From the Mosque to Satellite Broadcasting:
A Historical Perspective of Hamas Media Strategy

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Wael Abdelal
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Wael Abdelal,
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Abstract

The media keeps the Palestinian dream of a homeland and quest to end the occupation alive. Thus, the media has been a potent weapon in the story of the Palestinian people’s struggle for freedom. This thesis examines the Hamas media strategy in three different periods, and in its historical and analytical context. The first period begins with the outbreak of the Palestinian intifada in 1987 and ends in 1993. In this period, Hamas was strictly a secret/underground organisation. The second stage is from 1994 to 2005. This period witnessed the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority in 1994 and the second intifada. The third period begins after the 2006 elections, where Hamas came to the power after its victory in the PLC elections. The thesis uses an empirical investigation, which relies on two qualitative methods: interviews and document analysis. It illustrates how the Hamas media strategy developed over the mentioned periods and outlines the overall media strategy. The research critically assesses four elements of the Hamas media strategy, which were the media message (discourse), the media objectives, the infrastructure, and the target audience. The present research concludes that Hamas, since 1987, has developed a media strategy based on the four mentioned elements. In particular, it finds that the idea of the resistance is the key element of the Hamas media discourse. Political and ideological/religious agendas and impulses drive Hamas’s discourse. Second, it finds there are two types of objectives tactical and strategic. The former are subject to the context, while the latter is based on ideological political agendas. Third, it finds there are five ‘circles’ of the target audience, which Hamas considers in its media strategy. Finally, it finds that the Hamas media infrastructure expanded from 1987 to the present by using the maximum capacity of the media outlets and benefited from the new media institutions under the rubric of the ‘independent media’. Overall, the thesis is the first in-depth academic study on Hamas' media strategy.
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Chapter One: An Introductory Framework

Purpose of the Study and Research Question(s)

Interwoven into Palestinian pluralism, the Islamic resistance movement ‘Hamas’ is an integral part of Palestinian society and, arguably, one of the most important Palestinian organizations in recent decades. Its evolution is particularly remarkable given its young age, and when comparing it to other Palestinian factions such as the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah). Worldwide attention and its placement under a microscope really came after the Hamas' 2006 victory in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) election and through the formation of its government in the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Afterward, numerous debates and studies were conducted and organized by think-tanks and research centres all over the world, with the majority concentrating on Hamas as a case study in the context of the rise of political Islam. This study, therefore, falls in line with many others. It differs though, as will be demonstrated and discussed below, because no one has yet to systematically and historically contextualize the development of Hamas' media strategy. In this regard, the project is distinct from all previous studies.

The rise of Hamas, as argued by Abu-Amr\(^1\) and Hroub,\(^2\) must be understood in the context of the failure of secular-oriented projects in Palestine, and the presentation of itself as an ideological and political alternative. In Gramscian terms, it created for itself a discursive counter-narrative that propelled its representation as a counter-hegemonic force inside the world of Palestinian politics and, as this study will likewise demonstrate, the world of resistance. Hamas’ “Islamic resistance” project rivaled the ‘settlement of the Israel-Palestine conflict’ or ‘peace process’ that was adopted by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).

Since Hamas' establishment, it has extensively utilised the media as a means of mobilization for its political and ideological agendas. The media project began with rudimentary means such graffiti, posters, printed leaflets, and mosques microphones. Today, at least as of 2011, Hamas’ media infrastructure includes two satellite

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\(^1\) Abu Amr, Ziyad: *Islamic fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad*, (Indiana University Press, 1994).

broadcasting channels, a terrestrial TV station, FM radios, media production companies, electronic online media, a Hollywood-style media city and spokesperson offices. The evolution has been remarkable, to say the least.

These media outlets have represented and taken the form of alternative media, with the mainstream being reflective of the Israeli and/or the PNA media narrative. It should be noted here that both the Israeli and the PNA media could be considered separately or collectively, depending upon how they were being examined and analysed. Given that the intention of this study is not to compare counter-narratives in the creation of counter-hegemonic paradigms, the Israeli and the PNA media will be juxtaposed and recognised as Hamas sought and continues to challenge in the development of its media strategy. Development of an alternative and a counter-hegemonic narrative were a significant instrument of Hamas’ resistance project. Media has not been less important than “violent resistance.” As Hamas senior leader Fathi Hammad\(^3\) stated, “media is a decisive weapon”.\(^4\)

As alluded to in the introduction, the Hamas media strategy has not been studied academically and relatively little is known about its development in mainstream public discourse. This research rectifies that problem by investigating the emergence of its media strategy. In so doing, it explores the context accompanying the formation of the Hamas media strategy over three different phases. An examination of its development over the phases will shed light on the relationship between media development generally and its impact on the growth of Hamas’ strategy in particular. Theoretically, development is interdependent, thus implying that the process and actors are shaped by, and well as shaping, interaction and their relationship with one another and the paradigmatic forces.

Given this theoretical relationship, an examination of the three different phases is important. The first stage begins with the outbreak of the Palestinian intifada in 1987 and ends in 1993. In this period, Hamas was strictly a secret/underground organisation. The second stage is from 1994 to 2005. Ending prior to the 2006 Palestinian legislative

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3 The founder and chairman of the ‘Al-Aqsa media network.’ The network consists of the Al-Aqsa Satellite channel, the Al-Aqsa Local TV’, Radio ‘Sawt Al-Aqsa’ and Al-Aqsa Live FM, the Al-Aqsa training centre, and the ‘Asda’a media city’. Hammad also currently serves as the Interior Minister of the Palestinian Government in Gaza. He is regarded as one of the most important Hamas leaders involved in the Hamas media empire.

4 Lecture by Hammad to the Hamas media staff, October 2004.
Council election, this period witnessed the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority in 1994 and the second intifada. It is also in this phase that Hamas combined its political opposition status and that of resistance. The third period begins after the 2006 elections, where Hamas came to power after its victory in the PLC elections.

The study, therefore, addresses critical issues related to the emergence of Hamas' media strategy. Namely, it addresses the infrastructure of Hamas’ media and how evolved from using very rudimentary mass communications in the late 1980s to the building of a ‘media empire’ that includes all types of print and electronic media; and, it addresses the Hamas media objectives in each phase, the target audience and the media message (discourse). The aim is not to discuss the overall Hamas political/ideological strategy but, rather, the contextualisation and historisation of the media strategy. Thus, the core questions are:

- How, why and in what context did ‘Hamas media institution’ develop its media strategy? What were the key features of this strategy? Was there evolution in the strategy employed and how did this correspond to Hamas’ media development?

In addressing these core questions, the present research will investigate the emergence of the Hamas’ media strategy in the aforementioned three phases. Investigation permits the placement and understanding of the media in the overall Hamas’ project; the discovery of the concept of the al’ilam almuqawim [media resistance] of Hamas; and, the importance of media to Hamas' project of Islamic resistance. This contextualisation of the evolution of Hamas' media strategy will permit the development, historisation and understanding of what may be called ‘a comprehensive media strategy’. Consequently, four sub-questions emerge.

- To what extent was the Hamas media discourse based on the notion of resistance? What were the key features of such discourse? And, did Hamas manage to adapt (or modify) it according to political context?

- How, and in what context did Hamas expand its media infrastructure in each stage? And, how did Hamas use to its advantage the media and communication technology?

- To what extent did Hamas' media adapt its objectives in each phase? What were the key objectives?
What were the main categories of the Hamas media target audience? Why and to what extent did Hamas media take into consideration the specificity of each group of the target audience?

**Literature review**

This section aims to review the existing literature that pertains to Hamas' media. This will highlight the significance of the research project to the subject area by critically assessing existing articles, books and unpublished dissertations on Hamas. The section is divided into three sub-sections that are related directly and indirectly to the subject area. The first section covers the literature on media, including alternative media approaches and media strategy. The second section focuses on the literature on the existing media paradigms, namely the Arab and Palestinian media. The last section discusses the literature on Hamas and its media.

**Media and Alternative Media**

“It should be clear that the mass communication theory is really mass communication theories, each more or less relevant to the given medium, audience, time, conditions, and theorists. But this should not viewed as a problem. Mass communication theory can be personalised; it is ever-evolving, it is dynamic.”

Indeed, theorising a particular media paradigm requires understanding the context in which it is framed. This study argues that the emergence of the Hamas media strategy is inseparable from the context of its political development and the Palestinian issue. It is also connected to regional and international factors. For this study, conceptualising the media-political relationship within the Palestinian, regional and international context is important for understanding the development of the Hamas media strategy.

Today, there is no doubt that media has become an essential part of life. Media have become an instrument of political and economic power, as well as social and cultural life. Pioneer scholars in the field such as Frederick Siebert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm articulated four media theories in the mid-1950s, namely

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authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility and communist. Each theory deals with the media and its roles from different angles. For instance, the ‘Libertarian’ approach posits that media are “free to publish what they like” and “journalists and media organizations are given full autonomy”. In contrast, the authoritarian approach holds that “media serve the needs of the state through direct government control,” with journalists and media organisations working under the “censorship and punishment of those caught breaking the rules”.

Sarah Oates summarised the definitions of media in regard to the above mentioned theories. As Baran and Davis regard media theory as “ever-evolving [and] dynamic”, there is no exact description for such theory. In almost all the theories, media represent an instrument of exercising power in all aspects of life, including cultures, economics, politics and societies. Eoin Devereux emphasises that in politics it is “a means of exercising power by virtue of the relatively privileged access that politicians and agents of governments can gradually claim from the media as a legitimate right”. Robert Kolker in ‘Media Studies: An Introduction’ had the same opinion, articulating that political power is exercised through media.

Notwithstanding the hundreds, if not thousands, of books and articles dealing with media and its political milieu, literature on the alternative media are limited. Chris Atton has written a number of books on the alternative media model, arguing there are different approaches that comprise the paradigm. For Atton, the use of alternative media depends on spatial-temporal circumstances, the people in charge, and the issues adopted. Atton argues that “even within a single area of alternative media there is much heterogeneity”. Hence, “Alternative Media” scholars define it from different angles.

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8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Look at Appendix 1.
14 Atton, Chris: Alternative media, (SAGE, 2002), p. 8. See also Atton, Chris, Hamilton, James F., Alternative Journalism’, (SAGE, 2008), and Atton, Chris: An Alternative Internet: Radical Media,
perspectives with multiple meanings. Mitzi Waltz attempts to present a simple definition, stating: “the media are alternative to, or in opposition to, something else: mass-media products that are widely available and widely consumed”.

Olga Bailey, Bart Cammaerts, and Nico Carpentier determine four approaches to alternative media. The first approach focuses on the role alternative media plays in serving the community. In this instance, coverage pertains to community matters and the discussions thereof are also limited to its members. In this context, alternative media prioritizes the concept of the community. It does so by covering issues designed to enhance and strengthen the community. Vinod Pavarala and Kanchan K. Malik in ‘Other Voices: The Struggle for Community Radio in India’ apply this approach to examine community radio.

The second approach links alternative media to civil society. Consequently, alternative media is considered part of the civil society. This approach, it is argued, has the potential to play a significant role in ‘democratization through media’ by permitting civil society organisations to participate in public debate. Hock Guan Lee, in ‘Civil society in Southeast Asia,’ examined the role played by the media as an actor in civil society. The third approach is called ‘Alternative media as rhizome’. The metaphor of the ‘rhizome’ is used to describe “the ways ideas and tactics flow, like underground root systems, across space to unite his highly diverse and geographically scattered constellation of social change advocate”. Accordingly, alternative media in this context is considered “as the crossroads where people from different types of movements and struggles meet and collaborate.” They enhance and link diverse

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16 Bailey, Olga. G., Cammaert, Bart., and Carpentier, Nico: *Understanding alternative media,* (Open University Press, 2008), pp. 3-34
18 Bailey, O. G., Cammaert, B., and Carpentier, N., p. 3-34.
19 Ibid.
20 Guan Lee, Hock: *Civil society in Southeast Asia,* (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), p. 149.
21 Bailey, O. G., Cammaert, B., and Carpentier, N, p. 3-34.
23 Bailey, O. G., Cammaert, B., and Carpentier, N. p3-34.
democratic struggles through debates on a multitude of subjects related to political and social changes. This kind of alternative media is used widely by individuals in Iran, the Arab world and the developing world in general. Blogs and forums became the main outlets of such kind of media.

The fourth approach treats alternative media from the angle of opposition; that is, as a ‘counter-hegemonic’ critique of mainstream media. This approach is exploited by revolutionary organizations, struggle movements and political opposition groups, especially those who lean toward the adoption of ideological or religious propositions. Atton emphasises that ‘the alternative media are inseparable from ideology, domination and the Gramscian notion of hegemony’. Annabelle Sreberny, Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi, and Ali Mohammadi, in ‘Small media, big revolution: communication, culture, and the Iranian revolution’, present the experience of the Iranian revolution and the use of such kind of media against the ‘Shah’ in the late 1970s. Media messages of the Iranian activists were a reflection of the ideological-revolutionary nature of the Iranian revolution. Consequently, they adopted an ‘anti-hegemonic’ discourse. In a similar context, David Wigston historicised the South African alternative media/press in their struggle against the apartheid system.

John Downing agrees with Atton when referring to the Gramscian notion of the ‘organic intellectual’ to be re-rendered as a ‘communicator/activist.’ Gramsci was particularly concerned with the role of intellectual in the changing process. Downing, thus, situates the alternative media within the framework of the state power, hegemony and insubordination nexus. Martin James in his reading of Gramsci discusses the role of the media, stating: “Gramsci understood the power of literature, newspaper, [and] films in the creation of consensus. He was, no doubt, aware that Linen had discussed literature and especially film as part of the vanguard of revolutionary change, and possibly how Walter Benjamin had examined the role of newspaper and film in revolutionary and
counter-revolutionary terms”\textsuperscript{30} Daniala Baratiri places the cinema in Algeria in 1950s and 1960s in the frame of anti-colonial struggles.\textsuperscript{31} Similarly, Anthony R. Guneratne, and Wimal Dissanayake also situate their study in this framework\textsuperscript{32}.

There are a limited number of studies which utilize the fourth approach in the examination of the region. As the above referenced literature suggests, they concentrate on Algeria and Iran. A lack of such studies is problematic given the important role media plays in the rise of resistance movement throughout the entire region in the colonial and post-colonial period. These movements, whether religious or secular, can be situated within this paradigm and as actors in the Gramsian context. Movement mobilization depended on the development of the counter-hegemonic frame from the colonial and, later, mainstream narrative.

While the alternative media paradigm and the fourth approach is the most applicable and used in this study to examine the development of Hamas' media strategy, it should be noted that the theories discussed above demonstrate the problem of theorizing in general. The theories fail to examine and account for the new changes and shifts within the media such as the role and development of media institutions by non-state actors. Non-state actors play a significant role in global, regional and domestic politics. Thus, the lack of theorizing in that regard is problematic.

Resistance has used the media in their strategies and tactics. Yet, what distinguishes the past from the last 20 years in the area of resistance are the evolution of movements' media institutions and the creation of media empires. These empires and institutions have not only evolved, but so too has their discourse. Thus, they have become very much part of and also shaped by the growing interconnectedness of the global nature of our world. This is most evident in the nature and development of the discourse used. As Gramsci indicated, the media is important in creating and shaping what constitutes consensus. As the Hamas case demonstrates, the development of its overall media strategy has not only promoted, but has also been shaped by the consensus of the actors involved and the counter-narrative produced.

\textsuperscript{30} James, Martin: \textit{Antonio Gramsci}, (Taylor & Francis, 2002), p. 177.


Alternative media has helped to create a counter-narrative and image to those developed and presented in the mainstream. Consequently, they have challenged the hegemonic frame defined by the Israelis and its allies. Hamas has also created a counter-frame to the hegemonic discourse used by the PLO and Fatah in the domestic context and the diaspora, thus filling a void in the hearts and minds and becoming the voice of many in Palestine. Like the theories on alternative media suggest, Hamas’ media empire, institutions and strategy are designed to serve the community, to link members of civil society, and to help define the path and demonstrate the existence of crossroads. In so doing, through its media, movements, people, ideas and beliefs intersect, become part of, and define the collective. Hamas has been able to do what no resistance movement to date has accomplished; it has defined a new generation inside Palestine and beyond its borders. A case can likewise be made that it has transformed the way in which other resistance movements in places like Africa, Central and South America, Eastern Europe, Kashmir and the Middle East now engage and implement policies to develop their media infrastructures. Hamas’ organizational impact on others goes far beyond what even it understands. The evolution of Hamas as a movement, an organization and as an idea was and continues to be made possible as a result of its media strategy.

**Media strategy**

Like the larger media literature in which the media strategy scholarship is situated, there is little emphasis on resistance movements. Resistance movements do, however, share similar characteristics with social movements. A growing body academic literature examines resistance movements within the context of two social movement theoretical paradigms. Given the lack of emphasis on resistance movements' media strategies, an advantageous starting point might be Gadi Wolfsfeld's work on the relationship between collective action and mass media.  

Strategy in language is “an elaborate and systematic plan of action”. Such plan is a long-term plan which aims to achieve “some values in the real world in the best way possible”. Strategy, therefore, is a long-term plan leads to an objective. This is an

overall definition to the term ‘strategy’ as this term is broad and can be used in different contexts. This thesis will be narrowed to focus on the emergence of Hamas media strategy. Narasimha Reddi presents a detailed definition to media strategy. He states:

Media strategy is an overall approach to the media that is designed for programme or campaign to reach the target audience. It is coordinating theme or the guiding principle, the big idea, the rationale behind the tactical program. Media strategy is directed by problems, programs designed and the types of public to be reached.  

This definition shows that media strategy has specific elements. The first element is that the media strategy serves a particular program or campaign, which can be called objective. Charlotte Ryan sees that ‘the starting point of the media strategy’ is to “clarify your political goals”. The second element which can be extracted from this definition is that this campaign is directed to specific ‘target audience’ to be reached. Rayan indicates that one of the most important elements of the media strategy is to determine the audience are to be reached. The third element is the media message that can be broadcasted to the target audience. Preparing the media message in any media strategy is subject to context and issues which are “currently surface public debate”. The definition of Narasimha does not address one important element of the media strategy which is the resources that can be utilised to execute such plan (infrastructure). The infrastructure of the media institutions is a key element in the media strategy.

Each of the aforementioned elements will be examined to analyse, learn and understand the development and evolution of Hamas’ media strategy. Also absent from the literature and that which this study seeks to contribute, the interaction among the elements. Their interaction, at least what could be derived from observing them in the Hamas case, constitutes a process of sorts. Understanding this process could enable other scholars to look more closely at the variable interaction for the purpose of theory development. Moreover, non-state actors could examine it more closely too, so as to

38 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
refine and further develop their media strategies. In addition to observing and shedding light on the interaction of the elements, this study will be able to utilise the variable interactions to assess the strengths and weaknesses of Hamas’ overall media strategy.

Generally, the topic of media strategy of contemporary resistance movements has not been covered well. Some case studies do exist, however. For example, Hezbollah's media strategy has been studied recently. Its strategy is a good example because of the similarity between it and the Hamas case. In addition to both movements sharing common characteristics in terms of structural, political and ideological aspects, they also are resistance movements to the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Yelena Osipova, examining the four media elements mentioned previously, finds that Hezbollah has had a “well-designed media strategy.”

Hezbollah's media strategy utilised, to a large extent, its infrastructure and the resources needed to maximize its target audience. Its reach expands beyond the borders of Lebanon and stretches through the region to other parts of the world, thus enabling it to globalize its strategy. It is interesting to note that in spite of its global reach, Hezbollah has had difficulties in globalizing its discourse, which is needed for the effective transformation of its media strategy. As of the time of this writing, Hezbollah is continuing to working on the globalization phase of its media strategy. The situation in Syria has delayed this a bit, but it will be one legitimizing factor for the movement as the Syrian and Iranian cases unfold. Unlike Hezbollah, Hamas has been able to globalize its discourse to some degree since 2008, thus, propelling Hamas beyond its borders and region and enabling it to become a household name around the world. The transformation of its discourse, which is a product of its media strategy, has led to a reduction in the movement’s negative image and its quasi-acceptance as a vital actor in Palestinian politics by western government.

Annabelle Sreberny, Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi, and Ali Mohammadi, in ‘Small media, big revolution: communication, culture, and the Iranian revolution’, study the Iranian media strategy employed before and during the revolution. Such media strategy utilised similar policies which were employed at some stages by Hamas. In terms of

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43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
media infrastructure, Iranian activists utilised whatever they could. Cassette tapes were the main instrument of mobilisation, in addition to printed leaflets and places of worship. Media messages were a reflection of the ideological-revolutionary nature of the Iranian revolution. In a similar context but separate case, David Wigston, in ‘Media Studies: Media History, Media and Society,’ historicises the South African alternative media/press and activists’ struggle against the apartheid system. These cases, therefore, justify the emphasis of the media elements and the use of contextualisation and historicisation as the means for identifying, analysing and understanding Hamas' media strategy.

The Arab media and the Palestinian media

A majority of the mass media outlets in the Arab world are government owned and/or quasi-government oriented. The latter implies there is usually some sort of government affiliation or censorship that provides a check to the media outlet, even if it is private. This has changed, however. In the last decade, a new phenomenon has emerged in the Arab world. There are many non-governmental newspapers, electronic media and broadcasting-satellites, that run by businessmen, individuals, political organisations and/or trade companies. Among those mass media outlets, especially those under satellite broadcasting, new paradigms have emerged. There are now the Aljazeera Network Qatar-owned, the Middle East Broadcasting network (MBC) owned by Saudi Arabia, the Nile Group Channels owned by the Egyptian government, the Almanar Group owned by the Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Alqasa Group owned by Hamas.

William Rugh is a western scholar who has written on the Arab media. His first book on the Arab press is titled, ‘The Arab Press: news media and political process in the Arab world’\(^{45}\) and the second is ‘Mass Media: newspapers, radio, and television in Arab politics’\(^{46}\). In both, books, he sheds light on the Arab press and mass media. ‘Arab Media in the Information Age’ is also an interesting book edited by the Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research. A number of Arab and international scholars and media professionals made contributions to the book\(^{47}\). It addresses the rise of Arab


\(^{46}\) William. A Rugh, \textit{Arab mass media: newspapers, radio, and television in Arab politics}, (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004).

\(^{47}\) Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research: \textit{Arab Media in the Information Age}, (Abu Dhabi October 2006).
satellite stations, Arabic websites, and transnational Arabic newspapers and magazines that are reaching an even larger audience and readership than the past. The book analyses the Arab media’s effectiveness in shaping Arab public opinion and western perspectives of the Arab world; it also discusses several topics such as the relationship between media independence and credibility; how commercial interests and political influence affect the Arab media; and, the future of Arab media. It provides an excellent overview of the Arab media generally. Absent from the aforementioned coverage is the Hamas media and the Alaqsa Satellite channels, which are accessible and watched throughout the Arab countries. Absent is also a lack of discussion on Hamas' electronic media. Thus, this study makes a contribution to the existing literature on the Arab media.

The phenomenon of the Arab media and studies on the subject became salient as a result of the outstanding coverage of Al-Jazeera. Financed by the Qatari government, the Aljazeera Satellite Channel has become one of the most controversial media outlets in the Arab world. Its main slogan is ‘the opinion, and the other opinion.’ This is one of the most important characteristic that distinguishes it from the other Arab media outlets. For Mohammed Zayani Aljazeera became a ‘Phenomenon’. Mohammed Ahyish further explains that Aljazeera became famous because of its reputation of independence and professionalism. R.S. Zaharna also emphasises the uniqueness of Aljazeera. Faisal Al-Kasem, moderator of one of the most well-known Aljazeera talk-show programmes ‘Al Ittijah Al Muaakis’ [The Opposite Direction], argues that ‘this programme has changed the face of Arab television'. Al-Kasem states that “for the first time, Arabs have been able to see live programmes, tackling sensitive political, religious, social and cultural issues.

48 Mohamed Zayani is Associate Professor of critical theory at the American University of Sharjah, UAE. He has awarded his Ph.D. from Indiana University, USA. Currently, he is a researcher on a Social Science Research Council collaborative project on Arab media.


50 Ayish, Muhammad I., Media Brinkmanship in the Arab World: Al Jazeera’s The Opposite Direction as a Fighting Arena, in ibid, p. 108.

51 Zaharna, RS., Al Jazeera and American Public Diplomacy: A Dance of Intercultural (Mis-) Communication, in Ibid, p. 194.

52 Al-Kasem, Faisal, The Opposite Direction: A Programme which Changed the Face of Arab Television, in Ibid, p. 93.
Being extremely controversial and exceptionally open to sensitive issues, a programme called the Opposite Direction has become the talk of the town throughout the Arab world and amongst Arab communities abroad”.\(^{53}\) It provides evidence as to why Aljazeera is central to the satellite revolution in the Arab world. Josh Rushing\(^{54}\) wrote a new book on Aljazeera entitled, ’Mission Aljazeera: Build a Bridge, Seek the Truth, Change the World’.\(^{55}\) Rushing provides an autobiographical anecdote of his journey through the U.S. Marines and into the world of Aljazeera English\(^{56}\). The author’s experience is unique since he has been in two important posts during an extremely critical period in Middle Eastern modern history. He addresses issues he was not allowed to talk about when he was in uniform. It was through his position as US Marine spokesperson that he developed a relationship with Aljazeera. This permits him to engage in an analysis of the satellite station in relation to the U.S. Central Command headquarters located in Qatar.

Rushing argues that Aljazeera is an important Arab voice in the Middle East and provides an opportunity for Arabs to engage with other countries. The station, he argues, could be a model for a renewed global media perspective. The author harshly criticises the US policy regarding the media and the US administration's double-standard approach. To quote him on this point, he states: “In America, we like to say we cherish freedom of the press; we justly claim it as one of the blessings of democracy and look down on societies where the governments control the media, but in reality the United States has lost ground on these freedoms”.\(^{57}\) As many in the world may recall, the US and Aljazeera had their own row, with former President Bush suggesting its office in Iraq be bombed. Tony Blair told Bush during the White House Summit that

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\(^{53}\) Ibid, p. 94.

\(^{54}\) Josh Rushing is a former United States Marine Captain who was a media officer for United States Central Command during the war on Iraq in 2003. He became well-known after his appearance in the documentary Control Room, which documented his conversation with Aljazeera Arabic. The Pentagon ordered him to stop comment on the documentary. Consequently; he left the Marines and currently he is working for Aljazeera English. See Rushing’s official website: [http://www.joshrushing.com/](http://www.joshrushing.com/)


\(^{56}\) Aljazeera English is a TV channel headquartered in Doha, Qatar. It has been launched in 15 November 2006 as 24-hour English-language news and current affairs. It is considered one of the three largest English-language news channels worldwide, and is the sister channel of the Arab-language Aljazeera. See Aljazeera English website: [http://english.aljazeera.net/aboutus/2006/11/200852518555544449.html](http://english.aljazeera.net/aboutus/2006/11/200852518555544449.html), accessed in 03/04/2009.

\(^{57}\) Ibid. p. 78.
bombed it would provoke worldwide reaction.\textsuperscript{58} The station not only raised the ire of the United States, but also caused diplomatic crises between Qatar and some of the other Arab countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Tunisia, Iraq, Egypt, Kuwait, and Libya.

The role of the Arab world in the game of political-alliances in the Middle East has led other Arab countries to create new TV channels to compete the Aljazeera channel. Saudi Arabia launched the Alarabiya 24-hour News Channel on the eve of the outbreak of the Iraq war in 2003. Mohammed El Oifi regards its creation as ‘the Saudi media empire’.\textsuperscript{59} Mohammed I. Ayish suggests that coverage was intended to counterbalance the growing popularity of Aljazeera.\textsuperscript{60} Likewise, the US administration launched an Arabic-speaking channel called ‘Al-Hurra,’ which aimed to present the American government's points of view directly to the Arab audience.\textsuperscript{61}

While the literature on the development of the Arab media is more extensive, there is relatively little on the Palestinian media, its history and role. Ahmad Abu al-Said and Husain Abu Shanab wrote two books in which they sought to historicise the Palestinian media/press over the last century. These writers nevertheless differ among themselves in Arabic and address all phases of the media's evolution in Palestine. Palestinian media came to fruition in the late nineteenth century under Ottoman rule. Since then, it has developed under the British mandate, the Israeli occupation and, lastly, in the post-Oslo period. The books differ in the sense that Abu Shanab, who used to be one of the PLO journalists, presents a critical assessment of the role of the media in the Palestinian revolution through his experience in the PLO and in Diaspora.\textsuperscript{62} While Abu al-Said focuses on the Palestinian media within the Palestinian territories.\textsuperscript{63} The latter, of course, does make mention of the appearance of Hamas media outlets such as Alresala newspaper and Alaqsa radio, but he fails to critically analyse its development.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
  \bibitem{59} El Oifi, Mohammed, \textit{Influence without Power: Al Jazeera and the Arab Public Sphere}, in Zayani, Mohamed, (ED), p. 74.
  \bibitem{60} Ayish, Muhammad Ibrahim, \textit{The new Arab public sphere}, (Frank & Timme GmbH, 2008), p. 163.
  \bibitem{61} Ingram, Alan and Dodds, Klaus: \textit{Spaces of Security and Insecurity: Geographies of the War on Terror}, (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2009), p. 215.
\end{thebibliography}
In the context of democracy and nation-building, Amal Jamal and Dov Shinar also examine the Palestinian media. Jamal examines it differently than Abu Said and Abu Shanab, however. He argues that all Palestinian media, including those affiliated with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, played a role in shaping the political developments in the occupied Palestinian territories. Hamas, he argues, utilized its media through the Alresala [the message] weekly newspaper, while the Islamic Jihad used its Alisteqlal [the independence] to mobilise the Palestinian public around their political agendas. Jamal’s book is limited due its lack of resources on Hamas’ media and the fact that its publication occurred prior to the movement occupying the political position it has today. These two weaknesses are not his fault.

Shinar has approached in his study differently by examining the impact of the media on nation building prior to 1987. His study is also limited in the sense that its focuses only on the West Bank and its publication occurs prior to the formation of Hamas. Finally, Nibal Thawabteh wrote a chapter, which is titled “Palestinian media map: production congestion consumption desperation.” It is a descriptive account recently written that draws a map of the current Palestinian media. The author fails to use primary resources to document some of the data mentioned. As these referenced studies demonstrate, there is little scholarship on the Palestinian media. Thus, this project will make a contribution to this growing body of literature.

**Hamas and its Media**

A significant amount of literature has been written on Hamas in general, with most studies emphasising its ideology, history, and political thought, or its internal, regional and international relations. Consequently, there is a great multiplicity of scholarly arguments on and about Hamas. There are three different approaches in the literature on Hamas, the political Islam, ‘terrorism’, and the social movement approach. Various books such as those by Azzam Tamimi, Khalid Hroub, Zaki Chehab, and Ziyad

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67 Tamimi, Azzam, *Hamas, Unwritten Chapters*, (Hurst & Co. 2007).

Abu Amr\textsuperscript{70} consider Hamas as a legitimate Palestinian resistance movement that aims to liberate the occupied Palestinian territories. Others have taken an opposite approach and use a language that describes it as a terrorist movement and extremist group that seeks to destroy Israel. This position can be seen mostly among the Israelis, who identify Hamas from an Israeli or pro-Israeli perspective. Some examples include the works by Shaul Mishal, Avraham Sela,\textsuperscript{71} Walter Laqueur,\textsuperscript{72} Maxine Rosaler,\textsuperscript{73} Anat Kurz and Nahman Tal,\textsuperscript{74} Matthew Levitt\textsuperscript{75} and Yonah Alexander\textsuperscript{76}. A few books and articles, however, have been written on Hamas by western scholars that attempt to understand the rise of the Hamas phenomenon from ‘new angles’ such as using social movements theories. These emerged after the 2006 elections and/or following its governance of the Gaza strip in 2007. Many studies such those by Michael Irving Jensen,\textsuperscript{77} Jeroen Gunning,\textsuperscript{78} Paul McGeough,\textsuperscript{79} and Jonathan Schanzer\textsuperscript{80} and Azzam Tamimi raise questions on the future of this movement. Tamimi, in particular, makes use of unique data obtained from conducting in-depth interviews with Hamas' leaders, which led to an updated version of his book in a new edition titled ‘Hamas: A History from Within’\textsuperscript{81}.

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\textsuperscript{70} Abu Amr, Ziyad: \textit{Islamic fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad}, (Indiana University Press, 1994).
\textsuperscript{71} Mishal, Shaul, Sela, Avraham: \textit{The Palestinian Hamas: vision, violence, and coexistence}, (Columbia University Press, 2006).
\textsuperscript{72} Laqueur, Walter: \textit{Voices of terror: manifestos, writings, and manuals of Al Qaeda, Hamas, and other terrorists from around the world and throughout the ages}, (Reed Press, 2004).
\textsuperscript{73} Rosaler, Maxine, \textit{Hamas: Palestinian terrorists, Inside the world's most infamous terrorist organizations}, (The Rosen Publishing Group, 2003).
\textsuperscript{74} Kurz, Anat, Tal, Nahman, \textit{Hamas: radical Islam in a national struggle}, Issue 48 of JCSS memorandum Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1997.
\textsuperscript{75} Levitt Matthew, \textit{Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad}, (Yale University Press, 2007).
\textsuperscript{76} Alexander, Yonah: \textit{Palestinian religious terrorism: Hamas and Islamic Jihad}, (Transnational Publishers, 2002).
\textsuperscript{78} Gunning, Jeroen: \textit{Hamas in politics: democracy, religion, violence}, (Columbia University Press, 2008).
\textsuperscript{80} Schanzer, Jonathan: \textit{Hamas vs. Fatah: the struggle for Palestine}, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
\textsuperscript{81} Tamimi, Azzam, \textit{Hamas: A History from Within}, (Olive Branch Press, 2007).
Tamimi’s reference to a history from within refers to the origins of Hamas in the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt. Ziad Abu Amr\textsuperscript{82} confirms that the first existence of the Egyptian Muslim brotherhood movement in Palestine was in 1935, when Abdurrahman Albanna, the brother of the founder Hasan Albanna, visited Palestine to meet with Haj Amin al Husseini, who was Grand Mufti of Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{83} “Palestine is the issue of every Muslim”… “…As long as there is a single Jew in Palestine, the fighting task of the Muslim Brotherhood will not end,”\textsuperscript{84} said Hassan Albanna.\textsuperscript{85}

Tamimi locates the establishment of Hamas in a sequence of events such as the Palestinian exodus (\textit{Nakba}) in 1948 and the occupation of Gaza and the West Bank in June 1974, while Hroub provides details of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine from 1930s to the establishment of Hamas in 1987.\textsuperscript{86} Palestine according to the Muslim brotherhood’s is a ‘holy land’ and the ‘Alaqsa mosque’ is the ‘third of the Two Holy Mosques.’ Palestine in the Islamic Sharia is seen as ‘Islamic Waqf,’ which means that that nobody can give up this land or any part thereof.\textsuperscript{87} Beverley Milton-Edwards illustrates the ideological demotion of Palestine in the Muslim brotherhood thought, however\textsuperscript{88}. Politically, the Muslim Brotherhood considers the nature of ‘the Zionist-colonial project’ in Palestine a “real danger on the Arab and Muslim world”\textsuperscript{89}. They also look at the geo-strategic location of Palestine, so that the defence of Egypt and the Suez Canal starts from Palestine. Its location thus represents the link between the eastern Arab and Islamic world and the west.\textsuperscript{90} The Muslim brotherhood attempted to

\textsuperscript{82} Ziad Abu Amr is a Palestinian MP, and former Palestinian foreign minister. He was lecturer in Political Science at Birzeit University in Ramallah.


\textsuperscript{85} Hassan Al-Banna (1906-1949) is the founder of the Muslim brotherhoods movement in Egypt. He was born on 14 October 1906 in the village of ”Mahmudiyyah” in al-behaira County. for more about Hassan Al-banna and the Muslim brotherhood movement look at : Paul Mitchell, Richard: \textit{The Society of the Muslim Brothers}, (Oxford University Press, 1993).


\textsuperscript{89} Ibid.

be more involved in the Palestinian issue afterward. This led to the establishment of the ‘General Central Committee to Aid Palestine,’ which was headed by Hassan Al-Banna, the general supreme of the movement.91

The Muslim Brotherhood involvement in Palestine, therefore, evolved over three stages. First there was the mobilisation of the Palestinian issue through several activities such as organising demonstrations, speeches in mosques, distributing booklets and leaflets; and, use of the media to explain dimensions of the danger of the Zionist movement in Palestine. In the second phase, there was financial support through the donations and fund-raising campaigns that were organised by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. For instance, the popular campaign ‘Qirsh’ started in 1936 and managed to send financial support to the ‘Arab Higher Committee,’ headed at that time by Amin Al-Hussaini. In the last stage, the Muslim Brotherhood supported the Arab revolt in Palestine in 1936 by sending volunteers, mainly students, to participate in the revolution in Palestine. Many also took part in the armed attacks against the Zionist movement in Palestine afterwards.92

The war of the 1948 was thus a turning point of the Muslim Brotherhood toward the Palestinian issue. They participated in fighting Zionism alongside the Palestinians through the Brotherhood volunteers from Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.93 In the mid-1950s, the Muslim Brotherhood had become the largest local political movement in the Gaza strip.94 It participated in the armed resistance against the Israelis in the 1956 war.95

The movement in Jordan, however, approached the issue differently. It did not use armed resistance against the Israeli occupation for many considerations. The most important reason was the relationship between the movement and King Hussein of Jordan.96 After the 1967 war, the Islamic movement worked under the umbrella of various associations and unions that were involved in cultural, social and educational activities. Most notable were the ‘Mojamm’a Islami’ [Islamic Centre], the Jam’yyia

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91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
Islamiyya’ [Islamic Society], the Jam’yyat al-Shabbat Al-Muslemat [the female-youth society], and The Islamic University in Gaza. In addition, there were several medical clinics, kindergartens, schools, and sport clubs in the Gaza strip and the West Bank.\footnote{97 The Muslim Brotherhood was utilised these institutions as a tool of Da’wa [inviting to Islam] to attract young people, and gain public support. Many researches emphasizes that these associations played a significant role in the spread of the movement and breadth of its support. For more look at: Jensen, Michael Irving: The Political Ideology of Hamas: A Grassroots Perspective, (Tauris, 2009).}

In spite of the role played by the Brotherhood, Hroub and Milton-Edwards do not situate the rise of the political Islam in Palestine until later. They frame its rise in the context of the failure of the secular and leftist movements. Hroub argues that the defeat of the PLO in Lebanon in 1982 and the victory of the Iranian revolution in 1979 were the beginnings of the decline of the Palestinian national liberation movement (Fatah), who was the main rival of the Islamic movement\footnote{98 Hroub, Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide, p. 6.}. Accordingly, Hamas presented itself as an alternative to the secular factions in the Palestinian square. This position is supported by Michael Irving Jensen, who posits that “In the summer of 1988, a new phase of the Intifada began, marked by greater tension between Hamas and the United National Leadership of the Uprising. Increasingly, Hamas began to present itself as an alternative to the PLO”\footnote{99 Michael Irving, pp. 18,19.}. The outbreak of the first Palestinian intifada led to the historical leadership\footnote{100 The historical leadership of Hamas was: the Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Abdul Fattah Dukhan, Dr. Abdel-Aziz Al-Rantisi, Mohamed Hassan Sham’a, Salah Shehadeh, and Issa al-Nashar. Most of them have assassinated by the Israeli occupation during the second intifada, while some of them are still leading the movement by a different positions.} of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza holding its first meeting to decide on the establishment of the ‘Islamic resistance movement – Hamas’ for the purpose of carrying out ‘resistance’ against the Israeli forces, using all the ‘means available’.\footnote{101 Odwan, Atef, Shaykh Ahmed Yassin: Hayatoho wa jihadoho, [Shaykh Ahmed Yassin: his life, his jihad], (PIC publications, 1996), p. 155.} The meeting occurred after what happened when an Israeli truck crashed into a Palestinian car, which resulted in the killing of four Palestinian workers in the Jabalya refugee camp.\footnote{102 Vitullo, Antina: ‘Uprising in Gaza’ in Lockman, Zachary, Beinin, Joel: Intifada: the Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation, (South End Press, 1989), p. 32.}

The first Bayan [leaflet] issued contained three messages\footnote{103 The first ‘Bayan’ [statement] of Hamas, issued in 14/12/1987.}. The first message was for the Palestinian people to resist the occupation. The second was for the Israeli
occupation, which proposed that the “violence against the Palestinians [would] definitely be met for the most part by Palestinian children and youth”. The statement emphasised that the intifada made by the Palestinian people rejected the “occupation and its pressure” and the policy of “land confiscation and settlement building”. Finally, the third message was an indirect one to the Arab regimes and the Palestinian political opponents. It confirmed that the intifada awakened the consciences of the followers of what they called “the lean peace” and the international conferences that aimed at ‘treacherous reconciliation’ on the way to the Camp David agreement. The statement added that 'Islam is the solution and alternative’. In its conclusion, it was argued that ‘violence only brings violence’ and the killings would only bring other killings’. From this point the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine, which became Hamas afterwards, started a new phase Palestinian history. As Michael Irving states:

The movement started to call for strikes on fixed days and encouraged direct confrontation with the Israeli occupying forces. The younger and more activist oriented forces within the Brotherhood had thus managed to force through their policy. If the Brotherhood had refrained from taking a more activist line, the movement would undoubtedly have lost influence. The “new” activist movement, Hamas, which from this point onwards totally eclipsed the Brotherhood, fought against the Israeli occupation on an equal footing with the nationalist forces within the PLO (and Islamic Jihad). Hamas was able to rapidly take over the role of the Brotherhood precisely because it was not, in fact, a new movement at all.

Weeks after the outbreak of the intifada, the leadership of Hamas met to evaluate the experience of its participation and to decide whether it should continue. One of the Hamas founders said, “after evaluating and examining the pros and cons of each option, the leadership adopted [to continue] the confrontation with the Israeli army”. Hamas activists ran not only civil activities such as calling for strikes, igniting tires and throwing stones, but also in specific tactics that targeted the Israeli soldiers, ‘settlers’, and civilians in the Gaza strip and the West Bank. The military wing, which was originally called “Mojahido Felasteen” and was changed to “Ezziddin Al-Qassam Brigades,” carried out the armed resistance in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The most

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104 The researcher used the language of the first statement of Hamas to explain the political and ideological perception of Hamas toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.

105 Michael Irving, op., cit., pp. 18.


107 This term refer to the Israelis who live in the Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

108 The military wing of Hamas named for the Arab-Syrian leader Ezziddin Al-Qassam, who has led the first armed confrontation against the British mandate and the Zionism movement in Palestine.
violent campaign was a series of attacks that were in reaction to the Israeli assassination of the bomb maker Yehya Ayyash.\textsuperscript{109}

Many researchers on Hamas cover the use of violence by Palestinians in general and its use in particular, but from different angles. Matthew Levitt considers such violence as ‘terrorism’, identifying it as “terrorist attacks that target Israeli soldiers and civilians”\textsuperscript{110}. Levitt ignores the context in which violence occurs, thus failing to consider the reasons for its emergence and Hamas' adoption of the tactics of the Israeli occupation. His work shows figures of Israeli victims, but omits the thousands of the Palestinian victims. He further attempts to link Hamas with ‘Al-Qaeda’ without using any type of ‘objective’ evidence. Resources used for his assumption are taken from the Israeli, Jordanian and US intelligence. This conflation is incorrect, as Al-Qaeda globalises its violence and Hamas' confrontation is limited to the Israeli occupation within the Palestinian territories. Larbi Sadiki explains that “Hamas and Hizbullah have ‘localized’ their practice of muqawamah. They must, therefore, be distinguished from the ‘globalized’ brand of Islamist ideology and practice of violence practiced by al-Qaida”.\textsuperscript{111}

Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela hold a similar opinion to that of Levitt. They reference resistance as “strategies of terror and violence”\textsuperscript{112}. Maxine Rosaler states that “…Hamas uses Israeli retaliation as an excuse to escalate its terrorist attacks and spark larger war that they will hope result in the total destruction of the state of Israel”.\textsuperscript{113} Hamas’ charter states that resistance is a legitimate means to liberate the occupied lands. It uses the concept of ‘Jihad’ to refer to armed resistance as a strategic option in the confrontation with Israel. Hamas charter specifically states that “Jihad is our way”, “Jihad against the Zionist invasion”.\textsuperscript{114} Azzam Tamimi discusses the concept of Jihad from a Hamas perspective and the use of ‘martyrdom operations,’ which is also referred to suicide bombings by others, against the Israelis. According to him, “Hamas is

\textsuperscript{110} Levitt, Mathew, op., cit., p. 8.
\textsuperscript{112} Mishal, Shaul, Sela, Avraham, op., cit., p. vii.
\textsuperscript{113} Rosaler, Maxine, p., 7.
\textsuperscript{114} The Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas, Part I, article No. 8
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
believed to have been the first Muslim Sunni group to employ the strategy of suicide bombing, which stirred up an intense debate within Sunni circles”.

Tamimi describes the Islamic perception of the ‘life and death’, and ‘jihad’ and ‘Qital’. He presents the opinions of those who defend such operations and their arguments that the ‘sacrifice’ of a person who ‘offers himself’ for the sake of a noble cause is a ‘martyr’ who will be awarded ‘the paradise’. Religious opinions are also presented that oppose the operations, which make the argument that ‘suicide bombers’ are ‘desperate individuals’, who prefer to ‘die than live, having lost hope or patience’. Tamimi impressively attempts to redress the imbalance in the contemporary literature on Hamas. Sadiki’s arguments also support Tamimi’s opinion.

Following the 2006 elections, a new trend emerged in the scholarship on Hamas. Debates are waged on the possibility of Hamas recognising Israel and the renunciation of violence and its acceptance of a Palestinian state on the borders of 1967 or Hudna [a long-term truce]. Some argue that the period demonstrated a shift or the start of a transformation process, namely from a resistance movement to a political party within the Palestinian National Authority. Menachem Klein, for example, writes as follows:

Since it entered the political arena, winning 76 of 132 seats in the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, Hamas has given numerous indications that, in practice, it has ceased to be a fanatic and fundamentalist organization, unable to distinguish between principle and practice. It has demonstrated a willingness to change its positions on fundamental issues and even to take public stands in contradiction of its Islamic Charter.

Michael Bröning strongly agrees with Klein and emphasises that ‘Hamas is in the midst of an unprecedented ideological transformation.’ He calls on the west to pay attention to

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118 Ibid.
119 Sadiki, Larbi, op., cit.
120 Hudna is an Islamic term refers to a short term or long term truce. In 1990 the founder of Hamas Sheikh Ahmed Yassin offered a long-term Hudna with Israel if it withdrawn from the Gaza Strip and the west bank, with removing the settlements, returning the Palestinian refugees, and releasing the Palestinian prisoners.
this transformation. Hroub has the same opinion and argues that Hamas has been going through a process of moderation from a radical/religious to a pragmatic movement that focuses on state building. Zaki Chehab goes further when blaming the USA and the international community for boycotting Hamas, regarding it as a terrorist organisation. Chehab states: “Hamas is not a gang. Hamas is a part of an Islamic society, and the USA has committed a grave error in writing it off as a terrorist organisation with which there can be no negotiation”. Others scholars such as Levitt argue that the movement will never change, as the whole of its project is based on a charter that “aims to wipe out Israel.”

Baudouin Long also addresses the issue of change in the agenda following the 2006 election, but also examines the period after the division between Hamas and Fatah in 2007. Long concludes that Hamas has “effectively changed over the last decade,” especially in regards to its political agenda. According to him, there was a decline in martyrdom operations/suicide attacks committed by Hamas against Israel. They decreased from a peak of 55 attacks in 2002 to one in 2007. This, he argues, reflects a massive change in the political agenda. “Over the 2000s, Hamas has indeed become a major player in Palestinian politics. It implemented a strategy of attracting the Palestinian people that paid off at the 2006 elections.”

The literature on Hamas' media is almost non-existent and the above mentioned scholars do not give critical attention or in-depth analysis to it or its role in the evolution of the movement. Levitt briefly discusses Hamas media under the title, “Media Jihad” and “New Media Jihad”. Therein he explains that the ‘media branch’ is a significant part of the Hamas’ structure. Levitt emphasises the importance of it in the mobilisation process to its agenda. “For Hamas, the media is an important component of its goal of Islamizing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and radicalizing Palestinian society”.

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124 Chehab, op., cit., p. 225.
126 Ibid.
127 Levitt, Mathew, op., cit., p.140.
128 Ibid.
Similarly, Chehab documents the organized process of the media and public relations campaigns that contributed to Hamas' landslide victory in January 2006. Moe’en Kou’a, a writer of an unpublished Master's dissertation on Hamas' public relations, found that the organised campaign by the movement was a main factor in its election victory. In particular, he argues it was the extensive use of media outlets that influenced the Palestinian people's voting for Hamas.

Jensen also posits that Hamas mobilised the masses through its media network, including its print and Internet publications. A recent attempt was made by Fabrice Chiche and Nir Boms, who wrote an online article on its media strategy during and after the war in Gaza 2008/2009. Their article demonstrates how the role of Hamas media network represented a ‘further mobilization’ during the war and the role played by the Alaqsa satellite channel. The Alaqsa channel kept broadcasting Hamas' messages despite the Israeli strike on its building and the repeated hacking of its channel's waves.

Boms and Chiche argue that there was “a real war behind the virtual war”. ‘The marketing strategy of Hamas’ is an article which was recently published and focused on the electronic media of Hamas, in particular the Palestinian Information Centre (PIC). Tomer Mozes and Gabriel Weiman have designed a model to analyse and evaluate what they call the e-marketing strategy of the PIC website, including the potential audiences, resourcing, a company’s brand to the Internet, outsourcing and strategy partnerships, and organizational structure. It is considered the first academic work published on the Hamas media. Although it is useful, the article is very narrow due to its focus on one website from tens of Hamas media outlets. It also focuses on the technical aspects rather than the elements of the media strategy, which includes the infrastructure, target audience, objectives and message.

130 Jensen, op., cit., p. 93.
132 Ibid.
A Gramscian Theoretical Framework

A review of the existing literature demonstrated a lack of treatment of the Hamas’ media, but yet its importance was cited. Given the importance of the media and the information wing to the evolution and continued success of resistance movements, one ponders why there is such a void. Regardless of the reasons, the void provides a niche. Finding a niche in the existing literature is exciting for scholars and students, but it can also pose some theoretical issues such as how to approach and analyze the phenomenon under study. A lack of analytical paradigms and theoretical frameworks to guide means that it becomes essential to derive assumptions from existing scholarship. This study attempts to employ a Gramscian theoretical framework for analysis of Hamas’ alternative media paradigm.

Generally, Antonio Gramsci’s political thought focuses on the intellectual and political changes through ideologies. One of his notions therein is the role played by ‘cultural hegemony’. According to Roger Simon, “the starting-point for Gramsci’s notion of hegemony is that a class and its representatives exercise power over subordinate classes by means of a combination of coercion and persuasion”. The term ‘hegemony’ is used by Gramsci with a slightly different meaning, as Gundula Ludwig explains, at the early stages when Gramsci uses it to “describe the praxis of the ruling class”. At a later stage, he links the notion of hegemony to the state theory. Robert Cox goes beyond that to describe the hegemony as a “structure of values,” which

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134 Antonio Gramsci is an Italian Marxist philosopher’s (1891-1937). Gramsci exceeds the traditional communist political thought which based on the reverence the notions of Marx and Lenin, as Joseph Femia argues: ‘Gramsci passionately called for a renewal of the philosophy of praxis [Marxism], for more look at (Joseph Femia., Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process (Oxford University Press, USA, 1981), p13 John Schwarzmantel emphasise the Gramsci’s rejection of the dogmatic Marxism and his criticism of versions of historical materialism, and that tied in well with the attempt to rejuvenate Marxism. Lokk at: Schwarzmantel, John, and McNally, Mark: “Gramsci and Global Politics: Hegemony and resistance”, (Routledge, London and New York, 2009). Therefore, the Gramsci’s approach in his interpretation of the historical changes were through a deep understanding of the local reality in Italy, so that his analysis based on spatial and temporal considerations. This gives his ideas more analytical dimensions. Indeed, and undoubtedly the Gramsci’s works have presented very.


137 Ibid.

“permeate a whole system of the state”. Cox developed Gramsci’s notion of hegemony to link it to economic and media globalization, thus positing there is a type of ‘media hegemony’ not established on coercion but through the ‘consent’. Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman draw the role of the media in the hegemony of capitalists through their own expression ‘manufacturing consent’. They argue that media is part of the hegemonical structure, which leads the ruling leadership to utilise media capabilities for the purpose of dominating communities through ‘manufacturing consent’ in any manner. This can be done either through non-commitment to ethical and professional rules or to distract attention from the world’s problems that exist. Gramsci's theoretical framework, or at least part of it, is useful for this study.

**Three reasons for using a Gramscian theoretical framework:**

**First:** Gramsci’s notion of ‘cultural hegemony’ relates to the state of domination by a single ideology in a culturally plural society. The result of this is that existing ideologies with potentially viable ‘cultures’ are subordinated (even oppressed) by the dominant culture. The realm of ‘culture’ relates to all of the ideas, ideologies or laws that form what Marxists call the ‘superstructure.’ Hamas’ media emerges in a milieu dominated by a particular type of ‘cultural hegemony,’ which is principally secular (PLO) and colonial (Israel).

Civil society is the sphere of class struggles and of popular-democratic struggles. Thus, it is the sphere in which a dominant social group organises consent and hegemony. It is also the sphere where the subordinate social groups may organise their opposition and construct an alternative hegemony - a counter hegemony.

The civil society that Hamas is seeking to exist within is therefore largely secular and, in other words, not hospitable to Islam. This results in the movement's politics being based on a religious ideology. Hence, the existing

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139 Ibid.
141 Gramsci divides the ‘superstructure’ of community into two parts: civil society and political society. The civil society controls the society through the culture and ideology (dominance by consent), hence, Gramsci considers the civil society is a field for ideological competition of the intellectual, while; the political society is to control the society directly through the state and the judiciary authority. Look at Tester, Keith: *Civil society*, (Taylor & Francis, 1992), p. 141, 142.
142 Simon, p. 30.
cultural order led by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO)\textsuperscript{143} in the Palestinian Occupied Territories is one that Hamas seeks to replace or at least compete with for the purpose of acquiring political and cultural parity. In other words, the type of cultural hegemony that Fatah represents is one that is, in ideological terms, the antithesis of the kind of cultural order that Hamas is aspiring to establish. Two ideologies here are at loggerheads. Further what complicates the matter is that existing and dominant media paradigm in the domestic, regional and international arenas are secular. As Dani Filc argues, “every hegemonic project is threatened by alternative hegemonic projects; hegemony always implies counter-hegemony”.\textsuperscript{144}

**Second:** The concept of ‘cultural hegemony’ includes the realm of ideas. As Roger Simon states, “Hegemony is a relation, not of domination by means of force, but of consent by means of political and ideological leadership. It is the organisation of consent.”\textsuperscript{145}

**Third:** the Gramscian theoretical framework on the media has been deployed elsewhere. As mentioned, Annabelle Sreberny, Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi, and Ali Mohammadi\textsuperscript{146} examine the experience of the Iranian revolution, while David Wigston historicises the South African alternative media/press in the struggle against the apartheid system.\textsuperscript{147} Essentially, this study will invoke the Marxian term ‘struggle’ between competing notions and understandings of culture or ideology. Media is a space in which tension and contradiction is fiercely vented through the propagation of opposing cultural projects. Literally, there is a competition through the medium of the press, radio, satellite TV, television and the Internet that is primarily geared towards winning the hearts and minds of the Palestinian public. The Palestinian public is probably the most ideologically and politically divided and has a plural civil

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\textsuperscript{143} I refer the ‘PLO’ as a secular rival of the ‘Islamist’ Hamas. PLO is the umbrella of Ten of Palestinian factions, the most important: the National Liberation Movement (Fatah), the Popular Front of Palestinian Liberation, and the Democratic Front of Palestinian Liberation.


\textsuperscript{145} Simon, p. 24.

\textsuperscript{146} Sreberny-Mohammadi, A., Sreberny, A., And Mohammadi, A., op., cit.

\textsuperscript{147} Wigston, David in Fourie, Pieter J.: Media Studies: Media History, Media and Society’, (Publisher Juta and Company Ltd, 2008), p. 40-42.
society in contrast to other countries in the region. Thus, it is subject to the ongoing media rivalry between the PLO and its institutions. The PLO's media’s cultural hegemony has been routinised for decades, while Hamas' political status has only been consolidated in the past two decades. This addresses the ideational and discursive side of Hamas’s emerging media paradigm. It is this incipient paradigm, with its stress on Islamicity or religiosity, versus Fatah’s secular media paradigm that the study will examine. Hamas' alternative paradigm is a response to the existing secular media and, thus, cultural hegemony. “The Gramscian notion of counter-hegemony is discernible through a range of radical or (alternative) media projects.”¹⁴⁸

The applicability of the Gramscian framework is useful in two ways. First, no existing studies examine Hamas from counter-cultural hegemonic perspective. Rather, studies attempt to treat the Arab or Muslim region as exceptional. This form of Orientalist thought is rejected. All civil societies, in spite of their specific contexts, are subject to the kind of competition and tension between diametrically opposed cultural projects. Tension is not, therefore, specific to the Palestinian Occupied Territories or Hamas’ drive to replace the existing PLO-led cultural hegemony. Second, nowhere is the resistance against cultural hegemony more apparent in the age of globalisation than in the domain of media competition.

Scholarship on alternative media in today’s world presents one with a contradiction. On one hand, it provides an opportunity to search for and consider generalisable values deriving from comparative studies on similar problems. Questions such as what forms and processes does the drive to counter cultural (media) hegemony take can be asked. On the other, it poses a problem due to the field's complete silence on the rise of alternative media in Arab and Muslim contexts.

The case of Hamas is at the heart of what Gramsci was arguing, as it demonstrates how intellectual and political changes are possible through ideologies. Gramsci posited that changes occurred or were possible through media hegemony. Hamas’ media institutions were created within an existing cultural-hegemonic frame one dominated by the Israeli Occupation and another by the PLO. Creating a niche within the existing and competing cultural and ideological frameworks required the development and presentation of a

¹⁴⁸ Atton, p.7.
counter-narrative. Hamas had to create an alternative media framework. It had to create new media hegemony. This process - the creation of new media hegemony - is what the study seeks to get at and contribute to theoretically.

The Research Methodology

Generally, there are various techniques of data collection in qualitative research. Nicholas W. Jankowski and Fred Wester stress that data collection in qualitative research involves a variety of techniques. Some of the techniques cited include interviews, document analysis, and unstructured observations. In spite of the diverse array of data collection methods, a majority of the earlier qualitative studies mainly rely on either document analysis or interviewing. Reliance on a single data collection method is problematic because it reduces the reliability of findings. To avoid this, two basic primary sources are used.

In this thesis, the researcher will rely on two main qualitative methods: interviews and document analysis. Interviewing people who manufactured the events is believed to be most valuable for research. Those interviewed were people who witnessed the two intifadas and the period after the 2006 elections. They were or are either seniors in Hamas' media institutions or those worked within such institutions. These individuals have a wealth of information on the subject.

Published and unpublished official documents and records collected from Hamas media institutions are also used. Such documents, basically, are media strategies and plans of Hamas’s media institutions, especially those comprising the Alaqsa Media Network. In addition, a collection of audio recordings, booklets, leaflets, posters, a set of Hamas’s publications and transcripts videos issued in the period covered were used. Secondary resources are the literature on Hamas, including, books, articles and policy papers. The use of the primary resources for this work is what sets it apart from all of the existing

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150 Al-Aqsa Media network is a company established in an initiative of a group of Hamas members led by the Hamas senior Fathi Hammad. The network is regarded the umbrella of most important Hamas media outlets included: Al-Aqsa satellite channel, and Al-Aqsa TV local station, Al-Aqsa FM, A-Aqsa FM live, Shehab news agency; ‘Asda’a’ [echo] media production city, and Al-Aqsa training foundation.
literature on Hamas, especially those studies that reference its media institutions or strategies.

