Acknowledgments

One sets out on the project of a doctoral thesis with high aspirations and hope. One reaches the end of the project with relief, satisfaction and thankfulness. The total process is long and arduous, and during it many debts of gratitude are incurred, for helps and encouragement. Along the way friends and colleagues have encouraged me in this project; by reading, suggesting and correcting.

Most of all, the final outcome (less any faults that must be mine) is owed for its acceptance to Professor Tim Niblock, my supervisor – always urging accuracy, consistency and agreeable expression. I am grateful to my superiors in the Bahrain Forces for granting me the necessary time for undertaking the doctoral project. My family have looked on with patience and encouragement. I am grateful.
Abstract
The study covers two regions. These are shown to constitute ‘Regional security complexes’. The Gulf region and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the Southeast Asian region are the focus of study. The defence and security circumstances of the two regions and the responses of the regions’ governments severally and cooperatively are examined. The study has had to take account of the geographic, historical, ethno-cultural differences between the two regions. These are shown to be influential in their respective security responses. Nonetheless, the thesis demonstrates how the regions can be understood in terms of a common theoretical framework.

The study is undertaken primarily within the framework of the theory of ‘Regional Security Complex’ (RSCT), as developed by Buzan and Waever in Regions and Power. Regional security complexes are areas of internal “security interdependence” and securitisation. The theory (RSCT) is discussed critically. ‘Security Communities’ is a major comparative feature of the study. Amitav Acharya develops this approach in Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia. Emphasis is on the “creative construction” of a ‘security community’. The Gulf Cooperation Council may also be viewed in this way. ‘Regional security complex’ and ‘regional security community’ are not alternative theories of regional inter-state relations. The second is superstructural on the prior facts of regional security complexity. The GCC is a partial response to regional security and
is a securitising actor in the region. ASEAN is an attempt at region-wide inclusiveness and conflict avoidance.

Institutional management of security is described. The two regional approaches differ as beliefs that the “enmity/amity balance” is amenable to official regional policy and action: the Gulf and GCC are apparently locked in a dominant ‘enmity’ scenario; ASEAN seeks to establish a regime of ‘amity’. Whether ASEAN is notably less militarily oriented than the Gulf is questioned. States’ insistence on national security ‘resilience’ and ASEAN norms of ‘sovereignty’, ‘non-interference’ and conflict avoidance’ impede regional security development. ASEAN’s progress towards an ‘ASEAN Security Community’ is examined.

The study discusses practicalities of these policies. The application and limitations of ‘Revolution in military affairs’ (RMA) are discussed. The military are viewed as a principal operational actor in any regional security response to conditions of regional security complexity. An examination of state-military relations is based on the concepts of ‘grand strategy’ and ‘military doctrine’.
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Part 1
Chapter One

Introduction to the subject of the thesis

(i) Introduction
The writing and undertaken which follows is influenced by the writer’s intellectual attachment to the subject of defence and security as a primary concern of states often referred to as ‘third world’¹, and the responses of such states to their security concerns. It will be seen in this study that this is found in the development of national defence armed forces. The important element in these responses, however, is to be observed in the establishment by the states of regional organizations the purposes of which are largely directed towards economic development and security and defence. This study, then, will in large part be comprised of an examination of two regional organizations: the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the Gulf and the Association of Southeast Nations in Southeast Asia (ASEAN) in Southeast Asia. These organizations will be examined as responses to conditions of regional security. A view of these regional organizations will be of them as vehicles for building national and joint regional defence forces. The writer’s attachment to this subject is consequent from a professional and career interest as an officer in a national defence force.

(ii) Nature of the Study
The underlying nature of this study is comparative. This needs some explanation. The writer’s interest in defence and security – their policy
frameworks and the practical management of them – in the Arabian Gulf goes almost without saying since Bahrain, my home state, is located in the Gulf and shares defence and security concerns with the other Arabian states of the Gulf, particularly as these concerns arise from security relations with other Gulf States. This interest (mine and that of concerned authorities) is focussed in a regional organization: the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).¹ The study, however, is one of comparison between the GCC and the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN), particularly in matters of security and defence. The writer’s interest in Southeast Asia arose in the first instance from informal discussions and casual reading. Since little more than casual previous knowledge and no professional experience can be claimed in respect of Southeast Asia the study has a strong exploratory cast, which must nonetheless be enriched by an approach of appropriate research. The states of the Gulf Cooperation Council have diplomatic and trade contacts with states of Southeast Asia. These links are strengthened in relations between the two organizations; the GCC and ASEAN.² There are similarities and parallels between the two regions and between the two regional associations. These will be examined in detail. The following observation from Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, for example, made about the roles of the US and USSR in the Cold War and its aftermath, has general application to both of the regions under study here:

The arena in which the two sides engaged in a battle of proxies is littered with the legacy of major arms races, client-patron relationships and uneasy alliances that run counter to the national interest of many of the states in the region.³
In the post-Cold War situations factors of more immediate and local focus, of strategic and security, concerns came to attract attention. For example, competitive polar power, actual war and intra-state threats in the Gulf, and sub-region division and persistent threats to states stability in Southeast Asia. There are, moreover, similarities and dissimilarities in the fields of power-ranking in the international political and economic arenas. Such similarities and dissimilarities provide the bases for useful comparative study.

This study, then, is mainly comparative in interest and in form. Its purpose will be to tease out what is significant in the comparisons that can be drawn between the Arabian Gulf (otherwise referred to in the literature as the Persian Gulf) and the Southeast Asian regions and the states separately and conjointly within them, and how these relate to their immediate geo-strategic environments. These new forms of regional security environment have been conceptually developed in the theory and analysis of ‘regional security complexes’ and also in the conceptualisation of ‘security communities’. As the states join in regional arrangements so they highlight these forms of security environment. These new forms of security environment have been conceptually developed in the theories and analysis of “regional Security Complex’ and ‘Security Community’. These concepts are central elements in the study and examination of them will be undertaken in a later chapter. They will be tested for their relevance to an understanding of the two regions. The study will focus in large part on the various defence and security concerns in the Gulf and Southeast Asian regions and how policies are developed in response to
these, and will examine the attempts in the two regions to manage their respective joint affairs in regional organizations, particularly in respect of matters of defence and security, their management and how this is influenced by their respective perceptual frameworks in respect of security and defence. The political and economic influences that relate to these concerns will be discussed.

(iii) The study of two Regional Security Complexes in the Gulf and Southeast Asia
The Gulf and Southeast Asia are the settings of the study. The central analytic interest of the study is of the two regions as they are identifiable as ‘regional security complexes’. Each region is a group of states that have security concerns that are specific and internal to the regions. The study examines how the states of the two regions acknowledge their regional conditions of insecurity and the measures they take to respond to these. These concerns are subjects of processes of securitisation and desecuritisation which are undertaken primarily internally within the regions. The security relationships of the states within the regions can be understood and analysed fully at the level of the regions. The basic statement of this possibility is set out by Buzan and Waever:

A set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another.... Processes of securitisation and thus the degree of security interdependence are more intense between the actors inside such complexes than they are between actors inside the complex and those outside it.4

At the practical level resolution or containment of the regional security conditions rests with the states. Perceptions of insecurity among regional
actors do not alone define a regional security complex. Buzan et al remark that:

RSCs are defined by durable patterns of amity and enmity. Historical hatreds and friendships, as well as specific issues that trigger conflict or cooperation, take part in the formation of an overall constellation of fears, threats, and friendships that define an RSC. (My emphasis)

Processes of securitisation and desecuritisation are affected by enmity and amity. Recognizing this will be important in later discussion. The study undertakes an examination of the joint political initiatives that have been taken by the Arabian States in the Gulf and the states of Southeast Asia to construct organizations, the GCC and ASEAN, that are directed towards management of the security conditions that define their regions as regional security complexes. It will be an important part later in the study to trace and compare the development and goals of these organizations and to assess how successful in this they have been.

