Examining the impact of Turkey’s emerging Muslim Democrats on processes of party system institutionalization.

Submitted by Marc Herzog to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics, in May 2011.

This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement.

I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University.

Marc Herzog ..................................................
Abstract

This doctoral thesis examines the impact of moderate Islamist parties on party system institutionalization in Turkey. Its focus is on the political emergence of ‘Muslim-Democrat’ parties. This term was coined by the scholar Vali Nasr and refers to a new sub-type of party actor in the spectrum of political Islam that employs Islamic religiousity in its electoral appeal but operates within the normative framework of liberal democracy. The central question driving this thesis is to uncover how Turkey’s Muslim-Democrat parties have had a positive effect in advancing the institutionalization of Turkey’s party system. This thesis attempts to contribute to the broader debate regarding the compatibility of Islamist parties and democratic politics in demonstrating that the former, when adopting a moderate format akin to the ‘Muslim-Democrat’ ideal type, can have a positive effect in advancing processes of party system institutionalization. This effect would then be critically discussed within the context of its impact on broader democratic consolidation. The AKP, Turkey’s incumbent party, is chosen as the case study of a Muslim Democrat party.

The theoretical basis for the empirical element of this thesis is informed by the research framework for party system institutionalization that was formulated by Mainwaring and Scully in the context of Latin American ‘third-wave’ democracies. They posit four specific factors to examine the institutional strengths of democratic party systems. This framework is used to examine the development of the Turkish party system and the impact of the Islamist parties, especially Muslim-Democrat parties, on these processes. The bulk of this thesis uses statistical analyses of aggregate electoral as well as attitudinal survey data as well as examining the political discourse of the election manifestoes of Turkey’s Islamist and Muslim-Democrat parties using content analysis as well as discourse analysis. The findings of this analysis conclude that Muslim-Democrat parties like the AKP have indeed contributed towards party system institutionalization in Turkey both in terms of stabilizing inter-party competition and social rootedness as well as increasing the legitimacy of democratic civilian politics. In that sense, their effect on party system institutionalization has had a beneficial effect on Turkey’s democratic consolidation.
Acknowledgments of Thesis

Firstly, I would like to express my gratitude to my family for their constant support and belief in me in these last turbulent years. I would also like to extend my thanks to my supervisor, Professor Susan Banducci, for her excellent advice and constant encouragement throughout my studies in Exeter. Catherine Owen, I want to thank you for being there, enriching my life and always showing me the good things about it. My friends, especially Alessandro, Chris, Emily, Jörg, Larbi, Oliver, Theo, Wael and many others, for being there, especially in the dark and lonely times when I felt that nobody else was. Professor Ali Çarkoğlu, Professor William Hale, Mustafa Akyol and Suat Kiniklioğlu also need to be mentioned for their assistance and advice.

There are many, many other people who have helped and assisted me during these last few years in ways too numerous for me to narrate here. They can rest assured that I know who they are and will always value their kindness and generosity.
## Contents

List of figures and tables........................................................................................................8

### Chapter 1 - Introduction......................................................................................................10
1.1 Muslim-Democrat parties ...............................................................................................12
1.2 Focus of the thesis ..........................................................................................................14
   1.2.1 The case of Turkey ..................................................................................................16
1.3 Overview of research strategies .....................................................................................20
1.4 Findings of the research and implications .....................................................................21
1.5 Summary of the thesis chapters .....................................................................................22

### Chapter 2 - The theoretical framework...............................................................................25
2.1 Democratization, democratic transition and consolidation ............................................25
   2.1.1 The Transitology Framework ..................................................................................27
   2.1.2 Political Parties .....................................................................................................34
   2.1.3 Religious Parties and the Islamist spectrum .........................................................37
   2.1.4 Party Systems ........................................................................................................45
2.2 Mainwaring and Scully’s research framework .................................................................53

### Chapter 3 - The context of the Turkish case.......................................................................57
3.1 A brief outline of Turkey’s history ...................................................................................58
   3.1.1 Flaws and Failings of Turkey’s political and party system ....................................71
3.2 Outline of the Turkish Islamist party spectrum ...............................................................81
3.3 Research question and hypotheses ................................................................................95

### Chapter 4 - Measuring party system stability in Turkey and the influence of
Islamic and Muslim-Democrat parties..................................................................................99
4.1 - Overview of the various research methodologies, research question, aims and
hypotheses of research ........................................................................................................100
   4.1.1 Longitudinal analysis of aggregate electoral and attitudinal survey
data ............................................................................................................................................101
   4.1.2 Manifesto analysis ....................................................................................................101
4.2 Issues of conceptual stretching and contextual range .......................................................102
4.3 Operationalisation of the research questions ................................................. 104
  4.3.1 Stability in inter-party competition ...................................................... 105
  4.3.2 Political legitimacy ............................................................................. 106
  4.3.3 Social rootedness ............................................................................... 107
  4.3.4 Autonomy of party organisations ....................................................... 108
  4.3.5 Moderation of political discourse towards a pro-systemic stance .... 108

4.4 Research methods ....................................................................................... 109
  4.4.1 Statistical analyses of electoral data .................................................... 109
  4.4.2 Electoral volatility .............................................................................. 111
  4.4.3 Party system fractionalization ............................................................. 112
  4.4.4 Social rootedness ............................................................................... 112
  4.4.5 Political legitimacy ............................................................................ 114
  4.4.6 Party manifesto analysis ................................................................... 115
  4.4.7 Data Sources .................................................................................... 118

Chapter 5 – The AKP’s discourse of Muslim Democracy .............................. 120
5.1. The Political Discourse of Turkey’s Islamist parties until the AKP ......... 123
  5.1.1 The Milli Görüş movement of the 1970s and its political discourse ... 124
  5.1.2 Welfare Party and its political discourse of the Just Order ............... 126
  5.1.3 The theme of religion in the manifestoes of the Welfare and Virtue Party ........................................................................................................ 128
  5.1.4 The themes of democracy, freedom and human rights in the manifestoes of the Welfare and Virtue Party ............................................................ 132

5.2 The AKP’s ‘post-Islamist’ discourse of Conservative Democracy .......... 135
  5.2.1 Conservative Democracy in Erdoğan’s 2005 speech to the American Enterprise Institute ................................................................. 137
  5.2.2 The AKP electoral manifestoes and ‘Conservative Democracy’ ...... 141
  5.2.3 Laver and Benoit’s expert survey on Turkish parties ......................... 152

5.3 Conclusion .................................................................................................. 158

Chapter 6 – Regularity in inter-party competition in the party system and social rootedness .............................................................. 161
6.1 Regularity in inter-party competition ......................................................... 165
  6.1.1 Electoral Volatility in general .............................................................. 165

5
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.1.2 The Turkish context</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.3 Fractionalization of the party system</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.4 Electoral volatility in national elections in Turkey 1987-2009</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.5 Electoral volatility per party bloc at national level and for the individual electoral regions</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2. Social Rootedness</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.1 Age of political parties</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.2 Relative electoral difference</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.3 Social rootedness of Islamist parties</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3 Conclusion</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 7. Legitimacy of the electoral process and its key actors</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1 Attitudes towards the legitimacy of regime Principles, Institutions and Actors</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.1 Confidence in regime principles, institutions and actors</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.2 Confidence in the regime institution of government</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.3 Confidence in the regime institution of parliament</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.4 Confidence in the regime actors of political parties</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.5 Support for democratic governance</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.6 Confidence in the institution of the Turkish armed forces</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.7 Voter turn-out as a measure of confidence in the electoral process</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2 Regression analysis of Islamist voting preferences and religiosity in their impact on civilian regime institutions</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2.1 Confidence in government</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2.2 Confidence in parliament</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2.3 Confidence in political parties</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2.4 Overall analysis of the regression models</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3 Conclusion</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 8 - Conclusion</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1 Manifesto analysis</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2 Mainwaring and Scully’s Research Framework</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2.1 Regularity in inter-party competition</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2.2 Social Rootedness</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.2.3 Legitimacy of electoral process and key political actors………………..255
8.3 Implications for a future research agenda .................................................256
8.4 Party system institutionalization and democratic consolidation .................259
  8.4.1 Party system institutionalization and democratic consolidation in
  Turkey…………………………………………………………………………………261

Appendix ...................................................................................................265
Glossary of Party Acronyms ..............................................................274
Bibliography .........................................................................................277

List of Figures and tables

Tables
3.1: Turkish governments during the 1990s.................................................69
4.1: Genealogy of Turkey’s Islamist party spectrum..................................103
4.2: Pairing of local and national elections...............................................113
5.1: Historical evolution of the Islamist’s discourse..................................123
6.1: Comparison between the 2002 and 2007 national vote-share of the parties 175
6.2: Age of political parties.................................................................185
6.3: Overview of the electoral pairings between local and national election vote-share...186
6.4: Pearson r coefficient for correlations between respective local and national elections...194
7.1: Strength and direction of the association between Islamist voting preferences and the
    dependent variables........................................................................236
7.2: Strength and direction of the association between religious self-identification and the
    dependent variables........................................................................239
7.3: Ordinal regression analysis for confidence in government for Turkey.............271
7.4: Ordinal regression analysis for confidence in parliament for Turkey...............272
7.5: Ordinal regression analysis for confidence in political parties for Turkey.........273

Figures in the main text
3.1: Mean tenure in years of party leaders of Turkey’s current mainstream parties...........77
3.2: Aggregate electoral vote share in Turkey of Islamist parties: 1987-2009................90
3.3: Conceptual scheme of this research thesis.............................................97
5.1: Coverage in election manifestoes of Islamist parties of specific themes: 1991-1999....131
5.2: Coverage in election manifestoes of Islamist parties of key themes: 1991-1999......133
5.3: Election poster of Erdoğan, Özal and Menderes......................................140
5.4: Election poster of Erdoğan, Özal and Menderes......................................141
5.5: Parties on political left to right scale...................................................153
5.6: Perceived importance of dimensions to AKP.........................................154
5.7: Degree to which parties support religious principles in politics vis-a-vis secularism...155
5.8: Degree to which parties support Turkish EU membership..........................158
6.1: Main regional categorization of Turkey..................................................163
6.2: The effective number of parties in Turkish elections from 1987-2009................171
6.3: Total electoral volatility for national elections 1987-2007.............................172
6.4: Total electoral volatility per individual region for national elections: 1987-2007....178
6.5: Electoral volatility of all party-blocs in national elections: 1991-2007...............179
6.6: Electoral volatility of Islamist parties in national elections 1987-2007..............181
6.7: Proportional electoral difference for parties with vote-share above 5% or below......192
6.8: Revised proportional electoral difference of parties with more than 5% vote-share...193
6.9: Relative electoral difference of the main Islamist party in each electoral pairing compared
to other groups..................................................................................197
6.10: Relative electoral difference in percent for the Islamist bloc …………….198
6.11: Relative electoral difference of the Islamist party bloc in the electoral regions………………..199
6.12: Geographic overview of the provinces where Islamist parties received highest vote-share: 1987-2007. …………….202
7.1: Confidence in percent in various regime institutions: 1991-2007………………………………209
7.2: Overall support in percent for: 1996-2007…………………………………….210
7.3: Confidence in percent in government for individual party blocs: 1991-2007………………212
7.4: Confidence in government for respondents with religious or non-religious self-identification: 1991-2007…………………………………….213
7.5: Confidence in parliament for the individual party blocs: 1991-2007……………………214
7.7: Confidence for political parties for individual party blocs: 1996-2007……………………216
7.8: Confidence for political parties for respondents with religious or non-religious self-identification…………………………………….217
7.9: Support for having a democratic political system for individual party blocs …………218
7.10: Support for having a democratic political system for respondents with religious or non-religious self-identification…………………………………….218
7.11: Support for political leaders being chosen through electoral alternation for individual party blocs……………………………………….220
7.12: Eurobarometer survey data on public confidence in percent in the armed forces: 2006-2009……………………………………….221
7.13: Confidence for the armed forces for respondents with religious or non-religious self-identification……………………………………….222
7.16: Impact of highly positive religious self-identification on confidence on various regime institutions: 1991-2007……………………………………….239
7.17: Impact of left-wing voting support on confidence in civilian regime institutions…………242
7.18: Impact of non-voting preferences on confidence in civilian regime institutions………243
8.1: Conceptual scheme of this research thesis……………………………………….248

Figures and tables in the appendix

5.1.1: Space in election manifestoes of all parties devoted to positive mentions of tradition and morality: 1991-1999………………………………………..265
5.2.1: Space in election manifestoes for positive mentions of freedom and human rights: 1991-1999………………………………………………………..265
5.2.2: Space in election manifestoes for positive mentions of democracy: 1991-1999…………266
6.2.1: Effective number of parties in Turkish national elections per region: 1987-2009…………266
6.5.1: Inter-bloc volatility in the Anatolia and Black Sea region for national elections: 1987- 2007……………………………………………………..267
6.5.2: Inter-bloc volatility in the South-Eastern region for national elections: 1987-2007……267
6.5.3: Inter-bloc volatility in the Aegean and Mediterranean coastal region for national elections: 1987-2007……………………………………………..268
6.5.4: Inter-bloc volatility in Istanbul for national elections: 1987-2007…………………….268
6.5.5: Inter-bloc volatility in percent in Ankara for national elections: 1987-2007…………269
6.7.1: Proportional electoral difference per party bloc……………………………………….269
7.17.1: Turnout in percent for national elections at regional level: 1987-2007………………270
7.17.2: Turnout in percent for local elections at regional level: 1989-2009…………………..270
Chapter 1 – Introduction

The extraordinary social upheavals across the Middle East and North Africa during 2011, which have been called collectively referred to as the Arab Awakening, have contributed in a globally visible manner to falsifying the notion that Islamic societies contain an innate aversion towards representative, accountable and democratic government. Stephen Grand (2011: 22) has suggested that the developments in Egypt and Tunisia and beyond could in time portend the advent of a ‘fourth wave of democratization’. If the emergence of ‘people’s power’ in these countries is indeed followed by genuine democratic transitions starting with the introduction of free and fair elections, then Islamist parties stand to emerge as significant political actors due to their clear and visible historical status as socio-political movements, as has happened in Tunisia and to some extent in Egypt (Hamid 2011: 37). This makes the study and analysis of parties of the spectrum of political Islam and their impact on democratic electoral systems currently particularly relevant. It is quite commonplace for ‘anti-democratic aspirations’ to be attributed to the general spectrum of Islamist party politics (Storm and Bolleyer 2010: 1026). This sentiment was famously summed up in 1992 by the US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Edward Djerejian as ‘one person, one vote, one time’ in reference to the concern that a religious dictatorship could establish itself in Algeria based on the potential election of the Islamist FIS (Masoud 2008: 20).

Consequently, from a perspective of Western policy-makers and academics, democratization in the Middle Eastern region is sometimes regarded as an improvident undertaking and linked with the possibility of giving rise to ‘theocratic politics’ resulting in the ‘erosion of long-standing traditions of secularism and tolerance’ (Zakaria 1997: 28). Particularly in the post-9/11 climate, this has led to an intense search amongst by Western politicians and policy-makers for suitable, relevant and generalizable examples of ‘good Islamists’ (Fuller 2004: 3) that can be promoted and advertised role-models to the wider Muslim world. In that sense, Turkey, and the Justice and Development Party (AKP)\(^1\) which has governed the country since 2002, has found itself under heavy scrutiny as politicians, journalists and scholars debate and highlight

---

\(^1\) For ease in reading, this thesis will first mention parties by their full name and thereafter refer to them by the abbreviation given to them in the text. This rule will apply generally unless for the sake of emphasis it is appropriate to use the full party name. For a full list of party acronyms, their full name both in English and their own language and some brief details regarding their founding year and broad ideological orientation, please refer to the glossary at the back of the thesis.
the merits of both as a ‘model’ for the wider Muslim world, particularly at the current critical juncture (Duran and Yilmaz 2011; Kardaş 2011; Öktem 2011b). Walker (2007: 2) sums these sentiments up in saying that there was international interest in pointing to Turkey as an ‘exemplary model of a Muslim-majority, secular, and democratic nation’.

The intellectual motivation driving this thesis was informed by a desire to focus frankly and systemically on the relationship between a party actor within the spectrum of political Islam and the overall party system without being influenced by prejudices or negative stereotypes. However, the study of Turkish politics should be seen not just as useful for what it offers on a comparative plane, especially within the Muslim world, as Çarkoğlu (1998: 545) argues, but also as a significant topic of interest in its own right as Turkey has steadily increased in importance as a member of the international community in the past decade. According to Öktem (2011c: xii), Turkey is currently centred at ‘the core of many current intellectual and political debates’ focusing on international themes and issues. This rationale is briefly summed up below.

A multiplicity of factors is involved in presenting a holistic reason for this increased interest in Turkey, especially in the last decade, but Turkey’s development as an international actor can be perhaps be seen as the principal reason. In the international sphere, the country has gained significant stature as an economic and political actor. Turkey’s economy currently ranks as the world’s 16th biggest economy with an export volume of $115bn in 2011, compared with $28bn in 2000 (Türkstat 2011). Turkey’s increasing actoriness in regional and international affairs has attracted international interest and party also admiration. However this development has been compounded by a perceived shift in the orientation of Turkey’s foreign policy away from its traditional allies. As Bechev (2011: 1) states, ‘Turkey is no longer the country the West once knew’. Gordon and Taspinar (2008: 5) highlight this in stating that both Europe and the US have ‘high stakes’ in Turkey’s future development. Thus an analysis of Turkey’s political system and its driving dynamics would seem to be justified also for the sake of expanding understanding of the internal dynamics of an increasingly important member of the international order.

The 2002 election of the AKP in Turkey was seen by observers world-wide as a landmark event, but not just within the context of Turkey’s domestic politics. It also
seemed to provide an important test-case of whether a conservative Muslim party with an Islamist ‘pedigree’ (Cizre 2008: 1) could exert a stabilizing and consolidating effect on the party system and its overall political process and the circumstances under which this occurs. Moreover, if this were the case, what kind of an impact would such a party have on wider processes of democratic consolidation. One objective of this research project then is to explore and evaluate the claim that emerging moderate Islamist or ‘Muslim-Democrat’ parties can contributed firstly to the institutionalization of Turkey’s party system and then to see whether this has affected or influenced democratic consolidation. This research therefore has implications for the study of party politics and Islamist politics, particularly within the context of the Turkish case. Furthermore, it is hoped that this study will contribute to an expanded understanding regarding the interplay between processes of party system institutionalization as a factor within broader democratic consolidation.

The rest of this chapter will present the theoretical background underpinning this thesis and focus on the Turkish case. It introduces the various theoretical dimensions and concepts which will be applied and used during the course of this thesis. This will include outlining the central research question that will structure it. The Turkish case will be introduced and the mix of research methodologies that will be applied will be illustrated. Afterwards, the research findings will be briefly summarized as well as the direction in which they point for a wider-ranging future research agenda. Lastly, a short synopsis of the thesis’ structure will be provided.

1.1 Muslim-Democrat parties

The operative label that will be used to describe the AKP is as a ‘Muslim-Democrat’ rather than as an Islamist, moderate Islamist or centre-right political party. The distinction between these terms and the context within which they are set will be elaborated upon in the literature review in the second chapter. The term Muslim-Democrat was coined by the scholar Vali Nasr (2005) to correspond with the emergence of what he classified as a new variant of party actor within the spectrum of political Islam or religious politics across the Muslim world in the post-Cold War era. These actors, overwhelmingly political parties, evinced considerable ideological moderation to
the extent that they were not considered by some to have any connection or affiliation with political Islam (Fuller 2010: 55; Hakan Yavuz 2009: 7, Haynes 2009: 96; Kardaş 2008: 179; Robins 2006: 208). Instead of attempting to enforce a dogmatic image of society and state based on religious prescriptions on their surroundings thus posing an authentic alternative to the emergence of a democratic polity, Muslim-Democrat parties have domesticated their religious platforms and internalized liberal democracy as the main normative framework of political action. They are primarily guided by electoral considerations and subordinate the religious elements of their background to these priorities thus becoming comparable to Europe’s Christian-Democrat parties of the post-World War 2 period (Rosenblum 2007: 73; Öniş 2006b: 106).

In terms of the regional and international resonance of this novel ideal type, the AKP has become the pre-eminent international example of the Muslim-Democrat political party since its establishment in 2002 (Platzdasch 2010: xi; Mandaville 2007: 105). However, Nasr (2005: 13) also identified similar parties in other countries such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco and Pakistan. Parties such as the AKP seemed to have shifted their ideological stance towards a centrist, conservative-democrat position. They have instrumentalised religious ethical and moral values within a discursive framework that contains a strong emphasis on human rights, the need for systemic democratization and the normative acceptance of liberal democracy as the overall framework for their political activities. In that sense, scholars like Bayat (2008: 189) and (Zemni and Bogaert 2009: 163) have extended the label ‘post-Islamist’ to them. The AKP has also attained respect and admiration among Islamist party-political movements across the Muslim world as a model of political success and moderation.

As Norton (2008: v) states, ‘the Turkish democratic experiment is being closely watched in Muslim societies’. Politicians, policy-makers and scholars across the Muslim world cite it as an inspiring direction in which Islamist politics should evolve. Perthes (2011: 166-167) stresses that the AKP is widely seen as a source of inspiration to many moderate Islamist parties in countries that were affected by the Arab awakening. Rachid Ghannouchi, Tunisia’s current prime minister and the party leader of the moderate Islamist al-Nahda movement, has described the example of the AKP as ‘the best model I can think of’ (BBC News 2011; Yinanç 2011). Tariq Ramadan (2011), the grandson of the Muslim Brotherhood’s founder in Egypt, concurs with this
assessment stating that contemporary, democratic Turkey can serve as a ‘template’ and a source of ‘inspiration’ to Islamist civil and political movements across the region of the Middle East and the wider Muslim world. This view has also been echoed by members of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (Akyol 2011: 241). The following section will outline the theoretical focus of this thesis.

1.2 Theoretical focus of the thesis

As stated, the focus of this thesis will concentrate on examining the manner in which Muslim-Democrat parties like the AKP have contributed to strengthening the party system, and thus have been conducive to the general process of democratic consolidation of the Turkish polity. Political parties were selected as the units of analysis as agents in this thesis as they represent ‘the classic intermediary organization of liberal democracy’ (Grugel 2002: 73). According to Corrales (2001: 105), situating a research enquiry at the level of political parties as actors permits the dual application of top-down and bottom-up analytical perspectives in the study of party systems and broader processes of democratization. Richard Katz (1980: xi) stated that ‘modern democracy is party democracy’. The party, according to O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 58), is ‘the modern institution for structuring and aggregating individual preference’. In the Turkish context, Frey (1965: 301) similarly commented that ‘Turkish politics is party politics’.

The strength or fragility of party systems, the aggregated collectivity of parties extant within a national polity, has been analyzed using the conventional measures of gauging the extent of fractionalization and polarization (Mainwaring 1998: 67). However, it has been argued that a third dimension focusing on the institutional strength of party systems in relation to ‘third wave’ democracies should be included (Wallis 2003; Randall and Svasand 2002a; Schedler 2002; Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Institutionalization has been defined by Huntington (1968: 12) as ‘the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability’. Furthermore, an institutionalized party system, according to Mainwaring and Torcal (2006: 206), ‘is one in which actors develop expectations and behavior based on the premise that the
fundamental contours and rules of party competition and behavior will prevail into the foreseeable future’.

Köllner (2006: 6) and Mainwaring (1998: 79) argue that weakly institutionalized party systems may not necessarily entail democratic regression but will guarantee chronic political instability in the short and long-term and therefore hinder democratic political systems from undergoing long-term consolidation. Thus, it is important to stress that party system institutionalization as a process cannot be equated with democratic consolidation nor should it be seen as automatically being conducive towards greater democratic consolidation and that it can also be harmful in instances. Instead, party systems institutionalization needs to be theorized as one important dimension within a range of others of the broader process of democratic consolidation. In that sense, Weissbach (2010: 1230) argues that a certain interdependence between the degree of institutionalization extant within a country’s party system and its level of democratization exists. In fact, in the Turkish context, the institutional weakness of the party system as a whole has been cited by Sayari (2002: 31) as one of the key factors that contribute to the weak institutionalization and instability of the wider democratic political system in general. In order to capture this institutional dimension in the context of analyzing the political systems of Latin American democracies in the 1990s, Mainwaring and Scully conceptualized a research framework to examine the institutional durability of party systems.

This framework is based on 4 key aspects; regularity in inter-party competition; ‘rootedness’ in society; legitimacy given to the electoral process and the party political sphere; autonomy of the organisation of the party from external bodies (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 1). Although previous studies have extended the geographic reach of this research framework to Africa (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001) and East Asia (Johnson Tan 2006; Stockton 2001), there has not been any research undertaken using it in relation to Turkey. Yet due to its organisational simplicity and parsimony as well as its applicability in research across various regions of the globe, such a framework would seem to provide a suitable lens through which to examine the institutional strength of party systems.
Therefore, using the research framework elaborated by Mainwaring and Scully, the central research question that will motivate and structure the focus of this thesis will be:

*In what sense have moderate Islamist or Muslim-Democrat political parties been a significant driver of party system institutionalization within Turkey’s party-political sphere?*

The next section will seek to introduce the Turkish case and illuminate some of its historical specificities briefly.

### 1.2.1 The case of Turkey

The founding of the Turkish republic in 1923, following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War One and the subsequent Independence War, constituted a seminal point of departure in Turkey’s history from the last tumultuous period of imperial rule. This central event, as will be demonstrated more clearly in the third chapter, simultaneously marked the end for an old class of political norms and served as a point of introduction for a new system of practices, values and symbols based on ‘West-oriented modernism, secularism, and Turkish nationalism’ (Ҫınar 2007: 155). In that sense, the republic’s founding also constituted the starting point for the development of the Turkish polity up to the present day. The new values of the Turkish Republic were formulated into a concrete set of principles named Kemalism after the charismatic hero of Turkey’s Independence War and unelected leader from 1923 until 1938, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Following his convictions that dramatic institutional and societal change was necessary to protect the young republic against any future foreign encroachment and invasion, Atatürk embarked on a revolutionary top-down state project of western-oriented modernization in effect attempting to drag the population kicking and screaming into the 20th century.

Strongly influenced by universalist enlightenment ideals, Atatürk attempted to fashion a secular and western ideology that would complement this state-building process.²

---

² Atatürk was convinced that religion was a backward force preventing social development. This can be seen for instance in a speech he gave in 1923. ‘Gentlemen … the Republic of Turkey cannot be a country
Modeled on the French republic model of laicism, Kemalist secularism not only focused on the whole-sale expulsion of religion from the public sphere and restricting it to the realm of the private individual but also sought to impose state regulation over the economy of religious practice and observancy (Hakan Yavuz and Khan 2004: 390; Davison 2003: 337; Turan 1991: 34). Nevertheless, true religious equality among Turkey’s diverse confessional groups was not established as the newly created directorate of religious implicitly privileged the Islamic religion, especially the Hanefi branch of Sunni Islam which was followed by the majority of the population (Shankland 2002: 83). Lesser (2004: 183) has termed this as a ‘recessed Islam’, forming an ‘an implicit rather than an explicit part of political discourse’. The first signs of popular disaffection with the state-prescribed imposition of an entirely new and alien lifestyle and culture could be seen in the heavily suppressed revolt of Sheikh Sait which occurred in the country’s south-east in 1925 (Ahmad 2008: 228; Zürcher 2004: 170).

Despite the authoritarian nature with which the Kemalist republic sought to modernize and westernize, the reforms only had limited success. This was due to the fact that they did not manage to penetrate very deeply into the overall lifestyle and ethos of the country’s main population, which was mainly agrarian, situated in rural Anatolia, and quite attached to a lived culture of conservative traditions and religious piety. The long-term result was to effectively create ‘two Turkeys’ as Rabasa and Larrabee (2008: 33) state. One was led by the Republican People’s Party (CHP), which was established by Atatürk and headed by him from 1924 until his death in 1938. In this Turkey the political, social and economic elites who were highly educated, pro-western in outlook resided in the restricted geography of the urban centers of the country, mainly Istanbul, Ankara and Bursa. The ‘other’ Turkey was inhabited by the majority of the population which was overwhelmingly agrarian-based, suffered from economic and infrastructural under-development and remained wedded to their traditional lifestyles and beliefs in the rural hinterland. The sociologist Mardin (1973) famously formulated the ‘center-periphery’ framework in order to address the implications of this divide on the political process. Although Mardin’s referred mainly to the way the Ottoman Empire conceptualized its relations with its subject, the center-periphery framework traces the relationship from that period through that of early republican Turkey and into the epoch of Sheikhs, dervishes, disciples, and followers. The most correct and truest path is the path of civilization.’ (Ahmad 2008: 229)
of multi-party democracy. It has been held to be one of the most important approaches in the analysis and understanding of Turkish politics (Taniyici 2003: 468; Çarkoğlu 1998: 555).

Özel (2010: 145) and Turunc (2007: 83) both argue that the heavy-handed and repressive imposition of Kemalist modernization and its translation into a political cleavage concerning the cultural-regional divide between the centre and the periphery, facilitated the eventual revival of Islam in the political arena. Turan (1991: 43) supports this in stating that adopting secularization as a state project has ‘a built-in tendency’ to engender the ‘oppositional politicization of Islam’. In this regard, Anson and Hadden (1989: 112) have commented that processes of modernization ‘contain the very seeds of a reaction that brings religion back into the heart of concerns about public policy’. Thus modernization, especially if imposed in a top-down fashion alla Turca, can create a popular backlash that attempts to unmake or moderate it.

Hence, following the introduction of multi-party electoral democracy in 1946, a centre-right conservative movement quickly arose in party politics which challenged the hegemonic values of the Kemalist state in the name of Turkey’s socio-cultural periphery. Under the rule of the Democrat Party (DP) from 1950 to 1960, religious moral and ethical values received renewed political attention (Karataş 2007: 13). Nevertheless, the DP was not an Islamist but a centre-right party that sought to soften Kemalist restrictions on religious observance to meet the interests of its conservative constituencies (Ahmad 2003: 108). Simultaneously, an intense flow of internal migration to the western coastline and the urbanized centers commenced in the 1950s as the country became increasingly interconnected as a result of the extension of the national road system (Kalaycioğlu 2005: 79). Consequently, the periphery, in the form of large streams of poor, landless migrant workers, moved to the cities bringing their conservative and pious value systems with them as a form of social protection and a way of establishing social networks (Salt 1999: 75). Only much later however, in 1970, was the first genuine Islamist party, the National Order Party (MNP) founded. Although it was dissolved after the military coup of 1971, a successor party, the National Salvation Party (MSP), soon rose to succeed it. Both parties were under the firm, authoritarian leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, who directed the Islamist party
movement, which he termed the National Outlook Movement (Milli Görüş Hareketi), until the late 1990s.

This movement was initially known for its militant anti-systemic and anti-western stance and fused Islamism with Turkish nationalism. Its appeal however remained quite limited until, in the guise of the Welfare Party (RP), it began to enjoy increased electoral success during the 1990s, first by winning the mayoralities of Turkey’s biggest cities, among them Istanbul and Ankara, in the 1994 local elections and then receiving the largest vote-share in the 1995 national elections which allowed it to form a coalition government with the True Path Party (DYP), a centre-right party. The ascendance of Turkey’s Islamist party movement in the 1990s coincided with the gradual liberalization of Turkey’s economy after the military coup of 1980. After the re-introduction of multi-party democracy in 1983, Prime Minister Turgut Özal initiated a wide-ranging series of liberal economic reforms that created a new conservative-religious economic elite and middle class, mostly hailing from rural Anatolia, in the 1980s which in turn increasingly began to bring conservative values and religious piety back into the mainstream (Özel 2010: 143).

Nevertheless, the formation of a Turkish coalition government with an avowed Islamist as Prime Minister provoked a sharp backlash resulting in a social, political and military campaign of opposition which ultimately led to Erbakan’s resignation in 1997 and the constitutional dissolution of the RP in 1998. The Virtue Party (FP) was established to take the RP’s place. In 1999, a feud developed between two groups within the RP, the traditionalists on one hand and the reformists on the other, divided both in their political approach and their political vision. The reformists, led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the current Prime Minister, and Abdullah Gül, the current President, eventually split off and formed their own party, the liberal-conservative Muslim-Democrat AKP, which then went on to be elected into power in 2002 and re-elected in 2007. It was after this period that Turkey began to be eulogized in some circles, including to some extent by the Bush administration, as a ‘model’ for the rest of the region and the wider Muslim world (Öktem 2011a: 137; Hale and Özbudun 2010: 144).
1.3 Overview of research strategies

This thesis employed a mixed of quantitative and qualitative methods. In order to pursue the criteria of Mainwaring and Scully’s framework (1995) in relation to the Turkish party system over a time period of fifteen to twenty years, different types of quantitative data were examined. Since the first elections which were not constrained by the military following the restoration of civil democratic politics were in 1987, these were used as the first point in time for the analysis. Firstly, in reference to the first two criteria of the framework, namely the degree of regularity in inter-party competition and the level of ‘rootedness’ in society, aggregate data pertaining to the electoral returns for all local and national elections since 1987 were statistically examined at the provincial level. This allowed for the analytical use of 5 national and 6 local elections until 2009. In that sense, the first criterion was operationalised as the degree of electoral volatility extant within the party system and the second was mainly translated into the difference in vote-share between a party’s election results for the parliamentary and municipal elections.

The third criterion within Mainwaring and Scully’s framework, the legitimacy given to the electoral process and the key democratic actors within it, was researched using the survey data from the World Values Survey project (WVS). The data was statistically examined in terms of how voting preferences for Islamist or Muslim-Democrat parties and religious self-identification structured confidence in the regime institutions of government, parliament or the political parties. Data from the Eurobarometer survey was also sometimes used for complimentary purposes as well as electoral data pertaining to voter turnout. Furthermore, in order to differentiate the AKP from its more conventional and Islamist predecessors, an analysis of its two election programs and its discourses was undertaken and compared to that of Islamist parties of the National Outlook Movement in the 1990s by resorting to analysis of the data from the Comparative Manifestoes Project (CMP) as well secondary literature by political scientists and expert analysts. Furthermore, material from a cross-national expert survey undertaken in 2006 that included Turkish parties complemented this analysis. However, one criterion of Mainwaring and Scully’s framework which focuses on the degree to which party organizations operate autonomously from outside control or influence by the party leadership was not investigated in this thesis as it is commonly acknowledged that all political parties in Turkey are dominated to a very large extent by the party
leadership (Özbudun 1997: 137). Nevertheless, this aspect of Turkey’s aspect will also be discussed further in chapter 3.

1.4 Findings of the research and implications

As will be outlined in the eighth and concluding chapter, the results of the research undertaken for this thesis illustrate that party system institutionalization in Turkey under the rule of the AKP has increased in the main aspects under investigation as shall be shown in the fifth and sixth chapters. This process has developed the increasing civilianization of the political system in which the legitimacy of the main civilian political actors including political parties has been strengthened and stabilized while that of the armed forces has continuously declined. Nevertheless as stated before, this process should not be equated with the broader, multi-dimensional process of democratic consolidation. Furthermore, the discourse analysis of the AKP’s election programs highlight that it has indeed adopted a rhetorical style incorporating the normative aspects of liberal democracy which distinguishes it from its Islamist predecessors. However, the research also highlighted other findings which could also be considered significant. For instance, it supports the thesis that Turkey’s south-east is developing a dynamic of electoral politics of its own which is increasingly divergent from the rest of the country.

Also, one of the main findings of the sixth chapter was that confidence in civilian regime institutions among religious and non-religious samples of survey respondent from the World Values Surveys rose or stayed at the same level under the AKP but did not drop. Support for democratic governance also increase while confidence in the Turkish armed forces dropped. Furthermore, it was seen that the ideological basis of institutional incumbent can affect the confidence that people vest in the regime institutions of civil democracy, including party systems. As will be detailed in the last chapter, the research undertaken for this thesis has implications for the further study of turkey’s political system but also beyond in political parties and party systems in other new democracies in the Muslim world, especially in relation to the application of Mainwaring and Scully’s research framework. Furthermore, this research project has further and broader implications for the study of religious parties, especially Islamist or
Muslim-Democrat parties, in relation to processes of party system institutionalization that could be transferred to a wider range of cases.

1.5 Summary of the thesis chapters

The content of the thesis is structured along eight chapters, of which three are empirically-based research chapters. It needs to be noted that the research design of this thesis is only presented in the fourth chapter since the second and third chapter are concerned with firstly presenting the literature review on the conceptual framework guiding the thesis and secondly examining the context of Turkeys political system. Thus the first introductory chapter served to introduce the topic and research agenda of this thesis. As mentioned, in the following two chapters, a much broader literature review will be undertaken which aims firstly to review the particular literature on democratization, political parties and party systems which is relevant to this research project. As part of this review, the spectrum of party political Islam and the differing variants and ideal types within this field will receive special attention.

Secondly in the third chapter, the preceding literature review will be complimented with a politico-historical overview of the Turkish national and regional context which this thesis mainly focuses and aims to inform the remaining chapters of the thesis. As such, this chapter will concentrate on the specific features of Turkey’s political system and chart its historical development, especially since the introduction of multi-party democracy in 1946 up to 2002 when the AKP was first elected and 2007 when it was re-elected for the second time. Secondly this chapter aims to outline the key historical failings of Turkey’s political system and its party political sphere and examine the impact of the Turkish armed forces as the main non-civilian actor on it. The chapter will analyze the evolution of Turkey’s Islamist party spectrum and the emergence of the Muslim-Democrat AKP in 2002 and try to enumerate the factors behind its electoral success. Finally, this chapter will also present the main research question and the research expectations related to it.

In order to properly introduce and discuss the relevant theoretical concepts as well as the context of the Turkish case, the research methodological design of the thesis will be
presented in the 4th chapter. This chapter will also seek to outline and explain the specific approach of the research methodology pursued in the three empirical chapters which were undertaken for this doctoral thesis. The first of these chapters will test the extent to which the election programs and the discourse of the AKP reflect its ideological moderation as a Muslim-Democrat party. The chapter begins by framing the analysis within the history of Turkey’s Islamist party movement. Through the availability of content analysis data from the Comparative Manifesto Project which is complemented with secondary expert literature, the rhetoric of the AKP’s predecessors is then examined. Lastly, through an analysis of its discourse, it examines to what extent, the party’s rhetoric moves away from the extremist, anti-systemic stance of its Islamist predecessors and incorporates a language of human rights and liberal democracy as the overarching framework within which to situate their political agency as a party actor.

The main three criteria of Mainwaring and Scully’s framework are operationalised and researched in relation to Turkey’s party system in the fifth and sixth chapter. Chapter 6 focuses on two of the criteria from Mainwaring and Scully’s framework; regularity in inter-party competition as well as the degree of ‘rootedness’ of parties in society. Both of these criteria will be analysed using aggregate electoral data at national, regional and provincial level. The main source of information for this is Turkish election data. In chapter 7, survey data on Turkey from the WVS as well as the Eurobarometer Survey is employed in order to evaluate the extent to which the Turkish respondents value the individual regime institutions of government, parliament and political parties as vital actors of the democratic electoral process as well as how much trust they put in the armed forces. Furthermore, the development of electoral turnout at national and regional level will also be examined. This would encompass the third criterion from Mainwaring and Scully’s framework which looks at the degree of legitimacy that key democratic actors of the electoral process enjoy. Both descriptive statistical as well as ordinal regression analysis is undertaken. This chapter will also look at the development of electoral turnout in Turkey in order to complement the analysis. The eighth and final chapter will contain the conclusion of this thesis in which the findings taken from the individual research chapters will be aggregated and discussed in the light of the main research question and the related expectations, the focus of this research project and the wider subject surrounding this thesis. Moreover, it will also include a brief investigation
into expanding the research findings and focus of this thesis into a larger research agenda for the future.

The next chapter will focus on providing a literature review which will provide a detailed background on the field of democratization, political parties and party systems and party system institutionalization. It will also seek to introduce and detail the development of Turkish party politics and within that the evolution of Turkey’s Islamist party movement.
Chapter 2 – Islamist parties, party system stability, democratization: a theoretical framework

The next chapter will attempt to provide a literature review of the various theoretical fields that the themes of this thesis relate to. The first section will provide the main theoretical background. As such, there will be a brief revision of democratization theory, especially those areas relevant to studies of processes of democratic consolidation. The second section will then lead on to discuss the importance of political parties. There will also be special emphasis on the various types of religious political parties that exist how these can contribute towards wider party system institutionalization. It will also focus on the study of party systems and, in particular, outline Mainwaring and Scully’s research framework on party system institutionalization.

By providing the theoretical context and background of this research dissertation, this chapter will seek to complement the following third chapter which will focus its attention on the specific historical and political nature of the Turkish case which was selected as an in-depth case study for this thesis. Chapter four will then present and outline the research methodology which was used for this research thesis.

2.1 Democratization, political parties and party systems

The study of democratic political systems and their development is divided into various schools of thought with different perspectives, foci and approaches. Many of these variants resulted from the development of modernization theory (Hinnebusch 2006: 374). The major school of thought whose writings have informed the basis of this research thesis in terms of conceptualising the development of democratic political systems and the selection of the main object of analysis has been the agency-centred approach of the transitology school which began to emerge in the 1970s. Contemporary modernization theory of the 1950s and 1960s posited that the development of democratic political systems was the inevitable teleological consequence of the impact of social modernization and westernization (Gülalp 1997: 54). This included the
formation of the nation-state as a political unit of community (Peet and Hartwick 1999: 76).

Another predominant approach stemming from modernization theory focuses on socio-economic requirements for successful democratization. Seymour Martin Lipset famously linked the level of economic development of a country to the sustainability of democracy as a political regime within it (1959: 75). While transitology scholars dispute the causal link between levels of economic development and the potential for democratic transition, they do acknowledge their significance relating to issues of ‘democracy’s durability’ (O’Donnell 2004: 188). The drawback to these approaches is that they relate the potential for democratic development overwhelmingly to structural factors, thereby underplaying the role of human agency in these processes. India, and Turkey, to a lesser extent, can be seen as examples of developing countries that underwent democratization despite being relatively poor and agrarian (Waterbury 1994: 23). Other countries like Benin and Mongolia can also be cited in this regard (Doorenspleet and Kopecký 2008: 698).

Another strand of modernization theory elevates the ‘cultural variable’ above all others in explaining socio-political developments (Kazanciğil 1994: 215). In that sense, major cultural aspect which has been studied for its impact on the development of democracy is religion. Protestantism has been consistently seen as intrinsic in the emergence of liberal democracies across the Anglo-Saxon world, while Islam is argued to be the value-system that is least compatible with a democratic political culture (Woodberry and Shah 2004: 57; Posusney 2004: 128-129). Samuel Huntington’s much-touted thesis of a civilizational clash between different cultures of religion has been the most prominent proponent of this approach. In trying to explain the shortage of viable democratic countries in the Middle East, Stepan and Robertson (2003) ascribed a particular ‘Arab exceptionalism’ to the region which argues that the weak character of Middle eastern states as well as their political culture make them almost naturally inimical to the indigenous development of democratic political regimes.³

³ As seen by recent events in the Middle East, the ‘Arab exceptionalism’ thesis may have been somewhat premature in its assumptions.
2.1.1 The Transitology Framework

The transitology approach privileges an actor-centred lens from which to examine the development of democratic political systems as Posusney (2004: 133) states, which has also led to it being dubbed the ‘agency approach’ (Grugel 2002: 56). In the frame of the transition school of thought according to Potter (1997: 15), ‘democracy is produced by the initiatives of human beings’, rather than structural or socio-economic factors. These actors consist predominantly of the political and economic elites that are significant in processes of democratic transition and consolidation (Potter 1997: 17). The choice of using a transitology framework concerns the research choice of the explanandum, the effect of political parties as strategic actors in relation to processes of party system institutionalization and democratic consolidation. The general position within the school of ‘transitology’ presupposes that the formation and development of democratic political systems can occur universally regardless of socio-economic or culturally-specific contingencies.

Rustow (1970: 352), whose foundational article Transitions to Democracy set the agency approach into motion, claimed that initially, apart from the condition of national unity, ‘no minimal level of economic development or social differentiation is necessary as a prerequisite to democracy’. This amounted to a complete negation of the structuralist assumptions regarding the importance socio-economic or cultural explanatory factors that earlier modernization theories of socio-political development had stipulated as being essential for the formation and continuation of democratic polities (Burgess 2001: 54). Further seminal and ‘paradigm-setting’ work was undertaken in the 1980s by Guillermo O’Donnell, Juan Linz, Phillipe Schmitter and Larry Diamond who studied the democratic transitions occurring in Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe (Gill 2000: 44; Robinson 1996: 45). Their scholarship further reinforced the dominance of the transition paradigm and advanced the scope, relevance and currency of democratization studies. In fact, as Grugel (2002: 62-63) suggests, the emergence of transitology studies was ‘inherently responsible for the global scope of democratization studies’.

A sequential three-stage framework was developed within the transitology school which provides a clear and orderly analytical scheme within which one can chart the
progressive transition of authoritarian regimes into stable democratic polities (Künkler and Leininger 2009: 1060). This framework is not without its critics. Carothers (2004: 169) and Nuscheler (1995: 231) for instance argue that the assumptions of the transitology school are too teleological and deterministic by assuming a linear, uninterrupted and irreversible evolution of political regimes to liberal democracy. This framework has also been appraised in relation to the Middle East (Volpi and Cavatorta 2006: 367). In the aftermath of the cold war’s end and the subsequent democratic transition of many Eastern European countries during the 1990s, the transitology framework and its assumption was seen as becoming a ‘near-orthodoxy’ in democratization studies (Cohen 2000: 21). However, the three-stage model of breakthrough, transition and consolidation does not per se exclude the possibility of democratic stagnation and regression into semi- or wholly authoritarian regimes. O’Donnell (2004: 186) and Diamond (2002: 24) for instance have argued against the adoption of deterministic assumptions and highlighted that transitional processes did not necessarily lead to stable democracies.

Democratic Transition or Installation

Conventional frameworks of political democratization posit a sequential pattern consisting of several conceptual phases, liberalization, transition, democratization and consolidation, through which the actual transformative processes occurs which result in the replacement of the old non-democratic political structures and institutions in favour of democratic ones (Weissenbach 2010: 1230). After the actual democratic breakthrough or opening, a period of transitional democratization and subsequently democratic consolidation follows (Pridham 2003: 271; Smith 2003: 250). There are various forms that a political regime’s passage from an authoritarian to a democratic form can take. Norgaard (2001: 14) distinguishes between 4 classical types depending firstly on whether the transition is brought about either through the interaction of social and political elites or mass-based pressure and secondly whether this process occurs either on a negotiated or coercive basis.

On this basis, Karl and Schmitter (1991: 275) argue that the most viable and stable solution for the future development of democratic polities is a pacted transition, in which the institutional shift from an authoritarian to a democratic polity is negotiated
between the old political elites and the opposition, as it offers the best chance of institutional development that can benefit from the resources of the former regime and win over former regime elites. However, Schmitter (2010: 23) later contended that negotiated transitions often have the failing of allowing the former authoritarian incumbents of the old regime to retain significant political privileges which can obstruct long-term processes of democratization. For instance, the Chilean Pinochet dictatorship managed to embed substantial ‘institutional safeguards’ in Chile’s transitional democracy after 1989 which hampered the development of civilian democracy including allocating permanent senatorships for key ruling members including Pinochet and a strong autonomy of the military vis-à-vis the elected civilian government in significant policy areas (Hunter 1997: 456).4 The focus on the Turkish case in the third chapter will also focus on the key political role of the armed forces and their effect on the natures of the country’s democratic politics.

O’Donnell and Schmitter identified three main forms of pacted transition (Gill 2000: 53). A gradual military withdrawal from the political sphere, a pact involving the extension or re-establishment of political and civil rights and a pact centred on economic and social issues. Apart from these types, Karl also theorized on a ‘foundational pact’, involving the consensual agreement on the framework of norms, procedures and rules of the new political regime (Gill 2000: 54). In the case of Turkey’s three military interventions, the return to multi-party democracy was always supervised by the military authorities even as they formally withdrew as political caretakers of the country which would hamper and distort the country’s democratic consolidation as will be outlined later (Özbudun 1997: 132). In this sense, these interventions could be seen as a type of ‘guardian coup’, a term Smith (2003: 178) utilizes in his typology of military interventions in which the armed forces overthrow the government with the intention of handing power back to civilian control after a certain period of time.

*Democratic Consolidation*

The initial stages of democratic breakthrough and transition are followed by the phase of consolidation in which the exact political system and its concomitant norms are

---

4 The negotiated arrangements even allowed for former dictator Pinochet to retain the position of commander in chief of the Chilean Armed Forces until 1998 (Hunter 1997: 456).
cemented and legitimated by their acknowledgment and acceptance by the main actors in the formal political sphere and all the other main social actors. Therefore, Ehteshami (2004: 105) describes democratic consolidation as ‘the analysis of how democratization becomes embedded’. As the final stage within this sequential frame of democratisation, the main challenge affecting democratic consolidation concerns ensuring the continuity of the political regime’s democratisation in advancing the phase of ‘habituation’, as Rustow (1970: 358) termed it, of the newly entrenched democratic decision-making rules and procedures.

As the successful endpoint of a democratic consolidation should result in the persistence of a stable democratic political regime, it is worthwhile to quickly examine some definitions of the democracy as a regime that consolidation processes should ideally aspire towards. In attempting to arrive at a definition of what a democratic political regime should constitute, a division between ‘minimalist’ and ‘maximalist’ definitions emerged in the scholarly literature (Martin Lipset and Lakin 2004: 19). In the latter vein, Karl (1990: 2) for instance defined democratic political systems vis-à-vis the presence of only three individual criteria, a well-established ‘effective electoral process’, ‘a minimal constitutional guarantee of political freedom as well as restrictions on the political actoriness of the armed forces’. Similarly, Seymour Martin-Lipset (1995: v) similarly focuses on three essential items such as election for all political offices, popular participation in the selection of political leaders and policy-formation, and the broad and equal availability of civil liberties and political rights. Maximalist definitions have been used for instance by Freedom House in evaluating the democratic quality political regimes. Yet, apart from accusations of US-centric political bias in its work (Mainwaring et al 2007: 145–47; Angell 1996: 194), scholars have also taken the organisation to task for including too many attributes in its methodological framework without not adequately outlining the relationships between them (Bollen 1986: 584).

Moreover, Munck and Verkuilen (2002: 9) warn that maximalist definitions offer poor analytical value due to overburdening the concept they are attempting to describe by importing too many conceptual attributes that are extraneous to the essence of the notion. On the other hand, they also caution against definitions that actually fail to capture essential aspects of a concept. Dahl’s procedural description of polyarchic democracies is one of the most commonly used procedural definitions in evaluating the
democratic quality of a given political regime (Altman 2011: 35; Pickel and Pickel 2006: 162). Focusing on the twin dimensions of inclusion and participation, Dahl focuses on the presence of 6 particulars conditions such as free and fair elections, elected officials, freedom of expression, various sources of information, autonomy of civil societal association and inclusive citizenship (1998: 85). Dahl’s definition will also serve as the definitional anchor of a democratic political regime for this thesis.

Most of the scholarly treatment of democratic consolidation as a concept within democratization studies tends to emphasise its multi-dimensional nature. According to Schedler (2001: 67), the concept of democratic consolidation is difficult to operationalise as it depends not only on actual observations across various ‘behavioural’, ‘attitudinal’ and ‘socio-economic’ dimensions but also involves ‘prospective reasoning’ by both political elites and public opinion on the continuing endurance of the democratic regime into the future. Merkel (1997: 11) examines the concept by disaggregation consolidation into at constitutional, representative, behavioural and civic cultural sub-levels in which a political regime needs to consolidate itself to achieve democratic stability. Reynolds (1999: 22) addresses this multi-dimensional nature the consolidation process as well in stating that de-democratization is unlikely to take place when a democratic political regime ‘is behaviorally practiced, attitudinally widely accepted, and constitutionally entrenched’. Doorenspleet and Kopecký (2008: 702) however warn about expanding the definition of democratic consolidation to include too many features and expectation and argue rather that it should be seen primarily as referring to the extension and persistence of ‘a minimal or electoral democracy that has already lasted for some period of time, and that can be expected to last into the future. In the sense that party system institutionalization can contribute to democratic consolidation (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 1), it can be seen as one sub-element of this larger process.

There is still a wide debate within the academic scholarship concerning the exact stage at which processes of democratic transition successfully end and begin running into democratic consolidation. Time-related measures concerning the duration of the period of consolidation in which the rules and procedures of a democratic political system persist and are maintained are also regularly cited by other scholars of the literature.
Gill (2000: 235). Tilly (2007: 147) posits that consolidation has been successful through the persistence of political regime when de-democratization becomes very difficult. Similarly, Beetham (1999: 71) states that a political system has been completely consolidated once the legitimacy of the ‘electoral process or the political freedom on which it depends’ has seen fit to survive a series of socio-political crises which test the strength and durability of the democratic regime’s character. However, the benchmarks of the necessary passage of time within which a democratic regime has consolidated to that point are frequently measured differently in the literature.

Huntington (1991: 267) has a simpler and more straightforward approach by which he argues that a political regime has undergone a shift from an authoritarian to a democratic basis once the first legitimate and fairly conducted national election has been carried through. Morlino (1998: 19) also argues that the shift between the period of transitional democratization and consolidation occurs following the first elections to be held freely and fairly. However Huntington (1991: 267) further states that a country’s democratic political regime has successfully consolidated itself once it has successfully passed the ‘two turn-over test’ when the political actors winning power in the first elections peacefully yield to a successful challenger. This approach is also used by Hague and Harrop (2004: 163) who describe this first electoral process as ‘a referendum on, and a celebration of, democracy’. Nevertheless, they also state that the following elections are the more ‘convincing test for democratic consolidation’ (Hague and Harrop 2004: 163). On the other hand, Beetham (1999: 70) goes beyond counting the number of elections and sets a probationary period of 20 years for the continuation of a democratic regime until it can be seen as stable and consolidated.

As for the actual endpoint of democratic consolidation, that has been even more difficult and problematic to determine. Linz commented famously that a democratic regime has fully consolidated when all actors recognise that the democratic political process is ‘the only game in town’ (Linz and Stepan 1998: 49). Morlino (1995: 577-578) argues that processes of democratic consolidation have no definite time limits as ‘successful consolidation flows into stable persistence’ of the adapted democratic political processes and practices where ‘the passage of time no longer has an evident effect on established practices and tested structures and norms.’ For Schedler (2001: 2), there is no specific moment of truth at which democratic consolidation successfully concludes,
rather it can be perceived when all political actors ‘manage to establish reasonable certainty about the continuity of the new democratic regime, abating expectations of authoritarian regression’. Thus the conceptual imagining for the endpoint returns to Tilly’s statement that a democratic regime can be considered consolidated when de-democratization becomes very difficult to undertake or envision.

**Defective democracy**

The successful completion of the stage of democratic transition normally signifies that the most basic features of liberal democracy, electoral competition, the guarantee of civic liberties and political freedoms, and the division of powers within the state, have been attained to some degree. However, as suggested above, ‘authoritarian enclaves’ (Garretón 2003: 47), institutional pockets of the ancien regime, can still exist and distort the functioning of the main political system and impede democratic consolidation. This is also dependent on the nature of elite pacts that took place before and during the transition period. For instance, as with the early period of post-Pinochet Chile (Barahona de Brito 2001: 133), elites of the previous authoritarian regime can receive special privileges or posts within the new system and obtain immunity for human rights violations and other crimes that were committed during their rule. Merkel classifies a political regime with this condition as a ‘defective democracy’ (2004: 48).

In Turkey’s context, as will be further seen in the next chapter, these residual legacies of the ancien regime have been called the ‘deep state’, a loose but interlinked collection of networks within the military, the state bureaucracy and the civil service that have manipulated civilian politics and been unfavourable towards further democratization (Ahmad 2010: 115; Grigoriadis 2009: 52). The duration in power of the authoritarian pre-transition regime is significant to the extent to which it succeeded in shaping ‘the political culture of society’, a factor that can have a significant impact on the quality and integrity of the subsequent democratic polity (Merkel 2004: 54). In relation to Mexico’s previous semi-authoritarian political regime, Wallis (2003: 22) and Mainwaring (1999: 26) reinforce this view in pointing out that the degree of institutionalization of illiberal or non-democratic political regimes can hinder the development of democratic political systems or cultures as the patrimonial links of the ancien regime to the main political sphere and wider society persist.
In regards to global trends of democratization, Puddington (2008: 72) argues that a ‘pushback’ has occurred in recent years against the rise of the number of democratic polities across the world. Democratizing states have begun to re-impose restrictions on the arena of political participation and re-adopt semi-authoritarian modes of governance. In this sense, Diamond (2002: 21) raises the significance of ‘regime classification’ in the field of democratic regime development which arose in the last decade as the democratizing drive was seen to be stagnating in many third wave countries. Many of these states, such as Russia, Venezuela or Georgia, began adopting intermediate political systems that simultaneously manifested signs of procedural and electoral democracy on one hand and authoritarianism on the other. This condition has also defined Turkey’s political system since the introduction of multi-party democracy in 1946. As Collier and Levitsky (1997: 430) have highlighted, the analytical need to adequately capture the diverse definitional nature of this ‘democracy “with adjectives” has led to a proliferation of terms and labels. These forms of political regimes have been variously termed ‘hybrid regimes’, ‘pseudo-democracies’, ‘electoral authoritarianism’ or ‘illiberal democracy’ (Schedler 2006; Diamond 2002; Zakaria 1997). Storm (2008: 218) argues that the context-specific exceptionality of these various sub-types has complicated the ability of undertaking comparative evaluation of these regimes.

