Memories of violence in Cyprus: conflicting perspectives and dynamics of reconciliation

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ABSTRACT

When remembering violence in their collective past, Cypriot individual and collective perspectives are often based on a representation of violence. Popular thinking within communities and rhetoric of elites can intertwine and conflict. Individuals may in fact remember privately events that do not fit easily within the nationalist narratives forwarded by the community leaderships. In the case of Cyprus and other violent events of the past, we are often not discussing violence at all but the memories of respondents. Research has been conducted on the community memories but not necessarily on the 1963-4 period of inter-communal violence and the international intervention/invasion of 1974. Nor has research assessed the effect such memories have on the reconciliation of communities in the present. Through questionnaires and interviews, this research examines the response of Cypriots regarding political relations and attitudes and how these were perceived to have been affected by violence. This thesis argues that there appear to be two types of violent memories; one that may create divisions between communities, while another may encourage a sense of collective victimhood. Through recollection and transmission, such memories could drive communities apart or together, intentionally or otherwise. Often reconciliation needs to take place before a political solution can be found, although these processes exist in tandem. This thesis illustrates that these foundations may have been laid for reconciliation between Cypriot communities at the grass-roots, which would need to be built upon. For this to result in reconciliation, Cypriot elites need to change their policies in a number of areas for this groundwork to constitute a sound progression towards a sustainable solution.
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ACRONYMS

AKEL  Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazómenou Laoú or Progressive Party of the Working People
CTP   Cumhuriyetci Turk Partisi or Republican Turkish Party
ECMV  Escalating Cyclical Memory of Violence
EOKA  Ethnike Organosis Kyprion Agoniston or National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters
EU    European Union
KTOS  Kibris Turk Ogretmenler Sendikasi or Turkish Cypriot Teachers Trade Union
OLMV  Overwhelming Linear Memory of Violence
PRIO  Peace Research Institute, Oslo
SBA   Sovereign Base Area
TMT   Türk Mukavemet Teskilati or Turkish Resistance Organisation
UBP   Ulusal Birlik Partisi or National Unity Party
UK    United Kingdom
UN    United Nations
UNFICYP  United Nations Force in Cyprus

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INTRODUCTION

1.1 Concept of analysis
In the form of changing attitudes and relations, political transformations occur continuously and are subject to various influences. One such influence is violent events that occur, in both recent and distant past. This study will focus on perceived relation, and attitude transformations from the perspective of Cypriot communities. With the support of empirical evidence, observation of violent events can be carried out through examination of remembrance of violent conflict and events since (Neal, 2005). This strategy deals with the difficulties inherent when examining violent conflict, including obvious practical problems. Moreover, this research centres on the aspects of violence that impinges on modernity, primarily the dynamics of communities involved after violent events. While avoiding a historical approach, this research examines memories of violence in the past and evaluates the effects such memories have on the dynamics between and within the two Cypriot communities. Previous research appears to base itself either on statistics (Bryman, 2001) or on case studies of certain communities (May, 1998). This study evaluates violence through respondents’ perceptions of past violence and how those perceptions fit or contrast with the existing narratives. These narratives are illustrated by certain literatures highlighted by the researcher, although others may have chosen different sources to compare evidence against and so this must be taken into account.

The following section will identify and define the central notions of this research, namely: violence and its incarnations; memory; conflict and the politicisation of ethnicity.

1.2 Notions
1.2.1 Violence
Violence has many different elements that must be brought together in one easily understood definition (Kalyvas, 2006; Kalyvas, Shapiro and Masoud, 2008). Violence includes a vast array of actions and events which can often be difficult to examine empirically (Tilley, 2003). I have chosen to keep the parameters of this investigation tightly around an area of empirically visible events. As a result, the definition of
violence in this research ought to spell out clearly what events are being examined and retain a relatively narrow focus. Tilly (2003) defined violence as inflicting damage on persons or objects as well as a seizure of persons or objects above and beyond restraint or resistance (Tilly, 2003). This will be the working definition of violence in this study, although a broader definition could have been used (Weinstein, 2007). There are also wider perspectives of violence: stemming from psychological patterns and stresses (Colvin, 2000); economic hardships (Kaldor, 2007; Cramer, 2006); criminality (Jones, 1998); and peer groups (Bay and Donham, 2006). One area of broader thinking is structural violence and how the potential of actors is curtailed (Jacoby, 2008); although, a broader definition may be required. This study will examine two manifestations of memory that frame violence in what I term Escalating Cyclical Memory of Violence (ECMV) and Overwhelming Linear Memory of Violence (OLMV). So, instead of investigating violence itself, this thesis evaluates the memory of that violence from the perspective of Cypriots today. This type of approach will assist in evaluating the consequences of violence in terms of communities who have been directly affected by those violent events but not necessarily having experienced them.

1.2.2 Memory

I would suggest that memories are perspectives people have of events in the past. Such perspectives of the past are often mistaken, exaggerated, ignored, or forgotten (Misztal, 2003). On a collective scale, these perspectives are directed through top-down as well as bottom-up dynamics (Misztal, 2003; Koressar et al, 2009). Moreover, the community can collectively choose to ignore parts of their past, or exaggerate other elements. The memories and presentation of historical events have been forwarded within the elites’ nationalist narratives (Papadakis, 2008). Conversely, individuals or collectives may not accept the nationalist narrative and seek to challenge them. Meanwhile, individuals may place greater emphasis upon memories passed down through generations within the family (Neisser and Fivush, 1994). This research is not examining the historical events, but examines the interactions that individuals and communities have with their collective past. While there will be

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1 Structural violence will be touched upon in chapter two but broadly consists of harm upon the potential of states and individuals.
exaggeration, remembrance and forgetfulness exist at the level of families or small social groups.

1.2.3 Community conflict and politicization of ethnicity

Violence results from communal competition between groups that define themselves as communities (Smith, 1986, 2001; Petersen, 2002). This shared belief of common heritage, culture, ancestry and ethos results in those inside the group identifying themselves in opposition to an ‘other’ (Weinstein, 2007). Many such groups remained autonomous and retained their separate ethos and heritage while under the control of empires (PIO, 2010). As administration became more complex, competition between interests developed and the politicization of ethnicity began (Wimmer,; Turton 1997).

There are many ways in which to view this process: primordialist, modernist, post-modernist as well ethno-symbolist². This politicization was considered a tool for elites within established communities to mobilise support in order to capture governmental power and retain their personal authority. In the case of Cyprus, both the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaderships went to great lengths to retain control of their communities, eliminating opponents and rivals (Yennaris, 2003; Bose, 2007). In a sense, the communities existed and defined themselves by religious background prior to labelling themselves as elements of wider ‘nations’ (Papadakis, 2008; Loizides, 2007). Even if not claiming political power over territory, communities often face nation-states claiming authority over territory they reside on, as occurred in Cyprus since 1963-4 (Denktash and Moran, 2009). With the collapse of empires after the Second World War, these interactions resulted in an increase in intra-state conflicts, as observed by Gurr and Harff (2002) as well as Brown and Cote (1997). Conflicts must also be considered within their climates and locations. In this case, Cyprus should not be considered without noting the influence of international actors such as Turkey and Greece (Bose, 2007; Nicolet, 2001; Joseph, 1997). But this thesis will not be assessing the role of exogenous actors but the memory of violent conflict amongst communities and its effect on reconciliation, something that has not been fully covered by previous work.

² The discussion on how to view the process of nationalism has spawned numerous books including those of Anthony D Smith. Though I will not discuss nation, I think Smith has successfully synthesised the sometimes opposing perspectives (2001, 2004).
These core themes illustrate the wider perspective of an interdependent modern world system where transmission of past events can be multiplied through methods and technologies such as the Internet (Neal, 2005). The memory of violence affects the political relations and attitudes of actors and which is sent out to the wider world in efforts to spread the political actor’s point of view. This should also be examined in the context of an interdependent world of multi-ethnic states that have more tensions within the territory compared to conflict across borders (Joseph, 1997). In this research, the changes to Cypriot political relations and attitudes on various levels will be examined in respect of periods of violence and the memory of such episodes. Primarily, to what degree has the memory of violence affected the relations and attitudes of communities within a conflict environment, post-violence? Moreover, to what extent has the memory of violence evolved as a result of more recent political developments, affecting the opportunities for reconciliation and possible resolution to conflict?

1.3 Contextualisation of Cyprus
Cyprus is an island with a majority Greek population, less than fifty miles South of the Turkish coast in the Mediterranean Sea. According to the Greek Cypriot narrative, their community has existed under many different empires, and so they consider Cyprus to be fundamentally Greek (PIO, 2007). Conversely, the Turkish Cypriot narrative views Cyprus’ past to have been unalterably changed with the Ottoman period (Gazioglu, 1999; TRNC, 1997). Under the millet system, the Greek Orthodox Church was able to control its community’s issues which resulted in the strong position the Church later enjoyed within the Greek Cypriot community (Reddaway, 1986). The Greek community’s identity was reinforced after the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of British control (Panteli, 1990). Greek Cypriots lobbied for control of their own destiny and ultimately union (enosis) with Greece. Partly a result of the nationalism ideology that developed in the nineteenth century, enosis was the idea that islands with an historical link with Greece ought to be brought within a larger Greek nation (PIO, 2007). A precedent had been made in Crete, where the Greek community had successfully united with Greece against the wishes of a Turkish community.
Due to their historic trading links with Western Europe, the Greek Cypriots were an outward-looking community influenced by new ideas of self-determination and nationalism (Panteli, 1990). The Greek Cypriots also saw the opportunity the British administration presented for their aim of *enosis*. However, the Greek Cypriots neglected to take into account the Turkish Cypriot community’s ambitions (Reddaway, 1986). There is an ongoing debate as to what *enosis* actually was. Most literature suggests that it was a call to unify the island with Greece. But Greek Cypriots argue that *enosis* was not a call for union with Greece but a rallying cry to Greek Cypriots. Attalides (1979) notes Turkish Cypriots could not possibly distinguish between the use of *enosis* as a rallying cry and when it was used to call for union. These post-event distinctions do not take away the fact that either calling for immediate or long term *enosis* would present a clear threat to the Turkish Cypriot community.

The Turkish Cypriots, as opposed to the Greek Cypriots, aimed to remain under British rule and considered that, if the British did leave, the island should return to Turkey as the successor of the Ottoman Empire (Gazioglu and Moran, 2000). Both Turkey and Greece took an interest in the island for different reasons; Greece sought to bring Greeks within one country while the Turks saw the strategic importance of an island roughly 40 miles from its coastland. Turkey’s interest and concern for the Turkish Cypriot community led to calls for the partition, or *taksim*, of Cyprus. This call was designed primarily to oppose the Greek Cypriot’s call for *enosis*, and used by Turkish Cypriots when conflict threatened and violence broke out (Cranshaw 1978). The 1955-1959 conflict between Greek Cypriots and British authorities strongly supports the argument that Greek Cypriots sought change most vehemently while the Turkish Cypriots wanted the status quo. Between 1958 and 1959, the involvement of the Turkish Cypriots came to the fore with increased inter-communal and intra-communal violence occurring (Gazioglu, 1999). The perceived Greek Cypriot attacks on Turkish Cypriots, many of whom were involved in the administration, led to the establishment of the *Turk Mukavemet Teskilati* (TMT) (Reddaway, 1986). TMT was an underground organisation primarily designed to protect the Turkish Cypriot

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3 The debate as to when *enosis* should be achieved was the basis of the divide within the Greek Cypriots community. The competition over the term *enosis* reached the extent of opponents stressing how pro-*enosis* they were, moderates and extremists.
community, although Greek Cypriots argue it was a militia armed and supported by the Turkish state (Yennaris, 2003). Not recognised as a community by the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots involved in the administration were seen by Greek Cypriots as tools of the colonial powers (Panteli, 1990). The eventual 1960 constitution was designed to ensure Turkish Cypriots had a voice in decision-making, with safeguards enshrined in the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee. However, these treaties set a precedent by acknowledging the ability of external actors to intervene in Cypriot affairs (PIO, 2010). The events that followed the 1960 constitution, especially the 1963-4 inter-communal violence and the 1974 intervention of Turkey, were arguably results of this constitution. The 1955-59 conflict is in many ways the precursor to conflict between the two communities over the future of Cyprus. The years that followed were characterised by the communities’ inability to work together, resulting in deadlock (PIO, 2010; Denktash and Moran 2009).

From Turkish Cypriot perspectives, the 1963-4 inter-communal violence was targeted at their community and perpetrated by Greek regular and irregular forces, including Ethnike Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA). According to Greek Cypriot perspectives, attacks were mostly perpetrated by Turkish regular and Turkish Cypriot irregular forces, such as TMT (Yennaris, 2003; PIO, 2010). EOKA was the primary organisation involved in the 1955-9 insurgency campaign and became synonymous with attacks against Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriot opponents (Cranshaw, 1978). As a result of reported attacks in 1963-4, the Turkish Cypriots were forced, or driven, into small fortified enclaves. The withdrawal, or removal, of Turkish Cypriots from institution of the Republic was either for the safety of Turkish Cypriot individuals involved (Moran, 1998) or an attempt to establish sovereign control over small segments of Cyprus by the Turkish Cypriot leadership (PIO, 2010; Yennaris, 2003; Panteli, 1990). These two perspectives illustrate the conflicting attitudes and goals of the two separate communities, often fed by pre-existing perspectives and representations of their collective past. The attempted coup by Greek forces in 1974 was, in the eyes of Turkish Cypriots, grounds for external intervention (Bose, 2007; Denktash and Moran, 2009). Greek Cypriots claim they suffered first from external influence from Greece and then intervention by Turkey (Drousiotis, 2006). This research examines perceptions of intra/inter-communal relations and attitudes as a result of memories of these two violent events.
1.4 Objectives

In respect of memory and violence in the case of Cyprus, the objectives of this thesis are the following:

To identify and understand memories of violence as a method of analysis;

To expose changing perceptions of political relations and attitudes amongst Cypriots and whether such perceptions fit within the Cypriot nationalist narratives;

To illustrate and draw conclusions on perceived changes to political relations and attitudes and its relationship with the theorised memories of violence;

To provide the grounds for further study of the implications for reconciliation processes and successful transitions to sustainable peace.

The first objective requires this research to examine the theory behind memory and violence and explain why a new approach is necessary. In stressing political attitudes and relations, this research uses empirical data on individuals’ thoughts on the attitudes and relations between individuals, communities and institutions. This research seeks to draw distinctions between memories that fit nationalist narrative of Cypriot communities from those that do not fit such storylines (Riessman, 1993). The third, the illustration of changing memories of events, will be the core of this research. I will be examining 1963-4 and 1974 as periods of violence within the recent past. This study examines the attitudes and relations of Cypriots today through their memories: real, altered, or partial. The final objective of this research directs thinking towards the role of memory and the obstacle of nationalist narratives within the reconciliation process, in Cyprus as well as elsewhere. How do memories influence people’s willingness to interact with individuals from the opposite community? Individuals may find it harder to associate with others from the ‘other’ community outside the controlled environment of formal reconciliation programmes. As will become apparent from the empirical data, the future requires bridges amongst Cypriots, especially amongst the young. This research seeks to contribute towards better understanding of the barriers to such bridges.
In considering the timescale, Cypriot past is divided into three periods in this research. The first encompasses the period before Cypriot independence in 1960 and is characterised by growing nationalism and a resulting 1955-9 Greek Cypriot nationalist struggle for union with Greece. Though, arguably, this period changed the dynamics between communities, it is not part of this study primarily because it was an anti-colonial struggle against British rule of Cyprus. From 1960 to 1974, Cypriot history is characterised by community competition, deadlock, violence and negotiations. The third period of time covers developments from 1974 onwards and the consequences of the intervention and the paralysis that has remained since. Changing roles of actors, such as the European Union, are also significant in developments towards the possible reconciliation, but have not yet born fruit.

Memories of violence have various effects on transforming political relations and attitudes on Cyprus. Although the two violent episodes are very different, they are similarly perceived to have had consequences for community relationships. This research is examining the memory of violence, not the violence itself. Specifically, how some memories of violence fit nationalist narratives while others may force their reinterpretation?

1.5 Contextualisation of theory

Before considering how the memory of violence is constructed, a contextualisation of violence must be made to explain the approach taken. Although violence can be considered a broad subject that is likely to remain pertinent for the foreseeable future, much work has been carried out on how violence comes about and how it can be contained. One important division is whether violence is seen as an outcome or as a process. If viewed as an outcome, violence results from political economic and social ills and inequalities (Petersen, 2002, Jones 1998). As a process, violence results from a series of events and consequences that could result in subsequent violence (Weinstein, 2007; Wolff 2006). This study will consider violent events as part of a process that affects the political attitudes and relations of actors, but primarily through memory.
Violence can occur in and beyond a conflict environments and often occurs within the context of a civil war. Violence can also take place in the realm of terrorism and counter-terrorism, insurgency and counter-insurgency, brawls, riots, ethnic cleansing and civil unrest (Tilly, 2003). This tit-for-tat violence has been observed in many examples including Iraq (Hashim, 2006), in the former Yugoslavia (Petersen, 2002; Kaufmann, 2001) and in some African countries (Boas and Dunn, 2007; Weinstein 2007). The consequences of such actions are dependent upon your perspective as a researcher or observer. What is defined as counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism could be considered state-violence by the states’ opponents. Any state would designate such actions as necessary for the sake of security and order, as part of Weber’s monopoly over the use of force (Weber, 1964). Often subaltern groups need the support of the local population to exist; giving them sanctuary and supplies as well as legitimacy. This tit-for-tat violence involves both sides’ use of a degree of violence that delivers no knock-out victory, resulting in a continuation of violence and which can take a brutal and intimate nature (Tilly, 2003).

This research also touches upon previous studies in order to explain why I am not examining motives. A psychological definition of motive is ‘the reason for a certain course of action, whether conscious or unconscious’ (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/motive, accessed 10 July 2011). Sources that discuss motivations of actors vary widely: politics (Kalyvas, 2008, 2006); economic and financial need (Collier, 2002, 2008; Kaldor, 2006); social reasons (Goldstein 2003); criminal nature (Jones 1998) among others. Arguing that violence can often be financially motivated, academics can support the general conclusion that perpetrators are rational actors. The problem remains one of perpetrators denying intention or responsibility which calls into question any stated motives for violence (Payne, 2008). Therefore, such studies can lead to too much speculation based on too little empirical evidence.

As well as motives, dynamics are another area of study that is of relevance to this research. Writers such as Kalyvas (2006) and Tilly (2003) are prime examples of literature that examines dynamics of violence. Dynamic is defined as ‘an interactive system or process, especially one involving competing or conflicting forces’ (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/dynamic, accessed 10 July 2011). However, the
study of dynamics would be too expansive for all elements to be covered in one work. Escalation processes, economic consideration, security dilemmas, collective actions and theories of perceived irrational violence are just a few dynamics that could be examined but each ought to be examined separately. Moreover, while there is too little evidence in terms of motives, there is too much regarding dynamics.

This study follows a number of researchers who have examined the consequences of violence, namely the resulting political transformations. Wolff (2006) placed an emphasis on the dynamics of conflict rather than specific consequences. To varying degrees, Debreil and Klein (2002), Collins (2008) and Cramer (2006) assess the transformations that result from violence. Cramer centres on economic consequences as does the World Bank (2003). Collins (2008) includes various topics of interest in his work but has primarily examined social consequences. Debreil and Klein (2002) assessed the political consequences and, like Fearon and Laitin (2003), they discuss state failure. The primary concern is division, insecurity and the desire of political actors for reconciliation, sustainable peace-processes and state-stabilisation (Paris, 2008).

The 1963-4 clashes and the 1974 intervention by Turkey are case studies for this research regarding to how violent events are remembered. The 1950s struggle for independence was not primarily between competing communities but fits within a colonial context (Cranshaw, 1978). Cyprus illustrates that independence of territories can spark violence as communities disagree on the principles of power-sharing. The outstanding issue in the case of Cyprus has been the political relationship between the two communities. Often in cases of protracted conflict, political breakthroughs are not found because of the underlying issues behind conflicts often remain.

Both the 1963-4 and the 1974 events were based on communal competition between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Greek Cypriots argued they ought to be in total control of their destiny (Mallinson, 2005) while Turkish Cypriots have wanted that same freedom (Denktash and Moran, 2009). However, wider international interests complicated the situation in Cyprus, constraining changes and left questions over Cyprus’s conditional sovereignty (Gaziolgu and Moran, 2000). As will be discussed, there are elements that have changed relations and attitudes and this research will
illustrate how the memory of violence may allow the opportunity for political transformations, as well as create obstacles to reconciliation.

1.6 Transformations
Transformations such as the development of bi-zonal and bi-communal principles, the decline of enosis and the rising importance of supra-national organisations illustrate the complexity of the Cypriot case. The domestic transformations will be examined at the individual, inter-personal, and the institutional level of analysis.

1.6.1 Individual
On an individual level, political relations and attitudes differ according to circumstances. Attitudes and relations centre on perceived and real dangers as individuals worry about their own personal safety (Payne, 2008; Petersen, 2002). However, they often have no contact with people from the opposing communities as a result of violence (Bose, 2007). That people do not want relations with individuals from the opposite community does not necessarily follow (Gagnon, 2004). As will be made clear, frequently individuals do not blame others on the opposing side, including those directly involved in violence. The problem often lies with individuals who seek to build relations being shouted down out by more hostile and hardened opinions.

1.6.2 Inter-personal
Relations between communities may rest on communities’ utilisation of their institutions. The existence of two sets of institutions on Cyprus damaged relations between the communities. Inevitably, both communities seek a better deal than the status quo and do not want to weaken their current positions. Political relations may be improved in negotiations, while division and conflict worsen political relations (Tilly, 2003). To what extent did political attitudes and relations suffer from inter-communal conflict from 1963? How much did attitudes and relations deteriorate after the 1974 intervention?

1.6.3 Institutional
At an institutional level, the consequences of violence have a significant impact on the national army, the judiciary, the legislature, and the executive. Armies can often be implicated in violence, often in conjunction with supporting external actors (Gibbons,
The judiciary may be unable to keep its independence when violence is widespread (Denktash, 1988). Often justice is the first casualty of violence and one key element needed for re-establishing civil society (Paris, 2008). After violence, legislatures frequently contain those accused of enacting, or accused of being privy to, atrocities against opponents (Gibbons, 1997). Executives have often been implicated in the planning and organising of inter-communal violence (Yennaris, 2003; Gazioglu and Moran 2000). As a result, institutions that are reorganised or purged of obvious perpetrators are another key components to re-establishing stability (Paris and Sisk, 2009). Violence has consequences for institutions, often resulting in division, suspicion, conflict, corruption, nepotism, and broken infrastructure (Paris and Sisk, 2009; Stansfield, 2007). These themes will be discussed in depth later where the attitudes of, and relations between institutions will be examined.

1.6.4 Transformations on Cyprus

The 1963-4 violent episode resulted in the hardening of communities’ attitudes and forced Turkish Cypriots into enclaves, either by the actions of Greek Cypriots or by their own community. This paved the way for communities to galvanise support in external countries and remove opponents. The 1974 intervention of Turkey in Cyprus gave the pre-existing division a territorial element. The Turkish government satisfied its security concerns, avoided Cyprus uniting with Greece, and safeguarded Turkish Cypriots within the northern section of Cyprus. This did not make the action legal, nor did it stop the Greek Cypriots enlisting the support of the wider international community (Bose, 2007, Green and Collins, 2003).

Violence remains a very influential process, through physical damage and its representation. The representation of events changes through time and this must also be examined for its influence on political attitudes and relations. This research examines the memories of the Cypriots questioned, actual historical data sources or veteran’s testimonies are not part of this study. Such sources would provide a helpful study of how veterans remember events but does not explain how the narratives have been constructed and reconstructed from such memories. 1963-4 and 1974 are portrayed by communities in ways to serve the elites interest as well as in alternative forms. It serves the interest of the collective to create memories that may avoid joint responsibilities (Torpey, 2003). Individual memory can also be affected by collective
representations administered by government agencies through education, culture and social avenues⁴. It can also be a grass-root commemoration of past violent events not controlled or created by institutions or bodies (Misztal, 2003). These dynamics are examined in this research and are relevant throughout.

Through the analysis of case studies, this research will contribute to the understanding of politicized memory of violence and its influence on political attitudes and relations. The resulting data should assist in illustrating the transformations that Cyprus underwent and the existence of divisions. Developments within the context of Cyprus should be viewed as part of the process of joining of the European Union (EU) that the Greek Cypriots achieved in 2004 (Hannay, 2005). Meanwhile, the northern section of the island, the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC), may have suffered from political isolation, depending on which Cypriot perspective is observed. Other issues that are relevant in the context of Cyprus are included within the next section in order to illustrate the choice of topic.

1.7 Overview

This thesis looks into the memory of violence and changing political relations and attitudes; focusing on the 1963-4 period of violence and the 1974 intervention by Turkey. The similarities and differences allow for analysis of different memories of violence and transformations in political relations and attitudes. With a violent past between and within communities which has not resulted in a solution, the Cypriot situation allows past violent events, that remain relevant, to be broached objectively. If events were more recent, heated debate and argument could compromise research.

Although not directly part of the study, the colonial period in Cyprus and the history of the island have an important explanatory force when dealing with community relations. The Greek Cypriots always considered their community the unchanging majority on the island and aimed at union with Greece (PIO, 2010; Coufoudakis, 2006). This objective was especially forwarded after a precedent had been set with the enosis of Crete, with its Turkish minority, to Greece. The Greek influence on the island’s inhabitants led to pressure for enosis, which may have been used by the

⁴ Although the methods of transmitting the selected memories of the past will be touched upon, there are multiple ways that cannot be covered in one work alone.
British to drive a wedge between communities, from the perspective of Greek Cypriots (Coufoudakis, 2006). Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriots resented Turkish Cypriots’ involvement with colonial authorities (Reddaway, 1986). This highlights differing views of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots; some literature suggests communities could live together and that no dispute existed until 1974, including Yennaris (2003) or Hitchens (1999). Other literature considers communities had always been divided and conflict had occurred in the 1950s insurgency and in 1963-4 (Sonyel, 1997; Reddaway, 1986). This demonstrates the matrix of disputes and division on Cyprus.

The wider geo-political situation at the time should also be mentioned at this point as events coincided with the Cold War and competition between the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. As well as being positioned in a strategic location, Cyprus had, and still has, a strong leftist party in the form of the Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL). The NATO membership of both Greece and Turkey was designed to establish both countries within the western sphere while both had interests on Cyprus. The US and other European powers were concerned over the encroaching influence of the Warsaw Pact into the eastern Mediterranean. Arguably, NATO powers might well have allowed the 1974 intervention in Cyprus to placate Turkey and its security concerns. Yet, this area of discussion is not expanded beyond this as this thesis is primarily interested in the memory of violence and not actual events.

There are other examples of violence between communities within a state other than Cyprus, supported by outside forces (Kaufmann, 2001; Gagnon, 2004). As an example, Bosnia saw external involvement from Croatia and Serbia as well as eventual international engagement. Other situations which sparked intervention may not have an obvious ethnic connection but can be set in the context of post-colonialism and the Cold War (Finnemore, 2004). Cyprus is an example of a post-violent ethnic conflict unresolved in a post-colonial environment. This has positioned Cyprus as an ideal candidate for research on political transformations resulting from the memory of violence. Moreover, this research seeks to contribute to the literature on memory and narrative reinterpretation as a result of present political expediencies.
As the political situation develops, the interpretation of memories ought to account for newly remembered memories.

These political transformations remain ongoing. Recent developments have resulted in the Republic of Cyprus joining the European Union (EU), assisting the development of the Republic’s economy. The European Union’s expansion has included many Eastern European countries, but not Turkey partly as a result of the outstanding Cypriot problem (Green and Collins, 2003). The Turkish Cypriot community leaders argue they should have a significant level of autonomy in any solution, while Greek Cypriots argue that is unviable (PIO, 2010). The failure to unify before the EU accession of the Republic of Cyprus may have theoretically widened the divide between the Cypriot communities (Loizides, 2007). Conversely, the ability for Cypriots to cross the divide may well have opened the opportunity for individual Cypriots to mix and build networks. I argue that such access, plus the theoretical membership of Turkish Cypriots and Cyprus’ membership of the EU, may have created an alternative perspective amongst some Cypriots that challenges the nationalist narratives of the communities’ elites.

1.8 Method of study
Two general approaches to studying violence will be used. First, there is the empirical method for understanding the memory of violence, using statistical data/analysis. Results are valuable as raw data and serve as a basis for analysis. The second alternative approach is conceptual, examining history, status, and origins as factors of violence through evaluating responses from interviewees. Such a conceptual approach needs to assess the results against published resources and literature that represent the narratives (Reissman, 1993) that are dominant within the communities in question. In other words, this research fits within a political-cultural approach, using both empirical and conceptual methods.

The political transformations stem from changes in thinking among those in power and the general population. Both types are important and influential in the case of Cyprus, especially the changing and sometime contradictory sentiment of Cypriots regarding the conflict. Both communities wish for unification but Turkish Cypriots want reassurance of their autonomy (Denktash and Moran, 2009) while Greek
Cypriots want control over the island’s destiny (PIO, 2010). It is clear that the two main communities do have a competing relationship and their attitudes and relations have transformed over periods of time due to a number of factors (Loizides, 2007). Influences have developed and proliferated due to motors of ethnicity and identity politics (Kaufmann, 2001). This research will analyse political attitudes and relations and what has influenced these changing dynamics, primarily common and competing memories of violence.

To enhance objectivity, this research uses literature from a wide perspective of sources and will include sources on Cypriot affairs, violence, conflict and conflict management, memory, narrative, and state-building. Statistics will be used to support discussion in this research, even though such methods can only provide a basis. This study will utilise a triangulated method involving quantitative as well as qualitative methods of data collection (Bryman, 2001; May, 1998). Qualitative methods of research will be used to analyse information that simple statistics can not (Marshall and Rossman, 1999). This research will utilise interviews and questionnaires as methods for collecting primary source data (Bryman, 2001). Being British, I must also take into account bias that I may have to the topic in hand, given my background and those of my sources and which will be elaborated on in Chapter Three. Chapter Three lays out methods applied to the Cypriot case studies of 1963-4 and 1974. A discussion of sampling, interview and questionnaire design will also be included in this subsequent chapter.

1.9 Structure of thesis
This introduction will continue with a review of the literature published on the issues raised so far. Chapter Two will examine the theory of violence and memory and how memory plays an important part in giving violence meaning. Chapter Three will discuss the methodology used to answer the research objectives already raised. Chapter Four will examine the nationalist narratives that exist on Cyprus and illustrate that some memories from Cypriots do not fit those narratives. Chapters Five and Six are case studies of violent memories focused upon inter-communal violence and exogenous actor’s interventions and its consequences. Chapter Five will take on the case of the 1963-4 period of violence between communities. Chapter Six will examine the 1974 intervention by exogenous actors, including Turkey. In Chapter Seven, a
discussion of results suggests that the changing perspective of Cypriots results from circumstances, perspectives and freedoms. Conclusions are set out in Chapter Eight.

1.10 Literature Review
This section will examine the existing research to highlight the relationships between what has previously been produced and its relevance to this topic. It will also illustrate the omissions that this research seeks to address. This review of literature will examine these spheres under the headings: politicized ethnicity; violence; conflict and disorder; and finally memory and representation. But first, the author has found pertinent books examining Cyprus which will now be discussed.

1.10.1 Cyprus
Literature on Cyprus takes various positions that are either balanced or favouring the viewpoints of either Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot communities. Amongst others, Hitchens (1997) and Yennaris (2003) have both taken a pro-Greek Cypriot perspective. Other literature takes a more analytical position such as Joseph (1997) and James (2002). Denktash (1988), among others, provides a pro-Turkish Cypriot perspective. Literature has often centred on the importance of the historical period before and after independence, especially the constitution of 1960. The lack of cooperation between communities, resulting from the 1960 constitution, was clear to see for many observers such as Yennaris (2003) and Joseph (1997).

Most literature, especially Greek-Cypriot orientated examples, placed the blame for problems on wider influences. Yennaris, who wrote *From the East* (2003), believed the problems of Cyprus would not have been serious had Turkey not interfered. He provides an examination of developments within the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey (Yennaris, 2003). There were international interferences that may have had negative consequences. However communities lived together with limited interaction, resulting in both communities having contrasting and opposing objectives. Although this study will examine 1963-4 and 1974, the influence of the British colonial rule before 1960 cannot be ignored. As was mentioned previously, the British governed the island as a result of an Ottoman treaty and annexed the island after World War One (Reddaway, 1986; Cranshaw, 1987; Hitchens, 1997). Stefanidis’s (1999) *Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem* remains a
detailed account of British colonial rule in Cyprus and developments that later become the undercurrent of the communal struggles, primarily enosis. Other books that cover this period are Cranshaw’s (1978) *The Cyprus Revolt* and *Burdened with Cyprus: The British Connection* by Reddaway (1986).

Other literature concentrates on developments after the 1960 independence of the Republic of Cyprus, including Sonyel’s (1997) *Cyprus: The Destruction of a Republic*. Sonyel’s source is a collection of British documents. Alongside the TRNC publication *Cyprus Problem: Why No Solution* (1997), these are examples of sources that have used newspaper articles and reports as secondary evidence. These types of sources are helpful repositories of published articles but have limits in terms of analysis. Meanwhile, other sources debate the Constitution’s deficiencies and prospects for permanency. The Turkish Cypriots, according to Denktash in *The Cyprus Triangle* (1988), felt that the Constitution was set in stone while Makarios portrayed it to Greek Cypriots as a stepping stone towards true self-determination (Reddaway, 1986). The viewpoints of communities towards this Constitution meant they were unwilling to compromise. This lack of compromise created the situation of 1963-4 and has suggested ever since that communities would be unable to work together. Denktash (1988) argues Turkish Cypriots always negotiated and worked with the Greek Cypriots but they had always discounted the Turkish Cypriot community. It appears that for Denktash, and other writers including Tamkoc in *The Turkish Cypriots State* (1988), there was no united Cypriot community but Greek and Turkish communities. Exemplified by Yennaris (2003), the Greek Cypriots argue there were no separate communities until there was outside interference. Other sources are Borowiec’s (2000) *Cyprus: A Troubled Island* and Norma Salem’s edited *Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and its Resolution* (1992).

Literature, including Polyviou’s (1980) *Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation 1960-1980*, highlights the contrasting objectives of communities. The Turkish Cypriots wanted to avoid enosis with Greece and be allowed their quota of government jobs. The Greek Cypriot leadership sought self-determination and used the situation to work towards enosis. The Turkish Cypriot leadership later considered partition an objective to: first, stop violence against their community and; second, allow the Turkish Cypriot leadership authority within part of the island (Coufoudakis, 2006). Some literature
considered the Turkish Cypriot leadership had always intended partition (Bose, 2007). Bose’s *Contested Lands* (2007) covers a number of case studies and provides detailed analysis of problems with Cypriot relations. Although not detailing the conflicts themselves, Bose (2007) examined Cypriot relations from before the British governance of Cyprus right through to the Annan Plans and EU negotiations (often up to 2004). Unlike Coufoudakis (2006), Bose (2007) has a nuanced approach to the situation in Cyprus and examines the positions and problems that remain sticking points. Other sources that take international perspectives to the conflict include Claude Nicolet’s (2001) *United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention* and Axt and Brey’s edited (1996) *Cyprus and the European Union: New Chances for Solving an Old Conflict*.

It must be understood that the Cypriot Republic’s independence was never unconditional and suffered from the ability of exogenous forces to interfere (Joseph, 1997). As a consequence, communities were often unwilling to compromise to allow government to continue from 1960 onwards. Relations broke down when the Greek leadership refused to consider the Turkish Cypriots as equals. Communities’ unwillingness to cooperate is highlighted most effectively by Joseph in *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics* (1997). Joseph remains a notable source regarding politicized ethnicity as well due to his range of relevant points. Another notable source is Ehrlich’s (1974) *Cyprus 1958-67*, who looks at the legal context of decisions made by domestic and international actors. Primarily, the propose revisions of the Zurich-London Agreements was of interest to this study (Ehrlich, 1974). Other sources that had opposing perspective of the conflict were Stavrinides’ (1999) *The Cyprus Conflict: National Identity and Statehood* and Panteli’s (1990) *The Making of Modern Cyprus: From Obscurity to Statehood*.

However, most authors have concentrated on violence upon Turkish Cypriot communities. Greek orientated authors, such as Yennaris (2003), argue violence against Turkish Cypriot communities has been perpetrated by their own community. Gibbons’ (1997) *The Genocide Files* primarily centres on research into violence in the 1963-4 period allegedly by Greek Cypriot groups upon Turkish Cypriots. Although not strictly academic, it is an example of literature supporting Turkish Cypriot nationalist perspective, especially as it was handed to the researcher from a “TRNC”
official. The divisions between communities developed between 1960 and 1964 to such an extent that protective enclaves were established for Turkish Cypriots (Denktash, 1988). According to Yennaris (2003), Greek Cypriots argue no divisions existed before enclaves were established. One source that supports that view is Hitchens’ *Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger* (1997), taking the view that communities had one, primarily Greek, identity.

Mallinson’s (2005) *Cyprus: A Modern History* provides an alternative approach that pins blame for events squarely on external influences, as does O’Malley and Craig’s (2001) *The Cyprus Conspiracy*. Other existing works concentrate on Greek Cypriot violence perpetrated on British forces and fellow Greeks, especially ‘Nicosia’s Murder Mile’ ([www.britains-smallwars.com/cyprus/war.html](http://www.britains-smallwars.com/cyprus/war.html), accessed 10 March 2009). Hitchens’ (1997) book argues that Cyprus as a whole suffered primarily from interference from the US and Turkey. Broadly speaking, both communities were involved in violence against Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

Those authors who portray the Greek Cypriots in a positive light have considered the 1974 intervention/invasion as the beginning of the Cyprus problem. Although argued as such under international law, 1974’s illegality is questioned throughout the literature, notable by Moran’s (1998) *Sovereignty Divided*. Although an important event and a case study of this research in terms of memory, 1974 should be considered the culmination of events. A key source on the 1974 period is Asmussen’s (2008) *Cyprus at War: Diplomacy and Conflict during the 1974 Crisis*.

Since the 1974 intervention, constant negotiations have taken place between the communities and interested parties, upon which Polyviou’s (1980) *Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation* and Gobbi’s (1983) *Rethinking Cyprus* concentrated their research. The negotiations between the sides had been characterised by intransigence, both from Greek Cypriots before the 1974 intervention and from Turkish Cypriots afterwards. Moran (1998) has a predominantly pro-Turkish perspective and appears to centre his thoughts on how the Greek Cypriots directed negotiations. Polyviou (1980) illustrates fully the perspectives of the different groups involved and explores the changing elements of discussions. Gobbi, as former participant in these discussions on behalf of the UN, provides a perspective that highlights the difficulties that have
developed and offered suggestions as to how to overcome them\(^5\). Discussion often revolved on whether Cyprus would be a unified island with a confederal or federal system of government. The confederal system, with two entities of equal stature, remains what the Turkish Cypriot nationalist leadership want (Denktash and Moran, 2009). The Greek Cypriots have consistently argued that the Turkish community are not an equal partner and that the power distribution should reflect this. Both Polyviou (1980) and Gobbi (1983) illustrate the difficulties negotiations went through and characterise a channel of literature that examines the negotiations in detail.

Sources such as Hannay’s (2005) *Cyprus: The Search for a Solution* provides a nuanced examination of why negotiations have not resulted in a solution. Talks have culminated with the UN backed talks led by Kofi Annan and which resulted in the Annan Plans and the eventual referendum in 2003. The rejection of the plan resulted in the Republic of Cyprus joining the European Union divided and may have weakened the chances of a solution. Another source that assesses these divisions and framing has been Loizides’ (2007) *Ethnic Nationalism and Adaptation in Cyprus*. Other sources that discuss where this leaves Cyprus are Green and Collin’s (2003) *Embracing Cyprus: the Path to Unity in the New Europe* and *Cyprus: Domestic Dynamics, External Constraints*, edited by Ioannides (1992). One particularly interesting source was Papadakis’ (2008) *History Education in Divided Cyprus: A Comparison of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Schoolbooks on the “History of Cyprus”* which reported on the retention of nationalist narratives within the schoolbooks of Greek and Turkish Cypriot schoolchildren. He also noted the dramatic difference between the literature published under the National Unity Party (UBP) government and the Turkish Republican Party (CTP) government of Turkish Cypriots. For Papadakis (2008), the literature illustrated the Turkish Cypriot choice of identity and the compromise used to open the way for building bridges between themselves and the Greek Cypriot community.

Other literatures have come to reflect the Greek and Turkish Cypriot nationalist narratives. Although Yennaris (2003) and Coufoudakis (2006) have the hallmarks of

\(^5\) Gobbi’s work is limited in the way that it can provide proposals now as it dealt with the situation as it was in 1983. It is true that elements remain, while other discussions have developed. Up to date information on negotiations can be found at the Cyprus Weekly website (www.cyprusweekly.com.cy).
literature that support the narrative of Greek Cypriots, the Greek Cypriot government has developed the Press and Information Office to disseminate its perspective of the situation. Amongst others, the PIO has published *Republic of Cyprus, A United Homeland - A Common Future* (2010) and *The Cyprus Question: A Brief Introduction* (2010). Other sources that are part of the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative include *Toward a Unified Cyprus - The Myth of T/C "isolation"* (2010) and *Setting the Record Straight* (2010). These articles portray the situation from the perspective of the nationalist elite within the Greek Cypriot community.

The Turkish Cypriot community does not have an effective counterpart to the PIO. As a result, the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative is disseminated through a number of sources, published by CYREP amongst others. As a result, their nationalist narrative may not be as effective in portraying the Turkish Cypriot perspective of the Cyprus problem. The TRNC authorities have published literature but not to the extent the PIO has. As such, disparate sources reflect the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative, including Denktash (1988), Gazioglu (1999) as well as Gazioglu and Moran (2000). There is also the likelihood that these nationalist narratives are used and forwarded by individuals to retain their relevancy and support their policies within their community. This may well occur after having been divorced from executive power, such as in the case of Denktash, through his letters to Michael Moran (2009).

1.10.2 Politicized ethnicity
Divisions between communities are partly the result of British attempts to retain control in the late 1950s, according to the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative (PIO, 2010). Other literature suggests Turkish Cypriots were primarily concerned about the prospect of *enosis* with Greece (Reddaway, 1986). From their perspective, EOKA members and their political leaders were influenced by ideas of self-determination and were encouraged by the *enosis* of Crete to Greece. To encourage support, the leadership developed Greek cultural, religious, and educational programmes to create a feeling of common descent and identity among Greek Cypriots. This was successful; however, the politicization of ethnicity was not seeking independence but the expansion of Greece to include Cyprus.
Politicized ethnicity involves the seeking of autonomy and recognition with the aim of more concrete objectives, such as territory. There is a large body of work on politicized ethnicity, including Kaufmann (2001), Wimmer (2001) and Turton (1997). Conflict between the two Cypriot communities occurred; often the communities also clashed amongst themselves. As well as blaming other groups for attacks, the Turkish militias attacked Turkish Cypriot trade unionists for supporting cross-community cooperation (Yennaris, 2003) while the Greek Cypriot militias attacked Greek Cypriot communists and moderates (Reddaway, 1986). This, according to Joseph (1997) amongst others, led to the communities being forced away from moderation and reconciliation and toward extremism. Joseph (1997) described the politicized ethnicity that created political groups from as the transformation of ethnic identities. Joseph’s book, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics* (1997) examines the wider issues of developing the Turkish and Greek identities of Christian and Muslim Cypriots. The works of Smith (1986-2004), Anderson (1995) and Hobsbawn and Ranger (1983) are important sources in this research. With these literatures, politicized ethnicity developed away from primordialist-modernist distinctions and took a post-modern and ethno-symbolic perspective. Smith remains the leading proponent of such perspectives, although he has been critiqued by other researchers, such as Bell (2008).

A lack of moderation and tendency towards extremism led to polarised communities. This inability to concede and compromise has marred negotiations between the communities and explains the continued failure to find a solution. Looking to past opportunities, Yennaris (2003) amongst others suggest that Makarios dealings with the Turkish Cypriots were generous. Others, such as Mirbagheri (1998), portray Makarios as a rational political leader concerned for his own political position. The influence that extremists can exert in periods of uncertainty is illustrated by the responses of community leaderships (Gibbons, 1997). Leaders cannot be seen as too moderate as extremists can isolate them, as was attempted in 1974 (Assmussen, 2008). This, consequently, means leaders have limited scope to compromise in negotiations with opposing communities.

The lack of progress resulting from these dynamics can lead actors to consider drastic changes in strategy. Literatures on politicized ethnicity consider the dynamics to be
often too strong to stop once they are in motion (Kaufmann, 2001, Hall, 1999). Political leaders often set dynamics and spark events, often losing control of the situation as was the case in the former Yugoslavia (Gow, 2003, Cohen, 1996). Failed negotiations can also result in violence between communities and intervention by exogenous actors, as Denktash (1988) and Polyviou (1980) suggest. This literature review will now discuss violence and how it is defined.

1.10.3 Violence
Demonstrated by the plethora of books on the subject, violence remains a complex and multi-level notion. Although this research will examine the memory of violence, wider complexities of violence will be illustrated. The set of literature examined includes those that define violence through order/disorder, characterised by Kalyvas, Shapiro and Masoud (2008) in *Order, Conflict, and Violence*. This book provides a perspective of conflict situations as anarchic environments that require an imposition of order. Kalyvas, Shapiro and Masoud (2008) argue that order is necessary for the management of violence while the threat of violence is crucial in cementing order. Alternatively, authors such as Laitin and Fearon (2003) argue violence is a result of failures in order and government control. Laitin and Fearon (2003), Debreil and Klein’s (2002) *Fragile Peace, State Failure, Violence and Development in Crisis Regions* as well as Kalyvas, Shapiro and Masoud (2008) all support the importance of state strength in setting in motion as well as stopping intra-/inter-communal violence. One particularly helpful source in regards to the differing approaches is Jacoby’s (2008) *Understanding Conflict and Violence*.

