Is the machinery of local policing delivery seen as fit for purpose by practitioners and community members to anticipate and mitigate the risk of harmful radicalisation at street level?

Submitted by James Gale to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by research in Politics, February 2012

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I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University.
ABSTRACT

Is the machinery of local policing delivery seen as fit for purpose by practitioners and community members to anticipate and mitigate the risk of harmful radicalisation at street level?

This thesis achieves four objectives. Firstly, it adds to the existing knowledge of radicalisation: it discusses the concept, and contextualises it within other forms of social phenomena such as drug-related crime. Secondly, it proposes a menu of indicators which predict or forewarn of the risk of radicalisation. Thirdly, it establishes perceptions of success at street level of modern local policing methods, namely Neighbourhood Policing and the National Intelligence Model, at identifying risk. Fourthly, it establishes a ‘toolkit’ of options which might be used by practitioners to ‘switch-off’ the radicalisation process. I argue that urban unrest, radicalisation and terrorism share common roots, with a number of key social pre-conditions existing prior to their onset: a sense of injustice, a lack of political representation, declining perceptions of legitimacy in state authorities, relative deprivation, (which may include unemployment, and a gap between expectation and achievement), discrimination and high levels of drug related crime, and I thus propose a theoretical ladder of escalation. I critically analyse policy responses arising from five seminal events, and I isolate five ‘critical success factors’ from them, suggesting that the problem in general terms is a failure to implement these success factors, thus contributing to the crisis. I revisit ‘tension indicators’ first developed following urban unrest in 1960’s America, and I link them to the critical success factors and the common roots theory. Using quantitative and qualitative primary data which consists largely of face-to-face interviews with community members, police officers, council workers and others involved in the interaction between the state and communities at street level in Oldham, Greater Manchester, I test these proposals and their links. I conclude that Neighbourhood Policing is largely successful; however the National Intelligence Model is flawed in its ability to deliver risk mitigation in this context.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Finally, I would like to thank my lovely wife, Niamh, who has accepted my pre-occupation with the work – including extended periods away from home - with supportive good grace. One day I will be happy sitting still!

_Sapere aude_

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CHAPTER ONE:

Introduction

1.0 Introduction

This thesis addresses the following research question:

‘Is the machinery of local policing delivery seen as fit for purpose by practitioners and community members to anticipate and mitigate the risk of harmful radicalisation at street level’?

To examine this, the thesis:

- Charts demographic evolution in the post war years and the organisational police response to it;
- Identifies five ‘seminal events’ from which five ‘critical success factors’ are isolated. Failure to deliver these is demonstrated, contributing to the current crisis;
- Engages literature, much of it academic literature relating to policing, which points towards social unrest and radicalisation having common roots, and consequently proposes a hypothetical ‘ladder of escalation’;
- Proposes methodology to illuminate the research question, thereby adding to the existing knowledge of radicalisation.
- Presents quantitative and qualitative primary data from Oldham, Greater Manchester, the ‘theatre of the case study’¹, and contextualises it in the corpus of literature. The qualitative work consists largely of face-to-face interviews with community members, police officers, council workers and others – those who can be considered to be directly involved in the interaction between the state and communities at street level.

¹ I use this expression throughout the thesis because it better encompasses not only the geographic location, but also the systems, processes and infrastructure which exist to deliver services and engage with communities.
One of the principal purposes behind this project is to identify what local policing teams can actually do to mitigate the risk of harmful radicalisation and progression to terrorism. I argue that urban unrest, radicalisation and terrorism share common roots, with a number of key social pre-conditions existing prior to their onset: a sense of injustice, a lack of political representation, declining perceptions of legitimacy in state authorities, relative deprivation (which may include unemployment, and a gap between expectation and achievement), discrimination and high levels of drug related crime. The thesis will argue therefore that we already understand what it is we need local police officers, Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) and other local public authority officials to do because the issues have been met before in the context of urban disorder and other key crises. I critically analyse various selected laws, policy responses and edicts from the Home Office and elsewhere, largely arising from the five seminal events outlined in the second chapter, and I identify five ‘critical success factors’ from them. I suggest that the problem in general terms is a failure to implement these success factors, a failure correctly to identify where intervention is necessary, and a failure to understand what constitutes effective intervention. I argue that failures by key social agencies like the police to address fundamental problems such as racial discrimination and perceptions of social injustice, despite early and repeated identification of the challenges in the aftermath of the described events, lead and contribute to disenfranchisement amongst people from ethnic minority groups, and make them vulnerable to extremist influence.

In order to develop successful counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorist strategies, vulnerable groups and communities must first be identified, and then agencies must find local solutions to alleviate the risk of violent extremist tendencies. These local solutions should carry many of the themes which I identify from the policy responses. The identification and mitigation of the risk depends on the effectiveness of Neighbourhood Policing and the National Intelligence Model, both of which are described in section 4.12 of Chapter Four, and the thesis sets out to consider whether or not they are developed sufficiently to perform this task. That is to say, are these modern policing and partnership innovations, primarily designed to deal with crime, actually capable of identifying risk as it applies to radicalisation and terrorism, and then developing strategies to mitigate it?
Intrinsic to the research question is an understanding of what is meant by the term ‘radicalisation’: it is a problematic phenomenon to describe, a theme which recurs throughout the thesis. One respondent from the third sector in Oldham said this:

“There is a radicalisation of young Muslims happening, I would take the word harmful away from that, because I don’t think it’s like a pathology and it shouldn’t be looked at like a pathology, it’s actually, it is actually a response to their situation, to look and to challenge, now unless we’re saying that there’s a pathology why one and a half million mostly white people formed the biggest demonstration this country has ever seen in London against the invasion of Iraq, if we’re going to pathologise the fact that a lot of young Muslims are taking an interest in foreign affairs and in international relations, and have a sense of outrage about Britain and America’s foreign policy, then we have to pathologise an even greater number of white people in this country because they have the same view. So I think we need to be careful in terms of how we describe this.”

There is as yet no universally accepted definition of the phenomenon known as ‘radicalisation’. However, in a study financed by the European Union called ‘Causal factors of radicalisation’, the definition of violent radicalisation from the Council of the European Union is used, and the ancillary description is also helpful:

“The phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism’ (EC, 2006). Radicalisation is a gradual process that, although it can occur very rapidly, has no specifically defined beginning or end state. Rather, radicalisation is an individual development that is initiated by a unique combination of causal factors and that comprises a drastic change in attitudes and behaviour.”

Thus, I rely upon this definition throughout the thesis to provide an understanding of what is meant by the term ‘radicalisation’.

This chapter introduces the programme of research, provides the context, and demonstrates why it is so pertinent. It is organised into seven sections. The first section introduces me as the researcher, before moving on to illustrate the type of questions to which I sought answers, thereby demonstrating how the research question was isolated. The second section deals with the relevance of the work, and considers why it is

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2 B0024
4 ibid
valuable to researchers, practitioners and the public and, in so doing, it introduces the hypothesis. The third section discusses the seminal events used in the thesis together with the reasons why they have been chosen, and considers the policy and legal responses that they spawned. The fourth section provides an overview of the philosophical position the thesis adopts, and how this guides the choice of research method; the rationale for the choice of the research location is also discussed. In the fifth section, I introduce the research findings, their analysis and concomitant discussion. I show how the research has brought data into the public domain which was previously hidden, and use the thesis to turn theoretical argument and academic research into practical application. I also consider avenues for further relevant work. In section six, I critically review the research by considering the reliability of the sources, and outlining other significant areas of risk. Finally, in section seven, I provide a brief outline of each of the subsequent chapters.

1.1 The Research Question and the Researcher

As a mid-career police professional, I have been for some time certain that the art and practice of policing is capable of improvement through the contribution that police professionals themselves can make by research: applying sound academic techniques to challenge existing practices in order to develop more effective solutions to real-life problems. In fact, this view was crystallised in my mind by a prolific researcher and writer on the police in the latter part of the 20th Century, who was himself a police officer. John Alderson said “it is essential that the police research themselves.”

5 Alderson J (2008), Personal Communication, Ottery St Mary, 19 February 2008
6 Ibid

He felt strongly that no one was better placed, with a unique understanding of policing and the problems that police officers and police organisations face, to undertake this task. Having worked in operational roles with Devon and Cornwall Police for a number of years, including Neighbourhood Policing and patrol policing, and held strategic responsibility for the effective delivery of equality and diversity across the two counties in the period post-September 11th and during the London bombing incidents, a number of fundamental questions concerning the role of the police, and the relevance of past failings began to form in my mind. The opportunity presented itself to use my previous research experience gained at the University of Exeter during the completion of a Master of Arts degree at the Centre for Police and Criminal Justice Studies, and answer
some of these questions, thus contributing to the improvement of the practical delivery of policing. I wanted to know, for instance, whether there were social reasons which contributed to the development of radicalisation in some communities. I suspected that the role of the police in society was crucial not only in identifying potential risk, but also in the construction of mitigation strategies. I wanted to understand whether previous periods of unrest, not necessarily involving Muslim communities, were related in any way, and whether therefore they might provide a potential source of knowledge to deal with the current threat – and indeed whether the fundamental role of the police in society might have contributed in some way.

As already identified, of critical importance is an apparent failure by the police and partner agencies to learn past lessons. At the time of the conception of the research question, the Commission for Racial Equality had reported on their ‘Formal Investigation’\(^7\): police organisations had demonstrably failed to implement legally binding duties under ‘race’ equality legislation, and yet there had been hugely significant events over previous years which should have ensured that the police were not only legally compliant but perhaps also paving the way for the service to lead the state in the drive for equality. I discuss these events in more detail in section 1.3 below. Other ideas and questions followed. For instance, what made someone who was British-born, brought up and educated in Britain, want to murder fellow countrymen by the use of so-called suicide terrorism? What lessons from the past might be relevant and has the failure on the part of the police and partner agencies, alluded to above, contributed in some way to the growth of harmful radicalisation and subsequent progression to suicide terrorism? Can it be predicted, and if so, how? Are the police and their partners continuing to fail in identifying and mitigating risk? Are the current arrangements for the delivery of mainstream local policing capable of identifying and mitigating risk? In an intriguing contribution to the debate, Tupman and O’Reilly (2004) consider a series of ‘tension indicators’ created in the aftermath of riots in the USA and Britain during the 1960s through to the 1980s,\(^8\) and suggest that “if ‘anti-American or anti-Westerner or anti-foreigner’ is substituted for ‘racist’ then the creation of ‘tension indicators’ in


this area of interest, and thus the need for counter-terrorist intervention, is in the starting blocks.’\textsuperscript{9} This then gives rise to the question of what types of tension indicators might exist within communities which forewarn of the risk of the development of harmful radicalisation, and how capable are police organisations at detecting them? Moreover, how good are they at working with their partner agencies to mitigate the risk posed? This series of questions leads directly to the thrust of the research question. I deal with the rationale for the choice of the research location below.

\textbf{1.2 Relevance, Consequence, and the Hypothesis}

This thesis is of interest to academics, practitioners and the public at large. It is designed to contribute to the existing knowledge surrounding the risk of the development of harmful radicalisation within communities and, at the same time, provide practitioners with a menu of options which they might employ to mitigate that risk. It therefore provides a bridge between the theoretical and the practical, and answers the question posed by Murray (2005): ‘Policing Terrorism: A Threat to Community Policing or Just a Shift in Priorities?’\textsuperscript{10}

Problems in neighbourhoods should be subject to a neighbourhood problem solving plan, which should include details of the owner and representatives of partner organisations.\textsuperscript{11} In appropriate cases, these plans feed into multi-agency tactical tasking and coordinating groups and onwards to a more strategic assessment if they are of such importance that they might influence strategic decision making. Such problems would be supported by community intelligence, created when information from the community has been subject to evaluation and risk assessment.\textsuperscript{12} Such information and intelligence might include patterns of crime and disorder, changes in tension between different communities or indeed within the same community. Clearly, it might also include specific information relating to the growth of ‘anti-western’ or ‘anti-American’ graffiti or similar signals in a given area, the growth of extremist activity, or one-dimensional

\textsuperscript{11} ACPO Centrex (2006b) ‘Briefing paper on Neighbourhood Policing and the National Intelligence Model 2006’ Wyboston: NCPE p11
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid p14
media reporting – those ‘indicators’ discussed in Chapter Three which forewarn of the escalating risk. The challenge here is two-fold – firstly, the recognition of these signs and thus their evaluation and assessment; and secondly, the understanding of what they might signify.

In the examination of relevant literature in Chapter Three, I identify a number of key themes from the literature, and propose that certain forms of ‘social protest’ have common roots within communities, which, as indicated above, can be described as follows: a sense of injustice, a lack of political representation, declining perceptions of legitimacy in state authorities, relative deprivation - which may include unemployment and a gap between expectation and achievement - and discrimination, and levels of drug-related crime may also be important. Using this hypothesis, I propose a model, a ‘ladder of escalation’, which offers an incremental aspect to the progression towards terrorism:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PEACEFUL</th>
<th>VIOLENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voting</td>
<td>Demonstrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitions</td>
<td>Sedition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Ladder of Escalation

I exposed the theory and model to critical examination at academic conferences and through independent scholarly peer assessment during the construction of the argument.13

Application in the real world could enable strategic assessments at the macro level to determine the vulnerability of a given area, town or city. This might include problems

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13 Presentation of paper at Pisa, European Centre for Political Research, September 2007; HUSS Postgraduate Conference, May 2008;
of discrimination, poor housing, poor education and poverty, perhaps with higher levels of right wing activity and hate crime – a detailed environmental scan should reveal these issues. This begins to demonstrate the value of partners in the National Intelligence Model process. At the tactical level, level 1, shorter-term issues such as activity between individuals, within a family, or the identification of ‘tension indicators’, as discussed in Chapter Three, would inform the tasking process. Steps or rungs on the ladder of escalation would provide further information; thus three sets of ‘warnings’ can be postulated: (i) Social preconditions, as identified above; (ii) ‘Policing indicators’ – those things identified as indicators of raised tension, acting as a forewarning to the onset of urban unrest, which might also be relevant to predict the development of disenfranchised groups thus raising the risk of harmful radicalisation; (iii) Steps on the ‘ladder of escalation’ such as certain types of political activity, escalating towards demonstrations, sedition and radicalisation. Once again, the benefit of involvement of partners is obvious, and it would include the third sector. True partner engagement should maximise the opportunity for intelligence and information gathering, and once these things entered the NIM process, and were properly analysed, it would be possible to identify resources and plans to mitigate the identified risk. Moreover, the resolution or mitigation of the risk is unlikely to be solely within the gift of the police, and partner involvement at would enable partner resources to be allocated. This might be important in relation to, for instance, access to training. At this point, the value, the centrality, of Neighbourhood Policing becomes obvious. Since NIM depends upon intelligence and information to work, there must be sufficient contact between the police and communities because without this contact there will be no intelligence or information flow.

The research work tests the ladder of escalation and the associated processes in the theatre of the case study, bringing forward conclusions about their effectiveness, and thereby contributing to the academic debate advanced in Chapter Three regarding the common roots of radicalisation, terrorism and other forms of social protest.

In its examination of the impact of discrimination and racism at street level, the thesis also complements Lambert and Githens-Mazer (2010), where case studies are presented demonstrating how prevalent incidents are of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate
crime. Lambert and Githens-Mazer report evidence of institutional discrimination against Mosques and Islamic Centres from policing, local Government and politics generally, and they state that tackling these issues is a "litmus test for the new Coalition Government’s commitment for fairness and social justice." The current research project also comments on these issues in the theatre of the case study (section 7.2.4, Chapter Seven, and section 8.1.2.7, Chapter Eight).

One of the principal purposes of the thesis is to bridge the gap between theoretical, academic argument and practical application in the real world. To this end, it must be of significant interest and relevance to practitioners. In 2006, I submitted the research proposal to the National Policing Improvement Agency, seeking support from them for a Bramshill Fellowship. I was successful in this application, the research proposal being identified as a ‘key leadership issue for the service.’ The Fellowship has been reviewed on an annual basis to ensure the continued relevance of the work as the research has progressed, and it has been successful at each review. This demonstrates how the police service, the practitioners, consider the work to be of interest to them.

Finally, the thesis is of significant interest to members of the public generally but perhaps in particular, to members of Asian communities in Oldham and many other demographically similar parts of the UK. Its commentary on how state authorities, especially the police, can adjust the services they provide, and tailor them to meet the specific needs of communities, offers the opportunity to reduce the incidence of discrimination, reduce the perception of social injustice, provide for more inclusion and better community cohesion. These things make for safer communities and help people to feel safer.

1.3 Seminal Events and Policy Responses

In Chapter Two, I introduce what I argue are five seminal events in the context of police and ethnic minority community relations. Briefly, these seminal events are: (1) The

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15 Ibid p34
16 Bramshill is the National Police College, and it provides training for senior leaders in the police service
17 Acceptance letter, Bramshill fellowship, 18 April 2008
Brixton disorders of 1981. Here, significant urban unrest and rioting developed in a deprived inner city location; the area, which had high levels of minority black communities, had a poor history of relations with the police. Poor police practices precipitated the riots. (2) The murder of Stephen Lawrence. In this incident, Stephen Lawrence, an 18 year old black teenager was attacked and murdered by a group of white men in April 1993; the murder was motivated by racial hatred. The subsequent enquiry found a series of police failings, including evidence of institutional racism. (3) ‘The Secret Policeman’. In 2002, Mark Daly, an undercover reporter, joined Greater Manchester Police to determine what steps had been taken to eliminate racism from the force after its own Chief Constable had labelled it institutional racist. Daly exposed extremely damaging racism and racist new recruits at Bruche Training College, where he attended for his initial training. (4) Urban unrest in Bradford, Oldham and other Northern cities with sections of their ethnic minority communities living in areas with extremely high levels of deprivation. Over the weekend 26-28 May 2001, violence erupted in flashpoints across Oldham with petrol bombs being thrown and buildings set alight; rioting involving up to 500 Asian youths on the Saturday was followed with further unrest on the Sunday. The Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) reported that ‘the riots occurred as the culmination of 5 weeks of racial abuse orchestrated by right-wing extremists against the town’s ethnic minority community.’

In Chapter Four, I examine the policy and legal responses to each of these seminal events, and I isolate a number of ‘critical success factors’ from the first four – themes

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which are common to them all. I argue that successful delivery of these factors optimises the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of minority and disenfranchised groups, thereby minimising the risk of adverse social protest. The factors are:

- The need to work in partnership with other agencies, especially education and housing departments.
- The police organisation needs to strive to reflect the community it serves, and the recruitment, retention and promotion of ethnic minority staff is a crucial part of this.
- Community representatives should be involved in training, especially community awareness training.
- The local ‘beat officer’ or Neighbourhood Policing Team has a vital role and must attract officers of high calibre.
- Police organisations must work towards the elimination of racial discrimination of all types, and contribute towards the development of cohesive communities.

Since these factors are isolated from the legislative and policy responses from the seminal events, and since each of the first four demonstrate significant evidence of racism and discrimination (the police in particular have displayed poor judgement, poor community engagement and poor understanding of communities), I consider in Chapters Seven and Eight the extent to which police and state failings have contributed to disenfranchisement by ethnic minority communities, and therefore also contributed to the risk of individuals murdering people through suicide terrorism.

Thus, at this point, the thesis is poised to consider a number of linked issues. Firstly, having argued that to reduce risk, police forces need to have learned the lessons from the past and implemented the ‘critical success factors’, the research sets out to establish at a grass roots level what constitutes risk and whether or not the ‘critical success
factors’ have been achieved. Secondly, it tests the hypothesis, i.e. the common roots theory and the ladder of escalation that springs from it. Thirdly, it aims to determine whether there are reliable indicators of risk and, if there are, whether the mechanisms for the delivery of local policing, Neighbourhood Policing and the National Intelligence Model (NIM), described in Chapter Four, are capable of identifying and targeting these risks. In Chapter Eight, I pull all of these things together, and identify a fundamental impediment to the capability of NIM to achieve success on this agenda:

*Figure 2: Schematic showing the relationship between the ‘Common Roots’, ‘Critical Success Factors’, ‘Policing Indicators’ and the National Intelligence Model*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common Roots: NIM Level 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. A sense of injustice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. A lack of political representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Declining perceptions of legitimacy in state authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Relative deprivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Levels of drug-related crime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tackled by:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical Success Factors: NIM Level 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The need to work in partnership with other agencies, especially education and housing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The police organisation needs to strive to reflect the community it serves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Community representatives should be involved in training, especially community awareness training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The local ‘beat officer’ or Neighbourhood Policing team has a vital role and must attract officers of high calibre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Police organisations must work towards the elimination of racial discrimination of all types, and contribute towards the development of cohesive communities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Measured by:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policing Indicators: NIM Level 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Inter alia</em>:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Hate crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Racist incidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Assaults on police officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Complaints against the police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Activity on the ‘ladder of escalation’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Whispers and Rumours</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I suggest that NIM is inherently ill-equipped to deal effectively with this agenda. It becomes slow and lacks the ability to respond dynamically and effectively as a direct result of its structure – i.e., whilst there is some overlap, each component part of the relationship largely corresponds to a different level within NIM.

1.3.1 The Four Objectives

Thus, I indentify four key objectives for the research to achieve, and they run as a continuing theme throughout:

1. Contribute to the understanding of the development of harmful radicalisation amongst members of certain communities.
2. Develop a menu of indicators which predict or forewarn of the risk of radicalisation.
3. Establish perceptions of success of Neighbourhood Policing and the National Intelligence Model at identifying risk.
4. Establish a ‘toolkit’ of options which might be utilised to mitigate risk by ‘switching-off’ the radicalisation process, and developing multi-agency partnership strategies for the same purpose.

1.4 Philosophical Position, Methodology and Choice of Research Location

To successfully achieve these objectives, I design a research project and present the philosophical arguments in Chapter Five. I specifically examine ontological and epistemological issues and, in so doing, I consider the quest for the ‘truth’. By arguing that problems exist in societies, whether we know about them or not, I determine that the ontological position adopted by the thesis is ‘foundationalist’ – i.e. there is a ‘real’ world out there which exists independently of our knowledge of it and that, at first glance, this gives rise to a ‘positivist’ philosophical position. However, by asking whether an observer can identify these ‘real’ and tangible relations between social phenomena, and identifying that there is a double-hermeneutic in that the world is interpreted by actors (one hermeneutic level) and the interpretation is interpreted by the

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observer (a second hermeneutic level), I argue that the purely positivist philosophical
corpus of thought gives rise to the fallible conception of what constitutes ‘truth’; in
the words of Sayer (1992), “we can never justifiably claim to have discovered the
absolute truth about matters of fact”, and instead he offers the concept of ‘practical
adequacy’, a philosophical argument which reinforces the position adopted for the
thesis.

Establishing the philosophical position for the thesis and acknowledging one’s own
ontological and epistemological positions informs the nature and journey the research
takes as it evolves from conception through analysis to conclusion. The primary
methodological approach adopted for the research is qualitative, a methodology which
is consistent with foundationalist ontology but anti-positivist epistemology, or, in other

28 Marsh D and Furlong P (2002) op cit p31
29 Ibid p26
31 Ibid p69
words, a critical realist philosophical position. The arguments I am making are philosophical in nature but vital in order to justify the nature and type of research to be undertaken. Naively thinking in terms of qualitative versus quantitative only, without ontological and epistemological consideration being taken into account would make the research design difficult to defend. As Sayer reminds us, “it is quite extraordinary to compare the attention given in social science courses to ‘methods’ in the narrow sense of statistical techniques, interviewing and survey methods and the like, with the blithe disregard of questions of how we conceptualize, theorize and abstract.”32 In fact, the two methodological approaches are not mutually exclusive, and some types of quantitative data sit comfortably within the critical realist tradition. Acknowledging the value of some of this quantitative data to demonstrate the ‘reality’ of relationships, I present and discuss such data in the first part of Chapter Seven.

I present the rationale for choosing the location of the case study as Oldham in Greater Manchester in Chapter Five. In essence, the components of the hypothesis described above, i.e. a sense of injustice, a lack of political representation, declining perceptions of legitimacy in state authorities, relative deprivation and discrimination, together with drug-related crime, begin to prescribe the essential components of the study area. The research design might be described as ‘tight’, characterised by research which is based on clearly defined constructs and restricted to the investigation of particular relationships in familiar contexts.33 This permits the use of the case study in instrumental terms: the case is studied in depth in order to provide insight into the wider issue - “the case is of secondary interest, it plays a supportive role, and it facilitates our understanding of something else.”34

Designing the research project with Flick’s basic principles of ethically sound research at its heart,35 approval from the University of Exeter’s ethics committee was sought and achieved in April 2008. Work then commenced on constructing the research tool, the semi-structured interview schedule, using an advisory panel of independent community members drawn from students and others at Exeter Mosque. This was refined using initial pilot interviews with key players in the theatre of the case study before being fixed. In total, 41 people were interviewed and of these, half were community members

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32 Ibid p2
35 Flick U (2007b) ibid p69
in the sense that they were not employed by any state agency. The quest for new
information began to draw to a natural close as the number of interviews increased;
discovery of new themes and thoughts began to dry up, and the point of theoretical
saturation appeared to have been reached. This data gathering process was augmented
by a period of participant observation where I spent 16 hours on foot patrol with a
Police Community Support Officer, six hours attending partnership meetings and four
hours observing youth workers running clubs. I also took the opportunity to engage in a
public meeting as an observer in the immediate aftermath of a fatal drugs-related
shooting.

In order to understand the data and become immersed in it, all interviews, whether
recorded or not, were transcribed, coded and analysed by me, using recognised
techniques such as memoing. QSR-N6 NUD*IST software, specifically designed for
the analysis of qualitative data, was used as an aid. Records of all interviews and the
identities of the participants have been protected in accordance with Data Protection Act
principles, and will be subject to a controlled disposal three years after the completion
of the project.

1.5 Findings, Conclusions and Further Work

In Chapter Seven, I present the findings of the research broken down in to the primary
themes developed from the construction of the research tool. These five themes are:
Policing and Social Justice; Local Social Conditions; The Effect of the Media; Global
Events; and The Role of Islam. Each of these is then further sub-divided into a total of
27 sub-themes which emerge from the analysis and coding of the data. By using
interview data, I argue that there is evidence of radicalisation amongst communities in
the theatre of the case study, and I use this and other findings to contextualise the
research into the existing literature reviewed in Chapter Three. Of particular interest is
the question of identity, and I introduce through the use of interviewee response data the
notion of ‘Mr Big’ - the young and apparently wealthy Asian male, driving around
deprived housing estates in large expensive cars and wearing a lot of jewellery; an
individual who provides a role model for others from the community to emulate. The
evidence that these material possessions are obtained through the criminal supply of

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drugs is overwhelming. Thus, I analyse the link between drugs and the risk of the development of harmful radicalisation. I also present and discuss the case of Junaid, a 17 year old Asian male who was fatally shot on the street in the centre of the theatre of the case study during the course of the fieldwork, his link to the local drugs market, and the community and police reaction to his murder.

The methodology employed, and the unique nature of my position as both a researcher and a professional police officer, enabled me to access and present data which would have been otherwise unavailable. For instance, I had free and unfettered access to the NIM tasking meetings at which sensitive information pertaining to individuals and investigations was discussed; I was able to patrol on foot with members of the local policing team to see at first hand their interaction with members of the community and, in some cases, engage members of the community who would otherwise have been largely inaccessible. Moreover, the freedom with which police interviewees were able to talk with me, as a direct result of me being a police officer, added a depth and richness to this data.

In the final chapter, I use the findings presented in Chapter Seven to make observations, present conclusions and formulate suggestions for practical application in the real world. Firstly, I consider the success of Greater Manchester Police in delivering the ‘critical success factors’ discussed above, and I suggest that in the theatre of the case study, the force is not successfully delivering three of the five critical success factors: they are not reflecting the community being served, the community awareness training is weak, and partnership working is flawed. They are largely delivering two of the critical success factors: they have high quality staff who are very well engaged with communities, delivering Neighbourhood Policing (though they are not, in the main, police officers), and they are working towards the elimination of racial discrimination.

Secondly, I consider each of the four objectives in turn, and I illuminate each one; this includes an assessment of the validity of the hypothesis and the ‘ladder of escalation’. In support of achieving the four objectives, I use the data from the case study, in conjunction with the literature reviewed in Chapter Three and the policies and edicts distilled from Chapter Four, to produce a menu of indicators of risk, and a ‘toolkit’ that police and partner agencies can employ to mitigate that risk. In this way, I bridge the gap between the theoretical and academic study of social phenomena and the practical application in the real world.
Although this research project has examined issues at some depth within the theatre of the case study, there are three general areas which present themselves as offering fruitful avenues for further work. The first of these is linked to the philosophical position adopted by the thesis. As discussed above, both qualitative and quantitative methods are consistent with critical realism, and this project utilises a qualitative approach whilst engaging in an examination of quantitative data. A further project, using a bespoke quantitative research design, which is based around surveys and questionnaires, would complement this one, since it would help demonstrate and develop the understanding of those real relationships which exists between the police, partner agencies and the public. The second avenue for future work is linked to the use of the case study as an instrumental one (discussed above), and how it ‘relates to things beyond the material at hand.’\(^{38}\) I argue that the arguments and ideas which have presented themselves through the research in Oldham, and which are articulated in the following chapters, are capable of extrapolation to other areas in the country which have similar features to those of the case study – but testing of this argument is worthwhile. The third avenue for useful research is the relevance and applicability of the fundamental basis of the hypothesis and the findings of the research to other types of social phenomena – not merely radicalisation. I suggest here, for instance, that there are potentially powerful similarities to the development of gang related behaviour, linked to the question of identity and the dearth of suitable role models within certain communities.

1.6 Risks and Threats to the Research

As the thesis progresses through the background chapter, into the review of relevant literature and the examination of the policies and edicts which falls out of the five seminal events, it develops arguments based on material from alternative and sometimes opposing epistemological positions; the purpose of the current section is not to revisit risk in that sense, rather it is to comment on the risks and threats inherent in the research project.

Perhaps the biggest risk to the efficacy of the findings is related to sample size. Although I deal with the choice of the research location and the manner in which

subjects were chosen in a carefully constructed argument in Chapter Five, limited resources of time and finance militate against carrying out a research project involving qualitative data gathering over vast geographical areas or with huge numbers of participants. And yet, to compromise by using a quantitative method, and thereby missing the opportunity to establish not only the ‘whats’ but also the ‘whys’ and ‘hows’ would be to miss a fundamental goal of the research – to explore the topic openly, allowing people to express their opinions and ideas in their own words.\(^{39}\) The question then, is how to determine the point at which it is reasonable to stop. I interviewed nearly every member of staff from the police engaged in delivering Neighbourhood Policing in the theatre of the case study; the same might be said of the major partner agency, Oldham Borough Council. The same cannot be said of the interviews conducted with members of the community. But I appeared to reach a point where the collection of further bits of data ceased to contribute anything new, the point of theoretical saturation discussed above. Nevertheless, this represents a risk to the efficacy of the research.

A more fundamental question is raised regarding the effectiveness of the interventions proposed through the resolution of Objective 4. Although I describe a menu of options, which have been constructed using the data from the research and contextualised within existing literature, the measurement of the success of these interventions is problematic. How much radicalisation will be prevented? Is the research able to detect the effects of current policy and then measure or evaluate the effects of a changed policy? I submit that it would be able to, given time for the changes to take effect.

Although there are strengths and weaknesses to the work as there are to any project of its kind, this research is unique in that it considers the effectiveness of modern and mainstream policing techniques in the much wider and frequently specialist effort to tackle terrorism.

### 1.7 Outline of following Chapters

Chapter Two: ‘Background’, provides a background to the social, demographic and historical setting of the thesis. It charts the demographic changes in Britain’s society

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since the end of the Second World War, specifically examining the immigration of Muslim people. It then describes the key policing developments over similar time frames, before linking the two things together, and discusses police-race relations in the UK. It posits the notion that British institutions and society have failed effectively to eliminate discrimination and social injustice, and that the price of this failure is high. It introduces the five seminal events described in section 1.3 above.

Chapter Three: ‘Literature Review’, presents and discusses literature that examines the root causes of terrorism, radicalisation and urban unrest, arguing that their roots are similar; it constructs a hypothesis that suggests common roots exist: a sense of injustice, a lack of political representation, declining perceptions of legitimacy in state authorities, relative deprivation (which may include unemployment, and a gap between expectation and achievement) and discrimination. Levels of drug-related crime may also be important. Using this hypothesis, I propose a model, a ‘ladder of escalation’, which offers an incremental aspect to the progression towards terrorism, and I suggest that early identification of the steps provides a further fore-warning that state authorities should act to reduce the risk.

Chapter Four: ‘Selected Policies and Edicts since 1981: A Critical Review’, critically analyses various selected laws, policy responses and edicts from the Home Office and elsewhere which largely arose from the five seminal events introduced in Chapter Two. These seminal events and their responses demonstrate a failure by state agencies to address problems like racial discrimination, and perceptions of injustice, and the chapter therefore suggests that, linked with the common roots theory, the current crisis is an almost inevitable consequence of that failure. It isolates the five ‘critical success factors’ introduced in section 1.3, above. The chapter describes Neighbourhood Policing and the National Intelligence Model, the machinery of local policing delivery, to assist with understanding how policing is currently delivered – an important aspect of contextualising the findings of the research.

Chapter Five: ‘Research Methodology’, introduces the research methodology, examines philosophical theory, including a consideration of ontological and epistemological issues, and it argues the case for qualitative research. It describes the philosophical position for the research as ‘critical realist’, which has important methodological implications. It includes a discussion on ethical considerations, analysis of qualitative
data, and a rationale for the choice of research location. Importantly, it outlines some practical lessons learned during the conduct of this type of research.

Chapter Six: ‘Policing Indicators and Critical Success Factors’, this chapter consists of a literature review and discussion of the following policing indicators: crime, crime statistics, crime and place, crime and social indices, crime, ‘race’ and racist incidents. The discussion of indicators continues with an examination of assaults on police officers and complaints against the police. It describes the difficulty and complexity of measuring all these various phenomena. It also brings forward the ‘critical success factors’ from Chapter Four, and describes how they link with the common roots and policing indicators.

Chapter Seven: ‘Data and Analysis’, presents the data and findings from the research. The first part consists of quantitative data, largely in the area of the policing indicators discussed in Chapter Six. It then presents rich qualitative data broken down into five primary themes, prescribed by the construction of the research tool, and 27 sub-themes which emerge from the coding and analysis of the data.

Chapter Eight: ‘Discussion and Conclusions’, consists of a discussion of the findings, and contextualises them in the existing literature. It is carefully structured, dealing first with the ‘critical success factors’, before dealing with each of the four objectives, also identified in section 1.3 above. This forms the major part of the chapter, and ultimately addresses the research question.
CHAPTER TWO:

Background

2.0 Introduction

This chapter sets out the context of the research. It is organised into three major sections. The first provides an overview of the demographic changes in Britain’s society since the end of the Second World War, with a particular emphasis on ethnicity. This specifically includes immigration of Muslim people to Britain as well as an assessment of the impact and expansion of Islam.

The second section identifies key policing developments over the same time period. It paints a picture of where policing has come from and where it is now. This provides the foundation for section 4.12 entitled ‘The machinery of local policing delivery’ in Chapter Four, which examines and describes the principal models for the delivery of contemporary local policing: Neighbourhood Policing and the National Intelligence Model.

The third and final section knits the first two together. In so doing, it briefly charts the post-modern history of police-race relations in the UK, looking particularly at the urban unrest of the 1980s. It posits the notion that British institutions and society have failed effectively to eliminate discrimination and social injustice, and that the price of this failure is high. Five key ‘seminal events’ over three decades are described which support this position; state responses to these seminal events are critically dissected in Chapter Four.

In short, are the police and other state agencies partly to blame for the position we apparently find ourselves in:

“Britain remains a target of the highest possible priority to al-Qaeda and its affiliates; we are in a new reality. The sky is dark.”  

2.1 Demographic Evolution

2.1.1 Black and Minority Ethnic migration since 1945

The United Kingdom began the post-war years with a non-white population of some 30,000 people; it now has in excess of 3 million, whose origins extend from Africa, the Pacific Rim, the Caribbean and the Indian Subcontinent.\(^{42}\) Political parties, public authorities and a suspicious British public, with an acute sense of identity, have had to acknowledge the presence and needs of ethnic minorities who are visibly and culturally very different. Significant parts of major British cities and towns like London, Birmingham, Luton and Leicester, previously traditional homes to white working classes became, and remain, home to large numbers of ethnic minority people.

Hansen (2000) argues that this dramatic evolution was singularly surprising since the polling data for the first three decades of the post-war period demonstrate consistent majority public opposition to New Commonwealth migration, with primary sources from as early as the late 1940s suggesting consistent unease from Whitehall about non-white migration.\(^{43}\) He defines two periods: the first occurring between 1948 and 1961, a wave of primary immigration, and the second between 1962 and 1974, a wave of secondary immigration, when dependants and spouses of those already in the UK started to arrive.\(^{44}\) Layton-Henry offers an explanation: he argues that that the war was a vital catalyst – it uprooted large numbers of colonial people from their home communities.\(^{45}\) Many colonial servicemen and workers had experienced favourable conditions fighting the war for Britain, and since they were contributing equally, the restrictions on entering Britain were lifted. He points out that serious unemployment in places like Jamaica, together with labour shortages in Britain contributed to the migration but that it was disorganised and usually voluntary – the migrants paid their own way.\(^{46}\) That there were no colonial immigration restrictions until 1962 only served to amplify Commonwealth migration: under the British Nationality Act of 1948, citizens of the British Commonwealth were allowed to enter Britain to seek work and

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\(^{43}\) Ibid pp 4-5

\(^{44}\) Ibid p62


\(^{46}\) Ibid
settle with their families. West Indians were the earliest to come, followed by the Indians and Pakistani/Bangladeshis (the latter of who came from what had been East Pakistan, but after the creation of an independent state in 1972, is now Bangladesh). The most recent arrivals were those from countries such as Kenya and Uganda in East Africa, who opted, on the independence of these countries, for British Citizenship. Of these four major racial minorities, Indians constitute the largest group, followed by West Indians, Pakistani/Bangladeshi and finally East African Asians. Taking the racial minorities together, they constituted 1.4 million people in 1971, of which 28% had been born in Britain. But by 1977 this had grown to 1.85 million people, of which 40% had been born in Britain. This is discussed below in section 2.1.3 as it specifically applies to Islam.

Hansen sums up, stating “the extent and rapidity of the UK’s transformation from a largely homogenous society into a multi-cultural society is remarkable, unprecedented and complete.”

2.1.2 ‘Race’ versus Religion and other conceptual difficulties

It is relevant to consider briefly the juxtaposition of ‘race’ and religion and terminological problems. In the theatre of public service delivery, and elsewhere, they are frequently confused, with notions of ‘race’ and religion conflated: they are assumed to be one and the same.

‘Race’, as a concept is beset with difficulty. It is a term often used to denote a group or category of persons connected by common origin. Although it is used socially to denote people of different phenotypical characteristics, it is actually a social construct and has no scientific basis. ‘Racism’ can be understood as those ideologies and social processes which discriminate against groups of people on the basis of their assumed membership of a ‘racial’ group. Indeed, the terms ‘Muslim’ and ‘Islam’ are themselves problematic. People being classified as Muslim in the UK are in fact

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48 Ibid
49 Ibid
50 Ibid
51 Hansen, R (2000) op cit p4
52 Ibid p3
53 Layton-Henry, Z (1992) op cit p41
heterogeneous as they originate from different cultures, speak different languages and follow different schools of Islamic thought.\textsuperscript{54} Even the terms ‘Asian’ and ‘Pakistani’ can be misleading since most of the subjects to whom I refer were born in Britain.\textsuperscript{55} I continue to use these terms throughout the thesis, acknowledging the caution required for their use. For all of these reasons, teasing out the fundamental basis of discrimination for instance, or prescribing with high levels of accuracy the demographics of an area in terms of both ethnicity and religion is liable to lead to misclassification in some cases; nevertheless, as Macey argues, one is bound to rely on the notion that in this context, those from Pakistan and Bangladesh are predominantly of the Islamic faith, whilst white people living in similar areas are not.\textsuperscript{56}

\textbf{2.1.3 Islamic expansion in the UK}

Indians constitute the largest of the Asian racial minorities in Britain, having emigrated from two major areas, the Punjab and the Gujarat.\textsuperscript{57} Most Gujaratis and a few Punjabis adhere to the major religion in India viz. Hinduism. In Britain, Hindus are heavily outnumbered by Sikhs who mainly come from Punjab.\textsuperscript{58}

Hewer says that the largest concentration of Muslims from the subcontinent came from Kashmir, a state that was left unresolved following Britain’s withdrawal, and although political leadership was in the hands of Hindus and Sikhs, the majority of people were Muslim.\textsuperscript{59} Familiarity with migrant working patterns and a long association with British shipping meant that these areas and parts of North India, which later became East Pakistan, were fertile grounds for immigration to the UK.\textsuperscript{60}

The ‘Africanization’ of Africa in the early 1960s led to the migration of East African Asians from Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania, many of whom were descendants of families that had been taken from India to the East African colonies by the British; their links

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid p22
\textsuperscript{57} Pilkington, A (1984) op cit p15
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid p16
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid
with Britain were strong.\textsuperscript{61} Other Muslim groups came from Malaysia, West Africa, Somalia and Morocco, and the impact on British business and entrepreneurial flair was significant. Here, Hewer provides an indication of the changing nature of the Muslim communities in Britain.\textsuperscript{62} In 1951, the number of people in Britain of Pakistani heritage was 5000. By 1961, this had risen to 24,900, of whom 1.2 percent were born in Britain. By 1971, it was 170,000 with 23.5 percent British born; in 1981 it was 360,000 with 37.5 percent British born; in 1991 it was 640,000 with 47 percent British born and in the last census of 2001 it had risen to 747,285 of whom 55 percent were born in Britain. Muslims now make up 9 percent of the population of London and 14 percent of the population of Birmingham. He also makes some highly pertinent observations regarding the age profile. Of the UK Muslims in the 2001 census, 52 percent were less than 25 years, compared to 31 percent in the total population and only 6 percent were aged over 60 compared to 21 percent in the overall population. This means that Muslim populations will increase significantly in size in the next couple of decades simply by virtue of people marrying and having children. The best estimate using 1991 census figures indicated that the Muslim population of Britain would have to double before it reached demographic stability – i.e. the same number being born as die. Peach (2007), who argues that it was after the rise of the Islamic regimes in the Middle East and North Africa following the Iranian Revolution of 1979 that European countries became “uneasily aware that many of their ethnic-minority workers and their dependents were also Muslim”\textsuperscript{63}, provides an interesting and empirical approach in his analysis of the growth of Muslims in Northern Europe, and presents various calculations to chart future growth.\textsuperscript{64} He states that of the 1.6 million Muslims in the UK in 2001, 46 percent were Pakistanis, 18 percent were Bangladeshis and 9 percent were Indians.\textsuperscript{65} He also points out, which may become relevant, that Bangladeshis arrived during the 1980s, some twenty years later than the Pakistanis.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid p193
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid p196
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid p20
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid
Research has shown that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are consistently at a disadvantage with respect to white people, and often with respect to other minorities.\textsuperscript{67} Men continue to work disproportionately in manual work and are between two and five times more likely than white people to work in semi-skilled jobs; in fact, again evidenced through robust empirical analysis, Peach states:

"..Muslims are the most economically marginalized of the British faith groups, with poor educational qualifications, low participation in the labor [sic] force, poor jobs, high rates of unemployment, higher than average health disabilities, large families, and high segregation. The young age structure ensures the rapid growth of Muslims as a whole. Low educational qualifications and occupational concentrations in restaurant- and taxi-driving-type occupations, with limited opportunities to progress, suggest that it will be difficult for them to escape their current economic position….All of these factors unite to explain the extraordinarily high concentration of the Muslim population in areas with high indices of poor housing."\textsuperscript{68}

One third of the Muslim population of England and Wales live in the worst areas of multiple deprivation.\textsuperscript{69} The theoretical role of deprivation and poverty in relation to social unrest, including radicalisation and terrorism, is discussed in Chapter Three.

2.2 Post War Policing

This part of the present chapter provides an account of the journey of evolution that policing in Britain has undergone over the past four decades. How has it developed to take account of the dramatic change in the fabric of British society, some of it described above? Has it responded effectively, and what lessons have been learned?

2.2.1 The Golden Age?

Critchley characterises the 1900s as the zenith of police-public relations in Britain, citing an article in \textit{The Times} from 1908:

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\textsuperscript{68} Peach, C (2007) op cit p29

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid p30
“The police are a body who, though distinctive in their character from all others, as the members of any public service must necessarily be, are yet related to the people to whom they serve by ties of intimate personal association which are not to be found in any other country in the world. The policeman in London is not merely guardian of the police; he is an integral part of its social life. In many a back street and slum he not merely stands for law and order; he is the true handyman of our streets, the best friend of a mass of people who have no other counsellor or protector.”

Various authors have also referred to ‘the golden age’ of policing, characterised during the early 1950s by PC George Dixon who first appeared in the film The Blue Lamp. For example, Reiner (1992) says:

“Yet by the 1950s, the police had become not merely accepted but lionised by the broad spectrum of opinion. In no other country has the police force been so much a symbol of national pride.”

He also cites a contemporary 1955 Police Journal editorial which stated:

“‘The law-abiding sections of the community (and in this we include the larger majority of all classes, working, professional and leisured, alike) have come to accept the police more as guardians and less as oppressors.’”

And he develops the theme later on:

“As far as police acceptance by the public is concerned, the 1950’s seem a ‘Golden Age’ of tranquillity and accord, with only hesitant harbingers of a coming crisis.”

But these impressions are ridden with contextual dilemmas. The class system was rife in the early twentieth century: upper classes may well have been supportive of a coercive arm of social and political control, but what of the working classes? Later on, the public began to take an interest in the police through the explosion of post-war sitting room entertainment in the form of the television, and George Dixon was born. Now the

72 Ibid
73 Ibid p58
74 Ibid p59 for discussion.
public began to develop a view of the police largely formulated on the basis of invention and fiction. Emsley describes matters thus:

“Dixon knew everyone on his beat, and was known by everyone. He was always polite, whatever the circumstances, and always ready to offer friendly help and advice even to those on the wrong side of the law...Above all, he was honest and dependable...it was the character of Dixon which began to be used as a benchmark against which the behaviour of police later in the century was to be measured.”

But real life was somewhat different. Society was changing dramatically, not only in the context of 1930s depression, 1940s world conflict, 1950s and 1960s consumerism and technical development, but also, as described above, in societal fabric. Britain was turning from a largely homogenous society into a largely pluralistic one, and it was happening quickly. Overlaying this were a number of causes celebres, yet to be in the public domain but which ultimately lead to the Royal Commission of 1962 and the Police Act of 1964. Bunyan (1976) details one such example where he describes the establishing of the ‘ghost squad’ by Scotland Yard in 1946. This was a group set up to infiltrate London’s criminal underworld but was quietly and without ceremony broken up in 1958 because officers were becoming indistinguishable from criminals, and a number of them were caught ‘on the job’ by The Flying Squad. This was a far cry from the community police narrative where the emphasis was on harmonious relations within the police force and between the police force and the wider public – a narrative epitomized by Dixon of Dock Green. Major questions also arose over the constitutional position of Chief Constables, and some were investigated for fraud and corruption.

Other factors contributed to the Royal Commission of 1962. These included year-on-year crime increases from 1955 onwards, spreading and developing populations, and relatively slow increases in police officer numbers. The nature of the police organisation was also changing, with the numbers of policewomen doubling in the years...

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76 Ibid p162-163
78 Ibid
80 Emsley, C (1991) op cit pp161-163
81 Critchley, TA (1978) op cit pp253-254
1949-59, and continuing to increase through the next decade.\textsuperscript{82} Similarly, the number of civilians employed by the police service doubled between 1949 and 1959 and doubled again by 1966.\textsuperscript{83}

\textbf{2.2.2 The Royal Commission and the Police Act 1964}

This is not the place for a detailed assessment of the impact of the Royal Commission across the full gamut of policing, or indeed the resulting Act; many other writers have provided accounts.\textsuperscript{84} However, it is appropriate to provide an overview of the changes the Act introduced which may be said to have influenced the way in which policing has been delivered for the 40 years since, and indeed to reflect on the impact this has had on community and race relations.

The fundamental question the Royal Commission, appointed by the Home Secretary R.A. Butler on 25 January 1960, found itself having to confront was where the ultimate control of the provincial police should lie.\textsuperscript{85} Whilst most witnesses drawn from central and local government, as well as some senior police officers, were of the view that the existing system worked well, there were some powerful dissenting voices.\textsuperscript{86} In particular, the Chief Constable of Lancashire led a radical faction of chief constables who held the view that the requirement was local association but not local control, a view supported by the Police Federation who felt that local forces should be grouped into large regional units.\textsuperscript{87} The Commission came close: members were of the view that there was a logical argument for a single centrally directed force – that such an organisation would be clearly accountable to Parliament and that as an instrument for fighting crime, it was likely to be more effective than a large number of local forces possessing a high degree of local autonomy.\textsuperscript{88} They developed this theme with the idea that placing the police under the central control of a well disposed government would be neither constitutionally objectionable nor politically dangerous – that if an ill-disposed government came to power, then they would seize control of the police however they

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid p255 \\
\textsuperscript{83} Bunyon, T (1976) op cit p73 \\
\textsuperscript{85} Emsley, C (1991) op cit p162. \\
\textsuperscript{86} Critchley, TA (1978) op cit p279 \\
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid \\
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid p282
might be organised.\textsuperscript{89} In the end however, the Commission decided that the present system had not failed and that improvements could be found within the existing structure, bringing with it the advantage that evolution could occur without a major or radical change.\textsuperscript{90}

The resulting Police Act of 1964 incorporated most of the recommendations of the Royal Commission. It repealed old legislation and attempted to define the functions and responsibilities with regards to the police of the Home Secretary, of local Police Authorities and of Chief Constables.\textsuperscript{91} It provided the Home Secretary with powers to amalgamate forces and, in 1966, the number of police forces was cut from 117 to 49.\textsuperscript{92} In 1972, the Local Government Act reduced the number of provincial forces further to 41.\textsuperscript{93}

In a stroke, the structure and governance of police forces in England and Wales had dramatically changed.

\subsection*{2.2.3 Recruitment and Training}

In the aftermath of the war, and in the interests of efficiency, eight district training schools were established to provide a uniform instructional grounding for all recruits.\textsuperscript{94} Against this background was the recognition in the Police Act 1964 of the importance of the cadet scheme and that the intake of cadets should be between 30\% and 40\% of total recruitment.\textsuperscript{95} In earlier times, police recruits had invariably spent several years out at work because they left school at 13 or 14 years of age and did not qualify for the minimum age limit.\textsuperscript{96} However, after 1964 recruits were drawn straight from school at the age of 16 or 17; subjecting a young man to a police environment at this young age presented problems and a Home Office Working Party made the following comment:

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{89} Ibid p283  
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid  
\textsuperscript{91} Emsley, C (1991) op cit p163  
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid p164  
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid  
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid p159  
\textsuperscript{95} Bunyon, T (1976) op cit p73  
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid}
“A cadet’s training should be designed to make him a good citizen first; and thereby provide the makings of a good police officer, with some insight into the social roots of police work.”  

Bunyon saw this in a different way:

“Police cadets, like all unmarried policemen and policewomen, usually live in a station-house. The difficulties in trying to train a good citizen when these cadets are brought up in the rarefied social milieu of police life may go some way to account for the attitudes and extra-legal actions of young policemen today.”

This argument may extend to the modern regional or district training centres, a point brought into very sharp focus by the BBC in January 2003. This is discussed further in section 2.3.4.3.

**2.2.4 Unit Beat Policing**

Partly in response to staff shortages and increasing demand, and partly in response to technological advances, an entirely new system of policing was introduced to the UK in 1966. The Unit Beat System was originally introduced to cope with the policing demands of a new town on the outskirts of Liverpool. Kirby was built with no plans or thoughts for anything other than houses, and families that moved into the area were identified by police as ‘problem families’. The essence of Unit Beat Policing and its *raison d’être* may be summed up in the following terms:

“Although we had divided the town into eleven beats, we were unable to find enough policemen to send to Kirby, and we had at the most only six uniformed men patrolling the town at any one time, and this in a community which had risen to 60,000 by 1963. We decided the foot patrol must go, and in May 1965, the eleven foot patrol beats were reorganised into five mobile beats patrolled through the twenty-four hours by a policeman in a car…. More important, each man carried in his pocket a personal radio which enabled him at all times, whether in the car or out of it, to keep in touch with his station, so that wherever he was he could summon speedy help or be directed to the scene of any incident.”

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97 Quoted in Critchley, TA (1978) op cit p323
98 Bunyon, T (1976) op cit p73
99 Critchley, TA (1978) op cit p307
100 Emsley, C (1991) op cit p165
A detective constable would also be assigned to the area, and a ‘collator’ would collate the flow of information and intelligence; in time, small local teams built up. The new system was very popular and it spread rapidly: by the end of 1968, some two thirds of the population were covered by it.\textsuperscript{102}

The system had its critics – the increasing mobility of policemen in ‘panda’ cars tended to remove them dangerously far from that close contact with the public which had always been so valuable to policing in the UK;\textsuperscript{103} ‘Z Cars’ became the public image of the police. Although policing has evolved since the 60s, particularly in respect of recent developments around Neighbourhood Policing and the appointment of Police Community Support Officers, many police officers are still in police cars and still not engaging with the public in non-confrontational situations.

\textbf{2.2.5 A Crisis of Confidence?}

During the 1970s and 1980s, the police service was rocked by corruption scandals and miscarriages of justice, and politicisation of the function under the Thatcher Government, most powerfully illustrated through the miners strike (see below). Emsley refers to this period as ‘A crisis of Confidence’ and he provides several examples.\textsuperscript{104} They include attempts by Sir Robert Mark (Commissioner of the Metropolis 1972 to 1977), to root out the cancer of corruption in CID;\textsuperscript{105} the inception of Operation Countryman, an investigation by provincial police forces into corruption which was established by David McNee, Mark’s successor,\textsuperscript{106} and devastating problems with the investigations into IRA terrorism, most notorious of which were the Guilford and Birmingham pub bombings. In August 1989, the entire Serious Crime Squad of the West Midlands Police, some of whom were involved in the affair of the Birmingham bombers, was disbanded amid allegations of framing and corruption.\textsuperscript{107} It is undoubtedly true that these scandals dented the image of the police as impersonal and disciplined law enforcers.\textsuperscript{108}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{102} Critchley, TA (1978) op cit p307
\item \textsuperscript{103} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{104} Emsley, C, (1991) op cit pp169-177
\item \textsuperscript{105} Mark, R (1978) ‘In the Office of Constable’ London: Collins Ch 7-10
\item \textsuperscript{106} Alderson, J (1984) ‘Law and Disorder’ London: Hamish Hamilton Ch 10
\item \textsuperscript{107} Emsley, C (1991) op cit p170
\item \textsuperscript{108} Reiner, R (1992) op cit p80
\end{itemize}
2.2.6 Legitimacy and Politicisation

Reiner charts the rise and fall of police legitimacy in the country, arguing that the basis for such legitimacy is not so much a function of British society as some writers would have it, but actually a product of a deliberate policy dating back to the original architects of the ‘new police’, who were conscious of the opposition to their proposals.109 He identifies the perceived period of decline in legitimacy beginning in the very late 1950s, continuing to develop through the 1960s with the implementation of the Police Act 1964, and then becoming full politicisation as exemplified by police clashes with anti-Vietnam war and anti-apartheid demonstrators.110 This was a theme which was to continue through the 1970s, a period of industrial unrest, and into the 1980s:

“Following the arrival of Margaret Thatcher and her first Conservative government, the British police entered the 1980s amid widespread suspicion that their role had altered irredeemably from impartial citizen in uniform to political partisanship.”111

This was compounded with the Government’s implementation of the Edmund-Davies pay formula in 1979 at the same time as embarking on a programme of cuts in other public services.

The politicisation debate was in the public consciousness – the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police and Jack Straw MP openly – and strongly – debated the issue.112 Alderson (1998) identifies the miner’s strike of 1984-1985 as a key example of the way in which the police become embroiled in a political battle.113 He argues that since the dispute was political in the sense that the Government were the employers of the miners, then the policing of the dispute was ipso facto a political task.114 Images of the police fighting with the miners, in the name of the government, are indelibly imprinted in the memory of the British Public, and are discussed in the following section.

109 Ibid p61
110 Ibid p76
114 Ibid p143
As the 1980s drew to a close and the 1990s started, the police service began another transition. This commenced with the infamous Home Office Circular 114/83, which outlined Home Office expectations around efficiency and effectiveness.\textsuperscript{115} The drive to demand value for money from the police, coupled with the squeeze on public expenditure forced police organisations to evolve, not least in the area of “the dramatic management of the appearance of effectiveness”.\textsuperscript{116} This may well be extended to “the dramatic management of corporate image.”

\textbf{2.2.7 Media, Press and Public Entertainment}

If the police in England and Wales police by consent, that is to say, their existence and the way in which they deliver policing are legitimate with broad public support, then this depends upon many factors. These include the concept of the rule of law, in which all are equal before the law and equally answerable to it; the supremacy of Parliament and the independence of the judiciary from the executive arm of government, and the doctrine of minimum force.\textsuperscript{117} However, in order for the public to accept the police and the policing they do, they, the public, must have a view, an image, an impression or an idea of what the police are, what they do, how they work and their attitudes towards people. This construct is informed by many sources – the media and how they report policing activity, entertainment and the depiction of the police in action, comments of politicians, academics and other influential opinion formers, and of course the police themselves.

Leishman and Mason (2003) describe these various factors at some length. They point out that the 1980s and into the 1990s heralded a new approach to the handling of the media, with Chief Constables having media training and the development within forces of corporate communications strategies.\textsuperscript{118} They indicate that this new approach, although pioneered by Robert Mark in the 1970s, really became important during the miner’s strike:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{117} Alderson JC (1979) ‘Policing Freedom’ Plymouth: Macdonald & Evans Ch 1-6
  \item \textsuperscript{118} Leishman, F and Mason, P (2003) op cit p39-40
\end{itemize}
“It was widely recognised that the provision of facilities to journalists and other programme makers, such as pre-event briefings, interviews with suitable spokespersons and access for observation, photography and filming, would all be critical determinants in the way the public perceived police handling of demonstrations and other public order situations. However, some forces displayed more savvy than others in this regard, as the varying coverage of picket line confrontations during the Miners’ Strike illustrated only too vividly. In areas where more proactive media policies were pursued, filming tended to be shot mainly from behind police cordons, thus conveying the images of the back of the ‘thin blue line’ straining bravely to maintain public order in the face of abuse, in stark contrast to images of cavalry charges captured from behind the ranks of fleeing pickets.”\textsuperscript{119}

This passage sets out the potential impact of media depiction of the police in action as well as highlighting the importance of media strategies. It also contextualises some of the visual imagery which the public have lasting memories of. These are all issues pertinent to the debate because they impact directly upon how the police, and therefore the state, are perceived by the wider public as well as disenfranchised groups. I present primary data relating to this issue in section 7.5 of Chapter Seven.

So far in this chapter, I have sought to chart some of the socio-demographic changes to British society in the post-war years, particularly as they apply to race and religion. I have overlain this with some of the more impactive changes and challenges in the evolution and development of policing. I now turn to melding the two things together by looking at \textit{causes celebres} over broadly the same time parameters – what seminal events have taken place where policing has clashed with cultural and pluralistic evolution?

\subsection*{2.3 Policing Plural Communities}

This section charts the history of significant events involving ethnic minority communities and the police in the post-war years, and briefly touches upon police attitudes towards ethnic minority communities and individuals. It outlines five seminal events, which are then used and referred to in subsequent chapters. They are chosen and recorded in some detail for two principal reasons. Firstly, they have all had a profound impact on policing, especially the policing of ethnic minority communities, \textit{after} the

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid
event. Secondly, they all represent a failure on behalf of public authorities, frequently the police, before the event.

2.3.1 Advanced Warnings

In 1948, Liverpool experienced a race riot. It took place in the South End of the city where 8000 immigrants had settled in order to help the war effort. Of these, 30 percent were seafarers, 10 percent were employed on shore and the rest were unemployed. Determined to exclude blacks from jobs aboard ship, the National Union of Seamen pressured employers not to take on colonial labour: this was the social background to three nights of rioting. After police had arrested black people who had barricaded themselves into premises, they advanced on a blacks-only club, forcing their way in after occupants had run out of ammunition to throw:

“The police went on the rampage, breaking into houses and beating up the occupants. Sixty blacks and ten whites were arrested.”

Although the police are implicated here in terms of being partisan, this riot had much in common with the later riots of Nottingham and London in 1958, being largely based upon ‘structured antagonism’ over housing and jobs in the context of economic recession and rising unemployment, together with suspicion about black reluctance to join trade unions.

2.3.2 Simmering Mistrust

During the 1960s and into the 1970s, the antagonism prevalent between whites and blacks transformed into confrontations between black people and the police. This was related to economical and political conditions of the period: high unemployment, low profitability and soaring inflation. The Immigration Acts of 1962, 1968 and 1971, discussed above, are direct examples of state intervention to curb immigration, and were accompanied by anti-immigrant sentiments from the media. Waddington states:

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121 Ibid
122 Ibid p77
123 Ibid p79
“Police and immigration officials were given sweeping powers to stop and search blacks or their premises on suspicion of illegal entry, and the authority to impose surveillance over ‘ghettos’, and prosecute raids on social centres. This activity ostracised and alienated Britain’s blacks...These developments provided the context for a series of police-black confrontations in the 1970s.”

Such confrontations included the disorder at the Notting Hill Carnivals of 1976 and 1977. A formidable police presence was regarded as oppressive by blacks who reacted to arrests they perceived as wrongful by smashing the windows of vehicles and throwing missiles at the police.

That the police service was very slow to respond to demographic changes taking place in wider society, both in terms of employment and of attitude, was becoming apparent. As recently as 1963, there was not a single black officer in the whole of Britain, and several policemen forecast mass resignations if one were ever appointed. By the start of 1978 there were 199 in England and Wales, scarcely one fifteenth of their equivalent on the national population. Graef quotes police officers:

‘Detective Sergeant in a Home Counties [sic], age 38, sixteen years service. Now in a University City’

“You know why there aren’t more black coppers? They’re too fucking lazy, that’s why. I think they’re scared of their people. And I don’t think they’ve got the brain power for it either. I’m sorry but that’s how I feel. You can get a whole community, you wouldn’t get an O Level between them. They’re so bloody arrogant, they really are, certainly the people I come across from the West Indian community. I do know a couple who are quite nice guys, but 90 percent of them – they really are arrogant. And totally ‘anti’. Most of them are bloody born here. Yet they all live in their own community, which is not right. What’s the matter with other people? They think there’s a war between them and us.”

He also quotes a Superintendent from a Midlands force:

124 Ibid
125 Ibid
“…That’s a problem with Asians: they make so many allegations that are totally a pack of lies.”

It is worth noting that Graef’s work was carried out in the 1980s and many officers had joined the police prior to the passing of race equality legislation. Even now, the 1976 Act is only 35 years old – those most senior in service (and many of those most senior in rank) joined before the Act was passed.

2.3.3 Open Hostility

On 2 April 1980, the first major riot of the decade occurred in the St Paul’s area of Bristol. It heralded a new experience for the British Police Service. It began as a result of legitimate police action where a West Indian club was raided because illegal sales of liquor and marijuana were taking place. Alderson (1984) argues that it is common for a routine and proper police action to spark riots and serious disorder where social conditions are tense and potentially explosive. He quotes Ken Pryce’s work of 1979, where social conditions in the St Paul’s area of Bristol were characterised by a ‘ghetto’ way of life where “wretchedness, subnormal educational development, unstable family patterns and a heavy involvement in such predatory activities as violence, robbery, conning and living off ones wits” are the norm.

Although it seemed that commentators and some politicians thought this incident was a one-off and an isolated event, almost exactly one year later in Brixton, London, these complacent interpretations were shattered. Further violent unrest in various cities occurred in 1981, 1985 and, to a lesser extent, in 1986. A more recent event took place in 2001. Alderson highlights that St Pauls was merely a warning:

“The omens for the Metropolitan Police could not have been clearer. The graffito ST. PAUL’S TODAY BRIXTON TOMORROW, which appeared on some of London’s walls, said it all.”

