Italian Football in an Era of Globalisation: Neo-Patrimony, New Localism and Decline

Submitted by Mark Doidge to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology In October 2010

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Abstract

Italy and Italian football have captured the imagination of writers and fans across the globe. The Italia '90 world cup reaffirmed Italy’s standing as a world power in football. It also marked a turning point in global sport. At the end of the twentieth century, global sport underwent a period of profound transformation. In parallel to similar processes taking place elsewhere in politics, economics and society, sport was entering a period of de-regulation and commodification, which impacted national leagues and local fans. Despite the intensification of transnational global networks resulting from de-regulation, individual nation states still hold significant power. Likewise, national leagues are still significant to football clubs despite the growth of global markets and transnational competitions. Yet these global processes of commodification and de-regulation have impacted fans in vastly different ways.

This thesis provides analysis of Italian football in relation to the impact of the changing global political economy. Through analysis of the Italian political economy, it will identify the complex personal networks operating across Italian business, politics and football. This has witnessed the emergence of a number of significant charismatic leaders who operate across these networks and utilise patronage to gain an advantage. These patrimonial networks were initially successful, as Italian football quickly adapted to the changing global economy. However, it has not capitalised on this early success. Italian clubs are struggling financially in relation to their European peers. This has been compounded by a series of crises have impacted Italian football.

The crises within Italian society and football have impacted the engagement of fans. Political engagement has fallen and this is replicated in the stadiums. The historical failure of the Italian state to impose itself has been further undermined by globalisation processes. Traditional regional identities have been reinforced as globalisation has further weakened the nation state. Changes to the patterns of consumption have combined with these traditional identities and has led to a greater particularisation in society. Individualism and regionalism have grown, and this has led to a decline in engagement with wider public life and social capital. One aspect of this decline has been demonstrated by several high profile violent incidents, and deaths at Italian matches. The impact of this decline will be addressed in relation to the formation of supporters’ groups and the match-day experiences of fans. Ultimately this decline is financially affecting the clubs which further contributes to the overall crisis within Italian football.
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Preface

It was whilst sipping a nice glass of Primitivo in the courtyard of the British School at Rome that this thesis became envisioned. I had been studying sport and fitness in Ancient Rome as part of my Masters and through a conversation with an archaeologist friend, it was concluded that Italian football would make an apposite subject of study. The wheels were set in motion for a journey that would allow me to complete several personal ambitions.

Yet journeys rarely begin and end in isolation. The journey that took me to Rome to study the wonders of the city’s ancient civilisation began in less extravagant places than the courtyard of the British School at Rome. A nondescript schooling and university education led to a ‘sensible’ career in the logistics department of a (paradoxical) local multinational telecommunications company. Climbing the corporate ladder resulted in me having to implement a wide range of strategies and plans. Team working and kaizen were introduced to our manufacturing lines as the company embraced the telecommunications revolution. The dot.com bubble was inflating and our company was adapting to capitalise on the boom. Technology and telecommunications accelerated, transforming our working patterns and our lives as we struggled to maintain the momentum. Yet our human endeavour could not prevent the bubble from bursting.

Redundancies followed as the company rationalised its operation. The local plant was sold to a third party in a further process of rationalisation, but this could not prevent further redundancies. As the new company tried to maintain its market position and its finances, they decided to move the manufacturing facility to China to capitalise on the
cheaper labour costs. Globalisation had finally hit South Devon. For those that embraced change, China represented an enormous possibility. We helped set-up the factory in Shenzhen, near Hong Kong, and saw the globalised world from a different perspective. For others it brought domestic upheaval and change. The impact of the decline of that factory in South Devon is still being felt ten years after the dot.com bubble burst in 2000.

Globalisation and corporate re-structuring presented an opportunity. I asked to be made redundant so that I could follow my dream of studying Ancient Rome, and living in Italy. Enrolling in a Masters at the University of Exeter allowed me to reinforce my love of Italy. Rather than being simply a tourist, I would learn Italian and study in Rome. This would then help me become an archaeologist discovering the material culture of one of the greatest civilisations that has existed. The study in Rome impressed upon me the importance of history and its importance on contemporary life. It made me realise that my dream was not about understanding the past, but understanding the present.

Sport is a central element of many people’s lives. As a young male it gave me the skills to communicate with friends and strangers through a shared interest and common language. This interest led to my research into sport in Ancient Rome, which also revealed its centrality in the lives of many Romans. Sport seemed the best vehicle to understand contemporary society, and football seemed an appropriate way of understanding Italy. I had succumbed to the glamour and culture of Italian football during Italia ’90. It combined with my childhood love of Ancient Rome and I built my interest in Italy. Numerous visits continue to reveal a nation of beauty; the language, culture, food, wine, architecture and art are captivating. Yet it is also a nation of contradictions; the streets are dirty and chaotic as Italians hurry around in their own individual worlds.
Through the support and expertise of my supervisor, Anthony King, I have been able to turn my experiences into a thesis. In doing so I have made sense of myself and it has allowed me to understand my place in a globalised world. I now understand the changes that took place in the telecommunications company in which I worked, that I did not understand at the time. I have been able to utilise this background to tutor students and illustrate that our subject is not a series of abstract ideas but directly impacts everyday people across Britain, Europe and the World. We all sit in a complex network of interactions that impact us in different ways. Consequently, this is a story of the impact of those global forces on Italy and Italian football.

This journey could not have been completed alone. Without Anthony King taking a chance on an unknown with no background in sociology, this thesis would not have been possible. He is the epitome of supervisors upon whom all others should be measured. Thanks, and I hope that I haven’t let him down. I have been fortunate to have been based in an incredibly supportive department, whose reputation is well earned. They have provided immense assistance and guidance. Financially they provided me with a scholarship and funds to pursue my research. They also provided me with the opportunities and training to teach thus allowing me to develop more skills than just research. The department of Sociology and Philosophy has provided a caring, nurturing environment that has helped me bring the best out of myself. Professor Grace Davie, Professor Tia DeNora, Dr Nigel Pleasants, Dr Matthias Varul, Dr Massimo Mazzotti and Professor Michael Hauskeller have all provided help and advice throughout this journey. The strength of the department has created a strong support network amongst the students and they have all helped in various ways. Therefore, thanks should go to Trever Hagen, Eduardo De-Andrade-Chemin-Filho, Dawn Fox-Davies, Richard McCallum, Duygu Tekgül, Pinar Guran, Louise Bezuidenhout, Mattia Gallotti, Trijsje Franssen, Mila
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I have been privileged to work for the British Sociological Association and its postgraduate forum. I have been proud to work as a Postgraduate Forum Convenor and this has given me numerous skills and opportunities. Through it I have met some great people, namely Mike Bracher, Allison Hui, Yiu-Tung Suen, Hasnain Quayyum, Dr Ruth Lewis and Dr David Mellor. Most importantly though it gave me the opportunity to be friends with Dr Lara Killick, one of the most dynamic, talented and exceptional people I have had the good fortune to meet. She is the model for which all PhDs and ECRs should aspire to and has a great future ahead of her.

Through the BSA I also participated in the Sport Study Group. Likewise, this led me to many other great people, such as Professor Alan Bairner, Dr Dominic Malcolm, Dr Tom Gibbons, George Jennings, Craig Owen and many others. Also, thanks to Beth
Simmonds for being a sounding board when things got tough. A special thanks should also go to Dr Rob Lake for providing me with great advice, and more significantly, lecturing opportunities.

Obviously this thesis would not have been possible without the warmth and generosity of the Livornese. Many people travel to Italy for the weather, the architecture, the food, the wine, the art and the history. In concentrating on these factors they miss the warmth of the people who make up the individual cities and create the special culture that exists in Italy. Early support was provided by Roberto Filippi and Professor John Foot.

Thanks to all the ragazzi in the curva. Thanks for letting me come to games with you and most of all, for making me feel so welcome.

A substantial amount of my ethnography was undertaken at the Club Luca Rondina in Livorno. The members of the Club were amazingly generous with their time and contacts and this provided me with so much information and analysis. Through them I met so many great people, both within the club and within the fans. I cannot find the words (in English or Italian!) to express this gratitude. You are a credit to the football fans in Livorno, Italy and the World.

For ‘Our (wo)man in Livorno’ I would like to thank Sarah Thomson who runs the website livornonow.com. Not only did she allow me to write match reports for the website, she worked hard to make me feel integrated. She also provided me with one very important resource: the contact of Elena Bataazzi. Elena wrote for Il Tirreno newspaper and kindly wrote two articles about me. These articles provided me with many contacts and allowed my research to flourish. Elena and Sarah, I thank you.
My ‘Rosetta Stone’ was provided by Riccardo (Rick) Bertani whose archives, personal history and interest in all things football, Livorno, England and Italy provided me with so much information. Riccardo and the *ragazzi* made my time in Livorno so much more enjoyable and made me feel at home. You’ll never know how important this was.

Outside of football, a special mention should go to Silvia Cavalieri who showed me the sites, the sounds, and the faces of the city that allowed me to settle quicker. Daniele Bavone deserves a special mention for helping me find somewhere to live. To Gabriella Bianchi I would like to thank you for letting me into your home. What a wonderful apartment and location.

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Obviously I should thank my parents, grandparents and brothers for providing me with the development and support to pursue this research. My parents have always advised us that anything is possible if you put your mind to it. And last, but not least, I would like to thank my partner Claire for the support that has made this possible, giving me the confidence to continue and the diversions when I needed them. The journey has not always been fun, but I hope she enjoyed the Italian cheese and wine.
SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1

Introduction

“What should they know of England who only England know?” - Rudyard Kipling

“A man who has not been in Italy, is always conscious of an inferiority, from his not having seen what it is expected a man should see.” - Samuel Johnson

It was a sultry Tuscan night that wasn’t abated by the soft breeze blowing off the Tyrrhenian Sea. The esplanade that passed along the coast was deluged with people, cars and scooters. The night air was punctuated with whistles, car horns and chants as the participants and vehicles voiced their elation. Songs ranged from chants of ‘campione’ to ‘Bella Ciao’, a Partisan song from the Second World War. Alongside the noise, the streets were awash with a deep burgundy colour. Flags and scarves were being waved and displayed from every car and scooter, as well as prominently carried by the pedestrians. Included in this cacophony of colour were red flags emblazoned with images of ‘hammer and sickles’ or Che Guevara, as well as national flags of countries such as Brazil. People of all ages and genders were showing their delight. It seemed that most of the city had descended on the seafront to join in the frivolity. The reason for the celebration was due to a football match that had just finished in the Stadio Armando Picchi not far from the promenade. The local football team, Livorno, had just beaten Brescia by three goals to nil. In doing so they were promoted back into Serie A, Italy’s top division, after a one year hiatus in Serie B. After the match there was a pitch invasion; fans took mementos of
shorts and shirts from the players who hailed from across Europe and South America. The fans then headed to the five mile promenade to begin their party; a party that extended deep into the night.

Cliché and metaphor permeate the sport of football. Its global popularity permits the use and abuse of clichés from the ubiquitous post-match interviews of players and managers to the recurring tropes of journalists and writers. It is in this sense, that football is the global sport and represents the ‘deep play’ of many societies (Geertz 1972). Few cultural pastimes generate the volume of excitement and emotion to so many people. Football represents a *lingua franca* where participants, especially males, can communicate across cultures and nations, as Sugden and Tomlinson state:

> “Football is peerless in its capacity to generate passionate and rooted feelings of local and national pride or shame. In the latter part of the century, there are few, if any, other social gathering points like football. People congregate around football, either interpersonally, through the media and other forms of popular communication, to make strong public declarations of who they are, what groups they identify with, what they stand for and who and what they stand against.”
> (Sugden and Tomlinson 1998: 4)

As the most popular sport in the world, football becomes an excellent vehicle for understanding the unfolding process of globalisation in the latter decades of the twentieth century. This point is reinforced by Giulianotti and Robertson:

> “The dynamics of globalisation are manifest in the game's long-term changes... sport, and especially football, is epicentral to contemporary globalisation
processes... analysis of football's globalisation can advance both the sociology of the game and our theoretical understanding of globalisation” (Giulianotti and Robertson 2004: 561).

Football, like all sports, produces winners and losers. The art of the game is to defeat one’s opponent, both in direct competition on the pitch and over the course of a series of games in a cup competition or league. Some, like Livorno, win promotion or championships, while others face relegation and defeat. The emotionally charged nature of the sport creates a powerful stimulus for the articulation of identity and helps reinforce the difference between teams.

As with other areas of football, the location of football within academia had become a cliché. Initially, sport, and football in particular, were not deemed creditable avenues of study, as King argues:

“For many, football is entertainment and therefore unworthy of serious consideration… For enthusiasts, football is compelling because the outcome is uncertain. The game thrives upon the random and the accidental, which inspire ecstasy and despair among players and fans alike. Yet, the very excitement which the game engenders obstructs a proper appreciation of the social significance of the game. Although the exiting contingencies of football are not irrelevant to the analysis of it, contingencies need to be situated within a wider historical context which render them meaningful in a deeper and less emotive sense. It is necessary to become detached from the game and to become defamiliarised with it while at the same time recognising its profound social importance” (King 2003: 12)
Football, therefore, is an apposite vehicle with which to study the social interactions that constitute contemporary social life. The emotions and identities which become generated in local settings, like the events described in Livorno above, can be understood through the historical analysis of the development of football within its global context. Globalisation has increased international competition which has increased the opportunities for articulating these differences. As competitions and clubs adapt to the changing global network, the scope of winners and losers grows. Some clubs and national leagues adopt strategies that permit victory in the global marketplace. Others choose incorrect tactics or maintain anachronistic strategies that fail to manage the changing circumstances. It is within this global context that the success and failure of clubs like Livorno within national leagues such as Italy must be viewed. Italy quickly and successfully adapted to the global transformations sweeping across football in the 1990s. As these transformations have developed, Italian clubs have found it increasingly difficult to adjust to the changing global order. As football is situated at the nexus of research into globalisation and sport, this thesis will illustrate how Italian football has adapted to the new global order and how this incomplete transition has led to the bankruptcy of the Italian approach.

Globalisation and Football

As the global sport, football has not been unaffected by intensifying globalisation processes towards the end of the twentieth century. Globalisation itself had acquired much academic attention during the same period (Appadurai 1990; Giddens 1990; Mennell 1990; Giddens 1991; Robertson 1992; Featherstone 1995; Castells 1996; Tomlinson 1999; Sassen 2001; Nederveen Pieterse 2004; Ritzer 2004) (Held 1999). The
breadth of research illustrates the importance of globalisation to society, as Maguire states:

“Every aspect of social reality – people’s living conditions, beliefs, knowledge and actions – is intertwined with unfolding globalization processes. These processes include the emergence of a global economy, a transnational cosmopolitan culture and a range of international social movements” (Maguire 1999: 3).

These unfolding globalisation processes have profoundly affected the global political economy. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the nation state was central to economic and cultural development. The collapse of Keynesian national economies in the 1970s and the subsequent development of neo-liberal capitalism has challenged the centrality of the nation state and its ability to regulate its economy. Extensive de-regulation of the market and the media took place throughout the latter two decades of the twentieth century. This de-regulation permitted the multi-directional movements of people, practises and customs to flow throughout an expanding global network of inter-dependent entities (Appadurai 1990; Hannerz 1990; Castells 1996). Consequently, the growth of these networks has permitted the re-structuring of the global economy as capital flows to those spaces which have the means to attract and accumulate global resources (Castells 1996; Sassen 2005).

These global flows have also had a profound affect on national and local cultures. Throughout history, technology and communication have impacted culture. Roland Robertson, in particular, has highlighted the chronology of globalisation and has identified the significance of transformations in the late 1960s as constituting a significant shift in the history of globalisation (Robertson 1992). Significantly, Robertson has
demonstrated how the dual processes of transnationalisation and concentration has contributed to new cultural developments. For Robertson, “Globalisation as a concept refers both to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole” (Robertson 1992: 8). This has been facilitated by “the expansion of the media of communication, not least the development of global TV, and of other new technologies of rapid communication and travel, [which] has made people all over the world more conscious of other places and of the world as a whole” (Robertson 1992: 184). However, Robertson highlights the complexity of globalisation as increasing interaction between individuals, groups and capital on a global level is creating both greater similarity, and greater difference. Neo-liberal capitalism facilitates this process:

“Global capitalism both promotes and is conditioned by cultural homogeneity and cultural heterogeneity. The production and consolidation of difference and variety is an essential ingredient of contemporary capitalism, which is, in any case, increasingly involved with a growing variety of micro-markets [original italics]” (Robertson 1992: 173).

Local actors absorb these global flows in diverse ways. These processes see local identities re-articulated in relation to global influences and permit the articulation of new global-local identities. Robertson utilises the notion of ‘glocalisation’ to highlight how these global-local (‘glocal’) identities are articulated (Robertson 1992: 173). Consequently, the political economic transformations of the 1970s have witnessed the intensification of global capital flows which have accumulated outside the earlier national model. Local cultures have utilised these global flows in diverse ways in relation to the changing dynamics of globalisation.
Sport, and football in particular, operates within this new global network. It also provides a stage for local identities to be articulated in relation to global transformations. Consequently, leading academics have integrated sport into the wider body of literature on globalisation (Sugden and Tomlinson 1997; King 1998; Maguire 1999; King 2003; Sandvoss 2003; Giulianotti 2005; Horne 2006; Giulianotti and Robertson 2007; Goldblatt 2007; Porro 2008; Giulianotti and Robertson 2009). Despite the broad range of theoretical approaches taken within these studies, it is possible to discern a broad consensus of the historical and political economic development of globalisation. Joseph Maguire, for example, highlights the development of sport in relation to Robertson’s periodisation of globalisation (Maguire 1999). Through his figurational analysis of sport and globalisation, Maguire also highlights the significant transformations of sport emerging in the latter decades of the twentieth century. He highlights the thickening of networks between sport, business and the media, as transnational corporations intensify their links with sport. These networks (or figurations) have permitted the accumulation of resources on a global level:

“The global sports figuration accordingly involves the following mechanism of production, experience and consumption: achievement sport involves the identification and development of talent and its production on a global stage, in a single or multi-sport event, and its consumption by direct spectators or, through the media complex, a global mass audience. Traced over time there is a tendency towards the emergence of a global achievement sport monoculture – a culture where administrators, coaches and teachers promote and foster achievement sport values and ideologies and where competitions and tournaments are structured along highly commodified and rationalized lines” (Maguire 1999: 90-1)
The accumulation of sporting resources has been facilitated by de-regulation of the market. Maguire demonstrates the extensive global commodity chains connecting transnational sporting businesses who utilise extensive supply chains to design, manufacture and market their products on a global scale. This is facilitated by intensifying links between sports businesses and the media. Maguire’s discussions of the ‘global media-sport complex’ illustrate the intensifying relationship between the media and sport. The production and consumption of global flows of mediated images help reinforce the dominant groups within the network. In particular: “Sport has also become a commodity whose media value is determined by the size and composition of the audience it can deliver to potential advertisers and sponsors of media broadcasts.” (Maguire 1999: 151-2). The transnational media helps place sport at the nexus of business and entertainment and helps sport become a strategic component of wider marketing strategies. Sports teams provide advertising and sponsorship opportunities to the transnational companies who can present their merchandise to a global audience. Sponsorship and advertising have amplified the role of the athlete and transformed them into celebrities. De-regulation of national markets of athletes has permitted the increased migration of sports personalities. The Bosman ruling in particular, has permitted the accumulation of playing resources at the top European football clubs (Maguire and Stead 1998; Maguire and Pearton 2000).¹ Greater migration has also led to greater inter-civilizational interaction.

¹ Jean-Marc Bosman’s contract had expired at the end of his contract with Standard Liege in Belgium. The French club Dunkerque attempted to sign the player, but Liege refused, fearing that they would not receive a fee, and suspended Bosman on a third of his pay. Supported by the European professional players’ association, FIFPro, the Bosman case became an ideal opportunity to test European law. In 1995 the European Court of Justice found that clubs withholding pay and preventing transfers were a restriction on the free movement of players and a restraint of trade. An ancillary motion also held that quota systems imposed by national leagues on foreign players were also a restriction on the free movement of European citizens. As a result of the ruling, foreign quotas were removed from many national leagues, and from European competition. Furthermore, players became free agents at the end of their contracts and were free to move without a transfer fees.
The intensification of links between global capital, media and sport has impacted local culture. As Robertson highlighted, greater interaction between cultures has resulted in the re-articulation of national and local identities. For Maguire, this has led to ‘diminishing contrasts’ and ‘increasing varieties’ (Maguire 1994; Maguire 1999). In relation to transformations in the global economy, national identities have been profoundly impacted (Maguire 1994; Maguire and Poulton 1999; Maguire 1999; Poulton 2004). As Maguire states: “The interconnected processes of globalisation and further European integration have fostered in sections of the English both a defensive ethnic reassertiveness but also a deep sense of nostalgia” (Maguire 1999). Maguire utilises Robertson’s notion of ‘wilful nostalgia’ to illustrate the growth of nostalgia in the construction of national and local identities in relation to globalisation.

Similar themes emerge in the work of Richard Giulianotti. In his sociology of football he identified three phases of football, in particular citing transformations during the 1970s as contributing to a third phase, where:

“Football has entered a period of ‘post-modernity’. Deindustrialisation has fractured the nexus of the working classes with inner-city clubs. Television dominates the finances and administration of football leagues and their member clubs. The largest nations benefit, importing players from throughout the world, while smaller nations become dependent on overseas transfers. The global circulation of labour and ideas begins to undermine footballing ‘traditions’, increasing the hybridity of playing styles” (Giulianotti 1999: 32)

Giulianotti has developed this argument in collaboration with Robertson (Giulianotti and Robertson 2004; Giulianotti and Robertson 2006; Giulianotti and Robertson 2007;
Giulianotti and Robertson 2009). Together they place sport and football into Robertson’s earlier chronology of globalisation, reinforcing the significance of cultural and economic factors during the late 1960s and 1970s. Giulianotti and Robertson make a clear argument to place sport, and football in particular, at the centre of the study of globalisation processes. In particular, they argue that global sport has brought more cultures into contact with one another and through this awareness of others, social processes become articulated.

Football provides a platform for diverse cultures to meet and interact. Where Maguire utilised Eliasian theory to explain the inter-civilizational interactions that permitted diminishing contrasts and increasingly varieties, Robertson and Giulianotti utilise Robertson’s notion of the universal and the particular to illustrate new ‘glocal’ identities in football (Robertson 1992; Giulianotti and Robertson 2004; Giulianotti and Robertson 2009). As the global economy becomes more united and increasingly operated by transnational corporations, many groups are operating under similar circumstances. Yet decisive local factors operate which render the universal, global conditions increasingly particular. For Giulianotti and Robertson this creates a new, ‘glocal’ identity which is created through a concept of relatavisation:

“Globalization brings cultures into sharper reflexive and comparative focus, thereby compelling these cultures to respond to each other in an ever-amplifying manner across the universal domain” (Giulianotti and Robertson 2009: 36)

Through inter-relation and interaction with other cultures global factors are rearticulated locally to create a glocal identity. Drawing upon a range of global examples, Giulianotti and Robertson provide a rich account of global processes operating within global fan-
groups (Giulianotti and Robertson 2004; Giulianotti and Robertson 2006; Giulianotti and Robertson 2009). In doing so, they demonstrate the importance of grounded research into the implications of globalisation at a local level. In particular, Giulianotti’s use of Scottish fans in North America provides the kind of deep ethnography that is required to develop a wider understanding of global forces (Giulianotti and Robertson 2006). Consequently, the globalisation of football has permitted the re-articulation of national and local identities. The transformation of local identity has been facilitated by transformations in the global political economy. Neo-liberal economics have intensified the links between sport, the media and business and operate in relation to existing power relationships. Glocalised sport has been transformed by intensified flows: “in football, this involves the transnational circulation of labour, information, capital and commodities that can underpin non-national forms of cultural particularity” (Giulianotti and Robertson 2004: 549). These flows have intensified through increased mediation as global satellite and cable companies emerged during the 1980s and helped transform the presentation of sports stars, sports teams and competitions.

Elsewhere, Anthony King has demonstrated similar global processes affecting European football. King has identified a similar chronology and indicated that a new phase emerged from the collapse of the national Keynesian model in the 1970s which exposed European football to wider cultural and economic flows. Subsequent de-regulation of the television markets, and new satellite and cable technology, facilitated the initiation of transnational media companies, such as Kirch in Germany, Sky in Britain and Mediaset in Italy. As the media companies competed for advertising revenue, audience share became fundamental, and sport was a major driver. This consolidation was facilitated by the governing body of European football, UEFA, who re-packaged elite European competition, the European Cup, as the Champions League (King 2003; King 2004).
growth in exposure of the Champions League through the transformation of global capital has demanded a change in approach from football clubs:

“transnational competition has demanded new strategies from the clubs. In the face of increasing competition, clubs have been forced to increase the traditional income from gate revenue, while developing new forms of revenue streams, such as merchandising, stadium reconstruction, sponsorship, flotation on the stock exchange and the exploitation of new internet rights” (King 2003: 119)

The transformation of European competition was also facilitated by the de-regulation of players’ contracts under the Bosman ruling. Consequently, those national markets which could accumulate the most resources from television and sponsorship could also accumulate the most playing resources. As King highlights:

“The unification of the player market has facilitated a concentration of playing power in the core football markets of the New Europe – in England, Germany, Spain and Italy – because the clubs in these countries are financially better equipped than those in smaller leagues (now unprotected by national trade limitations) to buy players” (King 2003: 83)

Those clubs within national markets which could leverage the greater revenue could also further accumulate playing resources. Consequently, the elite clubs in England, Germany, Italy and Spain became central actors on the global network. They replicated wider transformations in global capitalism which witnessed global cities emerging as central nodes for company headquarters, while subsidiary companies were dispersed across the
globe (Sassen 2001; King 2003). This permitted the paradoxical process of accumulation and diffusion.

King also identifies similar transformations of localised identity which have occurred in relation to global and European transformations. The growth and accumulation of elite clubs has facilitated the construction and re-construction of fandom and its expression through consumption (King 1997; King 1998; King 2000; King 2003). Yet these localised identities have also become constructed in relation national identities. In the same way that national imagined communities became articulated through historic invented traditions, neo-local communities constructed their own historic narratives (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; King 1997; King 1998; Maguire 1999; King 2003; Anderson 2006). These localised identities become articulated in relation to other clubs as a consequence of greater interaction between rival fans. The greater number of games that take place as a result of European competition ensures that fans are exposed to a greater range of fan cultures. Exposure takes place through the physical attendance at games, as well as through mediated images. Furthermore, exposure to other national cultures takes place through the increased number of players from outside the national market. Consequently, local and national identities have become rearticulated as a result of globalised media, increased commodification of sport, and transformations in the operation of sport.

David Goldblatt’s global history of football observes similar processes. Goldblatt follows an analogous chronology to King, and details how the industrial development of football entered a period of crisis in the 1970s before developing into a globalised game in the 1990s (Goldblatt 2007). Goldblatt demonstrates that this globalised sport underwent profound economic transformation. He argues that “in the 1990s European football’s
long economic decline was spectacularly reversed: the ailing rustbelt of Fordist football was transformed into a booming post-industrial service sector awash with money and hubris” (Goldblatt 2007: 688). Goldblatt identifies how clubs have been turned into global brands through the collaboration and co-operation of global corporations, particularly through sponsorship and de-regulated television (Goldblatt 2007). This transnationalisation of the game resulted in a process of accumulation at the wealthiest clubs within the wealthiest national leagues of England, Italy, France, Spain and Germany (Goldblatt 2007: 685). The economic de-regulation of national economies and national leagues permitted this accumulation:

“The logic of economic concentration has allowed the leading teams in Europe to assemble the global elite of football talent, drawing on players from every continent. Most teams in the final stages possessed a majority of internationals, the leading players from Africa and Latin America as well as the very best from Europe, the concentrated talent of which has been sharpened by the regularity of European games” (Goldblatt 2007: 696)

De-regulation had facilitated the transformation of the global economy, and global football. This process permitted the accumulation and concentration of resources at a small number of elite clubs.

Other British academics also highlight the growing intensification of global commercial interactions within sport. Although they do not periodise globalisation as Maguire, Giulianotti, Goldblatt and King have, Bairner, and Horne and Manzenreiter have also identified commercial transformations during the last thirty years as being a driving factor in globalisation of sport. Manzenreiter and Horne highlight that although there has
always been commercial activity within football, this has intensified with the growing
influence of television. For these authors, television has produced “a serious challenge to
live spectators, hospitality and associated merchandise as the major income stream for
football clubs in national leagues and associations” (Manzenreiter and Horne 2004: 11).
Although Bairner does not emphasise television as a significant factor, he reinforces that
political, economic and cultural transformations globally have impacted the articulation
of national identities (Bairner 2001). He also reinforces that changes to consumption
since the 1970s, facilitated by the global media, have permitted the articulation of many
forms of identity (Bairner 2001: 165). Sport facilitates this identity formation as sports’
fans support teams from across the globe, and across sporting spheres. This reciprocal
process between identity formation and commercial consumption leads to a uneven and
diverse interaction between the various actors in global sport.

Similar transformations have been observed in academic literature in Italy. Although this
is not explicitly linked to globalization, many Italian academics have highlighted the
global processes highlighted above, but view these as a result of postmodernity. Through
the ascription of prefixes, they identify contemporary football as being distinct from its
earlier incarnation. All highlight the significant economic and cultural transformations
which took place in the 1990s and germinated in the two previous decades. Russo calls
the new product ultracalcio (‘ultrafootball’) and suggests that the sport is extreme and has
mutated from its earlier forms (Russo 2005). Meanwhile, Liguori and Smargiasse term the
sport neocalcio (‘neofootball’) to highlight the postmodern changes to the sport (Liguori
and Smargiasse 2003). Significantly, they identify the many continuities of the sport.
Alternatively, Porro focuses on the role of television and media within the new type of
football which he labels media-calcio (‘media-football’) (Porro 2008). For Porro, the de-
regulation of television had a profound affect on the cultural medium of football, as well
as providing increased finances for clubs. These works reinforce the broad consensus illustrated above. They highlight the importance of de-regulation, particularly of television, in the transformations of Italian football. However, there is a tendency to limit the analysis to the Italian football within these works. These processes were not restricted to Italy, and it is important to understand these wider changes in the global context. Consequently, this thesis will incorporate Italian football into the wider body globalisation literature originating in the UK.

Widespread global transformations have impacted nations in vastly different ways. Although national analyses have been displaced by global accounts of football (Giulianotti and Robertson 2009), national analysis is still required to understand the impact on the local level. It is therefore important to review its influence within diverse localities so that the full implications of the global transformations can be understood. As Rudyard Kipling’s quote at the opening of this chapter highlights, “What should they know of England who only England know?” If academics (and fans) only study their own field then they produce a restricted image and understanding of their work. Only through the wide research of subjects outside its common frames of reference, can the academy broaden its understanding and produce a comprehensive analysis of society’s changes. Along these lines, there is a broad range of research and analysis of global leagues. In addition to Giulianotti’s analysis of Scottish football fans in America (Giulianotti and Robertson 2006), research has been undertaken into a number of national leagues. Miller and Crolley have edited a work that actively engages with the contemporary research on globalisation and provides a sublime account of football in the Americas (Miller and Crolley 2007). Furthermore, Manzenreiter and Horne have edited and published a range of books and articles related to football in China, Japan and Korea (Horne and Manzenreiter 2002; Horne 2004; Manzenreiter and Horne 2004; Horne and
Manzenreiter 2008; Manzenreiter 2008). Bairner also expands attention away from England through his analysis of Swedish sporting identities (amongst others) (Bairner 2001). Elsewhere, several special editions of journals have investigated wider themes in European and Global football. Notable examples include the *Journal of Sports Economics* edition on the economics of European football (Lago, Simmons et al. 2006), *Global Networks* edition on globalisation and sport (Giulianotti and Robertson 2007) and a special edition of the journal *Soccer and Society* in 2010 featured analysis of various governance models in a global context (Hassan and Hamil 2010). In terms of grounded ethnography, Armstrong and Mitchell have provided a rich account of Maltese football but require more engagement with the wider literature to provide fruitful analysis (Armstrong and Mitchell 2008). Elsewhere, Spaaij provides a thorough analysis and grounding of six clubs within the Netherlands, England and Spain in his work on hooliganism (Spaaij 2006). Whilst there is a thorough engagement with contemporary discourses on globalisation, these are focussed on hooliganism, rather than wider transformations.

Wider research on Italian football in English has focussed predominantly on the fans. The 1990s produced a range of articles and chapters by Italian authors detailing the change in football fandom in Italy (Dal Lago and De Biasi 1994; De Biasi 1996; Lanfranchi and De Biasi 1997; De Biasi 1998; Podaliri and Balestri 1998; Roversi and Balestri 2000). Most of these focussed on the *ultrà* phenomenon and were directly related to the similar problem of hooliganism in Britain. Subsequent sporadic articles on Italian football have also focussed on the *ultrà* (Guschwan 2007; Scalia 2009). The most detailed and grounded research into the *ultrà* written in English comes from Testa’s ethnographic accounts of Lazio and Roma fans (Testa and Armstrong 2008; Testa 2009; Testa 2010; Testa and Armstrong 2010). Although these accounts focus on the *ultrà*, they are
beginning to bring in wider sociological analysis, in particular the impact of media constructions of football fans. Elsewhere, Porro and Russo have published a range of articles that actively integrate the wider political economy into analysis of Italian football (Porro and Russo 2000; Porro and Russo 2004). These integrate the transformation of football into the wider political economic context in Italy. In particular they highlight the role of Silvio Berlusconi, who combines his role as the president of AC Milan with ownership of Italy’s largest media network and his position as prime minister of Italy.

Alternative accounts of Italian football in English are limited. The comprehensive economic and cultural history of Italian football by John Foot, is a necessity for anyone with an interest in Italian football (Foot 2007). Alternatively, accounts are restricted to the journalistic works of Joe McGinniss and Tim Parks who narrated respective seasons with Castel Di Sangro and Hellas Verona (McGinniss 2000; Parks 2003). Similar works also narrate the wider Italian context with several references to football (Parks 2001; Parks 2001; Agnew 2006; Jones 2007). However, these do not engage with wider sociological discourses. This thesis attempts to rectify this discrepancy by providing an account of Italian football in relation to contemporary debates within globalisation and football. These debates, as illustrated above, emphasise that globalisation involves a dynamic of ‘glocalisation’ or concentration and transnationalisation. In Italy this has assumed a more national form through a patrimonial system, which contrasts sharply with the neo-liberal approach taken in Britain. This contrast has been utilised by many writers, especially the media, who romanticise foreign football to amplify the negative aspects of the English game. This will be addressed in the following section.

**English Clubs in Crisis and Romanticisation of Foreign Football**
‘Italy’ has been transformed into a powerful historical and cultural symbol. As the birthplace of the Renaissance, Italy has been constructed as a cultural colossus. Samuel Johnson’s comment at the introduction to this chapter highlights the imagined inferiority of those who never visit Italy. The 1990 World Cup in Italy permitted the re-articulation of some of these tropes. British television, in particular the BBC, played to this imagined cultural image of stylish and cultural Italians. The BBC packaged its presentation with several cultural symbols (Williams 2006). Through their use of the aria *Nessun Dorma*, performed by Luciano Pavorotti, Italy was presented as the epitome of high culture. The British broadcaster Channel 4 capitalised on this image in 1992. In response to the instigation of the English Premier League and its ensuing move to BskyB, Channel 4 introduced *Football Italia* to terrestrial television screens two years after Italia ‘90. At the time Italy’s top division, Serie A, contained international stars at the peak of the abilities, such as Ruud Gullit, Marco Van Basten and Maradona. In addition, Paul ‘Gazza’ Gascoigne, one of England’s star players and the unlikely hero of England’s campaign at Italia ‘90, had just moved to Lazio. Italian football exuded glamour and this was reflected in Channel 4’s production. The presenter James Richardson hosted the shows from a range of alluring locations, from Florentine piazzas to Roman cafes. The outside broadcasts in world famous cultural locations were congruent to the image of Italian football; it exuded quality, culture and style.

There was a clear distinction with British football. Italia ‘90 had demonstrated the superior infrastructure and organisation of the Italian game (King 1998: 103-4). This, along with the production of *Football Italia*, created a sharp contrast to English football, which was emerging from a sustained period of crisis. Although there was a long history of disorder at British football matches, hooliganism became entrenched in the 1970s (Dunning, Maguire et al. 1982; Dunning, Murphy et al. 1986; Williams 2006). Sustained
patterns of hooligan disorder culminated in the Heysel Stadium disaster in 1985. Thirty-nine Juventus fans were killed when a stadium wall collapsed after Liverpool fans rushed towards the Juventus fans. This resulted in English clubs being excluded from European competition for the first time since its inception in 1955.\(^2\) In addition to the ignominy of being excluded from Europe, English football suffered a further stadium crisis at Hillsborough four years later. Poor facilities and policing at the Sheffield stadium saw ninety-six Liverpool fans crushed on the terraces. The resulting government investigation by Lord Justice Taylor, saw a period of sustained investment in stadiums and policing (Taylor 1989; King 1998; Giulianotti 1999). These factors, when combined with the restructuring of the Premier League and Champions League, contributed to the transformation of English football in the 1990s.

These transformations have led to great introspection within English discourse. As mentioned above, there has been widespread academic research into the impact of wider global transformations. There has also been a wide range of popular football writing that questions the nature of the changes. Despite its relative success, Williams states: “why, then, does English football today still feel like a sport that is perpetually in crisis? [original italics]” (Williams 2006). This feeling pervades much of football writing in England. The writer, anthropologist or sociologist does not simply present an account of other cultures, but also presents their own cultural values. These values can pervade and represent an underlying text. Paradoxically, through understanding other cultures, we can also understand ourselves (Winch 1964). And this can challenge those pervasive cultural assumptions. In his seminal studies of the Trobrianders, Malinowski argued that the

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\(^2\) The European Cup was instigated in 1955 to provide a European competition in order to create a clear mechanism to affirm European Champions. This was in response to the British Press’ assertions that Wolverhampton Wanderers were the ‘Champions’ based on a number of friendly matches. The English FA prevented Chelsea from entering the first tournament in 1955, although Manchester United were allowed to enter in the following year King, A. (2003). The European Ritual: Football in the New Europe. Aldershot, England; United Kingdom, Ashgate.
people of the Trobriand Islands did not operate with a ‘natural economic’ approach to social life (Malinowski 1922). By constructing the generalised argument as a ‘straw man’, Malinowski could provide an alternative analysis to the general accounts of economists. In doing so he identified the pervasiveness of these arguments. Through understanding the Trobrianders, Malinowski began to understand his own position, and challenge the assumptions of Western culture. By doing this however, Malinowski’s approach became a ‘straw man’ in itself. The following account represents a similar ‘straw man’ by suggesting that there is a pervasive argument relating to the condition of English football, in contrast to foreign football. It is not intended as a singular criticism, but a more general observation to call for further in depth ethnographic analysis of other football cultures, and for this understanding to be incorporated into the broader argument.

Journalists are principal amongst those that perpetuate this image. The Observer journalist Will Buckley sums up this sentiment with his novel The Man Who Hated Football (Buckley 2005). Buckley disparages the contemporary fascination with football and its attendant celebrity. Similarly, The Guardian’s David Conn frequently questions the greed and organisation of contemporary British football in his Inside Sport blog on The Guardian’s website.³ He has also penned several books, including The Football Business and The Beautiful Game?: Searching the Soul of Football (Conn 2001; Conn 2005). The inference is that the game has changed beyond all recognition and has lost its ‘soul’. This is echoed in Matthew Bazell’s Theatre of Silence: The Lost Soul of Football which rails against the changes in English football (Bazell 2008). Elsewhere, the reporter and author, Tom Bower’s novel entitled Broken Dreams alludes to a game ridden with corruption, greed and media hype (Bower 2003). Once again, the author intimates that football is broken. The most illustrative of this range of books is simply called Modern Football Is Rubbish: An A-Z of All

³ http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/david-conn-inside-sport-blog
That Is Wrong with the Beautiful Game by Nick Davidson and Shaun Hunt (Davidson and Hunt 2008). This book is unashamedly nostalgic with laments for muddy pitches, floodlight pylons, casual sexism and black boots. These instances highlight a recurring trope against English football that insinuates that football is destroyed beyond repair.

The past represented a ‘Golden Age’ where even poor playing surfaces were seen as good. Like their academic counterparts, many of these writers limit their field of enquiry to English football. It is not possible to develop a full conception of the English context in an academic vacuum. To paraphrase the earlier quote from Kipling: “What should they know of English football who only English football know?”

When using examples of rival leagues, many journalists and popular writers fail to provide sufficient depth of understanding to develop the context. The media help construct a powerful image of rival leagues that reinforce the notion of English football in crisis. David Conn compared the ownership structure of the 2009 Champions League finalists Manchester United and Barcelona and concluded that “Barcelona have the edge over Manchester United in that they will never be sold” (Conn 2009). He concludes, as he does in his book The Football Business, that personal ownership corrupts the institution and leads to the rampant commercialism which is ‘destroying the game’. Conn argues that the concept of private shareholders in the English Premier League drives commercialism for private economic gain, rather than for the wider benefit of fans (Conn 2001). One article provides an apposite example of this trend in English journalism. Entitled ‘What Money Can’t Buy’ (Conn 2007) illustrates the tendency to simultaneously romanticise rival leagues in order to denigrate the English Premier League. For example:
“No other country has a perfect system, but in Spain the tradition of the membership club survives. Barcelona and Real Madrid are both owned by members who democratically elect a president and board. The clubs are resented for receiving the largest share of Spanish football's TV money and are ruthlessly ambitious, but nevertheless Barcelona, particularly, embody a sense of belonging in their very structure.” (Conn 2007)

In glamorising the Spanish clubs’ ownership, Conn overlooks the commercial aspects that have helped transform Barcelona and Real Madrid into the two richest clubs of 2010 (Deloitte and Touche 2010). The dominance of Spain’s top two clubs has led to an accumulation of resources at Barcelona and Real Madrid to the detriment of the rest of the league (Lowe 2010). The inequity in the Spanish League resulted in Real Mallorca, who finished fifth in the league in 2010, entering administration over unpaid debts. Sevilla, who pipped Real Mallorca to forth spot on the last game of the 2009-2010 season, finished thirty-three points behind Real Madrid in second place. Sevilla were closer in points to Xeres, who finished the season in last position, than they were to Real Madrid. Furthermore, Conn does not highlight the other problems that this situation has created. For example, despite its membership structure, Barcelona still accrued €77 million of debt during the 2009-2010 season (The Guardian 2010). Although the ownership model of Barcelona is ideologically laudable, there is a danger that writers and fans valorise the administration of one president, Joan La Porta, rather than the ownership model. A similar model operated under the previous regime of Josep Núñez without widespread transparency. Likewise, a similar ownership model is in place at Real Madrid which has its own problems. Although the president of these clubs are elected by members, in order to become Real Madrid’s president one has to guarantee the funds that will be used to run the clubs. In this way, Florentino Perez was elected unopposed in
2009 as he was the only person who could guarantee the €57 million in order to take control (BBC 2009). This process still provides limited access to the club for millions of fans.

German football receives similar respect. The German Football Association decrees that no single investor can own more than forty-nine percent of the club. This limits control passing to rich presidents. Paul Wilson states that “in putting fans and tradition before profit, the Bundesliga upholds values the Premier League has lost” (Wilson 2009). Once again, the allusion is made that English football is broken. Conn also maintains that this policy ensures “that clubs should remain connected to their local communities” (Conn 2007). This suggests that clubs have always been tied to their local community where fans and players have never originated from outside their locality. In valorising the German model, both Conn and Wilson overlook the special dispensation afforded to Wolfsburg and Bayer Leverkusen who are financially supported by Volkswagen and Bayer Pharmaceuticals respectively (Giulianotti 1999: 88). In addition, there is no mention made of the club 1899 Hoffenheim, a football club from a suburb of three-thousand inhabitants near the small town of Sinsheim in the South West of Germany. The club was an amateur club playing in a local league at the eighth level of German football until the 1990s when the co-founder of software giant SAP, Dietmar Hopp, provided money to the club. Hopp funded the construction of the €40 million stadium Rhein-Neckar-Arena which underpinned Hoffenheim’s successive promotions which took them to the Bundesliga in 2008. This helps to illustrate that despite stringent regulations in Germany, global capital is still permitting some clubs to circumvent the rules.

The ownership model in Italy is also under-analysed. Even though Italian clubs are not owned by fans, Conn enhances the benefits of being tied to a multinational company:
“In Italy, the clubs have long been owned by businessmen or, as with Juventus and Milan, by corporations. In theory the clubs could have been ripe for takeovers, but US-leveraged buy-out investors see England, not Italy, as the honeypot. Abramovich is said to have looked at the Italian giants, but Fiat and Silvio Berlusconi’s Fininvest are not for selling Juve or Milan, which add prestige to their corporate, and in Berlusconi’s case political, image” (Conn 2007).

This logic permits egotism for Italian presidents but precludes profit for foreign owners of English teams. This thesis will demonstrate the paucity of this argument. The lack of depth to the analysis seriously undermines the broader argument. The overall argument which denigrates English football presupposes that all other leagues are equal, or better, than the English leagues. Therefore it is perfectly acceptable for Juventus to be owned by Fiat, but not for Manchester United to be owned by an American. This argument also fails to account for smaller clubs who do not have the luxury of being owned by a rich multinational company which further extends the difference between the elite clubs and the provincial clubs. Despite the valorisation of the fan-owned model of Barcelona and Germany, no mention is made of Italian fans’ channels of communication with their clubs.

These mediated constructions are extended to other images of national teams and leagues. King illustrates the extension of national identity to clubs playing European competition (King 2003). Elsewhere, Crolley and Duke highlight the manner in which national images and stereotypes are shaped and constructed through mediatised narratives (Crolley and Hand 2002; Crolley and Hand 2006). The Italian national league has acquired a similar prestige to the glamour of Italian national culture. In particular, the media has utilised several imagined constructions of Italy and Italian football. Across
Europe, Italians were seen as technically superior, confident and stylish (Crolley and Hand 2006). These constructions conform to the history of culture and style of Italy and Italians. Furthermore, European media also reinforce stereotypes of Italian tempestuousness and passion (Crolley and Hand 2006). This leads inevitably to Machiavellian conspiracies and deviousness. Similar narratives construct the Germans as an efficient machine, or the Spanish as tempestuous (Crolley and Hand 2006). These constructions contrast sharply with the representation of the bravado and never-say-die spirit of English football; the very qualities that have helped shape the popularity of the English Premier League and promote its growth. Consequently, media accounts help shape wider opinion of national leagues and teams.

As a key component of identity, sport facilitates the construction of interpretive frameworks to understand profound societal transformations. Robertson highlights that in times of intense change, particularly in relation to globalisation, society experiences an upsurge in ‘wilful nostalgia’ for the disappearing past (Robertson 1992). Maguire and Poulton adroitly utilise this concept to illustrate the nostalgic approach of the British media in the 1990s (Maguire and Poulton 1999; Maguire 1999; Poulton 2004). In relation to an expanding Europe, Britain was feeling a sense of loss: the loss of sovereignty to Europe; the loss of industry to Japan; and various sporting losses (Maguire 1999). This loss of a perfect past coloured subsequent media representations of sporting disappointments. Similar romanticisation of a nostalgic past has been demonstrated by Gruneau and Whitson in relation to Canadian Ice Hockey (Gruneau and Whitson 1993). This acted as an interpretive framework to manage the overt commercialisation and American influence of Ice Hockey, whilst overlooking the explicit masculinity, individualism and commercialism of the past.
The wilful nostalgia exhibited in sports journalism crystallised during the de-regulated transformation of the nascent Premier League and Champions League. This period coincided with new forms of football writing. Two publications symbolise this transformation: Nick Hornby’s *Fever Pitch*; and the magazine *When Saturday Comes* (King 1998; Giulianotti 1999). King identifies how there was a nostalgic focus on a mythical ‘Golden Age’ in this new football writing (King 1998). The 1960s and 1970s represented a ‘Golden Age’ of English football; in addition to England winning the World Cup in 1966, British teams were successful in Europe. It also represented, King asserts, the national, Keynesian ideal of sport before the post-Fordist transformations of the 1990s.

The irony of this exhibition of wilful nostalgia is that it was chiefly written by writers, such as the Cambridge-educated Hornby, who were drawn from the middle class managerial and sales roles which had been created as a result of the changing economy (Giulianotti 1999).

The construction and re-articulation of the mythical ‘Golden Age’ represented authenticity for the new football writers, as most of these writers were white, middle-class and male. In this quest for authenticity, the writers have had to rearticulate their own notions of masculinity to reaffirm their authenticity and distinguish themselves from the changes taking place. As a result, the quest for authenticity colours much of the writing on football. Crawford highlights that:

“there has been a tendency to view the recent changes in the nature of the relationship between mass spectator sports and its audience as pivotal in creating a new kind of sport supporter, which sees ‘traditional’ and ‘authentic’ fans transformed into (or more specifically replaced by) a ‘new’ consumer market” (Crawford 2004: 11).
Commercialisation has been seen as countering the working class ethic of the sport. The encroachment of commercial interests into football was given as an early cause of hooliganism (Taylor 1971). Through the creation of typologies by writers such as Redhead and Giulianotti, Crawford highlights that ‘new’ consumer fans are seen as inauthentic and false (Redhead 1993; Giulianotti 2002; Crawford 2004). Much academic focus is placed on those fans who are deemed ‘authentic’. Principally this focuses on predominantly white, masculine groups who demonstrate solidarity through chanting, aggression and anti-commercialism. As Crawford states,

“Fans who buy a large volume of merchandise, those who follow sport via mass media, those who attend ‘live’ games in family units, or even those who do not conform to the ‘typical’ image of a ‘traditional’ fan (such as women or people with disabilities) are largely ignored in a large number of discussions of fan cultures.” (Crawford 2004).

However, this should not preclude the fact that fans themselves construct these binary oppositions. Markers of distinction permit the fan groups to distinguish themselves from alternative fan groups. These patterns of distinction are not restricted to football but take place across many forms of fan communities (Hills 2002). Many football fans identify themselves as devout supporters in contrast to other patterns of support. For example, a young masculine group, ‘the lads’, distinguished themselves from the ‘new’ fans of Manchester United (King 1997). They eschewed the commercial elements of the football club which were seen as indicative of non-Mancunian supporters. Within football, attending a match at the stadium is seen as being more authentic, whilst the pub is a suitable secondary alternative (Crabbe and Brown 2004). The display of willful nostalgia
does not lament the creation of new spaces of consumption, like pubs, nor the fact that there were few televised matches during the ‘Golden Age’. Fans either attended the stadium, or listened to a radio. Authenticity is bound within contemporary conceptions of fandom and utilises nostalgia to reinforce this notion.

These constructions demonstrate that perspectives of authenticity and inauthenticity are only valid from the standpoint of the masculine group. Those outside the group will have different conceptions of ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’. Many fans from outside these groups also invest their time and money in the support of their club and are no less ‘authentic’ than the masculine groups. Researchers must be careful to avoid the trap of valorising these masculine supporters’ groups and reinforcing the construction. The challenge for writers, whose personal demographic is the same as that of the masculine groups, is to traverse the boundary between retention of contacts within the group and presenting the information from more than one standpoint. Although changes to conceptions of masculinity are important areas of study, they are not the only areas.

Changing attitudes of masculinity and consumption emerged in relation to the role of players. Global deregulation of players’ contracts and mobility has seen similar nostalgic allusions to a ‘Golden Age’. Taylor lamented the loss of the local (working-class) player who grew up in the same town as his club, before retiring back to the same locale (Taylor 1971). In place of this nostalgic hero, we are confronted with international ‘mercenaries’ who do not share the same passion for the club as the ‘authentic’ fans. Football provided the opportunity to display masculine values. It provided an opportunity for the ‘male gaze’ where men could observe other men in a non-sexual environment (Coad 2008).

Players embodied the masculinity of the terrace through bodily development, physical challenges and endurance (Kennedy 2004). These tropes re-emerged during the 1990s as
new football writing and political changes saw the development of the ‘the new lad’ movement (Whannel 1999). The ‘new lad’ reinforced a particular brand of national, white masculinity (Carrington 1998). Despite fears that the game was changing, football remained a sport for young, white males (Waddington, Malcolm et al. 1998). This has accentuated the nostalgic ‘Golden Age’ as an influx of foreign football stars was deemed to be outside the national-masculine image of tough British footballers.

This British masculine image has been affected by changes to the consumption of footballers. Since the removal of the maximum wage of footballers in Britain in 1960, footballers have acquired an increasing ‘leisure class’ (Giulianotti 1999). Lucrative contracts have turned players into conspicuous consumers. Through consumption, and the resultant media spotlight, they are challenging the traditional notions of masculinity. David Beckham, in particular, has attracted much attention for his “narcissistic self-absorption” and his “departure from the dominant masculinised codes of footballer style” (Whannel 1999: 202). The formation of a celebrity class of footballers was not the result of the transformations of the 1990s. Within Britain, 1960s pop culture and increased consumption saw a number of footballers gain celebrity (Whannel 1999). George Best was dubbed the 'fifth Beatle' because of his style and demeanour (Bairner 2004). In Italy and South America, Lanfranchi argues that footballers were seen as stars much earlier. Giuseppe Meazza, the captain of the Italian national team during the 1938 tournament, was incredibly popular. French weekly magazine, Match, said “Meazza is an idol. Many perfumed letters have been intercepted by his mother…If you go to Italy, do not ask who was Meazza, it is the same as someone in France asking who is Maurice Chevalier” (Lanfranchi 2001: 85).
The overt wilful nostalgia that is exhibited by academics and journalists alike overlooks the origins of football research in Britain. The nascent discipline of Sociology of Football was primarily focussed on the hooligan phenomenon (Taylor 1968; Marsh, Rosser et al. 1978; Carroll 1980; Dunning, Maguire et al. 1982; Dunning, Murphy et al. 1986; Murphy, Williams et al. 1990). The wealth of early research into football hooliganism highlights the extent of the problem and led to Moorhouse lamenting the focus on the subject (Moorhouse 1991). The subsequent disasters at Heysel and Hillsborough reinforced the necessity of the focus. The emerging discipline retained the focus on hooliganism during the 1990s (Dal Lago 1990; Armstrong and Harris 1991; Giulianotti, Bonney et al. 1994; King 1997; Armstrong 1998; Giulianotti 1999). Ancillary to this, research was carried out into the ‘Casuals’, the related cultural phenomenon of young males who consumed fashion, music and football violence (Redhead and McLaughlin 1985; Giulianotti 1993; Redhead 1993; Giulianotti 1994). The fact that British research has moved away from hooliganism as a research topic is indicative of this change, despite its relevance elsewhere (Spaaij 2006; Tsoukala 2009). Italy, in particular, is continuing to experience widespread fan disorder which is contributing to a crisis within the sport.

Only through the wider analysis of the political economy of football and through analysis of alternative nations and leagues can we fully understand the global phenomenon of football. In one small way this thesis attempts to rectify this disparity through investigation into Italian football. As the following section demonstrates, Italian football has not built on its successes of the 1990s and is struggling to compete in European competition.

Decline of Italian Football
During the twenty years since *Football Italia* was first broadcast on British Television, globalisation processes have profoundly impacted the respective fortunes of Italian and English football. Whereas the English Premier League has developed into the most successful league in the world, Italian football has experienced profound crisis during the twenty-first century. Italy was initially successful in adapting to the changing global political economy in the 1990s. However, Italy has not been able to capitalise on this early success. The turnover for Serie A in the 1996-7 season was second to the English Premier League. By 2006-7 it was fourth behind Germany and Spain (Hamil, Morrow et al. 2010). This has impacted Serie A clubs’ ability to compete financially over wage expenditure on players, and financially many clubs operate with significant debt. The top leagues in Europe all made operating profits during this period4. However, Serie A made an operating loss of €1355m over the same period (Hamil, Morrow et al. 2010). The financial crises have been compounded by a number of scandals relating to match-fixing and administration. Furthermore, Italian football has been blighted by fan violence for decades which reached its nadir in 2007 when a policeman, Filippo Raciti, was killed during a riot between Catania and Palermo fans in February. This was followed in November of the same year by the death of a Lazio fan, Gabriele Sandri, who was shot by a policeman on his way to the game.

Crises in the Italian game have resulted in fan apathy and a decline in attendance at matches. The over-reliance on familial and patrimonial networks has prevented the Italian clubs from understanding and exploiting wider global transformations. The infrastructure has not been updated to reflect the changes taking place elsewhere. Failure to update stadiums and instigate effective business policies has limited the range of fans

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clubs can attract. This has been compounded with continuing problems with violence at football matches. These problems have impacted attendances at Italian football matches and contrast sharply with average attendances in the Germany and England. Figure 2.1 highlights the contrasting average attendance between the five elite football competitions in Europe. After comparable average attendances in the 1970s between Italy and England, the two national leagues encountered contrasting fortunes. England faced continuing problems with hooliganism that resulted in English clubs being excluded from European competition after the Heysel Stadium tragedy. Italian football began a similar decline at the end of the 1970s but sustained a rapid growth in attendances after Italy won the 1982 World Cup in Spain. A sharp decline began in the middle of the 1980s that was again halted by a successful World Cup tournament. Italia ’90 rejuvenated interest in Italian football, both domestically and internationally. However, this success was not capitalised upon. Elsewhere, in Germany and England in particular, stadiums were transformed, leagues re-formatted and wider business models incorporated. The assimilation of football into the broader global economy facilitated the wider popularity of the sport. As a consequence, Germany and England have experienced continued rises in average attendances, whilst Italy’s continue to fall.
The problems in Italian football are not only affecting attendances at stadiums, but are impacting its ability to capitalise on the new global market for football. The English Premier League has negotiated a range of television contracts with international television companies which promote the English Premier League’s brand globally. Serie A has not been able to do the same as they individually negotiated their television rights (until 2010). As a consequence, they have not been able to turn their matches into global television events. By restricting their focus to the domestic market, the Italian clubs have not maximised their global image and are losing market share to rival leagues. The impact of the failure to respond to these transformations is affecting the performances of the clubs outside of their domestic league. Rather than Italian football being seen as the epitome of European football, it is in danger of joining the second tier of European football.

Figure 1.1 Elite League Average Attendances

5 Source data from www.european-football-statistics.co.uk
leagues. The organiser of the Champions League, UEFA, determines the number of participants from national leagues based upon their success in Europe. Since 1997 UEFA expanded the Champions League to include runners-up in the national leagues. This was calculated on a coefficient system which calculated national league’s results over a five year period. Higher ranked national leagues have more representatives in the competition. Since the coefficient’s inception, England, Spain and Italy have been in the first tier of the coefficient, each having four representatives in the Champions League. However, Italian clubs have not maintained their previous standard. As a consequence they will lose their status in the top tier to the German Bundesliga (La Repubblica 2010).

