ, are then, in their sins, condemned, unholy, alien, and lost; while those in Christ are pardoned, justified, sanctified, adopted into the family of God, and saved.”¹¹⁵ [emphasis original] Thus, it is not only justification that is needed for one to have all of the effects of sin cancelled. One receives this justification through faith, repentance, confession of Jesus as Lord and Savior, and baptism. Through these conditions, one is justified, receives the gift of the Holy Spirit, is regenerated, and continues to be sanctified through one’s life:

Sanctification, in one point of view, is unquestionably a progressive work. To sanctify is to set apart; this may be done in a moment, and so far as mere state or relation is concerned, it is as instantaneous as baptism. But there is the formation of a holy character: for there is a holy character as well as a holy state . . . This requires aid. Hence, assistance is to be prayed for; and it is promised. Now as the Spirit of God, under the administration of Christ, is the author of all holiness in us . . . And when through faith, repentance, and baptism, we have assumed him as our rightful Sovereign, by his Holy Spirit, in answer to our prayers, he worked in us, and by us, and for us, all that is needful to our present, spiritual, and eternal salvation.¹¹⁶

1.3.2 JAMES S. LAMAR

1.3.2.1 BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

James S. Lamar (1829-1908) is a native of the State of Georgia. He spent much of his life ministering in that state, along with a short ministry in Louisville, Kentucky. Besides ministering to churches, he contributed numerous articles to Restoration Movement periodicals, especially the Christian Standard. He also authored books, including Organon of Scripture and Commentary of the Gospel of Luke.¹¹⁷ He appears to be a modest man. When he was asked for biographical material, he responded, “I was born in Georgia, May

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¹¹⁵ Campbell, pp. 64-65.
¹¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 47-50.
18, 1829, and through the mercy of God I am here still, and that is about all there is to it.”¹¹⁸

Lamar graduated from Bethany College, founded by Alexander Campbell, in 1854. So Lamar began his ministry while the Restoration Movement was becoming a coherent movement. He ministered in churches that would later become part of the Disciples of Christ strand of the Movement.

1.3.2.2 FORMULATION OF THE DOCTRINE

1.3.2.2.1 CONSEQUENCES OF ORIGINAL SIN

Lamar’s argument hinges largely on his exegesis of Romans 5:12-21, as with many of the other writers surveyed. He presupposes Adam’s role as head of the human race: “He [Paul] represents the first man as the head and embodiment of the human race—all humanity being in him. His sin, therefore, was the sin of all, and His death the death of all; and so ‘death passed unto all men for that all sinned.’”¹¹⁹ He further describes the death as spiritual death, because Paul presents it as “a definite past,” which would make little sense if it were physical death, as not all people have yet experienced physical death. This would contradict one of his contemporaries, Moses Lard, whom he directly refutes on this point.¹²⁰ This spiritual death, only potentially, brought a depraved and corrupt nature of humanity. But, Lamar contends that this only applies to Adam, since he was all there was of humanity at the time of his sin:

Such was the sin of Adam—a fearful crime committed in the face of solemn and gracious warning, and against the clearest light of immediate divine revelation. At the time of this sin he was man—he was humanity—he was all there was of it. Consequently when he sinned and died, all sinned and died—and so the human race was dead—dead in the trespasses and sins. It was no mere physical nor intellectual

¹¹⁸ Ibid.
¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 100. Moses Lard says of the word “death” in Romans 5:12, “By it simple ordinary death is meant, no more.” See Lard, Commentary of Paul’s Letter To Romans (Des Moines: Christian Board of Publication, 1914)
calamity, but the very soul had lost its all. God had been cast out of humanity’s sanctum sanctorum, and Satan enthroned in his place. Sin had entered into the world and death through sin, so death passed unto all men for that all sinned.121

Lamar’s interpretation of Paul’s meaning concerning humanity is certainly unique. Does Paul really mean that death came to all men, but only include one man, Adam, in this category? According to the Genesis account, Eve was involved. Is Eve not to be considered a live part of humanity? Despite this oddity, Lamar is clear that Adam’s sin was not without severe consequences.

Lamar describes Adam’s consequences as a corrupt nature that would have passed to humanity, but makes clear that Adam’s personal guilt would never have been imputed to humanity:

If we now think of him as an abandoned, desperate, hardened, polluted, guilty rebel against God—“wholly inclined to all evil, and wholly disinclined to all good, totally depraved and corrupt in every faculty and part of his soul and body”—we shall have something like an adequate conception of his moral and spiritual condition and be able to realize, in some measure at least, what it is to be dead to God and holiness—dead in trespasses and in sins. And if he had been left in this condition, while his personal guilt might not have been transmitted to his descendants, the awful pollution of such a nature, whether by heredity or association, or both combined, would inevitably have been felt throughout all generations.122

We must notice that Lamar qualifies such consequences as only potential. So he allows for a severe view of original sin and the spiritual death it brings, but that death is only potentially applicable to the human race. We now turn to the second Adam’s work in removing this spiritual death.

1.3.2.2.2 THE SECOND ADAM COUNTERACTS THE FIRST

Lamar bases his conclusion that Christ has removed the consequences of Adam’s sin on both Adam and the human race by seeing the emphasis in Romans 5 to be on the second Adam, namely Christ. The sin and death of Adam is merely “the shading and

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121 Ibid., p. 104.
122 Ibid., p. 105.
background” used to emphasize the work of Christ in conquering sin. In fact, the
theological truth found in the passage cannot be fully understood, “until Christ, and not
Adam, be made the alpha of the system as he is of the gospel.”123 In other words, whatever
doctrine of original sin that is taught in this passage is primarily present to demonstrate
work of the second Adam: “The second Adam appears, like the first, the representative and
embodiment of the race, to take away ‘the sin of the world,’ i.e., of the whole human
family, the sin which they sinned in Adam.”124 In taking away the “sin of the world,” Christ
also “restored the dead human race to spiritual life.”125 Therefore, all the consequences of
spiritual death described by Lamar are cancelled. This is a gift from God, “a finished
transaction, a completed event, and that is entirely independent of any human condition . . .
bestowed upon ‘all men,’” which brought humans “again into union and fellowship with
God.”126

Lamar further supports this interpretation by contending that salvation from
Adam’s sin conceptually fits with Christ’s position as “Savior of all men,” and that He

123 Ibid., p. 107.
124 Ibid., p. 105. Lamar gives an extensive illustration, using imagery of pictures and art galleries, to
show the drastic difference between the interpretation of Romans 5 given by many theologians that see the
passage as primarily a description of original sin and its horrible effects, and the interpretation that he presents
as Paul’s intended meaning. “He [Paul] seems to labor to give it emphasis, as if he rejoiced and glorified in it
as a precious truth, as if he exulted in the fact that the obedience of Christ effectually and completely
overcame the disobedience of Adam, together with all the consequences of that disobedience. Yet, theology,
over-looking, or at any rate underestimating, the influence of the perfect obedience and righteousness of the
second Adam, fixes its gaze upon the disobedience of the first, finds in that the fundamental postulate of its
doctrinal system. Paul, on the other hand is seeking only exalt Christ and magnify his work. To do so he
paints in colors of awful darkness, not what humanity is, but what it would have been if Christ had not come.
Theology paints the picture, with additions of gloomy horror ad libitum, seeming to esteem it merit to make
the case as bad against our unfortunate race as possible—declaring that we are dead now, and guilty of
Adam’s sin, that we are totally depraved and corrupt in every faculty and part of soul and body now, and,
having completed the ghastly picture, it frames it and hangs it up by itself as a work of art complete and
masterly. I am pleased to record that theology also draws a portrait of Christ, in which he is exhibited in his
blessed work, but it hangs this picture in a different part of the gallery . . . How differently does the apostle
paint! He makes no picture of sin and death of Adam, and yet he puts them on the canvas of gloom and
blackness, puts them there, not as the picture, not even to be looked upon per se, but as the shading and
background to bring out in bold relief and in glorious symmetry and beauty the divine image of the Son of
God.”
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid., p. 106.
becomes, after personal sin is committed, the “Savior specially of them that
believe.”[sic]\textsuperscript{127} In this way, God provides for the removal of both types of sin.

1.3.2.2.3 ARE INDIVIDUALS BORN AS CHILDREN OF WRATH?

Lamar answers possible refutation of his position based up Paul’s claim that we
“were by nature children of wrath.”\textsuperscript{128} This passage suggests to Lamar that all people are
born under the wrath of God because they are sinners. However, he looks to Romans 7:9 to
reconcile this difficulty: “For I was alive without the law once; but when the
commandment came, sin revived, and I died.” Of the commandment that came, Lamar
says, “Not before it came from God, for Paul was not then in existence; hence it must have
been before it came to him, as to an intelligent and responsible being.”\textsuperscript{129} So, Paul, using
himself as an example, makes it clear that he was alive before he was cognizant of the law,
and committed personal sin against the law, and therefore, God.

Lamar then answers a related question: “. . . if he [Paul] died in the consequence of
the coming to him of the commandment contained in the law, how can he account for the
prevalence of sin and death before the law?”\textsuperscript{130}

He anticipated the question, and meets it, Rom. 5:13-14, ‘For until the law,’ i.e.,
before the written law was given, ‘sin was in the world; but sin is not imputed
where there is not law.’ As therefore it was ‘in the world’ and was ‘imputed,’ it
follows that there was law, namely, the law written in their hearts. He continues:
‘Nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not
sinner after the similitude of Adam’s transgression.’ Who were these? Infant and
idiots? I think not. They never died the death here spoken of, the death of the soul,
death as the consequence of actual sin. And these sinners had violated no express
precept, no formal commandment, as Adam had done, but they had sinned against
the law written in their hearts and consciences. Just as Paul died for violating the
written commandment, so these persons died for violating the unwritten.\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid. p. 109.
\textsuperscript{128} Eph. 2:3.
\textsuperscript{129} Lamar, p. 108.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
In Lamar’s response, we see that infants and those mentally incapable of choosing or knowing right and wrong, are not spiritually dead. We may infer that this is the case both because they are not responsible for obedience to the law, and that Adamic sin is counteracted for them as part of humanity. Furthermore, he shows that it is biblically feasible for humans to be born alive, and only become spiritually dead after they become aware of the law (codified or not) and choose to break it.

1.3.2.2.4 SUMMARY OF LAMAR’S VIEW

Lamar gives a helpful summary of his position, while providing an important nuance: “I conclude, therefore, that by the infinite mercy of God we are not the victims of a remote ancestral act. Our first father fell, it is true, but in the merit of the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world, he rose again. If our nature was in him when he fell, it is also in him when he rose. I feel that we may rightfully claim to be the progeny of living Adam—of Adam justified unto life by Jesus Christ, an in worshipful communion of with God.” Lamar makes a unique claim by the way he emphasizes the human relationship to Adam. Where proponents of original sin normally stress that humanity is dead because of Adam’s representative headship (whether seminal or federal), Lamar stresses that humanity is actually made alive through this relationship. Jesus Christ redeems all of humanity from any direct effects of Adam’s sin by atoning Adam’s sin, and therefore the sin of the rest of humanity. In other words, through Adam, humanity potentially died spiritually, yet through the redeemed Adam, and ultimately through the Redeemer—Christ, humans are saved from spiritual death. Lamar does not attempt to address the mechanics of this theory, but makes an important point that may be explained in this hypothetical statement: “If Adam is

132 Ibid., p. 109.
humanity’s representative, we must share in both his sin and redemption, including the consequences of each.”\textsuperscript{133}

1.3.2.3 ANALYSIS

Several important implications come from Lamar’s views. First, he specifically avoids promoting universal salvation for all of humanity from personal sin, but instead demands conscious volition to receive salvation. Second, he retains the doctrine of original sin from the Romans 5 passage, while making certain that the emphasis on Christ’s saving work is primary. Third, he uniquely denies that physical death is at all included in the concept of “death” in Romans 5. Instead, it only includes spiritual death. Lastly, his most impressive contribution to this discussion is that humanity must equally share in Adam’s sin and his redemption. Some unanswered questions may be raised on this point: (1) How is it the case that Adam’s personal sin is forgiven in this way, yet it only forgives original sin for the rest of humanity? and (2) Does Lamar assume that personal sins are forgiven for all Old Testament saints in the manner of Adam? Despite these questions, Lamar’s balanced consistency on this point is admirable. This particular position will be taken up by several of the other Stone-Campbell writers.

1.3.3 MOSES E. LARD

1.3.3.1 BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Moses Easterly Lard was born “near Shelbyville, Bedford County, Tennessee, October 29, 1818” and died in “Lexington, Kentucky, June 17, 1880.”\textsuperscript{134} He received his Master of Arts from Bethany College. He worked with Alexander Campbell in an effort to fend off attacks on the Restoration Movement’s doctrine from various sources. He

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid
published a periodical called *Lard's Quarterly*, served as chief editor of *Apostolic Times*, and wrote his most extensive and defining work, *Commentary of Paul’s Letter to Romans*. He is said to have been a spectacular preacher, although no sermon transcripts survive, and a logical thinker and writer. Certainly, Lard had flaws: “It has been urged by some that one of the chief defects in his style was his dealing with words as if they were made of iron, and each had a value as exact as a mathematical formula.” However, “In our judgment, he towers above all his compeers in intellectual grandeur, in his power of analysis, in his elegant and poetic diction, in his prose poems, in his clear, clean-cut, lucid statements, to open the Word of God and turn its life-giving fountains in upon the thirsty soul, in that indescribable magnetic force which bears the audience away upon the winged thoughts of the orator.” Notwithstanding either such negative or positive statements, it is true that Lard made a significant intellectual impact on Restoration Movement scholarship.

2.3.3.2 FORMULATION OF THE DOCTRINE

1.3.3.2.1 PURPOSE OF ROMANS 5:12-21

Lard sets the purpose of this section upon the foundation of Romans 5:10: “For if, while we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his son; much more, being reconciled we shall be saved by his life.” He explains: “. . . the main premise is found in v. 10, and is the death of Christ. No other premise warrants the conclusion, or meets the necessities of the case. By that death we have been redeemed, have been reconciled, have been justified; in a word, by it every thing has been done for us essential to a complete rescue from the effects of both Adam’s sin and our own.” Christ’s death is the central focus of Paul’s discussion, while the effects of Adam’s sin are a literary device by which to emphasize its greatness.

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135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
1.3.3.2.2 EFFECTS OF ADAM’S SIN

Lard goes to great length to emphasize that the single penalty for Adam’s sin upon humanity is physical death. That death was brought onto humanity, not as some natural consequence but as a judicial penalty from God upon Adam’s posterity. Thus, Adam is acting as a representative of the human race. Lard further emphasizes that humans receive no guilt or implication of any kind in regards to Adam’s sin. They are responsible only for their personal sins, as was Adam for his.

Lard speculates, in rather cryptic language, how Adam would have been redeemed of his personal sin:

His death did not cancel his sin. On the contrary, his sin survived its temporal penalty; and he lived after his death. For that subsequent state, too, his sin had its penalty. Now it is just here that the redemption effected by Christ emerges in to view. By that redemption Adams’ sin, while he yet lived, was cancelled (a fact assumed), and with the sin its future penalty. This now restored him to the favor of God, and gave him title to all other blessings secured for him in Christ. Thus we must look even beyond death for the whole penalty of sin.

He does not further explain his words, so we must speculate somewhat on their meaning. It appears that Christ’s work retroactively cancelled Adam’s one sin for all of humanity, Adam included. However, it did not cancel the one penalty for it—physical death. Lard implies another penalty, which he later describes as the corruption of the spirit brought about by personal sin, during the “subsequent state.” He claims that the “redemption effected by Christ . . . restored him to the favor of God.” Despite the confusing nature of Lard’s words, his main point emerges: Christ’s redemptive work redeemed Adam from the effects of his personal sin beyond physical death.

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138 Ibid., pp. 165-167.
139 Ibid., p. 166. The same questions that applied to Lamar’s view apply here. Lard certainly goes into more detail, but he does not describe how the same redemptive act forgives Adam of personal sin, but provides forgiveness for only inherited sin for the rest of the human race.
140 Ibid., pp. 173-174.
1.3.3.2.3 THE GIFT THAT ABOUNED TO THE MANY

Lard sets as his foundation the fact that Adam is presented as a type for Christ. Thus, they are similar in many particulars, but vastly different in the effects of their actions: “But the resemblance does not hold in all respects . . . The sin was, in its effects, the diametrical opposite gift; while the effects of the latter reach far beyond those of the former . . . The difference is both in kind and quantity.” So Lard categorizes Adam as both a type and an “antitype” of Christ. Christ’s gift of grace far exceeds sin in quantity, and therefore sufficiently contradicts its effects. Lard explains the outgrowth of this fact: “Whatever evils Adam’s sin brought upon the world, without our agency, are all countervailed and remedied by the single act of Christ without our agency.” Of course, Christ’s redemption has done “much more” (v 15), which “includes a better body than Adam even had, a better life than he ever lived, a better world than he ever lived in, a world where Satan, and sin, and death can never come . . . all our sins are cancelled, and we await in hope the proud day of resurrection.” These provisions are “for the salvation of the whole human race from personal sin, but they invest none with this salvation except those that obey Christ.” Thus, Lard clearly distinguishes between the effects of Christ’s death on Adam’s sin and on personal sin. All the effects of Adam’s sin are cancelled, while only those who are obedient to Christ are saved from their personal sins.

1.3.3.3 ANALYSIS

Moses Lard makes three important contributions to the discussion at hand. First, he exegetically determines that the emphasis of Romans 5:12-21, based on 5:10, is the effects of Christ’s redemptive work on the cross. He is certainly not the first to notice such an

141 Ibid., p. 175.
142 Ibid., p. 174.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid., pp. 178-179.
145 Ibid., p. 179.
emphasis (i.e. Lamar), but his influence can be seen to this day in the writing of Jack Cottrell who expounds on this emphasis, making it the foundation of his discussion of Original Grace.

Second, Lard makes some interesting and speculative connections between the work of Christ and Adam’s personal sin, in that he seems to imply that Christ’s redemptive work can forgive personal sin for all of those before the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Christ. This, although outside the primary thrust of this project, is helpful in that it provides a preliminary answer to the question a reader may have: “If Adam’s sin is counteracted for all people by Christ, and personal sin for those who are in Christ, what about those without direct knowledge of Christ’s redemptive work? What is their destiny?”

Third, Lard skillfully exegetes Romans 5 with extensive detail, far more than shown in this section. In his exegesis, he takes great care to link Christ’s redemptive work to the cancellation of Adam’s sin and personal sin. Thus, he does not succumb to a narrow view by emphasizing one or the other. Instead, he follows what he sees as Paul’s intentions through to their logical conclusions.

1.3.4 ROBERT MILLIGAN

1.3.4.1 BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Robert Milligan was born in Northern Ireland in 1814, and moved to Ohio in 1818. He became a communicant of the Associate Reformed (Seceder) Presbyterian Church in 1835, but was later baptized in 1838 by Elder John Irvine of the church in Cane Ridge,
which had developed under Barton W. Stone. He was ordained in 1842, where Thomas Campbell served as one of the men laying hands on him.\textsuperscript{146}

Milligan received an A.B. and M.A. from Washington College in Washington, Pennsylvania, and held a teaching post at Indiana University, teaching mathematics, chemistry, and astronomy. Alexander Campbell invited him to be the Chair of Mathematics at Bethany College. He then became President of Kentucky University in 1859.\textsuperscript{147}

His most important contributions were \textit{Reason and Revelation} (1867), a systematic introduction covering hermeneutics, inspiration, nature, and design of the Bible, and \textit{Scheme of Redemption} (1868), a historical and biblical approach to soteriology. “Taken together, the influence of these two books is considered by some to be an ‘unofficial theology’ for succeeding generations within segments of the Movement.”\textsuperscript{148}

\textbf{1.3.4.2 FORMULATION OF THE DOCTRINE}

Milligan differs little from the other Stone-Campbell writers. However, it is important to look at his particular wording of the position, because, whether intentionally or not, Jack Cottrell’s articulation of Original Grace is heavily influenced by it.

Milligan discusses, at great length, the possible penalties brought upon humanity because of Adam’s sin. He concludes that these effects include both physical and spiritual death.\textsuperscript{149} He admits that, “The precise degree of this spiritual derangement or hereditary sinfulness is no where clearly and logically defined in the Holy Scriptures.”\textsuperscript{150}

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., p. 519.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{149} Milligan, pp. 48-56.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., pp. 57-58.
Milligan leaves the discussion unfinished, cautioning the reader not to engage in such speculations, and concludes that any effects brought on humanity by Adam are nullified:

For however good men may differ in their views of hereditary depravity or derived sinfulness, one thing is very certain; namely, that whatever mankind have lost through the first Adam, they will regain unconditionally through the second Adam. If through the first all men die, so likewise through the second all will be made alive. I Cor. xv, 22. If by one man’s disobedience the many were made sinners, even so by obedience of one the many will, to the same extent, be made righteous. No man need, therefore, feel any concern or anxiety about the sin of Adam and its effects on his posterity. To remove all the bitter fruits and consequences of this first transgression is the peculiar and exclusive work of the second Adam.151

Milligan offers no further support for his position, and does not describe the particular way in which humanity gains back what it lost. He goes on to state that it is not a practical question, and that those spreading the gospel to the unbeliever need only be concerned that the Christ’s redemption is sufficient for their sinful state.

1.3.4.3 ANALYSIS

A few observations concerning Milligan’s position are in order. First, he stresses that Original Grace is gained “unconditionally,” and is therefore available to the entire human race. Secondly, he removes from this doctrine any hint of universalism by limiting these unconditional effects resulting from the “second Adam” to derived sin from the first Adam. Lastly, similar to others in the Stone-Campbell tradition, he ultimately takes no definitive position on the effects of Adamic sin (“whatever mankind have lost through the first Adam”), largely because he views such consequences as potential, but stresses that the severity of Adam’s sinful transference is more than satisfied by the superior work of Christ.

1.3.5 A.I. HOBBS

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151Ibid., p. 60.
1.3.5.1 BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Alvin Ingals Hobbs, L.L.D. (1834-1894) is best known for his Conversion—What Is It and How Produced? and a contribution to New Testament Christianity, edited by Z.T. Sweeney, called “Ecclesiastical Polity.” He was ordained in 1854, while in the mercantile business, which he set aside to go to Butler University (then North-Western Christian University). He graduated with first honors in 1862.\footnote{152 A.I. Hobbs, ‘Conversion: What Is It and How Produced?’, in The Old Faith Restated, ed. by J.H. Garrison, 2 vols (St. Louis: Christian Publishing Company, 1891), pp. 254-274 (II. 253).} For the next three decades, he was a preacher in large cities in the mid-western and western United States. In 1890, he was appointed Dean of the Bible College of Drake University in Des Moines, Iowa. He was best known for his preaching and oratory skills.\footnote{153 Ibid.}

1.3.5.2 FORMULATION OF THE DOCTRINE

Hobbs gives only a glimpse of Original Grace in his discussion of the moral quickening of the dead sinner into life in Christ, which is in the broader context of the process and mechanics of conversion. He emphasizes that personal sin is the culprit in the spiritual death of mankind, rather than Adamic sin:

It should be emphasized that, under the reign of grace, whatever death was brought upon our race through Adamic sin by reason of his federal headship was annulled by reason of the federal headship of the second Adam. So now, ‘every one must give account of himself to God.’ Adam’s sin will never shut out one of his children from heaven. Our own sins exhale the atmosphere of death. What, without will or consent, we lost in the first Adam, we have regained or shall regain in the second Adam, without our will or consent. Hence, infant regeneration, baptism and church membership are the useless output of the mine of tradition and speculation.\footnote{154 Ibid., p. 269.}

Hobbs is responding to two important doctrines: original sin and infant baptism. He assumes that original sin, if true by virtue of federal headship being the case, is counteracted by the same token. By alluding to, though not directly citing, Romans 5, he
claims that the second Adam accomplished this apart from direct relationship to personal sin. Finally, Hobbs reaches the natural implication of his argument: infants, being innocent of personal sin, are not to be declared guilty, nor are adults to be held responsible for sins they did not personally commit.

1.3.5.3 ANALYSIS

Hobbs does not offer anything unique or new to the discussion. It is interesting to note that Hobbs’ contribution is written in The Old Faith Restated, which is an edited work representative of Stone-Campbell theology. It would seem that Hobbs’ view was accepted as part of the whole, giving some credence to his position as reflective of late 19th century (1891) Stone-Campbell soteriological views on original sin, its cancellation, and the implications for the Church.

1.3.6 J.W. MCGARVEY & PHILIP Y. PENDLETON

1.3.6.1 BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

1.3.6.1.1 J.W. MCGARVEY

John W. McGarvey was born in Hopkinsville, Kentucky, March 1, 1820 and died in Lexington, Kentucky, October 6, 1911. He attended Bethany College from 1847 to 1850, and graduated with distinction. He was ordained into ministry in 1851 and ministered in Missouri and Kentucky by preaching in several churches. He became a professor at the College of the Bible in 1865, and ceased preaching full-time. McGarvey distinguished himself as an able preacher, teacher, scholar, and debater.155 A description of McGarvey and his contributions will prove helpful:

The classroom was McGarvey’s throne, as he knew what he taught and then taught what he knew. It has been said that McGarvey never read a lesson text in the classroom but quoted the lesson from the Old or New Testament. The London Times wrote, "In all probability, John W. McGarvey is the ripest Bible scholar on

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earth." Some of the preachers he trained were eloquent and some were not, but all were oriented with a strong biblical foundation. McGarvey was a very prolific writer. For more than 40 years articles flowed from his pen to such periodicals as the *Millennial Harbinger*, *American Christian Review*, and *Lard's Quarterly*. He produced commentaries on Matthew, Mark, Acts, the Gospels (in conjunction with P.Y. Pendleton), and six of the epistles. In his books McGarvey dealt with criticism against Jonah, the eldership, the authorship of Deuteronomy, Christian evidences, and other topics.\(^\text{156}\)

1.3.6.1.2 PHILIP Y. PENDLETON

Philip Yancey Pendleton (1868-1930) is largely known for his works co-written with McGarvey. These works included *The Fourfold Gospel*, published in 1914, and *Thessalonians, Corinthians, Galatians and Romans*, published in 1916. He also published several articles for Standard Publishing’s *Standard Eclectic Commentary*.

1.3.6.2 FORMULATION OF THE DOCTRINE

McGarvey and Pendleton begin their argument with a rather narrow view of the effects of Adamic sin: “Adam’s sin brought natural death upon the whole human family, but nothing more. . . Adam, as progenitorial head of the race (1Tim. 2:13; 1 Cor. 11:8), involved, by his sin, all the race in natural death—death without any hope of a resurrection, much less of immortality.”\(^\text{157}\) In fact, they go so far as to say that physical death is caused by Adam’s sin alone: “But for whose sin did those die who lived in the twenty-five centuries between Adam and Moses? Clearly they died for the sin committed by Adam, their head . . . It is clear that men die because they sinned in Adam, their federal head, not because they committed sin in their individual capacity . . . Therefore, in this absence of law, the people of that day would have lived in spite of their own individual sin . . .”\(^\text{158}\)

They make clear that those who disobeyed the Mosaic law would be subject to death, just not in the absence of law. This seems an odd position. If Adam was sentenced to physical death, why are they saying that those who disobeyed the Mosaic law would be subject to death?


\(^\text{158}\) Ibid., p. 335.
death for his personal sin, why would other humans not also die for personal sin? This particular claim does not greatly affect the discussion at hand, but it does appear to be a glaring inconsistency.

From Romans 5:15, they derive the solution to the effects of Adamic sin: “We are here informed that the result of the sacrificial act of Christ fully reversed and nullified the effects of the act of Adam, and that it did even much more.” Unlike the other Stone-Campbell writers, excluding Cottrell, who agrees with him on this point, McGarvey and Pendleton link this nullification, not only to Christ’s sacrifice, but also to his resurrection: “Christ, as creative head of the race, by his righteousness redeemed all from this natural death by accomplishing for all the resurrection of the dead.” If physical death is the only penalty, it would logically follow that Christ would need to counteract that penalty. He does this, not immediately but eschatologically, for all humans must die a natural death.159

They give a detailed explanation this process:

The resurrection (which nullifies the effect of Adam's act), though a form of justification precedes the hour of judgment, and hence can not be final justification, for the latter is the product of the judgment. Moreover, the resurrection which Christ effects, as federal creative head of the race, does not depend upon faith; for all, the believing and the unbelieving, the just and the unjust, have part in it. But the justification which comes after that resurrection depends upon other relations and provisions. In administering this final justification, Christ stands as the federal regenerative head (the headship which peculiarly pertains to the church, and not to the race--Eph. 1:22, 23), and bestows it upon that part of the race which has been regenerated by faith. This headship, therefore, is conditional, and the salvation which depends upon it is not universal, but conditioned on faith. To illustrate by a figure, there are two doors which we must pass in order to inherit eternal life. The first is natural death. This door was closed for all by Adam, and opened for all by Christ. The second is the judgment. This door was closed for all having capacity to sin by their own individual sins, and opened by Christ for those who shall be justified through belief in him. Therefore, in teaching that Christ leads all through the first door, Paul has not taught universal salvation, for true, complete salvation lies beyond the second door. Justification from the sin of Adam is one thing, and final justification from our own sins is quite another.160

159 Cottrell later makes this same point. See Cottrell, pp. 188-189.
160 McGarvey and Pendleton, p. 337.
1.3.6.3 ANALYSIS

McGarvey and Pendleton make their most important contribution in their discussion of Christ’s provision of resurrection for all mankind. They are careful not to stray into a doctrine of universal salvation, yet they make an important connection between their view of Christ’s redemptive work on all people and their eschatological views. So all people will be resurrected despite their response to Christ’s saving work. This view emphasizes the fairness of God’s justice. He has provided, through Christ’s death and resurrection, redemption from the things over which humanity, save Adam, had no control. If humans are to be condemned, it will be upon their own choice to sin and deny redemption offered to them through faith in Christ, rather than the sin of their representative.

1.3.7 ANALYSIS OF ORIGINAL GRACE IN STONE-CAMPBELL SOTERIOLOGY

Original Grace could not rightly be considered a central tenant of the Stone-Campbell Movement’s doctrinal position. Each of the writers surveyed hold very influential positions in the Movement’s history, but Original Grace has not been widely accepted. What most, or perhaps all, do accept is that original sin, especially as found in Romans 5, does not include original guilt. Views vary on the level of depravity, from a Pelagian (none at all) to a semi-Augustinian (partial depravity—sin is inevitable) view. Wherever the theologian may stand on this spectrum, original guilt is denied along with its implications, such as infant baptism and the condemnation of the innocent.

In essence, the central tenant of the Stone-Campbell position is the denial of original guilt derived from Adam’s sin, no matter the method of arriving to that position. In that general sense, this discussion is absolutely vital to each writer’s discussion of soteriology. Several things are derived from this position: the denial of concepts such as infant baptism, total depravity and thus the need for God to act before salvation can be obtained, and the
acceptance of human freedom in terms of sin and salvation. The two major approaches can be divided thus: (1) either Romans 5 and related passages are believed to simply not teach original guilt, specifically, or original sin altogether, or (2) they teach a version of Original Grace. Theologically, each position arrives in the same location: the innocent are not condemned by Adam’s sin. Exegetically, however, they differ drastically. The first position, the denial of original sin/guilt, in Romans 5 may be guilty of ignoring Paul’s seemingly apparent language on the consequences of Adam’s sin. In other words, can one go so far as to say that Paul is not describing even the mildest version of original sin? The Original Grace position seeks to take Paul’s language at face value, namely that Adam’s sin brought perhaps very dire consequences upon humanity. Yet, it also aims to give due justice to Paul’s language about the all-sufficiency of the work of Christ in regards to sin. Does this position hold exegetical weight? These issues will be explored in Chapter 2.

Each Stone-Campbell writer places a different level of emphasis on Original Grace. The spectrum stretches from Robert Milligan, who mentioned the doctrine almost in passing, as if taken for granted with no explanation, to J.S. Lamar, who provides a more extensive treatment of the doctrine. All of the writers discuss the doctrine in the midst of treating a controversial position (i.e. infant baptism, original guilt, etc.) with no apparent (at least not stated) connection to Anabaptist or Wesleyan influence. In addition to these contextual effects, they come to their positions on the basis of exegetical work on biblical texts, and on the basis of their presuppositions that the above listed opposing positions do not fit the biblical evidence. Cottrell is also interested in confronting these issues, and gives significant credence to biblical evidence, as well. However, he also has a chronological advantage: he is able to survey Anabaptist, Wesleyan, and his Stone-Campbell predecessors for support.
So, despite small number of proponents of this position across Stone-Campbell scholarship, does Original Grace have validity within the Movement’s theology? More specifically, is there any evidence that makes it logically contradictory with the overall theological framework? With questions of this sort answered, we must turn to questions of exegetical validity. Is Original Grace biblically valid, based upon exegetical methods and assumptions of these Stone-Campbell theologians?

In Chapter 2, we turn to the work of Jack Cottrell, who serves as the sole voice in reviving the doctrine he terms Original Grace, very late in the 20th century. We will explore, in detail, his sophisticated, mature version of the doctrine in the context of his exegesis of Romans 5:12-21, against the backdrop of these previous proponents.\(^{161}\) To that end, the next chapter will seek to understand and evaluate Original Grace from a primarily biblical perspective, by providing a brief overview of earlier approaches to the passage, delving deeply into the exegetical work of Cottrell, and evaluating the strength, significance and distinctiveness of the reading of the text that produces the doctrine of Original Grace. Looking even further forward, Chapter 3 will provide both a theological analysis of Original Grace, built off of the exegetical work in Chapter 2, as well as a final analysis of the validity of Original Grace for Stone-Campbell Movement Soteriology.

\(^{161}\) As we will see, he intentionally builds upon the sources discussed in this chapter.
CHAPTER 2

A HERMENEUTICAL AND EXEGETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BIBLICAL SUPPORT FOR ORIGINAL GRACE

This chapter explores the exegetical basis for the doctrine of Original Grace. I begin by briefly surveying major ideas concerning the original sin debate to show how they reach the world of Jack Cottrell. The bulk of attention is given to Romans 5:12-21, as the principal passage cited in discussions of the subject, and to the exegesis of Jack Cottrell, who displays the most current and developed version doctrine of Original Grace. For Cottrell, the doctrine is primarily presented as being justified by detailed

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1 Romans 5:12-21 is clearly the principal biblical passage for the discussion of original sin and Original Grace. The proponents of Original Grace surveyed in Chapter 1 focus almost totally on this pericope. There are, however, three other brief biblical passages that may point to Original Grace: John 1:29, Galatians 3:13, and Colossians 2:14. None of the proponents use these passages, if they mention them at all, in order to support their view, except for Jack Cottrell. Even Cottrell does not give them attention in his two main writings on Original Grace. Instead, he mentions them in course notes from a graduate course, “Doctrines of Grace,” that I took under him at Cincinnati Christian University. Exegetical evidence proving Original Grace in regard to these passages is tenuous and speculative. Both Galatians 3:13, “Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us, for it is written: ‘Cursed is everyone who is hung on a tree,’”1 and Colossians 2:14, “having canceled the written code, with its regulations, that was against us and that stood opposed to us; he took it away, nailing it to the cross,”1 are written to Christians about their salvation as former sinners. Depending on how one interprets the passages, the emphasis on salvation may be for the purpose of contrasting the community salvation received by Jews and Christians. However, both do refer to the cancelling of the law and its effects by Jesus’ redemptive act. Much interpretive work has been done on these passages, but it will not be recorded here. The passages certainly support such cancellation for those that have become Christians, but do not obviously support the same for all humans. John 1:29 states, “The next day John saw Jesus coming toward him and said, ‘Look, the Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world!’” It would likely be difficult to align John’s concept of sin and the role of the Lamb of God in taking away the sin of the world, with the language of Romans 5:12-21. If proponents of Original Grace are correct in their approach to the passage—that “the sin of the world” includes both Adamic and personal sin—then it is a possible conclusion that John’s statement includes both types of sin. The passage, by itself, however, does not define the content of “the sin of the world.” Therefore, whether these passages support, or at least echo, Romans 5:12-21, depends upon one’s exegetical conclusions on this principal passage. All Scripture quotations, unless otherwise indicated, are taken from The Holy Bible: New International Version (Grand Rapids: Zondervan & International Bible Society, 1973, 1978, &1984).
exegesis, so that in order to understand his presentation and advocacy of the doctrine, it is necessary to understand the exegetical basis he provides. The task of understanding his exegesis will include an exploration of the assumptions that shape it and the questions that it raises. Also, in order to understand it more deeply, to see what is distinctive about it, and to acknowledge the questions it faces, I will set my examination of his exegesis of Romans 5:12-21 in the context of other interpretations, by noting where Cottrell's approach represents a distinctive option in the context of modern scholarship. To be plain, my aim is not to map other approaches to the passage, whether ancient or modern, but to understand Cottrell’s approach more deeply.

I look for other commentators that throw interesting light on Cottrell’s work, in order to understand more deeply the ways in which Cottrell’s position is explicitly set in conversation with other positions, whether they agree with his conclusions or not. I also go beyond what light other positions can shed, and analyze Cottrell’s approach and conclusions in my own right.

In regard to the interaction with other interpreters, I analyze the evidence in the terms that the authors themselves use: whether their exegesis is successful in the terms that they themselves set. Authors are chosen that share some basic hermeneutical assumptions with Cottrell, such as that Paul is the author of this passage and that the discernment of his original intent is paramount to the passages’ correct exegesis, in order that those writers have enough resemblance to Cottrell’s approach as to provide relevant and interesting comparison and contrast. At its core, the doctrine of Original Grace is a different way of reading Romans 5:12-21. Therefore, the careful exegesis of the passage is essential to testing its viability.

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2 I have gathered all of the sources referenced in Cottrell’s section on Romans 5 in order to discover the exegetical context in which Cottrell worked. The sources that he cites are representative of the spectrum of opinions on Romans 5:12-21, within similar hermeneutical assumptions.

3 For example, liberation or feminist hermeneutics sometimes begin with drastically different assumptions, which are not relevant to the purpose of this thesis.
I do not seek to provide a final solution to the interpretive issues regarding Romans 5, and also do not seek to provide my own independent exegesis of the passage, largely because it is unlikely that it is possible at this stage, and, additionally, it is beyond the scope of the project. Instead, I seek, primarily, to gain a deeper understanding of the ways in which the doctrine of Original Grace has been extracted from this text, explore the most detailed textual justification that has been provided for that extraction, and determine what kind of exegetical, hermeneutical, and theological issues are at stake in the kind of reading of the text that brings out the doctrine of Original Grace. Secondarily, I seek to assess whether the Original Grace interpretation of the passage is successful on its own terms—whether from the kind of theological perspective that determines, or attempts to determine, the conceptual details of Christian doctrine by means of this kind of exegesis, looking for authorial intent and trusting it as a guide to resolve our questions about the connections and distinctions that shape systematic theology, this interpretation is a responsible and defensible possibility, worthy of consideration.\textsuperscript{4} In other words, I seek to find out whether the doctrine of Original Grace as presented and justified by Cottrell is a viable, reasonable, and responsible position to hold. Of course, there are larger theological, historical, and practical concerns that are explored in Chapters 1 and 3 of this project. Thus, the point of this chapter is to be reactive to Cottrell’s claims, rather than to proactively pursue alternative positions.

The first part of the chapter gives a brief historical survey of ancient writers’ reading of Romans 5:12-21, beginning with the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Century Apologists and ending with Augustine. The next major section provides a brief biography of Jack Cottrell and presents a detailed summary of Cottrell’s exegesis of Romans 5:12-21. Each verse of Romans 5:12-21 is considered separately with a description of Cottrell’s exegesis. Any

\textsuperscript{4} How this doctrine relates to other perspectives will be explored in Chapter 3.
comments or questions are primarily present to discuss and clarify Cottrell’s position through my own analytical thoughts and probing questions when something significant arises that may not be clear.

The last part of the Chapter consists of a section that separately treats the most vital issues affecting the validity of Cottrell’s exegesis of the text. Whereas the aforementioned section was written primarily to describe and promote understanding of the exegetical foundations for Original Grace, the last section in this chapter seeks to “dig beneath the surface” by identifying both overt and covert theological and exegetical assumptions and distinctions that act as the true foundation of this exegetical approach, and evaluating them to judge their level of merit. Representative authors are sometimes used, not to set up some kind of neutral adjudication between them all and ascertain which of their interpretations is the most probable, for this is secondary, but instead to set Cottrell’s exegesis into relief; those authors are used to ask the vital question, “If these authors rest their interpretation on common assumptions, such as biblical authority and the importance of authorial intent, why do they come to very different theological/doctrinal conclusions?” More pointedly, “What causes Cottrell to come to such distinctive conclusions?” Before we answer those questions, we will turn to a brief history of the interpretation of Romans 5:12-21.

2.1.0 A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INTERPRETATION OF ROMANS 5:12-21

2.1.1 SECOND CENTURY APOLOGISTS

Before explaining and analyzing the exegetical claims that lead to Original Grace, it will be helpful to provide a broad view of the major interpretations of Romans 5:12-21 from the early Church, namely from the Apostle Paul to Augustine.\(^5\) The

earliest writers, excluding Paul, since his words on the topic are thoroughly treated in the project, upon which we will engage in a much deeper discussion in the subsequent section, neither promote a strong view of inherited guilt, on one end of the spectrum, nor any view like Original Grace. Inherited guilt does not gain a following until much closer to the time of Augustine, or arguably, within the work of Augustine himself. As I have shown in Chapter 1, Original Grace is not articulated until the time of the Anabaptists. The early Christian situation is varied and complex, but a few general statements can be made. First, there is a definite divergence between Greek and Latin writers regarding the exegesis of Romans 5:12f. Greek authors did not develop a concept that all humanity actually sinned in Adam (original sin), and thus were guilty of that sin (original guilt), at least partially because they had access to the correct text without the Latin in quo (in whom) translated from the Greek phrase ἐφ᾽ ὧν. The Greek position, in contrast, has been stated thus: “Whatever their opinion on the grammatical question, the Greek writers without exception understood this inheritance to be an inheritance of morality and corruption only, without an inheritance of guilt—which for them could only result from a freely committed personal act.” It is likely accurate to avoid the use of the term “original sin” (originalis peccatum) when speaking of the general Greek position, due to the connotation of guilt coming from the Latin interpretation.

Most 2nd Century writers were not concerned with Romans 5:12 at all. Kelly cites two possible examples: the Epistle of Barnabas (12:5 and 6:11) and the Shepherd of Hermas (12:1f). It is not until Origen’s Commentary on Romans (3rd Century) and Ambrosiaster’s commentary on Paul’s epistles (4th Century) that there is any serious dealing with the passage. The 2nd Century apologists are much more concerned with

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6 Weaver, ‘From Paul to Augustine,’ p. 187.

7 Kelly, p. 163.
combating pagan religion and Greek and Gnostic philosophy, meaning that their subjects focused on morality, salvation in Christ, and monotheism.⁸

Concerning the entrance of sin into the world, the apologists are much more prone to cite the seduction to evil by demons than any transmission from Adam. Adam, however, does have a role in process. Kelly describes the general position of Tatian, Theophilus, and Justin: “Like Justin, therefore, both of them [Tatian and Theophilus] seem to accept the Pauline teaching in so far as it links the entrance of sin and death into the world with Adam’s act of disobedience; but neither of them, any more than Justin sees that act as more than a type of disobedience of the race, although its consequences persist in the subjection of Adam’s descendants to labour, pain, death, and of course, the power of evil spirits.”⁹

Irenaeus’ position follows the teachings of both Theophilus and Tatian. Adam is endowed with God’s image and likeness, and has the Holy Spirit. However, he is immature, and therefore his sin is akin to a child disobeying a father. His sin disrupts the progress of humanity toward spiritual maturity, but it does not bring any kind of total destruction.¹⁰ “In several passages he implies a racial solidarity in Adam and involvement in his sin (e.g., Against the Heresies 3:18:1, 2, 7; 5:16:3; 5:34:2), but the mode of that involvement is never dwelt upon or elaborated, remaining entirely undefined. Although he is a witness to the tradition of the inheritance of death it is hard to find in Irenaeus anything that could be understood as inherited sinfulness.”¹¹ He does, however, extend the twin ideas of the unity of humanity and Adam’s sin to a logical conclusion: “... through the disobedience of that one man who was first formed out of the untilled earth, the many were made sinners and lost life.”¹² He is certainly echoing the text of Romans 5 here. He further explains: “In the first Adam, we offended God,

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⁸ Weaver, p. 189.
⁹ Kelly, p. 168.
¹⁰ Weaver, ‘From Paul to Augustine,’ p. 191.
¹¹ Ibid., p. 191-192.
¹² Irenaeus, Against Heresies (Adversus Haereses). III. 18. 7.
not fulfilling His commandment. . . . To Him alone we were debtors, whose ordinance we transgressed in the beginning\(^{13}\) . . . In Adam disobedient man was stricken.\(^{14}\) In response to this seemingly hopeless position, Irenaeus articulates the doctrine of recapitulation, in which Christ takes all of creation, including humanity, into Himself to redeem it from the effects of sin.\(^{15}\)

### 2.1.2 THE THIRD CENTURY

The third century marks the beginnings of divergence between eastern and western ideas concerning Adamic sin. A brief comparison of Tertullian and Cyprian from the west and Clement and Origen from the east will serve to illustrate the change.

Tertullian taught that every child’s soul “is a twig cut from the parent stem of Adam and planted as an independent tree,”\(^{16}\) and therefore, “the evil that exists in the soul . . . is antecedent, being derived from the fault of our origin and having become, in a way, natural to us. For, as I have stated, the corrupted nature is a second nature.”\(^{17}\) Each soul exists “‘in Adam’ until in baptism it is cleansed and reborn ‘in Christ’.”\(^{18}\) It is unclear whether Tertullian considered the state of personal sinfulness and an inherited sinful state as separate, as evidenced by his view on infant baptism: “Why should innocent infancy be in such a hurry to come to the forgiveness of sins? Let them come while they are maturing, which they are learning, which they are being taught what it is they are coming to. Let them be made Christians when they have become able to know Christ.”\(^{19}\) He does call Adam “the pioneer of our race and of our sin,”\(^{20}\) and says that, “Man is condemned to death for having tasted the fruit of one miserable tree, and from it proceed sins with their penalties; and now all are perishing who have never even seen

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\(^{13}\) Ibid., V. 16. 3.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., V. 34. 2.

\(^{15}\) Ibid., III. 18.7; V. 21. 1-3.

\(^{16}\) This is usually known as traducianist anthropology.

\(^{17}\) Ibid., p. 192. Tertullian, *On the Soul (De Anima)*, XIX.; XXXIV. 41; XLI. 11. Also see, Kelly, p. 174.

\(^{18}\) Ibid.

\(^{19}\) Tertullian, *On Baptism (De Baptismo)*, XVIII. 5.

\(^{20}\) Tertullian, *On Chastity (De Castitatis)*, II. 5.
a single bit of paradise,"^21 yet, apparently, does not indicate that any original sin needs
to be remitted for infants in baptism. It is unclear what exactly Tertullian believed on
the issue, but his view of inherited sin probably did not include inherited guilt. This
naturally leads to an understanding of original sin somewhat similar to Irenaeus, but it is
unclear whether he necessitated the concept of original guilt. Tertullian explains the
effect of Adam’s sin on each soul: “. . . every soul is counted as being in Adam until it
is re-counted as being in Christ, and remains unclean until it is so re-counted.”^22
Further, he explains the “fellowship” that humans share in Adam: “We have borne the
image of the earthy through our participation in transgression, our fellowship in death,
our expulsion from Paradise.”^23 Ambiguity exists concerning original guilt in the
context of the impurity of infants. He explains that baptism is necessary to rid them of
this impurity, but never explicitly states that they inherited guilt for which they will be
condemned.\(^24\)

Cyprian of Carthage, the other representative of third century western thought,
articulates a hypothetical doctrine of original sin in order to explain the importance of
infant baptism:

If, when they subsequently come to believe, forgiveness of sins is granted even
to the worst transgressors and to those who have sinned much against God, and
if no one is denied access to baptism and to grace; how much less right do we
have to deny it to an infant, who, having been born recently, has not sinned,
except in that, being born physically according to Adam he has contracted the
contagion of the ancient death by his first birth. The infant approaches that
much more easily to the reception of the forgiveness of sins because the sins
remitted are not his own, but those of another.\(^25\)

Cyprian is certain that baptism and grace can remit the sin of Adam, which is much less
serious than one’s personal sin. Apparently, the sin of Adam is a “contagion of the
ancient death,” but Cyprian does not fully describe the content of that concept.

\(^{21}\) Tertullian, Against Marcion (Adversus Marcionem), I. 28. 2
\(^{22}\) Ibid., 40.
\(^{23}\) Tertullian, The Resurrection of the Body (De Resurrectione Carnis), XLIX.
\(^{24}\) Ibid. See so, De Anima, XXXIX.
\(^{25}\) Cyprian, Letters, LXIV. 5.
In the east, Clement of Alexandria did not find a connection between the sin of Adam and personal sin in regard to the sinful nature of humanity. He even doubted that God actually inflicted the human race with death as a result of Adam’s sin. Instead, Adam’s sin brought what Weaver calls a “nonmoral ontological . . . separation from God.”

For example, he argues that a “newly born child” does not fall “under the curse of Adam”:

> When Jeremiah says, “Cursed be the day in which I was born, and let it not be longed for,” he is not saying simply that birth is accursed, but is in despair at the sins and disobedience of the people. In fact he goes on, "Why was I born to see labour and pain and my days accomplished in shame?" All those who preach the truth are persecuted and in danger because of the disobedience of their hearers. "Why did not my mother's womb become my tomb, that I might not see the distress of Jacob and the toil of the nation of Israel?" says Esdras the prophet. “No one is pure from defilement," says Job, "not even if his life last but one day." Let them tell us how the newly born child could commit fornication, or how that which has done nothing has fallen under the curse of Adam. The only consistent answer for them, it seems, is to say that birth is an evil, not only for the body, but also for the soul for the sake of which the body itself exists. And when David says: “In sin I was born and in unrighteousness my mother conceived me," he says in prophetic manner that Eve is his mother. For Eve became the mother of the living." But if he was conceived in sin, yet he was not himself in sin, nor is he himself sin.

Origen teaches that we inherit consequences from Adam’s sin. He never says that humans sinned in Adam. Instead, he describes sin and iniquity as both a stain or blemish, and says that every person gains it by being born into the flesh, and that humans are expelled from paradise along with Adam. In regard to the blemish or stain, in the context of Romans 5:12, he says the following:

> He thus shows us that by its birth in the flesh every soul contracts a stain of sin and iniquity . . . Why should baptism for remission of sins be administered, as is the practice of the Church, even to little children? Undoubtedly, if in little children there is nothing that needs forbearance and pardon, the grace of baptism would be superfluous . . . Every man, on entering this world, contracts a blemish . . . From the moment he dwells in his mother’s womb . . . Every man, then, has been stained at his conception, in his father and in his mother. Only my Lord Jesus entered the world unblemished.”