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128 Ibid p131
129 Alderson, JC (1984) op cit p154
130 Ibid
132 Alderson, JC (1984) op cit p155
The period of relative public tranquillity which occurred between the end of the Second World War and 1980 amplified the shock amongst members of the British public: what had gone wrong? Why were young British people throwing petrol bombs on the streets of London, Birmingham, Liverpool and elsewhere? “Is this really Britain?” asked some of the daily papers. The element of shock at the time, albeit tempered by understanding borne of hindsight since, has some poignant parallels with 2005 and 2006. The bombings of 7 July 2005 and the attempted bombings of the 21 July 2005 brought similar incredulity – how could this happen in Britain? It is sobering to note that at the time of the St Paul’s riot, there were only 339 black police officers in the whole of England and Wales. This compares with 6,615 today, approximately 4.8% of the total number of full time equivalent police officers, still someway short of the original target of 7%.

2.3.4 Seminal Events

This thesis draws upon a number of key seminal events. The policy responses to these seminal events are examined in Chapter Four, but it is appropriate to describe them now in broad summary as part of the background to the thesis. In general terms, each of the events in their own right had a profound impact on the public consciousness. Taken together, they are capable of a strongly revisionist stance – they represent a broad failure of public authorities, and, to some extent, British society, to recognise and tackle discrimination and social injustice on a systematic and institutional scale. The price of this failure is high.

133 Benyon, J and Solomos, J (Eds) (1987) op cit pxi
134 Whitaker, B (1982) op cit p217
135 www.politics.co.uk/reference/police-numbers-and-recruitment accessed 19 October 2011
2.3.4.1 Seminal Event 1: Brixton 1981

Social Conditions

Brixton is a commercial and residential area of South London. Although a lively and prosperous place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth Centuries, it was in steady decline since the 1920s.

At the time, over 12000 dwellings in the London Borough of Lambeth, of which Brixton forms a part, were defined by the local authority as unfit. 22% of housing was owner occupied, 33 percent privately rented, and 45 percent rented from the council or Housing Association. The population was also in decline, dropping 20 percent between 1971 and 1981. There was a strikingly high figure of children in care (in the two wards affected by the disorders, 61 percent of the children in care were black) and single parent families which were running at twice the national average - 50 percent of the single parent families in Lambeth were non-white.

Population

Some 25 percent of the population in 1978 belonged to non-white ethnic groups. West Indians were the largest at 12.5 percent, followed by Africans (3.4 percent), Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, (2.4 percent) and other non-white or mixed origin people (6.5 percent).

The Black Community in Brixton

The older generation of black people in Brixton largely came to Britain as immigrants in the late 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. They came in response to the demand from Britain for unskilled workers and in a search for better economic and social conditions.

In raising their children, the older generation of black people had to do without the network of support provided by the extended family, a feature of traditional West Indian society. The impact of British social conditions on the matriarchal West Indian family

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structure, whereby the mother was absent from the family home because she became a wage earner, was severe.

The children of the first generation of West Indian immigrants were in many cases born in the UK. They, and the third generation, shared aspirations and hopes of other British young people, but failed to benefit from British society to the extent that might have been expected. They underachieved academically, and then were unable to secure employment. It was estimated that the level of unemployment amongst black people in Brixton stood at 25.4 percent – double the average.

In addition to these difficulties, many young black people faced the burden of discrimination, and with no parental support, no job and few recreational facilities available, they made their lives on the street and in seedy clubs, where they came into contact with criminals.

The course of events

On Friday 10 April, a police officer in Brixton saw a black youth running across the street, evidently being chased by two or three other black youths. Unsure what was happening but sensing that an offence may have been committed, the officer caught hold of the fleeing youth, a male by the name of Michael Bailey.

Bailey was bleeding heavily but before the officer was able to establish the reason why, the youth broke away, being caught again with the assistance of another police officer. Bailey was found to have a four inch stab wound but before he could be asked about it, three other black youths jostled the police officers until Bailey escaped once again. He ran to a block of flats where he was taken in by a sympathetic white family. They called a taxi to take him to hospital. In the meantime, the police officer had informed the police station and colleagues of the serious condition of the youth, and officers in a van spotted the taxi, ordering it to stop. One of the two officers administered first aid whilst the second summoned an ambulance. However, a crowd of thirty or forty people, manly black youths, surrounded the officer and began shouting, saying ‘Look, they are killing him’, and ‘We will look after our own.’
Although the officers tried to explain that they were helping Bailey, the crowd took no notice. They hailed a car and whisked Bailey away. A skirmish developed, involving 30 to 40 police officers who had answered the call for assistance. Some were in riot gear and there were two dog handlers. Up to 100 youths who were mainly black, threw bottles and stones. This episode of disorder lasted for about 80 minutes. When it was over, 28 officers patrolling on foot and in pairs were deployed, and 96 additional officers were sent to Brixton.

Crucially, the police decided to continue with ‘Operation Swamp’, a largely plain clothes operation dealing with drug misuse and employing widespread use of stop and search powers. This resulted in the frequent and seemingly arbitrary stopping and searching of young black males.

On Saturday 11 April, a black taxi driver was detained as a suspect by two young plain clothes officers. They had seen him place folded pieces of paper into his sock. He asserted that they were bank notes, which indeed they were. The officers searched him and also searched his vehicle, carrying out both searches in front of a growing and hostile gathering of black youths. Attempts to arrest those abusing them only added to the tension – officers were assaulted and vehicles were damaged. Throughout the evening and into the night, riots took place involving hundreds of police and violent youths, and there was significant damage to property. Petrol bombs were thrown and barricades were assembled.

Violent and isolated attacks continued through Sunday and into Monday, when the riot came to an end.

Sir David McNee, Commissioner of the Metropolis at the time of the disorders reported:

“Between Friday 10 April, and Monday 13 April 1981, 415 police officers and 172 members of the public were injured. 118 police vehicles and 61 private vehicles were damaged. 4 police vehicles and 30 private vehicles were destroyed. 28 premises were seriously damaged by fire and a further 158 premises were attacked.”

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Thus began a period of violent unrest throughout British cities. Academic literature is examined in Chapter Three which offers some explanations of riots and urban unrest. Policy responses and Home Office guidance is critically reviewed in Chapter Four.

2.3.4.2 Seminal Event 2: The Murder of Stephen Lawrence 1993 138

The incident

On 22 April 1993, Stephen Lawrence, an 18-year-old black student, was murdered in Greenwich in London. He was on his way home with his friend, Duwayne Brooks who was also black. It was about 10.30 at night, and they were waiting for a bus. A group of white males saw Stephen and surrounded him. He was stabbed to a depth of about five inches on both sides of his body, severing several major arteries. The murderers ran from the scene. Stephen managed to run about 100 yards, trying to join his friend, when he collapsed and died. His was an unprovoked murder, motivated purely by racism. The group of white males were only convicted in 2012, 19 years after the incident. 139

The Police Response

The police investigated twice at the time, and although suspects were arrested, they were not convicted until much later; a private prosecution in 1996 failed because of the absence of any firm and sustainable evidence. A catalogue of police errors, ranging from inadequate initial scene management, including poor first aid, to a lack of understanding by senior officers as to what grounds might constitute a lawful power to make an arrest, contributed to the failure to secure a successful prosecution. There were serious problems around family liaison and sensitivity towards Stephen’s parents. As a result of the failure, the Home Secretary established an inquiry under section 49 of the Police Act 1996. The terms of reference were:

“To inquire into the matters arising from the death of Stephen Lawrence on 22 April 1993 to date, in order particularly to identify the lessons to be learned for the investigation and prosecution of racially motivated crimes.” 140

This event, and the subsequent Inquiry, had a penetrating effect on the police service and indeed on individual officers. Did it make a real and tangible difference to the way in which the British Police Service dealt with discrimination and social injustice? This matter is addressed in Chapter Four.

2.3.4.3 Seminal Event 3: The Secret Policeman 2002

“For many police officers, the media are still frequently perceived as yet another hostile and unsympathetic quarter from which unjustified criticism can regularly be expected.”  

In the early part of 2002, a BBC reporter by the name of Mark Daly began the application procedure to join Greater Manchester Police. This was because he wanted to see what steps had been taken by that force to eradicate racism following an admission by the then Chief Constable that the force was institutionally racist; a year earlier, the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry branded the Metropolitan police with the same label. On 27 January 2003, he had his first day of training as PC 2210 Daly. During his tenure as a sworn police officer, Daly covertly filmed his interactions with other officers, and recorded racist abuse at the Police National Training Centre in Warrington where he spent 15 weeks. He states:

“Racist abuse like “Paki” and “Nigger” were commonplace for these PCs. The idea that white and Asian members of the public should be treated differently because of their colour was not only acceptable for some, but preferable.”

This involved officers from forces in Wales and North West England, not merely Greater Manchester police, and there were other examples of grossly offensive racist behaviour. These included dressing up in Ku Klux Klan hoods, and one officer even

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141 Leishman, F and Mason, P (2003) op cit p 29
143 Ibid
144 Ibid
claiming that he would kill an Asian “if I could get away with it”.145 The same officer was also recorded insulting Stephen Lawrence, saying that he deserved to die and referring to Stephen’s parents, Doreen and Neville Lawrence, as ‘spongers’.146 Daly pointed out that there had been “countless” reports into institutional racism in the police, and a “huge number” of initiatives to deal with it, but the documentary showed that racism had been “driven underground” at GMP.147 This type of investigative journalism was able to infiltrate the inner workings of the British police service, demonstrate not only that racism was prevalent, but also that the service had clearly recruited racists, was training racists, and effectively ordaining them into the organisation. This would allow racist officers pro-actively to respond to their racist drive in their subsequent interactions with the public. If it is true that the timing of the application to join the police by Daly was random (and not timed to coincide with the first days of people pre-identified as being racist) and the choice of Bruche training school was largely random, the discovery of this type of behaviour amongst new recruits demonstrates negligence on the part of the police to deliver against their assertions to eliminate racism. The then chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality commented that “this shows a pattern of behaviour which is widespread, and though officially condemned, is tacitly condoned by [the officers’] peers.”148 The damage to police-race relations cannot be overstated.

Although Daly’s tactics were heavily criticised in some quarters,149 his investigation and his programme, which was broadcast on 21 October 2003, caused widespread anxiety.

2.3.4.4 Seminal Event 4: Urban unrest, Bradford and Oldham 2001

“A generation of Asians, discarded for their class, excluded for their race, stigmatised for their religion, ghettoised and forgotten, has found its voice – but is yet to be heard.” 150

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146 Ibid
148 Phillips T (2003), quoted on ‘Anger after police racism film’ op cit
149 Toll, N (2003) ‘Bogus cop’s cases to be re-examined’ in The Stockport Express 20 August 2003
Between April and July 2001, Oldham, Burnley and Bradford were the scenes of violent confrontations between young Asians and the police, culminating in the clashes of 7 – 9 July in Bradford in which 200 police officers were injured.  

In a portent of what was shortly to come, Walter Chamberlain, a 76 year old World War II veteran, was attacked by three Asian youths in Oldham as he walked home from watching a local amateur rugby league match in April 2001. His picture was widely published, and it showed a violently beaten elderly man. Over the weekend 26-28 May 2001 violence erupted in flashpoints across the town with petrol bombs being thrown and buildings set alight; rioting involving up to 500 Asian youths on the Saturday was followed with further unrest on the Sunday. The Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) reported that “the riots occurred as the culmination of 5 weeks of racial abuse orchestrated by right-wing extremists against the town’s ethnic minority community.” Indeed, Massoud Shadjareh, Chairman of the IHRC said:

“The Oldham riots were therefore rooted not merely in racism, but more particularly in anti-Muslim hostility. Groups such as Combat 18, the National Front and the BNP have clarified their hostile stance toward the Muslim community in Britain through numerous vehemently Islamophobic statements and activities. The Oldham riots illustrate the dismal failure of the Race Relations Act to protect the Muslim community in Britain from hostile provocation.”

Whilst right wing activity was clearly of importance, it was only part of the reason why Oldham flared.

Further rioting occurred in Leeds and Burnley in June 2001, before serious rioting occurred in Bradford, beginning on July 7 – a poignant date. That day saw the worst rioting in Britain for many years – the BBC reported that 120 police officers were injured and 36 people were arrested during battles between some 900 police officers, including officers drafted in from forces in Greater Manchester, South Yorkshire, North Yorkshire, Merseyside, Humberside, Cleveland and Northumbria, and about 1000

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151 Ibid  
155 Ibid
mainly Asian youths.\textsuperscript{156} The Daily Telegraph described it as “..an 11-hour orgy of violence, arson and looting.”\textsuperscript{157} Although less serious, violence ensued for a further two nights, with further arrests and outbreaks of sporadic violence across the city.\textsuperscript{158}

Once again, right-wing activity had had a significant part to play in the build up to the weekend, with senior police officers acknowledging that they had underestimated the scale of the backlash to a planned march by the National Front, even though it had been banned by the Home Secretary.\textsuperscript{159} The role of political activity and media reporting as ‘indicators’ of the risk of social protest is discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.

Of particular relevance to this aspect of the discussion is not so much the immediately preceding circumstances and political activity, though these are important to the discussion of ‘tension indicators’ described and analysed in Chapter Three, but rather the sociological and demographic factors which led up to the events. The Northern towns where this unrest occurred are old textile mill towns, and Kundnani (2001) outlines the social evolution that took place.\textsuperscript{160} His argument contextualises matters, bringing the above analysis of post war migration from South East Asia to life. He describes how the mills moved to new technologies during the 1960s, and were operating 24 hours a day. The night shifts were unpopular with the existing workforce and soon became the preserve of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi workers who had sought employment in the UK. Gradually the mills began to decline; in a twist of irony, the work that was done cheaply by Bangladeshi workers could be done more cheaply by Bangladeshi workers in Bangladesh. Whites and Asians were united in their unemployment, but discrimination on the part of the public services meant that it soared amongst young Asians – reaching around 50\% in Oldham.\textsuperscript{161} Kundnani states that a string of Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities, from Oldham to Bradford and Leeds, were amongst the most impoverished 1 percent in Britain.\textsuperscript{162} The paper then describes how segregation occurred owing to the growing gap between those white people who could afford to buy their own houses, and those predominantly Asian people who could

\textsuperscript{156} ‘Calm restored after night of riots’ 8 July 2001, from \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1428374.stm} accessed 6/1/08
\textsuperscript{158} ‘Further trouble in Bradford’ 10 July 2001, from \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1431284.stm} accessed 6/1/08
\textsuperscript{159} Stokes P (2001) op cit
\textsuperscript{160} Kundnani A (2001) op cit
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid
not, and who ended up living in very poor quality, cramped terraced housing. Peach (2007) advances the notion that the terraced Victorian houses of the mill towns made the arrangements for safety and family honour invested in Muslim women, to protect them from British society which is “regarded as sexually promiscuous, alcohol abusing, non-religious, and non-respectful of parents and elders” much easier, and since they were areas that white people wanted to steer away from, communities became separate. Discriminatory housing policies practised by some of the councils amplified this problem and the segregation in housing resulted in segregation in education. In a short period of time, a generation of whites and Asians were growing up with very little contact; mutual distrust festered. The key to the violent unrest, and perhaps to the growth in the risk of radicalisation, is held in the following extract:

“By the 1990s, a new generation of young Asians was coming of age in the northern towns, born and bred in Britain, and unwilling to accept the second-class status foisted on their elders.”

Added into this mix was a poor relationship with the police, perceived as failing to protect a vulnerable community against racism. Community fractures became entrenched owing to self-appointed community leaders, who largely had their own agenda, had no specific mandate to act as community representatives and therefore did not represent the community. Such fracturing, segregation, discrimination and the perception of poor social justice, illustrated by the relationship with the police, increase the vulnerability of communities to a range of damaging external influences. The Cantle Report, analysed in more detail in Chapter Four, supports the view of deeply divided communities.

There is much debate about the role of the idealistic leader, or the so-called ‘fundamentalist’ or ‘extremist’ cleric in the development and radicalisation of vulnerable people to the point where they commit terrorist atrocities, usually by suicide bomb. These concepts and others are analysed in Chapter Three. Although the far right were attacked for their involvement in the riots in Oldham and Bradford, as were the

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163 Peach (2007) op cit p23
164 Ibid
media and to some extent the police, little was said about the role of Muslim ‘radicals.’ One minor exception to this was Christian Voice, a somewhat controversial organisation, with fundamental views of its own. Nevertheless, they reported the comments of a so-called leading expert on Islam who suggested that “local Imams had recently brought in representatives of the Taliban regime of Afghanistan and Kashmiri Guerillas to speak in Mosques in the town. This would only encourage the criminal element of Muslim youth.” The accuracy of this may be debated, but intuitively and with the benefit of hindsight, such external influences were likely to be present because there was a market for them. More detailed discussion in Chapter Three develops this idea.

2.3.4.5 Seminal Event 5: The London Transport Bombings

On Thursday 7 July 2005, four co-ordinated attacks occurred on London’s transport system. Three bombs exploded around 8.50am on underground trains just outside Liverpool Street and Edgware Road stations, and on another travelling between King’s Cross and Russell Square. A fourth bomb went off an hour later on a double-decker bus in Tavistock Square, close to King’s Cross. The bombs killed 56 people, including the bombers, and more than 700 were injured.

This type of attack had been seen elsewhere in the world, most notably 11 September 2001, when the twin towers of the World Trade Centre were destroyed, but never before on mainland Britain. These events are characterised by four key facets: firstly, they consist of virtually simultaneous attacks; secondly, they aim to be ‘mass casualty’; thirdly, they occur with no warning; and fourthly, they involve the perpetrator killing themselves – i.e. they are suicide attacks. This last phenomenon is analysed more closely in Chapter Three.

The four individuals identified as responsible for these attacks were Mohammed Siddeque (sometimes ‘Sidique’) Khan, Hasib Hussain, Shazad Tanweer and Jermaine

167 ‘7 July Bombings: Overview’ from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/london_blasts/what_happened/html/default.stm accessed 8/1/08
Lindsay. Although the current study does not major on the psychology of suicide terrorists, a brief summary of the backgrounds of these individuals is useful to the current debate for two main reasons. Firstly, they were British, and three of them were British born. This was a jarring shock to the public – previous terrorist attacks had been from ‘foreigners’. The second reason was the *ordinariness* of them. These factors taken together begged the question: Why? The next chapter attempts to throw some light on this from an academic perspective, but for now, I précis information from the government’s Report of the Official Account.\(^{169}\)

Khan was 30 at the time of the bombings, and it is generally accepted that he was the ring leader. Tanweer was 22, Hussain was 18 and Lindsay, the outsider of the group, was 19. Lindsay was a convert to Islam, and was originally from Jamaica. The other three were all second generation British citizens, whose parents were originally from Pakistan, and who come to West Yorkshire, found work, and settled. All three grew up in the Beeston area of Leeds and the neighbouring district of Holbeck – Tanweer and Hussain were still living there with their parents when they died. After his marriage, Khan moved to Dewsbury, though remained very involved in Beeston as a teaching assistant and youth worker. The area is deprived and densely populated with back-to-back housing, much of which is in poor condition. Average income is low, although none of the three were poor by the standards of the area. After leaving school, where he was never in trouble, but where he was occasionally bullied, Khan worked locally, first for the Benefits Agency, then for the Department of Trade and Industry as an administrative assistant. In 1996, he went to study at Leeds Metropolitan University, where he achieved a lower second class degree in business studies. It was also where he met his future wife; after marrying in 2001, they had a daughter in 2004. Khan developed a vocation for helping disadvantaged young people and took on part-time youth and community work, which led him to work with special needs children at a local primary school, until November 2004, when extended sick leave resulted in his departure. During this time, he continued to be active as a youth worker in Beeston; he also apparently turned to religion.

Tanweer was a gifted sportsman, playing for a local cricket team and studying sports science at Leeds Metropolitan University between 2001 and 2003. After November 2004, he had no paid employment and was being supported by his family.

Hussain was not a high achiever academically, keen on sport but not outstanding. He left school in 2003, going on to study for an Advanced Business Programme which he completed in June 2005.

The social life of all three centred on the mosques, youth clubs, gyms and the Islamic bookshop in Beeston. It appears to be around these venues that the steps along the road to radicalisation were taken, with Khan playing a central role.

Jermaine Lindsay was bright as a child, successful academically at school and good at sport. His mother converted to Islam in 2000, and Lindsay converted almost immediately thereafter, taking the name ‘Jamal’; he was admired for the speed with which he achieved fluency in Arabic. It seems that he was strongly influenced by the extremist preacher Abdalah al Faisal (also of Jamaican origin). He met Khan at some point during 2004.

The synergy between the social narrative behind the urban unrest in Oldham, Bradford, Leeds and the other Northern mill towns and the social background and roots of three of the four bombers from July 7 2005 is self-evident.

2.4 Summary and Discussion

This chapter has examined the development of a pluralistic society in the United Kingdom, with particular emphasis on the immigration of Asians and the growth of Islam. It has overlain this with a focused narrative of the development of policing over the same time frames. In so doing, it has sought to highlight those critical events which tend to demonstrate that the police have been slow to respond to the rapid cultural evolution of British society since the post-war years. The arguments are developed from the macro issues at the outset of the chapter, to the micro, with five seminal events identified and described towards the end.

The presentation of these seminal events serves two principal purposes. Firstly, taken together, they imply that state agencies in the United Kingdom have failed in some way to meet the needs of a rapidly changing society. Secondly, they are catalysts which spur action. I revisit them in Chapter Four, where I critically analyse various selected laws,
policy responses and edicts from the Home Office and elsewhere which largely arose as a result of each. From these, I isolate five ‘critical success factors’ - themes which are common to them all. I argue that successful delivery of these factors optimises the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of minority and disenfranchised groups, thereby minimising the risk of adverse social protest.

Bowling points out that the disorder which occurred in Brixton between 10 and 12 April 1981 and in Southall, Manchester, Liverpool, the West Midlands and numerous other locations in July of that year may collectively be seen as the culmination of a deteriorating relationship between the police and black communities over the previous three decades. In the context of a sluggish adjustment, an adjustment necessary to meet the problem of policing a multi-racial community, this is perhaps unsurprising. It also poses the question as to whether British society had yet come to terms with ethnic diversity; the police being seen as the agents of a society which is unsympathetic and ignorant of the plight of people from certain communities.

Although not exclusively, the inner city riots of the 1980s involved young members of minority ethnic communities. Various explanations were offered, including outbursts of anarchic criminality, legitimate insurrections against an oppressive and racist state (characterised by conflict with the police, seen as agents of the state) and a function of social and economic deprivation. I present data in Chapter Seven which relates these factors to the growth of domestic radicalisation and extremism.

If it is the case that there are links with the roots of urban unrest and the growth of harmful radicalisation with the potential to progress to terrorism, then it may be said that the police, whilst not carrying sole responsibility either for the situation or the solution, are well placed as a public authority and state agency in three main areas. Firstly, they should be able to identify risk. This will include geographical factors: what communities there are and where they are located; sociological and demographic factors: where people are meeting, what the age groups and gender issues are, what external influences there might be; and policy issues, which include effect of local government or police policy as well as the effects of domestic and international governmental policy. Secondly, they should be able to detect community tension and

changes. This would be informed by having appropriate intelligence mechanisms in place – and pre-supposes that the National Intelligence Model works as it should. Such intelligence mechanisms would include Cover Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS), community intelligence from officers working closely with communities and, assuming the engagement structures are right, from the community themselves. These first two areas may be wrapped up in the expression ‘understanding communities’. Finally, police forces, together with their ‘statutory’ partners such as local councils, should be able to intervene in order to eliminate or minimise the risk. Whilst some intervention will be in response to specific threats, and may involve security services or the military, other appropriate interventions might take place much earlier – as soon as the changes and tensions referred to above are identified.

The terrorist incidents of 7 and 21 July 2005, together with intense media coverage of police and security service counter-terrorist operations engendered intense public and governmental interest. Money became available, research was undertaken and significant parts of domestic policy were influenced by this apparently sudden and unexpected turn of events. How long can this be maintained? Whilst it may be true that “thirty years of terrorism is a likely consequence of thirty years of American military supremacy”, will it truly remain at the forefront of the public consciousness? Benyon re-produces Anthony Downs ‘issue attention cycle’ which identifies the difficulty of sustaining interest in an issue:

1. **The Pre-Problem stage**: some highly undesirable social condition exists, which may be of concern to experts and groups, but which has received little public attention; for example, racism and poverty in the United States.

This may be considered to be the exclusion of ethnic minority groups from the polity, or the failure of police forces properly to engage with Muslim communities.

2. **Alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm**: the public suddenly becomes aware of and alarmed by the evils of a particular problem, often as the result of dramatic events – such as the American riots in 1967. Invariably there is great enthusiasm about solving the problem within a relatively short time.

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The terrorist incidents referred to above are examples.

3. **Realising the cost of significant progress**: gradually there is a spreading realisation that the cost of solving the problem is very high and may require sacrifices by large numbers of people, as the most pressing social problems often involve either exploitation of one group in society by another, or the prevention of one group from enjoying something that others want to keep for themselves.

Problems of Islamophobia and the risk of dramatically raised community tension with the potential for race-related riots and racially motivated murder may be examples of the high cost of dealing with the current issue in the publicised manner. Other examples include the restrictions on the private lives of citizens - for example, the carriage of liquids on aircraft.

4. **Gradual decline of intense public interest**: the public become discouraged, or they feel threatened, or they get bored and their desire to keep attention focused on the issue wanes, particularly if another issue is entering stage two.

5. **The post-problem stage**: the issue moves into a prolonged limbo – a twilight realm of lesser interest or spasmodic recurrences of interest. But the public has become aware of the problem and it may resurface sporadically, and new institutions and policies may have been created which are likely to continue to have some impact on the problem.

The issues raised by the terrorist incidents in the USA and here appear to have passed some way through the issue attention cycle, just as the inner city riots did. Benyon comments “...it is possible that unless the root cause of the problems are tackled, the issues may again be thrust on to the agenda by dramatic events” 174 I posit here that it is the case that our failure to address root causes of problems identified through Brixton, Lawrence and elsewhere have been thrust back on to the agenda by the recent dramatic turn of events. This then leads to the question of how do we stop the cycle, and maintain the momentum to deal with root causes, thus alleviating the risk of future ‘dramatic events’?

174 Ibid p241
The next chapter argues, using a foundationalist approach, that there are clear similarities between the root causes of urban unrest, radicalisation and terrorism.
CHAPTER THREE:

Review of Relevant Literature

3.0 Introduction

The events of September 11th 2001 precipitated a flood of research and publication loosely falling under the overarching heading of ‘terrorism’. This incident, which Freedman describes as ‘super’\(^\text{175}\), was audacious in its organisation, its choice of targets and ultimately in its success. It unfolded live across the world, and the global sense of shock, together with the American feeling of humiliation and vulnerability were palpable. That the incident influenced and continues to influence domestic and foreign policy in the United Kingdom and America is undoubted.\(^\text{176}\)

July 7th 2005 saw a series of bombs detonated by ‘suicide terrorists’ on the transport network of London. The murder of fifty two people in four simultaneous attacks, together with the iconic imagery of the destroyed London bus, not only instilled a sense of anxiety but also ignited a painful self-examination of societal infrastructure in the United Kingdom that continues today. What made someone who was British-born, brought up and educated in Britain, want to murder fellow countrymen?

This chapter constructs a hypothesis: that the development of harmful radicalisation and so-called home-grown terrorism have similar roots to urban unrest. It therefore examines these various phenomena in some depth and analyses relevant literature which may be considered ‘foundationalist’, towards an examination of ‘realist’ policy and process which occurs in Chapter Four. These philosophical positions and their relevance to the research project are discussed in more depth in Chapter Five. The examination of policies and edicts in Chapter Four will illustrate the intention behind them and assess whether or not they are capable and fit for purpose. The current chapter is organised into six sections. The first section discusses the definitional problems of the word ‘terrorism’, and compares and contrasts the phenomenon with organised crime. This is


important because the variation in the manner in which the state responds will depend upon any identified difference. It then moves on to examine the corpus of literature on the ‘root causes’ of terrorism.

The second section examines ‘radicalisation’, and again discusses ‘root causes’. It seeks to isolate root causes, and scrutinises specific social phenomena to test their role in precipitating radicalisation, comparing and contrasting them with the root causes of terrorism. This begins to point towards pre-conditions which might need to exist in order for radicalisation and terrorism to occur. It is argued here that such pre-conditions would constitute the first set of ‘warnings’.

In section three, the discussion turns to research relating to the root causes of riot and urban disorder. In so doing, it expressly examines literature relating to the inner city riots in the United Kingdom since 1980, as well as some reference to the riots in 1960s America, and identifies those social phenomena which were seen as pre-conditions to the riots. Policy responses are examined in Chapter Four.

In response to the UK riots of the 1980s, the police developed a series of ‘tension indicators’ which were designed to predict the possibility of rioting and interracial conflict. Section four re-visits ‘tension indicators’, and examines how they might be adapted to assist in assessing the local risk of radicalisation and progression to terrorism. This would then provide a second set of ‘warnings’.

Section five draws the preceding sections together. By comparing and contrasting the root causes of two forms of politically affected violence - terrorism and riot - the section proposes a ‘ladder of escalation’ to illustrate the hypothesis, and examines literature which moves the debate towards such a model. The ‘ladder of escalation’ postulates the idea that not only are pre-conditions important, but certain discrete steps may occur, with low level political activism at one end and more violent responses at the other. The model suggests that radicalisation and terrorism are mere examples of such steps and early identification of the lower-level events may add a third set of ‘warnings’ of escalation towards violence.

Section six provides a summary.
The subsequent chapter, Chapter Four, scrutinises neighbourhood level policing by critically examining the outpouring of Home Office circulars, national plans and policy statements, linked to the five seminal events described in Chapter Two. It isolates the critical success factors referred to above, and describes Neighbourhood Policing and the National Intelligence Model.

3.1 The terrorism definitional debate – is it just a crime?

Hamm (2005) suggests that recent history of criminological study has largely ignored terrorism, and that this criticism has taken on a new urgency since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.\textsuperscript{177} The problem with the word ‘terrorism’ is that it is far from being a value-free word: the United Nations strives to achieve an agreed definition but it has remained elusive.\textsuperscript{178} Although some years old now, and the arenas in which ‘terrorism’ has entered the public consciousness are many and varied, Anthony Arblaster’s examination of a series of books from the 1970s on the subject of terrorism is still highly pertinent:

“It is an elementary precondition of [arriving at a precise and well thought-out definition of terrorism] that we get beyond the essentially propagandist use of language…”\textsuperscript{179}

The word conjures up the notion of evil, something abhorrent and despicable. Guelke (1998) describes it as “one of the most condemnatory words in the English Language”.\textsuperscript{180} The emotive nature of the term has influenced the political context in which it is used because it implies a lack of legitimacy. In some cases, this extends to the point where responses to terrorism are one dimensional and seek to treat symptoms rather than causes. To focus on causes, motivating factors and grievances implies a justification for violence.\textsuperscript{181}

\textsuperscript{177} Hamm, MS (2005) ‘After September 11: Terrorism research and the crisis in criminology’ *Theoretical Criminology* 9:2, pp237-251
Can terrorism be distinguished from other types of violence, and if so, in what way? After all, terrorism is a crime.\textsuperscript{182} Crenshaw (1981) advances the concept:

“The term \textit{terrorism} was coined to describe the systematic inducement of fear and anxiety to control and direct a civilian population, and the phenomenon of terrorism as a challenge to authority of the state grew from the difficulties revolutionaries experienced in trying to recreate the mass uprisings of the French Revolution.”\textsuperscript{183}

An important foundation is introduced here: the notion of terrorism being used as a tool to achieve an end. In this context, it implies political discontent, because there is a challenge to state authority. Guelke discusses the problem of defining terrorism and in so doing, he quotes Schmid at length since he (Guelke) is of the view that Schmid’s definition is the most rigorous effort there has yet been to define it:

“Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actor, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.”\textsuperscript{184}

Schmid arrived at this definition (though, given its length, it has been suggested that description is more appropriate\textsuperscript{185}) in the mid 1980s after consulting with the research community, and thus it might be considered as an ‘academic consensus definition.’\textsuperscript{186} He has recently re-visited it, once again going out to the research community.\textsuperscript{187}

It is a definition which Guelke critiques, examining Schmid’s use of the term ‘violence’, which he points out is a term nearly as emotively impactful as ‘terrorism’ itself.\textsuperscript{188}

\begin{footnotes}
\item{183} Crenshaw, M (1981) ‘The Causes of Terrorism’ Comparative Politics 13 p380
\item{184} Guelke, A (1998) op cit p18
\item{186} www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alex_P._Schmid accessed 26/1/12
\item{188} Ibid p20
\end{footnotes}
The British Government too has wrestled with the problem of defining terrorism since July 7th. Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C. was commissioned to review the matter and he produced a 48 page report entitled ‘The Definition of Terrorism’. His first conclusion was “there is no single definition of terrorism that commands full international approval.” The problem with defining terrorism is the normative judgement which each person makes in using the term, especially when it is conjoined with the word ‘violence’. This inevitably leads to the oft quoted “one man’s terrorist is another man’s revolutionary”. Jamieson (2005) presents a useful definition which she takes from Title 22 of the US Code, Section 2656f(d) and it is one to which I shall return:

“premeditated, politically-motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”

This definition is helpful because it deals with several themes in a concise way. Firstly, the notion that terrorism is politically motivated - a key difference between terrorism and other forms of violent crime. Secondly, it identifies that the target is non-combatant, setting terrorism apart from war. It also suggests that the motivation behind terrorism is not the actual act of murder – it is the microphone with which to publicise the cause and call people to arms. Thirdly, the identification of subnational groups or clandestine agents implies some minority status amongst the actors. This is important in the current discussion.

Tupman and O’Reilly (2004) shed some light onto the hackneyed question of whether one man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist in their examination of ‘Legitimacy Arenas’. Their analysis is interesting because it adopts as its basis American military intervention in Afghanistan rather than an incident such as 9/11 or 7/7. This type of military activity does not neatly fit the definitional parameters of ‘terrorism’ because, whilst one may argue that the activity was both politically motivated and violent, it is not aimed at non-combatants per se. But the concept of ‘legitimacy arenas’ that Tupman and O’Reilly advance can be applied to terrorist activity. The paper identifies five

190 Ibid p47
‘legitimacy arenas’ in the context of this military intervention.\textsuperscript{194} They are: the US domestic arena; the domestic arena in the country where intervention has taken place; the international arena; the Muslim or Islamic world and finally the legitimacy of the market. The essence of discussing these ‘legitimacy arenas’ is the vexed question of whether or not military attacks of this nature actually increase levels of terrorist recruitment, and therefore terrorism, rather than reduce them. In a paradigmatic shift, Merari (2005) summarises from the terrorism point of view:

“The magnitude of public support for suicide operations seems to affect both the terrorist group’s willingness to use this tactic and the number of volunteers for suicide missions.”\textsuperscript{195}

What does Merari mean by the ‘public’? Based on Tupman and O’Reilly’s ideas, we might postulate arenas of legitimacy for so-called Islamist terror attacks in the United Kingdom. The following might be considered: firstly, the domestic arena within the country attacked. This would include the wider general public, political groups, and private organisations – whilst attacks may be condemned, what would the upshot be? How might it affect the terrorist organisation’s agenda? Secondly, the minority Islamic communities in the country attacked. Clearly, lack of even passive support for terrorist activity in this arena might seriously impede an organisation’s political aims. Thirdly, the \textit{umma} – the worldwide Muslim ‘brotherhood’ or family. How would the attacks be viewed by the wider Islamic communities? Fourthly, the worldwide arena – what might be the world wide reaction, and how might they respond? Fifthly, and perhaps one which varies from Tupman and O’Reilly’s framework, the mass media arena – the very platform upon which the terrorist organisation hopes to stand. Once again, universal condemnation might be the key theme, but what about the sub-text – the ‘message’ for which terrorism ultimately exists?

The vast majority of definitions of ‘terrorism’ set the phenomenon apart from other crimes because they declare a basis of \textit{political motivation}. Terrorism is a form of \textit{political violence}. However, it is important to acknowledge that matters are not as simple as often portrayed. Jamieson argues that terrorist groups began to take an interest in organised crime because of the enormous financial opportunity it presented – and the

\textsuperscript{194} ibid
power that came with it to destabilise economies.\textsuperscript{196} However, she contests that organised crime and terrorism should always be viewed as quite distinct phenomena in terms of objectives, motivation and tactics.\textsuperscript{197} She then goes on to elucidate those areas in which there is some ‘overlap’ between organised crime and terrorism. These are: (a) the self-financing of terrorist groups by typical ‘organised crime-type’ activities; (b) pragmatic collaboration between terrorist and organised crime groups for political purposes and (c) the use of terrorism by organised crime groups for political purposes.\textsuperscript{198} She contrasts her definition of terrorism, above, with the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime definition of an organised crime group:

“A structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences […] in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.”\textsuperscript{199}

Jamieson’s items at (a) to (c) (above) point towards the ‘terrorism – organised crime nexus’ which is so often debated. Although Jamieson cleverly articulates the differences between organised crime and terrorism, the definition she uses for organised crime groups could well apply to a terrorist group if the part reading ‘a financial or other material benefit’ were changed to read ‘a political aim or objective’. This is a remarkably minor amendment to the definition which results in a seismic shift in its meaning. Perhaps the two phenomena are not so materially different, and is some value in thinking of terrorism as a type of organised crime. The umbrella term ‘organised crime’ might then have a number of sub-categories of which ‘terrorism’ is just one. This has some advantages in terms of police structures because it enables effective ‘organised crime’ responses to be applied to terrorism. Since terrorism is becoming an increasingly transnational beast, with operatives in countries far away from the power base, this approach may have merit.

In some countries, the ‘nexus’ becomes ever more blurred, with terms such as ‘criminal terrorism’ and ‘economic terrorism’.\textsuperscript{200} Andresen (2001) makes the point powerfully:

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{196} Jamieson, A (2005) Op cit p164
\bibitem{197} Ibid p165
\bibitem{198} Ibid
\bibitem{199} Ibid
\bibitem{200} Lia, B and Skolberg, K (2004) op cit p49
\end{thebibliography}
“The majority of definitions of terrorism have until now emphasised the political or social motives for terrorist acts. However, if applied to Russia, such definitions would leave out most of the acts of violence that have been committed during the last decade, acts that in other respects qualify as terrorism….The terrorist threat in Russia is first and foremost a threat from organised crime.” [His emphasis]201

This happens because organised crime groups target rivals, journalists, state institutions, politicians and officials who may represent a threat to their material gain. This activity looks politically motivated, but actually is not. The Russian example demonstrates the blurred boundaries and shows that the terrorism–organised crime dichotomy is not as clear cut as Jamieson might assert, and that the ‘nexus’ may take various forms. One phrase in Jamieson’s conclusions stands out: “..violent groups do not exist in a vacuum but require a degree of consensus to persist in time.”202 This is a very similar phrase to one used by Maleckova (2005) – “Terrorism does not occur in a vacuum” where the issue under discussion is the need for some degree of public or community support.203 Merari (2005) arrives at a similar point.204 Dishman (2005) argues that the decentralisation of criminal and terror organisations owing to pressure from international law enforcement agencies is allowing synergistic ties to form between lower level criminal and terrorist operatives in a manner which their respective bosses would probably disapprove.205 He believes that this leadership nexus between criminals and terrorists is a phenomenon with far-reaching implications that should be a major concern for law enforcement.206

In an article published in Prospect Magazine, Shiv Malik visits Beeston in Leeds, home to three of the four bombers of 7/7.207 In the article, Malik quotes an interviewee of the same gender, age and ethnic identity as the bombers:

“To be honest with you, the downfall was a few years back. There were a lot of drug addicts in the area, which dragged everything down... I wouldn’t say that we’re stuck

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202 Jamieson, A (2005) op cit p 176
204 Merari, A (2005) op cit p80
206 Ibid p238
up people, but you move to an area and spend your money on your property. You want to live there, and if somebody’s gonna come up and throw syringes in your garden and put a brick through your window, you want to fight the battle. At the end of the day, it’s your pride more than anything else.”

The article then goes on to describe a gang established under the leadership of none other than Mohammed Sidique Khan, initially in response to the drug problem, a gang of second generation Pakistanis since the older generation did not know what to do.

This is a hugely important contribution to the debate because it describes, at the micro level, how organised crime, standing at the head of street-level drug problems, can directly help create the right conditions for radicalisation and ultimately terrorism to flourish. Courtenay Griffiths QC adds weight to this. He claims that British prison cells have disproportionately high numbers of black African men within, and that very few do not contain a copy of the Qur’an. He goes on to describe how those involved in gangs and gun crime are converting to radical Islam, and that this is a very dangerous mix. These last two areas may represent a ‘crime-terror nexus’ which is not pre-meditated, merely a consequence of circumstances. It suggests, in this dimension at least, a possible causal-consequential relationship. Additionally, it poses these questions: should certain types of crime be engaged as an indicator of radicalisation and terrorism, in addition to other social pre-conditions? And is the growth in gang related violent crime another consequence of social and political conditions which are similar in their roots to terrorism? I discuss these issues further, using data from the research, in Chapters Seven and Eight.

3.1.1 Root Causes of Terrorism: social and political concomitance?

The idea that certain sociological/economic/psychological demographic conditions may constitute an ideal breeding ground for radicalisation and terrorism is attractive in one sense because it implies that remedying those social conditions will mitigate terrorism risk. The problem with this notion is the implication that terrorism – i.e. the use of violence to kill and maim people – is in some way acceptable given the social conditions under which people are living. It also transfers responsibility away from the

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208 Ibid p2
209 Ibid
211 Ibid
terrorist. Both of these are inimical to Western policy makers. This section examines some of the concepts around ‘pre-conditions’ and assesses their relevance and value.

Two key sociological phenomena are often talked about by politicians and others as being linked with terrorism: poverty and educational underachievement.212 Krueger and Maleckova (2003) examined a potential causal connection between education, poverty and terrorism.213 At the outset, they acknowledge that the data is sketchy and possibly non-representative, but they conclude that there is no indication of a connection between poverty and terrorism.214 They arrive at this conclusion following examination of empirical data relating to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. They go further and suggest:

“members of Hezbollah’s militant wing or Palestinian suicide bombers are at least as likely to come from economically advantaged families and have a relatively high level of education as to come from the ranks of the economically disadvantaged and uneducated.”215

These conclusions seem to support evidence of the backgrounds of the nineteen hijackers who committed the 11th September atrocities, who “were neither poor nor uneducated”.216 Similarly, Mohamed Sidique Khan, the apparent ‘ringleader’ of the July 7th bombers was educated to degree level and worked with special needs children and did not appear poor “by the standards of the area”.217 In essence, Krueger and Maleckova are reporting that neither poverty nor educational attainment are pre-conditions of radicalisation and terrorism and actually the reverse may be true. This general point is supported by other writers (e.g. Caplan (2006)218, Gupta (2005)219). However, there are some important considerations that challenge Krueger and Maleckova’s argument. The first is the relevance of their empirical work in the Middle East to the evolution of radicalisation and progression to terrorism in a Western democracy. This is a weakness bluntly exploited by Brynjars and Skolberg (2004):

214 Ibid p121
215 Ibid p141
216 Hippel, KV (2002) op cit p26
“Krueger and Maleckova are right in pointing out that poverty reduction alone is not the only solution to reduce terrorism, but the validity of their research findings has been grossly overstated.”

Three of the four bombers of July 7th grew up in a largely residential area which is densely populated by back to back terraced housing, much of which is in a poor condition; the area is deprived, and average income is low. Ignoring poverty as a potential factor in the vulnerability to radicalisation and subsequent progression to terrorism cannot be entirely supported. Poverty may be relative, and it may apply to factors other than merely money e.g. poverty of opportunity. A second but related point is the effect of social injustice. This consists of several elements (discussed below) and Schmid comes to the issue quickly in his assertion that whilst poverty itself is not a motivator, unemployment amongst relatively highly educated young men might be. If it is accepted that terrorism is a function of political pre-conditions, then the better educated might be the very people who embrace it – particularly if there are other elements of social injustice. It would also be prudent to consider the less tangible issue of perception. Whilst actual measures of inter alia poverty, education, achievement may not provide evidence of motivation, the perception of these issues by key individuals may indeed make them relevant.

Newman (2006) explores root causes of terrorism and uses an empirical method to test a number of social phenomena to determine their link to terrorism. He identifies ‘Permissive Structural Factors’ which include poverty, demography and urbanization, followed by ‘Direct Root Causes’ which include exclusion and social inequality, dispossession, human rights abuse, alienation, humiliation and a clash of values. It is worth dissecting here some of these factors:

**Demography:** ‘Significant demographic conditions include rapid population growth, and especially a burgeoning of young males; and uneven population shifts across different ethnic groups….A related demographic condition that has been associated

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220 Lia, B and Skolberg, K (2004) op cit p31
There are parallels with this position and the growth of Islamic communities in the UK, described in Chapter Two. This growth has been rapid, and continues to grow at great pace. The combined effect of rapid growth of South Asian groups, with the linked growth of Islam has undoubtedly resulted in a shift in the ethnic, religious and social balance of British society. This is amplified further when one considers the intra-religious differences which exist within an apparently homogenous group. This change has occurred in a matter of decades, not centuries. The controversy this causes is never far from the public consciousness, often brought to the fore by politicians and the media.225

Urbanization: ‘Urbanization – especially in conjunction with unemployment and poverty – can generate a disaffected population, which enables terrorist recruitment and organization.’226

Massey (1996) also describes how urbanization and rising income inequality have produced a geographic concentration of affluence and poverty throughout the world, producing a geographic change in the basis of human society.227 He points out that the divide is amplified “when they occur in a group that is also segregated on the basis of an ascribed characteristic such as race.”228 The notion of macro-economic and demographic factors being significant and vital in the consideration of the development of moral indignation, and a desire to respond through terrorism receives support from Ehrlich and Liu (2002), although their focus occurs in the immediate aftermath of the World Trade Centre attack.229 But the argument may equally (more appropriately) apply to inter alia religion, culture, nationality, regimes. Indeed, Wade and Reiter (2007) identify that, though limited, there is a statistically significant interaction

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224 Ibid p752
225 For example, see debate at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/5410472.stm accessed 30 May 2007.
228 Ibid p403
between regime type and the number of religiously distinct minorities at risk from suicide terrorism.\textsuperscript{230} Massey crucially makes the following point in his conclusions:

“…inequality will continue to increase and racial divisions will grow, creating a volatile and unstable political economy. As class tensions rise, urban areas will experience escalating crime and violence punctuated by sporadic riots and increased terrorism.”\textsuperscript{231}

Here, Massey is implying an escalation process which includes urban unrest and terrorism, and he is linking this phenomenon with urbanization and the concentration of affluence and poverty. This is significant and I return to it in a later section of the present chapter. There is evidence of it in the United Kingdom, and the background of Mohammed Sidique Khan and his followers, described above, might be considered as an example.

Newman continues:

\textbf{Exclusion and Social Inequality}: ‘In particular, poverty and inequality, especially when affecting distinct national, religious, cultural and/or ethnic groups – so called horizontal inequalities – is a breeding ground for conflict...A combination of social tensions and heterogeneity can result in social upheaval, extremist politics and civil war’.\textsuperscript{232}

It would seem true to say that cultural tension and unrest still exists in the UK. A number of high profile incidents bear testimony to this (for example, riots in Bradford and Oldham, 2001, described in seminal event 4, Chapter Two). Social tensions bubble to the surface – Jack Straw, leader of the House of Commons said the veil worn by some Islamic women is “a visible statement of separation and difference.”\textsuperscript{233}

\textsuperscript{231} Massey, DS (1996) op cit p 410
\textsuperscript{232} Newman, E (2006) op cit p752
\textsuperscript{233} ‘Straw’s veil comments spark anger’ \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/5410472.stm} accessed 7/5/07
Dispossession, Human Rights Abuse, Alienation and Humiliation: ‘Physical dispossession and the perception of a denial of rightful resources or territory is a common thread to certain types of terrorism. A similar perception can be harboured among groups that believe that a particular political or social order denies their rights, be they social, linguistic, cultural, or ideological.’

Newman quotes other authors who describe a “burning sense of injustice and depression”, with an asymmetric balance of power of this nature likely to result in an asymmetric response. This terminology has resonance with Tupman and O’Reilly’s articulation of an asymmetric warfare (terrorist) response to American military supremacy.

Newman’s discussion continues with ‘sound bites’ from other writers: “Terrorist leaders seek support from people who feel humiliated, threatened, aggrieved and without help” and “Terrorism is thus often linked to a sense of injustice and impotence rather than sheer poverty.” In examining these ‘root causes’, Newman correctly points out that there are many cases of terrorism where none of them apply, and that the academic study of terrorism is analytically barren whilst being descriptively rich. Accordingly, he attempts to apply an empirical approach by first examining any relationship between frequency of terrorist incidents and the socioeconomic conditions in the societies where it occurs. He also looks at terrorist organisations and the societies from which they emerge. The paper concludes that analyzing a wide range of samples is not conducive to generalized conclusions regarding the relationship between social conditions and terrorism. Newman’s analysis is interesting, and his review of other literature provides a useful overview of the type and nature of social conditions which may have some form of relationship with terrorism. It is also valuable in terms of attempting to establish an empirical basis for such a relationship. However, it is flawed in its generality, a point which Newman himself acknowledges. Whilst his proposed model, which relates permissive conditions, direct grievances and catalytic causes is attractive, the empirical findings are not able to support it as a direct result of their generality. He usefully identifies that the findings have implications for counterterrorism and further

235 Ibid
236 Tupman, W and O’Reilly, C (2004) op cit p2
238 Ibid
239 Ibid p755
240 Ibid p79
academic scholarship which firmly establishes the need and context for my own research.

The notion that socio-economic factors may provide some basis for terrorism does not find favour amongst all writers. Jervis (2002) states:

“To see the absence of liberal arrangements as the root causes of terrorism is even more perverse. Tolerance for diversity, respect for human rights as the West defines them, free and diverse mass media, vigorous political competition, and equality for women is not the vision of the good society held by the terrorists and their supporters. The very notion of elevating the rights of individuals and the ability to choose one’s way of life is anathema to them.” 241

But I would contest that this is an over-simplification of the issue since it does not delineate ‘leaders’, ‘followers’, those radicalised without a developed understanding of what the intentions of leaders and terrorist organisations actually are and it tends to impose an ‘our system is obviously better than yours’ ideology. There is further evidence of this later in the article:

“More reasonable is the argument that the root causes of much terrorism lie in the intolerance and hatred preached in many mosques and taught in madrases, often supported by Saudi money.” 242

This stance may be partially explained by virtue of the fact that the paper is American in origin, and was written when the wound caused by September 11 was still very raw.

In any case, it moves the discussion towards ‘precipitant factors’. Crenshaw (1981) sets the tenor of the discussion for the next 25 years. She identifies the idea of pre-conditions – those factors which set the stage for terrorism in the long run, and precipitants – specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism. 243

She introduces a number of important concepts, providing the foundation for much of

242 Ibid p45
243 Crenshaw (1981) op cit p381
the subsequent discussion and analysis by other authors. Firstly, the so-called permissive factor of social facilitation:

“This concept refers to social habits and historical conditions that sanction the use of violence against the Government, making it morally and politically justifiable, and even dictating an appropriate form, such as demonstrations, coups, or terrorism.”

This quote goes to the heart of the question of legitimacy, discussed earlier, and links terrorism with other forms of ‘social protest’. This is analysed in further detail in the third section of the present chapter. Crenshaw goes on to identify three ‘direct causes of terrorism’, looking particularly at ‘background conditions’, the first of which is the existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable sub-group of a larger population. In this situation, a broad social movement develops, the extremist faction of which might resort to terrorism. The second condition is the lack of opportunity for political participation. Regimes that deny access to power and persecute dissenters create dissatisfaction. And finally, the notion of a precipitating event, which might include Government use of unexpected or unusual force, be it in the domestic or the foreign arena. These ideas of pre-conditions and precipitating events find favour with a number of other authors, although they may ‘tamper’ with the specifics. For instance, Ross (1993) identifies ten structural causes of terrorism. The first three are ‘permissive causes’: Geographical Location, Type of Political System and Level of Modernization. The next seven are: Social, Cultural and Historical Facilitation, Organizational Split and Development, Presence of Other Forms of Unrest, Support, Counterterrorist Organization Failure, Availability of Weapons and Explosives, and Grievances.

Bjorgo (2005) provides a list of conclusions at the end of a collection of papers written by several notable authors in the field. His conclusions are highly significant because

244 Ibid p382
245 Ibid p383
246 Ibid
they pull together much of the preceding work – and again, there are clear links with Crenshaw’s paper. Significant conclusions are:

‘Lack of democracy, civil liberties and the rule of law is a precondition for many forms of terrorism.

Hegemony and inequality of power – where local or international powers possess an overwhelming power compared to oppositional groups, asymmetric warfare can represent a tempting option.

The experience of discrimination on the basis of ethnic or religious origin is the chief root cause of ethno-nationalist terrorism – those groups fighting to establish a new order.

Failure or unwillingness by the state to integrate dissident groups or emerging social classes may lead to their alienation from the political system. Large groups of highly educated young people with few prospects of a meaningful career will tend to feel alienated and frustrated. Excluded groups are likely to search for alternative channels through which to express and promote political influence and change. To some, terrorism can seem the most effective and tempting option.

The experience of social injustice is a main motivating cause behind social-revolutionary terrorism (acts perpetrated by groups seeking to overthrow the capitalist economic and social order [might we add ‘infidels’?])

The presence of charismatic ideological leaders able to transform widespread grievances and frustrations into a political agenda for violent struggle is a decisive factor behind the emergence of a terrorist movement or group. The existence of grievances alone is only a precondition: someone is needed who can translate that into a programme for violent action. [Significant figures, such as Abu Hamza, have featured prominently in the public eye.]

Triggering events are the direct precipitators of terrorist acts. Such a trigger can be an outrageous act committed by the enemy, lost wars, massacres, contested elections, police brutality.

These conclusions are highly relevant. Not only do they intuitively ‘feel’ right – but they concentrate much preceding work into a cogent whole. They also provide a direct link with other types of social disorder, and some of the ‘root causes’ so identified are remarkably similar. Social injustice and a lack of cohesion in British society cannot be ignored: Tony Blair’s strategy said:

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249 The Times, ‘Suicide bombing is a legitimate tactic, Abu Hamza tells court’ January 21 2006 p27
250 Bjorgo, T (2005) op cit pp258-260
“There is concern about particular groups, e.g. Afro-Caribbean boys. More recently, there has been concern about Pakistani youths, who suffer disproportionately high unemployment, feel increasingly discriminated against, and disconnected from their parents.”

This then, provides the basis upon which to move forwards. We can identify the existence of pre-conditions, such as social injustice, discrimination, alienation from the political system, a lack of perceived democracy, and precipitators - trigger events like military intervention in Afghanistan, or police raids such as Forest Gate, which may provide us with a warning that an act of terrorism might follow.

One further quotation from Bjorgo (2005) sets the context and demonstrates the need for the current research project:

“The notion of ‘addressing the root causes of terrorism’ may become a dead end if by ‘root’ we mean the distant and general issues such as poverty, globalization and modernization that are far removed from the actual acts of terrorism and extremely difficult to change. The approach is far more promising if we focus on the more immediate causes and circumstances that motivate and facilitate specific campaigns and acts of terrorism. Future research and efforts should move in this direction.”

3.2 Radicalisation: why so dirty?

‘Radicalisation’ is an oft quoted term in the media and political world, especially post 9/11 and more recently 7/7, and tends to be used synonymously with the term ‘terrorism’. This treatment of ‘radicalisation’ militates against a full understanding of what it means. Other terms, like ‘fundamentalist’, ‘extremist’, ‘violent jihad’ creep into common parlance and tend to be used interchangeably.

Keddie (1998) considers terminological issues, and provides a helpful and much more generalised and neutral term: ‘New Religious Politics’, shortening it to ‘religiopolitics’, or NRP. This is useful because it demonstrates that there are principles under discussion, not merely the impact of Islam. In fact, Keddie herself identifies that: “The

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251 The Sunday Times, ‘Secret memo warns Blair of crime wave’ December 24 2006 p1
252 Bjorgo, T (2005) op cit p262
253 E.g. Pakistan Times ‘Pakistan, Britain pursuing strategic partnership to address Radicalisation’ from http://pakistantimes.net/2006/11/20/top2.htm accessed 24/6/07
term does not cover all recent religiopolitical movements but can be applied when movements exhibit certain specific features.”255 Such features include a reinterpreted religious tradition seen as solving problems exacerbated by various forms of secular, communal, or foreign power.256 She goes on to identify a series of trends which have favoured the rise in religiopolitics: first, recent expansive developments in capitalism which are uneven by region, class, race and gender; second, economic slowdowns, stagnation and insecurity in the developed world; third, increasing migration – urbanizing and international migrants experience prejudice, which can encourage counter-ideologies; fourth, greater choice for women in lifestyle, jobs, marriage and motherhood, leading to disputed challenges to male prerogatives; fifth, the continued growth in secular state power; sixth, education and urban growth allow many people [though it is probably uneven] to express discontent more effectively; seventh, global cultural homogenization brings reactions based on identity politics, including nationalism and religiopolitics because they are seen as expressing needs better than the current secular order; and eighth, increases in population which skewers towards very young age groups, groups that are the main supporters of religiopolitical movements.257 These general trends are important since they introduce a set of global imperatives which provide context to the following analysis of local (sub-national) manifestations.

In their Research Proposal ‘The Radicalisation of Young Muslims in Britain: Understanding the Roots of the Problem’, Al-Alami and Krishnan (2007) discuss the reasons why Islam, a peaceful religion, is such a serious threat to the West.258 They correctly identify that the problem does not lie with Islam itself, rather with the fundamentalist interpretation of it, an interpretation which sees Islam as politically incompatible with the West.259 Thus begins the debate around the politicisation of Islam. They argue, again correctly, that fundamentalism is not a new phenomenon, and at times of crisis, people tend to turn to the foundations of their religion and more radical ideas become appealing to the masses.260 This does not necessarily imply terrorism, or even progression to terrorism – merely ‘followers’ finding succour at a time of perceived threat. In relation to Islam, Al-Alami and Krishnan identify that the

255 Ibid p697
256 Ibid
257 Ibid pp699-700
259 Ibid p5
260 Ibid
Iranian Revolution of 1979 brought an Islamic fundamentalist regime into power, propagating Islam as an alternative model to the Western secularism: Islam is like no other religion - it provides a structure for a complete social system.\textsuperscript{261} This point is highly relevant because it begins to crystallize the reason behind Islam lending itself to exploitation:

\begin{quote}
\textquoteleft\textquoteleft in the United Kingdom, there are more than 1.6 million Muslims living among a population of just 60 million. Their radicalisation through fundamentalist ideologies, which are spread by Islamic states, organisations and certain individuals, poses a great threat to the West, as these ideologies encourage Muslims to reject integration and to take part in a general jihad against the West and the Western concept of a liberal society.\textquoteright\textquoteright\textsuperscript{262}
\end{quote}

The questions then, are these: what type of ‘threat’ would persuade an individual or a community to resort to fundamentalist ideas regarding their religion?

Here I provide the experience of a female called ‘Amy’, who describes a process of ‘radicalisation’.\textsuperscript{263} She presents her experience as being multi-factorial. Firstly, there was her own psychological disposition – she wanted to be someone; she was idealistic in the sense that she wanted the world to be better, and religion was important. She came from a social/family environment which was strict and authoritarian, and she was rebelling against her father. She perceived a lack of answers in society, and was disillusioned with mainstream politics and religion. Partly as a result of these factors, she felt a pull from the movement – an anti-capitalist ideology, coupled with the opportunity to do something. Once in the group, she felt a womb-like protection; spiritual practices like studying and certain other rituals engendered a sense of belonging. There was a father-figure who she believed to be infallible, with a direct ‘hotline’ to God, and so began the development of an ideology such that the ends justified the means, and any form of questioning was seen as dishonesty. The hierarchical authority contributed to the desire to conform, to prove herself and achieve promotion. A strong sense of identity occurred, with powerful group loyalty, putting the

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{261}{Ibid p6}
\footnotetext{262}{Ibid}
\footnotetext{263}{‘Amy’ presented at a seminar held to examine cults at New Scotland Yard, Metropolitan Police HQ, London, on 7 June 2006.}
\end{footnotes}
group interests above those of the individual, and resulting in detachment from family and the wider world, bringing about even greater dependence on the group.

Although Amy’s experience is just one example, it helpfully illustrates in a real sense the types of drivers that have a role in compelling an individual along a given route. Aspects of the group dynamic, such as the sense of belonging and the overriding interest being the group rather than the individual might be seen in other, more legitimate circumstances, where it is deliberately cultivated. Such examples might include Special Forces regiments. Occasionally it might occur in less legitimate circumstances but within the setting of respected agencies: Sir Robert Mark’s battle for control of the CID, for example.  

In the ‘Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005’, radicalisation is loosely examined in Annex B. It suggests that there is no consistent profile to identify who may be vulnerable to radicalisation but there are a number of factors which may contribute. These include attendance at a Mosque linked to ‘extremists’ who may be there intent on identifying potential candidates for radicalisation and a personal mentor who may ‘groom’ individuals in small groups until they feed off each other’s radicalisation. This grooming is part of the journey – initially group conversation about being a good Muslim and then moving towards propaganda about injustices to Muslims across the world, and identifying parts of the Qur’an which mentors would claim was religious justification for violent jihad. There is little evidence of coercion, more a reliance on the development of individual commitment, group bonding and solidarity. This group identity has resonance with the group commitment Merari (2005) identifies in his discussion of suicide terrorism.

The document is not a scholarly study of the concept, and it fails correctly to grasp the notion of radicalisation – either of its true meaning or indeed of its roots. Instead, it prefers to identify ‘spiritual leaders’ and meeting places. Clearly, a lot has to happen, or pre-exist, before a person arrives at the point where they adopt a radical or fundamentalist ideology.

266 Ibid p32
267 Ibid
The idea of young men and women, teenagers and those in their early twenties, returning to the fundamentals of the belief system of their parents and relatives, or even undergoing a conversion, might be attractive to those same parents and relatives. Since Islam provides a moral and social framework by which to live one’s life, there might be some perceived comfort in seeing one’s children apparently fully embracing the teachings of the Qur’an and regularly attending prayer meetings. This begs the question when did ‘radicalisation’ become a dirty word? Cummings (2006) argues that what the Government maligns as radicalisation is in fact politicisation, and goes on to assert that young Muslims taking an interest in global politics and getting engaged in non-violent discussion and campaigning is a good thing. Who could disagree? The point is the conflation of radicalisation and terrorism, often pedalled by the media. It is argued here that they are not the same thing; they are in fact separate and discrete points on a ladder of escalation. Although not a necessity, there is a gradational aspect, such that a person generally undergoes some sort of ‘radicalisation journey’ prior to engaging in acts of terrorism, especially suicide terrorism. This implies that radicalisation and terrorism have some common roots. The ladder of escalation is examined more closely in section 3.5, below. The question of whether or not radicalisation per se can be considered as a threat remains problematic, and for this reason we should think in terms of ‘harmful radicalisation’. In general, this thesis will consider the term ‘radicalisation’ to be ‘harmful’ where it is inimical to the cohesiveness of communities, whether through violence, or the intent of violence, or indeed for other nefarious purposes. This draws the distinction between ‘radical’ and ‘fundamental’ or ‘extremist’.

