

**MANAGING MODERATION:  
THE AKP IN TURKEY AND THE PKS IN INDONESIA**

Submitted by Syahrul Hidayat, to the University of Exeter as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Arab and Islamic Studies, January 2012.

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I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'Syahrul Hidayat', written in a cursive style.

(Syahrul Hidayat)

## List of Content

List of Contents	1
Abstract	3
List of Figures and Tables	4
<b>Chapter I Introduction</b>	<b>5</b>
I.1. Background of Study	5
I.2. Moderation in the Muslim Context	10
I.3. Manageable Moderation	14
I.4. Methodology	17
<b>Chapter II Conceptual Framework: Islamism and Managing Moderation</b>	<b>22</b>
II.1. New Face of Islamism?	22
II.1.1. Defining ‘Islamism’	22
II.1.2. New Trend	23
II.1.3. Different Types of Islamism	26
II.1.4. Conceptual Boundary	27
II.2. Moderation and Party Management	34
II.2.1. Party Organisation and Party Management	34
II.2.2. Managing Moderation	39
<b>Chapter III Moderation of the AKP and the PKS and Its Impact</b>	<b>47</b>
III.1. Moderation and Its Impact on the AKP	48
III.1.1. The Development of the AKP	48
III.1.2. Aspects of Moderation	52
III.1.2.1. Attracting Voters and Electoral Triumphs	52
III.1.2.2. Ideological Shift	59
III.1.3. Impact on the AKP	66
III.2. Moderation of the PKS and Its Impact	71
III.2.1. The Development of the PKS	71
III.2.1.1. Early Development	71
III.2.1.2. ‘Reformasi’ and Early Disputes	86

III.2.2. Aspects of Moderation	92
III.2.2.1. Attracting Voters and Electoral Achievements	92
III.2.2.2. Ideological Shift?	98
III.2.3. Impacts on the PKS	101
III.2.3.1. Movement's Style of Managing the Political Party	102
III.2.3.2. Internal Criticisms	106
III.2.3.3. Confusing Image and Stagnation in the 2009 Election	110
<b>Chapter IV Managing Moderation in the AKP</b>	113
IV.1. Party Leadership	114
IV.1.1. Personal Character and Vision	116
IV.1.2. Party Institutions	123
IV.2. Trust	133
IV.3. Decomposition and Party Discipline	140
IV.4. Conversion and Replacement	150
<b>Chapter V Managing Moderation in the PKS</b>	164
V.1. Party Leadership	165
V.I.1. Party Structure	167
V.I.1.1. The President and the DPP (Council of Central Committee)	171
V.I.1.2. The MPP (Central Advisory Assembly) and the DSP (Central Shari'a Council)	174
V.I.1.3. The DPTP (Council of Central Leaderships)	175
V.I.2. Party Leadership and Party Dynamics	178
V.2. Trust	195
V.3. Alienation	208
V4. Decomposition	227
<b>Chapter VI Final Remarks: the AKP and the PKS in Comparison</b>	238
Bibliography	254
Appendices A	276
Appendices B	277

## **MANAGING MODERATION: THE AKP IN TURKEY AND THE PKS IN INDONESIA**

### **Abstract**

Moderation does not constitute a monolithic model and the difference in the moderation process will influence the way a political party manages its internal dynamics. The cases of the AKP and the PKS show that both have different levels of moderation due to the different contexts of their social and political environments. The AKP has to deal with an extreme interpretation of secularism in Turkey that influences the party's members to refrain from any confrontation with secular strongholds. The PKS has more freedom to express its ideology in the Indonesian democratic political system; hence the party is able to develop internal organisational procedures and programmes based on religious principles. To anticipate difficulties arising from moderation, the AKP uses an organisational approach to give space for open and dynamic internal management and reduce the role of ideology significantly. The PKS still utilises its ideology in managing the impact of moderation by defining religious values as principles of organisation in parallel with organisational principles. Both parties are relatively successful in convincing their members to trust the party and its leaders in different ways. Party vision and personal charisma are more apparent for the AKP, although the PKS has to rely on interpretation of ideology as the main source of trust. By placing more emphasis on organisation, the AKP employs definition of violation toward party's rules and decisions based on an organisational approach. In contrast, the definition of violation in the PKS relies on both religious and organisational principles. As a result, the AKP implements policies to dismiss members based on unambiguous principles with relatively insignificant opposition. The PKS has to deal with complaints of dismissal since the policies are taken based on interpretation of procedures and reasons. It is also proven that the AKP is able to convince voters by offering programmes to meet popular demands without relying on a religious agenda. While the PKS has been successful in developing an effective and solid party, it still has many problems in gaining support during elections as its pragmatic adjustment moderation also generates confusion internally and externally.

**Keywords:** substantial moderation, pragmatic adjustment of moderation, trust, decomposition, party leader, alienation, conversion

## **List of Figures and Tables**

### **Figures**

Figure I.1.	Moderation and Its Relation with Crisis	10
Figure I.2.	Models of Strategies to Manageable Moderation	16
Figure IV.I.	The Structure of Central Party and General Assembly of the AKP	130

### **Tables**

Table II.1.	The Position of the AKP and the PKS in Some Aspects of Ordinary Muslim and Islamist	33
Table III.1.	Variables contributing to PK's vote by region	99
Table V.1.	Bases and Levels of Violations and Sanctions	216

## **CHAPTER I**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **I.1 Background of Study**

In studies of political parties, the role of ideology has been widely discussed especially in its relation with democracy. For scholars from the rational choice tradition, based on Hotelling's (1929) and Downs's (1957; see also Hindmoor 2006) arguments, ideology does not fit well with the demands of the public, so that a rigid ideological stance would only make the appeal for public support more difficult. In this argument, public political preference is closely related with the economic rationality which forces a political party to moderate its ideological standpoints. It then becomes more problematic for any party that still preserves a strong ideological position, especially one whose core values are conflicting with democratic principles.

Sartori (1976) opposes that proposition by offering an anti-system party to categorise political parties that still preserve ideology as their identity in a democratic system. He argues that the existence of an ideological party can be based on acceptance of the democratic process and following its general rules. However, he agrees with the central argument of rational popular support in influencing the direction of anti-system parties. Anti-system parties could either preserve or reduce their ideological standpoints with two possible tendencies, centrifugal or centripetal routes. The former takes place if parties maintain the ideological stance with very limited chances to obtain popular support. Conversely, the latter goes in a different direction to move toward the centre and apply political moderation.

On the centripetal side, an ideological party that works within a democratic system has to sacrifice some if not all of its ideological stance to integrate with the system, and making a move toward the centre to win elections. That process is called political moderation, which is when a political party with a radical position, platform or ideology moves to a median position (Sanchez-Cuenza 2004). Some examples of moving toward the centre as reflected in the cases of Italian PCI in the 1970s, the Spanish Socialist Workers'

Party (PSOE/*Partido Socialista Obrero Español*), the German Social Union (DSU/*Deutsche Soziale Union*), and the Communist Party of Russian Federation (CPRF/*Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii*; KPRF). The Italian Communist Party (PCI/*Partito Comunista Italiano*) did it in the second half of the 1970s when the party built a coalition with the Catholic Democratic Party (DC/*Democrazia Cristiana*) and other parties to form a government (Amyot 1981 and Urban 1978). To some extent, the tensions in post-Soviet Russia's Communist Party are the result of the party's efforts to redefine its ideology and attract more votes by adapting a position as a social democratic party like their counterparts do in Central Europe (Urban and Solovei 1997).

The term political moderation itself seems subjective and problematic when it is used as a working concept in Political Science. One of its problems as a concept is to find a solid definition of the moderation process. The definition of the term is perceived as challenging if not ambiguous (Whiting 2011), especially in developing a method to measure the process. Sanchez-Cuenz (2004) offers a definition by looking at a party's willingness to get involved in elections and respect for voter preferences. His definition suggests that the central role of voters in favour of a median ideological position gives a pressure to the reduced radical policies of a party. In contrast, Schwedler (2006) requires a deeper understanding of a party's ideological preference. For Schwedler, it is important to examine the party's behaviour in order to assess any change in its ideology. Those two different understandings of moderation, the role of median voters and party's behaviour, generate problems in measuring moderation. Each definition has to develop its own method, by looking at policy preferences or policy outcomes.

The problematic nature of political moderation is even more challenging when the concept is applied to the Muslim world. Al Anani (2011: 1-2), for instance, states that it is difficult to develop a common stance on moderation because one position may be seen as moderate by some and extreme by others. As a result, he suggests using the concept cautiously, especially in relation with Islamism. His warning is basically based on the fact that policies of major countries toward the Muslim world, especially Islamic movement and its variation in forms, tend to be subjective. Al Anani's warning on the application of the concept in the Islamic context reflects the fact that the concept itself was developed mainly in the context of anti-system ideology. It is not a coincidence that the tradition of recent studies on moderation is studies on socialist or communist parties in Western and Eastern

European countries. The various cases of moderation in these regions are very different from cases of moderation in the Muslim world. A recent study conducted by Wheatley (2011: 2) for instance argues that the concept is 'flawed' when it is used as an operational concept in the Muslim world.

In relation to Al Anani's concern, the problem of the concept is also due to difficulties in defining the starting point of moderation itself. If moderation is attached to any organisation which abandons violent means, it will be difficult to apply the concept to Islamic organisations or movements that commit to the democratic system from the beginning. This is relevant to the application of the concept to the AKP and the PKS in this research because, the two parties do not have any record of using violence. Accepting democracy itself is part of the willingness to reduce ideological rigidity, as Capoccia (2002) has noted.

Wickham's examination of the Wasat Party in Egypt provides a useful way forward. For her, 'abandonment, postponement or revision of radical goals' along with 'substantive commitment to democratic principles' are sufficient conditions for an institution to be categorised as a party of moderation (Wickham 2004: 206). By using her proposal, it is then possible to categorise the AKP and the PKS as parties with certain aspects of moderation. The two parties at least have committed to work in a democratic system as shown in their participation in numbers of elections. In addition, Wickham stresses that the moderation of an ideology then can be examined by looking at the changing of it, either by abandonment, postponement or even only revision.

Both the AKP and the PKS reflect at least a revision in different degrees of earlier ideological preferences. For the PKS, it is clear that the party tried to moderate its image in front of the voters in the 2004 election after gaining limited votes in 1999. After three national elections, its commitment to the democratic process is still evident. It is different in the case of the AKP, despite its successful winning in the last three national elections. The party does not have a formal image as an Islamic party as it denies any relation with Islam as an ideology and it gives commitment to democratic and secular political practices since its foundation. So, there is no changing of ideology to reduce its significance of moderation only a substantive commitment to democracy. However, 'moderation' can still be attached to it due to role of its founders who were members of political parties friendly to Islamist ideas, the RP and the FP. Erdogan himself, the leader of the party who served as governor



of Istanbul under the name of the RP, declared that he had taken away his clothes and changed into new ones (Heper and Toktas 2003).

Whatever the prevailing debates on the concept of moderation, sacrificing some aspects of an ideological standpoint is clearly a necessity condition for moderation. Sacrificing ideological platforms is never an easy choice and could potentially bring a party into trauma. Sanchez-Cuenza notices that internal tension is likely to occur between ideological and pragmatic cadres. Within a wider political context, the tensions will confuse the party's loyal supporters. In an advanced democratic political system, such a potential trauma can be managed through a democratic institutional process within the party. Negotiations between two competing groups seem to be more difficult to undertake in a newly democratic state. A political split might be a common outcome to the dispute.

The communist parties in the former-Soviet countries have experienced the dilemma of preserving communism as their ideology. The collapse of the communist regime was not necessarily followed by the disappearance of communist parties in each country since democratic procedure has allowed them to survive and compete in the electoral process. However, to survive in the democratic system also requires a degree of flexibility in preserving their ideological stance. In that regard, the struggle of the communist party in democratic post-communist Russia provides a good illustration.


After nearly two decades of democratic system with regular electoral process, the Communist Party of Russian Federation is still struggling to cope with the new system. As an opposition, the party must double its efforts to reformulate its ideological positions and win elections. To do so, the party must confront problems pertaining to ideological changes, practical strategy, and the need to maintain social support. Traditional and senior voters who have a long attachment with the party remain the major basis of support. However, the party has to deal with the fact that the younger voters and even some of their traditional base supporters from the working class demand more attractive political platforms which communism has failed to provide. Changing ideological interpretations to a more nationalistic taste might be necessary to widen the support basis but it is not always effective as the party needs to consider the potential rejection from its traditional supporters. Forming a new party, a move made by those who perceived Zyuganov as an ineffective party leader, does not always provide a good solution. However, lack of an effective solution to manage the moderation contributes to a long multifaceted crisis and

uncertainty, as clearly demonstrated in the party's defeat in the 1999 presidential election, despite its major improvement in the parliamentary election for the seventh Duma in 1995 (March 2001: 281).

The activism of the communist party in a democratic system has long been regarded as problematic by many scholars. Some have argued that as the representation of the working class, the party is expected to confront the capitalist agents through revolutionary means, a political stance perceived as incompatible with the nature of the democratic system. Unless there is a change in the ideological interpretation, the party will never gain an opportunity to fit into the electoral process. As shown by cases in France, Italy, and Spain, the change to Euro-communism made possible of these parties in the political system.

The dimension of crisis as experienced by many communist parties in the Eastern European context is only one of the two-sided aspects of moderation. The other aspect relates to the fact that a party must manage the process in order to survive in the political arena. Otherwise, the process will bring the party into multi-dimensional crises. Therefore, the ability to build a model of management that can handle the political process effectively will keep the party solid. A party without a strong management model will end up in acute crisis. Conversely, a party with a strong model management possesses better odds in coping with the traumatic process of moderation. As a result, a manageable moderation within a party is what is needed.

The study of party management in the moderation process, therefore, is critical to the understanding of successful moderation. However, this remains a subject of study that receives inadequate attention from scholars. The lack of study in managing crises in the moderation process is reflected the studies of Orbell-Fougere (1973) and Maor (1997). The study by Orbell-Fougere mentions the management of party moderation by reviewing various models of management, but the reviewed models are not specifically models of managing moderation. Meanwhile, Maor's study deals narrowly with models of party organisation and their development in the context of leadership and its relation to a solid and active party organisation. Therefore, the study of how a party manages the moderation process is still a rare case and this study will try to fill the gap, with particular reference to the Muslim context.



**Figure I.1.**

**Moderation and Its Relation with Crisis**

**I.2 Moderation in the Muslim Context**

The problem of communist party in Russia and elsewhere has initiated interest in an anti-system analysis in recent years, especially by scholars who focus on the existence of radical ideology in a democratic system (Capoccia 2002) and its connection to the moderation process (Sanchez-Cuenza 2004). Initially, the anti-system analysis was seen in term of its contradictive nature, where on the one hand such a party seemingly opposed the basic value of democracy, yet, on the other, used democracy as a political ground for its activities. An effort to adopt and apply a more positive meaning of anti-system as a concept (Keren 2001) has raised the possibility of utilising it more constructively, even though its contradictive character cannot be removed easily. It can provide a useful framework to understand the role of ideological party within a democratic system.

There is a widespread perception that any Islamic activism is not compatible with democratic practice and values. Both Islam and democracy are perceived as two different entities that cannot possibly work together, as argued by Lewis (2002), Kedourie (1994) and Huntington (1997). Therefore, in this perspective Islamic activism in the form of a political party cannot be seen as a possible route to integrate Islam with democracy since

the former brings the idea of the supremacy of God's law over man-made laws, while the latter does the opposite. Therefore, any political party which embraced Islamism would be regarded as an undemocratic element, almost similar to Sartori's category of anti-system party.

In the context of Islamic political parties, Capoccia argues that an Islamic party can be categorised as an anti-system party. However, rather than categorising them into a single monolithic category of anti-system, he introduces a category of accommodating anti-system party. He notes that this accommodating category is applicable in some Muslim countries. Unfortunately, he does not develop a deep analysis for implementing this concept to understand the dynamics of the accommodating anti-system concept in Muslim democratic countries. It seems that the concept is only applied to identify the phenomenon in the Western countries without providing objective analysis in the Muslim world. However, his sub-concept of accommodating anti-system parties might become an entry point for acknowledging the phenomenon of Islamist or Islamic parties that are integrated within the system of democracy.

The theoretical discourse of anti-system party that includes Islam as a factor leads to an analysis of cases in Muslim countries. As the concept gives a notion of the anti-systemic character of Islamic political parties, it also brings into the discourse of moderation the dimension of trauma, conflict and crisis. Some scholars mentioned the tendency of moderation in many political activisms in Muslim society. Kramer (Guazzone 1995) notes cases of moderation with reference to Ennahda in Tunisia, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (now form a political party: the Freedom and Justice Party), the Islamic Action Party in Jordan, and the al-Islah party in Yemen. She notes that there is a reluctance of many of Arab states to become a fully-fledged democracy as the regimes consider that political liberalisation provides an opportunity for Islamic movements to gain political supports from society and eventually this would be used against them. Developing a solid assessment of moderation performance in the Arab world is, therefore, problematic since democracy is not a common practice. The problem of democratic performance is also evident in the case of Jordan and Yemen when Schwedler tries to analyse the moderation process of the Islamic Action Party and al-Ishlah in both countries. It is true that a new interpretation of Islam is one of the significant factors for moderation in both cases; however the lack of median voters in a more open political space is absent since Jordan and

Yemen are still dominated respectively by the King and the military. To reduce the problem of democratic deficit in Arab countries, some scholars offer a recommendation to analyse party performance of moderation in the context of non-Arab countries (Guazzone 1995).

One of the advantages in observing non-Arab countries, then, is that they offer more evidence of the implementation of democratic processes. In this situation, even with many difficulties and problems, assessing the moderation process provides a better opportunity for political parties or elites that have an attachment with Islamic values to deal with median voters. The relationship between the parties and voters in an electoral process is essential to the moderation process of political parties with a radical element since it brings an incentive to parties that wish to integrate into a democratic process (Tezcur 2009: 1). Turkey, Iran, Senegal, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia are some of the examples of significant Muslim countries that experience some aspects of democracy. More importantly, there are some cases of moderation in those countries that have been studied by scholars such as works on the AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* or Justice and Development Party) in Turkey (Goymen in Hasan 2007), the PAS (*Parti Islam Se-Malaysia* or Islamic Party of Malaysia) in Malaysia (Abdul Rahman in Hasan 2007) and the PKS (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* or Prosperous Justice Party) in Indonesia (Collins and Fauzi 2005).

The AKP is a particularly important case: a party with an Islamic background that won massively three consecutive national elections (2002, 2007 and 2011) to form a single-party government for three consecutive periods. From the outset, the image of Islam has been associated with the party and raises serious anxieties among the Kemalist strongholds about its political motives. The Kemalists accused the AKP of being home to religious supporters who aspire to challenge the state ideology of secularism. The party denies the allegation, stating that there is no relation with Islam as the basis of the party. The party claims to put Islam into the private domain rather than as a collective objective to hijack democratic institutions for the purpose of Islamisation. The party claims that the main concern is to provide better services for Turkey and maintain democracy for more freedom of expression under the ideology of 'Conservative Democrat' and the programme of 'Development and Democracy'.

The party presents a good example of moderation within the democratic process, with significant median voters seeking new hope for change against the poor performance

of other political parties. However, learning from the experience of the RP (*Refah Partisi* or Welfare Party) and the FP (*Fazilet Partisi* or Virtue Party) that were banned from politics respectively in 1998 and 2001, the risk of military intervention is also significant in making the image less Islamic. Thus, the moderate outlook of the party is a product of the democratic process and pressures from the secular strongholds which confirms the Sanchez-Cuenza's belief in the importance of a conducive political environment. There is a strong element of abandonment of ideology on the part of its prominent founders as a result of political interaction with the environment. Hence, the formal abandonment itself is a result of a long process before the foundation of the party. The process goes back to the early political involvement of founders of the AKP with the RP since the 1980s.

The situation faced by the AKP in moderating its expression is different from that faced by communist parties in the post-Soviet countries. However, in both situations, all parties are equally presented with the risk of crises as a result of working within a democratic system while at the same time adapting some aspects of their ideological values in managing their internal moderation. There will be potential situations that lead to tension and conflict because of ideological change. There is also the possibility of crises arising due to oppositional ideological interpretation among members. The outcome of irresolvable crisis is a split that might produce at least two different parties to compete for electoral votes. After a decade of its existence, the AKP has suffered a minimum level of tension, although a small number of those who are not supportive toward the party's policies eventually left the party. Therefore, the party has not undergone any major crisis since its foundation in 2001. On the contrary, the AKP has been able to show harmony and solidity among its activists.

Similarly, the PKS also successfully manages to show an image of harmony. Its political activism does not raise any public alarm and major internal division leading to a political split is minimal. There are cases of internal criticisms but in general most party members are loyal to the current leadership. The party is known to be effective armed with disciplined activists who work enthusiastically. After changing the party's image, the PKS gained significant voters in the 2004 election winning 7.34 per cent of votes to claim 45 seats in the parliament; it increased to 7.88 per cent adding 12 more seats in the 2009 election. Despite an indication of stagnation due to decreasing support in major cities, more seats signified its success in attracting more votes from more provinces than before. The

achievement, to some extent, is a by-product of a moderation project following the shift of its jargon and programmes from a palpable Islamic party under Partai Keadilan (PK) —the predecessor of PKS— in 1999 toward a ‘clean and care’ image in the midst of other corrupt and selfish political parties (Permata 2008: 27). The achievement is also outstanding compared to other stagnant or less successful Islamic parties and the reformist/nationalist Muslim-based parties.


### **I.3 Manageable Moderation**

The solid image of the AKP and the PKS causes the inquiry on the way both parties have managed moderation and dealt with tensions and possible crises resulting from the process. Despite tensions, and even conflicts or crises, both have become relatively stable parties confident to sail through the sea of the moderation process and eventually harbour political success at all levels. Therefore, a study of internal management of both parties is important with a view to identifying models or strategies of management utilised in that process.

Based on the two cases of the AKP in Turkey and the PKS in Indonesia, I argue that moderation can be managed, and through a combination of management models, any tensions and conflicts can be minimised. In other words, the process of moderation for an ideological party does not have to be severely traumatic as featured in some cases of communist parties in the Eastern European context. For that reason, this study focuses on the application of different types of model in managing moderation.

The theoretical exploration in managing moderation identifies different strategies mentioned by scholars in different cases. The model widely applied in comparing two parties covers the dimension of leadership, decomposition, trust and conversion-replacement, by which parties are able to direct their respective activists to a relatively solid and effective organisation. A latest model, proposed by Carsey and Layman, is a combination of two different strategies. In practice, and as seen from the case of the AKP, it does not have to be a connected model since replacement can also be conducted in various ways. Through a combination of the models of management, parties can manage the impact of moderation and even emerge into relatively more solid and effective parties with a minimum level of tension and conflict.

Conversely, I also wish to highlight that different levels of moderation might result in different ways of applying management. The relevant factors and their relative relationships with regard to the AKP and the PKS are shown in Figure 1.2.



**Figure I.2.**

**Models of Strategies to Manageable Moderation**

The AKP has developed a more oligarchic leadership consisting of some prominent figures, with Erdoğan as its leading dominant person as the founder and the leader of the AKP. He is the most important figure of the party and many observers believe that one of the main factors of AKP's victory over three consecutive elections has been the trust of the Turkish people in him (Aktay 2009). However, his figure is not the only determinant factor in the triumph of the party since the shifting preferences towards political system (Sayari in Sayari & Esmer 2002) and the existence of a new middle class (Yavuz 2006) are also significant.

The PKS does not represent a case of strong personal leadership. Initially, it even suffered from a lack of prominent figures who could promote the party in politics. However, the strength of the party is not determined by an individual leadership but rather depends on its collective ability to maintain solidity during the transformation from a social



movement to a political party. The collective character of the PKS in arriving at important and crucial decisions is located in the Shura Assembly (*Majelis Syura*) that consists of 99 members. However, the head of the Assembly plays an important role in the decision-making process which is more informally inherited from the party's organisational character as a mixture of political party and Islamic movement.

Meanwhile, decomposition is the strategy to deal with vocal PKS members who demonstrate opposition against the moderation process as agreed by the party's leader. The practice is to dismiss members who cannot accept moderation on the basis of different interpretation of party ideology. This strategy is quite successful thanks to the high level of trust among the party's activists. The PKS develops a strong education process for its cadres, alongside a system of instruction in basic and advanced Islamic teachings through which trust in other members can be highly maintained. Every member has to be attached to a small group that meets routinely and is supervised by a higher-ranking party member (*halaqah* or *usrah*). Trust is internalised through various group activities so members can understand the mission of the party. In contrast to the PKS, the AKP does not install a specific and intensive religious programme for its cadres. However, as an individual, every new member of the party has to show their commitment to certain values as such praying, fasting and honesty. It is not regarded as an expression of ideology, rather an expression of admiration toward the tradition of Turkish society. In fact, the most important factor for the trust building in the AKP is its vision and the appeal of the leader.

I am convinced that those models of management applied by the AKP and the PKS contribute to their solidity and effectiveness. This study tries to demonstrate, as will be discussed in the subsequent chapters, that moderation can be manageable through different strategies so that the negative impact of moderation can be minimised. However, it is also important to recognise that both parties apply a different level and nature of moderation. By detaching itself from its more Islamist predecessors, namely the RP and the FP, the AKP has significantly abandoned a strict ideological preference. The absence of ideology of the AKP, and the focus on the vision and the leadership has pushed the party to develop a more inclusive platform that is open to members with different backgrounds. This is useful to appeal for more votes. The PKS also tries to lessen the image of an austere Islamic party in order to become more appealing for voters in elections. The difference is that the PKS is still an Islamic party and its efforts to move to the centre of the political continuum are

mainly a move enable it to win elections. Hence, both parties have a similar motivation: to survive in politics and win elections by considering the preferences of median voters, as indicated by Sanchez-Cuenza. However, both parties are facing different challenges in their attempts to maintain solidarity. In the aspect of substantive moderation the PKS, unlike the AKP that abandoned ideology, has still preserved Islam as its formal ideology. In Wickham's terms, it can be said that the PKS applies 'revision moderation' while the AKP conducts 'abandon moderation'.

This research aims to compare the way the AKP and the PKS manage the moderation process by looking at different strategies of leadership, trust and decomposition. Based on the comparison, this research argues that different applications of strategies in the moderation process reflect different types of moderation. The AKP has to convince its supporters who used to support the RP and the FP that the new approach is better for the future of Turkey and at the same time appeal for wider support from society. Therefore, the AKP relies more on the members' trust in the party's vision and its leader, with minimal decomposition efforts and a strategy of conversion. In contrast, the PKS has to provide a legitimate explanation that its new direction is not against any religious principles, due to criticism of the party's interpretation of moderation. The PKS develops trust in ideology combined with the role of the party's leader; so that decomposition, along with an alienation strategy, plays a more important role.

#### **I.4 Methodology**

The comparative method is applied in this research to analyse the applicability of the moderation concept in different cases. Since the concept deals with ideology in politics its application to parties with an Islamic background is worthwhile undertaking. It is important to analyse the dynamics as well as the ways and means by which a particular party involves itself in democratic games. To enhance the internal validity and generalizability of this study, comparative research is essential because the method can be 'tested with reference to the diverse manifestation of human behavio[u]r' (Murdock in Holt & Turner 1970: 5-6). Based on that assumption, Turkey and Indonesia are selected as case studies in comparing the phenomenon of Islamic activism in the form of political parties in the democratic system.

Comparative politics analysis is usually applied to the theory-building projects because of its application of quantitative method of analysis which is capable of replicating and predicting (Sanders in Marsh & Stoker 2002: 56-7). By using a large number of cases with statistical analysis, a more general theory can be generated. However, comparative study by using qualitative method is also possible. As Peters (1998: 141) has shown in his study, there are many studies of comparative politics that use qualitative method with a small number of cases. Indeed, a study of a single country using a similar method can also be applied to generate a certain theoretical significance. For example, a study conducted by Lijphart (1975) in the Netherlands has generated a concept of ‘consociational democracy’ that is useful to be applied in divided societies and countries. A single case study can also be categorised as comparative study as long as it applies a similar theoretical framework that applies to wider analyses (Peters 1998: 3).

This study uses a comparative method in terms of comparing two different cases. The cases of the AKP and the PKS can be classified as within-case comparison involving, in Peters’s (1998: 10) description, ‘analysis of similar process and institutions in a limited number of countries, selected for analytic reasons’. ‘Within case’ study has advantages in reducing the complexity of variables ground at the state level with its historical, cultural, and economic background, while at the same time some of those factors can be analysed to provide useful understanding. In doing a small-number comparative analysis, a careful selection of cases is essential to avoid groundless comparable analysis (Landman 2000: 201). In this study, two conditions have been considered as comparable factors of selecting the AKP and the PKS, namely the similar tendency of having manageable moderation, and the availability of a stable procedural democracy in a Muslim country. The last condition is important because it is related to the efforts of both parties to deal with voters’ demands which are usually not in favour of a firm ideological preference.

The application of democracy itself has been in doubt in both countries. Turkish democracy has been interrupted four times by the military that tried to control politics and eventually withdrew after changing the constitution (Özbudun 1983). Meanwhile, Indonesia has just started its democratic consolidation after more than three decades of authoritarian regimes, and with many problems such as the existence of patrimonial behaviour within the modern institutions (Webber 2006). However, despite those considerations, Turkey is known as the Muslim country that has applied a democratic

system over prolonged period since 1946, which at least has given the opportunity of having a multi party system with competition for political power. Indonesia itself is admired as a Muslim country which has applied the democratic system with three substantially democratic elections in 1999, 2004 and 2009 (Ananta et.al. 2005: 34). The fact that there is a significant tendency of popular acceptance of Islamist party in both countries on different levels has strengthened the selection of the countries in the research. Both parties have a similar tendency of moving toward the centre along the political continuum in each democratic system. It is true that the system applied in both countries is still facing many obstacles. The legal process against the AKP by the Constitutional Court has been criticised as undemocratic treatment by part of the state towards the popular governing political party (Akyol 2008: 14). However, in both countries at least a procedural democratic system has been applied and in the objective of this study, the existence of a stable electoral process is significant in forcing parties to moderate themselves.

The AKP officially does not identify itself as an Islamic party or even a party of Muslim activists. The party's elites have repeatedly denied any juxtaposition with Islam. However, their background of involvement with the Milli Görüş (National View Movement), a movement based on Islamic values, and with Islamic parties such as the RP, suggests their link to Islamic ideas by a different approach. It is also a fact that a majority of the RP activists supports the party even though they are not the majority supporters of the AKP. While it is problematic to term the AKP as Islamist, the label can be conveniently applied to the PKS as the party officially declares Islam as its ideological basis. Therefore, developing a term for both parties is essential and will take place in the next chapter. The discussion of the term 'Islamist' will also be used as a basis for the analysis of some of Islamic activism which have a tendency of moderation within a democratic system.

However, in comparing the two parties, there is also an aspect that has to be considered. Both parties do actually not share an entirely equivalent character. It is different with the PKS which declares Islam as its ideology so that it is comfortable for some to categorise it as Islamist; the AKP is more problematic. There is a different range of labels attached to it from Islamist to Muslim Democrats or Conservative Democrats to give a wide range of interpretations of the party. In fact, the party was declared in 2001 to accept secularism as its foundation rather than Islam to give a contrasting character with the PKS.

Therefore, the two parties can be seen as different, therefore uncomparable, institutions which may downgrade the significance of the comparison itself.

In the comparative method, difficulties in comparing different institutions can be resolved by identifying the similarity or dissimilarity of two or more different entities (Przeworski and Teune 1970). This is known as ‘most similar system design’ or ‘most different system design’ (Landman 2003: 33-4). In concept, the techniques apply to the comparison of countries, but it is also possible to shift it to do a comparison of institutions within countries by applying similar principles (Landman 2003: 34).

Therefore, comparing the AKP and the PKS which have different characters is possible in theory as long as the variable of comparison is carefully identified. What makes the two parties comparable is their performance in the electoral process. Although the PKS has not won election and formed the government as the ruling party, as in the case of the AKP, it has moderated its appearance in front of the voters. The PKS has often been compared with the SP (*Saadet Partisi*), which is perceived as the successor of the RP (*Refah Partisi*) and is heavily influenced by Necmettin Erbakan, because both parties have a relatively similar character based on the transformation of Islamic movements into political parties. However, in the context of moderation, giving attention to median voters, as proposed by Sanchez-Cuenza, is a more significant factor. In short, the AKP and the PKS have brought some common outcomes as parties that committed to democratic practices.

This study has collected data from party activists at three different levels of activism within the political parties, namely the upper-, middle- and lower-level activists. Each level of activists is seen in the context of managing the moderation at each respective level. In-depth interviews were seen as the main method in obtaining data on the aspects of leadership, positive-decomposition and trust. In view of the difficulty in choosing representative activists, the snowball technique was applied to find suitable sources. Since qualitative research requires an understanding of a phenomenon, the technique was considered appropriate in identifying and finding relevant sources. Hence, the informants from each party were recommended by other members. Recommendation was given on a basis of knowledge of the subject of the research.

The field research was conducted in two different time frames for each party. The total number of figures who will be interviewed in each party was at least 30 representing

all levels of activists. For the PKS, the interviews and observations mainly took place between May and December 2008. During that period, interviews were conducted to cover the party cadres from three different levels, including unrecorded interviews. The unrecorded interviews were written as field notes. Additional interviews were conducted on different occasions with PKS elites and other members who visited London in May and July 2010 and January 2011. There was also the opportunity to visit three different regions outside Jakarta (Central Java, West Java and Yogyakarta) in order to look at problems at the local level.

Field research in Turkey was done through three different visits to the country. The first visit in April 2008 was to familiarise the researcher with the situation and to develop initial contacts with important persons and organisations. The second visit in October and November 2009 provided a good chance to conduct discussions with researchers and Islamic social organisations. The last visit in December 2009 and January 2010 gave more opportunities to interview contacts in the AKP. During the field research, there were at least 26 recorded and unrecorded interviews. The different number of informants for the AKP is due to the limitation of communication, especially in conducting discussion or interview with mid- and low-rank members. Hence, informants had to be selected more carefully.

In some circumstances, observation provided a means to understand the dynamics of each party. In Jakarta, there were opportunities to attend gatherings conducted by critical members of the PKS on several occasions to observe their ideas and activities closely. This was also with the case of the AKP, when interviews and discussions were combined with observation of some of the party's activities. Of particular relevance here was the programme to enlighten members' insight on politics and economy. Other information related to legal process of the internal party dynamism was obtained from relevant documents such as newspapers, reports, and the party's constitution, structures, speeches and documents.

**CHAPTER II**  
**CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK:**  
**ISLAMISM AND MANAGING MODERATION**

**II.1. The New Face of Islamism?**

**II.1.1. Defining ‘Islamism’**

The term Islamism is usually taken to refer to views that Muslims should consciously choose Islam as a doctrine to guide their way of life. The definition proposed by Ayubi (1991: 67) tries to differentiate between Muslims who see Islam as a doctrinal consciousness in defining life and those who simply see being Muslim as a minimum identity. It also excludes those who are practising the Islamic traditions as pious individuals. This definition seems to have been accepted by other scholars in identifying individuals or groups within the Muslim society who hold a particular view of Islamic doctrine and try actively to implement it in society, and incorporate it in a political movement. Their efforts to implement such ideas may conflict with the existing political authorities or social institutions, which they see as targets for change. They may be prepared to use violent means. This tendency towards confrontation and use of force has led many scholars to label the movements as radical and militant.

The basic doctrine itself, defined as Islamism by Guazzone (1995: 4), is an ideology which provides a common denominator to guide the disciples’ political action. The ideology is grounded on two pillars, which are: (i) the belief that *shari’a* or Islamic law provides complete guidance to regulate all aspects of human life and (ii) the idea that political organisation is needed to achieve the Islamic ideal of society (ibid: 10). Dekmejian (1995: 41) mentions eight characteristics of Islamist ideology that envisage developing the ideal *ummah* based on Islamic faith, in which leadership is guided by the Qur’an and the Sunnah as a universally applicable system. To realise such a system requires efforts from Muslims by sacrificing themselves. In that perception sacrificing life (or death) is a noble way in order to claim a place in heaven. In its broader definition, Fuller (2003) offers a definition of an Islamist as someone who ‘believes that Islam as a body of faith has

something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim world and who seeks to implement this idea in some fashion’.

It seems that the definition of Islamist and the ideological basis of Islamism focus on the existence of certain ideas to challenge existing political regimes and international forces. It is rooted in the history of the decline of Muslim civilisation and political power when Western colonialism and imperialism were at a peak of political, military and economic supremacy. This highlights the aspect of protest towards political, economic and social order influenced by Western ideas as the source of the decline of the ideal society based on Islamic faith. In her explanation of the rise of Islamism in the Arab world, Guazzone (ibid) notes that the aspects of protest arise in the context of cultural contradiction, crisis of legitimacy and inadequate economic development in a growing society. The dimension of contestation is, in fact, intensified by the reactions of many political regimes in Muslim countries where Islamists have been excluded from the political arena, or when allowed to exist but with many restrictions. Certainly, the anti-terror campaign led by the US and the UK has escalated the dimension of confrontation involving Islamists. One of the reasons why Western governments have rejected Islamists has been the fear that, once in office, they may become un-friendly towards the West and affect Western interests in Muslim countries. For example, the Iranian revolution is seen as creating a political entity ‘aggressive’ to the West (Takeyh 2006).

### **II.1.2 New Trend**

While it seems to be difficult to find different aspects of conceptual understanding on the term of Islamist, yet some scholars have noted the new tendency within Islamism. Demant (2006), for example, mentions the third wave of Islamism with two different faces: terror and peaceful process. If the first face is characterised by death, blood, destruction and anger; the latter shows the peaceful process of growing Islamic influence in social and cultural spheres. Some of the projects of Islamification of social and cultural spaces might fail due to the reactionary policies of regimes, such as the banning of the FIS in Algeria following its election victory. However, there are also trends to develop an Islamic outlook in the system through social, cultural and economic processes. For instance, Bayat (2007) describes the growth of public space for citizens to actualise their cultural and social expression in the city parks, theatres or community centres. Despite the reaction of the



mullahs and the Revolutionary Guard towards the popular expression of Iranian citizens, the notion of being citizens with the rights to express themselves has caused the emergence of a new social outlook even under the strict moral control of the state. Contrary to Iran, the growth of Islamism in Egypt is not always based on political or ideological dimensions. There has been a trend to implement Islamic practises based on moral influences taught by populist preachers. In Bayat's terms, the post-Islamist phase ends the 'confrontational' character towards established authority. Therefore, the use of force or violence that often characterises the Islamist has disappeared. Bayat's terminology to some extent supports the dimension of an Islamist that Ayubi has noted before. Becoming a more peaceful Muslim in practising Islamic values means moving beyond the position of an Islamist.

Jones (2007: 229-31) also agrees with Bayat's idea of the end of Islamism when a group of Muslims reject the idea of using violent means and becomes involved in the political system. Such is the case with the AKP as a ruling party in Turkey which scored a massive election victory and saw its leader, Erdoğan, become Prime Minister, with Abdullah Gül later becoming President. Since coming to power, the AKP and Erdoğan have resisted the benefit of Islam as their identity or symbol. The party and its members are simply ordinary politicians who are supported by the people because of their ability to serve the people as citizens of the state irrespective of their religious or ethnic identities. The representation of the Islamist in the political arena through a more peaceful performance and a universal language of citizenship, public service, welfare, taking care of the less fortunate, and development is a new face of the Islamism; or in Shadid's terminology 'the new politics of Islam' (2002) and Baker's 'the new Islamist' (2003).

The turning point of the Islamist from revolutionary to reformist (Rubin 2003) through moderation raises again the question of the definition of the term Islamist itself. As mentioned before, the ideology of the Islamist is basically the development of an ideal society of *ummah* based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Consequently, the definition cannot be attached to the new face of Islamists who were legally active in the political arena using democratic means of popular support through the electoral process, as they consciously leave out any symbol of Islam in their political activities and abandon any violent strategies. There is also an apparent contradiction of implementing the ideal society of *ummah* based on the Quran and the Sunnah which may have to change the democratic structure of a state. The debate over democracy and Islam has been widely discussed and

there are at least three different responses from Islamists that Islam and democracy are contradictory, similar, and similar but different (Esposito and Piscatori 1991). The first point of view argues that they are contradictory because they are perceived as two different entities, which cannot be reconciled under any condition. In contrast, there are also perceptions that the two are compatible, so that Islam can work in democratic system. Meanwhile, the latest sees both as entities with some similarities as well as differences. In this context, many scholars have strong anxieties about the possibility of replacing democracy with another political system generated from Islamic roots. Even for Islamists who have shown their ability to work and survive within the existing system, some may still question their enthusiasm to support and maintain a democratic system while in power (Kramer 1998).

In other words, based on that conceptual definition, it is difficult to refer to those who are willing to participate in or have been struggling in the democratic system with a peaceful strategy without any intention of replacing democracy itself as Islamists. It is the reason why many scholars try to avoid using the term Islamist to describe them. In fact, there is a need to develop another concept to represent them in many discourses of Islamism to avoid ambiguity with the new phenomenon. It will not be a problem if the Islamist movements who have transformed themselves into political parties or joined formal political institutions are represented by a such term; such as the FIS in Algeria, Ennahda in Tunisia, al-Islah in Yemen, the Islamic Action Party in Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the PAS in Malaysia, or the PKS in Indonesia. Even with their apparent Islamic characteristics, they have a dimension of moderation (Kramer in Guazzone 1995; Schwedler 2006; Embong 2007). However, it will be difficult to identify those who do not formally attach themselves to any Islamic symbol. To some extent, the Wasat Party in Egypt has a dimension of Islamism because of its 'strong relation' with the Muslim Brotherhood as previous members of the movement. Nevertheless, instead of continuing in the footsteps of its seniors in the Brotherhood, the younger Muslim Brotherhood activists who established the Wasat developed it as a more inclusive political party by offering significant positions in the party to non-Muslims (Shadid 2002). The example of the Wasat might not be convincing in this debate due to its uneasy relation with the Muslim Brotherhood in its foundation. The social influence of Muslim preachers in the country has led to a significant increase in religiosity among the middle and upper class

citizens. The term is also problematic when attached to the Iranian reformist camp under Khatami which challenged the conservative status-quo. The latter case is not a confrontation with an impious regime but rather a restrictive interpretation of Khomeini's *vilayat-i al-faqih*. For Bayat, these are not the cases of Islamism supported by Islamists, but rather a post-Islamist trend.

### **II.1.3 Different Case of Islamists**

The AKP in Turkey represents a different case of Islamists whereby the party developed social networks to serve the people and occupy political positions on behalf of their constituents. It is the character of a social movement inherited from two previous, more Islamic, parties, the RP and the FP. The party's landslide victories in the last two elections of 2002 and 2007 do not change its representation as a people's party rather than an Islamic party. Many observers have noted the Islamic background or character or dimension of the party because the AKP cannot be easily detached from the RP and the FP. The AKP leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was a mayor in Istanbul as an RP member and Abdullah Gül challenged Recai Kutai for the FP leadership before leaving the party. Another argument regarding their relation with Islam is the fact that the AKP captured the RP and the FP's supporters, indicating its relation with previous Islamist parties (Tepe 2005: 295).

However, the AKP clearly declares that it is not an Islamic party. The party is merely a secular party with secular characteristics; even if it consists of religious or pious individual Muslims who are not, according to the party, against the principles of secularism. It does not have any attachment to Islamic ideas, identifies itself as conservative democrat and also demonstrates its position as a non-Islamic oriented party. The AKP rejects the idea of representing the *ummah* as a symbolisation of an attachment to Islamic idea in building a new civilisation under Turkish leadership. Rather than supporting the more Islamic ideas of the *Millî Görüş* (National Vision Movement, the backbone of the RP), the party supports the EU (European Union) accession process and integration with international market agendas, in contradiction to the character of the movement.

The AKP's support comes from people who have gained services from the party, which have been built up through the RP and the FP's social service activities in many social occasions, such as weddings, funerals, engagements, or caring for the sick (Shadid 2002; Arat 2005: 81). The big earthquake of 2002 also showed the ability of party activists

to provide better services than the government. Such may also be the case with similar Islamist parties or groups in other countries which maximised the absence of the state in providing social and public services to the people from whom they get significant popular support. This condition is again in contrast to the nature of Islamist movements which prefer to use violent means that failed to maximise mass support (Kepel 2004: 1-2).

Another case of the new face of the Islamist movement outside the Arab World can be seen in the PKS of Indonesia. This party is a unique phenomenon of an Islamic movement transformed into a political party and active within the framework of a newly democratic state. To some extent, the dimension of Islamism can be applied to the party since it is formally an Islamic party based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah. However, the aim of the party in joining the formal political arena is not to change the nature of the state but to serve the need of the people relating to their religious activities such as pilgrimage and education within the idea of a secular state. Unlike other Islamic political parties, the PKS tends to support a more substantial interpretation of an Islamic state based on the Madinah Charter principles. Therefore, as long as it shows respect for religious ethics, any form of political entity is acceptable including the democratic secular state of Indonesia. The way it attracts supporters is also quite similar with the AKP through social service activities within society, including in places which have suffered disasters. Many have suggested that the shift in its strategy, from the Islamic symbolism of the Partai Keadilan (PK) in 1999 to a people-centrist performance in 2004 was only a strategy to get more popular support rather than a reflection of a changing ideological interpretation. The criticism is true from the aspect of democratic pragmatism that is also relevant to other ideological parties. However, the new dimension of religious interpretation was also obvious in the case of the PKS in supporting the democratic process and secular state and keeping the struggle over the implementation of *shari'a* within the framework of democracy.

#### **II.1.4. Conceptual Boundary**

The difference between the AKP and the PKS is clearly on its formal basis of ideology. Formally the AKP is not an Islamic party. However, there are aspects of Islam that can be referred as expression of Islam in its activities. Hence, many perceive the party as using Islam as basis of policy preference. In the language of the AKP, supporting the right of veiled-women to study in the university, work in public institutions, or conduct effective

public service is a reflection of the party's constituent pressure. In the same way, the language of the PKS is based on ethical messages of Islam mixed with its commitment to serve the people. However, the AKP also holds religious ethics and even projects symbols reflected in their members' behaviour. The image of Islam can still be seen in the actualisation of its women activists who wear headscarves, even though the party does not give exclusive attention to them. The conflict between the party with the secular supporters took place in the context of reactionary response to the EU headscarf decision of the European Court of Human Rights, the restriction of the circulation of alcohol by the party's municipal leaders, and efforts to separate men and women in the public space (Onar 2007: 278-81).

Therefore, there is a problem in identifying the activism of a group of individual pious Muslims in a democratic system with the language of social and public service for the people to support the continuation of democracy whether they are Islamists or not. Yavuz denies that the AKP is a representation of an Islamic movement and its success in politics is not a model of its adaptation into a new situation (Yavuz ed., 2006: 2-3). He argues that once a group deliberately denies the character of Islam in its actions, it is clearly not representing Islam. Therefore, according to him, the AKP and its members who have an Islamic-rooted background cannot be categorised as Islamist. Other writers in this camp are Daniel Pipes and Robbert Woltering. Woltering argues that there are no moderate Islamists at all due to their main objective of changing the society and replacing its social and political system with an Islamic one. To this end, replacing the political system and the regime is essential. Once a person categorised as 'Islamist' enters the political system, he or she has to change the system drastically or accept the system completely (Woltering 2002: 1133-4).

It can be seen that some writings utilise the term Islamist to refer to the AKP's predecessor the RP (Gulalp 1995; Taniyici 2003) for showing some characteristics of pro-Islamic orientation such as its disagreement with the expulsion of Islamist army officers, closer ties to Iran, its support for easing the restrictions of headscarves in universities and civil services, disputes over the building of a mosque on Taksim Square, and the anti-regime slogans from the crowd in "Jerusalem night" in early 1997 (Narli in Rubin 2003: 125-35). The term Islamist is also mentioned by another writer in describing the Islamists in Turkey as pursuing radical strategies outside the formal political arena (Karmon in Rubin

2003: 41-68). However, applying the term Islamist to both cases of the AKP and the PKS according to Dekmejian's typology and Ayubi's definition of Islamist is problematic. Dekmejian does not refer Islamist to any political parties even in the category of gradualist-pragmatic (Dekmejian 1995: 57-60). Hence the term Islamist has no clear boundaries to be referred to.

**Table II.1.**  
**The Position of the AKP and the PKS**  
**with regard to Some Aspects of Ordinary Muslim and Islamist**

Defined by	Aspects of Ordinary Muslim		AKP	PKS	
Ayubi	Muslim as minimum identity		No	No	
	Practising Islamic tradition		Yes	Yes	
	Individual pious Muslim		Yes	Yes	
	<b>Aspects of Islamist</b>				
Derkmejian, Fuller	Belief in faith		Yes	Yes	
Ayubi	Islamic doctrine in <i>shari'a</i>		No	Yes (based on popular support)	
Ayubi, Derkmejian,	Guide the way of life	Individual	Yes	Yes	
		Collective	No	Yes	
Fuller	In contemporary context		Yes	Yes	
Guazzone, Derkmejian	Develop an <i>ummah</i> or ideal Islamic society		No	Yes	
Implementation (Fuller)	Ayubi	Social Movement		No	Yes
	Guazzone	Political action		Yes	Yes
		Legal political organisation	Political party as secular organisation	Yes	Yes
			Islam as legal basis	No	Yes
	Ayubi	Against political authorities		No	No
	Dekmejian	Sacrifice (to death if needed)		No	No/Yes
	Ayubi, Derkmejian	Tendency of confrontation and violence (leading to the terms radical, militant and terror)		No	No

The Table II.1. shows that some aspects of Islamism can be attached to both the AKP and PKS, such as the idea that one's faith should be the guidance for Muslims in the contemporary context. Both parties also express the need to conduct political activity in order to achieve the objective of their faith. However, the case of the AKP is different since the role of faith is only at the individual level. Since the AKP as a secular party is not the expression of collective action, the boundaries of the role of faith for members of the party as individuals and as a collective is quite ambiguous. This is parallel with the idea of developing the *ummah* or Islamic society which puts the AKP in a different position to the PKS. The latter party believes in the development of Islamic society, but one that uniquely will be achieved through the democratic system.

To avoid problematic definitions of Islamism, some writers have tried to use different terms such as post-Islamist (Bayat 2007), Muslim activism (Esposito and Voll 1996), reformer Islamist (Rubin 2003), political Islam (Roy 1994; Fueller 2003; ICG 2005), and Islamist politics (Ismail 2001 & 2003; Entelis 2004). They develop these terms to cope with the wider context of Islamists who enters the political arena and accept the political structure as the framework of their activism; even if the system does not offer full competition under an authoritarian regime's control (Pratt 2007). However, most of them cover activism in the Arab world and tend to give less attention to activism outside the region. Those who give attention to activism in Turkey also offer many interpretations, from a rejection of the term Islamist with regard the AKP (Yavuz 2006), new thinking on Islamism (Cavdar 2006), Islamic-rooted party (Tepe 2002), moderate Islamist (Onar 2007), pro-Islamic party (Turam 2007), Islamic party (Göymen 2007), to Islamist (White 2002). From the terms attached to the AKP, it can be assumed that the debate over the activism of individual pious Muslims within the formal political arena as shown by some members of the AKP is still ongoing with no solid agreement among the observers. The debate itself has shown the anxiety of the observers toward the seriousness of the party, regarding, not only its existence, survival and success in the democratic system, but also in supporting the existence of the democratic system itself. The fact that Islamic preference as an individual consciousness is in contrasted to Turkey's 'extreme' secular system has developed an imagination of strong Islamic representation of the party, which has been perceived as incompatible with democracy and will replace it at once in power (Kramer 1998: 25).

If the AKP faces strong suspicions of its Islamic agenda within a secular political system, the PKS confronts little political pressure regarding its ideology. It is true that some of the party's opponents in the political system, especially nationalist and religious parties, have questioned its commitment to the democratic system and highlighted its basic agenda of working toward a nation state based on Islamic principles. However, the consolidation of the democratic system after the fall of the New Order regime in 1998 has allowed many of the new political parties to adopt Islam as their ideological basis. Within this political context, Islamic political parties, including the PKS, have an opportunity to convert their alternative policies, based on an interpretation of Islamic principles, into concrete programmes. Therefore, the concern that they have a hidden agenda, namely replacing the system with a more Islamic one, is not relevant. Islamic parties are similar to other parties in terms of offering programmes to the people, hoping to gain popular acceptance, which will allow them to occupy strategic political positions.

Nevertheless, for the PKS as a political party, the term 'Islamist' is also problematic. The party has developed a strong public appeal and provided social services to build political support from the people. The performance of the PKS is quite similar to that of the AKP in terms of working within the democratic framework of a secular state and using the electoral process to get access to political structure. However, the former has formally declared Islam to be its ideological basis, while the latter rejected any symbolisation of religious ties except the expression of representing the people. The AKP has no implication of religiosity in its policy interpretation based on democratic principles; meanwhile the PKS has to deal with the 'conflicting' ideas of Islam and democracy even when the party believes that those two ideas can work together (Matta 2010). One of the conflicting natures of democracy is that it provides an opportunity for any kind of laws to be passed when supported by the majority in the parliament or the people in a referendum. However, democracy also grants Islamic parties a chance to perform within the political arena as a model of moral politics for the people and, therefore, to influence them. The PKS believes that Islamic values can be formulated as the law of the land through the formal, democratic, political process and by focusing justice as the substance of law itself (Majelis Pertimbangan Partai PKS 2008: 519-26).

Both parties also share the same experience of rethinking their position in the political system. The AKP, according to Cavdar (2006), has undergone a process of



‘political learning’ by which the leaders of the party repositioned its ideological basis to adopt a ‘fully’ democratic party like its counterparts in Western democratic systems. Some writers then compare the AKP with the Christian Democrats in Germany to describe it as a party of individual believers (Hale in Yavuz 2006). To some extent, the PKS also underwent a similar process, but without changing its ideological basis as a result. The failure of the PK, before it transformed into the PKS, in 1999 to pass the electoral threshold gave the party a stimulus to change its image from that of an openly Islamic party to a populist party by promoting itself as ‘clean and caring’. Of course, the two parties are not comparable in their ideological bases. However, the different political context made the AKP rethink its strategy so as not to confront the principles of secularism of the Turkish state. This is different to the PKS which exists in a more ‘friendly’ political system for an Islamic party. Still, the AKP enjoys a more competitive political system in which the process of repositioning its political stance can be made through the electoral process. At this point, if the PKS removed Islam as its ideological political basis, it might have the same image as the AKP in developing a new face of an ‘Islamist party’ in non-Arab Muslim countries.

Scholars find it a ‘surprisingly difficult’ to define Islamists who turn to electoral activism due to the paradoxical character of the vision of moral-based society based on *shari’a* (Kramer 1998: 25-7). The best possible classification uses the notion of moderation: that a moderate Islamist party has to accept democratic principles, including a commitment to pluralism and civic rights. Therefore, a truly moderate Islamist party should meet two conditions: the ‘abandonment, postponement or revision of radical goals’ and a ‘substantive commitment to democratic principles’ (Wickham 2004: 206).

However, even with the two dimensions, the concept of a moderate Islamist is still seen as a doubtful definition (Kramer 1998: 42). One of the possible reasons for this comes from the dimension of ideology. Wickham’s definition still allows for a wide range of positions regarding ideology; from a complete abandonment to temporary postponement and revision. Within that broad definition, there will be a variety of Islamist parties that can be categorised as moderate, despite their different attitudes. Such differences may have a huge impact on the different perspectives of each party in regard to conducting moderation.

There is also an indication that the unclear definition, coupled with concerns and suspiciousness of Islamists in the political process, was basically developed through the

experience of ‘moderate’ Islamists in Arab and North African countries where there have been persistent records of political repression. Paradoxically, these groups then became seen a threat and representation of the ‘green menace’. It is unfair to attach such concerns to Islamists in non-Arab countries which have a different experience of implementing democracy, so the more nuanced meaning of Islamist must be addressed if it is to deal with non-Arab Islamic activism (Bubalo and Fealy 2004: 46). One of the differences of democratic implementation outside Arab countries has been the real the possibility of changing the government through the electoral process. In this democratic experience, the opportunity of managing the state and society at a local and national level may provide a chance to see the true face of Islamist parties. There is no evidence that Islamists will suspend or change the democratic system while they are in power (Fuller 2003: 29-31). From the case of the AKP, a decade of experience as the ruling party is the evidence that the party has not changed the basic principles of the secular state. The accusation faced by the AKP of *takkiye* or dissimulation in some issues has to be seen as part of the learning process for the party’s repositioning within the system. The ability of the PKS to reposition its image is also the result of the different nature of more open and competitive democratic implementation.

If the definition of moderate Islamist is applied to the AKP and the PKS, it is clear that the term itself is problematic. Through an exploration of the two parties’ activities in politics and the way they treat their members, it is obvious that both have fulfilled the two dimensions of moderation. They accept the democratic process and also have different positions toward ideology. However, while the AKP has abandons Islamic ideology completely, the PKS has tried to ‘revise’ its understanding of Islamic principles which makes it different to the AKP. The difference between the two parties has a significant impact on the implementation of the moderation process itself. The abandonment of its Islamist roots has pushed the AKP to develop different values which are more universal, allowing people with different backgrounds to join. In contrast, the PKS is in the position of reinterpreting ideology, so that it is still difficult for the party to open its membership to everyone, unless new members are willing to join its life-long internalisation process or congregation, which is difficult for non-Muslims.

In the context of moderation potentially triggering ideological tensions, the difference is also quite apparent. The AKP does not have any problems with ideology

because they have already given up any politics based on identity, except on sociological and political grounds. Therefore, religion no longer provides the guidelines for political activism in building the party's institutions and vision, so that tensions based on ideology are relatively insignificant. The PKS, meanwhile, is a different case as it is facing criticisms and tensions for attempting to be pragmatic without giving up its ideology. The PKS has had to deal with internal criticism of its new interpretation of religious principles to legitimate recent political manoeuvres. The case of the PKS seems to confirm that moderation is likely to lead to internal tensions such as internal divisions (Sanchez-Cuenza 2004), splits or dismissals (Orbell and Fougere 1973).

The tension itself is the result of a new policy determined by the party leadership to overcome unexpected election results and perhaps also a long process of reinterpretation. In general, the efforts produced to deal with electoral outcome are crucial, especially for parties that are categorised as seeking either to capture power or to maintain their position in government. This research focuses on the impact of moderation. In the case of the AKP and the PKS, moderation seems have proved manageable. The AKP has not suffered from internal conflict due to ideological disagreement. The PKS actually has faced this problem, but the internal tensions have not led to severe divisions or splits and there has been no attempt to establish a new party as a result of internal divisions. Therefore, it is important to look at the way in which both parties have dealt with the moderation process.