Explanation of the research methods for a study is one of the hardest parts of writing, yet also the most important. This study uses qualitative methodology for achieving its objectives. The approach is adopted to gain insight into the emergence of the Hamas media paradigm through a combination of two methods of investigation, namely interviews and document analysis.

The aim of qualitative research is to learn about how and why people behave, think, and make meaning as they do, rather than focusing on what people do or believe on a large scale.\(^{151}\)

Qualitative methods are used for three reasons. First, it is most suitable for historicising and contextualising events or phenomenon. This study seeks to understand social and political phenomena. As Uwe Flick argues, “qualitative research is of specific relevance to the study of social relations, owning to the fact of the pluralisation of life worlds”.\(^{152}\) Explored here is the emergence of Hamas' media paradigm within the political/ideological rival context between it and its opponents in the Palestinian territories.

Second, the qualitative approach “seeks depth rather than breadth”\(^ {153}\). This feature of the qualitative approach centralizes and concentrates on the researched subject in order to analyse the subject and understand it in-depth. In the present case, extracting original data from a particular quality of people, who manufactured or contributed to the emergence of the Hamas media paradigm will fulfil that purpose. Third, qualitative research provides a comprehensive picture of the researched matter. It deals with all the elements involved in the Hamas media experience. As one of the leading scholars on qualitative approach states, this type of research “refers to the meaning concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, symbols and descriptions of things. It refers to the what, how, when and where of a thing – its essence and ambience”.\(^ {154}\)


\(^{152}\) Flick, Uwe: *An Introduction to Qualitative Research*, (Sage, 2007), p. 11.


\(^{154}\) Berg, Bruce L.: *Qualitative research methods for the social sciences*, (Pearson-Allyn & Bacon, 2007), p. 3.
Interviews

Interviews are a widely used research method in the social sciences. This study uses interviews as only one method to achieve the main objective of this research. Generally, an interview is defined as a conversation between two people. It is a conversation where one person, namely the interviewer, seeks responses for a particular purpose from another person, who is the interviewee. The interviews with Hamas officials aim to obtain information and understanding of issues relevant to the general aims and specific questions of a research project. Thus, “interviewing is a common enterprise in knowledge production.”

The interviews specifically aim to understand the Hamas media and the meaning it makes of that experience. According to Seidman: “At the root of in-depth interviewing is an interest in understanding the lived experience of other people and the meaning they make of that experience”. More importantly, interviews present access to an understanding of the context of experience. Seidman emphasises the importance of context by stating that “Interviewing provides access to the context of people’s behaviour and thereby provides a way for researchers to understand the meaning of that behaviour. A basic assumption in in-depth interviewing research is that the meaning people make of their experience affects the way they carry out that experience”. Focusing on the context of this experience is essential in the interpretation of data collected by interviews.

Interviews for research purposes usually take three forms. First, through structured wording of the questions. In this form, the questions are the same for every interview. Second, semi-structured interviews are where the interviewer asks major questions the same way but alter or probes for more information. Third, unstructured interviews occur when the interviewer refers to a list of topics he or she has prepared, which are then used as a guide. This research used unstructured interviews.

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158 Ibid, p. 10.
159 Ibid.
The information extracted from Hamas seniors are diverse. For instance, the interviewee who witnessed the first intifada gave information different from those who witnessed the Hamas media in the government. Questions were thus formulated according to the type of interviewee and what kind of data was being sought. Indeed, the most important reason for using interviews was the accessibility and availability of the interviewees.

The media background of the researcher, and being a Palestinian, from Gaza (the fieldwork place), justify using this research method, and show how important accessing those people who are first hand experience, and some of them moved from position to position within the institution of Hamas media during the past two decades.

In this study, there are about 40 interviews conducted with Hamas’ media officials. For example, Fathi Hammad, the founder of Hamas media foundations (Alaqsa Media Network); Ghazi Hammad, one of Hamas leaders (spokesman of the Tenth Palestinian government, the former Editor-in-Chief of Al-Risala weekly newspaper, one of the senior Hamas media foundation); and, Yousef Rizqa, who was the former minister of Media in the Tenth Palestinian government and author of Hamas Government: the hard Way. In addition to these individuals, there are a wide range of people who worked within the Hamas media institutions during the two Palestinian intifadas and those currently in charge.

**Ethical issues**

Concerning the ethical issue in conducting the interviews, all interviewees have been informed that I use the interviews only for the academic purposes. Gathering data treated in confidentiality according the criteria of research ethics. (See the consent form, appendix number 9). Physically, the collected data based on either audio files (MP3) or written format (DOC or PDF) as well as hand written notes. The sensitiveness of the gathered data makes me keen to save the data in safe and secure ways. For this purpose, the data will be saved on my own computers, my drive at the university server, and I will backup a copy on an external hard-drive. Moreover, all data are protected by own password. Regarding the declaration of interest, the interviewees were informed that this piece of work is going to be the first academic work on Hamas media and it will not be used for any commercial purposes. It is worth to mention that the ethics approval
committee at the school of social science and international studies have issued me a certificate of ethical approval, reference number: 14.07.10/x.

**Document analysis**

Documents represent a major source of data in social science research.\(^{161}\) The application of document analysis in this research project requires the identification of sources that are primary in nature. As mentioned, there are two types of documents utilized—official documents and records and Hamas publications. The importance of these documents is their content. In other words, the documents provide very important information on Hamas' view regarding the use of media to serve its political and ideological agendas. In this thesis, documents analysis is used in an attempt to organise and interpret the sources of data and look at the motives of Hamas to create its own media paradigm. Immy Holloway and Christine Daymon state that “the aim of qualitative document analysis is to discover new or emergent patterns, including overlooked categories, which might be those used by participant themselves”\(^{162}\).

For Stephan Wolff, the ultimate objective of document analysis is “the investigation of structural problems and at the methodological toolkit that document producers and recipients have to come to terms with, and seek to make explicit the implications and representations strategies”.\(^{163}\) Nigal Gilbert gives a deeper meaning to the analysis of documents, emphasising that the validity and reliability of the research. “A document may not be what it appears to be, its achievement may have been collected for motives one does not understand, and the context may be crucial in determining the nature of the object before us. This makes documentary work very different from, say, survey research, where validity and reliability are secured within the method itself”.\(^{164}\) In this case, document analysis remains a significant research method. It deals with meanings and concepts rather than frequency. According to David Altheide, “in qualitative document analysis the frequency and representativeness is not the main issue,

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\(^{162}\) Holloway, Immy, Daymon, Christine: ‘*Qualitative research methods in public relations and marketing communications*’, (Routledge, 2002), p. 243.


conceptual adequacy is”¹⁶⁵. Thus, this principle leads to illuminate how the data will be analysed and interpreted.

**Managing and interpreting data**

The sources of this research generates huge amount of text. Qualitative data (text) is naturally unstructured and unorganised. Hence, the first step in treating text is managing and organising this amount of data in order to help the researcher in the interpretation process. Interpretation is an explanation and translation of text into meanings within a particular context. According to Constance T. Fischer, “interpretation is a translation, an explanation within the context of qualitative research.”¹⁶⁶ Alan Mckee emphasises that “whenever we produce an interpretation of something's meaning we treat it as a text. A text is something that we make meaning from”.¹⁶⁷ In other words, according to McKee, “every description of a text is an interpretation”¹⁶⁸.

Richard Palmer argues that the ‘explanation’ should be seen within the context of a more basic explanation or interpretation.¹⁶⁹ “The interpretation occurs even in the way one turns toward an objective. Explanation will certainly rely on the tool of objective analysis, but selection of the relevant tools is already an interpretation of the task of understanding”.¹⁷⁰ Indeed, the interpretation of data will require understanding the text itself as well as understanding the context. In the context of Hamas use of media, placing the text in a context provides an extra understanding of the data that may be seemingly unclear from the actual contents of the text. This will help the researcher to ascertain what Hamas intended to achieve through its media project. As Preston King quotes:

> A context is itself intelligible only as a function of what it focuses upon: the text. If the text can be conceded no prior respect, is deemed to make no sense in itself, then neither can one meaningfully recuperate any relevant context for it. A context for this text is only intelligible on the grounds that the context demonstrably and logically

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 64.
¹⁷⁰ Ibid.
relates to the text. So if we can assign no prior logic or meaning to a
text, then neither can we assign to it any ‘relevant’ context. 171

In the social sciences, it is rare that any interpretation can present a full reality or
complete meaning because of the nature of the interpretation process. There are always
subjective and objective elements at play in role of interpreting data. Subjectivism, as
Carl Ratner argues, “is often regarded as the sine qua non of qualitative methodology”
172. However, in order to present a reasonable interpretation in this study, the subjective
elements were limited and objectivity enhanced. Limiting the subjective elements
requires definition of the concepts intended for use. It also requires empirical evidence
for the arguments presented. Sari Biklen Knopp and Ronnie Casella argue that
“qualitative dissertations are evidence-based texts.”173

In conclusion, this chapter has illustrated the introductory framework of this research.
The chapter has included the objective, and the research questions. The chapter also has
reviewed the literature that pertain media, alternative media, Hamas and its media. The
methodology section has discussed the methods used to conduct this research, including
the primary resources, managing, and analysing the collected data.

172 Ratner, Carl: Subjectivity and Objectivity in Qualitative Methodology, ‘Forum: Qualitative Social
Chapter Two: Historicising the Palestinian Media: Hegemony, Identity, and Resistance

... The mass media are subject to the production, reproduction and transformation of hegemony through the institution of civil society which cover the areas of cultural production and consumption. Hegemony operates culturally and ideologically through the institutions of civil society...

Dominic Strinati

This chapter aims to historicise the rise of Palestinian media. Specifically, it seeks to examine spatially and temporally the various contexts within which Palestinian media developed. This chapter investigates the connection between media creation and identity formation in the late Ottoman Empire and the beginning of the British mandate. It is argued that the variety of media outlets in Palestine were founded during colonial periods (Ottoman, British, Israeli) represent instruments of self-imagining and self-identification, which primarily aimed at ‘preservation’ and defence of Palestinian identity. These media, as will be shown, were born at a moment when the Palestinians had been seen as ‘colonised other’. The Palestinians on their part challenged the occupying/colonial force whose ‘hegemonic’ projects deny the Palestinian existence. From this perspective, ‘resistance’ is the operative term that sums up the historical vocation of the Palestinian ‘counter-hegemonic media’. In this sense, media represents a tool of resistance in most cases, which could be a vital point if it withstands investigation. This normative agenda will be highlighted in order to full grasp the proper perception of the rise of the Palestinian media.

Establishment of presses in Palestine and its importance

Similar to other emancipation movements in the world, the intellectual and cultural movement in Palestine realized at an early stage the importance of mass-media as a tool in the struggle against colonial powers. Indeed, Palestinian media/journalism has played an essential role in strengthening and enhancing the national consciousness and political awareness among generations. The Palestinian press was also a political forum for the nationalists and reformers, both of whom sought to treat national problems and encourage national awareness. Consequently, the media contributed to the formation of a Palestinian identity that was under threat.

Studies about the role of media in revolutions have been considered as secondary in the historiography of modern revolutions. Nevertheless, many historians recognise the important role played by the media in revolutions. In this context, several revolutions and liberation movements utilised the mass media to serve its political objectives. For instance, the Algerian revolution (1954 -1962) established ‘Almujahid’ newspaper as a tool of struggle against French colonialism. Likewise in Libya, a newspaper called ‘Alliwa’a Attarabuls’i’ approached the ‘resistance’ line against Italian colonialism by spreading the culture of struggle and resistance to liberate Libya. Other newspapers were issued in Libya included ‘Alwaqt’ [Time], ‘Aladl’ [justice], and ‘Alraqeeb’ [Observer]. All the papers adopted the anti-colonial resistance approach.

Mass communication activities in Palestine began in the late nineteenth century. While journalism was established in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, it was by the end of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century that the Arabs were introduced to the modern press through the French campaign against Egypt and the Levant (1798 - 1801). During this period the mass communications in the Arab countries generally and in Palestine specifically were mostly written-media. The first Arab newspaper published was apparently the Journal al Iraq, which began appearing in Arabic and Turkish in Baghdad in 1820s.

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176 Abdul-Rahman, Awatef: *qadaya altabai’ya al-ilamisy wa althaqafiya*, [Issues of media and cultural dependency], (National Council for Culture, Arts and Literature - Kuwait - 1984, p.120.

177 Ibid.

The pioneers of the journalistic movement were literary, political and religious leaders, which makes sense when one recalls Gramsci. According to Gramsci, intellectuals were central to movements. Two leaders of the journalistic movement were Ahmed Al-Shuqairi, the founder of the Palestinian liberation organization (PLO), and Amin Al-Husaini, the founder of the Palestinian national movement. Al-Husaini established and chaired the "Arab Club" in 1915, which was the first political organization known in Palestine. Other Palestinian leaders shared in the national movements such as Khalil Al-Sakakini, who was a scholar and poet. It also included former nationalists such as the writer and politician Akram Zuaiter, Ali Al-Dajani, Ali Rimawi, Isa’af Nashashibi, and Hanna Abdalla. Many others also participated deeply in the Palestinian national and liberation movements. Their participation confirms Thomas R. Bates arguments that “the intellectuals [are] the historically progressive class”.

The first printing house in Palestine was established in 1830 by ‘Nasim Baq’. It was opened in Jerusalem for the purpose of printing books in Hebrew letters on Judaism. In 1846, a group of monks established the ‘Franciscan Fathers Press’ in Jerusalem to print Christian books in both Arabic and Italian. In 1848, a British religious group established a press called ‘the London Press in Jerusalem.’ These efforts were intended to introduce the Bible to the Jews. This was followed by the Armenian patriarchate printing press, which used the Greek, Hebrew and Arabic printing letters. Then, in 1876, Yitzhak Herschensohn established ‘Herschensohn presses in the ‘Al-Wad neighbourhood’. The ‘Jurji Habib Press’ was established in 1894 by ‘Jurji Habib Hanania for the purpose of printing books in Arabic, French, and Russian.

Jews in Palestine, therefore, played a role in the historical development of the printing industry in the country. The first printed book to arrive in Jerusalem was the Torah and this was possibly followed by a series of pamphlets and booklets for prayer, which were first printed at the first Hebrew printing press in Istanbul. The Yitzhak Livi Press was established in Al-Sharaf neighbourhood in Jerusalem in 1896 by the German Naum.

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179 Strinati, op., cit., p. 185-159.
Livi; and, the ‘English Press’ was founded in the Bab Al-Amoud area near the Alaqsa mosque.\textsuperscript{183} It was owned by the Protestant Church Society in 1867. In 1908 the ottoman government announced changes in the Ottoman Constitution. The changes in the constitution allowed for ‘margin’ freedoms of publishing newspapers.

**National consciousness and debates on identity under the Ottoman Rule**

In the late Ottoman rule, there was revival of intellectual and political movements in Palestine. Consequently, many presses were established and about forty newspapers were published during this period.\textsuperscript{184} However, such activities faced many difficulties as the Ottoman government, considered them as a danger to its rule in the country. Therefore the applied applications by the Palestinians for owning and publishing newspapers took quite a long time for approval and issuance by the authorities.

Rashid Khalidi argues that the Arab and Palestinian newspapers played a significant role in opposition of the Zionist project in Palestine. This is because of the debates they provoked regarding a Palestinian identity and ‘Palestine’ as homeland for the Palestinians. Khalidi adds that this fact was recognised by both Zionists and Palestinians at the time.\textsuperscript{185}

Among the many influences on cultural and intellectual life during the last few decades of Ottoman rule, the press had perhaps the most widespread impact on society. As part of the cultural, educational and linguistic revival known as the ‘nahda’, which took place in bilad al-Sham and Egypt in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the daily press, as well as periodicals flourished. Although much of this journalism was forced abroad by the censorship of the period of Sultan Abdul Hamid II in the years after 1878, it continued to prosper in Egypt, acquiring readers all over the Arabic-speaking world. An ever-growing number of newspapers, magazines, and technical and scientific journals were published there by Egyptian and other Arab writers, bringing their readers daily news as well as the latest trends in European and Islamic thought.\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{183} Yehoshua, Jacob: *The Arabic Press in Palestine during the Ottoman Rule 1918*, Al-Ma’aref Press, Jerusalem, 1974, pp. 7-10.


\textsuperscript{185} Khalidi, p. 57.

The newspapers during the late Ottoman era were economic, literary and political and published weekly and bi-weekly in Arabic, English, Turkish and Hebrew. However, “Alquds Al-Sharif”, was the first newspaper published in Palestine in both Arabic and Turkish. The first issue appeared on 2nd September 1876. Abdel-Salam Kamal edited of the Turkish pages, while the Arabic section was edited by Sheikh Ali Rimawi. It was printed by the government palace press in Jerusalem and published only the official news of the Ottoman government. It was stopped for a short period in 1908, but was soon reissued thereafter.

Al-Nafir Newspaper was founded in 1904 in Alexandria by Ibrahim Zaka. It was later transferred to Jerusalem in 1908, but under the name “Al-Nafir Al-Othmani”. The name change was the return of its ownership to Elia Zaka, who was the brother of Ibrahim Zaka. Ultimately, the newspaper settled in Haifa city. It was published weekly and bi-weekly until 1930.

Elia Zaka was a close friend of Jews and had written in praise of the Jewish settlement in Palestine. It was deemed to be an Israeli newspaper to the extent that a majority of its readers were from the Jewish community and Palestinians called the magazine a “mercenary newspaper”. This indicates that there were Arabic-language newspapers established by pro-Zionists to compete with the Arab journalistic movement in the Palestinian cities in the late Ottoman rule. In 1908, Habib Hanania issued the first issue of ‘Al-Quds’ after receiving the long-awaited license from the local government. The newspaper was as a scientific, social and literary critical journal. In the first issue of Al-Quds on the 18th of September 1908, the editorial wrote under the title ‘thanks to God’:

In 1899 I asked permission from the local government to establish an Arabic newspaper to serve the ‘state’ because the term of ‘watan’ (nation) has been heard like ‘lightning’ by the authoritarian government... ‘Our newspaper will chase after the tyranny, looking for weak points, and searching for local ills. We will accept what received of useful articles and letters with thanks to the writers... the

187 Abu Shanab, p. 8.
189 Yehoshua, pp. 52-53.
191 Yehoshua, pp. 7-10.
conclusion that the newspaper is to serve the state... We ask God to give us the right thing.192

The message of Alquds was one of openness and reformation and aimed to highlight societal problems. It was established in a period when the Arab nationalist movement was on a rise. Alquds adopted a certain social and cultural perspective. Hanania sought to avoid confrontation with the Ottoman authorities in the issuance of his newspaper by working within a ‘narrow margin of freedom’ granted by the Ottomans. The magazine Al-Nafa’es Al-Asriya was a cultural magazine, which was issued in 1908. Its founder, Khalil Baydas, printed it in Haifa city. The magazine was sixteen-pages, issued initially weekly and then bi-monthly. Al-Asma’i magazine, founded in 1908 in Jerusalem by Hanna Abdullah Issa, was issued bi-monthly and had several offices in Jaffa city. In issuing this magazine, the founder aimed to contribute to the reformation of society.193 The Al-Asmai frequently criticized the Zionist settlers and showed resentment, in particular, of the privileges that foreign immigrations enjoyed under legal capitulations granted by the Ottoman Empire.194 The Filastein’ was a newspaper founded in 1909 in Jaffa by some Orthodox Christians who called for an independent Palestine.195

Several newspapers and magazines were also published during that period such as “Al-Sohof”, “Al-Insaf”, “Al-najah”, “Al-e’atidal”, “Al-akhbar”, and “Al-Osbou’iya” in Jerusalem. Following the first Zionist Congress held in Basel, Switzerland, a set of decisions were adopted to serve the Jewish interests in Palestine. Two decisions particularly important, namely the establishment of more settlements and support for Jewish agriculturists and tradesmen in Palestine. The Palestinians felt that the Zionist movement was a danger threatening their culture, existence and identity. Thus, the Zionist project in Palestine became a critical issue in the Arab and Palestinian press. At the same time, the Palestinian press participated in the debates on Zionism as the Palestinian nationalist and pan-Arabist movements were on the rise.

In that period, the features of Palestinian identity began to appear through dialogue on ‘Palestine’ as a homeland for the Palestinian people and the struggle against the colonial

192 Alquds newspaper, issue no. 1, 18/9/1908.
settler project in Palestine. The Alkarmil newspaper, which was named after the Carmel Mountain in Haifa, was at the forefront of the newspapers that dedicated the struggle against Zionism activities in Palestine. It was founded in December of 1908 by Najib Nassar in Haifa, and continued until 1913.

A crucially important source that sheds further information on this issue is the daily or periodical press, which started to appear in various cities in the wake of the 1908 Young Turk Revolution. This press—and particularly the most avowedly political newspapers of the period, Filastin and al-Karmil, which began to appear in 1911—has been extensively mined to shed light on the politicization of the Palestinian Arabs and their emerging reaction to Zionism. The new press began publication in 1908, when the Turkification policy of the new regime was not yet apparent or even extant, and shows that contrary to what we had previously assumed, the people of the period were well aware of the concept of nationalism, though the nationalism was mainly Ottoman.

A random sample of Alkarmil from 1908 to 1913 found many editorials and articles warning the Palestinians from the Zionists and their project in Palestine. For instance, on 31 March 1911, the newspapers started publishing a series of six articles about the Zionism movement, its history, objectives, plans, resources, and why the Arabs and the Palestinians should have fought the activities of the Zionists in the country. Some of the articles were written by the editor-in-chief or the owner of the newspaper. However, Nasser re-published articles on Zionism in al-muqattam and al-ahram in Cairo, al-mofid and alitihad al’uthmani in Beirut. The following quote is an example from al-karmil newspaper in which the editor had written an article about ‘the Zionism renaissance and nationalists’.

If it is permissible for the Israelis to declare aloud of necessity of colonizing Palestine; the right of the Palestinians to show that Palestine is full of its people who maintain it because it is their homeland, and they accustomed to its water, air, sun and its sky’... ... ‘If it is permissible for the Israelis to incite to collect money for mobilization the buyers of Palestine, and If it is permissible to their poor and rich people have to pay huge amounts of money for that purpose; we must recommend our farmers not to sell the home, because it is his treasure the treasure of his children... we must explain to him the awful consequences of selling the land we must

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198 The issues of Alkarmil from 1908 to 1913 are available on microfiche slides in the Arab World Documentation Unit at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies (IAIS) in the University of Exeter.
move the emotions of the National and virility to the Conscience of the rich not to sell land... We have the right of incite public opinion to look at the rich who do not respect these things as a traitor. 199

In this passage, the writer calls upon the Palestinians to obstruct the Zionist project which aims to seize the Palestinian lands. While, so doing, the writer shows his adherence to a nationalist rhetoric strongly manifested in encouraging the Palestinians to abstain from selling their lands to the Zionists and also to rise up to those who seek to sell their lands. He considers those who sell their lands traitors. Al-karmil press also printed a book of 64 pages called ‘Zionism’, which contained a set of facts about the Zionist movement since its appearance in 1905200; and, included a summary of its congressional decisions and blueprints in Palestine and Syria.201 Besides the complexities and difficulties involving the process of obtaining a license for publishing magazines and newspapers, it is important to mention that the press under the Ottomans was dominated by “Al-Nazara,” which was the Ministry of Knowledge and Ministry of Interior in Istanbul. The Nazara imposed strict control on the news and implemented various punishments, which sometimes included physical harm. Most of the newspapers and magazines were banned by the outbreak of the First World War for four years until the British Mandate over Palestine started in 1917. A new phase in the Palestinian press with new political circumstances took place.

The role of the press / media under the British mandate (1919 - 1948)

During the British Mandate in Palestine, the British authority controlled the newspapers and periodicals. In so doing, the British aimed to spread their official propaganda which endorsed the policy of the mandatory government. Among the aims of that policy was to argue against what had previously been published in the Palestinian press and publications. Likewise, the Zionist movement utilised its mass media system to face the growing anti-Zionist feelings amongst the Arab-Palestinians. In this regard, the leadership of the British army issued its official newspaper ‘the Palestine news ’on 11th April 1918; its supplement in Hebrew called the Hadashout Ha’aretz’ [the news of the land]; and, the Arabic supplement called the ‘Felasteen’.202

199 Al-karmil newspaper: (volume number 34, first year, 14 august 1909), p. 1.
200 Al-karmil newspaper, volume number 158, third year, 11 august 1911, p. 1.
201 Ibid.
Felasteen, [Government of All Palestine] Official Gazette was found in January 1921 in Jerusalem. It represented the voice of the Mandate authority and was directly edited by the Registry of Publications, which belonged to the government. The paper was issued once a month in three languages, namely Arabic, English, and Hebrew.\textsuperscript{203} In January 1932, its name was changed to “Alwaqa’i Al- Felasteeniya”\textsuperscript{204} [the Palestinian Facts]. It became the official newspaper that published governmental orders. In addition, the British Mandatory government launched the first local radio in Palestine under the name of the Palestine Broadcasting Station (PBS). The radio station began in 1936 and was supervised by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). It broadcasted in Arabic, English, and Hebrew.\textsuperscript{205}

The Zionist military groups (Haganah)\textsuperscript{206} established a clandestine radio station in the late 1930, which was during the time of military clashes between the Arab-Palestinians and the Zionist military groups.\textsuperscript{207} In one of his articles, Douglas Boyd draws a set of objectives for the radio broadcasting of the Jewish groups in Palestine.

The clandestine radio broadcasts sponsored by Jewish groups from the late 1930s until 1948 were done not by those interested primarily in radio broadcasting, but rather by groups that understood both the strategic and tactical importance of the sound medium. These broadcasts had five major goals. First, they were intended to provide various types of information to scattered Jewish communities in Palestine, an area where the Mandatory Authority controlled print and radio. Second, they were intended to gain favor, and members among the Jewish population for the three major independence groups discussed herein. Third, they aimed to hasten the departure of the British and foster the subsequent creation of an independent Jewish state. Fourth, they were used to provide specific political and tactical military instructions to members who otherwise would have had to

\textsuperscript{203}Khouri, pp. 33, 56.
\textsuperscript{204}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{206}The ‘Haganah’ was a Zionist military organization established in 1921 in Jerusalem regarded the first nucleus of the Israeli army after the declaration of the state in 1948. The ‘Hagana’ (defence in Hebrew) aimed to protect the lives of Jews and their property away from the authority of the British Mandate forces, and establishment of military checkpoints within the Palestinian territories to collect arms and ammunition and food supplies for use in their war against the Palestinians and Arabs, while working on the establishment of the Israeli state. More information is available on: http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/253D8483-2D85-4463-879A-B8CB624C8B00.htm (19/11/09), also see Bauer, Yehuda: ‘From Cooperation to Resistance: The Haganah 1938-1946’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3 (April, 1966), pp. 182-210.
\textsuperscript{207}Boyd, pp. 101-115.
In order to achieve these goals, the Haganah radio contributed to the ‘Haganah military group’s war against the Arab-Palestinians, especially in the late British mandate period. For example, the Haganah radio participated in the 1948 war through announcing the progress of occupying the Palestinian villages. On 12 April 1948, the radio stated that the Palestinian village ‘Kafrin’ was the fifth one taken over by the Zionist military groups. The radio station also ran an organised psychological war against the Arab Palestinian people by saying, for instance, that the Arabs of Haifa fled their homes in the direction of the Haifa port ‘shouting’: ‘Deir Yassin’. It was a message to the Palestinians to either leave or die.

This occupying/colonial project required the Palestinian movement to challenge this hegemonic project by the same tools. Hence, the Palestinian press became integrated as a fundamental factor in shaping the development of the Palestinian national movement in a gradual process. During this period, the Palestinian press and newspapers played an important role in mobilizing the Palestinians in their struggle against the Zionist project in Palestine. The Palestinian press was strongly challenging the Zionist project through publishing materials to incite Palestinians to revolt against the colonialism.

By the end of First World War and beginning of the British Mandate, most of the Palestinian newspapers began publishing in 1919 after being banned for years. In addition, the preexisting newspapers began re-issuing with some of the others that were established during the British Mandate. The Palestinian press faced extremely complicated circumstances in light of the continuous implementation of the old Ottoman Press Acts in Palestine until 1932. Furthermore, the mandatory government adopted a set of changes besides the Ottoman acts. It authorised ‘the Criminal

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208 Ibid.
212 Ibid.
Investigation Department’ through “the Office of Publications” be in charge of the press activities. The office was staffed by a number of Arabs and Jews who were appointed by the mandate authority. According to the new regulations, all the Palestinian journalists or writers must have a “Press ID Card,” which includes full information about them.

In addition, the office was empowered to suspend newspapers and to delete any topics or articles contrary to the general policy of the mandate government. As part of that policy three pioneering papers such as Falastin, Al-Karmil, and al-Quds were closed.

In spite of the general policy of the mandate government, the Palestinian journalists and newspaper owners tried to challenge these circumstances and carry out their message against the oppression and the stifling of journalistic freedoms. However, many daily and weekly newspapers and magazines in Arabic, Hebrew and English were published between 1919 and 1948. There were 241 outlets, including 41 in English owned by foreigners, five Arab owners in foreign languages, and a diversity of newspapers that cover economic, literature, political and religious affairs. One of the most prominent newspapers that existed during the British mandate period was “Surya Al-Janoubiya” (Southern Syria) newspaper, which was issued in 1919 and printed in the Greek Monastery Press in Jerusalem. This newspaper was published by ’Arif Al-Arif’ one of the Jerusalem’s most reputable teachers, who later became one of the Palestinian’s leading historians along with Amin Ahusaini.

The newspaper was notable for using specific terms that emphasized the Arab identity of the Palestinians. In its first issue in October 1921, it mentioned that it had been published in Jerusalem, ‘the capital of Palestine’. ‘Al-Jamei’a Al- Islamiya’ (Islamic

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214 Hanania, Mary: ‘100th Anniversary of a Pioneering Press and Newspaper’, (Jerusalem Quarterly autumn 2007 - 32), p. 3


217 Pappé, p. 82.

society) is a political and literary newspaper issued in 1932 in Jaffa in Arabic, and edited by Sheikh Suleiman Al-Taji; it was later headed by Ali Nasereddin and Sami Siraj. This newspaper aimed to demonstrate the Islamic ideas over the Islamic counties in order to revive the concept of ‘Umma’ [one Islamic nation]. During its existence from 1932 to 1937, it was closed by the British mandatory government for a limited period of time due to some of the opinions published.

“Mera’at Alsharq” [Mirror of the East] was considered the most influential national newspaper during British rule. This newspaper was founded in Jerusalem by Paul Shihadeh in September 1919. It was one of the first newsletters of the Arab press published in Jerusalem after the First World War and, contributed to an increased national awareness of the Palestinian people. Three Palestinian figures contributed in editing the newspaper. They were Ahmed Al-Shukairi, who later established the PLO, Akram Zu‘aytir and Aziz Shehadeh. The paper was closed in 1939 by the British authorities after it published a poem calling for revolt and rebellion against the mandate policies.

Al-Liwa’a was a daily newspaper established in Jerusalem and headed by Jamal Alhusayni. The newspaper was the mouthpiece of the Husayni family. The Al-Sirat al-Mustaqim newspaper was established in Jaffa by Shaykh ‘Abdallah al-Qalqili. It switched from semi-weekly to daily publication on 5 June 1936. The daily newspaper Filastin [Palestine] was published in Jaffa and owned by ‘Isa al-‘Isa but edited by Yusuf Hanna. The Al-difa’a [Defence] newspaper was founded in Jaffa in 1934 by a journalist named Ibrahim al-Shanti, who moved to Jerusalem in 1948. Proliferation of newspapers in that period led to the revival of a national consciousness, which

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221 Ibid.
222 Ibid.
223 Ibid.
224 Ibid.
225 Ibid.
226 Ayalon, Ami: Reading Palestine: printing and literacy, 1900-1948, (University of Texas Press, 2004), p. 64.
encouraged the people to organise national conferences, call for independence, and resist the British colonialism in Palestine.

The Balfour Declaration in November 1917, which clearly stated that Palestine should be a national homeland for the Jewish people,\textsuperscript{227} shocked the Palestinian people. This step by the mandatory authority created new political circumstances in Palestine. It fueled tension and enraged feelings among the Palestinians against the British policies in Palestine, especially the Balfour Declaration. Between 1918 and 1948, the Palestinian people made a number of revolutions and popular uprisings against the British policies in the country. The first clash under British mandate between the Palestinians and the Zionists occurred during the festival of Nabi Musa (Prophet Moses) in April 1920.\textsuperscript{228} At the annual religious ceremony of Nabi Musa, Palestinian popular delegations from different villages gathered in Jerusalem. Palestinian leaders gave impassioned speeches to the crowd that inflamed them and sparked attacks on Jews in Hebron.

The Palestinian leader Akram Zu’aytar was arrested by the British mandatory government due to a speech he gave at the Nabi Musa celebration.\textsuperscript{229} Subsequently, the Palestinians witnessed the popular uprising of Jaffa in 1921. A well-known action of the Palestinians was the so-called ‘thauluratul buraq’ (the uprising of Buraq).\textsuperscript{230} The turning point was the British mandatory government’s sentencing of three Palestinian youths (Mohammed Jamjoum, Fuad Hjazi, and Atta El-zeer) to the death penalty on 17 June 1930. The youth had been found guilty of organizing the 1929 uprising and arousing passions in the process.\textsuperscript{231}

In 1935, an armed revolution was launched against the Zionist movement and the British mandatory government by a Syrian-born Muslim preacher by the name of Sheikh Elzz-al-Din Al-Qassam.\textsuperscript{232} For this purpose, Al-Qassam formed an organization that consisted of secret military cells, comprising 200 fighters and about 800 supporters.

\textsuperscript{227} The original document of the Balfour Declaration, 2\textsuperscript{nd} of November 1917.

\textsuperscript{228} Khalidi, Rashid: The iron cage: the story of the Palestinian struggle for statehood, (Beacon Press, 2006), p. 57.


\textsuperscript{230} The British mandatory government called this action ‘The 1929 Palestine riots’, al-buraq known as the Western Wall of al-aqsa mosque.

\textsuperscript{231} Kabha, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.39, No.3, July 2003, pp.169–189.

Al-Qsaam was killed with ten of his companions in November 1935 in a district of 'ahrash ya’abad’ near Jenin. Finally, there was the great Palestinian revolution (1936–39), which was regarded as the most remarkable revolution in Middle East history. The first phase of the revolt was a general strike that began in April 1936 and continued for six full months.\footnote{Kabha, (Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.39, No.3, July 2003), pp.169-189.}

The Palestinian press, therefore, represented an important tool of the Palestinian struggle against the British Mandate through the mobilization of national resistance against the British and Zionist project in Palestine. The Palestinian press took this vital role in resistance through activities shown by newspaper reporters, editorials and articles about the Palestinian resistance.\footnote{Abu Amer, Adnan: ‘al-muqawama al-filastiniyya lel-intidab al-britani’ [Palestinian resistance to the British Mandate - An oral History study], (Palestine Foundation of Culture – Damascus, 2008), available on: http://www.thaqafa.org/Main/default.aspx?_ContentType=ART&_ContentID=7247217d-6310-4ac2-ab21-6d326d092abf.} In addition, it called for resisting and refusing outcomes of the Jewish immigration to Palestine by force and military action.

In 1919, the Palestinian Society for Resistance against Zionism issued a study under the title, ‘Palestine and renew its life’\footnote{Ibid.}, which called for a renaissance in Palestine culturally, politically, socially and intellectually. Also in 1923, ‘jama’yat al-nahda al-wataniyya’ [National Association for Renaissance] issued a booklet under the title, ‘Call and Covenant’, which emphasized that "the liberation of the nation and saving it from the clutches of Zionism does not come and will never come from Britain or any external power... the liberation is only in the hands of the nation ... and its future is in its hands only’.\footnote{Ibid.} In one of its articles, the ‘Felastin’ [Palestine] newspaper wrote:

> The Zionist movement misleads the World in the problem of displaced people in terms of the human sense to gain the sympathy to Jewish tragedy in Europe and to support its political and aggression demand in Palestine. But in reality is: they do not care for these displaced people, but as far as their political value in the case of Palestine.\footnote{Felasteen newspaper,( issue number 178, 27 September, 1927).}

Blaming Europe and the United State for supporting the Zionist project in Palestine at the expense of the Palestinian people had been a huge issue in the Palestinian press during that period. In this respect, Al-Difa’a newspaper strongly blamed the United...
States due to its support of the Zionist movement in Palestine through arming it with weapons that have been used against the Palestinian people and caused many massacres. Al-Difa’a wrote:

America adopted the draft of the division of Palestine, and provided the Zionist money... America was sending ‘shipments of Death’ (Weapons) ... this is a fact, the Arabs do not forget and will not tolerate that ... the newspaper concluded: …Nations will never forget who are blocking the way towards freedom and independence.238

An article published in the New York Post newspaper tried to justify the cause of the Jewish people in Palestine and the merit of support by the allies because of the valuable assistance of Jews in World War I and II. The newspaper called for the US administration to use as much influence as needed to create a Jewish State in Palestine… “Al-Mustaqbal” newspaper commented on this by saying:

We wonder why America does not propose Jewish immigration to the state of Texas for example, or to Argentina, there are few people there ... … why United States does not contribute to accept Jewish refugees? And why the Jewish people want to fill Palestine Jews to achieve their dream and establish a Jewish state on the land of Palestine.239

While criticising US policy, the Palestinian newspaper also criticised Europe by describing it as a barbaric. This criticism also appeared in Al-Jihad newspaper which wrote that “Europe is ‘barbaric’ as to what this ‘barbaric’ Palestine... it is one solution, it is independence”.240 Accordingly, the interactions of the Palestinian press in public affairs during that period created a new group of elites emerging from a strong national and political movement. This movement had bothered the Mandatory Government, who felt the hazard of such awareness toward the national issue. Thus, the High Commissioner of Palestine, Herbert Samuel, harshly criticized the Palestinian press in his annual report in 1928 and described it as “leaflets established for riots and hypocrisy”.241 It was clear that in the 1930s that priority of the Palestinian press was to challenge of the Zionist movement, whose plan was based on seizure of the Palestinian

238 Ibid, p. 45.
239 Ibid, p. 47.
241 Shomali, Kustundi, the Arabic press in Palestine, the mirror of the east, 1919 – 1939, A critical study and chronological bibliography, Arab studies society, Jerusalem, 1990, p. 21.
lands and promoting Jewish immigration to Palestine. The Palestinian press considered the British Mandate as a partner of zionism movement in capturing the Palestinian lands. The Palestinian press worked hard to reveal the joint British and Zionist plan to its people. Media efforts helped increase public awareness and ultimately sparked the outrage that created the revolution of Ezziddine Al-Qassam in 1935.

The national attitude of the Palestinian journalists against the Mandate government and the Zionism movement was clearly seen during the ‘100 Days Strike’. For instance, in 27th July 1936 the ‘Felasteen’ newspaper challenged the Mandate government by publishing on its front page the pictures of Ezziddine Al Qassam and his group who were killed in a battle against the British soldiers. The newspaper stated in bold “the Eighth Wonders of the World: a hundred days on the historical strike, we vow to keep struggling until the new century” 242 The press had evolved during the British Mandate period and witnessed richness in its content through increasing consciousness of the Palestinian national Identity and awareness of anti-colonialism culture. The press movement was led by the intellectuals and highly educated figures who thus became leaders of public opinion. The important issues that have engaged the press in the British Mandate time included the Palestinian national movement, the Arab Renaissance, and the cultural movement. It also triggered new calls for social, religious and political reform.

**Palestinian ‘Nakba’ and the Egyptian and Jordanian Administrations (1948 -1967)**

The Palestinian ‘Nakba’ [exodus] in 1948 and the establishment of a Jewish state on the ruins of Palestinian towns and villages destroyed the life and infrastructure of Palestinian society. This disaster included all political parties, local and national institutions, intellectual and cultural structures such as clubs, magazines, newspapers and theatres. Moreover, the social make-up of Palestinian society had been damaged as a result of the forced exodus of tens of thousands of Palestinians to the West Bank and the Gaza strip and to refugee camps in the Arab neighbouring countries such as Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. Hence, the Zionist project sought not only to occupy Palestinian land; rather, it was a comprehensive project. It aimed to change the demographic structure in Palestine by forcing the Palestinians out of their homeland and to replace them with Jewish migrants, thus creating a Jewish majority by wiping out

Palestinian presence in these lands. In light of that ‘disaster’, the historic Palestine was divided into three scattered parts. The main part of the country became under control of the Jewish state. The other two parts, namely the Gaza Strip and West Bank and including East Jerusalem, came under the rule of the Egyptian and Jordanian administrations respectively. Since then, the Palestinian people have been living in very difficult circumstances. They lost most of their homeland and were forced to live under non-Palestinian rule in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank or in the diasporas. As for the Palestinian press, it was subjected to Egyptian laws in the Gaza Strip, and to Jordanian laws in the West Bank. As a result, the press had been affected by the new situations, as there were restrictions imposed by the Jordanian and Egyptian governments.

Because of the Palestinian ‘Nakba’, Gaza received a huge number of the Palestinian refugees who fled from their towns near the Gaza Strip such ‘Askalan’, ‘Be’r el-sabe’a’, and Jaffa. Despite the de-facto occupation of most of Palestine, the Palestinians refused to recognise the consequences of the Nakba.\textsuperscript{243} The ‘Nakba’ experience has made the Palestinian people aware of the importance of uniting themselves and the rebuilding of destroyed institutions. Hence, a national conference was held in Gaza city in October 1948, which adopted a set of decisions. Most notably, the declaration of independence of Palestine and establishment of a free, democratic and sovereign state were adopted. The conference also voted for a new government called "Arab Government of All Palestine", which was headed by Ahmad Hilmi Abdul Baqi.\textsuperscript{244} The government had fallen, however, after truce agreements between Israel’s government in 1949 with the governments of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan.\textsuperscript{245}

In the period between 1948 and 1967 and in spite of the difficulties faced, the press in the Gaza Strip managed to mobilise the national struggle and challenge the censorship imposed by the Egyptian military government. Their challenge was remarkable given the lack of material resources, technical support and the fierce competition within the Egyptian press.\textsuperscript{246} However, a number of Palestinian newspaper and magazine had been published by Gaza intellectuals, most of whom were from the aristocrat well-known

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\item Ibid.
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families. Egyptian authorities granted a number of licenses to publish a number of newspapers and magazines in the Gaza Strip. Kamal Eddin Abu Shaban published ‘Ghazza’ (Gaza), which was considered the longest (1950-1964) and the most regular and widespread newspaper in the area. ‘Al-Saraha’ newspaper [openness] was published by Palestinian social clubs and some Palestinian Communists; the most prominent were Said Felfel and Mo'een Bseiso. It was issued in the period between 1952 and 1963.

Between 1954 and 1961, Moussa Al-Surani (the owner), Moneer Al-Rais and Saleh Abu Kamil published ‘Ellewa’a’ newspaper, which was the mouthpiece of national consciousness. ‘El-Wihdah’ (Unity) newspaper had represented the voice of the Arab Socialist Baath Party and was the pulse of the Palestinian people inspired by the widespread feeling of Arab nationalism during the so-called period of Nasserism in 1950s and 1960s. It was issued by Majed El-Alami in the period of 1954 to 1964. The Egyptian Corporation ‘Akhbar Al-youm’ made a significant contribution, as it provided supervision and training for the Palestinian editors in the Gaza Strip. This contribution was derived from the sense of pan-Arabism sense of Jamal Abdulnassir, the Egyptian president in that period. Some observers considered it a natural extension of the newspaper called Liberation, which was edited by Zuhair Al-Rayes.

‘El-Mustaqbal’ [future] newspaper was established by Mohammad Jalal Enaya between 1952 and 1956. The owner of this newspaper invited thinkers and intellectuals to write in the newspaper in an attempt to establish a political and intellectual direction. Also, the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip issued a newspaper called ‘al-liwa’a’ in 1954. In 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) issued in 1964 the Palestine News to be its official newspaper.

248 Ibid.
249 Ibid.
251 El-Dalow, pp. 281-310.
252 Ibid.
253 Basil, Suleiman M. op., cit.
There were not remarkable differences in the circumstances of the Palestinian press in the West Bank under the Jordanian rule. In this period, the West Bank was officially annexed to Trans-Jordan as part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Accordingly and for various reasons, the Jordanian government sought to improve circumstances of the Palestinian people in the West Bank. For instance, all the Palestinians in the area were granted full Jordanian citizenship including the original residents. This included Palestinian refugees who found themselves in the East and the West Banks of Jordan after the Nakba.\textsuperscript{254} They also participated in political life of the Kingdom and enjoyed freedom of movement to-and-from Jordan.

Notwithstanding and in the wake of the Nakba, many Palestinian newspapers such as ‘Filasteen’ and ‘Al-difa’a’ fled from Haifa and Jaffa to East Jerusalem, which was an integral part of the West Bank and Amman. Furthermore, a number of new newspapers appeared in the West Bank in the 1950s and 1960s, especially in Jerusalem, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Hebron and Nablus. They covered different aspects of the Palestinian life, namely political, economic, social, moral, cultural, women's affairs and many other areas.\textsuperscript{255} Yet, in 1966, the Jordanian authority closed most of the Palestinian newspapers and merged them in two press associations ‘Alquds’ and ‘Addostour’.\textsuperscript{256} The government also imposed strict control over them, thus making them a mouthpiece for the government. Many of the Palestinian newspapers published in Jordan during that time adopted a rhetorical approach indicating loyalty towards the king of Jordan.

\textbf{The Palestinian media under the Israeli occupation}

After the June 1967 war, the Israeli army occupied the Gaza Strip, West Bank including East Jerusalem, Sinai Peninsula of Egypt and the Golan Heights of Syria.\textsuperscript{257} In the wake of such military occupation, the Palestinian media witnessed a turning-point. This was because of the forced changes that occurred, such scattering of Palestinians, and the imposed changes of law that military occupation brought. Part of the Palestinian press was operated from in the occupied Gaza Strip and West Bank, while the other part operated from exile. Those in the latter were able to take advantage of the support by

\textsuperscript{254} Gubser, Peter: \textit{Jordan: crossroads of Middle Eastern events}, Taylor & Francis, 1983, p.15.


\textsuperscript{256} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{257} Gordon, Hayim, and others: \textit{Looking back at the June 1967 war}, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999.
those who sympathised with the Palestinian cause. In the Palestinian occupied territories, most of the publications including newspapers, and magazines were stopped. Afterward, there was a clear absence of the Palestinian press.

Consequently, the Israeli occupation authorities attempted to fill the gap by issuing a new Arabic-language newspaper called ‘Alyoum’ [Today]. This newspaper remained a symbol of hostility because of its nature as a publication of the occupation itself and thus remained a pariah and unacceptable by most of the Palestinians.\textsuperscript{258} The newspaper was, therefore, shut down in 1968. The Israeli authority established another newspaper called ‘Alanbaa’ [News].\textsuperscript{259} It aimed to limit the secret leaflets distributed by the Palestinians against the Israeli occupation. Additionally, it sought to influence the Palestinians to accept the new, ‘de facto’ rule of the Israeli occupation. However, the newspaper failed in its attempts to normalise life of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip according to policies of the occupation. Palestinian intellectuals encouraged the paper’s failure, which also increased the discussions on the importance of confronting the Israeli media. Among such discussions were how to deal with acts and orders of the Israeli military censorship.

There were several local newspapers and magazine issued in context of the ‘narrow margin’\textsuperscript{260} of ‘freedom of press’ given by the Israeli military censorship. However, under the Israeli military censorship law, the Palestinian newspapers were required to submit all of the materials to the military censor before publication.\textsuperscript{261} This strict control led to closing down some of the Palestinian newspapers by the Israeli military authorities under the pretext of ignoring the censorship orders. In addition to a large set of regulations and military orders of its own, the Israeli authorities utilised the British emergency law of 1945 to control various activities in the Palestinian occupied territories.\textsuperscript{262} Such regulations and orders gave the occupation authorities power to


\textsuperscript{260} Ibid, p. 7.


\textsuperscript{262} Ibid, p. 115.
prohibit any Palestinian book, newspaper and/or other publications to prevent what Israel considers to be incitement of ‘violence’ and ‘hostility’. 263

Some Palestinian journalists refused to respond to the Israeli orders. They also wanted to stop the so-called ‘cultural normalisation’ and hence political normalization with the occupation. 264 As a result of this several active journalists had been punished by the occupation authorities. They were deported, imprisoned and/or house-arrested. Many others were prevented from traveling outside the West Bank and Gaza strip, and some were beaten or tortured. 265 In spite of this, many Palestinian journalists continued circumvention of the Israeli military censorship. They established a set of journalistic institutions within the ‘narrow margin’ of the occupation. Such journalistic offices or institutions worked under different titles, some under the umbrella of international news agencies and others in the name of journalistic and translation. For example, there were the Palestinian Bureau of the Journalistic services in Jerusalem, Bethlehem Bureau of Journalism, and Al-nahar Bureau of Journalism in the Gaza strip. These situations continued until the first Intifada in December 1987, which began a new phase with new features of the Palestinian press.

**The Palestinian Media in the Diasporas**

The other part of the Palestinian media after the 1967 war was based outside of Palestine. Most of the Palestinian Diaspora media was mainly in the Arab countries. However, some of outlets were founded in Cyprus, London and Paris. While the Arab-Arab division negatively affected existence of the Palestinian media in the Arab countries, greater freedom was enjoyed in the Western countries. In Jordan, Syria and Libya some Palestinian newspapers have been closed due to their attitudes towards particular issues. Similarly, political disputes between some of the Palestinian factions negatively affected performance of the Palestinian media. Each party used to cover the Palestinian issue from their own perspective, which often were influenced by the parties’ alliances with Arab and non-Arab countries.

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264 Ibid.
In January 1964 the Arab summit in Cairo established the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as an official representative of the Palestinian people and granted it full membership in the Arab League. Moreover, the Arab League adopted a resolution on funding the establishment of the ‘Palestine Liberation Army,’ which approached the armed struggle as an essential path to liberate Palestine. Since radio is a huge instrument of mobilization and formation of the public opinion, the Palestinians used it as a mass media outlet. ‘Sawt Felasteen’ (Voice of Palestine) was the first Palestinian radio that represents the contemporary Palestinian resistance and was founded by the PLO in 1964. At the beginning, the PLO had limited airtime from the Egyptian Radio ‘Middle East Radio in Cairo’, on 388.1 m waves for 3 hours a day.

Raji Sahyoun, one of the Radio founders of Palestinian Radio, made a great effort to highlight Palestinian identity through many programmes. Sahyoun brought a large amount of recorded tapes including national songs. Various programs were prepared by the Art office of the PLO in Beirut. Then, he formulated structure of the radio administration with help from some broadcasters, writers, journalists and artists from both Palestine and Lebanon. Sahyoun also selected a number of professionals to help manage radio programs in Cairo. Among them were the prominent Palestinian poet Hisham Rashid and the Palestinian lawyer Ibrahim Ishaq. After that, some of the Palestinian young men from Arab countries joined them to help in authoring and editing articles and programs of the radio.

Afterwards, a number of Palestinian Radio stations representing several Palestinian movements appeared on air such as: ‘Sawt al aasifa’ (voice of storm), ‘Sawt al thawra al felasteeniya’ (voice of Palestinian revolution), and ‘sawt Fatah’ radio (voice of Fatah). These stations were broadcasting from several Arab capitals including Baghdad,

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266 No doubt that the radio -- as well as the other media outlets -- has had a massive impact in mid of the last century epically in the west. It has been utilised as a tool of propaganda in wars and political conflicts. The Nazi regime led by Hitler relied extensively on the radio of the official propaganda. To the extent that the Nazi regime produced a cheap one-channel radio for the masses and distributed a radio systems with loudspeakers in restaurants, factories, and the public places. Look at: Jowett, Garth S. and, O’Donnell, ‘Victoria: Propaganda and Persuasion’, (SAGE, 2005), p. 232.


268 Ibid.

269 Ibid.

270 Ibid.
Damascus, Cairo and Algeria. The political atmosphere following the 1967 war and the early 1970s affected on the Palestinian media circumstances. This is because there had been changes in the Palestine Liberation Organization institutions. In this context, Mohammed Suleiman says:

The most prominent development in the history of the Palestinian media was in April 1972, as a "Palestinian People's Congress" during the tenth meeting of the Palestinian National Council. The aim of the conference was to assist the Palestinian National Council to re-institutionalize PLO, and strengthening the Palestinian national unity after the events of ‘black’ September in Jordan. The conference concluded with a recommendation calling for the notification of military action, including media organizations of all factions and organizations in a united Palestinian Media Foundation. The conference asked the factions to stop all parties’ statements, to unite in one publication called the Palestinian revolution.

The Voice of Palestine Radio a PLO institution that witnessed the rebuilding process. The PLO created a new management of the PLO media called ‘the united foundation of the Palestinian media' headed by Kamal Nasser, who managed to merge the ‘Voice of Palestine’ Radio and the ‘Voice of the storm’ Radio into one Radio station called ‘Voice of Palestine’- the voice of the Palestinian revolution.

The Egyptian president at that time, Jamal Abdulnassir, granted Yasser Arafat a Radio station as a gift and expressed his endorsement and support for the PLO and its resistance approach. This station was fully equipped and used for ‘Voice of Palestine - the voice of the Palestinian revolution’ radio. It was broadcasting mainly from Dara’a city in Syria. Likewise, a number of waves were transmitting from some Arab countries Radio stations for limited times in Egypt, Algeria, Iraq and Yemen. All of the waves represented the mouthpiece of the Palestinian revolution.

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274 Kamal Nasser was one of the Palestinian revolution leaders, born in 1924 in Birzeit, headed the PLO Media; served as its spokesman and as editor of its journal Filastin al-thawra (The Palestine Revolution). He has been assassinated in Beirut in 1973 in an Israeli military operation targeted commanders and two other Palestinian leaders Kamal Adwan, Mohamed Youssef Al-Najjar. Available on Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (Passia) website: http://www.passia.org/ (01/11/2009).
The Syrian regime closed the radio station in Dar’a, which remained so until it was rebuilt again in Beirut two years later.\textsuperscript{276} In April 1972, the Executive Committee of the PLO decided to establish the Palestinian News Agency "Wafa" as an official news agency of the Palestinians. ‘Wafa’ was founded particularly for the purpose of publishing the official version of news about Palestinian affairs, especially the ‘military statements’ of the Palestinian revolution leadership. However, the agency's work gradually expanded to include different types of news.\textsuperscript{277} Then, it issued 'felasteen el-thawra' [Palestinian revolution] weekly magazine headed by Ahmed Abdel-Rahman. The PLO also created the "Palestinian Cinema Foundation" and "the photography department," which produced numerous documentaries and photographs to historicise this stage of the Palestinian revolution.\textsuperscript{278}

The Palestinian media in diaspora focused on achievements made by the Palestinian revolution such as the participation of Palestine in the United Nations for the first time. The media contributed to deliver the Palestinian voice to much more people over the world. It played vital role in mobilizing the Palestinian society to the resistance wherever they were, through explaining the Palestinian attitudes towards the clash with the Israeli occupation; even the Palestinian media pointed out that the Palestinian discourse dealt with Israel as a political matter not rather this, it only used the ‘Jew’ word just to denote the meaning of religion.\textsuperscript{279}

It is important to note that the Palestinian media in some places worked under very difficult circumstances, especially in conflictual areas such as Lebanon. For instance, the work of the radio entailed considerable risks in terms of the place of transmission. In many cases radio coverage was not far or directly inside active battles, which caused many correspondents to lose their life.\textsuperscript{280}

\textsuperscript{276} Interview with Mohammed Suleiman, op., cit.


\textsuperscript{278} Gertz, Nurith, and Khleifi, George: ‘Palestinian cinema: landscape, trauma and memory, traditions in world cinema’, (Edinburgh University Press, 2008), p12

\textsuperscript{279} Interview with Mohammed Suleiman, op., cit.

Intifada and the Palestinian media

With the outbreak of the first Palestinian uprising or ‘Intifada’ against the Israeli occupation on the 9th of December 1987, the Palestinian media started a new phase of its struggle. The context of this phase was not different from the previous stages. The licensed-media of the Palestinians during the intifada remained under the military censorship act, within the ‘narrow margin’ given by the Israelis. Yet, in some regards, there were even more strict measurements.

The intifada witnessed new types of media tools utilised by the Palestinians to cover what the licensed-media could not. Pictures of the Israeli repression of the Palestinian people, especially what was called the ‘children of the stones,’ who fought the Israeli army by throwing rocks and ‘Molotov’ bottles, drew the attention of lots of people worldwide. During the first intifada the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin implemented ‘a break the bones policy,’ which meant the Israeli occupation forces were to hit Palestinian protesters and break their bones and limbs. The first picture was captured by a journalist showing a number of Israeli soldiers beating three Palestinian boys- in ‘Howara’ village near Nablus in the West Bank- until they broke their arms and legs. Above and beyond, lots of stories were reported regarding the use of this policy against the Palestinians during the first intifada. Consequently, implementing ‘a break the bones policy’ and the ‘Iron Fist policy’ received international media attention, caused an international outrage against the Israeli policies, and increased sympathy toward the Palestinian issue.

The new types of using the media by the Palestinian activists during the intifada were leaflets, graffiti and the mosques’ loudspeakers. The activists distributed leaflets in most of the Palestinian cities to mobilise the people against the occupation forces; incited

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them to participate in the general strikes, boycott the Israeli products, stop paying taxes, refuse the military orders, and, calling for the resignation of so-called ‘government employees’ from office the governmental office.

Israel gradually started to publish fake leaflets to muddle the directives of the genuine leaflets, thereby hoping to generate confusion among the Palestinians. Palestinians, however, were quick to identify the false leaflets for two reasons and warned the population about them. First, leaflets were usually distributed collectively, that is, piles of leaflets were put in various locations for people to take, and sometimes, in their full version, they were aired on the radio, written as graffiti on walls, recited over the mosques’ speakers, or transcribed as tape recorder cassettes.

Calls received a wide response among the Palestinian people; they implemented the ‘comprehensive strike’, organised mass demonstrations and protests, and engaged in civil disobedience against the Israeli occupation. Graffiti comprised one of the very earliest media used during the intifada and came to cover not only walls and buildings of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the late 1980s and early in 1990s. It was a creative means of publicity by the Palestinian activists of the Palestinian factions.

The graffitists were mostly young men in their teens and twenties whom Palestinians referred to as shabab (singular, shabb), a word connoting testosterone swagger and street machismo and perhaps best translated as “the guys.” One of the major tasks of the shabab in the early days of the uprising, as they saw it, was informing and mobilizing the general public. With conventional modes of communication heavily censored by the Israeli military government, and Palestinian newspapers and other media remaining largely in the hands of older and more cautious elite, graffiti quickly came to be used for this purpose. Palestinians referred to it, some with a wink, as


286 After the Israeli occupation of the Gaza strip, West the Bank and east Jerusalem, Palestinians worked as employee at what so called ‘al idarah al madaniyya’ (the civil services department) of the Israeli occupation authorities, which have been followed the Israeli military ruler.


289 When I was a child during the first Intifada, I have frequently seen lots of the ‘masked’ activists writing on walls various national slogans and drawing graphics that demonstrate certain meanings. Moreover, they wrote to publicise their activities to the Palestinian people. For example, they were calling for ‘comprehensive strike’ while they ask the people to participate in demonstrations and to fight the Israeli occupation by stones and Molotov.
Graffiti worked well due to it being an attention-grabber, cheap, easily and quickly produced. It was also renewable; the masked young men used the white painting or some liquid prepared from white cement and water. Ron Schleifer called the graffiti ‘the poor man’s media’. This is true, as it is cheap and easy to prepare. It is also easy to erase the old writing and re-write new statements. Moreover, a single canister of spray paint can be easily concealed, can serve for a few messages, and can be disposed in critical times. Schleifer adds that some slogans have been written in English to deliver the Palestinian message to the foreign media, which have been widely available in the Palestinian occupied territories during the intifada. Some of other slogans were written in Hebrew, which served as a challenging message to the occupied forces. Some of the masked young men were challenged by the Israeli army when they writing national and Islamic slogans in ‘dangerous’ places such as walls of the Israeli military bases in the occupied territories. In some cases, the Palestinian activists managed to write and draw on the walls of the Israeli military base. In the Gaza Strip, for instance, they have written on the wall of the ‘central prison of Gaza’, which was considered as a ‘fortified castle’ of the Israeli army.