The idea that more senior family members tacitly support their offspring as they choose to become more immersed in the teachings of the Qur’an, attending prayer meetings with much closer observance of Islam is to oversimplify the issue. Conflict within Muslim communities, disagreement between generations and anxiety over identity are all significant contributors to the debate. This is examined and well argued by Shiv Malik. Here, it is identified that the division occurs because parents attitudes to dress, jobs, schooling and socialising all act to drive youngsters away from their parent’s generation. This article also makes an important link with urban unrest, demonstrating

270 For example The Independent on Sunday 13 November 2006 ‘Islamic leaders urged to combat radicalisation’ from http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/this_britain/article1963612.ece accessed 24/6/07
271 Malik, S (2007) op cit
that approximately thirty years after the establishment of an ethnic minority community, there are riots, using the African-Caribbean immigration of the 1950s and the riots of the 1980s, and the Pakistani immigration of the 1970s with the riots on Oldham and Burnley in 2001 as examples.\textsuperscript{272} The reason for this, argues Malik, is that it takes roughly three decades for a community to become frustrated with its status within its own community and the wider society – the frustration arises in part from a question of identity. Whose culture and values do you affiliate with? Your friends or your family? Your country or your community? This identity problem is capable of exploitation, making individuals and groups vulnerable to radical Islamic movements.\textsuperscript{273}

Al-Alami and Krishnan (2007) present three possible explanations regarding the attraction of Islamic fundamentalism to Muslims living in Western societies.\textsuperscript{274} These are: (1) Islamic civilianization has failed to adapt to modernity and is still in terminal decline. Fundamentalism becomes attractive to people because it promises a revival of Islam’s glorious past (the myth of a ‘Golden Age’). The relative weakness of Islamic states enables the West to be identified as an outside enemy and thus developing political cohesion amongst Muslim states and communities around the world. (2) Political and economic marginalisation and their failure to integrate in Western society. Here they discuss the controversial point that Muslims in the West are radicalised because they have fewer opportunities that Westerners in terms of education and job prospects. The issue of whether lack of opportunity is important in this debate is discussed elsewhere in this chapter, and is far from clear. However, identification with Muslims in other countries who may be perceived as having fewer opportunities whilst being oppressed may play a part. The argument is that at the same time as being disadvantaged, Muslims in the West feel excluded from the political process, thereby being susceptible to an ideology that promises a solution to their personal situation. (3) European societies have become a “hothouse of terrorism” because of ideological subversion through fundamentalist states and groups. Here, they argue that the main cause of radicalisation is identified as outside ideological subversion. Immigration is then crucial for supplying terrorists and ideologues, who can spread radical ideas. The openness and liberties of Western democracies make them particularly vulnerable to ideological attacks against which the West has no counter-ideologies to offer; ideologues can advocate jihad against the West more or less openly.

\textsuperscript{272} Ibid p6
\textsuperscript{273} Ibid
\textsuperscript{274} Al-Alami, M and Krishnan, A (2007) op cit p12-13
The politicisation of Islam, and the manner in which it can be used to great effect was intelligently dissected in an article by Euben (2002). This was written before 9/11 and assumed some poignancy at the time of publication, post 9/11. The essay examines the subject of jihad, and endeavours to demonstrate that, according to Islamist understandings of jihad, violence is a legitimate expression of political action; it is in fact but one category of action on a continuum of what is ‘an intrinsically legitimate and existentially significant struggle.’ If politics is said to end where violence begins because killing for politics entails, in essence, killing for politics itself, Euben (2002) points out that the roots of democracy are firmly based in violent and bloody uprising. Whilst this stance is neither apologia nor indictment, the examination of jihad in this way is crucial and a significant contribution to the argument since it aids an understanding of motivation. It is all the more important because it is largely unbiased by highly emotive events such as 9/11 and 7/7, written as it was prior to these incidents.

In summary, the notion of radicalisation, and indeed the use of the word in the popular media at least, are conflated with ‘terrorism’, and are used to indicate menacing and threatening behaviour. But I argue that this treatment is shallow, and that a deeper examination of the phenomenon, especially with respect to the role played by Islam, will bring forward relevant and fruitful debate. The critical time in a person’s life when they are searching for an identity, to ‘be someone’ as Amy puts it, is a vital consideration, and the positive opportunities provided in some circumstances for a form of radicalisation are significant. As one Muslim respondent put it to me:

“What it is, Islam is so powerful. Once somebody studies Islam, it’s a powerful religion. It’s so powerful, how can I describe this, it’s a way of life and people say this is it, this is what I’ve been looking for.”

This need not be a negative experience. But the rest of the quote demonstrates how it might be, and summarises the thrust of the current section:

“What if a new guy, who doesn’t know anything about Islam, OK, and if an extreme guy gets hold of him, then I describe him as clay, he can mould him in any form he

276 Ibid p26
277 Ibid
278 C0028
wants to take. It’s like a clay because you’re new. Whatever information I will give you, I will only give you the information I want to give you, not, I don’t want to give you the version of the Qur’an that the prophet say because I have got a different agenda, so he’s more vulnerable here it’s true, he’s more vulnerable, and the ones that are more vulnerable are the Muslim youth who are on this Jihad, no knowledge of Islam, therefore vulnerable, because, you know, they need that gang culture, that violent culture, and suddenly someone comes over and says look what’s happening in Palestine, look what’s happening in Afghanistan, let’s do something about it, and they say he likes fighting, do you understand what I’m saying? What do we do? You’ve done nothing all your life, let’s go, let’s do something.”  

In Chapter One, section 1.0, I introduce a definition of radicalisation which I rely on here, and which takes into account much of the foregoing discussion:

“The phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism” (EC, 2006). Radicalisation is a gradual process that, although it can occur very rapidly, has no specifically defined beginning or end state. Rather, radicalisation is an individual development that is initiated by a unique combination of causal factors and that comprises a drastic change in attitudes and behaviour.”

3.2.1 The Radicalisation Journey: social conditions or ideology?

As already touched upon, since the 7 July 2005, the British Government, UK security services and the European Union have taken a very keen interest in radicalisation. It has been closely examined by policy makers as a phenomenon, and a number of ‘root causes’ identified, with the idea of intervention. The following is an extract from the EU strategy for countering radicalisation:

“There is a range of conditions in society which may create an environment in which people can more easily be radicalised. Such factors do not necessarily lead to radicalisation, but may make the radical message more appealing both to those who suffer them and those who identify with their suffering. These conditions may include poor or autocratic governance; states moving from autocratic control via inadequate reform to partial democracy; rapid but unmanaged modernisation; and lack of political and economic prospects, unresolved international and domestic strife; and inadequate education or cultural opportunities for young people.”

MI5, the British Security Service goes further, identifying causes and factors such as the development of a sense of grievance and injustice, the process of globalisation, virulent

279 C0028 op cit
281 ‘The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism’ (November 2005) 14781/1/05 REV 1 Brussels: Council of the European Union p4
anti-Westernism, specific events such as military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, a sense of personal alienation or community disadvantage arising from socio-economic factors such as discrimination, social exclusion, and a lack of opportunity. Other factors identified by MI5 include group identification with those who are perceived as less privileged, the exposure to ‘radical’ ideas, perhaps through a forceful or inspiring figure, peers and contacts, or, less often, through radical literature or websites.

The subject of countering the radicalisation threat and developing intervention strategies or ideas is not restricted to policy makers. Cozzens (2006) develops the theme of Islamic ideological differences by looking specifically at Salafi-Jihadi ideology. His paper introduces a ‘continuum’ of Salafi-Jihadi radicalisation, a system spanning from an individual’s initial embrace of the Salafi-Jihadi world view to the commission of violence and its subsequent legitimisation. This might also be seen as the leap from ‘radicalisation’ to ‘harmful radicalisation’, discussed above. The intention is to identify opportunities on the continuum for intervention. The paper has potential to be controversial and divisive since not all Salafi Muslims can be considered as interested in violent jihad – and to potentially suggest that this is the case might be considered offensive and rather counter-productive. The author acknowledges this point by identifying the primary difference between Salafi-Jihadists and reformist Salafis being the disavowal of violent revolution against the government under which they live.

Examining an ideology in this way is an important link in the chain of understanding, and controversy should be welcomed. Cozzens notes an important caveat: that ideology cannot by itself satisfactorily explain jihadi violence; research has demonstrated that it works in tandem with social processes and other grievances to create militants. It is these social processes and other grievances with which this research is primarily concerned.

In a research package financed as part of a project by the European Commission under the Sixth Framework Programme, a report entitled ‘Causal Factors of Radicalisation’

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283 Ibid
284 Ibid pii
285 Ibid p26
286 Ibid p4
examines causal factors,\textsuperscript{288} and presents a theoretical heuristic framework of these factors, reproduced in Figure 3, below. It is argued that at the centre of the spectrum is positioned the individual, whilst the outside layer, the external factors, constrains people’s environment such that individuals only have a minor influence on it. It is further argued that:

“A complex interaction between factors at the various levels is likely to be crucial for the intensity of the readiness for radicalisation. Social factors play an important intervening role in the relation between external factors and radicalisation. For example, stigmatisation of Islam in the media, an external cultural factor, is likely to impose a stronger radicalising force on Muslims than on non-Muslims.”\textsuperscript{289}

This model makes an interesting comparison with a similar heuristic model in relation to crime, presented and discussed in section 6.1.3 of Chapter Six.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure3.png}
\caption{Heuristic model of causes of radicalisation\textsuperscript{290}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{288} ‘Causal factors of radicalisation’ 1 April 2008, Work Package 4, Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law, from \url{www.transnationalterrorism.eu} accessed 20/12/10
\textsuperscript{289} Ibid p11
\textsuperscript{290} Ibid p10
Choudhury (2007) identifies five key points which emerge from the literature on radicalisation and identity. These are:

(i) The path to radicalisation often involves a search for identity at a moment of crisis. There is a ‘cognitive opening’, a moment when previous explanations and belief systems are found to be inadequate in explaining a person’s experience.

(ii) Underlying the identity crisis is a sense of not being accepted or belonging to society. This is intensified by experiences of discrimination and racism, a sense of blocked social mobility and a lack of confidence in the British political system.

(iii) As part of the re-evaluation of their identity, individuals seek to construct a sense of what it means to be a Muslim in Britain today. The appeal of radical groups reflects, in part, the failure of traditional religious institutions to connect with young people.

(iv) A lack of religious literacy and education appears to be a common feature among those that are drawn to extremist groups. The most vulnerable are those who are religious novices exploring their faith for the first time since they are not in a position to objectively evaluate whether the radical group represents an accurate understanding of Islam. [This is probably also true in relation to politics - Islamic politics as well as British domestic and foreign politics.]

(v) The second generation have grown up in the UK long enough that their parents’ version of Islam seems distant and irrelevant but there has been insufficient time for a home grown religious leadership to develop.

Within these five points and the foregoing corpus of literature, we can tease out themes which are in common with other roots of ‘social protest’. We can delineate the existence of several social preconditions which may make groups or individuals
vulnerable to radicalisation. These include a sense of isolation, a lack of social identity, a lack of confidence in the political system, a lack of economic prospects, perceptions of blocked social mobility, all amplified by experiences of discrimination and racism.

The following section of the present chapter examines the literature on the ‘root causes’ of urban unrest, with particular reference to the riots in the inner cities of the UK during the 1980s. The Oldham riot of 2001 is also discussed.

3.3 Urban Unrest: legitimate violence?

“Students of collective action have given great attention to the sources, processes, and consequences of changing repertoires of collective action across space and time. One important focus of this scholarship has been the integral role of interaction between protesters and the police.”

To a great extent, the above quote sets out the position with regards to the study of urban unrest. Major conflict during the twentieth century, both in the USA and the UK, spawned an enormous plethora of writings, research and policy development. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to dissect and examine all aspects of the corpus of literature; however key parts are examined, particularly in relation to urban disorder since 1980 in the United Kingdom. This section of the present chapter sets out to identify what ‘root causes’ of urban disorder might be isolated.

Kratcoski, Verma and Das (2001) helpfully examine what it is that constitutes ‘public disorder’, making the point that, in a broad sense, it is a disturbance of public order – but the types of behaviour threatening public order will vary depending upon the political and social conditions of the society in question. ‘Riot’ is a word which tends to be used as shorthand for urban unrest, but will mean different things to different people and governments. It has also varied over time. Currently, in the United Kingdom, ‘riot’ is defined in the Public Order Act 1986, section 1:

“Where 12 or more persons who are present together use or threaten unlawful violence for a common purpose and the conduct of them (taken together) is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his

personal safety, each of the persons using unlawful violence for the common purpose is guilty of riot.”

Although it is useful to have such a definition, police institutions might be reluctant to recognise any given event as a riot because the relevant Police Authority, under the provisions of the Riot (Damages) Act 1886, will then be responsible for some of the costs of the damage, irrespective of any negligence on the part of the police. This begins to illuminate the link between urban unrest and policing.

Kettle and Hodges (1982) describe Britain’s riotous history in their introduction, even taking some ‘nice irony’ in the fact that the Peasant Revolt was almost 600 years before the very day in which the riots in Toxteth set in motion the most widespread phase of the 1981 riots.295 They point out that throughout British history, “powerless people feeling themselves oppressed and seeing no effective response to their grievances, have despaired of any improvement, formed themselves into crowds and physically challenged the world that seemed to deny them what they wanted.”296 This sets the tenor for the analysis of riot and unrest which follows.

Reiner (1998) presents evidence that the link between urban unrest and law enforcement reaches back to the beginnings of organised policing, with some commentators suggesting that it was riot and disorder which precipitated the development of the police, not the need to respond to crime.297 This is a theme which is picked up and recognised by a number of other writers. McPhail et al (1998) point out that the important focus for students of collective violence is the integral role of interaction between police and protesters, since the actions of each modify the environments of the other.298 The stance taken by some of these ideas is fraught with risk. To identify policing and police methods as a cause of a riot is to miss the point as to why people are rebelling. Waddington (1992) recognises this when he discusses the frustration-aggression hypothesis: “rioters ‘take-out’ their frustration on a local target of

296 Ibid
aggression, such as the police or symbols of the establishment”. Lord Scarman also realised it in his report into the Brixton disorders of 1981, where he first described social conditions, and then made the following point:

“...it takes little, or nothing, to persuade them [young black people] that the police, representing an establishment which they see as insensitive to their plight, are their enemies.”

Occasionally, the role of the police in urban disorder begins to be taken as given, illustrating a second point of risk: if the police are in some way responsible for riots, then ‘fixing’ the police will mitigate the risk of unrest. Mervyn Jones and Winkler (1982) address this by examining the oft quoted ‘the police have lost contact with communities’, and conduct research to establish the degree to which foot patrol actually occurs in a given police force. Although they state that they have not taken a stand on any suggested causal relationship between the mechanised reactive style of policing and the cause of riots, actually, there is a strong implication in the paper as a whole that this is the case: that policing style is responsible for riots and that foot patrol is the panacea. Joyce (1992) supports this position and states ‘a considerable volume of literature has cited police practices as a prime cause [my emphasis] of public disorder.’ But the paper does not identify any of the literature. Moreover, he states:

“The view advanced is that public disorder since 1980 has been primarily caused by young people who feel they have little stake in society as it is currently constituted.”

Young people may have been the main protagonists, but can they realistically be considered as the cause? Cain and Sadigh (1982) take a different view, pointing out that “it is necessary first of all to scotch the myth of the ‘traditional’ ‘bobby on the beat’”, arguing that there is historical evidence demonstrating that, before the 1964 act,

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302 Ibid p112
304 Ibid p246
police officers in towns and cities were “divorced from the population policed”. Interestingly, Clutterbuck (1973) charts the history of protest in Britain, and points out that, despite some major sociological changes, not one person was killed taking part in political demonstrations between 1919 and 1972. He later states that “the biggest single contribution to keeping protest peaceful is the existence of an unarmed police force.”

Thus, policing methods, and police interaction with communities and protesters is of considerable importance, but as a cause of a riot, the evidence does not stand up. The role of the police, and the unique position which they occupy, is summed up by Kettle and Hodges (1982) with a quote from the Drummet enquiry into the Southall riots:

“Those who belong to racial minorities and face repeated public and private expressions of hostility need some rock to cling to, some social institution they can trust to operate impartially, if they are not to be reduced to despair. Of all institutions, those whose impartial operation it is most important to maintain are the police and the law courts. Deprive people of the sense that they enjoy the protection of the law and of the agencies that enforce and administer it, and you destroy their whole feeling of security and any sense that they might otherwise have preserved that they are part of the society within which they live.”

The Brixton disorders, examined in Chapter Two, took place in April 1981. In July of that year, there was an explosion of rioting which began in Southall, then Toxteth and then in many other parts of the country. Kettle and Hodges (1982) examine these in some detail, and make the point that there were important differences in the circumstances which sparked off the violence. For instance, Southall began as a fight between Asians and white skinheads; in Toxteth, where police-community relations were in a state of crisis, blacks and whites took part. But whatever the actual point of ignition, the riots “overwhelmingly broke out in multi-racial inner-city areas where black people share the poverty of whites – only much more acutely.” On 25th May 2001, a serious race riot broke out in Oldham, Lancashire. This riot, twenty years after

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307 Ibid p24
308 Ibid ch 6
309 Ibid
310 Ibid p155-156
the disorders of the 1980s, begins to point towards a failure of UK policy, including aspects of policing, to learn the lessons of two decades earlier. Ahmed et al (2001) made the following comments:

“The riots have revealed the extent of antagonism and polarisation between ethnic minority and white communities in the town, and indeed across the United Kingdom. In particular, they highlight the grave level of discontent felt within the ethnic minority Muslim community. The Oldham riots are a manifestation of deep and long-standing social problems related to racism and deprivation within communities of all ethnic backgrounds…” 312

The authors interviewed locals in Oldham to give a voice to alienated Muslim youth, seeking to understand their perceptions. They came up with five broad categories:

“(1) The Muslim youth face complete alienation from social and political processes due to deprivation and discrimination.

(2) The local police have persistently pursued highly discriminatory policies against the ethnic and religious minorities of Oldham.

(3) Various institutions including the police and the media provoked the disturbances through highly sensitive and inherently discriminatory practice in May 2001.

(4) The far-right has developed and exploited Islamophobic sentiment.

(5) Muslim youth concerns have been deliberately excluded by various authorities, from all relevant discussions about local problems both historically and in the wake of disturbances.” 313

This paper clearly articulates deprivation and discrimination as issues which contribute to alienation from social and political processes. This begins to confirm the idea of disenfranchised groups reacting violently to perceived grievances. Deprivation also begins to occur as a theme. Ray and Smith (2004) make a scholarly and conceptually sound analysis of the Oldham disorders. 314 Their examination makes a hugely important contribution to the argument. They agree with Ahmed et al (2001) that “the perpetrators of the Oldham conflicts came from some of the most deprived areas of England”, 315 and

313 Ibid p2
315 Ibid p682
they identify four underlying structural conditions giving rise to racial segregation. These are systematic disadvantage – many members of ethnic minorities can only afford cheaper housing; higher unemployment than in the majority community, especially in Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities; cultural cohesion and choice among ethnic minority communities and discrimination in council housing allocation. This work begins to de-lineate several pre-conditions: discrimination, deprivation and unemployment. The paper illustrates that there are no simple explanations for all riots, and that a heady mix of pre-conditions need to exist. This paper is re-visited in Chapter Five. Neither Ahmed (2001) nor Ray and Smith (2004) address the issue of the effect of Islam on segregation and material deprivation. Macey (2002), confronts this issue head on, and bases her arguments on work conducted in and around Bradford following the riots in 1995 and 2001. The structural location of Muslims in the UK has already been discussed, and some explanation offered. Macey argues that the materially deprived, high areas of unemployment and poverty are associated with higher crime levels, and it might be suggested that Islamic doctrine has a part to play. Moreover, she suggests that the prohibition on mortgages as usury and the cultural tradition of the extended family go some way towards explaining housing disadvantages, has a consequence in terms of ethnic segregation, and also results in Muslims buying cheaper more affordable housing; educational underachievement might be a function of very tired young Muslim males who have spent long hours in the Mosque learning Arabic and sections of the Qur’an, and then spending lengthy periods in Pakistan. In a similar manner, Islamic definitions of gender roles pre-disposes females to focus on family and the home, and may even lead to the permanent removal of Muslim girls from school. This means that they have very little access to employment and, coupled with a Muslim preference for large families, contributes to familial poverty. These cultural idioms remain undiluted by British society because of the preponderance of intercontinental marriages between British and Pakistani partners. This has the effect of a constant intake of residents to a community who have little or no access to English, and results in the tendency for a highly traditional form of Islam from rural Pakistan to replicate in UK urban environments.

316 Ibid p690
318 Ibid p40
319 Ibid
320 Ibid p41
Macey concludes with the following sentiment:

“Policy-makers, at both the national and local state levels, need to acknowledge that incidents of ‘rioting’ and public affray are not simply a response to deprivation, marginalisation and white racism, but are the result of complex inter-sections and interaction between a large number of variables, some of them specifically related to cultural interpretations of Islam.” 321

She is equally as firm in an earlier article, prior to the unrest in 2001.322 By way of justification, she argues here that other residents in the area, who share the same material deprivation, did not resort to violence, and therefore material deprivation does not in itself constitute an explanation for public disorder.323 Of course this is flawed – it is tantamount to suggesting, for example, that higher rates of promiscuity amongst gay men mean that all gay men are promiscuous. The correct position to adopt is not that material deprivation constitutes an explanation for public disorder and tension; rather it contributes to the requisite conditions. Macey’s arguments regarding the role of Islam are highly important:

“Whether this type of Islam is theologically legitimate is irrelevant: as long as men use Islam to justify violence, religion must be considered a significant variable in its analysis.”324

This is a significant argument and one which cannot be ignored, even if it has the potential for accusations of Islamophobia. Data relating to this issue is presented in section 7.7.3 of Chapter Seven, and I further discuss it in section 8.2.1.3, Chapter Eight with respect to its links to social identity.

What is especially interesting about the Oldham example is the role of the media, and how representations and perceptions presented by the media began to mould police activity. This, coupled with far right intervention, built fear into minority communities. These factors are why riots did not occur in neighbouring Rochdale, which was demographically similar, and suffered from similar deprivation. Racist crime, political

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321 Ibid p42
323 Ibid p848
324 Ibid p860
activity (in this case the BNP) and media activity are therefore additional indicators of forthcoming politically motivated violence. The factors identified in Oldham in 2001 were similarly identified by Lord Scarman in 1981. By drawing on a considerable volume of research and evidence, Scarman identified a whole series of pre-conditions which he felt were apparent in Brixton prior to the onset of violent disorder. These are detailed in seminal event 1, Chapter Two. His enquiry was scrutinised and examined by an army of academics and politicians. Taylor (1981) offered a speedy contribution to the wider debate because he advanced some theories and explanations. He revised and reproduced his paper in 1984, and it is worth examining in some depth. He identifies five theoretical approaches to the study of collective violence. The first group of theories are sociological – they stress the importance of the dynamics of social relations, social institutions and social systems causing riots. Functionalist theory "embodies a notion of society as a set of individuals and groups held together by a moral consensus as to the appropriate social, economic and political values governing the social order." Social systems sometimes fail; therefore riots are a consequence of the system’s inability to adapt to new demands, coupled with the growth of generalised beliefs which provide an account of why the system failed, and offering a new basis for reconstituted social action. The failure of the social system creates the potential for collective violence; this becomes actual violence following the occurrence of a precipitator. These malfunctions were regarded as temporary – once social systems had adjusted, stimulated by the violence, the violence diminished. Conflictual social theory identifies society as an arena within which dominant and subordinate groups compete for wealth, status and power. This is a Marxist-type model.

The second group of theories are sociopsychological, which seek to explain riots as individual behaviours determined by particular psychological processes. Where one person’s cognitive system is consistent with that another person, then they are in cognitive consonance. When inconsistencies arrive, they are in cognitive dissonance, individuals therefore feel tension, and are motivated to alleviate this tension by adopting behaviours to realign the cognitions. Such behaviour would include rioting. The second sociopsychological model contends that where individuals are prevented from achieving

325 Scarman, Mr Justice (1981) op cit para 2.35
328 Ibid p21
329 Ibid p22
their goals, frustration occurs. Where individuals become frustrated, psychological tension exists, which is automatically transmuted into aggression and thence to violence. These two strands suggest individuals act non-rationally.

The third group of theories are the economic ones. That riots can be analysed in terms of individuals making rational choices based upon maximising the net differential between gains and losses. This is to do with the ‘fun’ value, and looting opportunities.

The fourth group is political variables. (i) Riots and like phenomena are engineered by extremist political groups in the hope of destabilising political systems. (ii) Political systems take time to adapt to rapidly changing economic and social environment. Riots are a response to this. (iii) As for (ii) but the decision for the non-incorporation of demands is a rational choice – i.e. a refusal to allow certain demands on to the political agenda. For any group thus excluded, riots offer a way of forcing demands onto the political agenda. (iv) Political repression as a cause of riots. Over the shorter term there is a positive relationship between the level of repression or coercion – the level of repression increasing with the level of counter violence by mass populations. In the end, collective violence becomes so costly it begins to diminish.

The fifth group suggests that riots may be caused by other riots in three ways: (i) Geographical contagion. A riot in one city may become known and stimulate riots in other nearby cities. (ii) Media contagion. Very similar but riots occur in remote cities – ‘copycat’ riots. (iii) Tradition of rioting – riots are more likely where they have occurred before.

These theories are pertinent because they contextualise pre-conditions. For example, deprivation may fit into the political theory; discrimination the sociological one. Riots in places like Oxford during 1981 may fit the fifth theory, and actually represent a ‘copycat’ riot which would not have taken place but for the unrest in Brixton or Toxteth. Scarman’s analysis of Brixton tends to demonstrate a mixture of these theories.
Field (1982) takes up these themes and makes some important demographic and sociological parallels between the British and American riots. He identifies five similarities between British and American riots, suggesting that the similarities greatly outnumber the differences. Four of these similarities are of particular importance to the identity of social pre-conditions and riot precipitators. Firstly, the primary sources of perceived grievance contributing to the American riots were police practices, unemployment and housing conditions. These were also the three most cited in relation to the British riots. Secondly, a typical American riot was sparked off by a fairly minor or routine police action which developed into a confrontation between the police and the black community, and then continued with widespread looting, arson and attacks on police. This general pattern was identical to the British riots. Thirdly, neither set of riots was the result of organised meetings or demonstrations, nor were they strongly linked to any particular group. Fourthly, and interestingly, American blacks have migrated from the poverty of the rural South to industrial employment in the cities of the North and West. The black population of these cities grew very fast in the 1960s as a new generation, born in the city, grew up. There bears an important resemblance to the immigration of South Asians to Britain and the social positions of the younger generations are in many respects analogous. This also resonates with the actions of suicide bombers, many of whom are second or third generation.

In a further attempt to contextualise pre-conditions, Waddington (1992) develops the theory of a flashpoint model for public disorder, comprising six integrated levels of analysis: the structural, political/ideological, cultural, contextual, situational and interactional levels. The structural level refers to inequalities of power, material resources and life chances, and he defines this as subjective deprivation. The political/ideological level refers to the relationship of a politically or culturally dissenting group to key political institutions, and how such institutions react. The cultural level refers to ways of life and thought which groups develop on the basis of shared material conditions and location within the social structure. The contextual level

331 Ibid p2
332 Ibid p6
333 Ibid
334 Ibid
335 Ibid
refers to the way in which a particular incident becomes highly charged or acquires greater significance. The situational level refers to spatial or social determinants of disorder relevant to the immediate surroundings and the interactional level focuses on the quality of interaction between the police and the dissenting group.

Benyon and Solomos (1987) worked with several themes in the decade or so following the Brixton disorders, and Benyon (1993) consolidates some of this work. He suggests that six ‘conflict variables’ underlie increased levels of conflict in Britain. These manifest themselves in rising crime, growth in the hidden economy, rising drug use and falling levels of cooperation with the police. This therefore links crime with public disorder. The six variables are: the effectiveness of government programmes; identity with the polity; opportunities for political participation; voluntary consent; views of state legitimacy and perceptions of social justice. The factors are linked such that a decrease in one may adversely affect the other. He further suggests that the six factors are affected by ‘basic grievances’ and conditions in deprived areas of Britain’s cities. These are high unemployment, social deprivation, political exclusion and powerlessness, and mistrust of, and hostility to, the police. Further factors which may be present are racial disadvantage and discrimination. Benyon identifies an important caveat: “a significant cause of disorder in the nineteenth century was the demand for political reform. Many other violent disorders were associated with social grievances, unemployment or lack of political representation.” Some of this might be thought to imply that riots are a peculiarity of ethnic minority status and ‘race’, but of course they are not. As Waddington puts it, “analysis of twentieth century riots in Britain and America suggests that disorder most typically occurs in those periods where relatively powerless sections of society experience a shattering denial of something they feel legitimately entitled to.” This notion gains momentum, and gives credence to the fundamental argument that riot is a form of political protest, albeit violent political protest. Benyon briefly outlines conservative, liberal and radical perspectives on crime and disorder. He considers liberal and radical approaches together, focusing ‘on ‘basic
flaws’ in society and its political arrangements, highlighting social injustice, inadequate institutions and the maldistribution of resources and political power as causes of disorder. A theme behind the liberal approach is that people have unrealised expectations, and that this is a cause of discontent. This again has some important parallels with motivation for terrorism where highly educated but discriminated-against individuals fail to achieve their objective potential or indeed their own expectations, discussed above. These failed expectations result in a build up of tension which eventually explodes and the resulting riot is therefore cathartic. This is a point with which Alderson (1998) agrees, since he suggests that the test of a ‘well-ordered’ society is not so much the absence of protest and disorder, rather the capacity for restoring social equilibrium and peaceful social union afterwards. Some argue that the violent outburst is “a rational and purposeful action by those who have been systematically excluded from full participation in society” therefore political exclusion as well as disadvantage is important as a fundamental factor. Riot forces demands onto the political agenda, it must be therefore, a form of political violence in this context.

This perspective raises two issues. Firstly, most riots, especially those in 1980s Britain, were spontaneous. Indeed, Crenshaw (1981) uses spontaneity as a characteristic that separates urban unrest from terrorism. But spontaneity does not mean that there is no political basis - the pre-conditions described provide the political foundations. Perceptions of social injustice, amongst others, create a tinder box; all that is required is the ignition. Waddington (1992) defines such points of ignition for 1980’s riots, and police activity in one form or another is the ‘lit match’. This creates the illusion of spontaneity; in truth, discontent has been building and building. The second point is one of legitimacy. Again, this is a very similar debate to the one around terrorism. In a ‘well-ordered’ society, is it not the case that riot, underpinned by perceptions of injustice, discrimination, deprivation, is actually legitimate? Once again, Tupman and O’Reilly (2004) shed light on the issue with their discussion of legitimacy arenas. Urban unrest, or rioting, is likely to be perceived as broadly legitimate in they eyes of those that are politically excluded, discriminated against and otherwise disenfranchised.

343 Benyon J (1993) op cit p11
344 Ibid p12
348 Waddington. D (1992) op cit pp90-91
349 Tupman, W and O’Reilly, C (2004) op cit
The literature demonstrates that, although not causes of riots, certain social conditions can be crystallised which pre-exist where urban unrest occurs. These are inter alia unemployment, relative deprivation (which may include poor housing and a big gap between expectation and achievement), discrimination, political isolation and a perception of social injustice. Racist crime, political and media activity are additional indicators of forthcoming politically motivated violence. Police activity, again not a cause of riots, is of major importance because the police represent the state, they exert coercive force, and because perceptions of social injustice are directly connected with the police as an institution. Their activity may provide the ignition. Benyon (1993) states “Social injustice is the central thread running through urban conflict. Above all, it is experiences of perceptions of injustice which may develop into a violent urban disorder.”

3.3.1 Partnership responses and community policing

Margaret Simey of the Merseyside Police Authority was one of many individuals and groups who recognised that the police alone could not be held accountable for the riots, and similarly could not be the route through which the solution might be found:

“Responsibility for public tranquillity on such a vast scale cannot and must not be off-loaded on to the police…It was our failure as a society to set about the conditions in the inner cities which led to the breakdown of social order in the 1980s…The responsibility is ours, and it is one which we cannot delegate to the police.”

Simey was outspoken at the time of the riots, and is quoted as saying that conditions in the area are so bad that people ought to riot, that she would regard people as apathetic if they did not riot, adding that the police were out of control. John Alderson, Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall Constabulary, had for some years been an exponent of what he termed ‘community policing’: he also recognised that the job of policing a complex pluralistic society was one which the police could not do alone, and he advocated a ‘social contract’ where the police and public came together under the

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350 Benyon, J (1993) op cit p 23
352 Kettle, M and Hodges, L (1982) op cit p172

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institution of ‘community policing’. It would involve inter-agency cooperation, consultative groups and community officers. Simey strongly disapproved:

“An equally popular panacea is to talk of ‘community policing’. This has a nostalgic appeal, but examined more closely it adds up to no more than a demand for the police to take up the burden left behind by the departure…of many of those who stood for ‘government’: the clergy, the teachers and doctors, local shopkeepers and the rest. There is no hope for the future in such backward glances.”

Others argued that community policing may not be compatible with democracy. In truth, Alderson held the seeds of the development over the next 25 years of a series of steps towards group responsibility for policing. Some of this became part of the law: for example, a legal duty on police, councils and others to work together is imposed by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998; and some of it is policy driven: recent policing developments and Government edicts around neighbourhood improvement are examples, examined in the next chapter.

3.4 Tension Indicators

Research work following the riots in 1960s America identified that there were certain indicators which forewarned of the likelihood of urban unrest. Field (1982) quotes Momboisse (1967):

“Every race riot is preceded by a flood of rumour, expressions of increasing antagonism between groups and an increase in the number and intensity of clashes between members of antagonistic groups. By developing adequate methods for obtaining and recording necessary kinds of information, the police can tell approximately how much danger of a riot there is at any given time, what group would start it, who their victims would be, and where violence would be most likely to break out. Such knowledge would be invaluable both in preventive work and in handling any disorders that might occur.”

354 Simey, M (1984) op cit p138
He also quotes, at length, the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (NACCJSG), dealing with the types of thing to look at. This resulted in a systemised means of assessing community tension, and lists the following:

i. disturbance calls involving group conflict
ii. routine police action resulting in abuse of police officers
iii. stoning of police or fire vehicles
iv. assaults between groups
v. assaults against police
vi. complaints against police
vii. changes in media coverage of police events or incidents, and
viii. unwillingness of the public to help the police

Brightmore (1992) takes up the theme, quoting Curry and King (1962) on the value of rumours:

“First, police officials must regard them as symptomatic. If rumours are plentiful, they should be reported. If they are then cleared through central police offices they can become an effective barometer of the state of mind of the community and can indicate the likelihood of trouble in any particular area.”

Home Office Circular 39/1982 was sent to Chief Constables and contained a list of eleven ‘tension indicators’ which experience suggested could be identified and used to give warning of unrest:

1. Increased hostility to police operations such as the making of arrests.
2. Unusually large groups of youths congregating in public thoroughfares and showing hostility towards the police.
3. Harassment of individual police officers by groups of youths.
4. Increases in the numbers of assaults on police officers.
5. Increases in the number of attacks on police vehicles
6. The development of heavy anti-police propaganda and the circulation of rumours and false information about police activities and practices.
7. Increased numbers of complaints against the police, especially of alleged brutality and harassment.

358 Ibid p24
359 Ibid p25
8. The breaking down of previously established liaison and consultative arrangements.
9. Increased numbers of complaints of racial attacks and a lack of police response.
10. Conflict between or within racial groups, particularly conflict involving violence.
11. Incidents which achieve notoriety, such as the arrest of prominent individuals, providing a focus for community discontent.

These indicators are heavily police centric, but get round the problem Field (1982) identifies concerning the morality of police officers systematically collecting information about certain groups.\textsuperscript{362} He draws the distinction between a close awareness of local events and community feeling, and surveillance of groups or communities.\textsuperscript{363}

Brightmore (1992) re-produces the Metropolitan Police model developed at the time. It includes the Home Office list, but also adds issues relating to schools, international events, analysis of local press, national media, consultative committees etc.\textsuperscript{364}

The US Department for Justice developed a ‘Distant Early Warning Signs (DEWS) System’, listing indicators which may be used to assess the potential for racial tension in a community.\textsuperscript{365} They are worth reproducing in full:

- Increased disturbance calls in a particular area
- Increased number of interracial assaults
- Increased number of assaults against police
- Increased citizen complaints of excessive use of force by police
- Complaints about police use of force
- Decreased levels of community involvement with local police department and officers
- Presence of or increase in hate groups
- Scheduled major event likely to attract protesters (opening of a controversial movie, music concert, athletic event etc)
- Media reports exacerbating racial issues, tensions, conflicts, or incidents
- Increased school-based racial incidents
- Increased incidents of racial graffiti
- Major racial or ethnic population changes
- Harsh weather conditions creating unusual hardships and stress
- Crowding in housing, schools and community facilities
- Critical, polarizing, or provocative comments from community leaders heightening racial tension

\textsuperscript{362} Field, S (1982) op cit p23
\textsuperscript{363} Ibid
\textsuperscript{364} Brightmore, C (1992) op cit pp49-50
\textsuperscript{365} ‘Distant Early Warning Signs: Indicators uses to assess tension in a community’ available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crs/pubs/dewslast.pdf accessed 31/7/07
• High unemployment and underemployment
• Perceived disparities in social services and welfare
• Demonstrations which reflect racial and ethnic polarization
• History or presence of unresolved racial conflict
• Rationing of gas, food, water, electricity, etc

The guidance states that consideration should be given to changes and trends in the above items.\textsuperscript{366} The list contains the Home Office recommended indicators, together with the additions made by the Metropolitan Police; they also contain a number of sociological or demographic indices. For example, it lists crowding in houses, schools and community facilities, and unemployment. This is relevant to the current discussion because I hypothesise that certain social pre-conditions need to exist for unrest to occur, and that since unrest, radicalisation and terrorism have similar roots, these pre-conditions can be used to provide a crude indicator of which communities are at risk. Tupman and O’Reilly (2004) take this idea one stage further.\textsuperscript{367} They suggest that if “‘anti-American or anti-Westerner or anti-foreigner’ is substituted for ‘racist’ then the creation of ‘tension indicators’, and thus the need for counter-terrorist intervention, is in the starting blocks.”\textsuperscript{368} Actually, this is not the creation of a new set of tension indicators; it is merely the application of previously developed indicators to a new threat. This is only possible because ‘terrorism’ in this context has similar roots to urban unrest and riot.

A number of these indicators are examined in more depth in Chapter Six, especially those that relate to crime, including assaults on police officers, and complaints against police. Chapter Seven presents data relevant to these indicators from the case study.

3.5 Ladder of Escalation

To re-capture an earlier point, Crenshaw (1981) describes the idea of the permissive factor of social facilitation:

“This concept refers to social habits and historical conditions that sanction the use of violence against the Government, making it morally and politically justifiable, and even dictating an appropriate form, such as demonstrations, coups, or terrorism.”\textsuperscript{369}

\textsuperscript{366} Ibid
\textsuperscript{367} Tupman, W and O’Reilly, C (2004) op cit p37
\textsuperscript{366} Ibid p37
\textsuperscript{367} Crenshaw, M (1981) ibid p382
This implies a gradational incremental structure to forms of ‘social protest’. Tupman (1987) agrees with this and develops part of it in a more coherent way. His idea begins with a demonstration countered by force, progresses through the death of a demonstrator and revenge killing of a police officer to the ultimate conclusion – ‘sub civil war’. Massey’s description of urbanization and rising income inequality, discussed above, also suggests such a structure. Wilkinson (1977) introduces ‘escalation ladders’, making the distinction between ‘Mass Political Violence’ such as riots and civil war, and ‘Small Group Political Violence’, including political terrorism, isolated assassination attempts, and guerrilla raids on foreign states.

I propose here a ‘ladder of escalation’ which develops these themes, and is depicted in figure 1 below:

![Figure 1: Ladder of Escalation](image)

A model of this nature is based upon certain assumptions. In particular, that varying types of ‘social protest’, be they violent or otherwise, have similar root causes. The model in this form is highly simplistic, and clearly a range of other ‘impact factors’ may

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371 Ibid pp10-11  
be brought to bear. These would include the position the media adopt, and, crucially, the activity of the police. Since this is capable of control, appropriate police response may militate against escalation. The key is to identify the incremental steps early enough, and then develop a multi agency intervention strategy appropriate to the situation. In the eyes of state Government, the model would tend to show declining legitimacy from the left hand side to the right. In the eyes of a group which perceives itself to have a ‘low level of identity with the polity’, with ‘low opportunities for participation’ and a ‘strong sense of social injustice’, legitimacy increases from the left hand side to the right. This contextualises the model within Tupman and O’Reilly’s ‘Legitimacy Arenas’ whereby the legitimacy of violent action by rebel groups on one hand, and the activity (or existence) of state authorities on the other, varies depending upon the position and nature of the audience. It also begins illuminate the question of whether a given activity reduces or increases the number of terrorists.

Ross (1993) hints at a similar structure, though he does not articulate it. He also views it from a slightly alternative angle:

“The presence of other forms of unrest among populations, violent or non-violent, may act as a catalyst for terrorism. These forms of unrest include war, revolution, guerrilla warfare, strikes, protests, demonstrations, riots, or other group terrorist actions. Unrest can motivate terrorist organizations; provide learning opportunities; increase the legitimacy of violent actions; and, heighten a sense of grievance.”

The position Ross adopts is not at odds with the model, since it proposes that the existence of other forms of ‘social protest’ might well indicate a risk of progression towards terrorism. The subtle difference is that he suggests the progression to terrorism is likely to accelerate with the existence of other forms of protest; the model suggests that terrorism might be one of the end points of a series of failed attempts to ‘protest’ and bring about change. In truth, either one of these situations might occur. Either way, I propose that the model serves as a useful tool to forewarn of potential risk.

373 Benyon, J and Solomos, J (1987) op cit p194
374 Tupman, W and O’Reilly, C (2004) op cit p2
375 Ross, J (1993) op cit
376 Ibid p323
3.6 Summary

Existing research appears to demonstrate the following: Urban unrest and terrorism in the current context are both forms of political violence. They share common roots with radicalisation, with a number of key social pre-conditions existing prior to their onset. Crucially, these include a sense of injustice, a lack of political representation, declining perceptions of legitimacy in state authorities, relative deprivation (which may include unemployment, a gap between expectation and achievement) and discrimination. Levels of drug related crime are also important. Racist crime, political and media activity are additional indicators of forthcoming politically motivated violence and pre-conditions are essential but precipitators are also required to initiate the event. The existence of a powerful figure may be crucial in influencing the path which the ‘social protest’ event takes. The ‘common roots’ theory points towards the conclusion that the seeds of understanding and therefore the fruit of successful counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorist strategies are already within our grasp. Similarly, the similarities between organised crime and terrorism might suggest that established mechanisms for fighting the former may be effective in tackling the latter.

There are a number of areas which require examination and further research. These include the following:

- How can state authorities, particularly the police, use the ‘common roots’ theory to identify communities which might be vulnerable to radicalisation and subsequent progression to terrorism?

- Does a ‘ladder of escalation’ provide an additional mechanism whereby peaceful forms of social or political activity can be used to forewarn, in the medium to longer term, of the potential for radicalisation and terrorism amongst some communities?

- To what degree can ‘tension indicators’, developed after the urban riots in the UK, be adapted to forewarn of the growth of radicalisation and terrorists within a given community?
• Is the National Intelligence Model, principally developed to tackle crime, capable of identifying radicalisation and terrorism risk factors, using the foregoing mechanisms, and developing appropriate partnership intervention strategy?

• What role does ‘Neighbourhood Policing’ play, and can a ‘toolkit’ be developed which enables local officers to assist in the identification of vulnerable communities?

• What relevance does the ‘social pre-conditions’ idea have to the current rise in gang related activity and the growth in radicalisation linked to Islam?

The following chapter moves the ‘foundationalist’ arguments discussed above towards an examination of the ‘realist’. It reviews selected Government sponsored research, Home Office and ACPO edicts and guidance intended to safeguard and protect communities issued in recent years, and assesses their intention and effectiveness. The subsequent chapter outlines methodology which will permit the examination and testing of elements of the ideas articulated above.
CHAPTER FOUR:

Selected policies and edicts since 1981:
A critical review

4.0 Introduction

As outlined in section 1.0 of Chapter One, a principal purpose of the thesis is to identify what local policing teams can actually do to mitigate the risk of harmful radicalisation and progression to terrorism. As this chapter unfolds, it will demonstrate that we already understand what it is we need local police officers, Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) and local public authority officials to do because the problems and challenges have been met before in the context of other examples of social unrest. Although there are pockets and areas of very good work (for example, the work of the Muslim Contact Unit in London\textsuperscript{377}), it suggests that the problem in general terms is a failure to learn and implement lessons from the past, a failure correctly to identify where intervention is necessary, and a failure to understand what effective intervention looks like. Chapter Five outlines methodology to test this assertion. The methodology will also outline a means to seek to understand whether recent policing innovation in a specific geographical area is capable of anticipating violent radicalisation and developing mitigation strategies.

The present chapter has two key themes. Firstly, it critically analyses various selected laws, policy responses and edicts from the Home Office and elsewhere which largely arose from the five seminal events outlined in the second chapter. The purpose of the analysis is to demonstrate that there has been a failure by key social agencies like the police to address fundamental problems such as racial discrimination and perceptions of social injustice. This has occurred despite repeated identification of the challenges in the aftermath of the described events, and it posits the theory that this has led to disenfranchisement amongst people from ethnic minority groups, rendering them vulnerable to harmful influence. By linking it with the ‘common roots theory’ advanced

in Chapter Three, the present chapter aims to establish that the current crisis is an almost inevitable consequence of this failure.

The development of successful counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorist strategies depends first upon the identification of vulnerable groups and communities, and then local solutions must be found by agencies working together to alleviate the risk of violent extremist tendencies. These local solutions should carry many of the themes advanced by Lord Scarman, and the authors of the other reports contained herein. The second thread of this chapter is to consider whether or not the National Intelligence Model and Neighbourhood Policing are developed sufficiently to perform this task. That is to say, are these new policing and partnership innovations actually capable of identifying risk, and then developing strategies to mitigate it?

The chapter is broadly organised in chronological order, and reflects the structure of section 2.3.4 of Chapter Two, which presents the five seminal events. It begins by outlining certain aspects of the Scarman Report into the Brixton riots of 1981 (seminal event 1), bringing forward key themes identified by him as being of critical importance for the health of society. It progresses to the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (seminal event 2), highlighting by reference to the Inquiry that the critical issues identified by Lord Scarman had not been adequately addressed. There is a brief examination of the Crime and Disorder Act (1998), which endeavoured to enshrine aspects of the Scarman and Macpherson recommendations into law. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary began a series of inspections of police forces, and the chapter re-visits these to illustrate the political imperative of the time. The chapter examines the Race Relations (Amendment) Act (2000), and the BBC television programme The Secret Policeman (seminal event 3) linking the two through the Formal Investigation of Police Forces by the Commission for Racial Equality. The discussion then turns to the riots of 2001 in Oldham and Bradford (seminal event 4). The resulting Cantle Report is examined and recommendations and observations from this report are considered in light of the foregoing reports into the Brixton disorder and the murder of Stephen Lawrence. The narrative continues to 2005, and provides an account and analysis of some parts of the Government response to the suicide bombing of 7 July 2005 (seminal event 5).

The chapter then examines the National Intelligence Model and Neighbourhood Policing. It demonstrates the intent behind these models, but exposes their weaknesses.
The critical question is: are they fit for purpose to counter threats of violent radicalisation and terrorism? The chapter concludes by identifying five common themes, which I call ‘critical success factors’, arising from the policy and legislative responses to the seminal events. These are revisited in Chapter Seven, where I test as part of the research how embedded they are in Greater Manchester Police and the theatre of the case study before discussing the findings in Chapter Eight.

4.1 The Scarman Report: The Brixton Disorders 10-12 April 1981

The Scarman Report was produced at the behest of the Right Honourable William Whitelaw, then Home Secretary, using the powers vested in him by Section 32 of the Police Act 1964 “to appoint the Right Honourable Lord Scarman to inquire urgently into the serious disorder in Brixton on 10 to 12 April 1981 and to report, with the power to make recommendations.” Seminal event 1, Chapter Two, outlines the key events and circumstances of this incident. The report was very wide ranging, and considered a rich variety of issues which cut across various areas of responsibility for public authorities. There follows an account of the key components of the Report, with some associated discussion.

4.1.1 Policing: Proposals and Recommendations

Scarman acknowledged that “the composition of our police forces must reflect the make-up of the society they serve” but he rejected the notion of a quota. He pointed out that the number of black police officers at the time fell a very long way short of representing the community being served. He therefore recommended that the Home Office, with Chief Officers of Police, with Police Authorities and representatives of ethnic minority communities conduct urgent research to find ways of improving ethnic minority recruitment and of involving ethnic minority groups in police-related activities. “The object of policy must be that the composition of the police fully reflects that of the society the police serve”. This begins to move the police towards being a much more inclusive agency than hitherto. Moving an agency such as the police

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379 Ibid para 5.6
380 Ibid para 8.28
381 Ibid
382 Ibid para 5.13
in this direction begins strongly to address notions of political isolation and non-identity with the polity, discussed as key drivers for disenfranchisement in Chapter Three. It may also serve to improve perceptions of social injustice. Scarman pointed out that racial prejudice cannot be wholly eliminated from the police so long as it is endemic in society, but he recognised the importance of a major institution like the police taking a lead and therefore he recommended that scientific means should be used nationally to identify evidence of racial prejudice.

Scarman alluded to the debate regarding ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ policing, saying:

“Policing is, however, too complex a job to be viewed in terms of a simplistic dichotomy between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ policing styles. Community policing – which I understand to mean policing with the active consent and support of the community – is too important a concept to be treated as a slogan.”

He discussed the role of the ‘Home Beat Officer’, describing how they were considered as ‘hobby bobbies’ and that this notion must be absolutely rejected. He advanced the view that the Home Beat Officer must “be seen not as occupying the bottom of the police pecking order (after the CID and specialist units have creamed off the best), but at its apex, in the forefront of the police team” and that the role of Home Beat Officers should be examined to see how and in what ways it can be integrated into mainstream operational policing. He also proposed a mix of mobile and foot patrols because patrol cars have distanced the police from their communities, and he suggested that there ought to be the provision of opportunities for operational officers to get to know the community they are policing. This relates directly to the dilemma of integrating Neighbourhood Policing and patrol work, a feature of Neighbourhood Management and Neighbourhood Policing, discussed below.

Apart from recommending statutory liaison committees and other appropriate consultative machinery, Scarman pointed out that “Community representatives must
seek to appreciate the difficulties (and dilemmas) of the police, and to avoid extravagant
language or ill-informed criticism”. Scarman might have elaborated here; it is a little
vague. There is a discussion about the roles consultation and accountability play in
ensuring that the police in their operations and policies keep in touch with, and are
responsible to, the community they police; Scarman also points out that “there is no
satisfactory or sufficient link between accountability and consultation”. Specific
suggestions as to how community representatives might appreciate the difficulties and
dilemmas of the police might have helped. Scarman concluded this section with an
assertion that his approach to policing would be necessary as a response to modern
social developments even without the presence of ethnic minorities in cities.

The following passage outlines Scarman’s view that social context and not merely
policing must be addressed to resolve social deprivation. This serves to reinforce the
position adopted in the preceding chapter that social conditions are crucial indicators of
social protest:

“The police do not create social deprivation, though unimaginative, inflexible
policing can make the tensions which deprivation engenders worse. Conversely,
while good policing can help diminish tension and avoid disorder, it cannot remove
the causes of social stress where these are to be found, as those in Brixton and
elsewhere are, deeply embedded in fundamental economic and social conditions. Any
attempt to resolve the circumstances from which the disorders of this year sprang
cannot therefore be limited to recommendations about policing but must embrace the
wider social context in which policing is carried out.”

4.1.2 Social Reconstruction

Although acknowledging the difficulty in a judge commenting about Government social
policy, Scarman saw it as his duty, since the issues were so inextricably linked with
social policy. He advanced this duty by examining problems of the inner city. He
suggested that the failure to tackle inner city problems over the previous three decades
were linked to a “lack of an effective coordinated approach...between central and local
government”. He further identified two further important aspects. Firstly, that local
communities should be more fully involved in the decisions that affect them – in

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391 Ibid para 5.71
392 Ibid para 5.48
393 Ibid para 8.42
394 Ibid para 6.1
395 Ibid para 6.6
planning, provision of local services and in the management and financing of specific projects. Secondly, there appeared to Scarman to be a deficiency in the extent to which the private sector – for example, banks and building societies – were involved in the process of inner city regeneration. These two threads are very interesting: they summarise a number of key themes which are being pushed forwards today. These themes aim to give communities a greater say in how and what services are delivered; they describe much better partnership arrangements, involving private and public sector, and they now bring together arguments from other agendas, including Neighbourhood Policing and Neighbourhood Improvement. They should be specifically examined and seen in the context of our present-day plural society, with an emphasis on ethnic and religious minority groups.

4.1.3 Ethnic minorities and community participation

Scarman pointed out that inner city problems should not be equated with those of ethnic minority groups: problems of inner city decline were much wider; ethnic minorities though tend to suffer the same problems as the rest of the population, only more severely. He identified three areas of disadvantage which particularly affected ethnic minority groups – (a) Housing; (b) Education; and (c) Employment. This should be compared with the situation in 2001 ahead of the Oldham and Bradford riots – see seminal event 4: in essence, a very similar set of social circumstances, despite the intervening gap of twenty years.

Scarman identified housing as a specific area where community participation was needed, and he described an example where management had been devolved down to neighbourhood level. The following extract is especially relevant to the policing debate:

“The police are involved together with other agencies in the development of a team response to problems – such as vandalism – on the estate. Local residents, and the local police, have much to contribute not only to management but to re-development.”

396 Ibid para 6.10
397 Ibid para 6.14
398 Ibid
This goes right to the heart of the Neighbourhood Policing, Neighbourhood Management, and partnership agendas of today. It has taken a quarter of a century fully to articulate this as good practice in tackling local issues.

On education, Scarman stated that “It is essential, therefore, that children should leave school able to speak, read and write effectively in the language of British society, i.e. English.” Scaran stresses the value of police involvement in schools, within reason.

The Scarman report points out that the weight of unemployment falls disproportionately heavily on black people. The report quotes a Home Affairs Committee “Asians and West Indians continue to be at a substantial disadvantage in employment long after their arrival in Britain and their children may also suffer substantial disadvantage in this respect”. He discussed the need for “speedy action if we are to avoid the perpetuation in this country of an economically dispossessed black population”. Data from various sources, discussed in Chapter Two, provide compelling evidence that British society has, in fact, reached this point with respect to South Asian, principally Muslim, communities. Scarman also contemplates the idea of young people being encouraged to participate in projects to regenerate the inner city. Although he does not specify, the implication is that the people to whom he refers are currently unemployed, and he therefore achieves two goals: regeneration and gainful (albeit unpaid) employment. The lack of an incentive in this situation remains unaddressed.

The report introduces an important concept at this juncture. It discusses the notion of monitoring. Scarman specifically endorsed the Home Affairs Select Committee proposal for improving the extent of the information available about ethnic minority needs, including ethnic monitoring by local authorities of the services they provide. This was later made mandatory by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, discussed below, twenty years after the Scarman report was published. The progress made by public authorities in the field of race relations had been too slow.

The following quote is interesting and relevant to the overall discussion:

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399 Ibid para 6.21
400 Ibid para 6.24
401 Ibid para 6.26
402 Ibid para 6.27
403 Ibid para 6.30
“There are already signs among some black youths, despairing of an end to white discrimination, of a disturbing trend towards a total rejection of white society and the development of black separatist philosophies”.\textsuperscript{404}

The use of this language in this context resonates strongly with the causal models of terrorism discussed in section 3.1 of Chapter Three.

Scarman raised some important points regarding the Community Relations Councils (CRCs) and the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE). He felt that they should be at the heart of attempts to foster a harmonious multi-racial society, and that they experience tension between their role in fostering good community relations, keeping a dialogue going with the authorities on the one hand, whilst not losing credibility with ethnic minority groups on the other. He listed the following criticism of CRCs:

i. Some appear to have a tendency to act purely as a special interest lobby for minority groups;

ii. Some are too readily influenced by extreme political views;

iii. Many too often expect to be the sole channel of contact and communication between the ethnic minorities and official bodies.\textsuperscript{405}

These are interesting because it is possible these problems have persisted with Race Equality Councils – and even other meeting centres like Mosques. It is an issue worthy of further examination but is beyond the scope of this work.

\textbf{4.1.4 The Role of the Media}

Lord Scarman addresses the role of the media, pointing out that they had a part to play in the copy-cat nature of some of the disorders,\textsuperscript{406} (see section 3.3, Chapter Three, for a discussion of this). Scarman steered clear of legislation controlling media reporting, but emphasised the need to ensure ‘balance’ and the importance of editors and producers assessing the likely impact on their reporting. He also pointed out the importance of not

\textsuperscript{404} Ibid para 6.35
\textsuperscript{405} Ibid para 6.36
\textsuperscript{406} Ibid para 6.39
perpetuating a label for an area. Always focusing on the problems and difficulties rather than the good prevents regeneration and improvement.  

During this brief journey through relevant aspects of the Scarman report, I have drawn out certain themes identified by Scarman as being important to the health and well-being of society. He identifies these things during his inquiry into the tremendous and riotous upheaval that occurred in Brixton and elsewhere, and provides a ‘roadmap’ for society, including the police and other public agencies, in order to minimise the risk of further trouble in the future. These themes remain relevant today, and I present data in section 7.2 of Chapter Seven regarding the success of Greater Manchester Police in delivering them; I discuss the findings in section 8.1 of Chapter Eight.

4.2 The Stephen Lawrence Enquiry

Stephen Lawrence was murdered on 22 April 1993, and the incident is described in seminal event 2, Chapter Two. The subsequent enquiry was ordered by the Home Secretary, The Right Honourable Jack Straw MP, in July 1997. The enquiry arose in large part because “prolonged police investigations, in two distinct phases, produced no witnesses other than Mr Brooks [Stephen Lawrence’s friend] who could properly purport to identify any of the attackers” and “sound evidence against the prime suspects, or against anybody else, is conspicuous by its absence”. Further, “three of the prime suspects were taken to trial in 1996 in a private prosecution which failed because of the absence of any firm and sustainable evidence.” As a result, Mr and Mrs Lawrence, Stephen’s parents, applied for a judicial review into the death of their son.

The enquiry reported in February 1999, nearly two years after the Home Secretary had asked Sir William to enquire into the matter. The enquiry was extremely thorough, and examined records, statements, evidence and cross-examined witnesses and police officers involved in the investigation. It makes for depressing reading: the errors were significant, fundamental and ultimately extremely damaging, not only for the Metropolitan Police but also for the police service in general. The report contains numerous references to poor understanding of race and community relations amongst

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407 Ibid para 6.40
409 Ibid para 2.3
officers dealing with the incident. It also discusses racism and discrimination, and provides a definition of ‘institutional racism’:

“The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people. It persists because of the failure of the organisation openly and adequately to recognise and address its existence and causes by policy, example and leadership. Without recognition and action to eliminate such racism it can prevail as part of the ethos or culture of the organisation. It is a corrosive disease.” 410

The next paragraph points out that “if such racism infests the police its elimination can only be achieved ‘by means of a fully developed partnership approach in which the police service works jointly with the ethnic minority communities. How else can mutual confidence and trust be reached?’” 411 This paragraph highlights the importance Macpherson attached to effective community engagement and partnership working, especially as it applied to eliminating racism and promoting trust in the police.

Central to the current theme of this chapter is to demonstrate the links between the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry report, and the Scarman Report. It is also important to remember that that the Lawrence murder was 12 years after Brixton, and that there were other race-related urban disorders in the intervening years. Macpherson makes the connection with Scarman very early on, quoting him thus:

“‘The evidence which I have received, the effect of which I have outlined…, leaves no doubt in my mind that racial disadvantage is a fact of current British life… . Urgent action is needed if it is not to become an endemic, ineradicable disease threatening the very survival of our society… racial disadvantage and its nasty associate racial discrimination, have not yet been eliminated. They poison minds and attitudes; they are, as long as they remain, and will continue to be a potent factor of unrest”.

It is a sad reflection upon the intervening years that in 1998-99 those extracted words have remained relevant throughout both parts of our Inquiry.” 412

410 Ibid para 6.34
411 Ibid para 6.35
412 Ibid para 2.20
This passage is of critical importance. Firstly, it demonstrates that the issues identified by Scarman had persisted, despite his highlighting them, and despite much apparent political pressure at the time to endeavour to move public authorities like the police, and indeed wider society, on. Secondly, it paves the way for further evidence of our collective failure to cure the disease. The previous chapter demonstrates that social protest may not be restricted to riots and urban disorder; radicalisation and terrorism are also branches of protest.

Aspects of the Lawrence Inquiry Report contrast fairly strongly with Lord Scarman’s report. In paragraph 6.32, Scarman makes a reference to ‘institutional racism’. The paragraph explains Scarman’s view that the reluctance of public and private organisations to carry programmes which recognise and cater for the needs of minority groups owes more to the likelihood of a backlash from the majority than it does from ‘institutional racism’. [Though I would argue that, if the risk of a ‘majority’ backlash exists, then it is the responsibility of public agencies like the police to take the lead in tackling it, and that if they do not, then this in itself amounts to institutional racism.] He recognises the phenomenon of institutional racism earlier on where he outlines a suggestion that ‘institutionally racist’ means “that practices may be adopted by public bodies as well as private individuals which are unwittingly discriminatory against black people” and that “this is an allegation which deserves serious consideration, and, where proved, swift remedy.” 413 He also says “The direction and policies of the Metropolitan Police are not racist”. 414 Macpherson disagreed:

“Given the central nature of the issue we feel that it is important at once to state our conclusions that institutional racism, within the terms of its description set out in Paragraph 6.34 above, exists both in the Metropolitan Police Service and in other Police Services and institutions countrywide.” 415

Crucially, the report also states the following at Paragraph 6.54:

“Racism, institutional or otherwise, is not the prerogative of the Police Service. It is clear that other agencies including for example those dealing with housing and education also suffer from the disease. If racism is to be eradicated there must be specific and coordinated action both from within agencies themselves and by society

413 Scarman, Mr Justice (1981) op cit para 2.2
414 Ibid para 4.62
415 Macpherson, Sir W (1999a) op cit para 6.39
at large, particularly through the educational system, from pre-primary school upwards and onwards.” 416

This then demonstrates that Macpherson and his team believed that discrimination and racism, ‘institutional or otherwise’, existed in Britain in the late 1990s amongst key public agencies, and specifically the police. Not only did they show that matters had not improved since the Scarman report, they actually re-stated the problem in terms which painted a bleaker picture. As Scarman pointed out, “discrimination against black people – often hidden, sometimes unconscious – remain a major source of social tension and conflict” 417 and therefore British society in the late 1990s had a significant, previously identified yet unresolved problem: social tension and conflict brought about by discrimination and racism.

What proposals did Macpherson advance to tackle this persistent problem? The following is a contraction of recommendations pertinent to the current discussion, with some commentary highlighting their relevance. 418

Macpherson recommended that a Ministerial Priority be established for all Police Services: “To increase trust and confidence in policing amongst minority ethnic communities”. The process of implementing, monitoring and assessing the Ministerial Priority should include performance indicators in relation to inter alia the degree of multi-agency co-operation and information exchange; achieving equal satisfaction levels across all ethnic groups in public satisfaction surveys, and levels of recruitment, retention and progression of minority ethnic recruits. The links between these and the Crime and Disorder Act and Neighbourhood Policing, discussed below, are clear. The need to eliminate discrimination is based upon an understanding of the impact of perceptions of injustice. Eliminating racial discrimination became enshrined in law by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, and is analysed in more detail, below. The overall aim of this series of recommendations is the elimination of racist prejudice and disadvantage and the demonstration of fairness in all aspects of policing.

416 Ibid para 6.54
417 Scarman, Mr Justice (1981) op cit para 6.35
418 Macpherson, Sir W (1999 a) op cit ch 47
Macpherson realised the importance of independent inspection of police services and decreed that Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Constabulary (HMIC) be granted full and unfettered powers and duties to inspect all parts of Police Services including the Metropolitan Police Service. This recommendation, now implemented, had and continues to have a powerful influence on the activity of police forces. Key HMIC inspections are examined below.

Recommendation 17 identified that there should be close co-operation between Police Services and local Government and other agencies, including in particular Housing and Education Departments, to ensure that all information relating to racist incidents (discussed in further depth in Chapter Six) and crimes is shared and is readily available to all agencies. This relates to partnership work, and the application of ‘tension indicators’ which cuts across agencies, to assess levels of community tension. It also implies a responsibility on agencies to intervene and act where circumstances dictate. Later events in Oldham and Bradford strongly imply that this recommendation failed to be fully implemented.

Recommendations 48 – 54 address issues of training in racism and valuing cultural diversity. Again, there is a clear link to Scarman, who advances his view as to the importance of training in community relations, and suggests that community representatives, especially those from ethnic minority communities, should be involved in that training. Specifically, Macpherson identifies that training courses should be designed and delivered in order to develop the full understanding that good community relations are essential to good policing and that a racist officer is an incompetent officer. All police officers, including CID and civilian staff, should be trained in racism awareness and valuing cultural diversity. Recommendation 50 of Macpherson reiterates Scarman’s view that local minority ethnic communities should be involved in such training. Clearly, there has been some organisational failure if Macpherson needed to restate this nearly two decades later.