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26 Weaver, ‘From Paul to Augustine,’ p. 194.
27 Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies (Stromata), III. 16; III. 100.
29 Ibid.
Origen’s belief in the premundane fall of souls is the foundation of this doctrine. Material existence is sinful existence, because in that fall, people “had fallen away from the contemplation of God” and also because material existence is a product of the fall, thus clouding the intellect.” 30 This defilement does not come as an inheritance from Adam. Instead he clarifies what consequence the sin of Adam had on humanity: “For all men were in the loins of Adam when he was in paradise, and when he was expelled from it; thus the death which came from prevarication passed by him into those who are of his blood; thus the apostle says: ‘As all die in Adam, all will be resurrected in Christ.’” 31 In regard to Romans 5:15, he asks why men are subject to death if Adam is the cause of death. He answers that men are subject to death, not from nature, but from following his example. 32 Ultimately, Origen is unsure if men die for their own sins or for Adam’s: “Whether all the sons of Adam were in his loins and were expelled with him from paradise, or whether each one of us was banished personally and received his condemnation in some way, that we cannot tell, and that only God knows.” 33 Of course, in order to consider personal banishment from paradise a possibility, Origen draws from his belief that the account of the fall of Adam was an allegorical description of the premundane fall of souls. 34

### 2.1.3 THE FOURTH CENTURY

Among fourth century fathers, including Athanasius, Cyril of Jerusalem, and Methodius, and also including the Cappadocian fathers, Basil and Gregory of Nyssa, death is seen as the universal consequence of Adam’s fall, but the processes and effects are normally left unspecified. 35

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30 Weaver, ‘From Paul to Augustine,’ p. 195.
31 Origen, Commentary on Romans, XIV. 1010.
32 Ibid., XIV. 1024b.
33 Ibid., XIV. 1010d–1011a.
34 Weaver, ‘From Paul to Augustine,’ pp. 196-197.
35 Ibid., pp. 197-198. See also, Rondet, p. 89 and F.R. Tennant, The Sources of the Doctrine of the Fall and Original Sin (Cambridge: 1903), p. 315-321. Tennant thinks that Gregory perhaps comes the closest to the future Augustinian position, but there appear to be contradictory statement and
Ambrose and Ambrosiaster serve as a window into the fourth-century Latin theories of human nature and salvation. Their views certainly influenced Augustine, who would later formulate a much more severe doctrine of original sin. The primary assumption that leads to this doctrine is the unity of human nature. Ambrose explains:

Adam existed, and in him we all existed; Adam perished, and in him all perished . . . In Adam I fell, in Adam I was cast out of Paradise, in Adam I died. How should God restore me, unless He find in me Adam, justified in Christ, exactly as in that first Adam I was subject to guilt and destined to death?36

It would seem that Ambrose is proposing a doctrine of original guilt. However, some of his other writings reveal a difference between inherited sin and personal sin. Hereditary sin is removed by infant baptism and personal sin by the washing of feet.37 The former merely gives humanity a propensity toward sin, but will not have any effect on humans on the day of judgment. Only personal sin will be valid reason for punishment.38

Ambrosiaster agrees by claiming that Adam’s sin is passed to humanity, as corruption, not guilt, through physical descent:39 “You perceive that men are not made guilty by the fact of their birth, but by their evil behaviour.”40

These two writers give a picture that certainly leans toward Augustine’s later understanding of original sin. More importantly, they give a clear understanding of the general perception of human nature and how that relates to the transmission of Adam’s sin.

2.1.4 PELAGIUS AND AUGUSTINE

2.1.4.1 PELAGIUS

We will avoid all but a brief description of the views of Pelagius and a bit more on Augustine. Suffice it to say that these two positions are radical and antithetical to

36 Ambrose, On the Death of Brother Satyrus (De excessu fratris Satyri), II. 6.
37 Ambrose, On the Mysteries (De mysteriis). XXXII; enarr. in ps. XLVIII. 8.
38 Ambrose, Explanation of the Psalms (Explanatio psalmorum), XLVIII. 9.
39 Ambrosiaster, Commentary on Romans, VII. 14.
40 Ambrosiaster, Quaestiones veteris et novi testamenti. XXII.
one another. Pelagius had many followers. Among them was a man named Celestius, who served as a kind of leader of the movement which Pelagius had begun. Celestius is likely responsible for the issue of original sin coming to the forefront of theological discussion, especially with Augustine, by stressing the tenets of Pelagianism even beyond the point Pelagius wished to press.\footnote{Augustine, \textit{On Man's Perfection in Righteousness} (\textit{De perfectione iustitiae hominis}), XXIIIf. See also, Kelly, p. 361.} However, for the sake of brevity, Pelagianism has been aptly summarized as follows: “(1) Adam was created moral and would have died whether he had sinned or not; (2) the sin of Adam injured only him, not the race; (3) the law leads to the kingdom (of heaven), just as the gospel does; (4) even before Christ there were men without sin; (5) newborn infants are in the same state that Adam was before his transgression; and (6) the human race as a whole does not die through the death and transgression of Adam, nor does it rise again through the resurrection of Christ.”\footnote{Weaver, ‘From Paul to Augustine,’ p. 204, taken from a summary by Augustine from six articles taken from Celestius in, Augustine, \textit{On Original Sin}, 11:12.} We now turn to a few examples of Pelagius’ words in this regard.

The core of Pelagius’ doctrine is free will and the nature of human action. Essentially, humans have the ability to choose good or evil. His view of human action includes three components: power, will, and realization.\footnote{Augustine, \textit{On the Grace of Christ, and on Original Sin} (\textit{De gratia Christi et de peccato originali}), I. 5.} Power comes from God, but the other two are the domain of humanity, and thus give him control over choice. Of course, the influence of sin is in the world, leading humans to sin, but it is not the result of any inborn defect caused by Adam’s sin, for “before he begins exercising his will, there is only in him what God has created.”\footnote{Ibid., II. 14.} What is the practical implication of this sin in regard to the salvation of an infant? What then is the role of infant baptism, if any? It is only benedictory, rather than for the removal of sin or any sort of imperfection. So, they were already destined for eternal life, and thus, infant baptism
brought, “spiritual illumination, adoption as children of God, citizenship of the heavenly Jerusalem, sanctification and membership of Christ, with inheritance in the kingdom of heaven.”\textsuperscript{45} So, it is certainly not unimportant, but as we will see, it is vital for Augustine. The infant must have original sin removed to receive eternal life, whereas the theology of Pelagius places infant baptism in a much less vital role.

The adult chooses good or evil according to his own will without any direct act of grace by God. Pelagius called the inherent faculty of free choice a kind of grace, along with the special revelation given by God, including the law and the example of Christ, of which humans can have knowledge.\textsuperscript{46} Thus, grace is offered to all people, not just to those on which God gives a special measure of grace. All humans have the tools, so to speak, to be holy. For example, he claims that “a man can if he will, observe God’s commandments without sinning.”\textsuperscript{47} Of course, this is no easy task. Instead, it is an immense exercise of will and discipline that increases over one’s life.\textsuperscript{48} In summary, Pelagius’ view may perhaps be categorized as naturalistic, at least in one sense of the term. In other words, Adam and every human are born in their natural, mortal state, not marred by sin, but perhaps only influenced by it, and are totally free to choose good or evil by exercise of will with a small measure of “grace,” limited to God’s gift of free will and His teaching on holiness through His revelation to mankind.

2.1.4.2 AUGUSTINE

Augustine is largely responsible for the capstone version of original sin that would be so influential in the Western Church for the next 1,000 years. Although Augustine had already produced many well-developed soteriological ideas, it was in the

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., II. 20-23.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., I. 45.
\textsuperscript{47} Augustine, \textit{On the Proceedings of Pelagius (De gestis Pelagii)}, p. 16.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p. 20.
debate with Pelagius that the Church received the full picture. It raged until it was “settled” by the Council of Carthage (A.D. 418) and Pope Zosimus’ document *Epistula tractoria* in the condemnation of the views of Pelagius. Pelagius’ doctrines were officially anathematized at the council of Ephesus on July 22, 431 A.D. Certainly, the debate among theologians did not end, but was certainly decreased throughout the Medieval Period when a basically Augustinian view of sin and salvation dominated the theological climate. It would be taken up again during the Protestant Reformation.

In contrast to Pelagius, Augustine’s position has been summarized as follows: “In his doctrine, Adam was the summit of created perfection, possessing original righteousness, total equanimity, serenity and immortality. The fall of Adam was a cataclysmic event that virtually destroyed human nature. Through concupiscence, Adam’s descendants inherited not only the effects of Adam’s sin—mortality, corruption and enslavement to the passions—but also, because of their seminal identity with him, original guilt (a forensic category first made explicit by Augustine), which rendered them hateful to God and liable to eternal damnation.”

Augustine provides this overview of his doctrine: “In the misdirected choice of that one man all sinned in him, since all were that one man, from whom on that account they all severally derive original sin... All sinned in Adam on that occasion, for all were already identical with him in that nature of his which was endowed with the capacity to generate them.”

2.1.4.2.1 The Original State of Humanity

Adam was created in a perfect state, usually referred to as “original righteousness,” very different from the state into which he would fall after his sin. Adam began immortal, provided he continued in a sinless state and fellowship with God.

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49 The coverage of the entire debate between these theological giants is unnecessary for three main reasons: it is beyond the scope of what is helpful in this project, it would take up entirely too much space, and it has been done adequately in other works.


and ate of the Tree of Life. He had the ability to avoid sin (posse non peccare), was inclined toward virtue, and was surrounded by divine grace (indumentums gratiae), given the divine gift of perseverance, which allowed him to persist in the correct exercise of his will. If Adam had any weakness, it was the fact that he was a creature, and thus not unchangeable, and ultimately corruptible, however unlikely.

2.1.4.2.2 The Nature of the Fall and Original Sin

Adam fell, totally by his own will, despite the advantageous nature of his original state. He was susceptible to temptation by Satan, primarily because of his pride, manifested by his desire to be like God. His sin was terrible and ruined the entire human race by condemning it to be a race of sinners. Augustine describes the multi-faceted nature of Adam’s sin: “For there is pride in it, since man preferred to be under his own rule rather than the rule of God; and sacrilege too, for man did not acknowledge God; and murder, since he cast himself down to death; and spiritual fornication, for the integrity of the human mind was corrupted by the seduction of the serpent; and theft, since the forbidden fruit was snatched; and avarice, since he hungered for more than should have sufficed for him.” Augustine cites several verses to support his view that Adam’s sin made the entire human race sinful: Psalm 51, the book of Job, Ephesians 2:3, Romans 5:12, and John 3:3-5.

2.1.4.2.2 Infants and Original Sin

Augustine summarizes his position concerning infants and original sin in the chapter, “Of the Male, Who Was to Lose His Soul If He Was Not Circumcised on the...
Eighth Day, Because He Had Broken God’s Covenant” in *City of God*. Augustine explains that infants are responsible for breaking the covenant of God, not directly by sinning themselves, but through the sin of Adam. He uses the Jewish sign of the covenant, circumcision, as an example to prove his point that although the infant does not choose whether to be circumcised or not, he could still be in breach of the covenant if he were not circumcised. It is the same with the infant sinsing in Adam. He does not choose it, yet is still in violation of the covenant and in need of grace. For Augustine, although not mentioned here, the covenant symbol would be infant baptism.

Augustine’s argument is rather complex, drawing from several places in Scripture and making several assumptions and inferences. Thus we must see most of his argument on the topic to make the connections that hold his argument together.

But even the infants, not personally in their own life, but according to the common origin of the human race, have all broken God’s covenant in that one in whom all have sinned. [Romans 5:12, 19] Now there are many things called God’s covenants besides those two great ones, the old and the new, which any one who pleases may read and know. For the first covenant, which was made with the first man, is just this: “In the day ye eat thereof, ye shall surely die.” [Genesis 2:17] hence it is written in the book called Ecclesiasticus, “All flesh waxeth old as doth a garment. For the covenant from the beginning is, “Thou shall die the death.” [Ecclesiasticus 15:17] Now, as the law was more plainly given afterward, and the apostle says, “Where no law is, there is no prevarication,” [Romans 4:15] on what supposition is what is said in the psalm true, “I accounted all the sinners of the earth prevaricators,” [Psalm 119 LXX] except that all who are held liable for any sin are accused of dealing deceitfully (prevaricating) with some law? If on this account, then, even the infants are, according to the true belief, born in sin, not actual but original, so that we confess they have need of grace for the remission of sins, certainly it must be acknowledged that in the same sense in which they are sinners they are also prevaricators of that law which was given in Paradise, according to the truth of both scriptures, “I accounted all the sinners of the earth prevaricators,” and “Where no law is, there is no prevarication.” And thus, because circumcision was the sign of regeneration, and the infant, on account of the original sin by which God’s covenant was first broken, was not undeservedly to lose his generation unless delivered by regeneration, these divine words are to be understood as if it had been said, Whoever is not born again, that soul shall perish from his people, because he hath broken my covenant, since he also has sinned in Adam with all others. For had He said, Because he hath broken this my covenant, He would have compelled us to understand by it only this of circumcision; but since He has not expressly said what covenant the infant has broken, we are free to understand Him as speaking of that covenant of which the breach can be ascribed to an infant. Yet if any one contends that it is said of
nothing else than circumcision, that in it the infant has broken the covenant of God because, he is not circumcised, he must seek some method of explanation by which it may be understood without absurdity (such as this) that he has broken the covenant, because it has been broken in him although not by him. Yet in this case also it is to be observed that the soul of the infant, being guilty of no sin of neglect against itself, would perish unjustly, unless original sin rendered it obnoxious to punishment.\textsuperscript{65}

Augustine recognized the unfortunate conclusion of his position, namely children are still punished because of original sin, despite their lack of direct responsibility.

Augustine uses Romans 5:12 to show that Adam’s sin was spread to all of humanity: Still, even in that one sin—which "entered into the world by one man and so spread to all men," and on account of which infants are baptized—one can recognize a plurality of sins, if that single sin is divided, so to say, into its separate elements.\textsuperscript{66} Those elements are pride, murder, spiritual fornication, and avarice.\textsuperscript{67} More specifically, he distinguishes between “Actual and Original Sin” based upon the passage:

Again, in the clause which follows, 'In which all have sinned,' how cautiously, rightly, and unambiguously is the statement expressed! For if you understand that sin to be meant which by one man entered into the world, ‘In which [sin] all have sinned,’ it is surely clear enough, that the sins which are peculiar to every man, which they themselves commit and which belong simply to them, mean one thing; and that the one sin, in and by which all have sinned, means another thing; since all were that one man. If, however, it be not the sin, but that one man that is understood, ‘In which [one man] all have sinned,’ what again can be plainer than even this clear statement?\textsuperscript{68}

He also distinguishes between actually sinning in Adam or just being influenced by Adam’s sin, and thus sinning in imitation of Adam (a specifically Pelagian concept), of which he chooses the former: “I do not believe that any one can find it anywhere stated in the Holy Scriptures, that a man has ever sinned or still sins ‘in the devil,’ although all wicked and impious men ‘imitate’ him. The apostle, however, has declared

\textsuperscript{66} \textit{Enchiridion}, p. 45.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{68} \textit{On Merits and Remission of Sin, and Infant Baptism}, 1:11.
concerning the first man, that ‘in him all have sinned;’ and yet there is still a contest about the propagation of sin, and men oppose to it I know not what nebulous theory of ‘imitation.’”⁶⁹ So, if humans actually sinned in Adam and not simply through imitating his bad example, how does it work?

Augustine assumes humanity’s solidarity with Adam, as others before have done, but goes even further by making humanity specifically participatory in Adam’s sinful act: “In the misdirected choice of that one man all sinned in him, since all were that one man, from whom on that account they severally drive original sin.”⁷⁰ Since sin is ultimately a matter of the will,⁷¹ all willed to sin in the person of Adam: “all sinned in Adam on that occasion, for all were already identical with him in that nature of his which was endowed with the capacity to generate them.”⁷² If sin is a matter of the will, then how did the rest of humanity exercise their will to sin? Augustine says that the will was exercised in Adam, and thus it is valid to consider all to have acted upon the basis of their will.⁷³

Several effects come from original sin. The first is guilt, which may be removed by baptism, for the infant or the adult.⁷⁴ In this regard, all of humanity is a “universal mass of perdition” or “lump of sin.”⁷⁵ If children are not baptized, they will experience an eternal hell with the Devil,⁷⁶ even if their suffering is somewhat less than adults that sin personally.⁷⁷ The second is a depraved nature. Man is enslaved to ignorance, concupiscence, and death,⁷⁸ but “the spark, as it were, of reason in virtue of which he

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⁶⁹ Ibid.
⁷¹ Retractions, I: 15.2.
⁷² On Merits and Remission of Sin, and Infant Baptism, 3:14.
⁷³ Augustine, Retractions, I:13:5.
⁷⁴ Augustine, Against Julian (Contra Iulianum), 6,49f.
⁷⁵ Augustine, Various Questions for Simplicianus (De Diversis Quaestionibus Ad Simplicianum), pp. I: 404-405. On the Grace of Christ, and on Original Sin (De gratia Christi et de peccato originali), 2,34.
⁷⁶ Unfinished Work in Answer to Julian (opus imperfectum contra Iulianum), 3:199.
⁷⁷ Enchiridion, 93.
was made in God’s likeness has not been completely extinguished.”

This depravity is closely related to the third effect, namely loss of liberty to be able to do good and avoid sin. Although there is argument whether he means to suggest that man has lost free will completely, and thus is determined to sin, or whether our sinful nature makes humans so prone to sin that they always do, he certainly considers sin at least *practically* inevitable by speaking of “a cruel necessity of sinning.”

The Augustinian concept of original sin became the dominant model in western Christianity, whereas the eastern church virtually unanimously held to a consensus that the inheritance from Adam was limited “to mortality and corruption, since their conception of culpability could result only from a feely committed personal act.”

“The medieval church tended to moderate this [the Augustinian view of human nature] by distinguishing between supernatural and natural aspects of human nature. The loss of original righteousness was the loss of the supernatural gift of divine grace, and therefore the destruction of the supernatural endowments of man. The natural endowments of human nature, especially reason, however, were only stained.”

The Protestant Reformation brought this forward as a central issue both within the ranks of the reformers and between some reformers and the Catholic theologians. As discussed in Chapter 1, the Anabaptists, Wesleyans, and eventually the Stone-Campbell Movement are examples of movements that rejected all or part of the Augustinian model, where as some reformers, although differing from the Catholic perspective on key issues, chose to remain within an essentially Augustinian framework.

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79 *City of God*, 22:24,2.

80 He seems to suggest, for example, the loss of free will in *Enchiridion*, 30, for example, yet suggests that it is still intact in *Answer to Two Letters of the Pelagians (Contra dua epistulas Pelagianorum)*, 1:5; 3:24.


82 Weaver, ‘The Exegesis of Romans 5:12 Among the Greek Fathers Part II’, p. 134.

83 Weaver, ‘From Paul to Augustine,’ p. 205.
2.2.0 JACK COTTRELL

2.2.1 BIOGRAPHICAL DATA AND THE CURRENT STATE OF ORIGINAL GRACE IN THE STONE-CAMPBELL MOVEMENT

Dr. Jack W. Cottrell was born in Kentucky in 1938, and raised in the independent instrumental Christian Church. He has taught in the area of theology at Cincinnati Bible Seminary in Cincinnati, Ohio since 1967. His graduate work was completed at both Westminster Theological Seminary and Princeton Theological Seminary, where he encountered and thoroughly interacted with Calvinist theology. He is a prolific writer, with dozens of publications to his name. Most of his work is in biblical and systematic theology, with several works focused on the nature of God, salvation, Calvinism, baptism, and feminism.

Jack Cottrell gives by far the most complete biblical and theological treatment, to date, of the doctrine of Original Grace, and is responsible for coining the term. Thus, his view provides the most extensive framework for understanding the doctrine. He is heavily influenced by many of the Stone-Campbell writers previously surveyed, especially J.S. Lamar and Moses Lard, and openly admits to being influenced by many of the Anabaptist and Wesleyan writers surveyed. His distinction, concerning this study, however, is largely in the way that he gives partial credence to Calvinist reading of Romans 5, namely that an account of original sin can be found in the passage, yet creatively shows how original sin is ultimately counteracted by Original Grace. There do not appear to be any explicit proponents, Stone-Campbell or otherwise, of the doctrine for the time between the writing of McGarvey and Pendleton on the topic in

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84 The seminary is now part of the larger Cincinnati Christian University.
85 Cottrell, The Faith Once For All, p. 185.
1916 and Cottrell’s commentary on Romans\textsuperscript{87} published in 1996.\textsuperscript{88} Cottrell is the only known contemporary, published proponent of Original Grace.

Cottrell is a very well-known theologian and teacher within the Stone-Campbell Movement, especially within the instrumental Christian Churches.\textsuperscript{89} He is a prolific writer, and has taught thousands of seminary students at Cincinnati Christian University over the last several decades. His graduate course, Doctrine of Grace, where Original Grace was taught, has been taken by many of those students. It is unclear whether his students have accepted the doctrine of Original Grace, and whether they teach that doctrine in their ministry contexts. However, it appears to be the case that no one after Cottrell, excepting perhaps the writer of this project, has written on the topic, much less written in support of the doctrine. So, on one hand, Cottrell remains to be very influential on the theology of at least the instrumental Christian Churches, but on the other, it appears that Original Grace has not gained wide acceptance.\textsuperscript{90}

2.2.2 SUMMARY OF COTTRELL’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF ORIGINAL GRACE

Cottrell’s primary contribution to the development of Original Grace, other than perhaps coining the term, is his integration of streams of work from the Anabaptist, Wesleyans, and his own Stone-Campbell brethren, into a complete, fresh perspective on the interpretation of Romans 5. His work is, therefore, certainly not original, but still vital to the doctrine’s continued refinement.

His argumentation is tight and consistent, seemingly impenetrable, assuming his presuppositions are accurate. If correct, he has provided a compromise between those


\textsuperscript{88} Although Cottrell’s views on Original Grace were not published until 1996, they were likely taught before that date in his seminary course called “Doctrine of Grace” at Cincinnati Bible Seminary, now part of the larger Cincinnati Christian University in Cincinnati, Ohio.

\textsuperscript{89} See the Introduction for a brief description of the three main branches of the Movement.

\textsuperscript{90} Anecdotal evidence, through conversations with various scholars in the Movement on this topic, reveals three main opinions on the doctrine: (1) some theologians are not aware of it, (2) they find it somewhat interesting, but unimpressive, and (3) they find it compelling, but think that either more research is needed, or that we cannot know for sure if Cottrell is correct.
who do not find evidence for original sin in Romans 5, and those who do. This is also his greatest weakness. If Cottrell’s understanding of Paul’s intent, and perhaps Paul’s usage of specific terms, is incorrect, it appears that his entire system would disintegrate and the most recent attempt to justify the doctrine of Original Grace would fail.

2.3.0 COTTRELL’S VERSE-BY-VERSE EXEGESIS ROMANS 5:12-21

Besides the more immediate context of Cottrell’s own exegesis of the passage, his interpretation is ultimately set against the way in which Romans 5:12-21 has been read by theologians before him in Church history. The passage has generated significant controversy, and has served as the exegetical lynchpin for the understanding of the nature of human sin and salvation from that sin. This section seeks to accomplish two primary tasks: (1) give a direct and thorough account of Original Grace through the medium of Cottrell’s exegesis of Romans 5:12-21 and (2) provide an analysis of the exegesis to enhance understanding of Original Grace’s exegetical foundation by revealing key textual points, explicit and implicit hermeneutical assumptions, and points at which the author, knowingly or unknowingly, moves from the task of exegesis to systematic theology, thus perhaps moving beyond authorial intent. The next major section will extensively discuss several key issues that could determine the validity of Original Grace. The issues flow from exegetically “stepping back” from Cottrell to identify and critique what makes his exegesis function.

2.3.1 ROMANS 5:12

“Therefore, just as sin entered the world through one man, and death through sin, and in this way death came to all men, because all sinned—”

Διὰ τοῦτο ὡσπερ δι’ ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἡ ἁµαρτία εἰς τὸν κόσµον εἰσῆλθεν καὶ διὰ τῆς ἁµαρτίας ὁ θάνατος, καὶ οὕτως εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ὁ θάνατος διῆλθεν, ἐφ’ ὦ πάντες ἡµαρτον.  

91 The structure of this section follows that of Jack Cottrell, ‘Romans’, pp. 330-368.
Adam, by his sin and because of his federal headship, brought physical death into the world, under which all humans suffer.93

Cottrell begins by connecting “therefore” to concepts both before and after v. 12. He interprets the function of the word “therefore” thus: “Therefore, in view of what has just been said about the saving power of the death of Christ (5:1-11), and also because we know that an example of such vicarious power already exists in the person of Adam (5:12-14), we may safely conclude that the one righteous act of the one man Jesus Christ is definitely sufficient to bring salvation to all people.”94 Cottrell admits three other popular options as to the reference of “therefore”: from 5:10 on, from 1:18 on, and perhaps that verse 12 is the beginning of a new argument. He states that his view is “probably” true.

He takes the “one man” to be the historical man, Adam, referred to in v. 14, who is the representative head of the human race. Paul’s contrast is between this “one man” who brings sin into the world, the “one man Jesus Christ” (v. 17) that brings grace and righteousness. This “one man,” Adam, brought “death through sin.” Cottrell believes that Paul’s primary consideration in vs. 12-14 is physical death, although, he believes, Paul broadens death to encompass spiritual death in vs. 15-18. His primary reason is, “to focus on spiritual death misses the main point of 5:13-14, where physical death even among babies is cited as evidence for the point about the ‘one man’ in v. 12.”95 This physical death, however, is not the result of sin in general, including a person’s individual sin. Instead, the direct cause of pervasive physical death, based upon both 5:12 and 5:15, is the “one man,” Adam: “The many died by the trespass of the one man” (5:15a).96

Along with many modern scholars, and the NIV translation, Cottrell takes the final clause to be best translated as “because all sinned,” rather than Augustine’s “in

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93 Each verse treated begins with my brief summary of Cottrell’s interpretation.
95 Ibid., p. 341. He that “those who did not sin by breaking a command” (v.14) include infants.
96 Ibid..
whom all sinned.” He considers several possible interpretations of this clause: (1) that all sinned personally, either by imitating Adam, or because of a corrupt nature, (2) that there is union between Adam and his descendants, either by all existing, and therefore, literally sinning in Adam (seminal headship), or by Adam being a representative head of the human race (federal headship). He denies both versions of the first option, because both describe an indirect cause of death by Adam. Such an indirect cause breaks down the Adam-Christ comparison. Also, neither of the two versions of the first option explain the physical death of infants (included in v. 14), who do not sin by their will either because of imitation or corruption. Cottrell also denies the first version (seminal headship) of the second option, because it implies that all actually sinned personally, although in Adam. He sees no evidence that personal sin fits the passage. Instead, he supports federal headship because it avoids any reference to personal sins of humanity, yet explains how “all sinned” through Adam. Federal headship, does not, Cottrell contends, lead to a doctrine of original sin.97

Cottrell’s argument does not hinge on exactly what was passed by Adam, or to what extent it affected humanity, for, “In the final analysis it does not matter what content anyone feels compelled to pour into the concept of ‘original sin,’ because Paul’s main point is this: whatever the whole human race got (or would have gotten) from Adam has been completely canceled out for the whole human race by the gracious atoning work of Jesus Christ.”98 [emphasis original]

Cottrell denies both the possibilities related to actual sinning of the individual, through imitation of Adam, or through a corrupt nature, because these are indirect causes of sin. Does this really violate the logic of the Adam-Christ comparison, as he suggests? Yes, and for this primary reason, namely that it is Adam’s sin, not sins, or his “one transgression,” rather than transgressions, which brought death to all mankind (vs.

97 Ibid., pp. 342-344.
98 Cottrell, The Faith Once For All, p. 185.
12, 16, 17, and 18). Thus, it is the one sin of Adam that brought death and condemnation, rather than the subsequent sins committed by Adam or his progeny, just as it is “one act of righteousness” (v. 18), the “free gift” (v. 16), and the “gift of righteousness” (v. 17) brings life and justification, rather than the numerous righteous acts of performed by Jesus during his ministry, or even of Christians throughout the history of the Church. Certainly, personal sins can be counteracted by grace (v. 20), but this is not the focus of the first part of the passage. The point seems to be that of the two acts, Christ’s wins out.

2.3.2 ROMANS 5:13

“For before the law was given, sin was in the world. But sin is not taken into account when there is no law.”

ἄχρι γὰρ νόμου ἁμαρτία ἦν ἐν κόσμῳ, ἁμαρτία δὲ οὐκ ἔλλογεται Μὴ ὄντος νόμου,

As proof of the universality of physical death, caused by Adam’s sin, Paul states that sin was present in the world because of Adam’s sin, but not actually taken into account over those that did not know the law of God, yet even the innocent are subject to physical death. They are subject to physical death because of Adam’s sin, rather than their own.

Many consider verses 13-17 to be the equivalent of a parenthetical comment by Paul, including Cottrell. Paul is giving additional data and clarification to his claim in v. 12, and in v. 18, he will return to the Adam-Christ comparison.

In vs. 13 and 14, according to Cottrell, Paul is providing evidence to support the second part of v. 12, namely that death for all is the result of the one sin of Adam. His beginning assumption is this: “The proof lies in the fact that some people die even though they have never sinned personally, including babies, young children, and some with mental handicaps. Thus if sin is indeed the cause of death, the fact that such people sometimes die proves that the one representative sin of Adam must be that cause.”

99 Ibid., p. 344. For the sake of clarification, the phrase, “sometimes die” may seem confusing because essentially all people die. However, as we will see later in his argument, he means that they die before they have sinned personally, and would only then deserve death.
Paul begins by saying that sin was in the world, before the law, but that it was not taken into account. Cottrell argues that Paul is responding to expected objections of his Jewish audience, who would have a strong concern for the Law of Moses. He paraphrases vs. 13-14a thus:

We have said that all die because of Adam’s sin. But what gives us any reason to think this? Let’s consider first of all a common assumption. Some who agree that Adam must be the source of human death base this conclusion on the fact that people died between Adam and Moses, before the Law was given; and we know God does not hold people accountable for their sins when there is no law. Thus (so this argument goes) since people died then, they must have died because of Adam’s sin. Now, at first glance this argument seems sound, but I’m sorry to say that it does not hold together. Why not? Mainly because it assumes that there is no law in this period between Adam and Moses; but this is not true. You will remember my clear teaching that there was law during this period, and people knew by breaking this law they deserved God’s wrath. So if we are going to show that all die because of Adam’s sin, we must find another argument.100 [emphasis original]

The “law” Cottrell is referring to is spoken of by Paul in Romans 1:18-32 and 2:14-15. In short, there was law by which humans may be condemned for breaking. So, the “death” that “reigned from the time of Adam to the Moses,” must have come from the sin of Adam, because it affected “those who did not sin by breaking a command” (v.14).

2.3.3 ROMANS 5:14

“Nevertheless, death reigned from the time of Adam to the time of Moses, even over those who did not sin by breaking a command, as did Adam, who was a pattern of the one to come.”

افظ": آللا يراسيلعون أض أدانم متشري موسى وكإت يوونشومينت هس باس يوسيسوس أدانم دوش إستين هذهس توه ميللونتوك.

Even in the period between Adam and Moses, before the Mosaic Law, there was still law available to all of humanity. However, even those who did not sin by breaking a direct command, like Adam did, namely the innocent, still live under the reign of death.

Cottrell begins his exegesis of v. 14 with this summary explanatory statement:

“Let’s stay with the period between Adam and Moses. In this era (as in all other times, of course), death came to all human beings, even over those not old enough to commit

100 Ibid., pp. 346-347.
personal sins like the sin of Adam. The fact that infants sometimes die is all the proof we need for the truth that all die because of Adam’s sins.”¹⁰¹ [emphasis original]

Cottrell believes that “death” in v. 14 is physical death only, evidenced by the reference in v. 17, “by the trespass of the one man, death reigned through that one man.” In both verses, “physical death . . . is personified as a tyrant having everyone under its power in the period in question . . . To depict death as a reigning monarch emphasizes its universal scope, its oppressive domination, and its inescapable certainty.”¹⁰²

The key point in vs. 13-14 is, “even over those who did not sin by breaking a command, as did Adam.” The word “even” (kai), limits the scope of those spoken of in this verse. It must be a special group of some kind. The key to identifying this group is in the meaning of the Greek work parabasis, or “transgression.” He defines it as “stepping over a boundary, a deviation from the prescribed path or norm, a trespass, a transgression.”¹⁰³ The entire phrase, “did not sin by breaking a command,” is problematic because “command” is not in the original, but instead, present in the NIV translation. Cottrell translates the phrase literally to be “the ones who did not sin after the likeness of Adam’s transgression.” This is an important distinction, because many commentators, he claims, define Adam’s sin to be a transgression against an explicit, direct command (special revelation), whereas all others between Adam and Moses did not have access to special revelation. So, Adam and anyone with access to the Law of Moses, and none in between, could be held responsible for actually transgressing the law.

Cottrell rejects the claim that there was no law that could be transgressed from Adam to Moses for three reasons: (1) “there were explicit commands and prohibitions (other than the command regarding the trees) between Adam and Moses, available in the beginning and sporadically thereafter by means of special revelation, and passed

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 347.
¹⁰² Ibid.
¹⁰³ Ibid.
along as tradition to future generations;” (2) limiting the law that was transgressed to special revelation is “indefensible” because of Paul’s emphasis on parabasis of general revelation in 1:18-32 and 2:14-15, including the death sentence that results for any who break those laws (1:32), and the “principle set forth in 4:15 (using parabasis);” lastly, (3) “the main difference between Adam’s sin and the sins committed by the specific group in 5:14 was not a difference in the kind of law they transgressed, but rather in the way the law was transgressed.”104 So, there is contrast between Adam’s transgression and anyone else who broke laws known to them, whether through general or special revelation—voluntary, conscious, deliberate—and the transgression of infants, small children, and the mentally handicapped—“not a voluntary, deliberate, personal sin.”105 Cottrell summarized his point, thus: “Thus only a group (such as infants) who have committed no personal sins and who sometimes die anyway can truly prove Paul’s point that the real cause of human death is the one representative sin of Adam.”106

This claim that infants are in view in this verse raises serious concerns. First, Paul has been talking about Gentiles, Jews, sin, the law, and even salvation up to this place in the book of Romans. There is no direct indication that he is referring to children, the mentally handicapped, or any other person innocent of the law. Second, as an extension of our first objection, Paul did not indicate that he was switching subjects away from Jews, Gentiles, sin, law, and salvation in order to talk to talk about children. Cottrell comes to the conclusion that children are included in the passage by bringing several points into an argument that arrives at this conclusion. It would seem that his interpretation is plausible, but not certain or even obvious.

Cottrell has identified what is at stake with this claim in the way that he summarizes the meaning of the verse: “Let’s stay with the period between Adam and Moses. In this era (as in all other times, of course), death came to all human beings,
even over those not old enough to commit personal sins like the sin of Adam. The fact that infants sometimes die is all the proof we need for the truth that all die because of Adam’s sins.”

In one regard, it would appear vital to his argument. All people, including the innocent, need to die because of Adam. In this case, Cottrell sees only physical death, but later, he will include condemnation in the scenario. Thus, all he is concerned with at this point is the relationship between physical death and children. Whether he is correct that Paul means to include children in the category of “those who did not sin by breaking a command” is not vital if one assume that Original Grace should be applied to all people, even those not explicitly mentioned.

The last phrase of the verse, “as did Adam, who was a pattern of the one to come,” points back to the Adam-Christ comparison begun in v. 12. “In what sense does Adam prefigure Christ? Only in this one point, namely, that just as Adam was only one man yet performed a single act that affected the entire world, so also was Jesus Christ just one man whose one act likewise affected the whole human race.” Cottrell will later, in vs. 18-19, emphasize the differences between Adam and Christ, namely that their effects were polar opposites.

Cottrell makes a clear application of his doctrinal stance in relation to infants. This is worth exploring in the context of vs. 13 and 14, as it will clarify the situation. Infants are under Original Grace. “Because of Jesus Christ no infant is born sinful, depraved, or condemned. All do face the inevitability of physical death, but insofar as death derives from Adam’s sin, it too will one day be canceled out in the final resurrection from the dead.” Two types of people meet the criteria for this label: (1) all children before reaching the age of accountability, and (2) the mentally handicapped. Both categories may, in fact, commit sins, but such sins are committed in ignorance.

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107 Ibid., p. 347.
108 Ibid.
However, when the child reaches the point where he sins personally, he forfeits his saved state and guaranteed resurrection to eternal life. Reflecting his view that both the wicked and righteous will be resurrected, each to his own destiny, he says that the person who steps out of Original Grace becomes a child of wrath and may only regain their saved state by a personal response to the Gospel.\(^\text{110}\) Original Grace is only efficacious to the innocent. This includes all children, and mentally handicapped that could be classified as innocent children insofar as their mental states warrants it, both before and after Christ’s atoning death. Thus, no infants ever go through original sin, but are already saved from the consequences of Adam’s sin. No infant, therefore, has an innate tendency toward sin, a depraved mind, or any guilt upon them. The primary reason infants will eventually sin personally is the fact of the pervasive existence of sin in the world. We now turn to Cottrell’s explanation of this situation.

Cottrell identifies “four presuppositions of sin” without which an action may not be considered sin in the biblical sense: (1) “the existence of law,” (2) “the existence of a Creator-God as the source of law,” (3) “a knowledge of that law,” and (4) “free will.”\(^\text{111}\) He then describes how these relate to determining the age of accountability:

Crucial for discerning the age of accountability is the third one, knowledge of the law. We must remember that law includes two elements: commands to be obeyed and a prescribed penalty for disobedience. Until a child understands that certain things he is doing are a violation of commands of God and will ultimately be punished by God, he is not accountable to God for these things. Once he does reach this understanding, he is then accountable to God in the sense that he is liable for the eternal penalty deserved by his sins.\(^\text{112}\)

Biblical support is provided from Romans 4:15, “where there is no law, there also is no violation,” and 7:9, “Once I was alive apart from law; but when the commandment came, sin sprang to life and I died.” Cottrell interprets the first verse to mean “where there is no consciousness of law’, in the sense of unavoidable ignorance.”\(^\text{113}\) He does

\(^{110}\) Ibid.
\(^{111}\) Ibid., p. 192.
\(^{112}\) Ibid.
\(^{113}\) Ibid.
this because Paul has already explained that some law exists in every human heart, even without special revelation (Rom. 1:18-32; 2:15). He then illustrates the fact that it is possible for children and the mentally handicapped, at least in many cases, to understand rules and the consequences of breaking them from human authority figures, such as teachers and parents. However, the group being discussed are those that had the knowledge of God, and his law, although limited in comparison to the Law of Moses, and chose not to “retain the knowledge of God” (1:28), trade “the truth of God for a lie” (1:25), and “become filled with every kind of wickedness, evil, greed and depravity” (1:29). Children do not fit into this category.

Romans 7:9 seems to be Paul’s explanation of his own “coming of age,” according to Cottrell. Here, we find that Paul, and all other children, were once alive until “the commandment came, sin became alive,” and Paul died. Children can learn many things at a young age, including spiritual truth from Scripture. Specifically, they can learn commands from parents, and even from God. However, the age of accountability “refers . . . to that age before a child connects the law to God and connects disobedience with eternal penalty. Before that time the child is ‘alive’ in that his soul is not yet dead in his trespasses and sins (Eph. 2:1) and he is not yet under the penalty of the second death (Rev 21:8).”\(^{114}\) It is possible for those sufficiently mentally handicapped (“those whose mental abilities never develop beyond those of young children”) to go through their entire lives and never be accountable. A child who dies before becoming accountable is in the same situation. Both classes of innocent humans are thus not accountable for the knowledge of God’s commands or their eternal consequences, and thus cannot be judged guilty of breaking God’s law. If Original Grace is assumed to be the case, all people are bestowed Original Grace from the

\(^{114}\) Ibid.
moment life begins, thus saving them from any ill effects of Adam’s sin, until they begin to become responsible for their personal sins, and forfeit Original Grace.  

2.3.4 ROMANS 5:15

“But the gift is not like the trespass. For if the many died by the trespass of the one man, how much more did God's grace and the gift that came by the grace of the one man, Jesus Christ, overflow to the many!”

The trespass of Adam brought death to all of humanity, whereas the gift of God's grace, through Jesus Christ, not only counteracts the consequences of Adam’s sin, but also potentially the consequences of personal sins if that grace is received by faith, thus making the redemptive work of Christ vastly superior to the harmful sin of Adam.

The first phrase of v. 15, “but the gift is not like the trespass,” according to Cottrell, is the “heading” for vs. 15-17. The rest of this small section fleshes out the meaning of this statement with three contrasts. We must first allow Cottrell to define his terms. Cottrell begins by defining paraptoma, “trespass,” as “a false step, straying from the path, departing from the norm,” and believes that the difference from parabasis is too small to make any exegetical difference. Charisma, or gift, is related to charis, grace, and likely refers to ‘the gift of righteousness’ (5:17), the imputed righteousness of Christ that results in justification (5:16, 18) and life (5:17-18).

The first contrast between the trespass and the gift is contained in the remaining portion of v. 15: “For if the many died by the trespass of the one man, how much more did God's grace and the gift that came by the grace of the one man, Jesus Christ, overflow to the many!” Cottrell claims that the “many” contrasts the “one man,” and is equivalent to “all men” in v. 18: “. . . even though Adam was only one man, what he did had consequences for many men (denoting all others as a totality).” Further, he

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115 Ibid., p. 189.
116 Ibid., pp. 350-351.
117 Ibid., p. 351.
states that, “The word ‘died’ is aorist (past) tense, pointing back to the first sin of Adam as the time when all came under the sentence of death.”

The “gift” that overflows “to the many,” resulting from the work of Christ, denotes a quantitative difference between the two acts. In short, the effects of the gift are greater than the effects of the trespass. Cottrell lists three results of the gift over and against the trespass: (1) . . . “God’s gracious gift reached out to embrace all who have been affected by Adam’s sin, and has completely canceled and nullified the total consequences of Adam’s sin for the entire human race. If it has not done at least this, then Christ’s act is not even as powerful as Adam’s sin, much less more powerful,” (2) “. . . the overflowing “much more” of Christ’s cross means that the saved state into which it brings us is a state far better than what was lost in Adam,” and (3) “. . . the overflowing “much more” means that the one saving act of Christ not only saves the entire race from whatever consequences have come upon us because of Adam’s sin; it also is able to save the entire race from the consequences of their own personal sins, and does in fact cancel all such consequences for those who personally accept the free gift of grace through faith.” In addition to the quantitative difference between the two acts, there is also a logical difference. Namely, the effects of Christ’s redemptive act are even more certain to actually occur than the effects of Adam’s act. Given that the theme of assurance, that “permeates this whole chapter,” finds this certainty to be important for those who put their trust in the word of Christ.

The concept taught by this verse, by itself, apart from the rest of the pericope, is not usually controversial. Commentators, among those that share basic assumptions

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118 Ibid. Also see, Lard, p. 177.  
119 Ibid.  
120 Cottrell quotes Lard, The Faith Once for All, p. 178, from whom he finds support in his claim: “It includes ‘a better body than Adam ever had, a better life than he ever lived, a better world than he ever lived in, a world where Satan, and sin, and death can never come.’”  
121 Cottrell, The Faith Once for All, p. 352. Cottrell quotes McGarvey and Pendleton, p. 336: “We are here informed that the result of the sacrificial act of Christ fully reversed and nullified the effects of the act of Adam, and that it did even much more. The effect, in other words, had in all points as wide a range, and in some points a much wider range, than that of Adam’s act.”  
122 Ibid., p. 353.
with Cottrell, as set out at the beginning of the chapter, agree that the verse primarily means to state that the trespass of Adam and the gift of Christ are similar in that they are each an important event that have pervasive consequences. Christ’s gift is better, however, in terms of both quality and quantity. The controversy is primarily concerning the “many” and the “all” in v. 15 and in v. 18. There is some agreement, yet there are fundamental differences among several approaches. We will deal with the possible differences in a dedicated subsection of the next major section.

2.3.5 ROMANS 5:16

“Again, the gift of God is not like the result of the one man's sin: The judgment followed one sin and brought condemnation, but the gift followed many trespasses and brought justification.”

Adam's sin alone caused all of humanity to be condemned, including perhaps both spiritual and eternal death, at least potentially, yet the work of Christ alone brought justification for that condemnation, actually, and also made available justification for the many personal sins of humanity that came after Adam.

Cottrell understands Paul’s phrase, “Again, the gift of God is not like the result of the one man's sin,” to be a repeat of the heading in v. 15. Also, he believes that instead of “the one man’s sin,” as the NIV renders it, the phrase is better translated, “the one who sinned.”

This leads to the second contrast in vs. 15-17, namely, “The judgment followed one sin and brought condemnation, but the gift followed many trespasses and brought justification.” He identifies two underlying contrasts. The first is between “one sin” and “many trespasses”: “The judgment unto condemnation results from the single sin of the one man; but the gift unto justification applies not only to this one sin but to many
personal sins as well (and thus is quantitatively superior).”\textsuperscript{124} The second is between the effects of each act: “On the one hand, Adam’s sin brought ‘judgment’ unto ‘condemnation,’” while “on the other hand, the free gift that comes from Christ, the gift of imputed righteousness (v. 17b), is unto ‘justification.’”\textsuperscript{125} Cottrell believes that we do not have to interpret “judgment” and “condemnation” to include more than physical death, for physical death can certainly be considered a punishment for sin, as is certainly in view as such in vs. 12-14, but there are good reasons to perhaps do so.

First, the word used for “condemnation” in this passage is κατάκριμα. It is also used in Romans 8:1, where it includes eternal death: “Therefore, there is now no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus.” Second, the fact that “the gift . . . brought justification,” implies that there was much more to counteract than just physical death. “Indeed, this is exactly how almost everyone understands these two terms when they are applied to the ‘many trespasses’ (personal sins) in this verse. Thus how can we give them more limited meaning when applying them to Adam’s sin and its consequences?”\textsuperscript{126}

Cottrell then distinguishes his exegesis of this verse and the Augustinian perspective:

But when we interpret condemnation as eternal death in hell and justification as the cancellation of this eternal punishment, are we not opening the door to the doctrine of original sin? Not at all. But is this not the Augustinian view? No, it is not. True, the Augustinian doctrine of original sin says the condemnation of eternal death in hell comes upon all as the result of Adam’s sin; but it omits the most important part of Paul’s teaching, namely, that the Original Grace of Jesus Christ justifies all men insofar as Adam’s sin is concerned. I.e., it completely cancels out this condemnation, so that in its eternal element it is never even applied.\textsuperscript{127}

Like v. 15, much of v. 16 is not controversial among those with whom Cottrell interacts. There is agreement that the gift is greater than sin, and that justification of

\textsuperscript{124} Cottrell., p. 354.  
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., p. 355.  
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., pp. 355-356.
many trespasses is greater than the condemnation from the one sin. In sum, the work of Christ is greater than the work of Adam. There are two key points of argument that can make a difference in the understanding of the passage. The questions that must be answered are as follows: (1) what is the nature of the “judgment” that “brought condemnation?” and (2) to whom does justification apply? These two issues will be extensively covered in the later sections on death and justification.

2.3.6 ROMANS 5:17

“For if, by the trespass of the one man, death reigned through that one man, how much more will those who receive God's abundant provision of grace and of the gift of righteousness reign in life through the one man, Jesus Christ.”

Death, including physical, spiritual, and eternal death, is the result of Adam’s sin. The reign of all three kinds of death is counteracted for all of the innocent, as also they will before the adult sinner who, by accepting the gift of grace, will reign in life.

This verse is the third contrast between Adam and Christ. Cottrell states that, “For if, by the trespass of the one man, death reigned through that one man,” is a continuation of the comparison, and adds nothing of new information to vs. 12-16. Instead, it is a reference back to the previous points. One minor point is that, “the aorist tense again indicates the past point in time when death began to reign, i.e., when Adam sinned.”

This point about death’s reign, Cottrell contends, stresses “the powerful and destructive sway it exercises over the affairs of human beings.”

The rest of the passage is somewhat more controversial. However, Cottrell begins by making rather standard interpretations of “abundant provision” and “much more”: “The word translated ‘abundant provision’ (the noun form of the verb ‘overflow’ in v. 15) points again to the fact that the benefits of Christ’s cross extend far beyond the scope of Adam’s sin and are able to offset the ‘many trespasses’ (personal

128 Ibid., p. 356.
sins) of v. 16."\(^{130}\) From this point, Cottrell draws two important emphases. First, Christ’s work is quantitatively superior. Second, “‘much more’ has a logical force here and is stressing the glorious certainty or assurance we can have with regard to Christ’s gift of grace.”\(^{131}\)

The controversy lies in the identification of “those who receive.” Cottrell believes that this category of humans includes all people, as opposed to those who claim that it refers only to those capable of accepting the Gospel. The reasons to hold the opposing position, according to Cottrell, are as follows: (1) there may be a parallel between “those who receive” in v. 17, and “many trespasses” in v. 16, which are understood to included personal sins, (2) spiritual death, in addition to physical death, is included in the “death that reigned,” which may only result from personal sin, and (3) the verb λαμβάνω (“receive”) is said to be active, not passive.\(^{132}\) Cottrell denies that these reasons necessitate limiting “those who receive” to adults or persons old enough to choose to obey the Gospel. He agrees that personal sin and the people that choose to commit personal sin are in view in this passage. However, he does not believe that there is sufficient evidence to merit holding to that reductionist position. First, “throughout these verses (15-17) where Adam and Christ are set in contrast to one another, the scope of those affected by both men is the same in all three verses. Adam’s sin affects all, and so does the cross insofar as it cancels the results of Adam’s sin for all. To deny this jeopardizes the main point of this whole passage, the all-sufficiency of Christ’s cross. The reference to personal sin in this immediate text is in addition to the Adamic sin, but not instead of it.”\(^{133}\) Second, “as v. 16 indicates, it is likely that spiritual death (including eternal death) has been brought into the picture here, but there

\(^{130}\) Cottrell, p. 356.  
\(^{131}\) Ibid.  
\(^{132}\) Ibid., pp. 356-357.  
\(^{133}\) Ibid., p. 357.
is no textual basis for regarding it as the result of personal sins."

Lastly, “the bottom line is that there is nothing in the word λαμβάνω that requires us to limit ‘those who receive’ to conscious, willing adults; the word is no less able to describe the passive reception of ‘Original Grace’ by all those affected by Adam’s sin, even in infancy or before.”

Cottrell makes this final point with the support of Delling’s article in TDNT, which states that the verb is used throughout the New Testament in both senses, and usually in the passive sense in theological contexts. Thus, “the primary reference in v. 17b (as in 15b and 16b) is to the universal application of grace to all mankind to counteract the results of Adam’s sin, with the added assurance that this grace is abundant enough to erase the effects of our personal sins as well.”

The last thing Cottrell does in regard to this verse is identify the “gift of righteousness” and what it means to “reign in life.” The “gift” is synonymous with the “abundant provision of grace.” It does, however, bring out the content of that grace, which is God’s righteousness given to man—justification. “Those who receive . . . the gift” will “reign in life.” Cottrell applies this, as mentioned previously, to be all people. Cottrell describes the nature of the “reign in life”:

‘Reign’ is future in tense and refers to the yet-to-come resurrection of the body at the end of time and to the gift of eternal life to be lived in the very presence of God. As Christians we are already partaking of the abundance of grace, especially justification, and we are already reigning in a spiritual way over sin (Rev. 20:4, 6); but in the life to come we shall surely reign as kings in an unprecedented way! See Rev. 1:6; 5:10; 22:5. (This is true of all children who die before reaching the age of accountability, and of all accountable persons who have personally accepted Christ’s saving grace.)

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134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid., p. 358 Cottrell cites the following verses as examples of the passive use of λαμβάνω: Luke 20:47; Acts 1:8; Romans 13:2; 1 Corinthians 4:7; 2 Corinthians 11:24; James 3:1; 1 Peter 4:10. See also G. Delling, ‘λαμβάνω’, in Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, ed. by Gerhard Kittel, 12 vols (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1967), IV:5-7. “Sense 2. [“to receive”] is predominant, esp. in theologically significant verses. From this it is apparent how strongly the NT — to some extent in marked contrast to Gk. Religion and to Judaism — views the relation of man to God as that of recipient and Giver.”
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
Cottrell clarifies his position concerning the effect of Original Grace on the death and resurrection: “Grace does not prevent us from dying. The nullification of physical death is a certainty for those under grace (original and personal), but it occurs only in the future when the redeemed receive glorified bodies like that of our risen Lord (Phil 3:21; 1 John 3:2).”