The victory of Inter, from Milan, over Bayern Munich in the final of the 2010 Champions League postponed this eventuality, yet without major changes, the trajectories of German and Italian football will not alter drastically in the short term.

![Figure 1.2 Champions League Semi-finalists and Finalists by nation](image)

Figure 1.2 Champions League Semi-finalists and Finalists by nation
Since the inception of the Champions League there has been a dramatic reversal in the fortunes of the various national leagues. Figure 2.2 graphically details the number of Semi-finalists, Finalists and Winners of the Champions League for the most significant countries. In the last decade of the twentieth century, Italy was the undisputed leader of the Champions League. It had seven representatives in the semi-finals, six of whom proceeded to the final. Of these AC Milan and Juventus won the competition in 1994 and 1996 respectively. Of all the national leagues in the Champions League in the 1990s, Italy had more semi-finalists than any other national league. This led to them having more finalists, and consequently more winners. During the same period, the English Premier League managed just two semi-finals, with Manchester United being the only club to achieve that feat in 1997 and 1999. The last year of the decade saw Manchester United progress to the final and win the competition in the last minute of their game against the German side Bayern Munich. This victory marked a turning point for the English Premier League in the following decade.

The twenty-first century has seen a dramatic reversal of fortunes for the respective leagues. Since 2000, Italy maintained its standing at the semi-final level, by having six semi-finalists. Of these, four progressed to the final, with AC Milan winning the tournament twice, in 2003 and 2007. The former was an all-Italian final against Juventus. In contrast, the same period has seen a dramatic increase in the number of English clubs at the semi-final stage. In stark contrast to the two semi-final appearances of Manchester United in the previous decade, the English Premier League had fifteen representatives in the decade after Manchester United’s 1999 victory. Six teams subsequently qualified for the final, which resulted in two clubs winning the competition: Liverpool beat AC Milan in 2005, and Manchester United beat their fellow English club Chelsea in 2008. In sharp contrast to the dominance of Italian clubs in the early years of the Champions League,
representatives from the English Premier League now demonstrate their European dominance.

This relative dominance of English clubs became more acute from 2005 until 2010. Twelve of England's semi-finalists have been achieved during this period. All six of the English Premier Leagues finalists were achieved during the same period, which resulted in two victories. In contrast, the all-Italian final of 2003 marks the zenith of Italian football. Since then only three Italian clubs have achieved the semi-final stage; on each occasion AC Milan were the participants. Juventus matched the feat in 2003, as did Internazionale of Milan. Juventus were the only other Italian club represented at the final stage after the first year of the competition. In 1992, the inauguration year of the Champions League, Sampdoria were Italian champions and runners-up, losing to Barcelona. 2010 saw the triumph of Internazionale under the management of the charismatic Jose Mourinho from Portugal, who reached their first final since 1972. Meanwhile, all of the top four clubs from the English Premier League, Manchester United, Liverpool, Chelsea and Arsenal, have achieved a Champions League semi-final. All of these have also progressed to the final. This is in addition to Leeds United reaching the Champions League semi-final in 2001.

English clubs fared less well in 2010. For the first time since 2003, no club from the English premier League reached the semi-finals of the Champions League. Meanwhile, Italy was represented by the Milanese side Inter. This resulted in speculation in the English media that the English Premier League had reached the end of its life-cycle. However, this analysis was premature. It failed to take into account the fact that three of the English clubs qualified from the group stages where both Manchester United and Arsenal proceeded to the quarter-finals. Like the English clubs, three Italian clubs
proceeded from the group stages. Of these, only Fiorentina qualified in first place. Both Fiorentina and AC Milan were subsequently knocked out in the next round. One club from each nation did not qualify from the group stages and consequently qualified for the Europa League: Juventus and Liverpool. Liverpool reached the semi-finals of the competition. Meanwhile, Juventus were defeated in the round of 16 by the English side, Fulham. Fulham subsequently exceeded all expectations by reaching the final. Although no English sides qualified for the semi-finals of the Champions League, two sides qualified for the equivalent in the Europa League. Only Inter proceeded with any credit in either competition. An exceptional year for Inter should not mask the respective fortunes of the two national leagues.

Consequently, Italy’s approach to globalisation represents an apposite case study. This thesis addresses the impact of the global transformations on Italy and in doing so, adds to the range of literature addressing diverse national leagues, from Europe to South America and Asia. The following section details the methodology and approach taken in this thesis to address the impact of globalisation on Italian football.

**Livorno and Italian Football**

The romantic construction of foreign football needs further analysis and needs to be situated within the wider body of literature on globalisation. This thesis seeks to address this aspect and seeks to expand the frame of reference. In order to develop an appropriate understanding of Italian football, a period of participant observation was undertaken in the city of Livorno, ten miles south of Pisa, on the Tuscan coast. Although some research has been undertaken into the fans of Livorno, this is extensively quantitative in outlook (Ampola 2002; Grillo 2010). In order to address this, and to fully
understand the impact of globalisation on a provincial Italian club, I needed to undertake a significant amount of qualitative research. Consequently, this research is based upon six months of participant observation in Livorno. During the period, I stayed with two Italian families which gave me extensive insight into Italian culture. Through these families, I made many acquaintances with whom I could familiarise myself with Livornese culture and Italian football.

**Participant Observation**

Deep ethnographic research has been a proved instrument within research into football groups (Marsh, Rosser et al. 1978; Murphy, Williams et al. 1990; Giulianotti 1995; Armstrong 1998; King 1998; Giulianotti 1999; Spaaij 2006; Testa and Armstrong 2010). These experiences covered a mixture of overt and covert participant observation, where the ethnographer is overt to some and covert to others. This situation can present a number of problems to the ethnographer. Sugden has highlighted the perils and pitfalls associated with ethnographic study. The ethnographer needs to ‘immerse’ themselves in their chosen surroundings, and strike the fine line between “understanding the natives and going native” (Sugden 1996). In order to traverse this fine line, Sugden provided a series of ‘rules’:

“be up front about the research role; remember, we are not secret agents and neither are we investigative journalists, although occasionally we may borrow information-gathering techniques from either camp; neither are we *agents provocateurs* – we should not set in motion procedures which otherwise would not have happened in order to unearth interesting material; we are interested in naturally emergent (or concealed) social truths, not good stories; under (almost)
all circumstances we should stay within the laws which govern the land within
which we are operating.” (Sugden 1996)

These rules provided a framework for my participant observation. My status as a
foreigner in Livorno automatically set me apart. Therefore, I openly detailed my presence
in the city as ‘conducting research for university’. This would naturally lead to further
questioning, as Livorno is not a city or football team that generally attracts investigation
from foreigners. This also allowed me to ask questions as the impartial observer which
helped to reveal these social truths.

Reflexivity is also vital when participating in ethnographic research. Sparkes has argued
that the researcher is a key actor within the research (Sparkes 1992). The researcher has
their own life histories, viewpoints and ideologies which frame their understanding of the
social action that they witness. My position as a white, heterosexual, male from the south
west of England provided an alternative perspective to the social situations I was
observing. As Sparkes highlights:

“researchers need to reflect on the political dimensions of fieldwork, the webs of
power that circulate in the research process, and how these shape the manner in
which knowledge is constructed. Likewise, they need to consider how issues of
gender, nationality, race, ethnicity, social class, age, religion, sexual identity,
disability, and able-bodiedness shape knowledge construction. These issue may
affect interactions in the field; who gets studied and who gets ignored; which
questions are asked and which are left unasked; how people are written in and
out of accounts; and how ‘others’ and the self of the researcher are represented”
(Sparkes 2002: 17)
Consequently, reflexivity of the researcher is paramount. My position as researcher had to be understood and reflexively interrogated throughout. On the one hand, my otherness as a foreigner made certain aspects of this reflexivity straightforward. At other times, it became a yoke around my neck. Comparisons with football in England were obvious. These affected my understanding, not only of Italian football, but also football in England. Seeing an alternative system, with its variety of ‘positives’ and ‘negatives’ also led me to challenge some long-standing assumptions I had held regarding English football. I generally agreed with many of the things written about the change in English football, and held a deep-seated distrust of commercial clubs like Manchester United. But researching football in Italy, and witnessing first-hand the conditions in the stadium, the police presence and the chronic ego building of club presidents, made me re-evaluate my position. There are problems in English football; but many other countries are in a far worse situation as a result of globalisation. And these are the issues we should be addressing.

Participant observation took place at a number of locations, not all of them football related. Most of these were in public settings (Hammersley 1983), where all members of the public were able to attend. Specifically linked to football matches, participant observation took place at the football-related spaces, namely the stadiums and football supporters’ clubs. Various spaces en route to the match were also included, such as supporters’ coaches, trains (and stations), Autogrills and car trips. Broader locations were also incorporated, such as bars, nightclubs, restaurants and parties (Livorno has a number of outdoor parties and festivals during the spring and summer). Some of these sites were less public, or ‘closed’, such as the supporters’ coaches, and some supporters’ clubs’ meetings. Most fans were ‘ordinary’ fans, as opposed to ultrà, and participation was
‘passive’ and ‘moderate’ (Spradley 1980) or in the terminology of Gold, ‘participant-as-observer’ (Gold 1958). Participant observation was not only a way of obtaining data, but as a means to develop a ‘feeling’ for the Livornese, and to understand the themes and approaches which the Livornese took to everyday life and football in particular. To embellish the participant observation, semi-structured interviews were undertaken with various fans. Five interviews were conducted with supporters’ club members. Appointments for these were simpler as they regularly attended these clubs. Additionally, a focus group was conducted with leading members of one of Livorno’s ultrà groups, Livornesi. This was conducted in the bar which they used as their headquarters.

Gaining access to rival fan groups can prove problematic. Alberto Testa’s excellent ethnographic account of ultrà groups of Roma and Lazio highlighted the difficulties in gaining access to important members (Testa and Armstrong 2010). The subjects of Testa’s research were infamous amongst ultrà groups and were suspicious of police or journalistic infiltration. Testa needed ‘gatekeepers’ in order to access these privileged domains. These gatekeepers were “actors with control over key resources and avenues of opportunity” (Hammersley 1983: 38). After gaining access, he had to pass a series of ‘filters’ in order to gain acceptance. As a Roman, Testa had sufficient cultural capital (Bourdieu 1984; Bourdieu 1986) to allow access through the ‘filters’. Meanwhile, his time away from the city (whilst studying in London) permitted sufficient distance from the ultrà subculture to analyse the group impartially, and also provided a focus of interest for his ‘subjects’.

Elsewhere, Giulianotti has highlighted how perceived difference can impede access to football fan groups (Giulianotti 1995). Giulianotti’s school friends provided easy access to a hooligan group of Aberdeen fans. However, when Giulianotti tried to access a
similar group of Hibernian fans in Edinburgh, he faced significant problems. His Aberdeen accent was treated with suspicion and this was not helped by media reports into the Hibernian group that surfaced at the same time which led to a fear amongst group members that the police were about to start an infiltration operation (Giulianotti 1995: 5). In order to gain acceptance, Giulianotti had to engage in a ‘research bargain’ and provide details of Aberdeen’s group. What this required is a constant re-performance of the participation. Armstrong identified how ethnographers have to constantly renegotiate with their subjects throughout the research period, especially as new contacts are made (Armstrong 1993). Researchers have to re-perform their identity throughout to ensure that they pass as members of the group. This constant awareness of one’s place in the group ensures that the researcher remains reflexive about their position and ensures that there are no dangers of ‘going native’.

As an English researcher, who spoke Italian with a clear accent, it was not possible for me to operate covertly, regardless of any ethical issue this represented. This however provided alternative problems, in that an English researcher with no background in Italy, or Livorno specifically, ensured that finding gatekeepers would be difficult. Serendipity led me to discuss the research with a former Italian teacher (from Florence), who directed me to another former Italian teacher who was from Livorno. In passing, she discussed it with her husband, who in turn, was a close friend of someone who organised local charity football tournaments. Through these tournaments, he knew a local supporters’ club and discussed the research with them. On a preliminary visit to Livorno, the directors of the supporters’ club invited me to meet with them. The social network led me to my first significant gatekeeper.
Although I am not Italian, and did not have the cultural capital associated with being Livornese, football fandom provides certain ‘cultural passports’ (Back, Crabbe et al. 2001) that enable fans to access alternative groups. As a keen football fan, and a fan of Italian football in particular, I had access to a set of resources that could be drawn upon in the field. Resources such as common knowledge of players, tactics and the rituals surrounding football, allowed me to converse with the members and directors of the supporters’ club with ease. However, preparation for this specific group was also essential. As part of my research I had immersed myself in the history of the city of Livorno and its football club. History provides a key structuring narrative to social groups and helps establish key traditions and memories. By knowing and acknowledging this history I was able to demonstrate my commitment to the research and pass the initiation. The supporters’ club headquarters was adorned with pictures and photographs of Livorno football club and its players. In particular, knowing that Igor Protti was the most celebrated player in the football club’s history clearly demonstrated this cultural capital. Protti was a journeyman footballer who came to Livorno late in his career. However, he was a prolific goal scorer for the club and his goals powered Livorno to two promotions. Yet Protti would not be a familiar name to many English fans, even those with an intimate knowledge of Italian football. His relevance was to Livorno and their fans, not to Italian football. Knowing the players like Igor Protti, and their relevance to the team, permitted me to demonstrate my understanding of their importance to the fans.

Passing the initiation permitted me to attend the club as a member. In this capacity, I attended on a regular basis to observe the daily undertaking of the club. In addition, I was able to purchase tickets for away matches. The supporters’ club organised travel to away matches, and as a member, I joined these coaches as they traversed the peninsular.
This provided several opportunities to converse with other fans. Being English, they saw me as a ‘VIP’ and an object of curiosity. I could exploit this to talk to people, explain the research and ask questions about their fandom. As always, my cultural capital as a football fan enabled me to talk to fans regardless of my nationality. My difference merely permitted me to ask questions about the differences between English and Italian football. In one of Garfinkel’s famous ‘breaching experiments’, he asked his students to act as though they were boarders in the family home (Garfinkel 1967). This led to perplexity and confusion from the students’ families. My status as a foreigner allowed me to undertake this type of ‘breaching experiment’ without causing embarrassment. I could ask obvious questions under the pretence of being English, which allowed me to illicit clear answers. If I had asked similar questions to English football fans, I would have been treated with incredulity, and this would have undermined my cultural capital.

Gaining access to the supporters’ club did not just allow me to attend as a member. One of the directors, in particular, was an active member within the network of supporters’ clubs. He introduced me to various clubs throughout Livorno and this allowed me to see the variety of supporters’ clubs in the city. It also allowed me to see the variety of locations and directors who ran these clubs. Many of these clubs are in residential areas, and although many are situated in bars, others are housed in shop units or as part of domestic buildings. Knowing where these clubs were, let alone being permitted to visit, would have been incredibly difficult without a gatekeeper to lead the way. Despite these introductions, as Armstrong argued, I had to re-demonstrate my cultural capital at every new meeting (Armstrong 1993).

Having a common knowledge and understanding of football and the history of Livorno allowed me access to the gatekeepers at the supporters’ club. Elsewhere, a shared
nationality granted me access to another gatekeeper. Through my extensive research to understand Livorno’s history and culture, I found a website written by an English resident in the city. Despite a rich historical association with the British, twenty-first century Livorno is not a popular location for British tourists or expatriates, most of whom reside in the Tuscan hills or at ‘cultural’ centres like Pisa, Siena or Florence. The website livornonow.com provided a database for the few English speakers in Livorno, as well as publishing English language news. Through this website, I wrote a series of match reports that granted me further cultural capital with fans, and other contacts. Most importantly, the webmaster of livornonow.com acted as another gatekeeper. She had a friend who was a local journalist and I was asked to provide an interview for the local paper, Il Tirreno. Once again, my nationality provided enough to pique the interest of the local paper, and the local football community. This was followed up with a second interview following the relative failure of Italian clubs, and the success of English clubs, in the 2009 Champions League. These interviews yielded a number of contacts and acquaintances. I was also interviewed for AS Livorno’s club magazine, Amaranto. However, this failed to produce any additional contacts. Through these interviews, I gained a certain amount of notoriety. I became increasingly aware of being called ‘L’inglese’ (“The Englishman”) when visiting some contacts. This fuelled further interactions.

As an Englishman in Livorno, language was vital. As already stated, Livorno does not have a large English-speaking population, nor is it popular with tourists. Unlike a city like Rome or Florence, I could not rely on my participants being able to speak English. Prior to commencing this research, I had been studying Italian for two years. In addition, I also attended an intensive language school in Livorno one year prior to commencing my fieldwork. This allowed me to familiarise myself with the geography, as well as giving me
the requisite language skills; there is a vast difference between learning a language in a classroom in England to speaking in a conversation in a bar in Italy. The vagaries of the Italian language also posed a problem. Although the Italian language is based on the Florentine dialect, Livorno has a distinctive vernacular. Specific words and turns of phrase had to be absorbed and understood, although my nationality permitted me much leeway in this regard. Older participants also proved more difficult to understand than younger participants. Older speakers often had much stronger accents, which could become difficult to decipher on occasions. In contrast, many speakers under forty also had an awareness of speaking to an audience which was not native-speaking, and they modulated their speech accordingly.

Impression management also helped to present the correct image to fans. In addition to having the requisite cultural capital and language skills, Hammersley and Atkinson highlight the importance of dress when undertaking ethnographic research (Hammersley 1983). Although there is a common stereotype about Italian style and dress, Livorno is a port city with a strong ‘beach culture’. Like many similar cultures around the world, relaxed, informal dress is worn. Shorts and T-shirts will be worn in summer, while during the winter months, jeans and hoodies are worn. Although this style of dress would be inappropriate for Florence or Rome, it was perfectly acceptable in Livorno. Growing up in a seaside town gave me this common cultural capital and made participation in this beach culture unproblematic. In addition, Livorno has a strong left-wing identity and this is demonstrated in political T-shirts, army-style clothing, and green military-style coats. Purchasing, and wearing, the specific T-shirts and coats allowed me to present the correct image on the terrace, and facilitated acceptance within the groups.

**Literature**
Local newspapers play an important part of Livornese daily life. As a result, the two Livornese daily newspapers, *Il Tirreno* and *Il Corriere di Livorno* have been analysed to provide an insight into public and media representations of the football and club and fan activities. Archival research was undertaken to locate notable earlier newspaper reports and some *ultrà* and fans allowed me to access to their own collections of cuttings and articles. Livorno also has a local political group who produce a monthly left-wing publication called *Senza Soste* (“Nonstop”). This newsletter provides a wide range of news articles that are absent from commercial Italian newspapers. Every edition will have one page devoted to football coverage, with special focus on Livorno. Italy does not have a widespread culture of consumption of match-day programmes. These are produced by the club and provided free to fans at designated outlets (bars, supporters’ clubs). Principally these provide a small range of details and statistics of the teams. The majority of the programme is composed of advertising space (which pays for the programme). In addition to the match-day programme, AS Livorno also produces a monthly magazine. Entitled *Amaranto*, after the colours of the city and the football club, it includes various articles on the football club, supporters and players. Archival work was also done to understand the background of the football club and its fans.

A useful source of information, particularly at the beginning of my fieldwork, was the wealth of literature available on Livorno Calcio. A wide range of official and unofficial histories of the club and the city exists (Abse 1986; De Luca 2000; Vivoli 2001; Galasso 2002; Chiarello 2005; Vaccari, Frattarelli Fischer et al. 2006). On account of its varied and interesting history, the city of Livorno has a particularly wide range of books detailing its history. Recent years has seen the emergence of some less academic, but nonetheless interesting accounts into the Livornese persona, often written in the local
vernacular (Noberini 2003; Bongini, Pannocchia et al. 2007). Specifically related to the principal supporters’ club where my research was based, one book gave a fascinating insight into football fandom in Livorno. On the death of their son Luca, the founders of Club Luca Rondina produced a book detailing the co-operation they received from the football club. The city library of Livorno housed a significant collection of works on the city and with the co-operation of the local library staff, a significant proportion of my early work in Livorno was based there. Wider academic research of football literature was also undertaken at the libraries of the University of Pisa and University of Bologna.

Fanzine culture within football fan cultures is particularly strong. The medium developed strongly during the 1990s, especially in Britain, and has been shown to be a valuable insight into the outlook of particular fan communities and worthy of academic attention (Jary, Horne et al. 1991; King 1998; Giulianotti 1999; Millward 2008). Fanzines have also been adopted across Europe, particularly in Germany and the Netherlands (Spaaij 2006). However, there is not a similar fanzine culture within Italy. Dal Lago and De Biasi ascribe this to the intense co-ordination of the match-day choreographies (Dal Lago and De Biasi 1994). However, there are two national fanzines that are produced in Italy and are easily obtained in Livorno. The fanzine Supertifo (“Superfan”) started in 1985 and has recommenced publishing in 2010. Supertifo conforms to the British notion of a fanzine, in that it contains a large number of ‘comment’ features, where ultras recount their experiences at football. Many of these are nostalgic stories of solidarity as fans attend away games, whilst others are historical reconstructions of the ultras. The fanzine also provides an ‘agony aunt’ column called “L’avvocato risponde” (“The lawyer replies”). In this article, a well-known solicitor and ultra of AS Roma, Lorenzo Contucci, responds to a question relating to legal issues relating to football fandom. Contucci also organizes the

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*http://www.supertifo.it/*
comprehensive ultrà website called asromaultras.org and defends a number of ultrà members in the courts. Consequently, he is highly regarded within the ultrà world. Supertifo also provides a large section devoted to fans’ photos of choreographies. The provide commentary and opportunities for ultrà to re-perform their identity outside the stadium.

The other fanzine principally operates as a medium to further display ultrà choreographies. Entitled Fan’s Magazine, it is produced by ultras of Salernitana. Fan’s Magazine re-produces the various choreographies of ultrà groups throughout the football league structure, as well as some basketball games (The ultrà phenomenon has been taken up by basketball fans). These magazines highlight the sophisticated ways that the ultrà identity is produced and consumed. Principally, it publishes photos that provide opportunities for ultrà to display and re-perform the choreographies. They also display photos of scenes from outside the stadium. They illustrate the chanting and clapping that takes place as ultrà approach the stadium. They also highlight the positioning of police in relation to these choreographies outside the stadium. More importantly, it illustrates key ultrà messages. For example, the title of the 212th edition of April 2010 stated: “Gli ultras non muoiono mai…” (“The ultras never die…”). Despite being predominantly photographic, it does include commentary and discussion related to government measures and police actions, so operates as an important method to investigate ultra viewpoints.

A noteworthy trend in British football literature concerns books written about hooliganism. Covering both fiction and autobiographies, there is a sizable market related to football hooliganism (Dart 2008; Poulton 2008). Nicknamed ‘hoolie-lit’, works of

7 http://www.fansmagazine.eu/
fiction, such as *The Football Factory* and *Awaydays* have been turned into films, alongside others such as *I.D.* and *Green Street*. Pioneered by Colin Ward with *Steaming In*, and developed by Cass Pennant, a cottage industry has developed producing a number of autobiographical works based on the lives and actions of key members of various crews. This trend has not been replicated in Italy. Although Pennant’s seminal *Congratulations You Have Just Met the ICF* has been translated into Italian, it is not possible to purchase a similar range of books in Italy. Fan accounts do exist, but are only obtained locally, through fan networks. Football-related books are limited to club histories, season diaries, or academic books. There exists one, simply written, fictional short story on the life of an ultrà, *Io, ultrà* (“I, ultrás”). In addition there are faux academic books, written by journalists, and the occasional ultrà, to try and investigate the phenomenon. As a result, there is not an extensive resource available for investigation in this field.

**Internet and Social Networking**

The internet has produced a number of instruments for ultrà identity to be re-performed and re-articulated. In addition to the official website of AS Livorno, there are a number of websites which have been created and maintained by fans of the club. These provided useful resources to understand significant historical events, memorable players, and current debates. There are also a number of websites dedicated to ultrà. In particular, the website www.asromaultras.org provides extensive information on the ultrà, in addition to information on AS Roma and its fans. This website is maintained by Lorenzo Contucci, the lawyer who defends ultrà, and provides legal advice for the fanzine *Supertifo*. Video footage was also analysed to provide further analysis of spectator behaviour. Youtube also proved to be a valuable resource. Fans and ultrà actively post videos and clips

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8 www.livornocalcio.it; www.alelivorno.it; www.amaranta.it; www.uslivorno.it; www.sportamaranto.it
9 www.tifonet.it; www.europeanultras.com; www.ultrasspirit.com
displaying their activities, in particular their choreographies and confrontations. Although these videos are not unbiased, they provide an apposite example of how ultrà actively perform their identity and re-perform it through the internet. Youtube, and other internet sites, provide extensive platforms for ultrà to actively choose the image they want to portray. In turn this reinforces the invented traditions of the ultrà as they seek to maintain their image. Other forms of social networking did not provide to be as useful, especially in gaining access to contacts. Early in the research, Facebook and Couchsurfing.com were used to try to build contacts. I also participated on internet forums related to Livorno football club. However, there is not a strong internet culture in Livorno (in contrast to England) and these approaches yielded little success. After a brief summary, the following section will present an outline of the thesis to address Italy’s approach to globalisation in football and contributing factors to the decline of Italian football.

**Summary**

This thesis will provide an analysis of Italian football in terms of globalisation in order to contribute to debates in the sociology of sport in the UK. These debates have often ignored the reality of Italian football and utilised a romanticised notion to reinforce criticisms of the English game. The analysis will be grounded in the global political economy; through the complex transformations which have taken place it is possible to see the profound affect that these have had on the nation state. The rolling back of the state has led to a decline in the social capital of urban communities and an increased individualisation which is contributing to a decline of Italian football. This is compounded by the continued practise of patrimonial networks that undermine the state and its institutions.
Consequently, this thesis is sub-divided into four sections. The following chapter will conclude the introductory section by outlining the theoretical context that will frame this thesis. The second section will focus on the Italian political economy. Chapter 3 will illustrate the historical development of Italy's national political economy. In particular it will focus on the transition from the Keynesian state-capitalism of the immediate post-war period into the de-regulated global economy of the 1980s and beyond. These globalised transformations are not uniform; in Italy, they have developed a specific characteristic due to the prior weakness of the State and extensive patrimonial networks. This argument will be explored in Chapter 4 as the culture of mistrust in the central authorities and patrimonial networks has been replicated within the world of football. The weakness of the de-regulated institutions has facilitated the emergence of strategic actors who can manipulate their networks for the benefit of the major clubs.

The third section will focus on the experience of fans. The crisis of Italian football is compounded by a poor infrastructure with antiquated stadiums and extensive policing. These factors will be explored in Chapter 5 whilst looking at match-day experiences. Chapter 6 will trace the historical development of the fans and how their social and political affiliations have fragmented in parallel to the de-regulation of the national political economy. The fragmentation of the fan groups has substantially weakened the position of the fans and facilitated the emergence of the strategic actors in football. Finally, the concluding section and chapter will situate the victory of Inter in the Champions League final within this framework. A tentative future for Italian football will then be proposed to conclude the thesis.
Chapter 2

Sport and Community

“The imagined community of millions seems more real as a team of eleven named people” – Eric Hobsbawm

“Every year the progress of advanced capitalist society makes our population consist of more and more isolates. This is because of the infrastructure of the economy, especially electronic communications” - Mary Douglas

Filippo Raciti died on 2nd February 2007; the police officer died from severe liver damage after being struck by a blunt object. Raciti was one of hundreds of police officers attending the Sicilian derby between Catania and Palermo. The match started in an unusual fashion as the teams held a minutes silence to commemorate Ermanno Licursi, the manager of an amateur side who was killed when he tried to stop a brawl during a match the week before. Despite the austere beginnings of the match, fans continued with their usual choreographies. There was such a quantity of smoke from the smoke bombs that the referee had to suspend the game for fifteen minutes. Palermo won the game 2-1 and their fans were being escorted from the ground by the police when they were ambushed by the Catania fans. The home fans had several weapons including one hundred home made bombs. The Catania fans threw various objects at the police,

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including pipes, sinks and a scooter (Craig and Pisa 2007). It was the ensuing riot that resulted in the tragic death of Filippo Raciti.

In contrast to the romantic notion of Mediterranean carnival fans, the Italian league has experienced a series of profound crises. The death of Filippo Raciti came less than year after Calciopoli, a major corruption and match-fixing scandal which affected many of the top Italian clubs. This contrasted with the presentation of television shows such as Football Italia on Channel 4 in Britain, which simultaneously reflected Italian success in the 1990s, and reaffirmed its dominance. Italy’s top division, Serie A, became known as “il campionato più bello del mondo”, the most beautiful championship in the world (Clegg 2010). Italy had capitalised on its success by successfully hosting Italia ’90 and their legacy seemed assured. However, globalisation has impacted Italian football in number of ways. Despite the success of Serie A during the 1990s, it has experienced a range of crises and faces declining attendances. As the global political economy has changed, Italy has struggled to maintain its position.

This chapter seeks to provide a theoretical framework for the thesis. Through the complex global transformations which have taken place, it is possible to see the profound affect that these have had on the nation state of Italy. The worldwide rolling back of the state has led to a decline in the public participation of urban communities which is reflected in the decline of Italian football. Through understanding the nation we can situate football in the wider political economy. In order to highlight these transformations, this chapter will locate the development of sport within the parallel development of the nation state. It will then build on this understanding of the nation state to illustrate the role of political economy within the nation state and how this has changed with globalisation. The subsequent section will address the literature on
declining participation in public life, in particular focussing on the fashionable term ‘social capital’.

**Sport and the Nation State**

Modern sport is intimately linked with the role of the nation state. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the nation state became a central component of social identity. The processes of rationalisation and codification that led to the development of modern sport also took place elsewhere in society. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the nation states increasingly centralised and monopolised national assets. Through control of the police and the armed forces, the state monopolised violence and gradually coerced and controlled the populace which changed the traditional role of the family to protect its members (Weber 1968; Elias 1982). Through coercion and elite distinction saw ‘uncivilised’ behaviours, such as violence, madness and personal bodily functions, became increasingly separated from daily life and removed from sight (Elias 1978; Foucault 2009). The designation of crimes and appropriate punishments allowed the state to increase surveillance over the individual (Foucault 1991). The redefinition of roles between the state and the individual facilitated the requirements for an independent bureaucracy to administer the organs of state (Weber 1968). This led to the creation of a separate bureaucratic class which necessitated a common official language that reinforced a commonality between all national members (Anderson 2006). With the state’s monopoly of violence, protection of the community and the family was performed by the State’s police and military. Sport provided an avenue to continue the traditional masculine traits of toughness and physicality (Dunning and Sheard 1979).
The rationalisation processes that formed the modern state occurred within sport. Sport in general, and football in particular, were the product of the British public school system (Dunning and Sheard 1979). These schools took the folk football games that had developed in British towns and villages since the fourteenth century and applied a regulatory system to control the violence and produce uniformity. Regulation and codification permitted measurement and specialisation which encouraged the maintenance of records for comparisons and opportunities to distinguish between athletes (Guttmann 1978). Records and measurement permitted public schools and sports clubs to compare themselves with others (Dunning and Sheard 1979: 4). Sporting success also acted as a marker of distinction as the public schools sought to differentiate themselves from the emerging industrial classes (Dunning and Sheard 1979; Bourdieu 1984). Sport also provided an emotional outlet from the constraining rationality of modernity, a ‘quest of excitement’ (Elias and Dunning 1986). Consequently, a combination of factors led to Britain becoming the birthplace of modern codified sports (Guttmann 1978; Dunning and Sheard 1979; Elias and Dunning 1986; Huizinga 1992; Giulianotti 1999; Maguire 1999; Miller, Lawrence et al. 2001). British industrialisation and urbanisation in the nineteenth century provided the spectators and interest for these new forms of sport. Meanwhile British colonisation and imperialism exported them across the globe where they were adopted by new urban groups emerging in the newly formed nations.

The growth of the nation state required powerful cultural identification. Consequently, the centralisation of resources under the auspices of the state ran in parallel to the growth of national identification. Powerful national symbols permitted the creation and execution of national rituals that engendered emotions and sentiments towards the nation. Hobsbawm illustrates the increasing number of ‘invented traditions’ that arose
during the late nineteenth century which initiated rituals that permitted the participants to share similar symbols which in turn provided the participants with the same emotional focus (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Collins 2005). Hobsbawm suggests that these invented traditions were proscribed by political elites, and this denies the masses and agency within their participation (Smith 1998). As the following chapter will illustrate, in the case of Italy, the nation was a political construct. But this is not to deny the wider agency of those who fought and died for Garibaldi and the architects of the Risorgimento. More importantly, however, it should be noted how invented traditions did not appear out of the ether, but were rituals and symbols which “incorporated several motifs and traditions from previous epochs and earlier ceremonies, and that is, in part, why they resonated with the public. To call them 'invented' traditions does scant justice to the complex ways in which these, and other ceremonies, were reconstructed and reinterpreted” (Smith 1998: 130). Thus, groups and nations incorporate a variety of memories, symbols and traditions into their identity.

The shared focus and emotional attachment engendered by shared symbols leads members to form a sense of shared belonging and collective memory. This participation developed an ‘imagined community’ of members. As Anderson states, it is:

“imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communities” (Anderson 2006: 6).

Whilst the participants will not know their contemporaries, they share the same symbols that provide the focus for their community. Although Smith suggests that this imagined political community underplays ethnic and historic resources which engender powerful
feelings of attachment, the political aspects should not be underestimated (Smith 1998: 130). Several elements impact identification with the nation. Political and religious identification can assist or impede this wider identification. In Italy, for example, the two mass political parties identified with global movements like Catholicism and Communism. Consequently, the nation has to find other ways to encourage participation.

Sport provides the powerful symbols and invented traditions for national identities to be articulated. Hobsbawm’s quote at the start of the chapter illustrates this position: “The imagined community of millions seems more real as a team of eleven named people” (Hobsbawm 1992: 143). Sport and football in particular, provides the symbols and invented traditions that permit thousands of participants to share in the same activity. This shared participation with strangers engenders powerful feelings of belonging. As Durkheim highlighted, emotional attachment is fuelled through increased participation in the rituals of the group (Durkheim 1915). This creates a distinction between the profane and the sacred and further delineates the membership of the group. Sports’ competitions provide opportunities to reinforce the sacred and profane of the nation. International events, such as the Olympics, provided apposite opportunities for nations to compete with each other (Roche 2000). As a consequence, the increased internationalisation of competition helped sharpen national identities (Maguire 1999; Miller, Lawrence et al. 2001). International sport helped demarcate the boundaries of the imagined community and reinforce the emotional attachments of the group. As a consequence, nationalism proceeded in parallel with increased internationalisation.

As the nation state developed it incorporated further aspects into its sphere of influence. In addition to monopolising violence and appropriating the role of defence of its citizens it also incorporated aspects of the economy within its control. This heightened after the
Second World War as state-capitalism, influenced by John Maynard Keynes, became fashionable in many western democracies (Marquand 1988; Gamble 1994; Lash and Urry 1994; Gilpin and Gilpin 2000; Trigilia 2002; Sennett 2006; Kiely 2007; Kaletsky 2010). Keynes argued that recession was caused by under-consumption and advocated that states should take an active role in managing the national economy to promote full employment. This approach necessitated large numbers of nationalised industries and large-scale mass manufacturing industries operating along Fordist principles. The national welfare state provided the security to maintain consumption, whilst international agreement at the Bretton Woods conference ensured national controls of national economies. To promote stability and peace during the post-war period, states within the Bretton Woods system agreed to national autonomy over borders. Exchange rates were fixed or ‘pegged’ by the nation state to prevent excessive speculation on the international currency markets. The US dollar in particular was pegged to its extensive gold reserves which provided a firm foundation for its exchange-value. National control of exchange rates and import duties also protected the national markets from cheaper imports. This maintained national industry and preserved aspirations for full-employment within the Keynesian system.

Global factors began to impinge on national control during the 1970s. As Castells states:

“A global economy... emerged in the last years of the twentieth century. It resulted from the restructuring of firms and financial markets in the wake of the 1970s’ crisis. It expanded by using new information and communication technologies. It was made possible, and by and large induced, by deliberate government policies. The global economy was not created by markets, but by the interaction between markets and governments and international financial institutions acting on
The rising cost and resultant inflation of the Vietnam War saw Richard Nixon attempt to reassert some control of the American economy. In 1971 Nixon removed the link between the US dollar and gold. This action became the beginning of the end of Bretton Woods and permitted the American currency to speculation on international monetary markets. The crisis was exacerbated by the Oil Crisis of 1973 with the formation of OPEC by the oil-producing countries of the Middle East which led to a sharp increase in the price of oil. The combination of increased fuel costs and flexible exchange rates directly impacted the Fordist mass-manufacturing companies. These economic factors were compounded by growing social unrest. Full-employment had led to increased union strength and demands for higher wages. Within a Keynesian national economy, wages need to be carefully controlled to maintain inflation at a low level. Rising inflation and unemployment resulted in stagflation which led to growing social discontent and a global economic crisis.

The exhaustion of the Keynesian system in the 1970s resulted in a new political approach to national economies. A change in the political ideology in Britain and the US under the guidance of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan saw widespread de-regulation of the state. They advocated a market-led, neo-liberal approach which insisted that the state should be disentangled from the markets. The removal of the US dollar from the gold standard allowed open currency speculation which removed national control of currency values and with it their ability to control imports and exports. This Widespread de-regulation and privatisation took place that resulted in widespread restructuring of the economy and society. In Britain this was characterised by a reliance on a historical
tradition of financial services (Marquand 1988). The incomplete nature of industrialisation in Britain resulted in the difficult transition to a post-industrial society and an over-reliance on financial services. In Japan and elsewhere, manufacturing industries re-structured to become more flexible and responsive to consumer demand (Lash and Urry 1994). This transition to post-Fordist economies not only affected the production of commodities, but transformed the patterns of consumption within the global economy. The reinvigorated focus of consumption facilitated the widespread restructuring of global football as the sport incorporated free market approaches to maximise exposure and revenue (King 1998; Maguire 1999).

The response of the state to these global transformations necessitated a paradox. As the state was systematically weakened from its controls over the economy, its authority had to be reasserted over citizens (Gamble 1994; Wacquant 2009). The State has to be strong enough to disentangle state involvement in the market, whilst at the same time remaining strong enough to police this new economic order. This involves effective regulation to maintain the liberty of the market as well as having the strength to fight the vested interests of the previous Keynesian regime. For example, in Britain, Thatcher undertook a series of contests with Trade Unions and other vested interests in the state-controlled market (Gamble 1994). The end of protectionism, especially of national industries, resulted in open international markets. The strong state had to be prepared to manage the effects that this openness created, such as redundancies, bankruptcy and immigration. Conversely, a state which failed to regulate the new global order would face a legitimation crisis (Habermas 1975).

Globalisation has affected the nation state in different ways. Transformations in the global political economy have facilitated the emergence and reinforcement of new
patterns of consumption, international migration and identity formations. Removal of state regulation has permitted new connections to be made across the global network. Capital flows to the areas that can best adapt and accumulate the resources (Castells 1996; Sassen 2001). This has permitted inter-connections between businesses and institutions to develop and intensify. Sport has witnessed the growing intensification of connections between clubs, media and business (Maguire 1999; Sugden 2002; King 2003). However, the political element of political economy needs further analysis. Political actors are instrumental in providing the conditions that contributed to economic transformation (Castells 1996). Consequently, the roles of politics and politicians operate within these global networks and have contributed to the re-configuration of the nation state. The combination of the political and the economic has seen the emergence of new symbols and invented traditions which have emerged to challenge the national monopoly and facilitated the emergence of new forms of identification. Furthermore, the flexibility and fluidity of global capital has had a concomitant affect on local communities. There is a wide range of literature focussing on how the identities of local groups and communities have adapted to global forces (Maguire 1994; Maguire 1999; King 2000; Maguire and Pearton 2000; Giulianotti and Robertson 2006). However, these principally focus on identity formation and do not take into account the literature on fragmentation of community and the decline of participation in public life. The following section will outline a theoretical framework for this decline. This will permit the investigation of the impact of changes to the global political economy on Italy, and the decline of Italian football.
Decline in Participation in Public Life

The decline in public engagement in civil society has been a central focus of academic, media and political discourse for centuries. Rapid industrialisation and urbanisation during the nineteenth century led to increased academic analysis of transitions from Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft and resulted in the birth of sociology as a discipline (Tönnies 2001). Communities began to move from the rigid mechanical solidarity of small kinship communities to the organic solidarity of larger, fragmented society (Durkheim 1964). This transition was seen to contribute a sense of helplessness, or anomie, as members of society lost their traditional purpose and focus of life (Durkheim 1952). Technological advances and global transformations at the end of the twentieth century have attracted similar academic interest into the change in community caused by profound economic transformations. The zeitgeist was captured by Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone which utilised the concept of social capital to demonstrate the increased individualism and resultant decline in community (Putnam 2000). Sport is one area that has been identified as having a wider social role in the formation of community (Jarvie 2003; Coalter 2007). Therefore, this thesis will add the wider discussion on social capital to the general account of political economy to present a synthesis of the impact of globalisation on local community participation through football.

Social transformation has been at the heart of sociological investigation since the discipline’s inception. The post-war period proved to be a fertile period as the economic transformations of Keynesian mass production and consumption combined with changing social ideals, which had fermented during the war. One of the first post-war writers to identify this emerging social change was Riesman, whose seminal work entitled The Lonely Crowd began to describe the changing composition of individuals within
society (Riesman 1961). Riesman suggested that social actors have moved through various character traits. Society has moved from groups of ‘tradition-directed’ individuals, who focused on tradition to provide group solidarity and regulation to more ‘inner-directed’ individuals of the modern era. These individuals had internalised a moral compass through their education and upbringing and this drove the individual to succeed. These individuals were driven by a strong work ethic and focussed inwards; on themselves and their family. As businesses changed from small family businesses into large corporations, and as the service sector and bureaucracy grew, individuals became more ‘other-directed’. They had to be aware of other people, as they had to rely on them for support. Morality wasn’t internalised, but was done in relation to others, depending on the context and impact. This affected politics as politicians were no longer elected on the basis of ideology and morality, but on their ability to appeal to the electorate. ‘Other-directed’ voters approached politics as amoral consumers, rather than moral producers. Although Riesman identifies these ideal types, like Weber before him, these should not be taken in isolation and combinations of all three can exist in any one individual or society at any point in time.

Elias noted a similar trend emerging in the princely courts of Europe (Elias 1978; Elias 1982). The public body became increasingly privatised as intimate actions, such as eating, bathing and going to the bathroom, were removed from the public gaze. These new manners and morals became internalised by cultural elites which then acted as a marker of distinction for others (or those who Riesman would call ‘other-directed’) to emulate. As human activities became increasingly specialised with greater division of labour, individuals began to form figurations, or networks of interdependence. As these networks grew, individuals became increasingly fragmented and it became harder for the individual to understand the overall context (Elias 2001). This encouraged individuals to
focus on their immediate needs, rather than the wider good. As individual personality was asserted, social actors removed themselves from the wider public which has been assisted by the increased range of privatised spaces available to individuals (Elias 2001). However this privatisation and individualisation necessitated a paradox. The ‘public’ became a space where private individuals utilised the knowledge they had amassed privately to debate wider issues publicly. As the ‘public’ debated politics and science in associations and coffee houses, there was a greater interest in the wider public life, which led to the state and society becoming entwined (Habermas 1989). Separation from the ‘public’ would contribute to a reduction in public debate and wider public opinion, which would fuel continued individualisation.

Whilst individual personalities were asserted, there was increased awareness of similarities and difference. ‘Other-directed’ individuals with similar goals began to develop networks of inter-dependence (Riesman 1961; Elias 2001). As these like-minded individuals came together to debate issues in the coffee shops of Europe, they facilitated in creating a ‘public sphere’ and laid the foundations of clubs and associations (Habermas 1989). These associations, De Tocqueville argues, contributed to political debate separated from the state and this helped underpin American democracy (De Tocqueville 1969). For Habermas, although associations provide a public sphere in which to discuss wider issues, they also can become vehicles for private interests (Habermas 1989). The formation of Sport in particular was assisted by debate within Gentleman’s clubs (Elias and Dunning 1986). The increased number and range of associations, both political and private, further contributed to the individualisation of society as collective identities became difficult, as boundaries have to be policed which leads to exclusion of specific groups (Sennett 1976). Collective identities become areas of inclusion and exclusion and this inhibits the growth of a wider collective identity. This impedes the growth of a
widespread public identity and actually decreases the role of public individuals (Sennett 1976).

Changes to consumption have facilitated the increased individualisation of society. For Riesman’s student, Sennett reinforced how ‘other-directed’ individuals who became focused on presenting themselves to other people, lost sight of the wider public engagement which built a cohesive society. ‘Other-directed’ social actors learnt to develop themselves in relation to others, but in Sennett’s opinion, this has led to increased narcissism and inward-focus, rather than wider public engagement. Increases in production, especially under the Keynesian system, actively promoted and provided an increased range of commodities for consumption. This permitted individuals to consume commodities which could present their personality and identity to the public gaze (Sennett 1976). As social actors asserted their individual personalities, participation in associations fragment and collective identities become difficult to form.

Individuals simply present themselves in public, but do not participate in it and do not take part in wider political debate. Consequently, this has facilitated the emergence of charismatic individuals who can appeal to the widest range of the populace and temporarily unite the imagined community of the nation (Sennett 1976). This is fuelled by changes to patterns of consumption, as Habermas argues:

“the presentation of the leader or the leader’s team plays a central role; they too need to be packaged and displayed in a way that makes them marketable” (Habermas 1989: 218)
The image of the charismatic leader is increasingly mediatised. Mass media, particularly television, permits the charismatic leaders to directly access the ‘floating voters’. Significantly, those voters who:

“are most decisively predisposed to avoid a public opinion formed by discussion are the ones most likely to be influenced in their views – but this time by the staged or manipulatively manufactured public sphere of the elections campaign” (Habermas 1989: 214)

Thus mass media permits the charismatic leader to market themselves in the same manner as other commodities operating within the consumer market. Politics and voting become extensions of the acts of consumption of individuals.

Changes to technology have facilitated new forms of political identities that have fragmented national politics. New social movements have witnessed the emergence of a number of political movements which aim to tackle a wide range of global, national and local issues politics, many of which are single-issue movements (Touraine 1981; Melucci and Mier 1989). Mass technology, especially the internet, permits the rapid dissemination of information across the network of supporters and activists. Therefore in parallel to the decline in participation in public life, there has been a widespread fragmentation of politics. Consequently, the role of the charismatic leader becomes magnified as they attempt to unite the disparate political groups.

The decline of community has captured the imagination of politicians, academics and the media. In particular, the term social capital has evolved to reflect this decline and has become a popular academic abstraction. Broadly speaking, the term ‘social capital’ refers
to the networks of people an individual can call upon in order to navigate their way through life (Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1988; Putnam, Leonardi et al. 1993; Portes 1998; Putnam 2000). The current popularity of social capital has enabled it to be seen as the ‘missing link’ between the anomie of society and the increased individualism and decline of participation in public life. Furthermore the term has been extended to explain political involvement and democracy. In his analysis of the success and failure of Italian regions, Putnam has suggested that social capital generated in civic associations helps in “making democracy work” (Putnam, Leonardi et al. 1993). Putnam builds on the observations of De Tocqueville who suggested that lack of associationism led to ‘soft despotism’, where individuals stop engaging with government in exchange for material needs (De Tocqueville 1969). The following section will critique the term ‘social capital’ in order to account for its relevance to the current situation in Italian football so as to determine whether public participation through civic associations can build a network of social capital and lead to greater political participation.

Social Capital and the Decline of Community

Social capital has become a popular term within academic literature in the twenty-first century. The generalised nature of the concept has permitted it to be applied to a range of situations, from ten-pin bowlers (Putnam 2000) to inner-city gangs (Deuchar and Holligan 2010), and from successful democracy (Putnam, Leonardi et al. 1993) to successful economies (Dasgupta and Serageldin 2000). As a consequence it becomes a difficult concept to isolate and has led to the theory being extrapolated and abstracted. Ultimately, there exists a theoretical gap between the decline in participation in public life and successful democracy or economy. Several academics have attempted to define social capital and identify the possibilities for the creation of networks. Coleman, for example,
identifies social capital as a facet of social structures that facilitates the action of actors within the structure (Coleman 1988). As a consequence of this structuralist conception, Coleman focuses on the social capital acquired in social structures such as the family and religious organizations. This detracts from many other types of networks which are fluid and temporary and do not derive from family and religion. Coleman’s contemporary, Bourdieu, suggests that social capital is inter-related to two other forms of capital, economic and cultural (Bourdieu 1986). Significantly, he defines social capital as:

“the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group”

(Bourdieu 1986: 247).

Once again, social capital is seen as a resource for facilitating the action of individuals. In particular, Bourdieu sees social capital as a resource that can be accumulated like other forms of capital, such as economic and cultural capital, that can be utilised to distinguish oneself from others. Consequently, social capital is produced and reproduced through exchange and investment within the social network in much the same way as economic capital. Thus, social capital is not a natural by-product or a given but has to be constructed through the investment of economic, temporal and cultural resources (Portes 1998: 3-4). However, neither Coleman nor Bourdieu discuss the relationship of social capital to political participation or economic development.

As Bourdieu suggested, social capital was one form of capital along with cultural and economic capital. These forms are not mutually exclusive and possession of one can facilitate accumulation of the others. For example, attending a school such as Eton can
provide the cultural capital and distinction of participating in an exclusive institution, as well as providing a network of friends and acquaintances who can assist the individual in acquiring other resources, including jobs opportunities. In some cases, being a member of an established group provides the necessary cultural and social capital which facilitates members of the established group, whilst excluding ‘ousiders’ (Elias and Scotson 1965). The success of these networks of social capital has been attributed to the success of accumulation of economic capital (Fukuyama 1995; Portes 1998; Lin 2001). Lin makes this link explicit as he sees social capital as an “investment in social relations with expected returns in the marketplace” (Lin 2001: 19). He sees the concept as a means for individuals profiting from their social networks and connections. These networks permit the individual to acquire information, exert influence and demonstrate their social credentials, as well as being a vehicle for identity reinforcement (Lin 2001: 20). Similarly, Portes’ excellent overview and critique of social capital provides a calculating, individualistic approach to social capital (Portes 1998). Fukuyama also sees social capital as social networks as a driver of economic capital (Fukuyama 1995). Networks of social capital permit the development of trust which allows individuals to free themselves from the constraints of familialism and opens those to new economic opportunities (Fukuyama 1995 1248). Through social interactions individuals acquire knowledge about contemporaries which permits them to enter into economic transactions. A similar observation was made by Weber in relation to the Protestant sects of North America (Weber 1948). The protestant sects created new social groups that actively encouraged hard work and profit. However, Weber did not attribute their success in encouraging capitalism to breaking from the family, but from the guild system where competitors remained within the same association. Therefore social capital within associations can actively impede and restrain economic capital accumulation.
The proliferation of the term ‘social capital’ has continued with Robert Putnam’s influential research. Initiated with his study of the Italian regions, Putnam transferred his hypothesis to America to observe the decline of participation in public life (Putnam, Leonardi et al. 1993; Putnam 2000). Putnam places social capital back into social structures and aims to expand the outcome of social capital to encompass benefits to the wider society:

“Social capital here refers to features of social organisation, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam, Leonardi et al. 1993: 176)

Fundamentally, Putnam sees social capital as trusting networks working towards shared objectives (Putnam 1996: 56). Putnam promotes the participation in civic associations as this permits the social interactions and networks to provide the social glue for group members to work together towards a common goal. Social networks are not necessarily developed for personal economic profit, but can be utilised for identity formation, solidarity and altruistic values. Putnam’s focus on face-to-face interactions in civic associations underplays the significance of global cyber-networks in creating new social networks and new forms of social capital (Lin 2001). Putnam therefore suggests that civic associations create a ‘public sphere’ with which individuals can engage with politics and promote democracy and economic growth (Putnam 2000), despite Habermas’ assertion that some associations become vehicles for private interests (Habermas 1989).

Although Bowling Alone attracted a lot of public and political attention in the United States, Putnam’s earlier work focussed on economic success in Italy. Deregulation of the Italian state in the 1970s saw increased autonomy granted to the Italian regions. During
the twenty years since de-regulation, each region performed significantly differently in terms of economic growth and political engagement. In order to analyse the respective differences, Putnam analysed the history of the Italian regions. Although this thesis will do likewise in the following chapters, a brief synopsis of Putnam’s argument suggests that successful Italian regions in the late twentieth century had long histories of civic virtue. He argues that strong civic associationism has resulted in successful regional governments and businesses in the north of Italy. In contrast, the south has struggled to be fully integrated into the Italian state. This has seen increased corruption, organised crime and under-investment. This represents a paradox that is illustrated by Portes who suggests that: “if your town is ‘civic’, it does civic things; if it is ‘uncivic’, it does not” (Portes 1998: 20). For an actor to overcome the problems of lack of trust and civic virtue, they must be more civic and needs to place more trust in strangers. This places the dilemma centrally within the agency of the individual actor. In doing so it neglects the opportunities for the accumulation of resources through interaction between actors. For Putnam:

“Personal interaction generates information about the trustworthiness of other actors that is relatively inexpensive and reliable” (Putnam, Leonardi et al. 1993: 172-3).

The actor is not operating independently, but through interaction with others across the social network. As Riesman argued, ‘other-directed’ individuals understood that they needed to co-operate and interact with others in order to achieve individual goals (Riesman 1961). Furthermore, Durkheim argues that increased social congregation builds collective emotion and solidarity (Durkheim 1915). Increased interaction will accumulate
increased emotional energy and solidarity between members of the group which could facilitate the accumulation of trust.

Significantly, Putnam suggests that declining social capital acquired through civic participation is contributing to a decline in participation in public life. In *Bowling Alone*, Putnam identifies falling associationism in the church, unions and political membership (Putnam 2000). There is a danger of constructing a ‘Golden Age’ of civic participation which descends into wilful nostalgia; a lament for traditional mass participation activities, such as national political parties and trade unions. This wilful nostalgia suggests that civic participation is unequivocally beneficial to society and democracy. Putnam acknowledged that there was a ‘dark side’ to social capital as this ‘Golden Age’ was also the age of extreme racial segregation in the United States (Putnam 2000). Furthermore, associations like the Ku Klux Klan would still generate social capital for its members despite not contributing to a fair and equitable democratic society. Even traditions of civic engagement do not necessarily generate positive results. For example, Putnam attributes the civic traditions of the successful economic areas of Lombardy, Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna as a reason for their success in the 1980s and 1990s. However, as will be seen in the following two chapters, several high-profile scandals have arisen in the north of Italy despite its ‘civic’ nature. Furthermore, Riley argues that during the 1920s, the civic nature of these northern regions also facilitated Fascist recruitment (Riley 2005). In contrast to facilitating democracy, as Putnam argued, it actually permitted authoritarianism. However, the anti-Fascist partisan movement also grew in the same regions (Ginsborg 1990). Therefore, the generation of civic traditions through social capital does not necessarily contribute to the formation of democratic institutions of government.
The decline of participation in associations underplays the proliferation of new forms of association and new social movements since the 1960s. There has been an increase of single issue movements which focus on a wide range of issues, from environmentalism to consumer groups (Touraine 1981; Melucci and Mier 1989). These groups have also been affected by changes to consumption. Putnam identifies this range of social movements and suggests that they have been reduced to acts of consumption where individuals ‘purchase’ a social movement through a regular donation (Putnam 2000). Furthermore, Putnam identifies the internet as a possible reflection of this change. The network of information that constitutes the internet permits the rapid exchange of information as individuals and groups interact online. Putnam attributes the lack of face-to-face interaction as a possible inhibitor for the creation of social capital. However, the fragmentation of contemporary society has witnessed millions of people migrating for work, family or leisure and the internet permits the maintenance of social connections across space and time. It also permits people to connect with other people with similar interests across the globe. This can provide networks of social capital as individuals exchange ideas and knowledge using the medium of the internet. However, as Putnam argues, this could lead to ‘balkanisation’ where groups become increasingly particular in their outlook. Groups become so specialised they appeal to an ever decreasing population and this prevents members creating bridging capital by connecting with people from outside the social group. The individualisation of society is being replicated as social groups fragment and focus on increasingly narrow horizons. The continued fragmentation of social groups would therefore reinforce the necessity of charismatic leaders to unite these disparate groups (Sennett 1976).

The fragmentation of political and social groups leads to a dislocation between personal and national politics. The politics of identity that characterise the new social movements
reflect an increased individualisation of society. More significantly, many of these movements do not align with national politics and therefore do not clearly correlate to national politics. Global movements, such as environmentalism do not contribute an attachment with the national imagined community. Likewise there has also been a growth of regional movements that resolutely focus on local issues. The following chapter will highlight the emergence of the *Lega Nord* as a political movement which advocates cessation from the Italian state. Herein lies the problem of Putnam’s Italian research. By analysing Italy’s regions, Putnam examined the success of *regional* government to explain the success of *national* democracy. Regional and global movements do not facilitate a sense of belonging with national politics and it is not clear, as Putnam asserts, that participation in civic associations naturally leads to attachment with national politics. Civic associations can only contribute to national democracy when they connect with the wider narratives that constitute the imagined community. National movements, such as national political parties, religions and trade unions all operate within the national narrative. Transformations in the global political economy have permitted the fragmentation of these movements, which has led to the creation of global and regional movements. These are not necessarily weaker in creating social capital, but they do not generate social capital towards a national purpose.

Despite the fragmentation of national social movements, civic associations can still contribute to national politics. Through these networks individual actors can interact and exchange information related to wider issues. As Andrews argues:

> “the associations can play an important role in facilitating public debate, as intermediate channels of participation, and in helping to define boundaries between private and public interests. They will become important in helping
renovate the institutions of the state by providing new channels of accountability and participation” (Andrews 2005: 176).

Although Andrews takes the same national outlook as Putnam, he highlights that associations provide a ‘public sphere’ where politics and other opinions can be exchanged and cultivated (Habermas 1989). Despite the fragmentation and resultant weakness of new forms of association, they can provide a space to contribute to political debate.

Despite this new form of association, Italy still finds itself in the lowest tiers of civic associationism in Europe. On a European level, participation in voluntary and civic associations is high within Scandinavia, followed by a second tier including the Netherlands, Germany and the UK (Delaney and Keaney 2005). The lowest tier of civic associationism in Europe comprises Greece, Portugal, Poland and Italy. Delaney and Keaney show that there are strong correlations between participation in civic associations, and levels of trust within society (Delaney and Keaney 2005). Italy also sits in the lowest tier of nations based on levels of individual trust. Although this does not prove causality, this suggests that participation in civic community also helps to generate trust (Putnam 2000). Although there are historic factors affecting the levels of trust in Italy, the lack of participation in civic associations is a significant feature of Italian politics.

For Putnam, political participation rests solely with individual actors within social institutions. Despite his analysis of regional governments, he omits the role of the state in facilitating economic conditions, national identity and continued political participation. As argued above, the wider political economy, and sport in general, have developed in
parallel with the nation state. Yet they have changed with an increasingly global economy. The ability of the state to impose the shared memories and invented traditions on its citizens directly impinges upon the participation of shared national rituals. Van Deth highlights that:

“The higher the degree of state intervention, the higher the chances are that citizens will be confronted with state activities, and the more likely it is that their interests are affected by these activities” (Van Deth 2008: 208).