Macpherson also addressed recruitment and retention, recommending that policing plans should include targets for the recruitment and retention of ethnic minority staff. Scarman presented this view in 1981: “I recommend that the Home Office….conduct an

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419 Scarman, Mr Justice (1981) op cit para 5.28
420 Macpherson, Sir W (1999a) op cit Recommendation 64
urgent study of ways of improving ethnic minority recruitment into the regular police…."

In 2005, a Home Office study was published which examined the impact on policing of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. Although it identified some ‘significant improvements’ in the relationships with minority communities, it said that “the roles of [community] liaison and beat officers were generally not integrated into mainstream policing.” Further, it stated that “BME research participants described mistrust of the police and an expectation of discrimination”, and “police tactics that focused activity on BME communities, particularly minority youth, were frequently experienced as provocative and discriminatory.” This has profound implications for the policy responses to radicalisation and terrorism, discussed below.

The Scarman Report and the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry were published 18 years apart, yet as can be seen, there are a number of similar key themes emerging from both. These are the need to work more closely in partnership with other agencies; the need to monitor and prevent discrimination in the application of services; the need to recruit more people from ethnic minority groups into the police and the need to train staff more effectively in community relations and valuing cultural diversity. They are practical recommendations aimed at reducing discrimination, increasing perceptions of fair social justice, and improving perceptions of state legitimacy, factors which the preceding chapter - the review of academic literature - identified as being at the root not only of social unrest, but also radicalisation and terrorism. The repetitive nature of some of the recommendations of the two reports begins to demonstrate a failure by state authorities to provide appropriate services to certain cultural and minority ethnic groups. This failure contributes to low perceptions of fairness of social justice, and poor state legitimacy. I propose, based on arguments presented from the literature in the previous chapter, that these social and political factors set the stage for vulnerability to radicalisation and escalation towards violence.

421 Scarman, Mr Justice (1981) op cit para 8.28
423 Ibid pxii
424 Ibid pxiii
425 Ibid
4.3 The Crime and Disorder Act 1998

The Crime and Disorder Act set out to establish crime and disorder as a political imperative, firmly placing the new Labour Government at the forefront in the battle against crime, previously the preserve of the Conservative party. It led directly from Tony Blair’s ‘Tough on Crime, Tough on the Causes of Crime’:

“On Crime, we believe in personal responsibility and in punishing crime, but also tackling its underlying causes – so, tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime, different from the Labour approach of the past and the Tory policy of today.”

Amongst such things as parenting orders and Anti-Social Behaviour Orders, section 17 of the Act introduced the statutory requirement for public agencies to work together:

“...it shall be the duty of each authority to which this section applies to exercise its various functions with due regard to the likely effect of the exercise of those functions on, and the need to do all that it reasonably can to prevent, crime and disorder in its area.”

The ‘authorities’ include the Police Authority and local authorities, i.e. local councils. Further, sections 5 and 6 require the police, the councils, probation and health services, and other ‘responsible authorities’ to formulate and implement a three year strategy for crime and disorder reduction, following a review and analysis, and to “obtain the view of persons or bodies in the area” – in other words, consult.

The enshrining of partnership work in this way not only begins to legitimise Alderson’s approach (discussed in the preceding chapter), but actually places it on a statutory footing. The notion of local authorities having to pay due regard to crime and disorder

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426 Labour party manifesto, General Election 1997, from http://psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/man/lab97.htm accessed 3/10/07
428 Ibid Section 6(2)(d)
was anathema – surely that is police business? The degree of adherence to this part of the Act varied – and varies – tremendously, both geographically and temporally.

The Act also introduces a range of ‘racially aggravated’ offences. These, in general terms, are existing offences which are committed and at the time of commission, or immediately beforehand, the offender demonstrates hostility towards the victim based on the victim’s membership, or presumed membership, of a racial group. The introduction of these offences is a clumsy attempt at eliminating ‘hate’ related incidents, and endeavours to take a step along the road of community harmony and cohesion. It can be argued that the establishment of these racially aggravated offences under sections 28-32 of the Crime and Disorder Act begin to enshrine in law the societal evolution recommended by Macpherson under paragraph 6.54, quoted above.

Taken together, both of the above parts of the Act have roots which can be traced back to the disorder of the 1980s. Although based around crime and ‘anti-social’ behaviour, the statutory partnership work has clear links with Scarman - for example, in his suggestion that the failure to tackle inner city problems was linked to a “lack of an effective coordinated approach…between central and local government”429 and that local communities should be more fully involved in the decisions that effect them – in essence, consultation and engagement.430

There are, of course, some difficulties with ‘partners’ working together. Organisations will have different performance indicators, different management structures, and different ‘layers’ to them. Communication within agencies is often fragmented; communication between partners is fraught with difficulty. Are these inhibitors inimical to achieving the very aims which spawned the partnership agenda in the first place? Whatever the answer to this hackneyed question, ‘partnership’ working is increasingly relied upon to deliver ‘community safety’, and whilst ‘community safety’ may mean nothing more than crime and disorder reduction to some,431 ‘community safety’ should clearly encompass issues relating to radicalisation and terrorism. The nature of organisations also varies – councils are subject to political inclination, and are likely to have an eye on the next round of elections in a way which the police and others such as

429 Scarman, Mr Justice (1981) op cit para 6.6
430 Ibid para 6.7
the probation service will not. On the other hand, this does make them responsive to public opinion in a way that police and other agencies tend not to be.

4.4 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) Diversity Inspections

In 1997, HMIC published the first of a trio of thematic inspections of police forces. The first, *Winning the Race: Policing Plural Communities* found that Community and Race Relations (CRR) was not at the core of police thinking but had edged to the periphery, and the report made twenty recommendations.⁴³² Although phrased in a less authoritative manner, the links these recommendations have with Lord Scarman’s Report are self evident. For example, Recommendation 4.1 states:

“Forces should publicly reaffirm their commitment to investing in good community and race relations as a core function of policing, this being reflected in the production of sound policies and strategies.”⁴³³

Other recommendations talk of the importance of training, recruitment and retention in respect of police officers and staff from ethnic minority communities,⁴³⁴ and the importance of the community beat officer.⁴³⁵ These are all key themes upon which, as I have demonstrated, Scarman focused much attention.

The second thematic, a follow-up inspection in 1999 entitled *Winning the Race: Policing Plural Communities Revisited*, found that little had changed and added a further six recommendations.⁴³⁶ Once again, the links with Scarman, and the need to re-state recommendations from their first report, demonstrates a lack of progress by the police in learning key lessons for the effective delivery of policing services to ethnic minority communities. This lack of progress, set against the reported evidence in the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, resulted in a third inspection in 2000, which uniquely involved all 43 police forces in England and Wales rather than the more usual representative sample. This third inspection, *Winning the Race: Embracing Diversity*,

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⁴³³ Ibid Recommendation 4.1
⁴³⁴ Ibid Recommendations 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 4.13, 4.14
⁴³⁵ Ibid Recommendation 4.9
set out to benchmark the 43 forces against the 26 recommendations of the previous thematic inspections.\textsuperscript{437}

The conclusions report a number of relevant points. Firstly, HMIC were pleased to record optimism that the police service was on the road to recovery following the disappointment of the earlier two inspections.\textsuperscript{438} But the report also stated:

“\textquote[The Service took significant strides forwards in the wake of The Scarman Report 1981...Whilst some of the post-Scarman progress is still evident, much was allowed to ebb away...The gains in response to the thematics, the positive response to the organisational catharsis on the publication of The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry report, must not be allowed to evaporate in the same way.}”\textsuperscript{439}

Progress was unsatisfactory and the Government legislated.

\section*{4.5 Race Equality Legislation}

The Government attempted to combat racial discrimination through a series of Race Relations Acts. The first was in 1965, and this outlawed racial discrimination in certain places of public resort. The second Act in 1968 outlawed racial discrimination in employment, housing and commercial services. Considerable ongoing evidence of covert racial discrimination persisted, and the third Act was passed in 1976.\textsuperscript{440} Although the Acts considerably tightened the law in relation to discrimination on the grounds of race, they fell short of a statutory responsibility on public agencies to pro-actively tackle the problem.

\subsection*{4.5.1 The Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000\textsuperscript{441}}

On 3 December 2001, the provisions of the above Act came into effect. It imposed a positive duty on public authorities to promote race equality. This meant that public

\textsuperscript{438} Ibid, Executive Summary, para 30
\textsuperscript{439} Ibid, para 32
\textsuperscript{440} Pilkington (1984) Op cit p150
\textsuperscript{441} www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/34/enacted accessed 7/2/12
authorities, including police forces (and police authorities, who are treated as a separate entity), must have due regard to the need to:

a. Eliminate unlawful racial discrimination
b. Promote equality of opportunity and
c. Promote good relations between people of different racial groups

By May 2002, all forces were expected to have detailed plans in place demonstrating how they would meet these duties. Doing it correctly would ensure public authorities eradicated the ‘institutional racism’ first postulated by Lord Scarman, and later prosecuted by Macpherson. Much effort ensued, and police forces published Race Equality Schemes which laid out how they intended to meet the statutory duties.

Unfortunately, progress was still very slow, and this was thrown into very sharp relief by Mark Daly, in his BBC programme *The Secret Policeman* as described in seminal event 3, Chapter Two.

4.6 Commission for Racial Equality: Formal Investigation

Immediately following the programme, there was a severe backlash both within and without the police service. Exactly how far had the police moved on? Were they complying with their statutory duties under Race Equality legislation? Had they learned anything from the previous *causes celebres*?

On 30 October 2003, Trevor Phillips, Chair of the Commission for Racial Equality speaking at the Metropolitan Police Black Police Association’s AGM, announced a formal investigation of the police service in England and Wales. The sense of frustration of the panel of commissioners can be summed up in the introduction to the final report:

“Policing in England and Wales must be among the most regulated and scrutinised of public services. In the field of racial equality, this has been reinforced by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000. It should not now or in the future be necessary for external events, such as the tragedy of the murder of Stephen Lawrence, and its flawed investigation, or the BBC documentary The Secret Policeman, to happen

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before real and measurable progress is made in an area which everyone concerned with its governance accepts as being one of the highest importance. Still less should it be necessary for the CRE, a small organisation that is responsible for racial equality throughout society, to become yet another permanent or semi-permanent, part of the actual governance of policing.\footnote{Commission for Racial Equality (2005) ‘The Police Service in England and Wales: Final Report of a formal investigation by the Commission for Racial Equality’ London: CRE para 1.10}

The findings of the investigation were disappointing. Of fifteen forces investigated in an initial investigation, fourteen were found to be non-compliant with their statutory duties as defined under the Race Relations (Amendment) Act.\footnote{Commission for Racial Equality (2004) ‘A formal Investigation of the Police Service in England and Wales. An Interim Report’ London: CRE para 2.11} Sir David Calvert-Smith QC commented:

“Willingness to change at the top is not translating into action lower down, particularly in middle-management where you find the ice in the heart of the Police Service.”\footnote{Calvert-Smith, Sir D (2005) quoted on http://www.cre.gov.uk/Default.aspx?locID=0hgnew058.htm accessed 25 September 2006.}

The report also identified a lack of joined-up governance and haphazard compliance with the statutory duty to eliminate racial discrimination and to promote equality of opportunity and good race relations. This was a pretty clear assessment that evolution by the police to embrace race equality and recognise the needs of minority groups in the community was sluggish at best and non-existent at worst.

So far, I have examined legislative and policy responses to the first three seminal events described in Chapter Two, and demonstrated slow progress by the police in learning lessons from the past. I now consider the responses to seminal events 4 and 5.

4.7 ‘The Cantle Report’

The Cantle Report was produced by the Community Cohesion Review Team, led by Ted Cantle, and was set up following the disorders in Bradford and Oldham in 2001, described in seminal event 4, Chapter Two. Its Terms of Reference state “to obtain the views of local communities, including young people, local authorities, voluntary and
faith organisations, in a number of representative multi-ethnic communities, on the issues that need to be addressed in developing confident, active communities and social cohesion.” 446 The contribution of the report is significant because it describes in a practical sense what earlier academic work (reviewed in Chapter Three) had forecast.

Before producing a list of 67 practical measures, to be addressed by a range of agencies, the team found a number of key issues relating to the question of social cohesion. In particular, they were struck by the depth of polarization in towns and cities. These included separate educational arrangements, community and voluntary bodies, employment, places of worship, social and cultural networks – all meaning that communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives. 448 In an almost prescient portent of things to come, they outlined the risk in the following paragraph:

“There is little wonder that the ignorance about each others’ communities can easily grow into fear; especially where this is exploited by extremist groups determined to undermine community harmony and foster divisions.” 449

The notion that fearful and vulnerable communities can be exploited by extremist groups begins to pave the way for an understanding of how social division and community disharmony results in the risk of radicalisation and, ultimately, evolution to terrorism. They found that there was little evidence of attempts to resolve this problem, and “failure ran through most institutions…” 450

Cantle also finds evidence of the identity crisis, clearly illustrated as a key component of radicalisation-risk in the preceding chapter:

“In such a climate, there has been little attempt to develop clear values which focus on what it means to be a citizen of a modern multi-racial Britain and many still look backwards to some supposedly halcyon days of a mono-cultural society, or alternatively look to their country of origin for some form of identity.” 451

447 Ibid para 2.1
448 Ibid
449 Ibid para 2.3
450 Ibid para 2.5
451 Ibid para 2.6
Cantle and his team recognised that some communities felt particularly disadvantaged and that the lack of hope and the frustration borne out of poverty and deprivation created a fertile ground for disaffection to grow.\textsuperscript{452} Yet these communities were not always well targeted, nor even identified. This goes right to the heart of the issue – the failure to identify disadvantaged communities, the failure to develop mitigation action, the failure to heed warning signals – whether through ignorance, or through inappropriate structures and processes, allows perceptions of injustice and a sense of discrimination to grow. As these evolve into declining levels of state legitimacy and growing disaffection, so communities and ‘sub-communities’ (often male, often under thirty years, the general profile of those engaged in the riots of the 1980s, as well as the terrorist suicide missions of the new millennium) become vulnerable to radicalisation.

The report is commendable in its determination to avoid ‘problematising’ any one group - making it clear that tackling poverty and disaffection should be seen as part of an equalities programme. This is of course partly because the unrest involved fights between whites and blacks – some white groups feeling that their needs were not always recognised.\textsuperscript{453}

The recommendations relating to policing cover such things as protocols between councils and police authorities to ensure criminality and tensions can be tackled on both sides robustly. They also talk of the value of ‘community policing’.\textsuperscript{454} In essence though, the recommendations are fairly superficial. They do not specify how a police team might identify problems, what they should do in response, and with whom. Neither do they mention the National Intelligence Model (although this was in its infancy at the time) nor the Crime and Disorder Act. The report does not have the scope to delve any deeper into the detail; the research aspect of this thesis will develop some of Cantle’s themes in more depth, and the resolution of the research objectives at section 8.2, Chapter Eight builds on the general recommendations of the Cantle report.

There are two key aspects of the report which are noteworthy. The first is alluded to above – the manner in which the proposals and recommendations position themselves within the equality realm. The second one is the multi-agency nature of the recommendations. It clearly articulates a partnership stance in resolving the problem. A

\textsuperscript{452} Ibid para 2.10
\textsuperscript{453} Ibid para 5.10.2
\textsuperscript{454} Ibid para 5.11.4
central tenet of the Cantle report is the need to promote community cohesion, and establish a greater sense of citizenship. ‘Community Cohesion’ became a focal point of action and discussion, further enhanced by the publication of the ministerial report chaired by John Denham MP.\textsuperscript{455} The Ministerial Group stated:

“There are no easy answers or quick fixes to the deep fracturing of communities on racial, generational and religious lines now evident in parts of Bradford, Burnley and Oldham. The causes are multi-layered and complex, and tackling them will require sustained effort, over several years, across Government working in partnership with local agencies and people….The development of effective policy responses must be truly inclusive, involving all sections of all communities.”\textsuperscript{456}

They also made the link with terrorism:

“The importance of our work has been underlined by the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC on 11 September and the consequent rise in racial incidents and community tensions.”\textsuperscript{457}

Some of the work identified by Cantle as being essential to building a cohesive community was articulated by the Local Government Association.\textsuperscript{458} They provided a report designed to assist local authorities and their partners in strengthening and building community cohesion – and addressed such issues as housing, community and political leadership, employment and the value of local strategic partnerships. A Government department, \textit{Communities and Local Government}, was established in 2001 under the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister; it was re-branded in May 2006 and Ruth Kelly became the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government. Her successor, Hazel Blears, announced an investment plan to promote cohesion and tackle community tensions.\textsuperscript{459} There is still much energy behind the concept.

\textsuperscript{456} Ibid para 10
\textsuperscript{457} Ibid para 13
\textsuperscript{458} Beecham J Sir (2002) (Chair) \textit{Guidance on Community Cohesion} London: LGA Publications
\textsuperscript{459} Labour Party Newsroom from: \url{http://www.labour.org.uk/newsroom?ResultsPage=4}, accessed 21/11/07
4.8 Assessing the Risk of Serious Public Disorder

In 1999, HMIC published a thematic report called ‘Keeping the Peace: Policing Disorder’. It specifically addresses the issue of tension indicators, and refers to Home Office Circular 39/1982, discussed in Chapter Three. Much of this is therefore repetitive – a case of going over old ground from nearly two decades earlier, as well as confirming academic work done following urban disorder in 1960s America – also reviewed in Chapter Three. It is perhaps surprising then that one of the issues arising from the unrest in 2001 is, once again, the question of tension indicators, and how they might be used to forecast the likely occurrence of public disorder. Four tension indicators in particular were identified as being a pre-cursor to the violence in 2001. These were a rise in racist attacks, a rise in racist graffiti, a rise in racist activity on the Internet and a rise in the activities of the Far Right. Much was made of the value of community intelligence and the need to ensure suitable analysis methods in conjunction with strong partnership work involving many agencies and people from the community, and although the tenor tends to confirm in a practical sense the ‘ladder of escalation’ model proposed in Chapter Three, nowhere is the connection with radicalisation and terrorism made. It is perhaps significant that of the six episodes of serious urban disorder taking place between April and July 2001, two occurred in Bradford and one in Leeds. West Yorkshire was home to three of the four suicide bombers from July 7th. It is thus crucial to ensure that the police and other agencies are structured correctly to ensure they collect information and intelligence that forewarn of heightened risk, thus enabling mitigation action to be implemented.

4.9 Responses to The London Transport Bombings

The discussion turns now to the fifth seminal event described in Chapter Two. The London bombings mark a very significant occurrence in the context of policing the United Kingdom generally, and policing ethnic minority communities specifically, although it is fair to say that the evolution of the UK’s response to international

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462 Ibid pp19
463 Ibid pp19-24
464 Ibid p7
terrorism began prior to the incidents in London in 2005.\textsuperscript{465} This section examines a number of areas of relevance, though does not have sufficient capacity to micro-analyse each one.

The British police service response to the threat of terrorism evolved during the last three decades, based initially around the threat from Irish Republican terrorism from the 1970s and into the 1980s.\textsuperscript{466} Since early 2003, the United Kingdom has had a long-term strategy for countering international terrorism known within Government and to police services as CONTEST.\textsuperscript{467} Its aim is to reduce the risk from international terrorism, so that people can go about their daily lives freely and with confidence. The strategy is divided into four principal strands: Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare. The Prevent strand is the relevant strand for the purposes of the current discussion. It is concerned with tackling the radicalisation of individuals and aims to do this by (i) Tackling disadvantage and supporting reform - addressing structural problems in the UK and overseas that may contribute to radicalisation, such as inequalities and discrimination; (ii) Deterring those who facilitate terrorism and those who encourage others to become terrorists by changing the environment in which the extremists and those radicalising others can operate, and (iii) Engaging in the battle of ideas - challenging the ideologies that extremists believe can justify the use of violence, primarily by helping Muslims who wish to dispute these ideas to do so.\textsuperscript{468}

Underpinning this as a concept is the notion that ‘Communities Beat Terrorism’ – a much quoted mantra. Sir Ian Blair, Metropolitan Police Commissioner stated “It is not the police or the intelligence services that will defeat the terrorists, it is the communities. They must be our eyes and ears on the streets and tell us about their concerns.”\textsuperscript{469} He was supported by his Deputy, Paul Stephenson.\textsuperscript{470} Here lies a difficulty. On the one hand, it is essential to engage communities, and identify that certain communities – and in a general sense, Islamic communities – are more vulnerable than others to exploitation by extremists, intent on causing harm to the UK.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{466} Weston K (2005) ‘International Terrorism – The British Police Strategy’ Police International Counter Terrorism Unit
\bibitem{467} From \url{http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page36.html} accessed 25/11/07
\bibitem{468} Ibid
\bibitem{469} Blair I, Sir (2006) quoted on \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/london/5156968.stm} accessed 25/11/07
\end{thebibliography}
On the other hand, there is a pressing need to avoid stigmatising and further alienating a community, the likely outcome of which is only to increase their vulnerability to radicalisation. Is it, for example, sensible to employ this type of dogma:

“…when will the Muslim community in this country accept an absolute, undeniable, total truth: that Islamic terrorism is THEIR problem? THEY own it. And it is THEIR duty to face it and eradicate it.” 471

When one considers that this was from a former Metropolitan Police Commissioner, one may well question whether there has been much attention paid to the second part of the conundrum – i.e. the need to avoid stigmatising and alienating a given community.

4.10 A Developed Understanding

The British Government, security services and police forces commenced a journey in the aftermath of July 7 2005; a journey at break-neck speed to find a solution to the problem of so-called home grown terrorism. The Metropolitan Police reviewed and reorganised its structure, merging Special branch with the Anti-Terrorism Branch to form the Counter-Terrorism Command on October 2 2006.472 All police forces were tasked to develop a better understanding of Muslim Communities, to develop a ‘Rich Picture’.473 This included an assessment of potential meeting places, details of Mosques and bookshops – venues where groups may meet and become radicalised. This approach was (is) ‘run’ by Special Branch – more used to dealing with Irish Republican Terrorism where invisible means of intelligence gathering was crucial. The Government also established seven community-led working groups under the ‘Preventing Extremism Together’ (PET) initiative to develop practical recommendations for tackling violent extremism.474 They were asked to consider things such as engaging with young people, education, Muslim women, supporting regional and local initiatives and community actions, Imam training and accreditation, the role of Mosques as a resource for the

474 ‘Communities and neighbourhoods’ from http://www.communities.gov.uk/archived/general-content/comunities/preventingextremisntogether accessed 2/12/07
whole community, community security, and tackling extremism and radicalisation, and to report within six weeks using a budget of £10k. 64 recommendations were produced, 27 for Government and 37 for Muslim communities.

All of these measures were conceived and implemented extremely quickly and very soon after the events of July 2005. The potential for further marginalising Muslim communities can easily be seen in each of them. Using Special Branch to develop a better understanding of Muslim communities, even re-badged under a banner of ‘Counter-terrorism command’, is fraught with danger (although a notable exception to this is the Muslim Contact Unit in the Metropolitan Police, which worked very hard to develop pioneering partnerships with challenging partnership groups475). Special Branch officers are renowned for, and skilled at, working in an undercover secretive manner; attributes which are not well suited for promoting an agenda requiring transparency and engagement. The PET initiative too has been described as a wasted opportunity in five key ways476: (i) it was rushed; (ii) the schedule was problematic – it coincided with Ramadan, betraying a telling lack of religious and cultural knowledge on the part of civil servants; (iii) question marks over the extent to which those Muslims engaged were qualified to represent their communities (there were no women, and very few people under the age of 50); (iv) accusations that the government had set the PET agenda before the process had even begun; and (v) there has been very little follow-through on the actions and the working groups have now disbanded. Other problems with this agenda included ‘Preventing Extremism Together – Places of Worship’477. This had the potential to stigmatise Islam even further. ACPO agreed: “The focus on places of worship is unhelpful as it will lead to identification of faith, especially Islam, with terrorism.”478 I present data regarding the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ agenda, with some analytical discussion, in section 7.7.2 of Chapter Seven.

4.11 The Legislative Framework

It is a common course of events that when the United Kingdom experiences some seminal or momentous event, the Government of the day brings forward hastily prepared legislation, generally attempting, often in a clumsy manner, to prevent such an

476 Ibid pp 26-28
incident happening again, and to be seen to be doing something positive. The response in this case was no exception, and continues today. The die had already been cast with the Terrorism Act 2000, which proscribes various terrorist organisations, enhancing the power of the police by providing them with greater powers to investigate terrorism; it also provides the police with the power to arrest a person whom the officer ‘reasonably suspects to be a terrorist’. Under this Act, it is a criminal offence to incite terrorism, and this has created clashes with civil liberties groups anxious to protect free speech as provided for under Articles 9 and 10 of the Human Rights Act (1998).

In response to September 11th 2001, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 2001 became law in December of that year. Key features of this Act were the cutting-off of terrorist funding; ensuring cooperation and sharing of information to counter a terrorist threat between Government agencies and departments; streamlining appropriate immigration procedures; protecting the nuclear and aviation industries and a variety of other measures. The House of Lords found that Part IV (Immigration and Asylum) breached the European Commission on Human Rights (ECHR), with Lord Hoffman stating that “Terrorist violence, serious as it is, does not threaten our institutions of government or our existence as a civil community…The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these.” In many ways, this goes right to the heart of the problem with terrorism legislation. Ultimately, it represents a diminution of civil liberties, justified some might say owing to the threat the nation faces. However, the tightening of these liberties is a dangerous and slippery road – and aspects adversely affect, or might be perceived to adversely affect, members of minority ethnic communities. This further undermines perceptions of social justice and state legitimacy, contributing to the already fertile environment for the development of radicalisation and violent extremism.

The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 followed. It introduced ‘control orders’ in two forms. The first, a strict form, requires the UK government to derogate from Article 5 (Right to Liberty and Security) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); the second is less harsh and requires no such derogation. Control orders can be used to

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479 Terrorism Act 2000, Section 41(1)  
481 Explanatory Notes to Anti-Terrorism, Crime And Security Act 2001 para 3  
482 Kfir I (2006) op cit p5  
483 Explanatory Notes to Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 para 5
restrict activities such as access to the internet, movement to or within certain areas and curfews. They are highly controversial because of the clash between them and the ECHR – *inter alia* Articles 5, 8 (Right to Privacy) 10 and 11 (Freedom of Association). They rest upon the civil standard of proof, (on the balance of probabilities), rather than the criminal (beyond reasonable doubt), and may be used for a *suspected* terrorist – i.e. someone who has yet to be charged or convicted of an offence. Although such measures may be justified, crucial to their legitimacy is the winning of hearts and minds of the public, in particular those sections that are most disenfranchised and most likely to be affected.

On March 30 2006, the Terrorism Act received its Royal Assent. The Act was designed with a central aim of tackling those promoting extremist activities, and was intended to reform and extend previous counter-terrorist legislation to ensure that UK law enforcement agencies had the necessary powers to tackle the threat. Article 5 of the Council of Europe Convention on the prevention of Terrorism requires states to have an offence of ‘public provocation to commit a terrorist act’. Thus, it became an offence to glorify the commission or preparation of acts of terrorism. The Act also covers the dissemination of books and other publications, including material from the internet, which must be done for the purposes of encouraging or inducing a terrorist act. The Act came at a time of tremendous controversy over detention of suspects without charge. The Prime Minister, Tony Blair, suffered his first Commons defeat in his efforts to secure a period of 90 days detention-without-charge, on the advice of the Metropolitan Police. A compromise was reached on extending the period from 14 days to 28 days. Civil rights groups were ‘heartened’ by this decision, and other concessions were achieved in the form of judicial review of the detention process. This debate has raised its head again more recently, with the Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith, saying that the time is ‘now right’ to reconsider extending detention without charge and that the 28 day limit had already ‘been pushed’.

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484 Ibid
485 Explanatory Notes to Terrorism Act 2006 para 3
486 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism Article 5 (1)
487 Ibid section 2
488 ‘Blair defeated over terror laws’ from [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4422086.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4422086.stm) accessed 5/12/07
489 Ibid
490 ‘Longer terror detentions opposed’ from [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6917802.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6917802.stm) accessed 5/12/07
Control orders, glorification and detention-without-charge are highly controversial aspects of these pieces of legislation. They provide significant power to the state and to state authorities such as the police, against a backdrop of mistrust and perceived abuses of power, including domestic police errors and misjudgements like Forest Gate (the arrest of two Asian men, one of whom was shot, during a raid on 2 June 2006 when the police were acting on specific intelligence relating to the existence of a bomb; no evidence of any terrorist activity was found) to controversial foreign policy such as military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. Use of stop and search powers under section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 against a suspect profile (“we should not waste time searching old white ladies. It is going to be disproportionate. It is going to be young men, not exclusively, but it may be disproportionate when it comes to ethnic groups”\(^{491}\)\(^{491}\)), and protocols such as Operation Kratos (‘Shoot to kill’) further undermine state and police legitimacy amongst ethnic minority communities.

There was and there remains an energetic reaction to the bombings on London’s transport system which manifested itself in a variety of different ways. It might be argued that whilst the intent was good, the final product has unravelled, and Muslim communities and the Islamic faith have been further disenfranchised. The following, from Peter Clarke, Head of the Metropolitan Police’s counter-terrorism command, must be at the forefront of all activity: “Counter terrorism is done with and for communities, not to communities”.\(^{492}\)

### 4.12 The Machinery of Local Policing Delivery

This section examines the National Intelligence Model (NIM) and Neighbourhood Policing.\(^{493}\) It aims to provide an overview of what they are, and how they are intended to work. It builds on the background outlined in the second chapter, and completes the process of identifying the areas to which the primary data will be applied in order to answer the research question.

\(^{491}\) Johnston I (2005), Chief Constable BTP, quoted in ‘Community engagement to counter terrorism’, Metropolitan Police Authority, Report 9, section 23, 26 January 2006

\(^{492}\) Clarke P (2007), Head of Counter-terrorism Command, Metropolitan Police, The Today Programme BBC Radio 4, 4 December 2007

\(^{493}\) For further discussion, see Maguire, M and John, T (2006) ‘Intelligence Led Policing, Managerialism and Community Engagement: Competing Priorities and the Role of the National Intelligence Model in the UK’ Policing and Society 6:1, pp67-85
4.12.1 The National Intelligence Model

The National Intelligence Model (NIM) is a business model for law enforcement and was adopted as policy by the Association of Chief Police Officers in 2000.\(^{494}\) NIM is concerned with the proactive deployment of resources to reduce the crime and disorder problems that are detrimental to the quality of life of communities.\(^{495}\) Forces underwent major restructuring and were allocated new resources to implement it; it became a requirement that NIM existed in all forces to national minimum standards by April 2004. The model takes an intelligence-led approach to policing by identifying patterns of crime and intelligence, enabling a fundamental approach to problem solving in which resources can be tasked efficiently against an accurate understanding of crime and incident problems.\(^{496}\) It is intended to promote a cooperative approach to policing since many of the solutions to problems will require the participation of other agencies and bodies which is further strengthened with joint tasking and co-ordination processes.\(^{497}\)

NIM operates at three levels of policing: level 1: local crime and disorder, including anti-social behaviour. Level 1 policing activity is often handled through local Neighbourhood Policing teams. Level 2: cross-border issues affecting more than one Basic Command Unit (BCU) or affecting another force or regional crime activity. Level 3: serious and organised crime usually operating on a national or international scale.\(^{498}\)

There are four foundations known as assets which underpin the NIM. They are knowledge assets, system assets, source assets and people assets. System assets include technological solutions and rules and policies governing their use, including security measures.\(^{499}\) Source assets might include ‘informants’ – Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS), as well as other information from communities etc. People assets are structural in nature – intelligence managers, analysts, ACPO lead officers, for example. All of these parts contribute to the ‘intelligence product’. There are four types of intelligence product.\(^{500}\) They are (1) strategic assessments – giving an accurate overview of the current and long-term issues affecting the police force, BCU or region. They are used to set the control strategy and are based on the research and analysis of a

\(^{495}\) Ibid p77
\(^{496}\) Ibid p12
\(^{497}\) Ibid
\(^{498}\) Ibid
\(^{499}\) Ibid p21
\(^{500}\) Ibid p64
wide range of information sources. Information should not be restricted to criminal activity and criminals but should include material from a range of other sources, including external information on public perception, public satisfaction surveys, and health, welfare and education data. The control strategy sets the longer term priorities for crime prevention, intelligence and enforcement opportunities, but there is no mention here of community risk assessments which may fall outside public perception or consciousness. (2) Tactical assessments identify the shorter-term issues in a police force, BCU or region in accordance with the control strategy. The tactical assessment should be informed from a wide range of sources too, including records from police databases, and through Local Action Group (LAG) forums. It is a review of recent performance and actions set at previous meetings. (3) Target profiles are secured by the Tasking and Coordinating Group (T&CG – see below) and aim to secure a greater understanding of a person or group of people. (4) Problem profiles, which aim to secure a greater understanding of established and emerging crime or incident series, priority locations and other identified high risk issues.

The T&CG is a decision making and resource management body. It sits at the three levels – level 1 (BCU), level 2 (force and regional), and level 3 (national). The Strategic Tasking and Coordination Group (ST&CG) – level 2 - consists of senior managers from across the force (some forces have introduced partner agencies at this level), and is chaired by either the Deputy Chief Constable or the Chief Constable. The group may sit as frequently as every six months with a three monthly interim review but any need to engage in a full strategic assessment at the quarterly review stage will be established. At level 1 sits the Tactical Tasking and Coordinating Group (TT&CG). This group meets once a fortnight, and prioritises intervention activity in accordance with the control strategy. It should avoid excessive responses to random events, and authorises tactical activity around four elements: crime or incident series, subjects, priority locations and other high risk issues. Terrorism falls into ‘other high risk issues’, and is not at the top of the list. To what degree is this failure to consider terrorism and related matters at the centre of the NIM contributing to the collective failure to mitigate risk? Clearly, the identification of potential radicalisation and terrorism risk fits well in this structure, but

501 Ibid p65
502 Ibid p67
503 Ibid p64
504 Ibid p70
505 Ibid p76
506 Ibid p78
the entire tenor of NIM is crime and anti-social behaviour-related. Application of the ‘ladder of escalation’ model postulated in Chapter Three would enable strategic assessments at the macro level to determine the vulnerability of a given area, town or city. This would be at level 2/3 and might include problems of discrimination, poor housing, poor education and poverty, perhaps with higher levels of right wing activity and hate crime – a detailed environmental scan should reveal these issues. This begins to demonstrate the value of partners in the NIM process. At the tactical level, level 1, shorter-term issues such as activity between individuals, within a family, or the identification of ‘tension indicators’, as discussed in Chapter Three, would inform the tasking process. Once again, the benefit of involvement of partners is obvious, and it would include the third sector. This should ensure two things: firstly, true partner engagement would maximise the opportunity for intelligence and information gathering. Once these things entered the NIM process, and were properly analysed, the TT&CG would be able to identify resources and plans to mitigate the identified risk. The second reason why true partner engagement is critical then becomes apparent – the resolution or mitigation of the risk is unlikely to be solely within the gift of the police, and partner involvement at TT&CG would enable partner resources to be allocated. This might be important in relation to, for instance, access to training. At this point, the value, the \textit{centrality}, of Neighbourhood Policing becomes obvious. Since NIM depends upon intelligence and information to work, there must be sufficient contact between the police and communities because without this contact there will be no intelligence or information flow. Other agencies who work closely with communities can obviously make an enormous contribution. I discuss a fundamental impediment to the effective operation of NIM in this arena at section 8.2.3, Chapter Eight.

4.12.2 The Local ‘Beat Officer’ and Neighbourhood Policing

“Neighbourhood Policing is an organisational strategy that allows the police, its partners and the public to work closely together to solve the problems of crime and disorder, and to improve neighbourhood conditions and feelings of security.” \textsuperscript{507}

It has three fundamental requirements. Firstly, the consistent presence of dedicated neighbourhood teams capable of working with the community to establish and maintain control – to be visible, accessible, skilled, knowledgeable and familiar to the community; secondly, intelligence-led identification of community concerns – prompt,

\textsuperscript{507} ACPO (2006a) ‘\textit{Practice Advice on Professionalising the Business of Neighbourhood Policing 2006}’ Wyboston: NCPE p10
effective, targeted action against those concerns; and thirdly, joint action and problem solving with the community and other local partners – to improve the local environment and quality of life within the community. Other government publications have set out a vision for policing which is accessible and responsive to citizen’s needs, and Neighbourhood Policing is seen as a key component.\textsuperscript{508}

The notion of ‘indicators’ are introduced to Neighbourhood Policing, albeit in a crime and anti-social behaviour context. ‘Signal crimes’ are described as ‘any criminal incident that causes change in the public’s behaviour and/or beliefs about their security’\textsuperscript{509}, whilst ‘signal disorder’ is described as an “act that breaches social order conventions and signifies the presence of other risks”, which can be social or physical in nature.\textsuperscript{510} Additionally, there are three types of priorities that can be dealt with in any neighbourhood. These are (1) Policing priorities – non-negotiable crimes and incidents that the Police Service has both a duty and responsibility to deal with (e.g. burglary, domestic violence); (2) Acute neighbourhood priorities – things that are important and serious to a small number of people, and confined to a small number of people (e.g. problem families, abusive behaviour); and (3) Chronic neighbourhood priorities – highly visible, low level issues that are witnessed by a large majority of the community (e.g. graffiti, criminal damage, fly-tipping).

“Neighbourhood Policing establishes a regime for engaging with other agencies and the public in collaborative problem-solving mechanisms” and should recognise the contributions from volunteers, community advocates and the public.\textsuperscript{511} Collaborative problem solving should be within NIM processes, and it is a fundamental requirement for the success of Neighbourhood Policing that it is integrated with NIM. Indeed, “Neighbourhood Policing should be driven by information that has been rigorously analysed, and by the disciplines of multi-agency [my emphasis] tasking and co-ordination at appropriate levels.”\textsuperscript{512} It requires the development of demographic and social data, and the development within the intelligence framework, of problem profiles identifying locations of greatest need and underlying problems. It also requires an

\textsuperscript{509} ACPO (2006a) op cit p6
\textsuperscript{510} Ibid
\textsuperscript{511} Ibid p13
\textsuperscript{512} Ibid p14
effective engagement strategy which should specifically address the needs of minority groups such as Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) communities.\textsuperscript{513}

A Neighbourhood Policing team should be selected using tough selection procedures, be specifically trained for the purpose and permanently deployed to a defined geographical area or community, which might include co-location with partners.\textsuperscript{514} These types of criteria resonate strongly with the description of the Home Beat Officer described by Scarman (see section 4.1.1, above) and the community policing concept articulated by Alderson some three decades ago.\textsuperscript{515} Other key elements of neighbourhood teams are community support officers, a new phenomenon in the delivery of local policing. They work within Neighbourhood Policing teams and alongside neighbourhood police officers and special constables.

As I demonstrated with the examination of the NIM (above), the essence of Neighbourhood Policing as presented by ACPO concerns crime and anti-social behaviour; radicalisation and terrorism do not feature. This is probably partly to do with temporal factors - the terrorist incidents of 2005 came largely after the concept of Neighbourhood Policing came to the fore. Another reason is more insidious. Neighbourhood Policing is about engaging with communities, providing them with an opportunity to identify their concerns, and working with them to resolve the problems. How many communities are likely to identify radicalisation and potential growth of terrorism as a problem within their midst? Since radicalisation and terrorism are conspicuous by their absence, (see section 3.1, Chapter Three for a discussion of the crime-terror nexus) it is worth conjecturing where in the Neighbourhood Policing model they might sit. It is argued in the preceding chapter that a ‘ladder of escalation’ can be postulated, within which radicalisation and terrorism exist. Whether or not these phenomena, and other related examples of ‘social protest’, can be identified by communities as policing priorities is arguable, because they are dependent upon other social variables. Examples of such variables include perceptions of social justice, discrimination and legitimacy, all examined from a theoretical point of view in Chapter Three. Declining levels of state legitimacy will militate against a given community working with the police, let alone identifying radicalisation as a policing priority. This presents a problem, and means that the police and their partners need to be pro-actively

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{513} Ibid \\
\textsuperscript{514} Ibid p18 \\
\textsuperscript{515} Alderson JC (1979) `Policing Freedom' Plymouth: Macdonald & Evans Ch 23-30
\end{flushright}
looking for the signals – those signals discussed and elucidated in Chapter Three - and reacting accordingly. If they do not, the signs may well be missed, and no mitigation action taken.

4.12.3 NIM and Neighbourhood Policing in Action

The strategic assessment should include a consideration of issues that are of most concern to the community, thus ensuring the co-ordination of Neighbourhood Policing utilising the tasking and coordinating process described by NIM. Therefore strategic tasking and coordinating meetings should include a representative of each organisation with the authority to direct activity in their own organisation and to commit appropriate resources. Similarly, tactical tasking groups should be attended by representatives of the various agencies who can commit resources at a tactical level. Indeed, “the chairs of strategic and tactical T&CG can be from any partner organisation.”

An essential element of neighbourhood coordination is a neighbourhood profile, a descriptive product which brings together information from a wide range of publicly available sources. It can contain demographic information, levels of deprivation and other factors, crime and disorder levels etc, and it should be updated every three to six months, widely accessible and used to create the strategic assessment. Clearly, in the determination of the risk of a given community to radicalisation and growth of violent extremism, this is a crucial aspect of the assessment process, and needs to be considered with conscious thought as to the existence of the risk.

Problematic issues in neighbourhoods should be subject to a neighbourhood problem solving plan, which should include details of the owner and representatives of partner organisations. In appropriate cases, these plans feed into the tactical tasking and coordinating groups and onwards to the strategic assessment if they are of such prominence that they might influence strategic decision making. Such issues would be supported by community intelligence, created when information from the community

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516 Ibid p24
517 Ibid p8
517 Ibid p9
520 Ibid p11
has been subject to evaluation and risk assessment.\textsuperscript{521} This information might include patterns of crime and disorder, changes in tension between different communities or within the same community, and therefore is likely to also include specific information relating to the growth of ‘anti-western’ or ‘anti-American’ graffiti or similar signals in a given area, the growth of extremist activity, or one-dimensional media reporting – those ‘indicators’ discussed in Chapter Three which forewarn of the escalating risk. Guidance on these issues is, once again, conspicuous by its absence. The challenge is two-fold – firstly, the recognition of these signs and thus their evaluation and assessment; and secondly, the understanding of what they might signify.

\textbf{4.13 Summary and five ‘Critical Success Factors’}

Despite the government legislating, and despite the seminal policing mistakes exemplified by Lawrence, progress by the police service in the area of race and community relations was woefully slow, and other agencies little better. I propose that the lack of progress by such a significant agent within the social framework of the UK is indicative of the failure of wider British society and governmental social policy to recognise and respond to the needs of minority communities and that, moreover, this has contributed to the disenfranchised feeling amongst young black people and Asians. This has contributed to the risk not only of race riots but also to the development of harmful radicalisation and the desire, in some cases, to attack Britain through the use of terror.

To ensure counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation are seen as core business of police forces and Crime and Disorder Reduction partnerships, and to ensure that they are fully sited within the NIM, notwithstanding the fact that NIM was primarily developed as a model to deal with crime and disorder, the starting point is the strategic assessment. Properly using Neighbourhood Policing at the tactical level should follow on from this process. Tactical tasking and Neighbourhood Policing in their pure form should permit true partnership responses to mitigate risk. The obstacles are these: firstly, that NIM and Neighbourhood Policing have been developed with crime and disorder at their core, not radicalisation, violent extremism or terrorism. Are neighbourhood staff - which should include representatives from the police, other statutory partners, and the third sector - actively observing, seeking and collecting

\textsuperscript{521} Ibid p14
information which will reliably inform the tactical and strategic assessment of a given locality, thus enabling effective mitigation response? Secondly, Neighbourhood Policing, or neighbourhood management, are dependant upon communities identifying their priorities. Where radicalisation and terrorism are concerned, this may not be appropriate. Communities may not know that they are vulnerable, or, in severe cases, may choose to refuse to engage with public authorities – the disenfranchised may not consider the state to be legitimate. In these cases, a much more pro-active approach is required, capable of execution through Neighbourhood Policing and the NIM, but with innovative and challenging engagement of influential and possibly radical groups and individuals within communities. The third challenge is the level to which partners – statutory as well as third sector – are truly part of the tasking and coordinating structure. If this is not in place, then neither the information/intelligence gathering arm, nor the mitigation arm will be effective.

In the examination of the legal and policy responses from the first four seminal events, certain key themes emerge which pertain directly to policing and police organisations. These might be termed ‘critical success factors’, since successful delivery of them optimises the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of minority and disenfranchised groups, thereby minimising the risk of adverse social protest. They can be summarised as follows:

- The need to work in partnership with other agencies, especially education and housing departments.
- The police organisation needs to strive to reflect the community it serves, and the recruitment, retention and promotion of ethnic minority staff is a crucial part of this.
- Community representatives should be involved in training, especially community awareness training.
- The local ‘beat officer’ or Neighbourhood Policing team has a vital role and must attract officers of high calibre.
Police organisations must work towards the elimination of racial discrimination of all types, and contribute towards the development of cohesive communities.

These factors are revisited in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight, where they are contextualised within the theatre of the case-study, reality-checked, and conclusions drawn.

The following chapter describes methodology which takes the foundationalist arguments from Chapter Three and the realist responses critically examined above into the theatre of the case study, testing the ‘common roots’ hypothesis and examining whether the National Intelligence Model and Neighbourhood Policing are actually capable of identifying and mitigating threat in the real world.
CHAPTER FIVE:

Research Methodology

5.0 Introduction

The previous four chapters have outlined the nature of the research question, and focused thought on potential failings of public authority policy in general, and police policy in particular. They describe and argue that social conditions might be seen to fertilise the growth of radicalisation and so-called ‘home grown’ terrorism. Chapter Three proposes a link between social pre-conditions and ‘social protest’, offering a model called a ‘ladder of escalation’, and the chapter concludes with a series of questions which are distilled from the review of relevant literature. The questions are:

- How can state authorities, particularly the police, use the ‘common roots’ theory to identify communities which might be vulnerable to radicalisation and subsequent progression to terrorism?

- Does a ‘ladder of escalation’ provide an additional mechanism whereby peaceful forms of social or political activity can be used to forewarn, in the medium to longer term, of the potential for radicalisation and terrorism amongst some communities?

- To what degree can ‘tension indicators’, developed after the urban riots in the UK, be adapted to forewarn of the growth of radicalisation and terrorists within a given community?

- Is the National Intelligence Model, principally developed to tackle crime, capable of identifying radicalisation and terrorism risk factors, using the foregoing mechanisms, and developing appropriate partnership intervention strategy?
• What role does ‘Neighbourhood Policing’ play, and can a ‘toolkit’ be developed which enables local officers to assist in the identification of vulnerable communities?

• What relevance does the ‘social pre-conditions’ idea have to the current rise in gang related activity and the growth in radicalisation linked to Islam?

Chapter Four outlines policy responses to key *causes celebres* that occurred over the years 1981 to 2005. In so doing, it identifies a number of key themes, which I called ‘critical success factors’, and I argue that successful delivery of them optimises the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of minority and disenfranchised groups, thus minimising the risk of adverse social protest. As already outlined, these factors are:

• The need to work in partnership with other agencies, especially education and housing departments.

• The police organisation needs to strive to reflect the community it serves, and the recruitment, retention and promotion of ethnic minority staff is a crucial part of this.

• Community representatives should be involved in training, especially community awareness training.

• The local ‘beat officer’ or Neighbourhood Policing team has a vital role and must attract officers of high calibre.

• Police organisations must work towards the elimination of racial discrimination of all types, and contribute towards the development of cohesive communities.

The research methodology outlined in this chapter provides a means to deal with these questions and issues, and others, thereby facilitating the achievement of each of the objectives for the research identified in section 1.3.1, Chapter One.

The chapter is divided into six sections. It begins with a discussion of the philosophy of science and research, examining ontological and epistemological issues. It establishes
the critical realism stance of the thesis and discusses the search for objective reality, or the ‘truth’, and therefore the rationale for the choice of qualitative methodology. The second section discusses reliability, validity, triangulation and bias, with particular reference to the impact on the research of my position as a researcher on the one hand, and a professional police officer on the other. The third section specifies and critically discusses the nature of the qualitative method; it includes a resume of ethical issues. The fourth section is a rationale for the choice of the fieldwork site, emphasising the diversity and history of the area. Section five discusses analytical issues, whilst the final section outlines some of the practical lessons learned in conducting fieldwork of this nature.

5.1.1 Belief and Knowledge: Ontological and Epistemological Orientation

“Each social scientist’s orientation to their subject is shaped by their ontological and epistemological position….Most often, these positions are implicit rather than explicit, but, regardless of whether they are acknowledged, they shape the approach to theory and the methods which the social scientist utilises.”

Recognising and acknowledging one’s own ontological and epistemological position is important for two critical reasons: firstly, to be able to defend them against critiques from other, perhaps opposing, positions and, secondly, to inform the nature and journey the research takes as it evolves from conception through analysis to conclusion. Ontological questions deal with the very nature of ‘being’. The key question is whether there is a ‘real’ world ‘out there’ that is independent of our knowledge of it. What might the ontological position be in relation to this thesis? In both Chapters Two and Three, I have posited the notion that discrimination and state failure have contributed to the growth of radicalisation and violent extremism. I argue that this is linked to poor economic opportunity and segregation amongst minority communities. The hypothesis I advance therefore is that ethnic minorities are disadvantaged and discriminated against by state authorities and indeed wider society, and this disenfranchisement contributes to the risk and growth of violent radicalisation. These problems are reflected nationally across many (all?) ethnic minority groups, and exist independently of our knowledge of them. However, I also suggest that there are deep

523 Ibid p18
relationships which cut across time and space which are not directly observable. The religion of Islam and the wider context of Muslim oppression come together to make Islamic communities (principally Asian) particularly vulnerable to this insidious problem. The ontological position this thesis adopts, which is implicit in the foregoing chapters, is therefore foundationalist, i.e. there is a ‘real’ world out there which exists independently of our knowledge of it.

An epistemology reflects a researcher’s view of what we can know about the world, literally, an epistemology is a theory of knowledge. There are two key questions. Firstly, can an observer identify ‘real’ and tangible relations between social phenomena, and if so, how? An interpretist might argue that no observer can be ‘objective’ because they live in the social world and are affected by social constructions of ‘reality’. This is known as the double-hermeneutic: the world is interpreted by the actors (one hermeneutic level) and their interpretation is interpreted by the observer (a second hermeneutic level). This is clearly of importance to the approach of this thesis, since it seeks interpretations of phenomena, and these interpretations will in turn be interpreted. The questions are these: does this render the interpretations, or responses, specious, or misguided? How useful are they? At first glance, it might appear to challenge the foundationalist ontological position because I have argued that solutions are sought based on the idea of a ‘real’ world; solutions which will ultimately resolve the social and political problem of disenfranchisement which has been described above. I identify that the thesis seeks interpretations of the phenomena, but here I suggest that they might also be considered as arenas: the view will be different depending upon where one sits, but the phenomenon still exists. In this way, the thesis will utilise interpretations of the phenomena, and since these will take varying perspectives, the reality of the issue will be illumined. I discuss this in more detail in relation to triangulation, below, and relate it to overall findings in Chapter Seven.

The second question is related. Is it possible, through direct observation, to establish the ‘real’ relationship between social phenomena, or are there some relationships which simply exist but are not directly observable? Specifically, the question is one of interpretist versus positivist versus realist positions. Positivists believe in an ontological and epistemological position which is foundationalist i.e. they believe that the world exists and is independent of our knowledge of it, and they aim to establish causal

524 Ibid p19
525 Ibid
relationships between social phenomena and therefore develop explanatory and even predictive models.\textsuperscript{526}\textsuperscript{526} Halfpenny (1982) describes various types of positivism, making the point that there are many different understandings of how the term ‘positivism’ is used.\textsuperscript{527}\textsuperscript{527} He identifies twelve positivisms, exposes their strengths and weaknesses, and demonstrates how introspective examination of positivism might lead towards realism, ‘where the crucial features of science are thought of as manifestations of ontologically real structures and process which are only partly revealed to experience but which guarantee the objectivity of science’.\textsuperscript{528}\textsuperscript{528} Importantly, he discusses the leap from physical science to sociology, highlighting that “attempts to establish any sort of positivist hegemony in sociology have always faced [so many] numerous challenges that alternative understandings of the social world are more appropriate to the human nature of its subject matter”.\textsuperscript{529}\textsuperscript{529} In the context of this research, we are dealing with human subjects and social structures. Since these social structures and the human subjects are inextricably linked, Halfpenny’s warning is highly relevant, and the applicability of positivism in its pure form to this thesis is fatally flawed.

The antithesis of positivism is the interpretist position. The interpretist tradition argues that the world is socially constructed and therefore does not exist independently of our knowledge of it.\textsuperscript{530}\textsuperscript{530} This stance leads to the double hermeneutic, discussed above.

The realist is also foundationalist in ontological terms, however the tradition establishes that there are deep structural relationships between social phenomena which cannot be directly observed but which are essential for the explanation of behaviour. Roy Bhaskar was a philosopher who introduced the idea of realism as “a comprehensive alternative to the positivism which since the time of Hume has fashioned our image of science.”\textsuperscript{531}\textsuperscript{531} His arguments are related to the world of physical science, and he describes ‘intransitive objects of knowledge’ – those things which would continue to occur even if man did not exist, such as the specific gravity of mercury, and ‘transitive objects’ – the artificially created models, methods and techniques available to scientific workers.\textsuperscript{532}\textsuperscript{532} The first is ontological in nature (\textit{being}); the second epistemological (\textit{knowledge}). The arguments

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{526} Ibid p20
\textsuperscript{527} Halfpenny P (1982) \textit{‘Positivism and Sociology’}, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd p11
\textsuperscript{528} Ibid p117-118
\textsuperscript{529} Ibid p120
\textsuperscript{530} Marsh D and Furlong P (2002) op cit p26
\textsuperscript{531} Bhaskar R (1975) \textit{‘A Realist Theory of Science’} 2\textsuperscript{nd} Ed, Hassocks: The Harvester Press 1978 p12
\textsuperscript{532} Ibid p21
\end{footnotesize}
developed by Bhaskar hold importance in the world of social science, a term itself which has some ontological emotion. Marsh and Furlong believe that “contemporary realism’ has been significantly influenced by the interpretist critique”. They describe this as ‘modern critical realism’, and suggest it acknowledges two points. The first is that while social phenomena exist independently of our interpretation of them, our interpretation affects outcomes. Here lies the solution to the apparent paradox I identify above: this thesis interprets interpretations, but this hermeneutic characteristic is permitted within the framework of realism modified by an interpretist aspect. Their second point is that our theory of the world is fallible – we need to “understand both the external ‘reality’ and the social construction of that ‘reality’ if we are to explain the relationships between social phenomena.” This has clear implications for the research, which has as its theatre social constructs, with human subjects an integral part of the overall framework.

5.1.2 The Quest for ‘Truth’

In his preface to the second edition of his highly accessible book *Method in Social Science*, Andrew Sayer articulates the importance of implications of realist philosophy for method and is clear that “realism is a philosophy of and for the whole of the natural and social sciences”. Realism philosophy enters the realms of truth and concept and, in so doing, confronts the epistemology of positivist and interpretist traditions. What is the relationship between thought and the material world? Describing our observation of ‘facts’, or the ‘truth’ is inherently metaphorical; terminology such as ‘relationship between’ and ‘corresponds to’ demonstrates this problem. Moreover, the description is dependent upon a fallible conception of what the truth actually is, and “we can never justifiably claim to have discovered the absolute truth about matters of fact”. Sayer introduces an important substitute for the concept of ‘truth’ (he refers to it as a modification), and describes ‘practical adequacy’. This intellection acknowledges the fallibility of our knowledge of ‘truth’ and suggests that, in order to be ‘practically adequate’, “knowledge must generate expectations about the world which are actually

533 Marsh D and Furlong P (2002) op cit p31
534 Ibid
535 Ibid
536 Ibid
538 Ibid p67
539 Ibid p69
realized” and that “knowledge is useful where it is ‘practically adequate’ to the
world”. This philosophical argument reinforces the position I adopt for the research –
we are not aiming to establish absolute truth, the objective is to discover ‘practically
adequate’ explanations which provide the opportunity to develop effective policy
responses.

Unsurprisingly, critiques of realism come from two quarters. Firstly, the positivists
argue that positing the notion of unobservable social phenomena and relationships
makes realism claims untestable and therefore unfalsifiable. In contrast, those from
the interpretivist tradition criticise the foundationalist ontological stance of realism, and
therefore reject realist claims that structures exist which cause social action. I have
negated these arguments to a significant degree because the conflation of aspects of the
positivist and interpretivist traditions found in modern critical realism deals with both
challenges. The position has important methodological implications. Although it might
be argued that it is impossible to combine realist and interpretivist traditions because of
their diametrically opposed ontological and epistemological positions, the approach
intuitively makes sense, bringing with it as it does, the best parts of both philosophies. It
paves the way for permitting discussion with human subjects about the social constructs
which exist in the case study, described below.

5.1.3 The Philosophical Case for Methodological Choice

Thus, this corpus of thought, and the ontological and epistemological orientations begin
to prescribe the nature of the research approach of the thesis – i.e. whether it should be
quantitative, qualitative or a combination of the two. A researcher from an interpretist
tradition is concerned with understanding rather than explanation and therefore the
tradition lends itself to qualitative evidence. Conversely, a positivist, looking for
causal relationships will seek a more quantitative analysis and will want to produce
‘objective’ findings. Since a realist believes that there are causal relationships, but there
may also be social phenomena which are not so easily described, a qualitative or

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540 Ibid
541 Ibid p70
542 Marsh D and Furlong P (2002) op cit p31
543 Ibid
544 Ibid p21
quantitative approach might be utilised. In order to obtain triangulation, some research programmes might adopt both, and they need not be seen as mutually exclusive.\textsuperscript{545}

The stance this thesis adopts is one of foundationalist ontology but anti-positivist epistemology, or, in other words, a critical realist position. Consequently, the primary methodological approach chosen for the research is qualitative, which is consistent with this philosophy. However, the data and analysis chapter, Chapter Seven, examines some quantitative data such as census information, numbers of police complaints, levels of hate crime and graffiti in order to quantitatively gauge and demonstrate casual relationships, which also sits comfortably within the critical realist tradition.

In this way, the thesis acknowledges the ‘reality’ of the relationship between the police and the communities, the ‘reality’ of the concept of Neighbourhood Policing and the National Intelligence Model, but deals with perceptions of these things, or, more appropriately, considers them from various arenas; thus demonstrating the belief in the existence of the relationship but endeavouring to deduce the nature of that relationship through perception or interpretation. This is discussed in more depth in relation to ‘triangulation’, below.

\section*{5.2.1 Triangulation, Validity and Reliability}

These three concepts are linked to the hypothetical and arbitrary point of reference one adopts, and are themselves intricately interwoven. Positivists see no difference between the natural and social worlds and are therefore concerned with producing reliable measures of social life.\textsuperscript{546} Conversely, the interpretist who treats social reality as always in flux need not worry whether the research instrument measures accurately.\textsuperscript{547} But what do the terms mean? Kirk and Miller (1986) provide the following explanation in relation to validity and reliability:

“A thermometer that shows the same reading of 82 degrees each time it is plunged into boiling water gives a reliable measurement. A second thermometer might give readings over a series of measurements that vary from around 100 degrees. The


\textsuperscript{547} Ibid p146
second thermometer would be unreliable but relatively valid, whereas the first would be invalid but perfectly reliable”548

They go on to describe three types of reliability. The third of these, *synchronic reliability*, the reliability of observations within the same time period, might be assessed through triangulation of methods,549 discussed below.

Silverman quotes Hammersley (1990) to define validity: “By validity, I mean truth: interpreted as the extent to which an account accurately represents the social phenomena to which it refers.”550 The concept of ‘truth’ has already been discussed above. Denzin and Lincoln are clear that “objective reality can never be reached.”551 It might be suggested that triangulation can make an experiment or research project more valid. For example, different methods might enable one to see whether the results corroborate one another.552 Flick asserts that “triangulation is less a strategy for validating results and procedures than an alternative to validation… which increases scope, depth, and consistency in methodological proceedings”.553 Triangulation is now examined in some detail to consider its contribution to both validity and reliability.

“This concept of triangulation means that an issue of research is considered – or in a constructivist formulation is constituted – from (at least) two points…[it] includes researchers taking different perspectives on an issue under study or more generally in answering research questions. These perspectives can be substantiated by using several methods and/or in several theoretical approaches.” 554

This generalisation of the concept of triangulation leaves it open to a number of interpretations.

The combination of qualitative and quantitative method in accord with the critical realist philosophy offers some interesting possibilities for triangulation in this thesis. The aim

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549 Ibid p42
552 Silverman D (1993) op cit p156
here might be to address aspects of the research question that the exclusive use of either one cannot cover, or to add validity to the findings of one method or the other. However, this pre-supposes that a ‘fixed point’ represents some reality, and, as noted in the discussion concerning the concept of ‘truth’ above, this has important ontological and epistemological problems. This is summed up by Silverman: “...if you treat social reality as constructed in different ways in different contexts, then you cannot appeal to a single ‘phenomenon’ which all your data apparently represents”. The approach this thesis adopts is one of simplicity and rigour, and although the critical realist stance dictates that attempting to arrive at a more complete picture by using a combination of qualitative and quantitative method enjoys potential triangulation advantages, I suggest that a further project might be undertaken to complement this one as an alternative to combing two methodological approaches in this one project. However, some quantitative data is presented and discussed in Chapter Seven.

Flick draws extensively on the writings of Denzin, and he describes four forms of triangulation. Data triangulation refers to the use of different sources of data as distinct from different methods. Investigator triangulation involves the use of different investigators to minimise biases emanating from an individual researchers. Theory triangulation, which involves testing varying theories against a fixed data set, supposedly preventing researchers from ignoring alternative explanations. The fourth form is triangulation of methods, both within-method and between-method, and this, claims Flick, was for Denzin above all to validate field research. Much discussion takes place about the role triangulation plays in terms of validity and reliability: does employing several methods increase reliability compared with employing just one method?

In their introduction to The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research, Denzin and Lincoln describe a crystallization process, where the tale is told from different points of view; there is no ‘correct’ telling of the event; a crystal is a prism, with multiple reflecting surfaces. The following passage sums up this conception, and successfully describes the basis upon which the research strategy of this thesis is built:

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555 Read M and Marsh D (2002) op cit p238
557 Flick (2007a) op cit pp42-45
558 Ibid p44
559 Denzin N and Lincoln Y (2005) op cit p6
“Viewed as a crystalline form, as a montage, or as a creative performance around a central theme, triangulation as a form of, or alternative to, validity thus can be extended. Triangulation is the simultaneous display of multiple, refracted realities. Each of the metaphors “works” to create simultaneity rather than sequential or linear. Readers or audiences are then invited to explore competing versions of the context, to become immersed in and merge with new realities to comprehend.”

For the current thesis, this form of triangulation is introduced, using an intra-method approach. Semi-structured interviews are used for local staff and local police officers engaged in working with communities. This in itself provides triangulation – local authority employees will have a different perspective on the ‘phenomenon’ than local police officers. Interviewing people from the community themselves introduces a third dimension, and offers a third perspective on the ‘phenomenon’. These perspectives may indeed compete – and this is de facto important to the research. They contribute to the construction, or conceptualisation, of the form of the crystal.

Triangulation is further introduced by using a participant observational method, working with local staff to assess how their interactions with communities actually work.

The essence of this approach is not to seek an objective reality, but a deeper understanding of the issues.

5.2.2 Bias and the ‘Insider’

The thesis endeavours to introduce triangulation into the research process in the manner above described. But how objective is this, given the researcher’s position as a professional police officer? What impact on the three perspectives might the professional position have? In the words of Bill Tupman “cops might just say what they think you want to hear.” Similarly, how ‘honest’ will be members of communities, knowing they are speaking with a police officer? They may be fearful of incriminating themselves, especially since it has been asserted that the police represent agents of the state. These factors, coupled with the perceptions of social injustice to which the thesis has referred, may result in disengagement.