We will discuss the nullification of physical death in the fashion in Chapter 3 in detail. As has been his central point throughout the entire text, and especially in regard to the three comparisons in vs. 15-17, the work of Christ applies directly to any humans under Adam’s curse, which includes the entire human race, but then exceeds these limits by applying further to adults that have sinned personally subsequently received the gift of grace.

2.3.7 ROMANS 5:18

“Consequently, just as the result of one trespass was condemnation for all men, so also the result of one act of righteousness was justification that brings life for all men.”

Ἅρα οὖν ὡς δὲ ἕνος παραπτώματος εἰς πάντας ἄνθρωπους εἰς κατάκριμα, οὕτως καὶ δι’ ἕνος δικαιώματος εἰς πάντας ἄνθρωπους εἰς δικαίωσιν ζωῆς.

If a single act of sin, performed by just one man, could bring condemnation to all of humanity, a single act of righteousness (the cross) by the God-man, Christ Jesus, can and does bring justification and life to all of humanity.

Cottrell takes vs. 18-19 to be the continuation of his main point in v. 12 that described the effects of Adam’s sin, in which he compares it to the effects of Christ’s act: “He now focuses on the one respect in which the two are equal, namely, the breadth or scope of the effects of the one act of each. Just as Adam’s sin had a universal effect, so also did the cross of Christ. This point is intended to reinforce our assurance that the cross is worthy of our trust. We need not doubt its all-encompassing and all-sufficient power.” In Cottrell’s opinion, nothing new is being presented here, in vs. 18-19, by Paul. Instead v. 18 is essentially a restatement of v. 12.

139 Ibid.
140 Cottrell, The Faith Once for All, p. 359.
The emphasis in v. 18 is the *one act* of one man results in such terrible consequences. Cottrell believes that the emphasis is purposely placed on the act (sin) of Adam, rather than the fact that he is just one man. The implication is this: all it took for all of these consequences to occur for the human race was one act of sin. Also, just as in v. 16, “condemnation” is not limited to physical death, but includes spiritual and eternal death, which is counteracted by justification.

Cottrell then moves to the counteracting single act of Christ in the second half of v. 18, “so also the result of one act of righteousness was justification that brings life for all men,” as the “long-delayed completion of the thought began in v. 12.” So, what is the “one act of righteousness?” Cottrell identifies it with the death of Christ, only, rather than the entire life of Christ, as some do. He has two main reasons for holding this view: (1) “The comparison here is between *one* sinful act and *one* righteous act. To broaden the scope of the latter to include the whole life of Christ compromises the comparison and forfeits the whole point of the passage,” and (2) “we must not lump Christ’s life and death together as if they had equal significance and are equally imputed to sinners as the basis for our justification.”

The “justification” resulting from “one act of righteousness,” is the same concept as presented in 5:16. Cottrell, as already stated, assumes that “Adam’s sin brought full condemnation upon the entire human race.” Of course, “Christ’s cross brought full justification upon all men in that it releases all (in infancy) from Adamic condemnation.” In these statements, Cottrell again denies that Adamic sin only brought physical death upon the human race, and therefore, justification should not only be applied to physical death. Further, Cottrell explains the “life” that results from justification: “The ‘life’ brought by this justification is therefore not just physical,

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141 Ibid., p. 360.
142 Ibid., p. 361.
143 Ibid.
bodily life, but *eternal* life in the sense of release from the penalty of hell and entrance into heaven."

Finally, Cottrell reiterates one of the main points from his introduction to Romans 5:12-21, which, he believes, Paul makes more explicit in this verse:

When Paul says the one righteous act of Christ results in justification of life *for all men*, he means exactly that and nothing less. In the introduction to this section I have discussed the common view that this ‘all’ is somehow less than the ‘all’ affected by Adam’s sin. This view must be emphatically rejected. Christ’s Original Grace cancels any potential state of original sin *for all men*. If this is not the case, then the point and purpose of 5:12-21 as a whole is completely negated.

As Cottrell has done throughout the entire exegesis, he places all of his proverbial eggs in one basket. If his one-to-one ratio between Adam and Christ fails, his entire argument falls apart. Further, Cottrell takes a position on the controversial part of this verse, namely the nature of the “one act of righteousness”. It is certainly important to clarify that for the single acts to be comparable, in the way that Cottrell contends that they should be compared; Paul is only referring to Christ’s death and not his life, ministry, resurrection, or ascension. It appears to be the more accurate option from a linguistic standpoint. In other words, Paul is comparing “apples to apples” (trespass to Christ’s death) rather than “apples to apple orchards” (trespass to all of Christ’s salvific work). Fortunately, this point is not central, or even particularly relevant, to the exegesis leading to the conclusion of Original Grace. It could be conjectured that Christ’s death on the cross alone counteracts Adamic sin, and that all of the components of Christ’s work are important to individual (and even cosmic) redemption. Perhaps that’s why Paul speaks of only the one act. Cottrell does not say this, nor is it necessary to prove his point. It seems more likely that Paul is comparing “one trespass” with “one act of righteousness” for linguistic reasons only. Christ’s death is likely primarily in view, but that would not necessarily exclude the rest of

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144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
Christ’s salvific work. Simply trying to understand what Paul is communicating is what is at stake here, rather than anything substantial from a theological perspective, and certainly not in regard to Original Grace. Cottrell believes there is more at stake here: taking the “one act of righteousness” as any more than the death of Christ “compromises the comparison and forfeits the whole point of the passage,” and (2) “we must not lump Christ’s life and death together as if they had equal significance and are equally imputed to sinners as the basis for our justification.”

Perhaps Christ’s life and death do not have equal significance in regard to justification, but what of resurrection? What would be the point of justification without the resurrection to eternal life for the believer, which is ultimately provided by Christ’s resurrection? Even though it seems Cottrell may be right in how to define “one act of righteousness,” it does not seem that so much of what he claims to be at stake is actually at stake.

Even though it likely does not matter what is included in “one act of righteousness,” it does matter whether the two acts are intended to be in direct contradiction to one another. They certainly are to be taken as such, but does that lead us to Cottrell’s conclusion? “He now focuses on the one respect in which the two are equal, namely, the breadth or scope of the effects of the one act of each. Just as Adam’s sin had a universal effect, so also did the cross of Christ. This point is intended to reinforce our assurance that the cross is worthy of our trust. We need not doubt its all-encompassing and all-sufficient power.”

Again we circle back to the matter of application. Cottrell’s opponents would also say that Christ’s work is “all-encompassing” and “all-sufficient,” yet they mean that it is potentially so, rather than actually so. The effects are able to extend to all of humanity, but only actually extend to those in Christ, which have been justified by faith. There is one thing to consider that may help decide between whether those effects of Christ’s are only available, or

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146 Ibid., p. 360.
147 Cottrell, The Faith Once for All, p. 359.
whether they are directly applicable, to all of humanity: Paul’s case for the all-
sufficiency and all-encompassing nature of Christ’s work in contrast to Adam’s receives
much stronger support if Paul is saying that these effects fit both descriptions. This
argument centers on the definition of categories of the “many” and the “all,” which
appears to be less a textual issue, and more of a theological one. In other words, textual
study cannot definitively solve this problem, or at least it has not historically done so.
Instead, perhaps we can turn to theological implications and see which is more faithful
to Paul’s overall argument. Let us look at the implications of both options. The
position that is contra Cottrell, might say, “Well, Christ’s work is certainly able to apply
to as many people as Adam’s sin, but only if they want it, even though the work of
Adam was not applied as such.” In contrast, Cottrell does say, “When Paul says the one
righteous act of Christ results in justification of life for all men, he means exactly that
and nothing less . . . Christ’s Original Grace cancels any potential state of original sin
for all men. If this is not the case, then the point and purpose of 5:12-21 as a whole is
completely negated.”\footnote{148} At the very least, Cottrell’s position is textually plausible, yet
so is the other position. All things being, hypothetically, equal between the positions,
Cottrell’s point concerning the actuality of the effects of the “one act of righteousness”
is a compelling reason to seriously consider his approach. The final answer, in this
regard, should be made according to our conclusion on both the strict parallelism
employed by Cottrell and on Paul’s meaning of justification.

2.3.8 ROMANS 5:19

“For just as through the disobedience of the one man the many were made sinners, so
also through the obedience of the one man the many will be made righteous.”

\begin{quote}
ὡσπερ γὰρ διὰ τῆς παρακοῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἄνθρωπον ἁμαρτολοὶ καταστάθησαν οἱ πολλοί,
οὕτως καὶ διὰ τῆς ὑπακοῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς δίκαιοι κατασταθήσονται οἱ πολλοί.
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\footnote{148} Ibid.
All humans were potentially, forensically declared to be guilty sinners by Adam’s act of disobedience. Through Christ’s act of righteous obedience, all humans were actually declared righteous before they could ever experience sinful consequences.

Verse 19 recalls v. 12 on the point that “all sinned” in Adam. “The word ‘for’ may mean that Paul is here explaining why it is possible or appropriate for all to receive condemnation as the result of one man’s sin. The reason is that, by this one man’s sin, the many were ‘made sinners.’”149 Also, Cottrell identifies “the many” as universal and equivalent in scope to “all men” from v. 18a. So, in vs. 18-19, both “the many” and “all men,” which are the same group, receive equivalent consequences from sin and blessings through Christ.

The most important concept to determine for v. 19a is the meaning of “made.” Cottrell explains the issue: “The Greek word is κατεστάθησαν . . . It means ‘to appoint, ordain, make, constitute, render, a plan in a particular class or category.’ The issue is whether it means merely ‘counted as’ or ‘declared to be something,’ or whether it means ‘actually made to be something.’”150 The correct meaning may be found in the identification of the subject, namely God or Adam (or Adam’s sin). If God is the subject, then He merely makes men sinners by describing them as what they have already become. Alternatively, if Adam or his sin is the subject, then man is actually turned, or perhaps transformed, into a sinner. Cottrell believes that Adam and his sin are the subject. He bases this upon similar uses of the word κατεστάθησαν, where someone actually causes someone to change in status. For example, Acts 7:10 says, “And rescued him from all his troubles. He gave Joseph wisdom and enabled him to gain the goodwill of Pharaoh king of Egypt; so he made (κατέστησεν) him ruler over Egypt and all his palace.” In this case, Pharaoh actually caused Joseph, through his authority, to rule over Egypt. Taking this point to its conclusion, “ . . . it means that in their solidarity with Adam all men actually became sinners; that’s why it was

149 Ibid.
150 Ibid., p. 362.
appropriate to treat them as sinners by condemning them (5:18).”\textsuperscript{151} But, “one point must be kept in mind, namely, that whatever nuance we give to ‘made sinners,’ it must be parallel to the meaning we give to ‘made righteous’ in 19b.”\textsuperscript{152}

Cottrell again, as he did with “one act of righteousness,” stresses that “the obedience of the one man” refers only to the death of Christ, not his entire life. He does, however, present two passages, as further biblical evidence, that use the language of obedience: (1) Philippians 2:8\textsuperscript{153} and (2) Hebrews 5:8.\textsuperscript{154} Cottrell does not appear to believe that something of great theological significance is at stake in this point. However, he believes if one expands the act of obedience to include the entire life of Christ, it “destroys the parallel with the one act of righteousness, the one supreme act of obedience, the cross,”\textsuperscript{155} as we saw in the discussion of v. 18.

As with the phrase “made sinners” from the first part of v. 19, “made righteous” is key to understanding the passage. The same verb is used, which may be interpreted in the same way as the two senses applied to the phrase, “made sinners.” Cottrell believes, for the same linguistic reasons, that “made righteous” probably includes both a forensic declaration of righteousness and the effect of humans actually becoming righteous: “. . . as the result of Christ’s one act of obedience, all are actually made righteous and become righteous.”\textsuperscript{156} Because the verb is in the future tense, Cottrell believes that there are two possibilities of how humans will be made righteous: (1) “. . . an ongoing process” that “will continue to apply to people in the future,” or (2) “something that will be consummated at the final judgment, when the redeemed will finally be completely sanctified.”\textsuperscript{157}

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., p. 363.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{153} “And being found in appearance as a man, he humbled himself and became obedient to death— even death on a cross!”
\textsuperscript{154} “Although he was a son, he learned obedience from what he suffered.”
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., p. 364.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid.
As Cottrell has already argued, “the many” and “all men” are the same group. “Thus, no baby is born a depraved sinner, a spiritually-weak sinner, a guilty sinner, a condemned sinner, a sinner by declaration, or a sinner in any other sense of the term. All are made righteous by the obedience of the one man, Jesus Christ.”

Cottrell’s extension of the effects of Christ’s obedient acts to the personal sins of adults is consistent with what he has said thus far. Our primary concern is with what this verse reveals about the effects on the innocent. It is true that salvation in Christ both declares the adult believer as righteous through justification, but also makes him righteous through sanctification. The nature of the sanctification process does not concern us, at this point, for opinions vary within orthodox Christian theology. There is agreement, however, on the fact that sanctification is a vital part of salvation. How is it that the innocent can be made righteous? Do they need to be declared righteous? If Cottrell is right that the “many” is the same category as the “all,” and thus includes both the innocent and adult sinners, then he is also right that the results of Christ’s obedient act must be two-fold, or the point Paul is making does not make sense. Cottrell’s position also hinges on whether he is right on his interpretation of the meaning of “made.” The two options for a definition involve the subject either being declared a sinner or righteous, or actually being changed into a sinner or a righteous person. What of a third option, namely that people are made sinners because they sin themselves? Let us consider this option. This would mean that the “many,” is identical with the “all,” and therefore, all people actually sin themselves because of the influence of Adam’s first act of disobedience or because their nature is marred to extent they will inevitably sin. Both possibilities neither directly declare the person a sinner, nor actually directly make him a sinner, for the sinner must actually personally sin to reach this state of affairs. Both are indirect causes. If the “many” is identical with “all” then how can we

158 Ibid.
account for the infant that dies in infancy? Such a person would never sin, and thus be both declared and made a sinner, because they would have never actually sinned. Two possible solutions could fix this issue: (1) “many” really means a limited number of people that include only sinful adults and not innocent children or (2) “made” must really be limited to the two possible definitions Cottrell supports. The first option would be arbitrary and not fit the usage of the word “many” elsewhere in the passage. Therefore, the second option seems to be the most reasonable answer for this scenario. Thus, all people, including infants, really have a sin problem that needs to be remedied. Either God has declared them to be sinners, or they have been made sinners through Adam, and possibly both are the case. Douglas Moo provides helpful support to this approach:

Many conclude, then, that people become sinners only by actually sinning in their own persons, but this does not follow. People can be ‘made’ sinners in the sense that God considers them to be such by regarding Adam’s act as, at the same time, their act. This particular understanding of the word is in keeping with the legal connotations that the term often has, and it alone matches the second use of the verb in the verse. For, although some suggest that, as people are ‘made’ righteous by believing, so they are ‘made’ sinners by sinning, the substitution of the different term in the second member, ‘believing,’ destroys the analogy. To maintain strict parallelism, we would have to argue, rather, that, as people are made sinners by sinning, they are made righteous by being righteous, or doing righteous things. Yet this interpretation is obviously impossible; people are made righteous only by the righteousness of Christ and their faith in Christ, not by being righteous.\footnote{Douglas Moo, \textit{The Wycliffe Exegetical Commentary: Romans}, 2 vols. (Chicago: Moody, 1991), I: 358-359. See the agreement on this point in, Murray, I:204.}

Moo would conclude, of course, that people are made righteous in Christ, and thus not all are freed from Adam’s sin. It is interesting, and somewhat perplexing, that an author like Moo, or John Murray, can agree on this key point, yet not conclude in agreement with Cottrell. The key is in the “many” and “all” controversy. Therefore, the question is not whether Adam’s sin is counteracted by Christ’s act, but, to whom the effects apply.

If Paul’s focus is really on all people being made sinners, then it would follow that it is the same focus he has on those being made righteous. Thus his focus reveals
that he is primarily dealing with the direct effects of Adam’s sin, because personal sin does not affect all people, and on the direct effects of Christ’s act of obedience on all of those affected by Adam’s sin, because personal salvation also does not apply to all people. It seems very likely that Paul has in mind even more than this, as revealed in some of the previous verses. For example, we find evidence in words like “much more,” “overflow,” and “justification” for “many trespasses,” that Paul purposes to reveal that Christ’s work is sufficient to take care of every sin problem for humanity. Again, however, if this a right understanding of the extent of justification in Paul? For example, in Pauline theology, does justification happen without faith, as would be necessary if applied to the innocent that cannot demonstrate faith? We will answer those questions in a later section.

2.3.9 ROMANS 5:20

“The law was added so that the trespass might increase. But where sin increased, grace increased all the more,”

νόμος δὲ παρεισῆλθεν, ἵνα πλεονάσῃ τὸ παράπτωμα· οὖ δὲ ἐπλεόνασεν ἡ ἁμαρτία, ύπερεπερίσσευσεν ἡ χάρις,

The law served as a means to increase awareness of humanity’s sinfulness, thus leading humanity to its need for grace. It is not, however, only a matter of awareness and need, but also an actual situation where the immense sinfulness of humanity is countered by a more immense grace.

Cottrell summarized the place of vs. 20-21 in the book of Romans: “This brief paragraph makes a fitting conclusion not just to Part Two as a whole. Indeed, it draws together the main elements of the entire letter thus far: law, sin, and death versus grace, righteousness, and life.”

The first part of the passage, “The law was added so that the trespass might increase,” is seen as an answer to questions that would have arisen in the minds of Paul’s Jewish audience: (1) “How does the law relate to all of this?” and (2) since Paul

\[160\] Cottrell defines Part Two as 3:21-5:21, and titles it “The All-sufficiency of Grace as a Way of Salvation.”

\[161\] Ibid., p. 365.
went straight from Adam to Christ, “Where is the place for Moses?” First, the law of Moses was “added,” or as Cottrell interprets, “the Law came in through the servants’ door, as opposed to making a grand entrance.” The Law, then, is “a secondary part of God’s plan, and not an end in itself.” Second, the Law caused “the trespass” to “increase.” The law did this “by increasing the very number of laws that could be broken, and by provoking specific sins (7:7-8).” Cottrell believes, however, that this one aspect misses a much greater point. The word “trespass” is singular, and has been used as such in vs. 15, 17, and 19, to refer to the “one sin” of Adam. So, Paul is not stressing the fact that the quantity of sin will increase, although this may be a secondary fact. Instead, “. . . the Law served to increase man’s awareness of the power and seriousness of sin and of the sinful condition brought upon the world by Adam’s trespass. By objectively embodying God’s standard for righteousness, and by unmistakably identifying sinful behavior, the Law served to magnify the reality of sin and to intensify man’s sense of hopelessness as he struggles against it.”

What good could come from God increasing the trespass? It is so that grace could increase: “But where sin increased, grace increase all the more . . .” Cottrell explains in detail:

God is always ready to bestow the gift of his grace; but (apart from the cancellation of the Adamic sin) this gift must be willingly accepted. Thus the only thing that prevents the increase of grace is man’s denial of his need for it and his refusal to accept it. But when confronted with the law in any form, man can no longer deny that he is a sinner. So by increasing man’s sense or consciousness of sin, the Law increase his sense of need for God’s grace, thereby causing grace to be more readily received and thus to increase.

Paul is specifically talking about the Law of Moses, and Israel, rather than God’s law in general. Cottrell believes that he is specifically targeting the special way in which Israel

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162 Ibid.
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid., p. 366. Cottrell explains, in footnote 103, that this is not the most important aspect of the Law: “This was not the only purpose for the Mosaic Law or any other law, nor even its main purpose. The ultimate purpose of the Mosaic Law was the same as God’s purpose for Israel as such, namely, to prepare for the coming of the Messiah.”
166 Ibid., pp. 366-367.
understood its sinfulness before God, compared to nations without the Law. Also, nations not having the Law were still able to see their sinfulness when compared to Israel and its Law, whether they followed it or not. Ultimately, the purpose of this was to prepare for the Messiah. Cottrell illustrates the point: “Among the very people where the Law caused the trespass of Adam to explode like an atomic bomb, the grace of God exploded like the more powerful hydrogen bomb.” Of course, the explosion of grace resulted from the work of Christ, who Israel had been purposed to bring to its fulfillment. “Thus the Law itself had a large part in Israel’s purpose of preparation for the coming of the Savior. By increasing the consciousness of sin, it increased the sense of need for grace, and thereby caused at least some Israelites to welcome the Messiah all the more.”

2.3.10 ROMANS 5:21

“So that, just as sin reigned in death, so also grace might reign through righteousness to bring eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord.”

God, in his desire to end the reign of death over humanity, sent his son, the Lord Jesus Christ, to bring eternal life.

Verse 21 describes why God wanted grace to increase, as mentioned in v. 20. Cottrell describes the connection: “God added the Law so that the awareness of sin might increase (v. 20a). He wants the awareness of sin to increase so that grace may be all the more accepted and increased (v. 20b). And he wants grace to increase so that it might defeat sin and death and reign triumphantly in the end (v. 21).”

Paul has said twice that death reigns due to Adam’s sin (vs. 14, 17). However, he now emphasized the fact that “sin reigned in death.” [emphasis mine] So, “he
identifies the true tyrant, sin itself.” Sin is the true tyrant because it brings about physical, spiritual (sickness of the sinner’s heart), and eternal death.

The end of the verse describes the replacement of sin, death, and defeat with righteousness, grace, life and victory. “When this fit of imputed righteousness is bestowed upon the believing sinner, sin and death become defeated enemies and grace reigns triumphant unto eternal life, all because of the all-sufficient redemptive work of Jesus Christ our Lord.”

Also, this verse ends the second section of the book (3:21-5:21). From 1:1-3:20, Paul has said that the law cannot save anyone. In the second section, Paul describes God’s solution to the problem—grace through the “propitiatory sacrifice of Jesus Christ.” We now come to the full purpose of the second section of which 5:12-21 is a part: “Knowing that we are justified by faith in Jesus Christ gives us a sure foundation for hope.”

Verses 20 and 21 serve an important role to Paul’s overall goal in Romans, despite their relatively small significance to the topic of Original Grace. Cottrell discusses these verses as if the doctrine has already been established, not for the sake of establishing Original Grace, but to stress the immensity of Christ’s salvific work, so that Paul can provide assurance of salvation to his readers. So, it is important for us to see the way in which Cottrell concludes his discussion of Romans 5:12-21. It is important to see that Cottrell may have motives for supporting this doctrine: (1) it is a faithful reading of the text from both a linguistic and structural perspective and (2) such a reading allows the theologian to take seriously the description of the dire effects that come upon humanity from Adam’s sin, rather than attempting to limit them to something less than physical, spiritual, and eternal death, as it is described both as death

169 Ibid., p. 368.
170 Ibid.
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid.
and as condemnation. The second reason has a positive practical consequence. It allows for Cottrell to take seriously the Augustinian view of original sin/guilt, yet it also allows him to dismiss it. In addition, it appears that Cottrell believes that his reading of the text actually highlights the value of Christ’s work more than any other. Assuming he is correct, it would appear that it does indeed do so.

2.3.11 SUMMARY OF COTTRELL’S EXEGESIS

The following is a collection of the individual summaries for each verse. It is my intention that this provide the reader with a clear and coherent summary of the flow of thought through the pericope:

Adam, by his sin and because of his federal headship, brought physical death into the world, under which all humans suffer. As proof of the universality of physical death, caused by Adam’s sin, Paul states that sin was present in the world because of Adam’s sin, but not actually taken into account over those that did not know the law of God, yet even the innocent are subject to physical death. They are subject to physical death because of Adam’s sin, rather than their own. Even in the period between Adam and Moses, before the Mosaic Law, there was still law available to all of humanity. However, even those who did not sin by breaking a direct command, like Adam did, namely the innocent, still live under the reign of death. The trespass of Adam brought death to all of humanity, whereas the gift of God’s grace, through Jesus Christ, not only counteracts the consequences of Adam’s sin, but also potentially the consequences of personal sins if that grace is received by faith, thus making the redemptive work of Christ vastly superior to the harmful sin of Adam. Adam’s sin alone caused all of humanity to be condemned, including perhaps both spiritual and eternal death, at least potentially, yet the work of Christ alone brought justification for that condemnation, actually, and also made available justification for the many personal sins of humanity that came after Adam. Death, including physical, spiritual, and eternal death, is the
result of Adam’s sin. The reign of all three kinds of death is counteracted for all of the innocent, as also they will before the adult sinner who, by accepting the gift of grace, will reign in life. If a single act of sin, performed by just one man, could bring condemnation to all of humanity, a single act of righteousness (the cross) by the God-man, Christ Jesus, can and does bring justification and life to all of humanity.

All humans were potentially, forensically declared to be guilty sinners by Adam’s act of disobedience. Through Christ’s act of righteous obedience, all humans were actually declared righteous before they could ever experience sinful consequences. The law served as a means to increase awareness of humanity’s sinfulness, thus leading humanity to its need for grace. It is not, however, only a matter of awareness and need, but also an actual situation where the immense sinfulness of humanity is countered by a more immense grace. God, in his desire to end the reign of death over humanity, sent his son, the Lord Jesus Christ, to bring eternal life.

2.4.0 KEY EXEGETICAL ISSUES

Now that we have summarized Cottrell’s exegetical approach to Romans 5:12-21, we will focus on key issues in a topical/thematic fashion. Cottrell himself constructs his argument around four major questions: (1) “What is the purpose of this passage in relation to the epistle as a whole?” (2) “Does this paragraph teach the doctrine of original sin? (3) “What is the scope of the words ‘many’ and ‘all’ as they are used in 5:12-19?” and (4) “Does this passage teach universal salvation, then?” 173 To these questions, we add four additional questions, which Cottrell does not directly address, but which seek to get to the heart of the validity of his exegesis: (5) What is the extent and meaning of “justification” in this passage? (6) What is the meaning of death in this passage? (7) What is the meaning of “sin” in this passage? (8) What is the appropriate way to interpret the comparison and contrast between Adam and Christ in this passage?

173 The structure of this section, in regard to the first four questions, follows that of Jack Cottrell, ‘Romans’, pp. 330-368.
Each of these issues depends on two primary questions. First, are the categories and distinctions made by Cottrell faithful to Paul? Did Paul think in the same or similar terms and distinctions? Even if Paul did not intend such things, are the assumptions still valid to clarify and develop our own account of the doctrine in ways that remain faithful to it but answer questions that we have no reason to think were posed by or to the author, or make distinctions that we have no reason to think were made by the author himself? Second, is the direct and detailed parallelism employed by Cottrell valid? In short, does Cottrell, perhaps unknowingly, switch from exegesis to systematic theology, in a sometimes implicit manner, in order to make his case? Put another way, we will identify and analyze the consequences of Cottrell’s exegesis, where he attempts to answer questions about Paul’s explicit intention, and his attempt to answer questions and supply distinctions that go beyond what Paul explicitly intended, but which are necessitated by the attempt to build a coherent scheme from this passage and all other relevant passages—systematic theology.

How can we understand Cottrell’s overall approach to the pericope? His basic insight into the passage is as follows. In order to show that the passage as a whole can and should be read in the way he reads it can, in part, rely on fairly uncontroversial claims. But he also needs to read some the elements of the passage in more controversial ways by, for example, excluding other interpretations, and explaining why he does so by giving reasons that are purely exegetical (e.g., the meanings of Greek words, etc), and other reasons that are to do with the way the passage in question fits in to what he takes to be the overall structure of Paul's argument. Along the way, he deploys the following distinctions: (1) physical death/spiritual (including eternal) death, (2) personal sin/sinful or corrupt nature/Adamic sin, (3) justification by faith from personal sin/justification of Adamic sin, and either argues for that deployment (again, either on purely exegetical grounds, or on the grounds that it is necessary to the
coherence of his reconstruction of the doctrine) or simply deploys them covertly. Some of these further claims and distinctions are, he thinks, necessary if his overall interpretation is to stand (though in some cases we must question the validity of such distinctions); others are presented in lesser supporting roles; others are of only tangential relevance. What I have stated in general, in order to describe the overall framework of the discussion to follow, I will now explore in detail. Chapter 3 will examine the wider theological implications of the exegetical decisions.

2.4.1 THE PURPOSE OF ROMANS 5.12-21

As the first of his questions, Cottrell considers the purpose of the passage to be of vital important to his interpretation. Taking his assumptions to be the case, perhaps he is correct. I will argue that it is an important piece of the exegetical puzzle, but that it is perhaps not as crucial as it seems to him. Cottrell believes that the overall purpose of the passage is to show that the death of Christ, specifically, is sufficient to provide salvation to all mankind. This leads to his contention that the primary purpose of this passage is to assure the Christian of the potency and solidity of their salvation. He looks back to the first eleven verses in chapter five to find support that, indeed, assurance of salvation is the most logical conclusion for Paul’s intention. As Cottrell sees it, Paul makes a thorough argument where verses 12-21 illustrate his point in verses 1-11, namely that the death of Christ is sufficient for the salvation of mankind:

In 5:1-11 Paul assures us that we can put all our hope and confidence in one saving act (the cross) of one man (Jesus Christ). In those eleven verses the apostle makes ten references to the saving efficacy of Christ and his cross. In light of this someone might begin to wonder, ‘Isn’t this expecting an awful lot from just one man?’ This is indeed what the gospel asks us to believe—that essentially one act of just one man has the power to save the whole world from all its sins.\(^\text{174}\)

Paul’s illustration in verses 12-21 contrasts the “one act of righteousness” performed by the one man Jesus’ death on the cross with another man who brought universal death on
man, namely Adam. Thus, “if we can accept the fact that the one sin of a mere man has brought sin and death upon the whole world, then we can surely believe that the atoning death of the Son of God has brought salvation upon the whole world.” Thus, Cottrell’s main focus is on the assurance of individual salvation, rather than assurance of Christ’s victory over his enemies or of Christ’s work in redeeming creation. He does add a corporate aspect by saying that “just one man has the power to save the whole world from all its sins.” This is really a focus on the assurance of individual salvation for all people. Thus, it actually remains a primary concern with individuals.

Cottrell finds agreement in Moo: “The main connection is with the teaching of assurance of final salvation in the immediately preceding paragraph.” John Stott connects the passage to the preceding chapters, specifically references to those under sin, including Jews and Gentiles (3:9), and the community of the faithful of which Abraham is the father (4:16): “Here then are two communities, one characterized by sin and guilt, the other by grace and faith. Anticipating verses 12-21 a little, we may say that the former is in Adam and the latter in Christ.” He also links 5:12-21 with 5:1-11 for two reasons: (1) “Paul has attributed our reconciliation and salvation to the death of God’s Son (9-10), and (2) “both [sections] conclude with the expression ‘through our Lord Jesus Christ’ (11 and 21).” Stott explains what is at stake in the connection between the two sections, specifically in reference to verses 9 and 10:

This immediately prompts the question how one person’s sacrifice could have brought such blessings to so many. It is not that (in Winston Churchill’s famous saying) so many owe so much to so few; it is rather that so many owe so much to only one person. How can that be? Paul’s answer is contained in his analogy between Adam and Christ. For both demonstrate the principle that many can be affected, for good or ill, by one person’s action.

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175 Ibid.
176 Ibid.
177 Moo, I:327.
178 Stott, p. 148.
179 Ibid., pp. 148-149.
180 Ibid., p. 149.
Cranfield offers a slight variation by denying a direct connection between chapter 5 and
the preceding four chapters. He admits “linguistic affinity” between the sections, and
that Paul is continuing the concept of justification as explained in the first four chapters,
but claims that 5:1-8:39 stands as a separate, main division of the book. Like the
others, he finds the most direct connection with 5:1-11. He explains his reasons:

... the best is surely that which takes the connexion to be with 5:1-11 as a
whole. Verses 1-11 have affirmed that those who are righteous by faith are
people whom God’s undeserved love has transformed from the condition of
being God’s enemies into that of being reconciled to Him, at peace with Him.
The point of Διὰ τοῦτο is that Paul is now going on to indicate in vv.12-21 the
conclusion to be drawn from what has been said in vv.1-11. The fact that
reconciliation is a reality in the case of believers does not stand by itself: it
means that something has been accomplished by Christ which is as universal in
its effectiveness as was the sin of the first man. Paul is not longer speaking just
about the Church: his vision now includes the whole of humanity.
Significantly, the first person plural of vv. 1-11 has given place to the third
person plural. The existence of Jesus Christ not only determines the existence of
believers: it is also the innermost secret of the life of every man. Διὰ τοῦτο
indicates that Paul is inferring Christ significance for all men from the reality of
what He now means for believers. The connexion, then, between vv. 12-21 and
vv. 1-11 is definite and close. [sic]

All of these perspective lead to the view that 5:12-21 finds direct connection with 5:1-
11.

Where does Cottrell stand in debate concerning the overall structure of Romans,
and does it matter to his interpretation? After categorizing separately Paul’s
introductory comments, he divides Romans into the following main sections: (1) The
Impotence of the Law as a Way of Salvation 1:18-3:20, (2) The All-Sufficiency of
Grace as a Way of Salvation 3:21-5:21, (3) The All-Sufficiency of Grace Give Victory
(5) Living the Sanctified Life 12:1-15:13, and (6) Personal Messages from Paul 15:14-
16:27. Moo would define this approach as “a very popular way of outlining the letter,
with 1:18-5:21 and 6-8 often being viewed as describing, respectively, ‘justification’

181 Cranfield, I:252-254.
182 Ibid., I:271-272.
and ‘sanctification.’\textsuperscript{183} There is significant debate concerning the structure of Romans. We will look at a couple of options. Moo himself concludes that 5:1 is the transition point to a new section that more closely links to v. 6-8 than v. 1-4, but that v. 5 contains concepts contained in both the previous and subsequent sections. N. T. Wright says, in contrast, that “v. 5-8 are a kind of formal centre, the tightly compressed driving motor for the rest, which energizes the discussions of major issues facing the Roman church in v. 9-11 and v. 12-15.”\textsuperscript{184}

Despite the importance of such options for the overall understanding of Romans, it appears that Cottrell is not significantly affected by these discussions, although he does take a “side” much like that of Moo. It is the correct identification of Paul’s \textit{emphasis} that is largely at issue, based upon the connection between the passage and the preceding text of Romans. The majority of the positions do not argue this point.

Cottrell’s exegesis is significantly affected if \textit{assurance} of salvation is not understood as at least one of, if not the primary, emphases. Cottrell makes several other assumptions that must go along with this in order to make his case. Cottrell’s general position in the camp of those who view Romans chapters 1-8 as being primarily about individual salvation, and chapters 9-11 as a shift to a more corporate perspective, could struggle with at least two of Cottrell’s claims: (1) that children are primarily in mind in 5:14, and (2) that justification can come without the expression of faith. Both seem out of place if one assumes that the primary subject Paul is talking about is sinners and lawbreakers, whether Jews or Gentiles, which need to be justified by faith in Jesus Christ. Of course, one could imagine it the other way around. Those from the same perspective could also be more likely to agree with Cottrell, because they could view 5:12-21 as a section where Paul is detailing the mechanics of salvation in regard to

\textsuperscript{183} Moo, I: 291.  
\textsuperscript{184} N.T. Wright, \textit{A Royal Priesthood: The Use of the Bible Ethically and Politically}, ed. by C. Bartholemew (Carlisle: Paternoster, 2002), pp. 173–193. His emphasis seeks to set Paul “In the Mediterranean world where Paul exercised his vocation as the apostle to the Gentiles, the pagans, and the fastest growing religion which was the Imperial cult, the worship of Caesar.”
Adamic sin. Beginning from a perspective where chapters 1-8 are read in light of chapters 9-11, and that the purpose of 1-8 is to describe the salvation of Jews and Gentiles corporately, it would probably be viewed as unlikely that Paul means to detail the workings of individual salvation in 5:12-21. Cottrell, coming from the former perspective, apparently thinks that Paul does intend to describe the technicalities of individual salvation and its relationship with Adam’s sin. We will give these issues, and other related issues, significant treatment both later in this chapter and in Chapter 3, in the context of the Adam/Christ comparison.

2.4.2 ORIGINAL GRACE, NOT ORIGINAL SIN

This question of the original sin and Original Grace distinction should really be the final question that we ask, as it is really the conclusion of the matter after we take all factors into account, although Cottrell asks it as his second question. Here, we are given his answer. The issue is that the answer to this question turns out to be the conclusions drawn from the other questions we must ask. However, his answer to this question does explain the role of assurance of individual salvation in his overall scheme. We have seen how this affects his view of the overall purpose of the passage, but now we can see how it plays out in his application of Original Grace to the issue of original sin.

Cottrell does not find original sin in Romans 5, mostly due to his view on Paul’s emphasis, or so he claims. He does not deny that some sort of original sin is taught, or that absolutely no consequences come upon humanity because of Adam’s sin. Cottrell explains this point upon which his entire view hinges: “His [Paul] main subject is Jesus and his cross, and the universal, all-sufficient consequences of that saving event. His purpose is not to emphasize what happened to the race as a result of Adam’s sin, but to emphasize what has happened to it as a result of Christ’s saving work.”

185 Ibid, p. 185.
therefore, believes that the varied views on the consequences of original sin are beside the point in terms of this passage’s interpretation:

In the final analysis it does not matter what content anyone feels compelled to pour into the concept of “original sin,” because Paul’s main point is this: whatever the whole human race got (or would have gotten) from Adam has been completely canceled out for the whole human race by the gracious atoning work of Jesus Christ. Make the Adamic legacy as dire as you want: physical death, total depravity, genuine guilt, and condemnation to hell. The whole point of the passage is that Christ’s “one act of righteousness” (5:18) has completely intercepted, nullified, negated, cancelled, and counteracted whatever was destined to be ours because of Adam. All the potential spiritual consequences of Adam’s sin are intercepted even before they can be applied. The only consequence that actually takes effect is physical death, and it is countered with the promise of resurrection to eternal life.\(^{186}\)

Original sin is described by Paul as something that could have happened. It is potential, not actual. God’s preemptive strike, so to speak, has saved humans from very real danger, including the reversal of physical death in the resurrection.

Cottrell’s argument, secondarily, hinges upon the contrasts he finds in Romans 5, namely that Paul intends to say that Christ’s “one act of righteousness,” in fact, nullifies the consequences of Adam’s sin.\(^{187}\) Cottrell provides contrast between the consequences of the acts of Adam and Christ, best represented in chart form:\(^{188}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verse</th>
<th>Consequences of Adamic Sin</th>
<th>Consequences of Christ’s Atoning Death</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>“the many died”</td>
<td>“the grace of God and the gift by the grace”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>“judgment” and “condemnation”</td>
<td>“justification”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>“death reigned”</td>
<td>“grace . . . righteousness . . . life”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>“condemnation”</td>
<td>“justification of life”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>“made sinners”</td>
<td>“made righteous”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cottrell’s point is one of consistency. Paul is demonstrating that anything Adam’s sin brought to humans is sufficiently reversed by Christ’s atoning death. This point will become clearer in the subsequent discussion of the “many” and the “all.” Although Cottrell answers this question simply by saying that what Adam brought, Christ dealt

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\(^{186}\) Ibid. The delayed counteraction of physical death, as part of the effects of Original Grace, is critiqued and explored in Chapter 3.

\(^{187}\) A detailed analysis of his hermeneutical approach is in Chapter 3 of this project.

with, his point about potential original sin, rather than actual, and about Christ’s work’s role in that process, is founded upon the fundamental assumption that there is a parallelism in the passage between Adam and Christ, where Christ does even “much more” than Adam consummated.

2.4.3 THE “MANY” AND THE “ALL”

Both of the claims contained in the two previous sections actually find their foundation in the scope of both the work of Adam and Christ. Thus, we turn to Cottrell’s definitions of the “many” and the “all” in this passage. As we will see, Cottrell is, whether consciously or not, restricting the primary focus of this passage to the concepts of Adamic sin, rather than sin in general, and justification apart from faith, rather than making faith an essential condition. Of course, Cottrell discusses personal sin and justification by faith in the context of this passage. For example, he explains that the concept of “much more” is Paul’s way of saying that Christ takes care of Adam’s sin through justification without faith for the innocent, but can do “much more” by bringing personal salvation to the adult sinner through justification by faith. However, these concepts could perhaps be described as a bonus to what is primarily meant by Paul in the passage. This leads Cottrell to determine his position on the passage, as we will see in the rest the questions, primarily in light of his restriction of the subject matter to Adamic sin and justification apart from faith.¹⁸⁹

Cottrell is in agreement with the assumption held by most scholars, that the “many” and the “all” refer to the same group of people.

Wherein lies the problem, then? It lies in the way the advocates of original sin apply these two terms to Adam on the one hand and to Christ on the other hand. The common approach is that, when these terms are used in relation to Adam’s sin, they are completely universal in scope; but when they are used in relation to

¹⁸⁹ Cottrell never calls justification applied to the innocent, “justification apart from faith,” or even overtly acknowledges that fact. I do not mean to misrepresent his position, but this phrase does accurately reflect the situation.
the work of Christ, they are more limited and restricted in scope and do not really mean ‘all.’

He cites two examples of this mistake. The first is from John MacArthur: “all can be made righteous in Christ” and that “Christ’s one sacrifice made salvation available to all mankind.” MacArthur acknowledges the universal nature of Christ’s atoning death, but treats it only as potentially efficacious. It is only receivable by those who accept the Gospel. The second example would be those from those supportive of the Calvinist perspective (according to Cottrell). Cottrell summarizes their position: “... the consequences of Adam’s act extended to all who were in him or belonged to him when he sinned—which includes the whole race; but the consequences of Christ’s act extended only to “all” who were in him or belonged to him when he died—which includes only the elect.”

Cottrell believes that these alternative interpretations are false: “The reason should be obvious: such a discrepancy in numbers would negate the whole purpose of the Adam-Christ comparison!” That purpose, upon which Cottrell places much of his argument is individual assurance of salvation. He bolsters his argument by further describing Paul’s theme: “Can I have confidence that Christ’s work is sufficient for taking away all my sins—and those of the whole world as well? Paul’s answer is “Yes! You can have such assurance! Look at what has already been done as the result of his work: his one righteous act has already counteracted everything brought upon everyone by Adam.” Christ’s work is therefore, “capable of taking away all the consequences of our personal sins as well.” Cottrell makes plain the importance of this

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190 Cottrell, *The Faith Once For All*, p. 187. John Stott, for example, articulates this view. “The ‘all men’ who are affected by the work of Christ cannot refer to absolutely everybody” p. 159.
191 MacArthur, I: 297.
192 Ibid., I:302.
194 Ibid.
195 Ibid.
196 Ibid.
interpretation: “Thus to maintain the basic theme of assurance, we must insist that the terms ‘many’ and ‘all,’ when used of Christ, are at least as broad in scope as when used of Adam . . . The failure to acknowledge this is the greatest hindrance to a proper understanding of this passage; it is also the single most influential reason why many still believe this passage teaches a doctrine of original sin.”

Cottrell seems to provide a tight refutation of the opposing positions. He does it, primarily, on the basis of structural and thematic reasons. It would appear that he believes his position actually provides more assurance than the original sin position. The difference Cottrell is describing is between two positions, both of which say that the believer can have full confidence that personal sin, and original sin as it affects the believer, are both completely dealt with by Christ’s work. The original sin position says that both are potentially dealt with until the Gospel is accepted by a person, the Original Grace position says that one is actually dealt with even before then, but agrees that the other is only potentially dealt with until then. It is not obvious that either position offers the believer greater assurance. Perhaps one can be more impressed if Christ’s act counteracts Adamic consequences for the innocent, so that no penalty is visited upon them, but does that equate to assurance? Certainly more infants are freed from original sin if Original Grace is the case, and therefore they are saved unconditionally. It is simply the difference of number between all of the innocent (everyone ever born), and the number of those that actually accept the Gospel (a minority). Of course, this only practically matters if the innocent person dies before sinning personally, where they will be in need of forgiveness for their own sin.

So, perhaps we could say that the effects of Original Grace are greater in quantity, but not in quality, for both positions claim to counteract Adamic and personal sin, but the question is in the number of those affected. Either position certainly poses

\(^{197}\text{Ibid.}\)
theological concerns, mostly over our view of Christ’s grace related those who are innocent. For example, both scenarios are closely linked to other positions about the character and working of God in regard to justice, love, etc. (i.e. are babies sent to hell for Adam’s sin, and how does that fit into our view of God’s justice and love?)

Does Cottrell’s position really give more assurance? Yes, to the innocent, but no, to the adult believer. From the view of an adult believer, we get the same result—both types of sin are erased. Even though an innocent person would not understand assurance, by definition, namely that they are innocent because of their lack of knowledge about sin, salvation, etc., they are theoretically more assured under Original Grace which provides a one hundred percent assurance of salvation, whereas, original sin provides a one hundred percent assurance of any or all of the following: corruption, guilt, and eternal punishment. In other words, Cottrell’s position provides more assurance for Christians about others, namely innocent children, but it does not really change individual assurance for anyone conscious of such concepts.

Does Cottrell’s position give more assurance in a way that determines how Paul should be read? No. It seems possible to take either position (original sin or Original Grace) on this point, while still being faithful to Paul’s point about the superior nature of Christ’s work and of assurance of salvation. However, the text does not seem to give sufficient detail to judge on this basis alone. Therefore, Cottrell’s point that the theme of assurance is hard evidence of this interpretation seems too overreached.

The identification of the “many” and the “all” is, in some ways, the foundational issue for some of the other issues, and, at the same time, possibly determined by the direction taken on the others. Namely, it is closely linked with the determination of the extent of justification, and specifically whether it can apply to those that cannot demonstrate faith in Christ, and it is also linked with those who are considered both “in Adam” and “in Christ.”
We will test Cottrell’s view of the “many” and the “all” to see if it, by itself, is perhaps viable. Let us first look at MacArthur’s opposing view:

Perhaps for the sake of parallelism, Paul uses many in two different senses in this verse. As will be seen below, he uses the term all with similarly distinct meanings in verse 18. In regard to Adam’s act, ‘many’ is universal and inclusive, corresponding to the ‘all’ in verse 12. Because all men, without exception, bear in themselves the nature and mark of sin, they are all, without exception, under the sentence of death (as he has made clear in the earlier chapters).  

He then contrasts the aforementioned usage with the other: “Contrary to its use in the beginning of this verse regarding Adam, the term many now carries its normal meaning, applying only to those for whom Christ’s gracious gift of salvation is made effective through their faith in Him. Although Paul does not mention that qualifying truth at this point, He has just declared that believers are ‘justified by faith’ and are introduced ‘by faith into this grace in which we stand’ (5:1-2). [sic] That, of course, is the cardinal truth of the gospel as far as man’s part is concerned; it is the focus of Paul’s teaching in this epistle from 3:21-5:2.” He states the practical consequences of this approach: (1) “all can be made righteous in Christ” and (2) “Christ’s one sacrifice made salvation available to all mankind.”

As Cottrell stated in regard to one of his foundational questions for interpreting the passage, “What is the scope of the words ‘many’ and ‘all’ as they are used in 5:12-19,” “Wherein lies the problem, then? It lies in the way the advocates of original sin apply these two terms to Adam on the one hand and to Christ on the other hand. The common approach is that, when these terms are used in relation to Adam’s sin, they are completely universal in scope; but when they are used in relation to the work of Christ, they are more limited and restricted in scope and do not really mean ‘all.’” Cottrell

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198 MacArthur, I:303.
199 Ibid., pp. 303-304.
200 MacArthur, I: 297.
201 Ibid., p. 302.
202 Cottrell, The Faith Once For All, p. 187. John Stott, for example, articulates this view. “The ‘all men’ who are affected by the work of Christ cannot refer to absolutely everybody”, p. 159.
believes that these alternative interpretations are false: “The reason should be obvious: such a discrepancy in numbers would negate the whole purpose of the Adam-Christ comparison!”

MacArthur’s claim that “many” is being used in two different senses has no linguistic foundation, at least not to the extent necessary for us to be certain he is right. The words are the same. Instead, he reveals his theological assumption that they cannot be the same, for all suffer death (including condemnation) because of the trespass, yet not all become Christians and thus receive the gift. He is right that indeed the gift extends beyond the trespass of Adam, but that’s why Cottrell says in regard to the extent of the gift that, “God’s gracious gift reached out to embrace all who have been affected by Adam’s sin, and has completely canceled and nullified the total consequences of Adam’s sin for the entire human race. If it has not done at least this, then Christ’s act is not even as powerful as Adam’s sin, much less more powerful.” Specifically, in regard to the “much more,” he says “. . . the overflowing “much more” of Christ’s cross means that the saved state into which it brings us is a state far better than what was lost in Adam,” and “. . . the overflowing ‘much more’ means that the one saving act of Christ not only saves the entire race from whatever consequences have come upon us because of Adam’s sin; it also is able to save the entire race from the consequences of their own personal sins, and does in fact cancel all such consequences for those who personally accept the free gift of grace through faith.” The most supportive point for Cottrell’s position, and consequently the most damaging to MacArthur’s, is the fact that it does not make sense that Paul would talk about the consequences of Adam’s sin that

203 Ibid.
204 Cottrell quotes Lard, The Faith Once for All, p. 178, from whom he finds support in his claim: “It includes ‘a better body than Adam ever had, a better life than he ever lived, a better world than he ever lived in, a world where Satan, and sin, and death can never come.’”
205 Ibid.
206 Cottrell, p. 352. Cottrell quotes McGarvey and Pendleton, p. 336: “We are here informed that the result of the sacrificial act of Christ fully reversed and nullified the effects of the act of Adam, and that it did even much more. The effect, in other words, had in all points as wide a range, and in some points a much wider range, that of Adam’s act.”
go to the “many,” which is defined as all people, and yet the gift does not go to the
“many” in the same sense of all people, but only to those that are in Christ. Are we then
to understand that gift of Christ cannot spread to the same number as the trespass of
Adam? If the gift cannot even do this, then why does Paul bother to refer to the “much
more” that it can do? “Much more” than what? In other words, not only does
MacArthur’s position harm the point of the Adam-Christ comparison, as Cottrell states,
but it also does not explain the content of “much more.” For MacArthur, the “much
more” would happen for the “many” (not all humans, but only those that accept Christ)
by the gift being applied to forgive both Adamic and personal sins at the point of
salvation. If Adam’s sin is imputed without human choice, why would the gift of Christ
not be applied equally? We are, in this system, condemned apart from any personal
rebellious act of sin, but yet we are saved only in a personal act of salvation. In
summary, let us boil down both systems. The gift in MacArthur’s system is equal to
that of Cottrell’s, in that they both believe it can forgive and counteract both Adamic
and personal sin. However, MacArthur’s version of the gift only applies to those that
actually become saved, whereas Cottrell’s gift counteracts Adamic sin for the same
number of people that Adam’s sin brought death upon—every single human that ever
lived or will live — and in addition, Cottrell’s version of the gift counteracts personal
sin for those that come to salvation.

Of the two approaches to this issue, considered by itself, Cottrell’s seems to be
more consistent. However, we must view this issue with the other vital hermeneutical
issues in view. Is making the distinction between Adamic sin and personal sin faithful
to Paul? Does the passage lend itself to this precise of a discussion, both in terms of
word usage and structure? Are Cottrell’s presuppositions about Paul’s writing accurate?
Is his analysis accurate?
Truly, the key issue, other than the aforementioned presupposition that Paul’s words lend themselves to a very precise comparison between Adam’s sin and Christ’s righteous act, actually resides in our discussion of the meaning of justification that is still to come. If one is bound to the idea that justification must come by faith, then MacArthur’s solution seems reasonable. However, if we conclude that Paul is talking about both sin and justification in unique senses, and therefore justification may be interpreted as the involuntary mechanism for counteracting the involuntary consequences of Adamic sin, then perhaps Cottrell’s explanation provides the better solution.