## **II.2 Moderation and Party Management**

### **II.2.1. Party Organisation and Party Management**

In political science, the term 'party management' is not commonly applied. 'Party organisation' is more common. Even though party organisation itself is perceived as a forgotten study and not taken seriously (Janda 1983: 319), scholars who deal with intra-party issues are more in favour of applying that term in their work. One possible explanation for this tendency is that the term management is perceived as being less suited to politics because it is the focus of other sciences, particularly management and administrative sciences.

The study of party organisation has been known as the frontier for the study of political parties. Leading scholars in the study of political parties from Ostrogorski to Michels and Duverger actually built their reputation on research into party organisation.

However, while the study of political parties itself has grown into one of the major studies in Political Science, party organisation is still lacking the attention of scholars. Panebianco (1988: xi) notices that the study of party organisation still has inadequacies in terms of insufficient focus on the complexity of relationship within party organisation since Ostrogorski-Weber, Michels and Duverger. It seems that a persistent lack of research into the intra-party dynamic remains. Substantial problems in this field of study are still being spotted. The approach and perspective in understanding the internal dynamics of internal parties is weak (Mule 1997).

As the study of party organisation itself is perceived as having ups and downs (Scarrow 1996; Janda & Colman 1998) concern about insufficient study into intra-party dynamism are still relevant. It is not only the problem of rarity of the enquiry itself, but also it is a matter of 'perspective.' Some of the studies are still dealing with categorisation or classification (Enyedi & Linek 2008; Boucek 2009) while others try to apply concepts that have been developed by earlier scholars such as oligarchy to contemporary cases (van Biezen 2000). Although the latter research has covered the power relations within political parties, new perspectives are rarely found.

If the question of party organisation is struggling for more attention, research which avoids a tendency to the parochial, and helps to develop a theoretical framework for worldwide comparison -while focusing on micro-level aspects or cases- in terms of party management are even more rarely found and used. It seems that the meaning of the term has been taken for granted with little appetite for elaborating on its meaning (Hanley 1999; Clemens 1998). Unlike others, Aspinwall (2004: 17-21) has tried to fill the deficiency of a conceptual framework by giving an illustration that party management is dealing with an effort to make a balance between different groups or wings within a party when dealing with crucial issues. From his study of the management of British political parties regarding the issue of European integration, he formulates the concept as efforts of the party leadership in the government to deal with pro- and anti-wings toward the issue and there is also a notion of leadership style in this matter. Aspinwall's illustration directs the substance of party management as a dynamic aspect of intra party-activism or an advancement of party administrative aspect (Rogers 2005). If that assumption is accepted, further questions of its conceptual position related to party organisation can be raised here.

The discussion of theorising and measuring party organisation itself has now become a major concern for many scholars. Previously, there was a strong tendency to bring the concept into the study of organisations generally, where political parties were perceived as being organisations similar to others. The latter perspective does indeed enable many internal aspects of political party organisation to be identified such as the degree of organisation or complexity, centralisation of power, coherence, and involvement which can also be broken down into micro level variables (Janda 1983: 326).

Even though developing measured variables is important for the analysis of party organisation, the need to focus on administrative and structural aspects is also clear. This also emerges from recent works on party organisations under the banner of comparative politics. The flourishing studies of party organisation in newly democratic countries follow a similar trend to apply indicators of the size of party membership, the extensiveness of their organisations, the level of professionalization of the political parties, and the attitudes of their leaders towards organising (Van Biezen 2003; Spirova 2005: 605). The significance of structure toward party activism or performance is admitted by saying that, “..... It is clear that it is the mode of organization that will determine if and how effective parties can perform the roles in promoting democratic institutionalisation. It is important to study how political parties in new democracies organize” (van Biezen 2003: 5). It is therefore structural analysis that is still significant in recent studies of party organisation, even though the new perspective of neo-institutionalism suggests more independent relations between the agents within an institution (Peters 2005).

One of the issues that may create divisions in a political party is the party's strategy in relations to ideology. The question of whether a political party should be strict on ideology or should focus on pursuing public office has been a major discussion from Downs (1957) to Strom (1990) and Schlesinger (1994). If the party prefers to pursue positions in public offices, winning elections is necessary. However, according to Downs and Schlesinger's proposition, in order to win elections, a political party should accommodate voters' preferences which can be contradictory to the party's ideology. Discussions of party activism in the electoral process, then, have directed scholars to develop three different categories of political parties which are vote-seeking, office-seeking and policy-seeking (Strom 1990).

For an ideological political party, which falls into the policy-seeking category, submission to ideological preferences over pragmatic goals of gaining political positions or winning elections is critical and may generate tensions, conflicts and even splits among the party members. For Strom (1990: 574), in facing intra-party dynamism regarding problematic incentives between pragmatism and party guidelines, the focus of party activism is mainly on the party's leaders who are perceived as being unitary and rational actors. Based on these assumptions, he can identify strategies applied by the party leaders in dealing with different objectives of policy-seeking, vote-seeking, and office-seeking. The strategies are decentralisation of policy decisions, impermeable recruitment structures, and accountability of personnel -especially party leaders.

Strom's proposal has initiated an integrative analysis approach to the study of party organisation by using a behavioural approach and giving examples of party leadership strategies. However, the exchange model of controlling political parties is also categorised as one of the models of party organisation along with other models (Duverger's mass party; Epstein's electoral party; Kirchheimer's catch-all party; and Katz and Mair's cartel party) rather than party management (Maor 1997: 96-99). It seems that even though Strom's model has a strong nuance of power relations rather than a structural approach, the term party organisation is still more attractive for political scientists compared to the latter.

Studies of the relationship between party organisation and ideology also illustrate that the nuance of structural approach is quite influential. In this subject, scholars have discovered that there are different kinds of party organisations, in terms of the structural dimension of more ideological parties. There is also a link between ideology and organisation of political parties (Enyedi and Linek 2008: 457). Centre-right parties tend to have a 'light organization' dominated by public office holders and supported by donation from business groups, less active members, and a less complex organisational structure, and depend on more charismatic leaders. In contrast to the centre-right, centre-left parties tend to have large-scale organisation and an active paying membership. Janda and King (in Enyedi and Linek 1985: 458) also confirm that there is a distinction in organisational style between them, especially on complexity and level of centralisation.

Later studies have strengthened the tendency to use the term party organisation and blend aspects of party management into it. The former term then becomes the conceptual umbrella for every aspect of party activism, while the latter becomes out of fashion. The

reluctance to use aspects of management in the study of party organisation might be the reason for the absence of a consideration of power relationships. A political party as an organisation applies managerial relations because it is a place for many political activists at different levels to put their interests into practice. That is why their activities can be called political activism. For the party's leadership at every level, the means of synchronizing all activists and their interests under a certain regulation is actually the implementation of management. The difference between pure management as a science and management in politics is the substance of relationships among the activists: power. The perspective of political management with power relationships as the basis of activism may relieve the deficiency of power relations in the study of party organisation. It is in accordance with Panebianco's concern (1988, xii) that the substantial analysis of party organisation is to give attention to the importance of power relations.

The debates over dynamic relations within an institution reflect the motivation to find a better understanding of political behaviour. In political science, the discussions are represented in the long contestation among existing approaches, mainly between institutionalism and behavioralism, on how to locate the 'real' actor of an action. For an institutionalist, institution is more important and has a great influence on the people's political actions. In contrast, the behavioralist approach denies such a claim, saying that the individual acts autonomously (Dahl 1961). The difference between the two is seen in the way of collecting data for analysis, which, in the end, generates two distinct and extreme positions. In relation to the examination of two political parties in this thesis, it is practical to look at the anti-thesis of both extreme in the form of new institutionalism. Although the latter approach originated from institutionalism as a reaction toward behavioralism and rational choice theory, there are aspects relevant to the study of party management, especially in its relation with ideology.

The approach is still looking for a solid argumentation and in fact it has not reached a single argument in understanding of what the best meaning of the approach is. One of the reasons is because the approach suffers from a diverse variety of explanations of the meaning of new institutionalism itself (Immergut 1998: 5). This is due to the fact that the approach has been claimed by different versions to form at least five dissimilar conceptions and methodologies: normative, rational choice, international, historical, and societal institutionalism (Peters 2005: 18-22) or rational choice, organisational, and historical

(Immergut 1998: 5). Despite the variations of arguments in the approach, the main argument of the new institutionalism is relevant for the research as it assumes that collective action should be the major approach in explaining political actions. It means that individual actions should be related to political structures, defined as ‘a collection of institutions, rules of behaviour, norms, roles, physical arrangements, buildings, and archives’ as they turn into major preferences of the action (March and Olsen 1984: 740-1). Hence, there are no ‘context-free’ actions as the individuals will refer to the existing institutions, including norms and values.

The practicality of this approach to this research is to give an idea of examining the major institutions that influence party members’ behaviour in dealing with the dynamic situation of moderation. In the organisational conception of new institutionalism, political decisions cannot be understood as aggregations of individual preferences as argued by behavioralism by accumulating all single individual actions. In contrast, it believes that these decisions are the result of organisational procedures and structures (Immergut 1998: 16). Other than organisational factors, March and Olsen emphasised the importance of norms or values to play as ‘logic of appropriateness’ in shaping the individual’s behaviour in particular organisations (Peters 2005: 19). Despite the weaknesses of these arguments, the importance of political structures and values to construct collective action finds its relevance in examining the dynamic of the moderation of the AKP and the PKS. Moderation implies the behaviour of the parties as political actors in directing moderate objectives, but there is also a strong dimension of members’ behaviour since the policy also relates to ideological implications. In explaining the dynamics of the parties and their members, the explanation of both (party and individual) actions will be based on organisational structures and procedures as explained in the parties’ constitutions combined with an examination of members’ individual preference in relation to the collective preference.

### **II.2.2. Managing Moderation**

Panbianco’s concerns on power relations suggest that management is important in how a party leader deals with impacts of moderation. In many cases, severe action from replacement to dismissal could become necessary because moderation means a new direction that is likely to trigger tensions due to different interpretations. In this



circumstance, power is significant because the party's leaders can use their legitimate position as leaders supported by the party's constitution to replace or even dismiss internal opponents. Therefore, it is also a discussion of strategy by which the survival of the policy of moderation can be assured.

Strom has mentioned that the role of the party's leadership is significant in the moderation process. Despite the problem of classification and terminology, the strategies offered by Strom as discussed before are actually equivalent to the objectives of the study of the AKP and the PKS, both of whose leaderships have to deal with different preferences of their members toward certain issues. However, there is a problem in applying Strom's proposal to both cases because it assumes that the party will give space for every member to get involved in the party's organisational process, even for factions which are not in favour of the leadership's preferences. Consequently, the proposal gives an opportunity for factions to challenge or change the party's policies through formal process, although, in fact, not all sections of the party may have similar opportunities because there is a tendency towards oligarchy, concentrating power in the hands of a small number of the party elites.

A similar opportunity is more difficult to find when the dispute relates to interpretation of ideology. For critical ideologues among the party's membership, the party's policy of trying to win elections or seeking office may not be acceptable. However, they have a problem in challenging the policy because their power base is not equal to that of the party's elites. Therefore, the relationship tends to be a zero-sum one as the party's leader could freeze the opponents' membership, hamper their political career in the party, or even dismiss them from the party. On the other hand, critical members may oppose the policy very critically and accuse the leadership of violating the party's ideological basis. For them, there might be no toleration for the violation and the only solution to resolve the difference is the removal of the party's leadership. In this situation, the medium for both sides to compete and contest their ideas is very limited and tends to be monopolised by the party's leader, which holds formal and high-ranking positions in the party, and most importantly, monopolises the interpretation of the party's ideology through internal education and socialisation.

Hence, the party's leaders need to apply different efforts in order to manage the sort of tensions or disputes based on ideological interpretation that are the focus of this study. These disputes are basically the impacts of moderation when the AKP and the PKS have

attempted to become centrist parties. In this case, the leadership of both parties need to offer a new interpretation of ideology that gives legitimacy to the shifting of the parties' direction from policy-seeking to voter and office-seeking. In the context of introducing a new direction, Strom's analysis offers a focus on the party's leadership as a strategy for a political party to deal with impacts of moderation. It gives attention to political consideration in dealing with the party's activists as pragmatists and ideologues. The leadership will treat them on the basis of what benefits the party in running government and facing election. As mentioned by Strom, the three strategies to deal with pragmatists and party guideliners are decentralisation of policy decisions, impermeable recruitment structures, and accountability of personnel -especially the party's leadership. In this research, the party's leadership becomes a variable to be applied to both parties in looking at different implementation in dealing with any critics and tensions.

However, both parties show that the role of the party's leadership is not the only strategy used to maintain solidity at critical times. Both parties also applied other strategies by developing trust among members from mid and low-rank levels. Trust is a strategy to deal with differences and it has proved to be less painful (McEvily et al: 2003) by persuading the party's members to maintain their loyalty without any force. One useful dimension of trust is the "willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the action of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control the other party" (Mayer et al. 1995: 712). The term 'party' in this definition can be related to any person, group or institution that interacts with another. By focusing on willingness, the definition offers a better conception to perceive trust as a positive social relation rather than as risk taking. Although the definition of trust itself as a concept has many problems, it is still useful to see the willingness of party members to accept the elite's strategy for moderation. During the process, there will be a high degree of uncertainty among the members and to some extent they will be unable to understand the behaviour and direction of the party. In this situation when the ability to control or to perceive the new strategy as part of the party's ideology is crucial, trust will play a significant role in minimising criticisms and opposition. What also makes it positive is that this trust can guide the members' behaviour to conduct beneficial actions based on the assumptions that the trusted persons will not benefit from others' weaknesses.

In a changing organisation, especially when it is related to the basic principles of values or ideology, formal control is sometimes difficult to implement. The legitimacy of the leadership may be under question and it may be accused of violating the party's ideology. Unlike decomposition strategy, which is costly and more traumatic, trust represents a better, more efficient and less painful, option (McEvily, et.al, 2003: 92). In an organisation with a high level of trust, decision making is easy to develop since members are willing to accept decisions as well as the reason. In such a situation, the leadership can explain to the members within a certain ideological perspectives easily and comfortably. Through trust, both sides are "simplifying the acquisition and interpretation of information" allowing information to be transferred more efficiently (93).

In contrast with trust, scholars also recognize that dealing with hardliners can be forceful and painful because it requires special treatment to force members to be loyal. If the treatment is not successful the party can dismiss them to resume the party's existence in politics. Dismissal, or decomposition, (Orbell and Fougere 1973) is one of the most common strategies to deal with those who oppose the party's decisions and directions in the context of moderation. Before applying this strategy, a political party can try to persuade its members to change their mind through the more forceful treatment of alienation. This strategy is applied in the PKS to deal with members who tend to contradict and dissent party decisions and policies.

The model focuses on a strategy of decomposition when a party expels a certain faction (individual or group) within the party which opposes the party's decision of moderation. The reason for the expulsion is to maintain internal harmony and support from a segment of voters. Orbell and Fougere explain the reason why the elite of a party may decide to expel a prominent elite member who has significant influence and supporters either within the party or in society due to his or her commitment to the original ideological position. However, the decision is positive for the party that decided to change its ideology to adapt to the recent general tendency of its supporters, who currently prefer a more centrist programme. It is also important for the party's activists, since the majority of them are loyal to the pragmatist approach. Expelling one faction or a member of the party elite who does not support the move to become a centrist party is more useful for the party rather than keeping them in the party or parliament whilst behaving contrary to the party's policy.

The decomposition model focuses on the managerial dynamic of a party to deal with the impact of moderation and initiates further conceptual analysis of intra-party dynamism. One of the objectives of moderation is to maintain a wide range of activists, supporters and passive voters after moving toward the centre. Some supporters might not be pleased with the decision and the performance of the 'new' party and then launch a campaign to retain the original ideological position. This tension may trigger severe conflicts, which is unproductive and infringes upon party harmony. This is the main contribution of the decomposition model, which captures the essential process of moderation as a traumatic experience.

Another contribution of the model is that it offers an effort to describe in more detail the categories of activists within the party. According to the model, there are two models of activists, called Type A and B activists. The first type represents a more active and ideological activist with a strong commitment to the party. Consequently, rewards are needed to maintain their loyalty and commitment parallel to their 'ambition' to become leaders of the party or representatives in the parliament or executive offices. On the other hand, the other type of activists is voluntary workers who do not harbour any strong political ambition.

However, this categorisation of different levels of party activist might not be the most significant contribution for the concept. The definition of party activist offered by Orbell and Foguere is not sophisticated enough to explain how a political party implements its strategy in order to minimise the impact of moderation process. One of the crucial issues here is that the model has been developed in a relatively advanced political system which has different social and political contexts. It is important to consider the different social and political context in the context of Muslim countries, which still recognise, at various levels, the importance of values or even ideology in their social and political life. The case of the AKP and the PKS clearly shows the role of certain values in the society, which have to be taken into account, not only Islam as a formal basis but also other societal norms and values.

Another strategy is 'conversion and replacement' (Carsey and Layman 1999), which applies to a party seeking to change members' interpretation of moderation as a newly direction and at the same time replace those who oppose the policy with members who support it. Carsey and Layman offer a more specific explanation of the relationship

between activists and ideological change. According to them, there are two processes that can describe the process of ideological change of the party's activists: conversion and replacement. Neither concept specifically explains the party's management of a decaying ideology but it may be relevant to the process of ideological strengthening. According to them, conversion is a process whereby activists' ideological preferences are changed according to the party's new direction. Converted individuals or factions will change the direction of the party once they are able to dominate or hold key positions in the decision making process. Meanwhile, replacement is a mobilisation of newly party activists with new ideological interpretation to replace old activists. For Carsey and Layman, the latter process is commonly accepted as the major sources of party change (1999: 18). Combined with the replacement process, converted members of party elites can manage the process of party change by mobilising the new activists with a similar interpretation to replace opposition within the party.

The case of the AKP shows that conversion is applied in different ways. The AKP has had to pay attention to conversion strategy since the party abandoned its ideological preference and the change had to be explained to its members with a more religious stance. However, the conversion in this context is somewhat different to the original meaning as offered by Carsey and Layman. It is not the conversion that contributes to the new direction of the party itself, but rather it is the changing position of the party's activists from the opposite interpretation to accept a more moderate ideological stance as supported by the party elites. There are two dimensions to this change, the individual process as an independent reflection upon, and acceptance of, the new interpretation, and the structural process imposed by the party as a formal mechanism to give 'correct' interpretation to party members.

In the case of the PKS, it can be noted that there is also a particular strategy to control its members, that of alienation. This is a strategy unique to an ideological party so that it will be less relevant for the AKP. In the discussion of political alienation, the centre of analysis mainly focuses on an individual related to his or her environment. From the classical tradition of Marxist labour alienation in the economic process to the recent analysis of political alienation, alienation is perceived as being a condition of estrangement of electorates from the political system. Some of the conditions that describe the situation of electorates are distrust in politicians and dissatisfaction with democracy (Borre 2000).

Alienation then is seen as a negative effect of unpopular social or political events due to misleading behaviour on the part of the system and those who dominate it. In the political context the negative aspect is attached to individuals or electorates, their behaviour is seen in unexpected actions such as an absence from the electoral process (voter apathy) or voting for different candidates or parties (protest voters). The reason for this is because there is a gap between politicians as policy makers in government bodies and as candidates during an election campaign. There is an unexpected outcome of the political process which makes an individual feels powerless, meaningless, normless, and isolated (Finifter 1970: 390-391) due to the impact of environmental adjustment towards the individual. In the context of an ideological party, creating these conditions acts as an effective disincentive for those who oppose the party's change in direction. For members who have a strong identification with a party due to its ideology, to be subject to such treatment is difficult. Hence, it will discourage any attempts to be critical.

However, besides the involuntary, externally imposed alienation there is also a dimension of self-alienation when an individual feels that 'because of its very nature, his social world is not worth participating in it' (Olsen 1969: 291). The discussion of alienation, then, views the individual's environment as an insignificant focus of discussion in the analysis of political alienation. In certain cases, alienation can be seen as a deliberate mechanism conducted by an institution or political authority as a process of achieving for certain political objectives. The 'negative' outcome for political activists who are not in agreement with the leadership's new interpretation of party ideology is seen as a positive result from the perspective of party solidity. The withdrawal of activists who are critical of or who disagree with the leadership's authority is a positive outcome in this matter. Therefore, alienation may be implemented by an authority as an effort to purify the party's members from discourses which are seen as unproductive.

However, in applying this mechanism, the authority runs the risk of provoking unexpected behaviour other than apathy or self-alienation. The policy of decomposing senior and important party figures may also lead to disagreement within the membership. Thus, there is a gap between the leadership and the party's members which needs to be contained in order to control the situation. The emergence of critical members among the PKS's activists is a result of this unexpected and uncontrollable situation which may lead to the appearance of wider protest. Unexpected results in the electoral process as experienced

by the PKS in the 2009 election and its uneasy relation in coalition with the incumbent president may become the basis for wider resentment or distrust. In filling the gap caused by the new direction of PKS, the leadership was able to maximise its legitimacy and support from most of the party's members because of a relatively high degree of trust between the members and towards the leadership.

These strategies will be examined for both parties to explore the difference between parties with different levels of moderation. The AKP is assumed to give more attention to party leadership and trust in its appeals for loyalty. In different circumstances, the PKS has to rely on ideology to maintain loyalty in order to solidify its members. Therefore, the Islamic party in Indonesia has more incentive to apply decomposition and alienation combined with leadership and trust. The difference in application of the strategies will be discussed in the next chapters, especially in Chapter IV and V, which focus on the two parties. The next chapter will give more explanation of the history of both parties to describe the different processes of moderation and its impacts.

### **Chapter III**

## **Moderation of the AKP and the PKS and Its Impacts**

As mentioned in Chapter II, moderation is not a homogenous category. It can be seen that different cases will apply different grades of moderation dependent on many factors. One of the main criteria to examine the difference is the attitude toward ideology; whether it is abandoned, postponed, or reinterpreted. Therefore, it is important to look at the ideological preferences of the AKP and the PKS to examine their position on ideology. As indicated previously, the AKP has shown a tendency to abandon ideological preference, while the PKS tends to reinterpret the party's ideology to meet the need to appeal to more of the electorate.

The other aspect of moderation is the position vis-à-vis democracy. It is surely important to examine their position on the democratic process and its principles. However, in the context of both parties, it is more important to look at the relationship with the voters in the electoral process. The objective of the party in moderating their position is that the electoral process is the arena for both parties to respond to public demand, which is crucial for the shift in position toward ideology. For the PKS it is a significant factor for moderation, where the political system provides a relatively free arena for ideological parties to participate in the electoral process to attract as many votes as possible. It is a slightly different case with the AKP where the state constitutes another factor as a pressure for moderation. However, the AKP relies significantly on the electoral process for its strength as the representative of the people in negotiating with the state. Therefore, dealing with public demand is also crucial for the political success of the AKP.



### **III.1. Moderation and Its Impact on the AKP**

#### **III.1.1. The Development of the AKP**

Three general elections in 2002, 2007, and 2011 have shown that the AKP has positioned itself as a centrist party in the Turkish political spectrum. This position is crucial for the party since centrism has consistently been the preference of the majority of the Turkish people since the 1960s, as shown in their support for centrist parties and figures such as the DP (*Demokrat Partisi* or Democratic Party) under Adnan Menderes, the AP (*Adalet Partisi* or Justice Party) under Suleyman Demirel, and the ANAP (*Anavatan Partisi* or Motherland Party) under Turgut Ozal. Therefore, the political success of the party cannot be separated from its ability to offer the public the image of being a centrist party and maintain this as a political basis for its future achievements.

However, it is quite misleading to see the AKP as a purely secularist party similar to other 'normal' political parties. Unlike the CHP (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* or People's Republican Party), which is perceived as the heir of Kemalism and perhaps as a 'raw model' of a secular party, the AKP has a historical link with Islamist parties as a result of the connection of some of its founders with the abolished parties of the RP and the FP. It is known that figures such as Erdoğan, Gül, and Arınç developed their political careers in those parties before the establishment of the AKP. The connection with those parties has formed the basis for allegations from secularist strongholds that the party is bringing Islamist ideas into Turkish politics and becoming a focal point for anti-secular activities.

The AKP was established by Erdoğan, Gül and Arınç after they criticised the way the RP and the FP approached Turkish politics. They saw that Erbakan's political approach and style during his leadership of the RP and his influence on the FP were no longer suitable for Turkey's changing political situation. Erbakan was perceived as a dominant figure with a strong preference for Islamic policies. His short experience as prime minister from July 1996 to February 1997 following the RP's victory in the 1995 election showed his intention to develop closer ties with the Muslim world rather than the West. This tendency led the military to pressure him to step down in a move known as the 28<sup>th</sup> February process. For the younger generation within the RP, pressure from the secularist camp to resist this apparent Islamic approach in politics was seen as too risky, possibly leading to a dangerous situation, and the approach therefore needed to be transformed.

The determination to change the approach was implemented by challenging the pro-Erbakan candidate, Recai Kutan, in the election for party chairman in May 2001. However, Gül's candidacy failed and he was defeated by Kutan, who maintained his position in the internal election, albeit by the relatively small margin of 633 votes to 521 (Yesilada in Rubin and Heper, eds. 2002: 69). The failure to weaken Erbakan's influence meant that there was only limited opportunity to take a different line as long as Erbakan was still dominant. This situation led to a proposal to leave the party. The closure of the FP in July of the same year gave Erdoğan and Gül an opportunity to express their idea of offering a new approach in politics under the banner of the AKP, which was officially announced in August 2001.

Establishing a new party has not led to Erdoğan and Gül discontinuing their connection with Islam completely. The political background of the leading figures in the AKP Gül's candidacy in the FP election and the more obvious example of Erdoğan's mayoralty of Istanbul under the RP in 1994 - has given the AKP an Islamic hue. Erdoğan's mayoralty was his highest political achievement under the RP after serving as head of the party's branch for the largest city in the country. Similarly, Gül started his political career with the RP, entering parliament for the first time in 1991 as a member of the party. Their deep involvement with the party has marked their embedded Islamic identity because the RP was also regarded as having an Islamic agenda. Erdoğan's efforts to ban alcohol in Istanbul when he served as mayor is an example of their record of promoting a religiously-related policy that led to suspicions among secularists that their true agenda is to put Islamic values in the public space.

That background has given chances for many secularists to accuse them of having a hidden Islamic agenda, or at least given rise to anxiety regarding their honesty in supporting secularism as the unchallenged basis of the Turkish state. However, politics is not just a game played by the elites. During the electoral process, the most important thing is how to attract as many votes as possible. Therefore, the discourse of whether the AKP is an Islamic party or not is less relevant than the concern of whether the party can offer the public what it wants. It is the electoral process that has been maximised by the party's ability to gain strength, as well as its reputation as a secular, rather than an Islamic, party.

This was also the case with the RP when it surprisingly won the popular vote in the 1995 national election. Even political parties with a more apparent Islamic discourse such

as the RP understood the character of the median voters in Turkish society. The RP under the leadership of Erbakan, the founder of the Millî Görüş movement, also tried to attract voters by developing an image as a party for the people through a strong and organised network of workers and volunteers which could reach every corner of the country to offer something that may help to ease their situation. The women's wing of the party was a clear example of the RP carrying out activities at the societal level to establish good contacts with the local people and get involved in every social event from marriages to funerals (Arat 2005). It is not surprising then to observe that the AKP has inherited and shaped some aspects of that initial moderate character. However, unlike the RP, which only maximised the moderate character in its campaign strategy, the AKP has moved forward from that level by accepting more from secularism while, at the same time, giving up some aspects of religious expression in politics.

As a result of the disappointment felt by the younger generation led by Erdoğan towards Erbakan's leadership style in the RP and its political prospects, the AKP's proposal managed less expression of political Islamism in Turkish politics. The manifestation of this approach under the new party put the Islamic political agenda outside the party's agenda. Islam was seen in term of individual and social expressions. This was reflected in the party's campaigning, which focused on a non-religious agenda to appeal to Turkish voters. The AKP's moderation can be categorised as a substantial moderation since the party's elite has shifted its orientation from religious-affiliated politics and focuses on working for the agenda of the Turkish people (Hidayat 2009). It is categorised as substantial since it is not only a tactical approach but both tactical and ideological. In Wickham's terms, the AKP is categorised as a moderate party because it has abandoned its ideological preference.

The foundation of the AKP could be seen as an effort to make a clear distinction with the pro-Erbakan camp and to develop a different approach in Turkish politics. One of the most important distinctions from its predecessor is that the AKP accepts principles of secularism not only in its political expressions and symbolic appearance but also in the party's principles (Tepe 2002). Accepting secular aspects and lessening religious credentials is perceived as being the most suitable accommodation in order to survive politically and avoid further state containment. In the context of negotiable relations between the state and the Islamic camp, the latter, represented by the party, is more

prepared to accept the former's demands (Turam 2007) despite many concerns regarding the AKP's genuine agenda.

Therefore, the first task for Erdoğan and Gül was to emphasize their detachment from the RP and the FP. The establishment of the AKP was surely not enough in the early phase of the party for a secular critic who needed political and public assurance as to what their ideological stance was. Erdoğan admitted that he has taken off the clothes of the past to assure doubters that he has changed (Heper and Toktas 2003). A similar conciliatory declaration was offered by Gül when he was running for the presidency saying that he would act according to the principles of secularism and promised to support them (BBC News, 28 August 2007). For analysts, this strategy of breaking their ties with the past was important politically to ensure their survival in politics (Aktay 2009).

Officially, the party has survived several political manoeuvres to remove it from the political arena. At least two such moves have been made; the military's attempt to discredit the party before the 2007 national election and the allegations of having an Islamist agenda from Turkey's chief prosecutor in an effort to close it down in 2008. Both efforts were unsuccessful. The first merely boosted support for the AKP and Gül was elected as president despite the military's reluctance to support him because of his headscarf-wearing wife (Hurriyet Daily News, 20 December 2010). Meanwhile, the second case was rejected because of insufficient support from juries in the Constitutional Court (Turkish Daily News, 31 July 2008).

The success and survival of the AKP since its foundation and during its time in power are due to its efforts to propose a moderate strategy and ideological standpoint which is crucial to adapt the Turkish political and social circumstances. As noted before, the obvious character of the party's moderation is its ability to accept secularism and lessen its ideological standpoint. That aspect of moderation is crucial in the context of moderation since it may reduce the contentious reaction from those who oppose the party's original ideological position. With the party's campaign strategy and its public image the AKP is able to offer a more attractive option for the Turkish people. The ability to win elections at both the national and local level including a referendum is an obvious indication of its success in attracting popular support.

The study of the party's moderation process in relation to the voters in Turkey has been discussed in the context of political behaviour and electoral process (Çarkoğlu &

Kalaycıoğlu 2007), relation to the state institutions (Turam 2007), socio-economic basis (Yavuz ed., 2006), and relation to the state ideology of secularism (Tepe 2006, Cizre ed., 2007). In relation to the moderation theory, there is a body of literature discussing the nature of the party. In general, there are common concerns with the nature of moderation in relation to median voters (Tezcur 2010a), the outcome of such transformation in policy preferences (Turunc 2007) and impacts on Turkish society (Ersoy 2010). Tezcur is one of the scholars who tries to explore more deeply into the complexity of moderation theory. He argues that the theory is useful in understanding the nature of moderation and the reason why a party like the AKP is eager to embrace the ideological shifting and points out that the basis of the shifting is the transformation of the leaders' understanding of ideology (Tezcur 2010b). It is then important to notice that the transformation reflects the commitment to embrace democratic values as seen in the policies of the Department of Religious Affairs to transform religious norms and traditions that are incompatible with liberal democratic values (Somer 2004). These examples of literatures run in parallel with the basic conception of moderation in this research. However, those studies give little attention to the internal dynamism of the AKP during the moderation process and the way the party develops members' loyalty during and after the process and this study tries to fill that gap through the explanation of the party's strategies during the process of moderation.

### **III.1.2. Aspects of Moderation**

#### **III.1.2.1. Attracting Voters and Electoral Triumphs**

The AKP has succeeded in retaining power for the third time after a landslide victory in the 2011 election, following its successes in the 2002 and 2007 elections. In the latest national election, the party gained almost 50 percent of Turkish voters to legitimize its status as the majority power in parliament. As such, the party became the first to form a single party government at three consecutive elections since the AP of Suleyman Demirel in the 1960s. The party also attracted attention since its initial success came only one year after its foundation in August 2001.

Despite its success in gaining wider support from the public through the electoral process, many elements of the state and society are still anxious about the AKP's real identity. As mentioned before, these suspicions emerged as the party was established by figures with significant previous attachments to the RP and FP, both of which were viewed

as focal points for anti-secular elements of the Turkish state. The basis for these accusations was the incident when one of its elected Members of Parliament, Merve Kavakci, entered the oath ceremony wearing a headscarf, infuriating secularist members of parliament, who attempted to block her way to the podium (Jenkins 2003: 52).

However, the attraction of the AKP for outside observers is not only its identity but also its ability to obtain such massive success in a relatively short time. In explaining the achievement, researchers have proposed a variety of reasons for the party's victory, using different approaches. The first explanation argues that the emergence of AKP as a dominant power in parliament after the 2002 and 2007 elections is a result of changing party preferences in the Turkish party system spectrum (Sayari in Sayari & Esmer 2002: 22). In the last ten years, scholars have identified shifting trends in voting preference following the RP's victory in 1995, and the success of the DSP (*Demokratik Sol Partisi* or Democratic Left Party) and the MHP (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* or Nationalist Movement Party), known as leftist parties, in the 1999 election (Gunes-Ayata & Ayata in *ibid*: 152). The success of these three parties has been attributed to the decline of centrist parties, which usually dominated the elections and held governmental positions as the legacy of Demirel and Ozal. Therefore, according to this analysis, Turkish voters no longer identified themselves with any of the centrist parties and shifted their support to other parties.

Following the shift in the party preferences of Turkish voters, it is relevant to consider the reasons behind that shift. According to Sayari (2002: 30), voters' identification with the centrist parties has decreased because of the failure of the government and state to meet citizens' expectations and concerns on a broad range of issues. One of the main concerns is economic and social problems, which have contributed to the difficulties of daily life for many Turks. The failure to ease day to day conditions has contributed to a loss of respect for the government and has significantly affected their willingness to vote for political parties and their leaders who run the government.

As respect for politicians was getting lower, anger among voters was increasing significantly and driving them to find alternatives. In this hypothesis, social and economic deprivation becomes the main factor for the protest against the ruling government. However, the anger of the voters is not always directed at a particular political party but indicates a protest against the system as a whole (Yavuz 2006) combined with the rise of more transcendental values among the voters that influence their political preference

(Sayari and Esmer 2002). The failure of political parties to offer satisfactory policies has created the context for advancing this approach among the people. Therefore, giving the votes to alternative parties was the direct outcome of dissatisfaction with politics and the way in which politicians behaved.

This situation encouraged people to seek alternatives to previous centre-right parties and the result is a relatively high degree of electoral volatility and a tendency for personalization of parties, especially in the case of the AKP in 2002. In 2002, when the AKP won the election, electoral volatility reached its highest degree of 41.2 percent, showing a significant shift of voters from other parties to the AKP (Hazama 2007: 3-5). Data from among the party's supporters shows a shift from traditionally centre-right parties, even though the party identifies its position as a centre-right party. However, there is no doubt that the AKP basically replaced the position of the RP and the FP. A majority of the supporters of these two parties, some 69 percent, voted for the AKP. There was also a shift in support of 29 percent of MHP voters and 29 percent of ANAP voters to the AKP. Meanwhile, 29 percent of new first-time voters also voted for the AKP (Yavuz 2006: 258). This factor is important in the context of analysis in this research, since the success of the AKP is also supported by the leadership of Erdoğan. It is a factor that has attracted many people to not only give the party their vote at the ballot box, but also to join the party. For those who joined the party because of him, the attitude of admiration for him is important, to develop respect for the party leader.

The second factor mentioned in the discussion of the AKP's electoral achievement is the representation of the new middle class within Turkish society who have different preferences toward the political system. As noted by Yavuz (2003: 262), the policy of the AKP of seeking legitimacy through EU membership to challenge the military or the state is vital to appeal the Turkish people, nearly 70 percent of whom supported the accession (Dağı 2005: 29). EU membership was seen as an opportunity for a better economic situation and also a symbol to normalise the Turkish political system. The status quo is represented in the pro-secularist parties and other pro-state establishments such as the military, bureaucracy and judiciary, all of which are mainly dominated by the urban secular elite who seek to preserve their domination of public life.

The new middle class emerged mainly after the implementation of economic liberalisation under Turgut Ozal in the 1980s. The policy offered more opportunities for

small businesses to access capital and markets and thus enabled them to expand their economic capacities. It is important to mention the role of MUSIAD (*Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği* or Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen' Association) as an organisation of business people to accommodate the new rising bourgeois class as an alternative to the long established business group, TUSIAD (*Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği* or Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen' Association). MUSIAD is perceived as representing the new bourgeois class who have a strong attachment to Anatolian culture, which is more religious than its counterpart. The expansion of their economic capacity was enhanced by the economic network of the organisation and due to their new-found prosperity they were able to support the activities of more Islamically-oriented political parties such as the RP, the FP and later the AKP, and began to challenge the economic elites favoured by the state and its supporters (Abramovitz and Barkey 2009: 2).

In this context, the relation between social and economic changes and Islam as an identity and value basis is rather difficult to identify. There are two different extreme explanations that can be mentioned here; firstly, that the socio-economic context is more significant in directing Turkish people to shift their preference. On the other hand, the opposite argument says that the shift in preference is mainly caused by Islam as a significant identity embedded in their daily life to develop significant political identification. The latter argument then offers the role of Islam as an intangible factor which encourages its adherents to act in accordance with the values of the religion. Furthermore, their attachment to these values might also encourage them to carry out more collective actions in the form of a structured movement.

However, Yavuz (2006) argues that in the perspective of state-society relations, Islamic movements are a result of many factors, between Islam as an essential value for its adherents and the context of socio-economic conditions as the basis of constructivist argument. Islam undeniably still plays a significant factor as an identity for many Turkish Muslims, especially in opposition to the state's project of secularisation and modernisation. Islam is also imagined as a major identity to endorse issues of justice and identity in comparison with the strong idea of Turkish nationalism. The existence of Imam Hatip schools, which focus on religious teachings, is a good example of the Turks' willingness to preserve their Islamic identity. The schools are perceived by many as a cultural resentment



within the education system in Turkey toward the state's imposing identity (Acar & Ayata in Kandiyoti & Saktanber eds.: 2002).

Nevertheless, to develop an argument that Islam is the only major factor in shaping the Turkish behaviour is to downplay the influence of the economic and social context. It is, then, difficult to explain the rise of the RP, the FP and the AKP without considering the effect of economic and social changes. According to this argument, there was a major change in the strength of the more religious elements of society thanks to economic liberalisation and an open market implemented by Ozal's administration in the 1980s, which has had an indirect impact on the new social structure of Turkish society. The policy offered great access for more religious entrepreneurs to integrate their economic activities with national and international markets. Before the liberalisation, they had no access to capital and played an insignificant economic role in the market. A new economic class then emerged mainly in provincial towns and afterwards penetrated the major cities and set up businesses to capitalise their wealth. Using their new affluence, they were able to develop their own schools, printing press, newspapers, journals, and broadcast stations. Yavuz referred to it as Islamism in parallel with ethnic Turkish revivalism after experiencing economic and political liberalisation. The new economic class also developed their independence with regard to the state. To express their autonomy from state control they used for election as the main instrument of change. Through elections they gained the opportunity to express their preference without being controlled by the state. This argument is a continuation from his explanation of the rise of the RP in 1990s where he applies the same model to examine the triumph of the AKP in 2002 and 2007 (Yavuz 1997: 72-3).

The argument that socio-economic factors provide a strong basis for the Islamist parties is also supported by Nilufer Narli (1999: 42) and Jenny White (2002). They agree that there is mobilization of Islamic activists and supporters in Turkish society. The combination of economic and social changes has created an enhanced opportunity for Islamists in the urban middle class to mobilise. The economic liberalization of the 1980s gave opportunities for marginalised Muslims to move into new socio-economic areas of society. However, it should be noted that the socio-economic basis is not the only factor affecting their support. There is an interaction between this factor and other factors such as political aims, the interests of specific social groups (such as university graduates seeking employment), and hopes for resolution of the Kurdish issue (Narli 1999: 43).

The AKP has successfully attracted wide public support as well as support from former RP and FP voters. The landslide win in the 2007 election with 46.6 percent of the total electoral vote (and also in the 2011 election with nearly 50 percent), confirmed wide acceptance of the AKP's ability to stabilise the economy (Kanli 2007) and provide better social services when they are in power. The AKP government has indeed managed to provide better services in some important areas such as access to medical care. Its commitment to speeding up the consideration by the EU of Turkish membership and enhancing integration into the global market, combined with domestic programmes to develop infrastructure for economic upgrading has affected many aspects of Turkish daily life. In Kurdish areas, where issues of separatism and unequal development arise, the AKP still gained more than 50 percent of the total vote because of its efforts to reconstruct the basic infrastructure needed by local communities (Ali 2011).

The third factor that contributes to the success of the AKP is related to the issue of protest votes. Before the 2007 election, the military released a message on its website on the 27<sup>th</sup> of April as a warning to the public. The warning mentioned a party with an Islamic agenda, which is forbidden according to the state constitution. This warning was actually part of the effort to foil the party's campaign for Abdullah Gül's presidency at a time when the secularist party in parliament (the CHP) was absent for the vote for the successor to Sezer, the previous president. The secularist efforts to block Gül became the main theme of the AKP's campaign to normalise the Turkish political system. According to one of the party's leaders, the military's manoeuvring contributed to the anger of Turkish voters. To show their discontent against the manoeuvre they supported the AKP in the election. The exact number of those who supported the AKP for that reason is difficult to calculate. However, it was estimated that around ten percent of the 47 percent of votes that the party gained fell into this category (Safuoglu 2009; Aktay 2009).

The fourth factor that contributed to the success of the AKP was the figure of Erdoğan as the party leader (Belcher 2008). Many Turks admit that he is seen as the representative of ordinary Turkish people. His father was from the eastern side of Anatolia and brought his family to Istanbul where Erdoğan was born, in the Kasimpasa district. Erdoğan spent his childhood in Rize, a Black Sea coastal city, until his early teenage years when he moved back to Istanbul. In Istanbul he went to school at the Imam Hatip religious school, while during his free time he sold newspapers and magazines to support his family,

as well as playing football like other teenagers. His background provides an image that can be easily associated with the lives of ordinary Turks (Heper and Toktas 2003), which is strengthened by his wife's connection with the south-eastern region of Siirt.

He is also admired by many Turks because of his ability to change Istanbul significantly when he served as mayor after winning the local election in 1994 under the banner of the RP. During his administration, he successfully delivered better services, especially in transportation, thanks to his experience working in the local transport company (IETT or Istanbul Electricity, Tramway and Tunnel). He improved the water supply after years of water crisis in the city, and succeeded in making a cleaner environment through effective waste disposal. As mayor of Istanbul, he was able to develop an anti-corruption image that was admired by many. For many Turks, then, Erdoğan is seen as an honest leader with a strong vision capable of offering Turkey a better political and economic situation. He is known as a leader who is not reluctant to admit that he is wrong publicly, but is confident in his decisions. His willingness to defend his positions is respected (Safuoğlu 2009). This makes many Turks believe in him and inspires confidence in his leadership.

From the above factors, it is important to note that the AKP has been successful in attracting many Turks by a combination of many factors. The party succeeded in becoming an alternative to other parties as it offered better economic promise. Erdoğan's ability to serve Istanbul is a significant factor as he provided the evidence for many Turks that he (and therefore the AKP) is able to deliver better services. The Erdoğan factor is not only about his ability, but also his trustworthiness person (Aktay 2009). As mayor he was perceived as a humble person who was not corrupt. In this context, religiosity plays a great role because people see him as an honest person due to his personal commitment to religion. It is then difficult to place religion as the main factor in the success of the party because it is a complex combination of other factors. However, it is obvious that the party and its leader do not seek to attract Turks through religious appeal or jargon as previously implemented by the RP. Therefore, ideological preferences do not play a great role in the success of the AKP as the party accepts the principles of secularism.

### **III.1.2.2. Ideological Shift**

For Tepe (2005) the willingness of the AKP to accept secularism does not involve a capitulation of religiosity before the state. Through their possibility of accessing the state's ceremonies and political processes while in the government and parliament, the party is able to penetrate some aspects of religiosity in the state's symbolic and public space. She regards the process of positioning religious symbols in the secular public space as part of the sacralisation. She argues that the chance to be more active in politics has given a chance for the religious middle class to give a religious understanding to Turkish national institutions. One of the examples is that the AKP has tried to give a different understanding of secularism by saying that secularism means neutrality of the state toward religion. Being a secular state does not mean that the state has the right to intervene in citizen's private lives, including religion. It is not the state's duty to force all Turkish people to become secular as defined by the state. As the party controlling the government the AKP has the ability to negotiate with the state even though in some aspects, such as the ban on headscarves in universities and the ban on Imam Hatip graduates entering universities, it has failed to change the rules. The party is able to show that faith can be expressed publicly as long as it is part of private and social, not political, expression.

The process of sacralisation, according to Tepe, works in parallel with the process of internal secularisation by accepting non-religious (secular) values. As an example, the party adapts to the secular Turkish state by admitting the national secular symbols as part of their identity as well. The acceptance of the Turkish flag as the symbol of independence and acknowledging the role of Kemal Attaturk as national hero is part of the process. After the announcement of the party's establishment in a room, with a big picture of the Turkish secular state's founding father, the party leaders went to visit Anıtkabir mausoleum, the place where Kemal was buried, to express their respect for him. Therefore, the AKP is trying to implement value negotiation between religiosity and secularism by sacralising secular symbols and at the same time secularising the party's identity.

The process of using secular jargon within the party has taken place by saying that the party itself is clearly secular. The party identifies itself as a secular party that is open to everyone regardless of their background, ideological preference or religion. However, there is a significant difference in understanding secularism from the AKP's perspective with that of other secular supporters in Turkey. For defenders of secularism, being secular means

avoiding any religious values in institutions such as political parties or state institutions, as well as at an individual level. Different from that understanding of secularism, the leaders of the AKP do not say that they, individually or collectively, are secular. The party as an organisation can be a secular structure that implements principles of secularism. As an organisation, the party does not have an ideology that is imposed on every member with a sole interpretation of it. As a consequence, the party cannot be used to implement any project to impose secularism on every individual within the party. The secular character of the organisation is not paralleled by individuals, who are free to act according to their preferences, including being religious people. Erdoğan, for instance, in his speech at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in 2002 said that only an institution can be secular, not the people. He said, ‘The average Turk is a moderate Muslim and the state’s cultural policies should first and foremost respond to the needs of these people’ (Quoted by Tepe from Sontag 2003).

The AKP has also tried to redefine the meaning of state and nation as inseparable from the people. In this definition, the state is an institution created by the people to preserve the interest of the people, especially in the context of social and economic services. Hence, separating the people from the state is a misinterpretation of the meaning of secularism taken from the West. A secular state is not a ‘sacral’ institution that cannot be challenged by the people. The party accepts the idea of popular support in which democracy, as one of the pillars of the party’s main programme, can exist. This recognition of popular support is essential in the context of Islamist movements. As a movement based on religion they usually believe that legitimacy is only from God. As a consequence, asking for legitimacy from people in electoral process is against the principle of God’s superiority. The definition of a secular state as endorsed by the AKP is an innovative effort to deal with the interests of the guardians of secularism without neglecting the Islamic roots of society. By proposing that interpretation, the party expects to maintain its traditional social support among pro-Islamic supporters and at the same time secure its existence in the political system and widen its social bases.

The AKP also introduced a new interpretation of the West, westernisation and modern values (Daği 2005: 21). Unlike the general view of Millî Görüş, which saw the West as immoral with its capitalistic market system and European Union as a Christian club that must be challenged, the party declared its commitment to speeding up Turkey’s

accession to the Union soon after winning the November 2002 election. In the campaign Erdoğan said, “EU membership is our priority target” and “meeting the Copenhagen political criteria is an important step forward for the modernization of the country” (Dağı 2005: 12). The party also maintained the country’s relations with international financial institutions, especially the IMF, to help Turkey’s economic stability after the crisis in 2001. This policy is very different to the ideas of Millî Görüş, the backbone of the RP, which sees these institutions as the representation of market capitalist power to exploit Third World countries. At the grass roots level, the members of the movement have shown their resentment of Erdoğan’s policy of maintaining close relations with the United States. For them, to meet Barack Obama to represent his position as the president to discuss and negotiate many issues is a symbol of Turkey’s marginal position in front of the United States that is not acceptable for them (interview with local leader of Millî Görüş in Konya 2009).

The AKP moved beyond FP policies. The FP accepted the EU accession process as well as universalist issues such as human rights as a sign that it has changed. However, this was not enough for the AKP. The party does not only want to accelerate the process but also handles other issues relating to religious supporters such as headscarves and Islamic education under the Copenhagen criteria (Saatçioğlu 2010). In order to meet the conditions for accession, the AKP government has introduced several packages of law to improve the country’s record on human rights, which had been one of Turkey’s weakest points according to the EU. The headscarf issue was handled by the government by proposing a bill to give freedom of expression to practice any religious behaviour and identity. However, strong opposition toward the bill made the party decide not to force the issue immediately. It seems that the party is focusing more on the ‘Western’ agenda rather than imposing an Islamist agenda after they came to power. Therefore, instead of leaning on traditional values of anti-globalisation which could erode national identity, the AKP has declared its position to integrate with global structures.

To emphasise that the AKP is a distinctive entity, and especially to convince those in the secularist camp, the AKP leaders declared their disconnection with the past in matters that can be related to allegations of anti-secular activities. As a prominent leader of the AKP with a long history in the RP and subject to accusations of anti-secular activities, Erdoğan leads the project of convincing the public that he and other party members with

historical connections with the RP and the FP have clearly left the Islamic political approach. However, whether he has changed his ideological standpoint is still in debate. Those who are still curious about his real beliefs argue that Erdoğan is still the same as he was under the political umbrella of the RP. In the 1990s, Erdoğan often criticised Kemalism and promoted Islam on many occasions. After he was elected as mayor of Istanbul in 1994 he publicly made comments that raised controversy. He said, “Praise is to God, we support the *shari’a* law” and “Parliament should be opened with prayers” (Jenkins in Yavuz 2006: 188). In a speech in 1992 he also said that one could not be both secularist and a Muslim (Heper & Toktas 2003: 173).

Erdoğan is aware of suspicions of his and the AKP’s position toward Kemalism, and does not reject his historical background. Nevertheless, he himself has clearly stated that everything has changed and he has left everything behind. He no longer uses religious terms in his speeches and accepts secularism at the political level to integrate them with the history of secular Turkey. He said, “There is no ideological connection of ours with any existing party. That’s it. There may be a few among us who had relations with other political parties in the past. But we took the garment off and we considered ourselves as the DP’s continuance” (Yildirim et al. 2007: 10). The declaration is very important for Erdoğan and the party to assure those who are still suspicious of the nature of the AKP, especially some of its prominent leaders, due to their previous connection with Erbakan’s camp (Aktay 2009).

In discussing the different image of Erdoğan as the model of a new Islamic generation in secular politics in Turkey, Heper and Toktas (2003) believe that Erdoğan has not basically changed his ideological standpoint. He still respects Islamic values and tries to bring them to the political realm even though he does not want these to confront the secular ideas of the state. According to Heper and Toktas, what makes him different from other political leaders is his avoidance of terms or symbols that can be differently interpreted by others. However, the interpretation of secular itself does not completely deny the religiosity of the people. Secular for him means a freedom guaranteed by the state for every citizen to practice religious behaviour. He “rejects the interpretation and distortion of secularism as an enmity against religion” (Jenkins in Yavuz 2006: 189).

Therefore, according to this perspective, the AKP is a result of negotiation between secularism based on Kemalist interpretation and the religiosity of Turkish people. Unable to

influence the state to lessen its interpretation of secularism that is imposed at a state as well as individual level as shown by Erbakan's experience, the AKP dropped the demand to accommodate religiosity at a state level. It declared that the party is a secular organisation so that there is no religious agenda supported by the party. However, it refuses to adhere to the state's version of secularism by proposing that the individual has the right to practice religion according to their individual preference. Therefore, the AKP has shifted the confrontation from a state level to an individual level, thus reducing the possible pressure from the state's institutions. For the time being, this strategy has been quite successful in allowing the party to avoid state pressure because the party also plays another battle in the elections.

After three national elections, it is clear that the party is leading in the electoral process enjoying the support of Turkish voters. Nevertheless, despite the success, the AKP still faces a potential threat from secularist strongholds. The closure case submitted by Chief Public Prosecutor Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya in 2008 is clear evidence that similar efforts can be indicted in the future if the party tries to ignite a battle in the state arena. Therefore, the narratives of the party leaders are still located in discourse of the rights of the individual rather than at a state level. Nevertheless, the AKP still avoids using religious expressions in defending the individual's rights to practice religious tradition. It is still reluctant to use religious terms and symbols to deal with 'controversial' issues such as women's veiling, turbans, and the religious symbol of the party (Tepe 2005: 13).

For example, the AKP tried to lift the ban on headscarves in universities not through religious motivation. Before the annulment of the law that has been passed by the parliament, the party argued that lifting the ban is considered as an effort to defend people's rights, especially its constituents, to equal opportunity to higher education. Abdullah Gül, for instance, supports the right of women to wear headscarves by saying "these are individual preferences and everybody should respect them" (BBC News, 27 August 2007). Meanwhile, on the issue of alcohol restriction and prohibition in some local areas, the party representatives also defend their argument by saying that the policy is not based on religious motives but follow similar policies in European countries (Appendix A.4.). The two examples show that the AKP tries to avoid any expression that can be referred to as religious, even though they are part of religious tradition.



However, even though the party officials struggle to explain that it does not have any religious agenda, some of the religious symbols have made their efforts problematic. For example, because some of the wives of the party's elite wear headscarves, they are still refused permission to attend state ceremonies. On many occasions, President Abdullah Gül has had to attend state ceremonies without being accompanied by his wife. He has to attend unaccompanied because the military forces are reluctant to conduct ceremonies if they are attended by the first lady with headscarf. When he hosted a reception for Republic Day in 2010 in his capacity as president, the military leaders refused to attend because it would be attended by her (BBC News, 30 October 2010). Another reason for their suspicious attitude toward the AKP is that a majority of the RP and FP supporters shifted their preference to the party. Research conducted by Basleven and Akarca (2008: 17) confirms that approximately 82 to 87 percent of former RP and FP supporters gave their vote to the AKP in the 2007 election. Because of that, many still perceive the party as a home for religious elements to preserve the images of religiosity within the party (Yavuz 2006).

In that context, it is important for the AKP to develop a particular ideology distinct from being depicted as an Islamic party. The party has proposed an ideology called 'Conservative Democrat' to identify the nature of the party by which a message that the party does not support religiosity in public places can be delivered. So, the ideology has strategic purposes designed by the party's thinker, Yalçın Akdoğan (in Yavuz 2006), to avoid any religious association in the term conservative. At the same time, the term democrat can be used to explain that there is a willingness to support democratic principles and accommodate different political backgrounds. It is the ideology of denial from religion while at the same time symbolising the struggle to explain a new nature (Dağı 2006: 89).

Conservatism is seen as characteristic of the majority of Turks, who are associated with a political attitude that persists on gradual change, as well as a continuation of moral family values in Turkey (Akdoğan in Yavuz 2006: 55). As explained by Akdoğan, who formulated the ideology, the concept does not aim to offer a theoretical debate on the meaning of the concept itself. It is only a reflection that the party is trying to associate itself with the values of the majority of Turks and offer a political approach that is suited to the socio-cultural context. This is an approach that is seen as the continuation of the DP, the AP and the ANAP, all of which were accepted by the Turkish people, as reflected in elections. For many years, religion has been perceived as a moral basis for Turkish tradition rather

than a formal expression in the form of *shari'a*. The efforts to have a more religious expression in politics as shown by the RP are seen as vulnerable and unproductive as it consists of elements of more revolutionary and destructive change. Therefore, conservatism represents the character of moderate Turkish people in perceiving Islam as the basis of morality to encourage gradual change.

Whether the concept of conservatism is compatible with democracy or not is not a problem for the AKP (57). Democracy itself is seen as a non-ideological concept and when it is mixed with conservatism it does not mean that there will be no support for open discourse. What is more important for the AKP is how to implement the commitment to represent the majority of Turks in a democratic way. It is a clear message to the secularists that there is no objective except to defend and develop democracy in accordance with the vision of Kemal. As the ultimate goal, democracy can be used to strengthen the role of society before the state while, at the same time, the party has shown its commitment to the vision of a secular state. In practice, the AKP succeeded in using democratic means to confront the secularist establishment in the deadlocked process of Gül's presidency by asking for an early election in 2007. The referendum in 2010 is also clear evidence that the democratic process is the best way to resolve political deadlock.

By maximising non-religious issues the AKP has gained wide support not only from more rural-based and lower classes, but also from urban-based and middle classes, especially the new middle class, which has arisen as a result of the economic liberalisation that has given opportunity for more rural people to integrate with the economic system. However, the established elite and some elements of the middle classes who support a Kemalist version of secularism tend to oppose the party. Significant numbers of the party's opponents demonstrated in several big cities to oppose Gül's candidacy. They are known to have 'different political attitudes and life-style' to the party's supporters (Ayata in Akanci 2007). Nevertheless, the party did gain support not only from pious and rural voters, but also traditional centrist voters. The party has replaced the fractured old centrist parties and successfully penetrated their traditional supporters with non-ideological programmes that were consistent with their needs.

Therefore, the motives of voters in supporting the AKP are not only dominated by religious factors. For many of the new middle class, the AKP may also symbolise the opportunity to become involved in and influence a system which was previously dominated

by the urban secular class, known as the ‘White Turks.’ Those who are not associated with the ‘White Turks’ have been excluded and repressed by the previous extreme secular approach which suppressed any religious symbol in public life for decades. Through the AKP, the excluded lower and middle classes have the opportunity to compel the system to ease the pressure on religious symbols in public spaces. Yavuz (2003) gives an example of the empowerment of some Turks with more Islamic influence in the public sphere such as in music, poetry and consumer behaviour. This process has given a hope that there is a chance to develop a more modern Islamic identity in the Turkish national context.

### **III.1.3. Impacts on the AKP**

The AKP’s policy of abandoning ideological preferences since its foundation has gained significant results. The most obvious achievement is the ability to win elections and control the government as well as parliament. The party’s success in becoming the ruling party is evidence that the public have given their trust to the party to lead without ideological preference and the party’s direction to focus on more practical issues has proven to be effective in significantly increasing public trust. Therefore, the decision to abandon ideology corresponds with demands of the public who want to see a political party with a more pragmatic approach.