Alternative perspectives that have developed within the literature, including the criminology literature that considers violence a result of wider social problems and the characteristics of individuals and groups (Jones, 1998). This relates to issues of peer pressure and whether wider social problems cause criminal behaviour to be learnt or innate (Jacoby, 2008, Goldstein, 2003). There is also an economic perspective to the literature, assessing the personal and collective incentives for using violence, such as Kaldor (2006), Collier et al for the World Bank (2003) and Collier with Sambanis (2005).
Often, literature has stressed the motives of those involved; however, general consensus remains fixed on the view that violence can often begets more violence. Much literature has speculated on motives of those involved in violence, most having a wide scope. Weinstein’s (2007) *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* and Boas and Dunn’s (2007) *African Guerrillas: Raging Against the Machine* set out theory and then apply those ideas primarily in the Third World. However, Boas and Dunn (2007) and Weinstein (2007) argue against the thinking that Third World conflict is in any way different to developed countries’ experiences. Moreover, most sources have different views on the exact dynamics, as illustrated by Cramer’s (2006) *Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing: Accounting for Violence in Developing Countries.*

**1.10.4 Conflict**

Conflict between communities is very frequently about authority, and power, strength, force, and violence. These concepts are illustrated by Arendt’s (1970) *On Violence.* Arendt viewed authority to be elusive and that those in government earned authority and are able to use force against others. Those who may not have authority but possess similar methods can be perceived to be using violence. Arendt (1970) has made interesting distinctions between these different concepts however there are some obvious questions raised in the Cypriot case; notably, the legitimacy of both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaderships that seek that authority through their ongoing conflict.

Literature on conflict varies as broadly as violence, but some common themes remain. Demonstrated by Bartos and Wehr’s (2002) *Using Conflict Theory*, conflict remains an incompatibility of roles and values amongst communities. Bartos and Wehr (2002) provide a useful springboard to deeper discussions on the dynamics of conflict. Ideas of retaliation and escalating dynamics are provided as is the idea of conflict without violence. These are important elements because the case of Cyprus has long periods of little, or no, violence between communities with incompatible values and goals. The conflict continues in the guise of negotiation (Polyviou, 1980) but also in the remembrance and commemoration of past violence (Pandey, 2001).

Although adopting Bartos and Wehr’s definition of conflict, it is necessary to explore the broad literature. McTernan’s (2003) *Violence in God’s Name: Religion in an Age*
of Conflict argues those involved in conflict are often self-interested parties. McTernan (2003) argued conflicts become more likely to erupt when communities become aware of their own existence and identity. The Greek Cypriot nationalists were able to mobilise during British rule while Turkish Cypriots went through the same process, possibly in response. Sources such as Loizides (2007), Joseph (1997), and Bose (2007) all noted that the situation amongst Cypriot communities was characterised by community conflict, ignited by nationalist identity politics. Meanwhile, those within community elites wanted to retain their position of control and used whatever means necessary to keep their position. Authors such as Gow (2003) and Hashim (2006) provide examples, in the Former Yugoslavia and Iraq respectively, of conflicts with ‘enemies within’ (McTernan, 2003), while Oberschall (2007) discussed in-group preference and introduced the idea of ethnic entrepreneurs. Elites, ethnic entrepreneurs and ‘enemies within’ are relevant factors in the case study of Cyprus (Bose, 2007; Stavrinides, 1999; Yennaris, 2003).

As well as considering conflict as a result of rational decisions and solidarity among communities, conflict can also result from emotions. Petersen’s (2002) Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe exemplified this approach, presenting ideas of perceived and real hatred. Though there are examples of emotions influencing conflict and violence, often the impact has been exaggerated in terms of motivation (World Bank, 2003). But violence, or its representation, can create emotions amongst communities, reigniting conflict. Another source noting the false perception of hatred among competing populations is Gagnon’s (2004) The Myth of Ethnic War. Violence and conflict has often been a result of rational decisions and choices by those in power. But such decisions can result in emotional environments which only result in conflict by means of remembrance, myths and stories.

1.10.5 Memory and representation

Smith (1986-2004) noted that memories were a key element in the politicization of communities and plays a key role in mobilising supporters, along with myths and traditions. As well as providing the impetus to use violence, past violent events are subject to representation and susceptible to changes in memory. A classic source on this is Ashplant, Dawson and Roper’s (2000) The Politics of War Memory and
Commemoration which examines the subsequent presentation of events. In this book, Ashplant et al (2000) make the important distinction between public representation and private memory. This is through media and cultural channels and organised by state propagators for consumption in the public sphere. However, this research will only make a distinction between memories that are part of the nationalist narratives and those that do not fit the established storyline. As Misztal (2003), amongst others, noted in *Theories of Social Remembering*, collective and individual memory cannot be easily separated as often the collective effects individual recollections. Another couple of sources that are of interest in this area of study are Bell’s (2003) *Mythscapes, Memory, Mythology, and National Identity* which seeks to draw the distinction between myth and memories and Poole’s (2008) *Memory, History and the Claims of the Past* who seeks to clarify the relationship between memory and history.

A separate source is a collection of articles edited by Lorey and Beezley (2002) entitled *Genocide, Collective Violence and Popular Memory*. For Ashplant et al (2000), the commemoration of conflict creates legacies that fuel new divisions. These new conflicts have been given more impact with the increasing commemoration of past events through heritage, discussed by Benton in his edited (2010) *Understanding Heritage and Memory*. Benton (2010) refers to the narrativisation of memory and heritage, creating a sense of time and linkage between then and now. Another interesting source on narrative is Zerubavel’s (2004) *Time Maps: Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past*. Other sources include Pandey’s (2001) *Understanding Partition*, which suggests a denial of events that nationalists use when casting themselves as victims, or an ‘aestheticising impulse’. Forty and Kuchler’s (1999) *The Art of Forgetting* provides a basis of assessing the ways in which communities forget events if they do not fit the story that the elites want to be told. This is especially the case if the state has perpetrated crimes against their own people (Jelin and Kaufmann, 2002). As Pandey (2001) states, history often removes any contradictions and sets the narrative as a clear sequence of events, when in reality occurrences are often confusing, contradictory and messy. This is important as the evidence that this research will produce must be viewed in light of these points.

Other sources that have discussed the memory, the forgetting of violence and trauma include Edkins’ (2003) *Trauma and the Memory of Politics*. Edkins provides valuable
points regarding the type of politics resulting from past trauma. She notes the inclusion of violence and trauma in the recasting of community and identity. Koresaar, Lauk, and Kuutma’s (2009) *The Burden of Remembering: Recollections and Representations of the 20th Century* illustrated the means of such recasting through the mode of narrative. Landsberg’s (2004) *Prosthetic Memory: The Transformation of America Remembrance in the Age of Mass Culture* explores the use and disuse of memories that serve their purposes and then are forgotten or ignored. Her Prosthetic Memory is that memory easily attached to serve a purpose of bridging gaps and creating “unexpected alliances across chasms of difference” (Landsberg, 2004, 1-3). In a sense, this type memory that can be attached for the purpose of bridging ‘chasms of difference’ may serve well in the case of Cyprus.

As well as the organisation of past events by collectives, the developments of narratives can also be achieved by individuals. Payne’s (2008) *Unsettling Accounts: Neither Truth nor Reconciliation in Confessions of State Violence* provides cases of individuals setting out events in terms of different themes. As well as denial of events, confessions of perpetrators can be characterised by remorse or rationalisation, demonstrate sadism or even spin a web of lies amongst other characteristics.

Other sources that have been of assistance in this area are Volf’s (2006) *The End of Memory: Remembering Rightly in a Violent World* and Minow’s (1998) *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness*. These sources focus on developments and reconciliations after conflict and violence as well as the role of memory. Other sources include Schaap’s (2005) *Political Reconciliation*, Schirch’s (2005) *Ritual and Symbol in Peacebuilding* and Rothstein’s edited (1999) *After the Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation*. This relates well to the works of Paris and Sisk (2008, 2009) and the effect memory of violence has on state-building and reconciliation after violent conflict, which is the area of specific interest in this thesis.

Although not specifically referred to in this thesis, the argument over the balance between justice and reconciliation is an ongoing debate. Sources that focus upon this area include Pankhurst’s (1999) *Issues of Justice and Reconciliation in Complex Political Emergencies* as well as Rotberg and Thompson’s edited (2000) *Truth versus Justice*. Along with Mani (2002), these sources support the discussion of transitional
justice as an important factor often been balanced out by truth-telling and processes of reconciliation. Other sources that have covered this area include Mendeloff’s (2004) *Truth Seeking: Truth Telling and Post-conflict Peace Building*, Guelke’s (1999) *Truth for Amnesty: the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on Human Rights Abuses in South Africa*, Rigby’s (2001) *Justice and Reconciliation: After the Violence* and Teitel’s (2000) *Transitional Justice*. In essence, the search for justice can result in the derailing of reconciliation processes. Although these issues should be addressed, justice has often been curtailed for the collective benefits of reconciliation.

**1.11 Conclusion**

Having introduced the levels of analysis that will be used, the theoretical framework of this thesis will be examined next. Through the introduction of central notions of this research and the memory and representation of past episodes of conflict and violence, the understanding of the conceptual underpinnings will be clearer. The literature review has highlighted the themes of this research and the areas that require further analysis by this thesis.
THEORY
This chapter deconstructs notions of violence and examines the political perspective within the context of modernity as well as violence’s representation after the event. It will also examine the theory of memory and its distinction from history, its relationship with narrative, forgetting, and remembering. The development of memory theory will explain from where theory has developed as well as why memory has been defined. Later, I shall examine the important conjunction of violence and memory theory, where a theorised memory of violence could open the political space to compromise in the case study of Cyprus.

2.1 Introduction
Elaboration on what types of violence are being examined may be required. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the analysis of violence varies and the dynamics of violence are far too complex to be handled in one thesis. Only a political perspective will be developed in specific areas of interest and in the context of intra-state conflict, and international responses. Moreover, this research will consider how such episodes are remembered by those who have or have not experienced the events.

This research will analyse the memory of violence through its consequences for political attitudes and relations. The empirical nature of such research allows: the development of a stronger argument; a broader use of methods to analyse data; the avoidance of speculation on violent motivations and consequences and; for conclusions about communities’ attitudes and relations. Attitudes and relations are the measure by which observers can view the transformational nature of different memories of violence at the individual, inter-personal and institutional level. This provides a multi-level framework for analysing and understanding the memory of violence.

As was discussed in Bartos and Wehr (2002), there can be various forms of violent episodes. This divergence can be illustrated by the intervention in 1974 by Turkish forces into the northern section of Cyprus compared to the intra-state conflict between Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot from 1963. The 1963-4 episode of violence involved militias such as the TMT and EOKA with Greek and Turkish support. The
1974 intervention involved the Turkish military responding to a Greek military-supported coup, with local militia involvement. Bartos and Wehr (2002) suggest violence will continue until forces expend their solidarity, resources, or their hostility. Due to their damaging cyclical nature, such conflicts should be remembered through what will be termed Escalating Cyclical Memory of Violence (ECMV). The second type of violent memory involves the memory of actions that victimised beyond ethnic identities. Termed Overwhelming Linear Memory of Violence (OLMV), these events are remembered for their perceived consequential harm to both Cypriot communities. OLMV may result in bringing people together from different communities if portrayed as a collective victimhood.

This research examines the consequences violence, not through it actual physical or material harm but through its representational value to communities involved in conflict after violent events. Of course, violence causes great harm to relations and attitudes but not all who are involved in conflict have suffered from violence. In essence, the memory of violence may have a greater effect on relations and attitudes compared with actual violence, in the case of Cyprus. This will be assessed at the individual, interpersonal and the institutional level.

2.1.1 Individual
At the Individual level of analysis, violence can have intimate consequences through the loss of family members, land, homes, and neighbours. The 1974 violence had such ramifications for many individuals amongst the opposing communities. Since 1974, the communities have been restricted from mixing and it would be expected that such limited interaction resulted in polarised attitudes and poor relations. This may well be a response to the events of 1974 or to the representation of those events. However, the 1963-4 violence was a case which presented Turkish Cypriots as victims of Greek Cypriots, or of Turkish Cypriot nationalist militias in some Greek Cypriot-orientated literature (Yennaris, 2003). The consequences of that violence included isolation of the Turkish Cypriots and the reinforcement of community ties while undermining cross-community links (James, 2002). Other consequences of violence on individuals can include the loss of modes of production and financial security. Changes within communities have also affected individual members. For example, Turkish Cypriots
have become a minority within the “TRNC” with the introduction of Anatolian settlers after 1974.

2.1.2 Inter-personal
The inter-personal level of analysis examines consequences for communities in the violent situations. A community’s relations and attitudes can be transformed as a direct result of violence. In Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots viewed Greek Cypriots with suspicion and felt they suffered from dictatorship by the majority (Denktash and Moran, 2009) while the Greek Cypriots viewed the Turkish Cypriots as a troublesome minority (Yennaris, 2003; PIO, 2010). These and other sentiments within and between communities have made the prospect of a solution seem unlikely. This political relations and attitudes between and within communities include trade unions and political parties.

2.1.3 Institutional
The Institutional level of analysis examines relationships and attitudes of institutions that form the states and the establishment that support states. In the case of Cyprus, however, there are in fact two separate sets of state apparatus and supporting institutions. In cases of intra/inter-communal conflict, violence can result in institutions becoming personal fiefdoms of actors with the capability to control supporters and coerce opponents (Weinstein, 2007). This is where ideas of competition for control of state apparatus have their relevance exposed in this research, as previously discussed by authors such as Fearon and Laitin (2003). The action of external forces can enfeeble local institutions while domestic actors often create fiefdoms or alternatives. Not all violent actions led to such results; institutions can often benefit from international support, within a state-building framework (Paris, 2009). This research examines political consequences at the institutional level and includes competition between institutions for power and influence. Economic and social problems that fuel violence result from the inability of domestic, or external, actors to organise and administer as a result of insecurity. Fragmentation of sovereignty has a knock-on effect when attempting to increase investment in violence-plagued regions (Cramer, 2006). It may be clear that relations between such institutions will involve animosity. Links between communities and state institutions
must also be taken into consideration as a close relationship may mean institutions do not represent other communities within the state's territory.

2.2 Violence

To define violence, international law may assist in creating distinctions in times of violent conflict between domestic as well as international actors. According to Weinstein (2007), the Geneva Convention applies to both sides in the case of intra-state, as well as in inter-state, conflict occurring in one of the High Contracting Parties:

“.. each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
1-Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including the members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed ‘hors de combat’ by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on the race, colour, religion, or faith, sex, birth, or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts and shall remain prohibited at any times and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) anchorages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilised peoples” (as quoted by Weinstein, 2007: 202).

Weinstein himself defined violence broadly to include patterns of rebel-civilian interaction that involve coercion (2007). However, this thesis uses Tilly’s definition of violence: ‘inflicting damage on person or objects as well as a seizure of person or objects above and beyond restraint or resistance’ (Tilly, 2003). Consequently, Tilly (2003) defined collective violence as involving the inflicting of damage; by at least two perpetrators resulting in part from coordination among persons who perform the damaging acts (Tilly, 2003). This definition was better suited to defining physical violence rather than including broader approaches and will therefore be used in this research.

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6 Another source is http://www.ppu.org.uk/learn/texts/doc_geneva_con.html#3
2.2.1 Variations

According to Weinstein (2007), analysts’ attention has been directed at understanding the variations in violence, noting that violence in towns and neighbourhoods can occur at different times (Weinstein 2007). These lulls and peaks need to be explained through changes occurring within local areas, such as altering demography. In the case of Cyprus, altering demography, festivals, and national holidays may play a part in changing environments. When identified, revenge attacks are not necessarily committed in the same town; but often occur in areas where the perpetrating community is the clear majority. Areas with mixed populations often have people with less polarised views (Weinstein, 2007), making incitement more difficult.

Violence, in the context of a political action, can be viewed as a way of creating, defending, or challenging rival systems of exploitation and opportunity hoarding (Tilly, 2003). Often, the aim was creating autonomous areas that new elites can control and exploit while seeking legitimacy from the wider international system. In the case of Cyprus, the TRNC was declared in 1983 with no international recognition apart from Turkey (Bose, 2007). However, the Republic of Cyprus has fostered international recognition and has successfully developed. The gaining of the legitimacy of international recognition has been the biggest step to successfully exploiting resources. Community elites have competed against each other to control exploitable commodities and have sought to gain legitimacy with external support. In the case of Cyprus, one community claims authority over all of Cyprus (PIO, 2010) whilst the other claims a separate authority (Denktash and Moran, 2009). Such elites have used violence to control resources and this research examines the memory of that violence. But first, I shall explain briefly the possible reasoning for the use of violence at the time it was inflicted, rather than the reason attached to it post-event.

2.2.2 Reasoning

Why do political actors use violence? With increased globalisation, actors that gain control need international recognition by other states to cement their position. Actors that did not may believe that the only way to alter their situation would be to use

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7 The lulls and peaks can often be at times of festival and days of remembrance for past victories or defeats. Relatively few attacks occur in towns where 50% of the population may attempt to strike back (unless that is the objective of attacks).
intimidation and sporadic violence to gain authority (Pappe, 2006). Ethnic cleansing
and redistribution of land in countries such as Cyprus (Bose, 2007), Bosnia (Mulaj,
2008), Palestine (Milton-Edwards, 2009; Pappe, 2006) and others are clear examples
of this. As well as seeking recognition and sympathy for their plight, respective
claimants to legitimate authority seek to demonstrate the deprivation that they have
uniquely suffered (Petersen, 2002).

There are two different types of deprivation that have driven violence and the sense of
grievance: internally experienced egoistic deprivation and; and fraternal deprivation,
which is experienced collectively (Jacoby, 2008). The central point remains that if the
deprivation of individuals and communities results in expectations not being fulfilled,
frustration and aggression leads to conflict (McTernan, 2003). However, changing
circumstances have affected political leaders’ actions. Before the 1974 intervention by
Turkey, the Turkish Cypriots felt aggrieved by their lack of governmental position
and Greek Cypriots felt they could dictate. After the 1974 intervention, these
positions were reversed with Greek Cypriots feeling aggrieved while Turkish Cypriots
considered themselves able to dictate. Both perceived deprivations are relevant in this
research, although the collective fraternal deprivation is of more consequence, given
its ethno-centric nature. The perception of changing political relations and attitudes
may result in perceived deprivations and grievances that fuel ongoing conflict
between communities.

Perceived deprivation and violence stem from opportunity: groups must have enough
freedom to mobilize politically without being stopped by state structure. Therefore,
when the state maintains an effective apparatus of repression, large scale violence
should not occur (Tilly, 2003). Relaxation of political repression opens up space for
all sorts of political entrepreneurs (Kaufmann, 2001). In the case of Cyprus, such a
relaxation may arguably have been the British governing of Cyprus, allowing for the
development of the enosis movement. This political science perspective stems from
Laitin and Fearon (2003) among others. The main reason the opportunity for
rebellions occurs has been the perceived lack of government apparatus (Weinstein,
2007), or will, to oppose political manoeuvres, based on government responses to
previous challenges. So, extreme repression can be counter-productive while
conciliatory measures may encourage rebellion.
Personal political attitudes influence their memories and can be affected by the representation of violent events. Moreover, attitudes of respondents will illustrate the grievances, deprivations, and perceptions of those who perceive themselves to have been affected by violence. The changing relations between communities and institutions will illustrate how ethnic groups handle such grievances and deprivations resulting from perceived and real past violent events. How these opportunities have been used by those who seek to achieve their collective objectives will be discussed next.

2.2.3 Dynamics
Groups mobilize through elites defining the agenda or through grassroots movements. Mass-led violent scenarios involve myth development; however, Kaufmann (2001) noted that such violence has no overall pattern. Alternatively, elites can mobilize communities to fight for their stated political objectives. Additionally, the elite’s power allows them to block potential compromise through intransigence and the ability to discredit moderate opponents (Kaufmann, 2001). This type of scenario has relevancy in the example of Cyprus as the elites of each community had the authority to organise and motivate (Loizides, 2007). Communities can retain organisations capable of using violence against opponents and the other community (Reddaway, 1986; Bose, 2007) as well as the means to discredit challengers and grass-roots activists. An example of a mass-led scenario in Cyprus could be the December 1963 disturbances in Nicosia, sparked off by clashes between Turkish Cypriot civilians and Greek Cypriot police, according to some literature (Yennaris, 2003; Hitchens, 1999). As the 1963-4 case study will illustrate, elite-led movements and groups can quickly organise responses to mass-led acts and create elite-led scenarios. Other sources however suggest that 1963-4 was not a sporadic mass-led event but an organised attempt to force the authority of the majority community onto the minority (Gibbons, 1997; Denktash and Moran, 2009). The dynamic depends upon what perspective observers have; in terms of space and time.

Rebel groups offer civilians collective benefits for their support; providing basic education, health care, and infrastructure. This supports the view that organisation can be treated like state structures or social movements (Weinstein 2007). Security has
been the most important benefit as counter-insurgent armies have been notoriously brutal and employed tactics that target civilians indiscriminately (Weinstein, 2007). Cyprus suffered counter-insurgency campaigns by British forces in the 1950s (Cranshaw, 1978) but the events of 1963-4 could also be considered counter-insurgent if viewing Turkish Cypriot as rebels against a Greek Cypriot-controlled state (Yennaris, 2003). Monopolistic control of security and services allows actors to shape popular support and deter defections (Kalyvas, 2006). As Kalyvas states, “the use of violence is bounded by the nature of sovereignty exercised by each political actor and generally must be selective rather than indiscriminate” (Kalyvas, 2006; 12). Examples of this include the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of areas of Bosnia (Gow, 2003, Mulaj, 2008), the movement of people from Anatolia (Dadrain, 1994) and Palestine (Pappe, 2006) as well as during the partition of India and Pakistan (Pandey, 2001). In the case of Cyprus, the communal security concerns of Turkish Cypriot civilians and the interests of the Turkish government intertwined, resulting in intervention in Cyprus. All such events remain disputed and, as a result, this research examines the perception of violent events by Cypriots and assesses Cypriot relations and attitudes as a result of the continued conflict since.

2.2.4 Actors

Violence often results from tensions and an environment of competition, outcomes of which have been listed by Oberschall (2007). Some situations are dealt with by peaceful negotiations; in other cases political leaders may create divisions (Oberschall, 2007). According to Oberschall (2007), the employment of communication tools can arouse fears while extremists may defeat more conciliatory forces and dehumanise opponents. The final possibility is coercion practiced through state backed militias (Oberschall, 2007). Oberschall sets the importance of elites above many other factors and there has been general agreement on the influence of community leaderships and ethnic entrepreneurs (Wolff, 2006; Kaylvas, 2006; Bay and Donham, 2006). Elites influence the course of ethnic relations in several ways, including channelling information through the media and shaping beliefs. Referring to nationalist myths and constant reminders of past and present victimisation, elites can inflame and intensify emotions (Petersen, 2002). However, McTernan (2003) discusses three dimensions of difficulty that occur at the inception of collective action:
“First is the free ride mentality: no matter how angry people may feel about their grievances against those in authority, the human dependency is to ‘free ride’ and to leave the fighting to others… second is what he calls the problem of ‘coordination’ in the sense that rebellions usually start small but many people are reluctant to join from out of a fear of punishment until they seem large enough to be assured of success. The third is the awareness that a rebel leader may promise more than he is prepared to deliver when he gains power.” (McTernan, 2003:12).

How organisations overcome these challenges depends upon the local environment; African guerrilla movements need different incentives to the Cypriot organisations within this research. The Cypriot elites appeared to use security fears and nationalist rhetoric to organise their communities around themselves (Joseph, 1997; Bose, 2007) and achieve desired total “overlap” between specific leaders, organisations, and populations (Kalyvas, 2006).

Many intra-/inter-communal conflicts feature a disproportionate victimisation of civilians and a perception of brutality (Kalyvas, 2006). However, conflicts have often been contested amongst civilians instead of being limited to militaries as no divide clearly exists (Kalyvas, 2006). Such violence near civilian areas, often termed barbarity (Kalyvas, 2006), appears only to apply to intra-state conflict. ‘Barbarity’ is not a method, or feature, of violence but a label that can be placed upon actions deemed illegitimate or ‘traumatic’ (Edkins, 2003). International interventions that are viewed as legitimate at the time may be deemed illegitimate and traumatic within the territory affected, as in the case of 1974. Events can have its legitimacy questioned and removed afterwards, as was the case in Cyprus in 1974 with the second phase of the intervention and the United Nations Resolutions condemning Turkey’s actions (Assmussen, 2008).

2.2.5 Polarisation

What needs to be emphasised is the importance of polarisation. This refers to the intensity of divisions between group members who attach overwhelming importance to the issue at stake and hold antagonistic beliefs and emotions (Kalyvas, 2006). Moreover, polarisation can be conceptualised as antagonisms between individuals belonging to separate groups that simultaneously display high internal homogeneity
and high external heterogeneity (Kalyvas, 2006). However, few individuals are extremists and most will compromise given incentive through power-sharing and peace settlements. Though individuals may be influenced by rhetoric that elites propagate, some individuals may act together across community divides. Education levels and economic pressures may well be important factors in creating the nationalist zeal of some and the pragmatism of others (Papadakis, 2008).

Unlike state repression and genocide, intra-state conflict is not unilateral and often produced by at least two political actors who have overlapping monopolies of violence (Kalyvas, 2006). Applying arguments originally for the study of interstate war, Kaufmann (2001), Wolff (2006) and others argue rebellion can result from a security dilemma. This can be applied in the example of Turkish Cypriots who had genuine concerns for their local security in 1963-4 and 1974. Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriots may argue that if they did not act in 1963-4, Cyprus would have been under the influence of Turkey. Such violent events often have unforeseen consequences in terms of relations and attitudes on an inter-communal level. This depends upon how such actions are portrayed. As these are violent past events, the perception of 1963-4 and 1974 may well have altered and the meaning of these episodes may well have changed.

2.2.6 Limitations
This thesis does not examine violence in line with these ideas and concepts as it remains impractical to build a framework around motivations or the dynamics of violence. As well as having been frequently covered by studies in anthropology, the study of violence has often been fraught with difficulties, theoretical as well as methodological. A different direction involves examining violence as a memory rather than an event. Violence directly affects a small number of individuals; the memory of violence affects a much wider spectrum. How does violent memory affect individuals and collectives in political relations and attitudes? This question is the central issue of this thesis.
2.3 Memory

2.3.1 Introduction

Having illustrated the complexity of handling violence, I will now seek to explain how violence shall be handled, by viewing violence as being perceived through memory. Through this prism, violence can appear very differently when set within a context and presented a certain way. Given the importance of memory to processes of transmitting intents and interests, it is important to define this concept. However, ‘memory’ needs to be defined in relation to the similar/opposite concept of ‘history’ as well as illustrating the ideas of ‘remembering’ and ‘forgetting’. Memory should also be contextualized as the building blocks that create ‘narratives’, through which memories can adopt very different and opposing meanings. Once these concepts have been defined, I shall then illustrate the key developments in the conceptual framework of memory and contrasting perspectives of the relationship with ‘history’, its utilisation within narratives and the effect ‘forgetting’ and ‘remembering’ have on memories. This would explain the changing memory of violence in the context of Cyprus.

2.3.2 Definition of Memory

When the concept of memory is not focused on individuals, the existence of structures with the power to retain and transmit memory has often been focussed upon. Such structures would be to ensure the persistence of certain impressions and mould present consciousness (Cubitt, 2007). Such memories can often be actively produced as representations which then are ‘open to struggle and dispute’ (Koresaar et al., 2009; 16-17). Memories are often based on a choice to either forget or preserve recollections (Koresaar et al., 2009) and often the role of such memory is instrumental in creating a representation of past events and experiences (Koresaar et al., 2009). However, there are cases of memory developing beyond organised institutions or bodies and, as others have suggested, memory development is a negotiation of memories (Misztal, 2003).

Amongst memory scientists, memory has been perceived to be essentially reconstructive, bearing little resemblance to the original. A psychiatrists’ ‘post-modern view’ argues that there can be no one correspondence between memory and the remembered event because there can be no single valid interpretation of the
original episode. This makes memory appear elusive, slippery, and different according to our position (Mollon, 1998). From this psychiatry perspective, different types of memory include autobiographical memory which we tell others and ourselves, stories about ourselves. For Larsen (1988), memory can be described in everyday reports - news, gossip, stories and the minutes of meetings. Without these, we would be confined to know a small slice of the world that we are able to observe by our senses (Larsen, 1988). Quoting Robinson (1986), Larsen argued that every experienced event nestles within a broad integrated structure, organised into ‘temporal segments’ and subdivided by “landmark events” (Larsen, 1988; 347).

One important function that self remembrance has in social life is that of establishing and sustaining particular identities within relationships. Neisser and Fivush (1994) quote Coulter (1985), who argues memories and forgetting operate as a means of establishing oneself in a relationship as a typical kind of person with privileges and duties (Nessier and Fivesh, 1994). Memory remains a highly important element in the account of what it is to be a person, being a central medium through which identities are constituted (Misztal, 2003). All individual actions can be expressions of memory and indicators of numerous other conditions, such as motive (Neisser and Fivush, 1994). As Neisser and Fivush (1994) note, scientific conclusions about memory are largely over the rhetorical power of existing myths.

Perceived vividness of a memory appears to be no indication of actual accuracy. The notion of ‘flashbulb memories’, first presented by Brown and Kulik (1977), suggests emotionally arousing events may appear to be recorded with exceptional detail and clarity (Larsen 1988, Mollon, 1998). While the original study was of personal circumstances on hearing the news of President Kennedy's assassination, Neisser and Harsch (1993) revisited this study using the morning after the Challenger space shuttle disaster. Having asked students to write down what they had been doing at the time they heard the news of the shuttle crash; four years later the same students were asked again to recall the circumstances. Neisser and Harsch (1993) found that 11 of 44 subjects recalling every detail incorrectly (Mollon, 1998). Mollon points out that there is a possibility of some accuracy, in that events may leave a cognitive record, but the retrieval of memory is a matter of reconstruction. Although here may be no way of getting back to the original record, there may at least be some correspondence
between the current and original version of the event (Mollon, 1998). However, it should be noted that often memory remains accurate in relation to central features of events.

Larsen (1988), amongst others, suggested information transits a selection process, either through people or organisations before that information reaches receivers (Larsen, 1988). Often when events are reported, the selection is made by the people who brought that information. Such ‘gatekeepers’ sometimes intentionally bias the available information, partly by what they exclude, present, interfere with or invent (Larsen, 1988). Memory can be collectively or individually manipulated and utilised, for many political, economic and social reasons. Such gatekeepers would have an active role in many communities and organisations involved in politically motivated violence. Organisations referred to previously would certainly include such gatekeepers.

Memory is social because every memory exists through its relation with what is shared with others: language; symbols; events. The way we remember has often been determined through a collective construction of language, as memory ‘can be social only if it is capable of being transmitted and to be transmitted, a memory must first be articulated’ (Schudson 1995: 359). This approach, therefore, suggests collective memory is shared and includes a representation of the past, giving the event and a collective meaning. In other words, when searching for means to impose a meaningful order upon reality, memory provides symbolic representations and frames. According to Schwartz (2000), “memory at once reflects, programs, and frames the present” (Mizstal, 2003; 12-13). The prominent place of the Vietnam War in the memories of Americans also suggests division of the past into ‘memorable’ and ‘forgettable’ is by social convention, as society ensures what we remember, how and when (Neal, 2005; Misztal, 2003).

2.3.3 History
If social memory is a process by which knowledge and awareness of the social past is generated, then ‘history’ is geared to the production and extension of such knowledge (Cubitt, 2007). ‘Memory’ can also be considered as a discursive term deployed in debates over history’s character as an intellectual activity and over the status of
‘historical knowledge’ (Cubitt, 2007; 27). According to Cubitt (2007), a more fluid conception of the production of historical knowledge is needed than conventional professional discourse of history has offered. For Cubitt, memory becomes a seductive concept for historians to think about and, as a result, ‘memory’ captures the sense of the fluidity that the conventional historical research tends to exclude (Cubitt, 2007).

To differentiate memory from history, there have been two opposing tendencies: on one hand, a desire to associate the idea of history with that of memory; on the other, a desire to disconnect or differentiate them (Cubitt, 2007). For Collingwood, the essential achievement of historical reasoning is to rescue us from a slavish dependence on memory. However, for Dilthey, ‘the root of all historical comprehension’ lies in individual mental relationship to his or her own life experience (Cubitt, 2007). Yet as Cubitt (2007) argues, Dilthey and Collingwood’s positions are not strictly incompatible.

The key alternative approach has been championed by Nora (1996-98), who argued forcefully that history remains the nemesis of memory. Nora argues that there is an enormous distance that separates ‘real’ memory - inviolate social memory in primitive and archaic societies - from history. There is a great distance between an integrated memory, all-powerful and unselfconscious and a memory without a past that recycles heritage and creates myths of heroes (Cubitt, 2007). For Nora, memory is something organic and artistic; history, by contrast, is a reconstruction and representation of past. Other authors, such as Savage (1994), have argued that Nora’s divisions are not mutually exclusive and that living memory and the history-based memory can exist, in the guise of private and public memory. Nora laments what he sees as the decline of a national, collective, identity-forming, memory in the age of globalisation (Moore and Whelan, 2007).

While Nora illustrates an impulse to drive a wedge between history and collective memory, other authors probed for multiple traditions of memory and sought to go beyond the post-modernist emphasis on representations, and to replenish the sense of history as the recovery of lived experience (Cubitt, 2007). Individuals and collectives seek a recovery of those lived experiences by using histories and creating a semi-
integrated memory from it. As Nora suggests, individuals and communities wish to have a ‘real’ memory. As a consequence they seek similar memories, whether from memories without past but which recycle heritage and creates myths of heroes.

For Moore and Whelan (2007), history can be claimed as a record, testimony or artefacts described as historical and through which historians reconstruct pasts by sculpting an idealised collective or collective memories out of such raw ‘historical’ material. What Moore and Whelan (2007) call ‘historical memory’ can be regarded as distinct from our own while ‘historical consciousness’ alludes to the choice of history as the model for organising past experiences (Moore and Whelan, 2007). Quoting Booth (2006), Poole (2008) noted that memory can assist in the understanding the past as a source of present responsibilities. Through memory, we research into the past and make that past an element in political and moral agendas (Poole, 2008) in the present. However, and at whatever scale a collective is constituted, communities have no capacity to share memories that are not, in some way at least, externally programmed for individuals (Moore and Whelan, 2007), often through gatekeepers. Through this, individuals and collectives appear imprisoned by their sense of belonging and corresponding responsibilities, whether nation or ethnic group. Memories often are programmed externally for us and not necessary those constituting the elite. Given developments in technology, top-down dynamic are increasingly challenged by bottom-up pressures, seeking to define a negotiated set of memories, instead of the existing sets that have become the nationalist narratives.

2.3.4 Narrative
Having defined memory and sought to differentiate between memory and history, the relationship that memory has with narratives must also be explained. According to Koresaar, et al. (2009), narratives operate as transports for remembering, through commemorative museums, monuments and representations of the past and lived experience. Such collections of representations and memories tell a story about a community or nation. However, the public or national plantations of memories in museums, memorials and commemorations can often contrast with personal experiences and memories. All narratives of the past have to be understood in terms of the nature of the society in which they are told. Memories are presented to us in
narrative structure, the means whereby humans come to understand and organise time, fictional and historical (Reissman, 1993, 2008).

Historical theorists maintain that ‘humans perceive time, experience life, and act in the world in a narratively structured way’ (Koresaar et al., 2009; 13-15). Neisser and Fivesh argue that intelligible narratives are often organised around “a point,” such as the establishment of cultural values (Neisser and Fivush, 1994; 92-3). This suggests individuals or collectives may have memories of events that are inaccurate because they have been shaped by narratives. Historians can use rhetorical strategies to overcome the fragmentation of historical record and organise the result into a single vision. In this manner, such strategies provide narrative qualities of continuity, coherence, and closure. Prominent amongst the conventions deriving from our history are those of folktales, parables, myths and legends (Neisser and Fivush, 1994).

Such elements can also be shaped through physical reminders, as noted by Basu (1997), in the example of Scottish clearance commemoration (Moore and Whelan, 2007). Drawing on the work of Tilley, Basu argues that concrete landmarks provide ‘stories’ and mythic value and historical relevance. In terms of the clearance ‘story’ of Scottish Highlands, Basu recognises the existence of a ‘dominant narrative’ that caused history, myth and memory to develop into structured memorials to these events. For that narrative, these memorials act as aid to making and maintaining myths of Highland identity (Moore and Whelan, 2007, 23-4). Narratives have also been considered ‘cultural tools’ employed in collective and individual remembering. Moore and Whelan (2007) focus on localised specific manifestation of the deployment of past in the contemporary manufacture and maintenance of identity narratives (Moore and Whelan, 2007). The two nationalist narratives that appear to exist on Cyprus can both be classed as dominant narratives within their separate communities. I will expand on this topic in Chapters Three and Four but actors that keep such narratives in place should be introduced now.

2.3.5 The Means of Production

In order to understand the production of social memory we need to examine how group maintains and cultivate common memory. One way to start studying social formation of memory is to analyse contexts, through which groups socialise us as to
what should be remembered and what should be forgotten (Misztal, 2003). These collective gatekeepers are called ‘mnemonic communities’ and include the family, ethnic group and the nation (Misztal, 2003). They regulate how far back we should remember, what part of the past should be remembered, what events mark the beginning and which should be forced out of ‘our’ story. Such processes of mnemonic civilisation remain important parts of efforts to incorporate new members while such group identities and collective memory are continuously reinforced (Landsberg, 2004). The ‘nation’ is a main mnemonic community as its continuity relies on a vision of a suitable past and a believable future (Misztal, 2003). Meanwhile, with ethnic memories surfacing in affiliation with the politics of memory and increasing importance of the human rights, memories of past injustices are critical source of empowerment of ethnicities in the present. In the case of Cyprus, we are faced with two ethnic groups with opposing memories of the past and nationalist identities beyond the island.

The family is another mnemonic community that plays a crucial role in the construction of our memories. As long as the family jointly produces and maintains memory, its cohesion and continuity is assured (Misztal, 2003). The content of family narrative, symbolic of family unity across generations, produces family traditions. However, two processes are noted by Misztal (2003): on the one hand, the growing impact of what might be described as quest for family roots; the other, the decline in the ability to maintain a chain of family memory. Decline of the multi-generational family is leading to the destruction of the social frameworks, their transmission of collective memories and affects the functioning of the institutions of memory (Misztal, 2003). Moreover, such developments have led to further emphasis on these institutions and the memory that they produce.

Such institutions of memory include schools, courts, museums and the mass media. The structure of the relationships between individuals and groups can be intercepted and preserved by public institutions. In the realm of schools as a fore instance, textbooks have always been updated due to international pressures and national voices (Misztal, 2003), as was mentioned in the case of Cyprus (Papadakis, 2008). Textbooks are frequently the subject of external and domestic scrutiny as nationalist narratives could harm social cohesion and undermine the authority of the state, unless
the narrative was established by the state. Where the state controls the educational and media system, collective memory is often fragmented and dominated by ideological values and used to produce legitimacy for the ruling elite. However, technology and communications created a mass audience for media, becoming an extremely powerful instrument of ordering knowledge of the past, according to Samuel (1994) (Misztal, 2003). Having illustrated those involved in the development of memory, I turn my attention to the dynamics that memory has arguably been inextricably linked with, that of remembering and forgetting.

2.3.6 Remembering and Forgetting

'Remembering' could be seen as an instrumental counterpart to 'forgetting', while memory may be conceptualised as the interaction between the two. The role of agents should be emphasised in the relations between these ideas, such as leaders or spokespersons. Such choices of memory can neglect certain details, reflecting the prevalent politics of the day, especially true for societies and individuals having coped with the experience of a totalitarian regime or atrocities of war. Moral or emotional dilemmas are intertwined into the choices made in remembering or forgetting (Koresaar et al, 2009). In other cases, there are no such developments as the existing justice system may appear to only represent certain actors, as in the Cypriot case (Moran, 1998). While it is an individual who remembers and shapes their memories, through relations: memories also have collective effects on perspectives of the past (Misztal, 2003). Such a sharing of memories is possible in many examples of post-conflict environments, such as in South Africa and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) (Stolten, 2007; Guelke, 1999).

Just as individuals are obliged to forget, so too are societies (Forty and Kuchler, 2009). As a New York Times reporter commented, since 1945, Europe's apparent amnesia about the war is largely a world phenomenon. He also noted that Europeans often remembered it all too well, and deeply resented being reminded of it (Forty and Kuchler, 2009). Memorials permit only certain things to be remembered and other memories, by their exclusion, are caused to be forgotten (Forty and Kuchler, 2009). In the case of France, the marginalisation of French colonials in institutionalised forms of historical knowledge was discussed by Hargreaves (2005). This was exemplified in the almost complete absence of any discussion of the overseas’ empire in Nora’s
work, according to Hargreaves (2005). Hargreaves (2005) argued that the reason for this was that public awareness of the overseas’ empire was never deep in France compared to the UK. According to Hargreaves (2005), the second factor contributing to public forgetfulness remains France’ traumatic loss of its overseas’ possessions.

Having defined memory, history, and narrative and differentiated them and examined the means of production, I need to explain the development of memory as a theoretical field. Through this, I would like to illustrate why this approach is a suitable way of handling the perceptions of Cypriots regarding past episodes of violence. Moreover, I explain why collective memory currently is considered a result of negotiations between the elite and members of the community through elite-population negotiation. This is more nuanced than the rather simplistic idea of memory as imposed upon members by the elite. In other words, the developments of this theoretical field began with Halbwachs and developed beyond the modernist perspective of conceptualising memory towards post-modernist thinking.

2.3.7 Developments of Theory
Durkheim (1974) argued that every society displays and requires a sense of continuity with the past. The importance of a sense of collective identity, reinforced through links to the past, is further elaborated by Halbwachs (Misztal, 2003). The first to systematically explore the ways in which present concerns determine the remembered past, Halbwachs asserted that a collectively imagined past is crucial for the unity of society, often in order to further political ends. Accordingly, collective memory is always ‘socially framed’ since social groups determine what is ‘memorable’ and how it will be remembered (Misztal, 2003). However, Halbwachs’ idea of collective memory is often criticised for its lack of clarity (Misztal, 2003). Moreover, Halbwachs placed too much emphasis on the collective nature of social consciousness and disconnected it from the individual.

The role of forgetting in the construction of national identities is first noted by Renan, who, in 1882, insisted that the creation of a nation requires creative use of past events. He pointed out that, although nations could be characterised by ‘the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories’, the essence of a nation is not only that its members have many things in common, but they have collectively forgotten some
things. Anderson (1995) argued that being reminded of what one has already forgotten is a normal mechanism by which many nations are, or have been, constructed. It illustrates how national memories, themselves underscored by selective forgetting, constitute one of the most important mechanisms by which nations construct a collective identity and imagine their community (Anderson, 1995; Misztal, 2003). Anderson himself referred to Renan as having assumed ‘memories’ in his readers’ minds even though the events themselves occurred hundreds years previously. Anderson notes Renan’s “pre-emptive syntax of *doit avoir oublier*’ - ‘obliged already to have forgotten’” (Anderson, 1995; 200). The obligation to forget has often been demanded from nationalist elites.

In the late eighteenth century, ‘forgetting’ engendered the need for a narrative of ‘identity’ (Anderson, 1995; 205-6), beginning with nationalism that developed in the ‘new world’, as Anderson put it (1995). ‘Second-generation’ nationalist movements developed in Europe between 1815 and 1850, creating a need to imagine a reawakening. In Europe, the new nationalisms almost immediately began to imagine themselves as ‘awaking from sleep’ (Anderson, 1995; 195). Greek nationalism was no exception; it in fact exemplified the rush to emphasise the awakening of previously sleeping nations. The Turkish nation ‘awoke’ after the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the construction of Turkey by Ataturk. Yet, forgetting and then remembering only explains the discontinuity of memories, and often ignored by the organised narratives.

Collective memory appears altogether to be an ephemeral concept. Mead (1932) argues that only the present is real, while the past is continually reconstructed through the present. Shils (1981) stresses the connection between collective memories and tradition-building, arguing that culture depends upon tradition as the storage of inherited conceptions, meanings and values (Misztal, 2003). For Giddens (1984), social remembering remained closely connected with the unity of society, although he does not explicitly rely on this notion, according to Misztal (2003). Instead, he structures theory around memory ‘traces’ that are constantly initiated in social practices or existing memory of knowledgeable agents (Misztal, 2003). As before, individuals remain important in the guise of gatekeepers, keeping control of collective memory through means such as literature or state media. In other words, social
practices by individuals are used to reinforce collective memories and join such recollections in understandable narratives.

As well by individual agents, memory has been employed as a reservoir of officially sanctioned myths and traditions, some of which can be invented, to explain and justify ends and means (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). Constructs were supported by commemoration rituals, marches, ceremonies, festivals with the help of teachers, poets and painters (Misztal, 2003). When the main social authority had been religious institutions, religious memory was called upon to sustain followers’ allegiance. After the decline of religious organisation and institutions, the state replaced religion and used the idea of nationhood (Cranshaw, 1978; Stefanidis, 1999). Today, memory is more distant from traditional sources of power while, at the same time, it becomes increasingly shaped by mass media. The state is no longer the sole user of such practices as challenging ethnic groups seek to use the same methods (Misztal, 2003).

The role media plays has undergone dramatic change as a result of new technologies, increasing the ability to store and transmit memory, allowing more freedom and creative possibilities. Generally, the nature of mass media has established the new role of mediated and localised traditions as a means of making sense of the world (Koresaar et al., 2009).

Though as the source of our memory-making diverge, so to does our perspective of the past, resulting in conflict reborn. Born out a need to be less deterministic, the popular memory approach suggests that understanding conflicts over memory as a manipulation from above did not go far enough in explanatory terms (Misztal, 2003). Instead, the popular memory theory points to the possibility of the construction of memory from the ‘bottom-up’. Seen in opposition to dominant forces, the ‘popular memory’ is a political force of people marginalised by a universal discourse (Misztal, 2003). But dominant political order was not viewed as monolithic, singular or totalising, but dynamic, fluid and unstable situation between the dominant and marginalised social formations (Misztal, 2003).