2.4.4 ORIGINAL GRACE, NOT UNIVERSALISM

The next issue is probably the least central of all. Cottrell deals with this issue to ensure that Original Grace is not mistaken for universalism. As previously discussed, Cottrell limited the primary subject of Romans 5:12-21 to Adamic sin and justification from that sin, apart from faith. Cottrell believes that the terms “many” and “all” necessitate that the sin of Adam and the counteraction of the second Adam, that is Christ, applies to all humanity. Thus, it may be possible to conclude that proponents of Original Grace promote universal salvation, or universalism. Cottrell provides a direct rebuttal to this claim:

Romans 5:12-19 does not teach universal salvation, and taking the “all” and “many” who receive Christ’s grace to refer to the whole human race does not entail such universalism. Why not? Because the primary focus of the passage as a whole and of these words specifically is how the work of Christ counteracts and cancels in their entirety the consequences of the one sin of Adam for every single individual. This is not a matter of possibility or potentiality; it is not just something Christ is able to do, or something that is offered to all and accepted by some. No, this is a reality; it is an accomplished fact; it has been done and will be done for the entire race; it is a sure thing.[207] [emphasis original]

Thus, to be clear, the effects of Original Grace do not extend to personal sin, and therefore, cannot provide salvation from it. The grace offered for personal sin and its

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[207] Ibid., p. 188.
acceptance by humans is a completely separate issue. Cottrell is therefore limiting the passage to Adamic sin, which he identifies as the primary sin to be counteracted. He also limits justification, not in quantity, as it applies to all who are under Adam’s sin (all humans), but instead he limits it in effect. This sort of justification is applied by the death of Christ to all people apart from the expression of faith. So, justification apart from faith is for all, but it only cures Adam’s sin. When one sins personally, one must demonstrate faith to receive justification.

Cottrell provides references to two authors that oppose his view, Ernst Käsemann and James D. G. Dunn. Käsemann suggests that universalism is necessitated by the passage, specifically in reference to v. 18: “Does not the hope of general restoration . . . come to expression here . . . all-powerful grace is unthinkable without eschatological universalism.” Dunn is slightly less committed to universalism, but allows for that possibility in Paul’s words: “Nor should we exclude the possibility that Paul . . . cherished the hope of universal salvation . . . How, after all, can grace be ‘so much more’ in its effect if it is less than universal than the effect of death.” Cottrell appears to agree, somewhat, with the sentiment expressed especially by Dunn, by demanding that the grace brought through Christ would be at least as far-reaching as the sin of Adam. As we will see in the discussion on v. 15, for example, Cottrell shows that the “much more” refers to the availability of salvation from personal sins. So, universal salvation is, without any act of human will, applied to all as it relates to Adam’s sin and its consequences. Even though it may be a possible interpretation of the passage to see universal salvation from even personal sins, Cottrell’s understanding of the passage does not necessitate it. Instead, he maintains the integrity of the principle that Christ’s work must be at least as powerful and widespread as Adam’s sin, but

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208 Ibid., pp. 188-189.
209 Cottrell, Romans, p. 335-336.
applies it only to the other universal fact, namely, Adamic sin. In short, Cottrell’s system of Original Grace necessitates this type of universal salvation, whereas the other interpretations cited may logically only allow its possibility.

Now that we have briefly explored Cottrell’s approach, we now turn to the underpinning of his work. Cottrell’s argument works by insisting upon the strict parallelism between the consequences of Adam’s sin and the consequences of Christ’s righteousness, and by reinforcing that by reference to assurance. He then has to guard against a problem in the other direction: one that appears to take the parallelism even further, and provide even more assurance, at least in terms of quantity. Namely, the Universalist position would assure that everyone is saved. So it is not simply random that this is Cottrell’s fourth question: it goes to the heart of his position. One of the main conceptual tools that Cottrell is using to make his defense is a strong distinction between the effects of the one sin of Adam on the one hand, and our personal sins on the other. Is the deployment of that particular distinction crucial to Cottrell’s position, such that any blurring or questioning of that distinction would be a serious challenge to his position? It would seem so. Take the parallelism argument the other direction (i.e. where the original sin position does not demand such a strict parallelism) and it comes to the conclusion that the counteraction of Adamic sin is only potential, and that salvation takes affect for the Christian only after they have been justified by faith. Both the Universalist option and the original sin option, if able to weaken parallelism, would seem to undermine the Original Grace position entirely, as it hangs on this very assumption. Another possible way to look at this problem is to assume this passage only means to say that people who sin personally in imitation of Adam are condemned, and then they may be justified by Christ through faith. This position maintains the strict parallelism as does the Original Grace position. We do not seek to choose a position, but to discover whether the Original Grace position has merit. So, the question must be
asked, “Does this mean that the rhetorical force of Cottrell’s argument is going to be weakened to the extent that he admits any significant lack of parallelism between the way that the consequences of Adam’s sin work and the way that the consequences of Christ’s righteous work?” Again, it would seem so. We now turn to the four probative questions that Cottrell does not directly answer, but that we will seek to answer in order to assess Original Grace.

2.4.5 THE EXTENT AND MEANING OF “JUSTIFICATION”

What is the meaning of “justification” in Romans 5:12-21? To what extent is justification effective on humans? Does Cottrell’s usage of justification to counteract Adam’s sin apart from faith, rather than the normal usage of justification by faith in the rest of Romans, serve as a valid use of the concept as it works in the Original Grace interpretation? Take Cottrell's account of the contrast in v. 15 between condemnation in Adam and justification in Christ. In order for this to fit Cottrell's system, 'justification' has to mean justification 'insofar as Adam's sin is concerned', and has to mean that act which 'releases all (in infancy) from Adamic condemnation'. In order to prove Cottrell correct, we would need to satisfy one of two possible avenues of evidence: (1) that Paul's usage of the term 'justification' is more flexible than the normal way it is used in Romans, and that he clearly does use it elsewhere with a range of meanings, that could well include the kind of meaning Cottrell gives to it in this passage, and/or (2) demonstrate more clearly that if we are to build a fully coherent and detailed doctrine on the basis of this passage, the only way to make it work is to be more precise than Paul was, and to specify clearly that we mean this kind of justification-of-Adamic-sin, not justification-by-faith. The first option seeks to be most faithful to Paul and his intent, whereas the second option seeks to do more than Paul knew or intended. It would seem that the strongest evidence would be founded on the first option, that justification can really mean what Cottrell suggests, and that it is appropriate to assign the usage in this
context. Perhaps Paul uses justification in regard to Adamic sin only this once in Scripture. Romans 5:12-21 is certainly a unique passage, in that it is the only passage that significantly raises and discusses the possibility of anything like original sin, in any of its forms. Nowhere else does Paul so thoroughly discuss the effects of Adamic sin, nor those effects in contrast to Christ’s redemption. Perhaps it is the uniqueness of the passage, besides other significant issues, that makes this pericope so difficult. What if Paul is using a unique meaning for ‘justification’ to make a rather unique point? Certainly we cannot take this passage out of the context of Romans without harming authorial intent, but perhaps we need to allow for the fact that Paul is doing something unique. If such assumptions can be made responsibly it would certainly decrease the probability of such an interpretation, but perhaps evidence from option two, going beyond Paul, can give us enough reason to make such a conclusion. We turn to this discussion, but I must say that without evidence that Paul uses the term elsewhere in regard to Adamic sin, the argument does not seem likely to succeed.

“Justification” is used twice in the pericope, in verses 16 and 18. It occurs as δικαίωμα in v. 16 and in v. 18 as δικαίωσιν (δικαίωσις). Δικαίωμα is normally translated as “righteousness.” In fact, it is translated that way every one of the other 10 times it is used in the New Testament. Only here is it translated “justification.” Δικαίωσις is the word normally translated “justification” and will, no doubt, help us discover the extent of the definition by Paul in Romans. We will focus on the two occurrences where it is translated “justification.”

It would appear that Paul intends similar content to both words used. It is thought that perhaps he uses δικαίωμα as a counterpart to κατάκριμα. Whatever the reason, “it is used here (as is also δικαίωσις in v. 18) to denote justification in the sense not of the action of justifying but of the result of the action, i.e. the condition of having

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212 It is used as “ordinance” in Romans 2:26 and 8:4, and as “righteous act” in Revelation 15:4 and 19:8, for example.
been justified, of possessing a righteous status before God. However, because of this unique translation as “justification,” it will not be possible to trace this particular word through Romans in regards to the subject of justification.

We now turn to δικαίωσις. The other time it is used in Romans is 4:25: “He was delivered over to death for our sins and was raised to life for our justification. (ὁς παρεδόθη διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα ἡμῶν καὶ ἠγέρθη διὰ τὴν δικαίωσιν ἡμῶν.)” This occurs before Paul’s significant discussion of justification beginning in 5:1, which, of course, precedes 5:12-21. This statement ends with a thorough treatment of Abraham, where we learn that his faith was credited to him as righteousness. One could perhaps conjecture that “justification” is being used in a very broad sense, and perhaps “our” refers to all humans, thus the justification may stretch over Adamic sin and personal sin for all people. For this to be considered even a remotely responsible interpretation of the passage, one would have to consider 4:25 apart from its context, which is, by itself, irresponsible. Verse 24 makes it clear that Paul’s “our” refers to “those who believe in Him.” So, the extent to which justification is provided, according to this passage, is limited to those with faith. Furthermore, we must consider the larger context of Romans 4. The purpose of the entire passage is to show, among other important things, that Abraham’s ability to be righteous before God has nothing to do with works, but instead it is through believing or having faith in God. At least so far, we see that Paul’s usage of δικαίωσις is inexorably tied to faith.

We must now broaden our view to the verbal usage of “justify” (δικαιώω) as this will help us to judge the limitations of the concept as an action, rather than just as a result. We will limit our exploration to Romans as the immediate context of the issue at hand. One of the strongest examples of the tie between justification and faith is Romans 3:21-31. Vs. 21-26, explain:

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213 Cranfield, I:287.
214 Barbara Aland, et al.
But now a righteousness from God, apart from law, has been made known, to which the Law and the Prophets testify. This righteousness from God comes through faith in Jesus Christ to all who believe. There is no difference, for all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God, and are justified freely by his grace through the redemption that came by Christ Jesus. God presented him as a sacrifice of atonement, through faith in his blood. He did this to demonstrate his justice, because in his forbearance he had left the sins committed beforehand unpunished—he did it to demonstrate his justice at the present time, so as to be just and the one who justifies those who have faith in Jesus.

The most pointed portions are “This righteousness from God comes through faith in Jesus Christ to all who believe . . .” (v. 21) and “. . . so as to be just and the one who justifies those who have faith in Jesus.” (v. 26)

Δικαιώω occurs 39 times in the New Testament and 13 times in Romans. 3:26, 3:28, 3:30 and 5:1 refer directly to being justified by faith, and 4:5 indirectly. 3:24 stands in the context of 3:21-31, as discussed above. 8:30 refers to believers that are called, justified and glorified. 4:2 speaks of how Abraham was not justified by works, but in 4:3 it was his belief instead. 3:4 is irrelevant to the current discussion, as it refers to being “justified in your words,” without specific reference to salvation. 3:20 tells us that no one will be justified by works of law. 6:7 is translated “freed” by the NIV and NASB, and is used in reference to the believer being freed from sin after being crucified with Christ and baptized into his death, clearly very adult actions. 8:33 speaks of God as one who justifies. It would seem, then, that of the 13 usages, 6 are directly related to justification by faith, and 2 are in reference to works and law, 1 has nothing to do with salvation, 1 speaks of freedom from sin for the one who is baptized, and 1 speaks of God as one who justifies. It would seem that none of these support, and instead, seem to contradict Cottrell’s usage of justification on Romans 5:16, 18. There is perhaps one verse that may have some merit: 5:9.

We now turn to examine whether 5:9 helps the Original Grace argument. Put in its immediate context of vs. 8-10, it is as follows:

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215 Such an exploration is purely my own. Cottrell does not use 5:9 or any of 5:1-11 to support Original Grace, as he believes that 1-11 is a discussion of personal salvation only.
But God demonstrates his own love for us in this: While we were still sinners, Christ died for us. Since we have now been justified by his blood, how much more shall we be saved from God's wrath through him! For if, when we were God's enemies, we were reconciled to him through the death of his Son, how much more, having been reconciled, shall we be saved through his life!

Taken by itself, this segment may give some credence to the Cottrell’s use of justification in the subsequent section of vs. 12-21. Cottrell’s contention is that the death of Christ, seen in “Christ died for us” (v. 8), “by his blood” (v.9), and “death of his Son” (v. 10), is the mechanism for not only the forgiveness of sins committed personally, but also Adamic sin. The key here is “justified by his blood” (v. 9), which directly refers to Christ’s death. It is a demonstration of love (v. 8), saves humans from God’s wrath (v. 9), and brings reconciliation and life (v. 10). Who is it that is justified by his blood? It would seem that we need to do two things to work this out: (1) look at the larger context of the concept of justification, at least as far as Paul’s beginning into this topic and (2) identify “sinners” (v. 8).

For context, we look back to 5:1-2, which states plainly how justification comes: “Therefore, since we have been justified through faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom we have gained access by faith into this grace in which we now stand. And we rejoice in the hope of the glory of God.” [emphasis mine] Twice, it is made plain that it is by faith that one is justified. This poses a serious problem to Cottrell’s theory of the justification of the innocent from Adam’s sin, apart from faith. Not only does this verse contradict that concept, but it also does so in close proximity (within the same chapter) to 5:16 and 18. It would seem that Paul very clearly believes that justification is only by faith.

The identification of “sinners” is a bit more complex. There is nothing from vs. 1-11 to suggest that sinners should be identified as anyone other than those that have actually sinned. This fits with the entire discussion so far (Chapters 1-4), where both Gentiles and Jews have been named sinners before God. Both groups are responsible
for breaking the law of God in whatever form they received it. The rest of Romans, Chapters 6-16, never returns to a discussion of Adamic sin. So, how should we understand Romans 5:12-21? Paul certainly means to discuss Adamic sin, but unfortunately, it stands alone in the context of the entire book of Romans. In no other place does Paul discuss this in Romans. The majority of commentators, Cottrell included, correctly identify Paul’s purpose to be that Christ’s redemptive work is superior to sin, not just Adam’s one sin, but the many sins that follow. So, it is at least illustrative, but it appears to be far more. Many find actual data in regard to our inheritance from Adam, rather than just treating Paul’s words as an extended literary device to express a point. So, if vs. 12-21 are saying that all men are actually condemned and even “made sinners,” “through the one man’s disobedience,” then is it not plausible to include those “sinners” in the category of those that have “been justified by His blood,” (5:9) and those “enemies” that have “been reconciled” and “saved by His life?” (5:10) If “all men” are “made sinners” by imitation of Adam, thus sinning themselves, for example, then the problem is solved, for those people are indeed justified by faith. They fit in the category of willing enemies of God who then are reconciled by faith. But, if “all men” are actually “made sinners” and condemned through “one man’s disobedience,” by no sin of their own, then “through one act of righteousness there resulted justification of life to all men,” how is it that we can understand the imputation of unrighteousness as not involving human will, but only understand the imputation of righteousness as resulting from the exercise of faith? In other words, in the rest Romans, sin is the willful rebellion against God, and justification is the willful exercise of faith, thus making the entire system of salvation work. In 5:12-21, however, some contend that condemnation is apart from any individual human will, but then justification can only be realized through faith. It would seem that one must reconcile this problem with the rest of Romans. There appear to be
two options for understanding the consequences of Adam’s sin: (1) Adam brought sin and its consequences on unwilling victims or (2) Adam merely started us toward our own sin and condemnation. The second option certainly fits with the overall description of sin in Romans. There also appear to be two, boiled down, options for understanding the consequences of Christ’s work: (1) the consequences of Christ’s work are also applied to the unwilling, in regard to Adam’s sin, thus not requiring a faithful response or (2) Christ’s work only applies when freely accepted by faith. Accepting both of the first options forces us to understand the functioning of both sin and justification differently than the rest of Romans. If we are willing to accept one, then why not the other? Thus, if we break with Paul’s concept of sin as a willing act of rebellion against God, why can we not break with his view of justification by faith, as long as we limit such a break to this unique passage? Of course, we could accept both of the second options, and thus be more in line with the rest of Romans in regard to both sin and justification. Thus, Adam brought sin into the world, in which all humans capable of volition participate by sinning themselves.

So, it seems there is a dilemma on how to treat Romans 5:12-21. On the one hand, it is part of Paul’s overall message in Romans, and in regard to justification, it would seem both wise and faithful to Paul’s intent to interpret it to be only for those that can demonstrate faith, as in the rest of the book. On the other hand, the passage stands as unique in that it is the only place that speaks extensively about the effects of Adam’s sin and their counteraction, and therefore, perhaps justification is meant in a unique way. The passage’s uniqueness can lead to two possibilities of interpretation as to its purpose: (1) Paul means it to be a unique look at both sin and justification that mostly serves literary purposes by helping him to make his overall point about the superiority of Christ’s work, or (2) Paul means to be taken, on the subject of sin and justification, exactly how he is taken in the rest of Romans.
Where does this lead us in regard to Cottrell’s views of sin and justification in Romans 5:12-21? On the one hand, we have shown that if one takes Romans as a whole to be the guide, then he may be wrong on both counts. On the other hand, if Cottrell is correct that Paul intends a special interpretation of both sin and justification, this would possibly be a good passage to express it. In other words, it is the uniqueness of the passage that allows for such departures on the nature of sin by the original sin position, and departures on both the nature of sin and justification by the Original Grace perspective. The exegetically safe conclusion, though, is that Cottrell is wrong on this view that justification may be applied apart from faith, but then he also seems to be wrong for allowing sin to be applied apart from choice as well, and for the same reason—it does not pan out in the work of Paul. The compelling aspect of Cottrell’s position can be largely seen in theological terms. One could say, as Cottrell has done in other words, “If you want to bring condemnation from Adam’s sin on all humanity in this passage, as never before expressed by Paul, then why is it not valid for me to counter that justification can be applied the same way, thus keeping Paul consistent, and avoiding original sin by making it nothing more than potential.” It seems that Cottrell’s leap is no different than the Augustinian perspective. Thus he is allowing the Augustinian perspective to be correct for the sake of argument, and then counteracts it with his own antithetical response. So, Cottrell’s theory of justification as part of doctrine of Original Grace is possible, if one recognized the difficulties associated with the uniqueness of Romans 5:12-21. However, there appears to be insufficient evidence to support his conclusion in terms of Paul’s intent in the rest of Romans.

2.4.6 ADAMIC SIN AND PERSONAL SIN

Does Paul view sin in distinct categories? If so, are they like those employed by Cottrell? Should Adamic and personal sin be viewed as having separate causes and effects, or are they artificial, instead to be viewed as just one general concept of sin?
How does the sinful nature relate to the one sin committed by Adam and sins committed by the individual? It would seem that a sharp distinction between Adam’s sin and its effects with personal sin and their effects is vital to the Original Grace interpretation. As with the previous two issues, it helps us determine whether strict parallelism is a valid reading.

The primary issue with determining the content of Adamic sin is that it is never discussed anywhere else in Scripture with any detail. Sin is always discussed either as a rebellious act against God, or perhaps the result of other sin, i.e. sinful nature. The only passage that may be helpful to us in our pursuit of the possible distinction between Adamic and person sin is 1 Corinthians 15:21-23: “But Christ has indeed been raised from the dead, the first fruits of those who have fallen asleep. For since death came through a man, the resurrection of the dead comes also through a man. For as in Adam all die, so in Christ all will be made alive.” Although it does not reference the sin of Adam directly, it is perhaps acceptable to infer that Adam’s sin is the cause of death. The passage presents a dilemma. It is primarily a discussion of the resurrection for those that are in Christ. Perhaps, then, we should understand the consequence of Adam’s sin to be physical death only, as the resurrection to life is Paul’s solution to the matter. Of course, it is not that simple. Paul is writing to believers to assure them of their hope that comes from the Gospel (vs. 1-11, 58). These people were once sinners that are no longer subject to the sting of death or sin, nor are they under the power of sin and law: “The sting of death is sin, and the power of sin is the law. But thanks be to God! He gives us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ.” The power of sin and law comes from the actual breaking of the law, which then leads to death (7:7-25), and believers are freed from it (8:1-2). So, how did “in Adam all die?” It seems the most accurate explanation, when compared to Paul’s words in Romans, is that all died because they sinned against the law. So, then, the resurrection is for those in Christ that
have been freed from sin. This would require that we understand Adamic sin as the
beginning of sin being in the world, which is carried on by all that sin in his likeness.
Why is it, then, that “death reigned from the time of Adam to the time of Moses, even
over those who did not sin by breaking a command, as did Adam, who was a pattern of
the one to come”? (5:14) Are we to understand that every human dies because of
Adam’s sin (5:12-15, 17), and also because of their own? Perhaps all are subject to
physical death because of Adam’s sin, and subject to condemnation because of their
own. It would appear that in 1 Cor. 15 Paul means not only to discuss how physical
death is counteracted, which is certainly a substantial concern, but also the overall
glorification of the believer in light of their salvation in Christ through the reception of
eternal life, in place of a temporal one. So, it is not just that believers are raised from
the dead. Instead, they trade a mortal life, leading to death, for an immortal life, leading
to eternal life. This passage simply does not give us definitive answers regarding the
consequences of Adam’s sin. However, taken along with Romans 5:12-21, we can
likely come to a safe conclusion that sin brings physical death, and perhaps more.
Despite this information, it is not clear whether Paul intends to establish a concept of
Adamic sin, or whether he is simply using Adam as type to compare to the second
Adam, and thus does not mean to say any more than, “Adam brought sin and death into
the world, but condemnation comes from breaking the law.” The fact that the only
substantial discussion of Adamic sin occurs in Romans 5:12-21 should make us cautious
when concluding what Paul means. In other words, nowhere else does Paul even
discuss the consequences of Adam’s sin, except for this brief reference in 1 Corinthians
15:22, which is scant at best. Therefore, nowhere else does Paul say that Adam’s sin
actually condemns (spiritual or eternal death) anyone. Such things only occur when one
sins against the law.
What is our conclusion, then? Is there a distinction between Adamic and personal sin that Paul intends to convey? Probably not. What does this do to the validity of the Original Grace position? In short, it makes it largely unnecessary, as it would only perhaps be needed to counteract physical death. Thus, it loses much of its practical importance. The deeper problem comes in the Adam/Christ comparison as it relates to this topic. If Paul has not set up a direct comparison between the consequences of Adam’s sin and the consequences of Christ’s free gift, then the entire position crumbles. In other words, if one understands Romans 5:12-21 to say that Adam’s sin brought physical death on all mankind, but that mankind’s personal sin brought condemnation on each individual, then perhaps it would be adequate to say that Paul is just using a typology to express the fact that even though Adam brought sin into the world, which led to others sinning. Once they become sinners, they may receive justification by faith in Jesus Christ. Thus, in this suggested interpretation of the text, the pericope could be understood as an illustration of the point that Paul was making in 1:1-5:1-11, namely that all people are sinners and are in need of justification, which comes by faith. To be fair, such a reading of Romans 5:12-21 equally invalidates original sin and Original Grace, at it removes the passage from the entire discussion of Adamic sin and its consequences. Such an understanding seems to be more consistent with the overall message of Romans, and therefore should cast doubt, at the very least, and perhaps completely invalidate the original sin/Original Grace contrast, at the very most. Again, we do not seek to provide a definitive judgment on the correct exegesis of the passage. Instead, this section has sought to raise possible difficulties with the Original Grace interpretation in regard to its stark distinction between Adamic and personal sin, which appears to be far from an obvious conclusion based upon the available evidence.

2.4.7 PHYSICAL DEATH OR SPIRITUAL DEATH?
The next issue raised by the Original Grace interpretation of Romans 5:12-21, closely related to the distinction between Adamic and personal sin, is the possible distinction between physical death and spiritual/eternal death. Does Paul mean to say that Adam’s sin only brought physical death as a consequence, or perhaps spiritual death (corruption, sickness due to sin, etc.), or eternal death (eternal punishment)? Commentators settle on just about every place on the spectrum. Cottrell believes that death refers to physical death in vs. 12-14, and then includes condemnation from v. 15-21 when it is mentioned. We will first discuss physical death in relation to vs. 12-14, then move to condemnation as we focus on the later verses.

Is this distinction valid in regard to the effects of sin, and more specifically in regard to this pericope, specifically? Perhaps the concept of death should not be distinguished as such. What is at stake for the discussion on the interpretation of the passage if it is invalid? The primary issue rests on whether Original Grace is even a necessary reading of the text. In other words, Original Grace would have less significant force, if any at all, if spiritual death and eternal death are not real consequences to be counteracted.

Cottrell believes that Paul’s primary consideration in vs. 12-14 is physical death, although, he believes, Paul broadens death to encompass spiritual and eternal death in vs. 15-18. His primary reason is, “to focus on spiritual death misses the main point of 5:13-14, where physical death even among babies is cited as evidence for the point about the ‘one man’ in v. 12.” This physical death, however, is not the result of sin in general, including a person’s individual sin. Instead, the direct cause of pervasive physical death, based upon both 5:12 and 5:15, is the “one man,” Adam: “The many died by the trespass of the one man.” (5:15a) So, death applies to all, even babies, because of Adam.

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\(^{216}\) Ibid., p. 341. He that “those who did not sin by breaking a command” (v.14) include infants.  
\(^{217}\) Ibid.
MacArthur provides both support and contrast to Cottrell’s position that will help highlight his distinctive position. He agrees that indeed death applies to all people because of Adam’s sin. However, death includes guilt and condemnation. Both agree that this did not come because of actual sinful acts performed by individual humans against any law. Instead, MacArthur would say that it is because humans take on the “sinful nature” of Adam because they sinned in Adam, but not of their own commission, whereas Cottrell does only allows for the potential of original sin/guilt.

Cottrell is willing to say that all people are only subject to physical death for reasons ultimately outside of their control, even after the application of Original Grace, yet MacArthur says that all are actually condemned for the sin of Adam. In addition, MacArthur seems to allow for the fact that there was actually no law between Adam and Moses: “...death was universal even though there was no law, it is obvious that men were still sinful. It was not because of men’s sinful acts in breaking the Mosaic Law, which they did not yet have, but because their sinful nature that all men from Adam until Moses were subject to death.” In contrast, Cottrell adamantly defends the fact that there was law, although not the Law of Moses, for which humans were responsible. Thus, they both think that Adam is the cause of the death that Paul is talking about. MacArthur says that Adam is the cause of both physical death and condemnation of those between Adam and Moses, even those that did not sin, because there is no law, and thus no imputed sin. For MacArthur, it is by process of elimination that he concludes that Adam’s sin explains both types of death. Cottrell finds that Adam can, ultimately, only be the cause of physical death, because it applies to all people, even after the application of Original Grace, including those that did not, and could not, personally sin. Adults would have had access to law, as expressed through general revelation (Romans 1:18-32 and 2:14-15), and would thus be able to be condemned.

218 MacArthur, I:299.
219 Ibid., I:298-299.
because of its transgression. As Cottrell shows in his exegesis of v. 14, those that “did not sin by breaking a command” were a classification of people who were ignorant of the law and its consequences, i.e. children and the mentally handicapped.

Cottrell’s position makes sense of history, namely that everyone is subject to physical death, even infants, preserves individual responsibility for sin and related punishment, and makes sense of Paul’s word in the chapter by allowing Adam’s sinful effects to be pervasive, but limited in content. We do not have enough data to judge between Cottrell’s position and MacArthur’s illustrative position. At best, we can recognize differences in assumptions between MacArthur’s Calvinistic position and Cottrell’s more semi-Pelagian/Arminian position, along with his distinctive elements.

To illustrate further, we turn to a comparison with another writer. Cottrell would find significant agreement with Murray’s position, as a point of comparison, on several points: (1) that physical death is the only kind of death in Paul’s view on vs. 12-14, (2) that the innocent are included in those that did not personally sin, (3) that there was law between Adam and Moses, although not the Mosaic Law, and that people of sufficient age or mental capability were responsible for that law, and (4) that the best explanation for why death reigns over all is the solidarity with the sin of Adam, leading all to physical death.

First, Murray provides his reasons for supporting physical death as the only death in view in vs. 12-14. He explains that it is an allusion to Genesis 2:17 and 3:19 in which physical death is in view:

On the question as to whether the moral and spiritual aspects of death and their eternal consequences are comprised in the word “death,” one thing must be appreciated that in the usage of Scripture and in the conception of Paul the dissolution which consists in the separation of body and spirit and the return to dust of the former had far more significance as the epitome of the wages of sin than we are disposed to attach to it. The catastrophe of misery which befell mankind by sin is summed up in this dissolution and it exemplifies the principle

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220 I am purposely being vague in labeling Cottrell’s position. Among other difficulties, such as labeling any theologian, Cottrell’s doctrine of Original Grace makes his position unique, even if it finds much similarity with the semi-Pelagian or Arminian perspective.
of separation which comes to expression in all aspects of death. In verse 14 it is
this death that is in view and there is no need to introduce other aspects of death
in this subsequent references to the universal reign of death (vss. 15, 17). It is
this aspect of death that is in the forefront in Genesis 2:17; 3:19, and although it
is true that death in all its aspects is the wages of sin, yet there is not sufficient
evidence to show that the apostle is comprehending all these aspects in his
purview when he says “and death through sin.”

Second, Murray claims that infants are certainly in view to make Paul’s point, although
perhaps others should be included in the category of “those who did not sin by breaking
a command” (v. 14): “Many commentators have understood this class to be infants who
died in infancy. Undoubtedly, they fall into this category and they are the most obvious
example of such a division of the human race . . . It is not so certain, however, that only
infants are in view. Those who were outside the pale of special revelation could be
regarded as belonging to this category—they did not transgress an expressly and
specially revealed command as Adam did.” This leads to the third and fourth points
of agreement, where Murray links this category that did not break the law with the fact
that there was law between Adam and Moses, and that the universal reign of death is to
be blamed on Adam’s sin: “And although adults in this category sinned against the law
of nature (cf. 2:14,15), yet the reign of death over all such could be adduced by the
apostle as pointing to the sin of Adam and as requiring the premise on which is interest
is now focused, namely, the sin of all in the sin of Adam. In other words, when all the
facts of the pre-Mosaic period are taken into account the only explanation of the
universal reign is solidarity in the sin of Adam.”

This comparison with Murray not only provides support for the validity of
Cottrell’s interpretation from an exegetical perspective, but also shows that his position
is similar to others writing from a non-Augustinian perspective. However, the most
important point we can pull from this comparison is what is so vitally at stake with these

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221 Murray, I:181-182. See also Frederic Louis Godet, *Commentary on Romans* (Grand Rapids:
Kregel, 1977). Godet is an example of another commentator that limits “death” to physical death in
Romans 5:12-14.
222 Ibid., p. 190.
223 Ibid., pp. 190-191.
conclusions. There are several values being protected: (1) physical death is ultimately not intended by God in his unfallen creation, but instead, it was caused by sin, (2) the historical fact of the universality of physical death is accounted for, (3) physical death, not spiritual or eternal, is the only aspect of the biblical concept of death that applies to all, and thus no one is condemned to hell for sins they did not personally commit, and (4) that any kind of spiritual or eternal death would be the consequence of someone sinning against God’s law of which they were aware.

In order to understand and evaluate Cottrell’s perspective on verses 13 and 14 we need only deal with a few points of significant disagreement with a more Augustinian/Calvinist perspective. The first and second values that Cottrell and Murray seek to protect are also normally protected by those from the Augustinian/Calvinist position. The difference is in the third and fourth. Namely, the death brought to humanity by Adam usually includes not only total depravity or spiritual death, but also condemnation to hell or eternal death. This was done by extending the nature of death to include all three types, and by claiming that humanity actually sins in Adam through his representative headship, whether federal or seminal. On these points, MacArthur will be the example.

MacArthur agrees with Cottrell and Murray, that death is indeed universal. It is on the nature of death that he differs. He includes all three aspects of death in the concept that Paul is teaching. He describes the effects this way: “His [Adam’s] sin became mankind’s sin, because all mankind were in his loins. . . Natural human depravity is not the result by the cause of man’s sinful acts. An infant does not have to be taught to disobey or be selfish. . . to lie or steal. . . Those are natural to his fallen nature. . . . Every person who is not spiritually reborn of Christ (John 3:3) is a child of Satan.” MacArthur seems to be expressing a seminal representative headship

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225 Ibid., I: 296.
headship is in view, but a federal headship. Although the emphasis is important, it is not important critical in order to proceed with our discussion. Adam’s headship allows for all to suffer under death, no matter its extent. On that, there is agreement.

MacAurther justifies his position that all actually sin in Adam, and are thus also spiritually and eternally dead with two main points. The first is as follows:

Some object to the idea that they sinned in Adam, arguing that they not only were not there but did not even exist when he sinned. But by the same token, we were not physically at the crucifixion when Christ died, but as believers we willingly accept the truth that, by faith, we died with Him. We did not literally enter the grave with Christ and were not literally resurrected with Him but by faith we are accounted to have been buried and raised with him. If the principle were not true that all sinned in Adam, it would be impossible to make the point that all can be made righteous in Christ. That is the truth he makes explicit later in this letter (5:15-19) and in his first letter to Corinth: “For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive” (1 Cor. 15:22).

MacArthur draws a parallel between the imputation of Adam’s sin and the imputation of Christ’s righteousness that is certainly a valid comparison, as far as it goes, but is not necessarily valid as a direct parallel. Perhaps it is better understood as analogy. In other words, the parallel is helpful in understanding the similarities. However, at best, such an argument allows for the way believers are redeemed to how they become sinful in Adam. In other words, he makes a jump in logic. The fact that both events occur without humans actually being present is true. His fault occurs in that he is comparing with an event where no human choice is involved that also applies to all humans (the imputation of Adam’s sin). In the case of redemption, human choice (faith in the Savior and submission to the Lord) only applies to those that enter into a saved state with Christ. The most we can infer is that, what is the case in terms of salvation may inform how we think about the transmission of Adam’s sin.

He then answers the objection that being born guilty because of Adam’s sin is unfair: “But neither was it “fair” that the sinless Son of God suffered the penalty of sin

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226 Ibid.
on behalf of all mankind. If God were only fair, Adam and Eve would have been destroyed immediately for their disobedience, and that would have been the end of the human race. It is only because God is gracious and forgiving, and not merely just, that men can be saved.”\textsuperscript{227} It appears that MacArthur is committing the same mistake as before. He is certainly correct that God tempers his justice with grace, and thus provides salvation, and that Christ unjustly took on sin he never committed. However, the parallel, however true, does not prove the point, but again, allows for it. First, God’s grace is “unfairness,” and is only ever for the benefit of humanity. MacArthur is equating grace, as a type of suspension of justice, with the unfairness of punishing humans for sins they never committed, which is not for the benefit of humanity. Secondly, he is correct that it is unfair that Christ died for sins he did not commit. However, he did this willingly, whereas humans do not take on Adam’s sin and its punishment willingly. In short, although MacArthur’s words about the concepts of justice and grace are true, they are misapplied.

As stated in the introduction of this chapter, the purpose of this exegesis is not to assess the validity of the various interpretations of this passage. What is primarily in view is the distinctive nature of the Original Grace interpretation as compared and contrasted with other positions. Cottrell’s position, thus far, finds agreement with the non-Augustinian perspective on perhaps all points, and both agree and disagree with the Augustinian/Calvinist perspective on certain points. Although Cottrell is defending very important values in regard to the interpretation, especially related to the nature of the consequences, namely death, that come from Adam’s sin, whether he is right or wrong will not ultimately affect Original Grace. For, the central point is that even if someone like MacArthur is correct in saying that death included spiritual and eternal death, Cottrell claims that those consequences are counteracted and never made actual.

\textsuperscript{227} Ibid., I: 297.
So, this comparison/contrast really serves to clarify Cottrell’s total position, even if it does not drastically affect the heart of the matter.

We now turn to a discussion of condemnation, beyond physical death, especially in relation to vs. 15-21. It is not certain what Paul means by condemnation. It is possible that he refers only to physical death. As previously discussed, at least physical death, if not more, was in Paul’s view in vs. 12-14. We concluded that the biblical evidence shows that physical death reigns over all people. When we turn to vs. 15-21, Cottrell makes the point that the word for condemnation is used elsewhere to include eternal death, and that justification is normally used, in the New Testament, in regard to the counteraction of spiritual/eternal death, and it is likely that he is right. Romans 8:1-2 is a prime example: “Therefore, there is now no condemnation (κατάκριμα) for those who are in Christ Jesus, because through Christ Jesus the law of the Spirit of life set me free from the law of sin and death.”

We can learn a few things from this verse, especially in reference to its textual context. Paul had previously discussed the relationship between the law and sin, along with the effects of sin, using himself as the example (7:7-25). It is indeed appropriate to understand condemnation as much more than just physical death in this context. He has described sin as having led to his death (7:9, 13) and that death is counteracted along with the law of sin (8:2) because there is “now no condemnation.” We will look at Paul’s understanding of death below, but we may infer two important things from 8:1-2. First, Cottrell, and anyone that holds to the belief that “condemnation” in 5:16 contains spiritual or eternal death, rather than just physical death, does that either by saying that Adam’s sin brought that condemnation on humanity without each individual actually committing sin or by saying that those that are condemned are condemned for their own sin, as they have sinned personally in imitation of Adam’s sin. It would appear that 8:1-2 provides better support for the

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228 Cottrell, ‘Romans’, p. 355. Cottrell actually uses these verses as his example.
second option than the first. For, Paul is explaining how death and condemnation flow from the breaking of the law (7:9), not from Adam, but as perpetrated by the sinner. Condemnation, in this context, comes from conscious sin. If we use this later passage in Romans to inform our reading of Romans 5:16, it appears that we have two possible approaches: (1) understand “condemnation” as only physical death, as in vs. 12-14, and thus an appropriate consequence for Adamic sin, at least in regard to what Paul had already stated, or (2) understand “condemnation” to include more than physical death, perhaps to include spiritual or eternal death, which would result from the actual sinning of individuals descended from Adam. The second option is given credence by Romans 8:1-2. If Adam’s sin only brings physical death (vs. 12-14), and only personal sin can lead to condemnation, then Original Grace is reduced to perhaps counteracting physical death, which Cottrell believes happens in the resurrection for the innocent. Cottrell would likely view this as valid because he believes Original Grace counters whatever Adam brought, even if it is only physical death. However, it raises the question of whether such a reading of the passage is needed if all we seek to accomplish is the resurrection of the innocent from physical death. As we have previously stated, original sin suffers under the same criticism as Original Grace in this regard. Original sin reduced to physical death, having nothing to do with condemnation, and Original Grace, a parasitic idea, may counteract physical death, but has no condemnation to reverse.

Cottrell’s view of condemnation is shared and opposed by others. Murray agrees that, “The one trespass demanded nothing less than the condemnation of all,” as does MacArthur: “Condemnation is a judicial sentence, as noted above, and it is the judicial sentence which pronounces us to be unrighteous. Death is the penal consequence of sin but condemnation is the divine sentence which is pronounced upon

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229 Murray, I:196.
it." In contrast, C.K. Barrett does not see it as a judicial sentence, but instead the beginning of a “process of judgment” that “inevitably began with the first act of transgression, and since the transgression was real and responsible it inevitably led to condemnation. The act of grace, however, could only take place where sin already abounded.”

The difference is fundamental. Either all humans are actually condemned by the one sin of Adam, and not their own personal sins (“many trespasses”), or they are condemned for their personal sins as they sin in the likeness of Adam. Certainly, personal sin is pervasive in the world (Rom. 3:23) and virtually inevitable. What is at stake for Cottrell and the Original Grace position? Cottrell certainly agrees that the full extent of the many trespasses is personal sin, and that justification stretches out to erase those for the ones that are justified. What is so interesting, and compelling, about Cottrell’s reading is that it does not matter if “condemnation” is limited to physical death, rather than spiritual and eternal. It also does not matter whether or not it is because of the one sin of Adam directly or from the many trespasses that simply began with Adam. His contention is this: whatever is intended by condemnation is more than handled by justification. This leads us to whether it is proper to connect justification to the counteraction of condemnation (whatever it includes) for all people. It is the same issue as in the “many” and “all” discussion. If the one sin of Adam can bring condemnation to all without any conscious participation in that sin, can the “gift of God” provide justification from that very thing, and then do “much more” by allowing for the many trespasses to be justified?

A deeper issue than even those discussed above needs to be pursued. Is the distinction between physical and spiritual/eternal death valid in regard to the effects of sin, and more specifically in regard to this pericope, specifically? Death in Paul’s

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230 MacArthur, I:195. See also Moo, The Wycliffe Exegetical Commentary, as another example of this position.
writings, specifically in regard to salvation, can range from an idea of at least spiritual
death, and perhaps even eternal death, all the way to physical death. Examples of
spiritual death include Ephesians 2:1, “As for you, you were dead in your transgressions
and sins,” and Colossians 2:13, “When you were dead in your sins and in the
uncircumcision of your sinful nature.” In both contexts, Paul describes the past lives of
believers that are now alive in Christ, and who struggle with putting the sinful nature to
death and living out their new righteous life in Christ. This meaning of death is
certainly not a reference to physical death, at least not primarily. Instead, it is the kind
of death that one experiences when they are actually living apart from Christ in sin.

1 Corinthians 15 appears to focus on more the physical side of death that is
counteracted in the resurrection. Of course, the context, too, is believers that now have
the hope of eternal life. So, even though Paul describes death as physical, the result for
the believer is more than a physical resurrection, as they attain an immortal,
imperishable body that lives eternally. At least in this passage, Paul’s concept of death
appears to be primarily about physical death in the sense that the antithesis is
resurrection. However, it seems that there is probably much more here, for this
resurrection is the result of salvation in Christ. Without the resurrection of Christ, and
the future resurrection of believers, those believers would have no hope and still be in
sin: “16 For if the dead are not raised, then Christ has not been raised either.17 And if
Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile; you are still in your sins.18 Then those
also who have fallen asleep in Christ are lost. 19 If only for this life we have hope in
Christ, we are to be pitied more than all men.” Paul seems to go even further to reiterate
that physical death and spiritual/eternal death are, in fact, quite inseparable:

50I declare to you, brothers, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of
God, nor does the perishable inherit the imperishable. 51Listen, I tell you a
mystery: We will not all sleep, but we will all be changed— 52 in a flash, in the
twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet. For the trumpet will sound, the dead will
be raised imperishable, and we will be changed. 53 For the perishable must clothe
itself with the imperishable, and the mortal with immortality. 54When the
perishable has been clothed with the imperishable, and the mortal with immortality, then the saying that is written will come true: "Death has been swallowed up in victory."

So, we see that no one can “inherit the kingdom of God” without being completely changed, even in regard to physical death. At least this passage would seem to indicate that one cannot separate physical death from spiritual/eternal death, but we must recognize the limitations of this passage to inform our view of death in Romans 5:12-21. 1 Corinthians 15 is about believers that were once sinners that have been saved by Christ. Romans 5:12-15, in contrast, appears to be about all people, including “. . . those who did not sin by breaking a command, as did Adam . . .” So, it would seem that physical death, at least, reigns over everyone. One verse may parallel Paul’s thought in 1 Cor. 15, namely Romans 5:21: “so that, just as sin reigned in death, so also grace might reign through righteousness to bring eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord.” This verse appears to use death and eternal life in much the same sense as in 1 Corinthians 15. Paul might mean to say, if we bring 1 Cor. 15 and Romans 5 together, that, yes, all people are subject to physical death, even those that did not actually sin, but both for those that did not sin and for those that did sin, who are also found in Christ, can be resurrected to eternal life.

If this is the case, then separating the idea of physical death from spiritual/eternal death, especially in regard to eschatological concerns, seems to be out of place. Our examples of Paul using death to describe the sinful nature do not seem to apply to the context of Romans 5. Instead, 1 Corinthians 15 seems to be a much more relevant comparison. 232 Neither passage seems primarily concerned with the change in behavior that comes with the death of the sinful nature, and being made alive in Christ, but instead, they both seem more concerned with the counteraction of death and condemnation that comes from sin.

232 Paul does seem to mention the kind of death related to the sinful nature and continuing in sin in 1 Cor. 15:29-34, but does so as what appears to be a caveat. For, in vs. 1-28 and 35-58, he turns to death in a more eschatological sense.
I certainly do not seek to fully discuss Paul’s view of death in this project. However, I do seek to raise some questions and possibilities that arise when we compare the distinction between physical and spiritual/eternal death employed by both Cottrell and other commentators. As we have asked previously, what is at stake if this distinction is invalid, or at least in question?

First, we must concede that Romans 5:12-21 is unique in that it deals with death, not just for those that are sinners, but apparently for all people, even those that are not sinners. Second, nowhere else does Paul deal with Adamic sin directly, but only that Adam brought death (1 Corinthians 15:21-23). With these two limitations in mind, we can proceed.

We will now lay out the scenario where these assumptions are played out. Let us say that Paul intends to use death in Romans 5:12-21 in the same sense that he means to in 1 Corinthians 15 (as I have proposed), namely that it is all-inclusive of physical death, and spiritual/eternal death, and does not intend to primarily discuss death in terms of the sinful nature. In other words, perhaps the primary focus is to describe how the gift of Christ can counteract the sins of the world, both Adam’s trespass, and the “many trespasses.” Perhaps Adam and everyone after him are dead “because all sinned,” except that even those that have not sinned still physically die. Perhaps Paul’s reference to those that did not actually sin is merely an aside to explain why children die. Then Paul proceeds (vs. 15-21) to describe how sin and condemnation were brought into the world by Adam, all are condemned because they committed those “many trespasses,” and then are justified, brought to eternal life because sin no longer reigns in death. It is then possible to understand death to mean physical and spiritual/eternal death, as it is normally described by Paul. In other words, we take death, and even sin, to mean exactly what it means elsewhere in Paul’s writings. If we do this, Romans 5:12-21 need not express a doctrine of original sin or Original Grace. Both the original sin and
Original Grace, which is ultimately parasitic on original sin, rely on an interpretation of Paul that is utterly unique, having no other comparative text, in regard to death, sin, and justification. In order for original sin or Original Grace to find support, each position would need to prove that Paul meant to use these aforementioned concepts in unique ways for just this one passage. I do not find the evidence compelling on either side.

2.4.8 THE NATURE OF THE ADAM/CHRIST COMPARISON

The final, and perhaps most significant, issue at stake for Cottrell is the nature of the parallel between Adam and Christ. It is generally agreed among commentators that there is a parallel between the two figures, specifically in Romans 5:12-21. What is at question is whether there is a strict parallelism between them where for every effect in one, there is a corresponding effect in the other. It appears that such a strict coherence is necessary for Original Grace to be a true interpretation of the text.

2.4.8.1 ROMANS 5:12-21 IN PARTICULAR

We will first view some of the issues brought up in the context of the scope of the passage, but we will look at it from a different perspective, rather than in the context of the interpretation of the “many” and the “all,” as we have done previously. If Cottrell is right that the one sin of Adam brought condemnation, including physical, spiritual, and eternal death, that come from actual guilt conveyed as a judgment of God through Adam, then counteracting such a situation would require both “life” and “righteousness” to be applied as a “provision of grace.” Take the case of a hypothetical infant in the scenario of this kind of condemnation. The infant is condemned to every kind of death, and is unrighteous through no direct action of his own. The adult who has sinned personally is in the same situation, but for a different reason. Perhaps the adult was led to personal sin by Adam’s sinful curse (total or partial depravity, for instance), but he is ultimately dead and unrighteous by direct action. Forgiveness of personal sin is certainly in view in this verse, but Paul is illustrating the fact that Christ can counteract
the sin of Adam, and then do even more, in order to stress the all-sufficiency of Christ’s work. This leads us to the question first asked in the analysis of vs. 15 and 16: to whom is this grace applied? Are Adam’s sinful effects only counteracted for the individual that comes to Christ for the forgiveness of personal sins? Or, does this “gift” apply to the same category that suffers because of the “one trespass”? 

It is interesting that no other perspective agrees with Cottrell on this point. They agree that the grace offered here is abundant and overflowing, able to go way beyond Adam’s transgression, whether the effects of the transgression are small or great. That is not the problem. As Cottrell has said, “Wherein lies the problem, then? It lies in the way the advocates of original sin apply these two terms to Adam on the one hand and to Christ on the other hand. The common approach is that, when these terms are used in relation to Adam’s sin, they are completely universal in scope; but when they are used in relation to the work of Christ, they are more limited and restricted in scope and do not really mean ‘all.’”

Take MacArthur as a representative of the Augustinian approach: “The one-dimensional result of Adam’s one act was death, whereas the result of Christ’s one act is life, which is multidimensional.” This is where the agreement ceases: “Christ not only offers life but abundant life, life that abounds (v. 15; cf. John 10:10) The redeemed in Christ not only receive abundant life but are given righteousness as a gift (cf. 2 Cor. 5:21). They reign in that righteous life with their Lord and Savior. They possess the very righteous, glorious, and eternal life of God Himself.”

Two keys to MacArthur’s presuppositions are important. First, he says that Christ “offers” life, and second, that the “redeemed in Christ” receive that abundant life. He is certainly speaking the truth on both counts. However, he slips in an assumption

\[233\] Cottrell, The Faith Once For All, p. 187. John Stott, for example, articulates this view. “The ‘all men’ who are affected by the work of Christ cannot refer to absolutely everybody”, p. 159.

\[234\] MacArthur, I:306.

\[235\] Ibid.
that such life can only come on a conditional basis to those that choose to be saved. The argument appears to hinge on “those who receive.” Cottrell has said that, “the bottom line is that there is nothing in the word λαμβάνω that requires us to limit ‘those who receive’ to conscious, willing adults; the word is no less able to describe the passive reception of ‘Original Grace’ by all those affected by Adam’s sin, even in infancy or before.” Murray agrees that λαμβάνω “does not refer to our believing acceptance of the free gift but to our being made the recipients, and we are regarded as the passive beneficiaries of both the grace and the free gift in their overflowing fullness.” Yet, Murray says that the nature of the free gift is not primarily focused on justification, but on one of the results of justification, namely righteousness. Thus, he essentially comes to the same conclusion as MacArthur—that this gift is offered to all, but only received by some.

Considering this argument alone, it would appear that neither position can be certain. Both readings appear plausible and legitimate. What can “break the tie?” Cottrell’s structural argument, if it can be sustained, and assuming that there is linguistic freedom in that interpretation, as in the example of the broad definition of justification, appears to provide a strong argument: “throughout these verses (15-17) where Adam and Christ are set in contrast to one another, the scope of those affected by both men is the same in all three verses. Adam’s sin affected all, and so does the cross insofar as it cancels the results of Adam’s sin for all. To deny this jeopardizes the main point of this whole passage, the all-sufficiency of Christ’s cross. The reference to personal sins in this immediate text is in addition to the Adamic sin, but not instead of it.” Again, is Paul intending not only to say this, but also for his words to be taken in such a strict structure? It would not be abnormal for Paul to rely on heavily structured arguments, so it is certainly plausible.

236 Ibid.
237 Murray, I:198.
238 Ibid., p. 357.
2.4.8.2 THE HISTORICITY AND HEADSHIP OF ADAM

A vital assumption is that Adam was the first man; an actual historical figure. Perhaps one can imagine that a non-historical conception of the beginnings of mankind, called Adam, could be used to describe the beginnings of human sin. However, the tight comparison between Adam and Christ, the second being a historical figure in Paul’s mind, needs an actual Adam to work. Specifically, anything like actual original sin, which can be inherited in some way by humanity, depends on a representative head to actually initiate and pass sin and its consequences. In other words, it seems that if one removes the historical Adam, then both original sin and its counteraction, whether Original Grace or some other conception of the passage, are lost as actual states of affairs. They would necessarily be reduced to metaphorical or hypothetical meanings.