Nevertheless, as a political party, there is a question of whether the direction is also supported by all elements within the party. The question is relevant because many still perceive the AKP as the home of many religious supporters as the majority of former supporters of the RP and FP have shifted their support. Internally, the anxiety is also relevant because there are many members of the party at all levels who were also part of the two closed parties. Party founders, Erdoğan, Gül and Arınç, were clearly members of both parties and became deputies in parliament or mayor to represent them. Some of the middle-ranking party members whom I met during field research were also previously members of at least one of the old parties. There is also research showing that some of the AKP’s women activists were also active in the RP (Erdoğan 2006). The women’s wing of the party is still strong and dominated by members with headscarves despite strong evidence that few of them were nominated by the party (Jenkins 2003: 54).

Despite their experience with the RP, the FP or the Millî Görüş, opposition toward the approach is relatively weak. The absence of an oppositional attitude is shown by the

willingness of many members of these parties to accept the approach since the foundation of the party. There was a process of negotiation with different prominent figures before they decided to join the party, including those in the liberal camp (Yayla 2010). Certainly, some of them examined the new direction and programme to determine the benefits of being members of the AKP (Denemeç 2009). Some important secularist politicians welcomed the offer and agreed to join the party including Kürşad Tüzmen of the NAP, Erkan Mumcu of the ANAP, and Koksal Toptan of the DYP (*Doğru Yol Partisi* or True Path Party). Other middle rank politicians also expressed an interest in joining and strengthening the young party before the first election. They can be perceived as representatives of secularist or nationalist elements to develop the mixture combination of the party with the religious element transferred from the RP and the FP.

At middle and lower levels, there is an indication that most of them were interested in Erdoğan's personal attraction in addition to the party's vision as expressed by some of the informants in this research. In some cases, the process of acceptance and admiration of the party's new direction was determined after joining the party or following at least one of the party's programmes. Some of the women activists found that the AKP has a different approach that is more suitable for individual members compared to the RP. They also found the benefits of the AKP's approach for Turkish people considering the recent political and economic situation. Other cases show a member of an Islamic social organisation who expressed an interest in joining the party after discovering the benefits of the party's role in government for the society. The conclusion was determined after following a party programme focusing on political education which is open either for party members or non-members.

Those cases illustrate the acceptance of the party's direction to abandon preference on ideology. Even though some of them had been members of the RP, they demonstrated enthusiasm with the vision of the AKP. Having drawn a clear line with the SP (*Saadet Partisi* or Felicity Party), the RP's successor, the AKP does not fail to attract their willingness to support and work for the party. The new vision is perceived as being the best option for a political party and they are happy with the new approach to politics. As a result, they are ready to act in accordance with the party's vision. Part of this vision is to be a party for all Turks, so that they are expected to work in different environments than

before such as having discussions and accomplishing party's tasks with members from different backgrounds.

So far, it has been seen that the AKP enjoys strong support from its members and one indication of dedicated support is a lack of tension and conflict. Although there have been cases of dismissal and withdrawal in different cases, most of these are related to breaches of party discipline rather than opposition to the decision to have no ideological preference. The cases are related to moral standards, which is part of the commitment of the AKP to represent Turkish tradition as an implementation of conservatism, such as pornography and drinking. Another case centred on the inappropriate attitude of one of the AKP members towards a leader of an opposition political party.

In the case of withdrawals, many of them are related to government initiatives regarding the Kurdish issue in which the way of managing the policy is also considered. For example, Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat resigned from his position as Deputy Chairman of the AKP in 2008. Even though Fırat's resignation was not declared publicly, it is thought that it was due to his disagreement with the way in which the party leadership chose to deal with the Kurdish issue (Uslu 2008). Other concerns related to the leadership's management came from a deputy and a former minister from the AKP who questioned the way the policy was being prepared. It is reported that Murat Başesgioğlu and Vahid Erdem criticised the process of preparing the initiative because it was designed improperly from the beginning and it had no chance of success (Hurriyet Daily News, 27 December 2009). These are cases of criticism of the party management preparing policy and not of different ideological preferences.

The case of having a dispute on party management is also found in the withdrawal of Erkan Mumcu who declared his departure in February 2005. He declared his decision to resign from his post as minister and party member due to his disagreement with Erdoğan, despite having served as a minister in two different posts under the AKP. Mumcu left the position as Minister of Culture as well as his post as the AKP member to join the ANAP. He found difficulties in dealing with the way the AKP managed the organisation and it was indicated that he was not happy with the position of Minister of Culture (Turkish Daily News, 16 February 2005).

There are also different cases of withdrawal more related to ideological preference which is still related to Kurdish initiative. Days before the voting for the constitutional

reform package is conducted Mehmet Zekai Özcan the party's Ankara deputy also announced his resignation. Unlike other cases of withdrawal, the case of Özcan was more related to the policies of the AKP on Kurdish initiative which he accused of undermining ethnic relations in the country (Today's Zaman, 13 April 2010). Özcan's case can be an example of dispute toward a different political stance because he is in favour of a more nationalistic approach by giving no chance for other identity except Turkism. Nevertheless, the case was not significant in terms of its impact in encouraging other members to act similarly.

For the media, especially those that do not support the government, negative comments from the AKP's deputies will be seen as an indication of tensions within the party. Nevertheless, for the party leadership these kinds of comment are not a big concern since they understand it as expressions of different constituencies (Önen 2010). They are confident that freedom of expression or even internal criticism will not bring the party into crisis. The fact that the cases of resignation are insignificant shows that the party is still manageable. It can be seen from the way other party members show concern regarding an issue. The Kurdish initiative issue encouraged some prominent members to leave, because they saw it as a problem of method or strategy. For example, in dealing with Erdoğan's statement regarding the government proposal, some members working in Kurdish regions said that 'they will not be able to explain Erdoğan's recent "love it or leave it" statement to the Kurds, which could damage the party in the region' (Uslu 2008). Despite these difficulties, concerns about the leadership's attitude did not lead them to resign from the party.

As a party that intends to be a party for all, the AKP initiated the character of open party which was quite evident when the party was established in 2001. In doing so, the party offered the vision to anyone interested to join the party. It also has commitment to develop an open party which was implemented in the early period of the party since its establishment. The commitment was reflected in the party structure to give an opportunity for the party board to be chosen by the lower level in the party congress. Some expressions from the high-rank party members also articulate the role of the party, party representatives in the parliament and members of cabinet to have strong and smooth communication in developing party policies. In the party's early period, the commitment was implemented quite seriously, and for some scholars it was a promising start. However, the potential for

democratic practice within the party has been reduced by the fact that the party is going in a different direction: power concentrated in the hands of a small number of elite party members (Tepe 2005: 73-5). The broad span of the three elements meant the party leadership found it difficult to control all of the party elements appropriately. The appropriate control means that the party leadership needs to have a balanced rhythm to deal with their opponents in parliament and also other elements outside state structure such as business sectors, the media, and parts of civil society which are still critical of the party's policies. To deal with these challenges, the party leadership has, in recent years, tended to implement stricter control over all elements of the party including those in parliament.

Following the success in securing a parliamentary majority and forming a single party government, the party leadership has tended to apply a more centralistic organisation in order to exert more control over all of the party members. Following the party's triumph in the 2002 election, they needed a more solid party which could only be achieved by tightening the leadership's control over party activists, especially in the higher ranks. To tighten their control of the party members they managed to develop a mechanism allowing them to choose more loyal members for leadership positions or those preferred by them, alongside the growing role of Erdoğan as the centre of the party (Kumbaracibasi 2009). This centralistic tendency has to some extent been successful in uniting the members in different levels and positions into a relatively solid political grouping with a unified political manoeuvre to confront challenging opposition from secularist camps in parliament and the wider political arena. In the strenuous situation of Turkish politics, a centralistic party structure seems to be more suitable to conduct more effective political manoeuvre where immediate political decisions have to be made.

However, despite several resignations as well as a tendency of becoming more centralistic, the party still enjoys significant support from its members at each level: elite, middle and lower. Religious elements within the party form one of the backbones of the AKP in support of its recent political stance, even though it is not in accordance with their previous experience with the RP, the FP or the Millî Görüş. The key element is that they understand the new direction and agree that it is the best alternative available in Turkish politics. With that consent, party members will support the party's programmes, even though it is not part of religious expression. In this regard, there is a kind of mutual

understanding between religious elements at many levels with party leaders who propose the new interpretation to conduct politics without religious preference.

With the new approach, the AKP does not have a hegemonic structure that imposes a definitive interpretation of certain issues on all of its members. The party is able to provide a space for debate and discussion of every issue at different levels. The space given by the party is not dominated by one single interpretation and imposed on every member. This simplifies the way the party deals with members from different backgrounds. Therefore, the party can emphasise the process of policy preferences which is relatively open for different party members to participate. Furthermore, the party can also give more attention to members who perform better than others rather than emphasise their connection to ideology.

## **III.2. The Moderation of the PKS**

### **III.2.1. The Development of the PKS**

#### **III.2.1.1. Early Development**

Unlike the AKP in Turkey, which is known for its electoral success, the PKS's achievements in the political arena are not comparable, since the party has not yet been able to become a major player in Indonesian politics. The party's only notable electoral success came in the 2004 election when it doubled its support from 1.4 percent to 7.34 percent. Although this could be categorised as a great success, the party's relatively stagnant result in the 2009 election showed its limited ability to develop the capability to challenge the major political parties or compete with other parties who have more popular figures. What makes the party more interesting than other parties in Indonesian politics is its ideological stance and its efforts to deal with the more pragmatic aspects of politics. Much research has been done recently to explore the party's interpretation of Islam and the way the party develops its capabilities in gaining electoral votes, despite the PKS's status as a relatively young and secretive Islamic movement.

It is still difficult to uncover the reality behind the organisation as well as the ideology of the party. As a new party established after the end of the New Order era with a relatively young membership, there are aspects that are still uncovered. One of the interesting aspects of the party is its tendency to become a moderate party. This effort proved quite successful at the last two national elections in gaining the party significant



numbers of supporters, which has established the party as a medium-ranking political party. However, looking at the fact that the PKS is still an ideological party it is difficult, for some, to imagine that the party is able to transform itself into a real supporter of democracy. Dirk Tomsa (2011), for instance, expresses his concerns regarding the PKS's ability to cope with Indonesian power politics as well its support for Islamist policies. Therefore, it is interesting to look at the party's background. This gives a contradictory image of the party, which raises questions as to its true motivation for engaging in politics. This is a question that can be answered by exploring the nature of the party itself, as it is the product of the transformation of an Islamic movement. Studying the party's historical background, then, has become a subject of interest for many researchers seeking an understanding of its unforeseen appearance in 1998 following the end of the Soeharto era.

The PKS is different from other political parties in Indonesia as it was established by an underground Islamic movement known informally as 'Gerakan Tarbiyah' or the Tarbiyah Movement. The movement had no official name and the members usually just used the term 'tarbiyah' (education) to express the importance of routine and semi-intensive religious training for each member in an effort to refresh their understanding of and commitment to Islamic values. Among the members, gatherings of small groups are called by different names such as *usrah*, *liqa'* or *halaqah*. The way of training its members is rather different from other, previously-established, Islamic organisations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama. The former organisation, which was established in 1912 by Akhmad Dahlan, usually focuses on social services such as education, health care and other social activities. Those who are active in the organisation are usually recruited loosely from the schools and universities run by the organisation, as well as some of the descendants of the older generation. Nahdatul Ulama, meanwhile, which was established in 1926 by Hasyim Asy'ari, is strongly focused on its religious boarding schools, both traditional and modern in the context of the method and curricula, which are to be found in many provinces of Indonesia, mainly in East Java.

Unlike these organisations, both of which carry out tangible activities under a formal organisational structure, the Tarbiyah Movement chose to recruit and run its training without any official organisational form and operated as an underground movement. There were at least two different objectives that influenced the decision by its founders in the early 1980s. Firstly, the objective of purifying the understanding of Islamic values inspired

by the ideas of Hasan al-Banna was sensitive to political authority at that time. Secondly, society in general was immensely suspicious of Islamic movement, since there were many incidents involving Islamic movements. The New Order regime in the 1980s was particularly sensitive toward any activities related to Islam, especially after the Tanjung Priok incident in September 1984 when security forces clashed with a group of people, known as followers of religious sermons in the area, demanding the release of their fellows and left numbers of them dead. Therefore, recruiting new members informally was seen as an appropriate way of avoiding any political and social risks.

The movement was established in the early 1980s by a complex combination of several groups of Muslim activists who were keen to combat the stagnation of Muslim society under the oppression of the state. The leaders of the movement were difficult to identify since it was a combination of figures from different generations who agreed to develop a new kind of religious teaching to spread Islamic understanding in Indonesian Muslim society. Most researchers who have explored the early phase of the movement agree on several components of the initial figures. They mention at least two elements from state universities and graduates of Middle Eastern universities (Damanik 2002; Furqon 2004), as well as students from LIPIA (*Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab* or Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies) (Machmudi 2005; Furqon 2004), but in some individual cases there are also individuals or activists from other Islamic movements or organisations, who joined on different occasions.

The first element mainly consists of the alumni of Islamic training activities run by the Salman Mosque at ITB (*Institut Teknologi Bandung* or Bandung Institute of Technology) in Bandung, West Java. The mosque was known as a centre of activities for Muslim students who wished to increase their understanding of an attachment to Islam in the 1970s to 1980s. An important figure in the development of the centre was Imaduddin Abdulrahim as part of his commitment to Islamic teaching. After his experience of an 'un-Islamic' environment at the institute during his studentship from 1953, the opportunity to teach at the institute after graduation gave him a chance to initiate Islamic activities among the students (Naipaul 1981). Abdulrahim's strong Muslim family background encouraged him to have such motivation. His father was a *naqib* (an Islamic chief lawyer) and head of an Islamic school under the Deli Sultanate in Medan.

His project was part of the wider effort of Islamic teaching as a new strategy initiated by Muhammad Natsir, a former prime minister from 1950 to 1951, and his colleagues from the Islamic party of Masyumi, following the failure of political Islam during the early part of Soeharto's reign. His effort to re-establish Masyumi under the new regime was refused by Soeharto and due to this rejection, Natsir, the leading figure of Masyumi, initiated the new strategy to leave political Islam and concentrate on Islamic preaching among the Muslim community through the foundation of DDII (*Dewan Dakwah Islamiah Indonesia* or Council for Islamic Preaching in Indonesia) in 1967.

Imaduddin, along with EZ Muttaqien, was invited by Natsir to organise training for academicians in state universities in 1968. It is recorded that 40 academicians attended the training and, through them, Natsir hoped to spread Islamic understanding among university students. The attendants then initiated the development of Islamic centres in each institution, Imaduddin's Salman in ITB being one of the most successful in developing methods of Islamic training for students. He developed methods of training through his knowledge of global Islamic movements as the head of LDMI (*Lembaga Dakwah Mahasiswa Islam* or Institute of Student Islamic Preaching), an organisation under HMI (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* or Muslim Student Association) that focuses on Islamic teaching. His position in that organisation led him to join IIFSO (International Islamic Federation of Student Organisations) and through its international network he was introduced to different ideas and methods of global Islamic movements. Two of those which were most attractive to him were Ikhwanul Muslimin and Jami'at Islami.

It is believed that Imaduddin was interested in their ideas and conceptual level (Damanik 2002: 92). According to this argument, Imaduddin took on one aspect of Ikhwan's tools of teaching new generations through the implementation of *usrah*, which was then developed by his training's alumni and other Muslim activists into different orientations. It seems Imaduddin adopted some aspects of Ikhwan's training methods and adopted them to the Indonesian and Malaysian context. Therefore, his project was unlikely to have any relation with the Ikhwan as a movement. In one session in Bandung, Imaduddin recited one of Iqbal's poems to encourage the trainees in Islamic understanding, while in another session the trainer guided a simulation of effective communication by using cards to show his effort to use as many sources as possible for the training (Naipaul 1981: 341-4).

His experience of teaching in ITM (*Institut Teknologi Mara* or Mara Institute of Technology) Malaysia from 1970 to 1973 was an opportunity for him to implement the *usrah* method among Malaysian students and he was admired as an excellent motivator who could stimulate young students to become aware of their wrongdoing and then learn Islam. However, it is still open to question whether he brought the idea of *usrah* to Malaysia and then implemented it at the time of ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia or Islamic Youth Force of Malaysia) establishment or transferred it from Malaysia to Indonesia (Collins 2003; Damanik 2002: 72-3). Despite that question, the method of encouraging motivation and self-reflection among young students is similar in the experience of both Malaysian and Indonesian students. One of the PAS leaders explained that he was crying in front of Imaduddin following a self-reflection session after night-time prayers. The method was also implemented in the Salman mosque's training and adopted by others, and it is also found in one of the Tarbiyah Movement's techniques.

Salman's training activities were popular among the youngsters in urban areas and attracted many students from universities and high schools from big cities all over Indonesia. The training, called LMD (*Latihan Mujahid Dakwah* or Training for Preachers in Indonesia and *Latihan Membina Diri* or Training for Self-Education in Malaysia) explained the role of Islam as a holistic way of life, not just guidance for ritualism. Islam is not just a religion of the mosque, as Imaduddin criticises the concept of 'religion' to describe Islam, and he tended to use the term 'din' to express Islam as a complete guidance for every Muslim.

The popularity of the Salman Mosque was a result of a mixture of the condition of Muslims in Indonesia as well as in the international context. In Indonesia, the New Order regime was opposed to political Islam after rejecting the idea of restoring Masyumi. Soeharto also rejected the possibility of hard-line leaders of Masyumi leading Parmusi, a new party to replace Masyumi, and forced the remaining Islamic parties to reorganise themselves into one single grouping, the PPP (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* or the United Development Party) in 1973. Another problem for Muslims in Indonesia at that time was the initiation of the formalisation of the indigenous Javanese faith (*kejawen*) and the introduction of marriage law to compete with Islamic rule. There was suspicion among some parts of Muslim society that strategic positions within the regime were occupied by

Christians and nominal Muslim figures, thus leading the regime toward more secular and materialistic stands.

The fact that the government was not supportive of student activism was also a significant factor. The policy of NKK/BKK (Normalisation of Campus Life) launched by Daud Yoesoef, the Minister of Education following the student protests in 1974 and 1978, pushed students to focus purely on their studies. The policy forced the students to study in more limited time with a new scheme of curricula meaning that they had less opportunity to get involved in more dynamic activism. The other consequences were the banning of all student organisations outside university and the government only allowing formal student organisations within the universities. The result was the decline of HMI, which was affected along with other student organisations, and the students had to face strict control from the university across the country.

In that situation, students tried to develop alternative activisms and transformed into small, intensive discussion forums that attracted many critical students. Students who had more attachment toward Islam also searched for other alternatives. Salman became the destination for students from Jakarta and Bandung, while those in Yogyakarta and Central Java gathered in Yogyakarta's Solahuddin Mosque. Another mosque which became a centre for Islamic activities was Arif Rahman Hakim in Salemba, Jakarta, but stricter controls meant the mosque had limited space to create more flexible activities. These three mosques were the continuation of Natsir's idea, with Salman Mosque under the supervision of Imaduddin becoming a magnet for students who wanted an alternative channel for their concerns.

Global Muslim dynamics also contributed to their attachment to Islamic activism. The Iranian Revolution was an intriguing event which encouraged young Muslims to praise the struggle against oppression in the name of Islam, even though most of them did not comprehend the anatomy of the revolution. The figure of Ayatollah Khomeini was thus very popular and his writings, as well as those of other Iranian scholars such as Ali Syari'ati and Murtadha Mutahhari, were then widely translated. One of the members of the PKS who joined the Tarbiyah Movement in 1984 explains that his appreciation of Khomeini led him to read many of Syari'ati's writings; even though his subject in university was maths. Later, he expressed his regret at encountering Marxist elements within Syaria'ti's ideas after he joined the training.

His disappointment reflects the search for alternative thought from international Muslim sources at a time when the two major Muslim social organisations, Nahdhatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah were unable to escape from the oppression of the state and could not be the alternative inspiring organisations for the Muslim political agenda. The willingness to find an alternative inspirational activism led some to attend the sermons in Tanjung Priok, North Jakarta. The preachers who gave sermons in the mosques, such as Tonie Ardhie and Abdul Qadir Djaelani, criticised the regime's policy of introducing Pancasila as the single ideology for all organisations in the country. This tension led to the 'Black September' incident on 12 September 1984.

A local leader of the PKS explained that in the mid 1990s he attended the sermons as part of his awareness of the condition of the Muslim society to seek an alternative to the regime's policy (Appendix B.5.). According to him, the sermons were very emotional and attracted many youngsters, especially when Tonie Ardhie and Abdul Qadir Djaelani were at the podium. His attendance of the sermons was also the result of his reading of Syari'ati's thoughts in finding the spirit of change in society. The event itself led to stricter surveillance by the security forces of preachers throughout the country with every preacher required to have approval from the local military authority before giving a sermon for the weekly Friday prayer or other events.

This is an example of strong spirit to defend Islamic faith and change society which led some of the youth to attend the Salman training. One of the characteristics of Imaduddin's thoughts on Islam was a focus on Tawhid as the basic teaching for the trainers. Imaduddin's principle toward *tawhid* was very strict as, according to him, smoking may lead a Muslim to abandon his or her *syahadah*, the basic oath to be a Muslim. Smoking might lead to the annulment of one's *syahadah* when it makes smokers feel happier and calmer than does the remembrance of Allah, thus replacing the meaning of Allah as the ultimate source of a Muslim's happiness, hope, courage and fear. He is consistent in emphasising this principle, which became one of his main themes in a series of private sermons broadcast in the mid-1990s.

The understanding of *syahadah* in the training encouraged the trainees to continue the spirit of being true Muslims after the training. Some of the alumni of the training then set up an informal forum to discuss the possibility of spreading the understanding among other youngsters. However, Salman was not dedicated to building and supervising such a

project and some of the alumni then met alumni from Middle Eastern universities, mainly from Madinah, such as Hilmi Aminuddin, Salim Segaf al-Djufrie, Abdullah Said Baharmus, and Acep Abdul Syukur (Salman 2006: 187-8; Furkon 2004: 132). These brought ideas of Islamic movements inspired by Ikhwanul Muslimin and wanted to adopt its methods of social movement in Indonesia (Damanik 2002: 97). With a fresh knowledge of Islam gained from studying in Islamic universities in the Middle East, as well as new ideas and methods adopted from the Ikhwan, they agreed to supervise the youngsters and build a new network of spreading Islamic understanding to wider society.

The discussion among the researchers of the Tarbiyah Movement partly focuses on the origins of the movement. For Damanik (2002), the alumni played a significant role by giving new knowledge and methods to the devout and eager young activists from Salman mosque. The agreement between the two parties was not coincidental since they had common objectives, especially in spreading a new understanding of Islam to Indonesian society. Each party also provided what was needed in order to achieve the objectives of Islamic purification by each side. The scholars had an understanding of Islamic thought and methods through a solid network while the Salman alumni provided 'ideal raw material' as early volunteers and become the first agents to recruit more youth to join the training. In this relationship, the Middle Eastern alumni became the major agent for the entrance of the Ikhwan's ideas and methods to Indonesian society.

For Salman (2006: 188), the argument of the Middle Eastern return is not too convincing since they were not the only Indonesians studying in the region and they did not come with the same ideas as the founders of the PKS. However, even though it is regarded as a weak argument, the attachment of the figures to the Ikhwan's idea could be traced to their relation to the universities where they studied. As mentioned before, most of them were graduates of Madinah University, which is significant since it is known as the hub for the dissemination of the Ikhwan's ideas (Machmudi 2005: 61-8). The foundation of the university in 1961 was supported by King Saud, who gave financial aid and political guarantees for the Ikhwan's leading figures, such as Muhammad Quthb, brother of Sayyid Quthb who was prosecuted by Nasser in 1954. Nasser's tough policy towards the Ikhwan forced hundreds of them to flee abroad to find political refuge. After years of trying to persuade the Saudi king, he finally gave them permission to establish a university after it was explained that Nasser had manipulated al-Azhar University for his own interests

(Rosen 2008: 122). For the King, the university was seen as a chance to challenge the influence of the al-Azhar facilitated by the Ikhwan's knowledge.

Having acknowledged that Madinah University became the centre of internationalisation of the Ikhwan's ideas due to the dominant numbers of international students, the possibility of the entrance of the Ikhwan's influence was apparent. Nevertheless, whether the entrance of the Ikhwan's influence was a deliberate manoeuvre is still debatable and difficult to confirm. The secretive character of the Tarbiyah Movement has made any confirmation difficult, while the leading figures of the movement only admit that such influence is the only possible connection between them. The Ikhwan also admitted the possible link through the transfer of the movement's ideas around the world as literatures on the ideas are widely spread (Helbawy 2009). Therefore, concerns that the Tarbiyah Movement is the representative of the Ikhwan in Indonesia remain unconfirmed.

Supported by the Middle Eastern scholars, some of the Salman alumni were then trained, supervised and organised into an underground network. To simplify the spread of Islamic purification, they produced a simple method of teaching using arrows to describe the understanding of Islamic concepts and referring them to specific verses of the Qur'an. This method of teaching proved quite simple for the first trained generation of Salman alumni to expand their understanding while it was also useful for them to transfer the knowledge to their colleagues in universities and schools. The method has proven to be effective as a basis for youngsters in the urban areas who lacked the opportunity to study Islam seriously at the Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*) operated and supervised mainly under NU members. They do not have to leave their study as required by the boarding school model. While those who want to study Islamic knowledge in the *pesantren* may need to spend the whole of his or her youth studying classical books from different religious teachers, most of them are students whose subjects are the technical sciences rather than social and religious science (Salman 2006: 178).

The first group trained by the alumni then tried to develop contacts with other Salman alumni to initiate a wider network of training in different universities. This call was met by an enthusiastic response from many students as it was suitable to the situation as a better alternative to student activism, which had lost its direction under the tight control of the universities. The early activities of the movement focused on small study groups detached from student activism. These usually concentrated on basic Islamic themes and



moral issues straight to the basic understanding of *tawhid* or *aqidah*. However, as an informal network they avoided discussing domestic political issues and shifted the focus to the general Muslim condition and international issues in the Muslim world. The training usually took place in mosques, mainly in universities and schools, or sometimes in one of the members' houses or community mosques.

At this stage, the important role of Rahmat Abdullah was apparent. Even though he did not study in any Middle Eastern universities, his knowledge of classical sources of Islamic knowledge was comparable with his Middle Eastern counterparts. What made him important in the early attempts to make the Ikhwan's methods more suitable to local needs without demeaning its character as a strong alternative capable of changing society in the eyes of the young urban Muslim generation (Salman 2006: 189) was his understanding of local people, since he had spent his youth in the local community both as a religious teacher and actively involved in local youth activism.

The small numbers of the first generation involved in the effort of spreading their influence had to deal with a wide area of training network in several main universities, at first mainly in Java. This led to a very tight schedule for training the growing numbers of new trainees, with, members sometimes travelling long distances to give training in other cities. Therefore, it was not unusual that their study was sacrificed for the development of the training. In some cases, they had to move to another area or province to initiate and direct the new training. Following the network's transformation into a political party in 1998, some of these became the head of the local party branch. Examples of this first generation of trainers in the higher party structure of the PKS are the former president, Tifatul Sembiring, who was a student in a private science and technology institute, and Aus Hidayat, who is now head of the party's Organisation Discipline branch.

At the same time, another entry-point for the influence of Ikhwanul Muslimin was LIPIA, an Islamic education institution sponsored by the Saudi government. The original objective of the establishment of the institution in 1980 was to teach Indonesians a *salafi* understanding of Islam to prevent the spread of the influence of *shi'ism* following the Iranian Revolution in 1979. However, some of the teachers in the institute had strong relationships with the Ikhwan, who were protected by the Saudi royal family. These teachers then introduced the movement's ideas and methods to their students through informal contacts. Some of these students were encountering the ideas of the Ikhwan for the

first time, while others knew the idea before attending the school. The alumni of the LIPIA schools are quite influential in the movement since their understanding of Islamic knowledge and, of course, Arabic is ahead of that of other members who only learned as a product of their informal training.

Like the students from the Middle Eastern universities, not all of those who attended the institute were influenced by their ideas. One of those who was influenced was Anis Matta, who is now the General Secretary of the PKS (as well as the PK) and who was recently elected vice- chairman of the House of Representatives. He is one example of the product of this path despite his strong background of activism in Muhammadiyah. He explains, in one of his sermons about his youth, that there was something different about the idea of understanding Islam and the way the activism was set up. He joined LIPIA after rejecting the chance to study at the University of Hasanuddin, Makassar, because LIPIA offered financial support. However, to say that LIPIA is purely a recruiting ground for the Tarbiyah Movement is misleading because other alumni have different preferences. These include Ja'far Umar Thalib, the founder of *Laskar Jihad* (Jihad Warriors), a salafi militia, and Ulil Absar Abdalla, a leading figure in JIL (*Jaringan Islam Liberal* or Liberal Islamic Network).

Despite each member's different pathway of entering and being involved in the network, there is a common structure in the training model. Every study group has its own tutor or *murabbi* who trains the members of the group of between 4 and 12 people or even more depending on the situation. When the number of a group exceeds the ideal proportion, the group is split into two or transferred to another tutor who also works closely with the previous tutor. The tutor encourages members of the *halaqah* or *usrah* to spread the understanding of Islam, not only in universities, but also in high schools. This encouragement has created networks between groups from different universities, high schools and mosques based on the relationships between tutors and trainers at different levels. A member in the movement will then have two functions, either as a trainer or a trainee, creating a pyramid model of community with relatively limited links between them, especially at different levels. The only close interaction between members comes through activities within the group itself with the tutor, or, sometimes, in a gathering involving different groups under one tutor. Consequently, members usually only know about the

movement from their tutor and do not know other members of other groups from different places.

Although the development of the network was quite slow at first, it gradually grew to recruit more new trainees. The number of members that could be recruited was limited by the political situation, which meant they were unable to carry out massive and attractive recruitment activities. Personal recruitment was the most common method of finding new recruits. A documentary film on Rahmat Abdullah (d. 2005), one of the founders of the PK, clearly shows the process of this personal recruitment when an already recruited member invites his friend to join the training (*Sang Murabbi*, 2008). Most of the new recruits were students from public universities since most of the first trained groups maximised their contacts in the universities. The same pattern also applied to the newly recruited trainees, who were encouraged to expand the recruitment to familiar environments. One of the most fertile sites for university students was their previous secondary schools where they set up networks to supervise student organisations as respectable alumni, in some cases making new contacts with the students as non alumni to arrange training sessions. After years of training, the trainees were pouring into universities across the country and strengthening the movement's presence in the universities.

With the more conducive political situation for Islamic social and cultural expression in the early 1990s, recruitment became more diverse through formal institutions. In universities and schools, training sessions were arranged and organised officially by which new members were introduced to the training. Usually, these were organised by university and secondary school student organisations offering after class activities. Others were arranged in the community, especially in the mosques, as well as social organisations. Members who had graduated from education and started work also played a large role in spreading the network in their new offices. The movement's alumni from institutions which required working in every corner of the country, such as STAN (*Sekolah Tinggi Akuntansi Negara* or State College of Accountancy) and STIS (*Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Statistik* or State College of Statistics) were significant in this development. By the time of the 1999 election, the movement already had approximately 50,000 members who helped set up the party's organisation across the country. This is one of the reasons for the movement's ability to rapidly establish well organized PK representation in almost every province. Through this web of networks, even though most of them might not know each other

except through social activities run by the members, more new members were recruited and helped to develop more influential social activism in order to introduce the movement to wider society.

Inspired by the Ikhwan's methods, the movement also introduced the stages of generating a better society. These stages are known internally as orbits (*mihwar*), and focus on different levels of objectives, *mihwar thanzhimi*, *sya'bi*, *mu'assasi*, and *daulah* (Takariawan 2010), which are implemented successively. The first stage focuses on the effort to develop individuals who are strongly influenced by Islamic values in a certain community organisation. The organisation functions as an arena where every individual can experience an Islamic environment, which is useful for every individual to develop their sense of being part of a solid community (*jama'ah*). The objective of this process is to train members who are qualified to carry out *dakwah* activities embedded with a strong individual and communal Islamic character. This stage was successfully implemented during the secretive stage of the movement until its effort to set up different social institutions related to *dakwah* and education.

The movement prioritised the educational sector. Having been benefited by the education system as its main basis of recruitment for generating a devout new generation, they acknowledged the importance of the educational sector. The first important educational institution was to provide a better understanding of formal Islamic disciplines for their growing membership as well as the public. Led by Abdul Hasib, some of the members set up a foundation called Al Hikmah in South Jakarta to focus on formal Islamic training programmes. The foundation and the mosque were to become the centre for the movement's intellectual and spiritual activism. Intellectual activities included Arabic language, *tafsir* or interpretation of Qur'anic verses, *hadith* or understanding of the Prophetic traditions, *tahsin* or improving reading of Qur'an, *tahfizh* or remembering Qur'anic verses, and *fiqh* or Islamic jurisprudence. Through these programmes the foundation aims to generate more capable preachers for public sermons in the community.

In the early 1990s, the mosque became a centre of spiritual activities for the Jakarta-based members to offer night prayers together, especially at weekends. The mosque was usually full with night prayers attended by hundreds of youngsters and members of the network. At that time, especially during Ramadhan, there was no space available. During the holy month the mosque organised *Tarawih* and night prayers reading one *juz* (one-

thirtieth part of the Qur'an) every night and introducing *i'tikaf* in the final ten days of the month. In the meantime, some of the members also made contact with other mosques and Islamic foundations. As a result, the congregations for night prayers were held constantly in many mosques which were filled with hundreds of youngsters. Public sermons were also held in many locations, the most important of which was at Al-Baraka Mosque in Tebet, which collaborated with a famous cleric from the At-Tahiriyah foundation with Khairu Ummah, an organisation for clerics set up by the movement in 1989. Yet again, hundreds of youngsters attended the sermons. It was the Khairu Ummah which also provided preachers to visit many provinces to spread Islamic teachings among the urban upper-middle class (Hasan 2009: 17). Some of these were then entrusted with supervising religious activities in big companies. The successful penetration was supported by its network of university graduates who worked in different companies across the country.

The other educational institution was Nurul Fikri, which introduced an integrated curriculum of Islamic knowledge into public curricula required by the state. Beginning from the primary school level, the foundation has been successful in developing a secondary school as well as a boarding school and it has become a highly respected integrated school. Its reputation has attracted many parents to send their children to the school and this has inspired the growth of similar schools initiated by members of the movement in major cities throughout Indonesia. The schools are quite easily recognisable since they always put the title IT (*Islam Terpadu* or Integrated Islamic Schools) in the name of each school. The school network now extends to not less than 700 schools across the country from kindergarten to secondary level (Hasan 2009: 17) and the foundation now has expanded its activities to focus on training programmes for university students to give them basic leadership skills and materials along with Islamic knowledge.

The initiation of Nurul Fikri was part of the process of penetrating the community without focusing on religious subjects. However, even though the school model is an attempt to achieve more respect in other subjects, the image of Islam was still immense. During that period of the early 1990s, the vocabulary of the movement was still dominated by the mobilisation and recruitment of new members, which was now taking place in the social arena. It was then that the second stage of *mihwar sya'bi* was emphasised for every member. Members were encouraged to get involved in society and seek social recognition, especially in the religious aspect. Inviting their neighbours to pray in the mosque was

strongly encouraged, especially for males, to open communications with the community. With this social recognition, they were able to set up local activities involving the youth, mainly based around the mosque. Many different youth activities were arranged in various forms including outdoor and overnight activities, along with similar activities run by university and high school students under LDK (*Lembaga Dakwah Kampus* or Institution for Preaching in Campus) and ROHIS (*Rohani Islam* or Islamic Spirituality). The objective of this stage was to expand the movement's influence in society by socialising the ideas of the movement and developing strategic efforts to recruit new members.

The growing numbers of the movement as well as its influence on the religious atmosphere has encouraged the establishment of publications and printing companies related to the movement. Among the most influential publications in the early 1990s was the bi-weekly magazine *Sabili* founded by Zaenal Muttaqien, one of the first recruited members. Meanwhile, other members were focusing on publishing translations of the Ikhwan's leading figures through several publishing companies. The former MP Abdi Sumaiti, since elected as senator for Banten, who translated many of Hasan al-Banna's books under the name Abu Ridho, was linked to Intermedia in Solo, while Tifatul Sembiring, the former president of the PKS and Minister of Communication and Information Technology, established Asaduddin Press in Jakarta. An institution called SIDIK (*Studi dan Informasi Dunia Islam Kontemporer* or Study Centre for the Contemporary Islamic World) which focused on international issues was also established in 1992 by Almuzammil Yusuf, Habib Abu Bakar Al Habsyi and Abu Ridho (Collins 2003: 9). At this point, the strongest position of the movement's supporters was the student when Tarbiyah activists slowly managed to take over strategic positions of student organisations in major public universities. Its solid and relatively well-organised activities made them quite successful in gaining the sympathy of other students.

The process of penetrating society was taking place along with the ideas of Hasan al-Banna, the founder of Ikhwanul Muslimin, who said that dissemination of Islamic understanding to society is the ultimate goal of revivalism (Dasuki 2009). Therefore, the stage of the *mihwar sya'bi* was also focused on the establishing of many activities that can be used to transfer understanding according to the movement. At this stage, there was no real possibility of entering the political arena since al-Banna himself suggested avoiding any political controversy that may disturb the process. Hence, when the political opening

became available after the resignation of Soeharto in May 1998, the only prepared element under the control of the Tarbiyah Movement at that time was its student activists. Some of the leaders of student organisations who had links with the Tarbiyah Movement joined with other student organisations to force the resignation.

It seems that the political opening came too early for the movement to respond to the unexpected situation. In the second phase of the 1990s, the movement still focused on the objective of the *mihwar sya'bi* and most of its related institutions and activists were still busy expanding their ideas. As a new community dominated by the young generation they were not yet able to penetrate strategic positions in most aspects in the country. There was also limited attention given to the development of a serious economic agenda for the movement. *Mihwar mu'assasi* as the third stage of the *dakwah* project had to be responded to with limited resources, let alone the fourth stage of *mihwar daulah*, because both phases were still in the theory and vision stage rather than in practice. Therefore, the movement had to examine the political opportunity very carefully before it responded by taking the rather uneasy decision to establish a political party.

### **III.2.1.2. 'Reformasi' and Early Disputes**

The decision to form a political party following the fall of Soeharto was a difficult process. His resignation marked the starting point of 'reformasi' (reformation) to reflect people's demand for change. Reformasi meant a great opportunity for Indonesians to express their political rights by establishing independent political parties, something which was impossible under the New Order regime. The Department of Justice noted that 148 newly established political parties applied for registration following Soeharto's ouster as corporation (Ismanto 2004: 58), illustrating the massive desire to participate in politics combined with the policy of President Habibie to ease the political situation.

The Tarbiyah Movement was not very eager to respond to the political change with any political action. They were quite satisfied with the involvement of student activists from its network, so the leadership felt that their contribution to the political change was enough. However, there were some ideas that the new political openness was also an opportunity that had to be responded to quickly for the movement to be formally recognised by the public for the wider context of *dakwah*. Political recognition and involvement in politics is a chance to offer an alternative for building the Indonesian society and state

through the political process, and this chance became available during the unstable transition situation under the new president.

The idea came from two senior members, Abu Ridho and Mashadi, who felt that forming a political party was the best way to realise the movement's intentions since the political system was undergoing a period of change (Mashadi 2008). They thought that it was a political opportunity as well as an historic chance, which should not be abandoned. According to their arguments, it was a great chance for the movement to make a significant contribution to the country within the new democratic political system. According to them, the main motivation of the establishment of a political party was 'morals for politics' or politics based on Islamic morality. It was also a chance to show their position and values to the public.

The idea was initially rejected and, at first it did not gain support in a high-level meeting, but the rejection was not final because the meeting recommended that every coordinating area consult the members from that area. After a series of discussions among the representatives of the 11 *dakwah* areas in Indonesia and discussions within each area there was no definite decision. To break the deadlock a survey was conducted of the middle level of the movement's members. The result showed that almost 60 percent of the members agreed with the idea of involving the movement in the political arena by forming a political party (Collins 2003). The main intention behind the establishment of a political party was that the political situation gave the movement the opportunity to gain political recognition and contribute to the development of a new Indonesia in the democratisation process. The movement thus entered the third phase of *mihwar siyasi* ahead of schedule.

The rest of the membership mainly accepted the decision without any hesitation even though they were against the idea of having a political party. In the survey there were members from some areas who did not support the idea of a political party; however they agreed to establish local representation of the party because the decision came from the national level. It means that they felt they had to obey the decision whatever the local position. For the local leadership of Central Java province, for instance, the decision was accepted without any disappointment. Their acceptance was based on the understanding that they are part of the network, so whatever the decision of the central leadership they will accept it after giving their inputs or arguments. According to one of the leaders of the



local branch, the reluctance of the area toward forming a political party was mainly based on the fact that they were not ready yet to enter the political arena (Harris 2008).

In training for local political sections for every regency and city branch two months after the foundation of PK in the Javanese provinces, most of the trainees were not qualified to act as real politicians. It clearly showed the unpreparedness and lack of qualification of members from remote areas to deal with political activity. Most of the sections in the local party branch dealing with politics and law were occupied by members who had no real knowledge of politics and law. Some of them were computer technicians or teachers and they were being pushed by the situation to serve for the new political structure. One of the local party officials explained that even though he had a good background in law from his bachelor's degree, he had since abandoned it and become a computer trader. He abandoned his degree for years due to the informal disregard for law as studied in the state universities as secular. For some members, law was regarded as *thagut* (idolatory), which had to be opposed, not to be studied. Now the members had to deal with the arena that they had previously regarded with disdain.

This clearly shows that basically the movement was not in a position to enter the political arena with confidence. Even in the stage of *mihwar sya'bi*, the movement in general had not been successful in penetrating the social structures of Muslim society to compete with other established Muslim social organisations. The membership was mainly young and dominated by students or pupils, while the more senior members were still at middle or lower-middle levels in their professional careers or had very limited access to capital for business. The maturity of the movement in the social structure was projected to be achieved in 2020 or beyond (Qodari 2000). However, as part of the movement's network there was almost no choice for them to do things in a different way, especially for lower level members.

For members who had more capacity to express their opposition the situation was quite different. In one case a leading figure in Central Java resigned from his position as one of the leaders in the province. He originally supported the decision of political party activism, but after careful study of materials related to the ideas of Hasan al-Banna and Ikhwanul Muslimin he came to the conclusion that a political party was not a favourable vehicle for *dakwah* (Kastori 2008). He also concluded that the mixture of *dakwah* and politics would lead to a difficult situation since politics required a more pragmatic and

mundane approach. The consequence of his decision was clear that he was then regarded as an outsider and the party did not offer him any position. The only relationship remaining between them was informal consultation from some members without any significant effect on the party's activism.

A similar case happened with Ihsan Tanjung when he explicitly opposed the decision to form a political party (Appendix B.8.). However, unlike the previous case, he did not agree with the way that the Movement's leadership influenced others regarding the decision to establish a party. Opposing such a decision was quite severe, even for him who was among the second layer of the Movement's leadership. The party did not develop any formal position for him at all as he was regarded as a member who did not have any right to get involved and contribute to the political project. Although he is still regarded as a member of the movement, his only role is in doing *dakwah* outside the party structure.

There were also some members who felt that the decision was problematic, especially in the relation of the movement's basic objective of *dakwah* with politics. A senior member at a provincial level said that in his province most of the members opposed the idea of forming a political party (Harris 2008). However, they took the position that whatever the decision made by the leadership they would agree and follow. His position describes the reaction of most members to the decision, except some of the senior members and other critical members. Due to their very limited numbers and the euphoria and optimism of the membership as a whole toward the new project they were not significantly influential. The only opposing action was made by a second line leader who resigned from his position, not because of the decision, but due to the way the decision was made by the top leadership. Nevertheless, most of the members agreed to follow the final decision and to develop a party infrastructure based on the movement's network throughout the country. It can be said that the acceptance of the leadership's decision is typical of the movement and reflected many occasions within the party activism afterward.

The party was finally declared on 9 August 1998 using the popular term in Islamic politics: justice. It was then known as PK (*Partai Keadilan* or Justice Party). Many observers have difficulties in identifying the basis of the party because other Islamic parties are usually based on mainstream Islamic social organisations such as Nahdhatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, DDII as the descendant of Masyumi, a prominent Islamic party in the 1950s, or other, less significant Islamic social bases. The difficulties are actually natural

because of the existence of the tarbiyah movement itself as an informal movement. In fact, the party was not built in a vacuum of any social bases, but was created by a new generation of 'young educated Muslims.' The leader of PK officially confirmed that the party's main basis is *dakwah* activists in the mosques who have developed their network nationwide as well as abroad in Europe, the US, and the Middle East (Ismail in Hassan et al. 1998: 30-1).

From the beginning of the foundation, the party was known as an organised party with its discipline, clean and controlled campaigns attended by mostly young men and women with headscarves. The party also did not have any prominent or well-known leader within its structure and the president of the party, Nurmahmudi Ismail, was a researcher in a government institution who gained his doctorate from an American university. At first, the movement sought to establish a broad-based Islamic party in conjunction with other Islamic elements. This effort failed due to disagreements on the basis of the party. The important Islamic figure of Amien Rais rejected the idea of an Islamic party because it would limit the broad plural and nationalistic agenda within the democratic system (Sumargono 2008). The failure to recruit Amien Rais to lead the Islamic coalition then led the Movement to form its own political party.

In the first democratic election after the New Order era in 1999, the party did not gain a significant amount of voters and failed to pass the electoral threshold of 3 percent of the voters and their seven members of parliament joined with another party, the National Mandate Party (PAN), to form the Reformation Faction in the House of People's Representatives. Because of its failure to reach the minimum required number of supporters, the party transformed to a different party, the PKS in 2004 following the failure of some small political parties to amend the threshold criteria.

The party itself is described differently by scholars as a political party and as a transformed Islamic movement. The latter depiction of the party became the mainstream image by placing a significant focus on the transformation process which gives an idea of the original identity as an Islamic movement. Initial research by Damanik (2002) was then followed by Furkon (2004) and others such as Salman (2006) and Rahmat (2008) who give attention to its ideological credence. However, the involvement in politics has given a complexity in identifying the true nature of the party. Because of its nature as a transformed Islamic movement, according to Mahmudi (2006 and 2008), the party is a unique entity that

is difficult to fit with existing categorisation of Islamism. By doing that, the reason for political activism of the party can be understood since it is influenced by global ideas of Islamism mainly from Ikhwanul Muslimin and its derivation in several countries that gives a specific understanding of political Islam. Based on that, he argues that political participation is an integrated part of the 'accommodative approach' of the PKS as a direct consequence of interpretation so that politics and *dakwah* can work together (2010).

However, the success of the party in politics is mainly due to its religious discourses and policy positions. It is part of its ability to develop its representation as the opponent of corruptive practice in different levels of Indonesian politics, locally and nationally (Sidel 2008). There is also an aspect of successful mobilisation in the grass root level supported mainly by youth to work and interact with local residents (Hamayotsu 2011a) which is in many cases significant to boost the party's votes in elections. Hence, the interaction with the so called secular elements of democracy has given opportunity for the PKS to shape their understanding of Islam in politics. It is slightly different with Machmudi who sees accommodative politics as an embedded value which is more related to Schwedler's reference on moderation, Permata (2008) argues that there is a significant influence of outer environment to its understanding. Political opening after the fall of Soeharto is an historical chance that should be maximised which is then unrelated with what the Tarbiyah movement understand. In that context, the PKS's experience is then connected with the understanding of moderation as a result of interaction with the political system as noted by Sanchez-Cuenza before moving to substantive acceptance toward democratic principles. Expressed differently, it is said that the PKS accommodate the democratic system due to limited options since it does not also have a strong and massive local infrastructure (Sidel 2008: 27).

In fact, this image is rather different in the perspective of party institutionalisation. Tomsa (2010: 151-6), for instance, emphasises the unique nature of the party. It is said that the party has a distinctive organisation compare to other political parties because it inherits the network of the Tarbiyah Movement. The commitment of the party's cadres is very high as they are working as if they are in a military structure (Hamayotsu 2011b: 151). In this regard, ideology is the basis of the cadres' attitude since the process of internalisation is still preserved as one of the main pillars of the party. Corresponding to that image this research also confirms the contribution of the internalisation process to maintain cadres'

loyalty especially in dealing with difficulties during and after the party's effort to be more pragmatic. More than that, it offers a more indepth outlook of how the ideological internalisation works as shown in the standpoint of some of the cadres to the policy of moderation which is still generally absent in recent writing on the PKS.

### **III.2.2. Aspects of Moderation**

#### **III.2.2.1. Attracting Voters and Electoral Achievements**

The declaration of the PK on 8 August 1998 marked the final decision of the Tarbiyah Movement to enter the political arena based on an internal network basis. Nur Mahmudi Ismail was chosen to lead the party after negotiated efforts to establish a single Islamic party failed. His appointment was actually rather unfortunate for the new party since he was not a public figure as he served as a researcher at BPPT (*Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi* or Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology). His name was even unfamiliar to many members of the Movement, leading to uncertainty regarding its prospect of passing the electoral threshold in the 1999 election. Meanwhile, many of the movement's members were themselves quite anxious as to how to deal with political activism to get as many votes as possible. It was this unpromising situation that the party had to confront to secure an electoral foothold.

Interestingly, the party was quite confident with the social basis that had been developed so far. In the 1999 election, only one year after its foundation, the party targeted getting 10 percent of the votes. On many occasions the party leadership described the calculation of the 'realistic' target and convinced the members to do their best. One example of the calculation of significant support was the visits to the charismatic leaders of Islamic boarding schools or pesantren. In many areas, especially rural, religious leaders are regarded as figures to be followed including in politics for political preference. The party leadership described the visits as constructive and supportive where the local religious leaders accepted their ideas and also supported their efforts to uphold Islamic vision in politics.

As an Islamic party, the PK tried to maximise its image as a party that would enhance Islamic values. However, unlike other Islamic parties, the PK wanted to give a more modern impression to the public since most of its members were of the younger generation with a relatively high level of education. For this reason, the appointment of Nur

Mahmudi, an American trained researcher, as the first president was designed to give the appearance of a new generation of young Muslims who were able to combine religiosity and modernity.

As a political expression of an Islamic movement, it was not surprising that the PK then developed a strong image of Islam during their campaign as part of their understanding of the significance of religion both for individuals and society. The spirit of Islamic purification was the basis for the members to support the party campaign, as a result of which many of its public gatherings were attended by significant numbers. For a completely new party, the ability to attract large crowds in public campaigning was quite appealing, especially as the congregation was also peaceful and impeccable. Compared to other parties' rallies which were either attended by too few people or too crowded, and, in many cases, led to trouble on the streets, the PK's way of organising gatherings was quite distinctive. However, it is understandable that the party should be able to manage such public campaigns since most of those in attendance were part of the Movement's network.

The main themes of the party during the campaign were on Islam, especially on the willingness to endorse Islamic *sharia*. Nur Mahmudi, the first president, also expressed the eagerness for the endorsement, which was paralleled by the party's slogans during campaigning for the 1999 election. Corresponding with the spirit of advancing religious values during their training, the party's cadres emphasized the message of dispensing justice according to Islamic perspectives. The members also supported the party's campaign based on the understanding that the party would deliver the spirit of Islamism in society. To reflect the party's idealism, the PK chose Didin Hafiduddin as its presidential candidate. Didin Hafiduddin was known as a Muslim scholar who specialised in alms as well as the head of an Islamic university in Bogor, West Java province. As a candidate, he represented himself as a Muslim scholar who was not actually prepared for political debates. Most of his arguments were based on his understanding of Islamic interpretation such as governing on the basis of morals. Anis Matta said that the willingness to reform Indonesian society needed a figure who was not only a civilian in contrast to the previous leader, but also a religious person (Jawa Pos, 14 March 1999).

Although the PK tried to lessen its ideological weight during the campaign, the party was still regarded as a stronghold Islamist party. Hafiduddin was a strong figure for Muslim scholars (*ulama*) and committed himself to an Islamic social activism. He stressed

the efforts to build a better political system to counter any forms of political authoritarianism under the control of any one person. According to him, to express that vision, the party should always uphold the name of Allah (*God*) during campaigning (Republika, 28 May 1999). In front of the PK's cadre, Hafiduddin represented the image of the true Islamic party character. The message of eliminating all forms of immoral behaviour according to Islam was also apparent such as stopping prostitution and the sale of alcoholic drinks.

It is true that the party decided to apply the term justice, which could be regarded as an effort to offer a universal message of Islam. During the campaign, statements on the caliphate were minimised to reduce public anxiety. The first president of the party was also a scholar, not a Muslim scholar, to represent the aspirations of the youth and the middle classes for a better society. However, the idea of mastering Islam as the ultimate goal was still quite obvious. The party's symbol was a black square to represent the *ka'bah*, the building in Mecca as a *qiblah* for Muslims during prayer and destination in Islamic pilgrimage. Although the two aspects of the PK raised a mixed image of the party, as an Islamic party, the image of Islam was more dominant in its major themes during campaigning. For some, these Islamic aspirations were seen as a willingness to establish an Islamic state based on Islamic *shari'a*.

The eventual result of the 1999 election was disappointing for the PK for at least two reasons. Firstly, its 1.4 percent of the poll was far below its expectation of 10 percent and secondly, it was not enough to qualify for the next election. The disappointment could be seen in the reaction of many cadres who hoped to get 10 percent of the votes. To relieve the disappointment the party released an announcement for the cadres to accept the result by stressing that it was a trial from Allah and every cadre should also be optimistic about the future of the party. One of the announcements was also found in one of the NF's learning centres since a majority of the teachers were members of the party.

Despite the disappointment felt at the result, obtaining 1.4 percent of the votes was actually not a failure at all. As a new party without any well-known figures among its leadership or a solid social basis, the achievement was better compared to other newly established political parties. It is also important to emphasize that the party had only about 50,000 cadres to support all of its campaign activities. Mathematically, the party was able to attract more than twenty times its number of sympathizers, which was quite remarkable.

Beside the fact that the party only maximised the strong image of an Islamic party, relatively unknown leaders, and little experience in politics, the demographic profile of the party's supporters also reveals the fact that the PK was only popular among the young, educated, urban community. The Table III.1. shows the party's inability to appeal to the rural community in Java who are mostly Javanese, less educated and working in the agricultural sector. It can thus be said that the PK is mainly an urban phenomenon rather than representative of Indonesian society as a whole.

**Table III.1.**  
**Variables contributing to PK's vote by region**

Order of importance	Java	Outer Islands	Indonesia
1	University	High-Ed	Migrant
2	Migrant	Non/ Low-Ed*	High-Ed
3	Non-Javanese	Muslim*	Non/Low-Ed**
4	Muslim	Poor*	Muslim**
5			Non-Javanese

\*the impact[s] of these three variables are the same

\*\* the impact[s] of these three variables are the same

Taken from Ananta et al., 2004 *Indonesian Electoral Behaviour. A Statistical Perspective*, Singapore, ISEAS, p. 407.

Given the strategies previously implemented by the Tarbiyah Movement the result was not surprising. Even though they were trying to offer a new approach toward Islamism, which emphasised the substantial and universal aspects of Islamic values, they could not deny that they were so far only affecting urban society. In the early stages of its activism the movement preferred to recruit from the young middle class in universities and schools because they had no previous strong attachment with other movements. This strategy explains why the movement is more popular in urban rather than rural societies, which are regarded as being strongly influenced by religious or cultural ties.

Unlike the 1999 campaign, in 2003 the PKS, which is regarded as the same entity as the PK, conveyed a less ideological message to the public ahead of the 2004 election. It retained its identity as an Islamic party but it extended the substantial and universal messages of Islamism under the slogan of 'clean and caring'. The party did not maximise the potential of the mass media to reach more voters. In the campaign, the party carried out



political canvassing in which every branch at the village or sub-district level visited houses in their neighbourhood to make personal contact with the occupants. It is argued that the strategy was adopted from the success of the RP in 1995, followed by the AKP in 2002, to get more votes by offering a variety of support during the cadres' visits to houses.

The result was quite remarkable. The PKS surprisingly got more supporters and increased its share of the vote to 7.34 percent. It is surprising since it was the only Islamic party to manage to increase its support in the election. The PKS phenomenon therefore runs counter to the argument that the performance of Islamic parties in Indonesian politics will decline as democracy becomes more advanced. However, many analysts argue that the achievement was not the result of the party's Islamic identity but, rather, that it was the effect of the image developed and message delivered by the PKS as a party that strongly supports good governance and morally based politics (Dagg 2007: 52), which paralleled voters' demands for change (na Thalang 2004: 331; Ananta, Arifin, Suryadinata 2005: 59).

Therefore, according to this argument, the PKS's increased support was actually the outcome of a political context whereby the main political parties were regarded as corrupt and unable to deliver effective and transparent government. The situation influenced the voters to look for alternatives, giving their support to the PD (*Partai Demokrat* or Democratic Party) and the PKS. In this context, the PKS was seen as a better alternative for Indonesian politics and it was hoped that the party would be able to endorse change. For that reason, the party's success was not simply the result of its Islamic identity and message, but its ability to get support from swing voters. The slogan 'clean and caring' may reflect an understanding that its Islamic appeal did not necessarily guarantee its electability (Watson 2004: 23) to appeal to more rational voters.

As an Islamic party, it is quite difficult for the PKS to shed its status as an intermediate party and establish itself as a major party without the support of more voters as it depends on a specific segment of voters only, namely highly educated urban voters as well as Muslim votes. According to some analysts, Islamic parties in Indonesia are in competition for a specific and relatively limited number of voters who identify themselves with Islam and an Islamic vision. The total percentage of the voters in 2004 who identify themselves in this way, based on Islamic parties' support, is around 37 percent. It has to be remembered that this group of voters has become the target of many Islamic parties: PKS, PPP, PBB, PBR, PKNU, PNU and other smaller parties. Some of the non-officially Islamic

parties such as the PAN, which is sometimes associated with Muhammadiyah, and the PKB, which has its stronghold of supporters from Nahdlatul Ulama, also compete with them for support.

The lesson of the 1999 and 2004 elections has encouraged the PKS to capture more voters by down-playing its original image as an Islamic party. The 2004 election shows that the issue of a less religious image but moral hope was more effective in appealing to voters in urban areas. However, the result was not enough for the party to develop into a major force in Indonesian politics. The party hopes that the momentum of 2004 may be continued in 2009 and assumed that the increasing support for the PKS remains steady. If the momentum is still in favour with the PKS it is believed that the support will increase significantly. Officially, the PKS has targeted 20 percent of the votes to reach the minimum requirement to have its own presidential candidate (Buehler 2009: 59).