This argument has been supported by historic evidence on civic participation in Britain. Hilton et al argue that the welfare state strengthened participation in civic groups (Hilton, McKay et al. 2010). These groups adapt and evolve alongside state institutions as volunteer organisations adapt to the strengths and weaknesses of state provision. Britain’s National Health Service provides a good example here. Alongside the state provision of healthcare, groups of volunteers within League of Friends have formed in conjunction with the NHS and provide equipment and services, alongside the state. Therefore, civic associations and the state are not mutually exclusive, but co-dependent.

The rolling back of the state from the market has contributed to the decline in public participation. The wide scale restructuring of the economy has led to a fragmentation of working contracts which has promotes flexibility amongst the work force (Sennett 1998). Flows of global capital are accumulating in global cities which necessitate the increased movement of people (Castells 1989; Sassen 2001). The focus on work has also promoted a ‘head down’ mentality as workers try to focus on the immediate working tasks rather than network with colleagues (Sennett 1998). Furthermore, suburbanisation and extended commuting time is impinging on individuals’ ability to participate in public life.
This is compounded by widespread changes in technology. The internet has become a powerful vehicle for new social movements as they seek to disseminate information widely and quickly, but has also led to social and political groups fragmenting. More significantly, television has been credited with the impact on political participation (Habermas 1989; Putnam 2000). The print media fuelled debate within the public sphere and helped establish national boundaries through the promotion of national institutions (Habermas 1989; Anderson 2006). In contrast, television promotes a superficial contribution participation in the medium (Robinson 1976; Habermas 1989; Putnam 2000). Physically, television viewing is removed to the private space of the home and is rarely done in public. This has been amplified since deregulation of the television industry during the 1980s. More significantly, television permitted the direct communication of politicians with the voting public and shifted the presentation of politics towards television (Robinson 1976; Habermas 1989). Consequently, state deregulation has impacted civic participation through transformations in the economy, as well as impacting the presentation of politics to the public.

As the restructuring of the economy has impacted the ability of some sections of society to participate has been affected. As with transformations of the global political economy, economic capital is accumulated by those with the resources to accumulate it. A similar situation occurs with social capital, as Skidmore et al states: “those already well connected tend to get better connected… community participation tends to be dominated by a small group of insiders who are disproportionately involved in a large number of governance activities” (Skidmore, Bound et al. 2006). Consequently, we are not witnessing a decline in social capital, but a restructuring (Warde, Tampubolon et al. 2003). This is also facilitated by access to economic resources. So while institutions like the National Trust may see an increase in participation, this may not be replicated in
areas with fewer economic resources. Consequently, the Bourdieu concept of social capital is useful to understand the link with economic capital. So social capital should be seen as a resource which is linked to other forms of capital (Bourdieu 1984; Bourdieu 1986), as well as a general principle denoting participation in public life (Putnam, Leonardi et al. 1993; Putnam 2000). This thesis will concentrate on Putnam’s wider argument, although Bourdieu’s theory should also be considered.

Sport becomes an apposite vehicle to analyse the transformations in the global political economy and their effect on local society. During the 1990s, British Football scholarship shifted its focus from analysis of football hooliganism to analysing changes resulting from de-regulation of the global political economy. Elsewhere, contemporary research has embraced social capital as a concept to explain the decline in participation in public life. There is a growing body of work which is analysing the role of sport and social capital (Warde, Tampubolon et al. 2003; Bailey 2005; Coalter 2007; Palmer and Thompson 2007). Through his analysis of Scottish sport, Jarvie highlights the importance of sport in educating and promoting communitarian ideals (Jarvie 2003). Through sport there is “the opportunity to promote communitarian philosophy based upon mutuality and obligations rather than individualism and some ideological notion of sport for all” (Jarvie 2003: 152). However, he highlights that sport is just one aspect in this process and should not have the sole responsibility. Likewise, Coalter questions the ability of sport to regenerate community (Coalter 2007). In recent years, sport has been seen as a cost-effective way to rejuvenate community and engage in local participation. Furthermore, the studies which have been done investigate participation in the act of sport itself, or through membership of an association where sport is performed. Few studies have been performed into the associations of sport fans (Palmer and Thompson 2007). The participation of fans within a fans’ group does not necessarily correlate to the
participation in a sports’ team or association. Therefore, this thesis will build on the earlier research into globalisation and incorporate contemporary debates on social capital by incorporating Italian supporters’ clubs into the research. Through grounded research undertaken in Livorno, it will highlight how Italy has adapted to transformations in the global political economy and address whether civic associations are a solution to the decline of Italian football.

Summary

Transformations in the global political economy since the 1970s have profoundly affected local communities. Many scholars assert that this period has also coincided with a decline in the participation in public life. The restructuring of the global political economy has resulted in social capital being lost at a local level. Political participation has fallen, as has membership in some civic associations. In Italy, this period has also witnessed a decline in Italian football attendances and the sport has become blighted by scandal and crisis. Yet civil society continues in spite of the impact of globalisation on the state. Fan groups continue to exist, even though attendances are in decline. The social capital which makes communities strong at the local level also operates within elite institutions. The capricious processes of globalisation have resulted in the intensification of connections between individuals and institutions. This has facilitated the accumulation of power and resources at those nodes which have the resources to accumulate them. The restructuring of the economy has also witnessed the restructuring of social networks and these aspects will be explored in subsequent chapters. The following chapter will outline the history of the Italian nation and its political economy to illustrate the development of social and political identity. As the political economy of Italy has
changed, so has the articulation of its social networks. This pattern is replicated in relation to Italian football which will be explored in chapter 4.
SECTION 2

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ITALY
Chapter 3

Modernity and Deregulation in Italy

“If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.” - Prince Tancredi Falconieri\textsuperscript{11}

“We have made Italy, now we must make Italians” - Massimo D’Azeglio

Standing in the bedroom of his sumptuous Sicilian villa, Prince Fabrizio faced the mirror whilst shaving. In the reflection he saw his nephew, Prince Tancredi enter the room. Tancredi has come to tell his uncle that he will be leaving and heading into the mountains to fight for Garibaldi. Garibaldi’s ‘red shirts’ have landed on the Sicilian coast and are fighting to unite the island with the new Italian nation. Sicilian aristocracy, like Prince Fabrizio, were being confronted with exclusion or death. Initially there was familial concern for his nephew’s well-being in the campaign. Tancredi allayed these fears and explained that the northern politicians will impose a republic unless the aristocracy take control of the situation: “If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change”. Tomasi di Lampedusa’s novel entitled Il Gattopardo (‘The Leopard’) illustrated the turmoil of the Risorgimento during the mid-nineteenth century. Unification required participants to change their way of life or face extinction. Those that changed were incorporated into the new state, a phenomenon which introduced the term gattopardismo.

into the Italian language, to illustrate the way that people and traditions remain continuous despite tumultuous change.

In 2011 Italy will celebrate the one-hundred and fiftieth anniversary of its inception. Italy is a relatively young nation and through its short life it has encountered several diverse forms of government, from a monarchy through Fascism to a Republic. The incomplete nature of the Italian state has created intense cleavages and a profound crisis of legitimacy which undermines central authority. Its youth and crisis of legitimacy has permitted the continuance of several pre-unification traditions and identities which reinforce the weakness of the state. Central amongst these, is the reliance upon the family. The weakness of the state and the continuance of traditional practises results in the family becoming the central unit of support. Family connections supersede those of the state and permit the persistence of patrimonial networks of support (Banfield 1958; Ginsborg 1990; Cento Bull and Corner 1993; Sapelli 1995; Ginsborg 2003). This has resulted in a vacuum within public politics as the family provides the focus. This vacuum has facilitated the growth of charismatic leaders who exploit their patrimonial networks to provide a focus for political and national identity.

To present a background to the thesis, this chapter will outline the one-hundred and fifty years of Italian history. In doing so it builds on the historical and theoretical framework described in the previous chapter. Through this historical outline, several recurring themes emerge. There is a strong regionalist identity throughout Italian history which contributes to a crisis of legitimacy of the central state. Local familial and patrimonial networks become strengthened as the weakness of the central state fails to institute a legitimate alternative. In order to overcome the resultant factionalism, charismatic leaders emerge to temporarily unite the peninsular. However, these charismatic leaders operate
within their own patrimonial networks which further de-legitimise the central state and perpetuate the crisis. The first section will detail the importance of understanding the role of the nation in the development of sport, before addressing the formation of nation states. As nations grew and developed, changes to the political economy profoundly changed traditional society through widespread industrialisation and urbanisation. As the global and national political economies transformed, groups within society adapted to the changes in different ways. In order to understand Italian football, particular focus will be placed on Italy’s post-war development to account for the transition from a protectionist national economy into a deregulated global economy. The collapse of the Fordist mass-manufacturing system facilitated the emergence of a new form of economy. It also resulted in the continuance of existing patrimonial practises as gattoparlismo remained. Patrimonial networks and de-regulation has permitted the close networks between football, business and politics to be intensified. This has occurred spectacularly with Silvio Berlusconi who combines being the leader of a political party and prime minister with ownership of a number of businesses, and one of Italy’s top football clubs, AC Milan.

**Italian Modernity**

In order to understand Italian football we must situate it within Italian society. Italy is essentially a modern construct which refers to the geographic peninsular south of the Alps. Until the mid-nineteenth century, the Italian peninsular was an historical oddity; it was still an assortment of regions with disparate forms of government. However, the increased influence of the nationalist model spreading across Northern Europe saw nationalistic sentiment grow across the peninsular, particularly in the north. Austrian political influence in the north resulted in strong anti-Austrian sentiments and fuelled
calls for a unified independent nation state. The charismatic leader Giuseppe Garibaldi became a focus for the political project of unification, the *Risorgimento* (‘Resurgence’). Supported by thinkers and politicians from Piedmont, such as Count Cavour and Giuseppe Mazzini, unification effectively became a ‘Piedmontization’ of Italy (Arvidsson 2003: 14). Through political machinations and conquest, the peninsular was declared a united kingdom in 1861. The new state has become the apposite example of an ‘imagined community’ (Dickie 1996; Anderson 2006). Successive governments have struggled to impose the unifying ‘myths, memories and symbols’ and ‘invented traditions’ on the nation state (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Smith 1987). Traditional practises continued after unification and this created a number of religious, political and geographical cleavages. Traditional identities conflicted with emerging national identities with neither becoming dominant. As a result the state struggled to impose itself over its subjects and faced a perpetual crisis of legitimacy.

The Catholic Church is central to the conflict between traditional practises and state control; it destabilises the state from above and below. To unite the peninsular, and the nation, the city of Rome had to be incorporated into the new kingdom. As a key symbol to a glorious past, Rome had been declared the capital of the new state even though it had not been physically incorporated into the nation. To unify the peninsular, Garibaldi had to invade Rome, leading Pope Pius IX to declare himself a “prisoner in his own city”. As a consequence, he refused to acknowledge the new state and forbade all Catholics, both at home and abroad, from participating in Italian politics and affectively destabilising the state at its inception (Wood and Farrell 2001: 133). Through the Church, local identity remains as Catholic rituals revolving around town and village’s patron saints reinforce individuals’ strong attachments to one’s home-town or village. Localised festivals worshipping the town’s patron saint combine with annual festivals in the
religious calendar, such as Easter and Christmas, to fuel local sentiments. The love of one’s home town is manifested in the term *campanilismo* (Richards 1995: 81). Literally this means the love of one’s bell-tower. As the most dominant urban symbol, the bell-tower could be seen and heard from all areas of the town or locality and came to symbolise the town and one’s attachment to it. *Campanilismo* is fuelled through local historic festivals. Throughout Tuscany there are many folk games that reaffirm a localised, pre-unification activity, such as the *palio* at Siena, the *palio marinario* in Livorno and the ‘game of the bridge’ in Pisa. The paradox of conflicting symbols emerges through the folk game of *calcio fiorentino* that originated in Florence. Mussolini emphasised the links between the Florentine game and the new game of football (Martin 2004; Foot 2007). In doing so he reinforced the Italian origins of the game whilst simultaneously reaffirming a localised, pre-unification activity.

The Church’s focus on the role of the family provides an alternative challenge to the state. The Church stresses that the family is the only social unit and this creates a strong kinship society (Lane 2004: 62). As the family constituted the first and primary point of reference for individuals, this colours their interactions with others. During fieldwork in the 1950s, Banfield highlighted the lack of civic association within a rural community in the South of Italy (Banfield 1958). This focus on the family led to ‘amoral familism’ which restricted the individual to assisting their immediate family rather than aspiring to a higher, civic ideal. Helping others will not only cause the individual a material or temporal loss, but potentially makes rivals stronger than the immediate family. Those that are seen as helping others are seen as frauds or hypocrites (such as the Church or Communists) or doing it because it is their job (like council officials). These officials are seen as corrupt, whether they are or not; they will perform to the same cultural amoral familism and favour their own family. With a weak state without the legitimacy to
overcome these challenges, amoral familism remains within bureaucratic systems and
everyday life. The generation of bridging social capital is inhibited and this vicious cycle
leads to further entrenchment in the family as state support and control are not utilised
to overcome the problems instigated by ‘amoral familism’.

Regional and family identification became a feature of the Italian media. The late political
development of Italy prevented the formation of a national print capitalism which could
unite the imagined community (Anderson 2006). Early industrialisation in Italy took
place in the north and around certain ports. The lack of national industrialisation
prevented the formation of a national consumer market which prevented manufacturers
from advertising nationally and providing additional economic stimulus to the newspaper
industry (Nowell-Smith 1990: 54). This led to a lack of independent newspapers who
derived their revenue from publishing and advertising. As a consequence, Italian
newspapers are:

“owned by companies which exist for, and earn most of their revenue from,
other activities, and for whom the newspaper is merely a tool for promoting
those activities.” (Wagstaff 2001: 297)

Although some independent publishers have emerged, such as Rizzoli (who owns the
Corriere della Sera) and De Benedetti (who owns La Repubblica) (Hanretty 2010), many
Italian newspapers have been incorporated into the wider business conglomerates of
leading families.

Political identities were forming before unification in the same way as regional and
religious identities. The Socialist party and the trade unions represented workers before
universal suffrage was extended to all males after the First World War (Sapelli 1995). Thus there was a serious disjuncture between the social citizenship of most Italians and their political relationship. This political membership was further divided by religious membership which precluded political involvement. Political and religious discord divided the urban and rural bourgeoisie and prevented the formation of a middle-class party, such as the British-style Conservatives (Sapelli 1995). This inhibited the formation of mass-political parties and created a fragmented political system. This contributed to a feature of Italian politics after unification called trasformismo (‘transformism’) where politicians would change political allegiances so as not to lose power or influence. Its prevalence and success led to Antonio Gramsci developing his theory of hegemony as he observed how the dominant power incorporated opponents into its sphere of influence (Gramsci 2000).

The fragmented political system necessitated a charismatic leader who could extend their patronage to unite the factions (Sennett 1976). Through patronage, successful leaders could utilise trasformismo to alienate the extremes of the political spectrum and create a relatively stable centrist government. Giovanni Giolitti utilised this system with some success and acted as Italian Prime Minister five times between 1903 and 1921. However, the First World War led to the collapse of the liberal post-unification political system and the emergence of another charismatic leader. Military failure in the war culminated in the humiliating Battle of Caporetto in 1917. The post-war territorial settlement resulted in Italy losing territory and gaining nothing of Germany’s overseas colonies (which were divided between Britain and France). Embarrassing military defeat in the First World War and the weakness of the coalition governments necessitated a charismatic leader to unite the disparate sections of society. This context permitted Benito Mussolini and his Fascist Party to assume control in 1922 (Gundle 1998). Mussolini proceeded to impose a
centralised bureaucratic state and reinforced national identity through carefully invented traditions. Mussolini invoked the image of Rome and the Renaissance to reassert Italian national identity (Adamson 1992; Minor 1999). Football subsequently became central in Mussolini’s strategy as Italy hosted and won the second World Cup in 1934, before successfully defending their title four years later in France (Martin 2004).

The fall of Fascism in 1943 and the post-war reconstruction of Italy retained many of the features of pre-Fascism. Co-operation between the Catholics and the Communists during the Resistance resulted in an agreement to support parliamentary democracy and the birth of the first Italian republic (Sapelli 1995). Despite the co-operation, the Vatican entered politics and actively supported the *Democrazia Cristiana*, the Christian Democrat Party (DC), to prevent the Communists taking power. To assist, Pope Pius XII excommunicated all members of the *Partito Comunista Italiano*, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) (Sapelli 1995). The Church’s support for the DC reinforced key aspects of Italian society. The DC fought to have the rights of the family guaranteed in the Constitution. As Bernini states, this resulted:

“In the Constitution, the rights of the family as an institution superseded the rights of its individual members, and the protection of the family as a whole took priority over the guarantee of the ‘legal and moral equality’ of the spouses” (Bernini 2010: 74-5)

Consequently, the DC reaffirmed the role and influence of the Catholic Church in Italian society. It also reinforced the centrality of the Italian family which precluded identification with wider associations or the state. Vatican support also operated to alienate the PCI and maintain a Catholic hegemony.
The emergence of two mass parties did not prevent political fragmentation. Proportional representation permitted many localised, independent parties whereas factionalism remained within the DC and PCI. In order to maintain parliamentary democracy and prevent the PCI from obtaining power, the DC utilised its patrimonial influence to maintain its hegemony. The negotiation practised through clientelistic relationships and transformismo continued. In order to control the factions and independent parties, the mass parties retained localised patrimonial networks and used these to distribute resources quickly and readily to supporters (Sapelli 1995). As a result Italy continued, as in other southern European countries, to be “governed more by the division of the spoils by the parties than by legal and bureaucratic rationality” (Sapelli 1995: 115). Through effective control of government and distribution of the resources the DC exercised control to prevent the Communists forming a government. As a result, Italy became a one party state, or partitocrazia (‘partyocracy’) (Della Porta 1995: 97; Ginsborg 1996: 23). The partitocrazia and factionalism reinforced the need for charismatic leaders to control the patrimony. Alcide De Gasperi was the founder of the DC and led the party for eight successive years from 1945. De Gasperi was instrumental in negotiating the terms of the Marshall Plan to provide American aid for European reconstruction. American support through the Marshall Plan provided the political capital for De Gasperi to reinforce public opinion against the Communists as the PCI became the largest Communist party outside Eastern Europe. American aid also provided economic capital to lubricate the system of patrimony and financially reward DC supporters, thus further alienating the PCI.

The patrimonial system under the partitocrazia was assisted by state control of the economy. As a result Keynesianism in Italy was distorted to facilitate clientelism (Della
Porta 1995: 50; Farrell 1995). Consequentially, Italy has retained a large nationalised industrial sector into the twenty-first century. Mussolini set up the *Instituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale* (ISI) to retain certain industries within national control. The ISI’s involvement in Italian industry was so great, that by 1962 it was the second largest industrial group in Europe; only the Royal Dutch Shell group was larger (Sassoon 1986: 37). ISI was augmented in 1953 with the *Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi* (ENI), the state oil and gas company, which (literally) provided the energy to support Italy’s post-war recovery (Sassoon 1986). A further agency of the state was instigated to overcome the ‘southern question’. The *Cassa per il Mezzogiorno* was set-up in 1950 to provide state support for development in the South of Italy, as the fragmented political system had contributed to a piecemeal industrialisation which had left the south significantly under-developed. The *Cassa*, ISI, ENI and similar government bodies became vehicles for clientelism as public money was used to facilitate existing patrimonial networks. Patronage was embedded in the system to such an extent that a process called the Cencelli Manual was implemented in 1968 to allocate positions (Foot 2003). Massimiliano Cencelli, a DC under-secretary, devised a mathematic formula to calculate the number of factions and ministers and allocate positions according to supporters. An apposite example of patronage occurred within the state-controlled television station, RAI. By the 1960s, state-control, and therefore control by the DC, was contested by the other political parties. A form of political de-regulation occurred with the *lottizzazione* (Ginsborg 1996; Hanretty 2010). The two television stations were divided between the DC and the Italian Socialists (PSI). A third channel, RAI Tre (‘RAI Three’), was added in 1979 to provide a station for the PCI.

The dominance of a single political party in the *partitocrazia* politicised much of society. As the DC maintained control, public appointments from teachers to council workers
became acts of political patronage. This led to the formation of a state bourgeoisie, a compliant network of public officials who relied on the patronage of the DC (Scalfari and Turani 1974). As opposed to the independent, rational and efficient Weberian bureaucracy, the Italian system stagnated; it necessitated the need to utilise personal contacts and family to circumvent the system. The clientelistic relationships in Italian society encouraged: “people to become negotiators. Because everything is fluid, everything may also be considered negotiable” (LaPalombara 1987: 59). As Riesman argued in relation to American society, Italy also developed ‘other-directed’ individuals who utilised their social networks and through negotiations, developed ways to improve their position (Riesman 1961). Consequently, social capital became a vehicle for patrimony. Gundle argues that: “the speed and efficacy of a bureaucratic act depended to a great extent upon the pressures that a citizen could exert upon the administrator” (Gundle and Parker 1996: 23). This resulted in a variety of practises being used, ranging from a network of contacts to systemised corruption (Ginsborg 1990: 149; Della Porta 1996: 103-4; Ginsborg 1996: 23).

State support and Fordist manufacturing facilitated the ‘Economic Miracle’ which originated around Milan and the north (Foot 2001). During the 1950s large scale mass production provided the catalyst for this ‘miracle’. The concentration in the north intensified the contrast between north and south. This was exacerbated by extensive internal migration as young workers from the impoverished south migrated to work in the northern factories. Alongside the demographic transformation within Italy, consumption dramatically changed. Increased prosperity led to demand for (Italian made) consumer items such as televisions, white goods, scooters and cars (Foot 2003: 138). Large-scale manufacturing was central and this was dominated by the car industry. This led to the dominance of ancillary companies, such as road building, rubber, oil and
steel manufacturing. Fiat controlled ninety percent of the national market and its
dominance turned many small and medium sized enterprises into dependent companies
(Sassoon 1986: 40). The dominance of certain industrial families saw Italian industry
become an extension of the political patrimonial system.

Economic Crisis and Deregulation

The industrial success that fuelled the growth in consumption and football started to
collapse in the 1960s. Economic recession, state inefficiency and dramatic cultural
changes caused by the Miracle culminated in the ‘hot autumn’ of 1969. The increase in
trade union power led to wide-scale strikes across the country. Italy’s economic problems
were exacerbated during the decade as their inflation and balance of deficits grew. Low
wages saw Italy increasingly at the bottom of the division of labour, as high technology
remained in the US, Germany and Japan. Further changes in international trade left Italy
open to increased foreign competition and its low technology base meant that it could
not compete (Sassoon 1986: 63). These transformations were heightened with the
devaluation of the dollar and the oil crisis. Large mass-manufacturing companies had to
restructure themselves to compete. Fiat, which epitomised the large Fordist mass-
manufacturing of the ‘Miracle’, was forced to restructure with redundancies and
outsourcing (Foot 2003: 141). Under these economic pressures, Italian society began to
politicise around earlier historical traditions.

The political turmoil during the 1970s saw the emergence of political terrorism, termed
the anni di piombo (‘years of lead’) (Wagstaff 2001: 55; Foot 2003: 38; Bartali 2006; Cooke
2006; Ignazi 2006). The period saw the emergence of a number of invented traditions
that harked back to the Resistance (Ginsborg 1990: 361; Wood and Farrell 2001: 137; Cooke 2006). With memories of the war and Fascism fading, the 1970s saw the re-emergence of the extreme right within Italy. Groups such as the ‘Ordine Nero’ and ‘Squadre di Azione Mussolini’ created a line back to Mussolini’s black-shirted Fascist squadristi (Ignazi 2006: 17). Bombings at Piazza Fontana in Milan in 1969 and at Bologna Railway Station in 1974, were neo-Fascist attempts to create a ‘strategy of tension’ (Ginsborg 1990: 333, 371). In the same way that the squadristi caused chaos in the 1920s, the neo-Fascists hoped that creating disorder in the 1970s would allow a strong, Mussolini-like figure, to emerge from the chaos to unite the nation and restore order (Wood and Farrell 2001: 138). More insidious was that this ‘strategy of tension’ was initially blamed on left-wing anarchists by the government and police. However, investigative journalists uncovered details which highlighted that neo-Fascists were to blame and that they were in contact with Guido Giannettini, the head of the Italian secret service (Ginsborg 1990). State complicity in terrorism left a scar in the national memory, that has not been successfully reconciled (Cento Bull 2010).

Parallel to the growth of right wing political identity in Italy, was a similar left wing identity. The 1970s saw an increase in popularity of partisan songs from the Second World War. Political groups used names that were deliberately evocative of the Resistance movement such as Stella Rossa (‘Red Star’), Volante Rossa (‘Flying Star’), and most importantly, the Brigate Rosse (‘Red Brigades’) (Cooke 2006: 172). The Brigate Rosse became infamous for their kidnapping and assassination of the DC president, Aldo Moro in 1978 (Dombroski 2001: 128; Bartali 2006). Moro was a key proponent of the ‘historic compromise’ between the DC and PCI that maintained the PCI’s commitment to civic participation through parliamentary democracy rather than revolution. The intense politicisation within Italian daily life impacted football as the politics of the piazza were
transferred to the stadium. This led to a politicisation of fan groups, and will be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters.

Local political agitation resulted in the Italian regions winning significant autonomy in the 1970s. Fifteen regional governments were instigated to provide increased regional representation. After an intense political struggle, these regions were provided with increased autonomy in 1976 (Putnam, Leonardi et al. 1993). Increased autonomy and politicisation resulted in a wave of invented traditions as regions sought to impose their identity. Monuments were built to commemorate local figures and events, whilst street names were renamed in honour of local and political luminaries. Many traced an historical lineage back to the Resistance. For example, a monument was erected in Bologna after two demonstrators were killed when a carabiniere car mounted a pavement. Their epitaph was inscribed as: “Fallen partisans of the new resistance” and “now and always Resistance” (Cooke 2006: 172). The contradictions between national and regional identification continues in 2010, with the cities of Florence and Rome contesting the national ownership of icons, such as the statue of David and the Colosseum (Kington 2010; Kington 2010)

These social and economic problems saw the development of a distinctly Italian brand of post-Fordist manufacturing. The combination of regional autonomy and family businesses created the appropriate environment to successfully adapt to the emerging global marketplace. A new geographical distinction emerged in Italy between the industrial Northern region and the impoverished South. The central regions of Tuscany, Umbria, Emilia-Romagna and Le Marche became known as the ‘Third Italy’ (Bagnasco 1977). In particular, the Emilia-Romagna region gave its name to a new type of manufacturing system called the ‘Emilian Model’ (Brusco 1982; Piore and Sabel 1984).
Excessive unionisation in larger firms saw increased subcontracting of production which was driven by an increasingly flexible consumer market (Brusco 1982). This necessitated a new form of dynamic small business that could respond quickly. The family orientation also provided the economic capital as support and security during the early years of the company. In addition tax exceptions for small businesses with fewer than fifteen employees facilitated their survival (Piore and Sabel 1984). The newly autonomous regional authorities assisted with support for new industrial zones that permitted the formation of extensive co-operative networks that reinforced the social capital of the families (Putnam, Leonardi et al. 1993). More significantly, globalisation permitted these organisations to capitalise upon historical trade networks direct to foreign markets. As a consequence, Italian family businesses, such as Benetton, Armani and Gucci became iconic global names.

Transformations in the global and Italian political economy necessitated a new type of charismatic leader. The economic shift from mass-manufacturing to flexible specialisation was not restricted to manufacturing. Post-Fordist services, like advertising and finance, emerged to augment the changing economy. The combination of this growth resulted in Italy overtaking Britain in 1987 to become the fifth largest economy, according to OECD figures (Goldblatt 2007: 578). Increasing affluence introduced a new middle-class of consumers. As Sapelli notes:

“The roots of this [new charismatic leader] can be found in the fact that, in the 1980s, the electoral growth of all the parties was due to the leaders’ ability to attract the new middle classes, only too happy to receive the resources dispensed by the party system of government that controlled the state” (Sapelli 1995: 116)
For the political parties to continue to function as before, they had to extend the patrimonial system to the new middle classes. However, post-Fordist consumerism constituted an ideological issue for the mass-parties of Catholicism and Communism. State-control and regulation could uphold traditional virtues without succumbing to the unconstrained vices of consumption. Italy’s third party, the PSI, was less ideologically restricted and openly appealed to the emergent middle-classes (Arvidsson 2003). Bettino Craxi was leader of the Socialist party who capitalised on divisions in the DC to negotiate his way to becoming Prime Minster. Although he represented an ideological break from the two mass-parties, he still operated within the political patrimonial system. Craxi was a new charismatic leader for the consumer age and attracted new middle-class voters through deregulation. Under Craxi, “A whole army of careerists, social climbers and yuppies entered the PSI, and used it as an instrument of political and economic promotion” (Padellaro and Tamburrano 1993: 35). Unencumbered by ideological issues, as the DC and PCI were, Craxi simplified politics and made it more media-friendly (Ginsborg 2003). He embraced the post-Fordist, de-regulated changes taking place in other Western democracies and this facilitated the growth of the ‘Third Italy’ and the resultant economic boom.

Craxi’s reforms were driven by political expediency rather than ideology. A key element of the New Right of Thatcherism in the UK was the notion of a ‘free economy/strong state’ (Gamble 1994). The State has to be strong enough to disentangle state involvement in the market, whilst at the same time remaining strong enough to police the new economic order through effective regulation and contesting the vested interests of the previous Keynesian regime. Thatcher undertook a series of contests with trade unions and other vested interests to end protectionism in the state-controlled market (Gamble 1994). Rolling back the state in Britain paradoxically re-legitimised the state as it
successfully disentangled itself from the economy and reinforced the role of central
government. The factional nature of Italian politics meant that government measures
always risked defeat in parliament. Consequently, vested interests and state involvement
in industry were not disentangled by Craxi. Likewise, the battle with the trade unions was
not undertaken in Italy as it was in the UK. Direct taxation on larger businesses was not
reduced, which was a key aspect of Thatcherite policy, and this facilitated the growth of
the smaller business within the Emilian model. Most significantly, there was no
systematic privatisation in Italy, as the ISI and ENI retained a number of nationalised
industries.

Craxi’s significant contribution to deregulation in Italy occurred in the world of television
through his friendship with a fellow Milanese called Silvio Berlusconi. Berlusconi
symbolised the new affluence in Italy and represented a significant shift from the
traditional industrial families like the Agnellis and Pirelli. Furthermore, Berlusconi
embodied the notion of the ‘other-directed’ individual (Riesman 1961). He was acutely
aware of his public image, and developed extensive social networks. Through his
friendship with Craxi, Berlusconi represents a shift towards neo-patrimony; networks
based on personal connections (Eisenstadt 1973; Sapelli 1995). Craxi was godfather to
Berlusconi’s daughter Barbara who was born out of wedlock to his mistress Veronica
Lario in 1984 (Ginsborg 2004: 34). Craxi subsequently acted as Berlusconi’s best man at
his marriage to Lario six years later (Stille 1999). Berlusconi started his career as a singer
on a cruise ship before capitalising on his personal contacts by persuading the manager
of the bank, in which his father worked, to loan him the money to build an apartment
complex in 1961. Showing his entrepreneurial spirit, he sold these apartments through
adverts in the local newspaper (Ginsborg 2004: 17; Andrews 2005: 23). Three years later,
Berlusconi used a further guarantee from his father’s bank, and money from a Swiss
bank with unknown proprietors, to build another residential complex (Ginsborg 2004: 18). However, it was with his third venture that signalled the arrival of Silvio Berlusconi.

Berlusconi’s third construction project signalled the emergence of a postmodern, individual consumer orientated business in Milan. Entitled Milano 2, it was built throughout the 1970s and represented an early Italian example of bounded space, with resident-only access and security guards (Foot 2003). Its location in the outskirts of Milan, close to Linate airport, meant that Berlusconi had to sharpen his negotiation skills and persuade various administrative bodies, such as the council, magistrates and unions, to receive the approval for its construction (Andrews 2005: 23). He also persuaded the airport authorities to change their flight paths so that they did not disturb residents (Ginsborg 2004: 20). The complex was marketed to the new affluent, yet individual, middle-class family and had to appeal to every generation of the family. Many green spaces and sports facilities were preserved by underground parking and were combined with schools, a church, shops and bars to provide an environment for the emerging consumer-orientated residents of Milan. In addition, and most significant for Berlusconi’s future, was that each apartment within the Milan 2 complex was provided with pre-installed cable television. One of these channels was supplied by TeleMilano, the cable company set-up by Berlusconi in 1974 to provide local news and entertainment for the Milano 2 complex (Ginsborg 2004: 19). This independent postmodern approach to residential complexes marked a profound departure from the Fordist residencies of the past. For example, the Mirafiori Sud apartment blocks next to the Fiat plant in Turin, had communal heating systems rather than individual control (Foot 2003: 141).

De-regulation of RAI, the state-broadcaster, presented Berlusconi with an opportunity to expand his media enterprise. In 1975 attempts were made by a parliamentary commission
to make local television and radio more regional in outlook. A year later the Constitutional Court decided that the state broadcaster, RAI, should no longer hold a monopoly of radio and television within the regions (Schlesinger 1990: 272). This led to the development of a number of local networks and presented Berlusconi with an opportunity to grow TeleMilano. Berlusconi acquired many regional stations and changed the name of his media company to Mediaset. Through Mediaset, Berlusconi actively challenged the regulators and RAI. He circumvented regulations by pre-recording entire schedules and sending them to each regional station for concurrent transmission (Lane 2004: 54). This gave, in Berlusconi’s own words, “the illusion of a network” (Schlesinger 1990: 273). With these transmissions he deliberately targeted the weak spots in RAI’s scheduling, using American imports such as *Dallas*, to increase audience share (Schlesinger 1990: 274). *Dallas* was the focus of another battle with the regulators, who wanted to control commercial programmes, and banned Berlusconi from showing consecutive episodes of *Dallas* and *Dynasty*. To circumvent this, he showed them concurrently on different channels (Andrews 2005). Eventually these clashes culminated in 1984 when three magistrates from Rome, Pescara and Turin decreed that these regional television networks were for regional, not national broadcasting and ordered for his channels to be suspended. This coincided with broadcasts of some of Mediaset’s most popular programmes, *Dallas*, *Dynasty*, the *Smurfs* and *High Noon* (Schlesinger 1990: 277-8; Ginsborg 2004: 34-5). Unsurprisingly, Berlusconi won much public sympathy and the matter had to be resolved by a special decree from his friend, the Prime Minister Bettino Craxi.

Berlusconi’s friendship with Craxi facilitated his contest with the regulators. As Prime Minister, Craxi could pass an emergency decree to temporarily permit the national broadcasts of Mediaset. However, Craxi’s 1984 decree was declared unconstitutional so
Craxi leveraged all of his political support to pass a new law effectively deregulating Italian television. The Mammi Law was named after its author Oscar Mammi, and eventually passed through parliament six years later (Lane 2004: 58). The Mammi Law ended the unregulated free-for-all that existed since the emergency decree. Yet rather than create a regulatory framework to ensure pluralism, the law confirmed the duopoly between RAI, the state broadcaster, and Berlusconi’s Mediaset. Although the law was drafted to look like Berlusconi had made sacrifices, it still looked bespoked to the media magnate. It maintained that no-one could own more than three stations, yet also stated that the owner of the commercial television stations could not also own stakes in satellite stations or newspapers. Berlusconi sold the daily newspaper *Il Giornale* to his brother, Paolo, and his stake in a pay-TV satellite channel to a group of investors to whom he lent the money (Stille 1999; Lane 2004: 64). The friendship between Berlusconi and Craxi facilitated new forms of patrimony based on personal contacts.

**Neo-Patrimonialism: Development and Change of Italy’s Patrimonial System**

This new patrimony of Craxi and Berlusconi operated on a personal *quid pro quo* basis. These ‘neo-patrimonial’ networks (Eisenstadt 1973; Sapelli 1995) relied on personal contacts, rather than a simple distribution of the resources; political support was granted in return for favours. After the Mammi Law was passed, allegations surfaced that ‘consultative fees’ were paid to the government office by Fininvest, Berlusconi’s umbrella company (Stille 1999). This was amplified when one of the key authors of the Mammi Law was employed by Fininvest shortly after leaving the ministry (Lane 2004: 59). Similarly, Berlusconi had offered Craxi political support during the politically delicate takeover of the publisher Mondadori. Berlusconi already had a stake in Mondadori and had bought the ailing television station Rete-4 from them in 1984 (the same year as
Craxi’s emergency decree). In 1989 Mondadori merged with the *L’Espresso* group which publishes the left-leaning newspaper *La Repubblica* and the weekly magazine, *L’Espresso*. The group was owned by the anti-governmental chairman of Olivetti, Carlo De Benedetti. Berlusconi entered the takeover to ensure that he gained control of Mondadori, while De Benedetti was left with the *L’Espresso* group. Although Berlusconi won access to another media outlet, by taking on the powerful anti-governmental *L’Espresso* group he also provided political support to Craxi (Gundle and O’Sullivan 1995).

Italy’s neo-patrimonial system was spectacularly exposed in the *Tangentopoli* scandal of 1992. *Tangentopoli* (‘Bribesville’) originated in Milan, the same city as the ‘Economic Miracle’ of the 1950s and the fashion and finance boom of the 1980s (Foot 2001; Foot 2003; Ginsborg 2003). Milan is also based in the region of Lombardy which Putnam classed as ‘civic’ and more likely to be economically successful (Putnam, Leonardi et al. 1993). However, it’s ‘civic’ nature did not prevent widespread political scandal. The scandal began on 17 February 1992 when the PSI politician Mario Chiesa was arrested for accepting a bribe. Chiesa was also the president of an old-people’s home and frequently received *tangente* (‘bribes’) in return for providing cleaning contracts (Ginsborg 2003). Chiesa was ostracised as a ‘rogue’ by Craxi and the PSI, and this led to Chiesa recounting the widespread systemised corruption taking place in Italy (Ginsborg 2003). Pandora’s Box had been opened and revelations of bribes between businessmen and politicians proliferated. The magistrates intensified investigations and arrests, which magnified media interest. The investigations became known as *mani pulite* (‘clean hands’) and profoundly affected the Italian political system.
The 1992 general election marked the beginning of the end of Italy’s First Republic. Craxi and the PSI were heavily implicated in the scandal. Craxi initially dismissed Chiesa as a ‘rogue’ before acknowledging that the system was widespread, and performed by all politicians, when he stated that: “We are all guilty. We all knew.” (Goffredo 1993; Gundle 1996: 88). Craxi went into exile in Tunisia. The loss of their charismatic leader resulted in the PSI disintegrating. The DC were also heavily implicated in tangentopoli and polled their lowest ever share of the vote (Ginsborg 2003). Parallel to mani pulite there was an ongoing Mafia trial in 1993 concerning the DC leader Giulio Andreotti, who had acted as Prime Minister on three separate occasions. He was heavily implicated in his connections to the Mafia, through whom the DC could garner more votes, and maintain the balance of power within Parliament. After being tried for collusion with the Mafia, judges declared that “He fully understood that his Sicilian associates had amicable relations with Mafia bosses, and he cultivated, therefore, amicable relations with the same bosses ... he asked them favours and he met them.” (Popham 2003). However, no proof of collusion could be proved after 1980 as the law decreeing that association with the Mafia only came into force in 1982 (Andrews 2005: 9). The PCI was least tainted by scandal but could not capitalise upon the weakness of the other two parties. The crisis of Eurocommunism and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 substantially weakened the PCI. The symbolic discrediting of Communism led to a period of introspection for the party. By 1991 the party had split into the centre-left Partito Democratico della Sinistra (PDS) and the Rifondazione Comunista. The weakness of the PCI also substantially weakened the DC who had established themselves as a bulwark against Communism. With the continued scandal and the defeat of Communism, the DC was further discredited and its factions split into various minor parties.
The Impact of Deregulation

Before detailing the outcome of tangentopoli and mani pulite it is necessary to make a brief excurses to illustrate the affect deregulation had on Italian society. These changes facilitated the political transformations that took place after 1994 when Silvio Berlusconi dramatically entered politics. Deregulation transformed the operation and consumption within the Italian economy. This permitted the emergence of a new business elite who operated new forms of business. However, they continued to operate within the patrimonial system as personal relationships blurred the boundaries between politics and business. Football operated within this patrimonial system as it became incorporated within the wider business groups of the new business elite. Silvio Berlusconi, for example, purchased and transformed AC Milan. The impact of deregulation on football will be considered in the following chapter on the development of Italian football. However, it is also important to consider football within the wider political transformations that took place in Italy during the 1990s. In particular, football facilitated Silvio Berlusconi’s move into politics. Therefore aspects of Berlusconi’s utilisation of football will be covered within this section as it is instrumental in understanding the move. This section will detail the impact of deregulation on television and consumption before assessing their influence on Berlusconi’s dramatic emergence in Italian politics.

A central feature of Italian deregulation under Bettino Craxi was the support provided to Silvio Berlusconi. Berlusconi fundamentally changed the role and approach towards television within Italy. Under the state monopoly, RAI was regulated to provide a public service, in the same way as the original BBC mission which was “to inform, educate and entertain”. In contrast, Berlusconi’s strategy was simply ‘to entertain’. This led to a dramatic shift towards ‘neo-television’ (Eco 1990). There was no ideology underpinning
Berlusconi's neo-television provided they generated audience figures (Ginsborg 2004: 42). Indeed it was not until 1991 that they complied with the law and broadcast a news programme, and the news was only broadcast across all three of Mediaset's channels a year later (Menduni 1996: 17). As mentioned in the previous section, Berlusconi's networks bought cheap American imports, like *Dallas* and a number of Hollywood films (Ginsborg 2004: 40). These were supplemented by extravagant variety shows with popular presenters, some of whom were symbolically signed from RAI (Schlesinger 1990: 275; Foot 2001: 102). Through these variety shows Berlusconi helped to reinforce gender divisions. Female presenters are invariably decorative to the more commanding presence of the central, male presenter (Ginsborg 2004: 43). In addition, Canale 5 was constructed as a feminine friendly station to appeal to the new consumer orientated housewives (Arvidsson 2003). Football also constituted a large aspect of Berlusconi's neo-television and will be covered in the following chapter.

Neo-television provided large audiences with which to advertise new consumer products and identities. In 1979 Berlusconi created an advertising company, Publitalia, in order to exploit the new commercial television which he was introducing. Through control of his television stations and Publitalia, Berlusconi dramatically reduced the advertising costs associated with advertising. In doing so, he opened up many new commercial avenues for consumer-orientated companies. This increased exposure to consumer culture coincided with the post-Fordist changes taking place under Craxi’s reforms. Through Publitalia, the Italian population became acculturated into this new post-Fordist consumer culture (Arvidsson 2003: 135). The new consumption taking place in 1980s, Italy took on a political agenda. Driven by Craxi and supported by the DC, the boom was fiercely contested by the PCI who saw excessive consumption as an erosion of traditional class boundaries which would lead to the formation of a ‘mass culture’
(Arvidsson 2003: 139). Despite recognising this transition, the PCI didn’t respond to these changes in their traditional support and this contributed to their weakness after the tangentopoli. With the mass political parties heavily ideologically based, in either Catholicism or Communism, Fordist consumption could be heavily regulated. With the removal of television and advertising regulations, ideological morality could be eroded and a consumer culture created. In doing so it opened the wider population to other aspects of Berlusconi’s empire and ambitions.

Deregulation of television facilitated the transformation of commercial neo-television and transformed television into a spectacle presented to entertain. The collapse of the political system after Tangentopoli presented an apposite opportunity of a new form of media spectacle. Berlusconi was central to the polarisation of information and entertainment throughout the scandal (Menduni 1996). As Robinson observed in relation to the Watergate scandal and political news broadcasting in general, network television has the power “to make the issues of our times those issues which best accommodate the medium” (Robinson 1976). Mediaset began broadcasting the political events as they unfolded and turned the scandal into public information and entertainment. It created a soap opera; the scandal created characters and plots as the drama unfurled. This was in sharp contrast to the state broadcaster, RAI, who did not take the same action. The result was a polarised audience between Mediaset and RAI viewers. The spectacle of Tangentopoli also created a strong feeling of ‘anti-partyism’ (Lipow and Seyd 1996; Axford and Huggins 1998) and resentment towards the traditional mass parties of the Christian Democrats (DC), the Socialists (PSI) and the Communists (PCI). The feeling of ‘anti-partyism’ fuelled by Berlusconi’s media organisation, led to him “entering the field” of politics in 1994.
Berlusconi utilised his full range business and media operations to assist his political emergence. Berlusconi built a broad business portfolio that was incorporated into an umbrella company called Fininvest. The company included Mediaset and Publitalia, in addition to AC Milan, Mondadori publishing, cinemas, supermarkets and financial services.\(^\text{12}\) Fininvest was founded in 1979 and entrusted to Berlusconi’s friend and confident, Marcello Dell’Ultri. Dell’Ultri was subsequently convicted of collusion with the Mafia and imprisoned for six years before having his conviction overturned in 2010 as the judges could find no evidence of collusion after 1992 (Ginsborg 2004; Lane 2004; Hooper 2010). Berlusconi made full use of his executives to construct and present a new political party called *Forza Italia* (FI). Publitalia chose the parliamentary candidates and charged them 500,000 lire (approximately £240) per day for their media training (Farrell 1995). All policies were market tested on voters by the market researcher Diakron, another Fininvest subsidiary (Farrell 1995). This market research permitted Berlusconi to communicate directly with the voters without the ideology of the traditional mass-parties. As Habermas argues, the breakdown of the electorate as a public enables the mass media to advertise the leader and his/her party to the section of society least engaged with the political process (Habermas 1989). Berlusconi treated the electorate as consumers and successfully utilised his media empire to target the crucial voters.

Berlusconi’s media ownership facilitated direct communication. Neo-television had blurred the boundaries between news and entertainment. Berlusconi’s political emergence reinforced the blurred boundaries as “the distinction between TV advertising, party political broadcasts, current affairs programmes and even light entertainment was *de facto* abolished” (Farrell 1995: 47). This was demonstrated when Berlusconi announced his “entering the field” through a television address broadcast live across all three of his

\(^{12}\text{http://www.fininvest.com/_eng/index.shtml}\)
networks. His direct televisual style utilised simple language and allowed him to develop his populist, anti-party appeal. During the factional days of the partitocrazia, political language, dubbed politichese, was opaque and cryptic as politicians tried to avoid revealing too much (Croci 2001). With his media and football background, Berlusconi began speaking in a clearer, more open style, gentese. This style facilitated the television orientated approach of Berlusconi and helped present him to Mediaset viewers as a sharp contrast to the traditional parties. For example, housewives, the target market of Canale 5, were more likely to vote for FI than for the traditional parties (Farrell 1995).

His media and football image combined to carefully symbolise his populist, man-of-the-people image. His choice of “entering the field” is a direct reference to footballers running onto the pitch. Yet, despite his anti-partyism, he still created a political party, Forza Italia. This was another direct reference to football as it was taken from a chant sung by Italian football fans at international matches. In addition, Berlusconi also referred to his cabinet, as his ‘team’, and FI’s political associations as Azzurri Supporters’ Clubs (Porro and Russo 2000: 357). This made another explicit reference to the Italian national team who are nicknamed the Azzurri after the colour of their shirts. Fininvest also used the transformation of AC Milan as a paradigm for Forza Italia. Following his success with AC Milan supporters’ clubs, the Azzurri Supporters’ Clubs were constituted in the same way. He used targeted advertising to attract new members, and provided incentives and discounts to join. Members were offered discount language courses, vacations and financial services (Porro and Russo 2000: 357). The direct correlation between football and politics was complete when he used the Milan supporters’ clubs to directly recruit Forza Italia members. The 2500 supporters’ clubs of AC Milan recruited nearly 200,000 FI members (Porro and Russo 2000: 357).
Distinctions between politics and football have blurred through Berlusconi’s media engagements. During the 1994 election, Berlusconi was campaigning against the economist Luigi Spaventa. Berlusconi quipped: “This Spaventa, how many championship cups has he won?” (Porro and Russo 2000: 365). Berlusconi himself takes part in chat shows in his guise as an owner of a football club (Foot 2007). This allows him to present his populist image and make political points. Much media attention is also created when Berlusconi visits the changing room of AC Milan to chat to the star players, or when visiting other squads. During the 2008 electoral campaign, Berlusconi visited the Juventus squad to encourage them to beat Fiorentina, so that AC Milan could qualify for the Champions League (Lewis 2008: 99). This trend is not restricted to television, or the media controlled by Berlusconi. The boundaries are also blurred in the print media as the *Corriere dello Sport* ran a headline “confidence vote while score 2-0” which referred to Berlusconi facing a confidence vote in Parliament at the same time as Milan were playing Barcelona in the Champions League final; a match they subsequently won 4-0 (Porro and Russo 2000). Elsewhere, Berlusconi has further blurred the boundaries between football and politics. Despite his position as prime minister and upholder of law and order, Berlusconi frequently attacks magistrates for being Communist (Lane 2004). In a similar fashion, Berlusconi also criticised a referee after Milan lost to the newly promoted Cesena in September 2010, because “the problem is that often Milan get left wing referees” (*La Gazzetta dello Sport* 2010). Political comments are bound into the wider social narratives.

The fractious nature of Italian politics means that even Berlusconi cannot win enough votes to maintain power without support. Since *Forza Italia’s* inception Berlusconi has maintained a delicate balance of power with two right wing parties which hold very different ideologies: *Allianza Nazionale* and *Lega Nord* (The Northern League). Both
parties make strange bedfellows, yet they both owe their proximity to power to the profound global transformations which took place at the end of the twentieth century. Both the *Lega Nord* and *Allianza Nazionale* appeal to popular, anti-party concerns and typify the postmodern shift from mass parties. They also represent another major paradox of Italian politics. Despite both campaigning for more autonomy and immigration controls, they represent two very different aspects of Italy. The anti-Fascist composition of post-war Italy not only created the polarity of the DC and the PCI, but also excluded the Fascists. Mussolini’s heirs continued under the neo-fascist party, the *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (‘Italian Social Movement’). Led by Gianfranco Fini, they took the opportunity that *tangentopoli* presented them to embrace democratic government and reconstituted themselves as a centre-right political party, the *Allianza Nazionale*. Following in the Mussolini tradition they remain staunchly in support of a strong centralised state and gain most of their support from the South of Italy. Their move towards the centre was complete when *Allianza Nazionale* merged with *Forza Italia* in March 2009 to form a new centre-right party called *Il Popolo della Liberta* (‘The People of Freedom’). Thus despite the anti-party populism of Berlusconi’s rhetoric, he continues to utilise the model of the political party (Von Beyme 1996). However, in contrast to this Southern, centralising influence, Berlusconi’s other coalition member comes from the North and is resolutely secessionist.

*Lega Nord* represents an apposite example of a new social movement that has developed a significant political following. Its populist rhetoric typifies the anti-party, single issue politics of contemporary Italy. *Lega Nord* grew out of the Lombard League which was started by Umberto Bossi in 1984. It developed throughout the 1980s as increased economic success in Milan, combined with increasing regional identities, brought a stronger affiliation for the pre-Italian regions. *Lega Nord* itself represents the imagined
nation of Padania in the north of Italy. Despite Putnam’s assertion that associations contribute to national democracy, the Lega Nord is resolutely regionalist in outlook. Secessionist policies are fuelled by strong anti-state sentiments, echoed in chants of Roma ladrona (‘thieving Rome’). These sentiments were confirmed during the tangentopoli scandal, despite the scandal originating in Milan itself. Despite Lega Nord’s strong anti-state and anti-party rhetoric, they became key allies of Berlusconi and Forza Italia, although they have remained independent and did not join Il Popolo della Liberta. Bossi and Lega Nord not only combines anti-centralisation and local identity rhetoric, but also strong anti-Southern and anti-immigration tendencies. Bossi orchestrated one of the most punitive immigration laws in Europe by effectively criminalising immigrants (Andrews 2005), as well as being quoted as saying that officials should open fire on boats of immigrants to prevent them landing: “I want to hear the roar of the canon. The immigrants must be hunted down, for better or worse ... At the second or third warning - boom! Fire the canons at them! Otherwise this will never stop” (Popham 2003; Andrews 2005: 56). Fragmentation of the traditional mass parties has provided the right conditions for the emergence of Berlusconi and his allies.

The combination of political support and mediatised populist rhetoric has enabled Berlusconi to act as Prime Minister on three separate occasions. His first coalition after tangentopoli lasted one year. However, he was the first Prime Minister to serve a full five year term after the 2001 elections and narrowly lost the 2006 elections (by 0.1%). The centre-left Union party was unable to maintain control and subsequently called an election in 2008, which Berlusconi won with his new Popolo della Liberta party. Unlike the partitocrazia of the Christian Democrats, the new Italian political settlement rests with one charismatic leader, Silvio Berlusconi. The following section will discuss the reasons and implications for this political transition.
Postmodern Populism: The Continuance of Berlusconi

Postmodern politics sees the transition from modern mass-association political parties into a new form of political approach. The crisis in global Communism and the tangentopoli scandal saw the decline of traditional mass-parties within Italy. This has coincided with the rise in anti-partyism where voters replaced their identification in the traditional mass parties and began to focus on single issue movements of personal identification. Axford and Huggins define this situation as ‘postmodern populism’ (Axford and Huggins 1998). Yet it is not just the dissolution of traditional boundaries and frustration with the previous system which accounts for this. Changes to consumption have shifted the traditional left-right politics centred on class and moved to politics of identity (Axford and Huggins 1998). In addition, as Castells suggests, society is increasingly becoming framed by electronic media (Castells 1996). As a consequence, politics is becoming increasingly mediatised and being fused with the culture industry. Berlusconi’s broadcasting of tangentopoli turned the scandal into a soap opera. The time-space compression facilitated by the media, has transformed the public sphere into regional and virtual spaces, as well creating a new ‘immediacy’ to politics as politicians seek to build their public image quickly (Axford and Huggins 1998).

New social movements of the 1970s have developed into ‘anti-partyism’ of the 21st century. These new forms of association are characterised as single-issue movements, with a more inclusive approach (Touraine 1981; Melucci 1988; Melucci and Mier 1989). In Italy there has been an increase in popularity for anti-Mafia movements in the south as local issues become paramount (Andrews 2005). Other movements are adjusting to global transformations, such as the Slow Food movement which was born in Italy as a
reaction against fast food and McDonalds.\textsuperscript{13} It campaigns for locally sourced produce, rather than mass-produced ‘fast food’ (Andrews 2005). The \textit{Lega Nord} represents another form of regional new social movement. It campaigns against state interference and immigration for the imagined nation of Padania. Under the charismatic leader of Umberto Bossi, it has been transformed into a powerful political party that embodies postmodern populism (Andrews 2005).

Like Bossi, Berlusconi utilises the anti-party rhetoric of postmodern populism. He has fused football, politics and media into a populist anti-party movement (Andrews 2005). Through ownership of various media platforms, as his “entering the field” showed, Berlusconi can operate quickly and efficiently. He can access many television networks to make political addresses, including using his populist football appeal to participate in many ‘non-political’ broadcasts. In addition he draws political candidates from television and football. In 2008 he appointed the former model and winner of Miss Italy, Mara Carfagna, as Equal Opportunities Minister (Hooper 2008). Likewise, candidates for the 2010 European elections included another Miss Italia contestant, Italia Caruso, a former dancer from Mediaset’s variety shows, Nicole Minetti, and Giorgio Puricelli, a physiotherapist at AC Milan (Kington 2010; Owen 2010). Populist candidates are combined with continued anti-party and anti-state rhetoric; for example, Berlusconi continues to decry the influence of the independent magistracy (Ginsborg 2004; Lane 2004; Jones 2007). This has coincided with extensive investigations into the Berlusconi’s financial affairs and has resulted in charges (and acquittals) of corruption, fraud, false accounting and bribery. Many cases have expired due to the case running out of time under statute of limitations laws, many of which were shortened by Berlusconi’s governments (Ginsborg 2004; Lane 2004). As a consequence of Berlusconi’s postmodern

\textsuperscript{13} \url{www.slowfood.com}
populism, he continues to undermine the central state even though his role of Prime Minister symbolises the governance of the state.

Berlusconi has come to embody and symbolise ‘postmodern populism’. Postmodern politics is increasingly personalised and constructed around the charismatic leaders (Von Beyme 1996). Berlusconi has mobilised a part of the population as a client in opposition to the state and political opponents. *Forza Italia* and Berlusconi were indivisible as there was no process within the party’s constitution which allowed members to remove him (Farrell 1995). Berlusconi carefully crafted his public image to distance himself from the corruption of *tangentopoli* even though he was a good friend of Craxi. His party represented the neo-patrimonial nature of Italian politics. The corrupt links between political parties and industry were replaced with personal ties (Von Beyme 1996: 137). As Farrell states:

“Berlusconi talks of creating a new democratic order, but his own approach is czarist. His movement is a personal clique rather than an orthodox party - it is composed of followers and dependents rather than members or equals and has more in common with a court than with a democratic functioning organisation” (Farrell 1995: 41)

Under the *Popolo della Libertà* the party’s statute, the president of the party is now an elected post.¹⁴ In spite of this democratic shift, the postmodern populism of Berlusconi is still based upon the cult of personality of its leader. In the summer of 2010, Berlusconi’s key ally in the PdL, and speaker of the lower house of the Italian parliament, Gianfranco Fini, led a faction away from the party. Fini wanted more internal democracy within the

¹⁴ http://www.ilpopolodellaliberta.it/speciali/statuto-del-pdl.pdf
party and greater sanctions over those found guilty of corruption (Hooper 2010). It is illustrative that Berlusconi demanded that Fini step down as leader of the lower house, despite it not being within the gift of the prime minister.