Quoting Zerubavel (1997), Misztal (2003) noted that memory becomes a ‘contested territory in which groups engaging in a political conflict promote competitive views of the past in order to gain control over the political centre or to legitimise a separatist orientation’ (Zerubavel 1997:11). Such contestation appears to have occurred in the case of Cyprus between the Cypriot
communities but opponents have also challenged the basis of the nationalist narratives in both communities.

More recent development created versions of theory that assumes public memory can be simultaneously multifocal and hegemonic. Public memory functions to mediate the competing interests and meanings of the past and present. Moreover, memory distortion takes place not through simple coercion but from a more subtle process of communication and negotiation (Misztal, 2003). However, it cannot be assumed there is conflict and contestation of memory as there may also be a consensus that develops through the communication of what is acceptable. This formation of memory from the earlier thinking to more recent conceptions suggests that memory constantly evolves as a concept and is intertwined with the idea of history and the politics of the day.

I will also suggest that organised collections of memories, myths, statements and arguments are part of narratives, set to create a storyline from that collection. This is especially true when such narratives are mutually reinforcing, as in the case of Cyprus. However, the narratives that exist in Cyprus can be challenged from the grass-roots, organisations that are not part of the elite such as Trade Unions, non-governmental organisations and charities (Misztal, 2003; Zerubavel, 2004). Through memory, it appears that the choices and imposition of narratives are not wholly those of the elite. Moreover, the elites and grass-roots enter into negotiation as well as competition to develop and reinterpret events and thus altering, or challenging, narratives. Having assessed memory, I ought to assess the concept of trauma as it is an ingredient of the memories that are being addressed in this thesis.

2.3.8. Trauma
The concept of trauma is applied primarily to extraordinary experiences in the personal lives of individuals and collectives. The essence of trauma experience is in the adverse unexpected happenings; a painful, extraordinary, and shocking interruption to ongoing activity (Neal, 2005). The central hopes and aspirations of personal lives are temporarily put on hold, replaced by the darkest fears and anxieties. Such disruption may take the form of threats of foreign invasion, danger to economic systems, a technological catastrophe, or of the emergence of rancorous conflicts over values, practices, and priorities (Neal, 2005; Edkins, 2003).
For Neal (2005), the degree to which the nation dwells upon a trauma depends on the degree of closure that is achieved. In the case study of the United State, October 1962 was the most terrifying moment in the history of the nation. With end of separate crises, cases are closed, and most people are able to put such episodes behind them (Neal, 2005). The trauma of the past becomes ingrained in collective memories and provides reference points for when the need arises. Crises precipitating a national trauma are of two types. One consists of an acute crisis that impinges upon the normal course of events in an abrupt and dramatic fashion. The second type of crisis can be chronic, enduring, and long-lasting. A chronic crisis may often have the dramatic beginning of an acute crisis, but builds in intensity with the passing of time. This type of crisis grows out of persisting contradictions within a social system. Rather than a volcano-like intrusion into an otherwise orderly system, a chronic crisis grows out of conflicts within a social system and the emergence of a crisis of authority (Neal, 2005). Both types of trauma are in evidence in the case of Cyprus, both the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots suffered from chronic and acute traumas (PIO, 2010, Gibbons, 1997).

2.4. The Consequences
All events of the past that are not experienced by ourselves first-hand can be subject to the developments of collective memory and the institution of narratives. The reasoning for an episode of violent conflict may change over time as would the consequences of that violent event. Like many social events, violence is subject to collective memory and given its meaning through accepted practices. If need be, violent actions that had meaning in its time can be robbed of it and deemed irrational, part of a modern ‘ethnic hatred’ (Kaufmann, 2001). Conversely, perpetrators may seek to self-rationalise action, post events (Payne, 2008). Like memory, the reasoning behind violence has often developed and changed as a result of present concerns for political space and influence. Bell (2002) noted that the realm in which these disputes occurs over what happened and what has been imagined to happen exists in what he termed a “mythscape” (Bell, 2002). Yet, I suspect that such events have not yet become myths and remain memories until the event has passed from living memory. The distinction of memory from myth is that memory is perceived to be based on recollections and impressions, while myth is recognised as an invented story. We only
seek meanings from myths, such as King Arthur, when there appears no likelihood of memories. Allowed through political developments in the present, the reimagining of memories by Cypriots may force a response from nationalist narratives. Such responses may result from community leaders seeking to avoid challenges by grass-root and political opponents.

Moreover, the retention of nationalist perspective thinking amongst the population may result from the perceived responsibility that they and their leaders have to their imagined forefathers (Poole, 2008). This sense of responsibility has to clash with the sense of choice amongst Turkish and Greek Cypriots, noted by Papadakis (2008) and Loizides (2005). This conflict of identity, and of responsibilities, is a recurring underlining factor in conflict between and within Cypriot communities. Meanwhile, other events are too central within the existing narrative to be whitewashed or ignored. Though 1974 created a great physical chasm, it cannot be argued that no socio-political chasm existed before 1974. Though not all, many Greek Cypriots have forgotten 1963-4, as a result of the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative. Yet, division is stoked by the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative referring to the need to remember the period 1963 up till 1974. While other research may have assessed numerous narratives existing, I have decided to limit this study to two nationalist narratives of the communities of Cyprus.

2.5 This Approach
Primarily through political science, this thesis will examine the consequences of the memory of violence for political relations and attitudes between and amongst domestic actors. Elements of memory and representation were covered in the previous chapter. However, the violent memory of respondents provides a core to this research and demonstrates the difference in perceptions between and within communities. This thesis argues that the memory of 1974 has centred on the role of exogenous actors as it appears to be shared by elements of both Cypriot communities. Moreover, such memories are possibly developing as a consequence of political developments in the present, assisted by progress in technology, such as the internet and mass media.

Only illustrated sporadically within the separate nationalist narratives, divisive memory of inter-communal conflict can be termed Escalating Cyclical Memory of
Violence (ECMV). Such memories have the potential to escalate a situation between communities towards division, if both narratives increase rhetoric about inter-communal violence in the past. Memories of violent events could also be used to create a new narrative of common past amongst Cypriots. I argue that the memory of the 1974 could unify Cypriot memories in what would be termed Overwhelming Linear Memory of Violence (OLMV). OLMV may not be pre-determined by what type of actor is involved in the event remembered. OLMV may represent a challenge to the duo-linear nationalist narratives, opening political space for possible reconciliation between communities. As a result, dominant nationalist narratives may well retain their importance by answering such developments with reinterpretations of their memories, to accommodate new trends.

Memories of violent events can bring people together and develop a collective memory of conflict. With a successful development of security apparatus and justice systems, the commemoration and remembrance of events have been seen as stages along a road toward state-stabilisation (Paris and Sisk, 2009). Similarly traumatic memories of conflict could also drive people apart and bring communities to the brink of inter-communal violence. Such types of memory could lead to Paris’s (2004) third possible outcome of state-building, namely partition. Only certain memories can bring the communities closer together and require a certain level of selective forgetfulness (Forty and Kuchler, 1999).

Though similar thoughts have been voiced before (Loizides, 2007), why have such memories not created significant progress in reconciliation? Nationalists on both sides of the divide view any integrative sentiment damaging to their political standing and oppose OLMV. Elements within both communities may seek to develop OLMV into an integrative narrative, but the Turkish Cypriot community retains vivid memories of 1963-4. If both communities are determined to create an integrative narrative, they would both promote OLMV and open the way to possible reconciliation. However, the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative remains centred on their communities’ victimisation in 1963-4 and their hardships since. Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative argues that the illegal ‘invasion’ in 1974 is the sole problem and needs to be rolled back for a solution to be possible. No reconciliation has occurred because
communities are not promoting OLMV and the elites would need to promote a form of OLMV for reconciliation to be possible.

2.6 Summary
Many sources handled this theoretical areas of violence and memory, through different strands and areas of discussion. Violence has a number of focuses: motivations; dynamics; types of actors involved (Kalyvas, 2006; Petersen, 2002). Yet, much of the literature on violence considers the occurrence to be instrumental in a physical rather than in a representational sense. The study of past violence needs to be examined through the prism of memory and violence’s place within the developments and alterations of collective memory. Having defined memory from history and having assessed its relationship with narrative, I illustrated the developments within this theoretical area to explain why I have defined memory. I introduced the distinction between ECMV, used by nationalists to ferment violence, and OLMV. The changing dynamics amongst Cypriots suggest a development of new common memories that do not fit the existing nationalist narratives of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

2.7 Conclusion
The levels of analysis illustrated earlier constitute the framework that will be used to examine memory of violent events. However, the instigations of violence were not the focus of this research but the tensions and commonalities which often are influential in the memory of violent events and their individual/collective transmission. However, what do common memories mean for building bridges towards reconciliation? Moreover, there remains the prospect of contestation between elements with both communities over developing narratives.
METHOD

3.1 Parametric or Not
There are a number of diverging methods in which researchers can collect data and the purpose of this chapter is to explain why this procedure was chosen. There must be awareness of the distinction of parametric data, which assumes normalcy, equal variance, and independence, and non-parametric. Parametric data includes measures such as depth, width, weight and height. Parametric tests result in bell-curve or ‘normal’ distribution. Any results that do not fit that type of distribution are considered non-parametric (http://www.statsoft.com/TEXTBOOK/stnonpar.html, accessed 30-10-09). Non-parametric data does not follow the assumptions or parameters applied to parametric data and, as researchers, we often do not know the parameters of the society in question. Like much social research, this project produced mostly non-parametric data; although demographic questions could collate parametric data.

3.2 Triangulated strategy
The difference between qualitative and quantitative research needs also to be explained. Quantitative research employs mathematical models and theories to explain phenomena and provides connection between empirical observation and mathematical expressions of social theories (Bryman, 2001). This contrasts with qualitative research that seeks in-depth knowledge of human behaviour and reasoning (Silverman, 2002). Both types of research have strengths and weaknesses and can be used in conjunction with one another, within a triangulated strategy. A triangulated strategy was used to collate the responses of Cypriots from both communities within a questionnaire. As well as questionnaires, interviews were used to gather a deeper-understanding of specific individuals’ responses. These interviews were with individuals from within political parties, state institutions and organisations.

Regarding research questions, Black (1993) noted that the statement of research questions should not be too restrictive, making project unchangeable. In fact, this research has developed and stems from grounded theory of research, as Anfara and Mertz (2006) noted that according to Gall, Borg and Gall (1996), “many qualitative
studies are done to discover theory” (Anfara and Mertz, 2006; xx). Anfara and Mertz also refer to Patton (1990) who joined the debate on how to encapsulate a set of theoretical traditions that derive from the social and behavioural science disciplines and who argued that “how you study the world determines what you learn about the world” (Anfara and Mertz, 2006; xxiii). Though this is not an exhaustive assessment of literature on methodology, I aim to illustrate that the procedures employed are similar to established methodological practice.

The evaluation of research involves recognising the sins of omission and commission, lack of innovation, as well as poor procedure (Black, 1993). The procedure and the process of skills in social science research are listed by Black (1993). Researchers supplement participant observation with interviewing, observation of gatherings and analysis of documents. As such, the review of documents is an unobtrusive method, portraying the values and beliefs of participants (Marshall and Rossman, 1999). One goal of scientific research is to be self policing through rigour and consistency of practice. Although good procedure are implicit in any study, social research is just as prone to bias and/or poor practice as any approach (Black, 1993). This research has sought consistency in its handling of respondents and interviewees as well as the literatures considered elements of opposing nationalist narratives, though the sources of such literature come from divergent sources.

I seek to explain how I have handled narrative literatures, questionnaires and interviews. Before that I should assess my own bias and standpoint. I come from a western perspective and hold certain common preconceptions. I have mostly been interested in constructionism and ideas of post-modernism, as explained by Crotty (2009). As a result, my perspective and background will have an unknowable bearing on how I handle the information collected from both questionnaires, interviews and my assessment and reading of narratives. The working language of this study was English, and so may have also influenced the outcome of the research. Being British would also have created a bias as well as coloured the responses of the Cypriots involved, given the historical relationship between the UK and Cyprus. However, many Cypriots considered any historical problems being ones of governmental policy while many Cypriots were fluent in English.
3.3 Narrative
Approaches that focus on event narratives tend to be interested in underlying structures and social functioning. Narrative language is often seen as a transparent window onto the storyline’s significance in individual and social life. The rapid passing over of the language to reach a narratives’ ‘meaning’ or ‘function’ is a broad trend in current narrative research, according to Andrews, Squire and Tamboukou (2008). In fact, we, as researchers, ought to be cautious of language being used as constitutive of reality and not simply a technical device for establishing meaning. The stories from sources do not mirror a world “out there”; they are constructed, creatively anchored and rhetorical (Reissman, 1993). The tellers of narrative select features from the “whole” experience to narrate. A similar process occurs with transcribing, analysing, and reading. Framing discussion of research process in the language of “representation” rather than as “perspectives” emphasises that we actively make choices that can be accomplished in different ways (Reissman, 1993). In other words, the narrators make their choices to construct meaning, as do researchers and the receivers of such narratives.

For Reissman (1993, 2008), narrativisation represents not only the past events but how individuals understand those recollections. Plots vary in type: tragedy, comedy, romance, satire. Tellers pour their ordinary lives into these archetypal forms and the telling of such tales tells a story in itself (Reissman, 1993; Elliott, 2005; Andrews et al., 2008). Concept of ‘genre’ could be a further analytical resource that can be borrowed from literary studies by sociologists with an interest in examining the form of narratives in their research. Trauma can be broadly defined as a pattern of narrative and imagery. Such imagery can be understood as providing a shared framework that can be used to structure events and experiences (Elliott, 2005, Reissman, 2008). For Gready (2008), the struggle was less over the articulation of the marginalised and subaltern voices that for greater power of voice, representation, interpretation and dissemination.

The current diversity of approaches can, in part, be traced to the different features of narratives. Central streams of approach to narratives have developed from three different aspects of narrative accounts. According to Elliott (2005), some had advocated stressing the temporal nature of social life as providing rationale for
methodology while others took a hermeneutic approach. Elliott’s final group would be researchers involved in the social processes surrounding the production and consumption of stories. However, Elliott argues that it would be an oversimplification to suggest interest in one of these three facets of narrative translates into a straightforward and specific technique for the analysis of narrative material (Elliott, 2005). I agree that no single method fully encompasses all researchers and approaches that have been termed those of narrative.

On the level of community, Mischler’s (1991) typology of researchers’ narrative research seems to suggest that many have been interested in the events and their representation (Elliott, 2005). For Mischler (1991), researchers may be primarily interested in the actual events and experiences that are kept in a narrative, to perform two functions: to describe the past events and produce a chronological account and; secondly, making clear the meaning of those events and experiences into lives of participants. Secondly, researchers may be more interested in the structure and form of the narrative or the way in which the stories are put together. A third type of approach is the interest in the performance of narratives within the interactional and institutional context in which storylines are produced, recounted, and consumed (Elliott, 2005).

Yet, narrative can also encapsulate an individual’s life story, which is given special importance if that person was and remains an important figure within public life (Andrews, et. al., 2008; Reissman, 2008). As well as previous elements, narratives often require a level of coherence. Baerger and McAdams (1999) provide a definition of coherence for use with the analysis of life stories, according to Elliot (2005):

a life story is coherent to the extent that it:
1) locates the narrative in a specific temporal, social and personal context;
2) displays the structural elements of an episodic system;
3) conveys an even evaluative or reportable point, or series of such points about the speaker in such a way as to give the story emotional significance; and
4) imparts information in an integrated manner, ultimately communicating meaning of the experiences described within the context of the larger-than-life story (Elliott, 2005; 48-9).
The activity of narrating an individual life therefore involves the restructuring or reconfiguring of past events in the light of the present. Quoting McIntyre (1981), Elliott (2005) notes that continuity makes us accountable for our past actions but also means that we expect others to be responsible for their actions (Elliott, 2005). According to Phoenix (2008), Gubrium (2006) advocated that analysts should pay detailed attention to what the individual narrator forwards and in which context they produce a particular account, reflected in his work with Holstein (2009). Reissman notes that narratives often serve different purposes for individuals than they do for groups. People use narrative form to remember, argue, justify, persuade, entertaining, and even mislead an audience. Groups use stories to mobilise and foster a sense of belonging. “Narratives do political work” (Reissman, 2008; 8). Reissman argues that narratives are connected with a flow of power in the wider world, having quoted Yucel-Davis who stated that “identities are narratives, stories people tell themselves and others about who they are (and who they are not).” Yucel-Davis refers to identity as “always producing itself through the combined processes of being and becoming, belonging and longing to belong. This duality is often reflected in narratives of identity” (Reissman, 2008, 8).

Current approaches stress the idea of narrative as always multiple, socially constructed and constructing, reinterpreted and re-interpretable. These contradictions do not go unnoticed (Andrews, et al., 2008). As a result, narrative is handled cautiously in this research and only examined as a benchmark to the memories of Cypriot respondents. Moreover, the latter may be influenced by nationalist narratives of Cypriot communities, forwarded by either organisations such as the Public Information Office or illustrated by individual accounts, such as that of Denktash (2009).

Both of these narratives are different and yet similar. Both are clearly obstacles to possible compromise from either community and yet the narratives have different functions. The PIO nationalist narrative forwards the argument that the Greek Cypriots were victims of the situation. Denktash’s letters to Moran (2009) illustrate his argument that he had often put across as leader of the Turkish Cypriot community. One attempts to justify a community’s position while the individual author seeks to justify his personal political position. I consider this personal narrative to be part of
the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative due to Denktash’s prominent position in his community’s political past and present. This situation is also partly the result of limited Turkish Cypriot ability to forward an organised narrative, as Denktash himself pointed out (Denktash and Moran, 2009). I use Denktash’s letters as totemic of the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative, although institutions of the “TRNC” produce articles and papers (“TRNC”, 1997). Denktash himself has noted the inadequate means of narrative production within the Turkish Cypriot community compared to the Greek Cypriots (Denktash and Moran, 2009). This reflects the comparatively incomprehensive nature of the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative compared to the Greek Cypriot narrative. As will be established in the next chapter, the narrative of stasis since 1974 has imagined, and reflects, a political stalemate amongst Cypriot communities.

3.4 Questionnaires

3.4.1 Why Questionnaires

Having briefly explained the benefits of using a triangulated strategy and assessed the handling of narrative, the use of questionnaires must be explained. When first setting about the questionnaires in Cyprus, the University of Nicosia and the Peace Research Institute (Oslo) office were asked if previous research had been conducted. Both bodies stated that no previous research had been done and so no previous dataset existed that would be suitable for this thesis. The University of Nicosia emphasised the importance of collecting this data through questionnaires, mentioning current researchers practiced in such methods (Bryman, 2001, 1994). But as no data existed previously and resources were limited, the possibility of using statistical models (Bryman, 1994) in analysing data was restricted.

There are also advantages of using questionnaires, especially those that are answered by the respondent. Such a method of administering was more viable given resources, allowing the respondent to answer relatively on their own terms with no interviewer variability. Questions can also be asked that are not salient to the respondent while other respondents may read questionnaires as a whole, therefore influencing their responses. Bryman (2001) also notes that such methods cannot collect additional data, nor ask detailed questions. Steps to improve rates of responses were listed by Bryman (2001, 1994), although these are listed in hindsight. A relatively easily answered
questionnaire was sought, handed to respondents to be answered without prompting and handed back to the researcher once complete. As a result, my presence when the respondent answered the questionnaires was only to observe and not assist unless asked to by the participant.

3.4.2 Design
The questionnaire was primarily designed to gauge the extent to which the episodes of violence were perceived to have affected the attitudes and relations of different actors. The design of the questionnaires was in line with the existing literature, primarily of which is surmised by Bryman (2001, 1994), although the answers were not on the Likert scale. Questionnaires were completed by individual Cypriots from both communities and gauged their thoughts on changing relations and attitudes of individuals, institutions and communities. Quantifying their attitudes could be achieved in a number of ways but a relatively simple number system was devised with 1 representing a highly negative effect on attitudes/relations and 10 representing a highly positive effect. Numbers 5 and 6 were used to represent little or no change and numbers in-between represented the scale of negative/positive effect. A different type of question used involved a statement that was followed by the respondent either agreeing or disagreeing. This was designed to confirm or refute what they had already said in the questions previously. Alternatively, the method of asking respondents to agree or disagree with a statement could have been applied more widely. For a more nuanced display of scale, the number system was thought better suited to this research. However, it was clear that respondents could take many things into consideration when answering but the questionnaire asked for a numeral answer, or a ‘yes’ or ‘no’. This was evident from the small pilot study conducted before the main fieldwork, in line with literature of methodology (Bryman, 2001; Ruane, 2005).

The questionnaire should also not be too long nor should many questions require long answers as it may seem daunting to many prospective respondents (Bryman, 2001). With questions that only required numerical answers, the total number of questions was thought manageable. The questionnaire itself had forty-six questions with four being statement-based while the first four required responses in words. Thirty-eight were in the format of a scale and considered the most important element of the questionnaire. The first four were designed originally to initiate thoughts on relations
and attitudes between communities on a general level. Each questionnaire was also supplied with a consent form for the respondent to fill in, leaving their details or select anonymity if they wished. Although concern was raised about certain questions, most appeared reasonably clear and understandable for the majority of Cypriots to answer. A copy of the full questionnaire and documents are available in the appendices.

In reality, some respondents were confused about the numbers system as some began by giving the answer 10 when they meant 1. This was dealt with by the following question using a statement; when respondents gave an answer to the statement that was contradictory to previous answers. Consequently, the contradiction was brought to their attention and the respondent had the choice to go back and alter the answers accordingly. Another pattern of behaviour amongst respondents was the tendency to give the same answers to all questions. Respondents who gave the same answers to all questions probably rushed to finish while those who only did so for certain groups of questions were assumed to have given genuine answers. The presence of the researcher when respondents were answering was in response to concern that questionnaires were in English. As well as the language concern, there was the overall wish to avoid a low response rate.

The questionnaire may have been too long for some respondents, even though it consisted of two pages and in line with methodology literature (Bryman, 1994; 2001). It may not be about how many pages a questionnaire covers but how easy questions can be answered. When some respondents took five to ten minutes, others took nearer twenty minutes. Moreover, respondents may have found the method of questionnaire cumbersome when trying to express their thoughts on changing relations and attitudes. When seeking clarity and concise answers, such methods sacrifice elements of nuance and complexity.

Another issue was the distinction between relations and attitudes. A distinction was needed as the working language of this research was English and some respondents sought to confirm what was meant by attitude and relations. The first four questions seem not to have appeared straightforward for Cypriots. The first question, for instance, asked about the thoughts on political relations and attitudes in Cyprus, allowing the respondent free choice where to take their answer. Many avoided these
questions altogether while others insisted these should be given a framework. This was understandable, however, the reason was to gauge respondents more general thoughts on political transformations and not limit it to one specific level. If queried, these questions were specified at the level of communities in Cyprus. Regarding the questions that use the scale of one to ten, many respondents seemed to get the impression they were answering the same questions (Bryman, 2001). This was dealt with by explaining the differences to the respondent when they queried the wording of questions.

The phrasing of the questions was also different in each section to emphasise this distinction. So, in the attitudes’ section, questions ended with words such as “attitudes of Cypriots” and “attitudes of institutions” while the relations sections ended with the phasing “between Cypriot communities” and “between institutions”. The relations sections also had an extra question regarding the political relations between individual Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Individual respondents would be unable to give an answer on the attitudes of individuals beyond themselves.

There was also the issue with what to call the de-facto government in the Northern section of Cyprus. The “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” was placed in speech marks for the sake of avoiding accusations of recognising the Turkish Cypriot state. The “TRNC” institutions were labelled ‘structures’ as a way to accommodate the sensitivities of Greek Cypriots. This was a questionnaire designed to be distributed to both communities and, as a result, certain compromises were made. This method allows for an interpretation of the question by the participants and allows comparisons to be drawn by the researcher.

### 3.4.3 Sampling

A sample that could be used in a representative fashion amounts to roughly one percent of the population, a percentage not achievable with the resources available. In the case of Cyprus, this would have been above four hundred responses spread throughout the island in separate cells of equal number and in correlation with demographic spreads. These cells would also allow data to be categorised to examine

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8 Although the first four questions did not provide data that was used in the research, I have listed the responses of the various respondents to the four questions in appendices.
differences among respondents with different geographical and sociological positions (Bryman, 2001). However, in reality, the sampling had to take on board the local issues and problems when distributing questionnaires in Cyprus.

Before commencing the quantitative research, advice on methodology issues was sought from local users of quantitative research at the University of Nicosia. They suggested using local phone directories and selecting the fiftieth person down or to go and physically seek out people at semi-random locations. Informed that there were no databases or other previously established routes to creating a large sample, collecting the quantitative data began through semi-random sampling at stages along bus route 23, using cells of roughly ten respondents. This bus route went along the Northern reaches on the Greek Cypriot side and passed the University of Nicosia. The areas were chosen from in, and around the University, to the main vehicle checkpoint for crossing over into the Northern half of the island (Agios Dhometrios). This was chosen as it was in a relatively concentrated area and, geographically, moved away from the buffer zone. When suggesting the use of bus routes for sampling purposes, the local quantitative researchers agreed that it was a valid method\(^9\). However, the responses were originating only in a certain quarter of the city of Nicosia and close to the buffer zone. This resulted in the decision to sample an area, further away from the buffer zone, in Aglandjia. Using the bus route number 59, the areas sampled were between the University of Cyprus and central Aglandjia. Of course other locations could be selected on a much wider scale throughout the city but these areas were selected as they were the most familiar to the researcher. Although there was a general outstanding issue of public transport in Nicosia and more widely in Cyprus, it appeared the most effective way of distribution.

Regarding Turkish Cypriot sampling, a similar use of bus lines in the Northern half of Nicosia was not possible. This was partly the result of a more disparate bus service compared to the Greek Nicosia bus system. Nevertheless, I did locate a residential area west of the parliament of the "TRNC" that spread in parallel streets up to the British Council. I used this area to collate the Turkish Cypriot respondents. I did not

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\(^9\) As well as being valid, the bus system was the method of travel in Nicosia during fieldwork.
ask or seek respondents within the walled city of Nicosia, as I had not done so on the
Greek Cypriot side of the city.

3.4.4 Distribution
As there was no distribution network for questionnaires to be issued to Cypriots, the
researcher had to handle the distribution of all questionnaires. This meant it took
whole days to get six or seven respondents, even though advice suggested that even
with only one person distributing, it was expected to get at least ten responses a day.
The results suggest that Cypriots were not enthusiastic to answer these questionnaires
through this method, at that time.

This could be due to a number of factors; some brought to my attention by the British
High Commission and Peace Research Institute (PRIO)’s Cyprus Centre in Nicosia.
When the research was commencing in August 2009, Greece was in the midst of an
election period and it was alleged that a number of political parties and pollsters had
been asking questions on Cyprus. On the Turkish Cypriots’ side, relatively few were
willing to be involved as the major employer is the de-facto state apparatus (Loizides,
2007) and so they may have been unable to contribute because of this. With the
continued importance of Greece in Cyprus and, as an Englishman asking such
questions, Cypriots probably viewed this research with suspicion. However, the main
factor appears to have been a fatigue amongst potential respondents due to previous
questionnaires as part of the elections in Greece, as well as other political
developments.

In respect of how Greek Cypriot respondents were selected, residential areas were
sought out along the bus route and houses canvassed along nearby roads. Many of the
roads were parallel to the bus route and had their own geographical boundaries. On
both sides of the divide, houses were targeted that appeared to be occupied: had lights
on or windows opened, had cars in drives or outside. Houses were chosen instead of
flats and apartments as a physical meeting with the occupant would be more
successful in building a rapport and gaining a response (Ruane, 2005). This appeared
to be an effective strategy but snowballing was also used when individual respondents
offered to assist in the distribution of questionnaires. However, the weakness of
snowball was that it can also fail to gain any respondents, which happened in a couple
of cases during the research. It can also result in a narrow sample (Bryman, 2001),
though the responses that were collected appeared to be from a variety of individuals.
It also had a spread of responses from the various generations, of whom the
overwhelming majority were residents of Nicosia and roughly equal numbers of male
and female respondents. The sample also roughly correlated with the, disputed,
percentages of Greek and Turkish Cypriots (Papadakis, 2008; Bose, 2007), with 84%
of respondents identifying themselves as Greek Cypriots. The combination of
methods did, however, gain enough responses to illustrate the opinions of Cypriots
from both communities, although it cannot be claimed to be a representative sample.

3.4.5 Coding
The coding of the questionnaires was based on the layout of the questionnaire with the
first available answer being 1 while the second was coded as 2 (Ruane, 2005). So
Greek Cypriots were coded 1 as was residents of Nicosia and those aged between 18
and 30. The questions that required answers in a scale of 1 to 10 had already the basis
of their coding and were processed as they were. Regarding the questions that had a
statement and respondents agreed or disagreed, agree was coded 1 and 2 was disagree.
The questions that were on the front page were not set in a spreadsheet but were
word-processed directly into a MS Word document.

3.4.6 Drawbacks
The question remains why choose this method and how could have it been done
better? This method has not been without obstacles, as have been discussed in this
chapter. If the questionnaires were distributed at a different time then they may have
had a larger response from Cypriots. The questionnaires have also been described as
ambiguous by some local individuals. However, if questions are too specific,
prospective respondents may not be able to answer the questions posed to them,
Turkish or Greek Cypriot. So the question must be understood as well as answerable
by any Cypriot. The first four questions were designed to allow respondents to either
make a concise decision or to elaborate on their answers in an open format (Bryman,
2001). Other questions were more complex and could have been answered for
different reasons, even though the answer itself was a relatively clear numerical
answer. A simple scale can suggest what respondents think but cannot fully explain
very complex situations (Bryman, 2001; Byrne, 2002).
The drawback of using this strategy of questionnaire then was that the respondent was only given a limited scope to answer, as with all quantitative methods (Ruane, 2005; Bryman, 2001). The questions could also have been interpreted by the respondents and, as a consequence, received a mixture of responses, although results suggest otherwise. Quantitative methods create answers that can be catalogued clearly but may also have been too restrictive as respondents may have wished to answer in a more comprehensive way, which questionnaires are unable to provide. The questionnaire’s strength in being specific was also a drawback and must be resolved through an alternative method of data collection (May, 1997). This supports the general approach of using a triangulated strategy (Bryman, 2001). Triangulation was achieved through the use of qualitative data collection through evaluating transcripts of interviews conducted with Greek and Turkish Cypriots, which will be discussed next.

3.5 Interviews

3.5.1 Why Interview

Other methods such as ethnographic participant-observation require lengthy spells in local communities and are more useful for strictly localised case studies and so were judged to be inappropriate. To gauge the opinions of policy makers and important individuals within the wider communities, interviews are more effective.

Research explores a plethora of topics through the use of interviews and has often been considered the most popular qualitative method. Such methods help uncover the participants’ views and how participants frame and structure their responses, through critical analysis of transcripts. In fact, such assumptions remain fundamental to research: the participants’ perspective on the phenomenon should unfold as the participant use it, not as the researcher sees it (Marshall and Rossman, 1999). For Marshall and Rossman (1999), the most important aspect of the interviewers’ approach concerns conveying the attitude that the participant’s views are valuable and useful.

In his *Interpreting Qualitative Data*, Silverman (1993) highlighted the dilemmas facing interview researchers concerned with what to make of their data. Positivists
have a goal the creating repeatable and effective interview techniques. Meanwhile according to Miller and Glassner (1997), radical social constructionists suggest that no knowledge about a reality can be obtained from interview, because this method is an exclusive interaction between the participants in which both create narrative versions of the social world. Like in the previous section on narratives, language shifts meanings but also permits inter-subjectivity and the ability of persons to create and maintain meaning (Miller and Glassner, 1997).

Meanwhile, writing up findings from interview data itself is an analytically active enterprise, according to Holstein and Gubrium (2002). According to them, the active analyst empirically documents the meaning making process rather than adhering to the ideal of letting the data speak for itself. With ample illustration and reference to records, the analyst describes the complex discursive activities through which respondents produce meaning. In other words, Holstein and Gubrium (2002) argue that interviews create new narratives and meanings.

3.5.2 Design
The design of the interviews was semi-structured to allow participants to explain their perceptions of the period before independence. In respect to changing relations and attitudes between communities, the first four questions asked for general thoughts on how such interactions had changed. This research focused only on episodes of violence in 1963-4 and 1974, although intra-communal violence did occur in between these periods. This research concentrates on the episodes of inter-communal violence in 1963-4 and violence that occurred under the aegis of the Turkish intervention of 1974. Questions that followed were of a certain pattern that examined first the 1963-4 and then 1974. Participants would be directed towards the level of institutions and how they perceived institutional attitudes and relations were changed by these past events. Then the levels of inter-personal and the individual were approached and answered separately. It was designed to have a natural progression from the early period through the 1960s and to 1974 and beyond. The weakness of this model was that often respondents centred upon political relations, to the relative detriment of political attitudes.
3.5.2 Recruitment
Before commencing fieldwork, a list of contacts was made from internet details and all were emailed beforehand. All telephone numbers were called once in Cyprus. All prospective interviewees belonged to organisations and groups that appeared to represent the cross-section of Cypriot communities. Interviews concluded with each interviewee being asked if they knew anyone who would be willing to contribute to the research. Details were left and interviewees sent me contact details of other relevant people who they said would be willing to contribute. Contacts were made either separately or through the first respondent and so subsequent interviews were made. This snowballing seemed to work once the first interview was appointed, first required getting contact details and phoning telephone numbers from internet sites and email responses (May, 1997, Silverman, 2002). This took time initially but, once in operation, this method seemed reasonably successful.

The sample through interviews was intended to be balanced between the two main communities with representatives of the community elites, political party officials, Trade Unions and institutional officials. There were more Turkish Cypriot interviewees compared to Greek Cypriots as there appeared more divergence amongst the Turkish Cypriots, which required investigation. Evidence suggests Greek Cypriots have more a homogenous perspective compared to Turkish Cypriots. Later in this chapter, a small profile of each interviewee sets out their perspectives.

3.5.3 Procedure
Once an interview began, interviewees were asked if they could be recorded through a Dictaphone. If they agreed, the Dictaphone was placed in a prominent position equal distance from the researcher and the interviewee (Ruane, 2005). If not or the place of interview did not allow for Dictaphones, then notes of the discussion were taken and written up later that day (Ruane, 2005; May, 1997). A brief explanation was given as to where the researcher was from, what the research was examining and why. Then the interview would begin and the Dictaphone would be started at an appropriate time. Once the interview was finished and the Dictaphone was turned off, they would be asked if: first, it was appropriate for them to be contacted again regarding the research and; second, did they know other suitable contributors likely to be interested in being
involved. It was felt that asking for oral consent at the beginning may not be appropriate and the consent form was considered satisfactory, obtained at the end of each interview.

Bryman (2001) suggests some practical steps before interviews commence, including creating a quiet and private setting as well as getting hold of a good tape recorder and microphone (Bryman, 2001). Bryman also notes that listening is very important - being very attentive to what the interviewees’ contribution. It means that the interviewer should encourage without being too intrusive. In fact, an interviewer must be attuned to the responses of the interviewee, whose body language may indicate that they are “becoming […] anxious about a line of questioning” (Bryman, 2001; 319).

3.5.4 Analysis and Coding

For generating categories and themes, researchers rely on editing and their own immersion in this phase of analysis, according to Marshall and Rossman (1999). For editing and immersion strategies, the categories are generated through prolonged engagement with the data. The process of category generation involves noting patterns evident in the points expressed by participants. Marshall and Rossman quote Patton (1980) who describes the process of inductive analysis where categories emerge from the data. According to Marshall and Rossman, Patton (1980) emphasises analyst-constructed typologies that are created by the researcher, grounded in the data but not necessarily used explicitly by participants. As a result, this process entails uncovering patterns that may well be subject to the “legitimate charge of imposing a world of meaning on the participants for that better reflects the observer's world than the world under study” (Marshall and Rossman, 1999; 154-5).

Analysis must also evaluate the plausibility of the researchers developing understanding and explore them through data. Part of this phase is to evaluate the data for its usefulness and importance (Marshall and Rossman, 1999). I have determined how useful the data is in illuminating the questions explored and whether they are central to the story unfolding about the Cyprus problem. Marshall and Rossman (1999) also argue that researchers ought to seek alternative explanations to the results. Although I have assessed the alternative explanations for the extracts, I have displayed data to provide corroborating evidence for the research’s explanations.
3.5.5 The Interviewees

Miller and Glassner (1997) noted narratives which emerge in interview contexts are situated in social worlds, and that they develop of worlds that exist outside of the interview itself. Miller conducted a study of mostly African American female gang members, with Miller being white and from a different class background. Miller and Glassner (1997) suggest that the existence of social differences between the interviewer and interviewees does not mean that the interviews are void of information about social worlds. In Miller’s case, the divergences was in terms of class and race while, in this case, the divergences is in terms of identity. Miller and Glassner (1997) conclude that sociologists have only stories some of which come from people, the researched and some come from the researcher. What matters is to understand how and where stories are produced, which sorts of stories they are, and how we can put from honest and intelligent use in theorising about social life (Miller and Glassner, 1997). To explain the dynamics of such research, I shall now give short profiles of each interviewee.

The first interviewee was a female employee at the “TRNC” Foreign Ministry who supported the nationalist narrative and gave the researcher a number of literature sources forwarding the Turkish Cypriot perspective. This respondent could be mirrored by a Greek Cypriot respondent who was employed by the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He had previously done research into relations between Cypriot communities and provided a number of interesting and valid points. Both of these respondents forward the separate communities’ nationalist narratives and are employed by their state institutions.

As well as employees of the institutions, I interviewed members of important trade unions and the parties that represented trade unionists. One respondent was a prominent representative of the AKEL party while another interviewee was a leader of the Turkish Cypriot trade union KTOS. Both of these respondents represented the perspective of trade unionists and both made a number of points that suggest communities could live together given the correct circumstances and compromises.
As will be made clear, the role of the European Union has developed in recent decades and two of the interviewees involved were associated with the EU. Both of these respondents had a good personal relationship with each other and came from the two separate communities. On an individual level, they represent the good working relationship that Cypriots claim they could have. However, elements of their extracts suggest that communities should not expect an early resolution to the problem of Cyprus.

As well as those who work for institutions or supranational organisations, there were respondents who have worked on grass-root projects and collaborations. Two of my respondents were involved in such developments, both of which were female and from separate communities. The Greek Cypriot respondent had previously been a politician but has since been primarily involved in building cross-community links. The Turkish Cypriot respondent was involved in evaluating Turkish Cypriot aspirations and came from the same generation as the researcher. Both respondents illustrate grass-root level attempts to bridge the gap between communities that have been developing since 2003.

Other Turkish Cypriot respondents include an established Turkish Cypriot spokesman who was also previously involved in the “TRNC” Foreign Ministry. As a result, this respondent forwarded the nationalist narrative that will be introduced in the next chapter. Another respondent was a leader of a smaller Turkish Cypriot political party connected with trade unionists. This respondent held similar perspectives to the trade union members and emphasise the similarities of Cypriots. Meanwhile, a third Turkish Cypriot respondent was involved with the relations between the EU and the “TRNC”. The two parties have sought to integrate elements of EU procedure in anticipation of future developments, which this individual has been involved in.

The last two interviewees were a leading member of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce and a representative of the British High Commission. The Turkish Cypriot respondent emphasised the harm Greek Cypriots had forced on Turkish Cypriots but also suggested an element of blame lay with his own community’s leadership. The third party representative portrayed the conflict in terms of community conflict rather than in terms of regional interests. These perspectives illustrate the diversion of
opinions; does the conflict rest on international actors or on communities? Many respondents suggest that the fault for conflict rests with international actors when, in fact, it remains more complex.

3.5.6 Follow up
As part of the follow up procedure, each interviewee was emailed with the information sheet to explain more fully what the research was attempting to achieve. This contained appropriate addresses and contact details if the interviewee wanted to contact the researcher or another person with regard to the research. The individual could be contacted again in respect of their contribution and asked if the presentation of their thoughts was correct. Many, having already filled in a consent form, had agreed for their information to be used. However, interviewees had the final say on what information was used, which was emailed to them.

3.5.7 Drawbacks
A problem with this method was that some interviewees elaborated quite widely in response to the first group of questions. This often led them to answer other questions that would have followed later on and so when such questions were posed, they were phrased as a reaffirmation of their previous comments. In other words, the first questions allowed interviewees too much space to elaborate (Miller and Glassner, 1997). However, each interview was kept strictly to the levels of analysis and, although systematic, this strategy may have been detrimental in certain areas that did not fit clearly within these parameters (Marshall and Rossman, 1999). Interviewees were given too much space to elaborate in certain areas while not in other parts of the interview.

3.5.8 Alternative methods
This explanation should also include why other forms of qualitative methodology was not used, including focus groups. When conducting focus groups, an organised bouncing of ideas and viewpoints often requires a controlled atmosphere (Bryman, 2001; Silverman, 2002). This subject area could easily result in disputes between individuals being brought to the surface. However, an attempt at a mini-focus group with two participants did prove an interesting, if not totally satisfying, experiment. Using ethnographic methods such as participant-observation methods were not
suitable for this type of research; although it maybe useful when examining community relations and attitudes in a small environment (Bryman, 2001; Crabtree and Miller, 1992). A case-study would be Pyla where the two opposing communities live and work side-by-side, if not together\(^{10}\). In this research however, participant-observation methods and focus groups appear to be unsuitable.

**3.6 Conclusion**

This chapter has elaborated on the methods used to collect the data that this research utilised. In it, explanations for the method used stressed why each decision was taken and also suggested ways to perhaps improve. It can not be called ideal, but the methodology was deemed suitable for the research objectives. While this research uses empirical data, the analysis was interpretative. There can be no positivist answers to these questions and all research has been based on the perspectives of the researcher and respondents and the interaction between such perspectives.

\(^{10}\) Pyla is a village within the buffer-zone where both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots live. Though similar to how Cyprus was before the inter-communal violence, it demonstrates that the communities live in the same village but do not interact.
DISPUTED PAST OF CYPRUS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will explain the development of nationalist narrative that appears in evidence from Cyprus. These two narratives are built upon elements of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot education system as well as cultural sites, practices and institutions. On the Turkish side, much of the nationalist narrative has been developed through the influence of Turkey and the Turkish Army. However, some memories of Cypriots displayed in this chapter do not all appear to correlate with the nationalist narratives. But first, we must assess narratives in a more specific fashion and how it connects disjointed and often sporadic events into a linear nationalist storyline for individuals and communities to remember. These narratives will also be illustrated along their lengths with divisions drawn at turning points: the 1960 Independence of the Republic of Cyprus, and the 1974 intervention by Turkey.

As was mentioned in a previous chapter on theory, memory is a discursive concept that offers a facility for fresh thinking and a broader appreciation of the production of historical knowledge (Cubitt, 2007). Cubitt (2007) noted the opposing perspectives of authors over memory’s similarity/difference with history, arguing that this illustrates the deep cleavages over how history is thought, and fought over. Through the critiques of Halbwachs and Nora, amongst others, theory has developed in terms of handling ‘memory’ that is not memory that people want, but what has been managed or left by the mechanisms of memory-making. Through these methods, the story is a continuous stream of events, often either in a progress narrative or a decline narrative (Zerebavel, 2004).

The narratives of the communities of Cyprus have been portrayed as Greek unable to remember the 1960s while the Turkish Cypriots could not forget the 1960s (Reddaway, 1986). Both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots perceived Cyprus progressing till 1960, for different reasons. The communities also both viewed the period up to 1974 as a time of division but, again, for different reasons. After 1974, the Turkish and Greek Cypriot narratives suggest a stasis begins, with both communities perceived to have been victimised. Such narratives have been cultivated and often illustrated in the literature already published on Cyprus. What was of
interest with this research was the extent to which these narratives have remained or have been reinterpreted.

I would also like to illustrate in this chapter individuals in the nationalist community elites seeking to utilise such narrative for self-empowerment, as well as financial and social benefits. The length of political careers for certain leaders appears marked in Cyprus, including Clerides and Denktash. Narratives can often be utilised by individuals to assist in sustaining long careers (Reissmann, 2008; Elliott, 2005) as well as providing collective identities and perspectives (Papadakis, 2008; Koresaar et al, 2009; Zerubavel, 2004). Such individuals have also published literature that illuminates their view of the situation, including those of Clerides (1989) and Denktash (1988, 2009). In fact, Denktash’s (2009) writings appear to be central pillars of the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative due to the relatively limited form of public relations and literature forwarding the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative. Recent changing of community leaders to Talat and Christofias signalled a change of leadership beyond those who directly constructed the nationalist narratives over the decades. As will be made clear, such changes in leadership do not necessarily mean an improved chance of success as these individuals may take similar positions to their predecessors due to overarching nationalist pressures. Nor does such positioning cancel the possibility of changing political fortunes, such as the defeat of Talat by Eroglu (UDP) in March 2010. Before examining the Cypriot narratives in the separate segments, I shall assess the means by which the nationalist narratives have been forwarded and received by the communities and their elites.

Throughout this chapter, the events of Cypriot past will be outlined from perspectives of both communities, using direct quotes from respondents. Portions of quotes in bold were particularly relevant to research and will be referred to again. This research is approaching the issue of Cyprus from a political scientist perspective. Respondents also perceived their past has been formed through the elements in the control of mnemonic communities, such as literature, film and other forms of media. It is beyond the remit of this thesis to discuss the historical facts of violent events under study, only the perceptions of Cypriots today to those past events. The respondents’ identities are confidential, although their backgrounds will be referred to when analysing individual contributions, which has already been discussed in the previous
chapter. Those extracts marked ‘T’ were Turkish Cypriot answering while ‘G’ denotes Greek Cypriots. ‘M’ and ‘F’ signify gender while the age groups are also included in the details. These events will be presented in three separate time periods: up till 1960; 1960 to 1974; and 1974 onwards.