560 Ibid
The ontological and epistemological orientation of the research project has been set out above. This will have been influenced by the professional experience of the researcher. Since it has been established that objective reality is not sought, but a deeper understanding is, the impact of the researcher’s position begins to be mitigated. A different researcher may develop a modified crystal, but this is permissible within the critical realist tradition established for this project. Indeed, there may be advantages from the research point of view in being a police officer engaged in this type of research. Punch (1993) describes the police organisation as erecting “barriers against prying outsiders”, forming an “occupational culture which is solidaristic, and wary of non-initiates.”\textsuperscript{562} He suggests that prolonged participant observation is the most appropriate, if not the sole, method for penetrating the mine-field of social defences to reach the “inner reality of police work”.\textsuperscript{563} There is an alternative, articulated by John Alderson: “it is essential that the police research themselves.”\textsuperscript{564} The researcher’s position as a police officer may in fact grant access to parts of the organisation, and the thoughts of staff working within it, which are closed to outside researchers. Bishop (2005) also considers the insider/outsider issue in relation to indigenous settings.\textsuperscript{565} He discusses both sides of the argument – whether being an insider means easy access and the ability to ask more meaningful questions, or whether insiders are inherently biased or too close to the culture to ask critical questions.\textsuperscript{566} However, he goes on to assert that such understandings ignore the diversity and complexity that characterises indigenous people’s lives: age, class, gender, colour and education are among other variables which might impact upon the research relationship.\textsuperscript{567} In the context of the current research programme then, it is important to discuss and recognise the possibility of bias, and the impact of the researcher’s position, but they are far from fatal to the project, and indeed may offer some advantages. Careful construction and preparation of the interview schedule, with appropriate ethical standards will minimise adverse impact.

5.3.1 The Qualitative Process

As previously identified, this research project is founded upon a qualitative method, principally using a semi-structured interview approach. Using this tactic enables some

\textsuperscript{563} Ibid
\textsuperscript{564} Alderson J (2008), Personal Communication, Ottery St Mary, 19 February 2008
\textsuperscript{566} Ibid
\textsuperscript{567} Ibid
of the variables discussed above to be included (age, gender etc) as well as providing an
opportunity to establish not only the ‘whats’ but also the ‘whys’ and ‘hows’. The goal
is to explore a topic more openly and allow interviewees to express their opinions and
ideas in their own words, and is in accord with the critical realist stance of the thesis.
The research design might be described as ‘tight’, characterised by research which is
based on clearly defined constructs and restricted to the investigation of particular
relationships in familiar contexts: the thesis has attempted to define the relationship
between the police and ethnic and religious minority groups, providing evidence of its
evolution over several decades. We now want to investigate the nature of that
relationship, including the degree to which partner agencies are involved – in the guise
of ‘Neighbourhood Policing’. An approach of this nature makes it easier to compare
and summarize data from different observations, building the crystal described above.
Tighter designs are based on a clearly defined plan for ‘sampling’ (see below). This is
augmented by a short period of participant observation – working with local teams to
observe the interaction with members of the community. This type of research has
strong parallels with ethnographic interviewing: in depth, open ended and
unstructured.

Much of the data in participant observation comes from observation in
the field.

The choice of interview subjects amongst the public agencies involved was based
around who is appointed in the particular geographic area concerned. Key local staff –
police officers, police community support officers, social workers, teachers and others
with responsibilities in a specific and defined geographic area, or neighbourhood(s)
were interviewed, and these have been triangulated with interviews of Asian and
Muslim people living in the area concerned. This enables intended comparison, i.e.
the views and perceptions of the participant groups are compared with each other, and
judgements made as to whether these are case-specific or group-specific. Access to
community members was facilitated largely through community advocacy groups such
as Race Equality Partnerships and other gateways into the community, using a

571 Ibid p27
572 Ibid
N and Lincoln Y (2005) op cit, p705
574 Ibid
575 Flick U (2007b) p39
‘snowball’ approach. This is discussed more fully below. It is then, a case study which permits the intensive analysis preferred in qualitative research. This approach poses the question of how representative are the findings across a wider area, or a different location; is it possible to generalise? The aim of this case study is not merely to describe it, or, in Stake’s terms, it is not an intrinsic case study, but rather the thesis aims to use it as an instrumental case study. Here, we are studying the case in depth in order to provide insight into the wider issue: “the case is of secondary interest, it plays a supportive role, and it facilitates our understanding of something else” — in this instance, we are aiming to use the case study to illuminate our understanding of how effective Neighbourhood Policing and the National Intelligence Model are at anticipating radicalisation and developing mitigation strategies, not only on the stage of this case study but also in the wider theatre of police-community interaction. Whereas quantitative research normally achieves generalisation through statistical sampling techniques, the type of qualitative research undertaken here is built upon theoretical concepts established in preceding chapters, especially Chapter Three. To this end, theoretical sampling has been employed in this project to identify the case study. In the words of Mason:

“theoretical sampling means selecting groups or categories to study on the basis of their relevance to your research questions, your theoretical position…and most importantly the explanation or account which you are developing. Theoretical sampling is concerned with constructing a sample…which is meaningful, because it builds in certain characteristics or criteria which help to develop and test your theory and explanation.”

The case has been chosen on the basis of its potential ‘fit’ with the concepts developed earlier, principally in Chapter Three, namely that urban unrest, radicalisation and suicide terrorism have common roots which consist of inter alia perceptions of social injustice, discrimination, relative deprivation and a lack of political representation. In fact, the thesis extrapolates rather than generalises — it presents arguments in the final two chapters which demonstrate how the analysis “relates to things beyond the material at hand.” The basis for extrapolation is established as being one of similarity: the

576 Silverman D (2005) op cit p127
578 Ibid
579 Silverman D (2005) op cit p126
commonality between geographical areas of demographic, social and economic factors and the similarity of perceptions of the police through the media as discussed in Chapter Two, for example, are used to draw inferences about different locations.

The rationale for the choice of the research site is examined in more detail in section 5.4. It also raises the problem of representation amongst participants from the community. Here, the limiting factors are those of resources and time. Some decision has to be made about the number and the nature of the community members who will be interviewed. The thesis has majored on the theory of disenfranchised younger members of communities as being those most vulnerable to radicalisation processes which may lead to violence, and typically male members under the age of 35. This type of profile conforms to profiles of those engaged in violent unrest as well as those involved in suicide terrorist bombings, described in Chapter Three. It is therefore not unreasonable, given the above arguments and the ‘tight’ design of the research, to endeavour to engage community members who fit this profile as participants for the research. A ‘snowball’ approach is adopted here, using a key initial interviewee to engage further participants.\textsuperscript{582} This approach is particularly important for ‘stigmatized’ groups, or those who engage in illicit behaviour.\textsuperscript{583} Although there is some subjectivity in the choice of case for this thesis, and indeed the choice of human subjects, any case might be chosen which has some typicality, but “leaning toward those that seem to offer opportunity to learn”.\textsuperscript{584} The choice of the research area is theoretically grounded,\textsuperscript{585} and is articulated below.

In order to mitigate the effect of insider bias, and to promote the efficacy of the research design, a panel of independent community members drawn from students and others at Exeter Mosque were engaged to assist with the initial development of the questionnaire, a copy of which is attached at Appendix 1. A specific framework for this questionnaire was agreed; it needed to elicit information to assist with answering the research question, as well as testing the ladder of escalation hypothesis proposed in Chapter Three. Careful refinement followed, using initial pilot interviews with key individuals in the area of the case study: senior representatives from the agencies involved, and individuals from the communities in question. These included local leaders of

\textsuperscript{582} Esterberg K (2002) op cit p93
\textsuperscript{583} Ibid p94
\textsuperscript{584} Stake R (2005) op cit p451
\textsuperscript{585} Silverman D (2005) op cit p130
community groups, head teachers, and other senior personnel. The questionnaires were then fixed. In total, 41 people were interviewed, and of these, half were community members in the sense that they were not employed by any state agency. The quest for new information began to draw to a natural close as the number of interviews increased; discovery of new themes and thoughts began to dry up; the point of theoretical saturation appeared to have been reached.\textsuperscript{586}

The gathering of qualitative data using semi-structured interviews was augmented by participant observation. As identified above, this introduces an alternative triangulation opportunity, and will further mitigate insider bias:

“In principle, participant observation can produce data which are better able than is the case with other methods to reflect the detail, the subtleties, the complexity and the interconnectedness of the social world it investigates.” \textsuperscript{587}

The nature of this aspect of the data gathering process was 16 hours spent on foot patrol with a Police Community Support Officer, attendance at six hours worth of partnership meetings, and four hours observing youth workers running clubs and a mobile bus aimed at engaging young people. Further opportunity was taken to observe the manner in which a fatal shooting of a young Asian man, which occurred in the middle of the research period and geographical location, was handled by the police and reported by the local press. I also attended and observed the subsequent community reassurance and Partners and Communities Together (PACT) meetings aimed at keeping the communities informed regarding progress of the investigation.

\textbf{5.3.2 Ethical Considerations}

The overriding importance of a programme of research which involves, engages and studies human subjects is the protection of those subjects. This is morally imperative – the first ethical codes were developed following particularly horrifying examples carried out by doctors in Nazi Germany.\textsuperscript{588} Failure in this regard will not only undermine

\begin{itemize}
\item Strauss A (1987) ‘Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists’ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p21
\item Flick U (2006) op cit p45
\end{itemize}
opportunities for participation in future research, but may also actually place subjects at risk of some harm, including risk of loss of life. The current research project has been built with Flick’s basic principles of ethically sound research at its heart:

- Informed consent which means that no one has been involved in the research as an active participant without knowing about this and without having the chance of refusing to take part.

- Deception of key research participants (by covert observation or by giving them false information about the purpose of the research) has been avoided. The identity of those involved incidentally by way of participant observation is completely unknown and therefore no risk to them exists.

- Participants’ privacy has been respected and confidentiality guaranteed and maintained.

- Accuracy of the data and their interpretation is the leading principle, which means that no omission or fraud with the collection or analysis of data has occurred in the research practice.

- In relation to the participants, respect for the person has been seen as essential.

- Beneficence, meaning the consideration of the well-being of the participants.

- Justice, i.e. addressing the relation of benefits and burdens for the research participants.

In order to ensure an ethical programme of research which is in line with the University of Exeter’s guidelines, a submission to the School of Humanities and Social Science ethics committee took place in April 2008. In summary, the following areas and activity are central to the research design:

- **The voluntary nature of participation.** Permission to engage participants from the various public agencies involved was sought from the chief executives or chief officers of those organisations. Approaches were first made in writing, including a copy of the participants consent form. These were followed up with personal contact to begin focusing the interview schedule. The opportunity was also taken to discuss the form of the period of participant observation. Once initial permission was established, individual participants were approached, and a consent form supported by the respective organisations written consent, where required, provided. In the case of community members, local advocacy and support groups were approached to facilitate the engagement of community members in a similar way to that used for the chief executives of the public agencies.

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589 Flick U (2007b) op cit p69
590 Denscombe M (1998) op cit p205
agencies. The chairmen or directors of these groups were similarly used to focus the interview schedule. ‘Snowballing’ was then used as a means to reach further into the community.

- **The informed nature of participation.** Chief executives, chief officers and participants were provided with an information sheet and consent form outlining the scope of the project, a copy of which can be found at Appendix 2. In addition to this, a verbal explanation was provided at the outset of the interviews, and there was an opportunity for participants to ask questions and clarify any issues before taking part.

- **Assessment of possible harm.** The protection of the identity of the participants (see below) will assist with mitigating risk of harm associated with legal, political or other forms of external harm. It is not expected that the research process will damage participants psychologically but risk assessments were carried out on a case by case basis. A greater level of risk is associated with community participants taking part in a research project being run by a police officer.

- **Data protection.** Interview details and records of interviews are managed using a standalone record management system, accessible only by the researcher. Material is anonymised using a coding reference method known only to the researcher. With the written consent of the participants, recorded data will be kept securely stored for a period of three years after the completion of the project before controlled disposal. Anonymised transcripts will be kept by the researcher in accordance with Data Protection Act principles.

- **Declaration of Interests.** Participants were advised of the independence of the researcher insofar as he was not commissioned to do the research. Financial contribution towards the project was provided by the Association of Chief Police Officers and the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary’s Diversity Directorate, and this was identified on the information sheet. The purposes for which the results will be used were clearly stated, including the possibility of publication with appropriate safeguards surrounding the protection of the identity of the participants.

- **User engagement and Feedback.** The interview schedules were developed using key individuals as identified above. This was to focus those areas which might be of interest to participants. Participants were given the opportunity to review their interview transcripts.

5.4 Rationale for the Choice of Research Site

This section outlines characteristics of Oldham, Greater Manchester, the site chosen for the fieldwork of the project. In so doing, it links the theoretical framework discussed above, especially the corpus of thought around case studies and generalisation, to the foundationalist arguments developed in Chapter Three. By describing relevant characteristics of the area, it shows how apposite the choice of site is for the purposes of
testing the hypotheses described. A detailed examination of the characteristics of the case study is provided in the following chapter, preparing the thesis for analysis and conclusion.

### 5.4.1 Essential Features for the Study Area

In Chapter Three, it was argued that urban disorder and terrorism in the current context are both forms of political violence and that they share common roots with radicalisation. These roots exist in certain minority communities, and as outlined in Chapter Two, South Asian communities, predominantly of the Islamic faith, are disproportionately represented. Such roots include a sense of injustice, a lack of political representation and identity with the polity, declining perceptions of legitimacy in state authorities, relative deprivation (which may include unemployment, a gap between expectation and achievement) and discrimination. Levels of drug related crime may also be important. A ‘ladder of escalation’ was postulated, a model which might be used by state authorities to predict or forewarn of risk to communities, and a series of questions were posed. These are reproduced at the beginning of the current chapter.

Thus, the choice of research site must maximise opportunity to illuminate these matters, and at the same time, have a level of ‘typicality’, enabling extrapolation beyond the case study. In searching for a suitable research site then, certain features were sought. These included a higher proportion of South Asian communities than the national average, higher indices of deprivation than the national average, and some history of social protest. A poor history of relationships with the police would permit exploration of the current relationship – assessing the impact of the recent advent and implementation of the National Intelligence Model and Neighbourhood Policing. Some examination of the role of the media in public perception of the police occurs in Chapter Two, and an area with a history of important media involvement is also of particular interest. Seminal event 4, Chapter Two, describes the urban unrest that took place in a number of Northern mill towns in 2001. Many of these towns have characteristics in common, and therefore any might be chosen which offer some typicality enabling extrapolation. Oldham has been chosen primarily on the nature of the media involvement and right wing activity during the unrest in 2001: these are factors which Chapter Three suggests might be used by police and other agencies to forewarn of a growing risk of radicalisation, community polarisation and progression towards violent social and
political protest – be it urban unrest or terrorism. It also presents the opportunity to revisit the issues described by Ahmed et al in their study ‘The Oldham Riots – Discrimination, Deprivation and Communal Tension in the United Kingdom’. The key aspects of this paper are outlined in Chapter Three, but some parts are worth expanding upon here to demonstrate the value in returning to Oldham. The paper, bearing the stamp of the Islamic Rights Commission, describes the alienation of Muslim youth in the context of discrimination and deprivation, describes and provides evidence of police discrimination and the development of defensive self-reliance within Muslim youth communities, and examines the escalation of the tensions into riots. It goes on to consider the role of Islamophobia, and whilst citing the part played by the National Front and the BNP, it specifically illustrates the role ‘New Labour’ has played in maligning Muslim aspirations.

Based on interviews with locals in Oldham, the report aimed to give a voice to a ‘particularly alienated group i.e. the Muslim youth.’ It came up with perceptions in five broad categories:

“(1) The Muslim youth face complete alienation from social and political processes due to deprivation and discrimination.

(2) The local police have persistently pursued highly discriminatory policies against the ethnic and religious minorities of Oldham.

(3) Various institutions including the police and the media provoked the disturbances through highly sensitive and inherently discriminatory practice in May 2001.

(4) The far-right has developed and exploited Islamophobic sentiment.

(5) Muslim youth concerns have been deliberately excluded by various authorities, from all relevant discussions about local problems both historically and in the wake of disturbances.”

The current project will revisit these issues and consider evolution over the intervening eight years: where are we now? What progress has been made, and does Oldham contain communities which might be at risk of exploitation: is there a risk of radicalisation and progression to terrorism? It will also provide some of the depth of detail lacking in the Cantle Report, which was set up following the disorders in Oldham and Bradford. This gap is identified and discussed in the preceding chapter.

592 Ibid p12
593 Ibid p2
594 Ibid
The following section presents key features of Oldham in closer detail.

5.4.2 Oldham, Greater Manchester

The metropolitan borough of Oldham, situated in the North West of England in the county of Lancashire, makes up one of the ten districts of Greater Manchester. It covers an area of 142 square kilometres and was home to a population of 217,273 people at the last census in 2001. The only town in the borough is Oldham, although there are other population centres at Chadderton, Failsworth, Royton, Lees and Saddleworth. This thesis is concerned with the town of Oldham, and will focus particularly on one part of the town, analysed in the following chapter.

In 2004, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister published ‘Indices of Deprivation 2004’, a means of assessing deprivation at a local level. Indices of deprivation are published by the government in order to identify the most disadvantaged areas in England so that resources can be appropriately targeted. At that time, Oldham featured in the top 50 for five of the six measures. Matters had not improved in 2007, when updated figures were produced by the Department for Communities and Local Government. Oldham again featured in five of the six measures, with a poorer score in four of them. This situation developed in the aftermath of the decline of the textiles industry - described in seminal event 4, Chapter Two: at the end of the 19th century, the town of Oldham was recognised as one of the most productive cotton-spinning towns in the world. In 2004, 43% of the Special Output Areas (SOAs - the smallest areas, containing roughly 200 households, for which census statistics are published) in Oldham were in the 20% of the most deprived SOAs in England. One SOA, in the Coldhurst ward, was in the 1% of most deprived SOAs nationally; Oldham has

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599 Noble M et al (2008) op cit
600 Ibid pp86-87
disproportionate numbers of deprived neighbourhoods as compared with the rest of the country.\textsuperscript{603} Census data from 2001 also paints an interesting story. There are significantly fewer males employed in the higher earning brackets in Oldham as compared with the rest of the country, whilst those in the lower brackets are significantly higher. For example, 14.51\% of males aged 16-74 in employment were engaged in elementary occupations compared with a national average of 11.79\%; those in professional occupations 8.62\% compared with a national figure of 12.22\%.\textsuperscript{604} Overlaying these facts are the high numbers of minority ethnic communities in the borough. 6.33\% defined themselves as Pakistani, 4.52\% Bangladeshi, compared with national figures of 1.44\% and 0.56\% respectively.\textsuperscript{605} Similar disparities are shown with those who describe themselves as Muslim: 11.06\% against a national average of 3.10\%.

We begin to see in these figures confirmation of the issues raised and discussed in Chapter Two, in particular that Muslim communities are concentrated in areas of high deprivation, and that the metropolitan borough of Oldham is a typical example. Ray and Smith also draw attention to the social differentiation in Oldham: Saddleworth East and Saddleworth West are in the least deprived 10 percent of the country, whilst those wards most affected by the disorders in 2001 were among the 20\% most deprived.\textsuperscript{606} They identify that the pattern of deprivation was further ‘racialised’ since only 16\% of whites lived in the worst 20\% enumeration districts, compared with 71\% Pakistanis and 87\% Bangladeshis.\textsuperscript{607} They say that these factors, coupled with the disproportionate impact of unemployment, “have resulted in a pattern of urban segregation and deprivation structured by and exacerbating racism”.\textsuperscript{608}

These characteristics of Oldham – its high levels of deprivation, high concentration of Muslim communities which are concentrated in those higher areas of deprivation, together with the town’s history of urban unrest make it a highly relevant case study for the current project. The research will further build-on and revisit the earlier academic and policy work described both above and in Chapter Two, taking the debate one step further on.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{603} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{604} Neighbourhood statistics, from \url{http://www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk} accessed 1\textsuperscript{st} April 2008
\item \textsuperscript{605} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{607} Ibid p689
\item \textsuperscript{608} Ibid
\end{itemize}
5.5 Data Analysis

Where interviewees agreed to be recorded, each of the interviews was transcribed and stored as a project under a unique reference number. Where respondents declined to be interviewed, contemporaneous notes were taken and then written up as soon as practicable, usually later the same day. Similarly, notes were made and written up pertaining to the elements of the research that constituted participant observation. At the conclusion of each day of research, notes were made as to the thoughts and feelings about the day, in order to capture the more nebulous concepts which transcription alone might not capture. Analysis and appropriate coding of the data took place, initially using the five themes established as the basis for the semi-structured interview, but additional themes were identified and further explored. Memoing was used as a technique to assist with the development of themes and to provide an audit trail of thought as the transcriptions were completed, and these complemented the notes made at the time. Memoing is recognised as good practice to act as a reminder to the researcher about new thinking, and also serves to support the audit trail. QSR-N6 NUD*IST software, specifically designed for the analysis of qualitative data, was used as an aid, although the development and refinement of the themes and the interpretation of the data and the coding was conducted by me. This technique closely mirrors that of Kenney; the data was analysed line by line, drawing out the five key themes, but those other emergent themes were identified and refined by repeated re-working of the data. While key issues supporting the hypotheses posited in earlier chapters were of specific interest, so too were those interconnections which exposed flaws in the argument. Moreover, in order to understand the data and become immersed in it, all transcriptions, notes, analysis and memoing were conducted by me.

5.6 Experiential Learning

This section aims to outline in brief some key practical learning points and observations which presented themselves during the course of the research.

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609 Denscombe M (1998) op cit p272
5.6.1 Adversarial Process

As I developed the hypothesis in Chapter Three, I introduced an ‘adversarial process’, deliberately exposing my ideas to critical peer review. This process of challenge provided credence to the efficacy of the research ideas, and enabled me to refine my thinking, and thus focus the research question and the research tools. Examples of the challenge process include the presentation of a paper at the ECPR International Conference at Pisa in 2007, presentation of a similar paper at the HUSS Postgraduate Conference at Exeter University in 2008 and a presentation at the Global Centre in Exeter in 2007. I continued with this process of challenge, utilising a panel drawn from the Mosque in Exeter, totally separate from the university, to test parts of the questionnaire, once again helping to refine and focus the research onto areas where the maximum information could be gleaned.

5.6.2 Brokering relationships

I chose Oldham as a research theatre for a number of reasons which have been discussed and presented; essentially, Oldham came forward as a result of academic argument. I had no contacts whatsoever in the town or in the police force and, consequently, my approach to the site of the fieldwork was totally cold. In order to conduct meaningful research singlehandedly in these circumstances, the ability to broker effective and trusting relationships with the intended targets for the research was critical. To this end, I adopted a carefully considered approach to each personal interaction, whether or not this interaction was an intended interview. For example, I thought very carefully about the manner of my dress, the type of bag I used to carry my recording equipment and paperwork, where I met with people, and how I spoke with them. All of these considerations were designed to maximise their trust in me, enabling me to engage them properly for the purposes of conducting the research, and optimising the effectiveness of the ‘snowball’ approach, discussed in section 5.3.1, above.

5.6.3 The Mechanics of the Interview

As discussed above, the approach was to use a semi-structured interview schedule, allowing the interviewee to expand where they wanted to whilst ensuring a framework
for the interaction. The effect of this in some cases was to ‘manage’ the conversation, resulting in a freer and more open interview. Part of the reason this occurred was because of the need to develop a coherent rapport with the interviewees, especially the younger Asian respondents from the community. Significant activity therefore took place outside of the formal interview environment, and I refer to some of this in Chapter Seven where I present and analyse the data used for the project. Interviewees were offered the chance to review their transcriptions in order to maximise the integrity of the research; none took up the offer.

5.7 Summary

This chapter has set out the methodology employed for the research, demonstrating the philosophical position and arguing the case for qualitative methodology. It has also set out the ethical considerations when dealing with human subjects, and specifies how those subjects are protected during the course of the work.

The following chapter consider ‘Policing Indicators’ and ‘Critical Success Factors’, contextualising themes from earlier chapters into critical realist philosophy.
CHAPTER SIX:

Policing Indicators and Critical Success Factors

6.0 Introduction

So far, this discourse has considered policing evolution over several decades in general terms, but especially in response to Britain’s developing plural society. It has also identified and outlined five seminal events over the previous twenty-seven years, describing and critically appraising legal and policy responses to each. From this analysis, five critical success factors are isolated, successful delivery of which optimises the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of disenfranchised and minority groups. I suggest that there is evidence of a failure on the part of public agencies in general, and the police in particular, to learn lessons from the past. A ‘ladder of escalation’ is postulated, theorising that urban unrest, violent radicalisation, suicide terrorism and other forms of ‘social protest’ have common roots, and that this provides state agencies like the police with an opportunity to identify risk and plan mitigation activity. The preceding chapter advances a methodological proposal to examine these ideas and themes, and to consider whether Neighbourhood Policing and the National Intelligence Model are capable of successfully tackling the invidious development of harmful radicalisation with the risk of progression to terrorism at street level.

This chapter is presented in two parts. The first considers the foundationalist aspect of the thesis, discussed in Chapter Five, acknowledging the ‘reality’ of the relationship between the police and the communities: it scrutinises the policing dimension of some of the arguments developed in Chapters Three and Four, and specifically examines policing indicators, thus building on section 3.4 of Chapter Three. It consists of an academic literature review and general discussion of the following: crime as a phenomenon, and then crime in relation to a number of specific issues of interest: crime statistics, crime and place, crime and social indices, crime, ‘race’ and racist incidents (with a particular focus on South Asian groups and Islam). The discussion of indicators continues with an examination of assaults on police officers and complaints against the police. It describes the difficulty and complexity of measuring all these various phenomena, outlining the impact of certain variables, thereby demonstrating not only
the difficulty in their sole use as indicators which portend of forthcoming violence, but also the impediment to simple foundationalist analysis in the context of this thesis; by so doing, it demonstrates the importance of the qualitative methodology employed for the research. These indicators are specifically examined within the case study in the following chapter.

The second part brings forward the critical success factors from section 4.13, Chapter Four, and discusses the link between them, the policing indicators above, and the ‘common roots’ identified in section 3.6, Chapter Three.

In this way, the chapter develops concepts initiated in preceding chapters, and contextualises them within the theoretical framework of critical realist philosophy. It provides the basis upon which the thesis moves towards a critical analysis of the data generated from the research, locating it within the existing literature, and identifying avenues for further work.

6.1 Key Policing Indicators

6.1.1 Crime

Although this is not the place for an extended discussion and analysis of the concept of crime, consideration of the phenomenon is essential because it serves to underline the nebulous nature of what is essentially an artificial construct. It is pertinent because the level and nature of crime is used as a key indicator of community tensions and the overall effectiveness of state agencies like the police. It is drawn upon in several guises, as will be seen.

The examination of what precisely crime is has exercised the minds of social theorists for many years. Durkheim argues that "crime is normal because a society exempt from it is utterly impossible". Indeed, he goes further, and asserts that since it is bound up with the fundamental conditions of social life, it is not only necessary but useful. This is an erudite and thought provoking concept. But consider the challenge of ‘outsiders’, whereby a person may have a different view of a given society’s rules - not only might

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612 Ibid p49
he not accept the rule, he might not accept the legitimacy or competence of those providing judgement over him\textsuperscript{613} - and one has a potent theoretical basis upon which to contest or challenge the ‘common notion’ of what crime actually is. This ‘common notion’ might be articulated as “behaviour that is prohibited by criminal law”\textsuperscript{614} and therefore, “no act can be considered a crime, irrespective of how immoral or damaging it may be, unless it has been made criminal by state legislation.”\textsuperscript{615} But a closer scrutiny of this apparently straightforward conceptualisation exposes weaknesses in the criminalising process. An example is the killing of another person - acceptable or even heroic in wartime, evil at other times.\textsuperscript{616} Nor is it the case that a crime must always have a victim – some sexual acts between consenting adults or certain types of drug taking might be cited in this context.\textsuperscript{617} Although advancing the idea that laws are useless and harmful, Kropotkin, writing in 1898, helpfully pointed out that if one studies the millions of laws that rule humanity, it is easy to see that they are divisible into three main categories: protection of property, protection of government and protection of persons,\textsuperscript{618} and this holds true today. Crime, then, is a social construct which is subject to arbitrary variation based on the establishment of laws. Since the concept of what constitutes a crime is defined by a transgression of ‘the law’, regardless of the ‘usefulness’ of that law, and since we are limiting the discussion to the situation in the United Kingdom, a free democracy, the challenge of whether a given law is legitimate or not recedes to a degree (though might still be cogently challenged - see, for example, the legitimacy of stop and search powers or control orders under terrorism legislation, discussed in Chapter Four).

I propose to use this as a basis upon which to move forwards – a crime is committed where there is a transgression of the law, and in general terms, they relate to the three categories described by Kropotkin. The discussion now turns to crime levels and statistics.

\textsuperscript{613} Becker H (1963) ‘Outsiders’ in Muncie J et al op cit Ch 19 p214
\textsuperscript{615} Ibid
\textsuperscript{616} Ibid p4
\textsuperscript{617} Ibid
\textsuperscript{618} Kropotkin P (1898) ‘Law and Authority’ in Muncie J et al op cit p50
6.1.2 Crime Levels and Statistics

The true extent of crime in the United Kingdom, and the degree to which it has risen or fallen is beset with ambiguity. Yet the epidemiology of crime is purported to be a fantastically important indicator and barometer of the health of society: “The left is still convinced that crime is a social and economic disease, produced by poverty, bad housing, poor schools…” 619 The first British Crime Survey was mounted in 1982 by the Home Office, and drew on a representative sample of 16,000 people. 620 Its main aim was to estimate the extent of various crimes, whether or not reported to police, which brought with it some political risk of exposing a substantial ‘dark figure’. 621 In broad terms, the survey indicated that there were around four times more offences of property loss and damage, and around five times as many offences of violence than in official police statistics. 622 Other work demonstrates the significance of this ‘dark figure’ of crime which remains unreported to the police. Accident and emergency data from a large inner city accident and emergency department demonstrated that around one quarter of victims of assaults had reported the matter to the police. 623 Shepherd et al (1989) cite reasons for not reporting, which include the perceived trivial nature of an incident, the feeling that the police could do nothing about it, or that they themselves could deal with the matter at a later time. 624 Crucially, the authors make the point, which is supported by other work, 625 that fear of the police and a belief that they would not be believed were also reasons for failure to report; 626 this is an important consideration in the context of ethnicity, and is a subject to which I shall return. Linked to this are findings which tend to suggest that those who are unemployed are far less likely to report an incident of burglary than those in work, 627 and since I am examining a case study in an area with disproportionate levels of unemployment, this is important. Other problems with crime statistics relate to the changes over time of the law, court

621 Ibid
622 Ibid p395
624 Ibid p251
625 MacDonald Z (2001) ‘Revisiting the Dark Figure’, British Journal of Criminology 41 pp127-149
626 MacDonald Z (2001) op cit p143
627 Shepherd J (1989) op cit p251
organisation, and methods of categorising and recording offences. Police activity, such as drugs operations, and chief constables ‘playing the crime card’ in order to boost funding from police authorities, can dramatically affect recorded crime figures. In summary, although we use crime statistics, and the present chapter will consider them in the theatre of the case study, they do not provide an incontrovertible objective measure of criminal behaviour.

6.1.3 Crime and Place

Crime is a very unevenly distributed phenomenon: whatever geographical scale is used, disparities consistently emerge. Indeed, neighbourhoods may have an effect on criminal behaviour quite separate from and independent of those of family, peer group or status. The purpose of this section is to consider the impact and relationship between crime and ‘place’, and it represents a nexus of several disciplines – geography, sociology, criminology and philosophy, and an examination of each will illuminate the others. The discussion begins from a sociological and philosophical perspective.

The previous chapter examines critical realism and establishes it as an appropriate philosophy upon which to base the current research. Here, I am examining the link between crime and place, and space and time are intrinsic to this consideration. They are also central to the theory of structuration, and it is therefore appropriate to deviate briefly to consider aspects of structuration theory, and draw the parallels with critical realism.

In their consideration of the use of critical realism to evaluate policy, McEvoy and Richards (2003) illustrate the stratified character of critical realism by using an example of a model of disability described by Williams (1999) which emerges as a result of the interplay between three levels of a stratified reality. These are the biological reality of physiological impairment, the reality of the structural constraints that are often placed

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628 Carrabine E et al (2002) op cit p5
630 Ibid p61
on people with disabilities and the wider reality of cultural attitudes towards disability in which these structures are embedded.\footnote{Williams S (1999) ‘Is anybody there? Critical realism, chronic illness and the disability debate’ Sociology of Health and Illness 21(6) pp797-819} Williams’ paper has a strong theoretical basis but manages to relate philosophical argument with the practical world.\footnote{Giddens A (1984) ‘The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration’ Cambridge: Polity} Although disability is moored by the reality of physiological impairment, the cultural responses to disability also have a real impact on the lives of people with a disability. This conceptual schema lends itself to parallels with victims of crime, and ethnicity. The contingent relationship between these layers, or stratifications, is the essence of the ontological parallel with Gidden’s theory of structuration.\footnote{Bottoms A and Wiles P (1992) op cit p23} An important aspect of Gidden’s theory is that the structures which result from human action may be unintended consequences as well as intended ones.\footnote{Giddens A (1984) op cit p10} He helpfully uses an analogy which plays directly into the context of the crime-place discussion:

“A pattern of ethnic segregation might develop, without any of those involved intending this to happen, in the following way, which can be illustrated by analogy. Imagine a chessboard which has a set of 5-pence pieces and a set of 10-pence pieces. These are distributed randomly on the board as individuals might be in an urban area. It is presumed that, while they feel no hostility towards the other group, the members of each group do not want to live in a neighbourhood where they are ethnically in a minority. On the chessboard each piece is moved around until it is in such a position that at least 50 per cent of the adjoining pieces are of the same type. The result is a pattern of extreme segregation. The 10-cent \textit{[sic]} pieces end up as a sort of ghetto in the midst of the 5-cent ones. The ‘composition effect’ is an outcome of an aggregate of acts – whether those of moving pieces on the board or those of agents in a housing market – each of which is intentionally carried out. But the eventual outcome is neither intended nor desired by anyone. It is, as it were, everyone’s doing and no one’s.”\footnote{Bottoms A and Wiles P (1992) op cit pp20-23}

This goes some way towards explaining ethnic segregation and can clearly be seen at work in Oldham, the social structure of which is introduced in Chapter Two, and described in more detail in the preceding chapter. I discuss the concept of ‘white flight’ in section 8.2.1.6, Chapter Eight.

Bottoms and Wiles (1992) draw heavily on structuration theory to examine the crime and place relationship, linking it with environmental criminology.\footnote{Bottoms A and Wiles P (1992) op cit p23} Of particular note...
in their paper is the ‘Heuristic model of the context of offending’, which has some considerable relevance to the current arguments regarding the development of radicalisation and terrorism. It is reproduced to illustrate the point:

![Heuristic model of the context of offending](image)

*Figure 4: Heuristic model of the context of offending*  

This heuristic model bears striking similarities with that of the causes of radicalisation, presented and discussed in section 3.2.1 of Chapter Three. Just as the impact of the “complex interaction between factors at the various levels is likely to be crucial for the

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639 Ibid p29
intensity of the readiness for radicalisation" so too are they crucial for the intensity of the readiness to commit crime. Within this, there are important lessons to glean: whilst the concept of radicalisation is prominent in the public consciousness, and ‘feels’ new, many of its features and relevant factors are familiar and have been the subject of intense scrutiny for a long time.

6.1.4 Crime and Social Indices

By reference to academic literature and research, the thesis has illustrated in Chapter Three that common roots can be identified which link so-called home-grown terrorism with other types of ‘social protest’ like urban disorder. These roots are pre-conditions which need to exist prior to the onset of the unrest, and they include a sense of injustice, a lack of political representation, declining perceptions of legitimacy in state authorities, relative deprivation, which may include unemployment, a gap between expectation and achievement, and discrimination. The purpose of this section is to consider in brief terms the relationship between these factors and crime, and comment upon this relationship as a comparator with violent radicalisation and urban unrest.

Lea and Young (1984) note that “discontent is a product of relative, not absolute, deprivation…[it] occurs when comparisons between comparable groups are made which suggest that unnecessary injustices are occurring.” This argument is framed in the context of crime and criminological perspective; nevertheless, it has striking resonance with the arguments discussed around the development of urban unrest, radicalisation and suicide terrorism in Chapter Three. In their discussion of the concept of relative deprivation as opposed to absolute deprivation, they raise the same dichotomy that was similarly discussed in the radicalisation/terrorism context in Chapter Three. They identify that:

“Relative deprivation is the excess of expectations over opportunities. The importance of this concept is that it gets away from simplistic notions that try to relate discontent and collective violence to levels of absolute deprivation”.

642 Ibid p140
The burden of argument in Lea and Young’s paper is the consideration of the effect of relative deprivation on levels of crime, and it discusses the effect of acute political marginality and unemployment in this regard. There are arguments that have important parallels with the development of violent radicalisation, brought into sharp relief by the authors’ use of the word ‘discontent’. The aspect of the paper is narrow insofar as it is silent on other important considerations, such as the ready availability of drugs and cheap alcohol, but it was written in 1984, and these issues where less advanced in the public consciousness than they are in the present day. Nevertheless, the parallels lend credibility to the argument that modern policing methods principally developed to tackle crime might be capable of adaptation to the current crisis. The arguments also point towards crime and violent radicalisation having an important contingent relationship, which may have relevance to the high incidence of gang related violent crime experienced in some British cities.

It might be said that unemployment and crime constitute the two major social problems faced by governments, and this has contributed to the plethora of research of the relationship between the two phenomena. In their investigation of the relationship, Carmichael and Ward (2000) conclude that younger unemployed men appear more likely to commit acts of criminal damage than theft, while the opposite is true for older men. Although this particular finding might be important in the consideration of anti-western graffiti (discussed in Chapter Three as a potential indicator of growing risk of violent radicalisation within a given community), the paper demonstrates that the relationship between unemployment and crime in general, let alone different crime types, is far from clear cut.

Closely linked to the discussion of crime and social indices is the consideration of crime and social cohesion. Here, the hypothesis at work is that the level of crime in disadvantaged areas will be influenced by levels of social cohesion. Hirschfield and Bowers (1997) examine this theory using two methods for delineating areas of disadvantage: geodemographic classifications and the British Government’s official deprivation measure, the Index of Local Conditions. The two independent components of social cohesion used were the level of ‘social control’ in an area, and the

644 Ibid p570
degree of ‘ethnic heterogeneity’. The level of social control was assessed using police information – three years worth of ‘command and control’ data. The number of calls made per year which related to juvenile disturbances was used as a direct indicator of a lack of social cohesion. They argue that command and control data do not relate to crimes and therefore it is more precise to treat them as an indication of the demand for formal social control from the public. They supposedly reflect an inability of parents and guardians to supervise and control the behaviour of young people. I argue here that this appears to be a pretty loose indicator of social cohesion. Do these types of calls relate directly to a problem of social cohesion? What about other indicators such as neighbour disputes and domestic incidents? There is a sense of assumption in the indicator they describe. Nonetheless, the research indicates that socially disorganised and ethnically polarised communities face a greater risk of crime, especially burglary, assaults and robbery. Given the polarised nature of the community forming part of the case study, relatively high rates of these types of crime might therefore be an important indicator of risk of the development of violent radicalisation.

Bottoms, Clayton and Wiles (1992) postulate a notion of ‘community careers’ in the context of crime, which they relate to the housing market. They stake a central argument that “the key to an understanding of [offender-based] residential community crime careers lies in the operations of the housing market”, and describe three main concepts used within this central theoretical claim. The first is the observation by Albert Reiss (1986) that “communities, like individuals, can have careers in crime, [and] today’s safe environment can become tomorrow’s dangerous one”. The second speaks of offender-based residential community crime careers rather than offence-based (picking up the distinction between area offender rates and area offence rates), whilst the third concept is the ‘housing market’. This includes not only the economics of private house-buying but also the “bureaucratically determined rules of public housing

646 Ibid p1275
647 Ibid pp1278-1279
648 Ibid
649 Ibid p1292
651 Ibid
653 Bottoms A et al (1992) op cit pp118-119
Seminal event 4, Chapter Two describes the situation in Oldham, and makes a particular reference to the housing practices of local authorities in the town - not only bureaucratic but also discriminatory. In identifying an appropriate case study for this thesis, discussed in some depth in the preceding chapter, certain characteristics were stipulated. They included a higher proportion of South Asian communities than the national average, higher indices of deprivation than the national average, and some history of social protest. It was identified that a history of poor relationships with the police would permit exploration of the current relationship – assessing the impact of the recent advent and implementation of the National Intelligence Model and Neighbourhood Policing. That I identified certain characteristics in this way suggests the possibility of the existence of a community career in a similar vein to that described above, i.e. a community that might ipso facto engage itself in marginalisation, contributing to political isolation and the feeling of disenfranchisement amongst its constituent community members. Whether or not there is consciousness to this career is debatable – and politically sensitive, since it risks further labelling a given community and thereby contributing to the career. It is not impossible to conceive though, in the light of the current argument, that a community career might exist where certain social conditions are prevalent. The course the career takes may well be dependent upon the influence of a leader.

In their consideration of crime and everyday life, Carrabine et al (2002) argue “that the risk from crime is unequally distributed among the population, with the poor generally bearing the greater burden.” They further argue that various British Crime Surveys have found that minority ethnic groups are generally at greater risk of crime victimisation than whites, young people rather than the elderly are more at risk, and those living in urban environments are also exposed to a greater risk of victimisation. This then begins to build a heady picture of that group of people experiencing the most significant risk – and they fall into the same bracket as the target community groups of the case study: ethnic minority, under 35 years of age, in a deprived urban environment. But all this comes with caveats: the problems of inter alia the measurement of crime and unemployment, the impact of varying social indices on the incidence of certain crime types, the effect of culture on the likelihood of committing and reporting crime, the variation between age and gender etc, all make for significant difficulty in defining

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654 Ibid
655 Carrabine E et al (2002) op cit p61
656 Ibid pp62-65
causal relationships between social indices and crime. The following section examines crime and ‘race’ with specific consideration of South Asian groups and Islam.

6.1.5 Crime, ‘Race’ and Racist Incidents

As discussed in Chapter Three, the number, type and location of racist crimes and incidents is acknowledged as being an indicator of community tension. However, the measurement and recording of racist crimes and incidents is beset with difficulty. The following discussion serves to further demonstrate the problem of relying on purely quantitative data, even with a foundationalist philosophical position, by building on the ‘crime’ discussion, and overlaying the contentious notion of ‘race’, identified in Chapter Two as being a social construct.

In Britain, the British Crime Survey has revealed that racist incidents and crimes are far more extensive than the number represented by police statistics. 657 Why? The answer to this question is illuminated to a degree by work carried out by Sharp and Atherton (2007), 658 although parts of it are open to criticism. They carried out a study in the West Midlands in which responses by the participants were characterised by hostility, lack of confidence in the police and a mistrust of authority. This impacted on the strategies the respondents employed in all their interactions with the police - and the findings suggest that there is still much to be done by the police to improve relations with black and other ethnic minority communities. This type of research serves to reinforce the argument that reported crime levels are riddled with cavities where ethnic minority communities are concerned. The study involved interviews of 47 people aged between 15 and 18 years, using a qualitative method. The article also refers to ‘community policing’, 659 embarking on a discussion as to the effectiveness of ‘community policing’, in particular drawing on research from Hawdon et al (2003) 660 to suggest that ‘community policing’ was introduced “as a means to legitimize the police as the lead institution to address law and order issues at a more local level, by consulting with

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659 Ibid p748
communities to set their priorities and target their resources more effectively”. This is open to debate. The article is silent on ‘Neighbourhood Policing’ as a concept, in particular the role that other statutory partners must play, in accordance with the legislation, to deal with crime and disorder, described in Chapter Four. What the paper does highlight is that black and other ethnic minority communities may feel excluded from consultation with the police, and, importantly, from engagement with their local community. In their findings, they state:

“There is a lack of confidence and trust both in terms of who the police are and what they can do. In short, the refusal to report a crime and a desire to sort out difficulties themselves without referring to the police is the way that these young, black respondents strategize about crimes committed against them or their families.”

They also refer to police attitudes, and illustrate, using the following extract, that police officers who are themselves from ethnic minority groups, display aggressive attitudes in their interactions:

‘“This Indian cop was sent to my dads shop ’cos of some trouble there and my dad tried to talk to him in Punjabi because he could explain better but the cop just said ’speak English’, all aggressive like. It was like he had to prove he was really a cop not an Indian (Male, 17 years).”’

This type of issue raises very important questions regarding the legitimacy of the police in general terms. There is insufficient space here to examine the minutiae of this, but an organisation which is predominantly male and white enjoys general support from the white majority in the population; when the police exercise their authority over minority groups, the contribution to this imbalance of power is significant. Moreover, the introduction of Neighbourhood Policing and the National Intelligence Model might be destined to fail simply because of police culture, characterised by Reiner (1992) as conservative, cynical, action-oriented, inward looking and suffused with machismo and racial prejudice. In sections 7.2.2 and 7.3.1 of the next chapter, I present data which comments on the ethnic make-up of the police organisation in the locale of the case study.

661 Sharp D and Atherton S (2007 op cit p749
662 Ibid p755
663 Ibid 0756
In many respects, the issue of crime and race is best examined from the perspective of those concerned. Garland et al (2005) contest that umbrella terms like ‘black’ and ‘Asian’ mask a host of ‘hidden’ communities.\(^{665}\) Although their paper is linked to academic research (and indeed the issues it raises are borne in mind throughout the course of the current research), the point they make might equally apply to the police and other public agencies, who often tend to employ the term ‘BME’, denoting Black and Minority Ethnic, and who also tend to think of communities in terms of substantial numbers of people concentrated in a relatively small geographic space.\(^{666}\)

The broader panorama of violent racism is examined by Bowling (1998).\(^{667}\) Historical documents indicate that white Britons have been ambivalent over centuries about the presence of dark-skinned minorities living on ‘their’ island,\(^{668}\) but Bowling goes on to chart the evolution of violent racism in the UK, arguing that speeches such as Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech marked a destruction of fragile bipartisan consensus on race and immigration, igniting a ‘moral panic’: the “presence of black people provided the political space for the emergence of new and explicitly racist political forces.”\(^{669}\) He identifies that for British ethnic minorities, violent racism has always been on the political agenda.\(^{670}\) This adds credence to the need for an alternative view, considering the experience from the perspective of those on the receiving end, something which public authorities have been so slow to do.

The current definition of a ‘racial incident’, adopted by the Association of Chief Police Officers, has come directly from The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, examined in Chapter Four. Recommendation 12 of that report stated that the definition should be:

“A racist incident is any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person.”\(^{671}\)

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\(^{666}\) Ibid p435


\(^{668}\) Ibid p23

\(^{669}\) Ibid p37

\(^{670}\) Ibid p57

The Report went on to state that the term ‘racist incident’ should be understood to include crimes and non-crimes and that they must be reported, recorded and investigated with equal commitment, being adopted by the police, local Government and other relevant agencies.\textsuperscript{672} The important variable, relevant to the current discussion, is that the more incidents that are being reported as ‘racist’, the more community tension is rising.

Bowling also discusses ‘racial incidents’ and reproduces a definition used by the Metropolitan police in the latter part of the 1970s.\textsuperscript{673} He dissects this definition and points out that it only partially matched the violent racism experienced by ethnic minorities at the time. He goes on to describe a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ for the police by the mid 1980s over the issue of their response to violent racism.\textsuperscript{674} Later, he asserts the crisis of legitimacy receded owing to improvements in ‘performance’ because racial incidents were made a force priority: recording and monitoring improved, contact with the community improved, and yet, he argues, “\textit{operational} [his emphasis] practice remains largely unchanged.”\textsuperscript{675} He concluded by making the following statement:

“For deep-rooted legal, organizational, structural and cultural reasons, the police still do not prevent violent racism; they offer little or no protection for victims and tend not to enforce the law against perpetrators.”\textsuperscript{676}

Bowling’s work was produced before the Stephen Lawrence Enquiry Report was published, though he was involved as a consultant. The points he makes are central to the current argument, and demonstrate sluggishness at best, negligence at worst, on the part of the police to understand the problem and react appropriately. The observation he makes regarding ‘lip-service’ rather than true \textit{operational} evolution in dealing with the issue is highly pertinent, and is an area upon which this thesis will throw some light.

So far, I have demonstrated that the nebulous nature of the phenomenon of crime, coupled with the variables around ‘race’, perceptions of the police and criminal justice system, impact of social indices and ‘place’ complicate the quantitative examination of

\textsuperscript{672} Ibid, Recommendations 13-14.  
\textsuperscript{673} Bowling B (1998) op cit p73  
\textsuperscript{674} Ibid pp101-115  
\textsuperscript{675} Ibid p284  
\textsuperscript{676} Ibid
the subject: the data is essentially unreliable. The reassurance aspect is similarly problematic – crime rates are dropping whilst fear of crime is not, which poses interesting parallel questions around perceived risks of terrorism. The effect of this is that any examination of the subject cannot rely simply on a quantitative analysis of available crime and incident data, or indices of social deprivation.

Yet there are important parallels between the phenomenon of crime and that of radicalisation and terrorism, highlighted in section 6.1.3 (above), which examines ‘Crime and Place’, and section 3.2.1 of Chapter Three, which examines the radicalisation journey. This demonstrates the opportunity for police forces and their partners to apply similar techniques. The acclaimed and famous Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment tended to show that the three basic elements of traditional task-focused policing – random and unfocused preventive patrol, rapid response, and reactive investigation – were an ineffective means of tackling crime. The failure of this one-dimensional approach to policing is part of the reason why Alderson developed his ‘community policing’ ethos of thirty years ago, discussed in section 3.3.2 of Chapter Three, and the more recent development of Neighbourhood Policing and the National Intelligence Model. In the same way, a one-dimensional policing response to the current crisis which consists of random examination of ‘extremist’ websites, rapid response to scenes of terrorist incidents, and reactive investigation at scenes, together with lengthy periods of detention without charge will be an ineffective means of tackling violent radicalisation and terrorism on their own.

The discussion now turns to the subjects of assaults on police officers, and complaints against the police. The purpose of considering these specific issues here is because, like racist incidents, they are identified and discussed in Chapter Three as being of importance in detecting changes in community tension, and perhaps forewarning of impending political or social unrest. Any discussion of these indicators must acknowledge their intrinsic link to the broader umbrella of police legitimacy, but this is not the place for a discursive analysis of police legitimacy in a free society such as exists in the United Kingdom. Reiner (1992) examines the issue in some depth.

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680 Reiner R (1992) op cit pp57-107
American discourse is provided by Tyler (2004), which discusses public cooperation with the police, and also Sunshine and Tyler (2003), a paper which addresses the issues of performance of the police in fighting crime and the fairness of the distribution of police services.

6.1.6 Assaults on Police Officers

There is an intuitive sense to the concept that declining levels of police legitimacy will manifest themselves in increasing levels of assaults against the police, and a rise in complaints. Other factors which might become apparent at the lower end of declining levels of legitimacy could include a drop in public cooperation: fewer people willing to provide help to the police in the form of criminal and community intelligence, a reluctance to provide victim and witness statements, and adverse press and media reaction to police activity. In the section entitled ‘Crime Levels and Statistics’ above, the nebulous nature of recording standards and the ambiguity of the data was discussed. Much the same situation exists with respect to assaults on police officers, with recording standards varying temporally within forces, and spatially between forces. For example, Watson (2006) gives a figure of 84 for assaults on police officers in Lancashire in 2003-2004; in 2004-2005, this rose to 1,492. Meanwhile, Merseyside police, an adjoining force, saw figures drop from 182 to 165 over the same time period. It is against this backdrop that we move to the discussion regarding assaults on police officers.

A study in South Wales in 1990, entitled ‘Why Police are Assaulted’ examined features of assaults against police officers, which included interviews with assailants. In this study, 80% of offenders had criminal records, 70% considered the police were to blame for the incident, and, perhaps unsurprisingly, alcohol was a pervasive feature. The study did not reveal any pattern associated with length of service, and figures for those officers with less than two years service who had been assaulted, though marginally over-represented, appeared to dispel the myth that officers young in service were those

684 Ibid
at greatest risk of assault. Of note were the number of multiply assaulted officers, and
the authors suggested further work in this regard. The study is silent on the subject of
‘race’, and whilst raising some interesting points, does not answer the question posed in
the header. The visible appearance of the police officer has changed very significantly
over the last thirty years and perhaps most significantly over the last fifteen, moving as
it has from truncheons and chain link handcuffs to side-handled or extendable batons,
rigid handcuffs, pepper sprays, leg restraints, stab proof jackets and, most recently,
Taser weapons. This creates an image of a paramilitary force, where “we understand the
term to mean specially trained and equipped cohorts of police with a repressive
capability which places them mid-way between the traditional peace-keeping police and
the military”.686 As Watson (2006) notes, this equipment may change the image of the
police officer to such an extent that it actually encourages assaults.687 The South Wales
study is silent on this issue too. In a comparable study in Cheshire over a three year
period from 1994-1996,688 more than half the assaults were against officers with one to
six years service (reflecting the fact that most frontline policing is done by officers with
this length of service), and, as with the South Wales study, assaults on female officers
were in proportion to the ratio of female to male officers. Once again, ‘race’ is
conspicuous by its absence, both in terms of the ethnicity of the officers assaulted, and
that of the assailants. There was of course, no mandatory requirement at the time to
monitor with respect to ‘race’ this data, but given the findings of the Scarman Report
ten years previously, and the link with tension indicators (discussed in Chapter Three),
it is surprising that it does not feature as a consideration.

A highly publicised report published in 2007 by Grant Shapps MP stated that “…across
Britain respect for the police has crumbled”.689 This conclusion is based on a number of
assertions, including that in 2006 “a police officer was assaulted somewhere in Britain
every 20 minutes.”690 This report identifies very high levels of assaults against police
officers, but does not deal with the nature of the assault, or any of the other variables
discussed above. It does not materially add anything to the debate and is only included
here to demonstrate the propensity for this issue to be used as political weaponry.

687 Watson M (2006) op cit p304
689 Shapps G (2007) ‘Police on the Beat: A comprehensive new study into the alarming level of assaults
690 Ibid p2
In summary, the inhibitors to an accurate assessment of levels of crime and their changes over time, discussed above, are equally applicable to assaults against police officers. The problems are compounded by the diverse manner of recording, both spatially between forces, and temporally within forces. The lack of data regarding the specifics of precisely where and exactly when a given assault, or series of assaults occurred against police officers, together with the dearth of information on ethnicity of both offender and victim, further complicates any process of historical analysis of the phenomenon for the purposes of assessing its level of importance around increasing levels of community tension. This issue is discussed further specifically in the context of the case study in Oldham in the following chapter.

6.1.7 Complaints Against the Police

An examination of police complaints and the history of the governance arrangements are conducted here for the same reason as that for assaults on police officers: because the number of complaints against the police might be considered as a tension indicator, and as discussed in Chapter Three, any increase might serve as a warning of raised community tensions. The concept at work here is that complaints against police will increase as police legitimacy declines. To this extent, it might be a rung on the ‘ladder of escalation’ postulated in Chapter Three. Of course, complaints made against the state arrangements for enforcing law and order is based upon an important assumption. There has to be an acceptance by the public in general, and the complainant in particular that it is worth complaining. This then is an important component in police legitimacy. Complaints against the police would be not be made in a totalitarian state. Thus, complaints made against the police will have a ceiling – and progression along any ladder of escalation will ultimately see a drop-off in numbers of police complaints. In the context of public confidence in the police being fundamental to democratic policing, together with public satisfaction in a complaints system for wider public support, Smith (2001) points out that the complaints process is the only means by which criminal proceedings are initiated against police officers after allegations by members of the public that they were the victim of an offence committed by officers when in the purported execution of their duty. 691 He goes on to describe the net effect of this - namely that police officers alleged to have committed an offence are treated differently

to citizens who might have been on the receiving end of the same allegation. Whilst it can be argued that police officers find themselves in difficult, confrontational situations, where allegations might be made against them, and therefore some protection is needed to mitigate the risk of spurious allegation and consequential wrongful arrest by colleagues, Smith raises an important point. He goes on to assert:

“The impression here is of a complaint process operating as an instrument of police management. Even where complaints have been substantiated, under 3 per cent annually of the total number of recorded complaints, it is apparent that the complaints process operates primarily to identify malpractice in the interest of police administration with scant regard for vindication of the complainant.”

Overall, Smith has a pessimistic opinion of the complaints process (and perhaps the police), but he raises important questions in relation to the police complaints system and its impact on public confidence. (For a more functional analysis of the complaints system and suggestions for a rights-based approach, see Smith (2004), and Kennison (2002). Some of this lack of confidence is aggravated by the role the media play, and Reid (2004) identifies two negative effects. Firstly, since the media rarely report the outcome of successful complaints, it increases the impression that making a complaint through the internal system is a waste of time. This might well have significant importance in an area like Oldham, where the role of the media was of demonstrable importance in the build up to the urban unrest described in seminal event 4, Chapter Two, and also in section 3.3 of Chapter Three. The second negative effect is that it may undermine confidence in the fairness of the process among police officers given that cases that are reported are big ones with outcomes which are often highly critical of the police officers involved. Seneviratne (2004) notes that “accountability is an essential prerequisite of public confidence in the police service because…police misconduct, if unfettered, can threaten the credibility of the criminal justice system” and “a complaints process for police misconduct must therefore command the confidence of

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692 Ibid p375
693 Ibid p378
697 Ibid p245
the public in order to achieve public support for the police.”\textsuperscript{699} The complaints system is one of three pillars of police accountability - the other two being accountability to the law and accountability to the police authority. There has always been a threat to public confidence in the complaints system in the UK – namely the impression that the police investigate the police, and that it can therefore never be free from partiality. The seminal events which have already been presented precipitated reviews of the complaints system in the UK, notably Lord Scarman’s report into the Brixton disorders of 1981 (see seminal event 1, Chapter Two), which saw the demise of the Police Complaints Board,\textsuperscript{700} and then Sir William Macpherson’s report \textit{The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry} (seminal event 2, Chapter Two) was highly critical of the Police Complaints Authority (PCA) which replaced the Police Complaints Board. This report highlighted that serious complaints against police officers should be independently investigated and that “investigation of police officers by their own or another Police Service is widely regarded as unjust, and does not inspire public confidence.”\textsuperscript{701}

In April 2004, the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) was established; it was designed to introduce an element of independence to investigations of misconduct by police officers. Seneviratne argues however that it is very similar to its predecessor, the PCA, highlighting some of the drawbacks, including the continued use of police officers and ex-police officers to carry out investigations; she also raises a query over the governance structure – the Home Secretary having responsibility for both the IPCC and policing.\textsuperscript{702} But the IPCC state that “A key aim of the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) is to increase confidence in the police complaints system.”\textsuperscript{703} Do they achieve this aim? A study involving 4000 respondents published by the IPCC in 2006 suggested mixed success.\textsuperscript{704} It reported that nearly a third of people surveyed thought that the IPCC was part of the police, with black and Asian people more likely to think this than white people.\textsuperscript{705} Moreover, they concluded that “there were a number of key groups who were either sceptical about the complaints system or disinclined to use it.”\textsuperscript{706} Crucially, and highly relevant to the current study, these

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{699} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{700} Ibid p334
\item \textsuperscript{701} Macpherson, Sir W (1999 a) op cit Recommendation 58
\item \textsuperscript{702} Seneviratne M (2004) op cit pp 336-338
\item \textsuperscript{703} Docking M and Bucke T (2006) ‘Confidence in the police complaints system: a survey of the general population’ London: IPCC
\item \textsuperscript{704} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{705} Ibid pviii
\item \textsuperscript{706} Ibid pix
\end{itemize}
groups included ethnic minorities, those who had a previous negative experience of the police, those from socio-economic groups D and E (the lowest socio-economic groups), and ‘to some extent’ young people.\textsuperscript{707} In these groups we have the main components of the community that the current study engages: South Asian, low socio-economic groups, and younger members of the community, with a history in the location of poor relationships with the police.

In 2006/2007, 28,998 complaints were recorded against police, a rise from 15,885 in 2003/04 when recording complaints became statutory in the Police Reform Act 2002.\textsuperscript{708} The statistics show 61\% were white, with 5\% Asian, 7\% black and 2\% ‘other’; an enormous 25\% were recorded as ‘unknown’.\textsuperscript{709} This figure is difficult to access with the available data; additional research and analysis is required. The Ministry of Justice affirm that the IPCC will be working with police forces to improve recording in this area.\textsuperscript{710}

Thus, once again, the use of quantitative data \textit{viz} ‘complaints against police’ as a reliable indicator for changes in community tension is beset with problems and ambiguity. There are important and tenuous assumptions associated with the data – first and foremost that people are willing and able to complain, an assumption which is highly questionable as it applies to ethnic minority groups in particular. Secondly, the manner of recording varies temporally and spatially, and data elating to ethnicity of complainants is unreliable.

\textbf{6.2 Critical Success Factors}

In the summary to Chapter Four, section 4.13, I propose five themes which I call ‘critical success factors’. I isolate them from the examination of the legal and policy responses to each of four of the five seminal events, where they can be seen as ‘golden threads’ running through each. The seminal events are: (1) The Brixton disorders of 1981.\textsuperscript{711} Here, significant urban unrest developed in a deprived inner city location; the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{707} Ibid \\
\textsuperscript{709} Ibid p22 \\
\end{flushright}
area, which had high levels of minority black communities, had a poor history of relations with the police, and poor police practices precipitated the riots. (2) The murder of Stephen Lawrence.\textsuperscript{712} In this incident, Stephen Lawrence, an 18 year old black teenager was attacked and murdered by a group of white men in April 1993; the murder was motivated by racial hatred. The subsequent enquiry found a series of police failings, including evidence of institutional racism. (3) ‘The Secret Policeman’.\textsuperscript{713} In 2002, Mark Daly, an undercover reporter, joined Greater Manchester Police to determine what steps had been taken to eliminate racism from the force after its own Chief Constable had labelled it institutional racist. Daly exposed extremely damaging racism and racist new recruits at Bruche Training College, where he attended for his initial training. (4) Urban unrest in Bradford, Oldham and other Northern cities with sections of their ethnic minority communities living in areas with extremely high levels of deprivation. Over the weekend 26-28 May 2001, violence erupted in flashpoints across Oldham with petrol bombs being thrown and buildings set alight; rioting involving up to 500 Asian youths on the Saturday was followed with further unrest on the Sunday.\textsuperscript{714} The Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) reported that ‘the riots occurred as the culmination of 5 weeks of racial abuse orchestrated by right-wing extremists against the town’s ethnic minority community.’\textsuperscript{715}

The themes can be summarised as follows:

- The need to work in partnership with other agencies, especially education and housing departments.

- The police organisation needs to strive to reflect the community it serves, and the recruitment, retention and promotion of ethnic minority staff is a crucial part of this.

- Community representatives should be involved in training, especially community awareness training.

\textsuperscript{714} ‘Oldham hit by fresh violence’ 28 May 2001, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1355379.stm accessed 6/1/08
• The local ‘beat officer’ or Neighbourhood Policing team has a vital role and must attract officers of high calibre.

• Police organisations must work towards the elimination of racial discrimination of all types, and contribute towards the development of cohesive communities.

In conclusion to Chapter Three, section 3.6, I said this:

‘Existing research appears to demonstrate the following: Urban unrest and terrorism in the current context are both forms of political violence. They share common roots with radicalisation, with a number of key social pre-conditions existing prior to their onset. Crucially, these include a sense of injustice, a lack of political representation, declining perceptions of legitimacy in state authorities, relative deprivation (which may include unemployment, a gap between expectation and achievement) and discrimination. Levels of drug related crime may also be important. Racist crime, political and media activity are additional indicators of forthcoming politically motivated violence and pre-conditions are essential but precipitators are also required to initiate the event. The existence of a powerful figure may be crucial in influencing the path which the ‘social protest’ event takes.’

Whilst the critical success factors will not necessarily directly impact on each and every one of the policing indicators discussed in section 6.1 above, they provide the best opportunity for the police to tackle the key themes which underlie social protest phenomena such as urban unrest and the development of harmful radicalisation. The reason for this is because, as Benyon puts it, “Social injustice is the central thread running through urban conflict. Above all, it is experiences of perceptions of injustice which may develop into a violent urban disorder.”716 By working with education and housing departments, by recruiting and promoting ethnic minority staff to help reflect the communities being served, by involving members of the community in training, by having high quality staff engaged with communities at a local level, and by working towards the elimination of racial discrimination, the police organisation maximises the

opportunity to minimise the reality and the perception of social injustice, and thus the risk of harm to communities in this context. The second benefit is the reduction in the likelihood of a precipitator, such as the inappropriate use of stop and search tactics as was seen in Brixton (see section 2.3.4.1, Chapter Two). A third benefit is possible too: bringing police and communities closer together to improve trust and confidence, and therefore legitimacy, leading to improved information and intelligence flows.