Despite various personal and political issues, Berlusconi remains publicly popular. Even scandals in his personal life have not impacted his popularity. During a 2009 Berlusconi became embroiled in a series of sex scandals. In May, Berlusconi attended the eighteenth birthday party of an aspiring model, Noemi Letizia, who he claimed was the daughter of a family friend and he presented her with an expensive necklace. However, his wife, Veronica Lario, stated that he did not attend his own children’s eighteenth birthday parties and filed for divorce stating that he: “spends too much time with minors” (Kington 2009; Pisa 2009). The following month, photographs were published in Spain of semi-naked guests attending a party at Berlusconi’s Sicilian villa (Hooper 2009). In July, it emerged that a businessman from Bari had paid for female escorts to attend parties with Berlusconi in order to receive favourable business decisions (Hooper 2009; Kington 2009; Owen 2009). One escort, Patrizia D’Addario, released tapes intimating that she had spent the night with the Prime Minister. She decided to release the detail after she claimed that Berlusconi’s promise of support for a hotel planning application was not fulfilled (Kington 2009). Despite these allegations, Berlusconi remains a powerful symbol for his supporters. In a political rally in September 2010, Berlusconi joked of his sexual prowess as he suggested that a way for young people to escape the recession was to marry into money (Kington 2010). His man-of-the-people charisma appeals to that section of society which is incorporated into his patrimonial network, and isolates his political opponents.
Political opposition has become reduced to opposition of Berlusconi. Despite Berlusconi’s power, he has become a powerful symbol for opponents. For example, Antonio Di Pietro was a leading prosecutor in the *mani pulite* corruption trial into *tangentopoli*. During Berlusconi’s first government in 1994 a number of counter-investigations were started against Di Pietro and were deemed to be politically motivated. Subsequently, he founded the anti-corruption party called *Italia dei Valori* (‘Italy of Values’). This party demonstrates the personalised and mediatised nature of new political movements. Di Pietro has made extensive use of information technology to highlight corruption and continues to publish a blog and weekly vidcasts to communicate directly with supporters.\(^\text{15}\) Even though Di Pietro has a broad political remit, the personalised nature of Italian politics has resulted in many attacks on Berlusconi. A political movement led by comedian Beppe Grillo replicates this transition. Like Di Pietro, Grillo makes extensive use of new media forms to campaign against corruption and for environmental issues.\(^\text{16}\) In 2007 he initiated a V-Day (*Vaffanculo* or ‘Fuck Off’ Day) to persuade people to sign a petition to prevent people with criminal convictions from standing for parliament.\(^\text{17}\) Grillo has also started a political movement called the *Movimento 5 Stelle* (‘Five Star Movement’) to fight the 2010 regional elections on environmental and anti-corruption issues (Hooper 2010).\(^\text{18}\) A similar movement was launched in October 2009 by a group of bloggers, citizens and celebrities, including Grillo, who called themselves *Il Popolo Viola* (‘The Purple People’).\(^\text{19}\) They designated 5\(^{\text{th}}\) December as ‘No Berlusconi Day’ after Berlusconi tried to pass an immunity of prosecution law for the heads of government, which would effectively make him

\(^\text{15}\) http://www.antoniodipietro.it/; http://www.youtube.com/profile?user=IDVstaff
\(^\text{16}\) http://www.beppegrillo.it/
\(^\text{17}\) http://151.1.253.1/vaffanculoday/
\(^\text{18}\) http://www.beppegrillo.it/movimento/index.php#post_grillo
\(^\text{19}\) http://www.ilpopoloviola.it/
immune from prosecution.\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Il Popolo Viola} have organised several more anti-Berlusconi rallies where participants all wear a purple item of clothing to symbolise their participation (Owen 2010). A more violent demonstration of anti-Berlusconi sentiment occurred in December 2009 after a political rally Berlusconi held in the square alongside Milan cathedral. Massimo Tartaglia, an engineer with a history of mental health issues, threw a marble replica of Milan’s cathedral at Berlusconi which broke his nose and two teeth (Owen 2009). Ultimately, political opposition to Berlusconi is so fragmented that it is reduced to wearing purple or a lone protester throwing an object.

**Summary**

The unification of the Italian state has created an ‘Italian solution’ to the nation state. The lack of legitimacy derived from its political construction, led to the state evolving in a clientelistic way as individuals sought to maintain power through a patrimonial system of patronage and corruption. As a consequence, Keynesian economics became distorted and developed into systemised corruption that eventually brought down the First Republic. In order to navigate around the corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy, Italian firms developed small and flexible post-Fordist enterprises that remained under family control. These businesses were well-placed to respond to global deregulation in trade and its subsequent consumer-driven economy. However, their rapid development and restrictive family control minimised the development of a separate business class. This was constrained by the political and bureaucratic system that permitted the business families to operate within the political realm. Berlusconi represents the neo-patrimonial shift which took place in Italy after the 1970s. He fought the existing state regulation and

\textsuperscript{20} http://www.noberlusconiday.org/
capitalised on the complete de-regulation to build a personal empire in the new post-Fordist services. Through media and football he represents the shift from state control to power divested to individuals. However, he also represents a continuance with past practises as he utilised personal contacts to win governmental concessions, and has retained extensive personal and family control of his business empire. The family became the perfect image for Berlusconi, as Bernini states:

“The family was used by Berlusconi as a useful metaphor to describe his own political and personal trajectory, as he presented himself alternatively as a father engaged in the rescue of his country, the offspring of a hard-working family, the devout son, and the patriarch at the head of a large family” (Bernini 2010: 77).

It is for this reason that the 2009 allegations of matrimonial impropriety affected Berlusconi more than any other. Berlusconi’s transition into politics represents the fusion of these various postmodern aspects, but with the retention of individual and family control.

The new social movements of the 1970s have developed into ‘anti-partyism’ of the 21st century. These new forms of association are characterised as a single-issue, with a more inclusive approach (including more female involvement). They encompass a wider range of issues, such as anti-Mafia, anti-globalisation, slow food and anti-war. Despite the social capital accumulated with these movements, they are not contributing to national democracy. Lega Nord in particular actively undermines the state. Consequently, fragmentation has permitted the emergence of the charismatic leader of Berlusconi who can utilise control of the media, football and the political system to neutralise dissidence. The following chapter will show how these developments are reflected within Italian
football, and more significantly, how Silvio Berlusconi contributed to the transformation of Italian football.
Chapter 4

Deregulation and Crisis of Italian Football

“\textit{I'll break the balls of all the false moralists of this world who think that everything is clean now because they got rid of ... Luciano Moggi}” – Luciano Moggi\textsuperscript{21}

\begin{quote}
\textit{“I’ll make him an offer he can’t refuse”} – \textit{Michael Corleone}\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

Fabio Cannavaro, the handsome and tattooed captain of the Italian national football team, stood upon the podium and raised himself above his \textit{azzurri} team-mates. The captain, wearing the world famous azure blue kit of Italy, received the world cup and held it above his head. Fireworks and confetti erupt from the back of the podium as Cannavaro and his Italy team-mates celebrated winning the 2006 world cup, the forth time the nation had won the competition; only Brazil have won the competition on more occasions. The team had just beaten France in a dramatic penalty shoot-out in the final in Germany. As the Italy team huddled around the cup and took turns in kissing the gold trophy, they became drenched in confetti and emotion. Over the public-address system the ‘Triumphal March’ from Verdi’s Aida reinforced the Italian victory. The world cup triumph appeared to be a vindication of the players who had endured a turbulent two months after allegations of match-fixing surfaced in the Italian media. This scandal affected the futures of many of the players at the tournament and the world cup provided a suitable liberation from the travails at home.

\textsuperscript{21} Burke, J. (2006). Paradiso to inferno. \textit{The Observer}.
\textsuperscript{22} Coppola, F. F. (1972). \textit{The Godfather}.
Triumph and crisis have been regular partners in Italian football. Italy’s short but colourful history has left an indelible mark on its football. Many of the actors operate across the fields of politics, business and football. The over-reliance on familial and patrimonial networks can provide rapid outcomes, but these often prove unsustainable. Global patterns of de-regulation were initially successful within Italy as these networks quickly adapted to the new order. However, the nature of globalisation has seen other nations surpass Italy’s success. This pattern was replicated in football where initial Italian success has been surpassed by relative English, German and Spanish success. This is compounded by the weakness of central authority which fails to adequately impose the necessary requirements on the federations and clubs to rectify the issue. The vacuum in national politics is replicated within the club structure as fans continue to remain outside the organisational hierarchy, yet still operate within the patrimonial system.

In order to witness these transformations within the Italian game, this chapter will present a history of Italian football to introduce the organisational structure of the Italian game. Several recurring themes re-emerge within the football context. In particular, there is a profound crisis of legitimacy of the central authorities which is undermined by widespread familial and patrimonial networks. Dense networks manifest in strategic cities which intensify regional differences. This chapter will present the history of Italian football within the framework of political economy illustrated in the previous chapters. It will chart the development of football from its inception, through Fascism to the Miracle and the 1970s. It will then illustrate the fragmentation that occurred after the 1970s and illustrate the transformations which occurred in the subsequent decades. Italy’s development and approach to these transformations helps explain the subsequent crises,
which will be detailed in the following sections. The chapter will conclude with details of
the Calciopoli scandal which reinforced the continued weakness of the authorities.

The Development of Italian Football

Football in Italy is entwined with formation of the nation state and the global diffusion
of the codified sport. During the nineteenth century the modern nation state began to
crystallise and the newly codified sports provided an apposite opportunity for
identification for nations and citizens. As with elsewhere in the world, the playing of
organised games of football dispersed from ports. British sailors landing at ports, such as
Livorno, Genoa and Naples, led to a growth in interest in these cities which were
undergoing extensive urbanisation and industrialisation (Foot 2007). In keeping with the
English origins of the organised game, the English word football entered the Italian
lexicon. As a result the original governing body set up in 1898 adopted the name
Federazione Italiana Football (FIF). The nascent governing body subsequently set up a
national championship which was won by Genoa Cricket and Football Club (Foot 2007).
Increasing internationalisation of the sport led to the development of FIFA and UEFA,
which Italy joined as a founding member.

The governing body in Italy has faced a crisis of legitimacy almost since its inception as it
struggled to impose national regulation. Early teams were set-up and populated by
foreign players. The Englishman James Richardson Spensley founded the football section
of Genoa Cricket and Football Club in 1897. Meanwhile, another Englishman called
Herbert Kilpin founded AC Milan in 1899. Elsewhere Torino was formed by a collection
of English and Swiss businessmen, and Swiss and Italians formed Internazionale (Papa
and Panico 2002; Foot 2007). Meanwhile, in 1905 the first club formed in Livorno,
Virtus Juventusque, was founded by Carmichael Montgomery, the son of the British Vice-counsel in Livorno (Chiarello 2005). The English influence of the game in Italy has resulted in the Italian colloquial term for a ‘manager’ being *Il Mister*, named after the first organised manager, William Garbutt (Foot 2007). The extensive foreign influence in the Italian game led to the FIF banning foreign players in 1908. This provides the first example of a challenge to the federation’s legitimacy. Milan, in particular, felt that this prevented them from winning their third championship in a row, and with it, the opportunity to win the Spensley Cup for such a feat. As a consequence, Milan, Torino and Genoa boycotted the tournament leading to the federation readmitting foreign players in the following season (Papa and Panico 2002; Foot 2007).

Football in Italy provided an early opportunity for nationalist symbols to become constructed. In 1909 the governing body changed its name to the *Federazione Italiana Gioco Calcio* (FIGC) to reflect the adoption of the Italianised word of *calcio*, rather than the English term of *football*. This made an explicit reference to the historic game of *Calcio Fiorentino* which had been played in Florence during the Renaissance. This represented an invented tradition (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) as the historic version of the sport bore little resemblance to the organised game introduced by the English as *Calcio Fiorentino* was more akin to modern Rugby and the hurling games of Britain (Dunning 1972). The Italianising trend continued under Mussolini who continued to develop a nationalised Italian origin for this invented tradition. *Calcio Fiorentino* was reintroduced to Florence in 1930 to construct a clear link between the Medieval and modern games. Indeed, Foot suggests that the historic Florentine game “has been adapted to *appear more like football* [original italics]” (Foot 2007). In highlighting this reinvention of tradition we see the incorporation of historical symbols of football into the nationalising tendencies of modern Italy.
Football in Italy quickly became incorporated into the industrial fabric. Industrialisation and urbanisation ensured a rapid participation rate in the new sport. The successful early teams came from the port of Genoa and the industrial cities of Milan and Turin. Industrialists quickly adopted the game’s popularity and incorporated it into their industrial network. The owner and founder of Pirelli was an early member of AC Milan and became president of the club from 1908 until 1929 (Foot 2007). Edoardo Agnelli, the son of Fiat’s founder became president of Juventus in 1923 until 1935 and initiated the long and successful association between the club and the company that has continued into the twenty-first century. Furthermore, Inter’s president from 1923 was Enrico Olivetti, from the type-writer manufacturers Olivetti, before he sold it to Senatore Borletti from another leading industrial family (Foot 2007). The industrial growth of the two cities led to power struggles between clubs in Milan and Turin. This further undermined the Federation as the seat of the FIGC transferred several times between the two cities as appeasement (Papa and Panico 2002; Foot 2007).

The extensive patrimonial networks within the clubs, and the failure of the FIGC to impose its authority, have successively de-legitimised it. The early game in Italy replicated its English forebears through the pursuit of amateurism. Industrial influence and the kudos of victory created a sham amateurism. In 1913 Genoa’s star player, Renzo De Vecchi, was paid as a bank clerk and with ‘travel expenses’ (Foot 2007). The system was exposed during the ‘Rosetta Case’ which resulted from Juventus paying fifty thousand lire for the Pro Vercelli player Virginio Rosetta in 1923 (Foot 2007: 32). The president of Pro Vercelli, a lawyer called Luigi Bozino, was also president of the FIGC and authorised the sale of Rosetta. The player meanwhile was an accountant by profession and was set up with a new accountancy post in Turin, underwritten by Juventus (and by extension,
Fiat, the owners of Juventus). The money involved ignited the scandal, and led to a number of resignations within the FIGC. Ultimately the federation docked Juventus points (preventing them from winning the title) and barred Rosetta from playing. The following season, however, he was allowed to re-join Juventus and went on to win six championships, as well as winning the World Cup with Italy in 1934 (Foot 2007: 33). In addition to paying players additional emoluments in order to accumulate resources to the detriment of rivals, clubs have also utilised match fixing to gain an advantage. The most notable example occurred during the 1926-7 season when Torino was found guilty of bribing a Juventus player. As a result, Torino had their title rescinded and the 1926-7 scudetto remains vacant (Foot 2007: 238).

Fascism attempted to assert a nationalist and centralised control over the national game. Mussolini saw football as the perfect way to create the necessary national symbols to unite the young nation. Alongside the reinvented tradition of Calcio Fiorentino, he also incorporated the powerful symbols of ancient Rome, which included the notion of mens sana in corpore sano (a healthy mind in a healthy body) (Martin 2004: 15). Mussolini supported the building of a number of municipal stadiums which would house the various sports’ clubs he initiated (Martin 2004). This permitted Italy to host the second World Cup in 1934 (Martin 2004). Not only did they act as powerful symbols to the power of Fascism, but they simultaneously harked back to ancient Rome and looked forward to a Modernist future. As a consequence, many stadiums in Italy date from this period, in particular the Stadio Olimpico in Rome, the Stadio Artemio Franchi in Florence, and Livorno’s Stadio Armando Picchi. Foreign names of football teams were changed, with Internazionale changing its name to a more Italian sounding Ambrosiana (Foot 2007). Fascist centralisation and nationalism led to a major re-structuring of football in Italy in 1926. The Viareggio Charter revolutionised football within Italy and
instituted many of the features that exist today (Foot 2007: 37-8). The charter introduced a professional national league and set up Serie A and Serie B. This abolished the previous provincial leagues, and likewise illustrated the boundaries of the Italian nation. The city of Trieste acquired in the settlement of the First World War could now be affirmed as Italian as it would play in the Italian national league (Martin 2004: 74). Furthermore, the charter permitted professionalism which allowed for the best players to participate in these national leagues. Finally, echoing previous attempts to ban foreigners, the charter instituted a ban on non-Italians playing in the national leagues. Even under Fascism, the illusion continued. Hungarians or Austrians were obviously barred from playing; however, players of Italian extraction (an oriundo) were permitted. Due to large numbers of Italians immigrating to South America in the previous century, a number of oriundi transferred from South America to play in the new professional Italian leagues. Ultimately, some of these oriundi represented Italy in the national team and consequently won an Olympic gold medal in 1932 and the World Cups in 1934 and 1938 (Martin 2004; Foot 2007).

Direct central Fascist control did not minimise scandal within Italian football. Fascism also influenced the patrimonial structure of Italian football. For example, the leader of the Bologna Fascists (and future mayor of Bologna), Leandro Arpinati, took an active interest in the championship play off between Bologna and Genoa in 1925 (Foot 2007: 34). Teams that finished level at the end of the season took part in a play-off that was replayed if the game finished in a draw. In the 1925 playoff final the two teams had already played two games and had drawn them both. The third match was played in Milan and watched by a crowd of 20,000 fans. Genoa proceeded to take a 2-0 lead before Bologna had an attack in the second half. A shot was made, the keeper dived and the referee indicated a corner. This resulted in a pitch invasion led by a group of ‘black-
shirts’ and delayed the game for fifteen minutes. The referee changed his mind and gave a goal, a ‘goal’ that Bologna subsequently doubled later in the game to force another draw. Under Federation rules, the pitch invasion should have led to Genoa being awarded the championship. Arpinati, however, pressured the referee to attribute no blame for the pitch invasion. This permitted the Federation to call for another play off. The subsequent play off, in Turin, was marred by gunshots being fired amongst fans at the train station after the match finished in yet another draw. Turin refused to allow another game to be held in the city on the grounds of public order, so the following match was held in Milan two months later, a match Bologna duly won. Arpinati went on to become president of the FIGC and produced a period of unprecedented success for the Italian national team and Bologna football club. The control and influence of football by Arpinati and Mussolini also led to a number of accusations being made regarding the 1934 World Cup final, hosted by Italy (Foot 2007: 440). Despite this, Italy successfully defended their title four years later in France.

Suspicion of central authority has undermined the FIGC’s ability to regulate effectively. This suspicion has also created the symbolic figure of the referee who becomes the focus of allegations of corruption. As a consequence, referees have become victims of abuse, violence and suspicion (Foot 2007: Chapter 2). Through the ‘deep play’ of football, historian Paul Ginsborg makes a clear comparison with wider society:

“Reactions to the game’s rules and refereeing can be seen as a mirror of wider reactions to authority in contemporary Italian society... the rules exist, but they are not easy to interpret. In these circumstances, the referee’s authority is perforce uncertain, but it is made much more so in Italy by the almost universal climate of suspicion, if not derision, that accompanies his decisions... it is not
difficult to discern here a series of emotions – suspicion, contempt, cynicism, even hatred – that characterise the relationship between Italians and the state” (Ginsborg 2003: 113).

The pressure Arpinati exerted on the referee in the Genoa-Bologna game in 1925 is merely an extension of this struggle for authority. The 1926 Viareggio Charter attempted to limit the opportunity for corruption by establishing a committee to select referees who were subsequently announced at the game (Foot 2007: 55). However, by the 1950s, this clandestine information had become valuable to third parties who sought to gain an advantage. One such scandal involved Catania football club when a local reporter claimed that whilst working for Catania, he bribed a referee and his cousin in order to gain access to the information (Foot 2007: 58). In the following decade the big clubs tried to exert pressure on the selection of certain referees. In one case, Juventus tried to go to court to bar a referee from officiating their matches and reinforcing the lack of legitimacy of the central federation (Foot 2007: 55). This has continued into the twenty-first century as Silvio Berlusconi used the media to accuse referees of being left wing and biased against Milan (La Gazzetta dello Sport 2010).

Italian Football During the ‘Miracle’

The economic ‘Miracle’ of the 1950s reaffirmed the hegemony of the cities of Turin and Milan. At the end of the Second World War, Torino emerged as the major force in Italian football. After winning the 1943 scudetto by one point over Livorno, the team won five consecutive titles and became known as Grande Torino (‘Great Torino’). The team established a number of Italian football records and provided the majority of the Italian national team (Foot 2007). Tragedy struck on 4th May 1949 when a plane transporting the
players encountered difficulty in fog around Turin and crashed into Mount Superga. All thirty-one passengers were killed. The catastrophe marked the end of Torino (despite a brief resurgence in the 1970s) and permitted the consolidation of the three major clubs of Juventus, Milan and Inter. The economic support provided by the industrial patronage of leading families ensured that Italian clubs could afford to pay the highest transfer fees for players. Since 1952, the world record transfer fee was held by Italian clubs, and Milan, Inter and Juventus in particular, for nearly fifty years (BBC 2009). Only the transfers of Johan Cruyff and Diego Maradona to Barcelona, Alan Shearer to Newcastle and Denilson to Real Betis dented the Italian monopoly.

The ‘Miracle’ reinforced the financial dominance of the three elite clubs. The growth of mass-manufacturing based on Fordist principles necessitated large numbers of industrial workers. The success of the ‘Miracle’ also provided increased economic rewards with which the owners could reinvest in their team. Juventus, in particular, benefitted from the success of Fiat. Fiat contributed over four percent of Italian gross domestic product and was the biggest employer in Italy; its staff canteen could host ten thousand employees (Foot 2007). Consequently, Umberto Agnelli, the club’s president during the 1950s and 1960s, stated that: “The team has followed the evolution of the nation” (Foot 2007: 79). Not only could the Agnelli family provide industrial patronage to finance the club’s success, but the extensive internal migration caused by the Miracle transformed the supporter-base of the club. Millions of workers left their hometowns, particularly in the south, and moved to Turin to work in the Fiat factory. The subsequent return of these workers to their home towns has resulted in Juventus being the most widely supported football club in Italy, with every town and village having a Juventus supporters’ club.
Financial support and industrial patronage also permitted the growth of the Grande Inter side of the 1960s. The oil magnate Angelo Moratti purchased Inter in 1955 and provided the financial support for the club to win three *scudetti* in 1963, 1965 and 1966, as well as winning consecutive European Cups in 1964 and 1965. Moratti’s financial support was augmented by the club’s Argentinean manager, Helenio Herrera, who implemented a highly professional training regime to drill the players in a quasi-militaristic style (Foot 2007). Herrera also bequeathed a lasting legacy on Italian football through his adoption and success of the *catenaccio* style of defence. Named after the Italian for ‘door-bolt, *catenaccio* was a highly defensive tactic that sought to nullify the opposition in attack and quickly counter attack. The rigidity and discipline required to execute *catenaccio* emulated the Fordist principles operating within the factories of Milan and Turin.

Increased professionalism within football brought greater incentives to win. A number of teams became involved in doping scandals during the 1960s and this led to the FIGC attempting to impose order through regular drug testing. Some minor members of the ‘Grande Inter’ side were found guilty of doping in 1962 (Foot 2007: 263). The following year five Genoa players were banned and the authorities decided to instigate a rule that any player found positive would see their team forfeit the result of the game (Foot 2007: 263). Ultimately this led to recriminations and a further demonstration of the crisis of legitimacy facing the FIGC. During the 1963-4 season five Bologna players were declared positive after a game with Torino (Foot 2007: 264-6). Under the rules, they would forfeit the game, and as a result ended up three points behind Inter at the top of the league. Riots ensued in the streets of Bologna and the club’s lawyers disputed the validity of the testing process. With Bologna and Inter tied on points at the end of the season, the authorities cleared Bologna amidst stories of the possible switching of samples. As a
consequence, the league declared that the title should be decided by a play off; the only time this has ever occurred.

**The Crisis of the 1970s**

The global financial crisis of the 1970s directly impacted football. King has identified that European football went through a period of ‘Eurosclerosis’ during the decade as clubs faced a reduced economic viability which resulted in a reduction in playing standards, hooliganism, and increased match-fixing (King 2003). The period marked an end to the dominance of the top clubs. Both Milanese clubs failed to win a *scudetto* for ten years during the period. Although Juventus remained dominant, provincial clubs won a number of championships. After the ‘hot autumn’ of 1968, Fiorentina won their second *scudetto* in 1969. This was followed by Cagliari in 1970 and Lazio in 1973. 1975 saw the brief re-emergence of Torino after the Superga tragedy. A similar pattern emerged in the early 1980s when Roma and Verona won titles in 1982 and 1984 respectively (Foot 2007).

The political agitations that took place in the wider society, which saw increased industrial action by workers and political militancy, was replicated by footballers. The players were becoming more political and requesting increased legal rights. In 1968 the Italian Footballers Association, the *Associazione Italiana Calciatori*, was created.23 It called for greater freedom for players and initiated the Italian footballer of the year award to recognise outstanding players. In 1974 all teams arrived ten minutes late in protest of the restrictions of movement. Until then, players were forced to move to whichever team their club decided to sell them to (Foot 2007: 381). Players also reflected the extreme

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23 http://www.assocalcatori.it/
politics of the piazzas. Paolo Sollier of Perugia was a visible supporter of far Left organisations (Foot 2007). Elsewhere, the Lazio team of the 1970s exhibited Fascist sympathies. Many of the players carried guns which they took to training and away games. Their frivolous approach to their weapons resulted in the death of their midfielder, Luciano Re Cecconi, in 1977. As a practical joke, he pretended to rob a jewellery store and was shot by the owner (Foot 2007).

The failure of the central authorities to effectively regulate the sport saw allegations of match-fixing re-emerge during the same period. In addition to the allegations of drug use detailed previously, in 1974 the Sunday Times journalist, Brian Glanville, exposed a wide ranging account of match fixing of European Cup games by Italian clubs called the ‘Golden Fix’ (Glanville 1999; Glanville 1999; King 2003; Foot 2007). The allegations centred on Italo Allodi who was the Sporting Director at Inter in the 1960s before moving to Juventus in the 1970s. He subsequently became the national team manager before moving to Napoli in the 1980s; the Napoli side that contained Maradona and finally wrested the title away from the powers in the north. Glanville suggests that Allodi used an intermediary to attempt to bribe referees. The intermediary worked for Allodi at both Inter in the 1960s and Juventus in the 1970s. In some cases, the bribe was deemed to have worked, such as with Inter in the 1960s, and allegedly with Juventus against Derby County in 1973. However, the allegations only came to light after a Portuguese referee, Francesco Marques Lobo, refused to be bribed the following year (Glanville 1999; Glanville 1999; King 2003; Foot 2007). A further match-fixing scandal developed in 1980 based on the Italian version of the Football Pools called Totocalcio. Two Roman shop keepers attempted, unsuccessfully, to fix a number of games in a scandal that became dubbed Totonero (Foot 2007: 244). The scandal included a number of players and coaches and led to seven clubs having points deducted, and Milan and Lazio relegated.
The scandal also led to the suspension of several players, including the superstar of Italian football, Paolo Rossi. Rossi was suspended for three years, but subsequently had this reduced to two years, which allowed him to take part in the 1982 World Cup final. He went on to be the leading scorer in the tournament as Italy won the tournament for the third time. The inability of the Italian authorities to deal with the causes of corruption was highlighted six years later when Totonero was replicated on a wider scale in 1986. This time nine teams were relegated or deducted points, as well as seventeen coaches and thirty-four players being suspended.

**Deregulation in the Craxi Years**

The 1980s represented a significant shift in Italian football. Deregulation and changes to the Italian political economy facilitated a major transformation of Italian football. Significantly, deregulation of television directly impacted the presentation of football which led to an increased popularity of the sport. This section will illustrate the importance of television in the deregulated world of football. Significant focus will be placed on Silvio Berlusconi’s contribution to the transformations in Italian television and football. It will also show how connections between businesses and football intensified as leading organisations incorporated football clubs into their family of businesses. Despite their initial success, the system collapsed at the end of the twentieth century.

Global deregulation has re-articulated the inter-relations between sport and industry. In contrast to earlier forms of industrial patronage, post-industrial patronage centres on services and information, particularly television. The resulting ‘media-sport complex’ (Maguire 1999) or ‘media-calcio’ (Porro 2008), provided a mutually beneficial relationship. Football was a primary component of Berlusconi’s programming despite
regulations preventing the broadcast of live footage. Italy’s victory in the 1982 world cup led to an upsurge in interest in football. This coincided with the newly emerging commercial networks which were seeking to increase audience figures and advertising revenue. As Maguire highlights: “Sport has also become a commodity whose media value is determined by the size and composition of the audience it can deliver to potential advertisers and sponsors of media broadcasts.” (Maguire 1999: 151-2). Berlusconi announced his entry into football broadcasting in 1980 by purchasing the rights for £1 million to an international event called the Mundialito (Foot 2007: 294). This mini tournament brought together all winners of previous world cups in Uruguay. Berlusconi’s television networks also broadcast friendly football tournaments which did not conflict with RAI’s monopoly of official tournaments.

Mediaset’s style contrasted with the state controlled and heavily regulated RAI channels and fuelled consumer demand for increased televised matches and shows about football. Due to regulations preventing the broadcast of live images, neo-television has led to the proliferation of football debate shows. The principal purpose of the programme is to talk about football and the live matches have become superfluous to the debate that is taking place in the studio. Outside broadcasts provide accounts of the live match taking place, whilst back in the studio; the important features have become simulacra and are simulated in various ways (Baudrillard 1983). Often chalkboards will be used to illustrate the position of players as the action had unfolded. Telelombardia, for example, used ex-footballers to recreate the goals, often with more spectacular effects (Foot 2007: 286). Computer generated players have also been used to recreate the goals and have removed the human element altogether. When debating games, the moviola (slow motion replay) is extensively utilised to decide if a player was offside, if they made contact with a player in the penalty area or if a goal was actually handball. The moviola, is also used to display
other controversial events. For example in September 2008, when the Milan and Italy midfielder Gennaro Gattuso was injured after falling backwards into the tunnel leading out from the changing rooms, this event was re-shown and debated for several minutes, and the moviola used over twenty times.

Without the corporal display of football, the focus of the debate becomes a fragmented collection of spectacles which necessitate a charismatic host to provide cohesion. Like the neo-television variety shows, football shows create hosts who are personalities. Foot dubs this phenomenon ‘Biscardism’ after Aldo Biscardi the host of the longest running football show Il Processo (‘The Trial’) (Foot 2007: 290). Personality-hosts like Biscardi facilitate the emotion and spectacle of the debate. They are supported by partisan pundits who do not hide the fact that they are fans and show the emotion of the game taking place. They discuss the team, manager and performance and reflect the emotions of the fans at home. The fan-pundits, such as AC Milan fan and pundit Tiziano Crudelli, have become celebrities in their own right. (Foot 2007: 290). The debate is fuelled by audience participation, both from a studio audience and fans at home, who send emails and text messages which are read out by another (usually female) host. These shows are so popular that they account for the top twenty-five most watched shows in Italy (Baroncelli and Lago 2006).

Alongside transforming the media display and popularity of football, Berlusconi transformed the operation of football. He introduced a ‘business’-orientated, media-friendly approach to football that Italian authors have called neo-calcio (‘neo-football’) (Liguori and Smargiasse 2003). AC Milan was one of the most successful clubs in Italy and had endured a difficult start to the 1980s. It was relegated for its role in the Totocalcio betting scandal of 1980 and despite winning Serie B the following year, it was
relegated again in 1982. A second promotion saw them become a mid-table Serie A side and in serious financial turmoil. In March 1986 Berlusconi purchased the club he supported as a child, and commenced a major re-structuring. Berlusconi signalled his intentions as he unveiled the team in July 1986. They arrived by helicopter at the stadium, to the tune of 'The Ride of the Valkyries' in front of ten thousand fans (Ginsborg 2004: 53). Berlusconi then utilised his television channels to broadcast the event. Berlusconi was signalling a new approach to football. In his own words, he states that “I knew very well that people would laugh at me, even treat me with irony. But we needed to show that the whole way of thinking at AC Milan had changed” (Ginsborg 2004: 53). By turning it into a media-orientated spectacle, he was transforming the way the game was organised, not just at AC Milan, but across Italy and Europe.

By combining his media panache and business acumen, Berlusconi successfully introduced business practises into AC Milan. He viewed the club as a business organisation and placed the club in the management of some of his senior managers of his umbrella company, Fininvest (Poli 2001). The role and importance of the AC Milan press office was transformed as Berlusconi carefully cultivated the image of the football club (Poli 2001: 376). To increase customers, Berlusconi targeted season ticket sales using television commercials created by his advertising company, Publitalia, and then broadcast on his television channels. Automatic booking systems for the season tickets were introduced as well as designated seating (Porro and Russo 2000: 354). The popularity of football after the 1982 World Cup win saw Italy successfully bid for the 1990 World Cup. This led to a major renovation project of Italian stadiums, which saw AC Milan’s San Siro stadium transformed into a world-class, all-seater stadium. The combination of comfortable stadium, improved ticketing and extensive marketing saw AC Milan sell over 65,000 season tickets for the 1986-7 season (Ginsborg 2004: 53). In addition to income
from season tickets, Berlusconi also sought to increase revenue through merchandising. The range of club playing kits and other official merchandise were increased to provide more marketing possibilities for the club (Poli 2001: 376). As a consequence, fans could use post-Fordist consumption to construct their football identity. These identities were strengthened through the promotion of official supporters’ clubs. Supporters’ clubs became affiliated to the football club who provided additional benefits to club members. Official merchandising became available to club members, as well as a new official AC Milan magazine, *Forza Milan* (Poli 2001: 376). In addition, Berlusconi introduced other commercial initiatives, such as discounts on merchandise and events, which were advertised through his various media forms. Brand loyalty was also fostered through events which players would attend, thus allowing fans proximity to the stars of the club. As a result of these transformations, by the early 1990s there were over 350,000 members of AC Milan official supporters’ clubs.

Television was central to Berlusconi’s strategy. He took every opportunity to promote AC Milan on his channels by broadcasting a range of ‘pseudo-events’ (Boorstin 1971; Poli 2001: 376). Team unveilings, such as his helicopter entrance in 1986, were televised. In addition, training sessions were broadcast, as well as events where fans and players met. The club’s annual budget was even televised on one occasion (Poli 2001: 376). However he was careful not to over-saturate the coverage of actual matches so that he could maintain a future market for pay-per-view (Porro and Russo 2000: 354). Friendly matches and international tournaments were transmitted, but Serie A matches were carefully controlled. With this co-ordinated use of television, commercial television rights became a central element of the club’s income. In 1982 television rights provided $2 million to the clubs. This rose to $510 million by 1998 as pay-per-view and commercial television responded to the larger audience for football (Porro and Russo 2000: 355).
De-regulation of television broadcasting has directly impacted European and National leagues and has had a significant affect in Italy. As a consequence of complete de-regulation of television and the weakness of the FIGC and Lega Calcio, the elite clubs successfully lobbied to negotiate individual television rights (King 2003). This has permitted all matches in the top two divisions to be broadcast live on pay-per-view subscription channels. Unlike the more regulated English Premier League which restricts the broadcasting of live football at three o’clock on a Saturday to encourage stadium attendance, any fan of Serie A and Serie B can watch their club every week without leaving their home. When combined with the problems affecting football in Italy, television de-regulation is contributing to the decline in attendance in Italian football. This is impacting the club’s ability to generate revenue from fans physically attending the stadium.

Television has also impacted the revenue of Italian football clubs through strengthening the elite clubs. The commodification of sport necessitates a total change in revenue generation. As Maguire states:

“Traditional sources of revenue, for example spectator receipts and patronage, have declined in importance. Sports organisations have to ensure that they gain sufficient exposure and are visible in the sponsorship and endorsement marketplace. Media coverage secures this.” (Maguire 1999: 150)

However, there have been different national approaches to media de-regulations. The English Premier League and German Bundesliga operate with collective television contracts (King 2003; Meier 2003). This ensures greater parity of income amongst clubs.
and provides for a more competitive league (Morrow 1999; Hamil, Morrow et al. 2010). However, until 2010, Italian football clubs negotiated television deals independently (Porro 2008). This gave more power and money to the elite clubs who could guarantee a larger television audience. These renegotiations contributed to the profound restructuring of the finances of Italian football clubs. For example, Juventus are the most successful and best supported club in Italy and derive sixty-five percent of their revenue from television deals. Yet, the Italian giants only generate eight percent from match-days (Deloitte and Touche 2010). Elsewhere, television revenue accounts for nearly sixty percent of both Inter and Roma’s income. Even with the more commercial approach of AC Milan, television revenue provides half of the club’s income (Deloitte and Touche 2010). In contrast, when Berlusconi purchased AC Milan in 1986, ninety-two percent of its revenue came from ticket sales (Poli 2001: 376). With the full range of matches being broadcast live every weekend, as well as the over-reliance on television income clubs are losing fans at the stadium and contributing to the decline in attendance.

The boundaries of spectacle and regulation were pushed on the football pitch by Berlusconi, as he had previously done with television. In 1987 he deployed Arrigo Sacchi as coach, who had never played the game professionally but knew how to organise a team. Sacchi abandoned man-marking and introduced zonal defending which allowed the team to play a high tempo pressing game (Foot 2007: 221). This style of play was in stark contrast to the staid, catenaccio defensive style that typified many Italian sides in the post-war period. This style of play was complemented by the signing of three of the best players in the world; the Dutch trio of Ruud Gullit, Frank Rijkaard and Marco Van Basten. In keeping with many European nations, Italy placed restrictions on the number of foreign players who could play in each match. Throughout the 1980s the number of foreigners permitted in a team fluctuated between zero and three, before being
suspended for Europeans as a result of the Bosman case in 1995 (Foot 2007: 571). In 1992, Jean-Pierre Papin was signed from Marseilles for a world record fee of £10 million. This introduced the squad system to European football as AC Milan already had the full quotient of foreign players. It prevented their rivals from having the best players and also provided a squad strong enough to compete on all fronts (Porro and Russo 2000: 367; King 2003). It is also alleged that traditional patrimonial practises were utilised to maintain a financial advantage. After the signing of Jean-Pierre Papin, AC Milan paid another world record fee of £13 million for Gianluigi Lentini. AC Milan was accused of paying the Torino chairman £5 million, outside of the accounts to obtain Lentini’s signature (Lane 2004: 63-4). The club was eventually acquitted in 2002 due to statute of limitations as the trial ran out of time.

AC Milan also implemented a professional training and recruitment programme to ensure the best players were signed. The MilanLab is based at the Milanello training facility of the club. It utilises extensive research to forecast physical and psychological aptitude. Through the PAS (Predictive Analysis Server) technology they predict the possible risks to the players. This allows the club to support their current players and predict which possible new players will be able to fulfill their role within the club. As the originator and head of MilanLab, Jean Pierre Meersseman states: “If you can predict the possibility of injuries, you stop the player before it happens” (Wilson 2009). Through training and medical diagnosis AC Milan had demonstrated a further professional approach to football. Many other clubs initiated medical support for footballers. In many cases support came from pharmaceutical products, many of which were outside regulations. Star players of Napoli’s scandetto winning team were found guilty of drug use. Notably this included their talismanic captain and star, Maradona, who was addicted to

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cocaine and banned for the use of ephedrine in 1991 (May 2004). Napoli later admitted that it circumvented the dope tests through the switching of samples (Foot 2007: 269). In 1998 the Roma manager, Zdenk Zemen suggested that “Football must get out of the pharmacy” (Eve and Goodbody 2004; Foot 2007: 267; Goldblatt 2007; Malcolm and Waddington 2008). These allegations led to an investigation which found that Juventus had two-hundred and eighty-one different pharmaceutical products, most of which were permitted prescription substances (Malcolm and Waddington 2008). Many players demonstrated evidence of enhanced red blood cell levels that suggested possible use of EPO (and at levels that would lead to bans in cycling) (Malcolm and Waddington 2008). In a classic Italian solution, Juventus were found not guilty as it could not be proved that they had ordered the administration of drugs. The doctor, Riccardo Agricola, was sentenced to twenty-two months in prison, but subsequently cleared on appeal (Hawkey 2006; Kempson 2009). A further doping scandal emerged in 2001 when Dutch stars Jaap Stam and Edgar Davids, and Fernando Couto of Portugal were found guilty of using nandrolone. Four years later startling footage emerged of the Parma player Fabio Cannavaro (and future World Cup winning captain) injecting himself with a substance he later claimed was ‘vitamins’ (Malcolm and Waddington 2008). Despite increased testing from the authorities, the clubs were continuing to circumvent the regulations in order to achieve success.

The success of AC Milan’s strategies was realised both on an off the pitch. Within two years of Berlusconi’s purchase, AC Milan had won the scudetto and this success was repeated the following year with the European Cup. In the six years between 1988 and 1994, AC Milan won four scudetti, three European Championships, two Intercontinental cups and three Supercups (Porro and Russo 2000: 354). They had been transformed into a financial and football super club. The success of his model relied on continual on-field
success and maximised television income. Therefore success in European competition was required to sustain maximum revenue. The knock-out structure of the European Cup meant that there was always a danger of large clubs, such as AC Milan, being knocked out by smaller clubs (King 2004). In Berlusconi’s own words, “The European Cup has become a historical anachronism. It is economic nonsense that a club such as AC Milan might be eliminated in the first round. It is not modern thinking” (Hughes 1993). In addition to the clubs, the national broadcasters and UEFA would lose revenue through the early elimination of larger clubs. This was observed in 1986 when both Juventus and Real Madrid were eliminated before the quarter finals of the competition (King 2003). As a consequence, UEFA introduced seeding to the competition, before introducing a coefficient system designed to calculate the success of individual clubs and individual leagues. As King highlights: “The seeding system was a conscious concession to the big clubs in the biggest markets” (King 2003: 139). By weighting the competition in favour of the larger clubs from the larger leagues, UEFA could ensure their longer participation in the competition. This in turn provided additional television revenue and greater exposure and revenue for the clubs.

Television revenue and market exposure was crucial for the transformation of the European Cup in 1992. Significantly, Silvio Berlusconi was a key driver of this transformation. In 1988, Berlusconi and the president of Real Madrid, Ramon Mendoza, proposed a new European competition based on the world cup format of mini-leagues, with the winner of each group progressing to a knock-out quarter-final (King 2003). When UEFA rejected this idea, Berlusconi commissioned Alex Fynn of Saatchi and Saatchi to propose a blueprint for the reform of European football (King 2003). Although Fynn’s proposal of a regional Superleague was not implemented, it created the right environment for further debate. Two years later Ramon Mendoza and the chairman
of Rangers, David Murray, submitted another proposal for a mini-league which was adopted by UEFA for the 1991-2 season. The following year UEFA re-branded the competition as the Champions League (King 2003; King 2004). The formation of the Champions League created a new brand that was used to market the competition to investors (King 2004). UEFA created a ‘family’ of corporate sponsors who had exclusive rights to the new branding. Likewise, television packages were sold to the highest bidder based upon market share. Therefore, those nations with the largest television market, such as England, Italy, Spain, Germany and France, paid more for the exclusive rights to broadcast the competition. This aligned to the wider transformations that had taken place elsewhere in sport, as had occurred with the World Cup and Olympics (Tomlinson and Whannel 1984; Sugden and Tomlinson 1998; Maguire 1999). It also provided increased revenue to UEFA and the football clubs participating which instigated a transformation of Italian football.

The Financial Rise and Fall of Italian Football

Increased revenue derived from larger television deals and European competition fuelled the growth of Serie A. Italian football experienced a growth in popularity after the success of the Italia ’90 World Cup and the continued success of clubs like AC Milan. Football’s popularity ensured the economic support for clubs to purchase the best players in the world. AC Milan’s success was supported by the Dutch trio of Marco van Basten, Ruud Gullit and Frank Rijkaard, while Maradona helped Napoli to break the Turin-Milan monopoly. Later Juventus signed players such as Roberto Baggio, Zinédine Zidane, and Edgar Davids. In 1992 alone the world transfer record was broken three
times by Italian clubs. As Serie A attracted the best players in the world, this fuelled interest in the league and provided increased revenue from global television deals. It was this success and popularity which saw the television programme *Football Italia* broadcast on British television.

The economic transformation coincided with an increase in industrial patronage in Italian football. The political processes of de-regulation that affected the media and business also occurred in football. Regulations governing the ownership of football teams where relaxed in the 1980s, and this permitted Silvio Berlusconi to purchase AC Milan (Porro and Russo 2000). The transformation of European football acted as catalyst for other businesses to intensify their links with Italian football. As Tim Parks states, “In Italy, you haven’t really arrived until you own a football club” (cited in Arie 2004). In addition to the Agnelli family who owned Fiat and Juventus and Berlusconi who combined his media operation and AC Milan, many other clubs became incorporated into this wider patrimonial network. The film producer Mario Cecchi Gori bought Fiorentina in 1990. After Cecchi Gori’s death three years later, he bequeathed the club to his son Vittorio, who was also a film producer and the owner of the television station Telemontecarlo. The ‘sport-media complex’ ensured that Fiorentina could sign star players like Gabriel Batistuta and Rui Costa. Meanwhile, Sergio Cragnotti, the owner of the food conglomerate Cirio (which owned Del Monte), bought Lazio in 1992. He funded the transfers of a number of international stars, such as Pavel Nedvěd and Paul Gascoigne. Lazio became the first club to float on the Milan Borsa stock exchange in 1998 before winning its second scudetto in 2000 (Capone 2000). Roma followed Lazio’s lead and floated two years later. The oil tycoon, Franco Sensi, purchased AS Roma in

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25 Jean-Pierre Papin moved from Marseilles to Milan for £10 million, before Gianluca Vialli signed for Juventus from Sampdoria for £12 million. This was followed by Gianluigi Lentini’s move from Torino to Milan for £13 million.
1993 and funded the signing of players like Gabriel Batistuta (in 2000). The financial contribution from flotation led to Roma winning the championship in 2001. Elsewhere, the dairy company Parmalat, which was controlled by the Tanzi family, bought Parma and other football clubs in South America. They used these clubs and their players to act as ambassadors and advertising agents for Parmalat in addition to utilising them for Parma football club (Porro and Russo 2000: 367).

The Italian model of family capitalism permits direct involvement from owners and presidents. Many Italian club presidents remain in close control of their clubs, especially over the recruitment of players and managers. For example, the president of Livorno is Aldo Spinelli, the owner of a major Italian logistics company, Gruppo Spinelli. Towards the end of the 2008-2009 season, as the team faltered whilst pushing for promotion, Spinelli took an active participation in the management of the squad. As well as sacking the previous manager with two matches remaining in the season, he gave motivational speeches at training and sat on the bench in these final matches. This continued into the following season when Spinelli sacked the young manager Gennaro Ruotolo a mere two months into the new season and replaced him with the effervescent Serse Cosmi. However, Cosmi resigned his post in January 2010 citing constant presidential interference. He subsequently retracted his resignation after talks with Spinelli (La Repubblica 2010; La Repubblica 2010). Cosmi was eventually sacked three months later, which saw the return of Ruotolo (La Repubblica 2010). This presidential style is in addition to the regular space that is dedicated to Spinelli in the local newspapers. Before every match there is a comprehensive preview of the match, with sections dedicated to the journalists’ preview and the comments of the manager. In addition there is a section detailing the thoughts of the president, Spinelli. This is replicated in television broadcasts.

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26 http://www.gruppospinelli.com/home.htm
and the national newspapers, where the quotes of the president often take precedence to those of the manager or players.

Livorno and Spinelli are not unique within Italian football. Some owners revel in the autocratic image they portray. Maurizio Zamparini, the owner of Palermo, is a self-confessed “mangiallenatori” (manager-eater) who has sacked twenty-seven managers in fifteen years with Venezia and Palermo (Bandini 2008). Likewise, Aurelio De Laurentiis, the film producer and owner of Napoli also takes an active role in the running of the club. This has included entering the changing rooms at half time and interrupting the manager’s team-talk to give his own motivational speech (Bandini 2009). Berlusconi’s interest in AC Milan was not restricted to the business aspects of the club. Although his role as Prime Minister has reduced his participation, Berlusconi stills maintains some direct involvement. In the summer of 2009, Berlusconi is alleged to have made former World Player of the Year, Ronaldinho, stand on a table and declare that he would act more professionally (Bandini 2009). The following summer, Berlusconi unveiled the new manager of AC Milan, Massimiliano Allegri, at a press conference and fielded every question from journalists, including insisting that the new manager plays two strikers (Callow 2010). Berlusconi even insisted that had he been the coach of AC Milan in the 2009-10 season, then AC Milan would have won the scudetto rather than finish third (La Gazzetta dello Sport 2010).

The fans are incorporated into the owners’ patrimonial network through the signing of expensive players. These players would operate as ‘gifts’ to the fans. For example in the summer of 2010, AC Milan purchased a number of star players, in particular Zlatan Ibrahimović from Sweden, and the Brazilian Robinho. With regards to the latter signing, AC Milan vice president, Adriano Galliani, stated that Robinho “is a gift from
Berlusconi” (Colombo 2010). Similarly, gifts can be given to the fans and owners of rival fans. A similar comment was made when the striker Marco Borriello was allowed to join Roma in August 2010 for €5m less than the asking price, Galliani said that Berlusconi sanctioned the price cut because he had “wanted to give a gift to our friends” (Bandini 2010). During the same summer, AC Milan was on the receiving end of a gift. Genoa purchased the Ghanaian striker Kevin Prince-Boateng from Portsmouth and immediately allowed him to go on loan to AC Milan (La Gazzetta dello Sport 2010). They also inserted a clause in his contract permitting AC Milan to purchase the player at the end of the following season. Essentially, Genoa’s greater financial liquidity permitted the purchase of a player on behalf of another club, and possible favours in return.

The direct involvement of presidents ensures that interactions are personalised. As has been demonstrated elsewhere in Italian society, the networks of industrial patronage extend into politics. Many of these new post-industrialists operated in extensive political-industrial patrimonial networks. Ultimately, the principal example in this case is the Prime Minister of Italy who owns AC Milan, Silvio Berlusconi. His counterpart at Inter is Massimo Moratti, the son of Angelo who constructed the Grande Inter side of the 1960s. In addition to being a director is his late father’s oil company, he is also a director of Telecom Italia and Pirelli. His sister-in-law is Letizia Moratti, the current Mayor of Milan, a former Education Minister and a former employee of RAI and Sky.27 Elsewhere, Gianni Agnelli, the owner of Fiat and Juventus, was made a senator for life in Italy’s parliament (Jones 2007: 187). Other club owners were members of parliament, such as the DC supporting Franco Sensi of Roma and Luciano Gaucci of Perugia and Catania.

(Bianchi 2004; Foot 2007: 256). These personalised, neo-patrimonial networks allowed strategic actors to operate across boundaries to influence individual goals.

The neo-patrimonial network that exists between politics, business and football extends beyond the football clubs. The weakness of the central authorities has permitted the incorporation of the Federation into the patrimonial system of the elite clubs. The inter-twined nature of Italian football sees powerful individuals in several positions in the FIGC. For example:

“On the one hand, we have Adriano Galliani, president of the Lega Calcio, champion of the unity of Italian professional football, and guarantor of equal treatment for small clubs with respect to the larger clubs. Moreover, he is also meant to protect the small clubs against the threat of secession of the larger, richer clubs. On the other hand, we have Adriano Galliani, a leading figure in the G-14 who participates in secessionist plans at the national and international levels.” (Porro and Russo 2004: 226)

Galliani’s position as head of Lega Calcio is fundamentally compromised by his position as Vice-president of AC Milan. AC Milan is part of the former G-14 group of elite European clubs who lobbied for increased individual control over national and European affairs. Furthermore, AC Milan is also owned by Silvio Berlusconi who is in a unique position as Prime Minister to affect the laws regulating the finances of football. The inter-relationship between football, politics and business is not restricted to club presidents and owners. The former president of the FIGC, Franco Carraro, was a former Mayor of Roma, PSI member and Tourism Minister in the 1980s. He was also president of MCC, a merchant bank owned by Capitalia. Capitalia was the major investor in a
number of Serie A clubs, in particular, Roma, Parma and Lazio. The financial underwriting of Capitalia permitted a number of clubs to operate despite accruing considerable debt. The president of the FIGC is also oversees Covisoc, the financial regulator for the league. In this position the president has a duty to maintain the financial probity and integrity of the league. However, this was compromised through Carraro’s involvement with an organisation that underwrites certain clubs’ debts. Consequently, patrimonial networks are re-trenched in a small number of dense familial and personal networks.

Although the neo-patrimonial networks permitted rapid success in the early years of the Champions League and expanding global television markets, they quickly proved unable to further capitalise on the globalised market. Incorporation into the business networks of leading families did not provide greater financial professionalism for Italian football. Stock market flotation for Roma did not bring financial transparency and the club were nearly bankrupt two years after winning the scudetto. The club continued with millions of euros of debt until 2010 when it was brought under the administration of the club’s major creditors, the Unicredit bank (Dinmore 2010). Meanwhile, the links between Cirio and Lazio were so entwined that when Cirio encountered financial difficulties in 2002, the club were directly affected. Lazio continued to be affected by widespread financial problems until the club was bought by Claudio Lotito in 2004. This followed Fiorentina’s bankruptcy in 2001 which saw the Florentine club relegated to the amateur leagues. A similar fate befell Napoli in 2004, who had €70 million of debts. The collapse of Italian industrial patrimony occurred spectacularly with Parma, the football club owned by Parmalat. When Parmalat went bankrupt in 2004, the football club was inextricably linked and this affected results on the pitch. The Parmalat bankruptcy highlighted the intricate nature of the patrimonial relationship between politics, business and football in
Italy. The intensification of relationships within the network affords the owners of the businesses, and their businesses and clubs, a degree of support and legitimation. The owner of Parmalat, Calisto Tanzi, built extensive networks with many powerful politicians:

“in the almost 40 pages detailed by prosecuting magistrates [investigating the bankruptcy] there emerges a design created by 20 years of friendships, acquaintances and links, resembling a large and intricate spider-web that Calisto Tanzi spun with the political and institutional elite of the First and the Second Republic… You could call it a work of lobbying. Tanzi did not corrupt politicians. He only wanted to establish strong links of friendship and collaboration, thus creating a layer of protection for his activities. He financed political initiatives, electoral campaigns, sponsored this or that event, provided advertisements, entered into business with those people nearest to this or that politician. Not much for the likes of him. From 4 to 6 billion old lira a year. In exchange he wanted attention paid to the fortunes of his businesses. From a certain moment onwards, however, Tanzi felt that he was being obliged to finance the initiatives of politicians, their electoral campaigns, newspapers or demonstrations. In some ways, to use a metaphor, from a spider that spun an intricate web to capture insects he became a prisoner of the same web he had constructed.” (La Repubblica (13 February 2004) cited in: Della Porta and Vannucci 2007)

Calisto Tanzi represents just one example of the extensive personalised neo-patrimonial networks that interlaced the worlds of football, politics and business. The collapse of Parmalat also demonstrated the collapse of the neo-patrimonial system in Italian football.
The financial collapse of Italian football and companies like Parmalat and Cirio highlighted the full range of creative accounting that was taking place within the football clubs. The difficulty with football accounting is that it is very difficult to account for the skills and depreciation of a footballer. As a result, statements of accounts become ‘visible illusions’ (Morrow 1999: 122). They only present an image of the financial situation of a club. This saw a range of illusionary measures being employed in Italy. The most serious example of this style of accounting was called plus-valenze (Foot 2007: 491). This is where the profit made on the sale of players could be spread over an accounting term: “Sales are immediately entered into the accounts, whilst purchases are spread over the entire period of the contract [original italics]” (Foot 2007: 491). Traditionally, the smaller clubs would benefit from this system through the sales of players to larger clubs, however the larger clubs realised that they could also benefit. By 2002 over seventy percent of profits were comprised of plus-valenze (Foot 2007). Complicated transactions took place where players transferred between clubs at inflated prices to balance the accounts. This permitted clubs to inflate their immediate accounts and provided a short term solution to financial problems. A good example of such a practise was the swapped transfer of Fabio Cannavaro and Fabian Carini between Inter and Juventus in 2004. Cannavaro was the Italian captain (who subsequently lifted the World Cup in 2006) whilst Carini was a Uruguayan reserve goalkeeper at Juventus. They were exchanged for the same value. Effectively Inter gave away their best player and suggests that there were a number of reciprocal favours exchanged between clubs (Foot 2007: 492.) Several players were exchanged in similar ways between both Milan clubs during the 1990s (La Corriere della Sera 2008).
Although *plus-valenze* accounting was technically legal, other clubs adopted more controversial approaches. Roma were nearly bankrupt, despite winning only their third ever scudetto in 2001. By the start of the 2003 season, they had to declare to Covisoc, the financial regulator, that they could financially fulfil their obligations for the season. They produced signed *fideiussione*, financial guarantees, to guarantee the financial eligibility for the season. However, these *fideiussione* later turned out to be forged. Roma claimed they were innocent and had been the victims of fraud themselves. Consequently, they were allowed to continue operating (Foot 2007: 496). Subsequently, in 2005, Torino were guilty of using similar methods (Foot 2007: 496). The result demonstrated that, as Porro and Russo state, that:

“Covisoc has had its powers hollowed out over time to such an extent that it now operates on the opaque frontier between respect for accounting rules and a technical-financial free-for-all” (Porro and Russo 2004: 223).

Covisoc was a façade, and Italian football was beginning to collapse. Wider economic problems of Parmalat and Cirio affected Parma and Lazio. Meanwhile, clubs such as Roma, Napoli and Fiorentina were in severe financial turmoil. The lack of political support for Fiorentina and Napoli saw them subsequently relegated for financial irregularities.

The financial crisis within the Italian football was severe and required political intervention. The inter-laced neo-patrimonial networks operating in Italian society have resulted in the strategic actors within football operating in politics. Berlusconi, in particular had a vested interest in finding a resolution to the financial crisis. Despite the deregulation rhetoric of the 1980s, Berlusconi’s government attempted to reassert state
control and reinforced the inter-related networks affecting football and politics. In January 2003 the Berlusconi government passed a special debtspeading decree. Dubbed *Salva Calcio* (‘Save Football’) by the media, it allowed clubs to spread their debts over ten years (Porro and Russo 2004: 221). Clubs such as AC Milan and Inter saved over €200 million. Juventus meanwhile accused the government and the clubs of “administrative doping” (Foot 2007: 493). Luca di Montezemolo, the manager of FIAT, the owners of Juventus, declared that this emergency decree was “the exact opposite of that which should be done in a serious country” (Foot 2007: 493). The decree was declared illegal under European law as it contravened competition laws and budgetary regulations (Corriere della Sera 2004). This led to the government amending the decree. These decrees permitted clubs to minimise the amount of tax they paid to the state and effectively this turned Italian football into a state-subsidised industry (Porro and Russo 2004). Thus the state made is easier for clubs to obtain licenses from Covisoc (Hamil, Morrow et al. 2010). The neo-patrimony of Italian politics and football ensured that the individual interests of strategic actors in football were supported without addressing the fundamental issues which caused the crisis.

The financial crisis further demonstrated the weakness of the federation’s regulation and the growing strength of the elite clubs. Political-institutional decline of the FIGC and the Lega Calcio was undermined by clubs who took their grievances to local courts, rather than to the federation. Silvio Berlusconi’s government tried to restore the jurisdiction of the sporting bodies with a law dubbed ‘TAR stopper’. The law aimed to bypass the local courts, the *Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale* (TAR), who always supported the local clubs whenever they took their cases to court (Porro and Russo 2004: 223). The federations that felt that justice was not being exercised by the local TAR, could go direct to the
Lazio TAR. The inability of the federation to arbitrate its members was a central cause of the crises and reinforced its own crisis of legitimacy:

“When an institution is no longer capable of resolving its internal disputes based on its own rules and mechanism, forcing actors to look at other spheres of justice, then the crisis has reached a condition that is close to terminal” (Porro and Russo 2004: 228).

The de-regulation of the football federation had a direct impact on its ability to regulate the elite clubs. Those that had powerful political patronage were able to circumvent the regulations. This was supported by the government who granted the clubs the right to evade the federation’s arbitration courts. In addition, the government attempted to provide state subsidies through salva-calcio. The Italian patrimonial system was bankrupt.