4.2 Methods of such developments
There are too many methods for developing narratives to allow for a full catalogue to be made. However, I will highlight the most significant methods in the case of Cyprus. One key coincidence was the retention of two separate education systems (Papadakis, 2008). This has remained a tradition-based issue as both communities would like to retain separate systems, as was the case under the Ottoman and British periods. As a result, both systems have developed with nationalistic rhetoric to reinforce the community leadership’s differentiation between communities:

Yeah, well the books always [focus] about EOKA and what they did to Turkish community. […] It was not like ‘people thought it was a good idea to kill Turkish Cypriots’ but that ‘all Greek Cypriots [were bad,] they tried to kill us and if given [the] chance, they may try again’ and ‘thank God the Turkish army was there to save us and we live happily ever after’. This is what we were being fed at the time in the history books. This gives you the image of the ‘other’, somebody who is not human because you're [impression] is that nobody […] would do these things. They wouldn't torture, they wouldn't kill and that [was…] building [the] impression that Turkish Cypriots have. If you don't [meet Greek Cypriots] to interact with then there is nothing to check whether [the rhetoric] is correct. (T, F, 20s)

As this respondent above put it, the closure of the buffer zone from 1974 to 2003 reinforced the nationalist narratives of which the Cypriots had nothing to compare rhetoric with. Cypriots may believe such rhetoric at a certain level of saturation and although they may question it, Cypriots may choose not to contradict their community’s accepted perspective. If individuals did not support the narrative, they may be portrayed as traitors, collaborators or sympathisers of the ‘other’. Papadakis (2008) made a note that Cypriot identities are a choice but such choices have responsibilities and obligations, pointed out by Booth (2006) and Poole (2008).

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11 One prime example was one Turkish Cypriot respondent had been singled out in the nationalist Volkan paper as sympathetic to the Greek Cypriot government. It cannot be under-estimated the possible danger that respondent faced as a result.
In both communities, moderates and extremists seek to control the public debate; although within the Turkish Cypriot community, no public debate occurred over the 1974 intervention by Turkey. The same moderate respondent suggests that the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative remains weaker than the Greek Cypriot, as a result of less established mnemonic institutions:

We don't talk about what happened before. We don't talk about the Helsinki summit when it was agreed [for] Cypriot membership of the EU. We don't talk about negotiations that occurred before and [as a result] all of a sudden we become EU members. We don't talk about how corrupt our system is. We don't talk about how the North is like. But we only talk about how ‘you told us that we would become an EU state, we said yes they said no, why are we not members of the EU?’ (T, F, 20s)

Both communities have a tendency to portray themselves as victims of the situation. The Greek Cypriots perceived the division of Cyprus as the victimisation of their community by Turkey in 1974 (PIO, 2010). Meanwhile, Turkish Cypriots perceived their victimhood as a result of their isolation since 1963 (Denktash and Moran, 2009). This perceived victimisation was clearly in evidence in the extract below:

Since 1974, there [was] a deep hostility [emanating] more from [the Greek Cypriot] community than us [and yet we] have always [been] people ready to reconcile [...]. Even now that the [Cypriot] government [is] attempting to create a law forbidding chauvinistic and racist slogans in the National Guard and getting rid of slogans like ‘the only good Turk is a dead Turk’. [But] I have got leaflets showing how to identify a Turkish soldier [...and] so in a way these racist slogans and attitudes among the [Greek Cypriot] community remain. (T, M, over 50)

The strength of jingoism on both sides of the community divide was partly a result of separate education systems and the continued influence of the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church on Greek Cypriot society. As the Cypriot National Guard is a conscripted force, it also plays a role in forwarding the established nationalist narrative. Most Greek Cypriot men serve in the Guard and are indoctrinated, as with any armed force, with the institutions perspective of Cyprus. However since 2003, Cypriots have had the ability to evaluate the rhetoric by meeting people from the other community, if they wished. The Church’s influence explains the development of Greek nationalism on Cyprus and the institution has played a key role in the nationalist vision of enosis (Reddaway, 1986). The Greek Cypriot elite have claimed enosis was no-longer their objective but the Orthodox Church restates its vision of
enosis (Denktash and Moran, 2009). As with other religions, the Cypriot Orthodox Church has been suffering from growing forces of secularism, though the Church remains relatively strong (Yennaris, 2003). This retention of position has been noted in the Turkish Cypriot community, including Denktash himself who wrote to Moran:

[...] you view the Greek Cypriots, in a new [and for them] unwanted but imposed partnership [...] will pose no threat or danger for Turkish Cypriots is impossible to accept in the light of our past experiences and the present setup: with the same Church and schools [...]. And this has nothing to do with good or bad nationalism. This is the reality as far as we are concerned. (Denktash and Moran, 2009; 52)

Whether Greek or Turkish, the nationalist narratives remain strong on Cyprus and are key barriers to reconciliation between communities. Any decline in nationalism will take decades to occur and should not hold back the attempts to bring about the grounding for a resolution to the conflict. Instead of seeking to remove the nationalist narratives, we ought to anticipate a reinterpretation of the nationalist narratives that may bring the communities closer together, which may be more achievable. From a nationalist standpoint, this Turkish Cypriot illustrates the ability of such people to perceive nationalism to be the central problem that needs to be dealt with:

The Cyprus problem was created not by people living together or by people not living together and not knowing each other. That is not the issue. The issue is ideology. It is [...] aggressive nationalism and it is a political issue, a political ideology, that has caused this problem and that has to be dealt with. (T, M, over 50)

Having explained the method, an examination of the context of the Cyprus conflict is needed and specifically the disputed elements of the past. The dispute is not just about events in 1974 but involves what happened previously before British rule, British rule itself and the period of independence. These two communities have very different perspectives on events in Cyprus’ past and which are vital to understanding the problems of relations and attitudes. In terms of the pre-existing nationalist narratives, these periods illustrate progress, division and stasis for both communities, though for different reasons. What will be made clear with this chapter is that not all extracts fit the nationalist narrative pattern and suggests alternative memories exist, both within the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.
4.3 Up to 1960 - progress

4.3.1 Nationalism

Cyprus’ past has been peppered with invasion and external actors’ use of the island as a pawn in their regional interests (Bose, 2007; Hitchens 1997). In other words, the island’s past can have an effect on attitudes amongst Cypriots as some may see the existence of another community as a result of political interests rather than having similar rights. Ottoman rule resulted in the Muslim Cypriot identity developing onto the island, alongside a majority Orthodox Christian population. With British rule as a result of a pact to support the Ottoman Empire against expansionist Russia, Orthodox Christian Cypriots saw an opportunity to expand their rights. This can be exemplified by the development of the enosis movement within the “Greek” Cypriot community (Bose, 2007; Reddaway, 1986). With the introduction of mainland Greeks to the island, the majority of Greek Cypriots came to believe the natural position of Cyprus was within a larger Greece, termed the ‘Megali Idea’ (Cranshaw, 1978; Bose, 2007). This perspective has led many Greek Cypriots to assume that the island is naturally Greek. For them, any presence of “Turkish” Cypriots as a result of the Ottoman period has not dilute the “Greek” character of Cyprus. This remains a template of how Greek Cypriots view Cyprus (Coufoudakis, 2006). At the time, these attitudes were encouraged by the British policy of benign governance, according to Reddaway (1986). However, Greek Cypriots believed that enosis with Greece was not just a feasible aim but an imminent objective (Reddaway, 1986):

The nationalism started during the years of [the 1920s,] especially amongst the Greek Cypriot’s community because of the influence of the Greek Orthodox Church. And [in] 1931, they rebelled against the British colonial administrators. (T, M, above 50)

The Greek Cypriots at the time believed the objective of enosis was the only possible outcome (Bryant, 2002) and any other would be unthinkable. Greek Cypriots did not take into account views and wishes of the Turkish Cypriots. The idea of enosis was exclusionary, not inclusive of Turkish Cypriots. Amongst many Greek Cypriots, there was a common perception that, for centuries, the two communities have lived together in peace and harmony (Hitchens, 1999), as this Greek Cypriot believes:

Things haven’t changed. Through centuries of peaceful coexistence, a common culture [developed]. A common Cypriot culture, I would say […] (G, M, over 50)
The two communities did live together; they co-existed before nationalism took hold (Mirbagheri, 1997). Though, this thinking is based on the two communities living without violence, it was not harmonious nor without conflict (Joseph, 1997). It could be argued that a common culture existed but which involved neighbourly interaction and tolerance (Joseph, 1997). It was not a common Cypriot identity that led to the two communities living together and fostering peace and harmony but a toleration of the others’ presence. This tolerance was then eaten away by developments in exclusionary terminology and the rise of the enosist and the taksim movements. This terminology was championed by the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus which had a significant, though not overwhelming, influence on Greek Cypriot society:

Because, 'till the [19]50s […] we [were] the [Muslim and the Greek Cypriots were] the Orthodox […] communities. But at the beginning of the century, [Orthodox Cypriots say], “No, we are the Greeks.” (T, M, 40s)

First [communities identified by] religion […] and then it was after [this period] they were turning to national [identities]. The [Greek] Orthodox [Christians] became Greek Cypriots and the Muslims became Turkish Cypriots. And it is very important to research a bit [regarding] terminology; the national terminology and by whom the national terminology was inserted in Cyprus. (G, M, 20s)

And it is very important [to note] that in the Greek Cypriot community, the Church had a very important role [… in the evolution of nationalisms…]. (G, M, 20s)

This Greek Cypriot suggests the original identities of Cypriots were based on religious difference and the Greek Cypriot Church had a defining influence on this and the evolution of nationalist identity (Coufoudakis, 2006). The response from the Turkish Cypriot above also takes this perspective, noting that it was the Christian Cypriots who declared their community to be Greeks. The Greek Cypriot recognised the religious cleavage before the nationalist discourse was superimposed (Mirbagheri, 1997) and highlights the distinctions between the communities which existed before the British period of rule from 1878 (Reddaway, 1986).

As a result of this combination of religious and nationalist identity, Greek Cypriots appear to have used literature to suggest the national struggle was always one of the military and religious leaders in league (Cranshaw, 1978; Reddaway, 1986). This
ignores the division between leaders such as Grivas and Makarios as well as the political in-fighting that took place through the period before and after 1960 (Coufoudakis, 2006). The leaflet, *The Liberation Struggle 1955-59*, stated under a picture of Grivas and Makarios:

Under the leadership of Ethnarch Makarios and (George Givas) Dhigenis, the Greeks of Cyprus wrote heroic pages in the history of Hellenism (PIO, 2007).

In fact, this literature suggests that Greek Cypriots had been seeking to join a greater Greece through *enosis* for decades and that Cyprus had always been an integral part of the Hellenic world (Coufoudakis, 2006; Hitchens, 1997). For this literature, Cyprus was a part of the Hellenic world that had been left outside the boundaries of the Greek state and therefore the desire of Greek Cypriots to return to the 'national homeland was entirely natural' (PIO, 2010). The entirely natural desire is often in evidence of nationalist movements that seek to portray themselves as rational actors answering the wishes of the people (Kaufmann, 2001). Though, it is surprising that the literature remains so openly nationalistic, given the general perception of a recent decline in nationalism (Green and Collins, 2003). The unresolved situation on Cyprus may allow for nationalism to remain a central characteristic of Cypriot politics.

Of course, there remains dispute as to whether the two nationalisms developed simultaneously or whether Turkish Cypriot *taksim* movement was a response to *enosis* (Coufoudakis, 2006; Yennaris, 2003). This respondent, coming from a nationalist perspective and holding a position within the Foreign Ministry, supports the argument that nationalisms were developed at the same time and inserted into Cyprus. He also suggests Turkish Cypriots developed their own nationalism by different dynamics:

[…] it didn’t seem to me that there was [a] relationship of response, of counter-nationality. It seems that the two nationalities in Cyprus evolved at the same time. (G, M, 20s)

[Greeks] came to Cyprus because of political problems; they actually migrated from Greece to Cyprus. And they started spreading their ideas of national values […] More like a wider Greek enlightenment. […] On the other hand the Turkish Cypriot political goals seem to have started from [with] in the Turkish Cypriot community. (G, M, 20s)
Well, if you go further back, but particularly 1955, things started changing relations [...] Greeks started agitating for enosis. Under Ottoman law, you could say that relations were friendly, sure. But the two communities remained in their separate quarters and did not attempt to unite [...]. Greek Cypriots [first] demand[ed] enosis [...] in 1878, relations began to sour and [...] the enosis movement took a different, violent turn, in 1955. (T, M, over 50)

Similar to Coufoudakis (2006) and Yennaris (2003), the above Greek Cypriot places emphasis on the Turkish policy and its consequences for Turkish Cypriot objectives. Elements of the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative may contend that the two nationalisms developed at the same time but through different dynamics. Turkish Cypriot nationalists may well argue that their nationalism was developed in response to calls for enosis (Gazioglu, 1999; Gazioglu and Moran, 2000). Through their narrative, Greek Cypriots may believe Turkey assisted and imposed nationalism on Turkish Cypriots while the Greek Cypriots awoke to theirs (Coufoudakis, 2006). However, results from interviews suggest that Greek Cypriots may not believe this and view Turkish Cypriot nationalism to have developed within their community, for varying reasons. Instead of being foisted upon them, Turkish Cypriots accepted the Turkish identity and more recent literature suggests an instrumental process of choosing identities (Papadakis, 2008). I would suggest that such a choice was a response to the situational and environmental cues, such as language or religion. These extracts suggest Turkish Cypriot nationalism developed alongside the Greek Cypriot nationalism, though for different reasons and partly in response.

So, the communities’ relations were damaged by the introduction and dissemination of enosis and taksim propaganda. The above Turkish Cypriot response provides evidence that their community saw themselves as primarily friendly but separate from the majority Greek population. This Turkish Cypriot response supports the argument that the Turkish identity was an evolution in response to the threat of the enosis movement on Cyprus and brought about worsening relations (Gazioglu and Moran, 2000). Key to the development of the enosis movement was the strength of the Greek Orthodox Church in Greek Cypriot society, which resulted from the Ottoman policy of allowing religious communities their own autonomy under the suzerainty of the Sultan. Within this, they were also allowed their own education systems (Papadakis, 2008). The Greek Orthodox Church was allowed to influence the education of Greek
Cypriots and has led to the history books of their community to be circumscribed. This developed into nationalist fervour borne out by the 1950s insurgency as well as later episodes of violence. It has been argued that this movement ignored the interests of the Turkish Cypriots and assumed UK authorities were seeking ways to bring about enosis (Cranshaw, 1978). When the UK did not offer an immediate plebiscite and, having refused all other offers of negotiation or gradual power-sharing, the Greek Cypriots began an insurgency campaign (Reddaway, 1986). This period has often been portrayed as a reluctant turn toward violence and often those who were involved are often celebrated and referred to with the prefix ‘hero’¹². This Greek Cypriot also notes that their community had seen the Turkish Cypriots as a threat, having developed their own exclusionary ethnic identity:

[…] it was perceived that the Turkish Cypriots were a threat. We [were] talking already about two different national communities. (G, M, 20s)

The Turkish Cypriots may have been seen as a threat due to links with Turkey but could not have offered resistance without Turkey’s help. Turkish Cypriots may argue that they posed no threat until enosis became a political objective of the Greek Cypriots. Yet, the Greek Cypriots believed Turkey had always sought to control Cyprus after having given it to the UK (Yennaris, 2003). The literature from the Press and Information Office or displays in the Museum of National Struggle provides little, if any, coverage of Turkish Cypriots. Like much of the Greek Cypriot government sources, Turkish Cypriot literature that illustrates their community narrative sought to highlight the differences of the Cypriot communities.

The above quote adds weight to the argument that there are two nationalist-orientated communities in Cyprus. It remains disputed to what extent Cypriots conflicted before the independence of Cyprus in 1960. It must also be emphasised that enosis was the objective of the insurgency campaign at the time (PIO, 2007). The insurgency was itself not successful and ended before either enosis or independence could be achieved (Cranshaw, 1978; Reddaway, 1986). In fact, the rhetoric of Greek Cypriots now suggests they never intended enosis but had always sought independence for the Greek Cypriots, under the all-encompassing term ‘self-determination’ (PIO, 2007).

¹² This is evident within secondary sources and literature, within the Museum of National Struggle and statues in evidence across Nicosia.
This alteration of the Greek Cypriot leadership objectives, referred to by a number of authors including Reddaway (1986), was as a result of achieving independence but not enosis. As situations change, the memory of how communities get to where they are has often been reinterpreted, as was discussed in Chapter 2.

4.3.2 Insurgency
EOKA was developed with the support of Archbishop Makarios and headed by Greek Colonel George Grivas. The campaign developed to become more professional and involved bombings, assassinations, and banditry (Cranshaw, 1978). These attacks were mostly directed at institutions that represented British rule but also aimed at those who worked alongside the British and perceived collaborators (Reddaway, 1986, Yennaris, 2003). This meant that the insurgents were targeting British servicemen, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot civilians. With a mixture of intimidation and fear, many Greek Cypriots refused to work for the British and left the police or administrative posts (Panteli, 1990). Having taken up these posts, the Turkish Cypriots were also targeted and suffered from attacks by EOKA. This is disputed as both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots with neo-communist perspective argue the British had intentionally recruited Turkish Cypriots to divide the two communities (Coufoudakis, 2006). Given these elements, the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative has considered community differences a result of British use of the Turkish Cypriot community rather than due to actual community differences.

So, in line with the existing Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative, many Greek Cypriots argue that the British and the Turkish Cypriots were in alliance against their community. The Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative may well argue that Turkish Cypriots created TMT as a result of Greek Cypriot attacks and portrayed as a community defence organisation, receiving help from Turkey (Denktash, 1988). As well as some Turkish Cypriots, the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative may claim Turkey developed TMT for its own interest (Yennaris, 2003). The extract below from a Turkish Cypriot argues that TMT was a response to EOKA violence against British institutions:

[The] Turkish Cypriot aim was to [oppose] the EOKA attacks and, [if] necessary, [to divide the island]. With the establishment of [the]
underground organisation of Greek Cypriots, EOKA [in 1955], violations were started [...] basically against the British colony. (T, M, over 50)

[In the] 1950’s, violence was clearly [directed at] the British forces but there was an element of this conflict building up between the two communities. (Third party, M)

Turkish Cypriots [...] military defence organisation, which [operated] illegally [on] the Island, [included] teachers. **Teachers were also the [soldiers] in villages.** (T, M, over 50)

These responses suggest the insurgency was against the British, while the Turkish Cypriots sought to respond, having felt threatened. The first extract fits within the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative pattern while the third forwards a neo-communist perspective, referring to the role teachers played in the TMT. The second extract was a third party perspective and illustrates the increasing division on the island, fitting the collective narrative of progress up till violence. Yet, the time at which the storyline turned to one of division is disputed. The Greek Cypriots may claim it was the 1959 Zurich-London agreements (PIO, 2007) while the Turkish Cypriots could argue it was the turn to violence in 1955 (TRNC, 1997). Although, others from a Turkish Cypriot perspective argue that their community elites’ intention was to retain the status quo but was forced to seek taksim in response to enosis (Denktash and Moran, 2009; Gazioglu, 1999). These extracts illustrate the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative’s differentiation of themselves and Greek Cypriots, creating division that both communities portray in the period 1963 to 1974. However, the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative emphasises that any differences with Turkish Cypriots were a result of exogenous influences and political manipulation by the Turkish Cypriot political elite (PIO, 2007; Coufoudakis, 2006).

Authority figures within small environments play an important role, as was established in the extract above in the case of teachers. Many teachers from Greek Cypriot Gymnasiums and Turkish Cypriot schools were involved in the nationalist movements. In the PIO leaflet (2007), schoolchildren were referred to directly regarding the ‘EOKA struggle’. Many schoolchildren were used for the political ends of the separate communities’ elites:

The entire Greek world bows its head to them and salutes their heroic sacrifice, for they were examples of honour and heroism, examples of courage and endurance. In times of crisis for the nation the struggle of the
Greeks of Cyprus, the struggle of EOKA opened the way for endurance, determination, national dignity and honour. This was the message sent out by the suffering Cypriots to Greeks all over the world. (PIO, 2007)

There had been negotiable offers before the turn to insurgency and the possibility of enosis was always there, though never offered as immediate (Reddaway, 1986). As these two next extracts demonstrate, the two nationalist narrative patterns clearly suggested that the other community was involved in the violence:

So with the outbreak of [violence] the first things to be a [targeted] were institutions. I mean it’s the sequence of events that may have created [a tension], not willingly, even if there was no will to help the Turkish Cypriot community [either…]. So you create tension, […] and there [was] violence […]. On the other hand in the Turkish Cypriot community another organisation was created, TMT. And this organisation was armed and they started a [to attack] Greek Cypriots […]. And they were targeting both civilian [communities]. They were also targeting civilians where Turkish Cypriots were in favour of normal relations or friendship. (G, M, 20s)

[…] one of the major factors [in creating] troubles in 1963 is the establishment of the Greek Cypriot underground EOKA. Because [EOKA] was established in 1955, […] naturally Turkish Cypriots had to establish an underground organisation. (T, M, over 50)

Turkish [Cypriots] would say in 1950’s you had [the EOKA] campaign. The Greek Cypriot complaint would be that the UK [was] responsible around that time for [a] ‘divide and rule’ [policy which caused] the future problems between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. [Regarding the police,] it was difficult to recruit Greek Cypriots into the police at the time [and resulted in] an emphasis on recruiting Turkish Cypriots. [This] caused the tensions in that the Turkish Cypriots were in the Police, the Greek were in EOKA and […] would then cause problems later […]. But that is the perception on the Island, particularly among the Greek Cypriot community. (Third party, M)

The third extract points out that the tension resulted from the turn to violence by the Greek Cypriot nationalists and Turkish Cypriot employment within the institutions (Panteli, 1990; Reddaway, 1986). Although coming from a British viewpoint and so possibly have a biased view, it would be logical to believe the result of violence was damage to relations and attitudes.

As these Cypriot respondents noted, the two nationalist militias were involved in conflict amongst themselves between 1958 and 1959, building an environment of
insecurity (Peluso and Watts, 2001). However, for the Greek Cypriot narrative, the EOKA campaign was part of their national struggle and is portrayed only in this context:

The people of Cyprus won their independence after hard and long struggles against colonial rule, which had stubbornly denied granting the Cypriots the right of self determination. During the period from 1955 to 1959 the anticolonial struggle took the form of an armed struggle, under the guidance of the EOKA organization (PIO, 2007)

Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, on the other hand, prompted by the British, advocated partition of the island with a Turkish Cypriot sector uniting with Turkey. [UK] enlisted Turkish Cypriots on its side against the Greek Cypriot liberation movement, thereby planting the seeds of inter-communal discord and polarization between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, a development that was to prove detrimental to their cooperation upon independence. (PIO, 2007)

4.3.3 A Turkish Response

[…] the Greek Cypriots starting being the mainstream or main ethnic group living on the Island. So when the British decided to leave the Island it was not a welcome situation for [the] British […]. (T, M, over 50)

Actually we have to look at the political aspects, […] partition of [Cyprus was] planned during the years of [the 19]50s by the British and Americans […]. (T, M, over 50)

These Turkish Cypriot responses suggest they suspect the UK, in conjunction with the US, of having sought to divide the communities on the island in an attempt to retain bases on Cyprus (O’Malley and Craig, 2001). According to Reddaway (1986), there is no convincing evidence that the UK and the US sought to create disturbances. However, these responses suggest there remains a perception amongst Cypriots that the British had an interest in staying on Cyprus (Joseph, 1997, Borowiec, 1983). But the nationalist narratives of both communities trumpet the belief that the exogenous actors were involved in supporting conflict, especially the Greek Cypriot. Although the nationalist narratives may correlate on certain elements of the past, the perspectives of these communities appear to remain at odds to a greater extent. Some Turkish Cypriots have also voiced their concern over Turkish involvement specifically, especially this Turkish Cypriot activist below:
There was an organisation, EOKA, which was formed in 1955, to get rid of the Brits if you like. […] another organisation, TMT, was formed as a response from the Turkish to EOKA […]. But what was actually happening was that [Turkish Cypriots] were being fed with more nationalism. This was from Turkey, [TMT] were formed by Turkey, by [Turkish] generals being sent over to make the Turkish Cypriots more Moslem, more religious and more Turkish […]. Turkey was trying to ‘Turkify’ the Turkish Cypriots and this started to [create] problems in the [community] relations. (T, F, 20s)

So when the Greek Cypriots started an uprising against the British rule, [the UK] used the Turkish Cypriot community against [the Greek Cypriots] and that in turn brought the two communities clashing against each other. [The] British enrolled many [Turkish Cypriots in the] auxiliary police [and] the police force […]. That means that the members of the two communities started being enemies and fighting each other […]. (T, M, over 50)

Although the first Turkish Cypriot was more concerned about the role of Turkey, other Turkish Cypriot respondents worried about the motives and actions of Greek Cypriots and Greece, in line with the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative. This first Turkish Cypriot suspects Turkey of wishing to ‘Turkify’ the Turkish Cypriot community, which is not voiced by other Turkish Cypriots (Yennaris, 2003). We are not examining the role of exogenous actors in this research, although, we are assessing the appearance of exogenous actors within the Greek and Turkish Cypriot narratives. Primarily, Turkish Cypriots worry about Greece and Greek Cypriots refer to the role of Turkey. As is noted in the second extract below:

And there is a fact that the majority of policemen under the British rule were Turkish Cypriots […]. The British did not insist very much on having only Turkish Cypriots but after the [19]30s the Greek Cypriots were not easily [recruited]. (G, M, 20s)

[…] Greek Cypriots […] started wanting to join [Greece] in 1931 if I am not mistaken, but it didn’t come to much. I mean the [armed] struggle started in 1955 and I think […] that at that point, the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey decided that they didn’t want Cyprus to be a Greek Island. So there was a counter movement developed of a sort […];TMT. And that’s when the British tended to use Turkish Cypriot Policemen, probably because they couldn’t [easily] recruit Greek Cypriots. (T, M, over 50)

While elements insist that the external interests were involved in fermenting conflict, other extracts suggest the opposite. The communities may have positioned themselves to collide, with Turkish Cypriots replacing the Greek Cypriot in administrational posts
Although it may appear that the communities were positioned to conflict, they may not have thought that at the time but such beliefs result from more recent interpretations of events (Misztal, 2003).

Representing the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative, Gazioglu (1999) noted that partition was the only way for peace to be re-established, supposedly as a result of the insurgency by the Greek Cypriots and guaranteed by the influence of Turkey:

The Turkish delegation emphasised the gravity of the situation regarding the Cyprus problem and warned about the likely occurrence of further strife […]. The Turkish government is convinced that peace and tranquillity can return to the island only if partition is put into effect and that the idea of partition and the idea of partnership put forward by the British government are not incompatible. (Gazioglu, 1999; 30-1)

While, according to this UK Foreign Office report (Gazioglu, 1999), the idea of partition did not require one physical boundary but could exist through a patchwork of administrative areas. This may seem reasonable from the perspective of Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative but for the Greek Cypriot narrative, this would be evidence that exogenous actors had always intended partition as a way to resolve the situation to their benefit:

Zorlu said that his idea of reconciling the British plan with partition was genuine and practical. His conception of partition was not to draw a line across the island and save for one side should be Turkish and the other Greek, but rather to group the Turkish urban and rural communities into Cantons with their separate administration. (Gazioglu, 1999; 30-1)

4.3.4 Community relations

The relations between communities were damaged by conflicting aims and objectives which resulted in violence between 1955 and 1959, which further harming interactions. According to the nationalist narrative of the Greek Cypriots, the communities had lived in peace previously. For the nationalist narrative of the Turkish Cypriots, communities had never been close and relations had also been fraught, but not overtly violent. In other words, there had always been two separate communities that have never unified; their religion and language kept them separate and developed their identities (Bose, 2007; Panteli, 1990). Often Cypriots lived within
segregated sections of mixed villages, though with notable exceptions. The relationship between individual Cypriots were also unequal on economic terms (Reddaway, 1986; Coufoudakis, 2006). Turkish Cypriots were often employed by Greek Cypriots but rarely the other way around. While Greek Cypriots were involved in commerce, Turkish Cypriots were often only employed in administrative roles:

If you [look at the] social history in Cyprus, [...] up until 1964 and even after 1974, you will see that the Turkish Cypriot community had more limited means than the Greek Cypriots. The reason behind that is not that they were [fewer], the Turkish Cypriots were not less educated or [...] had no land; the biggest problem was that traditionally up until [and after] 1878, with the British agreement,[...] the vast majority of Turkish Cypriots were employed by the state [...]. (G, M, 20s)

[...] the Turkish Cypriots in the eighteenth century; they had not had the opportunity to be involved in the banking sector [...]. They had not had the opportunity to [make] contact with Venice, to have contact with the big trade centres of that period [...]. Job opportunities [for some Turkish Cypriots were] not just to be as employees but [they made] contacts, [made] partnerships. Of course, they started talking [and] learning [through] being able to speak Greek [...] because they had to [...]. (G, M, 20s)

These responses appear to be consistent with the Greek Cypriot narrative that Turkish Cypriots have not had the opportunities that their community had. With the first response, the fault of this difference appears to be set on the former colonial rulers. The second response appears to highlight the advantages that Greek Cypriots had and which were accessible to only a few Greek-speaking Turkish Cypriots. While some on both sides of the divide argue that communities relations existed that were warm and hospitable before the events of the 1950s (Coufoudakis, 2006), others dispute whether tolerance equates to warmth (Denktash 1988). Though economically and numerically unequal, the communities saw the other as separate within Cyprus. The communities differed on what kind of relationship existed between such communities. The Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative did not see these separate identities to be equal in terms of their right to self-determination and expected to enforce their self-determination over the whole of Cyprus (PIO, 2010). Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative argued that the communities should be seen as equal and treated as such (Denktash and Moran, 2009). The nationalist narratives ensured communities perspectives centred on their separate communities with different/equal rights, as will be illustrated with the following extract. Developing from previously Orthodox
Christian and Muslim identities, nationalism and its rhetoric created a divisive environment. The Greek Cypriots saw themselves as a ‘national’ group (PIO, 2007) while viewing the Turkish Cypriots as a minority, as this Greek Cypriot puts it:

And the Turkish Cypriots were always perceived as a minority [...]. They were less than 20% of the population. They were [seen as a minority and] not only by Greek Cypriots. Again I’m not talking as a Greek Cypriot; I’m [saying it was a] internationally [held] perception. A minority which of course should have its own rights but should not have a say in the […] political future of the island. That was the general perception. That was what was deemed to be sensible and logical. (G, M, 20s)

Though not in numerical terms, Turkish Cypriots reason that they are partners based on the constitution of 1960 (Denktash, 1988; Moran, 1998). The above Greek Cypriot argues that the Greek Cypriot perspective was supported internationally and supported by UN Resolution 186. Constituting roughly twenty percent of the population and viewed as ethnically different, Turkish Cypriots wanted their own separate self-determination. Such an objective was viewed by Greek Cypriots as exogenous actors playing the two communities against each other rather than a political objective of the Turkish Cypriots (Hitchens, 1997; Yennaris, 2003). The evidence suggests this lack of agreement over the relations between the communities remains central within the ongoing conflict. The lack of agreement led to violence and the Zurich-London Agreement between Greece and Turkey (Reddaway, 1986; Joseph, 1997). As will be made clear, these complex arrangements were not the basis for reconciling the communities. This agreement did not end the dispute over rights and exacerbated the conflict between communities. Both communities appear divided over the constitution and argue that it had been imposed upon them by exogenous actors. What is clear from secondary sources is that the two communities accepted the constitution, at the time (Bose, 2007).

Fitting the Turkish Cypriot narrative, Gazioglu and Moran (2000) refer to the following extract from My Deposition by Clerides (1986) to inform readers of the ‘mentality’ behind Greek Cypriot actions:

*It was clear from the conversation I had with him (Makarios) that his priorities were: reduction of the excessive rights granted to the minority and the abolition of the equal status of the two communities, which was expressed by the distribution of equal executive power to present and the vice president, and the abolition of the Greek annual chamber and the

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creation of a ministry of education, thus creating the image that the education of the state was Greek, and that the minority, by way of protection and in accordance with international accepted principles, enjoys autonomy on education, personal status, culture and other related subjects.

*as far as the Greek Cypriots are concerned, there is no doubt that, in the early days of the Republic, they had strong feelings against the agreements and found they resented their existence, because the bar the way for self-determination – *enosis* [...]. The Greek Cypriots were ready and willing to struggle for their abolition. (Gazioglu and Moran, 2000: 3)

Moreover, under the title “Turkish Initiative and Goodwill Gestures”, Gazioglu (1999) noted that Averoff, the Greek Foreign Minister, admitted that Greek involvement in talks about guaranteed independence was for purely tactical reasons and suggests Turkey contributed to the establishment of an independent state in Cyprus (Gazioglu, 1999).

These literatures that have been published within the South and the North of Cyprus display different focuses on the same events for the purpose of reinforcing narratives. While the Greek Cypriot literature, which has often been published by the Press and Information Office, views the problem as one between Cyprus and Turkey while Turkish Cypriot literature views it a dispute between Greece and Turkey. This difference in viewing the past conflict also contributes to why it remains unresolved. This also suggests there are limited sources that provide a domestic perspective to the conflict, especially from the recently prominent pro-solution perspective within the Turkish Cypriot community (Loizides, 2007).

**4.4 1960–74 – division**

**4.4.1 Constitution**

From the constitution of 1960 to 1974, Cypriot narratives diverge dramatically and indicate a period of division. Communities agree that cooperation under the 1960 constitution was inflexible. However, Greek Cypriots considered the constitution unworkable and as only a stepping stone towards *enosis*:

And then we have [...] independence. And then once more conflict started from [19]’63. There were problems. It [was] not [a] general conflict. People still were living together until that period. After those incidents, of course, you know that [Turkish Cypriots] was dropped from the government […] after the Independence a number of Greek Cypriots didn’t believe in the new independent state [...]. We are talking about the [elite and their] objective, the idea of union with Greece. (G, M, over 50)
The arrangements that were set out in the 1960 constitution were cumbersome, as with any consociational system that seeks to safeguard rights of an ethnic minority. It can be argued that the Greek Cypriots were unwilling to work within that framework but the Turkish Cypriots appeared not to cooperate:

[The 1960 Republic] was of course not very friendly between the two communities and it lasted only three years. [...] Then [the Republic] broke up. Why? Because the Greek Cypriots, they demanded something [...] more [as the] stronger political community, more rights over the Turkish Cypriot community. (T, M, over 50)

There was no cooperation between communities before 1963. The Republic of Cyprus was established in partnership between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots but one side told the other that they would get more shares [...]. So, you see, during the first years of the republic, there was no relationship between the parties. (T, M, 40s)

These extracts suggest the two communities differed on whether to work with the systems set in place; Greek Cypriots were unwilling (Denktash, 1988, Moran, 1997; Denktash and Moran, 2009) while the Turkish Cypriot elite were insistent (PIO, 2010). From independence, Greek Cypriots sought ways to remove restrictions set out by the Constitution and develop a more unitary system. However, these actions set the two Cypriot communities at loggerheads: constitutionally, politically and socially. The nationalist narratives portray this period as one of unworkable deadlock, though the dispute is why it was so (PIO, 2010, TRNC 1997). In reality, some responses from the younger generation of Turkish Cypriots suggest this period did not last longer because of the inflexibility of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Although, the above responses demonstrate the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative retains influence within their community. Denktash (2009) remains an element that forwards the nationalist narrative, here referring to the consequences of the 1960 constitution:

“political equality” was worked out in the 1960 arrangement and it did not work. The men's interpretation of “political equality” has allowed Greek Cypriots to get away with the title of “the legitimate government of Cyprus”. So, there is no need to devise artificial meanings to “political equality”. Two separate states will put an end to this argument (Denktash and Moran, 2009, 28).

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13 Constitutional reform is a large area of study. The con-sociational model, the basis of the 1960 constitution, is the system in place in divided societies such as Bosnia.
According to Gazioglu and Moran (2000), the Treaty of Guarantee was signed by three guarantor powers, Archbishop Makarios and by Dr Kucuk and prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either enosis or partition. This was also incorporated into the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus in article 185. However, Gazioglu and Moran (2000) list quotes of Makarios and others stating their continued aim of enosis:

[…] For the first time in eight centuries, the government of Cyprus past into Greek hands (Gazioglu and Moran, 2000; 5).

Makarios was not the only Greek Cypriot seeking to promote enosis in this period, according to literature that forwards the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative. The House of Representative made a declaration to work towards enosis, according to Gazioglu and Moran (2000) who seek to show that the Greek Cypriots could not be trusted in this period:

Well then, how could anyone reconcile and justify the aforesaid enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece) resolution of the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives, one of the main treaties which provides for the establishment of the Cyprus public openly declared prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly union with any other state? (Gazioglu and Moran, 2000; 10-11).

4.4.2 Stalemate, Violence and Enclavement
These unwieldy arrangements set out in the 1960 Constitution were said to be improved by the proposed amendments, according to the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative:

The president of the Republic felt compelled to propose on 30 November certain constitutional modifications for discussion, which were intended to “remove obstacles to the smooth functioning and development of the state.” (PIO)

As a result of stalemate, President Makarios offered his thirteen amendments in 1963 which were designed to make governance more effective, in the eyes of Greek Cypriots (PIO, 2010; Coufoudakis, 2006). Turkish Cypriots only noted that the majority of these amendments would curb the rights of Turkish Cypriots. Here, the
Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative highlights the necessity of the reform while the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative emphasises its targeting of Turkish Cypriot powers. The rejection of these proposals by the Turkish government has been used as evidence by Greek Cypriots that Turkey had too much control over the Turkish Cypriots (Yennaris, 2003). Such attitudes support the continuing perception amongst Turkish Cypriots that Greek Cypriots discount or ignore Turkish Cypriots as a community (Moran, 1998). The resulting eruption in violence between December 1963 and August 1964 remains a period that the separate narratives focus on or downplay. Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative often refers to planned attacks on their community by militias consisting of police, army and ex-EOKA militia (Gibbons, 1997), what was later published as the Akritas plan (Gazioglu, 1999). Published in 1966 in the Greek Cypriot newspaper Patrie, this plan envisaged the need to remove Turkish Cypriots from Cyprus by force, intimidation and fear. Through the nationalist narrative, a proportion of the Greek Cypriot community supported this policy at the time:

I think that things had been boiling up [before] that period and then there was just an outbreak of [violence], […]. There was a view for example in the Greek Cypriot community that the problem could only be solved by removing all the Turkish Cypriots willingly or unwillingly, from the Island and [that] you could only govern Cyprus as a Greek Cypriot Island. (Third party, M)

I think from 1963 until 1974, Cyprus was like Texas […]. Exactly, it was like [the] Wild West and these organisations, they were carrying guns and they were walking like this on the streets. I heard from many people, from Turkish Cypriots who got scared when they saw a Turkish Cypriot armed. But many Greek Cypriot members from [EOKA] also killed innocent Greek Cypriots. This happened. (T, M, over 50)

Cypriots from both communities characterised this period as one of insecurity. This environment resulted from the security apparatus of the new state having divided allegiances to the separate communities (Gibbons, 1997). These extracts above demonstrate the general environment on Cyprus at the time and highlight the insecurity and danger of many separate armed groups. Elements of the Greek nationalist narrative did not refer to violence within their own community, but

Gibbons (1997) provides details but should be considered with scepticism as he clearly has a pro-Turkish Cypriot perspective. Other sources provide information on the plan but dispute how far the latter was implemented.
referred to cases of violence amongst Turkish Cypriots in 1963-4 (Yennaris, 2003) while the Turkish Cypriot narrative centred on violence by Greek Cypriot militias (Gibbons, 1997). However, Papadakis (2008) does refer to the school literature that suggests the Greek Cypriots were the main victims of 1963-4, as a result of Turkish actions. Factionalism within both communities created a complex and fear-inducing environment, especially for Turkish Cypriots and often led to the Turkish Cypriots leaving their homes and seeking refuge within larger groups (Yennaris, 2003; Gibbons, 1997). The Turkish Cypriots who were involved in the administration were either forced out (Gazioglu, 1999) or removed themselves from institutions of the Republic of Cyprus (PIO, 2010).

However, foreign conspiracies and interventions on the one hand, and mistrust between the two communities on the other hand, which was intensified by the problems in the functioning of the state, led to the inter-communal clashes of 1963-64. After the 1963-64 clashes, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership demanded the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriot community from the administration of the state and forced a large number of Turkish Cypriots to live in enclaves. (PIO, 2010)

According to the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative (Moran, 1998; Denktash, 1988), Greek Cypriots sought to make their community move back into Greek Cypriot-controlled government areas while imposing harsh measures on those who remained:

[…] after the Turkish Cypriot members in the cabinet [were] left outside[,] a different kind of administration at that time was established in the northern part of Nicosia. But Turkish Cypriots were faced with serious checks […] and sometimes harsh controls by the authorities, mainly Greek Cypriot police. (T, M, over 50)

This Turkish Cypriot extract illustrates their nationalist narrative’s portrayal of hardships that Turkish Cypriots faced. For Turkish Cypriots today, the seeking of safety led to the necessity of a more developed administration amongst themselves (Denktash, 1988). Yet this supposed need for a separate administration supports the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative’s argument that Turkish Cypriots were seeking to separate from the Republic of Cyprus. In other words, the two nationalist narratives mutually reinforce each other, giving purpose and fuel to their separate and continuing existences. Yet, as has been clear from some responses, there are signs that
not all respondents forward the nationalist narrative but challenge its orthodoxy and perceive the period differently. However, the nationalist narrative appears steadfast, including through the personality of Denktash (2009) himself:

The problem was not really settled because the Greek side did not abandon its original policy of enosis. The 1960 independence remained a diplomatic fiction because precarious and guarantor Greece looked upon it as a stepping stone for analysis. [...] Greeks Cypriots who gave a full picture of how the Greek army officers in the Cyprus Army, trained young Cypriots for a fact against Turkish Cypriots of the Turkish contingent (present in Cyprus under the 1960 Treaty of Alliance) refused to give us any help, even after the attacks on us in December 1963. (Denktash and Moran, 2009; 12)

4.4.3 Response

Violence has been illustrated to have been perpetrated by both communities’ militias and Cypriot policemen. It has been alleged that the violence also involved the Greek and Turkish contingents on the island (Gibbons, 1997). Community elites may have realised the UK was unwilling or unable to manipulate the situation in the way that Cypriots had previously envisaged. However, the nationalist narrative of both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities used rhetoric which built upon such myths. The UN responded to the violence by sending a peace-keeping force, with the UK sending troops from the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) to separate the communities before the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) arrived (Gibbons, 1997, Bose 2007). The Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative may view the UNFICYP as support for the Greek Cypriot government against separatists (PIO, 2010) while suggesting their community sought to bring the Turkish Cypriots back into shared institutions (PIO, 2010; Panteli, 1990, Patrick, 1976). Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative suggests their community sought to resist institutions that they did not recognise as legitimate (Denktash 1988, Moran, 1998). These narratives are opposing each other at this stage but, as in other cases, their opposition reinforces their own existences.

The UN Resolution 186 is also a source of discord amongst the nationalist narratives of Cyprus as the document was viewed to have recognised the Greek Cypriot-dominated government, forwarded by the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative. The
Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative suggests that this is a misuse of a UN agreement designed to send troops to Cyprus and stop violence:

The main reason was the United Nations Resolution 186 4th of March 1964. [...] since then all of the international world [recognised] Greek Cypriot[s] as an official [government] in Cyprus [...]. And now they are complaining that Greek Cypriots they’re official authorities and they occupy the [north] of Cyprus. (T, M, over 50)

There are many examples of towns destruction, it is a proven fact. This create a panic the forces people into a small space [...]. But [the Greek Cypriots extremists] kept killing Turks here and there. I read about fighting outside my village, read it in the American papers, and reported it to my history class. One Turkish Cypriot was shot in cold blood as he ran from his corner shop. This happened but this was not enough for some enosisists. There was two general attacks on villages in 1967 by General Grivas and they all wiped out those two villagers. But what happened? There was no real compensation some forces were withdrawn but not completely but many remain on the island. (T, M, over 50)

Yet, the placing of the UNFICYP did not immediately stop violence occurring in 1964 and nor did it stop violence in 1967 (Richmond, 2001). Memories of violence were also transmitted to Turkish Cypriots outside Cyprus, as in the case of the second respondent above, who was in the US at the time of 1963-4. Although he was in the US for a period, this respondent forwarded the nationalist narrative of the Turkish Cypriot community.

4.4.4 Further Sporadic Episodes
In the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative, killings that were perpetrated in the insecurity were mostly designed to spread fear and submission to Greek Cypriot governance. For the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative, little or no violence occurred and much of what did occur was within the Turkish Cypriot community (Yennaris, 2003). In their narrative, Greek Cypriots argued that violence was instigated to impose control in Turkish Cypriot community and blame such violence on Greek Cypriots (Yennaris, 2003). The period between 1964 and 1967 was characterised by increasing numbers of Greek military personnel on Cyprus (Denktash 1988; Moran, 1998). This corresponded with an increased Greek nationalism which created deeper divisions within the Greek Cypriot community (Reddaway, 1986). The period was characterised by sporadic episodes of violence in which relatively few were killed:
So really there wasn’t that much out right fighting as Greek Cypriots had a [simple] aim. They would tell our people of the onslaught. They would say that there was a genocide happening. (T, M, over 50)

Between 1968 and 1974[,] there was a lull in fighting because Makarios realised that he would not be able to finish [the Turkish Cypriots] off against the wishes of Turkey. And so he began to use other methods of getting rid of [the Turkish Cypriots]. This was a very sinister way […] killing us with kindness so to speak […]. And of course it is perceived that everything was more calm […and] we were no longer searched at checkpoints. [Meanwhile,] there was little or no public services [while the Greek Cypriots] sought to integrate individuals within the Greek Cypriot society. (T, M, over 50)

Yet, this Turkish Cypriot respondent refers to Makarios seeking to ‘finish off’ their community, yet failing to do so. As part of his community’s nationalist narrative, this perspective portrays a forcing out of Turkish Cypriots, through the ‘killing [Turkish Cypriots] with kindness’. This correlates to the Greek Cypriot narrative that suggests that they supported a re-integrative approach towards the Turkish Cypriots (PIO, 2010). There remains a widespread concern amongst Turkish Cypriots that their identity could be swallowed up by Greek Cypriot identity, or ‘osmosis’ (Denktash and Moran, 2009).