Many of the Palestinian walls-writers were killed by the Israeli commandos ‘Mosta’arebeen’. According the Israeli Human Rights Centre ‘BietSilem’, the Israeli commandos executed about 70 Palestinian activists between 1988 and 1992, some of them were walls-writers. According to Palestinian sources, 160 Palestinians were killed by the commandos from April 1988 to mid-May 1993, with 18% of them being walls-writers. One of the most striking features of the cultural landscape of the occupied West Bank at the height of the first intifada was the writing on the walls. However and regardless of the social and cultural dimension of this meaning, the Palestinians utilised it massively. They used it most occasions secretly, as the Israeli occupation

290 Ibid.
forces considered the writing on walls to be illegal. Hence, hundreds of Palestinian activists have been sentenced by Israeli courts due to their writing on walls.

**Transition from revolution to the state-building**

The Oslo Accord between the PLO and Israel in 1993 resulted in the creation of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), which was established on the Gaza Strip and some parts of the West Bank. Under this agreement, Yasser Arafat and thousands of the PLO members and their families returned to the Palestinian territories for the first time since the exodus in 1948. The Oslo Accord was considered by some people as a milestone in the Palestinian history, since it allowed the PLO to establish a political entity on the Palestinian lands, as a nucleus of the desired Palestinian State. The Palestinian media, as well as the political situation resulted in a new phase. In this phase, there was a semblance of Palestinian sovereignty in the liberated territories, which represented a dream for lots of the Palestinian people.

The media role under the Palestinian Authority worked in two directions. In the first, the media was considered a tool of the state-building and part of a transitional period toward the establishment of a modern Palestinian state. Following the arrival of the Palestinian authority in 1994, two new daily newspapers emerged. There was Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, which served as the official gazette of the Palestinian authority and followed the office of the President Yasser Arafat; it was also headed by the one of the well-known Fatah leaders Nabil Amro. The second paper that emerged was the Al-Ayyam newspaper, which has been semi-official newspaper headed by Akram Haniya, a Palestinian left-wing figure.

The second direction under the Palestinian Authority considered the Palestinian territories to still be under the Israeli occupation. The political agreements with Israel granted controlled Autonomy and not Palestinian sovereignty, which thus required keeping the revolutionary line of the Palestinian media. This direction was adopted basically by groups comprising the camp in opposition to the Oslo Accord. The camp consisted of groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad Movement, and many from the Palestinian left-wing. In spite of the opposition, the Palestinian Authority licensed two weekly newspapers. They were Alwatan for Hamas and Alrisala for ‘the National Islamic Salvation Party,’ which was a pro-Hamas party. Moreover, the Palestinian Authority allowed the Islamic Jihad to establish a new weekly newspaper called Al
Isteqlal. The mass media in the Palestinian territories worked under the Palestinian Publications Act which was issued in 1995 by the Ministry of Information. Under the Palestine Authority, several publications, including newspapers and magazines were issued, covering political, social, cultural, sport and academic affairs.

Conclusion

This chapter has presented a concentrated narrative in the context of the evolution of the media/press in Palestine from the late Ottoman rule to the peace agreement in the mid-1990s. It discussed the different phases of the media/press in Palestine and what role they played in defining Palestinian history, the creation of Palestinian identity, and challenging the occupied/colonial projects in Palestine. The chapter illuminated the way the Palestinian intellectual movement, and the Palestinian journalistic movement, worked hand-in-hand in their search for a Palestinian identity and opposing the Zionist project in Palestine. This was been clear in the Alkarmil newspaper and its counter-hegemonic rhetoric against Zionism. The Palestinian media/press also managed to adapt to ‘difficult’ circumstances under the different types of rule (Ottoman, British, Egyptian, Jordanian, and Israeli). Finally, they also managed to establish their media institutions in the diaspora around the world, where the PLO created its radios, newspapers and magazines.
Chapter Three: Hamas’s Project of ‘Resistance’ and the ‘Resistance Media’

Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.\textsuperscript{294}

Michel Foucault

Introduction

This chapter is divided into two parts, with the first exploring the notion of ‘resistance’ in Hamas’ thought. Particularly, it attempts to understand the meanings of ‘resistance,’ its means and objectives, and its ideological and political aspects. It will also examine the core of Hamas’ \textit{almashrou’a alislami} [the Islamic project] or \textit{mashrou’a almuqawamah} [the project of resistance]. To this end, this chapter investigates three elements comprising the projects. Hamas’ project of resistance is a comprehensive project that includes education, media, social work and the economy. Hamas Media, however, happens to be the core of the present research.

Hamas' project mainly calls for the creation of the \textit{mujtama’a muqawim} [resistance society], which ‘embraces’ the overarching resistance project advocated by Hamas. While Hamas' project includes both violence and non-violence, violent resistance will receive less attention. This is because of media resistance falling within the nonviolent paradigm. Some scholars may make an argument, however, that media sometimes adopt a paradigm of non-violent resistance. Finally, the second part of this chapter will concentrate on the concept of \textit{ali’lam almuqawim} [resistant media]. Specifically, it will discuss the significance of the media in Hamas’ resistance project and attempts to clarify its perception of the \textit{ali’lam almuqawim} concept.

Part One

Resistance in theory and the project of Muqawamah

Resistance in theory

In spite of the vast proliferation of scholarship on ‘resistance’ in recent decades, capitalising the term remains problematic. This is in part because various scholars the ‘resistance’ in various ways. According to Jocelyn A. Hollander and Rachel L. Einwohner, the term is used to depict “the wide variety of actions and behaviors at all levels of human social life (individual, collective, and institutional) and in a number of different settings, including political systems, entertainment and literature, and the workplace.” Indeed, resistance almost exists at all levels of life; it can be political, social, economic, and even ideological. It can be physical/violent or verbal/nonviolent.

The whole idea of resistance is mainly related to ‘power’. Simon argues that “wherever there is power there arises resistance to it” and this is in harmony with Gramsci’s logic of “resistance to oppression”. While the impression that resistance in the Palestinian occupied territories can be read as political violent action, various scholars consider that it can also be seen in different manners, shapes and methods. Gene Sharp counted about two hundred methods of nonviolent actions, including symbolic protest, social non-cooperation, economic boycotts, labour strikes, political non-cooperation, and nonviolent intervention. A number of these methods have been used by Hamas during the First Intifada, after the Olso Agreement with the establishment of its political party (alkhalas), and during the second Intifada. Resistance, therefore, can also be cultural, economic and social.

Social resistance occupies a significant position in the literature on nonviolent action. According to Larry P. Nucci, it “is part of most people’s everyday lives” and aimed at

296 Simon, op. cit. p. 85.
297 Ibid.
accomplishing social changes. For example, social resistance in China means challenging the ruling party by organising numbers of strikes and protests to force the government to change its local policy. In South East Asia, there was the Indian experience led by the well-known Indian leader Mohandas Gandhi. Hundreds of other empirical examples around the world exist, especially in Nepal, Brazil, Bolivia, Venezuela, Guatemala, Mexico, Uruguay and Colombia. All of them demonstrate the existence and importance of social resistance within the existing scholarship.

Cultural resistance “aims to curtail change” when a particular minority is exposed to a hegemonic project. For that reason, it has been prevalent in areas under occupation of a colonial power such as in South Africa. The South African people engaged in this type of resistance to defy the Boers and British endeavors to reshape South African life and culture in the 1800s and early 1900s. South Africa was not the only place, however. As Amal Jamal points out, it has been prevalent among the Palestinian minority in Israel. Palestinians living inside Israel, who are also referred to as “Arab Israelis” sought to challenge the continuous attempts to dissolve their Palestinian identity.

The form of cultural resistance is mostly cognitive and expressed discursively, which can be carried out orally or in written form. There are some cases where it can also be engaged in ideologically. Susan Gal argues that “while resistance is indeed widespread, especially in cultural or religious contexts, it can also be institutional or structural.”

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ideological incorporation may partially coexist with it, as different aspects of dominant ideology cross-cut each other". The ideological incorporation, in fact, is present in all forms of resistance and not just cultural. As this section has demonstrated, there are multiple difference forms of resistance. The common element that transcends time and space, however, is the notion of the challenge to overcome injustice and the fight against oppression. The next section examines Hamas' version of resistance, which meets the general attributes and characteristics exhibited in the examination of the concept and its various forms.

**Muqawamah [Resistance] in Hamas’s Thought**

‘Resistance’ is the founding idea of Hamas, as can be read from its name, logo and charter. Hamas' name is the Arabic acronym of *harakat al muqawamah al islamiyah* [the Islamic Resistance movement], thus it explains the political and religious dimensions of its orientation (Islamic resistance). The logo likewise reflects the same meanings; it contains a drawing of two crossed swords, the Quran or the holy book of Islam, the Alaqsa mosque, a historical map of Palestine, and two Palestinian flags. The contents of the logo symbolise the idea of *jihad*, which represent the Islamic term of ‘resistance’ connected to the national element of ‘Palestine’. Hamas’s charter emphasises in article seven that “the Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the links in [a] chain of the struggle against the Zionist invaders”. Hamas locates the main reason for ‘resistance’ in the British colonial occupation of the Palestinian lands in the wake of the First World War and, later, in Israeli occupation. According to Ghazi Hamad, the ex-spokesperson of the Palestinian government in Gaza:

> Resistance in Palestine began in the wake of British colonialism, and then it continued after the Zionist occupation. This aggressive occupation forced away the indigenous people and replaced them with migrant Jews from all corners of the earth, and established Israeli settlements on the Palestinian lands... so resistance is linked to the existence of the occupation; in the presence of the occupation must be resistance. So long as the occupation continues, resistance will be continued by all means."

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310 Hamas’s Charter, chapter I, article 7.

311 Author’s interview with Ghazi Hamad, the spokesperson of the Palestinian government in Gaza, 20th July 2010.
Similarly, Momen Bseisue gave the same reason when he stated that “where there is occupation, there is resistance”\textsuperscript{312}. Bseisue emphasised that ‘resistance’ is a means to end the Israeli occupation. It is “in our understanding a means not an end”\textsuperscript{313}. This is consistent with Gabi Baramki’s argument that “resistance requires one to be clear about its means and ends.”\textsuperscript{314} It also corresponds to Michel Foucault’s interpretation of the notion of power and resistance. For him, “where there is power, there is resistance”.

Hamas stresses that the concept of resistance stems from Islamic ideology since the Quran and the Sunnah urge \textit{Jihad} and the rejection of invaders. In the Sharia-law, \textit{Jihad} becomes an obligation for every Muslim man or woman in the case of invasion of any ‘Muslim territory’. According to Ghazi Hamad, “Hamas believes that resistance is an Islamic/religious concept, thus it is a legitimate matter.”\textsuperscript{315} Ismail Alashqar, the Hamas leader and the Palestinian MP, states:

\begin{quote}
The occupiers are terrorists, exterminators, who aim to expel the Palestinian people from their territory to establish a national homeland for the Jews, and achieve what one of Zionism leader said namely that ‘Palestine was a land without people for a people without land. We are aware that the establishment of the Zionist entity is part of a greater colonial project that aims to create a foreign entity amid Arab and Islamic countries. Therefore, we consider that our right in Palestine is un-negotiable and we consider that the first objective of resistance is to liberate the land of Palestine from the sea to the river, because it is a Palestinian/Arab/Muslim land.\textsuperscript{316}
\end{quote}

For Hamas thus the Israeli occupation is the core of the conflict, thereby making resistance confined to the borders of the Palestinian occupied territories. In addition, Hamas’ discourse emphasises that the conflict is not with Judaism as a religion. There are some articles in its charter that could be construed or interpreted as Jews being the enemy, however. Its charter and the discourse used must also be examined within the context in which it was written. Many analysts fail to incorporate this element, which in spite of the literature raising the importance of the environment in the development of a counter-narrative. On the ground in Palestine when the Charter was written, Jews and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{312} Author’s interview with Momen Bseisue, the ex-Hamas’s media senior, The Gaza Strip, 1\textsuperscript{st} September 2010.
\item \textsuperscript{313} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{315} Author’s interview with Ghazi Hamad, op., cit.
\item \textsuperscript{316} Author’s interview with Ismail Alashqar, the Hamas Palestinian MP, and He is ex Hamas’s media senior, Gaza 25\textsuperscript{th} August 2010.
\end{itemize}
Zionists were used interchangeably. Nowadays, however, a clear discursive distinction is made. As Ismail Alashqar, the Hamas Palestinian MP argues, Hamas’ ‘battle’ is with the Zionists who occupied Palestine sixty years ago. “The clash is with the ‘Jewish occupiers’ and not with the ‘Jewish religion’, so we localised resistance within Palestine and have never practiced it outside Palestine, although we know that lots of Jews living outside of Palestine support this evil entity.”

Despite the religious/ideological roots of resistance in Hamas’ thought, the political objective of resistance is very clear. Hamas’ leaders connect resistance with the occupation regardless of any other factors.

The project of resistance ‘mashrou’a al-muqawamah’

For Hamas, the notion of muqawamah [resistance] exceeds the traditional meaning of ‘violent resistance’, especially in the political sense as it is seen as part of a composite project. This project has been termed ‘mashrou’a al-muqawamah’ or the project of resistance. The term was used for the first time by the well-known Hamas leader Abdelazizi Alrantisi in late 2002. During that time the second intifada was at its peak. Although used for the first time in late 2002 the concept of the resistance project exists since 1948, as it is connected to the occupation forces and occupied people.

Rafat Murrah illustrates the two pillars of the concept of resistance adopted by Hamas. According to him, ‘military resistance’ against the Israeli occupation uses military tools, while ‘civil resistance’ aims to strengthen the steadfastness of the individual and collective, to further develop Palestinian society, and to maintain Palestinian identity. The project thus encompasses all the social and cultural components. It aims to improve abilities, aid and engage all the Palestinians in their battle with the occupation.

Sheikh Sayyid Abu Musamih, the Palestinian MP, ex Hamas’s media senior, Gaza, describes resistance as a ‘comprehensive project’ that includes all aspects of life, including social, religious, political, economic and cultural. “The notion of resistance is a comprehensive project that includes all aspects of life”.

Bseisue states: “resistance

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317 Ibid.
319 Author’s interview with Sayyid Abu Musamih, the Palestinian MP, ex Hamas’s media senior, Gaza, 31st August, 2010.
320 Author’s interview with Rafat Murra, the Hamas’s media senior in Lebanon, Beirut, 9th October 2010.
321 Author’s interview with Sayyid Abu Musamih, op. cit.
is not a matter of the exercise of violence or just resistance for resistance; it represents a comprehensive and integrated approach.”\textsuperscript{322} Abu Zohri also considers that the concept of resistance, in Hamas’s understanding, is not an aimless programme. According to him, “\textit{muqawamah} in Hamas’s vision is not bullet and gun-machine; it is a comprehensive programme that starts that from preparing generations and society to embrace the resistance and resisters…. …. Resistance is not a bullet that can be shot without any message; it must be utilised within a comprehensive and integrated project that has specific objectives.”\textsuperscript{323} The Islamic movement in Palestine (the Muslim brotherhood) only began armed resistance twenty years after the 1967 war. It even suspended the military attacks against the Israeli occupation in order to conclude a ceasefire (or truce) agreement with Israel that was brokered by Egyptian mediation in 2005 and 2007 and in the wake of the 2008/2009 war. Nihad Sk. Khalil, ex Hamas media senior, states:

There is no doubt that the concept of \textit{muqawamah} in Hamas’ thought is not limited to the ‘militarised resistance,’ but is instead a comprehensive concept; the biggest proof of this is how the Islamic movement undertook to prepare the Palestinian youth through the creation of and building community institutions and a social structure based on the notion of resistance; this was clear between 1967 and 1987. There were some periods when Hamas preferred preparation and education to the armed struggle.\textsuperscript{324}

Then, what is a ‘resistance’ project? What are its elements and tools (either violent/physical or verbal/cognitive)? Khalid Mishaal, the Chairman of Hamas’s Political Bureau, refers to the idea of Hamas’ project in the 1970s and 1980s in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and Kuwait, where it was developed.\textsuperscript{325} Mishaal identified it as an “Islamic, nationalist, \textit{jihadi}, and political project that was launched to end the Zionist occupation; to liberate the land and the holy places; to reclaim Palestinian rights; to secure the return of the refugees to their nation, lands, and homes; and, to reclaim Jerusalem. These are the national Palestinian objectives of Hamas.”\textsuperscript{326} Rafat Murrah elaborated that the project of resistance is “the project of all Palestinians,” reasoning

\textsuperscript{322} Author’s interview with Momen Bseisue, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{323} Author’s interview with Sami Abu Zohri, Hamas’s spokesperson, 22\textsuperscript{nd} September 2010.
\textsuperscript{324} Author’s interview with Nihad Sk. Khalil, ex Hamas media senior, Gaza, 23\textsuperscript{rd} September 2010.
\textsuperscript{326} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{327} Author’s interview with Rafat Murra, op., ct.
that Hamas’s project is the only way to reclaim Palestinian rights. He defines the project of resistance as follow:

The project of resistance was created due to the Israeli occupation, and it aims to liberate the oppressed Palestinian people from the Israeli occupation. Resistance will be constant until the Palestinian people obtain their freedom and the right to self-determination; the establishment of a Palestinian state, with full sovereignty on the Palestinian land, from the sea to the river; and, the return of the Palestinian refugees to their own properties, which they were forced from in 1948. The Arab-Palestine should live in peace and security with its neighbours and a member in the international community. This is our project.328

Bseisue gives an exhaustive definition for the project, suggesting that in Palestine resistance is a political and jihadi project, adopted by most of the Palestinian resistance organisations, and led by Hamas in order to ‘defy the Israeli occupation’. This project, according to Bseisue, is based on the following pillars. First, Palestine is an Islamic Waqf, and no one has the right to give up of a single inch in any circumstances. Palestine is owned by all the Palestinian generations until the Day of Resurrection. Second, Palestine is an occupied territory, and where there is occupation there is resistance. Third, resistance, in all its forms, is the sole strategic option to liberate Palestine. Finally, resistance is a legitimate right that cannot be given up in any circumstance. Thus, Hamas’ resistance project aims to strategically liberate the Palestinian land and free the Palestinians from injustice and occupation.329 In the words of Hassan Abu Hashish, ‘mashrou’a almuqawama’ in Palestine “is a project based on the resistance against the Israeli occupation that is derived from al’qidah al islamiya [the Islamic ideology] of the conflict between the occupation and the Palestinian people”330.

A Social Movement Angle on the Hamas’s project

Scholars on social movements define the term ‘social movements’ according to the context they see taking place around them. Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison define the social movements as “best conceived of as temporary public space, as a moment of

328 Ibid.
329 Author’s interview with Momen Bseisue, op. cit.
330 Author’s interview with Hassan Abu Hashish, the head of governmental media office in the Palestinian Government in Gaza (formulated by Hamas), 27th September 2010.
collective creation that provide societies with ideas, identities, and even ideals”.  

For Herbert Blumer, they are “collective enterprises to establish a new order of life”.  

Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, however, give a more detailed definition. “Social movements are a distinct social process, consisting of the mechanisms through which actors engaged in collective action: conflictual collective action, dense informal networks and collective identity”.  

The definitions demonstrate that the term social movements is comprehensive and reflects the version of the form or forms of collective action other than a reference to the values carried by this formula.

There are many social movements with social and political agendas that can qualify or be classified as social movements. The parties of these grassroots movements vary in style and composition and emerge according to contain interests and objectives. For example, a peasant movement; a movement of intellectuals within the national protest and demands for democracy; human rights defence organizations; feminist, cultural and religious movements; the anti-globalization movement; and, those that formed around specific issues like environmental protection, counter poverty, religious reform, opposing the death penalty, the promotion of the animal rights anti-discrimination based on sexual orientation. As this demonstrates, there are a diverse array that exist and their structures range from being centralised to so fluid.  

The emergence of the social movements are mostly seen as a product of major changes in society.  

David Aberle believes that “relative deprivation’ is made the bedrock of the social movements,” while Charles Tilly determines three essential ‘components’ for social movements.  

The first element is “a sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on target authorities.”  

The second is employment of a combination of various forms of political action such as rallies, demonstrations, statements to and made in the public media and pamphleteering. Finally, there are the

337 Ibid.
“participants' concerted public representations of WUNC: worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment on the part of themselves and/or their constituencies”.338

Michael Irving Jensen, Jeroen Gunning, Rachael Rudolph339 and Glenn Robinson have examined Hamas in the context of social movements. Robinson devotes his research to understanding Hamas by addressing three variables, namely political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and “cultural framing” variable. Through the mobilising structures, the social movements recruit what Robinson calls “like-minded individuals, socialize new participants, overcome the free rider problem, and mobilize orientations.” This, he argues, is a key concept to understanding the Hamas media strategy.

Hamas is a social movement with an institutional base far more important to its success than any individual leader, including Ahmad Yasin, its titular head. Indeed, while Hamas’s reputation in the West is that of a terrorist group, its ability to mobilize support in the West Bank and Gaza is tied to its vast institutional network, which supplies many types of social services.340

For Hamas the mobilising structure is not limited to the use of media in attracting people, but also other forms of mobilisation such as those within the social networks and charities of Hamas. It should be noted that chapter three addresses this aspect within the discussion of its resistance project. In Robinson thesis, he dwells on the various aspects of social networks as part of the mobilisation and fails to focus on Hamas’s media in that regard. This study, therefore, will add to his work.

As the extensive yet brief review of the literature demonstrates, there is a shortage of scholarship on Hamas' media. The literature on Hamas concentrates more on its history, development, future, and political and ideological perceptions. Yet the existing literature does provide many key ideas about the context in which the media strategy emerged and evolved. This project will make a significant contribution to and fill an existing gap within the academic scholarship in Hamas in particular and on resistance media in general.

338 Ibid.
The Mobilising Structure of the Resistance Project

Hamas, which is one of the largest and most important movements of political Islam in the Middle East, has developed its methods and techniques over the last two decades. It has used methods of peaceful or non-violent resistance like the rest of the political movements in the region. Namely, it has engaged in collective actions like boycotts, demonstrations, strikes and others. Maria J. Stephan conceptualises this by the term “Civilian Jihad”.341 In Hamas’ case, this concept is applicable to some aspects of its resistance project.

As discussed and set forth in the previous section, Hamas deems the project of ‘muqawamah’ as a comprehensive one that utilizes various of tools in its implementation. Ismail Al Ashqar states that “we use all legitimate means to achieve the strategic objectives of the resistance project”342. He emphasises that every activity, action or project could be useful for enhancing the concept of resistance amongst the Palestinian people and considered a tool of resistance. Indeed, over its history, and except the military actions, Hamas sought to win the hearts and minds of the Palestinian people through education, media, public relations, social work, training and upbringing. In order to achieve this, it created a massive network of cultural, education, media and social institutions. This is what Marc Walther refers to as the “mobilising structure”343 of Hamas. The structure contains four parts, namely the economic or business infrastructure, the educational institutions, the media, and the social work network. The media is obviously the most important for this present study, but an argument could likewise be made that it is the glue discursively holds the other interdependent network elements together. The rest of this section examines more closely the economic, educational and social infrastructures that comprise the internal components of the Hamas network.

Social network Infrastructure

342 Author’s interview with Ismail Al Ashqar, op. cit.
Hamas depends on social networks as an effective means of mobilization for the notion of resistance, according to Ghazi Hamad. Many researchers refer to it as the main reason for the popularity of Hamas. Its social work and extensive charitable social services attend to the poor in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. According to Herzog, “The group’s social arm (dawa), meanwhile, has developed a network of charities and religious, educational, and cultural institutions, positioning Hamas as an attractive provider of social services and an alternative to the hapless and corrupt PA.”

Over the last twenty years, Hamas established hundreds of charity projects such as ‘zakat’ associations, women societies, sports clubs, associations for the care of orphans, abandoned children associations, rehabilitation of the disabled child care and maternity associations, elderly care associations, kindergartens and schools, hospitals and health centres, literacy centres and public libraries. The number of beneficiaries further demonstrates the impact of the social work network.

In the West Bank, the number annual beneficiaries from Hamas associations is 541,248 out of the two million people, which is the total population of the West Bank. This number ensures that more than 2,850 orphans are covered monthly. Their coverage includes finance, health and entertainment. Loans and grants are given to 7,000 Palestinian students, in-kind and cash aid for 600 families monthly.

Hamas has also organised a large number of mass ceremonies such as wedding parties, sports competitions, and charity campaigns. These events aim to raise funds and help the people who participate in such activities. Nasser Barhoum, the director of ‘al jamiya alislamiya’ or the Islamic Society-Rafah, recently organised a mass wedding party for 200 young-Palestinians. Organising such kinds of events, he argues, is considered “part of our resistance to the Israeli occupation”. Barhoum posits that the people of the Gaza Strip, who suffer from the ‘unjust and unfair siege’ need help and support to be

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344 Author’s interview with Ghazi Hamad, op., cit.
348 Author’s interview with Naser Barhoum, The director of ‘al jamiya alislamiya’, [the Islamic society-Rafah], 13th August 2010.
able to confront the “the Zionist project. Strengthening the steadfastness of the Palestinian people on the Palestinian land is resistance”. 349

As this discussion demonstration, the Hamas' social work network is extensive and vast. It provides services for people from all various walks of life and not just those considered part of its movement. Hamas, like the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine, filled a gap that was missing within Palestinian society, which made wide popularity to such movements.

**Education Infrastructure**

Education is one of the Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood instruments. Hamas’ rules of membership require that everybody who wishes to join the ‘organisation’ should pass particular stages of *tarbiya* [special education]. In these stages, the member should read variety of subjects included the Quran, *Hadith, Sirah, Fiqh*, history, politics, and management and leadership. 350 After membership, Hamas provides advanced education and training. 351 This process demonstrates the significance of the education tool in Hamas’ strategy. Mohammed Shadid explained that “the pivotal role of education is particularly evident in the writings and statements of the Muslim Brotherhood, and that the proper Islamic education of the youth is one of the most important elements in this process.” 352 This illustrates that Hamas realises the importance of education in mobilization for its political/ideological agenda. Hence, before establishing Hamas in 1987, the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine created a large number of educational institutions, from primary schools to higher education institutions.

The Islamic University of Gaza, which is deemed to be the stronghold of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip, was a case study in Michael-Irving Jensen's research, who sees the issue as ‘re-Islamising’ Palestinian society ‘from below within the civil

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349 Ibid.
350 Author’s interview with Mohammed Awad, Hamas media senior, 5th August, 2010
351 Ibid.
society institutions”. In the same sense, Are Knudsen argued that Hamas followed the tenets of Hassan al-Banna's original vision for islamising society. Meir Litvak also emphasised that Hamas' ultimate aim was “the islamisation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict”. Ghazi Hamad refused the term of ‘Islamising’ or ‘re-islamising,’ arguing that Palestinian society is already “an eastern-conservative and Muslim society”. According to Hamad, “the issue of Islamization is not the duty of government or party. Islam is a system of principles, beliefs and values are already inherent and exist in Palestinian society with or without Hamas”. However, he argued, Hamas’ aim is to create a ‘new generation’ who believe in “the creed of resistance” to “liberate the usurped Palestinian land”, and not to islamise or re-islamise a Muslim society. Hamad, therefore, sees that the term of ‘re-framing’ or ‘re-educating’ the new generation would be more sensible.

Mohammed Awad attaches the concept of resistance to the education in Hamas’s thought; comprehensive resistance is exercised through education. Awad adds:

Hamas exercises this kind of resistance through its educational incubators, whether in mosques, educational institutions, or the places of its members. Perhaps this is what was maligned on the Islamists in 1970s and 1980s that the concentration was on tarbiya and I’adad [education and preparation] without any military resistance. The Palestinian factions (the nationalists and the Islamic Jihad Organization) criticized us for exercising armed struggle and its focus on education.

Ismail Alashqar justified what he called “refraining from military resistance at a certain stage,” by stating “that period was focused on education and construction of cadres and members of the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, and

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356 Author’s interview with Ghazi Hamad, op. cit.

357 Ibid.

358 Author’s interview with Mohammed Awad, op. cit.

359 Ibid.
*tarbiya* is inseparable from armed resistance, both complement each other*. Focusing on the ‘next generation’ is the priority of Hamas at this stage, argues Rami Khurais. Thus, Hamas to a large extent focuses on the ‘young people’. It attempts to attract juniors and teenagers to its events and activities, especially the summer camps, the Quran Memorization Centres, and the Katiba*. It is important to point out that the percentage of the age group (from 0-24 years) represents 63.1% of population in the Palestinian Territories. The figures of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics in 2009 shows that the majority of the Palestinian society are either from the age group of children or youth. Nasser Barhoum explains that “youth are the present and the future of the Palestinian people”. Together, he adds, “we must strengthen their existence on this land, and strengthen their steadfastness and fortitude to maintain the constants and sanctities”.

The Central Committee of the summer camps in the Gaza Strip, like Hamas, has organised hundreds of summer camps during 2009. It has the participation of more than 100,000 juniors and teenagers. The Quran Centres have graduated about 10,000 children who memorised the whole, or at least part of, the Quran. This project costs seven million US dollars. The Katiba is organised secretly, so information about it is rare. According to its website, the committee counts the purposes of such summer camps as follows:

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360 Author’s interview with Ismail Al Ashqar, op.ct.
361 Author’s interview with Rami Khurais, deputy of the editor of Alrisalah weekly newspaper, Gaza, 5th August 2010.
362 Katiba means battalion and is one of the Muslim brotherhoods methods of education created by Hassan al-Banna in 1937. The Katiba is gathering a group of Muslim Brotherhood members, who meet for one night every week to pray, read the Quran, sing and sleep together in a spiritual atmosphere. The Katiba could be ‘Rihla’ [excursion] to the sea side or mountains. For more information about Katiba and the Muslim brotherhood education system see the following work: Rosen, Ehud: “The Muslim Brotherhood's Concept of Education”, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, vol. 7 Published on Tuesday, November 11, 2008, available on: http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/the-muslim-brotherhoods-concept-of-education, (accessed in 10/10/2010).
364 Author’s interview with Naser Barhoum op., ct.
365 Ibid.
368 Ibid.
One: to make the participants live the actual ‘Islamic life’ all through the camp. Two: Getting to know each other and to strengthen ties among the participants to produce serious cooperation in the future. Three: to familiarize the participants in the camp on the exercise of the life of soldiery in Islam. Four: to establish the meaning of faithfulness to the Islamic religion and the homeland and to maximize the spirit of Islam in the heart of students. Five: to reveal the latent talents in the participants. Six: to encourage the spirit of love and tolerance among the participants. Seven: to invest the time and efforts in everything that could be useful and beneficial. Eight: to create young leaders to be able to lead the ‘da’awa’ and sacrifice for the sake of Islam. Nine: to train the participants on sport and fitness.

This quote shows that the programme of these summer camps provides the participants various activities which aim to direct their behavior and thought in an Islamic pattern. These activities are also similar to the training undertaken by candidates for membership in the Islamic Jihad. During the camps, the participants practice and engage in activities to encourage them to be part of the ‘resistance project’. For example, the camps divide participants into a number of groups, with each one being named after a particular Hamas leader (Ahmed Yassin, Salah Shehadeh, Abdel-Azizi Rantissi, etc…) or after the occupied villages cities (Jaffah, Haifa, Jerusalem, Safad, etc…). Moreover, the participants receive some of ‘paramilitary’ training.

The Quran centres aim more or less to create a ‘Quranic generation,’ as Hamas likes to call it. In the Summer Camps of 2010 for memorisation of the Quran, a new slogan was introduced; it was “toward a unique Quranic generation”. Ismail Haniyeh, the Prime Minister of ‘Hamas government’ in Gaza, considered the thousands of Quran memorisers in the Gaza Strip to “be the next army that liberates the Al Aqsa Mosque from the Israeli occupation”\(^{370}\). He called them the “generation of the forthcoming victory”.\(^{371}\) Finally, in the area of education, it is important to indicate the role of Hamas’ ‘student arm’, which represents it in the Palestinian universities and secondary schools under the name \textit{alkutlah alislamiya} [the Islamic bloc]. This bloc provided the movement with significant support in the 1980s and 1990s.\(^{372}\) The educational development and institutional infrastructure of Hamas is a vital aspect of internal

\(^{369}\) The Central Committee of the summer camps in the Gaza Strip (leaflet, May 2010).
\(^{371}\) Ibid.
network and for engaging in all forms of resistance, particularly for culture and the media.

**Economic Infrastructure**

The Palestinian economy is connected to the Israeli occupation, which weakens the Palestinian position. It will remain weak for as long as the Israeli occupation utilizes sanctions and an ‘economic blockade’ as a weapon to pressure the Palestinian people. Conversely, the Palestinians also employ economics as a tool of resistance. For example, boycotting Israeli products, encouraging national products, and promoting *Takaful Alajtmai* [social welfare] by the Palestinians. The form of ‘economic resistance’, in the point view of Salah Albardawil, is a ‘national necessity’ and an integral part of the resistance project. Bardawil states:

> The Zionist enemy uses all weapons to subdue the Palestinian people. Besides the brute force which is used to destroy the Palestinian economy by targeting the industrial and agricultural facilities, which represents the backbone of the Palestinian economy, there is a weapon of siege and starvation, through restriction of the raw materials used in construction and manufacturing. Hence, Hamas works to create an alternative economy (we call it: *iqtisad muqawim*) to prevent the enemy from subjugating the Palestinian people.  

Sayyed Abu Musamih places the *Iqtisad muqawim* [resistant economy] within the framework of a holistic resistance project. Likewise, Ghazi Hamad argues that the resistant economy “is not less important than military power”. He states that “resistant economy” aims to strengthen the elements of steadfastness of the Palestinian people. The term of *iqtisad muqawim* was absent in Hamas’ discourse for a considerable period. It became salient after the Hamas victory in parliamentary elections in 2006, especially after the political boycott and economic sanctions imposed by the Western governments and most of the Arab countries on the Palestinian government formed by Hamas, which was referred to as the Hamas Government.

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373 Author’s interview with Dr Salah Albardawil, the head of ‘alda’ara ali’alamiya’ [media department of Hamas], the spokesman of the Hamas’s Parliamentary Bloc, ex Hamas media senior, Gaza, 17th August 2010.

374 Author’s interview with Sayyid Abu Musamih, op., ct.

375 Author’s interview with Ghazi Hamad, op., ct.

376 It is interesting to note that following the 2008-2009 Israeli War on the Gaza Strip, the Hamas Government came to be used interchangeably with the Gaza Government among some western countries and many western media outlets. This was in spite of some attempts for the latter to create a separate
The strict blockade imposed by the Israeli occupation on the Gaza strip prohibited most of the foodstuffs, construction and raw materials, and fertilizers from entering the coastal enclave. Consequently, the Hamas government sought to create an alternative economic structure based on two main ‘sectors’, namely the agriculture and ‘tunnel’ trade on the Gaza-Egypt borders. They call it \textit{al-iqtisad almuqawim}. On the official website, Mohamad Alagha, who is the Minister of Agriculture for the Palestinian Hamas Government in Gaza, states that the program of his Government raised the slogan “towards building an agricultural resistant-economy”.\textsuperscript{378} According to him, this strategy is part of the whole project that is aimed at building ‘\textit{muqawim}’ [resistant society];\textsuperscript{379} this, in some respects, has become a reality.

The Government in Gaza managed to establish 23 large projects such as planting a million olives tree, planting a million palms, and establishing a number of animal and fish farms. Bardawil argues that the Government in Gaza has created these projects in very difficult situations, stating: “resistance has a creative dimension that it has managed to build a new economic factor to help the Palestinians to survive and be steadfast against the most powerful force on earth”\textsuperscript{380} This will achieve three important results. First, there will be self-sufficiency and a reduction in dependence on and subordination to Israel. Second, there will be encouragement of domestic sectors in the development of the Palestinian economy. Finally, there will be a decrease in the Palestinian people’s suffering and the strengthening of the social fabric. Chapter four will actually examine some of the texts and media material related to \textit{aliqtisad almuqawim}.

The first part of this chapter examined the meanings of ‘resistance,’ its means and objectives, and its ideological and political aspects. It did so by examining the three pillars of the Hamas’ resistance project. Hamas’ project of resistance is a comprehensive project that includes education, media, social work and the economy. Absent from the

\textsuperscript{377} The story of smuggling tunnels between the Gaza Strip and Northern Egypt borders has started after the Israeli strict blockade when Hamas took over Gaza in June 2007 by the military power. The Palestinian has used the Tunnels for the purpose of smuggling all the needs such as foodstuffs, raw materials, construction materials and even petrol. The Palestinians managed to dig more than 1000 closed tunnel under the border in both sides.


\textsuperscript{379} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{380} Author’s interview with Dr Salah Albardawil, op. cit.
discussion in the first part was Hamas' media infrastructure. It was intentionally separated from the other due to it being the main focus of this research project. The remainder of the chapter, therefore, will examined the fourth pillar of the mobilising structure of the Hamas media institution.
Towards a definition of al-ia’lam almuqawim [resistant media]

“The free word precede the bullet”

Yousef Rizqa

“The resistant media is a form of creativity”

Wasfi Kabha

As the previous section demonstrated, Hamas' resistance project is comprehensive. It include all aspects, which conform to the accepted definition of what constitutes resistance. Conceptually, resistance is a structure, a logic or paradigm that is comprised of two related yet separate forces within that can be broken into violent and non-violent categories. Therein are means and forms that fall into one or the other, with some having the potential to straddle or support the two. Media is a form of resistance that is interesting when pondering the operation of the paradigmatic forces operating within the overall paradigm of resistance and the interrelationship among the components. This section sheds light on the importance of the media in Hamas’s overall strategy, and attempts to conceptualise the contemporary experience of the Hamas resistance media, towards a definition of the alia’lam almuqawim [resistant media].

The Significance of Media in Hamas’s agenda

“Media is a decisive weapon,” says the Hamas media senior Fathi Hammad. His statement demonstrates the importance of it to the movement. Hamas’ charter also mentions the importance of media in more than one context. Article Two emphasises that Hamas, through its comprehensive perceptions, is interested in “arts and media” as a tool of raising the Palestinian consciousness in the Palestinian cause. It is the vehicle for creating awareness and mobilizing the hearts and minds of the masses. Article Fifteen and Article Thirty point out the role of “media men”. For Hamas, according to Abu Musamih, the media is located “at the top of its priorities”381. Similarly Barhoum

381 Author’s interview with Sayyid Abu Musamih, op. Cit.
states that the ‘media has a very high priority and Hamas realises its importance as a weapon in its hand, which is not less important than the gun’. Likewise, Ayman Taha argues that media action is a high priority and just as important as military action. Sh. Khalil explains the reason:

Of course, resistant media is extremely important, because today's battles are not managed only by arms, but the battles are run on screens directly. In today’s world, achieving victory or defeat is taking place in the minds of people first before they are on ground; if people's minds and psyche are defeated, troops would withdraw from the field. However, if resistance exists in the people hearts and minds, then resisters will remain on the ground; if they can not move over the earth, then they will work from underground. Hence, media is very important because it is an essential part of the battle. There cannot be victory without the role played by the media, and Hamas is well aware of this fact. Hamas’s extensive network of media organizations prove how essential media are in its strategy. This is the reason why Hamas is still harnessing huge energies in its media project.

Ahmed Saati, the Editor-in-Chief of the Felasteen newspaper and also a former Hamas media senior, highlights that Sheikh Ahmed Yassin (the founder of Hamas), was the first person to pay attention to the importance of establishing a radio station and satellite channel and daily newspaper. Saati states that Shaikh Yassin was aware of the importance of the media in the battle with the Israeli occupation. The battle is not only a military/violent battle, but also “a battle for consciousness” against the Israeli strategy of “burning into the consciousness” adopted by the ex-prime minister Ariel Sharon. Saati says that “the vision of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin was to focus on the media as a means of resistance”

The high level of priority of the media in Hamas’s strategy is evident. Hamas considers that the people's minds and psyche as a battlefield just any real or physical military battleground. This point of view is also not limited to Hamas. Any state military strategist or war theoretician will readily admit that in the absence of a discursive presentation or the “selling of the war” to the public, the battle is lost before it even begins. One can have all the firepower in the world, but if they lack the rhetorical

382 Author’s interview with Fawzi Barhoum, the Hamas spokesman in Gaza, Gaza, 27th August 2010.
383 Author’s interview with Ayman Taha, the spokesman of Hamas, Gaza, 5th September 2010.
384 Author’s interview with Nihad Sk. Khalil, op., cit.
385 Author’s interview with Ahmed Saati, the editor in chief of Palestine newspaper, the ex-Hamas media senior, Gaza, 22nd August 2010.
386 Ibid.
legitimacy associated with waging that battle, then their arms mean nothing in terms of winning and losing. This change has in part to do with instantaneous nature of communication and technological developments, but also because of the role of psychological warfare in what is called Fourth Generation Warfare. Hence, it is easy to understand when Hamas' Yusuf Rizqa stresses ‘the word goes before the bullet’; this is the philosophy of Hamas and its dealing with media.\textsuperscript{387}

Hammad, who used the term “decisive weapon”, also states that the “media has become a first power”; the power to do everything, even bring down governments and presidents.\textsuperscript{388} According to Hammad, “it was the reason of bringing down the governments and regimes, with the Watergate scandal being a excellent example”. Furthermore, a president or elected official in office can remain, but if he or she has lost popular and/or world legitimacy, then his or her tenure is meaningless and the policies implemented are ineffective. This act of delegitimization is made possible and only brought to the fore through the vehicle of the media.

Using terms like ‘weapon’ and ‘power’ in reference to the media by most of the Hamas leaders reflects the philosophy that the clash with the Israeli occupation is a total project, encompassing all aspects that also include the media. Theoretically, when the position of the media is pondered, one can see it serving as the vehicle of synthesis. It brings together and is at the same time the glue that binds the other elements of resistance. What good is the proposal or adoption of a policy if it cannot be articulated to the public; people will not adhere and it will be ineffective, meaningless and powerless. Likewise, what good is an act of armed resistance without the articulation of the reasoning and latent symbolism in the act; if it is not discursively accepted in the minds of the community in which one is operating, then the act itself is ineffective, meaningless and powerless. The point, therefore, is that in the absence of the media, which is the vehicle for legitimacy and the legitimation process, all other forms of resistance become ineffective.

\textsuperscript{387} Author’s interview with Yusuf Rezqa, the Political advisor of the Palestinian prime minister Ismail Haniya, and He is the ex-media minister in the tenth Palestinian government, Gaza, 15\textsuperscript{th} August 2010.

\textsuperscript{388} Author’s interview with Fathi Hammad, the founder of Alaqsa media network, and he is currently the interior minister in the Palestinian government formulated by Hamas, Gaza, 9\textsuperscript{th} August 2010.
Its importance helps then to understand why Hamas allocates a large portion of its budget to the media. A significant allocation of resources in this area has allowed it to build new media institutions and to create what Murrah calls the “media empire”. Hamas has benefited widely from technology to expand this empire, using all types of mass communications tools such as the print, electronic and, even, the new media, which will be examined in chapters four, five and six. It intends to attract and depend on qualified media men/journalists from the other media institutions, many of whom are specialists with university degrees in the press and media. Hamas has understood the importance of the well-trained and media men/journalists, so it sent some of its cadres to study the arts and practice of media. Some of them have even received training in big media institutions like the Aljazeera Media training and development Centre, which is led by experts from the Aljazeera channels. Similarly and for an identical purpose, Hamas created a training centre within its ‘Media Empire’ called the Alaqsa Centre for Media Training and Development. The centre uses the slogan “Manufacturer of the meaningful Islamic media”. It is considered to be the incubator of the Hamas media cadres due to it focusing on the young. Sawwaf argues that Hamas managed to formulate a group of well-trained journalists and media men. This will be discussed in detail in the forthcoming chapters as part of the investigation of the Hamas media strategy, as the focus here is mainly to articulate the conceptual development of resistant media.

**The concept of al-ia’lam almuqawim [resistant media]**

Notwithstanding the lack of literature on the media of the resistance movements, the term of *i’alam muqawim* [resistant media] lacks conceptualisation. Yet the term of *al-ia’lam almuqawim* [resistant media] or *alia’lam almuqawamah* [resistance media] is and has been used by the ‘resistance’ or ‘revolutionary’ movements for quite some time. The most remarkable experience in the Middle East is Hezbollah’s media. Hezbollah media has played a vital role during the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon and later in

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389 Author’s interview with Mustafa Alsawwaf, op. ct.
390 Ibid.
391 Ibid.
392 Look at the website of Alaqsa Centre for Media Training and Development: (http://www.aqsacenter.ps/).
Hezbollah’s wars with Israel.\textsuperscript{393} The Almanar TV, which used to show videos of Hezbollah’s military operations in the Lebanese occupied territories, is the main institution of its media machine.\textsuperscript{394} In the Middle East, there are also the Iraqi Resistance and the Algerian Revolutionary media.

Amer Kassir suggests that the resistant media is connected to an existing issue, namely that people fight and struggle within a particular political context. This media interacts with and is inspired by the struggle, which produces content that has meaning for resistance.\textsuperscript{395} Kassir adds that “the condition of the resistant media is to have a dictionary for each word, phrase, and meaning to carry the national commitment to deeper and broader sense, of the philosophy of resistance.”\textsuperscript{396}

Hamas has its own perception of the resistance media. “Life is resistance”, Sawwaf begins in his definition of the resistant media. He argues that it is axiomatic (to say) that any people or nation under an occupied power must turn everything in life to ‘resistance’, which media is very much a part.\textsuperscript{397} Resistance is a part of everyday life of the Palestinians. This corresponds to Larry P. Nucci’s vision of social resistance, wherein it is seen as “part of most people’s everyday lives”.\textsuperscript{398} Resistant media is, according to and simply put by Sami Abu Zuhri, “the media that serves the project of resistance”\textsuperscript{399}.

Wesam Afifa, the editor in chief of Alrisalah, which is the bi-weekly Hamas linked newspaper, identifies resistant media as “the media that holds the project of resistance and its identity, and adopts ‘resistance’ as an essential and permanent approach”\textsuperscript{400}. Murrah agrees with Afifa’s definition, using similar expressions. He argues that it is “media which adopts and supports the resistance project”.\textsuperscript{401} Murrah explains that the

\textsuperscript{395} Kassir, Amer: The media, and ‘resistant media’ (Al-Manar TV model), Alfikr assiyassì [political thought] quarterly, Arab Writers Union , Damascus, Issue 30 Summer 2007.
\textsuperscript{396} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{397} Authors’s interview with Mustafa Sawwaf, op., cit.
\textsuperscript{398} Nucci, Larry P., op. cit. p. 3.
\textsuperscript{399} Author’s interview with Sami Abu Zohri, op., cit.
\textsuperscript{400} Author’s interview with Wesam afifa, the editor in chief of Alrisalah bi-weekly newspaper, Gaza, 10\textsuperscript{th} August 2010.
\textsuperscript{401} Author’s interview with Rafat Murra, op., cit.
resistant media integrates other tools of resistance in order to counter the “the danger of the Zionist media machine and its psychological, social, and political impacts, which aim to influence and destroy Palestinian society.”  \(^{402}\) Mahmoud Albaik goes beyond their understandings to posit that the concept of resistant media is one that seeks to demonstrate the “the ideology and the culture of resistance” among the people. “The resistant media is media that considers the notion of resistance. It is the media that seeks to spread the ‘ideology’ and the culture of resistance among the Palestinian youth specifically and the Arab and Muslim world generally.”  \(^{403}\)

Abu Hashish describes the nature of this kind of media as “ordinary and traditional media in terms of tools and methods,”  \(^{404}\) but yet different through “its content and philosophy.”  \(^{405}\) This is because of its adoption of resistance as approach, thus aiming to achieve the ultimate objective of the ‘resistance itself’.  \(^{406}\) According to Taher al-Nono, the resistant media contains two parts. The first is to promote the resistance as an idea and its ‘jihadi’ characteristic, including the mobilisation thereof among the Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim people. Its second part is its coverage of all aspects of life including political, social, health, environmental matters. It is, for Alnono, to “cover everything in our daily life, as life is resistance. The gun-machine needs video cameras and a website; it needs a radio station and a satellite channel. This will show the achievements of the Jihadi resistance and losses of the enemy, which will affect them psychologically. The resistant media will defeat the morale of the soldiers and weaken the public support of the enemy.”  \(^{407}\)

Abu Musamih agrees with this vision, illustrating that resistant media is the media which effectively contributes to build and strengthen the elements of the resistance in all aspect of life. However, he adds a different angle with his argument that the resistant media should show the moral and humanitarian dimensions of the Palestinian issue, as well as the ‘legitimacy of the Palestinian resistance’. The latter, of course, is guaranteed by the international law, the international humanitarian law, and the Geneva

\(^{402}\) Ibid.

\(^{403}\) Author’s interview (part I) with Mahmoud Albaik, the director of Al-Aqsa Radio, Gaza, 4th October 2010.

\(^{404}\) Author’s interview with Hassan Abu Hashish, op. cit.

\(^{405}\) Ibid.

\(^{406}\) Ibid.

\(^{407}\) Author’s interview with Tahir Alnono, The Spokesman of the Palestinian government in Gaza (formulated by Hamas), Gaza, 31st July 2010.
According to him, “we are part of the free world that wants real peace with real justice”. Abu Hashish sees resistant media as being important for two main reasons. First, “resistance is a popular and national strategic option, which represents great value and must be defended.” The second is that the development of media tools requires good use in order to achieve the people’s will in freedom and self-determination. Justice, freedom and self-determination are terms that reflect the moral values of the resistance that Hamas’ intellectuals lead, which corresponds to Gramsci’s interpretation of civil society. Specifically, wherein he states that “civil society is an ethical or moral society because it is in civil society that the hegemony of the dominant class has been built up by means of political and ideological struggles.”

**Resistant Media Objectives**

Resistance media aims to achieve particular objectives. A deep discussion of the objectives of the Hamas media will be addressed in the forthcoming chapters and in the context of the study's findings. However, key objectives of the resistant media should be set forth. In what follows, they are articulated as presented by Hamas media seniors.

First, ‘mobilisation’ is the key word of the resistant media objectives. The majority of the interviewees used this expression to explain the objectives. Meanwhile, some of them consider that its ultimate objective is the same as that of the ‘resistance project’. The ‘resistance’ in the Hamas case is a political issue, with an ideological/religious dimension. Thus, it needs popular support and mobilisation can be obtained via the resistant media. Albaik, in particular, posits that a key objective is to “mobilise public opinion to the notion of resistance”.

Scholars Reid-Weiner and Weissman also agree with these arguments, but from a different angle. They argue that the Hamas media establishment aims, more or less, to

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408 Author’s interview with Sayyed Abu Musamih, op., cit.
409 Ibid.
410 Author’s interview with Hassan Abu Hashish, op., cit.
411 Ibid.
412 Simon, op., ct., p. 80.
413 Author’s interview with Mahmoud Albaik, op. cit.
“perpetuate the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”.\textsuperscript{414} The problem, however, with their framing of Hamas' media objectives is that it only examines one dimension. As Abu Zohri points out, the resistance media specifically addresses four “circles” of the target audience.\textsuperscript{415} The first circle is Hamas members; the second circle is the Palestinian public; the third circle is the Arab and Muslim public; and, the last circle is international public opinion. Abu Musamih adds that the fifth ‘circle’ is Israeli public opinion. Thus, the overall objective of mobilisation transcends each target audience, but the symbolic meanings associated therewith differ. This is an extremely important point to take into consideration and must be remembered when reading and pondering the information and arguments presented in the forthcoming chapters that examine each part of Hamas' resistant media in greater detail.

The second main objective is to counter the psychological warfare and refute rumors aimed at destroying the morale of the internal front in general and, in particular, the men of resistance. There is no doubt that the Israeli occupation uses the media extensively in dealing with the Palestinian matters. Historically, the Israeli occupation exercised psychological warfare against and in parallel with any military operations perpetrated against the Palestinians. The resistant media are, therefore, deemed to be a “counter-media to the Israeli media and its collaborators,” according to Ghazi Hamad.\textsuperscript{416} This, of course, corresponds to Gramsci's notion of the development a counter-hegemonic narrative, and the development thereof is what is of particular concern in the next three vital chapters.

Hamad further adds that “the Israeli media ever seeks to change the stereotype of the Palestinian resistance; it seek to de-legitimise by presenting an incorrect image through the use of its own huge media capacity and that of the pro-Israel media in Europe and the USA.”\textsuperscript{417} He stresses that Israel managed to a large extent to portray the Palestinian resistance as acts of terror.\textsuperscript{418} Thus, as Rizqa argues, the “refutation of what is

\textsuperscript{414} Reid-Weiner, Justus and Weissman, Noam: \textit{Hamas' Determination to Perpetuate the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Critical Role of Hate Indoctrination}, (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, August 1, 2006) available on: \url{http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp545.htm}, (assessed in 02/09/2010).

\textsuperscript{415} Author’s interview with Sami Abu Zohri, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{416} Author’s interview with Ghazi Hamad, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{417} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{418} Ibid.
broadcasted by the Israeli media machine is an important aim of the resistant media."  
Another angle in dealing with the Israeli ‘circle’, Rizqa states, “is by waging psychological warfare against the ‘Zionist enemy’ through sending messages directly to the Israeli public and the Israeli army”  
This will help in demoralising the ‘enemy’.  
Wasfi Qabha, a former minister in Hamas’ government, argues that “this also requires the use of several languages, including ‘Hebrew’ which is the language of the ‘Israeli enemy’. Using Hebrew permits conveyance and articulation of the resistance's messages through its perception to the Israelis”  
Chapter seven actually provides specific instances where Hamas directed its media to the Israeli public, especially with regard to the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit taken prisoner.

Conclusion

As this chapter has shown, Hamas' version of resistance is not limited to the traditional notion of ‘violent resistance’. It encompasses many forms that transcend the two paradigmatic splits (violent and nonviolent) that exist within the overall paradigm of resistance. Hamas' uses Mashrou’a Almuqawamah [the project of resistance], Almashrou’a Alislami [the Islamic project] or the Mashrou’a Almuqawamah Alislamiya [the project of Islamic resistance] to articulate its meaning, interpretation and form of resistance. The ‘Hamas’s project’ illustrates that ‘resistance’ in Hamas’s thought is a comprehensive project, including all aspects of life. As all aspects of life, the cultural, economic, media, political and social elements that comprise Hamas' resistance project constitute components of the whole, which are independent and, simultaneously, interdependent. The key motive driving Hamas' project is the Israeli occupation. It is not, as some scholars argue, the perpetuation of the conflict. Rather, it is about identity, meaning, symbolism, rightfulness and justice; it is about putting an end to injustice and ridding the Palestinian people of the occupation that has plagued their lives and attempted to usurp their identities, as individuals and a collective. Hamas has utilized different instruments in the service of Mashrou’a almuqawamah. Apart from the ‘military action tool’, it uses civil society institutions (social work, education, media and economic activities) to permeate the struggle and essence of resistance through the

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419 Author’s interview with Yousef Rizqa, op., cit.
420 Ibid.
421 Ibid.
422 Author’s interview with Wasfi Qabha, the ex-minister in the tenth Palestinian government, formulated by Hamas, Ramallah, West Bank, 6 November 2010.
Palestinian society. Thus, creating *mojtama’a moqawim* [resistant society] to ‘embrace’ and ‘protect’ the project of resistance is the main purpose of Hamas’ civil society institutions. Part two of this chapter concentrated on the media component of the resistance project. As it was argued in the beginning and demonstrated throughout, the media is the glue holding the other elements together and articulating the narrative of legitimacy within and outside of Palestine. Hamas’ media is an instrument of its overarching and encompassing resistance project. The proper concept to articulate it is *i’alam muqawim* or resistant media. Thus, the media has occupied a high priority in Hamas’s agenda. It is, as many Hamas media seniors posited, 'a weapon’. That is, the media is ‘not less important than the gun'. 
Chapter Four: Hamas’s Media Strategy, the context of the first intifada

If the ‘cassette weapon’ has been a mainstay of the Iranian revolution, the bayan [leaflet] is the strongest weapon in the Palestinian intifada; it was the revolution of “Bayanat”.

Hamas’s media office

Introduction

This Chapter focuses on the inception period of ‘Hamas’s media strategy. In this examination, I will contextualise Hamas’s media in the first Palestinian intifada (1987 - 1993). As part of this discussion I will shed light on the origins of Hamas’s first media institution, jihaz ali’lam, [the Hamas media apparatus]. The establishment of jihaz ali’lam, the strict secrecy of its circumstances, its rudimentary media infrastructure, and its challenges in the first intifada will be examined in this chapter. This chapter will also look at the priorities of the Hamas media in terms of target audiences and the objectives. I shall argue that the muqawamah discourse was the main characteristic of Hamas’s media message during the whole period of the first intifada. This discourse took three ‘shapes’. These dimensions are; the Jihadi resistance dimension, the socio-economic dimension, and the educational dimension. By using a gramsican approach, this chapter will show how Hamas media was important for creating and shaping what constitutes consensus. Hamas demonstrates this through the development of its overall media strategy during the first intifada. Its strategy has likewise been shaped by the consensus of the actors involved and the counter-narrative produced. This chapter will examine the original texts of Hamas’s media during the first intifada, mainly Hamas’s Bayanat [leaflets] and then secondarily the graffiti messages. The data gathered from the Hamas media leaders who worked in the entire period will be used to support the sources which I shall examine in this chapter.

423Hamas’s media office: min watha’eq alintifada almubaraka – watha’q harakat almugawamah alislamiya hamas [the documents of the blessed intifada – the documents of the Islamic resistance movement], (Hamas’s media office publications, 2nd year, 1989), p. 6.
The context of the intifada 1987-1993

The first Palestinian intifada (uprising) was a notable episode in contemporary Palestinian history. The killing of a group of Palestinian workers was the event that sparked off this intifada. On the 6th of December 1987, an Israeli settler’s lorry ran over a car which was carrying this group of Palestinian workers near the Palestinian refugee camp of Jabalya in the Northern Gaza strip. This intifada took a popular form at all levels. The Palestinians faced the Israeli occupation army by protests, demonstrations, and general strikes. The Intifada was a form of spontaneous popular protest by the Palestinians who stood against the miserable situation in the Palestinian camps and cities under occupation, where poverty, unemployment, the feeling of insult and the daily repression practiced by the Israeli occupation were part of Palestinian life. Thus, it was characterized by the movement of civil disobedience as well as large-scale, daily, ‘violent’ actions against the Israeli occupation, using their ‘instruments’: stones, slingshots, and ‘Molotov’ cocktails. It was therefore named intifadat alhijara [the stones uprising] as defined by stone-throwing children atfal alhijara. The appearance of Hamas itself was one of the consequences of the outbreak of this intifada. Hamas is the off-shoot of the Muslim brotherhood movement, which had already been active in Palestine since the 1940s. Before the appearance of Hamas on the Palestinian political scene, the Muslim Brotherhood movement used other names to express their political positions towards the Palestinian issue, including almurabitoon ala ardh al isra’a [stationed on the land of Palestine] and harakat alkifah al islami [the movement of the Islamic struggle] and other names. Hamas was one of the main Palestinian factions involved in the intifada acts. It called on the Palestinians to participate in strikes and the popular demonstrations which used to confront the Israelis directly, and these calls met a wide response among the Palestinians in the Gaza strip and the West Bank, as Hamas’ popular support base grew through 1988 and 1989 when intifada was at its peak.

Besides the popular actions, Hamas employed different activities from the other Palestinian factions, as it sought to use the ‘armed’ resistance against the Israeli occupation, to be more ‘violent’. In February 1989 Hamas kidnapped and murdered the Israeli soldiers Avi Sasportas and Ilan Saadon. Consequently Hamas received a painful blow in the shape of the biggest wave of arrests of its leadership and members, including the Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. However, Hamas continued targeting the Israeli soldiers and settlers in Gaza and the West Bank as well as Israel, which led the Israeli government to make a decision to deport about 400 leaders and cadres of Hamas and Islamic Jihad to Marj Alzohoor in southern Lebanon in 1992.