MacArthur explains this problem:

The fact that Adam and Eve not only were actual historical figures but were the original human beings from whom all other have descended is absolutely critical to Paul’s argument here and is critical to the efficacy of the gospel of Jesus Christ. If a historical Adam did not represent all mankind in sinfulness, a historical Christ could not represent all mankind in righteousness. If all men did not fall with the first Adam, all men could not be saved by Christ, the second and last Adam (see 1 Cor. 15:20-22, 45).239

For the purposes of this discussion, we will assume that Cottrell is correct about the historicity of Adam. Otherwise, we cannot proceed to the foundational assumptions that the proponents of Original Grace set. A much larger possible problem exists, however, coming from the assumptions of Cottrell, and MacArthur with him. It is important to contrast Cottrell’s position with MacArthur’s to show that Cottrell does not necessarily fall into the same problem. A portion of MacArthur’s statement above is at issue: “If a historical Adam did not represent all mankind in sinfulness, a historical Christ could not represent all mankind in righteousness. If all men did not fall with the first Adam, all men could not be saved by Christ, the second and last Adam (see 1 Cor. 15:20-22,

239 MacArthur, I:294.
It would seem that perhaps the first sentence is more correct than the second. If we assume that original sin is actually a problem and Adam made it a reality for the rest of humanity by representative headship, as a historical person, then the same would perhaps be logical on Christ’s side of the equation. Of course, this requires the assumption that original sin is actual and transmitted this way. So, at best, his comment is a possible scenario rather than a logical necessity, as he seems to imply. The second sentence is much more important to our discussion. MacArthur needs Adam to fall in order to explain original sin in his system. MacArthur is right that there is a connection between the two Adams that Paul makes clear, and Cottrell would certainly agree with the metaphor. However, MacArthur imports another assumption, namely that all men actually had to fall in Adam to be saved by the second Adam—Christ. It would be safe to say that many theological systems that deny a fall in Adam, or minimize it to the extent that it does not cause a person to be guilty and in need of salvation all by itself, still find Christ’s redemption essential and possible. The problem is in saying that humans need to fall by Adam to be saved. Cottrell would depart from MacArthur on this point. Cottrell does not believe original sin is actual anyway, but is, instead, being used as an example for Paul to prove the all-sufficiency of Christ’s redemption. Thus, he would disagree that humans must fall in Adam to be saved. Instead, he would say that if Adam brought the fall, then Christ can, and did, counteract it. We will deal with the implications of this counteraction in a later section, but it is important to show that Cottrell avoids the trap of necessitating the fall of all humanity with Adam in order for there to be salvation in the second Adam.

Cottrell agrees, on this point, with a Calvinistic perspective of federal headship. For example, MacArthur states that, “Mankind is a single entity, constituting a divinely ordered solidarity. Adam represents the entire human race that is descended from him.”

. Therefore when Adam sinned, all mankind sinned . . .”\textsuperscript{241} However, MacArthur would go further by saying that humanity “would share in that sin and the alienation from God and subjection to death that was its consequence.”\textsuperscript{242} Of course, MacArthur believes that these spiritual and eternal deaths remain the case in the life of the person until they are “saved permanently by Christ.”\textsuperscript{243} For Cottrell, these two deaths are only potential.

If some kind of headship is not in Paul’s view, then Original Grace appears to be unnecessary. Something must be at least potentially transferred to humanity, namely physical death, spiritual death or depravity, or even guilt. Original Grace does not claim to counteract sinful influence, namely the personal sins present in the word, originally introduced by Adam’s first sin. For, these are personally committed sins, cured only by a positive response of the individual to the Gospel. Instead, it claims to counteract potential consequences brought upon humanity because of Adam’s sin.

What of a corrupt nature? We have determined that Adamic consequences transmitted through federal or seminal headship may be counteracted by Original Grace, and that sinful influence, that Adam’s sin is merely the introduction of many personal sins in the world, does not make sense of the Adam-Christ comparison by equalizing Adam’s sin with all other sins. A corrupt nature, although indirectly leading to sin, death, and condemnation, may still be transmitted by a kind of headship. If humanity is actually corrupt at birth, in contrast to a kind of natural frailty or weakness related to creatureliness rather than sin, then is must have come from Adam’s sin. No other mechanism makes sense of the biblical picture of sin and redemption. So Cottrell’s conclusion, that corruption is too indirect to keep the Adam-Christ comparison intact, instead opting for guilt and condemnation as potential effects, may be erroneous.

\textsuperscript{241} MacArthur, I:293.
\textsuperscript{242} Ibid., I:294.
\textsuperscript{243} Ibid., I:295.
Therefore, corruption is an adequate consequence to allow for Original Grace to have a counteracting effect.

Original Grace is therefore only in real danger of not fitting this passage if Adam’s legacy is only one of many sinful influences, rather than inherited corruption (spiritual death or depravity). Any consequences, whether direct or indirect, coming from the one sin of Adam need antitheses if Paul’s overall aim to prove the sufficiency of Christ is to be realized. Thus, if it could be proven that nothing whatsoever was even potentially transmitted to humanity, then Original Grace would not be a viable reading of the passage. Both the distinctions between physical and spiritual/eternal types of deaths and those between Adamic sin, a sinful or corrupt nature, and personal sin will be treated extensively in a separate section.

Also, in regard to the headship of Adam, Cottrell’s insistence of the translation “because all sinned,” rather than “in whom all sinned,” is, surprisingly, of relatively little importance to his position, or at least it would first seem that way. It matters whether Adam’s sin and consequences were, at least potentially, transmitted to humanity, but in Cottrell’s mind it perhaps matters much less how it specifically happened. In other words, it seems not to matter whether all people sinned in Adam as their federal representative, for in this case they did not literally sin, but are only bound by a kind of corporate identity, or whether all people actually sinned by virtue of coming from Adam’s loins. Both allow for the potential transmission of consequences that can be counteracted by Original Grace. This particular point could certainly pose a problem, however, if the exact mechanism of transmission were not parallel to its counteraction in Christ. If Cottrell demands strict parallelism, then, for example, if the transmission of sin were through Adam as a representative federal head, it would seem that whatever happens in opposition to it, in Christ, must also be through federal headship of some kind. The
same would be true if seminal headship were the case. Cottrell supports federal headship, rather than seminal. This would seem to be more consistent. Assuming Cottrell can prove the rest of his Original Grace case, federal headship works better logically. If one sins as a representative in Adam, where God judges humanity on the basis of Adam as representative, this would seem to line up with the concept of justification where God judges the one justified\textsuperscript{244} in a similar sense where Christ is the representative of the new humanity. The parallel would appear to disintegrate if one demanded the same parallel of seminal headship. If Adam passed sin, of whatever kind, literally through his loins, and those of subsequent generations, then we would seem to need the same from Christ. Christ cannot be the seminal head as Adam was, for he is not the physical father of humanity. A possible solution would be something like Irenaeus’ doctrine of recapitulation, in which Christ takes all of creation, including humanity, into Himself to redeem it from the effects of sin.\textsuperscript{245} Such a theory is hard to substantiate from the text of Romans 5:12-21 by itself, but perhaps that is a way in which Christ could counteract the seminal headship of Adam. The purpose here is not to prove one or the other, but to show the potential problem of parallelism that Cottrell faces in this regard. We will explore the parallel effects in Adam and in Christ in a later section. So far, we have made sense of what Cottrell is saying and what is at stake, but not whether his definitions, categories, and distinctions are valid.

2.4.8.3 OTHER EXAMPLES OF THE ADAM/CHRIST COMPARISON

As discussed in regard to the distinction Cottrell makes in regard to sin and death, we have looked at 1 Corinthians 15:21-22 as the only other direct comparison between Adam and Christ. The passage mentions death directly, and perhaps implies

\textsuperscript{244} We later discuss whether it is appropriate to consider an innocent person justified apart from faith.

\textsuperscript{245} Irenaeus, Against Heresies (\textit{Adversus Haereses}), 3, 18,7; 5, 21, 1-3.
sin as a direct consequence of Adamic sin: “21 For since death came through a man, the resurrection of the dead comes also through a man. 22 For as in Adam all die, so in Christ all will be made alive.” Again, this passage makes reference only to those that are believers, and not to the innocent, so the comparison is limited. We have discussed this passage’s relevance to the concepts of sin and death, but now we turn to the very nature of the comparison. It seems that there are two general approaches to take: (1) Adam and Christ are directly opposite, even if Christ is far superior, and our interpretation of such comparisons are strict parallels, and (2) Adam and Christ are to be understood as illustratively opposite, and comparison does not require such strict comparison. Which does Paul intend? It does not seem possible to answer this question with certainty, but let us explore the plausibility of each approach.

It would seem that 1 Corinthians 15:21-22 is not a thorough enough treatment of the Adam/Christ comparison to make a strong judgment. If that were the only available passage, as it does not contain words like “condemnation,” perhaps original sin would not have ever come into existence. One could perhaps speculate that this passage means that everyone died physically because of Adam, and therefore needs to be raised from the dead, or perhaps that all those that are sinful die just like Adam died. Again, the fact that believers who were once sinners and are now under the hope of the Gospel makes this passage uncertain. On the other end of the spectrum, one could perhaps say that the death Adam brought was also inclusive of spiritual and even eternal death. Of course, this passage probably does not give enough details to make such a conclusion. It certainly does not necessitate a tight, one-to-one comparison as Cottrell demands.

What if we look at both 1 Corinthians 15 and Romans 5 as illustrations, metaphors, or perhaps typologies? Do we need to take Adam and Christ to be in strict parallel to one another? It is difficult to make this decision with so little evidence to guide. But let us posit that we can take the comparison more loosely. We could
understand that perhaps physical death comes upon everyone, as indicated in Romans 5:14. But, what of the more serious aspects of death? Must we believe that all people, apart from their own sin, are condemned because of the one sin of Adam? If we assume a less strict comparison between Adam and Christ, and between Adam’s one act and Christ’s one act, then we are allowed to understand sin as it is in the rest of Romans, as a willful act leading to death. With that understanding, we see Paul saying that Adam’s one act of disobedience led to the death and condemnation of all as they engage in “many trespasses.” Of course, such a reading is a double-edged sword. It cuts out both the original sin and Original Grace positions as good interpretations of Romans 5:12-21. Instead, it allows us to see Paul using death, sin, and justification, to name the vital concepts, in a way that fits well within the context of Romans.

Where does this discussion leave us? Because this passage is so unique, it is difficult to draw highly probable conclusions. Perhaps Paul means to express a strictly paralleled Adam/Christ comparison, but this would be the first time in Scripture, excepting perhaps the even more brief mention in 1 Corinthians 15. So, those that demand a strict parallel have a large burden of proof. Ultimately, both the original sin and Original Grace positions rely on a lot of assumptions, including this strict comparison. Those who take Adam to be the cause of original sin/guilt, then see Christ as only conditionally justifying those who believe (original sin position), and those who take Adam as bringing original sin/guilt, then see Christ as counteracting those effects for all people take the concept of sin to be quite different than anywhere in Romans (original sin position), at least, and perhaps in the entire Bible, at most, and the concept of justification and grace at the same level of inconsistency, along with sin (Original Grace position). As discussed in the section on Adamic and personal sin and the section on justification, it would appear wrong to interpret those concepts as anything other than what has been expressed in Romans, namely that sin is perpetrated by the
individual and justification is received by faith. When we consider Original Grace, including Cottrell’s motives, we must recognize a few things. First, he begins with the same main assumptions as the proponents of original sin about the strict parallelism that Paul intends, except in regard to justification. Second, he is competing with original sin on its own terms. It is as if he is saying, “If it is safe to take the concept of sin in relation to Adam, in Romans 5:12-21, in a unique way, then it is perhaps just as valid to explain justification in the exact opposite way. So, if Paul is saying that Adam’s sin brought death, and even condemnation, on all people, even though they did not actually sin, then why can we not take Paul to be saying that Christ’s “gift” could bring justification to the same group of people without regard to any choice?”

The strict parallelism employed by Cottrell on both sides of the Adam/Christ comparison appears to be more consistent with Paul’s meaning, in comparison to the original sin position which does not take the parallelism quite as far on the Christ side, if one begins with the assumptions made by those that hold to original sin. The problem, of course, remains that both positions come into doubt when one raises questions about the meaning of sin and justification in the overall context of Romans. So, essentially the same critique we level against Cottrell, we should equally level against the original sin proponents, namely that both make exegetical assumptions concerning concepts that do not match with the overall context of Romans.

2.4.9 FINAL ANALYSIS OF THE EXEGETICAL CASE MADE FOR ORIGINAL GRACE

We have explored the exegetical merits of Original Grace in regard to Romans 5:12-21. Cottrell’s example, being the most mature version, reveals agreement with both the Augustinian/Calvinist approach on some issues, and with a more semi-Pelagian/Arminian perspective on others. His distinct contribution is not so much on the interpretation of the individual verses, along with their words and concepts
expressed in each one, it is in his conclusions from his overall view of the passage. For example, he generally agrees with the Augustinian perspective on the severity of the consequences of Adam’s sin as expressed by Paul, yet he comes to a conclusion that resembles that of Pelagius—that there is no original sin.

There is likely no way to know whether Paul intended his words to be taken to have such a tight structure. It would not be odd for Paul to present such a structured argument, but neither is it certain. Paul’s structure is, indeed, tight. He certainly wants the reader to see direct contrast between Christ and Adam, but Cottrell’s argument demands essentially mathematical precision. In this regard, I find his argument compelling, but not certain, for he relies on factors that cannot be claimed with certainty, namely Paul’s structure and its implications. It appears that there are several weak points to his argument, namely his underlying assumptions that perhaps ultimately undermine his position. He takes the actual text, Paul’s intentions, and Paul’s overall theology, expressed in Romans and elsewhere, seriously, and does not intentionally do any damage to Paul’s theological integrity. He also seeks to take alternative theological positions seriously by, in essence, pulling in the best from both sides of the original sin/guilt debate, and coming to a distinctive conclusion that, at least in my opinion, seeks to be faithful to the theological commitments at stake. To be specific, he gives credence to the reality of original sin/guilt, thus recognizing the severity of Adam’s sin and its consequences on humanity, yet he concludes that it is only potential. As far as Cottrell’s intentions go, he seeks to give the greatest possible role to Christ’s “one act of righteousness” by extending it to infinity, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

For the sake of clarity, we will seek to clarify our conclusion on the exegetical issues that affect the validity of Original Grace. Of the eight questions, it would appear that the issues arising from three of them are the most critical of the Original Grace positions: (1) the extent and meaning of “justification,” (2) the distinction between
Adamic and personal sin, and (3) the nature of the Adam/Christ comparison. All three issues point toward the most serious problem plaguing Original Grace: the interpretation of Romans 5:12-21. It necessitates a redefinition of justification and sin that significantly departs from the rest of the book of Romans. Also, it demands more of the Adam/Christ comparison than can be guaranteed, which does not appear to hold up to criticism. As stated in the context of these issues above, it would be fair to Cottrell, and any other proponent of Original Grace, to recognize that the doctrine of Original Grace is both parasitic on, and a reaction to, the original sin position’s interpretation of the text. Since we have seen that both positions make some of the same assumptions and mistakes, it would appear that Original Grace would have a more significant contribution to the exegesis of this text if one allowed for the assumptions first made by proponents of original sin. It must be our primary concern to discover what Paul actually intended to say. In that way, both positions seem to suffer difficulty for much the same reason. If, however, we lay that aside for a moment to ask whether Original Grace is theologically helpful, in any way, we find that it is helpful in that it highlights problems with finding original sin in Romans 5:12-21 and responds to them in a thorough manner. Perhaps we can imagine Cottrell saying, “If it is necessary to conclude that Paul is making a unique claim about sin when compared to the rest of Romans, and perhaps to all of Paul’s writings, namely that Adam brought anything from physical death to condemnation upon even the innocent, then perhaps it is fair to conclude that we can take Paul to mean that justification should be used in a different way to contrast and counteract that original sin.”

Where do we go from here? Can Original Grace be believed on exegetical and theological grounds? Perhaps, as it consists of both strengths and weaknesses, very much like other optional interpretations of Romans 5:12-21. Is it such a certain conclusion that it should be considered a cardinal doctrine of orthodox Christianity?
Certainly not. Such an argument could not be sustained by either historical or exegetical/theological grounds.

An even deeper question needs to be pursued, pertaining to the Adam/Christ comparison: What is the metaphysical content of the concepts of “in Adam” and “in Christ” as expressed in the New Testament and in theology? Are these concepts essentially equal, yet opposite, or are there vast differences? Is there more to “in Christ” than the Original Grace position allows, at least in regard to this discussion about Adamic consequences? These questions will be pursued in Chapter 3, as they involve much more than the work of Cottrell and just Romans 5:12-21. In that chapter, we will explore the implications of Original Grace by setting it in the context of Christian theology, both accounting for the doctrine and critically evaluating it.
This chapter aims to make a significant contribution to Stone-Campbell Movement theology, and also contribute to wider contemporary theological conversations from within the Stone-Campbell Movement. Specifically, we seek to discover how the doctrine of Original Grace fares in conversation with other accounts of grace and salvation, both as a potential contribution, and as running the gauntlet of critique within that conversation. Thus far, we have surveyed the historical formulations of Original Grace, set them in their historical and theological contexts, analyzed their place within the relevant theological tradition, and presented and critiqued the biblical support claimed for the doctrine. We discovered in Chapter 1 that the doctrine of Original Grace, and its precursors, made sense within the historical and theological contexts within which it arose, and both supported and were supported by other doctrinal and practical developments, specifically within the Anabaptist, Wesleyan, and Stone-Campbell (Restoration) Movements. In Chapter 2, we discovered that a recent reading of Romans 5:12-21, which finds Original Grace in that text, raises considerable exegetical concerns that bring the doctrine’s validity into question. Despite this conclusion, the doctrine of Original Grace, including its underlying assumptions, claims, and implications, are still worth investigating, as such an exploration raises interesting questions and makes distinctive proposals that are worth
taking seriously as contributions to contemporary Christian theology. In order to fully highlight the role of this chapter, we must review what we learned in Chapter 2. First, the interpretation of Romans 5:12–21 played a key role in the development of the Augustinian tradition’s thinking about the effects of Adam’s sin and Christ’s work in response to those effects. Second, the doctrine of Original Grace is in one sense a venture within that Augustinian tradition, and even though it comes to non-Augustinian conclusions, it does so by answering the questions posed by that Augustinian tradition, and using some of the same resources that are central in that tradition. Third, specifically, the doctrine of Original Grace is an attempt to rework that tradition by reading Romans 5:12–21 differently, against the Augustinian grain, and then using the foothold created by that re-reading as a place to stand while repairing the tradition more widely. Fourth, in order to understand Original Grace, we need to understand it first as the conclusion of an exegetical argument (a detailed exegesis of Romans 5:12–21) by Jack Cottrell, who is significant because he offers the most detailed example to date of an attempt to provide that exegesis. So, this task was simply to trace that argument and make sure we understood it in full. Finally, we needed to dig a little below the exegetical surface and expose some of the bigger exegetical assumptions that are being made in Cottrell’s exegesis, trying, along the way, to distinguish between those that simply make Cottrell’s particular presentation of Original Grace function, and those that would seem to be necessary to any recognizable presentation of the doctrine. Leaving Chapter 2 and moving to Chapter 3, we take on the task of more fully understanding Original Grace in the context of a wider theological context. Therefore, in this chapter, we look at what the repair of the wider theological tradition would look like if one stood on the foothold created by this exegesis. What aspects of the wider tradition would be changed (e.g., claims about and practices towards innocent children)? What kind of overall construal of the tradition would this repair lead to (e.g., one where the tradition
as a whole is construed with a certain kind of freedom as a central motif)? What kinds of repair look like they would actually turn out to be destructive or impossible (i.e., at what points does this attempted repair meet real resistance and rebuff)?

To that end, this chapter seeks to accomplish two major tasks: (1) to give an account of the distinctive contribution of the doctrine of Original Grace in conversation with wider Stone-Campbell Movement theology and wider Christian theology beyond the Movement, and (2) to expose the doctrine of Original Grace to theological questioning and critique. The first task is largely intended to be constructive, while the second is largely intended to be critical.

Original Grace contributes to the wider theological discussion in specific areas within three broad areas of areas of conversation: freedom, sin, and grace. On the constructive side, the doctrine of Original Grace sets out a scenario in which humanity is both free and responsible. In regard to sin, the innocent human is free from both condemnation and depravity, only becoming condemned and depraved if they choose to sin themselves. In regard to grace, the human is free to either accept the offered grace of Christ by faith (justification) or to reject Him. Yet, Original Grace is the ground of all of this freedom and responsibility, as it is won by Christ’s victory over sin in His death on the cross. This doctrine assumes that human freedom and responsibility, at least at this significant level, are not, after the fall, at least, possessed naturally by humanity, apart from Christ’s work. Nevertheless, on the critical side, Original Grace holds open this interesting possibility only by making theological assumptions and conclusions that raise significant concern as to the doctrine’s validity. We will approach these tasks as follows. First, we will summarize the foundational role that freedom plays in all of the key assumptions that undergird the doctrine of Original Grace, and then explore the distinctive contribution of Original Grace in regard to the way in which it relates freedom to sin and grace. This section includes a brief but
A thorough account of four important theological terms that aims to clarify those terms in light of both systematic and historical theology, in general, and in light of Stone-Campbell soteriology, specifically. Such clarification will provide a valuable foundation to both understand and critique the doctrine of Original Grace. Second, we will explore some problematic theological issues that arise in the detailed formulation of the doctrine, namely the following: (a) the distinction between Adamic and personal sin, (b) the extent and meaning of “justification,” and (c) the nature of the Adam/Christ comparison. We explored these as aspects of Jack Cottrell’s exegesis of Romans 5:12-21 in the last chapter; now we are returning to the same ideas to see how well they fit into the wider doctrinal landscape. Finally, we will assess the viability of Original Grace as part of the traditional and contemporary Stone-Campbell soteriological system.

3.1.0 A THEOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF ORIGINAL GRACE:

FREEDOM, SIN, AND GRACE

3.1.1 KEY THEOLOGICAL CONCEPTS

As stated above, this section seeks to provide a foundation for discussing the contribution of Original Grace to Christian theology by defining and clarifying the sense in which four vital theological terms are being used in this chapter. Each term has a range of meanings in the history of Christian theology. We will identify the main options in Christian tradition, identify similarities and differences with the predominant Stone-Campbell position, and define the sense in which we will be using the term throughout the rest of Chapter 3.

3.1.1.1 ORIGINAL SIN

This section on original sin builds atop the brief history of the interpretation of Romans 5:12-21 in Chapter 2, which traced major theological work concerning original sin from the early Church Fathers to Augustine. We discovered that original sin did not take full form until the work of Augustine during his controversy with Pelagius and
Celestius, and that there is a significant divergence with the eastern tradition of Christianity where no view of original guilt ever comes to inhabit the concept of original sin, and that original sin is likely not an accurate term when talking about the eastern traditions’ views of Adam’s sin and its effects. Augustine is largely responsible for the first robust version of original sin that would be so influential in the Western Church for the next 1,000 years. Although Augustine had already produced many well-developed soteriological ideas, it was in the debate with Pelagius that the Church received the full picture. In short, Augustine’s doctrine dealt thoroughly with issues related to the fall of Adam (and the rest of humanity), and gave a full-bodied system to explain the theological, philosophical, and biblical implications of the fall of Adam and the rest of humanity.

During the Pelagius/Augustine controversy, John Cassian (360-435) opposed some of Augustine’s ideas about grace and original sin.1 His position would come to be called semi-Pelagianism, and essentially sought to soften the Augustinian position, yet maintain important claims such as the necessary role of God’s grace in the salvation of the individual, and essentially taught that Adam sin causes the nature of his progeny to be harmed in such a way that they are prone to sin, and in fact, will inevitably, although not necessarily, sin. Unlike Pelagianism, humans do not have the ability to save themselves, but must rely on God’s grace. Unlike Calvinistic Augustinianism, human nature is not totally depraved, and therefore it is possible for the human to respond to God’s grace without God’s prevenient grace, namely the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit prior to faith. In addition to semi-Pelagianism’s claim of partial depravity on the individual, it would also claim that no guilt is transmitted or imputed on the infant, or anyone else, because of Adam’s sin. Instead, guilt is incurred by the individual for his sin. Cassian was posthumously condemned for his position in A.D. 529 by the Second

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1 John Cassian, *Conferences (Collationes patrum in scetica eremo)*, XIII.
Council of Orange, although semi-Pelagianism would remain influential during the Reformation as seen in theologians like Zwingli.

The Second Council of Orange sought to support Augustine’s position while condemning the Pelagian and semi-Pelagian positions. It, however, supported Augustine in the essential aspects of original sin, while providing important modifications. For instance, it affirmed that Adam’s sin brings impairment of the will and corruption. However, the doctrine of reprobation, those not of the elect are predestined to condemnation because of guilt from Adam’s sin, was anathematized, and the Council promoted the idea that there was at least some human cooperation with Christ, through faithful works, for salvation.

Anselm of Canterbury separated original sin from the idea of concupiscence, the inordinate desire of the flesh to seek sin and temporal ends, sometimes called corruption, by instead defining it as a loss of original justice, which was once a supernatural gift in our First Parents. In other words, it is not the addition of corruption, but the lack of justice that humanity experiences, which leads to sin. In contrast to Anselm, Peter Lombard agreed with Augustine that original sin should be understood as having caused concupiscence. Peter Abelard distinguishes his position by refusing to acknowledge guilt as a consequence for original sin, even to the point of his position on that point being condemned by the Council of Sens in A.D. 1140. Some Scholastics followed Abelard in the point, but many, including the Franciscans, held to an essentially Augustinian version of original sin.

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3 Ibid., see the Conclusion. “According to the catholic faith we also believe that after grace has been received through baptism, all baptized persons have the ability and responsibility, if they desire to labor faithfully, to perform with the aid and cooperation of Christ what is of essential importance in regard to the salvation of their soul. We not only do not believe that any are foreordained to evil by the power of God, but even state with utter abhorrence that if there are those who want to believe so evil a thing, they are anathema.”
6 Peter Abelard, *Commentary on Romans*, (c. 1133-1139) II:6.
Thomas Aquinas is responsible for providing a new take on original sin that would find root in the theology of Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, who would, because of his influence, treat original sin only as the loss of Original Righteousness, not involving concupiscence. Thomas made an important distinction between the “pure nature” (pura naturalia) of Adam and the supernatural gifts (Original Righteousness) that were present in his life before the fall. These gifts allowed Adam to subordinate his other desires to reason, and therefore remain in righteous standing before God, having a moral rectitude that does not remain in Adam or humanity after the fall. However, the pure nature of man remains intact, and thus, he has reason and will, although without the supernatural gifts from God. Thus, humanity does not inherit a sinful nature in the Augustinian sense, but instead only loses his Original Righteousness. Further, Thomas counters the Augustinian position by describing the transmission of guilt not as the transmission of the actual sin of Adam, but instead that humanity is culpable for Adam’s sin in that they are part of the body of humanity of which Adam was the first mover. Humanity is still guilty, but as a result of a more “indirect” kind of sinning.

During the Protestant Reformation, two influential theologians, Martin Luther and John Calvin, led their respective traditions away from semi-Pelagian and Thomist tendencies that faced toward a more free humanity, even though under original sin, and instead reaffirmed Augustine in essentials. For example, they renewed the idea that one’s will was bound and depraved by original sin. Concupiscence destroyed reason and liberty so severely that one could not hope to accomplish the will of God. Luther and Calvin not only agreed on concupiscence, but also on the transmission of guilt.

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8 “Augsburg Confession,” *The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church*, trans. and ed. Theodore G. Tappert (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959), p. 29: “It is also taught among us that since the fall of Adam all men who are born according to the course of nature are
The Council of Trent presents a version of original sin distinct from that of the reformers, especially Luther and Calvin. On original sin, Calvin responds to the Council’s declaration that, as he puts it, “liberty has by no means been extinguished,” with “if the will were wholly depraved, its health would not only be impaired but lost until it were renewed,” and that his contention that liberty is lost “is uniformly the doctrine of Scripture.” Calvin also takes issue with the way the Council allows infants to be free of the guilt through baptism, namely that baptism actually imparts the necessary grace for them to be admitted to the Kingdom of God. Instead, he responds that, “The salvation of infants is included in the promise in which God declares to believers that he will be a God to them and to their seed. In this way he declared, that those deriving descent from Abraham were born to him. (Genesis 17:7) In virtue of this promise they are admitted to baptism, because they are considered members of the Church. Their salvation, therefore, has not its commencement in baptism, but being already founded on the word, is sealed by baptism.” In contradiction to Luther’s theology, the Council declared the concupiscence is not actually sin: “If any one asserts, that the prevarication of Adam injured himself alone, and not his posterity; and that the holiness and justice, received of God, which he lost, he lost for himself alone, and not for us also; or that he, being defiled by the sin of disobedience, has only transfused death, and pains of the body, into the whole human race, but not sin also, which is the conceived and born in sin. That is, all men are full of evil lust and inclinations from their mothers’ wombs and are unable by nature to have true fear of God and true faith in God. Moreover, this inborn sickness and hereditary sin is truly sin and condemns to the eternal wrath of God all those who are not born again through Baptism and the Holy Spirit. Rejected in this connection are the Pelagians and others who deny that original sin is sin, for they hold that natural man is made righteous by his own powers, thus disparaging the sufferings and merit of Christ.”

9 John Calvin, The Institutes of the Christian Religion, II.1.8, LCC, 2 vols., trans. Ford Lewis Battles, ed. John T. McNeill (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960), p. 251: “Original sin, therefore, seems to be a hereditary depravity and corruption of our nature, diffused into all parts of the soul, which first makes us liable to God's wrath, then also brings forth in us those works which Scripture calls "works of the flesh" (Gal 5:19). And that is properly what Paul often calls sin. The works that come forth from it—such as adulteries, fornications, thefts, hatreds, murders, carousings—he accordingly calls "fruits of sin" (Gal 5:19-21), although they are also commonly called "sins" in Scripture, and even by Paul himself.”

10 John Calvin, Antidote to the Sixth Session of the Council of Trent on the Doctrine of Justification (1547).

11 Ibid.
death of the soul; let him be anathema.”

The Council, then, is distinct from Luther and Calvin in that it denies total depravity by asserting that liberty has not been lost, it agrees that guilt has come upon infants, which is only remitted through baptism, yet denies that Adam’s sin, as it is transmitted to humanity, is actually sin itself.

John Calvin himself is responsible for systematizing the Calvinist/Reformed theological tradition, which would be articulated in his *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, and later in the Heidelberg Catechism (1563), the Canons of the Synod of Dort (1618), and the Westminster Confession and Catechism (1647-1648). *The Canons of the Synod of Dort* provides a thorough yet succinct Calvinist definition of original sin and the implications for infants under original sin. Dort begins with the premise that all people are justly condemned for both the sin of Adam and their own sins: “Article 1: God's Right to Condemn All People: Since all people have sinned in Adam and have come under the sentence of the curse and eternal death, God would have done no one an injustice if it had been his will to leave the entire human race in sin and under the curse, and to condemn them on account of their sin. As the apostle says: The whole world is liable to the condemnation of God (Rom. 3:19), all have sinned and are deprived of the glory of God (Rom. 3:23), and the wages of sin is death (Rom. 6:23).”

The sin of Adam not only brings eternal death and condemnation, but also a fallen human nature and corruption:

Man was originally created in the image of God and was furnished in his mind with a true and salutary knowledge of his Creator and things spiritual, in his will and heart with righteousness, and in all his emotions with purity; indeed, the whole man was holy. However, rebelling against God at the devil's instigation and by his own free will, he deprived himself of these outstanding gifts. Rather, in their place he brought upon himself blindness, terrible darkness, futility, and distortion of judgment in his mind; perversity, defiance, and hardness in his heart and will; and

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14 The Canons of the Synod of Dort (1618).
finally impurity in all his emotions . . . Man brought forth children of the same nature as himself after the fall. That is to say, being corrupt he brought forth corrupt children. The corruption spread, by God's just judgment, from Adam to all his descendants--except for Christ alone--not by way of imitation (as in former times the Pelagians would have it) but by way of the propagation of his perverted nature.15

This state of corruption also brings the inability of the person to avoid sin and to be regenerated without the work of the Holy Spirit: “Therefore, all people are conceived in sin and are born children of wrath, unfit for any saving good, inclined to evil, dead in their sins, and slaves to sin; without the grace of the regenerating Holy Spirit they are neither willing nor able to return to God, to reform their distorted nature, or even to dispose themselves to such reform.”16 Unlike Augustine’s conclusion on the destiny of children, the Synod provides one possible answer to the question of the salvation of infants of believers: “Article 17: The Salvation of the Infants of Believers: Since we must make judgments about God's will from his Word, which testifies that the children of believers are holy, not by nature but by virtue of the gracious covenant in which they together with their parents are included, godly parents ought not to doubt the election and salvation of their children whom God calls out of this life in infancy.”17

Calvinism finds opposition during and after the Reformation in the work of Anabaptists and in Arminian traditions, such as the Wesleyan movements, as we saw in Chapter 1. Arminianism is named after the Dutch Reformed theologian James Arminius (1560-1609) and follower of John Calvin. John Wesley is one of the most important proponents of this position, and thus a good example of the position. Like Calvinism, Adam’s sin makes humanity totally depraved, unable to act righteously or respond to the Gospel, and at least potentially guilty. Yet, prevenient grace, founded upon the redemptive work of Christ, clears all people of guilt,18 and through the work of the Holy Spirit allows the depravity to be alleviated in order that they can respond to the

15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Wesley, Works, 8:277. Wesley, Letters, 6:239. I have given a fuller treatment of Wesley’s position in Chapter 1.
Gospel and then act righteously. 19 So, Arminianism preserves some of the assumptions of Augustinianism and Calvinism, yet provides a remedy to the effects of original sin that makes the human situation look, after the application of prevenient grace, essentially like the version espoused in the semi-Pelagian perspective that we saw in the work of John Cassian.

As mentioned above, Zwingli finds himself denying the Augustinian, Catholic, and Calvinist positions on original sin in favor of a more semi-Pelagian perspective. He describes original sin as a terrible curse on mankind that only becomes punishable as personal guilt when one commits transgression himself. In Latin, he uses the terms *defectus naturalis* and *conditio misera*, and in German, *Brest* or *Gebrechen*, or disease. 20 Thus, for Zwingli, original sin is a terrible disease, but not one that brings total depravity or guilt.

As this Chapter is written by a theologian of the Stone-Campbell Movement toward the wider audience of Christian theology from the Stone-Campbell perspective, it will be helpful to place that theological system in these categories. Chapter 1 provided examples of several of the most prominent thinkers in the Movement, whose work is still influential in the Movement, and Chapter 2 provides a detailed look at Cottrell. Because we have seen in detail a wide range of opinions in the Movement on original sin, we will not rehearse them here. Each proponent of any version of Original Grace would likely fall into the category of an Arminian, or at least something like an Arminian, since the redemptive work of Christ is needed to counteract one or all of the consequences of Adam’s sin. Even if they do not posit total depravity, like Wesley, they certainly rely on prevenient grace to counteract the sin of Adam. Writers like

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Alexander Campbell, however, with his view of partial depravity, and no guilt, being brought by the sin of Adam, are perhaps best categorized as semi-Pelagian.

This brief survey of the options for the doctrine of original sin, seen along with coverage of the concept in the Introduction and Chapters 1 and 2, allows us to proceed with a framework of understanding the different approaches to original sin. We need not actually choose a position in order to proceed, but instead understand the range of possible consequences that are said to come from Adam’s sin. For instance, we will deal with physical, spiritual, and eternal death, along with relevant implications, separately in the Chapter. It is, however, important to extrapolate the core concept of original sin (denied in Pelagianism): that Adam’s sin brought a range of consequences on humanity, which Christ’s redemptive work needs to remedy in order to bring salvation to humanity.

3.1.1.2 GRACE

Grace may be defined and categorized in several ways, which we need not cover fully here. We are concerned, for purposes of this project, with grace in the sense that it relates to the actual saving of the individual from sin. In other words, we will not concern ourselves with what is sometimes called common grace as this is a set of freely given blessings from God, bestowed on all people, irrespective of any response, through such things as the order of creation and governmental structures. We concern ourselves with what is sometimes called special grace, which can, in turn, be categorized into at least prevenient, efficacious, and sufficient grace.

Prevenient grace, used in a general sense rather than the specific way in which we described it in the Introduction and, for example, in Wesley’s theology, simply means acts of grace performed by God previous to human volition or endeavor. For example, Scripture states that “while we were yet sinners Christ died for us,” (Rom. 5:8)

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and that “while we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son,” (2 Cor. 8:9), which highlights the fact that mankind is helpless to save itself and that it was necessary for God to provide the way to salvation. Effectual grace highlights the aspect of grace that it is God’s grace, and therefore, because of His perfect nature, cannot be defective in any way. (Rom. 8:29-30) Sufficient grace highlights the fact that, again, due to God’s nature, His grace is able to completely provide salvation, both in terms of quality and quantity. In other words, His grace is “good enough” to forgive sins (quality), and pervasive enough to forgive every sin (quantity). Special (or saving) grace provides all that is needed for the sinner to be chosen (Eph. 1:11), called (Rom. 8:28-30), predestined (Rom. 8:29), saved (Rom. 10:10), sealed (Eph. 4:30), ransomed (1 Tim. 2:6), regenerated (Titus 3:5), and justified (Rom. 4:25), just to name a few of the biblical pictures of salvation.

Those aspects of grace above represent generally uncontroversial components to the concept of grace, as long as one recognizes that different theological traditions may use different terminology and emphasize different areas. Our deeper definition of grace here will focus on the controversy over the involvement, if any, of human choice in the reception of grace. Do humans ultimately choose to receive grace? Is grace irresistible or resistible? These questions are the most relevant to our subsequent discussions.

Tertullian is responsible for developing one of the first complete versions of a doctrine of grace, where he described it as divine energy that worked on the soul. God does not do all of the work of grace, however, since humans are still responsible for their actions.22 As we covered somewhat in Chapter 2, Augustine, against Pelagius, emphasized God’s grace as being absolutely vital, not only for salvation and justification, which occurred in and through baptism,23 but also for the performance of

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good works. In this regard, Augustine distinguished prevenient grace as a gift of God from subsequent grace, in order to preserve man’s free will, in that man was able to cooperate, after his conversion, with the grace of God in living a holy life. Cassian sought to mediate between Pelagius and Augustine by accepting much of what Augustine said on original sin, but rejected total depravity, irresistible grace, and unconditional predestination (election), in favor of a divine grace that was not only universally available, but that also allowed for the freedom of the will in both accepting that grace and cooperating with it post-conversion. Of particular note is the work of Alexander of Hales, who, influenced by Cassian, identified prevenient grace as assistentia generalis, or general assistance, of God, rather than an irresistible divine act of grace. Cassian fueled this thought through his contention that humans, since they are not totally depraved, may initiate movement toward the virtue through “congruous grace,” which is the idea that God bestows grace on the individual in response to his good works. The Second Council of Orange, as we saw in the section on original sin, sought to condemn Pelagiansim and semi-Pelagianism, while essentially preserving Augustine. In regard to grace, it preserved prevenient grace as necessary because of the fall, yet anathematized reprobation.

Thomas Aquinas put more emphasis on the freedom of the will than Augustine. He is responsible for distinguishing the ideas of predestination to grace and predestination to glorification of the believer, and the ideas of “habitual grace” (sanctifying grace that enables humans to do good works, normally conveyed through the sacraments) and “actual grace” (grace bestowed in even perhaps an unbaptized individual for the making of a particular good work).

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26 John Cassian, *Conferences*, II.XIII.
27 *The Canons of the Council of Orange (529)*.
28 Thomas Aquinas “De divisione gratiae”, *Summa*, in Migne, II. 927-960.
Scholastic theology, in general, tended to include in grace the concept of *gratiae createae* (created graces), which included the concept of merits of the individual in the dispensation of God’s grace. Luther, for example, was adamantly opposed to such ideas because, “It is dangerous to say that the law teaches that its performance takes place in the grace of God.”\(^{29}\) Above all, Luther sought to utterly separate the concepts of human works and divine grace, in order that the Church find salvation in God’s grace, rather than human merit. Calvin taught the utter inability for the human to respond to the Gospel, and that God absolutely elected or predestined him to either salvation or condemnation. \(^{30}\) The Council of Trent, in contrast, sought to maintain free will by stating that although God’s grace was absolutely essential for salvation, the human must freely cooperate in that graceful state. \(^{31}\)

The Anabaptists provide a good example of the integration of God’s grace and human works. Anabaptists generally rejected any role of works in salvation, especially within the concept of justification by faith. They did, however, heavily stress the necessity of human cooperation in producing the fruit of good works that happens through faith and subsequent to the new birth experienced in baptism. \(^{32}\) Of course, as we saw in Chapter 1, the Anabaptist assumptions rest on human free will uninhibited by total depravity. In contrast, Arminians, like Wesley, maintain that a universal prevenient grace is applied to all people to make them free and able to respond to

\(^{29}\) Martin Luther, *The Works of Luther*, p. 31.13. See also thesis 57 of the 95 Theses.
\(^{31}\) *Canons of the Council of Trent: Sixth Session Decree on Justification*, V.
\(^{32}\) Packull, pp. 205-206. See also text from the earliest Anabaptist document, which is an epistle written by Contrad Grebel to Thomas Müntzer on September 5, 1524, in *Spiritual and Anabaptist Writers*, ed. by George H. Williams (Library of Christian Classics, XXV, 1957), p. 80.
Divine grace continues both in justification, also sanctification where the Holy Spirit provides enabling to live a holy life.\textsuperscript{33} The Stone-Campbell Movement’s position on grace generally resides in the semi-Pelagian and Arminian position. Prevenient grace is not necessary, excepting the minority that accept Original Grace, insofar as it is similar to prevenient grace, since one does not inherit total depravity or a significant enough loss of free will to necessitate the intervention of divine grace in order to respond to saving grace by faith.\textsuperscript{35} Grace, which is received freely by the individual through faith (resistible grace), brings both justification and sanctification.\textsuperscript{36} The Holy Spirit works in cooperation with the individual to produce holy character for the believer by providing aid in that quest for righteousness.\textsuperscript{37} The Movement certainly shows its distinctive ideas in the way it defines grace and surrounding issues, but at its core, grace is seen much as it is in all of Protestantism. For example, Barton Stone defines grace as, “... only a view of the holiness, goodness, love, and the free, unmerited grace and mercy of God, which produces true conviction and true repentance, and which humbles the soul, slays the enmity of the heart, and makes willing to depart from all in iniquity. He adores the riches of divine grace, which is extended to such a poor polluted worm of the dust.”\textsuperscript{38} Thus, grace for the Stone-Campbell Movement was, and still is, the unmerited divine act of love by God toward sinners in order to save them from sin and its affects.


\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Book of Discipline}, p. 68.

\textsuperscript{35} For example, see Alexander Campbell, \textit{The Christian System}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edn (Bethany: Forrester & Campbell, 1839), pp. 28-30.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., pp. 64-65. See also, Cottrell, \textit{The Faith Once for All}, p. 348.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., pp. 47-50. For a contemporary Stone-Campbell perspective, see Cottrell, \textit{Faith Once for All}, pp. 318-345.

\textsuperscript{38} Barton W. Stone, et. al., \textit{An Abstract of an Apology, For Renouncing the Jurisdiction of the Synod of Kentucky. Being a Compendious View of the Gospel and a Few Remarks on the Confession of Faith.} (1804), p. 204.
We have briefly explored the nuances and ranges of meaning wrapped up in the term “grace” in Christian tradition, but a broad definition of, “God’s unmerited acts of blessing bestowed upon sinners for the purpose of redeeming, sanctifying, glorifying them through person and work of Jesus Christ,” will serve as the operating definition for later sections where we discuss how Original Grace frees the individual from bonds that would prevent him from receiving and experiencing all aspects of salvation. We have seen examples of definitions of grace that go from a totally irresistible act of God apart from human volition to versions where not only is human choice involved, but so also is human works. For purposes of this Chapter, we need not define the term too tightly, except to remove the possibility of works being involved in the giving or receiving of God’s grace, and to allow human volition to have a part in the reception of grace. We have discussed grace broadly to include the entire experience of salvation in Christ, but must now turn to the specific aspect of justification, including the role of faith.

3.1.1.3 JUSTIFICATION

The term justification has been used to refer to both the entire process of salvation by grace in Christian theology, and to denote the specific aspect of salvation that focuses on the legal, forensic declaration by God that a sinner is now righteous through Christ. Since we have already discussed grace broadly, we will focus on the second aspect of justification, including two main issues that have been hotly debated throughout church history: (1) the role of works and human action, and (2) the role of faith, including the nature of that faith. Underlying both of these issues is the question of human free will.

The early church fathers, including Clement, Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Origen, generally held to the view that “justification by faith alone suffices, so that a person is justified only by believing, even if he had done no work.”39 When we enter the

39 Origen, Commentary on Romans, 3.9.2.
Pelagian/Augustinian controversy, we discover that Augustine, against Pelagius, stresses that not only is works not involved in justification, but that belief (faith) is itself a gift from God.\textsuperscript{40} Any kind of merit that a person has is also a gift of God.\textsuperscript{41} For Augustine, Christ is the justifier, through the Holy Spirit, who works in use to make us righteous.\textsuperscript{42} Thus, for Augustine, justification is not just a declaration of righteousness, but a divine work in which humans are actually made more righteous, although not completely in this life.\textsuperscript{43} Both the Council of Carthage (418) and the Second Council of Orange (529) essentially support Augustine’s views on grace and justification.

Among the Scholastics, there was a renewed interest in the role of the cross in the discussion of justification, such as the work of Anselm of Canterbury, and Peter Lombard is responsible for linking the idea of justification with the sacrament of penance.\textsuperscript{44} Thomas Aquinas, by far, gives the most thorough and important treatment of justification in the Middles Ages. He agreed with Augustine on the principle of \textit{sola gratia}, and contributes to the concept of justification by equating it specifically as the remission of sins.\textsuperscript{45} In justification, God not only declares the sinner righteous, but actually makes him righteous.\textsuperscript{46} Justification is gained through the free human response of faith, but it is not merited in any way. That free response is affected by the grace of God through the Holy Spirit.\textsuperscript{47} After the unmerited forgiveness of sins, there is an internal gift of grace that actually leads the believer to lived righteousness.\textsuperscript{48}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[40] Augustine, \textit{On the Predestination of the Saints (De praedestinatione sanctorum)}, 2.7.
\item[41] Augustine, \textit{On Grace and Free Will (De gratia et libero arbitrio)}, 6.15.
\item[42] Augustine, \textit{On Merits and Remission of Sin, and Infant Baptism (De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo parvulorum)}, 1.3.18.
\item[44] Peter Lombard, \textit{Sentences}, IV.17.1.
\item[46] Ibid., I.113.1.2.
\item[47] Ibid., I.110.2.3.
\item[48] Ibid., I.113.8.1.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
is not fully assured for Thomas, yet can be held to because of the hope, rather than faith.50

Luther is responsible for placing justification in the prominent position that would characterize the Protestant Reformation and the traditions that flow from that time period. He famously said that justification is “the article by which the church stands or falls.”51 Luther hangs salvation on the concept that justification is a forensic declaration of righteousness by God, because of the defeat of sin by the work of Christ. However, he also makes clear that justification includes union with Christ and his divinity. Justification is accomplished by sola gratia and received by sola fide (faith alone).52 No merits or works of either the individual or other saints has any bearing on justification.53 Agreeing with Luther on much in regard to justification, Calvin works hard to distinguish justification and sanctification in order to ground the assurance of salvation in the completed work of divine grace as God declares the sinner righteous, whereas sanctification is a continual work by the Spirit that has not yet been fully accomplished. Like Luther, this further separates human works from salvation.54

The Council of Trent responded to the reformers by declaring that justification is not only a declaration of righteousness by the imputation of Christ’s righteousness to the sinner, but also the transformation of the sinner into a Christ-like character through the continual work of the Holy Spirit.55 Faith alone does not lead to justification or full assurance of salvation. Instead, justification must also be obtained through the exercise of human free will and merits, which are themselves gifts from God.56 This is not to say that merits can gain salvation prior to justification, for they cannot. Instead,

49 Ibid., I.112.5.
50 Ibid., II.18.4
51 Martin Luther, WA, 40.3.352.3.
52 Martin Luther, Works of Luther, 26.168, 129-130, 227.
53 Ibid., 32.190. See also, WA, 40.1.360.24-25.
54 Calvin, Institutes, 3.11-16.
55 The Council of Trent Decree on Justification, III and V.
56 Ibid., VIII and IX.
justification and sanctification, as well as faith and works, are inexorably linked and grounded in God’s grace and human free will.

More recent Protestant theology has clarified even more plainly the role of faith in the justification. In particular, some in the Lutheran and Reformed perspectives have taken great pains to highlight the absolutely essential position of faith in justification, but also the nature of faith being utterly devoid of human effort. Wayne Grudem, from the Reformed perspective, defines faith as an “attitude of the heart that is the exact opposite of depending on ourselves.” \(^{57}\) Braaten, from a contemporary Lutheran perspective, says that, “Faith is the way that an individual person receives the righteousness of God in Christ, and therefore not on the basis of law and merit. The state of being righteous in the sight of God is radically a free gift of grace, never the result of human achievement. Faith itself comes of the Spirit of God.” Gerhard O’Forde makes the unconditional nature of justification by faith by saying that, “Faith is the state of being grasped by the unconditional claim and promise of the God who calls into being that which is from that which is not.” \(^{58}\) That unconditional claim, namely justification, is “an absolutely unconditional decree, a divine decision.” \(^{59}\)

The Stone-Campbell Movement departs from the Reformed and Lutheran on at least two issues. First, the Movement assumes a semi-Pelagian/Arminian perspective on original sin and free will that leads to faith being a free choice that is made upon the hearing of the Gospel. Thus, faith itself is not a gift of God, but a rational “action” by humans that relies on “conviction” of the truth of the Gospel as well as “confidence” in “Jesus as the Christ.” \(^{60}\) Second, the Movement presents faith as a condition for salvation. Campbell, along with the Reformation, stresses that justification is the forgiveness of sins that is accessed by faith, and faith is the “formal cause” of salvation,

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\(^{57}\) Grudem, p. 730.

\(^{58}\) Gerhard O’Forde, p. 22.

\(^{59}\) Ibid., p. 23.

yet it is one cause among many: “Saved by grace the *moving* cause; by Jesus the *efficient* cause; by his death, and resurrection, and life, the *procuring* cause; by the gospel, the *disposing* cause; by faith, the *formal* cause; by baptism, the *immediate* cause; and by enduring to the end, or persevering in the Lord, the *concurring* cause.”61

Campbell does not remove the centrality of grace and faith in justification, but he does at least emphasize it differently.

The Stone-Campbell Movement also experienced controversy over the concept of imputation of Christ’s righteousness as part of justification. Instead, Campbell, and the later A.B. Jones, both sought to stress the change of state that was brought on by conversion. For example, Campbell described salvation as multi-faceted: “pardoned, justified, sanctified, reconciled, adopted, and saved.”62 This view of salvation stressed that it was not only a pardon for sin gained, but an actual change in character. So, justification, as a divine legal act, was only one small piece of the salvation picture. The person also experienced the other aspects of salvation, including the transformation from sinner to one who has a righteous character. A.B. Jones describes justification as more than just a declaration of righteousness, but also a real change experienced by the penitent believer as he surrenders to Christ in faith.63 C.A. Hendrick argues that justification as only a forensic declaration does not get to the heart of the sinner’s issue, namely by removing the desire to sin and the need to turn toward God.64 Contemporary Stone-Campbell Movement writers Paul Blowers and William Richardson give a summative historical perspective on the Movement’s difficulty with taking justification as only a forensic declaration of righteousness: “The apostolic declaration that in Christ God was seeking to reconcile humanity to himself (Rom. 5:10; 2 Cor. 1:18-19; Col.