2.1.2 Political Parties, Party Systems and party system institutionalization

As mentioned in the introduction, this thesis focuses on political parties and their relations to aggregate party systems as its main units of analysis are political parties. In that sense, Randall and Svasland (2002b: 6) note the analytic importance of distinguishing between the level of individual political parties on one hand vis-a-vis the overall party system on the other. Katz (1980: xi) has stated that ‘modern democracy is party democracy’ as the attributes and practices of contemporary governance would be ‘unthinkable without them’. Political parties start playing a role after the democratic breakthrough, in the phases of democratic transition and specifically that of consolidation. Johnson Tan (2006: 89) argues that while opposition movements from the entire spectrum of civil society may be the key players in achieving the breakthrough, it is political parties who become the central focus of attention in later stages of democratization., It is their organizational assets in terms of mobilizational
resources that benefit political parties as institutional agents in the initial transitional phase (Gill 2000: 61). For that reason, O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 58) see the political party as ‘the modern institution for structuring and aggregating individual preferences’. The party as a political actor is an electoral ‘fighting organisation’ as Michels termed it in 1911 (2001 [1911]: 31), designed to compete for office. Randall and Svasand (2002a: 7) highlight three main ways in which political parties fundamentally contribute to processes of democratic consolidation; ‘conflict resolution’, ‘institutionalization of democracy’ and by providing ‘regime legitimacy’.

As ‘intermediate-level political institutions’ which are positioned ‘in both state and civil society’ (Potter 1998: 27), political parties ideally perform a dual representative function. They aggregate, crystallize and compress the demands of wider civil society in a coherent political discourse within the political system (Peters 1999: 123). Therefore, according to Sartori (1976: 41), political parties are ‘channeling agencies’. According to him, they constitute an ‘instrument for representing the people by expressing their demands’ (1976: 27). In this function they also have a monitoring role that oversees the workings of the government and the state at large. However, the political party system is also outwardly representative as it is supposed to transmit a legitimizing sense of the democratic electoral system by signalling that it is working in the electorate’s interests (Mainwaring 1999: 14). Thus, parties operate between ‘the bottom-up and top-down domains of action’ and are ‘efficient conduits of democratization’ (Corrales 2001: 105).

This reinforces the indispensable role of political parties in the overall political culture of a democratic society. Additionally, parties fulfil a role as a recruitment agent for the next generation of the political class of actors (Randall and Svasand 2002a: 4; Özbudun 2001: 247; Roberts 2001: 4).

The historical development of political parties as public actors

It is instructive to outline the changing nature of political parties throughout history as it has important implications on the relation between the state, political parties and civil society and on democratic consolidation. Hague and Harrop (2004: 187) emphasise the role of historical contingency and periodicity in examining the evolution of political party formats through successive historical eras in Western Europe and North America. During the industrial period, cadre parties, groupings of similar minded elites, became
increasingly incapable to express and represent the interests of new social groups (Calvert 2002: 162). This facilitated the development of mass parties which established close social and cultural bonds between themselves and their constituencies. In this sense, Roberts (2001: 23) describes them as ‘mass bureaucratic organizations with active grass-roots structures’. Their main constituent groups, according to Randall and Svasand (2002b: 21), derived either from the industrial working class or religious groups. Mass parties also created subsidiary organisations, like youth groups, trade unions and recreational organisations, within their structure that in order to address the different socio-economic needs of their main constituent groups. Thus, as Smith (2003: 51) states, the mass party tried to integrate its members within its organisational community ‘in all aspects of their members’ lives’. Scarrow (2000: 82) supports this in defining mass parties as significant ‘community-based agents of political socialization and mobilization’.

In the post-war era, the mass party model became outdated as the demands of their main constituent groups were increasingly met by the growth of the welfare state in North America and most Western European countries (Katz and Mair 1995: 12-13). As social boundaries increasingly blurred and merged with the expansion of the middle class, political parties were forced to appeal to wider audiences to survive. The emerging mass media facilitated this process as it enabled parties to individualise their electoral appeals, rather than focusing on entire social groups (Roberts 2001: 22), and dramatically reduced the costs for reaching out to large audiences on a national basis (Özbudun 2001: 247). Thus, in the 1960s the term catch-all party was coined by Kirchheimer (1966: 186) to define this new political party format. Panebianco (1988: 264) called this new political party model the ‘professional electoral party’.

Rather than being specifically loyal to any particular constituent community, the sole objective of this party model was ‘not to represent but to govern’ (Hague and Harrop 2004: 187). Consequently, relations to civil society were completely redefined within this model and usually this resulted in ‘an erosion of the party-civil society linkage’ while institutional relations to the state grew (Katz and Mair 1995: 7). In that sense, Scarrow (2000: 82) laments the disappearance of mass parties as the loss of vital ‘community-based agents of political socialization and mobilization’. In the 1990s, Katz and Mair (1995: 17) identified a new model of a political party, the cartel party,
‘characterized by the interpenetration of party and state’, thus further severing links between the formal political sphere and civil society. In the Turkish context, most parties have been either catch-all, cadre or cartel parties with the exception of the Islamist party spectrum which have most closely approximated the format of the mass party (Musil 2010: 206). The following section will now shift the discussion to focus on the spectrum of religious parties.

2.1.3 Religious Parties and the Islamist spectrum

Historically, religious parties, those that either use religious appeals or symbolisms in their political communication or derive their programmatic stance from a religious context, have been a vital constitutive element of almost every party system, especially in industrial Western Europe (Manza and Wright 2003: 299). In post-world war Europe, in countries like Germany and Italy, Christian Democrat or Catholic parties gained long-term electoral dominance (Inglehart and Norris 2004: 199). In the majority of these cases as Künkler and Leininger (2009: 1082) state, the religious identity of these parties has progressively weakened to the point where they serve only as vague guides or labels to their mostly conservative, centre-right politics. In large parts of the Muslim world, as will be detailed later, religious political parties are a key historical fixture within the political system (Brumberg 2006: 114). Many of these party actors, as Taspinar (2011: 272) states, developed as movements in authoritarian political settings where the only form of expression political opposition was through religion and the mosque was one of the few sites where open oppositional political discussion could take place. The following section will present the analytical classifications among the various subtypes of religious, and especially Islamist, parties. This section intends to describe the various sub-types that exist and their impact on national processes of democratic development.

Definitions as to what constitutes a religious political party differ but some significant features have encountered widespread agreement. As political organisations, religious parties resort to religious appeals and symbolism in crafting an external and internal image for electoral mobilization (Hakan Yavuz 2006: 2). Additionally, many of these political parties, like the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB), Yemeni Islam party or the Moroccan Justice and Development party (PJD), emerge from religious social
movements and have close links to these organisations, although they aspire to remain independent of them (Hamzawy 2007). Thus many party actors within the spectrum of political Islam emerged from what Rosenblum (2003: 33) terms an ‘associational nexus’ of religious civil society groups, ‘overlapping associations’ and traditions. This is a significant electoral asset. Secondly, the programmatic agenda and the party political doctrines will be derived from religious or scriptural texts. For instance, according to Salih and el-Tom (2010: 2), the agenda of Islamist parties commonly reflects their interest to transform both state and societal structures in accordance to religious values as well and on the basis of the shariah, the Islamic system of jurisprudence. Nevertheless, Kalyvas (2003: 297) highlights stresses that in most cases this involves the interpretation, instrumentalization and appropriation of these texts for political usage within a strategic context.

The diversity of the Islamist political spectrum

In examining the spectrum of Islamist political parties, typologies and sub-types abound that seem to elude simple analytical capture. This is echoed by LeVine and Salvatore (2005: 51) who speak of the difficulty that ‘the vocabulary of social science’ has in analyzing the multiple movements and discourses under the rubric of political Islam. This term has been employed in the social sciences since the 1970s in reference to a resurgence of movements across the Middle East ‘drawing on Islamic referents – terms, symbols and events taken from the Islamic tradition – in order to articulate a distinctly political agenda’ (Denoeux 2002: 61). Ismail (2003: 3) uses the term ‘Islamist politics’ to refer to the presence and action of organisations which ‘mobilise and agitate in the political sphere while deploying signs and symbols from Islamic traditions’. Esposito (2011: 185) employs Islamism to refer to individuals, movements or organisations which posit that ‘Islam or God’s will applies to all areas of life, private and public, individual and social’. Similarly, Ayubi (1992: ix) defines political Islam as ‘the doctrine and/or movement which contends that Islam possesses a theory of politics and the State.’

Barton (2005: 28) stresses the elasticity of the term ‘Islamism’ in being applicable to a variety of positions ranging from the moderate and liberal on one hand to the militant and fundamentalist on the other. Therefore, in order to focus on the sub-genre of party
actor that this thesis is concerned with, it is necessary to break down the plethora of different organisations, movements and party actors that can be found within the spectrum of Islamist politics into categories. Coffman Wittes (2008: 8) proposes a three-stage classification of Islamist political movements measured against the level of integration into electoral politics within the frame of the nation-state and democratic norms of interaction that can be used here for a brief overview. Following her scheme, the rest of this section will disaggregate the various types of organisations and movements within the spectrum of Islamist politics before focusing on the ideal type of the Muslim-Democrat party actor.

The first type of actor Coffman Wittes stipulates in her scheme concerns militant organisations which resort to armed struggle and reject the arena of electoral politics such as al-Qaeda, Egypt’s Gamaa al-Islamiyya or Turkish Hezbollah. These organisations which Volpi (2003: 14) refers to as ‘transnational, radical Islamic movements’, sometimes operate on an international level as in the case of al-Qaeda, and frame their struggles in the internationalist context of a global faith community, the ummah, rather than specific domestic constituencies (Ottaway 2010: 46). The second type of categorical type of actor, according to Coffman Wittes (2008: 8), does engage with electoral politics but simultaneously retains a capacity for armed struggle and violence such as Hamas or Hezbollah. As Denoeux (2002: 71) argues, these organisations have moderated and softened their policies by entering competitive electoral politics while continuing to see a strategic interest in the retention of paramilitary assets and the legitimacy of armed struggle. Thus organisations like Hamas and Hezbollah according to Sadiki (2010: 371), in their dual commitment to armed struggle and electoral politics framed around a ‘resistance-based ethos’, deploy both ‘civic’ and ‘un-civic’ forms of politics and remain uncommitted towards the institutionalized and monopolised legitimacy of violence within the state. Therefore, in continuing to view armed, extra-parliamentary struggle as legitimate, they do not recognise electoral democracy as ‘the only game in town’ (Linz and Stepan 1998: 49). Evidently then these organisations have not fully internalised the democratic rules of peaceful electoral contestation (Schedler 2000: 71).

The third and largest category of Islamist political actors in Coffman Wittes’ categorical scheme (2008: 9) reject the use of political violence and seek bottom-up change by
becoming active as political party actors. Within this category there are various ideological, programmatic and organisational subtypes that one can identify. Mandaville (2007: 107) differentiates between the classical Islamists, moderate Islamists and the Muslim-Democrat parties. Prominent examples for the first category would include Egypt’s MB and the Jammat-i-Islami in Bangladesh. It is worth briefly examining the history and development of the MB, one of Egypt’s strongest political movements, as it was one of the first modern Islamist movements and is seen as ‘the prototype for virtually all subsequent Islamist groups across the Muslim World’ (Mandaville 2011: 10). For this reason, Lahoud (2005: 17) classifies Egypt as the ‘heartland’ of Islamist politics in terms of the ideas and values that were developed by the MB, especially its founder Hasan al-Banna and its famed ideologues Sayyid Qutb and Yusuf Qaradawi.

Founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna, the MB quickly built up a membership that reached half a million by the early 1950s making it the largest socio-political movement in Egypt at the time (Wickham 2002: 113). Zahid (2010: 72) attributes the quick expansion and growth of the MB to the charismatic leadership of al-Banna, the movement’s strong presence within the mosques, and its strong focus on charitable activities and social services. Although it now clearly renounces the use of violence for political means, the MB went through periods of militancy in its early history where it undertook political assassinations and bombings (Soage and Franganillo 2010: 40-41). The ideas of the MB’s main ideologue, Sayyid Qutb, in particular the concept of Jahiliya, the notion of Muslims that adopted westernised modes of behaviour and thought should be seen as quasi-infidels, spread internationally after the 1960s and became one of the ‘most influential expression of Islamism today’ according to the historian Black (2010: 309). The Muslim Brotherhood also expanded to other national settings like Syria, Tunisia or Jordan, and similar parties nowadays exist across the Middle East and beyond (Linjakumpu 2007: 60; Leiken and Brooke 2007: 115). Qutb’s ideas of militant direct action and struggle for an Islamic society also reached Turkey where they influenced the endogenous development of its Islamist politics in the 1970s although they always remained at the margins of the Turkish Islamist movement (Akyol 2011: 216; Filiz and Uluç 2006: 25; Yıldız 2006: 44). However, another reason why the MB is also interesting to focus on as an Islamist party is because it has undergone a slow and painstaking evolution in the last two decades, within the context and constraints of Egyptian politics, to become a primarily electoral Islamist actor that
accepts the democratic legitimacy of multi-party politics (Hamid 2011: 31; Norton 2005: 140). Like Turkey’s Islamist party movement in the 1990s and early 2000s, as will be seen in the next chapter, ideological and generational differences within the movement were also influential in shaping its image, as well as leading to the creation of new parties such as the smaller, more moderate Hizb Al-Wasat party (Zahid 2010: 95). These internal processes and dynamics of moderation will appear in later discussion again.

The Pakistani Muslim League and Bahrain’s Wefaq Party can be seen as belonging in the middle category of moderate Islamists while Turkey’s Justice and Development Party, and perhaps the Moroccan PJD, can be seen as embodying the more recent phenomenon of the Muslim-Democrat party (Platzdasch 2010: xi). Gunther and Diamond (2001: 21) distinguish between ‘proto-hegemonic religious’ or ‘religious fundamentalist’ parties on one hand and ‘denominational mass parties’ on the other. While the ‘religious fundamentalist’ party is comparable to Mandaville’s category of the ‘classical Islamist’ party, the ‘denominational mass party’ resembles his two subtypes of the moderate Islamist or the Muslim-Democrat party. Additionally, many organisations contain within themselves a diversity of viewpoints and interests and various competing moderate and radical factions like the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria (Denoeux 2002: 75).

Proto-hegemonic religious party or religious fundamentalist party

As Kalyvas (2003: 304) states, many religious parties tend to have a pronounced ‘grassroots character’ and derive their strength from mass mobilization and are vertically linked with civil society through their own dense network of social organisations. In the Islamic context, Denoeux (2002: 72) argues that the popularity of religious parties is linked to their intense grassroots activism and their programme of social welfare. In Egypt for instance, the MB provided a diverse range of social services to the poorest sections of society which the Egyptian state ignored (Esposito 2010: 63). The ‘associational nexus’ that Islamist parties can emerge from and be part of means that many of their members, activists and leaders can have overlapping associations with other movements and parts of religious civil society (Mohseni and Wilcox 2009: 210). Their leaders and activists usually originate from religious civil society and there
is a strong sense of party membership that often spreads across many aspects of social life and allows the party to exist as a permanent organisation outside electoral periods. According to Sinno and Khanani (2010: 34), structural factors such as the degree of embeddedness of Islamist political organisations in broader civil society can be significant in shaping their decision to emerge as electoral political actors.

As Brown, Hamzawy and Ottaway (2006: 18) contend, frequently religious movements and social organisations are the only civil society actors that are allowed to develop outside the boundaries of direct state control in authoritarian regimes, which gives Islamist parties a potentially significant advantage in an electoral setting when these regimes liberalize or even democratize. As stated before, classical or proto-hegemonical Islamist parties are committed to the expansion of the role of religion in public life using state resources with the ultimate aim of fostering a state and society based on the jurisprudential precepts of the sharia (Nasr 2005: 13). As will be detailed later, many of Turkey’s previous Islamist parties as well as the current Felicity Partisi (SP), while significantly more moderate, fit the term of ‘proto-hegemonic religious’ party quite well. In fact, Gunther and Diamond (2001: 21) use Turkey’s Welfare Party (RP) of the 1990s as an example for this term.

_Denominational mass party, moderate Islamists and the Muslim-Democrat party_

As stated, the category of denominational mass parties could easily accord to either moderate Islamists or Muslim-Democrat parties. As Mandaville (2007: 105) states both subtypes are very similar although the latter places no emphasis on the sharia in its rhetoric or party program and adopts an approach to religion’s social role that places it within the private realm of the individual. Denominational mass parties accept and fully internalise the ‘bounded uncertainty’ of electoral politics and are normatively committed to the democratic rules of the game. They do not seek to change the structure of the state along religious lines in order to implement a religious agenda although their programmatic agenda does necessarily include defence and protection of religious values in society. Muslim-Democrat parties have a gradualist, long-term view towards religiosity that refrains from the agency of the state (Cavdar 2006: 478). In that sense, as some scholars (Duran 2008: 85; Öniş 2006a: 124; Nasr 2005: 16) suggest, they can be compared with the European Christian Democrat variant of religio-conservative parties.
Nasr (2005: 13) theorised the term Muslim-Democrat party as relating to political parties that have a normative interest in the development of a tolerant, pluralistic and democratic political system and culture. Zubaida (2011: 208) refers to these parties as examples of ‘reformist and modernised’ Islamist politics as opposed to the ‘conservative’ Salafi Islam of the Saudi Arabian state and the ‘radical and militant’ that Qutb promoted. They can accept the ‘bounded uncertainty’ (Schmitter 2001: 68) of electoral competition for political office. In many cases this shift in moderation is triggered by generational changes and the advent of a younger generation of Islamist activists and politicians that feel more comfortable and have more experience with operating in competitive electoral contexts (Brown et al 2006: 6). With moderate Islamist political actors there is a lingering suspicion that their commitment to participating in electoral politics is entirely instrumental (Tibi 2008: 44). Conversely, it could be said that Muslim-Democrat parties instrumentalise faith and religious values for electoral advantage.

Springborg (2007: 162) uses of the term ‘Muslim Democrats’ in a broader fashion in referring to any party that has abandoned the means of violence and engaged in democratic processes of electoral contestation. Yet he also emphasises the particularity of these parties to processes of democratization by stressing their moderation, refraining from direct projects of societal Islamization, and service-based focus on society as a whole rather than specific groups (Springborg 2007: 169). Although he defines the same position and stance as ‘post-Islamist’ rather than Muslim-Democrat, Bayat (2008: 19) accurately describes these parties’ aim as a normative attempt to ‘fuse religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam and liberty’. Turkey’s AKP is usually presented as the most prominent example of this relatively new subtype of the Islamist party family (Mandaville 2007: 105; Nasr 2005: 19; Eddin Ibrahim 2003: 7). However, although the AKP may be the most internationally prominent example, there are other party actors which have also been referred to as within the category of Muslim-Democrat parties. Nevertheless, comparisons between individual party actors in different national settings should be made in the context of the particular ‘historical, religious and resource endowments of each region’ (Whitehead 2002: 191). Thus the format of Muslim-Democrat parties cross-regionally should be seen in the context of ‘family resemblance rather than mechanical replication’ to paraphrase Hefner’s caution in comparing
democratic regimes (2000: 216). Mohseni and Wilcox (2009: 226) second this in stipulating that ‘different configurations of regime type, party politics and mobilization constitutions’ change the mode of interaction between religion and politics. These caveats are especially relevant in terms of the emergence of these actors, their composition and agenda as well as their relative electoral success. The below section will briefly outline a few of these contemporary examples beyond the Turkish case to add more cross-national context to the label of a Muslim-Democrat party.

In the region of the Middle East, in terms of its religious moderation and pragmatic approach to electoral politics, Morocco’s PJD is often seen as the closest example for a Muslim-Democrat party. The party emerged in the Moroccan elections of 1997 as a result of a merger of two political groups (Sater 2010: 72). According to Zighal (2008: 34) and Mandaville (2007: 135), the party’s tone and programmatic agenda in later elections, especially in those of 2007, placed it within the centre-right, conservative spectrum of politics rather than the Islamist camp. Moreover, Hamzawy and Brown (2008: 50), as well as Werenfels (2006), argue that the process of integration within the settings of electoral competition has led to the PJD moderating its Islamist politics and articulating its demands in a more inclusive and political sustainable discourse. Nevertheless, Lagendijk and Wiersma (2008: 72) prefer to refer to the party as ‘moderate Islamist’ rather than describing them as Muslim-Democrat party and cite the party’s religious and Islamic stance towards moral and ethical issues in society.

Indonesia and Bangladesh have also been pointed out as countries where parties akin to the Muslim-Democrat format have been emerging. In Bangladesh, Nasr (2005: 14) sees the Bengali National Party (BNP) as another actor whose political outlook and agenda fits that of a Muslim-Democrat party. In Indonesia, similar to Turkey in earlier periods, strong connections exist between religious civil movements and centre-right and Islamist party politics with different parties representing different groups (Elisabeth 2007: 80). Indonesian religious movements such as the Muhammadiya and Nahdatul Ulama were instrumental in effectuating the countries democratic transition in 1998 (Webber 2006: 403). Afterwards, the two largest Islamist parties Nation Mandate Party (PAN) and the Awakening Nation Party (PKB) which are frequently seen as Muslim-Democrat were formed based on these two movements respectively (Elisabeth 2007: 79). However, these parties have not managed to win national office yet. Furthermore,
in contrast to the AKP, Çınar and Duran (2008: 34) states that other examples of Muslim Democrat parties in Morocco, Bangladesh and Indonesia have much more strongly pronounced religious political agendas. This range of examples revealed a snapshot of comparative cases akin to the format of a Muslim-Democrat party that exist in other political settings of the Muslim world.

The next section will look at the concept or party systems, its relation with political and the various means that party system have been measured and analysed. Before going on to examine Mainwaring and Scully’s framework of party system institutionalization, the conducive effects that Islamist party actors can have on party system institutionalization and democratization will be summed up.

2.1.4 Party Systems

As mentioned, party systems are the constitutive entities made up of the totality of political parties within a national polity. However, as Janda (1993: 180) stresses, a party system ‘is more than the sum of its parts’ as it presents an interactive frame whose characteristics are shaped by the interaction of the parties an individual as well as a collective basis. Sartori (1976: 230) defines a party system as ‘the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition’. Furthermore, the concept of the party system also integrates the manner in which the party political sphere interacts with the state and civil society. Hence, party systems constitute the ‘traffic rules that plug the society into the state’ (Sartori 2005: 37). Political parties have to construct their modes of interaction and competition for electoral office within the party system. According to Peters (1999: 115), the party system ‘tends to define the limits of behaviour of the individual members of the system’. Thus Penner-Angrist (2004: 115) argues that the nature of the party system and its structural characteristics are influential in determining how this political space relates to processes of democratic consolidation among the main political actors and civil society in general. Furthermore, Morgan (2007: 79) adds that ‘the nature of the party system’ in democratizing countries may either benefit or damage processes of democratic consolidation.

Studies of classifying and evaluating party systems have focused on a variety of different features and characteristics and compared how they have affected the
individual development of political systems on a cross-national basis. The main
classificatory indicators that have been established according to this measure have
distinguished between two-party systems, multi-party systems and extreme multi-party
systems (Peters 1999: 116). Duverger’s law (1951) states that while systems of
proportional representation will tend to result in the formation of multi-party systems,
electoral regimes based on first-past-the-post majority voting will be likely to develop
two-party polities. Due to the differing dynamics of interaction of each individual type
of system, they all produce ‘different critiques of parties’ (Linz 2002: 294).
Conventional approaches taken to studying party systems have included examining their
levels of fractionalization through the number of operating parties or the degree of
consensus on key issues (Mainwaring 1998: 67).

Fractionalization and polarization

The presence of a high number of parties operating within the boundaries of a
parliamentary system has been theorized to have negative impacts on party system
stability which can impede processes of democratization (Karvonen and Anckar 2002:
11; Randall and Svasand 2002a: 8). According to the electoral research organisation
IDEA (2005: 68); In multi-party systems, especially those with proportional
representation voting systems, high numbers of parties in parliament can result in
destabilizing coalition governments as the formation of single-party government
becomes very difficult (IDEA 2005: 68). Pedersen (1983: 46) argues that the more
parties are present within a party system, the less ideological distance exists between
them which can encourages increased short-term vote shifting between parties and lead
to heightened electoral volatility. In her work on electoral volatility in Latin American
countries, Remmer (1991: 194) found a positive relationship between party system
fragmentation and electoral volatility. This was reinforced by Mainwaring and Zoco
(2007: 171) although they highlight that institutional characteristics of the electoral
system constitute important mediating factors in this relationship. This can be seen very
well in the Turkish case whose political make-up after 1982 was affected by an electoral
threshold of 10%. On the other hand, Karvonen and Anckar (2002: 19) also point out
that low levels of fragmentation in a party system can signify that one party may be
exerting an unhealthy dominance on the rest of the political system. They propose that
the quality of democratic governance is highest ‘in countries with moderately
fragmented party systems’ (Karvonen and Anckar 2002: 11). Sartori (2001: 94) has argued that a party system between 3 to 5 main parties, what he calls ‘moderate multi-partism’, represents a moderate level of fragmentation beneficial to democratic stability.

A second indicator is used to indicate the fragility of a party system. This concerns the level of ideological polarization on key systemic norms and principles or ‘the degree of agreement or disagreement between political parties on fundamental political values and institutions’ (Macridis and Burg 1991: 66). Penner-Angrist (2004: 229) acknowledges polarization levels as a key variable characterizing party systems. Almond et al (1993: 118) characterise that party systems with high levels of political polarization are ‘conflictual’, whereas those with lows levels are ‘consensual’. They also state that increased ideological within a party system can orchestrate a shift from centrist to anti-system parties as the ‘social glue’ on which the former based their position weakens (1993: 118). High party political polarization also reflects a situation where there is effectively no normative consensus about the procedural norms and rules on institutional interaction between the political actors. This inability of political actors to maintain a political consensus is also damaging to the legitimacy of the overall democratic political system (Penner-Angrist 2004: 234).

Cleavage structure

Another valuable manner of analysing party systems is to examine the main divides or cleavages that define the electoral competition between political parties within a party system. In their 1960s study focusing on West European politics, Lipset and Rokkan (1990 [1967]: 101) posited that the main cleavage issue which could structure voter loyalties concerned language, religion, social class, or the interplay between a country’s centre against the periphery. In that sense, cleavage issues become reconstituted as ‘durable patterns of political behaviour’ (Bornschier 2010: 55). Once a particular party becomes repeatedly identified as representing a particular group structured around a particular cleavage, it is likely to gain that group’s voter loyalty in the long-term, thus managing to transfer ‘cleavage politics’ into the party system (van der Eijk and Franklin 2009: 92; Ware 1996: 197). In Turkey, as will be seen in the next chapter, party politics has traditionally also been structured around the three dominant cleavage issues of a centre-periphery conflict and a religious-secular divide, as well as ethnic polarization
involving the ethnic Turkish population, the state and the armed forces on one hand and the Turkey’s Kurdish minority on the other (Kalaycıoğlu 2010: 2; Çarkoğlu 2002: 35). Leftwich (1997: 531) points out that enduring cleavage structures, whether ‘ethnic, religious or cultural’, can greatly hinder democratization processes and reverse them as they sabotage the formation of a procedural and normative consensus on the parameters of interaction.

It is necessary to comment on the limitations of the above measures when applied to third wave democracies within the developing world. A great deal of the academic literature on party systems has based itself on the historical experiences of stable liberal democratic regimes in Western Europe and North America. As Erdmann (2010: 1285) points out, many of the scholarly assumptions regarding party systems, their development and their functions treat the specific historical experiences within Western Europe as ahistorical and package them as universal models which can be applied to all other cases and periods. In contrast, many scholars (Hague and Harrop 2004: 200; Karvonen and Anckar 2002: 28; Grugel 2002: 74; Randall and Svasand 2002b: 6; Mainwaring 1998: 21) argue that the extent to which these insights can be applied to non-western contexts is restricted, especially in the developing world where most democratic regimes are quite young and suffer from continuous internal instability and increased possibilities of authoritarian reversals. For instance, Mainwaring (1999: 22) claims that the left-right divide does not match the socio-economic realities of new democracies that have not undergone periods of mass industrialization and Schmitter (1995: 20) has warned about the ‘unrepeatability’ of western experiences. In Turkey’s case for example, it has been claimed that analysing Islamist parties along the left-right divide can be problematic as their policies can be simultaneously left-wing, in terms of social redistribution, and right-wing, in their economic liberalism (Hicks 2003: 377; Öniş 1997: 748).

**Party system institutionalization**

One of the most important factors affecting the ‘the quality of democratic practice and accountability’ (Mainwaring 2000: 38) in third wave states and new democracies in the developing world, is the level of institutionalization that party systems have undergone and their degree of grounding in wider civil society. Smith (2003: 148) presents
democratic consolidation as being ‘conditional’ upon a sufficient level of party system institutionalization. Grugel (2002: 74) lists the implications of low levels of party system institutionalization for democratic politics as consisting of the absence of popular legitimacy of the party system, poor intra-party organisation, weak links to society and ‘few opportunities for structured interaction between parties’. Through the scholarship of Mainwaring and Scully, the level of party system institutionalization became recognised as a significant factor in determining the legitimacy and health of democratic political regime. According to Mainwaring (1998: 69) party-system institutionalization essentially signifies that ‘actors entertain clear and stable expectations about the behaviour of other actors, and hence about the fundamental contours and rules of party competition and behaviour.’ Furthermore, these expectations can be held to be valid for the ‘foreseeable future’ (Mainwaring 1999: 25).

Mainwaring and Scully discern between three types of party systems (Wallis 2003: 20). Their scheme of party systems builds on an earlier distinction by Sartori (1976: 310-311) between ‘structured’ and ‘fluid’ party systems. Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 25) distinguish between ‘institutionalised’ and inchoate’ party systems. ‘Institutionalised party systems’ are characterised as systems ‘where parties significantly structure the political process’ whereas ‘inchoate party systems’ distinguish themselves by weak patterns of stability in party interaction, very weak links to the electorate and an absent consensus on the normative and procedural parameters and rules of democratic process. This prevents a proper absorption of democratic values and norms in the political sphere and society, thus impeding democratic consolidation (Mainwaring 1998: 78). Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 6) theorise a continuum of development between their different ideal-types of fluid and institutionalised party system. Numerous scholars (Linz and Stepan 1998: 53; Diamond 2002: 226) consider competitive political-party systems as vital to process of democratic consolidation. In the consolidation stage the focus shifts on securing and stabilizing the democratic political system and strengthening the norms and procedures by which political processes occur.

However, whereas insufficient party system institutionalization has been increasingly focused upon since the mid-1990s, few scholars have examined of too much institutionalization of party systems on democratic stability. Naming the case of Austria’s party system in the 1990s which had been ossified for two decades, Schedler
(1995: 7) highlights that overtly high levels of party system institutionalization, or ‘over-institutionalization’ of party systems, can also be detrimental towards democratic consolidation. Morgan (2007: 96) points this out in the party system collapse of Venezuela which exhibited so much institutionalization that the political system was not perceived as responsive towards the main public issues. Nevertheless, it seems that this issue touches upon the rootedness of political parties in their electoral settings which is one Mainwaring and Scully’s main criteria for evaluation the institutionalization of party systems although it also highlights the importance of electoral choice. Thus, while excessive uncertainty is extremely destabilizing for the legitimacy of democratic political systems, the normative and practical operation of democratic politics, especially the competition over political offices within the electoral arena, nevertheless does require a certain amount of ‘bounded uncertainty’ (Schmitter and Karl 1991: 83).

However, as seen in the earlier section of this chapter processes of party system institutionalization, significant as this dimension may be, constitutes only one of multiple dimensions within the larger process of democratic consolidation. It is important to acknowledge this qualitative distinction. Furthermore, it should also be emphasised that processes of institutionalization of one or a few parties should not necessarily be equated with overall institutionalization at the level of the party system (Randall and Svasand 2002b: 6-7). The examples of the longstanding former ruling parties of Italy, Mexico and Japan’s incumbent party are a relevant example (Diamond 2002: 25; Heywood 2002: 262). In their focus on the emergence of the South African ANC, Giliomee and Simkins (1999: 352) come to the same conclusion that in some cases the institutionalization of a single party may not necessarily benefit that of the wider party system. Therefore, the extent to which party systems manage to structure the political choices within society is closely related to the overall stability of the democratic regime to the extent that anti-systemic forces are not seen as political alternatives.

Religious parties, Islamist parties and party system institutionalisation

The following section will now focus on the specific features that Islamist actors, especially moderate Islamist or Muslim-Democrat parties, possess which are conducive to the institutionalization of their specific party systems and broader processes of
democratic consolidation. As far as the impact and effect of religious parties on democratization, as Rosenblum (2007: 29) points out, the brunt of the literature on democratic theory has traditionally seen it as being overwhelmingly negative. For instance, Tibi (2008: 46) argues that the overall electoral motivation of Islamist political parties is merely strategically oriented, without being normatively committed to the wider principles and norms of a democratic political culture. Ottaway (2010: 44) identifies Islamist political movements and organisations ‘of all varieties’ as ‘one of the major challenges to democratization’ in the Muslim world and in particular the Arab Middle East.

Newer literature in the last twenty years on religious parties, especially relevant in the context of Muslim societies, has identified various points in which they can be significant agents in democratization processes. Enyedi and Mahoney (2004: 172) argue that religious political actors and organisations can play significant roles ‘not only in democratic transitions but also in the ensuing phases of consolidation’. Christian-Democrat political parties in Western Europe are a good example of this. Kalyvas (1996: 25) highlights that ‘confessional parties’ are able to contribute towards the stabilization and consolidation of democracy by mobilizing popular legitimacy for the overall electoral process as well as the key actors involved therein. Tepe (2005a: 287) supports this argument in stating that within societies influenced by religious mores and ethics religious parties can consolidate the practice of electoral participation as their politics of piety is representative of the wider religiosity of society. Furthermore, Islamist parties tend to be deeply rooted in the wider social contexts from which they emerged by being integrated into a network of communal associational groups (Brumberg 2006: 104).

In the Turkish context, the Islamist party spectrum has maintained its structural and thematic coherence, always recycling figures familiar to the wider electorate since the late 1960s. Many figures and activists within the contemporary AKP have also been members of preceding Islamist parties (Hale and Özbudun 2010: 50; Cagaptay 2002: 44). Moreover, Turkey’s Islamist party spectrum has always closely connected to religious social movements such as Sufi brotherhoods and simultaneously possessed extensive networks of social welfare services (Yeşilada 2002: 174). Coskun (2003: 70) notes that the members and activists of Islamic parties have an established tradition in
performing badly needed social work in poor urban ghettos and rural areas. While most main parties in Turkey resort to mass media methods of electoral communication, the Islamist party spectrum still mobilize voters at local level, involving local communities and establishing contact on a direct, face-to-face basis district by district (Özbudun 1996: 129). Based on these mobilization capacities and social rootedness, they can contribute to stabilizing the wider party system arguably. Furthermore, according to Brumberg (2005: 97) and Hinnebusch (2004: 385), their social rootedness makes the wider institutionalization of the party system dependent on the inclusion of Islamist party political actors.

Herzog (2006: 84), Nasr (2005: 19) and Dannreuther (1999: 49) argue that the dynamic of integrating religious parties within the context of democratic electoral competition compels them to become more pragmatic and moderate their religiosity in order to maximise their vote-share. Wickham (2006: 6-7), in reference to processes of internal moderation within Egypt’s Islamist spectrum which lead to the establishment of newer moderate Islamist parties, has called this process ‘Islamist auto-reform’. Rosenblum (2007: 74) depicts it as a ‘virtuous cycle’ as ‘the imperatives of competition’ compel religious parties to adapt their outlook according to the dynamics of the political system and progressively shed their anti-systemic, extremist outlook. Perthes (2011: 166) also argues electoral competition can stimulate internal discussion within Islamist which crystallize divisions between reformist and hard-liners within the party and can ultimately lead to splits. As will be seen in the third chapter, this happened in Turkey in 2001 when the reformist faction of the Fazilet Partisi (VP) left the party to found the AKP. Furthermore, by engaging in arena of party politics, Islamist parties contribute to enlargening the avenue of electoral choice and enrichening the pluralist character of the party system by being representative of religiously observant, social-conservative segments of society, thus reducing the appeal of armed, anti-democratic and extra-parliamentary groups (Tepe 2005a: 287). Islamist political parties have had an intrinsic role in including and legitimating this trend within the boundaries of the political process of democratic political systems by offering an avenue of expression for this section of the electorate (Çarkoğlu 2005: 311; Özdalga 2002: 144). Consequently, this results in strengthening the legitimacy of the democratic political process by widening the avenue of choice in the party political realm.
2.2 Mainwaring and Scully’s research framework of party system institutionalization

As mentioned, Mainwaring and Scully framework on party system institutionalization is widely used in evaluating the ‘durability’ of democratic party systems in developing countries. It will serve as the main conceptual framework in analysing the flaws and failing of Turkey’s party system. Their model on party system institutionalization accords special attention to 4 particular factors; regularity in inter-party competition; ‘rootedness’ in society; legitimacy given to the electoral process and the party political sphere; autonomy of political organisation from external organisations (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 4-5). These 4 factors will now be briefly analysed in order to explore them further.

Regularity in inter-party competition

The first principal criterion that Mainwaring and Scully establish relating to the level of institutionalization of national party system is ‘stability in the rules and the nature of inter-party competition’ (Mainwaring 1998: 69). In an environment dominated by fly-by-night political parties, it will be difficult for the electoral base to develop any authentic links to the party system (Wallis 2003: 20-21). Heywood (2002: 7) states that patterns of party interaction can only be defined as a party system when they achieve a certain measure of ‘stability and a degree of orderliness’. This sense of stability also frequently coincides with a ‘more effective programmatic representation’ that increases popular partisanship through information shortcuts concerning party labels (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007: 155). In this sense, Randall and Svasand (2002b: 13) argue that regularity means a form of ‘routinization’ and the framing of a system of norms and conventions regulating interaction. Crotty (1993: 665) argues that democratic polities cannot function without stable inter-party competition. Stockton (2001: 97) states that regular inter-party competition is heavily dependent upon the electoral habituation of ‘party alternatives’ that enjoy widespread ‘social embeddedness’ and whose stances and position are well established. As will be seen in the next chapter, Mainwaring (1998: 71) states that this criterion can be easily measured and contrasted by examining patterns of electoral volatility in a political system.
The second criterion that Mainwaring and Scully raise concerns the degree to which the key parties are entrenched in the social landscapes whose interests they aggregate and articulate. ‘Strong party roots’, as Mainwaring (1998: 70-71) states, ‘help provide the regularity that institutionalization implies’. Simultaneously, a strong social grounding enables parties to remain electorally sustainable for longer (Esteban Montes et al 2000: 803). This relates to the legitimation role of political parties within broader society in so far as ‘rootedness’ or ‘party penetration’ (Ware 1996: 150) is intended to measure the extent to which citizens feel that political parties are linked to them collectively and can therefore relate to their everyday needs. Wallis (2003: 21) links the term to the incidence of electoral volatility present within a political system, as a lack of rootedness will result in ‘limited regularity in how people vote’. Janda (1980: 19) relates the institutionalization of political parties to the extent to which they are ‘reified in the mind’ and to the extent that it exists as a recognisable social and political organisation.

As was stated, in the era of the mass party model, political parties maintained strong and durable links to their main constituent groups, attempting to integrate the private lives of their activists, members and voters into a network of organizations and bodies connected to them. Mainwaring (1999: 6) argues that political parties which ‘develop allegiances among citizen, organized groups, and politicians’ are invaluable for the functioning of democratic system. The decline of this party model has led to a corresponding decline in the social rootedness of political parties. One indicator of this is the waning public trust in political parties across the world (Mainwaring 1999: 35; Randall and Svasand 2002b: 8). In that sense, Randall and Svasand (2002b: 14) identify ‘reification’ as an attitudinal measure of the degree to which a party has imbedded itself in the ‘public imagination’. This could correspond to the criterion of social rootedness in the sense that it describes the extent to which a party becomes established ‘in the public imagination’.

**Legitimation of electoral process by major political actors**

This relates to the degree to which the electoral competition and the party system are seen as legitimate by the major actors. Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 14) argue that the
citizenry must perceive the electoral process and its main democratic actors to be the legitimate means of ‘determining who governs’. In terms of social legitimacy amongst the greater public, Mainwaring (1999: 39) states that where political parties are part of the functioning of basic democracy, ‘system stability’ overall increases. One has to distinguish here between the legitimacy that these institutions enjoy amongst actors in the political sphere and the legitimacy that they receive in society (Morlino 1995: 582). In consensualist political systems, there is a much greater likelihood that actors in the party system will respect the ‘uncertainty of democratic competition’ (Corrales 2001: 89). Leftwich argues (1999: 528) as well that the principle of electoral competition will remain acknowledged and respective if the elected parties exhibit ‘policy restraint’ and adhere to the ideological consenses that exist in the party system. As seen, Morlino (1995: 575) sees one of the principal targets of democratic consolidation as establishing ‘democratic structures and norms’ which are recognised and integrated into civil society.

Independent and autonomous status of party organisations

The last criterion which Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 17) posit stipulates that political parties should have internal structures that have an ‘independent status and value of their own’ without merely being vehicles for their leaders or constituting facades for other movements and organisations. This entails ‘a routinization of intraparty procedures, including procedures for selecting and changing the party leadership’ (Mainwaring 1999: 27). According to La Palombara and Weiner, parties should have enough structural cohesion to survive its political leaders (Tachau 1994: xiii). Stockton (2001: 209-210) points out that it is important to distinguish between political parties having strong links to civil society on one hand, and being manipulated by outside ‘sponsoring institutions’ for the interests of the latter. In the context of Turkey, as mentioned in the first chapter, it is acknowledged that there is a universal lack of intraparty democracy across the political spectrum and party politics is dominated by high levels of personalism. This will be seen when this phenomenon is examined in greater detail in the following chapter. This feature is shared with most party systems of the Middle East according to Abukhalil (1997: 154). For this reason, this criterion of Mainwaring and Scully’s research framework was not operationalised in this thesis. Nevertheless, the issue of party autonomy will be extensively focused upon in the next
chapter in order to present the context within which the wide-spread and absence of intra-party democracy has developed in Turkey,

This first section outlined a variety of inter-related aspects concerning the theoretical fields in which the proposed research will base itself. As such, it was seen how political parties and party systems play an indispensable role in processes democratic transition and democratic consolidation. Furthermore, the historical evolution of party models was brought into relation with the declining relation between parties and civil society. This was then linked with the conceptual frame of party systems, different manners of analysing their health. Finally, the factor of party system institutionalization was briefly outlined as well as the Mainwaring and Scully’s model of untangling this concept and subdividing it into different criteria.

The following chapter will accompany the outline forming the theoretical basis of this research dissertation with a thorough summary of the Turkish case and the historical context of its electoral political system before examining the development of Turkey’s Islamist political within that system to the present day. At the end of the chapter the research question of this thesis will then be presented.
Chapter 3 - The context of the Turkish case and its political system

The preceding chapter was aimed at giving a review of the theoretical literature relating to processes of democratization and party system institutionalization. As Randall and Svasand (2002b: 17) state, it is crucial to consider the historical democratic parameters of the party system in order to contextualise the character of institutionalization. Therefore, the following section will attempt to flesh out the particularities of the Turkish case in relation to the preceding theoretical discussion. The aim is provide an in-depth background into the Turkish case and convey a sense of familiarity with the Turkish regional background and its characteristics which can also serve to inform the research chapters of this thesis as well. This chapter will therefore outline the key episodes in Turkey’s political history that provided the context within which the country’s state framework of Kemalism is set and within which the Islamist parties developed after the late 1960s.

Firstly, the evolution of Turkey’s democratic development after 1946 will be retraced. Afterwards, the development of the Islamist spectrum from the 1960 to the present day will be briefly revised. Then, the main failings and flaws of Turkey’s party system will be enumerated. This will include a detailed focus on the independence of political party organisations in Turkey and why it is unsuitable to examine this dimension for this thesis. Finally, an outline of the historical development of the Islamist party spectrum will attempt to show how some of its key strengths and advantages, especially its strong civil society linkages, can address some of the key failings of Turkey’s party system and advance democratic consolidation. This section will not only outline the context of the Turkish case in that sense but also provide a point of orientation for the rest of thesis in terms of contextualising the discussions and the presentation of research.

The final section of this chapter will present the research question and the derived hypotheses for the proposed research, the various ways in which the evolution of a moderate Islamist party spectrum in Turkey has increased overall party system institutionalization will be listed and the overall gap in the literature that this research attempts to address will be presented. It will also present the question of whether this process has benefited overall democratic consolidation. The following fourth chapter will then present and outline the research methodology pursued for this research thesis.
and summarise the specific approaches in which Mainwaring and Scully’s research framework for party system institutionalization was operationalised.

3.1 A brief outline of Turkey’s history

In order to examine the failings and dilemmas of the Turkish political system currently, it is instructive to cover several overlapping themes of importance in the country’s political culture and history that have a significant bearing on the current configuration of the party system and principal norms and values in its political culture. As stated in the first chapter, the establishment of an authoritarian republic determined to modernize the country in a top-down fashion in the face of the broad majority who were grounded in a conservative culture of traditional and religious values isolated the political elites from society in a manner that affected the democratic political regime adversely. This was furthered by the institutional legacies of the military coups and periods of military rule, 1960-1961, 1970-1971, 1980-1983. These events generated an institutional configuration which grossly disfigured the democratic political culture of Turkey and gave it a deeply patrimonial and authoritarian character. In this sense, as Salt (1999: 78) argued that Turkey’s political system could be described as a ‘military democracy’.

It is important to commence any discussion of the genesis of Turkey’s multi-party political system which emerged in 1946 with a quick review of the late Ottoman period and the early era of the Turkish republic. Under the last three decades of the Ottoman Empire when foreign encroachment and internal revolts slowly shrank its boundaries, leaving it with a small foothold in Balkan Europe, a resistance movement to the empire’s autocratic rule emerged. Deeply influenced by the values of the European enlightenment, positivism and secularism, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) was dominated by military officers who became known as the Young Turk movement (Kanra 2010: 72). Seizing power in 1908, the CUP proclaimed intentions to establish a constitutional parliamentary monarchy. Nevertheless, the CUP constituted the real centre of power in the empire from then on and eventually established a military dictatorship after 1913 which lasted throughout the First World War (Zürcher 2004: 110).
Findley (2010: 200) notes that this dynamic set off a trend of tutelary ‘guardianship’ by non-democratic forces over the overt political process that would continuously reproduce itself in Turkey’s republican era of multi-party democracy and be characteristic of it. Öktem (2011: 7-8) refers to this relation as the establishment of a ‘guardian state’ whose foundational ethos he sees as ‘the importance attached to state preservation as opposed to legitimate political processes’. He traces it from the late Ottoman period to the mid-2000s when it begins to weaken as the armed forces lose power as a political actor. Tezcür (2010: 90), who also uses the concept in the context of both contemporary Iranian and Turkish politics, refers to the political concept of ‘guardianship’ as the privilege of ‘the ruling elite... to govern by reason of its unique knowledge, wisdom, and virtue’ in contrast to the norms of representative democracy.

As seen in the first chapter, this cleavage between the ruling elites and the population became conceptualised as the ‘center-periphery’ framework in the early 1970s by the sociologist Şerif Mardin (1973). The concept of political guardianship in the Turkish context will be revisited in the later section on the Turkish armed forces as a political actor. The character of the ‘guardian state’ became embedded in the character of the Turkish republic that was founded after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War which led to a temporary occupation of Turkey by British, French, Italian and Greek forces. This state of affairs which would have left Turkey with a tiny state in central Anatolia was supposed to cemented by the 1919 treaty of Sevres (Ahmad 2010: 93). Nevertheless, the independence struggle which saw these forces successfully evicted by 1923, gave way to the establishment of the Turkish republic under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk and nullified the Sevres treaty with the treaty of Lausanne in 1923 (Heper and Criss 2009: 195). The newly founded Republican People’s Party (CHP) absorbed a significant part of the defunct CUP’s membership (Findley 2010: 249-250). The political elite of the new Turkish republic also paralleled the CUP in being heavily dominated by military officers (Cook 2007: 103).

The founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923 constituted an overt formal rupture with the political institutions, norms and value of the Ottoman Empire (Fisher Onar 2010: 67). Secular republicanism replaced the Ottoman Empire. As seen, the Kemalist separation of state and religion in all main socio-political levels was based on the French laicist model (Hakan Yavuz and Khan 2004: 390; Davison 2003: 337). This
laicist orientation of the polity was to anchor its adoption of a Western nation-state’s features. As part of an extensive and ambitious programme of socio-cultural westernization and modernization, the reforms introduced included a republican constitution, the abolition of the Islamic caliphate, the replacement of the old Ottoman with the Roman alphabet, replacing traditional forms of dress with modern European ones and instituting civil and criminal codes of justice from European countries like Switzerland and Italy (Faucompret and Konings 2010: 5; Jenkins 2003: 46-47; Bill and Springborg 1994: 183). As stated in the first chapter, the state-prescribed ostracism of religious identification from all public dimensions of life, as well as the abolition of the caliphate and the banning of all religious movements and brotherhoods, was met with heavy resistance from the outset and provoked a quasi-religious and pro-Kurdish uprising in the eastern Turkey (Zürcher 2004: 169; Mardin 1973: 182). Despite the ‘revolutionary’ nature and scale of these changes, there were structural continuities between the political norms of governance of the Ottoman Empire and the new Turkish republic as Heper (2000: 63) states. The new republic’s leadership under Kemal Atatürk shared the same ideological background as that of the Young Turk leadership of the late Ottoman period for instance. The top-down and authoritarian fashion in which the state envisioned the delivery and reception of these radical reforms, effectively summarised the manner in which it envisioned relations between the Turkish state and the citizenry and re-affirmed the binary dichotomy between an elite, western-orientated and ‘secular’ center and a rural ‘religious’ periphery (Kanra 2009: 47). This dichotomy mirrored the normative stance of the ‘guardian state’ and was well represented by the oft-cited Kemalist slogan of the 1920s, ‘For the people, despite the people’ (Taspinar 2007: 118). In that sense, despite the symbolic importance of the Turkish Grand National Assembly for the legitimacy of the Kemalist nation-building project, from 1925 onwards, Turkey could essentially be characterised a ‘single party system’ (Kalaycıoğlu 2005: 52) or an ‘authoritarian one-party regime’ (Zürcher 2004: 166). During this period, Turkey’s one experiment in permitting an opposition party in 1930 was quickly aborted (Penner-Angrist 2004: 237). This one-party rule persisted until the formal introduction of multi-party politics in 1946. Instead of multi-party politics, the one-party CHP continuously institutionalised its one-party rule and set into
stone the foundational principles of the Kemalist weltanschauung by compressing them into the ‘six arrows’ outlook at its annual congress in 1931.5

The introduction of multi-party politics in 1946

The initial democratization of Turkey’s political system in 1946 could be seen as constituting a pact between elites, rather than a rupture with the past due to social demands and pressures (Kazanciğil 1994: 228-229). The urge to institute multi-party democracy and representative elections was based mainly on strategic calculations concerning Turkey’s position in the international environment following the Second World War, specifically the perceived need of the Turkish state elites to gain the support of the United States as a shield against possible Soviet expansionism (Öktem 2011a: 39; Karpat 2001: 40; Bayart 1994: 285). Both Zürcher (2004: 207-208) and Kalaycioglu (2005: 70-71) state that a combination of elite economic and political interests within the one-party state and particularly charismatic political leadership were the most influential domestic factors in the push for multi-party democracy. Therefore, as Heper (2002: 140) and Çarkoğlu (1998: 546) argue, the dynamics behind Turkey’s transition to democracy in 1946 were guided by a top-down logic, orchestrated by political elites connected to the Kemalist state and the CHP and receiving no input from interest groups or association linked to Turkey’s broader society.

The presence of a strong, interventionist state, baba devlet or father state, as much during Ottoman as republican times left the presence of civil society weak and practically non-existent as a socio-political actor (Kalaycioglu 2002a: 68). This situation was exacerbated with the banning of religious movements and brotherhoods in the 1920s by the state as it diminished the capacity of one of the few Ottoman civil societal actors (Yükleyen 2008: 382). Thus civil society had no big role to play in the post-war democratisation of Turkey in the 1940s. As Tuğal (2009: 36) emphasises, both civil and political society developed ‘secondarily’ and ‘under the shadow of the state’. The orchestrated nature of this process contributed towards continuing the disjuncture between the Turkish state, the new party system and civil society, with electoral relations built on patrimonial bases within bureaucratic networks of support rather than genuine organic links (Rubin 2002: 1; Özbudun 2001: 244). As parties thus became the

5 The 6 arrows remain the symbol of the CHP to this day (Brooker 1995: 55).
main overt actors in the political arena, Heper (1985: 101) described Turkey as a ‘party-centred polity’.

The first post-1946 party system was based on a Westminster-style first-past-the-post format (Kalaycıoğlu 2005: 83). Through recourse to systemic electoral manipulation the CHP won the 1946 elections (Brooker 1995: 252). However, four years later in 1950, the newly founded centre-right Democratic Party (DP) was elected. The DP, seeing itself as the opposition to the statist CHP and as a representative of the ‘periphery’, began to gradually widen the parameters of political discourse so as to enable themes pertaining to religious identity or affiliation to gain public visibility again (Jenkins 2003: 48). Nevertheless, as Filiz and Uluç (2006: 43) clarify, although the DP promoted ‘societal Islam’, the party was against ‘political Islam’. Rather, the central identity of the DP consisted of economic liberalism and social conservatism with a modest religious flavour resembling Europe’s tradition of Christian-democrat parties (Öniş 1997: 762). Nevertheless, in the decade of the 1950s until it was ousted from power in the 1960 coup d’etat, the DP was seen as ‘the public face of Islam’ according to Kanra (2009: 47). As the chief challenger to the pro-status quo CHP, the DP benefited more from being accepted as ‘the voice of the periphery’ than from its modest Islamic flavour (Penner-Angrist 2004: 241-242; Tapper 1994: 9). This, as Steinbach (2005: 45) and Heper (2002: 140) state, is a re-affirmation of the centre-periphery cleavage, the phenomena in which a more traditional-minded political elite representing a fragmented ‘periphery’ confronts a centralised, western-orientated network of state, military and bureaucratic elites.

In 1961, the Menderes government was overthrown by the military. The reasons were linked to the government’s increasingly authoritarian and arrogant behaviour towards the end of its 10-year period in office which was reinforced by the ‘tyranny of the legislative majority’ of the first-past-the-post system (Kalaycıoğlu 2005: 73; 83). As the economic situation in the country deteriorated, government debts amassed and inflation rose drastically, Menderes and the DP increasingly availed themselves of religious imagery in their rhetoric (Mango 2004: 20). This sufficed to make the civil-bureaucratic elites, the intellectual forces in the country and the military increasingly anxious about the ideological sanctity of the kemalist legacy and it constituted an important background factor in the decision to undertake a military putsch (Heper 2006: 346). It is
also noteworthy that there was general public support for the overthrow of an elected government by the armed forces (Mango 2004: 20).

*The political era of 1960 to 1980*

In the aftermath of the coup, the military reformed the political and electoral system of the country. As part of these top-down reforms, a new constitution was unveiled which ironically was much more liberal than the preceding one in terms of the civil rights and entitlement it granted to Turkish citizens (Alpay 2010: 373; Ahmad 2003: 126). Furthermore, the reforms included shifting from a plurality to a proportional representation voting system (Coskun 2003: 65). This was done to prevent and correct the majoritarian excesses of the 1950s (Ahmad 2008: 241). The DP was banned but a new party, the Justice party, was created which was practically a successor party (Findley 2004: 215). The much more liberal constitutional framework of 1961 and the shift from a pluralist to an electoral system based on proportional representation stimulated a quick rise in the number of actors in the party system including those from outside the centre-left or centre-right ideological spectrum, such as the Marxist Turkish Worker’s Party (TIP), the far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP) or the Islamist National Salvation Party (MSP) (Sayarı 2002: 14), as will be seen in more detail later. These factors began to complicate government formation while the twin processes of gradual urbanization and industrialization of Turkish society started to increase the ideological polarization of society. Coalition governments involving a mixture of centre-left and centre-right parties became the norm during the 1960s (Ahmad 2003: 127). The growing militancy of student movements, whether leftist or far-right, coupled with rapidly growing urban populations and the state’s inability to provide these groups with sufficient employment, infrastructure or welfare services became, as Ahmad (2003: 132) describes it, ‘an explosive mix’, contributing to ever increasing political instability.