One particularly important development was the National Guard legislation, one of many violations of the constitution according to Gazioglu and Moran (2000). As well as suggesting the illegal nature of legislation, this passage suggests that the UK was complicit in such actions. It reminds observers that the National Guard remains a very important institution for the retention of the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative, due to compulsory military service:

The principal national guard law was enacted in early June 1964 in order to both provide for the introduction of compulsory military service, which was against not only article 129 of the Cyprus constitution and thus need the approval of the Turkish Cypriot vice president, also generally in violation of part VIII of the constitution. […] the British also reminded the Greek Cypriot side that if the proposed bill was adopted, it would not be in conformity with paragraph 1 of Security Council Resolution 186, of 4 March 1964 (Gazioglu and Moran, 2000: 17-8).

While quoting Ehrlich (1974), Gazioglu and Moran (2000) note of the Greek influence on the Cypriot National Guard and its symbols. As well as the symbols, the
officers were all Greek nationals who were given authority outside the laws while their soldiers were only answerable to their officers:

[…] the troops dominated the separate (Greek) Armed Forces. The Cypriot National Guard had begun wearing Greek Army badges and a new Cypriot (Greek) recruits took an oath of allegiance to the Greek king (Gazioglu and Moran, 2000; 14).

Illustrated here and supported in the subsequent chapters, the two Cypriot communities forward their nationalist narrative based on certain memories of events, collective or individual. Greek Cypriots often do not remember this period and argue that the government of Cyprus retained legitimacy after the withdrawal of Turkish Cypriots from power-sharing. In literature from the Press and Information Office, little or no mention was given to the period between 1963-4 and 1974. Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriot national narrative focuses upon this period as a violent and difficult time of enclaves and sporadic violence.

4.5 After 1974 – stasis
4.5.1 Coup and intervention
1974 is considered the primary turning-point in Cypriot affairs and seen by the Greek Cypriots as their bleakest period. The two nationalist narratives agree the period since 1974 has been overshadowed by 1974’s consequences, which remain to this day. However, direct intervention by an exogenous actor may often be characterised as an ‘invasion’ by the community most affected while the other nationalist narrative may see it differently. As the majority, the Greek Cypriots had the most to lose from Turkish intervention but Greek Cypriot elements brought about that intervention:

I’m not blaming anybody but there were some people, I mean nationalist people, they wanted reunification with the motherland of Greece. (T, M, over 50)

[…at] the United Nations, [Makarios] said that Greece had invaded Cyprus and that both communities, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, were under threat. (T, M, over 50)

Greek Cypriots had publicly competed in rhetoric, supporting enosis at least from 1967 till 1974. Those who did not may have been portrayed by others as possible collaborators (Drousiotis, 2006). There were extremists who insisted on immediate enosis, such as George Grivas (Reddaway, 1986). Grivas himself brought extremists
together in the newly-formed EOKA-B, the extremist nationalist militias that formed the core of the coup against Makarios in 1974 (Drousiotis, 2006). The resulting intra-Greek Cypriot violence led to the deaths of countless Greek Cypriots. Nicos Sampson, who had built his reputation on claiming to have killed many Turkish Cypriots could have been the worst candidate for president in Turkish Cypriots’ eyes, was declared President (Drousiotis, 2006; Gibbons, 1997). None of the developments mentioned here would be included in the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative. It does state that a coup did occur against Makarios but as a pretext to the Turkish invasion (PIO, 2010). The Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative has developed to consider 1974 as a necessary evil (Denktash, 1988) that unfortunately occurred:

[We come to the 1974] coup d’etat. […] murders of innocent people […] were done not only by Turkey, [as] instead of fighting against [Turkish forces, Greek Cypriot extreme nationalist] were murdering innocent people in villages […]. Turkish Cypriots were [saying] that innocent people were murdered and buried in mass graves […] So we have many […] members of [AKEL] murdered both by [EOKA-B] at that period and also by [Turkish forces]. (G, M, over 50)

[Sampson] had intended to declare enosis and Turkey had decided that it had either let Cyprus fall into hostile hands or intervene and save the Turkish Cypriots. They intervened and […] saved the bi-communal independence of Cyprus […]. Yes, violence occurs in human tragedies: people killed and people missing. All these things did happen […].(T, M, over 50)

Both Turkish Cypriot extracts signal the harm done to both communities through the murders, fighting and intervention by Turkey. The consequences of the Turkish actions are undeniable: the killings; the missing; the lost property; the injury and violence that resulted (PIO, 2010; Assmussen, 2008, Denktash, 1988). For the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative:

With it came military occupation, forcible division, population displacement, ethnic segregation, massive violation of human rights, colonization, attempted secession, cultural destruction, and property usurpation. These conditions, imposed by Turkey, constitute an unacceptable situation that has persisted on the island since 1974 (PIO, 2010).

Neither community denies these events occurred but, often, no recognition is given to their own actions. The Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative overlooks domestic elements as they may class such events as of minimal importance compared to Turkey
invasion (PIO, 2010), if mentioned at all. For the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative, their community had been victimised by the Greek Cypriots until Turkey intervened (Moran, 1998; Gibbons, 1997). For the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative, their communities’ victimisation has continued from 1974 to the present day, as a result of foreign occupation (PIO, 2010). Since the 1974 intervention, almost no disturbances or clashes have occurred between the communities:

One […] reason you didn’t have any violence is between 1974 and 2003 you couldn’t cross [the buffer-zone]. (Third party, M)

From 1974, a level of security was established that had not existed since 1955, from the perspective of Turkish Cypriots. As this respondent from a British perspective puts it, there could be no violence as the island was divided. With the presence of Turkish troops, the conflict had been frozen but has remained unsolved with the Turkish presence complicating the situation. In the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative, the presence of Turkish forces was portrayed as a relief (Denktash and Moran, 2009) and has allowed the Turkish Cypriots to counter-act Greek Cypriot-domination. But Turkish presence was portrayed as illegal by the Greek Cypriots nationalist narrative and has been accepted by the wider United Nations (PIO, 2010; Assmussen, 2008). As a result, Turkish Cypriots have been isolated due to the presence of Turkish troops. Any coverage that the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative gives the Greek Cypriot coup a ‘treacherous’ character which played into the hands of Turkey:

The treacherous coup against the lawful President of the Republic of Cyprus on 15 July 1974, gave Turkey the long awaited pretext to invade Cyprus in order to implement its partitionist plans. (PIO, 2010)

The invasion of Turkey in Cyprus on 20 July 1974, is undoubtedly the most tragic event in the turbulent history of Cyprus. The blow was heavy and the human pain indescribable. (PIO, 2010)

4.5.3 Talks since 1974
The failure to find a solution has resulted in differing perspectives as to what is an achievable solution. The separate nationalist narratives have not supported the finding of common ground; in fact, the narratives have often championed the distinctions
between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Greek Cypriots insist that their community needs to be treated differently to the Turkish Cypriots while Turkish Cypriots insist that their community is a separate identity that needs to be treated as an equal. Under Denktash, the Turkish Cypriots took a tough negotiating position after 1974 as they had the ability to make their own laws in a secure environment (Moran, 1998). The nationalist narratives have opposed each other through the negotiations on what should be the basis of a political system. The problems have often been the lack of compromise and elements of nationalist narratives appear to encourage an avoidance of a solution:

**Important because still in both sides there are people who maybe want to sabotage peace**, who do not want to have a solution like Annan Plan. Maybe we [can] achieve a solution **if we [create] two federated states with [in] an international one.** Of course there will be **anti-believers to peace or nationalists.** (T, M, over 50)

In other words, the nationalist narrative would suggest communities would not accept anything less than their maximalist objectives (Denktash and Moran, 2009). Denktash notes that in his letter to Moran:

> We then had Vassiliou followed by Clerides rejecting the set of ideas. Then Clerides, again forced me to meet, which takes us to the Glion meetings where Clerides declares that “they (the Greek Cypriots) attend the talks for tactical reasons - to show that Turkish Cypriots are intransigent!” Keeping the title of the government of Cyprus is “the nearest thing to enosis”. They will not compromise on that. My intransigence arose from the fact that I did not accept the Greek Cypriot administration as “the government of Cyprus” (Denktash and Moran, 2009; 48-9)

Previous attempts to find a solution before the accession of Greek Cypriot-controlled Cyprus to the European Union (EU) failed partly because of this. A push to find a solution, led by Kofi Annan, culminated with the Annan Plan V and the following referenda, in which the Greek Cypriots rejected the plan (Hannay, 2005). Although the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative argues that:

> The Greek Cypriot “no” vote was not a vote against reunification or reconciliation. It was a rejection of a process that led to a one-sided plan perceived harmful to the legitimate rights of the Greek Cypriot community and to the survival of the state of Cyprus itself. It was a rejection of a flawed plan that did not provide for the genuine reunification of Cyprus, its institutions, people, and economy. (PIO, 2010)
Since 1977, the long negotiations have been on the basis on the principles of bizonality but what this constitutes has been bitterly contested (PIO, 2010; Denktash and Moran, 2009). The Greek Cypriots nationalist narrative would argue that it would be a federal state with power at the centre (PIO, 2010). The Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative would consider it to involve two constituent states with significant powers within their own areas which combine to make an internationally recognised state (Denktash and Moran, 2009). This dispute has been one central reason why communities have been unable to find a solution, which has been influenced by these nationalist narratives. Underneath all the nationalist rhetoric, the dispute rests on who governs who and what power is handed to whom and by whom.

In *Cyprus: Unity and Difference*, Denktash and Moran (2009) discuss the future through letters but do not offer anything else other than the two-state solution, which remains the favoured outcome within the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative. However, they differ as to the utility of the Annan Plan, with Denktash arguing why he did not support it. Denktash tells Moran:

> your assessment that “the Greek side want to minimise the agreements reached via the UN since 1977, hoping to get a solution that will leave them largely in charge of Cyprus, something like things were before 1974 but with the Turks being permitted to have a small, ineffectual role in the government” is quite realistic. The international community is not only “not telling the Greeks that they should perish any such thoughts” but, on the contrary, Mr Bryza of the USA has publicly called upon Turkey “to fulfil her obligations towards the EU markets” (meaning recognition of the Greek Cypriot administration as the legitimate government of Cyprus). And no doubt the whole exercise envisaged by “the international community” is for amending [of] the Annan Plan (without even mentioning its name) in such a way that Greek Cypriot objections will be removed! (Denktash and Moran, 13)

4.5.4 Cyprus Today

Turkish and Greek Cypriots remained separated from 1974 to 2003 with the only ways for individuals to meet in either Pyla or outside Cyprus. Relations were not totally severed by the inter-communal violence of 1963-4 as mixed villages existed after 1964 (Bose, 2007; Reddaway, 1986). However, the events of 1974 forced a geographic divide to be created (PIO, 2010); although, the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative would argue that division had always existed (Moran, 1998). The opening
of the buffer-zone in April 2003 allowed people to cross the buffer-zone to meet old friends for the first time in decades (Hannay, 2005):

Initially, when we opened the doors, on the 23rd of April 2003, [due to] **curiosity and interest**, people [crossed to] buy things, people [looked] for work on the other side. **And Greek Cypriots came here or Turkey to gamble.** (T, M, over 50)

However since 2003, economic and social interaction has been limited to Greek Cypriots seeking gambling and Turkish Cypriots looking for work. This Turkish Cypriot trade unionist suggests little interaction occurred between Greek and Turkish Cypriots except for the pre-existing friendships established before 1974. A generational difference has become clearer as the older generations know of individuals from the other community while younger generations may feel no need to. This development is another obstacle to the Greek Cypriot belief that the communities can be brought together under one system of government (PIO, 2009). The economic restrictions placed upon Turkish Cypriot ports and airports not recognised by the Greek Cypriot government can also be used by the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative as evidence of Greek Cypriot victimisation of Turkish Cypriots (Denktash and Moran, 2009). Attempts to force Turkish Cypriots to use Greek Cypriot-dominated institutions would also have limited effect give the support the Turkish Cypriots have received from Turkey (“TRNC”, 1997). Yet the inability of the Greek Cypriots to stop the use of Turkish Cypriot ports and institutions is used to support the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative that Turkey is behind the façade of Turkish Cypriot institutions (PIO, 2009). Turkish Cypriots also genuinely worry that Turkey has taken advantage of its influence on the Turkish Cypriot elite and institutions:

Because the Turkish never trust us, Cyprus [remains strategically important] and [Turkey would] like to keep it. **[Turkish Cypriots] can [remain] because we have good relations with the Greek Cypriots.** (T, M, over 50)

Many Turkish Cypriots would prefer Turkey to leave if security on the island was guaranteed. But with no solution and no guarantees offered, Turkish Cypriots fear Turkish involvement and Greek Cypriot control. Meanwhile, Greek Cypriots fear Turkey will remain on Cyprus and have sought international influence to force Turkey to leave (PIO, 2009). Because of these fears, the nationalist narratives remain potent within the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.
The nationalists on both sides see it to their advantage for conflict to remain and use the narratives to retain their relevancy, giving the narratives their sense of stasis. For the purpose of this thesis, there are two nationalist narratives on Cyprus which are mutually reinforcing in terms of oppositional standpoints. However, narratives can be constructed through a chain of the reinterpreted memories that create a storyline from the distant or near past to the present (Zerubavel, 2004). Moderates in both communities have sought to bring communities together in a reconciliation process but little progress has been made. However, can the reinterpreted memories of violent episodes of 1974 and 1963-4 provide the foundations to a reconciliation process between conflicting communities? We must also establish individual and collective utilisation of narrative and for what purpose such actors have for such storylines.

4.6 Cypriot Users of Narrative

Collective utilisation of narratives occurs within a group level rather than a community level, transmitting their narrative to the wider community through means of media and communication. Institutions such as the Orthodoxy Church of Cyprus and the National Guard are considered to have utilised the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative for their own political ends (Papadakis, 2008; Moran 1998). The Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative has been utilised by the small Turkish Cypriot military and the political parties with links to Turkey, such as the National Unity Party (UBP). However, the utilisation of the nationalist narrative is not limited to those of the nationalist elements. Given pressures and political influences, moderates and neo-communists may have to reinforce elements of the nationalist narratives for political expediency. If they did not, they may be portrayed as traitors to the communities in the present and past (Poole, 2008; Booth, 2006). Moreover, the communities may well seek justice rather than reconciliation (Pankhurst, 1999; Minow, 1998). Whoever is in power is limited in the available political space to alter their community’s narrative; whether moderate, nationalist, or neo-communist.

On an individual level, the personal utilisation of narratives has often resulted in the long political lives of politicians like Rauf Denktash. Though such figures can be termed ethnic entrepreneurs or activists, these politicians saw the uses of coherent and understandable storylines that portray their communities’ victimhood and injected
milestones and heroes into their separate narratives (Zerebavel, 2004). Such narratives are often the result of elites reinterpreting the existing narrative for the present circumstances. Illustrated in the subsequent chapters, I would suggest that there are signs that Cypriots seek to reinterpret the nationalist narratives. Many of those who seek this reinterpretation may see the opportunity resulting from the growing plethora of media outlets influencing narratives. Such a growth in the means of production is a result of technology and may force the elite in the future to react to grass-root alternatives and challenger organisations.

4.7 Conclusion
The Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative appears to place the history of Cyprus in a number of processes of progress, division and stasis. The same can be said of the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative, though for different reasons and such differences stem from their communities separate memories of past events. Central to these differences are the 1960 constitution, the 1963-4 period of violence, the violent sporadic events after 1964, as well as the events of 1974 and since. 1963-4 and 1974 are periods of violence key in the separate memories of Cypriots, although those memories may well not be accurate.

In this thesis, memories of 1974 and 1963-4 will be examined for developments within the nationalist narrative of Cypriot communities. This thesis will not underestimate the damage Turkish intervention in 1974 wrought on Cyprus. This thesis posits that political elites in both communities lack a political will to solve the Cyprus issue and have found a useful culprit in the form of exogenous actors. There is grass-root evidence of reconciliation beginning to develop, possible a result of memories that focus on the role of exogenous actors. As no political will appears to exist for a solution, these developments amongst the grass-root may not result in a new narrative but may force a re-interpretation of the existing nationalist narratives. Such a process is at an early stage but collective and individual memories appear to be consistent with its occurrence. This research will now illustrate the panorama of evidence that was gathered through methods illustrated in Chapter Three.
5.1 Introduction

As was discussed in previous chapters, this research will be using both quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection and analysis. This chapter will examine the research conducted and results regarding the 1963-4 period of violence. It will proceed on the levels of analysis previously mentioned: first, the individual; second, the inter-personal; and thirdly, at the institutional level. References will be made to transcriptions and quotations, with graphs positioned throughout this chapter. A summary will be made but discussion of the implications will be left to a subsequent chapter, once all data has been presented.

Analysis of the quantitative data is presented here and takes two forms: first, the accumulated score of scales within the graphs; and second, the calculated percentage of the most significant responses. The threshold for significance is above ten responses. The scores allow trends to be examined throughout graphs and are based on extreme responses carrying more weight compared to moderate responses. So, a response in columns 1 and 10 is multiplied by -5 or 5 while responses in columns 2 and 9 are multiplied by -4 or 4. Adding the results of columns 1 to 5 calculates the negative score while 6 to 10 calculates the positive score. There are two graphs for each question posed, with one illustrating the Turkish Cypriot response and the other displaying the Greek Cypriot answers. As there were relatively few Turkish Cypriot respondents, given the obstacles that have been discussed in Chapter 3, it would not assist research to use such methods on the Turkish Cypriot graphs but will be used on the Greek Cypriot graphs only. As there were 58 Greek Cypriot respondents, the scores can add up to a maximum positive or negative 290, if all respondents answered in columns 10 or 1. This was considered a surprisingly good sample given the general reticence of Cypriots and the resources available, according to the British High Commission. With regard to these responses, totals above 200 are considered highly negative/positive while responses above 100 will be considered strong. These spikes and trends allow examination of data in a more comprehensive manner. For interviews, discussions were conducted with a sample of Cypriots from both communities and across different generations, whose identities and reasons for inclusion have been previously discussed.
5.2 Disputed events of 1963-4

When discussing the events of 1963-4, a number of different perspectives develop, some of which fit within nationalist narrative and others that do not. This section will first illustrate the events of 1963-4 as inter-communal events that are a source of dispute. Disputes over events occur throughout Cyprus’ history but when regarding the inter-communal violence of 1963-4, many respondents referred first to the thirteen amendments proposed by President Makarios (Yennaris, 2003, Gibbons, 1997):

Then we get to [19]63 the Greek Cypriots feel that Makarios was deceived by the [British into believing that] Turkey wouldn’t react [if the Greek Cypriots] would propose a few amendments. [Turkish Cypriots would] discuss them and would accept them whatever. Of course Makarios should have been more wise to realise the game. (G, M, over 50)

[Makarios] had asked the opinion of the British Ambassador about the amendment [and] he got the okay […]. The reaction of the Turkish Cypriots were to withdraw from any public position, even public servants withdrew. (G, M, 20s)

These Greek Cypriot contributions suggest they lay the blame for the proposing of amendments on the alleged agreement of the British High Commission. The amendments were issued to the British High Commissioner to make alterations and the High Commissioner made hand-written notes and failed to realise the full implications of such proposals (Reddaway, 1986). Such proposals could have led to the creation of a more workable unitary system of government but was clearly targeted at the rights of Turkish Cypriots (Bose, 2007). Greek Cypriots have consequently seen UK officials as having intentionally created a situation of conflict (PIO, 2010; Yennaris, 2003). Had Makarios thought such amendments would be agreed to by Turkish Cypriots or was it a ploy for Greek Cypriots to enforce such amendments? This question remains filled with myth and dispute as the Akritas Plan did suggest an organised element to the 1963-4 period of violence (Gazioglu, 1999; Gibbon, 1997). There was also reference to the withdrawal of Turkish Cypriots from services and institutions, as was discussed in the previous chapter. Whether this occurred before violence broke out or as a result of unrest is still disputed, as was who was responsible for the outbreak of violence:
It was a [...] reaction to some violence starting from the Turkish Cypriot side. I mean a [planned] withdrawal and then some effort to kick the forces of the Republic of Cyprus from [Turkish Cypriot] areas [for it] to be controlled by the Turkish Cypriots was initiated. (G, M, 20s)

This Greek Cypriot perspective suggests that the violence that did occur may have begun through the actions of Turkish Cypriots. This respondent supports the conclusion that the Turkish ministers and administrators withdrew from institutions to create a separate entity (Coufoudakis, 2006). This correlates with the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative issued through the Press and Information Office:

The atmosphere on Cyprus became tense and volatile. Relations between the two communities deteriorated as a series of events snowballed into a crisis extending beyond the borders of Cyprus. Isolated minor incidents escalated into inter-communal clashes. Turkish Cypriots from around the island, under pressure from their leadership, started concentrating into certain areas […]. The Turkish Cypriot Ministers withdrew from the government, the Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives withdrew from the parliament, and Turkish Cypriot civil servants ceased to attend their jobs. Eventually, Turkish Cypriots withdrew from all state institutions and government agencies (PIO a, 2010; 36-7).

Unrest was blamed by Greek Cypriots on Turkish Cypriots (Yennaris, 2003) while Turkish Cypriots can claim Greek Cypriots were the instigators (Gibbons, 1997). Presented here, evidence suggests communities blame each other for the outbreak of violence which harmed Turkish Cypriots exponentially (Reddaway, 1986; Bose, 2007). Greek Cypriot nationalists within the Cypriot government and security apparatus were likely to have been involved in violence, many of whom were former members of EOKA (Bose, 2007; Joseph, 1997). The alleged disarming of Turkish Cypriot members of the security apparatus (Gibbons, 1997) suggests the intention was to make the Turkish Cypriot community vulnerable, although this allegation comes from a pro-Turkish Cypriot perspective. Often exaggerated by Turkish Cypriot leaders, concerns about a planned use of violence by Greek Cypriots were given credence with the publishing of the Akritas plan in 1966. As a result of violence, Turkish Cypriots took refuge in areas which developed into enclaves. The Greek Cypriot respondent below placed emphasis on the threatening intervention of Turkey:

**Greece had [its] own [problems]. I don’t think that there was much support [from Greece]. In Turkey’s case we have the first effort [at] invasion [in 1964].** (G, M, 20s)
For those forwarding the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative, the greatest fear was an intervention by Turkey (Yennaris, 2003). Evidence points to heavy Greek involvement both before 1963-4 and after (Gazioglu and Moran, 2000), causing Turkey to threaten intervention on a number of occasions (Bose, 2007; Joseph 1997). Exogenous influences are also highlighted by the Greek Cypriot who worked for the Greek Cypriot Foreign Ministry, arguing that the insecurity of the time and the number of weapons on Cyprus were possibly a result of Turkish planning:

Greek Cypriots started driving with guns in the area […]. And there was a lot of tension, there were a lot of guns. Very little security, very little capacity of the state to control the situation. And my personal view is that it was designed to happen like that by Turkey. (G, M, 20s)

Given the insecurity of the time as a result of the number of weapons on Cyprus as well as the limited utility of government institutions to keep order (Kalyvas, Shapiro and Masoud, 2008; Laitin and Fearon, 2003), it is noted that often people take their own precautions. In other cases, it has been alleged that massacres or killings occurred in various locations throughout Cyprus. Many of these alleged occurrences enter community memory, both collectively and individually (Neal, 2005; Edkins, 2003). Although questions must be raised over its reliability, the extract below is a recollection of an atrocity upon Greek Cypriots, related by the Greek Cypriot activist:

Yes I mean there were a lot of atrocities committed even in the [19]60s I think, there [was] one incident where it was Greek Cypriots, they were taken off a bus and told to walk to their village and they were killed. I am not sure if there isn’t a similar incident with Turkish Cypriots. So there were these very unpleasant violent situations. (G, F, 40s)

Then we have the 1963 clashes. And of course TMT helped very much [to divide…] the two communities, […]as did] EOKA. Somehow, they were fighting each other […]. But then they were actually allies in separating the two communities. (T, M, over 50)

The above extract from a Turkish Cypriot develops the idea that the two nationalist militias were acting in similar ways, though not in league. This Turkish Cypriot points out that although they were fighting each other, they may have been acting together to separate the communities. However, it is more likely that the two nationalist militias, like their narratives, were in opposition to each other and their existence meant the
necessity of the other. This theme will be a key issue regarding relations between nationalist narratives and opposing points of view. In many cases, the nationalist narrative had previously portrayed neo-communists of their own community as enemies rather than the other community (Panteli, 1990, Reddaway, 1986). Of violence that did occur across the community divide, it has been suggested that such violence has been exaggerated (PIO, 2010; Coufoudakis, 2006; Yennaris, 2006). This Turkish Cypriot below, the political activist, was one of the Turkish Cypriots who suggested that 1963-4 was not a widespread attack on their community but a sporadic episode affecting only hundreds of people:

When we look at the number of people who died, we are not talking about thousands. We are talking about three hundred or so Turkish Cypriots died. So it was not like genocide. When you look at [events], there are three villages that suffered greatly. It happened. [...] it was not even planned to be that way. (T, F, 20s)

This same respondent spells out the suspicions that Turkish Cypriots may have, for a number of real or imagined reasons. Many Turkish Cypriots were aware of the harm that resulted from 1963-4 and retell stories of how their family suffered. The two extracts from the Turkish activist suggest that although they were suspicious of the situation, they saw no help from other sources and that their community’s feelings were of anger, not hatred. For the Greek Cypriot respondent below, the concern was for the occupation of land by the Turkish Cypriot political leadership, separate to the Greek Cypriot dominated Republic:

They [Turkish Cypriot nationalists] were trying to make people scared and trying to make things bigger. There was ‘funny’ stuff. Turkish Cypriots [were] killing Turkish Cypriots and blaming it on Greek Cypriots. (T, F, 20s)

[Turkish Cypriots] were weaker [and] they did not have best guns they could have. There was anger, there was [no] hatred, just anger. Nobody was doing anything about what was happening to the Turkish Cypriots. (T, F, 20s)

The consequence [was] that the Turkish Cypriots were isolated in their own areas. And they occupied only about 7% [of Cyprus] because we had the first [UNFICYP] force in Cyprus. (G, M, 20s)
The exact details of events are susceptible to myth and dispute (Gagnon, 2004) and the memories of Cypriots cannot be verified but the political and demographic consequences are undeniable (Bose, 2007; Moran 1998). Many Turkish Cypriots moved, or were forced, into armed enclaves for the purpose of either protection, or secession (Yennaris, 2003; Denktash 1988). The 1963-4 period of violence was primarily targeted at Turkish Cypriot civilians (Gibbons, 1997) but there were also violent episodes targeted at Greek Cypriots (Bose, 2007, James, 2002). The separation of communities and subsequent loss of contact meant a loss of common interest and goals. However, this separateness of communities had developed previously to 1963-4, as a result of the events in the 1950s and before and was exemplified by constitutional deadlock between 1960 and 1963. It was also the beginning of a longer period of tension and sporadic violence that ended in 1967 (Patrick, 1976).

5.3 Individual

Given that events occurred in the 1960s, the memories were managed by a combination of mnemonic communities, primarily the family and the ethnic group. Many respondents referred to the lack of interaction between communities as well as geographical divisions that resulted from violence. As was made clear in the previous chapter, the narratives suggest divisions had existed before 1963-4, although through the behaviour of Cypriots rather than as a physical divide (Denktash, 1988). Division was based on Turkish and Greek Cypriot rights to self-determination as both wanted control of all or part of the island (PIO, 2010; Denktash and Moran, 2009). Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the extent to which the 1963-4 period affected the political relations of individual Turkish and Greek Cypriots. As you can see, respondents believed the period affected individual relations negatively. Responses on the positive side of the scale suggest a few Cypriots felt relations were improved by the separation of communities. In general, the communities seem to agree that relations between individual Cypriots were badly damaged. Turkish Cypriots feared for their security and this resulted in the enclavement of their community (Reddaway, 1986; Bose 2007), viewed as a highly negative consequence by Greek Cypriots (Yennaris, 2003).
The 1963-4 period was a key moment, cutting many relations amongst a majority of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, though the exact figure is disputed. Illustrated in Figure 2, the negative score amongst Greek Cypriots was -168 and column 1 has 36.2% of the respondents. However, 31% positioned their response at column 4 which suggests a split over 1963-4’s effect, with three non-responses. Cypriots appear to view relations as having worsened as a result of violence. For Turkish Cypriot respondents, there had been a genuine fear of Greek Cypriot violence and so a minority of Turkish Cypriots viewed relations as having been positively affected, in opposition to the majority in both communities.
Many Cypriots referred back to the period before the 1955 insurgency, to times when communities are perceived to have lived side-by side (Coufoudakis, 2006). Other Cypriot respondents referred to the master-servant relationship of Greek and Turkish Cypriots while others refer to Cypriots not as friends or enemies but as neighbours. Many Cypriots reported that communities invited each other to wedding celebrations and other occasions and festivals (Reddaway, 1986; Coufoudakis, 2006). This period before the violence has been remembered as a peaceful period, like a ‘golden age’ (Smith, 2004) of relations. Once the Greek Cypriot demand for self-determination turned violent, the communities are perceived to have viewed each other with suspicion (Moran, 1998). The Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative may seek to portray the resort to violence as only a result of many years of intransigence from the British rulers (PIO, 2007). Greek Cypriot wishes for ‘self-determination’ would be in direct conflict with Turkish Cypriot wishes for the status quo, or at least not enosis (Reddaway, 1986, Cranshaw 1978):

We have so many stories told by our relatives; they were saying that all the neighbours were Greek Cypriots, they were cooking together, they were eating together, [children] were playing together […]. I mean we [were friends] and suppose that incidents are happening every day. What do you do? Of course you don’t get suspicious towards me because we are friends with you but you start to be cautious. (T, M, over 50)

From the recollections of respondents, there appears to have been a clear connection between individuals within mixed villages, where interaction occurred even after 1963-4 (Hitchens, 1999). This respondent above supports the perspective but also proves that relations were damaged between communities, as a result of reported violence (Kalyvas, 2006; Neal, 2005; Kaufmann, 2001). This Turkish Cypriot notes that relations and attitudes changed even with little physical violence occurring. The reporting of such events has as much effect on relations and attitudes as the actual use of violence in the location, creating barriers (Bay and Donham, 2006). Another Turkish Cypriot noted that people of similar class are perceived to have worked together in the past and alludes to the possibility of it happening again:

I mean the working class people were working together in different sectors and [shared] their problems together. (T, M, over 50)
Greek Cypriots also remember peaceable relations between their community and individual Turkish Cypriots, especially within mixed villages before violence. However, the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative suggested that such peaceable relations remained up until 1963-4 (PIO, 2010). During relatively peaceable times, both the Greek and Turkish languages have been perceived to have been used by Cypriots for the purpose of trade and communication within villages, although Greek would have been used more widely due to the Greek majority (Patrick, 1976). However, the necessity of communication within a village or the need to trade does not necessarily mean relations were warm. However, many Cypriots did refer to members of the other community that were family friends and neighbours:

My grandfather was a farmer [and in a village that] was about 50% [Greek] Cypriots and 50% Turkish Cypriots […] and my grandfather used to speak fluently Turkish, [so] people were actually bi-lingual. My grandfather used to speak Turkish and hasn’t been to school, never. Not for a single day but he could speak Greek and Turkish, both with the same fluency. **Those examples were spread all over Cyprus**, especially in mixed villages, mixed areas [that now] you won’t find. (G, M, 20s)

You’d take [relations] on an individual basis you could find very good relations but the problem was the Turkish Cypriots were [economically] isolated and the Greek Cypriots were progressing. **Because the Greek Cypriots had all the opportunities, the Turkish Cypriots were fighting to survive.** I mean the old people they all know Greek because it was a way to interact with the Greek Cypriot and sell their products. I mean they needed, the Greek Cypriots at the time. And many Greek Cypriots knew Turkish because of their interaction. The Greek Cypriots would tell you good things about the Turkish Cypriots. **When it was just at the level of people you hear mostly good stories that we live happily with each other.** (G, M, over 50)

The Greek Cypriots saw relations as peaceable until the British allegedly used their influence to sow seeds of division and encourage Turkey’s involvement, according to the extracts above (PIO, 2007; Yennaris, 2003). Turkish Cypriots view the relations between individuals as more complex, illustrated by the previous extract. The communities needed to trade with one another and, in cases, lived as neighbours. This complex relationship took a different direction when violence broke out, which has kept the two communities apart (Bose, 2007; Loizides 2007; Joseph, 1997). As a result of violence in 1963-4, Turkish Cypriots sought justice through the Republic of Cyprus’ institutions, but:
People were still being killed, Greek Cypriots are still looking for victims and the Turkish Cypriots were looking for [the] guilty. [Turkish Cypriots] said that we are citizens of the Republic of Cyprus and those who did this are citizens of the Republic of Cyprus. We expect the government to trial these people. [But the perpetrators] are not punished […]. (T, F, 20s)

The legal system that had existed before no longer existed after 1963-4 and as this respondent notes, no justice appears to have occurred after the violent events (Moran, 1998). The perception of justice remains a critical element of providing a social cohesion (Payne, 2008) to any society and its breakdown was perceived to be for the benefit of Greek Cypriots. The same respondent noted that relations had continued but there were growing ethnic divisions; violence exacerbated a pre-existing division and gave it relevancy:

I interviewed a Greek Cypriot and there is always a Turkish Cypriot who is a friend or [whom] their parents knew […]. The same was for the Turkish Cypriots. If you perceive [or] see [members] of the other community doing something bad to a member of your community you will see an individual differently. In 1963, there was this feeling of ‘us and them’. But it was irrelevant. We had been living together with their ethnic background and our ethnic background. But when they started to kill us, we had to begin to be suspicious of all of them. ‘They belong to the other’. (T, F, 20s)

The only thing that I can add is that between [19]64 [and 19]74 the Turkish Cypriot community members were not very happy about the Greek Cypriot individuals. Because they were the ones who were making life very difficult for the Turkish Cypriots while entering or getting out of the Turkish enclave. So at the end of the day it was not the institutional organisations of the Republic of Cyprus making things difficult for the Turkish Cypriots but individual Greek Cypriots. (T, M, over 50)

Aware that division had resulted from violence and events before 1963-4, Greek Cypriots appear to consider division a result of exogenous factors (PIO, 2010; Yennaris, 2003). Their community realised it needed to bring Turkish Cypriots back into the mainstream political institutions but did not act upon this until after 1967 (PIO, 2010). The Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative may argue that Turkish Cypriots had always wanted secession, thus the reason for the division and why Greek Cypriots have not sought to bridge the divide since. The extract above noted that the individual Greek Cypriots made things difficult for individual Turkish Cypriots. Although a
logical occurrence, this memory runs counter to previous evidence that relations were relatively warm between individuals. As this Turkish Cypriot comes from a nationalist perspective and has forwarded the nationalist narrative, suggesting Greek individuals sought to be obstacles to Turkish Cypriot individuals supports their perspective. Yet this same Turkish Cypriot individual also notes that his family had a close Greek Cypriot friend who would do no harm to Turkish Cypriots, individually. However, the collective nature of protests and rallies meant that individuals can become caught up in the situation (Tilly, 2003), as individuals often do things that they would not have done on their own (Jacoby, 2008):

[There was a] Greek [Cypriot] family friend and we considered him a family member. And at some point there was a [Greek nationalist] counter demonstration and I asked my father whether uncle Yiannis was there? And [my father] said that by himself, he would never [act violently]. When he's in [a] mob, then killing a Turkish Cypriot is [possible]. This is the difference I saw between individual behaviour and [collective] behaviour. To talk about relations at an individual level and at the group level are two very different things. It depends on the individual. (T, M, over 50)

As with many Turkish Cypriots, this extract has a note of suspicion regarding relationships amongst Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots recognised relations between individuals were warm in many cases (Hitchens, 1999). The mistrust was not based on ethnic difference but perceived and real violence, creating a 'them and us' attitude (Smith, 2004; Anderson, 1995). Such perceived or real violence is seen through the prism of collective memory and the reporting of such incidents by gatekeepers (Larsen, 1988). Referred to in the last extract, the nationalist rhetoric that was influencing the “mob” of Greek Cypriots may remain in the nationalist narrative, though reinterpreted since. Such narratives remain a factor on Cyprus as they exemplify the obstacles to a resolution and reconciliation, as will be made clear in this research.

5.4 Inter-personal
At the inter-personal level, the effect on attitudes of Cypriots was highly negative, according to data illustrated in the graphs below. These results suggest the attitudes of these communities are seen to have been polarised by the outbreak of violence. The score for attitudes amongst Greek Cypriots (Figure 4) was -186, with 37.9% of
respondents placing their response in column 1. In Figure 3, the Turkish Cypriots responded in a similar way to the Greek Cypriots, with responses either in the highest column or in column 4. These responses support the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative that attitudes were only polarised temporarily. As some Greek Cypriots argue violence did affect attitudes, results suggest the nationalist narrative no longer holds true for a significant proportion of their community. Yet the Turkish Cypriot response suggests that attitudes were not totally polarised by 1963-4 and events must be kept within their context. Especially given the existing literature, evidence suggests that polarisation of community attitudes had already occurred as a result of the 1955-59 insurgency campaign (Cranshaw, 1978; Reddaway, 1986). In Figure 4, there was a 30.3% response in column 4, suggesting that Greek Cypriots respondents were qualifying their answers. A similar pattern can be seen amongst Turkish Cypriot respondents answering in columns 1 and 4 of Figure 3.

![Figure 3](image-url)
How has the 1963-4 period of violence affected the political attitudes of Cypriots?

Figure 4

How has the 1963-4 period of violence affected the political relations between Cypriot communities?

Figure 5
How has the 1963-4 period of violence affected the political relations between Cypriot communities?

Figure 6

Portrayed in Figures 5 and 6, relations between the communities as a result of the 1963-4 period of inter-communal violence appear to have been badly damaged. Figure 6 displays the Greek Cypriot response, including a negative score of -186, with 36.2% of respondents answering at the highest level. If the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative was forwarded by respondents, little or no harm to relations would have resulted from the 1963-4 period of violence, but from the following Turkish Cypriot enclavement. Figure 5 displays the response to the same question from Turkish Cypriots and bears a marked similarity. These results suggest that Cypriots from both communities recognise that relations were harmed by the 1963-4 period of violence.

For Turkish Cypriot nationalists, the violence was the reason why relations were damaged and resulted in the enclavement of the Turkish Cypriots (Denktash, 1988). Meanwhile, nationalist Greek Cypriots may portray the consequences of 1963-4 as being harmful to relations. The similarity is in the dynamic but the difference is in the causal factor. Violent events can be instrumentally remembered or intentionally forgotten (Forty and Kuchler, 1999) but 1963-4 is an important period within the narrative of both communities. It serves the purpose of portraying the communities as victims of violent events or of attempted secession.

The harm to attitudes and relations are incorporated within the nationalist narratives as memories are interpreted to support the narratives (Zerubavel, 2004). As responses suggest Cypriots hold more complex perspectives, such memories may no longer fit...
the narratives. As seen through the prism of nationalist narratives, the violent episodes should have the effect of portraying each community as victims of events, either physical or consequential (PIO, 2010; Denktash and Moran, 2009). Nationalist narratives do not highlight their common aspects but choose only to trumpet their differences, for politically popularist reasons. The events also need to be placed in their context and evidence suggests relations were damaged severely in the period before 1963-4, especially as a result of the 1955-9 enosis insurgency (Reddaway, 1986; Joseph, 1997). Responses from Cypriots appear to agree about damage to relations and attitudes, suggesting the nationalist narratives have been challenged.

Referred to in Chapter Four, there was a pattern of politicized ethnicity that developed in Cyprus before British rule and affected both communities (Bose, 2007, Kaufmann, 2001). Greek Cypriots saw themselves as Greek, not Cypriot, while the Turkish Cypriots may have developed their Turkish identity (Reddaway, 1986). For Greek Cypriots, this led to the drive for enosis by the Greek Cypriot leadership, with support from Greece (PIO, 2007). For Turkish Cypriots, their response was support for the retention of the existing colonial system or a separation for fear of rule by the majority (Denktash, 1981; Moran, 1998). However, this next extract refers to the complex interconnectedness of the two nations as a result of the Ottoman Empire and regional rivalry (Bose, 2007; Joseph, 1997):

[The Turks] lost their identity, so they decide after the Greek independence to create their own national identity and in the [19]20s, they managed to come up with something. For [Turkish Cypriots], the internal [enemy was] the Greeks, [resulting from the 1950s insurgency]. And [although] it’s a very small area, most of the people [had] very good relations with each other. But they [were] living together because [of the many limits] on [Cyprus], especially for the villagers: “You shall share the soil. You shall share the water.” (T, M, 40s)

What I heard from my parents [was] that both communities were living together in the villages, cities and the other regions. Honestly speaking, we [did not] have any serious recorded violations or troubles within the communities up to let’s say 1960. (T, M, over 50)

Collectively, communities appear to believe that they can live together and share the island of Cyprus. The second extract above recalls that there were no serious recorded violations or troubles up to 1960. Though I would say the late 1950s were violent,
such conflict was not specifically inter-communal. Illustrated by these extracts and graphs, the nationalist parties within each community have been weakened in recent years by the changing political landscape of Cyprus. The election of former trade unionist as leaders (Loizides, 2005) should have supplied the political opportunity for an alternative set of memories to become established. Yet, it appears that the AKEL have not been able to change the landscape from the perspective of Turkish Cypriots like Denktash (Denktash and Moran, 2009). Moreover, the moderate political actors were unable to bridge the chasm that remained between the communities. As will be clear, the Turkish Cypriot position did not change as a result of Talat replacing Denktash, though the Turkish Cypriot position has hardened with Talat’s replacement by Eroglu (Economist, 2010).

Yet the respondents also suggest communities had worked together before the violent political dispute arose, according to the Greek Cypriot below. This Greek Cypriot respondent, from the AKEL party, suggests that the communities worked in the same jobs and no problems arose until EOKA in 1955:

So we have common villages. People working the same jobs […] and in general there was an interaction between the two communities. No problems arise until [EOKA]. (G, M, 40s)

While relations were perceived to have been reasonable by sections within both communities, it was not a universal perception. There was also a perception of geographical difference; villages and towns that were mixed were perceived to have better relations compared to more homogenous ones (Reddaway, 1986; Weinstein, 2007). The interviewees below question why communities may interact as well as the underlying tensions:

People who were living in mixed villages did have relations. From what I know from people living at that time, there were few issues but the Greeks were richer and mostly Turkish Cypriots were working for Greek Cypriots. There was an economic inferiority. (T, F, 20s)

From [19]63 to [19]74, I would say that it was [a] relation of necessity because you [had] to interact with the other to sell your things, sell your products. (G, M, over 50)
From these extracts, relations between the communities had an economic aspect on which other respondents may choose not to dwell upon. The economic differences have been claimed to be a result of the tradition amongst Turkish Cypriots to work for the authorities and Greek Cypriots to work in commerce. However, this is too simple a division as Turkish Cypriots have also been involved in commerce and Greek Cypriots were certainly involved in administration (Panteli, 1990). Moreover, one of the interviewees was a businessman himself and involved in the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce. But since 1963-4, the Turkish Cypriots may have found it difficult to sell their goods or trade with others given their community’s situation. Economic difficulties as a result of 1963-4 gave the political atmosphere an added level of animosity for elements of the Turkish Cypriot community. With the first forwarding the nationalist narrative while the other challenges that narrative, the two extracts below are both from female Turkish Cypriots who agree that relations were damaged as a result of 1963-4:

I guess [the communities] have always been apart [...] if you [had] neighbours, [you] may think differently, but on a community level, [1963-4] definitely damaged relations. [...] I had an uncle who was shot in the back by a [Greek Cypriot] neighbour. (T, F, 30s)

[There was] a development of the idea [that] ‘the two communities cannot live together, we must separate’ and there were many incidents [that] created an atmosphere of fear. [TMT] kept [Turkish Cypriots] inside [enclaves]. [TMT did not] let them out. Things were happening outside but it was exaggerated. Obviously, that changed the relations and led to less interaction between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots once the enclaves had been established. The Turkish Cypriots could not [easily] leave the restricted areas they were living in. These were difficult times. I think [relations were] more damaged in 1963. (T, F, 20s)

Those Turkish Cypriots not employed by their authorities felt their elite sought to keep Turkish Cypriots in enclaves, building upon myths that communities could not live together. This appears to be a recurring theme amongst the Turkish Cypriots, although they also blame Greek Cypriots for appearing to be making their lives more difficult (Denktash, 1988). Nationalist elements within both communities emphasised difference and division whilst moderate opponents argued that relations were cordial, though strained. In 1963-4, the Greek Cypriots were actively seeking ways to bring about enosis with Greece, disregarding Turkish Cypriot interests (Bose, 2007; Moran,
As Greek nationalism and the taksim movement developed, violence and divisions became more pronounced (Cranshaw, 1978):

[Enosis] was more like a vision than a [goal]. Of course you have to have in mind that it was not very easy. It was very difficult for the Greek Cypriots leadership at the same time [as] people were prepared for [enosis], not for independence. [It] was not an easy task to change their minds. [AKEL] was [the] only [party] supporting [independence] at that time. [Most of] the Greek Cypriot community [had not] accepted the new independent state. (G, M, 40s)

[The last Ottoman governor, when he] welcomed the British Government before handing authority and administration [over], [he] saw [an enosis] demonstration [and] personally requested the British Government [to arrest] those demonstrators just to keep the peace and the order. [I point this out as] I am trying to be objective as much as I can. [...] this shows there [is] a Greek Cypriot fanaticism in the island, I'm not generalising it but there are some people [within the] Greek Cypriot [community] that would like to join to Greece, [even today]. (T, M, over 50)

In other words, Greek Cypriots had made enosis their primary goal and anything less than enosis was probably considered a failure by Greek Cypriots at that time. From a neo-communist standpoint, the first respondent suggests that it would have been difficult to change Greek Cypriot minds at the time, given the insurgency had only ended four years before. As he states, the Greek Cypriots had not accepted the independent state of Cyprus. From a nationalist perspective, the Turkish Cypriot extract above illustrates the perspective of suspicion of Greek Cypriot nationalists and argues that a level of fanaticism remains within that community. This Turkish Cypriot suspects the retention of enosis is a political objective which is only forwarded as a token (PIO, 2010). The belief that enosis remains a political objective appears to be important for the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative. The Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative retains the demand for a separate territory within any solution (Denktash and Moran, 2009).