The collapse of the Italian neo-patrimonial system was highlighted in another scandal. Illegal documentation was used to circumvent controls over players. Prior to the Bosman ruling in 1995 de-regulating the market for footballers, many national leagues imposed restrictions on the number of foreign players allowed to play in the league. The Italian football federation has experimented with a number of quota systems since its disastrous foray in 1908 which saw a number of clubs withdraw in protest. The situation was further complicated by the use of oriundi, foreign born players of Italian descent. Quotas permitting oriundi as additional foreigners saw the opportunity for players and clubs to invent Italian ancestry to evade the restrictions. This led to a number of scandals involving false passports. Many emerged in the 1940s and 1950s, yet the most widespread passport scandal occurred in the 1990s (Foot 2007: 436). A large number of non-Europeans, specifically from South America, produced passports with invented
Italian ancestry. Major players, such as the Lazio and Argentina midfielder, Juan Sebastian Veron, Inter winger Recoba and AC Milan goalkeeper Dida were implicated in the scandal. The FIGC once again demonstrated their inability to deal with the problem. As the problem was so widespread and the repercussions potentially explosive, they decided to remove the regulations of foreign players, at a stroke legalising those who had infringed the rules (Jones 2007: 71-2). The FIGC reinforced its own crisis of legitimacy by legitimising the actions of the clubs.

The collapse of the regulatory bodies strengthened the neo-patrimonial system. Reciprocal favours became more significant in the absence of effective regulation. Inducements were not always financial. In 1992 the Sporting Director of Torino, Luciano Moggi, was alleged to have provided prostitutes for referees of Torino’s UEFA Cup matches. Moggi claimed that they were interpreters, and that he wasn’t culpable if they weren’t used for interpretation (Foot 2007: 255). In the circumstances no-one could prove who requested the three women, and no charges were found. There are also many instances of physical gifts being provided to referees. In 2000 Roma president, Franco Sensi, was accused of trying to corrupt referees when he gave two £8,000 Rolex watches to the head of the referee panel, as well as lesser priced Rolexes for the other thirty-seven referees in Serie A (Capone and Cecere 2000; Carroll 2000; Hughes 2000; Foot 2007:57). Sensi claimed conspiracy and said that it was normal practise which had never been questioned in the past. Indeed, in 2004 Sensi provided six bottles of Krug champagne in a Christmas hamper which he gave to every Serie A referee (The Observer 2004). Similarly, the president of Perugia and owner of a racehorse stable, Luciano Gaucci, provided a referee with assistance in purchasing three racehorses. The referee, coincidentally, officiated in the same division as Perugia, and Perugia subsequently went on to win promotion (Foot 2007: 255-8; Jones 2007: 274). Occasionally, the authorities punish
infringements of the rules which illustrate the disparity between clubs and reinforce the crisis of legitimacy. In light of these events, the Roma president Sensi escaped censure. Gaucci’s Perugia, however, were prevented from being promoted, whilst the referee was banned for life and Gaucci for three years (Foot 2007: 258).

Football provides significant symbolic capital in Italy. The media interest provides the president with public exposure; something that Berlusconi has exploited to his advantage when entering politics. As Agnew highlights:

“As June 2003, the accountancy firm Practice Audit estimated AC Milan to be €142.8 million in debt, while the club returned a €51.5 million loss for the financial year 2003-4. Berlusconi, however, understood that, in terms of image, AC Milan was well worth the investment, and each year he came up with the cash to meet the club’s debts. For someone with huge commercial and ultimately political ambitions in a country where football is encoded into the DNA, four [now five] European Cup/Champions League trophies and seven Serie A league titles over the next 19 seasons were worth more than money could buy” (Agnew 2006: 114)

As the inter-dependencies have intensified between politics, business and football, prestige and symbolic capital have grown. Clubs and presidents have pushed the boundaries of authority in order to maximise the benefits for themselves and their families.
Calciopoli

The extent of the Italian neo-patrimonial system was spectacularly demonstrated in 2006. The Calciopoli scandal demonstrated the extensive neo-patrimonial networks operating within Italian football and how personalised contacts and *quid pro quo* favours had become embedded in the system. A full investigation was not undertaken by the football federation as the initial findings were passed to the President of the FIGC, Franco Carraro, who chose to take no course of action. Politics, football and the federation were so intertwined that the scandal could only emerge through the media and the judiciary.

An investigation into the Neapolitan organised crime network, the Camorra, revealed an illegal betting ring in Naples. Separate investigations also took place into further illegal betting rings in Parma and Udine. These were combined with earlier investigations into the use of drugs by Juventus and a separate investigation into the sports agency, GEA World, in Rome (Burke 2006; Marcotti 2006; McMahon and Buckley 2006; Foot 2007: 506; Jones 2007). As a result of these inquiries, the results of thirty-nine matches were investigated and over forty people were investigated for sporting fraud. Over one-hundred thousand conversations were transcribed over eight months by six transcribers (Foot 2007: 505). The leaked transcriptions permitted the various strands of the scandal to be woven together by the media and named after the *Tangentopoli* scandal. The subsequent investigation was conducted by a *Tangentopoli* magistrate, Saverio Borrelli, and dubbed *piedi puliti* or ‘clean feet’ (Feltri 2006; Kiefer and Fisher 2006; The Independent 2006).

Global deregulation and extensive media coverage had facilitated the emergence of charismatic leaders who can bypass regulations and use media to communicate direct to the public. This has occurred in Italy with personalised politicians and football club
presidents. *Calciopoli* demonstrated the emergence of a charismatic leader who operated out of the media spotlight. Luciano Moggi was the Director of Football at Juventus who began his career at Napoli under Italo Allodi, the manager of Juventus at the centre of Brian Glanville’s ‘Golden Fix’ allegations of the 1970s (Glanville 1999; Hawkey 2006). Moggi then went to both Roman clubs before making a similar cross-city move from Torino to Juventus. It was whilst at Torino that Moggi was implicated in the alleged procurement of prostitutes for referees. Through these various positions he built strong networks with the politicians in the capital as well amongst the games’ administrators. *Calciopoli* revealed an extensive patrimonial network of reciprocal favours. Moggi was nicknamed the ‘lollipop man’ (*la paletta*) because he controlled the traffic between the clubs, referees, players and their agents (Dunne 2006). He was at the nexus of a network of referees, players, politicians and agents and made over four-hundred telephone calls per day across the network to create *la sistema Moggi* (‘The Moggi System’) (Mensurati 2007).

Moggi’s system required a network of compliant referees. A wider culture suspicion of central authority in Italy has also resulted in match officials being viewed with distrust. Fans felt that referees suffer from *sudditanza psicologica* (‘physiological subjection’) and would naturally favour large clubs to ensure a successful career (Foot 2007: 501; Jones 2007: 277). In the 1926 Viareggio Charter, a committee was created to select referees for matches. The details of these selections were kept secret in order to prevent corruption. However, this situation quickly became unworkable as the information became valuable to fans and clubs. By the 1980s allegations were made regarding two back-to-back championship wins for Juventus in 1981-2 that were categorised as ‘thefts’ (especially by the fans of Roma and Fiorentina who lost out) due to the refereeing decisions in favour of Juventus. As a result the FIGC implemented a ballot to draw referee names at random.
and in the only year this was performed, a small provincial team, Hellas Verona, won their only scudetto in 1985. This has become an oft-quoted example used by fans to ‘prove’ the favouritism towards larger clubs (Parks 2003; Foot 2007: 56). The FIGC reinforced its lack of authority by reverting to a selection committee in the following year. Under this system, in 1999 Paolo Bergamo and Pierluigi Pairetto had become the joint heads of the Italian referees’ association with the power to designate referees for matches. Three years later Pairetto became the vice-chairman of UEFA’s referees’ commission (Dunne 2006; Marcotti 2006).

Moggi’s own neo-patrimonial network allowed him to influence the choice of referees. Moggi was close friends with both Pairetto and Bergamo and persuaded them to use their discretion to direct certain referees to certain games. They recruited another referee to act as an intermediary. Massimo De Santis was a world respected referee who had been selected to officiate at the 2006 World Cup in Germany; a position he subsequently lost after the scandal broke (Dunne 2006). De Santis took a certain amount of pride in the role he played. He was accused by Livorno president, Aldo Spinelli, of being part of the “Roman Gang” and as a consequence was ‘punished’ by De Santis. After refereeing a match between Livorno and Siena, De Santis sent off the Livorno player Fabio Galante after seventeen minutes. The referee was recorded speaking to Innocenzo Mazzini, the vice-president of the FIGC: Mazzini said “poor Spinelli…you were, as always, splendid”, to which De Santis replied, “Did you see? Ready and go, one off” (La Repubblica 2006). This network of compliant referees would assist Juventus by dismissing rival players like Fabio Galante at Livorno or by showing leniency to Juventus players. This system also applied in games that did not involve Juventus so that their rivals’ star players would be booked or sent off so that their suspensions would coincide with the game against Juventus (Dunne 2006; Jones 2007: 272).
Moggi influenced the referees in a variety of ways. As Juventus was owned by Fiat, Moggi could access staff discounts on Fiat cars. These he would provide to acquiescent referees at a discount of between twenty-three and fifty percent (Dunne 2006; Jones 2007: 271). In one case he called the Agnelli house to request a four-door Maserati as a gift for an important friend (Corriere della Sera 2006). Pairetto subsequently called the vice-president of the FIGC, Innocenzo Mazzini, to state that he had the car. This was not the first time gifts had been provided to referees as the Roma president Franco Sensi gave gifts of Rolex watches in 2000 and Krug champagne in 2004. Moggi also resorted to physical threats. In one transcript, the referee observer Pietro Ingargiola was overhead speaking to Tullio Lanese, the president of the Italian Referees’ Association:

“I've never seen anything like it in my life. Moggi and Giraudo [Juventus Chairman] go in, and Moggi starts really threatening him [the referee, Paparesta], with his finger right up to the referee’s eye. He was shouting at the linesman too, ‘You're an absolute disgrace, not giving that penalty, how dare you?’ I pretended not to see anything and went to the toilet” (Marcotti 2006).

This is confirmed by Moggi himself, in another transcript when he says that “I locked the referee [Paparesta] and linesmen in the toilet and took the keys away with me to the airport.” (Marcotti 2006).

Moggi used his personal relationship to exert pressure onto Pairetto and Bergamo. The following exchange demonstrates the tone and exasperation of Moggi after Juventus drew 2-2 with the Swedish minnows in a Champions League qualifying match:
“Moggi: But what the fuck kind of referee did you send us?

Pairetto: Fandel is one of the best...

Moggi: Miccoli’s goal was valid.

Pairetto: No it wasn’t.

Moggi: It was valid, it was valid.

Pairetto: He was in front...

Moggi: What are you talking about in front? And anyway, all through the game he messed things up for us.

Pairetto: But he's one of the top...

Moggi: He can go and fuck himself. And for Stockholm [the return leg] I’m counting on you.” (Corriere della Sera 2006)

Moggi clearly expected a favour in return from Pairetto for the ‘poor’ performance of the German referee Herbert Fandel. He later discovered that the English referee, Graham Poll was to officiate the second leg. He subsequently rang Pairetto to find out why the Portuguese referee Lucilio Cardoso was not officiating. Pairetto expressed surprise and stated that “something must have happened at the last moment, I have Cardoso, something must have happened… he must have been sick or something like that” (Corriere della Sera 2006).

Television became another medium to coerce referees. Neo-television has contributed to an increasing television audience for football (Porro 2008: 60). The football talk show is a significant contributing factor of this audience share. These shows, like Il Processo, make extensive use of the moviola (slow motion replay) to analyse contentious decisions, especially disallowed goals, offside decisions and fouls. The moviola helps to increase the emotional and dramatic narrative of the game as it fuels debate. The centrality of the
technology has entered Italian language, with an episodio da moviola being a controversial incident within the game (Foot 2007: 69). Every Monday the most popular Italian national newspaper, La Gazzetta dello Sport, has a match-by-match round-up of these episodi da moviola. Despite the fallibility of referees, the moviola ‘proves’ their incompetence. The hyper-real emotion of neo-television becomes heightened as the referees’ decisions become scrutinised. This has led to the role of the moviola being pinpointed as a key factor in discontent and destabilisation of the referee. It has suggested that it was attributable to fan violence and the referee’s association took Aldo Biscardi, the host of Il Processo, to court (Foot 2007: 70). In the year before Calciopoli, Pairetto and Bergamo admonished the media for their excessive use of the moviola by highlighting the fact that television had the benefit of the images of forty television cameras, and the time to replay and dissect decisions, whereas the referee had to make the decision in ‘real time’ (Monti 2005). More recently, the respected ex-referee, and 2010 chief referee, Pierluigi Collina, stated that “the problem in Italy [the referees] whistle every contact: the referees have fear of being judged in the evening by the moviola and in this way, in doubt, they whistle” (Palmeri 2010). In this way neo-television reinforces the sudditanza psicologica exerted on referees to benefit influential teams. The distinction between the neo-television of Mediaset and the regulation of RAI was confirmed in 2010 when the state broadcaster announced that it would be ceasing to use the moviola during it’s football talk shows (La Gazzetta dello Sport 2010).

Moggi used television and the moviola to exert more psychological pressure over the referees. He realised that more people would have their opinions formed by the television, than physically in the stadium. He was a close friend of Aldo Biscardi, the creator and presenter of the longest-running and most popular football show in Italy, Il

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28 For example see the following from the first round of matches of the 2009-10 season: http://www.gazzetta.it/Calcio/24-08-2009/materazzi-alvarez-501118219157.shtml.
Processo (Kiefer and Fisher 2006; Jones 2007: 271). Once again, Moggi’s social capital lubricated the network. Moggi helped choose the guests and even fixed the results of phone polls. He asked Biscardi to minimise analysis of debatable decisions. For example after AC Milan striker Andriy Shevchenko was controversially denied a penalty, he called Biscardi and said: “You need to lay off the referee in this one. You either say the referee was correct in his decision or you don’t show the images at all and gloss over it.” (Italian Calcio Blog 2006). Referees that refused to co-operate would be disgraced on air as Moggi could request a debatable decision to be shown, and debated at length to discredit the referee. (Burke 2006). For example, the following conversation took place on 18 October 2005 between Moggi and Fabio Baldas, one of Italy’s most famous football presenters and an ex-referee:

“Baldas: How are you? Well?
Moggi: Good.
Baldas: Listen Luciano, today we haven't got much ... there is ... [just] Rodomonti [the referee for a game between Cagliari-Milan over the weekend, later investigated but cleared by the tribunal]. Is it OK if we make him look bad? If you agree, of course ...
Moggi: Oh naturally.
Baldas: And then? And then? There's always Siena-Fiorentina ...
Moggi: But was there a penalty?
Baldas: Er ... bloody hell, yes, there was a penalty! ... And there Rosetti [a referee, also cleared by the inquiry]. You know the guy ... But if we show him, what are we going to do?
Moggi: No, no, leave him alone ... just drop the Siena game.
Baldas: OK ... if I need a favour will you do me a favour?
Moggi: No problem.

Baldas: You'll call me back soon?

Moggi: Yup, soon.

Baldas: Fine, bye” (La Repubblica 2006)

As with previous conversations, there is succinctness. Moggi did not request any particular action against the referee Rodomonti; he trusted Baldas to perform correctly. In return Baldas requested of Moggi, “if I need a favour will you do me a favour?”. A favour ‘bank’ was created where Baldas now had a credit. As with those referees that complied, television presenters that acquiesced to Moggi’s demands got favours in return. As general manager of Juventus, Moggi had access to the players of Italy’s most popular club, and some of the best known players in the world. Many of these players were Italian international stars and this increased their desirability to the media. In return for showing the highlights that Moggi requested, Juventus’ general manager would provide exclusive access to these players for interviews and features (Burke 2006). Moggi also had access to a wider network of players through the sports agency GEA World.

Globalised sport has seen the increase in third party intermediaries which has expanded the opportunity for familial patrimony in Italy. De-regulation of sporting contracts, accelerated by the Bosman case, has seen the introduction of a professional group being introduced to the network, including lawyers, accountants and consultants (Maguire 1999; Sugden 2002). Investigations by the Italian anti-trust commission during Calciopoli highlighted that there were 233 agents working in Italy (AGCM 2007). GEA World was the largest sports’ agency in Italy with nearly an eighteen percent share of the market (AGCM 2007; Jones 2007: 273). The agency was formed in 2001 when three agencies merged: General Athletic; Football Management; and Riccardo Calleri. These three
agencies demonstrate the familial nature of Italian football and business (see figure 4.1). Calleri, is the son of a former Genoa and Lazio president, Gianmarco Calleri. Meanwhile, General Athletic was comprised of Andrea Cragnotti, who is the son of former Lazio and Cirio president Sergio Cragnotti. Cirio went bankrupt at the same time as Parmalat, who were owned by the Tanzi family. Their daughter, Francesca Tanzi was also a shareholder of General Athletic. Alongside Francesca Tanzi was Chiara Geronzi, the daughter of leading Italian banker, Cesare Geronzi, who was also investigated as part of the Parmalat collapse (Smorto 2001; Hamil, Morrow et al. 2010). Another major investor in the agency was the bank Capitalia through a trust called Romafides. Capitalia was also a major investor in Parma and Lazio, as well as underwriting AS Roma (owned by Rolex giving Franco Sensi) and AC Perugia (owned by racehorse training Luciano Gaucci) (Malagutti 2003). In addition, Capitalia owned a merchant bank called MCC whose president was Franco Carraro, the president of the FIGC who suppressed the original details of the Calciopoli scandal.

Figure 4.1 (Hamil, Morrow et al. 2010)
The third body within GEA World reinforces the familial networks operating in Italian football. Football Management employed one of Italy’s leading agents, Franco Zavaglia, as well as Giuseppe De Mita, a former Lazio official and son of a former Italian Prime Minister, Circiaco De Mita (Burke 2006; Marcotti 2006). It also comprised of Davide Lippi, the son of the Italian head coach Marcello Lippi. Lippi senior had also managed Juventus on two separate occasions, from 1994-1999 and from 2001 until he took the Italian position in 2004. In this position he would have worked closely with Luciano Moggi, who began working at Juventus in the same year as Marcello Lippi started his first spell as Juventus manager (Smorto 2001). Most significantly, the agency also employed Luciano Moggi’s son, Alessandro. This provided Moggi with access to a wider range of players with whom he could dispense favours to television and the newspapers. In return, if players signed for GEA World, they would have access to the networks that could provide them with the potential opportunity to play for Italy’s biggest and most successful club, Juventus, or for the Italian national team. Indeed, there were serious allegations of favouritism towards both Juventus and GEA players ahead of Italy’s participation in the World Cup finals in Germany (Foot 2007: 513).

As with other aspects of Moggi’s patrimonial system, threats and undue influence were used. During the instigations Roma’s general manager, Franco Baldini, claimed that youth team players were placed under undue pressure to sign for GEA (Leroux 2008). In 2005 the former Siena midfielder, Stefano Argilli, was forced to leave the club because he refused to sign for GEA. He said that “Our new manager was GEA, our general manager was GEA, half the team was GEA. It was clear to me that if I wanted to stay, I would have to sack my agent and join GEA as well” (Marcotti 2006). It didn’t end at players leaving clubs for not signing with his son’s agency. Through his connections and
control of agents he could end the careers of those players that displeased him. Fabrizio Miccoli and Enzo Maresca ended up playing in Portugal and Spain respectively and this effectively ended their international chances (Jones 2007: 273). Even major players such as Thierry Henry, Zinedine Zidane and Edgar Davids have been sacrificed when they didn’t succumb to Moggi’s wishes (Jones 2007: 273). Not only did this control amplify the opportunities for Moggi to influence television, it also suggests the possibility of influence of players and teams (Burke 2006). An acute example is that of Siena. When Juventus played Siena in May 2006 (before the scandal broke), the press highlighted the close financial links between the two clubs. Of the fourteen players in the squad to play against Juventus, seven of them were GEA players, as was the coach Gigi De Canio and the director of football Giorgio Perinetti. After a losing streak of seven games, Juventus duly went three-nil up inside seven minutes and this did nothing to dispel the rumours of Juventus’ undue influence (Richardson 2006b).

The inter-connections between Italian football, business and politics was further exposed during Calciopoli. Moggi had many friends within politics and would extend the same acts of patrimony on politicians. The Interior Minister Giuseppe Pisanu was a close friend of Moggi and consulted with him when Pope John Paul II died to see if the league could be suspended (Sarzanini 2006). The contact between Pisanu and Moggi was further cemented over Pisanu’s request for assistance in support of his local side, Sassari Torres del Viminale, who were given a ‘problem’ referee. When the team won away for the first time in two years a few weeks later, Pisanu rang back to ask Moggi if they could be helped from relegation (Kiefer and Fisher 2006; Sarzanini 2006; Jones 2007: 271-2). The Finance Minister, Dominico Siniscalco, was also in contact with Moggi to ask if his sons could attend a Juventus training school. In return Moggi wanted help for a friend who

29 Moggi wanted Juventus’ game against Fiorentina to go ahead despite the mourning because Fiorentina had a number of injuries and suspensions. His pressure did not work in this case.
wanted to transfer within the Guardia di Finanza (Italy’s tax police) (Kiefer and Fisher 2006; Sarzanini 2006).

Although Moggi and Juventus were central to the Calciopoli investigations, they were not the only avenues of investigation. There had been long term suspicion within the Italian game over the influence of Moggi and some openly tried to fight the system. As repeatedly demonstrated, Moggi would use the network to damage those that did not cooperate. Fiorentina was bankrupt in 2002 and relegated to Serie C2. Their new president, the owner of Tod’s shoes, Diego Della Valle, took over and guided the club back into Serie A. Della Valle spoke out against the imbalance within the Italian game and campaigned against the individual television rights that favoured the larger teams. However, in the 2004-5 season, Fiorentina was facing relegation due to Moggi’s influence; an influence so strong that Fiorentina had two players sent off in the first eight minutes of a game against Sampdoria. Delle Valle repented and asked for Moggi’s assistance. As a consequence Fiorentina avoided relegation that season but were deducted points following the scandal (Dunne 2006; Marcotti 2006; Foot 2007: 509).

Lazio had faced similar financial problems to Fiorentina but were not relegated. After Cragnotti’s arrest following Cirio’s bankruptcy, Claudio Lotito, the owner of a cleaning services industry, bought the club. Lotito made similar requests of Moggi to help Lazio avoid relegation (Foot 2007: 509). Franco Carraro, the president of the FIGC, also supported Lazio. Carraro called the referee designator, Pairetto to say that “Listen, we need to give Lazio a hand...”. In a subsequent conversation with the vice-president of the FIGC, Lazio president Lotitio says “So you have spoken to Carraro ... that’s good ... that means he is on my side” (Burke 2006). In the following game Lazio beat Parma 2-0 thanks to a penalty that was controversially disallowed. A further club, Reggina Calabria, was also investigated in the scandal as it transpired that club president Lillo Foti asked
Moggi for assistance to avoid Reggina’s relegation. The Tuscan club of Arezzo were also penalised during Calciopoli for trying to fix matches in Serie B.

Calciopoli revealed that Moggi and Juventus were not the only club or individual to be developing patrimonial networks. Silvio Berlusconi’s AC Milan was also trying to minimise the influence of Moggi and Juventus by building a rival system. AC Milan’s referees’ liaison officer Leonardo Meani was trying to build a separate influential network of compliant referees (Dunne 2006). Meani was heard in phone-taps talking to the Italian Football Association’s head of linesmen, criticising the appointment of a linesman and AC Milan lost to Siena: “I don’t want him. I never asked for him nor wanted him”. As a result he advised that: “On Wednesday, try to send two intelligent ones” (Williams 2007). For a game against Chievo Verona, Meani asked for two linesmen by name, including one, Claudio Puglisi, a noted AC Milan fan. Meani was granted his request from Gennaro Mazzei, the head of linesmen and AC Milan subsequently won the match with Chievo.

The scandal highlighted that Leonardo Meani was performing his task with the full approval of the vice-president of AC Milan, Adriano Galliani. As the prosecutor Stefano Palazzi stated: “Meani was in telephone contact with linesmen, who were asked, when in doubt, to favour AC Milan. Galliani approved” (Dunne 2006). Until the scandal, Galliani was president of Lega Calcio, the Italian football league. In this role, Galliani was the guardian of the probity of the leagues. He already had a conflict of interests in relation to the arrangement and negotiation of television deals (Porro and Russo 2004). He now was operating a ‘Milan system’ that undermined the integrity of the league. Although he denied the existence of a ‘Milan system’, Galliani resigned from his position at Lega Calcio for his part in Calciopoli (although he has since rejoined the board of Serie A). AC Milan was subsequently docked points and disqualified from the Champions League. However, on appeal, they were reinstated and went on to win the trophy in the following year.
The expansive investigation into *Calciopoli* highlighted the extensive networks utilised by two of the three biggest clubs in Italy. Inter were the third club of that triumvirate and were not investigated, even though they had the most to gain from the penalisation of their two main rivals. After the initial *Calciopoli* investigation had been concluded, an alternative power base emerged across the city of Milan. In October 2006 it transpired that Inter took an active role in the evidence gathering three years before the scandal broke and were undertaking their own investigations into Massimo De Santis, the leading referee in the scandal, whom they suspected of favouring Juventus (Richardson 2006). They did this through the utilisation of phone taps executed by Telecom Italia. Telecom Italia was also instrumental in authorising and placing the phone-taps that caught the various protagonists in the *Calciopoli* scandal, and which were subsequently leaked to the press. Once again, business networks help piece together the story. Telecom Italia is part-owner of Inter and Massimo Moratti, the president of Inter, is also a non-executive director of Telecom Italia. Although there is no suggestion that Moratti was personally involved, Inter was complicit in compiling the evidence that led to the downfall of their biggest rivals. A downfall that has led to Inter winning every subsequent *scudetto* and the 2010 Champions League

**Summary**

Italy has a long history of scandal and crisis. The crisis of legitimacy of the state is reflected in a similar crisis of legitimacy for the football federation. This situation has become manifest in the distrust of referees who have become symbolic of the crisis. Patrimonial networks in business and politics meet in football and these networks are utilised to circumvent existing regulations. These networks of inter-dependency have
intensified between a small number of family and personal contacts. Despite social capital being generated, it is not contributing to a wider public benefit. *Calciopoli* demonstrates the bankruptcy of this system. Serie A now has a tarnished image that is impacting its ability to compete in the global marketplace. This is reflected in reduced attendances and interest in the game. The failure of the neo-patrimonial system is restricting Italian football’s ability to implement the necessary changes. The following chapter will detail the match-day experience to illustrate that despite the political-economic transformations that have taken place in Italy; these transformations have not been undertaken by the clubs and authorities. The bankruptcy of the neo-patrimonial system is impeding Italy’s ability to adjust to the new global order. Consequently, stadiums and policing has not been radically transformed to adjust to the transformations in global football.
SECTION 3

ITALIAN FOOTBALL FANS
Chapter 5

The Match-Day Experience: Stadiums and Policing

“Football spectators are invited by the clubs for entertainment and enjoyment” – Lord Justice Taylor\textsuperscript{30}

“Quis custodiet ipsos custodies [who guards the guards]?” - Juvenal

The early summer sun ensured a relaxing morning on the beach. At the cafes alongside, hundreds of fans were enjoying a pre-match drink or lunch. Opposite the landmark bar called the Barrachina Rossa, the police were anticipating the arrival of Lazio fans to Livorno. Riot police stretched across the road that led to the entrance of the settore ospiti where the coaches of the away fans would be directed. Meanwhile, further along the road, young local male fans amassed behind the trees and bushes that divide the seafront from the road in similar anticipation of the Lazio coaches. The buzz of excitement filled the air as a police motorcycle drove down the road, quickly followed by four Lazio coaches flanked by police patrol cars. A flurry of activity ensued as bottles and objects were thrown at the coaches as they sped through to the away end. The youths melted back into the bushes and the patrons of the cafes continued with their drinks. The occasion marked a strange contrast to the exclusive villas that line the esplanade. The Stadio Armando Picchi, located in the fashionable Ardenza district in close proximity to

the sea, is transformed when Livorno have a home match. Every match-day the residential roads are closed with police cordons controlling access to the stadium. There followed a two mile walk around the cordons to the home end in order to guarantee good vantage point for the match. Approaching the turnstiles, a chant erupted and a group of *ultrà* began marching towards the entrance, singing and waving a variety of flags. Anticipating a queue at the turnstiles, we quickly showed our tickets and identification and walked through, only to be confronted by a wall of riot police ready with their shields and batons. They rushed towards the gates at the same time as the *ultrà* descended on the entrance. The police stopped and the gates were opened letting all the *ultrà* into the stadium. Stewards quickly beckoned us through the second turnstile as a similar situation occurred with the *ultrà*. The gates were opened and they marched towards the home end, continuing to wave their flags and singing their anti-Fascist songs.

Despite the fragmentation of Italian politics, games between Livorno and Lazio continued to provoke strong political emotions.

The match-day experience represents a significant aspect of Italian football. The organisation and administration of the stadiums and police are major contributing factors to the crisis in Italian football. As elsewhere in Italian football, the political and administrative bodies have not adjusted to the transformations in the global political economy. The continuance of existing patrimonial networks inhibits the opportunities for the game to reinvent itself and halt the decline. There has been little change in the policing of football matches or in stadium development and design. Italian football has not embraced the changes that have taken place elsewhere and this is impeding their ability to rectify the situation. Through analysis of the fans’ experience, it will be shown how the failure of the organising bodies to correctly identify and implement coherent strategies is affecting the fans, and ultimately harming the sport. Initially, there will be an
overview of stadium development within the wider political economy of sport before addressing its development in Italy. Interviews with fans will be incorporated to illustrate the problems that are being encountered. This will be followed with a section illustrating the response from the authorities before providing a similar overview and development of policing within football. This will be concluded with a discussion on the role of stewards within football and their limited use in Italian football.

The Stadiums: Mussolini, Italia ’90 and Beyond

The development of the football stadium reflects the political economic development of football. Stadium development has evolved from unregulated spaces in public into multi-functional entities that illustrate the global business of the sport. As football has developed into a multi-million dollar business with global appeal, the physical spaces have had to develop in line with these transformations. As Paramio et al state: “Modern and postmodern stadium developments need to be linked to both the socio-economic conditions of the capitalist mode of production as well as relevant sporting factors of every historical period” (Paramio, Buraimo et al. 2008). It has been shown in previous chapters that political economic transformations during the 1980s contributed to a realignment of Italian television and politics. These have impacted the economic aspects of football and provided increased interest and revenues to clubs. Globally, these transformations have been replicated within stadium development as stadiums have shifted from focusing principally on sports and are now expanding their range of services to maximise revenue (Bale 1993; Giulianotti 1999; Paramio, Buraimo et al. 2008). However, Italy has not managed this transition well and this is affecting the ability of football clubs to compete within Europe. This section will chart the development of the football stadium before illustrating the current situation in Italy.
The development of football has coincided with the development of spaces for football. Before the codification of football, folk games were played in unregulated spaces. Games took place in fields, churchyards and public squares. They were often confined by the existing natural boundaries, such as walls, ditches and buildings. Games of *Calcio Fiorentino* were played in the piazza opposite the church of Santa Croce in Florence. A 1555 painting by Jan van der Straet depicts the edge of the pitch being de-lineated by the crowds of spectators. Spatial regulation of this historic game emerged by the late seventeenth century. Pietro di Lorenzo Bini’s 1688 print depicts railings around the Piazza Santa Croce. This highlights the increased social regulation to maintain the square free of traffic, rather than the regulation of an annual football tournament. Nevertheless, these games were still played in public spaces, accessible to all. The development of industrial cities saw the increased sub-division and regulation of space. As modern codified football evolved, the physical space for playing the game became privatised, regulated and commodified which assisted in the creation of football stadiums (Bale 1993). The link between the wider political economy and sport converged as grounds were built near large industrial areas with easy access to the emergent railway infrastructure to encourage an active support (Inglis 1987: 12;_paramio, Buraimo et al. 2008).

Modern stadiums were functional and focussed on the core aspect of the club: football matches. Matching the phases of globalisation highlighted in the Introduction, three distinct forms of Modern football stadium have been identified: from the late nineteenth century until 1920; 1920-1940; and 1940-1990 (Bale 1993;_paramio, Buraimo et al. 2008). Functional football stadiums began to emerge during the early period of football

expansion (Bale 1993; Paramio, Buraimo et al. 2008). During the inter-war period, modern construction materials, such as steel and concrete were used to increase the match-day capacity and enhance the comfort for the increasing numbers of fans. After the Second World War, clubs began to incorporate architectural features to maximise comfort and enjoyment. To increase the revenue from additional games, floodlights were introduced to allow for regular midweek games. Covered terraces and additional tiers were constructed so that fans were protected from the elements and capacity was maximised. Most importantly these maximised the revenue for individual clubs. Corporate boxes were incorporated into stadiums during the 1960s in a bid to increase match-day revenue (Paramio, Buraimo et al. 2008). Modern stadiums also incorporated increased social control. Not only was the space delineated to clarify and commodify the space, it also demarcated class lines and provided clear social divisions (Giulianotti 1999: 67). Ticket prices were valued according to facilities and comfort, whilst barriers and fencing were added to physically demarcate the divisions and prevent anti-social behaviour, such as pitch invasions and hooligan fighting.

The Hillsborough tragedy provided the nadir for modern stadiums. After the tragic deaths of ninety-six Liverpool fans, Lord Justice Taylor published a report in 1990 recommending a number of changes to the football stadiums. As Bale suggests:

“In British football, 1990 might be flagged as the beginning of the postmodern stadium when the metal fences surrounding many grounds were taken down and scrapped” (Bale 1993).

The Hillsborough tragedy highlighted the antiquated and dangerous stadiums in Britain that were incoherently policed. Lord Justice Taylor reviewed the state of football in
Britain and recommended opportunities for resolution. The report recommended that all grounds should be converted to all-seater to provide more control and safety:

“Put together with progress towards all-seating, improved accommodation, better facilities, improved arrangements for crowd control, and better training of police and stewards, I believe these measures would give the best chance of eliminating or minimising football hooliganism.” (Taylor 1990: 75)

The combination of a number of recommendations transformed elite British stadiums, as all clubs in the top two division have to have all-seater stadiums in place. All-seater stadiums have led to numbered seating for all ticket holders allowing cameras, police and stewards to identify and remove troublemakers. In addition, they became increasingly comfortable spaces that could be enjoyed by all the family (Spaaij 2006). This contributed to increased attendances and opportunities for market exploitation.

Stadium redevelopments no longer rely on the product of football to generate revenue. Club superstores and outlets in the concourses have been incorporated into the stadiums which sell a variety of merchandise. The stores are open throughout the week and are not limited to fans’ match-day consumption. Food and drink facilities are also incorporated into the new stadiums. Rather than fans consuming these commodities outside of the ground, they are consumed within the ground and provide a source of revenue for the club. Many stadiums have incorporated restaurants and hotels into their facilities which operate throughout the week. Clubs and stadium owners also rent out the corporate spaces within the stadium for meetings, exhibitions and conferences. All of these generate income and positive emotions towards a football club as the club markets itself.
as a corporate venue for engagements and as a space for match-day hospitality. As a consequence the postmodern stadium is synonymous with corporate commodification.

Stadiums have become tourist spaces where ‘post-tourists’ consume a range of experiences (Urry 1990; Urry 2002). Some clubs have added a museum to symbolise their status within world football. Barcelona and Manchester United are notable in this case and have also added stadium tours to their portfolio of facilities and services (Paramio, Buraimo et al. 2008: 528-530). Postmodern stadiums also use their facilities for other unique experiences that are not restricted to that of the football club. Often international matches or local tournaments are hosted. As the stadium is a facility that can host large numbers of visitors, this permits the stadium to host alternative large-scale events. For example, Wembley stadium has hosted Rugby Union, Rugby League, and American Football matches, in addition to hosting England’s national tournaments and international football matches. It also allows for various spectacular events to take place, such as car racing at the ‘Race of Champions’. Music events have also become popular features of new stadiums. International music stars invariably incorporate large stadium events into their touring schedule. As a result, stadiums have become self-contained service economies where consumers and fans purchase an increasing range of commodities and experiences. In the case of the Amsterdam ArenA, they have even generated their own currency for use within the stadium outlets (Giulianotti 1999: 83).

Innovative design and architectural elegance in postmodern stadiums mark a distinct difference from the modern stadium with their functional approach. In addition to the incorporation of architectural features, such as shops, museums and corporate boxes, postmodern features are becoming architectural events. These redevelopments and renovations challenged fans’ emotional attachments (Robson 2000: 111). Modern
stadiums generated positive emotions or *topophilia*, amongst fans who ascribed a symbolic value to the stadium (Bale 1990; Bale 1993). The personal attachment and the atmosphere generated by the collective solidarity of the crowd fuelled the construction of emotional ties to their physical environment. New symbols are being created, as stadiums become markers of high architecture. As eminent architects design stadiums, such as the new Wembley stadium, designed by Sir Norman Foster, and the Michel Macary designed Stade de France, stadiums are attracting renewed interests from fans (Paramio, Buraimo et al. 2008: 527). These transformations have come to symbolise a club’s standing amongst its peers as these stadiums become physical manifestations of the club’s status. As King argues “The international standing of clubs like Real Madrid and Barcelona are physically demonstrated by the Bernabeu and Nou Camp stadiums” (King 2003: 130).

Working class fans who resented the commercialisation of Manchester United, still took pride in the fact that Manchester United was one of the best run clubs, and that Old Trafford was the best stadium in England, especially in comparison to their rivals Manchester City (King 1997: 342). New architectural status, allied with the shops, museums and tour facilities, is contributing to stadiums becoming symbolic spaces for fans and tourists alike.

Stadium redevelopment in Britain was facilitated by government support, driven by the emotional tragedy of Hillsborough. As Piore and Sabel demonstrated, local government assistance facilitated the growth and expansion of small, family-owned businesses in the Emilian Model (Piore and Sabel 1984). Similar support from the British government assisted stadium redevelopment, despite the free-market ethic of the Thatcherite government which implemented the Taylor Report. The stadium renovations could not be achieved through the free-market alone (King 1998: 100). Most grounds in Britain were owned by the club and these clubs would not have been able to afford the costs of
renovation. As a result money from central government was provided through the Football Trust, the Football Grounds Improvement Trust and the use of money from the Football Pools. Taylor also recommended that co-operation could come from local councils or from private-finance initiatives, such as supermarkets (King 1998: 102). Similar co-operation exists when countries, such as the Netherlands and Germany, host international tournaments and generate similarly powerful emotional foci for change. English football also benefited from the initial injection of revenue generated by the formation of the Premier League. Clubs like Manchester United realised that they could incorporate the stadium into the overall package of football provided to fans (King 1998).

Ironically, Italy provided an additional impetus for stadium redevelopment in England. The popularity and success of Italia '90 acted as a catalyst for the nascent Premier League as interest in football increased. It also demonstrated the inadequate and antiquated stadiums in use within Britain. As King notes: Italia '90 “demonstrated the inadequacy of English football grounds but also the potential market for football if it was properly organised” (King 1998: 103-4). Consequently, the recently renovated Italian stadiums were used as a benchmark against which English stadiums were measured. It is ironic that English stadiums were considered inferior to their Italian counterparts at this time, but now those same Italian stadiums are being criticised for their anachronism. However, it was the renovation for Italia '90 that meant that many Italian stadiums missed the reforms that arose out of the troubles of the previous decade. Giulianotti held that Italian stadiums had “all the architectural qualities of high modernism, in facilities, scale and shiny newness, but succumbed to the Fordist vices of soulessness and instrumentality” (Giulianotti 1999: 77). For example, many of the stadiums constructed for Italia 90 failed to incorporate executive boxes into their structures (Giulianotti 1999: 67).
Early success inhibited the opportunities for Italian football to capitalise on the economic transformation taking place in football. This is compounded by the ownership structure of Italian stadiums. Most football stadiums in Italy are municipally owned and are housed in multi-purpose complexes that house a variety of sports, many of which date to the Fascist period. The area around the Stadio Armando Picchi in Livorno houses a horse-racing track, basketball courts, football pitches and athletics tracks. Similarly, the Stadio Olimpico in Rome is housed in the Foro Italico complex built by Mussolini to host the Olympics. This complex also includes an international swimming pool complex and a tennis stadium which hosts the Rome Masters international tennis tournament. However, the nominal communal use maintains that stadiums are for the benefit of the wider community rather than the club itself. The Stadio San Nicola in Bari is an apposite example of a stadium that is encumbered by its communal status. It was constructed for Italia 90 and the spectators’ gaze is poor, despite its architectural aesthetics. Many communal stadiums, like the Stadio San Nicola, have running tracks encircling the pitch which places the fans some distance from the pitch. Furthermore, as these stadiums are communal, the clubs take little interest in enhancements or security issues (Kiefer 2007; Sinnott 2007; Williams 2007b). Club owners do not welcome investing in facilities that they do not own, especially when many of the clubs are in dire financial shape. The vice-president of Juventus, Roberto Bettega, highlighted the difficulty Italian clubs are placed in because they do not own the ground:

“If we want to invest, to put money in to the stadium, to make it better, to make it nicer, make it a meeting point for the supporters, you have to do it in a place you know is yours or is yours for the next thirty or forty years. Why invest money

33 http://www.asbari.it/societa/stadio.html
in a stadium now when you don’t know whether you will be playing in it next
year?” (King 2003: 130).

Despite this, Juventus are one of the few Italian clubs that are interested in investing in
their stadium (Bramardo 2008; Squinzani 2009). Wider resistance to stadium
redevelopment is also apparent within the media. After Inter defeated Chelsea in a
Champions League match in March 2010, Il Giornale’s Tony Damascelli wrote:

“Some people will be happy for the Uefa ranking points, I prefer to be happy for
the fact of having seen one of our teams win in London. However, what matters
isn’t owning your own stadium and having a multimillion turnover, what matters
is not blowing a big match in the key moment” (Damascelli 2010).

For this journalist, winning games is more important than any of the off-field aspects of
football. Despite this resistance, clubs in Italy are slowly beginning to see the wider
business benefits from stadium investment.

The transition to consumerism that has been facilitated in wider society through
television has not been utilised by Italian football clubs. The lack of investment in the
stadium not only impinges on spectator comfort, but affects the ability of the clubs to
maximise revenue. Although the San Siro has a shop for AC Milan and Inter, other clubs
do not have stores at their ‘homes’. Although some clubs, like Roma, have stores within
the city centre, smaller clubs, like Livorno, sell official merchandise in designated outlets
like the local shopping mall. During the 2008-9 season the club signed a deal with a local
sports shop to sell official Livorno products. However, they are constrained by regulated

http://www.juventus.com/site/eng/NEWS_newseveni_BF81DA4EEB924A30ACCB75FF63D5C0.asp
business practises which prevent them from selling non-clothing items, such as pens and key rings, as this would infringe on the market of stationers and newsagents in the city. This limits the range available and minimises opportunities to increase revenue. Likewise, clubs do not see the benefit in providing tours for visitors. Again, the San Siro has implemented this service. What differentiates the San Siro from other Italian stadiums is the fact that Inter and AC Milan have purchased the ground (King 2003: 133). This has allowed them to invest in these wider business practises and renovate the stadium. Others are beginning to follow their lead. In November 2008, Juventus announced that they would be investing in a new stadium (Bramardo 2008; Squinzani 2009). The postmodern design of the stadium includes merchandising outlets, corporate facilities and catering. Significantly, the football club will own the stadium. The San Siro in Milan and Roma’s Stadio Olimpico are designated for redevelopment. However, these will remain communal and therefore limit the club’ opportunities to generate revenue (Deloitte and Touche 2010). Fiorentina have embraced the full concept of postmodern stadium facilities through their Cittadella proposal. In September 2008, Fiorentina announced that the new facility would house a modern art gallery, hotels, conference facilities, and a new stadium (De Pinto and Pasquini 2008; Giudici 2010).

Stadium facilities in Serie B are indicative of the wider situation. Within Serie B during 2008-9, the three clubs that were promoted had the better stadiums. Livorno and Parma had been relegated from Serie A in the previous season and Bari was one of the larger teams in Serie B. As previously stated, the stadium of Bari was constructed for Italia ’90 and failed to incorporate new facilities. Parma was one of the ‘Seven Sisters’, the seven biggest clubs in Italy during the 1990s. Despite this, the Stadio Ennio Tardini highlights the incomplete development of Italian football stadiums. Constructed in 1923, it has

35 http://www.juventus.com/site/eng/NEWS_newseveneti_BF81DA4EEB924A30ACC7B5FF63CDD5C0.asp
36 http://www.asbari.it/societa/stadio.html
undergone a series of modernisations. The main stand has now incorporated fourteen executive boxes, a shop and disabled facilities, but the terraces at the ends of the ground are still uncovered ‘temporary’ stands made of scaffolding polies and in need of extensive redevelopment. In contrast to the status of Parma, Livorno is a smaller club with a less distinguished history. Their stadium, the Stadio Armando Picchi, was constructed during the Fascist period and inaugurated in 1933 and dedicated to the eldest daughter of Benito Mussolini, Edda Ciano Mussolini. Little modernisation was undertaken until 2005 when the club returned to Serie A which coincided with the visit of the President of the Republic, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, who was born in Livorno. This led to the renovation of the main stand, including the dining room, VIP area and seating. What marks Livorno as different from other stadiums in Italy, is the incorporation of facilities to eat and drink within the stadium. Underneath the Curva Nord, which houses the Livornese _ultra_, there is a large food outlet that sells a range of fresh sandwiches and drinks. In addition there is also a bar incorporated into the main stand. This operates as a franchise, and is open throughout the week as many, mainly older, Livorno fans congregate to observe training, debate tactics and play cards.

In contrast to these larger clubs, many stadiums in Italy are comprised of poor quality communal stadiums. Piacenza’s Stadio Leonardo Garilli is a typical Serie B stadium of the 2008-9 season. The away support was housed in ‘temporary’ stands made of scaffolding which was distant from the action on the pitch. There was no seating, only the metal steps of the temporary stand. The need for economic improvements was exemplified at half time. Like many stadiums, the facilities are housed under the stands. These stands are subdivided into sections partitioned by steel fences with each section being able to be opened up dependent upon the away support. The refreshments were

http://www.livornocalcio.it/
housed in a shopping trolley on the other side of the steel partition. The two vendors sold their items through the bars of the fence. Similar redevelopment was required for the toilets, which were unisex and in need of complete renovation. Piacenza was not unique. A similar structure existed in Grosseto with the Stadio Olimpico Carlo Zecchini. The temporary metal stands comprising of metal steps were ill prepared for three thousand Livorno fans attending a Tuscan derby in February 2009. The eating facilities were more civilised than at Piacenza, where an attendant served snacks from a small kiosk. However, the location of the toilets was unclear, and this resulted in the large number of male fans utilising the back of the stands. In fact, the two unisex toilets were housed in a section close to the home support and were ill-equipped to cope with the volume of away support. These facilities were not restricted to the stadiums of provincial clubs in Serie B. Poor toilets and eating facilities were demonstrated at Serie A clubs, including Fiorentina’s Stadio Artemio Franchi, and the Stadio Olimpico, home of Lazio and Roma.

The communal nature of Italian stadiums is clearly reductive. By permitting the clubs to own their own ground, they will be inclined to consider the experiences of their fans. If the clubs can invest in the facilities then they can begin to capitalise on these investments and begin to compete with other leagues. The following passage demonstrates the problems and a potential solution:

“The first thing to do, in my opinion, the stadiums must be new. Rebuilt… Every so often the Italians should copy the best of others because if not, we see the stadiums of Serie A or Serie B, also the other leagues, the lower leagues, are not full. It is difficult. Meanwhile, we see the English championship, the German championship, the Spanish championship, and there are full stadiums and they have the same
television rights as us. A motive must be, therefore, that we make the stadiums not belong to the community. In Italy the major part of the stadiums are communal. In my opinion, the stadiums must be privatised, managed by the club, therefore with the presidents etc etc. There must be space also for the children so they can see the match. If you want to eat, in my opinion, there must be [an outlet] inside the stadium. Also a museum and something for merchandising and the directors of the clubs making this so. Privatise, why privatise? In my opinion, we could change the hope/trust this way. The solution? No. However it could be a solution.” (Max, official supporters’ club director, personal interview, June 2009).

Max highlights that the stadiums should be privatised and sold to the clubs. In this manner the directors of the clubs will be responsible. Max is aware of the transformations taking place across Europe. Not only does he compare the full stadiums of England, Spain and Germany, he suggests that the club would benefit by including post-modern facilities, such as a museum, a family area for children, food and drink outlets and spaces for merchandising. In addition, the creation of a family area would actively encourage children and families to attend matches. This would inculcate them into the football culture and encourage their future support.

Privatisation leads to the question of investment. Although there is widespread agreement over the requirement for stadium redevelopment, there is little consensus over who pays. With many parties having an interest in the stadium, the question of investment is contested.

“The community [should pay]. There are the damages effectively paid by the community… an act of damage ultimately Livorno has to pay the bill. There were
crazies, I don’t remember the team, but they destroyed the toilets in the away end. Who paid? Us! Our commune and therefore this is not right. As I said earlier, if the drive is private security, they pay the damages because the private security is given the authority to take with him the person that makes of damages and makes them pay.” (Max, official supporters’ club director, personal interview, June 2009)

Max believes that the long-term cost of retaining the communal stadiums would be more expensive than providing all of the police and investment required to supervise matches.

Just as Mussolini built many public stadiums in Italy to act as a powerful symbol, contemporary urban governments try to use them as civic symbols. In an American context, Schimmel has argued that public investment in stadiums for sports’ franchises and mega-events operate as a form of irrational gambling and do not always provide value-for-money for the public (Schimmel 2006). Elsewhere, Schimmel has highlighted how urban elites use sport to promote their own interests in the name of regeneration (Schimmel 2001). In the contemporary Italian context, neither the football clubs nor the municipal authorities are compelled to invest in the stadiums. More importantly, the local or national elites are not utilising public money to promote the wider regeneration of football stadiums. Without statutory regulation enforcing clubs to provide adequate facilities, the focus of club presidents will be to remain successful on the pitch. As one respondent states:

“The presidents here spend all the money on players’ salaries. Instead they should invest in smaller stadiums, but comfortable” (Greyhound, official supporters’ club member, personal interview, June 2009)
Club presidents focus their attention on the playing staff until required by the state or federation to upgrade stadiums. The weakness of central authority reinforces the patrimonial nature of Italian football and means that the club presidents are not investing in football clubs for the economic capital, but purely for the symbolic capital. Furthermore, failure to invest in the playing staff and its effect on the performance of the football team would see a president face extreme pressure from vocal fan groups, such as the ultrà. At the end of the 2008-9 season, the Livorno team struggled to maintain the impetus required to win promotion back into Serie A. The team lost three home games in succession. The subject of the ire of fans was not the team or the manager, but the president, Aldo Spinelli. During home games against Ancona and Vicenza the home fans chanted: “Spinelli is not my president, in ten years he spends nothing”. A similar comment was voiced after the disagreement between the manager of Livorno, Serse Cosmi, and Spinelli:

“Spinelli has proved, once again, to be the wrong man here: we need someone who can raise our attendances and give the supporters something to dream of. We don’t care if the balance sheet is immaculate...” (Greyhound, official supporters’ club member, personal correspondence, February 2010)

Spinelli’s focus on maintaining the finances of Livorno football club does not win him favour with the fans of Livorno. Despite Greyhound’s earlier comment suggesting that presidents should invest in smaller, more comfortable stadiums, when the club struggled on the pitch, money should have been spent on players. Fans feel that they are not competing with their peers, who may not be playing by the same financial rules. Consequently investment in a stadium is not seen as imperative.
It is illustrative of the Italian stadiums, that only three of them are fully covered. Northern Italy especially, encounters the full spectrum of weather, from freezing temperatures and snow in the winter to dry, hot summers. This can make for an extremely unpleasant experience, as the following comment illustrates:

“For the stadiums, in my opinion, they should make the stadiums a little more covered, like in England. In Italy they make it disgusting for us. If it rains, we get soaked, if it is windy, we get blown by the wind. This is the minimum.” (Paolo, official supporters’ club director, personal interview, June 2009).

Livorno’s Stadio Armando Picchi location near to the sea means that it feels the full affect of extreme weather, as Paolo stated. However, this also occurs in the extreme heat of the interior. The lack of roofs at the Artemio Franchi in Florence, for example, does not provide shade in extreme sunshine. Stadiums have not adapted to their environments and only three Italian stadiums are fully covered. In addition to the San Siro in Milan and the Stadio Olimpico in Rome, the Stadio Comunale Luigi Ferraris in Genoa is fully contained. Along with the San Siro, it is one of the few Italian stadiums which could be classed as post-modern in Italy. It is the home of Sampdoria and the oldest club in Italy, Genoa. It incorporates architectural style with user-friendly facilities (Giulianotti 1999: 77). Although many redevelopments of postmodern stadiums in North America and Northern Europe have seen stadiums constructed outside the city, the Marassi, as it is known locally, is located in the heart of the city. In a clear indication of a post-Fordist approach, the city council has decided to sell the stadium. However this is not a privatisation as suggested by Max, above, as the council is not selling to either of the clubs. Instead it is selling the Marassi to a third party business consortium who will seek
to capitalise on their investment (Il Secolo XIX 2008). Although the introduction of new business practises has seen the council release their interest in the facilities, neither of the clubs are likely to be able to increase their own revenues. Any additional events that could be located at the stadium, such as conferences and music events, will profit the individual business owners, rather than the clubs themselves.

Revenue from television is not contributing to stadium development in Italy. In contrast to the economic stimulus provided to the Premier League from Sky and the British government, which assisted stadium redevelopment, television money is underpinning the Italian clubs finances. This is impinging on Italian clubs opportunity to capitalise on their match-day revenues. One respondent highlights how the clubs are completely over-reliant on television revenues:

“The clubs are totally dependent on television. They do not have commercial aspects. They do not own the stadium and there are no merchandising outlets. They do not invest in the stadium and depend exclusively on television. The system is for television royalties only. Therefore it is very weak the system… [We need] less money from television and young people to return to the stadium. [We need] stadiums in an English style… to be a fan is more comfortable, more customer focussed, and above all, the type of police are more civil. It is a civil country” (Greyhound, official supporters’ club member, personal interview, June 2009).

The patrimonial nature of Italian business and politics permitted the complete deregulation of television rules. This contributed to an over-reliance on television money and precludes the development of other revenue streams or for the correction of other
problems. As already stated, the club presidents do not feel the need to invest in their stadiums when they do not own them. They also do not have to invest in them when they are competing in the national league, as television money allows them to compete with their peers. Television also necessitates the requirements for fans at the stadium. The choreographies in the stadium generate an additional atmosphere for the fans watching football on television at home. In keeping with this notion, Silvio Berlusconi has suggested that in the future, football spectators will be allowed free access in order to generate the collective atmosphere required to enhance the television audience at home (Armstrong and Giulianotti 1997: 25). The Italian patrimonial system is not generating the collective will required to transform the stadium experience for fans which will enhance the television event.

In light of the prestige accorded to football, the governmental approach to stadium safety is unplanned and haphazard. There seems to be no over-riding principal driving change within the Italian leagues. Part of the drive for change in England came through the Taylor Report and this formed the legislative framework to facilitate improvements which were enforced by government support. Money for safety improvements came from the Football Pools and government incentives. Allied to this, commercial pressures in England led clubs to invest in their own stadiums as they sought to maximise revenue from all avenues (King 1998: 102). As King notes:

“the Taylor report, despite its own intentions, did little more than provide judicial legitimacy to the free-market arguments which proposed the easiest line of reform for football in the light of the organic development of the sport, on the one hand, and the transformations of British society, on the other” (King 1998: 106).
The British government’s political desire to impose a free-market approach, allied with the desire to impose the rule of law, saw the legal and economic support to these transformations.

In recognition of the necessity for new stadiums in Italy, the president of Livorno, Aldo Spinelli, has suggested one proposal. He proposes that the state should provide tax relief to the clubs to allow the reconstruction of new stadiums:

“The Italian State received 100% of the taxes that we pay, I believe it is right that for 2 or 3 years they reduce the levy in a way that the club, together with the councils and the government, can make new stadiums” (cited in: Liguori 2010).

Clearly, Spinelli is openly absolving club presidents from the responsibility for stadium improvement. He also does not take into account the ‘salva calcio’ debtspaying laws that were implemented in 2003 which effectively acted as state aid to the clubs (Porro and Russo 2004; Liguori 2010). Yet, Spinelli is also highlighting the need for state involvement and sees the development of stadiums as a co-operation between the central state, the council and the club. Stadium renovations in England could not be achieved through the free-market alone (King 1998: 100). Similarly, Spinelli is proposing an opportunity to inject public funds into the stadiums and launch the transformations within Italy. However, without clear management of the funding, it is unclear that stadium renovations would be managed in compliance with safety regulations. Assurances must be made that the funds are used only for stadium development, and not to be appropriated for players or the other functions of the clubs. Furthermore, there needs to be a clear and unequivocal legal document with the appropriate sanctions to
drive through this change. The Football Trust and Football Licensing Authority implemented new regulations governing safety in England (Hamil, Morrow et al. 2010). The government enforcing the Taylor Report supported these. The problem in Italy, as Francesio states, is “money and will” (Francesio 2008: 88). Many of the rules are in place, but no one enforces them (Francesio 2008: 89). New regulatory frameworks are required and supported politically.

There is an acknowledgment from the football authorities that Italy’s stadiums need to be renovated or rebuilt. For this reason the FIGC submitted bids to host the 2012 and 2016 European Championships, both of which failed. Like Italia '90, these tournaments were predicted to act as a catalyst for stadium rejuvenation. However, the patrimonial nature of Italian politics has accumulated the power within a small number of elite clubs. Therefore stadium regeneration would only benefit certain clubs, especially the elite clubs. This is illustrated by the two exceptions to the communally owned stadium in Italy. As their names suggests, the Stadio Olimpicos in Turin and Rome are owned by the Italian Olympic Committee, CONI. As one of my respondents observed:

“Rome and Turin have Stadio Olimpico made by whom? By CONI. Who are CONI? We are. Therefore they have marvellous stadiums [and] they don’t pay anything because of CONI” (Max, official supporters’ club director, personal interview, June 2009)

Max states that three of the biggest clubs in Italy (Roma, Lazio and Juventus) have better grounds because the Italian public pays for their facilities. As a publically funded body, CONI’s support for these two stadiums ensures that the taxpayer is subsidising the biggest clubs in Italy. The equivalent does not occur for clubs like Livorno whose
grounds are paid for by the Comune of Livorno only. The patrimonial connections within Italian politics, business and sport permit the state subsidence of elite clubs to the detriment of smaller provincial clubs like Livorno.