To achieve that figure, penetration among the wider electorate is necessary and PKS tends to apply more pragmatic adjustment of moderation (Hidayat 2009). It refers to an ideological party that wants to be a centrist party without giving up its ideology and, in the case of PKS, the party still clearly abides with Islam as its formal ideological basis. The continued usage of the term 'partai dakwah' shows the willingness of PKS to declare a religious agenda in politics. Alongside its original identity as an Islamic party, the PKS has also developed less ideological images and messages in its campaign strategy. However, as a formally Islamic party, moving toward the centre in the democratic system is more problematic. The party will inevitably face questions of whether Islam is suitable for democracy or not and also the questions of accepting the idea of a nation state with a 'human made' constitution.

In facing the 2009 election PKS has tried to lighten its ideological stance to acknowledge people's awareness. Besides relaxing its ideological image, the party has also sought to make its campaigns more attractive. For most Indonesians, public campaigning with a musical group on the stage is quite normal, so the PKS now allows popular bands to take part in the party's campaigns. Image building through the media is also applied by releasing different types of publicity for different targeted groups. The party's most controversial effort to attract people is to portray Soeharto as 'guru bangsa' as part of accepting the history of the country, along with some of Indonesia's important figures (The Jakarta Post, 17 November 2008).

In order to be seen as more Indonesian, the party has also introduced the cry of ‘Merdeka’ alongside the typical ‘Allahu Akbar’ during the state’s independence ceremony and has acknowledged the plurality of Indonesian society by holding the 2005 National Summit in Bali, a favourite tourist destination dominated by Hindus. As a party that wants to be more Indonesian, building relationships with all political, social and economic powers is acceptable under the idea of building the state together. Based on that principle, the idea of building a political coalition with any political party is possible, including with secular nationalists and even Christian parties. One example of this more pragmatic strategy was exploring a possible coalition with the PDIP, which has a limited record of religiosity, and Golkar, which has a long history as the backbone of the authoritarian New Order, based on the idea of great narration introduced by Anis Matta, the party’s General Secretary (Hidayat 2008).

### **III.2.2.2. Ideological Shift?**

The PKS always refers to itself as a party of *dakwah*, which has a religious objective, rather than just as a secular organisation. It is a continuation of the Tarbiyah Movement as *dakwah* activities to purify the understanding of Islam, an objective which can also be conducted in the form of a political party. The party leadership believe that forming political parties is parallel with the objective of the Prophet when he changed his strategy from that of an underground movement (*sirriyah al-da'wah*) to open preaching (*jahriyah al-da'wah*) after several years of activities. A political party is perceived as a consequence of the development of the movement in many social aspects and uses the momentum of political openness or democratisation following the fall of the New Order regime in 1998. It is a combination of religious with rational objectives. Forming a political party is also an objective of *shari'a* implemented in a worldly institution as a manifestation of the existence of a group of people (*jama'ah*) (Nurmahmudi in Hassan 1998: 36-7).

The PKS also introduced a reformulation of the idea of an Islamic state as put forward by Hasan al-Banna. Al-Banna is the founder of Ikhwanul Muslimin, who strongly inspired the Tarbiyah Movement with his ideas of Islamic interpretation and the system of training developed in the organisation. According to al-Banna, establishing an Islamic state is compulsory. The PKS is actually aligned with the idea of the establishment of an Islamic state, but they want to establish any form of state managed Islamically, rather than insist on

the establishment of a formal Islamic state. For the PKS, substance is more important than the legal formal aspect. In this interpretation, Islam can accept every form of political institution as long as they implement Islamic values. The PKS still recognises the term of *khilafah Islamiyah* that can be applied to every political system as a product of human civilisation. Matta (2006: 11) argues that in the era of empire states, Islam still could exist even though there were aspects of that political system which were not ideally fitted to an Islamic vision. The recent situation is similar whereby the nation state is widely accepted by human beings with democracy running the system of the state to relate the superstructure of society to the whole society through the electoral process or other forms of political participation. Islam can adapt to the situation because of its flexible and universal ideas. Hence, *khilafah* does not mean adopting a construction similar to that of Madinah, but, rather, taking the substance of the political process in it and implementing it to a different political structure according to the condition of society.

From that idea, the PKS offers a reconstruction of the concept of *khilafah*. Hidayat Nur Wahid notes that *khilafah* is political activity in which Islamic values are present in developing society, reducing negative behaviour and encouraging a positive attitude among the members of society (Furkon 2006: 249). Therefore, *khilafah* is interpreted as a substance that can be applied in every form of political system. A republic or a monarchy can be seen as *khilafah* as long as Islamic objectives of justice, welfare, stamping out corruption, and not authoritarian society, with an Islamic mechanism for selecting the leader, form the main principles of a nation's political practices (ibid).

Similarly, the party also accepted the concept of nation state as the basis of the Indonesian state and rejected the idea of a supra-national state based on the Muslim *ummah* as an agreement of every member of society within the state. The PKS respects the agreement and there is no desire to impose Islamic values formulated as state law as a reflection of the party's commitment to the superiority of the will of the people. For that reason, the PKS prefers to uphold the idea of Piagam Madinah (the Madinah Charter) rather than Piagam Djakarta (the Djakarta Charter) because the former offered a pluralistic idea, recognising and protecting different communities, while the latter only mentions the welfare of the Muslim members of society as its main objective. Piagam Madinah is the pact of agreement between the Prophet Muhammad and the non-believers in Madinah to ensure stable social and political relations in the city. Meanwhile, Piagam Djakarta is the

preamble to the 1945 Indonesian constitution, which mentioned the obligation of every Muslim to abide by Islam before being abolished by Muhammad Hatta before its declaration.

The same strategy is also implemented for the issue of *shari'a* law. It is regarded that the majority of Indonesian society are far from accepting the formalisation of Islamic law except in Aceh province, which has a different context following the 2004 tsunami and reconciliation with the Aceh Independent Movement. One of the most controversial aspects of the law is *qishas* or cutting the hands off thieves. Therefore, the party sees it as a more substantive ethical consideration. The party tends to develop an interpretation of *shari'a* based on its welfare aspect and downplaying its legal formal aspect. The idea of *shari'a* is to provide for people's needs, both material and psychological, before its full implementation. A comprehensive *shari'a* cannot be implemented in a society that is still economically poor and in a state of moral degradation. Suryadarma, one of the party's MPs, said,

How can we implement that law [of cutting off a thief's hand], while the thieves are poor people? How can we implement *qishas*, while we are the persons who commit the illegal practices? Therefore, when we uphold the issues of justice and welfare, all of them are basically the nature of the implementation of *shari'a* (Machmudi 2005: 102).

Based on that premise, the PKS seems to be implementing a more pragmatic moderation by maintaining an ideological identity with less apparent messages and images. The party has tried to lessen its ideological burden, which potentially makes it difficult for an Islamic party to explain its policies in front of the public. In the debates of the Anti-Pornography Bill, it is clear that the party is perceived as having an ambiguous stand point (Tomsa 2011). The Bill was introduced to prohibit any activities that can be related to pornography which is difficult if it is interpreted by using religious values. The argument of the opponents is that the interpretation cannot be monopolised by a single point of view. Despite the opposition, the PKS supports the Bill strongly and until it is finally accepted by DPR (the House of Representative) to show that it remains an Islamic party. In this process, the party gives a strong consideration to religious values rather than public opinion in general and there is a concern that it is part of efforts to 'set moral standards and drive

moral policy' (Allen 2007: 113). The confusion is also contributed by the party's calls on the disbandment of Ahmadiyah which is regarded as unusual in the view of the majority of Indonesian Muslims (Hasan 2009: 11).

An apparent ideological appeal in Indonesian politics remains popular, however, it may be used to monopolise righteous behaviour. Historically the cases to claim that giving support for a non-Islamic party might be regarded as un-Islamic, took place in the electoral process. During the New Order era, in the 1982 election, the PPP tried to persuade Muslim voters to support the party as an expression of their Muslim faith. The reaction to this method of using religious appeal was implemented in two ways. The state exerted pressure on all organisations to accept Pancasila as their only ideology, known as policy *asal tunggal*, with those in violation of the policy regarded as subversive. Intellectually, Muslim scholars also opposed the strategy by offering the slogan 'Islam Yes, Party No' to reject the use of Islam in politics (Azra 2000: 312). As a result, the issue of Islam in politics remains quite sensitive for many voters, especially the issue of an Islamic state and the implementation of *shari'a*. By lessening the ideological message and image, the party hopes that anxiety toward the party will also be minimized. The outcome, of course, is more votes in the electoral process.

### **III.2.3. Impacts on the PKS**

In the 2009 legislative election, the PKS performed better than other Islamic and Muslim-based political parties, but the 7.8 percent obtained by the PKS was relatively stagnant and the party failed to achieve its target. Because other Islamic parties, as well as the majority of other political parties, polled fewer votes, the PKS became the leading Islamic party in Indonesian politics. The percentage enabled the party to gain more than 10 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives, or approximately 57 seats. For the party's elites, the achievement was regarded as a significant success because the party was able to get more votes in unexpected provinces (Republika, 26 April 2009).

However, it is undeniable that the party suffered from internal disputes regarding the strategy to add new voters and saw significant losses in its urban bases. Months before the election, the efforts raised major concerns within the ranks of the PKS itself. Some of the senior members supported by some other members, mainly from Jakarta and its surrounding urban areas, are known to have been unenthusiastic with the pragmatic

approach and strategy to seek a political advantage as the party's strategy was seen as violating Islamic principles or at least being not Islamic enough.

### **III.2.3.1. The Movement's Style of Managing a Political Party**

During the first two years of party activities, almost all of every cadre's energy was focused on previously unknown political activities. After the 1999 general election, when the party received only 1.4 percent of the votes, forcing them to form PKS, the party consolidated all of their members, strengthened the method of *tarbiyah* as the basis of their movement and developed solid socialisation for every member of the party. It is the essential element of the party to produce cadres who understand the party's policy and are productive in influencing and serving the society. Its discipline and good organization are reflected in the training programme for every level of cadres and the materials provided for them. Basically, the programmes for the party's activists are not different from the model of the Tarbiyah Movement. What makes it different is that the training is no longer a secret activity and is held formally under the programme of a political party. Recruitment can be carried out openly and is announced by posters and banners on the street or in bazaars. In the early 2000s for instance, the PK launched a TOP (*Training Orientasi Partai* or Training of Party Orientation) recruitment programme which was implemented at every level of the party.

However, even though the party is now able to recruit from among wider society, universities and schools still remain important sources of a hardcore of party activists. It has been confirmed by party officials in Jakarta that the party still needs the input from both sources for its new activists (Appendix B.13.). There are many difficulties in training new activists from among older members of society, even though they may agree to join the party's training, such as time concerns as well as their different orientation toward the future. For ordinary people who already have a settled family life, political activism is not a priority. Hence, their objective in attending the training is only to seek further understanding about Islam. That objective also has another constraint in that they only want to deal with Islamic guidance in their daily life. For the local party, developing a spirit of change, which is the main character of the students' training, among the ordinary people is more difficult.

Due to these difficulties in training ordinary people, the party has developed two different categories of activist, which are the core cadre (*kader inti*) and the sympathizer (*simpatisan*). The core cadre is a term for those who are trained based on the module similar to the Tarbiyah Movement, with the emphasis on the understanding of *tawhid*. By giving the understanding of *tawhid*, the cadre would hopefully have a determination to support the party's durable agenda without hoping for any material reward. Supporting the party is parallel with defending their Islamic faith because all the party's activities are aimed to be for da'wah. All of the energy put in to fighting the election is meant to position the party as a strong and influential party, so that, through its representatives in the executive branch and local and national legislative bodies, it can influence policies which are more friendly toward Islam and Muslim society. The party's ultimate political goal is developing a *madani society* under the umbrella of a unitary Indonesian state. The party wants to contribute to the management of the state as Anis Matta (2006) explains, "Let the party get a chance to manage the country in our way."

It is a complicated, if not unique, situation for the party to run training by which those two very different goals are embedded within the same module. On one side, the training wants to introduce an understanding of Islam as a universal religious value for every Muslim; on the other hand, the trainers are also encouraged to mobilise their trainees to support the party's political objectives. The latter objective is definitely a political activity associated with material benefits such as political position and higher income that follows it. Therefore the party usually recruits new members without any political agenda within the new training group. The most important understanding for the first stage of the training is planting a pure understanding of Islam. There will be no political agenda for the new groups. The members of the newly-recruited group will understand by experience and interaction that their trainer has an affiliation to a certain party.

However, the basic approach is not always implemented smoothly. The local party branches are sometimes impatient to mobilise the new young trainees into their programme. In one school in Eastern Jakarta for instance, the alumni who have an affiliation to the party have struggled with intervention from the local party branch, which wants to control all of the young trainees by integrating the network of trainers under the coordination of the branch (Appendix B.1.). Even though the branch officials have promised not to include



them in any political activities, the alumni remain unconvinced by the offer and have kept the training groups beyond the party's control.

The intention of the local branch to integrate the entire cadre in its area is part of an effort to put all of the network range on their records, so the local branch is able to figure out the numbers of the entire cadre. However, due to different interpretations of how the training group or *halaqah* should relate to the party and the indistinct criteria of core cadre and sympathiser, the exact number of cadre in certain provinces is sometimes difficult to figure out. One local branch officer in Jakarta said the number has to be revised because the official statistics are too optimistic and unrealistic (Appendix B.13.).

The situation reflects the difficulties faced by the party in dealing with intensive training of party activists and penetrating wider society. The party wants to have control over all of its activists, whether cadre or sympathiser, and put all of them into a training process similar to the previous structure of the Tarbiyah Movement. It can be said that integrating the movement's structure and mechanism into a political party has turned the party into a cadre party. At the time of the party's foundation, it is estimated that the movement had around 50,000 members, who became the backbone of the young party of PK. Until recently, under the banner of PKS, the President of the party claims that the total number of party cadre is approximately 800,000 across the country as informed by Tifatul Sembiring when he visited London on 16 June 2008. However, at the same time, the party also wants to develop into a mass party by recruiting new cadre and increasing their membership.

The difficulties in integrating two different lines of command can be seen from the experience of a local party leader in Jakarta. According to one of his former trainees (Appendix B.4.), the district where the local leader lives was led by a party member who was still young and had less experience than him. Under this young leader, the party's coordination was ineffective because many local party decisions or directions were ignored by many of the members. It is indicated that the reason for ineffective coordination was the inexperienced local party leader. His decisions were ignored by the membership, especially those who were more senior. Because this situation was actually quite common, the party took drastic action to tackle the problem. The leadership restructured the organisation to maximise coordination and mobilisation of members' potential through a policy that the party is the movement and the movement is the party itself (*al-hizb huwa al-jama'ah, wal*

*jama'ah hiya al-hizb*). At the party's National Summit in 2005, it was decided that the party should be governed in accordance with the structure of the Tarbiyah Movement.

This decision was aimed at coordinating all activities under one solid structure within the movement and the party. Therefore, the party's decision and instruction is also an instruction of the movement itself. To implement the policy, the entire party structure was changed to reflect the structure and leadership of the movement. Following that decision, all the movement's coordination also came under the party structure of the cadre section to establish a solid and planned level of membership within the structure of the party. All of the members came under the supervision of local party leadership to improve the coordination in each area. Hence, the trainer of a member will be the leadership of the local party structure and reflected into the lowest level of party structure.

The consequences of uniting the party structure and the movement coordination were significant. There was a major project of transferring all of the movement's members to the new trainers according to each member's neighbourhood. The lowest party structure is the DPRa (*Dewan Pengurus Ranting* or Council of Branch Committees), led by a member who has the highest level of membership in a village or regency. The same pattern was applied to every level of the party structure up to the national level. Based on that pattern, it is likely that the central party leaders were trained by the head of the Shura Assembly, Hilmi Aminuddin. The impact of this restructuring was that, in contrast to the previous leaders, all members of the party could work effectively as decisions were taken by the most senior member, and there was no reason to reject his decision or be reluctant to carry it out because he had the legitimacy to ask for loyalty due to his experience and understanding of Islamic teachings (Appendix B.4.)

The spirit of unity which led to the integration of all structures in the PKS can also be seen in the willingness to integrate all members, regardless of their background, into a unified group. Anis Matta noted that the elite movement and mass movement are not something which can be separated but must be integrated (Furkon 2006: 208). His statement is an optimistic one, but in fact it is the same vision among other middle-ranking cadres. In an internal discussion held by the committee for electoral victory for the party in 2001 at the PKS headquarters, most of the cadres denied the dichotomy of those two characteristics. They believed that the strategy of grouping people in the training system is the most effective way to build a better political party as the movement's core activity. This

optimism to some extents indicates the complexity of defining the character of the movement vis-a-vis the character of Indonesian society in general. Nevertheless, in some points, there are some aspects of the movement's activity which can be translated quite easily. One of the movement's student leaders still believes that the training model is necessary and all positions in the party should be filled by those involved in the training process and who have obtained a certain level of understanding and act accordingly (Appendix B.1.).

Based on that understanding, the opportunity for those seeking to join the party directly at the upper level or even middle level is limited, because everyone has to first undergo the training process. Promotion to a higher level also depends on one's achievements in the training, which becomes the basis of the party hierarchy. Hence, the question of inclusive and exclusive party is still significant, as is the consequence of the experiment of integration of the movement's character into political activism. It is also admitted by a mid-rank cadre that the party is still in the stage of searching for a suitable model of internal system for the unity of the movement and the party structure (Appendix B.18.)

### **III.2.3.2. Internal criticisms**

The party's pragmatic moderation raised concerns within the PKS itself. Many senior members and other members, especially in Jakarta, had mixed feelings - unenthusiastic, disappointed, confused and offended - toward the party's approach to seeking a political advantage in the electoral process. These concerns basically reflect the confusion of the party's moderate image both in front of the public and in front of its own cadres.

Criticism grew significantly, especially after the National Summit in 2005 when the party discussed the possibility of resigning from the government coalition following the rise of gasoline prices. The change in stance of the party's MPs, from opposition to support of the price rise, raised suspicions that the party made a political deal with the government (Tempo, 28 March 2005). Although such negotiation was denied, the party's image was badly damaged due to its support for the new price. The criticisms reached its peak before and during the election campaign of 2004. In the absence of any formal activities to accommodate this criticism, disappointment was only expressed by individuals, and it is difficult to give an accurate figure or percentage of those who were critical, but it is clear

that there was growing discontent within the party. One member, writing in 2009, suggested that at least 10 percent of the total membership were unfavourably disposed toward the leadership (Ja'far 2009). A year later, a party lawmaker mentioned that discontented members amounted to approximately 15 to 20 percent (Appendix B.10.).

Growing disappointment became a collective interest when some disaffected members started to hold informal gatherings to discuss the recent situation. These gatherings took place at Al Hikmah mosque in South Jakarta, which was known as the centre of religious education and training for many of the party's members. Monthly gatherings were set up to invite speakers who could explain the recent situation, and soon attracted more confused, disappointed or outright critical members. The gatherings in the mosque were known as KIK (*Kajian Islam Kontemporer* or Contemporary Islamic Studies) and were usually attended by audiences of around 300 to 400. Most of the speakers in the forum were critical of the party's political direction, which was viewed as being more pragmatic than morally based. On some occasions, the committee also invited more neutral speakers. It is predicted that the gathering was started in the beginning of 2008 and reached its peak in the middle of that year.

Following these informal gatherings, more forums were set up to arrange an agenda to spread an understanding of the recent situation to other members in different areas around Jakarta. It started with an intensive two day gathering in *Taman Mini Indonesia Indah* (Beautiful Indonesia Mini Park) in East Jakarta, 5-6 September 2008. The forum which was set up to organise the members in attendance was known as the FKP (*Forum Kader Peduli* or Forum of Concerned Cadre). The name actually came from Mahfudz Siddiq, a lawmaker from the PKS, who mentioned it publicly when the forum sought to have an open hearing. The initial informal name of the gathering was *Forum Silaturahmi* (Hospitality Forum) which was formed following the Taman Mini gathering.

One of the main items on the agenda was to arrange similar gatherings of the KIK in different areas, with the coordinator in each area responsible for organising the gathering as well as being the local focal point. One gathering was arranged in a mosque in East Jakarta to embrace Ramadhan in 30 August 2008, the main speaker being one of the senior members, Yusuf Supendi, who at that time had received a penalty from the party leadership. The speech, though, did not mention any criticism at all and there was an insignificant attendance. There was also a sermon on Palestine held in Al Azhar Mosque,

South Jakarta, in 24 August 2008, organised by well known preachers from the Tarbiyah Movement. One of the speakers was clearly not aware of the objective of the sermon as his talk was only aimed at encouraging young Muslims to come back to the mosque such as were conducted before the establishment of the PK and the PKS. Neither of these sermons was recommended event for the party members or supporters and was only attended by less than a hundred. If they were recommended, the attendance would be in the thousands as the movement is able to mobilise massive numbers of members.

One of the initiators of the gatherings managed to run a small but routine gathering to discuss the recent situation. He became the routine speaker, but sometimes he also invited other critical senior members to speak about the current situation and give their reflections on the Islamic movement as a whole. This kind of small discussion activity is actually similar to the official training run by the party and the Tarbiyah Movement. From the party's viewpoint, therefore, it was confrontational and illegal, but those in attendance argued that they were only expressing their disappointment at the party's leadership and policies, not at the party (or the movement) itself and the project of *dakwah Islam*. These routine gatherings were the main opposition activities since the senior members who were critical of the leadership were isolated from party activities. Later, the party cancelled their memberships as they were regarded as opposing the party's decisions. After the change in direction of the Forum Silaturahmi, more intensive gatherings were held with smaller numbers in attendance. On some occasions, they stayed overnight to meet with a critical senior member and the gathering ended with night prayers and preparation for fasting.

Those whose membership was annulled were senior members who came to Lembang, Northern Bandung, to meet Hilmi Aminuddin directly to express their concerns at his leadership in March 2008. There was no discussion at that time because Hilmi accepted their concerns without hesitation. However, one of them knew that Hilmi was angered by the criticism and their dismissal was part of his disapproval (Zein 2010). Two senior members were finally dismissed by the party while others were unwilling to remain active in the party for different reasons.

The growing criticism is a reflection of decreasing trust toward the leadership. According to the critical members their disappointment was mainly due to the lack of humility shown by senior members in the parliament and the highest leadership, who are regarded as violating the principles of what the movement had taught for decades. It was

also stimulated by the party's recent more moderate policies and move into the middle of the political spectrum in Indonesian politics. Uniquely, these critical points are either directly or indirectly connected with the previously mentioned figures of creative small groups linked with Anis Matta. One example of controversy came when Matta argued about the importance of seeking more prosperity to upgrade cadres' confidence and dignity in carrying out political and social activities (Matta 2008). His opinion regarding prosperity was challenged by Daud Rasyid, whose writing was distributed informally. Although the writing is difficult to confirm, in one of his sermons in East Jakarta in early 12 September 2010, Rasyid expressed his discontent with the recent condition of the PKS, arguing that the party had been heavily influenced by the political situation rather than being able to influence it. As a declaratory of the PK, he is a respected member of the Tarbiyah Movement, especially after he confronted Nurcholis Madjid's ideas in the mid-1990s.

This criticism and disappointment had, to some extent, a direct and indirect impact on the party's performance during the campaign. Those who were not in favour of the leadership were reluctant to support activities coordinated by the party to promote the party's programme in the community. As political canvassing became the main strategy for developing closer relation with members of the community, the involvement of every cadre was essential, especially when critical members had experience and capabilities in making good social relations or had a good reputation in their community. It was known that some of them were not only reluctant to join the party's canvassing, but that they were also critical as it could degrade the spirit of some younger cadres. One of them who lives in Depok, a city to the south of Jakarta even declared his intention to campaign in his neighbourhood for people not to vote for the PKS, differing completely from his position in the previous election when he campaigned for the party.

However, the numbers of disaffected members reluctant to support the party's political canvassing for different reasons were insignificant compared to those who were still working for the party. Even though some of them were also critical it did not undermine their full loyalty. They might have been critical of some decisions or policies, but they still remained committed and supported every campaign programme. They did not express any opposition and still worked for the party without hesitation. It was good for the party since they did not significantly affect the party's performance because they were still happy with the situation and committed to work. Therefore, the main concern about the

growing criticism was its impact on the efforts to influence more voters as the reluctance of the critical members to support the party during campaigning may deter some potential voters.

### **III.2.3.3. Confusing Image and Stagnation in the 2009 Election**

The direct impact on the party's performance in the 2009 election is quite difficult to examine. However, since most of the critical and opposing members were in the middle rank and some of them were influential, their impact reduced the PKS's penetration into wider society significantly. As a party with a strong and relatively solid political machine at the lower level, the PKS has been successful in mobilising their cadres to do door to door campaigning. This model of campaigning requires as many cadres as possible to be involved with a good quality of communication with people. The reluctance of the critical members to support this campaign was detrimental since they also had trainees under their supervision. Even though some of them had been dispelled from the party structure they still had access to and influence over some of the younger cadres. In addition, they had valuable capabilities in communicating and influencing people which the party was not able to utilise.

The burden of the cadres was made even harder when they had to deal with several new images and strategies launched by the party. It is not an easy task to explain why the party has to make a coalition with candidates who are not in tune with the public's concern. There were several cases before the national legislative election where the PKS supported candidates in local elections who had a problematic reputation because of corruption and other reasons. Some of these cases came in the local election of South Sumatra (provincial election), Central Java and Jakarta (provincial election), and also Semarang (district election). In Central Java, a mid-rank party member expressed his concerns at the party's decision to support the mayor of Semarang for a second term by sending a formal letter (Appendix B.14.). The concern was not about the cases themselves but the question of how the party developed political relations with those figures. The difficulties of this situation are significant since the political canvassing was emphasised by the party as one of the political contributions whereby its cadre would work as a political machine to campaign to every household to secure victory for the party's candidate. If the candidate has a problematic image, explaining the situation is rather difficult, which could also damage the party's reputation.

Other messages delivered by the party also contributed to the problem of portraying its real image during campaigning. One of the most controversial issues came when the party launched an advertisement showing Soeharto as ‘guru bangsa’ or national guru. It was controversial and contributed to the confusion, not only for the cadres, but also for the public, since the former leader of the New Order regime has a bad reputation for damaging Indonesian political life with political repression and spreading corruption throughout government. The party’s rehabilitation of Soeharto and Indonesian history under the New Order was officially explained by a party official. Anis Matta explained that there was a need to develop a new narrative regarding national development under Soeharto. In a seminar in the University of Indonesia in 19 April 2008, he argued that in order to do so, Indonesia as a nation should consider the previous narrative to learn from its mistakes as well as its achievements. However, the reconciliatory motive was a controversial issue since the student elements of the PKS, the KAMMI (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia* or Indonesian Muslim Students Action Unit), and many student activists close to the movement had strongly opposed the regime in 1998. The party also had no track record of arranging any such reconciliatory effort before, and a meeting with the children of Indonesian figures from a broad spectrum of ideology was not convincing. The controversy may not have been a big concern for many, but for some among the middle class in Jakarta and its satellite cities, it might have been a big concern, since most of the party’s supporters in the ballot box in the 2004 election were swing voters who could transfer their vote to other political parties. As one of the reasons for the party’s significant increase in support in 2004 was its image as an anti-corruption party and a new hope in Indonesian politics, utilising the figure of Soeharto was bound to be counter-productive in attempting to retain their support (Hidayat 2010). Equally controversial was the announcement that the party is an open party, meaning that it is a party for all (The Jakarta Post, 17 June 2010). The message was unclear given that the statement was quoted without giving a full background to it. In fact, it was not an expression of a fully open party as shown in the case of the AKP. The PKS accepts non-Muslim members, but they cannot reach a higher level than *anggota pemula* (beginner member) and it is only allowed in particular areas where a majority of the population are non-Muslim. Furthermore, there was no decision made to declare that the party is open (Appendix B.10.), which confirms that there are confusing messages from the



party's elite to the public, or even party members if there is no further explanation through the solid internal network.

In gaining 7.8 percent of the votes in the election, the PKS was unsuccessful in achieving its ambitious target of 20 percent. In fact, it was the PD which achieved that percentage, due to the significant influence of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the incumbent president. The party also failed to achieve their more realistic target of 11 to 12 percent. The campaign was not a total failure as the party was able to increase its number of seats from 45 to 57. However, this was achieved at the cost of losing some of their seats in certain provinces such as Jakarta and West Java which represent urban voters, especially in the capital and its suburban cities (Hidayat 2010).

The loss of seats in these areas might be covered by growing support in other provinces such as Central Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. Central Java is quite surprising in that it contributed four more MPs than before. It is surprising since the province was not regarded as a major base for the party's supporters. However, the loss of support in Jakarta and its surrounding cities may indicate that the party is losing its credibility in the areas that are supposed to be the strongholds of the PKS as shown in the previous election. In Jakarta, the PKS surrendered its position to the PD and the PDIP (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* or Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), becoming the third party with slightly less than 20 percent of the vote. In Depok, which was known as a PKS stronghold, the party was beaten into second place by the PD and lost around three percent of its votes. Therefore, despite its ability to get more seats in parliament, the result of the 2009 election saw the party's level of support stagnate.

## Chapter IV

### Managing Moderation of the AKP

As explained in the previous chapter, the AKP is a party that was built on the remnants of the RP and the FP. The party has sought to survive in the Turkish political system despite there being a stronghold of secular groups where seek to intervene repeatedly. In order to survive under the intense political pressure, the party is therefore compelled to apply a pragmatic approach. Nonetheless, such a pragmatic approach has posed difficulties for the AKP particularly in describing its stance in front of the Turkish general audience regarding their identity and programme, and more so in appealing to the supporters of the RP and the FP. The strong attachment to religion and the more nationalistic approach of the RP are two key challenges that must be overcome in order to have the polity switching their preference to the AKP.

Putting those difficulties aside and combining its obvious pragmatic approach with ideological moderation (Mecham 2004), the AKP was able to maintain significant popular support in three consecutive national elections in (2002, 2007 2011). Their accomplishment in those three elections was further strengthened by the party's success to win the popular referendum for a constitutional change that was held in 2010. The result of the latest national election in 2011 was a clear indication that the party has been able to gain more votes than before. It also confirms the shift of ideas from political to social Islam (Dağı 2008). In the analysis of moderation, changing the identity from more religious and nationalistic preferences to a more pragmatic one should indicate some tensions especially from and within those who are not in favour with the decrease of religious weight of the party. As a matter of fact, the AKP is still able to maintain its solidity and a 'religious element' within the party and is still committed to the current formula of party identity known as Conservative Democrat to work with different groups.

Accordingly, this chapter will examine some of the party's strategies in maintaining political support from its own members or even expanding its popularity to the entire

Turkish society. Based on the theoretical discussion presented in Chapter II, this chapter demonstrates that in certain situations particularly when a party tries to change its identity (either because of new interpretation of politics or strategy), different strategies might be applied according to different levels of moderation. Those approaches are party leadership, trust, conversion, alienation and decomposition.

In this Chapter, the AKP has given more attention to conversion strategy rather than alienation with different degrees of application on leadership and trust. It is also clear that decomposition is also implemented, but based on a more organisational basis rather than ideological. To examine the organisational character, this Chapter explores the party structures and how it works to generate members' trust. Through an exploration of the party structures and also the constitution the distinctive characters of the party can be revealed as it gives more attention to the contribution of members to its electoral success rather than interpretation on a particular ideology. The AKP has abandoned any fanatical ideological preference, so a more pragmatic approach has led the party to develop more universal values and visions in order to be functioning as a "shelter" for different preferences of supporters and members alike.

#### **IV.1. Party Leadership**

Party leadership of the AKP is one of the crucial aspects of its success in maintaining internal stability and harmony. Despite risks of having suffered from tensions and splits rooted from its deliberate efforts to detach itself from certain ideological preferences, the party can still offer an open and institutionalised party structure under a system of leadership to run day to day politics. It is widely assumed that the AKP has been benefitting enormously from the strong personal leadership of Recep Tayip Erdoğan. This has been expressed in such comments as "There's no AKP without Erdoğan" (Roux 2011) or "He is the party and the party is Erdoğan" (Barkey 2011). On many occasions, ordinary, middle class, intellectual and political opponents maintained to the researcher that the success of the AKP to win numerous local and national elections as well as the referendum from 2002 to 2011 is simply due to Erdoğan's persona.

Moreover, from an informal conversation, a retired military officer praised him as a good leader who has resolved successfully many of Istanbul's acute problems, while a young researcher elucidated that his nature of an honest person suits with the

imagination of many Turkish people. Acknowledgements of Erdoğan's significant role can also be seen in many international forums which help elevate the country's position and respect especially in the region. His gesture to abruptly leave a panel attended among others by Shimon Perez, President of Israel, at the World Economic Forum, following the latter's inflammatory comments on the Gaza raid was remembered by many as an expression of protest and signature of his strong standpoint on Israel's attack on Gaza in January 2009 (New York Times, 29 January 2009). He returned home a hero and was welcomed in Turkey with a reception of thousands praising his bold action (BBC News, 30 January 2009).

Due to his centrality to the success of the AKP, many are also anxious about the post-Erdoğan party's future. Yet, it is considered a common and frequent phenomenon that in Turkish politics strong leaders have been influencing the political parties in many ways. Furthermore, there is a strong tendency that political parties in Turkey have developed a structure of domination by strong leaders (Hale and Özbudun 2009: 44-5).

Along with the issue of domination, political parties are also constantly faced with threats of discontinuity particularly when they are confronted with the struggle to maintain their existence in Turkish politics. The case of the AP (*Adalet Partisi*) is a good example to demonstrate the discontinuity of a political party. It had dominated Turkish politics during the 1960s and throughout the 1970s, but suffered from military intervention. It had to transform itself into a new party, the DYP (*Doğru Yol Partisi*) which continued to exert its political influence on politics throughout the 1980s, and yet, was once again forced to transform itself into another party after suffering a defeat in 2002 election. It did so by merging with the ANAP (*Anavatan Partisi*) in 2007. On the side of ANAP, the legacy of Turgut Ozal, who was praised as the influential prime minister from 1983 to 1989 and as president until his death in 1993, could not salvage the decline of his party, the ANAP, resulting in the exigency to form a political merger with the DYP.

However, despite serious concerns over the growing influence of Erdoğan and the future of the AKP after him, this research maintains that the party's strong reliance on Erdoğan's influence is not the only key to its success. The party has also been able to build a sophisticated organisation throughout the country to reach the people. In order to examine the argument, this section will explore both the Erdoğan factor and also the party's institution to identify and explain factors behind the AKPS's success to secure loyalty and

garner support from its members. The first part of this section focuses on Erdoğan as a political figure who offers personal influence as well as visions that inspire his party members. The second part explores the party's mechanism which manages three separate power sources namely the political party, the parliament and the cabinet and synchronises the interests within all political arenas. Again, Erdoğan plays a vital role as the key to lead all significant elements to control the AKP through an institutionalised party mechanism that provides confidence to all members through an objective, rational and open process.

#### **IV.1.1. Personal Character and Vision**

For his political opponents and adversaries, Erdoğan has been described as a threat for the Turkish state. His background as a member of the banned RP has given Erdoğan's adversaries a strong reason to make accusations against him. He also served as the mayor of Istanbul after winning its local election in 1994, but then imprisoned by the state prosecutor who charged him with the accusation of expressing religious symbol during a public event. He was also accused of implementing *taqiyye* or covering his original intention of Islamic preference in order to deceive secular strongholds and survive Turkish politics (Mecham 2004). For them, to declare that he has changed and left his background behind to embrace a new appearance with the AKP was not enough. The fact that he also chose a different path with the SP (*Saadet Partisi*) to show his protest against domination of Erbakan's idea could not convince the secularist to trust him fully.

However, despite pressure from state apparatuses, Turkish politics offers an arena of democracy in which the politicians are given opportunity to appeal for popular support to confirm voters' preference towards a particular person or vision. The opportunity to appeal for popular support has given Erdoğan a chance to offer his persona and vision that is proven to be effective against the secularists. After succeeding in winning the referendum for constitutional change in 2010, his vision for writing a new constitution that gives more power to the president was still effective to garner more supports in the latest election of 2011. Even though the party failed to get the majority of seats in the parliament needed to amend the constitution without prior consultation with the oppositions, the AKP has been able to gain the decisive support of nearly 50 per cent which indicate a strong mandate from the public.

As mentioned before, the party owes greatly to Erdoğan as a crucial selling point during election. Scholars have explained the reasons behind the party's success and focused on the social dynamics of Turkish society as the basis for the success as well as the result of political circumstances. However, despite the fact that it represents the emergence of the middle class (Yavuz 2006 and White 2002), voters' protests toward the failure of other political parties, and also voters' anger toward the military intervention, Erdoğan himself has become an icon of the people's representation.

One of the impressions expressed by many Turkish people in amplifying their feelings about Erdoğan is that he is the person who can actually represent them, especially for the ordinary Turks. For many decades, Turkey has been dominated by a certain elite class to represent and guard the legacy of secularism initially developed by Atatürk. Those who opted to have more preference on religion and tradition from the Anatolian rural were forced to stay aside from the discourses and activisms of state supported by the military, the bureaucracy, businessmen and also universities. The turning point of their domination was the economic liberalisation that had opened an opportunity for Anatolian businessmen to penetrate the Turkish economy. After years of economic involvement, more opportunities had been widely opened to level the status of the old elite class by having a university degree as well as the urban job market. However, the process of integration between the two social classes has been difficult due to the fact that the secularists demand the newly-formed Turkish class to dismantle all religious traditions and values. At the same time, the attachment toward religion is also difficult to remove as part of centuries of legacy from the Ottoman period. The clash between the two sides has significantly increased after the rise of the RP to offer a more religio-nationalistic vision under Erbakan. Within the Turkish political arena, the secularists managed to prevail and won the battle between these two camps following pressure to put Erbakan in the position to withdraw from his office as prime minister in 1997.

In the context of struggle between the two sides, Erdoğan emerged as an alternative leader to replace Erbakan and the latter's style of confrontation toward secularism. Erdoğan inherited a situation in which the new class (sometimes known as "the Black Turks") has grown significantly, but at the same time a majority of them was reluctant to support the Erbakan's idea of a more Islamic approach in Turkish politics. From the outset of his political career in Istanbul, Erdoğan has initiated a different approach of conducting

political activism. One of the new approaches was to maximise the outlook of professionalism during his campaign to run for the mayor's office in Istanbul. He did so by working closely with young political workers with coats and ties rather than bearded and traditional suits. He also initiated to form a women's wing in the city's branch of the RP.

Actually, Erdoğan delivered a rather vague message at the beginning of his political career as a politician of the RP. At first, he was known as a person who admired religion so deeply as reflected in such expressions of his as "I am for *sharia*," "My reference is Islam," and "One cannot be a secularist and a Muslim at the same time" (Heper and Toktas 2003: 170). Moreover, it is believed that his background as a student of the Imam Hatip School has given him deep respect toward Islam and an appreciation of values and respect to older people. He was also influenced by Erbakan, when he was active in the RP as a source of inspiration. To show his respect for him, he adopted Erbakan to name one of his sons.

However, he also had a different standpoint to contrast himself with what Erbakan had implemented in the RP. He admitted that his experience in the Imam Hatip School has influenced his personality as a devoted Muslim. However, he also explained that the school had taught him to respect others as well as strengthen his patriotism. Respecting the rules is also a value he thoroughly observed during his youth. When he played football, he preferred to use shorts rather than long trousers to cover his belly to his knees as recommended by Islam. That was his expression of respect of the rules of playing football (Ibid: 161-2). It is a rather pragmatic repositioning, a move that is commonly and possibly practised in politics. However, he is not a mere opportunist who maximises the advantageous situation for his own benefit. For example, his political career in the RP was not only built by blindly admiring Erbakan's charismatic leadership. On several occasions, Erdoğan openly expressed his criticisms toward the style of leadership applied by his political mentor. He also led a group of the FP members who tried to propose a different approach in politics aimed at avoiding future pressures from the state apparatuses which could disperse the party's opportunity in politics.

Therefore, a decisive decision to establish a new political party that is detached from Erbakan's political legacy was within reason and not unfounded. For example, there are also other expressions to show Erdoğan's admiration toward the rule of law, the constitution, the principle of consultation and the equal rights for every citizen. Erdoğan believes that Islam will guide one to become a good leader rather than a tyrant, and with its

principle of *shura*, Islam provides a much needed guidance toward an interpretation of democracy as a consultation process. He further sees and takes Islam as the guidance at a personal level, and it has to be differentiated when a Muslim is active in politics. Politics is an arena of admiration toward the rules of law and the constitution; hence, it is inappropriate to bring the idea of political Islam into day-to-day politics and enforce its implementation through the state's institutions.

To show his transformation of ideas, he used the expression of taking off his cloth if it felt needed in order to reduce the anxiety of his opponents (Aktay 2009). For his adversaries, anxiety toward Erdoğan's commitment on secularism may be difficult to ease. However, for voters who tried to find a new figure that can represent them in politics and challenge the long established and dominating secularist camp (known as "the White Turks") that was seen to have failed solving many problems in the Turkish economy and politics, Erdoğan was regarded as a perfect model as well as a new hope to revive the legacy of Turgut Ozal.

What is important in this context is that Erdoğan is able to represent the ordinary Turkish people. He lived in the Kasimpasa area—known as an area of the middle- and lower-classes—and having a long cozy relationship with the people in that area has given him a strong feeling of being part of the periphery Turkish. He even categorised himself deliberately as a brother who belongs to the Black Turks (Heper and Toktas 2003: 162). To show his place in the community, he used to go to the same barbershop and also had conversation with many shoppers in Istanbul while shopping for his own needs. His attachment with ordinary lives of people in Istanbul has proven to be significant in strengthening his credentials and getting more acknowledgments from a variety of people. He was and is still known as a religious person and his wife also wears a headscarf. For the secular elite, headscarf is a symbol of religiosity that is forbidden to be worn in the public sphere.

Nonetheless, Erdoğan has been admired for many as a successful mayor of Istanbul, who during his term is able to solve many acute problems suffered by the city's residents for years. More sophisticated water services and city waste systems are just examples of his many successes and, at the same time, more city officers were willing to visit the neighbourhoods to listen to the residents' inputs and complaints. The achievement is part of his commitment to put a problem solving approach and pragmatic solution to ensure the



people's happiness which forms an ultimate goal of his work. In contrast to his fellow SP activists, he did not put piety as the main factor to resolve more technical problems. Instead, he consulted with experts from the Istanbul University and the Technical Istanbul University to discuss many issues confronting the city. He also urged his officers to learn more about the subjects relevant and necessary in running the city administration (Ibid: 161).

As a leader, he managed to offer a different style of leadership. He could act as a stubborn person who was willing to stand for something he believed is right. To some extent, his supporters welcomed his style as it was part of his efforts to confront his opposition. Conversely, he became a brave man who fought for principles. When he protested the Israeli's siege over Gaza, hundreds of Turkish people who shared the same feelings as him cheered his stand. However, he was by no means hesitant to express his regret once he understood that his objective or judgement was incorrect. Many would appreciate his way of admitting mistakes and his character to learn from error. He admitted that his style prior to the local election in 2007 has gained the party fewer votes. Hence, many suggested that his arrogant style has affected many voters. Learning from that lesson, he tried to compose more careful speeches and reactions in front of the public. That was also part of his appreciative style of learning from experience. Apparently, it was not a problem for him to claim that he had made mistakes before. One of the examples of this was to admit that throughout his municipal period, he was unable to build parking places to reduce congestion (Ibid: 160).

Therefore, it was not surprising to find many Istanbul residents gave their appreciation to his achievements. For this, strong religious identity was no longer an issue since they have received what other politicians could not deliver previously for their needs. It was easy for a secular retired military officer who did not practice Islamic tradition and who drank alcohol to lend his appreciation to Erdoğan's works. Understandably, he received double appreciation from more religious residents who piously practised the Islamic tradition. Like others before him, he was surely regarded as a successful mayor, but he was distinctively depicted as a person who was honest and trustworthy (Cemalettin 2009 and Aktay 2009). Islam is surely the source of both honesty and trust, but it is far more important for the people to have a leader who can implement religiosity into practical behaviour. Honesty is important for many Turkish people since they see politicians as

corrupt and incompetent. In an interview, an economic analyst described aptly the importance of religiosity of leaders for the Turkish society.

Support for [the] AK Parti is not about their religious agenda or vision but the ability to run the government better than others. But at the same time they also keep looking at the background of the leadership. If the leadership has a good background of Islam they will be keener to support them. Why? Because if the leadership is more religious they will think that the leadership will not cheat them. Religious people must be honest and not corrupted. In other word religious background has boosted the confidence of the people toward the leaderships (Appendix A.3.).

At the same time, it is also important not to juxtapose religion with political aspiration because “By doing that, they manage to build a relation with people from different characters but still they are criticising it. It is good because they can manage to be in the middle and make a contact [even] with people from extreme position, [at] left [or] right” (Cemalettin 2009). Those combinations between an ability to deliver better service and a representation of ordinary people with honesty and trust have attracted many followers who did not only lend their support to the party but also joined it.

For some members, he was the magnet of the party that has encouraged many people to become party members and simply involved more actively within the party. Many of these people did not come from the same political or social preferences and yet, the party welcomed everyone regardless of her or his ideological preferences or positions. On one occasion in January 2010 at the party central office, two party members shared their thoughts on the party as well as Erdoğan. One member was religious and the other was a nationalist and tended to be less observant toward religion. It was unique to see both of them sat together discussing many issues related to the party’s programmes. Both claimed that the Erdoğan factor was the main reason to join the party and like other citizens, they praised him as a trusted leader who can do many good things for a better Turkey (Unsal and Rusen 2009). Therefore, in the perspective of the AKP, Erdoğan has practically become the focal point to bond the Turkish people from different backgrounds to work together under the same umbrella. A group of new female party activists also gave a spontaneous and homogenous response that they attended party programme to admire and follow Erdoğan’s vision.

Accordingly, it can be concluded that Erdoğan is a crucial source for the rise of the AKP. However, some still maintain that personal representation of Erdoğan is not the only

factor that cements differences. Other crucial elements would be the vision offered by the party itself. For the nationalist members, the party was seen as offering a commitment to work for Turkish people regardless of their backgrounds. My source admitted that the party has given a wide opportunity and arena for all members to be actively involved (Denemeç 2009). In the party headquarters, there are routine and open events for every member in which they can acquire more knowledge. In the society, the party representatives are also present to help members discussing many local issues. In his opinion, the party has given him an opportunity to develop his capabilities and knowledge by which his ambition to become a national politician can be realised.

The party owe to Erdoğan's vision and that of his colleagues who have started to find a better alternative political approach for Turkish politics. Erdoğan repeatedly expressed his commitment to open his arms to every citizen by pushing his party to follow his commitments as their basic principle. "We are the party of Turkey; we should open our arms to everybody," as he insisted to party members (Heper and Toktas: 166). That principle was implemented during his term at office particularly when electing his aides and executives from different parties to join the team consisting of people from his own party. That principle has further provided an assurance for the nationalist member that the party would give him benefits not because of his identity, but instead, his ability to learn and work within the party freely.

In contrast with his nationalist fellow, the more religious member admitted that he shared the party's vision. He was a member of the Millî Görüş, a social basis and backbone of the Refah founded by Erbakan in the late 1960s. He is now active in the party as a party activist in a district in Ankara. Nevertheless, he found that the vision of the Millî Görüş movement was incompatible with the general idea of Turkish people. For him, the Turkish society is conservative and does not want to bring religious principles into politics. That is why he possesses a different perception toward the movement which he depicted as willing to bring the Islamic principles into daily politics. He shared Erdoğan's idea that Islam should only inspire an individual at the personal level. Therefore, he decided to join the AKP instead of the SP.

The AKP has enjoyed a degree of success in gathering different people by having Erdoğan as a magnet. His strong and charismatic leadership and attractive vision have attracted different people to sit together in a relatively harmonious manner. Differences are

resolved which further spurs people to interact more and hence acknowledge their diversities. It is true that Erdoğan is not the only factor because his is merely a part of a larger new vision and idea shared by the party founders. Therefore, whatever great sympathy is addressed toward the role of Erdoğan in putting different preferences into a single party platform, it is believed that the Erdoğan factor is somehow overstated by many observers. In some media, especially the foreign media, he is frequently portrayed as practising an authoritarian style of leadership and blending it with populism. But for some, such a portrayal is rather misleading because they believe that the party still plays the central role in reaching the Turkish society (Aktay 2009). Many sources confirmed that the party has been able to establish a huge and complex organisation with good management to reach more people in every corner of the country (see Tezcur 2009: 1). To confirm that indication, the following section explores more on the way with which the AKP built its institution as a part of an internal management process aimed at preventing the tensions resulting from moderation.

#### **IV.1.2. Party Institutions**

In the previous section, it was observed that Erdoğan became the centre of the AKP and consequently, concerns were raised that he would be too dominant. An expression of “Without a strong opposition, the prime minister seems to have been tempted by a hegemonic style of leadership” illustrates such cautions (Le Roux 2011). Hasan Ali Karasar, a lecturer at the Bilkent University, confirms that the AKP is similar to other parties that have a dominant leader. According to him, “The leader is everything. Erdoğan plays the role heavily” (Karasar 2009). However, it is also indicated that the AKP is not only Erdoğan because the party has its own structures and principles that should be taken into account by all members. One of the principles that has been developed by the party is consultation. The fact that Erdoğan himself is not unquestionable has urged the party to continue to develop the principle (Aktay 2009); hence consultation should become the main principle of party.

Genuinely, consultation is part of Erdoğan’s leadership that has been implemented since his early political career in the Istanbul branch of the RP. As alluded to in the previous section, he is a kind of leader who is willing listen to others. That is why he has a strong advisory group that supports him, in addition to the ministers who stand ready to

help him understand particular subjects. A professor of Konya University whose ideas published in newspapers are often quoted by Erdoğan on many occasions confirms the latter's willingness to listen to others. From that point, he assures that Erdoğan was and is still used to listening to others (Aktay 2009).

One of the party's deputy chairmen also explains the implementation of the consultation process as follows: that it is true that Erdoğan is the leading figure who represents the majority of the AKP's policies or decisions. It is a good strategy to demonstrate to the people that the party is solid. However, before any policies or decisions are taken and announced by the chairman, the party have discussed them intensively internally. The Deputy explains that

We talk in the party board about all these things. We are expressing whatever we feel in that small group face-to-face with Mr Erdoğan; even if he does not like it. If you think that it is right then he listens. Everybody. Then we vote and then whatever is the majority he expresses to the outside and we obey that thing even we express that we are against it in the group. That is the way. You know *istişare*? From time to time people think that he is deciding everything. It is good because it looks like that is very strong. [It is] one person decision and no-one [is] against it. But behind that thing he expresses the result of *istişare* and everybody thinks that everything is through Mr Erdoğan. That gives power to Mr Erdoğan (Denemeç 2009).


Therefore, from the perspective of the party, the appearance of Erdoğan as a strong leader is primarily a strategy to maximise his ability to become a public figure to attract votes. The party elites understand well that they can maximise his charisma for the benefits of the party in line with the fact that the Turkish society admire and need the presence of a solid party that can govern effectively. A study conducted by Baslevent and Akarca (2008) after the 2002 election confirms that any possibility to form a single and effective government becomes a significant factor in supporting the AKP after experiencing years of instability with the previous unreliable coalition government.

However, the party sees the Erdoğan's factor is a mere strategy because behind his public appearance, the party elites practice the process of consultation. During the consultation, the party elites have an opportunity to express their ideas in front of Erdoğan himself without any difficulty. This is aimed at ensuring Erdoğan's impeccable public appearance and his confidence to speak about the party's policies. The same practice is also

applied in the consultation of government's policies which involves party members in the parliament and in cabinet. To ensure that the process is run efficiently, the party structure is developed as such to accommodate the chairman's role which is also enshrined in the party constitution.

Diagram IV.I. below shows that the AKP has developed three levels of party authority. The General Assembly (*Büyük Kongre*) is the highest institution. It has an authority to select the party's chairman and members of the Central Decision Making and Administrative Committee or CDAC (*Merkez Karar ve Yönetim Kurulu*) as well as providing the general direction of the party, including an amendment of the party constitution. The General Assembly also provides all party's provincial branches with certain mechanisms in every province to select delegates to attend the Assembly meeting. One of the main bases for the selection of the 550 delegates who meet regularly at least every three years is regional and the selection of them is conducted through election in every province (Party Constitution, Article 62.1). Other criteria for delegation of the Assembly is Vice President, Central Decision and Executive Board members, the chairman and members of the Central Disciplinary Committee, continuing membership of the founders of the party with the Party ministers and Member of Parliaments (Article 62.2 and 62.3).

All Assembly delegates will then elect the party's chairman and also 50 members of CDAC. The party's chairman will become the head of the committee who leads the 50 members that are elected by the Assembly through a secret ballot. There are also another 25 reserve members to complete all membership of the committee. They will form a supervisory body to control the direction of the party and to call for a General Assembly meeting if needed (Article 73). Similar with the process to take decision in the Assembly, the CDAC uses the principle of majority by using a mechanism of open voting among members (Article 73.4). Meanwhile, to run the party on a daily basis, there is a Central Executive Committee or CEC (*Merkez Yürütme Kurulu*) whose members include the party's chairman and the deputy chairmen, the general secretary and the president of the parliamentary group. Differing from other elements, the deputy chairmen are elected by the party's chairman (Article 79) to fill the positions that have own responsibilities over certain particular subject.

**Figure IV.I.****The Structure of Central Party and General Assembly of the AKP**

The party constitution clearly provides the party's chairman with a central role within the AKP. After being elected by the General Assembly where he participates with other party elites (founders and honorary members), the chairman also leads the CDAC to represent the supervisory duties of the Assembly. At the same time, the chairman also leads the CEC whose members are from the parliament and the cabinet. To underline his authority, the chairman appoints all deputy chairmen to help him manage the party more efficiently and they should be loyal to the chairman (Denemeç 2009). Loyalty is important for the AKP because after winning the 2002 election to become a dominant power in the government, the party needs a strong leadership to overcome the pressures from the secularist strongholds (Kumbaracibasi 2009)

It seems that the party applies two different approaches to accommodate the centrality of Erdoğan as the chairman and to maintain the consultation at the same time. In the party constitution, the principle of consultation is not stated as a compulsory mechanism to make a decision. It constitutes a mechanism of open-voting based on the majority in order to elect the party's chairman and the members of the CDAC. A similar mechanism is also applied to appoint delegates from the provinces. Therefore, consultation

can be regarded as an implementation of a leadership approach in relation to other party members (or elites) which is not part of visible mandate from the constitution.

Regardless of its informality, the principle of consultation also plays an important role in developing a healthy internal mechanism. It gives confidence to every member that decisions are taken through a process that involves all important elements within the party. To be involved in the process of critical discussion internally, neither the length of membership nor the depth of involvement determines one's position in the party. Instead, a deep knowledge, expertise and professionalism can also be important considerations to get involved in the consultation process, regardless of any formal position. An expert in economics can attend sessions on economic problems. "The person who has more knowledge and experience, like an economist or professor in economics, will be more important on certain issues. Different issues will have different discourse" (Appendix A.4).

It seems that debates and discussions on certain issues are common within the AKP albeit conducted in a mixed way alongside the authoritative mode of decision. The party structure depicts the centrality of the party's chairman, yet, the party members in no way maintain an ill-perception that the chairman is the only person who decides everything. A mid-ranking party activist in Istanbul explains

For example when there was a case of American soldiers who wanted to have base in Turkey, the prime minister was pleased with the proposal but some prominent members like Arınç were against it. This decision somehow gives a negative effect from the US. We can say that Mr Erdoğan is more powerful but he is not the only actor at the party who makes the decision (Appendix A.4.).

The dramatic Turkish parliamentary debate in February and March 2003 over allowing US military personnel to use the country for a possible attack on Iraq demonstrated both how pragmatically AK Party leaders approached the volatile issue, choosing to support US plans after intense negotiations, but also exposed lingering divisions between pragmatists at the helm and party moralists (Mecham 2004: 54).

From the above explanation, it is obvious that the elites accept the consultation process in combination with the strength of its chairman. The mid-ranking party activists' attitude is an example of how consistent the perception of party members from different levels is toward the combination of the power invested in the party chairman and the application of consultation among the party elites. Differences of perception and mixed interpretations toward messages from the party can crucially pave the way for contentious relations among members.



Nonetheless, a homogenous perception on the way the party conducts its power relations is critical for the members at the lower and middle levels to encounter their opponents. For example, Erdoğan's powerful role has been recently criticised as a deliberate effort to bring Turkey into a South American style of authoritarianism (Hooper 2011). Related to such a criticism, the party has been accused of suffering from contentious relations among its prominent elites because Erdoğan's idea to introduce a presidential system was not a product of a consensus among them.

However, for the party members to have different ideas is not forbidden and they believe that the party has developed consultation as a mechanism to accommodate differences. They appreciate it as an effective working mechanism and their leaders have demonstrated accordingly. They found it as useful to overcome the nature of the party as a coalition of different groups. The outcome for them is that they can experience the party's harmony rather than otherwise. A member of parliament expresses his feeling on this by stating that

There is no ideological problem in the party because we look to each other in tolerance. Tolerance is very important. We can understand each other by talking. Not fighting. Our prime minister always does this. He is our leader and he is always going to manage all the people in the party and he is managing all people to think about the party and the government (Önen 2010).

Similarly, a young party activist from Istanbul branch maintains

As far I can see there is not much conflict because of ideology. There are not many disputes between religious and liberal members. It is from the experience of Istanbul branch and according to this perspective there is not so much difference. Nobody rejects the idea of not selling alcohol in public or government buildings. So, most members from the liberal camp also accept that idea. There is no experience of more religious members are rejecting the ideas of liberals because of ideological perspectives. There will be discussion so that every member can meet a certain point [of agreement] (Appendix A.4.).

In explaining the anxiety toward religious ideas within the party, both have similar experience. Fighting or conflict is not a common practice within the party especially on such sensitive issues as religion. On the idea to reject selling alcohol in public places, both camps within the party retain a similar rational standpoint that selling alcohol in the government buildings should be prohibited. Meanwhile, the religious camp understands

that people have rights to trade alcohol in their private shops; hence, a ban is seen as unwise.

Consultation is then understood as having conversation and discussion among members. Although the chairman has a relatively dominant role simultaneously in the party, and within parliamentary group and cabinet, the elites do not hesitate to discuss many things directly with him. Erdoğan may be dominant and a difficult figure to persuade, but is not immune to criticisms and remains willing to change his mind after receiving many inputs.

If he believes in something, he will speak and persuade others very strongly. And he will speak very confidently and even try to persuade all Turkish people about a policy that he thinks is right. When there was an issue of military attack on Iraq from the Turkish border, he believed in a policy and tried to argue that this was the best position for Turkey. But when there were so many criticisms toward his policy, he stopped arguing it and said ok I have made a mistake and I would not do it again (Cemaluttin 2009).