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61 Ibid., p. 259.
62 Ibid., 194.
1:20) has historically suggested to Stone-Campbell Christian that God’s primary concern is to overcome alienation through a multifaceted economy wherein justification (forgiveness of sins) goes hand in hand with the other ‘enjoyed’ graces of sanctification, adoption, salvation.”  

For the Stone-Campbell Movement, justification by faith, with its nuances, is still central to the salvation picture, yet it takes its place among the other biblical pictures of salvation as part of God’s plan to reconcile man to Himself.

This Chapter is written with the core importance of justification by faith in mind, defined in the general sense, where there is general agreement among Protestants. However, as Original Grace is also discussed within the context of Stone-Campbell theology, not just the wider Protestant perspective, it is important to see that some of the criticisms of Original Grace derive from the view that faith is a volitional act of belief and trust in the saving power of Jesus Christ, as a condition, along with others, such as repentance and baptism. Original Grace, being a kind of irresistible grace, bestowed on the innocent, prior to faith, seems to perhaps fit much better with a Reformed or Lutheran perspective where irresistible grace is acceptable, and where, further, faith is a gift of God, not a rational action that does come as a gift of divine grace. This is not to say that Original Grace actually works within those perspectives, nor that such suggestion is without problems. Instead, I only mean to suggest the possibility of such a fit. We will explore this in a later section on justification by faith in regard to Original Grace.

3.1.1.4 FREEDOM

We will, in this section, explore the concept of freedom in Christian theology, limiting our work to exclude a vast array of work on the subject from, for example, philosophers through the history of Western thought. Freedom is closely tied with the above three concepts of original sin, grace, and justification. Some overlap will

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necessarily occur. Christian theology, in regard to humans, normally focuses on freedom of the will, and also normally focuses on issues of salvation and morality. Freedom is discussed both before and after the individual comes to salvation, with sin and the sovereignty of God being two of the primary considerations in determining the extent to which humans are free as infants and children (whether sinful or innocent), adult sinners, and adult Christians, to name important distinctions. Does sin (original and/or actual) destroy free will, both in terms of the reception of the Gospel and grace and in acting morally? How does God’s sovereignty over humans and creation affect the nature of human freedom? These are just a couple of general questions that have been asked throughout the discussion over human freedom in Church history. We will now explore what some of the major positions are in this regard.

Irenaeus described God as totally free, and humans, created by Him, as moving toward that kind of freedom. Specifically, Irenaeus shows that humanity, Adam included, was trapped by Satan’s power, but was liberated from that power, and the condemnation that comes from it, through the recapitulating work of Christ. Thus, the kind of liberty Irenaeus talks about is a returning to humanity’s true God-given state, before sin brought condemnation upon them. That freedom is only found in Christ: “man, who had been led captive, was loosed from the bonds of condemnation.”

Augustine described freedom, in regard to humans, in several important ways. First, there is the idea of self-activity where the human is free from external or animal instinct constraints. This kind of freedom exists even in the sinful state and is necessary, according to Augustine, to allow for the responsibility of man in terms of sin, guilt, punishment, and reward. Thus, even though the sinful state brings bondage to sin, the human is still free enough to be responsible for that sin. Second, Augustine taught the idea of free choice (liberum arbitrium) in the individual. This kind of freedom

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66 Irenaeus, Against Heresies (Adversus Haereses), 4.20.2; 4.38.4; 3.23.1, 2.
67 Ibid., 3.23.1.
68 Augustine, Retractions, 9.4.
existed only in Adam, before he sinned. Adam, had he used this freedom properly, and
with the help of the grace of God, would have become truly free. Instead, he turned to
sin and therefore lost the freedom, at least mostly, for even fallen man retains this kind
of freedom enough to choose between evil and good in terms of moral actions in one’s
society and among other humans (jutitia civilis).69 However, the human is not free to
ultimately please God. This leads to the third kind of freedom Augustine discusses,
namely, the true freedom experienced only by Christians. This freedom is the freedom
of self-determination. This is experienced in heaven when one will be totally free from
sin. This freedom is produced by grace, and allows humans to serve God for eternity,
apart from sin.70

Erasmus of Rotterdam and Luther engaged in debate concerning the freedom of
the will between 1524 and 1527. Erasmus believed that human free will, even after the
fall, remains enough intact to allow both moral and salvific choice: “we understand a
power of human will by which man may be able to direct himself towards, or turn away
from, what leads to eternal salvation.”71 Luther heartily disagreed with Erasmus, in
favor of a much more limited understanding of free will. In fact, he accused Erasmus of
making the same mistake as the Pelagians, by giving free will its own power of
discernment and choosing in the individual, rather than it coming by grace.72 He even
accuses Erasmus of excluding the work of the Holy Spirit in his version of inherent free
will.73 Luther believes that there is no free will, in the sense that Erasmus defines it.
For Luther, free will is not inherently part of human nature, for it has been destroyed by
original sin and the work of Satan: “there can be nothing left in a man devoid of the

69 Against Two Letters of the Pelagians (Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum) ii. c. 5 and On
Grace and Free Will (De gratia et libero arbitrio), c. 15
70 On Rebuke and Grace (De correptione et gratia), 32-33.
71 Erasmus, Freedom of the Will, 21.
72 Martin Luther, The Bondage of Will (De Servo Arbitrio or On the Enslaved Will), XLIV.
73 Ibid., XLV.
Spirit, which can turn itself towards good, but which must turn towards evil!”\textsuperscript{74} In fact, “... man, without grace, can do nothing but will evil!”\textsuperscript{75} Thus, man was utterly lost until redeemed by the blood of Christ, but through the Spirit, man’s “free will,” of the kind that is given purely by grace and accomplished by Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit, is reestablished in believers.\textsuperscript{76}

Calvin essentially follows Luther’s line of thinking in regard to the bondage of the will. Because of sin, both original and actual, man is totally unable to be righteous:

Let it stand, therefore, as an indubitable truth, which no engines can shake, that the mind of man is so entirely alienated from the righteousness of God that he cannot conceive, desire, or design any thing but what is wicked, distorted, foul, impure, and iniquitous; that his heart is so thoroughly envenomed by sin that it can breathe out nothing but corruption and rottenness; that if some men occasionally make a show of goodness, their mind is ever interwoven with hypocrisy and deceit, their soul inwardly bound with the fetters of wickedness.”\textsuperscript{77}

Freedom, restored for the believer by justification, allows the believer to be free of guilt, the law (free from slavery to the law, not obedience to it), and free to be righteous before God.\textsuperscript{78}

Campbell, as representative of the Stone-Campbell Movement, finds much in common with Erasmus’ position. The original human, before the fall, “was not merely an animal, but an intellectual, moral, pure, and holy being.”\textsuperscript{79} Under the law of God, man was intended to remain in this free state. However, after the fall, man becomes corrupted and prone to do evil.\textsuperscript{80} Despite this corruption, inherited from Adam, man still has the ability to make significant moral choices: “Still, man, with all his hereditary imbecility, is \textit{not under an invincible necessity to sin}. Greatly prone to evil, easily seduced into transgression, \textit{he may or may not yield to passion and seduction.}

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., CLXVII.  
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{77} John Calvin, \textit{ICR}, II.4.19.  
\textsuperscript{78} See Calvin, \textit{ICR}, III.19.  
\textsuperscript{79} Campbell, \textit{The Christian System}, IV.II.  
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid. VI.IV.
Hence the differences we so often discover in the corruption and depravity of man. All inherit a fallen, consequently a sinful nature . . .” [emphases mine] After one’s conversion, which happens at baptism for Campbell, he experiences freedom from sin and many other blessings: You have been immersed, not only by the authority of Jesus, as Lord of all, into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, but into the death or sacrifice of Christ . . . This gives you an insight into sin, and a freedom from it, as respects conscience--a peace and a joy unutterable and full of glory . . .”81 [emphases original] Freedom not only covers moral choices, and does not only apply to Christians. In Stone-Campbell thinking, the will, even if corrupted and depraved to a point, is still free enough to make a significantly free choice for or against the grace offered in Jesus Christ through faith. As we discussed in the sections on grace and justification, prevenient grace is not necessary for a person’s will to be free to respond to the Gospel (positively or negatively), excepting the minority that accept Original Grace, since one does not inherit total depravity or a significant enough loss of free will to necessitate the intervention of divine grace in order to respond to saving grace by faith.82 Also, grace, which is received freely by the individual through faith (resistible grace), brings both justification and sanctification.83 True freedom, if we are to use Augustinian terms, is found in Christ for the Stone-Campbell Movement. However, freedom is never totally lost, even for the one under original and/or personal sin.

Thus, we have seen that freedom, in Christian theology, is important, before the fall, in order to preserve things like human responsibility for sin, after the fall, but previous to salvation, in some versions of freedom, in order to preserve human

81 Ibid., p. 347.
82 Ibid., pp. 28-30. Cottrell treats free will within several theological topics in Cottrell, *Faith Once for All*, pp. 86,114ff, 121ff, 152, 157ff, 165, 168f, 193, 220ff, 346, 348, 376, 586. Also, Barton Stone, et. al., *Apology of the Springfield Presbytery*, p. 191 “. . . though man be thus alienated from God, and prone to evil, he possesses rational faculties, capable of knowing and enjoying God. If not, he has ceased to be a moral agent, and consequently is no longer a fit subject of moral government. He is a machine, incapable of rational happiness. But this we believe none will assert. Still, though a moral agent, yet he is depraved. The crown is fallen from our head:--who unto us that we have sinned.”
83 Ibid., pp. 64-65.
responsibility for sin and salvation alike, and after salvation, in order to elevate the redemptive work of Christ to preeminence over the effects of sin in the new life of the Christian believer. In this Chapter, we will refer to freedom in all of these ways. When we discuss the freedom that Original Grace proposes to bring from physical death and eternal death, we use the term in the very basic sense that the person will be liberated from the negative effects of original sin. When we discuss the freedom that Original Grace brings in regard to freedom from spiritual death, we mean freedom in the sense of liberty of the individual’s will from depravity inherited from Adam, and liberty of the will to accept or reject grace without inherited corruption to cloud such a choice.

3.1.2 THE THEOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION OF ORIGINAL GRACE

The most important contribution the doctrine of Original Grace can give to Christian theology is in regard to freedom. It is a doctrine that presents humanity as freed by an irresistible work of grace from the effects of inherited Adamic sin, and so given by that same irresistible grace real freedom to choose how to respond to the further working of grace offered to those who hear the Gospel. Specifically, humanity is given, in this work of irresistible grace, the freedom to sin or refrain from sin, and the freedom to accept or reject the gospel. Through Christ’s cosmic victory, not only is the whole creation, once subjected to frustration, now set to be restored in the eschaton, but also humanity is freed in the present from the sin (Adamic) to which it was subjected. Humans are not free of sin or its effects (including its curtailment of freedom and responsibility) apart from Christ, but with Him, they are all actually freed from physical death and from guilt leading to condemnation (eternal death) and from depravity (spiritual death). Of course, this situation of adult free responsibility, created in this way, is not one in which each adult chooses sin or righteousness entirely without bias or influence, as if each adult were back in Eden. Instead, we still have to reckon with the ways in which sin spreads, infects, and influences, and thus account for the fact that
every human being chooses to sin at some point. So, the doctrine sets out a picture of humanity genuinely freed from sin, not even having an internal, inbuilt propensity to sin, because of Christ’s work. Yet, this is a picture in which sin is eventually a practical inevitability for all human adults.

We will briefly explore the effects of Original Grace on sin and its consequences by categorizing the ways in which Original Grace overcomes different forms of death. First, we will give a brief account of Original Grace’s effects in regard to eternal death and to physical death, which will involve exploring its possible relationship with the cosmic fall and restoration. These points are certainly interesting, but they do not hit at the heart of the truly central claims of Original Grace in regard to freedom, sin, and grace. Most of our work will be done in giving an account of what Original Grace has to say in reference to spiritual death (depravity) and the continuing influence and inevitability of sin. As we discussed above, Original Grace frees the innocent, and ultimately the adult, from a depraved nature (resulting from Adam’s sin) that inevitably leads the person to sin. Original Grace frees human beings from the depravity that binds them to sin, with no freedom to escape from it, but those who have been freed from this depravity, and given real freedom nevertheless, exercise that freedom in a context that makes it inevitable to fall into sin. In doing this, it protects the innocence of the non-sinner and allows them to start fresh, new, and blameless of sin. However, Original Grace still claims that every adult human, conscious of God’s law, will inevitably sin because of the pervasiveness of sin and sinful influence in the world. Grace is the ground of this freedom from depravity, granted to humanity, as it flows from the redemptive work of Christ. As we will see subsequently, humanity is said to be free of depravity until they actually sin, at which point they become depraved and guilty because of their own sin. In that situation, the person is no longer under Original Grace.

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84 For purposes of this project, we will treat spiritual death and depravity as essentially synonymous. One could perhaps distinguish between the two, but treating them as synonymous will be adequate for what is being discussed here.
The theme of freedom persists, however, in that, despite their newly acquired depravity, humans are still free to accept or reject the Gospel without any other act of prevenient grace. We will not pursue a full account of the place of grace in the process of conversion, but instead, we will examine the kind of justification by faith that is consistent with the doctrine of Original Grace.

3.1.2.1 FREEDOM FROM PHYSICAL DEATH

Physical death appears to be the bare minimum consequence experienced by all people due to Adam’s sin, at least according to Romans 5:12-21. Human experience confirms that all humans, both innocent and guilty of personal sin, die. If the innocent are redeemed by Original Grace from all of the consequences of Adamic sin, then why do they still die? An innocent person, still under Original Grace (not guilty of sinning personally), will eventually die. No proponent of the doctrine of Original Grace claims that the innocent do not die. A proponent might, however, claim that an innocent who dies in the state of Original Grace will be resurrected in the same way as a Christian (a sinner that has been redeemed from personal sin by the Gospel). This would mean that the description of the resurrection in 1 Corinthians 15 should perhaps be appropriately applied to innocent humans. However, this promise of resurrection from the dead, and transformation into the likeness of Christ’s resurrected body, is forfeited once a person breaks the law of God, resulting in spiritual death. Of course, there is also a resurrection for the wicked, but it is a resurrection to judgment and eternal condemnation.

There is a possible difficulty with this claim about Original Grace. At first glance, it may appear that dealing with physical death like this is an attempt to make the system work by introducing an arbitrary modification. If Original Grace really counteracts all effects of Adamic sin, and physical death is one of those consequences, then why do the innocent still die? One of the main things that the doctrine of Original

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85 This is not strictly true, if one takes the biblical accounts of Enoch and Elijah, for example, to be true.
Grace has going for it is the simplicity and clarity with which it takes the symmetry between Adam and Christ. It more or less says, “Christ undoes Adam’s work completely.” The difficulty is that this account of physical death seems to contradict this simplicity and clarity. It may be stated thus: “If physical death is counteracted, then why do infants die? It seems that if Christ’s redemption takes every penalty away, then why must the innocent still suffer this penalty? Saying, ‘well, it just has not happened yet,’ seems to be an attempt to escape the problem.” One of the strengths of the Original Grace position is its simplicity. It argues that whatever Adam brought, Christ counteracted. In this case, we see a “chink in the armor,” so to speak. This issue is not one that fundamentally harms the position, but it certainly raises doubts. Why, if all consequences of Adamic sin are dispensed with, must we wait on this one? If Original Grace counteracted physical death, one may expect that it would be done as with the other kinds of death. We would expect an immediate suspension of physical death. This scenario may seem odd from the perspective of a humanity that assumes all will experience physical death, but under Original Grace it would appear that no innocent people should ever physically die if and when they sin themselves. We will discuss more serious issues subsequently, but we start our analysis by identifying this apparent inconsistency that makes the doctrine less convincing.

There are several possible alternative answers to Original Grace, three of which seem relevant here: (1) physical death does not come from Adamic sin at all; (2) physical death is not counteracted by Original Grace because it has no “sting” (1 Cor. 15:55; cf. Hosea 13:14) for the redeemed person, whether child or adult, and can therefore have, qualitatively, the same level of significant effect by taking away the dreadful element from death; or (3) physical death is part of the cosmic fall, which has yet to be redeemed (Rom. 8) and would perhaps fall outside of the scope of Original
Starting from Scripture as the authority in this matter, Romans 5:12-21 specifically seems to indicate that physical death is caused by Adamic sin, namely as indicated by Rom. 5:14: “Nevertheless, death reigned from the time of Adam to the time of Moses, even over those who did not sin by breaking a command, as did Adam, who was a pattern of the one to come.” If this passage indeed indicates that physical death is the result of Adam’s sin, then the last two options are possible. It must be said that Romans 5 does not address this topic specifically, but some explanation is needed. Even Cottrell, the most thorough theologian on this topic, does not identify, and therefore does not provide a response to, this problem. As such, we will explore the implications further here.

As we have said, physical death is not the most serious of the possible effects of Adamic sin. Certainly physical death is terrible in its own right, especially when it involves one who is innocent. However, with eternal and spiritual death removed by Original Grace, physical death is, at most, a temporary punishment and, at best, a mere passage to eternal life for the redeemed innocent. 1 Corinthians 15 provides a glorious description of the resurrection that comes as a result of Christ’s redemptive work and the hope that makes physical death seems rather insignificant. Original Grace places the innocent into this category of people that will experience the resurrection and transformation into indestructible, immortal bodies. If we assume that Original Grace’s attempt to posit that physical death is dispensed with by the same mechanism that dispenses with spiritual and eternal death, but only in a delayed fashion, and we therefore raise doubts about this claim, then two problems arise if indeed physical death is not dealt with by Original Grace: (1) there is no other mechanism, save Christ’s

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86 This is a category of the wider consequences of sin that is not directly addressed by Original Grace. We will treat this topic in a later section.
87 Any other approach would be beyond the purpose and scope of this project.
88 It is not within the scope of this project to flesh out all possible interpretations of this passage. That Romans 5:14 teaches physical death to be a consequence of Adamic sin, in whatever way that happens, is the majority opinion in at least evangelical theology, if not beyond. The theological context of this project leads me to limit the discussion to this exegetical assumption.
redemptive act as applied in Original Grace, which we have just removed from the range of possibilities for the sake of discussion, to provide resurrection to the innocent, and therefore it could be argued that the innocent would not be included in the group described in 1 Cor. 15, and (2) the Adam-Christ comparison in Romans 5:12-21 would not be consistent—Adam would bring physical death, but Christ would not counteract it. So, this option, that Original Grace removes only eternal and spiritual death, and not physical, creates more problems than it solves. It is true that death has no “sting” for the innocent that are under Original Grace, but this can only be true within the scenario proposed by Original Grace, if they have been redeemed and promised resurrection, because whatever Adam brought upon mankind is counteracted by Christ’s redemption. So, this second option relies on several assumptions, as well.

We now turn to the third option, namely that physical death is part of the overall cosmic fall, yet to be counteracted, and is therefore outside of the effective purview of Original Grace. Romans 8 describes creation as being subjected to decay and desiring the transformation of itself and of humanity: “For the creation was subjected to frustration, not by its own choice, but by the will of the one who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself will be liberated from its bondage to decay and brought into the glorious freedom of the children of God.” (Rom. 8:20-21) The passage makes clear that there is a delay in the realization of freedom from decay. So it is, also, for humans:

22We know that the whole creation has been groaning as in the pains of childbirth right up to the present time. 23Not only so, but we ourselves, who have the firstfruits of the Spirit, groan inwardly as we wait eagerly for our adoption as sons, the redemption of our bodies. 24For in this hope we were saved. But hope that is seen is no hope at all. Who hopes for what he already has? 25But if we hope for what we do not yet have, we wait for it patiently.

Paul is talking to the redeemed, those that have a hope in the future redemption of their bodies. The hope described is not something realized, for it would not be hope if it were. Instead, it is something that believers need to patiently wait for, as does the creation.
So, creation, including humanity, is subjected to decay. This is the cosmic curse brought about by Adam’s sin. How do the innocent relate to this? Romans 8 makes clear that creation, and humanity must wait for resurrection and restoration. Those in Paul’s audience need not have fear of death—physical, spiritual, or eternal. However, all are still subject to physical death. Under Original Grace, innocents are redeemed from Adam’s sin, just as adults once were. Adults now need to be redeemed from their personal sin by accepting the Gospel. Creation committed no sin, much like infants, yet is still subject to decay. Yet, all will be redeemed. Is it inconsistent for infants to be redeemed immediately from spiritual and eternal death, and yet there be a delay in their redemption from physical death? Perhaps not. Their destiny is the same as the creation and adult Christians—they must wait patiently for the restoration of all things when there will be no more decay, nor death of any kind. Of course, this raises the same question as the physical death of the innocent. Both creation and humanity are subject to decay, and Original Grace only claims to counteract one, but in a delayed manner. So, if Original Grace does not counteract the cosmic curse, does it really deal with every problem brought on by Adam’s sin? None of the proponents of the doctrine claim that it counteracts the sinful effects on the cosmos. This does not pose a logical problem, but it does raise questions about the effectiveness of Christ’s redemptive work. If it can take away guilt and depravity before they ever take effect on humanity, why not physical death and the cosmic curse? We can really only conjecture about the relationship between Original Grace and the restoration of the fallen cosmos. We must turn our discussion back to the core theological claim of Original grace—freedom.

Original Grace only concerns itself with the freedom of the individual. As we will discuss more fully in the subsequent sections, innocent humans are both free from the negative effects of Adam’s sin and free to choose in regard to sin and salvation.
Thus, humanity is free and responsible, but it is a different discussion altogether how the cosmos is restored.

Perhaps Original Grace is not destroyed by these concerns, but what if Original Grace is not necessary to deal with the physical death of infants? Instead, it is possibly the case, as suggested above, that infants would be resurrected to eternal life precisely because they have not sinned, perhaps parallel to the way in which the creation is renewed. To this possible scenario we now turn.

3.1.2.2 THE COSMIC FALL, NATURAL EVIL, AND RESTORATION

We began to scratch the surface in the previous section about the possible relationship between Original Grace and the cosmic fall and restoration. We will give it specific attention in this section. The cosmic fall, as described in Romans 8, is the result of Adam’s sin and God’s curse\(^9\), applied to the creation, including humanity.\(^{90}\) In Romans 5, we see the specific consequences for humanity, namely physical, spiritual, and eternal death. There are consequences for the creation, also. The consequences of Adam’s sin were, therefore, applied to two entities that had no volitional part in the sinful act: creation and humanity. We have seen how humanity is redeemed from Adamic sin, according to the doctrine of Original Grace, but how does this movement of Original Grace relate to the work by which God restores the whole of creation? What mechanism causes the restoration of creation, including perhaps also the end of natural evil?

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\(^{9}\) For purposes of the present discussion, it is not necessary to flesh out the exact nature of the cosmic fall and its mechanisms. Suffice it to say that it appears, biblically speaking, to somehow come through the fall of humanity. We can proceed with our discussion on its relationship with Original Grace without the cosmic fall on these terms.

\(^{90}\) See the following article for a discussion of Romans 8:19-23 as it relates to the redemption of the cosmos with ecological and ethical concerns primarily in mind: Cherryl Hunt, David G. Horrell, and Christopher Southgate, ‘An Environmental Mantra? Ecological Interest in Romans 8:19–23 and a Modest Proposal for its Narrative Interpretation’, Journal of Theological Studies, 59th ser., 2 (2008), 546-579.
In Romans 8, we see a glimpse of the kind of trouble that can be experienced by humanity both because of the cursed creation and of moral evil, especially in the context of Christian persecution:

35 Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall trouble or hardship or persecution or famine or nakedness or danger or sword? 36 As it is written: "For your sake we face death all day long; we are considered as sheep to be slaughtered." 37 No, in all these things we are more than conquerors through him who loved us. 38 For I am convinced that neither death nor life, neither angels nor demons, neither the present nor the future, nor any powers, 39 neither height nor depth, nor anything else in all creation, will be able to separate us from the love of God that is in Christ Jesus our Lord.

Not only can things like famine occur in the cursed creation, but the creation also allows for severe types of moral evil. However, we see that those who are redeemed have nothing, ultimately, to fear from these things because they are bound to the love of Christ Jesus. Eventually, the creation will be restored from its state of decay (8:21), and all evil, natural and moral alike, will be annihilated. In Revelation 21:1-7, John gives us a picture of this future reality:

1 Then I saw a new heaven and a new earth, for the first heaven and the first earth had passed away, and there was no longer any sea. 2 I saw the Holy City, the new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God, prepared as a bride beautifully dressed for her husband. 3 And I heard a loud voice from the throne saying, "Now the dwelling of God is with men, and he will live with them. They will be his people, and God himself will be with them and be their God. 4 He will wipe every tear from their eyes. There will be no more death or mourning or crying or pain, for the old order of things has passed away." 5 He who was seated on the throne said, "I am making everything new!" Then he said, "Write this down, for these words are trustworthy and true." 6 He said to me: "It is done. I am the Alpha and the Omega, the Beginning and the End. To him who is thirsty I will give to drink without cost from the spring of the water of life. 7 He who overcomes will inherit all this, and I will be his God and he will be my son.

The absence of the "old order of things" that have "passed away" will allow for there to be no more pain, conceivable from moral or natural evil. So, there will be no more natural disasters, nor murder, for example. Instead, God will create a new reality, based upon the redemptive act of Christ.

Although there is not direct biblical linkage between the Original Grace taught in Romans 5 and the restoration of creation taught in Romans 8 and Revelation 21,
similarities exist. Romans 5:12-21 is focused on the sufficient salvific value of Christ’s redemption, both from Adamic and personal sin. It does not specifically mention the restoration of creation. However, just three chapters later, Paul describes the state of creation and its relationship to Christ and Christians. Ultimately, creation and the bride of Christ (21:1-2), and not the wicked (Rev. 21:8), will be redeemed. All are saved by the redemptive act of Christ, but each is saved differently. Both the creation and the innocent are redeemed from the consequences of sin they did not, or could not, choose to commit. Adults are saved by the acceptance of grace through response to the Gospel. So, is it proper to equate Original Grace as applied to the innocent in Romans 5:12-21, and the redemption that will restore creation? Maybe. The answer is yes, in the sense that Christ’s redemption applies to the innocent in much the same way as creation. For, as we have previously discussed, it is applied without the consent of either, and part of the curse brought upon both is delayed until the end of all things—physical death for the innocent and decay for creation. The answer is no, in the sense that Paul is describing two quite different situations. The consequences of Adam’s sin, if we take original sin to be true for the sake of argument, are common for both the innocent and creation, but it perhaps brings more dire consequences upon the innocent, namely also spiritual and eternal death. For creation, it does bring natural evil and decay. However, the creation is not, and could not, be subjected to eternal death in the sense of eternal torment in hell. Thus, the grace that flows from Christ upon creation and the innocent equally cancels all consequences for both.

Original Grace may only certainly be applied to the innocent. Whether the term “Original Grace” may be used to describe the restoration of the cosmos is a different matter. This could be done, but the definition of the term would need to be broadened. However, for the sake of clarity, it is probably best not to exaggerate the links between similar concepts. In the final analysis, the source of both types of redemption is the
same, and the method of application of that redemption is similar, but not exact. Also, Romans 5:12-21, Romans 8, and Rev. 21:1-7, together give a broad picture of the effects of Christ’s redemption. It is best to say, then, that the restoration that comes from Original Grace and the restoration creation appear to have a similar origin and parallel effects. As suggested in the previous section, if the same, or similar, mechanism causes the restoration of creation and the resurrection of the innocent, then perhaps we do not need a full-blown concept of Original Grace to explain and counteract the effects of Adam’s sin. To make this work, we would need to reduce the effects of Adam’s sin to only physical death and perhaps depravity for the innocent, and decay for creation. If we include guilt, we must either accept that the innocent can go to hell for Adam’s sin, or that something like Original Grace is needed to counteract it. So, if we assume that Adam’s sin does not cause guilt, then we can perhaps explain the restoration of all of creation and the innocent as being the result of Christ’s redemptive act as it transforms creation. Original Grace sets out one of two movements of God in response to the Fall, namely the irresistible grace applied to humanity to make them free, responsible adults. In order to make account of the biblical data, we must also recognize the movement of God in terms of the restoration of the cosmos, for which Original Grace does not account. Each movement of grace is distinct both in terms of dynamics and timescales. The overall movement of grace is leading to the restoration of all things. The movement of original grace frees innocent humanity to responsibly choose their eternal destiny. It appears that, within the overall framework of Original Grace, the application of that grace is a necessary condition for the wider movement of grace to proceed, and is, therefore, part of the overall picture of grace painted by this doctrine. We now turn to a discussion of Original Grace and the freedom it supplies in regard to guilt and condemnation.

3.1.2.3 FREEDOM FROM ETERNAL DEATH
The present section describes a freedom *from punishment* which is in fact a freedom from punishment for crimes for which one was not truly responsible. We have been discussing freedom in the sense of freedom of *human will* which makes them truly responsible for their sins. The complex thing here is that this insistence that human beings only be held responsible for the crimes they have themselves freely committed is only secured because of the work of Original Grace. It is insisted upon within a system that has still to be able to make sense of the idea that God *could* justly have punished all human beings for Adam’s sin. It is almost as if there are two metaphysics at work: one which can work with ideas of federal headship and imputation, where federal headship links Adam to all of humanity, and where the consequences of his sin are imputed to all of humanity without consent. The other metaphysic focuses on the free responsibility of the individual. These two metaphysical approaches are not logically contradictory. Perhaps it is best to identify the situation as paradoxical. This observation does not ultimately defeat Original Grace as a viable doctrine, at least not by itself, but it should certainly give us pause. To be clear, in principle, Original Grace allows the possibility of sin being imputed upon innocent humanity, presumably by God, or at least allowed by God, yet fully rejects this by insisting that God graciously counteracted the impending imputation preemptively. This is, at least, a confusing point, and a striking inconsistency.

In the larger theological discussion, as presented in the previous sections, freedom is the central theological claim of Original Grace. Practically speaking, freedom from guilt gained from Adam’s sin is likely the most important claim of Original Grace to humans.\(^91\) It is certainly the point which has most at stake, because eternity in hell is the most severe possible consequence. In short, through Original

\(^91\) This chapter seeks to claim that the central theological contribution of Original Grace is in regard to freedom from depravity and freedom to accept the Gospel. To be clear, my distinction about the practical importance of freedom from guilt and condemnation should not be confused with this point. I only mean to say that freedom from eternity in hell is of extreme practical importance to the individual.
Grace, babies do not go to hell. It is possible to believe that Adam’s sin simply does not, and cannot, bring about guilt. However, most of the proponents of Original Grace, to greater or lesser degrees, take original sin, as taught by Paul in Romans 5:12-21, very seriously. Some of the proponents surveyed, specifically those whose ideas are characteristic of a robust belief in Original Grace, believe that had Christ not provided redemption for all people of all times from the effects of Adam’s sin, then certainly some version of original sin would have been the case, perhaps including condemnation to an eternal death in hell. Of course, this freedom from guilt and condemnation to hell is normally short-lived, as the person who sins themselves incurs guilt for their own sin. So, the doctrine of Original Grace assumes that condemnation to hell was a just consequence of Adam’s sin, therefore posing a legitimate threat to humanity, but that God provided a graceful means for its preemptive counteraction.

We now seek to make the implications of this movement of grace even clearer. Eternal death may be earned through both Adamic and personal sin. Original Grace only claims to counteract the former. For infants, insofar as they are considered innocent of personal sin, this redemption from Adamic sin is paramount. For, if condemnation is truly a consequence of Adamic sin, then a very severe possibility exists: infants justly experience condemnation and eternal death in hell. Original Grace, then, justifies the innocent, apart from their choosing. This system is consistent in that the innocents (all people) that sin in Adam do so not of their free will, but are instead imputed (potentially) with guilt caused by the trespass of their representative, Adam. In the same way, the innocent are redeemed from this sin by the Second Adam, namely Christ Jesus, as their representative. All of this is done for those that cannot choose either to sin or to accept grace. Thus, God, in His grace and love, has provided strength for the helpless.

92 This is most apparent in the work of Cottrell.
This position, in one sense, agrees with a more Augustinian approach, and in another, it is antithetical to it. It agrees in the sense that Adam’s sinful consequences on humanity are to be understood as extremely dire. They are not to be taken lightly or dismissed. Adam’s sin had the power to bring physical, spiritual, and ultimately, eternal death to all people, even the innocent. The Reformed perspective, following in Augustine’s footsteps in this regard, would say this about the consequences of original sin: “Original sin is not only the absence of original righteousness, but both the depravity and corruption of human nature diffused through every part of the soul and communicated by Adam to his posterity and the state of liability by which also the very babes at birth are on account of Adam’s fall liable to the wrath of God and to eternal death, until remission is made.”93 As we have said, both the proponents of original sin, here represented by Reformed theologians, and proponents of Original Grace make the same basic assumptions concerning the imputation guilt from Adam’s sin. Braun describes the process of and reasons for the imputation of Adam’s sin:

Original sin is either imputed or inherent. Imputed sin is Adam’s actual lapse according as all men are regarded as having sinned in Adam, and so are held worthy of the same punishment into which Adam hurled himself; (1) because Adam was the head of the whole human race and first party to the covenant; (2) because all men were in the same covenant along with Adam, therefore they broke the covenant along with him; (3) all would have participated in the benefits, if Adam had stood out Gen. 1.26-28 . . . (4) all to this day participate in the blessing, increase and be multiplied; (5) All are under the same threat; and so (6) under the effects of sin, under the curse and the same evils, pain, sweat, toil and death . . .(7) our soul is produced devoid of original holiness; which cannot be, unless as punishment for Adam’s sin; (8) in cited words we say that all have sinned in Adam Rom. 5.12, that in Adam all die, that in Christ all may be made alive I Cor. 15.22.94

None of the proponents of Original Grace go into this much detail about the imputation of guilt, likely because they ultimately believe it to be counteracted, as we have see in the accounts of their thoughts on the subject. The theologians that assume original guilt

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93 Gulielmus Bucanus, Institutiones theologicae seu Locorum Communium Christianae Religionis ex Dei Verbo et praeestantissimorum theologorum orthodoxo consensu expositorum Analysis (Geneva, 1609) XVI: 34.
94 Johannes Braunius, Doctrina Foederum sive Systema Theologiae didacticae et elencitcae, (Amstedam,1688) I,iii, 3, 16.
to be a part of original sin begin with similar assumptions, namely that imputed guilt is something that needs to be dealt with. Informed by Romans 5:12-21, they take Christ’s death on the cross to be the remedy for the situation, thus removing guilt for those only under the sentence of Adam’s sin. As with justification, on the grace side of things the imputation of Adam’s guilt is an objective act performed by God. Practically speaking, there is not a way to empirically test whether someone is under guilt or justification, as it is normally understood as determined by God, and to be believed because of a promise, at least in the case of justification. Original Grace, however, still applies its underlying principle of human freedom to this situation, in that all of humanity is found “not guilty” of Adam’s sin because of the gracious work of Christ. So, even if the freedom realized is more objective than subjective and noticeable, as in contrast with our discussion of the removal of spiritual death (depravity), it is still a dramatic call to freedom. It is a freedom from eternal punishment in hell for the entire category of the innocent. Frankly, babies do not go to hell. The removal of guilt perhaps does not, by itself, have any part in preventing humans from sinning themselves, thus becoming condemned anyway. But, this is not the aim of Original Grace. It does get to the point of removing depravity, but its primary intention in this regard is to protect the core value that only those actually conscious, and thus responsible, for their sin should be punished for it. Viewed the other way, the value is that those who cannot understand law, morality, or the punishment for law, should not be responsible for breaking the law, becoming sinners and suffering the penalties. In modern day terms, it is the same moral sensibility that causes judicial systems not to bring criminal charges against a child aged two, for example, that sets a house fire which harms other humans. Thus, the kind of concept of freedom we see at the heart of Original Grace is one that seeks to make humanity free of any penalty that they should not be considered actually, not vicariously, responsible for, and under penalty for any act for which they are truly
responsible. So, even if Adam’s sin would have caused every innocent person to go to hell, Christ made a way to free them from those consequences, thus leaving children, whenever they become accountable, to make their own choice about their eternal destiny.

As we just mentioned, many of the proponents of Original Grace do not articulate very clearly their view of imputation. In the most recent version, that of Cottrell, which we discussed in Chapter 2, humanity is the potential recipient of guilt, as well as depravity and physical death, because of Adam’s federal headship. It will be fruitful to briefly explore the implications of this approach to union with Adam and that of seminal headship, and its meaning for the concept of imputation. Federal headship views the union of humanity with Adam as a kind of legal standing largely determined within the mind of God. Seminal headship usually focuses on the physical and spiritual solidarity between Adam and his posterity. Under federal headship, imputation is more clearly a legal determination of guilt by God upon humanity because of their legal standing in union with Adam, whereas seminal headship more clearly allows for the view that guilt is an inheritance, although this view would not categorically exclude legal imputation guilt by God. In other words, seminal headship claims a real link between the spiritual and physical realities of Adam and the rest of humanity, but not to the point of negating objective legal action by God in the way of imputation of guilt. These general comments concerning these views are not meant to account for all of the theological work done on them, but to give us a foundation from which to discuss what is at stake for Original Grace in regard to the imputation of both guilt and justification. Since part of Original Grace’s claim is that all innocent people are justified and objectively treated as if they were righteous, it is necessary to understand guilt to be imputed as part of Adam’s heritage. In other words, Original Grace’s view of justification as an objective, legal declaration of righteousness and salvation seems to
necessitate that original guilt be an objective, legal declaration of unrighteousness and condemnation, which is perhaps more easily seen to flow from federal headship. If this antithetical relationship is not the case, significant doubt would be cast upon the necessity of Original Grace’s purpose and effectiveness in regard to guilt, for Original Grace does not supply a way for physical/spiritual transmissions from the loins of Adam, in the case of seminal headship, to be remedied.

Another important question is how imputation relates to the sinner’s union with Adam, or the believers union with Christ. Is imputation the primary fact undergirding the doctrine of Original Grace, where the concept of being united to either Adam or Christ is simply the name for the relation that imputation creates, or does imputation itself depend upon a prior union between the believer and Christ or the sinner and Adam? We will discuss the concept of “union with Christ” in a later section, but suffice it to say that the primary consideration in the context of the Original Grace discussion is not the full content of “in Adam” or “in Christ.” As we will see later, there are many complex considerations in this regard that raise serious questions about the entire scheme of salvation assumed in the formulation of Original Grace. Proponents of Original Grace certainly do not make clear whether imputation of sin or righteousness is imputed primarily because of prior union with Adam or Christ, or whether imputation is the cause of the relationship. We can see that imputation is more obviously in view than the concept of union. The question here is not what proponents have said, but what is actually needed to make Original Grace work. It would seem that imputation is all that Original Grace has to have in order to function as a doctrine and a reality. It does not matter whether imputation causes union with Adam or Christ, or whether those prior unions bring about imputation. There simply needs to be an imputation of sin, then an imputation of righteousness, in order to bring about the state of Original Grace. This perhaps describes a rather minimalist picture of this portion of the salvation process, and
perhaps misses the rich biblical picture of salvation, in general, and the concept of “union with Christ,” specifically. But, in regard to only the removal of guilt leading to eternal death, this is as far as Original Grace has to go.

Proponents of Original Grace do not directly or fully address the relationship between that state of grace and the concept of “union with Christ.” As we just stated, it is not pragmatically important, as far as the removal of eternal death. In the final analysis, Original Grace removes that consequence from the salvific picture for those that are innocent. Does being in the state of Original Grace equate with the concept of “union with Christ?” Is it the same, or even a similar, state as being united in Christ for the adult Christian? At the very least, Original Grace creates a neutral state where the innocent person is neither condemned nor enslaved by Adamic sin. The innocent is justified by Christ’s righteousness, and it is imputed to him, but only in regard to Adam’s sin. No imputation of righteousness occurs that makes the innocent person actually righteous in his own right. Instead, the innocent person exists before the age of accountability, and can therefore not be considered a sinner.\textsuperscript{95} Christ does the work associated with Original Grace, and the innocent experiences a state of grace. Despite the lack of direct information from proponents of Original Grace, it appears that the state of Original Grace and the state of grace a Christian experiences have parallels, but are not exactly the same in every aspect. In the next section we will explore the most important contribution of Original Grace to Christian theology, namely its relationship to, and effect on, spiritual death, and what that means for the state of freedom experienced by the innocent.

3.1.2.4 FREEDOM FROM SPIRITUAL DEATH

The doctrine of Original Grace asserts that, by grace, human beings are enabled to start life innocent and undistorted, without a nature that, thanks to Adam, inclines

\textsuperscript{95} We will discuss the age of accountability and its relationship to Original Grace in a subsequent section.
them already to sin. Two points are important caveats to this position: (1) the innocent still start life in a context shaped by the actual sins of others, and so amidst influences that make their avoidance of actual sin practically impossible and, (2) they can become depraved (distorted in their own nature) as a result of their own actual sinning. As with the freedom provided from the other consequences of Adamic sin, what is fascinating about Original Grace is that it allows for all of those effects to be potentially true, but then counteracts them. As we saw in Ch. 2, this is done by making many of the same assumptions as proponents of original sin make, then making other exegetical assumptions that allow for original sin’s removal, largely from the text of Romans 5:12-21. However unique this approach may be, what is practically interesting and significant is that the removal of depravity allows for the innocent human to approach life and the possibility of sin much like the First Parents, Adam and Eve. As we will explore in the next section, this is not strictly true, because of the pervasive influence of sin in the world that was not present for the Parents. In essence, the innocent child escapes any harmful effects of depravity, however it is defined, whether it includes some vague proneness to sin, or whether his nature is actually marred by sin.

In order to understand Original Grace’s position on this matter, we turn to examples of Lutheran doctrine that show how freedom, sin in general, and original sin interrelate. We see that man starts out in a state of Original Righteousness, only experienced by Adam and Eve. In this state, they were immortal, intellectually and morally sound, and not at all affected by sin. Adam and Eve expressed the image of God this way: “This wisdom, righteousness, and holiness of the first pair so express the idea of the divine image, that it is then only from which man, speaking in the abstract,
can be called the image of God.”97 John Andrew Quenstedt describes the nature of the image of God in the state of Original Righteousness, but explains that sin was not outside of possibility for our First Parents:

The perfection of the will of the first man, therefore, consisted (1) in a natural inclination to that which is good, which altogether excluded every proximate power of erring; (2) in a free and unhindered volition of good, and the execution of that volition, and thus there was in him a holy freedom of the will, and a free holiness which excluded all sin. But his will was so free that it inclined only to good, and was not prone to the choice of evil or the neglect of good; whatever occurred afterwards, happened through an unfortunate abuse of the freedom of the will. But holiness in the first man did not introdue absolute impeccability, but only a relative freedom from sin in his will.98

The First Parents began with “unhindered volition of good.” This actually has two elements that are important distinctions for Original Grace. They were free of both depravity (internal hindrance) and sinful influence (external hindrance), as there was no sin in the world. Original Grace claims that the innocent are freed from internal hindrance, while still remaining under external hindrance. It is upon this delineation that the discussion of spiritual death proceeds for the doctrine of Original Grace. We also see that when Adam (and Eve) sin, humanity enters a state of corruption: “The State of Corruption is that condition into which man voluntarily precipitated himself by his own departure from the chief good, thus becoming both wicked and miserable.”99

The sin of the first parents not only subjects them to the corruption of their natures, but also all of their posterity. The flow of thinking on the topic works like this:

. . . the first sin, in its results, affects not only the first pair, but also all their posterity. Since, therefore, the first human pair became exposed to divine wrath by reason of sin, so also are all mankind descended from them, in a similar state; and that, too, for two reasons; first, because the state of depravity, which they have derived from their-first parents, renders its subjects the objects of God's wrath; secondly, because all the descendants of Adam are represented and

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99 Ibid., Quenstedt II: 48; p. 252
contained in him, as the representative of the human family, therefore, that which was done by Adam, can be regarded as the act of all, the consequences of which also must be borne by all, so that Adam's sin also is imputed to his posterity, i.e., it is regarded as their own sin, because they are all represented in Adam. The state of depravity which followed Adam's transgression, and which now belongs to the first pair, as well as to all their posterity, is designated by the expression original sin. Original sin is a thorough corruption of human nature, which, by the fall of our first parents, is deprived of original righteousness, and is prone to every evil. According to its single parts, it is described, (1) as a want of original righteousness, which ought to exist in man; (2) as carnal concupiscence, or inclination to evil. In the place of original holiness and purity, there came directly the opposite, a state thoroughly sinful and desirous of that which is evil, which in itself is sin, so that, in consequence of this constant propensity to evil, and not originally on account of actual transgressions proceeding from it, man is an object of the divine displeasure. This depraved state, then, is the foundation and fountain of all actual transgressions, and has, as its consequence, the wrath of God and temporal and eternal punishment.

The last statement makes clear that depravity is the “foundation and fountain of all transgressions.” This is also called “spiritual death” and is described more thoroughly in this way: “Spiritual death, the root of all evil, is the immediate consequence of the first sin. For, as soon as man turned his heart away from the divine law, he deprived himself of spiritual union with God, who is the life of the soul, and thus, having been deserted by God, he died spiritually. This spiritual death brought with it the loss of the divine image, the entire corruption of the whole human nature, and the loss of free will in spiritual things.”

Spiritual death is as severe as the term sounds. It is not just the loss of the imago dei, but is also the near loss of the very knowledge of God himself. In these terms, we see how this kind of depravity should be understood as death, for it is a

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101 Ibid., p. 256
102 Ibid., 512-513; p. 259
loss of abilities, nature, and knowledge. One truly dies to who they were intended to be by God, and become a spiritually dead human being.

Original Grace claims to remove the depravity, but it does not, so far as any proponents have stated, reinstate totally union with God or Original Righteousness, as it is sometimes called, as experienced by Adam and Eve before the fall. In other words, Original Grace places the innocent under the grace of Christ and removes the effects of Adamic sin, but it produces a rather neutral scenario. Of course, Original Grace would claim that this fact means that the *imago dei* was never lost in the first place, and the nature of the human is left in its natural, righteous state. But, the innocent are not restored to the state of knowledge and intimacy with God, like Adam. Instead, they are only released from negative effects, such as depravity. This allows for the distinction between internal hindrance and external hindrance stated above. The innocent human is not prone, by nature, to sin, yet they are still subject to the practical inevitability to sin because of external sinful influences.

The whole of original sin leads humans to physical, spiritual, and eternal death. Only in Christ can one obtain remission from both original sin and their own sins:

“Original sin is a want of original righteousness, derived from the sin of Adam and propagated to all men who are begotten in the ordinary mode of generation, including the dreadful corruption and depravity of human nature and all its powers, excluding all from the grace of God and eternal life, and subjecting them to temporal and eternal punishments, unless they are born again of water and the Spirit, or obtain the remission of their sins through Christ.”

We see that humanity, infants and adults, are all condemned by Adamic sin, but also by their own sins. Both types of sin are equally inevitable, even though one leads to the inevitability of the other.

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104 Quenstedt, II:62; p. 264
However inevitable depravity makes sin, freedom of will still exists in Lutheran thought. Free will was intact before the Fall: “Free will in man before the fall was that faculty of the reason and will by virtue of which he was able to sin and not to sin.”\textsuperscript{105} After the fall, however, free will is intact, but not ultimately for spiritual choices. Instead, it is only by the power of the Holy Spirit that one can truly exercise free will: “The human will cannot, by its own powers, without the Holy Spirit, either begin interior and spiritual motions, or produce interior obedience of the heart, or persevere unto the end in the course commenced and perfect it. They are called spiritual actions because (Rom. 7:14) ‘the law is spiritual,’ that is, it is not satisfied by certain external civil actions which the unregenerate man can perform; but it demands such motions and actions as (1) cannot be performed except by the agency of the Holy Spirit; (2) which unrenewed nature not only cannot perform, but even hinders the Holy Spirit in performing.”\textsuperscript{106} [emphasis original] We will discuss the concepts of freedom and grace in a later section, but for now we turn to an even more pointed explanation of free will: “There exists in man, therefore, freedom of will, along with the servitude of sin, for he both sins and is unable to refrain from sinning, whilst he nevertheless sins freely and delights to sin; although he is not moved except to evil, yet he chooses it freely, i.e., willingly and spontaneously, not unwillingly or under coercion, and is moved to it with all his energy. Add to this that in the very choice of evils he exercises a certain liberty.”\textsuperscript{107} Put another way, “. . . this propensity of our will is properly described as both enslaved and free. Enslaved, with respect to the lost image of God. For, since by the fall the faculty of choosing the good and avoiding the evil was taken away, there was afterwards left a will which is so held captive under the tyranny of sin that it is not moved, except to the choosing of evil and avoiding the good. . . . But, though the will be


\textsuperscript{106} Chemnitz, 190; p. 283

\textsuperscript{107} Gerhard, V:99; p. 285
such a slave, yet it nevertheless is very properly called free, if we only have regard to
the proper seat of sin, which is in the will of man.”\textsuperscript{108} If we can be plain, it seems that
freedom of the will, while in a depraved state, is a very limited sort of freedom. It is
certainly not the same freedom of the will found in the regenerate believer, who has had
their depraved nature removed.

What does this stark contrast reveal about the distinctive contribution of Original
Grace to Christian theology? Similar to the way that it deals with eternal death, it
recognizes the seriousness of sin, namely Adam’s sin in this case, the seriousness of the
fall, in that humanity lost its place of fellowship with God, and it also takes seriously the
words of Paul that, in their reading, suggests that sin is inevitable because of Adam.
They settle on the fact that spiritual death and depravity are only potential, and that
sinful influence is sufficient to explain the inevitability of sin. They also have a
developed opinion of depravity that is just as severe as depravity supposedly imparted
through original sin. But, that depravity is limited to the adult sinners who have made
themselves depraved and sin-sick by actually sinning. Whereas many in the original sin
camp would see depravity present from birth because of Adam, then increased depravity
being added to the human when he sins himself, those in the Original Grace camp only
hold to a depravity brought on by one’s own sins. Both positions agree, then, that the
person who actually sins becomes depraved. The disagreement is over whether
depravity is present in innocent humans due to inherited sin.

Freedom is the key element in regard to depravity and Original Grace. As with
the other consequences, spiritual death is removed because of the gracious work of
Christ. Unlike eternal and physical death, which do not in themselves lead to sin, the
removal of spiritual death reveals the underlying principle of human freedom and
responsibility by allowing the human to choose sin or righteousness freely. The

\textsuperscript{108} Leonard Hutterus, \textit{Compendium Theologie}, (1610), 272; reproduced in Heinrich Schmid, \textit{The
Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church}, trans. by Charles A. Hay and Henry E. Jacobs
(Philadelphia: Lutheran Publication Society, 1876), p. 285
removal of eternal death certainly frees the human from guilt and the sentence to eternal
punishment, but this does not help the person to be free in terms of moral action. The
same is true of physical death. Hope of resurrection for an innocent person, even if they
could understand the concept, does not necessarily affect the way they approach moral
choices. Spiritual death, whether total or partial depravity, at the very least makes the
human prone to sin (partial depravity), and at the very most makes sin inevitable (total
depravity), and in fact, basically continues the already existent sinful state of the person.
In the final analysis, all actually sin. By removing depravity, Original Grace is saying
several things about freedom and sin: (1) Christ, in his grace, did not want anyone to
actually suffer under any kind of depravity, so he made a way for it to be removed that
is applied to all humans before it could ever take effect, (2) although sin is practically
inevitable, it is not because we are determined to sin by our sin-marred nature, and thus
humans are not set up to fail, and (3) the removal of depravity allows humanity to be
significantly free, thus satisfying values concerning free will, responsibility, and the
moral treatment of the innocent by God.109 In the final analysis, the proponent of
Original Grace is saying, of spiritual death, “Yes, spiritual death was probably a
consequence of Adam’s sin, and perhaps even rightfully so, but God, by His grace,
through the work of Christ, restored innocent humanity to an Eden-like state where they
can approach the choice between sin and righteousness totally free of handicap that
would have made the situation unfair. Though Christ removed depravity, sin is
everywhere. Like Adam, who began in an even better state than the undepraved
innocent, we will eventually misuse our freedom to sin, thus becoming dead, depraved,
and guilty because of our own sin.” Now that we have discussed the way that Original
Grace frees humanity from the internal hindrance of depravity, we now turn to the

109 I must say, at this point, that I do not intend to enter a philosophical discussion on free will.
My intention is only to describe concerns with free will in a very general sense that forms the core
motivation for Original Grace. In other words, I do not intend to evaluate this view of free will, but only
to describe it, and its place in Original Grace.
external hindrance, namely sin and sinful influence present in the world, which leads invariably to every free adult choosing to sin himself, thus leaving the state of Original Grace, and moving into depravity and condemnation caused by that sin.