The pre-existing religious and language division were built upon by political and religious leaders and incorporated within the nationalist narratives. These stories and memories are designed to create boundaries between peoples (Fenton, 2003) so that territory can be claimed (Smith, 2004), controlled and exploited (Cramer, 2006). In
the case of Cyprus, some of the physical boundaries and borders existed prior to the independence of Cyprus:

[...] at that time there [were] riots and barricades [were setup], before the establishment of the Republic [in the 1950s], it was a sort of green line, it was a kind of border, in a way dividing the city. So, the situation, if we consider the walled city of Nicosia, in the northern part of that walled city the Turkish Cypriots were residing and in the south part the Greeks. This was obviously clear in 1963. (T, M, over 50)

The relationships between Turkish and Greek Cypriots have never been easy. One community is a majority that holds claim over the whole of the island and the other is a minority that sought to coexist together. I would not say that there was no cooperation between the communities but you have to look hard to find examples of it. Violence occurs because one sides aims to dominate the other side. That is how we must look at it and how the minority responds to this. (T, M, 40s)

I wouldn't say that [Cypriots] weren’t left alone to live together. There was real hatred that was planted. (T, F, 20s)

In other words, the division between the communities had existed physically before 1960 and such physical boundaries lagged behind the behavioural boundaries (Fenton, 2003; Anderson, 1995). Turkish Cypriots lived, in most cases, in Turkish Cypriot areas and met other Turkish Cypriots in their community’s coffee houses (Reddaway, 1986). The behavioural boundaries created the physical boundaries, reinforcing division. As the second respondent above notes, the relationship between Greek and Turkish Cypriots had never been easy but such boundaries made it more difficult.

The second Turkish Cypriot extract above also noted that the majority-minority relations were often strained over the governance of communities (Panteli, 1990; Denktash, 1988). Relations between communities fluctuated as violence resulted from attempted domination by the Greek Cypriot community, according to the second extract above. Having worked with the EU and the Turkish Cypriot government, this respondent noted that violence would result if the majority on the island sought to dominate the minority. Conversely, other respondents blamed division and violence on exogenous influences rather than domestic actors, though this habit distracts away from the altering perspectives. The habit of blaming exogenous actors may be a result of retaining elements of the social order (Poole, 2008; Booth, 2006):
[The] **British organised some special forces, police forces [and] a civil organisation against the Greek Cypriot** [and so created] a big [separation] between the two communities. This had changed everything [...]. **Turkey** tried to make Turkish Cypriots more [Turkish] and [Greece made] [Greek Cypriots] more nationalistic. (T, M, over 50)

[Most] Turkish Cypriot teachers who were the founders of [KTOS] **were members of the TMT [as well]**. **They played an important role because teachers were very important positions, social positions in the communities**. In every [village], teachers were leading the communities. (T, M, over 50)

Although there appear to be any number of perspectives and literature that points towards exogenous actors being ultimately responsible for the events on Cyprus (Mallinson 2005; Joseph, 1997), domestic actors hold key roles. The respondent above refers to teachers’ roles as vital members of local communities, holding an influential position over youngsters. Many teachers and youngsters were involved in direct action as was clear from Chapter Four (PIO, 2007). This same respondent also points out the influence trade unions had in opposition to the nationalist elements within both Cypriot communities (Mallinson, 2005; Reddaway, 1986), creating the divide within both communities:

[Communities] **had separate sport clubs**, they had separate coffee [shops]. **In the Greek Cypriot communities they have two groups.** Lefties and [the] right wing. [Which would] the [Greek] right-wing hate more? Turkish Cypriots or the Lefties? Because of that, the junta organised a [coup and on] capturing the [leftists], [Greek Cypriot were killing] each other. **In Turkish Cypriot communities we have some separation – lefties and we also have a right wing, especially. But it’s not as strong as Greek Cypriots.** (T, M, over 50)

This division has often been overlooked by some authors and analysis, many of which focus on the international sphere (Yennaris, 2003). This respondent had a trade union background and made similar points to Greek Cypriots of the same background. The divide that they emphasise is the one within rather than between communities (Reddaway, 1986; Cranshaw, 1978). As a result, there is a perception of improved links across the divide amongst moderates and trade unionists in opposition to nationalists within communities. This Turkish Cypriot respondent highlights the difference between Greek and Turkish Cypriots as Greek Cypriots having a more distinct political divide than the Turkish Cypriots, though this is disputed. The
nationalist element within the Turkish Cypriot community has been portrayed as closer to Turkey than the Greek Cypriot nationalists are to Greece (Loizides, 2005). The political climate remains as deeply divided between nationalists and opponents as it was in 1963-4 and this suggests why 1963-4 retains its relevancy.

Exogenous actors could be blamed for divisions between communities and the decisions of nationalist elements, according to Cypriots from both communities. The Greek Cypriot respondent below blamed divisions on the UK and claims that no violence within the communities existed. Though this comes from the AKEL perspective, it would not be credible to suggest no violence occurred within both communities, as it arguably did in the late 1950s and the 1960s (Panteli, 1990; Reddaway, 1986; Cranshaw, 1978). This respondent stated that the AKEL party, and its predecessors, had been organising Turkish Cypriots, mostly before 1963-4 as well as to a lesser extent after (Mallinson, 2006). Such memories suggest elements of collective unity but such institutions that involved Greek and Turkish Cypriots before violence took on different identities as a result of violence. Moreover, AKEL supported enosis in the 1950s, which led to many Turkish Cypriots leaving that organisation and founding their own Trade Union and political organisations (Moran, 1998; Reddaway, 1986):

But of course in those times, [AKEL was] working in favour of cooperation between the two communities. From the very beginning [and] before [AKEL, its predecessors] were organising Turkish Cypriots as well [so as] not to allow [the UK] to divide the people in order to rule us. So we didn't have Greek Cypriots kill or murder Greek Cypriots. (G, M, 40s)

For me I truly believe that [we should] set aside the stupid things that took place from both communities in [19]63. Because it was after the independence of Cyprus and Cyprus was not a real democracy [and] people who had their own guns or groups were armed, like in [“the Wild West”]. So there were many cases of Greek Cypriots – these stupid guys killing Turks or Turks killing Greek Cypriots. (G, M, over 50)

The Greek Cypriot respondent who worked for the European Union suggested those involved in violence were ‘stupid people’ and that the environment was like the ‘wild west’. This was reminiscent of other examples of environments of insecurity such as in Yugoslavia and Sub-Saharan Africa (Kaufmann, 2001; Bay and Donham, 2006). But such a period should not be put aside and forgotten, especially as it remains a key
element with in the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative (Gibbons, 1997; Patrick, 1976). 1963-4 explains why the Turkish Cypriots felt the need for a separate territory they could govern, and a wish to avoid Greek Cypriots entering such territory (Denktash, 1988). However, it may be necessary to forget individual violent events in the need to move on towards reconciliation and a solution (Minow, 1998). But such episodes should also be commemorated given their importance to peoples and communities. Previously, Cypriots were aware of the insecurity but tended to blame that insecurity on external influence rather than domestic interest (Mallinson, 2006; Yennaris, 2003). The environment that 1963-4 characterises tended to create fear within the smaller Turkish Cypriot community:

Turkish Cypriots viewed this as a way of doing away with them, either by force of arms [or attempts to subjugate them and turning them into second grade citizens. This was reinforced when] the two communities became more and more alienated as a result of the enosis movement’s campaign. These people developed separate existences way before [1963] and again I come to my main point whether you see Cyprus as an island of Greeks, Armenians and others or whether you see [Cyprus’] character as essentially dualist. Dualism is in the essence of Cyprus. (T, M, over 50)

The pain of remembering the violent environment of 1963-4 has led Turkish Cypriots to view the situation today as relatively stable, given the physical divide as a result of 1974. The present political situation has given credence to the perspective that Cyprus has a dualist character rather than an island with a single identity (Hitchens 1997). This dualism within the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative (Denktash and Moran, 2009) contrasts with the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative that views the situation as a majority Greek Cypriot community living alongside minorities (Yennaris, 2003; PIO, 2010). In the Turkish Cypriot narrative, the Greek Cypriots have been portrayed as seeking to impose their vision on the Turkish Cypriots by use of force (James, 2002; Gibbons, 1997), opening the gates to the ‘wild west’ environment. Greek Cypriot attempts to impose a solution were countered by the Turkish Cypriot elite’s attempt to retain its influence on part, if not all of Cyprus. This dualism versus the unitary perspective remains key to the conflict between communities as well as fuelling the conflicts within communities.
5.4 Institutional

The circumventing of state apparatus resulted from Turkish Cypriot suspicion of state institutions, such as the police force or the justice system, as a result of 1963-4 (Moran, 1998; Reddaway 1986). The 1963-4 period of violent events was seen to have effected relations and attitudes amongst institutions. The 1963-4 period of violence also affected institutions in the sense that this period resulted in a new set of institutions which took away the perceived authority of the pre-existing institutions. Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the respondents’ perspectives of institutions attitudes as a result of the 1963-4 period of violence. The Greek Cypriot response in Figure 8 was a highly negative -218. 48.2% of Greek Cypriot respondents registered their answer as the most negative, while another 17.2% registered a more moderate negative response. As this episode of violence led to the creation of the new set of Turkish Cypriot institutions, a strong response could have been envisaged amongst Greek Cypriots. However, Figure 7 also has similar patterns of response amongst Turkish Cypriots, suggesting they have similar thoughts on institutional attitudes as a result of 1963-4. The new set of institutions was created when all that was perceived to have been needed was compromise within the pre-existing institutions. The results mean the perception of the two separate authorities was negative and their negative attitudes were the result of failure to compromise.

![Figure 7](image_url)
How has the 1963-4 period of violence affected the political attitudes of Republic of Cyprus institutions and Turkish Cypriots structures?

According to responses illustrated in Figures 9 and 10, the relations between these institutions were perceived to have also been negatively affected. The Greek Cypriot negative score was -227 and 51.7% responded at the highest level. The second highest number was in column 2 with 20.6% of responses. Similar features appear in both graphs, suggesting Greek and Turkish Cypriots share perspectives regarding institutional relations. Greek Cypriot institutions remain recognised by the outside world, except by Turkey which recognises the Turkish Cypriot institutions (PIO, 2010). Although the Turkish Cypriot institutions provide services and security, their existence and legality remain disputed (Mallinson 2005; Coufoudakis, 2006). The existence of the opposing institutions possibly assisted Greek Cypriot claims of the need for economic restrictions as such territories were considered secessionist (Reddaway, 1986; Coufoudakis, 2006). Clashes and economic hardships contributed to Turkish Cypriots becoming more dependent upon handouts received from Turkey (Tamkoc, 1988; Denktash, 1988). The refusal to recognise the opposing institutions led to the bodies never having official relations. Leaderships did contact each other in negotiations after 1967 but often as attempts at resolving issues or setting arrangements within specific areas, such as sewerage (PIO, 2010).
How has the 1963-4 period of violence affected the political relations between Republic of Cyprus institutions and Turkish Cypriot structures?

Figure 9

As at the community level, nationalism and identity politics influenced the development of institutions. While politicized ethnicity kept a gulf between the two sides, those in power used the institutions against their opponents, according to sources and respondents (Bose, 2007; Yennaris, 2003; Reddaway, 1986):

But, [until] the [19]60s, as a Cypriot, you cannot learn to be a good Turkish nationalist. Then [nationalists are] starting to [isolate] us to [teach nationalism] in the ghettos. And the [big thing] there [was] that you are good Turks, [saying] “look, you should be proud of your national identities
and you should fight for it.” And most of the time, in the period 1960 to 1964, they also killed protesting people, leftist people. So it’s kind of two sides: Turks and the Greek Cypriots [sought] to create nationalism.

(T, M, 40s)

For Turkish Cypriot respondents, nationalism manifested itself and then reinforced itself through these institutions. Though Turkish nationalism on Cyprus appears to be a response to Greek Cypriot nationalism, their nationalism has been supported and reinforced by the only source of help to Turkish Cypriots, Turkey (Yennaris, 2003, Panteli, 1990). The incidences of opponents being attacked and silenced may well have occurred within both Cypriot communities, though we must not assume such episodes happen now. Instead, the memory of such events and the nationalist rhetoric may often succeed in much the same way. After 1963, the developments of institutions kept the two communities separate and may have become part of the problem, in the eyes of many Cypriots:

Now between 1963 and 1974 the Turkish Cypriots who were working in the Government institutions like hospitals. For education, it was separate during the republic. There were some schools for both communities but mainly both communities were going to their own educational institutions. I am talking about between 1960 and 1974, [a division or] something like that was established and most of the public services were performed with this [division]. The money was coming from Turkey. So Turkey has started to support the Turkish Cypriots, or [their] administration, from 1963. (T, M, over 50)

This respondent stated that many Turkish Cypriot professionals moved to the new government institutions from the Republic’s institutions. The reasons why they did not work for the Republic’s institutions after 1963-4 remains disputed. According to some sources (Denktash, 1988; Reddaway, 1986), Turkish Cypriots were forced out of the Republic’s institutions while Turkish members of the parliament were apparently barred (Denktash and Moran, 2009). Other sources have claimed that the Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite forced individual Turkish Cypriots not to work for the Republic’s institutions, through fines and intimidation (Yennaris, 2003). These standpoints both portray a position of victim for the communities, either through the barring of posts or the withdrawal from employment.

Other sources suggest communities were cooperating on other levels, such as trade unions (Panteli, 1990), as governmental institutions had become a source of division.
in the eyes of Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriot trade unionist below notes that his organisation, the Turkish Cypriot Teachers Trade Union (KTOS), was involved in building links between the communities’ non-governmental institutions:

Up to [the 19]50s, both communities were living and cooperating together under the same umbrella [organisations:] organised many struggles against [the political leaderships], doing it together. Well first, especially teachers [were] playing a very important role to create pressure under the nationalistic Greek Cypriots [and under the] nationalistic Turkish Cypriots. Education systems consist of lots of lots of nationalistic elements. And the [KTOS] founders tried to do many things but they didn’t manage [to alter the education system]. [Greek Cypriots] have also trade unions but the main problem [was] the big unions were communist and they were under the influence of Soviet Union at that time [, the Greek Cypriot establishment] set up their union organisation, which are nationalistic. Getting support from the [Orthodox] church. (T, M, over 50)

Some elements within the communities developed links and encouraged dialogue before a hardening of positions occurred between 1964 and 1974 (Reddaway, 1986). The hardening of positions occurred on both sides of the divide, primarily due to nationalist pressures (Stavrinides, 1999). This suggests wide divisions within communities as well as divisions between communities. Despite these divisions and pressures, negotiations between communities from 1967 to 1974 could have led to a unitary system with limited rights for Turkish Cypriots (Coufoudakis, 2006). Greek Cypriot respondents referred to this period of negotiation to an extent while Turkish Cypriots often did not, although the respondent below was Turkish Cypriot. As Turkish Cypriots were vulnerable after years of enclavement, concessions were offered which possibly would not have been offered in other periods:

There weren’t any negotiations [but then] negotiation happened [in 19]67 and [it was] important of course because three years makes some changes. (T, M, over 50)

As this Turkish Cypriot notes, the situation had changed in the three years after 1964 and negotiations were needed. The Greek Cypriots had not been able to force the Turkish Cypriots into accepting majority rule (Stavrinides, 1999). As a result, the Greek Cypriots sought a way to negotiate the return of the Turkish Cypriots into the Republic of Cyprus. For the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative:
The government of Cyprus took various measures to restore normalcy on the island. These steps resulted in the elimination of inter-communal violence and dramatic reduction of tensions between the two communities. The government also offered economic incentives to Turkish Cypriots, who had been forced by their leaders to move to Turkish controlled enclaves, to return to their homes. The Turkish side did not reciprocate, maintaining, instead, roadblocks in order to keep Greek Cypriots from Turkish enclaves. (PIO a, 2010, 38)

The Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative considered this period promising, supposedly bringing the communities back together through economic incentives. There is only mention of Turkish Cypriot-imposed isolation, while other sources have suggested that similar roadblocks were controlled by the Greek Cypriots (Denktash, 1988; Reddaway, 1986). The Greek Cypriot respondent below suggests that the political parties on the left were working together to find a form of re-integration:

The political parties of the left were trying to support each other, working together under the same trade unions. **There is a tendency to forget these efforts in building [links] and friendship.** We are talking about political parties that had the support of 30% [of Greek Cypriot population - and as a result of] economic re-integrations by then end of [19]67, the communities were working together again. And there is also a tendency to forget [this issue]. The main reason is because there was an effort to bring integration [that] would [have ended] up wounding the Greek Cypriot community more. (G, M, 20s)

This re-integration was also referred to in the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative:

These talks had achieved considerable progress and, according to some reports, were close to success, when they were interrupted by the tragic events of 1974. (PIO a, 2010; 38)

The leaderships’ positions changed as a result of 1963-4, resulting in a weaker negotiating position for the Turkish Cypriots who had only the support of Turkey (Denktash and Moran, 2009). On the Greek Cypriot side, the nationalist narrative has been that no contacts or relations existed between the Greek dominated institutions and new Turkish Cypriot structures (PIO, 2010; Yennaris, 2003). Even if Turkish Cypriot institutions were built from the Republic’s institutions as existed prior to 1963-4, the Greek Cypriots claim that there are no legitimate authorities existing
beyond Greek Cypriot controlled areas. This makes developing a working relationship between negotiating teams difficult but not impossible:

**Officially there are no relations. The institutions in the occupied area are not recognised.** Therefore there are no official relations. In practice, no. (G, M, 20s)

I think the only level where there was interaction was on the level of the [community leaders and those] who worked on the master-plan and the sewage. The two municipalities got together, but I don’t think there [were relations] you know [as] there wasn’t real infrastructure. (G, F, 40s)

The Greek Cypriot government was seen as unwilling to negotiate with any Turkish Cypriot institutions not identified under the 1960 constitution. The municipalities were recognised under the 1960 constitution, as were the communal chambers, although literature suggests such bodies were not developed fully under the constitution (Markides, 2001). The Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative argued that the Turkish Cypriots had always intended to separate themselves. Disputing this, the Turkish Cypriot narrative may have considered separation a possible outcome and seen it as an alternative to a unified system (Denktash, 1988). However:

[Turkish Cypriots] had let say their own judge who would examine cases involving Turkish Cypriots in these local areas, [they] were not recognised and worked poorly. It’s like Indian reservations in the States, […] they managed their own affairs. That was not a recognised thing. (G, M, over 50)

Separate services had existed within the Turkish Cypriot community, as this Greek Cypriot puts it. It may not have been a recognised way but Turkish Cypriots had handled their own affairs, certainly after the events of 1963-4. While the Greek Cypriot narrative may see this as unrecognised, Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative would suggest that Turkish Cypriots had never needed central government and had always governed themselves:

**But we have never had central government. Even in 1960 the two federated states had their own education systems. What would central government give us.** Actually there have been no [interactions] between institutions, we have a foreign ministry and we have been governing ourselves ever since. [Relations] have been minimal to non-existent. What little relations that did exist were damaged [significantly] by 1963-4. (T, F, 30s)
Like other respondents from the Turkish Cypriot institutions, this interviewee suggests that the existence of institutions and bodies means a separate and equal state exists amongst Turkish Cypriots (Denktash and Moran, 2009). As the Turkish Cypriot nationalist elite attached little importance in building relations with the Greek Cypriots, there remains little to suggest compromise is likely from their part of the community. Such devolved control of services also harks back to the Ottoman millet system that had given the Greek Cypriots a substantial level of autonomy, allowing their nationalism to develop (Reddaway, 1986). Similar to the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative, the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative presents relations as having been damaged by the violence of 1963-4. Forwarding the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative, this respondent argued that the increased involvement of communal chambers meant devolved government was central in the 1960 constitution:

**We have Turkish communal chambers and Greek Cypriot communal chambers.** We are acting as if we had a federation and these were the two local governments. Then the Republic of Cyprus was the central problem. These chambers were entitled to collect taxes, introduce laws to the [biggest] communities. So basically that federation then was not a federation but some kind of a federation between the communities, bi-communal. *(T, M, over 50)*

Forwarded as part of the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative, this extract suggests such an expansion of role has been a clear development from before 1960 to the present. Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative emphasised the illegality of Turkish Cypriot institutions and trumpeted the continued legitimacy of Greek Cypriot dominated institutions.

The nationalist narratives in both communities appear to be increasingly challenged by those who perceive these narratives as having kept the existing elites in power. Not all Turkish Cypriots forwarded the nationalist narrative perspective that there had always been a separateness of communities. This Turkish Cypriot respondent suggests that the Turkish Cypriot leadership may have sought separation but the community always wanted reunification, as part of a federated state:
Well, basically it is developed from a federated state in 1960. In 1963 the Turkish Cypriots broke away. For some time, it was the federated state of Turkish Cypriots. It was a state that in a way sought reunification. (T, F, 20s)

Like many Turkish Cypriots, the Greek Cypriot activist below noted that the UNFICYP was sent to Cyprus under a resolution that inadvertently legitimised the Greek Cypriot-dominated government (James, 2002). Such a resolution was in aid of sending the UNFICYP force, which, according to this Greek Cypriot respondent, had a major impact on the Cyprus conflict. This and the previous extract suggest an alternative perspective is developing separate to the nationalist narratives. Evidence that elements within both communities have sought ways to promote forms of reconciliation and build relations across the divide has increased in recent years:

So the government of Cyprus, in 1964 was Greek Cypriot only, and became legitimised in order to get the UN to the island. [UN Resolution 186 in 1964] is one thing that makes [an] impact on the island. In order to keep the peace, the Greek Cypriots were recognised as the government to get the UN on the island and [was] interpreted by the international community as the Turkish Cypriots accepting the government of Cyprus. (G, F, 40s)

The Turkish Cypriots believed that they [UNFICYP] were there to protect them from violence as Turkey was unable to intervene. The Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, saw this force as coming to help them suppress a rebellion by Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots look upon them differently but want to keep them here for political reasons. (T, M, over 50)

UN Security Council Resolution 186 was the basis of Greek Cypriot claims of legitimacy. This resolution recognised that a state existed within the territory so that UN peacekeepers could be sent. This event is considered a legitimisation of the government of Cyprus in the eyes of the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative (PIO, 2010) and a tragic farce in the eyes of the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative (Moran, 1998; Denktash, 1988). The resolution could be considered a serious setback for the chances of reunification:

We have no participation in it and we have no say in it. And yet they claim and [are] accepted [by] the outside world as the true [Republic of Cyprus enshrined in the 1960 constitution]. I don't know what you would call it but it is a scandal of the 20th century [to] have a whole segment of society says that ‘you are not my government and I don't accept you as my
government’. The problem has remained before and since Turkish intervention in 1974, so no one can blame it on the Turkish arrival and presence. It is a symptom but not the cause. (T, M, over 50)

[The Turkish Cypriot institutions] are at least as real as [the Greek Cypriot government]. The only difference is that we do not claim to [represent] anyone other than ourselves. We are the government from the people of the people and for the people. (T, M, over 50)

The Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative appears to view the existence of their institutions as proof of their equal validity. The nationalist narratives appear to have different ways in which they perceive their conflict since violent events; the Greek Cypriot narrative champions a legal route since violence while the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative centres on the fait accompli. The government system on Cyprus after 1963 may not be the same system designated in the 1960 constitution. The Greek Cypriot narrative argues that government continued under the Republic of Cyprus, citing the Security Council Resolution 186. The Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative forwards the opposing view that the legitimate governance of Cyprus ended in 1963. Moreover, evidence suggests not all avenues were explored before the communities sought to enforce their objectives in December 1963 (Reddaway, 1986).

The influence of the Orthodox Church over government and institutions was also an element explored, primarily by the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative. It was a mentioned in the Greek Cypriot narrative as well but suggested the Churches supporting role within society rather than any direct involvement in politics. It should be made clear that Archbishop Makarios was both the President and the head of the Church for much of the Cyprus conflict, until his death in 1977 (Reddaway, 1986; Mayes, 1981):

The [Orthodox] church [remains] a very important and powerful institution in the Greek Cypriot community. Potentially, they can control the system. It has positioned itself as the founding institution of Christianity on Cyprus. This is part of the nationalist ideology. (T, M, over 50)

The Orthodox Church remained a very influential institution within the Greek Cypriot community and a key social institution (Papadakis, 2008; Loizides, 2007). It has major influence on individual thinking and social behaviour, especially amongst nationalist elements. The influence of the Church involves the education system
which remains, to this day, a vitally important organ for the Church to retain influence (Economist, 2010; Hannay, 2005). On the Turkish Cypriot side, the nationalist narrative also tends to be a defining influence on the education system but not through a religious body and has recently gone through a number of changes (Papadakis, 2008). Such a change suggested that an alternative was being sought to improve the chances of a resolution (Papadakis, 2008), though such changes can easily be reversed. This demonstrates the fluidity of the situation in Cyprus despite the overall narrative of stasis since 1974, which both nationalist narratives have presented. This stasis has been a result of the failure to handle the key issue of what system of government can be implemented that both parties can accept:

And this has been going on for the last 40 years, since 1968, more than 40 years. Try to bring the parties together. The basic problem was academic; [negotiations] couldn't come up with a formula of federation for the Cypriots to agree on. (T, M, over 50)

5.6 Summary

The respondents appear to remember that interactions were neighbourly but that tensions resulted from problems of governance. The quantitative evidence suggests relations between individuals suffered extensive damage as a result of the 1963-4 period of violence. As a result of violence, suspicion and fear were seen to have developed on both sides. Whether passed down within the family as well as through media and representations, individual memories of 1963-4 suggest many Cypriots perspectives support and forward the nationalist narratives. There are clearly individuals who have an opposing perspective to the nationalist narratives and have remained an important counterweight.

Interactions were perceived to have been damaged by violence at the level of communities, although respondents from both communities qualified their answers. It was noted that community identities developed to produce two nationalisms that contributed towards violence on a collective scale. The opposing views and similar distinctions have moulded Cypriot responses, to varying degrees, within the nationalist narratives. While the Turkish Cypriot viewed separation as a necessity, such objectives were perceived as a secessionist policy by Greek Cypriots. However, as has previously been mentioned, the power of nationalist narratives had been
increasingly questioned through the diffusion of media and developments in technology.

Compared to the individual or inter-personal levels, attitudes and relations at the institutional level were markedly more damaged by 1963-4, according to the quantitative evidence. The events before 1963-4 allowed for the establishment of Turkish Cypriot institutions (Denktash, 1988). Following on from the inter-personal level, the institutions reinforced the ‘necessity of autonomy’ versus the ‘plot of secession’ perspective of the separate Cypriot communities. Interviewees agreed that little or no interaction occurred amongst institutions as neither set recognised the other. There was some interaction and negotiation began after 1967 but much of this occurred between the political parties and bodies that controlled the institutions. Overall, it does suggest that communities may be more willing to compromise but institutions have acted as obstacles to compromise. Moreover, there remain strong dynamics within communities that may slow the process of reconciliation (Booth, 2006).

5.7 Conclusion
This chapter has illustrated the memories and perceptions of Cypriots from both communities in respect of the 1963-4 period of violence. This chapter has used graphs and direct extracts from interviews with Cypriots to highlight the relations between individuals as well as relations and attitudes of communities and institutions. These results suggest that amongst communities, attitudes and relations were perceived to have been damaged by the 1963-4 period of violence. Relations and attitudes of institutions appear very limited as separate Turkish Cypriot institutions developed as a result of 1963-4. Meanwhile, relations between individuals appear to have been fairly consistent in their tolerance, though relations were damaged by violent events. Memories of respondents suggest the tolerance and neighbourly environment that had existed before inter-communal violence was damaged severely. Divisive interpretations of memories have formed the nationalist narratives that remain influential in Cypriot communities. But new interpretations of those memories may challenge the nationalist narratives and may lead to a reinterpretation of those narratives if the nationalist elites wish to avoid irrelevancy. The memories presented here reflect the basis of such a challenge.
CASE STUDY 1974

6.1 Introduction
This research used both quantitative and qualitative methods for collecting data on Cypriot perspectives of the 1974 intervention by Turkey, results of which are set out in this chapter. The analysis will use the same levels as before: the individual; interpersonal; and the institutional level. References will be made to transcriptions and graphs position throughout this chapter. Discussion of the implications of such data occurs in the subsequent chapter, once all data has been presented.

6.2 Disputed events of 1974
The events of 1974 are so multi-layered and complex that it remains inherently difficult to unravel facts from the myths that surround the Greek coup and the Turkish intervention\(^{15}\). However, both events occurred and the Turkish intervention itself had two phases (PIO, 2010, Yennaris, 2003). Nevertheless, Cypriots clashed both within the context of the coup and the subsequent Turkish action. From a relative position of neutrality, the first interviewee noted that events included invasion but also attacks on Turkish Cypriot enclaved areas (Gibbons, 1997). Such memories of the conflict would not fit well within the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative but were in aid of their nationalist objectives, at that time. Memories of communities turning on each other could be of use to the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative, though there was evidence of Turkish Cypriot militia involvement as well. The second extract, from a Turkish Cypriot, highlights some key stages and suggests the US and the UK knew of Turkish plans (Assmussen, 2008). Other sources argue that Turkey had asked for other exogenous actors to intervene (Assmussen, 2008; Reddaway, 1986) alongside Turkey. The Turkish Cypriot respondent below also highlights the violence within the Greek Cypriot community:

Then you have [19]74 and you get another two outbreaks of violence, you have the coup against Makarios and then you have the invasion. And what was happening during the invasion was that not only did you have the military confrontation but you had attacks on the enclaves, where you had Cypriots turning on Cypriots. (Third party, M)

\(^{15}\) For the details of 1974, there are many books including O’Malley and Craig (2001) as well as other more nuanced books, including Asmussen (2008).
The basic attacks were first of all against the civilian government. Then second was against the socialist/communist party. [Papers support the argument] that the British and the USA knew about the first intervention by the Turkish army on the 20th of July. What they did not like was the second one, the 16th of August. (T, M, over 50)

Now after [1974] the problem was that there was no interaction between the two communities at all because the Greek Cypriots were expelled from their properties. About 20,000 stayed behind and about, almost, 200,000 came to the South. Turkish Cypriots were obliged by the Turks to move to the North for protection or for whatever reasons. So there was a geographical division between the two communities. (G, M, over 50)

The third respondent above concentrates his focus on the consequences of 1974 in terms of relations between the communities. This Greek Cypriot is an example of how his community primarily remembers the events of 1974, not the coup but the consequences. The Greek Cypriot narrative would also suggest that little or no physical division existed before 1974. But the existing literature and other extracts suggest that the coup occurred and that division existed prior to 1974 (Bose, 2007; Stravrinides, 1999; Panteli, 1990; Reddaway 1986). Those Greek Cypriots that did recall the coup argued events were originally an internal Greek matter and not something Turkish Cypriots were involved in. The coup was against a Greek Cypriot government by Greek Cypriots (Attalides, 1979). But if that Greek Cypriot government claims authority over all of Cyprus (PIO, 2010), such actions would affect Turkish Cypriots. If Greek Cypriots had not claimed to be the one legitimate government, then Turkish Cypriots would not have had cause to worry:

But this had [nothing] to do with their relationships with Turkish Cypriots. It was more a local power game. [Within] the Greek Cypriot community, who would get power? There were many left [wingers] who died in the invasion. And the reason was they were prisoners of the [extreme nationalists]. And they were sent to the front line. Because they were sent there without weapons. (G, M, 20s)

[Cyprus] was not going [Turkey’s] way and they decided to [intervene]. There was about 5,000 dead, 1,500 missing, about 200,000 refugees misplaced, losing all their properties. It could be perceived that [Turkish actions] reinstalled the Constitution. For the Turkish Cypriots, the general belief [is that] the Cyprus problem was resolved in 1974. (G, M, 20s)

References made to such events in the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative were limited in their scope:
On 15 July 1974, the Greek military junta and its Greek Cypriot collaborators carried out a coup against the democratically elected president of Cyprus. Using this criminal act as a pretext, Turkey invaded Cyprus five days later. (PIO a, 2010; 39)

Leftist AKEL supporters who surrendered to extreme nationalists and were not executed by fellow Greek Cypriots (Assmussen, 2008; Drousiotis, 2006; Reddaway, 1986) were sent to the frontline with Turkish forces, according to this Greek Cypriot leftist above. The Greek Cypriot respondent suggested that Turkish Cypriots believed the problems had been resolved through the victimisation of the Greek Cypriots. Although secure in terms of territory, Turkish Cypriots have concluded that they remain isolated and some consider this isolation their community’s victimisation (Denktash and Moran, 2009). The Turkish Cypriot below voices his concern over events and how those events have been treated since:

And intervening was supposed to be restoring the constitutional order. Turkey had to protect the rights of the Cypriots altogether. But what happened [was] 180,000 Greek Cypriots had fled and 30,000 [Turkish Cypriots moved] from the south to the north of Cyprus. This was not protection of the rights of inhabitants or citizens of the Republic of Cyprus either. (T, M, over 50)

As this Turkish Cypriot puts it, the events of 1974 did not resolve the conflict and it did not protect the rights of individuals, except in terms of security. Many Turkish and Greek Cypriots lost homes and property and have been often unable to claim compensation since (PIO, 2010; Denktash and Moran, 2009). From within the TRNC Foreign Ministry, a Turkish Cypriot stated that the events of 1974 happened and that the Turkish Cypriots had no guarantees under the pre-existing arrangements. As this is coming from a Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative position, such a view has been propagated widely in the past:

What was done was done. There were no guarantees to the Turkish people. Even now Turkish people are afraid [as we] don’t believe that it is very safe for us. (T, F, 30s)

Though such standpoints may be retained publically, other perspectives have been forming to challenge the established nationalist narrative. The recognition of 1974’s consequences appears to have been accepted by many Turkish Cypriots. Yet this respondent suggests that the Turkish Cypriots have been unable to talk about such issues publicly, due to the nationalist narrative and nationalist political elite:
In [19]74, there was a war, and our story was that. **We don’t talk about how many people were killed,** or [how many] the Turkish Army killed. **We don’t talk about the refugee issue** that has been a big issue for the Greek Cypriots but not in ours. **We don’t talk about what those people went through.** (T, F, 20s)

I would also say that 1974 was a consequence of the inter-communal violence in 1963-4. (T, M, 40s)

Many Turkish Cypriot responses suggest their community have considered the events of 1974 as an unwanted solution, if a solution at all. As well as an event of serious consequences, 1974 was partly considered a consequence of the 1963-4 period of violence. I suggest that 1974 was indirectly a consequence of 1963-4, due to the damage 1963-4 exerted on relations and attitudes of Cypriots. But were those consequences a result of the actual events or the representation of those events? Turkish Cypriots are not ungrateful for the actions of Turkey but remain concerned over Turkey’s policies and intentions, as well as the consequences. These perspectives suggest a complexity of opinion within both the Turkish Cypriot community and, to a lesser extent, within the Greek Cypriot community. Much of this complexity results from the interchangeable interpretation of events of 1974.

**6.3 Individual**

At the individual level, the 1974 intervention by Turkey in Cyprus had an overwhelming effect on relations amongst individuals. As is made clear in the graphs below, the majority of Cypriots responded that the effect that 1974 had on relations between individuals was highly negative. In Figure 12, the Greek Cypriot negative score was a very strong -218 while the one significant percentage was in column 1, at 50%. In Figure 11, the Turkish Cypriots demonstrate a similar pattern of response. This suggests Turkish Cypriots saw relations being damaged by events supposedly enacted for their benefit. Such a response could be considered unsurprising, given many individuals have been unable to visit previous homes and interact with Greek Cypriot friends. Between 1974 and 2003, the only way that Cypriots could interact was either in western countries or in Pyla.
How has the 1974 intervention affected the political relations between individual Greek and Turkish Cypriots?

**Figure 11**

How has the 1974 intervention affected the political relations between individual Greek and Turkish Cypriots?

**Figure 12**

In interviews, many respondents refer to individual interactions between communities as warm and hospitable before they were no longer possible. Since 2003, relations between individuals have increased, but:

So believe it or not and this is still valid, the number has dropped [but] Greek Cypriots cross [the buffer zone] but they don’t purchase [items] from the north. Now, the majority of the Greek Cypriots who are crossing to the north, are going to the Casinos, [and] they are spending a lot. (T, M, over 50)
Relations were made impossible by the events of 1974 and few new relationships developed as a result of the buffer-zone opening in 2003. For a notable proportion of Cypriots, interaction since 2003 has mostly been for economic reasons. Shared memories of the older generations seem to have assisted them in re-establishing relationships lost in 1974, including the nationalists themselves on an individual level:

**But then if you look at [nationalists], they are really happy and positive, [on a] person to person relationship. They work together.** They were the first ones to cross the green line in 2003 to meet their friends in the Turkish Cypriot community. But then when it comes to the settlement they are benefiting from the existing discord and they want this to carry on. So, people to people we never had a big problem. **Even with the nationalist groups.** But at the end of the day, if one day [people] come or they meet a Turkish Cypriot friend in the south, they have no hard feelings between them. **There is no hate between the ordinary people.** (T, M, over 50)

On an individual basis, many of those involved in conflicts and violence do not have any personal animosity towards individuals from the opposing community (Kalyvas, 2006; Wolff, 2006; Petersen, 2002). However, this does not mean political parties are willing to sacrifice political positions and interests, as nationalists often benefit from the existing discord (Smith, 2004; Kaufmann, 2001). This supports the argument that the nationalists have benefited from the division and retention of conflict, in terms of retaining political influence and personal position. Individuals whose influence and position have been extended include figures such as Rauf Denktash who may seek to create a personal legacy.

Given the economic hardships that the north of the island has suffered since 1974, the next extract below refers to the feelings when people cross the buffer-zone:

**It has psychological satisfaction, relaxation for a Turkish Cypriot to cross to the southern part of Cyprus. In a way the psychological therapy** for the Turkish Cypriots is the same with the Greek Cypriots [crossing north]. (T, M, over 50)

For Cypriots, there appears to be a sense of foreign-ness when Greek and Turkish Cypriots cross the buffer-zone. This division may have widened as a result and individuals may no longer consider unification possible given this sense of difference. After thirty-five years, the different economic and social situations of the two halves
of Cyprus may make reunification impractical. As well as this sense of the foreign, the sense of loss as a result of 1974 was all-encompassing and not exclusively Greek Cypriot. It appears widely thought that roughly a third of all Greek Cypriots were internally displaced as a result of 1974 (PIO, 2010; Yennaris, 2003). There is little mention of the Turkish Cypriot refugees who were also moved as a result of 1974, though the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative refers to their plight (Denktash and Moran, 2009). However, such feelings of loss did not correspond to a hatred of individuals:

For the Greek Cypriots it’s worse. And of course [many] grew up without a father. It [is] whole communities that grew up, children growing up with only one parent or [relative]. (G, M, 20s)

It was a visit organised by the American Embassy for American University graduates. So we went to the North, organised by the American Embassy. We were received by Turkish Cypriots. We were received like I mean like brothers and it was amazing. I mean this is something which says to me that the people, [we] didn’t have a problem with each other. (G, M, over 50)

The nationalist narratives may well accept and exploit the thinking amongst Greek and Turkish Cypriots that no problems occurred amongst individuals. The Greek nationalist narrative may suggest that only the Turkish Cypriot elite ever wanted to be separate from the rest of Cyprus (PIO, 2010). Turkish Cypriot nationalists may argue they had no problems with Greek Cypriot individuals, as long as Turkish Cypriots had the same rights (Denktash and Moran, 2009). Yet, as a result of 1974 and the lack of interaction up till 2003, few relationships have developed amongst the younger generations:

So, the new generation feel differently, they have [a] different perception of things. Now you hear, they have meetings, I mean people who lost their brothers/sisters and they say “Look we don’t have anything against each other. I don’t blame [them]”. (G, M, over 50)

On an individual basis most people, like most Mediterranean people, are warm, but even on an individual level there is sometimes a problem. When I was serving in New York my kids and my wife lived there as well and they [meet] with Greek Cypriots. But when you say you were Turkish Cypriots, they said ‘oh, but you are supposed to be our enemies’. It is not all happy, generally speaking, [but] I don’t think it’s a problem between or among individuals. (T, M, over 50)
Like previous respondents, Cypriots appeared to feel that individuals never really had problems with those of the other community, even those who had lost members of their family. While both respondents above had nationalist narrative perspectives and both referred to relations being warm, it was the Turkish Cypriot who noted the problems amongst individuals from opposing communities. This same respondent also suggest that when the Turkish Cypriots sought to establish an economy; it was Greek Cypriot individuals who sought to create ‘difficulties’:

**Then the Greek Cypriots did not want [Turkish Cypriots] to establish an economy in our enclave.** So [Turkish Cypriots] who wanted to buy new cars, build a new house, they were all restrained with the difficulties [put in place] by the people waiting outside of the enclave. (T, M, over 50)

The difficulties included the disputed roadblocks between the communities that resulted in little or no economic interaction. For Greek Cypriots, their nationalist narrative suggests that the Turkish Cypriots had isolated themselves with their own roadblocks (PIO, 2010) as a result of 1963-4. As a result of 1974, more legal rulings supported Greek Cypriot claims and considered the Turkish Cypriot areas as occupied territory:

Turkey’s occupation brought economic ruin to the part of the island which prior to 1974 was the richest and most developed. Poor economic conditions resulting from Turkey’s mismanagement and Turkey’s systematic colonization of the occupied areas by illegal settlers forced Turkish Cypriots to emigrate to Europe and elsewhere (PIO a, 2010; 39)

Despite this, there seemed to be general agreement that individuals do not view each other as culpable for events and appeared to perceive similarities amongst themselves. There was also a harking back to when communities lived together and reminders that diaspora communities in other countries interact well, in London for instance. However, the nationalist narrative also appears to retain a level of influence on Cypriot responses at present. There are clearly memories of events that oppose the argument that individual Cypriots had no problems. Political leaders may seek to use these memories within their interpretation of events, namely their communities’ nationalist narrative.
At the interpersonal level, the attitudes of communities have been severely affected as a result of the 1974 intervention by Turkey. Illustrated in Figures 13 and 14 above, community attitudes have been significantly negatively affected; in Figure 14, the Greek Cypriot response was a highly negative -252. Column 1 contained 68.9% of participants, with one non-respondent. The Greek Cypriots may refer to the strengthened position of the Turkish Cypriots as a result of 1974 and the resulting
change in attitudes. However, the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative focused upon this episode of violence and could refer to their attitude towards Turkish Cypriots. The highly negative response may result from Greek Cypriots believing Turkish Cypriots wanted Turkish intervention. As is clear from the results in Figure 13, Turkish Cypriots appear to have a different perspective, although attitudes were still seen as negatively affected. The Turkish Cypriots appear divided, possibly resulting from the perceived danger had Turkey not acted (Gibbons 1997) yet respondents recognised the consequences. Turkish Cypriots may believe the Turkish intervention was not of their doing and yet feel punished for it (Denktash and Moran, 2009).

A Greek Cypriot sense of victim-hood and the Turkish Cypriot-perceived need for security harmed relations between communities, as illustrated in Figures 15 and 16. In Figure 16, the Greek Cypriot response was -226. The response in the highest degree of negativity was 53.4%. The hardening of attitudes may have had direct consequences for relations, from the perspective of both communities. 1974 led to almost no interaction between Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island and population transfer agreements were signed for movements north and south that had already occurred. While the Greek Cypriot response was in the highest column in both cases, the Turkish Cypriots mostly responded at the highest level for relations but more moderately regarding attitudes, in Figure 13. As a result of 1974, movement of more Greek Cypriots south created a sense of victimisation (PIO, 2010).

![Figure 15](image-url)

Figure 15
How has the 1974 intervention affected the political relations between Cypriot communities?

![Bar Chart](chart.png)

Figure 16

The nationalist narratives appear to influence the perspective of respondents, with partition seen by Turkish Cypriots as the last option (Denktash and Moran, 2009; Moran 1998) while Greek Cypriots claim that no serious problems existed prior to 1974 (Yennaris, 2003). However, the extracts below imply that alternative perspectives have developed amongst Turkish Cypriots suggesting that Turkey has worked towards influencing events and identities on Cyprus:

Turkey continued to bring the people on here. We [are losing] our identity, our social life on here. (T, M, 40s)

[Greek Cypriots are] more afraid of property, but the property issue is not crucial. Okay, after the [19]70s, they demand anything. (T, M, 40s)

These extracts suggest the Greek Cypriots were weakened by 1974 and that Turkish influence remains a significant element within the Turkish Cypriot community, which suits both nationalist narratives. The respondents suggest 1974 has taken Cyprus further away from a solution. Neither nationalist narrative suggests a solution is likely in the foreseeable future, as was made clear in Chapter Four.