(iv) Geographical, Social-Cultural and Economic settings of the two Regional Security Complexes

This section will examine briefly some physical, social and cultural, and economic features of the Gulf and Southeast Asia. These features provide the basic setting within which security in the two regional security complexes is pursued. The common analytic ground in the study is the regional configurations in the Gulf and Southeast Asia and how these are operationalized in regional policies and institutions, or in weaknesses and inadequacies in these.
Geography: The two regions have quite contrasting geographic characteristics. The Gulf region, as defined by the six-states membership of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) plus Iraq and Iran, is situated within parallels latitude N38°/N12° and longitude E34°/E64°. The Gulf region is fairly contained as two great landmasses with a waterway (the Gulf proper) which largely divides the area. Major oceanic waterways to the south of the region provide essential exits into the channels of international trade. (See map 1) The Arab Gulf states are territorially contiguous with no major geographic barriers between them, facilitating therefore prospective shared good land-based infrastructure and communications. The states lie on a continuous littoral along the major Gulf international waterway, which also possesses vital energy (oil and gas) resources. The Saudi Kingdom covers over three-quarters of the Arabian land mass, some 2.2 million km², and also is also littoral on the Red Sea to the west and has westward territorial borders, and a troubled boundary with Yemen to the south. These present Saudi Arabia with additional strategic dimensions. Iraq lies at the northern end of the Gulf, bordering Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran. Its several violations of these borders have been proof of the country’s strategic importance in the Gulf. Iran lies along the eastern shore of the Gulf through to the outer Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea. Iran, some 1.65 million km² in area, (three quarters of Saudi Arabia’s area but nearly four times that of Iraq), with a population one and one half that of all the Arabian Gulf States (including Iraq) together is the sole non-Arabian member of the Gulf regional security complex. Three smaller states, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, lie along the southern end of the Gulf. Iran has a
commanding position around the Strait of Hormuz at the southern end of the Gulf. The Strait is the sole entry-exit point to the Gulf and so is of vital economic and strategic interest for all the Gulf States and for international commerce. The narrow Strait (some twenty kilometres at its narrowest) makes Oman and Iran the closest neighbours across the Gulf. Oman and Yemen are littoral along outer seas and international waterways to the south. These are also of strategic and security concern in the Gulf as passage-ways for piracy and illegal immigration.
The Southeast Asia region has been defined since the 1990s by the ten-state membership of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The region lies within the geographic parallels latitude N28°/S11° and longitude E93°/E142°. Southeast Asia is made up of the Indochina landmass bordering to the west on South Asia and on China to the north and to the east is made up of large and small islands lying off the South China Sea and Pacific Ocean. The initial ASEAN-Six states (with Brunei from 1984) are mostly insular and archipelagic in form. Thailand is situated within Indochina. The long Thailand-Malaysian extension to the south links Indochina with the maritime and insular states of the Southeast Asian region. (See map 2.) Southeast Asia is the world’s most physically disjoined and scattered major strategic area on account of its lying uniquely astride some of the world’s main international sea lanes which are arteries of trade and trans-continental communication. Yahuda says, “...the region is immense and hugely diverse. That in itself is detrimental to the emergence of an indigenous sense of a common regional identity”. The geo-physical characteristics of the region account for its strategic significance and make for the scenario within which the dynamics of its securitization are largely generated.

Indonesia and The Philippines are the main maritime states. They contain together one-half of the land area of the region, but this is scattered around hundreds of islands, creating for the two states problems of internal cohesion. Indonesia is an archipelago of thousands of islands.
large and very small (only one thousand of which are settled) which stretches some 5,000 klm/3,200 miles from west to east and some 1,700kml/1,040 miles from south to north. The Philippines too is a vast archipelago. There are 7,000 islands of which some one thousand are settled, scattered over 1,800km S/N and 1,100 W/E. The whole are widely scattered in the Pacific, South China, Sulu and Celebes Seas, strategic waters shared with other Southeast Asia nations with the inevitable effects of demographic and cultural diversity and detaching distances between centre and periphery (See Map 3 in Chapter 8). But, according to Yong Mun Cheong: “regional differences were slight, except for the stark but general contrasts between the Muslim south and the Christian north”.71

Malaysia’s position gives it a shared security oversight with Singapore and Indonesia of the long and narrow Malacca Strait, which is effectively a conduit for oil and merchandise. Singapore is a physical yet insular, appendage to the Malaysian peninsula, with the consequence of contended adjoining waters. As Leifer has put it: Singapore is subject to “the tyranny of geography” which places it close between its greater neighbours, Malaysia and Indonesia.10 Brunei, like Singapore, is a micro-state and wealthy from its oil resources.11 Knowledge of and anticipation about resources lying in shared maritime areas, particularly in the South China Sea, agitate relations among the states of the region, as well as with the neighbour state of China.
The territorial mass of Indochina has been the scene of traditional conflict, and latterly of communist dispute and territorial combat. Laos is the sole land-locked state in all of Southeast Asia and with Cambodia lies between the Indochina sub-region’s greater and mutually hostile states of Thailand and Vietnam. Myanmar is territorially the largest country in the sub-region and by population the third after Thailand and Vietnam. It is the territorial connection with south Asia; or as Buzan and Waever would have it, Myanmar is an ‘insulator’ between the South Asia and Southeast Asia regional complexes:

The concept of insulator is specific to (regional security complex theory) and defines a location occupied by one or more units where larger regional security dynamics stand back to back. This is not to be confused with the traditional idea of a buffer state.  

Myanmar was embarked on a separate authoritarian and isolated career. In the sixties and seventies ethnic and ideological issues dominated the political system. It fell to a political-military regime to manage these.
Society and Culture: Socio-political features distinguish the two regions in numerous ways. The populations of the GCC states are small, Saudi Arabia only exceeding ten million. Iraq’s population (2007) was 27.5 million while Iran’s population of 72.5 million in the same year was greater than all the other Gulf States together. In Southeast Asia three states have populations greater than any Gulf state, including Indonesia whose population alone (231 million) exceeds that of all the Gulf States.
The Arabian Gulf is relatively free of the deep and affective ethnic cleavages that characterize the Southeast Asia area. In the Gulf ethnic and cultural linkages are widespread among the Arab people who enjoy general cultural commonality. Peaceful relations between the peoples of the states are based on widely shared modes of livelihood, systems of government, and similar and connected ethnic/cultural systems of language and religion. Uniformity of Arab culture and language, and common Islamic religion inform contemporary politics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.1 GCC states’ populations (millions)</th>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
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<tr>
<td>S. Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.A.E.</td>
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<td>(Total)</td>
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</table>

Area (total) 2,672,700 km²

Source: Population Reference Bureau, Washington

* national/non-national

Politics is based on common traditional monarchical authority. These features facilitate regional association and present a wide interface of security interest. On the wider inclusive basis of the Gulf cultural (ethnic, linguistic and religious) differences are influential in relations between the Arabian States and Iran. Tensions filter through to non-Arab communities on the Peninsula where doubts about national and ethnic and sectarian loyalties agitate political and social stability. Since the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in 1958 a strong secularised regime was evolved in
Iraq. Military coup, internal ethnic community separation and armed force aggression against regional neighbours have over four decades set Iraq in a general antagonistic relationship in the Gulf.\textsuperscript{14}