These circumstances of prosecution and stalking by the Israeli occupation forced Hamas to operate in complete secrecy, since joining Hamas entailed facing charges requiring prosecution in the law of the Israeli military court. Hence, not only were the military activities of Hamas underground, but also the nonviolent activities were undertaken in the same manner. Also, Jihaz ali’alam [The media Apparatus] the first media ‘structure’ of Hamas at that time worked in secrecy.

**The creation of Hamas’ media apparatus**

Hamas’ media apparatus or Jihaz ali’alam was the first media institution to run the Hamas media activities. [Hereafter, I will use the term Jihaz which means ‘the Hamas media apparatus’]. Momen Bseisue, one of Hamas’ media leaders, who used to be in charge of the Jihaz in the first intifada asserts that this media institution came out in response to the new reality of the intifada. He argues that creation of the jihaz at the

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429 Author’s interview with Momen Bseisue, op., cit.

430 Before establishing Hamas in 1987, the Muslim Brotherhood or the ‘Islamist movement’ in Palestine depended on rudimentary means of media. Bseisue explains that there were no media in “the literal sense of the word” due to the “complexities of the circumstances” because of the occupation in the entire time. So, the means of explaining the ideas and attitudes of the Muslim Brotherhood were confined mainly to the ‘Fridays sermons’ and preaching lessons and guidance in the mosques as well as individual communications and public visits to particular people. In addition, they used leaflets and publications which were usually distributed at various events and university campuses. According to Bseisue, the Muslim Brotherhood media messages before the intifada focused on the following points: 1- explaining the contents of the Islamic faith that is this discourse aimed to promote the moral values and virtues in society. 2- To address the ideas and attitudes of secular and leftists. 3- Propagating ‘the Islamic position’ of political developments, and mobilise the local, regional and international associated to the Palestinian cause. 4- Exposing the Israeli occupation’s crimes against the Palestinian people. Ibid.
beginning of the first intifada 1987 was a necessity for Hamas to deal with the new phase (intifada).\textsuperscript{431} Bseisue states:

Hamas realized that one of the requirements of the new reality is establishing a media ‘body’, thus Hamas formed, for the first time, media committees and sub-committees to deal with this reality (intifada) and to cover the various events and developments. These committees developed later took the institutional form, and then crystallized to the formation of the Media Office of the Hamas, which was in charge of all Hamas media activities, in terms of coverage of the intifada events and developments, and issuing policies of Hamas regarding the various issues and developments.\textsuperscript{432}

This \textit{jihaz} was administrated by Hamas’s Political leadership directly for a period of time, and then it came under the ‘media wing’ of Hamas which was named \textit{almaktab ali’alami} [the media office].\textsuperscript{433} However, Murrah claims that the \textit{jihaz} was based on “independency in the field” within principles and rules that represent the ideology of Hamas.\textsuperscript{434} That means the \textit{jihaz} had a margin to work within according to the developments at the local level. Bseisue explains that the \textit{Jihaz} was divided into zonal committees to follow up the local issues in coordination with the media office and the political leadership of Hamas. For instance, Bseisue was the person in charge of the \textit{jihaz} in Gaza city, which was part of the Gaza Strip region, and Gaza city was divided into two zones: North Gaza and South Gaza, each zone having a number of neighbourhoods and refugee camps.\textsuperscript{435} This structure was part of an ‘underground organization’; that is the communication between the leadership and the members was by written letters to be exchanged via what is so called \textit{noqta maiytah} [dead points].\textsuperscript{436} This method of secret work was due to the Israeli occupation, as it was major challenge

\textsuperscript{431} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{432} Author’s interview with Momen Bseisue. op., cit.
\textsuperscript{433} Author’s interview with Sayyid Abu Musamih op., cit.
\textsuperscript{434} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{435} Author’s interview with Momen Bseisue op., cit.
\textsuperscript{436} \textit{noqta maiytah} [dead point] is a tactic used by Hamas activists to communicate with each other in secrecy. The idea of the \textit{noqta maiytah} [dead point] is that the Hamas members who do not know each others communicate with each others by letters. A particular level of Hamas leadership determines a specific secret place (it could be a deserted place, house wall or even public toilet), provided that nobody could suspect that this place used for this purpose. The members communicate with each other by exchanging letters at this point at different times so that the member leaves a ‘rolled letter’ with symbols and codes about the activities. This process aims to reduce the harm to the organisation in case of arrest any member of Hamas. Author’s interview with Mohammed Almadhoun, the ex Hamas media senior, Gaza, 3\textsuperscript{rd} August 2010.
to Hamas in the first intifada. Bseisue explains that the main challenges that the Jihaz faced at that time lay in the financial challenge, that was the breadth of media work entailed obligatory expenses, which was a burden on the budget of Hamas and this generated difficulties in the media work. The second challenge according to Bseisue was “the harsh and repressive measures of the Israeli occupation against the activists”, including the continuous arrest campaigns. These campaigns targeted members and leaders of the jihaz which affected the pace and effectiveness of the media activities at some points.

According to Ahmed Sa’ati, the Jihaz had two types of roles; ‘functional-administrative’ role and the role of ‘enlightening-awareness’. The functional-administration role Hamas includes: issuing leaflets, media mentoring, communicating with the local, regional, and international media, printing and distributing the media materials, writing on walls, and producing the cassettes and video tapes which serve the resistance idea, while the ‘enlightening-awareness’ role of the jihaz represented its responsibility as a media institution. Sa’ati summarises these responsibilities in the following three points:

**First:** to confront the “Zionist propaganda machine” and refute its “slanders against the Palestinian people” and their resistance. It is noteworthy to mention that Israel utilised the mass media forwarded to the Palestinians, either in Israel [the Palestinians who remained in their original cities after 1948 Nakba] or to the Palestinians in the Gaza strip and the west bank. The Israeli governmental media have an Arabic department, Arabic-language radio and television.

**Second:** to enhance the image of resistance and clarify its attitudes at ‘the internal level’. This makes clear that the priority of Hamas media in its first stage was the Palestinian society.

**Third:** to re-produce a discourse based on religious, national, and moral dimensions in order to formulate a Palestinian public opinion that adheres to the Palestinian constants and refuses to give up. Michael Arena and Bruce Arrigo

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437 Author’s interview with Momen Bseisue op. cit.
438 Author’s interview with Ahmed Sa’ati op. cit.
439 Ibid.
440 Ibid.
argue that Hamas’s discourse contributed to the revival Palestinian identity with the aim of the emergence of what Hamas calls *al-sahwa al-islamiya* [Islamic awakening].\footnote{Arena, Michael P. Arrigo, Bruce A.: *The terrorist identity: explaining the terrorist threat*, (NYU Press, 2006), p. 129.} In addition, Hamas illustrates its objective of the intifada’s media. Ahmed Saati states: “Through its leaflets, Hamas has taken upon itself the duty of ‘formation’ of Palestinians on the basis of homogeneity to qualify them to be torchbearers of freedom and resistance, since resistance in Hamas’s understanding is not only slingshot and stone, or a dagger or gun, but it is a way of life, starting from discipline in traffic and respecting people, and ending with stone, dagger and gun; this civilised understanding of the content of resistance is what distinguishes Hamas from other resistance movements which did not give importance to the ‘building of humans’.”\footnote{Author’s interview with Ahmed Saati, op., cit.}

The key media outlets

During the first intifada, the *Jihaz* has utilised several media outlets. Nahs’at Abu Amira asserts that Hamas’s strategy in all stages of resistance is to use all means of media available in order to deliver its ‘voice ‘to the largest number of the Palestinian public.\footnote{Author’s interview with Abu Amira op., cit.} The media means which have been available for Hamas in the late eighties were: the leaflets, posters, booklets, video and audio cassettes, mosques pulpits and graffiti.

1- The *bayan* [leaflet]

Reference to Hamas’s media office documents quotes: “if the ‘cassette weapon’ has been a mainstay of the Iranian revolution, the *bayan* [leaflet] is the strongest weapon in the Palestinian intifada, it was *thawrat albayanat* [the revolution of leaflets]”. Indeed, the cassettes of Khomeini’s sermons played a main role in the mobilisation of the Iranian people which led to the overthrow of the Shah’s rule.\footnote{Hirschkind, Charles: *The ethical soundscape: cassette sermons and Islamic counterpublics*, (Columbia University Press, 2006), p. 3.} Foucault himself emphasises this fact, saying “the revolt in Iran spread on cassette tapes”.\footnote{Foucault, Michel: *The Revolt in Iran Spreads on Cassette Tapes*, in Afary, Janet, Anderson, Kevin, and Foucault Michel: *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 216–20.} Despite the fact that Khomeini was in exile in France since 1963, he was “in effect ‘governing’ Iran...
from exile since at least the early 1970s”, thanks to these smuggled cassettes as Johann Beukes argues.\textsuperscript{446} Likewise, the \textit{bayan} was the first media instrument during the intifada; Hamas issued thousands of leaflets between 1987 and 1993 since it was the most important outlet of Hamas media. These leaflets were distributed widely in the streets and mosques, as they reflected Hamas activities and events during the intifada, they also took in all aspects of life in the Palestinian society, such as education, economy, social affairs and others.\textsuperscript{447} The leaflets were a source of news for the universal news agencies, Alashqar states that the mass media and the news agencies used to pick up the leaflets as soon as they were issued as they demonstrate Hamas’s attitudes.\textsuperscript{448} These leaflets are divided into two categories; the first is a series of monthly leaflets, which declare the Hamas political attitudes towards the intifada developments, as well as the Hamas activities in the intifada, such as strikes and the escalation of confrontation with the occupation. The second category concentrates on the emergent issues in-between the monthly leaflets.

\textbf{2- Mosques}

Mosques were a fertile ground for Hamas media. For Hamas, the mosque is the source of oxygen; historically Hamas controls most of the mosques in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank;\textsuperscript{449} these mosques are considered as a springboard for all types of activities. Gunning states: “the mosque is still the key location where potential leaders are observed, or rise to prominence. More generally, mosques are one of the chief recruiting grounds for Hamas.”\textsuperscript{450} Abu Amr expresses that in a different way, saying “mosques are useful vehicles for spreading Hamas’s ideas”,\textsuperscript{451} whilst Ross and Makovsky claim that Hamas used mosques as their battleground and hiding places.\textsuperscript{452} To a great extent this is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{447} Author’s interview with Ismail Alashqar op., cit.
\item \textsuperscript{448} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{449} Between 1967 and 1987, the number of mosques on the West Bank and the West Bank grew almost from 600 to 1350. See: Abu Amr, Ziyad: Hamas: A Historical and Political Background, op. cit.
\item \textsuperscript{450} But since the first 1987 the number of mosques grew almost doubled. Knudsen, Are: Crescent and Sword: The Hamas Enigma, \textit{Third World Quarterly}, Vol. 26, No. 8 (2005), pp. 1373-1388. This shows that Hamas gives building mosques a high priority due the advantages that it can gain through.
\item \textsuperscript{451} Gunning, Jeroen: ‘\textit{Hamas in politics: democracy, religion, violence}’, ibid, p. 122.
\item \textsuperscript{452} Abu Amr, Ziyad: Hamas: A Historical and Political Background, op. cit.
\item \textsuperscript{453} Ross, Dennis and Makovsky, David: \textit{Myths, Illusions, and Peace: Finding a New Direction for America in the Middle East}, (Penguin, 2010).
\end{itemize}
true; Bseisue illustrates that the mosque is a good place to spread ideas, since most of the Palestinian people have a religious background and they go to mosques once a week at least, to attend the weekly *Khutba* [sermon]. As Hamas had control over the mosques in the Palestinian territories, the Friday preachers were receiving the outline of the *Khutba* which represented the views of Hamas in the various issues. Bseisue believes that face-to-face communication between the ‘preacher’ and the audience is one of the most effective forms of media.\(^{453}\) In addition, people in the Muslim world respect the mosques and preachers, and therefore they trust what comes from them. Alashqar quotes:

> Pulpits for us were extremely important; they played a key role in transmitting the Hamas views to the mosque-goers directly. All of the issues which were raised used to be addressed from a religious perspective. Preachers speak to the general public, and other issues (for members of the Hamas movement) were raised through releasing particular secret bulletins to discuss specific issues.\(^{454}\)

The most well-known mosque speakers and preachers were: Sheikh Hussein al-Masri, Sheikh Rajab Al-Attar, Sheikh Dhafer al-Shawa, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin (the founder of Hamas), Sheikh Mohammad Taha (one of Hamas founders), Abdel Fattah Dukhan (one of Hamas founders), and others.\(^{455}\) Besides the Friday sermons, Hamas used the mosques to show its posters and billboard on mosque walls; Appendixes (2, 3, and 4) shows examples of these posters. The contents of these posters were divided into two categories, the first category contain a selection of articles or re-written Hamas’s leaflets. The second category was ‘paintings’ or ‘drawings’ reflecting the Hamas vision of the armed resistance which obviously had religious overtones.

### 3-Graffiti

Graffiti was the one of the earliest and widespread ‘media’ instruments in the first intifada; it was used by most of the Palestinian organisations. This form of media is not new; the Nicaraguan revolution used graffiti and other visual arts in its revolution.\(^{456}\) Most of the graffiti written during the Nicaraguan revolution were lyrics and political

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\(^{453}\) Author’s interview with Momen Bseisue. op. cit.

\(^{454}\) Author’s interview with Ismail Alashqar. op., cit.

\(^{455}\) Author’s interview with Yousef rizqa. op., cit.

Similarly, the graffiti used in Mexico projected the leftist or revolutionary ideologies of Mexican nationalism. Graffiti is *sahafat aljudran* [the journalism of walls] as Mustafa Sawwaf calls it. Ron Schleifer describes it as “poor man’s media”; since it is attention-grabbing, cheap, easily and quickly produced, as well as, it is easily renewable, and most importantly, it is out of the censorship control. That is true; a single canister of spray paint can be easily concealed; it can serve for a few messages and can be disposed of in critical times. Mohammed Suleiman, the author of “media Intifada”, argues that for the intifada all the walls are ‘open pages’ for writing, and they are distributed in a manner commensurate with its aim; so that the slogans of resistance and steadfastness are concentrated in public places such as the doors of shops and the walls of houses, while the negative graphics and slogans which concern the enemy leadership are often on the walls of public toilets or garbage containers. The graffiti during the intifada was one of the main matters which concerned the Israeli occupation. The military governor’s administration issued a number of military commands that prescribed punishment of the writers on walls; the military order number 1260 established a sentence of imprisonment for 5 years or a fine of 1500 shekels. That is why the Palestinian activists were working in secrecy and used masks when they wrote on the walls. Hamas used this instrument widely during the first intifada to publicise its messages. These messages were usually short and determined.

**4- Booklets**

Hamas also used the booklets, to a lesser degree compared to the outlets mentioned. The *jihaz* produced and distributed large numbers of copies of Sheikh Abdullah Azzam’s speeches, who had fought the Russians in Afghanistan. Azzam was considered “a symbol of Jihad” for Hamas. Yousef Rizqa explains that Hamas used to issue booklets to be distributed to members and supporters, and some times to be stuck on the

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459 Author’s interview with Mustafa elsawwaf. op., cit.


462 Ibid.

463 Ibid.
mosques’ notice boards. Rizqa argues that this outlet of media was an effective means of spreading Hamas’s ideas, especially taking into consideration the severe competition with the communist wave led by the PFLP and DFLP, and also the secular rival Fatah.

5- Video Tapes and Cassettes

The dependence on cassettes by Hamas was less important than the other media outlets at the beginning of the intifada. However, the use of the video tapes and audio cassettes increased especially by Hamas’s student movement in the Palestinian universities, which used to be a vital environment for the competition between the Palestinian factions. The audio cassettes consist of “resistance, Jihad and martyrdom” [sung Islamic poetry] and speeches of some Palestine scholars from inside and outside Palestine. At some points these cassettes became very popular due to the increase of the interest of Hamas in producing new cassettes of famous Islamic scholars. Ghazi Hamad believes that the cassettes had a “big effect” and it was easy and cheap for people to get them. That is why Hamas produced a large number of these cassettes, which were an integral part of the Hamas’s resistance, Ahmed Sa’āti argues. At some stages of the first intifada, the jihaz used the video tapes to declare the responsibility for particular military operations. These tapes used to be sent to the press offices in the Gaza strip and the West Bank. Reuven Paz claims that concentrating on activities like producing Islamic literature, preaching, and distributing cassettes were considered much

464 Author’s interview with Yousef rizqa. op., cit.
465 Ibid.
466 Author’s interview with Ahmed Sa’āti, op., cit.
467 Author’s interview with Nihad Sh. Khalil, op., cit.
468 Look at the examples of these songs in: Israeli, Raphael: ‘War, peace and terror in the Middle East’, (Routledge, 2003), pp. 120-121.
469 Author’s interview with Ghazi Hamad, op., cit.
470 Ibid.
471 Ibid.
472 Author’s interview with Ahmed Sa’āti, op., cit.
more efficient than publishing a newspaper. This is not accurate; Hamas deliberately used the cassettes alongside all of the rest of possible media outlets as part of its strategy to deliver its voice to the largest number of the Palestinians.

**Resistance in Hamas’s media during the first intifada**

*Muqawamah* [resistance] discourse was the main characteristic of the resistance media of Hamas during the first intifada. As mentioned in chapter three, Hamas’s project is based on notion of resistance including: armed resistance, economic resistance, resistance by education, and also resistance by solidarity and social work. All words, meanings, and terminologies that incite the Palestinian people to resistance were the aim of Hamas media during the first intifada as Abu Musamih argues. He states: “the media discourse of Hamas during the first intifada is a speech against an enemy occupier, this discourse uses all the words, meanings, and terminologies that incite the Palestinian people to the exercise of all forms of resistance.” Likewise, Momen Bseisue emphasises that the daily fight with the Israeli occupation imposed a discourse that matched the nature of the circumstances at that time, and this is what Ghazi Hamad calls “the mobilizing discourse”. Hamad states: “Without doubt in the first intifada Hamas was in its early stages, and it concentrated on inciting the Palestinian street to revolt against the occupation, hence Hamas adopted the mobilizing discourse for resistance by all means, peaceful and violent, by stones, molotovs and even guns. In that time Hamas believed that engaging politically with the Israeli occupation would never achieve anything for the Palestinians, and that the sole and strategic way to reclaim the Palestinian rights is by resistant action”. Therefore, the Hamas media was directed primarily at the local Palestinian society, which is one of the Hamas’s objectives; to create *Mujtama’a Muqawim* [resistant society] to embrace such a project.

In the following section, I will analyse samples of Hamas leaflets and some of the graffiti text of Hamas during the intifada, which will show aspects of the Hamas’s discourse during the first intifada.

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475 Author’s interview with Sayyed Abu Musamih op., cit.

476 Author’s interview with Momen Bseisue, op., cit.

477 Author’s interview with Gazi Hamad, op., cit.
The Jihadi resistance rhetoric

*Intifadat almasajid* [the uprising of the mosques]⁴⁷⁸, *thawrat almasajid* [The revolution of the mosques], ⁴⁷⁹ and *alintifada almubaraka* [the blessed intifada] were the names that Hamas called the first Intifada. This is the starting point to investigate the religious/ideological dimension of Hamas’ resistance media. The mosque in the Arab and Muslim culture represents one of the fundamental values of Islam and one of the symbols of ’ Islamic civilisation’. ⁴⁸⁰ This was clear in the Islamic history. The first step taken by the prophet Mohammed after *Hijrah* (emigration) from Mecca to Medina was the commissioning and building of a new mosque called *Qubaa*. Also, the term of *alintifada almubaraka* [the blessed intifada] was used to express the idea that the Intifada is blessed by God. Religion for Hamas is the main component of its political thought which deems it to be the essential determinant of the Hamas media. The Hamas charter which was written in the wake of the outbreak of the first intifada, in religious rhetoric. Nihad Sh. Khalil stresses this, arguing that Hamas’s charter was a document containing ethical religious texts rather than a political document.⁴⁸¹ The ‘Palestine cause’ itself has religious weight in Hamas’s thought as Alashqar argues “our linkage to this homeland (Palestine) is our linkage to this religion (Islam); Palestine is an integral part of our faith.”⁴⁸² The dictum of the military leader of Hamas during the first intifada, ‘Imad Aqel’ was “to kill Israeli soldiers is to worship God.”⁴⁸³ Such dictum illustrates the extent of the religious perception of this discourse. This concept comes from the fact ‘that the *Jihad* is an obligation of every Muslim man and woman’, that is why *Jihad* is considered the essence of Hamas’s thought. Alashqar emphasises that Hamas’s perspective is an “Islamic perspective”⁴⁸⁴ this was clear from the content of Hamas media during the first intifada. The religious language was one of the characteristics of Hamas media discourse; it was used in Hamas media materials, mainly in the leaflets.

⁴⁷⁸ Author’s interview with Sayyid Abu Musamih, op., cit.
⁴⁷⁹ Qaud, Hilmi Muhammad: *Thawrat al-masajid: Hijarah min sijil* [The revolution of the mosques: stones from the hell] (Dar al-Itisam, Lebanon 1989).
⁴⁸¹ Author’s interview with Nihad Sh. Khalil, op., cit.
⁴⁸² Author’s interview with Ismail alshqar, op., cit.
⁴⁸⁴ Author’s interview with Ismail alshqar, op., cit.
All of the leaflets contain texts taken from the Quran, Hadith [biography of the Prophet of Islam] or the Arab-Islamic culture.

The heading of all Hamas leaflets is different Quranic texts that are connecting to the concept of resistance; here are few instances:

- “This is a clear message for mankind in order that they may be warned thereby.” The message of this verse reflects the meaning of powerful. Although the verse is interpreted as the Quran is a proclamation for mankind, Hamas used it in its leaflets to proclaim to the Palestinian people the message of Hamas which may warn them that the leaflet contains instructions (in some cases), declarations, arguments, attitudes, etc...

- “Fight them! Allah will chastise them at your hands, and He will lay them low and give you victory over them, and He will heal the breasts of folk who are believers.” This verse urges for Jihad, and promises those fighters that the hand of God will bless them, and they will get the victory at the end of the battle.

- “Go forth, light-armed and heavy-armed, and strive with your wealth and your lives in the way of Allah! That is best for you if ye but knew.” The message of this verse is the preparedness for the battle with the Israeli occupier that Hamas was urging the Palestinians to wage.

- “Those who believe do battle for the cause of Allah; and those who disbelieve do battle for the cause of idols. So fight the minions of the devil. Lo! the devil's strategy is ever weak.”

- “O Prophet! Strive against the disbelievers and the hypocrites! Be harsh with them. Their ultimate abode is hell, a hapless journey's end.” This verse is addressed to Prophet Mohammed and his nation after him and urges them to fight the ‘infidels and the hypocrites’ by sword and tongue. Hamas uses this Quranic text in its own way; it applies the context of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict to the context of the clash between the prophet Mohammed (the prophet

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485 Holy Quran, Chapter 14, From Verse 52, in leaflet number 54, 11/03/1990.
486 Holy Quran, Chapter 9, From Verse 14, in leaflet number 33, 21/12/1988.
487 Holy Quran, Chapter 9, From Verse 41, in leaflet number 92, 07/02/1992.

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of Islam) and the ‘unbelievers’. This language is considered a source of inspiration for many Muslims, especially the religious people.

- “Of the believers are men who are true to that which they covenanted with Allah. Some of them have paid their vow by death (in battle), and some of them still are waiting; and they have not altered in the least;” 490
- “The one equpper of fighter for the sake of God is like a fighter”. 491
- “Any prophet who starts the war should not stop it until God judges between him and his enemies” 492

Here are few examples of the titles of Hamas’s leaflets, which employ a discourse derived from the Islamic culture:

- “The sacred Jihad is a holy duty against the Zionists and the Crusader invaders.” 493
- “Not to live on the illusion of so-called peace.. Yes to the reality of Jihad and resistance” 494
- “Our Islamic identity, our character of civilization is our way to victory” 495
- “Blood is fuel of the battle, we all die, long live Palestine”
- “from May of Bereavement and defeat to May of intifada and Determination” 496
- “Jihad and unity are the way of victory” 497
- “The intifada is continued until the homeland be liberated” 498
- “Cleansing our land is by Jihad not by pleading” 499
- “Patience is the soul of victory, and the defeat is the fruit of recidivism” 500

490 Holy Quran, Chapter 33, From Verse 23, in leaflet issued by Hamas prisoners, 07/03/1991.
492 Hamas’s leaflet number 48, 4/10/1989.
493 Hamas’s leaflet number 64, 26/09/1990.
494 Hamas’s leaflet number 60, 10/7/1990.
495 Hamas’s leaflet number 61, 3/8/1990.
498 Hamas’s leaflet number 93, 4/12/1992.
499 Hamas’s leaflet number 34, 12/1/1989.
“The call of the continuous jihad for elevating the Word of God”

These examples show that Hamas replaced many terms used by the nationalists to use its own terminology and symbols. The term *jihad* replaces ‘struggle’ (communist term), as well as *Mujahedeen* [the Islamic term of ‘fighters’ or ‘resistors’] replaces ‘commandos’. *Jihad* and *mujahedeen* represent a big importance in the minds and awareness of Muslims since this language comes from the holy book of Muslims. The aim of using the discourse of *Jihad* is to re-formulate the concept of resistance to be consistent with the message of Hamas. Ghazi Hamad explains why, stating that “the resistance, *Jihadi* discourse in Hamas’s beliefs was derived from its religious and creedal vision.” This is what Amal Jamal calls “a major foundation of power for Hamas.”

Israel or the Israeli occupation was replaced with the “Zionist enemy”, “the Jewish state” “Zionism” or “Zionist entity”, as well as using words like: “cowardly occupier”. Hamas uses these terms because it has never recognised Israel as a legitimate state. Michael Arena and Bruce Arrigo argue that the term “Zionism” is one of the most powerful symbols to influence Hamas. They stress that this discourse infers “that members wage a ‘holy war’ against the invader that has usurped Palestinian land”. Hamas leaflet states:

O sons of Palestine: Here is the blessed, valiant intifada moving solidly, towards its seventeenth month, to challenge oppression and tyranny. We live in the shadow of Ramadan month; Ramadan is a good opportunity to increase our giving and to emulate of the pioneers of *Mujahedeen*, the Ancestors, who were knights in the day time and monks at night. They achieved for their religion the greatest Victory, and we have to approach their way. Hence, The Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas applauds your ‘combatant sleeves’ which avenged the massacre of the mosque of Sheikh Radwan neighborhood in Gaza; you have proved that the blood of our children will not go in vain, this blood will remain the curse chasing the Zionist enemy and expels...
them from our land. Therefore, Hamas calls to escalate the confrontations with the enemy to drench his army the bitter death; raise the voice of Allahu Akbar everywhere, this voice is a bomb and it will terrify your enemy.\footnote{Hamas’s leaflet number 39 - 5/4/1989.}

The celebration by Hamas in the month of Ramadan and the commemoration of the Battle of ‘Badr’ within the context of resistance against the Israeli occupation [look at the poster in appendix number (2)], together with the use the Islamic/religious words and expressions such as Allahu Akbar [God is the greatest], the month of Jihad, the historical battles with the ‘infidels’, indicates that Hamas gives priority to the religious discourse in the first intifada. The discourse was vital for Hamas' cultural hegemony. It was important not only against the Israeli occupation, but also within the frame of competition with secular-nationalists and communists. In some stages, Hamas' discourse resulted in Palestinian nationalists reframing their own in religious/ideological language. Loren Lybarger agrees with this opinion. She states: “Hegemony produced intense competition between the secular-nationalist and Islamist milieus; it also led to ideological sub-differentiation as activists crossed over factions boundaries, bringing with them orientation of forged elsewhere. The incorporation of proto-Islamist activists from the secular-nationalist milieu reinforced the nationalist reorientation of the Islamist milieu.”\footnote{Lybarger, Loren D.: \textit{Identity and Religion in Palestine: The Struggle between Islamism and Secularism in the Occupied Territories}, (Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 119.} Hamas defends the idea of using this kind of discourse, arguing that the discourse of ‘Jihad and Muqawamah’ basically stems from “the religious perspective” which comes from Quran verses and Hadith texts, as well as ‘ulamaa fatwa’ [A legal opinion or ruling issued by an Islamic scholar]. Ayman Taha clarifies the principle of using the term, stating: “Jihad by wealth and soul is part of our Islamic project”\footnote{Author’s interview with Ayman taha, op., cit.} However, Momen Bsiesue argues that the Hamas’ media discourse in the first intifada was combining religious discourse with politics and often the dominant element was religion and belief.\footnote{Author’s interview with Momen Bseisue, op., cit.} Efraim Inbar sees that the holy texts of a religion can be used for a variety of political purposes. The writer considers that Hamas is a good example in that it deals with the Palestinian Israeli conflict not as a territorial issue, but as “historically, culturally, existentially irreconcilable conflict between Islam and Judaism between truth
and falsehood”.

That is true, since Hamas’ discourse in the first intifada focussed on the ideological dimension, the religious factor of the conflict with the occupation. It referred to the opposing side in the conflict as Jews, and this was based on the description conveyed by the Quran and the biography of the prophet of Islam. For example, “Fighting the oppressive forces of the Jews”\footnote{Hamas’s leaflet number 65, 10/11/1990.} “To consider all Jewish and settlers as legitimate targets to kill”\footnote{Ibid.}. There was also a concentration on touching the people’s emotion through emotional texts; these texts were mostly containing sensitive issues for the Palestinians such as: God, homeland, martyrdom, the Alaqsa mosque etc... These issues for Hamas are religious. The following quote is an example and taken from one of Hamas’ leaflets during the first intifada.

> The nation which desires its sons to die for the love of God, endowed its prideful life, and we as an Islamic Resistance Movement and our united people have accepted to approach this path of jihad and nothing else, and we are sure that the end will be one of two goals: victory or martyrdom. We and our Mujahid people, with our deep understanding are able to foil this plan which attempts to satisfy us with crumbs,, we are able to thwart all attempts to compromise our homeland and legitimate rights.\footnote{Leaflet number 54, op., cit.}

The graffiti (texts and drawings), and the posters also used the same content of jihadi resistance discourse. As previously mentioned, graffiti was one of the main media means used by Hamas in the first intifada, so it was rare to see a wall without graffiti containing slogans to incite the Palestinians to rise up and urging them to participate in the general strikes, and to resist the occupation and to support the resistance. The walls therefore turned into blackboards with a daily schedule so that all could see the activities of the Palestinian resistance on these walls. Here are examples of these slogans of the jihadi resistance discourse:


2 – “The intifada is a start not an end.”\footnote{Ibid.}
3 – “The intifada is my mother, and my father, I am its weapon.”

4- “The ‘stones’ and ‘gunpowder’ Yes, dialogue with the Jews No.”

6- “We must deal with the enemies in the language that they understand… the language of bullets.”

The term ‘the land of Palestine’ is connected to Islam in Hamas’s thought as explained in chapter three (Hamas’s project section). Therefore, the use of this term in the Hamas media reflects, more or less, a religious aspect. Frequently, ‘Palestine’ is tied with words like ‘Muslim land’, ‘waqf’, jihad, and so on. This quote shows that:

Sheikh (Sheikh Ahmed Yassin) constantly emphasised that Hamas’s position is not to give up of any inch of the Muslim land of Palestine. The tricks of the deceitful enemy will not mislead us that they are advocates of peace, nor will the biased U.S. position deceive us. America has not been sincere in its dealings with our people, even for a single moment. This position stems from the Islamic creed and from the conviction of our struggling people.

This language is also used in the Hamas media posters and drawings. The poster in the appendix number (3) shows a fighter riding a horse, holding a sword and the Palestinian flag. The background is a picture of the ‘Dome of the Rock’ of Alaqsa mosque (Jerusalem). The slogan written at the top of the poster is: “It was freed by Omer bin Alkhattab, and liberated by Salaheddine Alayoubi, who can do it now?”. The poster is signed “Hamas”, which indicates that Alaqsa mosque and Jerusalem can be only liberated by approaching the way of Salaheddine and Omer. Another poster in appendix (4), contains: a bleeding man’s fist catches barbed wire, the ‘Dome of the Rock’ with the Palestinian flag and Hamas flag, two guns, and the Quranic word “wa ’aiddu” [prepare yourselves]. At the bottom of the poster is written the well-known Hamas slogan “Islam is the solution” with the Hamas signature.

Bseiuse refers to using the religious discourse for three reasons:

516 Ibid.
517 Ibid.
518 Ibid.
519 Ibid.
520 Leaflet number 52, 8/01/1990.
1. Religion, and religious discourses, are the best tactics of Hamas in the public relations and contact with people since it is “successful and influential” at the local and regional levels.

2. Religion is a key factor in attracting people to combat and resist the Israeli occupation. This leads many Palestinian people to join the resistance movement.

3. Re-framing the Palestinian identity to have an Islamic shape as religion traditionally contributes to shaping the Arab and Muslim identity.

Nevertheless, Bseisue argues that this kind of discourse was used extensively by Hamas media in its early stages for the reasons are explained above, but then it decreased and became more political and less religious. This will be discussed in chapter five (when Hamas become a political opposition) and chapter six (when it has become a ruling party).

One more function of the resistance media in the first intifada was the ‘organizational administrative role of resistance’. It was like the role of a leader who commands and distributes the orders to members, calling them to organise strikes and the confrontation with the occupation. For example, in its leaflet number 64 Hamas called for strikes on the 9th of October 1990 for the occasion of thirty-fifth month of the intifada, and on the 14th of October on the occasion the anniversary of the ‘Qibya massacre’ and to protest against the continued presence of U.S. and “invading Crusader forces” in the Arab peninsula and the Gulf. Meanwhile, in the same leaflet Hamas called for a few events 28th, 29th and 30th of September 1990 to write on walls the slogans. The 1st October 1990 is a day for celebrations of the anniversary of the birth of the ‘Mujahedeen’s commander’ Mohammad. 10th of October 1990 is a day for Molotov to take revenge on the enemy on the occasion of the anniversary of the massacres in Shajaeya/Gaza. The 11th of October 1990 is a day of escalation of the confrontation against the Israeli soldiers and their “folk of settlers” on the occasion of the entry of those so-called ‘Trustees of Temple Mountain’ to the Alaqsa Mosque. Mohammed Madhoun asserts that the leaflets were like instructions to Hamas members for running tasks such as the administration of the strikes, escalation of the resistance against the Israeli soldiers and

521 Hamas’s leaflet number 64, 26/09/1990.
settlers, and to respond to crimes of the occupation, as well as the implementation of sanctions against agents and traitors.\textsuperscript{522} The monthly leaflets of Hamas during the first intifada used to organise the activities of the uprising for three to four weeks at a time.

\textbf{The socio-economic dimension of resistance media}

Hamas media dealt with the social and economic situations which emerged as a consequence of the first intifada such as the increasing number of the victims’ families (the dead, wounded and prisoners), poverty, unemployment, and absence of security. Therefore, Hamas addressed this dimension by concentrating on the importance of social solidarity, tolerance, and giving help and support to the Palestinian society in order to alleviate the burden of the Palestinians and enhance their steadfastness.

The economic situation in the first intifada represented a big challenge for the Palestinians. The Israeli occupation put severe restrictions on the Palestinian workers, imposed more tax on the people, obligatory collection of money under the pretext of different reasons, as well as systematically working against the agricultural seasons and the uprooting of trees, confiscation of lands to build up settlements, demolition of buildings, preventing the entry of money.\textsuperscript{523} As a result of these situations, Hamas also sought to call the Arab and the Muslims to increase the financial support as well as calling the local Palestinian businessmen to employ more Palestinian workers in their companies and factories. As part of what is called the economic resistance, Hamas and the Palestinian factions urged (and some times forced) the Palestinians to embargo the Israeli products as well as targeting the Israeli economic resources in order to harm the Israel economy. Under the title “call and a warning about dealing with the enemy's economy”,\textsuperscript{524} Hamas issued a special leaflet containing a few messages to the Palestinian traders about dealing with the Israeli economy. Hamas even adopted the idea of the independence in the national economy as an alternative to the Israeli economy. The idea of the independence is part of the Islamic vision of Hamas.

\textsuperscript{522} Author’s interview with Mohammed Al-Madhoun, op., cit.

\textsuperscript{523} For more details about the first intifada see: \textit{Kitab felasteen athourah 3} [Palestine revolution, 3], (Bisan Press and Publication Institution LTD, 1988).

\textsuperscript{524} A special leaflet about dealing with the Israeli’s economy, 10/03/1989.
One the features of our Islamic idea is ‘independence phenomenon’ and this idea is Islamic in its descent and origin. Therefore, all the acts in our daily lives and our national economy must stem from the phenomenon of independence. The enemy realised this issue and he went to fight us by ‘economic swords’. Israel intends to drown our local markets by their production. Hence, Hamas sees that the Palestinians respond to the enemy war by counter-war using the same tools represented in boycotting the goods and products especially those goods and products which have national alternatives.

On the one hand, Hamas warned the traders who tried to swindle by replacing the labels of the Israeli goods to show it as a national products, and called on the Palestinians to boycott the Israeli products (Hamas issues a list of these goods). On the other hand, it demanded that the national factories owners deal with the intifada stage in a highly responsible way by maintaining a good level of production quality and reasonable prices. Hamas also encouraged people to build-up the so called domestic economy through the promotion of agriculture and poultry farming.

The issue of solidarity and ‘compassion’, which were heavily covered in the Hamas media in the first intifada shows that these issues were a priority for Hamas. These calls by Hamas were successful according to Ahmed Sa’ati. He argues that Hamas media highlighted the issue of prisoners as a central issue because of the high number of the Palestinian prisoners (exceeding ten thousand), which resulted in tens of thousands of the Palestinian children living without a guardian. Sa’ati adds: “that’s why we were focusing on this issue and demanding that the masses support the families of prisoners and we allocated special strikes for solidarity with them”. Under the title ‘challenge the occupation policy of starvation’, Hamas leaflet number 35 called on the employers, companies and national industries to accommodate the largest number of workers, and to review the salaries of employees taking into account the depreciation of the dinar and rising prices. It also invited the landlords to re-consider the properties rents, helping those people who have ‘zero-income’, it also demanded that the merchants and traders helped the consumers by reducing their profits. Also, it called on the poor people to help themselves by exploitation of agricultural lands and the kitchen gardens for the cultivation of legumes and vegetables in order to save part of the income, rationalization.

\[525\] Ibid.

\[526\] Author’s interview with Ahmed Sa’ati, op., cit.

\[527\] The Jordanian dinar is the second currency in the Palestinian occupied territories after the Israeli shekel.

\[528\] Hamas’s leaflet number 35, op., cit.
of consumption and the reduction in expenditure.\textsuperscript{529} In addition, it urged the benevolent committees and charities to intensify their activities and to increase their deeds towards the victims of the intifada.\textsuperscript{530}

These socio-economic circumstances with the absence of security during the first intifada generated some negative phenomena such as the proliferation of crimes of burglary, theft, and assault on the properties of people. In addition, the range of conflicts between clans/families increased and led sometimes to crimes of murder. Hamas and other Palestinian factions claimed that these situations were well planned and supported by the Israeli occupation. Hamas media also covered these issues. For instance, Hamas cautioned the Palestinians about these plans and at the same time Hamas threatened what it called “traitors” and “suspects” that Hamas was able to strike them strongly. The following quotes show that:

- “We draw the attention of our citizens that the occupation drives some (traitors) and some (suspects) to fabricate problems with people and tries to implicate some national(?) people. These problems aim to bring about clashes between national trends in order to abort the intifada and create a sense of total chaos. To those (suspect) people so be aware, the arm (Hamas) will strongly hurt you and will foil all of your despicable ways.”\textsuperscript{531}

- “Hamas strongly condemns the destruction of properties of innocent people, and warns of the methods of the enemy and the undermining the unity of our people”.\textsuperscript{532}

Hamas also advised people how to deal with these circumstances; it called for national unity. The title of its leaflet number 56 states: “unity is the secret of our power and the first stage of victory”.\textsuperscript{533} Hamas warned what it calls “traitors” that it will be on the lookout for them, as it is clear in this quote: “We warn the traitors of the Israeli authorities against any robbery and theft of property of the people and we call on our citizens to enhance the night security guards and monitoring of the thieves and stand up

\textsuperscript{529} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{530} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{531} Hamas leaflet, July 1989 (without specific date).
\textsuperscript{532} Hamas’s leaflet number 42, 28/05/1989.
\textsuperscript{533} Hamas’s leaflet number 56, 16/04/1990.
against them.”  

“Hamas calls on all citizens to ‘close ranks’ and put aside their differences to unite all energies against the ‘infidel enemy’; we confirm our position and declare that our situation is not like an internal clash, its only serves the enemy and the enemy only”.  

In some cases Hamas media addressed the Palestinian clans/families disputes which arose from time to time. Besides the media efforts, Hamas contributed through lijan al-islah [reconciliation committees which aimed at doing away with anything customary] in resolving many clashes between the Palestinian clan/families. In Gaza, Hamas efforts were successful in restraining numerous Gazan families. Hamas even aspired to get more involved in the public life of the Palestinians such as providing security and contributing to solving the clashes between people. It went on to intervene in the traffic issues; Hamas called the private cars owners not to vie with the taxis and the public transportation.  

It called on the drivers to be disciplined and to comply with the traffic law, the leaflet states: “all drivers should be disciplined in full in the traffic law and live up to the level of awareness of traffic issues without any need for the traffic police (which follow the Israeli police)”.

In the socio-economic aspect, Hamas also treated it from a religious perspective, concentrating on the Islamic concepts of the social solidarity such as ‘zakat’ and ‘sadaqa’. Likewise in the jihadi resistance discourse, Hamas used quran and hadith texts to urge the Palestinians towards giving and helping people in need. In April 1989,

534 Hamas’s leaflet number 36, op. cit.
535 Hamas’s leaflet number 50, 27/11/27.
537 Hamas leaflet, July 1989 (without specific date).
538 Hamas’s leaflet no 35, op., cit.
539 Zakat is one of five of the Islam principles. It means that everything belongs to God, and that wealth is therefore held by human beings in trust. “The word zakat means both ‘purification’ and ‘growth’. As a religious term it means “transferring ownership of an amount of material wealth specified by the Lawgiver to a poor Muslim who is not Hashimi nor their client, without material benefit returning to the giver in any way, for the sake of Allah Most High”. SunniPath, the online Islamic academy, available on: http://qa.sunnipath.com/issue_view.asp?id=2642, accessed in 25/01/2011.
which marks the holy month of Ramadan, Hamas issued its leaflet number 40. The entire leaflet concentrated on the religious concepts of goodness, giving, tolerance, and social solidarity. The leaflet quotes:

Ramadan is the month of *Zakat* and *Sadaqa*: God compounds your deeds. This is an invitation to support the families of our poor brothers, the needy, and the martyrs, prisoners, and the wounded people. Give generously with a satisfied soul. God says: (And whatever you spend in good, it will be repaid to you in full, and you shall not be wronged). *Eid al-Fitr* and kinship: God made the *Eid al-Fitr* holiday for those who fasted, for those who laboured in the sake of God. God also made it as a day for kinship and solidarity for the poor people and orphans, and for the sons of martyrs and prisoners.

With all of these calls by the leaflets, Hamas used to spread its messages in Ramadan and Eid by the posters and graffiti, and most widely via the mosque speeches. The media efforts used to be with an organised movement by Hamas activists and its civil society. On the Eid days Hamas used to organise processions of Hamas members, activists and supporters to visit the houses of the victims and give them gifts, financial and moral support.

In reference to the concept of *Mujtama Muqawim* [resistant society] which represents an essential part of the ‘resistance project’; Hamas identifies resistance as a duty, not only on the ‘Mujahedeen’ but also it is duty of people and society. So it is a joint duty between the resistance groups and the society; since the resistance groups’ role is circumstantial, while the society carries the resistance to continue. Therefore Hamas constantly calls for building what it calls a “resistant society” to be able to embrace these groups of resistance. So, it is an integrated and composite of roles and responsibilities.

**The education as a core issue in Hamas media**

The education and the higher education sector in the Palestinian occupied territories were widely damaged during the first intifada due to the Israeli occupation policies towards the education process. According to the Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories under the Israeli occupation (the B’Tselem –), a large

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541 *Eid al-Fitr* is the first day follows Ramadan month. Muslims celebrate this day as a holy religious day.

542 Hamas’s leaflet number 40, 17/04/1989.
number of Palestinian students and teachers have been arrested or physically injured.\textsuperscript{543} Three reasons caused the harm to the educational process during the intifada.\textsuperscript{544} First, the Israeli occupation resorted to the closure of some educational institutions as a disciplinary measure against those schools and universities which used to lead the violent actions against the Israeli army and settlers. Second, the education process was affected by the general strikes which were organised by the Palestinian factions at the beginning of the intifada, which paralysed the education process for a few days every month.\textsuperscript{545} However, this status did not persist for a long time; in the second year of the intifada, Hamas realised the danger of disabling the education process for the Palestinian new generation, hence it excluded the schools, institutions and universities from the general strikes (This will be examined in Hamas’s media leaflets about education in this section). Third, the curfew which was imposed by the occupation Palestinian territories, especially refugees camps. The imposition of curfews caused the loss of dozens of study days over the intifada.\textsuperscript{546} B’Tselem report shows the Palestinian schools that closed by the Israeli army in the West Bank from December 1987 to May 1990.\textsuperscript{547} The students were the backbone of the ‘stones uprising’;\textsuperscript{548} and this clarifies the concentration of the occupation on this segment of Palestinian society.

This situation deprived thousands of students of their right to education, which led the university students to leave the Palestine territories to complete their study abroad, while large numbers of students left education. The Palestinians considered the targeting by the Israeli occupation of the education sector a conspiracy aimed to de-educate the Palestinian people and this is what has been termed syasat attajheel [de-education policy]. To make up for the closure of the schools and universities, Hamas


\textsuperscript{544} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{545} See B’Tselem Annual Report, 1989, pp. 68-69.

\textsuperscript{546} The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, B’Tselem, a report, “Closure of Schools and Other Setbacks to the Education System in the Occupied Territories”, op., cit.

\textsuperscript{547} Ibid.

created informal schools and universities based in the mosques and Hamas members’ houses, and they were run by volunteer-teachers.\textsuperscript{549}

Within this context, Hamas media addressed the education issue as a factor in strengthening the internal front against the Israeli occupation. The Palestinian factions blamed Hamas for its call to exempt the schools and universities from the general strikes, saying that this was a conspiracy aimed at eliminating the uprising, but after a while all of the Palestinian factions adopted the same view calling for the same obligation.\textsuperscript{550} The concentration of Hamas on the issue of education did not stop at the exception of educational institutions from the general strikes or demanding the complete opening of schools and institutes, but also extended to other dimensions. Hamas was concerned in the details of the education process to the extent of tackling the relationship between the teachers and students. Hamas media also concentrated on the popular action to support its action in order to maintain the education process in the mosques and houses.

During the first intifada, Hamas utilised most of the media outlets, including the graffiti, the posters, the series of leaflets, and special leaflets to address particular educational events such as the examinations period or starting the new academic year. The Hamas leaflet number 45 was allotted to cover the education process on the occasion of the re-opening of some of the schools by the occupation authorities. This leaflet can be a good example to show how important the education is in Hamas’s project. The leaflet title was “Education is a sacred human right, we are dedicated to it, and it is not a favour from anyone”.\textsuperscript{551} The leaflet uses challenging language, and at the same time it carries advice and guidelines directed to the students, families, teachers, and to the education institution’s administrations, which indicate to the deep engagement in this issue. The leaflet states that the Israeli occupation, by their declaration of re-opening the schools, has “reluctantly acquiesced”\textsuperscript{552} as a result of the Palestinians “persistence, patience, heroism and sacrifice”.\textsuperscript{553}

\textsuperscript{549} Legrain, jean-francois: The Islamic Movement and the intifada, in Heacock, Roger, and Nassar, Jamal Raji, "Intifada: Palestine at the crossroads", (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1990), p. 199.

\textsuperscript{550} Author’s interview with Sayyed Abu Musamih, op., cit.

\textsuperscript{551} Hamas’s leaflet number 45, 21/07/1989.

\textsuperscript{552} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{553} Ibid.
O our students: school is a fortified castle, we must preserve it, and protect its integrity, as we are keen to fight the occupier, to remain a natural incubator for generations to configure them, and build up the nation and the upbringing of our children in knowledge and morality, virtue, as God wants it to be… …Your movement ‘the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)’ is aware that the decision of our enemy to re-open schools in this way is an obvious attempt to embellish its ugly face, however, we call on our people and our students not to give up this right (the right of education).

The message of Hamas to the Palestinian students and their families is that they must preserve the education process as it is part of their religion (upbringing of our children in knowledge, morality and virtue, as God wants it to be). The morality and virtue are values which come from Islam. The message is also that the Israeli occupation had bowed to their determination at the end, as this achievement came from the steadfastness and the insistence on reclaiming rights, and this is what Hamas wants from the students and the Palestinian society. Accordingly, Hamas appealed to all students and teachers to return to schools on Saturday 22/07/1989 (the first day of re-opening the schools) as the strike declared by Hamas on the same day did not conflict with that.

As evidence of Hamas’s involvement in the details of the education process, the same leaflet (number 45) demanded the head teachers to take into account the psychological, physical and security conditions of the students and to bear with patience, wisdom and good treatment, as well as to pay attention to poor students. It also appealed to the teachers to redouble their efforts to compensate for the lost study periods of our students. Hamas also concentrated on the role of society in supporting Hamas’s efforts in the educational process. Therefore, Hamas media emphasised the necessity of the families’ participation. It called on the families to help the schools by: guiding the students to uphold the right in education, visiting the students in their schools, and devoting special times to their children in order to strengthen their weaknesses.

Following statements taken from other leaflets that illustrate Hamas involvement in the education process in the light of the intifada circumstance:

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554 Ibid.
555 Ibid.
556 Ibid.
557 Special leaflet on Education, 07/10/1990.
- “Hamas calls on everyone to maintain ‘the educational march’ and compensate the students in homes, mosques and in every place, we also call on you to fight against the policy of de-education and to seek for any possible way to re-open the universities and educational institutions.”

- “Education: We emphasise the maintaining of the educational process as we call firmly to respond to ‘disrupters’ who intended to disable the schools in the Gaza Strip, as well as we emphasise the importance of mosques, and home education”.

- “Hamas calls on the Tawjihi [the high school] students to show studiousness and to work hard and to maintain the examinations schedule, and calls for obedience to teachers and administrators to maintain calm. and declares that in case of any emergency calls to switch the times of examinations”

This discourse shows that Hamas considers that preserving education is in the national interest as it is a shared responsibility of the national factions (Hamas one of them), the students, their families, the schools administrations.

Although the Hamas media in the first intifada aimed to communicate with the Palestinians inside the occupied territories, in these issues Hamas sought to call on the international organisations to intervene and put pressure on the Israeli government to re-open the universities and the educational institutions. Hamas states: “Hamas calls on the international organisations; especially UNESCO to practise all levels of political pressure on the Israeli enemy's government to open the doors of universities and colleges to accommodate the tens of thousands of our students who sought to emigrate out of our country in search of education”. As Hamas confirmed that tens of students and teachers were subject to arbitrary detention, it called on UNESCO and the United Nations to use their influence in order to release them. Hamas also called the Arab and the Palestinians who were already abroad to take care of the Palestinian students by

558 Hamas’s Leaflet number 36, op., cit.
559 Hamas’s leaflet number 40, 17/04/1989.
561 Hamas’s leaflet number 54, op., cit.
562 Ibid.
supporting them and encouraging them to return after study to take part in building their homeland.  

Similar to the jihadi resistance discourse, and socio-economic, the focus on the educational dimension took on a religious aspect. Some Hamas leaflets which were allocated for education begin with Quranic texts, such as “Are those who know equal with those who know not? But only men of understanding will pay heed”, and “Read: In the name of thy Lord who created, Created man from a clot. Read: And thy Lord is the Most Bounteous, Who teaches by the pen, Teaches man that which he knew not.” As mentioned, one of the consequences of targeting education was that a large number of the Palestinian students left the occupied territories, either to study abroad for immigration. Hence, Hamas called on the national universities to encourage the students and facilitate the acceptance conditions in order to “to help the students stay in the ‘Ard al-ribat’”. Alribat ribat [The Land of the ‘Frontier Post’], is a religious term which comes from a saying of the prophet Mohammed.

**Al-kotla al-islamiya [Islamic bloc]**

Al-kotla al-islamiya The Islamic bloc is the ‘student arm’ of Hamas. In the first intifada the name of this bloc was ‘the Islamic student movement’. This bloc also played a significant role in managing the activities of Hamas in the schools and the educational institutions, including the recruitment of new members for Hamas, and running the Hamas media activities. Al-kotla al-islamiya used to distribute the Hamas media leaflets in the schools as well as using the graffiti. A leaflet signed by ‘the Islamic student movement’ and issued in October 1990 shows that the student arm of Hamas has also a media section. The leaflet considers the education with Jihad is a mean of liberation stating: *bel’ilm wal jihad tataharar albilad* [liberation homelands by knowledge and jihad]. So it uses slogans and terminologies reflecting this meaning. For instance:

> Dear friends stationed in the strongholds of knowledge: your Islamic Student Movement was founded from the heart of ‘the students body’ to carry the concerns of our people, to carry the banner of jihad and

563 Ibid.

564 Holy Quran, Chapter 39, From Verse 9, in leaflet number 45, 21/07/1989.

565 Holy Quran, Chapter 96, Verse 1,2,3,4,and 5, in Hamas’s leaflet (without number), 03/09/1990.

566 Leaflet Number 65, 16/04 / 1990.

567 A statement from the Islamic student movement, October 1990 (without specific date).
resistance in one hand, and the banner of science and the bina’ā [construction] in the other hand. We promise to God to serve you and to ensure your interests. The movement [Islamic Student Movement] is from you and for you, it listens to you, defends your rights and adopts your issues. It is a movement that believes that God is Lord, Mohammed is His prophet, Islam is our religion, in the Quran is our constitution, and Jihad is our approach. It invites you to surround it and approach its way... being generous with the opinion and advice.568

This quote demonstrates a few messages between the lines. First, the schools and the education institutions represent ‘castles of resistance’ which must be maintained. Second, the educational process does not interfere in any way with the continuation of the intifada; and this message is to encourage the students to be involved more in the intifada and at the same time they should give their study enough time. Third, the intifada is to achieve a better future for them and for the forthcoming generations; and the intifada itself is against oppression and occupation and against ignorance and backwardness as well. Fourth, Hamas and its ‘Islamic students’ movement’ are integral parts of the society (from you and for you), and they share the students’ suffering, as they share with them the advice and ‘mashoura’ [consultation]. Fifth, schools and educational institutions are a ‘fertile ground’ for recruitment and the attraction of new members and supporters (it invites to approach its way). Emile Sahliyeh agrees with this view, she explains that the high schools and universities were rich places to attract new members and supporters for Hamas.569

Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated the early stage of the establishment of the Jihaz ali’alam of Hamas; it has inspected its responsibilities and its key media outlets during the first intifada 1987-1993. This jihaz, which represents the ‘resistant media’ in Palestine is one essential tool of Hamas’s project of Islamic resistance, as it is not less important than the other tools such as the armed resistance or the social networks tool. The infrastructure of the Hamas was modest as it was composed of very rudimentary media outlets. The jihaz utilised all of the media outlets available at that time, which were

568 Ibid.
mostly ‘rudimentary’ like the printed leaflets, graffiti, posters, video and audio cassettes, and the mosque pulpits.

The first intifada was typified by violent actions and violent reactions. Hence the ‘jihadi resistance’ was the main characteristic of the Hamas media discourse; however the concept of resistance was connected to *Mashrou’al muqawamah* [the project of resistance], although practicing media itself is a non-violent action. Hamas widely used the Quran texts, Hadith texts, as well as utilising the Islamic rhetoric. The emphases on these concepts were part of a deliberate policy aimed to consolidate them in the mind of the Palestinians to become a milestone that is accompanying the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, and this is the major objective of the Hamas media strategy throughout the first intifada.
Chapter Five: Hamas media strategy Post Oslo Era: From Clandestine to the Public

‘We renew our rejection of the Cairo agreement as we promise to continue our jihad’

Hamas, May 1994

Introduction:

This chapter aims to investigate the Hamas media strategy between 1994 and 2006. This period witnessed the Oslo agreement followed by the establishment of the PNA, and the outbreak of the second intifada after the failure of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part covers the Hamas media strategy after the establishment of the PNA and Hamas’ establishment of the Islamic National Salvation party (alkhalas) which represented the political ‘licensed’ party of Hamas. I argue that the Hamas media strategy during this period witnessed a turning point in terms of objectives, infrastructure, media message, and target audience. Hamas has expanded its media infrastructure by establishing the first newspaper, and creating the first online webpage. In this regard, this chapter attempts to uncover the context of the establishing of Alwatan newspaper and the reasons for closing it down, and establishment of Alrisala newspaper as an alternative. The media message of Hamas also witnessed a major shift by using discourse that Hamas had not used before. I argue that Hamas’s discourse during this period was a combination of resistance/anti-Oslo discourse which focused on the failure of the PNA in reclaiming any of the Palestinian rights by negotiations, as Hamas presented the ‘resistance’ option as an alternative to this path, and political opposition discourse which focused on the everyday concerns of people like: the economy and poverty, child labour, education, corruption, and human rights etc. The target audiences of Hamas media strategy also expanded by establishing the Palestinian information centre which was available in six different languages. This raises the question of the objectives of the Hamas media over this period. The second part discusses the Hamas media in the context of the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada. This part will look at the creation of the first radio station for Hamas in Palestine. It also examines the media message, target audience, and objectives Hamas set to deal with the second intifada context. All of there element will be dicussed to explain the Gramsican notion of counter-hegemonic narrative. Hamas’ media institutions were created within an existing cultural-hegemonic frame—one dominated
by the Israeli Occupation and another by the PLO. Creating a niche within the existing and competing cultural and ideological frameworks required the development and presentation of a counter-narrative. Hamas had to create an alternative media framework, a new media hegemony. This part will analyse documents gathered from Alaqsa media network.
Part One

Hamas media strategy under the rule of PNA

This part of the chapter investigates the Hamas media strategy under the rule of the PNA in 1994 until the outbreak of the second intifada. Three different titles will be discussed: the Oslo accords and their consequences on Hamas media, Hamas’s expansion of its media infrastructure, and the media message adopted by Hamas during the studied period in this section.

Oslo Accords and its Consequences

The Oslo Accords or ‘the Declaration of Principles’\(^{570}\) represent a major milestone in the path of the Palestinian cause; it ended the armed conflict between the PLO and Israel, and arranged for the establishment of Palestinian government in the West Bank and Gaza. This agreement, which was conducted through secret negotiations in Oslo, is considered the first formal direct negotiations between Israel, represented by the Foreign Minister Affairs at the time Shimon Peres, and the PLO represented by the Secretary of the Executive Committee Mahmoud Abbas (the current PLO president). The accords provided for the establishment of the Palestinian authority of interim self-government [it called later the Palestinian National Authority – PNA], and an elected legislation council. The security part of the agreement was to establish police forces in the territories under the Palestinian Authority to guarantee the public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.\(^{571}\) According to the agreement, Israel continues to carry out the security in their regions, while retaining the right to any prosecutions of security within the territory of the Palestinian Authority in collaboration with Palestinian security forces,\(^{572}\) and this is what has been termed the *Tanseeq Amni* [security collaboration]. The interim period was five-year and called the ‘transitional period’; during this period the agreement states that the negotiations will

\(^{570}\) Oslo accords is officially called ‘The Declaration of Principles’ or ‘The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements’ is the first Palestinian Israeli agreement. It started through secret negotiation in the wake of Madrid conference 1991 which launched the peace negotiations between Israel and the Arabs, and signed at a public ceremony in the white house on 13/09/1993.