It was in this atmosphere in 1971 that the military chose to intervene for the second time, banning all parties and installing a civil-military transition government until 1973 when general elections were held again (Cizre 2008: 309). However, this intervention did not solve or ameliorate any of the conditions it had aimed to cure and the decade of the 1970s became known as a period of ‘political instability, civil unrest and severe economic difficulties’ (Erdoğan 2002: 42). Özbudun (2001: 239) has described the main
features of the Turkish politics in the 1970s as dominated by ‘volatility, fragmentation, and ideological polarization’. The global recession exacerbated the country’s economic crisis and led to heavy unemployment, high inflation and massive capital flight (Gülalp 1997: 52). This increased ideological polarization in the political spheres and resulted in much heavier civil unrest than in the preceding decade (Turan et al 2005; Boland 2004: 18). Güneş-Ayata and Ayata (2001: 107) state that the main political axis of the decade was centred around left-wing and right-wing politics. Turkey had seven coalition or minority governments during the 1970s and long periods where the country was governed by ‘caretaker administrations’ (Hale 2002: 168-169).

In the social sphere, conflicts between left- and right-wing extremists escalated sharply in the second half of the 1970s (Keyder 2004: 66). It is worth briefly mentioning the ferocity of these conflicts to acquire an impression of the contemporary climate back. Between 1975 and 1980, 5,000 people were killed in social unrest between left- and right-wing extremists (Eligür 2010: 87). Findley (2010: 320) notes that in the last 12 months before the coup alone, the death toll reached almost 3,000 people. On various occasions right-wing violence could take an explicitly ethnic edge such as when Alevi communities were targeted, especially in Kahramanmaraş, where one hundred people were killed over 6 days in 1978 (Jenkins 2008c: 140). Conditions were approximating those of a ‘civil-war’ (Cizre 2008: 310). This extreme polarization increased the fragmentation of the party system without leading to any meaningful change of the patrimonial manner in which it related to greater society (Özbudun 2001: 246). Finally, in the eye of growing social and political instability, the military putsched for the third time in Turkey’s history on September 12 1980.

**The military coup of 1980 and its consequences on political culture**

Unlike the previous putsches in Turkey in 1960 and 1970, this time the armed forces kept the country under military government until November 1983. Following the coup and the imposition curfews and round the hour military patrols, the violence and social unrest stopped abruptly (Öktem 2011: 59). Tezcür (2010: 99) comments how this added to the military’s prestige and legitimacy as ‘the saviour of the nation’ in the eyes of an

---

6 The Alevi are a Muslim minority in Turkey of approximately fifteen to twenty million whose beliefs, rituals and practices have often been seen as heretical within Sunni Islam (Heper and Criss 2009: 10-11).
exhausted population who accepted the coup with ‘general relief’ (Hale 1994: 247) that some measure of public order and safety had been restored. The fact that the military putsch was executed without any initial loss of life added to its prestige (Pope and Pope 1997: 141). Nevertheless, the period of the military government also imposed its own regime of fear. All political parties and association of a right-wing or, especially, a left-wing hue were disbanded and any political meetings, demonstrations and publications were banned (Hale 1994: 251). Öktem states that over 600,000 people were detained during the period of military government, often without charge and for long periods, and torture was widespread and endemic. Zürcher (1994: 280) adds that over 3,500 death sentences were handed out in this period, although only 20 were carried out. Furthermore, the public sector, the civil service and specifically educational institutions like as schools, academies and universities were purged of anyone with an explicit right-wing or, especially, left-wing political stance (Findley 2010: 352). In this way, as Kalaycıoğlu (2008: 299) argues, one of the long-term effects of the 1980 coup was to disrupt the political socialization of the Turkish electorate which contributed to the lack of ideological partisanship of Turkish voters in the 1980s and 1990s. This he and Özbudun (2001: 242) contend constitute an important factor in the high volatility rates that Turkish elections experienced during that period.

Rubin (2002: 2) and Çarkoğlu (1998: 546) argue that the format of Turkey’s party system was intrinsically influenced by the military’s ‘interventionist’ stance in the political sphere. The 1982 constitution, which was authored by the military authorities, and could therefore be seen as ‘a product of the military intervention in 1980’ (Baydemir 2011: 45), was vital in re-arranging significant aspects of Turkish party politics and its relations with civil society. It should be seen as the key framework which structured Turkey’s eventual return to multi-party democracy in 1983 and conditioned its pace of democratization. The overarching aim of the Turkish armed forces in designing the constitution was to prevent a return to the political and social ‘immovilism’ and instability of the preceding decade (Evin 2005: 36; Öniş 1997: 751).

In that sense Özbudun (2007: 179) emphasises that the constitution was meant to ensure the stability of the state and the main social order rather than guaranteeing the liberty of the citizenry. By suspending Turkey’s democratic regime through its intervention, the military saw itself as salvaging the country’s democracy from its incompetent and
fractious political class (Zürcher 2004: 278). Turkey’s party system was reformed in several significant aspects. Firstly, an electoral threshold for national elections of 10% was introduced (Öniş 1997: 751). Although intended to prevent a return to the extreme multi-partism of the 1970s, these conditions returned during the 1990s as will be seen later along with high levels of volatility. Additionally, the 10% clause actively constrained the representational capacity of Turkey’s political system in favour of a ‘winner-takes-all system’ (Hakan Yavuz 2009: 195). Thus, pro-Kurdish parties that usually win with extremely high margins in Turkey’s south-eastern provinces have traditionally been unable to gain parliamentary admission as political parties as their total vote-share falls below 10% (Somer and Liaras 2010: 160). In the aftermath of the 2002 elections, the flawed nature of the extremely high threshold was highlighted as only two parties entered parliament due to their vote-share and 45% of the electorate’s votes were effectively wasted (Başlevent and Kirmanoğlu 2004: 308).

Secondly, the military prohibited the old political class of actors from the 1970s from re-entering politics. Thirdly, the involvement of citizens in trade unions or any other type of political or civil societal organisation was constitutionally curbed and the establishment of new associational organisations was prohibited (Hale 2003: 110). The emergence active civil society was discouraged and in this sense, according to Özbudun and Gençkaya (2009: 21), the 1982 constitution was intended ‘to protect the state and its authority against its citizens rather than protecting individuals against the encroachments of the state authority’.

The prohibitions placed on the average person on joining such groups played a major role in deterring people from becoming involved in civil society (Kalaycıoğlu 2001: 60). From the armed forces’ view, the coup was an act of institutional engineering aimed at securing and maintaining the long-term stability of the political sphere. Turkey’s transitional process back to parliamentary democracy in 1983 conforms to Terry Karl’s definition of the pacted transition (Kazanciğil 1994: 228-229), whereby the shift from an authoritarian to a democratic regime is negotiated between regime insiders and political elites although only a very small number of actors were involved. It was in regards to this endeavour, the creation of a passive and obedient citizenry that the military enacted a further project of socio-cultural engineering that aimed to reconfigure Turkey’s self-perception and identity formation.
In order to avoid the social instability and disorder of the 1970s and pre-empt the emergence of strong leftist social movements within Turkish society, the military attempted to engineer a new sense of national identity. Zürcher (2010: 68) states that the military saw religion as an ‘antidote’ or as a powerful means of defanging the extreme ideologies that had held sway during the 1970s. Countering the alleged threat of internal communism was a specific concern (Özbudun 2011: 51). According to Eligür (2010: 93), whilst regarding Islam as a backward and suspicious social force, after the coup the military thought it could be harnessed as ‘a useful tool for creating citizen who would be respectful and loyal to the state’. Tapper (1991: 10) also concludes that the military saw the need for ‘reinforcing an unchanging national culture’. The concept of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis as an ideational approach was ideal for these purposes. It was conceived of by the Aydınlar Ocağı (nationalist hearth), a right-wing, nationalist organisation of intellectuals in the 1970s which argued that the identity of Turkish people at its core was constituted by Sunni Islam and the ethnic culture of the Turkic people which pre-dated Islam that constituted the core identity (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2009: 9). Forming a synthetic identity from Sunni Islam and Turkish ethnic nationalism was not a novel concept at all and had already been formulated by the secular sociologist Ziya Gökalp, a key member of the Young Turk movement, prior to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire as a means of creating a viable sense of national identity (Altınay 2004: 14).

In the post-coup climate, the military seized upon the Turkish-Islamic synthesis and used it as a force of ‘social cohesion’ (Jenkins 2008c: 142). Heper (2009: 16) describes it as having constituted an ‘official ideology of state’ for a short period. According to Hakan Yavuz (2009: 50), the military government sought integrate the Turkish-Islamic synthesis as an outlook into the country’s population using the ministry of education and the directorate of religious affairs as well as other planning bodies. The 1982 constitution also made religious education compulsory in schools (Zürcher 2010: 64). As pointed out by Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2009: 10), it was ironic that the most avowedly representative state institution of Kemalist secularism would choose to promote a quasi-religious sense of national identity and numerous scholars (Eligür 2010: 95; Kanra 2009: 86; Jenkins 2008c: 214; Lapidot 1997: 70) believe that this is an additional factor which contributed to the electoral fortunes of Islamist and right-wing parties in the 1980s and 1990s.
The restoration of multi-party democracy and Turgut Özal in the 1980s

In 1983, multi-party politics was gradually restored in Turkey with controlled elections in which two of the three competing parties were set up by the military authorities (Findley 2010: 354). To their great surprise, the elections were won with a wide margin by the third party, the centre-right Anavatan Partisi, (ANAP), which was interpreted as a popular vote against the public involvement of the military in politics (Ahmad 2010: 103). ANAP’s electoral victory with 45% of the votes was partially due to its charismatic leadership by Turgut Özal who completely controlled the party (Kalaycıoğlu 2002c: 47). Özal had been a junior economic minister in the last pre-coup government but was kept on by the military government and entrusted with the office of deputy prime minister in order to implement reforms shifting Turkey’s from a statist to a free-market system increasingly integrated into the global economy (Zürcher 2004: 182).

ANAP, consisting of a coalition of different interest groups, based itself on the values of economic liberalism, moderate religiosity, political conservatism, social democracy and nationalism and bore a resemblance to the DP of the 1950s (Güneş-Ayata and Ayata 2001: 94). Özal’s political discourse was noteworthy for its pronounced anti-statism, which paralleled his advocacy of free-market economics, and he is credited for introducing discourses based on the norms of individual rights and civil society into the political mainstream (Hakan Yavuz 2009: 78). In that sense, Acar (2002: 178) credits his contributions to Turkey’s political culture of democracy to have been of ‘paradigmatic dimensions’ and calls him a ‘pious agent of liberal transformation’. He was a significant influence in shaping the image and discourse of the later AKP and its party leader Erdoğan (Tezcür 2010: 162). Özal was also noted for being close to religious conservatives as his brother Kotku was a senior member of one of Turkey’s most important lodges of the Nakşibendi movement, one of the biggest sufi branches in Turkey and the wider Muslim world (Özel 2010: 142). The neo-liberal economic reforms launched by Özal during the 1980s were termed the ‘Reagan revolution’ (Ahmad 2003: 155) and instituted an ideological and economic shift from a statist to a more liberal form of economic governance (Toksöz 2001: 147). These economic reforms which increased Turkey’s integration into the global economy (Adamson 2002: 173), combined with the waning appeal of Turkey’s ‘strong state tradition’ (Özbudun
and Fuat Keyman 2002: 298), stimulated the emergence of a new Anatolian business class and community that would be invaluable to Islamist parties in 1990s (Hakan Yavuz 2004: 391). Additionally, Hermann (2003: 267) argues that the 1980s witnessed the formation of ‘Islamist businessmen and companies, Islamist intellectuals and media’ within the space of republican Turkey.

The return in 1987 of the old class of politicians banned by the military authorities after the 1980 coup as a result of a popular referendum on this issue signalled the gradual decline of ANAP’s electoral fortunes (Coşar 2010: 169; Tachau 2002: 37). This decline was cemented with the demise of Özal in 1993 which also helped the electoral fortunes of the Islamist RP (Akdoğan 2010: 210). The subsequent elections of 1991 produced a coalition government between the centre-right True Path Party (TPP) and the centre-left Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP). These elections marked a shift in the 1990s towards a series of fractious and relatively short-lived coalition or minority governments, there were altogether 11 individual governments during the decade as can be seen in the table below. Öktem (2011: 84) defined the 1990s in Turkey as ‘the lost decade’ due to the political instability and corruption, the economic crises and the full-blown Kurdish conflict that marked this period. The 1990s were also marked by destabilizing party system fragmentation (Sayarı 2002: 17). As will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter, one of the coalition government was led by the Islamist RP and was brought down with pressure from the military authorities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Parties in government</th>
<th>Leader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991-1993</td>
<td>Coalition (DYP-ANAP)</td>
<td>Demirel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-1995</td>
<td>Coalition (DYP-SHP)</td>
<td>Çiller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1995</td>
<td>Single (DYP)</td>
<td>Çiller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1996</td>
<td>Coalition (DYP-CHP)</td>
<td>Çiller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1997</td>
<td>Coalition (ANAP-DYP-CHP)</td>
<td>Yılmaz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>Coalition (RP-DYP)</td>
<td>Erbakan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-1999</td>
<td>Coalition (ANAP-DSP-DTP)</td>
<td>Yılmaz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-1999</td>
<td>Single (DSP)</td>
<td>Ecevit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2002</td>
<td>Coalition (DSP-MHP-ANAP)</td>
<td>Ecevit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1. Turkish governments during the 1990s (Sayarı 2007: 205)
The 1991 elections initiated an era of extremely unstable electoral politics in Turkey until 2002 in which the overwhelming public impression was that the country was governed by ‘a group of corrupt politicians, businessmen and media Barons’ in collusion with the military forces (Yavuz 2009: 16). This impression was compounded by periodic economic malaise and stark budget deficits during the 1990s were common features for Turkey, with inflation reaching a peak of 126% in 1994 and 73% in 2001 (Nas 2010: 69). The open rivalry and unwillingness to cooperate between party leaders led to highly de-stabilizing fragmentation and increasing popular disenchantment with national politics (Başlevent and Kirmanoğlu 2004: 310).

One particular incident that can be highlighted which particularly heightened public anger, cynicism and disillusionment with mainstream party politics was the 1996 ‘Susurluk affair’ that can be seen as the Turkish equivalent to Watergate or Italy’s Tangentopoli. A traffic accident near the village Susurluk revealed the bodies of a senior police chief, a wanted right-wing mafiosi and a former beauty queen all in the same car which was found to be carrying weapons used for political assassinations (Kalaycıoğlu 2006: 156-157). The incident revealed that networks of corruption and patronage existed between the political class, the army, the intelligence services, parts of the state bureaucracy and the drug-smuggling underground which were used to combat the Kurdish insurgency groups. These networks were called ‘the deep state’ and the incident became ‘Turkey’s biggest political scandal to date’ (Alpay 2010: 380). The fact that the subsequent investigations on the ‘Susurluk affair’ did not manage to shed much light on the incident and were successfully restrained by the government generated a wide-ranging protest campaign which sought to highlight the complicity of the contemporary coalition government in a range of corruption issues (Grigoriadis 2009: 52). In contrast to the steadily declining image of the political class throughout the decade as measured by opinion polls, that of the military as the only efficient state institution seen as serving the public interest kept increasing (Ahmad 2010: 105; Bulut 2006: 126).

In the 1999 elections, another coalition government came to power consisting of the centre-left DSP, ANAP and the right-wing MHP under the helm of Bülent Eçevit, a veteran centre-left politician. This period ended with two crises that highlighted the inadequacy and incompetence of Turkey’s party political leadership in a dramatic way.
Firstly, when a major earthquake struck just eastwards of Istanbul in 1999, the government and the state responded belatedly over a matter of days in what was publicly seen as a major failure of governance (Kubicek 2005: 367; Özbudun and Keyman 2002: 313). Secondly, as will be seen, the major economic crises which erupted in 2001 and 2002 partly due to political mismanagement, the worst since World War II (Tezcür 2010: 110; Toprak 2005: 184), were major sources of popular anger that mobilised the electorate against the mainstream parties. These two events were so profound in their impact on the Turkish electorate that they set the ground for a wholesale rejection of nearly all mainstream parties at the 2002 elections and a new reconfiguration of the party system that was coupled with the emergence of the AKP (Çarkoğlu 2002: 36).

This section briefly introduced the main periods of significance in the evolution of Turkey’s political system which are critical to understanding the nature of its contemporary party system. The next section will outline some of the main flaws and failings of this political system as identified by the literature.

3.1.1 Flaws and Failings of Turkey’s political and party system

Having provided a brief outline on the most important episodes which are of significance to the formation and development of the Turkish party system, the next section will examine its main institutional failings. Using Mainwaring and Scully’s terminology, Turkey can be characterised as suffering from an ‘inchoate party system’ (1995: 22) hindering the unfolding of its democratic consolidation. As such, it can still be described in some key aspects as a defective or illiberal democracy because of the superficiality of the low rootedness and lack of legitimate support that the official political sphere has in the wider social structures.

Lack of social rootedness

As mentioned, the legitimacy of political parties in the public sphere is traditionally associated with the degree to which they are anchored within the social structures whose interests they are supposed to represent. However, as Tachau (1994: xx) states political
parties across the Middle East ‘have often incorporated within their structures and functions pre-existing patron-client relationships’. As was seen, Turkey’s political system of democracy developed in ways that isolated it from any societal involvement bar the act of voting. Kubicek (2002: 763) argues that Turkish parties have a gatekeeping function in ‘limiting who could enter and participate in mainstream political processes’. According to Sayari (2002: 25), the inability of Turkish parties to develop real structural links with society contributed significantly to the high electoral volatility that has traditionally characterised Turkish politics. In that sense, Hale (2002: 184) defines the Turkish voter’s instinct as short-termist, devoid of a great sense of party attachment and compares it to the consumerist manner of shopping. Özbudun (2001: 250) argues that Turkey’s earliest parties after the introduction of multi-party democracy went through the transition from being a cadre party to a cartel party without experiencing a mass party format in between, although importantly the Islamist party spectrum is named as a ‘possible exception’. Therefore, as argued, the relationship of most political parties to the state was always prioritised above that to their own constituents.

*Lack of public legitimacy*

Due to prominent public memories of the periods of political chaos, corruption and economic mismanagement during the crises periods of the 1970s, 1990s and early 2000s, political parties have been traditionally regarded with mistrust and revulsion in Turkish society. Although there was still broad distrust of parties and politicians during the 1980s, it was on a lesser scale than during other periods as there was significantly more political stability and economic growth than in the preceding decade (Ahmad 2003: 139). As seen, distrust increased significantly during the 1990s. Opinion surveys and polls have consistently shown the most trusted institution in Turkey to be the military forces (Kaya and Kentel 2005: 35). Political parties do not enjoy widespread popular legitimacy in Turkey and are often rated as one of the political institutions most susceptible to corruption as well as being thought of as being ineffective and untrustworthy (Abramowitz 2003: 6).

Large-scale disillusionment exists regarding the impact of party politics on the major social and economic problems within the country, especially amongst young people.
This disillusionment has affected the established centre-right and centre-left parties the most as political power increasingly shifted away from them in 1990s with fringe parties increasing their electoral share (Çarkoğlu 2005: 311; Ayata-Günes and Ayata 2001: 96-97). Public disaffection and distrust of party politics culminated in the 2002 elections when only two parties, the newly founded AKP and the CHP, received enough votes to enter parliament while the entire gamut of centre-left and centre-right parties were evicted (Çarkoğlu 2002: 31). This distrust was also reflected in the turnout which was the lowest since 1977 and fell below 80% (Çarkoğlu and Henich 2006: 373), although turnout rose by 7% in the next elections in 2007.

_Failure of civil society linkages_

Frey (1965: 301-303) wrote in the 1950s that politics in Turkey was mainly ‘party politics’. As mentioned, the genealogy of the Turkish democracy and its party system finds its roots in the priorities and imperatives of the state’s structures rather than deriving from a mixture of social and political pressures as was the more typical precedent in Western Europe. The absence of organic interconnections contributes to the classical rupture between the dynamics of the political sphere and society in general as the former constantly lags behind the latter in terms of its development as Steinbach (2003: 48) contends. Therefore, a veritable organic connection between the party system and civil society never actually developed. In this context, one could apply Carothers’ term of a ‘feckless pluralist system’ to Turkey’s political system (2004: 175), that is a parliamentary regime in which electoral power is circulated amongst ‘competing elites who are largely isolated from the citizenry but willing to play by widely accepted rules’. According to Rubin (2002: 1), the results of the Turkish party system’s roots created a strong gravitational pull towards the interests of the state while effective links with civil society were never explored as there was no perception from the parties that this would benefit them. As a result, most Turkish parties ‘lack substantive organic ties with their voting base’ (Quinn Mecham 2004: 343). At the same time though, ‘a robust and independent civil society’ that could have channelled demands and serve as a partner for social interaction did not really exist (Robins 2003: 30).
Electoral volatility

Since the reintroduction of the multi-party democracy in 1983, Turkey has had 6 national elections. According to Hale (2002: 172), since the 1950s, Turkey has had ‘7 years of military rule, 20-21 years of single party rule and 20-21 years of coalition governments’ with periods of high instability in 1961-5, 1973-80 and 1995-99. Çarkoğlu (2002) states 23% of the electorate shifted their voting patterns in Turkey from one party to another at every election. The complete rejection of all main parties at the 2002 national elections in favour of the AK party and, to a lesser degree, the CHP was the most drastic manifestation of this trend with total electoral volatility in Turkey reaching 51% (Sayar 2007: 200). Despite the military’s aim to prevent a return to the political instability of the 1970s with the 1982 constitution, high electoral volatility characterised Turkey’s party-system again in the 1990s, resulting in very unstable coalition governments and complete sea-changes in the composition of governments from one election to another. Özbudun (1996: 242) directly identified the lack of stability in electoral behaviour as being detrimental to the wider consolidation of Turkey’s political system. The re-entry of Turkey’s old class of politicians into the political system in the late 1980s, the return of political instability and electoral volatility and the high fragmentation in the party system all testified to the ineffectiveness of the military intervention and the way it attempted to reform the political system.

Highly personalist format of Turkish inter-party politics

One of the Turkish party system’s key features is its high degree of personalism. Hakan Yavuz (2009: 120) supports this in stating that the leadership of parties is more important than its ideological affiliation or its party programmes. This phenomenon relates directly to the fourth criterion of Mainwaring and Scully’s research framework concerning the autonomy of party organisations from their own leadership or external organisations (1995: 17). As stated in the preceding chapter, all nation-wide parties are currently structured along a very hierarchical format. As Heper (2002: 217) states, it was mostly political leaders who led the drive towards Turkey’s democratic transition as well as playing a key part in its breakdowns. This phenomenon, he argues, is interlinked with the autocratic format in which leadership is traditionally exercised in most political
parties (Heper 2002: 224). Musil (2011: 39) suggests that ‘party organisations in Turkey, in essence, have leader-dependent, authoritarian structures’. Kalaycıoğlu (2002c: 52) defines this model of party structure as ‘democratic centralist leadership’ in which a small elite decide on all the key issues and transform their decision into party policies.

As Musil (2010: 200) emphasises, the law on political parties which was formulated by the military authorities along with the 1982 constitution entrenched the ‘hierarchical party model’ in which authority is concentrated in the party’s leadership. It set out the exact internal structure of political parties of this format thus constraining the space for institutional alternatives. The survival of specific individuals as party leaders for decades is a common phenomenon. In some cases, certain politicians were equated in the public eye with the entire party itself, even when they did not lead them officially. As Heper (2000: 69) states, ‘voters tended to give their votes to political leaders rather than parties’. The image of well-known party leaders also sometimes manage to survive beyond the death of their parties, as they establish new parties (Hakan Yavuz 2009: 120). Corresponding with the highly leader-centric character of party structures is an absence of intra-party democracy across the party spectrum. As will be detailed in the next section, on, religious movements were also very influential external lobbies within the Islamist party spectrum, even at the level of its leadership, until a feud in 1990 effectively restricted their influence upon it.

This personalization has percolated to the electoral level from the intra-party level in that voters increasingly start to focus on the qualities of the parties’ candidates rather than the party manifesto (Özbudun 2001: 249). Thus, according to Hale (2002: 185), this format results in an ‘extremely low frequency of leadership changes’, ‘immobilism’, and impedes the flow of new ideas and individuals into the political arena. As Özbudun (2001: 247) notes, candidate selection processes across the Turkish party system are some of the ‘most centralized and oligarchical methods used in Western democracies’. The extreme concentration of authority within the highest echelons among political parties also means that parliamentarians are overwhelmingly selected and maintain their position on their loyalty to the party leaders in order to gain their approval rather than actual personal merit (Kalaycıoğlu 2010a: 132). The election of the AK party in 2002 itself was partially due to the personalist nature of Turkish
politics as Erdoğan was directly identified by many people as a ‘saviour’ to the country’s many problems, benefiting from his ‘honest and charismatic image’ as well as his good record as mayor of Ankara (Mango 2004: 111; Ahmad 2003: 181; Çaha 2003: 102).

Hale’s comment regarding the ‘low frequency of leadership changes’ can be seen when the mean tenure of party leaders for all three national mainstream parties is calculated, as can be seen in figure 3.1. One can see that for the centre-left CHP it is 22 years, although its current head, Kemal Kilicdaroğlu, has only been in power since 2009. For the right-wing MHP it is 21, and for the Islamist party spectrum, in which the Muslim-Democrat AKP is placed, it is approximately 13. It must be noted that Kemal Atatürk led the CHP from 1923 until 1938. His successor, Ismet İnönü, headed the CHP for 34 years and was given the title Milli Şef, national leader, by the national parliament in 1938 (Howard 2001: 107). Nevertheless, even the CHP’s party heads during Turkey’s era of multi-party democracy, which include İnönü, had long tenureships, including the penultimate leader, Deniz Baykal, who was in his post for a total of 17 years until 2009. Despite, being nominally placed on the centre-left, the CHP has often espoused authoritarian and ultra-nationalist norms and values, viewing the military as the most venerable Kemalist institution, which reproduce very hierarchical structures within the party (Ciddi 2009: 98).

The ultra-nationalist MHP was lead by its founder, Alparslan Türkeş, for more than 30 years since 1967 until Devlet Bahçeli succeeded him as party leader upon Türkeş’ death in 1999. Türkeş, who was called Başbuğ (great leader), the party was re-structured as to give him complete control of it (Arikan and Ünmar 2002: 27). Landau (2002: 153) describes the MHP under Türkeş as possibly the most autocratically ruled and hierarchically organised political party in the Turkish party system. In fact, according to Bacıık (2011: 121), Türkeş was identified more as the leader of a great ethno-nationalist movement rather than just a party leader. Since Bahçeli became the MHP’s leader, the party’s hierarchical structure was actually intensified even more to give him absolute personal control over it (Arikan and Ünmar 2002: 38). The AKP has been led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan since its founding in 2000. As will be seen later in the chapter, despite initial promises to institute intra-party channels of democratic consultation, the AKP has fallen in line with the traditional personalist norms of Turkish party politics in
restricting authority within the hands of the party’s leadership elites (Tepe 2005: 74). The Islamist party spectrum, which will be introduced later in this chapter and within which the Muslim-Democrat AKP can be placed, has an average tenure of 13 years owing to the political longevity of Erbakan in 1970.

![Mean tenure in years of party leaders in Turkey's current mainstream national parties](image)

The untrammeled power dominance of leadership elites in Turkey’s party politics has also time and again led to defecting groups forming rival parties across the political spectrum. A recent example of this in the left-wing party spectrum can be seen in the party-building efforts of Mustafa Sarıgül, who was expelled from the CHP in 2007 for opposing the leadership (Musil 2011: 204). Subsequently in 2008, he formed his own short-lived party, Turkish Change Movement (TDH). In the far-right party spectrum one can point to the Grand Unity Party (BBP) which split off from the MHP in 1992 (Kanra 2009: 145). Lastly of course, as will be outlined later, the AKP itself was founded following the dismissal of its founding group from the Islamist Virtue Party (FP) in 2000 as a result of a failed rebellion against the latter party’s entrenched leadership

The role of the armed forces in Turkey’s politics

A foundational principle of the liberal democratic model of governance is that problems are solved within the frame of the political regime by its legitimately elected actors and not by the actual powers present in the polity (Garretón 2001: 49-50). Indeed, Terry Karl (1990: 2) sees ‘restrictions on the political actorness of the armed forces’, next to a
functioning electoral process and the guarantee of political and civil rights as one of the main criteria for democratic political system. Hence, the relationship between the government and the military forces should be structured with the military as an impartial and subservient instrument that is ‘subordinate to democratic control’ (Cizre 2004: 107). As seen however, in Turkey civil-military relations have historically diverged from this institutional norm of the liberal democratic ideal type. As the aspect of civil-military relations in Turkey, or rather the role of the armed forces in domestic politics, is essential in order to understand the structure of Turkish politics, it is worth elaborating upon this theme.

As already stated at the beginning of the chapter, the armed forces constitute a key and central normative institution in the state-building efforts of the Turkish republic. The military was the first sector that underwent wide-spread modernization during the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century thus allowing its officer corps to be brought into contact with enlightenment values on one hand and outside influence upon their education. As stated earlier, internal resistance movements within the late Ottoman Empire became dominated by the military class, particularly in the guise of CUP. During the First World War, the CUP ruled through a military triumvirate and became an ‘unelected power center’ (Findley 2010: 200). As Altinay (2004: 6-7) shows in her work on militarism in Turkey, official discourses of history since the early republican period have entrenched the image of Turkey as an ethnic and cultural ‘military-nation’ by privileging narratives with the armed forces as the principal actor in Turkish history such as the independence war for instance. Moreover, the founding of the republic, Turkey’s armed forces have always been looked upon as a stern but incorruptible caretaker of the country’s moral and politico-cultural heritage (Dodd 2002: 253), defending the ‘political and territorial integrity of the state as well as its secular character not only against external threats but also against its internal enemies’ (Karaosmanoğlu 2000: 213).

The hegemonic and omnipresent role of the military in Turkish politics was epitomised by the chief of staff of the Turkish armed forces, Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, in 2002 when announced that ‘if necessary the guardianship role of the military over politics in Turkey would continue one thousand years’ (Heper 2010: 248). Thus, as mentioned before, Tezcür’s concept of ‘guardianship’ is useful in this regard as it illuminates the
tutelary role in the political system that the Turkish military developed for itself. In this sense, the three military coups of 1961, 1971 and 1980 which overthrew democratically elected governments and suspended democratic politics, as well as another ‘soft’ intervention in 1997 (Cizre 2008: 302), were framed by the military as acts of necessity ‘to ensure the survival of Turkish democracy’ (Tessler and Altınoğlu 2004: 35). In another ‘soft’ intervention, as will elaborated upon later, in 1997 the armed forces exerted sufficient pressure on the coalition government, which included the Islamist RP, to cause it to collapse (Nasr 2005: 22). These military interventions have been characterised as ‘reform coups’ or ‘guardian coups’ in the sense that they aimed to eventually restore civilian multi-party politics after a period of corrective administration under military authorities (Smith 2003: 179). As Cook (2008: 8) argues, having ‘overseen the development of an institutional setting – a system – that ensured the predominance of the officers’, the military withdrew from the political arena. In that sense, according to Heper (2011: 247), the aim in Turkey was to establish a system that from the perspective and the interests of the military amounted to a ‘rational democracy’ which was understood as ‘an intelligent debate among the educated for the purpose of arriving at the best policy option’.

In order to keep track of civilian governments, governmental institutions were created which enmeshed the armed forces such as the National Security Council (NSC) with the civilian governments. Established in the aftermath of the 1960 military coup, it comprised the high command of the armed forces and leading members of the civilian government would meet on a monthly basis therefore according to Özbudun (2000: 107), ensuring a form of ‘tutelary supervision’ of elected governments. In 1971, a constitutional amendment reinforced the NSC’s powers (Kalaycıoğlu 2006: 94). However, the 1982 constitution gave the organisation significantly more authority and prioritised policy recommendations by this body in terms of domestic policy (Heper and Criss 2009: 226; Franz 2003: 168), therefore institutionalising the military’s hold over civilian democracy as an ‘unelected power center’. The Turkish armed forces’ sense of autonomy and insulation from governmental pressures is reinforced by their economic self-sufficiency through a network of profitable commercial enterprises which grew out of a military pension fund, OYAK, which was established in the 1960s (Ahmad 2010: 98).
Although the military has desisted from the practice of coercive interventions in civilian politics since 1997, it has nevertheless frequently attempted to influence civilian politics. However, Somer (2007: 82) states that this has increasingly occurred through public statements, press conferences and media appearances. Throughout the AKP’s incumbency, especially the latter part, the military often acted as a form of political opposition against it as it saw it as a threat to the Kemalist order, its public conduct at times signalled threats to the government and its elected officials (Öktem 2011a: 153; Jenkins 2008c: 170). One such incident was the so-called ‘e-memorandum’ episode (Balkir et al 2008: 197), when in the run-up to the parliamentary election of a new president in 2007, the military released an on-line statement which not only voiced its opposition to the candidate proposed by the AKP, Abdullah Gül, but also signalled a veiled threat against the ruling party by declaring ‘... the Turkish Armed Forces reveal their stance and act accordingly whenever necessary’ (Tezcür 2010: 181). Furthermore, there have been repeated revelations across the Turkish media of discussions in high circles of the armed forces regarding the destabilization and even overthrow of the AKP government (Aydinli 2011: 231; Gunter 2011: 165; Öktem 2010: 159-162).

In 2007 an investigation was launched into secret networks linking the armed forces, the security apparatuses and the state bureaucracy which resulted in the arrest of military officers for the first time in Turkey’s republican history by non-military authorities (Heper 2011: 245). At the same time, Turkey’s media were beginning to be openly critical towards the military’s record in its campaign against the PKK which was also unprecedented (Öktem 2011: 161). However, it has to be said that the military has lost a lot of prestige and authority over the last decade leading to doubts as to whether coup attempts would still be successful (Rubin 2012: 180; Ahmad 2010: 113). Overall though, the election of the AKP in 2002 coupled with the EU accession process has been detrimental upon the military’s prerogatives to intervene in the civilian political process at will (Cizre 2008: 332). For instance, the make-up of the NSC has been re-shaped to favour dominancy by the civilian government and the body has lost much of its mandatory powers as a result of legislative reforms introduced by the government since 2002 (Tezcür 2010: 102). Another important example of this was the elimination of military-run the state security court system in 2004 (Grigoriadis 2009: 85). It can be argued that civil-military relations have been significantly reformed along liberal democratic norms (Heper 2011: 251). The current configurations of civil-military
relations make it seem probable that a ‘paradigm-shift in Turkish civil-military relations’ is currently taking place in which the military is gradually coming under civilian oversight (Aydinli 2009: 595). Karaveli (2010: 91) goes further in claiming that political reforms had succeeding in ‘decisively establishing civilian supremacy over the military’ in the second half of the last decade.

In this section, some of the key institutional failings of Turkey party system and political system in general were reviewed. As seen, the majority related to the isolation of the party political sphere from general society and consequently the lack of popular legitimacy which it enjoys. This lack of trust in the political system has contributed greatly to its fragility. In the next section, a historical overview of the Islamist party spectrum will be provided following which there will be a focus on some of the properties predominantly found within the Islamist party spectrum will be outlined that can counteract these failings and contribute to bridging the divide between the party system and society.

3.2 Outline of the Turkish Islamist party spectrum

Yeşilada (2002: 79) states that the history of Turkey's Islamist politics is one of consistent adaptation to new circumstances as ‘they keep returning to politics, albeit under new names’. This section will anchor the history of the Islamist party spectrum within the wider narrative of Turkish politics that was just presented in the preceding section and examine the manner in which their emergence and participation in mainstream, electoral politics engages with some the key failings of the Turkish party system. If one examines most parties in this party spectrum historically since the 1960s, their most prominent characteristic is the continuity in terms of programmatic themes, party principles and perhaps more noticeably key figures in the leadership structure from one party to the next.

The Islamist party spectrum of the National Outlook from the 1960s until the 1990s

The first significant Turkish Islamist party, the National Order Party (MNP), was founded in 1970 and headed by Necmettin Erbakan (Taniyici 2003: 470). It is
commonly claimed that Erbakan, a professor of engineering, established the MNP following extensive consultation with the head of the most powerful Sufi movement in Turkey, sheikh Kotku of the Iskenderpaşa lodge of the Nakşibendi, of whose community he was a devout member (Jenkins 2008c: 132; Özdalga 2002: 128). This highlights the influence that established Sufi religious movements, especially of the Nakşibendi and Nurcular communities, had within the Islamist party spectrum to whose leadership it continued to advise until the early 1990s (Yükleyen 2008: 386; Yeşilada 2002: 174). Although as stated, ideas and concepts from abroad, such as those from Sayyid Qutb and the Pakistani ideologue Mawdudi had an influence on Turkey’s Islamist movement, the country was relatively isolated from the Arab world and the main ideological influences were derived from endogenous, Turkish sources such as the Sufi movements (Zubaida 2011: 185; Roy 1994: 2).

Erbakan named the outlook of his party movement the ‘National Outlook’ (Milli Görüş or MG). The MG discourse combines a mixture of Islamist, nationalist and statist developmentalist narratives in its composition. Its discourse will be analysed more closely later on in the fifth chapter. For that reason, Turkey’s Islamist parties until the AKP has often also been called milli görüş parties or movement. The MNP was dissolved after the 1971 military coup. However, a facsimile party, the National Salvation Party (MSP) was founded in 1972. The appeal of these early Islamist parties was confined to the central Anatolian, north-eastern and south-eastern Turkish provinces (Hale and Özbudun 2010: 12). The MSP attracted around 10% of the electorate and participated in two coalition governments, first with the centre-left CHP in 1974 and then as part of a grouping of centre-right and far-right parties in two successive governments until 1978 (Eligür 2010: 70-71). The MSP was subsequently banned during the 1980 military coup.

The Welfare party (RP), successor to these parties, was founded after the first post-coup elections in 1983. Amongst the diverse links of continuity with those parties is the longevity of key political individuals in retaining vital leadership positions within the new party, especially Necmettin Erbakan, head of MNP, MSP and, after resurfacing in 1987, the RP. Erbakan’s ability to survive as the doyen of Turkish Islamist politics decade after decade, party after party, continued until his death in 2010, as he had a significant influence in the operations of the Felicity party (SP) despite being officially
banned from engaging in politics (Hermann 2003: 272). As previously stated, shortly before his death he became the SP’s leader at 84 years of age (Turan 2010: 1) As stated, the charismatic presence of Özal whose conservative-democrat political style coupled with the success of his neo-liberal reforms ensured him and ANAP dominance in the Turkish politics until Özal’s death in 1993. His mixture of moderate Islamic religious beliefs and social conservatism dominated the electoral scene and Islamist parties had no significant successes until his death. Nevertheless, already in the 1980s, the RP’s vote-share gradually began to increase at national level, whether in municipal or national elections. Thus, as can be seen in figure 3.2 later, whereas the party received 4.4% in the 1984 municipal elections, this rose to 7.16% in the 1987 national elections, 9.4% in the 1989 municipal elections and 16% in 1991, although on that last occasion the RP entered a ballot list with two other far-right parties (Kanra 2009: 86).

*The rise of the Islamist Welfare party in the 1990s*

The RP first achieved widespread success in the 1994 local elections when it was elected not just in the traditional heartland of Turkish political Islam, eastern Anatolia, but across the country, including twenty-nine of Turkey’s major cities including Istanbul and Ankara (Hermann 2003: 271; Hakan Yavuz 1997: 72). In Istanbul, Erdoğan won the mayoralty of the city (Hakan Yavuz 2009: 63). In the 1995 national elections, the RP won 21% of the national vote, consequently receiving the most seats in the Turkish national assembly, which was unprecedented in Turkey’s democratic history (Keppel 2002: 350). Through continued negotiation with the incumbent party, DYP, the RP then entered a coalition government in 1995 through which Erbakan became prime minister until his resignation in 1997, the first statesmen in Turkey’s history whose personal philosophy was based on Islam (Hakan Yavuz 2003: 214; Hicks 2002: 377).

*Factors behind rise of the Welfare party*

Various explanatory factors have been named as contributing to the rise of the RP in the 1990s. Öniş (1997: 751) highlights the poor standing of the rest of the Turkish parties and overall party system. As was seen already, this was especially true during the decade of the 1990s. Keppel (2002: 391) argues that the loss of the charismatic Özal
made the RP electable as ANAP seemed unable to maintain its political standing without him (Kalaycıoğlu 2002c: 58-59) and the RP’s conservative Islamic image seemed to overlap with Özal’s own moderate Islamic identity and his conservative politics. The political re-emergence of the veteran politician and leader of the Islamist party spectrum, Erbakan, as party leader of the RP also shifted the conservative Islamic vote towards RP (Yesilada 2002: 67).

Furthermore, Lesser (2004: 181) contends that the steady migratory influxes into Turkey’s western cities from the more traditional and rural Anatolia were also a big contributing factor in the success of Islamist parties. Poor, rural and mostly conservative migrants tended to live on the margins of cities in ghettos which grew exponentially (Hale 1981: 223), thus altering the electoral balance in favour of Islamist politics in cities like Istanbul, Bursa or Ankara, formerly identified as the sites of the secular, elite centre. As will be seen later in chapter five, one strand of the RP’s discourse which Buğra (2002: 189) terms the ‘language of social disadvantage’ addressed the plight of these low-income, working-class communities, whose economic standing had worsened as a result of the economic liberalization reforms of the 1980s (Öktem 2008: 70-71, and assure them of a brighter future under its leadership. The gradual emergence of a religiously conscious business elite, the so-called ‘Anatolian tigers’ (Fuller 2004: 53), partially created by Özal’s economic reforms in the 1980s, was also seen as an important factor in the RP’s success. To a large extent, they based their collective identity based on the religious value-systems of their traditional communities. This aspect of their self-identity also translated into a political affiliation with conservative or Islamist political parties. Therefore, this ‘counter-elite’ provided the Islamist party spectrum with an invaluable source of social, cultural and economic capital (Keppel 2002: 349).

This phenomenon was paralleled by the growth of a religiously conscious, upwardly-mobile middle class constituency. Though Islamic and conservative in its orientation, this group was also part of a modern consumer society, another product of the neoliberal 1980s (Ahmad 2003: 161). Thus, the image of Islam managed to merge with that of the ‘new consumerist culture’ (Özbudun and Fuat Keyman 2002: 317), bridging a value-gap that enabled it to promote itself more easily to a mainstream middle-class audience. The social and economic nature of this new group also had a conditioning
effect on Islamist political parties, in favouring a less militant and more pro-systemic political Islam in form and substance (Hakan Yavuz and Khan 2004: 391; Keppel 2002: 343). As a result, the RP moderated the tone and substance of its political programme to suit this new electoral constituency. This also had an effect on facilitating the RP’s integration into mainstream politics and enhancing its electability.

Lastly, the RP also received heavy support from Turkey’s most significant tarikats, religious orders, such as the Nakşibendi order which had access to a large array of resources like television and radio stations, networks of economic contacts and social welfare services (Hakan Yavuz 1999: 138-139). However, a rupture between the RP and the Nakşibendi order developed in 1990 when the head of the Nakşibendi order, Sheikh Esat Çoşan, accused the RP leadership, and especially Erbakan, of appropriating religious affiliation for party-building purposes and electoral strategies (Tuğal 2009: 87; Hermann 2003: 271). Indeed the RP made public statements in which they said true Muslim were required to vote for them (Çınar 2005: 174). Atacan (2005: 191-192) argues that the RP felt strong enough at that point to ‘free themselves from the hierarchy in the Sufi order’ in order to focus on ‘party membership’ rather than the good of the wider community of believers. This then can be seen as a clear sign of the party becoming more autonomous from outside religious influence and focusing on faith issues instrumentally for electoral purposes.

The organisational properties of the Welfare party

In terms of its party organisation, electoral campaigning methods and party format, the electoral success of the Welfare party’ must be attributed to its voter mobilization strategies and tactics, its party model and its extensive links to a large and diverse variety of civil societal organisation (Hakan Yavuz 1997: 77). The RP’s status as a halfway mass party can be described to have contributed significantly to its electoral successes in the 1990s. Musil (2011: 207), Taniyici (2003: 469) and Özbudun (2001: 244) single out the WP as the only actor within the Turkish party system to resemble the characteristics of a mass party and not a catch-all or cadre party. In this sense one could speculate that the sudden evolutionary emergence of a mass party in Turkey’s party system may have accelerated the decline of other system parties in the same manner that the failure of traditional European cadre parties to articulate and represent the popular
sentiments of the electorate influenced their demise when mass parties emerged (Calvert 2002: 162).

Instead of resorting to mass media methods of electoral campaigning, the RP placed a major emphasis on its grassroots campaigning structures involving face-to-face contact with the electorate and ‘building interpersonal trust’ on a communal level (Özel 2003: 86; Hakan Yavuz 1997: 78; Öniş 1997: 755). Electoral committees formed at the level of local districts involving local members. These members usually canvassed on a house-to-house basis throughout the entire neighbourhoods ensuring direct contact between the public and the political party. In its abandonment of the more common political approach based on patron-client relations in favour of this one, Roy (2005: 61) defined the RP as Turkey’s ‘only modern political party’. Once again, most other Turkish political parties failed to adequately develop such campaigning methods (Taniyici 2003: 469), focusing instead on the mass media to spread its message. Furthermore, the RP was also involved as an organisational umbrella in running social service programmes, hospitals, and its own media (Esposito 1998: 168). This enabled the party to develop ‘an extensive organisational level’ at a grassroots level and kept ‘voters together’ (Quinn Mecham 2004: 343; Hakan Yavuz 1997: 77). Thus the party could be seen as deeply rooted across a wide range of communities from which it received its electoral support.

*February 28 process and its effect of the Islamist party movement*

The decade of the 1990s was pivotal for the establishment of political mainstream Islam in Turkey. This was due not only for the widespread electoral success of an Islamist party for the first time but also because of the counter-reaction that it provoked from the pro-kemalist state establishment. Despite a strategy of attempting to harmonise their ideological setting with the precepts of kemalist state culture, the Welfare party in government quickly began to anger state elites and the political establishment. Several of the key policies that the RP sought to enact in domestic politics seemed to threaten the secularity of Turkey’s state culture. As Keppel (2002: 357) highlights however, the hostility to Erbakan’s pronouncedly Islamist tone stretched beyond the military-bureaucratic establishment and extended into large parts of secular civil society as large scale gestures of protest were regularly held (Cagaptay 2002: 44), although these were
partially orchestrated by the military forces (Hakan Yavuz 2003: 246; Taniyici 2003: 464).

Simultaneously as this clash between Erbakan, the RP and the secular forces deepened, mass capital flight abroad occurred (Ahmad 2003: 170). The stage seemed set for an eventual confrontation between the armed forces, the secular establishment and the government. Finally, the steady stream of perceived antagonism towards the RP-DYP government led by Erbakan culminated in the so-called ‘soft’ or ‘post-modern coup’ of February 28th 2007 by the military authorities which did not result in any blood-shed or violent repressions (Aydinli 2009: 585; Hakan Yavuz 2009: 78). This was preceded by an incident just a few weeks earlier when the army sent tanks through the streets of an Ankara suburb in response to a public meeting arranged by the local RP mayor at which the Iranian ambassador spoke in favour of implementing the shariah law in Turkey (Jenkins 2007: 345). On February 28th, the military forces released a harsh statement calling on Erbakan to act against the rising forces of Islamic fundamentalism across the country and expunge every religious influence in society (Doğan 2005: 426). Amidst this pressure Erbakan resigned (Zürcher 2004: 301). One year later, in 1998, Turkey’s constitutional court then dissolved the RP for anti-secular activities (Hakan Yavuz 2003: 247). Erbakan himself was banned from involvement in politics for the next 5 years although as seen he remained in the background as the actual driving force behind the milli görüş parties. (Akdoğan 2009: 210). This significant chapter in the evolution of Turkey’s Islamist parties came to be known as the ‘February 28 process’ (Larrabee and Lesser 2003: 61).

The feud between modernists and traditionalists and the founding of the AKP

In the wake of the Welfare party’s constitutional abolition another Islamist party, which was seen as a facsimile party to the RP, the Virtue party (FP), was founded in 1998. What became quickly noticeable was the growing rivalry within the FP between two groups that held diverging views on political organisation and orientation (Doğan 2005: 428). One, headed by Recai Kutan, the leader of the FP remained completely loyal to Erbakan’s narrow-minded, militant and anti-western view of political Islam. Its counterpart, lead by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül, consisted of those who found Erbakan’s format of politics highly damaging for their electoral fortunes, disliked

The military’s ‘soft coup’ against the RP was seen as confirmation by this modernist faction that Islamist politics in Turkey needed to undergo drastic change and modernization by in order to widen its electoral appeal, but more importantly to secure its survival in the political sphere (Larrabee and Lesser 2003: 61). It advocated a more modern and moderate style of political Islam which reached out to other social groups in the population as well. This included a normative paradigm shift towards the liberal democratic model of governance as its pluralistic nature would be more sympathetic to their identity and ensure their political survival (Findley 2005: 218; Fuller 2004: 56). Furthermore, in this model the role of the armed forces, the main institutional opponent of political Islam in Turkey, was to be relegated to issues of ‘external defence’ (Cizre 2003: 218). This partially accounts for the enthusiastic adoption of a zealous pro-EU stance by the Erdoğan administration although EU membership was also seen as overwhelmingly positive for Turkey (Shankland 2005: 55; Robins 2003: 112). Nevertheless, as Cavdar (2006: 487) states, the experiences of this group’s key members in municipal government also influenced their shift as the exigencies of everyday governance persuaded them to adopt more pragmatic and flexible stances and abandon doctrinaire, Islamist politics. It is this normative shift and the ideological moderation of the reformist group regarding their Islamist politics that has made Mandaville (2007: 105) argue that the AKP represents the foremost example of a Muslim-Democrat party.

The conflict between the traditionalist and reformist camps broke out in 2000 with Kutan’s leadership being openly challenged by the modernist camp which advocated ‘the need for a system-oriented political party’ (Çaha 2003: 105, Yesilada 2002: 68). Dalacoura (2006: 521) suggests that the FP’s poor results in the 1999 national elections played a part in triggering this outbreak. Following the downfall of the RP-led coalition government in 1997, the FP only received 14%. In June 2001 the constitutional court outlawed this party on the wishes of the armed forces as it was seen as resembling the RP too much in style and programme (Quinn Mecham 2004: 349). Subsequently, the rival wings went their separate ways. The old traditionalist wing founded the SP, while...
the modernist wing established the Justice and Development party (AKP). While the AKP moved away from the anti-systemic, Islamist tone and agenda to become centre-right, conservative Muslim-Democrat party, the FP retained a strongly Islamist continuity in both tone and agenda and could be classified as milli görüş party (Öktem 2011: 127-128; Tezcür 2010: 18).

The election of the AKP in the 2002 national elections with an unexpectedly large vote-share, 34%, was interpreted as a public protest vote against Turkish mainstream politics, specifically in the context of ‘the worst economic and financial crisis in modern Turkish history’ in 2000 and 2001 (Lesser 2004: 176; Özel 2003: 82). Apart from the CHP, with 19%, no other party was elected into parliament (Çaha 2003: 95). The decisive electoral victory with which the AKP came into power, unlike the previous weak results which had produced unstable coalition governments, had the tendency of consolidating the electoral legitimacy of moderate Islamist or Muslim-Democrat forces within Turkish politics. In the 2004 local elections, the AKP followed up its previous electoral success by increasing its share of the vote to 41.6%, an indication perhaps that the party had attracted the approval of a large electoral constituency (Çavdar 2006: 494). Despite large-scale political turmoil, the 2007 were won by the Justice and Development party by 47%. This electoral result was remarkable as no party had managed to be elected with such a high vote-share since 1969 (Balkır 2007: 421).

It would appear that the AKP managed to attract its target share of the electorate, the conservative, religious constituencies which had voted for the RP in the 1990s, an estimated 7–10% of the electorate (Hermann 2003: 273; Çarkoğlu 2002). However, Celik (2003: 83) states that the ‘sunny-conservative electorate varies between 45 and 55%’. Nevertheless, as shown in figure 3.2, the unexpectedly large electoral share that the AKP attracted in the 2002 and 2004 elections indicates that the majority of voters fell outside the traditional constituency of Turkish Islamist parties (Brown 2006: 116; Cagaptay 2002). In contrast, the SP only polled 2.5% of voters at the 2002 elections. This was seen as an indication that Erbakan’s strident and traditionalist style of Islamist politics had lost its electoral appeal (Hermann 2003: 272). Quinn Mecham (2004: 353) argues that the SP’s failure at the polls was linked to its anti-western, anti-systemic image and program, which associated it with the other banned Islamist parties as this deterred most Islamic-minded voters.
Çarkoğlu (2005: 311) has asserted that the February 28 process, the dissolution of the FP and the ‘painful decade of metamorphosis’ which the Islamist party spectrum underwent, especially its reformist wing, influenced the shape of the AKP. It provided the stimulus for the party to replenish its leadership with fresh faces, appeal to a wider electorate and alter the manner in which it espoused terms like religion within its programme and rhetoric (Atacan 2005: 194). Roy (2004: 61) defined the rise of the AKP as the ‘culmination of the process of ‘normalisation’ and democratisation of an Islamist party’. In terms of its internal organisations, the AKP has followed in the hierarchical footsteps of Turkey’s preceding Islamist parties. Despite initial promises to organise the internal decision-making structures along democratic lines, this did not come about and the extent to which decision-making has become concentrated within the leadership has increased in recent years in line with traditional norms of power-sharing in Turkish party politics as was seen (Cinar 2006: 479).

Mecham Quinn (2004: 340) states that like the RP, the AKP has a ‘formidable grassroots organisational strength’. This became very evident in the 2002 elections, where no other party had such an overwhelming ‘grassroots structure’ (Öniş and Fuat Keyman 2003: 102). Therefore, the tradition of strong grassroots campaigning that characterised the electoral style of RP has continued through into the AKP. Furthermore, this is reinforced by a dense network of civil society organisations,
especially charitable and philanthropic groups in poor urban and rural areas, which has linked Islamist political parties to its voter base (Hale 2006: 82). Öniş and Fuat Keyman (2003: 100) state that another crucial difference between the AKP and the other main Turkish parties was that it maintained links with civil society organisation, although these were mainly Islamic bodies. Cagaptay and Unver (2007: 4) have noted that the particular strength of Islamist parties in Turkey, especially the AKP, is concentrated in the working class and lower-middle class areas that have expanded to hold the majority of the population of large cities like Istanbul or Ankara since the 1950s.

As stated, there is a debate relating to whether the AKP can still be located within the frame of an Islamist politics and whether it hasn’t in actually escaped that category by transforming itself into a conservative, centre-right Muslim party. Fuller (2004: 52) has referred to the AKP as ‘an overtly religious party’. Tibi (2008: 46) and Cagaptay (2007: 8) argue that the AKP is a straightforward Islamist party masquerading as centre-right, conservative-democrat force. Similarly, Baran (2007: 57) has also argued that the AKP has not lost its Islamist ambitions and is simply pursuing a long-term strategy of gradual, bottom-up Islamization at social level to escape constitutional persecution and closure. In contrast, İlhan Dağı (2008: 30) has argued that it is actually wrong to define the AKP as an Islamist party since they are not striving for the establishment of an Islamic state, they do not seek to introduce the sharia as the main instrument of civil jurisprudence.

Kardaş (2008: 178) prefers to define the AKP as a centre-right party as well. In a similar vein, Kalaycıoğlu (2008: 312) sees the AKP as a new political phenomenon aiming to transform itself into a catch-all party whose main constituency encompasses ‘conservative-traditional Sunni Islamic voters’. The party prefers to see and present itself as conservative Democratic Party along the lines of Germany’s Christian Democratic Union. Hakan Yavuz (2006: 245) sees the AKP’s ideology framed around a ‘democratic Islamic identity’ rather than narrow Islamist politics. This view is supported within the academic debate by Tepe’s assertion that the AKP corresponds more to a ‘reformist party with conservative Islamic views’ (2007: 111) or an ‘Islamic-inspired party’ (2005: 79). Robins (2006: 208) and Bayat (2005: 5) has referred to the AKP as ‘post-Islamist’ as it situates its ideological and programmatic concerns within a rights-based discourse that accept democracy as its wider frame of normative reference.
Turkey after the 2002 election of the AKP

The penultimate section of this chapter will attempt to give a brief overview of some of the most prominent domestic themes that have marked the AKP’s period in government, especially since 2007. As the issue of Turkey’s accession negotiations to the EU is outlined at the end of the fifth chapter, it will not be presented here. In terms of public religiousity, although the AKP had prominently stated that they would work towards reversing the ban on admitting veiled female students to state universities, which is one of the biggest public issues across the Turkish religio-secular divide, their campaign to do so was weak, half-hearted and abandoned after the ECHR ruled negatively on the case in (Hakan Yavuz 2009: 166). The centre-right ANAP had already tried to lift the ban in the 1980s (Bayram 2009: 511). In fact, Kavakçı (2011: 138) states that the AKP, despite numerous campaign promises, vacillated in engaging with the veiling ban and ultimately put it off their agenda although this caused anger within the religious-conservative segments of the party and its followers. In that sense, Hale and Özbudun (2010: 79) attest the AKP period has not seen any concrete attempts to pass legislation aimed at introducing elements of Islamic rule of law or other religious content into society and rather that the party has pursued a ‘politics of avoidance’ in relation to religious issues, angering many of its core followers. Following its second election victory in 2007, the AKP again attempted to pass legislation to reverse the veiling ban again by popular referendum but the constitutional court rejected it (Seggie 2011: 38). Moreover, when the constitutional court opened an ultimately unsuccessful case to dissolve the party on the grounds of being anti-secular, the AKP postponed the resolution of the issue indefinitely (Kavakçı 2011: 138).