In recent times in the Gulf there have been hesitant and cautious moves in the direction of political reform with the establishment and revision of elected assemblies. The cautious political reforms that have been undertaken have opened up new avenues for the expression of popular discontents and aspirations, however without moderating these. Open civic society is limited. The pace of reform is a difficult judgment to make for the regimes. The ruling houses remain in control, by means of ministerial dominance and appointments in organizations of social and economic development.\textsuperscript{15} Radical economic development has generated a peculiar demographic situation where there are imbalances of national and non-national populations, with all manner of social, political and security consequences. This is explained by the demands of development exceeding available indigenous human resources. However, more aspirant indigenous youth (male and female) are entering the workforces. The integral place of Yemen in the Arabian Peninsula has been in part as a source of unskilled and cheap labour, but as the country is drawn into the GCC fold its economic needs gain attention.\textsuperscript{16} There is a significant South and Southeast Asian immigrant and short-term workforce located in the Arabian Gulf which serves to compensate for the local employment shortfalls.
Southeast Asia, on the other hand, is a region of greater cultural complexity. One of the most striking differentiations between the Gulf and Southeast Asia is the socio-cultural pluralism of the latter brought in from the wider South Asia and Asia-Pacific areas as well as by European intruders. By comparison, intrusions of foreigners in the modern Gulf do not present issues of historical depth, sensitivity and challenge and have not generally taken on forms of settlement, they have rather been invited, controlled and on notice of eventual departure.

Southeast Asia’s cultural complexity is not surprising given that the people are also so widely dispersed. Indonesia’s ethnic cleavages, for example, are reinforced by the diffusion of the country’s population over a vast sea area. The region’s strategic and security circumstances are exacerbated by separatist elements within the states units; particularly those of archipelagic form – that happen also to be the region’s largest members, the Philippines and Indonesia. Both these states are persistently menaced and unsettled by separatist provinces at their geographic extremes, the sources of which are inflammatory mixes of ethnicity and sectarianism.

The countries of Southeast Asia have been subjected historically to a variety of intrusive cultures and belief systems. In all but the Philippines deeply embedded historic religions, mostly native to East Asia, have been the principal influences in society and politics. Western imperialism implanted Christianity as the dominant influence in the Philippines. In recent times there has been the additional divisive influence of a global militarised Marxist/Maoist ideology. Southeast Asia therefore does not
have a cohering regional identity. This leads also to a lack of coherence within some of the states. This leads to the weakening of the notion of nation-state in some states, thus emphasizing the political burden of nation-building. A mix of political liberalisation and state centralism among the states is present against a backdrop of traditional and modern authoritarianism – and a widely articulated conviction in an ‘Asian way’ of political and economic development. We will later observe the widespread influence of the military and its causes in the states’ social and political systems.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.2 ASEAN states’ populations (millions)</th>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
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<td>Laos</td>
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<td>Malaysia</td>
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<td>Myanmar</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
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<td>(Total)</td>
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<td>Land Area (Total)</td>
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<td>Source: Indexmundi.com</td>
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</table>
Disputes and Conflict: Both the Gulf and Southeast Asia, have been extensive zones of conflict. These will come to be seen to be dynamically located in what are the ‘regional security complexes’. Intraregional disputes among the Arabian Gulf States, mainly around borders (and linked sought-after resources) have been low-level and generally contained. They have not been allowed to be regime-challenging however, or nation-threatening, and are sometimes left unresolved. The ‘Gulf Arab way’ is sometimes not to allow grievances to disturb unity, especially as this serves to maintain a united defensive front. The most dangerous border issues are at the boundaries of the present Arabian security community. The border disputes that have most seriously challenged the stability and security of the Gulf have to the north between Iraq and Iran and between Iraq and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Lying south in the peninsula the ancient lands of Yemen and Oman remained intact, but in the one case coming in time to be deeply embroiled in internal tribal (1962) and political ideological attachments alien to the Arabian ethos, and in the other challenged in its unity by the tribal-sectarian Dhofar Rebellion (1965-75). Saudi Arabia’s southern border with Yemen has been subject to recurrent armed clashes.

In the processes of regional development conflicts of national interest have to be negotiated and balanced. Nevertheless, national security issues remain primary and will be the major focus later in the study. Saudi Arabia in particular has had to put down violent challenges to the stability of the state. The Gulf contains a security configuration of small powers and competitive great powers, which latter have been real and persistent
threats to regional stability. Security concerns about domestic cleavages, dissidence and insurgency have increased towards the end of the twentieth century. Social groups, sectarian and economic, that see themselves as discriminated against have become increasingly restive, notably in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain. Internal dispute and conflict have become dominant security concerns. Intrusive destabilizing influences have come to be more enlivened, especially as nationals have returned from the Afghanistan war zone and as Al Qaida has become increasingly effective in penetrating the social and political systems of the Arabian Gulf. Non-state groups and individual actors have increasingly become securitizing elements. The boundary between the domestic and the external is made uncertain and so the framework of security made more complex. The deeper strategic and security issues and the dynamics of regional security have been around the inclusive Arabian Gulf, engaging power and territorial challenges from Iraq, Iran and more locally Yemen.

Intraregional disputes in south East Asia involve direct conflict and remain active. Contemporary territorial disputes, for example, do not have exclusive origins in the claims of modern nation states, but connect at times with traditional identities. The modern Southeast Asian state is embroiled in inherited tensions as well as with those generated from its own contemporary sovereign demands and its eye to locations of potentially rich resources, as in the South China Sea. Numerous boundary and territorial disputes occur on the Indochina mainland, notably between Thailand and Cambodia, Thailand and Malaysia. Cambodia and Laos have traditionally been a buffer in conflicts over territory and influence
between Thailand and Vietnam. The border area between Thailand and Myanmar is unstable.

Territorial disputes arise also in the maritime area. Important among these are those between Malaysia and Indonesia and the Philippines over Malaysian absorption of Sabah and Sarawak on the Kalimantan (Borneo) Island. Refugee movements in conflict areas disturb relations. Irredentism is present, inspired by ethnic and sectarian divisions, which particularly affect the Philippines and Indonesia. A compound of such disputes can challenge the creation of new national identities, making nation-building harder and threatening to destabilize regimes. Maritime defence and security are paramount in Southeast Asian strategic affairs. Defence forces are deployed at territorial borders and at focal points of maritime dispute and insecurity. The Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN), we shall come to see, is a vehicle to defuse conflict, to ameliorate through processes of communication and contact, and to pacify by incorporation in shared institutions.

_Polarity and Hegemonic Claims._ An important factor in the overall security configuration of the Gulf is the hegemonic aspirations of its three largest members: Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Owing to its greater size, its resources and military weight, Saudi Arabia enjoys great influence over its partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council and authority within the organization. Perceptions of Saudi pre-eminence can be obstructive in matters of command and logistics in regional defence and in matters of distribution in regional economic development. Hegemonic ambition has
been active in the wider Gulf region where it has been the cause of outright conflict over the 1980s between Iraq and Iran. Iraq and Iran are core hegemonic aspirants in the Gulf. Projection of Iraq’s military power in the Gulf after the 1980s conflict was put down by war and foreign occupation in 2003. But assuming the restoration of national unity, economic reconstruction and restored sovereign defence capabilities, regional tri-polarity will re-emerge. This is a critical strategically defining aspect in the Gulf security complex. Iranian hegemonic pretensions within the Gulf continue to be a major source of security anxiety among the Arabian states, and in the twenty-first century Iranian ambition is the critical aspect of the Gulf security complex. Nuclear development in Iran is widely believed not to be wholly for civil use and is a major threat aspect of regional security.