\(^{572}\) Ibid.
cover the remaining issues, including Jerusalem city, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, and borders.\footnote{573}{Ibid.}

Fatah Organisation led by Yasser Arafat represented the Palestinians in this agreement. Fatah signed the agreement after secret negotiations excluding most of the other Palestinian factions. Most of those factions opposed the agreement, including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, PFLP, DFLP, and others. They considered the agreement as a historic transformation in the Palestinian cause as Fatah and PLO had made a momentous concession by recognizing Israel's right to exist on Palestinian land. The discourse of the Palestinian factions was focused on what they thought the negative consequences of Oslo.\footnote{574}{Shafiq, Moneer: \textit{ittifaq Oslo wa tada‘eyatoh} [The Oslo agreement and its implications], (Palestinian information centre publications, 1995), p.} For instance, they saw that the withdrawal of the Israeli army from parts of the occupied territories and the establishing of an interim self-governance is a withdrawal from populated areas where the intifada and resistance were strong while remaining in control of the situation generally, and all the strategic points on borders and crossings, and this exempted the occupation from clashes with the Palestinians with full control of the situation.\footnote{575}{Ibid.} The Oslo accords were not a detailed agreement, it represents the ‘principles’, while it was under the agreements started after the Gaza-Jericho agreement in Cairo 1994\footnote{576}{Cotran, Eugene, et al., \textit{the Arab-Israeli accords: legal perspectives} (Kluwer Law International, 1996).}, that the withdrawal from parts of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank began. After that Palestinian security forces returned from some of the Arab countries.

**Hamas’s attitude vis-à-vis Oslo Accords**

Regardless of the reasons mentioned in the previous section, Hamas had its own reasons for rejection Oslo, which were based on political and ideological perspectives. In the wake of the Cairo agreement in 1994, Hamas declared that it completely rejected this agreement on the grounds that it confirmed and legitimised the occupation of the Palestinian lands. Hamas claimed that the agreement was ‘humiliating’ for the Palestinians and declared that it would work with “loyal and honest people of the
Islamic nation"\textsuperscript{577} and the national and Islamic factions that rejected this agreement, to detect the extent of “the collapse and surrender"\textsuperscript{578} that were conceded by the PLO.

Hamas reaffirms the absolute rejection of this agreement, and considers it negligence and a humiliating surrender. Hence, Hamas along with the \textit{Mujahid} Palestinian people and most of the national and Islamic factions will remain faithful to the people and the cause! It is determined to continue the path of \textit{Jihad} and Liberation, and to endorse and consolidate the unity of our people to face this critical juncture, with our keen desire to avoid any form of fighting among the sons of the Palestinian people\textsuperscript{579}

The entire leaflet bears eleven points of harsh criticism of the PLO for its acceptance of this agreement which resulted in establish an “authority without any sovereignty”, and confirms that what happened represents “great and dangerous misfortunes”.\textsuperscript{580} However, Hamas stresses that this “fateful agreement” is the end of one stage, not the end of the Palestinian issue, as it is not the end of “the Palestinian people’s \textit{jihad} against the Israeli occupation”\textsuperscript{581}.

\textbf{Ideologically}, Hamas explains its rejection by the fact that the Palestine issue is the cause of all Muslims not only the issue of the Palestinians. Hamas also believes that the conflict is between “the rights of Arabs and Muslims” and “the Zionist Jews”, as Palestine is ‘waqf’ belonged to all Muslims.\textsuperscript{582} To enhance its attitude, Hamas invokes the fatwa [the advisory opinion] of some Muslim scholars who have agreed on the inadmissibility of the Oslo accords, and calls for the obligatory \textit{jihad} to liberate Palestine.\textsuperscript{583} This discourse will be discussed in the forthcoming sections. A number of Islamic Fataws are connected to the main issue of the Israeli Palestinian conflict, such as the sovereignty over Jerusalem, the right of refugees’ issue, and settlements.

\textsuperscript{577} Hamas’s leaflet: ‘We renew our rejection of the Cairo agreement as we promise to continue our jihad’, 15/05/1994.\textsuperscript{578}  
\textsuperscript{579} Ibid. \textsuperscript{578}  
\textsuperscript{580} Ibid.\textsuperscript{578}  
\textsuperscript{581} Ibid.\textsuperscript{578}  
\textsuperscript{582} Hamas’s leaflet number 94, January 1994.\textsuperscript{583}  
\textsuperscript{583} The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and the Holy Lands, Sheikh Ekrima Sabri, with other Muslim scholars issued Fatwa states that Jihad is the only way to liberate Palestine, and the recognition of the right of the Jews to exist on the land of Palestine is forbidden in Islam. For more about this statement and other fatwas, look at Sabri’s website: \url{http://ekrimasabri.net}, (accessed in 20/5/2011).
Politically, Hamas refers the rejection of the accord to a number of reasons. First: the agreement gave Israel the political legitimacy to exist on the ‘historical Palestine’, while there is no reference in the agreement to the Palestinians’ right to self-determination, or to establish an independent state and it does not refer to the Gaza Strip and the West bank as occupied territories which reinforces the opinion that they are disputed territories.\(^5\) Second: Hamas claims that the PLO was not authorised by the Palestinian people to conduct such a momentous agreement on behalf of the Palestinians. The PLO has ignored a massive layer of the Palestinians when it negotiated with Israel, including the Islamists and the leftists. Also, this situation led to a severe division amongst the Palestinian people in that the PLO leadership with Fatah adopted this approach, while ten Palestinian factions stood against the agreement and pledged to overthrow it.\(^6\) Third: the accords did not provide solutions to the critical issues such as Jerusalem, refugees and settlements, and postponed them to the final stage of the negotiations. Meanwhile the PLO has pledged not to use violence against Israel. For Hamas, this means that the PLO renounced the armed resistance which Hamas considered as one of the most important elements of the Palestinian power.\(^7\) Fourth: many of the terms of the Oslo agreement are unclear. This has given an opportunity to Israel to procrastinate, and impose conditions on the weak counterpart (the Palestinians).\(^8\)

The impact of Oslo agreement on Hamas Media

Undoubtedly, the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the PLO has strategically influenced Hamas. Hamas found itself facing real danger in the absence of Arab and international recognition of its legitimacy, and in the light of unprecedented international support for the establishment of a Palestinian entity in the occupied territories under the leadership of the PLO. The declared aim of Hamas was to overthrow the Oslo agreement and its consequences. Thus Hamas sought to enhance its presence on the ground and present its political alternative to the Palestinians by increasing its civil and military resistance activities. In November 1994 Hamas called for a popular march at the ‘Palestine Mosque’, one of the biggest mosques in the Gaza


\(^{6}\) Ibid.

\(^{7}\) Ibid, also, look at the text of ‘Declaration of Principles’, op., cit.

\(^{8}\) Document: “the attitude of the Islamic resistance movement (Hamas) on the Oslo agreement after five years, 17/8/1998”, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, op., cit.
Strip, but the Palestinian police surrounded this demonstration and violently suppressed it, which led to the deaths of 17 protesters and dozens wounded.\textsuperscript{588} Hamas called this event ‘the Palestine Mosque massacre’ and this was the first direct confrontation between Hamas and the Palestinian authority after the Oslo agreement. Meanwhile, Hamas launched a series of suicide bombings inside Israeli cities, as well as targeting the Israeli soldiers and settlers by organised military operations in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank as a response to the Israeli assassination of the Hamas military leader Yahiya Ayash, ‘the engineer,’ by using an explosive device planted in his mobile phone.\textsuperscript{589} This reinforced the impression by the leadership of the Palestinian Authority that Hamas wanted to sabotage the Oslo Agreement. As a result of these operations, ‘the Conference of Peacemakers’ held in Sharm el-Sheikh in March 1996, with the participation of 27 countries, including Arab and Muslim countries decided to root out “resistance forces” under the title of “counter-terrorism”.\textsuperscript{590} Therefore, the Palestinian authority restricted the Hamas activities, and launched an extensive campaign to deconstruct and demilitarise the Hamas organisation, especially the military apparatus which is called \textit{Ezziddine Elqassam} brigades. The Palestinian Authority campaign against Hamas has amounted to its largest extent; that Hamas members appeared before military courts in the Gaza strip and the West Bank. The security forces of the Palestinian National authority led by Yasser Arafat committed widespread human rights abuses against Hamas members.\textsuperscript{591} Hamas felt the danger of liquidation, as it was described as a ‘terrorist organization’ by Israel and most Western countries, as well as the Palestinian Authority. This prompted Hamas to change its policy in dealing with the Palestinian Authority.

The Oslo period required preparation and strategic thinking by Hamas, given the sensitivity and seriousness. The recognition by the PLO of Israel represents a national disaster, and a major setback in the Palestinian history. So it was necessary to change the Hamas methods in dealing with the stage of the Oslo. The core of the new approach is to focus on the political and communal realms to bring down the Oslo agreement and its aftermath. The establishment of the National


\textsuperscript{589} Perry, Dan, and Ironside, Alfred: \textit{Israel and the quest for permanence}, (McFarland, 1999), p. 99.

\textsuperscript{590} Holtmann, Philipp: \textit{Martyrdom, Not Suicide: The Legality of Hamas' Bombings in the Mid-1990s in Modern Islamic Jurisprudence}, (GRIN Verlag, 2009), p. 18.

Islamic Salvation Party (*Hizb al-khalas Alwatani Al-Islami*) represented one of the biggest features of the new strategy.\(^{592}\)

In its attempts to circumvent the Palestinian Authority restrictions against Hamas as a secret movement, Hamas created this political party (the National Islamic Salvation Party) to deal with the new reality which required other means and objectives of resistance. Alashqar makes the assertion as: “resisting Oslo through the political and media means”.\(^ {593}\) This party, which was licensed by the Palestinian Authority, represented Hamas indirectly to practice its “resistance” within the space given by the Palestinian Authority. The Hamas leadership instructed the party as well as its members and cadres to intensify its media and political work among the Palestinian masses to show the illegitimacy of the Oslo agreement and expose its illegality, as it is not even in line with United Nations resolutions 242 for the withdrawal to the lines of June 1967. At the same time, Hamas promoted its attitude which highlights the legitimacy of the *Jihad* and resistance as an alternative to this process. Hence, Hamas boycotted the Palestinian Authority and refused to participate in its institutions although Yasser Arafat offered Hamas the chance to participate in the government as part of his ‘containment policy’.\(^ {594}\) Hamas also boycotted the first Palestinian election which has been one of Oslo agreement outcomes. Hamas issued a memorandum emphasising the illegitimacy of this election since it was one of the results of Oslo agreement and excluded two-thirds of the Palestinians. The leaflet states: “We renew our rejection of the Oslo Accord and all of its costs and we emphasis our adherence to the programme of resistance against the occupation until we expel them from our land, no matter what the cost and whatever sacrifices”.\(^ {595}\)

**Hamas media after Oslo: expanding the media infrastructure**

The crackdowns that were directed to Hamas by the security forces of the Palestinian Authority led to the breaking apart of the structure of Hamas apparatuses including the *jihaz* [media apparatus]. The Palestinian Authority seized all the equipment and supplies

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\(^{592}\) Author’s interview with Ismail AlAshqar, op., cit.

\(^{593}\) Ibid.


related to the *jihaz* such as the printers, photocopiers, and the presses.\textsuperscript{596} In spite of that, some of Hamas’s secret cells kept up their activities like distributing leaflets and posters till late 1994.\textsuperscript{597} Taking into consideration these conditions, Hamas had to think about an alternative way to run its media in the new context of the political opposition as Ghazi Hamad argues. He states: “We believe that media influence is a tool of the political opposition, and any organization that does not have the media tools will be weak in delivering its message to the public”. \textsuperscript{598} Hence, Hamas sought to establish a radio and television station after establishing the PNA, but all attempts failed due to the restrictions imposed by the PNA against its opposition in general and against Hamas in particular. The PNA have had ‘media and publication laws’ which requires any radio, television or newspaper to get a licence. For Hamas described the PNA as authoritarian, repressive and non-democratic, especially in dealing with the media, Ghazi Hamad claims. Against all these odds Hamas built its own media institutions using the available margins. It is worth mentioning that the mosques in the Palestinian Territories were ‘nationalised’ by the *Waqf* and religious affairs ministry. This led to the banning of Hamas from utilising the mosques which were historically considered important platforms for recruitment and mobilisation.

**A) Alwatan Newspaper**

The Palestinian Authority refused to grant Hamas a licence to issue a newspaper in its name because of the severe tensions that prevailed between them during that period. However, Hamas managed to get a licence to issue an ‘independent’ newspaper with the help of one of the ex-Hamas leaders who utilised his personal relationship with the leaders of the Palestinian Authority. Salah Bardawil states that Hamas had to get the license for Alwatan newspaper by Imad Alfalouji who had personal relationships with Tayeb Abdel Rahim (the general secretary of the presidential office), and General Nasser Youssef (the commander of the National Security Forces).\textsuperscript{599} Alfalouji took the advantage of this newspaper as it has been running a number of young people ‘close to Hamas’ of this newspaper and began to work.\textsuperscript{600}

\textsuperscript{596} Author’s interview with Sayyid Abu Musamih, op., cit.
\textsuperscript{597} Author’s interview with Ghazi Hamad, op., cit.
\textsuperscript{598} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{599} Author’s interview with Salah Albardawil, op., cit.
\textsuperscript{600} Ibid.
**Alwatan** which means ‘homeland’ was the first newspaper which represented Hamas, despite the fact that the newspaper was declared as being ‘independent’. Even so, this newspaper faced a great deal of challenges although it adopted a ‘moderate discourse’ with regard to the Palestinian Authority, and it attacked the occupation. Ghazi Hamad the editor in chief stated: “worked under difficult conditions because of the follow-up security and security controls and closures continued. Therefore, this newspaper did not last much. Sayyid Abu Musamih, the director of Alwatan has been punished and tortured several times and the rest of the employees have been subjected to harassment and prosecutions”.

Sayyid Abu Musamih himself explained that he has been jailed for being an editor of this newspaper. He was accused of publishing “incitement articles”. Nonetheless, the newspaper played a major role in defence of the positions of Hamas and its ‘resistance project’ against the PNA policies, as well as highlighting a great deal of social and economic issues. Alwatan was the first newspaper to represent Hamas but it was opposed by the PNA and finally shut down.

**B) Alrisala newspaper: representativeness by proxy**

The Hamas leadership has always sought to have a media platform even if it is not directly under the Hamas’s name. After the closure of Alwatan, Hamas attempted to get a license for a different newspaper, but the Palestinian Authority has never granted Hamas a license to create any media institution as it does not recognise Hamas as a legitimate political party. However, the Salvation Party managed to get a license to establish Alrisala newspaper. The first issue of Alrisala was issued in February 1997, when Yahya Moussa, Secretary General of the Salvation Party, delegated Ghazi Hamad to be the editor in chief of the newspaper. Ghazi Hamad explains: “It was not easy to establish a newspaper in the light of the political conditions that prevailed during that time, because of security fears, and with very modest financial capabilities. However, we started processing the newspaper as we brought a crew of professional journalists”. “Alrisala came to continue the Alwatan newspaper march”, Hamad states.

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601 Author’s interview with Ghazi Hamad, op., cit.
602 Author’s interview with Sayyid Abu Musamih, op., cit.
603 Author’s interview with Ghazi Hamad, op., cit.
604 Ibid.
605 Author’s interview with Nashat Abu Amira, op., cit.
606 Author’s interview with Ghazi Hamad, op., cit.
clear since most of the journalists and the administrators of Alwatan moved to run Alrisala, such as Ghazi Hamad, Saiyd Abu Musamih and Salah Albardawil.

Alrisala newspaper clearly adopted the political attitudes of Hamas as Rami Khurais argues. He states: “The Salvation Party and its newspaper were totally following the leadership of Hamas, and it was no longer a secret that Hamas and its cadres have formed the Salvation Party which is recognised by The Palestinian Authority as a political party”.  

That is true; the manifesto defines the Salvation Party as “a party that emerged from the womb of Hamas and the Muslim brotherhood”. Also, the political platform of the Party shows that it has very similar political and ideological attitudes to Hamas. For instance, the party believes in the right of the Palestinians to achieve the “liberation of Palestine and to reclaim their rights”, as it “refuses categorically to give legitimacy to the occupation in any form.” The Party believes that the Palestinian people have the right to use “any legitimate means” to end the occupation, as it believes that “the desire and the will of people to employ any means they choose to liberate the lands should be respected.” Therefore, the key motivation for the establishment of this newspaper is to “Speak on behalf of the Islamic project and not on behalf of the party”, Ismail Alashqar emphasises. In other word, Alrisala was the voice of the Hamas, during the absence of Hamas as an organisation after the PNA and Israeli crackdowns. Abu Amira asserts that Alrisala was the only media outlet to represent Hamas between 1997 and 2000 (the outbreak of the second intifada). Hence, Alkhalas party and his newspaper represent, more or less, the other face of Hamas; and Alrisala’s coverage was within this principle.

607 Author’s interview with Rami Khurais, op., cit.
610 Ibid.
611 Ibid.
612 Author’s interview with Ismail Alashqar, op., cit.
613 Author’s interview with Nasha’t Abu Amira, op., cit.
The Palestinian Information Centre: Hamas’s voice to the world

The Palestinian Information Centre (PIC) describes itself as “an independent Palestinian organization”. However, Yehudit Barsky calls it the “the official Arabic Internet site of Hamas”, while Lori A. Allen considers it as “the unofficial Hamas website”. Badriddine Mohammed, the correspondent of the PIC in Gaza refuses to identify it as “a Hamas website”, but he stresses that the website completely adopts the “project of resistance”. This is clear from the PIC statement on its website; it asserts that the Palestinian Information Centre is a media website that specializes in ‘one of the most serious issues of conflict in our nation's history’ and deals with its political, religious and cultural dimensions. The statement adds, “The PIC has the honour to be the mouthpiece of the resistance and jihad and of those people who love to pray at Alaqsa Mosque”. The PIC was established in December 1997 to “promote awareness about Palestine, the Palestinians and the Palestinian issue and to balance the often distorted picture presented in the mainstream media”. The PIC broadcasts from Syria and Lebanon in eight languages: Arabic, English, French, Turkish, Urdu, Russian, Persian and Bahasa (the Indonesian language). The PIC declares a set of principles under the title of “Policies and principles”; the highest of these principles is that the PIC is “biased towards the right of the Palestinian people and the Arab and Islamic nation in Palestine, which is Palestine from the sea to the river, and stands with the Palestinian people and their legitimate Jihad and resistance to respond to the campaigns of Israel and its ‘auxiliaries’ which aim at the falsification of the will of the Palestinian people”. The PIC is characterised by its comprehensiveness in addressing the Palestinian issue, including the history, geography, politics, economy, heritage, culture and literature. The website is also committed to the principles and morals and ethics of Islam in dealing

617 Author’s interview with, Badriddine Mohammed , op., cit.
619 Ibid.
620 The Palestinian Information Centre (PIC) English website, op., cit.
621 The Palestinian Information Centre (PIC) Arabic website, op., cit.
with and addressing the issues.\footnote{There is no doubt that the PIC played a significant role in covering the Hamas attitudes after Oslo agreement, it was one of two media outlets of Hamas (besides Alrisala). Yassir Ali, the Hamas senior in Lebanon – from where the PIC broadcast -- believes that the PIC was one of the most important news resources about Hamas for the journalists and the news agencies, especially in the light of the severe conditions facing the Hamas leadership inside Palestine. He asserts that the existence of the PIC outside Palestine gave it a good margin of freedom so that the “censorship scissors of the PNA” could not control this media outlet.\footnote{“Voice of Palestine to the world” is the slogan of the PIC, but actually, as it is clear from the “policies and principles” of the website, it represents Hamas’ voice to the world; all of the principles of the PIC are in line with Hamas’ political and ideological orientations.}

The Hamas media message during PNA rule

This section will look at the media message during the PNA rule in the Gaza strip and the west bank. Three major titles can be found in Alrisala discourse; resistance, anti-Oslo accords discourse and the ‘local opposition’ discourse. On the one hand Alrisala promoted Hamas’s opposition to the Oslo agreement; on the other hand it endorsed Hamas’s position in dealing with the Israeli occupation. This is what the current deputy Editor in Chief of Alrisala Rami Khurais calls “a combination between the discourse of resistance and the discourse of the political opposition”\footnote{However, Salah Albardawil, the ex-director of Alrisala claims that Israel considered this newspaper “Hamas-affiliated” and “The Israelis were always asking ‘the authority of Oslo’ to close the newspaper, or put out its voice”.\footnote{Scholars in the Arab\footnote{And Palestinian media\footnote{also describe Alrisala...} also describe Alrisala...}...}}. At some points Alarisala became called “an opposition newspaper\footnote{At some points Alarisala became called “an opposition newspaper...}. However, Salah Albardawil, the ex-director of Alrisala claims that Israel considered this newspaper “Hamas-affiliated” and “The Israelis were always asking ‘the authority of Oslo’ to close the newspaper, or put out its voice”\footnote{Scholars in the Arab...\footnote{and Palestinian media...} also describe Alrisala...}.

\footnote{The topics and items are covered by the PIC:1- Palestine Today (News straight from the heart of the event). 2- Palestine History. 3- Jerusalem and Alaqsa mosque. 4- The Zionist terrorism. 5- The Human rights and freedoms. 6- The Palestinian folklore. 7- Saberoun [Patient]: it follows up and documents the conditions and news of Palestinian prisoners in Israel. 8- Literature and Culture. 9- Embargo and normalization. 10- The affairs of the ‘Zionist entity’. 11- Books and Publications. 12- Video Library. 13- Audio Library. 14- Photos, maps and paintings. 15 – Fatwas [Legal opinions]. 16- News and activities of Hamas. Addressing these topics indicate the wide scale of the coverage of aspects of the Palestinian issue. Look at the Arabic website of the PIC: http://www.palestine-info.info/ar/default.asp.\footnote{Author interview with Yasser Ali, The Hamas senior in Lebanon, 01/10/2010.\footnote{Author interview with Rami Khurais, op., cit.\footnote{Nossek, Hillel. And Rinnawi, Khalil.: Censorship and freedom of the press under changing political regimes: Palestinian Media from Israeli Occupation to the Palestinian Authority, international communications Gazette, 65/2 (2003), p. 183.\footnote{Author’s interview with, Salah Albbrdawil, op., cit.\footnote{Rugh, William A.: Arab mass media: newspapers, radio, and television in Arab politics, op., cit., p75}}}}
as one of the Hamas media outlets. The following discussion is an attempt to examine the titles that Khurais and Albardawil have mentioned: resistance, anti-Oslo agreement discourse, and the ‘political opposition’ discourse.

A) Resistance in Alrisala coverage:

To promote the notion of resistance that is adopted by Hamas, the newspaper focussed on the “jihad and resistance discourse”629. Alashqar argues that Alrisala was undertaken in defence of a very big project which is the project of resistance. He adds that “our newspaper promoted the ideology of resistance and the resistance operations and in all its forms, whether military or otherwise, as well as the glorification of the leaders, ‘martyrs’ and ‘detainees’ who have sacrificed themselves for the sake of the Palestinian issue.”630 He insists that Alrisala was created to be the “National, Islamic and resistant media”. 631 Here are some news stories, reports and interviews shown in Alrisala:

i. A special reportage was published about the military leader of Hamas on the second anniversary of his death, under the title: “Yahya Ayyash .... Legend and the remaining epic over time: a special report on the second anniversary of his martyrdom”. 632 For Hamas, the focus on this symbolic leader, who was nicknamed Almohandis [the engineer] referring to his ‘proficiency’ in making the bombs, meant that Alrisala glorified this leader and the way that he was approached.

ii. Another news report by Alrisala highlighted the statement of the jailed military leader Hassan Salama, under the title “Hasan Salama from his prison: Jihad is legitimate as long as the occupation exists.”633 The report shows Salama’s steadfastness and insistence on the idea of jihad and resistance. Although he was sentenced for hundreds of years. This relates to Alashqar’s argument of the glorification of the leaders who have sacrificed

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629 Author’s interview with, Nashat Abu Amira, op., cit.
630 Author’s interview with, Ismail Alashqar, op., cit.
631 Ibid.
their lives for the Palestinian cause, which ultimately amounts to the service of what Abuamira calls “the discourse of jihad and resistance”.

iii. In this context, Alrisala sought to demonstrate that Hamas was a coherent unified and strong ‘resistance organisation’ despite the crackdowns by the Israeli and the PNA; as the following title of Alrisala report shows: “the arrest of Hamas’s military cell in Hebron does not mean a harsh blow”.634

iv. After the failure of the Israeli intelligence ‘Mossad’ in the assassination attempt of Khalid Meshaal in Amman, Alrisala reported: “Ariel Sharon threatens to repeat the attempt, Hamas: threats will not deter us from the path of Jihad”,635 and “Rantisi: Hamas is one and unified despite the predators and their lies.”636 This shows that despite the fact that Hamas and its leaders were being targeted, Hamas challenged the Israeli Prime Minister Sharon’s insistence on killing the Hamas leaders by increasing their adherence to the option of ‘jihad and resistance’.

The frantic campaigns which were launched by the Palestinian Authority against Hamas, especially its military wing represented a major challenge to the idea of resistance. These campaigns managed -- to a certain extent -- to stop Hamas operations, in parallel with media campaigns by Palestinian television affiliated to the PNA and Fatah, which were intended to promote the idea that these armed groups were working “to serve foreign agendas” and aiming to “bring down the dream of Palestine” (Palestinian state).637 While Yassir Arafat and his media institutions638 were engaged in promoting the project of the peaceful settlement, as he believed that the peaceful means were most successful to reclaim the Palestinian rights”, Hamas’s project of resistance declined, Afifa argues. He states: “this was a big motivation for Hamas to promote the notion of resistance in that period in particular”.639 He stresses the fact that one of Alrisala’s objectives was to deepen the awareness of the jihad and to promote the

638 In the wake of founding the PNA, Yasser Arafat devoted huge efforts and money to establish the official media of the Palestinian Authority. He managed to establish the Palestinian TV and Radio Agency which includes: Palestine TV, Palestine. Also, He established the official newspaper Al-hayat aljadidah.
639 Author’s interview with Wisam Afifa, op., cit.
culture of resistance. The following points show the titles of some Alrisala reports which illustrate the arguments of Afifa:

i. The Israeli occupation committed a horrific massacre which caused three men to be killed. ... Anger and mourning ... and the bloody confrontations dominate the city of Hebron. Hamas: The incident marked a new phase of the second uprising of our people.  

ii. A comprehensive interview was conducted with Sheikh Ahmed Yassin: “If the PNA cannot remove the occupation, then it is our right to resist”. “The PNA must not consider us as enemies; it considers itself as everything and does not care about the opposition”. 

iii. Alrisala interview with Dr Ibrahim Almqadma: Resistance to settlements means resistance to the idea of the Jewish presence in Palestine.

The focus on the main leaders of Hamas, at that time, had an important indication, since these leaders were considered, as “symbols of resistance” by Hamas members and were supported and Alrisala intended to bring to light these figures as part of its promotion of the idea of resistance. This demonstrates the argument of Afifa that Alrisala was “the sole media outlet which represented the resistance project.”

**B) Anti-Oslo discourse**

Historically, the relationship between Hamas and Fatah is characterized by continuing tensions, since they represent the two major factions in the Palestinian territories with two different political projects. The tension increased after the Oslo agreement since all the outcomes of Oslo agreement contradicted the ideological/political orientations of Hamas. The newspaper focussed on the political orientations of the Palestinian Authority, showing what Fathi Hammad calls: “the danger of the Oslo agreement and its consequences for the Palestinian people”. Hence, Alrisala intended to highlight the

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643 Author’s interview with Wisam Afifa, op., cit.
644 Author’s interview with Fathi Hammad, op., cit.
disadvantages of those agreements. For instance, Alrisala has constantly shown that the peace agreements ignored all the core issues of the Palestinian people like the refugees, Jerusalem, settlements in Gaza and the West Bank, water issues, and prisoners. It also focused on the Israeli violations of the Oslo agreement and the weakness of the PNA and its reaction in dealing with these violations. The following examples illustrate how Alrisala dealt with these issues:

i. The Israeli settlement

Alrisala covered intensively the events following the launch of the construction of the ‘Har Homa’ settlement or Jabal Abu Ghunaim as the Palestinians call it. This was clear from Alrisala’s special coverage on the 6th of March 1997 of this issue. It was written under a big title: “The Palestinian people are waiting for a critical resolution of the confrontation about the project of settlement (Har Homa)” 645. Under the same title Alrisala wondered: “Does the PNA have any plan to ignite a popular confrontation at this time?” 646 This question by Alrisala indicated that the PNA was the weak part of the Palestinian- Israeli equation and could not take a decision to confront the Israeli measures due to the Oslo commitments. While Alrisala called for Marches of Millions as a first step to face up to the “Zionist project of settlement,” 647 at the same time Alrisala showed a harsh criticism by one of Fatah members of the PNA leadership for their “silence” towards the settlements, showing that the Palestinian MP Kamal Shrafi called on the Palestinian leadership to leave Gaza and Ramallah and go abroad to avoid the Israeli pressure. The quote is, “MP Shrafi: the Palestinian leadership should leave Palestine to avoid pressure”. On top of this, Alrisala highlighted Bill Clinton’s statement that the US could not put any pressure on Israeli to stop the project. 648 A month after this coverage, Alrisala addressed a poll result which showed that most of the Palestinian People thought that the PNA was responsible for the failure to halt the settlement in Jabal Abu Ghoneim. Alrisala quotes: “In a recent poll, the PNA is responsible for the failure of efforts to stop the settlement in Jabal Abu Ghoneim. The majority of the Palestinian people against the continuation of the peace process” 649 This

646 Ibid.
647 Ibid.
648 Ibid.
is a particular example. However, Alrisala constantly used to focus on this issue and its impact on the Palestinian people, and the following are some examples:

➤ “Huge financial donations to activate the settlement in the west Bank; ‘Settlement’ street swallows up 4500 dunums (4500000 MS) of Hebron, and Attiyrat Cohanim is preparing to acquire 38 houses in the old town” 650

➤ The Palestinian Academic, Abdelsattar Qassim who was close to Hamas, wrote: “the peace of settlements” 651, criticising harshly the attitude of the PNA and its leader Yasser Arafat for their “failure to prevent Israel or to stop settlement building” 652.

➤ Ghazi Hamad, the editor in chief of Alrisala, wrote “bulldozers of the negotiations” 653. Through this metaphor Hamad sarcastically criticized the Palestinian Authority for the negotiation with Israeli which failed to stop the Israeli bulldozers and the settlement construction.

➤ Alrisala highlighted the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s statement “The West Bank is an integral part of Israel”. 654 In the details of this report Alrisala interpreted Netanyahu’s statement that Israel will not withdraw from any of the major settlement blocs in the West Bank or “Judea and Samaria” since it is part of Israeli lands. In this context Alrisala zoomed in on the Israeli infrastructure projects in the West Bank such as the bypass roads and tunnels which are connected to the settlements. For example, a report in Alrisala deals with these projects, with under the title “Goals of the Israeli bypass roads: Roads surrounding the West Bank and others dividing it” 655. The report explains the consequences of these bypass roads for the Palestinian cities and villages and how this influenced the Palestinian people’s life.

653 Alrisala newspaper, Vol. 19, 19/6/ 1997, p. 3.
ii. Jerusalem

Alrisala also focused on the Israeli actions in east Jerusalem; especially those actions related to the Palestinians of east Jerusalem who have Israeli citizenship, and the Israeli projects in the Alaqsa Mosque which is called by the Israelis “The Temple Mount”. One of these issues is the Israeli property tax “Arnona” which is levied on the Palestinians of East Jerusalem by the Israeli Authorities. Alrisala wrote: “the Israeli Arnona raid dozens of shops in East Jerusalem. Traders closed their shops and others are looking for extra work!” In this report Alrisala shows that imposing the ‘Arnona’ comes in the context of the Israeli attempts to crack down on the Palestinians of Jerusalem in order to force them to leave the holy city. Alashqar claims that the focus on this area is to expose the “Israeli policy of ethnic cleansing” in Jerusalem. Alrisala’s report gives details about how the municipality of Jerusalem collects the tax equally regardless of location; that is the tax is imposed on the wealthy neighbourhoods in West Jerusalem, such as "Rehavia" at the same tariff imposed on the poor Arab neighbourhoods in Jerusalem's Old City. The closure of the Palestinian institutions in east Jerusalem was also a matter covered by Alrisala. A special report was published in the wake of the closing by the Israeli authorities in Jerusalem of the Orient House which has been created by the PLO. This illustrates that Alrisala’s purpose was to show the inability of the Palestinian Authority to defend the holy city as a result of the Oslo agreement, which did not give great importance to Jerusalem.

iii. The arrests of Palestinians

Article 20 of the Gaza-Jericho protocol provided for the release of thousands of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons in three stages, ending with the closure of the entire file in the final stage of negotiations. However, the statistics of the Israeli Information Centre for Human Right (B’Tselem) show that Israel has arrested thousands of the Palestinians after the Oslo agreement. This is what

657 Author’s interview with Ismail Alashqar , op., cit.
Alrisala sought to focus on, for the purpose of showing the failure of the Palestinian Authority to achieve one of the aspirations of the Palestinian people in terms of the detainees and prisoners. The following selected examples illustrate this:

- A special report on the detainees and prisoners entitled: “Half a million Palestinians detained in Israel since 1967; the Oslo agreement did not prevent the arrest by the Occupation of 10 thousand Palestinians.”\(^{661}\) The report sheds light on the Palestinian detainees and prisoners issue supporting that by figures and statistics, specially concerning the post Oslo agreement period.

- On several different occasions Alrisala covered particular cases of arrests of Palestinians in the West Bank.

\section*{iv. Security collaborations}

*Tanseeq Amni* [security collaboration] between the PNA and Israel was the most severely painful issue for Hamas.\(^{662}\) Ghazi Hamad argues that the security collaboration with Israel made the PNA into a guard for the Israeli settlers and the Israeli borders instead of its role to protect the Palestinian people. He condemned the PNA role in terms of its involvement in this issue saying: “It is the PNA’s job and it cannot give up its job; the PNA and its security apparatuses have been brought to serve the occupation, to protect the settlements and to arrest and kill the resistance fighters, these terms have been upon as part of the Oslo agreement”.\(^{663}\) Several stories on the security collaboration have been covered by Alrisala:

- The assassination of the military leader Mohiuddin Al-sharif in March 1998 was one of the most debated stories on the security collaboration, since Hamas strictly insisted that the PNA had a particular role in the assassination operation, while the PNA emphasised that the Israeli occupation killed Al-sharif without any PNA role. Alrisala wrote a report under the title “the Martyrdom of the Mujahid Mohiuddin Alsharif, a Palestinian security source: Israel told us that they have no responsibility for the assassination and the


\(^{662}\) Author’s interview with Ghazi Hamad, op., cit.

\(^{663}\) Ibid.
investigation is still on-going. Medical report: three bullets were fired at him before the blast. Hamas: the Zionist enemy is behind the assassination and our response will be strong.\textsuperscript{664} Alrisala showed the view of Hamas that Israel was the concerned party in the assassination of Al-sharif, but the PNA was engaged in a particular role. In the same report Alrisala highlighted the fact that Ribhi Al-sharif, the father of Mohiuddin Al-sharif, confirmed that the Israeli intelligence had confirmed the death of his son by Palestinian security forces;\textsuperscript{665} which means the report of Alrisala had questioned the story of the Palestinian Authority about the incident.

- Alrisala focused on the story of the military leader Emad Awadallah who was arrested by the PNA security apparatus, and later on, disappeared for a period and was then assassinated by the Israelis. Alrisala made an observation of Awadallah’s story in a full report on him. The report is entitled: “Awadallah suffers from severe pain and he has lost 23 kg. Hamas cast doubt on the PNA story of the escape of Imad Awadallah from detention. Jamal Mansour: Awadallah has been forgotten behind bars for one year. Sheikh Yassin: Who can guarantee that this is not an attempt to get rid of him?.”\textsuperscript{666} This report question the PNA narrative and indirectly accuses it in killing Awwadallah.

- With mounting criticism of the PNA, the leaders of the PNA, especially the security institution leaders, become stuck in a defensive position. Alrisala deliberately showed defensive statements by the PNA leaders. For instance, Alrisala highlighted the statement of the commander of the ‘preventive security apparatus’, Jebril Rajoib “Rajoub: We do not protect the Israelis and the settlers”.\textsuperscript{667} Meanwhile, it showed the pressure that Israel exerted on the PNA to crackdown on Hamas. Alrisala wrote: “within its effort to destroy the Palestinian national unity: Israel requires an attack on Hamas for the resumption of the negotiations”.\textsuperscript{668}

\textsuperscript{665} Ibid.
C) Political Opposition Discourse

As Hamas represented the main political organisation in opposition to the PNA, it has dedicated a certain amount of its media coverage to the local issues which were categorised as ‘public issues’ or ‘everyday concerns’. These issues include social and economic issues such as poverty, unemployment, education and child labour, and political issues like: government corruption, human right and media freedoms, and the clash of authorities. Alongside the resistance discourse and the anti-Oslo discourse, Alrisala focused on these issues. Ghazi Hamad justifies the Alrisala policy which tried to achieve balance between the issue of resistance with the occupation and the question of reform of the internal situation. Hamad states that Alrisala was very bold in dealing with internal issues like corruption and human rights violations, as well as covering issues which have influence with the Palestinian ground. He adds that some of those issues were very sensitive and dangerous, for example, the issue of ‘deaths under torture’ that occurred within the jails of the Palestinian authority; Alrisala published the details and documentation of the centres for human rights regarding specific cases. However, the most infuriating matter for the Palestinian Authority was the criticism of the president Yasser Arafat or the security apparatuses leaders for their corruption. Hence, the newspaper was closed two times by the ‘security apparatuses’, in addition to sacking and assaulting many of its journalists and the members of the board of directors of the newspaper.  

Here are some examples of the main issues of the people’s everyday concerns which were covered by Alrisala:

1- Economy and poverty:

- “Half a million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are living at poverty level!!”
- “Alrisala opens the file of the Banks and their investments in the PNA territories. 73% of the of bank deposits are held abroad”

669 Author’s interview with Ghazi Hamad, op., cit.
not real investments here because the required guarantees are many and complex”

2-child labour

➢ “The children of Palestine ... A loud scream to the national conscience The children of Palestine: psychological pressure and lost childhood…. 90% of Palestinian children suffer from psychological problems”

➢ “Child labour... a disgrace to society!!! More than 18 thousand children leave school and go to the work in the West Bank and Gaza!!! They work in car workshops, construction, plumbing... 22% of children worked before the closure and the figure has gone up to 44% during the closure.”

3- Education

➢ “Demand to sack the Minister and his Deputy … teachers start open strike after a decision to fire 19 teachers from work and refer them to the disciplinary board.”

➢ “Student overcrowding in classrooms! Till when?”

4- Corruption in the PNA

➢ “MPs call for no confidence in government: Palestinian Authority is still dragging its feet in approving the budget”

➢ “Khidr: How can some officials start their job whilst they are ‘beggars’ then become the owners of a villa?”

➢ “Some of the PNA Staff members are paid without work... and others are receiving more than one salary! The absence of accountability increases the incidence of these phenomena!”

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“Why does Palestinian television not broadcast the Legislative Council assemblies? The fear that the people may detect a sensitive issue by the broadcasting of the proceedings of the parliament!”

5- Legislative Council

“The Clash of the Two Authorities in Palestine: There is no true opposition in the Legislative authority. The legislative authority is not elected from the ranks of the opposition, however the clash with the executive authority is continuing.”

Battle in the halls of the Legislative Council on the Law of Personal Status.

Hamid Betawi: This Parliament is not competent to consider the legal issues...
Parliament: We have no intention of touching the Islamic law.
Betawi: I assure that what is happening now is a big campaign on the personal status law, which is derived from The Islamic law. Changing the law because of the pressure imposed by foreign powers (European, American or Israeli) who target our law of personal status.

6- Human rights

A weekly section titled “human rights and freedoms” focussed on the human rights violations committed by the PNA’s security apparatuses. One report uncovered the deaths in the PNA jails. The report said: “Deaths in Palestinian prisons… the forgotten files. 18 cases of deaths where there is no investigation and trials. Shami and Shallah: hunger strike in the day of the sixteenth”.

7- Suicide phenomena

“The spectre of suicide invades Palestinian society. Two cases of suicide and 14 attempts in the last month! Quta: the frustration and depression, family

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disintegration are the motives of suicide. The use of pills and pesticides!
Suicide attempt by the use of toxic agricultural pesticide

For Hamas, addressing such issues is a type of nonviolent resistance to an authority, which does not perform its duties to serve the people. When Alrisala newspaper question the government's role in solving social phenomena resulting from poverty and unemployment, such as child labour and suicides, it necessarily, says to the target audience that this authority is weak and unable to solve the problems of society. This is much like the struggle of social movements against governments, which include a focus on this kind of issues in the alternative media. Downing addresses many examples which share common characteristics in different countries and different contexts.

Part Two: The second Intifada Context

The failure of Oslo agreement and the outbreak of the second intifada

The second Palestinian intifada [hereafter, I will use the term Intifada II which means the second Palestinian Intifada] was launched in late September 2000. The main reason for the outbreak of the Intifada II was the visit of the Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon to Alaqsa Mosque [or the Temple Mount/Noble Sanctuary] under the protection of hundreds of Israeli Police. The Palestinian Muslims considered this visit as a provocation to the Muslim feelings in their own holy place. Consequently, the crowds of worshippers surrounded him as his guards tried to prevent him from wandering in the Mosque’s courtyard. However, some scholars refer to different reasons for the outbreak of the second Intifada: Jeremy Pressman argues that the deepening of the Israeli occupation during the Oslo years, in contrast with Palestinian expectations for peace, freedom and economic gains, “led to popular discontent”.685 In addition he claims that the harsh Israeli reactions to the Palestinian protests resulted in “a rapid escalation and high Palestinian casualties”.686 Also, the Intifada II came after the failure of the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations in Camp David, which was named ‘Camp David II’, and was one of cumulative reasons of this event.687 Some scholars, such as Edward Said688 and Khalil Shikaki,689 connect directly the “failure of Oslo” and the outbreak of the intifada. Likewise, Asad Abdul-Rahman and Nawaf al-Zour argue that the Intifada II produced a number of results and implications; for the Palestinian level, the Intifada II put an end to the Oslo accords that failed to end the occupation and bring a just solution to the Palestinians.690

The Alaqsa Intifada has recorded a new stage and a new discourse which will certainly have new characteristics. it will also be unique and build on the harvest of the first Palestinian Intifada 1987 1993, but on the qualitative level, more mature, solid and comprehensive. In addition, the comprehensiveness of the Intifada II was not only on a

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686 Ibid.
689 Shikaki, Khalil, Palestinians Divided, Foreign Affairs, 81/1 (01/01 2002), 89-105.
690 Abdul-Rahman, Asad and Al-Zour, Nawaf: Alintifadha alfelastiniya alkubrah al’thaniya [the second greater Palestinian intifada], (Maktabat alra’ay, 2001).
This Intifada II developed to very violent clashes between the Palestinians and the Israeli army resulting in thousands of dead and wounded, and this is what ignited the intifada II, which was called ‘Alaqsa Intifada’. The Intifada II was “largely overshadowed by the military resistance” and that is what explains the high number of casualties on the Israeli side. This means that the Intifada II was completely different from the first intifada, in terms of the reasons and motivations, political circumstances and the tools of resistance. In the Intifada II the Palestinians militant groups extensively targeted the Israeli settlers and soldiers, especially in the West Bank, and inside the Israeli cities, whereas the militants of Hamas in the Gaza strip managed to develop “handmade rockets” to target the Israeli districts on the borders of the Gaza Strip.

Expansion of the media infrastructure during the second Intifada

A new stage of Hamas media began with the outbreak of the second Intifada. The new context (the second Intifada) benefited Hamas in terms of recovering and reorganising itself after the Palestinian Authority crackdowns. The release of Hamas’ historical leaders Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas, and his deputy Ismail Abu Shanab was an important factor in the reorganisation of Hamas. In addition, Abdel-Azizi Alrantisi, an important figure in Hamas, who was released few months after Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, played the main role in reorganising Hamas. This period witnessed the creating of new media institutions and the development of the already existing ones. The most remarkable step in this regard was the establishment of the

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691 Ibid.
693 According the Israeli Information Centre for Human Right (B’Tselem), about 1000 Israeli (civilians and militants) were killed by Palestinian attacks during the Intifada II 2000-2005, while more than 2000 Palestinians (civilians and militants) were killed at the same period. Look at the B’Tselem statistics on: http://www.btselem.org/english/statistics/casualties.asp?sD=29&sM=09&sY=2000&eD=26&eM=12&eY =2008&filterby=event&oferet_stat=before (accessed in 10/04/2012).
694 Author’s interview with Ahmed Sa’ati, op., cit.
Alaqsa Voice Radio, which is considered a big shift in Hamas’s media, not only because it was the first Radio station for Hamas, but also because it was the nucleus of the existing media network of Hamas. Hamas also developed the existing media websites, such as the PIC, by adding new languages and new sections which were related to the Intifada. As the second Intifada was a military and civilian uprising, the military wing of Hamas created its own media institution under the name almaktab al’ilami likata’eb alqassam [media office of the Qassam brigades] which had website in three languages: Arabic, English and Turkish. The media office of Hamas worked in very strict secrecy due to the complicity of the military apparatus of Hamas and its relations with the political leadership of Hamas. This research does not deal with this area for reasons related to the personal security and safety of the researcher.

**Sawt Alaqsa Radio [Alaqsa voice]**

This radio was named *itha’at sawt Alaqsa* [Alaqsa voice Radio] and at some stage the name became *etha’at Alaqsa* [Alaqsa radio]. Alaqsa radio started broadcasting on 14th of June 2003 and launched its website (www.aqsavoice.ps) in 2004 and started to broadcast the radio programmes ‘online’ aiming to expand the range of its audience outside of Palestine, especially the Palestinians in the Diaspora. The website was hacked several times and the website administration claimed that Israel was responsible for these electronic attacks by unknown hackers.

The Hamas media institution evolved qualitatively with the launch of the ‘Alaqsa radio’ in the Gaza strip in 2003, then we began listening to different views from that the existing ones. We began listening to the Islamist Palestinian leaders expressing the real pulse of the Palestinian people. The Palestinian Authority monopolised the mass media, and the Palestinians used to receive one voice and one point of view. Hence, Hamas managed to de-monopolise the media in Palestine through establishing new media institutions against all odds.

Mahmoud Albaik, the ex-director of this radio describes it as the first “resistance radio on the land of Palestine”, as all of the Palestinian revolution radios broadcast from

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696 Author’s interview with Badreddine Mohammed, op., cit.
698 Ibid.
699 Author’s interview with Mohammed Thoriya, op., cit.
700 Author’s interview with Mahmoud Albaik, op., cit.
outside of Palestine. Albaik argues that the main reason for the creation of this radio was to carry the notion of resistance and to lay it in the right context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. He emphasises that the radio was named “Alaqsa” to give the ‘holy city’ issue more importance, especially in the light of naming the second intifada “Alaqsa Intifada”. Alaqsa Voice was described as a “radio which has an Islamic identity”\footnote{Alaqsa voice statute, electronic version, (Alaqsa media network, 2005).} and “interested in issues of the Palestinian people in particular and the issues of the Islamic Ummah in general”, as it covered all aspects of the Palestinian life including “religious, news, political, social, educational, and cultural aspects”.\footnote{Ibid.}

Fathi Hammad asserts that “creation of an Islamic Media was a necessity” in the light of the marked increase of the number of the mass media in the Palestinian territories, which mostly represented the PNA and its political agenda. Hammad adds “… and from here Hamas has established Alaqsa Voice radio after severe tension between the ‘Board of Directors of the radio’ and the ministry of information of the PNA”. The statute of Sawt Alaqsa radio shows that there were a set of objectives that Alaqsa voice radio sought to achieve.\footnote{Author’s interview with Fathi Hammad, op., cit.} At the head of these objectives is “delivering the true and honest media message to the Palestinian audience”,\footnote{Alaqsa voice statute, electronic version, (Alaqsa media network, 2005).} and spreading the political and intellectual awareness of the Palestinian issue amongst the Palestinians”.\footnote{Ibid.}

The media message and the second intifada

The daily events and developments of the Intifada were a top priority of Hamas media in general and Alaqsa Voice radio in particular. This section will look at the media message of Alaqsa during the Intifada, since it was the most important for Hamas and the Hamas media outlet which was most successful in reaching the Palestinian audience. In the early period of the radio, it used to broadcast an unplanned variety of “Islamic songs”, “religious Sermons and speeches” and hourly news briefings over the day-time. The planned programs of the Sawt Alaqsa started in January 2004.\footnote{Author’s interview with Ibrahim Zahir , op., cit.}
programming season 2004\textsuperscript{707} of Sawt Alaqa\textsuperscript{a} radio shows that the programs included various themes which can be summed up under the following themes:

**News programs:**

These programs include covering the news at the local level, in particular, and at the regional and international levels, in general. The radio allocated a brief news headlines every hour and three detailed news programs every day. The three programs were: *Hatha Alsabah* [this morning] *Montasaf Alyaum* [Mid-day news] and *Hasad Alyoum* [round-up of the day]. These programs included, besides the news and features, a look at the newspapers, currency rates, weather, and sports as well as interviews and in-depth reports.

**Palestinian Politics programs:**

These programs, which monitored the hot events in the Palestinian arena, shed light on these events from Hamas’s perspective. Usually, these programs invited experts and political analysts who adopted the political position of Hamas. The document shows that the list of guests that the radio invited to participate were, politically and ideologically, either very close to Hamas or counted as Hamas figures. For example, the list includes: Mustafa Bakri the editor in chief of Alaosbou’a weekly newspaper (Egypt)\textsuperscript{708}, Abdelsattar Qasim, an academic in Alnajah University in the West Bank, Nahidh Arraiys, the ex-Palestinian MP and the Ex Fatah leader, Jamil Almajdalawi, the leader of the PFPR, Ismail Haniya, the current Prime Minister of the Hamas-led Palestinian government, Saied Siyam, the previous Minister of Interior in Hamas’ government, Osama Hamdan, a member of the Hamas political leadership, and others. Three examples of these programs are: *Qadhiya wa tahlil* [matter and analyses] which selected a ‘hot issue’ and focussed on all aspects related to this issue. *Dharibat almuqawama* [the tax of resistance] is a metaphoric name implying that “resistance against the Israeli occupation will exacerbate the suffering of the Palestinians”. The program demonstrates stories from the Palestinian areas such as stories about prisoners, injured people, and bereaved families.

\textsuperscript{707} Alddalil alshamil – Sawt Alaqa [Comprehensive directory Alaqa voice], (Alaqa media network, 2005).

\textsuperscript{708} Mustafa Bakri, is the Pan-Arab oriented figure and the editor in chief of Alaosbou’a weekly newspaper (Egypt) Mustafa Bakri is an independent Egyptian MP for two mandates.
Religious programs:

These programs are of two types, one: live programs dealing with the religious matters that listeners asked question about. This gave the radio audience the opportunity to contact the radio directly seeking for religious enquiries. The live programmes also addressed “Quran recitation”; a “Quran scholar” hosted to teach people how to read the Quran. Two: 10-20 minute “recorded programs” addressing particular aspect of the Sharia’a law such as the interpretation of Quran and Hadith and the biography of the Prophet, such as the program “a masterpiece of biography”. According to the document, those programs addressed many Islam-related subjects, from “how to perform worship” to “how to practice jihad”709

Intellectual Programs

This includes the aspect of the program which aimed to shed light on the key ‘contemporary intellectual issues’ from an Islamic perspective, and to discuss issues like democracy, human rights, political freedom, the religious discourse, etc… within the framework of the ‘Shari’a law’. The program discussed topics like the “renewal of religious discourse”, “religious discourse as drawn by the Quran”, “the characteristics of the desired religious discourse to this era”, “the political belief in Islam”, “freedom of opinion and its role in the intellectual unity of the Muslims”. This type of programs raises the question of the re-Islamising of the Palestinian cause which is addressed in chapter three (education section).710

Social programs:

These programs focussed on the social aspects of the Palestinian people. The programs dealt with various topics of everyday concerns including issues of poverty, unemployment, rise in prices, health service, and education. Those programs usually gave a chance to people to be involved in the discussion in the radio studios, by telephone, email and SMS. For example, Nabdu ashare’a [Pulse of the street] was a program broadcast live. It was based on people’s

709 Alddalil alshamil – Sawt Alaqa [Comprehensive directory Alaqa voice], op., cit., p.52.
710 Ibid, p. 53.
participation and discussion. That program hosts were experts or officials who interact with the audience and answer their questions.711

**Entertainment programs:**

There are a set of entertainment programs, such as the comedy drama, and competitions. *faris ala elhawa* [Faris on-air], *yawmiyat fiddha* [Fiddha diary], and *abu nos Isan* [the guy with half a tongue]. According to the document, these programs had “meaningful messages”712 through entertaining people.713

**Family, women and children programs**

Various programs dealt with family, women and children and considered societal issues. For example, ‘Family doctor,’ addressed common health issues, including, family health, and food. *Toyour Aljannah* [the heaven birds] was a children’s program. *Wahat al’okht al muslimah* [oasis of the Muslim sister] was a program for women, which highlighted the specific situation of Palestinian women.714

In general, that description shows the diversity in the radio programming in its early stage (2004) which seem to have been more general, covering different types of issues. However, the context of establishing *sawt alaqsa* was the second Intifada which has been characterised as a “militarised resistance”. Albaik affirms that the agenda of Alaqsa radio was to support the resistance during the second Intifada. He argues that this new stage (second Intifada) required a media policy that was commensurate with the nature of the political and social developments. Therefore, the priority of Alaqsa Voice radio was the coverage of the development of the Intifada II, including all aspects of Palestinian life with a special focus on the Intifada and its military actions. So, Alaqsa radio devoted a great deal of broadcasting to the ‘accelerated events’ of the Intifada. It should be pointed out that the period from 2004 till the Cairo Agreement of the Palestinian Factions in March 2005,715 witnessed significant events for the

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711 Ibid.
712 Ibid, p. 54.
713 Ibid.
714 Ibid.
Palestinian issue, such as the assassination of Ahmed Yassin, the founder of Hamas, the death of Yasser Arafat, the president of the Palestinian Authority, as well as a large number of mutual military attacks between the Palestinians and the Israelis including the bombing of the Alaqsa Voice station itself in Gaza by Israeli helicopters. With reference to Albaik’s quote “Alaqsa is a resistance radio”, Alaqsa radio exhaustively covered the Israeli invasions of the Palestinian territories through what it called ‘opened wave’, for example, the offensive on the north of Gaza in September 2004 by the Israeli army. An ‘internal report’ of Alaqsa radio showed that this Israeli invasion of the Northern cities of the Gaza Strip received extensive coverage over twenty days the period of the invasion. The report states:

Despite the limited human and material resources, Alaqsa radio spent nearly twenty days in the coverage of this brutal aggression on the civilian areas in Jabalia and Beit Lahia. During this period the regular daily programs have been disrupted, and all the broadcast time has been allocated to cover the event, with headlines of the latest updates at every hour. Four reporters worked 24 hours a day to keep up with events and bring the reality about what is going on, where the focus was on ‘swiftness’ in broadcasting the news, taking into account the ‘accuracy and objectivity’. Alaqsa Radio played a prominent role in the transfer of “humanitarian appeals” to the people about the shortage of food and medicine, and how to deliver them through international organizations such as the Red Cross and the United Nations. Also Alaqsa had a role in announcing the information and statistics on deaths and injuries through coordination with the emergency operation rooms of hospitals and health centres.

This coverage includes the usage of what is so called “The Jihadi Nashid” [Jihadist Anthems] and sung poetry, which mostly encourage the spirit of sacrifice; the report states that Alaqsa reporters acted as almujahid al’itha’i [the mujahid of the radio], which is a metaphor to describe the reporter as a fighter in “Jihad”. This quote illustrates that the coverage by Alaqsa of the invasion was an inseparable part of the battle with the occupation, and this finding is in line with Albaik who states “Alaqsa radio is the radio of resistance.”

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716 Alddalil alshamil – Sawt Alaqsa [Comprehensive directory Alaqsa voice], op., cit. p.24
717 Alddalil alshamil – Sawt Alaqsa [Comprehensive directory Alaqsa voice], op., cit., p.62.
718 Ibid.
719 Author’s interview with Mahmoud Albaik, op., cit.
Over the Intifada II era the Alaqsa radio covered selected issues, under the title of *Waqafat Khassah* [special coverage] which dealt with particular issues described as ‘critical and sensitive’. The report states that those issues were mostly linked to an important historical event, or linked to the existing hot events such as the Israeli invasions of the Palestinian territories or the assassination of prominent Palestinian leaders, or linked to central cases which needed more light shed on them, such as the prisoners’, the Separation Wall and the refugees’ cases. Such ‘breaks’ occurred throughout the day, and included reports and interviews with officials who were involved with the event, as well making room for different opinions to be expressed. In addition, the *Taghiya* included the messages from correspondents in the field in order to cover all aspects of the event. The report of Alaqsa radio shows that following issues were covered over 2004:

1- Alaqsa radio assigned April 17th 2004 (the anniversary of the Palestinian Prisoners Day since 1974) for prisoners.  
   *Ahrar khalf alqudhban* ['free behind the bars'] was a program allocated to focus on the Palestinian prisoners in the Israeli prisons, and shed light on their suffering, especially the women and children prisoners. This program represented “a bridge between prisoners and their families by radioing messages from their families on air.”

2- July 9th 2004, when the international court of justice issued its advisory opinion against the Israeli West Bank wall, which is called by the Palestinians “the apartheid wall”, Alaqsa radio focused on the consequences of this wall on the Palestinian people in the short and long terms throughout the day.

3- The radio allocated special coverage for ‘big historical events’ such as: the anniversary of the Balfour declaration on November 2nd 1917 which is

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720 *Alddalil alshamil – Sawt Alaqsa* [Comprehensive directory Alaqsa voice], op., cit., p. 95.

721 Ibid.


723 The Israeli government decided to establish a wall made up of concrete slabs up to 8 m in height between the Palestinian cities in the West Bank and the Israeli territories in April 2002 and it started building the wall in June of same year. The length of the wall in its first stage is 115 km in the northern West Bank, and its final stage is 350 kilometres. The wall has seized 6 km depth of east of the Green Line (from the Palestinian territories). See : *Stop the wall: the Palestinian grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign*, [http://stopthewall.org/news/thecampaign.shtml](http://stopthewall.org/news/thecampaign.shtml) (accessed in 30/5/2011).
considered ‘by the Palestinians’ as the first step towards the loss of ‘Palestine’, the Palestinian Nakba 1948, the occupation of Gaza and the West Bank in 1967, which remind the Palestinian refugees of their calamity, the anniversary of burning of Alaqsa Mosque, and the anniversary of Sabra and Shatila camps’ massacre.\textsuperscript{724}

4- The radio also gave special space for the coverage of the assassination of Hamas’ political leaders such as Ahmed Yassin, Abdel Azizi Al-Rantissi, and Ismail Abu Shanab, and the military figures such as Adnan al-Ghoul, Wael Nassar, and others,\textsuperscript{725} as well as the developments on the ground in the tense areas including the invasions of particular villages or cities in Gaza and West Bank.

5- \textit{Alaqsa fi khatar} [Alaqsa mosque is in danger] was the title of the open wave on Alaqsa mosque and Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{726} This open wave took place over five different periods over the whole day, and included 59 different programs, including: reports, interviews, interacting with audience by telephone, songs, and others.\textsuperscript{727}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{724} These events are mentioned in \textit{Alddalil alshamil – Sawt Alaqsa} [Comprehensive directory Alaqsa voice], op., cit., p81, 82.
\item \textsuperscript{725} These Names are examples of what Alaqsa radio dealt with over 2004 period.
\item \textsuperscript{726} \textit{Alddalil alshamil – Sawt Alaqsa} [Comprehensive directory Alaqsa voice], op., cit., pp. 95-99.
\item \textsuperscript{727} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Conclusion

This chapter has examined the development of Hamas media strategy in two important periods of the Palestinian issue; the creation of the PNA and the outbreak of the second Palestinian Intifada. This chapter has shown how Hamas significantly expanded its media infrastructure by establishing the first newspaper, and the first radio station to represent Hamas, overtly, for the first time in its history, despite the restrictions by the PNA. Therefore, Hamas also expanded the circle of the target audiences to reach a greater audience worldwide by creating its webpage in several languages. As argued, the media message of Hamas during the PNA rule up to the beginning of the second intifada was a combination of resistance/anti-Oslo discourse and political opposition discourse. Hamas media have focussed on the failure of the PNA approach of negotiations, and at the same time Hamas presented the ‘resistance’ option as an alternative to the PNA approach. The political opposition discourse was presented by focussing on people’s everyday concerns, including the subjects of economy, education, and social problems. As shown, the context of the second Intifada compelled Hamas media to interact with the daily developments of the Intifada, especially through the *Waqafat khassah* [special coverage], and at the same time, Hamas media dealt with the everyday people’s concerns.
Chapter Six: Hamas media strategy: the context of the pairing of governance and resistance ‘Hokoumat Moqawama’

There is a significant degree of media coordination between Hamas and the government, while the government is maintaining margins as the government represents all the people.