The two biggest domestic issues which have appeared in the second period of AKP have been firstly the ‘Ergenekon’ investigations into the shadowy networks between the military, the intelligence service and different parts of the state bureaucracy, and secondly the eruption of the conflict between the Turkish army and pro-Kurdish insurgency groups, particularly the PKK. These investigations into the para-military networks that have frequently been called ‘the deep state’ were set into motion by the discovery of a large hidden arms cache connected to a special army in 2007 in an Istanbul suburb (Jenkins 2008a: 37). Insel (2003: 17) has also called this phenomenon ‘the national security state’. Öktem (2011: 157) named the ensuing judicial investigation
as the first genuine confrontation in Turkey’s republican history between ‘an elected government and the guardian state’. The presence of these networks had already been seen previously, especially during in the 1996 Susurluk affair as stated. The ‘deep state’ networks in Turkey have also been linked to a wider international network of similar organisations throughout Europe called Gladio which was established with the help of NATO during the cold war (Kılıç 2007: 23; Ganser 2005: 243-244). They have been implicated in the murder of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink and three protestant christians in 2007 as quite a few of suspects came from these circles, especially from JITEM, the anti-terror branch of the paramilitary Gendarmerie (ESI 2011: 1-2). Since then the investigations, which encompass over a hundred suspects, many from military ranks including senior officers and generals, have come under criticism for the long pre-trial detention periods of the accused as well as the careless handling of the case by some prosecutors (Jenkins 2008a: 78).

The second domestic issue that rose up concerned the expansion of the conflict between the Turkish military and pro-Kurdish insurgency groups after increasing attacks in 2007 (Stansfield et al 2010: 3). The AKP had more than any other party in Turkey previously aimed at a civil and political resolution of the Kurdish issue (Park 2011: 97; Hakan and Yavuz 2006: 103). Despite having had made some limited progress, especially in language and educational reform, the AKP government’s reform approach has been seen as piece-meal and ill-managed with little long-term planning (Tezcür 2010: 216) An attempt by the government to initiate a public peace process with the PKK in 2009-2010, ‘the Kurdish opening’ initiative, the first of its kind in Turkey’s history, collapsed due to a lack of commitment, energy and long-term strategy on part of the AKP government and distrust on both sides (Gunter 2011: 179). Additionally, the initiative was persistently challenged by a generally unsupportive and hostile Turkish media, political opposition and public opinion who saw the AKP and this peace initiative as being ‘soft on PKK terrorism’ (Tezcür 2010: 216). Moreover, in the early period of the initiative the constitutional court decided to dissolve the pro-Kurdish Democratic Scoiety Party (DTP) which was then replaced by the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) (Karaveli 2010: 10). Since then, the political opening has been ignored and the conflict has continued to harden.

7 Some institutions of higher education, like Artuklu University in the South-Eastern province of Mardin, have now begun to teach university courses in Kurdish (ICG 2011: 14-15)
Lastly, the most significant ambition of the AKP government in terms of promote
regime reform has been the attempt since 2007 to draft a new civilian constitution to
replace the current one which was authored during the 1982 military government.
Özbudun (2012: 149) identifies the 1982 constitution and its authoritarian character as
the key impediment in holding back long-term democratization of the Turkish polity.
Since 1982, 3 major amendments to the constitution were already made (Özbudun 1995:
195). The AKP (2007: 13) included the drafting of a new, civilian constitution as a
central pledge in its 2007 manifesto and set up a parliamentary advisory committee after
the elections. Following the 2011 elections, a parliamentary cross-party committee was
created to draft the format of the new constitution (Bozkurt 2011). However, Özbudun
(2011: 144) points out that due to heavy disagreements amongst the various parties,
including the pro-Kurdish BDP, progress on drafting a consensually agreed text would
be very slow. Indeed, the conflictual relations between the main parties and their
differing outlooks, Muslim-Democrat, Kemalist, far-right, pro-Kurdish, has so far made
progress difficult in the discussions surrounding the charter reform within the cross-
party parliamentary committee (Bozkurt 2012).

The last section provided an outline of the Turkish political system, its evolution within
the last 50 years and its main institutional flaws and failings. This enabled a further
focus on the rise of the Islamist party spectrum in the Islamist party spectrum in the
1990s and in 2002, centring on the RP and the Justice and the AKP. It contextualised
these phenomena with reference to the political and social changes that Turkey
underwent since the 1980s such as the rise of a religiously conscious middle class. It
attempted to list the organisational and structural properties that enabled the RP and
AKP to maintain strong links to civil society. This continued into a presentation of the
discussion surrounding the party’s Muslim-Democrat tone, character and identity.
Finally a brief summary of some of the key themes during the government of the AKP
was given. The next section will now illuminate the research questions that drive the
research project.
3.3 Research question and hypotheses

From the preceding two chapters, it has become clear that Mainwaring and Scully’s framework on party system institutional can be usefully applied to Muslim nations to gauge the institutional health of their party systems. It was seen that Islamist parties tend to be strongly rooted in civil society. As Brumberg (2005: 114) has pointed out, they tend to be the only political organisations that have an ‘organised constituency’ although they are not trusted as legitimate political actors due to fears concerning their normative acceptance of democratic governance. Yet, as was stated, the new emerging tier of Muslim-Democrat parties within the spectrum of political Islam has tried to arrive at a normative synthesis between Islamist, conservative and liberal politics with a that is attached to the framework of liberal democracy and electoral politics. Therefore, this literature has attempted to point towards the suitability and absence of a study in which Mainwaring and Scully’s framework could be tested in the novel setting of Muslim countries in examining how the new Muslim-Democrat party may have contributed to party system institutionalization. It then remains to be seen to what extent party system institutionalisation in the Turkish context has advanced democratic consolidation.

In that sense then the overall research question that will be the central focus of this research and that was derived from the literature review is:

*RQ: In what sense have Islamist political parties been a significant driver of party system institutionalization within Turkey’s party-political sphere?*

In this regard, two interlinked expectations have been formed:

1. *The social rootedness of the AKP has been conducive to the wider institutionalization and legitimization of Turkey’s party system.*

2. *Moderate Islamist, Muslim-Democrat or post-Islamist parties have undergone a normative shift from the anti-systemic position of classical Islamist parties and frame discourses of socio-cultural religiosity and*
conservatism discourses within a rights-based normative understanding of
democracy.

As was seen, both in terms of the electoral campaigning style and in the diversity and strength of its links to civil society, the Islamist party spectrum has shown itself to be grounded in the social settings of its main electoral constituents. As such, Turkey’s Islamist parties are the only element of the party system which have attempted to fulfil Mainwaring and Scully’s criterion of ‘rootedness’. As Coskun (2003: 70) notes, the members and activists of Islamic parties have an established tradition in performing badly needed social work in poor urban ghettos and rural areas. Meanwhile the local organisations of most other Turkish parties, like their links to civil society, are weak, underdeveloped and entirely absent from large portions of the country, especially the south-east. While having undergone considerable adaptation to conform to new political and socio-economic circumstances within the Turkish polity, the Islamist party spectrum of the National Outlook movement maintained its structural and thematic coherence and its parties always recycled figures familiar to the wider electorate since the late 1960s.

The central founding group of the AKP, Erdoğan, Gül, Arınc and Topsal, all originated from the reformist faction of the Islamist political spectrum of the National Outlook parties (Turkish Analyst 2008). This has signalled an enduring continuity within the cycle of the Islamist party spectrum. Many members both within the party’s leadership and its rank-and-file membership had been members of the RP (Cagaptay 2002). This continuity extended into the strong linkages between civil society and Islamist parties and its electoral campaigning style. The mass model aspects of the AKP, derived from the structural continuities with its predecessors, have contributed to extending political representation to a substantial segment of the population which is religiously pious and social-conservative. This has contributed to the overall normative legitimacy of the democratic political process. As seen, both examples of Turkey’s Islamist party spectrum that were examined, the RP and AKP, possess formidable grassroots structures of members and activists which enabled to transmit its electoral message on a much wider basis. While most main parties in Turkey increasingly resort to mass media methods of electoral communication, the Islamist party spectrum still mobilizes voters on local level, involving local communities and establishing contact on a direct basis.
As was stated in the first section of this chapter, religious parties are critical in ‘consolidating electoral participation by mobilizing masses’, especially in democratizing polities, thus strengthening the overall legitimacy of the political regime (Tepe 2005a: 286). In that sense, figure 2.2 has attempted to visualise the conceptual scheme in which the effect of Muslim-Democrat parties, with a focus on the AKP, in the Turkish context.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 3.3: Conceptual scheme of this research thesis**

However, as a caveat to the above-mentioned hypothesis, these factors expressed within it can be said to also exist in religious parties or political movements which are overwhelmingly fundamentalist and anti-systemic. As stated, there exists widespread suspicion that moderate Islamist political parties may participate in elections for purely strategic and context-specific reasons without having internalised the underlying norms of democratic politics. In the case of the AKP, it is argued that their ideological pragmatism and their shift away from doctrinaire politics of Turkey’s classic Islamist parties enabled the party to change the normative orientation of a key religiously conservative electorate from a ‘politics of faith’ to a ‘faith in politics’ as Rosenburgh states (2007: 75). Therefore, the second research expectations relates to the extent to which the party in question has moderated its religious agenda sufficiently within a democratic framework to integrate the main principles and elements of a democratic political culture which is seen as the hallmarks of a Muslim-Democrat party. The final
examination, as seen in figure 3.3, would be to see whether party system institutionalization in the Turkish context has contributed to advancing democratic consolidation of the political system.

This concludes this chapter. The preceding two chapters aimed to provide a comprehensive and useful discussion of the main areas that are related to the research project. In that sense, the second chapter focused firstly on the general concepts, processes and stages of democratization. Afterwards, it focused on the rise of political parties as public actors, especially religious or pro-religious parties, before looking at the party system literature and concluded by concentrating on Mainwaring and Scully’s framework of party system institutionalization. This chapter dealt mainly with setting out a comprehensive and in-depth examination of the Turkish political region and its political system, its particularities and main institutional flaws before describing the emergence and evolution of its Islamist party spectrum. The preceding discussion should also inform the discussions and analyses of the following chapters.

In the following fourth chapter, the research design underpinning this thesis will be presented and outlined. As such, it will detail how the stated hypotheses and research expectation will be operationalised into researchable propositions.
Chapter 4 – Measuring party system institutionalisation and stability in Turkey and the influence of Islamist and Muslim-Democrat parties

This chapter will serve to introduce the mix of research methods which will be applied in order to help focus on the stated research expectations of this project which were presented at the end of the last chapter. As stated, Mainwaring and Scully’s research framework of party institutionalization will be used as the main conceptual measure in this research to examine the impact of Turkey’s Islamist parties on the overall institutionalization of the party system. Various analytical means have been used in order to assess the main research question of this project. The structure of this chapter will fall into three broad sections. The first section will focus on some of the conceptual difficulties that need to be elaborated upon in order to refine the focus of the proposed research. For instance, there are conceptual difficulties with some of the academic terminology for the spectrum of political Islam that will be addressed.

The next section then will set out the overall scheme of different measures and research tasks through which this thesis will attempt to operationalise the research question and its related expectations. The main conceptual lens through which the relation between the Turkish party system and the Islamist party spectrum is examined is the research framework of measuring party system institutionalization elaborated by Mainwaring and Scully. This section will firstly focus on the operationalization of the four main criteria in Mainwaring and Scully’s framework. Additionally, a separate component of the research for this thesis examines the AKP party’s electoral programmes as well as its overall discourse to find out whether the party moderated its views and adopted liberal democratic norms. The third part of this chapter will then present in broader detail the individual research methodologies chosen. As will be seen, a combination of both quantitative and qualitative methods was chosen to pursue some aspects of the research question. A specific advantage to using a triangulated mixed-methods approach is that the drawbacks of one particular research methodology would be offset to a certain degree through recourse to other methods (Read and Marsh 2002: 237; Blaikie 2000: 263).

As stated in the introductory chapter, this research thesis focuses on Turkey as a singular case study. Thus, for the research purposes of this thesis, Turkey is constituted
as ‘an integrated system’ (Stake 2005: 2) or rather according to Gerring (2007: 18), as a ‘relatively bounded phenomenon’ within which the analytical focus will be contained. Nevertheless, this need not signify that the thesis’ findings cannot be generalized across a larger field for future research. Despite the particular national context within which this thesis is set, it examines the impact of the emergence of a Muslim-Democrat party actor on processes of party system institutionalization and in that sense produces knowledge relevant to other polities in the Muslim world undergoing democratic consolidation.

The singular perspective of the single case study format has frequently exposed it to criticisms that its findings are difficult to generalize across a wider field as the knowledge it produces is extremely context-dependent. Nevertheless, Flyvbjerg (2006: 225) for instance argues that the findings of single case studies can be generalized and that single case study research has contributed immensely to generating broader insights related to the social sciences. Of intrinsic value in this regard is the ability of the single-case study to provide in-depth, contextual analysis and description, help elaborate classification, produce hypotheses and to prove or disprove theories relating to the studied phenomena (Landman 2008: 29). The study of Islamist politics is a good example where single-case studies have been very helpful in generating general knowledge that has cross-national application. One could point to example such as the local study of Turkey’s Islamist parties in an Istanbul neighborhood by White (2001), Wickham’s examination on Islamist politics in the Egypt (2002), or Platzdasch’ research on Islamist parties in Indonesia (2010).

4.1 - Overview of the various research methodologies, research question, aims and expectations

This research will utilize a mixed-methods approach, involving both qualitative and quantitative means of analysis, permitting one to address different aspects of the research question. For instance, while the repeated wave analysis of electoral data in chapters 5 and 6 can establish at macro-level the patterns related to party system institutionalization that have characterised the Turkish party system over the period of the last 15 years, the manifesto analysis in chapter 4 links the quantitative analysis of
macro-level data with a focus on the political rhetoric that the AKP has used officially as public actor in the political process.

### 4.1.1 Longitudinal analysis of aggregate electoral and attitudinal survey data

For the purposes of this research all local and national elections since the re-introduction of free and fair elections following the restoration of civil multi-party democracy in 1983 were examined in terms of the emergence, evolution and development of the Islamist party spectrum. In correlation with this the development of party system institutionalization will be analysed across various dimensions according to three criteria of Mainwaring and Scully’s framework of party system institutionalization using a variety of statistical measures such as electoral volatility, party system fractionalization, electoral turn-out and proportional electoral difference as well as a wide ranging statistical analysis of World Values Survey data pertaining to the perceived public confidence in regime institutions and principles. Thus, the time period of the analysis is over 6 national elections, from 1987 until 2007, and 5 local elections, from 1989 until 2009.

### 4.1.2 Manifesto analysis

An analysis of the AKP party’s election manifestoes from 2002 and 2007 as well as other public party documents would expose the political rhetoric which the party employs as a public actor and reveal how the party formulates and conceptualises its understanding of themes like democracy and religion. Thus, the keywords that will be singled out in the analysis and examined pertain to the manner in which it interprets and communicates essential normative principles and values of a liberal democratic political system. As will be detailed, the analysis would fall into a broad quantitative section using data of the comparative manifesto project relating to the AKP’s Islamist predecessor parties as well as the 2006 expert survey carried out by Laver and Benoit. Since there is no CMP data available on the 2002 and the 2007 elections yet, the manifesto analysis on the AKP will follow the broad qualitative format of discourse analysis on the same themes which are used by Comparative Manifesto Program.
4.2 Issues of conceptual stretching and contextual range

... the explanatory categories and concepts we use may have to be adjusted, “stretched” and even reinterpreted in the course of a dialogue between comparative analysis and the political processes under consideration. (Whitehead 1996: 260)

As Collier and Mahon (1993: 847) state, concepts should be seen as ideal types in the sense of an ‘analytic construct’ designed to give orientation and guidance, rather than perfectly encompassing each particular case. This has to be weighed against the risk of diluting the analytical utility of the operational concepts by expanding or ‘stretching’ them to suit the characteristics of a particular case’s context-specific political development. This could result in facilitating a false or distorted analytical reading of the political processes at work which would hamper the external validity of the research design. The need to strike a balance between these two pitfalls requires one to approach the comparative study of democratization of political systems cautiously. It is evident that one has to allow for a certain space of adjustment and accommodation in comparing different political systems which have yet to experience democratic transition like Morocco or those that have moved beyond this stage as in Turkey’s case. This is also the case when looking at the spectrum of Islamist parties. It is utile here to heed Zubaida’s cautionary words against presuming an ‘unitary’ conception Islamist politics, as he argues happens all too easily in western media discourses (2011: 106). Thus, for instance the Moroccan PJD is less liberal in its political discourse and outlook than the Turkish AKP (Çınar and Duran 2008: 34). However, Morocco’s socio-political culture in which the party is embedded was not marked by a top-down process of statist laicization as Turkey experienced.

This predicament highlights the requirement of using operational concepts that can accurately describe the object of analysis at a local level but which can also be easily transferable to other cases. This issue was briefly mentioned in the last chapter. A particular issue with the issue of conceptual validity in terms of the AKP as a Muslim-Democrat party is that there is a great debate on the actual strength of the party’s religiosity and its Islamist character. Consequently, what sub-type of pro-religious party the AKP actually corresponds to has been the focus of a large and unresolved academic debate as was stated in the literature review. The AKP ‘politics of avoidance’, as Hale
and Özbudun (2010: 26) term it, from openly discussing this subject in order to broaden out its electoral appeal and due to the sensitive nature of Turkey’s secularist state establishment have further complicated this matter. For that reason Kardaş (2008: 178) has criticised the application of the label ‘Islamist’ to the AKP as it would distort and ‘overstretch’ the meaning of the label beyond any analytical value.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Genealogy of Turkey’s Islamist party spectrum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Salvation Party (MSP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virtue Party (FP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice and Development Party (AKP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felicity Party (SP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1

Three different terms, Milli Görüş, Muslim-Democrats and Islamist, have been employed in reference to Turkey’s Islamist party movement. The term Islamist is used in order to differentiate these parties as a bloc from others like the centre-right or centre-left party blocs even when referring to the AKP which is classed as a Muslim-Democrat party. In the Turkish context, the term Islamist can sometimes be awkward to apply as outright Islamist politics is subject to immediate censure from the secularist state establishment. Thus in the past parties like the RP sometimes undertook the double-faced approach of using different discourses for different publics, a pro-systemic one for the secularist establishment and an Islamist one for its supporter in order to avoid closure (Toprak 2005: 173). The term Islamist then is used to refer to the overall spectrum.

The term party spectrum is commonly used to refer to a specific grouping of political parties sharing ideological ‘common property’ that relate to their core principles and beliefs and structure their party programs along them (Pennings 1999: 191). Turkey’s history of military coups repeatedly suspended the democratic political process only to reinitiate it again after periods of political engineering which were meant to correct the failings of the Turkish political system. These regular suspensions periodically restructured the party system but left intact the various underlying ideological and political trends and within the party systems. As Yeşilada (2002: 79) states, the same
Islamist party actors, as well as the key figures within the movement, have consistently kept re-emerging in Turkish party politics ‘albeit under new names’. This continuity can be identified both in terms of structural resources like social support networks and electoral membership bases as well as agential terms as there is a high overlap of membership and involvement in one party with that in another. In that sense, the leadership elites tend to be composed of the same figures, like Erbakan, from 1970 until 1997, Erdoğan or Gül. In the case of Turkey’s Islamist party-family, as shown in figure 3.1, one can see this line of succession and reformation very clearly starting in 1970 with the establishment of the National Order Party. The first four parties, as well as the current SP, in this succession were part of the so-called ‘National Outlook Movement’ or Milli Görüş. Therefore Milli Görüş is sometimes used as a label to refer to these parties as will be seen in chapter 4. Lastly the term ‘Muslim-Democrat’ party is used in this thesis to refer to a new type of moderate, pro-systemic political actor within the spectrum of Islamist politics, comparable to the post-war Christian-democrat parties of Western Europe.

4.3 Operationalisation of the research questions

As stated, the majority of the empirical research for this project, apart for the manifesto analysis, is situated within the research framework on party systems institutionalization which was by Mainwaring and Scully in 1995 in relation to Latin American countries. This section will detail how the main criteria of this framework are operationalized into research tasks. The second part of this section will then set out the various research methodologies which will be used to address these propositions. The four individual criteria of Mainwaring and Scully’s framework can each be sub-divided into separate research tasks.

- Stability in the patterns of inter-party competition
- The social rootedness of political parties
- Legitimation of electoral process and key electoral actors
- Autonomy of party organisations
To a great extent, the first three criteria can be researched through a variety of different statistical measures based on aggregate electoral and attitudinal data as well as surveys or opinion polls dealing with popular political preferences and trust in particular political institutions.

4.3.1 Stability in inter-party competition

- Electoral volatility
- Fractionalization of the party system

The criterion of stability in inter-party competition can be broken down and examined through separate but interlinked conventional measures of examining the extent of electoral volatility and party system fractionalization. Both measures are quantitative and statistical and address a different aspect of this particular criterion. Electoral volatility focuses on the aggregate turnover of voter share between the electoral cycles and is the primary indicator for signalling the degree of stability in an electoral party system (Morlino 2009: 209; Johnson Tan 2006: 97). This again can be sub-divided by focusing on the total amount of parties competing in the electoral arena or by separating out the specific party families or blocs sharing common ideological outlooks. The second measure of party system fractionalization allows one to oversee very easily the stability of a party system by not only highlighting the number of parties that achieve parliamentary representation but also the total number of parties which received a certain share of votes or seats. In this regard, Webb (2007: 12) supports Sartori’s assumption that a moderate multi-partism of 3 to 5 parties is the ideal number of effective parties that should be represented in parliament for the stability of democratic systems. Nevertheless, as stated in the second chapter, it is important to recognise the inherent ‘trade-off’ which exists between the quality of representation of an electoral system on one hand and excessive stability of the party system on the other (Carey and Hix 2011: 383).
4.3.2 Political legitimacy

- Confidence in the electoral process and the key electoral actors
- Popular electoral turn-out

The criterion of political legitimacy corresponds to the extent that the democratic political process, and the actors involved in that process, are accepted amongst elites and the general public in society as constituting the main, if not ‘the only game in town’. However, it is possible for general popular agreement and support for democracy as a political system to coincide with strong levels of disenchantment, if not outright cynicism or hostility towards its actual institutional manifestation within a specific socio-political context. Easton (1975: 438; 444) captured this distinction through the separation of ‘diffuse’ support for more generalized popular attitudes and ‘specific’ support which relates to the evaluation of specific objects or institutions. Thus, in order to untangle aggregate popular support for democracy and examine the political legitimacy of its individual institutional components, it was suitable to apply David Easton’s conceptual approach of disaggregating democracy as a political model of governance into a hierarchical separation of different regime principles, institutions and actors (Norris 1999: 1). Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 14) as well as Gill (2000: 239) recommend the use survey and polling data as the most appropriate way to measure attitudinal support for political institutions and values.

By using an approach based Easton’s disaggregation of support into various regime institutions and actors, the attitudinal measure of gauging support for the democratic electoral process can be broken down into different researchable issues and computed through the help of polling data and opinion surveys. In this sense, confidence in political parties, the parliament, the government and the Turkish armed forces as well as aggregate support democracy as a political system of governance, are different foci that were explored using the World Values Survey data sets as well as material from the Eurobarometer survey. This was combined with an examination of aggregate electoral data at national and regional level concerning public turn-out at national and local elections.
4.3.3 Social rootedness

- **Age of political parties**
- **Relative difference of vote-share at national and local elections**
- **Geographical rootedness**

The third criterion of Mainwaring and Scully’s framework stipulates that social connectedness of political parties at the local level of their electoral constituencies has a positive impact on the degree of party system institutionalization. Social rootedness in this sense can also be defined as ‘reification’ or ‘the extent to which a political party becomes installed in the popular ‘imaginary’ (Randall and Svasand 2002b: 23). There are various means and measures both at micro and macro level by which a party’s level of social rootedness can be ascertained. Mainwaring and Scully argue that similar voting shares at municipal and national elections for the same parties can also signal partisan acceptance, affiliation and identification trust (Stockton 2001: 102).

The reasons that parties gain office during national elections are varied and diverse; however municipal elections are more likely to reflect predominantly local concerns. Therefore, electoral convergence at both levels in terms of the vote-share that parties attract can indicate that there is partisan attachment to a party regardless of the level of elections. Thus, this can be used as an indicator of rootedness and can be indicative of the strength and extent of a local support infrastructure and partisan grassroots networks affiliated with this party in a specific locale. For the purposes of this research project then, the relative electoral difference for 6 national and 5 local elections was calculated and evaluated for a 20-year period from 1989 until 2009. Two other minor indicators were also used to examine the rootedness of Turkey’s party system. One of them, a static indicator, focuses on the median age of parties that win more than 10% of the vote-share as the likelihood of these parties being rooted within their electorates increases the older they are (Kuenzi and Lambrighi 2001: 446; Mainwaring 1998: 73). The other indicator concentrates on the geographical rootedness of Turkey’s Islamist party spectrum. Johnson Tan (2006: 100) argues that the rootedness of parties in certain regions or areas can also contribute to party system institutionalization.
4.3.4 Autonomy of party organisations

As stated before in the last two chapters, as the criterion of institutional party autonomy is universally absent across the Turkish party spectrum, it will not constitute a focus of investigation in this research project. It was discussed in the third chapter how universal and widely shared leadership authoritarianism in Turkish parties is. This was illustrated with a table showing the mean tenure of party leaders in each of three main parties, CHP, MHP and AKP, currently represented in the Turkish parliament. Decision-making powers in parties, such as concerning candidate nomination, are overwhelmingly concentrated in the leadership cadre and the party is organized hierarchically and in an entirely top-down manner (Sayarı 2002: 25). Although the AKP came into power promising to become the first mainstream party to introduce substantial intra-party democracy in terms of strengthening the voice of party members over party policy and internal decision-making, this pledge quickly became null and void with authority increasingly concentrating within the leadership elite around Erdoğan (Turkish Analyst 2008).

4.3.5 Moderation of political discourse towards a pro-systemic stance

- Content analysis of manifestoes using CMP data
- Discourse analysis of AKP election programmes and a 2004 Prime Ministerial speech
- Expert survey by Laver and Benoit

Although this strand of the research is not related to Mainwaring and Scully’s research framework on party system institutionalisation, it relates directly to the second research expectation. As stated above, the second research expectation serves to highlight that party actors within the spectrum of political Islam can contribute to party system institutionalisation within transitional and consolidating democracies by shifting to a political discourse that legitimates the democratic political system rather than basing their rhetoric on anti-systemic and sectarian narratives. Thus, as a necessary precondition, a moderation of their agenda and discourse towards a more pro-systemic position was posited. In that sense, the main contention of Nasr (2005: 13) is that
Muslim-Democrat parties which have undertaken this process of moderating their religious discourse and agenda for the sake of electoral politics which in turn has led them to progressively internalise the normative elements of electoral liberal democracy.

The purpose of this particular arm of the research is to examine the political discourse of the AKP as a public actor and determine how it frames its relation to liberal democracy and the key terms and concepts related to it on one hand. On the other hand, the focus on the AKP’s manifestoes should also determine the degree to which religious and traditional values persist as themes within its discourse. In order to contextualise the shift which the AKP undertook in its political discourse, the rhetoric it uses in its election manifestoes will be compared it to that of its Islamist predecessors from the Milli Görüş movement. For this purpose, CMP content analysis data shall be examined in relation to the manifestoes of Milli Görüş parties. Furthermore, AKP manifestoes and a prime ministerial speech from 2004 will be analysed using discourse analysis. This particular speech was selected since in it, Erdoğan focused directly on the AKP’s political outlook which has been called ‘Conservative Democracy’. Therefore, this political text presents a very relevant opportunity for analysing the public discourse of the AKP. Finally, data from an expert survey on Turkish parties by Laver and Benoit (2006) will be used to complement and reinforce the findings from the discourse analysis. This expert survey looked at situating Turkey’s political parties in regards to a range of policy themes and therefore also enabled a comparative look at the AKP in contrast to other parties.

4.4 Research methods

4.4.1 Statistical analyses of electoral data

A central part for the proposed research consists of statistical data evaluation in order to measure the criteria given in Mainwaring and Scully’s framework. As stated in the second chapter, three of the model’s criteria lend themselves easily to statistical measurement and comparison. For instance, to measure stability in inter-party competition, studying the levels of electoral volatility and party system fractionalization for instance within a party system can constitute what Black (1999: 35) terms the
‘operational definition’ of this conceptual variable of Mainwaring and Scully’s framework, which can be used to set out concrete research tasks.

Mainwaring and Scully also outlined a range of research measures that could be used to examine the other criteria of their framework. In those terms they proved within their own ample research on party system institutionalisation in Latin America that these measured withstood the test of ‘construct validity’ (Yin 1994: 33), in the sense of establishing proper and accurate ‘conceptual definitions’ that would apply the conceptual relation that was being studied to the socio-political realities of the actual world. Most of the statistical research will rely on data sets from reputable and trustworthy secondary sources such as Türkstat, the Turkish statistical office, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ankara, Yerelnet, a Turkish governmental website for municipal governance, the World Values Survey, the Eurobarometer survey and the Comparative Manifesto Project. In terms of ‘time and cost’, recourse to such readily available material has the advantage of helping to minimise financial expenditure and an immediate transition to actual data analysis (Hinde 1991: 251).

The availability of aggregate electoral data related to 6 national elections and 5 local elections spanning a period of 20 years from the local elections in 1989 to the recent local elections in 2009 permitted the application of longitudinal and comparative measurements and analyses necessary to arrive at a picture of the Turkish party system’s degree of institutionalization. In relation to this research project it was especially fortunate that this data existed for the two Turkish national elections, 2002 and 2007, and two local elections, 2004 and 2009, which the Muslim-Democrat AKP had contested since being established in 2001. This enabled a comparative analysis to be undertaken for the measurement of social rootedness for those two electoral cycles and also allowed for comparison with the preceding period. It was decided to begin the longitudinal observations with the 1987 Turkish elections as they were the first properly civilian ones of the post-1980 military coup party system. The 1983 elections were not included since they were held under military supervision and two of the three competing parties were established by the military (Öktem 2011: 66-67).

The analyses concerning this long-term observation across the electoral cycles would focus mostly on the research tasks in relation to above-mentioned established
operational definitions of Mainwaring and Scully’s framework of party system institutionalization such as electoral volatility, party system fractionalization, electoral participation as well as the proportional electoral difference for parties and party blocs between paired national and local elections. The electoral data was acquired from various sources such as TürkStat, the Ankara office of the Konrad Adenauer foundation and Yerelnet, a government website for municipal governance. In addition, data sets from the World Value Survey program and sometimes Eurobarometer surveys were also used further to examine the legitimacy and confidence of regime institutions in Turkey.

4.4.2 Electoral volatility

Electoral volatility is one of the key indicator for party system institutionalisation, and regularity in inter-party competition, and is understood as ‘the propensity for individuals to vote for different parties at successive election’ (Maor 1997: 28) It is measured by ‘adding the net change in percentage of votes gained or lost by each party from one election to the next, then dividing by two’ (Mainwaring 1998: 71). In examining electoral volatility scores in Turkey both for national and local elections since 1989, the level of analysis was set at the national, regional and provincial level. As will be seen, rather than resorting to the traditional framework of regionalising Turkey, a new scheme was established based on the three main electoral regions and existing scholarship on Turkish politics which supported this. The new regional groups consisted of the Aegean and Mediterranean coastal provinces, the Anatolian provinces and those of the South-Eastern region. Istanbul and Ankara were also included as separate due to their enormous size. Electoral volatility was calculated at the level of individual parties as well as ideological party blocs which were divided into the 4 categories of Islamist parties, right-wing parties, left-wing parties and pro-Kurdish ethnic parties. Additionally, the notion of ‘critical elections’ theorised by Key (1955), an election in which a substantial realignment of the electorate occurs, will be used in order to contextualise the settings of the 2002 national elections in which the AKP were first elected into office.
4.4.3 Party system fractionalization

Although electoral volatility is the most commonly used indicator to establish the degree of stability in inter-party competition at party system level, examining party system fractionalization can serve as a robust and straightforward secondary standard for observing the ‘extent of electoral support spread across multiple parties’ (Çarkoğlu 1998: 550). In order to calculate party system fractionalization, Laakso and Taagepera’s formula which is the most suitable and commonly used was applied to aggregate voting figures at national level. The availability of 6 national and 5 local election cycles enables one to examine the level of fractionalization in terms of seat distribution in parliament as well in terms of national vote-share in order to compare with the dynamics of local elections. In terms of actual voting dynamics within the party system, it was decided to base the calculations mainly on national vote-share which seemed more appropriate for the Turkish case as the 10% electoral threshold excludes the majority of parties from parliamentary representation thus preventing a measure based on seat-share from reflecting the actual degree of fractionalization. This manner also enabled a comparative analysis of this measure with local election results.

4.4.4 Social rootedness

In order to measure the third conceptual criterion which Mainwaring and Scully outline, the social rootedness of political parties, a number of operational definitions were used during the research. Mainwaring (1998: 72-73; 74) presents various ways for evaluating the level of social rootedness of parties. Firstly, he advocates examining the average age of parties within the party system with a vote-share of more than 10%. The argument he presents with this measure is that socially rooted parties survive longer than those which are not embedded within the electorate. Furthermore, Mainwaring (1999: 29) recommends using surveys and voting data to examine the extent to which political partisanship amongst the electorate structure their voting patterns as a sign of party connectedness.
One statistical method by Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 9) suggest in order to gauge the rootedness of a party system within its individual constituencies is to compare voting patterns for parties between local and national elections. When these are highly differentiated it is indicative, according to Mainwaring (1998: 30), of ‘weak party roots in society’ as voters do not make their choices according to partisan preferences. Conversely, when they are not very pronounced this could indicate that there is a certain level of partisan affiliation and identification between voters at the local level and political parties. Again the advantage of having multiple sets of national and local elections to analyse dating back to 1989 at per-province, regional as well as national level, is that it facilitates a longitudinal study of this difference at each electoral cycle and permits a more comprehensive understanding of the proportional electoral difference of the parties.

As will be set in detail in the section of chapter 5 focused on Mainwaring and Scully’s criterion of social rootedness, it was decided to elaborate a statistical measure based on the proportional electoral difference of parties between national and local elections rather than evaluating the absolute difference. A measure based on absolute difference would have created the false impression that parties with large vote-share, and therefore larger fluctuations in vote-share between elections, are less socially rooted than parties with smaller vote-shares. In order to test this measure, five pairings between local and national elections from 1989 to 2009 were made in the order indicated below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National election</th>
<th>Local election</th>
<th>Gap in time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>held on same day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: Pairing of national with local elections
4.4.5 Political legitimacy

As stated, this criterion of Mainwaring and Scully’s framework of party system institutionalisation concerns the extent to which the democratic process of electoral competition and the main institutional actors of the democratic political system are accepted as legitimate in society. For the purposes of this, as stated at the beginning of the chapter, David Easton’s conceptual separation of the democratic political system into regime principles such as the actual normative appeal of democratic government, as well as support for the electoral process, regime institutions and actors. In order to investigate this particular aspect of Mainwaring and Scully’s framework the repeated wave data sets of the World Value Survey as well as some elements of the Eurobarometer surveys were used. Additionally, aggregate data on electoral turnout at both national and regional level was examined over a time period between 1987 and 2009. This seemed ideal since the time-frame fitted the period very well in which WVS’ four waves on Turkey were undertaken, 1991, 1997, 2001, and 2007. Several of the regular survey questions focused on the dimension of popular legitimacy and support for particular regime institutions, government, parliament, political parties, the Turkish armed forces as well as the ideal of democratic governance.

By recoding the survey respondent’s voting preferences along three ideological blocs, left-wing, right-wing and Islamist, as well as a group for pro-Kurdish voting preferences, the first part of the analysis of the WVS data focused descriptively on the amount of support that these different groups expressed for regime institutions such as the government, the parliament or political parties in general. The separation of respondents was also divided according to whether they perceived themselves to be highly religious in self-identification or not. The support of these various sample groups for the institution of the Turkish armed forces, an influential veto player in the political process as seen, and support for the appeal of the democratic political system were also examined.

This first descriptive analysis was then followed by establishing an explanatory model based on statistical regression analysis in order to ascertain whether there was a relationship between confidence in the mentioned regime institutions and co-variates for Islamist voting support and religious self-identification. A series of other covariates
such as education, gender and class for instance. This model was tested for each of the 4 WVS waves undertaken in Turkey. Furthermore to complement the analysis of the WVS survey data, sometimes the regularly bi-yearly Eurobarometer survey were also evaluated since they started extending their focus to include Turkey in 2004. This combination seemed suitable as the WVS surveys are undertaken in intervals of 4-6 years, while the Eurobarometer reports are issued twice a year. Its surveys also include questions on the degree of support respondents hold for regime institutions such as government, parliament and the political parties as well as the military forces. Lastly, aggregate electoral data on voter turnout at the national and provincial level for local and national elections in Turkey was examined to observe its variation across time and regions as this feature also seemed to reflect the extent to which people expressed support for the legitimacy of the democratic electoral process.

4.4.6 Party manifesto analysis

Election manifestos are not usually seen as credible documents by the public and are believed to serve only as cosmetic icons during pre-election period and are quietly shelved afterwards. Nevertheless, manifestoes and other party documents for public consumption are a testament to their programmatic as well as normative stances on the main key socio-economic issues that are derived from the party’s own internal ideology, the demands of its voter base as well as the party’s perceptions of those demands. In that sense, they can be seen as the party’s external finger-print. These texts therefore are valuable windows that enable the researcher to examine the party’s immediate programmatic stances as well as their deeper, more abstract ideological and normative outlook.

The second expectation derived from the research question argues that moderate Islamist or Muslim-Democrat parties contribute substantially towards democratization processes by framing their discourses of identity and faith within a rights-based normative understanding of democracy. Although this arm of the research project does not directly deal with the causal relationship between Turkey’s Islamist parties and their effect on party system institutionalization, it does clarify the AKP’s identity as a party of Muslim-Democrats strategically and normatively committed to situating their
political action within the operative framework of liberal democracy. The central aim of the manifesto analysis for this research project then would seek to establish how the AKP’s frames and present its framing of liberal democracy and key terms related to the concept on one hand and in what sense religious and traditional values play a role in its manifestoes. Furthermore, the chapter also seeks to demonstrate the AKP’s shift away from the political rhetoric of its Islamist predecessors and towards a more centrist, mainstream and pro-system position.

Content analysis

The manifesto analysis falls into two separate stages. In order to compare the shifts in the political discourse of the AKP to those of its Islamist predecessors, the data of the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) was used. As the Manifesto Research Group has accumulated sufficient experience in their of analysis election manifestoes since 1979, their data is commonly regarded as valid and usable. Furthermore, their research is also designed to have a wide transferability in large-n comparative research across different countries. Nevertheless, estimating the party stance of the AKP’s predecessor parties solely on the basis of CMP data evaluation does not suffice and therefore this chapter will complement this with secondary expert literature on these parties and their rhetoric. The CMP’s analysis of election manifestoes is based on quantitative content analysis of texts in which coding focuses on the frequency distribution of certain policy themes. The coding unit are quasi-sentences (Volkens 2005: 12). The CMP focuses on 56 thematic categories related to public policy which are divided into 7 larger ‘policy domains’. Below is an overview of those coding categories which were used for this research project in order to examine the quantitative incidence of themes related to democracy, freedom and religion look at the manifestoes of Turkey’s Islamist parties in the 1990s, and a quick outline of what they refer to.

In order to look at the extent to which the manifestoes contained openly isolationist and anti-western references the following two categories were looked at.

Positive mentions of Internationalism (107) - Need for international cooperation; cooperation with specific countries other than those coded in 101; need for aid to developing countries; need for world planning of resources; need for international
courts; support for any international goal or world state; support for UN. (Volkens 2005: 8)

Positive mentions of European Integration (108) - Favourable mentions of European Community in general; desirability of expanding the European Community and/or of increasing its competence; desirability of the manifesto country joining (or remaining a member). (Volkens 2005: 8)

In order to look at the way in which the manifestoes valued democracy as a political system and as a set of values as well as human right and civil liberties, the following categories were used:

Positive mentions of freedom and human Rights (201) - Favourable mentions of importance of personal freedom and civil rights; freedom from bureaucratic control; freedom of speech; freedom from coercion in the political and economic spheres; individualism in the manifesto country and in other countries. (Volkens 2005: 8)

Positive mentions of democracy (202) - Favourable mentions of democracy as a method or goal in national and other organizations; involvement of all citizens in decision-making, as well as generalized support for the manifesto country’s democracy. (Volkens 2005: 9)

In order to examine the frequency with which religious or traditional themes in the manifestoes of Turkey’s Islamist parties the following coding theme was used:

Positive mentions of traditional Morality (603) - Favorable mentions of traditional moral values; prohibition, censorship and suppression of immorality and unseemly behaviour; maintenance and stability of family; religion. (Volkens 2005: 13)

Qualitative discourse analysis

As seen, the AKP prefers to call its conception of politics ‘conservative democracy’ and avoids the label ‘political Islam’. However, both the 2002 and 2007 AKP election manifestoes do not try to explain what this shift towards ‘conservative democracy’
means. Therefore the discourse analysis of the election manifestoes is preceded by a focus of a 2004 speech by Erdoğan at the American Enterprise Institute in which he fleshed out the AKP’s understanding of ‘Conservative Democracy’ as a political approach that is distinct from the Islamist politics of its predecessors. The aim of the discourse analysis then would be to examine the particular meanings assigned to certain key words and terms related to democracy, civil and political rights and freedoms, focus on the extent to which these terms are integrated in the election documents of the AKP as public actor and elaborate how the AKP positions itself in relation to liberal democracy. Thus in terms of liberal democracy and religious and moral values, themes of interest whose appearance and presentation in the manifestos were examined included:

Democracy, freedom, human rights, civil society, individual rights, secularism, religion, tradition

Expert survey data

Lastly, as a means of complementing the discourse analysis on the AKP election manifestoes, a quantitative statistical analysis based on data of a comparative expert survey conducted by Laver and Benoit (2006). The data on Turkish political parties is useful as some of the 10 policy themes it includes in the survey are related to the focus of the manifesto analysis. These include for instance survey items focusing on parties’ positions within the religio-secular divide and the left-right spectrum or the perceived importance of EU membership for individual parties. Therefore, it seemed suitable to include an analysis of this data in the chapter focused on manifesto analysis.

4.4.7 Data Sources

As mentioned, in order to compile a complete data set of all national and local elections in Turkey since 1987, various sources had to be used. For data relating to national elections, the data which the Konrad Adenauer Foundation supplies on the website of its Turkish office was sufficient to establish a comprehensive per-province image of all parties’ vote-shares in the 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002 and 2007 national elections.
Additionally, Professor Ali Çarkoğlu from Koç Üniversitesi, very kindly supplied electoral material and data from his own research on national elections. For local elections, an official Turkish website called Yerelnet was used which is devoted to issues of municipal governance and politics and keeps an extensive digital archive of all provincial elections results since 1963. Additional electoral information for the 2009 local elections was sourced from the internet archive of the Turkish daily Hürriyet and the website of the psephologist Adam Carr who specialises in collecting election data from every known country. For the focus on public legitimacy of parties and the other main actors of democracy in the seventh chapter, four different waves of the World Value Survey on Turkey, 1990, 1996, 2001 and 2007, were used as well as some elements of the Eurobarometer surveys.

This chapter sought to present and elaborate upon the design scheme which structures the research focus of this thesis. Thus, at first the merits of the single-case study design in relation to this research thesis were briefly recapitulated. Then after clarifying how this thesis intends to classify the various actors it focuses upon, it was detailed how the stated expectations will in part be investigated through Mainwaring and Scully’s research framework and the manner in which they will be broken down into concrete, empirically-based research tasks which will make up the brunt of the thesis. The following chapter will be the first research chapter of this thesis and will examine the political discourse of Muslim Democracy as promoted by AKP in order to focus on the second research expectation.
Chapter 5 - The AKP’s discourse of Muslim Democracy

This chapter focuses on the secondary hypothesis of this dissertation that only moderate Islamist or Muslim-Democrat parties can have a positive impact on party system institutionalisation by foregoing the anti-systemic and extremist nature of their more radical ideological family-members. Therefore, for the purposes of this research project it was important to establish how the AKP’s Muslim-Democrat discourse differentiated itself from that of the preceding Islamist parties concerning the way in which it framed its relation to liberal democracy as a political system of government and its underlying values. Secondly, it was similarly expedient to look at the manner in which themes of religion were presented and again how the AKP’s approach differed from that of previous Islamist parties.

Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how the AKP, in contrast to its Islamist predecessors, has moderated its political discourse and bases its outlook as a public actor regarding political governance on liberal democratic principles of pluralism, human rights and freedom of expression and belief. In that sense, the party has distanced itself from an Islamist stance and adopted a centrist, conservative democratic tone suited to the ideal type of a Muslim-Democrat party. This would substantiate the claim that the AKP shifted its discourse from the anti-systemic and polarizing outlook of its predecessors to one that is conducive of liberal democracy and the precepts of a democratic political culture. For the purposes of this study, it was essential to place this evolution within the context of the development of Islamist parties rather than simply accepting the fait accompli of the AKP as a centre-right party. As will be seen, although the AKP has retained a vague emphasis on certain normative and ideational aspects associated with its Islamist predecessors in its language, it has been diluted to the point of seeming harmless.

The first section of this chapter will attempt to describe the discourses and ideological framework of the AKP’s Islamist predecessors. The purpose of this section is to establish the main pillars on which the political discourse of Turkey’s previous Islamist parties was based and highlight their stance on the dimensions of religion and democracy in organising their political communication. Turkey’s Islamist party movement from 1970 onward were guided by the same key leaders who called the
general outlook they held ‘Milli Görüş’ (MG) or the National View. For this reason, although they were distinct party organisations, the Islamist parties which preceded the AKP will also sometimes be referred to as MG parties. In order to examine the manifestoes of the earlier Islamist parties in terms of the emphasis these texts gave to themes of religion on one hand and democracy and civil and political liberties on the other, quantitative content analysis data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) was used. Using individual sentence as coding units which are then assigned to more than 50 categories, the data of the CMP illustrates the overall frequency, expressed as a percentage, with which certain categories are mentioned in manifestoes which then enables one to either compare this to the manifestoes of other parties or that of the same party across different years (Çarkoğlu 1998: 554).

The CMP project which was initiated in 1979 has been described as ‘one of the great success stories of international political science cooperation’ (Mair 2001: 16) and constitutes a trustworthy and commonly used source for manifesto analysis. However, Mair (2001: 6) has also stated that the CMP has suffered from problems when comparing the mapping of party’s positions across several countries. For the Turkish case, the availability of content analysis data of Turkish political parties up to the 1999 elections due to the comparative manifesto project (CMP) enables one to map the ideational positions of the older Islamist parties of the Milli Görüş for the 1991, 1995 and 1999 elections. Yet, as Chilton and Schäffner (1997: 209) state, quantitative studies only offer ‘the raw data for interpretive political analysis’. Therefore, in order to put the findings of the quantitative evaluations into context, secondary sources from the relevant literature of Turkish party politics will be used to complement the CMP data analysis and contextualize the political discourse of Turkey’s Islamist parties in the 1990s. This is also necessary as the coding scheme at times is not always able to adequately interpret the rhetoric of the Islamist Milli Görüş parties as will be seen later on. Laver and Benoit (2006: 65) have already criticized the CMP coding procedure and cited numerous problems with its execution among which are the fact that sometimes the text is only coded once by one person. Moreover, each coding unit is only coded in one way which is also problematic as it means that secondary meanings and emphases in the text cannot be captured.
They also take the CMP’s to task for using a theoretical basis, the saliency theory on political policy, to inform their project which does not suit the task of estimating party positions on issue dimensions very well. However, as Laver and Benoit (2006: 65) point out, most of the coding themes of the CMP project are ‘positional’, thus research work, such as this thesis, that are interested in party positions rather than ‘dimensional weights’ to use the data. Nevertheless, although the CMP data contains contextual flaws and failings regarding its coding of party manifestoes, it still makes sense to use this data as it is the only quantitative content analysis study presently available across different time points for political party manifestoes from Turkey. Other mainstream studies of Turkish party policy such as by Çarkoğlu (1998) have also resorted to it. Additionally, the ambiguity it has in pinning down the Islamist identity of the MG parties reflects the shifting discourse of these parties in the 1990s. Having illustrated the political discourses used by the MG parties, the second section will analyze the AKP’s political discourse of ‘Conservative Democracy’. Firstly, as the term ‘Conservative Democracy’ is not directly explained in the party’s 2002 and 2007 manifestoes, a speech given by Erdoğan in 2004 at the American Enterprise Institute on the subject will be examined. Subsequently, both of the AKP’s electoral manifestoes will be subjected to a content analysis undertaken by the author that will focus on the manner in which the party frames democracy and religion in comparison to earlier MG Islamist parties. Lastly, in order to complement the content analysis of Erdoğan’s speech and the manifestoes, data from a cross-national expert survey on party policy undertaken by Laver and Benoit (2006), which included Turkey, will also be analysed.

In terms of focusing on the electoral manifestoes of political parties as an object of analysis for this chapter, one could object to the serious study of these texts to map the political positions of parties regarding specific issues or ideological dimensions. Linz (2002: 291) for instance comments that political parties are viewed with general public distrust and disillusionment across the world. Nevertheless, despite the frequent truth of this claim, party manifestoes do constitute ‘the official statement of party policy’ (Laver and Benoit 2006: 64) of a party as a public actor to which it can be held accountable by the public. In that sense, Gemenis and Dinas (2009: 3) argue that manifestoes constitute the ‘most reliable source to make estimates of party positions’. However, apart from party manifestoes, the speeches and statements from the party leadership should also be kept in consideration as a further methodological instrument which one can use to locate
a party’s position, especially when the party leadership exerts a lot of authority vis-a-vis the rest of the party structure.

5.1. The Political Discourse of Turkey’s Islamist parties until the AKP

Within the history of Turkey’s political Islamist movement from 1970 until the present-day AKP, one can distinguish between three individual phases which are illustrated in the table below. The initial phase during the 1970s was marked by a very anti-systemic and Islamist discourse. This was then followed by a more nuanced and cautious Islamist discourse of the parties of the 1980s and 1990s until the AKP emerged in 2001 with its ‘post-Islamist’ Muslim-Democrat discourse that was committed to the governance model of liberal democracy. The following section will examine the historical development of Islamist parties’ political discourse until the AKP’s advent.

Table 5.1: Historical evolution of the Islamist’s discourse in reference to democratic politics. The different tones of shading denote the individual stages.
5.1.1 The Milli Görüş movement of the 1970s and its political discourse

As previously stated, the history of Turkey’s Islamist parties begins with the founding of the National Salvation Party (MNP) in 1970 which could be termed the first Islamist party in the history of republican Turkey. Upon being banned following the military’s intervention in 1971, this party was replaced by the National Salvation Party (MSP) in 1972 that was later banned in the 1980 military coup. In terms of the political discourse of these first Islamist parties, this first phase can be seen as the most anti-systemic and militant one. Both the MSP and the MNP were led by Necmettin Erbakan, the undisputed leadership figure of Turkey’s Islamist movement until he was banned from politics after the Welfare Party’s closure in 1998, although he remained a powerful behind-the-scenes puppet master even afterwards as Özdalga (2002: 134) contends. It should be noted as well that important political figures of the AKP like Erdoğan and Gül were socialised into politics as youth activists of these parties and under Erbakan’s leadership (Hakan Yavuz 2009: 50). It was during the lifespan of these parties and especially that of the MNP that Erbakan formulated a political outlook known as the Milli Görüş (MG) or National View (Toprak 2005: 181). As this outlook would remain associated with all future Islamist parties including the contemporary SP, these parties are sometime called the MG parties.

Drawing heavily on officially banned Sufi movements (Kumbaracıbaşı 2009: 160), the MG’s general outlook posited an Islamic alternative to the secular politics of the Turkish state in terms of the domestic and foreign sphere. In this sense, on one hand the discourse of MG included an appeal for greater individual spirituality and ‘moral development’ within society by internalizing the ethical values of Islam and restoring the traditional values of the pre-secular Ottoman society (Heper and Toktaş 2003: 158). At a 1980 political meeting in Konya, one of the most conservative cities in central Anatolia and an electoral bastion of Islamist parties, for instance the creation of an Islamic state was called for (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2007: 15). Simultaneously however, the outlook of the MG highlighted the need to embrace elements of modernity in terms of science and technology to build a strong, independent and modern Turkish nation that could challenge the perceived imperialist hegemony of Western powers.

---

8 Erbakan’s ban from politics was rescinded in 2009 and he was elected as the new leader of the SP in 2010 at the age of 84 (Dişli Zibak 2010).
(Yıldız 2003: 190). This included calls for heavy statist industrialization and promoting an Islamic Anatolian economic elite to create a self-reliant national economy (Toprak 2005: 182).

On the international sphere, the tone of the MG discourse had strong undertones of anti-imperialist and third-worldist rhetoric and called for the restoration of a greater Turkey that would lead the Islamic world to challenge the colonialist ambitions of the Western powers (Taşkin 2008: 63). Thus within its outlook, the MG combined an assurance of returning society to the moral and juridical values of traditional Ottoman Islam with a nationalist language focusing on the use of modernity through contemporary technology and modern industrial means to restore Turkey as a significant Islamic power in the international arena. While the MG in that period never took any position on the merits of democratic expansion within Turkey’s political system, it tried to portray itself as an anti-systemic political force.

In this regard, the term MG or ‘National View’ was chosen to distinguish its Islamist parties from the rest of the political spectrum which was seen as a ‘Western Club’ conspiring with foreign powers to plan the eventual subjugation of Turkey as a nation-state (Hakan Yavuz 2009: 50; Toprak 2005: 181). Thus it can be argued that the framing of democratic electoral politics as an illegitimate game in the interests of foreign powers within the political discourse of the MG party-political movement in the 1970s did not endorse liberal democracy as a system of governance nor was it conducive to promoting its underlying values. Rather, it interpreted the precepts of electoral democracy as benefitting the interests of Western foreign powers and westernised state and business elites, and actively pursued a discourse that lead to further political instability and polarization. The following quote by Erbakan at a political rally in 1980 reflects this:

*We should take as our guide the industry, determination and love of jihad [that resulted] in the conquest of Istanbul. May you, the new army of Sultan Fatih Mehmet, be victorious and your holy struggle be blessed. Be prepared, we shall sharpen our swords.* (Jenkins 2008c: 138)
5.1.2 Welfare Party and its political discourse of the Just Order

The second generation of the Turkey’s Islamist parties surfaced after the 1980 military coup with the founding of the Welfare party (RP) in 1983. After its ban in 1998, the RP’s successor party, the Virtue party (FP), carried forward its outlook and political discourse, albeit in a more moderate form. After the FP’s constitutional closure, the Saadet Partisi (SP) continued the MG outlook up to now (Yıldız 2008: 41). Although the RP won the largest vote-share in the 1995 national elections and was part of a coalition government with the centre-right DYP, it was forced to resign 2 years later after a vehement public campaign against its perceived Islamist agenda that found the support of the armed forces and other bureaucratic state institutions. As was already mentioned in the third chapter, this period culminated in the so-called ‘February 28 process’ when the army forwarded a list of demands to the RP-led government which made Erbakan’s position as prime minister untenable and prompted the government to collapse.

Following the RP’s closure, a successor party, the Virtue Party (FP), was established but it was also constitutionally dissolved in 2001 due to its perceived Islamist agenda. During the existence of the RP from 1983 until its ban in 1998, it proceeded to become the most electorally popular party in Turkey receiving the highest vote-share in the 1995 national elections with 21.38%. During this period, the political rhetoric of the RP was epitomised by its ‘Just Order’ (Adil Düzen) discourse which it adopted before the 1991 national elections (Eligür 2010: 29). This discourse had a prominent economic dimension within it and was conceptualised in the context of Turkey shifting from a statist economic system to one based on private market forces during the 1980s. This process created a large class of discontented ‘losers’ of economic liberalization (Öktem 2011a: 83).