Lack of stadium development is contributing to the crisis in Italian football. Stadiums are not generating the additional revenue required to allow Italian clubs to compete economically in Europe. Reliance on patrimonial networks circumvents the need to make profound changes to the infrastructure and allow Italian football to move forward. This point was clearly made by Marco Mazzocchi, a former football analyst on Il Processo:

“The stadiums are old, the tickets cost a lot and so the fans arrive and they are already angry. The fans feel that the soccer world doesn't respect them and we are hearing these days the same phrases from officials that we have heard in the past. If they don't do something now, Italian soccer will die.” (Kiefer 2007).

Unsafe stadiums and poor facilities are contributing to fan apathy and declining attendances. This has been exacerbated by the government response which has attempted to impose increased regulations on the attendance at games, rather than focus on stadium redevelopment and safety. The following section will describe the impact of the Pisanu Law that was implemented after the death of Filippo Raciti in Catania.

**The Pisanu Law: An Italian Taylor Report or Criminalisation of Fans?**

The de-regulation of the nation state and the football authorities has magnified the financial crises within Italian football. It permitted the increased control and manipulation of the situation by the elite clubs. Despite the carnivalesque image of Italian
football fans, there have been increased controls over individual fans as extensive regulations were introduced to control disorder at football matches. Aligned to the approach of the police, the government have passed a number of measures to try and combat the problem of violence at football matches. An early attempt at controlling fan behaviour occurred in 1989 when police authorities were given the authority to serve a Daspo\(^3\) (*Diffida ad Assistere alle manifestazioni Sportive*, ‘Prohibition to attend sport events’) on fans causing trouble (Scalia 2009: 51). Those holding a Daspo have to sign a register at the time of the game at the local police station, thus ensuring that they are not in attendance. The problems arise when these measures appear to be misused or badly enforced. Daspos have been issued for having keys, flag-poles and mobile telephones as these could constitute weapons (Marchi 2005: 106-7). Five Pisa fans received Daspos for taking toilet rolls to a match. The reason given for their allocation was that they were holding “inflammable” materials (Lo Bianco and Messina 2008). These contribute to fans’ anti-state narratives and reinforce their anti-state identities. They have also not been successful, as the continued violence in Italian football highlights.

The death of a policeman during fan violence securely focussed the attention of fans, the media and the government. The Pisanu Law was an attempt to rectify the crisis in Italian football through increased regulation. The law was named after Giuseppe Pisanu, the Interior Minister from 2002 until 2006. Pisanu was also implicated in the *Calciopoli* scandal, as the minister who wanted assistance for his local team, Sassari Torres del Viminale, as well as consulting Luciano Moggi when Pope John Paul II died (Kiefer and Fisher 2006; Sarzanini 2006; Jones 2007: 271-2). The Pisanu Law illustrates the lack of enforcement within Italian football as the law was enacted in 2005, but was only enforced in 2007 after the death of Filippo Raciti in Catania. In addition, due to the

\(^3\) http://www.osservatoriosport.interno.it/Daspo/index.html
heightened interest after the riots in Catania, a full-scale review of all stadiums was undertaken that highlighted that only four stadiums were safe to hold matches (Roma, Palermo, Siena and Turin) (Kiefer 2007; Sanminiatielli 2007; Hamil, Morrow et al. 2010). Few questions were asked regarding investigation of the causes of this lack of safety and no provisions were made to fund the necessary improvements. There were rumours that that the Finanziaria (Italian Budget) in 2009 would provide special credit for clubs to renovate their stadiums (Rossi 2008). However, this has not been implemented in light of the world-wide recession and Italy’s growing debt.

The Pisanu Law orders that games can be played “behind closed doors” or with certain restrictions, if authorities deem there to be a potential problem. Every month the central authority, the Osservatorio Nazionale sulle Manifestazioni Sportive\(^40\) review the forthcoming list of fixtures. Those, which they deem to cause a substantial risk to fans and the public, are placed under additional restrictions. These measures intensified after thousands of ticketless Napoli fans descended on Rome in August 2007, which saw missiles being thrown and trains vandalised (Hawkey 2008). The Osservatorio deemed that both games between Pisa and Livorno during the 2008-2009 season were subjected to restrictions (Bernini 2008). The police blockaded every road and rail entry between the two cities to prevent movement of fans (De Majo 2008). This had the desired effect on disorder, but led to fan protests and banners being attached to prominent buildings in Livorno stating that “without fans and colour, this is a derby of repression” (Corriere di Livorno 2008). However, inconsistent prognosis reinforces the anti-state narrative of fans. In May 2010 the match between Livorno and Lazio was permitted to go ahead with fans.\(^41\) This was in spite of the fact that there is a history of conflict between Lazio and Livorno due to their political identities. Livorno has a strong left-wing identity, whereas Lazio fans are noted

\(^40\) www.osservatoriosport.interno.it

for their right wing politics (Foot 2007; Testa and Armstrong 2008; Testa and Armstrong). In contrast to this declaration was a decree from 17 March 2010 related to Livorno’s local rivals, Pisa.\footnote{http://www.osservatoriosport.interno.it/allegati/determinazioni/2010/osservatorio_13.pdf} The Serie D (amateur league) game between Pisa and Chioggia Sottomarina had a ban imposed on away fans from Chioggia, a small fishing port south of Venice with fifty thousand inhabitants. This match was deemed to be a greater risk than Livorno-Lazio and away fans from Chioggia were banned from travelling even though there is no history of disorder between the fans and only a small number of fans would have attended. Despite some of the more forceful attempts to prevent away fans from travelling, lack of enforcement means that fans still circumvent the restrictions. A decree by the Osservatorio was passed for the Livorno game against Napoli in January 2010.\footnote{http://www.osservatoriosport.interno.it/allegati/determinazioni/2010/osservatorio_02_10.pdf} Restrictions were placed on ticket sales to Napoli fans and away fans were banned. Despite these restrictions, approximately one thousand Napoli fans attended the game. They obtained tickets from friends and family members in Livorno and congregated towards one section of the ground. Despite these restrictions, fans still circumvented them without sanction.

The most striking feature of this monthly review is the composition of the review board. It contains representatives from each of the police authorities (police, road police, train police, carabinieri, specials, Guarda di Finanza), the football federation, CONI (the Italian Olympic Association), the League as well as interested businesses, such as Autogrills and the train company, Trenitalia. However, it doesn’t contain any representatives from the provincial councils or any fan groups, such as FISSC (Federazione Italiana Sostenitori Squadre Calcio – the Federation of Supporters of Italian Football Teams).\footnote{http://89.97.230.138/index.htm} Not only does this illustrate the lack of political involvement of the fan groups,
but it reinforces the patrimonial nature of Italian decision-making. Furthermore, the reasons for the decisions taken are not explained and alternative assistance is not always put in place to deal with any potential breaches. For example, the game between Juventus against Inter in April 2009 was considered “a risk” and that the committee “is invited to value the opportunity of suggesting measures to make the contest with the participation of both the fans, but with restrictions on the sale of tickets”. It is not clear what measures were suggested, as the Inter striker Mario Balotelli was still subjected to racist abuse by Juventus fans, whilst the Inter team bus was pelted with eggs and bottles (Bandini 2009). The result was that Juventus had to play their next home game without fans (The Independent 2009). This effectively criminalises all fans regardless of their involvement. Similarly, in 2009, Livorno fans were banned from attending Frosinone because Frosinone fans had performed the fascist salute, effectively penalising Livorno fans for the actions of Frosinone fans. Unsurprisingly, this has not addressed some of the main issues and has further contributed to the narrative against central authority.

The Pisanu Law passed a further Draconian measure which banned all articles that make the choreographies at matches (Massucci 2007). All items that are deemed to be offensive or could constitute a weapon are banned from stadiums. These items include megaphones, banners and flags (except flags in the team colours). At a stroke, the government banned the one element that differentiated Italian football from other leagues and provided an opportunity for fan antipathy. As Francesio observes, the rationale for this is that “we must do the English model, and since in England they do not have banners, megaphones and drums, we ban banners, megaphones and drums and we have done the English model” (Francesio 2008: 197). This false synergism does not solve the problem, especially as Filippo Raciti was not killed by any of the items, nor was

he killed in the stadium. The weakness of the central state contributes to fan apathy as the decree reinforces the anti-state narrative due to regional authorities being granted autonomy over the designation of items. Certain banners and items can be allowed with the prior agreement of the club, police and relevant authorities. This can create a wide range of difference in the designation and implementation of these items as the following demonstrates:

“In Italy, for example we make an example of Livorno, it is prohibited to enter with microphones, it is prohibited to enter with drums, the things that make noise, in this case musical instruments, is prohibited. It is prohibited because the Osservatorio have said. Last Saturday we were in Salerno, there at Salerno there are trumpets, loudhailers and also drums.” Max, official supporters’ club director, personal interview, June 2009

Livorno’s Osservatorio have designated that flares and certain flags constitute a breach of the law. The Southern Italian city of Salerno has a different outlook as they deem that trumpets, loudhailers and drums are within the law and can be taken to games. For Livorno fans, political symbols constitute a significant aspect of their identity. Under the Pisanu law, these come under the jurisdiction of the questore, the local chief of police:

“The questore of Livorno says that ‘this and that’ can not enter. According to him Che Guevara is a political symbol. Perhaps, I don’t know. At Florence, it is not the same...At Florence the questore decides that Che Guevara is not a political symbol and can enter. Because the laws in Italy make it this way.” (Stefano, ultras, personal interview, June 2009)
The autonomy of the regions creates opportunities to dispute the legitimacy of the central government. Only Fascist political symbols are illegal in Italy, therefore it is not illegal to display images of Che Guevara. However, within the jurisdiction of the Pisanu Law, the questore is permitted to prohibit these images if they feel that these constitute a breach of the regulations. Consequently these markers of Livornese identity are banned at certain away games.

The declarations permit the re-articulation of local symbolic markers of distinction. The fans of Livorno do not restrict the performance of their identity to the use of banners and flags. They actively perform their identity through costume and songs. Although the actions of the questore represent a significant infringement of local identity, the fans inflect other symbols with cultural meaning. In the case of the fans of Livorno, the green military-style jackets and caps become inflected with greater significance. In the case of the fans with right-wing identities, the cultural inflection becomes more problematic:

“Some fans in Italy, Lazio, Roma, Verona and many others, the tricolour is not shown for nationalistic pride, but is shown to signify that this is a curva of the right… the origins are not political, however now it becomes associated as a political symbol. In Italy, a political symbol cannot go into the stadium. The hammer and sickle, the Celtic cross. So what happens, a right wing fan shows the tricolour, it is as if they were showing the Celtic cross” (Stefano, ultras, personal interview, June 2009)

Fans with a Right-wing identity have inflected the national flag as a symbol of the Right. The fans of Roma, Lazio and Verona have reframed the national flag as a marker of xenophobia and Right-wing politics, and this becomes difficult to legislate against. Yet
this also contributes to fan resentment and apathy. During the match between Livorno and Lazio in May 2010, Lazio fans displayed several tricolour flags, including one prominent national flag, which stood over twice the height of the carrier, which was waved throughout the match. The pole required for this flag would undoubtedly fall within the remit of the Pisanu Laws and could constitute a weapon. In spite of the contravention of the law, and the reputation of the Lazio fans, the flag was permitted in the stadium. Livorno fans, however, are frequently prohibited from taking large flags with poles and political flags into away grounds. For example at Parma in December 2008, Livorno fans tried to enter with a range of flags. The longer flag poles were deemed to be weapons and had to be returned to the coach. This led to a number of confused interactions between fans and stewards that eventually saw a senior fan instruct one fan to return the flag to the coach. The contrasting implementations at Livorno and Parma undermine fan confidence in the law-making authorities and amplify fan antipathy.

The Pisanu Law also instigated regulation over the sales of tickets. These controls insist that fans must purchase a ticket from an official source, either an official supporters’ club or official ticket vendor. To obtain the ticket, identity must be provided. The ticket vendor enters the fan’s details into a ticket database that verifies that the fan is entitled to attend the ground. Any fan with a Daspo is prohibited from attending the ground. However, this does not preclude people without tickets causing trouble before or after the game. In addition to taking identification to ticket vendors, fans must also take their identification to the ground. As with the Daspos, the ticket controls are not effectively controlled. Two months after the death of Raciti, presenters on the television programme Le Iene (‘The Hyenas’) purchased tickets in the names of Benjamin Franklin,
Karl Marx and Alessandro Volta (Stefanini 2009: 143). The same programme highlighted that the presenter was able to enter the San Siro Stadium, in Milan, to watch Inter, without documentation. These factors inhibit the casual fans from attending matches. Criminalisation of all fans is compounded through lack of enforcement which undermines and de-legitimates the central authorities.

The regulations for purchasing tickets necessitated additional security at the stadium. The Pisanu law instructed all clubs to install fencing around the stadium with a series of checkpoints. Upon approaching the stadium, tickets are checked by stewards before entering the stadium confines. Thereafter, one enters the turnstiles and places the ticket into a barcode reader. Both processes together can slow down entry to the stadium, causing confusion and resentment and this can reinforce a unified fan identity (Stott and Pearson 2007: 221). Such an incident occurred at Parma in December 2008 when the supporters’ coach arrived late. With two minutes before kick-off, the queue awaiting ticket inspection by the two stewards was leading to a crush. There was increased anxiety and emotion amongst the fans who felt that they would miss the start of the game. Fortunately, the stewards sensed the changing mood and made cursory glances at the identification to facilitate a rapid entrance into the ground. Thus the stringent checks required were abandoned due to insufficient processes being in place to deal with large numbers of football fans arriving at the same time. The rules were circumvented in the interests of expediency and undermined the rule of law. A more insightful incident occurred prior to a game with Lazio at Livorno’s Armando Picchi Stadium in May 2010, as described in the introduction to this chapter. A group of over fifty Livorno ultras marched towards the gates of the Livorno curva, waving flags, chanting anti-Fascist and anti-Lazio songs and performing an image of unity and strength. As they approached the

http://www.video.mediaset.it/mplayer.html?sito=iene&data=2007/02/26&id=2316&from=iene
gates of the end, riot police mobilised and marched forward. The gates were opened to allow the ultrà to enter without a public order incident and they marched directly into the stadium, continuing to chant and display their flags. No tickets were displayed, so there were no identity checks performed. If ultrà are a public order problem, the police and stewards at the ground permitted them entry without legal checks. This undermines the law, the stewards and the forces of order and de-legitimates the authorities and highlights the incorporation of the ultrà into the patrimonial system.

The government measures also make it increasingly difficult for casual fans to attend matches at home. The ticket office, by law, has to be separate from the stadium; one cannot buy a ticket at the turnstile. At Livorno, the ticket booth is part of the sports complex adjacent to the Armando Picchi Stadium, about two-hundred metres from the stadium. Livorno’s stadium is located in a residential area with access from a number of residential streets. The erection of the steel fences prevents fans from accessing different areas around the ground without a ticket. Therefore to go to the designated ticket office, one has to go around the residential streets, onto the main road and back around the other residential streets. This ring of steel around the ground further inhibits the match-day experience, as Paolo state:

“There are the regulations at the stadium. At Livorno, perhaps there is the most classic example one can make. If you decide on Sunday or Saturday to go to the match and do not have a ticket you must then go practically five long kilometres: first to the only open ticket office and then you must return to the other side to the sector of the stadium for that ticket. Therefore this would be the simplest thing [to solve]” (Paolo, official supporters’ club director, personal interview, June 2009)
With the imposition of barriers around the ground, someone who decides to go to the game on the day must walk further to buy a ticket before going to the stadium. As the state struggles to impose its authority it treats all fans as potential hooligans and this contributes to fan apathy. This situation acts as a serious disincentive to casual fans and magnifies the anti-state narrative.

The Ministry of the Interior has attempted other approaches to limit violence at matches. In 2008 they launched an initiative called “Stop alla Violenza” (“Stop the Violence”). As part of this initiative they have created a public information advert that was broadcast during the advertising breaks between football shows. The advert is a series of sublime skills from footballers, intersected with acts of violence from fans. With each set of images, there is a caption, with the last one stating, “Violent fans are cowardly in every stadium”. The Osservatorio has also implemented an identity card for fans, la tessera del tifoso. The card allows fans to purchase tickets easier and should prevent away fans from purchasing home tickets, as was witnessed with Napoli fans in Livorno. It also, however, affects the casual fan that may not have the tessera. It also makes it difficult for non-Italian nationals to purchase tickets to away matches, thus reducing potential revenue to clubs. The card also presupposes that consumers of football only watch one team, and will not watch another. Placing these obstacles prevents all but the most dedicated fans from attending matches.

The card does, however, provide opportunities to access the loyal fanbase and once again, AC Milan has seized the initiative. They have instigated the Cuore Rossonero card which also operates as a Maestro card and a loyalty card. It allows users to accumulate

47 http://www.govorno.it/GovernoInforma/Dossier/campagna_anticviolenza/index.html
48 http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=GrqUc8CHDWA
loyalty points. These can be redeemed against cheaper tickets, gifts, or events with players, such as training or a meal. Likewise, Livorno have implemented the *Triglia Card* (Mullet card, named after the mascot of the club, and one of the symbols of the city). Like AC Milan’s card, the *Triglia Card* accumulates points that can be redeemed against gifts, and also acts as a MasterCard. Although these initiatives demonstrate an attempt to deal with the problems in Italian football, the lack of stadium renovation is a major discrepancy. Furthermore the ‘Q&As’ related to the *Triglia Card* at Livorno is instructive of the wider distrust of authority which undermines effective regulation. Two general questions answered by Livorno deny that the card has a microchip that emits a radio signal indicating the physical location of the card owner, and that the details provided for the card will be transmitted to the chief of police. Therefore the role of the police is central in understanding the match-day experience and in accounting for the decline in participation in football. The following section will outline the development of the Italian police forces and highlight how this contributes to the identification of fans their security at stadiums.

The Italian Forces of Order: Development and Continuity

This thesis has addressed several key groups within Italian football. Initially it illustrated that the worlds of politics, business and football operate within dense patrimonial networks that are emptying out public involvement and facilitating the emergence of charismatic individuals. Significantly, there is another group operating within the Italian football network. The Italian forces of order are key actors in the execution of state policy and represent an important aspect of the patrimonial network. The police forces simultaneously reflect the Italian solution to globalisation processes and illustrate the

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49 [http://cuorerossonero.acmilan.com/main/?menuId=1.146](http://cuorerossonero.acmilan.com/main/?menuId=1.146)

50 [http://www.livornocalcio.it/](http://www.livornocalcio.it/)
problems and contradictions of this approach. This section will highlight the historical development of the Italian police force to illustrate how they have reflected the unplanned organic growth of the nation and the failure of the central state to impose control. As key actors within the Italian patrimonial system, the police play an important role in the presentation and control of football fans and this can affect the chances of violence. This section will present a brief history of the Italian police before presenting the role of the police with particular reference to public order. Changes to European policing will be also be presented to illustrate the continuance of certain patterns of policing and their affect on the continuing crisis in Italian football.

There are various divisions of the Italian police that combine under the term ‘forces of order’. The divisions that exist reflect the contested nature of the Italian state and lead to confusion and lack of co-operation. As we have seen, the Italian state is comprised of semi-autonomous regions, with enduring local histories and memories, which undermine the central state. Likewise, the rivalry between the FIGC and Lega Calcio has undermined the ability of the federations to regulate efficiently the finances and operations of the Italian football clubs. These patterns are reflected in the development of the Italian police. Before unification the House of Savoy instigated a two-tier approach to local security. The *Corpo Arma dei Carabinieri Reali* (Royal Carabinieri Corps) was based on the French Gendarmerie and was introduced to Savoy by King Vittore Emmanuelle I in 1814. With unification the corps was institutionalised as the ‘First Force’ of the new nation and represented an armed corps for the state.\(^{51}\) Nearly forty years later in 1852, the *Corpo delle Guardie di Pubblica Sicurezza* (Guardians of Public Safety Corps) were introduced to Savoy which created a dual model of Carabinieri and State Police which has continued from unification to the present day. Although there are

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\(^{51}\) [http://www.carabinieri.it/Internet/Multilingua/EN/HistoricalReferences/01_EN.htm](http://www.carabinieri.it/Internet/Multilingua/EN/HistoricalReferences/01_EN.htm)
further police divisions within Italy; these do not have direct jurisdiction over the policing of social order and have less impact on football.\textsuperscript{52} In addition to the other forces of order, there is a section of the State Police with special responsibility for undercover surveillance. The \textit{Divisione Investigazioni Generali e Operazioni Speciali} (Division of General Investigations and Special Operations), known by their acronym Digos, are charged with investigating serious offences such as terrorism and organised crime. Under this remit the Digos also have to investigate football hooligans. They operate as non-uniformed police who infiltrate fan groups and record their patterns of behaviour and obtaining positive identifications of known activists. As a result, this sees football hooligans placed under the same umbrella as terrorists and the Mafia. This constitutes one area where the Italian police are following similar, pan-European, patterns of surveillance (Tsoukala 2009).

The dual nature of the Italian police reflects the failure of the state to gain control over individual interests. There are two conceptions in academic literature of the police: the state’s police imposed from above; or the citizens’ police from below (Della Porta 1998: 246). In Italy, since the inception of the police, the forces of order have been seen as a function of governmental interests imposed from above (Della Porta 1998: 246). This has been amplified through the police having the absolute right to stop any Italian citizen for identification. As Barbagli and Sartori state:

\begin{quote}
"The forces of order in fact have the power and duty of identification, which no citizen can avoid. They can stop any person and request an identifying document, and, in some cases, when some irregularity is noted or if there is something
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{52} The forces of order also comprise of the Guardia di Finanzia who deal with tax and customs matters. Additionally there are Municipal Police, who deal with motoring and local regulations, and Provincial Police, who deal with country laws such as hunting and fishing regulations. There are also Coast Guards and National Park Police.
suspicious, they may escort the person to the commissariat or to the carabinieri station” (Barbagli and Sartori 2004: 167).

Despite the attempt by the state to impose control over its citizens through identification, the dual nature of the Italian police reflects its weakness. After unification the two forces were granted distinct remits with the carabinieri being granted control of the countryside whilst the State Police monitored the cities. This was semi-clarified in a law of 1919 stating that the State Police would be responsible for

“police functions that [are] preventative, repressive, and related to maintaining public order in the larger population centres, leaving the supervision to maintaining public order of the remaining territory of the State to the Royal Carabinieri” (Barbagli and Sartori 2004: 163).

The irregular development of industrialisation and urbanisation which led to chaotic patterns of migration resulted in the inconsistent growth and development of the two corps which depended heavily upon local factors and political involvement. By the 1960s however, parity in numbers was achieved between the two corps (Barbagli and Sartori 2004).

The dual model prevented the creation of an independent, strong and centralised force. As a consequence the divided forces could be incorporated into the patrimonial system. Maintaining two parallel forces with similar responsibilities over public order has been inefficient and has lead to confusion and lack of co-operation and has contributed to Italy having the largest police force in Europe (Tavares and Thomas 2008). The two forces frequently refuse to co-operate, as occurred during the ‘years of lead’ in the 1970s,
and this ultimately failed to prevent the assassination of the Christian Democrat leader, Aldo Moro (Collin 1999: 32). Attempts have been made to rectify this situation and develop co-operation between the two forces, principally with Law 121 of 1 April 1981. Law 121 requires that Provincial Committees for Security and Public Order be set up containing the chiefs of the three main forces of order, as well as the mayor of the provincial capital and the president of the province (Barbagli and Sartori 2004: 177). However, orders made in these meetings “are at times ‘reinterpreted’, if not actually ignored, by the Carabinieri” (Barbagli and Sartori 2004: 177). The lack of enforcement of the forces of order ultimately leads to the lack of enforcement of order further along the network of crimes. Law 121 also proposed a joint operations centre; the first of which was opened in Milan in 2000, nineteen years after the law was passed. As of 2004, seventy-four of the one hundred and nineteen provinces did not have these joint operations rooms implemented, and none were functioning correctly (Barbagli and Sartori 2004: 177).

The political nature of the Italian forces of order has seen them develop a significant position within the patrimonial networks of Italian politics. The forces of order help shape public opinion as they seek to protect their institutions and generate public goodwill:

“Police have a notable discretionary power, not only to the complex level, but also that of the single politician. The forces of the police can be considered as policy makers, in the sense that they “make” the politics” ((Della Porta and Reiter 2003) cited in: Ferreri 2008: 100)
The forces of order are conscious of public opinion and their public image. Consequently, they choose appropriate action that will give them the most public support and in turn constructs an image of a force that operates appropriately (Della Porta 1998: 230). The 1960s saw a sharp increase in certain distinct forms of crime, specifically, public protest and crimes against property (Della Porta 1998; Barbagli and Sartori 2004). This provided the police with an apposite opportunity to manage their public image. For example, the police would not use force against a group of pensioners protesting about the cost of living. Therefore, the selective use of violence presents an image to the media and general public that this particular group required violent action.

As the problems associated with political problems diminished, incidents surrounding football matches increased (Della Porta 1998). This has resulted in the policing of football matches being one of the largest exercises performed by the Italian police (Roversi 2003). Building on Cohen’s seminal work, Marchi suggests that through selective use of force, the police help create ‘Folk Devils’, as well as the media (Cohen 2002; Marchi 2005). This becomes self-fulfilling; as the football fans are constructed as ‘Folk Devils’, the police feel increasingly justified in using force against them. Their discrimination in other fields reinforces this construction and magnifies the events surrounding football. Ferreri develops this argument by stating that the use of the Digos, the anti-Mafia and anti-terrorist force, to infiltrate ultrà transformed the fans into viable targets: “with the Digos, the ultra ceased to be simply hooligans from the stadium and were transformed into a subversive phenomenon, that needed repression with force” (Ferreri 2008: 100-1). The Pisanu Law legitimated the political role of the police. In the previous section it was highlighted that the Osservatorio designated certain matches ‘at risk’. The forces of order are key members of this group and become clearly situated within the patrimonial network. Consequently, through a variety of measures, specific
groups and particularly football fans, have been targeted which accounts for a number of incidents related to football.

Violence at football is not inevitable, despite the political influence exerted by the forces of order. In his theory of violence, Collins suggests that violence is led by a small number of key proponents who are supported by the crowd (Collins 2008). Violence is often ignited over flashpoints which, in turn, are caused by ‘forward panic’. When parties are engaged in the emotional cauldron of physical confrontation they have to maintain ‘face’ and preserve the advantage. This can erupt into violence as one party’s emotions rise and seeks to capitalise on a perceived weakness of the opponent. The propensity for violence increases as the duration of the tension increases before a confrontation. This allows the emotion to build, and lengthens the period for this emotion to abate. Utilising a Durkheimian perspective, Collins advocates that an increase in the crowd will build the emotional energy of the situation and fuel the emotional tension in the parties. A flashpoint will instigate violence when one of the parties utilises this emotion to gain the advantage. Collins recommends that participants in these events need “to reduce their confrontational tension” (Collins 2008: 464). This is especially true as the numbers of police increase: “the more officers called to the scene, the greater the chance of a forward panic or other kinds of police violence, quite apart from what the suspect does” (Collins 2008: 464). Furthermore, rumours can spread and fuel the opportunity of miscommunication and violence. The build up and stand offs increase the opportunity for forward panic to occur and for one side to provide the flashpoint. The perception of the police is crucial to the initiation of violence (Della Porta 1998; Stott and Reicher 1998). If parties enter into an situation expecting violence, then this increases the possibility of forward panic occurring and violence ensuing.
The active role of the police in manipulating political and public opinion has combined with the weakness of the central state which has created a history of aggressive policing in Italy. This has facilitated the construction of narratives that contribute to the lack of legitimacy of the state. The G8 summit of 2001 became the zenith for aggressive Italian policing. The summit was held in Genoa, and attracted a number of anti-globalisation, anarchist and leftist demonstrators. Riots ensued that resulted in one protestor shot dead, over 500 people injured and an estimated £30 million damage caused to property (Johnston 2001; Vidal 2001). Of the two hundred thousand demonstrators, many claim they were there to protest peacefully. However, chaos ensued as the police took a hard-line with the demonstrators. The manner in which the protestor was killed highlighted the confusion of the police approach. The Guardian reported that, “Witness accounts of the fatality were conflicting, but it appeared last night that the young man had been shot and then run over by a police armoured vehicle” (MacAskill and Elliot 2001). This account was by no means unique as The Telegraph reported that armoured vehicles were used to plough into dustbins that protestors hid behind. Thomas Harding, the reporter of The Telegraph, was attacked by the carabinieri, as were other officially accredited reporters. Harding states that “Anyone, lawbreaker or not, was fair game in the eye of the carabinieri, which showed itself to be as badly led and ill-disciplined as it was thuggish” (Harding 2001). Indeed, the police action in Genoa was used as an example by the Scottish police, of what can go wrong when the police act aggressively (Macleod 2005). The Italian police had demonstrated a clear sign of forward panic by attacking first to gain the advantage. This forward panic culminated in the raid on the Diaz school, the protestors’ headquarters. Accounts suggest that the police had employed rightwing activists to attack the protestors (Carroll 2007). Indeed, it was reported that the police sang Fascist songs as they acted (Davies 2008). The police raided the school at night, whilst the protestors slept. Accounts suggest that people were kicked and beaten with
batons whilst they slept. The police methodically went through the school beating all in their way, regardless of their physical position. Fire extinguishers were fired in peoples’ faces, whilst others were spat upon or had their heads thrust down toilets. Several women were threatened with rape and all ninety-three occupants of the school suffered serious injuries, some life threatening (Carroll 2001; Ginsborg 2004: 136-7; Jones 2007: 204-5; Davies 2008). The tactics caused international outrage and strained relations with the Italian government (Johnston, Alleyne et al. 2008).

Heavy police presence at football matches, like the G8, provides several potential flashpoints that could generate forward panic. As described in the introductory section above, a potential flashpoint occurred before the match between Livorno and Lazio at the Stadium Armando Picchi in May 2010. A group of over fifty Livorno ultrà marched towards the gates of their curva. As they approached the gates, armed riot police approached the gates from inside the ground in anticipation of an attempt to attack the gates. The ultrà were marching, waving flags and chanting anti-Fascist and anti-Lazio songs. They were not armed, throwing objects or performing any form of ritualised violence. In spite of this the riot police prepared themselves for violence and marched forward. No violence ensued, as the ultrà were allowed into the stadium without having their tickets checked. This was an apposite example of how forward panic could escalate; the police were not responding to any specific acts of violence, but were responding to the (incorrect) perceived threat of the ultrà. In practise the Livorno were more focussed on their hatred of Lazio and Fascism than confronting the police. In other contexts it would be clear that the police could ignite the emotional tinderbox.

A further example of aggressive Italian policing surfaced in the media in May 2010. The Gugliotta affair highlighted the aggressive approach taken by certain sections of the
Italian police (Corriere della Sera 2010; La Repubblica 2010). Stefano Gugliotta lived in the vicinity of Rome’s Stadio Olimpico. On the night of the Italian Cup final between Roma and Inter, Gugliotta was riding his scooter, with his cousin, in order to go to a party. He had not attended the match but was stopped by a policeman. The incident was filmed from the window of one of the neighbouring apartments and through this it appears that the policeman held his arm outstretched onto Gugliotta’s chest to prevent him riding off. Gugliotta pushed the police officer’s arm away and was subsequently punched in the face. Gugliotta’s cousin was confronted by the same policeman and ran off, before a number of Italian police descended on Gugliotta. Gugliotta had a broken tooth and evidence of head injuries. The young Roman was arrested and alleged that “When I was brought in jail I was asked to sign a sheet with an X already deleted, which states that I refused additional medical visits, but I opposed. Only after I was able to sign a sheet with boxes still empty.” (La Repubblica 2010). The case demonstrates the forward panic of Italian police as they seek to use violence early, rather than as a last resort. They subsequently attempted to fabricate evidence to suggest that he had refused to seek medical advice. As they act as an independent, politically orientated body, they attempt to manipulate their position.

Aggressive policing in Italy has not been restricted to Italian football fans. Fans of English clubs and the England national team have faced considerable involvement from the Italian forces of order (Stott and Reicher 1998; Stott and Pearson 2007). The police’s perception of England fans ensured that fans entering Sardinia for the 1990 World Cup were treated as hooligans as soon as they arrived, with as many as a third of Italy’s police force being there to meet them (Stott and Reicher 1998: 366). Similarly, recent games involving English clubs in Rome have highlighted the continued perceived threat against

53 http://video.corriere.it/?v=Channel=Roma%20Cronaca&vidClipId=2524_d07ce4c-5a9d-11de-903e-00144f02aabe
English fans. Against Liverpool and Manchester United in 2001 and 2007 respectively, similar patterns emerge (Stott and Pearson 2007). Both sets of fans were attacked by Roma fans on their approach to the stadium and the police did not intervene. Inside the stadium riot police were stationed in the away end. There were no police in the home curva, only stewards. The Roma fans threw missiles over the barrier into the English fans, who subsequently threw them back. In the case of the Liverpool fans, they were attacked by the police for throwing these missiles back (Stott and Pearson 2007: 224). Regarding the Manchester United fans, United scored and Roma fans surged towards the barrier. The United fans responded, whereupon the riot police charged down and began to baton charge indiscriminately into the United fans. It is clear from the actions of the Italian police in relation to English fans is that they police the situations based on perception of the fan-group. English fans had a reputation for trouble and disorder that has subsequently subsided (although not disappeared).

The intricate political networks operating in Italian society legitimates these actions. Politicians and the media want to be seen as taking a firm line and support the police in their conduct. The Prime Minister, Berlusconi defended the tactics of the police in Genoa by saying in Parliament that “We found ourselves faced with protests that grew in intensity and numbers that grew beyond all expectations. As a result it was necessary to intervene in such a way as to guarantee the maximum security for all the delegations.” (Johnston 2001). Similarly, Achille Serra, the Prefect in Rome who was in charge of the police during Manchester United’s incident, argued that “The stewards were overrun by drunk fans, the police had to intervene. I was there and from what I saw they followed the established protocol. If you’re going to try and establish order over a drunk, angry

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34 This clip from Danish TV talks to a young Danish Manchester United fans and highlights the events after Roma fans surge: http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=glfgEwL2QMo. This reinforces the importance of situational context as Danish fans may not fall under the same perception as English fans.
mob, you’re not going to do it carrying a bunch of flowers” (Marcotti 2007). This reinforces the prominence of police perception in their handling of these situations. If the authorities and police perceive a group to be violent, then they are more likely to adopt an aggressive stance. This increases the likelihood of forward panic and resulting violence. Therefore, training needs to be undertaken by the police so that they understand the culture of the fans attending a match (Stott and Adang 2003: 3; Foot 2007; Stott and Pearson 2007: 241-2). Although public drunkenness is rare in Italy, it is relatively common around travelling British football fans. Making the correct perceptions allows the police to operate more effectively and prevents the opportunity for forward panic to occur.

At the highest level, the Italian police and politicians have not adopted a flexible approach to policing football fans. Fans are treated as one homogenous group, rather than dealt with as individual contexts. Most of the focus is on the away fans in the settore ospiti, the area designated for away fans to park before being escorted to the ground. There are extensive regulations governing the settore ospiti:

“In Italy, I speak of our experience of Livorno, when we organise an away trip, a major part of the club organised trips is by coach. Therefore according to the number of people going, the Osservatoria, or its better to say the responsibility of the forces of order in Livorno, require a list of the number of people going. They order an escort of one or two patrols to go with us in police cars and therefore they escort us from the motorway toll booth and escort us to the stadium…. When we make an away trip the questura calls every club what time the coach is leaving and to know what route we are taking.” (Max, official supporters’ club director, personal interview, June 2009)
Official supporters’ clubs are required by the *questura*, the chief of police, to detail the number of people going, the route and expected departure and arrival times. This allows for coaches to convene at the motorway toll booths and await the escort by police. Usually two police cars will escort the away coaches; one at the front, one at the rear. On arrival at the outskirts of the destination city, the away coaches are collected by a police escort from that municipality and escorted to the *settore ospiti*. This will comprise of a number of police patrol cars and motorbikes. In addition to the escorting patrol cars and motorbikes, the route will be well marshalled by other police patrol cars and motorbikes that stop and direct traffic to facilitate a clear route for the escorted coaches. In most cases the *settore ospiti* is directly alongside, or inside the stadium. In the case of a trip to Brescia in March 2009, the *settore ospiti* was on the outskirts of the city. The coaches parked in the designated zone and were escorted onto modified city buses to be taken to the stadium. The buses were fitted with a Perspex barrier separating the fans from the driver and front door of the bus. Alongside the driver, behind this Perspex barrier, stood two policemen clearly armed with semi-automatic rifles.

On arrival at the away end of the Italian stadiums, the visiting fans are greeted by a wall of riot police, standing behind full length riot shields. They act as a funnel towards the turnstiles where the away fans are met by state police, carabinieri and stewards. At this point the stewards will check any baggage for prohibited items and ascertain the details of flags and banners. Any banned items can be confiscated for being too political, or for constituting a weapon. In addition they perform security checks on the fans which consist of the usual ‘patting down’ consistent with many sporting events and airports. After the security checks, the stewards check tickets with the fans’ identity to ensure that the name on the ticket matches the identity of the person holding the form of
identification. Once this check has been performed satisfactorily, the fans approach the turnstiles where they insert the barcode on the ticket into the barcode reader of the turnstile and proceed into the stadium. Stewards and police remain in sections underneath the stadium, but do not make their presence felt within the curva.

The entire operation creates an overwhelming image of force and control and increases the tension and emotion of the situation. In a country where the state has faced a long standing crisis of legitimacy, the presentation of force at away games is potent. Not only does it criminalise all fans, it can present an altogether different image:

“When we arrive in the host city, what we see outside seems to be a war with Police, Carabinieri... Helicopters. It seems like being where there is a war.” (Max, official supporters’ club director, personal interview, June 2009)

In addition to highlighting the costs incurred by the local community to fund this quantity of police, Max also indicates a clear image of the police approach to away fans. The analogy to a war zone reinforces the notion of a lack of legitimacy. It suggests that they are an occupying force which has not won the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people they are supposed to be protecting. It also reinforces the suggestion that the police and fans are adversaries. The police are not acting as intermediaries, but adversaries, and this provides ample opportunity for forward panic and potential violence. It is for this reason that a number of Italian authors utilise the analogy of war in their research. This is particularly apposite in Dal Lago’s seminal Descrizione di una Battaglia (‘Description of a Battle’) (Dal Lago 1990). In light of this, however, no violence was witnessed at any of these games during the ethnographic fieldwork in 2009, and none was reported subsequently in the media. As Collins highlights, it is rare when fights start as most
people avoid them (Collins 2008). However, when the ingredients are right, and the
tension and emotion on both sides increases, this can lead to the flashpoints and forward
panics that precipitate violence.

By treating all fans as one homogenous group, the police do not take account of the
range of fans within the curva. Not all fans are hooligans or looking for violence, as one
respondent notes:

“There exists in Italy the settore ospiti, where the mischief inside is often
investigated as if [they] are all assassins. This is not true because a major part of
the persons inside are graduates, by this I mean cultured, someone who knows
what they are doing” (Max, official supporters’ club director, personal interview,
June 2009).

Max is highlighting that a number of the fans are not ‘assassins’ or people out to
deliberately make mischief. Many of them are educated and aware of their actions. Yet
through the pattern of policing, all fans are treated as potential hooligans. This is
compounded by the Osservatorio which designates a particular game as ‘at risk’ and places
certain restrictions on fans. This effectively criminalises all fans that may have attended
that game and restricts them from watching their team. The police response to away fans
is to treat them all as potential hooligans. The construction of this homogenous ‘outsider’
group contributes to the creation of a unified identity within the group (Stott and Reicher
1998; Stott and Pearson 2007). Consequently, when violent incidents occur, many fans
sympathise with group members and this contributes to the anti-police narrative.
Despite the treatment of fans as one homogenous group by politicians and the police authorities, the officers on the front line operate with extreme flexibility. In specific situations police officers circumvent the rules depending on circumstances. This is often done in co-ordination with the police hierarchy. One example related to an incident at Brescia settore ospiti. The area was directly outside the Stadio Mario Rigamonti and entry was under police authority, although this English researcher was allowed entry without questioning whilst waiting for the contact with the ticket. There was a delay in the arrival of the buses from the parking area and this delay saw the buses directed immediately into the away end. This led to a series of negotiations inside and outside the ground to allow admission into the ground. On admission it became apparent that no bags or other objects would be allowed on the terrace. As the fans had transferred to the specially modified city-buses, there was nowhere to store a rucksack. A negotiation took place with the Digos, who refused to take it and suggested to the officer in authority that it should be allowed to be taken into the ground. This was permitted, without being searched. This example, as well as the examples described above of English fans having bottles thrown at them in Rome, illustrates the way that some Italian police make an exception in certain situations. However, this can increase the opportunity for violence.

Group identities and potential incidents are magnified through the police’s ‘all or nothing’ approach to policing football. By not proactively responding to minor incidents, the police allow the tension and emotion to build. This increases the chance of flashpoints occurring and violence ensuing. Francesio argues that the British police take a more active role than Italian police at prevention and control (Francesio 2008: 89). Stott and Adang suggest a more flexible attitude to policing football crowds that centres on a more interactive and less intimidatory approach (Stott and Adang 2003; Stott and Pearson 2007). They argue that a good police model is to not wear riot gear and maintain
a low profile with high levels of positive interactions with fans (Stott and Pearson 2007: 229-30). This can help prevent major incidents before they start, as well as preventing the construction of symbolic events that reinforce existing narratives. By treating all fans as one homogenous group, the collective identity and memory of the group becomes shaped by events that reinforce the collective narrative. When the police used tear gas and riot equipment on fans at the ‘derby of the dead child’ in Rome in 2003, the wider groups of fans could understand and believe that a child had been killed (Marchi 2005). Likewise, English fans who were subjected to a baton charge from riot police in Rome could have been spared this ignominy had the original missile throwers been identified and arrested (Stott and Pearson 2007).

The poverty of the stadiums inhibits control within the stadium. This encourages the extensive policing and restrictions outside the stadium. The lack of stadium development has meant that they have not taken advantage of the transformations in surveillance and stewarding that have been adopted elsewhere in Europe. This allows the curve to remain liminal spaces for the creation of ultrà identity and legitimised their activities. Consequently, stadium redevelopment should coincide with changes to the operation of the police:

“[We need] stadiums in an English style… to be a fan is more comfortable, more customer focussed, and above all, the type of police are more civil. It is a civil country [Interviewer: the police are not civil here?] No. The police do what they want. Unfortunately the police arrest always and also, when the police are culpable, they always have the cover of personal liberties and are not punished. [There are] many cases, for example the case of the G8 at Genoa in 2001.” (Greyhound, official supporters’ club member, personal interview, June 2009)
Not only are the episodes of the G8 at Genoa used to reinforce the image of police brutality, there is a strong feeling that the Italian police are unaccountable. This image of accountability contributed to the transition to postmodern policing in Britain, especially after several high-profile miscarriages of justice (Reiner 1992). These miscarriages of justice coincided with a transformation of the police in Britain and North America (Reiner 1992; Bayley and Shearing 1996; O'Malley 1997; Jones and Newburn 2002). De-regulation of the state impacted the position of the police. In particular:

“the state’s monopoly on policing has been broken by the creation of a host of private and community-based agencies that prevent crime, deter criminality, catch lawbreakers, investigate offences, and stop conflict” (Bayley and Shearing 1996: 586).

The emergence of private security firms has seen the commodification of policing and the restructuring of police and policing. The ‘docile bodies’ of Foucault’s ‘governmentality’ (Foucault 1991; Foucault, Burchell et al. 1991) produces an increasing trend towards individual responsibility for individual action. The use of third party security has provided accountability towards clubs (Bayley and Shearing 1996). This aspect represents a central feature of the Taylor Report (Taylor 1989) and will be covered in greater depth in the following section.

**Stewards**

Privatisation of police and security has seen the increased responsibility of stewards at football matches in Europe. As stated above, the transition to privatisation of security
was made explicit in the Taylor Report that facilitated the redevelopment of stadiums in Britain. Taylor stated that:

“The safety of the public inside the ground is the responsibility of those who stage the event and administer the ground in which it is held, *ie* the ‘management’. This responsibility applies in both normal and emergency situations” (Taylor 1989: 33)

Not only did Taylor place the responsibility for the hosts to manage their safety and policing, he also introduced the commercial element into the equation:

“In my view a more consistent and businesslike approach should be made to such charges. If clubs were to find it more economical to recruit efficient stewards than to delegate duties to the police, there could be a significant reduction in the number of police deployed at football grounds to the benefit of the community at large… Some clubs presently have efficient stewards whom they recruit individually and train fully with the assistance of the police. Others hire security firms to bring in a well-trained team of stewards.” (Taylor 1989: 37)

The outcome of this approach was that the police should charge the clubs for the use of their services within the football stadium. Outside of the private space of the stadium, the police had the duty to maintain public spaces as part of their public duty. Should the costs involved be too high, then the club could recruit their own stewards or employ a third party security firm to cover the stewarding aspects. Furthermore, UEFA have highlighted that stewards are an importance safety feature of football. Şenes Erzik, the chairman of the Stadium and Security Committee stated that:
“If stewards are well-trained and well-placed, they are the best people to help the police and allow the game to go smoothly and safely, hopefully, there will be more work for the stewards in the future, and less for the police”.

In England and the Netherlands, for example, stewards have become a professional organisation that acts as the clubs’ arbiters between the police and the fans (Spaaij 2006: 207, 230).

As with other aspects of stadium safety, Stewards have not been fully implemented in Italy. Although proscribed by law, the stewards in Italy do not fulfil the same function with the same vigour as in England or the Netherlands. The Osservatorio provides guidelines for stewards and has published a manual to assist stewards with their functions. However, they are not provided with sufficient support from the state, the police or the authorities. Many stewards are voluntary and this permits their incorporation into the patrimonial network. Stewards are provided with free entrance to the matches but do not have the skills, training or support to manage disorder. One respondent in Livorno is a volunteer steward in the main stand and highlights the problems stewards have in Italy:

“Because, at the moment, the steward as stated by the law, is quietly an official of public order. … In Italy they continue to say that there should be less police but in the stadium they continue to be there. The [authority of] the forces of order [begins] when effectively the fan doesn’t understand the figure of the steward.

55 http://www.uefa.com/uefa/keytopics/kind=1048576/newsid=689264.html
http://www.uefa.com/uefa/keytopics/kind=1048576/newsid=600885.html
56 http://www.osservatoriosport.interno.it/pubblicazioni/steward_new.html
And only when it is impossible to remove them. I am speaking about inside the stadium. Outside the stadium certainly the forces of order come into being. We the stewards cannot intervene certainly. There is not the powers, there is not the capacity and one cannot act.” (Max, official supporters’ club director, personal interview, June 2009)

The continuing presence of the police places the legitimacy of the stewards into question. They are reluctant to place themselves in difficult situations and therefore do not seem to enforce any rules. Bottles and other objects are frequently thrown at Italian football matches with impunity. Rather than adequate stewarding, architectural features, such as netting and Perspex barriers, are added to preserve the safety. The opportunities for an incident like Hillsborough are manifest.

The lack of stewards’ authority reinforces the legitimacy of the ultras. As demonstrated above with the police, the lack of enforcement over minor infringements amplifies the opportunities for tension and emotion to increase. Some stewards have been complicit with transgressors and this reinforces the group identity of the fans. The incidents with Liverpool and Manchester United fans in Rome, saw stewards co-operating with the fans with “some even allowing Italian fans through the segregation line to collect missiles that they then throw over the barriers” (Stott and Pearson 2007: 4). At Livorno, there are no stewards in the Curva Nord and this reinforces the liminal space of the curva. An incident during the match between Livorno and Mantova occurred when a ‘debateable’ corner decision was given by an assistant referee. This resulted in the assistant referee and the player taking the corner, being the focus of a barrage of bottles and other assorted objects. No fans were reprimanded or ejected and the liminality of the curva remained. The club was subsequently fined €5000 for this infringement, which acts as a calculable
cost. The costs of employing dedicated, trained stewards can run into several thousands of euros. The costs of €5000 for occasional infringements are minimal compared to the costs the club would have to pay if they were charged by the police and stewards. Ultimately, these costs are born by the community.

There are signs that certain areas are adopting an alternative approach to policing and stewarding at matches. Two Tuscan clubs have experimented with extensive stewarding. Empoli and Fiorentina have played a number of matches with minimal police (Giudici 2010). In addition, Fiorentina is planning a new stadium and this will remove the perimeter fencing and incorporate increased stewarding. As Giudici states: “The project has the objective of ‘demilitarising’ the stadium, improving excessively the commercial appeal of the event” (Giudici 2010: 199). The Florentine club will provide an apposite example for the future of Italian football. This point is affirmed by the Chief of Police of Florence, Francesco Tagliente who stated that:

“At Florence is not like this, because in this city a project was taken forward, launched by the Osservatorio, strongly backed by the head of police, that has taken away the nets from the away end, to make it that the forces of order are always moved away towards the centre of the city. The fans, initially sceptical, have started a constructive dialogue with the chief of police and the authorities. Florence is a reality seen as a model in international football. I speak for Florence; there are other problems of security for others.” (Cellini 2009)

By taking away the nets that cover the away stands, the police and Fiorentina football club are beginning to treat the fans in a different manner to other clubs. Furthermore, by

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57 For example, in Britain the cost of policing to Wigan (in the Premiership) in 2007-8 were £240,000; for Hereford (in League 1) were £80,000. House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2009). The Cost of Policing Football Matches.
removing police from the stadium, they are acknowledging that the police are not passive in relation to fan violence. This approach was taken in the Champions League match between Fiorentina and Liverpool in October 2009. Fan choreographies from both sets of fans helped create a carnivalesque atmosphere and Liverpool fans freely went around the city (Giudici 2010). This situation contrasts with the response of Manchester United and Liverpool fans in Rome. It will take time to see if the ‘Florence model’ works, but it suggests a move towards a more progressive approach when dealing with fans.

**Summary**

The bankruptcy of the Italian patrimonial system has impeded its ability to undertake the wider transformations necessary to compete globally. Over-reliance on the revenue from television is permitting clubs to remain in communal stadiums with poor facilities. The lack of stadium redevelopment is contributing to the reinforcement of existing corrupt practises, as witnessed during calcioioli and the financial scandals. Lack of redevelopment is also impacting safety. Curve are surrounded by Perspex fences and netting, that prevent easy exit in the event of an emergency. Without important stadium safety regulations being introduced, the potential for a Hillsborough-type tragedy is a time-bomb waiting to explode. The poverty of the stadiums is also necessitating increased security outside as the police struggle to maintain order. Excessive legislation and police actions are effectively criminalising all fans and contributing to the articulation of localised identities. This is heightening the already emotional situation that takes place at a stadium and amplifies the possibility of violence. The political role of the two police forces legitimates this violence as they seek to maintain their own profile and create the ultrà as a ‘folk devil’. Despite these factors, there is acknowledgement that Italy needs to change. The FIGC submitted bids to host the 2012 and 2016 European Championships to act as a
catalyst for stadium redevelopment. Meanwhile, Fiorentina has started the planning process to build a new stadium and has trialled matches without police. Despite these plans, the widespread failure of the neo-patrimonial system to adjust to the global political economic transformations have impacted the match-day experience of fans and contributed to a decline in participation in football. The following section will detail how diverse fan groups have adapted to the changes in Italian and global football.
Chapter 6

The Social Capital of Italian Fans

“Being a fan is our job” – Roma slogan, 1970s

“In Italy the ultrà are in charge” – Fabio Capello

The home curva in Livorno’s Stadio Armando Picchi was awash with colour as the crowd waited in anticipation for the start of the match. A large burgundy flag depicting the name of one of Livorno’s star players, Igor Protti, dominated the end. Elsewhere, national flags of Jamaica and the Soviet Union were displayed alongside flags in the colours of the home team. The warm September evening was punctuated with Second World War Partisan songs and football chants. The songs and flags contributed to the crackling atmosphere as kick-off approached. Livorno was playing their second home game after winning promotion to Serie A. Their opponents were AC Milan who boasted a range of international stars like Ronaldinho, Clarence Seedorf and Alessandro Nesta. Yet the crowd displayed little interest in the world-class footballers on display. Their focus was on the owner of their opponents, Silvio Berlusconi, who had just endured six months of sex scandals. Fans displayed banners satirising the prime minister and released inflated condoms into the stadium. A number of fans exhibited inflatable sex dolls dressed in Livorno football shirts to reinforce the sexual nature of Berlusconi’s scandals.


The political nature of the event was reinforced through the songs, many of which were directed at the Prime Minister. Renditions of the Partisan song, *Bella Ciao*, were performed amongst songs extolling the virtues of Livorno. Berlusconi’s sexual peccadilloes were satirised with a chant of “*Silvio pedofilo*” (‘Silvio paedophile’), while the greatest participation came from chants of “*Berlusconi, pezzo di merda*” (‘Berlusconi piece of shit’). Politics and local identity combine in the carnival atmosphere of Livorno’s stadium.

Italian fan culture is a central image of Italian football. Passionate fans help create a carnival atmosphere full of flags, fireworks and songs. It can also result in violence, as the death of Filippo Raciti demonstrates. The recurring themes of this thesis re-emerge in relation to the fans and fan groups. They operate within their own familial and patrimonial networks and these are incorporated into the wider networks of the football clubs and their owners. Global political economic transformations have directly impacted the identification of fans with their local clubs. The intense politicisation of Italian society has led to an amalgamation of regional and political identities that reflect the wider social context. Furthermore, the intense politicisation of everyday life is reflected in the identities of fan groups. These identities are impacted by the prevailing regionalism and distrust of central government that exist in Italy. With the rolling back of the state and changes to the global political economy, mass participation in football and associated fan groups has fragmented into smaller groups with a diverse range of outlooks. Groups embody the interests of members and reflect the single-issue outlook of contemporary Italian politics. Yet this fragmentation also contributes to the falling participation of the wider public associations.
It is this falling participation in public life that has captured the wider political and academic imagination in the twenty-first century. Scholarship during the 1990s focussed on globalisation, whereas the following decade was characterised by research into ‘social capital’. Whilst the previous chapters presented the effects of globalisation on Italian football, this chapter will highlight the impact of globalisation on sporting communities. This chapter will contribute to this literature in combination with the literature on social capital, through analysis of Italian supporters and situating this within the wider political economic transformations in Italy. The following section will provide an historical account of the development of Italian football fan groups in relation to the wider political economic transformations in Italy and will present a theoretical approach for understanding ultrà. The extensive deregulation and fragmentation of the Italian state and politics in the 1980s corresponded to widespread fragmentation of the ultrà groups during the same period. In particular, this will focus on the development of localised identities, particularly with reference to Livorno. Fragmentation has led to an increased focus on violence. This in turn had generated interested from the de-regulated media companies who are searching for news that appeals to a wider audience. By the 1990s, the ultrà began to coalesce around a common identity focussing on symbolic anti-state targets. Finally, the chapter will provide an account of official supporters’ clubs, to present an alternative view of Italian football fans, and highlight how these associations provide the strengths and weaknesses of social capital formation.

**Italian Ultrà: Development and Change**

Italian games are characterised by spectacular choreographies and passionate fans that add colour and spectacle to the Italian game. This phenomenon has spread across much of Europe since its inception in Italy. These fans are called ultrà and have attracted much
of the focus of the police, authorities, media, and academics. During the 1980s and 1990s, much of the football research in Britain analysed football violence; currently Italian research is maintaining the same focus. As English football has developed and moved away from its violent past, Italian football remains mired in corruption and violence. Whilst a number of Italian academics have focussed on global transformations, in particular the role of television (Menduni 1996; Menduni 2002; Liguori and Smargiasse 2003; Russo 2005; Porro 2008; Cacciari and Giudici 2010), much of the focus of Italian literature has centred on the ultrà. From Dal Lago’s seminal Descrizione di una Battaglia (‘Description of a Battle’) there has been extensive research analysing the ultrà identity (Dal Lago 1990; De Biasi 1996; Podaliri and Balestri 1998; Roversi and Balestri 2000; Salvini 2004; Ferreri 2008; Francesio 2008; Lava 2008; Squinzani 2009; Stefanini 2009). Although the continuing violence at football ensures that the ultrà remain a focus of academic research, there are signs that academic research is beginning to investigate the wider global issues in Italian football. In particular, English football becomes an apposite focus (Lava 2008; Manes 2008). Wider analysis is also provided by Cacciari et al (Cacciari and Giudici 2010). This collection of essays represents an attempt to situate analysis of Italian football within the wider body of literature on globalisation. As Tintori states in the Introduction:

“This is not a book on the ultras, a work on the animals. A book on the ultras is inevitably destined to failure as some work of fiction that pretends to represent reality. Here we search for the exact opposite, inverting the subject and object. This is a book on modern football: at the centre of interest are the powers and institutions that govern football, the completely restructured economy, the conflicts that arise” (Cacciari and Giudici 2010)
Consequently, although the *ultrà* are a significant aspect of Italian football, they must be situated in the wider political economic transformations that have affected global football. Through this analysis, it can be shown how the wider patrimonial networks operating within the Italian political economy incorporated the *ultrà* and helped legitimise them.

History and performance are significant aspects of the *ultrà* movement. The term itself derives from French politics; during the French restoration period (1815-30), an *ultrà-royaliste* was a partisan supporter of Absolute Monarchy (Testa 2009). The term has been adapted to refer to all hardcore football fans who demonstrate an unwavering support of their team (Testa 2009). Principally, *ultrà* are young men and although young women participate, the leaders and core of the *ultrà* are male. Match-days are characterised by extensive displays of flags and banners which result in a riot of colour. The flags depict the colours of the team and of the city and are waved at the start of matches, and at various points throughout the game. Banners or *striscione* are unfurled across the *curve*. These depict membership of the group, political messages or taunts to rivals. In addition to the visual display, the fans produce an aural performance through orchestrated choruses combined with drums and trumpets. Many of the songs supplement the visual, being songs about the team or political views. The choreography is often supplemented with flares and smoke bombs with add to the aural and visual spectacle. It is this aspect of ‘spectacle’ that distinguishes *ultrà* support:

“Italians refer to the staging of a match as a *spettacolo*. No English word adequately conveys the *spettacolo*, but it involves creation of a special atmosphere characterised by a combination of colour, vibrance and noise” (De Biasi 1996: 116)
The combination of flags, banners, flares, and choruses produce a powerful spectacle which is orchestrated with a chant-leader. These combine to create a visual and audible display that enhances the emotion of the situation and increase group solidarity.

The choreographies are not passive displays but powerful displays of identity and solidarity. A good example of positive ultrà display arose in December 2007 when Fiorentina faced Inter. The wife of Fiorentina’s manager, Cesare Prandelli, had died of cancer on the Monday before the match. The Fiorentina ultrà displayed a striscione stating “the time that passes deadens the sorrow, but if you would need her, raise your eyes to the sky, her star will drive you forever and carry us far”. Ultrà also undertake a range of charity work (Testa 2010). After an earthquake struck the Southern Italian town of L’Aquila in 2009, Livornese ultrà organised a collection for the victims. In contrast to these displays of inclusion, charity and membership, ultrà are frequently depicted as violent hooligans. Football matches are often marred by violence between rival groups and police. This occurred tragically in February 2007 when Filippo Raciti was killed in riots with Catania and Palermo fans. Although this events focussed the attention of the authorities squarely on the phenomenon, it represents just one example of violence and death at Italian football matches.