The 1974 events supposedly drove enosis out of mainstream Greek Cypriot thinking, according to some Greek Cypriot respondents. It remains questionable whether that thinking is correct as the Orthodox Church still retains much influence (Denktash and
Since 1974, Greek Cypriots often emphasised the idea of a common Cypriot identity, although never a distinct identity (Loizides, 2007). While the Greek Cypriot notes ‘Cypriotism’ below, the Turkish Cypriots feared this concept amounted to assimilation of their identity into a primarily-Greek identity. Yet Turkish Cypriots also feared their identity was being supplanted by an identity foisted upon them by their Turkish Cypriot nationalist establishment:

**After [19]74, Greeks Cypriots are starting to learn more Cypriotism:**
they feel there is a bitter taste about nationalism. (T, M, 40s)

**So, every time [Turkey] continues to [impose] the nationalist, religious identity to us,** especially the last ten years. They build too many mosques, they put too many flags on there, “Yes: we are the pure hearts,” and that we should be proud of our identities. But they feel that they cannot convert us enough, so that they continue to bring [a Turkish] population on here. (T, M, 40s)

Okay. Until [19]74 the Turkish Cypriot side wasn't even losing. [Turkish Cypriots] have questioned whether after [19]74 the Turkish Cypriot community or the Greek Cypriot community [was] on the winning side. **Because the end result of course shows us whether [1974] was to the benefit of any community.** (T, M, over 50)

The second extract above suggested that the nationalists have tried developing a Turkish identity, using flags, mosques and other forms of symbol. The myths and symbols referred to in such extracts suggest a developing opposition to the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative. All three of these extracts are from Turkish Cypriots, suggesting a developing perception and memory that opposes the nationalist narrative. More broadly speaking, Turkish Cypriot concerns were twofold: one, that the Turkish Cypriot community would either be supplanted by Turkish settlers; or two, dominated by Greek Cypriots within a unitary system. As a result of these fears and physical divides, few interactions occurred between the communities according to Cypriot respondents and only strengthened the nationalist narratives:

**No there as been no interaction. But [up] to the 2000s, we have had interaction.** Even then [communities] had bi-communal meeting and that was all that existed. In 2004, we got more interested but then again we do not see much interaction [and] this indicates the lack of confidence. (T, F, 30s)
The gate [were] closed, [as a result,] there [was] no relations. There [was] no relations between the two communities. Unfortunately, we're starting to lose common life experience. [The] young grow up with their separate communities. They don't have any experience, [of living] together, [sharing] something socially. But old generations now, they like to go out and see their old friends and everything. (T, M, 40s)

From a Turkish Cypriot nationalist perspective, the first Turkish Cypriot respondent above indicated meetings have taken place between community members and suggested improvements were expected as a result of the referendum and the opening of the buffer-zone (Denktash and Moran, 2009, Green and Collins, 2003). It was to the advantage of nationalists in both communities that expectations were not satisfied. This interviewee and the second extract above suggest that little interaction has occurred at the community level as a result of these developments. From a moderate perspective, the second extract above indicates that Cypriots were losing a common life experience due to the lack of relations. He also highlights the differences between generations, which was a theme already noted by others, as does the third party respondent below:

I think yes, the political tension has been high and confrontational. I think one of the problems you have now is that you had a generation growing up who have never lived with the other community. (Third party, M)

[From] 1974 onwards, the two communities have almost no contact. There was inter-communal violence and the [solution was 1974], so [it] did have an effect on relations [between] the two communities. (T, M, 40s)

The new generations, they don’t care, they don’t care so much about ideas. They care about having a good life. Yeah, getting a car, a BMW. They don’t care whether their neighbour’s a Turkish Cypriot. (G, M, over 50)

As a result of 1974, there [were] no [relations]. The only way to meet a Greek Cypriot would be in Europe, or in Pyla. So when we were growing up, we were getting the advice that they were all demons so why would [you] want to meet one anyway. If you look at our generation and the generation after, you see Turkish Cypriots have no problem. They don't care. Yes, after the poisoning of the atmosphere [after the referendum], jobs are more important. (T, F, 20s)

So relations between communities appear to have been badly affected by the memory of events in 1974. The damage was partly a result of the Turkish intervention (PIO, 2010) but may also result from the blame-game on Cyprus (Hannay, 2005). Greek
Cypriots appear to consider Turkish Cypriots the pawns of Turkey (Yennaris, 2003) while Turkish Cypriots blame Greek Cypriots for sparking events (Moran, 1998). Both of these arguments reflect the nationalist narratives of the Cypriot communities, representing the perspective of many Cypriots. Such narratives are not conducive building relations and their established portrayal of the events of 1974 will not hasten a solution. Reflecting the nationalist narrative, this Greek Cypriot described interaction since 2003 and complained about how interactions have been established:

Yes, between actual people not the officials. It was very hard between 1974 and 2003. There were some help for us initiated by the British Council or by the UN but they weren’t much and involving very few people. And there were meetings mostly abroad. And the way [it] was done! I mean we did not agree on this way – control checkings, passport checks, etc. But in any way this allowed people to interact and by 2003 interaction was very positive. We had several events by youth organisations. So people start interacting. It’s [a] slow procedure. (G, M, 20s)

After 1974 both communities, we lost our contacts [and the] problem now is there is imbalance in the population, the demographic structure [has] changed [from] Ottoman Empire, in the British Colony and then in the Republic of Cyprus. Now when you consider, when you compare these communities with some people from Turkey they are not culturally equal so this was very, very significant problem in the northern part of island after 1974 until now. The problem [was] the majority of the people [were] coming for the sake of labour. Then the Turkish Cypriot labour force was detached from the labour system and replaced by the settlers. Turkish Cypriots have suffered a lot especially from 1983 until 2002 or 2003. (T, M, over 50)

Even though there are symbols and practices that Turkish Cypriots have placed upon interactions such as passport controls, the interaction allowed Cypriots to organise wider cross-community youth events, etc. This and the other developments since 2003 may have altered the perspective of Cypriots from viewing other Cypriots as the ‘enemy’. However, the Turkish Cypriot above highlighted the economic consequences resulting from 1974 and changing demographics. The consequences resulting from Turkish settlers appear to be as much a problem for Turkish Cypriots as they appear to concern Greek Cypriots (PIO, 2010). The Turkish Cypriot respondent noted below the social problems and the decline of law and order in Turkish Cypriot areas:
Maybe you heard this from a Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot, I remember [before] 1974 our houses, we kept our houses unlocked, we opened the windows, we were staying like that and I remember my father he was parking his car and the keys were on the car. But after 1974 there was an increase in the crime rate, especially in the north because of the settlers and the other foreign people. The first [major crime] is drugs, [then] theft, burglary and we realise gangs [are] in the street and the money is [what you would] call, black money. (T, M, over 50)

As a result of 1974, Turkish Cypriots have feared burglary and appear to have growing concern for drugs and crime. The nationalist narrative would suggest that there was a need for more people in the occupied areas and that there have been relatively few problems, given the circumstances (Denktash and Moran, 2009, Denktash, 1988). But it appears that Turkish Cypriots are more concerned about developments within their territory than what is highlighted in their community’s nationalist narrative. This concern has been reflected by the numbers of Turkish Cypriots leaving Cyprus altogether for London and elsewhere (Hannay, 2005; Mallinson, 2006). Meanwhile, the main division within both communities remains along a political spectrum of nationalists, leftists and moderates:

But [Greek Cypriot extreme nationalists] hadn’t murdered Greek Cypriots for their beliefs. They have done so later in [EOKA-B]. In the period before the [coup] they have murdered Greek Cypriots that were supporting [Makarios], democracy and [those] against [their plans]. So you have to have this in mind. Because those I believe [are the realities]. What was the very negative issue concerning Greek Cypriot was that [the extremists] were playing the game of imperialists at that period because they were helping them in a way by [this conflict within] the Greek Cypriot community. (G, M, 40s)

But they were nationalists. Of course [if] that they were nationalists they were people that knew what they wanted and what they were doing and what game they were playing. Anyway mistakes done by the Greek Cypriot in this process, [were by] all those that haven’t believed in an independent state. (G, M. 40s)

From a Greek Cypriot with a neo-communist perspective, these extracts suggest that the violence within the Greek Cypriot community was part of a wider plan. Although the reality could have included a domestic struggle between neo-communist and extreme nationalists; the established Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative suggests a small minority acting under instruction from exogenous actors were to blame (PIO,
Evidence suggests an alternative memory of events has developed within the Greek Cypriot community in opposition to the nationalist narrative. Forwarded by pro-solution organisations amongst others (Loizides, 2007), these memories suggest nationalists never wanted an independent state before 1974, which the nationalist narrative suggests was their meaning of ‘self-determination’ (PIO, 2007). Nationalists may have used ‘self-determination’ in the 1950s to mean *enosis*, although they may claim otherwise in the present. The Turkish Cypriot leftist below compares nationalists and suggests that both communities’ nationalists had somehow worked together:

There are of course, like in every community, there are extreme nationalists and somehow without talking to each other, extreme nationalists of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, somehow work together for no settlement. (T, M, over 50)

I would suggest that instead of the nationalists working together, the nationalists’ narratives of actions have mutually reinforced each other’s narratives. The neo-communists and moderates have sought to bring the communities together, however, they often note that the younger generation “don’t care”. As mentioned in the last section, there seems a lack of interest in building links across the divide:

For the unification of the island and the ending of the occupation. This is what we have been doing for many, many years. It’s easy to understand [nationalist rhetoric] if you [are] ordinary people. [Some Greek Cypriots are] prepared to live together with Turkish Cypriots in a common land, in a common country. A lot of people are not. Because unfortunately nationalists [with] the policy of [enosis] all these years and [the intransigence of Turkey] in negotiations [has] created a disappointment. They have had enough [and as a result] some [Cypriots] are not caring about the situation. They don’t care, they just don’t care. Of course, they don’t believe that there is a possibility once more to unite the island after 35 years. (G, M, 40s)

And maybe if the Turkish Cypriots were left alone and the Greek Cypriots were a bit smarter, I mean this is my perception, they could easily find solutions. I think Turkish Cypriots were used by Turkey and they are also the victims of the whole situation as well. But still I think Makarios should have done more to bring the Turkish Cypriots closer. Because he could see the mentality of the people [are] the same. (G, M, over 50)

Other respondents accuse nationalists of seeking to avoid a solution that may be against their political interests. Greek Cypriots appear to insist that if left alone,
communities would integrate and focus on commonalities, especially trade unionists. Given their stronger economic position, Greek Cypriots may believe Turkish Cypriots, or Turkey, ought to make concessions. But both Greek Cypriot respondents above noted that the situation has not been improved and is set to remain devoid of possible solutions, reflecting the common narrative of stasis since 1974.

These responses support the argument that an alternative set of memories has developed in opposition to the nationalist narratives. However, there remain questions over the effectiveness of pro-solution memories influencing a reconciliation process, given the prevailing political circumstances. The neo-communists and trade unionists have developed their own memory of their victimhood in 1974, targeted by the Greek nationalist violence. This interviewee suggested AKEL was criticised for its decisions to try to build links between communities (Panteli, 1990). Such actions may have been seen as treacherous by the nationalists at the time but the nationalist coup has been labelled as treacherous since by the nationalist narrative (PIO, 2010). The nationalist narrative disowned the actions of nationalists in 1974, if any attention was paid to their actions (PIO, 2010). As the extract below states, AKEL’s actions were criticised for decades but this has recently changed:

[AKEL] have been receiving [criticisms] for many decades for [1974, accused of being] traitors. **Trying to do everything in order to bring the communities together.** Even in a situation where we have total partition, there was no possibility of interaction from just a simple meeting between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. [The leaderships were] **not supporting friendship and cooperation.** They use many excuses of course. (G, M, 40s)

But I think in the long run people realised that the Greek Cypriots [were] not the enemy [and nor was] the Turkish Cypriots. **So despite that, between [19]63 and [19]74 there was an interaction** and that was a period where good relations could be normalised. Then in [19]74, it’s over. But I think we [have reached] a stage at which for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, I mean that is the rational ones, [realised] that **they’re first Cypriots and then Greeks or Turks.** They become friends; they exchange [photos] and telephones [numbers]. And they keep in touch. **So there is interaction between the two communities since 2003.** And this interaction shows that the two communities could live with each other. (G, M, over 50)

Because what we are saying is that **we are [one of] the two communities [working] in the direction of the solution** of the Cyprus Republic but it is
not the key [to a] solution. Because the key still remains in the hands of Ankara. (G, M, 40s)

These responses suggest that although the nationalist narratives have changed since 1974, communities have realised that the Turkish or Greek Cypriots should not shirk their responsibilities. Moreover, Greek and Turkish Cypriot nationalist narratives may need to be reinterpreted to reflect the nuanced thinking of Cypriots regarding the events of 1974 and since. The second extract above suggests those Cypriots who have met have exchanged photos and telephone numbers and have sought to keep in touch. Amongst the neo-communists and moderates, this increased interaction has shaped their alternative memories of events in Cyprus. Meanwhile, the nationalist elites within both communities appear to reject any attempt to bring the two communities closer for ideological and practical reasons (PIO, 2010; Yennaris, 2003; Denktash and Moran, 2009). The Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative may reflect the broad Greek Cypriot wish to avoid compromising for the sake of an unwanted solution (PIO, 2010). The nationalists, moderates and neo-communists appear to agree that the problem centres on Turkey and yet a solution can only be set out and agreed upon by Cypriot communities:

If that is the status then that is unlikely to change. I wish it would but the Greek Cypriots continue to regard us as Greeks, or as latecomers. It is not an argument against a settlement and not an argument for a settlement. There is a need for [a solution], but there is a need to identify the problem correctly. We never regarded the whole of Cyprus as being ours. The EU said something similar. The Secretary General of the UN said the same thing; [Turkish Cypriots] are the co-owners of Cyprus. Co-owners is fine, but the Greeks won't except being co-owners. (T, M, over 50)

The community level remains vitally important in illustrating the complexity of the situation in Cyprus. Communities are divided between those seeking to build the links necessary for a solution and those wanting to hold on for their objectives. But no solution has been found that can please all parties and so the conflict continues. In more general terms, communities are divided between those who forward and reflect the nationalist narrative and those who appear to oppose such narratives. This competition has been through the negotiation of memories that can create a new interpretation of the past or allow for its reinterpretation. The sphere where this competition and negotiation takes place has been termed the mythscape (Bell, 2002)
and through this process new narratives can be established or old narratives re-imagined.

6.5 Institutional

The 1974 intervention affected the political attitudes of Cypriot institutions highly negatively, shown in Figures 17 and 18. A majority of respondents replied at the highest level of negativity, correlating with evidence at other levels of analysis. In Figure 18, the score for the Greek Cypriot response was -249. In this graph, the significant percentages were in columns 1 and 2; 68.9% and 18.9% respectively. In Figure 17, Turkish Cypriots had a similar pattern of response.

Having developed in answer to social problems resulting from violence in 1963-4, Turkish Cypriot institutions developed more permanent services as a result of 1974 (Moran, 1998; Denktash, 1988). These developments were viewed as highly negative by Greek Cypriots and further evidence of Turkish Cypriot secessionist ambitions (PIO, 2010; Yennaris, 2003). The Greek Cypriot response was to label all methods of Turkish Cypriot exports and industry as illegal, not controlled by the only legitimate government of Cyprus (PIO, 2010). This led the north of the island to become more dependent upon Turkey and exacerbated the situation.

![Figure 17](image-url)
How has the 1974 intervention, by Turkey, affected the political attitudes between Republic of Cyprus institutions and Turkish Cypriot structures?

![Graph showing the impact of 1974 intervention on political attitudes between institutions and structures.]

Illustrated by Figures 19 and 20, the relations between Cypriot institutions were perceived to be affected highly negatively as a result of 1974. The score amongst Greek Cypriots in Figure 20 was -256. The percentages of the first two columns remain similar to attitudes: 63.7% and 25.8% respectively with one non-respondent. The Turkish Cypriot response in Figure 19 shows the hallmarks of a similar reaction.

Relations between institutions were limited because giving opposing institutions any form of recognition was something neither side was willing to concede (Denktash and Moran, 2009). The dispute over the rights of the majority community and the rights of the minority had led to political stalemate, as was the case in the 1960-1963 period of government. The institutions appear less willing than the individuals and communities to compromise, possibly because the future of institutions may be in question if a solution is found. There may also be the moral obligation to steadfastly refuse to compromise because of memorised sacrifices and injuries (Poole, 2008; Booth, 2006).
How has the 1974 intervention affected the political relations between Republic of Cyprus institutions and Turkish Cypriot structures?

Figure 17

The nationalist narrative of both communities had a significant role in the perspectives of their separate institutions and hence the perceived institutional relations and attitudes. This has meant individual Cypriots and the wider Cypriot communities worry about the actions of institutions, resulting in a wider gulf between the communities. As a result of 1974, Turkish Cypriot institutions exist in a more substantial form but have exacerbated underlying economic decline, exemplified by the extracts below:
The slight difference was the southern part of the island was still known as the Republic of Cyprus and since it was internationally recognised it continued to have an international financial aid and the other benefits. However, the [northern administration] wasn’t a recognised state but people are living there. **Something must be done [for Turkish Cypriots] in order to survive, these people need to have economy; these people need to have services, health, education.** (T, M, over 50)

Because when you check the working population of the northern part of Cyprus you would realise that the majority of the working population are civil servants. **Simply because [it is a] guaranteed job, the salaries are good** and they have nice holidays and other benefits. **This situation has put [the] Turkish Cypriot community in a difficult [position regarding] administering the resources.** [as] ministers were just waiting, [for handouts] from Turkey. (T, M, over 50)

As well as the administrative problems that were experienced by Turkish Cypriots, questions remain over the justice system. As no agreement has been reached over who owns what land and the compensation owed (PIO, 2010; Denktash and Moran, 2009), there remain many barriers to a successful solution. From previous evidence, it appears that nationalists on both sides may prefer to keep the conflict open for economic as well as political reasons. In the meantime, the northern administration has failed to successfully provide services independently since 1974 and may require major reform, according to this Turkish Cypriot respondent:

> I don’t want to humiliate anybody but sometimes it is an empty show, you know what I mean, because **we have [a] serious public administration problem in the north.** I am talking about the whole government system, it needs to be reformed and changed completely. But nothing happened, the laws need to be harmonised, updated, they are very old laws, they are outdated, totally. (T, M, over 50)

After 1974, **all these services were separated only from 1974 to 2003.** United Nations help a lot because the medical services were more developed on [the Greek] side [and] **this shows that Turkish Cypriots benefited from the Republic of Cyprus medical services with the help of international actors** during 1974 until 2003. (T, M, over 50)

Services on the Turkish Cypriot side remain limited, given the limits that the north of the island has been under as a result of 1974. This Turkish Cypriot does state that the services were only separated after 1974, rather than in 1963-4. In a sense, the development of institutions took on a new phase in 1974 following the original establishment of rudimentary services after 1963-4 (Reddaway, 1986; Bose 2007).
The extract above also notes that Turkish Cypriots had benefited from the Republic of Cyprus’ medical services, through the UN. There has been cooperation and interaction but neither community wishes its institutions to recognise the opposing community’s institutions (PIO, 2010):

[There is] interaction [with the] Turkish Cypriot community without recognising [the northern administration] because we all have a reservation. We are not doing this interaction in a way that it will in any way recognise the so-called “TRNC”, nobody is recognising [the “TRNC”] except the Turkish. We are very, very careful in order not to give any. But this does not stop us from having this interaction. (G, M, 40s)

There is a kind of cooperation there because of course the ruling parties exchanged their views and they’re not only talking about political issues they talk also of [social issues]. Besides that, there is kind of cooperation between the municipalities [over a] unified sewage system for example that was materialised by the UN. So there is kind of cooperation under the aegis of the UN. I mean the UN is addressing our departments, addressing their departments; [so it is] a high level of cooperation between the representatives of the communities, that is official. The representatives of the Greek Cypriot community and the representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community, Mr Christofias and Mr Talat, are meeting in the framework of negotiations. (G, M, 20s)

As institutions do not recognise each other, the communities have worked together to find areas of common ground beyond such institutions. Meanwhile, nationalists retain their legal argument versus a facts-on-the-ground argument when handling the conflict between the two halves of Cyprus. Meanwhile, moderates and neo-communists may view institutions as necessary but not the original institutions of 1960 (Reddaway, 1986). The communities have worked around institutions, with the municipalities and community representation, according to interview respondents. However, the declaration of TRNC in 1983 was claimed to have been a significant legal alteration, by Greek Cypriots who suspected it was designed to create two equal entities:

The decision to declare an independent state was I think very determined. Yeah, but this destroyed everything. The north of Cyprus is under foreign military occupation. So there is no means, there is no way to open its ports or airports to international traffic without the consent of the Republic of Cyprus who is the only authority. [The] Turkish Cypriots [are not allowed] to have some [kinds] of economic interaction. And this created the so-called isolation, this isolation was not the result of Greek Cypriots wanting to isolate and impoverish the Turkish Cypriot
community. It was mostly a result of the occupation. And another issue is the whole effort of the Turkish Cypriot regime to use the opening to the outside world for trade, culture, sports etc as a pretext to promote their break away regime. (G, M, 20s)

In this extract, the respondent reflects the nationalist narrative by suggesting that the ‘so-called isolation’ that the Turkish Cypriots suffered from 1974 was a result of Turkish occupation (PIO, 2010). From a Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative, the isolation that Turkish Cypriots suffered was a tool Greek Cypriots had used from 1963-4 (Stravinides, 1990).

The isolation was a result of the perceived illegality of the TRNC and the Greek Cypriot response to this. It was widely accepted that the TRNC was unrecognised but Greek Cypriots claim their own legitimacy should not be questioned, despite the legitimacy of the Greek Cypriot-controlled institutions centring on such institutions not fitting the requirements set out under the 1960 constitution (Reddaway, 1986; Cranshaw 1978). Having forwarded such arguments, the Turkish Cypriots who reflect their nationalist narrative claim Turkish Cypriots do not use ports controlled by authorities they do not recognise (Denktash, 1988). Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriot respondent below believed a solution was possible, though his use of the word ‘viable’ suggested a unitary system was envisaged:

And it has to have a solution that will be viable. [That] will be embraced by the people [and] that will create the framework in which the people will cooperate and they will abide by that solution. Not a solution that in ten years time will break apart. [If so, Cyprus would be] back to minus square one because now at least the Greek Cypriots they have a recognised State. If the solution breaks up in ten years we are going to have two constituent States trying to find their place in the international community. The biggest weapon of the Greek Cypriots is that they have a recognised State. They’re a member of the UN, the EU. (G, M, over 50)

After the events of 1974, [Turkish Cypriots] managed to create their own institutions. So after [the developments there] was the huge civil service, everybody wanted to join the civil service, no real economy – I mean infrastructure. There were [improved] institutions but still the problem in the North was Human Rights. There was no real democracy. And the other thing was the economic situation was very bad. (G, M, over 50)

The creation of institutions has added a new level of complexity to any proposed solution, even though such institutions have assisted the administration of the northern
territory since 1974. Such institutions are not recognised in the wider international community and so the Greek Cypriots are in an advantageous position compared to Turkish Cypriots. Meanwhile the Greek Cypriot narrative has reminded the outside world:

The plight of the Turkish Cypriot community has been the direct result of Turkey’s aggression, which keeps Cyprus, its people, institutions and economy divided. It is also the result of misguided policies by Turkish Cypriot leaders, who have consistently promoted Turkey’s interests at the expense of their own community and of Cyprus as a whole. The so-called “isolation” of Turkish Cypriots is very much a self-inflicted wound (PIO b, 2010; 7).

The Turkish and Greek Cypriots agree that the economic situation in the northern half of the island has been poor (Denktash and Moran, 2009). They disagree on why, and on what should be done. As the first Greek Cypriot extract above noted, a solution has to be viable but should allow for the sharing of power. Yet, that Greek Cypriot above noted that their community has the upper-hand as their institutions have been recognised as the government of Cyprus. The nationalist narratives may reflect the argument that no solution might be better than a poor solution (PIO, 2010; Denktash and Moran, 2009). The extract below also illustrates how the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative differentiates itself from Turkish Cypriot institutions:

For the Greek Cypriots, each institution of [the Turkish Cypriot’s] so-called “TRNC” was not existent. Because it was the fault of the “TRNC” not to be recognised. You can make the political parties if you want. You can make jobs. You can make the Chamber of Commerce, which is legal the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce [was] recognised by the Republic of Cyprus because it’s a legal thing. (G, M, over 50)

Or you can meet Mr Talat as their Leader, as their Leader of the Turkish Cypriot community. You cannot meet him as President in the Presidential Palace. (G, M, over 50)

Greek Cypriots emphasise the recognition that the Greek Cypriot government claims to have received from the UN (PIO, 2010). This was based on UN Security Council Resolution 186 and on the recognition that many states have given the Greek Cypriot-controlled Cyprus since. Nevertheless, Greek Cypriots recognise they need contact with Turkish Cypriots, without necessarily recognising their institutions. Turkish Cypriots have complained that Greek Cypriots were unwilling to talk with their
counterparts but Turkish Cypriots have done the same regarding Greek Cypriot institutions. The avoidance of giving recognition to the other community’s institutions suggests nationalism and the prevailing nationalist narrative remain central tenets of Cypriot politics:

No, [our] officials are not accepted. Even in negotiations they are not considered real officials. They [Greek Cypriots] think that we take our orders from Turkey. (T, F, 30s)

There is no outside connection, no international connection for the [Turkish] institutions and I don’t know if you are interested in psychological violence but there is a lot of psychological violence from the Greek Cypriots. It was somehow perceived that it was the Greek Cypriots who cut the outside lines of communication. [This] was used by those [Turkish Cypriots] who were close to Turkey. (T, F, 20s)

At first, the state was in there to serve for a time until the two parts [of Cyprus] came together. A part of a federated state, a constituent state. Then, in 1983 [Turkish Cypriot leaders] decided that there was to be no state and that [there was a] right of self-determination, to live our lives based on our own government. When we try to do something together, [we] can’t come together as the institutions don’t recognize each [other]. You don’t exist if you live in the northern part of the island. [But] you need schools to go to. You need a place to collect your papers if you apply for something. You need a place to register your kids. You need these [institutions] to live. (T, F, 20s)

From a moderate perspective, the above Turkish Cypriot suggests that the institutions were built only to fill the void left by the divisions of the 1960s and 1970s. Such institutions are unrecognised and have become a barrier to bringing the communities together, yet she recognises the need for such institutions in the north. Given that communities remain influenced by nationalist distinctions and appear to emphasise their community’s victimhood, compromise appears unlikely and community leaders appear unwilling to take steps to build the links necessary for a sustainable solution. The measures that the Greek Cypriots have taken are explained in literature that reflects their community’s nationalist narrative:

One of these measures was the declaration of all seaports and airports in the Turkish occupied area of the Republic as illegal. Such measures became necessary, because the government was not able to exercise effective control in the areas of Cyprus under Turkish military control. […] Under international law, the Republic of Cyprus is the only legal and recognized
authority with sole responsibility for air and sea travel, trade, security, safety, and similar issues within its sovereign territory. (PIO b, 2010: 7)

For other Turkish Cypriots, the existence of such institutions confirmed there was a state in the northern half of the island, though unrecognised. Non-recognition was not seen as a barrier to statehood, according to this Turkish Cypriot who formerly worked at their Foreign Ministry:

"The state is there. We have recognized entities in about 30 or 40 parts of the world. We have many representations of countries: a US embassy and a British High Commission. We are as functioning as [Greek Cypriots], it is just that they are wealthier. They started their organs earlier and they are on the level of states with flags at the UN. We are not a failed state. We are a bona fide functioning state. (T, M, over 50)"

"Because, we do not believe they have institutions capable of [representing] us [and] so this is why from the beginning of this process we have talked about a comprehensive settlement rather than a bit by bit piecemeal agreement. The Greek Cypriots rejected this because of developments; they do not recognize or accept the legality of the entity. "You can't be allowing all disallowing entry into Cyprus giving people documents unless you are the government of Cyprus". (T, M, over 50)"

This Turkish Cypriot suggested that recognition of institutions was not key compared to representation and authority. These Turkish Cypriots claimed their state has representatives in political centres while representing and administering services to their community. With a nationalist perspective, this Turkish Cypriot argues that the institutions of the Republic of Cyprus are not capable of representing the Turkish Cypriot community. Moreover, institutions would need to be reformed for such structures to represent both communities, but such reforms remain distant goals:

"The crux of the matter is that they can never accept the institutions of the Turkish Cypriots, the collective rights, where our demand lies. We have six committees dealing with each chapter of matters on the agenda, in the current talks that starting next month. There are also seven technical committees. 23 projects have then [been] worked upon so far [and] only four have been [processed up till now]. The reason for this is that the Greek Cypriots do not recognize our officials for what they are, officials from the Department for Health Policies. They have difficulty with our status [and] it gets in the way constantly. We have no problems with them, we don't recognize them either. (T, M, over 50)"
The same Turkish Cypriot respondent suggests the problems have centred on the Greek Cypriot unwillingness to ‘recognise’ their officials. This deadlock supports the argument that the communities are the key component to any solution as they need no recognition. This respondent has reflected the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative, which remains resolute in its argument that no power-sharing solution appears possible (Denktash and Moran, 2009). Noting that Turkish Cypriot institutions are not perfectly efficient, the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative appears to suggest that no sharing of power can be possible, only the division of it (Denktash and Moran, 2009). Overall, co-operation between Greek and Turkish Cypriot institutions and structures have been hampered primarily by the lack of recognition. This lack of recognition was a result of developing Turkish Cypriot institutions since 1974. However, the political leaders have circumvented this issue by meeting as leaders of Cypriot communities. Resolving the outstanding issues between the communities remains a protracted affair, illustrated by the numerous discussions and negotiations since 1974. Moreover, the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative appears to envision a two-state solution to the Cyprus conflict (Denktash and Moran, 2009). These extracts suggest that the reflection of nationalist narratives remains a strong tendency amongst Cypriots and has affected the attitudes and relations of institutions as a result of 1974:

The Turkish Cypriot institutions were able to develop much more freely in an atmosphere of their own state. This geographic basis gave us the opportunity to develop fully on our own. To me that is not an argument against state, it shows that it does exist and that it is democratic. There are two democracies on this island. Two states, two systems, two legal systems. (T, M, over 50)

6.6 Summary
The strongly negative responses suggest the effect of 1974 was significant, even though Cypriots continue to suggest they could live and work together given the chance. The attitudes and relations at an individual level were harmed as a result of 1974, according to responses from both Turkish and Greek Cypriots. This was illustrated with extracts that discussed themes of economic isolation and political stagnation. It also suggested that individuals and collectives do not conflict unless part of ethnic or national groups.
At the level of communities, strong negative responses were evident, and similar themes discussed at the individual level were elaborated on. Within the quantitative evidence, the Turkish Cypriot response to community attitudes was significantly different to the Greek Cypriot response, in Figures 13 and 14. It suggests that at the community level, Turkish Cypriots felt attitudes were not severely affected by 1974 compared to relations. Though relative, it suggests that attitudes of communities may have worsened because of events before 1974, from the perspective of Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, the communities appear to agree that relations were badly damaged by 1974 but results suggest Turkish Cypriots felt attitudes had worsened prior to 1974.

Responses also suggest interactions were perceived to have been damaged at the institutional level as a result of 1974. Turkish Cypriots argued they needed services, and existing institutions did not represent them. Greek Cypriots believed their institutions were legitimate and gave no recognition to Turkish Cypriot institutions. At all levels of analysis, the nationalist narratives appear to remain major influences on Cypriot responses, based on myths, symbols and behaviours (Smith, 2004; Kaufmann, 2001). Such nationalist narratives remain barriers to a solution and this evidence suggests a solution remains a distant possibility. Although noted in Chapter 4, the wider narrative appears to unite the communities in terms of the stasis that has characterised the conflict since 1974. There is clearly an alternative set of memories developing amongst moderate and neo-communist elements within both communities. Whether these collective memories will develop to challenge the existing narratives remains to be seen.

6.7 Conclusion
The levels of analysis remained similar to previous evidence on 1963-4. Relations between individuals had appeared good, though relatively sporadic since 1963-4 and becoming almost non-existent after 1974. Community relations and attitudes were worsened as a result of 1974; although attitudes and relations had already been badly affected by 1963-4. The relations and attitudes of institutions were very limited as a result of 1974 and the growing competence of the Turkish Cypriot institutions. 1974 retains an important position in Cypriot identities and was reflected in the nationalist narratives.
What has been made clear is that significant numbers of Turkish Cypriots refer to 1974 as a ‘traumatic’ event (Edkins, 2003). In many ways, elements in both Cypriot communities recognise the damage to relations and attitudes that resulted from 1963-4 and 1974. But the national narratives reflect the underlying sense amongst Turkish Cypriots that they were victimised in 1963-4 and since 1974 while Greek Cypriots are reminded of 1974. However there is evidence to suggest the nationalist narratives are able to change and reinterpret their past. The Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative no longer suggests 1974 was a ‘peace-operation’ but suggests that it was a necessary evil. Meanwhile the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative no longer considers that the nationalist struggle was for enosis but for independence. These ever-changing nationalist narratives may be challenged by pro-solution Cypriots with a new set of memories and interpretations. As was shown in Chapter Four, not all perspectives appear to fit these narratives and this challenge results from political developments in the present. Communities may seek to smooth the edges of contrasting memories into a malleable mythological storyline of a linear conflict which included the interests and influences of exogenous actors.
DISCUSSION

7.1 Introduction

This chapter will now bring together themes from the previous two chapters and discuss dynamics of Greek and Turkish Cypriot memories. The two episodes of violence discussed differed in terms of the level of violence involved, yet the episode’s influences appear relatively similar. Turkish Cypriots remember 1963-4 and the period of enclavement and insecurity that resulted. Meanwhile, Greek Cypriots primarily remember 1974 as a traumatic event and often downplay the significance of 1963-4. These patterns of remembrance, or not-forgetting, fit the nationalist narratives previously discussed in Chapter Four. Meanwhile, Greek Cypriots may also have honestly not remembered 1963-4 rather than having been influenced by the elite-led downplaying of events. Turkish Cypriots appear to accept the consequences of Turkish action in 1974, as necessary actions for their community’s survival. For this Greek Cypriot respondent, there appears to be no comparison between events, though he handles it in terms of numbers and forces, not in terms of the perceived consequences within the wider narrative:

I don’t think there is [a comparison]. It was a whole different story. First of all it was communal, it was inter-communal. In 1974, you have a foreign intervention; you have a permanent division – [a] hard-line border. Nobody [was] able to cross for almost 30 years. The actual reality was not comparable. I mean we’re talking [19]63/[19]64 how many dozens are dead? I mean that’s not comparable to 5,000 dead. (G, M, 20s)

I don’t think it’s [right] to compare 1963 and 1974. There were certain events, there was violence [but] it didn’t take long to come back to an organisation, but 1974 changed everything. And it changed the future of the [island]. (G, M, 20s)

1974 should not be viewed outside of the context of previous conflict that involved communities. Evidence from this research suggests that 1974 was not the ‘bolt from the blue’, that has often been presented as by elements of the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative. As was made clear in Chapters 4 and 5, a physical division had been made by Turkish and Greek Cypriots, through means of collective boundary formation (Reddaway, 1986). Such formations were given support after 1964 by the UNFICYP, which patrolled the dividing line.
While the sources that reflected the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative focused on 1974, the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative has focused on 1963-4 as well as 1974:

1963 [was] the beginning, [it] is where all the issues come clear. But I cannot ignore the radical events [resulting] from 1974 either. The strategic location of Cyprus resulted in the dualism of Cyprus came to be in a physical form. (T, M, over 50)

Well if you believe Greek propaganda, then you would say 1974 as many people know about 1974, but fewer know about 1963-74. I would say 1974 but that is to do with propaganda. (T, F, 30s)

From the Turkish Cypriot working in the “TRNC” Foreign Ministry, the second extract suggests more Cypriots know of 1974 because of Greek Cypriot propaganda. This may result from the more effective public information service within the Greek Cypriot community as well as the lack of an effective counterpart in the Turkish Cypriot community. However, there was recognition amongst both communities that 1974 was a major political, social and human upheaval that resulted in a major change in all aspects of Cypriot affairs. Events in 1974 suggested Greek Cypriot extremists intended to force *enosis*, and so Turkey argued it had the legal right to intervene (Bose, 2007; Hannay 2005).

To reflect the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative, Denktash said that:

The idea that the TRNC was established through the use of force, should be balanced with the undeniable fact that the title of the government of Cyprus was “stolen” through acts of terrorism and with the clandestine infiltration of 20,000 Greek troops into the island - which was the beginning of the Cyprus problem. How can one blame the “remedy finders” without blaming the original guilty party? The idea that the “status quo” created by the Greek Cypriot side, as from 1963 December onwards, this was quite viable, but this situation brought about by our success in escaping the tragedy in which we lived is not, continues to prevent the establishment of the necessary balance of equality needed for a just solution how can we accept such a lopsided decisions? (Denktash and Moran, 2009; 52)

Someone to have personally utilised the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative, Denktash suggests to Moran (2009) that Turkey had always had an interest and any solution should take this into account:
The division/separation of partners took place in 1963. Had Turkey not arrived in 1974, Cyprus would have become a Greek island. Turkey's presence gives both sides a chance to come to a realistic agreement, having regard to the existing realities which our two peoples and two states. Accepting these as a basis on which the future can be built is realism and not nationalism. Projection of this reality by the Greek Cypriot side is solid nationalism going back to the *Megali Idea* in the 1840s. (Denktash and Moran, 2009; 52-3)

Yet, the points that Denktash supplies reflect the Turkish Cypriot perspective that offers no compromise to the Greek Cypriot community. Like his Greek Cypriot counterparts, Denktash (2009) suggests Turkish Cypriots have gone beyond nationalism and seek a solution built on realism. Yet this realism remains based on a nationalist narrative that has a polar opposite to reinforce its relevancy. Despite a semblance of progress, interview responses and extracts suggest stasis remains, as a result of 1974.

In Chapter 2, OLMV was referred to as the memory that may appear to have an overwhelming, but possibly unifying, influence on Cypriot consciences. Such a memory may create a linear time that is understandable to a majority of Cypriots instead of a more complex traumatic time (Edkins, 2003). Such time may fit within the narratives of both communities, given a reinterpretation of their memories. The more complex ECMV refers to the memory of violence that cannot unify but only divides actors and communities, including elements of 1963-4. Like Edkins’ (2003) trauma time, ECMV would not fit within a common narrative and would only assist in the continued differentiation of communities, nationalist or otherwise. Both communities’ nationalist elites could utilise such divisive memories to support their nationalist narratives. However, moderate elements in both Cypriot communities appear to have forwarded an OLMV of 1974. The evidence from this research suggests more complicated dynamics.

In terms of what researchers consider organised and organic memories of violence, such memories can not be easily distinguished as authentic nor should they be condemned as primarily social. As previously noted in Chapter Two, there can arguably be little that remains in the archaic form of memory to which Nora (Misztal, 2003) harked back. However, memory has often been collectively imagined by the community to be ‘real’. Although family recollections could be considered organic,
such memories are also subject to gatekeepers and collective pressures. These memories exist alongside organised collective memory, which they forward on a collective scale against elite-sanctioned history and the reflection of nationalist narratives.

Turkish Cypriots perception of the 1963-4 inter-communal violence and the threat the 1974 coup posed are not shared by Greek Cypriots. Greek Cypriots consider the inter-communal violence as sporadic and perceive the 1974 coup as an internal matter for Greek Cypriots. Though the communities may unify elements of narrative around 1974, this appears only one step towards reconciliation. Moreover, the nationalist narratives appear to remain influential upon communities and individuals and have been reinforced by the institutions.

7.2 Individual

Well yes, for instance my father, who is now 90, when he was growing up, the neighbours next door were Turkish Cypriots, a family called Aziz and he says that when his parents used to go out in the evening, they used to ask Mr Aziz to come and sit with the children, they didn’t want to have the [maids] there and so the relationship came to be very close you know, neighbourly. (G, F, 40s).

At the individual level, memories passed down within families often referred to how their families used to live. Cypriots argued that they did not have any problems with members of the other community, noting that communities had lived alongside each other. The relationship was neighbourly and tolerant but there was always a distinction between Turkish and Greek Cypriots:

There was a Turkish lady who was saying “I don’t blame the Greek Cypriots because five stupid Greek Cypriots killed my brother.” There was a Greek Cypriot said that “I don’t blame the Turkish Cypriot people because three Turkish Cypriot soldiers killed my sister and raped her.” So time heals and I think we’ve reached a time when we realise that we cannot back out of common future. But the thing is that the necessity and the conditions nowadays make people become much more rational and understanding [of] each other. (G, M, over 50)

Division does not mean communities cannot have a common future, but collective memories of violent events can make a common future unlikely. As the above Greek Cypriot states, the necessity and conditions may lead to Cypriots coming to
understand each other. How that unlikely coming together is to be brought about remains unclear, given the context. Time can heal wounds and the need for economic development may have altered the thinking of individuals, especially within the Turkish Cypriot community. However, there appeared to be relatively little evidence in terms of developing alternative Greek Cypriot perspectives. As this extract comes from a Greek Cypriot who reflected some elements of the nationalist narrative, he may believe the Turkish Cypriots stance requires changing rather than the Greek Cypriot position.

Questionnaire responses support the argument that both events damaged Cypriot attitudes and relations at the level of individuals. The differences in responses may be a result of Cypriots qualifying their responses to 1963-4 in the knowledge they would be asked the same question regarding 1974. The graphs suggest the majority of people thought the 1974 intervention by Turkey affected individual relations more severely. There was a tendency amongst Greek Cypriots to dismiss the 1963-4 period as of little consequence, reflecting the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative. However, interviewees support the argument that interactions were damaged by the enclavement of Turkish Cypriots from 1963, if not before. Qualitative evidence suggests that violence was perceived to have created an environment of insecurity and fear during the 1955 insurgency by EOKA. Directed against the colonial administration and institutions, the actions by EOKA were seen to have affected the Turkish Cypriots disproportionately. As a result of collective memory passed down generations and state-sanctioned literature, these historical events have been reinterpreted.

Stories of good individual relations between Cypriots were plentiful but the separate education systems were key apparatus for reinforcing the nationalist narratives:

_I don’t know, I didn’t know anything – they didn’t teach us anything about Cyprus. I learnt about Turkey more than a Turkish citizen [and Turkey] push us to create [a] nationalistic character._ (T, M, over 50)

This Turkish Cypriot referred to learning more of Turkey than Cyprus. This inevitably developed the communities’ identity as Turkish on Cyprus rather than Cypriot. Although individual members of communities argued they had nothing against each other, factors such as education can foster a sense of separateness. Greek Cypriots felt they were a ‘national’ community on Cyprus while classing the Turkish Cypriots as a
minority (PIO, 2007). Violence was commemorated and immortalized to develop this difference, in the public sphere (Benton, 2010). However, individual memory often does not support this and Turkish and Greek Cypriots have insisted people never hated each other. Moreover, community memories that are formatted within nationalist narratives may only be publicly accepted by individuals. Meanwhile, individual Cypriots retained the position that reconciliation was possible:

I know people who were in the bi-communal groups, many of them may have missing members in their families. They may have been through very bad experiences, [it] doesn’t mean that all those who had negative experiences don’t want to reconcile. (G, F, 40s)

Memories within families and amongst friends suggest communities could live together despite past violence, missing persons and other outstanding issues. However, the theme of difference was a clear element of memories from various sources, suggesting the reflection of the nationalist narratives continues to dominate the memory of Cypriots.

7.3 Inter-personal

At the inter-personal level, community attitudes and relations have been damaged considerably by the events discussed. As has been previously mentioned, the separate education systems supported the growth of separateness (Papadakis, 2008). This sense of difference remains a major element of community perceptions on Cyprus:

Because before that neither the Greek Cypriots nor [the] Turkish Cypriots [were] aware of their national identity, nationalism. I already think that the teachers and the education systems spread the [nationalism], very crucial. [Teachers] played a very crucial role during this separation of both communities, [after 1963]. Of course the education system in both sides made [Cypriots] feel more Turks or Greeks than Cypriot. (T, M, over 50)

A lot of the younger people have no interest and no desire to [interact with] the other community; it’s the schools and the educational system [that] had tended to teach them that the other community is the villain, on both sides. Therefore, I think it needs a tremendous amount of work with both communities. (G, F, 40s)

The education system played a key role in sustaining this sense of difference and the distinction between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Both of the two extracts above, one from each Cypriot community, suggests the education systems were designed to teach
pupils about the villainy of the opposing community. A great deal of work is needed to reverse this use of the education systems, though Papadakis (2008) noted that the Turkish Cypriot system has been significantly altered. The education system had played a substantial role in solidifying the nationalist narratives, especially if communities sense they need to defend themselves and their identity:

Yes [relations] did change, when you come under attack [the Turkish Cypriots] defended ourselves. And of course there was a response and Turkish nationalism developed. (T, M, over 50)

Although the nationalist narratives remain, evidence appears to suggest that nationalist narratives work in tandem to reinforce each other. The Turkish Cypriot extracts below illustrate both communities are to blame for the developments of isolation and division. The extremists of both communities had worked somehow by consensus, according to the Turkish Cypriot in the second extract below:

So there is dispute [in] government between extreme nationalists and extreme religious people [in] the northern part of Cyprus. [This] was the [result of the] mistake of the majority to attack the Turkish Cypriot community. But this attack was not one sided, it was two sided. So [exogenous elements] were making sure that the two communities will hate each other, be enemies to each other. (T, M, over 50)

So it was a common effort actually to come to the point [of violence]. Leaving posts in the government of the Republic of Cyprus was [encouraged by the] Turkish Cypriot underground organisation. But this was of course welcomed by the Greek nationalists. So it was somehow a consensus between the opposing sides to come to that conclusion. And it happened. Even [19]74 was somehow a consensus between the two [extremes] of the communities. (T, M, over 50)

The underlying theme consists of separate nationalist identities being ‘pushed’ upon communities (Yennaris, 2003, Cranshaw 1978). While considered a response to enosis, taksim remained an ideology that threatened Greek Cypriots. Apportioning of blame upon exogenous actors appears to have been achieved through organising memory, from the top as well as from the bottom. This apportioning of blame to exogenous actors could equate to a ploy to avoid fuelling the reinforcing dynamic between nationalist narratives.