Hegemony is a factor present more in the wider Pacific region than in the Southeast Asian region. Southeast Asia consists largely of what Dibb has called ‘middle powers’:

The political strength of the ASEAN countries and the reluctance of key middle powers, such as...Vietnam and Indonesia, to be subordinated to any concert of great powers will serve at least as a partial check on hegemony.21

The mission of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations is to constrain pretentious power, within the region through joint processes of consultation and avoidance of conflict. ASEAN seeks to achieve this through its authorship of elaborate diplomatic and consultative structures.22 In the wider region China’s suspected contemporary pretensions are largely the outcome of the collapse of the tri-polarity of power and conflict at the dissolution of the Cold War in Indochina and
China’s own internal generative capacities of reformist communism. ASEAN seeks to moderate China’s conduct and its aversion to multilateral engagement by incorporation into the Association’s discussion processes.

**Economy**: The Gulf Cooperation Council and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations are both regional groupings of states that are designated by the relevant international agencies\(^2^3\) as “developing” and generally view themselves as such. Their national policies are consequently directed to increasing their productive capacities and domestic ‘welfare’ capabilities, and to strengthening their economic and trading competitiveness in the global economy.\(^2^4\) The Arabian Gulf (including Iraq) and Southeast Asia see regional association as essential to achieving this objective.\(^2^5\)

On a global scale the Gulf States are middle-ranking, and by orientation they are states of relative low-level development.\(^2^6\). Oil has been the base from which traditional rural and sea-resourced low income economies have been transformed into wealthy modern economies and societies. However the petro-economy is intensely specialised and has developed in isolation from other forms of production and wealth creation.\(^2^7\) Development is increasingly directed to ‘diversification’ away from this concentrated resource base, which in the meantime provides the vital capital input for development. The oil-gas economy produces a global income base and generates much external sovereign investment. But their substantial control of the world’s most wanted energy resources, oil and gas, place the Gulf States in an almost unique position in the global economy. Their substantial control of the world’s most wanted energy
resources (oil and gas) place the Gulf States in an almost unique position in the global economy. This economy, however, also creates a regional profile of international strategic significance and recurring security uncertainty.

The economies of the Gulf member states’ are state-dominated, excessively protective and non-complementary between the states. A halting approach to economic liberalization within the six states is under way. They have been tentative in admitting increased foreign participation and domestically are reluctant to envisage extensive privatisation. Integration of the states’ economies into a wider Gulf regional economic framework is still limited and of uncertain commitment. The states are, however, members of the World Trade Organization.

Southeast Asia comprises a mix of middle and low-ranking economies. The states are of low-level development and their national policies are strongly directed towards promoting economic development. They vary, however, according to the state’s economic principles; from centralised state control to state-centric participation and to liberalizing and open capitalistic systems. Liberalization has progressed mainly among the ‘westernised’ and IMF-influenced systems of the original ASEAN-six states. Reconciliation and growing cooperation between the one-time communist states of Indochina and the original ASEAN-six states have been a major aspect of the region’s development since the 1990s.
Intra-ASEAN trade persists at a level well below twenty per cent. The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), agreed in 1992 has not produced a noticeable increase in intra-ASEAN trade. Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs) are present in the ASEAN area, notably in Singapore and Malaysia. Economic liberalization is limited and the state is the dominant economic factor in all the region’s countries. This remains most emphatically the case among the states in Indochina that are moving away from their communist centralized state legacies. Progress along the course of development is at different stages among the states. Economic development is strongly pursued on a national basis, with limited progress as yet towards a declared regional ambition of establishing an ‘economic community’. The needs among the states to change their orientation, to catch up and equalize are processes on the way to establishing a regional ‘economic community’.

(v) Conclusion

In this introduction we have stated why this study was undertaken and what intellectual interest it carries for the writer. This interest is in states’ and regional defence responses to their conditions of insecurity. The basic framework of the study is comparative. The parties to the comparison are (i) groups of states that are generally of relatively limited resources and (ii) of limited capabilities for ensuring their security and defence. In both these regards the states and the regions are developing. These parties to the comparison are, on one side the states of The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) plus Iraq and Iran, and on the other the states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The two associations are
the focal aspects of the comparison of the regions as configurations of insecurity and of states’ responses to these conditions. The two groups of states under study are identified as ‘regional security complexes’ (RSCs). The principal analytical framework of the study is the concepts of Regional Security Complex and Regional Security Community. The first is a reference to conditions of insecurity at the regional level; the second is a reference to a particular way of managing these conditions of insecurity at that level. Analysis of these concepts is undertaken later in the study. A brief survey of the histories over the second half of the twentieth century of the two regions provided the setting within which the regions came to be identified as regional security complexes.

The Introduction has very briefly set out a number of parameters within which the relative conditions of the two groups of countries may be understood and which provide a relevant backdrop to the understanding of them as regional security complexes. These parameters tell us something of the ‘security vulnerabilities’ of the states of the regions, which collectively identify them as security complexes and to which the states must respond to secure their defence and security. This is the core of what the study examines.
Notes Chapter One

1. More formally and properly, ‘Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf’. For convenience we shall usually use the familiar form Gulf Cooperation Council, or GCC in what follows. The two organizations will be identified and discussed at length in Chapter Seven.

2. Again we shall use the familiar reference; that is; to ASEAN.

3. Milton-Edwards, Beverley and Peter Hinchcliffe, *Conflicts in the Middle East since 1945*, London, Routledge, 2001, p.35. Of course, the factors of oil in the one case and of Chinese power in the other draw attention to distinguishing aspects of the two regions. These will feature in the ensuing discussion.


5. Ibid pp.45 and 50.

6. See Chapter Seven below.

7. Region-wide railway, linked roadways and sub-surface communications cable systems are real prospects, while they are not in Southeast Asia.

8. Beyond the territorial waters of the Gulf States the Gulf is an internal waterway as defined in International Law of the Sea. Foreign vessels have ‘conditional rights of transit passage’ under UNCLOS as amended in 1994. Navigable lanes are narrow and vulnerable to hostile action against traffic as was shown during the Iraq-Iran War of the 1980s. This adds a major international dimension to Gulf regional security complexity. Maritime Southeast Asia also contains waterways of regional and international interest and security concern. The South China Sea particularly is the major resource exploration and defence interface with China.


12. Buzan et al, *Regions and Powers*, pp.41 and 490 (glossary): “a state or mini-complex standing between regional security complexes and defining a location where larger regional security dynamics stand back to back”. For four decades a strict political-military elite kept the country steadfastly detached as a “buffer state” – in the Buzan et al geo-strategic scheme of things. Myanmar’s rehabilitation in a Southeast Asian political community was cautiously set in motion by membership of ASEAN in 1997. See *Cambridge History*, pp.117-22.

13. More refined comment on the Sunni-Shia divide needs to be made if due assessment of loyalties and their influences on Arabian-Iranian relations are to
be made. For example, many Shia are long-lived and born in the Arabian states and put their nationality before any external sectarian identity and loyalty. Ethnic and sectarian identities are notoriously roused and made pawns in political and international disputes.