To understand the ultrà phenomenon, it must be analysed in relation to the political-economic transformations occurring across Italy. Widespread internal migration fuelled by the ‘Miracle’ contributed to an upsurge in interest in football in the larger industrial cities. This led to fan-groups organising supporters’ clubs in the 1950s, such as Inter’s I Moschettieri (‘The Musketeers’), to meet and discuss football and their football club and to organise social events with other fans. The ultrà originated from these earlier forms of
supporters’ clubs, with the first ultrà group being formed in 1968; the Fossa dei Leoni (‘Lion’s Den’) of Milan. This was followed a year later by the Boys of Inter (Foot 2007; Ferreri 2008). The phenomenon developed throughout the following decade and has seen various transformations. In this way we can identify three distinct phases of the ultrà (Roversi 1994; Roversi and Balestri 2000; Ferreri 2008; Testa and Armstrong 2008; Scalia 2009). From its development and growth in the early 1970s, the homogeneity of the groups began to fragment during the 1980s. Despite this fragmentation, a new form of umbrella ultrà identity emerged in the mid-1990s.

The ultrà phenomenon originated in the politically fertile period of the 1970s. The political turmoil during the decade saw the emergence of political terrorism, termed the ‘years of lead’, and also witnessed the emergence of many political movements like the Brigate Rosse (Wagstaff 2001; Foot 2003: 38; Bartali 2006; Cooke 2006; Ignazi 2006). The intense politicisation of public life was extended to the football stadiums where the ultrà adopted similar political language when naming their groups. Group names such as ‘Red and Blue Commandos’ at Bologna and ‘Tupamaros’ and ‘Vigilantes’ at Sampdoria identify the militant tendencies of the groups (Podaliri and Balestri 1998: 90). The ultrà actively incorporated the political symbols of the piazza into the stadium (Stefanini 2009: 101-2). Teams started to reflect the wider political allegiances of the city or wider region. Bologna, in the Communist stronghold of Emilia, had left-wing supporters whilst the more conservative Veneto was reflected by the right-wing Verona. Political banners and flags, of the type paraded on marches and demonstrations, were displayed prominently in the curve, and political songs were sung throughout the match (Dal Lago and De Biasi 1994; Roversi 1994; Podaliri and Balestri 1998: 91). These features were incorporated into the choreographies to create the conspicuous spectacle. Likewise the military style of

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60 a Uruguayan urban guerrilla group
the street was also reflected in the clothes adopted by the groups. The ‘urban guerrilla’ style of combat jackets or camouflage outfits, with balaclavas and scarves obscuring the face, were taken directly from the political turmoil on the streets (Roversi 1994; Podaliri and Balestri 1998). This represented a marked contrast to certain styles of hooliganism, such as the English and Dutch, who developed a casual style of dress to evade police detection (Redhead and McLaughlin 1985; Giulianotti 1993; Spaaij 2006). As a consequence the ultrà became an extension of the politics of the city.

In addition to politics, the ultrà incorporated campanilismo into their identity. Campanilismo is literally the love of one’s bell-tower and represents the love of one’s home town. While Putnam ascribes local identity to civic traditions (Putnam, Leonardi et al. 1993), many of these traditions were shaped through historical and religious rituals and narratives. Friendships and rivalries were affirmed through politics and regionalism and this helped shape intra-group dynamics (Lanfranchi and De Biasi 1997). Within the major cities, teams polarised around traditional notions of the team and political affiliation. In Milan, Internazionale were seen as the team of the bourgeoisie and more conservative while AC Milan, as the traditional team of the railway workers, represented the working class. (Roversi 1994; Podaliri and Balestri 1998). Similar patterns emerged in Turin where Juventus represented the owners and mangers of Fiat whereas Torino represented the workers in the factories. In Rome, Roma represented the city, whereas Lazio represented the more conservative region of the same name. Campanilismo also facilitated the emergence of inter-city rivalries. The more passionate derbies operate between close neighbours, such as Vicenza and Verona, Ascoli and Ancona, or Como and Varese (Foot 2006: 309). There has been long-running conflict between Pisa and Livorno in spite of their common political affiliations. When the AC Milan striker Luther Blissett scored the goal that caused Pisa to be relegated, Livorno fans held parties and subsequently unveiled
a banner thanking him at their next game (Foot 2006: 390). This continued in the 1990s when over twenty-thousand leaflets were dropped over Pisa from a specially hired plane before a derby game (Foot 2006: 390).

The complicated constructions of *campanilismo* see a complex network of interactions take place. Dal Lago describes Italian football culture as “a form of extended municipalism” (Dal Lago and De Biasi 1994). The battle lines of the football *ultrà* are those of the ancient rivalries between regions and towns. This led to the emergence of what Dunning has termed the ‘Bedouin Syndrome’ (Dunning, Murphy et al. 1986). This is where “the friend of a friend is a friend; the friend of an enemy is an enemy”. As a result, the rivalries are negotiated through *gammellaggio* or ‘twinning’ (Dal Lago 1990; Bruno 1992; Dal Lago and De Biasi 1994; Marchi 2005; Stefanini 2009: 121; Testa 2009). Historical traces became re-invented. During the religious wars of the Middle Ages, those cities who supported the Pope (Guelphs) became enemies with those that supported the Holy Roman Emperor (Ghibellines). Pisa who feared the rise of the Papacy, supported the Emperor, whereas Genoa supported the Pope due to their proximity to the Emperor. As Pisa and Siena were political and trading rivals with Florence, Siena also became a Guelph. Similar patterns emerged centuries later with political and city rivalries. Fans of Florence’s Fiorentina are still rivals with Pisa and Siena. Furthermore, supporters of teams that represented different political views became rivals whilst friendships were forged with groups of similar beliefs. In this way, Bologna became friends with AC Milan in the 1970s because of their left-wing politics, yet Verona became enemies based on their right-wing politics. Livorno, a team affiliated to the Left, had rivalries with Lazio and Verona, in addition to being rivals with friends of Pisa. Consequently, civic traditions become bound in with historical narratives and rivalries. The following section illustrates

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61 For example, the fan website tifonet details the various twinnings and rivalries with other teams under it’s ‘war and peace’ section: http://www.tifonet.it/guerraepace/
the importance of history to the construction of Livornese identity, especially as political identities become entwined.

**Livorno: An Historical Identity**

Livorno represents an apposite field of study because its political identity is central to its local identity. Furthermore, there is a unique flavour to Livorno’s history that contributes to this political identity and creates a range of inter-city and inter-club rivalries. As Abse states: “Livorno is interesting not because it is a typical Tuscan city but because it is an atypical one” (Abse 1986: 57). The political and historical development of Tuscany has created a network of friends and rivals. Pisa, in particular, represents a significant factor within Livorno’s history and identity. During the early medieval period, Pisa was the main port on the Tuscan coast and was one of the main Maritime powers in the Mediterranean. A decisive naval defeat at the Battle of Meloria to Genoa in 1284, one of its major mercantile and military competitors, halted Pisan expansion. This was compounded by the growth of Florence further east along the River Arno. Pisa eventually succumbed to Florence and became their port and communications access to the world. The slow moving River Arno began silting up and by the 16th Century Pisa was unusable as a port. Consequently, the rulers of Florence built a new port at Livorno, ten miles south of Pisa. To populate this new town, Florence passed the *Leggi Livornine* in 1593.\(^2\) This law welcomed anyone, regardless of background, and as a result the city was populated with criminals and those fleeing religious persecution (Nudi 1980: 206-7; Galasso 2002: 17). There were a number of merchants from across Europe and the east who helped to create a cosmopolitan city (Abse 1986). The free-port status continued until unification when the city became heavily industrialised which resulted in widespread

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\(^2\) [http://dewey.library.upenn.edu/sceti/ljs/PageLevel/view.cfm?option=view&ManID=ljs379](http://dewey.library.upenn.edu/sceti/ljs/PageLevel/view.cfm?option=view&ManID=ljs379)
political activism, particularly around working rights. This resulted in the popularity of Socialism and anarchism which was reinforced during the politically turbulent times of the 1920s. The period that saw the growth of Fascism, also saw a decisive split in the Socialist Party. As one of its architects, Antonio Gramsci, stated:

“At Livorno, the destiny of the working people of Italy will be under discussion. At Livorno, a new era in the history of the Italian nation will begin” (Gramsci 2000: 121).

The 1921 Socialist Party conference was held at the San Marco Theatre in Livorno. Those Socialists who wanted to follow the Soviet model engineered a split to form the Italian Communist Party, the PCI. The links to the Communist Party were reinforced in 1975 with the formation of Eurocommunism. Democratic Communism resulted from the meeting of the PCI and their Spanish equivalents in Livorno (The Times 1984). In addition, Livorno has historically voted for left-wing parties, in particular the PCI.

The complex political and local constructions of the fan groups permit the creation of new forms of imagined communities (Anderson 2006). As with the wider national constructions demonstrated in chapter two, these imagined communities have unifying invented traditions that permit the creation of common rituals and collective memories (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Local rituals and memories help inflect the fan group with meaning which is reinforced through the rituals of football (King 1997). Consequently, Livorno fans draw on their history to reinforce their identity and distinguish themselves from their rivals. Livorno’s history as a free port shapes much of the city’s narrative. The Leggi Livornine permitted all people, whatever their race, religion
or criminal record. This created a ‘city of nations’ as inhabitants from across Europe and the Mediterranean settled in the city (Nudi 1980: 206-7; Galasso 2002: 17). Many of these were professional merchants who were attracted by the absence of tax. Others were criminals and slaves, who would not face investigation in the city, whilst others were fleeing religious persecution. The religious tolerance exhibited within the city was reflected in the incorporation of Jews in society. In defiance of a papal edict, the city did not ghettoise the Jewish population, making it extremely unusual in contemporary European culture (Galasso 2002: 21). This political image was reinforced through the creation of the PCI at the Livorno Congress in 1921 (Gramsci 2000: 118; Dombroski 2001: 121).

These significant events in Livorno’s history create an historical narrative that reinforces the imagined community of the city and its football fans. Religious and historic rituals provide the opportunity for the continual reinvigoration of civic solidarity. Simple classifications and analogies are interwoven into narratives and symbols to facilitate understanding and memorisation (Rydgren 2007). These historical symbols and narratives assist in incorporating new members into the groups by familiarising them with its past values (Llobera 1989; Zerubavel 1996). These narratives are framed by existing knowledge through the individual interactions of members and this permits Livornese identity and history to be presented and reinforced (Collard 1989; Tonkin 1992; Rydgren 2007). Historical narratives require trust to assist in memorisation (Rydgren 2007) so the social capital of the group reinforces the historical tradition of the imagined community.

http://dewey.library.upenn.edu/sceti/ljs/PageLevel/view.cfm?option=view&ManID=ljs379
Two narratives are often provided to illustrate a ‘Typical Livornese’. In 1984, the city of Livorno was celebrating the one-hundredth birthday of Amadeo Modigliani, Livorno’s most famous son, the Avant-garde artist who later moved to Paris. In addition to an exhibition of his work, the commune sought to dredge the canals near where Modigliani used to live and work. Local legend stated that after poor reviews of his work and in a fit of pique, the artist threw some sculptures into the canal. Whilst the council was dredging the canals they discovered much debris, which led to residents quipping that the council had discovered Modigliani’s bicycle or shoe. After eight days of dredging, the dream became reality as a stone sculpture of a head was unearthed. Two hours later a further two busts were discovered. With the world’s art media focussed on Livorno, many art critics authenticated the discoveries as Modigliani sculptures. However two months later, a group of students admitted making one of the busts in their garden with an electric drill. The art experts immediately denounced them as publicity seekers. However, they provided pictures of themselves in action and on national television proceeded to make another ‘Modigliani head’. Their explanation for the delay was their confusion over the other two busts; they had only made one sculpture. The confusion was soon allayed when a dock worker and part-time sculptor, Angelo Froglia, admitted making the other two heads as a conceptual work to highlight the pomposity of the art world. Not only is this story recounted to illustrate the anti-establishment sentiments, it also illustrated that two distinct groups of people came up with the same idea as a practical joke.

The other story used to demonstrate Livorno’s identity and character, relates to the fans of the football team who were attending the first game of the 2004-5 season. Livorno was returning to Serie A for the first time since 1949 and as a result took nearly ten thousand fans to the San Siro Stadium for their match with AC Milan. That summer, the Italian Prime Minister and AC Milan’s owner, Silvio Berlusconi, was photographed
entertaining the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, at his Sardinian villa. In these photos
Berlusconi sported a white bandana that was either a bad fashion accessory or covering a
hair transplant [Pisa 2009]. The Livorno fans took this symbol as an opportunity to mock
Berlusconi, who not only represented the establishment, but also was a right wing
politician. Thousands of Livorno fans arrived at the San Siro, similarly attired to
Berlusconi, with white bandanas emblazoned with the words “Silvio, Siamo Arrivando”
(“Silvio, we are coming”) (La Repubblica 2004; Foot 2007). Through the articulation of
these stories, Livornese are articulating and re-articulating an historical narrative that
reinforces local identity and campanilismo. These historic constructions become vital in
narrating the invented traditions of imagined communities and are weaved into the
overall presentation of the group.

The creation of the imagined community with its own invented traditions and based on
the socially constructed history of the community, requires social action to operate. The
imagined community operates within a social space. Football facilitates by providing the
focus and location for this social action to exist. The stadium becomes a central location
for the articulation and expression of the identity of the imagined community. The
atmosphere generated by the collective solidarity of the crowd fuels the construction of
emotional ties to their physical environment. This contributes to a feeling of topophilia to
the stadium (Bale 1990; Bale 1993). This turns the stadium into a temporary sacred space
that subverts the normal everyday practices. Consequently, the curve have become liminal
spaces that are sacred to the ultrà (Ferreri 2008: 74). They become decorated with the
signs and markers of the group and these operate as sacred markers which depict
temporary ownership. In the creation of these temporary liminal spaces, the imagined
community builds its own rules and rituals:
“In a stadium, according to sectors or groups that occupy it, become of fact legal behaviours that in other situations of daily life tend to be hidden, or however protected from the gaze of the forces of order. In this way, in a “curva” one can smoke marijuana with relative impunity, one can throw objects onto the field, simulate brawls, tear up the symbols of rival teams and above all express in various ways transgressive behaviours” (Dal Lago 1990: 37)

The importance of liminality is reinforced through the ‘carnivalesque’ atmosphere generated within the stadium.

In his concept of the carnivalesque, Bakhtin highlights the spectacle and performance involved within the carnival. The traditional rules and borders of everyday life became subverted as degradation of the sacred becomes permitted (Bakhtin 1984). The vocal choruses and profanities targeted at referees and rival players would not be permitted outside the carnival. Yet within the sacred space of the curva this ritual denigration heightens the spectacle. Leading figures outside of the carnival also become ripe for satire and are transformed into grotesques that are ritually humiliated. Within the politically afflicted world of Italian football, politics and politicians become targets. The example of Livorno fans wearing bandanas to AC Milan was a ritual humiliation of the Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi. Through its performance it reinforced the collective memory and identity of the group and the liminality of the stadium. The passive legitimation of these practises permits the carnivalesque to continue as official consent negates the organic actions of the crowd (Giulianotti 1991). The lack of active policing in these situations reinforces the legitimacy of the carnivalesque:
Quantity not quality seems to be their preferred method, combined with a degree of non-intervention. Surrounding the curva they permit the fans in it to behave in a way as if the curva were a zone of liminality. Such discretion points to a discrepancy between legal requirements and tolerated behaviour which is not manifested by the police in Britain” (Lanfranchi and De Biasi 1997: 101)

Without the gaze of surveillance, the participants can remain in their liminal space and endorses the carnivalesque. In addition to subverting existing hierarchies, the carnivalesque spectacle blurs the boundaries between performance and audience. As Bakhtin states:

“Carnival does not know footlights, in the sense that it does not acknowledge a distinction between action and spectacle. Footlights would destroy a carnival, as the absence of footlights would destroy a theatrical performance. Carnival is not a spectacle seen by the people; they live in it, and everyone participates because its very idea embraces all the people. While carnival lasts, there is no life outside it. During carnival time life is subject only to its laws, that is, the laws of its own freedom” (Bakhtin 1984: 7).

The actor and performer become entwined as they watch performers creating the spectacle (Abercrombie and Longhurst 1998: 68-9). The performer is continually watching other performers for visual and aural cues to reinforce the carnival.

The creation of the imagined community within the carnivalesque stadium needs constant reaffirmation for the group to continue. Through the production and consumption of the spectacle, the Livorno fans are continually performing and re-
creating their identity. Goffman has suggested that all social actors perform specific roles depending upon their social environment (Goffman 1990). This presupposes that actors are calculating and mechanical who drop the façade as soon as they are backstage (Jenkins 1996: 68; Romania 2005: 66). Social actors acknowledge and learn visual and aural cues that signify participation within an acknowledged group. Butler suggests that these cues are utilised to construct the performance and this process reinforces the identity:

“[t]he subject is not determined by the rules through which it is generated because signification is not a founding act, but rather a regulated process of repetition that both conceals itself and enforces its rules precisely through the production of substantialising effects [original italics]” (Butler 1990: 145).

Therefore performance is not just an ‘act’ or ‘masquerade’, but is constantly reaffirmed through daily performance of cultural cues. Where Goffman’s actor chooses their ‘face’, Butler’s denies the agency of the actor as they merely repeat the actions from the cues around them (Lloyd 1999: 209):

“There is no volitional subject behind the mime who decides, at it were, which gender it will be today… gender is not a performance that a prior subject elects to do, but gender is performative” (Butler 1993).

Consequently, the distinction between performance and performativity becomes blurred. Even if an individual chooses to wear drag they are still taking cues from previously performed identities to highlight which is already understood. Therefore, as Lloyd argues, “a performance is itself performative” (Lloyd 1999: 202, 209).
The choreographies of the *ultrà* constitute such a performance of identity. The actors within the choreography are not cultural dupes, but active producers with knowledge and understanding of the elements of the performance. In order to do this they must utilise the correct commodities to present the group in the correct way and are consequently performing their consumption:

“Each and every expression of fan identity is hence both a non-volitional citation *and the* (consumerist) ‘choice’ of a volitional fan-subject. The *performative consumption* which characterises media fandom.... Is hence both an act and an iteration-without-origin [original italics]” (Hills 2002: 159)

The *ultrà* participate in this ‘performative consumption’ with a range of commodities. Choreographies are created and performed with flags, *striscione*, and smoke bombs. Although flags are sold outside the stadium and in the local market, many of the items are actively produced away from the stadium, at home or in bars. Many of the *striscione* are made on rolls of white cloth or paper. Other home-made devices include the *bomba carta* which are home-made bombs that make spectacular explosions or smoke for the choreographies. They have also been used as weapons; Catania fans had amassed over one hundred *bomba carta* to ambush Palermo fans during their infamous derby that resulted in the death of the policeman, Filippo Raciti (Richardson 2007).

Through the performance of the choreography, the *ultrà* are producing the symbolic markers of their localised imagined community. Livorno fans utilise many left-wing symbols to symbolise their identity. Flags, scarves, t-shirts and graffiti display ‘Communist’ symbols such as the ‘hammer and sickle’, ‘red star’ or image of Che
National flags, such as Cuba and Palestine, have been adopted to demonstrate solidarity. Green military-style clothing also reinforces the militancy of the ultrà. Military style jackets are worn during games, in addition to the green army-style cap popularised by Chairman Mao. These symbols are not freed from political or historical connections since green military-style jackets were a symbol of left wing identity during the politically turbulent period of the 1970s and reinforce the invented traditions of the group. This military style is also locally contingent. When the Americans left the city after the Second World War, they left much of their equipment behind. A market was set-up which sold these supplies. This market, the ‘American Market’, still exists today and mainly sells military style clothing. One stall sells a range of unofficial Livorno merchandise, such as T-shirts and scarves, as well as the various national flags which are displayed at the ground. Consequently, when the Livorno fans perform at the stadium, displaying left-wing symbols on T-shirts, striscione and flags, they are performing a type of drag which becomes performative; it not only reaffirms their identity, but reaffirms their collective memory. Despite the formation of ultrà imagined communities based around local narratives, and the continuance of collective identities like the ones that exist in Livorno, the groups have still fragmented, a process which started in the 1980s. The following section will illustrate this transformation in relation to deregulation and globalisation.

**Fragmentation of the Ultrà**

Despite the high level of organisation and planning that the choreographies demonstrate, the ultrà have not been unaffected by changes to the global political economy and neofootball. Although these ultrà groups still accumulate social capital, they are no longer a homogeneous group. The ultrà have developed broadly in line with the political economic phases of global football identified by King and Goldblatt (King 2003;
Goldblatt 2007; King 2009; King 2010). Following the highly organised groups of the 1970s, the uniform political blocs began to fragment by the 1980s. The organisation adapted to new forms of display as younger groups began to focus on neo-localism and violence (Dal Lago and De Biasi 1994; Roversi 1994). Alongside the choreographies, violence had been a small part of the overall ultrà identity. By the end of the 1970s the number of violent instances began steadily increasing. It is difficult to isolate the timing of this transition. There is some consensus that the patterns began emerging in the 1970s and crystallised in the earlier 1980s (Roversi 1994; Podaliri and Balestri 1998; Ferreri 2008). This became apparent by 1983-4 when there was a sharp increase in the number of occurrences of violence (Roversi 1994; Lanfranchi and De Biasi 1997; Roversi and Balestri 2000). A clear demarcation of the transition can be assigned through identification of a significant event (Scalia 2009; Stefanini 2009; Testa 2009). During the Rome derby between Lazio and Roma on 28 October 1979, a nautical flare was launched from the Roma curva (De Biasi 1996; Foot 2007: 326). It flew across the stadium and lodged in the skull of a Lazio fan who was using his brother’s season ticket for the match. The fan, Vincenzo Paparelli, died on the way to the hospital and represented the first death attributable to ultrà. By the 1980s violence became a central feature of ultrà identity and a new way of performing group identity. In contrast to the earlier political names of ultrà groups in the 1970s, the emerging groups’ names highlighted the change of focus to violence (Roversi 1994; Stefanini 2009: 120). Names, such as the Sconvolts (“Upsetters”) or Kaos, were used by the fragmenting groups (Roversi 1994; Stefanini 2009: 120; Testa 2009). Indeed, Juventus’ group the Droghi were inspired by the ultraviolence of the Droogs in Stanley Kubrik’s film, The Clockwork Orange (Foot 2007).

As the ultrà focussed on violence, they became more organised and militarised. The ultrà had already become militarised through the political conflict of the anni di piombo. The
military uniforms of the 1970s had been adopted, yet more organised tactics emerged during the 1980s. Alongside these tactics, groups started using weapons. Rather than the bare fists of the 1970s, the new groups started using knives, bombs, iron bars and rockets (such as the one that killed Paparelli). (Dal Lago and De Biasi 1994; Ferreri 2008: 26).

The groups operated under a hierarchy, with capi-ultrà, the heads of the ultrà leading the chants and the choreographies (Foot 2007). This militarisation has led to a number of Italian commentators using the metaphor of war when discussing ultrà. For example, Dal Lago and De Biasi wrote:

“In order to defeat the enemies on the field, ultrà groups try to adopt urban guerrilla tactics (particularly setting ambushes near to stations and involving the police) (Dal Lago and De Biasi 1994: 86)

The parallels with urban guerrillas are used to illustrate the mode of operation of the groups. The creation of the curva and the city as sacred spaces sees the groups attempting to defend their territory from outsiders by ambushing opponents and defending their honour. In line with this militarisation, the police responded with an increased military presence (Dal Lago and De Biasi 1994; Roversi 1994; Marchi 2005). In addition to seeking out rival fans, the ultrà who focus on violence utilise their tactics to evade the police, as well as incorporating them into the attacks (Dal Lago and De Biasi 1994).

The liminal space of the curva became an apposite location to perform the new forms of politics emerging in Italy. The anti-south rhetoric of the Lega Nord was reflected with stronger regional rivalries in the stadiums. Striscione in particular, demonstrated the increasing anti-Southern sentiment. Verona is a city at the heart of the Lega’s imagined nation of ‘Padania’. The city’s historic football team, Hellas Verona, epitomises the
Northern anti-Southern bias that is utilised by the Lega Nord. In 1985 the Hellas Verona fans displayed a banner to rival Napoli fans stating: “Welcome to Italy” (Foot 2007: 310). The inference was that the south was not part of the Italian nation. When Mount Etna started to smoke, Verona fans held up a banner against Catania declaring “Forza Etna!” meaning “Go Etna!” (Parks 2003; Foot 2006: 309). At the same time graffiti appeared in the North expressing the same sentiment (Hofmann 2008). Similarly, Verona fans unveiled a banner at Napoli saying “Vesuvio facci sognare” – “Help us dream, Vesuvius” (Foot 2006: 309). The fans of other football clubs also suggested that they wanted volcanoes to destroy the south. AC Milan fans unveiled a similar banner at Napoli saying “Give us a present Vesuvian”, highlighting the increasing fragmentation of the Italian state (Foot 2006: 309). This invective is not confined to geography. The carnivalesque atmosphere also permits the desecration of sacred symbolic associations. Famously, Napoli fans retaliated to Verona fans with a striscione that drew on the city of Verona’s literary connection with Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet. The banner stated that Giulietta è ‘na Zoccola e Romeo Cornuto - ‘Juliet is a Slag and Romeo is a cuckold’. The sentiment has resulted in a series of books under that title, which have published the various humorous and offensive striscione displayed on the curva (Militello 2004; Militello 2004; Militello 2005). Although informal associations may generate social capital for its members, they do not necessarily contribute to a wider feeling of national sentiment, as regional identities continue to be asserted.

Italia ‘90 provided an apposite example of the increased regionalism within Italy. During the group stages of the competition, fans in AC Milan supported Cameroon in their match against Argentina. Similarly, when Argentina played Brazil in Turin, the local fans supported Brazil (Dal Lago and De Biasi 1994). In both cases the fans were focussing

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their support on the opponents of Maradona. The Argentinean player was the totemic player of Napoli who had transformed the fortunes of the southern club. On account of their footballing power and the renewed regionalism within Italy, Maradona became the focus for the hatred of the fans of AC Milan and Turin. The clubs of those cities, in particular, Inter, AC Milan and Juventus were fierce rivals with Napoli and consequently, the fans of these clubs supported Maradona’s rivals in the World Cup. Fatefully, Argentina drew Italy in the quarter finals of the competition; a match that was to be played in Naples. The situation prompted Maradona to declare to Napoli fans: “For 364 days a year you are treated like dirt, and then they ask you to support them” (Foot 2007: 478). The statement divided Neapolitan opinion and reveals the contested nature of national identity in Italy. One banner stated: “Diego, we love you but at the end of the day we are Italians” (Foot 2007: 478). Argentina defeated Italy to reach the final in Rome. Regional and footballing rivalries entered the international arena of the World Cup as the Roman crowd jeered throughout the Argentinean national anthem (Foot 2006: 126).

The 1980s also saw on the curva an increase in racism against groups from outside Italy. Increased global migration saw many immigrants move to Italy to work in the northern factories or in low-paid work, such as fruit picking. As was witnessed in the 1970s, the politics of the piazza were transferred to the curve. Whereas many ultrà groups in the 1970s were left wing, the 1980s saw a trend towards political neutrality or even to the extreme Right. Racist chants and banners were becoming more widespread across the stadiums (Podaliri and Balestri 1998; Testa and Armstrong 2008). This does not mark the ultrà as right wing, but identifies a shift in politics elsewhere. This process has occurred spectacularly with Roma. Traditionally, Roma was associated with the working class area of Testaccio and had a strong affiliation to the local Jewish community. This led to the fans of Lazio presenting a striscione to the Roma fans of the Curva Sud stating: “Curva Sud
full, Synagogues empty” (Foot 2007: 310). The racism became more acute when Lazio fans presented striscioni stating: ‘Your home is Auschwitz’ and ‘Team of blacks, curva of Jews’ (Foot 2007: 310). In recent years the leading ultrà groups of Roma have become affiliated with the far Right (Testa and Armstrong 2008). This has resulted in Roma fans utilising the same anti-Semitic references against Livorno, another club with strong Jewish connections. In 2006 Roma fans displayed a banner stating: Lazio-Livorno, stessa iniziale, stesso forno (‘Lazio-Livorno, same initials, same oven’) (Caccia 2006; La Repubblica 2006). The Roma fans utilised Livorno’s strong Jewish history through the analogy to the Auschwitz ovens. They also identify their move from the left wing identity characterised by Livorno. By placing them in the same category as their fierce local rivals, Lazio, they were declaring that Livorno fans are enemies. These sentiments were strengthened through word play with the poetic rhyme of ‘Livorno’ and ‘forno’ which reinforced the statement.

Racism has also frequently been directed at the players. The Bosman ruling de-regulated the national leagues’ ability to control player numbers. This has seen an increase in the number of players from outside the national borders (Maguire and Stead 1998; Giulianotti 1999; Maguire and Pearton 2000; King 2003). Although Italy has a long history of overseas players, many were oriundi players of Italian ancestry. Consequently, the de-regulated player markets saw an increase in players from outside the ‘traditional’ European markets. Players who are marked as being outside the ‘norm’ were targeted. Based on his Romanian heritage, the Fiorentina player Adriano Mutu, was labelled a “crafty little gypsy” by Maurizio Zamparini, the president of Palermo (Kick It Out 2007). He has also been the subject of ‘gypsy’ taunts from the curve. Similarly, the Japanese star, Shunsuke Nakamura, received racist abuse and suggested that this “probably explains why so few Japanese players have made it here.” (O’Henley 2008). African players have
become particular targets. Frequently black players receive “buu buu” chants whenever they touch the ball. This situation has manifested itself in the abuse levelled at Mario Balotelli. Balotelli was a young Inter player who was widely seen as the future star of Italian football. He was born to Ghanaian parents in Palermo and two years later was adopted by an Italian family and raised in Brescia. Balotelli has been subjected to widespread abuse, including chants of “There are no black Italians” and “If you jump up and down, Balotelli dies” (Crosetti 2009; Il Giornale 2009; Il Giornale 2009; Kington 2009; La Corriere dello Sport 2009; Sorrentino 2009). Rival fans claim that it is not racism, but the abuse is due to the attitude of the player. Balotelli provokes fans when he scores, and has an insolent attitude to training which has seen him attract criticism from his manager at Inter, Jose Mourinho.

The reaction to Mario Balotelli should not be taken in isolation. After being subjected to abuse from Inter’s fans in 2005, the Côte d’Ivoire player Marco Zoro attempted to walk off the pitch during a game between his team Messina, and Inter (Menicucci 2005). By 2010, players eventually took a stand. In February 2010 players from the amateur club of Casteltodino in Umbria walked off the pitch (La Repubblica 2010). Castelodino had two players with Nigerian parents and were labelled “Dirty Negroes” by an opposition player. Unfortunately abuse is not restricted to opposition players. After Juventus’ victory against Atalanta in March 2010, the French player Jonathan Zebina was slapped by a Juventus fan (La Repubblica 2010). In response to this Zebina said:

“Definitely it is racism… it is an ugly thing for the image of Italian football that does not deserve this. The Federation must do something. I will probably stay

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65 Balotelli left Inter, and Italy in August 2010 to join Manchester City.
and live in Italy, however, these images must be fought with much force, Italy deserves better” (La Repubblica 2010).

The FIGC has instigated some initiatives to counter these regular episodes of racism. After the Marco Zoro incident, they requested that players entered the pitch holding “No to Racism” banners (Menicucci 2005). They also sanction clubs whose fans participate in racist chanting. For example Juventus has been ordered to play a match behind ‘closed doors’ and fined €20,000 for the various episodes of abuse directed at Mario Balotelli (Kington 2009). However Jose Mourihno, the manager of Inter, was fined €40,000 and suspended for three games for making a crossed-arm ‘handcuffs’ gesture after two Inter players had been sent off. He was insinuating that the authorities were contriving to prevent Inter from winning their forth league title (Kington 2010). When accusations against the Federation are punished more severely than widespread racist abuse, there is little surprise that the problem continues. Furthermore, the equivalent of the ‘Kick it Out’ campaign in the English Premier League does not have a counterpart in Italy and this illustrates the continued lack of legitimacy of the FIGC. The perceived challenges to national identity, and the weakness of the central state to impose itself, have permitted local and regional identities to emerge.

Out of these transformations in fan identity, there was a re-emergence of the imagined community of Livorno. By drawing on its historical roots as a cosmopolitan city, it could reinforce its invented traditions. In opposition to the ‘generalised others’ across Italy, Livorno’s ultrà remained resolutely left-wing. This saw the emergence of the Brigate Autonome Livorno (BAL) (Foot 2007: 385). The group utilised the left wing symbols of Russian, Cuban and red flags, in addition to flags with Che Guevara. Communist songs were re-employed on the curva, such as the Bandiera Rossa (‘Red Flag’) and the Partisan
song Bella Ciao. This also included displaying a striscione dedicated to Stalin’s birthday: “Eternal Honour to you, Great Man. 21.12.1879” (Foot 2007: 385). BAL’s potency was reinforced through their membership of Cristiano Lucarelli. Lucarelli was a striker from Livorno who took a pay cut to transfer from Torino to play for his home-town club. He famously stated that “some players buy themselves a Ferrari or a yacht, for a billion lire, I bought myself a Livorno shirt” (Foot 2007: 388). After transferring he assigned himself the number ‘99’ shirt in homage to the date of formation of BAL. This in turn has become an invented tradition in Italy, where left wing footballers ask for the number ‘99’.

As a consequence of increased global migrations of players, local players become inflected with increased significance (King 2003). Lucarelli became a potent player-symbol for Livorno; a totemic object for the fans. He attracted much media attention, including becoming the subject of a documentary, “99 Amaranto”. Lucarelli can be contrasted with another potent player-symbol; Paolo Di Canio of Lazio. Both players were the subject of a parallel interview on Mediaset’s television show, Le Iene, based on their image as player-ultrà. Di Canio was famed for his support of Lazio’s far right tendencies and expressed an admiration for Mussolini. He has celebrated scoring goals with a Fascist salute to the crowd (Phillips 2005). In 2005 he made the same gesture as he was substituted against Livorno (The Independent 2005). In contrast, when Lucarelli scores a goal, he holds aloft his clenched fist as a goal celebration, in allusion to the Communist symbol of solidarity. With actions and interviews, Lucarelli and Di Canio show solidarity with their ‘comrades’ on the curva. Di Canio confirmed this after the Fascist salute against Livorno. He said afterwards, that “I will always salute as I did yesterday because it gives me a sense of belonging to my people” (The Independent 2005). His ‘people’ are the ultrà on the curva. He is highlighting that he understands the ultrà and what is important to

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67 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kblqsUPWLMw
them. By behaving in the same way, he is claiming membership of the group. A similar incident occurred in March 2010 when the Argentine striker Mauro Zarate was photographed performing the fascist salute with Lazio fans in the home curva, although he subsequently claimed that he had never heard of Mussolini (La Repubblica 2010). The subsequent media furore around incidents such as these helps reinforce the outsider status of the groups and reinforces members’ solidarity (Testa and Armstrong 2008).

Thus players that empathise with the fans become signified with greater meaning and importance.

The actions of Di Canio and Lucarelli reaffirm the strong legitimacy ultrà groups hold. As a result they have not been immune to the patrimonial nature of Italian political and business life. As we have seen, club owners utilise their clubs in the same way they use their business connections. Just as Moggi dispensed favours to those who helped him, club owners do the same. Ultrà operate within this sphere of influence. This grants the ultrà a degree of legitimacy as the club owners utilise them for their own ends (Scalia 2009). Some clubs provide free tickets or merchandising rights to ultrà, who in turn sell them through their organisations (Dal Lago and De Biasi 1994: 84; Kington 2007; Scalia 2009). Originally these concessions were in return for favours to the owners. Owners realised that empty stadiums were not good for the clubs and provided free tickets to stimulate interest. Other scenarios have seen presidents looking for justification to sack a manager, who would call on the ultrà to start chanting against the manager and get the other the fans to support the decision. Similarly, if the club wants a star player to sign a new contract, then the ultrà would perform a similar task (Vialli 2007: 385). On a wider level, club presidents purchase players as ‘gifts’ to fans. For example Berlusconi signed Robinho as a gift to AC Milan’s fans and permitted Marco Borriello to transfer at a
reduced price to Roma, because he “wanted to give a gift to our friends” (Bandini 2010; Colombo 2010).

Owner neo-patrimony emerged during the 1980s as owners sought to utilise the power of the ultrà to leverage purchases and control in the boardroom. Once again, Berlusconi is central to these changes in Italian football as Scalia highlights:

“The first example of this dynamic dates back to 1986. As AC Milan was suffering a deep financial crisis, the old owners tried to sell the team. Many entrepreneurs and businessmen made their bid, and among them the TV tycoon Silvio Berlusconi, who promised to bring the team back to the glories of the recent past. His offer was not considered as the best by the incumbent owners. Ultrà organised a snap protest in the stadium, and they were backed by some prominent politicians who supported the then-rampant entrepreneur. The result of this action proved to be successful, and in February 1986 Berlusconi became the boss of AC Milan” (Scalia 2009: 46)

In addition to introducing business and media practises into football, through his ownership of AC Milan, Berlusconi helped introduce the ultrà into the legitimate football network. Similar scenes occurred at Roma where the co-owners of Franco Sensi and Pietro Mezzaroma battled for complete control. The ultrà campaigned for Sensi, which helped him obtain full control (Scalia 2009: 46)

As a result, the ultrà have been incorporated into the owners’ patrimonial networks and this creates a paradoxical relationship the clubs and the fans. The concessions offered to the ultrà simultaneously justify and reinforce the crisis of legitimacy. Providing
concessions to ultras undermine the clubs’ opportunities to deal with the crises and introduce measures which will allow them to compete fairly in Europe. The ultras are faced with supporting a club owned by someone who does not feel the same emotional attachment and can resist attempts to remove their privileges. They have become an imagined community with an invented tradition of special privileges. Accordingly, they draw on these traditions and campaign vociferously to maintain their special status. An official at Palermo reportedly received a goat’s head after ending free ticketing (Kington 2007). Similarly, Lazio ultras threw bombs into the grounds of Lazio owner’s offices after he withdrew their 800 free tickets per match (Kington 2007). Their legitimation and propensity for unrest was used by Silvio Berlusconi as a reason for his debt-spreading decree, salva-calcio. He stated that clubs could not be allowed to fail as “there will be a revolution” (Foot 2007: 349). Once again Berlusconi utilised the image of the ultras to justify his actions relating to football and, by extension, his own football club. All of which serves to undermine the integrity of the league and the bodies seeking to regulate it. As a consequence, the ultras see themselves as legitimate members of the club.

Having gained legitimacy from the clubs, the ultras of some clubs have grown in strength. This has led Fabio Capello, the manager of England and the former manager of AC Milan, Roma and Juventus to state that: “In Italy the ultras are in charge” (La Gazzetta dello Sport 2009). With changes in consumption and technology, the ultras have acquired new forums to perform their identity. This has combined with the political fragmentation to create new symbolic markers of identity. Despite social capital being accumulated within these groups, they are not contributing to a common goal and actively undermine Italian football. The increased individualisation and fragmentation of the groups is narrowing the horizons of the groups who fail to see the wider context. The following section will highlight the development of the ultras group identity through incorporation of
consumption. This will be followed with examples of how the new forms of politics have been integrated into this new collective identity.

**Mentalità Ultrà: A Collective Identity?**

The transition from homogenous political ultrà to fragmented violent groups was marked by the death of Vicenzo Paparelli. Similarly, another death marks the emergence of a new form of ultrà identity. On 29 January 1995 a Genoa fan was stabbed to death before their game with AC Milan (De Biasi 1996; Foot 2007; Ferreri 2008; Stefanini 2009). Vincenzo Spagnolo was a twenty-four year old football fan who was part of a group that was confronted by a small band of AC Milan ultrà. A fight ensued and Spagnolo was stabbed by Simone Brasaglia; Spagnolo died in the street. Brasaglia went to the stadium and even held showed the knife to his fellow ultrà (Foot 2007: 342). The AC Milan ultrà even included a chant declaring that there was ‘one fewer’ of the Genoa fans: “uno di meno, voi siete uno di meno” (Ferreri 2008: 38; Stefanini 2009: 125). News of Spagnolo’s death circulated the stadium and led to the Genoa fans demanding that the game be halted. After initial rebuttals, the referee and players decided to abandon the game; the first time that a match had been stopped in this manner (Foot 2007: 343). Meanwhile, the Genoa ultrà attempted to storm the AC Milan curva to exact revenge on the culprit. This led to a seven-hour standoff with police that resulted in a riot outside the stadium. Such was the shock of the murder; Lega Calcio abandoned all of the following week’s matches (Foot 2007: 344).

There had been deaths relating to football since Paparelli’s death. It was, however, the first to be followed directly by the media (Stefanini 2009: 126). The reactions from the authorities were similar to those employed after Paparelli and Raciti. They introduced
swift measures to ban offensive items into the stadiums and reinforced the use of the
Daspo (Diffida ad Assistere alle manifestazioni Sportive, ‘Prohibition to attend sport events’)
68 banning order introduced in 1989. These are similar to football banning orders in the
UK, and are hybrid laws that do not require a criminal conviction before ratification
(Tsoukala 2009). The reaction from the ultrà, however, was unprecedented. On 5
February 1995, a week after Spagnolo’s death, ultrà from groups from across Italy held a
conference and issued the following statement:

“1) On Sunday Vincenzo Spagnolo, an ultrà of Genoa, died. This umpteenth
absurd attack leads us to say: Enough! Enough of these people who are not ultrà
who try and make the news by using the ultrà world to gain importance and by
ignoring the evil of what they do (as in this case irreparably). Enough with this
trend of twenty against two or three and Molotovs or knives.

2) Ultrà: once the championship starts again we will be faced with a difficult
period. The police can now do what they like; the only people who will be
blamed will be us, who have nothing to do with these cowards. If being an ultrà is
truly a way of life, we must have balls. On other occasions we ignored events,
arguing that they were not our problem, now we must shout enough!

3) What is the alternative? We find ourselves caught between policemen who
would like us to disappear and these filthy scum who don’t care about anything
and will continue with their cowardly ‘attacks’. Let us unite against those who
want to destroy the world of the ultrà, a free and true world despite all its
contradictions” (Foot 2007: 344-5; Ferreri 2008: 40-1; Stefanini 2009: 126-7)

68 http://www.osservatoriosport.interno.it/Daspo/index.html
The statement, or peace treaty, highlights some significant developments. It utilises the language of the oppressed, there is little self-criticism, and it calls for unity (Foot 2007). In the creation of this collective identity, it draws on the invented traditions of the movement by insinuating that there is no honour in using knives or outnumbering rivals. The statement is an attempt to create a collective image of ‘honourable’ ultrà.

The formation of this collective identity sees the increased fragmentation of boundaries. Roma fans have moved away from their traditional left-wing roots and are now combining with the Lazio fans to achieve common goals. The political symbols have become reframed as the politics of the curva fragments (De Biasi 1996). Rather than the traditional left-right axis of politics, the ultrà are politicising around single-issue politics and a common focus. Drawing on extensive fieldwork with Roma and Lazio fans, Testa highlights how the traditional rivalry between Roma and Lazio is becoming blurred. Testa has identified this emerging movement, calls them UltraS to differentiate them from the previous incarnation of ultrà (Testa 2009; Testa and Armstrong 2010). He highlights the charity work and single-issue politics that characterises the new social movement of the UltraS (Testa 2010). Although these highlight the shifting political nature of the ultrà, they do not take into account the changes to consumption that facilitate the performative nature of the ultrà. Consequently, analysis of the collective identity should encompass the changing act of consumption and performance, in addition to the political nature of the groups. A new collective mentality is emerging, mentalità ultrà, that is being performed through consumption and politics.
An apposite example of the production and consumption of an identity is demonstrated with the brand ‘Mentalità Ultras’. This clothing company was formed in 1995, the year of Spagnolo’s death, and produces a range of clothing and designs to exploit the ultrà identity. In addition to having a brand name and logo, ‘Mentalità Ultras’ also has created a logo that presents the image of the perfect ultrà. The ‘Cheeky Boy’ logo depicts the head of an ultrà in a hooded sweatshirt, fully zipped up. The hood is designed to completely cover the face, and leave the eyes free. The eyes are then covered with goggles so as to completely remove any individuality from the ultrà. The result is a character that resembles a ninja or military individual who can’t be identified and prosecuted. Furthermore, individual ultrà groups are also are capitalising on their images and club concessions, to produce a range of merchandise. Lazio’s infamous ultrà group, the Irriducibili (‘The Indomitable’), are famed for their explicit racism and right-wing identity. This provides the Irriducibili with symbolic capital that the group has used to operate group and club merchandising. The Irriducibili operated Lazio’s merchandising until Claudio Lotito, the current Lazio president, began to reintroduce the merchandising to the club. The group still runs a number of fan shops, which is distinct from the official clubs store. In a similar fashion, Livorno’s left-wing ultrà group, BAL, had acquired a similar status. The range of scarves, T-shirts and flags became markers of left wing identity and effectively a brand in itself. These brands contribute to the overall construction of a collective mentalità ultrà.

New forms of technology are creating new spaces for the performance of ultrà identity. Although there has not been a widespread fanzine culture in Italy (Dal Lago and De Biasi 1994), as there has in the UK, two national fanzines reproduce images of the ultrà. The fanzines Supertifo (“Superfan”) and Fan’s Magazine re-produce the various choreographies

70 http://www.laziofanshop.com/; http://store.sslazio.it
of ultrà groups throughout the football league structure. They provide opportunities for the ultrà to perform their identity on a national stage. The photos are self-produced so the groups exercise agency in selecting the appropriate images that will present their group in the best light. The internet is also providing the technological space to reinforce the image and performance of ultrà groups. Youtube provides such a space for the selective presentation of the groups. Portable recording devices permit the choreographies and chants to be performed to a worldwide audience. Umbrella sites such as tifonet.it, also provide online communities for the re-articulation of ultrà identity. In addition, individual ultrà groups have their own websites that reinforce the collective identity. Many of these sites include online shopping facilities where members can purchase the assorted paraphernalia that comprises the mentalità ultrà. These include the flags and scarves that help create the choreographies. They also include the hats and jackets that allow the user to recreate the ‘model’ ultrà through the wearing of the correct clothing and by covering the face. The performative nature of acquiring the correct costume for the curva reinforces the collective identity of the ultrà imagined community.

As with other imagined communities, the ultrà construct powerful symbols that enable them to articulate their support. The political nature of the ultrà ensures that the central symbolic markers are taken from the central narratives from the wider society. In the case of Italy, these markers become symbols of the central state.

‘All Cops are Bastards’: A Change of Focus

This thesis has argued that changes to the global political economy have fragmented political engagement. This has contributed to a decline in social capital which is seeing an
emptying out of civic engagement. Although the *ultrà* are engaged in political and charity work (Testa 2010), the fragmentation of *ultrà* has witnessed a reframing of key aspects of the *mentalità ultrà* political identity. Ironically, the weakness of the state is facilitating the creation of a collective identity. The statement resulting from Spagnolo’s death created a clear indication of this change of focus for the *ultrà* community. The police have become a symbolic object to the collective identity and this has resulted in the police becoming the focus of subsequent conflict. The origins of this shift in focus appeared the year before Spagnolo’s death. On 13th November 1994 the Deputy Head of Divisional Police and the Chief Inspector of the State Police were injured in a confrontation after a game between Brescia and Roma (De Biasi 1996: 121). Reports indicated that around fifty ultra-right militants travelled from Rome with the specific intention of attacking the police (Curro 2009). A similar incident occurred two weeks later when Lazio and Roma fans united during the Rome derby to attack the police, injuring eight officers (De Biasi 1996: 121-2). Ten years later the same group of fans united to create one of the most haunting spectacles in Italian football. The Rome derby of 24 March 2004 has since been dubbed “the derby of the dead child’ after several clashes with police before the match, a rumour circulated the stadium stating that the police had killed a child with their patrol car (Marchi 2005). This led to chants of ‘murderers’ to echo around the stadium. Despite denials being broadcast across the public address system, the *ultrà* of Lazio and Roma called for the game to be suspended. The *capi-ultrà* of Roma entered the pitch to speak to the Roma captain, Francesco Totti (Foot 2007). It was suggested that the heads of the *ultrà* said that they had spoken to the parents of the child and that the players should call the game off. The Lazio players addressed their fans to ascertain the truth. Meanwhile the referee phoned the head of the League, Adriano Galliani, for advice. Galliani permitted the game to be suspended. A riot ensued outside the stadium which resulted in
over two-hundred police officers being injured (Foot 2007: 348). The role of the police has become an important aspect of the identity of the ultrà.

The construction of the collective identity is not restricted to the performance of its members. Outside agents also shape and direct the image of the group. Deregulation of the media has turned them into active agents within the construction and production of images for wider public consumption. The fragmentation of the ultrà and resultant focus on violence that took place in the 1980s coincided with the emergence of the newly deregulated media businesses. As deregulated media companies compete for audience share, they sensationalise certain aspects of the news. For example, the previous chapter highlighted that Mediaset dramatised and sensationalised the tangentopoli scandal. Consequently, the sporadic acts of violence that has accompanied the ultrà has been amplified in the media who have constructed them as a ‘folk devil’ (Cohen 2002; Marchi 2005). In the case of the “derby of the dead child”, much of the media speculated that the ultrà had pre-planned the move to protest against laws that would force many clubs into administration (Owen 2004; Foot 2007). The police assist in this construction as the Rome chief of police, Achille Serra, corroborated the media by saying that he suspected that the violence was premeditated (Owen 2004). The police and media construction of the ultrà as folk devils legitimates the requirement for a hard-line approach. The construction of the ultrà folk devil and the emotion of a ‘hot’ derby confronted with large numbers of police provided all of the ingredients for ‘forward panic’, as the police pre-empted violence from the fans (Collins 2008). On the night of the Rome derby the police took aggressive action against all fans because they anticipated that violence would occur. When the match was initially suspended, fans threw flares towards the police. The police responded with tear gas. This heightened the emotion of the situation and caused increased confusion as fans tried to navigate through the smoke of the flares and the
clouds of tear gas. In addition to the scenes witnessed by the fans, the police response contributed to an atmosphere that could lead to fans at the ground to genuinely believe that the police could have killed a young fan (Marchi 2005).

The creation of the ultrà folk devil is assisting in the creation of the mentalità ultrà. Although powerful established groups enable the formation of ‘outside’ groups, the groups themselves reinforce this construction (Becker 1963; Elias and Scotson 1965). Fans expecting a negative police response will have constructed themselves as Outsiders who will be treated in a different manner to other groups (Stott and Pearson 2007: 289). This would make them more susceptible to perceived negative policing and therefore more likely to further embed themselves as Outsiders. Action against the police becomes legitimised once the Outsider imagined community has been created between ‘us’, the fans, and ‘them’, the police. The emergence of the mentalità ultrà collective identity reinforces the Outsider identity. After two-thousand Napoli fans without tickets visited Rome for their match against Roma on 31 August 2008, they were confronted with ‘zero tolerance’ from the police (Hawkey 2008). The situation was exacerbated by the fact that the police allowed the fans to travel even though they knew they did not have tickets. Any resulting management of the Napoli fans in Rome would be greeted with confusion and tension. Unsurprisingly, the situation saw violence around the stadium and at the train station. The police reinforced their stance, and the folk devil image, by releasing figures stating that eight hundred of the two thousand fans had criminal records. This included twenty-seven who had connections with the Neapolitan organised crime networks, the Camorra. The Napoli fans subsequently demonstrated the Outsider identity at their subsequent game through an act of consumption, by wearing T-shirts stating, “I’ve got a criminal past” (Hawkey 2008).
The death of the policeman Filippo Raciti in 2007 marks a symbolic moment in the reinforcement of the mentalità ultrà collective identity. Following Raciti’s death, all Serie A games were cancelled for the following weekend. For the following round of matches, a minute’s silence was held to commemorate the policeman. However, a different approach was taken nine months later when a fan was shot dead by a policeman. In November 2007 Lazio fans had an altercation with Juventus fans at a service station in Tuscany as both sets of fans were travelling north to attend matches. The situation resolved itself, in a case of self-policing, until a policeman in the service station on the opposite carriageway fired his gun in the air to try and calm the situation. The bullet hit Gabriele Sandri, who was asleep in the back of a car. He was fatally wounded (Moore 2007). After Sandri’s death, only the Lazio-Inter game was officially cancelled. The Atalanta-Milan game was also cancelled, but that was as a result of fan violence (Kington 2007; Landolina 2007; Moore 2007). A banner displayed at Parma prosaically stated the thoughts of the fans: “Death is the same for all” (Bandini 2007). The authorities and the police acted differently depending on who was killed which was deemed unfair by ultra and consequently reinforced their ‘Outsider’ identity.

This mentalità ultrà identity is beginning to transcend existing club and political rivalries. These rivalries are abandoned when confronted with a perceived police threat (Stott and Pearson 2007: 97). This was witnessed during the “derby of the dead child” as Lazio and Roma fans united against the police aggression and succeeded in suspending the game before joining together to attack the police after the match. Likewise ultra from various groups attended the funeral of Gabriele Sandri. This included fans of Livorno and Roma, groups who traditionally would be sworn enemies of Lazio (Nathanson 2007). Parma fans reinforced this solidarity on the anniversary of Sandri’s death. Before their match with Livorno in November 2008, they attached a banner to the railings alongside the
main roundabout approaching the Tardini stadium that read: “A year has passed, but we have not forgotten: justice for Gabriele”.

The creation of ultrà as folk-devils has given them an outsider status and reinforces their opposition to the central authorities and further condemns the central state. As a consequence of a number of similar events, the police have become the target for fan violence. This has created “ACAB syndrome”, named after the English term “All Cops Are Bastards” (Stefanini 2009: 131). Consumption is being used to reinforce this aspect of the performance of the mentalità ultrà identity. The abbreviation can be seen on a number of T Shirts worn by fans and is also exhibited in graffiti around stadiums and cities. Within Livorno, two of the three ultrà groups utilise the acronym. One group is simply called ‘ACAB’; the other is called ‘Visitors 1312’. The latter was formed from the amalgamation of two groups, ‘1312’ and ‘Visitors’. ‘1312’ is significant because it refers to the numerical positions in the alphabet of the letters comprising ‘ACAB’. The performance of the anti-police attitude was witnessed in fan reactions to various commemorations for carabinieri. 2003 saw an attack on a military base in Iraq which resulted in the death of twenty-eight people, including nineteen Italians, mostly carabinieri. Serie A matches were cancelled in honour of the dead, but Serie B games continued. The depth of feeling towards the police was illustrated in the minute’s silence before kick-off. Mantova fans whistled throughout the silence, whereas in Livorno the fans continued singing (Francesio 2008: 161). Meanwhile, attacks on police increased dramatically in the 2006-7 season (Popham 2007). The zenith of this antipathy towards the police was reached after Raciti’s death in Catania. During the minute’s silence held to commemorate him, Torino fans sang through the silence, while at Roma, the fans

73 Author’s observations 22nd November 2008.
whistled throughout (Francesio 2008: 192). ACAB syndrome is reinforcing the *mentalità ultrà* and fuelling the anti-authority identity.

The *mentalità ultrà* is also being reinforced through the government’s actions to contain the violence. As mentioned, after Raciti’s death, the government quickly enforced a declaration called ‘the Pisanu Law’ which restricts certain articles inside the stadium. Regional autonomy, however, permits the regional authorities and police discretion over which items are restricted. In the previous chapter, one respondent highlighted how Salerno had a different approach to Livorno regarding designation of musical instruments at stadiums. The perceived injustice is undermining the authority of the state and contributes to the overall crisis of legitimacy in the Italian state. Other instruments of the law are also contributing to this overall anti-state, anti-police identity. The use of the Daspo banning order provides similar examples of inconsistent policing as occurred when five Pisa fans were given Daspos for carrying toilet rolls classed as ‘inflammable material’ (Lo Bianco and Messina 2008). These examples reinforce the notion that the *ultrà* are persecuted and strengthens the crisis of legitimacy of the police and authorities.

The lack of state legitimation is reinforced through their approach to stadiums. Despite the stadium restrictions and Daspos, fans are still operating within the liminal space of the stadium. Police do not enter the *curva* for fear of causing more trouble. A police officer interviewed after the riot in Catania that resulted in the death of Raciti, stated that they dare not enter the *curva* as: “It would have been considered an act of war. That’s another country in there, outside the Italian Republic” (Richardson 2007). The police sanctify the sacred space of the *ultrà* and this simultaneously reinforces the imagined community of the *ultrà* and de-legitimises the authorities. This permits an anarchic *mentalità ultrà* to continue. In addition to the wide use of marijuana in the *curva* banned
objects are still smuggled into the stadium. This spectacularly occurred in May 2001 when Inter fans stole a scooter from an Atalanta fan before the game. They smuggled it into the top tier of the curva, set it alight and pushed it into the tier below. Even though stadium regulations were tightened after the death of Raciti, Roma and Lazio fans still used homemade *carta bomba* and flares during their derby in December 2009 (Bandini 2009; Bicocchi 2009). Similarly, during a game between Livorno and Bologna in February 2010, a rocket was fired across the pitch and landed in the Hippodrome next door to Livorno’s stadium (*Il Tirreno* 2010). The perpetrator could not be identified as it was launched from underneath the stand where there are no CCTV cameras. A month earlier, Napoli fans were banned by the *Osservatorio* from travelling to Livorno. In spite of this restriction nearly one thousand Napoli fans obtained tickets and attended the game. The lack of enforcement of the law and stadium regulations actively undermines and de-legitimises the police and reinforces the *mentalità ultrà*. As a consequence, the *ultrà* are legitimised by the authorities and are thus incorporated into the neo-patrimonial system operating in Italian society.

**Continued Fragmentation of the Curve: The Berlusconi Factor**

In addition to the transition to an anti-police collective identity, political identities are fragmenting and becoming realigned. The blurring of the boundaries between left and right-wing party politics has been replicated on the *curva*. In contrast to the political affiliations of the 1970s, political debate has moved from the traditional powers of left and right to the politics of one man, Silvio Berlusconi. Berlusconi polarises debate to such an extent that he surfaces in most conversations. His ownership of AC Milan, television companies and publishing businesses lead to many debates relating to his

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74 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L_Nu6HKVSmk
conflicts of interests and this debate has crossed to the *curve* where fans now actively use the figure of Berlusconi as a symbol of hate between clubs. Fabio Capello, whilst managing AC Milan, suggested in interviews in the *Corriere della Sera* that political rivalry in the early 1990s was because of Berlusconi (De Biasi 1996: 123). For clubs like Livorno who have constructed an anti-establishment, left-wing identity, Berlusconi cuts a very potent symbol. Not only do his populist centre-right politics contrast with the left-wing identity of the city, but their opinions dovetail into the wider public debates on Berlusconi’s business interests and his approach to law and order:

“The [Pisanu] Law is anti-constitutional for several reasons. It was not debated in Parliament. If a politician wanted to oppose they would have great difficulty because it is not a law. It is a decree. It is temporary. This is the way of the government of Berlusconi. All are like this, decrees. In this way, the rest of Parliament cannot oppose.” (Stefano, *ultrà*, personal interview, June 2009)

Stefano argues that Berlusconi utilises decrees to circumvent democratic debate in Parliament. Governmental decrees are temporary and were utilised by Bettino Craxi to deregulate national television. This deregulation permitted Berlusconi to monopolise the Italian media and facilitated his transition into politics. As Berlusconi utilises decrees to promote a personal agenda he reinforces the central weakness of the state.