Hassan Abu Hashish

Introduction:

This chapter will discuss Hamas media strategy in the context of Hamas’s government combination of ‘governance and resistance’ after its victory in the Palestinian elections in January 2006. The chapter contextualises the Hamas victory and forming of the tenth Palestinian government, and then taking over the Gaza Strip. In this chapter, I will argue that this period of study witnessed a ‘milestone’ in the evolution of Hamas' media infrastructure leading to what has been called a ‘Media Empire’. In this regard, this chapter seeks to examine the context of the creation of Alaqsa satellite TV, which I argue was the voice of Hamas, not only to the Palestinians, but also to the Arab and Islamic world. To this end, the chapter will examine the expansion in the circles of the target audiences from local to regional by reaching the largest number of the Arab and Muslim audiences. As it will be seen in this chapter, the Hamas government has used Alaqsa satellite TV as an alternative, as the new programming season after Hamas’s victory was designed in order to support the Hamas government’s platform. The term, “the government of resistance” and the topics which are related to this idea will also be critically assessed within the discussion of the media objectives and the media message. This chapter discusses emerging aspects of Hamas’ media strategy after the war on Gaza, such as the psychological warfare that Hamas practiced before, during and after this war. This will include discussion about the role of the ‘independent’ media that support the Hamas trends, and how this embodies the idea of integration and exchange of roles and responsibilities between the media institutions belonging to Hamas as one of the most important elements of the Hamas media strategy. This chapter also investigates the Hamas utilisation of the new media and telecommunication technologies as new tools of Hamas’s media. I argue that Hamas has systematically used the new media telecommunications technology as an important supplement to the Hamas media empire. This chapter shows how Gramsci’s term of cultural hegemony is
applicable on the Hamas case in governance as Hamas government uses a means of combination of coercion and persuasion.
Part one:

Election campaign, Hamas victory, and Hamas’s government

The importance of the Palestinian parliamentary election in 2006 comes from its being the first election involving all of Palestinian factions, including all orientations (Islamists, Secular, left wing and the independents) except for the ‘Islamic Jihad movement’. In this election Hamas achieved an unexpected victory when it won 60.6% of the PLC seats, while its political opponent, Fatah won 32.6% of the Palestinian Legislative council seats. This election was also important since it represented a “new” experience, not only in the Palestinian territories, but in the Arab Middle East, as it was the first free and democratic election, despite the complicated circumstances under which this election was conducted, under occupation, and in the face of the existence of militant factions.

Contrary to what has been argued by some researchers, that the Hamas landslide victory in the legislative elections was unpredicted, Abu Zuhri confirms Hamas had studies and polls, conducted by one of the units within Hamas, which predicted a sweeping victory in the legislative elections by a ‘wide margin’. Hamas formed the Palestinian government headed by Ismail Haniyeh after the refusal by the rest of the Palestinian factions to participate in a unity government based on a Hamas program. The International Quartet, composed of the United States, European Union, the United Nations and Russia, set three preconditions for dealing with the elected Palestinian government led by Hamas; these conditions were: recognition of Israel, renunciation of violence, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations of the agreements signed with the PLO’s Palestinian Authority. In turn, Hamas and its government, categorically rejected these conditions, regarding them as “political blackmail” and a

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731 Author’s interview with Sami Abu Zuhri, op., cit.

732 Author’s interview with Hasan Abu Hashish, op., cit.
coup against “the will of the Palestinian people”733 and “Palestinian legitimacy” and against the result of free and transparent elections.

The death of the historic leader of the PLO and Fatah, Yasser Arafat, opened the door to Hamas to fill the void caused by the absence of Arafat, especially as Hamas’s political rival ‘Fatah’ movement was not at its best. It was divided, and threatened with differences and the clash of interests between its leaders.734 This happened at the time of a ‘stalemate’ in the peace process between the Palestinian Authority, led by Mahmoud Abbas, [elected after 60 days of the death of Yasser Arafat] and Israel. There is an argument that the Palestinian people voted in this election against ‘the program of negotiation’ of Fatah, as the Palestinians had realized that the peace process had failed; that is the Israelis did not match the large concessions made through the PNA, such as the recognition of Israel and its right to exist on 78% of the land of Palestine.735 This is what Barhoum argues; he considers the result of the election was a great victory for the “resistance project” and an abominable defeat for Fatah and its political project. Barhoum uses the term Tasfiya [Liquidate] rather than Taswiya [settling] referring to the fact that the PNA was ready to solve the Palestinian issue ‘at any price’.736 The Middle East Studies Centre in Amman links the victory of Hamas to different factors. One of these factors is the corruption endemic in the Fatah-led PNA.737 In addition to the internal strife within Fatah, the corruption of the PNA during the previous years greatly decreased Fatah’s popularity. Some of the Fatah votes went to Hamas, not because the voters liked Hamas and its program, but rather that they rejected the program and the leadership of Fatah and its corruption.738 Corruption within Fatah led many of the Fatah leadership to call for the postponement of the elections, especially

733 Author’s interview with Yusef Rizqa, op., cit.
735 The Middle East Studies Centre: Panel Discussion: Implications of the Hamas victory in Palestinian parliamentary elections 2006, on the future of the case and the conflict in the region, and Israel, January 2006. The following Palestinian intellectuals have participated in this workshop: Professor Ahmed Nofal Saeed (Professor of political science at Yarmouk University), Dr. Anis Kassim (lawyer and legal expert), Dr. Sabri Samira (Professor of political science at the University of Jordan), Faleh Tawil (Member of the Senate of Jordan, a former Jordanian ambassador), Arafat Hijazi (the writer Ex Yasser Arafat’s advisor), Leila Khaled (a member of the Political Bureau of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Palestinian National Council member), Shaker Aljawhari (a news reporter and writer), Hassan Haider (Director of the Office of Quds Press agency in Amman), “Muhammad Sharif Jayyousi, (journalist).
736 Author’s interview with Fawzi Barhoum, op., cit..
737 The Middle East Studies Centre: Panel Discussion: Implications of the Hamas victory in Palestinian parliamentary elections 2006, on the future of the case and the conflict in the region, and Israel, op, cit.
738 Ibid.
the head of the Fatah Central Committee, Farouk Kaddoumi, who claimed that no elections could take place under occupation, and of course the fear of the loss of Fatah’s position in the leadership of the Palestinian people also increased the calls for postponement.\(^\text{739}\) So, as argued by Nabil Amr, one of the Fatah leaders, Fatah was punished by the election of Hamas.\(^\text{740}\)

In contrast, Hamas also contributed to its victory in the elections by presenting its alternatives. Hamas had a major role in the resistance against Israel; it had endured the sacrifice of many of its cadres and leaders, and this increased its popularity. Beverley Milton-Edwards supports this argument, calling the Hamas victory: “victory with Ballots and Bullets.”\(^\text{741}\) Also, Hamas has had a long history of providing social aid and various social services to the needy and those affected by Israeli occupation.

One reason for Hamas’s victory is related to Hamas itself; Hamas is a well-organised movement, with generally good discipline within the ranks of the movement and it had not shared the experience of Fatah in having splits in their electoral lists, and candidates, and this encouraged the Palestinians to choose Hamas as leaders for the next phase. As Mahjoob Zweiri argues, Hamas had the ability to demonstrate the discipline and the coherence of the organisation.\(^\text{742}\) Moreover, the impression of the Palestinians was that Hamas leaders were not involved with corruption as was the case with Fatah, in accordance with the view of many analysts and Palestinian public opinion polls.\(^\text{743}\) It was clear that Hamas's candidates were well organised, and their election strategy was also well planned. More importantly, the attitudes of the United States of America and Israel in refusing to deal with Hamas, led to an opposite reaction by the Palestinian voters who chose those who were rejected by Israel and the United States, not to mention their rejection of those associated with agendas of these parties,\(^\text{744}\) especially

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\(^{739}\) Ibid.

\(^{740}\) Nabil Amr, Symposium broadcasted on Aljazeera channel in 30/1/2006, available on: http://aljazeera.net/Channel/archive/archive?ArchiveId=324894 (accessed in 18/072011/).


\(^{744}\) Ibid.
after the revelations about foreign funding for some candidates, including candidates from the Fatah movement.745

The role of Hamas’s media in its victory

The according to Ismail Alashqar the campaign for the PLC elections 2006 was well-planned and Hamas utilised huge efforts in this campaign.746 Alashqar states that once Hamas decided to participate in PLC elections it started to prepare, not only at the media level, but began to work at different levels throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip. He claims that Hamas made very great efforts in its elections campaign, as it hired all of the media outlets, and also benefited from experts and specialists in the field of Public Relations and election campaigns. In addition, Hamas recruited thousands of volunteers a month before the election campaign began. The editor in chief of ‘Al-Islah forum’ magazine Yazid Khader explains that these volunteers expressed their desire to serve the ‘Islamic movement and its candidates because they believed that it was their duty. He adds “in Ramallah and Albireh alone more than 500 activists worked in the service of the campaign as volunteers.”747

Hamas hired Nashat Aqtash as a public relations and media advisor to the election campaign,748 and it benefited from some consultants, media specialists, and some media institutions which were friendly to it, and it also allocated a budget for this campaign.749

In conjunction with the start of the election campaign, Hamas opened its first satellite channel which broadcasts from the Gaza Strip on two satellites (Arabsat and Nilesat), so that it covers all the Arab countries, Turkey and some parts of Europe. The main objective of the start of Alaqsa TV precisely at this time was to broadcast news of Hamas’ campaign and programs about the candidates on Hamas’s list of change and reform, as well as the leaders of Hamas who were assassinated by Israel, including its

745 Kelly, Rick: Hamas victory in Palestinian election, the International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI), 27 January 2006.
746 Author’s interview with Ismail Alashqar, op., cit.
747 Interview with Yazid Khadir, the director of Hamas campaign of the 2006 election, the editor in chief of Alaislah magazine, the mouthpiece of Hamas in the west bank till July 2007, 20/07/2011.
749 Author’s Interview with Sami Abu Zuhri, op., cit. Abu Zuhri declined to give any figures about this budget but he emphasised that the budget was not very large, but Hamas spent this budget for funding the printed matter, and the mass meetings, without any extravagance.
founders Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Abdel Aziz Rantisi.\textsuperscript{750} Ibrahim Zhahir argues that the role of Ala'qsa was essential in the elections campaign, saying: “There was a prominent role of the Hamas media, especially Al Aqsa TV, which had just been established, in the presentation of Hamas’s program and its achievements. Samir Abu Mohsin, director of programs at Ala'qsa TV, confirms that the creation of this TV by Hamas before the elections was a recognition of the importance of this medium and its effectiveness.\textsuperscript{751} He adds: “Hamas had to have this sort of medium to promote its program and its “Islamic message. The widespread Ala'qsa radio also undertook a major role.\textsuperscript{752} In addition to this, Hamas used large banners, posters, and graffiti. These efforts culminated in the great victory which was honoured and valued.”\textsuperscript{753}

The next section presents a brief introduction about Ala'qsa satellite TV, and its objectives.

In contradiction with election law, which prohibits the use of places of worship in the election campaigns, Hamas used the mosques to promote its program through the speakers and preachers as well as using mosques as places to distribute printed materials. The observers of the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights documented dozens of cases of abuse of election law at the Friday prayers of January 20\textsuperscript{th}, in which the preachers explicitly called on people to vote for a list of change and reform (Hamas) and their candidates in the constituencies. The statement of the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights gives an example of one of these violations in what happened in one of the Gaza mosques called ‘Al-Soussi mosque’ in the ‘refugees Beach Camp’, where the preacher called on worshippers to vote for the ‘change and reform list’, and libelled and insulted other candidates. This raised the ire of some of the congregation, which caused uproar inside the mosque, where a number of worshippers pulled the preacher down from the pulpit, before he was able to complete his speech.\textsuperscript{754} However, and despite this episode, Hamas widely used the mosques, and this was one of the most powerful places for mobilisation. Hamas’s media agenda for the election campaign was concentrated on people's concerns and their daily life issues such as poverty,

\textsuperscript{750} Author’s interview with Ibrahim Zhahir, op., cit.
\textsuperscript{751} Author’s interview with Samir Abu Mohsin, op., cit.
\textsuperscript{752} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{753} Ibid.
unemployment, corruption and security, taking advantage of Hamas’ achievements on this level through their associations and charities and benefiting from Fatah mistakes in these aspects. On top of that there was the stalemate in the peace process which was seen as a failure of the Fatah political project. In contrast, Hamas ‘theoretically’ presented the alternatives for all of the mentioned issues that Fatah had failed in.

**The Era of the Governance: Shift in Hamas’s media infrastructure**

The refusal by the Hamas government of the international conditions led to the boycott by Israel, the United States and the international community, and to the imposition of a financial and political siege. Israel stopped transferring the revenues from the PNA customs tax. The United States, the European Union and most Arab countries stopped all support programs that were intended for the Palestinian Government, including the development projects, and the salaries of Palestinian Authority employees. This caused a great deal of pressure on the Hamas government in Gaza as a result of the financial and political siege; this caused outbreaks of disorder and strikes carried out by security officers of the Palestinian Authority loyal to Fatah, and huge conflict within the managerial apparatus of the PNA. Then, the conflict moved to the tensions between the ‘military wing of Hamas’ and the security forces of the PNA and Fatah. Consequently, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank witnessed a harsh period of loss of security, murders, revenge amongst the families and tribes, kidnapping of journalists and foreigners, culminating with the formation of a Hamas police force to carry out the ‘functions of security and law enforcement’. The force was named *Tanfithya* [executive force]. The formation of this force led to the intensification of the conflict between Hamas and Fatah, and the Gaza Strip and West Bank witnessed armed clashes between the two parties, which ended in an agreement on forming a national unity government after the Mecca agreement, also headed by Ismail Haniya. However, this agreement quickly broke down because of the mutual killings; Hamas then took over Gaza after a bloody battle that killed hundreds from the two parties. Media therefore played significant role in Hamas-Fatah clash. For Hamas, Alaqsa TV was the ‘media arm’ of Hamas in this conflict. In this regards, Hamas media received harsh criticism from Fatah about Hamas

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media performance during the conflict in June 2006, as Alaqsa TV showed a scene of dragging a body of Samih Almadhoun, one of Fatah leaders. Alaqsa TV also broadcasted a scene of the Hamas military members of the Fatah-affiliated police in very humiliated way, as most of them were forced to take off their clothes.

The Palestinian territories become subject to different governments, one in Gaza, headed by Ismail Haniyeh (Hamas), and the other one in Ramallah headed by Salam Fayyad (appointed by the PNA president Mahmoud Abbas). Israel, USA, and the international community dealt with the Government of the West Bank as a legitimate government, and supported it politically and financially, while the Hamas government was considered by the Israeli Government as a “hostile entity,” so has been sanctioned by a strict blockade politically and financially. During these events, Hamas was aware that the media was a vital part of this battle, and used it best to its best advantage, says Mahmoud Albaik, director of Alaqsa voice radio. Once the rule of Hamas began, Hamas undertook the establishment of the so-called ‘media empire’, since it was first the first chance for Hamas to operate freely in the Palestinian land.

Before the Hamas takeover of Gaza, Hamas faced many obstacles in operating the media; under Israeli occupation in the first intifada Hamas worked underground (see Chapter Four), it was targeted by the Israeli occupation even during the PNA era, for example, the bombing of the radio during the second intifada by Israeli helicopters (see chapter Five). Hamas also faced obstacles set by the Ministry of Information in the Palestinian Authority in terms of getting the necessary licences for the operation of media institutions. Therefore, Hamas benefited from being in power in the Gaza Strip and controlling the entire Strip to establish a number of media institutions, and media production companies publicly, and by obtaining licences from the Palestinian government in Gaza. The next section demonstrates the extent of the development of the Hamas media under the governance of Hamas.

The Media Department of Hamas

The mother institution of the Hamas media at the current stage is alda’erah al’ilamiya [the media department] which is linked directly to the ‘political bureau’, the supreme

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758 Author’s interview with Yousef Rizqa, op., cit.
759 Author’s interview with Badiddine Mohammed, op., cit.
leadership of Hamas, as it worked secretly.\footnote{Interview with Salah Albardawil, the Hamas MP and the head of the media department of Hamas, op. cit.} This department is an extension to the Jihaz Al’ilam [media office] which was in charge of the media work during the first intifada, but after 2006 it was reformulated to take its current shape. This department is currently headed by Salah Albardawil, the MP and one of Hamas’s leaders. The Media Department (the membership of which is not to be disclosed, except for the Chairman), is composed of representatives from all the media institutions of the Hamas openly, and those media institutions that were established by Hamas to have an independent status, as well as representatives from the governmental media office in the Gaza strip. Each of these institutions has a Board of Directors; all appoint a representative for the media Department to attend meetings and share the formulations of policies. This department, which meets regularly, often weekly, is the central reference of all of Hamas media institutions based in the Palestinian territories (especially in Gaza), and links with media institutions in the diaspora (Damascus and Beirut). Albardawil summarises the tasks of the media department in the following points:

1- The media department is responsible for the formulation of the media strategies, and the following-up of their implementation by the institutions of the Hamas media. The formulation of the Hamas media strategies and the determinants of its objectives are in accordance with the context of each stage, and this is subject to the interest of Hamas.

2- The media department coordinates between the media institutions of Hamas, including the distribution of roles and responsibilities, and follow-up implications which must be adhered to. The question of the distribution of roles and responsibilities is part of the Hamas media strategy, as mentioned in chapter three.

3- It evaluates and reviews the performance of the Hamas media institutions, as well as “correcting the imbalance in the performance” and “punishing those who exceed the lines drawn”.

4- The media department is in charge of the “financial management” of the Hamas media. It is worth mentioning that Hamas has dedicated a “large budget”\footnote{Most of my interviewees state that Hamas has got a “large budget” for its media institutions, but none of them give an exact number, or shows documents of the financial situations. At meantime, most of them declare that there is an immense scale of spending on Hamas media.} to
spend on its media institutions. Most of the interviewees decline to disclose the amount of the budget allocated to the media due to the sensitivity of the financial issue, as this issue is a subject of strict secrecy for Hamas. However, Mohammed Thuraya reveals that the Alaqsa satellite channel’s annual budget is about six million U.S. dollars.\textsuperscript{762} If the budget of one institution of Hamas’s media is 6 million, the total budget can be estimated in the dozens of million.

The biggest media institution that works under the media department is ‘Alaqsa Media Network’ which is composed of Alaqsa satellite TV, Alaqsa TV (Local, in the Gaza Strip), Alaqsa Radio, Alaqsa Radio Live, Shahab News Agency, Alaqsa Centre for Media Training and Development, and ‘ASDAA City of Media Production’. The founder of this network is Fathi Hammad, a well-known leader of Hamas and the current [2011] interior minister of the Palestinian government in Gaza. For Hammad, this network is part of an “ambitious project”\textsuperscript{763} which is not confined to the media outlets of this network only; but rather seeks to expand to deliver the voice of the resistance media to the whole world. Hammad says: “We are waiting for the dream; the dream of a special satellite to include all of the Islamic channels and Islamic resistance channels in support of the great humanitarian project to unite the Arab and Islamic nation.”\textsuperscript{764}

Hamas has a number of news websites that work in secrecy, such as the website of the Hamas military wing, Izz al-Din al-Qassam (www.alqassam.ps), felesteen ala\textsuperscript{an} [Palestine now] news website (www.paltimes.net), and the official website of Hamas’s media office in Gaza (www.hamasinfo.net). This website has been launched recently as an official website of the media office as it contains all the press releases and statements of Hamas’s leaders, as well as press conferences, and the news of any event related to Hamas.\textsuperscript{765} There are sub-branches of this media office. These offices also have their own websites as follows:

\textsuperscript{762} Author’s interview with Mohammed Thuraiya, op., cit.
\textsuperscript{763} Author’s interview with Fathi Hammad, op., cit.
\textsuperscript{764} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{765} The official website of the Hamas’s media office in Gaza www.hamasinfo.net. (accessed in 24/07/2011).
- Media Office of Northern Gaza, headed by Abdel Latif Alqanou’a, Hamas’s local spokesman.

- Media Office of Middle-Gaza, headed by Yousef Farahat, and he is Hamas’s local spokesman (http://www.wosta.ps).

- Media Office of Khan Younis City, headed by Hammd Al-Riqib and he is Hamas’s local spokesman.


- Media Office of the West Gaza City, headed by Ismail Radwan, and he is also one of Hamas’s spokesman (http://www.seraj.ps).


In addition to all of the above-mentioned institutions, there are a few media institutions established in the Gaza strip and outside which categorise themselves as independents, such as the daily newspaper Felesteen [Palestine] and the Palestinian News Agency SAFA. (Look at the section Independent but pro-Hamas in chapter six). It should be pointed out that after Hamas took control of Gaza, most Hamas media became based either in the Gaza strip or outside the Palestinian territories (Syria and Lebanon). This is due to Hamas being banned from practicing any media work in the West Bank. The PNA government led by Salam Fayyad banned the distribution of Hamas newspapers like Alrisala and Felesteen. On 19/9/2007, Fayyad’s government in Ramallah closed the office of Alaqsa Satellite channel and arrested its correspondent and cameramen and banned ‘Ałaqṣa’ from working in the West Bank under the pretext that they were “inciting hatred.” 766 Hamas did the same, closing most of the Fatah media institutions and those which were Fatah affiliated in the Gaza strip, as it has imposed restrictions on the media freedoms. 767

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766 Ałaqṣa Satellite TV, Tawarikh Hammah [Important dates], (Internal report), October 2010.

767 Thawabteh, Nibal: Palestinian media map: production congestion consumption desperation, in Josephi, Beate Ursula: Journalism education in countries with limited media freedom, (Peter Lang, 2010), p. 91.
The Creation of Alaqsa satellite TV

Alaqsa TV is an extension of the Alaqsa terrestrial TV which emerged from Alaqsa Radio that worked during the second Palestinian intifada as the primary outlet of the Hamas media. On the 8th of January 2006, Alaqsa satellite TV started an experimental broadcast by a Recitation of verses from the Quran for an hour. At this stage the Alaqsa TV limited its broadcasting to six hours a day as most of the programs were “live”.

Thuraiya explains that the establishment of this TV was undertaken in different stages. At the first stage was booking a satellite frequency. The Alaqsa administration, composed of a group of youths directed by Fathi Hammad, reserved a ‘satellite frequency on the ‘Arab-Sat’ while the ‘Nile Sat’ which was owned by the Egyptian government refused to give a licence for Alaqsa to use their satellite. This was due to the refusal of the PNA to grant Alaqsa TV a licence to broadcast from Gaza for a while. The second stage was the recruitment of staff for the station. For recruitment, Alaqsa TV administration sought to bring professionals from other media institutions as well as depending on its own cadres. Hamas also sent some of these cadres to Lebanon (Almanar TV, Hezbollah affiliated) and to Qatar (Aljazeera training centre) for training outside of the Palestinian territories. The main obstacle for Alaqsa was the lack of people with qualifications and of equipment. Abu Mohsin explains that the team of the TV had no experience in dealing with the satellite TV channels. As for the equipment which includes studios, cameras, computers, broadcasting devices etc. Alaqsa bought some of them from local companies and some of them were smuggled from Egypt by the tunnels since Israel restricted the selling any of media equipment to the Palestinians, especially in Gaza. Alaqsa also started to buy new media materials such as documentaries and news materials for its archive and library as the archive and

768 Author’s interview with Mohammed Thuraiya, op., cit.
769 Author’s interview with Mohammed Thuraiya, op., cit.
770 Ibid.
771 Ibid.
772 It was not necessary that there was co-ordination between Hamas and Aljazeera to get these trained in Qatar. Most of them joined the training courses as independents. But is different in the case of Almanar TV, that is Hamas has been in good relations with Hezbollah (the owner of Almanar) as they (Hamas and Hezbollah) collaborate with each other at all levels. Author’s interview with Badreddine Mohammed, op., cit.
773 Author’s interview with Samir Abu Mohsin, op., cit.
774 Author’s interview with Mohammed Thuraiya, op., cit.
library of the TV were almost empty. The third stage was finding a suitable building for the channel; Alaqsa had its own building and started gradually developing the departments and the programmes [appendix number 5 shows the structure of Alaqsa TV in 2010]. The channel had its first ‘programming season’ in January 2007 as the channel started to broadcast 24 hours a day.

In the Statute of the channel there is great deal of information and definitions about the channel and its financial and administrative rules, its policies, and objectives. This section will cover the brief about the Alaqsa TV. The Statute of the channel shows that the Chairman of the Board of director and its members are chosen by election by the channel staff [about 200 members of staff in 2011]. The board is in charge of the planning and development policies of Alaqsa, in addition to the making of programme schedules seasonally within the determinants adopted by the Media Committee of Hamas, as the Chairman of the Board of director is the representative of the Alaqsa TV in this committee. All logos, symbols, slogans, promotions, and even the name of the seasonal schedules mirror the political and the ideological orientations of Alaqsa TV.

The name of the channel “Alaqsa” and its logo (look at the appendix number 6) reflect an Islamic/Palestinian direction; the picture of the “Dome of the Rock” of Alaqsa mosque in the logo is to refer to “Palestine” as Jerusalem is the capital of the desired ‘state of Palestine’. It also denotes that Alaqsa mosque is one of the holiest places for Muslims all over the world as it was the direction for Muslim prayers in the past and the site of the ascension of the Prophet Muhammad. There is an arc surrounding the ‘Dome of the Rock’. This arc, according to a description about the logo in one of the Alaqsa leaflets, is a reference to “Extending to the Arab and Muslim world the Palestinian cause, which represents the strongest firewall against all plans aimed at Judaizing Jerusalem and the desecration of the Alaqsa Mosque and Palestine.”

The slogans are designed to express particular messages that serve the objectives of the TV and reflect the orientations of the channel. For example,
- \textit{I'alamuna Islami, Hadif, Muqawim.. leta'alw alraya} [Our media: Islamic, meaningful, and Resistant.. to raise the flag]. This slogan includes the two main meanings of the Hamas project “Islamic and resistance”, but also the addition of the word “meaningfulness” to the slogan shows that this media has a message and obligation towards its audiences. This also has a ‘hidden’ message, that is the audience will find in this media institution what they cannot find in any other media, as the latter could present meaningless messages. This is what Badreddine Mohammed calls “rotten goods”.\footnote{Author’s interview with Badreddine Mohammed, op., cit.} This metaphoric expression is offset by a similar expression for the Hamas media by Mohammed, “Hamas’s goods are secure, healthy and useful”\footnote{Ibid.} Mohammed declares: “Hamas is aware that their viewed goods are a commodity, truthful and honest, as Hamas has sacrificed for it with its senior leaders and founders and their children, so the goods are good, secure, healthy and beneficial and will be accepted by the public as correct. But by presenting rotten goods, Hamas media or any other media would not be able to convince the Palestinian people of their program and their approach”.\footnote{Ibid.} “To raise the flag”, at the end of the slogan, represents the final goal of this Alaqsa. In other words, it can be read as approaching Islam and resistance should lead to liberation and raising the flag of Palestine.

- \textit{Aynoka ala alwatan} [your eye on the home]. This slogan has been used by Alaqsa TV since it was established. This slogan shows the national dimension of the Hamas media whose priority is ‘the (national) home’ and National issues. Mohammed Almadhoun describes the Hamas media as ‘a Palestinian media with an Islamic reference’ arguing that that the ‘project of liberation of Palestine’ will never happen without an Islamic vision.\footnote{Author’s interview with Mohammed Almadhoun, op., cit.}

- \textit{Fada’iyatu Alaqa,, norika alsoura be’alwaniha} [Al-Aqsa TV.. we show you the picture in its real colours]. This slogan reflects the way that Alaqsa deals with its coverage of the situation, particularly in Palestine.

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{Author’s interview with Badreddine Mohammed, op., cit.}
\item \footnote{Ibid.}
\item \footnote{Ibid.}
\item \footnote{Author’s interview with Mohammed Almadhoun, op., cit.}
\end{itemize}
The seasons’ \textsuperscript{783} names also have meanings that serve the idea of Hamas’s project depending on the context. Moa’az Ala’amoudi, producer and moderator of some programmes in Alaqsa TV, asserts that the names that given to the ‘seasons’ of Alaqsa programs carry a great significance, and generally serve the objectives of the channel. \textsuperscript{784}

The Alaqsa TV has one or two seasons of programmes per year which are prepared by all departments and accredited by the board of directors. The copies of the seasons that were obtained for this research show that each season contains a collection of recorded and live programmes. the season copy contains all details about every programme, such as description of each programme, its goals, objectives, mechanisms, target audiences, internally and externally, output and the requirements of the programmes. Each program also has ‘model implementation’ and contains the following points: description of the programme, the stages of preparing the programme, duration, and date of broadcast. (See appendix number 7 which clarifies the details of the program (so as not to destroy Alaqsa mosque).

**The voice of Hamas to the Arab and Islamic target audience**

With the establishment of Alaqsa TV which reaches most of the Arab countries in the Middle East and north Africa, as well as Turkey, Iran and some of the European countries, the circle of the target audience of Hamas has expanded to reach to what Hamas repeatedly calls, *Al-Omq Al-Arabi Wal-Islami* [the Arab and Islamic depth]. The statute of Alaqsa TV identifies the channel as:

A Palestinian TV channel which has an Islamic orientation, and aims to keep the Palestinian issue ‘alive’ in the heart and the minds of the Palestinian people and the Arab and Islamic nation by endorsing Palestinian rights and the Palestinian constants, as it raises the crucial issues of the ‘nation’ and seeks for its renaissance at all levels, culturally, intellectually, and religiously. \textsuperscript{785}

Despite the fact that the statute of Alaqsa TV does not have any article which shows that the TV is owned by Hamas, several sources confirm that the TV is the main media

\textsuperscript{783} I refer the word ‘season’ to the TV season programming schedule of the Alaqsa TV.

\textsuperscript{784} Author’s interview with Moath Alamoudi, producer in Alaqsa TV, 13/8/2011.

\textsuperscript{785} Alaqsa media network, the statute of Alaqsa satellite channel, Gaza, 2007.
outlet of Hamas. Mohammed Thuraiya, the deputy director general of the TV, reveals that, saying:

*Alaqsa TV considers itself as the voice of resistance and its project, explaining that the TV station is owned by the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas, the creator of the project of resistance, and the channel exists in the Gaza Strip which is called the ‘geographical heart of the resistance’. The discourse of Alaqsa generally serves the subject of the resistance, and uses this tool as a means and instrument of power to mobilize the public for the idea of resistance.*

Fathi Hammad, the godfather of the Hamas media, says that the establishment of this satellite channel is the largest project of the Hamas media until this moment. Hammad states that this channel is a sharp weapon, not less in importance than real weapons adding: “it supported Hamas and its government in their confrontation with the ‘Zionist occupation’ and the ‘Palestinian forces’ which were seeking to liquidate the Palestinian issue by the so-called ‘peace process.’”

As Alaqsa broadcasts through two main satellites and covers most of the Middle East and the North Africa, Turkey, as well as parts of Europe and Asia, it is not only aimed at communicating with the Palestinians in the occupied territories and the refugees camps in the neighbouring countries. This denotes that Hamas intends to expand the range of its media to reach the largest number of audiences in the Arab and Muslim world in order to propagate its political and ideological message. Within this context, Hammad claims that Alaqsa channel has become one of the most watched channels in Palestine and the Arab world, especially in the Arab Maghreb despite of its ‘young age’ in comparison with the other Arabic Satellite channels. This claim is derived from estimates by Alaqsa TV senior executives themselves and from some of the surveys published by Palestinian research centres.

There are not any surveys on the Arab media in general including the Alaqsa TV. At the Palestinian level, three different polls have been conducted by the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research which show that Alaqsa is one of the most watched TV

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786 Author’s interview with Mohammed Thuraiya, op., cit.
787 Author’s interview with Fathi Hammad, op., cit.
788 Ibid.
789 Even Alaqsa administration does not have any of this sort of studies or surveys.
channels amongst the Palestinians in the Gaza strip and the West Bank. The following three surveys show that Alaqsa TV is the second most watched TV in the Palestinian territories after Aljazeera, which is the most popular channel in the Arab world. This enhances the impression that Alaqsa TV has achieved real popularity in the Arab world as Hammad argues.

**PSR Poll No. 27 (13-15 March 2008)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From among the following satellite news stations, which one did you watch most during the last two months?</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Gaza Strip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Al Arabia</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Al Jazeera</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Al Hurra</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Al Manar</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Palestine TV</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Al-Aqsa TV</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Do not watch TV</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Others</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Do not have a dish</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) No Opinion/Don’t know</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PSR Poll No. 28 (5-7 June 2008)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From among the following satellite news stations, which one did you watch most during the last two months?</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Gaza Strip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


791 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research - Survey Research Unit, Full Analysis, Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No 28(5-7 June 2008).
From among the following satellite news stations, which one did you watch most during the last two months?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Gaza Strip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Al Arabia</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Al Jazeera</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>37.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Al Hurra</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Al Manar</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Palestine TV</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Al-Aqsa TV</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Do not watch TV</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Others</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Do not have a dish</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) No Opinion/Don’t know</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hammad states:

Thank God, at the Palestinian media level the Alaqsa TV is ranked at the top in terms of watching and in terms of credibility. Also Alaqsa TV is highly respected and watched in the Arab world, and you can judge this by the interaction with the contributions in the callers from...
the Arab and Islamic countries, from Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and others.  

Abu Mohsin refers the popularity of the channel amongst the Palestinians and the Arabs to its being one of the few media channels that operate in the “space of resistance”.  

Alaqa TV and Almanar TV [the Lebanese Hezbollah affiliated] are the only media institutions who are adopting the ‘discourse of resistance’, as most of the Arab media institutions are owned by the governments or are government-affiliated. These channels adopt necessarily the positions of Arab Governments, most of which are not democratically elected, as they suppress their people and do not respect human rights, as well as being allied with the United States and Western governments -- which is seen as against the Arab peoples’ wills. Therefore the impression is that the channels of the movements of resistance are closer to the pulse of people than the media of ‘Arab dictatorship regimes’. Ahmed Sabir, one of the senior officials of Alaqa TV, describes this situation as: “Alaqa is against the current”, arguing that the mission of Alaqa is to keep the Palestinian issue alive in the hearts and minds and to work to spread what he calls, “the spirit of Arab and Islamic unity, and a message of resistance and liberation”. Sabir adds, “Indeed the mere presence of this channel in the Gaza Strip, since it was a target for the bombing and the destruction, is a big accomplishment for the resistance and its project.”  

Alaqa has opened branches [offices] in a number of Arab and Islamic capitals, such as Damascus and Beirut, Khartoum, Amman and after the Arab spring in Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen it opened two offices in Cairo and Tunis, in recognition of the importance of its presence in such the Arab and Islamic countries.

The use of Alaqa satellite TV as an alternative

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793 Author’s interview with Fathi Hammad, op., cit.
794 Author’s interview with Samir Abu Mohsin, op., cit.
795 Author’s interview with Ahmed Sabir, op., cit.
796 Ibid.
797 Author’s with Interview Moa’ath Alamoudi, op., cit.
This section addresses two issues related to the use of Alaqsa TV as an alternative; firstly the media challenges that faced the government of Hamas, and the later alternatives to face such challenges.

A) Hamas government and media

The media have represented a big challenge for Hamas’s government, headed by Haniya, who started his mandate on the April the first 2006. Haniya’s dictum, “We were in the government, but we were not in power” was - to some extent- true. Haniyah’s government was not in control of most government departments, since most of the government’s employees and seniors were either Fatah members or pro-Fatah, and on many occasions those employees and seniors refused to deal with the new government, especially following the presidential decrees which were issued just before Haniyah assumed the premiership, limiting the powers of government, and strengthening the powers of the president.

In this regard, Youssef Rizqa, the former ‘Information Minister’ in the Hamas government, and the current media adviser to the Prime Minister, states that before he ‘assumed the information ministry’, the PNA president Mahmoud Abbas issued a decree which transferred the responsibility for Palestine TV and Palestine Radio to the PLO and the institution of the presidency, which deprived the Ministry of Information and the ‘tenth Palestinian government’ of any media outlet to represent government policy through the governmental media. Worse still according to Rizqa, the Palestine TV and radio adopted an anti-government policy, and took part in the “incitement, sedition and anarchy!” So the majority of talk shows and guests were against the government led by Hamas.

Tahir Alnono, the spokesman of the Hamas government, describes this situation as a “difficult reality”. He explains that in the first stage of the Hamas government, and before the ‘Palestinian division’, there were no dealings by the official media with the “elected legitimate government”, saying that: “There was a programmed war by the official media institutions against this government, the official newspapers attacked the government, the official television attacked the government and the official news agency attacked the government. This was an unprecedented

798 Cited in Rizqa, Yousef: altariq alsa’ab [the hard way], (Dar Elshorouq, Amman, 2007), p 10.
799 Ibid.
800 Author’s interview with Yousef Rizqa, op., cit.
801 Author’s interview with Tahir alnono, op., cit.
situation with regard to States and Governments." Alnono gives another example; the official media of the PNA, especially the Palestinian TV, ignored the Hamas government’s Foreign Minister’s official foreign visits, while covering “the Foreign Minister's visits to the Zionist enemy”. This contradiction was not unprecedented, Alnono claims, but rather represents sort of special status in the Arab media, since most of the Arab media are owned by governments (look at the Arab media section in the literature review) and therefore represent the government policy.

The situation of Hamas government was different from any previous Palestinian government; the Media Foundation of the government was against the government, to the extent that Palestine TV intended to insult the Hamas prime minister, Ismail Haniya, in an interview in one of the television programs, since the TV did not deal with him according to the protocol as the Prime Minister, Rizqa argues. At the same time, Hasan Abu Hashish, the head of the Governmental media office, describes the media situation of the Hamas government saying: “the government had almost no media outlet since the governmental media responsibility was withdrawn from the government, including the Palestine TV, the Palestine Radio and the Palestinian news agency (Wafa), however, the ministry of information issued a weekly magazine called the Alraai [opinion] to cover the news of the government ministries and authorities.

During this period, Hamas faced challenges on two fronts: first, the Israeli front especially after the operation named by Hamas “Operation Dispelled Illusion”, when Hamas’s military wing kidnapped the Israeli soldier Gilaad Shalit, and two other Palestinian military organisations in Gaza at the early stage of the Hamas Government. This operation caused a rapid Israeli military and security operation called “The operation of the summer rains”. This operation was described as the most violent attack on the Gaza strip since the war of 1967; it included severe bombardment from the

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802 Ibid.
803 I refer the term “Hamas government” to the tenth Palestinian government formulated by Hamas in March 2005.
804 Author’s interview with Tahir Alnono, op., cit.
805 Author’s interview with Yusef Rizqa, op., cit.
land, the sea and the air using F16 fighters.\textsuperscript{808} Israel also targeted the Hamas government by arresting most of its ministers in the West Bank and most of its Parliament members. The strike against Gaza was aimed at undermining Hamas rule in Gaza, and obtaining the return of the kidnapped soldier. The second front was the interior pressure exerted by Fatah and the security apparatuses loyal to president Mahmoud Abbas. Rizqa calls it a “rebellion against the legitimacy produced by elections”\textsuperscript{809} Rizqa claims that this “rebellion” and the “chaos” created by Fatah and its “military groups” were fully supported by the Palestinian official media, as well as private media loyal to Fatah.\textsuperscript{810} The private media which adopted an anti-Hamas government position were, for example, the \textit{Sawt alhurriya} [Voice of Liberty] radio and \textit{Sawt elshabab} [Voice of Youth] affiliated to the Fatah Youth Organization, the print media, especially \textit{alhayat aljadida} newspaper and also the electronic media such as the Palestine press agency (www.palpress.ps), \textit{Donia Alwatan} website (www.alwatanvoice.com) and others.

The Hamas government struggled to take over part of the official media, but this attempt failed, so the Hamas government decided to establish a satellite channel for the government and to reflect its policies.\textsuperscript{811} Rizqa states: “So, the information ministry sought to create ‘a supreme council for media’ to work under the Ministry of Information, but the ministry failed to reach an agreement with the PNA President, and this project was not implemented for many reasons. And then they tried to establish a satellite channel for the government, but it also failed for financial reasons. Hence you can say that the Ministry of Information in the tenth government was without any media outlets”\textsuperscript{812}. Thinking about the creation of a satellite channel for the Hamas government was in order to find an alternative way to create a space for the representation of Hamas’s project in the Palestinian media. The failure in this endeavour made the Hamas government resort to other alternatives. \textit{Alaqsa} satellite channel was the first of these options. The second alternative was utilization of the pro-Hamas media, and finally, the creation of the Governmental media office, headed by Hassan Abu Hashish.

\textsuperscript{808} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{809} Author’s interview with Yousef Rizqa , op., cit.
\textsuperscript{810} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{811} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{812} Ibid.
B) Alaqa TV as an alternative

For the Hamas government, Alaqa Satellite channel embodied the alternative media to the official media represented by the Palestine TV and Wafa news agency as well as the printed newspapers. Alnono justifies the use by the Hamas government of the Hamas media institution saying that: “indeed, the official media institution was against the government, which pushed the government to find out an alternative from outside of the government to support the government”. The important point in this context is the disclosure by Hassan Abu Hashish, director of the Governmental media Office, which operates under the supervision of the Office of the Prime Minister that the government uses the institutions of the Hamas media such as Alaqa TV and Alaqa Radio, and benefits from the independent daily newspaper *Felesteen*, which has an Islamic orientation. He declares that there is significant media coordination between Hamas and the government, while the government is maintaining margins as the government represents all the people. This shows that the media of Hamas, as a whole, represents one project, and this is also consistent with what Taher Alnono, spokesperson for the Hamas government, said, that both institutions (the government and Hamas) complement each other’s roles to achieve “the great objective” and serve the great project that is carried by the Hamas and the government.

New ‘season’ in the support of the Government’s platform

This section will look at the first season of Alaqa TV which followed the formulation of the Hamas government, and aims to analyze the relationship of the political platform of the Hamas government and the TV programs of Alaqa TV season 2007.

The first season of Alaqa was in 2007 under the name “towards one nation”, and was produced by a team of Alaqa TV staff, headed by Hazem Alsha’arawi. Thuraiya explains that the team who prepared this season benefitted, in terms of the professional aspect, from different experiences from other Arab satellite channels’ season, through a comprehensive study of the seasons of a number of Arab and Islamic TV channels such as Aljazeera, Alarabiya, Ala’alam, Al-Manar, Abu Dhabi, Sama, Iqraa and Sharjah). Alaqa TV administration also sent some of its staff to visit Almanar TV in

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813 Author’s with Interview with Tahir Alnono, op., cit.
814 Author’s with Interview with Hassan Abu Hashish, op., cit.
815 Author’s with Interview with Mohammed Thuraiya, op., cit.
Lebanon for the same purpose. Before accrediting the season of 2007, Al-Aqsa’s board of directors organised a private workshop, and invited the representatives of all Hamas media institutions, including representatives of the Hamas government, to discuss the draft of the season.

The season that followed the formation of the Hamas government states that it was prepared to serve and support this government. Fathi Hammed states that this season was prepared very carefully, as it was not a result of superficial discussions, but depended on research and deep debates by the “Hamas experts”, in order to serve the project of resistance of this government that leads it at this era of history. The season shows that Alaqsa was keen to focus on the programmes which deal with the political issues and then with the religious issues, although the season included different aspects like social, economic, cultural, and other issues.

The season shows that the programmes of the Alaqsa TV address the determinants of the political program of the Hamas government in different ways and that it addresses the important elements of the project of Hamas, and its government.

A document under the title “Determinants of the political programme presented by Hamas to the Palestinian factions and parliamentary blocs to form a coalition government” shows the main issues addressed for the platform of the forthcoming government – which were formulated by Hamas. The general principles of the Hamas’s government platform are related to various issues such as the conflict with the occupation including the issues of resistance and truce, the political settlement and the position towards it, the attitude towards the recognition of Israel and the international resolution on Palestine, and the vision towards what Hamas calls ‘Arab and Islamic strategic depth’. From these principles, the document points out the position of the government towards the main critical issues which will face the Hamas government at the local level, regional level, and the international level as well.

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816 Ibid.
817 Ibid.
818 Author’s with Interview with Fathi Hammad op., cit.
819 A document titled “Determinants of the political program presented by “Hamas” to the Palestinian factions and parliamentary blocs to form a coalition government”, 11 March 2006.
On several occasions, the Hamas leaders describe the government headed by Hamas as a ‘government of resistance’, considering that clinging to the Palestinian constants is resistance, and on the grounds that not succumbing to the dictates and policies of USA and Israel is resistance. Wasfi Kabha, the prisoner and ex-minister in the Hamas government, emphasises that his government “has paid a very high price” because it adopted the project of resistance, and rejected all of the internal and external pressures to give up this project. Kabha adds: “We are a resistant government, because we were the first Palestinian government to adopt the option of resistance against Israel, and our role was to protect the project of resistance and protect the resisters, not fight them”. Kabha states that when Hamas was in power, it carried out large military operations against Israel such as the operation which imprisoned the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, claiming that Hamas was leading the resistance factions, and arguing that Hamas military groups were on the top of the defence of the Palestinian people during the Israeli invasions of Palestinian towns during the period of Hamas’s government rule. Therefore, he adds “our government was embargoed and boycotted politically and economically, and targeted by Israel, and was fought by the presidential bureau and Fatah”.

How did Alaqsa TV season support the Hamas government’s platform especially within the framework of the mentioned issues? Four ways can be extracted from the Alaqsa TV documents and the data collected from Alaqsa TV seniors:

- Space was given to the Hamas government officials, the Hamas MP’s, or Hamas leaders to put forward the views of the movement, and justify their positions towards the central issues and major events taking place in the Palestinian territories.
- Special programmes were allocated to deal with various issues including political, social, economic, cultural, sport, education and children which ultimately served the projects of Hamas and its government.

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820 Author’s interview with Wasfi Kabha, op.cit. (It is worthy mentioning that Kabha himself was one of the Hamas’s government members who was arrested in the Israeli crackdown which followed the kidnapping of the Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit).
821 Ibid.
822 Ibid.
- *Attaghiyat alkhassa* [The special coverage] which played a significant role in supporting the Hamas government, through the special coverage of the events that served the Hamas government’s agenda.

- *Fawasil* [Promo breaks] to promote the ideas of the government of resistance such as cultivation of what Hamas calls *Muharrarat* [the evacuated Israeli settlements in Gaza strip], paving roads, and re-construction of the demolished houses etc. Some of these *fawasil* also included promotions of the ideas of resistance to the Israeli occupation, including armed resistance, and also contained criticism of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and its president Abbas, and to the ‘security collaborations’ between the PNA and Israel.

**First: Highlighting the Hamas government men**

In the season of 2007 there were two weekly programmes to be broadcast live specially for interviewing senior members of the Hamas government such as ministers, deputy ministers, undersecretaries of the Ministries, the directors of particular departments that were in contact with the public, and also some of the Palestinian public figures. One of these two programmes, named: *Liqa’a Ma’a Mas’soul* [interview with an official] was allocated to interview the Government men in particular. The other programme, which was called: *Dayf-u Alaqsa* [the guest of Alaqsa], was allocated for Palestinian figures in general, although mostly it hosted the Hamas or senior Hamas government members.

**1- *Liqa’a Ma’a Mas’soul* [interview with an official]**

It was a one-hour programme. This programme hosts one of the decision-makers, Government officials or the MPs to raise the hot issues that concern the Palestinian people. In the description of the programme in the 2007 season, the first objective of this programme was “To make room for the leaders in the new government to demonstrate their views to the Palestinian people.”

Leading a Palestinian government was a new experience for Hamas. As mentioned, this government, which faced challenges including the political embargo, the economic siege and the security chaos, did not successfully perform its duties towards several

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issues. The Hamas government failed to pay the salaries to the employees in the public sector, as it also failed to proceed with the financing of vital projects like the paving of roads and other infrastructure projects, as well as the financing of vital sectors like the municipalities. *Liqa’a Ma’a Mas’soul* was one of the programmes that Alaqsa allocated to the senior government figures to concentrate on justifying their failure on these issues by highlighting the reason of what they call “the political and economic siege” which aimed to put pressure on Hamas to accept the international quartet “conditions”. Moa’ath Alamoudi, one of the Alaqsa producers, states this programme hosted the Prime minister of the Hamas government, Ismail Haniya, and all of the Hamas government ministers, as well as most deputy ministers and undersecretaries of the Ministries. In most of these interviews the government leaders were required to answer questions from the public, especially those questions related to the salaries, food supplies, electricity, water and everything that affected the daily life of people. Answering the people’s questions was also one of the *Liqa’a Ma’a Mas’soul* objectives. The team of *Liqa’a Ma’a Mas’soul* selected the topic of the episodes according to the importance of the topic of the week. For instance, the programme invited Ziad Alzaza, ‘the minister of transport’ (and he was also the deputy Prime Minister) to discuss the crises related to roads and transport, taxi drivers etc. It invited the director general of the Kanan Obaid, the deputy of the Palestinian energy and natural recourse – PENRA, to talk about the electricity problem in the Gaza strip, since this issue was considered one of the most critical challenges that faced the Hamas Government. It should be pointed out that the problem of electricity was one of the consequences of the siege imposed by Israel on the Hamas government, since the source of the fuel supply for the power is Israel, and the latter do not recognise the Hamas Government and then do not deal with it in any issue, including the power supply. So, the Hamas government always linked the siege on its government to its political reasons. Ismail Mahfouz, the deputy of the finance ministry talked about the ‘chronic crises of salaries’ in the Gaza strip since the Hamas government could not pay the employees’ salaries for several months after the elections. For the political issues

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824 Author’s with Interview with Mo’ath Alamoudi, op., cit.
825 The second season of Alaqsa satellite channel, op., cit, p. 23.
826 Important: these examples were taken from Mohammed Thuraiya the deputy director of Alaqsa TV as there is no document to detail these episodes, since Alaqsa TV lost a huge amount of documents (electronic and hard copies) in the building of the Channel which was bombed by the Israeli army during the war on Gaza in 2008/2009.
programme hosted Hamas officials who were capable of responding to the presented political topic.

In the season of 2009 till the season of 2011 this programme name was changed to be *liqa’u khass* [special interview]. Moa’ath Al’amoudi says, “Nothing has changed on the programme apart from the name”\(^{827}\). In addition, with creation of new branches and studios in the Arab capitals, the Alaqsa TV began to broadcast some episodes of this program from various Arab capitals and hosted figures who were close to Hamas and supported its political and ideological line. The appendix number 8 contains the notes of programme’s producer for an episode with the Minister of Health in the Hamas government, Basim Nae’im. The document shows the points that were covered in the interview, which was mostly about the suffering caused by the siege.

2- *Dayf-u Alaqsa [the guest of Alaqsa]*

This programme is a live one-hour programme. It hosts Palestinian public figures, in general, to shed the light on their life experience, and highlight their successes and their own characters, especially poets, intellectuals, opinion leaders and decision makers.\(^{828}\) This program focussed not only on the personalities of Hamas, but was also inviting figures who were respected in the Palestinian community, but at the same time were close to Hamas and its government, and most importantly those who had an ‘Islamic tendency’. For example, the programme invited Nahid Rayes, who was a poet, writer, well known lawyer, ex-minister of law, ex-MP, and one of the historical leaders of Fatah movement who later became one of the one of the most opposed to this movement. The programme has Rayes on the 13\(^{th}\) of March as the episode focussed on his personality as a public figure. The document of this episode shows that presenter Yahya Salem aimed to direct the episode in a way that serves the Hamas line. In between the questions, he introduced issues that were completely in line with the Hamas tendencies and related to the relationship with the Israeli occupation and the PNA in Ramallah.\(^{829}\) Despite the fact that the presenter started the episode by talking about the poetic talent of Rayes, and his combination of poetry and politics, Salem (the presenter) discussed various issues such as: “The Palestinian Nakba”, “Living under siege”, “The

\(^{827}\) Author’s with Interview with Moath Alamoudi, op., cit.

\(^{828}\) The second season of Alaqsa satellite channel, op. cit, p33.

\(^{829}\) A document of *Dayf-u Alaqsa* [the guest of Alaqsa] proposal of the episode that hosted Nahid Rayes, prepared and presented by Yahya Salem, 13/3/2008.
struggle with the Zionist enemy”, “Policy pursued by President Abbas and his team” and “What is our way to deal with the occupation?”.

Another example is the episode that hosted Jamal Alkhudari, the independent MP and the Chairman of the Popular Committee against the Siege on Gaza who is also an ex-minister of telecommunications. Most of the episode concentrated on the siege on Gaza and the consequences for the Palestinian people in the Gaza strip, while the presenter addressed several political subjects. In particular he asked Alkhudari about his visit to several European cities and his meetings with political parties’ representatives and activists, within the activities of the Popular Committee against the Siege on Gaza. In addition to this type of public figure, the programme hosted Hamas government ministers, such as Mahmoud Alzahhar, the foreign minister, Talib Abu Sa’ar, the minister of Waqf and religious affairs, and others. Moreover, a large number of the guests on the programme were personalities who belonged to Hamas, including the leaders/founders of Hamas, like Abdul-Fattah Dukhan, Hammad Elhasanat, and Mohamed Taha, Ibrahim Yazouri, who were all companions of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the founder of Hamas, as most of them have rich histories and life experiences.

Second: Achievements and failures of the government

The suffering of the people, especially the people of Gaza, were exacerbated when Hamas came to power, and the suffering increased after the Hamas takeover of Gaza, as Israel regarded the Gaza strip as ‘a hostile entity’, and controlled by a ‘terrorist organization’ by force of arms. Hamas, despite the blockade, was making efforts to solve these everyday problems, but in most cases did not provide radical solutions, and

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830 Ibid.
834 A document of Dayf-u Alaqsa [the guest of Alaqsa] proposal of the episode that hosted Abdul-Fattah Dukhan, 05/05/2008.
thus Alaqsa TV, like all the media of Hamas, dedicated its endeavours to show the achievements (if there were any) or to justify the failure, mostly by blaming the occupation, and sometimes these programmes criticised the government of Hamas for what they believed they were wrong policies and practices. This section presents two examples:

1- *Lil-Ahamiya [For the importance]*

This was a weekly, live broadcast programme which addressed the problems and everyday concerns, particularly the economic and social issues that faced the Palestinian citizens, whether they were caused by the Israeli occupation or by what ‘Alaqsa TV’ called “mistaken policies of the government”\(^{838}\) and civil society institutions. The programme invited officials to respond to questions and queries by citizens. Mo’ath Alamoudi, one of the programme presenters, suggests that the programme hosted non-political government officials such as the undersecretary of the Ministry of Education and Higher Education, or the projects manager in the Ministry of Economy etc; as the programme aimed to deliver the voice of the citizens who were voiceless to the officials, in order to help both officials and citizens by presenting solutions or at least answers about the people’s concerns.\(^{839}\) A long list of topics was dealt with in 2009; examples of these topics are following:

- Medical mistakes in the Palestinian hospitals.
- Encroachment on public land by some citizens.
- High price crisis.
- The crisis of water salinity and the crisis of water scarcity in the Gaza strip and West Bank.
- Gaza patients and the crisis of the shortage drugs.
- Environmental Pollution in the Gaza strip.
- Reconstruction of demolished houses and public buildings.
- Rafah crossings crisis.


\(^{839}\) Author’s Interview with Moath Alamoudi, op., cit.
- Public services in the refugee camps.
- Archaeological sites in the Gaza Strip.
- The poor quality of mobile phone services.
- Police behaviour towards people
- The traffic problems in Gaza
- The rescue and safety measures offered by the Municipality on the beach of Gaza.

Alamoudi argues that the programme policy was not to defend the government and its mistakes, but to defend the ‘poor citizen’ and alleviate the suffering of the Palestinian citizens. He states: “For the benefit of the government, which leads the Islamic resistance project, we were keen to address the problems of the people, most of which were caused by the unjust blockade imposed on the Gaza strip, but also, there some shortcomings and mistakes committed by the government. We in Al-Aqsa TV, feel a responsibility towards this project and therefore we highlight the disorder aspects in order to correct the path”.

However, the programme addressed those achievements of the Hamas government which Alamoudi called the “fundamental achievements”, especially in terms of imposing security and utilising the Muharrarat and employing a number of the unemployed youths. Hamas considered that it managed to end the Falatan after taking charge of the Gaza strip by restructuring the security apparatus and establishing a civilian police, and re-organisation of the judiciary. Hamas also managed to dismantle some of the drug dealers’ gangs, and arrest some of the ‘car thieves’, as well as managing to close many files on well-known crimes that had existed since the years of the previous rule of the PNA in Gaza. The Hamas government also boasts that it had a ‘big achievement’ in utilising the lands of Muharrarat. The agriculture ministry

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840 Ibid.
841 Ibid.
842 Ibid.
844 See Sayigh, Yezid: "We Serve the People": Hamas Policing in Gaza, Brandeis University Crown Centre for Middle East Studies, Crown Paper, April 2011, p 55.
of Hamas’s government ran a number of agricultural projects such as the million olive trees project, palms nursery project, medicinal and aromatic plants projects, the fish farming project and other projects. These projects were aimed at achieving self-sufficiency in some crops, as well as employing numbers of the unemployed citizens. This was important for the Hamas government as Alaqsa had a role in shedding light on this ‘achievement’, to restore confidence in Hamas and show that Hamas had succeeded where its political opponent (PNA led by Fatah) had failed.

2- **Qadiya Ala Besat elbahth [Issue on the table]**

This programme is similar, to some extent, to the *Lil-Ahamiya* programme, in terms of objectives and mechanisms of selection of guests and topics. However, the topics covered the political issues of the government. The description of the programme shows that it was keen to deliver the Government's view on events in the Palestinian arena.

It should be pointed out that the daily entertainment programme; *Nasim alsabah* [morning breeze] addressed a variety of issues related to the people’s daily life and how Hamas government deals with such issues, as it hosted representatives of the government to propagate their views.

**Third: the Special coverage**

Samir Abu Mohsin states that the Alaqsa TV intended to cover all the “important events” that served Hamas and its project, including the activities of the Government, the Legislative Council, and activities of Hamas itself, such as festivals, rallies, and press conferences, etc. Therefore, Alaqsa played a major role in supporting the Government of Hamas. Here are some examples of this special coverage:

- Live broadcasting of all assemblies of the PLC in Gaza, (mostly composed of Hamas MPs) to show the PLC perform its role as it had the ability to convene and enact laws against all odds, as there was no opportunity for the proceedings to be broadcast on the Arab news channels, like Aljazeera and Alarabiya.

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846 Author’s interview with Mo’athalamoudi, op., cit.

847 Author’s interview with Samir Abu Mohsin, op., cit.
• Full coverage of the Hamas marches and rallies which Hamas organised on the anniversaries of historical events related to Hamas in particular and to the Palestinian issue in general, such as the anniversary of the founding of Hamas on the 14th of December every year and the anniversary of the assassination of Hamas founder, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, on the 22nd of March of every year.

• Special focus on the siege imposed on the Gaza Strip, and the ‘humanitarian catastrophe’, especially the issues like the constant power cuts and the water shortages, and shortages of medicines and the preventing of patients from seeking treatment abroad which led to the deaths of dozens, according to reports of human rights organizations, as well as the restricting of the “foodstuff lists” and all types of the construction materials, which caused difficulties as many homes were destroyed during Israeli incursions. In this regard, the Alaqsa TV tried as hard as it could to utilise these situations to serve the issue of ‘ending the siege on Gaza’ as it not only be reflected on the people’s lives, but also on Hamas and its government. The coverage of the humanitarian situation was designed to show that Israel and the international community, together with the Arab regimes were punishing the Palestinian people of Gaza for their democratic choice, as this was the official attitude of the Hamas government.