The RP was one of the few parties who addressed the concerns of this segment of the electorate with its ‘Just Order’ discourse (Kramer 2000: 79). The Just Order promoted an utopian, quasi-leftist vision of an alternative and more egalitarian economic and political system that was ‘far removed from the accepted norms of modern-day economics’ (Sayar 1996: 41). The ethical basis of the Just Order was anchored around Islamic precepts of morality, ethics and justice (Gülap 2001: 440; Aras 2004: 5). The
party reinforced this image by offering much-needed welfare services through its large networks of activists and volunteers, especially in the poor urban neighbourhoods of large cities (Kinzer 2002: 66). Simultaneously and confusingly however the RP’s Just Order discourse also appealed to the conservative constituency of small to medium-sized businesses and the ‘Anatolian tigers’, a rising class of pious Anatolian businessmen, by emphasising that it would also protect their interests and reward free enterprise (Öniş 1997: 753). Thus in its idyll of a new economic and political order informed by Islamic morality, the RP managed to fuse appeals to both the winners and losers of Turkey’s processes of economic liberalization and globalization (Tuğal 2007: 12). The RP’s political language also focused heavily on the politics of identity by presenting itself as the political champion to promote the socio-cultural needs and interests of Turkey’s religiously conservative underclass (Buğra 2002: 109). The RP also insisted that believers had a duty to vote for the party which led to conflict and the cutting of contacts with one the party’s previous benefactor, the Nurcular religious movement, as was stated in the third chapter. In that sense, the Just Order discourse was anti-status quo and anti-systemic, fusing its anti-establishment language with Islamist idioms. In parliament for instance it called for the constitution to be changed by removing the article that guaranteed the secular character of the Turkish republican system (Zürcher 2004: 297). The RP’s rhetoric also retained its anti-Western and anti-Zionist undertones (Akyol 2008: 83).

It is important to mention that this discourse was also used by Erdogan and Gül, the futures leaders of the Muslim-Democrat AKP. The issue of the divergence of their current stances with their former comments will be focused on in the later section on the AKP although it is useful therefore to review a selection of their statements here. Erdoğan on various made remarks during the mid-1990s that put into doubt his commitment then and acceptance of democratic norms. During Erdoğan’s tenure as mayor in Istanbul for instance he commented: ‘Democracy is like a streetcar. When you come to your stop, you get off’ (Sontag 2003). In 1996, he stated that ‘democracy is not the goal but is an instrument for the RP’ (Eligür 2010: 243). In terms of Erdoğan’s stance towards the position of religion in society, he actively approved of sharia in a 1994 interview with a mainstream Turkish newspaper (Hakan Yavuz 2009: 4), while in another he claimed, ‘one cannot be a secularist and a Muslim at the same time’ (Akdoğan 2009: 214). In contrast, Gül, a senior figure in the RP, in 1995 described the
European Union as a ‘Christian Club’ intent on dominating Turkey’s economy and promoted his party’s decision to oppose Turkey signing a customs union with the EU that was being negotiated at that point (Taniyici 2003: 471). The shift in both figures rhetoric and discourse will be detailed on in the second section that focuses on the AKP.

Nevertheless, according to Taniyici (2003: 472) and as will be seen below, the RP and the FP were flexible as to the degree to which it promoted its ‘Islamic’ and anti-systemic character in response to the political and electoral context and situation and throughout the 1990s its rhetoric softened, and became more nuanced and ambivalent. For instance, although the RP was heavily in favour of changing the secularist orientation of the state to favour a non-interventionist stance in the realm of social religiosity, the party avoided making pronouncements in its official literature that would make it seem that it was advocating radical Islamism, although it did sometimes revert to anti-Western and Islamist discourses when addressing its followers (Toprak 2005: 173). Following the collapse of the RP-DYP’s coalition government and the party’s subsequent dissolution in 1998, the FP drastically softened its tone and began to place an supportive emphasis on the EU, human rights as well as political and civil liberties (Taniyici 2003: 474). The following section will use data from the comparative manifesto project on Turkey during the 1990s to examine the degree to which the two dimensions of democracy and religion were illustrated in the manifestoes of the RP and the FP for the general elections of 1991, 1995 and 1999. Although these two dimension should not be seen as completely separate as many issue fall into both dimension, the following section will first focus on the dimension of religion and then on that of democracy.

5.1.3 The theme of religion in the manifestoes of the Welfare and Virtue Party

Although the CMP does not include a specific category which focuses specifically on the theme of religion within its data-set, there are various coding categories dimensions which are of relevance in examining this dimension within a manifesto. First and foremost, among the 56 coding categories, the one which seemed to be the most relevant in terms of the quantitative frequency with which issues related to religion occur in a text was the category of tradition and morality. The coding category of
traditional morality, per 603, which was used for this research, explicitly mentions religion as one of the sub-themes on which it focuses (Volkens 2005: 18). Furthermore, references to tradition and morality within the context of Muslim societies are frequently derived from or related to the Islamic religion or Islamic understandings of morality. As seen, despite Turkey establishing a republican political system that was strongly anchored around principles of French laicism, Islam remained a potent source of spiritual and moral guidance in the private lives of the majority of the population and was deeply connected with traditional values (Heper and Toktaş 2003: 158).

Every coding category in the CMP has two dimensions focusing on positive or negative mentions of that item in the text. However, for this research project only the positive mentions of tradition and morality were examined in relation to the RP and FP as it was unlikely that their manifestoes would refer to traditional and moral values in a disparaging manner. Apart from this, in order to look at the degree to which the RP and FP were Islamist, for the second and third categories proxy values were chosen. In looking at euroscepticism in European party systems, Taggart (2003: 372) suggests that hostility to the EU or euro-scepticism is used by parties on political margins as a mobilization issue to differentiate themselves from mainstream parties. In addition, political Islam has tended to construct itself in clear opposition to the West (Daği 2008: 92). Hence, one could posit that the degree of anti-Westernism found within the manifestoes of Islamist parties would be correlated to the extent that they were inward-looking, conservative and hostile to Western values. Therefore the second category which was used relates to the frequency with which the European community is negatively mentioned in the manifestoes of the RP and FP. The anti-Western character of the rhetoric of the first and second generation of Turkey’s Islamist parties was already remarked upon previously. Within their early views until the mid-1990s, Turkey’s Islamist parties saw the West, with which the European community was indelibly associated, as an imperialist and anti-Islamic entity (Çağliyan-Içener 2009: 601).

The Islamist appeal of these parties’ rhetoric was fused with a definite cultural rejection of international actors such as the US, the European Community and later the EU. Therefore, one could postulate that a low incidence of negative or hostile mentions of the European community in the party manifestoes of Islamist parties is correlated to a
less anti-Western and consequently more moderate and pro-systemic stance. For the same reason, the coding category on internationalism was also included. This time both the incidence of positive and negative mentions of internationalism in the manifestoes were examined as both seemed relevant. The CMP coding handbook interprets ‘favourable’ mentions of this theme as indicating support for international cooperation and support for international institutions such as the UN, whereas negative mentions are associated with an emphasis on national sovereignty and independence in contrast to internationalism (Volkens 2002: 30).

As can be seen from the CMP data in figure 5.1, the emphasis on issues of tradition and morality in the manifestoes of the RP and the FP is not consistent. While these issues cover approximately 5% and 3% respectively of the text in the RP’s 1991 and the FP’s 1999 manifesto, in the 1995 RP manifesto they are almost non-existent. One of the measures which the RP undertook in the mid-1990s was to strategically moderate and soften the tone of its political rhetoric in order to widen its electoral base and attempt to reach out to disaffected non-religious voters in order increase vote-share and attract more members, (Hakan Yavuz 1997: 76; Eligür 2010: 199). For instance, the party avoided making references to the shariah, the religious body of law in Islam, as in the past (Rouleau 1996: 77). Simultaneously, as seen, the party also began to focus greatly on the ordinary bread-and-butter issues of Turkey’s electorate, especially the social dislocation that Turkey’s reforms of economic liberalization reforms caused for the poorest segments of society. This strategy bore fruit as the party increased its share of the votes in the national elections from 17% in 1991 to 21% in 1995.

---

9 The RP’s membership base, according to the party, increased from 180,000 in 1991 to more than 4 million in 1995 according to its records (Yeşilada 2002: 70).
Therefore, the party’s rhetorical moderation and its focus on issues socio-economic injustice in the 1990s may partially account for the quantitative drop in themes related to tradition and morality in the RP’s 1995. However, in the 1999 manifesto of the Virtue party, the RP’s successor, themes of tradition and morality took up 3% of the manifesto. While the FP tried to adopt a more Western and less Islamist stance than the RP in order to avoid constitutional closure, including abandoning any reference to the Just Order discourse, it was still distinguishable as a ‘clearly Islamist’ party (Hale 2002: 180), in order to reach out to its core voter base at a time when few other would have voted for it. However, when the positions of other political parties are compared as shown in figure 5.1.1 in the appendix, it can be seen the centre-right DYP itself was not far away itself regarding the frequency of positive mentions of tradition and morality in its 1999 manifesto.

When one looks at the incidence with which themes related to internationalism and the European Community appear, it can be seen that negative mentions of both declined throughout the three national elections in the manifestoes of the Islamist parties. While 2% of the RP’s 1991 manifesto was devoted to negative mentions of the European Community, this declined to almost zero in the FP’s 1999 manifesto. In fact, according to the CMP, the FP’s manifesto was also the first time in which the European

---

10 Despite the closure of the RP in 1998 and the hostile environment for Islamist parties, the FP managed to retain their mayoral seats on Istanbul and Ankara (Kramer 2000: 80).
community was mentioned in a positive manner. This can be read as indicated that Islamist parties throughout the 1990s due to a variety of different factors were struggling to tone down the anti-systemic character of their discourse and attempted to promote a more open-minded, less extreme image of themselves. Although the Welfare Party is commonly identified in the literature on Turkish politics as an Islamist or even, within Diamond and Gunther’s typology of parties, as a quasi-‘fundamentalist’ party, like any other electoral competitor the RP altered the strength of its emphases according to the existing political circumstances. It is important in this regard to take into consideration that explicit references to a religious political platform carry substantial costs for political actors within the Turkish framework exemplified by the constitutional closures of all Islamist parties from the NOP in 1971 to the FP in 2001 (Dagi 2008: 26).

5.1.4 The themes of democracy, freedom and human rights in the manifestoes of the Welfare and Virtue Party

When looking at figure 5.2 which shows the changing emphases in the manifestoes of the RP and the FP on these various categories which were selected for further examination, it is very notable to what extent there in an quantitative increase in the frequency of positive mentions of the coding categories of democracy as well as freedom and human rights in the 1995 manifesto of the RP. While positive mentions of democracy as well as freedom and human rights only accounted for around 0.5% and 4% of 1991 manifesto respectively, in the 1995 manifesto they account for 7% and 18%. When this result is compared to the frequency with which the coding categories related to freedom and human rights appear in the other parties’ manifestoes for 1995, as can be seen in figures 5.2.1 in the appendix, one can see that the closest any other party comes to matching this is the CHP with 8%. Similarly, as can be seen in figure 5.2.2 in the appendix, the RP also leads the other parties at the rate of positive mentions of democracy although not with such a large margin. Secondly, as can be seen, although the frequency of positive mentions for both themes declines from 1995 to 1999, they still surpass the values of the RP’s 1991 manifesto. Moreover, apart for the small centre-right DTP, the FP mentioned themes related to freedom and human rights with more frequency than any other party in its 1999 election manifesto.
From the substantial rise in the CMP frequency scores for the positive mentions of freedom and human rights in the RP’s 1995 manifesto, one could infer that there had been a substantial shift towards a more liberal political stance within the party. However, one has to note that this does not conform to the analysis of the RP’s position by mainstream scholars. Rather, it seems to be an instance where the coding scheme of the CMP did not manage to capture the context of the RP’s political discourse. Certainly the party did emphasise the issue of freedom and human rights, but according to a very narrow-minded and sectarian understanding. Thus, Çarkoğlu (1998: 558) states that the RP was not advocating a greater normative promotion of democracy, freedom and human rights at general level but that it restricted this call exclusively to expanding the civic rights of religious liberties, such as the freedom to express and practice your religious beliefs openly without state intervention or discrimination. Sayarı (1996: 40) supports this in stating that the party limited its focus on democratization and the expansion of civil liberties purely to the interests of the ‘believers’ in the public realm.

Yıldız (2003: 142) and Toprak (2005: 175) reinforce this view by arguing that the RP structured its perception of freedom and human rights in the mid-1990s in accordance to an exclusively sectarian understanding of ‘negative freedom’ in relation to its religiously-conservative followers. Özdalga (2002: 130) supports this further in stating that the RP’s discourse on democracy was projected mainly in ‘self-defense’ such as
when the party was closed down, as well as for specific cases such as the issue of veiled women being barred from university. In response to other more flagrant issues of rights violations, or when other political parties were dissolved during the 1990s, the party remained indifferent (Hicks 2002: 377). Hakan Yavuz (1997: 75) also questions the authenticity of the RP’s liberalizing stance and dismisses it as strategic manoeuvre given that the party still saw as its main constituency the religiously-conservative segments of Turkish society.

Indeed Erbakan, the RP’s leader, made numerous remarks during the 1990s which put into question a growing normative attachment on his behalf or the party’s, which was effectively under his control, to a pluralist culture of liberal democracy. On several occasion, at political rallies or during speeches to his party’s MPs, Erbakan declared for instance that the social order could change ‘harmoniously or by bloodshed’ (Council of Europe 2003: 4), or by stating during campaign rallies that the RP was the party of ‘holy war’ which all Muslim Turks needed to join unless they belonged to ‘the religion of the potato’ (Özdalga 2002: 141). When one looks at the frequency of positive mentions for the armed forces, one cannot detect a lot of emphasis in the manifestoes of the RP and FP. As can be seen in figure 5.3 above, the 1999 FP manifesto does contain some positive references to the armed forces despite the fact that the downfall of the RP-DYP coalition government was triggered partially through the efforts of the armed forces. Although this may seem odd given that the army was instrumental in causing the downfall of the RP, it may be possible that the FP was being careful and trying to avoid attracting the ire of the armed forces (Yeşilada 2002: 166), which may explain the positive mentions of the military in the party’s 1999 manifesto.

As seen in this first section of this chapter, until the dissolution of the Welfare Party (RP) in 1998, Turkey’s Islamist parties followed a discourse which was heavily steeped in Islamic idioms and symbolism, very anti-Western and often anti-Semitic. Their understanding of the norms and values associated with liberal democracy were rather nebulous and they often interpreted these norms in a narrow and strategic manner in order to advance the interests of their religious-conservative constituency rather than advocating them on a more general basis. Thus it was often questionable to which extent these parties had internalised the rules of the democratic game. Towards the end of the 1990s however with the dissolution of the RP, the FP began to hastily vocalise
support for liberal democracy as a political system of governance and changed its ‘anti-
Western’ orientation towards the EU (Yıldız 2003: 198). Although it has been often
argued that these changes were instrumental, they also reflected a generational power
struggle within the party between old-guard traditionalists centred around Erbakan and a
younger faction of reformists who would later go on to found the AKP. The discourse of
the AKP, whose members realized that a full commitment to democracy was necessary
and beneficial for their survival, will be investigated in the next section, especially in
regards to its relation towards the twin dimensions of religion and democracy in contrast
to the previous Islamist parties.

5.2 The AKP’s ‘post-Islamist’ discourse of Conservative Democracy

As discussed in the third chapter, the AKP was founded in August 2001 as a result of an
‘intergenerational struggle for power’ within the FP which was constitutionally
dissolved in 2000 (Taşkin 2008: 59). This closure produced two new parties, the AKP
and the Felicity party (SP). The SP followed the more rigidly Islamist tradition of the
MG political tradition and was controlled behind the scenes by Erbakan. It failed to
reach 3% of the vote-share during the national elections of 2002 and 2007. The AKP’s
founding core, headed by the former mayor of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and
Abdullah Gül, a foreign minister during the coalition government of the RP and DYP,
constituted a younger generation of more pragmatically minded Islamists that wanted to
create a more politically moderate party combining a pro-systemic embrace of liberal
democracy as well as a shift towards a more centre-right political position integrating
strands of thinking such as political conservatism and liberalism. Thus, they also hoped
to dilute the strength of their former public image as straight-forward Islamists and
present themselves as conservative democrats (Kinzer 2004: 40). The findings of the
expert survey by Benoit and Laver at the end of this chapter show that the AKP has
generally been accepted as centre-right political force.

As stated earlier in this chapter, both Erdoğan and Gül were socialised into political
activism under the banner of Erbakan’s political Islam of the MG parties and had
previously used Islamist and anti-Western rhetoric. Davdar (2006: 482) describes this
shift in rhetoric and policy between the AKP and its Islamist predecessor of the MG
movement as a form of ‘political learning’ in which the difficulties the mainstream Islamist movement towards the end of the 1990s stimulated the rise of ‘new reformist thinking’ and led to a split of the AKP cadre from the Islamist movement. This resonates with Wickham’s concept of ‘Islamist auto-reform’ that was illustrated in the second chapter in which the increased integration into electoral politics instantiates a push towards the political centre both in external appearance as well as internal thinking.

They also realised that in order to be seen as trustworthy for the office of government in the eyes of the secular establishment and be allowed to enter and stay in the party system, the party had to either ‘disguise or change its language’ (Yavuz 2009: 87) from that of its Islamist forebears. Informed by the repeated closures of previous Islamist parties, the AKP’s post-Erbakan generation of politicians tried to evolve by fusing a more modern, pragmatic and moderate template of Islamic values and traditions to a centre-right political position that is normatively and strategically committed to a pluralist model of liberal governance (Findley 2005: 215; Fuller 2004: 56). This model would not only tolerate and safeguard the existence of moderate Islamist and Muslim-Democrat parties such as the AKP but also benefits its supporters by enshrining collective and individual freedoms of expression and belief within the rule of law.

As outlined previously, it is this fusion of a normative internalization of liberal democracy as the arena of political conduct and agency with an electoral instrumentalization of Islamist politics which has been outlined as a new form of politics derived but not directly linked to political Islamism and has been termed Muslim Democracy by Nasr (2005: 18). Rather than appealing directly to religious sentiments or having a programmatic Islamist agenda, the AKP has engaged in a ‘pietistic politics’ well linked to rural ideals of religious observancy and moral propriety (Mandaville 2007: 120). As mentioned in the second chapter, Bayat (2008: 187) has termed the political approach as part of a new wave of thinking he has defined as ‘post-Islamist’. Significantly, the AKP defined their specific outlook on politics as that of ‘Conservative Democracy’ and claimed that this described their political behaviour rather than Islamist politics.
It is the aim of this section to examine the extent to which the AKP’s political approach of ‘Conservative Democracy’ signals its transformation into a pro-systemic moderate Islamist or Muslim-Democrat political party which is normatively committed to liberal democracy and has downgraded and merged the Islamist focus of its preceding parties of the MG from which it stemmed with other strands of political thought such as economic liberalism and political conservatism. For this reason, this section will first examine a political address given by Erdoğan at the American Enterprise Institute in 2004 in which he expounded upon the concept of ‘Conservative Democracy’ with which he described the political orientation of the AKP. Although both manifestoes attempt to encapsulate the AKP’s ‘Conservative Democracy’ outlook with which they diverge from the more Islamist, anti-systemic nature of the preceding Islamist parties, the manifestoes themselves do not cover or focus much on this theme. However, in the 2004 speech, Erdoğan illustrated this outlook and for this reason it is worth examining this text first. For that reason, this section will look at this 2004 speech before continuing to look at the 2002 and the 2007 manifesto. In the foreword of its 2007 manifesto, the AKP is described as ‘democratic-conservative’ party (AKP 2007: 5) but the term does is not elaborated upon.

The latter part of the section will then apply some of the main points of his speech to the AKP manifestoes for the 2002 and 2007 elections and examine specifically how these political documents frame or define the party’s stance towards two separate dimensions, religion and democracy. Finally, this will be supplemented by an analysis of a 2006 expert survey undertaken by Laver and Benoit on the policy positions of Turkish parties.

### 5.2.1 Conservative Democracy in Erdoğan's 2004 speech to the American Enterprise

The contents of this 2004 speech revolve around Erdogan’s attempt to elaborate on the ‘Conservative Democracy’ outlook of the AKP. In the terminology of discourse analysis (Chilton and Schäffner 1997: 213) therefore this speech carries the strategic function of legitimizing the AKP government by embedding its ideological outlook within the context of mainstream and pro-systemic centre-right rather than Islamist politics. Despite constituting a single speech, since it was narrated to a public audience by
Erdoğan in his capacity as Turkey’s Prime minister, it should be seen as ‘a small part of a large mosaic’ in the strategic political communication of the AKP (Sauer 1996: 236). In a highly personalistic environment such as that of Turkish party politics (Sayarı 2002: 25), where individual party leaders exercise much greater control and authority than in many other countries, their speeches, especially when in government, will often be an accurate reflection of the party’s ideological and programmatic stances and thus carry documentary weight. As the leading figure of the reformist generation of AKP politicians, Erdoğan has been highly invested in portraying himself as a centre-right conservative democrat rather than an Islamist as his political past still cast him in the light of the latter for many people.

Conservative Democracy

The text of the speech contains various inter-related themes in illustrating the political approach of ‘Conservative Democracy’ and is nested within the general theme of a discussion on globalization. As will be seen, there are many contradictions within the ‘Conservative Democracy’ doctrine that Erdoğan outlines which reveal a desire to distance the AKP’s image from its Islamist genealogy without wanting to abandon its moral grounding within the context of religious and traditional Islamic values for the sake of alienating its core voter base. This tension can be said to characterise the uneasy nature of the Muslim-Democrat party in general. The following excerpt constitutes a key part of Erdoğan’s speech where he attempts to present a comprehensive conception of ‘Conservative Democracy’ and its relation to the Turkish politics and society. The excerpt illustrates some of the tensions and contradictions that have been highlighted.

“A significant part of the Turkish society desires to adopt a concept of modernity that does not reject tradition, a belief of universalism that accepts localism, an understanding of rationalism that does not disregard the spiritual meaning of life, and a choice for change that is not fundamentalist. The concept of conservative democracy ... answers to this desire of the Turkish people.”

This definition attempts to endow the ‘Conservative Democracy’ approach with legitimacy by presenting it as a moderate, centrist outlook attempting to arrive at a synthesis between ‘modernity’, ‘rationalism’ on one hand and ‘tradition’ as well as the
‘spiritual meaning of life’ on the other. In that sense, as Kuru (2006: 141) states, ‘Conservative Democracy’ puts its emphasis on socially orthodox values such as ‘common sense, prudence, gradual change’. This conceptualisation resembles that of earlier centre-right conservative discourses in Turkish politics as Hale and Özbudun (2009: 25) point out and therefore puts distance between this new type of discourse and the anti-systemic rhetoric of the AKP’s Islamist predecessors. However, this concern of striking a balance between the forces of modernity and science on one hand and traditional morality and spirituality on the other is also a theme that is often mentioned in the writings and speeches of some key Turkish religious movements, such as the Gülen movement or the Nakşibendi (Yükleyen 2008: 383; Roy 1994: 88). Fethullah Gülen, the leader of the influential moderate religious Gülen movement with close links to the AKP’s leadership (Park 2008) has formulated its own form of modernity as ‘an inclusive middle way’ between religious traditional value and modernity (Kuru 2003: 130).

Erdoğan also presents the AKP’s outlook of ‘Conservative Democracy’ as a ‘... new political style and understanding in Turkish political life’, thus seemingly disconnecting the party from any links to its Islamist predecessors from the MG movement. Nevertheless, the speech later seems to contradict that by claiming that the political outlook of ‘Conservative Democracy’ was partially based on the ‘general principles of conservatism which have stood the test of time’. Erdoğan goes on to state that the AKP is ‘... a mass political party based on conservatism’ and that it ‘... takes its strength from the centre of the social spectrum and has consequently become the largest party in the centre right’. Therefore it can be seen that the term ‘Conservative Democracy’ is presented as a synthesis of political thought that is novel and based on the tested values of political conservatism. Tepe (2006: 129) suggests that the ambiguities in the AKP’s representation of ‘Conservative Democracy’ give it enough strategic flexibility to cater to a large variety of different electoral publics and segments and address both those who used to vote for its Islamist predecessors as well as those who position themselves as centre-right. Therefore, its statements reinforce the impression that the AKP has cast itself into the role of a catch-all conservative centre-right party despite continuing to hold traditional moral values linked to religion central to ethical its outlook.
In order to supplement this reasoning it could be useful to see how this desire of the AKP to portray itself as conservative-democrat, centre-right party has been manifested in election posters. The two campaign posters shown below in figures 4.3 and 4.4 are exemplary in that they present Erdoğan either in the middle or the foreground against the images of two other famous former prime ministers from centre-right parties in Turkey, Adnan Menderes and Turgut Özal. The picture do not include any politicians from Turkey’s Islamist parties, such as Necmettin Erbakan, and can be seen therefore to visualise the AKP’s attempt to present itself in a new light of a centre-right party (Hakan Yavuz 2009: 89: Akdoğan 2010: 221). The posters also reinforce Erdogan’s comments at times that he saw himself as following the political tradition of statesmen from the centre-right such as Menderes or Özal (Ayata 2004: 255). Therefore, it possible to see how the AKP has sought to identify within the historic of Turkey’s centre-right rather than Islamist parties in order to push itself into the centre-right political space of the party system.

„This image has been removed by the author of this thesis/ dissertation for copyright reasons“

Figure 5.3: Poster shows Erdoğan (middle) with former politicians Turgut Özal and Adnan Menderes
The following section will examine the 2002 and 2007 AKP manifestoes in relation to the way it frames the parties to two key dimensions, religion and democracy, which test the degree to which the party has become moderate and pro-systemic Muslim-Democrat party. As will be seen the political discourse of those texts is close to identical in its tone and emphases to the Erdoğan’s 2004 speech which was looked at in this section.

5.2.2 The AKP electoral manifestoes and ‘Conservative Democracy’

This section will analyse how the 2002 and 2007 manifestoes frame the AKP’s relation to the dimensions of democracy and religion. While the AKP’s Islamist predecessors were considered anti-systemic parties due to their heavily religious manifestoes and their ambiguous if not hostile framing of democracy, the AKP has internalised the normative principles of liberal democracy as well as moderating its religious tone to the extent that it presents itself as a self-described ‘conservative party of the masses’ (Hermann 2003: 276). Both manifestoes are similar in tone and content although the 2007 party manifesto is much longer. The 2002 programme titled ‘Development and Democratization’ and runs to an approximate length of 66 pages and 22,000 words.\footnote{The 2002 AKP programme is available at http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.html.} The 2007 AKP manifesto is much more extensive and diverse in its structure, contains more chapters, and runs to approximately 233 pages long and 53,650 words. The first
part of this section will look at how the programmes’ framed the party’s stance to religion as part of its political approach of ‘Conservative Democracy’. The second section will examine the manner in which the manifestoes reference its relation to liberal democracy as a system of governance. As Toprak (2005: 183) states, in terms of their discursive focus, the electoral programmes themselves instantiate the shift of the party from the focus of the National Outlook Movement on religious identity to the post-Islamist Muslim-Democrat perspective.

Religion in the manifestoes

One of the astonishing aspects of the AKP as a political party, given its background, is the extent to which its official discourse downplays the role of religion, whether at the individual level of perception or as collective good in the public sphere. Tepe (2006: 32) as well as Hale and Özbudun (2010: 26) term this ‘the politics of avoidance’.

As seen, the political rhetoric of the AKP’s predecessor parties from the MG movement was permeated by religious terminology (Eligür 2010: 145), although it was downplayed intelligently. In terms of actual direct references, both the 2002 and 2007 manifestoes contain hardly any religious terminology. In the latter the word religion or religious is mentioned 37 times as opposed to 10 times in the former. The increased mentioning of religion or religious in the 2007 manifesto is primarily because this larger and more extensive manifesto included as part of the ‘social Policy’ chapter a short section on the role and activities of the directorate of religious affairs in the Turkish state rather than focusing on the values of religion in the public or political sphere. Furthermore, terms which one would associate with religious values such as ‘tradition’, ‘values’, ‘moral’ or ‘ethics’ also fail to be mentioned more than a dozen times each. There are almost no direct references to god in these documents. The remainder of this section on religion in the AKP manifestoes will focus on the context of religious references in the text with a focus on the prominence of the term ‘service’. Before looking at how the manifestoes frame their understanding of democracy, the section will also analyse how the AKP presents its definition of secularism.

---

12 This restraint has sometimes elicited accusations by secularist sceptics and critics that the AKP is engaging in takiyeh, a historical practice derived from Shia theology permitting dissimulation in situations of peril (Ayata and Tütüncü 2008: 367; Baran 2007: 59; Grigoriadis 2004: 5)
Our Party refuses to take advantage of sacred religious values and ethnicity and to use them for political purposes. It considers the attitudes and practices which disturb pious people, and which discriminate them due to their religious lives and preferences, as anti-democratic and in contradiction to human rights and freedoms. On the other hand, it is also unacceptable to make use of religion for political, economic and other interests, or to put pressure on people who think and live differently by using religion. (2002 AKP Programme)

In the above-mentioned statement which appears in the first chapter of the AKP’s 2002 manifesto, ‘Fundamental Rights and Political Principles’, the party is sending out a clear and direct message that it is not a Islamist party and is also not motivated or influenced by a religious agenda. Furthermore, the party sees the involvement of ‘sacred religious values’ in the political arena as ‘anti-democratic’. This phrase has the key function of distancing if not clearly de-coupling the AKP in its political rhetoric from its Islamist MG predecessors. In this regard, the introduction of the 2002 programme also makes an interesting point that the party will not conduct politics according to ‘ideological platforms’ which refers to the Islamist ideological outlook of the RP as well as the Kemalist secularism of the centre-left CHP. In the above-discussed speech from 2004, Erdoğan makes a statement of similar length using very much the same terms. The 2007 AKP manifesto (2007: 11) repeats this claim in the first chapter though not to the full length as in the previous programme.

Yet in the instances where religion does appear throughout the manifestoes it is obvious that the AKP sees it as a key social and cultural value of Turkish society and culture. In fact, the 2002 manifesto in the first chapter states that the party sees religion ‘as one of the most important institutions of humanity’. The 2007 manifesto describes religion as ‘as a fundamental opportunity to assure continuity of moral and spiritual values and to inspire national solidarity and unity’ (AKP 2007: 110). Furthermore it refers to the ‘embracing and cohesive nature’ of religion (AKP 2007: 110). Similarly, in his 2004

---

13 “While attaching importance to religion as a social value, we do not think it right to conduct politics through religion, or to resort to organizational activities based on religious symbols. To make religion an instrument of politics and to adopt exclusive approaches to politics in the name of religion harms not only political pluralism but also religion itself. Religion is a sacred and collective value. This is how we should interpret it, how we should understand it. It should not be made the subject of political partisanship causing divisiveness.” Erdoğan 2004
speech, Erdoğan states that the primary aim of religion is ‘to bring people together with love, with peace. This is ‘the main objective of religion.’

Yet references such as these which obliquely posit the importance of religion within the context of Turkish society are so scarce within the manifestoes that it is difficult to see them in a structured or patterned way and the programmes refrain from any direct discussion on the role of religion or Islam specifically within society apart from mentioning the need to reconceptualise Turkey’s principles of secularism as will be discussed below. Hakan Yavuz (2009: 2) has underlined the necessity in Turkey for religious socio-political actors to develop ‘a highly coded political language’ and obey the rules of the secular game of Turkish politics in order not be seen as anti-systemic. Tepe (2006: 130) has also remarked on how this implicit assumption of religion as a key marker of Turkish cultural identity has been meant to subtly signal that the party still values its attachment to Islamic religious values.

*Service to society as a religious duty*

Another aspect of the manifestoes’ content which also refers to religious lens of observing social affairs is the emphasis that the party puts on service to society as a central obligation. The introduction of the 2007 manifesto the AKP cites a quote from Atatürk stating that only service to society rather than rule over it can be accepted for a state’s political leadership (AKP 2007: 5). This is mirrored in a similar statement in the 2002 programme which claims that the party understands politics as ‘a vehicle for serving society’ and that this was the party’s ‘basic purpose’. Also, the AKP in statements by Erdogan and in other literature has described itself as a *hizmet partisi* or party of services. (Yavuz 2006: 2). In a later remark in the 2007 manifesto containing the only reference to god in the text, the manifesto (2007: 62) states, ‘serving people is service to God himself’. ‘Hizmet’ (service) is an Islamic term for performing charitable acts (Özdalga 2003: 85).

Rather than simply constituting a pious description of the ethos of public service however, this particular line should be considered within the context of Turkey’s religious and Islamist movements, especially the Gülen movement, for whom ‘hizmet’ (service) represents a religious or faith-based duty (Agai 2003: 59). Further remarks in
both electoral programmes reinforce this impression. In the 2002 text for instance it mentions that ‘social solidarity and mutual assistance’ is said to be an ‘expression’ of the Turkish public’s national and ‘religious character’ while the 2007 manifesto states that ‘assisting the needy is a fundamental principle of religion’ (AKP 2007: 111). To clarify, the assertion that the AKP’s conceptual understanding of its public service ethos derives from a religious Islamic conceptual grounding of communal altruism is not meant to state that the AKP is actually an Islamist party. It is simply meant to illustrate that Islam continues to play a significant role in the ‘Conservative Democracy’ discourse even though its textual presence is euphemised. This hidden emphasis also suggests a retrospective link to the party’s Islamist predecessors.

Redefinition of secularism

The third thematic aspect in which religion surfaces across both the 2002 and the 2007 manifestoes is in their attempt at reconceptualising the definition of secularism in the Turkish context which surfaces in the first chapters of both programmes. In the first chapter the text of the 2002 manifesto reasserts the primacy of ‘Atatürk’s principles and reforms’, of which the Turkish laic variant of secularism is the most significant one, regarding them as ‘the most important vehicle for raising the Turkish public above the level of contemporary civilization’. In the foreword of the 2007 manifesto, written by Erdogan, he emphasises that the nature of Turkey’s state is ‘secular, democratic and governed by the rule of law’ and that the AKP is the ‘guarantor’, ‘guardian’ and ‘promoter of these core principles’ (AKP 2007: 10). These declarations are meant to legitimate the AKP’s political approach and nature by presenting it as centrist, pro-systemic and harbouring no particular aim ‘to alter the state system’ due to any apparent religious agenda (AKP 2007: 11). However, when one analyses the references to secularism as presented in the manifestoes it become obvious that the party in its definition envisions a secular state that is quite different from its approach to the contemporary form of Turkish state secularism. As seen, the traditional Kemalist form of state secularism formed a key ‘foundational basis’ of republican Turkey (Ayoob 2008: 99). It is much influenced by the French post-enlightenment form of laicism since in which the state exerts direct administrative and regulatory control over the conduct of religion and religious groups in society (Esmer and Petterson 2009: 483; Taniyici 2003: 468).
The AKP favours a re-interpretation of secularism according to a softer, more ‘passive’ format in line with the US model where the state has a neutral and not an interventionist role in the religious affairs of society except to safeguard people’s freedom to practice their chosen religion (Kuru 2006: 141). This preference finds expression in both manifestoes in the first chapter and in the 2004 speech by Erdoğan. The 2002 manifesto states that the party defines secularism as ‘pre-requisite to democracy’ and an ‘assurance of the freedom of religion and conscience’ rather than a form of ‘enmity against religion’. Similarly, the 2007 AKP manifesto (2007: 10) refers to secularism as ‘a model of freedom for all denominations and orientations inherent in society’. It goes on to state that it sees secularism as ‘the ability for every citizen to practice his chosen religion without the fear of retribution or discrimination’ (AKP 2007: 11).

Thus it can be seen that the manifestoes openly advocate the re-conceptualization of state secularism to a form that would be more sympathetic with the overt religiosity of the AKP’s conservative-religious voter base. This stance bears a close similarity to the view espoused by the Islamist FP which preceded the AKP (Yıldız 2003: 199-200). Importantly however, in order to formulate this aim in a manner that is seen as legitimate and pro-systemic, the retrenchment of the state’s role as an agent of regulating the sphere of religion is presented as furthering the democratic quality of the Turkey. Thus the 2002 manifesto declares secularism to be ‘a principle of freedom’. Similarly in the 2007 programme, it is referred to as ‘a model of freedom’ (AKP 2007: 10).

As seen in this section, the AKP has been quite careful in its political language of ‘Conservative Democracy’ to avoid a discourse reminiscent of Turkey’s Islamist political tradition. It avoids overt references to religion and does not present a religious agenda. Nevertheless, it is also clear through its discourse that it indicates that religion or religious values remain a significant but implicit rather than explicit element of the party’s identity. As an example, the concept of hizmet (service) within the manifestoes was discussed. Lastly, it was seen that although the party sees itself as ‘a guarantor’ of secularism it uses the election manifestoes to announce its preference for a more
moderate form of state secularism that would take a less hostile and more accommodating stance towards the promotion of religious values in society.

The manifestoes’ framing of democracy, freedom and human rights

While the AKP’s manifestoes were explicitly light on religious terminology, there is more coverage of the language of democracy, civil and political freedoms and human rights. The election manifestoes seem at times almost desperate to ensure that every ingredient of the ideal type of a liberal democratic system is acknowledged and named in the manifesto. In regard to this, Hale and Özbudun (2009: 21) emphasise the complete contrast between the language used by the AKP and its Islamist predecessors. Dağı (2008: 89) states that the use of this particular discourse as part of the AKP’s political language is motivated by the party’s ‘search for systemic legitimacy and security’. Thus, the title of the 2002 manifesto was called ‘Development and Democratization’ and its first chapter was termed ‘Fundamental rights and political principles’. Similarly, the first chapter of the 2007 chapter is called ‘Democracy and the rule of law’. It is slightly shorter and comprises one tenth of the entire manifesto. However, it needs to be considered that the 2007 manifesto is also considerably longer and more segmented at 53,650 words.

The fact that the first chapter of both electoral programmes sets out at length their attitude towards democracy and its political values signals that the party wants to emphasise their normative attachment to liberal democracy as a model of governance. Secondly, it serves as a way for the AKP to present its credentials as a mainstream and pro-systemic party. Therefore it is no great surprise that this emphasis is reinforced through the repeated use within the chapters and the rest of the manifesto of words like ‘right(s)’, ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’, ‘democratic’, ‘human rights’, ‘rule of law’, ‘civil society’, ‘NGO(s)’. For instance, the word ‘right’ or ‘rights’ is mentioned 60 times in the first chapter of the 2002 and 41 times in that of the 2007 manifesto. ‘Freedom’ appears 28 times in both chapters. Words such as ‘democracy’, ‘democratic’ or ‘democratically’ are mentioned 46 times in the first chapter of the 2002 and 47 times in that of the 2007 manifesto. For the purposes of this section, the main focus will lie on the way how democracy, human rights and freedom are framed within the first chapters of both manifestoes. For the purpose of looking at the way the manifestoes frame the
party conception of democracy, it will be examined how the texts articulate key normative aspects of liberal democracy as a system of governance. This will include how the term democracy is mentioned and understood as well as ‘freedom’, ‘individualism’, ‘human rights’, ‘rule of law’ and ‘civil society’.

**Democracy**

Both the 2002 and 2007 election manifestoes state that they value electoral representation as the primary mechanism of ensuring representative government by saying that governing authorities will be chosen ‘by public elections’ (AKP 2007: 10). In this regard, both manifestoes express the view that democracy equates to a political system ‘where legal rules are created with the approval of the citizens’ (AKP 2002) or ‘where sovereignty is vested with the people’ (AKP 2007: 10). In the 2002 manifesto, political parties are endowed within this relationship with an intermediary role of interest articulation and representation standing between the institutions of the state and the preferences of the citizenry. Importantly, the texts also qualify their stress on electoral contestation by declaring that the definition of democracy cannot simply be equated with ‘the rule of the majority’ (AKP 2007: 10) and has to make space as well for considering for the views and interests of minority groups. The 2002 manifesto state that in order to ensure ‘the pluralistic quality of democracy’ the views and interests of minorities must be taken into consideration. Thus apart from simply advocating the legitimacy of electoral democracy as the primary mechanism of ensuring representative government, the manifestoes also stress the importance that the interests of individuals need to be safeguarded against the liberal spectre of the ‘tyranny of the majority’ (Heywood 2003: 44).

**Freedom**

When the term freedom is mentioned in the texts it appears mostly in the negative sense of the concept of liberty, assuring that the ‘state always remains within the limits of the law’ (AKP 2007: 11). This also relates to what was already discussed in the previous section in the sense of how the AKP implicitly advocates a reconceptualization of Turkey’s variant of secularism towards one which would act as a ‘model of freedom’ to ensure the individual freedom of belief, especially in the religious sense, and therefore
restrict the powers of the state. This focus on the negative conception of freedom in terms of ‘absence of restraint’ (Birch 2001: 119) therefore also implies shrinking the boundaries of the state in terms of its involvement in the socio-cultural affairs of the individual or something that ‘neither government nor bureaucracy is permitted to interfere in’ (AKP 2007: 15). The desire however for limiting the powers of the state vis-a-vis the affairs of its populace encapsulates another key tenet of liberal democracy (Vincent 2010: 37). Thus the strategic interests of the AKP of expanding the civilian realm of politics as a means of ensuring their survival seems to merge with a normative attachment to the pluralistic conception of the liberal democratic model of governance (Findley 2005: 218).

**Individualism**

In framing its position in relation to liberal democracy in the manifestoes, the party also attempts to underline that it frames its conception of democracy from a bottom-up perspective starting from the perspective of the individual rather than the community. The conceptual outlook of conventional Islamist parties has traditionally articulated its collectivist and communitarian ethos of politics in a way that prioritises the interests and rights of the Islamic community of believers, the Ummah, over those of the individual members (Kardas 2008: 176). In contrast, the AKP’s individualist orientation can be seen in the manner that the manifestoes engage in a language of civil rights and freedoms and how the texts also warn against majoritarian interpretations of electoral democracy. For instance, the 2002 manifesto states that ‘respect for the rights and freedoms of individuals is the basic condition ... for the acceptance of a democratic political regime by the people’.

The 2007 manifesto carries repeated mentions of the rights of the individual as well but emphasises their importance more within the framework of establishing a strong and democratic rule of law (AKP 2007: 11). This change may be indicative of a shift of emphasis from that of a party in opposition to one in government. While the term ‘rule of law’ appears only 3 times in the 2002 manifesto, it is mentioned 13 times in the 2007 manifesto. In fact, the 2007 manifesto’s first chapter is called ‘democracy and rule of law’. Rule of law is also a key normative term in the definition of liberal democracy in codifying a set of rules and precepts enshrining the liberties and freedoms of the
individual and therefore limiting the degree of interference that the state has in the life of the private citizen (Heywood 1999: 154).

Civil society

Most definitions of liberal democracy seem to predicate its moral legitimacy partially upon the presence of a strong and healthy civil society (Heywood 1999: 227). The presence of a strong civil society is often cited as conducive or even essential to democratic consolidation (Grugel 2002: 115; Linz and Stepan 1998: 55). The concept of civil society or its importance is not clearly framed within the AKP’s manifestoes nor is there any explanation of how civil society would be enabled to contribute to democratic politics. This is slightly surprising given that the AKP has roots in different Islamic civil society movements in Turkey (Tuğal 2007: 14). The ambiguous definition of civil society on the part of the AKP in its manifestoes must also be understood in the context of the relatively poor history that the concept of an autonomous civil society has understood until recently. Instead political discourses have been dominated by emphasis on the patrimonial benevolence of the state as the main political structure (Kalaycioğlu 2002b: 250). Within the 2002 manifesto, one of the subsections of the first chapter is called ‘democratization and civil society’ but there is little open discussion of what civil society consists of and only one reference stating the importance of listening to the opinions of ‘non-governmental organisation’ when implementing democratic reforms in order ‘to raise the civil society organizations to the level at contemporary democratic countries’. The 2007 manifesto does not mention ‘civil society’ per se but contains a short discussion of the important benefits NGOs bring towards democracy.

For instance, the text mentions that the presence of ‘strong and influential’ non-voluntary organisations is an indication of the strength and rootedness of the democratic system (AKP 2007: 17). This is preceded by a large section detailing the AKP government’s plans to facilitate the establishment of non-governmental associations and trusts. Nevertheless, despite the party’s stated aim of involving the voluntary sector as well as the widest sections of society into the governmental decision-making processes, there is no indication within the texts how this will be implemented or what mechanisms will be used for this purpose. Furthermore, the use of the term NGO, civil society is not mentioned often in the 2007 manifesto, possible reflects a narrow and
rather instrumentalised conception of civil society. Although the manifesto goes on to mention the term several times throughout the text it is always in conjunction with the delivery of certain services whether in the healthcare sector, gender issues, domestic violence or youth services. As a result the impression arises that there is a certain confusion regarding the application of the term NGO, especially as a synonym for civil society, and that the AKP acknowledges it but in a rather restrictive fashion that accepts it as a useful partner in the provision of social services but not much else.

_Human rights and Universalism_

The manifesto texts combine their normative emphasis on the values and merits of liberal democracy as a system of governance based on the rule of law and the guarantee of civil and political liberties and freedoms with a heavy stress of their normative attachment to universal values and international standards of rights and freedoms (Toprak 2005: 183). This coincides with the general usage of these terms in the party’s overall discourse (Larrabee and Rabasa 2008: 47). Dağı (2008: 97) argues that acknowledging the importance of human rights confers ‘discursive legitimacy’ upon the AKP while the language of universalist values endear it to liberal sectors of the intelligentsia. In the 2002 programme there are numerous references to ‘international standards’, ‘universal standards’ and ‘international agreements’ relating to civil and political liberties and mentions specifically in this context the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights (Kumbaracıbaşi 2009: 67).

The programme further claims that without embedding the ‘fundamentals of universal justice and human rights’ in the rule of law, Turkey ‘... cannot obtain a respectable place in the international community’. The 2007 manifesto continues the focus on human rights in its text, specifically in a sub-section of the first chapter titled ‘fundamental rights and freedoms’ which outlines their importance to the party and refers to the international UN treaties on political rights and liberties that the AKP ratified (AKP 2007: 14). Again, the text invokes an universalist reference to civil and political rights and liberties by acknowledging them as ‘the common ground of humanity’ and ‘universally shared ideals of mankind’ (AKP 2007: 14) and stating that human rights
issues cannot be framed only within domestic rule of law but requires an international code of protection (AKP 2007: 14-15).

This concludes the analysis of the AKP’s election manifestoes. As was argued, these documents served as one of the primary platforms in which the party as a public actor has instantiated its separation from the discourse of its Islamist predecessors from the MG tradition. Instead the AKP defined its ‘Conservative Democracy’ political outlook in terms of a mainstream and pro-systemic conservative democrat party. It was seen that the party’s discourse as presented through its manifestoes as well as Erdoğan’s 2004 speech emphasises the AKP’s normative attachment to liberal democracy, political and civil rights and liberties as well as the values of pluralism. Simultaneously, it has attempted to downplay any type of Islamist political language while also retaining an emphasis on the importance of religion as source of moral and ethical values. The next section will focus on expert survey data collected by Laver and Benoit on Turkish parties in 2006 to see to what extent perceptions of the AKP match the profile it aims to present with its ‘Conservative Democracy’ discourse.

5.2.3 Laver and Benoit’s expert survey on Turkish parties

The previous sections of this chapter have set out and examined the manner in which the political discourse used by the AKP in its manifestoes diverges from that of earlier Islamist parties in relation to its attachment to the norms of liberal democracy and its moderate tone in terms of religion. This last section will now complement this analysis by looking at expert data that was collected by Laver and Benoit (2006) as part of a bigger cross-national research project on party policy. As such, the expert survey did not focus on the party’s political discourse or its manifestoes but were concerned more broadly with the nature of the party regarding key social, political and economical position as perceived by observers of Turkish politics. The survey was undertaken towards the end of the AKP’s first term as a ruling party. Although Laver and Benoit (2006: 157) lament that the response rate to the questionnaire for Turkey’s parties’ policy position was very low at 9%, the survey still collected 29 responses, a sufficiently large number to justify the use of this particular material as valid research data for this thesis.
The expert panel survey collected and measured responses to 10 policy dimensions included in the survey on Turkish parties.\textsuperscript{14} It asks the respondents to locate parties along a scale from 1 to 20 either in relation to the saliency that the dimension has for them or regarding the degree to which they are either inclined or opposed to a particular theme. The data uses the mean value of all survey responses. For the purpose of simplifying the analysis, using the weighted average, the scale was expanded to 100 and sometimes reconfigured from -50 to +50 in order to better visualize the comparative evaluation of the parties’ perceived position on a dimension. This section will focus on the position that the experts gave to the AKP in relation to the other parties according to the dimensions of the left-right ideological spectrum, support for religion in politics as well as support for joining the EU. Unfortunately, Laver and Benoit’s survey did not feature an item measuring respondents’ views concerning the degree to which parties expressed support for or attachment to liberal democratic norms of governance.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure5.5.png}
\caption{Based on the data from Laver and Benoit’s expert survey}
\end{figure}

As one can see in the above figure 5.5, when placed along a left-right ideological scale the AKP is not identified as the most right-wing party in the expert panel survey but rather, with an aggregate score of 7, is placed between the centre-right ANAP and DYP, at 2 and 11 respectively. The mean score for all right-wing parties is 13. This would seem to indicate that the AKP’s promotion of a moderate centre-right position with its

\textsuperscript{14} The 10 policy dimensions are: EU membership, religion versus secularism, decentralization, deregulation, nationalism, social policy, immigration, environment, NATO Peace-keeping, taxes versus spending.
'Conservative Democracy' political discourse and its policies has been accepted and is regarded with some credibility as genuine and legitimate by the political experts that were consulted for the panel. This estimation also accords with the images of the party’s posters that were shown in the previous sections which visualised the AKP’s aim of placing itself within the historical tradition of Turkey’s centre-right rather than Islamist party politics. Nevertheless, when one looks at the mean scores of the saliency estimations for the AKP on the 10 available policy-dimensions in figure 5.6, it is noteworthy that religion, at 90, tops the list, followed by the issue of EU membership with a score of 88. Economic or fiscal dimensions such as the issue of deregulation or increased taxation rank much lower at 68 and 66.

![Perceived importance of dimensions to AKP](image)

Figure 5.6: Based on the data from Laver and Benoit’s expert survey

When this is compared with the salience estimation of religion for other parties, as shown in figure 5.7 below, it is seen that the AKP was clearly identified as being the most party most sympathetic towards supporting religious principles in politics with a score of 26. The nearest party was the far-right MHP with 2 points. The mean score for the right-wing parties also amounts to 2 whereas for the left-wing parties it is -33. Therefore, this illustrates that the AKP was practically placed into a class of its own in relation to this dimension as most other parties were perceived as being equivocal in their stance or tending to favour secular principles in politics. This signifies that despite the clear efforts of the AKP to portray itself as a mainstream, conservative-democrat party as for instance through its adoption of the ‘Conservative-Democracy’ discourse, it
is still perceived as a political party for whom religious principles are of great significance in its political approach. This finding also validates looking at the Muslim-Democrat AKP in the context of its Islamist predecessors of the MG movement rather than simply assessing it on its merits as a centre-right conservative party.

Figure 5.7: Based on the data from Laver and Benoit’s expert survey

However, as seen in figure 5.6, despite linking the AKP with its Islamist MG predecessors, when all the mean saliency estimations for the available policy dimensions are compared, according to the expert survey the issue of EU membership is placed second-highest for the AKP. In order to contextualise this, the following section will give a brief outline of the recent history of Turkey EU membership accession as well a short overview of the position of the main parties towards the accession negotiations.

After being elected in 2002, the AKP adopted a very positive and zealous policy of pursuing the opening of EU accession negotiations which were officially opened in 2005 and contributed to the passing of several which were unprecedented in terms of liberalizing Turkey’s political culture (Kubicek 2011: 914). This process was part of bringing Turkey’s political system into line with the EU’s acquis communautaire and conforming to the Copenhagen criteria. Nevertheless, after 2005 and partly in response to the defeat of the referenda on the EU constitution in France and the Netherlands, this reform process began to slow (ICG 2008: 1). The second half of the AKP’s period in government was marked by relative stagnation in the EU accession process as
recriminations between both sides increased, especially the election of leaders in key EU member states like Germany and especially France that were hostile to Turkish EU membership (ICG 2008: 4). As of 2006, due to Turkey’s refusal to recognise Greek Cyprus as a sovereign state, 8 of the accession chapters Turkey needs to implement have been ‘frozen’ which has stalled negotiations indefinitely (Usul 2011: 167-168). Nevertheless, according to Lagendijk (2012: 186), a new subtle push for further reforms in line with working towards EU accession has been visible at times since 2009.

At the time that this expert panel survey in early 2006 was undertaken, Turkey’s EU accession process had not entered its current period of stagnation owing to mutual difficulties yet although the 2005 referenda in France and the Netherlands against an EU constitution had already taken place. In many countries, the issue of the EU constitution was linked to Turkey’s EU membership accessions and the vote against the EU constitution in key EU member states was thus also interpreted as a public vote against Turkey joining the European Union (MacLennan 2009: 29). Turkish public support towards EU membership, although already declining since its all-time high in 2002, was still relatively high before but began declining to 50% after 2006 (Öniş 2008: 14-15). The overall picture resulting from the expert panel survey is relatively accurate in capturing the degree of support shown by the particular parties towards the issue of EU membership. Firstly however the stances of the main parties towards EU membership and the accession process need to be illustrated briefly.

All three main parties, AKP, MHP and CHP, have shown various degrees of sympathy in their respective stances towards EU membership. Nevertheless, drawings its position from an ideational basis of militant ethno-nationalism, the MHP has traditionally adopted a hostile and ‘ultra-nationalist’ stance towards the EU (Ҫarkoğlu 2009: 15). Moreover, the party has frequently rejected the entire structure of the entire accession process (Kösebalaban 2011: 15). Meanwhile, the CHP has been more supportive of EU membership theoretically but has also often adopted a hostile and ‘euro-sceptic’ stance in order to gain ground against the AKP (Gülmez 2008: 434). Gülmez (2008: 433) and Kösebalaban (2008: 14) also state that a substantial number of the CHP’s members and ruling cadres as well as the kemalist supporters have opposed the actual process of Turkey’s EU accession on grounds of harming Turkey’s national interests and being inimical to the values of republican Kemalism.
The AKP has long been seen as the least EU-sceptic party actor in Turkey since 2002 and the most supportive party of EU membership. In that sense, Grigoriadis (2009: 121) credits it as the party that has advanced the membership process the furthest. Since the increasing stagnation in the EU accession process following the French and Dutch referendums on the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 and the emergence of European politicians who are deeply hostile to Turkey’s accession like the French Prime minister Sarkozy and Germany’s chancellor Merkel (Öniş and Yılmaz 2009: 14), all parties have become less enthusiastic towards EU membership and this development has also been mirrored, as seen, in a decline of popular support (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2009: 122; 127).

If one looks at where the individual parties were located in their support for EU membership as seen in figure 5.8, the AKP, along with the pro-Kurdish DEHAP and the centre-right ANAP, is seen as being one of the most sympathetic parties with a score of 37. Çarkoğlu (2003: 168) has noted that the pro-Kurdish DEHAP tended to exhibit the highest support for Turkey’s EU membership. This is linked to the fact that the high levels of popular support for EU membership have consistently been expressed in the South-East of Turkey (Tocci 2007: 70) Towards the low end of the scale are the far-right MHP and the populist right-wing GP, both of whom vehemently opposed the accession process and saw it as threat to Turkish sovereignty, are located at the low end of the scale with -26 and -21 points. This is a fairly accurate overall picture of their stance as both parties advocate a nationalist and, in the case of the GP, populist opposition to EU accession process. The overall mean for all parties is 15, whereas the average amongst all right-wing parties is 10 with the far-right MHP and the being the most opposed parties to Turkey joining the EU.

The policy dimension of EU membership was analyzed here as the earlier section focusing on the AKP’s Islamist predecessors in the 1990s featured negative references to Western political actors as a proxy indicator to test the level of extremism and anti-Westernism of these parties. It was argued that extremist or anti-system parties are far more likely to make negative references concerning Western political actors in negative light than moderate and centrist political actors. In that sense it is important to note that the AKP was seen as one of the parties most favourable towards joining the European Union in the expert survey.
This concludes this section. As seen, the complementary analysis using the data from Laver and Benoit’s expert surveys was useful in reinforcing the argument that the AKP’s Muslim-Democrat discourse has shifted away from that of its Islamist predecessors towards that of a moderate, centre-right political actor. Firstly, it was seen that the survey respondents placed the AKP in between conservative, centre-right parties like ANAP and DYP rather putting at the extreme right end. Secondly, the AKP is perceived as placing a lot of importance on the issue of Turkey’s EU membership and was identified as the second most supportive party on this dimension. However thirdly, according to the survey respondents, of all the available dimensions in the survey religion was perceived to be the most salient to the AKP suggesting that it is still seen as a type of Islamist or Muslim-Democrat rather than a conventional centre-right, conservative party. Having come to the end of the analytical part of this chapter, the next section will now briefly summarise the findings.

5.3 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to explore the ‘Conservative Democracy’ political discourse of the AKP in order to illustrate its pro-systemic and moderate political orientation in terms of the party’s relation to religion and liberal democracy, especially in the context of the AKP’s Islamist predecessors. This related to the stated research hypothesis that
only Islamist parties which had shifted their normative outlook in favour of liberal democracy as a governance system and moderated the significance of religion in their political agenda and tone could have a positive role in consolidating or institutionalising party systems. In order to place this shift into the context of the Turkish case, the first section of the chapter presented and examined the discourse of Turkey’s Islamist party movement up to the founding of the AKP.