14. The tri-polar relationship between Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia will be discussed later as this is observed to be a central element in the configuration of defence security in the Gulf.


16. However, Yemen’s main call on attention in the Gulf has grown as a regional security factor. It has been engaged in border conflict with Saudi Arabia (and earlier with Oman) and is feared to harbour Al Qaeda elements and Iranian influence.

17. Parrinas, Julius, ‘The GCC and the Development of ASEAN’, Abu Dhabi, Emirates Lecture Series 26, ECSSR, 1998, pp.3-4. However, Indonesia’s large population, nearly half of that of the whole region, includes the largest Muslim community in the world.


19. This phrase belongs to this text only. It harks – with the ‘Asian Way’ – to a perception of a unifying normative framework.

20. And put down only by engaging external (mainly British, and in 1973 Iranian) armed assistance; a security relationship that has continued even after British withdrawal from the east. Oman has tended to have a high level defence concern which is advanced this in the counsels of the GCC.

21. Dibb, Paul, Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995, pp. 24-25. Dibb does not discuss the possible significance within the Southeast Asia region of the large number of middle powers (six states out of ten) and their wide distribution in the region. In Note 6 to the Introduction (at p.74) Dibb discusses the difference between great, middle and small powers. He identifies Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines as ‘middle powers’. “Singapore is a small power geographically, but a middle power in terms of its political influence and military might”.

22. We will see later that relative weights of power can be a cause of anxiety in the region, and on the other hand on occasion the relative influence of states can be

23. The states are members of the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

24. The Charter which founded the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981 was accompanied by an equally constitutive Economic Agreement. This committed the six states to wide-ranging programmes of regional economic development. In 2001 an up-dating Unified Economic Agreement committed the states to furthering a Gulf (GCC) regional economy by common tariffs, a common market and common currency. These have continued to be ‘work in progress’ since then. The Bahraini Minister of Finance, Abdullah Saif, has been a particularly out-spoken advocate for monetary union.

25. There is also wider Gulf cooperation in the field of economics: both Iraq and Iran are members in the twelve-member Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) along with four GCC countries (excluding Bahrain and Oman). The state-centered and planned economy of Iraq was not an entire obstacle to economic relations with Gulf neighbours. See Milton-Edwards, Beverley, *Contemporary Politics in the Middle East*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, Polity Press, 2006, p.80. The post-war changing regime is likely to open up prospects of freer economic relations. Halliday, Fred, *The Middle East in International Relations*, Cambridge, C.U.P., 2005, pp.308-309, fn.3.

26. Conditions not wholly compensated by financial wealth derived from energy resources. See the United Nations (UNDP) *Arab Human Development Report*, New York, 2002. The Report has been strongly criticised about its finding by Arab commentators. Of course, economic weighting is relevant, but it is also a limited index as to national and regional capabilities to manage the states’ international relations, especially as these concern matters of security and defence. Issues of these kinds will be central to the later discussion.


28. However, among the communist states in Indochina there is increasing movement towards economic liberalism and openness to trade. Indeed, Vietnam was reforming its economy before its accession to ASEAN.

Chapter Two

Regional Comparisons: – a brief survey of the modern histories of the regions

(i) Introduction
This chapter briefly focuses on the states of the two regions and on the major factors in their histories over the second half of the twentieth century that are relevant to the regions as security complexes. The context is set by the Gulf and Southeast Asia emerging as autonomous regions largely as outcomes of changes in the global system of international relations.

(ii) Arabian Gulf States
The Arabian Gulf states are post-traditional, post-imperial restructured and modernizing political units with relatively clear separate sovereign identities. On the Arabian side of the Gulf the process of release from imperial control was brief in time, being brought about by a series of Treaties of Understanding with Britain, first with Kuwait in June 1961 followed by Understandings with the smaller states of Bahrain, Qatar, the federated emirates of the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) and Oman in the early sixties. The experience of the eight Gulf states which comprise the Gulf security complex, was of various impacts of imperial control rather than of direct colonial occupation. The removal of imperial “overlay” in the Gulf left behind it many ingredients of regional insecurity and what constitute the ‘regional security complexity’ of the Gulf. Notable among these have been border disputes, incompatible regime and ideological
characteristics among the states, conflicts of state ambitions and varying strategic interests across the region.

Saudi Arabia had been recognized as an independent Kingdom from 1927. Over the course of the twentieth century Saudi Arabia has secured a standing of pre-eminence in the Arabian Gulf and the status of a Gulf polar power. The Kingdom has, however, been subject to challenges to the regime, such as by violence brought to the annual Hajj at Mecca (1979) and other anti-regime/anti-US violence within the country through the 1990s and further. The six littoral states on the western side of the Gulf formed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 to promote regional development and also as a local security umbrella. The strategic vision of these states, as we shall come to see, has been one of defence and deterrence. Cautious moves have been made in recent years to draw Yemen into the organization.³

The modern state of Iraq emerged first as a Hashemite Kingdom in the 1920s⁴ and later as a republic by military coup in 1958. On its northerly flank the Arabian Peninsula had been left with an area predisposed to the enticements of Arab Nationalism and other ‘leftist’ conceptions, and later for associations and alliances based on these. As Peterson put the matter in 1987:

The real threat to the Arab littoral came not from potential invasion but from the ideology of radical Arab nationalism, with (Ba’athist) Iraq (after revolutions in 1958, 1963 and 1968) serving as a source of worry. As long as the British remained in the Gulf, the Arab monarchies seemed to have little reason to fear external threats.⁵
The Arabian states and regimes have found generalist political conceptions in the Arab World menacing to the relative passive ideological coherence of the Gulf – its open economy, regime stability and its socially conservative character.\textsuperscript{6} Iraq’s later hegemonic pretentions in the Gulf have been dissipated by futile conflict and lost wars, notably against Iran through the 1980s and a failed campaign of invasion and occupation by Iraq for absorption of Kuwait in 1990-1991. A general confrontational and aggressive stance in the region and uncertainties about Saddam Hussein’s weapons development programs led to an attack and occupation of Iraq by international forces in 2003. Later in this decade Iraq has been undergoing processes of sovereign political and economic restoration.

(iii) Iran

In the identification of the strategic and security configuration of the Gulf Iran is a core element. The modern state of Iran emerged first from the installation of Reza Shah Pahlavi as ruler in 1925 and the establishment later by a civil coup of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1979). A severely confrontational and subversive defence-security situation was to evolve later in consequence of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979). Iran has cultural identities that distinguish it from its Arab neighbours. A basic shared Islamic identity is aggravated by a Sunni-Shia sectarian divide which resonates in hostilities across the Gulf and domestically among the Arabian states.\textsuperscript{7} An historic effect has been to create a cultural, political and security fault-line between Iran and the Arabian side of the Gulf. Since the fall of Iraq in 2003 an effective Iran-Saudi Arabia bipolar situation has arisen and Iran has been widely perceived as the principal
element of threat in the security complexity of the Gulf. Iran with its national interests and ambitions in the Gulf presents itself as a strategic and security interface with the Arabian Gulf States so directly that it is a major factor in Gulf insecurity. In the Gulf Iran also presents a challenge to Saudi Arabia’s pre-eminence. The tri-polarity of Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq is a core defining factor in the security complexity of the Gulf. Later discussion will also take account of the significant place of the smaller states in the Gulf regional complex. In the present circumstance of Iran’s detachment from the Gulf Cooperation Council much quiet diplomacy, cultural and economic exchange help to maintain stable regional relations.