Livorno fans utilise the carnivalesque atmosphere of the *curve* to reinforce this anti-Berlusconi sentiment. In addition to the performance of thousands of Livorno fans wearing bandanas, fans frequently chant “*Berlusconi pezza di merda*” (“Berlusconi piece of shit”). It attracts the most participants as fans bend down and begin a dull roar before members of the *curve* hold out their arms and wave their hands. This is followed by the
chat “Berlusconi pezza di merda” followed by rhythmic clapping and is often repeated a number of times. The match between Livorno and AC Milan in September 2009, as detailed in the introduction to this chapter, provided an apposite opportunity to perform Livornese identity after the prime minister had endured a summer of sex scandals. These ranged from his use of state vehicles to transport personal guests to parties at his private villa, through to his attendance at the eighteenth birthday party of Noemi Letizia, the daughter of a family friend, who called him “Papi” (“Daddy”) (Kington 2009). This led to his wife filing for divorce before another sex scandal emerged that alleged that Berlusconi had slept with an escort, Patrizia D'Addario, who had been procured by a businessman trying to obtain favours from the prime minister (Bannerman 2009; Hooper 2009; Kington 2009). This scandal prompted Berlusconi to declare that: “I have never paid a woman for sex” (The Guardian 2009).

The summer of scandal, combined with the promotion of Livorno into Serie A, provided a perfect opportunity for Livorno fans to articulate their identity in relation to Berlusconi and politics. The home game between Livorno and AC Milan in September 2009 saw an opportunity to recreate a spectacle similar to the bandanas of 2004. Newspapers, internet forums and fans recounted the story of the bandanas and helped reinforce the collective memory of the crowd (Ceccarini 2009; Il Tirreno 2009). At the match, some fans even sported white bandanas in a recreation of the earlier episode (Il Tirreno 2009). The match attracted national television and newspaper coverage and saw a number of incidents. In addition to the normal plethora of flags depicting Livorno, Che Guevara or Cuba, political striscione were displayed that reinforced the left-wing nature of the fans’ identity. One related to the proposed closures of the Delphi factory and the ENI gas refinery in Livorno that would result in the loss of a number of jobs: “Close the Delphi, close the refinery. Close also the port and we’ll all go away”. Another simply stated: “Now enough,
respect for the workers” (*La Nazione* 2009). In one example, the fans combined the local issues of the workers under threat of redundancy with the scandals that were affecting the Prime Minister: “Papi here we stay inc… solidarity with the workers in the fight” (*La Nazione* 2009). By referring to the Prime Minister’s sex scandals in the same banner, local and national politics become entwined in the figure of the prime minister, who clearly becomes the focus of the blame for the fate of the workers.

In light of the sexual nature of the scandals involving Berlusconi, a number of sexual references were produced on the curve. Condoms were inflated as balloons and released onto the curva. A small number of fans held up inflatable sex dolls, some wearing the Livorno shirt (*Il Tirreno* 2009). A number of striscione were held up at the same time stating ‘vergogna’ (‘shame’). Further banners were held up with direct reference to the ‘Papi’ scandal. They utilised humour and satire in an attempt to humiliate the Prime Minister. One makes a reference to a film entitled *Come te nessuno mai*: “‘Papi’ ‘like you, nobody, never… and thank goodness” (*La Nazione* 2009). Another utilised word play to draw both aspects of the scandal together: ‘Papi, you have the Escort double parked” (Ceccarini 2009). Once again they refer to Berlusconi as ‘Papi’. They also utilise the double meaning of the word ‘Escort’. Italian uses the English term ‘escort’ to refer to the people operating in high-class prostitution. However, the word ‘Escort’ also refers to the make of car manufactured by Ford. By utilising the car, they could incorporate the ‘double parking’ reference. This is the illegal practise of parking alongside parked cars in the middle of the street and causing an obstruction. By making the analogy to double parking the striscione highlights the fact that Berlusconi was married.

Similar anti-Berlusconi sentiments were performed at Livorno after the Prime Minister was struck by a model of Milan’s cathedral in December 2009. At the following game
against Sampdoria, Livorno fans sang a variety of chants in support of the perpetrator, Massimo Tartaglia. Chants included “Tartaglia one of us” and “Sign him up Spinelli” (Calabrese 2009). Livorno fans also held up a striscione stating “Berlusconi non parla, tartaglia”, which translates as “Berlusconi doesn’t speak, he stutters” (Bianchi 2009). Tartagliare is the Italian verb for stutter and conjugates to tartaglia, meaning “he stutters”. Livorno fans use word play to emphasise the assailant of the Prime Minister. The response to the actions of the fans also clearly illustrated the role of the media in amplifying ultrà incidents. Il Giornale, the newspaper owned by Silvio Berlusconi’s brother, labelled the fans “hooligans” and highlighted that the fans let off a smoke bombs during the game which held up play for two minutes (Il Giornale 2009). La Repubblica in contrast was more sober and presented the events in relation to the proposed government sanctions facing Livorno (Bianchi 2009). Livorno football club was fined eight thousand euros for the offensive chants and banners and were criticised by the Interior Minister, Roberto Maroni, for the actions of the fans.

Tartaglia’s actions provide a metaphor for contemporary political discourse in Italy. Fragmentation of the Italian political spectrum has resulted in political debate being reduced to symbolic targets of the state. In the case of Tartaglia, debate has been reduced to throwing a replica of Milan’s cathedral at Berlusconi. Likewise, the fans perform similar ritual humiliation of the prime minister within the liminal space of the stadium. Through the use of humour and satire, the Livorno fans are operating within the carnivalesque. The subversion of hierarchies is acute as they denigrate one of the most powerful individuals in their country. They utilised the image of the grotesque, the sex obsessed individual who abuses their position of power. As a consequence he has brought shame on himself, his family and the country and attracted the attention of someone who would seek to harm him. The liminality of the space permitted these
transgressions without repercussions. As with the lack of police authority over the curve, these actions contribute to the legitimation of the fans’ activities in the curve as well as de-legitimise the targets of the abuse. The police become de-legitimated as they cannot enter or control the curve. Meanwhile, Berlusconi is profaned, which de-legitimises the authority of the prime minister. Public engagement with national politics has been reduced to such symbolic targets. It is not clear how social capital formed in associations, like the ultrà can contribute to democracy and re-engage the public with politics. The following section details the official supporters’ clubs which offer an alternative form of association for football fans. In doing so, they simultaneously reflect the continued decline of social capital and the potential to re-engage with national politics.

**Official Supporters’ Clubs**

Official supporters’ clubs provide an alternative form of supporter association, alongside the ultrà. The official supporters’ clubs are, as their name suggests, officially affiliated to the football club and they operate within the patrimonial networks of the football clubs. Fundamentally, the difference between the groups is demographic (De Biasi 1996: 116). Most ultrà are young males, whereas the official supporters’ clubs encompass all ages and genders. Consequently, the focus on choreographies, politics and violence of the ultrà is not replicated by the official supporters’ clubs, although members may still participate in the activities of the ultrà. Likewise there is no spatial demarcation between groups. Although the ultrà would restrict themselves to the curve at the ends of the pitch, official supporters’ club members can be found in the curve, the tribunes along the length of the pitch or in the grandstand. Therefore, discussion of the official supporters’ clubs presents an alternative view of Italian football supporters. This section will detail the organisation
and activities of these associations and locate them within the broader argument illustrating the decline in social capital and political participation in Italy.

The principal participant observation for this study was performed in one Official Supporters’ Club in Livorno (‘The Club’). Other ethnography and interviews were performed at other clubs around the city. The Club is formally constituted with a headquarters based in a residential area near the stadium. The headquarters is in a small row of units, along a fairly major road and in close proximity to local shops. These shops and units are on the edge of a predominantly residential area. As with the majority of the city, this residential area is comprised of tower blocks of apartments. Next door to the Club office is the local office of the Partito Democratico, the major political party of the left, which has local offices in every commune in Livorno.\footnote{http://www.pdlivorno.it/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=33} This political office has a small football pitch and children’s activities in the yard outside. Next door, in the other direction is a bar, with a hairdressers’ shop being further along the row. Further down the road there are allotments and sports fields. Returning to the Club’s headquarters, the interior is decorated with various items of memorabilia relating to the Club and the football club. Along one wall there are numerous photos of the Club’s directors with members of the playing and management staff of AS Livorno. These photos have taken place at various awards or memorial dinners held throughout the last five years, or have been taken at on-pitch ceremonies, such as player-of-the-season awards. Above these photos are scarves donated by fans of friendly clubs. Along the back wall there are AS Livorno posters and a framed insignia of the Club. Above these are a number of signed football shirts from some of the football club’s key players, notably, Cristiano Lucarelli, Marco Amelia and the club’s hero and leading goal scorer, Igor Protti. On the other wall there are pennants of other AS Livorno supporter’s clubs and other friendly football
clubs, such as Barcelona and Marseilles, which have been donated by the fans of these clubs. On the storage cupboards there are also posters of the monthly magazine published by the football club, entitled *Amaranto* (named after the colours of the city and the football club).

Official supporters’ clubs are set-up by fans independently of the football club. In this manner they are not dissimilar to the *ultrà*. However, supporters’ clubs can choose to become affiliated to the football, which the *ultrà* would not do:

“Everyone can found a Club Amaranto [supporters’ club]; later on one can ask to have relations with the football club and can be a member of associated clubs… Innumerable clubs can exist. There is no limit and the football club of AS Livorno does not have a voice in this and cannot influence the clubs” (Max, official supporters’ club director, personal interview, June 2009)

The independent nature of the supporters’ clubs is reflected in the naming conventions of the clubs. Some are named after the area of the city in which they are located, such as *Il Porto* (“The Port”). Others are named after prominent players, such as Club Igor Protti. Local history can also influence the nomenclature of the clubs as in the case of the female supporters’ club called B52s. This club is named after the World War II American bombers that were stationed at Camp Darby, an American airbase located between Livorno and Pisa. Some clubs are also named after family members in order to preserve their memory. The clubs come to embody their operators and become a space to perform their identity. The B52s is located in a bar and this provides for a more socially orientated approach to their club. Like the Club’s headquarters, it is decorated with

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76 http://www.usag.livorno.army.mil/
memorabilia of AS Livorno, such as team shirts, posters and photographs. This club is also more frivolous as it embodies the personality of the director. This was evident from my first meeting with her as she responded to my interest in the club and AS Livorno with “Why Livorno? We are all pirates and prostitutes?” This Livornese performance reaffirmed the history of the city and the ‘earthy’ character of its inhabitants. The B52s club provides other opportunities to perform this Livornese character through the consumption of a range of products that were produced by the club. T Shirts were sold in the deep red colours of the city and the football team and were emblazoned with the passage, “Better to be unemployed in Ardenza [the suburb of Livorno near the beach where the stadium is located] than a worker in Milan”. Similarly, they also produced a range of stickers with similar amusing and vulgar quotations.

The Club itself was set-up following the death of the director’s son, Luca, who died in 2005 in a motorbike accident. The director, a shift worker in a local factory, runs the Club with the brother of his wife (the son’s uncle). The Club is named in honour of Luca, and acts as a vehicle for them to continue their son’s memory. By transforming their personal identities and through the consumption of football they are providing a fitting memory for their son and building social capital for themselves, the Club and the football club. This consumption and social capital can be witnessed in a book that was published shortly after Luca’s death. Published by the family, it details the co-operation they had from the players and management of the football club. At the game following his death, all players wore T shirts stating “Luca you are in our hearts”77 and the star player, Igor Protti, placed flowers at the foot of the Curva Nord, the main stand of the stadium. This practise was not unique to Luca as during the first home game of the 2008-9 season against Mantova, the captains of AS Livorno and Mantova presented flowers to

77 “Luca sei nel nostro ♥”
the *curva* in memory of a young fan who had died during the summer. The book also highlights the tremendous communal outpouring of grief of the fans. It contains letters from various friends, fans and Club members honouring Luca’s memory. Similarly, after Luca’s death, the Curva Nord organised an impressive choreography that filled the entire curva. It was comprised of blue cards being held above the heads of the fans, with yellow cards spelling ‘Luca’. The photo of this choreography has become the symbol for the Club. It is used on their membership cards, the club’s internet homepage, the signage on the club headquarters and their advertising in magazines and newsletters. It is also centrally placed on the wall of the Club’s headquarters amongst the memorabilia and photos.

In keeping with the extensive de-regulation of the Italian state, many of the activities of Italian football clubs are de-centralised. Many of the activities performed by English clubs are outsourced to the fans. As highlighted earlier, some *ultrà* organisations like Lazio’s *Irriducibili* were granted the rights to sell tickets or merchandising. In the case of Livorno, these concessions are granted to official supporters’ clubs. Season tickets and match tickets are organised through the Club and members will go to the Club in the first instance to obtain match tickets. This allows the Club to make block bookings, if required, to ensure members sit together. Ticket purchases are not restricted to home games as the Club also organises travel and tickets to away games. Coaches collect fans from the Club and travel direct to the away stadium. On these coaches, and at Motorway service stations, members get the opportunity to meet fellow fans who are outside their demographic group and outside their family and friendship networks.
Official status grants the Club concessions to sell merchandise, and to use the football club’s logo on the supporters’ clubs details. Consequently they are incorporated into the football club’s patrimonial network. As the Club director, Max, states:

“we have the possibility… of the gadgets. We as a club can make, with the agreement of the football club, gadgets with the official logo of Livorno Calcio”

(Max, official supporters’ club director, personal interview, June 2009)

All individuals must become a member, or socio, at a cost of eleven euros. On joining, the socio receives a Club rucksack with the logo of AS Livorno and the Club name on it. They also receive regular newsletter detailing Club benefits and upcoming fixtures. The Club can also produce ‘gadgets’ that they distribute through their office. Many of these ‘gadgets’ are provided as gifts to members, such as the rucksack provided to new members. Other items, such as calendars and stickers are also offered. Club gadgets are also given at Christmas and at the end of season dinner:

“Once a year we do a party of the Club at which socios can participate and at this event we give gadgets to the female members” (Max, official supporters’ club director, personal interview, June 2009)

The gifts and gadgets provide material benefits for socios and they reinforce the patriarchal nature of Italian society. Gifts are given in exchange for attendance at special occasions. In some cases, these are only presented to the female members. The proximity to the local residences makes it more accessible for fans to purchase club merchandise. One member commented that one of the reasons he visited the club was for:
“the possibility of purchasing the clobber of Livorno Calcio directly from the Club” (Nick, official supporters’ club member, personal interview, June 2009)

Official supporters’ clubs therefore provide a dual purpose to fans and the football club. They provide services for the de-centralised football club and they provide a local space for fans to consume football.

Official supporters’ clubs also provide financial benefits for their members. Berlusconi provided a range of incentives to join the AC Milan supporters’ clubs after he took over AC Milan. The extent of this patrimonial network facilitated his move into politics as he utilised the same practises when he set-up Forza Italia, his political party. Membership of supporters’ clubs in Livorno also allow for certain economic benefits. Club members can pay for their season ticket in two or three instalments. Thus, club members can spread their costs depending upon their economic circumstances. For other fans, the economic benefits entail having access to cheaper away travel:

“I am a socio because the clubs organize away trips; therefore it is easy to travel to away games. The prices are more advantageous in respect of going by car or alone” (Greyhound, official supporters’ club, personal interview, June 2009)

Therefore the price of membership of eleven euros is quickly justified by fans that travel to many away games. Although anyone can travel on coaches organised by the Club, socios have a discount of two or three euros per trip. This is a reason for Nick’s membership:
“for away games, the coach costs a little, more or less, for someone who is not a socio” (Nick, official supporters’ club member, personal interview, June 2009) (member of the Club).

Along with the cheaper travel and payment options for season tickets, the Club also provides additional incentives to members. As they have access to a wide network of fans, they negotiate benefits for their members:

“For example we sent an email [to socios] because we made an agreement with Hotel Rex in Antignano [a suburb of Livorno] in which all socios are offered a discount of twenty percent on the cost of a room” (Max, official supporters’ club director, personal interview, June 2009)

Similarly, a cinema chain with a multiplex cinema on the outskirts of Livorno provides discounts to football fans who can demonstrate that they are a “true fan”. In practise this requires the presentation of a supporters’ club membership card or item of merchandise.

The physical proximity of the club to the local residential area allows for ease of access for the members and opportunities to create bonding social capital. Due to its proximity to the local neighbourhood, there are also many regular visitors who come into the Club for social interaction. Most of these are male, covering a wide age demographic. These social interactions are given as advantages for club membership and attending the Club headquarters:

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78 http://www.medusacinema.it/promozioni.jsp?Menu=F
“[I go] when I want to see someone” (Maria, official supporters’ club member, personal interview, June 2009)

“[I go] in order to see friends and relatives and the possibility of buying a ticket for the match” (Nick, official supporters’ club member, personal interview, June 2009)

Local fans, like Maria and Nick, use the Club as a social space; a place where they can go and meet friends and socialise. Many clubs are situated in bars, such as the B52s. This reinforces the public sphere of the clubs. The social space allows members to socialise with fellow members when purchasing tickets and merchandise. There are four ticket outlets for the football club within the city, two are based in bars close to the centre of the city, one is located at the shopping mall on the edge of the city and one is at the football stadium. Because the Club is located in a local neighbourhood, it allows for socios to book tickets locally in addition to making block bookings for away travel. Many members drop-in to inquire about tickets as it is often easier to access the Club’s headquarters than the official ticket points in the city and is more social. When important matches approach, the Club becomes a focal point for local fans trying to obtain tickets.

The Club also organises other events which provide opportunities for wider social interaction. To commemorate Luca, they organise an annual football tournament every May. This takes place between local youth teams and the proceeds of the tournament are donated to a local leukaemia charity. This tournament is arranged in co-operation with the football club. Star players attend the after tournament dinner and provide a ‘star attraction’ to entice spectators. It is also organised with the co-operation of the local council as the tournament is held on the council football pitches that form part of the
complex that houses the stadium for AS Livorno. The Club also organises end-of-season dinners in which socios receive gifts and a meal. Players from the football club attend the dinners and are presented with awards. It also allows fans to meet their heroes. As Nick highlights:

“There are the parties principally for [meeting] the players” (Nick, official supporters’ club member, personal interview, June 2009)

For Nick, the opportunity to meet the players of the football club is one of the main benefits of attending the dinners. Connection to the players is also maintained through the organisation of an annual end-of-season dinner for the socios of the Club. The dinners and events allow fans to strengthen their connection to the football club. The record of these dinners and meetings are photographed and displayed as evidence of the social capital of the members of the club. The club headquarters has approximately fifty of these photos displayed on the wall highlighting the club directors meeting players, managers and club officials. This display allows the member to be aware of the social capital of the supporters’ club and reinforces the solidarity and proximity, not only within the supporters’ club, but to the wider football club. A major criticism of many football writers, from fans, journalists and academics, is that increased commodification of sport has led to an increased distance from the fan (this was even put forward as a reason for hooliganism (Taylor 1968)). In a similar review of supporters’ clubs in North America, Giulianotti and Robertson have demonstrated that members of Celtic and Rangers supporters’ clubs felt closer to the players of their respective football clubs than they would have done in Glasgow (Giulianotti and Robertson 2006: 144). This was because players and ex-players attended the clubs’ social engagements and dinners which would not have happened as regularly in Scotland. Likewise, the supporters’ clubs in Livorno
provide this opportunity to interact with players and management of the football club, as well as allowing them to interact with fellow socios. This provides an environment for people to socialise and interact away from the family and work colleagues and allows them to build bridging social capital, trust and associations in a wider community.

Social capital is accumulated through the networks provided by supporters’ clubs. By providing spaces for fans to meet and interact, the Club facilitates access to a wider information network. These nodes provide opportunities to meet with other fans seeking information. For those running the clubs they are able to access a wide network of supporters. Max highlights that:

“at club level I know all [the clubs] in the city, the province and many from abroad and across Italy. I also know clubs from other Italian squads” (Max, official supporters’ club director, personal interview, June 2009)

Thus active members of clubs are ideally situated to accumulate social capital. However, these clubs are not simply avenues for the organisers to accumulate social capital. They provide spaces for the fans to meet, interact and build connections. By providing these spaces, such as the club headquarters, websites, media events and social gatherings, fans are able to access increased information, which further fuels the network as fans seek more information. As Durkheim highlighted, regular congregations heighten emotion and affinity with a totemic image (Durkheim 1915). Participants gather together away from the mundanity of daily life and participate in rituals that inscribe the group with emotion and meaning. Coles extended this to reflect the quasi-religious nature of sport (Coles 1975). Coles argues that sport, like religion, “regenerates and amplifies the feelings expressed in a group context” (Coles 1975: 69). The ritual of sport generates solidarity
for the group and invests the club with meaning and emotion. Supporters’ clubs provide such spaces for the ritualistic regular interaction between fans. In doing so the organisers of the clubs regularly meet, increasing connections and building social capital. These clubs act as social clubs for their members. Often they are based in bars that allow for members to socialise, and enables functions to take place where members can meet the players (De Biasi 1996: 116). Although the Club was not housed in a bar, it was situated next to one. These bars and Clubs provide physical spaces for social interaction, as well as the events to facilitate this interaction. Nowell-Smith has suggested that football is consumed throughout the week, which is shaped and articulated “in representation and recall” (Nowell-Smith 1979: 51). Similarly, King highlights how hooligan collective memories are recounted and reinforced in bars after the event, and often at much greater length than the original incident (King 2001). Football is constructed and reinforced through the memories, social interactions and media representations throughout the week (and beyond). The Club provides a platform for the reinforcement and re-articulation of these memories. In turn these conversations fuel existing social relationships, group solidarity and identities. Sharing this intercourse is what makes the group - if they do not share the collective memory, then they are outside the group. Reasserting Durkheim's contention that totemic beliefs are reaffirmed by groups coming together in congregation and re-sharing their collective emotions towards the totem, collective memory needs constant reaffirming to keep it relevant. As a consequence, the Club provides the space where the collective memories and identities of fans are reinforced through social interaction.

These conversations revolve around the same topics. Being a football supporters’ club, many exchanges centre on AS Livorno, their games and their rivals. Therefore the Club provides a platform for Nowell-Smith’s assertions of the game of football being shaped
and articulated throughout the week (Nowell-Smith 1979). Similarly, wider conversations of past matches are recalled and reconstructed as group members demonstrate their knowledge of the game and build their collective memories, such as the fans wearing bandanas at AC Milan in 2004. Wider issues are also discussed, specifically in relation to various scandals in Italian football. Calciopoli was discussed on several occasions as it demonstrated the power relationships which exist within Italian football and how they favour the larger clubs such as Juventus and AC Milan at the expense of provincial clubs such as AS Livorno. These power networks were specifically addressed towards the end of the season when AS Livorno faltered in their drive for promotion. Their major competitors were Parma and Bari. Parma had been one of the seven biggest clubs in Italian football, dubbed the ‘Seven Sisters’, and a major European team until financial mismanagement and scandal hit their parent company, the dairy company Parmalat. Bari’s owner was highly influential in the Italian Football Federation and had spent a considerable amount to fund the club’s ambitions. This combined with the significance of Bari as a trading port in the south of Italy and the political importance of their success.

The intricate nature of football and politics within Italy, inevitably would lead to wider conversations about the state of Italian politics. After football, politics was the most common conversation. Important events in the media would be discussed and most discussions were related to national politics. Principally, Berlusconi was central to these discussions as he became embroiled in a scandal relating to the use of state vehicles to transport personal guests to parties at his private villa. This scandal escalated as allegations of sexual impropriety at these parties emerged (Kington 2009). Ancillary to this, the prime minister’s wife filed for divorce after Berlusconi attended the eighteenth birthday party of the daughter of a family friend, who called him “Papi” (“Daddy”)

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(Kington 2009). This was particularly fascinating as Berlusconi did not attend the eighteenth birthday parties of his own children. These discussions not only highlight the political nature of much of Italian society, but they were performed in the semi-public space of the club which existed outside of the family and workplace. Putnam’s central argument suggests that participation in voluntary associations contributes to increased political involvement and this underpins democracy (Putnam, Leonardi et al. 1993; Putnam 2000). Likewise, Habermas suggested that public debate created a ‘public sphere’ which assisted in the formation of liberal political democracy. Although politics were discussed and debated at the Club this was not translated into political action. Whilst social capital was generated and accumulated at the Club, Putnam’s assertion that democracy is reinforced lacks empirical support.

The emptying out of political engagement is also replicated in relation to football. Although the Club provided a public sphere, this is not translated into active political involvement. The director of the Club took an active interest in the transformation of football, but this was not translated into involvement with political groups. This is replicated within the umbrella organisation for supporters’ clubs. Many clubs are affiliated to the Centri di Coordinamento (‘Co-ordination Centres’) which in turn is associated with the FISSC or Federazione Italiana Sostenitori Squadre Calcio (Federation of Supporters of Italian Football Teams). This is not the equivalent of the independent Football Supporters Federation in Britain which performs a more politically active role in challenging the transformations in football. As a result they are not politically orientated in the same way as Independent Supporters’ Associations in Britain (King 2003: Chapter 9). The FISSC has become involved with specific transformations within football, specifically the Italian government’s laws relating to identity cards. For example, the

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79 http://89.97.230.138/index.htm
80 http://www.fsf.org.uk/
FISSC promotes the *Carta del Tifoso* along with the advantages associated with being seen as a positive fan of the football club.\(^1\) However, by simply complying with government proposals, they risk being seen as part of the government’s patrimonial network. The FISSC also promote specific initiatives, in particular Fair Play projects. There are not, however, any anti-racism or anti-homophobia projects. While they publish a monthly newsletter, written by fans, entitled *La Voce del Tifoso* ("The Voice of the Fan"), this promotes the various initiatives of the Federation, as well as highlighting the transformations taking place in football from a fans perspective. In doing so, it promotes an alternative to the *ultrà*. Its apolitical stance sees it remain relatively passive. In contrast to the strength and visibility of the *ultrà*, this sees the FISSC struggle to provide an alternative voice for fans and further illustrates the decline of public life in Italy.

**Summary**

Football support provides for extensive opportunities to perform one’s identity. As Maguire has stated: “Global sport provides some people with opportunities to experience moments of ‘exciting significance’ in their daily local lives” (Maguire 1999: 212). Therefore sport, football in particular, provides a space of real significance for certain groups and how they articulate their identity. Changes to the political economy of Italy have promoted the act of consumption and fans are consuming football in a variety of ways. Fans have utilised a range of avenues for this performance that encompasses choreographies and violence at stadiums through to supporters’ associations. These social groups produce and consume their fandom throughout the week, as well as at the stadium. Yet they have become fragmented. From the more homogeneous groups of the 1970s, the *ultrà* began to fragment and have changed their focus from predominantly left-

\(^1\) http://89.97.230.138/carta_tifoso.htm
wing politics to regional and anti-immigration politics, violence and single-issues. The neo-patrimonial political system that has incorporated business and football surreptitiously legitimises football fans and ultrà. As the England manager Fabio Capello stated in October 2009: “In Italy the ultrà are in charge” (La Gazzetta dello Sport 2009). Consequently, violence and deaths have occurred that presents and reinforces the overall crisis of Italian football. Draconian legislation and continued lack of co-ordinated action from the authorities and the police has permitted the ultrà, in particular, to form a strong anti-state collective identity. This reinforces their self identity and further undermines the authorities. Although groups like the ultrà and the official supporters’ clubs provide spaces to debate political action, in many cases they rely on single-issue politics that fail to tackle the over-riding problems. Ultrà identity has been condensed to symbolic targets of the police and Berlusconi. Where the ultrà are politicised this is less co-ordinated and undermined by media portrayals of the groups as violent hooligans. For the official supporters’ clubs the lack of co-ordinated action permits the status quo. Despite the clubs being public spheres where politics are discussed, the plethora of official supporters’ clubs ensures a fragmented outlook. The following chapter will conclude the thesis with an overview of the situation in Italian football and suggest a possible future for the sport in Italy.
SECTION 4

CONCLUSION
Chapter 7

An Italian Winner of the Champions League: ‘Year Zero’?

“Italian football is not liked by the rest of the world” – Jose Mourinho

“I don’t like [Italian Football] and it doesn’t like me… I always speak with my heart but if I spoke with my heart now about Serie A, I would be suspended” – Jose Mourinho

The flashlights of the cameras were illuminating the pitch of Real Madrid’s Bernabeu Stadium. The Milanese side, Inter, had just beaten Bayern Munich by two goals to nil in the 2010 final of the Champions League and despite football being a team sport, the focus was on one man. The cameras all focussed on the charismatic manager of Inter, Jose Mourinho who had been nicknamed the ‘Special One’ during his time in the English Premier League. Few would disagree with this moniker as Mourinho became only the third manager in the history of the European Cup to win the competition with two different clubs. After Mourinho’s first final, in contrast to the scenes in Madrid, the cameras focussed on the team and the fans of Porto, rather than the manager. In Madrid, however, the Portuguese manager was photographed striding around the pitch, hugging his players and demonstrating overwhelming emotion. Amid the hugs from Mourinho, the international squad of players received their national flags and parade around the stadium. As the UEFA stewards gathered to prepare for the presentation of the trophy,

83 http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/football/europe/8595928.stm
Mourihno crouched to lift his son onto his shoulders. Sporting the famous blue and black stripes of Inter, Jose Jr. was carried across the pitch as his father celebrated. Mourinho’s success in Madrid led to speculation that he would leave Inter for the Spanish giants Real Madrid, for whom he would sign three weeks after the final.

Inter’s success in the Champions League represents a paradox. This thesis has analysed Italian football within its historical context. The peculiar development of the Italian political economy has fundamentally affected the transformation of football in Italy. The family model of capitalism has seen football incorporated into the wider groups of businesses and this initially led to a rapid and successful response to the transformation of global football in the 1990s. However, the patrimonial nature of Italian business and politics has seen a number of crises affect the sport, from match-fixing scandals to doping, from financial mismanagement to fan violence. After the initial success, the last twenty years has seen an intensification of scandal within Italian football. These crises have impacted Italian football’s ability to compete globally and Serie A has not developed and improved. Meanwhile other leagues, in particular the English Premier League, have exploited the global markets which have brought relative success in European competition. However, after years of crisis, how is it possible to account for Inter’s success in the Champions League Final? This chapter will conclude the current situation in Italian football and the response from the clubs and authorities. This will illustrate that wealthy presidents can still fund successful clubs in Europe, whilst continuing to undermine the long term sustainability of the league. Finally, this chapter will present some future directions for the discipline and for Italian football.
The ‘English Model’

The introduction to this thesis highlighted the romanticisation of foreign football in English football writing. In presenting English football as being perpetually in crisis foreign football is lionised and romanticised. This pattern is not confined to English football as Italian football continues to have a neurotic relationship with its English counterparts. As a result it both looks to England for example, but continues to take an Italian approach to governance and organisation. One such trope that epitomises this relationship is the term *modello inglese* (‘English Model’). The Italian government and media talk about applying an ‘English Model’ to resolve the problems in Italian football, especially in relation to hooliganism and policing. Although putatively based on the Taylor Report, the ‘English Model’ is not actually explained or developed and had become rhetoric to symbolise a hard-line approach to violence (Bianchi 2005; Francesio 2008; *Il Giornale* 2008; *La Gazzetta dello Sport* 2008; Valdiserri 2008). As has been demonstrated throughout this thesis, an ‘English Model’ has not actually been implemented as there has not been wide scale redevelopment of stadium safety, the implementation of wider commercial practises, nor reform of policing. Ironically the changes within the ‘English Model’ also provide an alternative symbol to fans. The commercialisation and commodification of the game represents something for many fans to resist (Francesio 2008: 98). Paradoxically, English fans represented the model of support for Italian *ultrà* and hooligan groups across Europe (Dal Lago 1990; Dal Lago and De Biasi 1994; Podaliri and Balestri 1998; Spaaij 2006). As Francesio states sardonically, “evidently there is always an ‘English Model’ to refer to” (Francesio 2008: 73). Yet these constructions become interpreted by different groups.
Central to the symbolism of the ‘English Model’ is the continuing crisis in Italian football. The first decade of the twenty-first century has seen Italian football rocked by financial scandals that have affected large Italian businesses and their football subsidiaries, such as Parma, Lazio, Fiorentina and Napoli. This has been compounded by scandals including forged passports, forged financial declarations and doping. The nadir of the crisis in Italian football was reached in 2006 when the calciopoli scandal was leaked to the Italian media. Calciopoli revealed the intricate patrimonial networks of politicians, businessmen and the football authorities which were operating in Italian football. Strategic charismatic leaders were extending their patronage across the network in order to favour their teams. The culmination of the years of scandal did not lead to any widespread change within the game as existing practises continued. Fan apathy led to a decline in attendance at football stadiums and continued violence from the ultras. Less than a year after calciopoli, violence between Catania and Palermo fans led to the death of a policeman, Filippo Raciti. The government adopted the Pisanu Law as an attempt to enforce an ‘English Model’, and an attempt to impose some regulation upon football, but without understanding the full details of the Taylor Report.

The over-arching argument of the Taylor Report was to improve the safety at stadiums through stadium reconstruction and reformed policing (Taylor 1989). Yet neither of these points have been addressed in relation to the Pisanu law. Many of the Italian stadiums are antiquated and have poor facilities. After the death of Raciti, only four stadiums passed the safety review (Kiefer 2007; Sanminiatelli 2007; Hamil, Morrow et al. 2010). Despite this, there were no provisions to improve stadium infrastructure in the Pisanu Laws. Fundamentally, the Taylor Report sought to prevent congestion at entrances to stadiums and on the terraces, which was a significant factor contributing to the Hillsborough tragedy. However, this aspect has not been acknowledged by the Pisanu
Law. The Pisanu law has in fact added to the congestion at turnstiles by instigating an identity check to ensure hooligans do not enter the stadium. However, these checks become disregarded when there is excessive congestion at the turnstiles and fans have been admitted without checks at Parma and Livorno. Controls over ticket sales are also not adequately controlled as approximately one thousand Napoli fans attended their match at Livorno despite the Osservatorio banning all away fans. Furthermore, some of the features of the Taylor Report were never implemented in Britain. For example, membership cards for fans were never introduced in Britain after widespread opposition from fans, yet the equivalent in Italy, the tessera del tifoso was introduced in 2009. If an ‘English Model’ is to be implemented in Italy, a full understanding of the report must be undertaken.

A key element of the Taylor Report related to the architecture of the terracing within the stadium. The report required that perimeter fences should be dismantled to ensure that fans had a safe exit from the end in the event of an emergency (Taylor 1989). Within Italy, only Fiorentina has removed the Perspex fencing that encloses the curve (Cellini 2009; Giudici 2010). In addition to the removal of the perimeter fences, numbered seating was installed in British stadiums, and followed by similar measures in the Netherlands (Spaaaj 2006). In combination with Foucauldian surveillance techniques, numbered seating permitted the identification of individual trouble-makers. These surveillance techniques outside of Britain, in Germany in particular, have permitted the retention of terraces in certain circumstances. However, these practices have not been fully implemented in Italy. Although there are closed-circuit television cameras in Italy, perpetrators are not reprimanded. Objects are frequently thrown onto the pitch during games. For example, at Livorno’s Armando Picchi stadium, there are no cameras underneath the stand and this permitted a fan to launch a rocket across the pitch (Il
Inter fans have even launched an enflamed scooter, that they stole from an Atalanta fan, from a stand of the San Siro Stadium.\textsuperscript{84} The lack of enforcement and the draconian measures employed against all fans reinforces the ‘Outsider’ identity of the \textit{ultrà}. They perform their identity within the liminal space of the stadium in opposition to the symbolic constructions of the police and the state. As the state does not infringe on the territory of the \textit{ultrà} problems occur when the two sides re-enter the ‘Italian’ state outside the stadium. Consequently, the opportunities for a Hillsborough-style tragedy in Italy are manifest.

The perceived lack of legitimacy of the central authorities ensures that it does not impose safety regulations onto the clubs. The Taylor Report placed the responsibility for safety of fans within the stadium on the clubs (Taylor 1989). In abdicating responsibility for fan safety, the British state reaffirmed its legitimacy. It advocated individual clubs’ responsibility for their consumers, and the individual responsibility of the fans. Surveillance assumed that all fans were potentially being observed (King 1998). In doing so, the state imposed neo-liberal economics by placing the economic burden on the clubs. Consequently, English clubs employed third party security firms to maintain order which restricted the police to a public order role away from the stadium. However, the poverty of the stadiums and the Outsider identity of the \textit{ultrà} have necessitated increased police presence at Italian stadiums; the police operate as the lynchpin that maintains the \textit{status quo}. As the police operate within the political patrimonial system they become active agents in constructing the \textit{ultrà} as the only cause of the problem in Italy (Della Porta 1998; Marchi 2005). The weakness of the central state to impose reform permits the maintenance of existing patterns of policing. The heavy police presence operating around the stadium, combined with the regulations related to the stadium security check

\textsuperscript{84} http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L_Nu6HKVSmk
and the *tessera del tifoso* criminalises all fans. This is apparent from the police presence afforded to *all* fans travelling to away games. Without fully understanding the key aspects of the ‘English Model’ the Italian authorities are perpetuating the vicious cycle of decline in Italian football.

The incorporation of football into the patrimonial system permits the presidents of football clubs to abstain from the responsibility of stadium safety. As most stadiums are owned by local councils or state institutions like CONI, presidents do not have responsibility for their maintenance. Consequently, this prevents Italian clubs from capitalising on their stadiums. An unintended consequence of Stadium redevelopments in Britain led to football clubs increasing their commercial and match-day revenues (King 1998). Corporate boxes were enhanced and augmented with catering facilities, merchandising outlets and special events. In addition, stadiums host conference and restaurant facilities, club superstores and various leisure facilities to extend the profitability of the stadium over the course of the week, rather than restricting their facilities to match-days. In contrast, few Italian stadiums include facilities to purchase club merchandise and even fewer have adequate catering facilities. Fan comfort is restricted to inadequately maintained *curva*. Poor seating and temporary stands create an unsatisfactory fan-experience that is compounded by poor toilets and catering. This point has been echoed by the England national team manager, Fabio Capello, as he collected a career award at Parma University in February 2010. Capello stated that:

“Italian teams are well equipped but English sides are on top right now. Players prefer to go to England and Spain and it is not just for the money. They see Italian stadiums are half empty and realise we've got problems” (Kington 2010)
The lack of revenue-generating facilities is compounded by the failure to implement improved stadium safety. This contributes to fan apathy and falling attendances which impact the financial viability of the clubs. Consequently, match-day revenue constitutes the smallest percentage of overall revenue for many Italian clubs (Deloitte and Touche 2010). The vicious circle is complete as the restricted revenue further reduces the clubs’ ability to improve the facilities of the stadium.

Television revenue has been a key driver of transformation within football. De-regulation of television networks saw the inauguration of new broadcasters (King 1998; Giulianotti 1999; Maguire 1999; King 2003; Liguori and Smargiasse 2003; Russo 2005; Porro 2008). These networks had more freedom over content and sport became a key market opportunity. In Britain, the satellite broadcaster, Sky, was central to the transformations within the English Premier League. Similarly, television income from the Champions League helped transform European and national competition. Within Italy, Silvio Berlusconi’s Mediaset made extensive use of entertaining neo-television and utilised these networks to publicise and transform his football club, AC Milan. Neo-patrimonial networks permitted central actors, like Berlusconi, to accumulate resources at the elite clubs. This was compounded by the complete de-regulation of the football television rights in Italy as individual clubs were permitted to negotiate their own television contracts. This has seen the popular and powerful clubs in Italy maximise their revenue and lengthened the economic distance between them and the provincial clubs (Porro 2008). Consequently, television revenue constitutes most of the overall revenue for Italian football clubs. For example, Italy’s most popular club, Juventus, generates over two-thirds of its revenue from television (Deloitte and Touche 2010). The neo-patrimonial system has permitted the over-reliance of television revenue to the detriment
of other aspects of the football experience. Without effective regulation or state pressure, clubs do not have to utilise their funds to improve the stadiums.

Football requires referees to arbitrate between the sides. In the wider political economy, the state acted as this arbitrator. Within the global neo-liberal economy, the authority and power of the state as arbitrator has been challenged, changed and in some cases diminished. In the absence of a powerful arbitrator, such as the state, powerful actors operating across business, politics and football can accumulate resources to the detriment of the wider benefits. The Italian political economic system encourages the incorporation of football clubs into the wider patrimonial network. The ‘deep play’ of football within Italian society sees the sport as a major contributor of social and symbolic capital to charismatic individuals. As the British novelist and cultural commentator of Italy, Tim Parks states: “In Italy, you haven’t really arrived until you own a football club” (cited in Arie 2004). This permits dense inter-dependencies between football clubs, television, business and politicians which frame the production and consumption of Italian football. The de-regulation of the 1980s resulted in connections thickening between the media, politics and football. Silvio Berlusconi utilised television to promote his football club before using this as a paradigm to “enter the field” of politics. Italian family-capitalism and thicker personal connections permitted clubs like Parma and Lazio to be incorporated into wider family businesses. The lack of regulation and transparency, however, resulted in the clubs being affected when the parent companies went bankrupt. The problems affecting Parma and Lazio exposed widespread financial irregularities across Italian football and sees many clubs operating under incredible debt. Top clubs such as Parma, Fiorentina and Napoli have all been relegated due to financial complications. The neo-patrimonial system then saw the government attempt to pass the *salva-calcio* law to allow clubs to delay repayment of their tax debts (Porro and Russo
Furthermore, the lack of regulation also resulted in several clubs utilising fraudulent paperwork or doping in order to gain an advantage. Personal connections across a neo-patrimonial network were exposed spectacularly with the *calciopoli* scandal in 2006. This permitted a successful club with the right connections to influence the outcomes of football matches. *Calciopoli* became a metaphor for the wider Italian state; personal connections influenced the operation of the system for individual gain at the expense of the wider interest. The accumulation of resources by strategic individuals, facilitated by personal networks, permitted the elite clubs to dominate Italian football and empty out wider involvement.

Several of these factors explain the Champions League success of Inter in 2010. Since its inception in 1992, the Champions League has only been won by members of the G14 group of the richest clubs in Europe (which has expanded and is now called the European Clubs Association).\(^85\) As a member of this group, Inter represent one of the richest clubs in Europe. Furthermore, the incorporation of Italian football clubs into the wider family portfolio of businesses permits revenue to be spent on football. The president of Inter in particular, Massimo Moratti, invested substantial personal wealth in order to replicate the success of his father’s *Grande Inter* squad of the 1960s. In the year of their Champions League victory, Inter made a financial loss of €154 million (Capone 2010). The combination of *calciopoli* and economic investment resulted in Inter building the strongest squad in Italy, and one that could compete in Europe. This was facilitated with the signing of Jose Mourinho, one of the best managers in the world. Italy’s patrimonial system had permitted the accumulation of resources at a small number of elite clubs. Clubs like Roma, Lazio and Fiorentina are not able to acquire the resources to compete in Europe; only Juventus, AC Milan and Inter have won the Champions

\(^{85}\) www.g14.com; http://www.ecaurope.com/
League. Global factors also contributed to Inter’s success. The worldwide recession had impacted the ability of smaller clubs to compete within the Champions League, whilst the English clubs were also impacted by the devaluation of Sterling. Meanwhile, the re-emergence of Florentino Pérez as Real Madrid’s president dramatically impacted the network of European clubs. Real Madrid took the best players from Manchester United and AC Milan (Cristiano Ronaldo and Kaká respectively) whilst divesting themselves of Arjen Robben and Wesley Sneijder. These players were sold to Bayern Munich and Inter respectively and both played key roles in leading their clubs to the Champions League Final. The 2010 Champions League highlighted how the new European competition is one of elite clubs who operate within their own European networks and have the resources to buy the best players in the world. Whether Italy can remain in this elite network will be explored in the following section.

The Future of Italian Football: ‘Year Zero’?

At the start of the 2009-2010 season, Carlo Verdelli of the Gazzetta dello Sport suggested that it was ‘year zero’ for Serie A and Italian football (Verdelli 2009). The season passed without any major scandals or incidents and finished with Inter’s triumphant victory in Madrid. The success of Inter has demonstrated that Italian football can still compete on the global stage. However, much of this is down to personal wealth and ambition, as well as to the economic weakening of rivals. In order for Italian football to build upon this success it needs to understand the changing global economic system. After two decades of deregulation, King has highlighted that the worldwide recession of 2007-2010 could constitute a renewed process of regulation (King 2010). This signal has been sounded by the European governing body UEFA, who have announced that from the 2011-12 season they will enforce ‘financial fair play’ rules to ensure that all clubs who play in
UEFA competitions comply with strict financial regulations. As Michel Platini, the
president of UEFA states: “The clubs will comply, or they will not play” (Conn 2010).
This is confirmed by Uefa's general-secretary, Gianni Infantino, who confirmed that:

“There may be intermediate measures. We would have to ask why, maybe there
would be a warning first, but certainly, we would have to bar clubs in breach of
the rules from playing in the Champions League or the Europa League.
Otherwise, we lose all credibility” (Conn 2010).

It is instructive that a trans-national body is imposing regulation in the absence of state-
regulation. Furthermore, UEFA will need to enforce the regulations to ensure legitimacy;
a problem that has dogged the Italian federation since its inception.

There are signs that Italy is beginning to adapt to this global situation. In 2009, all but
one of the twenty Serie A clubs voted to create a separately administered league, along
the lines of the English Premier League. This league became operational at the start of
the 2010-2011 season and signals the start of a collective television deal for the league
(Prestisimone 2009; Deloitte and Touche 2010). This will represent an opportunity to
make the league more competitive and appealing to a global market. In the short term it
will dramatically affect the revenue of the elite clubs who have received a substantially
larger share of the television revenue during the last twenty years. How these clubs
manage this transition will be crucial. Juventus, for example have struggled since
Calciopoli and with the loss of television money, their future may not be as successful as
their past. Promotion of other revenue streams, particularly stadium redevelopment, will
mitigate this revenue reduction. Conversely Serie A would not be able to survive another
calciopoli if patrimonial networks become further entrenched.
Any form of regulation must be adequately policed. There has been a long history of patrimonial networks used to circumvent regulations. The ‘Rosetta Case’ in 1923 resulted from Juventus providing Virginio Rosetta an accountancy job in addition to his salary. Similarly, the restrictions on foreign players resulted in passports being forged to ‘prove’ Italian ancestry. These scandals are in addition to the opportunities taken by presidents and players to profit from their positions. Betting scandals and match-fixing payments has beset the Italian league since 1926 when Torino were found guilty of bribing a player from Juventus. Brian Glanville highlighted systematic bribery in Italian football during the 1960s and 1970s. Totonero and Calciopoli are further examples of individuals utilising their networks to organise football results. Economic profit is not always the prime driver for these scandals. Symbolic capital and prestige are equally important. The history of Italian football is a history of pushing the boundaries of authority.

The football authorities and the elite Italian clubs have highlighted the need for improved stadiums. The Italian Football Federation made a bid for the 2012 European Championships to act as a driver for stadium renovation. Fan violence and Calciopoli, however, saw the Championships granted to the Ukraine and Poland (Praverman 2007). The Federation subsequently bid for the 2016 tournament, yet this was awarded to France (The Guardian 2010). As a result, the Federation and the clubs will need to seek alternative funding for any redevelopment. Stadium redevelopment is vital in order for these clubs to offset the short term loss of television income. This situation is complicated by the continuing communal control of football stadiums in Italy. This will restrict opportunities for revenue generation for the clubs. Some clubs have begun the process of stadium redevelopment. The two Milan clubs and Roma have announced

86 http://www.figc.it/it/3463/22606/Impiami.shtml
plans to rejuvenate their stadiums. Meanwhile, Juventus are constructing a new stadium which is due to open in 2011. The stadium will include postmodern design, corporate facilities and merchandising and catering outlets. The cost of the stadium has been offset by the advance sales of naming rights and corporate facilities (Deloitte and Touche 2010). More significantly, it will be owned by the club. This will allow them to retain more of the revenue generated by the stadium. Further south, Fiorentina have announced their Cittadella project which will house a modern art gallery, hotels, conference facilities, and a new stadium (De Pinto and Pasquini 2008; Giudici 2010). Furthermore, Fiorentina have experimented with new policing techniques to minimise confrontation and violence at the stadium. Time will tell if the new stadium and reformed policing will constitute a ‘Fiorentina Model’ for Italian football (Giudici 2010).

Despite the changes to the structure and administration of the leagues, there has been little widespread reform in the governance of the federation and this will impact the wider success of the league. Guschwan succinctly summarises this problem:

“The difficult task facing Italian government, soccer league and fans is to balance the requirements of safety and civility with the passion and expression that makes Italian soccer matches so compelling.” (Guschwan 2007)

The crisis of legitimacy affecting the central authorities undermines the potential for lasting change.

Despite Putnam’s assertions that social capital contributes to national democracy and national economic success, this has not been demonstrated in Italy. Restructuring of the

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87 http://www.juventus.com/site/eng/JPL_newstadium.asp
global political economy has also led to restructuring of local communities. Deregulation of the economy and the movement of capital as also had a direct impact on individuals who have less time to attend associations, or have moved away from their community. This has been facilitated by increased consumption where traditional associations have been supplanted with new forms of association. Although social capital is generated at all levels of society and within every social network, it operates in accordance with economic capital. Capital is generated in greater quantities by those with the resources to accumulate it. As Skidmore et al suggested, “those already well connected tend to get better connected… community participation tends to be dominated by a small group of insiders who are disproportionately involved in a large number of governance activities” (Skidmore, Bound et al. 2006). Economic and social capital are intimately entwined, as Bourdieu argued (Bourdieu 1984; Bourdieu 1986). So as individuals accumulate these stocks of capital, it reinforces their position. Consequently, we must make a clear distinction between the Bourdieu concept of ‘social capital’ which is a resource that is used by individuals within a group, and the more generic theory proscribed by Putnam. Whilst stocks of social capital may increase with thanks to certain individuals participating in community life, this does not automatically translate to a wider benefit for the community in general.

Social capital accumulation amongst elites seriously impacts the work of local associations. The restructuring of the global economy has opened up the football economy for new entrepreneurs (King 1997). These have exploited existing social capital to exploit transformations in the global political economy. ‘Other-directed’ individuals like Silvio Berlusconi extend their wide social networks and in doing so win acclaim and favours from their supporters. This facilitates the accumulation of economic capital and sets in motion a self-reinforcing cycle. This in turn has accumulated and reinforced
patrimonial networks. For example, personal patrimonial connections are retained within the new structure of the league. The president of Roma, Rosella Sensi, is vice-president of the new Serie A and is supported by various club presidents, including Adriano Galliani, the president of AC Milan and former president of the Italian League (until he resigned due to Calciopoli). The central authorities have to impose a regulatory framework upon Italian football in order to mitigate the patrimonial networks. For example, the English Premier League is managed by a putatively independent Chairman and Chief Executive.

The crisis of authority has contributed to player and fan malaise which is contributing to the decline in Italian football. The culture of mistrust towards the authorities has been highlighted by the changes to the league structure in the 2010-11 season. These changes have necessitated a new collective agreement between the players and the clubs. In September 2010 the players of the Italian Footballers’ Association (AIC) voted to strike (which they subsequently suspended) in opposition to a new agreement proposed by the clubs. In particular they were protesting against the suggestion that footballers should not have additional jobs outside football, that salaries should be tied to performance, and significantly, that a club could force the sale of a player in the last year of his contract to any club which agreed a transfer fee (Bandini 2010; La Gazzetta dello Sport 2010). Challenges to central regulation have also affected fan involvement. Stadium regulations have not been enforced and years of scandal, violence and crisis has resulted in fan apathy and this has resulted in a decline in attendances at the stadium. This has been compounded by the introduction of the tessera del tifoso. Ultras have protested against the imposition of this card, and this has seen a dramatic reduction in attendances at Italian stadiums for the 2010-11 season. For example, Roma only had 18,600 fans for their

http://www.legaseriea.it/it/lega-calcio/il-governo-della-lega
opening match against Cesena in the 80,000 capacity Stadio Olimpico (Bandini 2010). These factors are impacting the spectacle, both in the stadium and on television. Draconian legislation has directly impacted the one area that made Italian football unique, and has simultaneously created a symbol of resistance for the ultras.

The fans have a key opportunity to turn the patrimonial networks to their advantage. Increased individualisation in Italian society has resulted in the overall decline in participation in public life. The supporters’ clubs and ultras groups represent excellent avenues of social capital creation, which Putnam argues would overcome this decline (Putnam 2000). However, they also represent the emptying out of politics from public life (Sennett 1976; Habermas 1989; Putnam 2000). Richard Sennett suggested in *The Corrosion of Character* that the way to overcome individualisation’ and to manage changes brought about by the global deregulated economy’ is to form small collectives (Sennett 1998). The supporters’ clubs and ultras already constitute these collectives. Yet they need to reframe their political outlook. Historically, ultras have reflected the politics of the piazza. Political symbols of the extreme left and right emerged in the curve during the 1970s. This has been replaced by anti-immigration and secessionist politics that reflect the growing dominance of the Lega Nord and Berlusconi’s centre-right government. There need to be more social movements like *Progetto Ultrà* to present an alternative image of the fans. There are no equivalents of the Football Supporter's Federation, Kick it Out or Fan Projects in Italy. Therefore, there is no natural correlation between social capital and political involvement. Historical, political and cultural factors must be understood as these can inhibit political involvement and reinforce the emptying out of public life. More research is required to investigate the connection between social capital

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in networks of individuals and political involvement if the concept is to prove useful. It also needs to include political and economic factors, especially the role of the state.

Italy stands on the precipice. ‘Year Zero’ and the newly formed Serie A constitute a new beginning for Italian football. Yet Italy has been adept at *gattopardismo* which has permitted change whilst remaining the same. For Italian football to reach the echelons they once occupied, all parties must adopt a controlled strategy to compete across Europe. Alternatively, Serie A will contract and become a chapter of history. For those who succumbed to the glamour and style of Channel 4’s *Football Italia*, this will be a sad loss to world football.
Appendix: Glossary of Italian Terms

Allianza Nazionale (AI) – The National Alliance Party formed after the dissolution of the MSI.

Calcio – The Italianised word for ‘Football’.

Calciopoli – Match fixing scandal which emerged in 2006 involving Juventus, AC Milan, Fiorentina, Lazio and Reggina.

Campanilismo – Literally, the love of one’s bell tower. Reflects the feelings of attachment and belonging to one’s home town or city.

Carabinieri – Corps of armed police with the standing of armed forces (along with Air Force, Army and Navy).

Cattenaccio – Literally ‘padlock’; a style of defence popularized by Hellguera in Italy in the 1950s-60s and specialized in preventing the opposition from scoring.

Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano (CONI) – The Italian National Olympic Committee. This is the umbrella organisation which administers and manages all national sporting federations.
**Covisoc (Commissione di Vigilanza sulle Società Calcistiche)** – Literally, ‘Vigilancy Commission on Football Clubs’. This body operated as the financial regulator for CONI to ensure that football clubs had the financial assets to complete a full season.

**Curva (pl. Curve)** – The ends behind the goals in Italian stadiums, similar to the terrace in Modern British stadiums.

**Daspo (Diffida ad Assistere alle manifestazioni Sportive)** – Literally ‘Prohibition to attend sport events’. This is the equivalent of a football banning order in Britain. It prevents the holders of this quasi-legal order from attending football matches.

**Democrazia Cristiana (DC)** – The Christian Democratic Party.

**Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (FIGC)** – The Italian Football Federation. Responsible for the administration and management of Italian Football.

**Fideiussione** – Financial guarantees provided by clubs to guarantee the financial eligibility for the season.

**Forza Italia (FI)** – The political party started by Silvio Berlusconi in 1992 after the tangentopoli scandal.

**Gattopardismo** – From the novel entitled *Il Gattopardo* by Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa. It reflects the continuance of existing practises despite change.
Lega Calcio (Lega Nazionale Professionisti) – The Italian Football League; the governing body for the professional leagues in Italy, principally Serie A and Serie B.


Mani Pulite – Literally ‘clean hands’. This is the investigation by magistrates.

Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) – The Italian Social Movement (MSI), a neo-Fascist, then national conservative right wing party.

Moviola – The slow motion replay performed on sports broadcasts.

Oriundo (pl. Oriundi) – Foreign born players of Italian descent.

Osservatorio Nazionale sulle Manifestazioni Sportive (Osservatorio) – Quasi-political body initiated to review safety at football matches.

Partito Communista Italiano (PCI) – The Italian Communist Party.

Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI) – The Italian Socialist Party.

Plus-valenze – An accounting system that spread the profit made on the sale of players over an accounting term.
Il Popolo della Libertà (PdL) – The ‘People of Freedom’ Party formed after the merger of Forza Italia and the Allianza Nazionale.

Questora – The Chief of State Police.

RAI – The state television and radio station. Originally called Radio Audizione Italiana it changed its name in 1954 to Radio Televisione Italiana to reflect the new medium of television. The acronym remained unchanged.

Risorgimento – The political and social movement that led to the Unification of the Italian peninsular.

Scudetto (pl. Scudetti) – Literally ‘little shield’. The winner of the Serie A championship. Champions are entitled to wear a small shield with the Italian tricolour on their jerseys in the following season. The winner of ten scudetti is entitled to place a gold star above their badge. Only three clubs have won this gold star: Juventus (twice), AC Milan and Inter.

Settore Ospiti – The area for away fans. This is an area for parking, congregation and confinement for fans travelling to away games. Occasionally these areas are adjacent to the stadium. Alternatively, they are located at the edge of the city.

Striscione – Banners held up at games to make political, insulting or humorous comments to the players, opposition or politicians. Usually written on white sheets, or rolls of white paper.
Tangentopoli – Political scandal of 1992 which resulted in the *Mani Pulite* investigation and the subsequent demise of the First Republic, the DC, PCI and PSI.

*Tessera del tifoso* – The identity card imposed by the FIGC on fans to reduce the requirement for identity checks at football matches. It also operates as a loyalty card and MasterCard.

*Trasformismo* – The practise of Italian politicians to switch political support in return for personal support. Personal patrimony was utilised to ensure that political support endured. This maintained a stable form of government without ideological shifts to the right or left. It dates to the pre-fascist period, after unification.

*Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale (TAR)* – Regional Administrative Courts which exercise regional judicial autonomy.


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