• Full coverage of the emergent events, the Israeli offensives in the Palestinian territories, the assassination of Palestinian activists, and convoys of foreign delegations who were standing in solidarity with Gaza and the Hamas government.

**Fourth: the Fawasil [the promos] and Nashid**

Alaqsa TV used to broadcast the fawasil in the intervals of programmes over the duration of the daily broadcast. The lengths of these fawasil were from 30 to 60

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seconds, as each one has hold a message to serve a particular purpose. The *fawasil* promoted the message through film footage, together with comments and sound effects. Most of the Alaqsa TV *fawasil* had jihad/resistance characteristics. For example, they showed some of the previous military operations of Hamas against Israel and others vowed that the occupation would be defeated if it invaded Palestinian areas (with emphasis on the Strip). Some of the *fawasil* used the Hebrew language since the message was directed to the Israeli soldiers and settlers. These *fawasil* contain comments like: “To the Zionists Soldiers, your state will not protect you, and Gaza will be your tomb”, and “Urgent call to the settlers, the rockets of resistance will come down like rain until you leave our country”. 850 In the support of the Hamas government, there were also some *fawasil* which showed government projects in the *Muharrat* and paving some roads, etc. 851

As for the *Nashid*, which represent an important part of the mobilisation in the Hamas media, dozens, if not hundreds, of these *Nashid* were produced by the Alaqsa TV and production companies affiliated to Hamas. Several *Nashid(s)* were written particularly to support the government of Hamas in Gaza. One of these *Nashid* was to glorify the prime minister of the Hamas Government, Ismail Haniya, and to declare support and the allegiance, during the clash of the Hamas government with the Palestinian presidency and the challenges which faced the Hamas government. The *Nashid* lyrics title was “we declare allegiance to Abu Al-Abed”. Another *Nashid* was written specially for Haniya after his recovery from an operation.852 There were also *Nashid* against the siege on Gaza which were broadcast constantly, such as the *Nashid* “Those oppressors besiege us”.

The above discussion indicates that the above-mentioned Alaqsa programs focussed on issues that served the Hamas government, which Alaqsa TV institution called ‘the government of resistance.’

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**Part Two: New aspects in Hamas media strategy**

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850 Author’s with Interview with Moath Alamoudi, op., cit. Note: Alamoudi stated that it was himself who wrote these words.
851 Ibid
852 Ibid.
This part will shed the light on the new aspects of Hamas media strategy, which have mostly emerged during the last five years. One of these aspects is the use of media in psychological warfare during and after the war in Gaza, especially the utilisation of the captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. The second aspect is related to the expansion of the media infrastructure, which includes four new topics: creation of media institutions under the title of “independent media institutions”, the utilisation of the new media, Hamas media as a financial resource, and creating the journalistic guild.

**Counter - Psychological warfare: a new front in Hamas resistance**

Psychological warfare has been used by the Israeli army since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. The Israeli army used psychological warfare in order to compel the Palestinian people to leave their villages.\(^{853}\) In the two Palestinian intifadas Israeli propaganda was part of the battle against Palestinian militant groups.\(^{854}\) In the first and second intifada, the Israeli army used different tactics in its psychological warfare in order to “wear down” the Palestinian militants and the civilians who supported them.\(^{855}\) This included using the radio, leaflets and, at some points, loudspeakers.\(^{856}\) During the war on Gaza 2008/2009 Israel used new techniques. For example, the Israeli aircraft dropped leaflets warning the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip against any violent actions.\(^{857}\) The Israeli army also used the land line phones and text messaging in addition to hacking the local radio and television stations and broadcasting Israeli army messages.\(^{858}\)

Hamas considered that these tactics sought to weaken the morale of the Palestinian people and wear them down, especially the men of the resistance, so this required that the Palestinian resistance deal with the Israeli strategy of psychological warfare through what may be called counter-psychological warfare. One of the main objectives in

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\(^{856}\) Ibid.


Hamas media strategy was to “refute” what Hamas regarded as “rumours and lies” by the Israelis, and at the same time the Hamas media aimed to “wage psychological warfare against the enemy to affect the morale of his soldiers and weaken its public support in its wars”. The media of the Hamas military wing, which is separate from the general media institution of Hamas, intended to document some of its military operations against Israel and to broadcast them to the world media as part of this psychological warfare.

Psychological warfare was used by Hamas before, during and after the war on Gaza; in particular it utilised the issue of the Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit who was held captive by Hamas for 5 years. Over the five years, Hamas intended to leak some news related to Shalit’s life. It released an audio tape about Shalit, saying that his health was not good and that he needed permanent treatment in hospital, and calling on the Israeli government to work for his release, reminding them that he had a father, mother, and family, as did all of the Palestinian prisoners. This message was released after one year of Sahlit’s captivity. After the war on the Gaza strip in 2008/2009, Hamas leaked to the media that Shalit might have been injured during the war. Ron Schleifer, addressed this issue from a psychological warfare perspective, arguing that the timing by Hamas of the news of Shalit's injury came deliberately at a very sensitive time in order to increase the raging controversy among the Israeli public about the issue of Shalit. Schleifer also saw that Hamas had taken this step when it felt that the issue had begun to fade from the minds of Israeli politicians’ priorities.

In April 2010, Hamas produced an animated 3D video, in Hebrew, with English subtitles. The video shows Noam Shalit, the father of Gilad, walking in the streets in Israeli cities, and looking at huge billboards; on each one there is an Israeli leader vowing to release his son. At the end of the video, Noam becomes an old man when he

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859 Author’s interview with Momen Bsiesu, op., cit.
860 Author’s interview with Wissam Afifa, op., cit.
reaches the borders of Gaza to meet with Gilad, which is long overdue. Then he issues a
cry of pain and grief when he finds that his son is no longer alive.863

Two points can be understood from this discussion:

A) Obviously, the target audience of these video and audio tapes, and the news
leaked about Shalit’s life, was the Israeli people and the Israeli soldier, and they
were aimed at putting pressure on the Israeli government to negotiate with
Hamas and complete the prisoner exchange deal. This means that Hamas
intended to enlarge the circle of its target audience to the Israeli public, as
Hamas was aware of the importance of the pressure of public opinion in Israel.
The day after the release of this video, the Israeli media dedicated media time
and space for debates about the movie. The other message that this video carried
was to the Israeli soldiers: that Shalit’s case could be the fate of any soldier
serving in Gaza.

B) The production of such videos, using 3D technology is considered a “new
technique” used by Hamas in its psychological warfare against Israel. This was
the first time in Hamas’s history that Hamas produced this sort of media
production. Aaron Larner sees that the production of this video means that
Hamas “seeks to send a message to every single home in Israel, as this method is
better than any political statement or article by Hamas.”864

Independent but Pro-Hamas

This section look at the media institution that Hamas has established under the rubric of
‘independent media institution’. One of the Hamas government has benefited from ‘the
independent Palestinian media’, which Hamas established to serve its agendas. These
media institutions were established to support the Hamas government and to regard it as
a legitimate government. This present section reviews three examples of these
institutions and corporations; Felesteen daily newspaper, Alquds satellite channel and
the Palestinian press agency SAFA.


864 Larner, Aaron interview with the Xinhua News Agency, 27/4/2010, available on:
1- **The felesteen daily newspaper:** The felesteen daily newspaper identifies itself as an independent newspaper, and so does the director general of the paper Ahmed Sa’ati.  

Mohammed Awad, one of its editors, affirms that the newspaper belongs to a private company, “Alwasat for media and publishing” which refuses to be classified as part of Hamas’ media. However, many sources classify the newspaper as “counted as Hamas” according to ‘Israel's Terrorism Information Centre’. This Israeli centre claims that most of the central staff members (which includes about 50 employees) of the newspaper are “counted as Hamas”. There are some indications that the felesteen newspaper deals with Hamas and its government positively, as it covers everything related to the Hamas government in Gaza at all levels. In addition, the newspaper does not use terms that imply that the government in Gaza is ‘a de facto government’ or illegitimate government. For example, it does not use the term “Hamas government” or the “resigned government”, but the article says the Palestinian government, as it does not use “the resigned prime minister”, but it uses the description in its “natural context”, “the Palestinian Prime minister” as Awad states.

The newspaper also publishes public service announcements, which have a legal dimension, such as court announcements in Gaza, and also publishes advertisements of the various ministries such as for tenders and auctions, as well as covering the news of these ministries on a regular basis. This newspaper is banned by the Palestinian authority in the West Bank in the context of the conflict between Fatah and Hamas. In reaction, the Hamas government banned the three daily newspapers that belong to Fatah and the PNA from distribution in the Gaza strip ruled by Hamas.

2- **Alquds satellite channel**

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865 Author’s interview with Ahmed Sa’ati, op., cit.

866 Author’s interview with Mohammed Awad, op., cit.

867 During the conflict between Fatah and Hamas, two of felesteen newspaper, Sulaimen Alashi, and Mohammed Abdu were killed at one of the checkpoints of the Fatah militants. Look at the report of CPJ (Committee to protect Journalists), available on: [http://cpj.org/killed/2007/suleiman-abdul-rahim-al-ashi.php](http://cpj.org/killed/2007/suleiman-abdul-rahim-al-ashi.php), (accessed in 20/9/2011).


869 Interview with Mohammed Awad, op., cit.

On Saturday 15/3/2008, the Alquds Satellite Channel started an experimental broadcast of some folk songs of the Palestinian singer Abu Arab, footage of the Alaqsa Mosque, the old city of Jerusalem, the Palestinian territories’ occupied cities and villages and showed their aspects of daily life. Later on, it became Alquds satellite channel and started broadcasting 24 hours a day, from Beirut, and it has a broadcast studio in the Gaza Strip and main office in the West Bank with correspondents in most West Bank cities. The security apparatuses loyal to Fatah restricted Alquds’ TV work in the West Bank as they arrested six correspondents of Alquds channel under the pretext that the channel belonged to Hamas. The Palestinian centre for human rights considered that the arrest of those correspondents was part of the Hamas-Fatah divide, it stated: “pushing journalists in the cycle of confrontation between Fatah and Hamas.” However, Badreddine Mohammad, one of Alquds TV officials, said that the channel was a ‘Palestinian independent, and not Hamas’, but it had an approach close to Hamas’s, politically and intellectually. The message of Alquds channel was to “Highlight the importance of Palestine and Jerusalem to an Arab and Islamic nation, and to emphasise the justice of its cause.” In addition, Badreeddine asserted that the great objective of Alquds was directed to ‘the adherence to the Palestinian constants’ including ending the occupation, and removing the settlements, building an independent and free Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, the return of the Palestinian refugees to their lands and properties, and the liberation of the Palestinian prisoners.

In fact, these issues represent Hamas’s project in all of its details, as Alquds objectives served, at the strategic-term, the objectives of Hamas’ project against the project of the peace settlement with Israel led by the Fatah movement.

3- The Palestinian press agency SAFA.

In the same way as Alquds TV and Felesteen newspaper, Yasser Abu Heen, the editor in chief of Safa press agency, refused, categorically, to attribute his
institution to Hamas, saying that it was an independent news agency and performed its mission in a professional manner. Abu Heen argues that his news agency was the agency which provided instant media services on the latest developments on the Palestinian issue with verification, accuracy and objectivity in these media materials. However, the Israeli Information Centre of Intelligence and Terrorism at the Centre for Intelligence Heritage, clearly claimed that the Safa agency was created by Hamas as Abu Heen who is “Hamas-affiliated” was the director of this news agency. Safa aimed to “expose the crimes of the Israeli occupation against the Palestinian people as a national priority”

Indeed, the Hamas leadership who work in media, have some reservations about declaring that these media are affiliated to Hamas for the following reasons:

A. **The security reason**: Hamas and its institutions are considered as Israeli targets at all times, so Hamas wants to avoid Israel targeting its media institutions under the pretext that they are ‘terrorist organizations’. It is worth mentioning that Israel has bombed most of the Hamas media, such as Alrisalah newspaper, radio Alaqsa, and Alaqsa TV, and Alaqsa terrestrial TV.

B. **Address all the masses**: Hamas, through these independent institutions does not aim to address a particular category of the public, but rather aims to attract the public in general, especially those who are not Hamas. Ostensibly, these media institutions focus on particular aspects of the Palestinian issue, and they received favourable comments from a lot of people because they are not biased towards any of the Palestinian factions, especially the two warring factions, Fatah and Hamas. However, these media institutions propagate the Hamas political and ideological agenda directly and indirectly, not under the name of Hamas but as Palestinian/independent media institutions which serve, in the long-run, Hamas’s project.

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877 Author’s interview with Yasser Abu Heen, op., cit.

878 Author’s interview with Moath Alamoudi, op., cit.
C. Exchange of roles and responsibilities: Taking advantage of the principle of the exchange of roles and responsibilities gives the Hamas media flexibility and margin for manoeuvre in certain political topics, so that these political topics do represent the position of Hamas while it serves its interests. For example, Alquds satellite channel has hosted both Fatah and PNA figures to comment on particular issues since the channel considers itself a channel for all Palestinians, while Alaqsa TV does not give this chance to Fatah figures.

Hamas and the new media

The term ‘new media’ “remains open and ongoing.”879 The term has been used since the 1960s for cyberspace, and interactive television.880 There are many definitions of new media. Some point to the development of information and communication technologies. Robert Logan links it to digital media that are interactive, incorporate two-way communications and involve some form of computing.881 Andrew Dewdney and Peter Ride add a third angle to the term, naming it a “new media equation”, combining both the technological and social aspects, in the other words, they focus on the new media and its cultural consequences.882 So do Leah A. Lievrouw, Sonia M. Livingstone.883

This section will look at the utilisation by Hamas of the new technologies, especially interactive media such as social networks, blogs, and telecommunications technology, precisely the mobile phone.

1- Social networks:

Hamas established the Palestine forum for dialogue (http://www.paldf.net) as the first Palestinian website, in 2001, and this website is part of the main Palestinian information centre.884 There are 50,000 members, the number of shares has amounted to

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882 Dewdney, Andrew and Ride, Peter: The new media, op., cit.
884 Author’s interview with Bara’a Rayyan, board member of the Palestinian dialogue forum, 2/6/2009.
approximately 3 million since its founding.\textsuperscript{885} This indicates that Hamas has kept pace with development in the use of the media outlets. However, Bara’a Ryyan sees that “the interest of Hamas in the social media was weak” until the Arab Spring uprising, as the social media networks played an important role in the mobilisation of these uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen. Rayyan claims: “The Arab Spring uprisings brought into prominence the question of the importance of the new media for Hamas”.\textsuperscript{886}

At early stages of the emergence of the social media websites, security reasons were enough, for Hamas, to urge its members to beware of dealing with new media and social networks such as Facebook and Twitter, as dissemination of personal information and activities of Hamas members on such networks would hurt them, and give free information to Israeli intelligence agents. Then, after the Arab uprising in 2011, Hamas found itself forced to deal with the new media, including the social networks, as the total number of Facebook users in the Palestinian territories is 646620, which represents of the 25.71\% of the population, the vast majority are Youth. The age group 18-34 represents 68\% of the users.\textsuperscript{887}

\textsuperscript{885} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{886} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{887} Social barkers, the social media statistics available on: \url{http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics/palestine}, (accessed in 06/10/2011).
After the appearance of a few groups on the Facebook calling for demonstrations against the divide in Gaza and the West Bank, Hamas started to take action. Abdallah claims that these groups were driven by points of view belonging to the Palestinian left wing as well as some of them by Fatah and that they aimed to act against Hamas rule in Gaza under the title “people want an end to division”, copying the experience of the Tunisian and Egyptian peoples who succeeded in forcing their presidents to step down. Hamas formed a “special committee” to deal with what is termed *alhirak alshababi min ajl inha’a alinqisam* [the youth movement for the end of division], as they already had pages on the face book under the same slogan, “people want to end the division”. According to the committee’s recommendations, Hamas instructed its members (who are able) to get involved in the social networks sites such as Facebook, Twitter, blogs, video sites, photos sites and others. Hamas conducted training courses in some of the Palestinian Territories in using the social networks, especially Facebook and Twitter. It has distributed an “inner leaflet” enclosing instructions about how to use the social networks websites, focussing on two aspects:

A) The presence in the social networks, as all Hamas members should do their best to demonstrate and defend the Hamas attitudes toward the current issues as such networks have a huge number of people and groups that can be connected with, and deliver the Hamas’s voice.

B) The security aspect, as Hamas instructed supporters to deal with these networks very carefully, by hiding the profiles and not revealing “sensitive information”, as the interior security apparatus of Hamas has discovered some cases of Israeli agents who try to link some Palestinians with the Israeli intelligence through the social networks.

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888 Personal conversation with Ahmed Abdallah, the admin of Palestine Now website, (Hamas-affiliated), 05/10/2011.

889 Ibid.

890 A quick search on the Facebook search engine shows that there are about a hundred of paged under this name *alshaab yirid inha’a alinqisam* [people want to end the division]. The search has been done in 06/10/2011.

891 Author’s interview with Moath alamoudi, op., cit.

892 Abdalla reveals some of the leaflet information as he refused to give a copy of the leaflet.
Consequently, dozens of Facebook pages and blogs have begun to appear on the internet. Some of these pages (Facebook groups) cover several titles that, politically, serve the Hamas interests. For instance, there was a group carrying the slogan, “people want to end the divide” which is the same as the slogan of the “youth movement for the end of division”, as Hamas instructed its members, strongly and effectively, to join all activities calling for end to the Palestinian division, and this is what happened, according to Abdallah. He states: “It was decided to create three Facebook pages calling for the end of division and to urge the Hamas members in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to join, strongly and effectively, in the demonstrations, and this is what happened, we did not only participate but also Hamas led the marches.”

Maseerat alwada [the march of return] face book group, which was administrated by Ziad Mohammed, a Palestinian resident in Gaza, was one of the activities that was adopted by Hamas, as the group called on the Palestinian people of the home and the Diaspora to commemorate the 63rd anniversary of the Palestinian Nakba. Thousands of Palestinians have answered this call and went out in demonstrations in the occupied territories and on the borders of Israel with Syria, Lebanon and Jordan; several Palestinians were killed and injured in this event. In the West Bank, where Hamas activities are restricted, the social networks and blogs have been used widely. Hamas members have organised a number of campaigns against the PNA in the West Bank using the Facebook and the blogs. For example, the campaign of “rejection of the political detention in the west bank” organised by a group called “the Association of Muslim youth in the West Bank”. This was followed by different campaigns under different names for the same purpose.

893 Author’s interview with Ahmed Abdallah, op., cit.
894 Ibid
895 Personal conversation (Skype) with Ziad Mohammed, the admin of the maseerat alawda Facebook group, 04/10/2011. Mohammed claims that the idea was to just to “reclaim our natural right to return to our houses” and this call is for all Palestinians, regardless of whether they are Hamas or Fatah”, however, Mohammed said that Hamas supported the marches, despite the fact that Hamas did not declare officially its participation to avoid the consequences in the Israeli border”.
897 Author’s interview with Moath alamoudi, op., cit.
899 Author’s interview with Moath Alamoudi, op., cit.
Indeed, Hamas turned to the use of social networks, to promote its agenda, and serve its interests, by the above-mentioned activities. Also, the presence of Hamas, whether as an organisation or as individuals, can be clearly seen through the following:

**First:** Most of Hamas’ media institutions have linked with the social networks, this includes the electronic media (Alaqsa TV, Alaqsa radio, the Palestinian information centre, etc.), and the print media (alrisalah and felesteen).

**Second:** The Hamas media office has established, officially, accounts on: Facebook, Twitter, Worldpress blogs, Flicker and YouTube. In addition, Hamas spokespersons have created accounts on Facebook and Twitter in their own names and official posts as Hamas’ spokespersons, and this has become a source for the local and world media.

**Third:** Numbers of the Hamas leaders, the ministers of Hamas government, and the Hamas MPs have created accounts on Facebook, and in smaller numbers on Twitter, aiming to communicate and interact with the public, present their ideas, and answer questions of people. For example, Azizi Dwaik, the president of the PLC, Hatem Qufaisha, the Hamas MP, Yahya Musa, the Hamas MP, Samira Alhalayqa, the Hamas MP, Izzat Errishiq, the Hamas political bureau member, Ahmed El-Kurd, Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, and others.

2- **SMS as a mobilising tool**

The use of mobile phone technology as a mobilising tool by social movements and political activists has become obvious. The youth of the Arab Spring have widely used this technology in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen, which pushed the Arab regimes to turn off the mobile networks to prevent the youth from using this technology. Hamas has used mobile phone technology effectively since the last PLC elections, mainly, the short message service, SMS. Alamoudi justifies the use of SMS

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902 Author’s interview with Moath Alamoudi, op., cit.
by its easiness, speediness and efficiency, as well as it being relatively cheap.\textsuperscript{903} He states: “in one hour, Hamas can mobilize thousands of members and supporters via SMS, this has happened on several occasions”.\textsuperscript{904}

\textit{Jihaz alamal aljamahiti} [The mass action apparatus], which follows the media department, has made a lists of mobile phones numbers containing thousands in each district of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The SMS web service, which is mainly used by Hamas, is provided by the different companies in the Palestinian territories. By this service, SMS can be sent to all numbers included in a very easy way.

For events and activities at the national level, Hamas sends the same text to all regions of the Palestinian territories. For example, Hamas called all of its members and supporters to join the demonstrations of the 13 of March 2011 which called for the end of the Palestinian divides; the following messages were sent to all Hamas members:

- “to resolve the battle in the street: this is a mandatory obligation to the brothers and sisters, including students and employees, the presence at 10:00 am tomorrow in front of the mosque and set off mass demonstrations holding flags to protect the movement. We will not allow one that affects our project.”\textsuperscript{905}

- To reject the insurgency against the Hamas movement by the thugs of Fatah, and to preserve constants, participate strongly in the massive march tomorrow after Friday prayers, your participation is very important.”\textsuperscript{906}

- “Urgent: everyone to go now to ‘the Unknown Soldier Square’, Fatah rally in the arena is under alias titles against the movement, and tomorrow our meeting in the Green March the 10:00 pm.”\textsuperscript{907}

- “Today after the Maghrib prayer, massive march in support of the Turkish position to expel the Israeli ambassador (mandatory raise green flags).”\textsuperscript{908}

\textsuperscript{903} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{904} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{905} The source of these SMS texts is Moath Alamoudi, one of Hamas activists and the programme producer in Alaqsa TV.
\textsuperscript{906} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{907} Ibid, this message has been sent to the Hamas members in 13 march.
\textsuperscript{908} Ibid.
At the local district levels, the SMS was used for mobilizing the Hamas members and supporters for participation in social events such as funerals, mass weddings, and festivals. For example, in the Rimal district, they called for participation in the funeral of Mohammed Hassan Sham’a, one of the Hamas founders. The full text of this message was: “There is a bus tomorrow afternoon, in front of the mosque, to go to funeral of the Mohammed Hassan Sham’a”. In the Muslim Eid, Hamas also called for sharing the mass Eid ceremony, in Khaniyonis city, the SMS stated: “Congratulations and Eid Mubarak to all, May God accept your deeds. Just to inform you that there are buses from Bilal and Imam Shafei mosques between 4:45 am until 5:15 to share the prayer with the ‘Prime Minister Abu Abed’. Note: There is a special place for women.”

Within the discussion of the use of mobile phone technology, it is important to recall that Hamas also turned to the use of smart mobile phones, and tablet PC’s, as it has begun to use modern means to address the public. The Palestinian information centre has recently launched its iPhone and iPad applications, as these applications are available in the Apple’s applications store. This goes to prove Kabha’s argument that Hamas keeps abreast of technology and utilises it as far as it can.

**Hamas Media: a financial resource**

The funding sources of the Hamas media is unknown, as most of the answers of the interviewed people in this research were mysterious. Rizqa declined to talk about funding, saying: “I cannot answer the question, how much money or how it comes, I have no clue about this”. Similarly, Raafat Murrah said: “I do not really know where money comes from”. Mohammed Thuraiya said that the financial resources of Alaqsa TV are from “the Palestinian people, Arab and Islamic people’ who are sympathetic

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909 Ibid.
910 Ibid.
911 See the Palestinian information centre, available on [http://www.palestine-info.info/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd87MDI46m9rUXdJEpMO%2bi1s7x9hCPb3PHFWa%2fgGd98Xp%2bhSzW8x6Jnp9awLqsmv3etoQDFojj7TT%2bt9c6NorAwj5acVishX63qOUFFIz1bSRcuhFnPQIA3vrcs%2bSKQ%3d](http://www.palestine-info.info/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd87MDI46m9rUXdJEpMO%2bi1s7x9hCPb3PHFWa%2fgGd98Xp%2bhSzW8x6Jnp9awLqsmv3etoQDFojj7TT%2bt9c6NorAwj5acVishX63qOUFFIz1bSRcuhFnPQIA3vrcs%2bSKQ%3d), (accessed in 08/10/2011).
912 Author’s interview with Wasfi Kabha, op., cit.
913 Author’s interview with Yousef Rizqa, op., cit.
914 Author’s interview with Rafat Murrah op., cit.
with our cause and our project”\textsuperscript{915}. Rajoub argues that the financial problem is subject to counter-terrorism acts that list Hamas under this category in many countries.\textsuperscript{916} The ‘fund’ is the most significant challenge for the Hamas media institution.\textsuperscript{917} Therefore, the media institutions of Hamas have resorted to what Saati calls “self-financing and sustainable resources”.

\textbf{a) Paid advertisements:}

The Alaqsa TV as well as Alaqsa Radio has depended on the commercial advertisements as a financial source for self-funding. Thuraiya claims that Alaqsa TV managed to make advertising contracts with big national companies such as the mobile phone companies, as well as the local and small business companies.

\textbf{b) Investment in ‘a media production city’}

‘ASDAA media production city’, one of the Alaqsa media network branches, is a large leisure park which includes models of some of the Palestinian cities and villages, restaurants, swimming pools and a huge green area. ASDAA, which means in English ‘echo’, has been founded on the evacuated Israeli settlements in the middle of the Gaza strip.\textsuperscript{918} Thuraiya states that this ‘project’ is not only a profit project, but also it is a ‘beacon’ of culture, arts and media. He adds: “the media production city is the first in Palestine, and contains some investment and tourism projects to self-support and fund film and television production projects, and also creating dozens of jobs for our resistant people.”\textsuperscript{919} One of the ASDAA productions was a feature film on the commander of Hamas’s military wing, Emad Akel, as this film has been produced in in the ASDAA city. The cost of this movie did not exceed 120 US dollars as most of the two-hour movie has been made within ASDAA. In this regard, Kabha states that the production of this film gives a strong indicator of how the Hamas media has changed even in terms of “financial dimension”.\textsuperscript{920}

\textbf{c) Training centre}

\textsuperscript{915} Author’s interview with Mohammed Thuraiya, op. cit. The only one who reveals the amount of the Alaqsa satellite channel budget is Mohammed Thuraiya without giving any information about the source.

\textsuperscript{916} Author’s interview with Naiyf Rajoub, op., cit.

\textsuperscript{917} Ibid


\textsuperscript{919} Author’s interview with Mohammed Thuraiya, op., cit.

\textsuperscript{920} Author’s interview with Wasfi Kabha, op., cit.
The Alaqsa training centre is also one of the Alaqsa media network branches. This centre, which is ‘well equipped’, offers numerous training courses in the print and electronic media including: TV cameras, directing, screenwriting, and graphic design, along with engineering disciplines relating to television broadcasting techniques etc. The stated objective was to train young cadres in media skills, and especially Hamas’s cadres, but this Centre opens its doors to the public for ‘paid training courses’ in media skills. Thuraiya asserts that the centre has trained hundreds of the Palestinian youth, which means that the training centre has provided a financial income to the Alaqsa media network.

**Conclusion**

The studied period, in this chapter, shows the significant evolution of Hamas media strategy at all levels: infrastructure, target audience, media message and the media objectives. This chapter has shown that Hamas has expanded its media infrastructure by creating new and diverse media institutions. The Alaqsa Satellite TV, is the most important media outlet that propagates Hamas’s voice and covers all of the Arab countries and most of the audience in the Arab world. As argued, creating media institutions under the title of the ‘independent media’ such as Alquds TV, Felesteen Newspaper and Safa News Agency, was part of Hamas’s strategy of the integration, and exchange of roles and responsibilities amongst Hamas media outlets. Working under the title of ‘independency’ allowed Hamas to utilise its media institutions in the self-finance, as finance is one of the biggest challenges that faces Hama media. In addition, Hamas has benefited from the new media and telecommunications technology to support its media infrastructure. Indeed, the expansion of the Hamas media infrastructure is connected directly to the enlargement of the circles of the target audiences. As illustrated, the Hamas media TV coverage reaches all of the Arab countries, and some of the Muslim countries. Using different languages adds new categories to the Hamas media target audience. In this respect, Hamas used the Hebrew language in its media as part of its goal to address the Israeli people. Addressing the Israelis was also one of the Hamas media objectives of waging what Hamas calls counter-psychological warfare. The Hamas media institutions have dedicated their

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922 Author’s interview with Mohammed Thuraiya, op., cit.
media message to enhance the idea of the so-called ‘government of resistance’, as the latter, for Hamas, represents the project of resistance, in different shape and means. Alaqsa satellite TV, as most of the Hamas media outlets, was the alternative media for the Hamas government. All new programming seasons after Hamas’s victory in the election have been designed in order to support Hamas and its government’s agenda.
Chapter Seven: Reflections on the Hamas media Strategy

This chapter discusses the study findings in order to answer how, why and in what context did ‘the Hamas media institution’ develop its media strategy; and, what were the key features of this strategy? The Hamas media institution developed a strategy that included several elements, which were developed over three chronological stages or period. The incremental and chronological development demonstrates the evolutionary nature of the Hamas’ media strategy. It also demonstrates the transformative effect that Hamas had in the development of a counter-hegemonic narrative. Likewise, Hamas’ engagement and interaction in the production of a counter-hegemonic narrative impacted the movement too. Media, especially with the vast technological and communicative tools developed, implemented and used by all over the last twenty some years, helped to propel the development of a counter narrative. This process, thus, suggesting the elements operating within and for the production of an alternative paradigm are incremental but not linear, and functioning independently yet interdependently. In order to understand this interactive process, this chapter scrutinizes in-depth the ‘components’ of the elements in the strategy in order to articulate the features of what will be called ‘Hamas’s comprehensive media strategy’. It concludes that the underlying concept of all the elements of the Hamas media strategy is “Islamic resistance”, which was discussed in-depth in chapter three.

The Hamas media message is built on the notion of “the Islamic resistance,” which is part of its holistic project. The idea of Islamic resistance is clearly present at all stages, in spite of the fact that there were different contexts in Hamas’ history such as it being an underground resistance movement, its political opposition status and its governance role. It is argued that the Hamas media strategy is based on two types of objectives. There are tactical objectives, which are subject to developments and circumstances; and, particular strategic objectives that include legitimising the Islamic resistance, mobilising people, and using “psychological warfare”.

A third element of the media strategy is related to the Hamas media infrastructure. The main argument is that Hamas intended to use the maximum capacity of the media outlets, including use of huge resources to develop its media institutions. Paralleling these, Hamas benefited by establishing new media institutions under the title of ‘independent media’; and, by using the non-Hamas media, the new media and social
media networks. A final element of the Hamas media strategy is the target audience. The Hamas media’s target audience has five spheres, namely the Hamas’s supporter; the Palestinians inside and outside of the Palestinian occupied territories; the Arab and Muslim public; the international actors and community; and, the Israelis. Each sphere is independent and interdependent, which also parallels the organizational structure and policies of the movement. All the elements and the corresponding components that comprise the Hamas media strategy will be examined in individual sections of this chapter. The chapter will also conclude with an analytical and theoretical discussion of the transformative effect of Hamas and the media on the movement.

First: ‘Islamic resistance’ is the essence of Hamas media strategy

During the preparation of this research, Hamas conducted a prisoner-swap deal with Israel. In exchange for the Israeli soldier who had been imprisoned for the last 5 years in the Gaza Strip, hundreds of Palestinian prisoners (many of whom were sentenced to life in prison) were released. According to Hamas, this deal was a ‘victory’ for the ‘resistance project’. It succeeded in releasing a large number of Palestinian prisoners, while its political rival (the PLO) failed to achieve such a deal through political negotiations over the last twenty years—the age of the peace process. The success and implication of the Hamas deal, in a sense, summarises the key idea of this section.

‘Islamic resistance’ is a foundation idea for Hamas. Through this idea, ‘the resistance project’ is promoted as an alternative to its rival. The latter’s project is based on the peaceful settlement with Israel and led by the PLO and Fatah. In this sense, the current study finds that the idea of resistance is the most important element in Hamas’ media strategy. It is addressed directly and indirectly in every stage and in all the covered subjects in the Hamas media. Thus, all institutions and their emergence in the historical phases of Hamas’ media development were in service of the resistance project.

In the first intifada, the Hamas media message focused primarily on violent resistance against the Israeli soldiers and settlers. In addition, it focused on different subjects such as social issues, economics and education. These were all considered an integral part of the resistance project. Under the PNA rule, the Hamas media concentrated its messages in three directions. Firstly, it harshly criticised the PNA at all levels—from its performance to its ‘failure in the peace process.’ The purpose behind this was to show that the PNA had given up the Palestinian thawabit [constants], including the issues of
historical Palestine, Jerusalem, prisoners, refugees and the right of return, and the right of the people to wage resistance against the Israeli occupation. In a sense, Hamas presented an alternative approach to reclaiming Palestinian rights. Secondly, the Hamas media focused on the role of the PNA as a rival and its collaboration with the Israeli occupation entity. The PNA aided the Israeli occupation by targeting the members of resistance through arrests, crackdowns and, in some cases, in assassinations of Hamas’ leaders. Thirdly, the Hamas media concentrated on the negative aspects of the PNA performance, particularly in the areas of corruption, human rights violations, and the PNA failures on problems of poverty, unemployment, child labour, and poor performance in public service institutions.

After 2006, the media continued propagating the idea of resistance, but yet in a different way. The feature of this stage was Hamas coming to power and leading the Palestinian government for the first time, which was a completely new context for it as a resistance movement. The term ‘resistance government’ articulates the characteristic of this stage and the direction of the media message showed that Hamas could simultaneously act as a government and as a resistance movement. Most of the Hamas media institutions, especially the Alaqa media network (by virtue of that its tendencies were toward the Hamas agenda), focused on the personalities of the Government. It considered them as symbols of ‘the resistance Government’ and focused on its “achievements” on the grounds, arguing that they achieved the resistance government program. This clearly shows continuity in maintaining the resistance idea in Hamas’ media. The tactical and strategic objectives of maintaining the idea of resistance in Hamas' media will be addressed in the second section in this chapter, particularly within the discussion of the objectives in Hamas’ media strategy. However, there are three key findings related to the resistance discourse. They are the dimensions of the ‘Islamic resistance’; the relationship between the discourse of resistance and the context; and, the ‘dictionary of terminology’ that has been generated in relations with the resistance discourse.

1- The dimensions of notion of resistance

The resistance idea in the Hamas’s media discourse has two dimensions. The first dimension is political and the second is ideological/religious. This section sheds the light on both directions and attempts to look at the meanings behind the two concepts.
A - Political characteristic

In all its stages, Hamas maintained the option of resistance as the only solution to reclaim all of the Palestinian rights, thus presenting an alternative discourse to the Fatah and PLO approach. The media message was aimed in this direction for the following reasons:

i. Hamas believed that reclaiming rights through all forms of resistance, including armed resistance, was a realistic vision and applicable in Palestine. It posited that the Israeli occupation authority withdrew from Gaza due to Palestinian resistance. Yet, omitted from the discourse was the impact of context. Israel evacuated the Israeli settlements and the military bases in Gaza because it was more cost effective. Moreover, turning the Gaza Strip into an open air prison also served Israel’s military objectives more than continued occupation. Through the imposition of the siege, it was thus able to ensure that it had the capability to collectively starve, stifle, and shackle a population. The Israeli withdrawal, however, did make Hamas more confident that resistance was the only way to deal with Israel. Resistance was very much part of the equation for explaining withdrawal and the means for it were more efficient and useful, especially given that the path of the negotiations had been at a standstill since the Oslo agreement.

ii. Hamas believes that the land of historic Palestine is the aim of the resistance, as it will not give up the major Palestinian and historical rights, including the return of expelled 1948 refugees to their towns and villages. In fact, the Right of Return has been one of the major hindrances in the past “peace negotiations,” with Israel and the International Community wanting to reserve discussion on the matter until later. Some within the 1948 camp argue that there can never be an immediate or temporary solution without first resolving the Right of Return issue. Hamas’ media constantly recalled all the major national occasions, such as the Nakba and the Naksa, the United Nations partition plan for Palestine 1947, the Balfour Declaration, and the anniversaries of the massacres which occurred in the Palestinian villages and towns, and so on, to enhance the idea. Obviously, this is not incompatible with the Hamas proposition of the temporary solution, such as the acceptance of establishing a Palestinian state on border of 4th of June 1967 and a long-term truce with Israel. There is no single statement
or text in all of Hamas’ media that refers to the possibility of its recognition of Israel's right to exist on the land of historic Palestine.

iii. Hamas is a national movement, despite its religious/ideological motivations. Its project aims, ultimately, to liberate the occupied Palestinian lands. The context of the conflict with Israel is a context of conflict between a state and its army, who are occupiers, and the people under occupation are forced away from their home under the force of arms. Therefore, Hamas’ practice of resistance was confined within the borders of the occupied Palestinian territories. It has never targeted Israelis abroad, as did other Palestinian groups.

B) Ideological/religious characteristic

As mentioned in the preceding section, Hamas is a nationalist movement that is ideologically motivated par excellence. The media messages of Hamas, in all stages are studied in this thesis, based on religious content, especially during the first intifada. The first intifada is particularly important because it corresponds to the birth of the movement. Throughout that period, there was not a single leaflet or poster without any Quranic, Hadith, or reference linking events with Islamic history. For example, there were connections made between the call for resistance in the month of Ramadan to the ‘Badr Battle’, as well as to its meanings of jihad, sacrifice, and victory. Reliance on religious discourse in Hamas' official statements gradually became the less used, especially when Hamas came to the power. It turned to use terminologies like democratic participation, good governance, peaceful transfer of power, and public freedoms and human rights. These terms were accompanied with the classical description of Hamas to its government, thus giving birth to the concept of ‘the resistance government’. This does not mean that religious discourse does not exist in the Hamas media in general. An excellent example is the main slogan of Alaqsa TV, which was examined in Chapter six. It is “Our media: Islamic, meaningful, and Resistant..to raise the flag”. Moreover, Fathi Hammad's statement that “we do not shy away from our religious discourse” clearly demonstrates that religion/ideology is still an important part of the tactics of Hamas media. Sawaf further argues that there has always been a moral and religious level control of
Hamas in its media discourse, which Bseiso calls “netting religion and politics”.

Linking ideology to the resistance project was, undoubtedly, important for Hamas, for the following reasons:

i. The religious factor is very effective in the process of mobilization. Hamas is aware of the importance of religious discourse for ‘shaking the trees’, calling for jihad, and resistance and sacrifice. This is because religion is an essential component in the identity in Arab and Muslim world, as it impacts the spiritual, intellectual, psychological and social aspects.

ii. Religious discourse is important because of the large magnitude of respect and reverence given to religion among Arabs and Muslims. It defines and shapes the hearts, identities and minds for many. The words of the Imam's speech or other learned individuals invited to deliver the Khutba at the Mosque are important for Muslims. Many positively respond to the words or speech given after Friday's prayer. Thus, Hamas took the advantage of its position in a vast majority of the mosques in the Palestinian occupied territories and utilised them as a means for mobilization. In addition, the prime minister of the Hamas government in Gaza delivers the Friday sermons as Alaqsa TV broadcasts these sermons every week.

iii. Hamas offers religious discourse as part of its project, which is guided by its belief in the faith. In the discourse, the resistance project is an Islamic project which includes all aspects of life—social, political, economic and cultural. As may be recalled from chapter three, the term almashrou’ alislami [Islamic project] is mentioned repeatedly and frequently in is discourse and within each type of resistance. In addition to its belief in the project, Hamas also theorises the political, social and economic concepts from the Sharia law in order to attract those desirous for an Arab-Islamic identity.

iv. Hamas uses religious discourse for what Rizqa calls the “reestablishment in the understanding of the Islamic values, which are to be a guide in the Muslim life of the Palestinian people”. That is, Hamas sees the existence of

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923 Author’s interview with Mustaf Sawwaf, op., cit
924 Author’s interview with Momen Bseiso, op., cit
925 Author’s interview with Yoser Rizqa, op., cit.
misconceptions existing within society regarding religious values, which need to be reconsidered. As both Khalid Meshaal and Ismail Haniyeh have stated, the problem plaguing many Muslim societies today is a lack of understanding of the essence of Islam. This, thus, leads to individual and collective weakness among the Muslim community. Palestinian society is a Muslim society and understanding the Islamic values underpinning it are, therefore, the key to its strength and unity for obtaining, in the words of Hamas’ spiritual founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the liberation of Palestine.

Henceforth, the feature of the Hamas’ media message was a combination of the political and the ideological/religious characteristics. To see its message and to analyse it from only one dimension is to misunderstand or misinterpret the movement, its goals and objectives. The dual dimensions of this is one of the main distinguishing factors that differentiates it with the PLO/Fatah narrative. These two dimensions to the Islamic resistance project is one of the underlying foundations of the counter-hegemonic narrative that is developed over the three stages. Further, the tactics or strategy of juxtaposing the two dimensions resulted in a discussion in the continuity and change in the Hamas’ media discourse, and how it adapted the discourse with the context.

2- Discourse for each context

Continuity in the discourse of resistance from the first intifada to the present has been a hallmark of Hamas. This continuity persisted in spite of the fact that there were difference in context. Chapters four through six, in particular, demonstrated that the resistance message transcended each time and space regardless of the form of resistance employed. According to Abu Zohri, “there is a discourse for each stage and this is part of our strategy, it is intended and well planned according to the audience, aim and the context.”^926

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<td>Context</td>
<td>The first Intifada (Under Occupation)</td>
<td>Oslo accord &amp; the second Intifada (truce after 2004)</td>
<td>Hamas in Government (Mostly in truce)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>Islamic Resistance</td>
<td>A political opposition to the PNA. Anti-occupation resistance.</td>
<td>A combination of the government and resistance. (resistance government)</td>
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</tbody>
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^926 Author’s interview with Sami Abu Zohri, op., cit.
This diagram shows the relationship between the context and the discourse. In the first intifada, when Hamas was an underground resistance movement and strictly refused any political settlement to the Palestinian issue, it maintained the discourse of resistance. After the Oslo Agreement and during the Second Intifada, there was a shift in the discourse that included both resistance to the occupation and opposition to the PNA. In particular, the Hamas media message through Alresala newspaper focused simultaneously on local issues and the daily life concerns of the Palestinian people from the angle of political opposition and on political issues propagating its resistance project. After the 2006 elections, Hamas continued utilising the resistance discourse but also added the discourse of governance. It characterized the period as ‘a combination of the governance and resistance.’ The governance discourse also built on that which was used in the second period, namely when it was in political opposition to Fatah. This became more pronounced and visually evident after July 2007, which is when there was the split in governance between Ramallah and Gaza. The main criticism in regard is the the use of resistance discourse in the absence of resistance. The spokesperson of Fatah, Jamal Nazzal, states that Hamas turned from resistance movement into ‘resistance of resistance movement’.

The research, however, could not determine whether the conflation of the discourse and the context was intentional on the part of Hamas or whether it evolved. Bardawil asserts that Hamas sets the media “period-plans” to deal with the political developments in the Palestinian territories, thus making it intentional that ‘the media discourse is to serve each stage.’ This, as he explains, is “relatively new”. For obvious reasons, it was relatively difficult to implement during the first intifada. Hamas, according to Baradail, only started its media infrastructure after Oslo, which is when there was a margin of freedom of action and movement. Theoretically, therefore, this implies that the shift in discourse is in part dependent on the development of a media organizational infrastructure. With this development in particular, the counter-hegemonic narrative really becomes visible within society, the region and the international community.

928 Author’s interview with Salah Albardawil, op., cit.
3- Manufacturing terminologies

Over the three studied periods, the Hamas media created a long-list of its own terminologies. Hammad actually refers to the discourse created as “the war of terminology”. Essentially, the terminology comprise what Bsiesu calls the “Hamas dictionary”. It reflects the Hamas conceptual and discursive political/ideological orientations, which are related to the concept of resistance. The terminologies usually represent alternatives to existing terminologies. what follows are some examples of the terminology used.

Examples of the Hamas’s terminology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The terminology</th>
<th>Alternative to what?</th>
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<td>Resistance/ Jihad</td>
<td>Violence/terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Zionist Enemy/entity/the government of occupation</td>
<td>Israel state/Israeli government</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Palestinians in Occupied Palestine 1984</td>
<td>The Palestinians of the green line borders</td>
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<tr>
<td>Palestinian rights</td>
<td>Palestinian demands</td>
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<td>The occupied west bank</td>
<td>Judea and Samaria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Martyrdom operations</td>
<td>Suicide operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>The occupation forces</td>
<td>IDF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zionist usurped (Mughtasabat)</td>
<td>The Israel settlements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The occupied Jerusalem</td>
<td>Greater Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance groups</td>
<td>Subversive groups</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Hamas regards the creation of its own terminology as a means to respond to the psychological warfare waged against the Palestinians by Israel. Its purpose is to contribute to truth and reality, which is absent in the existing mainstream narrative. The mainstream narrative that is propagated by the Israeli and some of the Arab and western media, according to Rizqa, aims to “spread the culture of surrender, lie and falsify history”. In this sense, Hamas sees the Israeli utilisation of some of the terminologies such as describing the Palestinian resistance as ‘terrorist’ or ‘subversive’ groups allows Israel to legitimise any assassinations in the world media. Israel attempts

929 Author’s interview with Momen Bseisu, op., cit.
930 Author interview with Fathi Hammad, op., cit.
to simultaneously demonise the Palestinian resistance and distort its image by defining it as anti-freedom, authoritarian, repressive, radical religious, and operating outside of international legality.931 Terminology is, therefore, very important for Hamas, and several points can be made.

a) The key idea behind the terminology is to raise awareness of the Palestinian rights and constants, as this is for Hamas part of the resistance. Hamas is keen to disseminate these concepts and those of occupation and legitimate resistance so that they become part of a culture not only amongst the Palestinians, but also for future generations of Arabs and Muslims. Badreddin Mohammed argues that the terminology is one of the most important issues that helps to keep the memory of the Palestinians among the Arab and Islamic countries alive, as the latter must build generations that recognise “the Zionist entity is an illegitimate object in the body of the nation”932 and must remind everyone that “the occupied Palestine is an Arab, Islamic land, which belongs to all Muslims”933 and all of them work for its liberation and freedom.

b) Hamas considers that there is great deal of “wrong terminology” that must be replaced. As Alashqar states, “we must call things by their rightful names.”934 For example, “Israeli settlements” is not the right word. They were built on the Palestinian territories that were seized by force for the establishment of cities and villages, and to become later as ‘fait accompli’. Therefore, Hamas sees that the correct name as Mughtasabat Sahyouniya [Zionist-usurped], since it reflects the illegitimacy of such settlements. In the Palestinian mentality, this is true. The problem lies in the lack of familiarity among the outside audience.

c) Hamas regards itself as a movement with religious, intellectual and cultural roots that has a long history of resistance, daawa, and social work, which accumulates ‘a knowledge reservoir’. The Hamas terminology comes from this ‘reservoir of knowledge’ that represent concepts and ideas. Kabha illustrates this in a different way arguing that if Hamas succeeded to install a particular

931 Ibid
932 Author interview with Badreddin Mohammed, op., cit.
933 Ibid
934 Author interview with Ismail Alashqar, op., cit.
terminology and people understand it and start to use it, then it the idea was successfully delivered.\textsuperscript{935}

It should be pointed out that Hamas also used its own terminology in its conflict with Fatah, especially after winning the PLC elections in 2006. For example, Hamas described the PNA government in Ramallah as the “illegitimate government”, the “Fayyad/Abbas government”, or the “Dayton government”; the latter was in reference to the American General Keith Dayton who used to lead the security coordination between Israel and the PNA, as well as overseeing the training of the PNA forces. Adli Sadeq, the Palestinian ambassador in India and one of Fatah leaders, has constantly condemned the use of Hamas of the ‘language of distrust’ against Fatah, arguing that this discourse further divides the Palestinians and complicates the opportunities of the reconciliation.\textsuperscript{936} “The war of terminology” is an attractive topic for future research.

In conclusion, the Hamas of 1987 is definitely not the Hamas of 2012. The movement has evolved. This evolution has taken it over many stages, which are filled with both triumphs and tribulations. Yet, there are elements of the movement that transcend time and space. The resistance discourse and its persistence over the three specific phases provides an example. Resistance discourse is also at the heart of the media strategy. Although at the heart and its remaining a constant, there were changes in its nature and dynamism. These changes raise questions concerning “the continuity and change” in Hamas.

**Second: Setting the Objectives**

Theoretically, setting objectives is an essential element for the media strategy of any organisation,\textsuperscript{937} as the overall media strategy aims ultimately to meet that which is set.\textsuperscript{938} A number of the Hamas media seniors emphasise that the movement works within a clear strategy, which is comprised of tactical, short-term and strategic

\textsuperscript{935} Author interview with Wasfi Kabha, op., cit.


objectives. However, others stress that the Hamas’ media in its infancy, “disorganized and impulsive”. Sheikh Khalil believes that Hamas media apparatus in the first intifada was lacking in the planning stages due to obvious security reasons. Rizqa, who was a member of the media apparatus, witnessed and experienced its inception and development. He reveals that the pressure on Hamas forced it to move the “media apparatus centre” from the occupied territories to the diaspora in 1990. In particular, it was moved to Jordan.

Hamas was able to develop its media infrastructure so that it could become an integral body. The dedicated leadership body was headed by Ahmed Saati and comprised representatives from all the geographic districts of the Palestinians, including Gaza, the West Bank, and the diaspora. Rizqa himself was the representative of Gaza. He states that the nascent infrastructure at the time outlined the Hamas media message, developed the media outlets (which were rudimentary in the beginning) and defined the target audience. Thus, the organizational structure was centralised during the first intifada. A major shift occurred after the Oslo Agreement, which corresponds to the establishment of media institutions within the territory ruled by the Palestinian Authority.

There was an important change in the way Hamas handled the media. This is evident through its evolution. Establishment of the first newspaper Alwatan made a big difference before and after Oslo in 1994. Since then, there has been a change in the levels of planning and working mechanisms for the Hamas media. It expanded the utilisation of the media and established more media institutions, including the newspapers and the ‘licenced media services offices’.

The Hamas media is centralised. Alda’erah al’ilamiya or the media department is in charge of formulating media strategies and determining the outlines of responsibilities and duties for each Hamas media institution. Albardawil asserts that there are shared general objectives for all of these institutions. In particular, there are two types of objectives: tactical/short term and strategic/long term objectives. Although there are common objectives, difference also exist due to the policy implementation structure. Each Hamas media institution has its own administration, programs, plans and budget. This means that each institution has the ability and a margin of independent

939 Author’s interview with Yousef Rizqa, op., cit.
implementation and decision capacity to set its own plans; however, they must be done in coordination with the Aldaera Alailamiya. For example, Alaqsa TV formulated its first programming season to serve the new phase immediately after the PLC elections. The process will become more evident upon examining the two types of objectives.

1- Tactical Objectives

The tactical objectives are subject to the context in which they serve particular purposes. For instance, in the armed confrontation between Hamas and Fatah in late 2007, the Hamas media and specifically the Alaqsa Radio and the Alaqsa TV played a clear role in resolving the battle in favour of Hamas. According to Abu Zuhri, “I do not say that the media is the reason for the clash, but it helped greatly to resolve the battle in favour of Hamas. It was more of a psychological battle rather than anything else; a battle against those who committed crimes against our people and collaborated with the Israeli occupation against the resistance.”940 Coverage on the Gaza siege after July 2007, which is when there was a division between the Gaza and Ramallah governing bodies, is also a good example. Most of the Hamas media institutions, including those which are counted as ‘independent media’, employed a significant amount of efforts in their coverage of the issues related to the siege on Gaza and its consequences.

These two examples apply to Albardawil's description that Hamas sets media “period-plans” to deal with the political developments in the Palestinian territories. These period-plans include the determinants of the discourse, the outlet and the target audience. A document, under the title “the determinants of the Hamas media discourse”941, shows that there are guidelines to the Hamas media about how to deal with different categories of the target audience, including specific Palestinian factions and countries. This will actually be addressed further in the target audience section. However, it is very important to emphasise that the period-plans and the tactical objectives eventually go into the service of the strategic objectives of the Hamas media strategy.

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940 Author’s interview with Sami Abu Zuhri, Op., Cit.
941 Hamas media office, “the determinants of the Hamas media discourse”, 30/12/2009. This document is gained from Hamas’s media office source.
2- Strategic Objectives

The long-term objectives of the Hamas media strategy have been set to achieve the general objective of its project, which is basically built on the idea of “resistance until the occupation ends.” In this aspect, there are three fundamental objectives that can be extracted. First, there is the legitimization of resistance and de-legitimization of the occupation. Second, there is mobilising the masses to “the resistance project”. Finally, the third is media as tool for waging psychological warfare. In the latter, there are two directions. The first one addresses the Palestinian people, aiming to raise their morale, and raise the awareness of the importance of the notion of resistance. The second form is directed toward Israel and aimed at intimidation.

A) Legitimisation of ‘resistance’ and delegitimisation of Israel

Legitimising ‘resistance’ represents a great challenge to Hamas in its clash with Israel, especially in light of the wider clashes in the Middle East. Hamas considers itself as a ‘liberation movement’ and the pioneer ‘resistance project’ in Palestine. Thus, its resistance to the Israeli occupation is legitimate and guaranteed right by international laws. This situation is supported by a number of countries, Arab and Islamist parties, and national liberation movements. In contrast, Israel, many Western countries, and even some Arab regimes categorise Hamas as a terrorist movement and claim that exercising violence against Israel is an illegitimate act. The battle of legitimacy is, therefore, very important for Hamas. In this context, Hamas focused on three aspects:

i. The moral and humanitarian dimension of the resistance

Hamas is well aware that its image in the world should be the image of the ‘national liberation movement’ and not the image of the ‘terrorist organisation’. The former is needed to win the sympathy of the people in the world. Therefore, the centrality of the idea of resistance in Hamas’s media strategy all the time and in every context is to emphasise that its approach is and has been adopted by all the people under occupation, colonization and dictatorships. Hamas message is that its resistance is like any other movement in the world seeking and struggling to free itself and liberate its people. Its cause and issues are moral and humane.

942 Author’s interview with Mohammed Thuraiya, op., cit.
Abu Zohri argues that “against the siege, strangulation, injustice, and oppression” Hamas defined its project as not only a Hamas project, but also “the option of the Palestinian people”, who voted for the resistance project in 2006. According to him, “the legitimacy of resistance was strengthened by the ballot box”. Therefore, Hamas sees the practice of resistance as an end to the injustice and oppression of the Palestinian people. It is to be coupled with the assistance of international laws, which preserve its right to end the occupation.

Legitimising resistance is important for Hamas to deal with the world. In this respect, Hamas believes that its image is gradually changing. Alashgar states that after the war on Gaza in 2008/2009 and the continuing siege, Hamas reaped “a great deal of sympathy, not only at the level of the people but also at the level of the states”. He cited the existing channels of communication with a number of countries, including some of the European countries. Regardless of whether Alashqar is right or wrong, the most important matter was Hamas’ keenness on its image in the West.

ii. Hamas is different from Al-Qaida

In the framework of addressing the matter of legitimacy and the difference between resistance and terrorism, Hamas has always been keen to emphasise its difference from Al-Qaida in terms of thought, approach and methods. Hamas deals with the Israeli occupation as one led by the ‘Zionist movement’. Hamas has repeatedly argued that the religion of this movement is not of importance. If the occupier had any other religion, then it would deal with such an occupation in a similar fashion. In this sense, Hamas claims that its resistance is not against Jews or against Westerners for their religion. This is different from Al-Qaida, who carried out violent operations in several countries under the pretext of the religion of Islam.

According to Alashqar, “there are numerous international institutions and human rights organisations that make a distinction between Hamas’ resistance to the Israeli occupation and the violence practised by some of the other Islamist groups. Differences

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943 Author’s interview with Sami Abu Zohri, op., cit.
must be with the Jewish occupiers and not the Jewish religion; this is why we restrict our resistance in Palestine and did not engage in actions outside of Palestine.”

The leaflets and the Imams of Hamas during the first intifada focussed on the ideological/religious dimension in reference to the Jewish as Jews in the stage of the first intifada. Bseisu justifies that reasoning as being part of the tactics. Religion was important in attracting the masses, especially in the formative stages of Hamas' development and its conflict with the occupation. Nevertheless, Bseisu hypothesises that the referencing of the Jewish as Jews has declined, with the main focus being on the political question and the conflict with Israel as a result of the “compelling occupation”. In the same context, Hamas also focuses on the Israelis demanding a Jewish state. This demand is incompatible with the simplest concept of democracy and is a threat to other religious minorities such as Arab Christians and Muslims who hold the Israeli citizenship and live within the borders of Israel since 48.

**B- The non-violent dimension in Hamas**

Hamas does have non-violent aspects. The involvement in politics and its leadership of the Palestinian government, its interest in the public affairs of the Palestinians and attention to the people’s everyday concerns, as well as new development projects, all demonstrate the other face of Hamas. The other face is that of a non-violent Hamas which seeks to engage in state-building and strengthening the steadfastness of the people. This exceeds the stereotyped image of the underground/violent movement.

Rafat Murrah argues that Hamas does not practice violence just for itself. Resistance in all its forms are for ‘political actions, international relations,' and interim solutions. Murrah states: “Hamas is an Islamic movement with a moderate approach.” The document titled “The Determinants of the Hamas Media Discourse” shows that Hamas is highly interested in particular countries and regimes. For example, despite the negative attitude adopted by the former Egyptian regime and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia towards Hamas, it was keen to keep good relations with both countries. It did so through emphasizing the importance of Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the world and their activities.

945 Author’s interview with Ismail Alashqar, op., cit.
946 Author’s interview with Momen Bseisu, op., cit.
947 Author’s interview with Rafat Murra, op., cit.
948 Ibid.
impact in supporting the Palestinian people.\textsuperscript{949} More importantly, the document showed that Hamas is very careful in dealing with the Western countries and takes into account the specificity of each one. In that document, Hamas categorises the Western countries into three different categories. In the first category, there is the USA and its allies such as United Kingdom and Canada. In the second, there are “the neutral countries”, which are those that are neutral in their attitudes toward the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Finally, in the third category are the “moderate western counties”. Hamas launched this title to refer to the European states that engage in dialogue or have communications with the movement such as Norway and Switzerland.\textsuperscript{950} In all of these classifications, what is also emphasized are that attitudes of the people of those countries are different than their governments. The importance of this categorisation comes from the keenness of Hamas to develop and build political relations. The development of political relations also aids in the battle for legitimacy.

C- Mobilising people

The idea of mobilisation is a fundamental objective in the Hamas media strategy. The majority of the interviewees have used this expression to explain the objectives of the resistant media. Meanwhile, some of them consider that the ultimate objective of the ‘resistant media’ is the same as the objective of ‘resistance project’. Albaik emphasises that the key objective of the resistant media is to “mobilise the public opinion to the notion of resistance”\textsuperscript{951} The mobilisation in Palestine is to mobilise people to the Hamas project and to the idea of resistance on two levels, namely the recruitment of new members within the ranks of Hamas and also increasing support for Palestinian society.

Media is not the main means of recruitment, but it is a tool that assists in recruiting members to Hamas. The Palestinian public has known Hamas through its leaflets and the graffiti posted on the walls in the West Bank and Gaza. This is in addition to the mosques and the educational institutions. Hamas seeks to recruit new members who admire its model of resistance. Ghazi Hamad explained that tens of the Palestinian youth were enthusiastic to resist the Israeli occupation and joined Hamas.