The global Cold War ended in 1989 and lifted the Soviet “arc of crisis’. The menace of Iraq’s links with the Soviets was removed. External influence and conflict obtained in the wider Middle East but with no direct interior impact within the Gulf. The nearest implant of communism, or rather Marxist influence, was in South Yemen. The Cold War was not otherwise territorially active within the Gulf, but was prosecuted ideologically and diplomatically. What menaced the Gulf most were happenings internal and particular to the area. The 1970s and 1980s were a time of considerable disturbance within the Gulf. The Gulf was subject to a proliferation in its neighbourhood of military coups and revolutions, leaders and regimes producing soldier-politicians frequently of leftist and secular authoritarian leaning. The revolution that was most to exercise the Arabian Gulf States occurred in Iran in 1979. The ‘Islamic Revolution’ was trumpeted as exportable. From the end of the Cold War the Gulf states have been led to be more introspective about their several and
collective affairs and attentive to the distribution of power at their own level and so to their security.\textsuperscript{9} Arabian Gulf politics have turned on local and regional issues and events. These were pragmatic and opportunistic more than ideologically informed, as this was shown in the founding Charter of the Gulf Cooperation Council of 1981.

The United States, nonetheless, has been building an increasing strategic interest and presence in the Gulf. Subversive rather than directly combative was the general mode of influence of external Cold War conflict and intervention. To counter Iran’s revolutionary influence in the Gulf after 1979, American military presence around the Gulf was so firmly implanted that it was to be a principal actor in the maintenance of stability in the Gulf. How successful it has been in this, or how much a factor in instability in the Gulf will be considered. Events over the last quarter of the twentieth century have created in the Gulf a scene of reciprocal deterrent and combative securitising activity, notably between the three polar powers.

(iv) Southeast Asia

The modern Southeast Asian countries are post-colonial political units. What has followed have often been contentious national identities within and between the states. Buzan’s notion of foreign “overlay” of local securitizing conditions is more relevant to Southeast Asia than to the Gulf of more pristine geopolitical characteristics. Southeast Asia is made up of two sub-regions: Indochina of five states and the five states of maritime Southeast Asia. The title ‘Indochina’ suggests the geographical lie of the
area, but the collective term also indicates a history of interaction uniquely between the states, and which has been one of internal division and conflict and separation from external contacts. Apart from Thailand which maintained its national independence (with assurance of external protection), the Indochina states had long colonial histories, which were overcome by violent decolonizing processes in the 1940s to 1960s.\(^\text{10}\) Since its independence from Britain in 1948 Myanmar has followed a course of detachment from the other Indochina sub-region states under continuous military rule.\(^\text{11}\)

Cold war embroilments were more complicated in Southeast Asia than in the Gulf and so more drawn out and difficult to unravel. Communist influence in the Southeast Asia region had been in an embryonic stage. It was to become the dominant political and military force in the Asian Cold War, particularly over most of Indochina. Turnbull describes the competitive leads into the Cold War in Asia:

\begin{quote}
It was the contest between left-wing and moderate nationalists that (was to) determine the character and international ties of these states.\(^\text{12}\)
\end{quote}

It was in Southeast Asia (and Korea in the north Pacific) that the only ‘hot wars’ of the international Cold War were fought. Historical enmities were a fertile context for modern conflict, and so were widespread conditions of underdevelopment and poverty. As Sheldon remarked:

\begin{quote}
It was the interconnection between internal security vulnerabilities and great power interference that underlay the Cold War in Southeast Asia. Regimes lacked the time to build sufficiently legitimate and integrated polities. Hence, their susceptibility to disruption from outsiders.\(^\text{13}\)
\end{quote}
In Indochina and beyond in the Southeast Asia region home-grown communist parties and militant organizations were the principal agents of the sub-regional Cold War conflict, and of subversive threat in the wider Southeast Asian region. National communist parties and insurgent movements thrived alongside anti-Japanese occupation nationalist movements in Southeast Asia (1940s), but with peace nationalist movements became more relevant in the cause of independence. In the course of time as ideological battles were won the nation (and history and ethnic identity) and national leadership claims were apt to come to the fore. Such was to lead to the convolution of political affairs in Indochina.

Over the same post-World War/independence period nationalism was rising, especially in Indonesia where a strong military leadership emerged. What was generating in Southeast Asia was just the sort of regional ideological infections that had been feared in the Gulf. Malaya was subjected to a twelve-year state of Emergency (1948-1960) to contain communist guerrilla warfare.\textsuperscript{14} In the later part of the twentieth century Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam were caught in a prolonged period of communist conflicts and the intrusion of Cold War external communist and anti-communist powers. But as a conflict zone there were also traditional and sub-regional ‘enmities’ at play. The subordinate roles of Cambodia and Laos in the Indochina ‘Vietnam War’ reflected these. The Vietnam War (1954 to 1973) had destabilizing effects over the whole region, deepening traditional enmities between the central Indochina states of Cambodia and Laos, and between Thailand and Vietnam. The
The ending of the Cold War in 1989 in Southeast Asia was brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The effects of this were to lift the hold of this power on the affairs and policies of states in Indochina. Vietnam was particularly affected by withdrawal of Soviet alliance, a major source of military support and resources. The critical effect was to induce Vietnam to pursue a course of domestic liberalisation and openness in relations with its regional neighbours leading to membership in ASEAN in 1995. Indochina’s conflicts and ideological attachments had set the area apart from the sub-region of Malaysia and maritime Southeast Asia. This lasted until the 1990s when the region of all the ten states was joined together in the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN), which the maritime states and Thailand had separately established in 1967.

The maritime states also experienced difficult processes of decolonisation, from the British, Spanish, Dutch and America. Decolonization and uncertain early nation-building provided fertile ground for communist influence and insurgency. In 1963 Malaya became the Federation of Malaysia by the incorporation of Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak (north Borneo/Kalimantan). The Sultanate of Brunei refused incorporation. The course of independence and nation-building was troubled in other ways. Ethnic difficulties led to the separation of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965. Communist insurgencies were common, often rural-peasant-based where there was detachment from the political centre and social and economic discontents were rife, as, for example, in otherwise conservative royalist Thailand. The geographic and social location of communist influence and organization and its capacity to challenge the state or ruling
elite would depend on the particular socio-political character of states.\textsuperscript{15} Three years of Indonesian-Malaysia-Singapore \textit{Konfrontasi} (confrontation) (1963-1966) over the accession of Sarawak and Sabah to Malaysia also troubled relations with The Philippines. Indonesia was deeply troubled by ethnic and sectarian separatism in Aceh province in the 1980s/1990s. Indonesian annexations of West Papua in 1963 (independent as Irian Jaya 2003) and East Timor (independent in 1999 as Timor Leste); and internal state instabilities, corruption and military coups and military rule have blighted the course of nation building. Indonesia is in numerous respects pre-eminent in the region, but Indonesia’s problems have been less those of state-building and more those of nation-state building – of establishing a national regime of ‘unity in diversity’ as the State’s motto (Pancasila) demands.\textsuperscript{16} Ethnic and sectarian conflicts in the Philippines, notably on the Mindanao and Jolo Islands, demonstrated the problems of holding centre and periphery together in large archipelagic states. Factors of traditional enmities, disputes and conflicts infuse Southeast Asia with regional security complexity.\textsuperscript{17} However, since their independence the maritime states have sought to pursue a general course of liberalising and capitalistic development in which Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand have been notably successful. Release from their Cold War embroilments was a necessary condition for states in the Indochina sub-region to be incorporated into the Southeast Asian regional security and development systems from the 1990s.