In this sense it was seen that the AKP’s predecessors since the 1970s employed a political language which was much more anti-systemic and Islamic. Data from the CMP project was analysed in order to scrutinise the RP and FP manifestoes for three separate elections in the 1990s in relation to the themes of religion and democracy. It was seen that although the manifestoes’ emphases on the policy dimensions as measured by the CMP wavered throughout the 1990s a process of moderation occurred as themes of tradition and morality and negative mentions of the EU declined while positive mentions of internationalist themes and even the EU increased. This reinforces the broad opinion within the scholarly literature that Turkey’s Islamist parties embarked on a limited and strategic process of moderation during the second half of the 1990s in order to escape censure and closure at the hands of the establishment. Nevertheless, as seen, was constructed within a narrow-minded and sectarian manner and fell far short of adopting an inclusive understanding of democracy which is compatible with liberal democratic precepts.

Having established and defined the anti-systemic nature of the AKP’s predecessor parties, the second half of the chapter looked at the party’s political discourse of ‘Conservative Democracy’. As stated, this form of discourse shows how much the party moved away from the position of its predecessors to fully embrace the norms of liberal democracy. Through the analysis of a prime ministerial speech given by Erdoğan in 2004, a conceptual sense of the term conservative democracy was established. This showed that the discourse of ‘Conservative Democracy’ aimed to promote the AKP as centre-right, democratic party while simultaneously signalling that religious and traditional values continued to be seen as important sources of guidance and inspiration. Subsequently, a qualitative discourse analysis of the 2002 and 2007 manifestoes was undertaken to establish how the AKP’s political language frames the party’s relation to religion and tradition on one hand and liberal democratic values on the other. Lastly, in
order to complement the analysis of the AKP manifesto texts, expert survey data collected by Laver and Benoit in 2006 was analysed.

The findings of the analysis of Erdogan’s speech on the AKP’s ‘Conservative Democracy’ discourse, the content analysis of the 2002 and 2007 manifestoes as well as of the Laver and Benoit’s expert survey data from illustrated that the AKP has undertake great effort to fundamentally divorce its discourse as a public actor from that of its Islamist predecessors. The role of religion within the party’s discourse has been diluted to the point of appearing to be harmless and trivial, while the party’s normative attachment to liberal democracy and its guiding values were repeatedly and prominently highlighted. Nevertheless, as was stated, the AKP does still hold religious values to be important and at times this is vocalised in the manifestoes although in very general terms. Additionally, the analysis of the expert survey data showed, there is still a perception that the party as a whole is supportive of the role of religion in politics.

The next chapter will proceed to implement the Mainwaring and Scully’s research framework on party system institutionalization in relation to the Turkish case and will focus on the first two criteria that they posit, regularity in inter-party competition and social rootedness.
Chapter 6 – Regularity in inter-party competition in the party system and social rootedness

The purpose of the next two chapters is to summarize the statistical research relating to the Turkish party system that was undertaken in applying the three separate criteria of Mainwaring and Scully’s framework of party system institutionalization which were investigated in this thesis to the Turkish party system. The aim of these chapters is two-fold. Firstly to examine the claim that party system institutionalization has advanced in the Turkish polity across various empirical fields pertaining to electoral democracy. Secondly, the chapters will investigate the relation between the emergence of a nation-wide ‘Muslim Democrat’ quasi-mass party in the Turkish party system, in the form of the AKP in 2001, and the development of party system institutionalization. This chapter will analyse the evolution of Turkey’s party system under the lens of two individual criteria of Mainwaring and Scully’s framework of party system institutionalisation, regularity in inter-party competition and the social rootedness of parties. The other criterion of the framework, the degree to which all the main actors of the democratic political system and the electoral process are seen as legitimate and accepted, will be investigated in chapter 6.

The time span that is used stretches from the elections of 1987, which are seen as the first national elections in which there was no military interference after the 1980 coup, until the local elections of 2009. In the first section of this chapter, regularity in inter-party competition in the Turkish context will be operationalized by using two different measures. Firstly, the party system fragmentation within Turkish party politics will be examined throughout the period of 1987 to 2009 using Laakso and Taagepera’s formula. Secondly, regularity in inter-party competition will be analysed by examining the levels of electoral volatility in the Turkish party system using both total electoral volatility and intra-party bloc volatility. The criterion of social rootedness will also be examined through two different methodological approaches. Firstly, following Mainwaring and Scully’s methodology, this will involve looking at the average age of parties in the party system. Secondly, using both electoral data from both the local and national elections, the difference in municipal and parliamentary vote-share extant in the Turkish party system will be explored as a means of illustrating to what extent parties receive the same vote-share from their constituencies.
Inter-party regularity in voting

Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 205) posit that a high degree of regularity in inter-party competition is vital for the emergence of a stable party system. As the first section will illustrate in more detail, the manner in which this has been generally operationalized is to examine the evolution of total electoral volatility within a party system. Hence, unstable or ‘inchoate’ party systems will exhibit a high degree of total electoral volatility. The more institutional stability a party system acquires, the lower its indices of electoral volatility will be. A further measure for determining the extent of regularity in inter-party competition is the method of determining the effective number of parties developed by Rae in the 1970s and further elaborated by Taagepera and Laakso whose formula will be used. As previously stated, low fragmentation in party systems can also attest to stable party systems (Webb 2007: 12). In the Turkish context, this doctoral dissertation posits that the emergence of a moderate Islamist or ‘Muslim Democrat’ party like the AKP has contributed to stabilising and hence institutionalising the party system by increasing inter-party regularity in voting and thus subsequently lowering electoral volatility. This section will use macro-electoral data pertaining to 6 national from 1987 to 2007.

Social Rootedness

Mainwaring and Scully’s criterion pertains to the degree of rootedness that political parties enjoy within their electoral settings. It is a measure of the intensity and strength of the linkages that exist between political parties and their electoral constituencies. The main methodological measure for this section is based on examining the relative difference of individual parties and party blocs between their vote-share at the level of local and national elections. This statistical measure of electoral difference, as Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 9) argue, can serve to reliably assess the degree to which parties are embedded within their local electorates. A second complementary measure, the age of political parties, will also be applied as previous studies on party system institutionalization have also used it (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Lambrighi and Kuenzi 2001; Johnson Tan 2005). This section will also use macro-electoral data pertaining to 6 national and 5 local elections from 1989 until 2009. In order to examine ‘partisan attachment of the electorate’ to evaluate the social rootedness of the individual parties, party blocs and the party system overall, the vote share for provincial general council elections was chosen to serve for local
elections as they are seen as the best comparative equivalent to the general parliamentary elections (Çarkoglu 2009: 1).

Regional categorization

In order to aggregate the electoral data of Turkey’s 81 provinces and evaluate more specific regionalised electoral patterns, 5 distinct regional clusters were devised. Theoretically, it would have been possible to use either the classic geographical categorization scheme adapted by the Turkish government in 1941 for census purposes using 8 regions or the newer scheme used by the Turkish Statistics Office which divides the country into 12 separate regions.\(^{15}\) However, in line with earlier studies of Turkey’s electoral geography (Şekercioğlu and Arikan 2008; Jefferson West II 2004; Çarkoğlu 1999), it was decided to divide Turkey’s provinces according to a three-part scheme owing to the generally similar voting dynamics that are found within three general regions. They

\(^{15}\) The classic 1941 scheme divides Turkey into an Aegean region, Black Sea region, Central Anatolian region, Eastern Anatolian region, Marmara region, Mediterranean region and south-eastern Anatolia region. The newer The classificatory scheme which is used by the Turkish statistics bureau categorizes the country along the lines of: Istanbul; West Marmara; East Marmara; Aegean; Mediterranean; West Black Sea; East Black Sea; West Anatolia; Central East Anatolia; Central East Anatolia; North East Anatolia; South East Anatolia.
consist firstly of one grouping holding 14 provinces from the Thracian, Aegean and Mediterranean coastal regions; another one incorporating 51 Black-Sea and Anatolian provinces and a final regional cluster holding all south-eastern provinces. However, Istanbul and Ankara were excluded from this and kept as individual provinces due to their unique status and size. Istanbul’s provincial boundaries hold 72 parliamentary seats while those of Ankara contain 29 parliamentary constituencies.

Most south-eastern provinces were put into a separate regional category based on the degree of Kurdish ethnicity extant within their provincial populations as they exhibit electoral characteristics that differentiate them from the rest of Turkey especially in regards to the pre-dominance of pro-Kurdish parties in both local and national elections. For instance, in the 2009 local elections, the pro-Kurdish DTP was usually the first or second party in the provincial returns (Çarkoglu 2009: 3). The same pattern was visible a decade earlier in terms of the now defunct pro-Kurdish HADEP thus reinforcing this assumption (Çarkoglu 2000: 156). As will be pointed out later in this chapter as well, the south-eastern region of Turkey is also the least developed and most impoverished in the country. As it is formally forbidden to publish official statistics or surveys regarding demographic information on ethnic characteristics in Turkey, secondary literature had to be used. Sirkeci (2000) and Mutlu (1996) in their research on Kurdish demographics in Turkey arrive at an approximate estimation of the level of Kurdish ethnicity along an 8-step percental scale at a per province level.

Using their data, all south-eastern provinces whose populations were at least 65% ethnically Kurdish were put in one regional category. This grouping included the provinces of Ağrı, Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis Diyarbakır, Hakkari, İğdir, Mardin, Mus, Şanlıurfa, Siirt, Şırnak, Tunceli and Van. The data used for this chapter is macro-level electoral data. Almost all of it derives from Turkish sources. In order to compile a dataset of national and local election return for all 81 provinces from 1987 until 2009, the main sources that were used were supplied due to the kind courtesy of Professor Ali Çarkoglu, as well as from the Ankara office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. For the local election data 1989-2004 for all provinces, the data was sourced from Yerelnet, a governance website attached the TürkStat, the office of Turkish statistics. For the 2009 local elections, the election returns were taken from the Turkish news websites NTVMSNBC and Hürriyet.
6.1 Regularity in inter-party competition

This section will address the first criteria of inter-party regularity that Mainwaring and Scully establish within their framework. Firstly, there will be a brief recapitulation of some of the theoretical and methodological ground concerning this field and applying this to the Turkish context. Secondly, two measures, the effective number of parties and electoral volatility, will be used to examine how regularity in inter-party voting developed in Turkey from 1987 until 2009, especially focusing on the period after 2002.

6.1.1 Electoral Volatility in general

As discussed in the literature review, party systems can only be judged to have developed functional constancy when patterns of electoral interaction have achieved a certain degree of ‘stability and a degree of orderliness’ (Heywood 2002: 7). Mainwaring (2006: 206) argues that regularity in electoral competition is the most important dimension from the four criteria in Mainwaring and Scully's framework due to conceptual proximity between stability and institutionalization, and sees it as the easiest and most straightforward to determine. Therefore, Mainwaring and Scully set out the level of stability in the rules and the nature of inter-party competition as their first criterion in assessing party system institutionalization.

Furthermore, there seems to be a consensus in the terrain of party system scholarship that aggregate total electoral volatility extant within a party system constitutes the best ‘yardstick’ (Mainwaring 1998: 71) for measuring a party system’s stability (Mainwaring 1998: 71; Schedler 1995: 11; Johnson Tan 2006: 97; Hazama 2009: 2; Morlino 2009: 209). Mainwaring and Scully use volatility as their only measure for determining the regularity in inter-party competition. By examining the electoral shifts between parties or party blocs between several elections, it is possible to determine long-term trends in the party system. Morlino (2009: 209) uses Key’s concept of ‘critical elections’, those which succeed in significantly re-aligning voting behaviour, and argues that the frequency of their occurrence can also serve as an additional gauge of the stability in regularity in inter-party voting although he admits that it is a rather subjective measure. However, this term makes
sense and can be used to interpret the Turkish national elections of 2002 which significantly re-ordered the political landscape.

The main premise derived from the discussion of the extant party system literature in chapter 2 is that in stable and institutionalized party systems the electorate has sufficiently acclimatized itself to and gained awareness of the positions of political parties that the body of floating voters is minimized. Although as stated this development cannot be equated with the broader process of democratic consolidation, party systems with a certain degree of institutionalisation and public responsiveness have been seen as a boon to the process of democratic consolidation in democratizing countries. In contrast, weakly institutionalised or ‘inchoate’ party systems in Mainwaring and Scully’s terms, typically register high rates of electoral volatility and are more likely to lead to an electorate with weak or little partisan identification as in Turkey during the mid-1990s where voters tend to shop around between parties, ‘moving on to another brand if the first one fails to meet their expectations’ (Hale 2002: 184). In that sense, along with the gradual institutionalisation of the party system, there is the expectation of a concomitant drop in electoral volatility. In order to calculate the electoral volatility on a per-party level or on the level of the party system, Pedersen’s method is the most widely recognised and commonly used and is also advocated by Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 6). In this section, using Turkish election data, apart from calculating the total electoral volatility, volatility for each ideological party bloc was also calculated.

6.1.2 The Turkish context

As stated in the third chapter which focused on the Turkish context, since the mid-1960s, the stability of Turkey’s political system has been chronically undermined by high levels of electoral volatility (Özbudun 2001: 239). This was compounded by the military interventions of 1970 and 1980 as well as constitutional party dissolutions that were instrumental in disrupting voters’ linkages to the established party labels and therefore hindered partisan attachment (Kalaycioğlu 2008: 299). These acts decoupled the structured partisan relations between the electorate and the party system that had existed up to then in an attempt by the military authorities to re-initiate democratic party politics with a clean slate. The restrictive laws promulgated in the 1982 constitution which restricted the
freedom of the press, the freedom of Trade Union as well as the political and civil rights of individuals exacerbated this by effectively closing civic spaces for political articulation and severely curtailing the activities that Turkey’s citizens were allowed to engage in politically (Zürcher 2004: 281). Kalaycıoğlu (2002: 62-63) has argued that Turkey’s civil society in the 1990s was very weak reflecting both low levels of inter-personal trust in society in general as well as a low overall involvement in civil associational groups. Furthermore, Toros (2007: 408) highlights that the 1982 constitution, by upholding laws introduced after an earlier military intervention in 1971, immensely complicated the bureaucratic procedures for establishing civil society organisations and increased control over these by the interior ministry.

As seen, until 1987 the Turkish political landscape following the re-introduction of elections in 1983 was completely new in the form of the parties and the names running them. It was only in 1987 that the old generation of party leaders from the 1970s were permitted by popular referendum to resume their political careers (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2007: 32). Subsequently, in 1994, 14 years after the 1980 coup, did a constitutional decision allow parties to re-adopt their old pre-1980 coup names. According to Sayarı (2002: 10), ‘voter volatility defied the regularity in patterns of party competition and hindered the stabilization of the party system’. The return of the former party leaders from the 1970s after 7 years of absence did not stabilize electoral politics but rather contributed to considerable electoral instability in the decade of the 1990s which was dominated by short-term minority or coalition governments. Zürcher (2004: 296) argues that the reconfiguration of Turkey’s party system in the wake of the 1980 military coup was instrumental in introducing the phenomenon of the ‘floating voter’ into the Turkish context which set the ground for high electoral volatility during the 1990s.

Çarkoğlu (2002: 31) states that since the first post-1980 coup elections 23% of the electorate shifted their voting patterns in Turkey from one party to another at every election. In this sense, he classified the incidence of electoral volatility in Turkey as ‘... by far the largest among modern democracies’ (Çarkoğlu 2000: 156). In that sense, the 1990s were characterised as a period of ‘extreme multi-partism’ with periods of high electoral volatility, party system fragmentation and weak voter attachment to parties throughout the decade (Sayarı 2002: 22). Özbudun (2001: 242) reinforces this view adding that parties
were not ‘strongly rooted’ in civil society and the local settings although he names the Islamist RP and its semi-mass party format in the 1990s as an exception.

In this sense, as was mentioned in the third and fourth chapter, the parliamentary elections of 2002, coming on top of the most severe economic crises in Turkey’s post-World War II history and a major earthquake in 1999, were ‘critical elections’ which introduced a major re-alignment in voting dynamics. The notion of the ‘critical elections’ is useful in analysing the nature of the 2002 national elections. Conceptualised within the context of US politics originally, critical elections are those which cause ‘sharp and durable realignments’, in which ‘more or less profound readjustments occur in the relations of power’ and where ‘new and durable electoral groupings are formed’ (1955: 4). Sayarı (2007: 206) noted how those national elections, which were the first that the AKP contested, had far-reaching transformational consequences for the party system.

The first level at which this change can be seen electorally is that only two parties, the newly founded AKP and the traditional center-left, Kemalist CHP, succeeded in gaining parliamentary admission. The entire remaining political mainstream was excluded and has since struggled to survive as marginal players in an electoral landscape featuring the AKP as the new centre-right dominant party in Turkish politics and the centre-left CHP, as well as the far-right MHP after the 2007 elections, as the remaining opposition party (Rabasa and Larabee 2008: 2). This systemic realignment at the national ballot box in 2002 through the parliamentary defeat and ejection of all incumbent parties also serves to explain the phenomenal rise in electoral volatility that was recorded in 2002 to 51% at national level as will be seen later.

Political party groupings

For the purposes of straight-forward analysis and evaluation of intra-bloc volatility, a tri-partite ideological division of the political spectrum was undertaken comprising the political spectrum of left-wing, right-wing and Islamist party families. Despite their ideological differentiation, the Muslim-Democrat AKP has been included in the last group. The inherent instability and fragility of many party systems in so-called ‘new democracies’ with their concomitant high electoral volatility means that many parties have a life-span of one election, promptly disappearing at the next one (Wallis 2003: 20-21; Schedler 1995: 209-210).
This complicates monitoring the development of a party system across different elections over longer time periods. The high number of party closures and bans in Turkey is an additional aggravating factor. This measure is often quite ineffectual as the same party will often re-emerge under a new name, either on its own or by merging with another similar-minded party. Hence, for the purposes of this research project in order to measure the total electoral volatility across several electoral cycles it was decided to include all political parties for which a predecessor party could be found in the previous election. However, in the instances where parties could not be matched up at national elections their fraction of the total vote-share was usually insignificant. At the most the vote-share that could not be taken into the equation therefore amounted to 9% during the 1999 national elections.

6.1.3 Fractionalization of the party system

Apart from looking at the development of electoral volatility within a party system, a second complementary lens through which the regularity in inter-party competition can be evaluated is by examining the level of fractionalization extant in the Turkish party system. As seen in the literature review of chapter 2, party system fractionalisation is primarily concerned with the number of parties present within a party system. A high number of parties in the party system, extreme multi-partism, is conventionally equated with a highly fractionalised as well as weakly institutionalised party system. Sayarı (2002: 23) refers to Turkey in this regard. As stated, party systems institutionalisation, although theorised to be an important contributing factor in processes of democratic consolidation, cannot be equated with the latter phenomenon as it is a conducive but subordinate development. Also as stated in the second chapter, at the other end of the spectrum, institutionalization of the party system is of course also impeded in situations where one single party has virtual ‘ownership’ over it as in Mexico where one party ruled controlled the political system for 70 years until 2002.

Sartori (2001: 94) places the ideal number of parties for moderate, pluralist and institutionalised multi-party systems between 3 or 5 ‘effective’ parties. Additionally, Sartori (2000: 16) focuses on what he terms ‘effective’ political parties, those which possess sufficient electoral resources to have either blackmail or coalition government
potential. As stated in chapter 3, this is an ideal measure to investigate the number of effective parties in party systems and furthermore can also be used to indicate electoral stability. Laakso and Taagepera’s formula for calculating the effective number of parties (ENP) within a party system, generally seen as the best and most universally accepted method (Webb and White 2007: 12), was used here to determine the effective number of parties using national vote-share, distribution of legislative seat-share and vote-share at regional level.  

As shown in figure 6.2, when looking at the effective number of parties in the Turkish party system as per aggregate vote-share in national and local elections as well as per seat-share since the 1987 national elections, it is possible to observe that the ENP rose across all three levels until the 1999 elections when 5 ‘effective’ parties entered parliament. Çarkoğlu (1998: 551) cites this development as a significant factor impeding stable single party government and conducive to the contemporary atmosphere of political instability and short-lived coalition governments throughout the 1990s. Subsequently, starting with the critical national elections of 2002 and continuing with the 2007 national elections, there was a drastic decline in the effective number of parties. Thus, the number of effective parties at the national level per vote-share peaked in 1999 at almost 7, but then fell to 5.40 in 2002 and to 3.47 in 2007. When this performance is compared with the development of party system fractionalization as per local elections, one can see that the evolution across both types of elections is broadly similar.

When examining the effective number of parties in the party system using legislative seat-share rather than vote-share, the trend from 1987 to 2007 is generally similar yet drastically lower as this measure is affected by Turkey’s 10% electoral threshold. The drop in the number of parties between 1999 and 2002 is more dramatic here since the electoral threshold barely allowed two parties, the AKP and CHP, to gain parliamentary representation. However, it can be argued that the 10% electoral threshold distorts the number of effective parties as it acts as an artificial measure of capping the number of

\[ \text{ENP} = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i} = \frac{1}{1 - F} \]  
(Laakso and Taagepera 1979)
parties admitted to parliament and moderates fragmentation (Özbudun 1996: 127). Sayarı (2007: 204) reinforces this in arguing that the composition of parties based on parliamentary seat-share is more a reflection of Turkey’s electoral system and in particular the 10% threshold rather than a genuine reflection of voting impulses among the electorate. Therefore, calculating the ENP by using the aggregate vote-share of national and local elections leads to a more accurate evaluation on the number of effective parties based on actual voting dynamics rather than with the artificial cap of the 10% electoral threshold. However, as shown in the below figure, the score for the number of effective parties based on seat-share in parliament was also given.

Despite minor variations, fractionalization of the Turkish party system is fairly homogenous in the different electoral regions and generally follows the same trend as shown in figure 6.2.1 in the annexe. Thus, except for the coastal provinces, one can see that 1999 was the peak year for every region, with the south-eastern and Anatolian region exhibiting the highest number of effective parties with 6.53 and 6.60 respectively. The subsequent fall in the effective number of parties over the 2002 and 2007 national elections occurred throughout all regions though at different speeds. In fact, the Coastal region experienced a rise to 6.31 in the 2002 national elections before falling to 4.23. All other regions, including Istanbul and Ankara, dropped to an average of 3.09. At present, when determining the effective number of parties by examining vote-share, it drops to a level around 3.5 which is within the range of 3 to 5 parties that Sartori argued is ideal for a
political system with electoral competition based on moderate multi-partism (Webb and White 2007: 13). Therefore, in the sense that high party proliferation on one hand and one-party systems on the other hinder party system institutionalisation, the effective number of parties within Turkey’s party system at present is conducive to stabilizing a system based on moderate multi-partism averaging around 4 parties.

6.1.4. Electoral volatility in national elections in Turkey 1987-2009

In this section, the development of electoral volatility in Turkey will be examined using the formula by Pedersen. In figure 6.3, a graphic overview of this is provided using aggregate figures at national level for both national and from 1987 until 2007. A first preliminary observation that can be made is that total electoral volatility peaked with 51% in the 2002 national elections. On the face of it, this would seemingly contradict the hypothesis that the advent of a moderate Muslim-Democrat party has led to a reduction in overall volatility. However, as stated before, this rise in the 2002 national elections needs to be contextualised within Turkey’s political, social and economic situation at that point. Apart from the spike in electoral volatility in the 2002 elections, at the level of national elections one can also see that electoral volatility dropped to 15% in the elections of 2007. Throughout the 1990s, it surpassed 20% with a peak at the 1991 elections with 43%, although overall volatility dropped to 16% in 1999.

![Total electoral Volatility in percent for national elections 1987-2007](image_url)

Figure 6.3 Based on aggregate vote-share data at provincial level
As stated before, the unprecedentedly high electoral volatility for 2002 was the result of a variety of linked socio-economic and political factors. These include firstly the severe economic shocks that Turkey experienced in 2000 and 2001. These crises characterized by mass capital flight, devaluation of the Turkish Lira, unprecedentedly high inflation and the need for an IMF loan package (Öktem 2011a: 115-116; Kalaycioğlu 2005: 181), were unprecedented in their impact on the general welfare of Turkey’s population. In addition to these economic crises, the coalition government was seen as having catastrophically failed to react to a series of earthquakes in the outer area of the Istanbul region in 1999 that killed over 17,000 people (Kubicek 2002: 765; Özel 2002: 36). These multiple crises and their incompetent management by the incumbent coalition government fed public disenchantment with mainstream politics, especially at the high incidence of corruption in the main parties, at the end of a decade that had experienced chronic political instability (Kalaycioglu 2006: 164).

Lastly, under these circumstances, as a credible and novel alternative at this juncture to the discredited mainstream parties, the AKP was seen as a saviour with popular and trustworthy candidates for the upcoming 2002 elections, especially Erdoğan, the former mayor of Istanbul (Mango 2004: 111). The combination of these factors produced a harsh backlash amongst the general electorate at the 2002 polls which saw almost all previously incumbent mainstream parties, apart from the CHP, which had not been involved in the last coalition government, failing to cross the 10% threshold. This resulted in the unprecedented but also unique spike in electoral volatility of 51% in the 2002 national elections as well as an almost whole-sale re-alignment of Turkey’s electoral landscape. Therefore, only two parties, the AKP and the CHP, managed to enter parliament. In that sense, the national elections of 2002 can be seen as a relevant example of Key’s typology of a ‘critical election’ which led to a dramatic realignment of Turkey’s voting dynamics.

**Overall volatility**

As noted, one of the first observations to make is that total electoral volatility in contemporary Turkey has decreased to unprecedentedly low levels. In the 2007 national elections it declined to approximately 15% nationally. In order to understand this low level after the record high of 52% in the 2002 parliamentary elections, the 2007 elections and their dominant dynamics will be briefly outlined.
If the 2002 elections signalled a significant reconfiguration of voting patterns, then the new system of voting patterns seemed to confirm itself during the 2007 elections. Both parties that entered parliament in 2002, the AKP and CHP, were re-elected with sufficient votes to become the two strongest parties again. The MHP, which received the 4th largest vote-share in the previous elections, became the third strongest party. Although the pro-Kurdish DTP managed to gain parliamentary representation for twenty seats this was due to the fact that it ran its candidates as independents to circumvent the 10% threshold (Bahar 2007: 70). In overall terms of its overall vote-share, it remained on the same level as its predecessor party DEHAP in the 2002 elections. The parties that gained parliamentary admission, AKP, CHP, MHP as well as the DTP, increased their vote-share at national level to over 85% with only 15% wasted (Hale 2008: 238). In contrast, in 2002, only 54% of votes were counted in terms of parties entering parliament. A corresponding trend which was seen in the 2007 elections was that the electoral erosion of the mainstream parties from the 1990s that was seen in the 2002 elections continued with most of their votes being absorbed by either the AKP or the CHP. The electoral decline of the main centre-right parties from the 1990s, ANAP and DYP, continued due to the AKP successfully positioning itself as the main centre-right party in the party system and absorbed most of the previous parties’ votes (Bahar 2007: 73). Additionally, most of the voters who had voted for the new populist, centre-right Youth Party (GP) in 2002 shifted toward the AKP in 2007 (Hale 2008: 239), partly due to the party leader’s criminal activities.
One of the main factors that benefitted the AKP at the polls in gaining a substantial nationwide increase was the economic growth Turkey had experienced since 2002 (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2009: 129; Çarkoğlu 2008: 340). This enabled it to gain substantially more votes in Turkey’s south-east, which is the poorest region of the country (Tezcür 2010: 163). As seen in the third chapter, just prior to the national elections in a parliamentary struggle concerning the next president, the military released an ominous statement in which it declared its readiness to do everything to combat Turkey’s internal enemies. This was read as a veiled threat against the AKP. However, some observers argue that this actually benefitted the party at the polls by giving them an image of the democratic underdog (Tezcür 2010: 154; Çarkoğlu 2007: 504). The overall vote-share for the centre-left CHP in 2007 stagnated in comparison with 2002, with only a small nationwide increase to 21%. Meanwhile, the DSP, the main other centre-left party from the 1990s decided to abstain from the elections in order not divide the centre-left vote (Bahar 2007: 68). The increase in votes that flowed to the AKP in the 2007 elections can be seen as the prime source of electoral volatility in those elections as the party expanded its vote-share. Table 6.1 show the increase in vote-share for the AKP between the 2002 and the 2007
elections well. However, at the same time, as seen, the new configuration of the party system under a single party government decreased total overall volatility to unprecedentedly low levels in 2007 as well.

Having provided this brief outline of the factors underlying the 2007 national elections, total electoral volatility will now be examined at the regional level. When the volatility scores are divided across the various electoral regions, it is again possible to see that there is a strong discrepancy in the regional dynamics of electoral volatility although it is restricted to the contrast between the south-eastern electoral region as opposed to the others as shown in figure 6.4. As can be seen, most of the electoral regions generally follow a fairly similar patterns throughout the 6 national elections from 1987 until 2007. The national elections of 1987 were the first ones to be seen as free and fair since the restoration of civil democratic politics in 1983 with the center-right ANAP being the only civilian party which had participated in the previous elections which were organised and supervised by the military.

As a result, the overall volatility for 1987 was quite high in every region as the parties formed by the military all but dissapeared and all the old parties of the 1970s, under new names, returned (Kalaycıoğlu 2005: 132; Sayarı 2002: 16-17). As seen, the military interruption of civilian electoral politics had an effect of several traditional voter linkages to parties. The average volatility score for the individual regions was 35%, except for the south-east where it amounted to 51%. During the three elections of the 1990s the scores ranged between 20% and 23%. During the decade there were 11 different governments of which only one under Akbulut managed to garner sufficient votes to form a single party government. The other two single-party governments collapsed within months when their coalition partners deserted. Furthermore, the personal enmity of the party leaders towards each other and the lack of a consensual culture in Turkish party politics complicated the formation of coalition governments (Ahmad 2008: 257).

In the 2002 elections, all the different electoral regions experienced a steep rise with both the Anatolian and the coastal regions registering around 55% volatility, while the figures for Istanbul and Ankara were 66% and 64% respectively. In the south-eastern region however, electoral volatility only numbered 30% for reasons that will be examined below. In the subsequent elections, the volatility figures for all regions except the south-east then
drop substantially to 8% for Ankara and an average of 12% for the rest. Thus, while the mean volatility for these regions exceeded 20% at every election since 1987, in the 2007 elections it fell to the unprecedentedly low level of 11%. It is notable that the volatility figures for the south-eastern region diverge significantly from this overall pattern. Electoral volatility was highest in this region amongst all in 3 out of national 6 elections, in 1987, 1994 and 2007. Secondly, while the drop in volatility by almost 30% in the south-eastern region from 1987 to 1991 reflects the overall development in Turkey, the subsequent rise by twenty-five points to 45% in 1995 deviates substantially from the movement within the rest of the electoral regions. Severe socio-economic underdevelopment and deprivation of the region as well as the resentment of the heavily dominant Kurdish population against the continued oppression by the Turkish army and state and the continued activities of the pro-Kurdish separatist movement PKK continue to distinguish Turkey’s south-eastern region from the rest of the country (Jenkins 2008a; Park 2005: 17; Toprak 2005: 180). Çarkoğlu and Eder (2005: 171-173) describe this region as the country’s ‘least developed’ in terms of basic infrastructure, access to education, health services and employment.

Using the human development index developed by the UNDP, Pamuk (2008: 197) shows that while the most developed regions in Turkey have a human development index which puts them on a par with Croatia or Slovakia, the south-east can be placed on the same level as India. These socio-economic circumstances help explain why attachment to party labels tends to be weaker than in most other regions, clientelistic attachments are stronger and why a large part of elected independents in Turkey came from this region (Sayarı 2002: 23). An exception to this was the popularity of Islamist parties due to their highly conservative and religious character which blended with regional social values, their affiliation with sufi religious movements and their explicitly anti-Kemalist character (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2009: 14). Secondly, when pro-Kurdish political parties began to appear in the mid 1990s, they quickly developed strong partisan attachment from the regional constituencies. Thus both Islamist and pro-Kurdish ethnic parties have traditionally received strong popular support in the region of the south-east (Cagaptay and Unver 2007: 6).
The large rise of volatility in the 1995 elections in the south-eastern electoral region is linked to the emergence at the polls of the pro-Kurdish HADEP (Zürcher 2004: 298). It attracted an average of 25% of the region’s vote-share in 1995 and 36% in 2002. The electoral strength of this party in the region until its constitutional closure in 2003 began to structure the electoral dynamics and this in part accounts for the rise in volatility in 1995, the subsequent drop by more than 25% in the 1999 national election and why volatility only rose to 30% in the 2002 elections, against the national average of 51%. The reason why it increased at all in 2002 was the emergence of the AKP as a strong electoral competitor with 35% of the regional vote-share. In 2007, the AKP attracted 46% of the votes in the region and the newly formed pro-Kurdish DTP ran its candidates on an independent status to escape the 10% electoral threshold. Although this inter-play between the two parties did result in lowering the total electoral volatility to 26%, the median electoral volatility of the other regions was much lower at 11%.

6.1.5 Electoral volatility per party bloc at national level and for the individual electoral regions

When electoral volatility in the Turkish party system is examined at the level of the individual party blocs, whether it be left-, right-wing or Islamist, the same pattern of overall decrease in electoral volatility to the lowest levels in post-1980 Turkish politics can also be observed. In fact, for national elections the development of intra-bloc volatility
seems to follow similar trends in all three blocs across national elections as can be seen in figure 6.5 below as well as figures 6.5.1 to 6.5.5 in the annex.

![Electoral volatility of all party-blocs in national elections: 1991-2007](image)

As most parties that ran in the 1983 elections apart from the centre-right ANAP were created by the military, it was decided not to take them into account when calculating the volatility for the individual party blocs and therefore to start from the 1987 elections. For that reason, the first election for which volatility figures per bloc are available here are the 1991 national elections. Although total electoral volatility as seen above declined to unprecedentedly low levels in the 2007 national elections, when one examines it at the level of the individual party blocs, it can be seen that the lowest levels for the Islamist bloc within the time-span of five national election were in 1999 when the Islamist party was FP. This will be explored in more detail below. However, one can see that both the left-wing and right-wing blocs dropped to their lowest levels in terms of electoral volatility in the 2007 national elections, at 1% and 5% respectively.

In 1991, volatility was quite high amongst all blocs though it was most pronounced with 15% among the right-wing bloc as the centre-right governing party ANAP lost its dominant position, partially due to the souring of the economic climate beginning in the late 1980s (Zürcher 2004: 286), and was replaced at the polls with its ideological competitor, the DYP. Secondly came the left-wing parties at 11% and then the Islamist bloc with around 5% of bloc volatility. For the next election in 1995, the mean bloc
volatility dropped to around 9% although this masks the fact that it rose among the left-wing bloc to 14% which was a result of two left-wing parties, the CHP and SHP, merging in 1995.

Simultaneously, amongst the right-wing bloc volatility fell by 5% and dropped to 2% among the Islamist bloc. Then with the critical national elections of 2002 it rose again. With the Muslim Democrat AKP winning 34.28% of the votes, more than double the vote-share of the FP in the 1999 elections, bloc volatility for the Islamist parties increased to 10%. Likewise the right-wing parties, of which none succeeded in gaining parliamentary admission in this election registered a high level of volatility, increasing by more than 6% from 1999. Lastly came the left-wing bloc where volatility rose to 4%. In the 2007 national elections, all three party blocs registered a decrease in bloc volatility. Amongst Muslim Democrat or Islamist parties, it dropped by 3 percentage points to 7%. For right-wing parties it dropped by 5 points to 5%, whilst the left-wing bloc parties it fell to 1% as its vote-share at a national level remained static at 24%.

Although the large increase in the AKP’s vote-share, from 34% in 2002 to roughly 47%, accounted partially for the smaller decrease in the Islamist bloc than in the other blocs whose vote-share did not greatly change. However, when one looks at the regional distribution of the Islamist bloc’s electoral volatility it becomes apparent that one of key reasons why it remained higher than that of the left-wing and right-wing parties was because its volatility actually rose in the south-eastern electoral region. The AKP was especially successful there in the 2007 national elections. Its regional vote-share more than doubled from 17% in 2002 to 45% in 2007 because of its moderate and inclusive political discourse towards the Kurdish minority and because the main pro-Kurdish party in the 2002 elections, DEHAP, had been banned before next election (Bahar 2007: 69). In contrast, although the AKP’s vote-share also increased substantially in the other electoral regions, the mean volatility score for the Islamist bloc fell between 4% as can be seen in figure 6.6 whereas for the south-eastern electoral region it amounted to almost 13%.
The low intra-bloc volatility for the left-wing bloc in 2007 in virtually every electoral region can be explained by the contraction of its electoral space from two effective mainstream parties in the 1990s, the centre-left CHP and DSP, to just the CHP as an effective party in the Turkey’s post-2002 party political landscape although various marginal extreme left-wing parties continue struggling to survive. DSP, its vote-share having receded to just 1.22% in 2002, joined the CHP in the 2007 elections. Nevertheless, the CHP’s vote-share hardly increased, from 19.41% to 20.88%.

**Conclusion**

As was seen in the last section, the 2002 national election, which were categorized as ‘critical elections’ using Key’s notion, witnessed a significant electoral re-alignment of Turkey’s party system. This was seen to be an important factor which needs to be taken into account in the manner that the AKP was elected. Total electoral volatility surged to an unprecedented spike of 51% at national level as all incumbent parties failed to re-enter parliament in a collective show of throwing out the rascals. Only two parties, the AKP and CHP, entered parliament with an effective 45% of votes being wasted. Subsequently, during the 2007 elections, total electoral volatility decreased to just below 15%. As seen, this election continued the new voting trends seen in the 2002 elections with 85% of the national vote-share shifting to the centre-right Muslim-Democrat AKP the centre-left CHP as well as the far-right MHP and the pro-Kurdish DTP.
The elections results were interpreted as the governing AKP being rewarded for Turkey’s economic growth in the preceding years with a significant increase of votes. The abandonment by the AKP’s of its Islamist predecessors’ tone and approach made it electorally appealing to a wide range of electoral audiences. This included those from the centre-right constituencies of mainstream parties from the 1990s like ANAP and DTP who continued to fade into electoral obscurity as the AKP positioned itself as the new political force of the centre-right. Therefore, one can observe that inter-party competition became more stable since the 2002 national election and that emergence of a moderate Muslim-Democrat party with a nation-wide appeal has been conducive to improving the regularity of inter-party competition in the Turkish party system. The following section of this chapter will deal with Mainwaring and Scully’s criterion of social rootedness. As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 9) see the criterion as separate but ‘intertwined’.

### 6.2. Social Rootedness

In this section, the third criterion of Mainwaring and Scully’s framework of measuring party system institutionalization, social rootedness, will be investigated in the context of Turkey’s electoral politics during the last 20 years. Mainwaring and Scully posit that the degree to which political parties are able to penetrate society, especially at local electoral constituency level, constitutes an essential element to the overall institutionalization of a party system. Mainwaring (2006: 206) also argues that social rootedness is inter-related with electoral volatility as a socially integrated party system is conducive to a reduction in swing votes and therefore in lowering electoral volatility. In this section, a range of measures will be used to trace the development of social rootedness of the different party blocs in Turkey social rootedness as well as that of the overall party system itself. The first measure that will be used to examine the social rootedness of Turkey’s party system in this section will be the average age of political parties. Mainwaring and Scully have often used this measure in their own research, as have Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) and Johnson Tan (2006).
Secondly, using data at per-province level and aggregate data on the national level, the relative electoral difference between national and local electoral vote-share for each party bloc, Islamist, left-wing, right-wing as well as pro-Kurdish, will be calculated. This statistical measure is the main one that Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 9) use in their research to calculate social rootedness. With this measure, it was possible to attain the electoral difference for each province, electoral region and at national level from 1989 to 2009. Two other complementary analyses were undertaken to complement these findings. Firstly, the results for the three main party-blocs for each of the local and national elections that were paired up were correlated against one another in order to see how they developed over the 20 year period from 1989 to 2009. Secondly, using a map of Turkey with the provincial boundaries, a visual examination was undertaken in which the top twenty provinces that recur in the provincial election results of the main Islamist party were charted over the same period 1989 to 2009 using both national and local election results. In this sense, the elections results of the AKP were linked to those of earlier Islamist parties like the Welfare party and the Virtue Party.

6.2.1 Age of political parties

Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 14) and Lambright and Kuenzi (2001: 446) instrumentalise the age of political parties that win more than 10% of the votes as a measure of indicating social rootedness. Mainwaring and Scully use 50 years of age as a benchmark to indicate a relative degree of rootedness for political parties. In the context of Turkish party politics, instrumentalising the age of political parties as a measure with which to indicate their social rootedness is potentially problematic as many, sometimes all, parties were disbanded in the three military coups which occurred since the introduction of multi-party democracy in 1946. Turkey’s constitutional court is very ‘activist’ has disbanded 25 political parties, mostly of Islamist, pro-Kurdish or left-wing orientation, since 1961 (Hakyemez 2008: 135). As mentioned, according to Kalaycioğlu (2008: 299) and Çarkoğlu (2002: 299), these recurring waves of dissolutions, especially the one which occurred after the 1980 coup, had a corrosive effect on political partisanship across the political spectrum although the broader ideological inclinations of the electorate were largely preserved.
At first sight then, of the 7 mainstream parties represented in parliament only three, the centre-left CHP and DSP as well as the extreme right MHP, have existed for longer than 25 years. The secularist and pro-Kemalist centre-left CHP is the longest surviving party having been founded in 1923, the year in which the Turkish republic was established. The centre-left DSP, founded in 1985, is 25 years of age. As a distinct party political organisation, the AKP was set up in 2001. The MHP received its current name in 1992. Three further parties currently represented in parliament are each no more than three years old. Therefore, based on these figures, the mean age of the parties represented in parliament would be approximately 21 years.

However, apart from the CHP, both other major competing parties in the current party system, the AKP and the MHP are respectively linked to either Islamist or Islamist and far-right nationalist party genealogies dating back 50 years. In both cases, there are continuities involving a large overlap of figures, personalities and activists. In that sense, rather than simply seeing the AKP as a concrete, specific and distinct organisation which was founded in 2000, it should in this sense be regarded as an aberrant successor party to the Virtue party and Welfare party a heterodox element in an ideological continuum of Islamist politics that dates back to the founding of the MNP by Erbakan in 1970. In examining patterns of voter affiliation and partisanship, Kalaycıoğlu (2008: 309-310) goes some way to supporting in showing that voters with affective links to previous Islamist parties, or whose family members had voted for them, tended to identify more with the Muslim-Democrat AKP. In this regard, Kumbaracıbaşı (2009: 20) for instance states that 80% of all local AKP candidates in the 2004 municipal elections held ideological views and perspectives similar to those of the National Outlook Movement. Similarly, the MHP should be seen as part of the same continuous right-wing, ultra-nationalist party-family, led by its founder Alparslan Türkeş until his death in 1997, and since then by his designated successor, Devlet Bahçeli. It also dates back to 1969. Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 14) support this in arguing that parties can still be linked to another in the analysis despite changing their names as long as one can detect a ‘clear organizational continuity’ between them.

In that sense as shown in table 6.2, when one examines these three parties and takes its predecessor parties into consideration, they date back much longer, CHP (87 years), AKP (40 years), MHP (41 years). Thus one would see that the media age among the group of 7
parties represented in parliament reaches almost 30 years. If one were to concentrate only on the parties reaching more than 10% of the vote which is taken as benchmark by Mainwaring and Scully, then the mean age rises to 56 years in which case one could say that according to this measure, the Turkish party system would seem to be fairly socially entrenched.

Table 6.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adalet Ve Kalkınma Partisi</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barış Ve Demokrasi Partisi</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demokratik Sol Parti</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demokrat Parti</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye Partisi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, it can be argued that this measure is inadequate in order to acquire an impression of a party system’s social rootedness as it only provide a static snapshot impression of a party system’s social rootedness and cannot be used to look at its development over time as will be done in the next section. Therefore, in order to gain a better and more dynamic understanding of the level of social rootedness extant in Turkey’s party system across time another statistical measure focusing on differences between local and national vote-share was applied.
6.2.2 Relative electoral difference

The difference between president and legislative voting provides relevant information in assessing how deeply parties penetrate society. Where parties are key actors in shaping political preferences, this difference should be less pronounced. Citizens would more frequently vote on the basis of party labels, and therefore they would tend to vote for the same label in legislative and presidential elections. (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 9)

In reference to the above argument by Mainwaring and Scully, a measure to calculate the electoral difference was elaborated to examine the vote-share difference between local and national elections in Turkey from 1989 to 2009. In their comparative examination of African party systems, Kuenzi and Lambrighi (2001: 444) use the same measure. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, for local elections the vote-share for the provincial assembly elections was chosen as mayoral competitions are often more dominated by candidates’ personalities than actual party labels. Although these legislative and municipal elections have not been concurrently held on the same day, with the exception of 1999, for comparative purposes it is still possible them to attain the legislative-municipal electoral difference. In their own research on Latin American Party systems, Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 9) also encountered this issue. Therefore, for most comparisons each national election was paired up with the closest local election in time. This meant that usually there was a gap of 1 or 2 years between them. However, regardless of this time delay between the paired elections under consideration, the fundamental value of this comparative analysis, being able to look at the difference in vote-share that a specific party or party bloc receives between the parliamentary and local level, remains intact. Thus, a series of patterns could be identified overall across the paired elections that revealed relations of social rootedness among Turkish party or party blocs and the electorate. In that sense, the following pairings were made for comparative purposes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National election</th>
<th>Local election</th>
<th>Gap in time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>held on same day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.3: Overview of the electoral pairings to calculate the electoral difference between local and national election vote-share
The electoral difference was calculated for parties individually as well as for the existing ideological party blocs similar to the analyses in the first section of this chapter concerning electoral volatility. In each case, the political parties were aggregated into their ideological blocs and thus, 4 separate categories, left-wing, right-wing, Islamist and pro-Kurdish blocs, were formed. Despite their left-wing rhetoric and agenda, pro-Kurdish parties were kept separate wherever possible as their separatist and ethno-regionalist character distinguish them from other Turkish parties.

**Absolute electoral difference versus proportional electoral difference**

In evaluating the electoral difference, a relational rather than an absolute measure of difference was used as it was deemed better for evaluating the electoral difference extant within a party system’s individual components using political parties as the unit of study. Using a measure of absolute difference may be more suitable when undertaking comparisons of the electoral difference between aggregate party systems across different countries. However, when used for intra- rather than inter-party system analyses, it does not fulfil the operational criteria of validity as it leads to the false impression that parties with large vote-shares have more variation in proportion to parties with small vote-shares. In fact, as will be shown later, it is often the parties with small vote-shares that have a large proportional electoral difference. For that reason, a proportional or relative measure for estimating party’s vote-share difference between local and national elections is much better suited for the purposes of comparative analysis within a party system. The following formula was used to calculate the relative electoral difference:

\[
\frac{[V_{nk} - V_{lk}]}{V_{nk} - V_{lk}}
\]

Proportional electoral difference formula: \(V_{nk}\) for vote-share at national election \(k\); \(V_{lk}\) for local election \(k\)

Once this measure for calculating the electoral difference was determined, a matching pair of parties had to be found for every national election and its corresponding local election in order to catalogue the relative electoral difference on a provincial level per individual political party as well as per the respective party blocs. For instance, for comparative
purposes for a certain party X running in the 1994 local elections, the same party X would have to be found in the 1995 national elections. Sometimes there were problems in being able to match up parties as they did not exist in the first election of the pairing or had ceased to exist in the next. For instance, HADEP, a pro-Kurdish party, took part in the 1995 national elections but not in the 1994 local elections. As in other party systems, there were numerous instances of party splits in Turkey over the last 20 years. In such a case, in order to calculate the electoral difference, the votes of the remaining party and the new splinter party would be added together at the latter election and compared with the vote share of the original party at the former election. For instance, after its disastrous performance in the 2002 elections, a discontented faction of ANAP broke away and formed the Demokrat Parti (DP) which contested the 2004 municipal elections. Therefore their vote-share in that election was combined with that of ANAP in order to compare it with ANAP’s vote share in the 2002 national elections.

On the other hand, sometimes two parties that contested one election separately would merge into one for the next. This was the case with the centre-left SHP, which had run as a distinct party in the 1994 local elections and then merged into the CHP for the 1995 national elections. A further problem arose from the fact that small parties sometimes run their candidates as independents in national elections as this allows them to circumvent the 10% electoral threshold in Turkey like the far-right BBP and the pro-Kurdish DTP did in 2007, for instance (Baran 2008: 66). In these cases, it is often very difficult to obtain records of which candidates ran where independently, especially if they ran unsuccessfully, which is almost always the case for Turkey’s small parties. However, in no election did the combined vote-share of those parties for which a suitable partner could not be found in one election, be it national or municipal, exceed 5% except for the 2009 local elections when 6 parties, for whom corresponding parties in the 2007 national elections could not be found and whose total vote-share amounted to 8.86% on a national level, could not be included.

After calculating the proportional electoral difference for all individual parties for which comparisons could be made, a tripartite distribution of these parties along ideologically left-wing, right-wing and Islamist parties was made. In addition to this a separate category was also created to accommodate pro-Kurdish parties. Nonetheless, this has not excluded them from fashioning electoral alliances with left-wing parties in the past. Another problematic issue in allocating individual parties’ proportional electoral difference to
separate party blocs’ aggregate electoral difference is that it became difficult when parties from different backgrounds cooperate, for tactical electoral considerations across ideological or cleavage boundaries, to decide how to apportion the resulting electoral difference as all parties ran on the same ticket in one election. For instance, during the 2002 national elections both the social-democrat SHP and the far-left EMEP ran under the same ticket as DEHAP, a pro-Kurdish ethno-nationalist party. In 2004, DEHAP contested the local elections with the SHP under the latter’s name (Watts 2004).

When looking at the electoral results of this coalition across all provinces it becomes noticeable that in areas with a heavy Kurdish population in both the 2002 and 2004 elections the vote-share was much higher than anywhere else in the country, presumably due to the presence of DEHAP in the coalition. Therefore, in order to separate out the votes for these parties from different backgrounds, the vote-share for all the south-eastern provinces, as well as eastern Anatolian provinces like Kars and Erzurum, were allocated to DEHAP. All the remaining provinces were treated as being those in which EMEP and SHP ran. Although this solution is far from perfect especially in the absence of adequate data to identify which party ran where, treating the coalition as one party whose electoral difference should be allocated either to the left-wing or pro-Kurdish party bloc would have been far more imprecise. Similarly, for the 1989-1991 electoral pairing, the same problem appeared as two members of the right-wing party bloc, the nationalist parties IDP and MÇP, ran under the ballot of the RP in the national elections of 1991 (Tezcür 2010: 151). Unfortunately, in this case it is not possible to distinguish between these parties on a regional basis as they both have their electoral homeland in central and eastern Anatolia. Therefore, on the basis that the RP’s vote-share in the 1989 local elections was much higher than that of the two other parties and that all elected deputies entered parliament as members of the RP, the proportional electoral difference calculated for this electoral coalition was allocated to the Islamist party bloc.

The double elections of 1999

In the examination of the proportional electoral difference for the parties and party blocs, as can be seen in figure 6.7 further down, it is striking that for the 1999 electoral pairing

---

17 In the provinces within the electoral region of the south-east, the SHP attracted on average 28% of the vote-share, as opposed to roughly 3% on average for the provinces in the rest of Turkey.
almost all party-blocs seemed to register a dip. This needs to be contextualised further as it could otherwise be assumed that this period may somehow have been unique in terms of a greater degree of rootedness of parties in general within their local electorates. This would be an erroneous conclusion however.

What does differentiate the local and national elections of 1999 from the other pairings is that they were held not only in the same year but also on the same day, April 24th. The holding of both elections on the same day will have had a significant impact in voters aligning their choices at the local and national electoral level, thereby increasing the possibilities that they would choose the same party. This would then have registered in the low rates of relative electoral difference that were recorded for the parties and party-blocs. It is important to bear this difference in mind as it explains to a large extent the unusually low degree of proportional electoral difference that all parties and party-blocs experienced in that year. If as per norm, the local and national elections that occurred in that year had been held one year apart, it is very probable that the proportional electoral difference for that electoral pairing would have been much higher, thus bringing it more in line with the other electoral pairings. In the rest of the section on social rootedness firstly the total electoral difference of all party blocs over the 5 electoral pairings from 1989 to 2009 will be analysed and discussed. The results for the individual party blocs will also be illustrated, including correlating these across the different pairings. Subsequently, the development of relative electoral difference of the Islamist party bloc over the same period will be shown.

**Total relative electoral difference**

When the mean relative electoral difference for all four party families, left-wing, right-wing, Islamist and pro-Kurdish, is displayed over 5 consecutive national-local electoral comparisons from 1989 until 2009, it can be seen at first that that the proportional electoral difference for all party families actually increases in the 2007 and 2009 electoral pairing. This is shown in figure 6.7.1 in the annexe. Secondly, there is an evident dip in proportional electoral difference for the 1999 electoral pairing which is visible for the left-wing and Islamist party blocs though there is very little change for the right-wing bloc. As previously explained, this can be partially attributed to the unique circumstance that both elections were held on the same day in that year which would have a minimising effect on the proportional electoral difference. However, as will be discussed further below, when
proportional electoral difference of the Islamist bloc is disaggregated into the Islamist FP and the Muslim-Democrat AKP, as shown in figure 6.10 later, it is notable that the proportional electoral difference for the AKP is actually one of the lowest within the span of 5 electoral pairings with the exception of the results of the 1999 electoral pairing.

When the score for the mean relative electoral difference was examined at the level of individual parties rather than blocs, it was decided to disaggregate the figures for ideological party blocs into two distinct groups. This is briefly explained in the following section. At the level of individual parties, when the score for the mean relative electoral difference of political parties is examined as shown in figure 6.8, it is notable that it also experiences a definite increase from 13% for the electoral pairing of 1989-1991 to 32% for 2007-2009, although it peaked at 38% in the previous pairing of 2002-2004. However, a significant factor which needs to be taken into account in evaluating the figures for party-blocs and individual parties is the steady expansion of the party system in the numbers of parties competing in elections. The number of parties increased from 7 in 1989 to 21 in 1999 and 17 in 2007. This expansion in the party system encompassed to a large extent parties which have never been electorally competitive, mostly situated at the left or right-wing margins of the political arena and which regularly receive less than 5% of the total vote-share at national elections.

For instance, in the 2007 national elections, two thirds of all parties received less than 5%, with a mean vote-share of this group of 0.53%, while in the 2002 elections, over half the parties polling under 5% had a mean vote-share of 0.84%. Therefore, when the overall mean figure for the relative electoral difference is calculated, this large proportion of electorally uncompetitive parties in the Turkish party system contributes to inflating the resulting figure. Due to this, it was decided the mean figure should be separated out to look at the relative electoral difference of those parties whose vote-share was less than 5% and for those whose vote-share exceeded 5%. This figure was chosen for the threshold since most European electoral democracies with a system of proportional representation have a threshold of 3-5% which is also in the range of recommendation by the Venice commission, a body of experts on constitutional law attached to the Council of Europe (Daems 2010). Figure 6.7 shows the trajectories of these two groups.
As predicted, when looking at the relative electoral difference of these two different groups of parties, two different trends emerge. For the first electoral pairing, no parties received less than 5% of the vote-share at the 1989 national elections. Subsequently, the electoral difference of the parties polling less than 5% of vote-share at national elections experience a steady and continuous rise over the 4 electoral pairings from 21% in the 1994-1995 pairing to 42% in that of 2007-2009. The holding of both elections on the same day in 1999 did not have an effect on this trend which suggests a low level of social rootedness for these parties nation-wide as well as perhaps a general awareness among the electorate that they would not pass the 10% electoral threshold. For the second group, the mean scores for parties receiving more than 5% at each national election followed a different pattern.

Firstly, as could be expected, one can see a fall for the 1999 electoral campaign to 10%. In the next pairing, as most of the established parties experienced large drops in vote-share and other parties like the AKP saw a large increase in vote-share from the 2002 national to the 2004 local elections, the overall relative electoral difference in this group increased significantly to 33%. However, in the subsequent pairing of 2007-2009, one sees a large drop in the relative electoral difference to 17%. This pattern reflects the overall development of relative electoral difference for the Turkish party system on the whole more accurately since this latter group received around 90% of the votes in the last two electoral pairings. Thus when the relative electoral difference for all party blocs is revised
by excluding parties that did not receive more than 5% at each national election, one can clearly a different picture than from the initial evaluation for the aggregate party blocs. Thus, one can see in figure 6.7 that the evolution of the mean relative electoral difference for the group of parties receiving more than 5% of vote-share is lower in the 2002-2007 pairing than at any other point except for the 1989-1991 pairing despite the overall increase in parties if one takes the exceptional circumstances of the electoral pairings of 1999 into consideration.

![Revised relative electoral difference in percent per party bloc for those parties receiving more than 5% of vote-share at national elections.](image)

Figure 6.8: Based on aggregate vote-share data at provincial level

Similarly for instance, as shown in figure 6.8, one can see that the relative electoral difference for the left-wing as well as Islamist party bloc for the electoral pairing of 2007-2009 are at the same level with those of the first comparison of 1989-1991 if not slightly below that at 19% and 11% respectively. Although the figure for the 2002-2004 comparison are at the same level as the ones in 1999 for the left-wing bloc, it must be said that only one party, the CHP, could be examined as the centre-left DSP which emerged out of the 1999 elections as the strongest party received only around 1-2% of the vote-share in the 2002 national and 2004 local elections. If this party had been included, the relative electoral difference of the left-wing bloc would have much higher. Owing to a slight increase in the CHP’s vote-share in the 2009 local elections over the 2007 national elections, its relative electoral difference rose slightly for that comparison. For the right-wing party bloc, the relative electoral difference rises from 7% to 32% in the 2002-2004 pairing but then drops to 18% in the 2007-2009 pairing. For both the Islamist and the right-
wing party blocs it dropped significantly over the 2002-2004 pairing. Although there was a slight rise for the left-wing bloc, its score was still lower in 2007-2009 than in other pairings apart from the 1999 comparison.