\textsuperscript{949} Hamas media office, “the determinants of the Hamas media discourse”, 30/12/2009.
\textsuperscript{950} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{951} Author’s interview with Mahmoud Albaik, op., cit.
In addition to recruitment, the media has also helped through increasing support among Palestinian society. At all stages of the research and in the development of the media strategy, Hamas has given high priority to Palestinian society. Palestinian society is the heart of Palestine, which is the movement’s primary target. Furthermore, one of its objectives is to create Mu'tama'a Muqawim or a resistant society and to have the people embrace its project. Related to this project and that of mobilisation is the psychological impact of the media on society, people and all the components comprising resistance.

D- psychological and counter-psychological influence

One of the important objectives in the Hamas media strategy is the use of media as a tool of ‘psychological warfare’. It is known that the media has historically played an important role in psychological warfare, especially in non-traditional wars, revolutionary guerrilla warfare, and decolonization movements. In this context, the Hamas media strategy aims to influence two sides. First, it seeks to psychologically influence the Israelis; in particular, it aims to affect the Israeli people and the occupation forces psychologically. This includes intimidating the Israelis by spreading despair and surrender in their hearts; causing gaps in the internal-front and questioning the Israeli army and in its political leadership; creating divisions between the people and leadership; and, weakening the public support for wars against the Palestinians.

For example, Hamas used psychological warfare in the issue of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, who had been held for 5 years. It would occasionally leak news that is related to Shalit’s life, issuing an audio tape, or producing the animated cartoon. Hamas’ aim from this was to have a psychological effect on Israeli society and the Israeli army. Timing of psychological operations are also important. The media of the military wing is separate from the general media institutions, but it intends to document some of its military operations against Israel and broadcast it to the world as part of the psychological warfare campaign.

Second, in the Palestinian context, the Hamas media acts as a counter-psychological tool to the Israeli propaganda, which of course is a media objective. One of the goals of its media institution is to counter “the Israeli war of rumours”, which aims to destroy

953 Author’s interview with Mohammed thuraiya, op., cit.
the morale of the Palestinians and “undermine their confidence among the Palestinian resistance factions”. In this regard, it is important to reference the Israeli broadcast messages through special radio waves or leaflets that are dropped by the Israeli planes over the Palestinian territories. Many of them warn them from engaging in ‘acts of terrorism’ and incite against ‘the Palestinian resistance’. Consequently, the Hamas media aims to achieve three objectives. The first is to refute what Hamas calls disinformation campaigns, which are aimed at the Palestinian people and aim to undermine their resolve. By engaging these campaigns, it is able to raise the morale of the Palestinian people and increase their confidence in the resistance project. Second, confidence is targeted by focusing on the positive aspects and the achievements of ‘resistance’. Finally, it aims to raise the morale of “the combatants on the resistance factions members” by providing them with the correct information, as well as purification of any media information that comes through the occupation side or through third parties.

Third: The target audience

The third pillar of the Hamas media strategy is the choice of the target audience. The target audience is particularly important because of its impact on the other elements. In many ways, it is what determines the discourse used and the dynamism in the nature of the counter-narrative's development. As will be recalled from the first chapter, Gramsci posited that the counter-hegemonic narrative was developed over time to challenge the existing mainstream narrative. Those in the production of the narrative were intellectual actors, who were engaged in a battle with those in the opposing side. Each was battling the other or engaged in psychological warfare, battling for audiences and mobilising bases. The strategies employed were, thus, designed according to whom was being targeted. Shifts in the target audience also correspond to evolution of the media strategy. The process implies that as the infrastructure grows so too does the strategy, with growth becoming complex, interdependent and multi-dimensional. This section examines two findings concerning the target audience.

1) Five circles of target audience

In the early stages, the target audience of Hamas media was limited to its supporters and local Palestinian society. This lack of focus is in part because Hamas was totally inexperienced in dealing with media. At the same time and when taking mobilization
theory into consideration, it is first necessary to mobilise the base. An act of resistance is meaningless and incapable of producing real political results in the absence of a base or supporters. Moreover, it is necessary to create the support needed for the community in which a group is operating and living to withstand the retaliatory campaign waged by the opponent. Thus, the initial selection or emphasis on supporters and local Palestinian society was necessary.

Gradually, the target audience expanded. It went from being local (Hamas members and supporters) to societal; from societal to the Arab and Muslim world; from there to the audience in the west and in the East Asia; and, finally, to the Israeli public. The expansion of the target audience network corresponded to the growth and development of the Hamas media infrastructure. Even more interesting is the expansion of Hamas' awareness to the importance of each category of the target audience. This, therefore, suggests the existence of internal (even if unintentional) evaluation mechanisms and feedback loops, which permit the process to move, expand and grow over time in an evolutionary capacity. If correct, then it becomes easier to understand why the evolutionary process is not linear in nature and is instead multi-dimensional.

As indicated, there are five circles reflecting the Hamas' target audience. Abu Zuhri referenced four, which were Hamas and its supporters, the Palestinian public in Palestine and in the diaspora, the Arab and Muslim public, and the public in Western countries. However, a fifth circle also exist. It is the Israeli circle. Each of these will be examined below.

a) The first circle is Hamas’s members and supporters. This segment represents the hard-core for Hamas, and the latter is counting on this group at all stages, from the organisation level (within Hamas structure) to mass collective action, which include but are not limited to protests and rallies. Addressing this segment is also important for Hamas to keep them abreast of its positions toward different issues. It is also good for provoking them ideologically and psychologically to prevent “frustration and despair among them”. Of course, this is not the only way for Hamas to address its members concerning the mentioned issue; there are

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954 Author’s interview with Sami Abu Zohri, op., cit.
955 Ibid.
other internal/secret channels that provide Hamas members with special leaflets and instructions for particular purposes.

b) The second circle is the Palestinian public. Hamas represents an integral part of the Palestinian fabric inside Palestine and in the diaspora, especially among the refugee camps in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. The people are the “incubator of the resistance” and without their support and steadfastness the resistance project would not succeed. The power of Hamas, thus, comes from its popularity. This is the reason why it always seeks to attract more Palestinians to increase the circle of support for the resistance project. This makes clear that the priority of Hamas media at all stages was the Palestinians' audience.

c) The third circle is the Arab and Muslim public. It is referred to as al-omq alarabi wal-islami or the Arab and Islamic depth. This category is important for financial and political support. Interest in this category for Hamas has been present since the stage of the first intifada. Many references in the leaflets of Hamas in the first intifada address the importance of the support by the Arab and Muslim peoples. Accordingly, interest in the Arab and Islamic masses increased after the 2006 elections. Its interest was also paralleled by the movement being at the forefront of the political scene, which was not only limited to Palestine. From Palestine to the Middle East, eyes around the world turned toward Hamas as it won, led and formed the first Palestinian government. It won on a platform that rejected the previous agreements with Israel and presented a ‘new vision’ based on resistance and the preservation of what Hamas calls the Palestinian thawabit [constants]. On many occasions, Hamas leaders emphasised the importance of the Arab and Muslim world for the Palestinian issue. For example, Ismail Haniyya, the Palestinian Prime Minister in Gaza and a Hamas leader, stated in the governmental platform that one of the main tasks of his government is “to reinforce the status of the Palestinian cause in the Arab and Islamic depth”. Hamas also has specific discourse directed to this category, which will be discussed in the next section.

d) The forth circle is international public opinion. Hamas is keen to change the stereotypical image amongst the audience around the world, and the audience in the west in particular. As mentioned in the “setting the objectives section”, the

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956 Haniyya, Ismail, the Palestinian PM, the governmental statement in the Palestinian Parliament, March 27th 2006, Gaza.
matter of legitimatising resistance is a key issue for Hamas, especially towards the international target audience. For addressing the non-Arabic speakers, Hamas uses different languages in its media outlets. For example, the official internet website of Hamas, which is the Palestinian information centre (PIC), is in eight languages—Arabic, English, French, Turkish, Urdu, Russian, Persian and Bahasa (the Indonesian language). The Alaqsa TV broadcasts an English news every day. Finally, the media production companies of Hamas produces few works in Hebrew to address the Israeli audience.

e) The fifth ‘circle’ of the Hamas media target audience is the Israeli public. Despite the fact that this category of the target audience is not mentioned in the document of the determinants of the Hamas media discourse, the Israeli public represents an important category. This is especially the case in the arena of the psychological war waged by both Hamas and Israel. As discussed in chapter seven, the Israeli occupation engaged in psychological warfare against the Palestinians in parallel with military operations. In contrast, Hamas exercised a counter-psychological warfare campaign in the Shalit’s case, which included the use of the cartoon animation, comedy, SMS, and video tapes. All of these were done in Hebrew (chapter eight).
This diagram illustrates the five categories of the Hamas’ media target audiences. For Hamas it difficult to deal with the segmentation of these different target audiences, as Bardawil argues. Hence, understating the target audience and what message should be directed to each group of the target audience represents a challenge for Hamas. Likewise, finding language that is symbolically powerful enough to transcend the boundaries of each target audience is problematic. This is something that has evolved in Hamas’ media strategy, but it is also something that can develop over time. Thus, it is not something limited to Hamas. Rather, any and all movements that seek to develop a counter-narrative develop a multi-dimensional discourse that gains in symbolic power over time. Specifying the discourse according to the target audience is the next section.

2) Discourse for each category of the target audiences

The Hamas media discourse takes into account the specificity of each category. This also relates to its belief in the role that timing plays. Timing is important for both the media message and the target audience. It also impacts the changing nature of discourse. Hamas’ discourse changes depending on context, the target audience, or the source of the discourse in the Hamas’s media. In Hamas, there are three sources of Hamas media discourse. They are the political level, the military wing level, and the Hamas’s government in Gaza. This research does not deal with the military wing’s media for obvious reasons. However, it is worth mentioning that the military media apparatus is one of the three mentioned sources of the Hamas media; and, naturally, there should be a certain degree of coordination amongst the three levels due to the centralisation of the Hamas media institution.

As examined in the last four chapters, Hamas witnessed three different contexts. In the first intifada, Hamas was deemed a resistance movement. It was not until after the Oslo Accord that the movement became a political opposition party to the Palestinian authority. Then, after the 2006 elections, it became a ruling party and conducted a truce with Israel. In all the mentioned phases, Hamas changed its discourse toward particular issues. Likewise, the priorities of the Hamas media discourse changed during the three different periods.
In the first intifada, the focus was on the resistance and enhancing the steadfastness of the local community in order to help them to continue the struggle. Post Oslo focused on the everyday concerns, with much of the discourse harshly criticising the PNA and its political project. After Hamas got into power, it acted as a ruling party and concentrated on the performance of the public service of the Hamas government. The periods mentioned have also witnessed ‘multiplicity’. Sometimes there has even been contradiction in regard to the question of the exercise “resistance and truce” and their relationship to the context.

The Hamas media strived to combine its discourse between the roles associated with a ‘resistance movement’ and a political opposition or ruling party. This is regardless of whether Hamas’ practiced violent or non-violent resistance. Abu Zohri argues that this was intended and well planned according to the target audience and the context. As Alashqar emphasised, “We have a discourse to the local audience; we have a discourse to our Arab and Islamic audience, and another discourse to our friends and those who support the Palestinian cause in the world. Also, we have a discourse that is directed to the Israeli audience. However, the common denominator among all of these is that we are an ‘Islamic resistance movement’, and we do not shy away from being Arab Palestinian and Muslim and holding this identity.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The determinants of the Hamas media discourse for the different categories</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Palestinian Publics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Fatah movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The factions of resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Arab and Muslim publics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt and Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran, Syria, Turkey, Sudan, Qatar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The western countries level
- The USA and its alliance
- Neutral western countries
- Moderate western countries

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957 Author’s interview with Sami Abu Zohri, op., cit.
958 Author’s interview with Ismail Alashqar, op., cit.
Understating the segmentations among the target audience represents a challenge. The document of ‘the determinants of the Hamas media discourse’ shows that Hamas does take into account the specificity of each of these categories. It is clear that Hamas has committed itself to the standards that should be taken into account when addressing the specific categories. The document determinants of the Hamas media discourse shows that there are of seven categories of the target audience, which are depicted by the diagram (x) below. It is noted that even among the Arab countries, there are also three categories. They are the Arab and Islamic world in general; states that Hamas considers friends like Syria, Iran, Qatar, Turkey and Sudan; and, other Arab countries that have tense relations with Hamas such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. There are also three categories in the Palestinian home, which are the Palestinian public in general, Fatah and the armed resistance factions allied with Hamas. The following diagram shows the characteristics of the discourse directed to two different categories, namely the USA and its allies and Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Regardless of the core of these characteristics, setting particular determinants for specific target audience category is the main issue in this discussion. This shows the keenness of Hamas on addressing the different categories of the target audiences, how to address then, and in what way. Understanding the relationship between discourse and the role of the target audience helps to shed more light on the importance and development of the media infrastructure.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USA and its allies</th>
<th>Egypt and Saudi Arabia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis that the US and its allies policy of supporting the Israeli occupation will not succeed in breaking the steadfastness of the Palestinian people. This policy towards the Palestinian Israeli conflict contradicts the values of democracy and human rights.</td>
<td>Avoiding the criticism of the negative attitudes of both countries, and demonstrating the criticism in a way of ‘polite reproach’, and at the same time avoiding excess of praise for the leadership of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, unless otherwise it comes in the context of professional work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis that no enmity between the Palestinian people and between those countries, though their governments’ policy bias to the occupation.</td>
<td>Emphasize the importance of the strategic relationship with Egypt and Saudi Arabia as they are the largest and most effective countries in the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highlight the positions of dignitaries from those whom have positive attitudes, and interest in and to clarify their views.</td>
<td>Highlight the positive points in the positions of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and their impact in alleviating the suffering of the Palestinian people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highlight the events and activities in support of the Palestinian cause and anti-occupation in these countries.</td>
<td>Highlight the role of popular and institutional support for the Palestinian people in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highlighting legal and humanitarian dimensions of the “unjust siege” on the Gaza Strip, and it bears full responsibility for payment of the occupation to end the siege continued.</td>
<td>Highlight the reliance of the Palestinian people on Egypt and Saudi Arabia to end their suffering.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recall the historical leadership of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and their roles in supporting the Palestinian people.</td>
<td>The emphasis on the importance of national security to both counties, as their security is part of the Palestinian people’s security.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fourth: The infrastructure

The infrastructure is one of the most important elements of the Hamas media strategy. This infrastructure has massively evolved since the first intifada 1987 to the present time. Hamas recognises the importance of establishing its own media institutions, including the use of mosques, walls, advertisement boards and other places. At the present time Hamas has dozens of media print and electronic media, including satellite televisions, radios, and variety of websites. It also has production companies and media centres for training cadres and other media. In addition, Hamas takes advantage of the new media and the social networks. The development in the use of media is linked to the widening of the target audience, from local and national and to the regional international, as it is explained in the following diagram.

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Media infrastructure</td>
<td>Rudimentary outlets such as: Mosques speeches, graffiti, leaflets, booklets, and tape cassette.</td>
<td>Weekly Newspapers, FM Radio, leaflets, media offices (spokespersons)</td>
<td>TV Satellite broadcasting, Local TV station, Radio, daily newspaper, weekly newspaper, magazine, media production companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Audience</td>
<td>Local (Hamas supporters)</td>
<td>Local-National</td>
<td>Local- Regional- International</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Hamas media department

Electronic media

Internet Websites
- Palestinian Information Centre – Syria, the official website of Hamas media, broadcast from Syria in eight languages: Arabic, English, French, Turkish, Urdu, Russian, Persian and Bahasa 'the Indonesian language': [http://www.palestine-info.info/]

Falasteen alaan websites of Hamas: [http://www.paltimes.net/]

Ajinad News is the Hamas website in the west Bank: [http://ajinad-news.com]

Palestine Dialogue Forum - it is an open forum, [http://www.paldf.net/]

TV, Satellite channels and radio stations
- Fada' ayat Alaqsa Satellite TV – Gaza Strip (Arab Sat and Noor Sat, cover the Arab world), the electronic version is: [http://www.aqsa.tv.ps/aqsa/]
- Alaqsa TV – Gaza Strip (Local Satiation)
- Saniit Alaqsa Radio – Gaza Strip (Alaqsa voice), the electronic version is: [http://www.alaqsavoice.ps/]
- Al-Aqsa Mukasher Radio – Gaza Strip (Alaqsa live)

Print media
- Falasteen Newspaper – Gaza Strip (describe itself as a non-profit company), and the electronic version is Palestine online: [http://www.felesteen.ps/]
- Al Risala Bi-weekly Newspaper – Gaza Strip (follow al-Khalas Party – off shoot Hamas), and the electronic version, AlRisalah.net, is: [http://www.alresalah.ps]
- Al-Saadah Magazine – Gaza Strip (happiness) Magazine (Social magazine)
- Falasteen Al-Muslima Magazine – Lebanon, The Magazine has a website [http://www.fm-m.com/]

The Palestinian Government in Gaza
- The ministries and governmental departments’ media offices
  (There are about 50 websites, besides the newspapers or magazines)

Media Agencies and Companies
- Shihab News Agency (Media services centre – Gaza): [http://www.shehab.ps/]
- Palestinian Press Agency – SAFA (Arabic and English) [http://www.safa.ps/]

The Media Office
- The Hamas Media Spokespersons (Sami Abu Zohri, Ayman Taha) The office is in charge of the Bayan Centre website where they publish Hamas's news and the official statements in Gaza. [http://www.albian.ps/]
- There are sub-branches of this media office. These offices can be classified as follows:
  - Media Office of Northern Gaza, Headed by Abdel Latif Alqanou'a, Local Hamas’s spokesman.
  - Media Office of Middle-Gaza, headed by Yousef Farhat, and he is Hamas’s local spokesman.
  - Media Office of the Khan Younis City, Headed by Hammal Al-Riqb and he is Hamas’s local spokesman
  - Media Office of the Rafah City, and he is also Hamas’s local spokesman
  - Media Office of the West Gaza City, headed by Ismail Radwan, and he is also one of Hamas’s spokesmen
- Media office of the east of Gaza
There are four specific findings pertaining to the infrastructure of Hamas media.

1) **Using the maximum capacity of media outlets**

During the three phases are covered by this research, Hamas used all media outlets available, which included radio, television, satellite broadcasting, and electronic media. It also used the ‘new media’ tools such as SMS, twitter, Facebook, and the online forums. Fathi Hammad explains that the expansion in using the media outlets is an essential part of Hamas’s media strategy, arguing that the most important elements of this strategy are based on utilising all venues. “We sought in all directions to expand our media institutions, created a satellite TV stations that are broadcast on more than one satellite, and have news agencies to deliver the latest news and events to the world media and to the core of our audience, which is Palestine and those in the Arab and Muslim world. For this purpose, we have our own media production companies to produce Palestinian/Islamic drama and movies. All is produced through our own vision.” Variety in the media institutions and outlets is what Raafat Morra, the head of Hamas media office in Lebanon, calls the Hamas media empire. This diagram ‘the map of Hamas’s media’, is a modest attempt to illustrates the extent of the evolution of the Hamas media institutions.

2) **Creating independent media institutions for particular purposes**

One of the tactics of the Hamas media apparatus is to establish new media institutions under different labels, especially, under the name of the ‘independent media’. Hamas created diverse media institutions over the recent five years. Most of the interviewees of this research had some reservations about declaring the affiliation of these media institutions for security reason. Hamas and its institutions are considered Israeli targets at all times, so it wants to avoid Israel targeting its media institutions under the pretext that they are ‘terrorist organizations’. It is worth mentioning that Israel has deemed most of the media as belonging to Hamas, such as Alrisalah newspaper, radio Alaqsa, and Alaqsa TV, and Alaqsa terrestrial TV.

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959 Author’s interview with Fathi Hammad, op., cit.
The main purpose of this tactic is taking advantage of the principle that exchanges roles and responsibilities, which gives Hamas flexibility and a margin for manoeuvre in certain political issues. The integration of roles and responsibilities among the media institutions represent Hamas directly and also indirectly through the independent media or private companies. The Governmental media also followed the Hamas government in the Gaza strip. Hamas’s media also are ‘overt and covert’, with some of these media institutions being well-known and work with ‘clear addresses’ and others are clandestine. Examples of the later include the Palestinian Information Centre in Damascus, the Palestine Now website in Gaza and the entire military media institution. Most of these media institutions are based in the Gaza strip, the West Bank, Beirut, and Damascus. They also all follow the ‘alda’era al’alamiya’ [the media department].

A question has been put to the Hamas media seniors whether ‘the integration of roles and responsibilities’ among Hamas’s media institutions, including what they called ‘the independent media’, is part of their strategy. Fathi Hammad says “yes”;\(^{960}\) Yousef Rizqa also replied that “this was true”;\(^{961}\) and, Albardawil said “of course all of these institutions work under alda’irah al i’alamiyathe; there is coordination among all of them, and they are all committed in the determinants of the media policy and the outlines of the media discourse”\(^{962}\). Barhoum goes further to illustrate that it is not only a matter of ‘coordination’, but it is one institution with ‘direct responsibility’ on the ‘sub-institutions’. “Certainly, alda’ira al’ilamiya [the media department] is an integral part of the media machine of Hamas, which is responsible for all the media outlets of ‘the movement’, whether print, audio or visual; the media department is responsible for all of them. Therefore, it is not a question of coordination; it is just direct responsibility for all these sub-institutions.”\(^{963}\)

In this context, the Hamas media can achieve large benefits from establishing the ‘independent’ media institutions. The media institutions can address all levels of the different masses other than those sympathetic to Hamas. These institutions do not aim to address a particular category of the public, but aim to attract the people in general, especially those who are not Hamas. Ostensibly, these media institutions focus on

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\(^{960}\) Author’s interview with Fathi Hammad, op., cit.

\(^{961}\) Author’s interview with Yousef Rizqa, op., cit.

\(^{962}\) Author’s interview with Salah Albardawil, op., cit.

\(^{963}\) Author’s interview with Fawzi Barhoum, op., cit.
particular aspects in the Palestinian issue, which receive favourable comment from a lot of people because they are not biased to any of the Palestinian factions. However, these media institutions also propagate the Hamas political and ideological agenda directly and indirectly, even if not under the name of Hamas. The Palestinian/independent media institutions serve, in the long-run, the Hamas’s project. This is the case of Alquds TV and Felesteen newspaper.

3) Media as a financial resources

The question of funding the Hamas media institution is extremely sensitive. The vast majority of the interviewees refused to give details on financial issue due to the secret nature of some aspects of Hamas' operations. Finance is one of those areas. However, some of the interviewees state that the lack of funds is the biggest obstacle faced. The Hamas media and the breadth of the media institutions compels increasing expenditures in this area. Alsawwaf asserts that there is a budget allocated for the media apparatus, which is part of the general budget of Hamas.\textsuperscript{964} Bsiesu claims that the allocated budget to the media is always short. To overcome the problem of the under-funding, Hamas media institutions sought to be self-sufficient in different areas. They resorted to commercials advertisements on Alaqsa TV and the Alaqsa terrestrial channel, as well as on the Alaqsa radio. Hamas also created ASDAA media production (Leisure Park style), which is part of Alaqsa media network and one of the biggest family attractions in Gaza strip. The Alaqsa centre for media training and development is also one of the investment projects of the Hamas media.

4) Taking advantage of Non-Hamas media

Hamas has attempted to keep good relationships with the independent media institutions, news agencies, and the journalists to benefit from their advantages. Barhoum classifies the non-Hamas media institutions into two types. The first is the ‘professional media’, which cover Hamas ‘objectively’, while the second type is those that are ‘biased’ and intend to ‘distort’ Hamas’ image. Many of those in the latter category are almost belonging to or are closely associated with the regimes’, political parties or states that have already adopted a hostile attitude toward Hamas.\textsuperscript{965}

\textsuperscript{964} Author’s interview with Mustafa alsawwaf, op., cit.
\textsuperscript{965} Author’s interview with Fawzi Barhoum op., cit.
In spite of these classifications, the Hamas relationship with ‘the media institutions’ and
the news agencies is generally good and distinct.966 “When I say ‘media organizations
are closed to Hamas’, it does not mean that its role is to defend the positions of Hamas,
but any media institution dealing with the Palestinian cause serves the Palestinian
constants and the project of resistance, which is embraced by Hamas. Hence, these
institutions service Hamas and its project and all the Palestinian factions that adopt this
approach (resistance), on the one hand. On the other hand, Hamas and the Palestinian
government media are simple and limited, and cannot be reached to all of the
Palestinian, Arab and international public. Thus, through the other outlets Hamas can
deliver its message to all people.967 For this purpose, Hamas has created a body called
‘the Palestinian journalist block’, which represents the ‘Hamas journalists’ and those
that are pro-Hamas. In other words, this entity is the ‘Islamic Bloc’, which ‘competes’
with ‘the Palestinian journalists guild that is controlled by ‘Fatah’. On many occasions,
Hamas invites the Palestinian journalists and writers for ‘open’ meetings with the
Hamas leaders or with the Prime Minister in Gaza Ismail Haniya.968 In addition, some
of Hamas leaders have created individual relations with well-known journalists.

The media development and Hamas’s transformative effect

It is clear that Hamas has developed a comprehensive media strategy since its inception
in 1987. All political/ideological movements evolve over time. Evolution always
encompasses infrastructural, organizational and policy growth, which is especially
evident in the Hamas case. Hamas evolved from an underground movement that
comprised a small number of people in 1987 to one that represented a majority of
Palestinian population after the 2006 elections. The movement extends all throughout
the occupied Palestinian territories and the diaspora, especially in refugee camps in
Syria and Lebanon. It also has developed or positioned itself as the main alternative and
opponent of Fatah and the associated left-wing Palestinian movements.

During the past two decades, which is the age of Hamas, tremendous developments
have occurred in the area of media and communication technology. There were a spread
of new types of media that were transformed by mobile telecommunications, satellite
broadcasting and the Internet. Other significant developments occurred in the area of

966 Ibid
967 Author’s interview with Samai Abu Zohri. op. cit.
968 Author’s interview with Badreddine Mohammed, op., cit.
print media. The spread of new modes of media and the communicative technology used to transmit information has impacted Hamas. In a sense, it has been one catalyst in the transformation of the movement, which had a transformative effect in terms of the use of the media and in the development of the discourse.

The evolution in media and information technology has made the media outlets available. Media is no longer preserved for the ruling authorities, especially in the third world countries. Government and the elites of those countries traditionally control the media, which permitted their ability to define the hegemonic narrative presented. This fact actually corresponds to the authoritarian approach, which has been put forward by some media scholars. As will be recalled from chapter one, this approach posits that media serves the needs of the state through direct government control, which means that journalists and media organisations work under the censorship of and subject to punishment by the government in the countries from where they are operating.

Access to new communicative technologies has limited but not prevented the governments' control over the media. Control is still made possible through other legislative means such as licensing requirements, censorship offices and other laws that restrict or set parameters for what can be published. The internet and other online technology, however, has eroded some of these controls. New social media tools have propelled and ushered forth an era where the libertarian approach is more applicable to some degree. In particular, they have made it possible for non-state actors to publish what they like.

Communicative and technological developments and their impact on media had a significant impact on Hamas. For Hamas, there was a significant amount of growth in the use of media technology in the latter part of the 1990s. Changes brought about by the new technology were really accelerated when there was the governance split between Gaza and Ramallah in June 2007. In particular, the split provided Hamas with a geographical area to build up and expand its network. Consolidation of its various media institutions were made possible and the way they interacted resulted in more effective policy implementation. The development of a multitude of media programs were greater than those in the past. In the past, media development was hindered by Israel and the Palestinian Authority, thus limiting the impact of the evolving counter-cultural narrative depicted and represented by Hamas.
In spite of Hamas governing Gaza, there were attempts to limit its media's reach. For example, there were attempts to prevent the movement from booking frequencies on certain satellites. The Hamas media radio and television station were bombed several times. Also, there were attempts to jam frequencies. The United States included the Alaqsa TV on its “terrorism” list as a terrorism-financing organization. While these attempts were problematic, Hamas continued its endeavors to develop its media strategy. In particular, it enlarged its media infrastructure, expanded the circles of the target audience, and developed its media discourse in accordance to the political context.

The development of its discourse is another transformative change in Hamas media strategy. As mentioned, Hamas greatly changed since its establishment in 1987. This change is in part because of the interrelationship between media development and the evolution of Hamas. Being a part of ‘the game of Axis & Allies’ in an age of rapid media and telecommunication technological development forced Hamas to take into consideration every single issue and to consider how it could influence its status as part of particular axis. This was made evident in the discussions in this study pertaining to the ‘discourse for each category of the target audiences’ and discourse for each context.

In terms of the macro political contexts, it is clear that there was a change in the Hamas media discourse over the three stages. Hamas was able to address the Arab and Islamic peoples and to engage the Israeli narrative at the regional and international levels, which was made possible by its media development. To address them, however, it also had to adapt its discourse accordingly, thus leading to further discursive evolution. In the Arab context, this in particular enabled Hamas to break the narrative monopolized by the Arab regimes that were hostile to it and its resistance project. At the international or global level, Hamas was able to appeal to the people at the grassroots level, who shared its sympathy toward struggle, the need for justice, and accountability at the international level. Consequently, Hamas was able to spread its culture of resistance and to fight against normalization of relations with Israel. The spread and transcendence of a culture of resistance among the various levels heightened the issue of Palestine and, ultimately, served Hamas’ objectives.

The importance of all this for Hamas is that the hegemonic powers were no longer able to monopolize the narrative to serve their hegemonic agendas. Development of Hamas' media infrastructure permitted the emergence of a counter-narrative. In particular, it
expanded the target audience and resulted in the evolution of discourse. Likewise, target audience expansion and discursive evolution further developed the media infrastructure. This, thus, supports the claim made in chapter one that the relationship between the elements and variables are independent and interdependent. They operate and interact with one another according to a logic or process, which is historically and contextually determined.

Although technological changes, context and historical development defined and shaped Hamas' production of a counter-cultural hegemonic narrative, they also lent themselves to it becoming the mainstream narrative within the local context. Hamas assumed government control in the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2007. It, thereby, replaced the Fatah institutions with new ones and used the existing laws to restrict the operation of some of the partisan and independent media. Using the same laws that Fatah did, there were restrictions imposed on freedom of opinion and media coverage. The controls permitted Hamas to maintain its counter-cultural narrative when looking at it from a regional and international perspective, but resulted in it becoming the local mainstream narrative. While recognizing the complexity of the process, the claim that media represents an instrument of exercising power in all aspects of life, including cultures, economics, politics and societies holds true.

The transformative changes brought about by media development more generally also correspond to the internal organizational changes of Hamas, and particularly the way the Politiburo functioned. In the post-Oslo period and under Meshaal's leadership, there was a greater level of organizational maturity. This is in part because of Hamas' evolution, but also the increasing level of interaction with the regional and international forces via the media. The structure of the media apparatus of Hamas witnessed major changes during that period. As mentioned in chapter four, the hijaz was working under very difficult circumstances. It was composed of few members and suffered from a lack of the financial resource. The changing context or environment helped usher in the development of the Hamas' media strategy and its corresponding policies.

In conclusion, Hamas demonstrates the importance of non-state actors in global, regional and domestic politics. Like many others, it created a media empire for political purposes and to engage in resistance. The empire and institutions have not only evolved, but so too has the discourse. Thus, actors and all of the components of their media strategy have become very much part of and also shaped by the growing
interconnectedness of the global nature of the world, which is most evident in the nature and development of the discourse used. As Gramsci indicated, the media is important for creating and shaping what constitutes consensus. Hamas demonstrates this through the development of its overall media strategy. Its strategy has likewise been shaped by the consensus of the actors involved and the counter-narrative produced. Academic emphasis on non-state actors' media development is important not only because it is relatively new phenomenon, but also because of the increasing role they play. The evolution of Hamas as a movement, an organization and an idea was and continues to be made possible as a result of its media strategy.

**Conclusion: Outlining the Hamas Media Strategy**

This chapter has discussed the main findings of the current study and shown that the Hamas media strategy is composed of four key elements. The main key element is that the ‘Islamic resistance’ is the essence of Hamas media strategy. In this regard, three issues related to the media message of the ‘Islamic resistance’ were discussed. They were the dimensions of the notion of resistance, which are political and ideological/religious; the discourse of the Islamic resistance and its context; and, the manufacturing of resistance terminologies.

The second key element of the Hamas media strategy is based on two types of objectives. They are tactical objectives, which are subject to the context and the goal they are designed to serve; and, also strategic objectives. The strategic objectives were extracted. The first objective is legitimising the Islamic resistance and de-legitimising the Israeli occupation. In this context, Hamas concentrates on three messages to achieve this objective. First, it concentrates on the moral and humanitarian dimension of the resistance. Second, it emphasises the difference between its Islamic project and its movement from that of Al-Qaida. The third message is that Hamas has a non-violent dimension in its resistance. Finally, the second objective is mobilising people in two directions, namely through recruiting new members and increasing support among Palestinian society. The third objective is the psychological and counter-psychological influence on and of the Israeli media.

The third key element of Hamas media strategy is determining the target audience. The circles encompassing the Hamas media target audience include the Hamas members and supporters, the Palestinian people in Palestine and in the diaspora, the Arab and Muslim
public, the international public, and the Israelis. This chapter asserted that Hamas takes into consideration the each category of the target audiences, in terms of what, how and when to address each category.

The fourth key element discussed the media infrastructure. In this respect, it was argued that Hamas media infrastructure expanded massively between 1987 and the present. Hamas has used the maximum capacity of the media outlets. It has also benefited by establishing new media institutions under the rubric of the ‘independent media’, which utilises the non-Hamas media, the new media and social media networks.
Chapter Eight: Conclusion

This study has examined the Hamas media strategy from 1987 to the present. In so doing, it situated the development of the media strategy within its proper contextual setting. The contextual setting encompassed historical, intellectual and political developments. This is because everything emerges within and is impacted by the environment, including how internal and external variables directly and indirectly effect the development of a counter-hegemonic narrative. Hamas’ media institutions were created within an existing cultural-hegemonic frame—one dominated by the Israeli Occupation and another by the PLO. Creating a niche within the existing and competing cultural and ideological frameworks required the development and presentation of a counter-narrative. Hamas had to create an alternative media framework, a new media hegemony. This process—the creation of a new media hegemony—is what the study sought to examine, extrapolate and explore.

Media is a space in which tension and contradiction is fiercely vented through the propagation of opposing cultural projects. Literally, there is a competition through the medium of the press, radio, satellite TV, television and the Internet that is primarily geared towards winning the hearts and minds of the Palestinian public. This thesis has argued that the widespread use of media demonstrates its importance and priority among Hamas’ overall strategy. It has shown that Hamas has developed a comprehensive media strategy over the recent two decades, which is based on four pillars. These pillars are the media infrastructure, media message, target audience, and the objectives.

Each pillar was examined to analyze, learn and understand the development and evolution of Hamas' media strategy. Through this examination, several major findings can be articulated.

The first major finding is that the Hamas media discourse is concentrated on one key idea, namely the idea of “Islamic resistance”. The relationship between the discourse and its centrality to the concept Islamic resistance is the founding idea of Hamas. The Hamas media utilised the discourse of resistance during all stages, even in the different contexts. Specifically, it used this idea as underground/secret resistance movement during the first intifada, when it adopted the mantle of political opposition, after the Oslo Agreement, and when it came to the power. Throughout these historically
contextualized periods, the resistance discourse took different shapes. Thus, discourse is shaped by and also shapes context. This is most evident when the two dimensions were examined. It will be recalled that the notion of resistance within the Hamas media took two dimensions, namely the political and the ideological/religious. The latter has been used to a lesser extent after the 2006 elections. This, thus, supports the finding that Hamas pragmatically and strategically adapts its discourse to context. The discourse of resistance also generated a new Hamas-branded terminology, all of which go into the service of the idea of resistance.

The evolving nature and variance of the concepts and discourse used over the three historically contextualized periods are evident in another major finding of this project, namely that pertaining to the target audience.

The second major finding was that Hamas has progressively expanded the circle of its media target audience over the last twenty years. It went from local to national, from national to regional, and from regional to international. Granted the evolution was not so linear as the fact appears; there was variance, peaks and regressions from the upward, evolutionary trend, which correlated to specific crises. Because of this, it is best to conceptualize the target audience in a networked circle that are independent and interdependent from one another. The Hamas media has five target audience circles that are in operation at the various levels. The first circle is the Hamas’s members and supporters; the second circle is the Palestinian public; the third circle is the Arab and Muslim public; the fourth circle is the international public opinion; and, finally, the fifth ‘circle’ is Israel. As the study concluded, Hamas takes into consideration the specificity of each group of the target audience, especially in terms of when and how to address of each of them and the type of discourse to be used. Several examples highlighted in chapters four through six also permit the summation that the discourse which transcends the boundaries carries greater symbolic meaning and power, thus permitting Hamas to attain greater levels of political and ideological/religious gains.

Like discourse and target audience, objectives impact development and are driven in part by context.

The third major finding of this study demonstrates that setting objectives is an important component of the Hamas media strategy. In particular, there were two specific types. The first type is comprised of short term/tactical objectives. They are
subject to the context that they serve particular purposes in particular context. This is clearly supported by the finding that Hamas adapt its discourse to the context. The second type is comprised of long term/strategic objectives, which represent the overall Hamas media objectives. In the latter type, there were three strategic objectives. The first was the legitimization of Hamas’ resistance and the de-legitimization of the Israeli occupation. The second strategic objective was the mobilisation of the masses according to the Hamas agendas. Finally, the third strategic objective was the use of psychological warfare. Psychological warfare was used positively to target Hamas members in particular and Palestinian people in general for the purpose of recruitment and to raise their morale. It was also used against the Israelis in general and on the Israeli soldiers in particular to wear them down and to intimidate. Obviously, both types of objectives are connected to one another and go into the service of overall objectives of Hamas’ project.

The last finding, which the others were leading up to, was the gradual development of Hamas' media infrastructure. Its development was evolutionary and, today, it is most appropriate to refer to it as the Hamas media empire. The research demonstrated how the media infrastructure significantly developed over the course of 20 years, beginning with the outbreak of the first intifada 1987 and continuing to the present time. The media infrastructure is centralised and led by a media department that operate in accordance with instruction from the political leadership. This media department is in charge of all the Hamas media institutions.

Hamas used all of the available media outlets at each stage in this study. It used the rudimentary media outlets during the first intifada that included leaflets, posters, graffiti, pamphlets, and the mosques. Taking advantage of the margin of freedom after the establishment of PNA in 1994, it built up its media institutions to include the print media (newspapers), and electronic media (radios, TVs, internet). Hamas also established media companies in the name of “independent media” as part of its expansion efforts. One of the most important things this evolution in particular demonstrates is that Hamas makes a significant effort to utilise the non-Hamas media institutions, including the international news agencies and the news networks and through ongoing communication with journalists and representatives of the international media. Furthermore, Hamas has awakened to the importance of social media. This was
the case especially after the Arab spring and the role it played. Hamas urges its media institutions, leaders and members to be connected with such media networks.

**Significance of the Research**

Every study must have significance. Significance is sometimes found by testing assumptions and hypotheses developed by others; examining a new case, facts or variables and their relationship to the subject matter; developing inductively or deductively a theory or framework; or, applying an existing framework that has yet to be used on a new case, which permits the study to say something about the assumptions and hypotheses developed by others. This study sought to do the latter. It used a Gramscian framework by drawing on assumptions found therein to examine the historical and contextual development of Hamas' media strategy, which is has not been examined. A lack of an examination of Hamas' media provided a niche in the existing literature for this research and permitted theoretical reflection on assumptions and hypotheses posited by scholars in the field.

The general topic of media strategy of resistance movements has not been well covered. Consequently, the present findings add substantially to the investigation of the Hamas media strategy. It is the first in-depth examination that deals with Hamas' media. Studying Hamas' media contributes to the literature on the movement. As was demonstrated in chapter one, most of the existing literature examines the political and ideological aspects of the movement and in the context of Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This was different because none of the existing studies examined Hamas' media. They also never approached it from a Gramscian framework.

The current research also provides theoretical enquiry on the utilisation of the media by Islamist resistance movements such as Hamas, which will help researchers understand the foundations and rules of resistance media. Resistance media is not a well studied or examined topic, yet it is developed and used by resistance/revolutionary groups around the world. Any scholar focusing on the development, rise and mobilisation of other social movements and the non-state actors will find of interest the common characteristics exhibited by Hamas. Likewise, this research will serve as a base for future studies on the role of media on non-state actors in Palestine and the Middle East.
More generally and in the field of media studies, this research contributes to future studies in the areas of constructing public opinion and mobilization of certain ideas and policies. Finally, the Hamas' case contributes to the identification of the importance of media in general as a tool of war and peace, in spreading ideas and ideology, and serving as an element of power.

**Challenges and limitations**

Three specific limitations must be acknowledged. One of the biggest limitations was the lack of existing literature and studies on the theoretical aspect of the “media strategy of resistance movements”. Even the few studies cited in chapter one that examined the use of the media in the Algeria, Iranian and South Africa context lacked the use of a theoretical framework and failed to posit any assumption from which could be drawn for this study. Thus, and as indicated above, this study used the Gramscian concept of cultural hegemony to understand the use of the Islamist resistance discourse in Hamas' media. It also used some aspects of social movement theory, particularly aspects related to mobilization, to deal with the rest of the media strategy elements.

The second major limitation was that the study did not specifically seek to analyse the content of Hamas' media. Rather, it sought to look at all aspects of the media strategy. Content could be examined later and in a different study. It was first necessary to examine the structure or strategy employed because it in a sense drives the content. Now, when looking more closely at Hamas' media strategy, there are smaller and more specific limitations. For example, one element of the Hamas media strategy was the ‘media message’. The present research was unable to analyse the media message of all of the media outlets at the three different stages. This was the reason why the ‘main’ media outlet in the particular stage was selected. In the first intifada, the research examined the leaflets and the graffiti; in the post-Oslo Agreement period, the Alrisala newspaper and the Alaqsra voice radio were examined; and, after the 2006 elections, the Alaqsra TV programs were utilised. Analysis was supplemented with evidence obtained from the interviewees, as well as the documents of the Hamas' media institutions.

The last major limitation to be highlighted pertained to geography or, rather, physical obstacles. Inability to travel to conduct interviews and collect documents limited the data collected. Obviously, the lack of traveling had to do more with personal safety and security. Gaza was not only under siege from the Israeli blockade, also bombarded in
the 2008-09 War and thereafter periodically. Fieldwork was going to take place in the occupied Palestinian territories, especially in the Gaza Strip. Gaza is the home to the majority of the Hamas' media institutions and personnel. The Ethics Committee at Exeter university prohibits researchers to travel to high risk areas. Being from the Gaza Strip makes it almost impossible to travel to the occupied West Bank. This is due to the strict travel controls imposed by the Israelis. Finally, there would have been the need to travel to Lebanon and Syria to meet some of the Hamas media seniors. Both countries prohibit the Palestinians from the Gaza strip who hold the PNA passport to enter. Geographical limitations were overcome by alternative means of communications. Most of the interviews were conducted by Skype, phone calls, and emails. Personal relations were used to access the Hamas media seniors. Due to some of the secrecy associated with Hamas' operations, it was difficult to access some information. This was most evident in the inability to access the media office of the Hamas' military wing media office; it was also evident in accessing information pertaining to the financial issues and the Hamas' business empire. Most of the Hamas media seniors refused to provide any details about such issues.

**Recommendations for Future Research**

A limitless number of questions were raised for future research. Studying Hamas media strategy opens the door for more areas to be researched. One area in particular is the media strategy of non-state actor groups in general and the Islamic resistance movements in the Middle East and in the Palestinian territories in particular. In this regard, there are several topics related directly and indirectly to this study that can be recommended for further investigation. Suggestions are listed below and are in no particular order in terms of importance.

- A study could comparatively examine the media of the Islamic resistance movements at various levels. The Palestinian/Palestinian level, which includes Islamist/Islamist and Islamist/secular. There are many different Islamists groups in Palestine such as the Islamic Jihad and the Salafists. At the regional level, more studies need to be done to compare experiences of Islamic resistance movements' media strategy. Such studies could look at Hamas, Hezbollah, Hizb ut-Tahrir, Islamic Jihad of Palestine, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Jaish Alansar, Jundallah AlAnsar, Iraqi Resistance and many others. A study could also be extended to include other Islamic resistance groups operating in other regions, which would permit the identification of common
characteristics. A large number of cases would permit better theoretical enquiry on the media strategies of such movements.

- The ‘creation of independent media institutions’ in order to serve Hamas’ agenda is an intriguing issue that needs to be explored further, especially when pondering global developments and Hamas' indirect impact on the rise of some of the new non-Islamic movements and their discourse. Could the development of “independent media institutions” have indirectly propelled the globalization of discourse and the Hamas' resistance model? Likewise, investigating the methods and tactics of the different media outlets of Hamas itself would be very interesting. Further research on this area would be of great help in understanding the precise role of each media outlet, as it would ‘refute’ or ‘confirm’ the real trends of such institutions. More broadly, further investigation and experimentation are also needed on the credibility of Hamas’ media and the extent of its commitment to the ethics of media standards nationally and internationally.

- Further research might investigate Hamas' media discourse on specific issues; examine the relationship between the media discourse and that of its officials; and, the relationship between the Hamas media discourse and the principles recorded in Hamas’ official documents such as its Charter. Researching this area could provide more evidence on the methods and tactics that Hamas approaches in dealing with the different issues. For example, ambiguous issues in Hamas' attitudes toward the ‘two states solution’, the Hudna (truce), the recognition of Israel, and the use of specific armed tactics. Finally, in the area related to discourse, studies examining Hamas’ terminology and what has sometimes been referred to as the Hamas' dictionary could be examined. This issue would actually be an excellent examination into the roles of and relationship between discourse, tone and symbolism. How a sentence or concept is constructed in written format and also the tone used to deliver it in a speech or press conference does impact perception and how others interact with and develop policy toward the movement. Many examples in the before and during the Hamas governance period provide insight on this issue. Related thereto would be how that particularly influenced Hamas as a resistance movement separate from it has a governing party.

- More experimental research is needed to study the target audience of the Hamas media. This would permit understanding of the effectiveness of such media on a particular category of the target audience. A number of possible future experimental studies can be conducted on the effect of specific programs on a particular target
audience. For example, the impact of (X) children program on (Y) Palestinian group of age (A to C) would raise awareness toward the issue of the “Palestinian refugees”. It would also be very interesting to assess the effects of the Hamas' media on a particular category of the Israeli public, especially after the Hamas 3D animation video received widespread coverage in the Israeli media. This could help to establish a greater degree understating on the impact of the Hamas media.

• Finally, what is now needed in the age of the “Arab spring” is the ‘new media’ discipline and what role it played and will play in the future. In particular, how and what the role has been played by the new media and used by Islamist movements of the Arab spring counties such as ‘Nahda’ in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the Islamic Movement in Libya. Research is also needed to investigate the future role of the media of the Islamist movements, who will hold important positions in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and other countries in the Arab spring. The potential research in this area is limitless for scholars interested in Islamic movements, Islamic resistance, social movements and all forms of resistance more generally, and for the rise and dominance of the alternative media paradigm that is not challenging mainstream media domestically, regionally and globally.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>jihaz al’ilam</td>
<td>Media apparatus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>almaktab ali’alami</td>
<td>The media office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>almurabitoon ala ardh al isra’a</td>
<td>[stationed on the land of Palestine]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>harakat alkifah al islami</td>
<td>The movement of Islamic struggle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intifadat alhijara</td>
<td>The stones intifada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>atfal alhijara</td>
<td>The children of stones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>marj Alzohoor</td>
<td>A Lebanese village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mashrou’a’ al-muqawamah</td>
<td>The project of resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muqawamah</td>
<td>resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khutba</td>
<td>Friday ceremony speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFLP</td>
<td>Popular front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFLP</td>
<td>Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td>The Islamic term of resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mujtama’a Muqawim</td>
<td>The resistance society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadith</td>
<td>The saying of the prophet Mohammed (PBUH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiqh</td>
<td>the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sira</td>
<td>The history of the prophet Mohammed (PBUH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mujahideen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intifadat almasajid</td>
<td>The Uprising of the mosques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thawrat almasajid</td>
<td>The revolution of the mosques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alintifada almubarak</td>
<td>the blessed intifada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ulamaa fatwa’</td>
<td>A legal opinion or ruling issued by an Islamic scholar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lijan alislah</td>
<td>reconciliation committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-iqtisad almuqawim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-kotla al-islamiya</td>
<td>Islamic bloc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nashid</td>
<td>[Islamic songs],</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intifadat alhijara</td>
<td>[the stones uprising]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-sahwa al-islamiya</td>
<td>Islamic awakening</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Media definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Libertarian (commercial)</td>
<td>The media are free to publish what they like. Attacks on the government are allowed and even encouraged in the interest of bettering society. Journalists and media organizations are given full autonomy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social responsibility</td>
<td>the media are not completely free to publish what they like as they have certain obligations to society to provide information and balance. the media should provide access to all groups. the media and the government are partners in constructing civil society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>The media serve the needs of the state through direct government control. The media are not allowed to print or broadcast anything that could undermine the established authority or give offence to the exiting political values. Control is by censorship and punishment of those caught breaking the rules.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet</td>
<td>In theory, media serve the interests of the working class and the sense of limit censorship is imposed by the consciousness of the journalists in solidarity with the workers. In practice, the soviet media were controlled by the state as in the authoritarian model.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source, Sarah Oates[^969]

Source: Hamas’s Archive of the first Palestinian Intifada
Appendix (3)

Source: Hamas’s Archive of the first Palestinian Intifada
Source: Hamas’s Archive of the first Palestinian Intifada
The Structure of Alaqsa TV in 2010
Source: Alaqsa TV annual Report
Appendix (6)

Alaqsa TV logo
| إلى عدم | البرنامج | الرسالة | التحري والصدام والتنسج من تهويده القدس والتعدي على المسجد الأقصى.
| --- | --- | --- | تكرار أن جميع اتفاقيات التقدم والخدمات التي قامت بها خيارات إسرائيليون لم تثبت ولأن يوجد ذلك الهيكيل المزعوم.
| محاولة | غايات | الحديث عن أساطير المؤسسة الإسرائيلية التي تقوم على وجود هذه الهيكل والاقدام الصهيونية وال"الدولة اليهودية الصافية" يسقط ومن ثم تنقى كل التنظيمات التي قامت على إسرائيل وتحول وعدها إلى مجرد كمية كبيرة كما في الحقيقة.
| ما يجب النفي إليه في هذه الحلقات من مسلسل إزالة المسجد الأقصى وتهويده القدس هو ما تم تسريحه منذ سنوات قبلية خلت عن نية تفكك المسجد الأقصى وإعادة تركيبه وبناءه في بلدة أبو ديس التي تبعد عن مركز مدينة القدس ثلاثة كيلومتر مترا.
| تحري الشارع العربي لأن القدس ليست للفلسطينيين فقط. | أهداف الverige | إعداد التقارير.
| | | اختبار موضوع الحدث في القدس.
| | | حشد النصوص الشرعية.
| | | حشد المواقف التاريخية.
| | | حشد الآيات.
| | | حشد الأحاديث.
| | | حشد العلماء والسياستين.
| | | اعتماد الضيوف الذي ينبغي ظهورهم في البرنامج.
| هو عبارة عن برنامج سياسي بحت من مخاطر هذه المسجد الأقصى ويحدث عن فضيلته وتاريخه والحريات من تحته. | وصف البرنامج | مراحل إعداد البرنامج.
| | | إعداد التقارير.
| | | حشد الآيات.
| | | حشد الأحاديث.
| | | حشد المواقف التاريخية.
| | | التسويق الكامل للحلفات.
| | | الأعمال الدعائية.
| | | بدأ البرنامج في الموعد الأول له.
| | | مدة البرنامج: 15 دقيقة.
| | | اسم | رقم الجوال | المهمة |
| | | | | |
| | | مهدي | 0599773717 | المقدم |
| | | محمد شنتوي (ضفة) | 0599773717 | إعداد |
| | | جمال نصار | 0599883548 | مشرف عام |
الحصول على صور كالتالي، لملحقات برنامج (للقراءة)

| لقاء مع مسنود | البرنامج | معالج المدعي | مقدم البرنامج | الصيف
|---|---|---|---|---
| الدكتور باسم عامر، وزير الصحة | الحصار الصهيوني المفروض على قطاع غزة منذ ما يزيد على الـ 2003، بفضل القائمة | | | |
| | يظل مرهقًا للاعياد، في ظل الظروف الصعبة التي عرضها على فلسطين وطوف صدام | | | |
| | يعتبر ما أنجح الحصار الصهيوني من أزماته كانت الهزيمة بالليل من وثباته | | | |
| | وجديدة من القراع على ثلاثة اتفاقية مرضي القطاع الذين عاشوا المتع | | | |
| | والحرمان. فحين أن بدأ الحصار والقطاع الصحي تلامس الأزمات حيث تمثل | | | |
| | المرضى من السفر للعلاج بالخارج وتلف الكثير من الدواء والลอتير من | | | |
| | المستلزمات الطبية المستخدمة في البعثات الجراحية فضلاً عن تعطيل الكثير | | | |
| | من الأجهزة والمعدات ونوفقاً على العمل بعد أن حلال الحصار دون إدخال قطاع | | | |
| | الهويري اللازمه لصيانتها كما حلال دون توريد أجهزه ومعدات جديدة. كما نال | | | |
| | القطاع الصحي نفسه كاماً من أزمة الوقود التي تعصف بالقطاع هذه الأزمة | | | |
| | التي فاقها من مدافعاتها الإقطاع المستمر للنيران الكهربائي، وفي ظل كل هذه | | | |
| | الأجهزة البارزة على الإبحار والركون والاستكشاف أخذ أن وزارة الصحة تقوم | | | |
| | ببعدها وواجباتها بمستويات وكفاءة عالية بعد أن نجحت في توزيع عوامل | | | |
| | الإخاذ والفلس إلى معمل إنتاج ونجاح ففعل استمرارها المتميز لكل ما أتيح | | | |
| | لها من طاقات وإمكانات. | | | |

الأنشطة

اليوم وبعد مرور عام على حصار غزة، كيف ترى الحالة التي عليها القطاع

ال الصحي؟

بداً وأصبح طوال العام المنصرم املاك القطاع الصحي للقدرة على تأديبة المهام

والواجبات الموظقة بالشكل المطلوب، هذه القدرة من أين استمدتها في ظل

انعدام الكثير من مستلزمات ومعدات المعمل؟

إحتراف القطاع الصحي بالقدرة على ثلاثة اتفاقية مرضي القطاع غزى، إلى أي

 مدى ساهم في تعزيز مصادر الشعوب الفلسطيني أمام الحصار؟

القطاع الصحي يعد من أكثر القطاعات ضراوة من الحصار المفروض على

قطاع غزة حيث تلقى العديد من الصيانة الكافية لترتيبه وتجاوزها إلا أنه نجح

في انتصارات هذه الوبائيات والخدام من تنفيذها، أو تحللها عن تلك

الأعمال التي تلقاها القطاع الصحي. كيف تعاملت معها؟

نفاد الكثير من أنواع الدواء

نفاد الكثير من المستلزمات الطبية والغازات اللازمة للعوامل الجراحية

تعمل الأجهزة والمعدات الطبية

من المرضى من السفر للعلاج بالخارج

ازمة الوقود وصول وصول الأطباء والعملين إلى المشافي والعيادات والمراكز

الطبية التابعة لوزارة الصحة

في ظل هذا الحصار والمعrom، بالإغراق، قد نجد أن وزارة الصحة تشن وتتفتح

مستشفيات وعيادات ومراكز. هل حثتنا على تلك المشاريع التي تمتلك وزارة

الصحة من إنجازها؟ ومن هي الجهات التي قامت بتمويقها؟

هذه المشاريع الصحية إلى أي مدى ساهمت في التخفيف من معاناة المرضى

قطاع غزة؟
برغم الحصار وقلة الإمكانيات المتاحة لوزارة الصحة إلا أننا رأينا العديد من العوامل الجراحية النوعية قد أجريت في مستشفى قتاع واحد. ما هو إجراء هذه العمليات؟ وكيف تمكنت هذه المستشفيات من إجراؤها؟ تمكنت مستشفيات قطاع غزة من إجراء مثل هذه العمليات النوعية. كيف ساهم في التخفيف من معاناة المرضى المحتاجين السماح لهم بالسفر لإجراء هذه العمليات في الخارج؟

يزور قطاع غزة من وقت لآخر فود طبية أوروبية والتي أجرىها الوفد التركي هذه الوفد حينما ترى هذا الواقع المأساوي الذي نعيه ما الذي نقوله؟ هذه الوفد الطويل. هل يتم الاستفادة منها سواء على صعيد إجراء عمليات نوعية أو على صعيد اكتساب المزيد من الخبرات التي تحملها هذه الوفد؟ بعد أن تأتي هذه الوفد زيارة لقطاع غزة وعود إلى بلادها ما شاهدته على أرض الواقع والذي نحن نتظر ونتعاطف ونقصم هذا الوفد. هل يترجم هذا عملياً في شكل دعم وتوافق؟

- على صعيد التخفيف من معاناة المواطنين الفلسطينيين فيما يتعلق بالإعاء المالي التي يتكلفها العلاج في مستشفى قطاع غزة. ما الذي فعلتموه في هذا السياق؟
- هذه الأزمة الاقتصادية الخاصة التي يحتاجها مرضى القطاع لا سيما مرضى الأورام السرطانية. منحة العشرة مليون درهم المقدمة من الأمير محمد بن راشد إلى أي مدى ساهمت في توفير تلك الأدوية؟
- مواجهة البلاد والعائلات والمادية التي تصل إلى وزارة الصحة إلى أي مدى تساهل في دعم الالتزامات الخاصة وتعزيز قدرة وزارة الصحة على القيام بالدور المطلوب منها؟
- ماذا عن تواصل الوزارة مع مؤسسات المنظمات الصحية الدولية؟
- الحصار المفروض على قطاع غزة إلى أي مدى أعاد وفرص عمليات تطوير المستشفيات والارتفاع بالخدمة فيما؟
- هنا هناك متابعة ورقابة دورية من قبل وزارة الصحة على عمل وداء الصيدليات فيما يتعلق ببيع وشراء الأدوية المحددة؟

خلال العام الماضي، بلغ عدد الموظفين الذين قتم حضورهم إلى وزارة الصحة وما هي المعايير التي اعتمدتها عند اختيارهم لعوام الموظفين؟
- الهيكلية الإدارية التي اعتمدتها وزارة الصحة لأول مرة في التاريخها. ما هي المعايير التي أدختها بها؟
- هذه الهيكلية الإدارية. إلى أي مدى تساهم في تنظيم العمل داخل الوزارة وفي الراهن بمستوى الخدمات التي توفرها الوزارة للمواطنين؟

ما هي خططكم المستقبلية في هذا الإطار؟
نموذج إجراء مقابلة
قسم السياسة والعلاقات الدولية، كلية العلوم الإنسانية
جامعة أكسيتر - المملكة المتحدة
عنوان البحث
"From the mosque pulpit to the satellite broadcasting: the emergence of Hamas media strategy"

تفاصيل

معلومات عن الباحث
الاسم
وال بك عبد العال
الجامعة
قسم السياسة والعلاقات الدولية، كلية العلوم الإنسانية، جامعة أكسيتر - المملكة المتحدة.
العنوان
50 Linnet Close, Exeter, Devon, EX4 5HF, UK
0044795027113

نوع
wa218@ex.ac.uk
بريد الإلتروني

خصوصية البيانات:
كل مواد هذه المقابلة ستستخدم حصرياً في رسالة الدكتوراه هذه، وسيتم التعامل معها بالسرية والكتمان وفقاً لأخلاقات البحث العلمي المتعارف عليها أكاديمياً. ونلتقي عنايةكم إلى أن هذا البحث لن يستخدم لأغراض تجارية أو نحوه. هذا وسيتم تزويد حضرتك بنسخة من هذه الدراسة.

هل تفضلون ذكر اسم مستعار؟ نرجو الاختيار: لا
إذا كانت الإجابةنعم
الاسم: ____________________________
مكان الإقامة: ____________________________

إذا كانت الإجابةلا
الاسم: ____________________________
مكان الإقامة: ____________________________
التلفظ: ____________
ال должность: ____________
البريد الإلكتروني: ____________________________

التاريخ: ____________

2010/11/7
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