3.1.2.5 THE INFLUENCE OF HUMAN SIN AND MORAL EVIL

If the innocent are freed from spiritual death, or depravity, by Original Grace, then why do they choose to sin? A proponent of Original Grace would say that it is the presence and influence of moral evil, the personal sins of all of humanity, which will eventually lead the innocent under Original Grace, to sin. Original Grace, as stated above, removes internal hindrance toward righteousness, but it does not remove external hindrance, namely the immense amount of sinful influence present in the world. Once sin enters a person’s life, then they are spiritually and eternally dead. Spiritual death is relevant here. This means that sin breeds more sin, until the sinner is transformed by the Gospel. (James 1:14-15; Rom. 7:9) The best example of this position is explained by Cottrell: “Thus the Pelagians are right in teaching that a child is born into this world with a spiritual nature that is pure, free, and innocent . . . Even though no one is born condemned and depraved by original sin, in fact everyone who reaches the age of accountability commits personal sins; and these sins in themselves being condemnation and depravity upon the sinning individual.” Thus, depravity is something that one “acquires” when one engages in personal sin. This depravity and sinfulness grows in the individual, who was once good and freed from depravity that would have resulted from Adam’s sin, turning the person evil.

Is the influence of a sinful humanity, and therefore a sinful culture, a sufficient mechanism to explain why the innocent would choose to sin? Biblically speaking, the

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110 Cottrell ends up in the same place as the Pelagians on this point, but unlike them, he believes that the effects of Adam’s sin would have been severe were it not for the redemption of Christ. Also, Cottrell, unlike the Pelagians, would promote human depravity as the result of personal sin. Thus, depravity comes when one dies in their own sin, not the sin of Adam.
111 Cottrell, *Faith Once for All*, p. 191.
112 Ibid., p. 195.
113 Ibid., p. 197.
fact that sin is inevitable, practically, not logically, is quite clear (Romans 3:9-20, 23).

Perhaps the primary way to answer the question is through biblical evidence. However, Scripture does not say how we learn to sin from the first, or whether it is a result of depravity, or some other influence. Instead, Scripture begins with the inevitability of sin, then talks about how our fallen, depraved natures help lead us to more sin (Rom. 1:28; 7:5-25). The difficulty comes when we attempt to separate the concepts of inherited depravity and external sinful influence. We do not find such a distinction in the following texts, which we will examine briefly. In fact, this discussion raises complex questions that are beyond the scope and purpose of this project: (1) is it possible to make a coherent and meaningful distinction between internal influences toward sin (human nature) and external influence, and (2) if one denies inherited depravity in favor of sinful influence as the cause of the inevitability of sin, what then happens to other kinds of inheritance, such as genetic inheritance or some other physical inheritance? These questions would be important to tackle in a project focused on the nature of depravity, sin, and related issues. In this project, however, we seek to show that Original Grace needs to make this sharp distinction between internal and external sinful influences in order to account for the biblical evidence on the inevitability of sin.

We now turn to biblical passages that deal with these issues, not to draw conclusions on controversial issues, but to point out difficulties with the Original Grace position’s assumptions. There is perhaps one glimpse of the beginning of sin in the following controversial passage:

7 What shall we say, then? Is the law sin? Certainly not! Indeed I would not have known what sin was except through the law. For I would not have known what coveting really was if the law had not said, "Do not covet." 8 But sin, seizing the opportunity afforded by the commandment, produced in me every kind of covetous desire. For apart from law, sin is dead. 9 Once I was alive apart from law; but when the commandment came, sin sprang to life and I died. 10 I found that the very commandment that was intended to bring life actually brought death. 11 For sin, seizing the opportunity afforded by the commandment, deceived me, and through the commandment put me to death. 12 So then, the law is holy, and the commandment is holy, righteous and good. 13 Did that which is
good, then, become death to me? By no means! But in order that sin might be recognized as sin, it produced death in me through what was good, so that through the commandment sin might become utterly sinful. (Rom. 7:7-13)

Here, Paul seems to speak of his own life as an example of the struggle against sin. Paul personifies sin, saying that it seized “the opportunity afforded by the commandment,” and “produced . . . every kind of covetous desire.” One is meant to follow the law, and thus have life. But, once one has knowledge of the law, transgressing the law willingly is at least hard to resist, and perhaps inevitable. That knowledge also makes one responsible.

Paul says, however, before he broke the law, he was alive. He may, to be fair, have some sort of depravity in mind, but the text is not clear on this point. Instead, it does say that he was alive until “sin sprang to life.” It is certainly possible to see some type of tendency toward sin in the passage. However, it is not explicit from where that tendency comes. The explicit elements are knowledge of the law and the deception performed by sin. Paul explains that the law identifies sin for what it is, and is not to blame for the act of sin. What of the deception of sin? Is this even a partial depravity, a tendency toward sin? Or, may it be interpreted as the influence of evil and sin?
Certainly, this passage can be interpreted to describe spiritual death and depravity: “This concupiscence, denoting the propensity to evil which is implanted in the depraved nature, even as it remains in the regenerate, is truly sin, because the definition of sin suits it, and therefore Paul, Rom. 7, calls it sin fourteen times, not by metonymy, that it is only the punishment of the first sin, and the cause of subsequent actual transgression, as the Papists teach, but properly and formally, because it is truly sin, whence also the Apostle names it the law of sin warring against the law of the mind, an evil, a sinning sin.”\textsuperscript{114} We will not settle the debate here, but I do wish to raise the fact that one could take Paul’s words differently, and not find depravity to be the focus of the Apostle. I

\textsuperscript{114} Quenstedt, II:60; p. 267
offer my above comments as probing questions that could lead one to read the passage differently, and specifically in favor of the view that depravity is not necessarily what leads to sin. Perhaps the influences are from spiritual forces (Eph. 6:12). Perhaps it is the reality of human nature that a free moral agent, given the opportunity to sin, may, and eventually will, do so. It was certainly possible for Adam and Eve, who were not depraved before they sinned, yet had both succumbed to Satan’s deception and their moral freedom to lead them to sin and death. Anyone after Adam and Eve, including this present age, would have both elements (Satanic influence and moral freedom), in addition to the influence of pervasive evil and sin in the world around them. Practically, then, it would seem that anyone after Adam would have a greater challenge in keeping the law. Thus, we have the practical inevitability of sin.

The small amount of biblical evidence related to our question at least points to the possibility of the occurrence of personal sin without pre-existent depravity. The only practical example similar to a child under Original Grace would be our First Parents. Because they sinned in their pre-sin condition, it seems at least possible for children to do the same. When you add the pervasive existence of evil and sin in the world in which children are now born, the inevitability of sin becomes even more apparent. So, can the commission of personal sin by a child, not depraved, be explained? Yes, it is possible to explain sin without depravity, but neither the biblical nor the practical evidence briefly examined here should be considered conclusive at this point.115

As we have already discussed in the section concerning spiritual death and depravity, Original Grace is seeking to make the person free to choose sin or not. At the same time, proponents of the position, for biblical (Rom. 3:23) and practical reasons

115 Perhaps fields like anthropology, psychology, history, and sociology can shed some light on the factors leading to sin. These questions are beyond the scope of this project. Of course, conclusions of the social sciences in the area would likely not be conclusive either. For instance, a child would have to be raised without any adult interaction or influence to test whether they sin anyway, but such an experiment seems impossible, not to mention extremely immoral.
(human experience), see that sin is indeed pervasively engaged in by any and all people that can be shown to be responsible for sinful decisions. It is somewhat similar to the Pelagian view, in that one lacks any depravity that would inevitably lead to sin. It is distinct in that depravity does come upon one who sins himself, whereas Pelagianism, summarized in Chapter 2, would deny depravity on both sides. For the innocent person, however, it is a similar kind of freedom to do good or evil that Pelagius suggested.

Strangely, the Stone-Campbell theologian, Moses Lard, who is also a proponent of Original Grace, takes a Pelagian position on depravity: “I hence deny that Adam’s sin ever touched or in any way affected the spirit of one of his posterity . . . I am denying for want of proof . . . the spirit is as free from its influence as though the sin had never been committed.”116 The only explanations left are as we suggested above. One must explain the pervasiveness of sin through the medium of influence, either from the world or from dark powers. Are these sufficient to explain the situation? It seems to be an argument not easily settled, and will not be settled here. The point that we need to make is that the freedom demanded of Original Grace is a total freedom of the individual to choose sin, however strongly tempted, without an inherent propensity, however strong, toward it. Original Grace makes the distinction between internal and external influences, as described previously. The freedom offered is from a corrupt nature that inevitably leads to sin, but not a practical freedom from the inevitability of sin. In the case of the innocent who perhaps dies before committing personal sin, we have an example of a person that experiences the full benefits of this kind of freedom. In short, they are not prone to sin, internally, nor are they ever influenced to sin in the state of life at which they can be held responsible. An adult must choose to sin to become a sinner. They began with an uncorrupted nature, but through external influence they sinned.

It may be fair to say that this adult was “free” in that he was not doomed to sin
because of corrupt nature that led, irresistibly, to sin. This may answer questions about fairness and responsibility, but that adult still inevitably sins because of external influences. Freedom, according to Original Grace, and in the specific context of spiritual death and depravity, is a freedom of responsibility, not a total freedom from sin. In other words, the human is free to choose righteousness or sin with their nature intact, just as God created them, yet that same human is simply going to sin. Where Original Grace provides for freedom in regard to responsibility, it maintains a limit to that freedom in the fact that all adults eventually sin. In fact, we may even speculate that this deterministic view of external hindrance caused by the pervasiveness of sin in the world could perhaps fairly be called a very mild kind of spiritual death. In other words, whether proneness to sin (partial or total) comes from within or without, sinful influence still inevitably leads to death and condemnation resulting from one’s choice to sin because of that influence. Why does Original Grace not provide counteraction for that kind of inevitable sinful influence? There are at least two reasons for this: (1) Original Grace does not claim to deal with personal sin occurring in the world, but only inherited effects of Adam’s sin, i.e. internal effect, not external, and indirect effects, and (2) Original Grace does not infringe on the freedom of adult humans to choose to sin, and thus allows for personal sin to exist in the world. The pervasive existence of personal sin, in the Original Grace model, is dealt with by Christ’s redemptive work, but only through the spread and acceptance of the Gospel. So, what is the motivation of Original Grace to remove internal hindrance, and not external hindrance, when either one (or both) still leads to sin and condemnation for all adults? It would seem that the heart of the matter is freedom, namely freedom from propensity to sin that would be unfairly inherited without choice from Adam. In other words, if adult sin is inevitable, it is not determined in the full sense (logical necessity), but is so highly probable that all adult, in fact, choose to sin.
3.1.2.6 FREEDOM BY GRACE TO RECEIVE GRACE

The other side of the freedom discussion is very closely linked to our previous discussion about sin. It is grace. We will not rehearse the sin side of the conversation, although some overlap will naturally occur. Original Grace is grounded upon the redemptive work of Christ, and more specifically upon His death on the cross. The death of Christ, by grace, then frees the individual from physical death, spiritual death (depravity), and eternal death. By virtue of being freed from spiritual death, the person not only has the ability to choose whether to sin or not without any inherent propensity toward sin, but their nature, will, image, likeness, or whatever the case, is free of any inability to respond to the Gospel. To be clear, proponents of Original Grace normally believe that personal sin brings depravity, and they also normally believe that the person’s will, even in that depraved state, is sufficiently intact to respond to the Gospel, thus retaining at least a partial freedom of will. Here, though, we are focusing on the lack of depravity during the state of Original Grace.

In order to see just how unique Original Grace is, we will again contrast it with view from a quite opposite perspective. Lutheran theology claims that there is still freedom of the will. For example, John Gerhard states that, “These powers of man are best judged of from the rational soul by which he is distinguished from the brutes, and is constituted a distinct species. Two faculties belong to the rational soul, viz., mind and will; the former performs its office by knowing, discriminating, reflecting, judging; the latter by choosing and rejecting . . . freedom of the will . . . is a faculty of the mind and will, so that the determination belongs to the mind and the free belongs to the will.”\footnote{Gerhard, V:87; p. 279} [emphasis original] The human cannot, however, accomplish anything truly spiritual: The human will cannot, by its own powers, without the Holy Spirit, either begin interior and spiritual motions, or produce interior obedience of the heart, or persevere unto the
end in the course commenced and perfect it. They are called spiritual actions because (Rom. 7:14) 'the law is spiritual,' that is, it is not satisfied by certain external civil actions which the unregenerate man can perform; but it demands such motions and actions as (1) cannot be performed except by the agency of the Holy Spirit; (2) which unrenewed nature not only cannot perform, but even hinders the Holy Spirit in performing.”  

More specifically, man cannot receive grace by himself:  

We believe that man is entirely corrupt and dead to that which is good, so that there has not remained, neither can remain, in the nature of man since the fall, and before regeneration, even a scintillation of spiritual power, by which he could, of himself, prepare himself for the grace of God, or apprehend offered grace, or be capable (in and of himself) of [receiving”] that grace, or of applying or accommodating himself to grace, or by his own powers contributing anything, either in whole or in half, or in the smallest part, to his own conversion, or of acting, operating, or co-operating [in if] (as of himself, or of his own accord). [emphasis original]

In this system, the person begins life depraved due to Adam’s sin, participates through his own sin, thus remaining depraved, and thus unable to respond to the Gospel without the Holy Spirit’s direct intervention. Some proponents of Original Grace speculate that some kind of depravity, although usually partial, rather than total, could have been the case, but it was never made actual because of the preemptive action of Christ. Wesleyans generally hold to a depravity that is counteracted by prevenient grace. In Anabaptist and Stone-Campbell thought, however, this theme of freedom of the will, even in spiritual matters, carries through to the person under the influence of their own sin. We find, then, in the final analysis that Original Grace clears the way for a truly free humanity, only responsible for its own sin, and only subject to the consequences of those sins. Humanity is free of physical, spiritual, and eternal death, by grace, and freely allowed to choose faith for justification when they become sinners, without any intervention by God, excepting Original Grace itself.

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118 Chemnitz, 190; p. 283  
3.1.2.7 THE THEOLOGICAL PICTURE OF ORIGINAL GRACE

In order to make the distinctive and important contribution of Original Grace to the wider theological discussion abundantly clear, we will repeat some of what we said at the beginning of this major section. Original Grace supplies distinctive, interesting, and helpful portions to the overall Christian theological discussion in matters of sin, freedom, and grace. The doctrine of Original Grace sets out a scenario in which humanity is both free and responsible. Original Grace provides this condition of freedom and responsibility won through Christ’s victory over sin in His death on the cross. Humanity is given, in this work of irresistible grace, the freedom to sin or refrain from sin, and the freedom to accept or reject the gospel. Humanity is actually freed from physical death and from guilt leading to condemnation (eternal death), and from depravity (spiritual death). This state of adult free responsibility, created in this way, is not one in which each adult chooses sin or righteousness entirely without bias or influence, as if each adult were back in Eden. Instead, we still have to account for the ways in which sin spreads, infects, and influences, and ultimately makes sinning inevitable for every adult. Thus, humanity is genuinely freed from the internal influence of sin because of Christ’s work. Yet, through external hindrance, sin is eventually a practical inevitability for all human adults.

The overall picture of Original Grace raises interesting questions that are beyond the scope of this project: (1) if Original Grace removes all original sin and its consequences for infants and children, what, if any, is the role of infant baptism, and (2) what are the implications for the way in which children are raised and discipled, especially in the context of Christian communities and families?

3.2.0 A THEOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF ORIGINAL GRACE

We now turn to repairs that the adoption of Original Grace would seem to require to the Augustinian tradition: a reinforcement of the Adamic sin/personal sin
distinction, a revision of the meaning of justification, and an insistence on a clear symmetry between Adam and Christ. But these are repairs that there is good reason to resist. The first would shore up the Augustinian tradition precisely at one of its most dubious points. The second does not fit within the wider structure of biblically-informed thinking about justification. The third needs heavy qualification if it is to make wider theological sense. We will explore them as follows: (1) the distinction between Adamic and personal sin, (2) the extent and meaning of “justification,” and (3) the nature of the Adam/Christ comparison. We explored and critiqued the exegetical assumptions and conclusions of Cottrell, but now we move to set the positions that the Original Grace interpretation takes on these issues against a wider theological audience.

To review, the distinction between Adamic and personal sin asks whether it is responsible to make a sharp distinction between the two in order to support the Original Grace interpretation of Romans 5:12-21. The issue of the meaning of justification asks whether justification can be responsibly defined as a salvific act by God upon the innocent without the agency of faith. Finally, the nature of the Adam Christ comparison asks whether the strict antithetical relationship drawn by Original Grace is plausible, and whether the contrasting concepts of “in Adam” and “in Christ” are metaphysically similar enough to support such a relationship. We seek to identify whether there are viable and responsible ways to understand these issues that would either support or place this doctrine under suspicion. From within the Stone-Campbell Movement tradition, we seek to make strong, if not definitive, judgment as to the viability of Original Grace within that tradition.

In order to facilitate this analysis, we will place these exegetical assumptions in the context of other writers that have contributed important works to the discussion. This will not be an exhaustive survey concerning all of the possible positions, but instead, a focused analysis of Original Grace. Biblical texts discussed will no longer
necessarily be limited to Romans 5 or other very closely related texts. As an alternative, we will focus on texts raised by the other writers wherever we find them in Scripture.

### 3.2.1 ADAMIC AND PERSONAL SIN

We left the questions concerning the possible distinction between Adamic and personal sin in Chapter 2 with the conclusion that it is unlikely that Paul intended to articulate a doctrine of Adamic sin as a separate type of from sin committed by an individual in Romans 5:12-21. In this section, we seek to leave that passage behind and look for other reasons, both biblical and theological, to either maintain our conclusion or perhaps uphold some kind of valid distinction between the two concepts. To this end, we will discuss these concepts in the midst of writers on both sides of the debate, including their proposed biblical support.

Romans 5:12-21 is clearly the principal biblical passage for the discussion of original sin and Original Grace. The proponents of Original Grace surveyed in Chapter 1 focus almost totally on this pericope. There are, however, three other brief biblical passages that may point to Original Grace: John 1:29, Galatians 3:13, and Colossians 2:14. None of the proponents use these passages, if they mention them at all, in order to support their view, except for Jack Cottrell. Even Cottrell does not give them attention in his two main writings on Original Grace.120 Exegetical evidence proving Original Grace in regard to these passages is tenuous and speculative. Both Galatians 3:13, “Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us, for it is written: "Cursed is everyone who is hung on a tree” and Colossians 2:14, “having canceled the written code, with its regulations, that was against us and that stood opposed to us; he took it away, nailing it to the cross,” are written to Christians about their salvation as former sinners. Depending on how one interprets the passages, the emphasis on salvation may be for the purpose of contrasting the community salvation

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120 Instead, he mentions them in course notes from a graduate course, “Doctrine of Grace,” that I took under him at Cincinnati Christian University.
received by Jews and Christians. However, both do refer to the cancelling of the law and its effects by Jesus’ redemptive act. Much interpretive work has been done on these passages, but it will not be recorded here. The passages certainly support such cancellation for those that have become Christians, but do not obviously support the same for all humans. John 1:29 states, “The next day John saw Jesus coming toward him and said, ‘Look, the Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world!’” This passage, at best, merely reflects the sins that are said to be taken away in Romans 5:12-21. Thus, if proponents of Original Grace are correct—that “the sin of the world” includes both Adamic and personal sin—then it is a possible conclusion that John’s statement includes both types of sin. The passage by itself, however, does not define the content of “the sin of the world.” Therefore, whether these passages support, or at least echo, Romans 5:12-21, depends upon one’s exegetical conclusions on this principal passage.

There are also at least two passages that may indicate original sin. First, there is Psalm 51:5: “Surely I was sinful at birth, sinful from the time my mother conceived me,” (NIV) or “Behold, I was brought forth in iniquity, and in sin my mother conceived me” (NASB). The NIV reading seems to indicate original sin of some kind, where, in the NASB, “iniquity” seems to have “brought forth,” and “in sin” applies to the conception. Psalm 51:1-4 focuses on David’s personal sins, which makes it uncertain whether to understand v. 5 to mean some kind of original sin. By itself, it seems difficult to take this verse as conclusive proof of original sin. Perhaps some kind of depravity is in view, but David does not give any details that really explain the nature of what he inherited, if anything.

Second, Ephesians 2:3 is also sometimes used to support original sin: “Among them we too all formerly lived in the lusts of our flesh, indulging the desires of the flesh and of the mind, and were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest.” [emphasis
Normally, the phrase “by nature children of wrath” is used to say that all people are under wrath by their nature, not by their own sin, necessarily. In context, however, we see that the subjects of the passage are people that engage in sin:

1 As for you, you were dead in your transgressions and sins, 2 in which you used to live when you followed the ways of this world and of the ruler of the kingdom of the air, the spirit who is now at work in those who are disobedient. 3 All of us also lived among them at one time, gratifying the cravings of our sinful nature and following its desires and thoughts. Like the rest, we were by nature objects of wrath. 4 But because of his great love for us, God, who is rich in mercy, 5 made us alive with Christ even when we were dead in transgressions—it is by grace you have been saved. [emphasis mine]

Of course, opinions vary on this passage, but it is certainly not clearly the case that Paul intends to teach original sin on this point, and is probably better considered very doubtful. The point here is not to exegete any of these passages that may teach either original sin or Original Grace, but to show that the biblical case is, at best, sparse without Romans 5:12-21, especially in regard to teaching on the distinction between Adamic and personal sin. There are dozens of passages concerning sin and its consequences, but the content of Adamic sin is really only gleaned from Romans 5:12-21, and as we saw, the passage may or may not be responsibly interpreted to even include Adamic sin.

Proponents of both original sin and Original Grace have to assume that it is Paul’s intention to teach some kind of Adamic sin in Romans 5:12-21, and that it is in view in any of the other previously mentioned passages. In other words, it may very well be that if Paul had never written Romans 5:12-21, there would likely not be a doctrine of original sin, at least not to the extent that it exists in Christian theology. Let us assume that Romans 5 really does teach original sin. In this case, it may be responsible, although not necessary, to see Adamic sin in the other passages, as one must sometimes draw from New Testament theology as a whole when engaging in responsible hermeneutics. However, if Romans 5 does not teach original sin in the

sense that humanity actually inherits something from Adam, but only that Adam was the first to sin, and that perhaps humans sin in imitation of him or in participation with him, then these passages seem entirely too unclear to conclude that either original sin or Original Grace is present. Thus, the case for either doctrine is dependent upon one controversial text that appears to be utterly unique in Scripture. Our theological critique largely rests upon biblical grounds, namely the lack of available evidence to pursue either doctrine if textual evidence is the single most vital criteria for doctrine, which it is according to the assumptions and limitations of this thesis. The broad twofold structure of soteriology that I have been exploring, where one movement deals with Adamic sin, set within a wider movement dealing with personal sin amongst other things. This distinction seems to rest on thin exegetical ice. The difficulty of finding a clear Adamic sin/personal sin distinction in Scripture is actually a symptom of the fact that the whole double-movement construal of soteriology is hard to ground biblically at all.

3.2.2 THE EXTENT AND MEANING OF “JUSTIFICATION”

The primary opponent of Original Grace’s view of justification is the view that justification is limited to those that have faith. Justification, if it is to be compatible with Original Grace, would have to account for both the irresistible movement of grace on the innocent and the movement of grace received by faith for the adult sinner. Those that hold to any version of Original Grace, as surveyed in Chapter 1, and Cottrell in Chapter 2, of course hold that justification is by faith for the adult sinner, but allow the extent of its effects to include justification from Adamic sin apart from faith or choice. As discussed in Chapter 2, it appears that the primary exegetical reason for taking this step is, at least as pursued by Cottrell, the understanding that Paul is using sin in a rather unique way, namely that sinful effects are inherited from Adam apart from human choice, and therefore, justification can also be extended to include the counteraction of Adamic sin for all people, also apart from human choice. We concluded that Paul
neither uses sin nor justification to mean those things in Romans or anywhere else. In fact, other than a brief mention of the Adam/Christ comparison in 1 Cor. 15, Paul does not articulate Adamic sin or its counteraction anywhere in Scripture. So, Romans 5:12-21 is the only text extensive enough to possibly address the topic. The difficulties with such a view of sin and justification have been identified in this context in Chapter 2. We will not rehearse them here. Are there other reasons to suppose that justification can be understood like the Original Grace position suggests? We will explore other positions on justification to place this discussion in context. Our primary purpose is to identify what is so vital about the doctrine of justification by faith in Protestant theology by looking at several important contemporary works on the topic. We will then answer the question, “If the Original Grace position has any merit, what would its proponents need to say about justification, and what are the consequences?” First, we will briefly analyze the exegetical situation.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to find convincing biblical support, besides perhaps from Romans 5:12-21, which merits were already discussed in Chapter 2, for Original Grace, in regard to its view on justification. If Paul meant to say that justification could occur apart from faith in that passage, then he apparently did not state that explicitly in any other text. As we began to do in Chapter 2, we will now more thoroughly explore the possible theological merit, by means of implication rather than exegetical evidence, of the Original Grace version of justification.

The key exegetical issue is the usage of “justification” in Romans 5:12-21 when it is contrasted with “death” and “condemnation” apparently brought by Adam. If we can set aside possible exegetical concerns that we covered in Chapter 2, and perhaps speculate a bit on what Paul may have meant by his contrast, we can evaluate the theological implications. In Chapter 2 I hinted at my conclusion that it seems that Cottrell’s leap in terms of the definition of justification is no different than the
Augustinian perspective on sin. Thus he is allowing the Augustinian perspective to be correct for the sake of argument, and then counteracts it with his own antithetical response. We concluded that if Paul meant to say that condemnation, and not physical death, flows from Adam’s sin all by itself, without even bringing personal sin into the picture, then he is making a unique statement that he makes nowhere else. In the same way, if he is saying that condemnation can come on all of humanity without any commission of sin, then perhaps he is saying that justification can come upon all of humanity without faith. No proponent of Original Grace explicitly makes this argument in support of their position. It appears to be the only argument, outside of possible exegetical proof, which we have discounted as probably inaccurate, that makes sense of the situation. So, it appears that a proponent of Original Grace is making assumptions, perhaps unconsciously, that, (1) the Augustinian view is correct about original sin, despite the uniqueness of that approach to sin when compared to the rest of Scripture, and (2) that justification should be taken in an antithetical way, despite the uniqueness of that definition. If one begins with these assumptions, also assuming that the passage should be taken as a unique illustration, metaphor, object lesson, etc., in order for Paul to make his point, then perhaps Original Grace has theological merit, despite the lack of exegetical evidence. It would seem that it is perhaps a better theological answer than to assume a normal Augustinian approach that assumes that Adam’s sinful consequences are brought upon even innocent children without their consent, and that the only way for those innocent children to be justified is by faith.

Original Grace seeks to provide an explanation of Paul’s words in Romans 5:12-21 that is coherent with the meaning of sin and justification. In one sense, this approach is just as consistent as an interpretation that takes sin to be an act actually committed by an individual, leading to condemnation, and justification by faith to be the road to salvation by that sinner. The second option has the support of the rest of the New
Testament in regard to the definition of those terms, whereas the first option does not. A third, and perhaps most inconsistent option, in regard to the exegetical evidence, is the original sin interpretation where sin is imputed from Adam apart from human choice, yet the condemnation that comes from that imputation may only be counteracted with justification received by faith. Our purpose is not to necessarily argue that original sin is false. Instead, it is to show that Original Grace has greater merit if original sin is assumed to be true, at least in terms of consistency of terminology (sin and justification).

So, Original Grace’s version of justification is exegetically weak, at best. But, it offers a possible explanation of what Paul meant in Romans 5:12-21 if he indeed intended to express a unique doctrine of original sin. It may, then, have theological merit if one assumes the truth of original sin. Thus, we must understand Original Grace’s merit as ultimately parasitic on original sin. If we do not assume that Paul is teaching original sin, in the Augustinian sense, then there is no need to consider the possibility of justification being applied to innocent humans under that curse. This analysis cannot be where we stop in order to fully assess the validity of Original Grace’s view of justification. To do this, we now turn to theological issues within the larger context of Christian theology.

We must first differentiate, briefly, between the generally accepted view of justification from a Protestant and a Roman Catholic view.122 This discussion of Original Grace occurs only within Protestant theology, sharing the vast majority of the central assumptions held by the Reformation as a whole. So, this analysis will also center within a Protestant understanding of justification. The Roman Catholic view, pre-Vatican II, essentially teaches that justification is not primarily a forensic judgment wherein God declares the sinner righteous, but instead it includes the “sanctifying and

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renewing of the inner man.”123 “The instrumental cause . . . of the first justification is the Sacrament of Baptism.”124 Justification is only possible because of faith, which includes not only fiducial faith, but also dogmatic faith were one must accept certain divine truths.125 The most telling distinctive between the Catholic and Protestant concepts is the concept of the “state of grace.” The Council of Trent explains that, “If one considers his own weakness and his defective disposition, he may well be fearful and anxious as to the state of grace, as nobody can with certainty of faith, which permits of no error, that he has achieved the grace of God.”126 Ott explains that, “The reason for the uncertainty of the state of grace lies in this, that without special revelation nobody can with certainty of faith know whether or not he has fulfilled all the conditions which are necessary for the achieving of justification. The impossibility of the certainty of faith, however, by no means excludes a high moral certainty supported by the testimony of conscience.”127 Finally, Ott makes explicit how the Catholic view is distinct from the Reformation:

As the Reformers wrongly regarded justification as a merely external imputation of Christ’s justice, they were obligated also to hold that justification is identical in all men. The council of Trent, however, declared that the measure of grace of justification received varies in the individual person who is justified, according to the measure of God’s free distribution and to the disposition and the co-operation of the recipient himself.128

The cooperation of the recipient is in works, so “eternal life is both a gift of grace promised by God and a reward for his own good works and merits.”129

In contrast, the Reformation has generally, if not completely, held to the position that justification comes by God’s grace, apart from any works or merit of the individual, by faith. So, in that regard, the views are similar—grace is involved, as well as faith.

122 Ibid., p. 251.
123 Ibid., pp. 252-253.
124 The Council of Trent in, Grudem, p. 728.
125 Ott, pp. 261-262.
126 Ibid., p. 262.
127 Ibid., p. 264.
The degree to which grace and faith are involved in salvation is the key issue. It is interesting that both views still require faith in order for justification to occur, whereas, as we have seen, Original Grace allows for justification to occur without faith for the innocent. Within Protestantism, there is little to no controversy over whether justification is by grace alone or by faith alone. Original Grace, however, seeks to expand the definition of justification to still be by grace alone, as Christ grants justification for potential guilt flowing from Adamic sin, but not to be by faith in this case. The innocent child who suffers under death and is condemned, according to the original sin and Original Grace positions, is justified apart from any expression of faith. In Chapter 2, we looked at the immediate context of Romans to discover whether Paul used “justify” or “justification” more broadly than only in the context of faith, and we found that he does not.

When one turns to other Pauline writings, we find that that Paul consistently makes explicit the integral relationship between faith and justification. The following are two such examples: (1) Eph. 2:8-9, “For it is by grace you have been saved, through faith—and this not from yourselves, it is the gift of God— not by works, so that no one can boast,” and (2) Gal. 2:16, “know that a man is not justified by observing the law, but by faith in Jesus Christ. So we, too, have put our faith in Christ Jesus that we may be justified by faith in Christ and not by observing the law, because by observing the law no one will be justified.”

We now turn to examples of the Protestant tradition’s position on this topic, supported by both texts in Romans and beyond. Grudem provides a rationale for this vitality of faith as the only means to receive justification:

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130 See also Gal. 3:11 and 5:4. One could also bring up James’ words that “man is justified by works and not by faith alone” (James 2:24). Within the context of the entire letter, this can be defended to mean that a faith that does not produce good work is not faith at all. But, even if one could prove that works should be included, as in the Catholic perspective, for example, it does not directly affect Original Grace’s position that justification comes on the innocent without faith or works. Instead, that position requires no response by the individual.
Why did God choose faith as the means by which we receive justification? It is apparently because faith is the one attitude of heart that is the exact opposite of depending on ourselves. When we come to Christ in faith we essentially say, “I give up! It will not depend on myself or my own good works any longer. I know that I can never make myself righteous before God. Therefore, Jesus, I trust you and depend on you completely to give me a righteous standing before God.” In this way, faith is the exact opposite of trusting in ourselves, and therefore it is the attitude that perfectly fits salvation that depends not at all on our own merit but entirely on God’s free gift of grace. Paul explain this when he says, “That is why it depends on faith, in order that the promise may rest on grace and be guaranteed to all his descendants (Rom. 4:16).”

Justification by faith appears to be the only biblical justification related to salvation. Nowhere in Scripture does Paul, or any other writer, specifically mention that someone, including an innocent person, cannot receive justification apart from faith, but this would be an argument from silence. Taking the biblical evidence alone, it seems safe to conclude that justification comes by faith and not by works. When we work within the Protestant position on the topic, assuming it is correct, which we will as it is the appropriate context for understanding Original Grace, the faith that justification by faith is the only justification unto salvation becomes more certain.

Carl Braaten represents a contemporary Lutheran approach. He is greatly informed by Luther’s approach to justification by faith, and both reaffirms and updates Luther’s position for contemporary audiences. He sees justification by faith as absolutely vital to Lutheranism, Protestantism, and the true Catholic church as a whole. He defines the Lutheran mission as one of preaching the true gospel of the one true Church, which is ultimately founded upon the doctrine of justification by faith. His vision of a truly catholic church is one that is not “Roman Catholic,” for Lutheranism rejects papal infallibility, but a truly evangelical universal church that affirms “justification by grace alone, through faith alone, on account of Christ alone—the article

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on which the church stands or falls.” Thus, despite the fundamental disagreements between the Protestant Reformation, and Lutheranism, in particular, with Roman Catholic doctrine, he believes that justification by faith is the primary doctrine that guides all that the universal Church believes. Braaten articulates the Lutheran version of justification by faith, while reflecting back upon the motivation of the Reformation:

The gospel declares that God acts to communicate his own righteousness that no effort on the part of human beings can possibly attain. This happens at a particular place and time, namely, through the cross and resurrection of Jesus. This puts an end to the way of the law. God’s act in the death and resurrection of Jesus is the final and full revelation of God’s justice and mercy. Faith is the way that an individual person receives the righteousness of God in Christ, and therefore not on the basis of law and merit. The state of being righteous in the sight of God is radically a free gift of grace, never the result of human achievement. Faith itself comes of the Spirit of God. To say that faith is reckoned as righteousness apart from the works of the law underscores the absolute gratuitousness of God’s generosity. God gives what he demands, both the righteousness and the faith by which it is grasped. In essence this was the message that turned things around for Luther and his followers. Justification by grace along through faith alone on account of Christ alone is the absolute truth by which the church stands or falls. It is this truth that makes Christianity Christian and the church really the church, preserving it from idolatry, preventing its secularization, providing the charter of its career and offering believers a solid basis and direction for their daily life. The doctrine of justification was the ‘doctrine of doctrines,’ not one among many. It functioned as a critical principle, cleansing the church of everything that enters into contradiction with the evangelical basis and content of faith.

We can see from Braaten’s description of the doctrine, that justification, grace, and faith, including their respective roles in the overall doctrine, are absolutely vital to the Church’s theology, and not just the Lutheran tradition, but the entire church. It is a doctrine that informs all other doctrines of the church, thus serving as the core truth of Christianity. The doctrine is primary because it solves humanity’s most severe problem: the need for forgiveness of sins. We need this forgiveness, because it allows us to be reconciled to God, our creator and redeemer, and engage in fellowship with him. It is only through Christ that our predicament is “objectively and realistically” dealt with, where “a person gains a new orientation in life, new possibilities of

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132 Braaten, p. 9.  
133 Braaten, p. 82.
existence, and a new motivation to practice the way of forgiving love.” Thus, justification (forgiveness of sins) has the ultimate effect on humanity, both existentially and practically.

So far, we have seen both the vital role of faith (Grudem) and justification (Braaten) themselves, both for the individual and for the church as a whole. We now turn to the work of Gerhard O. Forde, also writing from a Lutheran perspective, but who seeks, it seems, to speak for the entire Protestant tradition, which shows the truly radical nature of justification by faith. He does so by explaining it in very blunt and dramatic terms, as well as by pushing faith beyond the point of a condition for salvation, making justification an unconditional act by God. He bases his work on Article IV of the Augsburg Confession, which says, “Our churches also teach that man cannot be justified before God by their own strength, merits, or works but are freely justified for Christ’s sake through faith when they believe that they are received in to favor and that their sins are forgiven on account of Christ, who by his death made satisfaction for our sins. This faith God imputes for righteousness in his sight (Rom. 3:4).” He begins by saying that faith is not a work of law or a work in any sense. In regard to justification, it is the way that humans receive justification. “To the age old question, ‘What shall I do to be saved?’ the confessional answer is shocking: ‘Nothing! Just be still; shut up and listen for once in your life to what God the Almighty, creator and redeemer, is saying to his world and to you in the death and resurrection of his Son! Listen and believe!’ When one sees that it is a matter of death and life one has to talk this way.” Is it really that simple? He says, yes, “Faith is the state of being grasped by the unconditional claim and promise of the God who calls into being that which is

134 Ibid., p. 83.
137 Ibid., p. 22.
from that which is not. Faith means not having to deal with life in those terms. It is a death and resurrection.” He describes the truly radical nature of the Reformers’ perspective on faith in justification. He does this by further defining faith as “nothing” in that it is not even a condition in the sense that perhaps we would normally think. “The ‘nothing,’ the sola fide, dislodges everyone from the saddle, Jew and Greek, publican and pharisee, harlot and homemaker, sinner and righteous, liberal and orthodox, religious and non-religious, minimalist and maximalist, and shakes the whole human enterprise to its roots.” As faith is, in some sense, “nothing,” so justification is unconditional and completely without human power. “Justification, the reformers said, is by imputation, freely given. It is an absolutely unconditional decree, a divine decision, indeed an election, a sentence handed down by the judge with whom all power resides.”

Despite Forde’s claims to the contrary, it could be said that faith, or repentance, or even baptism, is a condition for salvation. We will not argue this point here, but we will look at Forde’s answer to understand his position. He equates the understanding of faith as a condition for justification as an “if-then statement.” He denies this understanding and provides his own version of what is occurring, calling it a “because-therefore” statement. Namely, “Because Jesus died and rose, your sins are forgiven and you are righteous in the sight of God!” So, faith is not a condition. Instead it is a realization of the reality that God justifies totally on his own, without human action. “It can be received only by faith, suddenly ‘seeing’ the truth. It is not a movement on our part, either with or without what was previously called ‘grace.’ It is a re-creative act of God, something he does precisely by speaking unconditionally.” Forde thinks that making faith a condition moves back to a law mentality. Justification, by imputing

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138 Ibid.
139 Ibid., p. 23.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid., p. 24.
142 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
righteousness, assumes the person to be a sinner. “God’s justification, you see, is fully as opposed to human righteousness and pretense as it is to human unrighteousness . . . Only faith in the flat-out judgment of God is equipped to do battle with human sin. One can only be still and listen to the judge.”¹⁴³ What’s so important about Forde’s approach to the topic? One could disagree with his exact description of faith. One could call it a condition and still believe that it is not a work. Again, this is not a point we will argue here. What Forde offers to the discussion is a frank description of Protestantism’s view of justification and faith. Putting aside any nuances to this position, he shows the vital relationship between faith and justification, including the fact that it is utterly central to a total and correct understanding of the Christian faith, especially within the Protestant tradition.

Turning to Robert Jensen, we find a thoroughly developed view of the role of faith in justification that is heavily informed by the work of Luther. As we express faith in the Gospel, Christ is actually present in that faith. Through faith, the person becomes ontologically righteous. “. . .the believer’s created unrighteousness is no balance for God the Son’s divine righteousness . . . when the Father judges the believer and says that he or she is righteous, the Father is simply acting as a just judge who finds the facts—about the only moral subject that actually exists in the case, Christ in the believer and the believer in Christ.”¹⁴⁴

It will now be instructive to explore the role of faith in justification within the Stone-Campbell Movement. In Chapter 1, we placed the Movement within the overall Protestant tradition and discussed some of its distinctive. Other than perhaps some nuances, which can be found throughout Protestant theology on the subject, justification by faith is a core teaching of the Movement. To bring the issue we are discussing in to focus, namely whether the Original Grace position should find any merit in the idea that

¹⁴³ Ibid., p. 31.
justification, especially as understood in Romans 5:12-21, but also beyond, should be understood as something which can be accomplished apart from faith. We have looked at a sampling of important contemporary works on the matter, and have thus far discovered that justification by faith is the only doctrine of justification in Protestant Christianity. Not only is it the only allowable possibility, but many, if not all, theologians in that tradition see the doctrine as central to Christian belief. We will now turn to the work of Alexander Campbell. As discussed in the Introduction and Chapter 1, he is seen as one of the most central figures in the Movement. We will look at what he has to say about the relationship between faith and justification. We have seen that some of the “second generation” leaders, as discussed in Chapter1, taught an early version of Original Grace. Even though they apparently view it as consistent with their doctrine, should they do so, considering their views on justification by faith?

Campbell says of faith in Christ many of the same things we have already discussed. We may find nuances of difference, but the essential elements are congruent with the Protestant view. First, he describes belief and faith, and provides helpful illustration of his point:

Faith in Christ is the effect of belief. Belief is the cause; and trust, confidence, or faith in Christ, the effect. "The faith," sometimes means the truth to be believed. Sometimes it means "the belief of the truth;" but here we speak of it metonymically, putting the effect for the cause—or calling the effect by the name of the cause. To believe what a person says, and to trust in him are not always identical. True, indeed, they often are; for if a person speaks to us concerning himself, and states to us matters of great interest to ourselves, requiring confidence in him, to believe what he says, and to believe or trust in him, are in effect, one and the same thing. Suppose a physician present himself to one that is sick, stating his ability and willingness to heal him; to believe is to trust in him, and to put ourselves under his guidance; provided, only, we love health rather than sickness, and life rather than death.\footnote{145 Alexander Campbell, \textit{The Christian System}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edn (Bethany: Forrester & Campbell, 1839) II: 54-55.}

Essentially, then, faith is a condition of salvation that includes both belief in the facts of the Gospel and trust in the one that can save. Campbell goes on to embellish the nature of faith by saying that it is an “action” by humans that relies on “conviction” of the truth
of the Gospel as well as “confidence” in “Jesus as the Christ.” So, it is previous to justification by Christ, freely chosen out of the acceptance of the Gospel message:

While, then, faith is the simple belief of testimony, or of the truth, and never can be more nor less than that; as a principle of action it has respect to a person or thing interesting to us: and is confidence or trust in that person or thing. Now the belief of what Christ says of himself, terminates in trust or confidence in him: and as the Christian religion is a personal thing, both as respects subject and object, that faith in Christ which is essential to salvation is not the belief of any doctrine, testimony, or truth, abstractly, but belief in Christ; trust or confidence in him as a person, not a thing. We take Paul's definition of the term and of the thing, as perfectly simple, intelligible, and sufficient. For the term faith, he substitutes the belief of the truth. "God has from the beginning chosen you to salvation, through the sanctification of the spirit; through the belief of the truth."And of the thing, he says, "Faith is the confidence of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen." And John says, it is "receiving testimony," for "If we receive the testimony of man," as a principle of action, or put trust in it, "the testimony of God is greater," and of course will produce greater confidence. Any belief, then, that does not terminate in our personal confidence in Jesus as the Christ, and to induce trustful submission to him, is not faith unfeigned; but a dead faith, and cannot save the soul.146

This thorough description tells us what Campbell thinks about the nature of faith, and specifically faith in Christ. When he puts faith in Jesus Christ in the context of the remission of sins, he places his view in the context of the Reformation, namely the thought of Luther:

Luther said that the doctrine of justification, or forgiveness, was the test of a standing or falling church. If right in this, she could not be very far wrong in any thing else; but if wrong here, it was not easy to suppose her right in any thing. I quote from memory, but this was the idea of that great reformer.1 We agree with him in this as well as in many other sentiments. Emerging from the smoke of the great city of mystical Babylon, he saw as clearly and as far into these matters as any person could in such a hazy atmosphere. Many of his views only require to be carried out to their legitimate issue, and we should have the ancient gospel as the result.147

Campbell makes the point, like the other authors we’ve surveyed, that faith is not actually what saves. It is grace, justification, the blood of Christ, etc. Faith gives us access to these things:

We are said to be justified, sanctified, and purified by faith--to walk by faith, and to live by faith, &c. &c. But these sayings, as qualified by the Apostles, mean no more than by believing the truth of God we have access into all these blessings. So that as Paul explains, 'By faith we have access into the favor in

146Ibid., 54-55.
147 Ibid., p. 186.
which we stand... That faith by itself neither justifies, sanctifies, nor purifies, is admitted by those who oppose immersion for the forgiveness of sins. They all include the idea of the blood of Christ.\textsuperscript{148}

For Campbell, and the rest of the Restoration Movement, this faith leads to immersion in Christian baptism that is actually the point at which the penitent believer receives remission of sins.\textsuperscript{149} This does not change the importance of faith, nor does it depart in meaning from the Reformation. Campbell describes the entire process of salvation through several Scriptural examples, naming faith the \textit{formal} cause:

If we examine the word \textit{saved} in the New Testament, we shall find that we are said to be saved by as many causes, though some of them differently denominated, as those by which we are said to be justified. Let us see: we are said to be "saved by grace," Eph. ii. 5; "saved through his life," Rom. v. 9, 10; "saved through faith," Eph. ii. 8, Acts xvi. 31; "saved by baptism," 1 Peter iii. 21; or "by faith and baptism," Mark xvi. 16; or "by the washing of regeneration and renewal of the Holy Spirit," Titus iii. 5; or "by the gospel," 1 Cor. xv. 2; or "by calling upon the Lord," and by "enduring to the end," Acts ii. 21, Rom. x. 13, Matt. x. 22. Here we have salvation ascribed to grace, to Jesus Christ, to his death and resurrection—\textit{three} times to baptism, either by itself or in conjunction, once with faith, and once with the Holy Spirit; to works, or to calling upon the Lord, or to enduring to the end. To these we might add other phrases nearly similar, but these include all the causes to which we have just now alluded. Saved by grace the \textit{moving} cause; by Jesus the \textit{efficient} cause; by his death, and resurrection, and life, the \textit{procuring} cause; by the gospel, the \textit{disposing} cause; by faith, the \textit{formal} cause; by baptism, the \textit{immediate} cause; and by enduring to the end, or persevering in the Lord, the \textit{concurring} cause.\textsuperscript{150}

Campbell has shown us that the Restoration Movement expresses its soteriology in a way that would, in the essentials, agree with Protestant theology. There would be differences of opinion on such things as baptism, for example, which is likely the most controversial. Justification by faith itself, and the doctrine within the Movement’s soteriology, remains central.

Our conclusion, insofar as it relates to Stone-Campbell theology, is that justification by faith is just as central to its theology as to the rest of Protestant theology.

Despite this fact, Original Grace, and its underlying assumption that justification can be applied to a person without faith, has been taught to varying degrees by influential

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., pp. 201-202.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., pp. 202-260.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., p. 259.
leaders in the Movement. We can only speculate how they would react to this charge, namely that their doctrine understands justification in a way that Protestant theology as a whole, and Restoration Movement theology specially, would not accept, at least not if they accept the critique as offered in this project. There is no evidence to suggest that any of those writers have ever considered this issue. Perhaps they would side with the preponderance of the Movement’s thinkers by simply denying the existence of original sin or limiting the effects of Adamic sin to physical death and a very limited partial depravity, thus largely removing the need for the doctrine of Original Grace. They would, at the very least, take the charge seriously. The fact that Original Grace essentially denies that justification is always by faith raises serious issues.

Theologically speaking, it questions the most central doctrine of Protestant theology, not to mention the fact that it stretches the meaning of justification beyond the exegetical and biblical evidence. It is possible that perhaps justification should be understood analogically from the perspective of Original Grace. Perhaps, if one could sustain such an argument, which we have shown to be unlikely based upon the assumptions of our current discussion, it could alleviate the apparent problem with suggesting that justification can be applied without the involvement of faith. Perhaps, then, justification is an analogy that seeks to describe something like the justification that happens in the context of faith. If one could prove that Paul intended this in Romans 5:12-21, then perhaps we could proceed with this definition of justification.

One more interesting thought comes out of the comparison between Forde and Campbell, as representatives of their positions. The Protestant view of faith as expressed by Forde presents faith as subsequent to justification, where both justification and faith are freely given by God without any work on the part of the human. As we saw, Campbell maintains the centrality of faith, but treats it more like a condition, along with others, for justification. So, for Campbell, faith comes before justification and
results from human choice. Forde’s version provides a partial open door for the kind of justification provided by Original Grace. Forde is dealing with adult sinners that need justification, while Original Grace deals with the innocent. In both cases, however, justification is awarded by God without any human choice or action. In Forde’s case, faith is guaranteed, while Original Grace never requires faith to come into the picture. If we apply Forde’s approach to faith and justification to the doctrine of Original Grace, we see a possible opening. Perhaps Original Grace’s view of justification is granted validity by comparison to the Lutheran view of justification. What seems like a possible theological opening for the case of Original Grace quickly closes when one realizes that this view of justification, if it were applied consistently to both innocents and adults, would violate a central assumption of Stone-Campbell theology (or possibly other non-Augustinian soteriologies)—freedom—which Original Grace seeks to allow. So, Original Grace, in order to use the Lutheran definition of grace, would probably have to allow justification to be without human freedom and will in both cases. Frankly, this does not seem plausible for the overall theological orientation of the Movement.

We now turn to an assessment of the implications of this kind of view of justification, namely that Original Grace requires justification to be executed upon an innocent individual, apart from faith in Jesus Christ, in order to remove the consequences of the sin of Adam, whether they include any or all of the following: physical death, spiritual death (depravity), and eternal death (condemnation to hell). We have seen that the biblical support for this view is scant at best. Within the widest Christian theological context, Catholic and Protestant, this concept is completely foreign, as justification is only gained through faith, with some involvement of works in the Catholic context, and is not gained without some kind of human involvement. If we
are to measure this doctrine on these two bases, we would likely have to say that its merit is on shaky ground.