It demonstrates that in some ways, there is a space for compromise and altering position as long as a proposed policy is seen in the best interest of Turkey. As a mayor of Istanbul then, Erdoğan was not free from questions. Yet today, he remains consistent with his previous stance to admit that some of his policies are not as successful as he thought. Therefore, despite his domination, there are still avenues to challenge and discuss different options which benefit many members.

At the middle level, an activist in a local party branch also experienced similar circumstances that led him to admire the process as ideal in finding commonalities among members from different backgrounds. Hence, it is not surprising to observe the way of two activists at the Ankara district level having discussion on many issues. Both, Unsal and Rusen expressed their opinions freely and without any hesitation when they attended a party event in January 2010. Without any imposing gesture, Rusen, a more religious activist, spoke eagerly about the importance of religion yet avoided talking about the application of formal law based on religion. Despite of his not-too-religious background and as his response to Rusen's points on moderate interpretation of Islam, Unsal comfortably listened and gave Rusen more time to share his ideas. He even injected more information to support Rusen's arguments. Thus, this fragment indicated that the

internalisation process works in some ways to encourage an open communication among members.

Furthermore, there was no intention from either activist to stop or negate the other's opinion. When Rusen discussed the Islamic interpretation of politics, Unsal remained silent and did not try to get involved in the conversation. Nevertheless, when the discussion arrived at a subject that is familiar to both of them, the talks turned into more enthusiastic conversation. It seems that members with different preferences are able to exploit the space the party provides in developing a discourse among themselves. To a certain extent, the party has been able to develop a common practice of consultation among members, which is relatively new in Turkey's tradition of political party. It is common, however, to conduct undemocratic manoeuvre to maintain the party leader's position by giving a punishment or dismissal to any members who openly challenge the leadership's policy. A party member of the MHP, a nationalist party, explains his situation when he actively criticises his chairman.

It is difficult for me and my fellows to challenge the policy of the leader because he is powerful and he can kick out every member who does not support his policy. When he visits a party branch somewhere he just says that the local leaderships are not legal and suddenly all of the party branch structures are losing their legitimacy within the party. It is as simple as that (Karasar 2009).

Therefore, the effort to implement consultation and find solution is a breakthrough of political behaviour in Turkish politics. The establishment of the AKP itself was a result of a breakthrough from a domination of the charismatic leader of the FP and, to some extent, subsequently, an attempt to create a more institutionalised party organisation. By way of developing the party's constitution, making it a rules-based party. In contrast to other parties, the constitution also allows a restriction of term for the chairman, in addition to a commitment that Erdoğan "will obey the rule" and made "the 2011 election his last" (Denemeç 2009).

However, the attempts to establish a more democratic party that are attractive to many Turks pose a contradictory challenge. Its success to become a dominant ruling party has brought its limits to deliver a political party with internal democratic practices (Tepe 2005). As a newly established party with a new vision and ideas to accommodate different ideas and interests, striking a balance between democratic mechanism and effective party

organisation is quite a challenge. The party constitution stated that the chairman is the authoritative institution to appoint 12 executive members to fill in the position in the CEC. The fact that the chairman is now acting as the leader of the parliamentary group and head of government is a clear indication that there is a concentration of power in the chairman's hands.

Furthermore, there is also an indication that the chairman controls the making of party's electoral list in spite of the clear established criteria i.e. education, an ability to speak foreign language(s), knowledge, experience, an ability to attract votes, *et cetera* (Önen 2010) combined with elements of political negotiation and the nature of competition among potential candidates in certain provinces (Appendix A.4.). However, in the end, the final decision is in the hands of the chairman. While the real criteria remain puzzling yet, it is up to Erdoğan to decide on the fate of every candidate in the list. One said that is based on his personal judgement (Appendix A.2.). Another said that it depends on the degree of religiosity i.e. practising five-time prayers (Karasar 2009).

It is not possible to become MPs without his permission. Every candidate must be interviewed by him personally. It is not a complicated interview but at least he can meet with all of them face to face and analyse, ok he is religious enough so he can be a candidate. So he controls everything within the party (Karasar 2009).

Whatever the reason and mechanism, it seems that it is a deliberate strategy. It is not only to appeal to voters but also to make party organisation more effective. In the period of growing as a new dominant party with different backgrounds of members, they also must negotiate with the secular state institutions in order to deliver successful reforms. Hence, on the one hand, it is not perfect timing to build a purely democratic party because the elites have to make a lot of political manoeuvres and strike a balance between an idealistic vision of more open democratic political life. On the other hand, it continues to counter deliver a promise to break the domination of ageing Kemalist leaders and to clear out rampant corruption, and to promote the nation-wide expansion of democracy by strengthening the rights and freedoms of expression while at the same time limiting the military's power over civilian affairs (Toledano 2011). Consequently, the practice of giving more power to the chairman is perceived as normal due to the enormity of challenges. A party's deputy chairman argues that the chairman's authority to appoint members of the CEC from among the 50 members of the CDAC and also replace ministers is normal (Denemeç 2009).

Moreover, it was thought that such practice can undermine the solidity of the party itself. While party members at the middle and lower levels can tolerate the chairman's domination, too much control has led the party elites into difficult situations on certain issues. It is reported that the vision of changing the country's constitution campaigned by Erdoğan is part of his ambition to stay in politics. As promised, the June 2011 election would be his last parliamentary election and reforming the constitution is considered as his pathway to become the first directly-elected president by the voters, and not by members of parliament. The constitutional change proposed by the AKP is aimed at transforming the Turkish political system into a presidential system similar to the French style by which the president will be more powerful than before.

The problem is that some of his closest aides are not happy with the proposal (Hooper 2011). It is reported that Abdullah Gül and Bulent Arınç have shown reservations to the proposal while other high-ranking members also expressed their wariness and it indicates an unusual opposition within the party (Ayoob 2011). Their concerns were rooted in the fact that the idea was not consulted widely enough within the party especially with Gül (Kaminski 2011), while others expressed their worries about the presidential system because it will evoke opposition due to its embedded character of authoritarianism (Cameron-More and Butler 2011) to lead the country into an 'ugly' contestation (Hooper 2011).

However, some of the party elites still consider the heated debate as normal. The party has experienced many internal debates before that were not known publicly and different opinions, even ones that reflect personal ideas, are welcome. Yet, some may see it as conflict. "It may be seen as boiling, no. It is not boiling. We are talking. We are negotiating all these things. Without expressing all these ideas it will not be democracy" (Denemeç 2009)

Nonetheless, the situation seems to be problematic because the party has entrusted Erdoğan with growing power but, at the same time, it must be assured that the party could still exert an effective control. However, the decision making process is clearly shifting to the hand of Erdoğan, a shift that is backed up by the party's constitution. However, let us not forget that the discourse itself can play a pivotal role and, based on the previous practices, might lead Erdoğan to reverse from his initial position. As long as there is a rational and resilient reservation against his will from within or outside the party, a

consensus is still possible. From the party's point of view, the discourse is not seen as an irrecoverable game since the party itself has another strong basis to maintain the loyalty of the majority of its members: trust.

#### **IV.2. Trust**

Trust plays a great role in a changing party. It is a factor that encourages the members to tolerate many of the party's decisions and also the party's elites whose behaviour might differ from what the members think or feel it ought to be. Trust is important to maintain the members' positive attitudes so whatever the party decides, it is for the benefit of the party itself and not harmful to them.

The AKP has introduced an ideology of 'conservative democracy' which some scholars regard as a vague ideology (Tepe 2005; Yavuz 2006). Despite its ambiguity, the ideology provides a useful guidance for those who believe in the party. It assures many Turks that there is no hidden agenda behind its existence because the AKP will only preserve the Turkish legacy in a democratic way. That stance is important for many Turks because a more nationalistic and religious appearance in politics is not a desired model that will yield success in politics. There is a growing demand in the society that Islamism should be represented in politics as the basis for moral ethics. Therefore, religiosity remains an important part of the AKP's 'ideology' and plays a great role in building trust from the people who join the party.

It is clear that the party is perceived as the continuation of the RP and the FP in different ways. The AKP's victory in the 2002 election was also a great loss for the SP which wanted to bring in all supporters of its predecessors (the RP and the FP). In fact, it was the AKP that successfully receive a landslide of around 82 to 87 per cent of the FP supporters (Basleven and Akarca 2008: 17). Those votes formed one fifth of the AKP overall votes. Although they are not the main supporters of the AKP, the result indicates that the element of more religious supporters exist within the party.

In other words, the party has secured an important element that helped build the much needed trust from many Turkish people. That includes religion, which is vital to enhance general confidence in the party and its leaders. Once these leaders are seen to have strong religious backgrounds and credentials, people are keener to support.

Because if the leadership are more religious they will think that the leaderships will not cheat them. Religious people must be honest and not corrupted. In other words religious background has boosted the confidence of the people toward the leaderships. The AK Party is not only a structure of an institution, but it is the mentality of the society. The party represents the mentality of the society; so it is parallel with the actual demand of the society (Appendix A.3.).

It is then not surprising to see many members of the party with backgrounds from religious movements. Some of them were active in the Millî Görüş, the backbone of the RP and the FP and now of the SP. Many of them express their loyalty to the AKP because of its vision for a better Turkey and left the idea of imposing Islamic ideas in politics. They are positioned in different party ranks and of course follow the vision offered by the triumvirate of Erdoğan, Gül and Arınç.

As former members of the RP, those who joined the AKP retain some ideals and practices that were inherited from the previous party. They understand that the party represents their ideas too with some adaptations due to the changing situation. A youth leader in Istanbul explained that “We have some ideals now but we also have to think about strategy” (Appendix A.4.). It is a clear indication that those with a tie to the RP would still keep some of the RP’s ideas but with some alteration to fit into a new condition. Hence, they give their trust to the triumvirate and believe that supporting a new model of political party is worthwhile.

The support is important from the party’s point of view because it is an indication of toleration, even approval, toward what the party does and will do. One of the examples is the willingness to accept consultation as a basic process to decision-making. It requires a process of open conversation and discussion to achieve consensus with other members from different backgrounds. It is a situation that might be different from that of the RP under Erbakan. During his era, decisions always came through him with a very limited space to be challenged and it was unlikely to be transparent (Aktay 2009). Within the AKP, the process is different and the former members of the RP have to offer rational arguments in order to be accepted by others. They also have to be ready to listen and accept their peers’ arguments.

It is not an easy process, indeed, because the liberal members must exercise extreme patience to persuade their fellow religious members. Before the establishment of the AKP,

there were intensive discussions between the reformists within the FP with the liberal figures to find an agreed option. From the liberal point of view, the process was not easy either because at some point Erdoğan, Gül and Arınç were not too convinced by the idea of leaving some religious ideals to get support from liberals (Yayla 2010). The process to arrive at a conclusion, following difficult negotiations and an exigency to moderate each other's idealistic vision was never easy. However, the result of this process was so positive that mutual confidence was tenable in the end.

For members who possessed an association with the Millî Görüş and the RP or the FP, the transformation with the AKP was a huge challenge. "I was in the youth of the Welfare Party before joining the AK Parti when I was a teenager. There is a huge difference" (Appendix A.4.). During his involvement at the RP, efforts to put forth the idealist policies were imminent but they did not fit anymore with the current situation. A member from the youth wing confirms that the party and its current strategy is the best option. The experience of Rusen is also important to be amplified here. As a former member of the Millî Görüş movement, he also disagrees with the idea of the movement and now lends supports to the AKP leaders to lead Turkey with their strategy. It is a challenge for Rosen and his colleague because they have to give up some of their ideals, accept new approach and prepare themselves to any criticisms from their former movement.

To stay in the party and support its leaders' strategy is part of their trust of the new approach. The way they accept the condition that the party is more of a mosaic rather than homogenous political entity such as the RP is also part of their sacrifice. They are ready to refrain from their ideal vision being implemented through the government policies. They realise that imposing the ideals will attract serious opposition from the secularist strongholds. When the parliament passed a law to let the students wear headscarves in the university in 2008, the Constitutional Court cancelled it and began to consider processing a case to ban the AKP and put 71 names in bar, including Erdoğan and Gül. The Court argued that the party and the 71 members tried to impose *sharia* which is against the Turkish constitution. Some of the party members contemplated to mobilising thousands of their supporters on the streets to protest against the allegations. However, the plan was rejected because they knew that a rally would only provoke the military to undertake a drastic action and even remove the government (The Economist, 12 June 2008).



Refraining themselves from unwanted confrontational actions in defending what they believe as an ideal is an example of “self-boundary”. It means that the members have a definition of what constitutes a proper action that should be followed and conversely understand an improper action that should not be conducted. The understanding of self-boundary was actually set up from their experience with the fall of Erbakan’s government following pressures from the National Security Council on 28 February 1997 and the closure of the RP. In this regard, a party advisor describes that, “It looks like they have a self-assessment not to exceed the expression of religiosity. So they will not ask for further action or position from the party toward religious issue” (Appendix A.3.). By forming a self-boundary, they understand that the party will not be able to do more than they expect. The party will also ensure that a religious element will not ask for policies favouring their ideals. From the party’s point of view, such a stance is considered advantageous because it will help the party’s leaders to fend off pressures from potential opposition.

The mentality of having a self-boundary is also useful in the building of tolerance among the religious members vis-à-vis other elements. Therefore, they believe that debates among members are never meant to be a problem. Different ideas are seen as positive and natural, as opposed to a severe conflict typically illustrated by the media. The members from different levels have the same attitude toward the diversity within the AKP and often articulate similar expressions toward contestation. Such a practice is seen as normal and considered to be a part of “talking” instead of “fighting”. Acceptance of this practice is indicative that trust exists among the members who believe that the practice and the party’s leadership are not harmful.

It is also common to see that the AKP’s members do not consider challenging their fellows’ opinions as appeared in media as it might be seen as a sign of serious frictions. Even though some of them harshly voiced their opposition against the general party’s policy, others particularly the leaders would merely see it as an expression of aspiration of their constituents. In the case of dissenting opinions among the members toward the Kurdish initiative, all comments from interviewed members from within the party simply revealed that it was only an expression of their constituents and did not create a big problem for the party. The Kurdish initiative was a proposal by the ruling party to end the Kurdish problems after years of conflict. But the initiative was faced with opposition from two fronts within the party itself, namely: members with nationalist preference and those of

Kurdish origin (Hurriyet Daily News, 30 December 2009). The former says that the initiative would give a recognition to the rebel organisation (the PKK, *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan* or Kurdistan Worker's Party) and undermine years of military fights against it. Meanwhile, the latter stood against it due to its slow pace to end the conflict.

The disputes seemed to be so crucial when depicted by media that was not in favour of the ruling party. However, all party members who were interviewed at the height of the disagreement reacted calmly to the situation. For them, the situation was a normal part of the party's dynamics. They believed that the party would find a solution by talking with all members who were unhappy with the proposal. Their confidence was further cemented when the Minister of Interior, Beşir Atalay, arranged a meeting with those who were hesitant and the outcome was a new road map for the initiative. The system seemed to work as had been anticipated by the party's members where a problem within the party was resolved through consultations. It was a process that many within the party admired.

Admittedly, not all of the party's members were satisfied with the way of the party leaders handled the issue. Elazığ deputy, Feyzi İşbaşaran, resigned from the party after throwing an accusation against the leaders to launch a probe against him (Hurriyet Daily News, 27 December 2009). However, his resignation was not massive since only a handful of members followed in his departure. The move did not create a concern among the leaders and was not seen as a big problem because the majority of the AKP's members of parliament were still in their positions (Denemeç 2009).

Criticisms and hesitations were visible in many issues and sometimes it led to the resignation of a deputy. However, despite its tense dynamics, the party still enjoyed the loyalty of the majority of its members. "This party is different because while other parties are suffering from division between members the AKP enjoys the trust of their members," explains a political analyst in Ankara (Appendix A.1.). The party leader also received similar admiration from the member as he was depicted as a trusted person (Aktay 2009).

Therefore, it is unusual to have severe opposition from within the party with a huge scale of mobilisation to inflict a challenge toward the leaders. Distribution of power and rotation among members in strategic positions that are perceived as sources of conflict is relatively absent within the AKP. To lose a strategic position is acceptable because the decision is made based on the performance with a transparent benchmark. It was explained

that the party's members who lost their positions would not pose a challenge and leave the party to protest the decision.

When the party got lower votes in the local election this year, two of the prominent members who were acting as ministers lost their positions. It is the result of the party's defeat in Antalya for instance..... But it is reasonable why they lost their positions. So there is kind of reason behind the decision and they are still members of the party and still working for the party. They are not arguing and then leaving the party. They are still loyal because they believe that the party has a vision and they support it. They believe in the party so much. It is completely different from other parties when a member or some members are losing their positions because of punishment from leadership, they feel disappointed and leave the party or at least there will be conflicts. Why? Because there is no reason behind the decision and the parties are controlled by personal leadership (Appendix A.1.).

There are changes in the party, in the parliament and also in the cabinet. Some of the party's members resigned from the AKP as an expression of protest. It is noted that members of parliament such as Zekai Özcan and Murat Başesgioğlu resigned from the party due to their hesitation toward the Kurdish initiative. A rotation has also taken place in the CEC since 2001. Of the 12 deputy chairmen in 2001, only three of them remain in their positions. There were also changes in the cabinet. In the 2011 election, the party leadership decided not to re-nominate 167 deputies to compete in the election. With all those changes, fluctuation was relatively low because they were conducted rather transparently (Aktay 2009) and based on merit (Denemeç 2009). It was reported that most of the deputies from South Eastern were not re-elected due to the party's unsuccessful performance in the referendum held on 12 September 2010 (Today's Zaman, 13 April 2011). Rotation and promotion are part of the competition among members and whoever can give benefits to the party are likely to be promoted. On the contrary, if there is failure or minimum achievement, a member can be rotated to other position as a consequence (Appendix A.4.).

In the AK Parti, the leader is not the actual leader, there is another behind him. In that sense, the AK Parti is more modernised. Everything is transparent. Everything is not without rule. Every rule is official and everybody is very clear with the rule. There is a legitimate competition for positions or ranks. Everybody is ready to participate in the political competition within the party (Aktay 2009).

With all that system and mechanism, the members must understand and observe the rules necessary to be promoted or relegated. Even though the chairman is playing a great role to orchestrate the changes, there is still a degree of understanding about the rule of game. For them, the Prime Minister is undeniably the maestro. Every member who was interviewed expressed similar admiration and respect for the chairman's political achievements which had led them to accept and follow the mechanism. It was therefore not surprising to find that despite some hesitation, opposition against on the decision making process was kept minimal.

Undeniably, there are concerns about the way the AKP treated its vocal members. There were reports and expressions that the party treated its members improperly. One of the party members who resigned explained that the party's leaders wanted to silence him on the Kurdish initiative. "It became impossible to resume my duties in a party that silences and blackmails deputies who express their thoughts, just like me," he said (Huriyet Daily News, 27 December 2009). His statement indicated that there was a deliberate effort to suppress oppositional voice which is against the principle of consultation. He has become one of the examples among 11 other similar cases due to his inability to influence party's decisions that tend to be dominated by a small elite circle (Tepe 2005: 74). There was also concern that the party has dismissed many members from 11 party's city centres and 39 municipal centres without proper explanations. The concern was that the policy to dismiss them lacked transparency and only led to a conclusion that the party was restraining to function as a fully democratic party (Ibid).

Officially, the party fervently denied that there were ambiguous decisions because it claimed that all decisions concerning members' disciplinary cases were formally presented in writing. Those who become the subject of any decision would receive a formal letter confirming that decision. Omer Latif (2010), the General Secretary of the AKP, explained that, "In the AK Parti every process is under a legal procedure. Every decision is always on the track of legal procedure. We also put every decision into a written document so there is no unclear and informal decision." Again, the party's officials denied that their actions were against the principle of transparency and the rule of law. The efforts to communicate with any vocal members who were accused of violating their independence have been part of the policy of the party to maintain discipline and order following the process of discussion and consultation. The sense of discipline can be seen from the statement that "if

we decide something as a party, do not worry about it, everybody is supposed to say something similar” (Denemeç 2009).

From the above statement, it was clear that the party wanted to strike a balance between freedom of expression with the basis of consultation and an effective party management. At this point, the AKP’s pluralistic character has to meet with the need to form a solid support from all party members, especially in dealing with challenges from the oppositions in the parliament as well as the military and the court. In that regard, trust plays a great role when the party produces policies as represented in the government and also replaces members in its structure or cabinet. Disappointments and hesitations are not at all absent as a reaction to the party’s decisions that might be against members’ personal preference. Yet, the trust in the vision and leaders of the party has undermined the rebellious feeling to pose challenges against the party (Appendix A.3.).

The sense of unwillingness to challenge appeared in efforts made by a member of parliament which denied his opposition against the party’s policy in a newspaper (Hurriyet Daily News, 7 January 2010). It was an important public clarification because oppositional stand point could inflict serious damage if the public accept the media reports as proof of the serious cracks, subject to investigation by the party’s authority as violation of the party’s discipline. In the end, the party was forced to become firmer with its own decisions, upon which discipline was needed in particular circumstances. Therefore, some disciplinary actions were deemed necessary to control members’ behaviour and it had been applied in many occasions (Önen 2010).

### **IV.3. Decomposition and Party Discipline**

Conceptually, decomposition is a strategy for a political party to deal with its members who oppose moderation of its ideological standpoint. As Orbell and Fougere (1973) explained, the real implementation of it is to dismiss a member who is perceived as disrupting the party’s solidity from within by seriously criticising and challenging the leadership’s policy or authority. By doing so, the party wants to maintain harmony among members and from the perspective of the party’s elites, the absent of internal opposition is important in maintaining their success in politics.

In the case of the AKP, there are also cases of firing members although the cases might not be similar with what Orbell and Fougere have noticed in their studies. Both scholars focused on a case of the New Zealand Labour Party that won the 1935 election and the party leadership dismissed its militant left wing who accused the Labour government of betraying the party's ideology. A strong opposition from within the party is a threat to the government because it revealed the internal conflicts that might affect public confidence toward the effectiveness of the party to govern. Therefore, the target of decomposition policy is the hard-liner ideologues within the party that do not want to follow new interpretation of the party's ideology when they were in power.

Applying the concept of decomposition to the AKP, one can see the fitness of the context of moderation. The current AKP's vision is different from that of its predecessors and despite its leaders' background with the Millî Görüş, they have negated their background and proposed a new vision of secular politics. The party's policies are also different from that of the RP. The AKP accepts and endorses Turkish accession into the EU while the RP opposed the idea, a position similar to that of the Millî Görüş that remained suspicious against the Western countries.

However, the party is relatively absent from the implementation of decomposition as imagined by Orbell and Fougere. The main reason for the absence is that the party itself does not have any strong opposition toward new interpretation of the party's ideology. It is a party that is unusual to have internal opposition (Kaminski 2011) and the dismissal of membership based on ideological reasons in the context of moderation is also absent.

The party admits that there are members who were dismissed from party membership (Latif 2010). Mostly, the cases were caused by the violation of the party's disciplinary code. The General Secretary mentioned a case that has caused a member's dismissal due to his unacceptable behaviour. The unacceptable behaviour he referred to was about alcohol consumption that caused a dreadful traffic incident. "That is an unacceptable for the party to have that kind of behaviour," stated the General Secretary.

Other cases also confirmed that the party practiced a zero-tolerant policy for any misconduct. There are reports mentioned that the party dismissed members due to their behaviours and most of them are related with immoral acts. In Izmir, the local party

authority fired its young member after repeated action to access pornographic internet sites (Hurriyet Daily News, 21 August 2009). The zero toleration toward similar action was also demonstrated in the sacking of a party member who was found committing similar behaviour by his spouse at the same branch five years ago.

The two cases demonstrated that the party retained a tradition as a moral guardian that prohibits its member to commit any immoral action. Consuming alcohol is not forbidden in Turkey and many Turks consume it in public places. However, religious people adamantly oppose the circulation of liquor. For the AKP, the issue of alcohol is quite problematic because it has a strong religious sentiment and as individual, many members strongly oppose the drinking habit and alcohol circulation. Some of the party's authorities at local level have tried to ban or limit the circulation, an act used by many outside the AKP to accuse the party as supporting the religious principles. The case of pornography also presents a similar situation for the party because pornography is forbidden in Islam. It also becomes an issue to be associated with the AKP especially after it proposed an adultery bill in 2004. Both issues, in fact, have never been a strong case to allege the party as promoter of the Islamic principle because it only privatised alcoholic production and limited the area of consumption and the bill was finally withdrawn (Akyol 2010).

However, the party does not want to declare religion as the basis for moral criteria. The party officials only referred to the party constitution as the basis to examine the behaviour. The party's constitution has provided guidance to define any actions that can be categorised as violation of the party's principles. Article 114.3 stipulates that there is a term that can be utilised written as 'reckless behaviour.' The term itself can be used broadly for any behaviour that is not in favour with the party's tradition due to its broad definition of reckless.

Another action that is related to the criteria also leads to the expulsion of party members. In Van, an eastern province of Turkey, two members of the AKP threw eggs and stones at Deniz Baykal, leader of the opposition party. What they did cannot be tolerated by the party's authority even when they claimed to have relatives at the party's headquarters in Ankara (Hurriyet Daily News, 8 April 2010). Local party authority explained that such an act was against the principle of respect of human beings. Although Baykal was an

opposition leader of the CHP, he must be admired as a brother, a descendant of Adam. As a result, the party processed the case seriously and the two members were expelled accordingly.

At the high rank level, cases of dismissal are relatively limited. Most conflicts do not seem to end up with formal removal. In the heated debates on the Kurdish initiative, some of the AKP deputies in the parliament resigned from the party. They argued that the proposal was against the constitutional mandate and put them in a difficult position to accept the proposal. Zekai Özcan explained the reason for his resignation as “I resign from the AKP because I see that its policies no longer fit my political understanding” (Hurriyet Daily News, 12 April 2010). Other members who have resigned because of the initiative expressed more than an opposite stand point. The concern is about the way the party treated him after expressing his criticisms. “It became impossible to resume my duties in a party that silences and blackmails deputies who express their thoughts, just like me,” he told media the reason for his resignation (Hurriyet Daily News, 27 December 2009).

The cases also showed that those who were not comfortable with the party’s policy or the way it treats the members preferred to resign rather than staying on in their respective position. It is difficult to examine whether or not they criticised party leadership because of the ideological preferences. In fact, some of those who left the party criticised the initiatives because of its recognition of the Kurdish identity. The idea is to remove the criteria of Turks to be a single identity for all citizens in Turkey. From the argument, it seemed that they relate to a more nationalistic idea and the Kurdish initiative has passed their limit to tolerate ideas that tampered with their nationalistic principles.

The latest case is on the Golcuk paper that contains pieces of information about a high-ranking party member who collaborated with the military to undermine the AKP. The party officer, Turhan Çömez, was written in the document found in the Golcuk Naval Command which was asked to provide a list of party members who were willing to cooperate with the military against the ruling party. The document had a title of “Monitoring reactionary activities” and was sent to the Bandırma 6th Main Air Base in February 2005. It was said that Çömez would be urged to provide the command in the base with a list of the AKP’s members to be asked to destroy the governing party (Today’s Zaman, 1 June 2011). The allegation was a serious violation toward the ruling party, and



from the party perspective, it was a clear behaviour of breaching the party's code of conduct. The case became a flaring issue since it was connected with the Ergenekon case as an effort to topple the government. Soon after the allegation was formally made public, he was invited to come for an investigation. However, he stayed abroad as he understood that the case was very sensitive and might lead him to jail.

High level cases as mentioned above have not been processed into a formal investigation by the internal party's institutions. The process of disciplinary allegation is stipulated in the Article 113 to 117, which defines such actions as subject to penalty. Actions such as attending a meeting that was not authorised by the party, paying less or unwilling to pay contribution and conducting reckless behaviour would require warnings from the party's authority. Another provision of disciplinary action is to make a statement that is harmful to the party, subject to a penalty in a form of formal reprimand.

Those actions can be penalised after a warning is given. So, the case of two members in Van should be categorised as this disciplinary case. However, due to its political sensitivity that related to a high profile opposition leader that might lead the party into a difficult position, the case could end up in a direct expulsion. Meanwhile, in the case of internet abuse in Izmir, warnings were given many times before the final decision of dismissal was made. It is likely that in the case that did not relate to any highly political sensitivity, a normal procedure was conducted by firstly giving a notification. Nevertheless, the AKP pornographic related case was considered to be beyond reckless and its moral basis was included in the principle of universal values. It was then reasonable to put it as a serious violation of party principle and the penalty is direct expulsion.

In the Article 117.1 to 117.9, it is mentioned that there are nine categories for direct expulsion or termination of all connection with the party. These include violations against the party's principles and universal norms, the threats to the integrity of the Turkish nation, any misuse of the party's documents, corruption, efforts to manipulate results of elections, providing a statement to undermine the party, and violations against the party's leaders. The case of Cömez can be categorised, if proven, as an effort to undermine the party and termination of all connection is likely to be taken. Another form of disciplinary decision is to give suspension of party membership for a certain period of time. It is related to any

member who fails to comply with the party's decision or has received a reprimand letter for more than once.

It is likely that any allegation toward criticism of the party's leaders can lead to membership suspension. For a high-ranking member, to be penalised with suspension is a token of bad record of his or her party membership and is not beneficial for to have such a record. The AKP leadership has a record of replacing deputies and ministers not because of violation against party constitution. Under performing deputies in the election are subject to be 'penalised' politically as a consequence of becoming less beneficial for the party in the election. As mentioned before, new deputy candidates in the last election would replace those who could not give maximum support for the party in the September 2010 referendum.

Therefore, some opt for resignation as a better way rather than being accused of being too critical which could lead to suspension or even termination of membership. The provision of violation toward the party's leaders enables the party's authority to take necessary action that is perceived as an attack toward them. Hence, even though the party will apply persuasive approach, allegation toward members who are openly criticising the party and show less willingness to follow the party's general policy is also likely to be taken by the party's authority. In this context, clarification that a member is not against any of the party's policy is important to avoid any internal investigation.

The process to investigate internal cases is not simple. It is a process that includes several institutions before a final decision is made. The first institution that has authority to conduct initial investigation is the Central Disciplinary Board or CDB (*Merkez Disiplin Kurulu*). If a member is accused of violating the party's discipline, the CDB will work to analyse the case and then submit a report to the Arbitration Board for Democracy or ABD (*Demokrasi Hakem Kurulu*). It is a special institution established to assess reports produced by the CDB on whether or not a member has complied with democratic principle. After the ABD finalises its assessment on the report, it will then produce a recommendation regarding the disciplinary report, and together with the report from the CDB, both are submitted to the CEC. In the end, the CEC will make its final decision. According to the AKP's General Secretary, the final product of the CEC is a political decision. Nevertheless, it is still based on the general principle of the party's constitution (Latif 2010).

The assurance from the party official does not mean that the process is free from any political consideration. To some extent, the decision not to follow the internal process is an indication of scepticism toward the fairness of the process. The fact is that the party leaders, especially the chairman, are still relatively dominant in providing a reasonable basis for any decision gives a strong foundation for scepticism. Loyalty is important and worries members who want to criticise him because a disciplinary action can be applied and their political career will be hampered. Even though it is yet to be verified, reports confirm that despite his willingness to listen to others, Erdoğan is relatively sensitive to criticisms (Kaminski 2011). He requires the members who work closely with him to be loyal and such a demand would affect those who are critical of him or at least sound different in providing him with alternative options. Some members seem to have no option other than giving their loyalty in order to stay within the party rank or work in the cabinet. However, a high demand of loyalty is seen by some party members as uncomfortable and other option of being processed by the CDB threatens their career.

Resignation is then perceived as the best option for those who cannot afford to tolerate the need to strike a balance between recognition for plural ideas and effective party manoeuvrings. It is common in Turkish party politics to have inter-party movements. Members of parliament frequently shift their loyalty to another party. The cause of the changing loyalty is the domination of party leadership in a paternalistic way. The party leader is surrounded by members who want to win the leader's sympathy and having the sympathy spells an assurance for obtaining a strategic position or responsibility. Therefore, there is no need to build a strong relation with society because the source of power lies in the leaders' hands.

It is the reason why many political parties in Turkey do not have a strong attachment with the society they represent. It is also easy to find deputies or high ranking members shifting their loyalties to other party after losing confidence of the party's leader. Others would feel better to establish a new party. Other reasons for inter-party movements are ideology, constituency service, conflicts in electoral district or self interest (Turan, Iba and Zarakol 2005: 3). Nevertheless, the trend of shifting party loyalty through resignation is getting less in recent years. It reached its peak in the period of 1995-1999 when almost half (47 per cent) of parliament members shifted their loyalty (Ibid: 2). High percentage of party mobility was also caused by the closure of political party. In that period, the Turkish

authority closed two political parties, including the RP in 1997. The closure of the FP in 2001 also caused significant movement in the period of 1999 to 2001. Because of the closure, all deputies from the disbanded parties automatically had to find new parties and they did so by joining an existing or establishing a new one or becoming independent deputies. In the case of the RP deputies, most of them joined the FP as its successor party. In 2001, deputies from the FP split into two different parties as a result of the establishment of two different descendants: the SP and the AKP.

From the AKP's point of view, resignation is not perceived as the outcome of ideological conflict. It is simply because of the fact that those who resigned from the AKP did not get what they wanted or for other pragmatic reasons (Denemeç 2009). A similar expression from mid- and lower ranking party members claimed that there was no ideological conflict. In fact, to say that there was no case of resignation because of ideology is also misleading. The criticism toward the Kurdish initiative is a combination of nationalistic views on the Kurdish issue and the way the AKP treated dissenting opinions.

Resignation has become less significant in recent years, especially after the AKP dominated the parliament following its victories in the three consecutive elections. From the beginning of its domination in 2002 until 2005, the number of deputies who moved to other parties was 38 or only seven per cent (Turan, Iba and Zarakol 2005: 3). According to a party's official, the percentage of the AKP deputies who resigned or were dismissed is less than five percent (Önen 2010). So, potential internal conflict due to ideology took place on the nationalist side over the Kurdish issue.

There are examples that the party proposed bills that favoured the objectives of a religious group. The lifting of headscarves was an example. Wearing a headscarf was prohibited for public servants and other workers such as: judge, attorney, and lawyer. It was then extended to the universities. The party together with the MHP, a nationalist party, supported and passed the bills to lift of the ban in February 2008. Both argued the ban is against the principle of human rights and freedom. However, the law was annulled by the Constitutional Court in June 2008 based on the reason that it was against the principle of secular state inherited by Ataturk.

The failure of the lifting did not lead to heavy criticism from the religious groups because the party proposed it under the interpretation of non-religious principles. The

support for the law itself had triggered accusation to closure the AKP by the Constitutional Court. The Court argued that the law was strong evidence that the party consisted of supporters of Islam who would undermine secularism. The AKP saved from the allegation when the Court failed to reach minimum support from its judges. However, the party was reminded of the indictments to close the RP and the FP in 1998 and 2001. Therefore, the religious element within the party did not mobilise its supporters to manoeuvre against the annulment and tended to stay neutral in every campaign that supported the women's right to wear headscarves.

Prior to the 2011 election, there was a campaign to elect headscarf-wearing women and it gained national attention. And yet, the conservative element within the party did not want to support the campaign and remained neutral. In their statements, they even stated that the issue was meaningless. "These elections are a vital opportunity for Turkey to create the foundations of civilian democracy", so "Why put that at risk with all this talk of headscarves," wrote a columnist in Today's Zaman that was seen as a supporter of the conservative AKP (Birch 2011). For that reason, the party was reluctant to support the issue and preferred to focus on its main campaign, the constitutional reform.

The party's standpoint on the headscarf issue clearly reflected the pragmatic approach of its leader in avoiding any political pressures from the secularist strongholds, especially the military and the Constitutional Court. Their concerns toward negative reaction became the basis to form a self-boundary that limits the party's preference. On the headscarf issue, the backlash might well become irrecoverable and ruin their targets to gradually change the constitution. Therefore, rather than focusing on the meaningless issue, the party chose to give more attention to the upcoming election. Winning the majority of parliament was an assurance to be able to change the constitution without any consent from the opposition or referendum.

Therefore, the conservatives that formed the religious backbone of the AKP refrained themselves. It was a position that reduced the aggressiveness toward the issues. The direct impact of this stance was a more compromising attitude to other elements in the party. In any social relation, members of the party who are conservative tend to say nothing in judging others who possess different attitudes toward what is prohibited by religion. "Yes, they are Muslim but to express that they do not like people who drink alcohol is by

saying that it is prohibited. They will not do more than that because they also respect others' choice," said a researcher in Ankara (Cemalettin 2009).

In that context, decomposition is not useful to apply because those who are perceived as religious restrain themselves from any action that might lead to conflict. They fear any confrontation with the secularist strongholds that still hold the authority to close any organisation including the political party in power. Moderate interpretation of religiosity in politics is then seen as a good strategy that benefits them and has enabled the party to stay in power for almost a decade.

Referring back to the case that Orbell and Fougere have focused upon, the party leadership does not face significant contenders from within, except from the nationalist element and those who have problems with the style of management. It is a general stance toward the secularist camps that has forced them to agree on a common attitude: being moderate is the only option on the table. The Millî Görüş potentially presents a contending vision. However, the vision has already been represented in the SP, so there will be no opportunity for the elements of the Millî Görüş movement to criticise the AKP from within. The split into the AKP and the SP after the closure of the FP has put the former in a comfortable situation since supporters of more religious and nationalistic parties were gathered in the SP.

Therefore, those who join the AKP with the Millî Görüş background or had an experience with the RP or the FP are actually members who have changed their ideas before or after they joined the party. The change has given a pathway to the AKP to establish a homogenous interpretation on conservatism as the party's 'ideology'. The transformation became a crucial process upon which the party also encourages support from its members. Shifting interpretation has become one of the party's efforts to engineer the Turkish society and it has tried to conduct many programmes and activities that can give a strong basis for the new conservative vision. Although the commitment is questioned suspiciously (Tepe 2006), the transformation is a strategy that will be discussed in the next section.

#### **IV.4 Conversion and Replacement**

A process to create a new interpretation is vital for the existence of moderating party and the process may be painful. It may lead to tension if the party leadership who proposes the new idea fails to convince their members that the new interpretation is legitimate and beneficial. Carsey and Layman (1999) call this conversion. Conversion is a parallel strategy with replacement. It is a pairing concept. The process is related significantly with the authoritative position of the party leadership to replace any member who dares to challenge new ideas with those who are ready to support. In fact, replacement does not have to relate with the ideology itself. The AKP shows that conversion is relatively strong while replacement in the party is not significantly related with ideological contestation.

After its establishment in 2001 and winning three consecutive elections, the AKP has been depicted as a party committed to change the Turkish political and social landscapes. Many scholars use the term transformation (Cinar 2006 and Mecham 2004), a model for Muslim democracy (Tepe 2006), a new thinking (Cavdar 2006), and a re-interpretation (Kuru 2006) to represent the party's novelty in the Turkish political and social landscapes. Some journalists also use similar terms such as reformation (Bonner 2004) or even revolution (Margolis 2011) in their writing. From the outset, by detaching itself from any religious background and embracing new vision on secular politics the AKP has declared its transformation marking a new era.

Detaching from religious backgrounds means that the party chooses to adopt a more conservative democracy as its formal ideology. It is a declaration of its commitment to represent the 'conservativeness' of the Turkish people and give up any ambitions to impose idealistic visions. By doing so, religiosity is perceived to belong to private domain leaving individuals to have their own choice to be religious or not. As a result, publicly the AKP accepts the concept of secularism and is active in politics to advance the true meaning of democracy (Akdogan 2006).

The ideology of conservative democracy is faced with two different ideological fronts. Firstly, it has to challenge the existing interpretation of the importance of the element of religion in politics, or at least as the political rhetoric, as shown by Erdogan. Some of his visions such as 'Just Order' and the idea of the Muslim market are expressions of his strong affinity with Islamic ideas in different forms. Secondly, the party is also

situated in an opposite position with the secularist strangleholds who want to preserve secularism as the legacy of Atatürk. Departing from the legacy, the AKP asks for a different interpretation of secularism where the individual is free from any imposition of particular forms of secularism (Tepe 2005: 297-300). Hence, it is expected to give wider opportunities for all Turkish citizens to practice their beliefs without any fear.

To win or at least survive the contestation, the party needs support from Turkish citizens who are in fact ready to abandon the idea of religion in politics and are seeking an alternative party that governs better than the secularist ones. However, as a new party, the AKP must first convince the public that its idea is suitable and beneficial for the people. At the beginning, it was a difficult process especially when Erdoğan was jailed by the Constitutional Court in 1999 and banned from any political activities. One of the party founders explained that it was a situation that begged an explanation to the public because the new party was not allowed to register Erdoğan as its candidate in the 2002 election. He stated, “Many ask me about the future of the AK Parti because our leader is not allowed to compete for election. But, we explain to them that it is not a problem because the party is not only him” (Denemeç 2009).

Explanation was crucial because prior to the AKP, the social basis of conservatism in the society was represented by the RP and the FP. Both parties were seen as having some ideals for society and, as a result, many members of society believed in their campaign, despite the fact that the FP had tried to ease some of its programmes and expressions from religion. The Constitutional Court banned the FP on the allegation that the party functioned as home of anti-secularist elements. So, the initial challenge for the AKP was to convince voters from different elements of society that it had the potential to become an obvious alternative party. In order to counter the religio-nationalistic language, the party supported the proposal on EU accession. In contrast with the RP and the SP, the AKP accepted the role of the IMF in supporting the Turkish economy, a sign of acceptance to the integration of domestic market to the international markets.

Indeed, introducing opposite ideas is a difficult task and the party has to prepare a strategy to convince the public that it has the capability to lead the country to a better situation. The party launches campaigns on issues that may lead the voters to choose the AKP, as a party of and for the people and not an ideological one or one for certain groups.



This was reflected in such jargon as “to place individual at the centre of all policies” and acceptance of the Turkish society “with all its colours, its points of commonality and difference” on the basis of “state based rule of law” (Insel 2003: 305-6). By introducing the focus on the individual and the rule of law, the party wants to protect “people from behaviour that offends religious people” because they have rights to become a religious individual, and as a citizen, to affect the “decisions concerning public life” through a democratic process (Ibid).

The success to win three consecutive elections is a complex combination of several factors. However, the new outlook of the party has played a great role in attracting many voters, especially better economic conditions, is also crucial (Baslevant and Akarca 2008). The party successfully appeared to become a supporter of Westernization, while the secularists are now seen as opposing the West. For the AKP, getting closer to the West should be undertaken by accelerating the accession process of EU membership. On the one hand, it is a strategic manoeuvre to challenge the secularists because the party defines itself as a follower of advanced economic life like the European countries. Moreover, it would be beneficial for the party because the democratic West is perceived to protect the individual’s rights and freedom to practice personal beliefs. Therefore, opposing the AKP has become problematic for the secularist strongholds since public may perceive the latter as obstacles of democracy.

Despite its advantage in discourse against the secularists, the AKP still has to deal with the fact that the main public discourse remains largely influenced by the discourse of a more religio-nationalistic interpretation. Changing the religious voters’ state of mind is a huge challenge but Erdoğan’s charisma and the emergence of a new social class who are ready to accept the party’s vision help ease the challenge. Those two advantages were meaningful in winning the 2002 election but more actions are needed if the party wants to dominate the Turkish politics by winning popular support.

What the party has been doing is to provide suitable environments for those who join the party and also programmes that could attract potential supporters. These efforts are important because in order to attract and maintain supporters, the AKP has to change the way former supporters of the RP understand the role of religion in public life. It has more than 80 per cent of supporters of the FP and most of them have inherited the influence of

the RP as well. In the context of moderation, especially those who have religious preference, transformation is vital to create more loyal supporters.

The first effort is related to the way the party creates a different environment. Rusen, former member of the Millî Görüş, described the movement's intention to apply idealistic visions into politics as narrow-minded. Similar thought were also expressed by a former member of the RP who manages the youth branch in Istanbul. According to him, the RP was full of ideals and it encouraged its members to try to realise those ideals in politics. A research conducted by Esra Erdoğan (2006) also shows that women activists from the RP have changed their ideas after joining the AKP. Another case of a young party activist who is also a member of an Islamic organisation is also interesting in which the AKP is seen as presenting an opportunity rather than as a target of suspicion.

The experience of Rusen is also an interesting case in describing the changing of understanding of the role of religion in the public sphere. During his membership in the Millî Görüş, he had to attend meetings as part of the movement's programmes. During the congregation, it was common to hear sermons on religious aspects and one of the important understandings was that religion should play a great role in society and in order to be effective it should be applied by authoritative institutions. More concrete implementation is the application of *sharia* in a formal way that is accommodated as positive rule or canon. He is not too happy with the interpretation of implementing religious principles into formal regulation under state authority. When he joined the AKP, he did not find any imposition of ideals into reality and what he found was the situation that the party was a place for individuals with religious piety to work and give contribution to society. Therefore, the party was only a place to gather and exchange ideas about how to make a better society. In the party meetings, there was no agenda of religion and what was discussed was real agenda to tackle social and economic problems. In the lower level organisational structure, party meetings usually discussed problems in the neighbourhood and what the party could do. It is important to identify neighbours who have problems and usually the party will arrange a visit to hear the problem. If the party cannot solve it entirely, at least it has given its attention. However, it does not stop in a visit because every problem should be written and gathered together as a formal report to party structure at a higher level. If there is a chance, party representation in parliament or high rank level will be able to come to that neighbourhood to meet with the community and it will be brought into higher level to be

considered as input for regulation. It is not surprising that the party claims that it has the reports on problems of society in every corner of the country and even “if there is a member of the community who passed away, we also know about it” (Önen 2010).

From the experience of Rusen, it was reasonable that the idea of formalising religious principles did not have any place in the AKP. The party agenda is mainly to deal with the problems of society and how to help solve them. As a secular party, there is no activity related to religious congregation, even in a small group meeting.

The youth leader shared the experience of his membership with the AKP. It was not completely different in the sense that he could still preserve his idealistic vision based on religion. He mentioned that alcohol was still unacceptable. Nevertheless, the party has given him a new understanding that ideals inspired by religion should not have to be imposed in a direct way. He explained that “Nobody rejects the idea of not selling alcohol in public or government buildings. So, most members from the liberal camp also accept that idea” (Appendix A.4.).

In the case of alcohol, the party taught him how to deal with the issue more carefully by underlining that opposing alcohol should not have to be based on religious understandings. It could be rationalised by saying that it is unhealthy and it is not correct that state institutions support the practice especially to the public. Therefore, the maximum involvement that the government can do is to stop the state from sponsoring any company that produces alcohol. The government can also limit the area in which trade and consume it. In the end, it is free for individuals to sell or to drink and it is not the domain of the state to authorise it. It is an example of how the party has given a new understanding by underlining the importance of strategy in dealing with reality. The result is a different stance of party members, at least in the case of the youth member in Istanbul, in dealing with the alcohol issue.

A research conducted by Erdoğan (2006) for her degree in Sabancı University, Istanbul, is another example of the transformation of the AKP members in the experience of being a member. In her research, she shows that women activists of the AKP who were also members of the RP previously find that different environments have directed their understanding on certain issues. The research is mainly focused on the issue of EU membership which is vital as the oppositional discourse of the RP and the AKP. During their membership with the RP, activities were mainly dominated by congregation in which

religious interpretation is disseminated. From the congregation, they understood that the EU is not a better option for them since it is perceived as a group of Christians. It means that the EU will not favour the interest of Turkish people who are Muslim in majority. Therefore, there is no benefit in joining the group with that characteristic.

When they joined the AKP, the discourse of the EU changed dramatically because it supports the EU accession. At first, it was difficult to understand the background behind it but what made them more comfortable to explore the reason of its proposal is the absence of congregation. Absence of congregation means there will be no imposition of particular interpretation. Hence, they will have more space to explore reasons behind it. For example, the party officials explain that the EU should not be perceived as a Christian club and automatically it is not a threat to the Turkish society. The absence of religious discourse has lifted religious interpretation as well and it is able to reveal rational objectives of the EU. For instance, the EU is perceived to have a better economic situation and a model of providing better service and freedom of individual expression, including practicing religious beliefs freely. Joining the EU means more job opportunities for the Turks to work in the European countries and of attracting investment that helps to increase the economic growth. Moreover, protection for individual rights can be further obtained as demonstrated by the case of the headscarf which was brought to the European Court on Human Rights in The Hague (BBC News, 10 November 2005). Although the case was rejected by the Court, Europe can be seen as an alternative solution in resolving domestic issues. So, the discourse has changed from 'threat' to 'opportunity', and for the women activists, the promise of opportunity is more convincing than a perilous Christian club.

The absence of congregation has provided opportunities to place emphasis on the individual's interest without any pressures. For women activists, it is an opportunity to give more emphasis on the existence of individuals. Unlike their experience as members of the RP, they can act and think as individuals rather than associate themselves with a collective interpretation.

There is also another case to demonstrate a new nuance of the AKP that has influenced members in developing a novel way of looking at the reality. A youth member who has graduated from university explained that the party has given more rooms and opportunities for religious group activists. He is still a member of an Islamic movement and actively recruits new members from schools and universities and conducts activities in the

movement's accommodation. He encouraged his fellow members of the movement to join the party or at least to become actively involved in the party's programmes. One of the programmes that is useful for youth is *Siyaset Akademisi* or Political Academy that gives a useful tool to deepen youth's understanding on many new issues. He joined the programme together with a group of young activists from the movement and consistently persuaded them to come again to the next session of the programme.

When he was asked to explain his motivation to actively persuade his colleagues to come to party programmes, he responded that joining the party has given him opportunities to see the real world. Unlike the movement, the party has presented him with new realities to be dealt with. Previously, he thought that the party would not give him any benefit because it has no religious agenda. Additionally, it was not attractive for him since he believes that religion is important in life. In his mind, without any religious guidance and focusing only on politics, the party will place emphasis on worldly motives and undermine morality to achieve a political triumph.

In fact, his involvement with the party has given him a confidence that the AKP would be beneficial to the Islamic movements in Turkey in particular and the whole society in general. From the movement's point of view, the party has created a better environment for religious movements to work without creating any suspicion from the security apparatuses. He said that previously, the place where he lived was closely monitored and the presence of the apparatuses was apparent in the surrounding neighbourhood. The decreasing scale of security presence is part of the party's efforts to ease civil rights and is beneficial for religious life. Today, the movement is no longer worried to undertake any activities at the very same place. The fear of being monitored and taken into custody has gone. The people also benefit from such conditions and one of the direct impacts is that they can ask permission to build a mosque through easier procedures. Therefore, the presence of the AKP in Turkish politics and its significant role in the government is crucially critical for the development of civil rights in which Muslim communities also accrue the benefits.

Nonetheless, the nature of the AKP as a secular party does not affect the level of support from Islamic organisations. He believed that supporting the party is seen as an obligation for Islamic organisations. The Islamic movements including the one in which he is a member, should give their votes in the ballot box and do not leave the party to stand

alone in the political arena. More than that, they should also actively support the party's programmes. For him, the AKP's commitment to secularism which seems to be far from religious principles does not constitute any problem. Therefore, the transformation toward a secular party does not automatically reduce the movement's attachment to the party. In politics, according to him, the most important thing is how to bring benefits for the people and it does not necessarily relate to any religious preference.

The case of the young activist shows that being a member of an Islamic organisation does not automatically lead them to have political preference based solely on religiosity. It is however completely different from other cases of youth members of other Islamic organisations. Two youth members of the Gülen movement showed different thinking in looking at politics. Although they do not possess a strong willingness to be active in politics, they still used religious principles as a benchmark to evaluate the way politicians behave. For instance, they are hesitant to support the AKP because, according to them, influenced by material wealth, the leaders of the party have lost their integrity in practicing humbleness and modesty as taught by the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. Thus, it will be difficult for the AKP leaders to commit with those principles since they are seen as too tolerant to the material extravaganza. All these had forced them not to choose the party as their representative in politics.

A new trend in how members of Islamic organisations look at politics seems to emerge as reflected in their stances towards the AKP. Although coming from an Islamic organisation, the young activist in the AKP can still enjoy a flexibility to join a political party. More than that, he even could ask other members to attend the party's activities. There is no religious reason for the involvement except that the party has brought benefits for society which in turn also put Islamic organisations in an advantageous position.

In fact, bringing benefits into society is not the only factor that attracts members of Islamic organisations to change their view about politics. The party has committed to educate its members at every level. The programme aims at strengthening the knowledge and skills to work for the party especially in making effective and intensive communication with the voters. At the central level, for example, one the popular activities for the younger generation is *Siyaset Akademisi* launched in February 2008. It is a programme offered by the AKP to train its young or new members to deepen their knowledge of politics. The programme is also open to the public with a pack of themes on several political issues for

certain period of time. Hayri Çağır (2009), a coordinator of the programme, explained that the programme is open to every citizen without any discrimination and aimed at giving insights on politics from a variety of sources, and not solely from the party's officials. It is also a manifestation of the party's commitment to educate all members or supporters and also citizens, so they can embrace better political circumstances in the future.

I had a chance to attend sessions of the programme and those sessions were conducted in a good manner. The committee set up the sessions that keep up with the schedule and also provided refreshments for participants. Two of the sessions observed in the party's central building were on liberalism and public speaking. The session on liberalism was taught by a prominent scholar known as a liberal defender, Prof. Attila Yayla from Gazi University. Another session for public speaking was conducted by a young professional from a private company. The two sessions gave an impression that the party wants to provide an open forum for many Turkish citizens to learn useful skills and knowledge. The session on public speaking was more interesting when the speaker demonstrated his skills to the audience. The party also arranged various similar activities for local party representatives on different subjects ranging from complex issues such as foreign policy, economic and social policies to practical skills such as leadership, communication, and body language (Hale and Özbudun 2009: 48).

The impact on party members is obvious. Some of the participants have expressed their gratitude to the party because they have acquired more knowledge and understanding on different issues. One of the attendants expressed his desire to be a good politician for better Turkish politics in the future after following the programme. He added that Turkey should have been in a better situation if all parties can do similar commitment as the AKP. At some points, his expression shows that the party's programmes have achieved its intended impact on attendants. In general, they want to educate the Turkish citizens on how to embrace politics in a better way and if they are committed to the party, they would be willing to work with strong commitment.

It is reported by Hale and Özbudun (2009: 46) that one of the different characters of activists of the AKP is their desire to work with passion and commitment. They give the impression in their activities as having strong ideological and emotional attachments. In fact, as many have shown, not all of the party members are working for ideological preferences. As demonstrated in their explanations, these members have transformed some

of their understanding on the role of religion in politics. Some of them, as in the case of the youth leader in Istanbul, might not give up totally his commitments to religious belief. However, he knows that politics is not a place to impose his beliefs on others and it has to be conducted in a different way according to the state's law. One of the significant changes is that they do not want to use religious principles in condemning others' behaviour.

To some extent, the party has succeeded in transforming some of its ideological elements. Most of the supporters of the RP and the FP have expressed their commitments to work in a democratic way and uphold the Turkish conservatism. Prominent party leaders who have experienced the severe impact of the Court's decision to close the RP and the FP may possess a new attitude to restrain themselves from making any confrontational gesture. However, self-restraint is not the only attitude monopolised by the party's elites. It has been transferred to many lower party activists who had a similar experience with the influence of the RP and the FP through the party's education programmes. As a result, it is now a common understanding that religion is part of individual's belief and some have given up ideas of the implementation of formal *shari'a* as part of the public law.

From the observation of the party's education programmes and the discussion with some members with experience of the RP and the FP, it can be concluded that the expression of ideological preference has been moderated. It is now a new vision of a better Turkey with enhanced democracy for every citizen that has driven a strong commitment of the AKP's members. It is also a vision that has attracted members from different backgrounds to work for a better Turkey. With that vision, the AKP tries to become a melting pot for the Turkish people regardless of their ideological preferences. The party's education programme has become a significant instrument of the transformation. The circumstance has helped the party to run a project of normalising democracy in Turkey (Insel 2008 and Aktay 2009) that is also known as 'quiet revolution' (Tepe 2006).

In Carsey and Layman's term, the AKP's effort to change is beyond what they refer to as an objective of preserving the authority of the party's elites. According to them, the objective of transformation of party's members to follow leaders' interpretation of party ideology is to put the party's members under their control. With a new but legitimate understanding, they are able to ask party's members to give their loyalty to the party. As a result, an effective authority can be obtained resulting in a solid party. Therefore, the objective of this strategy is not far from maintaining a leadership that can monopolise the



party's authority with legitimate interpretation. Therefore, it is understandable that they also offer a parallel strategy with conversion which is known as replacement.

Still, according to Carsey and Layman, in order to maintain party solidity, replacing those who oppose the new interpretation of the party's leaders is essential. The reason is simple: the opposing members will challenge the leadership by accusing them of betraying the original party's ideology. However, in the end the party's leaders will secure their position by using their authority to expel their opponents. In this context, the implementation of replacement is based on conflict of interpretation on ideology.

In the case of the AKP, replacement is also part of its policies. It takes place in three different arenas: party structure, parliament and cabinet. As a leader of those three arenas, the party's chairman has a legal authority to promote any party member to fill the positions in the party and cabinet. He has power to control the selection of party candidates to represent districts in parliamentary elections. In that position, the strategy of replacement in the context of moderation can be implemented rather easily.

However, several rotations of members from those positions showed how difficult it is to determine if a rotation of a party member is motivated by their opposition toward the party's notion of moderation. Most replacement cases are simply related to poor performance or failures to bring benefits for the party. Recently, there is also a suspicion that the party's leader is trying to change the composition of deputies in the parliament. To win the 2011 national election, there were reports that the party chairman tried to put candidates who support him to replace deputies known to be long loyal supporters of Abdullah Gül. Nevertheless, the effort to replace a number of deputies was not related to the ideological matter. It was part of Erdoğan's effort to strengthen his idea to change the Turkish constitution from a parliamentary to a presidential system. In order to achieve the goal, a solid party manoeuvre in parliament is essential especially if the party failed to secure its majority above minimum requirement to change the constitution without consulting the opposition. For some, the manoeuvre is part of Erdoğan's ambition to control the parliament through his trustworthy people who support the constitutional reform proposal.

The problem with such a manoeuvre is that not all of the AKP's elites support the proposal. Two of its prominent leaders, Gül and Arınç, are not happy with the proposal. The Speaker of the parliament also expressed his reservations toward the idea (Aliriza and

Koenhemi 2011: 2). Arınç, the Deputy Prime Minister, prior to the 2011 election assertively stood for a parliamentary rather than a presidential system. In that case, it is difficult to claim firmly that the manoeuvre to replace significant numbers of the party's deputy candidates is a reflection of ideological contradiction. The contending elites are in fact not representing any ideological position in challenging the chairman's idea of constitutional reform. The main reason for the disagreement is based on the elites' own self-restraining attitude and worry that the proposal would provoke unnecessary backlash for the party. Therefore, the current status quo is preferred than a move that might provoke new chaotic situation.