(v) Conclusion
The brief historical accounts have sought to provide a backdrop to the later examination of the Gulf and Southeast Asia as regions identified as ‘regional security complexes’ and ‘regional security communities’. Three aspects of twentieth century development are suggested: (a) imperial “overlay” and its dismantlement; (b) the Cold War and its dissolution; and (c) the exposure of conditions of regional insecurity which were specific to the regions. Chapters One and Two have prepared the ground for the analysis and examination of the Gulf and Southeast Asia regions as security complexes and security communities in the chapters after the Review of the Literature that follows.
Notes Chapter Two

1. The point made here is a legalistic one rather than one of historical or political analysis, which latter would call for much more than this brief statement. Rosemarie Said Zahlan’s *The Making of the Modern Gulf States*, 2nd ed., Reading, Ithaca Press, 1998 is an indispensable source, but is restricted to the Arab Gulf states and so is limited as a guide to regional strategic and security affairs; but see chapter ten. As Roger Owen remarks in his Forword: the Gulf States live with “a basic security structure created over 150 years ago by the British and now maintained by the new Pax Americana”. Strictly, legally, the Gulf territories had not been colonial dependencies. But there could be little practical difference between administration under a Foreign Office ‘Resident’ and rule under a Colonial Office ‘Governor’. Some of the flavour of the former (in Bahrain) is caught in Charles Belgrave’s *Personal Column*, London, Hutchinson, 1960. The Sheikhdoms were ‘protected’, severally under the guiding authority of a common ‘Resident’. Saudi Arabia retained its full autonomy throughout. Hussein Al Baharna, *The Arab Gulf States: their Legal and Political Status and the International Problems*, Beirut, Librarie Du Liban, 1975, remains the best authority on the complicated and sometimes ambiguous status of the Gulf territories until their release under the terms of bilateral Treaties of Friendship with Britain in the 1970s and 1980s.

2. “Overlay’ occurs: “when the interests of external great powers transcend mere penetration, and come to dominate a region so heavily that the local dynamics of security interdependence virtually cease to operate”. Buzan et al, *Regions*, glossary p.490. The states that are ‘overlaid’ are in a “pre-complex” situation.

3. In more recent years Yemen has come to figure in security questions, as an Arabian Peninsula factor and as a Gulf factor: Yemen has been an instability influence in southern Arabia, adjacent to Oman and Saudi Arabia. Yemen is also a Gulf destabiliser on account of Iranian intrusion and the country’s involvement in asymmetric terrorist and criminal threats to regional security.


6. It is a question of some interest whether the ideological character of particular rebellions and revolutions is what is most telling, or whether a pattern of such disturbances, a disposition over time and place to menace regimes, is what is important? The particular is important to the extent that it incites the general. For the Arabian Gulf this was the menace of Arab Nationalism and of Iran 1979. Geopolitical proximity is important too, of course. The greatest “source of worry” is, perhaps, a wide geo-political infection of regime insecurity, sourced in whatever ideology or even none at all, that creates constant instability and threat. We have to come back to these issues later in the study.

7. It is one of the primary markers of stress in human and international relations that faction and stress within the great religions can generate hostility and conflict as well as between the religions. In the notorious ‘Conflict of Civilizations’ (Huntington, Samuel, The Clash of Civilizations and the remaking of World Order, London, Simon and Schuster, 1997) there is profound inadequacy of understanding. Just how important stress within the religion is adequate for understanding the international (and domestic) relations in the Gulf will be an issue later in the study. However, account must be taken of the influences of alternative and conflicting factors in international relations, as is clear both in the Gulf and Southeast Asia.


9. The removal of imperial overlay from the seventies was the first time when the Gulf States had severally and collectively to be introspective and engaged about their strategic and security affairs. U.S. strategic prominence in the Gulf had grown from the time Britain announced its withdrawal “East of Suez” in December 1971. Gulf oil had established a U.S. interest decades before.

10. Thailand has benefited from United States security and strategic cover in recent years. Joint ‘Cobra Gold’ military exercises are conducted every year (participation has been extended to several other states, largely under the auspices of the wider U.S. Pacific Command strategic interest. Thailand is a ‘major non-NATO ally’ of the U.S.

11. Myanmar has, on the other hand, steadfastly maintained its political and strategic isolation in spite of ASEAN’s ‘constructive engagement’ over the 1990s and membership in 1997. As late as May 2008 Myanmar declined international aid in face of the major ‘Nargis’ cyclone disaster, although ASEAN help was accepted on the understanding that this would not lead to “meddling with its domestic politics”. Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia*, Abingdon, Routledge, 2009, p.258.

12. Turnbull, C.M., ‘Regionalism and Nationalism’ in the Cambridge History, pp268-69. The following figures for membership indicate communism as a major (the major) political force in Indochina given the dominance of Vietnam: 1930-211, 1945-5000,


15. Thailand was a notable case in point:“... the revolutionary insurgents in the rural areas, mainly those identified with the Communist Party of Thailand. Communism, it should be noted, had always been regarded as contrary to traditional Thai values and Buddhist principles... the territories in the northeast... (By) 1973 the party (TCP) constituted an alternative political structure that expressed an ideology different from king, religion and nation”. Cambride History, pp.114-15. Thailand has been recurrently turbulent, with a strong military- monarchist component.

16. Funston, Government and Politics, pp.161-63. Also, late in1957 breakaway rebellions took place in Sumatra and Sulawesi (Indonesia). The failure of the rebellions in mid-1958 “helped to bring about an uneasy coalition between President Sukarno as the country’s leader, the army as the defender and upholder of national unity and the Communist Party, which could mobilize mass support”. Yahuda, p.57.

Chapter Three

Critical and Analytic Review of the literature

(i) Introduction
In post-World War II international relations numerous new states and new regional systems in international relations arose. The study of international relations clearly needed to take this into account. Theoretical approaches to international relations (IR) had to adapt to shifts and changes in ‘real’ events in the world and the structure of relations in the world. New and restored states took on new regional identities and were linked together in relations of amity and enmity, and in hopes of cooperative development. Account of the dynamics of relations at the regional level was needed.

The present study is of two Regional Security Complexes (RSCs), those of the Gulf and Southeast Asia, and the presence of Security Communities in the two regions. In the study two texts are basic to the analysis: Buzan, Barry and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: the Structure of International Security and Acharya, Amitav Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia. The study sets out to describe the two regions from the perspectives advanced in these texts. The underlying object of the study is to examine what circumstances there are that show each of the two regions to be security complexes and to take this further to show how, in their different ways, the states of the regions respond to their states’ and regions’ conditions of (in)security. ‘Regional security community’ development is seen as an alternative to direct military confrontation; this
underpins the securitising approach examined in the study. The present study was in part motivated by there being an apparent absence of comprehensive, comparative and critical study of the two regions, the Gulf and Southeast Asia, especially in regard to the post-colonial and imperial security conditions of the regions. In the respective studies of the two regions (to date) there has been minimal cross reference.

(ii) General literature and other sources – the Gulf
The regions have each been widely studied and written about by regional specialists, both third party and indigenous scholars. Much of this writing, particularly of third parties, has been informed by outside strategic interests in the two regions. Such writing is also commonly tied into a global system and power, neorealist approach. American strategic interest and commitment in the Gulf is reflected in a substantial literary output. Anthony Cordesmann is a particularly attentive commentator on Gulf security affairs. Strategic importance of and security interest in the two regions feature strongly in the present study. This, however, is with local regional concerns, Gulf and Southeast Asian, as ‘regional security complex’ and ‘regional security community’ interests would indicate.