It is also noteworthy that the Kurdish party bloc has a far lower relative electoral difference than all other party blocs. However, these results are derived only from their polling data in the south-eastern electoral region. As seen, the electoral scope of the pro-Kurdish parties is regionally confined to the Turkey’s south-eastern electoral region and other areas with a large Kurdish population such as some eastern and northern Anatolian provinces like Adiyaman or Kars or large urban metropolises such as Istanbul containing a large Kurdish population of several hundred thousand people. It is therefore not a nation-wide electoral phenomenon, as the party does not field candidates in the majority of Turkey’s provinces, and should not be seen as such.

In addition, as a complementary measure, the provincial election results for each of the three nation-wide party blocs were plotted against one another. As can be seen in the below table, if one excludes the results of the 1999 elections, the 2007-2009 electoral pairing on average obtains the highest Pearson r coefficient for the polling results of these three party blocs plotted against one another.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Leftwing bloc</th>
<th>Rightwing bloc</th>
<th>Pro-Islamist bloc</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989-1991</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-1995</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-1999</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2004</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2008</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.4: Figures indicate Pearson r coefficient for correlations between respective local and national elections for each pairing

The previous sections formulated relative electoral development as a statistical measure of social rootedness and looked at the development of this measure in relation to the Turkish party system since the 1980s. In the following section, this measure will be applied to the electoral performance of the Islamist party bloc will be examined, especially in the two electoral pairings of 2002-04 and 2007-09.
6.2.3 Social rootedness of Islamist parties

Islamist political actors and movements are well known for being well entrenched within civil society through various linkages with social movements as well as charitable organisations (Brumberg 2005: 104). The strength of Islamist political parties is based on the strong, well-organised and maintained networks of partisan support at local level that were established largely in the early 1990s by the RP (Kramer 2000: 79). The RP was the only party that heavily and systematically used door-to-door canvassing during its political campaigns, district by district, neighbourhood by neighbourhood, thus building up a reservoir of social capital through repeated face-to-face contacts and providing vital social services in working class areas (Eligür 2010: 36; Hale 2009: 51). Additionally, support networks at local level were divided into different groups such as youth or women groups. This segmentation of support groups in particular proved to be a particularly effective tool with which these parties built up strong networks of partisan support at local level (Ayata and Tütüncü 2007: 369).

As Kinzer (2002: 66) states, the Islamist party networks ‘made it their business to know the needs of their neighbours all year long, and to ensure that no one who sought the party’s aid went unsatisfied’. In the sense that the Islamist parties of the National Outlook Movement and the ‘Muslim-Democrat’ AKP are hierarchically organised from the national to the local level with a large activist base constantly mobilizing the electorate through direct contact all over the country, this aspect of these parties’ means of mobilization fulfil the criteria set out for a denominational mass party (Diamond and Gunter 2001: 17). Arguably, they are also the most socially rooted and established part of the Turkish party system across a nation-wide basis. Eligür (2009: 473) claims that in Istanbul alone, the AKP can mobilize a force of 300,000 voluntary workers.

As shown in figure 6.9, it is evident as per the measure of relative electoral difference that the Islamist party bloc has consistently exhibited a strong degree of social rootedness at national level. In two of the five electoral comparisons between 1989 and 2009, the main contemporary Islamist party had the lowest electoral difference of all political parties. Even with the revised mean for parties polling 5% or more in national elections, the relative electoral difference of main Islamist party was persistently lower at each electoral pairing. It can also be seen that the pattern in the relative electoral difference of the main
Islamist party, although much lower, resembles that of the revised mean. Thus, during the electoral comparison of 1999, the FP as the main contemporary Islamist party held a relative electoral difference of 5% whereas the mean of all the other electoral pairings was 13%.

However, one complimentary explanation for this figure could be that the electoral base for the FP, the successor party to the RP, was retrenched to its essential religiously-conservative voter base as most other electoral segments that had been attracted by the RP’s attempts to broaden its electoral appeal avoided the new party due its ‘Islamist’ pedigree in the wake of the RP’s closure on year before, as Yeşilada (2002: 166) argues. This context combined with the fact that both elections were held on the same day meant that the FP’s relative electoral difference was minimal compared to the other political parties. Subsequently, there was a rise to 16% in the 2002-2004 pairing with the emergence of the AKP which improved substantially in the latter elections over the former as it became more familiar to the Turkish public in general. Hence in the 2007-2009 pairing the relative difference in vote-share dropped to 11%, slightly below the level that the main Islamist party held in the 1989-1991 pairing.

Nevertheless, in the comparison between the 1989 municipal elections and the 1991 national elections the RP came third in terms of the relative electoral difference. At this point the Islamist National Outlook movement in Turkey was still in the process of building and strengthening its grassroots networks that would enable it to steadily increase its vote-share throughout the mid-1990s (Eligür 2010: 199). However, as stated before, it must also be said that this figure should be interpreted cautiously as the RP ran together with two nationalist parties, the IDP and the MİP, under its own name in the 1991 national elections. This tactical cooperation makes it difficult to decide whether to allocate the vote-share of this electoral coalition to the Islamist or right-wing ideological bloc. However, as the RP was the strongest component of this temporary alliance, the overall score of the comparison of these parties was allocated to the Islamist party bloc.
It can also be seen that for the electoral comparisons of 1994-1995 and 2002-2004 the main contemporary Islamist or ‘Muslim-Democrat’ party also did not have the lowest relative electoral difference, although in the former case the RP came quite close to the lowest score by less than 1%. As stated, the 2002 elections can be seen as ‘critical elections’ which significantly reconfigured the Turkish political landscape. The AKP as a relative new-comer that was founded only one year before (Hale and Özbudun 2010: 19), went to increase its vote-share substantially at the 2004 local elections by 7% nationally which may partially explain the rise in the electoral difference to above 15% for that comparison. Thus when the anomalous findings for the 1999 electoral comparison are left out, one finds that the relative electoral difference of Islamist parties are relatively unchanged, moving between the range of 10-20%. In that sense, the low relative electoral difference exhibited by the AKP matched that of its Islamist predecessors. The second, more traditionally Islamist party, the Felicity party (SP), which emerged with the AKP from the split within the FP before it was closed down in 2001, fared less well, receiving less than 3% of vote-share at the 2002 and the 2007 national elections as most of the core religiously conservative voter base chose the AKP in the polls. Figure 6.10 shows this divergence between the relative electoral difference of the AKP and the SP in the 2002-2004 and 2007-2009 electoral comparisons.
When one looks at the relative difference in local and national vote-shares at the level of the three main electoral groupings that were constructed as well as Istanbul and Ankara, it is evident that there is a strong regional character to it. Unsurprisingly, as can be seen in figure 6.11 of the three regional groupings of provinces, it is in Anatolian provinces where the Islamist parties exhibit the lowest relative electoral difference, ranging fairly stably between 10-12% when the extremely low result of 3% from the 1999 electoral comparison is excluded. This confirms the oft-repeated assertion that these socially conservative and agrarian provinces constitute the electoral ‘hotbeds’ of the Islamist vote in Turkey (Çarkoğlu 2002: 33). In comparison, the electoral regions of the south-east and the coastal Aegean and Mediterranean provinces manifest much more variation in the difference in vote-share of the main Islamist party between the national and local elections. In the latter region, the electoral difference is much higher than either the Anatolian region, Istanbul or Ankara. In the 1999 electoral pairing its relative electoral difference drops to 2% but rises to 23% in the 2002-2004 comparison before decreasing by around 17% in the 2007-2009.

Although the south-eastern electoral region experiences a similar dynamic with the rises and drops of its relative electoral difference, the figures are much higher by an average of 7%. The largest amount of variation in vote-share for Islamist parties at national and local level is found in this region. In fact, at 30% and 33% respectively it also represents the region in which the left-wing and right-wing blocs experience the largest relative electoral difference. The large electoral difference for Islamist or Muslim-Democrat parties in the
region can be partially explained by the duopolistic rivalry which has emerged in this region between parties based on religious identity like the RP and FP on one hand and political parties based on a pro-Kurdish ethnic identity on the other (Ҫarkoğlu 2009: 12; Cagaptay and Unver 2007: 6). While Islamist parties have often been quite successful at the local level, pro-Kurdish parties have tended to dominate national and local elections to varying degrees.

Similar to the Anatolian electoral region, the large urban regions of Istanbul and Ankara also do not show much variation. In Istanbul, the relative electoral difference of Islamist and ‘Muslim Democrat’ parties was especially low. In the first electoral comparison for 1989-1991, it was above 15% but then remained within the range of 3-7% for the remaining 4 pairings. Since the mayoralty of Istanbul was first won by the RP in 1994 under Erdoğan, Islamist parties have managed to keep their hold until the present and establish very well integrated support networks. With their emphasis on maintaining strong support networks at local level and providing much needed social services, Islamist parties have become particularly well entrenched in the poorer varoş neighbourhoods of the working-class and lower middle-class (Larrabee and Rabassa 2008: 47). The extremely low variation in their vote-share at local and national level is an indication for this rootedness. With an average 8%, the electoral difference for Ankara is slightly higher but having also kept their grip on the capital’s mayoral office since 1994, the Islamist parties also have a strong presence in that city’s poor neighbourhoods.

Figure 6.11: Based on aggregate vote-share data at provincial level
In order to obtain another indication of how electoral support across was regionally structured for Islamist parties, the top twenty provinces where they obtained their best results at every national and local election were compared. The more often a province appeared in these lists, the more likely it would be that the party in question would enjoy great support at local level in that province. The results, as shown in figures 6.12 and 6.13, indicate that there is a regional cohesiveness to the core electoral base of the AKP. As stated previously, Johnson Tan (2006: 100) asserts that regional rootedness of parties can also contribute to party system institutionalization.

The regional rootedness of Islamist parties in the Anatolian heartland becomes clear when one compares electoral maps featuring the provinces which have traditionally been in the best results of Islamist parties of in national and local elections respectively from 1987 to 2009, highlighting those which feature various times. Bearing in mind the different electoral regions set out in figure 6.1, it is possible to see for instance that Islamist parties really do derive the brunt of their electoral strength from the central Anatolian heartland. Unsurprisingly, the two provinces in which Islamist appear most frequently are Konya and Karamanmaraş, whose cities are among the largest of central Anatolia. The same regional cluster of 7 to 8 central Anatolian appear recurrently among the top 20 provinces in which Islamist parties receive the highest vote-share in local elections.\(^\text{18}\) One can also see that quite a few south-eastern provinces like Bingöl or Ağrı are in this group. Although Islamist parties tend to be well integrated in this region which is the most underdeveloped and deprived in Turkey and whose population is deeply conservative, pro-Kurdish parties generally attract the brunt of voter sympathies. On the other hand, the conspicuous absence of provinces of the Thracian, Aegean and Mediterranean electoral region from the list of provinces where Islamist parties receive their highest vote-share also highlight the electoral centrality of the Anatolian region.

The next section will sum up the main findings of this chapter in regards to the two criteria of Mainwaring and Scully’s research framework, stability in inter-party competition and social rootedness.

\(^{18}\) This grouping consists of Adıyaman, Elâzığ, Kayseri, Karamanmaraş, Malatya, Sivas, and Şanlıurfa.
Figure 6.12: Geographic overview of the provinces in which Islamist parties received the highest vote-share in the 6 national elections from 1987 to 2007. Different shadings denote in how many elections they figured in the top 20 provinces. Provinces in all 6 election are indicated in □ (darkest grey), those in only 5 elections are indicated in □, those in only 4 elections are indicated in □, those in only 3 elections in □ (lightest grey). All other provinces are shown in □.

Figure 6.13: Geographic overview of the provinces in which Islamist parties received the highest vote-share in the 6 local elections from 1989 to 2009. Provinces in all 6 election are indicated in □ (darkest grey), those in only 5 elections are indicated in □, those in only 4 elections are indicated in □, those in only 3 elections in □ (lightest grey). All other provinces are shown in □.
6.3 Conclusion

This chapter set out to apply the first criteria of Mainwaring and Scully’s research framework to the Turkish case. For that purpose and in accordance with other studies on Turkey’s political geography, the country’s 81 provinces were grouped into 5 regional clusters of which 2, Istanbul and Ankara, due to their size, population and importance, contained only 1 province. In the first section of this chapter, the criterion of regularity in inter-party stability was investigated. In reference to the existing party system literature, this criterion was operationalised by examining the level of extant total electoral volatility. Additionally, party system fractionalization was taken as a second complimentary measure with which to pursue stability in inter-party competition.

The results of the analysis involving the two measures which were used to operationalise the criterion of stability in inter-party competition, and electoral volatility, indicate that the arena of electoral contestation in Turkey has become more stable since the AKP was elected in the 2002 national elections. As seen, total electoral volatility did increase up to an unprecedented 51% in those elections. However, as was argued using Key's notion of 'critical elections', this was due to a swell of public disenchantment with mainstream parties in relation to successive crises of governance and the economy. At the parliamentary elections of 2007 it was seen that volatility then dropped to just below 15%, the lowest levels in Turkey’s political history since the 1980 military coup. This was shown to be the case for almost all the electoral regions except for the south-east where the socio-political cleavage relating to chronic regional under-development and the ongoing Kurdish conflict have created electoral dynamics that differ greatly from the rest of the country.

In the second section of this chapter, the social rootedness of the Turkish party system was studied through 2 different measures, the average age of parties receiving more than 10% of national vote-share and the proportional electoral difference. Additionally, the geographical rootedness of Turkey’s Islamist spectrum, including the Muslim Democrat AKP, was mapped out. When name changes are taken into consideration, the mean age of Turkey’s parties who won more than 10% of the vote-share at the last parliamentary election was 56 years. Although it was observed the overall mean proportional electoral difference did rise drastically for the two electoral comparisons after the 1999 elections, it
was shown that this increase was to a large extent attributable to the growth in the overall number of parties from 7 in 1989 to 17 in 2007. Most of these new parties have small, if not tiny, vote-shares and are very weakly represented at a nation-wide level. When the total electoral difference was separated according to those parties with more and those parties with less than 5% vote-share, it was shown that the former group’s relative electoral difference was declining. In accordance with general agreement in the literature on Turkish politics, it was also seen that the Islamist spectrum is most socially rooted among all other parties. This has been beneficial and contributed to the wider institutionalization of Turkey’s party system, especially under the AKP.
Chapter 7 - Legitimacy of the electoral process and its key actors

‘Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion, even in the midst of major economic problems and deep dissatisfaction with incumbents, holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life, and when support for anti-system alternatives is quite small or more-or-less isolated from pro-democratic forces.’ (Linz and Stepan 1998: 50)

This chapter will focus on the criterion of Mainwaring and Scully’s framework of party system institutionalization, the degree to which the main democratic actors, including political parties and the party system overall, are viewed as being key elements of a political system based on democratic governance. In the vein of the above-mentioned quote, according to Mainwaring and Scully’s framework of party system institutionalization, the amount of legitimacy that the electoral process and the main political actors in the democratic system enjoy reflects the degree to which they have become accepted as being part of a routinised democratic political culture. Mainwaring (1999: 26) states that where ‘citizens believe that parties are a core institution of stable democratic politics, there is a greater likelihood of system stability’.

For the purpose of researching this criterion of the Mainwaring and Scully’s framework, Easton’s multi-dimensional separation and categorization of political support at different levels of the political regime applied. Easton (1965: 215) discerned between different hierarchical levels of public support from the political community of the nation and the particular political regime in place to the individual institutional actors that constitute the political authorities. Norris (1999b: 11) used Easton’s approach in disaggregating public support into support for the nation-state itself; particular regime principles such like possessing a democratic political system; regime actors like parliament or concrete political actors like specific parties or politicians. In that sense, one call also apply the Easton’s differentiation between ‘diffuse’ public support given to abstract notions and concept like democracy or the democratic political system and more specific types of support directed at concrete institutions or actors, such as the parliament, the momentary government or political parties (1975: 438; 444).
The first section of this chapter will begin with a descriptive statistical analysis of popular attitudes in Turkish society towards particular regime institutions such as the government, the parliament and political parties as well as the broader notion of having a democratic political system as a regime principle. In that respect, Norris (1999a: 231) suggests that countries with a higher democratic quality also persistently show higher public support for the political system and its institutions. The statistical analysis will be based on the use of data on Turkey from the World Values Survey program from 1991 to 2007 although this was complemented with the use of Eurobarometer survey data for one instance. As a second means of analysing the extent to which the democratic political process and the main actors therein are seen as popularly legitimate, voter turnout data from national and local elections in Turkey was also evaluated although this will be placed at the end of the chapter as it is not based on attitudinal survey data.

Looking at the levels of electoral turnout follows the argument that the degree of popular participation in the electoral process can also serve as a significant indicator of the extent to which the democratic electoral process is seen as legitimate in permitting voters to influence the political system. In research conducted across the US and Western European countries, Dalton (2004: 175) has posited that there is a strong and significant bi-variate correlation between the level of political trust and electoral turnout. Uslaner (1999: 133) also links social and political trust to electoral turnout. The Democracy index report of the Economist Intelligence Unit supports this argument, stating that turnout is linked to satisfaction with democracy (2011: 31-32).

As will be seen, this has been suggested as a critical factor as well in at least one Turkish election. The source of the electoral turn-out data is the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ankara. Using the same data from the World Value Survey, an explanatory model using ordinal regression analysis is outlined that examines the degree to which voter affiliation with Islamist parties as opposed to other factors can account for increasing the legitimacy in regime institutions. Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 14) have argued that opinion polls and attitudinal survey are the most suitable means of researching this criterion in party systems. Thus, it was decided that the World Values Survey would be a suitable and reliable survey instrument for this task as it provides for the opportunity of investigating individual-level popular attitudes and opinions at nation-wide level towards regime institutions and actors such as political parties, the

7.1 Attitudes towards the legitimacy of regime Principles, Institutions and Actors

In order to operationalise Mainwaring and Scully’s criterion, it was decided to break it down into a range of researchable variables by focusing on a range of questions relating to the legitimacy of regime institutions, actors and principles according to Easton’s multi-dimensional conception of political legitimacy. In each of their survey waves, the WVS have repeated specific survey items that focus on the degree of confidence that respondents expressed in particular regime institutions such as government, parliament and political parties as well as having questions relating to confidence in the democratic system. This was seen as a suitable way of operationalising Mainwaring and Scully’s criterion of legitimacy in political actors or regime institutions into relatively self-contained research tasks.

Since regime institutions like the government and parliament are intricately connected to the democratic political process it was decided to keep them in the focus as well rather than just concentrating on public perceptions of political parties. Unfortunately, some aspects of these questions were not universally included in each wave. For instance, in the 1991 wave, the WVS did not include a survey question on confidence in political parties. Additionally, individual WVS waves sometimes featured questions which were also quite relevant for gauging the extent of popular legitimacy for certain institutions or regime institutions but these were not included in the data sets for the other years and thus could not be compared across time. For instance, the 2007 wave included survey items focusing on the degree to which respondents see certain aspects of democracy as essential to it, including a question relating to the regular holding of elections for political office.

In order to be able to see whether religiosity or Islamist voting preferences had any impact on the extent of support for and trust in these institutions, a variety of variables in the data set were cross-tabulated against the survey questions on confidence in
regime principles, institutions and actors. A survey question concentrating on voting preferences for individual parties was used to construct a variable for Islamist voting preferences. Similarly to create a variable for religiosity or, more specifically, religious self-identification, this project used survey questions examining the importance of religion or god amongst respondents or whether they identified themselves as religious for example. In most cases, variables were collapsed from a 4-scale into a dichotomous binary format in order to present a clearer and more meaningful picture reflecting either positive or negative indications of confidence in regime principles, institutions or actors.\textsuperscript{19} Furthermore, sometimes binary variables were created to generate larger and more representative samples. For instance, in the case of most variables expressing popular religiosity, 75-80\% of all respondents identified themselves as ‘religious’, whilst the remaining 20-25\% were divided into those classed as ‘not religious’ and those classed as ‘convinced atheists’. Therefore, these two last groups were aggregated in order to retain and augment the sample strength.

In order to look at the impact of respondents’ voting preferences, the variable looking at preferences for individual parties was recoded into the 4 groups of a left-wing, a right-wing, an Islamist and, whenever available, a pro-Kurdish party bloc. This variable was combined with the one focusing on respondents’ religiosity to see if this had an effect on the general stance of these blocs regarding confidence in regime principles, institutions and actors. In some instances, problems with the sample strength of some groups were encountered and this issue will be highlighted and signposted during the analysis. For instance, in the 1991 data set, the overall Islamist party voter sample only numbered 40. The same problem sometimes applied to respondents expressing voting preferences for a pro-Kurdish party. In 1996, there are only 9 respondents with pro-Kurdish party voting preferences. As a way of measuring support for anti-democratic actors, confidence in the armed forces was also evaluated.

The next section will analyse the descriptive statistical analysis that was carried out examining the development of confidence in regime institutions over the four WVS data-sets of 1991, 1996, 2001 and 2007. The section afterwards will describe and evaluate the conception of the statistical models based on ordinal linear regression

\textsuperscript{19} The original WVS survey questions on confidence in a range of political and social institutions into ‘a great deal’, ‘quite a lot’, ‘not so much’ and ‘none at all’.
analysis which look at the impact of religiosity and Islamist voting support on confidence for the regime institutions of government, parliament and the political parties.

7.1.1 Confidence in regime principles, institutions and actors

As stated, the regime institutions which are the object of analysis in this chapter, the government, the parliament and the political parties, are usually considered to be the most prominent ones in the arena of democratic electoral competition, representation and decision-making. Therefore, these would be the most important ones to concentrate on in the frame of Mainwaring and Scully’s criterion of legitimacy of the main actors in the political democratic process. In order to compare the confidence expressed for civilian institutions and actors by survey respondents with that for a non-democratic actor, the Turkish armed forces were also included since, as was seen in the third chapter, they are a key political force in the country and have tended to be the most trusted institution in society.

Popular support for the regime principle of democratic governance was measured. As stated, in order to test for the impact that religiosity and voting preferences for Islamist parties may have on confidence in regime principles, institutions and actors, the general sample of respondents was separated according to left-wing, right-wing, Islamist and pro-Kurdish voting preferences. Additionally, they were also divided into the two groups of the religious and non-religious. An overall overview of the confidence in the civilian regime institutions and the armed forces will now be presented as well as public support for the regime principle of democratic governance. Subsequently, confidence in each of the regime institutions will be examined in more depth as well as support for the principle of democratic governance.
As can be seen in figure 7.1, the overall confidence in the civilian regime institutions of government, parliament and political parties rose to the highest levels in the 2007 WVS wave from all the other survey waves. Previously, as is shown, it had been falling consecutively from 1991 to 2001. This is most notable for the regime institutions of government and parliament where confidence increased by approximately 18% and 16% respectively to around 64% and 62%. This corresponds well with the political and economic instability which occurred in Turkey during the 1990s as well as the government’s dismal reaction of the 1999 Marmara earthquake as a result of which popular trust in civil political institutions, their incumbents and politicians in general steadily eroded while the image of the military remained relatively stable (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2007: 139; Hale 2002: 167-168).

Confidence in political parties, the lowest of the three regime institutions across all three WVS waves which measure it, rose by 5% in the 2007 WVS wave to 34%. Simultaneously, it is also evident that over the 4 WVS waves, confidence in the institution of the armed forces exceeds that for the other civilian institutions by far although it did decline slightly during that period by almost 5% from 91% to 86%. As stated in the third chapter on the Turkish context, the armed forces are held in high popular esteem as a public institution due to their role in the nation-building of the republic, their perceived lack of corruptability, their readiness to intervene in the political sphere in the interests of the country and in general the ‘widespread view of the military as the ultimate protector of the nation’ (Aydinli 2009: 585). Nevertheless, as
shown later, this finding which shows a slight decline in support is reinforced by looking at data from the Eurobarometer surveys which also confirm a decline in public confidence in the armed forces in recent years.

![Support in percent for democratic political system: 1996-2007](image)

Figure 7.2: As from the WVS data

When looking at the overall scores for public support in the regime principle of democratic governance, as shown in figure 7.2, at 93% the figure remained relatively constant in the three WVS waves in which this item was featured. These figures are almost identical with the support of all respondents across the different sample groups as the great majority of these groups also support having a democratic political system. These findings coincide with an attitudinal survey undertaken after the Turkish parliamentary elections in 2007 by Rose (2008: 376) in which he found that popular attitudes accepting the current system of democratic electoral politics as ‘the only game in town’ were solidly entrenched among Turkey’s general public, even when subdivided among the winners and losers of the election in terms of party choice. Furthermore, it was also found that more than 80% of the survey respondents rejected alternative forms of governance, either by the military authorities or through Islamic rule of law (Rose 2008: 371).

---

20 The samples across the WVS waves were 1103 cases for 1996, 3401 cases for 2000, 1326 cases for 2007.
Heper (2012: 87) has also underscored this by pointing out that successive surveys carried out during the 1990s and 2000s, the amount of respondents favoring a system of governance based on the Islamic the rule of law declined progressively. Thus, in 2006, survey research by Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2006: 11) found that only 9% of respondents supported a sharia-based system of governance in contrast to 21% in a similar survey that they carried out in 1999. Similarly Tuğal (2009: 239) suggests in his work that the influence of radical Islamist groups has declined in the last decade as all forms of political mobilization increasingly became incorporated in the electoral arena. This is supported by a finding shown later that overall support for democratic governance has increased among respondents with a religious self-identification.

### 7.1.2 Confidence in the regime institution of government

Overall support for the regime institution government increased from 45% to 63% between 2001 and 2007. However, when this support is broken down into ideological voting preferences according to individual party blocs as shown in figure 7.3, it becomes apparent that a cross-ideological consensus on confidence in government, or any of the other regime institutions, does not yet exist. Instead the party-political or ideological nature of the incumbent seems to have an impact on the extent to which respondents falling into the various party blocs express confidence in them. Specific support for the actual office-holder seems to be conflated with ‘diffuse’ support for the regime institution in its conceptual form. This impression is reinforced by Norris (1999a: 11-12) who states that the dividing line between the office and the incumbents is often quite ‘fuzzy’. Thus, it is notable that among the four WVS waves confidence levels amongst respondents with Islamist voting preferences peaked with 87% in 2007 and almost 80% in 1996, when this office was respectively occupied by a Muslim Democrat party and a coalition headed by an Islamist party.

---

21 The samples across the WVS waves were 772 cases for 1990, 1103 cases for 1996, 3401 cases for 2001, 1304 cases for 2007.
Furthermore, in 2001 when a coalition of centre-right, centre-left and ultra-right parties headed by the social-democrat DSP under the leadership of Bülent Eçevit was in power, positive confidence amongst respondents with Islamist voting preferences for the regime institution of government dropped to 40%. In contrast, amongst respondents with left-wing voting preferences, positive confidence was around 28% in 1996 and 34% in 2007. However, in the 2001 wave it was approximately 51%. Meanwhile, amongst those inclined to vote for right-wing parties, there was no great shift upwards or downwards as with the Islamist and left-wing blocs, although there has been a gradual decline of confidence in government from 63% in 1991, when the centre-right ANAP was in power, to 53% in 2007. At 22%, respondents with pro-Kurdish voting preferences notably expressed the lowest confidence in government as with the other civilian regime institutions.

When the confidence in government survey item is cross-tabulated with the recoded binary variable on respondents’ religiosity across the 4 WVS waves, it is noticeable that those respondents classifying themselves as religious consistently express more confidence than those classed as not religious by a mean difference of 25%. Nevertheless, in the 2007 WVS wave confidence increased in both sample groups, amongst religious respondents by more than 20% from 2001. Confidence in government amongst non-religious respondents rose above the average of 32% for all four WVS sets to 35%.
Within the left-wing bloc, there is a mean gap of approximately 18% over all 4 WVS waves with 23% in 2007. For the right-wing bloc, the mean gap as well as the confidence score in 2007 is also 18%. Amongst those with Islamist voting preferences, the scores for the religious sample are similar to the overall ones as the non-religious sample only numbers 20 cases. Although confidence amongst this sample in government is lower it is still relatively high, with 80% in 1996 and 75% in 2007 while it drops to 40% during the other waves. With only 24% of religious respondents expressed confidence in the government, as opposed to 20% of non-religious respondents, the sample group with pro-Kurdish voting preferences constituted the group with the lowest confidence in the regime institution of government.
7.1.3 Confidence in the regime institution of parliament

The results for confidence in the regime institution of parliament when distributed across the different party blocs resemble those obtained for confidence in government. As per figure 7.5, respondents with Islamist voting preferences expressed the highest amount of confidence with 76%, followed by those with right-wing voting preferences with 56%, and those with left-wing voting preferences at 41%. Lastly, respondents with pro-Kurdish voting preferences expressed the lowest confidence with 21%. Amongst the Islamist bloc, again it is noteworthy that confidence was high in 2007 and 1996 when Muslim-Democrat or Islamist parties were in government but numbered just over 40% in 2001. As can be seen, amongst the right-wing sample there was almost no change over the last three WVS waves. For respondents with left-wing voting preferences, there was a slight decrease in confidence by 4% to 41%.

In terms of the samples of religious and non-religious respondents as shown in figure 7.6, it is notable that confidence in parliament amongst both groups increases from the 2001 to 2007 wave and that the figures for both groups were highest then for the 4 waves. The ‘religious’ sample of respondents showed an increase of confidence from 48% to 66%. On the other hand, among the sample of respondents as ‘not religious’ in

---

22 The samples across the WVS waves were 833 cases for 1990, 1103 cases for 1996, 3401 cases for 2001, 1277 cases for 2007.
2007, only 39% showed confidence in the institution of parliament, a very small increase of 3% from 2001.

![Confidence in percent in parliament: 1991-2007](image)

Figure 7.6: For respondents with religious or non-religious self-identification as from the WVS data

7.1.4 Confidence in the regime actors of political parties

Political parties receive the lowest level of support amongst all three regime institutions across the three WVS waves, as shown in figure 7.7. In the 1991 wave, the confidence in political parties did not feature in the survey. In 2007, on average approximately one third of the respondents in each of the three mainstream party blocs and less than 10% of respondents with pro-Kurdish voting preferences expressed positive confidence in political parties. Amongst those with left-wing voting preferences, the level of confidence dropped only slightly over the three survey waves from almost 30% to 28% in 2007. Amongst the Islamist bloc confidence peaked in 1996 and 2007 with around 40% but drops by almost 15 percentage points in the 2001 wave. Amongst those with right-wing voting preferences, confidence drops by 5 percentage points from 37% in 2001 to 32% in 2007. It should be mentioned that this low level of confidence or trust is consistent with global trends expressing a lack of trust in parties as competent and

---

23 The samples across the WVS waves were 833 cases for 1990, 1103 cases for 1996, 3401 cases for 2001, 1277 cases for 2007.
responsible agents in the political environment (Linz 2002: 291; Mainwaring 1998: 75-76).

![Confidence in percent for political parties: 1996-2007](image)

Figure 7.7: For the individual party blocs as from the WVS data

When dividing survey respondents into religious and non-religious sample groups again, as shown in figure 7.8, it can be observed that confidence rises in both groups though much more faintly than for parliament or government. Amongst the religious group, 37% express confidence in political parties in the 2007 wave in contrast to 29% in 2001 and 32% in 1996. There is a mean difference of 10% in confidence levels between the religious and non-religious groups. Nevertheless, even for the latter group there is a slight increase from 20% in 1996 and 21% in 2001 to 22% in the 2007 wave.
7.1.5 Support for democratic governance

As stated, as one of the more abstract and ‘diffuse’ dimensions of political support Easton formulated support for regime principles which relate to wider-ranging values or norms underpinning a particular system of political governance. For the purposes of this section, public support for having a democratic political system as opposed to one based on rule by the armed forces was examined. A survey item on the importance of electoral alternation of political leadership within a democratic political system in the last WVS wave was also analysed although this question was not asked in the previous waves and thus can only be used as a ‘snap-shot’ of public attitudes in 2007.

As could be seen in figure 7.2, support for democratic governance is relatively high across the three WVS waves and stood at 93% in 2007. When one examines confidence levels amongst the individual party blocs, as shown in figure 7.9, it is noticeable that support converges in 2007 at this level across these different groups of respondents. There was also a small increase among respondents with right-wing voting preferences from 92% in 1996 to almost 94% in 2007. However simultaneously, support amongst left-wing party supporters saw a small decline of almost 3% over the same time period to 93%. Amongst the group with pro-Kurdish voting sympathies, there was also a drop

---

24 The regime principles of the early kemalist state for instance were formulated in 1931 as based on republicanism, populism, statism, secularism, nationalism and revolutionism (Brooker 1995: 244).

---

Figure 7.8: For respondents with religious or non-religious self-identification as from the WVS data
from 100% in 1996 to almost 92% although, as mentioned, the 1996 survey wave only included 9 respondents with pro-Kurdish voting preferences. The biggest overall rise in support across the three survey waves can be seen among the sample group with Islamist voting preferences. The increase in support for democratic governance across the waves is an encouraging sign especially when taken in combination with the overall decline in support for sharia-based governance that was revealed in studies by Rose (2008) as well as Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2006) as mentioned earlier. As one can see, support for democratic governance also rose in the 2001 wave when a coalition of centre-left and centre-right parties occupied office and despite the fact that two Islamist parties had been constitutionally banned in the last 3 years and that the coalition government in which the Islamist RP had been the dominant party was forced to resign by the military authorities.

When support for having a democratic political system is cross-tabulated with the survey item on respondents’ religious self-identification one can see again in figure 7.10 that the scores are almost identical in the 2007 wave, 93% for the religious and 95% for the non-religious sample respectively. What is notable in the cross-tabulation with respondents’ religious self-identification is that support for having a democratic political system among the religious sample experienced a slight increase over the three waves from 1997 to 2007. This consolidation of diffuse support for democratic governance may be linked to the emergence and survival of the AKP without being closed down. As
Norris (1999b: 219) states when a political force that has previously been consistently excluded from the political arena, it may increase diffuse support for the political system of governance among the main constituencies of that movement. In that sense, the election of the AKP in 2002 and its endurance, rather than being closed down, may have increased overall system support among Turkey’s conservative electorate.

![Graph of Support in percent for having a democratic political system: 1997-2007](image)

Figure 7.10: For respondents with religious or non-religious self-identification as from the WVS data

Paradoxically however, while support for democratic governance is very high and seems to have stabilized around 93% regardless of voting preferences or religious self-identification,

Lastly, as stated, a survey question in the 2007 wave was examined which focused on the perceived importance of electoral alternation of political leadership within a democratic political system. As shown in figure 7.11, on average 92% of all survey respondents across all party blocs saw the holding of elections as essential to a democratic political system. The highest support for the statement was expressed by respondents with pro-Kurdish voting preferences with almost 97%. This was followed by the left-wing blocs and Islamist with 91% and 90% respectively. Respondents with right-wing voting preferences expressed the lowest level of support for that statement with 87%.

---

The sample for this survey item was 964 cases.
The overall conclusion of the section on the descriptive analysis undertaken on confidence in regime institutions in relation to Mainwaring and Scully’s third criterion will be presented in the overall conclusion of this chapter. In the next section, electoral turnout data from 1987 to 2009 is employed in order to look at the development of voter participation in terms of turn-out as a measure of trust or confidence in the electoral process of competitive alternation and contestation. This will complement the descriptive analysis undertaken in this first part focusing on Mainwaring and Scully’s third criterion of party system institutionalization.

### 7.1.6 Confidence in the institution of the Turkish armed forces

As seen in figure 7.1, with 86% in the 2007 wave, the armed forces attracted far more confidence from survey respondents than any of the three civilian regime institutions of government, parliament or political parties. Scholars of Turkish politics and society have repeatedly stated that the armed forces, due to their central historical position in the kemalist nation-building project, have traditionally been the most respected and prestigious institution in the country (Özbudun 1996: 131; Hale 2002: 169).

---

26 The samples across the WVS waves were 848 cases for 1990, 1103 cases for 1996, 3401 cases for 2001, 1326 cases for 2007.
Nevertheless, it was also seen that with 92% in 2007 confidence has been gradually declining over the 4 WVS surveys. This decline in public confidence in the Turkish armed forces can also be noted in the Eurobarometer surveys since they started to monitor from 2004 onwards on a bi-yearly basis. As can be seen in figure 7.12 below, although questions regarding this aspect were only consistently examined in the survey so that there are only five points in time from 2004 to late 2009, one can see that the amount of respondents expressing confidence in the armed forces dropped by fourteen points from 88% in spring 2004 to 70% in fall 2010. Although there is some slight variation in the degree of trust in the armed forces across both surveys, it is still useful to use the Eurobarometer data in a complementary function as it reinforces the finding of a declining trend of public trust in the armed forces.

![Public confidence in percent in the armed forces: 2004-2010](image)

Figure 7.12: According to data from the Eurobarometer surveys

The decline in public trust recorded by the Eurobarometer survey parallels the emergence of an increasingly critical and less reverential attitude in Turkey’s mass media towards the armed forces (Heper 2011: 245). Furthermore, the latter period also coincides with the well-publicised, ongoing investigations in the networks known as ‘the deep state’ as well as others examining allegations that some military circles were planning to overthrow the government in the early AKP period (Aydinli 2009: 231). In figure 7.13 it can be seen that confidence in the armed forces amidst the religious and non-religious groups fell slightly over the 4 WVS surveys to 88% for the former and 77% for the latter. Since the 1996 wave, there has been a gradual drop in both groups
although at more than 10% it is more pronounced among the non-religious sample group. What is surprising concerning this figure is that support among the religious sample is higher than among the non-religious sample.

The previous section look at popular confidence in a range of political regime institutions and the Turkish armed forces. It also examined overall support for democratic governance and perceptions of electoral alternation as an element of democratic governance. When the WVS sample was divided according to party-ideological voting preference it was seen that a cross-party convergence on confidence in regime institutions was absent. This result is perhaps understandable given that these institutions are mostly associated with their current occupiers so that political partisanship tends to structure confidence towards them. However, when the WVS samples were divided according to the issue of religious self-identification, it was seen that confidence among the respondent group with a positive religious self-identification rose for all three regime institutions. Among respondents that do not have a positive religious self-identification, confidence did not drop however and even showed very small increases for government, parliament and political parties.

When support for democratic governance was examined, it was seen that support across the different party-ideological groups converged at above 90% and that support among the samples with Islamist voting preferences rose across the last three waves. Among the religious and non-religious samples, support levels increased slightly as well and

---

**Figure 7.13**: For respondents with religious or non-religious self-identification as from the WVS data
seemed to converge. Simultaneously, popular trust in the armed forces fell across the 4 WVS waves and this was also supported by data from the Eurobarometer surveys between 2004 and 2009.

7.1.7 Voter turn-out as a measure of confidence in the electoral process

Having looked at popular support for the key regime actors and institutions within the electoral process on one hand and for the Turkish armed forces on the other as well as support for the regime principle of political democracy as opposed to military governance, this section will now turn to focussing on support or confidence in the electoral process itself as this is key to researching Mainwaring and Scully’s attitudinal criterion in the legitimacy of the electoral process and its key actors. In order to examine the legitimacy of the political process in Turkish electoral politics, aggregate turn-out for national elections from 1987 onwards as well as local election from 1989 onwards was analysed at both national as well as regional level.

Popular participation in electoral contests is presumed to directly reflect popular trust and belief in the legitimacy of the democratic political process. The act of voting is the principal or even ‘only mode of political participation involving a majority of citizens’ (Norris 2007: 629). As Franklin (2004: 148) states, it constitutes the ‘lifeblood of democracy’. By voting, citizens advance not only their own interests within the sphere of electoral politics but also legitimate the democratic political regime (van der Eijk and Franklin 2009: 4). In that sense, the degree of electoral turn-out or popular participation in an election can be interpreted as an indicator of the level of popular legitimacy that the democratic process of electoral contestation enjoys.

In that sense, high turn-out can be associated with a vivid and active popular interest in participating in the political system. Of course, electoral participation can also sometimes be affected by the design of the electoral system. In that sense, the liberal electoral research NGO IDEA (2005: 133) states that countries using voting systems based on party-list proportional rather than pluralistic representation are thought to have a higher likelihood of high turnout. Furthermore, since 1983, Turkey practises a form of compulsory voting. Franklin (2004: 158) states that compulsory voting increases
electoral turnout by 6-7%. However, although voting abstention is punished by a fine, the penalty for non-voting is very low and Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2007: 16) state that the authorities are very lax in terms of enforcing mandatory voting or punishing non-voting. As can be seen in figure 7.14, there is still significant variation in aggregate turnout across time and space owing to political and socio-economic contexts. Therefore, it is plausible to employ aggregate turn-out here as a measure of legitimacy in the electoral process.

As can be, popular turn-out at the ballot box has remained consistently high throughout the last twenty years at national level for both parliamentary and local elections and never dropped below 75%. Nevertheless, there was significant variation in figures throughout that period. Turnout in national elections declined from 94% in 1987 to 84% in 2007. Electoral participation in 1987 was above 90% in the first national elections free of military interference since the 1980 military coup. This result was unprecedented in the history of Turkey’s elections since 1946. This would accord with the hypothesis put forward by O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 93) that turnout in the founding elections of a new democratic regime will be relatively high but will then progressively decline in subsequent elections. As we can see, turnout then dropped to around 84% in the 1991 and 1994 elections and increased to 87% by 1999. In the 2002 national elections however turnout declined to 76% at national level, the lowest level in national elections since the restoration of electoral politics in 1983 (Özel 2003: 82).

Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2007: 44) point out that numerous newspaper surveys in the run-up to the 2002 elections, showed a significant portion of respondents consistently registering their intention either not to vote for any of the mainstream centre-left and centre-right parties or to abstain altogether, and link this both to economic crises as well as the mal-management of government in 1990s. Therefore, it can be assumed that the unusually steep drop was at least partly related to popular disenchantment and declining trust with mainstream politics. Miller and Listhaug (1999: 211) support this by suggesting through their research that ‘failed government performance’ in terms of managing the economy can lead to dropping support for politicians as well as government institutions. At the next national elections in Turkey in 2007, electoral turnout rose to approximately 85%, slightly below the median levels for the 1990s.
In comparing electoral turnout in national elections with that in local elections it is notable that after the 1999 elections there was a similarly dramatic drop of almost 10% to 78% in turnout at the 2004 local elections the level of 78%. Again however, political participation increased afterwards at the 2009 local elections by almost 6.5%. In contrast to electoral turnout in national elections, there was an increase in popular participation throughout the decade of the 1990s in local elections. It peaked at the 1994 elections with 92%. It has been argued that with the increasing urbanization of Turkey and the concurrent expansion of administrative powers and service provisions of municipal governments, the importance of elections for local office began to augment in the public mind in the mid-1990s (Incioğlu 2002: 73). Nevertheless, from 1994 onwards until 2004, turn-out in local elections declined by 14.5% after which, as stated, it rose by approximately 7% in 2009.

When turnout is examined at the level of the individual regions for both national and local elections, as shown in figures 7.14.1 and 7.14.2 in the appendix, one can see that all regions follow the same pattern although there are regional disparities. Both the region of Istanbul and that of Turkey’s South-East seem to differentiate themselves from the rest in consistently having the lowest turnout at both national and local elections. On average, there is a difference of 5% between these two regions and the rest in turnout at national elections and 6% at local elections. It seems plausible that the lower turn-out rates in the South-East region are linked to voter apathy and disillusionment in Turkish politics as this region that suffers the most from under-development as well as the continuing conflict between Kurdish separatists and the
Turkish armed forces.\textsuperscript{27} Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2007: 72) support this claim in arguing that patterns of under-development in the south-eastern regions of Turkey contribute to lower rates of electoral turnout in contrast to the countries’ western provinces. This reinforces the impression mentioned in the previous chapter and echoed by Çarkoğlu (2009) that Turkey’s south-eastern region is developing a political subsystem whose dynamics are increasingly diverging from the national norms of electoral politics.

Although more detailed analysis on the causes for the increase or decline of voter turnout were not undertaken for the purposes of this dissertation, it was stated that this short analytical overview served only to complement the main methodological part of this section. In terms of Mainwaring and Scully’s criterion of legitimacy of the main political actors as well as the political process, high rates of electoral participation could be linked with higher rates of trust and confidence not just in the electoral political process but also in the main actors within it such as the institutions of government, parliament or political parties. In these terms then the development to electoral participation in Turkey from 1987 to 2009 was examined. As seen, although turnout decreased quite steeply in the first election after 1999, there was then a modest subsequent increase by 5.5% in the 2007 national elections and by 6.5% in the 2009 local elections.

The next part of this section will display the results of the statistical model which was constructed to test the impact of Islamist voting preferences and religious self-identification amongst other variable on confidence in the regime institutions of government, parliament and political parties.

\textbf{7.2. Regression analysis of Islamist voting preferences and religiosity in their impact on civilian regime institutions}

Further to the descriptive analysis, it was of interest to see to what extent and under which conditions religiosity and electoral support for Islamist parties accounted for

\textsuperscript{27} Chronic underdevelopment and poverty have been seen to have depressing effects on voter turnout (Blais 2009: 633).
increased confidence in the regime institutions of government, parliament and political parties and therefore had an impact on attitudinal processes of party system institutionalization. For this reason, in order to test how much explanatory power a model could have which featured religiosity and voting preferences for Islamist parties as co-variates and used confidence levels in regime institutions as the dependent variables, a series of ordinal regression analyses were undertaken focusing on the World-Value Surveys in Turkey in 1991, 1996, 2001 and 2007. This was the best testing approach as these variables are presented in an ordinal fashion in the WVS. For the ordinal regression analysis, the ordinal regression of function of Stata was used. Among the findings of the models which were carried out is the observation that having Islamist voting preferences and a religious self-identification increased the likelihood of the respondent having confidence in regime institutions in the 1996 and 2007 wave. However, having left-wing voting preferences shifts from having a negative to having a positive correlational effect on the dependent variables during the 2007 wave.

The models for the analyses featured nine to ten predictors. Following the elaboration approach, in order to subject the relationship between the intended predictor variables and the dependent variables to a more sophisticated examination, a group of test variables was introduced into the regression in order to control for the potential effect of a number of socio-demographic characteristics. Thus the control variable for gender was chosen to see if the same relationship between religiosity and voting preferences holds for women and men when you look at them separately. Likewise, other control variables for demographic characteristics such as age, socio-economic class and education were also included to see whether these factors had a bearing on the relationship between religiosity and voting preferences. A second group focused on voting preferences for left-wing parties, Islamist or pro-Kurdish ethnic parties. An alternative voting preference variable for those who either did not intend to vote or did not have a preference and a variable concerned with ideological placement was also included. Lastly, in addition to this, a religious self-identification variable focusing on the subjective importance of god for the respondents was inserted. This was substituted for an alternative one related to the importance of religion for respondents when the former was not available in the 1996 survey.
A series of predictors had to be recoded from ordinal into binary dummy variables in order to include them in the ordinal regression analysis. For instance, in order to be able to measure for the effect of left-wing, Islamist or Kurdish voting preferences in accounting for the level of confidence in the dependent variables, four different dummy variables were derived from the voting preference variable in the WVS survey. Also, the religious self-identification variables focusing on the subjective importance of religion and god for respondents were recoded from ten-point and four-point scales to binary variables. One category centred on those respondents who indicated that god or religion was ‘very important’ to them and who comprised around 75% of the overall sample. The rest of the sample, for whom god and religion were less than ‘very important’, was put in the other category. Another predictor on ideological self-placement used a ten-point scale with ‘extreme left’ at one end and ‘extreme right’ on the other. This was also recoded into a binary predictor, with the first half of the scale collapsed into ‘left-wing’ placement and the second half into ‘right-wing’ placement.

The following contains a brief evaluation of each of the twelve ordinal regression models that were used for the four WVS waves in order to evaluate the explanatory power of Islamist voting preferences and religious self-identification amongst other in relation to confidence in regime institutions. The more detailed results of the regression models which include sample sizes can be seen in tables 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 in the appendix. The models were divided into three separate groups and will be presented starting with those focusing on confidence in government, then confidence in parliament and lastly, confidence in political parties. The results of the ordinal regression models in terms of the effect that predictors such as Islamist voting preferences, highly positive religious self-identification, pro-Kurdish party voting preferences and had on the chosen regimes institutions are visually summarised in the figures in the conclusion of this section.
7.2.1 Confidence in government

Confidence in government for the 2007 WVS wave

In this model, the assembled predicting variables carry the highest explanatory power amongst all the ordinal regression analyses undertaken for the WVS surveys in Turkey from 1990 until 2007. The model fit of Cox and Snell’s pseudo r-square amounts to 0.36 which indicates a very strong association between the predictors and the dependent variable. Both the dichotomous variables for voting preferences concerning Islamist parties and pro-Kurdish ethnic parties are statistically significant, at p < 0.05, and have high odds ratios. Hence, having an Islamist voting preference would lead to a 345.6% increase of movement towards a higher ordinal category, therefore affecting confidence in government positively. In that sense, a highly positive religious self-identification increases the odds by 61.5% that confidence in government will be positively affected. On the other hand, a pro-Kurdish voting preference would result in a 61.6% reduction in the odds of being in a higher category thus affecting confidence in government negatively. Ideological placement only increases the likelihood of affecting the dependent variable by 17.6% while educational attainment reduces it by approximately 16%. Gender, age, social class, left-wing voting preferences and non-voting preferences are all statistically insignificant at p < 0.05.

Confidence in government for the 2001 WVS wave

The model does not seem to have a high explanatory power as the model fit of the Cox and Snell pseudo r-square only amounts to 0.07. Unlike the regression model on confidence on government for the 2007 WVS wave, Islamist voting preferences, statistically significant at p < 0.05, have a negative association with the dependent variable. In fact, they lead to a 52.3% reduction in the odds of movement to a higher category in the dependent variable per one unit increase. However, a highly positive religious self-identification positively affects confidence in government with a 39.8% increase in the likelihood of movement within the variable into a higher category. A pro-Kurdish voting preference reduces the likelihood of movement into a higher category by 66.2% thereby negatively affecting the dependent variable. Additionally, non-voting preferences, also statistically significant, reduce the likelihood by 53.9% per
one unit increase. Neither left-wing voting preferences, educational attainment, age or gender are statistically significant in this model. However, gender is statistically significant, resulting in a 47.1% likelihood of movement within the dependent variable into a higher category, thus positively affecting confidence in government. Social class as a predictor on the other hand at $p = 0.066$ has a relatively weak negative association with the dependent variable.

**Confidence in government for the 1996 WVS wave**

This model has a model fit of 0.19 using Cox and Snell’s pseudo $r$-square. As the religious self-identification variable, the importance of god in respondents’ lives, used for all other years was not available for this survey year, a substitute variable, the importance of religion, was utilized. Islamist and left-wing voting preferences are statistically significant as predictors although a pro-Kurdish voting preference is not. In addition, non-voting preferences, having a highly positive religious self-identification and age are also significant at $p < 0.05$. Having an Islamist voting preference increases the likelihood of movement to a higher category within the dependent variable, confidence in government, by almost 150%. Having a highly positive religious self-identification is also positively associated with confidence in government and leads to an increase likelihood per 1 unit of almost 140%.

On the other hand, having a left-wing voting preference leads to 58.4% likelihood of movement into a lower category in the dependent variable, while a non-voting preference, also negatively associated with confidence in government, leads to a 54.2% likelihood. While age is statistically significant as a covariate, it does not affect the dependent variable significantly as the odds increase of movement into a higher category within the dependent variable is almost 1%. At $p = 0.057$, educational attainment is almost statistically significant but similar to the age variable but has very little impact on the dependent variable, leading to a 1.8% likelihood of affecting confidence in government negatively. The remaining predictors, gender and social class are all statistically insignificant.
Confidence in government for the 1991 WVS wave

The Cox and Snell’s pseudo r-square for this model with the dependent variable confidence in government reports a model fit of 0.17. Due to the absence of such pro-Kurdish ethnic parties during this period in the WVS, a pro-Kurdish voting preference predictor could not be employed for the models based on the 1991 WVS survey. According to the model, Islamist voting preferences are not statistically significant at p < 0.05 although its association on confidence in government is negative, leading to a 54.6% likelihood of movement to a lower category within the dependent variable. Likewise, highly positive religious self-identification is also statistically insignificant and has a negative association as it would increase the odds of movement to a lower category by 18%. Having left-wing or non-voting preferences is both statistically significant and negatively associated with the dependent variable, leading respectively to a 45.1% and 58.1% likelihood of movement to a lower category. The ideological placement predictor increases the odds of movement to a higher category by 16.5%. In this model, gender and educational attainment are also statistically significant with the former leading to likelihood of 16% of movement into a lower category while the latter is positively correlated with confidence in government with 57.6%. Age and social class are statistically insignificant.

7.2.2 Confidence in parliament

Confidence in parliament for the 2007 WVS wave

Again this model seems to have a relatively high explanatory power and the association between the assembled predictors and the dependent variable is very robust as Cox and Snell’s pseudo r-square amounts to 0.23. However, although voting preferences for Islamist and pro-Kurdish ethnic parties are statistically significant again, here an Islamist voting preference is only likely to affect the dependent variable, confidence in parliament, positively by 123.1%, roughly 2/3 less than with the dependent variable of confidence in government. Therefore, there is a likelihood that there is 123.1% increase in movement towards a higher ordinal category. A pro-Kurdish voting preference would negatively confidence in parliament, reducing the probability of movement towards a
higher category in the dependent variable by 72.9%. The direction of association of both Islamist and pro-Kurdish voting preferences is similar to the first ordinal regression analysis for 2007 however.

Additionally, in this model, ideological placement, social class, education attainment, highly positive religious self-identification as well as having non-voting preferences are all statistically significant in relation to the dependent variable at $p < 0.05$, while gender and age as predictors are not. Having a highly positive religious self-identification affects confidence in parliament positively as it leads to a 98.2% increase in movement towards a higher category in the dependent variable. In that sense, ideological placement also affects the dependent variable positively, but only by 7.5%. Class and educational attainment are likely to have a negative impact on the dependent variable as the former leads to a reduction of 19.4% and the latter of almost 13% of movement towards a higher category within the dependent variable. Having a non-voting preference also reduces the likelihood of movement towards a higher category by almost 40%.

**Confidence in parliament for the 2001 WVS wave**

The model has a low Cox and Snell pseudo $r$-square of 0.04 and the lowest explanatory power of all the models for the 2001 wave. Islamist voting preferences, left-wing voting preferences, pro-Kurdish voting preferences, non-voting preferences, a high positive religious self-identification, age, gender and ideological placement are statistically significant at $p < 0.05$. Educational attainment and social class are not statistically significant in this model. As in the previous model for 2001, Islamist voting preferences are negatively associated with the dependent variable, confidence in parliament, with a 42.4% likelihood of movement into a lower category. Similar to the first regression model for 2001, a highly positive religious self-identification positively affects confidence in government with a 34.1% increase in the likelihood of movement within the variable into a higher category. Left-wing voting preferences lead to 25% likelihood of movement into a lower category in the dependent variable. Non-voting and pro-Kurdish voting preferences both individually also have a strong negative association with confidence in parliament leading to a likelihood of 54.5% and 46.9% reduction. Gender on the other hand increases the likelihood of movement into a higher category
by 27.7%. Although age is statistically significantly and has a positive association, it only leads to an increase of 0.6% per 1 unit increase.

Confidence in parliament for the 1996 WVS wave

The model with the dependent variable, confidence in parliament, has a model fit of 0.09. The variable of Islamist voting preferences is not statistically significant here and has a low positive association with confidence in parliament, with a 13.7% likelihood of movement into a higher category. A highly positive religious self-identification is statistically significant and increases the likelihood of movement into a higher category within the dependent variable by 78%. On the other hand, either a left-wing or a non-voting preference negatively affects confidence in parliament with the former resulting in a 35.2% reduction likelihood and the latter in a 51.4% reduction likelihood. Age again, while statistically significant, does not affect the dependent variable significantly as the odds increase of movement into a higher category within the dependent variable is only 1%. Social class is negatively associated with confidence in parliament resulting in a likelihood of a 6.6% reduction. Gender as well as social attainment is not statistically significant.

Confidence in parliament for the 1991 WVS wave

Cox and Snell’s pseudo r-square for this model with the dependent variable confidence in government reports an model fit of 0.22. As with the previous model, Islamist voting preferences are statistically insignificant and show a negative association with the dependent variable confidence in parliament, resulting in a 37.7% likelihood of movement into a lower category. A highly positive religious self-identification however is statistically significant but has a negative association with the dependent variable as well and leads to an increase of the odds of movement to a lower category by 32.2%. Left-wing and non-voting preferences are each negatively associated with the dependent variable, the former predictor resulting in a 48.6% and the latter in a 52.5% likelihood of movement into a lower category. The ideological placement variable leads to increasing the odds of movement to a higher category within the dependent variable by 9.6% in this model. Educational attainment, statistically significant, results in a 24.6%
likelihood of movement to a lower category while gender has the reverse effect by 76.8%. In this model the co-variates social class and age are statistically insignificant.