Thus, it can be said that the current disagreement is not based on ideological tensions, but rather focused on certain issues with some tactical consequences. Firstly, there is an element of personal ambition to secure future political position in 2014. Secondly, in order to achieve that, more obedient party deputies in the parliament should be installed and consequently, a selection of deputies is required (Associated Press 6 May 2011). The process can be conducted efficiently because Erdoğan has a legitimate power which is useful to select candidates of party deputies. As a result, disagreement also broadens to 'faction like' conflict because a monopolised selection process has been conducted at the expense of some deputies who have close ties with Gül or Arınç. However, it is too early to conclude whether or not such a situation is a pure competition for power whose objective is to undermine political adversaries. From the members' point of view, internal power struggle is not a phenomenon that should be denied because disagreement is natural and also legitimate. For them the struggle is part of the process to find solution and will not bring the party into chaos and disagreement and is perceived as normal as it is focused on a certain issue (Appendix A.4.).

The AKP has shown that conversion is quite a successful strategy to transform the members' point of view. The 'ideological' element, especially those who have experienced being members of the RP or the FP, within the party has been brought into a realm where understanding the reality is important. That attitude is in line with the commitment of the party's leaders with the RP and the FP backgrounds to 'take off their clothes' or to change and leave the history behind. The closure of the FP in 2001 could be a critical factor in shaping the attitude. Yet the party is also consistent in sponsoring programmes that strengthen a common understanding about the Turkish politics. However, from the

experience of some party members, the absence of ideological imposition is also crucial in the development of individual political preference. Having enjoyed a more open political life, they are now able to expand their knowledge on several issues from more diverse sources. The impact is to accept the party's programmes even though they are completely different with that of the the RP or the FP. Through the party's programmes and approaches, there is now a common parallel attitude between the party's elite and those who are at the lower levels. However, the result is quite different from what Carsey and Layman have predicted that conversion will be paired with replacement policy. The policy is related to the effort of creating a more homogenous party by removing members who oppose moderation ideas. In the AKP, efforts to replace a number of ministers and the party's deputies in the parliament are related to power competition rather than to any ideological opposition.

The AKP has shown that the absence of rigid ideology has given more opportunity to gain more support from various elements of society. It gives more space for members with different preferences by institutionalising the principle of consultation. Even though it has been implemented in combination with the dominant leadership in hierarchical party structure, personal appeal and vision that meets the objectives of many Turkish people it remains significant in attracting supporters and maintaining loyalty of the party's members. The vision has compelled members to think that the party's leaders would not lead them into a difficult situation. This has become their source of trust.

With moderation of ideology, the need for rule enforcement upon oppositional ideas based on diverse ideological interpretation becomes less significant. Offering different proposals on certain issues has become the norm; hence dismissal of members based on differing ideological interpretation is also minimal. Less ideological conflict is quite obvious since consultation can offer different elements to discuss. Additionally, the existence of self-boundary, especially among those who are categorised as the religious element within the party, has prevented any dramatic response to issues related to religious beliefs or demands. As a result, the AKP benefits from the combination of those circumstances and continues to receive support from its members. In other words, the party has developed the character of a party with strong party institutionalisation based on procedures written in the party constitution, although it tends to accommodate the powerful figure of its leader. Hence, the party applies leadership and trust based on leadership

charisma and vision combined with appreciation to contribution to the success in elections. Disciplinary action in decomposition strategy is then based on the impact to the party in general to electoral success and appreciation will be given if members' ideas are beneficial. In that regard, conversion is more relevant to direct members with strong religious preference parallel with the party's vision. Therefore, the application of alienation is not relevant in the case of the AKP.

The situation is certainly different from the case of the PKS in Indonesia. On the one hand, the PKS formally upholds Islam as its ideology, but on the other, the party tries to appeal for more support in elections, even from public with no ideologous preferences. As a result, the party has to face a problematic situation, especially on how to interpret the aspects of moderation with its pragmatic character of political manoeuvring in front of Islamic principles. The subsequent chapter will examine the problematic circumstances which the party has to deal with and where ideological aspects are proven to be crucial in the struggle of interpretation that leads the party to apply different strategy in its moderation process.

## Chapter V

### Managing Moderation of the PKS

In the previous chapter, the AKP was described as a party which allows its members space for debate and discussion as well as the opportunity to work for the benefit of the party. It gives different groups within the party, such as religious, liberal, and nationalist groups, as well as those from a particular ethnic background, the chance to work for the party with a universal vision suitable and comfortable for every group. This is a result of the absence of an ideological preference meaning that the AKP is able to implement more lenient procedures to punish or sanction members who breach the party constitution. At the same time, the party has managed to develop a strategy to persuade members to adapt to a vision which enables the party to develop a more sympathetic public opinion.

This chapter will explore the way in which the PKS has managed the impact of moderation, which is dissimilar to the AKP. It is proven that the PKS has not suffered from division as has occurred with several other parties in Indonesia. The party's solidity is inherited from the Tarbiyah Movement as a network of members, who, after the movement transformed itself into a political party, were ready to work as an effective political machine for elections (Permata 2008: 26). Despite its efforts to become a moderate party, the strength of the network is still preserved in the PKS, and, even though there are tensions within the party, and also some splinters, in general, the majority of its members still work for the party.

As an Islamic political party, the way of managing its members is different to that of the AKP. Leadership and trust combined with alienation and decomposition are the common strategies to anticipate the impact of moderation. It can be seen in the strategy of developing loyal cadres through the ideological doctrine of a solid group in pursuing an ideal vision (*jama'ah*) and legitimacy of obtaining religious understanding. However, because the moderation of the PKS still preserves an ideology, decomposition strategy plays a great role in controlling members' behaviour but in a different application from the

AKP. The definition of breaching party's rules is not simply based on organisational aspects, but it also refers to Islamic principles. Hence, in the party structures and constitution, the twofold bases of disciplinary action are obviously exhibited as an interpretation of breaching party rules allowing the party to implement sanctions for disloyal members. Another distinctive strategy is alienation that is absent in less ideological parties such as the AKP. In the PKS, strong feeling of in-group as part of sacred community (*jama'ah*) makes it effective for the party leader to develop serious consequences of breaching the party's procedures or having a position too hostile to its decisions.

### **V.1. Party Leadership**

In the case of the PKS, the notion of a small, influential group directing the party's policy is also relevant, especially in the context of Indonesian party politics, which is characterised by the dominance of a small number of political leaders. The indication has been noted in classic studies of political parties from Ostrogorski and Michels, who mention the existence of small but significantly powerful elites within a political party as the key factor in an internal dynamic power relation. According to this analysis, any direction of a political party will be led by this small elite group, which constitutes an oligarchy within the party. In modern political party dynamics, the existence of this influential small group is still apparent, as when Robert Dahl explains the phenomenon of polyarchy in the American democratic system (Dahl 1989).

However, to locate the influential group in the PKS is not as simple as pointing at the party president as the head of the executive body as shown in the case of the AKP. The head of the party is a position which has the most significant power in the majority of Indonesian political parties. In both PDI-P and Golkar, for instance, the party's general chairman is the most influential figure in the party. Strategic policies in both parties need to gain their consent before they are implemented, and, at elections, they are likely to be the party's candidate for president. In the case of the PKS, however, it would be quite misleading to identify the party chairman as the holder of power. When the movement's party was founded in 1998 under the name of PK, the party chairman was a relatively unknown figure. The first president, Nur Mahmudi Ismail, was a civil servant researcher and PhD graduate from an American university, with no record of strong relations with any

of the Middle Eastern Islamic movements. His profile is unlike that of the second president, Hidayat Nur Wahid, who graduated from the University of Madinah and is better suited to represent the Islamic appearance of the PK, and then the PKS. With Ismail's sound attachment to science rather than religious subjects, there was a question of how effective his authority was in leading the party to work with other leading figures with advanced religious attachment to the party.

The president of the PKS, after the transformation of the PK in order to participate in the 2004 election, seems to have limited power in that the president always refers to other institutions in making crucial party decisions. In deciding whether the party should support a particular presidential candidate or not, for example, the president has to wait for a decision from the Shura Assembly and negotiations are undertaken by the head of the Assembly. When President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono replaced Suharna Surapranata with an academician as Minister of Research and Technology in the cabinet reshuffle of October 2011, the decision was taken by the Assembly, rather than by the DPP (*Dewan Pimpinan Pusat* or Council of Central Committee) as the executive body (the Jakarta Post, 20 October 2011). Therefore, identifying the power holder in the party needs more careful examination.

For the purpose of analysing the role of the party leadership in managing the impact of moderation, a clear definition of power holders and relations within the PKS is essential. The following paragraphs in this section are intended for that purpose and, in order to do so, the explanation will be based on the formal approach analysis through the examination of the party constitution and structure, as well as an analysis of elite – cadre relations. The analysis corresponds with the conceptual discussion of party management, especially on power relation, in Chapter II, which states that both party structure and party dynamic are important. However, in the PKS, it is important to give more attention to the party dynamic, which can be defined as the relationship between cadres (elite and cadres).

Unlike the AKP, which gives a significant role to the party's chairman, the PKS does not have a strong individual leader. Hence, the analysis of party structure is important as the party developed a disciplined organisational structure and has had a strong commitment to the formal political process since the beginning of its involvement in politics (Diederich 2002: 107 and 105). From the organisation of party structures, we can identify the decision making process clearly, especially the role of institutions such as the

Shura Assembly, the DPTP (*Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat Pusat* or Council of Central Boards) and the DPP (*Dewan Pimpinan Pusat* or Council of Central Committee), along with the Presidency and its executive structures. Meanwhile, the analysis of inter-cadre relations is also essential to describe the power relations between cadres, especially the elite's exercise of power in relation to the party's cadres at different levels. The first part of the analysis, then, will focus on the party structure in order to locate the power holder within the organisation, which will be useful for the second analysis of the power dynamic.

### **V.I.1. Party Structure**

As shown in Chapter III, the party emerged from an underground Islamic movement (Tarbiyah movement) with a strong organisation and control to coordinate its members at each level. Although the party is seen as the result of a transformation (Damanik 2002), the PKS still inherited the movement's basic character which emphasises the quality of cadres through a careful recruitment and training process. The transformation into a political party in 1998 did not automatically change the organisational character of the movement into that of a modern political party. Following the policy decision to integrate the structure of the movement into the PKS in 2005, the character of the movement is embedded within the structure of the party. It means that the leader of the party is also the leader of the movement and *vice versa*. Similar conditions also apply at different levels, such as the leader of the movement in a particular province will be likely be the leader of the PKS in that province. The head of a local party branch at a provincial level, for example, should be someone who has reached the required level of membership to lead the branch. The party also has a strong educational character by giving more attention to the internalisation process for members. The message to be internalised is the Islamic teaching, which is also similar to that which cadres had received during the movement era. For that purpose, the party has set up a special division to take care of all internalisation processes, known as *divisi kaderisasi* or the division of cadre regeneration. In addition, the party also runs regional coordination management adopted from the organisation of the Tarbiyah Movement dividing Indonesia into different areas of coordination. During the movement era, these coordination areas were known as *area dakwah*.

According to the party constitution published in 2008 (MPP 2008), the Shura Assembly is the highest ranking institution in the PKS. The function of the Assembly is similar to the concept of *ahlul halli wal-aqdi* as the forum for selected members to



represent the people. The term relates to the interpretation of representation of a community by selected and trusted individuals who have the wisdom and specialisation to discuss issues wisely in the Sunni tradition going back to the writings of al-Mawardi and al-Farra. In the Indonesian context, it is not a unique case since other Islamic organisations such as Nahdlatul Ulama also applied the concept for a long time (van Bruinessen 1991: 190). The PKS's constitution assigns the Assembly, as the highest institution in the party, the authority to decide strategic policies as well as in guiding all party institutions and cadres. The example of strategic policy as mentioned in the constitution is that the Assembly has the authority to change the party's constitution, the party's platform, and basic and strategic plans of the party (Party Constitution, Article 11, verses 2c, d, e).

The Assembly also has the authority to select members of the party's central committee, which functions as an executive body, as well as other strategic institutions such as the MPP (*Majelis Pertimbangan Partai* or Central Advisory Assembly) and the DSP (*Dewan Syariah Pusat* or Central Sharia Council). For the PKS, the DPP, led by a president does not have the authority to decide strategic decisions in relation to major political events such as elections or coalitions. The president as the head of the executive body only has the authority to declare the party's presidential candidate in elections as well as the party's direction after elections to join coalition to form a government as decided by the Assembly. It is an authority that is written in the party's constitution as stated in Article 11, verse 2l. In practice, the last two elections have shown the Assembly's role in making decisions regarding political coalitions because the Assembly has the authority to decide on the presidential candidate to be supported by the party. In two presidential elections, the party has supported three different presidential candidates, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono – Jusuf Kalla after the defeat of Amien Rais – Siswono Yudhohusodo in the first round of the 2004 election, and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono again in the 2009 election, but this time with Boediono as his running mate for vice-president. The recent cabinet reshuffle which reduced the number of PKS ministers in the cabinet demonstrates the centrality of the Assembly in deciding the party's position with regard to the policies enacted by the President as the head of cabinet. In that case, the President of the PKS had to wait for a definitive decision by the Assembly before producing a final decision in reaction to the reshuffle. This is the mechanism that has been maintained since the beginning of the party starting from the PK in 1998 and continued by the PKS until recently.

The Assembly is a forum for members who have outstanding capacity in understanding the Islamic principles. For this reason, only expert members (*anggota ahli*) can be elected as members of the Shura Assembly, as they are seen as having religious insight, mandate and influence (Party Bye-law, Article 7, Verse 1f). Members of the Assembly will serve for at least 5 years in lunar system and their membership is arranged to accommodate a wide range of members; it is mentioned in the party's constitution that the Assembly may consist of a minimum of 51 members and a maximum of 99 (Party Bye-law, Article 7.2). Despite this regulation, which allows for the number of members of the Assembly to vary, in practice the institution has always had the maximum number of 99 seats from the beginning. It is relatively unknown who decides the number, but from the authority obtained from the party's constitution, it is the Assembly itself which decides. It is believed that the figure is arranged to reflect the Assembly as a collective forum for experts and senior cadres. With that composition, the party hopes that the collective character of the Assembly will give its decisions a significant degree of legitimacy, so that all cadres will trust any decisions. The degree of trust among cadres toward the Assembly can be seen from their common perception that the Assembly 'will not cause us any difficulties and damage' and that it 'knows what is best for the party and all of its cadres'. Such expressions are important to maintain the party's solidity when it produces contentious decisions.

Members of the party must hold the status of expert member for five years before they are eligible for election to the Assembly. The membership is important in the party because those who are included in the category will be regarded as elite members of the party, or at least perceived as respectable members. In the party's levels of membership, expert member is almost the highest level attainable, ranking above two other levels of middle member (*kader madya*) and senior member (*kader dewasa*). There is only one category above it, which is premier member (*anggota purna*). The four categories of membership are known as core cadre (*kader inti*) that is known as full member of the party. This is categorised as full membership because the party also has a different category of membership, which is for supporters (*pendukung*). The two categories of membership are differentiated by different rights and obligations. For example, the former have rights to vote for candidates for the Assembly as well as an obligation to fulfil the party's tasks to be in the party's structures.

In the Assembly formed in 2010, an election was arranged to choose 65 electable members, all of whom were expert and premier members. All of them had an equal opportunity of being elected in a process known as internal election for the Assembly. The 65 candidates were elected by those who have the right to vote (the core cadre), while the supporter members did not participate in the election. There were 195 candidates for the election selected from around 1,000 expert members, and they had to compete for 65 seats from 33 provincial electoral areas (Vivanews, 21 February 2010). Each core cadre has the right to choose a candidate from the province where he or she resides and candidates will be chosen from the votes they get using the first-past-the-post system. Therefore, a cadre will choose a candidate who lives in the same province to represent cadres in that province.

The 65 members of the Assembly represent a category of regional representation based on provinces, distributed according to the number of cadres who reside in each province (Vivanews, 22 February 2010). West Java has the largest number of seats in the Assembly, followed by Jakarta and Central Java. West Java has 12 seats to represent the region while Central Java and Jakarta have six seats each. Jakarta has only six seats even though votes from members abroad are counted for the capital. Its number is not too significant compared to its position as the focal point of the party because its three suburban cities (Tangerang, Depok, and Bekasi) are administratively under the coordination of Banten and West Java. The other significant region is East Java, which has four representatives in the Assembly.

In the Assembly, there are also 32 members who are not elected by core cadres. These members are selected by the Assembly after the 65 members are elected because of their expertise in areas such as law, politics, governance, education, economy, etc. In addition, the Assembly also has another category, which is permanent member. This is a membership status granted to the former head of the Assembly as well as the current head himself. Hilmi Aminuddin, who developed the movement from the early 1980s, leads the Assembly and was automatically granted the status of permanent member. His membership is also similar with Salim Segaf al-Djufrie, the Minister of Social Affairs from 2009 to 2014, who was also granted permanent membership after his service as head of the Assembly in the early period of the PKS.

The last election for the Assembly was held on 21 February 2010 in all provinces including those who live abroad. There were approximately 37,435 core cadres registered

who had the right to give their preference to an individual candidate. As in a normal election, expert members compete for seats in each province, which functions as an electoral area and, using a simple first-past-the-post system, the candidate who gets most votes in each electoral area wins the seat. However, unlike other political parties, the PKS internal election does not feature campaign activities from the candidates or intensive lobbying to attract votes. It seems that every cadre who has the right to vote already has the necessary information on candidates so that he or she can vote without any doubt despite the absence of campaign activities (Appendix B.11.).

The Assembly is regarded as a collective forum in which every member has the opportunity to speak and express their ideas. The right to speak in the Assembly is combined with the obligation to be heard by others (Appendix B.10.). In this context, the Assembly gives a free opportunity to discuss and debate every available option of a particular decision to be made. Having the opportunity to speak and be heard, the Assembly acknowledges the mechanism of contesting every idea emerging in the Assembly's meetings. Therefore, it takes a long time to make a decision because the meeting should allocate equal opportunity for every member to speak.

Nevertheless, collectivism is not the only aspect of the Assembly because it is important to look at the head of the institution. The head of the Assembly is also called *Muraqib 'Amm*. As formally stated in the party's constitution, the head of the Assembly only leads the meeting and has the final decision if the Assembly is equally divided on an issue. However, he also has the authority to propose party committees in the DPP and two other important institutions (the MPP and the DSP). That authority makes the head an important person in the Assembly. With that authority, the leader is not just a leader who facilitates the assembly's meeting but also a person with a considerable role within the party.

#### **V.I.1.1. President and the DPP (Council of Central Committee)**

Since the inauguration of the political party, the movement decided to use the term president for the party leader. The purpose of using the term is to de-sacralise the term itself after 32 years of authoritarian rule under President Soeharto during the New Order era (Abidin 1999: 135). During this era, Soeharto was a powerful president unrestricted by control from legislative and judicial bodies, until he became the target of reformation forces in 1998. The PK wanted to adapt the spirit of reformation to impress upon the public that it

had no relation to the old regime and to settle its character as a party that is dominated by youth (Diederich 2002: 105). As a party founded in the reformation era, dismantling the meaning of president is an important message to the public that the party promises significant change for Indonesian politics.

The president is responsible for running the functions of the party as well as the project of *dakwah*. The former is related to functions as an ordinary political party dealing with many strategic issues such as economics, politics, security, and social policies. At the same time, the president also has to manage its most important mission of spreading the message of Islam, both internally and externally, under the project of *dakwah*. Internally, the importance of this project can be seen in the existence of training and cadre division to organise training for all members by providing structured programmes and material. The implementation of the programme is overseen by area coordinators who cover more territorial functions to cover some provinces. Hence, the area coordinators play a great role in helping the president to handle coordination in different areas and may thus be seen as his deputies. Constitutionally, then, the president has a strategic position in the party since he has access to the whole function and coordination of the party. He has direct command of all of the party's structures involved in the coordination of all territorial projects of *dakwah* as well as political functions as a party through the divisions in the DPP.

However, despite this strategic position which allows him to represent and act for the party externally, the president is restricted in his ability to manoeuvre on certain issues. One of the restrictions is to make decisions on issues related to the presidency and its cabinet such as elections, coalitions, power sharing, and strategic governmental policies. This is simply because it is the domain of the Assembly to decide the party's standpoint and negotiation as mandated by the party constitution (Constitution, Article 11, Verse 21). The article only gives the president of the party the right to present recommendations to the Assembly. However, as a member of the Assembly, the president can give opinions during its sessions. The President (and the General Secretary) is automatically a member of the Assembly because all members of the DPP must be chosen from those who are elected in the Assembly (Party Bye-law, Article 18).

In fact, the constitution only mentions the president as part of the DPP that is supported by the general secretary and treasurer with all of their responsibilities and authorities. The DPP has an obligation to implement all of the decisions made by the

National Summit and the Assembly. Therefore, the DPP is an operational structure to ensure that all of the party's policies are implemented, especially to run training for cadres in accordance with *manhaj tarbiyah* or method of training (Party Constitution, Article 14, and Verse 3b). The DPP does not have exclusive authority to decide its political representation in the House of Representatives and candidates for provincial governorships because these decisions are held by the DPTP. The fact that the Council holds the authority to formalise them cannot mask the authority of the DPTP (Bye-law, Article 19). The DPP only has the authority to decide candidates for provincial representatives, so that it has to share the power of executive at the national level with other institutions in the DPTP. The DPP's secondary status is also reflected in its regular report to the DPTP every six months (Bye-law, Article 14), more specifically, it has to prepare a regular financial report for the Head of the Assembly (Bye-law, Article 19).

Other than that, the DPP has the authority to coordinate all the party cadres in the legislative and executive bodies (Bye-law, Article 19). With that authority, the President is usually free from all political positions in either the House of Representatives or the Cabinet. In the PKS, there is a tradition that a member will withdraw from the parliament if selected as President and *vice versa*. The President has to withdraw from his position if he is selected as a minister. The three presidents of the PKS (Hidayat Nur Wahid, Tifatul Sembiring and Lutfi Hasan Ishaq), as well as the previous president of the PK (Nur Mahmudi Ismail), have not held any political office. They never occupy different positions in order to focus on their duties as president. It is also a message to the public that the President of the party is a professional working for the party to avoid any conflict of political interests embedded in different positions, such as minister. Nur Mahmudi Ismail gave up his position to Hidayat Nur Wahid after becoming Minister of Forestry in 1999. The tradition was followed by Tifatul Sembiring, who took over the position when Nur Wahid became the chair of the People's Consultative Assembly in 2004. He himself withdrew in 2009 when he was invited to become Minister of Communication and Information and he finally was replaced by Lutfi Hasan Ishaq, the current President of the PKS.

### **V.I.1.2. The MPP (Central Advisory Assembly) and the DSP (Central Shari'a Council)**

Constitutionally, both institutions are positioned parallel with the DPP and structurally have important roles in the decision making process. The leaders of both institutions are automatically included in the DPTP as the highest-ranking institution to make strategic decisions when the Shura Assembly does not have an agenda to arrange meetings. However, both institutions also have different roles which make them less significant in terms of their political influence.

In concept, the MPP has the legislative function of preparing the party's rules and guidance. Interpreted from the results of the National Summit or meetings of the Shura Assembly, the MPP transfers them into documents which can be read and distributed to all members. Most of its energy, then, is focused on preparing and socialising the document of the party's platform, which was finally published in 2008.

In practice, the MPP acts as a supervisory institution for the DPP, giving advice, recommendations and consultations for the implementation of the party's guidance (Constitution, Article 13). It may give its assessment of the implementation of the platform and guidance and present recommendations to the DPP as well as to the Assembly. Constitutionally, that function is quite significant, especially when the DPP leads the party in a different direction. Nevertheless, the supervisory function of the Assembly constrains it to act more passively with regard to the daily political dynamics and its recommendations will not have any direct outcome on the party's direction.

Despite its position of supervising the DPP, the MPP faces problems in getting involved in the daily politics of the party. One of the main reasons for the obstacle is because of its nature as an advisory institution, as a result of which, most of its members are senior cadres who have previously served the party in honorary positions. Hence, there is an anecdote that the MPP is humorously referred to as 'Mantan Pengurus Pusat' or former central committee members (Appendix B.10.).

Compared to the MPP, the DSP plays a greater role in the party since it fulfils a judicial function. The DSP as an institution defends the party's morals, dealing with cases that need a legal response according to Islamic principles. Difficult situations need religious judgement by using principles of *ushul fiqh* as a method of assessing them in accordance with Islamic values. Therefore, it is common for the DSP to release statements to describe

the party's position according to its Islamic interpretation. For example, the DSP released the party's statement on the case of Ahmadiyah in Indonesia, which became a controversial issue in 2007 - 2008.

However, the DSP as an institution not only produces statements but also articulates its position toward *shari'a*. As an Islamic party, it is quite unique that the PKS does not call for an implementation of *shari'a* law in Indonesia. Through the DSP, it makes it clear constitutionally that state law is still acknowledged by the party. The DSP is significant in the implementation of this acknowledgement since it has a function to review the implementation of aspects of *shari'a* in the state's laws (Bye-laws, Article 23). The article shows the willingness of the party to implement *shari'a* law in Indonesia, but it is the review of the substance rather than replacing all of the state's laws by *shari'a*. The article also shows the PKS's commitment to work within the the constitutional framework to find opportunities to incorporate aspects of *shari'a* into the state's law. The support of the PKS for the anti- pornography law in 2008 is one example of the party working within that framework.

While the PKS tries to find compromise with the state's laws, the party attempts to implement *shari'a* internally. The way of implementing it is by giving the DSP authority to adjudicate in all cases of the party's cadres violating *sharia* law (Bye-laws, Article 23, Verse 3.e). It is widely known that the DSP has the authority to impose severe punishments on cadres who break *shari'a* law and some of them are officially dismissed for severe violations of *sharia*. These include senior cadres such as Syamsul Balda and Yusuf Supendi, who were expelled from the party for different reasons. Unfortunately, the verdicts for cadres found to be in breach of the *shari'a* are not published to keep the reasons for their dismissal secret; hence, the party can protect their names from disgrace (Appendix B.17.).

### **V.I.1.3. The DPTP (Council of Central Leaderships)**

It is undisputed among the party's cadres that the Assembly is the most powerful institution in the party after the National Summit. However, the Summit only meets once every five years and, therefore, lacks the flexibility to deal with short term issues, while the Assembly has more regular meetings every six months, so that it has the ability to respond more quickly to short term and strategic issues. Therefore, it has the authority to provide strategic



decisions in response to the dynamics of the Indonesian political system, especially before and during the electoral process for legislative and presidential elections.

However, the Assembly is still somewhat inflexible when it comes to the decision-making process, which should involve all members of the Assembly. The six-monthly schedule also gives rise to problems when there is a need for prompt strategic decisions. Therefore, it is necessary to find an institutional mechanism to deal with making immediate decisions. In response, the PKS introduced an institution to represent all the authoritative institutions of the Assembly and the DPP, called the DPTP (*Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat Pusat* or Council of Central Leadership). As mentioned in Article 12 of the party's constitution, the institution consists of six of the most important persons representing institutions at the national level; these are the head of the Assembly, the DSP, and the MPP, as well as the President, the General Secretary and the Treasurer. Led by the head of the Assembly, the DPTP has all the authority of the Assembly, in terms of representing and supervising the implementation of its decisions. In the party structure as seen in Diagram V.1., the DPTP is located between the Assembly and the governing bodies, reflecting its strategic position above all strategic institutions.

The DPTP's important role in the party can be seen in its constitutional considerations, especially in Article 12 of the party's constitution, and Article 14 of the bye-laws. In the former, the DPTP is assigned to comply with all decisions of the Assembly and supervise all of their implementation. The DPTP is also authorised to decide the party's political position when the Assembly is not able to do so. The institution also gives recommendation to candidates who will be supported officially by the party in provincial elections, as well as selecting candidates to represent the party in the House of Representatives.. Its supremacy over the governing bodies is also reflected in its authority to recommend the structure of the party and its committees to be decided at the Assembly's meeting. The DPTP itself has no set time period for its meetings, which gives it the flexibility to arrange critical decisions without being constrained by the party's constitutional clauses. In Article 14 of the party's bye-laws, it is mentioned that the DPTP can meet at least once every three months. This means that the DPTP can arrange meetings at any time when needed. With its flexibility and the involvement of important figures, the DPTP is the most strategic institution in dealing with daily political dynamics. However, its authority has a direct implication on the political roles of others, in particular as it lessens

the President's role. The PKS, then, has limited the role of the party's President, so that he is not a central figure.

The role of the Assembly as well as the DPTP confirms the commitment of the PKS to implementing a collective approach to politics. The party's structure indicates the determination to avoid any possible opportunity for one person to have a powerful authority without any control. One reason suggested for developing a collective approach is due to the party's lack of influential figures that are widely known to the public (Appendix B.6.). In the case of the DPTP, although it has a higher position than other governing bodies, it cannot intervene in the decisions of the DSP. The DPTP also has limits to its ability to act as a powerful institution because the nature of its composition as a collective institution makes it difficult to accumulate power. Hence, to take a strategic decision, it needs the consent of representatives of different institutions.

There is also another significant reason for that approach, which is the centrality of Hilmi Aminuddin's role. As the head of the Assembly, he is also the representative of that body in the DPTP. Moreover, he was also chosen as the head of that collective leadership institution. It is, then, interesting to focus on his role not only as the head of the Assembly but also as the head of the DPTP as both institutions have the power to make any strategic and critical decisions for the PKS.

Having two strategic positions on the two institutions, there must be a notion that he is more than a mere head of the institutions. To understand the nature of his role in the party, we have to be aware of the basis of the party itself and his contribution to the party's roots. As a continuation of an underground Islamic movement, the importance of his involvement is significant because he was the founder of the movement and trained most of the party's elite in the movement's early stages. Moreover, even today, there is no figure in the party who can substitute for his ability to guide all cadres in politics with an appropriate approach (Appendix B.6.). He is still the central figure for all cadres to listen to and follow in implementing the general vision of the movement's sacred mission of *dakwah* in politics. Hence, obtaining both strategic positions is a manifestation of admiration for his great contribution to the movement while, at the same time, providing general guidance and direction in politics.

Therefore, the party's structure is also a reflection of Aminuddin's informal status in front of its cadres. It is explained that the collective approach of the party is a reflection

of his unchallenged position in front of all cadres as a catalyst for the complex nature of the cadres, especially those at the elite level (Ibid). Hence, the position of the party's President as part of the collective leadership of the Assembly and the DPTP is an indication of the subordinate position of the person in that position before Aminuddin, at least informally.

The party's structure indicates the importance of Aminuddin's role in the party. Further examination, then, is needed to find out the power relations between political figures in the party, which will be provided in the following section. To get a clearer picture of the relationships between cadres the subsequent section will explain relations between members of the elite, as well as between the elite and lower cadres and *vice versa*. The description is important to find an explanation of how leadership in the PKS is developed and maintained to strengthen the solidity of its cadres. It is proven that the leadership plays a large role in minimising the impact of moderation introduced by the party leadership.

#### **V.I.1.2. Party Leadership and Party Dynamics**

Despite his reluctance to engage in public life and occupy a political position, it is important to note the pivotal role of Hilmi Aminuddin as the head of the Assembly and the DPTP. He is central to the Tarbiyah movement as its initiator in the early 1980s. After its declaration as a political party in 1998, his major role can be seen in strategic political decisions and negotiations, especially in support of presidential candidates in national elections and deals for power sharing in cabinet through coalition. Therefore, examining his role as a figure who is able to represent the PKS in its strategic affairs is important, especially the relation between him and all cadres. It is also a question that may be addressed toward all of the elites and cadres in the party to examine the actual relation between them beyond their nature as members of a political party.

Those inquiries are important for the party since the PKS has successfully maintained its solidity after efforts to be seen as more moderate in the last two elections. Instead of suffering from conflict or even split, the PKS only suffered from tensions among some of its members. The impact of the tension itself is believed to have influenced the party's electoral performance, especially in big cities when some critical members were not eager to maximise the efforts to maintain or get more voters (Hidayat 2010). Nevertheless, despite confusion among some of its cadres, supporters and sympathisers toward the

messages delivered by some of the party's elite, the party still enjoys the loyalty most of its cadres.

One of the answers for the continued solidity is that the leadership still receives the loyalty of most cadres, whether at the elite, middle or lower level. At the elite level, the key figure is Hilmi Aminuddin himself as the founder of the Tarbiyah Movement before acting as the head of the Assembly. He spent most of his time in the early 1980s training large numbers of young people in Islamic understanding brought from the Middle East. It is believed that the influence of Ikhwanul Muslimin was embedded in his ideas and interpretation of Islam and he also adopted the Ikhwan's training methods, even though the real connection between the two sides still remains unclear. His long efforts to build the new network of youngsters were rewarded after almost 20 years when the movement revealed its identity to gradually become an increasingly, influential political party.

After his hard work in building the network, his meritorious service was then rewarded by the party, most of whose elite he had previously trained. Although he showed his reluctance to accept any political position, his colleagues honoured him with the leadership of the Assembly after a short period of Salim Segaf al-Djufrie's leadership. However, the party elite's admiration of Aminuddin is not merely an appreciation of his dedication in training most of them. There are also aspects of their mutual relations that encourage them to respect him. From the interview with a senior cadre, there is an impression that Aminuddin is adept at maintaining the loyalty of his aides. Before the foundation of the party, he was able to support the growing network, which needed more funds to coordinate the spreading of cadres to remote provinces. He was able to utilise his network with sources of funding in the Middle East and used it to support new cadres from that region, who had just finished their studies in the Middle Eastern universities, to run the network (Zein 2010). For new graduates, the offer was significant before they had any settled position and stable income. Therefore, they worked for the movement and gave their time and skill for the projects set up by the movement.

That relationship was maintained until the cadres were able to find an income to support themselves. However, in many cases the elite were in a difficult situation because they had to give up most of their time to work for the movement and train different groups of recruits in different places without asking for payment. Many of them lived in very modest conditions. For those who worked for the movement on a full time basis, financial

support was given. While it is too simplistic to conclude that they are now loyal to Aminuddin because of his previous efforts to provide financial support, nevertheless some of them express their admiration of him by not challenging his ideas and opinions, especially as he is also able to talk dominantly but calmly (Appendix B.6.). In other words, his efforts were really appreciated by the party's elite when he showed his spirit to work seriously for the movement. He, then, became the source of spirit for the senior cadres in the early period to work tirelessly and his speeches always inspired them (Zein 2010).

Therefore, in reality, the relations between Aminuddin and the party's elite are about giving an appropriate reaction to his opinion and ideas. When he has a wish, the elite cadres respond appropriately without challenging him. A scholar explains that when the transformation process to declare unity between the PK and the PKS was being prepared, some of the senior members asked him to explain directly to Aminuddin about the legal consequences of conducting the declaration, which was not in accordance with the law. He remembers that none of the senior members were able to convince Aminuddin and nobody was eager to continue challenging his ideas, even though they knew that his plan was not right (Appendix B.11.). Aminuddin's argument was that opposing the state's law where necessary is part of *jihad* and that the movement does not have to be afraid of it, a similar attitude to challenging the New Order regime when they managed the underground activities. However, after receiving inputs and arguments based on interpretation of the law and the state administration with less strict emphasis on religion and the movement's perspective, he withdrew his insistence on making the declaration at that time.

Before the movement was transformed into a political party, his profile was difficult to unveil, even for the majority of members of the movement. There are layers of generation in the movement which have filtered the information about him as the leader of the movement. As a person, he does not represent a strong figure able to attract mass support since most of his track record is unknown publicly, except that he is the son of a prominent member of DI/TII, an armed movement in the 1950s which sought to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia that was crushed by the government. Although it was formally destroyed, some of its followers were still trying to attract young Muslims to join its underground movement until recent years.

However, his studentship in Medina has made him an important person in transferring the ideas of Hasan al-Banna to Indonesia as part of a wider process of

transferring ideas from the Middle East to Indonesia (van Bruinessen 2011). He was also the person who was actively trained in the first and the second generations of the Tarbiyah movement from one house to another in the early 1980s. As an alumnus of a Middle Eastern university, his links to the Islamic movement in that region are quite strong and proved significant in providing the support which allowed the movement to expand. Finding financial support was one of his strengths in developing the organisation of the Tarbiyah movement. Due to his significant role in initiating the movement and his ability in mastering the idea of the Ikhwan's training through many classics and contemporary Arabic literatures, his position as the Assembly's focal leader is reasonable. Therefore, the members' admiration of him is basically centred on his role as the initiator and main source of the movement's ideology.

The indication of his exceptionality in the party is confirmed through a careful reading of a clause in the constitution saying that he has the authority to make a final decision when there is no definitive decision or deadlock. As explained in the previous section, the clause is a legitimate basis for him to choose one option alone without considering the number of supporters of any other option, even though voting is also acceptable. However, this authority does not merely grant Aminuddin legitimacy to wield absolute power because he has to listen to all members' opinions and if there is no deadlock the authority cannot be applied (Appendix B.10.). Formally, the mechanism in the Assembly is to find acclamation before moving onto voting (Bye-law, Article 13, Verses 3 and 4). If the voting mechanism cannot produce a definite conclusion, the head of the Assembly has the legitimacy as determinant to give preference to a particular option (Bye-law, Article 13, Verse 5 and 6).

The practice is quite unusual in a democratic system since it does not give a quantitative measure for an application of the authority. In the case of the PKS, authority to give a final decision is in the hands of *Muraqib 'Amm* (the informal term for the head of the Assembly) if decision cannot be reached collectively or through a vote. Therefore, the final decision is not at the hands of the entirety of the cadres but a small number as a collective representation. In certain conditions, the final decision will be handed to a single person, the head of the Assembly, especially in a deadlocked situation if there are equal votes for different alternatives.

According to a senior member of the party at a local level, the clause giving Amnuddin the authoritative position to take any decision is based on the experience of choosing which presidential candidate to support in the 2004 election (Appendix B.9.). The process to decide on Amien Rais as the party's presidential candidate in the first round of that election was quite difficult and the meeting had to be cancelled many times due to fractious opinions between those in support of Rais and Wiranto, a retired military General. It is said that at the time the *Muraqib 'Amm* had no authority to take the ultimate decision in a deadlocked situation and it took several meetings before Rais was, eventually chosen as the party's candidate.

The difficult situation before the decision was made was quite traumatic for the party and it occurred because there was no authoritative decision maker who can give a final decision in such a situation. This was the main reason for changing the clause regarding the authoritative decision, which is now entrusted to the leader of the Assembly. Some cadres have criticised the change because it gives the leader an uncontrollable authority. The critique was also based on the abolition of limitation in the Assembly leadership in terms of time or certain periods (Ibid). Before the National Summit in 2005, the party's constitution limited the period of the Assembly leadership to only two terms, or a maximum of ten years. In the constitution published on the party website in 2005, Article 9 clearly mentions that the maximum period for the head of the Assembly, the MPP, the DSP and the President is two terms only. After the amendment, the constitution does not specify any limitation of period. Thus, it can be interpreted that a party cadre could lead the Assembly for more than two terms.

In fact, formally, there is no mechanism within the party that can be used to control the head of the Assembly, except the Assembly itself. The Assembly has the authority to discuss crucial issues faced by the party and may recommend a decision to be accepted and legalised by the leader. However, the leader may reject or change the recommendation. The uncontrollable authority of the leader seems to be similar with the ultimate authority of a king. Uniquely, as mentioned before, most of the members are not in the position to oppose the authority because their basic standpoint is that the highest leader will be wise enough and will not lead them into difficult situations.

However, the elite cadres ensure that the leader of the Assembly cannot exercise a power-grab under his leadership (Appendix B.10.). His role during the Assembly's

meetings is usually to facilitate all members to explore a number of options that the party can consider and, then, to categorise and focus them into a strategic policy. He also wants all of the Assembly's members to express their argument personally at the meeting. To express his humble position toward politics, he is reluctant to live in Jakarta, preferring to stay away from it. He resides in Lembang, Bandung, to represent his unwillingness to deal with political activities intensively and leave the majority of them to the party's elites (Ibid). In that point, admiration from the majority of cadres is inevitable because he is seen as a person with less political ambition to represent the party's attitude.

More than that, he has the admiration of cadres because he is capable of translating the party's ideology into a general vision which can be understood and practiced using simple words. At several major events of the PKS, he had a particular time to speak to cadres and explain the party's direction and it was one of the most awaited moments for all those in attendance. In this regards, a member of parliament from the PKS admitted that he is the only person who has the capacity to interpret the party's vision with a holistic approach (Appendix B.6.). He added that there are no other figures in the party, at the moment, who have the ability to expand on his understanding of civilisation and wide range of reading. Hence, he holds the exclusive role as the person to ask and discuss, even though many senior cadres have a similar capacity in Islamic knowledge. In many cases, it is difficult for senior cadres to equal his wide range of knowledge on many occasions since he can provide arguments which are not easy to challenge (Appendix B.11.). As a result, they tend to refrain from challenging his arguments.

On one occasion, an expert member of the Assembly was asked to meet with Aminuddin by a number of senior cadres (Ibid). He was asked because none of the senior cadres were able to convince him not to declare the merger of the PK with the PKS before the bill of elections and political party were formally approved. The PK had to merge with another party or change its name after its failure to pass the electoral threshold in the election of 1999. The merger with the PKS, which was itself established by a number of members of the Tarbiyah Movement, was finally declared in July 2003; hence it was no different from the PK. To convince the head of the Assembly, he had to argue from an academic perspective and challenge him without hesitation because Aminuddin was so confident in the declaration regardless of the absence of a legal framework.



The hesitation of many senior cadres to confront Aminuddin reflects their stance towards him. He is not only the person who holds the most strategic position in the party, but also has the admiration of the party's elite due to his capacity. Moreover, he is able to manage the party's elite with their different characters and views, which has made him the person to resolve differences among senior cadres (Appendix B.6.). With that exceptional position and capacity, he is able to obtain the trust of the elite as the legitimate guide and leader of the party. Although the middle and lower-rank cadres do not have the chance to meet him more intensively except through his appearances at party events, the respect is also reproduced through the network of training (*halaqah* or *usrah*). In the end, respect is the common attitude toward him and hinders any rebellious attitude against him.

He also has the power to control and arrange the personnel in the party, as well as its direction. As the head of the Assembly, he now enjoys the privilege as the leader without any time limitation after the amendment of the party constitution in 2005. The previous constitution mentioned clearly that the *Muraqib 'Amm* could only serve for two periods only. However, the amendment eliminated this clause, making the position of *Muraqib 'Amm* secure as long as members of the Assembly agree. However, given the special relationship between him and the party's elite finding any contender for the position is difficult.

There is also a mechanism to set high-rank cadres to be less critical and keep their loyalty. Political positions, mainly in the parliament, are used to keep them obedient to the party leadership. As explained by one of the critical members who was expelled recently, some of the elite are not ready to give up their positions in the House of Representatives (Zein 2010). He added that it is not about supporting the truth, but, in practice, they need financial income to support them. Losing that privileged position is not easy for those who do not have a fixed income. And one of the considerations of recommending a cadre for a position in the legislative is to reward those who have worked hard for the movement.

Some of them who are unhappy with the direction of the party and the leadership were put in a difficult position. According to one member of the local party elite, at least one member in the House of Representatives is not happy with the recent situation (Appendix B.9.). However, he does not have the strength to be critical since his wife was selected as a member of the DPP. It would look very odd if he were to criticise the party while his wife holds an important position. This situation is a starting condition for the

implementation of alienation, which will be explained further in the next section. Nevertheless, the point here is that the head of the Assembly was able to arrange the selection of senior cadres to the DPP or even to the Assembly through formal and legitimate mechanism.

It is difficult to find cadres who are willing to challenge him because there is a norm within the movement that *ketaatan* (obedience) is one of the most important values as a member of the network or *jama'ah*. A senior cadre explains that even his close colleague who did not like the recent situation could do nothing because of the doctrine of obedience towards the leadership (Zein 2010). Actually, the doctrine is utilised by the *Muraqib 'Amm* to accumulate power. It is a collective doctrine, which is accepted by all of party cadres as part of the party's basic values. Collectively, the doctrine works successfully to keep the party's meetings tension-free since they realise their position as part of a group. Individually, it inspires the cadres to refrain from any actions that may lead to conflict, either with other party members or the party's directions or policies.

For example, the decision to establish a political party was not accepted by all the members of the movement and, during discussions and meetings among the movement's elite, there were numbers of members who were against the option (Mashadi 2008). The case of Central Java province also reflects the readiness of cadres to accept decisions at a national level. In the province, more than fifty percent of core cadres were against the option to establish a party in the survey before the decision to transform the Tarbiyah Movement into a political party in 1998. However, when they learnt that the result of the survey showed that, overall, the membership supported the establishment of a political party, they accepted the decision and worked happily even though they did not originally support it as expressed in the survey (Harris 2008).

It is quite unusual that those who opposed the decision were not eager to challenge it and accepted it without any reserve. In the context of Indonesian politics, the case of the PKS, whose decisions are accepted quite easily without any dramatic challenge, is quite unique. In other political parties, challenging a decision interpreted by a faction or small number of elite figures within a party may create opposition and lead to severe conflict.

Unlike other parties in Indonesia that have a highly dynamic process to elect their leader, the president of the PKS is usually discussed through a relatively efficient and smooth process without drama or conflict. The succession process, such as from Hidayat

Nur Wahid to Tifatul Sembiring in 2005 and now to Lutfi Hasan Ishaq in May 2010, is usually efficient since the president served as acting president before being formally elected at the National Summit. Hidayat Nur Wahid enjoyed a peaceful transfer of power from Nur Mahmudi Ismail in 1999 under the PK. A similar process also took place in the transition process from the PK to the PKS when the leader of the newly established party, Almuzammil Yusuf, was replaced as leader of the PK.

The process shows, to some extent, the unique character of the party's cadres who are not ambitious for political positions. As the head of the Assembly explains, In the PKS there is no race to run for positions. It is more focused on the distribution of roles. So, the PKS does not have any clamouring for positions, it is more effective to think about how to distribute roles to every cadre effectively and efficiently (Republika, 21 June 2010). For the party cadres, a position in the party is not an arena for competition because it is more important to work for the party. Positions in the party are perceived as mandates rather than political achievement as the party is only a medium for spreading the teaching of Islam (Appendix B.12.). A similar attitude is applied to address the process of leadership succession, as the President of the party is not actually decided by all the participants in the party's National Summit. The real process to assess and examine the future leader of the party is conducted before the Summit and the Summit is a mere declaration of the new leader whereas other sessions are for discussing other issues (Appendix B.4.).

In the PKS, one of the most critical situations is to decide on candidates for president and vice president, as shown in the last two presidential elections in 2004 and 2009. Unlike other parties, whose national party meetings can be tense affairs, for the PKS, the National Summit is a medium for socialising the party's political directions and announcing the name of the President. The selection process takes place in the Assembly, leaving national meetings such as the Summit as ceremonial activities for the local branch representatives. Examining the selection model in the PKS, some scholars, such as Bahtiar Effendy, a political scientist from the State Islamic University, admire and respect the way the party chooses its leadership because it shows that democratic process can be cheap and stable. According to them, it may become a positive alternative to Indonesian democracy where a similar process is expensive and fractious (Kompas, 20 Juni 2010). However, despite the admiration for the process, there is also anxiety because it is perceived as a closed process (Fealy 2010). It is difficult to access the dynamic of the Assembly's

meetings since they are usually closed to non-members. For cadres, although they do not know the detail of process, they still believe that the process is legitimate. According to a low-ranking cadre in Semarang, the process is acceptable because it is conducted by trustworthy figures. She said, ‘We believe that the knowledge of our leaders is greater than ours and their considerations are far deeper and extensive. So, in the name of God, if it is a collective decision, we will just follow’ (Appendix B.3.).

The cadre’s stance indicates the consent of cadres towards the collective process within the PKS. Although the process is perceived as being not transparent, it is still considered as legitimate because those in the party’s institutions are also trustworthy. As a result, cadres from middle and low-ranks tend to accept every decision made by the elite, despite their insignificant direct involvement with the process. For the low-ranking cadres, the only involvement with the elite at a national level is through election of the Assembly members. All core cadres have the right to vote for their favoured representative to represent their region. The electoral system has developed the sense of ownership since the institution reflects the willingness of the party to encourage wider representation based on provincial and professional bases. Besides that, the internal election also has a positive impact in developing a balance of power within the Assembly, since the result of the election cannot be controlled by anyone, including the Muraqib ‘Amm. In the view of a member of parliament, the election has given opportunities for expert members with a wide range of views. As a result, any manoeuvre to dominate the Assembly is difficult to implement easily.

However, for critical cadres, although the process in the party has been made as democratic as possible, the head of the Assembly is still perceived as a dominant figure who strongly influences the policies and decisions of the party. A senior member in a local branch explains that every major decision of the party has to be accepted by him after discussions in the Assembly’s meeting (Appendix B.9.). Moreover, according to him, in the election of the Assembly, a candidate has to get his recommendation before formally following the electoral process. In this structure of mechanism, the Assembly will be stuffed with figures that are in favour with the leader’s ideas. Nevertheless, this kind of view is not accepted by other members of the elite. The last internal election in 2010 has shown a different tendency whereby the proportion of elected members in the Assembly has risen to 65 and as a result, it gives an opportunity to remove members who are not in

favour with core cadres in general. It is said that there was a trend that those who had closer relationships with Anis Matta, the General Secretary, were not significant compared to the total membership of the Assembly (Appendix B.10.). Therefore, for those who want to reduce the influence of the General Secretary, who has served since 1998, the composition is better as there will be more senior cadres who can show their ability in front of the cadres in general and the head of the Assembly himself.

As a collective forum, the party has a problem in that it lacks a public figure that could attract the public to support the party. In the context of Indonesian political culture, the role of the leadership is indicated as a significant factor (Liddle and Mujani 2007) in appealing to the public in the electoral process. For the PKS, the lack of such a figure has the effect of focusing on the development of a strong ideology rather than an influential person. Islam as the ideology of the party encourages all cadres to spread its teachings in order to develop a better society in a process known as *dakwah*. According to Sembiring, the President of the party until 2009, the party developed from the strong commitment to do *dakwah* as a life-long project. As a sacred mission, it needs commitment and sacrifice that can subdue the role of individualism within the project. The significance of Islamic preaching, even in the form of a political party, has led every individual within the party, and the movement before, to lessen their original identity if they come from a certain Islamic cultural basis or organisation (Machmudi 2008). In this regard, a member who has grown up within a more traditional-rural social context will not have the opportunity to show off the tradition. Therefore, there is relatively limited opportunity in the PKS to develop strong influence based on an individual who can attract significant numbers of cadres solely due to personal appeal.

In the implementation of the *dakwah* project, admiration for a cadre is based on his or her contribution to the spreading of Islamic values in society. Since the beginning, the major method of the spreading is to recruit new cadres and train them in small groups with Islamic understanding. Therefore, the cadres do not inherit the tradition of competition in pursuit of political achievement and tend to avoid individual ambition in politics. One of the examples of this attitude is when the movement prepared the announcement of the PK in 1998. At first, there were no members who were willing to be the president of the party for different reasons (Mashadi 2008). Finally, the party chose Nur Mahmudi Ismail, a relatively unfamiliar figure, to lead the party. The appointment of Ismail confirmed the less

significant role of individualism. The PK, then the PKS, developed a basis for loyalty based on ideology and the principles of *jama'ah* (a group with a sacred mission) rather than admiration for the personality of the party leader, including the *Muraqib 'Amm* or the President.

Ideally, the ideological character of the PKS should work if all mechanisms within the party are guided by Islamic values. It is perceived that collectivism is one of the basic mechanisms in party meetings as the implementation of the principles of *shura*. In fact, some of the senior members are quite critical since there is a tendency to pursue particular agenda in the party. The fractious discussions surrounding the presidential candidacy in the 2004 presidential election showed that the party's ideological vision was confronted by pragmatic concerns. In that election, the Assembly had two options to choose between; Wiranto, a retired military general, and Amien Rais, a former leader of the large Islamic organisation, Muhammadiyah. The critical members were suspicious of the hidden agenda to support Wiranto which was encouraged by Anis Matta and supported by Hilmi Aminuddin (Mashadi 2008). It took a series of meetings before the Assembly chose to formally support Rais. It was a difficult process because at that time there was no clause in the party's constitution that the head of the Assembly could take the final decision. The supporters of Wiranto argued that supporting the general provided a better chance of winning the election (Hamzah 2011). The argument was countered by some senior cadres, including Hidayat Nur Wahid, who were concerned at the preference of the party's votes for a more Islamic agenda. Moreover, the manoeuvre was perceived as an alarming indication of a more pragmatic approach which may undermine the party's project of *dakwah* (Appendix B.9.).

In addition, there are also recent concerns about the role of the *Muraqib 'Amm*, which has become more centralistic in terms of requiring that all decisions taken have his agreement or at least his recognition. The anxiety is based on his role as head of the Assembly as well as the DPTP. In the first institution, there is an issue surrounding the decision to remove the limits on the period for which he can serve. The *Muraqib 'Amm*'s period of office was originally limited to two five-year terms, but following the change, he can stand for election every five years for life. In addition, there is the problem of his influence on all decisions taken by the Assembly. Similar concerns also arise in his latter position where all decisions must be accepted by him. Uniquely, there is a clause in the

explanation of the constitution mentioning that the meetings of the DPTP must be attended by its head and in the case that he is the only member of the institution who attends the meeting he is authorised to make any decisions (Appendix B.10.).

The problem for those who have concerns about his centrality is that they have to challenge the authority of the *Muraqib 'Amm* who enjoys the loyalty of most of the cadres. As mentioned before, the majority of the cadres do not have any problem with the mechanism of the decision making process, even though they do not have any access to the process. Nevertheless, critical cadres undeniably exist and the party's elite are aware of their existence. A senior member estimates that the total number of critical cadres is approximately around 20 per cent. However, the rest are still loyal to the system, so that it is not easy to break down the system, which has been in place since the foundation of the movement. Another reason for the loyalty to the system is that togetherness is better than seceding from a group which is still held together very strongly (Appendix B.10.). Most of them believe that decisions taken by *shura* are better than considering any individuals' opinions or perceptions. It is also believed that the comments of the critical cadres will not affect the majority of cadres since the party has a strong legitimacy in running *usrah* or *halaqah* (small group training for all cadres) as the major method of the internalisation process. Through *usrah* groups that are run weekly for all members at every level, all cadres are solidified and provided with official information about the party. That system is too strong to be destroyed and individuals find it difficult to expand their influence to infiltrate the *usrah* system.

However, concern is actually spreading among some other members of the elite who are not categorised as critical. They are still loyal to the party and all of its systems including the central role of the *Muraqib 'Amm*. Their concern is mainly toward how to contain the impact of manoeuvres conducted by the General Secretary which are admitted to be damaging the image of the party for the public. The aggressive statement about open party that was started in the National Meeting in 2008 until it was fully accepted in the National Summit in 2010, the location of events in both Bali and the Ritz-Carlton Hotel, the depiction of Soeharto as hero and national guru in campaigning for the 2009 election, are examples of the confusing image that has influenced the PKS's performance. It is admitted that Anis Matta has a vision beyond other members' understanding (Appendix B.10.). However, his actions have given the impression that he does not share his vision and

manoeuvres with others. Therefore, he is now being depicted as representing a faction within the party that wants to drive the party in a more pragmatic, moderate direction.

For some cadres in the DPP under Tifatul Sembiring, there was the option of discussing Anis Matta's pragmatic vision with him and his colleagues. However, the problem is that he and his team make statements and manoeuvre without prior coordination with the rest of the party hierarchy. Under Sembiring's presidency, they sometimes tried to initiate political moves, but members of the DPP including the president himself worked to contain their moves. In the case of the rehabilitation of Soeharto, Sembiring at first showed his reluctance to accept Matta's concept before he later changed his mind and accepted it. His acceptance might be based on the wider consideration of making the party solid. According to a senior member, Sembiring was upset with the announcement, not only because of Soeharto's previous image, but also because it was published without being discussed first (Zein 2010). Other members in the DPP during the Sembiring period also tried to contain Matta's moves if they were considered unnecessary, at least by giving a report to the President.

Matta and his team have more room to manoeuvre under the current President Luthfi Hasan Ishaq because he is perceived as a close colleague with similar vision. Not only that, there is a rumour that the recent DPP reorganisation, where some of the previous members of the DPP were replaced by more pragmatic and less ideological figures, was carried out by those who are in favour of Matta's vision. (Appendix B.9.). Some of the ousted figures were transferred to the MPP, including cadres who tried to block Matta's moves. One of them admitted that he did not have any problem with Matta personally and he would continue to have good communications with him. However, because of his position at the MPP he could do nothing to prevent any further impact except developing a better system for the party in general (Appendix B.10.). As a result of these changes, Matta faces fewer restrictions on his manoeuvres and the support of *Muraqib 'Amm* allows him and his colleagues to work with ease. Recently, after the cancellation of the award of national hero to Soeharto, Anis Matta expressed his disappointment and stated that there is no problem with Soeharto's possible honour as national hero. He still hopes that in the future he will be awarded the honour as a symbol of reconciliation (Eramuslim 2010).

However, Matta's ability to control the DPP is not the end of the game. A calculation made by a senior cadre shows that the influence of Matta's team in the



Assembly is less now as a result of the internal election in 2010. Despite being supported by the head of the Assembly, ‘the supporters’ of his vision are less than a third and might be defeated quite easily if there was a discussion leading to a vote (Appendix B.10.). Some of his team also performed quite badly in the election to the Assembly. Hence, there is a hope that other members can reveal that his vision and direction could be less productive while other, in contrast, can perform better.

Cadres who are loyal to the party but concerned at the recent more pragmatic approach are using a different approach compared to more critical members in containing the impact of moderation. Disappointment toward pragmatism is not always followed by severe criticism which leads to tension and conflict. They might be upset with the recent developments, but, for them, unity is more important than being critical and running the risk of being expelled or alienated. For those who are critical they have already suffered the double disappointment of the National Summit at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel and the official statement on the openness of the party. For loyalists, the statement is not acceptable because there was no mention of it on the agenda for the Assembly meeting in the Summit. However, to publish a counter announcement is also less productive compared to what the critical members have done. The loyalists believe that severe criticism will create confusion among cadres in the middle and lower-ranks, which is perceived as being unproductive for the party and its project of *dakwah*.

The tendency toward moderation can be referred to the classification of party activists introduced by May. Support for a moderate approach is more apparent at the elite level and it will be supported without significant opposition from low-rank cadres. The controversy of moderation in the case of the PKS indicates that the elite have been split into different responses. The first response is to accept the project and support it under the slogan of democratic achievement which translates in the party’s phraseology as the victory of the *dakwah* project. To obtain this objective, getting closer to the voters’ preference is essential including being more moderate and less conservative. More pragmatic and younger cadres who graduated from public universities are more in favour with this project.