The following schematic illustrates the relationship.

*Figure 5: Schematic showing the relationship between the ‘Common Roots’, ‘Critical Success Factors’ and ‘Policing Indicators’*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common Roots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7. A sense of injustice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. A lack of political representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Declining perceptions of legitimacy in state authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Relative deprivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Levels of drug-related crime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tackled by: | Critical Success Factors |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6. The need to work in partnership with other agencies, especially education and housing.</td>
<td>6. The need to work in partnership with other agencies, especially education and housing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The police organisation needs to strive to reflect the community it serves</td>
<td>7. The police organisation needs to strive to reflect the community it serves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Community representatives should be involved in training, especially community awareness training</td>
<td>8. Community representatives should be involved in training, especially community awareness training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. The local ‘beat officer’ or Neighbourhood Policing team has a vital role and must attract officers of high calibre</td>
<td>9. The local ‘beat officer’ or Neighbourhood Policing team has a vital role and must attract officers of high calibre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Police organisations must work towards the elimination of racial discrimination of all types, and contribute towards the development of cohesive communities</td>
<td>10. Police organisations must work towards the elimination of racial discrimination of all types, and contribute towards the development of cohesive communities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Measured by: | Policing Indicators |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inter alia:</td>
<td>Inter alia:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Hate crime</td>
<td>9. Hate crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Racist incidents</td>
<td>10. Racist incidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Assaults on police officers</td>
<td>11. Assaults on police officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Complaints against the police</td>
<td>12. Complaints against the police</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thus, whilst acknowledging the problematic nature of them, the policing indicators discussed in section 6.1 might provide a barometer against which the success of police organisations in delivering the critical success factors can be measured.

6.3 Summary

In conclusion to this chapter, the above discussion of selected police-related indicators, namely crime and its links to social indices, crime statistics, crime and ‘place’, together with racist incidents, assaults on police officers and complaints against the police, demonstrate that the foundational aspect of the thesis carries with it considerable complexity, and that the use of these as ‘tension indicators’ as described in Chapter Three must be treated with caution. Although a superficial consideration of the data may tempt researchers to focus entirely and exclusively on the quantitative dimension, actually to do so would incur an error fatal to useful conclusions.

I propose that since the critical success factors isolated from the policy and legal responses to the seminal events described in Chapter Two recur in each successive response, they are critical to optimising the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of minority and disenfranchised groups, acting as they do on the ‘common roots’ thereby minimising the risk of adverse social protest. Police activity is of major importance because the police represent the state, they exert coercive force, and because perceptions of social injustice are directly connected with the police as an institution. Their activity may provide the ignition. Success can be measured by the policing indicators described.

In the following chapter, I present quantitative data against the policing indicators for the case study itself. I also provide a commentary on the degree to which Greater Manchester Police has delivered the critical success factors before presenting rich qualitative data secured through the methods described in Chapter Five.
CHAPTER SEVEN:

Data and Analysis

7.0 Introduction

The primary purpose of this chapter is to present and analyse key findings of the research which will be used to crystallize conclusions in the final chapter. It does this whilst also acknowledging the ‘arenas’ from which the issues are viewed or considered, linking clearly with the ontological and epistemological philosophy of critical realism discussed in Chapter Five.

The chapter is organised into eight sections. The first presents publicly available quantitative data from the location of the case study. This aids an understanding of the research locale, which enables subsequent sections to be understood in their correct context. It also serves to illustrate the challenge associated with relying on a quantitative-only method as discussed in the previous chapter. Most importantly, it provides data against the policing indicators for the case study, before moving onto the second section, a commentary on the degree to which Greater Manchester Police has delivered the critical success factors discussed in section 6.2 of Chapter Six. I discuss this further in section 8.1.6 of Chapter Eight, including their impact on policing indicators, and taking into account the relationship between them. The following five sections present rich qualitative data, reflecting the construction of the research questionnaire: policing and social justice; local social conditions; the effect of the media; global events and the role of Islam. There are 27 sub-themes within these sections which are identified through the coding and analysis of the data (see section 5.5, Chapter Five). These are examined and their links with the critical success factors are identified. Where possible, the data is presented from the differing perspectives of the participants; this then demonstrates the use of triangulation and enables the ‘reality’ of the relationships to be illuminated, acknowledging the ontological and epistemological position adopted in accordance with critical realism. The data and evidence presented in all these sections is used in the final chapter to address the
research question. The eighth section consists of a short summary, pulling together each of the preceding areas.

A table showing the demographic information, and the appropriate codes used to protect the identity of the participants can be found at Appendix 4.

7.1 Oldham West, Oldham Division, Greater Manchester Police

In Chapter Five, I outlined the rationale for choosing Oldham as a suitable location for the case study. The current section is designed to do two things. Firstly, it is intended to build on the discussion presented in Chapter Five: it will distil the arguments by providing a description and account of the demographic and social characteristics of the exact neighbourhoods where the case study is located, and in so doing will contextualise the discussion of key policing indicators from section 6.1, Chapter Six, into the case study. This is important in order to develop the foundationalist character of the research, consistent with its critical realist position, and for offering avenues for further research which are discussed in more depth in the final chapter. The second purpose of the section is to promote a coherent understanding of the nature of the area of the case study, enabling analytical arguments developed in the final chapter to be understood in their correct context.

Oldham West lies centrally within the borough and consists of four wards: Coldhurst, Werneth, Alexandra and Medlock Vale.717 Although these names existed at the time of the riots in 2001, boundary changes in 2004 mean that statistics do not exactly correlate with the present day. Unrest in 2001 took place in geographical locations very close to or actually in these wards. The following information is provided by Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council, and consists of ward profiles published in September 2007.718 It is intended to provide an overview only; reference should be made to source material for full details.

Coldhurst has a young population with children under 16 years making up 32.4% of the population, the highest in the Borough. People belonging to black and minority ethnic groups make up 56.9% of the population, the highest proportion in the Borough.

718 [www.oldham.gov](http://www.oldham.gov) accessed 13/6/08
48.9% of the population are of Bangladeshi heritage (again the highest in the Borough), with Pakistani people making up 2.4%. For families claiming Child Benefit, 22.2% of families claim for four or more children, five times the average for England. 54.8% of households receive Housing Benefit and/or Council Tax Benefit; 40.6% of households receive Income Support. Nearly four in ten people experience ‘income deprivation’, compared to an average 18.3% in the Borough, and 13.9% of the population of England. Nearly four in ten people experience ‘income deprivation’, compared to an average 18.3% in the Borough, and 13.9% of the population of England. Half of all children aged under 16 years live in ‘income deprived’ households, and 42.9% of school children are eligible for free school meals, twice the Borough average. The claimant count unemployment rate at 14% is the highest in the Borough, and is more than three times the rate for England. More than half of all 16 – 74 year-olds have no qualifications, and 7.3 % of 16 – 74 year olds have degree level qualifications as their highest level of qualifications, less than half the average for England. 46% of all households live in terraced housing, with the lowest proportion of owner-occupiers in the Borough at 40.5%. Coldhurst also has the highest proportion (36.3%) of households that are local authority tenants, and the highest proportion of households in the Borough classified as being ‘overcrowded’ (22.8%). The recorded crime (BCS comparator) rate in Coldhurst is the highest in the Borough, with rates per 1000 population of 147.4, compared with 79.1 in the Borough.

**Werneth** has a relatively young population, with children under 16 years making up 29.6% of the ward’s population. People belonging to black and minority ethnic groups make up 56.9% of the population, with the highest proportion of residents of Pakistani heritage (38.2%) in the Borough; 11.6% of residents are of Bangladeshi heritage. For families claiming Child Benefit, the ward has the 3rd highest proportion (16.7%) of families claiming for four or more children. 42.8% of households receive Housing Benefit and/or Council Tax Benefit and 32.1% receive Income Support. 32.6% of people in Werneth experience ‘income deprivation’, with 35.7% of children under the age of 16 years living in ‘income deprived’ households, and 32.1% of school children being eligible for free school meals. The claimant count unemployment rate is 9.5%. Nearly 10% of 16 – 74 year-olds have a degree level qualification as their highest level of qualification, and 49.2% of all 16 – 74 year-olds have no qualifications. 57.2% of all households live in terraced housing, with owner-occupiers in the ward at 54.2%. Werneth has the second highest proportion of households in the Borough with no central heating (13.9%) and 17.5% are classified as being overcrowded. The recorded
crime (BCS comparator) rate in the ward is 83.1 per 1000 population, 7th highest in the Borough.

**Alexandra** has a relatively young population, with 25.4% of the ward’s population aged under 16 years. Of the 20 wards in the Borough, Alexandra has the 5th highest proportion (17.6%) of residents belonging to black and minority ethnic groups. 10.7% of the residents are of Pakistani heritage, and 2.2% are of Bangladeshi heritage. For families claiming Child Benefit, Alexandra has the fifth highest proportion (8.3%) of families claiming for four or more children, twice that for England. 41.5% children aged under 16 years in Alexandra live in ‘income deprived’ households (twice the national average), and 38.7% of children are eligible for free school meals. 45.6% of households receive Housing Benefit and/or Council Tax Benefit and 35.5% of households receive Income Support. 31.5% of people in the ward live in ‘income deprived’ households. The claimant count unemployment rate is 10.1% and 49.5% of all 16 to 74 year olds in Alexandra have no qualifications. 8% of all 16 – 74 year-olds have a degree level qualification as their highest level of qualification. 10.1% of households are classified as overcrowded, 9.5% have no central heating and 35.8% are ‘local authority’ tenants (compared with 18.1% Borough-wide). The recorded crime (BCS comparator) rate in the ward is the 3rd highest in the Borough at 118.7 per 1000 population.

**Medlock Vale** has a relatively young population, with children under 16 years making up 26.6% of the population. More than 22.7% of the ward’s population belong to black and minority ethnic groups: 14% are of Pakistani heritage, and Bangladeshi heritage people make up 2.8% of the ward population. For families claiming Child Benefit, 9.6% claim for four or more children. 33.3% of children aged under 16 years live in ‘income deprived’ households, and 26.2% of school children are eligible for free school meals. 33.3% of households in Medlock Vale receive Housing Benefit and/or Council Tax, and 24.6% of households receive Income Support. The claimant count unemployment rate is 7%, and 46.7% of all 16 – 74 year-olds have no qualifications. 9% of all 16 – 74 year-olds have a degree level qualification as their highest level of qualification. 53% of all households live in terraced housing, and 30.7% of households live in accommodation rented from the local authority. Medlock Vale has the 5th highest proportions of households in the Borough without central heating (9.2%) and 9.1% of households are considered to be overcrowded. The recorded crime (BCS comparator) rate in the ward is the 6th highest in the Borough, with rates per 1000 population of 96.0.
7.1.1 Key Policing Indicators, Oldham: Crime

On 17 June 2008, I made a Freedom of Information Act request to Greater Manchester Police (GMP). The request, a copy of which can be found at Appendix 3, sought information relating to burglaries, assaults, robberies, assaults on police officers, complaints against police officers and racial incidents. It also included a request for ethnicity data in respect of offenders for assaults on police, and ethnicity of those making complaints against police. The information was sought for the years 2001-2002, and 2007-2008 for both Oldham Division, and Oldham West Neighbourhood Policing Area. The rationale for choosing the time spans was to include the period of unrest in Oldham in 2001, and compare the relevant data with the present day. A reply in relation to burglaries, assaults and robberies was received, and is reproduced in Table 1 below. A written response was also provided in relation to the request for racial incident data; the letter explained that the data was not held in the format requested, and gave an explanation: the boundaries of the relevant policing areas changed in 2004, and the method of recording changed in 2005/06. Data was supplied for the years 2005/06 and 2006/07, and is reproduced in Table 2. Data for 2007/08 was not available at the time of writing. Further contact was made to establish why the boundary changes affected racial incident recording but not crime recording. The answer provided by GMP explained that the force uses several different crime recording databases, and that the data was correct.

This exercise is worthy of note for two significant reasons. Firstly, boundary adjustments and changes to recording methods have both been provided by GMP as reasons why data cannot be supplied, or comparisons cannot be made. This serves to support the arguments made in section 6.1.2, Chapter Six. Secondly, the data as initially supplied by GMP was incomplete, and did not constitute a full response to the request. For example, I had requested ethnicity data, and no explanation was offered to explain the absence of this information. Technically, their compliance with the Freedom of Information Act was flawed. These issues complicate reliable statistical analysis of police data, and, perhaps more importantly, render the service somewhat opaque to examination. This has profound implications for accountability, and therefore trust,

719 Humphreys P (2008a), Personal Communication, Information Governance Unit, Information Management Branch, Greater Manchester Police, Letter ref 1005/08, dated 16/7/08
720 Humphreys P (2008b), Personal Communication, Information Governance Unit, Information Management Branch, Greater Manchester Police, email dated 12/8/08
especially amongst ethnic minority communities. Bad data also undermines the ability of Greater Manchester Police to understand where services need to be improved, or where there are opportunities to gather better intelligence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime Type</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Oldham West</th>
<th>Oldham Division</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burglary Dwelling</td>
<td>2001/02</td>
<td>1740</td>
<td>3785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>2105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary Other</td>
<td>2001/02</td>
<td>1293</td>
<td>2878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>1806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious Wounding</td>
<td>2001/02</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Serious Wounding</td>
<td>2001/02</td>
<td>1039</td>
<td>1782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>1651</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Crime Statistics for Oldham. The statistics are for the financial years 1 April to 31 March. Assault statistics are recorded as Serious and Less Serious Wounding – Less Serious includes Robbery.

Notwithstanding the difficulties already discussed in interpreting these figures, it is worth highlighting a number of features. Oldham West, which saw the worst of the urban unrest in 2001, has seen a significantly greater drop in all types of crime than has the division as a whole (which will of course include the figures for Oldham West). This difference is most significant with reference to the levels of assault, which have remained largely static in the division as a whole. This is a hint towards the usefulness of crime statistics as an indicator of raised tension with the associated risk of urban unrest. Further study, utilising a bespoke quantitative survey in the specific geographical locations would illuminate this aspect of the relationship more clearly. This is examined in more detail in the final chapter.

7.1.2 Key policing indicators, Oldham: Race Hate Incidents

In 2005/06, GMP introduced new crime recording codes so that they could qualify whether a hate incident was motivated by race, religion, sexual orientation, gender or disability. Prior to this, hate incidents were recorded under one code, irrespective of

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721 Humphreys P (2008c), Personal Communication, Information Governance Unit, Information Management Branch, Greater Manchester Police, Letter ref 001006/08, dated 14/7/08
722 Humphreys P (2008a) op cit
Thus, race hate data pre 2005 is not capable of isolation without an intensive and time-consuming examination of individual crime records. Table 2 outlines the situation in Oldham West and Oldham Division.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victim’s Ethnicity</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Oldham West</th>
<th>Oldham Division</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Ethnicity</td>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian or Asian British</td>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black or Black British</td>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese or Other Ethnic Group</td>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity Not Recorded</td>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Race Hate Incidents for Oldham 2005/06 and 2006/07

Here again, some interesting features can be observed. According to the figures, the largest number of victims of race hate incidents in Oldham West were white, whilst in the division as a whole, the largest number of victims were Asian/Asian British. In the absence of additional statistical work, postulating reasons for this amount to conjecture. Population is likely to play a part, with proportionally higher numbers of Asian/Asian British people in Oldham West as compared with the division as a whole. Other important factors might include variations in community tension and relationships with the police. In the latter, the *willingness* of sections of communities to report matters to

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723 Ibid
724 Ibid
the police, a function of trust and confidence, discussed in section 6.1.5 of Chapter Six is crucial. Data relating to this issue is presented in section 7.3, below.

Between 2005/06 and 2006/07, reported race hate incidents have risen in the division as a whole by 21%, whilst they have risen by 52% over the same time period in Oldham West. Once again, any explanation for this can only be conjecture without additional research and data (including a consideration of other ‘indicators’, such as complaints against the police, discussed below), but possible reasons might include an increase in real terms, or they might indicate an increase in the confidence of people to report matters. In either case, there are important considerations for the police – the data might signify raised community tension, and therefore, as I discuss in Chapter Three, highlight a need for the police and their partners to think of mitigation activity. It might be a rung on the ‘ladder of escalation’, or it might be indicative of improved relations with the police, brought about for instance by the introduction of the Neighbourhood Policing model, which occurred in the area in 2004. Data and analysis relating to the general issue of trust, policing and social justice is presented in section 7.3, below, and there is further discussion in section 8.2.1.4, Chapter Eight.

7.1.3 Key Policing Indicators, Oldham: Assaults on Police Officers

Between 1 April 2007 and 31 March 2008, there were 20 assaults on police officers in the Oldham West area. Data is unavailable for 2001-2002 because “the information is not held in a comparable breakdown to provide the data.” In the division as a whole, there were 74 assaults on police officers in 2001-2002, and 83 in 2007-2008. This information is limited in its value, although it is interesting to note that during 2001, when Oldham was the scene of such unrest, the level of assaults on police officers appears to be less than in 2007-2008. The information relates only to officers attached to the Oldham division rather than those drafted in, and this is an important consideration. It also highlights the difficulty faced in using such data as an indicator of increased tension: forces are unable to say whether or not there are increases in levels of these indicators owing to simple self-imposed constraints such as boundary changes.

725 Ibid
726 Ratcliffe A (2008), Personal Communication, Information Governance Unit, Information Management Branch, Greater Manchester Police, Letter ref 001004/08/, dated 17/7/08
727 Ibid
728 Ibid

212
GMP were unable or unwilling (on the grounds of cost) to provide a breakdown of the ethnicity of the offenders for these offences.\textsuperscript{729}

### 7.1.4 Key Policing Indicators, Oldham: Complaints against Police

The final strand of the current discussion of policing indicators concerns complaints against police. Data was again requested under the Freedom of Information Act for both Oldham West and Oldham Division (see Appendix 3) to underline the theoretical issues discussed in relation to complaints in section 6.1.7, Chapter Six. The response from GMP in relation to Oldham West was that “this information is not broken down into sub-divisional level.”\textsuperscript{730} However, for the division as a whole, there were 88 conduct complaints in 2001-2002, and 89 in 2007-2008. The ethnicity of the complainants is shown in Table 3:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any other Asian Background</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Other Black Background</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Other Ethnic Group</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Other White Background</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian - Bangladeshi</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian - Indian</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian - Pakistani</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black - Caribbean</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declined</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing Data</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed – White &amp; Asian</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed – White &amp; Black Caribbean</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White British</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Irish</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Complainants</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 3: Ethnicity of complainants, complaints against police, 2001-2002, and 2007-2008, Oldham*\textsuperscript{731}

\textsuperscript{729} Ibid
\textsuperscript{730} Ibid
\textsuperscript{731} Ibid
The variation in the number of complaints made and the number of complainants is because there can be more than one complainant per case.\footnote{Ibid} At a superficial level, the numbers of complaints in the two periods concerned do not show an enormous discrepancy. However, data for 2001-2002 pre-dates the statutory requirement to record all complaints, described in section 6.1.7, Chapter Six. Moreover, closer examination of the data reveals some interesting features. In 2001-02, there are no complaints recorded by complainants who are of an Asian Bangladeshi/Indian/Pakistani background; there are however 96 complainants where the data is ‘missing’. This of course underlines the issue of ‘unknowns’, discussed in section 6.1.7. It also begs this question: given the unrest at the time, might this missing data originate from the Asian community, and if it does, why has ethnicity data not been recorded? The difficulty is that we are merely guessing, and it is impossible to tell. This figure drops to 9 in the years 2007-2008, but there is no corresponding rise in complaints from Asian people. In fact, the rise is seen in complaints from the White-British category, rising from 7 in 2001-02 to 90 in 2007-2008. Rises in complaints from the Asian categories are extremely modest, the largest being from zero to 8 amongst the Pakistani community. Nevertheless, the percentages of complaints from each category in 2007-08 broadly mirror the ethnic make-up of the population, discussed in the previous chapter. The change in the statutory recording of police complaints in the Police Reform Act 2002 renders the data from 2001-2003 problematic. Had the same statutory requirement existed then as exists now, complaints against police in that year, especially from Asian communities, might have been significantly higher. This demonstrates the point made in section 6.1.2, Chapter Six, regarding variations in the law over time, and changes in recording and categorising matters.

The first section of the previous chapter provides a theoretical overview of certain key policing indicators. It draws on literature to comment on the complexity of the foundationalist aspect of the research question, highlighting various impediments to simple statistical analysis of available data. The current section demonstrates these arguments by drawing on police information for the location of the case study and the surrounding area. This sets the scene for identifying avenues for a further research project, utilising police information, but additionally designing a project which elicits reliable data independent of official sources. This proposal is examined in more detail in
the final chapter, and is consistent with the critical realist philosophical position of this thesis.

In the following section, I begin by commenting on the degree to which key themes of the policies and edicts examined in Chapter Four have been successfully implemented by GMP. The section then goes on to describe the local arrangements for the delivery of policing, with specific reference to Oldham West. This then will be the link with the concluding section of Chapter Four, and the second part of Chapter Six, providing reflections on the application of the National Intelligence Model and Neighbourhood Policing in the theatre of the case study, and again building an understanding of the nature of the research locale.

7.2 Greater Manchester Police (GMP): A Commentary on Critical Success

In Chapter Four, I examine a series of legislative and policy responses to five key seminal events which were described in Chapter Two. These events are: The Brixton Riots (1981), The Murder of Stephen Lawrence (1993), The Secret Policeman (2002, with links to 2000), Urban Unrest in Bradford and Oldham (2001), and the Terrorist Bombings in London (2005). Rather than attempt to examine GMP against compliance and implementation of each of these legislative and policy responses (which is the function of various Government bodies), I consider in this part the themes identified within Chapter Four which were common to all or most of the responses described in that chapter. I argued that police forces and other public agencies had failed to learn lessons from the past, and that to some extent, this was demonstrated by the recurring themes in the various Inquiries and policy responses to the five seminal events, occurring as they did over a 25 year period. I call these themes, critical success factors. They are reproduced below:

- The need to work in partnership with other agencies, especially education and housing departments.

- The police organisation needs to strive to reflect the community it serves, and the recruitment, retention and promotion of ethnic minority staff is a crucial part of this.
• Community representatives should be involved in training, especially community awareness training.

• The local ‘beat officer’ or Neighbourhood Policing team has a vital role and must attract officers of high calibre.

• Police organisations must work towards the elimination of racial discrimination of all types, and contribute towards the development of cohesive communities.

In Figure 5, Chapter Six, I present a schematic showing how the critical success factors relate to policing indicators. Here, I provide quantitative data and comment on the degree to which GMP has been successful in delivering the critical success factors, although further light is thrown on it by the qualitative data later in the Chapter. I discuss the impact of this delivery on the policing indicators in section 8.1.6, Chapter Eight, and indeed Section 8.1 of Chapter Eight draws conclusions from the data in relation to the delivery of each of these critical success factors.

I deal with some of the factors with reference to GMP as a whole, and some with specific reference to the Oldham Division, and Oldham West. Thus, I examine the ‘machinery of local policing delivery’ for the case study, focussing general issues discussed in section 4.12, Chapter Four, into the arena of the fieldwork.

7.2.1 Partnership Working and NIM Tasking

HMIC report encouraging progress in the partnership arena:

“The Local Area Agreement (LAA) has provided the impetus for development within Oldham’s sustainable neighbourhoods framework, and has brought agencies together to work in collaboration for the common good of Oldham. Partnership tasking processes have been developed and since May 2007, they have been driven through SNMG [Safer Neighbourhoods Management Group] of the local strategic partnership.”733

This type of approach to building cohesive communities is referred to in the Cantle Report, discussed in section 4.7, Chapter Four, and is clearly moving matters in the intended direction.

However, tactical tasking and coordinating group meetings (see section 4.12.1, Chapter Four) have evolved into meetings which focus on priority crime and, although there is some partnership representation, are principally about police tasking. Other tasking meetings include daily tasking (in line with the National Intelligence Model), and monthly “Safer Stronger” partnership tasking at strategic level. At the more local level, multi-agency partnerships, consisting of local police officers, housing providers, local authority departments and representatives of local residents exist, and in Oldham West efforts have been made to take these down to a lower (ward) level. This has met with mixed success owing to the difficulty of full partner support. Where they do exist, they provide a means of tasking partners through the police led weekly Neighbourhood Police Team intelligence/tasking meeting.

### 7.2.2 Reflecting the Community

GMP is a large metropolitan police force with some 8,000 police officers. Table 4 shows the proportion of officers in GMP and the Oldham Division who are from self-defined ethnic minority groups:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Officers</th>
<th>Minority Ethnic Officers (%)</th>
<th>Asian/Asian British (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GMP</strong></td>
<td>8053</td>
<td>316 (3.9)</td>
<td>118 (1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oldham</strong></td>
<td>449</td>
<td>25 (5.6)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4: Proportion of officers from self-defined ethnic minority groups as at 31 March 2007*

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734 Ibid p7
735 Humphries A (2008) op cit
736 www.gmp.police.uk/division12/pages/Oldwestneigh.htm accessed 23/7/08
737 Humphries A (2008) op cit
739 Ibid
Although falling short of representing the ethnic make-up of the community, GMP has seen an increase of seven officers from ethnic minority groups compared with the previous year (2005/06), and they report that this is slow but steady progress.\textsuperscript{740} Further, Oldham Division shows a higher proportion of officers from ethnic minority groups. Although still falling short of reflecting the ethnic make-up of the community in Oldham (see section 5.4.2, Chapter Five), the fact that Oldham Division shows higher numbers of officers from ethnic minority groups, just as Oldham itself has a population which has higher proportions of ethnic minority communities than most of the rest of the Greater Manchester area is encouraging. GMP also has a ‘Positive Action Recruitment Team’ actively engaged in recruiting from minority groups.\textsuperscript{741}

Table 5 deals with the issues of recruitment, promotion and retention:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recruitment</th>
<th>Promotion</th>
<th>All Reasons for Leaving</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>BME(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>359</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>14(3.9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5: Recruitment, Promotion and Retention of BME staff, 1 April 2006 – 31 March 2007, Greater Manchester Police*\textsuperscript{742}

The figures in this table demonstrate that rates of recruitment exceed rates of loss of minority ethnic members of staff, resulting in a steady increase of representation. They also show promotion rates which exceed percentages of total minority ethnic staff, demonstrating encouraging opportunity of progression.

Although this data is a ‘snapshot’, and has not considered aspects of it in greater depth (for example, the progression of ethnic minority staff into higher ranks of the organisation), overall the picture is one of optimism. There is much work to do in order to meet recommendations first articulated by Lord Scarman in 1981, but progress appears to be slowly under way.

\textsuperscript{740} Ibid
\textsuperscript{741} Ibid
\textsuperscript{742} Ibid
7.2.3 Community Awareness Training

GMP provides diversity awareness training to its entire staff, and has an increasing number of external customers.\textsuperscript{743} Publicly available sources are silent on the involvement of community representatives in the training, however Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) reported that the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) had noted that training by the force to members of staff contained elements of good practice.\textsuperscript{744} HMIC also report other significant strengths in the diversity arena for GMP, including \textit{inter alia} chief officer lead on confidence and equality issues, a force-wide diversity framework with divisional diversity action groups and Independent Advisory Groups (IAGs), which advise the force on service delivery.\textsuperscript{745} The actual practical effectiveness of some of these developments is assessed in the research component of this thesis through the interviews with members of communities and operational staff in Oldham.

7.2.4 The Elimination of Racial Discrimination

In Chapter Two, seminal event 3, I described the activities of Mark Daly, an undercover reporter for the BBC, who joined GMP posing as a new recruit. In the programme that followed, \textit{The Secret Policeman}, new recruits to the police service (some from GMP) were not only exposed as racist, but also demonstrated the willingness and desire to discriminate on the grounds of their prejudices. This was at a time shortly after the enactment of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, which imposed certain positive duties on public authorities, including the police (see section 4.5, Chapter Four). The positive duties are to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination, promote equality of opportunity and to promote good relations between people of different racial groups. This then is a statutory requirement, and enshrines the third of the themes into law. The formal investigation of police forces, described in section 4.6, Chapter Four, arose directly from \textit{The Secret Policeman}. GMP was one of 14 forces subject to an initial investigation, and who were found to have fallen short of their statutory requirements under the Race Relations (Amendment) Act, and as a direct result, entirely

\textsuperscript{743} \url{www.gmp.police.uk/trainingpages} accessed 19/8/08
\textsuperscript{744} Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (2006a) \textit{Greater Manchester Police – Baseline Assessment October 2006} Crown Copyright, London: Home Office p14
\textsuperscript{745} Ibid
re-wrote their race equality scheme with some significant enhancements. They had already responded to *The Secret Policeman* by establishing a ‘Respect Programme’, which focused on key issues arising from consultations and scoping exercises which centred on, amongst other things, feedback from communities and staff in the immediate aftermath of the programme, and a revisit to ‘Operation Catalyst’, the force response to the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, examining issues relating to ‘race’ and police processes. The programme board was chaired by the Deputy Chief Constable, and was comprised in the majority by lay community members. Initially then, GMP were found wanting, both through the BBC documentary, and the subsequent CRE Formal Investigation. However, these two formative experiences galvanised GMP into action, and at the time of writing, the force appears to be not only fully compliant with the auspices of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act, but also working hard to promote racial equality in all areas of its business. By using IAGs capable of influencing service delivery, they are also working towards building cohesive communities. This aspect is further considered in the following sections.

### 7.2.5 Neighbourhood Policing

Here I describe the manner in which Neighbourhood Policing has been implemented in GMP by referring to the system in Oldham Division generally and Oldham West specifically. This will engender an understanding of the policing arrangements in the area and, at the same time, demonstrate the wider implementation of Neighbourhood Policing by the force. Together with the next section, it constitutes an explanation of the ‘machinery of local policing delivery’.

Oldham Division was the Neighbourhood Policing (safer neighbourhoods) pathfinder site for GMP. The division is divided into six safer neighbourhood areas, known locally as townships, each of which consist of three or four local authority wards. Each of these townships has a team of ‘neighbourhood’ police officers and Police

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748 Ibid
750 Ibid
Community Support Officers (PCSOs) – all except one led by a police inspector.\textsuperscript{751} Oldham West is the busiest of these townships, and the inspector is supported by a team of one sergeant, seven constables and 14 PCSOs, although additional staff are provided by ‘New Deals for Communities’, which funds two additional constables, and GMP are running a 3 year Priority Neighbourhood initiative for a further sergeant and five constables for the Alexandra and Coldhurst wards.\textsuperscript{752} The patrol teams, covering the 24 hour, seven day a week response capability, are the responsibility of a different inspector, and although they are theoretically allocated neighbourhood areas as car beats, the reality is that they respond to urgent calls all over the borough at the discretion of their supervisors.\textsuperscript{753} The result of this is little continuity of patrol staff working in the townships.\textsuperscript{754} Additionally, HMIC noted in 2006 that “there is a perception among safer neighbourhood officers that they are frequently abstracted from their core role”,\textsuperscript{755} whilst in 2008, response constables reported that they feel they carry heavy workloads and do not get enough support, “particularly from neighbourhood teams.” The difficulty of fully integrating the patrol function with Neighbourhood Policing is a weakness reflected in many areas, and probably represents the biggest challenge to optimum benefit from the Neighbourhood Policing ethos.\textsuperscript{756} So, the policing arrangements in Oldham and Oldham West are typical examples of the implementation of the Neighbourhood Policing model, with officers dedicated to working closely with communities.

I now move on to present qualitative data elicited from interviews and participant observation work from the case study. The sections are structured around the five major themes from the semi-structured interview questionnaire, but there are 27 sub-themes which emerge as a result of the analysis and coding of the data.

\textsuperscript{751} Ibid
\textsuperscript{752} Humphries A (2008), Neighbourhood Inspector, Oldham West, Personal Communication, email dated 24/8/08
\textsuperscript{753} Ibid
\textsuperscript{754} Ibid
\textsuperscript{755} Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (2006b) op cit p17
\textsuperscript{756} Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (2008) op cit p9
7.3 Policing and Social Justice

7.3.1 Recruitment and Deployment of Ethnic Minority Staff

Like the UK Police Service in general, data in the previous sections demonstrates that Greater Manchester Police struggles to reach targets around the recruitment of ethnic minority staff in its pursuit of the second critical success factor identified above – i.e. the need to reflect the community served. This problem appears to be compounded by a lack of sophistication in the choice of deployment for officers recruited from minority communities, and a lack of bespoke training for non-ethnic minority staff deployed to areas of high ethnic minority numbers.\textsuperscript{757} Moreover, police staff identify language itself as an enormous barrier when engaging with certain communities.\textsuperscript{758} This is a key area in which recruits to the service from minority groups can prove to be a win – it is not merely some tokenistic virtue linked with legitimacy of policing; local police team-leaders identify that there are real and tangible benefits,\textsuperscript{759} language being just one. Other vital contributions concern the understanding that ethnic minority officers engender in others, especially around culture and understanding of Islam. It was said by one of the neighbourhood sergeants that “diversity training in the force is limited, you only learn it by immersing yourself in the community, and the only way to do that is to utilise those members of the team with the appropriate background”.\textsuperscript{760} During the course of research work with the neighbourhood team, I also observed that this mixture of ethnicities within the team engendered some very positive views of each respective culture; this complements the notion discussed with the consultation panel I established for the construction of the questionnaire,\textsuperscript{761} and appears in a more coherent form in section 7.4.8 below entitled ‘The Successful Community’. This lack of success of reflecting the make up the community in ethnicity terms is also experienced by the council according to a senior member of their communities unit, albeit to a lesser degree.\textsuperscript{762} He points out that the turn-over in a large organisation like Oldham Borough Council is small, and that to reach the targets will either take a very long time, or there has to be massive disproportionality in the numbers of Asian recruits when compared with white. The housing department of the council fares a bit better – they report that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{757} A0021
\item \textsuperscript{758} A0019
\item \textsuperscript{759} B0026
\item \textsuperscript{760} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{761} Exeter Mosque 24 July 2008
\item \textsuperscript{762} C0033
\end{itemize}
they deliberately moved people into the department from elsewhere in the organisation to overcome language difficulties working closely with communities.\textsuperscript{763} One of the supervisors from the neighbourhood management team within the council also reports a good diverse mix of staff, similarly reporting that the value brought by these members of staff around language and engendering wider understanding is huge.\textsuperscript{764}

Although statutory agencies clearly articulate and identify the advantages of having a diverse cross-section of cultures and ethnicities within their teams, especially those working closely with communities, what about the perception of people from communities themselves? Many of the younger interviewees I spoke to had been stopped and searched by the police (discussed in more detail in section 7.3.9, below), and this has given them, in general, an adverse view of the police whether the officers were white or Asian. It was commented by a young Asian male that it would probably be good if there were more Asian police officers but made the point that Asian recruits would still need to meet the standard.\textsuperscript{765} Another commented that “you hardly see any”\textsuperscript{766}, and in general it made no difference to the community members whether or not the police officers were Asian or white, they were still police officers, and subjecting individuals to stops and searches. One respondent even commented that “..it’s like they’ve gone on the other side now…it’s seen as a betrayal in some ways.”\textsuperscript{767} Linked with the discussion above regarding the appropriate deployment of staff to police in certain areas, one male Asian respondent observed that it would be helpful for officers who lived in the local area to police the local area “because they would know who does it [crime], where it goes on.”\textsuperscript{768}

In essence, the major advantages in the second critical success factor appear to lie with the organisation itself, manifesting themselves through a better understanding of culture and an ability to communicate with minority communities by overcoming the language barrier. The notion that trust from these same minority groups in a state agency like the police is automatically elevated as a result of increased ethnic minority representation appears to be misguided; legitimacy still needs to be worked at, and appropriate

\textsuperscript{763} A0022  
\textsuperscript{764} C0029  
\textsuperscript{765} A0036(a)  
\textsuperscript{766} A0035(b)  
\textsuperscript{767} B0043  
\textsuperscript{768} A0034
recruitment and deployment of staff drawn from ethnic minority communities should be driven by the business need, rather than merely the pursuit of a target.

7.3.2 Use of Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs)

There are two PCSOs in the team that speak several different languages and, as identified above, language is a significant barrier to high quality engagement with minority communities. PCSOs have made an enormous impact in this area; the role is seen by prospective recruits to the police from ethnic minority communities and, crucially, their families, as being much more appropriate than a full-time regular police office, partly because communities have difficulties seeing past the uniform, regardless of the individual’s background and ability to speak their languages. This sits very comfortably with the views outlined above from some community members, and raises the question of whether the police service should use Genuine Occupational Requirements to employ people preferentially from ethnic minority communities for deployment as PCSOs in a given area. This gets round the problem of positive discrimination but meets an identified business need, and helps towards the delivery of the second critical success factor discussed above. Views from community members are a little mixed: “a lot of PCSOs grass us up man, they see us and call the police.” Others have a positive view of PCSOs and feel that policing is fair. That PCSOs have furthered relationships between the police and Asian communities, both through the fundamental reasons for having PCSOs – to work with communities – as well as through the recruitment of people from hard-to-reach communities seems undoubted. Although not a representative sample, the PCSOs seem to understand the communities much better than police officers and they are truly engaged with them.

As part of the fieldwork for this research project, I spent time on foot patrol with an Asian PCSO. He knew nearly everyone we saw or came across on the beat, including young children, and was able to converse with them in their first language. The positive impact this had was self-evident, and the opportunity for information and intelligence gathering was enormous. This opportunity, and the value in having PCSOs working as

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769 B0023
770 A0039(b)
771 E0024(b)
772 E0026
773 Foot patrol with B0023 30 July 2009
part of the safer neighbourhood team more generally, was thoroughly recognised by police officers from within the team:

“There’s an officer, if you can arrange a meeting with him, he’s really good, [names officer] a Police Community Support Officer, he knows absolutely everybody and everything. He’s been here a lot longer, I’ve only been here 12 months. He’s got a really good relationship with the Imams, you know, for the Mosques. So if we’ve got a particular problem in the area, then, he speaks Urdu as well, and that’s obviously a great benefit because that’s the language the majority of people speak on this area. He goes into the Mosques and he puts the message out to all the communities that are coming in regular, so that’s been good. I take him out quite a lot with me, for my own purposes as well you know, because sometimes, I’ve learned a couple of words, you know, at the front door to get past and get a bond with people, but he’s a really good benefit.”

And:

“Couldn’t do it with out them. We haven’t got enough cops to do what we need to do. The PCSOs are brilliant. We’ve got some fantastic PCSOs.”

The fourth critical success factor distilled from the work of Scarman and others, critically examined in Chapter Four, describes the importance and value that must be attached to the local officer who is part of the Neighbourhood Policing team. Any role the police have to play in the reduction of risk associated with the development of harmful radicalisation or raised community tension will clearly rest heavily on those officers with that crucial community role, and PCSOs appear to be very successful in the theatre of the case study.

7.3.3 Opportunities for Intervention

Although linked to questions around partnerships, identity and influence, together with whispers and rumours discussed below, it is worth examining intervention opportunities here as part of the effectiveness of the National Intelligence Model. The precise mechanics and theory behind this model are examined and discussed in Chapter Four, and the intended method of delivery in the theatre of the case-study is outlined in the preceding chapter.

A situation is described by one police respondent (though several others make reference to the same situation) whereby the development of radicalisation was identified by
youth services, i.e. a partner agency. Here, the issue was identified through the use of a kick-pitch by a group of young Asians not normally engaged in using the kick-pitch. Members of staff communicated this issue to the PCSOs, and intelligence was submitted, and then there was a pause to see what happened. There was no thought from within the local teams that intervention might occur immediately and that responsibility for initiating and leading that intervention might lie with them. Why? Is this a fault of a reliance on the infrastructure around the National Intelligence Model to effectively task a response? A supervisor of the neighbourhood management teams at the council also cannot be sure that warning signs and appropriate mitigation activity would occur, although he remains optimistic that it would be. There are some important barriers to prompt and effective mitigation activity, which are linked with the problems associated with partnership working, discussed below. But of course, the question remains, how do you intervene successfully and with credibility? Chapter Four introduces Briggs et al (2006), who examine the work of the Muslim Contact Unit which conducted pioneering partnership work in London, engaging credible (although controversial in some cases), individuals from Muslim communities to work with the police to ‘switch off’ the radicalisation process. This approach finds resonance in Oldham:

“..if people are getting drawn into extremism in the name of Islam, the only people who are going to have any clout with them in terms of influencing that thinking is actually other Muslims who have a really detailed understanding of Islam, and who can say no, no, that’s not what the Qur’an is about.”

One of the interviewees is used by the police and the local authority to engage with harder-to-reach communities, and whilst he may not be described as radical, he has a lengthy criminal record for a number of serious offences; yet his influence is such that the agencies are keen to use him. He has this to say on the subject:

“I think it would be good if we engaged with certain radical people, and reason with them…not sit here and tell them we have come to beat you… This is sensible.”

776 A0019 op cit
777 C0029 op cit
779 C0033 op cit
780 C0028
There are clearly opportunities for intervention, and there are opportunities for using key people from within communities who carry much more credibility than the agencies themselves to assist. But there are barriers to the success of such an approach, and these are discussed below.

During the course of the participant observation component of the research, I attended a ‘tasking’ meeting chaired by a police superintendent.\textsuperscript{781} This was a multi-agency meeting, and was well placed to meet the intention of the National Intelligence Model:

\begin{quote}
“It is intended to promote a cooperative approach to policing since many of the solutions to problems will require the participation of other agencies and bodies which is further strengthened with joint tasking and co-ordination processes.”\textsuperscript{782}
\end{quote}

But the meeting was attended by over forty people. There was a focus on performance issues (police) and was a reporting mechanism for progress against targets (crime reduction and ‘sanction detections’ – Home Office approved resolutions to crimes - in the main). There was no discussion about community tension, radicalisation, local problems of crime and disorder, and no tasking of resources. It amounted to a good intention but a missed opportunity.

\textbf{7.3.4 The ‘Trust Deficit’}

The concept of legitimacy and policing by consent is introduced in Chapter Two, and then expanded upon in Chapter Three, where the legitimacy of the state is discussed. In the theatre of the case study, there appear to be factors which contribute to a ‘trust deficit’ between some state authorities, especially the police, and the Asian communities, which focuses attention on the question of police legitimacy. It is articulated in its strongest form by a key member of a third sector organisation in the town, although he acknowledges that politically it is not something the police would be keen to admit.\textsuperscript{783} He describes the application of the laws on terrorism, examined in

\begin{footnotes}
\item[781] Multi-agency ‘Tasking Meeting’, Old Chadderton Town Hall, Oldham 13/11/08
\item[783]B0024
\end{footnotes}
Chapter Four – and specifically refers to the glorification of terrorism, using an example from Oldham:

“It’s a stupid stupid law, and it’s a stupid stupid prosecution but it’s happening in all our names, and how it’s going to be reported I do not know, but how it is going to be understood by Muslim communities in Oldham is of victimisation… the trust gap between the police and the community has suddenly got a lot bigger.”

He points out that the decision to prosecute had no connection whatsoever with the local authority and the local police. So we have a situation whereby the trust gap between the police and the Muslim communities has increased as a direct result of a decision made at a distance from the community. A leading member of the local safer neighbourhood team says this:

“Generally, Oldham is one of those towns where the community is broadly supportive of the police. Certainly when I speak to officers who have worked in other parts of Greater Manchester, more urban areas, more city centre areas, they would comment on the support, they get a different attitude, a different approach, the police are not the enemy here, as much, not saying that’s across the board, I mean this was more so in the immediate aftermath of the disturbances, that there was always one rule, the police always behave one way towards white British residents and a different way towards Asian heritage residents, and those accusations come at us from both sides. It’s still there to a certain extent amongst those people who have hardly any, or who have deeply entrenched views along those lines but I think it’s easier now, and I think there is a perception that the police are even handed now, more widely, although some of those hard held beliefs are still there in the hardcore and the public are broadly supportive of the police.”

The trust deficit is a critical issue recognised by the strategic lead for Prevent within Greater Manchester Police:

“You know, it’s about how you build up trust and confidence to the point where like you said earlier on, a lot of the communities don’t want radicals, they don’t want the violent extremists, they don’t want these people who run off to terror training camps and all the rest of it. So we want to get to the point where there is sufficient trust and confidence for them to say actually there’s an issue about foreign policy that we want to talk about, or there’s an issue about you know we’ve got concerns about individuals within our community, and we’ve got concerns about this particular group, and they’re starting to talk about the terrorism agenda, and you can’t, I don’t

782 Ibid
783 A0016 op cit
think you can always go in and say, OK neighbourhood policing, right, let’s talk about counter terrorism, because the door will be slammed in our face.786

A female Pakistani ‘elder’ also describes a latent mistrust of the police by the Asian community, especially Pakistanis, but this is owing to the corrupt nature of the police in Pakistan. She identifies that this latent mistrust makes it extremely difficult for the police in the UK to engage with this section of the community, whether it is in relation to drug dealers, the investigation of murders, or counter terrorism/radicalisation.787

In essence, the police appear to have a well-developed understanding of the need to narrow the trust gap in order to maximise the flow of community intelligence and information to tackle threats, which includes development of harmful radicalisation as well as drug dealing. Yet their efforts appear to be hampered by decisions that they have to take apparently in the wider interests of the community, as well as dealing with pre-existing latent mistrust born out of cultural differences from some parts of these communities. Whilst always being a point of tension, critical to success here is the link between NIM levels one, two and three – i.e. how effectively local neighbourhood policing is servicing and working to reduce perceived threats at force level and beyond.

7.3.5 Partnerships and Silos

The effectiveness of partnership working is brought into sharp relief by speaking with the partners themselves; communities are on the receiving end of outputs, and therefore less able to comment on how well partnerships operate. The first critical success factor distilled from the policies and edicts in Chapter Four, from which Neighbourhood Policing and the machinery of local policing delivery springs, identifies how important effective partnership working is, and within the locale there is much partnership work going on. For instance, one of the members of the council’s neighbourhood management team said:

“Our action teams are multi-partnership, and we’re looking at issues now. So if we’ve got a high burglary rate, we’ll go in and try and target harden, you know, securing houses – the physical stuff that we can do. Anti social behaviour, you know, we’ll put

786 C0032
787 D0042
more people on the street, look at where they are selling alcohol, all that type of stuff.” 788

But there is also a lot of ‘silo working’, whereby organisations focus on their area of responsibility only. A housing officer commented:

“IT’s quite clear you can identify with the deprived areas, but I think the problem arises, as you get, as gets raised all the time, you work for an agency, what exactly are you responsible for? And its trying to work out some kind of responsibility, it seems to be, and again perhaps people within our sector are guilty of it as well, where they would just say, well, is it a housing related matter? No it’s not, right, well it’s not our... and the same with social services. We have a major issue between ourselves and them, you sort of say, well, we’re not really responsible for that. But you can’t have, if you’re trying to impact in an area, and improve it, it can’t be lack of my, there are grey areas, and someone has to be responsible for those grey areas. Well at the moment, there just isn’t.” 789

A PCSO, (and, as indicated above, PCSOs might be considered to be the principal means by which the police engage with the community), talks about a man from Connexions; he was unable to name this man, but he thought it was his responsibility to engage wayward youngsters – the PCSO had no idea how successful the man from Connexions was, and was not wholly aware of the role he himself had to play. 790

Key police staff continue the theme of partnerships not functioning as effectively as they could, with the notion that staff from the council do not get out into the community as much as they should, and through apologising for his view, it is clearly a source of frustration for some:

“We’ll persevere. It’s not easy, but like I say, it would be easy if all the multi agencies got their fingers out, and I apologise for saying that. They need to be listening to people and, you know, too often these glossy magazines, leaflets, this is what we do, and that’s fine, but who’s going to read a glossy magazine? Get out there and just talk. Communicate with people, it’s easy.” 791

788 C0029 op cit
789 A0022 op cit
790 A0021 op cit
791 B0023 op cit
Neither is the journey towards effective partnership work with community groups smooth, despite the advantages of such an approach in brokering better relationships with sections of the community as discussed above. This appears to be, in part, because of the shifting sands of various agency agendas, which in turn are linked to the fickle political winds of change. The second interview of key individuals from a community group working for racial equality provides evidence of this problem. The group has experienced a decline in interest as the agenda has changed. The weekly meetings with the police and the council which focused on hate crime have been replaced by the Oldham community tension framework, so the police and the council are now engaging with others instead. In this case, the Preventing Violent Extremism agenda, discussed below, has altered the perspective and affected the flow of funding streams.

7.3.6 The ‘Democratic Deficit’, the ‘Homeland’ and ‘Tribal Influence’

Two key police respondents talk about how important ‘the homeland’ is – that it is more important than what is going on in the local community, and thus introduce the concept of a flaw in the democratic system amongst Asian communities. A community respondent also says “Asian politics is complicated because it is tribal”. This is developed more explicitly by others from community groups, who talk passionately about the local ‘democratic deficit’ – arguing that local representatives have been corrupted by the British political system. The mainstream politicians have cultured relationships with people from the community – the heads of clans – who then mobilise members of their ‘Biraderi’ – clan – to vote. The BBC have previously reported on the damaging nature of the Biraderi networks, describing the term as meaning ‘brotherhood’, and then explaining that they are essentially tribal networks influencing nearly 1 million of the UK’s Pakistani population, and are extensions of systems of allegiance in Pakistan itself. The result of this is that the young Muslim who is radicalised politically by foreign policy has nowhere to go – he perceives a complete lack of opportunity to be elected. This is potentially hugely damaging: it plays directly into the notion of a lack of political representation being a contributor to disenfranchised groups, and makes no distinction based on poverty or education (arguably, the more educated will be more profoundly affected by this situation.)

792 E0028
793 A0016 op cit, and A0018 op cit
794 E0020
795 B0024 op cit, E0028 ibid
796 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/3181851.stm accessed 17/08/10
Other, more independent respondents also identify this phenomenon. One, a prominent member of the infrastructure of the town, who was directly involved in the riots of 2001, and who has been associated with Oldham for over forty years, talks about a political driver which might contribute to increasing distrust and tension:

“….because the volatile political areas in Oldham are in the sort of inner city areas around the town centre, and both the major parties, the liberal democrats and the labour party knew that to get control of the council, they needed to have a majority of seats in these areas. So they were inclined to throw money at these areas. And that obviously created a tension in the poorer white communities…”

These arguments, which start to describe a particularly murky political environment since they imply transparency operating within a transparent democratic process but are in reality corrupt, are lent further weight by an example provided by a key police respondent. He cites an example of a young person complaining about her elected representative bringing tribal practices to Oldham – essentially the same argument described above. The affiliation has nothing to do with representing the interests of the local area, and much more to do with ancient tribal provenance. Community members themselves comment that whether councillors were Asian or not, they are not very representative, and one prominent ‘elder’ comments that it is OK in terms of accountability to have councillors irrespective of background in general terms, provided that they understand their duty to the whole community, although he acknowledges the advantage of having Asian councillors to tackle language and cultural barriers.

7.3.7 Whispers, Rumours and Tension Monitoring

One of the purposes behind the fourth critical success factor described above is to enable members of local Neighbourhood Policing teams to work ‘cheek by jowl’ with the communities they serve. Chapter Four describes how the machinery of local policing delivery works in theory, outlining the principles behind Neighbourhood Policing and the National Intelligence Model, whilst the mechanics which exist in the theatre of the case study are provided above. The fuel which feeds Neighbourhood

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797 C0031
798 C0032
799 A0035(b) op cit
800 E0027
Policing and the National Intelligence Model is the flow of information and intelligence from communities and individuals via local teams, through the assessment and tasking process, and then the allocation of resources to mitigate the problem. During the course of the participant observation phases of the fieldwork, I saw this in action: the gathering of community intelligence during various phases of foot-patrol,\(^\text{801}\) the discussion of the analytical product at a tasking meeting, and then how resources should be allocated to tackle crime hotspots.\(^\text{802}\) Of crucial and highly significant importance to the research was the identification of the value of ‘whispers’ or ‘feelings’. In assessing tension within communities, previous measures, outlined and discussed at some length in the review of literature in general terms in Chapter Three, and then more specifically in relation to Oldham (above), have included increased levels of racist crime for instance, or assaults on police officers. But various respondents refer to “feelings”, those ‘softer things’ which local neighbourhood management or policing teams might ‘pick up’ during the course of their close interaction with communities, and groups of individuals.\(^\text{803}\) For instance, a neighbourhood manager from the council says this in relation to the teams’ monitoring of tensions:

“Between us, PCSOs, housing association, what we’re looking for is that touchy-feely stuff you can’t explain. It’s just people commenting to you and, it’s something slightly different this week…”\(^\text{804}\)

This is reinforced by a police officer from the neighbourhood team:

“…there’s been a few things that have happened that have not been reported, you know, they tend to sort them out themselves, and we only find out that information by speaking to people…”\(^\text{805}\)

And a PCSO from the same team talks about how the use of a kick-pitch came to light through talking to people, and how this led to the identification of a group on the radicalisation route; this was exposed through listening and talking to communities, not through the analysis of quantitative data.\(^\text{806}\)

\(^{801}\) Foot patrol with B0023 30 July 2009 op cit
\(^{802}\) Multi-agency ‘Tasking Meeting’, Old Chadderton Town Hall, Oldham 13/11/08 op cit
\(^{803}\) C0029 op cit, A0020 op cit, A0019 op cit
\(^{804}\) C0029
\(^{805}\) A0020 op cit
\(^{806}\) A0019 op cit
This makes an interesting comparison with Dave Sloggett’s rumours theory, which describes how rumours, in dangerous circumstances, may be of an extreme nature and become rapidly embellished over short time frames. He argues that it is of crucial importance therefore to make sure that law and order officials maintain contacts with key individuals within communities to assess the traction such rumours gain within those communities. The value and importance of whispers and rumours in the assessment of community tension, and what contribution they might make, is revisited in the following chapter.

### 7.3.8 Asymmetric Resourcing and Community Tension

The build-up to the unrest and the resulting riots that occurred in Oldham in 2001 are presented in seminal event 4, Chapter Two, and further analysed as part of the review of academic literature in Chapter Three. Here, there is a discussion about the way in which Asian communities were discriminated against by the local agencies (see Ahmed et al (2001) in particular), and how this discrimination contributed to the backlash. One interviewee who is currently working within the neighbourhood management team at the council feels that the “alleged discrimination against Asians, which was supposed to have provided the tinder prior to the riots of 2001 was perception rather than reality”.

He was working for the council at the time and is an ex-police officer. The distinction between perception and reality is, however, somewhat blurred. A community respondent, also talking about the riots, and how Asian communities might react to perceived unfairness states:

“They don’t know how to. One of the ways [is] they just get frustrated and they say the police is racist, the court is racist, everyone is racist, they just get really angry and then brand everybody as racist when they are not.”

The way in which these perceptions work inevitably varies, depending on one’s position, making the mission of agencies even more problematic. It is certainly true that

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808 Ibid p1
810 C0029 op cit
811 C0028 op cit
the most deprived areas were (and still are) occupied by mostly Asian communities; the reasons for this are discussed at some length in preceding chapters. According to one respondent from the media, this creates a perception of favourable treatment – these areas attract higher levels of funding, to the exclusion of white working class estates, and the perception then is that Asian people are treated more favourably:

“There was a huge perception that a lot of money was being spent on the Asian communities to the exclusion of the poor white communities on the council estates. To some extent, in fact to a large extent, that was true, because the volatile political areas in Oldham are in the sort of inner city areas around the town centre, and both the major parties, the liberal democrats and the labour party knew that to get control of the council, they needed to have a majority of seats in these areas. So they were inclined to throw money at these areas. And that obviously created a tension in the poorer white communities. And also brought us into contact with our friends in the BNP.”  

Interestingly, this notion appears to have some current support. The Head of the Communities Unit at Oldham Borough Council said:

“To be honest, I would say all communities really [have a lack of trust]. I mean, if you look at our survey results about people’s perceptions of the area, and of the council, actually probably the ethnic minority communities are more positive than the white communities…”

This can very readily have the effect of building community tension. In 2001, it provided an opportunity for the BNP to develop a power base, further enhancing and exploiting these community differences. The evidence appears to suggest that Asian communities, whilst living in the most deprived areas, are not further penalised by a lack of financial investment by the local authority. Consequently, the perceptions of communities, which I examine in more detail below, become highly relevant.

7.3.9 Police and Young People

One respondent, who works for the council to reduce Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB), and who is another ex-police officer, is of the view that attitudes towards the police will

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812 C0031 op cit
813 C0033 op cit
vary between ‘Asian kids and white kids’.\textsuperscript{814} He also concurs with the thrust of the notion that the police are seen as representatives of the state, and that the actions of the police could further alienate these groups:

> “And it’s all negative. It’s all negative towards.. They don’t name names if you like about communities, but it is geared towards the Muslim community. Certainly that’s the perception. If it’s the perception of us as white people it’s going to be the perception of the Muslim community, the victim again, so you are opening up doors for people to come in and say ‘I know you’re the victim, lets pay these bastards back. Lets do something that’s going to…’ Yeah, why not? Because everything else has failed.”\textsuperscript{815}

It is of some concern then that the views of many of the younger respondents, especially the Asians, were negative. Many of them had been stopped and searched by the police, with a perception that it was for no purpose:

> “Yeah, I’ve been stopped and searched for nothing, I haven’t been searched, and still they sent a letter to my house saying I been in a robbery area, doing this and doing that, what’s that all about?”\textsuperscript{816}

It was also said that there were delays when they called the police and yet when people call the police in relation to them, they show up within a few minutes:

> “Yesterday after college, I went down to the area, and there was some boys in this house, it was like caged up, but there was some boys in there anyway, and we called the police and they didn’t turn up. I was waiting there like a good 45 minutes, they didn’t even turn up. And if we didn’t call them, and some white person call them yeah, then they would be there in five minutes.”\textsuperscript{817}

This perception enhances the notion that the police act in a discriminatory way, potentially increasing feelings of disenfranchisement. Interestingly, one white female respondent asserts that “Most coppers are racist”, and says she gets treated differently

\textsuperscript{814} B0025  
\textsuperscript{815} Ibid  
\textsuperscript{816} A0039(a)  
\textsuperscript{817} Ibid  

236
by the police when she ‘hangs around with Asians’.\textsuperscript{818} This view of racism amongst police officers gains some support from two young Pakistani respondents, who think the police are racist in the way they act towards Asians.\textsuperscript{819} Another, also a Pakistani, reckons that “the police are muppets, not good for anything.” \textsuperscript{820}

It is, however, clear that PCSOs in particular are doing much to promote the relationship between young people and the police. I saw this during the foot patrol I carried out,\textsuperscript{821} but it was also independently confirmed by a local youth group leader:

“In the past, police wouldn’t have gone to youth clubs, but now the PCSOs do. They are promoting relationships between community and police partners.” \textsuperscript{822}

The challenge for the police in these circumstances is that their interactions on the street are a vital and necessary part of tackling drugs and crime – a fact acknowledged by some respondents:

“Well, they [the police] are doing their job but it’s not good enough is it. The people that are dealing stuff, they are still on the road. Fair enough, you see the police patrolling in the area, but what’s the point, crime is still going on.” \textsuperscript{823}

But such interactions will inevitably result in a negative perception. The key is to equalise the perception across different groups.

7.4 Local Social Conditions

7.4.1 Polarisation and Community Tension

At the beginning of one interview, the respondent, a member of the Bangladeshi community who is also a volunteer at the Oldham Muslim Centre, continues the theme initiated in the first section of the current chapter, and provides ‘on the ground’ support for the argument that Oldham is a divided community, although he does indicate that people have come together more in recent years than before.\textsuperscript{824} He also makes a clear

\textsuperscript{818} E0021(b)
\textsuperscript{819} E0022(a), E0022(b)
\textsuperscript{820} E0025(a)
\textsuperscript{821} Foot patrol with B0023 30 July 2009 op cit
\textsuperscript{822} E0020 op cit
\textsuperscript{823} A0034 op cit
\textsuperscript{824} C0028 op cit
link between lack of education and jobs, and also a gang culture, discussed in more detail below. This notion of a divided community is described in more explicit detail by some local staff, who are able to define the boundaries between communities down to street level: “..Rochdale Road divides the Coldhurst side from the Westwood side, Westwood side is predominantly Bangladeshi community, the Coldhurst side predominantly the white British working class community.” The lack of understanding between communities springing forth from such divisions is profound, and is played out within the responses amongst the community respondents. For instance, one white respondent talks about disrespect from some members of the Asian community in that they use their own language when in the company of others who cannot understand them. He is 75% convinced that people are ‘radical’ so far as Islam is concerned in Oldham, and seems to partly base this on their reluctance to speak English, so it is difficult to know what is going on. There is also a distinct difference in those Muslims who describe their national origins as Bangladeshi as opposed to Pakistani. Some of this is observed by others. For instance, two white female (non-Muslim) respondents both suggest that Bengalis have more respect for people than Pakistanis (though both have Pakistani boyfriends), and there is an implied tension between these groups; one male Pakistani respondent states that Bengalis “have no manners, repeat, no manners.”

What role do the police have to play in the resolution of such differences, especially in support of the fifth critical success factor identified, above?

There are a number of contributory factors identified by interviewees giving rise to this situation. One, an elder female, seen as a community ‘wise woman’ where others go for advice, expresses the view that in the 25 years she has been in Oldham, relations between the Asians and the Whites has turned from the Whites hating the Asians to the Asians hating the whites, and that this is a function of the bad treatment of the older generation of Asians when they first came to Oldham. She develops this further in her ideas around the reasons why young Asian men pick fights with young white men – she claims it is as a result of the perceived treatment of older people when they first settled.

825 A0016 op cit
826 A0038 op cit
827 Ibid
828 E0024(a)
829 D0042 op cit
in the town. Another argument put forwards by a Pakistani male from a third sector organisation identifies that Asians are frequently employed in low paid and fringe jobs like taxi driving. He argues that “white kids will get drunk and are then driven home by Asian taxi drivers – who then tell their wives and family about ‘drunk white kids’”, and this then reinforces a negative opinion of white people which is very damaging to social cohesion.

Amongst people who have lived and worked in Oldham for longer periods of time, and who have observed or been a part of the expansion of Asian communities, the development of these divisions has taken time to evolve. One, a prominent white member of the community who works in local media, does not believe that there was tension between ethnic groups for the first two or three decades. Another, who arrived from Pakistan in the early 1970s, describes how the Asian people kept themselves to themselves – working long shifts seven days a week at the cotton mills, tending to avoid mixing at all, and therefore not experiencing any prejudice. This tends to support the intellection, discussed in Chapter Three, that it takes that long for communities to become polarised, and for urban unrest to occur.

Taken together, all this tends to indicate that divisiveness in communities breeds distrust, and makes communities vulnerable to exploitation through political or quasi-political means, just as the BNP did in the build up to the riots of 2001.

### 7.4.2 Deprivation

It has already been demonstrated in this thesis that the study area experiences extremely high levels of deprivation. The question, then, is to what degree does this level of deprivation contribute to the risk of the development of harmful radicalisation? One Pakistani police respondent said this:

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830 Ibid
831 E0028 op cit
832 Ibid
833 C0031 op cit
834 E0027 op cit
“I understand radicalisation as in it’s the young people particularly who in one sense, you know, have no opportunities, no aspirations perhaps, they feel down in the doldrums.”

This is his understanding of radicalisation. Given his links with the community and his faith, this is quite interesting. He is also firmly of the view that a lack of employment and education opportunities increase vulnerability of young people. This is not the view of a Bangladeshi member of a third sector organisation, who had this to say in response to the issue of Asians living in socially deprived areas:

“That’s not going to radicalise, that will just create distrust in the institution, the police and the council, that will just create distrust, that’s all. That’s not going to turn them into terrorists.”

Others are also sceptical. A member of the council’s community unit suggests this:

“I think we’ve got a set of assumptions around this, and I don’t think there’s the evidence base at the moment, at a common sense level it kind of makes sense, but I’m not sure that there is the evidence base yet around extremism, you know, what are the real risk factors for people generally, and young men in particular being drawn into it.”