7.2.3 Confidence in political parties

Confidence in political parties for the 2007 WVS wave

In contrast to the other two previous models, the Cox and Snell’s pseudo r-square is approximately 3/4 lower here than for the 2007 model with confidence in government as a dependent variable, accounting for a model fit of 0.11. What is notable is that unlike the previous models for 2007 neither the predictor for Islamist voting preferences nor the one for religious self-identification are statistically significant in this model at p < 0.05. Neither is gender, age, left-wing voting preferences or ideological placement. Instead, the covariates for pro-Kurdish voting preferences, non-voting preferences, educational attainment and social class are all statistically significant. Apart from not being very statistically significant, having an Islamist voting preference leads to an increase of only 21.2% of movement towards a higher category in the dependent variable, confidence in political parties.

Likewise, having a highly positive religious self-identification increases this likelihood by only 18.2%. As with the two other models, a pro-Kurdish voting preference leads to a reduction, 68.7% in this case, in the odds of movement towards a higher category in the dependent variable, thus affecting confidence in political parties negatively. A non-voting preference leads to a 52.7% reduction. Both social class and educational attainment also affect the dependent variable negatively with the former leading to a 23% reduction and the latter to a 11.7% reduction of the odds of movement towards a higher category in the dependent variable. Strangely, even though left-wing voting preferences are not very statistically significant in this model, they affect confidence in political parties positively, leading to an increase of almost 50% of movement towards a higher category in the dependent variable.
Confidence in political parties for the 2001 WVS wave

This model on confidence in political parties has a slightly higher model fit using Cox and Snell’s pseudo r-square at 0.05 than the previous one. As in the previous model, here both Islamist voting preferences and a high positive religious self-identification are statistically significant. So are left-wing, pro-Kurdish and non-voting preferences as well as age and gender. Again Islamist voting preferences affect confidence in political parties negatively and lead to a 39% likelihood of movement to a lower category within the dependent variable. Simultaneously however, having a highly positive religious self-identification increases the odds of movement to a higher category within the dependent variable by 22.2%. Both affect the dependent variable negatively, with a highly positive religious self-identification only allowing a likelihood of 4/5 that it will increase. As with Kurdish voting preferences, Islamist voting preferences only make it 3/5 as likely that the dependent variable will increase. Educational attainment, gender, age, social class and whether one has an ideological placement are all statistically insignificant.

Confidence in political parties for the 1996 WVS wave

The model with the dependent variable, confidence in parliament, has a model fit of 0.08 using Cox and Snell’s pseudo r-square. Again, as in the previous model, having an Islamist voting preference does not seem to be statistically significant and is positively associated with confidence in parliament, leading to a 27.8% likelihood of movement to a higher category within the dependent variable. Similar to previous models for 1996, a highly positive religious self-identification however is statistically significant and also increases the odds of movement to a higher category within the dependent variable by 28.5%. Left-wing and non-voting preferences both have a negative impact on the dependent variable and respectively lead to a likelihood of 25.1% for the former and 63% for the latter of movement to a lower category. All the other predictors, gender, age, social-class, educational attainment, ideological placement, left-wing and pro-Kurdish voting preferences, are statistically insignificant in this model.
7.2.4 Overall analysis of the regression models

In terms of the overall results gathered from the multiple ordinal regression analyses focusing on different regime institutions and spread across 4 different WVS waves, it is possible to draw a series of general conclusions. The effect of Islamist voting preferences on the various regime institutions will be discussed first, then those of religious self-identification and finally the other significant results of the model will be focused on.

The association of Islamist voting preferences on confidence in regime institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>-37.60</td>
<td>13.70</td>
<td><strong>-42.40</strong></td>
<td><strong>123.10</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>-54.60</td>
<td><strong>146.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>-52.30</strong></td>
<td><strong>345.60</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.1: Strength and direction of the association between Islamist voting preferences and the dependent variables of confidence in the regime institution of political parties, parliament and government.

As can be seen from table 7.1, using Islamist voting preference as a covariate has the biggest impact on confidence in government, followed by confidence in parliament and lastly by confidence in political parties. A high positive association between the Islamist voting preference predictor and confidence in government can be observed during periods when an Islamist party actor was governing, either as a single party government or in a coalition. In the 2007 wave, during the rule of the AKP, this predictor results in a 346% likelihood of movement into a higher category and a 146% likelihood in 1996. In 1996, voters with a preference for Islamist parties would have been likely to have had high confidence in the government as the actual incumbent was a coalition government which included the Islamist RP under the premiership of its leader, Necmettin Erbakan.

In contrast, in the 2001 wave, when a coalition of centre-left, centre-right and far-right parties was in government, the Islamist voting preference predictor shows a negative association with confidence in government with a likelihood of downward movement of 52.3%. These results are supported by the findings in the preceding section on the
descriptive statistical analysis concerning confidence in government. In Turkey, leaders of the governing party simultaneously occupy the office of prime minister. Therefore, the high visibility of party leaders in government, especially in a party political environment which, as was seen in the third chapter, is as personalistic as in Turkey, facilitates public conflation of the regime institution of government with a particular regime actor such as a political party or individual leader. As stated in the previous section concerning the descriptive statistical analysis, the ‘dividing line’ between diffuse support for the office of state and specific support for the actual incumbent, though institutionally distinct, is ‘fuzzy’ as the two are closely interlinked in the eyes of the general public. This finding is also reflected in the cross-tabulation analyses in the first section of this chapter on confidence in government.

![Impact of Islamist voting preferences in percent on confidence of regime institutions: 1991-2007](image)

**Figure 7.15: Based on WVS data**

The pattern of a high positive association between Islamist voting preferences and confidence in the regime institutions of government during times of Islamist incumbency is also mirrored in relation to the confidence levels in parliament as a regime institution, although as shown in figure 7.15 above, it is weaker in this case. Again, this is supported by the descriptive statistical analysis in the first section of this chapter regarding confidence in the regime institution of parliament. In 2007, there is a 123% likelihood of upward movement per 1 unit increase in confidence in parliament as a dependent variable. For the 2001 WVS wave, the impact of Islamist voting
preferences upon confidence in parliament results in a 42.4% likelihood of movement into a lower category within the dependent variable. However, for the 1996 WVS wave, the relationship is more ambiguous and the likelihood increase within the dependent variable is only 13.7%. Although a coalition government involving the Islamist RP was in power at that time, whose leader, Necmettin Erbakan, also held the premiership, it held less than 30% of all parliamentary seats. This could account for the weaker association between Islamist voting preferences and upward movement within the dependent variable of confidence in parliament for the 1996 WVS wave.

In contrast, during the 2007 wave, the ruling AKP held an absolute majority in parliament with 2/3 of all parliamentary seats. The dominant parliamentary representation of the AKP could have facilitated the public conflation of the office with its actual incumbent. As will be seen later, the Eurobarometer surveys show that public confidence in government and parliament are almost identical throughout the ruling period of the AKP. Lastly, although the impact of Islamist voting preferences upon confidence in regime institutions is statistically insignificant for the 1991 WVS wave, it is noteworthy that the negative association of this covariate upon the dependent variable for that year reinforces the above-mentioned pattern regarding the ideological nature of the incumbent.

In regards to confidence in political parties, the ordinal regression analyses performed for the 2007, 2001 and 1996 WVS waves do not clearly show Islamist voting support to have a statistically significant association in relation to the dependent variable, confidence in political parties. Nevertheless, although the correlational impact is the weakest among the three regime institutions there is an important observation that can be made in examining the relationship. The pattern of association between voting preferences for Islamist parties and regime institutions is clearly seen to switch from having a downward impact during the 1991 and 2001 waves, when Islamist were not involved in the government, to an upward impact within the dependent variable during the 1996 and 2007 waves when Islamist parties were involved in the government.

What is also noteworthy is that the result for the 2001 wave, -39.2%, is highly significant and not much weaker for that year than the impact of Islamist voting preferences on the other two regime institutions with the highest being -52.3% for
confidence in government. The constitutional closure case and eventual dissolutions of the Islamist FP in June 2001 as well as the perceived economic mismanagement of the contemporary coalition government during that time probably explain this stance. Overall, it can be seen that although the increase in likelihood of upward movement in the dependent variable is not as high as with either confidence in government or parliament, there is a positive relationship between Islamist voting preferences and confidence in political parties when an Islamist party actor is in government and there is a negative association when that is not the case as in 2001 when there is likelihood per 1 unit of 39% of downward movement in the dependent variable.

*The association of religious self-identification on confidence in regime institutions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Parties</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Political Parties</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>*-32.20</td>
<td>**78.00</td>
<td>**34.10</td>
<td>**98.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>-18.00</td>
<td>**137.30</td>
<td>**39.80</td>
<td>**61.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2: Strength and direction of the association between religious self-identification and the dependent variables of confidence in the regime institution of political parties, parliament and government.

As stated, testing the regression model for the impact of religiosity was operationalised through the use of a binary predictor focusing on the respondents having a highly positive adherence to the importance of god. This variable was substituted for the 1996 wave with one focussing on the importance of religion for respondents. In reference to the impact of voting support for Islamist parties, the operationalised co-variate for highly positive religious self-identification bore out two important similarities. In comparison with confidence in government and parliament, the impact of religious self-identification is weaker all WVS waves, as shown in tables 7.1 and 7.2, but resembles the pattern established with the previous dependent variables in relation to Islamist voting preferences confidence in government.
As shown in figure 7.16, firstly it can be observed that having a positive religious self-identification has a positive effect on confidence in all three regime institutions in the last three waves as leads to an increased upward movement within the dependent variable. Furthermore, the increased likelihood of upward movement within the dependent variable is again stronger when an Islamist party actor is in power either as part of a coalition government as in the 1996 wave with 137.3% or through a single-party government as in the 2007 wave with 61.5%. As shown in the fourth chapter which focused on the analysis of AKP manifestoes, the Welfare Party, the main Islamist party at that time, placed more ideological and rhetorical emphasis on political Islam than the moderate and heterogeneous Muslim-Democrat AKP ever has. This may account for the reason that respondents who identify themselves as being religious expressed more confidence in the coalition government of 1996 than the AKP government of 2007. In contrast, in 2001, when the contemporary coalition government did not include any Islamist parties, the association between positive religious self-identification and confidence in government remains positive but the likelihood of upward movement in the dependant variable decreases to just under 40%.

The same relation can be observed in the percental change in movement within the dependent variable of confidence in parliament. In the 1996 and 2007 waves respectively, there is a 98.2% and 78% increase in the likelihood of upward movement within the dependent variable but in the 2001 wave the increase likelihood drops to
34.1%. While the association of this variable with confidence in government for the 1991 wave was not statistically significant, the fact that it manifests a 18% likelihood of downward movement again indicates a similar pattern as with impact of the co-variante of Islamist voting support. Interestingly, as can be seen the impact of a highly positive religious self-identification on confidence in political parties remained relatively static throughout the three waves of 1996, 2001 and 2007 in which it was included in the WVS survey. There is a drop in the likelihood of upward movement from the 1996 to the 2001 wave of 6%, both of which are statistically significant. This decline continues in the 2007 wave although the association is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, it is seen that positive religious self-identification tends to have a positive association with confidence in political parties throughout these three waves regardless of the party-ideological nature of the incumbent in government.

In looking at the impact of the other party-bloc related predictors on confidence in regime institutions of government, parliament and political parties, there are other important observations which can be made, especially in terms of left-wing voting preferences. Although the association of left-wing and non-voting preferences is at times statistically insignificant, the direction of association with the dependent variables across the four WVS waves is increasingly positive. Thus one can see in figure 7.17 below that the 2007 wave marks the first time that the predictor for left-wing voting preferences registers a positive impact on confidence in government, parliament and political parties causing respectively a 9.5%, 31.5% and 47.7% likelihood of upward movement within each dependent variable. All previous WVS waves had registered a negative association between left-wing voting preference as a predictor and confidence in government, parliament or political parties but during the 2007 wave it shifts in correlational direction to have a positive association with them although a Muslim-Democrat party is in government. This is an observation regarding ‘specific’ support for regime institutions and actors that should be highlighted as positive. Despite being statistically insignificant, one can see that the association between left-wing voting support and confidence in regime institutions as a dependent variable is strongest for political parties, then for parliament and only then for government. This is perhaps natural for respondents with a voting preference for another party than the one which is in power.
In relation to non-voting preferences, although this co-variate results in a downward movement within the dependent variables for confidence in regime institutions over the four WVS waves, there is also increasing movement towards a shift in the other direction as can be seen in figure 7.18. Thus the likelihood of downward movement within the dependent variable of confidence for government decreases by 35 percentage points from the 1991 to 23.6% in the 2007 wave. Over the same period of time, for confidence in parliament it decreases by 13.2% and for confidence in political parties by 10.3%. Summing these observations up, this indicates that in the 2007 wave, when a moderate Muslim-Democrat party is in government, left-wing voting preferences shifted in direction to have a positive impact on the dependent variables. The non-voting variable continued to result in a downward likelihood in the dependent variables but one can see that the association moves increasingly towards a positive one although it is statistically insignificant.
Lastly, in contrast to the relation of co-variates such as left-wing and non-voting preferences with the dependent variable, the impact of pro-Kurdish voting support and confidence in government, parliament or political parties remains wholly negative with a decreasing trend throughout the three waves in their likelihood to effect upward movement within the dependent variable. Given the current stagnation in any comprehensive political settlement of the Kurdish issue in the last decade this is quite expected and not likely to change any time soon following the constitutional closure of yet another pro-Kurdish party, the DTP, in 2009. This concludes the section on the statistical regression analysis. The next section will now summarise the main findings of this chapter.

### 7.3 Conclusion

This chapter presents an empirical examination of the third criterion of Mainwaring and Scully’s framework for party system institutionalisation, the acceptance of the main political actors within a democratic electoral system as well as the electoral process itself. As this criterion is largely based on popular perceptions of these actors and processes within the general public and the extent to which they are regarded as legitimate it was decided to base the analyses on attitudinal data from the World Values
Survey program, data from the Eurobarometer survey and lastly, data related to Turkey’s electoral turnout.

In the first section of the chapter, a descriptive analysis of these sources was undertaken which was then followed up by constructing a statistical model based on ordinal regression analysis measuring the impact of Islamist voting preferences and religious self-identification upon the perceived confidence of regime institutions such as the government, the parliament as well as political parties. As the descriptive statistical analysis of the WVS waves on Turkey from 1991 to 2007 showed, overall confidence in all the three regime institutions of government, parliament and political parties increased while trust in the Turkish armed forces decreased slightly during the same time period. It was seen that confidence in regime institutions among respondents with a positive religious-self identification increased greatly. Simultaneously, for those without a religious self-identification there was no decline in confidence in regime institutions but rather the figure remained approximately at the same level with a small increase. Moreover, for both groups, the figures for the 2007 wave were the highest showings in confidence across the 4 waves for both groups. However, when the survey results were broken down along voting preferences according to a left-wing, right-wing, Islamist and pro-Kurdish party bloc, it was seen that a cross-party convergence on support for the regime institutions among the different groups was absent as it was also during the other periods across the WVS waves which is perhaps expectable. Partisan identification along the left-right spectrum seemed to be linked with the ideological orientation of the incumbent power holder.

Data from the Eurobarometer surveys from 2004 to 2009 supported that of the WVS in showing that popular confidence in the Turkish armed forces gradually dropped over that period. Popular support for democratic governance consolidated at a very level above 90% across in general and across all three party blocs, regardless of religious self-identification. These findings were also framed in the context of other studies that support the finding that popular support for democratic governance as opposed to other forms during the period of the AKP government has remained universally high. The overall long-term trend of consolidation of public support for democratic governance as well as increased trust in these regime institutions by the religious sample of respondents, which constitute 70-75% of the overall cases, provide positive signs for
increased public confidence in the main actors of electoral democracy which is conducive towards increased party system institutionalisation. Aggregate data on electoral turn-out was also examined as a proxy indicator of public confidence or trust in the democratic electoral process. This followed research by Dalton (2004) indicating a strong link between overall political trust and turnout. At national level it was seen that turn-out declined steeply in the 2002 national elections. Turkish scholars have linked this to the lack of confidence in mainstream parties over the preceding years, the Turkish state’s failure to take adequate action during the 1999 Marmara earthquake as well as the disastrous economic crises that occurred before the 2002 elections. It was then seen that turnout increased again in the subsequent 2007 elections. This development was also seen when turn-out was examined at the level of the regional groupings.

The results of the regression analyses confirmed in part the earlier findings of the first section that when the ideological nature of the respondent is consistent with the governing incumbent trust is higher. Thus when an Islamist or Muslim-Democrat party is in power, there is a positive relationship between confidence in civilian regime institutions and Islamist voting support. This relationship, albeit being somewhat weaker, was also observed in the association of positive religious self-identification. Furthermore importantly, when the impact of the other predictors was looked at, it was seen that there was a shift in the direction of the association between the variable for left-wing voting support and confidence in regime institutions. Having been negative throughout the first three WVS waves, the association became positive and led to upward movement within the dependent variables in the 2007 wave. Although the association was not statistically significant, the shift in direction from a negative to a positive correlation in the 2007 wave while the Muslim Democrat AKP was in government should be highlighted as a positive sign indicating broader legitimacy of the institutions. Moreover, a trend towards an increasingly positive relationship with the predictor for a non-voting preference and confidence in regime institutions was also observed although this association was also statistically insignificant. The association between pro-Kurdish voting support and confidence in regime institutions was negative for government, parliament and political parties.
This penultimate chapter concludes the empirical part of this research thesis. The next chapter will provide a comprehensive synopsis of the research chapters within the context of the research outline, the research question and the related expectation. It will also point out various avenues of research which constitute a future research agenda building on this thesis.
Chapter 8 - Conclusion

Will Turkey continue its erratic but progressive democratic consolidation, which began in the late 1940s, or will the Muslim Democracy of Justice and Development prove to be a dead-end scenario for politics in Turkey? (Öktem 2011a: 13)

As the above-cited quote indicates, Turkey’s political system has undergone dramatic change and transformation in the last 10 years which must be seen in the context of its democratic history and one will have to see whether this promising trend continues. Crises in the political system have persisted such as the constitutional attempt to close down the ruling party in 2008, the ongoing stagnation of the EU accession process and the continuing conflict with the separatist, pro-Kurdish PKK and this points to the many remaining challenges facing Turkey on the path towards attaining the status of a stable and consolidated democracy. This is also borne out by quantitative indices such as those of Freedom House and the Economist democracy index (2011: 6) which still respectively continue to describe Turkey only as ‘partly free’ or as a ‘hybrid regime’. Despite the pro-Western biases and the methodological flaws of these indices (Bollen 1993: 1226), they still do give an indication of the difficult journey ahead.

As stated in the introductory chapter of this thesis, Turkey’s transformation on the domestic and international level into a rising middle-ranking power with vibrant economic growth and a functioning procedural democracy during the last decade has reverberated loudly, especially within the Muslim world. A wide-ranging debate has emerged in that regard focusing on the ‘modelhood’ of Turkey and the AKP, as Cavdar (2006: 497) terms it, to the wider Muslim world, able to provide insights and guidance on processes of state-building and democratization for other countries (Kirişci 2012: 145). In a recent 2011 survey on popular perceptions of Turkey undertaken in 16 countries of the Middle East, 61% of respondents answered that they thought Turkey represented a model in that sense for the region (Akgün and Gündoğar 2012: 20). Therefore, if we return to the premise stated in the introductory chapter, this thesis has sought to approach the study of Islamist politics and its relation with democratic political systems from a perspective which tries to look at its role in processes of party system institutionalization. For this purpose Turkey was chosen as a single case study.
This research thesis was based on the assumption that the emergence of moderate Islamist or ‘Muslim-Democrat’ parties, specifically in the form of the AKP, had a positive and stabilizing effect on the institutional character of Turkey’s party system. It aimed to systematically test that assumption through the research framework established by Mainwaring and Scully. Following the central assumption of Mainwaring and Scully’s research on party systems, institutionalized party systems are supposed to benefit processes of democratic consolidation. Nevertheless, as stated before, party system institutionalization is not equated with broader democratic consolidation but rather factored in as a process that can have a positive impact on wider consolidation although this also need not necessarily be the case. This hypothesized relation of the Turkish case was visually summarized in the figure 8.1 as shown above, the conceptual scheme of this thesis, which was also presented in the literature review.

In this chapter, the combined findings of this thesis will be listed thematically. First the findings of the manifesto analysis from the fourth chapter will be recapitulated. Afterwards, the findings will be organized according to the structure of Mainwaring and Scully’s research framework for party system institutionalization. Therefore, the structure of this chapter will organize the presentation and elaboration of the findings by themes. Following this, there will be a brief discussion on the potential for developing a broader research agenda in the future based on the findings and the research themes from this thesis. The final part of this chapter will open out into a broader discussion.

Figure 8.1: Conceptual scheme of this thesis
regarding the relationship between party system institutionalization and processes of

democratic consolidation in general before looking at these developments in the Turkish
case in particular with regard to the past decade.

The following section will now thematically present the findings from the 4 empirically
based research chapters in the order in which the thesis was structured. Therefore,
firstly, it will focus on the manifesto analysis and the latter ones will address the
findings relating to the various criteria of Mainwaring and Scully’s research framework
for examining party system institutionalization.

8.1 Manifesto analysis

As mentioned, a central assumption which underpinned this research thesis concerned
the emergence of a new variant of actor within the field of political Islam across the
Muslim world and especially in Turkey, the so-called ‘Muslim-Democrat’ party. It was
argued that this new generation of actors within political Islam was generally supportive
of the normative ideals of the liberal democratic framework in contrast to their
ideological forebears. Therefore, the secondary research expectation stipulated that the
Islamist actors would have to adopt this format to have a positive effect on processes of
party system institutionalization. For that reason, it was decided to undertake a critical
examination of the AKP’s political discourse in their 2002 and 2007 election
manifestoes as these documents constituted elements of the party’s ‘public persona’.
The focus concentrated on the manner in which the AKP framed its guiding ideology of
‘conservative democracy’ in terms of its understandings and depictions of democracy,
human rights on one hand and religion and tradition on the other and how this diverged
from the rhetoric of the AKP’s Islamist predecessors. The investigation was preceded
by a brief historical synopsis of the anti-systemic discourse used by Turkey’s Islamist
National Outlook Movement (Milli Görüş) and its parties in the 1970s before going on
to focus on those in the 1980s and 1990s like the RP.

Content analysis data from the Comparative Manifesto Project on Turkish election
programs was employed to examine the emphases in the RP’s election programs on
tradition and morality as well as anti-western prejudices. It was seen that electoral
pressures, as well as the fear of closure from the socio-political establishment, affected variations in the Islamist party movement’s emphases of these themes. However, as the CMP had difficulties in examining the Islamist parties’ rhetoric this was combined with secondary literature from the relevant scholarship in the field. As there was no available CMP data for the 2002 and 2007 elections, both AKP manifestoes were examined in terms of how their discourse framed understandings of democracy, human rights and civil society on one hand and traditional values and religion on the other. The analysis was preceded by a focus on a prime ministerial speech given by Erdoğan in 2004 in which he expounded on the wider philosophy of ‘conservative democracy’ which the party has adopted in its discourse. This illustrated that the AKP undertook a discursive shift towards centre-right political rhetoric reminiscent of centre-right parties from Turkey’s political history. This shift was also in the AKP’s visual election material such as billboards and election posters placing Erdoğan next to former centre-right statesmen as Menderes and Özal. The final part of the chapter used data from a 2006 expert survey by Laver and Benoit to illustrate that although the AKP was perceived as a centrist party along the left-right axis and extremely positive towards EU accession, there was also a wide-spread perception among survey respondents that religion still constituted a vital element of the party.

The research undertaken showed conclusively that the AKP had shifted its discourse towards the centre-right political ground and away from the anti-systemic and anti-western of its Islamist predecessors. As shown by the analyses of the AKP’s manifestoes, this shift and the manner in which the party integrated and emphasized a liberal understanding of human rights, democracy, civil and political rights and the rule of law showed that the party had adopted or was seeking to emulate a political discourse similar to previous centre-right parties in Turkey and conservative-democrat parties in Western Europe. This accorded to the political discourse then that a moderate Islamist or ‘Muslim Democrat’ would choose to promote. This development in its political rhetoric exemplifies what Wickham terms the dynamic process of ‘Islamist auto-reform’ (2006: 6-7), where the integration in electoral politics exposes a pro-religious political actor to vote-maximizing pressures, thus pushing it to significantly moderate its tone and agenda which can then gradually lead to a deeper internalization of democratic norms.
Although many research articles have been written on the AKP’s discursive shift (Çağliyan-Içener 2009; Akdoğan 2008; Taşkin 2008; Tepe 2006; Doğan 2005) these have mostly been abstract discussions on the concept of ‘conservative democracy’ which did not sufficiently refer to the party’s language in the election manifestoes or combine this with an examination of CMP data relating to the AKP’s Islamist predecessors. A notable exception is Joppien’s study (2011) of the AKP’s party program. In this sense, a mixed-methods approach was chosen here combining both quantitative means like content analysis and expert surveys on one hand and qualitative research methods such as discourse analysis on the other. After establishing that the AKP did in fact espouse a conservative-democrat rather than Islamist discourse in public, the next research chapter then examined the first two criteria of Mainwaring and Scully’s research framework on party system institutionalization. The findings related to this chapter will be discussed in the next section.

8.2 Mainwaring and Scully’s Research Framework

The history and development of Turkey’s politics and its multi-party system has been covered by a rich tradition of theoretical and empirical scholarship dating back to the 1950s and 1960s. This research study attempts to situate itself within that field. It is to date the only one which has been undertaken systematically using the Mainwaring and Scully’s research framework on the institutional strength and stability of Turkey’s party system. In chapter 5, the first two criteria of the framework, namely regularity in inter-party competition and social rootedness, were researched. These criteria were both put in the same chapter since, as Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 9) argue, they are ‘intertwined but nevertheless separate’. Moreover, both dimensions were examined using aggregate, province-level electoral data on poll returns for local and national elections. In order to adequately order and structure the analysis of data of Turkey’s 81 provinces, 5 regional groupings were created which held a regional as well as electoral significance although the populous regions of Istanbul and Ankara only constituted one province each. Much of the analysis focused on individual parties but was also categorized according to left-wing, right-wing, Islamist party blocs as well as pro-Kurdish blocs where this was possible.
The other main criterion, the legitimacy of the electoral process and that of the key actors within it, was the focus of the sixth chapter. As stated in the literature review and the research design, although the framework consists of 4 separate criteria, it was decided not to investigate and operationalise one criterion relating to the ability of individual party organizations to act independently and autonomously of outside influence and to resist monopolization by the party’s leadership (Mainwaring and Scully 2008: 119). As was seen in the third chapter which focused on the Turkish context, Turkey’s party system has yet to overcome the persistent challenge of extremely personalized politics and party leaderships that remain in power virtually forever (Turan 2010: 2; Sayarı 2002: 25). As this problem affects Turkish party politics across the board to almost the same extent, it made little sense to investigate variations of it and therefore this criterion did not receive further focus. As will be discussed later, high levels of personalism have a detrimental impact on party autonomy. As seen in the Turkish case which has a historical legacy of personalism across the party spectrum, this condition obstructs the recruitment and renewal of leadership within the party system, a key function of parties in political society.

8.2.1 Regularity in inter-party competition

The first section of the chapter 5 attempted to operationalise the concept of regularity in inter-party competition and apply it to the case of Turkey’s party system, especially after the 2002 parliamentary elections in Turkey. As seen, Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 5) argue that the most accurate manner of operationalising the concept is by looking at the total electoral volatility extant within the party system. Furthermore, the degree of party system fractionalization within the Turkish party system was also investigated using Taagepera and Laakso’s formula, as a secondary indicator, as it also tests the stability of inter-party competition (Morlino 2009: 210). In order to compare this with the local election results, vote-share rather than seat-share was used as the means of analysis. As seen, the results of this analysis demonstrated that party system fractionalization decreased dramatically since 2002 under the AKP, dropping to a level defined by Sartori as constituting moderate multipartism. Electoral volatility increased to record levels in the 2002 elections which were seen as a ‘critical election’, to use Key’s term (1955), which significantly re-aligned Turkey’s electoral landscape.
As discussed, following grave economic crises in 2000 and 2001 which were tied together in the public mind with incompetent political governance and mismanagement by the coalition government, the electorate punished almost all mainstream parties at the ballot box in 2002 and elected the newly founded AKP as well as, to a smaller extent, the centre-left CHP. This complete sea-change in political representation generated an unprecedented spike in total electoral volatility to 52% at national level. However, although the AKP’s party volatility increased as a result of its vote-share rising significantly in the 2007 national election, it could also be seen that total electoral volatility as a result of the new party system configuration decreased to relatively benign levels of 15% as the new configuration of the party system endured. A further, significant finding in the research reinforced Çarkoğlu’s argument (2009: 17) that the predominantly Kurdish provinces of South-Eastern Turkey are increasingly diverging from the rest of the country in developing an autonomous pattern of political dynamics revolving around the Kurdish conflict. While the volatility results from the 2007 elections signal that the emergence of a popular Muslim-Democrat party has had a stabilizing effect on the stability of inter-party competition, one will need to look at further national and local elections in the future in order to judge whether this pattern will continue. It will be interesting whether the June 2011 elections confirmed or disproved this trend, but with roughly the same parties having competed, it is likely that total electoral volatility declined even further.

**8.2.2 Social Rootedness**

The second part of chapter 5 attempted to operationalise a statistical means of analyzing the degree of social rootedness of Turkey’s political parties. Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 5) argued that the development of strong links at local level for political parties is a key dimension within party system institutionalization. Firstly, this section employed a method used by Mainwaring and Scully to examine social rootedness in political systems which focuses on the median age of parties in the system which receive more than 10% of the vote-share. However, it was noted that this was problematic in the Turkish case due to the repeated military coups and interventions in which all or most parties had been periodically closed down before re-establishing themselves under different names. Yet, by tracing back these parties which kept the
same organizational structures over time despite the name changes, it was shown that the median age of parties which won more than 10% of the vote-share in 2007 was approximately 53 years. In order to operationalise the criterion of social rootedness following Mainwaring and Scully’s suggestions, a database was constructed which calculated the relative electoral difference between each party’s vote-share at national and local elections.

The preliminary results showed that the median relative electoral difference of the parties rose in the last decade since 2002. However, when disentangling those parties receiving more than 5% of the vote-share from those that did not, it was found that the relative electoral difference of the first group had actually dropped since 2002 and that the numerical superiority of the latter group, whose vote-share is extremely limited, disproportionally inflates the overall median relative electoral difference. Thus, the relative electoral difference actually fell since 2002 indicating that overall social rootedness strengthened. The results also showed that the main Islamist or Muslim-Democrat party manifested the least difference between vote-share at national and local level at almost every election signifying that people readily identified with its party labels. As stated, Turkey’s Islamist political parties have traditionally devoted themselves to establishing linkages with the electorate, thereby contributing to the overall rootedness of the party system. In line with Johnson Tan’s suggestion, patterns of rootedness should also be explored geographically (2006: 100). The last section attempted to map the rootedness of the Islamist party bloc in Turkey by looking at the provinces in which the bloc consistently got the highest vote-share since 1987. The results showed that Islamist parties are strongly rooted in the heartland of central and eastern Anatolia and that this long-term pattern has continued with the AKP.

This research method of translating social rootedness into an operative concept through the relative electoral difference is quite novel and has as of yet not been applied to party political research in Turkey or many other Muslim democracies. Its advantages as a quantitative method for studying party political linkages make it ideal for wider comparative use in combination with other means and this will be referred to later in the discussion of future research.
8.2.3 Legitimacy of electoral process and key political actors

The last criterion within Mainwaring and Scully’s research framework of party system institutionalization to be investigated pertained to the legitimacy of the electoral process and the main political within it. This element of the framework followed the assumption that the more institutionalized a party system is, the more public approval the electoral system and the main actors within it enjoy as constituting the principal means of determining a country’s political leadership (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 14). Using survey data on Turkey from the World Values Survey as well as the Eurobarometer, legitimacy was operationalised in this case by looking at the degree of trust or confidence that the main civilian regime institutions and the military enjoyed and examining aggregate patterns of electoral turnout. Furthermore, the data analysis sought to examine the associative link between religiosity or religious self-identification and Islamist voting support on one hand and the public confidence and trust that civilian regime institutions like the government, parliament and political parties receive on the other.

As was seen, the first part of the chapter which focused on descriptive statistical analysis showed that overall confidence in all these regime institutions did increase over the four survey waves, especially in the 2007 survey. When the respondents were separated according to left-, right-wing or Islamist voting preference however it was seen that a cross-party consensus did not exist and that the party ideological nature of the incumbent had a strong structuring effect on the relationship which may perhaps have been expected. Nevertheless, significantly, it was also seen that when the respondents were subdivided according to samples with a positive religious self-identification and those without that confidence in all regime institutions, government, parliament and political parties, among the former group increased while that of the latter group stayed at the previous level or even rose slightly. Overall support for democracy as a political system also rose slightly but progressively. This was also the case when the respondents were categorized according to their voting preference within the blocs of left-wing, right-wing, Islamist and pro-Kurdish parties, it was seen that confidence in regime institutions increased among all the party blocs, except for the pro-Kurdish parties. This was also confirmed by reference to other similar studies that showed that support for non-democratic forms of governance, either through the army
or based on the sharia, had declined. Simultaneously, it was observed using both WVS and Eurobarometer survey data that support for the Turkish armed forces has declined, especially in the last decade.

In the second part of the chapter, an explanatory model using ordinal regression analysis sought to look at the association between religiosity and Islamist voting support in relation to confidence in regime institutions. Although the association between the two was positive and the presence of Islamist voting preferences or positive religious self-identification did lead to an increased likelihood of respondents having confidence in the various regime institutions, the institutions where this relationship showed most clearly were those of government and parliament with political parties being the last in line. It was also seen that this relationship was strongest when the incumbent in power as an Islamist or Muslim Democrat party. However, in the analysis of the regression models it was also seen that the impact between left-wing party preferences and the dependent variable of confidence in the regime institutions moved to a positive one during the last WVS wave. Despite the lack of statistical significance of these correlations, the shift in direction from a negative to a positive impact was still noted as significant especially since it occurred when the AKP was in power. It was also seen that electoral turnout at national and local elections held steady over the last 10 years despite suffering a steep decline. Thus confidence in the electoral system remained high overall although the south-eastern provinces of the country manifested the lowest voter participation, another signal that the electoral dynamics of the region diverged significantly from the rest of the country.

8.3 Implications for a future research agenda

Due to the thematic focus of the thesis on party system institutionalization it was not possible to focus on other related processes of Turkey’s democratic consolidation, such as the normalization of civil-military relations in accordance to liberal democratic norms in the last few years. This is also the reason why the thesis did not focus overly on Turkey’s EU accession process. In terms of the methodological limitations of the thesis, there were several and they can be considered as points which could be connected to further development in future research. As mentioned, in regards to the
manifesto analysis there is no CMP data yet for Turkey’s 2002 and 2007 elections. Furthermore, it was seen that the CMP data had difficulties capturing the religious content of the Islamist parties in the 1990s. However, this ‘weakness’ enabled a more differentiated approach which focused on the combined used of a variety of other research methods and strategies.

In regards to the operationalisation of the criterion of social rootedness, as was stated in chapter 5, by using the statistical measure of the relative electoral different, a gap of one to two appeared between local and national elections apart for the elections of 1999 which were used as a base year. This does somewhat blur the focus on the degree to which people are attached to one party in casting their votes at national and local level. However, this is a methodological problem that has also been acknowledged by Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 9) in their own research. However, despite this time difference the essential value of the exercise, the comparison of voter attachment to a party label across different elections and the examination of parties’ rootedness within their constituencies, does remain intact and allows for detecting relations across the different electoral levels.

The findings of this research project have opened up a variety of avenues that may offer fruitful grounds for further future research. The following section will examine the different dimensions and elements of the research that would be taken into account. In that sense it will focus on the Turkish case first before looking at a wider comparative frame. For the Turkish case, the passage of time will add further observations allowing the monitoring of the development of its party system’s institutionalization. The June 2011 parliamentary elections, which is likely to see the re-election of the AKP for a third term, would offer another data-point in time allowing the expansion of observations regarding the institutionalization of Turkey’s party system. This would also enable one to include the last AKP manifesto into the manifesto analysis in the fifth chapter and see if the party’s discourse after almost ten years in power has shifted in contrast to the preceding two manifestos. Both in terms of their social rootedness and the intra-party bloc volatility, the 2011 national elections and the local elections in 2013 would be crucial in determining whether the observations which were gathered as a result of the data analysis are genuinely sustainable over further elections. In that sense,
the data set of the next WVS wave on Turkey, which is being currently gathered, will be important as well in allowing a second point in time in which the AKP is in government in the context of Turkey’s Islamist spectrum and beyond, it would be fruitful to combine the use of aggregate, electoral data, already detailed in chapter 5, with a focus on micro-level case studies, possibly alternating between rural and local electoral settings, employing interview and survey-based methods. The study by White (2003) of political mobilization by Islamist parties in lower-middle class to working class neighborhoods of Istanbul could provide a useful template in this case. Furthermore, one could also integrate this with interviews with AKP parliamentarians. The same approach could also be used to focus on the growing divergence between the Kurdish South-East and the rest of the country which was already remarked upon.

The Islamist party spectrum in Turkey has recently expanded in the number of parties with the newly founded, Islamist People’s Voice Party (HSP) as a result of a split within the Islamist SP. This indicates that religious and political Islam will continue to be an important ideological reference point for party political organizations as well as the wider electorate. The availability of further CMP manifesto data on Turkey in the future will enable further comparative analysis comparison not just diachronically between the AKP and its Islamist predecessors but also looking synchronically at the AKP in contrast to other existing parties in the last decade of Turkish elections. Another area which could provide amply ground for further research is the interaction between the rise and fall of small parties, those receiving less than 5-10% of the vote-share, in the systems and the development of the party system. In a recent paper, Powell and Tucker (2009) proposed a new approach in determining electoral volatility which distinguished between older, established parties and smaller and newer parties in as the two groups contribute differently towards it with their electoral performance. The same dynamic between larger, more established parties and those that were smaller and received minimal vote-share was observed in calculating the relative electoral difference of Turkey’s political parties in order to operationalise the criterion of social rootedness.

On a wider more comparative scale beyond that of the Turkish case, there is significant scope for a greater application of Mainwaring and Scully’s research framework, or elements thereof, for a wider comparative study of party system institutionalization across the Muslim world. Therefore, recent development open up the possibility of
going beyond this thesis and attempting a more wide-ranging, cross-nation comparison between the different political parties that have been summed up as ‘Muslim-Democrat’ across the Muslim world in relation to the political discourses they apply and the impact they have on their electoral setting. The sample of countries would depend on the nature of its party system and whether Muslim Democrat parties play a significant role within them. In that sense, Nasr (2005: 13) has pointed to countries such as Indonesia, Morocco, Bangladesh, Malaysia. Tunisia’s ruling en-Nahda party, which compares itself with the AKP (Arieff 2011: 6) could also been seen as another potential example of a Muslim Democrat party. Similar parties emerging in Egypt such as. In this sense, it will have to be seen to what degree countries in the Middle East will succeed following the period of the Arab awakening in struggling for a sustainable, democratic breakthrough which may in time result in attempts to build long-term, civil multi-party polities. If this development were to take place and persist, it could have a spill-over effect into many other regions of the Muslim world which could considerable strengthen the ranks of Muslim democracies in the world and open up a new field of study.

Having presented the main findings, the final section of this chapter will attempt to engineer a brief discussion regarding the broad themes of this dissertation. Thus firstly, the discussion will focus on party system institutionalization and its impact on democratic consolidation. Secondly, the Turkish case will be examined in terms of contemporary domestic developments concerning both party system institutionalization and democratic consolidation. Some key issues will be highlighted and briefly elaborated upon.

8.4 Party system institutionalization and democratic consolidation

As Köllner (2006: 10) indicates, party system institutionalization is still a comparative new field of research within party politics and the dynamics which shape the interaction between it and broader processes democratic consolidation are still relatively nebulous and remain to be conclusively analyzed. It is quite clear however that there is a positive relationship between them which Smith (2003: 149) refers to as a ‘virtuous circle’ in the sense that the habituation of the formal and informal procedures and norms of the democratic process will be facilitated when the main party political actors in this arena
and the general public are familiar with the line-up of players in the field of electoral politics. There is still discussion regarding the exact relationship between individual parties and party systems in regards to institutionalization. Webb (2006: 4) for instance contends that processes of consolidation at both the level of party systems and individual parties are inter-linked and less closed off than has been assumed.

Nevertheless, as has been argued, party system institutionalization cannot be equated with the much larger and more multi-dimensional process of democratic consolidation and should rather be seen as one of the elements which can contribute towards it. Mainwaring and Scully (2008: 119) also stresses this contingent nature and that the two processes are not equal in noting that institutionalized party system can lead towards greater democratic consolidation. For that purpose, the direction of the institutionalization must also be continuously monitored in order to see what form of party system this process helps to generate. Furthermore, there are important aspects and dimensions of democratic consolidation which are related to but beyond the remit of party system institutionalization such as the civil-military relations, rules on freedom of the press and other aspects of the relationship between state and society. It is also the case, as Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 6) point out, that party system institutionalization is certainly not a linear or irreversible process. In this context it is necessary to critically examine the ways in which party actors contribute to this process.

In recent research by Künkler and Leininger (2009) looking at the effects of religious or quasi-religious political actors on democratization, they examine how these agents can in fact shape their political systems in a democratizing and simultaneously de-democratizing manner. It is also important to be clear that both processes of party system institutionalization as well as democratic consolidation can regress. Warning against teleologically deterministic presumptions regarding democratic development, Larbi Sadiki (2009: 116) argues rather that democratization in Middle Eastern political regimes occurs in cycles of ‘advances’ and ‘retreats’. Dankwart Rustow, a seminal figure in the history of democratization scholarship, having been partially raised in Turkey, formulated his dynamic model of sequential democratization partly with the political experiences of Turkey in mind (1970: 350). Like Sadiki, Rustow (1970: 345) clarifies that democratization processes are not irreversible and holds against the assumption that it constitutes ‘a steady process that is homogeneous over time’.
The term crossroads has perhaps been overused in relation to Turkey’s political development in the last decade. It is however appropriate to state that Turkey’s political system has arrived at a critical juncture at the end of the first decade of the 21st century. It remains to be seen whether Turkey will move towards having an institutionalized party system conducive to democratic consolidation, move towards a party system with one dominant party or fall back into an ‘inchoate’ party system. Following Mainwaring and Torcal’s argument that party system institutionalization provides ‘stability in who the main parties are and how they behave’ (2006: 206), one can argue that Turkey’s politics has achieved this to a certain degree at the present point. The current configuration of moderate multi-partisanship constitutes a political space in which a centre-left, a centre-right, a far-right party and a regional pro-Kurdish party exist as distinguishable alternatives. In the 2011 national elections, these four parties received over 90% of all votes with an increased overall electoral turnout of 87% (SETA 2011: 1). The AKP did not obtain an absolute majority of parliamentary seats in these elections despite receiving almost 50% of the vote-share.

However, it still needs to be seen if this process will sustain itself over the next few electoral cycles. Many observers of Turkish politics have noted that the AKP has shown increasing signs of authoritarianism since its re-election in 2007. The predominance of the AKP in the party political arena and the current lack of a credible political alternatives have reinforced this sensation and fuelled concerns that a new hegemonic party system under the AKP may develop. The increased concentration of authority within the party around the leadership of Erdoğan caused Soli Özel, a liberal commentator and scholar to describe the AKP as a ‘democratizing force but not necessarily a democratic one’ (cited in Evin et al 2010: 25). The enduring culture of top-down, personalistic leadership within the Turkish party system, the one aspect of Mainwaring and Scully’s framework in which no progress has occurred across the political spectrum, encourages party leaders to adopt authoritarian mindsets and hinders this aspect of party system institutionalization. It also prevents parties from fulfilling one of their main functions in the political system which is to raise and socialize the next generation of politicians and facilitate the emergence of new ideas (Gunther and Diamond 2001: 7; Yanai 1999: 7). Thus, it is still the case across the political spectrum...
that authority within parties is overwhelmingly concentrated within the hands of the leadership elite. The most recent and controversial example of this practice was the appointment of Necmettin Erbakan, aged 84, to lead the Islamist SP in 2010 (Turan 2010: 1).\(^{28}\) Despite initial pledges to introduce intra-party democracy, the AKP has not diverged from that pattern and has concentrated decision-making power within the leadership elite surrounding Erdoğan (Jenkins 2009).

However, it is also important to acknowledge that significant processes of democratization outside the party system have also occurred such as the increased civilianization of politics and governance in recent years as the Turkish armed forces, once viewed as the ‘master of the country’ and ‘guardian of the republic’ (Ahmad 2010: 113), have increasingly withdrawn from the political arena has.\(^ {29}\) Indeed, Özel and Özcan (2011: 127) has even gone as far as claiming, somewhat optimistically as of yet, that ‘the demilitarization of the Turkish polity is complete’. This decline in popular legitimacy was already seen in the analysis of survey data in the sixth chapter. The significance of this process has been in emphasizing the importance of civilian politics and electoral democracy more than ever before in the country’s political history.

This development has been paralleled by the first-ever investigation into the secretive networks known as the ‘deep state’. Despite many criticisms concerning the conduct of the investigation, it has succeeded in invalidating the long-held tenet of Turkish republican politics that the armed forces were practically untouchable and could not be held to account for past misdeeds by the civil authorities (Park 2011: 48). The conceptual legitimacy of ‘tutelary democracy’ in which the military acts as fifth institutional control and exercises guardianship over the political process is disappearing and being slowly substituted by civilian electoral politics and a new perception of state-society relations in which, as Aydinli (2011: 237) argues, ‘society, with all its competing elements and actors, may very well own the state’. Simultaneously, in part due to legislative reforms that were passed in the last ten years decade of the past decade, civil society has undergone increasing quantitative and qualitative expansion and pluralization, becoming increasing capable of vocalizing its demands and shaping the country’s domestic and foreign politics (Park 2011: 49; Grigoriadis 2009: 65). In

\(^{28}\) Erbakan passed away four months later in February 2011.

\(^{29}\) A recent referendum on amending the constitution in 2010 has strengthened this civilizing process by making the military more accountable to Turkey’s civilian courts than ever before.
that sense, they have also been increasingly important actors in the country’s democratization since the 1990s (Burak 2011: 68; Göksel 2011: 2; Toros 2007: 412).

Nevertheless, large areas of governance relating to state-society relations in Turkey’s political system remain indicative of the strong traditional top-down statism within Turkey’s political governance and culture and require significant reforms along liberal democratic lines and a revitalization of the EU membership accession process. The government’s cross-party initiative on crafting a new ‘civilian’ constitution, if successful, could create a fundamental consensus among the main actors in politics that further reforms could be broadly based on. This would seem especially important in order to address the persistence of the Kurdish conflict, perhaps the most contemporary important domestic issue nowadays and which points to the as of yet unfinished and defective nature of Turkey’s democratic political system as it is quite clear that large doubt still remains concerning the legitimacy of democracy’s ‘rules of the game’.

In that sense, the development of Turkey’s party system in the near future will need to be critically interpreted following the diagram in figure 8.1 at the beginning of this chapter which was also shown in the literature review. Hitherto, as this thesis has shown the consolidation of Turkey’s Islamist spectrum, especially since the emergence of the Muslim Democrat AKP, has reinforced overall party system institutionalization. This process has been beneficial towards entrenching the consolidation of Turkey’s civilian democratic system although this larger, multi-dimensional process, as seen, is also dependent on many other factors and dynamics beyond the institutionalization of the party system. As Tocci and Walker (2012: 50) recently argued, despite many problems and flaws, the past decade has seen Turkey become ‘more European, more democratic, more Islamic and increasingly more nationalism’. Under the right circumstances as argued these interlinked processes can form a ‘virtuous circle’ in which party system institutionalization complements and reinforces democratization and ‘facilitated democratic governance’ (Mainwaring and Scully 2008: 19). Increased democratic consolidation would also enable Turkey to tackle the other enduring legacy which has surfaced in recent years, the conflict between the pro-Kurdish separatist PKK and the Turkish military as well as broader Turkish society. If Turkey can continue stabilizing its party politics in a way that legitimates civilian politics and democratic governance, it may be able to gradually transplant this conflict to the arena of democratic politics.

263
It is indubitable that Turkey’s political system has undergone significant changes in the last decade which has led to an increasing entrenchment of civilian democratic politics as well as increased stabilization of the overall party system. Turkey has moved away from the awkward ‘military democracy’ (Salt 1999: 78) as which it was viewed in the past. The emergence of a new strand of moderate actor within the spectrum of political Islam, the Muslim Democrat party, has been instrumental in this process but it will remain to be critically monitored whether increased party system institutional will lead to a wider consolidation of Turkey’s democracy. As stated, significant challenges outside the party system as well as within remain that are detrimental to the country’s political development. However, the primacy of electoral politics as the key arena for determining Turkey’s future has strengthened in the last decade. In that sense Öktem (2011b) argues that ‘… the notion of the ballot box as a place, where history can be made’ does make Turkey into an inspiring model for the wider region of the Middle East and the Muslim world at its current juncture.
Appendix of thesis

Figure 5.1.1: Based on CMP data

Figure 5.2.1: Based on CMP data
Figure 5.2.2: Based on CMP data

Figure 6.2.1: Based on aggregate vote-share data at provincial level
Figure 6.5.1: Based on aggregate vote-share data at provincial level

Figure 6.5.2: Based on aggregate vote-share data at provincial level
Inter-bloc volatility in percent in the Aegean and Mediterranean coastal region for national elections: 1987-2007

Figure 6.5.3: Based on aggregate vote-share data at provincial level

Inter-bloc volatility in percent in Istanbul for national elections: 1987-2007

Figure 6.5.4: Based on aggregate vote-share data at provincial level
Inter-bloc volatility in percent in Ankara for national elections: 1987-2007

Proportional electoral difference in percent per party bloc

Figure 6.5.5: Based on aggregate vote-share data at provincial level

Figure 6.7.1: Based on aggregate vote-share data at provincial level
Figure 7.17.1: Based on aggregate vote-share data at provincial level

Figure 7.17.2: Based on aggregate vote-share data at provincial level
Table 7.6: Summary of ordinal regression analysis for confidence in government in Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Higher Education</th>
<th>Religious Self-Identification</th>
<th>Abroad and Undecided Votes</th>
<th>Left-wing Voting Preference</th>
<th>Confident Change</th>
<th>Confident % Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p < 0.01

Sample sizes (small and large)
Table 7.4: Summary of ordinal regression analysis for confidence in parliament in Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>0.150</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>0.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No degree</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;2000</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-4000</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4000-6000</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6000-8000</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000 or more</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>0.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-wing</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrist</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 7.5: Summary of ordinal regression analysis for confidence in political parties in Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1488</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2958</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.445</td>
<td>0.441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3839</td>
<td>1.111</td>
<td>1.111</td>
<td>1.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-square</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.810</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.810</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Kurdish voting preference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly religious self-identification</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstentionist and undecided voters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic voting preference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-wing voting preference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Glossary of Party Acronyms

AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – Justice and Development Party; Turkey’s current ruling party; founded in 2001)

ANAP (Anavatan Partisi – Motherland Party; Turkish centre-right party; founded in 1983)

AP (Justice Party – Adalet Partisi; Turkish defunct former center-right party; founded in 1961; dissolved in the 1980 military coup)

BNP (Bangladeshi National Party; Bengali centre-right party; founded in 1978)

CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – Republican People’s Party; Turkey’s main current centre-left party; founded in 1923)

DEHAP (Demokratik Halk Partisi) – pro-Kurdish party; founded in 1997; successor party to HADEP; in 2005 merged with another party to form the pro-Kurdish DTP)

DSP (Demokratik Sol Partisi – Democratic Left Party; Turkish centre-left party; founded in 1985)

DP (Demokrat Parti – Democratic Party; defunct Turkish centre-right party; founded in 1946 and closed down in the 1960 military coup)

DTP (Demokrat Türkiye Partisi – Democratic Turkey Party; Turkish defunct centre-right; founded in 1997; dissolved in 2005)

DTP (Demokrat Toplum Parti – Democratic Society Party, Turkish defunct pro-Kurdish party; founded in 2005 and closed down in 2009)

DYP (Doğru Yol Partisi – True Path Party; defunct Turkish centre-right party; )
FP (Fazilet Partisi – Virtue Party; Turkish Islamist MG party; founded in 1997 and closed down in 2001)

HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi – People’s Democracy Party; Turkish pro-Kurdish party, founded in 1994 and closed down in 2003)

HSP (Halkın Sesi Partisi – People’s Voice Party; Turkish Islamist party; founded in 2010)

MB (Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun – Muslim Brotherhood; Egyptian Islamist party and broader social movement; founded in 1928)

MHP (Milli Halk Partisi – National Movement Party; Turkish far-right, nationalist party; founded in 1969)

MG (Milli Görüş – National View; movement of Islamist parties in Turkey under leadership of Erbakan; founded in 1970)

MSP (Milli Selamet Partisi – National Salvation Party; Turkish Islamist MG party; founded in 1972; banned in 1980)

MNP (Milli Nizam Partisi – National Order Party; Turkish Islamist MG party; founded in 1970; banned in 1971)

PJD (Parti de la Justice et du Développement – Justice and Development Party; Morrocan Islamist party, changed its name to PJD in 1998)

PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa – National Awakening Party; moderate Islamist party in Indonesia, founded in 1999)

PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan – Kurdistan Workers Party; pro-Kurdish separatist movement, founded in 1984)
RP (Welfare Party – Refah Partisi; Turkish Islamist MG party; founded in 1983; closed down in 1998)

SP (Saadet Partisi – Felicity Party; Turkish Islamist MG party; founded in 2001 after the closure of the FP)

TDH (Türkiye Değiştirme Hareketi – Turkish Change Movement; Turkish centre-left party, founded in 2009 but discontinued in the same year)

TIP (Türkiye İşçi Partisi – Turkish Workers Party; far-left, nationalist party, founded in 1961, it merged with the Turkish Communist Party in 1988)
Bibliography


Akgün, M., Gündoğar, S.S. (2012) The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East, TESEV


Bengio, O (2011): The “Kurdish Spring” in Turkey and its Impact on Turkish Foreign Relations in the Middle East, *Turkish Studies*, 12(4), 619-632


Calvert, P. (2002) *An Introduction to Comparative Politics*, Pearson Education


Duverger, M. (1951) Les Partis Politiques, Armand Colin


ECHR (2003) Case of Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, ECHR


Erdmann, G. (2010) ‘Political party assistance and political party research: towards a closer encounter?’, Democratization, 17(6), pp.1275-1296


ESI (2011) Murder in Anatolia: Christian Missionaries and Turkish ultra-nationalism, European Stability Initiative


Everts, S. (2004) An asset but not a model: Turkey, the EU and the wider Middle East, Centre For European Reform


Faucompret, E., Konings, J. (2008) Turkish accession to the EU: satisfying the Copenhagen criteria, Routledge


Flyvbjerg, B. (2006) "Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research", Qualitative Inquiry, 12(2), pp.219-245


Frey, F.W. (1965) *The Turkish Political Elite, M.I.T Press*


Hakyemez, Y.S. (2008) ‘Containing the political space: party closures and the Constitutional Court in Turkey’, Insight Turkey, 10(2), pp.135-144


Jenkins, G. (2008a) *Between Fact And Fantasy: Turkey's Ergenekon Investigation*, Central Asia Caucasus Institute

Jenkins, G. (2008c) Political Islam in Turkey: Running West, Heading East, Palgrave Macmillan


Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2010b) The Turkish Referendum: Democratic Consolidation or Political Conflict?, German Marshall Fund of the United States


296


Kardas, Ş (2011) ‘Revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia Highlight Dilemmas of Turkey’s Democracy Promotion Agenda’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 8(24) – http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37453&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=390&cHash=f4257b54a61805583b613d03507385a2 (Feb. 15 2011)


Laakso, Taagepera, R. (1979) “Effective” Number of Parties: A measure with application to West Europe’, *Comparative Political Studies*, 12(1), pp.3-27


303
Mardin, Ş. (1973) ‘Center-Periphery relations: A key to Turkish politics?’, *Daedalus*, 102(1), pp.169-190


Nas, T. (2010) *Tracing the economic transformation of Turkey from the 1920s to EU accession*, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher


Norgaard, O. (2001) *Democracy, Democratization and Institutional Theory*, University of Aarhus


Roberts, K. (2001) Party-Society Linkages and democratic representation in Latin America, University of Mexico


Robins, P. (2003) Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War, Hurst


Seggie, F.N. (2011) Religion and the state in Turkish universities: the headscarf ban, Palgrave Macmillan


SETA (2011) *Turkey’s Elections: General Facts*, SETA


Tezcür, G.M. (2010) Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey: The paradox of moderation, University of Texas Press


316


318