The second response is to reject the project completely. The reason is that it will mean the activities of the party and all the cadres are less guided by Islamic principles. There are too many considerations that have to be made in order to win an election. For them, getting less support at the elections is preferable to leaving the party’s Islamic agenda

behind. Some of them are now critical toward the democratic system which is perceived as a failure to acknowledge Islamic principles. For them, it is better to stay away from politics if it is still not in accordance with Islamic values. However, involvement in politics is possible as long as it is on an individual basis and in an emergency. Meanwhile, the third response basically understands the vision of moderation and can accept it to a certain degree. However, if it is conducted in an extreme way they are also against the practice. They are more than happy to maintain the identity of Islam, while at the same time the party works to solve problems in society through politics. Hence, there is no need to struggle to win national or local elections since the party offers values and good deeds for the people.

The second response is usually supported by those who are referred to as 'old soldiers', who were very active at the beginning of the movement and are now senior members. After assessing the way the party is conducted, they found that there was some intolerable misconduct. Dialogue is difficult since organisational approaches, such as alienation and decomposition, are being implemented to respond to those who are too critical. More explanation of the implementation of these approaches will be provided in the next section. The third group is less ideological since most of them are in the upper-middle level. They are mostly loyal to the party and the new approach in politics; however, they have a different interpretation of moderation. Hence, they are still committed to the party and ready to work for the party in any condition.

Therefore, the responses vary in the PKS, so that it is better to consider the elite in the PKS as a non-solitary unit of analysis, which will respond in the same way. It is also difficult to look at the middle-level cadres as more ideological because many of them are also still loyal to the new approach as it is perceived as part of a transformation process, so that they will be less critical of the elite's direction. The key for them is how to avoid the principle of obedience without being critical of any wrongdoing even it comes from the party. Therefore, for those who are in favour of the principle of listening to the party and working for it, this is the only option to take. Some of them understand the situation that the party is still in the process of transformation and it is moving towards maturity (Appendix B.8.). He admits that there are problems during the process. However, it does not mean that cadres should just criticise and leave it without being involved and trying to fix it. There are cases where middle level cadres are less willing to work for the party due to its confusing

direction. For them, it is better not to do anything, either helping or criticising. In one province in Java, a local middle level cadre admitted that he is getting tired of supporting candidates for local election who have very bad track records of misdemeanours such as corruption (Agus 2008). The most difficult part is how to meet their constituents or potential voters during canvassing activities and then having an argument with them about the candidates.

What corresponds to the Orbell-Fougere indication is that the majority of critical cadres come from the middle-ranks, who have experienced the ideological internalisation process for longer. This is due to the doctrine of *sami'na wa' atho'na*, which is greater than other considerations in examining the moderation. Therefore, cases of middle-ranking cadres who are critical are also quite limited. The limits of critical mid-level cadre to express their feelings are related to their ability to put information and direction in *usrah* accordingly, without being taken for granted. It is likely that most of the attendees at the KIK (*Kajian Islam Kontemporer* or Contemporary Islamic Studies) gatherings at the Bangka Mosque in 2008 were hundreds of cadres in the middle-ranks who were not afraid of warnings from the party to avoid such activity. A small number of them agreed to attend smaller gatherings to discuss the recent development of the party and tended to accept an option of creating a new training network which is similar with the network built in the early 1980s.

It is easier to explain to cadres in the party's lower levels or at least sympathisers who can sometimes be informed by a language of instruction rather than discussion and brainstorming. It is true that for low-ranking cadres, there is no consideration to discuss the multi-faceted political aspects of campaigning activities. For them, working for the party is simple: they do what they have to do and listen to the instructions, and they are happy to do it. They have no political ambition to become a cadre at a higher level as the reward for their efforts. Therefore, in terms of accepting the moderation project, it is an attitude that comes from their readiness to follow any direction from the party leadership. Their way of thinking toward the leadership is simple; that they will not lead the cadres into difficulties or wrongdoing, and they also believe that their leaders know better than they do. Following them is, to some extent, not an option, but a natural attitude among lower level cadres in the PKS. Their attitude basically corresponds with the existence of trust among cadres that give their consent to the party's structure and its mechanism of decision-making process,

regardless of the relatively closed and dominated process. The next section will discuss the attitude of cadres that is also playing a significant role for the party in managing the impact of moderation.

## **V.2. Trust**

As explained previously, following the leader's order is significantly important for the PKS because the order is perceived as legitimate to comply with religious principles. However, it has to be considered that the relation between the leader and the cadres is not a mere top down relation without any dynamics. It is also important to notice that respect for senior cadres is also a result of an intensive relationship within a community bounded by a strong collective awareness. The party owes a lot to an effective and solid basis of its internal training to produce such consciousness that has brought all of cadres of the Tarbiyah Movement to have the same consciousness of brotherhood and sisterhood under the banner of Islam.

This feeling is proven to be significant in building a strong character as a community that has the common idea to spread the Islamic vision among Indonesian society. There is a belief in the party that Indonesia needs such vision to initiate a better Indonesian society that essentially needs a solid group for its implementation (BPK DPP PKS 2008a: 15-9). The cohesiveness actually tried to materialise by developing a solid network throughout Indonesia in the form of the Tarbiyah Movement, the basis for the PKS. It is then understood that the party controls a significant number of cadres bounded by Islam and their activism in politics is far from pursuing political gain.

The belief that the party will bring all cadres to a better society has also developed a positive attitude among them. The attitude is applied in both directions: horizontal towards their colleagues and vertical toward senior cadres and the party's elites. There is a common belief among cadres that the party elites are trustworthy to lead the party towards achieving the Islamic vision in a political arena that is seen as an integral part of Islam. For them, trust has brought them into a solid party and it makes them difficult for external forces to influence or even to split. A former lawmaker from the party said that, "If [there is] trust, chance for external provocation is difficult to influence us" (Ula 2008).

It is proven that trust saved the Movement from critical moments on previous occasions. One of the moments was when the idea to establish a political party was

introduced for the first time raising concern among cadres following the fall of Soeharto. As explained before, majority of cadres finally accepted it after it was decided by the Movement's leadership, even though there were some who were not fully complacent with the decision. To prove their support, the party's representations were established in almost all provinces as evidence that they were in line with the decision without any significant hesitation.

There are several other situations that put the cadres into difficult positions to deal with related policies (supporting government's policy to raise gasoline price in 2005) or supporting candidates for national and local elections (supporting non-cadre candidates). Despite several difficulties, the PKS is relatively successful in maintaining support from the majority of its cadres. One of the obvious indications is the absence of a new party to accommodate those who are disappointed with the party's policies. "Yes, there will be a splinter if it happens in another party. [But] there is no such idea." (Appendix B.10.). Hence, even when Yusuf Supendi, a founder of the PK and also a former member of the Assembly and the DSP, filed an allegation toward unjust dismissal from the PKS and at the same time claimed that the party had become corrupt, there was still no massive mobilisation to organise splinter groups.

Trust among members and also toward leadership is vital in this context, especially when the PKS has become more pragmatic as part of the moderation policy. Changing the image in front of the public is a risk for ideological party because it will create uncertainty among members as well as the public. The PKS also suffered from internal tensions when a number of members conducted gatherings to discuss the new direction. When the party deliberately maximised the pragmatic strategy to offer more inclusive messages (conducting the National Summit 2005 in Bali, hosting a similar event in 2010 in Ritz-Carlton Hotel, Jakarta, and inserting more nationalistic character into the party's events) questions among members were relatively widespread. However, trust plays an important role when members, especially at lower level have an assumption that the party leadership will not take any benefits from such policy.

Theoretically, trust will lead individuals to have confidence in any conditions laid down by the trusted person. The first thing that arises from the trustor is a positive attitude toward any behaviour or argument, so that criticism and conflict is less likely to be the reaction. It is even more trusted if the argument for any change of interpretation toward

certain aspects of ideology can be justified based on the ideology itself. When the argumentation of new interpretation is conducted by a person who has authority or capable of rationalising the reason, positive attitude and acceptance is more apparent.

In the case of the PKS, there are many expressions from cadres at every level that typically represents such a position toward the party's leadership. One of the implementations of the new direction is to support candidates who have more opportunity to win elections (local or national). At national level, the latest election shows that the PKS has declared its intention to support Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as its presidential candidate even before he chose the candidate for vice president. At local level, either provincial or regent/municipal, there were difficulties in corresponding the ideological principles with the record of the candidates. For the PKS, it is important to support a candidate who has the ability to win election but at the same time is relatively free from corruption.

In Jakarta, questions emerged when the party decided to support Adang Daradjatun, a high-rank police officer whose institution has relatively the lowest level of public confidence (LSI 2010). In other cases, the PKS supported Sukawi Sutarip as mayor of Semarang who, for some residents, was perceived as having a bad reputation in governing the city in his first period. In the daily conversation with ordinary citizens in years after the local election the image of that reputation was still apparent, even though at that time there was no legal action yet taken by law enforcers. These two cases represent the strategy of the PKS to penetrate higher political level which is part of the interpretation to implement the phase of *musyarokah* or getting involved with the society.

At the lower level, cadres who worked to promote the candidate from door to door had only insignificant concern with the decision and they did not have a chance to get closer with the candidate. A party activist in North Jakarta explained that she knew the candidate from the local party leader. She said, "We know Mr. Adang from our leaders. Then, we also check his profile and we are confident with our leaders. Choosing Mr. Adang is not a random action and we trust our leaders..... By God's will, we hear and we follow" (Appendix B.2.).

Another woman activist also explains, "At the beginning there is [scepticism] because we do not know him personally and there was no explanation. However, after having an explanation, thanks to God, the suspicion has gone. Our leaders have chosen the right

person” (Appendix B.7.). A similar situation was also faced by another activist in Semarang where the party supported Sukawi Sutarip. However, despite the controversy and hesitation from some cadres, most cadres in Semarang supported the decision.

Actually there is a problem within the cadres in supporting Mr. Kawi, but because it has become a collective decision..... Disagreement can be managed by every individual and also the party itself. By God’s will, it will not become a big case.... Other colleagues and I [will] hear and follow. If we are critical it is conducted according to our capacity because we believe that the knowledge of our leaders is above us and their considerations are far deeper and extensive. So by the name of God, if it is a collective decision we will just follow (Appendix B.3.).

It is clear that cadres are trying very hard to understand the reason behind a decision. Questions and criticisms toward particular decisions are not absent among them; however most cadres applied positive attitude to think that the party’s leadership will not lead the party and all of its cadres into a harmful situation. The most important thing for them is that decision does not violate the holy project of *dakwah*. As long as the reason behind any decisions is for *dakwah*, most cadres will understand and define it as a legitimate manoeuvre. This attitude is a reflection of a positive attitude that is clearly meaningful for the PKS because being more moderate means that they have to deal with other political powers to negotiate. With less significant political power in the parliament due to a relatively small portion of its representatives, nationally and locally, negotiation to deal with more pragmatic objectives is undeniable if the party wants to have more roles in the policy making process.

In Semarang, some cadres were angry and criticised in a formal meeting with the local party leader and the central board had to send special envoy to ease the situation (Appendix B.14.). In the middle level, there were also expressions of disappointment that also influenced their enthusiasm to conduct political canvassing for the Central Java provincial election. In Jakarta, cadres did not accept the decision to support Adang Daradjatun comfortably. Questions and criticism were common after the announcement. Nevertheless, the potential opposition did not significantly happen and the party still had a relatively strong support from the majority of cadres. In the PKS, cadres could suppress their anxiety after being informed and explained to by the party’s leader.

In the lower level, anxiety is not too significant and can be managed quite comfortably. The cases of female party activists in Jakarta and Semarang are obvious in

supporting decisions made by the leader. Giving trust to the party's leader is significant to avoid the potency of being critical because they understand that they do not have enough capacity to comprehend the situation, so that they entrust all of the process to the leader. By having such attitude, the only adequate response is to 'hear and follow.' They also understand that the party's elites are also their trainers in the weekly training. It is then understandable that they do have less intention to challenge the decisions. For the cadres, deeper understanding in religion is a guarantee to be a wiser person and obtains more wisdom. In that context, religiosity and piety are seen as the source of wisdom. Therefore, having such a quality is also a legitimacy to take the position to produce political decisions. It is, then, not their right to challenge any decisions, except to ask for explanation, because the decisions are perceived as taken based on religious understanding.

However, it is unique to notice that most of women party activists interviewed in the research are not in the position to challenge or question the leaders any more than asking for explanation. For them, explanation is enough to satisfy their concern. A female activist from Semarang explained, "At the beginning there is [a doubt toward a decision] because we do not yet know the candidate. But, after getting the explanation, thanks God, the doubt is vanished. Our leaders have chosen the right [candidate]." For male activists, the situation is slightly different because there is a feeling that criticism is more related to men and more particularly students as noted by one female activist. However, for them different opinion toward decisions is not a big problem because it is normal in working for religious missionary (Appendix B.2.).

According to most informants, the key to develop harmonious internal relation is to understand. It is a duty for all cadres to understand the importance of *jama'ah* or group. However, they understand that the group is not an ordinary one because it refers to the truth that they believe in collectivity. Therefore, having a strong attachment with the PKS is a reflection of their commitment to the truth, a religious truth. The consequence is that they have to admire the group and put other interest aside. If cadres understand the principle then severe frictions and differences will be insignificant. A low-rank activist said, "I think [it is] our understanding, understanding toward *jama'ah*" (Anonymous 2008).

A mid-rank cadre explained that the materialisation of this principle is to follow any decision taken by the party because it is a representation of what the Prophet Muhammad had taught before. He says, "We learn from the history of prophecy, Muhammad (PBUH)



in his working of Islamic teaching implemented ‘to hear and follow’, a system of following the group which is following decision taken by leaders according to the mechanism of *shura*. [It is] sure that they want to consider carefully [every decision]” (Appendix B.12.). As an example he refers to his case when the party decided to support Adang Daradjatun. It was very hard for him because he hates police officers very deeply. However, “When it is decided that the provincial board choose Mr. Adang to become candidate for governor, at the same day I was compelled to like him, to love police officers. Because it has become a decision, I have to give my ultimate commitment to him. I have to fight for him.”

That is the commitment of cadres to face a decision, even though the decision is against his or her preference. In a group committed to the truth, the truth will be the ultimate basis for making a decision. Thus, the decision represents the truth because it is taken by the wise. That is the reason why the process works through recognition of non-individual preference of cadres, but it is represented by small number of wise people in a small institution called *shura* (BPK DPP PKS 2008b: 1-8). *Shura* represents a principle that can be implemented in every level of decision making in the party. However, the principle is the same in that all cadres have to hear and follow it. The cadres also believe that those who are in the position to take decision will conduct the process wisely and carefully. The result is an attitude to hear and follow, not to discuss and complain, even though it might be contradictory to individual preferences.

Positive thinking is very important in this context because contradiction, especially in political activities, is common. Political decision is likely to raise controversies or at least differences due to different preferences. The case of supporting a candidate in local elections is one of the examples when the party has to consider more practical preference in winning elections rather than preserving more religious principles. However, the risk of frustration and disappointment is relatively manageable in the PKS because there are cases that cadres are ready to accept decisions although it is against their individual preferences. They believe that their leaders are individuals to believe not to criticise. They have to think positively toward their leader’s preferences. “Positive thinking,” explained some high-ranking party cadres.

In lower or middle level, this attitude is effective to moderate suspicion among cadres who work for the party. It is related to a horizontal relation with other colleagues at the same party level. There were occasions where suspicions emerged due to imbalance

activities conducted by different cadres. Some conducted tasks more than others or sometimes their colleagues did not appear at all during party events. For a mid-rank cadre in Jakarta, the situation is common when some cadres feel uncomfortable toward others who did not appear on some party occasions. “Suspicion among cadres is not absent. However, the feeling does exist for a short time only because it is only due to miscommunication. Because a cadre is absent. It is then known that the cadre is handling a task in another place. We always give understanding to our colleagues so that we become more mature. If we can reach that attitude we can have a positive attitude toward others” (Ibid).

Similar attitudes can also be found among high-rank cadres. In this level, potential conflict is more apparent because they are situated in a more strategic position to develop the party’s decisions and direction. It is well known that current party direction is mostly directed by Anis Matta, the General Secretary from 1998 until today. Some cadres expressed their reluctance to support more moderate manoeuvres and they chose to organise un-official gatherings to express their disappointment, even though it might end their relationship with the party. For those who are still in the party structure, the situation is easier because positive attitude is still more dominant in examining the new direction.

A PKS lawmaker says, “.... but sometimes I agree with Anis and his friends. There is also a blessing in disguise too because for groups that want to get closer to us it may become a message. The PKS is starting to be inclusive; it is not fundamentalist anymore.... I see that his thinking is far beyond ahead” (Appendix B.10.). Hence, according to him, there is also awareness that the direction also damaged the party’s image which is actually similar with what has been criticised strongly. However, despite the similar understanding, the willingness to strongly oppose such direction is relatively insignificant among high-rank party cadres.

Another criticism is on the issue of prosperity that has been widespread among certain party’s elites. Some of them have been accused of becoming wealthier after occupying strategic political positions, either in executive or legislative bodies. For those who are still loyal, this issue is not relevant for consideration because the party has developed a system to impose all cadres to follow party standards on this issue. One of the systems that has been developed is to make an automatic income deduction from party representation in the public institutions. The party decided that all of its lawmakers must

share from their income as a result of occupying political positions under the name of the PKS. The party decided the percentage of the share in each level from national to local level. There are also other obligations that must be fulfilled in relation to welfare, such as alms.

According to a former lawmaker for the PKS, the system in the party on welfare is very strict and also transparent. For him, the implementation of the system is important because it is the key to develop trust among cadres (Ula 2008). Based on this system, there is no need to accuse someone as a materialistic person. If the person has paid all of his or her obligation to the party, there should not be any problem and envy toward particular cadre should not exist among other cadres. The only difference among cadres is their religious practices or habits. If a cadre practices the Islamic tradition more than others, then, their colleagues will appreciate him or her more than others. Therefore, there is no need to feel uncomfortable with others' wealth which could disturb personal relationship among cadres. If there is any wrongdoing by cadres, the party will examine them, not as cadres but as an individual. By having such attitudes, the majority of cadres tend to avoid any criticisms of personal behaviour of certain cadres.

On our colleagues who have decadent behaviour, it is God who has his own calculation. Ibn Taimiyah also had similar attitude. He spent almost half of his life being detained by Abbasiyah sultanate. But, when the Sultan declared holy war it was him who stood in front. People asked him why you obeyed an order from someone who detained you. The order is his business with God, my business to answer the call is also my business with God too. Most of us think as simply as that. (Appendix B.12.)

For those who are critical, there is a tendency of dishonouring the recommended behaviour as a Muslim. One of the criticisms from cadres who gathered in Bangka is that some cadres, especially in the high-rank level, behave immodestly, especially in wealth. At the same time, they also condemn them as moderating the party's political standpoint. For them, this behaviour is not acceptable and they tend to confront it seriously, even though the consequences are clear in a cadre party like the PKS. In contrast, the loyal cadres tend to accept it without any resistance. All cadres, especially in the middle and low-rank, tend to avoid any anxiety because they believe that their leaders are wise enough, based on their religious understanding and practice, to deal with all the contagious effects in politics.

Some cadres at high-rank level are aware that these criticisms are relevant. They are still in the position to support the current party leadership with the new direction which has positive aspects. However, on the other hand, there is also tendency of damaging the party's image in front of its voters. "I think the version of Anis is correct because he has certain access, but our version says that it produces damage in general," explained a high-rank cadre (Appendix B.7). Hence, there is also awareness that the direction has two different effects. With that awareness, some cadres are able to draw a distinction with the supporters of the moderation policy. "They have their own responsibility, I have my own. That is it, so we are not moving forward, but we are not falling apart either," he continues (Ibid).

In the perspective of party solidity, the attitude to have positive thinking is significantly important because it has made the majority of cadres think in favour of party interest. It may explain why many cadres do not take drastic action similar the Bangka gathering or the KIK. Drastic action is against the ultimate goal of a united network as a group of truth (*jama'ah*). It is the truthful goals that have influenced them to take dedicated consideration to uphold the goals. A senior party cadre remarked that deviation is normal in struggling with the holy ideas of Islamic vision; therefore there is no need to react exaggeratedly (Abu Ridho 2008). Although there are feelings of discomfort toward recent events, most high-rank cadres consider refraining from confronting it, but rather to follow and obey. For them, it most important to stay in a group rather than mobilising opposition or splinter groups that will create more damage to the unity of a truthful group.

Hence, although some of the high-rank cadres are aware of the negative effect of the current moderation, the common awareness to fight for the goals of the group rather than mobilising an opposition is still strong. "We have values that bind the party because the awareness is very strong," explained a high-rank cadre (Appendix B.10.). Because of the existence of this awareness, there will be no movement within the party to confront the party leadership. Besides the awareness, the cadres also keep calm regarding any wrongdoing because there will be authoritative institutions to handle the problems such as the DSP and BPDO. Thus, if there is a cadre who stays in his or her position, either in the party or in the parliament-cabinet, it means that the person does not have any problem and the cadre has to fulfil all obligations required by the party's system.

There is also another source of trust in the party as expressed by some cadres. According to them, there is a legitimate explanation of all policies that have been taken so far. In the case of being moderate in recent years, even with some confusion among cadres, many of them understood the new direction. When asked about the difference between the PK and the PKS, a cadre said that she actually missed period during the PK era before changed into the PKS to participate in the 2004 election. According to her

If we miss the situation, there is a feeling. However, our market now does have its own demand. For example at the inauguration we want to show the public that an ordinary person can recite [Holy Qur'an], someone who does not wear veil because it might be a strategy. It is a way to declare that we are accepted not only in an exclusive environment but also in wider society (Appendix B.12.).

This expresses that cadre at grass-root level understood the reason of the changing current direction. She still missed the period before entering the party era when they were active in the Tarbiyah Movement. However, the feeling can be undermined because the leadership was able to give convincing arguments to all cadres. For those who trust their leaders, the arguments are reasonable, so that they are eager to support it. In the case of being more moderate, the party argued that moderation is a strategy to penetrate different segments of society. To justify the argument the party published a special book to explain why it is important to enter political domain (Takariawan 2009). The book was written by a member of the Assembly who had a good reputation among cadres who argued that there are different orbits of *dakwah*. After developing an understanding on Islamic teaching through an underground movement and the efforts to integrate with social life, it is now the opportunity for the movement to enter the political arena. The leap to political orbit has to be accepted by all cadres with the awareness to accept all of the consequences. It is then that the term of the transformation is known widely among cadres in order to comprehend the recent situation.

The majority of cadres interviewed for the research expressed similar awareness in understanding the current situation and are using it as a legitimate basis to support all of the party's decisions. In practice, a clear argument is also provided to reduce confusion and anxiety among cadres. In the case of supporting certain candidates in the elections, locally and nationally, the party argues that all support to candidates has been legalised with a formal agreement with candidates to secure long term political cooperation. That is the

argument mentioned by the local party leader in Semarang and also Jakarta to explain the decisions to support candidates from non-cadres, despite their reputation as a cadre party, especially in Jakarta where they gained popular votes in the capital in the 2004 national election.

Therefore, many problems following their activities in politics dealing with elections and political negotiation such as coalition and policy making processes can be framed under the transformation's point of view. It has strengthened their position toward growing criticism from its own cadres. The party's leader will argue that severe criticisms can be understood as a normal consequence of being active in politics. It is also the same language of low-rank cadres who said "..... but we believe it is normal in this mission" (Appendix B.2.).

Another example of providing legitimate explanation is a short piece of writing written by Anis Matta. The title of a short chapter, 'Managing disagreement toward *shura*'s decision', signifies his argument for all cadres in managing dilemma toward decision produced by the Assembly or other decision through the legitimate mechanism of *shura* (Matta 2010: 82-6). Basically, he does not deny that there will be disagreement or even opposition on the decision taken by *shura*, especially after transformation into a political party, which also happens in the PKS. However, the most important aspect of his argument is that all cadres should learn to have an attitude of sincerity. Sincerity is the most difficult test for all individuals in the movement and the failure to manage disagreement toward the decisions of *shura* determines the survival of cadres in the party. If a cadre fails to manage that situation and tends to develop an oppositional position, it will not be tolerated and the person will be perceived as the one who falls in the holy mission of *dakwah*. Again, the message here is that all cadres should undermine their personal interests or analyses or arguments without strong bases. They should also admire the mechanism in the party as a representation of a truthful group. "It is more important to maintain the unity of the group's line rather than to win an argument, even though the argument itself is correct" (Ibid: 85).

These attitudes that are deeply embedded in the cadres can explain why there is no significant mobilisation of opposition. They are aware that the party represents their ultimate mission to disseminate Islamic vision. Violation on norms and rules is possible, but they believe that the party has a system to handle it. In the political era, they also believe that to argue differently with the party's decisions is inappropriate. Being too

critical is not virtuous due to its hostility toward the frame of understanding of *jama'ah* and the mechanism of *shura*. The cadres also understand that undermining their individual arguments to confront the party's decisions is more important than arguing and debating.

With all those sources of trust which are awareness, working system, legitimate explanation, and appropriateness, the PKS can contain more damaging impact after introducing a more moderate approach in the Indonesian political system. The majority of cadres from every level still work for the party, despite confusions on several policies and directions as an impact of dealing with more pragmatic considerations. Criticism does occur among cadres and in some occasions tensions also happen, even in a formal party meeting. However, there is always a working system and existing norms that prevent potential oppositional movement toward party leadership and they contribute to the existence of deep-rooted trust among cadres toward their leadership.

For the PKS, the existence of trust is an integral part of its characteristic of a party as a group that upholds a holy mission to broaden the influence of Islam in the Indonesian society. To achieve that mission, all energy of all cadres should be arranged by a solid system that is known among them as *manhaj dakwah* or method of mission to spread Islam. Under the method, all cadres who are basically different in terms of knowledge and capacities as well as personal characteristics are bound into a single perspective. In reference to the 10 principles of the movement's membership, trust has been set in the tenth place. The principles themselves are adopted from ideas of Hasan al Banna, the founder of Ikhwanul Muslimin, who has become the main inspiration of the Tarbiyah Movement (Machmudi 2005: 69-84).

It is interesting to see that, in the context of political activism, to obey the leader is also part of the principles. If trust is positioned as the tenth principle, to obey the leader is the sixth principle after understanding, sincerity, deed, struggle, and sacrifice. In relation to particular situations resulting from the impact of moderation in politics, those principles have developed a strong basis for the individual's interest as secondary after the objectives of the movement. It can be assumed that the party's cadres should be sincere in working hard with high degree of sacrifice as the main ethics led by a trustful leadership. The result is a majority of cadres who agree with the party's leadership as the foundation to prevent acute tensions within the party.

Different reactions toward the party's decisions are acknowledged as explained by cadres themselves. Fury and confusion are the most common initial reactions toward the party's moderation. Nevertheless, the party calls all cadres to refer to the ethics in order to deal with the situation following the moderation. Those who abide by those ethics of membership, differences, confusions, or disappointments are not problematic since they are able to manage their personal reaction accordingly. If they are successful, the party will acknowledge them as devoted cadres.

At this point, there is still a problem since the boundary of being a loyalist is based on the ethics and, to some extents, the definition of being an authentic cadre is to obey or not. In practice, there will be an opportunity to express their personal reaction toward the party's decisions. To protest or argue differently is not perceived as a permanent reaction, so it can be tolerated. However, if it becomes a permanent standpoint, the party will no longer tolerate it. In the case of a gathering in al Hikmah Mosque in Bangka, there was a period of omission before severe action took place, especially towards its focal organisers. When the gathering was initiated for the first time, the PKS was administered by Tifatul Sembiring and the severe action itself was taken under the new leadership of Luthfi Hasan Ishaq.

Actions toward cadres who do not wish to stand for the party will be arranged in a different mechanism that is also crucially important to maintain the solidity of the party's cadres. When ethical preference is not convincing to drive cadres to be loyal deliberately, the impact of action will become the imposing factor to restrain them from any further oppositional positions. The awareness of that situation is also realised by some cadres, even by those who are not critical. A party cadre in the lower level explained, "There might be some critical cadres, but they are not courageous enough. It may be because they do not want to be labelled. For example, they want to speak differently, but because all of the cadres argue on A meanwhile he or she is alone with B. It needs courage. Therefore, it is because they are not courages enough" (Appendix B.3.).

There is a mechanism for those who are reluctant to follow the party's order and courages enough to confront. They will be treated accordingly based on the principles of the organisation as written in the party's constitution. It is a mechanism that may hinder cadres from being extremely critical or even against any decision. In social relationship, they feel discouraged because being critical will isolate them from other cadres. However,



there are also severe consequences in confronting the leadership and their decisions. Excessive criticism can be perceived as an expression of disloyalty and it can be considered as a violation of religious values that is unforgivable. In practice, the party could take serious action toward cadres who are perceived as disobeying the party's decisions in the form of dismissal, which will be discussed in the next sub-chapter.

For the PKS, the ethical force works effectively since it has been embedded through the mechanism of training. The party has various medium to deliver information to its cadres according to its objectives. There is a continuous effort to convince all cadres about the current situation and maintain their trust in the party's leader. In the case of the PKS, the most effective mechanism is the training (*halaqah* of *usrah*) where it can be used exclusively by the party to deliver official messages, information, clarification, instruction, etc. Through an extensive reach in the training, the party can make an intensive contact with all cadres in which interpretation of information can be conducted by both sides: party leader and cadres.

Differing with severe treatment such as dismissal, trust is less traumatic and the example of the PKS confirms the effectiveness and convenience of its application in a critical situation. No wonder that the party can exercise its programmes quite effectively to reach the grass-roots by conducting an effective political canvassing, despite many obstacles that need to be tackled. More importantly, the party's leader can develop a solid party because the majority of the party's cadres are not influenced by internal criticisms which can be answered officially through the weekly gathering.

### **V.3. Alienation**

The previous sections explained that the party leadership and structure combined with trust have developed the PKS into a solid party. The two variables are important to encourage a positive attitude among cadres in addressing decisions made by the leadership. The party structure has been developed in accordance with cadres' understanding of Islamic values, especially *shura*. Therefore, the existence of the Assembly as an implementation of the *shura* principle with a collective approach to the decision making process is perceived as legitimate. The consent towards the party's structure is also based on the fact that senior cadres who obtain positions in the structure are seen as capable. With a sophisticated level of membership based on understanding and practice of Islamic teaching, the party

leadership and elite are perceived as trustworthy people to represent them. Hence, although there is an indication of dependency on a particular figure, the common attitude of the cadres is to trust and believe their leaders.

Despite the solidity of the party, there are also cases of resentment and anxiety towards the party's moderate direction. Most of the suspicion is directed at the pragmatic approach due to the party's willingness to get more votes in the elections. Those who were not able to take a positive attitude to the new direction tended to criticise strongly and organised gatherings to mobilise confused cadres. After the resentment reached its height in 2008 with the existence of the KIK, the FKP and other expressions including online blogs, the criticism was channeled into two different forms: writing articles in a particular online forum and organising an alternative training network. However, these efforts were relatively unsuccessful in mobilising mass opposition to the party and the party still enjoys the loyalty of the majority of its cadres.

In dealing with the criticism, the PKS conducted two different approaches: soft and severe approach. The first approach deals with the effort to put cadres in certain condition in order to increase their understanding of the recent situation, while the second approach relates to the stricter decision such as dismissal from the party's membership. The two approaches are actually part of the party's organisational rules, which warn its cadres that oppositional attitudes are not acceptable and will lead to disciplinary action in the form of sanctions.

In the study of party moderation, discussing sanctions and their implementation is very important because it is one of the party's instruments to deal with the impact of moderation, especially those who are critical and defiant. Clearly, every party wants to have a cohesive party to control every member in the party structure as well as in the parliament or government. As a party with ideological weight, cohesion is more important in maintaining the party's existence following a change in party direction that is vulnerable to internal criticism. Depending on members' loyalty by maximising ethics in relation to leadership is not the only strategy because there is always potential for a situation which will influence members to question organisational policies. Therefore, the party needs an instrument to control all of its members to behave accordingly by applying sanctions.

Unlike ethics, which encourage inner motivation to follow the party line, sanctions deal with the consequences of deviant behaviour with a more tangible impact. A party

member will be punished if his or her behaviour is categorised as being against the party's principles. From the party's perspective, the implementation of such sanctions follows the 'rule of anticipated reactions' when party members understand that there will be sanctions imposed by the party's leadership if they oppose them (Damgaard, n.y). To avoid the punishment, party members will not defy the party principles in calculation of getting a political benefit (promotion or re-election).

In the context of the PKS, a blatant political interest is relatively rare because it is replaced by a religious motive of gaining a reward from God, rather than pursuing a strategic political position. Hence, the effectiveness of sanctions in terms of damaging one's future political career (such as promotion or re-election) might be irrelevant. However, in the process of moderation, managing cadres' reaction is proven to be effective in deflecting more critiques and opposition when the punishments are related to the character of its communality as a collective group. It is found that from sanctions stated in the PTPS (*Peraturan dan Tata Cara Penjatuhan Sanksi* or Regulation and Protocol of Sanctions) document, there are two different categories of sanctions that may have a direct impact on the membership; *syar'i* and organisation. The former focuses on scrutinising members' behaviour according to Islamic principles. For example, a light breach of *syar'i* is mentioned as inappropriate etiquette and the sanction for this violation is a written warning. The latter is organisational violation, which is more related to party discipline according to party rules. Both have three levels of sanctions which are mild, moderate and severe. Table V.1. describes both violations and the sanctions in relation to the basis and the level.

**Table V.1.**  
**Bases and Level of Violations and Sanctions**

<b>Bases of Violation</b>	<b>Level of Violation</b>	<b>Example</b>	<b>Sanctions</b>
Syar'i	Mild	Inappropriate conduct	Written warning
	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Innovation (but not leading to association of others with Allah)</li> <li>- Less effort to carry out group prayers</li> <li>- Close illicit relations with members of the opposite sex</li> <li>- Defamation</li> <li>- Spreading rumors</li> <li>- Threatening other(s)</li> <li>- Ignoring family's rights</li> <li>- Underestimating obligation on possessions</li> <li>- Failure to fulfill a promise or obligation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Announced admonition</li> <li>- Severe admonition</li> <li>- Transfer to new post</li> <li>- Excommunication</li> <li>- Fine</li> <li>- Penalty (1 - 3 months)</li> </ul>
	Severe	Mortal sin, serious crime that can be penalized with <i>hudud</i> (theft, robbery) and <i>qishas</i> (murder)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Penalty (3 - 6 months)</li> <li>- Suspension or downgrading of membership</li> <li>- Boycott</li> <li>- Dismissal from the party</li> </ul>
Organisational	Mild	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Failure to fulfill official mandate from the party</li> <li>- Not giving contribution deliberately or without acceptable reason</li> </ul>	Written warning
	Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Damaging the party's image</li> <li>- Pronouncing, positioning and acting against the party constitution</li> <li>- Absence from usrah (routine training) without acceptable reason</li> <li>- Failure to fulfill official mandate from the party</li> <li>- Insubordination to a party decision, rule, policy, or standpoint</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Announced admonition</li> <li>- Severe admonition</li> <li>- Transfer to new post</li> <li>- Excommunication</li> <li>- Fine</li> <li>- Penalty (1 - 3 months)</li> </ul>
	Severe	Insubordination to a party decision, rule, policy, or standpoint	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Penalty (3 - 6 months)</li> <li>- Suspension or downgrading of membership</li> <li>- Boycott</li> <li>- Dismissal from the party</li> </ul>

Source: Peraturan dan tatacara penjatuhan sanksi (PTPS) Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (regulations and protocol of sanctions, Prosperous Justice Party), accessed from <http://dsp-pks.org/ptps.php> on 24 June 2011.

The approaches of applying sanctions will be examined in two different sections related to the conceptual framework of managing the impact of moderation for the PKS.

The softer approach is categorised as alienation strategy and the more severe approach is classified as decomposition. In this section, the focus of explanation will be on the alienation strategy, while decomposition will be described further in the following section.

Alienation is related to sanctions that diminish the relation with the party removing one from any formal tasks as well as from *halaqah* or *usrah*. The strategy is related to the effort to put a significant distance between the party and cadres who violate the *syar'i* or organisation. Isolation is an effort to alienate members from their community with an opportunity to be restored after a certain period. After a member has served their punishment there will be an opportunity to be readmitted as a full member ready to follow the party line.

From sanctions mentioned in the PTPS, there are different forms of distancing or alienating members. The sanctions are excommunication, penalties, suspension, and boycott. Although the sanctions are applied for different levels of misbehaviour (mild, moderate, and severe), they are similar in substance; that is, to put a recalcitrant member outside the training network. Excommunication (*al hajru*) is implemented by cutting off all communication with a defiant member for a certain time. Penalties are given to a member by removing their membership rights for a fixed period: one to three months, or three to six months. Meanwhile, suspension is related to stopping one's membership, with all of its consequences, such as losing the opportunity for promotion or standing in elections. The most severe sanction in this category of alienation is to stop all relations with a recalcitrant member in terms of communication, as well as economic or business relations.

It is quite difficult to find any documents confirming official verdicts on alienation of a certain cadre. There is a principle of protecting a cadre's reputation after a decision has been made and announced to members (Appendix B.17.). Based on that principle, the verdict on a member will not be published openly. However, there is a mechanism for informing core cadres in order to alert other cadres not to take similar action. In some cases, information on certain verdicts will not be given to all core cadres to protect his or her reputation among members. According to a local level cadre, most of the cases related to party sanctions can be categorised as *syar'i* rather than organisational. The cadre from Jakarta explained that all cases related to breaching of Islamic principles or *syar'i* are handled by the DSP (or similar institution at local level) (Appendix B.13.). For this kind of

sanction, there will be no dispute because all of the verdicts will be decided in accordance with the principles mentioned in the Qur'an or Sunnah (the Prophet's traditions).

For organisational violations, the PKS established an institution to handle breaches of this kind after the National Summit in 2005. The special institution, called the BPDO (*Badan Penegak Disiplin Organisasi* or Organisational Discipline Enforcement Body), only operates at the national level. The foundation of the institution is an indication of an anticipation of more problems after the electoral process in 2004 when the party started to apply its moderation strategy. Since the BPDO's establishment, all violations related to organisation will be processed through this body, especially for cases at the national level. At the local level, local party committees (DPW for provincial or DPD for regent/municipal level) are responsible for any organisational breaches, including the local party head, general secretary, and treasurer.

It is believed that cases of organisational violation are very rare (Ibid). Most cases are related to *shari'a*, such as business disputes, unlawful marriage, being together with a non-*mahram* (no legal relation), or using orphan donations for private purposes. It is quite common for cadres to know the verdict on defiant cadres, the announcement is usually made through an informal party training gathering (*halaqah* or *usrah*) when the group trainer (*murabbi* or *naqib*) explains the cases. Hence, the mechanism to socialise the verdict is informal by using verbal explanation conducted by a wise person in a group. The purpose of this mechanism is to protect accused cadres from unwise accusations from other cadres, because everything has been discussed and decided by trustworthy institutions. It is also important that the information is distributed by the trainer to find *hikmah* (wisdom) in such cases and allow members of the group to discuss it wisely. By doing so, the party wants to prevent tension among cadres, especially if the person is relatively well known with a good reputation. In essence, it is better to discuss or announce an allegation calmly in small groups rather than discuss or debate it in public.

The party has built instruments and mechanisms to prevent tension. In the PTPS document, there is a procedure to process violations, either through the DSP or BPDO. The party set up an institution of Lajnah Hisbah to receive and file cases. The files are then sent to the Majlis Qadha to process the allegation, and the Majlis will pass a verdict. The Lajnah Hisbah itself acts as prosecutor against the accused member. If the member in the case is not happy with the verdict, he or she can file an appeal to be discussed at a higher level.

The Majelis will then conduct a session to hear the appeal and may strengthen, revise or cancel the previous verdict. In the case of cancellation, there is an obligation for the party to rehabilitate the accused member in front of other cadres. However, the verdict of the appeal session can also be cancelled by the DSP if there is new evidence in the accused's case.

The principle of protecting an accused member's reputation is strongly implemented by the party. In the case of a severe violation that leads the party to dismiss a member, the PKS officially refuses to declare the verdict. This was the case with Yusuf Supendi, who was dismissed from the party due to a severe violation. According to a party official, the case was processed accordingly and the decision made in October 2009 (Widjaya 2011). The party still strongly holds to the principle, even though Yusuf Supendi made his case public and announced that several party leaders are corrupt or act unlawfully.

The case itself revealed some issues regarding the implementation of sanctions. For party officials, the case was very clear and it was processed legally via the party's internal mechanism. There is no doubting the process because it was conducted by a professional qualified to investigate the allegations against him (Hamzah 2011). There was also an opportunity to present his case in front of the internal judiciary panel after giving two letters of notification. However, due to his reaction not to respect the verdict, his membership was dismissed, even though he had a good reputation of supporting the movement since its foundation. His reputation as a member of the Assembly led the party not to announce the case in public and only a small numbers of core cadres were informed of the details of the case.

The key issue in the case of such violation is that the party has another principle of granting the accused the opportunity to accept the verdict, with the possibility of regaining his or her status if they do so. The possibility of the accused member regaining their status depends on their reaction to the verdict and the level of it. If the decision is categorised as a severe violation, dismissal will be the ultimate punishment and there is relatively little chance of regaining one's status. In contrast, if the case of violation is moderate there is the possibility of rehabilitation and the party could readmit him or her into the party. Excommunication and restriction for one to three months are examples of the sanctions. The sanctions might extend to restrictions for three to six months and a boycott, which are categorised as severe sanctions of alienation.

For these sanctions, before being expelled from the party, accused members will be given the opportunity to think about the sanction and contemplate the situation. The aim is that they are able to amend their behaviour and make serious efforts to obey the punishment. If they follow the party line during the implementation of alienation, they might be rehabilitated into the party. It is unique to look at those sanctions that have a similar character of cutting off relations with all members of the party. Excommunication means banning any verbal communication with the convicted member. It is different from boycott, because the latter means not only verbal exclusion, but also other relations such as business, contract, etc. All party members categorised as core cadres will automatically be warned not to have any dealings with the convicted members.

One of the difficult situations they face is that they will have no opportunity to obtain a political position in the party structure as well as being banned from doing particular tasks. It is still possible, though, to attend training (*halaqah* or *usrah*) during the conviction period, so that the group and trainer have a chance to give supervision and advise. Dismantling from party tasks means that they have to hand over all of their trainees (*mad'u*) if they have any. The trainees will be temporarily transferred to other groups. It is quite common among members to refer to the transferred members, informally, as 'rawat inap' or overnight patients undergoing treatment (Wibisono 2008).

The process of transferring all trainees under convicted members is conducted very smoothly. There was one case where a transferred member did not realise that his trainer was guilty and he was transferred from Jakarta to Bogor due to that verdict. Therefore, the party treats the judicial process carefully without harming the network and the convicted member will not be denounced in front of his or her trainees to prevent any negative perception and to preserve his or her honour. It is a crucial process within the party to minimise any tension or questions, especially from the trainees, who have a close relation to the trainer. Transferring the trainees away from a convicted member is also strategic for party solidity in terms of cutting the relations between members when there are moral and organisational problems. By doing so, the party can secure the loyalty of other cadres and maintain their uncontaminated understanding by keeping them away from potentially negative reactions to the verdict.

Basically, the party does not want to punish its members and only does so when it has to be implemented. In principle, the aim of the action is to seek as natural rehabilitation



as possible. Punishment is perceived as the worst alternative of action to deal with defiant members. As with the leadership of other parties, the PKS wants to see all its cadres follow the party line and transfer its political vision to all of its cadres. The process of transferring such understanding is not an easy one. As acknowledged by many of the party's elite the danger of changing is opposition to the idea of change itself. Transforming the movement into a political party was a huge shift in paradigm. The movement, originally, was a paradigm of educating people by using less vulnerable tools of approach to society. Political activity is in contrast to approaching society with *dakwah* and its more apparent religious message. At the same time, most of the elite in the movement period enjoyed a more comfortable situation because most of them were capable of preaching a religious message to people, rather than conducting negotiations or debating in the political process within state institutions.

However, the decision to establish a political party has to be accepted, including all of its consequences. In this critical phase, a key concept that was widely disseminated among members was that the movement was experiencing a process of transformation. Almost all party members, especially in the higher and middle-ranks, mentioned the term to express their understanding of any possible turbulence during the process. The narrative of transformation is crucial for enabling members to analyse the situation when some of the prominent members and others are expressing their criticism or, at least, confusion at the new political situation. The narrative has been mentioned consistently by cadres from the elite to middle levels as an expression to understand the situation of growing criticism and disenchantment after 2004.

Based on that understanding, the high-rank cadres at the local or national level handled members with critical questions or expressions and misapprehensions very carefully. They understand that working for the party is not about pursuing political interest in general and the discussions with most cadres during the field research reflected similar feelings. There is no economic gain in terms of salary or material compensation for supporting party activities. Therefore, if a cadre is critical or refuses to work, the party will not impose any punishment. Punishment is not the first option for the party, even though there is the possibility of imposing punishments on defiant members (Ibid).

Difference of opinion is welcomed and there is even the principle that, so long as they are obeying all party decisions, the party still tolerates different opinions among its

members (Appendix B.13.). In the case of local elections, there are several cases where local party decisions were challenged by cadres, some of whom are prominent in their region. One local party leader explained his difficult situation when the PKS decided to support a candidate for mayor, only to face criticism and questions (Rifa'i 2008). He had a moment to resign because of harsh criticism from his closest colleagues as well as some middle-ranking cadres in the local branch. Some of them even sent a formal letter signed by many middle-ranking cadres expressing their grievance at the decision (Appendix B.14.). He described that even though he had authority in the structure and training network (*usrah*), arranging formal party decisions to impose sanctions is not an option. The only advice he received from the provincial level was to be patient (*shabr*) and submissive (*tawakal*) to God. Following the turmoil, the local party did not produce any sanctions related to the situation. In another case, opposition also emerged in the local election for the position of governor of Jakarta in 2007 when the party decided to support a police general rather than its own cadres. Complaints were common during the selection process as well as after the official announcement of Adang Daradjatun as the party's candidate for governor. A similar approach was taken by letting those who were not in favour with the decision disagree without facing any sanctions.

In principle, expressing a different opinion on a party decision is a problem according to the party's constitution. However, the local party leadership prefers to leave them rather than imposing any punishment. The limit of giving or not giving out punishment is whether the critical members try to advertise their complaint and mobilise other members to take a similar standpoint. So, if the objection is only a matter of personal point of view without trying to mobilise more support the party will not impose any punishment. The party will take proper action when such criticism is expanded into mobilisation of cadres against a party decision or advertising the criticism in public. Another reason for increasing the severity of punishment is for a deliberate act against a party decision (Yusra 2008).

To handle individual critical and defiant cadres, the party, in general, tries to isolate the cadre from all party activities. It is not only to release him or her from all party tasks, but also transfer all cadres under his supervision in *usrah* to other cadres (Wibisono, 2008). After isolating the cadre, the party asks the trainer (*naqib*) of the cadre to discuss the situation as well as supervising his or her opinions. The process will be undertaken within

the activities of the routine training (*usrah*). If the cadre changes to a more positive standpoint, the party, through the training, will begin the process of rehabilitation until the local party leadership entrusts the cadre to do some tasks. However, the previous criticism or defiance is still written in the party's formal record, which can be used as a reference for his or her future career in the party.

The party is not bothered with individual or personal defiance because the impact on other cadres is relatively limited. In the case of refusing to support the local electoral candidate, the party does not mind criticism as long as most of the party's cadres support the decision. In fact, in the case of Jakarta, the party realised that there was significant support for the decision and that is more important than dealing with a small number of recalcitrant cadres (Appendix B.13.). With the support of the majority of cadres, the manoeuvre to support Daradjatun in the local election could be conducted effectively and its manoeuvre during the electoral campaign was supported by all of the party units.

There is a good example of dealing with such individual defiance and defining the limits of whether sanctions are applied or not. As explained by an upper middle-level provincial branch officer, when the local party in Jakarta conducted Caring Camp in Cibubur (a district in east Jakarta) one member came late with his group. Due to his record of criticising the party on certain occasions, the local party leadership was anxious that the group was late at his suggestion. The camp itself was obligatory for all cadres in the province, so any efforts to interrupt the programme could be categorised as a form of protest. To clarify the case, the party asked him to attend a session with all of the local party committees. The session itself was arranged to get information from the cadre directly and the situation was clarified when the reason for the group's late arrival was found to be unrelated to dissent against the party. Having found that there was no basis of dissent, the party did not impose any sanctions because being invited to attend the session is itself part of the party's warning system.

The PKS has drawn the boundaries for applying sanctions to its members by defining protest toward the party's decision and influencing or mobilising other members as the indicators. As long as any critical action is personal without affecting other members, the party will regard the cadre as a case for treatment leading to alienation, and not apply any sanctions for dismissal. It seems that the reason for this policy is whether personal opinion has shifted into mass mobilisation or not. If the situation is affecting other

members, it means that the party will lose its control of the cadres. Losing control of its cadres is not acceptable for a party that emphasises the solidity of its cadres.

If the cadre is unwilling to change his or her opinion as a personal standpoint the party will also be reluctant to reinstate their membership. Ikhsan Tanjung was one of the movement's prominent members at the time of the PKS's establishment, but he ignored the decision and consistently criticised the party's decision and direction. As a result, the party relieved him of his party tasks including transferring all of his trainees. With no responsibilities in the party and no trainees, he found himself in the position of having no involvement with any of the party's activities. The party cadres had no reason to have any contact with him. On some occasions, a number of cadres met to consult him informally on many issues including discussing the political situation. Nevertheless, in general, the party does not consider him as an important figure in its political activities.

It is quite unique to look at Tanjung's case because he did not try to mobilise other cadres to support his standpoint. His reason for this has been described by another as a commitment to the movement, as he does not want to completely sever his relations with it (Zein 2010). To express his criticism, he withdrew from his position as deputy chairperson of the movement not long after the declaration of the PK in 1998. However, his criticism of the transformation did not lead to his dismissal. His situation is quite similar to that of Abdul Hasib, head of the Al Hikmah foundation, who hosted the gathering of the KIK (*Kajian Islam Kontemporer* or Contemporary Studies of Islam) in al Hikmah mosque. Until last year, he was mentioned as regularly attending training despite his approval for critical cadres holding gatherings at al Hikmah mosque located at his foundation in Bangka, southern Jakarta. He spoke once at the gathering and talked about the importance of being committed to Islamic principles in every activity, including politics. He also mentioned the deficiency of relationships among cadres, especially in regard to information or commands from party elites.

The organisers of the gathering itself asked for permission to arrange the gathering in response to concerns among members and give them a place to share and discuss. Tizar Zein was one of them and he was asked to lead the gathering as a loose forum of social relations. On some occasions, these gatherings were a place for expressing different points of view on the party's policies and stance. There were also expressions of criticism toward the elite's behaviour, especially on welfare and Islamic practices. The speakers claimed that

some of the elite have been more permissive toward welfare, which, according to them, is not a pure reflection of the moral principles inherited from the Prophet and his companions.

The forum itself was the extension of previous restlessness among senior cadres at the recent development of the party in early 2008. Those with similar concerns attended a meeting in Bogor to discuss the recent situation more extensively. Many of them agreed to send a direct message to the head of the Assembly, Hilmi Aminuddin, as an expression of their concern. Not all of the attendees at the gathering were pleased to go and, from nine of them, six were warmly welcomed by Aminuddin himself in Lembang, northern Bandung, on 28 March 2008. One of the guests explained that their mission went well and they were able to read their written advice and one gave a spontaneous speech on the principles of Islam (Zein 2010).

After the meeting, only two of them remained determined to criticise the party. Both then continued to discuss the recent situation. After a series of small group discussions with some other senior cadres who had similar apprehensions as them, they agreed to arrange the KIK gathering. They knew the risk of arranging such activities. It was mentioned by one of the committees when a visitor of the gathering asked about the possibility of having similar gatherings in his area. He simply said, "Are you ready for the consequences?" Unlike other critical senior cadres who are simply individually critical to avoid being completely alienated, those who arranged the gathering faced more severe sanctions. The offence can be categorised as a severe one, so the ultimate possible sanction is dismissal.

However, before the dismissal was applied, there was a period where the DPP refrained from any severe acts. It was a period of waiting for deliberate consciousness to leave critical positions. During that period under the leadership of Tifatul Sembiring, tensions were apparent and the gathering gained momentum and found more supporters. From just holding a series of gatherings, the momentum for the forum to become a more significant pressure group came when the party's lawmakers preferred to modify their position regarding the BLBI (*Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia* or Bank Indonesia Liquidity Assistance) inquiry in the House of Representatives in 2008. The assistance was a huge bailout package to help the banking system avoid collapse in 1998, but it was later found that the majority of the banks submitted fake assets to obtain the support. The party's position was seen as a failure to push parliament to uncover the scandal, which encouraged critical cadres to call for a meeting with the PKS lawmakers. The lawmakers agreed to meet

and one of them then called the group the FKP (*Forum Kader Peduli* or Forum of Concerned Cadres). The meeting was eventually cancelled, with each party accusing the other of being behind the cancellation (Giri 2008).

The group, which was later known on as the FKP, pushed to arrange a more massive movement. They asked the attendance of the KIK gathering to attend a two day intensive gathering in TMII (*Taman Mini Indonesia Indah* or Beautiful Indonesia Miniature Park) in East Jakarta. The gathering was held during the month of *ramadhan* in September 2008 and it was attended by around a hundred cadres. Most of them were middle-ranking cadres who were already experienced in activities of *dakwah* during the Tarbiyah Movement period. Two of them expressed their disappointment at the party because it had become too political, while another explained that some of the elite in his neighbourhood were now rarely seen in the mosque for early morning prayers (*fajr*).

Similar to the two days' training activities in the party, there were speeches from senior cadres and they conducted night prayers (*tahajjud*) before early breakfast in preparation for fasting during the day. The speakers discussed the recent condition of the party. On that occasion, some of them denied the accusation from the party's elite that they were critical because they were only upset, having lost significant roles in the movement after it was transformed into a political party. That is a typical allegation aimed at the critical cadres which is used to accuse them in public when the case was brought to court and covered in the media (Vivanews, 18 March 2011). In the end, the organisers tried to expand their influence and activities throughout Jakarta and its suburban area by inviting key persons from each area.

It seems that there is limited room available to relieve the tension between the two sides. Two prominent leaders of the gathering then continued the momentum by arranging small-group discussions on a routine basis. This was very similar to the training supervised officially by the party. However, this small group activity was to contemplate the recent situation by exploring verses in the Qur'an and the Prophet's addresses. Sometimes other critical members also attended to share their thoughts with the audience and evaluate the current situation. The reason for carrying out such activity is that the only way to contest the downgrading of the party is by cutting their ties with it (Mashadi, 2008). The small group activity then became the root of the establishment of a completely independent new network.

At the same time, the party tried to be patient. According to a middle-ranking party official, during the period of Tifatul Sembiring's presidency, the party leadership tried not to be harsh to them (Hartono 2011). There were no official sanctions imposed, in the hope that those who attended the KIK gatherings would change their mind and come back to the party. However, despite its relaxed approach, the development of the critical cadres was still under the radar of the leadership. The party's organ dealing with the discipline of cadres also conducted an assessment of the activities that were not under their control. The mechanism of asking for clarification was held and it was admitted by one of the initiators of the KIK gathering. The party arranged a session to clarify his position, but he did not attend, as, according to him, it was not an appropriate mechanism for tackling the main issue. On one occasion, he attended a session in the DSP and expressed his opinion. One of the statements he mentioned in that session was that "There are calls for maintaining what is right, but there is no call for forbidding what is wrong" (Zein 2010) as an expression of consistent disapproval.

The party, then, had no other choice but to apply sanctions. These sanctions were due, not to the criticisms of the party, but to the impact beyond the party's control. As mentioned before, the indicator of imposing severe sanctions is the existence of efforts against the party's decisions. It is a common value that all cadres have to obey and honour the party's directions and refrain from activities against it. Mobilising hundreds of cadres is an act of rebellion, especially conducting training outside the official network. On 12 November 2008, the official sanction was released to isolate four prominent cadres. By this sanction, it was then illegal to have any relation or contact with them. Unfortunately, it is difficult to obtain the official letter of the verdict and, if it is accessible, there will be no terms mentioning the breach very clearly. There will be only a general statement that the person is in breach of party statutes and has acted against party norms. As explained before, the reason for only stating general allegations is to avoid disgracing accused cadres. This kind of official verdict has been criticised by one of the accused cadres by saying that it is not a proper verdict because of a lack of clear information on the article(s) or section(s) that one has been accused of violating (Mufied 2010).

The verdict itself is widely applied and for the prominent leader of critical cadres, being cut off from the wider Tarbiyah community is apparent. The majority of cadres do not wish to break the party's rules because they will be in trouble if they do so. They

understand that if they become more critical and express different opinions, there is a risk of being treated differently to loyal cadres by the leadership or, at least, being labelled as disloyal by other cadres at a relatively similar level. As a cohesive community bound by a similar vision of *dakwah*, brotherhood and sisterhood among cadres is relatively strong. Therefore, being alienated from the party as a community is unimaginable for most cadres and conforming to party rules and ethics is more beneficial than being dismissed. It is not surprising to hear the expression, “Are you ready for the consequences of being critical?”, delivered to cadres who wish to act or say differently to the party’s leadership. It is the rationale of the ‘rule of anticipated reactions’ that works in the PKS to prevent any opposition from the cadres. As a result, only those who have no hope of any change are willing to attend the gatherings or meetings critical of the party. Only cadres who can bear to face the consequences will be courageous to act and speak differently. Therefore, those who criticise and oppose the party’s leadership are from the elite and mid-ranking level and it is difficult to find oppositional views from the lower-ranking cadres.

Dealing with sanctions is quite hard because they may lose their income. Some of the alienated cadres have small businesses and many of their costumers are the party’s cadres. After the verdict against him, one accused cadre was shown a text message stating that it is not allowed to buy goods from him or to use his services anymore (Zein, 2010). It was also mentioned that a workshop in a municipality in West Java had to be cancelled because the trainer was one of the formally alienated cadres. The other alienated cadre complained that his daughter’s wedding party was boycotted by other cadres because of a message saying that cadres are not allowed to attend it (Mashadi 2008). However, it is quite difficult to accurately verify conditions after the verdict.