This theme relates directly to the construction of the hypothesis in Chapter Three, and I return to it in the final chapter, but the idea that deprivation in itself is a major contributory factor in the development of harmful radicalisation finds little evidence in the case study locale; and deprivation crosses the cultural divide: there are very poor white communities too.

7.4.3 Identity and Vulnerability

The issue of identity and vulnerability also goes to the heart of the construction of the hypothesis. That these things exist amongst some of the communities in Oldham

836 B0023 op cit
837 C0028 op cit
838 C0033 op cit
appears to be accepted fact. A PCSO with 6 months service talked about a minority of 18 to 25 years of age people who are ‘lost’.\textsuperscript{839} He goes on to describe how they are money orientated, and influenced by a culture which has come over from America. It’s reflected in the music, and he thinks they look up to it. They see people in valuable cars, and aspire to achieve the same. This is examined further in subsequent sections, but it links with observations by other respondents.\textsuperscript{840} Indeed, I saw it for myself: on an independent visit to Werneth, I saw young lads driving Range Rovers and Golf GTIs in deprived neighbourhoods, and it was oddly incongruous.\textsuperscript{841} Controversially, the same PCSO thinks that ‘they’, and by this he means young Asian men, want the money but do not want to work for it.\textsuperscript{842} Might it be the case that the opportunities don’t exist for one reason or another? He answers the question regarding those that are lost, and therefore capable of being influenced and directed, in the affirmative, but he sees it as an opportunity for him as a PCSO. This is fascinating and represents the first opportunity for intervention – mitigating the risk of someone else doing it for harmful or criminal purposes – although the upshot of not intervening is not recognised by this PCSO.

Another PCSO from the team expresses the view that the prevalence of single parent families contributes to the vulnerability of young males to a raft of external influences which may lead to harmful activity.\textsuperscript{843} Such harmful activity he identifies as including drug taking, alcohol abuse, ASB and radicalisation, and he suggests that the fact that their single mothers do not speak English amplifies this problem.\textsuperscript{844}

A key respondent from a third sector organisation in the town makes reference to the generational differences,\textsuperscript{845} a point which illustrates the debate around identity discussed in Chapter Three. Whose culture and values do you affiliate with? Your friends or your family? Your country or your community? He develops the theme with the idea that people, young people especially, need to be ‘rooted’ in a culture which satisfies them across a range of areas. This is interesting because it serves to minimise risk. If the ‘rooting’ is right, vulnerability is lower and hence the risk is lower – of

\textsuperscript{839} A0019 op cit
\textsuperscript{840} For example, A0036(b) op cit, A0016 op cit, C0029 op cit
\textsuperscript{841} Independent visit to Werneth, Oldham, 13/11/08
\textsuperscript{842} A0019 op cit
\textsuperscript{843} A0021 op cit
\textsuperscript{844} Ibid
\textsuperscript{845} B0024 op cit
crime, of gang related behaviour (discussed below) and of vulnerability to harmful radicalisation.\textsuperscript{846} He describes those that are “psychologically damaged” – people who have not led consistent lifestyles, not been fully accepted, not been able to create for themselves – “which doesn’t mean that they may not be fully functioning human beings, and people with degrees”.\textsuperscript{847} This last point is very important in terms of dealing with the poverty/education/ radicalisation link, discussed at length in Chapter Three. It implies that those who become radicalised may well be highly educated. A superficial glance at an individual’s antecedence is insufficient: a detailed examination of influences and experiences, including exposure to issues such as low-level racism (antilocution), is likely to be much more illuminating.

In a similar vein, a respondent who works for the council as an ASB officer, also talks about the conflict in young Asians minds because he thinks they are being westernised on the one hand and yet have their cultural and religious teachings on the other, and that this creates tensions.\textsuperscript{848} This issue is identified by others, and one who works for a college, acknowledges that it must be very difficult for some Asian students, as if “they’re almost living in two worlds.”\textsuperscript{849} I posed a question to a prominent Head of an educational establishment about identity, and whether tension exists in the minds of young Asian people:

“…I’m really interested in this, because it must create a big question mark in young people’s minds about who do I identify with, do I identify with my peer group, who will have and display behaviours and things which are at odds with my other option, which is to identify with my parents and my religion, and which way am I going to jump?”\textsuperscript{850}

However, the young Asians I spoke to indicated very little of this tension, they say that it is all to do with self, and what they themselves can achieve.\textsuperscript{851} They identify that being a Muslim is a struggle and therefore there will be degrees of success. It appears to be little different to other behaviour that young people engage in, whether that is unsafe sex, speeding, smoking etc. So although these contradictions exist, the notion that they

\textsuperscript{846} Ibid
\textsuperscript{847} Ibid
\textsuperscript{848} B0025 op cit
\textsuperscript{849} C0030(b)
\textsuperscript{850} C0030(a)
\textsuperscript{851} For example, A0034 op cit, A0039(a) op cit, A0039(b) op cit
somehow create tension, and increase vulnerability does not appear to have much substance, at least amongst the individuals themselves.

One interviewee, a white member of staff at a school, refers to boys finding an allegiance with ‘gangs’ based on locality, and this is more of an issue in recent years than it was. What does this mean about role models, and the search for an identity? Continuing the theme, she also states:

“In terms of their position in society or within a structure, a gang warfare, that’s really outwith the college isn’t it, and we always have this that within the college, we have very good race relations, and we have very little of the tension that seems to be going on outside. I don’t feel particularly well enough informed to give you any specific view on that, I think it is endemic in a minority, where you have a minority group who are trying to assert themselves in an area, and that happens in a lot of places doesn’t it?”

This is an interesting observation on the reaction of ‘oppressed’ groups in society, where it was identified that some common roots around terrorism and urban unrest might be identified; it is intrinsically linked to the common roots theory advanced in Chapter Three, and I return to it in the following chapter.

There are links coming forwards in this theme around identity and vulnerability to gang related behaviour and other types of crime. A respondent from a prominent position in the Communities Unit within Oldham Borough Council talks about identity, and the fact that different paths might be taken at a crucial point in someone’s life. Those paths might be criminality and gang related behaviour, or radicalisation, but he would not be drawn on the suggestion that these phenomena have common roots because he feels the evidence base is not currently there. He also talks about intervention where extremism is identified, and suggests that this should form part of the common assessment framework methodology, and therefore dovetail with any other interventions which might be required. The links to gang related and criminal behaviour are brought out again in subsequent themes, below, and discussed in the following chapter.

852 C0030(b)
853 Ibid
854 C0033 op cit
855 Ibid
7.4.4 Mr Big, Mr Parent, Mr Radical

Following very naturally on from the theme of identity is the issue of what the prominent influences are within the sphere of those that might be vulnerable. Who might they look to for inspiration? Who might they model themselves on? Very early on, the notion of ‘Mr Big’ was introduced to me by a Pakistani PCSO. He paints a picture of ‘Mr Big’ in a short punchy statement: “Range Rover, Bling bling”. The essence of the intellection is that young Asian men are driving around extremely deprived neighbourhoods in very expensive cars, they are heavily bejewelled, and they are presenting an image of wealth. The upshot? “I want some of that” – ‘Mr Big’ then becomes a role model. A local youth worker agreed with the notion of Mr Big, saying that young people used to look up to their elders, but now they look up to Mr Big – role models have changed. He suggests that they see the ‘elders’ as people who put restrictions on them and therefore they do not perceive them as role models which consequently creates a gap. Furthermore, heroin is coming in through Oldham, and Dads of young people are going to prison. In a quote which serves to reinforce the defensive view of Mr Big expressed by one of the young Asian respondents, below, the youth worker said this:

“They [the young people] watch the stuff on the telly, and justify other young people –‘he’s a nice bloke’. ‘Mr Big’ has influence, and so do other role models, there is a risk of radicalisation in Oldham”.

He suggests that educating the community from within is the key to saying that certain role models are unacceptable. That this phenomenon exists is undoubted – as outlined above, I saw it for myself, and other respondents have identified the same thing. One, with extensive experience of working in the third sector in connection with race equality issues, refers to those ‘guys’ dripping with gold and driving BMW cars, linking it to poverty but also a lack of satisfaction with their lot. The younger generation do not want to follow in their father’s footsteps, into running taxis or working in takeways,

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856 B0023 op cit
857 Ibid
858 Ibid
859 Ibid
860 E0020 op cit
861 Ibid
862 For instance, C0029 op cit, E0020 op cit, A0038 op cit, E0026 op cit
863 B0024 op cit
they want more, influenced as they are by Western material gain as a measure of success.\textsuperscript{863} There is then a heady mix here – culture and tradition on the one hand, boredom and a lack of fulfilment on the other. Drugs and crime beckon. What else? So how close is the link between drugs, crime and radicalisation? I discuss this issue in the following chapter.

Many of the young Asian respondents were defensive about ‘Mr Big’:

“Yeah, it’s like the police nowadays think that if you drive a sporty car, if you are wearing a gold chain, wearing like four or five bracelets, they think this guy is doing something dodgy, illegal yeah? So we need to keep an eye on him, but at the end of the day if you think about it, it’s more going to be a business or something, if a guy owns three or four shops, the money they get from that it’s like, what they earn in profit, they can spend it on what they like, they can spend it on what they desire.”\textsuperscript{864}

And:

“That doesn’t mean they are selling drugs now does it? It’s the Asian boy innit, in his flashy car, with the bling, and the, yeah? And the police look at that and pull him, for what? Drugs. How do they know, how do the police know he hasn’t been working all his life for that?”\textsuperscript{865}

One of the ‘elder’ respondents describes a generation gap, which links to the cultural tension argument – the traditional form of an Islamic way of life versus the more ‘westernised’ behaviour. He argues that elders brought up in the East [Pakistan] brought with them habits and cultures and they try to impose the same thing on their children.\textsuperscript{866} But there is much less respect – and there is a need to spend more time with children because time not spent with them means they have no role models, and then they are out on the streets and looking up to ‘yobpos’ instead of people at home.\textsuperscript{867} This is not quite confirmed by one of those who was actually brought up in Pakistan; he does not speak English, but he describes coming from Pakistan to Oldham to work in the cotton mills ‘for a better life’ in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{868} There they would work for 14 hours a day, and there was very little time to interact – he is firmly of the view that it is worth going to university, getting educated and getting a degree. This is at odds with most of the

\textsuperscript{863} Ibid
\textsuperscript{864} A0036(b) op cit
\textsuperscript{865} A0039(a) op cit
\textsuperscript{866} E0026 op cit
\textsuperscript{867} Ibid
\textsuperscript{868} E0027 op cit
experience and opportunity of those young Asians in Oldham. He argues that respect is a big thing in the family and chastising is important, but it has largely stopped, especially in schools. Parents should be role models and they are not.

In relation to anti-social behaviour (ASB), one respondent, who works for the council, comments that there is a big difference between ‘Asian kids’ and ‘white kids’ – Asian kids do not do ASB on their doorsteps – they go elsewhere, owing to extended family in neighbourhoods.\(^{869}\) White kids do not care and do it on the doorstep.\(^{870}\) This makes it far more difficult to identify and therefore engage with Asian kids. But clearly there is a role model gap which is being exploited, and which offers opportunities for state agencies to minimise risk.

### 7.4.5 Drugs, Girls and Alcohol

There is a common thread from the police, and to some extent the partner agencies, that the issues are about drugs, money and girls. For instance, the local police leader says:

“…I’m trying to move us all away from talking about race because the reality is that some of the things that look like they are about race are actually about money and girls.”\(^{871}\)

And a key member of the local safer neighbourhood policing team is even more explicit:

“My personal view is there is a split personality: the identity is important, the Muslim identity and the cultural values that that gives are valued by the young people, but there’s also the draw of dealing drugs, drinking alcohol, getting involved in sexual practices with young white girls, you know, and all those things, there’s kind of a split, a kind of tension there, a split personality.”\(^{872}\)

This moves the debate away from being race and culture related, to much wider issues: to things like social cohesion. Consequently, agencies need to be thinking of these broader aspects and not narrowly focusing on one issue or another, despite the

\(^{869}\) B0025 op cit  
\(^{870}\) Ibid  
\(^{871}\) A0018 op cit  
\(^{872}\) A0016 op cit
inevitable complexity that occurs, and recognising that ‘race’ can twist the response: we think it must be race-related, therefore it is.

Some argue though, that the nature of criminality does indeed have a racial bias to it, which should be recognised. For example, a respondent from the neighbourhood management team in the council describes a phenomenon by which Asian males are more engaged in drug related criminality, such as dealing, than their white counterparts, who he argues are more into burglary.\textsuperscript{873} He asserts that this is due to cultural differences – Asian family units are stronger, which helps to perpetuate deprivation because young men do not move around in the same way as their white peers.\textsuperscript{874} They also tend to follow in their father’s footsteps, working in low paid employment, sometimes setting up on their own.\textsuperscript{875} But this does not deal with aspiration, and role models are provided by other Asian peers who make a lot of money from dealing drugs, and flaunt it by driving around in big 4X4s.\textsuperscript{876} As an aside, there was a slight sense with this respondent that he had not achieved everything he wanted in life: “you can’t sit here and tell me you don’t want a big brand new car, go on holiday when you want, big house, the draw is there for anybody, I defy anybody not to want that.” \textsuperscript{877}

A senior police officer, who has a leading position for Greater Manchester Police in the delivery of Prevent, also talks about the link between drugs, and a search for identity. In response to a question around the strength of the link between drug use, the risk of being radicalised and other types of criminal activity like gang-related behaviour, he says:

“I think it’s difficult because at the end of the day, when you look at the profile of the people who have been arrested and detained [under terrorism legislation], they don’t automatically fit that profile. But having said that, there is a danger that you just go and profile the people that you know about. I mean, I think in due course, we will uncover things about those types of relationships.”\textsuperscript{878}

This is important, and I return to it in the final chapter.

\textsuperscript{873} C0029 op cit
\textsuperscript{874} Ibid
\textsuperscript{875} Ibid
\textsuperscript{876} Ibid
\textsuperscript{877} Ibid
\textsuperscript{878} C0032 op cit
Young Asian respondents confirm the notion that drugs are a problem in their part of Oldham, and that they have a profound influence.\textsuperscript{879} One states “[Drugs] are corrupting our area. You need to sort it out.” \textsuperscript{880}

A senior member of the communities unit within Oldham Borough Council brings together much of the arguments of this theme, and the two previous themes. He talks about ‘schizophrenic identities’, with some young Asian men behaving differently depending on where they are:

“…some young men who behave one way with their families, and then actually behind the scenes are going off and smoking dope, and going out with girls and drinking alcohol, and it’s all kept completely hidden.”\textsuperscript{881}

He then goes on to describe “baggage…around attitudes to women and you know, it’s almost like if she sleeps with me she’s a slag…and so I’ll treat her as bad news.”\textsuperscript{882}. This underlines the huge complexity and interdependencies of the many issues at play, and finds resonance amongst some of the young Asian respondents themselves:

“It’s like not eating Halal meat, it something we shouldn’t be doing but we do but it’s not that bad though is it, drinking and smoking, it’s still got the Muslim thing of intention.”\textsuperscript{883}

So it seems that there are ‘pulls’ in a number of directions, but they are not obviously in tension: young Muslim men appear capable of reconciling these various influences in their own minds.

\textbf{7.4.6 ‘White Flight’}

“…there’s also white flight, and various other movements in Oldham…”\textsuperscript{884}

The first time I heard this phrase used was in a matter-of-fact manner, as if it is used in general common parlance; later, I noticed others used it in a similar manner.\textsuperscript{885} It has

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\item \textsuperscript{879} A0035(a) op cit, A0035(b)
\item \textsuperscript{880} A0039(a)
\item \textsuperscript{881} C0033 op cit
\item \textsuperscript{882} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{883} A0039(a)
\item \textsuperscript{884} C0030(a) op cit
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
sinister and disturbing overtones. In order to explain the phenomenon, an interviewee from the council’s neighbourhood management team uses a donut analogy:

“...in the middle, you’ve got your jammy bit, and as with everything, the jam always seeps into the sponge bit, it never stays in the middle. If you can imagine the jam bit being the Asian community, which is what has happened in Oldham, because that’s the centre of Oldham, and, I’m generalising here, jam seeps into certain areas of the donut, right. We can tell you that all those areas, we can tell you what’s happening, and we can tell you the feelings in that area, and they tend to be, if anything is going to happen, they’ll be the sparking points.” 886

It is not an intellection with which a prominent member of the communities unit at the council wholly agrees, yet uses a similar metaphor:

“It’s a term we’re trying to avoid using, and I think it’s, and I’m not sure it adequately describes what we’re getting really. Because we’re getting, the Asian heritage communities are growing. So in places like Westwood and Glodwick and Clarksfield, and that’s a sort of as a result of things like higher birth rate, people marrying partners who are coming from overseas, so basically those, and also those communities are just very young, so there are just loads of people who are at an age where they are starting to marry and have kids. So those communities are growing, and that’s then creating pressures on housing and the gradual moving out of those areas, so it’s almost like a donut where we’ve got, you know, if the Asian communities are the centre of the donut, and it’s gradually expanding out.” 887

One member of the Asian community describes an evolution in Chadderton which begins to confirm this notion of ‘white flight’ – or more specifically, an expanding Asian community and population.888 But he does not indicate the same level of community division that others in the agencies have described: he will go to a different Mosque to his Pakistani friends (“there are Mosques in every area”) and he confirms that he has both white and Bangladeshi friends.889

Another adds weight to the notion of ‘white flight’, though he does not describe it as such. He states:

885 B0024 op cit
886 C0029 op cit
887 C0033 op cit
888 A0034 op cit
889 Op cit
“You see, the side I’m living on, there’s a lot of Asians there, but now day by day, there’s more going more going, and further down further down, and I don’t think the white people are really liking that. That’s what I feel. The area I used to live in before now there was a lot of white people living there, now it’s just full of Asians. Every type of Asian.”

The concept of ‘white flight’ is significant, and plays into the theory discussed in Chapter Two which relates to the expansion of Asian communities. But it is also indicative of a more sinister notion of a lack of tolerance between communities of varying ethnic origin, which not only results in raised community tension, it also permits the concentration of Asian communities in deprived areas to persist. It necessitates state action, but it is not discussed at all by any of the local police respondents. A prominent member of the local media states:

“Yes, well there are Asian groups in probably two main areas of Oldham, and both of the areas are spreading out slowly but surely. And increasing in size. And the areas where almost exclusively white people live, which are largely in the large council house estates, there are in fact people moving out of there, and moving out of Oldham altogether, and, it’s a hideous term I know, but we have experienced a fair amount of ‘white flight’, in Oldham, people moving out, but I think it was cheapness of property in the first place that brought people, and the fact that some of the mills where they worked were close to where they were living, and then people coming over – we all like to be with people with whom we have a lot in common, and English people living in Spain all live together in little enclaves.”

The only police respondent to discuss it, and only then when he was questioned specifically by me about it, was GMP’s lead for the PREVENT agenda. He says this:

“..white flight, that’s what it is… and I think you’ve got, there is, this notion that you can bring communities together is all very well and good but you can’t force them together. It’s a bit like in the school playground getting two kids who hate each other to like each other. Well it ain’t going to happen. And I think you’re looking at some of the traditions that exist within Britain, part of that is, well if we’re truly multi-cultural then at the end of the day, perhaps in one, two or three generations time, we might actually achieve a situation where we truly are multi-cultural and we do get that integration of communities. But you’re not going to solve this overnight, so for

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890 A0039(a)  
891 C0031 op cit
me it’s about well, what is the overall strategy from government to turn round and say, well how do we actually make this happen.”

This effectively sums up the position, and I discuss it again in the final chapter.

### 7.4.7 Racism

Racism is an insidious and damaging phenomenon; it might manifest itself as antilocution between individuals, or more systematic racism, examined and identified in Chapter Four as institutional racism. Here, I consider it at the individual level, to ‘scratch at the surface’ of the experience of people living in the community.

A key respondent from the third sector does not think the housing authorities or the police treat people unfairly but then describes an incident of discrimination:

> “…once I can say a guy applied for a job with his name on, with his Muslim name, he got rejected. The same person applied for the same post with a different name, do you know what I’m saying, a Christian name, and he was called for an interview, do you understand what I’m saying? These are the things that a lot of youngsters are facing in terms of discrimination.”

The term ‘Paki’ seems to be used as a pejorative term frequently, by white members of the community, but perhaps more by the Bengali members. One respondent, a Bengali, said this in response to a question about his experience of things that have been aid to him:

> “Like what are you doing here you Paki boy, or how can this Paki.. We’re not Pakis, that’s what it is. They’re calling me a Paki, and I’m telling them look I’m not a Paki. I’m a Bengali.”

Some also describe being called a terrorist and a “Paki Bastard” in the street and elsewhere. The following is a quote from a Bengali community respondent:

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892 C0032 op cit
893 C0028 op cit
894 A0039(a) op cit
895 For example A0034 op cit, A0037, A0039(a) op cit
“Yeah, I’ve experienced it but you get called Paki bastard, terrorist, and you just turn around and say I’m not a Paki and I’m not a terrorist. Just ignore it, whatever. In the street, whatever, if you go out at night, stuff like that. How many times? Once every two weeks...It’s quite often but you just got to get in the wrong place at the wrong time, and you see pissed people outside... At the end of the day, I know I’m not one of them and nothing can change that, so no matter how much you call me names and stuff like that, I still won’t get offended.”

It has been around a long time:

“When I was a kid, about 16-17, I worked in a paper mill, lots of Asian lads worked there, and there was a culture of, you know, there would be racist abuse. Not there’ll be racist comments, not meant as an abuse, as a normal, it was meant as a joke between these people, and I was guilty of that myself when I was 16 years old, walking around you know, they were my friends, you know, and they, well, on the surface, they did not say to me, well I’m concerned about that, I’m bothered about that, I don’t want you to do that anymore. But if you spread that out, people must get absolutely naffed off with that.”

These lower-level things are very rarely reported to the police, but their impact may be profound – perhaps contributing to the ‘psychological damage’ referred to above in the ‘identity and vulnerability’ section.

7.4.8 The Successful Community

Perhaps one of the most important themes arising from this research, which I draw on significantly when I address the conclusions in the next chapter, is the notion of what a successful community looks like, and how conditions can be established that allow it to flourish. A prominent member of staff at Oldham College, which has 40% of students of an Asian heritage, massively out of proportion with the resident population, offers this:

“If we have an issue about something, you appeal to them [students] for support, and they do, and if there’s going to be any trouble, they’ll come to the door and they’ll say it’s going to kick off somewhere but it won’t come here. Now, why do they do that? They do that because they feel there’s somewhere that’s going to take them

896 A0034 op cit
897 B0025 op cit
somewhere, in other words they have some share in a prosperous feel. They like a place where people are polite and friendly to them, and where they can succeed. There’s an element of self-interest as much as social behaviour." 898

And then, developing the theme:

“… there’s no way I would know if we had violent extremists here. I wouldn’t even know how to start to combat that. What you can do is create a place where consensus marginalises these people and pushes them to the extremes… because there are models where you can set things up and end up with a stable community, and that stable community has an interest in there not being terrorists, and that’s what we can do” 899

The limited educational attainment in Oldham, together with the high levels of unemployment and low paid work has already been documented in the previous chapter, and is reinforced by Asian respondents, who confirm that only low paid shift work is available for them and their friends.900 But what role do schools and colleges play in the wider community sense? “It’s a really really long and hard road, and you end up getting really unexpected obstacles put in your place,”901 but creating that pluralist community, which marginalises extremist groups, is not only suited to the learning environment, it actually takes root there before reaching into all corners of society. This appears to be a vital and highly pertinent position to adopt.

But creating this environment does not have to be limited to schools and colleges. The notion of developing understanding within communities and between people from different cultural or ethnic backgrounds can occur in the workplace. This is articulated by one of the neighbourhood managers working in the council,902 and is directly linked to critical success factors two and three: the need to reflect the community served so far as possible, and to involve members of minority communities in training.

A key member of the Communities Unit at Oldham Borough Council echoes some of the above views with regards to promoting good relations between different ethnic groups:

898 B0027
899 Ibid
900 A0039(b) op cit
901 B0027 op cit
902 C0029 op cit
“And the other side of engagement is getting communities to engage with each other, so we know the last survey shows that where people from different ethnic backgrounds are regularly coming into contact with each other, actually their attitudes are more positive, so what we’re trying to do is to find lots of different ways to break down the barriers between communities because actually, if people get to know each other, what we find is that people aren’t as different, the more they get to know them, the more they find they find they’ve got thing in common rather than difference.”

Oldham council are also working to bring communities into contact with each other by creating more ethnically diverse secondary schools under their Building Schools for the Future programme.

Respondents from the Oldham Race Equality Partnership develop a strong pro-active argument, saying that when people move into an area through housing associations etc, there is a need for ‘community infrastructure’, and that active investment in these things is very important for better community cohesion and a reduction in the risk of radicalisation. Such things might be mothers and toddlers groups, family support groups, sessional play. Family support workers would go with people to support them at these groups, so there is active investment. Many of the local communities have been left to their own devices in excess of twenty years, and this has contributed to polarisation and lack of understanding. This position has powerful resonance with other views articulated in this section, because it provides support for the idea that it is possible to ‘construct’ the right environment for communities to flourish.

Other ideas are advanced by respondents, all of which form part of the jigsaw of the successful community. For instance, a local youth leader states that “educating the community from within is the key to saying that certain role models are unacceptable. There cannot be an ‘us and them’”. Promoting mixing at a younger age is talked about by one of the ‘elder’ Pakistani respondents – integrating young people together to reduce tension. He feels that sport is a very good way, although acknowledges that on the other side of the coin, rival Asian gangs and territorial divisions between Asian

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903 C0033 op cit
904 B0024 op cit, E0028 op cit
905 Ibid
906 E0020 op cit
907 E0027 op cit
groups themselves within Oldham may require different facilities to be made available. The key is to ensure that it is about citizenship:

“Need to build rapport in terms of citizenship and community cohesion – what will they be teaching their children? It’s about citizenship, not just white or Asian. Everyone needs to be friendly and their children to be friendly. Religion is a big thing – it tells you to look after your neighbour.”

7.4.9 Crime, Radicalisation and Junaid

During the course of the fieldwork, an incident occurred which is worthy of closer examination, since it illuminates so many issues. The name of the individual concerned is real - it was widely reported in the local media, however I only use his first name as a mark of respect to his family. The description of Junaid’s lifestyle and his activities deserve a closer look because they depict a modus operandi which is very similar to radicalisation, but they actually revolved around drugs and crime.

Junaid was an Asian lad of 17 years of age. He lived above a small shop run by his family in the Werneth area of Oldham. One of the ‘elder’ respondents who lived very close said that “all the lads were always outside, smoking the weed, you know, the cars parked up, music blaring…” and the police were “always busting the shop”. Junaid was influenced by ‘Mr Big’, and saw an opportunity to make money by selling drugs. But Junaid went further:

“…I don’t know if you’ve seen his photograph where he had a bandana on and the bullet proof…and on the computer they actually made their own website, and he was there with all money around him, and he was holding I don’t know, a gun or a rifle…there were a few pictures of him, wearing a bullet proof vest.”

This builds a heady and powerful image, not so far removed from images of freedom fighters or ‘terrorists’ seen on Al Qaeda videos.

908 Ibid
909 Ibid
910 D0042 op cit
911 Ibid
912 Ibid
By piecing together conversations, some of which formed part of the peripheral information provided by respondents during the course of the fieldwork, most of which did not and were ‘offline’ conversations with other individuals with whom I had contact, the following is an account of events. A short time before the incident outlined below occurred, a house in the neighbourhood was being used as a base for dealing drugs, and Junaid, together with another Asian lad, went to break into the house intending to steal the drugs. One of the neighbours called the police, who arrived promptly. Junaid ran off, but the female police officer who attended successfully detained the other lad. However, Junaid returned to the house and, pointing a gun at the officer, ordered her to let his friend go, or he would shoot. So she released him.

Here we have the beginning of an escalation process, which was, with the benefit of hindsight, capable of identification by the police. Additional information from partner agencies and the community, in the form of whispers and rumours, would have aided the development of the jigsaw, thereby offering the chance for early intervention. The simplified escalation process was: (i) repeated warrants executed against the shop; (ii) websites showing Junaid appearing armed and surrounded by money; (iii) a threat to shoot a police officer; all these things occurring over a period of a few months. That this was on course for a violent crime is clear.

Junaid was shot 17 times with an automatic weapon in the car park of a doctor’s surgery in the middle of a residential area in the early hours of 9 July 2009. His killers have still not been found, and yet a large gathering of Asian youths ‘appeared’ very quickly after his murder. As part of the normal engagement process with communities, the Neighbourhood Policing team conducted a ‘PACT’ meeting three weeks after the shooting. PACT is an acronym for Partners and Communities Together – the intention being that the police and their partner agencies engage with communities to establish what people living in neighbourhoods think are the local priorities for the agencies to tackle. It is a cornerstone upon which Neighbourhood Policing depends. As part of the ‘participant observation’ aspect of the fieldwork, I attended this PACT meeting, which was arranged some months earlier. The venue was approximately three hundred yards from the scene of the shooting; anxiety about reprisals was running high (“one of his brothers has said that the person who done this to my brother, I’m going to put him in a
coffin”913); the body had not yet been released; it was a serious crime linked to a drugs problem which was high in the public consciousness; and the Senior Investigating Officer was present at the meeting to answer questions. Although the meeting was in an overwhelmingly Asian-dominated resident population, the meeting itself was overwhelmingly white-dominated. No one at the meeting challenged the police or any of the other agencies in relation to drugs, violent crime, shootings, reprisals, or any other matter associated with Junaid’s death. In fact, the issues raised were parking, speeding, and dog mess. This raises some fundamental questions about the way in which the police consult the public about their policing priorities, as well as providing a commentary on a divided community.

What this real-life, real-time example tends to indicate is that the process of escalation towards violent crime is very similar to the escalation process involved in radicalisation and progression to terrorism. I discuss this in more detail in the following chapter.

On the subject of radicalisation and gangs, GMP’s senior leader for the PREVENT strategy states:

“you can’t put your finger on one thing and say this is the cause of radicalisation because in some parts of the country, and if you look at gangs and guns for example, in London, in Brixton, there are gangsters who are renaming their gangs to The Baghdad boys for example, and this type of thing because it’s it gives them a lot of street cred and kudos amongst other gang members.”914

And a prominent member of the Oldham Race Equality Partnership discusses ‘radicalisation’ in the following terms:

“But there is also something else happening, and this is maybe a challenge to the perspective your research is coming from. There is a radicalisation of young Muslims happening, I would take the word harmful away from that, because I don’t think it’s like a pathology and it shouldn’t be looked at like a pathology, it’s actually, it is actually a response to their situation, to look and to challenge, now unless we’re saying that there’s a pathology why one and a half million mostly white people formed the biggest demonstration this country has ever seen in London against the invasion of Iraq, if we’re going to pathologise the fact that a lot of young Muslims are taking an interest in foreign affairs and in international relations, and have a sense of outrage about Britain and Americas foreign policy, then we have to pathologise an

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913 Ibid
914 C0032 op cit
even greater number of white people in this country because they have the same view.\footnote{B0024 op cit}

I argue in Chapter Three that the notion of radicalisation of Muslim people is not necessarily a bad thing, and use the word ‘harmful’ to indicate, not a pathology, rather an activity, which becomes damaging to society, to Islam, to communities. He argues that young Muslims rigidly following Islam is a form of conservatism, not radicalisation - an interesting contribution to the debate.

One key Asian member of a third sector organisation strongly refutes the idea that certain issues and events might contribute to vulnerability to radicalisation, saying:

“These things [being treated badly by the authorities, or having the perception of being treated badly by the authorities] wouldn’t get them to become radicalised, or extreme, or commit suicide and kill people. You know, these petty things they will see as petty things, as an individual incident.”\footnote{C0028 op cit}

And he is also very clear that social deprivation will not radicalise, it will merely create distrust:

“That’s [social deprivation] not going to radicalise, that will just create distrust in the institution, the police and the council, that will just create distrust, that’s all. That’s not going to turn them into terrorists…”\footnote{Ibid}

I discuss this in more detail in the following chapter, since it goes right to the heart of the construction of the hypothesis.

7.5 The effect of the media

7.5.1 Tolerance levels

The council’s ASB officer talks about the role of community cohesion, and the demarcation that exists in Oldham – which he says is at sharp contrast to Bolton, just up the road.\footnote{B0025 op cit} He also talks about the role of the press, and links it to tolerance levels:
“So any sort of, any issues that are highlighted through media, it’s a self-fulfilling prophecy type stuff, you know. I’m living on this estate, I’ve been told this estate has all these issues, I’ve been told this estate has got idiots running around who do x, y and z – I put up with that tolerance up there [indicates high], expectations down there [indicates low]. We’ve got to balance that press bit out like you say, between us being more concentrated on, yeah, we know the negatives are going to get in there, but concentrating on the positive stuff that we are doing to build up the confidence.” 919

This fits to some extent with views that communities in Oldham have been neglected for a very long time by the authorities:

“The communities here, I am afraid to say, not just from the police, but from the council, from the political parties, the whole lot, are used to neglect. That’s what they get, they get, yes there are problems there, but if we go in heavy handed we’ll be accused of racism, so we’ll leave them to it to a degree, we’ll leave them to it and that’s what they’re used to, and there’s been a long history of neglect.” 920

This issue of tolerance and expectation is important because it acts as an inhibitor for agencies and communities to mobilise and address problems and weaknesses within communities, consequently increasing risk of vulnerability. And the role of the press is critical in perpetuating this conception.

This respondent also talks about the development of groups of young people in the community – with a leader - and how these groups may be involved in ASB. The quote from him is interesting since it also betrays a frustration with the apparent impediment of ‘political correctness’- i.e. things that might be considered racist:

“Well, with anti-social behaviour, with young people, there’s a group dynamic. The group dynamic is the followers, the integrated members and the leaders, and that is there for their own protection. They see that as a protection mechanism, because if you don’t belong to that group, not only may you be picked upon by a white group that may enter the area, or that you may come across, but also that group may see you as a threat or a target and seek you out for some sort of retribution. Now, with the leaders from within that group, are not necessarily radicals as such, not potential radicals as such but they are definite potential criminals and they are, and I think

919 Ibid
920 B0024 op cit
sometimes, let me get this point across, sorry, and I know I ramble on, but I think that sometimes the Muslim community fall back on this race, sorry, this, the radicalism question, you know, I am the victim, well no, hang on, you’re an idiot, you’re a thief, you’re a criminal, I don’t care whether you’re pink, black, blue, striped, polka-dot, I’m not bothered, you know, you cause… and there’s this sort of ‘I am the victim in all this…” 921

The evolution of these groups is connected with gangs, and there is also some similarity with the development of radical groups. 922 There are links here to do with the role model gap – conflating aspects of crime, radicalisation, ASB and gang related behaviour. He also describes the racial abuse that went on in the factories and paper mills he worked in as a youth – and wonders what impact that type of behaviour has on people. 923 This is linked to the questions I pose around the effect of discrimination and racism, and is addressed in the following chapter. It also has resonance with the experiences of young Asians, discussed above, where they discuss being racially abused at some level.

7.5.2 Perceptions

The manner in which perceptions are formed seems to occur in a number of ways, although much of it is undoubtedly through the media. One of the police respondents was very clear in her thought that people were influenced by what they read in the papers. 924 She also suggests that it is the things not being reported to the authorities, in terms of raised community tension, which are important. 925 This links with the point being made by others that it is listening to people on the street which counts, not merely the analysis of reported crime. 926

A member of the Oldham Muslim Centre offers this:

“…it’s the media now also, you know, like trying to demonise the Muslims you know, it’s like all the bombing, all the terrorism, so they feel you know, it’s the media

921 B0025 op cit
922 Ibid
923 Ibid
924 A0020 op cit
925 Ibid
926 A0016 op cit, A0018 op cit,C0028 op cit
and certain institutions also giving them a bad name because as a result of that they are not getting the job they are supposed to.”  

A college Principal also talks about how groups are perceived:

“….when you look at the sections at the end of the day and during the day a lot of Asian students hang around in gangs with their friends. A lot of that is because they like college, they don’t want to give it up, they’re actually being very sociable and friendly, if you’re driving past that, what you see is potentially a weird looking gang. I went to the shopping centres yesterday and saw all these Asian kids and they just closed in around me, all ex-students. And they wanted to talk, that’s what they wanted. And they were really friendly, absolutely great kids, some of them will end up being doctors, police, teachers, but if you see them, to me I see them, and it’s great, it’s a good chance to talk to them but you can quite easily see people staring and think that’s quite frightening, what are they going to do.”

He also talks about elements of fracture within Oldham, and further illustrates how perceptions are used for capital:

“One of our strengths is the fact that we do have these kids coming to us, but the schools with sixth forms rather than colleges they use it against us because part of their marketing as well is you wouldn’t want to go to the college with all those pakis.”

Another Head considers the issue of the development of perceptions from an alternative viewpoint, and provides an insight into cultural differences within the wider community:

“But it’s interesting isn’t it, you know, when we’ve been into some Asian homes, they’ll be watching celeb TV on sky, and you’re thinking, why, you why would you be watching day to day all the time TV from somewhere you haven’t lived in for a lot of years.”

A Pakistani community member is of the view that the normal British television channels:

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927 C0028 op cit
928 B0027 op cit
929 Ibid
930 C0030(a) op cit
“show people getting, English soldiers getting killed. They won’t show what really happened, and they just say that, so the country doesn’t go against them and you know, what happened to the Americans in Vietnam.” 931

It is interesting to consider what he thinks ‘really happens’, and whether his Pakistani roots influence these views. I discuss issues in relation to this particular respondent in more detail, below.

Thus perceptions form across the cultural divide, serve to reinforce stereotypes, and the media has a significant role to play. Perceptions, like stereotypes, can be dangerous, becoming an unnecessary reality.

7.5.3 Readership and Community Access

One of the respondents, a white British/Ukrainian is able quickly to refer to the ‘Oldham Chron’ – he reads it regularly for the football results, and thinks the paper is good for reporting on local stories. 932 This is in contrast to young Asian respondents: “I don’t tend to read the local newspapers” 933 and one of the elders who does not speak English, confirms that he does not buy papers, and so is not aware of their content. 934 This begins to confirm the view that the paper is not read in big numbers by the Asian community. The white British/Ukrainian respondent also makes a reference to the prominence of stories in the paper where the victims of assaults are Asian, whereas when they are white, the stories get less prominence:

“…like I’m not racist or anything, I know a lot of Asians and other races, but I have like noticed that a lot of these that are put in are like, when they are put in, say like, a couple of months ago, a white guy was picked up in this, in a Landover, and beat up and then chucked back out on the street, and he dies, and it wasn’t even in the paper that much, but like a couple of months before that, an Asian guy was beat up and that like on the front page, so it was like a bit of… It was actually on the front page, but like, the white guy was on page 6, with a little column about it. It’s like unfair, it should have both equal to each other.” 935

931 A0037 op cit
932 A0038 op cit
933 B0043 op cit
934 E0027 op cit
935 A0038 op cit
This has featured as an issue elsewhere and perhaps results in increases in tension between communities and consequential exploitation by the BNP, even though the paper has positive intention (promoting the paper to the Asian communities, and trying not to be racist towards them). This respondent also interestingly agrees that you could get a distorted view of Islam from the television or the main papers, but then mentions “I think that’s just a minority of Muslims, because all the Muslims I know don’t have anything wrong with them” – which tends to suggest he believes the media, but thinks it does not apply to the Muslims he knows – rather than assuming that the media might be inaccurate or biased. Other (Asian) respondents assert that the papers just lie.

According to a key interviewee from the local media, not many papers are sold to Asian communities, despite much effort:

“…we don’t sell a great many newspapers in the Asian communities, as indeed very few daily papers do. They are not great, Asian communities are not great readers of white English newspapers. They read papers such as the Jang, the Daily Jang…We’ve tried all sorts of things to try and boost our readership in those areas, but nothing we have done, indeed nothing that has been done across the industry has worked really. I mean Leicester started publishing part of their newspaper in Asian languages, and the white audience of the newspaper dropped off alarmingly. So they abandoned that and went back to publishing it in full English language.”

This will inevitable mean that most of the letters published are from white contributors, and the paper will aim its stories at the target audience in order to maximise sales, which may have the effect of creating a polarised view of communities and things going in within them. This interviewee makes the point that there is no mechanism for getting information out to all the communities in Oldham, other than the council newsletter. This, from the editor of a local paper, points towards a communication failure which contributes to polarisation of communities, because there is no mechanism for promoting joint understanding. He also identifies that the flow of letters and phone calls, and their nature indicated ‘a rise in temperature’ in the lead up to the riots of 2001. This is a key aspect of the model I propose in Chapter Three, and is discussed in the next chapter.

936 C0031 op cit
937 A0038 op cit
938 A0039(a) op cit
939 C0031 op cit
7.5.4 Internet, DVDs and ‘Messages’

One of the respondents, a Pakistani Muslim, is particularly interesting, and deserves closer examination. He is of the view that British intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq is wrong, and he holds views that everything is the fault of the freemasons. At first glance, this sounds a bit ridiculous, and it is tempting to dismiss it out of hand. However, on describing matters further, there is a clear modus operandi to his behaviour which resonates strongly with how some people become radicalised, discussed in Chapter Three; after all, to many others, radicalised views sound ridiculous. He describes a DVD which has influenced his thought in this area, and he informs me that it is available by typing in the relevant name on the internet. The video describes a New World Order, and was produced by ‘some guys’. According to this respondent, the video explains what the freemasons are trying to do, and why they are doing it, and describes a connection to George Bush. He says the DVD is very long, with lots of seven or ten minute clips – and it offers reasons for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and why the “Twin Towers were knocked down, or the main reason for it.” He says the video was going around and everybody was watching it, so he decided to watch it. This might be evidence of more community whispers, or rumours, discussed above. When asked how the video made him feel, he responds:

“Well you just think shit on them basically, you know, what they’re doing and this that. But you really can’t do nothing about it. So you just let it go. You do your own thing.”

It is easy to dismiss these thoughts as coming from someone not very well informed and not very intelligent, but actually this respondent is not stupid, and he has given thought to things in a way which other respondents have not, especially those of Bangladeshi heritage. The feeling that he is naïve and not so bright might well be the very impression one gets when speaking to an individual with polarised views. In fact, the Arrivals series does relate to a conspiracy theory involving the New World Order, and is available on mainstream websites. But it is of significant note that many of the other key requirements are there and in place, not least the belief in what is being said. These

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940 A0037 op cit
941 Ibid
942 Ibid
things are all ingredients, with subtle amendments, of someone either radicalised or on the road to radicalisation. One community respondent is unequivocal; he states “there is a risk of radicalisation in Oldham”.

7.6 Global events

Here, the question of whether or not global events have an impact on people locally is examined, and if they do, in what ways. This is linked to the commonly held notion that it is foreign policy which is the main contributor to disenfranchised Muslim communities.

7.6.1 Global versus Local

One of the non-Muslim PCSO respondents is of the view that global events do not affect communities in a big way because they are struggling to deal with their own lives in a much more local sense:

“Not much to be honest. No I don’t think so. I think they’re struggling to get on with their daily lives. But most of them I would say are comfortable with living in this country and where they are, I think they do realise they’ve got to, there are benefits to living here, even in Oldham. And the majority are just trying to live like the rest of us. I don’t think, for instance, no one ever talks to me from that community about what’s going on in Iraq and Afghanistan, it never, you never get throw away comments – such as you need to get out of there – don’t see graffiti about any of those topics. It’s all just about sex, all that stuff that they put on the walls. So really I don’t think it’s bothering them at all. But you never know do you, but I don’t see it. I don’t see it and I don’t hear it.”

He says people never speak to him, or make throw away comments about those topics, and you never see graffiti about it either. This is interesting, and relates to the notion of tension indicators discussed in Chapter Three, and I discuss it further in the following chapter. His view is at odds with that of a Muslim respondent from a third sector organisation in Oldham. In relation to the notion that people might be vulnerable to being radicalised by virtue of being treated badly, or having the perception of being treated badly, he says this (partly quoted above):

942 E0020 op cit
943 A0021 op cit
“These things wouldn’t get them to become radicalised, or extreme, or commit suicide and kill people. You know, these petty things they will see as petty things, as an individual incident. But what will radicalise them, if you’re asking the question, then I say bad, or you know, policies, towards the Middle East, especially Palestine issue, do you understand what I’m saying? Reactions to extremism. Do you understand what I’m saying? Bad policy.” \(^{946}\)

He later qualifies this, because the interview occurred in the immediate aftermath of Israeli attacks on Gaza, and he was of the view that issues around unemployment and lack of opportunities would have been higher in people’s minds in general – but identifies that international issues can have a major impact in very short timescales. \(^{947}\)

Notably, one of the Pakistani PCSOs is strong in his opinion that foreign policy is a topic of conversation amongst his communities:

“I mean, from grass root levels, you know, invariably there will be relatives, extended families, friends, who still living in Pakistan and Afghanistan you know, and they are greatly affected by that you know. And what is mentioned is foreign policy, and that will come up time and time again.” \(^{948}\)

This raises some questions about the efficacy of a relationship between a white PCSO and Asian communities, as compared with that of an Asian PCSO and Asian communities, perhaps lending weight to the reported advantages of an ethnic make-up of the police organisation which reflects that of the community. Is it the case the Muslim community members are more willing to share their thoughts and feelings with a fellow Muslim, or is it in fact that as Muslims themselves, these two latter respondents feel it more strongly?

A respondent from the Oldham Race Equality Partnership talks knowledgably about the concept of terrorism, and identifies ‘Shock and Awe’ and ‘Carpet Bombing’ as tactics which effectively amount to terrorism – thereby not recognising the distinction between American/allied military tactics and terrorism. Members of the community believe that the Afghan conflict does affect people locally, with one asserting that it is because:

\(^{946}\) C0028 op cit
\(^{947}\) Ibid
\(^{948}\) B0023 op cit
“we’re Muslims, and they’re Muslims in Afghanistan and you white people you are fighting against them...All Muslims are terrorists – that’s what they [white people] are going to think by looking at things that are happening over there…”949

So matters of foreign policy appear to be a factor at one level, but also, perhaps unsurprisingly, people are pre-occupied with living their own lives, which can be challenging in an area with limited prospects of well-paid employment, and when finances are tight.

7.6.2 Afghanistan, Iraq and Gaza

I consider these areas specifically (as distinct from more general global issues) because they are very high-profile military operations in which Britain has played a key part.

A non-Muslim respondent from the race equality partnership postulates the idea that it is a mainstream Muslim belief that military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq has occurred because they are Muslims.950 But his own view is that it is nothing to do with that, and it is everything to do with oil and other natural reserves.951 Another respondent from a key local third sector group, who is Muslim, says that foreign policy and the treatment of Muslims in places like Palestine certainly does contribute to the risk of radicalisation.952 It should be noted, though, that this interview took place just after the Israeli action against Muslims living in Palestine, and there had been recent (peaceful) public marches in Oldham, voicing opposition to the Government’s stance. In fact, the research revealed surprisingly divided opinion on the local impact of these types of foreign policies. A community member, a 17 year old Bangladeshi male, identifies the difference between being Bangladeshi and Pakistani in terms of the military action in Afghanistan, based around the close geographical location and tribal ties between the two countries:

949 A0039(a)
950 B0024 op cit
951 Ibid
952 C0028 op cit
“I suppose it does have an effect, like, well, I’m not a Pakistani so it doesn’t really bother me but, but if, say I was like Pakistani or something, and it’s like, say for instance you were in the war in Afghanistan, and I was, like, a Paki, then you know, even though you would not say to me, you would think I was one of them, if you know what I mean. It would encourage others, if you see what I mean. It would be like, and if I was a Paki, I would be encouraging other Muslims. Yeah. It does affect the Pakistani the more because that’s their family, we’re not Pakistani.”

[Note the use of the word ‘Paki’ in this context.]

This notion is expanded upon by one of the Pakistani ‘elders’ who is a first generation immigrant. He identifies that the enemies in places like Afghanistan and Iraq are not the only ones being targeted – civilians are being killed and this breeds resentment, and people who you want on your side go over to the other side. The problem is that in most hotspot areas, people have ties, complex tribal groups. He develops this further by saying that not all Israelis are bad, and it is wrong to demonise all Israeli people – good must prevail.

Another Bengali respondent, who was 18 years of age, responded to the question of whether these matters affected Muslims locally by saying:

“No. It’s the other side of the world. It doesn’t affect us, it’s just killing other people, like Muslims, you know, it’s bad innit, but that’s them innit?”

Once again, we have a division of view: there may be tribal and family links through Pakistan to action in Afghanistan, but this does not appear to cut across the Islamic panorama more generally; Iraq was barely mentioned, and Bengali Muslims were less interested or informed.

The local Safer Neighbourhood Team leader said:

953 A0034 op cit
954 E0027
955 Ibid
956 Ibid
957 A0035(a) op cit
“I can’t say I’ve had first hand experience of that. All I can say is that the issues that I see on a day to day basis are issues for everybody, drugs, anti-social behaviour, drug dealing, crime in general. I’m sure there will be opinions of that sort of thing but I’ve certainly not been personally made aware of you know it making a major impact.”

7.7 The Role of Islam

7.7.1 Training and Knowledge of Police Personnel

One of the white British PCSOs, who was previously a Special constable, and had six months experience as a PCSO, refers to the ‘unknown’ when he talks of Islam and goes on to describe how working with officers who are of the Islamic faith significantly improves his confidence:

“And that picking up knowledge from [Muslim PCSO]. You know I’ve been asking [Muslim PCSO] quite lot, you know, how things work and questions about the Qur’an, cultures, you know, he’s taught me a lot really. And how, you know, I was talking to him about how Islam can be misinterpreted to do harm to people, you know, and he’s helped me quite a lot really. But other than that it’s been myself really, cos, you know, we’re all human beings, and I don’t see any difference in people, you know, we’re all the same. But it’s quite a good mix in the community.”

This is linked to the discussion above regarding the use and deployment of PCSOs, and supports the second and third critical success factors. This PCSO thinks that the general lack of understanding of Islam as a religion contributes to the rise in tensions – people go by what they read in the papers and see on the television. Interestingly, there was some reticence by some officers to use certain terms. For instance, one of the local police officers seemed reluctant to use the term ‘Pakistanis’, and the term ‘Indian’ was used instead, yet the area is not noted for large numbers of Indians. This sort of reluctance was demonstrated, albeit in a slightly different way, by more senior officers, one of whom seemed to show some reticence around the term ‘Muslim’. This respondent was also keen to move the discussion away from ‘race’, as if it would be

958 B0026 op cit
959 A0019 op cit
960 Ibid
961 A0020 op cit
962 A0018 op cit
frowned upon – arguing that there was a need to avoid “badging the thing under race because that’s what 2001 was” [a reference to the riots].963 This issue was not obvious at all with any of the other respondents.

Most police respondents said that training around community and race relations was superficial or virtually non-existent; their knowledge had developed from working closely with communities. This from the Safer neighbourhood Team Leader:

“No [training]. I’ve found it being on the neighbourhood side of things you’re more tuned to it and you get the training, it’s not training, it’s being involved in the community…”964

And from a white British PCSO:

“Obviously we did the diversity training but other than that, I’ve learnt it on the job. From the diversity training, you obviously, you’re made aware, very aware, that this is the way you’re expected to behave, and we’re all aware, particularly in Oldham where there were all the riots, so you know first hand that experience is a big thing and you do need to behave in the proper way.”965

The white British police officers and PCSOs felt they had received little in the way of formal training, and instead had learnt from doing the job and working with communities, as well as depending heavily on their colleagues who knew the culture and spoke the language.

### 7.7.2 The Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) agenda

‘Prevent’ is part of CONTEST, the Government’s response to the threat of terrorism from ‘Islamist’ groups, discussed in Chapter Four. The PVE agenda relates to the investment by Government of millions of pounds, designed to tackle violent extremism, and is aimed at stopping people from becoming terrorists. The tax payer’s alliance reported in 2009 that over £12m had been given to local authorities to fund community groups, but owing to insufficient monitoring, Government were unsure as to what

963 Ibid
964 B0026 op cit
965 A0021 op cit
groups had received money. It has been openly suggested that the whole agenda has been a waste of public money.

A key respondent from a third sector organisation suggests that the PVE agenda is a source of discontent for Muslims because the state’s arguments do not have any moral resonance at all. Specifically, he says:

“There is a moral deficit in the way in which the PVE agenda and the anti-terrorist agenda is put to the Muslim community. Because if you stand back from it at all, you know, the Muslim community is outraged about the revelations about Abu Garhab, it is not just something that appeared on BBC news five times and the rest of society has fallen back, people are still outraged about that. They see it as absolutely despicable. People are still outraged about Guantanamo, and they do not recognise the moral high ground of the state in terms of its anti-terrorist activities.”

He believes that the PVE agenda is damaging, because it requires organisations to spend money on something which they don’t believe in:

“…but what you’ve got to use it for is something you don’t necessarily believe in, and I’m telling you, people who run small Muslim organisations who have got this cash are agonising [his emphasis] over this at the moment, they are not sleeping well.”

He goes on to say:

“The PVE agenda is there as part and parcel of trying to win the hearts and minds battles in this country behind the war….. It’s there in order to try and win people away from criticising British and American foreign policy.”

In essence, he is saying that the PVE agenda is a politically motivated tactic to engender support for foreign policy, regardless of the potential damage to communities – thereby creating and storing bigger problems for the future. Offering a mildly opposing view, GMP’s lead for ‘Prevent’ makes the point that ‘Prevent’ is politically sensitive and that

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967 BBC Radio 4 The Today Programme 30/3/10
968 B0024 op cit
969 Ibid
970 Ibid
it therefore attracts a high level of scrutiny, even though there are other pieces of Government business which are financed to a far higher level.\footnote{C0032 op cit}

The net effect of this investment on individuals in the community might be illustrated by a quote from one of the respondents, a Pakistani youth worker living in Oldham. Although he is well qualified he is unable to find a job, but describes some reluctance even to consider joining the police because it is seen as a betrayal:

“They look at this, with this whole terrorism thing as well, it’s perpetuated it, it’s made it worse, they all, there’s this idea that you’d get hauled up to a terrorism charge, that you’d have to arrest someone, infiltrate a mosque, it’s a dual identity, you’re Asian and Muslim as well. Yeah, you know, it’s seen as a type of betrayal in some ways.”\footnote{B0043 op cit}

\subsection*{7.7.3 The Power and Influence of Islam}

A Muslim PCSO talks about the radio link Mosques have, enabling the call to prayer to be heard at home (where there is a receiver).\footnote{B0023 op cit} He is very enthusiastic and earnest, a point which comes across with many of the Muslim interviewees. Islam appears to be an integral part of this enthusiasm. The Muslim respondents seem to give examples to illustrate their points to a much greater degree than the non-Muslim respondents.

On Islam, one Asian community respondent says this, which goes some way to articulating what it is about Islam which leads people to believe that they can use it to pedal harm:

“Islam is so powerful. Once somebody studies Islam, it’s a powerful religion. It’s so powerful, how can I describe this, it’s a way of life and people say this is it, this is what I’ve been looking for.”\footnote{C0028 op cit}

Two others discuss the westernisation of Islam, implying that it is a myth – being a Muslim is a struggle, and people achieve it to a lesser or greater degree.\footnote{A0035(a) op cit, A0035(b) op cit} Islam seems to help young people make life decisions, and this serves to illustrate the power of

\begin{thebibliography}{975}
\item C0032 op cit
\item B0043 op cit
\item B0023 op cit
\item C0028 op cit
\item A0035(a) op cit, A0035(b) op cit
\end{thebibliography}
Islam: “it helps us make our choices. Choices at work, choices at home.” But it is still a struggle, wrestling with those other things which attract some young people:

“It’s like not eating Halal meat, it’s something we shouldn’t be doing but we do but it’s not that bad though is it, drinking and smoking, it’s still got the Muslim thing of intention.”

This clearly poses questions about vulnerability and internal struggles, and also demonstrates the persuasive nature of Islam.

Certain physical aspects of Islam present themselves as important ‘players’ in the lives of young Muslims, a point recognised by those in communities who are not themselves Muslim but who live or work closely with those who are. For example, one of the college Principals talks of the impact of Ramadan on tension because people, especially young people, are going for lengthy periods of time without food and drink. With Ramadan starting for boys as young as seven, it represents a major undertaking. Others identify cultural problems around such things as the Christmas lights in the shopping centres, and the practical problems of getting hold of people.

7.8 Summary

This chapter has acknowledged the critical realist philosophical position adopted for the thesis by first producing quantitative data for key policing indicators in the theatre of the case study, thus building on themes developed in the previous chapter. It has then presented rich qualitative data based on face-to-face interviews with members of the community, with police officers and other employees from state agencies working closely with communities, and using participant observation. The semi-structured nature of the interview schedule, developed in conjunction with members of the community and with the aid of an independent panel drawn from a local Mosque, and the coding of the data, have had at their heart the aims and objectives of the research. Thus, it enables the following chapter to utilise the data presented here and contextualise it within the

976 A0036(a) op cit
977 A0039(a) op cit
978 C0030(a) op cit
979 E0024(a) op cit and E0024(b) op cit
980 E0021(a) op cit and E0021(b) op cit
corpus of literature reviewed in Chapters Two and Three to address the objectives and answer the fundamental research question.

This thrust of this chapter, and most of its themes, might be summed up with a largely unprompted statement from one of the respondents, a member of the third sector, representing the interests of Muslims in Oldham:

“What it is, Islam is so powerful. Once somebody studies Islam, it’s a powerful religion. It’s so powerful, how can I describe this, it’s a way of life and people say this is it, this is what I’ve been looking for. Now if a new guy, who doesn’t know anything about Islam, OK, and if an extreme guy gets hold of him, then I describe him as clay, he can mould him in any form he wants to take. It’s like a clay because you’re new. Whatever information I will give you, I will only give you the information I want to give you, not, I don’t want to give you the version of the Qur’an that the prophet say because I have got a different agenda, so he’s more vulnerable here it’s true, he’s more vulnerable, and the ones that are more vulnerable are the Muslim youth who are on this Jihad, no knowledge of Islam, therefore vulnerable, because, you know, they need that gang culture, that violent culture, and suddenly someone comes over and says look what’s happening in Palestine, look what’s happening in Afghanistan, let’s do something about it, and they say he likes fighting, do you understand what I’m saying? What do we do? You’ve done nothing all your life, let’s go, let’s do something.” 981

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981 C0028 op cit
CHAPTER EIGHT:

Discussion and Conclusions

8.0 Introduction

In Chapter Three, it was argued that urban unrest, radicalisation and terrorism share common roots, with a number of key social pre-conditions existing prior to their onset. These include a sense of injustice, a lack of political representation, declining perceptions of legitimacy in state authorities, relative deprivation (which may include unemployment, a gap between expectation and achievement) and discrimination. As shown in the previous chapter, levels of drug related crime are also important. A ‘ladder of escalation’ was proposed, arguing that such a model offered an opportunity to identify and therefore mitigate the process of disenfranchisement of individuals and groups of individuals which may ultimately lead them to commit acts of terrorism. A number of other policing indicators were examined in Chapter Six, and then data presented in Chapter Seven relating to these indicators for the case study. Thus three sets of ‘warnings’ can be postulated: (i) Social preconditions, as identified above; (ii) ‘Policing indicators’ – those things identified as indicators of raised tension, acting as a forewarning to the onset of urban unrest, which might also be relevant to predict the development of disenfranchised groups thus raising the risk of harmful radicalisation; (iii) Steps on the ‘ladder of escalation’ such as certain types of political activity, escalating towards demonstrations, sedition and radicalisation. The identification and mitigation of the risk depends on the effectiveness of Neighbourhood Policing and the National Intelligence Model (NIM).

The purpose of the present chapter is to address the research question, using the data presented in the preceding chapter: ‘Is the machinery of local policing delivery seen as fit for purpose by practitioners and community members to anticipate and mitigate the risk of harmful radicalisation at street level’?

To achieve this, the chapter is carefully structured and argued, addressing questions posed in earlier chapters as it proceeds, and locating the findings within the reviewed literature.
It is structured in four major parts. The first summarises the position in relation to the ‘critical success factors’ in Oldham, distilling them from the previous chapter. These are themes which I isolate from the examination of the legal and policy responses to each of four of the five seminal events, where they can be seen as ‘golden threads’. I have argued the police service and others has failed to deliver them effectively, thereby contributing to the current crisis.

The second part deals with each of the four objectives, using the data and analysis presented in the last chapter, and linking the findings and discussion with the corpus of literature used in Chapter Three to construct the hypothesis. The objectives are:

5. Contribute to the understanding of the development of harmful radicalisation amongst members of certain communities.

6. Develop a menu of indicators which predict or forewarn of the risk of radicalisation.

7. Establish perceptions of success of Neighbourhood Policing and the National Intelligence Model at identifying risk.

8. Establish a ‘toolkit’ of options which might be utilised to mitigate risk by ‘switching-off’ the radicalisation process, and developing multi-agency partnership strategies for the same purpose.

I produce a schematic which demonstrates how the common roots theory, critical success factors, policing indicators and the National Intelligence Model fir together. In this way, this part forms the major thrust of the chapter and addresses the fundamental research question. I use it to contextualise the research findings within the literature, and it includes a discussion of the ‘ladder of escalation’; the examination of each of the four objectives includes a summary and conclusion section. The third part comments on the ability to ‘extrapolate’ the research findings to other settings, whilst the fourth and final part identifies avenues for further work.

8.1 Critical Success Factors

In the last chapter, I brought forward themes which I identified as ‘critical success factors’, and I argued that successful delivery of them optimises the legitimacy of the
police in the eyes of minority and disenfranchised groups, thereby minimising the risk of adverse social protest. I described them as follows:

- The need to work in partnership with other agencies, especially education and housing departments.

- The police organisation needs to strive to reflect the community it serves, and the recruitment, retention and promotion of ethnic minority staff is a crucial part of this.

- Community representatives should be involved in training, especially community awareness training.

- Police organisations must work towards the elimination of racial discrimination of all types, and contribute towards the development of cohesive communities.

- The local ‘beat officer’ or Neighbourhood Policing team has a vital role and must attract officers of high calibre.

These themes were distilled from the analysis of the legal and policy responses relevant to the seminal events in Chapter Two, and I analysed and discussed them in Chapter Four. I argued that failure to deliver these critical success factors represented a fundamental failure on behalf of state agencies generally, and the police in particular, which ultimately contributes to the current challenges now faced. I now make an assessment of the degree to which they are embedded and effective in the theatre of the case study, using the data presented in Chapter Seven.

### 8.1.1 Partnership Working and NIM Tasking

In section 3.3.1 of Chapter Three, entitled ‘Partnership responses and community policing’, I quote Margaret Simey from the Merseyside Police Authority, speaking after large scale urban disorder in Toxteth, Brixton (see seminal event 1, Chapter Two), and elsewhere:
“Responsibility for public tranquillity on such a vast scale cannot and must not be
off-loaded on to the police...It was our failure as a society to set about the conditions
in the inner cities which led to the breakdown of social order in the 1980s...The
responsibility is ours, and it is one which we cannot delegate to the police.”

Later, in section 4.3, Chapter Four, I demonstrated how this intellection had effectively
been enshrined into law through the Crime and Disorder Act 1998:

“...it shall be the duty of each authority to which this section applies to exercise its
various functions with due regard to the likely effect of the exercise of those
functions on, and the need to do all that it reasonably can to prevent, crime and
disorder in its area.”

I also outlined in this section some of the difficulties with partners working together:
organisations having different performance indicators, different management structures
and different ‘layers’ to them; communication within agencies is often fragmented,
communication between partners is fraught with difficulty. I then posed this question:
Are these inhibitors inimical to achieving the very aims which spawned the partnership
agenda in the first place? I discussed in section 4.12.1 of that chapter how the NIM is
intended to work, optimising effective partnership working by ensuring appropriate
tasking of partner resources to counter community problems – the intention being to
give life to the legislative framework, and I return to this subject in the discussion
relating to objective 3, below.

I have presented and discussed the qualitative findings of the research in relation to this
critical success factor in section 7.3.5., and the commentary can be found at section
7.2.1., Chapter Seven. There was some evidence of where partnership working was
effective at a local, tactical level within Oldham West, usually attributable to the way in
which individuals developed personal relationships with members of partner agencies
(for example, the use of the kick-pitch facility, section 7.3.3 ‘Opportunities for
Intervention’). But the question posed by the Housing Officer ‘what as an agency are
you actually responsible for?’ - goes right to the heart of the difficulties outlined above.