The graphs illustrating the Cypriot responses varied in the extent to which relations and attitudes were perceived to have been negatively affected. The 1963-4 period
appears to have had a lesser effect on relations and attitudes compared to 1974, from the perspective of Cypriot communities. There were differences across the community divide, with the Greek Cypriots noting the highly negative effect on attitude after 1974 while Turkish Cypriots felt it was less so, illustrated in Figure 11. Like their responses on the individual level, the majority of Cypriots, from both communities, stated the effect on relations as highly negative as a result of 1974. In the case of 1963-4, less than a majority in both communities gave the same answer, although it remained the most frequent. With competing nationalist narratives, elements within Cypriot communities attempted to undermine the other community’s claims over the past to strengthen their present political standings. Cypriot elites may have created memories, myths and symbols to support their claims that communities could, or could not, have close ties (Kaufmann, 2001; Smith, 1986). Such a phenomenon has developed to centre upon 1974 in the case of Greek Cypriots and some Turkish Cypriots:

But there was a failure to understand on the Greek Cypriot’s [side] that the Turkish Cypriot community could [not] share that aspiration. Basically, Greek Cypriots never took Turkish Cypriots into account. No, there was just no realisation on the part of the Greek Cypriots. And then the independence came as a kind compromise for both sides. (G, F, 40s)

Since 1974, Greek Cypriots have sought to remove all possible semblances of cultural difference and emphasised certain similarities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, including nationalist elements. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative has sought to encapsulate Greek Cypriot identity under a form of ‘Cypriotism’ that could accommodate the Turkish Cypriot identity. Meanwhile, the main issue remains one of governmental power between communities (PIO, 2010; Denktash and Moran, 2009). Cypriots appear to recognise that domestic actors are the most likely to find a solution. However, younger generations have too few interactions to make prospective solutions foreseeable:

So many generations have grown up with no knowledge of the other community. [If they did,] those people who were growing up in the 60s and the 70s have just bad memories. The only people who have good memories are probably in their 70s by now or 80s. (G, F, 40s)

The communities have very little contact. The youth have very little contact. [The nationalist elites] cannot find a way out of their political rhetoric. I’m talking about both sides. (T, M, 40s)
The community members will often have bad memories of interactions with other Cypriots, if they have any. As a result, young Cypriots will not find out about the other community due to the lack of contacts since 2003, although there have been grass-roots projects. Such factors would cause the separate political leaderships to question the feasibility of altering the existing political rhetoric and taking a political gamble. Political leaders will obviously wish to find a solution but they fear the costs, in terms of economics and politics (PIO, 2010). In terms of politics, the nationalist politicians will not want to lose support or prestige amongst their followers and influential figures. This will mean that no solution will be found in the immediate future as no political will exists to face those costs. While some remain unconvinced, others remain optimistic that given contact, the communities would recognise their similarities:

**People don’t realise it because they don’t have contact, but I think the two communities are almost mirror images of each other.** You know, I mean culturally, take out the factor of religion [and] there is very little cultural differences: the food we eat; the way we behave; you know, the way families behave; and so on. We are almost mirror images of each other. (G, F, 40s)

I mean there is closeness between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities. **But there will not be any closeness between Greek Cypriot culture and the Turkish culture in the north.** (T, M, over 50)

**The character [keeps] changing in the north, becoming more and more Turkish. And it's not going to be the Turkish of Istanbul [but] is going to be Turkish of Anatolia.** (T, M, over 50)

I agree that the individual Cypriots may develop links and are culturally close but their separate identities and cultures which have developed since 1974 will not aid integration. The last Turkish Cypriot response above suggests the Turkish Cypriot identity has been pressured by the Turkish identity of settlers (PIO, 2010). Even if relations were developed amongst younger generations, conflict between communities may not be erased by the prospect, or the achievement, of reunification. More realistic than expecting reunification, the communities may agree to recognise their separate identities but remain in conflict over governance. The last respondent below suggests that present thinking assumes that after a solution, reconciliation will automatically follow:
So in many levels we are trying to have this interaction between the two communities. (G, M, 40s)

Of course we are not saying to prepare ourselves for unification. We are saying that it is important in political terms to create the conditions for [a solution]. At least believing the solution of the Cyprus problem [is possible]. (G, M, 40s)

But I think some work has to be done and I think it’s the process of reconciliation which should be considered separate to the process of the solution. But even if we don’t have a solution, we still need to go through the process of reconciliation. People don’t understand that. They think that through a connection, we [can] get a solution [and] then we’ll reconcile. (G, F, 40s)

Moderates within both communities had wanted to bridge the gap between communities. In the second extract above, the Greek Cypriot respondent recognised the island could not be unified without working to ‘create the conditions’ for a solution. Representing the pro-solution elements, these comments help explain the developing memories that are counter to established nationalist narratives. Moreover, it was the Turkish Cypriots who felt the need for separate institutions and it was a Greek Cypriot government that sought to enforce its authority over the Turkish Cypriots:

You will see that through [19]63, [19]64, [19]65, Turkish [Cypriot] positions [moved nearer to] the position of the Greek Cypriots, [but] political position of the Greek Cypriots was changed in 1974 and [the idea of] union with Greece [declined]. [Enosis became] the most extreme position [within] the [Greek Cypriot] community. Now I see that [Turkish Cypriots] are moving towards two states with perhaps [federation]. I mean that’s what I get from what they say. [The Turkish Cypriot] may not say that directly, officially, but that’s what I [perceive]. (G, M, 20s)

As was noted by this extract, the political positions of the two parties have changed due to factors such as political strength. The Turkish Cypriots were seen to have moved towards seeking a two-state solution (Denktash and Moran, 2009). Reflecting the nationalist narratives, community elites have accused each other of seeking their maximalist objectives, thus reinforcing political positions. Such leaders may fear withdrawing or backing down from this rhetorical trap but nationalist elites can not achieve their objectives. Nationalist narratives exist partly to reinforce the nationalist political establishment against moderate opponents outside government. However,
other political actors who gain power are unable to escape the nationalist narratives, such as AKEL. This was the same for the CTP when it was in government as it had to retain many of their nationalist opponent’s perspectives. This supports the general narrative of stasis since 1974 as the communities have been unwilling to make compromises. For Denktash (2009) below, the talks appear to have no real purpose as “no Greek Cypriot leader will accept political equality and consequently current negotiations are just a waste of time” (Denktash and Moran, 2009; 61-4):

Hence the “red line” of Mr [Christofias]: no guarantees, no soldiers, yes to bi-zonality but subject to freedoms of settlement, ownership and movement; Turkish Cypriots should not expect, anew, such rights which will overshadow the rights of Greek Cypriots, Armenians, Maronites and Latins; equality under the law is a must because we are one people, one state, on sovereignty, and we shall have a united territory, united economy, united establishments/associations! For 45 years and this is what we have been trying to avoid, by insisting on a new partnership settlement on the basis of equality, subject to the continuation of the guarantees. We are offered anything but guarantees under the flag of one people which means eventual osmosis as Papadopulos predicted. (Denktash and Moran, 2009, 61-2)

Meanwhile, Denktash suggested reasons for the failure to find a solution which chime with extracts from Turkish Cypriot interviewees:

In a conflict as in Cyprus where two partners/ethnic groups/nations, call it what you may, have fallen at each other's throat, the attempt to settle the problem must begin with a fact-finding mission and the party who had stuffed it all must be pinpointed as the guilty party prior to dealing with the two sides on the basis of absolute equality. […] On the contrary the guilty party was exonerated and honoured as “the legitimate government of Cyprus” and whatever we did, or had to do, in order to prove the contrary and defend ourselves has been treated as a sign of proof of our intransigence. In other words, we are asked conjoin those big powers who created a Greek Cypriot republic under the old “Republic of Cyprus” title, in recognising this Republic by joining this time minus the guarantees and other vested rights. (Denktash and Moran, 2009; 61-2)

What [the Turkish Cypriots want] is a partnership on an equal base [with Greek Cypriots]. When you do not have this relationship [and] one is dominating the other one, you will always have problems. (T, M, 40s)

And it is always difficult to regulate between a minority and majority communities. Actually there is no conflict between the two communities. There is this problem of [the] majority feeling that [a] minority is controlling them. And then there is fear in the smaller community that the majority will rule them. It is not going to be easy [for] the bigger community, to accept political equality. They say that they accept this political equality but it is
always difficult. **And for the smaller community, not to use this political equality against the majority is another thing that we need to learn.** (T, M, over 50)

The first Turkish Cypriot extract above suggests problems will always result when relationships are between dominating and dominated communities. If this was altered, what safeguards should be created to ensure that a shared system does not lead to deadlock, as was the case in 1960s? The second Turkish Cypriot extract suggests that if communities were ever treated as equals, the minority should restrain themselves from using that political equality. However, such a situation remains unlikely given the present situation and retention of the established nationalist narratives (PIO, 2010; Denktash and Moran, 2009). Although Greek Cypriot positions altered as a result of 1974, Greek Cypriot nationalism appears to remain a key element in Greek Cypriot politics. Greek Cypriots remain insistent that any arrangement for equal treatment of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots would be unfair:

But still the people [remain] believing people; **they believe that the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots could find the common future in Cyprus.** I think Talat is a man of goodwill. I don’t think he’s stupid I think he’s sharp and he understands that with no solution in 20, 30, 40 years there will not be a single Turkish Cypriot on the island. (G, M, over 50)

The Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots both recognise the population in the north of Cyprus has developed as well. There have been a growing number of people who are classed as settlers from Anatolia, though many have few memories of living in Turkey. The difficult economic conditions in the “TRNC” had driven many Turkish Cypriots to London and elsewhere:

Now we have 250,000 Turkish Cypriots living in UK and do you know [that] we only have 80,000 living in the north and there [are diasporas in] other countries. **Turkish [people] from Turkey stays there and gets the most benefits of the services in the north.** (T, M, over 50)

[Greek Cypriots] need to be very stupid to kill [Turkish Cypriots] and why should [Greek] kill [Turk]. I mean those things happen when people are not able to get on together, [that was in] other times when having a gun – you could play the macho guy. **This is not the case anymore.** The issue [is] to have a solution that will guarantee the respect of Human Rights and will be viable. But I don’t think that we’ll live long enough to see it. (G, M, over 50)
While the demographics have changed, the Turkish Cypriots have often not talked about what happened in 1974\textsuperscript{16}. The response from the Greek Cypriot above suggests that common ground could be made. Coming from the Greek Cypriot employed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the tone of this extract appears to downplay both the issues and the Turkish Cypriot community itself. This chimes with the complaint from Turkish Cypriots that Greek Cypriots often forgot about their Turkish compatriots when talking about the conflict (PIO, 2010). In a sense, there needs to be respect for each community’s identity and an acceptance of difference. As this extract below suggests, mutually reinforcing dynamics amongst moderate elements could develop, as has been suggested amongst extremists:

\begin{quote}
At the end of the day it's because of lessons [in the past, of] \textbf{external powers [involvement] in our conflicts rather than resolving them [at the community level]. But at the end of the day it will boil down to how far the culture of the communities [can] work [together]. (T, M, over 50)}
\end{quote}

As well as an element of hope, trauma and fear remain sentiments reflected in the communities’ nationalist narratives. This was exemplified by this extract below that states that communities consider the same events as two very different occurrences. The memories of events are subject to the collective memories of communities and are to some extent subsumed within nationalist narratives (Zerubavel, 2007, Bell, 2002). Like literature explored in previous chapters, elites have tools to transmit nationalist narratives to their community and reinterpret those narratives if necessary:

\begin{quote}
\textbf{I mean on the Greek psyche, the big trauma is the invasion of [19]74 and you know the expulsion of large numbers of Greek Cypriots and on the Turkish psyche it’s you know, what happened prior to [19]74. I mean they consider that [19]74 was a peace operation and we consider it to be an invasion. (G, F, 40s)}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textbf{It leaves a sense of fear you know and both types of violence leaves a sense of fear. I mean the Turkish Cypriots living in enclaves felt they were under threat, from the Greeks and when the invasion took place there [were] a lot of atrocities [which] leaves its mark on people. And even those who have not experienced it, they hear about it from others. We carry all the historical baggage as well as the enmity between Greece and Turkey. (G, F, 40s)}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{16} The dynamic that denies people the freedom to talk about these subjects maybe a genuine fear of the consequences or a logical excuse to allow Cypriots to have selective memory. This is a theme within both communities.
Although the communities can challenge these nationalist narratives with collective memories, the communities cannot easily unwrap themselves from their nationalist narratives (Papadakis, 2008). The historical baggage may remain too cumbersome for the communities to take responsibility, even if they wanted to:

Well I think you know first of all Cypriots don’t take responsibility for their own actions and I think this is true on both sides. I mean, on both sides you get the [impression] that our side we are innocent and all the nasty things were done by the other side and vice versa. There is a very convenient tendency to say that everything would have been fine if the British and American’s hadn’t messed this up. Particularly the left-wing will say this, but even right-wing people. I mean the left-wing loves to say it because they still think in terms of imperialism. So it’s always the rotten imperialist who is to blame for the fact there’s problems. (G, F, 40s)

I don’t think the Cypriot culture on either side is particularly forgiving. I think [Cypriots are] very heavily [involved in a] blame game. I mean Greek people recognise that in themselves. Some Greeks recognise it, let’s put it that way, but yes, I don’t know where these [characteristics] come from, it must be part of the culture I guess and the [culture of blame] gets handed down to generation to generation. (G, F, 40s)

The nationalist narratives remain partly because the communities cannot escape, or because they choose not to escape. A common theme has been to blame the events on exogenous actors such as the UK and US, as was clear from extracts as well as other primary data. There have also been accusations that a culture of blame exists on Cyprus that remains an obstacle to a resolution (Hannay, 2005). Nevertheless, political will is required to bring about a reinterpretation of Cypriot memories that will allow for the possibility of a solution. However:

I think it’s more to do with the political actors on the island. It takes political courage to start demythologising when for, all these years, politicians have been through a lot of pain and the other side are to blame. On [the moderate] side, you know it’s very difficult, [to] turn round and say, ‘yes [demythologising the situation] can be done, it has to be done’, but it just takes a lot of political courage and most people who are in politics don’t want to cut their own throats. (G, F, 40s)

There is no political will to solve the problem. We have until [that] time to raise the will for the political solution. When that time comes, [we] will not have this power sharing or territorial issue, or [a] reinstatement of the property. It will be solved in no time. (T, M, over 50)
No political will exists amongst the political parties, including AKEL or CTP. However, the evidence suggests elements of both communities have memories of events beyond what has been reflected as the established nationalist narratives. Such memories may develop and establish an alternative or force a reinterpretation of the nationalist narrative. With such memories, Greek Cypriots perceive the damage that resulted from 1963-4 and Turkish Cypriot recognise the harm that resulted from 1974.

7.4 Institutions

Both 1963-4 and 1974 badly affected relations and attitudes between institutions, though 1974 influenced interactions more, according to the quantitative evidence. As a result, these institutions may be crucial in understanding the retention of the nationalist narratives. One possible reason why the nationalist narrative remains strong in the Turkish Cypriot community is that their institutions require the narrative to support their necessity. But questions remain over such institutions:

[Turkish Cypriots] **don’t know who is responsible from whom [in government].** We have a president but sometimes he cannot give [commands] to the police [on] the border. (T, M, over 50)

**They used the [TMT] organisation to create a nationalist community.** [Turkish Cypriots were] not Turkish but [Turkey] makes [Turkish Cypriots] Turkish. They create Turkish words. Secondly, they create a kind of pressure amongst [the] community. **If somebody [talked] in Greek they [would have to] pay a fine.** (T, M, over 50)

Barriers were being established between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots with the use of such methods. There were fines for using the wrong language, the place-names were all changed and towns were renamed with Turkish identities (Yennaris, 2003, Reddaway, 1986). The Turkish Cypriot institutions claim that they receive support from Turkey rather than orders. Turkish Cypriot institutions remain the main employer in the territory; this maybe one reason why many Turkish Cypriots were unwilling to contribute to this research. For some respondents, the Turkish Cypriot leadership wish to maintain a separate independent state rather than negotiate for a federal or con-federal solution was their main concern:
Nowadays [Greek Cypriots] don’t want to share [within a unified] administration. This is the problem but our leaders want a separate state. (T, M, over 50)

Evidence exists that the Turkish Cypriot elite do not want to unify the island unless the solution allowed for the equal treatment of communities. Denktash clearly argued for the necessity of two separate states on Cyprus (Denktash and Moran 2009) as the only viable outcome. When discussing worsened relations and attitudes, the Greek Cypriot respondent below stated that poor relations between institutions resulted from 1983:

That was mostly caused by [19]83. There is a third turning point in the relations. But the [19]83 development actually dissolved the Turkish Cypriot community and [created] new situations [on] Cyprus. And the Turkish Cypriots are trying to promote that with every opportunity. (G, M, 20s)

It may have damaged relations from the perspective of Greek Cypriots but the Turkish Cypriot leadership may have perceived a need to appear to look for alternatives (Denktash and Moran, 2009). 1983 was perceived by Greek Cypriots to have irrevocably changed the situation on Cyprus. This Greek Cypriot below noted Turkish Cypriots wanted to manage their own affairs but that they needed to find a solution:

But I think that this period from [19]74 to 2004 showed to the Turkish Cypriots that they need to find a solution because these things cannot go on, not in a non-recognised state. But this resolution of the institutions made them realise that they want to manage their own affairs in a recognised state. (G, M, over 50)

Having retained their own education system, and having developed municipal authorities, the Turkish Cypriots may not want to relinquish these vestiges of influence. Living in an unrecognised state remains detrimental to their community but the prospects in an unreformed but recognised Republic of Cyprus appear bleak to Turkish Cypriots (Dentash and Moran, 2009). This next extract suggests that while excluded from the EU, the Turkish Cypriots would not accept a solution detrimental to their autonomy. The longer this issue remains open, the bigger the gulf between communities according to this Turkish Cypriot:

Well, joining a state would not be a problem if [only Turkish Cypriots were] accepted for what we are. I think they would see Cyprus as an asset in the European Union. But it's not going to happen. [Outside observers]
will get bored of the problem if they have not already and ignore what is said. [Then], things will take their course. (T, M, over 50)

Some Cypriots perceived that the situation requires both communities to compromise over their institutions. As in previous extracts, elements in both communities may wish for developments but often want compromise to be made by the other community. The Turkish Cypriot activist with a moderate standpoint argued that the Turkish Cypriot elite may have been more successful in their objectives if they had worked with Greek Cypriots within the constraints of the 1960 constitution. She also suggests that the Greek Cypriots need to alter the way they view the Turkish Cypriots:

Yeah, but would it [have been] better for the Turkish Cypriots to stay in government and try to block [the Greek Cypriots]. Or does it make more sense to run away from [the 1960] constitution, from the government and say [we are] going [to] have our own independence. (T, F, 20s)

The Turkish Cypriots are invisible. [Greek Cypriots and others] don't talk about them when they are considering the Cyprus problem. [But Greek Cypriots had] began to realise that [Turkish Cypriots] were not the greatest fans of Turkey. (T, F, 20s)

Most Turkish Cypriots stated Turkey had damaged chances of Turkish Cypriots living normal lives on Cyprus but it was their nationalist political leadership that created isolated enclaves. They may say that they are not the greatest fans of Turkey, but their leadership has allowed their community to become dependent on Turkey, through the institutions. Other Turkish Cypriots blame their elite for not working within the constitution and believe events of 1963-4 were exaggerated to support their elite’s policies. The institutions on both sides of the divide created division, but while Greek Cypriot institutions were developed in the place of republican institutions, the Turkish Cypriot institutions were created outside the ‘Republic’.

7.5 Context

Illustrated in the evidence of previous chapters, new developments appear to be in motion that could create the groundings for a route to reconciliation. Though still early in development, the nationalist narratives that have supposedly held sway for years appear to have been challenged by alternative memories of events. Though the narratives remain intact, Cypriots are seeking to challenge the storylines that have
been forwarded by the elites of both communities. As was made clear, the alternative memories suggest exogenous actors and community elites were at fault. Such memories support their conclusion that communities could have lived together if they compromised and cooperated. However, public pressure has remained to support the nationalist narratives in both communities, and constrained opponents such as AKEL and CTP for fear of being branding as traitors.

Despite pressure to retain nationalist narratives, the increasing involvement of the European Union has influenced the way in which Cypriots view themselves. Though the EU had been unable to resolve the conflict, the effect of its involvement has influenced the outlook of individuals, as it did amongst East Europeans in the 1990s (Koresaar et al, 2009):

The initial intention of the EU was to somehow get involved, what we call the Europeanisation process. (T, M, over 50)

**For all intents and purposes, the European Union is the partner that we are negotiating with, through the Greek Cypriot side.** The Greek Cypriots now are saying that this is a European problem. But we do not want to put the European Union in the position of judge and jury. They are a party, and you cannot have them as an intermediary, which is what the Greek Cypriots are trying to do. **What changed the relationship was the Greek Cypriots joining the European Union.** (T, M, over 50)

From a nationalist perspective, this Turkish Cypriot considers the end result has been that the Greek Cypriots have joined the EU and the Turkish Cypriots have not. It would be wrong to think only Greek Cypriots are able to benefit from their EU membership, as Turkish Cypriots have gained Cypriot passports which entitles them to move around the European Union. But, those that have done so may argue that they do not recognise the institutions involved but use the passport for ease of travel. EU involvement may have opened the opportunity for the communities to meet as well as view themselves differently. But agreement that the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus could enter the EU without a need for a solution resulted in no solution:

**But that Helsinki [summit] decision was supposed to be used as leverage. But it worked the other way. Cyprus was left without a settlement.** So at the end of the day it was a risk taken by the EU on the account of the Turkish Cypriot community. (T, M, over 50)
Cyprus is an EU member, although one community lives in a territory where the EU *acquis* have been suspended (PIO, 2010; Hannay, 2005). A change of perspective may have influenced Cypriot memories of past violent events away from the established nationalist narratives, as happened in other countries (Koresaar et al., 2009). This has coincided with supposedly more moderate political leaderships of Christofias and Talat, replacing previous leaders who had benefited from nationalist narratives, such as Denktash. Denktash himself noted that Cyprus could not be an EU member without Turkey becoming a member as well:

> as to Cyprus! The EU's continuous assertion that Cyprus (meaning the 1960 partnership Republic) is a member, is also unacceptable. As long as the 1960s Cyprus agreements are valid, Cyprus pre-1963 or thereafter could not apply nor become a member of the EU unless Turkey was also a full member. As you point out no one can agree, least of all Britain, that the agreements "wrecked or ignored" are no longer valid. What we have been trying to do, in the course of all the talks, is to preserve the “the state of affairs” established by these treaties, namely the balance between the two sides in Cyprus and the Greco-Turkish balance under the guise of guarantees, which also coloured the needs of Britain as far as her bases were concerned. (Denktash and Moran, 2009, 19-20)

This ending of some nationalist leader’s political careers may have influenced the wider acceptance of mistakes by both communities for a period. Nationalist narratives could be placed under greater pressure if more individual Cypriots from both communities interact with individuals from the opposing community. However, the inability of moderate political leaders to create a political will to find a solution has meant they are trapped within the previous nationalist rhetoric. Although the grassroots level supported alternative memories, such memories may not result in a new narrative being established. Instead of uncertainty, elites within both communities may reinterpret the nationalist narratives to encapsulate the changing memories of Cypriots on both sides of the divide. Although publicly the political leaderships wish for a resolution, there remains a lack of political will to create the conditions for a solution. As Denktash (2009) notes of Christofias:

> “Bizonality” has been on the table since 1977 and in no Greek Cypriot leader was ready to accept it as an agreed end. As stated by Clerides today “(Greek Cypriots) attended the talks for tactical reasons”, to gain time and embody themselves more and more as “the government of Cyprus”, and the project Turkish Cypriot side as “the intransigence side”. [Christofias] is not doing anything different. The unanimous decisions of the (Greek Cypriot)
National Council are also binding on him as they were on the previous leaders. *Enosis*, unitary state, no partnership, no guarantees, no soldiers, the settlers are part and parcel of “these unanimous decisions.” (Denktash and Moran, 2009; 28-9)

Meanwhile, the Greek nationalist narrative retains similar positions as before:

The government of Cyprus is determined to continue its search for a viable and functional solution within the parameters of the UN resolutions as well as the new political context created by the accession of Cyprus to the EU, in order to safeguard the rights of all Cypriots. In this manner, all Cypriots will fully enjoy the benefits and advantages of EU membership and bring about the reunification of their country after more than three decades of artificial division. (PIO a, 2010; 34)

### 7.6 Summary

These developments have formed an alternative set of memories that may possibly lead to the creation of the common ground needed for reconciliation between the Cypriot communities. The alternative but unifying set of memories may emphasise the culpability of Turkey and the importance of 1974 as a violent rupture. It also has led some Turkish Cypriots to recognise that their community has not helped themselves with past choices, especially in 1963-4 and 1983. Meanwhile, Greek Cypriot contributions have noted the damage to relations as a result of the 1950s insurgency, the 1963-4 period of violence and political decisions since. The differences amongst the quantitative evidence suggest attitudes and relations were damaged most greatly on the institutional level. This suggests that the memories of both violent events can reinforce the nationalist narratives if institutions are able to reinterpret these narratives. The similar patterns from Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities and individuals suggested an increasingly common sentiment. But the lack of political will amongst leaders may make such sentiments redundant except within the grass-roots level organisations that seek to create common ground.

OLMV is these sets of memory that challenge the established nationalist narratives. Although both communities could forward such sets of memories, it remains unclear whether reconciliation would result as a consequence. In a sense, OLMV represents the opportunity for altering the long-established narrative and breaking out of the political rhetoric that has dogged progress towards reconciliation. Whether this opportunity is taken depends upon the political will that has so far been absent. Given
their long-established positions, the nationalist narratives of both Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities will not accept another set of memories supplanting their positions. Political elites appear to promote the retention of such narratives for personal as well as political reasons. Through their more divisive ECMV, individual political leaders, such as Denktash, have invested their own political prestige upon the retention of such narratives. As well as the individual political leaders, the media and cultural organisations involved may only be willing to alter their activity if there are clear political movements. In a sense, the negotiation of memory is dependent upon the political will of the present to create the possibility of a political solution in the future.

### 7.7 Conclusion

This chapter first reintroduced elements of theory discussed in Chapter Two. Evidence from the previous two chapters and extracts throughout support the ideas of contrasting and consensual memories. It is concluded that the events of 1963-4 and 1974 have affected the political relations and attitudes of Cypriots. At the levels analysed, the individual level was least affected, although Cypriots from the younger generations had little or no contact. The institutional level was the most affected as little interaction between institutions existed, according to quantitative evidence. At the community level, relations remain strained with little or no interaction occurring between 1974 and 2003, but a slight increase since 2003. However, evidence suggests nationalist narratives remain in place and little room for compromise exists. Developments in technology and media have opened Cypriots to an alternative interpretation of events, as well as political developments such as the accession of the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus to the EU. This may not result in the replacement of nationalist narratives but such developments may ensure their reinterpretation. As a result, the nationalist narratives may come to incorporate the more unifying memories and open up some political space for compromise.
CONCLUSION

8.1 Aims

In the Introduction, the aims of this thesis were set out as:

To identify and understand the memories of violence as a method of analysis;

To expose the changing perceptions of political relations and attitudes and whether such perceptions fit within the Cypriot nationalist narratives;

To illustrate and draw conclusions on perceived changes to political relations and attitudes, as a result of the theorised memories of violence;

To lay the ground for further study of the implications for reconciliation processes and successful transitions to sustainable peace.

8.2 Results

This research used interviews and questionnaires to achieve these aims. The major findings are set out in the following ways:

8.2.1 The memory of violence remains influential on individual and collective perception of attitudes and relations.

Both 1963-4 and 1974 are remembered as periods of trauma for the Cypriot communities and constitute central tenets of their identities. Respondents suggest that there were more complex dynamics than simply Greek Cypriots only remembering 1974 while Turkish Cypriots remembered 1963-4. There was clear evidence of divided opinion and perspective within and between communities. With an understandable level of caution, I suggest the memory of 1963-4 and 1974 have affected perceived political relations and attitudes of Cypriots since. The individual level was perceived to have been least affected in terms of relations, although little or no contact existed amongst the younger Cypriots. Unless part of negotiations, the institutional level saw little interaction and has suffered the greatest effect on its relation and attitudes, according to the quantitative evidence. At the community level,
relations remained strained and little or no interaction occurred between 1974 and 2003.

The reason for this was primarily due to Cypriot nationalist narratives centring on communities’ victimhood. The younger generation had no links because of the existing barriers and obstacles that have been created by the nationalist narratives. The relationships between the younger generations need to be established and supported for a solution to be possible. Violence can often be a memory used in a broader conflict, a conflict that remains often unsettled long after violence has ended. These nationalist narratives fuel the continued conflict between communities.

8.2.3. 1963-4 increased the tension between communities, and individuals, as well as created institutions. Relations between institutions were limited because the Turkish Cypriots established their own institutions as a result of 1963-4. Meanwhile, relations between individuals appear to have been fairly consistent as memories suggest a tolerant and neighbourly environment prior to the events of 1963-4. Individuals from both communities may state that they felt they could live together again but the Cypriot memories and perceptions suggest attitudes were polarised as a result of events. As the evidence points out, institutions reinforced this polarisation of attitude. For example, the creation of new Turkish Cypriot institutions was seen as a secessionist plot, within the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative. But the 1963-4 period of violence created the need for these institutions, according to those that reflect the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative. However, not all Cypriot memories fit within these nationalist narratives.

Relations and attitudes were damaged by inter-communal violence in 1963-4 and resulted in the development of enclaves. 1963-4 remains prominent within the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative while within the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative, 1963-4 was often downplayed. Conversely, the events were often also characterised as a continuation of previous episodes of conflict in the 1950s, forming a broader narrative of division that was addressed in Chapter 4. Members of both communities considered the 1963-4 period of violence harmful to relations and attitudes. It was also noted by at least one respondent that 1974 would not have occurred if the 1963-4
period of violence had not badly damaged interactions. Some Cypriots have suggested that 1963-4 was of little importance and relatively few were killed and injured. Though true, the memory of such episodes often has a similar effect on a community’s narrative as larger episodes of violence.

8.2.4. 1974 harmed relations and attitudes to a greater degree but remains part of a nexus of harmful events.

Illustrating the Cypriot perceptions of 1974 and the consequences of intervention, this research concludes that each community portrays itself as victims of other actors. Relations between individuals were cut as a result of the Turkish intervention of 1974 and were only reinstated in 2003. The perceived relations and attitudes of institutions were harmed further as a result of division on the island and the growing competence of the Turkish Cypriot Administration. Relations and attitudes were damaged more by 1974 than 1963-4, although 1974 was not the only event to damage relations and attitudes.

1974 was focused upon by the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative but was also highlighted by some Turkish Cypriot individuals. Although the Turkish Cypriot nationalist narrative portrays 1974 as a necessity, individuals see the damage and the harmful consequences. 1974 was a major junction in the conflict over Cyprus but was not the only important turning point, nor was it the only violent episode. The frozen conflict has not encouraged Turkish Cypriots to compromise as they had previously. Before 1974, the Greek Cypriots had a considerable advantage over the Turkish Cypriots. This change in circumstances has been central to the continued issues on Cyprus and why 1974 has been stressed in the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative.

8.2.5. Memories of violence appear to emphasise a certain interpretation of events for what appears to be the political benefit of elites.

The focus on 1974 appears understandable given the frozen nature of the conflict since. Elites could emphasise consensual developments within Cyprus, including the benefits of EU membership. But in fact elites have often ignored the collective guilt and harm that has befallen Cyprus as often such sentiment could be detrimental to their political positions. The Turkish Cypriot elite centred its nationalist narrative on the events of 1963-4 as their community’s traumatic experience. But their capacity to
direct and transmit memories and construct their narrative appears to be less successful compared to the Greek Cypriot elite. There are a number of ways in which both elites may control memories, including through education and culture. In the case of the Greek Cypriots, the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church and National Guard are institutions that have supported and forwarded the Greek Cypriot nationalist narrative.

The political objectives of elites can alter over time but often may settle upon the retention of influence. The minority’s elite may seek to govern their own community in an unrecognised state while the majority’s elite aims to govern all of Cyprus. Not everyone agrees with these objectives, including the opponents of elites who may seek to replace them. The challenge that they pose to the nationalist narrative is through their alternative set of memories. The memories that do not fit the nationalist narrative but are widely held offer a challenge to the nationalist narratives. In other words, such a development may force the elite to answer by reinterpreting the memories and reimagining their nationalist narrative. The Greek Cypriots nationalist narrative may develop to reflect a common culture and traditions amongst Cypriots. Often termed ‘Cypriotism’ in the past, such sentiment has been echoed by some Turkish Cypriots for pragmatic or ideological reasons and offers an end to their own isolation. Meanwhile, other Turkish Cypriots may seek to dispute ideas of common culture and tradition as myth and propaganda.

8.2.6. Memories of violence can encourage or deter dialogue between communities. As the Turkish Cypriots were less successful at focusing their communities’ narrative, both Turkish and Greek Cypriots appear to centre upon 1974 as a major turning point. As a result, both communities may focus upon the role of exogenous actors, their interests and the consequences. This focus on OLMV was because if that was not focused on, divisive and traumatic memories of 1974 and 1963-4 may create a larger gulf between communities. Communities may establish dialogue and develop links for a reconciliation process to occur if they have a set of memories that are not necessarily mutually reinforcing a narrative of stasis.

A common trauma can bring communities closer and encourages individuals to develop relationships with those from the other community. However, such processes
ought to develop on a much wider scale if a viable solution is to be found. There are non-governmental organisations involved but elites need to provide political will and support such efforts. OLMV may develop the common sentiment of victimhood for Cypriots relationships to incorporate with each other and open routes towards a solution. The problem is that there remains no political will and the nationalist narratives remain, although the elite can reinterpret the set of memories to counter-act the opposition.

8.3 Assessment

From these conclusions, it is now reasonable to consider all the aims of this research achieved. An alternative approach to examining violence has been uncovered by analysing the memory of violent events. Memories of those indirectly affected by violence allowed this research to examine the wider implications of conflict. Assessing violent memories was an area not clearly understood nor fully exposed in the case of Cyprus. This approach allows for the long-term consequences of violent events to be analysed in terms of community relations and attitudes. It also has an influence on possible reconciliation and the methods by which elites may seek to respond to alternative memories of past violence.

Relations and attitudes have been examined, as have the developments of perceptions amongst Cypriots. As mentioned above, perceived relations and attitudes of Cypriots were transformed as a result of 1974. Such a transformation may have been provoked by damaging developments such as the enosis/taksim movements and insurgency of 1955. This method also allowed the examination of Cypriot perceptions of relations and attitudes between as well as within communities. Moreover, changing perception of relations and attitudes may have resulted from growing opposition to established nationalist narratives. The results suggest competition over the memory of violent events existed, reflected by the changing perception of relations and attitudes.

Interactions were worsened by the memory of violent events, including the 1963-4 period of inter-communal violence. However, evidence suggests an interpretation of the memories amongst Cypriots which emphasised events of 1974 and the roles of exogenous actors. This draws attention away from violent events amongst domestic actors, in 1963-4 but also in 1974. These memories may constitute a grass-roots
alternative to the elite’s representation of past violent events, displayed through the separate nationalist narratives. The elites in both communities may counter this by reinterpreting their set of collective memories and avoid losing their relevance with a newly re-imagined nationalist narrative.

Such conclusions support the continuation of study regarding the memory of violence and its implications for reconciliation. In the case of Cyprus, the memory of violence has an impact on the perspective of those involved in reconciliation. When presented in organised nationalist narrative, memories can easily be used to reinforce the elites and act as obstacles to reconciliation and possible resolution. Yet, communities need narratives to help them understand their environment and ensure justice for the past (Booth, 2006). Unlike Papadakis (2008), Poole (2008) noted that ethnic identities are not chosen and so narratives are likely to remain important aspects of society. Moreover, the contesting nationalist narratives may well remain the main storyline for both Cypriot communities. The prospect for further study will be explained below.

### 8.4 Prospect

As this study has been focusing on Cyprus, the same methods could also be used on other episodes of violence in Cyprus, such as the 1955-9 insurgency. Memory of the 1955-9 insurgent violence would be a very interesting comparison, especially given its anti-colonial element. Another area that deserves further examination appears is the length of time between violent events and research. This research has studied how memories can be used within narratives as well as suggesting narratives can be reinterpreted as a result of changing memories. Further examination of the transmission of memory could be important, especially non-institutional means.

These methods and ideas could be utilised in other case studies such as Iraq or Bosnia. Moreover, this research could lead to examinations of other historic episodes of violence and how they are remembered, or forgotten. Such research would examine whether these theories on the memory of violence are applicable elsewhere. Such comparative studies would provide further evidence of when, how and why memory becomes organised within narratives. The extent of conflicts that could be examined depends on a number of factors. Examples that may not have been studied enough include those from Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.
Collective memories of past episodes of violence can bring communities together with a shared sense of victimhood. Subsequent research could suggest methods for exogenous actors to avoid the portrayal of their actions as significantly damaging. Research could also assess the process of communities working towards reconciliation, although research should ask what reconciliation consists of in the various conflicts that exist. Recognising what should be the outcome, the international community will collectively know what assistance they can provide. This research has raised interesting questions that deserve further attention by subsequent studies.
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APPENDICES
Individual Cypriot responses to the first four questions of the questionnaires:

**Question 1: What are your thoughts on political relations and attitudes in Cyprus and how they have changed?**

No2 - not peoples fault, the problem is political – if we got to know each other – would be better – care more
No4 - I think the biggest change occurred in 2003 when the checkpoints opened. When people could start having contact with the other community at a personal level. At a people’s level relationships have changed positively as both communities understood that in reality they are not so different. At a political level, there has been a positive transition with Christofias as president (as he appears willing to find a solution) nevertheless at a practical level not much change occurred on the ground.
No5 - By the time all the people get more and more confused from political attitudes and actions in Cyprus
No6 - The Greek Cypriot politicians are trying to find a solution which will be fair for both sides (Greek-Turkish Cypriot) but the T.C. (Turkish Cypriot) politicians try to make the situation more difficult and create two countries to the island
No7 - I believe that they can’t change, and is difficult to change(s) because [there] are many differences between the two communities
No8 - quite negative political attitudes
No10 - political relations have been negatively changed
No11 - the relation are changed slowly and people are coming closer. Politicians are making things more difficult and they try each political party to impose their ideas.
No13 - Relations between G/C and T/Cypriots will change when Turkish occupation has ended and Turkish troops go.
No14 - Since 1974 worsen. Only moves backwards by Turkey and even constant compromising by Greek Cypriot, no agreement found as continued rising demands by Turkey.
No16 - I don’t think they changed
No18 - They are changing slowly
No20 - Not good – hope to be better
No21 - If external factors let communities on their own they will find a solution peacefully
No23 - Made worse by Turkey
No25 - positive
No27 - They are becoming better
No28 - Both sides are trying to find the ideal solution on teh political problem here in Cyprus without any changes. And after 30 years and more of living separately nothing could change the status
No29 - There’ll be no change
No30 - The same for several years. No change at all
No32 - We do not forget our relations and friends who died for our cause and our country
No33 - Until 1958, the attitudes were more or less ok. Afterwards, especially after 1963 December and 1974 invasion it deteriorated.
No34 - Seems like there are a lot of activities happening but within the changing governments on both sides from left/right wings, the political situation keeps altering.
No35 - No change
No36 - At first positive but now I think for worse
No38- Moving backwards
No39-I think that there will be no change at all
No44- the political relations and attitudes were very good before 1974. They have changed in a very serious manner
No45- Unchanged – some thought it solved in 1974
No46- No
No47-I think political relations and attitudes in Cyprus have changed a lot before 1974 we are all together very happy. After Turkish invasion we are like enemies.
No48- No change
No49- very negative and haven’t changed much
No50- up till 1950- relations between communities as they worked together (like brothers) but 1955 – fight British (contact with Turkey) 1960 onwards against one another but big fight was in 1974 – can work together if left alone.
No51- Two different parts who polarise
No52- they are polarised between them because of their different thoughts about the future of Cyprus
No53- Attitudes and relations haven’t changed, there is a shift in the way that the two communities pursue their goals

Question 2: Have political attitudes of communities become more accommodation or are they polarised?
No2- More polarised
No4-To a certain degree, at a people’s level, attitudes have become more accommodating. At a political level, attitudes remain polarised.
No5- they are polarised between them because of their different thoughts about the future of Cyprus
No6-Two different parts who polarise
No7-Polarised
No8-Polarised
No9-Political attitudes of both communities become more polarised
No10-I think have [become] accommodating
No13-Before the Turkish invasion there were better relations than after, but now they are a bit better than they were immediately after the Turkish invasion.
No14-with communication and negotiations, there should be a solution, if Turkey stops increasing and [marginalisation] demands affecting the peaceful and happy solution and living of Greek and Turkish Cypriots....... Turkey’s intentions and acts don’t seem to be optimistic for a solution. Though the process of negotiation is at least an attempt.
No16-I don’t think they changed
No18-more accommodating
No20-Polarised
No21-More accommodate since 1963
No22- More accommodating
No23- No change
No25- Negative
No27- They became more accommodating
No28- Polarised
No29- Polarised
No30- Polarised
No31- Polarised
No32- Greek Cypriot communities have better relations but involving Turkish
Cypriots communities are a bad way
No33- If there are no foreign involvement/interventions, the relations are always
good.
No34- I would say, it moved towards a more accommodating level, but probable not
even enough to provide a 100% security.
No35- Polarised
No36- Polarised
No37- I think they are polarised
No38- They (Turkish Cypriots) are more and more...
No39- Closer but with more problems
No40- They are polarised
No41- Same
No42- Same
No43- I think they polarised and this is a very bad for Cypriot people.
No44- No change
No45- More polarised
No46- Coming close – but TC [Turkish Cypriots] won’t allow them – because of
Turkey – not Turkish Cypriots
No47- They are polarised
No48- The same
No49- Closer
No50- They seem to be more accommodating. In surface but is a question about
depth.

Question 3: Have relations between communities become closer in the recent
past or are they more distant?
No2- closer before but 1974 divided them
No3- They were closer before 1974, but after the invasion they were more distant.
Now I think due to education people are more close.
No4- Relationships have become closer given the fact that the two communities can
actually have contact and interact. This however is still limited to a small share of the
population (5-10% having real interaction).
No5- They are more distant in the recent past because of their actions (Turkish
Cypriots)
No6- They are the same like before 10 years
No7- They are the same and will not change
No8- There is a change, but still relations are tough
No9- Relations between communities become closer since 2003
No10- Closer since the borders opened
No11- see question 2
No12- Less distant than prior 1974, but minor progress in the last few years.
No13- I don’t think they change
No14- closer
No15- A little better
No16- Cypriots (Greek and Turkish) are becoming closer since 1974
No17- No
No18- since 2003 closer but it depends
No19- negative
No27- I think they become closer
No28- Neither- none of the above
No29- More distant
No30- Distant
No31- More distant
No32- Distant
No33- closer
No34- definitely become closer
No35- more distant
No36- now they are more distant
No37- In a way they become more closer
No38- A bit closer now
No39- Closer but with more problems
No43- the old generation of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots are always very closed. The question is on the new Turk [Cypriot] generation.
No44- Still distant – some friends
No45- Same
No46- They are more distant
No47- Same
No49- distant becoming closer
No50- There’s been some interaction improvement since 2003.
No51- Have fought together – don’t want them – now they are closer
No52- I don’t think relations will ever become so close as before the events in 1974.
No53- they become closer
No65- closer
No66- They become closer since the pass from the north part to the south is allowed.

**Question 4: How have external actors influenced the political attitudes of, and relations between, communities in Cyprus?**

No2- self interest etc....
No3- My thoughts are that external actors influenced negatively the relations of the two communities because as they say “split and reign”. They had personal advantages on Cyprus.
No4- No influence from external actors on Cyprus is too small of a country for external actors to have a real stake in it.
No5- They are helping the Turkish people and that is the reason that Turkey always ask and wants more things from our ground and land (Cyprus)
No6- According to what I have read until now US and UN support the Turkish side because they will earn from them
No7- I believe and I see that they support the Turkish side more
No8- I don’t know
No10- External actors influence the political attitudes in Cyprus by trying finding a solution for the Cyprus problem. The solution must be found by the Cypriots.
No11- They influenced them a great deal especially Greece and Turkey.
No13- They haven’t influenced sufficiently for everybody to understand the fact that G/C [Greek Cypriots] are 82% and the T/ [Turkish] Cypriots are 18% of the Cypriot population (still one people, though).
No14- Much. Some countries interest is that the country is divided whereas Greek, Turkish and all other Cypriots want to [live] together without of course ignoring Turkey’s role in invasion, some other countries might want division. Cypriots want unity.

No16-I don’t think they changed

No18-Actors influence is normally guided by their own narrow interests

No20-Turkey’s attitude is to blame and Greece’s mistake

No21- External actors are...

No22-In a very big degree

No23-Really bad relations

No25-positive

No27-I think two sides should decide themselves

No28-Negatively. Everybody acts and acted on their best interest.

No29-Not positively

No30-Badly

No31-Russia, Italy, France the best. Greece is our brother. The rest are crap.

No32-Russians for better, Greece also but the others – except Italy and France – for worse

No33-Very bad, especially first Anglo-American intervention, after 1974 Turkish policy of partition which was realised in every field of life, especially in the north.

No34-One of the main reasons for the current political situation on the island is the political influence of US/UK/Turkey mainly. Depending on their benefits, the political situation keeps altering, eventually affecting the relationships between communities.

No35-Dramatically [underlined]

No36-Negative, though it is a question of how and when and for what value.

No37-Each actor especially the British and the American influence the political attitudes and the relations of the two communities, according to their own interests. Usually their interests do not comply with the two communities’ interests or with the interest of Cyprus in general.

No38-Yes as always for bad

No39-Some of them are trying to do their best but not for the right reasons for example not for the “good” of the country but for their geographical position of Cyprus which everybody wants to take advantage of.

No43 – Not so good

No44- they support Turkey- the powerful – because of their position.

No45-They try to bring them closer. I think that they didn’t have any positive result they didn’t achieve much.

No46-External actors like Turkey influenced a lot. My opinion is to leave alone Cypriot Turks and Greeks to do as they want and I am sure they will find a solution.

No47-Not good, no change

No50-Theres been some attempt towards achieving some link between the communities and seems to be improving as time goes by.

No51-All problems from outside – in the middle of Arabs – want the petrol.

No52-External influences have played a big and major role in the relations between the communities. British and the primary factor.

No53- some of them have a positive influence, some of them negative influence.

No65- 7

No66- They are the first and most vital factor for the Cypriot problem in general.