Further developments have shown that, despite the sanctions, some of the party’s members still try to contact cadres who are being isolated or alienated. Some of them agreed to join an overnight gathering in Depok in July 2010. At the gathering, the size of the audience was significantly less than for the KIK gatherings, with only around 30 people in attendance. The small numbers who attended the gathering was due to obstacles in building a solid vision to appeal to different individuals, the most important one being what action to take in the future (Giri 2010). A lack of vision had actually been noted during the last gathering of the KIK. One attendee felt that there was an effort to use those who attended the forum to create pressure on the party’s elite. Since then, he did not attend any



future gatherings, though he kept coming to the 'illegal' small group training. Another attendee of the gathering in Depok said that he just wanted to know the direction of the defiant group. Despite the difficulties in building a solid vision, the new network was still trying to build a stronger appeal to critical cadres in different provinces. It is noted that a similar overnight event was also arranged secretly in Bandung, the capital of West Java, and it was attended by critical, mainly middle-ranking, cadres (Yusuf 2011).

Nevertheless, the coordinators of the new training network do not have an ambitious target of replacing the existing network. For the coordinator of the new network, the legacy of the Muslim Brotherhood is universal at the moment and every Muslim has a right to be inspired and to apply it. Whether this effort will be acknowledged by others is another problem (Zein 2010). Unlike the PKS, the new network seems to support the idea of avoiding democracy since it can be used to undermine Islam. One of the problems with democracy is the principle of majority that can be used as a basis of truth in the form of law, while, in Islam, the truth is based on revelation rather than the views of a majority of the people. Based on that standpoint, they do not support any involvement in politics such as what the PKS is doing. Perhaps, this view has emerged as a reflection of the experience of the PKS, whereby the pragmatic approach is more apparent than the ideological approach. It seems that those who arranged the new network have become fed up with the party and, even though there is an opportunity for rehabilitation, and a return to the party, they are not eager to do so. By developing such a network, it is clear that they have made a definite break with the party and, even without an official verdict, they have already decided to excommunicate themselves.

Currently, they are creating a community to assemble the remnants of the KIK gatherings. Unlike the KIK gatherings, which criticised the party directly, the community is more relaxed in creating warnings for every Muslim and reminding their supporters of Islamic principles for their daily life. They use a virtual magazine, *Eramuslim*, to express their vision and most of the preachers who write in it are known as former cadres, critical of the PKS. Some of the articles tend to discuss the party and its activities, but this time with a series of studies on the Islamic movement. The community of its readers, then, is known as the KEM (*Komunitas Eramuslim* or the *Eramuslim Community*). One informal critical leader acknowledged that the KIK was not effective in terms of gaining positive results because the outcome of both opposite sides was tensions (Zein 2010). For that reason, a

more reactive approach was denied and they adopted a similar approach to that applied at the beginning of the Tarbiyah movement.

As described in the theoretical perspective, alienation occurs when there is a condition or environment sufficient to force an individual or group to withdraw from a certain situation. This theoretical approach gives more attention to the individual or group who becomes the object of negative impact. Therefore, alienation is commonly associated with the object that is suffering the impact. In Marxist terms, those who are alienated from the capitalist system are mainly labourers, who do not have access to capital except as part of the workforce. Meanwhile, in modern politics, alienation occurs when people do not have access to the political process, which is decided by an oligarchic group at the centre of power.

In the case of the PKS, there is a sense of a deliberate mechanism implemented by the leadership to force its dissident members to stay away from the party system for a while. Therefore, alienation is a process undertaken by the party leadership, as the authoritative institution, to generate the benefit to it of decontaminating its ranks of rogue elements. The action is applied in order to prevent their influencing other cadres. Misguided cadres who deviate from the party's line are perceived as a problem and the most effective way to contain the problem is to alienate them for a while. In this way, the party can maintain cadres' loyalty, while, at the same time, there is a hope that the critical cadres will change their attitude toward the party's line.

This action is designed for members who are still controllable. It means that the party hopes that the person will change their point of view and understand his or her wrongdoing. In this situation the verdict is given to members with a relatively small scale impact on other members. In different cases, more severe alienation is applied; not only excommunication, but also cutting all business or professional relations. For those who spent most of his or her time with the Tarbiyah Movement, alienation is a very difficult situation to deal with. Only those who are brave enough are eager to confront such a situation. Mostly, they already have a back up in terms of financial or community resources to support their daily life. If there is no financial or social support, the situation might be different (Appendix B.11.).

The situation is more complicated when a cadre's spouse is still in favour with the party, even though he or she is already annoyed with the recent situation. Facing that

situation, there is no alternative other than to soften his or her stance. However, a gradual withdrawal from party activities is possible, without leaving the party at all or stays to support the party (Appendix B.9.). In that position, if there is a task given from the party he or she will accept it apathetically in order to avoid being recognised by the leadership as a recalcitrant cadre. It is more difficult for cadres who are in the parliament because they are supposed to support the party at all costs.

For cadres in the position where it is impossible to release their loyalty, there is a danger of putting themselves into a more passive position. More than that, there is also the possibility of adopting a stance whereby they stay away from politics. This is a deliberate position taken by cadres who think that the party has been steering in a different direction and that some of the elite have behaved immorally. Others might think to reduce their activities due to the political decision. While the former is more ideological, the latter is a result of exhaustion from continuously carrying out political manoeuvres. These two indications have been noticed in several locations, even though they have not significantly affected the party. The indication is that cadres deliberately absent themselves from the party's activities or routine training (*halaqah* or *usrah*). By doing so, they have taken an action of self-alienation because the isolation is self-inflicted without any sanction from the party.

The phenomenon of self-alienation has shown that reaction toward the party's manoeuvre is more complex than simply a matter of being loyal or disloyal. In fact, between the two extremes, there is a range of attitudes among cadres creating a spectrum of stances. At the more critical pole, those who attended the 'illegal' gatherings have different reasons and backgrounds. It can be an effective mobilisation at first, but becomes less cohesive when the manoeuvre is beyond their expectations. As a result, some of them prefer to retreat. A lack of vision on what to do next is crucial at this stage. Within the prominent critical cadres, there is also no cohesion. For example, from the nine people who attended the discussion in Bogor, as mentioned previously, only six agreed to meet Hilmi Aminuddin directly, while from those six, only two were eager to establish a new network. Therefore, using the term factionalism to look at the critical cadres is an exaggeration of the real situation. It is also applied to those who are loyal to the party. It seems that the claim of a solid party is difficult to challenge. In fact, within the cadres who are loyal, there are also cadres who, for different reasons, are less eager to support the party. Case by case

examination is more relevant in this context because it is common to see different opinions in different cases among the elite (Appendix B.11.).

#### **V.4 Decomposition**

Unlike alienation as a process which allows for the restoration of the accused members' loyalty and secures other members from their influence, decomposition does not give any chance for a rethink, contemplation, or retaining one's previous status in the PKS's membership. Decomposition is a direct action against cadres who do not obey party decision or commit a severe violation of the party's principles. In the PTPS document, it is mentioned that the meaning of severe violation is 'insubordination to the party's decisions, rules, policies, or standpoints, which could be penalised by direct dismissal from party membership. There is also another category of severe violation that can be penalised by similar action, which is violation of Islamic principles. Actions that can be categorised into severe *syari'ah* violations are 'mortal sins, serious crimes that can be penalised with *hudud* (theft, robbery), and *qishas* (murder)'.

In similarity to other actions against violations, the party also set up a mechanism to tackle these actions through a series of investigations and assessments of individual cases. The Lajnah Hisbah collects evidence regarding the cadre's behaviour and files the case for assessment by the Majelis Qadha. The Majelis then produces a decision after hearing the evidence and asking the accused cadre to explain the case. The decision will be released later and it is made official by the DPP of the party if it is a case of organisational violation and by the DSP if the case is related to *shari'a*.

To describe definite figures related to the decisions is not easy because, as mentioned previously, the party has a policy of not publishing decisions regarding disciplinary cases involving its cadres. The verdicts are not for public consumption and are kept for internal information announced through weekly training (*usrah*). Therefore, it would not be surprising if there was a case of a cadre who does know about any sanction imposed on his trainer (*murabbi* or *naqib*). Only after being transferred to another training group, would the cadre understand why the party transferred him or her to another group due to the trainer's dismissal from the party.

Because of the closed policy in handling party discipline and implementing its verdicts, it is also quite difficult to reveal details of the process of investigating and

assessing disciplinary cases. However, despite its secrecy, there are some notions about the process that represents two different positions. For cadres in the party structure, the process is seen as credible and handled by professionals, so that cadres are not expected to doubt the whole process and the verdict itself (Hamzah 2011). That kind of expression is issued as a response to the disappointment uttered by particular cadres who faced sanctions. Although it is a response to a specific case, there is a range of dissatisfaction about the way of the process of disciplinary decision is taken. It is noted that one cadre expressed his feeling that the process did not give him a fair opportunity to defend himself and clarify his case (Mufied 2010). Another expressed his regret at finding that his case against a senior cadre should be withdrawn from official investigation (Budi 2008), while a third refused to attend a session due to different interpretations of who should handle his case (Zein 2010). Apart from those negative expressions, the cadres in the party's structure tend to have confidence in the official process because it is handled by trustworthy and professional scholars in *syari'ah* and law as well as an understanding of the case itself (Hartono 2011).

The policy of dismissing party members is said to be implemented more explicitly under the leadership of Luthfi Hasan Ishaq when he replaced Tifatul Sembiring in 2010 after acting as interim president in late 2009 (Appendix B.11.). The previous President seemed to avoid direct confrontation with cadres who are critical and less supportive of the party standpoint, even though the DPP had already obtained a constitutional mandate to do so after the establishment of the BPDO. He used a metaphor to describe them; he only described them 'as passengers on a ship who are producing smoke by burning some part of the ship, which has disrupted other passengers' (Ibid). His policy also tended to contain the influence of the critical thinking by asking cadres in general not to attend gatherings where the party was discussed critically, as they were regarded as illegal and so unworthy to attend. In contrast, the current President has been more decisive in handling the cadres who have a different political position. The case of Saiful Islam Mubarok is clear evidence that the party under Ishaq's leadership is more firm in this matter.

The case of Saiful Islam can be categorised as an organisational violation according to the PTPS because he was seen to be insubordinate regarding a party's decision. The case is a result of the process to find a cadre to replace the national parliamentary seat which was previously occupied by Suharna Suprapranata. As he was appointed a member of the cabinet in 2009, he had to transfer his seat in the House of Representative from Electorate

Region 1 in West Java. To replace him, the PKS decided to appoint Arif Minardi, a leader of the worker's union at Dirgantara Indonesia Co. rather than Saiful Islam, under the mechanism of PAW (*Pergantian Antar Waktu* or interim replacement). From the party's perspective, the decision was not a problem because, according to the head of the Provincial Party Board, Taufik Ridlo, Suharna was appointed by the PKS. The appointment was a policy decided by the party; therefore any consequences due to the appointment should be decided by a party policy as well. Arif Minardi was chosen to replace Suharna because he had more knowledge and experience of labour issues as he was the head of a trade union (*reference*).

However, the decision was challenged by Saiful Islam, who argued that as he collected more votes than Arif Minardi in the 2009 national election (around 19,000 votes compared to Arif's 16,554 (Cetro 2009)) he was more popular with voters, a fact which should be considered in the decision to choose a replacement for Suharna. For that reason, he refused to withdraw his candidacy to make Arif Minardi's candidacy possible. For the party, the refusal could be categorised as insubordination and, if referred to the party's constitution and its code of sanctions, the penalty for such behaviour is instant dismissal.

As mentioned before, the detail of the process of handling such a case is an internal issue which is not made public. However, it is certain that the clarification process on that case is conducted for the related cadre only and the party seemed to be trying to contain the problem as far as possible. It is likely that if the party tried to keep the case for internal consumption, there would be a fundamental reason. However, similar to most disciplinary cases within the party, there was no official announcement in order to keep the real process and issues discussed in disciplinary related institutions (the BPDO, Lajnah Hisbah, Majelis Qadha and in higher level, the Assembly and the DSP).

In the perspective of party management, expelling cadres is common since the party's line must be accepted by all party cadres. If the reason is rational, the case will be accepted quite readily by other cadres and supporters, and even the public. There are cases in the PKS where members were expelled for immoral behaviour such as gambling or corruption. In March 2011, for example, the party, through its disciplinary organ, the BPDO released an official letter confirming the dismissal of Darmawan Duming, a member of the local parliament in Gorontalo Province (Antara, 13 March 2011). The decision was taken after the PKS formed an investigation team and processed the case according to

formal procedure. Other cases of expulsion are believed to be related to corruption, such as when two cadres in Jember, West Java province, were expelled (Antara, 6 April 2011). For both cases, there was no reaction towards the decisions and they were accepted without question.

The problem in the case of Saiful Islam is different because there is an aspect of protesting against the party's decision. The suspicion, according to critical members, is that the party had conducted an unwise and undemocratic approach toward its own cadres. This suspicion was made more dramatic since his forum of worship (*sholat bersama*) in Bandung had reduced in numbers significantly. For critical members, the loss of his followers had a strong relation to the fact that the PKS's cadres were recommended not to attend any of the defendant's activities as part of the process of alienation as well as dismissal. To give support to Saiful, some critical cadres tried to mobilise groups of people from Jakarta to attend his night worship sessions (Zein 2010).

It seems that the policy of concealing the actual process and basis of a case to keep the honour of a defendant or other alleged cadres has raised some questions, especially for those who do not have clear and valid information. This was the case with Yusuf Supendi when the PKS expelled him from the party in October 2009. He signed the declaration of the PK foundation in 1998 and was seen as a prominent cadre in the Tarbiyah Movement. It is known that he studied in Madinah at the same time as Hilmi Aminuddin and became a close friend and aide in the expansion of the movement from the beginning. Among cadres, Yusuf Supendi was widely known for his extensive knowledge of *shari'a* and perceived as a spiritual figure as he was also appointed as a member of the DSP.

The case of Yusuf Supendi is actually not a new case because it has been widely known among cadres in 2008 when the research was conducted in Jakarta and it was believed that he had been under investigation since becoming a member of parliament from 2004 to 2009. Similar to other cases, it was difficult to confirm the actual reason behind the decision to remove him from his positions. After he finally opened his case publicly and brought it to court, controversy emerged in the media since he also spoke about various issues regarding the PKS's activities and his suspicions that some of the party's leaders were guilty of inappropriate behaviour. Officially, the party had issued a decision in October 2009 after years of investigating Supendi and asked for clarification or confirmation. On one occasion, he was accused of defrauding an orphan fund collected by

the PKS, rumours of which had previously circulated among party cadres; an allegation which he denied (Vivanews, 4 May 2011). One mid-ranking cadre stated that he knew that Yusuf was involved in such activity (Hartono 2011) and others expressed their conviction that the handling of the case in the BPDO and the DSP had been carefully conducted (Hamzah, 2011).

It seems that the party decided to expel him due to misconduct for misusing the orphan's fund, which may be categorised as a serious crime in the *shari'a*. If the case is a violation of *shari'a* principles, there should be less controversy, such as if it refers to the case of gambling described before. However, controversy can flourish when the public, in this case the media, perceive the case as a conflict between a cadre and the party leadership with aspects of an undemocratic approach. The party is officially consistent in its policy of not publishing the verdicts and its reasons in public in order to veil the real misdeed of the accused member.

The case was made more confusing when critical cadres offered their support by inviting him to speak at an event conducted by a group of cadres known as the FKP, linked to the gatherings in Bangka, known as the KIK. The event, which took place in a mosque in the Pramuka area of East Jakarta, was a reception to welcome the holy month of Ramadhan in 2008, and his speech itself contained no direct criticism of the party leadership, except stressing aspects of a democratic Islamic approach within an organisation. By inviting him to the event, his case of *shari'a* violation became mixed up with questions of abuse of power. It is likely that the decision to expel him from the party was related to the closer link between him and the FKP as a member of parliament from the PKS, and members of the central party board accused him of political manoeuvring rather than contemplating and amending his behaviour (Hamzah 2011). If it is true, the decision is consistent with the principle of not mobilising and influencing other cadres as a boundary between individual protest and manoeuvre to mobilise protest or criticism.

To clarify the case of dismissal due to efforts to mobilise personal critical views toward party leadership the case of M. Haekal Mufied might be representative to describe the limit. He was a member of the local Sharia Council in Jakarta dismissed by the party after sending a text message warning cadres to be careful with instructions from the party leadership regarding cases in the House of Representatives. The text itself, according to Haekal Mufied (2010), said:



“Distribute!!! Open letter from Brother Haekal: Honoured brothers Mahfudz S, Fahri H and Andi R. Become the heroes of dakwah and do not become traitors to this nation...! Do not fear instructions from “Lembang”, but fear the judgement in the afterlife. Conclude the case of Century. God is the Greatest....!”

The case of Century is widely known in the country as the government wanted to bailout the bank under the consideration of stabilising Indonesian economy in general from the risk of systematic impacts on the banking system (the Jakarta Globe 2 March 2010). For many lawmakers, the policy taken in November 2008 was a fatal error because it was taken without careful judgement and led to suspicions that it had become the source of fraudulent actions. The former Vice President at the time of the policy even claimed it as a robbery (the Jakarta Globe 9 January 2009). A similar case that was conducted in 1998, when BLBI (Bank Indonesia Liquidity Assistance) also became the concern of critical cadres who were at the beginning of the gathering in Bangka and tried to have a dialogue with the PKS parliamentary party over their suspicions at the party’s unwillingness to take serious action. The text was part of the effort to pressurise PKS lawmakers to open up the case. In the text, there is a warning about any instruction from Lembang, which refers to the residence of Hilmi Aminuddin, the head of the Assembly and the DPTP.

The warning itself is a reflection of concern at Aminuddin’s role in the political process in parliament. Some critical cadres believe that he played a significant role in influencing the process. The party’s shift in political position in 2005 with regard to the government’s increase in gasoline prices was also linked to his ‘instruction’ (Mashadi 2008). The PKS was one of the political parties that did not strongly oppose the implementation of the price rise and the party’s change of position was a dramatic manoeuvre just before the final session in the House of Representatives to discuss the policy. However, suspicion of the party’s leadership was significantly reduced in early December 2009 when the PKS faction supported the decision of parliament to declare that the bail-out policy on Century Bank was a problematic policy that warranted further investigation. It was a tough political position because the party had an agreement to obtain four ministerial posts in Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s new cabinet following the 2009 election.

Apart from the political context as the background of the Mufied text, the party was not happy with his manoeuvre. Referring to the principal of allowing personal political

views but banning any effort to influence other cadres, the party took the drastic decision to dismiss Haikal Mufied, even though he had a strategic position in the party as secretary of the provincial Sharia Council. Mufied published the official letter, saying that it was officially released as provincial party decree 01/KEP/AI-PKS/I/1431 under the heading of ‘dishonourable dismissal.’

From the cases above, it seems clear that the party’s dismissal of members will be based on the principal written in the constitution and its supporting document. The violation of *shari’a* principles is commonly accepted without any doubt, but it can be more controversial if it is related to more a political dimension of organisational issues. The case of Yusuf Supendi is basically a *shari’a* case, but it becomes problematic when aspects of organisation are attached to represent the misleading or undemocratic approach of the PKS. Meanwhile, the case of Saiful Islam is a clear example that organisational violation of the party’s decisions can be devious on membership, even though he did not mobilise any cadres against it.

The most obvious case of expulsion due to conducting more significant mobilisation and influencing wider cadres can be referred to the prominent cadres who arranged the gatherings in Bangka in 2008. Mobilisation and affecting wider cadres are the characteristics of such manoeuvres. After conducting several gatherings, in large and medium open forums, they try to conduct smaller training sessions analogous to what the Tarbiyah Movement and the PK, then PKS, were doing. It was a clear breach of the party’s organisational principle, which has very strict coordination of such training. Although they have changed their approach not to challenge the party leadership overtly and directly, their next focus is still unacceptable by managing an online media of Eramuslim with its reader community (the KEM). The decision was taken to expel them from the party, which is a clear sign that such manoeuvres are not acceptable according to the party line. After years of tensions, the decision to cut their ties with the party was taken when efforts to mediate between the two parties failed to produce a better outcome. At least four prominent cadres in the case were convicted and were fully dismissed at the end (Zein 2010).

What makes these cases of criticism and mobilising cadres so sensitive is that they potentially undermine the authority of the party leadership. In the principle of decomposition in the context of party moderation, such action is crucial to protect the solidity of members who might not be interested in the issues. As has been noted by Orbell

and Fougere, decomposition is a strategic decision to dismiss members of an ideological political party who are still holding on to an earlier interpretation. For an ideological party wanting to win electoral votes, changing its interpretation is significant to obtain more voters and, according to them, it is usual that the party leadership will preserve its position when it has succeeded to gain more voters and maintained political benefits from it. It is logical for the party, then, to dismiss members who are protesting the new political position by saying that it betrays the authentic interpretation of party ideology.

For some reason, criticism from some cadres in the PKS is quite similar to the situation described by Orbell and Fougere. The party's new, more pragmatic, direction in order to place it at the centre of the Indonesian political arena is perceived as a violation of their movement's vision of *dakwah*. Actually, the narrative of party officials is still the same by upholding the issue of 'partai dakwah' and winning election is also the winning of *dakwah*. Therefore, there is a different interpretation of achieving the success of the *dakwah* project. The party officials say that the project of the PKS is to grab a chance to lead the nation and give a better alternative for a better result. *Dakwah* is perceived as a vision to lead the country with capability and quality to benefit all of society and politics is part of the implementation of it. Offering the best cadres for the country to give their best is the way to lead the path to the vision (Matta 2011). This kind of vision is certainly different with the interpretation of some members who are saying that the political project is too pragmatic and has a negative impact on the party and its cadres.

These two opposite points of view are certainly difficult to resolve when party officials use the approach of transforming the party to face the new reality of politics. Activities of the new phase of '*mihwar dauli*' in politics are significantly different with the approach of '*mihwar tanzhimi*' when the focus of the movement was mainly to train its cadres. The criticism from party officials of critical cadres mainly focuses on the inability of critical cadres to embrace the new reality and to relinquish their perception of the old reality as the only way to guide the movement (Wijaya 2011).

For Orbell and Fougere, the reason for dismissing critical members is rational in that winning elections is clear evidence that the new interpretation is successful. Based on that point of view, the leadership should maintain the winning perspective by preserving the approach to win votes. In that situation, a different interpretation of party ideology will be perceived as an obstacle to retaining the support of voters. Expelling members with a

dissimilar vision who are critical of the authoritative interpretation is the best way to ensure party members support the new approach. The principle is stated in the decomposition theory, which says that losing defiant elements is better than losing political benefits.

In the case of expulsions from the PKS, the principle in keeping political benefits is less important since the party has already set up principles of violation that could lead to dismissal. Moral bases are still preserved by the party by using the *shari'a* principles as the main reason for imposing sanctions equal with organisational principle. Therefore, immoral party members can be dismissed as a direct consequence of breaching Islamic principles, quite apart from the unintentional political impact. When Arifinto, a lawmaker from the PKS, was caught by a journalist looking at pornographic images contained in his gadget during a general session of the House of Representatives, the DSP imposed personal sanctions and urged him to withdraw from his position in parliament as well as in the Assembly. The case was a humiliation for the party as an Islamic party to see its cadre engaged in such immoral behaviour in public. However, the sanctions and pressure for him is not an intentional effort to compensate for the negative impact of the case. Rather, it was an automatic response toward the misbehaviour; therefore it is less political than Orbel and Fougere suggest, even though it might be admired by the public.

However, more political aspects are seen in the case of organisational violations. To dismiss cadres who are defiant is more important than keeping them in the party. As expressed by the former president of the party, Tifatul Sembiring, those who are critical are producing 'smoke that may suffocate other passengers in the ship' while they are still passengers who should be taken care of by the crew. It is difficult to handle them because they are still members of the party and may use their influence in front of other cadres to get sympathy. It is believed that one reason for fewer votes in Jakarta and its suburb cities in the 2009 election was caused by the existence of critical cadres who were reluctant to support the party campaign (Hidayat 2009 and 2010). It is not surprising that the newly appointed President has taken a more drastic approach toward those who are perceived as conducting insubordination toward the party leadership, including senior cadres who have contributed significantly to the foundation of the movement before the party era.

In the perspective of decomposition theory, removing those who oppose the party line is a simple way to purge defiant elements from the party. The case of New Zealand cited by Orbel and Fougere is an obvious example that the opposition element then

established a new political group to challenge the main party in election. The case of the PKS is rather different in this context because there is no oppositional element lead by critical cadres. Their challenge toward the leadership is, rather, individual contestation as an expression of their devotion to the movement itself. Therefore, their motive is less political and, as a result, there has so far been no manoeuvre to establish a new political party to challenge the PKS. This is also confirmed by one of the expelled critical cadres, who stated that they do not have any intention of establishing a political party (Zein 2010). Despite challenging the party in the electoral process, some of them prefer to challenge the party by establishing new training networks using similar methods and principles to those implemented by the movement since the early 1980s.

Decomposition is proven to be effective in solidifying the party, since defiant elements are either no longer active in the party or give up their efforts to harshly criticise the party. Others will also think to do the same and choose to keep their criticism within the realm of a personal point of view, which is still tolerated (Appendix B.15.). Other critical cadre also decides to stay in the party with minimum activity as long as he is not perceived as defiant, in order to save their family's life and their position in the party. He tried to avoid being nominated by the party at the national election by asking for a lower rank of candidacy to avoid current confusion (Appendix B.9.). As a result, the party now enjoys a more comfortable internal situation, allowing it to implement its activities without significant opposition. The only concern for the party leadership is the influence of expelled cadres who are still influential to some extent by using online media. However, for a solid party, which has a relatively high degree of control over its members, the PKS could direct them not to have close contact with external influences.

Another concern is to contain issues released by ex-cadres in public as some of them try to bring their cases to court and unveil the party's internal information. Yusuf Supendi is an example of a former cadre who tried to bring his expulsion case to court and spoke with journalists about the party's internal affairs. For some, his actions can be seen as the beginning of division in the PKS. In fact, the division has already been made by the party drawing a clear separation between them and the defiant cadres. As a consequence, any strong criticism now comes from outside rather than from within, which makes it easier to tackle by saying that they are not part of the party anymore. Nevertheless, from the perspective of the party leadership, external criticism is now perceived as insignificant and

harmless compared with before. With cadres who are trusting toward the party leadership, not only because of the figures but also the belief that it is a trustworthy system, such external information and influence is now easier to contain.

It is then clear that the PKS has distinctive strategies in dealing with moderation with the AKP by preserving Islam as an ideology. It is proven that the existence of religious principles has obliged the PKS to apply two different principles at the same time. Both are written clearly in the party constitution and also reflected in the party structures by having two different routes of disciplinary examinations. The organisational aspects are represented by the BPDO to deal with party discipline while infringements on Islamic principles will be handled by the DSP. Hence, the party represents two different authorities, secular and religious, but both are under the control of a collective body, the Shura Assembly. The combination of both authorities has given the PKS effective control of its cadres since the party represents their religious vision. So, those who are in the party structures, especially in the high ranks, are seen as most trusted and authoritative people due to their extensive understanding on Islam.

In this regard, room for debates on better options of policies will be monopolised by those who obtain the status of a trusted person. Hence, it is understandable that the party leadership ask for selective opportunity for discourse among members to emphasise the importance of respect to decisions rather than criticism. Trust, then, plays a great role in this context in the belief that those who are in the party structures are capable in handling many issues and the members' role after the decision is taken is to accept and support. The effective control is also strengthened by the fact that all members are bound to the party as a big family under the banner of *jama'ah*, so punishments can be produced in different ways through decomposition and alienation. Decomposition is a definite strategy and it is even more effective by underlining the right of membership dismissal under the reason of preserving all members from precarious ideas and attitudes. With the existence of ideological preference, it is also obvious that the party can also alienate critical or uncontrollable members that may lead them into difficult situations. The effect can be positive in terms of generating the psychological effect on members not to infringe any principles, but it is also revealed that some members tend to conduct a self-alienation strategy to hinder any disciplinary action and maintain the membership status.

## Chapter VI

### **Final Remarks: The AKP and the PKS in Comparison**

In discussing political parties that are guided by a strong ideology, the question arises as to whether their role in the political process can be compatible with democracy. Strong ideologies often seem to be unsuited to the principles of a democratic system. Ideology usually asks for loyalty and devoutness toward ideals from its adherents. From the opposite side, democracy gives the opportunity for individuals to express their preference without fear of sanction from political authority. The electoral process enables the electorate to vote for parties or candidates that it expects to benefit from. An ideological party finds it difficult to accommodate popular demand and compete for votes in a system where elections are conducted on a regular basis. The discussion of an anti-system party originating from Sartori's study of Fascist and Communist parties is an obvious example of the problematic existence of ideological parties in a democratic system. The problematic situation cannot be resolved unless the party embraces a moderation process (moving toward the centre in Sartori's term) aimed at gaining acceptance among a large section of voters.

The case of Islamic parties, or at least parties with a strong background of Islamic preference, is significant in this context. Different from Communist parties who are losing their ideological attraction, parties with Islamic preference still manage to have a significant appeal in Muslim societies. Recent examples of them are in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco where Islamist parties managed to gain more votes than other political parties. In Egypt, the party of Muslim Brotherhood even had to compete with another Islamic party with a more conservative interpretation. Despite the success, it is still difficult to find clear evidence that Islamic parties can gain sufficient popular votes in elections and become dominant political players in a democratic system over a relatively long period. There is

also a fear that their victories will mean an imposition of a strict Islamic interpretation and consequently isolation from international markets, including investment.

It is, thus, reasonable to focus on the AKP as it has been successful in winning three consecutive elections as a model for Islamic parties in Muslim countries. Soon after Ennahda gained support among Tunisian voters in the first democratic election in Tunisia, October 2011, it declared its preference for the Turkish ruling party as a model. In fact, this claim is still dubious due to the nature of the AKP itself. The AKP has maintained its dominant position in Turkish politics for almost a decade with three consecutive national elections. It has attracted popular support and has also respected the rule of law as required by democratic principles. The case of the PKS makes the claim more uncertain because it represents the challenging situation if a party intends to preserve Islam in a democratic system. The PKS can also be considered as a party that is trying to survive in politics by accommodating popular preference rather than attaching itself to a strict ideological interpretation. The PKS's involvement in three consecutive national elections since 1999 and also hundreds of local elections is evidence that it has a strong willingness to base itself on democratic principles. Therefore, both have the elements of moderation according to Sanchez-Cuenza and Schwedler's versions.

What makes the AKP and the PKS interesting in comparison is their different degree of moderation. The AKP abandoned any formal ideological preference based on Islam and replaced it with a more 'vague' ideology of 'Conservative Democrat.' The actual meaning of the AKP ideology may become a debate among scholars, but the vagueness of conservative democracy has given opportunity for individuals with different political preferences to come and work together. It has also been possible for the party to maximise other aspects to generate public support through the personal charisma of the party leader, the party's vision, and also programmes.

While the AKP declared its commitment to make a distinct distance from its predecessors, the RP and the FP, the PKS initiated serious attempts to change its image after it started to participate in the electoral process. After a relatively poor result in the 1999 election, there was an understanding of the need to respond to popular sentiment in order to survive. The 2004 election confirmed that its initiative was productive as the party became the seventh most popular party in Indonesia with less religious appeal and jumped to four in the 2009 election to become the most popular Islamic party. The success



persuades the defenders of the initiative to move forward and reinforces the party's more inclusive approach. However, unlike the AKP, the PKS has suffered from conflicting interpretations over how far moderation can be acceptable in reference to Islamic principles. The different interpretations within the PKS indicate that moderation will be likely to lead to internal tensions as the party becomes more moderate. Though the PKS seems to suffer from various internal problems such as threats of a split, the PKS seems not to have suffered a major negative impact. In general, the party still has the support of its cadres across the country and the tension itself is relatively concentrated in the big cities.

The AKP, in contrast, does not have intense tensions or conflicts based on ideological preferences. Most conflicts related to party and government policies and the role of ideological preferences is negligible. A particular policy has led some party deputies to resist because of their nationalistic point of view. However, in fact, the reaction is not a solely ideological reaction. There is also a dimension of criticism toward the way the party leadership deals with their views. Therefore, the AKP faces relatively less ideological conflict compare to the PKS.

The difference between the two parties' internal situations is due to the fact that they have experienced a different route of moderation. The AKP has started to abandon the ideological position of its foundation. It is not a sudden outcome though; the process of developing new interpretations of politics had started already as a learning process. The parties' founders had experienced the dynamics of the RP and the FP before these were closed, so that abandonment is not an abrupt decision. On the contrary, the PKS had a different starting point. The PKS did not have a strong commitment to a serious moderation policy from its foundation. It is a party that was established directly by an underground Islamic movement, known as the Tarbiyah Movement which had expanded its influence among the educated young in the big cities. It is true that the party leaders tried to withdraw the discourse of Caliphate in the party's political vision at the outset. However, it was the result of elections and the opportunity to gain more support in elections which was the most significant and influential factor that persuaded party leaders to take the policy of moderation more seriously. In Wickham's terms, the AKP can be categorised as abandoned moderation and the PKS tends to fit with revisionist moderation.

From the case of the AKP and the PKS, different implementations of moderation influence the way both parties generate loyalty among party members. In the case of the

PKS, preserving ideology during the moderation process put the party in a difficult situation searching for the compatibility of moderation with Islamic principles. Lack of sufficient explanation of its political manoeuvres as implementation of moderation, either in electoral or decision making process at state level, was apparent and it influenced the cadres' loyalty. For some cadres, insufficient explanation can be interpreted as failure to comply with the principles of Islam as the party's leading ideology. As a result, the party suffered from continuing internal criticism and tensions in debates on the legitimacy of its political programme which also corresponds with the criticism of the appropriateness of the elites' attitude to represent the party in several public institutions. In contrast, the party leadership used the interpretation of the party's ideology also to respond to its critics. Therefore, both sides applied similar attempts to undermine each other. However, the party leadership was in a better position to apply legitimate interpretation to dominate cadres' understanding and applied sanctions toward its opponents, including sanctions against the infringement of Islamic principles. Hence, for the PKS ideology is still the point of reference for every member, either to support or oppose the party leadership.

In this regard, it is concluded that the PKS practises moderation without abandoning its ideology. The reason for the moderation may be partly based on Islamic interpretation, as claimed by the party elites, but it is difficult to deny that it is also partly driven by the motivation to win elections. With a mixed basis of moderation, political achievement such as winning elections and supporting the Government as part of a coalition is interpreted as the success of *dakwah*, a sacred mission inherited from the Tarbiyah Movement. Therefore, it is difficult to deny that the party needs ideology to legitimise its actions in politics as it tries to use it as the final point of reference, even though in practice the real pressure is to gain as many votes as possible in elections. In fact, ideology is still crucial for the PKS because it is a tool to maintain the loyalty of members and in certain situations to determine members' loyalty.

It is a different situation for the AKP in the Turkish political system. There is a real pressure from secularist strongholds to abandon any ideological reference to Islam. Therefore, the reason for working without strong reference to Islam is a deliberate attempt to avoid the pressure. Abandoning any reference to Islam is a pragmatic effort in order to survive in politics and the real challenge for the new party is to explain that without it there is also opportunity to achieve political success. It means that there is no deliberate attempt

to impose or even promote principles of religion in public life and the political success is a result of ability to deliver services and produce policies to meet public demands. The key element for the AKP to succeed is having a vision and leadership that are attractive to the public. Religiosity is part of public's evaluation of the personality of the party leadership rather than an attachment to the party as ideological preference. But the party could face a potential conflict especially from those elements within the party that still have a strong attachment to Islam. The challenge for the AKP, then, is to explain to its members that certain aspects of religiosity can work with secularism to reduce potential internal conflict.

Therefore, with different grades of moderation, the two parties face different potential problems. Abandoning a strong attachment to Islam, the AKP has had to convince internal religious elements to accept its political vision and leadership. Besides that, the party has also needed to develop internal party mechanism and suitable institutions to accommodate a variety of backgrounds of its members, as it has become a virtual secular party that is open to all Turks. But the relationship between members with different political preferences can trigger internal conflict.

As distinct from the AKP, the PKS has to face the problem of defining its policies in relation to moderation. Moderation has become a problem in the party because there are various interpretations regarding the implementation of moderation itself. It is typical of internal tension within a party that is trying to change its interpretation as a basis for political action. To deal with it, it is crucial to develop a legitimate interpretation and to force it as an effective basis for loyalty and mobilisation. For the PKS, the struggle to find a legitimate interpretation is shaped by those who hold positions of power in the party structure.

Theoretically, there are various strategies applied by moderated parties in dealing with the impact of moderation which relate to party leadership, trust, conversion-replacement, and decomposition. The application of these strategies to the AKP and the PKS shows different application of each strategy. For the AKP, all of the strategies are applied, except the conversion that does not have any relation with replacement. Meanwhile, the PKS tend to apply alienation in spite of conversion-replacement to combine with the other strategies of leadership, trust and decomposition.

On party leadership (also related to the character of party institutions), the AKP has stressed the leadership of its chairman. Erdoğan became a significant factor to attract

supporters to join the party and members admired him for his vision for a better Turkey. He was also perceived as an honest person due to his religious background. Nevertheless, Erdoğan also posed mixed challenges for the party. He helped the party to gain popular support, but the AKP had to accommodate his role by legalising it in the party constitution. He controls three branches of power: the party itself, the parliamentary party and the cabinet. On the party executive board, he has the right to choose his closest aides. However, to balance his formal influence the party also implemented mechanism of consultation so as to enable alternative policies to be discussed.

The absence of strict ideology has given the party the chance to give space to discussion within the party. Every member has a relatively equal opportunity to express ideas without fearing expulsion. Therefore, the AKP is able to build loyalty as members believe that the party has offered opportunity to express their political activism. There is a widespread conviction that the party leadership will improve their circumstances despite the shift in ideological direction. The shift is not perceived as a threat to members' beliefs since it is linked to the tradition of conservatism among the Turks that is also coherent with current political trends. Therefore, the leadership's ability to convince religious elements has clearly reduced potential conflict given the fact that the majority of the RP and the FP supporters now support the AKP. They are relatively happy with the new direction and see it as an opportunity rather than a threat.

There is a significant factor that makes the AKP's members able to accommodate the new direction, especially among the higher-rank members. They understand that they have to refrain from any confrontation towards secular strongholds which are perceived as a threat to the party's existence. With that mentality, they have developed self-discipline to define appropriate and inappropriate political actions to maintain the AKP's position in order to prevent severe actions from secular strongholds. They can refrain from actions to challenge secular strongholds on issues related to religion such as the prohibition of the headscarf in education. Although some members are not genuinely happy with that position, staying in the party and supporting the current vision of the party are still perceived as the best option rather than leaving it. It can be said that the political environment has significantly shaped the way the AKP's members define themselves and locate themselves in the current political context.

The PKS faces a different style of leadership. There is no charismatic leader because it has developed, rather, from the solid network of an underground Islamic movement. The movement, known informally as Tarbiyah Movement, created a network to internalise the understanding of Islamic teaching and recruited members carefully. This remained secret from the 1980s to the fall of New Order in 1998. Given the nature of the movement it was difficult for a leader to develop a personal charisma. Most members were interested in the message of Islam with strong emphasis on purification as well as the method of the movement itself. Therefore, the movement emphasised the importance of the mission of Islam, using particular methods of teaching, rather than focusing on the influence of a particular person.

However, despite its strong emphasis on collectivism, the Tarbiyah Movement did give prominence to the movement's foremost founder, who is now acting as the head of the Shura Assembly. The structure of the parties established by the movement, since the PK and then the PKS, gave authority to Hilmi Aminuddin to direct general and strategic policies. Although he is only the leader of a collective body, he does appear to have informal authority and can influence many of party's decisions including the endorsement of the moderation policy. Therefore, it is logical that recent criticisms are also aimed to Hilmi Aminuddin himself who was accused of leading the party against the Islamic principles.

In general, the party leadership is able to maintain the loyalty of the majority of its members by utilising the understanding of principles of *amal jama'i*, taught in the weekly training sessions for members. This requires a member to become a single "brick on a wall" and a good member is one who behaves in accordance with such a role. The result is an embedded attitude of obedience toward the party leadership which becomes a strong basis of solidity for the party. With such an attitude among members, the party can mobilise its members quite easily. When other parties in Indonesia are still having the problem of building an organisational cohesiveness based on strong values or ideology, the PKS has shown its ability to go through many difficult moments by utilising the obedience of members.

The attitude may also be linked to an understanding that the system in the party has worked well. For members, it is inconceivable that the party leadership will drive the party and its members based on personal interest. They understand that the party works for the

vision of *dakwah*. Hence, every single activity within the party is perceived as connected with party and its religious values and whoever is in the position of leadership will also commit to its mission. Therefore, the obedience comes from the understanding that the party is not merely a group of politicians who are working for their own interest but for the *dakwah*.

This is also strengthened by the fact that those who obtain strategic positions within the party are seen by members as the authoritative persons. As long as the elites can be categorised as wisdom cadres due to their understanding of Islam, they will be entitled to hold higher positions and automatically have a privilege to be admired due to their extensive knowledge. Therefore, the party leadership is a strong element that enjoys submission from all cadres according to the principle of obedience toward leadership and with the basis of implementation of religious principles, trust among cadres is incalculably significant to build strong awareness. Obedience and trust will endure as long as the party leaderships are able to maintain legitimacy by giving religious as well as strategic explanation toward their decisions. With the admiration from all cadres toward the leadership and system, the party could minimise the potency of internal conflict.

For the PKS, the existence of a clear ideology has constituted a basis for legitimacy. As long as the party leadership is able to explain party policy in accordance with ideology, party members will accept new directions, including moderation. Therefore, support for the leadership mainly depends on its ability to produce a clear interpretation for members as it can be challenged by critical members. In that situation, different interpretation within the party is possible and it may lead to a contest in interpretation between the party leadership and critical members. Carsey and Layman noted that the confrontation to win the loyalty of the party's members will be secured by those who have the legal authority to make decisions. It means that the party's leader is in a better position to resolve the tensions in order to assume the loyalty of members. The case of the PKS demonstrated that its internal tensions had been reduced significantly by the dismissal of critical and disloyal members.

In terms of dealing with opposition, another comparison with the AKP can be made in the case of defining those who are not in favour of the party's policies or decisions. When it is decided what internal opposition is, the party can withdraw the defined member's rights to attend weekly routine training (*halaqah* or *usrah*) or discharge them from any organisational tasks. The party's actions can become more serious if there is no

genuine effort to accept the party's decisions that may lead to isolation from any relation and communication with all of the party members. It may also lead to imposition of sanctions depending on the level of infringement. In the PKS, the definition of violation is based on two different aspects which are moral and organisational. The former is developed from the principles of Islam which has a clear definition of actions and related sanctions as well. Meanwhile, the latter is related to organisation and leadership that has a dimension of interpretation in defining action that may be categorised as degrading the party's image and leadership. At this point, as noted before, the party leadership has the advantage of giving definition of legitimate interpretation on ideology that should not be violated.

Therefore, the PKS applies the combination of sanctions on cadres who refuse to adapt their individual preferences to the intrinsic values of trust and obedience. The sanctions are related to the implementation of a mechanism that will be applied to cadres who are defined as extensively critical. The principle is clear that collective decision should become the ultimate goal of the party. Hence, having different opinions on the party's policies is perceived as a violation of religious principles. The party has defined details of behaviours that can be categorised as violation in the party's constitution including details of sanctions that can be imposed to the dissidents. However, in practice, the PKS applies flexible implementation of the sanctions. The party still tolerates different opinions as long as they are expressed individually. More stringent sanctions will apply if criticisms are shown to be able to influence other members. It is proven that firm actions have influenced many members who do not want to lose their connection with the party. In the case of the PKS, decomposition strategy that is particularly applied in a party in moderation as noticed by Orbell and Fougere is conducted effectively to protect 'positive' outcome in electoral process.

In addition to the decomposition strategy, the case of the PKS indicates the application of alienation strategy. Alienation is part of the strategy to deal with members who do not adhere to the party's decisions. However, it is a different strategy from decomposition because the party still hopes that they will change their attitudes. The strategy also aims to protect other members from their influence by discharging critical members from organisational tasks. It includes dismantling all training groups under supervision of critical members, in order to minimise the effect of oppositional opinions. More harsh action is taken against those who are completely confronting party decisions

without any hope that they will alter their position. Another consideration for more severe action is if there is the potential to circulate different opinions and mobilise more members into opposition. This is the demarcation to differentiate between members who are likely to be forgiven or who will be dismissed from the party membership.

Alienation and decomposition strategies are effective to undermine the willingness to oppose or criticise the party's decisions. It is effective in the case of the PKS due to the nature of the party as a collective group. Hence, members are tied closely with the group defined by Islamic brotherhood, so that any exclusion from the party is seen as a severe punishment. As a result, many party members try not to be categorised as critical members. They know the consequences and because of that they do not want to behave contrary to the party's policies. The PKS does not give opportunity for members to comment freely in public, especially if it is an expression of criticism or dissent after a decision was made. The policy to restrict comments protects the party from internal conflict also because many members will refrain from any expressions that may lead to accusations of not supporting the party. Therefore, both sanctions, alienation and decomposition, play a great role in preventing internal criticism and opposition in the PKS.

Nevertheless, there is a danger of excessive implementation of alienation and decomposition strategies that may lead the party leadership to be unchallenged and without criticism of its policies. Despite the effectiveness of making political decisions without much challenge from within, the party might not be able to examine different ideas among the party's elites or wider members in order to formulate better options. This lack of discourse among the party elites is also acknowledged by some members who are loyal but still maintain a certain level of criticism. There is a need of having more space for discourse as proven from an expression such as 'discourse is needed as a mechanism to find better options because there are no false decisions, but only good or better decisions.'

It will be more difficult for those who are willing to be loyal but at the same time expressing their eagerness to get more opportunities to build a tradition of discourse within the party. As mentioned before, the idea is not to challenge any religious principles or breaching loyalty. It is more related to the opportunity of getting better options if there is more space to have wider discourse among members. There is also a willingness to have more stringent supervision of cadres' behaviour in politics that can potentially damage the party's image among the public. However, the structure of the decision making process and



also the relation of tutor – trainee do not give opportunities to the realisation of such ideas. For the last aspect, the origin of the PKS as an Islamic movement that focused on intensive Islamic teaching has maintained the relation of giving more admiration to the high-rank members who also function as their religious tutor.

The role of the head of the Shura Assembly as *Muraqib 'Amm* is more exceptional because he has the most distinctive role in building the movement from the very beginning and developing it carefully until it became a significant political power. It then became difficult to challenge his opinions and argue any issues because many of the party elite admire him. Only those who are strong or courageous enough to challenge his position with arguments will be able to influence him. Those who fail to reassure him and even dare to criticise him directly will face severe consequences. However, the head of the Assembly is not always the ultimate dominant figure since he also urges collective decision making process in the Assembly.

Having the courage is essential for members to deal with the consequence of being critical because being alienated is also an unpleasant experience. Restriction to have any relation with those who are officially alienated is strict and may have economic consequences losing business with many cadre colleagues. It may also lead to the loss of close friends who suddenly dissociate themselves from the dismissed cadres. For those who are not strong enough to face such consequences the only option is to remain passive or resign from party activities. There are cases of self alienation from the party politics as an expression of discontent or at least to lessen their support to the party's politics. Hence, the only remaining association with the party is the attendance to weekly party gathering (*halaqah* or *usrah*) to maintain their relation with the original vision of spreading Islamic vision. In cases of strong disciplinary action, there will be restrictions on attending the congregation as well as having a group of members to teach.

Refraining is the best option for some until the new direction emerges to replace the current approach. The consequence is that they will not work for the party with full commitment which is not in the party's best interest and tend to apply a self-alienated position. However, it has to be considered that the number of those who commit to work for the party is still high compared to critical members and the self-alienated. Many of those who are dissatisfied with the current situation continue to work for the party to limit the possible damage to the party, even within the elite circle as well. They work within the

party system and try to maintain good relation with the party's leader and all elites. They have a more optimistic point of view and leave all consideration of misbehaviour and misdeeds of some party elites to God.

It is a different situation with the AKP because the party gives a space to every member to express their feelings without any fear of being dismissed or given sanctions. There is a promise that the party members will not be punished because of representing demands of their constituents, especially for deputies in the parliament. However, it is not a free ticket to express whatever they think because the party also requires them to act as a collective group as well. However, different from the PKS where dissent can have serious consequences, the members of the AKP who are not in favour with policies of the party may declare publicly to leave the party voluntarily. As a party of coalition from different backgrounds, it is quite easy to leave and find other political parties that are more suitable to their preferences. Therefore, there is no need to pressure party members to follow the party's leadership based on ideological understanding.

In the AKP, the definition of being dismissed or replaced is defined by performance and the ability to maintain popular support. If a member fails to perform, there is a potential action to withdraw from his or her position. In this context, ideology has less of a function in defining loyalty of party members, even though the party has "Conservative Democrat" as a formal ideology which actually functions as identity. For the AKP, it is more important to persuade its members to perform rather than look at degree of understanding on the ideology. Therefore, the definition of violation toward the party's principles is emphasised on organisational dimension as written in the party constitution.

However, the party still has ethical aspects by imposing certain moral aspects. One of the examples is to reject any actions involving pornography by using internet facilities at the party's office. The case is quite similar to the PKS when one of its legislators was forced to withdraw after accessing pornographic pictures during a parliament session. He had left his parliamentary responsibilities but the party continues to retain his membership despite the detrimental impact caused by his actions. In contrast, the AKP shows more strict position on this by rejecting membership of any person who has committed such transgression because such attitude is damaging to the party's image. The PKS maintains the lawmaker's membership because the misdeed was processed under religious consideration rather than organisational. The treatment is an authoritative action because it

is written in the constitution that mandates the party to form a special body to deal with religious matters, the DSP. Hence, the constitution of the PKS contains two different principles rather than one which are organisational and Islam as a reflection of preserving ideology.

It is obvious that abandoning a strong attachment to an ideology created a tricky task for the AKP's leaders. They have to deal with former supporters and members of the RP and the FP regarded as having more ideological credence. It is a huge task to explain and propose a new direction toward them and it is defined as efforts to transform party members and its supporters to embrace a new approach in politics. The main message of the transformation is to separate religion and politics to accept politics as a secular arena. With this approach, religious congregation as a method of transferring interpretation on certain ideology as implemented by the RP is replaced by training on professional skills and non-religious topics. By offering the training combined with organisational style, the party developed more individual character of membership. It is one of the characteristics of the AKP that has developed its image as a secular political party as a result of transformation. At that point, it is reasonable to understand why there is no need to obtain a certain level of ideological understanding in order to gain higher level in the party's structure.

In more direct words it can be concluded that both the AKP and the PKS have given different tendencies to implement strategies to manage the impact of moderation. In the leadership, both parties emphasised the role of the party's leader as one of the main factors to maintain members' loyalty. However, each party implements a different style of leadership. The AKP depends on a more charismatic leader who plays the role of party chairman to control the parliament and the cabinet. In contrast, in the PKS the role of party leader is to act behind the scenes as the head of the Shura Assembly but he holds also a strategic position to supervise general party's direction and manoeuvre in politics. Meanwhile, the President runs the party's organisation to implement mandates decided by the Assembly. In this case, moderation does not give any preference on particular style of leadership. It is not a unique case exclusively influenced by moderation process because other parties, other than the AKP and the PKS, can also operate under similar conditions. However, there is a tendency that having an ideology will result in relatively less available space for free expression because popular demand is not the only determinant factor in

formulation of policies within the party. Meanwhile, less significant ideological preferences will give more opportunity to represent popular sentiments as an implementation of principle to serve the people.

The AKP and the PKS parties also enjoy a high degree of trust among the party members. It is also an important strategy to minimise opposition to moderation. For a less ideological party such as the AKP, the vision and personal charisma combined with the party's programmes are more significant than an attachment to ideology. There is also a conviction that lessening an ideological weight is better in the current political circumstances of Turkish politics that makes demands on a strict ideology less significant.

In contrary, an ideological party such as the PKS depends on its ability to convince its members that the moderation policy is part of the sacred mission which is legitimate to be supported. Unconvincing explanation has initiated internal criticism but supports from prominent party elites as well as a strong commitment to the sacred mission have left the opposition in a difficult situation. A strong belief on ideological interpretation by legitimate party elites is also crucial to maintain the loyalty of the majority of members. Therefore, ideology plays a great role to make members not oppose the party leadership's new direction. It is believed that moderation is heading toward righteous direction in accordance with the ideology. The case of the PKS has given an indication that trust based on ideological interpretation is more durable because it encourages followers to be loyal as long as moderation is legitimate justified by legitimate persons. The willingness to maintain ideology has also encouraged the party to sustain the method of congregation as a process to transfer official interpretation, which is not needed in the party that has abandoned ideology.

It is also proven that the absence of ideological preferences in the AKP has changed the nature of decomposition strategy. If the party needs to take action against its member, it is more related to disciplinary issue rather than dismissing party members because of opposition to the party's interpretation of ideology. There is a case of members' dismissal that is related to values that can be categorised as moral which is categorised as part of tradition in society. Hence, this is not the case of an ideological party because dismissals are based on evaluation of criticism toward the party's leadership and its interpretation of the party's ideology and the definition of violation also depends on interpretation of principles of ideology itself. It can be concluded that decomposition is more difficult to be

found in a party that has been moderated and reach the level of abandoning ideological preference. Meanwhile, a party that is still in the process of moderation but still uphold ideology will face internal ideological disputes that may lead to dismissal of critical members because of different interpretations.

In the strategy of conversion and replacement, the party that applies moderation to abandon ideology has to place emphasis on transformation strategy in order to gain more popular support, including those who have strong ideological preferences. Once the reason is accepted then a party will get support from different backgrounds, not only from particular groups. The AKP and the PKS show that it is crucial to hold positions in the party's structures in order to monopolise rightful interpretation which is significant to control members' attitudes.

It is noticed that alienation is also a significant strategy to prevent internal opposition because of the nature of the party as a collective and communal group. It is an effective psychological pressure for members to refrain from any action or behaviour that can be perceived as insubordination. Alienation means to lose contact with the community and there is a fear that it is difficult to maintain previous status as well as reputation among other members, that forces members to maintain their loyalty rather than being critical or initiating discourse. As a result, being alienated as well as decomposed from the party are not the best options for members of a moderated party with ideological preferences. However, the party without ideological preferences is relatively free from the implementation of alienation.

The cases of the AKP and the PKS suggest that different implementation of moderation can signify the variation of strategies in managing the impact of moderation. It can be concluded that the former applied moderation to make a substantial transformation by abandoning ideology, while the latter has not transformed its ideology substantially to implement more pragmatic adjustment of moderation. In Wickham's definition, the AKP has reached the condition to abandon any ideological preferences, so that it does not apply any strategies related to ideology, such as dismissal of membership due to ideological conflicts and alienation. In contrast, the PKS still holds an ideology so the moderation is still in the level of either revision or postpone, even though it has initiated several efforts to accommodate popular sentiments.

The outcome is obvious that the AKP can develop an organisational approach more significantly compared to the PKS. One of the strong indications of an organisational approach is the definition of violation of the party's rule. The AKP defines the violation according to the principles of organisation, while the PKS develops two different categories of violation which are violation on *shari'a* and organisational principles. The difference indicates that substantial moderation will lead a party to non-ideological character. Hence, to achieve this stage of moderation, a party and its members should abandon any ideological preferences. In its internal perspective, the consent toward the abandonment can be achieved by providing a series of party programmes to convince those who still have strong relation with any ideology. However, the AKP has distinct social and political contexts that stimulate the motivation to develop a substantial moderation, especially given the strict interpretation of secularism of Turkish state. On the contrary, there is a space for ideological expression in democratic Indonesia to allow the PKS to maintain Islam as its formal ideology.

In that case, to put the AKP as a model for other Islamic parties in the Muslim world is rather debatable. There is still a big question mark on the readiness of the Islamic parties to abandon or at least transform Islam to suit the popular sentiments due to participation in electoral process. The case of the PKS is one of the examples of a problematic situation because the party has to deal with two different aspects at the same time: winning elections and preserving its ideology or to make a balance between votes and *shari'a*. The strategies to manage the impact of moderation in the PKS indicate that ideology still plays a great role in maintaining members' loyalty. It is probably premature to conclude that the PKS model of moderation is unsuccessful due to its stagnation in the last election. However, democracy gives opportunities for the party and also the public to evaluate their preferences. Thus, the moderation process has to be seen as an ongoing process. In the future, the party may offer different approaches in politics which may be acceptable to the wider public. The two cases, the AKP and the PKS, signify the challenges of Islamic movements to find a suitable 'transformation' that suits the local context. Participation in the electoral process requires significant adjustment and also creates complexity that they have to deal with.

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## **Appendices A**

### **List of Interviewees for the AKP whose names are not for publication**

A.1. Anonymous (2009). Political analyst, interviewed by author, Ankara, 27 October.

A.2. Anonymous (2009). Journalist, researcher, interviewed by author, Istanbul, 23 October.

A.3. Anonymous (2009). Economic analyst, interviewed by author, Ankara and Istanbul, 7 and 9 January.

A.4. Anonymous (2010). Party member, youth branch, interviewed by author, Istanbul, 24 January.

## Appendices B

### List of Interviewees for the PKS whose names are not for publication

- B.1. Anonymous (2008). Student activist, interviewed by author, Depok, 8 July.
- B.2. Anonymous (2008). Member, village level, interviewed by author, Jakarta, 25 May.
- B.3. Anonymous (2008). Member, district level, interviewed by author, Semarang, 28 Mei.
- B.4. Anonymous (2008). Former member, interviewed by author, Bogor, 26 June.
- B.5. Anonymous (1994). Member of Tarbiyah Movement, personal communication with author, Jakarta, July.
- B.6. Anonymous (2008). Member of parliament, interviewed by author, Jakarta, 23 May.
- B.7. Anonymous (2008). Member, village level, interviewed by author, Jakarta, 25 May.
- B.8. Anonymous (2008). Journalist, member, district level, interviewed by author, Depok, 5 August.
- B.9. Anonymous (2010). Former member of local parliament, interviewed by author, Jakarta, 29 July.
- B.10. Anonymous (2010). Member of parliament, interviewed by author, London, 16 July.
- B.11. Anonymous (2009). Member of parliament, interviewed by author, Jakarta, 10 June.
- B.12. Anonymous (2010). Academician, interviewed by author, London, 20 March.
- B.13. Anonymous (2008). Member, district level, interviewed by author, Jakarta, 29 June.
- B.14. Anonymous (2008). Member, district level, interviewed by author, Jakarta, 8 May.

B.15. Anonymous (2008). Member. district member, interviewed by author, Semarang, 29 May.

B.16. Anonymous (2011). Member, national level, interviewed by author, London, 12 January.

B.17. Anonymous (2008). Academician, interviewed by author, Depok, 13 May.

B.18. Anonymous (2008). Journalist, member, national level, interviewed by author, Depok, 14 May.