Lord Scarman’s report, the riots and their aftermath Oxford: Pergamon pp 135-142. p142
Police staff also identified that partnerships were not functioning as they should, suggesting that staff from the council do not get out into the community as much as they might. These findings, coupled with the ineffective multi-agency tasking meeting I observed (section 7.3.3), leads to the conclusion that the ability of the state agencies to work effectively together in the theatre of the case study is flawed, and that therefore this critical success factor is not being delivered effectively.

8.1.2 Reflecting the Community

In section 7.2.2 of Chapter Seven, I present data demonstrating the extent to which GMP generally has been successful in reflecting the community in the make-up of its workforce, and I focus this further into the theatre of the case study using figures for Oldham Division specifically. Although slow, progress appears to be underway.

The findings from the present study serve to emphasise the value of recruiting staff from minority communities: section 7.3.1 of Chapter Seven provides evidence of where and why these members of staff are successful. In the main, it is linked to the ability to overcome language barriers, and therefore enable communication to occur between the police and the community. Two other advantages are also articulated. The first is that it helps other officers and staff understand the cultural aspects of communities: parts of the Islamic way of life, which they had not been taught in other ways, for instance. Secondly, and crucially, it establishes a real-life point of reference for some very positive views of each respective culture, rather than relying on perceptions from the media and elsewhere. I return to this extremely important point in the second section, below. It was clear that a sophisticated decision-making process regarding the deployment of a paucity of ethnic minority staff was absent – i.e. where is the best business benefit achieved?

Three linked and successive conclusions might be drawn from the findings: firstly, the advantages of reflecting the community are primarily for the organisation itself, i.e. overcoming language barriers and a lack of cultural understanding; the community response was ambivalent, even talking of it being a betrayal; secondly, the notion that trust is improved automatically by virtue of increased representation is flawed; and thirdly, recruitment and deployment of staff drawn from ethnic minority communities should be driven by business need rather than merely the pursuit of a target. Although
progress has occurred, especially through the deployment of PCSOs, there is a relative failure to deliver this critical success factor.

8.1.3 Community Awareness Training

In Chapter Four, I compare the recommendations of the report of Sir William Macpherson into the murder of Stephen Lawrence,\(^984\) and the comments made by Lord Scarman into the Brixton disorders twenty years earlier.\(^985\) I demonstrated in section 4.2 of the chapter that training in racism awareness and valuing cultural diversity was highlighted by both reports as being essential to good policing, and that local minority ethnic communities should be involved in that training. In section 7.2.3 of Chapter Seven, I discussed the publicly available sources which GMP had produced in relation to their community awareness training, and I commented that these sources were silent on the issue of whether community members were involved in the training. Although the training department of Greater Manchester Police did not feature in the research component of this study, I show that the recipients of ‘diversity training’ in the theatre of the case study, a location with an acknowledged history of problematic inter- and intra- community relations, consider their training in this arena to have been ‘limited’ (section 7.3.1), and ‘superficial or virtually non-existent’ (section 7.7.1). The development of knowledge for these largely untrained staff had occurred on the ground, working closely with communities and staff from those minority communities, on whom they depend heavily. Although more difficult to demonstrate, there also appeared to be a reluctance to use certain terms by some police officers, which is also discussed in section 7.7.1. This reticence is potentially dangerous because it is capable of being misconstrued, and might easily manifest itself in the institutional racism of which Scarman and Macpherson have much to say.\(^986\)

Although some progress is demonstrated through an open-minded attitude amongst staff, there is largely a failure effectively to deliver the third critical success factor by GMP in the location of the case study.


\(^{985}\) Scarman, Mr Justice (1981) \textit{‘The Brixton Disorders 10-12 April 1981’} HMSO: CMND 8427

\(^{986}\) Macpherson, Sir W (1999 a) op cit para 6.4 and Scarman, Mr Justice (1981) op cit para 2.2
8.1.4 The Elimination of Racial Discrimination

Although this is one of the themes distilled from the examination of policies and edicts found in Chapter Four, it is also enshrined in law, and I describe the requirements in section 4.5.1, of that chapter. In section 7.2.4 of Chapter Seven, I assess the degree of compliance by GMP, and indicate that at the time of writing, it was fully compliant. There was nothing I observed or heard during the course of the research that suggested that the police and other agencies were not working hard to eliminate racial discrimination. The second part of this critical success factor – ‘contributing towards the development of cohesive communities’ – is more problematic. It is analysed in more detail in the discussion surrounding the objectives of the research, below.

8.1.5 The local ‘Beat Officer’ and Neighbourhood Policing

Writing in 1979, John Alderson had this to say for a new model of policing:

“…The role will go beyond that of the traditional “village bobby” but will embody the spirit of that tradition within it. The community constable will be a high status officer.”

In truth though, it is probably fair to say that this role is the epitome of what British policing has been about for many centuries. Critchley (1978) says this of constables in the 13th Century:

“Among these officers, the titles of whom attest the special purpose for which each was appointed – ale-taster, bread-weigher, swine-ringer – the constable was pre-eminent, carrying a special responsibility, as the principal representative of the manor….”

In section 4.12.2 of Chapter Four, I set out how Neighbourhood Policing is intended to be established in each of the 43 police forces of England and Wales, and in section 7.2.5 of Chapter Seven, I describe the manner in which it has been achieved in Oldham West, the theatre of the case study. In that section, I refer to a quote from an inspection carried

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out by HMIC in 2006: “there is a perception among safer neighbourhood officers that they are frequently abstracted from their core role”. In section 7.3.2 of the previous chapter, I describe and demonstrate the impact that the introduction of PCSOs has had on developing police-community relations.

I conclude that the fourth critical success factor is being delivered in the theatre of the case study, but it is being delivered by PCSOs and not police officers.

8.1.6 Critical Success: Summary and Conclusion

To summarise the conclusions in this section, Greater Manchester Police are not successfully delivering three of the five critical success factors in the theatre of the case study: they are not reflecting the community being served, the community awareness training is weak, and partnership working is flawed. They are largely delivering two of the critical success factors: they have high quality staff who are highly engaged with communities, delivering Neighbourhood Policing (though they are not, in the main, police officers), and they are working towards the elimination of racial discrimination.

8.2 The Four Objectives

This thesis contributes to the existing knowledge surrounding the risk of the development of harmful radicalisation within communities, and, at the same time, provides practitioners with a ‘toolkit’ of options which they might employ to mitigate that risk. It is therefore a bridge between the theoretical and the practical. In order to achieve this thorny goal, four objectives are articulated, and the ultimate success of the research and the concomitant ability of the study to address the research question, depends upon the contribution it makes against each of these objectives. The objectives are reproduced here:

1. Contribute to the understanding of the development of harmful radicalisation amongst members of certain communities.

2. Develop a menu of indicators which predict or forewarn of the risk of radicalisation.

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3. Establish perceptions of success of Neighbourhood Policing and the National Intelligence Model at identifying risk.

4. Establish a ‘toolkit’ of options which might be utilised to mitigate risk by ‘switching-off’ the radicalisation process, and developing multi-agency partnership strategies for the same purpose.

This section will now consider each of these objectives in turn, linking the research findings with the corpus of literature examined in Chapter Three. In doing so, it will seek to provide answers to, or comment on aspects of, the series of questions posed at the close of Chapter Three, and reiterated in section 5.4.1 of Chapter Five:

- How can state authorities, particularly the police, use the ‘common roots’ theory to identify communities which might be vulnerable to radicalisation and subsequent progression to terrorism?

- Does a ‘ladder of escalation’ provide an additional mechanism whereby peaceful forms of social or political activity can be used to forewarn, in the medium to longer term, of the potential for radicalisation and terrorism amongst some communities?

- To what degree can ‘tension indicators’, developed after the urban riots in the UK, be adapted to forewarn of the growth of radicalisation and terrorists within a given community?

- Is the National Intelligence Model, principally developed to tackle crime, capable of identifying radicalisation and terrorism risk factors, using the foregoing mechanisms, and developing appropriate partnership intervention strategy?

- What role does ‘Neighbourhood Policing’ play, and can a ‘toolkit’ be developed which enables local officers to assist in the identification of vulnerable communities?

- What relevance does the ‘social pre-conditions’ idea have to the current rise in gang related activity and the growth in radicalisation linked to Islam?
8.2.1 Objective 1: The Development of Harmful Radicalisation

I use the term ‘radicalisation’ to represent a political and social journey of an individual which involves polarisation and ‘fundamentalist’ ideas, becoming ‘harmful’ when an intention forms to cause damage to communities or people.

In Chapter Three I examine the concept of radicalisation, and I draw on work by Al-Alami and Krishnan (2007)\textsuperscript{990}, which discussed the attraction of Islamic fundamentalism to Muslims living in Western societies. I also brought into the discussion the work of Cozzens (2006)\textsuperscript{991} since he notes an important caveat in his examination of ideology: that ideology cannot by itself satisfactorily explain Jihadi violence; research has demonstrated that it works in tandem with social processes and other grievances.\textsuperscript{992} I note that it is these social processes and grievances with which this research is primarily concerned. I close the section by using five key points from Choudhury (2007) which emerge from the literature on radicalisation and identity,\textsuperscript{993} and use this to argue that the roots of the journey to harmful radicalisation and progression to terrorism are very similar to the roots of other forms of ‘social protest’ like urban unrest. In this way, I start to build the hypothesis that constitutes the ‘ladder of escalation’, arguing that the social preconditions which may make groups or individuals vulnerable to radicalisation include a sense of isolation, a lack of social identity, a lack of confidence in the political system, a lack of economic prospects, perceptions of blocked social mobility, all of which are amplified by experiences of discrimination and racism. I examine each of these in turn, below, to realise the first objective, and contribute to the understanding of the development of harmful radicalisation.

8.2.1.1 \textit{Prima facie} Evidence of the Development of Harmful Radicalisation

I examine the concept and phenomenon of radicalisation in section 3.2, Chapter Three, and there are very close links with the subject of identity, also discussed in that section.


\textsuperscript{992} Ibid p4

\textsuperscript{993} Choudhury T (2007) ‘The Role of Muslim Identity Politics in Radicalisation (a study in progress)’ Department for Communities and Local Government: London
In section 7.3.3 of Chapter Seven, entitled ‘Opportunities for Intervention’, I outline an example described by police interviewees whereby the initial stages of the development of radicalisation was identified by youth services from the local authority. Here, a group was hiring kick-pitches, and organising football tournaments, recruiting from a certain age range from the male Asian community within the theatre of the case study. It was explained to me that intelligence demonstrated that extremism was at the core of the motivation for their activities. Although this had only come to light in the week immediately preceding my interviewing of these respondents, and thus was a highly sensitive issue, it demonstrates that the development of radicalisation exists.

8.2.1.2 A Sense of Isolation

That the communities in Oldham are polarised is undisputed: I demonstrate this first in the account of seminal event 4, Chapter Two, which describes the urban unrest in the Northern mill towns; then in section 5.4.2 of Chapter Five, where I articulate the case for choosing Oldham as the location of the study; and, finally, in section 7.1 of Chapter Seven, where I examine the location in much closer detail. These arguments receive further support from interviewees, described in section 7.4.1, Chapter Seven, entitled ‘Polarisation and Community Tension’.

Given the nature of the polarisation within Oldham, the degree of isolation that might be felt by communities is problematic to express. However, I utilise here two pieces of evidence to demonstrate the existence of isolation, one at the community level, the other at an individual level. The first is described in section 7.4.9, Chapter Seven. This was part of the participant observation component of the research, when I attended a Partners and Communities Together meeting held in the immediate aftermath of a fatal shooting of a young Asian male. Despite the impact of the incident on the Asian community, and the fact that the meeting was held in an overwhelmingly Asian-dominated community, very close to the location of the incident, the meeting was overwhelmingly white-dominated. I suggest here that this is evidence of an isolated community.

The second was the behaviour exhibited by one 18 year old Pakistani male, described in section 7.5.4 of Chapter Seven. In this section, I describe how this particular respondent has utilised the internet, viewed DVDs and formed his own thoughts on the impact other
groups have had on Muslims across the world. It is a ‘journey’ which has strong resonance with the notion of a ‘radicalisation journey’ conducted largely alone through the use of the internet and other external sources. This is evidence of individual isolation within the wider context of an isolated community.

8.2.1.3 A Lack of Social Identity

A key theme of the risk of a person embarking on such a journey towards radicalisation seems to be their search for a social identity at a critical juncture in their lives:

“The path to radicalisation often involves a search for identity at a moment of crisis. There is a ‘cognitive opening’, a moment when previous explanations and belief systems are found to be inadequate in explaining a person’s experience.”

In relation to young people, this is examined and well argued by Shiv Malik in an article in *Prospect Magazine*. Here, it is identified that the division occurs because parents attitudes to dress, jobs, schooling and socialising all act to drive youngsters away from their parent’s generation. Whose culture and values do you affiliate with? Your friends or your family? Your country or your community? This identity problem is capable of exploitation, making individuals and groups vulnerable to radical Islamic movements.

In Chapter Three, section 3.3, I discuss the potency of Islam as a religion, and I provide this quote from Macey (2002):

“Whether this type of Islam is theologically legitimate is irrelevant: as long as men use Islam to justify violence, religion must be considered a significant variable in its analysis.”

994 Ibid p6
996 Ibid
998 Ibid p860
The persuasion of Islam was evidenced by many respondents in this study, both Muslim and non-Muslim, but I discuss it as a specific topic in section 7.7.3 of Chapter Seven. It plays directly into the issue of a search for identity, for as one respondent notes:

“Islam is so powerful. Once somebody studies Islam, it’s a powerful religion. It’s so powerful, how can I describe this, it’s a way of life and people say this is it, this is what I’ve been looking for.”

I examine the issue of identity and vulnerability in section 7.4.3 of Chapter Seven. Although there is a general view amongst the respondents from the statutory agencies that there is a tension in young Asian minds linked to generational differences, this is not borne out by the views of the community members themselves. Instead, they prefer to point out that Islam is a struggle, and therefore there are degrees of success.

But there clearly is a problem of identity, and a dearth of suitable role models, since the one theme which all respondents understood and acknowledged was the existence and influence of ‘Mr Big’, described in Section 7.4.4 of Chapter Seven. ‘Mr Big’ has clearly made his money from dealing in drugs, although many of the young Asian community respondents were strongly defensive of this, arguing that he may have made his money legitimately; it is just an assumption on behalf of the police that he has been acting illegally. That there is this shortage of influential role models is a potent indicator of a vulnerability to harmful external influence. Other influences also seem to be relevant: for example, the incidence of gang-related violent crime was raised by one agency respondent, and issues relating to alcohol and girls were common. Perhaps most important though is the widespread prevalence and use of illegal narcotics. To re-quote one young Asian respondent, “[Drugs] are corrupting our area. You need to sort it out.” These are street level issues, the tip of the iceberg of the more organised criminal gangs.

In Chapter Three, section 3.1, I discuss the terrorism-organised crime nexus, arguing that the phenomena have important similarities. I develop this argument to discuss the local link between drugs and terrorism, quoting a respondent who was the same age, gender and ethnic identity as one of the 7/7 bombers, and from the same area:
“To be honest with you, the downfall was a few years back. There were a lot of drug addicts in the area, which dragged everything down... I wouldn’t say that we’re stuck up people, but you move to an area and spend your money on your property. You want to live there, and if somebody’s gonna come up and throw syringes in your garden and put a brick through your window, you want to fight the battle. At the end of the day, it’s your pride more than anything else.”

I go on to point out that the article describes a gang established under the leadership of Mohammed Sidique Khan, leader of the 7/7 bombers in response to the drug problem, and I argue that this is a highly important contribution to the debate because it describes at the micro-level how organised crime, standing at the head of street-level drug problems, can directly help create the right conditions for radicalisation and ultimately terrorism to flourish. Moreover, I draw on the testimony of Courtenay Griffiths QC, who claims that those involved in gangs and gun crime are converting to radical Islam, and that this is a very dangerous mix. I pose these questions: should certain types of crime be engaged as an indicator of radicalisation and terrorism, in addition to other social pre-conditions? And is the growth in gang related violent crime another consequence of social and political conditions which are similar in their roots to terrorism?

Here, and in answer to these questions, I seek to propose that certain types of crime, especially those that are drug related, should be engaged as an indicator of increased risk of radicalisation and terrorism. This is because the shortage of role models and the veneration with which ‘Mr Big’ is held are strongly indicative of a vulnerable community. With regards to the second question, the research does not illuminate this properly; I did not examine the incidence of gang-related violent crime. However, there would be a certain logic behind the argument, and I suggest in the summary to this chapter that further work should be conducted in this area.

Islam is a powerful and persuasive way of life. It can be corrupted by those who wish to use it to convey a violent intent: a vehicle which is capable of employment within the theatre of the case study to exploit vulnerable communities and individuals.

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1000 ibid p2
8.2.1.4 A Lack of Confidence in the Political System

In the review of relevant literature, and the examination of common roots of urban unrest, radicalisation and terrorism, I describe concepts which condense down to a lack of confidence in the political system. For instance, Newman (2006) talks about dispossession, and how particular groups might perceive that the political or social order denies them their social, cultural or ideological rights,\textsuperscript{1002} while Bjorgo (2005) discusses how a lack of democracy, an inequality of power, and the experience of social injustice are all capable of motivating terrorism.\textsuperscript{1003} He also says this:

\begin{quote}
\textit{"Failure or unwillingness by the state to integrate dissident groups or emerging social classes may lead to their alienation from the political system. Large groups of highly educated young people with few prospects of a meaningful career will tend to feel alienated and frustrated. Excluded groups are likely to search for alternative channels through which to express and promote political influence and change. To some, terrorism can seem the most effective and tempting option."}\textsuperscript{1004}
\end{quote}

Some of this failure is evident in the theatre of the case study. In section 7.3.4 of the previous chapter, I consider the ‘Trust Deficit’. Here, two respondents, one from the third sector, the other from the community, describe a latent mistrust between the police and the community; the application of anti-terrorism legislation apparently increases this gap. This is generally borne out in the evidence of the young Asian community respondents. They described police as racist, and gave examples of other practices which they felt were unfair. These are presented in section 7.3.9 of Chapter Seven, and tend to lend weight to the second of five categories described by Ahmed et al (2001),\textsuperscript{1005} which stated:

\begin{quote}
\textit{"The local police have persistently pursued highly discriminatory policies against the ethnic and religious minorities of Oldham."}\textsuperscript{1006}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{1004} Ibid p260
\textsuperscript{1006} Ibid p2
Perhaps though, alienation from the political system in the theatre of the case study is brought into sharper focus in the section from the previous chapter entitled ‘The Democratic Deficit, the Homeland and Tribal Influence’, section 7.3.6. The impact of the ‘Biraderi’ – or clan – the complex mix of Asian politics with the British political system, and councillors who are not perceived as being very representative add up to a local political system which is lacking in efficacy and therefore cannot deliver confidence for local communities.

Overlaying the impact of a lack of confidence in the local political system are global events in which the British Government have immersed the state; it is a commonly held notion that it is British foreign policy which is a main contributor to disenfranchised Muslim communities, because such foreign policy is an attack on Islam itself: “The relative weakness of Islamic states enables the West to be identified as an outside enemy and thus developing political cohesion amongst Muslim states and communities around the world.”1007 Indeed, a poll conducted for the BBC in 2002 found that Muslims thought that the so-called War on Terror was in fact a war on Islam.1008 This issue is examined in section 7.6 of Chapter Seven, which includes specific consideration of Afghanistan, Iraq and Gaza at section 7.6.2. The data in this area is mixed, with some respondents saying it does affect local people and communities, others saying it does not. It is worth noting, as one respondent did, that international issues can have a major impact in very short timescales,1009 and some of the interviews were carried out in the immediate aftermath of the Israeli attack in Gaza. Britain was slow to denounce this attack – condemning Hamas action only; the United States positively endorsed Israeli action as self defence.1010

In general then, there does indeed appear to be a lack of confidence in the political system, which is primarily brought about at a local level through the complex interplay of the British political system with Asian politics: tribal and clan influences, and the desire of local political parties to court the Asian vote. The route for a “search for

\[1008\] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2600919.stm accessed 5 January 2011
\[1009\] C0028
alternative channels through which to express and promote political influence and change” would appear to be open.

8.2.1.5 A Lack of Economic Prospects

In section 3.1.1 of Chapter Three, I review literature which examines the contribution of deprivation, poverty and educational underachievement might make to the risk of radicalisation leading to terrorism. I also discuss perception of these issues, manifesting themselves as a discrepancy between what people believe they are rightfully entitled to, and what they can actually expect. The absolute links between terrorism, radicalisation and a lack of economic prospects are far from clear in the literature, but I suggest that there are indirect links.

The social deprivation indices of the location of the case study are presented and described in section 7.1 of Chapter Seven; it is amongst the most deprived urban environments in the UK. In section 7.4.2 of Chapter Seven, I present findings dealing with the issue of deprivation and its potential impact on the vulnerability of young people. Interestingly, the picture in the area of the case study is similarly mixed regarding the impact deprivation has, with a member of the council’s community unit summing up effectively: “I think we’ve got a set of assumptions around this, and I don’t think there’s the evidence base at the moment…”

Unemployment, which is also very high in the area, and is disproportionately high amongst Asian communities, plays an important part in the perception of a lack of economic prospects. In section 7.4.4 of Chapter Seven, I introduce the concept of ‘Mr Big’, and I discuss it in relation to identity, above. A component of the lure of ‘Mr Big’ is the perception that this is how money is made – legitimate methods of employment do not offer the same invitation to material gain. This is summed up by one respondent when he says that the younger generation do not want to follow in their father’s footsteps into running taxis or working in takeaways - they want more, influenced as they are by Western material gain as a measure of success. This remark lends plays well into the same point made by Peach (2007), introduced in section 2.1.3 of Chapter Two:

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1011 Bjorgo T (2005) op cit p260
1012 CO033
1013 BO024
“..Low educational qualifications and occupational concentrations in restaurant- and taxi-driving-type occupations, with limited opportunities to progress, suggest that it will be difficult for them to escape their current economic position.”

Young people themselves do not appear to have high levels of aspiration where employment is concerned. Where they have achieved educational success, the rewards seem limited; in one example, a well-educated Pakistani respondent had been unable to find suitable work commensurate with his qualifications in the theatre of the case study. This tends to lend weight to the intellecction of a gap between that to which people feel they are rightfully entitled, and what they can actually expect. These things are powerful drivers for crime, and the links between crime and radicalisation have already been discussed.

8.2.1.6 Perceptions of Blocked Social Mobility

Aspects of this area are closely linked to the last one, and deal with the issue of perception, which in turn is linked to certain types of social injustice, discussed below. But blocked social mobility per se is in evidence in the theatre of the case study, which can be demonstrated through the polarisation of communities along geographic lines as discussed above, and as described in section 7.1 of Chapter Seven. This is also partly linked, as highlighted in section 3.3 of Chapter Three, to Islamic doctrine. Macey (1999) makes several points in this regard - for instance, that the prohibition on mortgages as usury and the cultural tradition of the extended family go some way towards explaining housing disadvantages and ethnic segregation; educational underachievement might be a function of very tired young Muslim males who have spent long hours at the Mosque; and Islamic definitions of gender roles pre-disposes females to focus on family and the home, giving them little access to employment, and a tendency towards very large families, all of which contribute to familial poverty.

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1015 B0043
A key phenomenon that presented itself during the course of the research, referred to by a number of respondents from agencies as well as the community, was what they called ‘white flight’. This is described in section 7.4.6 of Chapter Seven, and I acknowledge that it is a term with sinister overtones. In essence, it is an expansion of the Asian community and population, and is linked to the arguments described by Peach (2007) and Macey (2002), described above. In fact, it is a real-life manifestation of the expectation described by Hewer (2006), described in section 2.1.3 of Chapter Two, which argues that there has to be a significant expansion of Muslim populations to reach demographic stability. It is the manner of that expansion which appears to demonstrate a block to social mobility, and there are important links with Giddens’ theory of structuration, discussed in section 6.1.3 of Chapter Six. In section 3.1.1, I quote Newman (2006) where he examines a number of ‘Permissive Structural Factors’ in his exploration of the root causes of terrorism. One of these factors is:

“Demography: ‘Significant demographic conditions include rapid population growth, and especially a burgeoning of young males; and uneven population shifts across different ethnic groups….A related demographic condition that has been associated with terrorism involves migration and shifts in the ethnic, religious , and social balance of society”

The concept of ‘white flight’ fits very comfortably within this permissive structural factor.

8.2.1.7 Experiences of Discrimination and Racism

Underpinning much of the theoretical argument that surrounds the discussion of root causes of terrorism, radicalisation and other forms of social protest are experiences of discrimination and racism; a sort of ‘golden thread’ running as a theme, sometimes wrapped up as a grievance of sorts, sometimes as a notion of exclusion and social

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1020 Ibid p752

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inequality. Other more recent research expands on some of these themes, bringing in to the debate the impact media has on a general culture of discrimination:

“..we introduce empirical evidence that demonstrates tangible links between Islamophobia or anti-Muslim bigotry in both (i) mainstream political and media discourse and (ii) extremist nationalist discourse and anti-Muslim hate crimes…. The report provides *prima facie* and empirical evidence to demonstrate that assailants of Muslims are invariably motivated by a negative view of Muslims they have acquired from either mainstream or extremist nationalist report or commentaries in the media.”

In section 3.3 of Chapter Three, I reviewed literature which examined the concept and causes of urban unrest, beginning to construct the theoretical argument that terrorism, urban unrest and radicalisation have common roots. Two highly relevant papers were discussed in relation to Oldham, both produced in the aftermath of the riots there in 2001; and I make the point in section 5.4.1 of Chapter Five that the issues raised lend considerable weight to the value of revisiting Oldham in this study. Ahmed *et al* (2001) came up with five broad categories having interviewed locals in Oldham, seeking to understand their perceptions:

“(1) The Muslim youth face complete alienation from social and political processes due to deprivation and discrimination.

(2) The local police have persistently pursued highly discriminatory policies against the ethnic and religious minorities of Oldham.

(3) Various institutions including the police and the media provoked the disturbances through highly sensitive and inherently discriminatory practice in May 2001.

(4) The far-right has developed and exploited Islamophobic sentiment.

(5) Muslim youth concerns have been deliberately excluded by various authorities, from all relevant discussions about local problems both historically and in the wake of disturbances.”

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1023 Ahmed NM, Bodi F, Kazim R and Shadjareh M (2001) *op cit* p2
In a paper which was arguably more independent, Ray and Smith (2004) identify four underlying structural conditions contributing to the unrest: systematic disadvantage (for instance, an inability to afford better quality housing), higher unemployment than in the majority, cultural cohesion problems and discrimination in council housing allocation.\textsuperscript{1024}

In section 7.3.8 of Chapter Seven, I present the views of a member of the council, who was of the opinion that the alleged discrimination against Asians was perception rather than reality, and I make the point that the distinction between perception and reality is blurred. It is a fact that the most deprived areas are mostly occupied by Asian communities, and I have discussed above some of the reasons for this. But it can create a perception of discrimination in council housing allocation. Conversely, these more deprived areas can attract higher levels of funding, to the exclusion of white working class estates, which has the effect of building community tension; these issues are extremely complex. Interestingly, one community respondent, who I quote in section 7.3.8 of Chapter Seven, points out that frustrated communities will brand the police racist, the court racist, and everyone racist, when in fact they are not.\textsuperscript{1025}

I present data relating to the interaction between the police and young people in section 7.3.9 of Chapter Seven. Many of the younger Asian community respondents spoke negatively of the police, and many had been stopped and searched by them. This negativity did not just extend to being stopped and searched, it also included calls for assistance from them, where they felt the police response was slower for them than others and therefore unfair. PCSOs are generally better accepted, and appear to do much for the interaction between the police and the community. The tension which occurs as a result of the police attempting to deal pro-actively with a significant drug problem and the need to maintain high levels of trust from the Asian communities, especially the younger members of the community, is clear. There is therefore a need to re-think the policing approach, which is revisited in the ‘Toolkit of Options’ section, below. The findings of the research in this area lend weight to the second point described by Ahmed \textit{et al} (2001), above.

\textsuperscript{1025} C0028
In Chapter Two, section 2.2.7, I highlight the hugely important role the media have in influencing public thought in relation to the police. Later, in section 3.3 of Chapter Three, I highlight with reference to the 2001 riots in Oldham, how the representations and perceptions presented by the media began to mould police activity. In fact, it is argued that, along with BNP activity, the influence and activity of the media was an additional factor in the precipitation of violence – partly explaining why rioting did not occur in neighbouring Rochdale, despite similar demographics and deprivation levels. The Oldham Evening Chronicle in particular was heavily criticised for its coverage and reporting at the time. In section 7.5 of Chapter Seven, I present findings in relation to the role the media appear to have in the theatre of the case study. The effects are profound. In relation to tolerance levels, the type and nature of reporting appears to be capable of lowering the expectations of people – matters become a self-fulfilling prophecy. This then leads to the creation of perceptions, not least the perception amongst the wider community about Islam and Muslims:

“…it’s the media now also, you know, like trying to demonise the Muslims you know, it’s like all the bombing, all the terrorism, so they feel you know, it’s the media and certain institutions also giving them a bad name because as a result of that they are not getting the job they are supposed to.”

And then there is the issue of who is reading what. Readership in Oldham amongst the Asian communities of the local newspapers is extremely low; they appear to be largely watching Asian television channels, in some cases concerning countries which they feel powerful resonance with, and yet have never visited. Local newspapers are profit driven, they have a need to sell papers to survive, and therefore will shape their stories and reporting to appeal to their buying customers. All these things act as powerful drivers of division between communities, contributing to the sense of isolation, suspicion and disenfranchisement.

Understanding the true effect of ‘racism’ is problematic but I present the findings of the research in section 7.4.7 of Chapter Seven. I show that it is prevalent in a number of forms, from systematic racism through to the use of pejorative terms such as ‘Paki

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1026 Ibid
1027 CO031
1028 CO030(a)
bastard’. In fact, the frequency and usage of this latter form of racism appears to be so common that it is almost expected and is therefore ignored – it is very rarely reported to the police, and I discuss these types of statistics and indicators in section 7.3.2 of Chapter Seven. But I pose the question, in conjunction with the myriad of other factors outlined above, what effect on the minds of individuals does this type of racism have?

The findings of the research indicate that perceptions of racism, discrimination and social inequality are rife within the theatre of the case study. In many cases, the actual presence of racism, discrimination and social inequality also appear to be common.

8.2.1.8 Objective 1: Summary and Conclusion

In summarising the above, this section will address this question: How can state authorities, particularly the police, use the ‘common roots’ theory to identify communities which might be vulnerable to radicalisation and subsequent progression to terrorism? It draws to a close with a discussion of the ‘ladder of escalation’ proposed in Chapter Three.

In the above discussion, I have used data from the research project to illuminate the position within the theatre of the case study of each of the emerging themes from Chapter Three that appear to constitute ‘common roots’ of radicalisation, urban unrest, some types of terrorism, and other forms of social protest, namely: a sense of injustice, a lack of political representation, declining perceptions of legitimacy in state authorities, relative deprivation (which may include unemployment, a gap between expectation and achievement) and discrimination. I have also demonstrated that levels of drug related crime are important. Of course, these findings can never be regarded as the absolute truth – I discuss in some depth the concept of truth and reality in section 5.1.1 of Chapter Five. The critical realist philosophical position adopted for this thesis permits an examination of issues, acknowledging the reality of the relationships but also allows for the double-hermeneutic, i.e. the actors interpretation of the relationships, and the observers interpretation of those interpretations.

The findings appear to indicate the following:
a. There is currently evidence of radicalisation in communities from the theatre of the case study.

b. There is evidence of a sense of isolation, both at a community level and at an individual level.

c. Many young Asian men are experiencing a crisis of identity. This is highly complex, and not linked purely (and simply) to tensions which allegedly exist between traditional family values and Islam on the one hand, and the western influences such as drugs and girls on the other. Instead, it is mainly linked to aspiration – the measure of success being material gain. This makes some individuals vulnerable to role models who are criminal. Thus, the level and nature of crime, especially drug-related crime, is very important as an indicator of a community vulnerable to external influence.

d. There is a problem with the political system, and the degree to which Asian communities are truly represented by elected individuals. This is linked to the complexities of the interaction at a local level between Asian politics and the British political system. It particularly affects Pakistani communities owing to the influence of the ‘Biraderi’. Foreign policy appears to have less of an influence, though can be impactive on a short-term basis.

e. There is a real gap between expectation and achievement, to the point that career aspiration is denuded amongst young Asian men. This feeds the attraction of a criminal route to material gain.

f. There is evidence of blocked social mobility amongst Asian communities in geographic terms in the location of the case study, and this is linked to Islamic doctrine amongst other things. The term used to describe this phenomenon in the area is ‘white flight’, which has sinister overtones, and conveys a theme of polarised communities along racial lines.
Discrimination and racism are prevalent in a number of forms, from systematic racism through to the use of pejorative terms such as ‘Paki bastard’. Perceptions here are important, and the activity of the police amongst young people was perceived to be discriminatory, with similar risks around housing allocation.

The fundamental pre-conditions of the unrest which occurred in Oldham in 2001, those same pre-conditions which can be distilled from the literature around urban unrest in other geographical locations and from other periods, are largely still in place. The existence of a radicalisation journey in the area at the time of the case study lends weight to the links between these various forms of social protest, and implies that there is still a material failure of state agencies to learn the lessons from the past, and thereby failing to mitigate risk of violence – whether that is urban unrest or acts of terrorism. State agencies can use this information to help identify where risk exists – key features consist of the elements identified above. There is evidence in Oldham of some pioneering work which certainly does reduce risk, and this is discussed below.

In Chapter Three, I review literature which examines things which are at the root of ‘social protest’ – and I specifically consider radicalisation, urban unrest and terrorism. I distil themes, identified above, which emerge from the literature and are common to each, and from this, I construct a hypothesis – an escalation framework which I call a ‘ladder of escalation’, articulated in section 3.5 of Chapter Three, and reproduced below:

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<th>PEACEFUL</th>
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<th>→ VIOLENT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voting</td>
<td>Demonstrations</td>
<td>Strikes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Increased levels of political extremist activity</td>
<td>Urban Unrest</td>
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<td>Terrorism</td>
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<td>Civil war</td>
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<td>Petitions</td>
<td>Sedition</td>
<td>Increased levels of ‘hate’ crime</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Growth of radicalisation and fundamentalism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Coup</td>
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Figure 1: Ladder of Escalation
I suggest that rungs on the ladder might be used as a set of indicators for state agencies to predict and forewarn of the development of radicalisation and progression towards terrorism. I now assess the degree to which this might be true, and whether or not this gradational incremental structure is efficacious given the findings from the research study, and thus I answer the second question posed above: Does a ‘ladder of escalation’ provide an additional mechanism whereby peaceful forms of social or political activity can be used to forewarn, in the medium to longer term, of the potential for radicalisation and terrorism amongst some communities?

Although a compelling theoretical argument, there is limited evidence from the case study to suggest that this model stands up to scrutiny because each of the steps does not necessarily need to occur, let alone occur in sequence. This means that over-reliance on it as an additional set of indicators would risk missing other vital signs. In part, the reason for this is that the triggering mechanisms vary. I have argued that social pre-conditions are similar in relation to risk of the various forms of ‘social protest’, and I have presented evidence which supports this, but the factors which actually trigger a particular step are not the same. Crenshaw (1981) describes what she calls ‘precipitants’ and these are discussed in section 3.1.1 of Chapter Three. Instead, agencies should take a step back, and examine social pre-conditions in general terms, thus developing mitigation strategies which mitigate risk across the piece rather than one specific aspect of the ladder of escalation. I consider this in more depth below.

8.2.2 Objective 2: A Menu of Indicators

One of the key themes of this thesis is to provide an insight into how radicalisation and progression towards terrorism might be predicted by state agencies, and how effectively multi-agency strategies might be developed, using Neighbourhood Policing and the National Intelligence Model, to mitigate the anticipated risk. Thus, this section deals with the second objective, and argues that the research points towards a menu of indicators which can be used to predict or forewarn of the risk of radicalisation.

In constructing the hypothesis above, and drawing the parallel between the risk of the development of radicalisation with the risk of urban unrest, it is a natural progression to examine the series of tension indicators developed after various periods of urban unrest.

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through the 1980s, and consider their applicability to the current crisis. In Chapter Three, section 3.4, I introduce tension indicators to the analysis and review of relevant literature, based upon the argument of Momboisse (1967):

“Every race riot is preceded by a flood of rumour, expressions of increasing antagonism between groups and an increase in the number and intensity of clashes between members of antagonistic groups. By developing adequate methods for obtaining and recording necessary kinds of information, the police can tell approximately how much danger of a riot there is at any given time, what group would start it, who their victims would be, and where violence would be most likely to break out. Such knowledge would be invaluable both in preventive work and in handling any disorders that might occur.”

There was an attempt to translate this into statistical data, and Chief Constables were in receipt of Home Office Circular 39/1982, which contained a list of largely measurable indicators which might be used to forewarn of impending unrest; other lists were produced by the US Department for Justice, and these are reproduced in section 3.4. They include such things as increased numbers of assaults on police officers, increased levels of complaints of racial attacks, increased numbers of complaints against the police, and increased levels of racial graffiti. Tupman and O’Reilly (2004) suggest, in relation to these tension indicators, that “if “anti-American or anti-Westerner or anti-foreigner” is substituted for ‘racist’ then the creation of ‘tension indicators’ in relation to terrorism, and thus the need for counter-terrorist intervention, is in the starting blocks.”

In Chapter Six, section 6.1., I critically examine in much more detail a number of these indicators, looking at crime as a phenomenon, the recording of crime in the UK in recent years, racial incidents, assaults on police officers and complaints against police officers. I expose serious flaws in these things as reliable indicators, and I demonstrate this by providing relevant data from the theatre of the case study at section 7.1, Chapter Seven.

Rather than rely on these questionable statistics, the findings of the research tend to support the value and strength of rumours, whispers and ‘feelings’ that occur within communities as indicators of what is going on within them, and thereby demonstrating

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the vital importance of being close enough to the community to hear them. I discuss whispers, rumours and tension monitoring at section 7.3.7 of Chapter Seven, and present evidence of their efficacy in relation to the fatal shooting of Junaid at section 7.4.9, and the identification of suspicious activity in relation to a kick-pitch at section 7.3.3. In both cases, there is evidence of weakness, not in the ‘hearing’ of the rumour, rather in how the rumour is handled. I return to this issue, below. One police respondent suggests that it is the things not being reported to the authorities, in terms of raised community tension, which is important,\textsuperscript{1032} and yet there appears to be a continuing tendency to use statistical data in ‘tasking’ meetings (see section 4.12.1 of Chapter Four); I observed this as part of the participant observation component of the fieldwork, and refer to it at section 7.3.7 of Chapter Seven. This also represents a flaw in the process of using information and intelligence to tackle radicalisation, and this is discussed below too.

There is another aspect to the manner in which tension monitoring takes place in relation to potential unrest, and it is linked to time-frames. As set out in section 4.12.1 of Chapter Four, the local tasking meetings, which occur every two weeks, are linked to performance, and tend to focus on crime and incidents over the previous fortnight as a means to decide how to task resources (see also section 7.2.1 of Chapter Seven, which describes the delivery mechanisms in the theatre of the case study). Thus, the focus of these meetings is the performance period over the forthcoming two weeks, and while tension monitoring in relation to potential unrest in the form of a review of relevant crime and other statistical data occurs, this process does not lend itself to a more strategic review of risk in relation to potential radicalisation. This has occurred in part because of the systematic problem with the National Intelligence Model, highlighted and discussed at section 4.12.1, Chapter Four, and re-visited in section 8.2.3, below.

To this extent, and in answer to the third question above: ‘to what degree can ‘tension indicators’, developed after the urban riots in the UK, be adapted to forewarn of the growth of radicalisation and terrorists within a given community?’ as currently constructed, their use is limited. They need to be considered in a less performance-driven manner rather than is currently the case: the traditional task-focused, ‘action-orientated’ approach which is so inherent within police culture,\textsuperscript{1033} is not fit for purpose,

\textsuperscript{1032} Ibid
\textsuperscript{1033} Reiner R (1992) The Politics of the Police 2\textsuperscript{nd} Ed, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf Ch 3
and a softer, more integrated mechanism of engagement together with the means to capture and consider the information that is forthcoming is crucial to success in identifying and mitigating risk. The inherent problems with NIM contribute to this flaw.

In section 7.5.3 of Chapter Seven, I discuss readership and community access to the local daily newspaper in Oldham, the Oldham Evening Chronicle, and demonstrate that the paper has low levels of readership amongst the Asian communities. I also show that letters and phone calls to the paper indicated ‘a rise in temperature’ in the lead up to the riots of 2001. I propose here that there is an opportunity to use these sources of information in a similar way to whispers and rumours heard from the community, and consider them as an indicator. I examine this proposal in more detail in the ‘Toolkit of Options’ section, below.

8.2.2.1 Objective 2: Summary and Conclusion

Here, I aim to summarise much of the foregoing, and suggest a menu of indicators which might be used by the police and their partner agencies to forecast the potential risk of the development of radicalisation within Asian communities. They are all closely linked and none are mutually exclusive. This will then meet objective two:

(a) Evidence of community and individual isolation. This might be geographically obvious, but pro-active analytical and survey work may also be required.

(b) Drug-related crime and activity. The level and nature of this is indicative of vulnerability within communities, and is linked to a crisis of identity which creates a void capable of exploitation.

(c) Local political mechanisms and structures. Influential members of Asian communities may not truly represent the communities they purport to represent, and this creates a vacuum within communities such that they have no voice.

(d) The gap between expectation and achievement. A sizeable gap between these two fuels vulnerability to a range of harmful sources.
(e) Perceptions of racism and discrimination, both through state activity, for instance stop and search, and at an inter-community level. These things serve to further enhance isolation, and may feed grievances.

(f) Letters, emails and other communications to local media groups which are capable of interpretation and influence – monitoring, through a carefully cultivated relationship.

(g) Whispers, rumours and feelings from communities. This requires a very close relationship with communities, and appropriate infrastructure to deal with the information.

8.2.3 Objective 3: Perceptions of Success

This section crystallises the perceptions of the degree of success of Neighbourhood Policing and the National Intelligence Model at detecting risk of radicalisation, and the effectiveness of the partnership response to mitigate that risk, to meet the third objective. It will also illuminate this question: ‘Is the National Intelligence Model, principally developed to tackle crime, capable of identifying radicalisation and terrorism risk factors, using the foregoing mechanisms, and developing appropriate partnership intervention strategy?’

In section 4.9.1 of Chapter Four, entitled ‘The machinery of local policing delivery’, I set out how Neighbourhood Policing and NIM are intended to work, and then, in section 7.2.1 and 7.2.5, Chapter Seven, I set out how they work in the theatre of the case study. Throughout Chapter Seven, there are various references to the ‘participant observation’ component of the research, where I spent time with the local neighbourhood team, going out on footpatrol, attending tasking and coordinating meetings, and local ‘PACT’ (Partners And Communities Together) meetings. This enabled me to observe at first-hand the effectiveness of these models and styles of policing at anticipating and mitigating the risk of harmful radicalisation.

I comment on the effectiveness of Neighbourhood Policing and the value brought to it by PCSOs in section 8.1.4, above. In essence, the model appears to be working well;
PCSOs and neighbourhood police officers are working closely with communities, they understand them and in many cases enjoy levels of trust from groups within communities which have hitherto been very distant. Although there is still much room for improvement, especially around the relationship between patrol officers and young Asian men (see above comments regarding the perception of racism and discrimination), Neighbourhood Policing as a model appears to be successful. It has demonstrated its capability for listening to whispers and rumours (the kick-pitch example), and staff are aware of the value and importance of this type of intelligence.

I have already implied that there are process and procedural problems with the National Intelligence Model, and in section 4.12.1, where I describe the model and how it is intended to work, I highlight that it is geared primarily towards crime and anti-social behaviour. This builds-in an inherent problem with its application to the current agenda. In practice, as discussed above, the tasking and coordinating group, which meets once a fortnight, reviews performance over the preceding two weeks, before tasking some actions to deal with perceived threats for the forthcoming fortnight. This looks primarily at crime, incidents and prolific offenders. Although partners attend the tasking meeting, there is little evidence of them actually being tasked; additionally, the meeting is very large, with over forty people present – making it cumbersome and sluggish in terms of producing tangible outputs.

An example from the research serves to illustrate the problems with NIM in a practical sense. A police respondent, a local neighbourhood officer, confirms that on receipt of information or a concern, intelligence is submitted. It should then go for analysis and tasking (in accordance with NIM), and it then it might be the case that something comes back from tasking for the safer neighbourhood team to do something in relation to that intelligence.

This process of course relies on accurate and timely assessment of the intelligence; any delay might reduce the relevance of the intelligence. It also means that the safer neighbourhood team are waiting for instructions from a remote group of analysts and senior officers. Although submission of intelligence in this way may help assess other pieces of intelligence, it appears to miss an opportunity. The safer neighbourhood team

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1034 Multi-agency ‘Tasking Meeting’, Old Chadderton Town Hall, Oldham 133/11/08
1035 A0020
might be best placed to react to the issue there and then. This response might not involve a traditional police response – warrants, positive action etc, it might entail engaging local community groups, Mosques, and other partners for the specific purpose of reducing risk. This type of response is unlikely to emerge as a tasking from a remote tasking meeting because the attendees will not have sufficient knowledge of local neighbourhood links. There is a sense that there is a reliance on the submission of intelligence and then a pause, waiting for the subsequent tasking. In the above example, the respondent also comments about the number of meetings associated with NIM, which raises the question of bureaucracy – there might be a danger of stifling activity owing to the number and frequency of meetings.

I also conclude that there is a fundamental impediment in the effectiveness of NIM in this context. In Chapter Six, I demonstrate the relationship between common roots, critical success factors and policing indicators. I re-produce the Figure here; however, using the description of the National Intelligence Model from section 4.12.1 in Chapter Four, I have added the most appropriate relevant NIM Levels:
Thus, NIM is inherently ill-equipped to deal effectively with this agenda. It becomes slow and lacks the ability to respond dynamically and effectively as a direct result of its structure – i.e., each component part corresponds to a different level within NIM

8.2.3.1 Objective 3: Summary and Conclusion

Neighbourhood Policing is broadly working well, and the PCSOs have a major impact, but the ability of NIM to act and react effectively to whispers and rumours appears to be
compromised for a number of reasons. Firstly, as identified above, the primary focus is performance-driven, and is related to crime. Secondly, the nature of the processing of the information appears to be flawed – it is sluggish and vacuous when dealing with wider issues, such as the indicators listed above. Thirdly, NIM will work fully effectively only when there is full partner engagement and tasking, and this is absent. Finally, I suggest that its structure is fundamentally ill-equipped to deal with the counter terrorism agenda: common roots of the risk sit at NIM level 3, critical success factors sit at NIM level 2, and the relevant indicators, including whispers and rumours, sit at NIM level 1.

8.2.4 Objective 4: A ‘Toolkit’ of Options

Thus far, this chapter has considered the extent to which the ‘critical success factors’, distilled from the examination of policies and edicts in Chapter Four, are in place in the theatre of the case study. It has concluded that Greater Manchester Police are not successfully delivering three of the five ‘critical success factors’ there: they are not reflecting the community being served in their organisational make-up; the community awareness training is weak; and partnership working is flawed. They are largely delivering two of the critical success factors: they have high quality staff who are highly engaged with communities, delivering Neighbourhood Policing (though they are not, in the main, police officers); and they are working towards the elimination of racial discrimination.

It has also contextualised the findings of the research within the review of literature from Chapter Three, and proposed a list of indicators which the police and their partners might use to assess the risk of the development of harmful radicalisation.

By drawing on the arguments and ideas presented so far in this chapter, I now propose a ‘toolkit’ of options which local agencies might use to inform and help mitigate the risk of the development of harmful radicalisation in communities. This meets objective four:

(a) Self/Peer Assessment. In order to assess whether partner agencies, especially the police, are effectively delivering the ‘critical success factors’, I propose a focussed objective assessment. This might be carried out in the form of a critical self-assessment, but it probably has more value if an independent assessor is
used. In order to obviate the risk of public criticism and adverse media comment regarding the results of such an assessment, I suggest a partnership arrangement with a local university to carry out suitable work with appropriate academic integrity. The results of this assessment might determine further action, such as altering the deployment policies of the force when it recruits members of staff from certain minority communities.

(b) Review of NIM. Although the National Intelligence Model is nationally mandated, it was designed to deal with crime and anti-social behaviour. A review would ensure that it is appropriately constructed to maximise the opportunity to mitigate risk associated with harmful radicalisation – capable of ensuring joint action in response to key community intelligence in the form of rumour and whispers. Testing of this might be possible using Sloggett’s theory of planting rumours.\textsuperscript{1036} This might therefore be done only in those geographic areas where key features are present.

(c) Surveys. Although the police conduct surveys around things like ‘customer satisfaction’, information relating to perceptions of racism, discrimination, the gap between expectation and achievement and other perceptions would be highly useful information for the purposes of adjusting the policing style. Once again, independent survey work through an appropriate partnership with a local university would help to ensure academic integrity. Survey results may also determine further action, such as changes to the stop and search policy, or alterations to the community engagement mechanisms. I discuss policing style below.

(d) Local political environment. This is potentially problematic, because it raises questions of legitimacy around the level to which the police can influence local democratic processes. I propose here a systematic review of the local political structures, and how they might be interpreted by some local people. Alternative methods of giving groups a voice might be required.

(e) Police culture. The action-orientated, task focused culture of police organisations is a potential inhibitor to the sensitivity and empathetic style which would maximise the opportunity to hear whispers and rumours, and be aware of the ‘feelings’ of communities rather than the current focus on statistical data and hard performance indicators. This requires a different mindset around performance, and asks for different skill sets from front line police officers. This research indicates that PCSOs in the theatre of the case study are already delivering effectively in this area. It also strongly indicates that policing terrorism is far from a threat to community or Neighbourhood Policing, and should in fact be an enabler to shift some priorities, and redouble efforts in others, supporting conclusions of Murray (2005).1037

(f) Partner intervention. One of the factors apparent in the research is that, despite good intention, the effectiveness of partnership working in the theatre of the case study is questionable for reasons already articulated. To be fully effective, partners need to carefully review their arrangements for dealing with a radicalisation threat, specifying which agency, and what person has responsibility for what. This should be linked to proper accountability structures.

(g) Policing style. The research indicates that the policing style is capable of adjustment to promote an improved relationship with young Asian men in particular. The views held by young people about the police are generally negative, yet the police have to deal strongly and pro-actively with a significant drugs problem. The advantages of working closely with communities are self-evident and have already been discussed; additional steps might be taken to enhance it. For instance, the use of independent advisory groups drawn from the local community to inform the police and the Crown Prosecution Service with regards to charging decisions; community resolutions as an alternative to prosecution or criminalisation might also be worthy of further examination. This issue raises questions of the role of police in society; I examine aspects of this in Chapter Two.

(h) Role models. The police and their partner agencies should critically examine communities, and ask ‘who are the role models?’ In large part, the role models in the theatre of the case study are criminal – people look up to ‘Mr Big’. There is much good work through youth clubs and similar, enhancing and supporting these will help fill the void around identity and vulnerability. In some cases, PCSOs and members of the council’s communities unit act as role models, and this might also be worthy of expansion. Identifying influential people from within the community, building a suitable relationship with them, and then using them to help inform young people about Islam, politics and a sense of community has occurred to a degree already in Oldham; much more potential exists.

(i) Proactive management of media relationships at a local level. The research shows that the local newspaper, and in particular communication to the local paper from members of the community, is a valuable source of community intelligence. A close working relationship with the local media to act as a means of gathering additional information, an additional mechanism of listening to the community.

(j) Active community investment by all partners. This was articulated by a Pakistani respondent from the third sector in Oldham.\footnote{E0028} When people move into an area through housing associations etc, there is a need for community infrastructure, and that active investment in these things is very important for better community cohesion and reduction in the risk of radicalisation. Such things might be mothers and toddlers groups, family support groups, and sessional play. Family support workers would go with people to support them at these groups, so there is active investment. Many of the local communities have been left to their own devices in excess of twenty years, and this has contributed to polarisation, a lack of understanding, and resultant community isolation.

(k) A successful community. An educational establishment in Oldham, visited as part of the research, has proved extremely successful in promoting very good relationships between people from many different nationalities and cultures. The essence of the success, which should define the ethos of the partnership
approach to mitigating risk, is: “The creation of a place where consensus marginalises these people [those intent on causing harm] and pushes them to the edges”. This raises questions of the influence and contribution of Islamic doctrine on the creation of the ‘white flight’ phenomenon, and what can be done to mitigate it.

8.2.4.1 Objective 4: Summary and Conclusion

In section 4.7.1 of Chapter Four, I reviewed The Cantle Report which was produced after the 2001 riots in Bradford and Oldham. The Terms of Reference of the review team were “to obtain the views of local communities, including young people, local authorities, voluntary and faith organisations, in a number of representative multi-ethnic communities, on the issues that need to be addressed in developing confident, active communities and social cohesion.” The team found a number of key issues related to social cohesion – they were struck by the depth of polarization, which included separate educational arrangements, employment, places of worship and social networks, meaning that communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives. They also recognised that some communities had such a lack of hope and frustration borne out of poverty and deprivation that it created a fertile ground for disaffection to grow, yet these communities were not always well targeted, nor even identified. Recommendations applicable to policing include such things as protocols between councils and police authorities, and it talks of the value of community policing. The Cantle Report is another good reason for re-visiting Oldham, and focusing the microscope – how far has Oldham progressed?

The current research project was able to examine matters at a lower level in Oldham than the Cantle Report was able to do. This has meant that it has been able to offer a more detailed set of options for the police and partner agencies to consider. But the findings demonstrate that many of the issues identified by Cantle remain stubbornly unchanged. There has been progress – Neighbourhood Policing and PCSOs in particular

1039 B0027
1041 Ibid
1042 Ibid para 2.1
1043 Ibid para 2.10
1044 Ibid para 5.11.4
have moved the police much closer to communities; there has been financial investment in parts of Oldham to improve things like housing, but the fundamentals of the fracturing within communities remain, and better multi-agency work, and active investment in communities is required.

8.3 Extrapolation beyond the Material at Hand

In my examination of the qualitative process at section 5.3.1 of Chapter Five, I build the argument for the nature of the research undertaken. I pose the question of how representative are the findings across a wider area, or a different location – i.e. is it possible to generalise? As I identify in that section, the aim of the case study is not merely to describe it, it is to use it as an instrumental case study. In fact, I argue that the thesis offers the opportunity to extrapolate rather than merely generalise, the basis for extrapolation being one of similarity: the commonality between geographical areas of demographic, social and economic factors for example. The argument of commonality between Oldham and other parts of the country is lent weight from two sources contained within this thesis (detailed comparison of indices of deprivation, for instance, would provide further evidence, but they are not analysed here). Ted Cantle, who visited Bradford and Oldham, amongst other places, identified common features showing that communities operate on a basis of parallel lives (referred to above) in towns and cities affected by the riots in 2001. And one of the respondents working in the third sector in Oldham has worked extensively over a long period of time in places like Bradford and Burnley, and was involved in a special investigation in these areas following the riots in 2001. He had this to say:

“I don’t think Oldham is fundamentally different from a number of similar places in West Yorkshire, in the Northern parts of Greater Manchester, and in Lancashire, and in the Potteries. It’s a place where the reason for it being there in the first place no longer applies.”

1047 Cantle T (2001) op cit para 2.10
1048 B0024
1049 Ibid
And he goes on to describe the attraction to these locations for Asians seeking work in the cotton industry and the mills in decades past.

I suggest here that the arguments and ideas which have presented themselves through the current research in Oldham, and which are articulated above, are capable of extrapolation to other areas in the country which have similar features to those of the case study. This is argued through in section 5.4.1 of Chapter Five.

### 8.4 Further work

In Chapter Five, I discuss the philosophy of research and science, examining ontological and epistemological issues. I present the position for the thesis as having a foundationalist ontology but an anti-positivist epistemology, and can be described as critical realist. Thus, this permits a belief in the reality of the relationships that exist between the police and communities, but deals with the perceptions of these things. Both qualitative and quantitative methods of research are consistent with critical realism, and I have utilised a largely qualitative method for the purposes of this work. I present a critical analysis of the type of quantitative data which might be used to demonstrate the reality of the relationship between the police and the community, beginning at section 6.1 of Chapter Six. In Chapter Seven, I present quantitative data for the case study in the areas discussed at the start for two purposes: firstly, to show that the available quantitative data is highly problematic, and therefore relying on it as the sole source of information for this type of study would be fatal to the project, and by the same token, should not be relied upon as the only mechanism to forewarn of impending social violence; and, secondly, to promote an understanding of the nature of the research location. Whilst these arguments stand, there is an opportunity to design and conduct a research experiment to complement this one, examining quantitative data, some of which might be obtained through bespoke survey work. The purpose of this is to isolate general relationships, and demonstrate them in accordance with the critical realist philosophy.

The discussion above in relation to identity and vulnerability, and the void in relation to role models, poses some interesting questions about other influences on the lives of young people. At various points through the thesis, I have posited the possibility of a
link between this vulnerability and the development of other forms of violent crime, such as knife crime and gang related behaviour. If this link exists, then the options outlined above may prove capable of adaptation to deal with a different kind of threat. To this end, a research project along the current lines might be designed to test the theory, and develop mitigation strategies.
Appendix 1

Semi-structured interview schedule

Paperwork
Consent form and Information Sheet

Pre-amble (N6 Base Data)
Name:
Research code: (Use code from recorder)
Age Group: 18-26, 27-35, 36-44, 45-53, 54-62, 63+
Sex:
Work/Role/Ward:
Level of education:
Length of time in the UK:
National heritage:

1. Please can you give me your views on the area?

How long have you lived/worked here? What sense of community is there? How well-off are people? How are different communities treated by state agencies like the police and housing providers? How fair is political representation in the area?

2. Please can you tell me how you feel about social justice and local policing?

How do you and your friends feel about the police? How well do you think other agencies like social services, or the council, or the local school work with the police? How representative of communities are the local police? How do they engage with you? What do you think would happen in communities in Oldham in the event of perceived injustices, by, for example, the police or housing authorities?

2(a). Please can you tell me how you feel about perceptions of social justice and local policing?

How do you think local communities view the police? What do you think they feel about other agencies like housing providers and councils? What are our views on how representative of local communities the police are? How effective do you think your engagement with communities is? What do you think would happen in communities in Oldham in the event of perceived injustices, by, for example, the police or housing authorities?

3. How fair do you think the local papers and media are?

What sort of things do the papers report? How fair are they? What do you think the impact on the area is? How do they make you feel about Oldham? How
representative is the media? What effect does the media have on community tension?

4. What role does religion play in here?

How serious is the problem of Islamophobia here? What role does religion, especially Islam, play in helping young people to find an identity, or purpose? What do you understand by the term radicalisation?

5. How are local Muslim communities affected by national and international events such as 7/7 and military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan?

How do you feel about UK foreign policy and the way it impacts upon Muslims? What effect does the international situation have on local Muslim communities?

Sections:

- Policing and social justice
- Local social conditions
- The effect of the media
- Global events
- The role of religion

These may also be considered in terms of arenas: organisational arena, community arena, communication arena, global arena, cultural arena and (matter for discussion and analysis, linking back to previous chapters).

Stated Objectives:

9. Contribute to the understanding of the development of harmful radicalisation amongst members of certain communities.
10. Develop a menu of indicators which predict or forewarn of the risk of harmful radicalisation.
11. Establish perceptions of success of neighbourhood policing and the national intelligence model at identifying risk.
12. Establish a ‘toolkit’ of options which might be utilised to mitigate risk by ‘switching-off’ the radicalisation process, and developing multi-agency partnership strategies for the same purpose.
Appendix 2

Information/Consent Sheet

Research Question:

In Oldham, Greater Manchester, are neighbourhood policing and the national intelligence model fit for purpose in order to anticipate harmful radicalisation and develop local partnerships to mitigate risk?: A grass roots appraisal.

Details of Project

The project is largely concerned with highlighting shortfalls in police and state authority policy over the last three decades. It seeks to establish perceptions of success of modern policing methods by listening to street-level workers and people from the community. The objectives of the research may be outlined as follows:

1. Contribute to the understanding of the development of harmful radicalisation amongst members of certain communities.
2. Develop a menu of indicators which predict or forewarn of the risk of harmful radicalisation.
3. Establish perceptions of success of neighbourhood policing and the national intelligence model at identifying risk.
4. Establish a ‘toolkit’ of options which might be utilised to mitigate risk by ‘switching-off’ the radicalisation process, and developing multi-agency partnership strategies for the same purpose.

Researcher Details

The researcher is a serving police officer with the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary. His professional role is a uniformed police inspector with geographical responsibility for policing East Devon. His previous role as force Diversity Inspector, with a remit of promoting mutually beneficial community/partnership relationships, led to the research proposal.

Contact details: James Gale, PhD student, Department of Politics, Exeter University, Devon, UK. Tel: 01392 263240. Mobile: 07866 442434, Email: jrg202@exeter.ac.uk

The supervisor, who has extensive experience in the field of police/community research, is Mr WA Tupman, and he is available for advice and a point of contact for any queries you may have. Email: watupman@exeter.ac.uk

The research has received financial support from the Association of Chief Police Officers, and the Diversity Directorate, Devon and Cornwall Constabulary. However, the work is entirely independent and is the responsibility of the researcher alone.

Confidentiality
Interview records and transcripts will be held securely and in confidence. They will not be used other than for the purposes described above and third parties will not be allowed access to them (except in the case of legal subpoena*). However, if you request it, you will be supplied with a copy of your interview transcript so that you can comment on and edit it as you see fit (please give your email below).

Anonymity

Would you prefer your interview information to be held and used on an anonymous basis, with no mention of your name? (Note that we still need to refer to the group(s) of which you are a member).

PLEASE CIRCLE YES / NO

IF YES

_Pseudonym to be used_: .................................................................
_Member of which group_: ................................................................

IF NO

_Name of interviewee_: ................................................................
_Signature_: ................................................................................
_Email/phone_: .............................................................................
_Member of which group_: ............................................................

Consent

I voluntarily agree to participate and to the use of my data for the purposes specified above. I can withdraw consent at any time by contacting the researcher. I agree that the interview records may be kept in a secure archive by the researcher for three years before controlled disposal.

TICK HERE: ☐

DATE.................................

* A legal subpoena (also known as a witness summons) is an order of the court directing a person to give evidence to a court or to disclose information or documents to a court in connection with specified legal proceedings.
Appendix 3

Freedom of Information Act Request

Mr J R Gale
18 St Georges View
Cullompton
Devon
EX15 1BA

17 June 2008

Dear Sir/Madam

I write in order to seek information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 in relation to the following questions:

1. How many reports of assaults on police officers were recorded in the years 2001-2002, and 2007-2008 in the Oldham West neighbourhood policing team area (sector)?

2. How many reports of assaults on police officers were recorded in the years 2001-2002, and 2007-2008 in the Oldham division?

3. Please can you provide a breakdown of the ethnicity of the offenders in the data requested for questions 1 and 2?

4. How many racial incidents were recorded in the years 2001-2002, and 2007-2008 in the Oldham West sector?

5. How many racial incidents were recorded in the years 2001-2002, and 2007-2008 in the Oldham division?

6. Please can you provide a breakdown of the ethnicity of the victims in the data requested for questions 4 and 5?

7. How many complaints against police were recorded in the years 2001-2002, and 2007-2008 in the Oldham West sector?
8. How many complaints against police were recorded in the years 2001-2002, and 2007-2008 in the Oldham division?

9. Please can you provide a breakdown of the ethnicity of the complainants in the data requested for questions 7 and 8?

10. How many offences were recorded of burglary, robbery and assault (GBH and ABH) in the years 2001-2002, and 2007-2008 in the Oldham West sector?

11. How many offences were recorded of burglary, robbery and assault (GBH and ABH) in the years 2001-2002, and 2007-2008 in the Oldham division?

12. Please can you provide a breakdown of the ethnicity of the victims in the data requested for questions 10 and 11?

I look forward to receiving your reply in hard copy to me at the above address. Please feel to contact me on 07866 442434 should you require additional clarity in relation to the request. The information is sought in support of an academic research project.

Thank you,

Yours faithfully

James Gale
# Appendix 4
## Redacted Schedule of Interviewees

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<th>Name</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Gender (M/F)</th>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>National Heritage</th>
<th>Muslim (Y/N)</th>
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