The doctrine of Original Grace may be worth holding, however, if one understands it only as a speculative possibility. As we have stated previously, and will explore in detail in the next section, Original Grace is only given life because of the existence of the original sin interpretation of Romans 5:12-21. It is on the basis of certain assumptions that theologians have asserted that original sin can be counteracted by justification apart from faith, even if they did not do so consciously. Namely, one must assume that Adam’s sin actually brings direct consequences to humanity, that the innocent suffer under those consequences, that God (and Jesus) would never allow the innocent to be condemned to hell when they had not sinned, and therefore God provided a way for the innocent to escape the penalty of Adamic sin. As we discussed in Chapter 2, proponents of Original Grace have to say, in regard to justification, exactly what proponents of original sin say of sin. Sin is not just disobedience of the individual before the law of God, which leads to the condemnation of that one person. Instead, it is the disobedience of one man that leads to the condemnation of all people. Therefore, justification is not just the forgiveness of sin for individuals that receive it by faith in Jesus Christ. Instead, it is the forgiveness of original sin that leads to the justification of all people from the condemnation caused by that sin. Despite the lack of biblical and theological support for this view of justification, it would seem fair to say that it is no more unique or even out of place than its opposite version of original sin. At a very superficial, straightforward level, the proponent of Original Grace is only saying that justification could apply to the innocent, and perhaps even should, assuming something like that is needed. So, it makes some sense that the proponents of Original Grace are comfortable with going outside of the normal definition of justification. In other words, they may be consciously thinking that, “Well, perhaps justification, in this one, special
case, can be taken more broadly than we normally do, because of our assumptions about
the destiny of the innocent. So, if Adam’s sin really condemns babies to hell, and Jesus
himself proclaims the innocence of children, then God must have made a way for
justification to extend to those children.” If one makes the theological assumptions
previously mentioned, then perhaps Original Grace’s view of justification has
something to say to Christian theology. It is certainly one way to answer the question of
the destiny of the innocents that fits with most Christians’ moral sensitivities. It seems
that what it has to say, however, is not that it, in itself, is true, but that original sin
should also perhaps be subjected to similar critique. Perhaps, then, Christian theology
can and should exit the entire discussion of original sin and Original Grace because it
finds it invalid.

I have argued that the doctrine of Original Grace sets out two soteriological
movements, and have explained in detail how those two movements seem to relate.
However, when faced with biblical material that seems to lend itself to description of
one movement, as I showed also in the section on Adamic/Personal sin, the language
used to describe that one movement inevitably has to be stretched to cover Original
Grace’s two movements. The language of justification, which appears to be one form of
biblical language for the single soteriological movement, now becomes language that
has to describe two quite different movements. And because the Original Grace
movement is one that irresistibly creates the possibility of freedom, and the wider
soteriological movement is one in which human beings are therefore free, justification
language is having to do service both for the irresistible work of God in Original Grace,
dependent upon no human response whatsoever, and for the free response of human
beings in faith to offered grace. The strain becomes theologically intolerable.

3.2.3 THE ADAM/CHRIST COMPARISON
Original Grace relies on a strict comparison and contrast of Adam and Christ that, if brought under scrutiny, finds signification exegetical difficulty. In the subsequent two subsections we will explore two theological aspects of the Adam/Christ motif that will reveal theological difficulties as well. The first aspect is an exploration of some of the other options for understanding the Adam/Christ comparison in the context Romans 5:12-21, extending to the entire salvation story as presented in Scripture. The second aspect is a discussion of the metaphysical content of “in Adam” and “in Christ,” which is then brought to bear on the validity of Original Grace’s interpretation of those concepts.

3.2.3.1 The Adam/Christ Comparison in the Salvation Story

In Chapter 2, we identified possible difficulties with Cottrell’s assumptions concerning the parallel between Adam and Christ. As with the other issues, his motivation flows from seeking to combat original sin with similar assumptions about the parallelism of concepts in Romans 5:12-21. We will now step back from the exegesis of that passage, and look at the overall concept of the Adam/Christ comparison from a theological perspective. What are some of the options for interpreting the Adam/Christ comparison? How does each of them inform our reading of Romans 5:12-21? How does each of them inform our view of original sin and Original Grace? There are three main approaches to the typology of Christ and Adam: (1) the minimalist position where only passages where Adam is specifically mentioned are considered valid, (2) the maximalist approach\(^{151}\) where those specific passages (1 Cor. 15:21-22; 44-49; Rom. 5:12-21) are not the starting point, and (3) the “middling position, which does not limit itself only to explicit references but is less inclusive as to what else in Paul’s writings actually makes a comparison of Christ with Adam viable, based on what appear to be certain connections made by Paul between Christ and the actual language

of Gen. 1-3.”\textsuperscript{152} We will look at representatives of each general perspective to see how they can inform our discussion.

Millard Erickson does not categorize himself as a minimalist, as it is Fee’s descriptive term, but functions as such because he only references Romans 5:12-21 in his discussion of the Adam/Christ comparison. His take on the comparison in the passage is particularly interesting because he accepts some of the original sin position, yet provides solutions to some of the problems sought by the Original Grace position. His view of the passage is as follows:

We were involved in Adam’s sin, and thus receive both the corrupted nature that was his after the fall, and the guilt and condemnation that attach to his sin. With this matter of guilt, however, just as with the imputation of Christ’s righteousness, there must be some conscious and voluntary decision on our part. Until this is the case, there is only a conditional imputation of guilt. Thus, there is no condemnation until one reaches the age of responsibility. If a child dies before becoming capable of making genuine moral decision, the contingent imputation of Adamic sin does not become actual, and the child will experience the same type of future existence with the Lord as will those who have reached the age of moral responsibility and had their sins forgiven as a result of accepting the offer of salvation based upon Christ’s atoning death. The problem of the corrupted nature of such persons is presumably dealt with in the way that the imperfectly sanctified nature of believers will be glorified.\textsuperscript{153}

He expands on how a child becomes responsible for Adam’s sin:

What is the nature of the voluntary decision that ends our childish innocence and constitutes a ratification of the first sin, the fall? One position on this question is that there is no final imputation of the first sin until we commit a sin of our own, thus ratifying Adam’s sin. Unlike the Arminian view, this position holds that at the moment of our first sin we become guilty of both our own sin and the original sin as well. There is another position, however, one which is preferable in that it more fully preserves the parallelism between our accepting the work of Christ and that of Adam, and at the same time it more clearly points out our responsibility for the first sin. We become responsible and guilty when we accept or approve of our corrupt nature . . . But if we acquiesce in that sinful nature, we are in effect saying that it is good. By placing our tacit approval upon the corruption, we are also approving or concurring in the action in the Garden of Eden so long ago. We become guilty of that sin without having committed any sin of our own.\textsuperscript{154}

\textsuperscript{152} These three positions are delimitated in Gordon Fee, \textit{Pauline Christology: An Exegetical-Theological Study} (Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 2007), p. 513. Fee proposes the middling position, and will be our representative for that approach.

\textsuperscript{153} Erickson, p. 656.

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid.
Erickson’s position is interesting in that he believes humans are cursed by original sin due to the transmission of Adamic sin through seminal headship. The extent of original sin includes physical death, depravity and corruption, and even guilt for all people. He appears to have two reasons for dismissing the claim that children are actually guilty: (1) the Bible seems to teach that children are innocent through Jesus (Matt. 18:3; 19:14), David (2 Sam. 12:23), and that they are not morally responsible (Deut. 1:39), and (2) to preserve the parallelism between Adam and Christ in Romans 5:12-21. His position makes sense of the problem that people unconsciously come under the sin of Adam, yet have to consciously be justified by faith. In his system, a person unconsciously becomes physically dead and corrupt, and consciously participates in Adam’s sin in order to become guilty. Thus, the parallel makes more sense of what Paul may mean, namely that Adam brought sin into the world, that all men sin in Adam as they choose to participate in his sin, and all can be made righteous (justified) by faith in Jesus Christ, the second Adam.155 Erickson does not overtly describe, in this context, his exact view of the Adam/Christ comparison, namely what it is to be “in Adam” or “in Christ.” However, he does show what he thinks through implication. He preserves a biblical view of justification, in that it is only by faith, and preserves the dominant biblical model of sin, in that it is a conscious act. He also preserves two values that the Original Grace proponent seeks to protect: (1) that innocent not be guilty of Adam’s sin and therefore be sentenced to hell for something they had no control over, and (2) that Romans 5:12-21 be taken seriously when it comes to the content of Adamic sin, namely that it not be dismissed merely as an illustration, but have real substance. This minimalist approach essentially includes many traditional readings of this passage, including the original sin and Original Grace positions. This approach helps us test the

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155 Erickson sees personal sin as an actual participation in Adam’s sin, not just that Adam is an exemplar that humans follow in imitation. Karl Barth provides an example of one who proposes that Adam is an exemplar. See Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of Reconciliation*, 14 vols (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1985) IV.1, pp. 500-510.
Original Grace position on similar terms and exegetical/theological assumptions. We now turn to the *maximalist* and the *middling* perspectives to see how they inform the comparison at hand.

N.T. Wright has as his starting point, rather than specific references to Adam (1 Cor. 15:21-22; 44-49; Rom. 5:12-21), “the deliberate verbal connection in the Genesis narrative (and beyond) between Adam and Abraham and through Abraham and Israel.” Wright is working in a context of scholarship that has varied views on this issue. Some include specific texts that may refer to Adam, namely Romans 1:18ff; 7:7-12, Philippians 2:5-11, and Colossians 1:15, but there is no consensus. Wright agrees with some of his colleagues that the origin of the Adam/Christ comparison comes to Paul through Jewish writings and tradition, rather than Gnosticism or any other influence. He boils down the contribution of Jewish literature, including the Old Testament, the Scrolls, the Apocrypha and the Pseudepigrapha, to this point:

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\text{God’s purpose for the human race in general have devolved on to, and will be fulfilled in, Israel in particular. Israel is, or will become, God’s true humanity. What God intended for Adam will be given to the seed of Abraham. They will inherit the second Eden, the restored primeval glory. If there is a ‘last Adam’ in the relevant Jewish literature, he is not an individual, whether messianic or otherwise. He is the whole eschatological people of God. If we take ‘Adam’ language out of this context we do not merely distort it; we empty it of its basic content. And if we are to use this material at all for understanding Paul—as I believe we must—we cannot ignore its emphases, or imagine that Paul ignored them, but must ask what he did with them.}^{157}
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Wright then takes this background material to work through the comparisons in 1 Corinthians 12:20-57, Romans 5:12-21, and Philippians 2:5-11. We will look at each of these in turn.

Wright contends that Paul both accepted and rejected elements from Jewish literature. He specifically rejected the idea that Israel was God’s true humanity in favor of Jesus Christ fulfilling that role: “To put it simply: the role traditionally assigned to Israel had devolved on to Jesus Christ. Paul now regarded him, not Israel, as God’s true
humanity.”  

In 15:20-28, Wright identifies the main thrust: “the resurrection of the Messiah as a fact of history does not mean that there is no more resurrection to come, but, on the contrary, when properly understood against its apocalyptic background it actually entails the future resurrection of believers.” In other words, “Paul has thus set up an apocalyptic scheme, revised in the light of the gospel. That is to say he has taken the traditional Jewish framework of the apocalyptic drama and battle, in which the people of God are first surrounded by enemies and are eventually vindicated over them, and has substituted Jesus and his people for Israel, and a string of nameless enemies, culminating in Death itself, for Israel’s political enemies.” Further, Paul is representing the Messiah as the new Israel in that God’s original purpose to rule the world through an obedient humanity (Gen. 1-2), which was lost (Gen. 3), is now restored in Christ. “The Messiah, however has now been installed as the one through whom God is doing what he intended to do, first through humanity and then through Israel. Paul’s Adam–christology is basically an Israel-christology, and is predicated on the identification of Jesus as Messiah, in virtue of his resurrection.”

Wright maintains that Paul’s primary focus in this passage is anthropological, rather than Christological. To this end he views v. 45, “So it is written: "The first man Adam became a living being"; the last Adam, a life-giving spirit,” as an aside to vs. 44 and 46, “it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body. If there is a natural body, there is also a spiritual body.” So it is written: "The first man Adam became a living being"; the last Adam, a life-giving spirit. The spiritual did not come first, but the natural, and after that the spiritual,” which make sense without v. 45. The consequence of this fact, along with the anthropological emphasis is that v. 46 “is perhaps not discussing at all the questions of two mythological ‘men,’ and speculating on their

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159 Ibid., p. 27.
160 Ibid. p. 28.
161 Ibid., p. 29.
162 Ibid.
proper chronological sequence. It is simply pointing out, in line with the passage as a whole, that the physical precedes the spiritual as the seed precedes the plant.”\textsuperscript{163} Thus, Adam and Christ are not primarily in focus, but are being used by Paul to support his assertions about humanity. In other words, “... the first man, Adam, and his humanity was not the end of the story. There is now a new Adam, and he has become a life-giving spirit.”\textsuperscript{164} In summary, Wright explains what we learn from the passage like this:

As last Adam, the representative of the people of God in their eschatological task and role, the Messiah completes his work of obedience on the cross and, being raised up after death, enter upon a new mode of human existence, becoming in one sense the pattern and in another sense the life-giving source for the future resurrection life of those who belong to him. The best background for understanding the Adam-christology of 1 Corinthians 15 turns out to be the Jewish eschatology we sketched earlier. The last Adam is the eschatological Israel, who will be raised from the dead as the vindicated people of God. Paul’s claim is that Jesus, as Messiah, is the realization of Israel’s hope, the focal point and source of life for the people of God.\textsuperscript{165}

Wright now turns to Romans 5:12-21, which contains a much more thorough treatment of the subject, following many of the same principles and assumptions set forth.

Where does Romans 5:12-21 stand in regard to Paul’s overall argument? “5:1-11 then provides an advance summary of the point which is made in various ways throughout chs. 6-8: the privileges of Israel, particularly those of the fulfillment of the law and of being children of God, have been transferred to Christ and thence to those who are ‘in Christ.’ 5:12-21 stands in relation to 1:18-5:11 and chs. 6-8 as the link which holds the two parts together. Summing up the first, it provides the basis for the second.”\textsuperscript{166} Because of Romans 4-5:11, we see clearly that the people of Abraham are the true people of God because they are people of the Messiah.\textsuperscript{167}

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., p. 31. See also, Fee, p. 788, 793.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., p. 33.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., pp. 34-35.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., p. 36.
\textsuperscript{167} Ibid.
These assumptions about Paul’s overall scheme lead to several conclusions. The passage does not merely seek to explain how the last Adam replaced the first Adam, for the task is much larger and more complex. “It is one of Paul’s chief points in Romans, especially in chs. 2, 3, 7 and 9, that Israel too is ‘in Adam,’ (2:17-3:20; 5:20; 7:7ff.). The re-evaluation of his basic theological scheme which Paul was compelled to make mean a new understating of the task to which the true Israel, God’s true Man, was called. He had not merely to replace Adamic humanity with true humanity. He had to deal with the ‘many trespasses,’ and the consequent judgment, which has resulted from the sin of Adam.”168 Thus, Christ did not only provide resurrection through His own (1 Cor. 15), but also was obedient, as the new true humanity, and with that obedience replaced disobedience with righteous, most fully accomplished in this death, the “act of righteousness.” (Rom. 5:18-19) Wright summarizes the entire complex scheme:

There are two tasks, undertaken by Christ, which may be identified. The first, involving the obedience unto death, is essentially (in Paul’s mind) the task by which the old Adamic humanity is redeemed, that is, the task with which Israel had been entrusted. There is a sense in which this is not ‘Adamic,’ in that it was (clearly) not Adam’s task; this is why vv. 15-17 emphasize the initial imbalance between Adam and Christ. The second task, in which there is more obvious balance, is the gift of life which follows directly to the task envisaged in 1 Corinthians 15:20-28, 45. In this latter task, Christ is the obedient human through whom the Father’s will for the world is put into effect (5:21, through Jesus Christ). If this were all that needed to be said, there might have been something in the view that the post-resurrection task of Christ is more truly ‘Adamic’ than the pre-resurrection one; but this is not the whole story. The obedience because of which his is now exalted is precisely the obedience unto death. And, as will become clear when we examine Philippians 2, this obedience is in itself, however paradoxically, ‘Adamic.’ The weakness of the view that sees Christ as last Adam only in his resurrection is that, in sticking too closely (without, perhaps, always realizing it) to the Jewish eschatological model, it fails to provide what Paul achieves: an adequate soteriology. In reacting, not without reason, against a soteriology focused on incarnation, it has instead offered one focused on resurrection. Paul’s is centered firmly on the cross.169

Verses 20-21 further reveal that the Torah magnified sin upon the people of God, who’s representative, Jesus Christ, dealt with fully on the cross, thus redeeming those “in

168 Ibid., p. 37.
Adam” and leading them in to a new existence in the true humanity of which He is the head.\textsuperscript{170}

1 Corinthians 15 and Romans 5:12-21 reveal that Christ is the Messiah and originator of the new humanity through both His resurrection and His death. Adam and Christ are not mythological characters that merely represent Paul’s purpose in both cases. Instead, all people, Jews and Gentiles, were in Adam as those that had committed “many trespasses,” and are made to be “in Christ” when they become part of the new Israel—all humanity that is in Christ.

Wright finds a further expansion of the Adam-christology in Philippians 2:5-11. Specifically, he calls it “Servant-christology,” finding a connection with the Servant in Isaiah 53. He claims that both of these are “Israel-christologies.” As in Romans 5:12-21, Christ is pictured as being obedient, and as Wright argues, he is obedient in the way that Israel was intended to be, as was Adam before him. Christ succeeded where both Adam and Israel failed. “It is not the case that Christ first became human and then adopted the role of the servant. His fundamental mission—the reason for his coming into the world—was to accomplish the task which was marked out for Israel, namely, to undo the sin of Adam. In order to achieve this goal, he became human.”\textsuperscript{171} So, “Adam, in arrogance, thought to become like God; Christ in humility, became human.”\textsuperscript{172} Christ’s act of obedience, as we saw in Romans 5:12-21, is much more than the sin of Adam, and thus cannot be placed in strict parallel. “It does not involve merely the substitution of one sort of humanity for another, but the solution of the problem now inherent in the first sort, namely sin. The temptation of Christ was not to snatch at a forbidden equality with God, but to cling to his rights and thereby opt out of the task allotted to him that he should undo the results of Adam’s snatching.”\textsuperscript{173}

\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., p. 39.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid., p. 61.
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., p. 91.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., pp. 91-92.
Gordon Fee provides for us the *middling* position, where he does not limit his discussion of the Adam/Christ comparison to only explicit references, yet only makes connections to those passages that appear to be certain, especially with the actual language of Genesis 1-3. Although not as narrowly as the minimalist would, he uses the direct references in 1 Cor. 15 and Rom. 5 to be a kind of starting point, rather than other starting points that we saw in Wright.

Fee begins from three passages that speak of Christ’s role in Paul’s “new creation” theology. These passages flow from the new creation spoken of in Isaiah 65:17-25. The first is 2 Corinthians 5:14-17:

> 14 For Christ's love compels us, because we are convinced that one died for all, and therefore all died. 15 And he died for all, that those who live should no longer live for themselves but for him who died for them and was raised again. 16 So from now on we regard no one from a worldly point of view. Though we once regarded Christ in this way, we do so no longer.

Here, Christ’s role in the bringing of the new creation, specifically the individual, is through His death and resurrection. Fee states that, “The new creation, he argues, brought about by Christ’s death and resurrection, nullifies viewing anything any longer from the old-age point of view (κατ' σάρκα [*according to the flesh*]).”

The second text is Galatians 6:14-16:

> 14 May I never boast except in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, through which the world has been crucified to me, and I to the world. 15 Neither circumcision nor uncircumcision means anything; what counts is a new creation. 16 Peace and mercy to all who follow this rule, even to the Israel of God.” Fee explains that, “. . . again in the context of the cross (and assumed resurrection) Paul asserts that the old order that distinguished people on the basis of circumcision has yielded to the new.”

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174 Fee, p. 514.
175 Ibid.
These two verses provide the context for Colossians 3:9-11: “Do not lie to each other, since you have taken off your old self with its practices and have put on the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge in the image of its Creator. Here there is no Greek or Jew, circumcised or uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave or free, but Christ is all, and is in all.” Verse 10 specifically uses εκών (image) to describe Christ, which Paul also used in 1:13-15: “. . . having earlier (1:15) identified Christ as the bearer of the divine image, he adds that the “new person is thus being newly created . . . in keeping with the εκών of him who has [thus] created the new person.” This language, he contends, echoes Genesis 1:26-26 and 9:6. Fee explains why this connection matters:

The one who as the Son of God bears the divine image is also the one who by virtue of his death and resurrection is now re-creating a people in that same image. Significantly, for our present purposes, this passage contains all three of the matters that here concern us: (1) the new creation, in which (2) God’s new people are being restored into the divine image, and (3) that this is effected by Christ, the divine image-bearer. It is this combination of ideas and language that is crucial christologically with regard to any real significance that Christ might have as the “second Adam.”

These assumptions form the foundation by which Fee approaches both explicit and non-explicit comparisons between Adam and Christ.

Fee first deals with the explicit references: 1 Corinthians 15:20-22; 44-49 and Romans 5:12-21. Of the 1 Corinthians passage, he explains that, “. . . in both instances of this analogy in 1 Cor 15, Paul’s concern is singular: Christ in his humanity, through death and resurrection, has not simply identified with us as human beings but has set a future resurrection in motion—as the new creation with its eventual realization of a new body, fully adapted to the life of the future. And all of this because in his incarnation he bore a body that was truly in keeping with that of Adam.”

He explains how Romans 5:12-21 contributes to the overall new creation theology:

176 Ibid., p. 517.
The issue now, however, is not death itself but rather the cause of death, sin. Nonetheless, despite the focus on sin and righteousness that led to this analogy—a focus that is repeated throughout and follows from it—Paul continues with this analogy to emphasize death and life. What Adam let loose in the world was sin, which led to death; what Christ brought into the world was righteousness, which leads to life; and as with 1 Cor 15, the emphasis through this passage is on the repeated use of θροπος for both Adam and Christ.\(^{177}\)

Fee does not stop at these explicit passages, however. He continues beyond them: “... there is every good reason to believe that Paul’s referenced to the Son of God as bearing the divine “image” (Rom 8:29; Col 1:13-19; cf. 1 Cor 15:49; 2 Cor 3:18-4:6; Col 3:10) are intentionally contrasting Christ as “second Adam” with the first Adam. This seems especially to be so because, in Paul’s first use of εκόν in this way (1 Cor 15:49), he himself deliberately sets out this contrast in an Adam/Christ context.”

The example of how this plays out in 1 Corinthians 15:44-49 will be sufficient to show the consequences of this approach. Fee contends that the primary contrast is between these two bodies, one that is earthly and one that is heavenly, but “It is the ‘same’ body now adapted for the life of the future.”\(^{178}\) What he means by this is that, “the emphasis lies primarily with Christ’s bearing the imago dei in his human life, even if the first emphasis is on his truly human, but now transformed, body. There is no emphasis here on the fact that he bore this image because he was divine; rather, in his coming as the ‘second Adam,’ he did what Adam failed to do; bear the divine image in his humanity and thus serve as a progenitor of all others who do the same, which has Christ’s present eschatological existences as the final goal.”\(^{179}\)

We have now explored three approaches to the Adam/Christ comparison that will help us to evaluate Original Grace. Erickson, the minimalist, Wright, the maximalist, and Fee, from the middling perspective, agree on the basic premise that Adam and Christ have an important connection that ultimately communicates the truth of the Gospel message for the salvation of humanity. Erickson begins with a relatively

\(^{177}\) Ibid.

\(^{178}\) Ibid., p. 519.

\(^{179}\) Ibid.
normal approach to the two principle texts, namely Romans 5:12-21 and 1 Corinthians 15, in a traditional way. In other words, he finds original sin in the passage that has been transmitted upon humanity by Adam. His choice of seminal headship over federal headship, and other usual conclusions on controversial concepts is not what is important to the current discussion. We use Erickson’s approach to exemplify one of the possible scenarios that comes out of a minimalist approach to the Adam/Christ comparison. His fundamental assumption that the Adam/Christ comparisons need to be taken so directly, as he does, leads to discussions about concepts like original sin, how justification occurs for those under original sin, whether babies are condemned, and when or if a person becomes responsible for the sin of Adam, just to mention some of the most important. Beginning from the minimalist assumptions, we concluded that Erickson’s view does solve many of the exegetical and theological problems, especially as posed by Romans 5:12-21. He generally maintains the integrity of the Adam/Christ comparison by finding an effect/counter effect relationship. He takes seriously Paul’s words about Adam being responsible for death and condemnation, but also seeks to integrate this assumption with other texts about the innocence of those that have not consciously sinned. Thus, by saying that no one is guilty of Adam’s sin until they participate in it by sinning themselves, he maintains the innocent status of children, and yet still explains what Paul may have meant by describing Adam as the progenitor of sin and death. He also preserves the normal meaning of justification, discussed previously, in that it is grace through faith, and not applied by God or received by humanity unconsciously. Even if one does not conclude that Erickson is correct, his approach at least seems more consistent with the Pauline texts, and New Testament theology as a whole, than Original Grace.

What if we take an approach to the comparison like that of Wright or Fee? Both come at the problem from different starting points, but in at least one sense, both are
very similar to one another. Instead of taking a traditional view of the direct comparison between Adam and Christ, they take a much more communal view. Wright traces Adam to Abraham, Abraham to Israel, then Israel to the Church (the entire people of God). His motif traces God’s covenants with his people. Fee sees the primary motif as a comparison between the old and new creations, with Adam as the head of the old and Christ the head of the new. We will not critique these approaches here, but instead we will explore how this general approach could affect Original Grace.

We have already said that Original Grace is parasitic on a traditional reading of Romans 5:12-21 that assumes some kind of original sin to be the case. In other words, it assumes that there must be a direct comparison between Adam’s sin and its consequences, and Christ’s righteous act and its consequences, which plays out with original sin being the case, at least potentially, and a new approach, Original Grace, counteracting that sin. Let us be clear that it does not matter what conclusions Wright and Fee draw from the text about original sin. What informs this discussion is the general approach to this topic. The maximalist and middling approaches take a much broader view of the entire redemption scheme. They see the Adam/Christ comparison as an important part of that scheme, but not in the same way as the minimalist approach that can play out in the traditional view of original sin, or even something as unique as Original Grace. For example, Adam is not seen just as the first man that brought sin and condemnation that, through his individual nature, passed death and condemnation to all people. Sure, this is part of the story, but by no means the end of it. Instead, Adam is seen as a representative or even prototype of the old creation or the original covenant breaker. So, if we view Adam as the representative of the old creation that is made new in Christ, including creation and humans, and as the representative humanity that was disobedient, as was Israel, that needed to be made into new Israel, our perspective widens drastically.
Several important things shift in our view of the original sin, Original Grace, and the Adam/Christ debate, if viewed from this “God’s-eye view.” First, we may view Adam’s role in the redemption story differently. The minimalist makes Adam the first sinner that brings death, and perhaps even condemnation, but misses this bigger picture. These broader approaches certainly do not (?) exclude this possibility. However, it is at least possible to understand Paul to be primarily making the point that the old creation, as exemplified by the first man, Adam, who brought the creation down through sin, has already been made new in Christ. (Fee) Stated differently, Adam was supposed to keep a covenant with God that the rest of humanity would keep by remaining obedient, but he broke the covenant. God passes the covenant to Abraham and his seed (Israel) that also break the covenant. He then sends the second Adam (Christ) to renew the covenant and establish the people of God, encompassing Jews and Gentiles, who are the seed of Adam, physically, but are now the seed of Christ, spiritually. (Wright) These two approaches essentially take a step back and view redemption as a much bigger picture. Perhaps Paul had a similar picture in mind and did not intend to convey anything like what exists today as original sin, and in turn, Original Grace. This bigger picture, in other words, allows us to read explicit Adam Christ comparisons, and even non-explicit ones under debate, in a way that does not necessitate anything that exists in the original sin or Original Grace models. Perhaps Paul intends to say that what has been marred because of sin, represented by Adam, has been made new by Christ, as he brings both a new creation and a new Israel.

Second, this approach allows us to view sin more globally, as a universal, all-encompassing problem that is part of the old creation, brought on by past and present disobedience. In other words, Adam did not just bring a depraved nature or even guilt, if he brought those things at all. Instead, Adam and all of those that participate with him are covenant breakers, and part of the old order until the entire sin problem is dealt
with, not just Adamic sin, but personal sin, a marred cosmos, and whatever else sin has
damaged or destroyed. This view of sin is less narrow than the Adamic/personal sin
distinction that is sometimes made in Christian theology. Perhaps that distinction is
helpful up to a point, but it does not account for the profound effects of sin in that it has
utterly derailed all that God intended.

Finally, drawing from the first two points, that Adam’s role as representative is
much superior to the concept that he just brought original sin and/or death, and that sin
should be viewed much more broadly than it is in a minimalist view, Christ is also more
accurately portrayed as the creator of the new Israel and the new creation, rather than
just one who counteracts Adamic and/or personal sin, depending on the approach. I do
not mean to suggest that theologians in the minimalist camp do not support such a
premise, for they certainly do. I mean, however, that these broader views concerning
Christ and Adam do greater justice to the entire scheme of redemption. Adam, sin, and
Christ, as viewed by this perspective, are given their due, specifically in regard to the
entire biblical picture of salvation, to a much greater extent than a narrow view of the
Adam/Christ comparison.

These broader views on Adam and Christ do not negate the possibility of
original sin, and the corresponding response of Original Grace, but perhaps they, if
followed to these aforementioned conclusions, ask us to step back and consider that
original sin and Original Grace are perhaps not the intention of Paul’s teaching. Instead,
he means to show that where humanity has brought ruin, Christ brings restoration.

3.2.3.2 The Content of “in Adam” and “in Christ”

The Original Grace position takes a limited view of the content of “in Adam”
and “in Christ.” We saw this in Chapter 2 and explored it only briefly. At least in the
context of Romans 5:12-21, it appears that the Original Grace position takes “in Adam”
to be the fact that all people are potentially under the sentence of death and
condemnation because of his sin, and that “in Christ” amounts to being justified from the consequences of Adamic sin. To be fair, in Cottrell’s case, for example, he does seem to recognize that being “in Adam” also includes personal sin and that “in Christ” includes being justified by faith, but this is secondary at best, in that it does not greatly affect his reading of Romans 5:12-21. Put plainly, he believes in the usual Protestant model of personal sin and justification by faith, but this is not brought to bear on the passage.

As we saw in the previous subsection about the overall purpose of the Adam/Christ comparison, being “in Adam” includes all kinds of symbolism related to the covenants with God, which were broken by humanity, and that “in Christ” symbolizes the renewal of those covenants in the second Adam, Jesus Christ. So, in terms of the overall biblical picture of salvation, it would appear that the Adam/Christ comparison is much larger than just a discussion of individual sin (whether it is understood as original sin, or not) and individual salvation. But, there is a greater problem. Is the Original Grace position fundamentally flawed because it understands what it is to be “in Adam” and “in Christ” too narrowly? The deep-seated problem, I contend, is that “in Adam” should be understood as much more limited, metaphysically, than “in Christ.” Whether “in Adam” should be defined as a symbolic identification with the first man, who was a sinner, on one end of the spectrum, or that all of humanity is physically, spiritually, and eternally dead due to Adam’s seminal headship, being a very real metaphysical relationship, it should not be construed as containing nearly the same quality or quantity of metaphysical content as the reality of being “in Christ.” Being “in Christ” constitutes a reality involving several levels of spiritual reality, including ecclesiastical, pneumatological, and eschatological realities. The Original Grace position would agree that “in Christ” is vastly superior to “in Adam.” This is important to see, because I am not accusing the position of degrading the concept of “in
Instead, I am suggesting that, in regard to this conversation about original sin and Original Grace, it appears that the assumption is that these two concepts are essentially the same, but on opposite ends of a spectrum. This leads to a misunderstanding, both theological and exegetically, that brings the doctrine of Original Grace into question. More, specifically, as we saw in Ch. 2, it leads to a one-to-one comparison of the concepts which is one of the key assumptions that makes the doctrine of Original Grace possible. This is not to say that one should not see a comparison and contrast of Adam and Christ in the New Testament, for there certainly is such a concept taught. Instead, we must question approaches, like Original Grace, that take the comparison/contrast in such a strict manner. Fundamentally, the issue rests on this question: If “in Adam” and “in Christ” are metaphysically distinct, should the Adam/Christ comparison be interpreted as the proponents of Original Grace have suggested? In order to make this case, we will broaden our scope by bringing other theological perspectives to bear on this issue.

Dunn provides a thorough treatment of what he called “Adam Christology.” He takes a maximalist position somewhat similar to that of Wright in that he finds references to Adam in many more New Testament texts than are blatantly obvious. Specifically in regard to Romans, he finds direct references to Adam in 1:18-25; 3:23; 5:12-19; 7:7-11; and 8:19-22. Describing what he finds in each passage, briefly, will help us understand his contribution to our understanding of “in Adam” before we turn to “in Christ.” First, Rom. 1:18-25 should be read as a summary of Gen. 1-3, where references to “man” should be understood as representative of Adam. Dunn is not claiming that Paul is excluding other humans in the description of sinfulness, but that he has Adam in the Garden in mind. For example we see, “Adam as a man enjoying knowledge of God plainly revealed to him (1.19,21), as a crown of God’s creation enjoying the full benefits of God’s power manifested in creation (1.20), enjoying the
truth of God as yet unclouded by sin (1.25). But, as Gen. 3 goes on to relate, Adam did
not honour God as God or accept his role with gratitude (1.21) he did not acknowledge
God (1.28); instead he believed the serpent’s distortion of God’s command, exchanged
the truth of God for a lie (1.25).180 He claims Paul continues his reflection on Gen. 3
in Rom. 3:23:

Man, Adam, by virtue of his creation in the image of God was given a share in
the glory of God, the visible splendour of God’s power as Creator. But by his
sin he forfeited that glory. Not only so, but his exclusion from the garden shut
him out from the tree of life, cut him off from the eternal life that God had
intended him to enjoy . . . man’s plight was that he had attempted to escape his
creatureliness and to snatch at divinity, and thereby had forfeited the glory he
already enjoyed and failed to attain the fuller glory of God had intended for
him.181

Briefly, he says of Rom. 5:12-19 that Paul is reflecting the sin and consequences for
Adam’s sin in Gen. 3 by using words like “transgression,” “sin,” and “death,” just to
name a few. No matter what one concludes about original sin from this passage, Paul is
using Adam to represent sinful humanity and Christ to represent all who believe unto
righteousness. In, Rom. 7:7-11 we see Paul’s description of the everyman who was
“alive once apart from the law.” Dunn contends that this could not be autobiographical
of Paul, but must be Paul’s attempt to use Adam to represent every man’s struggle with
sin. Finally, in Rom. 8:19-22, Dunn finds the decayed creation subjected to futility as it
is brought down by Adam’s fall.182

Dunn defines the content of Adam Christology found in Paul in three elements:
(1) “salvation as the fashioning or reshaping of the believer into the image of God,” (2)
“salvation as the restoration of the believer to the glory which man now lacks as a result
of his/Adam’s sin (Rom. 3.23),” and (3) “Jesus is the indispensable model or pattern for
this process.” The restoration of the image and glory of the man is accomplished by
both the “earthly Jesus” and “last Adam.” In 1 Cor. 15, we see both the earthly Jesus (v.

181 Ibid., pp. 102-103.
182 Ibid., p. 104.
22) and the risen Jesus or last Adam (v. 45-49). He contends that the earthly Jesus is primarily in view in Rom. 5:12-21. \(^{183}\) 1 Cor. 15 is reflective on Rom. 5 in this way: “The archetype of the first Adam stamps all men with death and until death; the archetype of the last Adam is the image and the power of resurrection from the dead.” \(^{184}\) Jesus was in the pattern of the first Adam up until his resurrection, then became the last Adam: “. . . up to and including his death Christ himself was patterned according to the archetype of the first Adam, ‘born of woman’ (Ga. 4.4), ‘in the (precise) likeness of sinful flesh’ (Rom. 8:3); only with the resurrection did Christ become himself archetype of a new man, eschatological man, the last Adam.” \(^{185}\)

Dunn finds Rom. 5:12-19 to be focused solely on the earthly Jesus, rather than the last Adam because he was “patterned according to the archetype of Adam (Rom. 5.14), about the man who ‘recapitulated’ Adam’s fate (as an act of obedience rather than a consequences of sin), who repeated but reversed the drama which brought about man’s fallenness (so also Phil. 2.6-11). That is to say, he is talking about Jesus as the one who shattered the mould of Adam’s archetype, who broke through Adam’s death to resurrection beyond, to a new humanity beyond (cf. Eph. 2.14f.).” \(^{186}\) So, the last Adam is the one who brings the new humanity into its new reality, rather than the earthly Adam:

But the new humanity is life from the other side of death, shaped by power from the other side of death (the life-giving Spirit). Paul does not usually speak of the believer being patterned according to the image of the earthly Jesus, his ministry his teaching. And he thinks in terms of the believer sharing in Christ’s death only because Christ has lived through Adam’s fate to resurrection life beyond; so that only those who share in the death of Adam as experienced by Christ will share also in the resurrection life of Christ, that is, only those who follow out of the pattern of Adam to death with Christ will be stamped with the pattern of Christ’s resurrected humanity, only those who follow the footsteps of the pioneer will be crowned like him with honour and glory and thus fulfill God’s original purpose for man. \(^{187}\)

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\(^{183}\) Ibid., p. 126.  
\(^{184}\) Ibid., p. 127.  
\(^{185}\) Ibid.  
\(^{186}\) Ibid.  
\(^{187}\) Ibid.
Although the earthly Jesus shares a fundamental quality with Adam and the rest of humanity, namely his human nature, this metaphysical similarity transforms to extreme dissimilarity when Christ, on the other side of death, becomes the last Adam, and fundamentally changes those who are in him. By sharing in our humanity, Christ provides a way of transformation for all of humanity. Just as Christ, after conquering death, destroys the mold of the old humanity while creating a new one, so humanity is able to participate in this destruction/re-creation when they are “stamped with the pattern of Christ’s resurrected humanity.”

So, even if we take Romans 5:12-21 to primarily be about Adam and the earthly Christ, as Dunn does, we must still view Christology with a wider lens by seeing the last Adam that is metaphysically distinct from the first Adam. We now widen our view and turn to the concept of “union with Christ” as expressed throughout the New Testament.

Union with Christ is a concept sometimes designated as “mystical union” in recognition of its immensity and elements that humans simply will never understand. It is, however, of supreme importance as it is perhaps the summative concept of what it means to be a saved Christian believer. Grudem defines “union with Christ” as follows: “Union with Christ is a phrase used to summarize several different relationships between believers and Christ, through which Christians receive very benefit of salvation. These relationships include the fact that we are in Christ, Christ is in us, we are like Christ, and we are with Christ.” We will explore these four aspects as they widen our understanding of “in Christ” to include not only Christological elements, which we have partially explored, but also ecclesiological and pneumatological elements.

First, Christians are in Christ. God chose believers to be “in him before the creation” (Eph. 1:4). Apparently God had believers in mind from before we ever sinned

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188 Ibid.
and had a plan to bring us into relationship with him. Paul shares some of the important elements in this passage:

11In him we were also chosen, having been predestined according to the plan of him who works out everything in conformity with the purpose of his will, 12in order that we, who were the first to hope in Christ, might be for the praise of his glory. 13And you also were included in Christ when you heard the word of truth, the gospel of your salvation. Having believed, you were marked in him with a seal, the promised Holy Spirit, 14who is a deposit guaranteeing our inheritance until the redemption of those who are God's possession—to the praise of his glory. (Eph. 1:11-14)

Most importantly, we find that believers have hope in Christ that will save them, and that their guarantee of that salvation is the Holy Spirit himself. Believers also share in the redemptive actions of Christ, namely his obedience (Rom. 5:19), his death (Rom. 6:6), his resurrection and ascension (Eph. 2:6). Christians live out these elements in their lives through the work of the Holy Spirit: (1) “dying and rising with Christ” (Col. 2:12), (2) living a new life in Christ (2 Tim. 1:1), (3) performing actions in Christ (Phil. 4:13), (4) exist in unity with the Body of Christ (Rom. 12:5). Each one highlights different aspects of the concept of being “in Christ.” We see, as we put all four together, the interaction of the Christological, pneumatological, and ecclesiological elements, as the believer dies with Christ, and raises with Him to live a new life through, acts-righteously, and lives in community. The Holy Spirit’s work is most apparent in the regeneration to life, the changing of behavior, and in the unity of the Body. Of course, the body itself is synonymous with the Church. We will see these elements fleshed out in the next three aspects of “union with Christ.”

Second, Christ is in Christians. Jesus promised this kind of relationship in John 15:5 when he said, “I am the vine; you are the branches. If a man remains in me and I in him, he will bear much fruit; apart from me you can do nothing.” This concept is seen even more clearly in the context of salvation in Galatians 2:20: “I have been crucified with Christ and I no longer live, but Christ lives in me. The life I live in the body, I live

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189 Ibid., pp. 843-844.
by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me.” Finally, Christ living in believers is evidenced by obedience and the presence of the Spirit: “Those who obey his commands live in him, and he in them. And this is how we know that he lives in us: We know it by the Spirit he gave us.” (1 John 3:24)

Third, Christians are like Christ. This concept boils down to simply imitating Christ in our thoughts and actions. For example, Paul encourages believers to “be imitators of me, as I am of Christ.” (1 Cor. 1:11) This applies the way Christians love (Eph. 5:25), forgive (Col. 3:13), and even suffer (1 Peter 2:21). Ultimately, Christians are to grow in maturity (Eph. 4:13, 15) and “be conformed to the image of his Son” (Rom. 8:29).

Fourth, Christians are with Christ. In this regard, Christians have actual union with the Trinity, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and have fellowship with Christ and his body. Grudem summarizes the biblical evidence for all of the aspects of this aspect of the union:

We are *in the Father* (John 17:21; 1 Thess. 1:1; 2 Thess. 1:1; 1 John 2:24; 4:15-16; 5:20) and *in the Holy Spirit* (Rom. 8:9; 1 Cor. 3:16; 6:19; 2 Tim. 1:14). *The Father is in us* (John 14:23) and *the Holy Spirit is in us* (Rom. 8:9, 11). We are *like the Father* (Matt. 5:44-45, 48; Eph. 4:32; Col. 3:10; 1 Peter 1:15-16) and *like the Holy Spirit* (Rom. 8:4-6; Gal. 5:22-23; John 16:13). We have fellowship *with the Father* (1 John 1:3; Matt. 6:9; 2 Cor. 6:16-18) and *with the Holy Spirit* (Rom. 8:16; Acts 15:28; 2 Cor. 13:14; Eph. 4:30). These additional relationships [to Christ] are not blurred into distinctionless, mystical ecstasy, however. Both now and in eternity we related to the Father in his distinct role as our heavenly Father, to the Son in his distinct role as our Savior and Lord, and to the Holy Spirit in his distinct role as the spirit who empowers us and continually applies to us as all the benefits of our salvation.

Included in our relationships with the members of the Godhead, we also have personal fellowship with Christ. For example, 1 Cor. 1:19 makes it plain that, “God, who has called you into fellowship with his Son Jesus Christ our Lord, is faithful.” Christ promised to be present with us on at least occasions (Matt. 18:20; Matt. 28:20) and we

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190 Ibid., pp. 844-845.
191 Ibid., p. 847.
learn from Paul that we live our lives in his presence (2 Cor. 2:10; 1 Tim. 5:21; 6:13-14; 2 Tim. 4:1).

This concept of “union with Christ” is certainly more expansive than this Chapter’s length or purpose will allow us to treat. Suffice it to say that our look at the biblical concept of “union with Christ,” and “in Christ” specifically, has yielded important results to our discussion of the Adam/Christ comparison. In one limited regard, it is fair to say that the concepts of “in Adam” and “in Christ” are similar. They have enough commonality to be compared and contrasted by Paul in Romans 5:12-21 and 1 Cor. 15. They are metaphysically similar only in the location where the two cross, namely where Christ takes on the mold of Adam and the rest of humanity, redeems it, and then breaks the mold. Once the believer passes beyond being “in Adam” and into the new humanity “in Christ” the similarities cease. The last Adam, Christ, restored humanity up to and beyond the point at which Adam was intended to exist. Thus, as some have said, being “in Adam” is perhaps best understood as one dimensional, while, as we have vividly seen, being “in Christ” is multidimensional.

What does this mean for our discussion and critical analysis of Original Grace? As we concluded in our discussion of the Adam/Christ comparison itself, we also concluded in our discussion of the metaphysical realities of the two concepts. It is likely not Paul’s intent to use the Adam/Christ comparison or use the concepts of “in Adam” or “in Christ” to create doctrines of either original sin or Original Grace. In line with the aim of this project, it is not our aim to make a judgment on the complex discussion of original sin, although this evidence may perhaps indict it in the same way as it does Original Grace. Our focus remains the doctrine of Original Grace. Especially in the regard to the principal text on the topic, Romans 5:12-21, we can now perhaps view Original Grace and the corresponding doctrine of original sin in a new light. The most telling charge we can level against Original Grace and therefore bring it into
question is by inquiring whether the strict comparison/contrast between the consequences of the works of Adam and Christ is valid. Although our case is not conclusive, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that the concepts of “in Adam” and “in Christ” are vastly different in quality and quantity and therefore should not be used to create a scenario where Christ’s redemptive work provides a direct counteraction of everything brought on humanity by Adam, i.e. Original Grace. To be fair, the drastic metaphysical differences between the two concepts do not logically exclude the possibility of the much deeper “in Christ” counteracting the much shallower “in Adam.” The difficulty is in proving that this is, in fact, what Paul intended to communicate in Romans 5:12-21, and that assumption relies heavily on the very strict comparison/contrast between the two, which the drastic differences appear to make difficult to prove.

3.3.0 ASSESSMENT OF THE VIABILITY OF ORIGINAL GRACE AS PART OF THE TRADITIONAL AND CONTEMPORARY STONE-CAMPBELL SOTERIOLOGICAL SYSTEM

In summary, in Chapter 1, we explored, historically, how the doctrine of Original Grace originated and developed in different Christian traditions, especially the Anabaptist, Wesleyan, and Stone-Campbell traditions, by surveying the works of the proponents of Original Grace in which they discuss the doctrine in order to demonstrate the place of Original Grace within each tradition, and to make specific connections from the ideas of each writer to their respective theological, philosophical, and historical influences. In Chapter 2, we explored and tested the biblical justifications provided for the doctrine from within the Stone-Campbell Movement as seen in the exegetical work of Jack Cottrell on Romans 5:12-21, who represents the most current and developed version of the doctrine of Original Grace. We subjected that exegetical position to eight critical questions. From that analysis, we identified three central issues that needed
further theological inquiry: (1) the extent and meaning of “justification,” (2) the distinction between Adamic and personal sin, and (3) the nature of the Adam/Christ comparison. In Chapter 3, after clarifying the four major theological terms, original sin, grace, justification, and freedom, within historical theology, we discussed the theological and practical implications of Original Grace in a wider conversation of Christian soteriology in order to account for the contributions of the doctrine, to subject it to critique, and ultimately, to determine the viability of that doctrine as a coherent part of Stone-Campbell soteriology. We built atop our historical and exegetical explorations in order to give a full account of Original Grace. We looked at what the repair of the wider theological tradition would look like if one stood on the foothold created by this exegesis, what aspects of the wider tradition would be changed, what kind of overall construal of the tradition would result, and whether these kinds of repair would turn out to be constructive or destructive in theological terms.

The doctrine of Original Grace sets out a scenario in which humanity is both free and responsible, free from both condemnation and depravity, only becoming condemned and depraved if they choose to sin themselves, and free to either accept or reject the offered grace in the Gospel of Christ by faith. This freedom and responsibility is won by Christ’s victory over sin in His death on the cross. This movement of grace provides a unique, creative, and interesting critique of original sin, and contributes important points to that historically long and complex discussion. Nevertheless, on the critical side, Original Grace holds open this interesting possibility only by making theological assumptions and conclusions that raise significant concern as to the doctrine’s validity. We found that Original Grace demands two movements of grace in the larger soteriological picture, which necessitates a hard distinction between Adamic and personal sin, and between a movement of irresistible grace and a movement of grace received by faith, both of which are termed “justification.” In addition, Original
Grace demands a strict comparison and contrast of “in Adam” and “in Christ,” both in theological and metaphysical terms. Each of these distinctions raises significant exegetical concerns, which we first introduced in Chapter 2, and deep theological difficulties, which, in this chapter, we have found untenable.

Original Grace could not rightly be considered a central tenant of the Stone-Campbell Movement’s doctrinal position. Each of the writers surveyed in Chapter 1 hold very influential positions in the Movement’s history, but Original Grace has not been widely accepted. What most, or perhaps all, do accept is that original sin, especially as found in Romans 5, does not include original guilt. Views vary on the level of depravity, from a Pelagian (none at all) to a semi-Augustinian (partial depravity—sin is inevitable) view. Wherever the theologian may stand on this spectrum, original guilt is denied along with its implications, such as infant baptism and the condemnation of the innocent.

In essence, the central tenant of the Stone-Campbell position is the denial of original guilt derived from Adams’ sin, no matter the method of arriving to that position. In that general sense, this discussion is absolutely vital to each of that tradition’s writer’s discussion of soteriology. Several things are derived from this position: the denial of concepts such as infant baptism, total depravity and thus the need for God to act before salvation can be obtained, and the acceptance of human freedom being vital to a correct understanding of sin and salvation. The two major approaches can be divided thus: (1) either Romans 5:12-21 is believed to simply not teach original guilt, specifically, or original sin altogether, or (2) they teach a version of Original Grace. Theologically, each position arrives in the same practical location: the innocent are not condemned by Adam’s sin. Exegetically and theologically, however, they differ drastically. The first position, the denial of original sin/guilt in Romans 5, may be guilty of ignoring Paul’s seemingly apparent language on the consequences of Adam’s
sin. In other words, can one go so far as to say that Paul is not describing even the mildest version of original sin? The Original Grace position seeks to take Paul’s language at face value, namely that Adam’s sin brought perhaps very dire consequences upon humanity. Yet, it also aims to give due justice to Paul’s language about the all-sufficiency of the work of Christ in regards to sin. On the other hand, the first position may indeed be correct that the passage does not teach original sin, but instead that Adam was just the first to sin among humanity, and the second position may be incorrect because of the difficulties raised in both Chapters 2 and 3.

So, despite a small number of proponents of this position across Stone-Campbell scholarship, does Original Grace have at least some validly within the Movement’s theology? Yes. Historically speaking, it has not received a general acceptance for the theologians in the Movement. Instead, it appears to be limited to the Stone-Campbell theologians surveyed in Chapter 1. But these theologians are major figures in the Movement. More specifically, is there any evidence that makes it logically contradictory with the overall theological framework? No. It comes down to the ultimate conclusion of the doctrine, as discussed earlier in this section: original guilt from Adam’s sin does not apply to the innocent. Whether one simply denies the validity of original guilt, or if Original Grace serves to counteract it, the conclusion is the same.

This project has provided not a criticism that claims to be objective and neutral, but a criticism from within the Movement from a servant of the Movement. We have shown, however, that significant difficulties arise from perspectives within and outside of the Movement. The largest difficulty with Original Grace existing in the Stone-Campbell Movement is the possible contradiction with one of its core principles, namely its emphasis on well-established biblical evidence as being the primary basis for Christian doctrine. We have raised many difficulties both of an exegetical and a
theological nature. The exegetical problems appear to be even more telling than the theological ones. For a Movement where exegesis is so important, this creates a difficult situation, at best, and an impossible situation at worst. So, should the Stone-Campbell Movement seek to make Original Grace a central component of its overall understanding of salvation? The theological implications that we have explored are certainly productive to consider, in that they bring to light difficulties with the exegesis of Romans 5:12-21 and with the doctrine of original sin. If we could somehow prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that original sin is the case, then perhaps Original Grace should be taken up as an answer, as they rest on very similar assumptions. It is likely a much more exegetically and theologically responsible approach for the Movement to answer the challenge of original sin by holding to the position that Paul does not intend to teach original sin in Romans 5:12-21, or in any other passage, in the first place. We conclude this project by recognizing the positive contribution of Original Grace, yet remain unconvinced that it should ultimately be considered a valid component of Christian, and more specifically, Stone-Campbell (Restoration) Movement doctrine. Unless, or until, successful repair can be performed on Original Grace, we must determine that the doctrine is ultimately untenable.
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