The wide literary attention to the Gulf has in important ways made it difficult to uphold the autonomy of the Gulf in understanding. The Gulf in recent times has had to assert some freedom for itself from history and academic conventions in political and international studies that subsume it in wider identities such as ‘the Arab World’, ‘the Middle East’, ‘the Islamic Peoples’, as if the Arabs are all of a kind, or all in a common
situation and condition. This literature of wider identities is legitimate and distinguished, but it does not exclude proper focus on narrower, legitimate and practical security and other identities. Such focus is vital for it compels us to observe the integral place of (non-Arab) Iran in the Gulf. The Gulf is not the Arabian States plus Iran, but the two as an integral security complex whole. The presumption that the Gulf is to be understood only or mainly within a wide Middle East framework is one that is questioned later in the study, in Chapter Five (iv). In this study the application of Regional Security Complex Theory to the Gulf is seen as symptomatic of recent inclinations to recognise the strategic (and more comprehensive) autonomy of the Gulf. This is not to say that there is no continuing external strategic interest and concern about the Gulf – oil alone belies this – but analytically and strategically autonomous Gulf, Gulf *regional* identity is prior. Let this identity collapse or implode by major internal conflict or fracture in the GCC and external interests would be thrown into disarray or ‘anarchic’ incidents of external power could occur.

In an increasingly interactive world regions are caught in a web of contact and interaction. Regional boundaries are established as members of a region attend to security issues as they perceive these to be particular and internal to the regions in which they are situated. Boundaries are also settled as they gain acceptance externally. This is to say that regional boundaries have two dimensions, internal and external. The integrity of a region is maintained as it is supported internally and accepted externally. This, we suggest, is crucial at least to practical strategic identification of a
region. Regions become identifiable as corporate actors, and as acted upon, in the international scenario. Tripp attends to this issue:

Despite the limitations of the GCC, it appeared to other states in the Arab world that it did represent an attempt by a group of states to build on common concerns and to address problems for governments to talk of region-specific, without bringing down on their heads the full weight of Arab nationalist criticism.⁴

Within the region, the Gulf Cooperation Council in particular needs a comprehensive organizational multi-aspect (structural, political, military, and economic, etc.) study, security considerations permitting, covering the first twenty-five or thirty years, up to, at least, the attempts at reconstruction of the Peninsula Shield Force from 2000. Such a study would be more than one of the GCC as a growing security community. We know little about the inner workings of the organization. The best small-compass study of the GCC we have observed is that of Abdul Khaleq Abdulla. This is written mainly in community building and securitizing terms.⁵ The GCC has a website but this is less generous than ASEAN’s website, though both tend to be blandly descriptive and even acclamatory and lack the neutral penetration of third party treatment.

There is a wealth of literature around issues of security in the Gulf. It is generally specific to particular events and focussed on issues around events. Content is widely historical, analytic and descriptive. There are useful collections of writing and papers within a Gulf geopolitical compass and with a political and security focus.⁶ There is much commentary on recent and current events at the time of its writing. Two prominent local regional ‘think tanks’ (ECSSR) and (GRC) are productive of reports, commentary, research, lectures, seminars and conferences.⁷ These
organizations pride their independence at the same time that they offer their research outputs to governments. It would be an innovation of great significance if the Manama Dialogue could become part of a ‘second track’ facility to support and assist the GCC after the manner of Track Two resources as these are semi-structured within ASEAN. Closeness, accessibility might be served by the recent transfer of the Dialogue’s office to Manama. ASEAN appears to be reasonably adept at keeping its ‘Track” facilities at arm’s-length from officialdom. The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) is a fertile source of information and analysis, especially through its periodic and annual Survival and Military Balance reports and occasional Strategic Dossiers, and even more especially its annual ‘Manama Dialogue’ conference, speeches and plenary sessions. IISS activities represent a substantial body of work specifically directed to the Gulf (as is done for other regions, as in The Shangri La Dialogue, Singapore). An important aspect of the Dialogues is that they act as forums where states’ representatives meet and scholars, speak and discuss openly where they might not otherwise encounter so freely. In Southeast Asia a similar benefit for regional security study is gained from the meetings of the Asia Regional Forum (ARF), in which China, generally reluctant to be drawn into multilateral encounters, takes part. Celebrating its fiftieth anniversary, the Institute published a collection of its most celebrated Adelphi Papers, The Evolution of Strategic Thought, one of which was used as a basic source in Chapter Seven of this study.

But, as Buzan and Waever say: “Studies of ‘regional security’ usually take place without any coherent theoretical framework ... other than a few
basic notions about balance of power and interdependence borrowed from the system level”.\textsuperscript{11} But much is ‘explanatory’ within contextual understandings. The existing very discursive body of writing invites a potentially important attempt to gather from it those elements that could provide grounding for a Gulf regional theoretical framework. A model of Gulf security is suggested by James Bill from which “The Gulf system can be best described as a rectangle of system-challenging tension in which each of the actors exists in a tenuous state of balanced conflict with each of the other actors”.\textsuperscript{12} The model seeks to demonstrate “the dynamics of system instability in the Gulf”. The model is Gulf-specific and state-centric and does not deal with the forms of insecurity that are below the model’s inter-state radar.\textsuperscript{13} From the Gulf-specificity of the model it is not easy to see if it might be generalised (achieve theoretical status) beyond ‘see if/how in other regions regional security actors securitize in a regional system’. Each regional security complex will exhibit its own pattern of actor security relationships and its own systemic dynamics.

(iii) General literature and other sources – Southeast Asia
This study had to start from a baseline of the writer’s virtual absence of knowledge on the Southeast Asia region. The first need was for a good wide aspect-inclusive history. \textit{The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia} has been invaluable.\textsuperscript{14} In the Preface to the volume the editor makes an interesting comment:

\begin{quote}
There were some good histories of Southeast Asia, there were some good histories of particular countries; but there was, perhaps, no history that set out from \textit{a regional basis and took a regional approach}. This seemed worthwhile in itself, as well as establishing a coherence and a format for the volumes (my emphasis).\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}
What appears to be suggested here is that Southeast Asia suffered a similar problem of identity as that we remarked above for the Gulf. It is suggested by Tarling that a number of events in the wider Pacific area contributed to this problem. There was first, the Pacific War of the 1940s when the states of Southeast Asia fell to the Japanese military. It is widely remarked that it was in World War II that “the political and military concerns ... had popularised the concept of ‘Southeast Asia’”\textsuperscript{16}, but these were concerns less of Southeast Asians than they were of external powers. However, Japanese occupation was widely unsettled by nationalist resistances that were later carried over into a principle of ‘national resilience’ in ASEAN and hamper the development of regional security cooperation. Secondly, there was the Cold War (1950s to 1980s) when the countries of the area fell to the ideological ambitions of the East/West great powers and “might fall like dominoes”. The ideological ambitions were also localised, but the ambition was an infection from outside. Sheldon says: “It was the interconnection between internal security vulnerabilities and great power interference that underlay the Cold War in Southeast Asia”.\textsuperscript{17} But, “even before that war came to an end, the newly independent countries in the region had seen the possibility of an unprecedented degree of cooperation among themselves, partly in order to limit the penetration of outside powers”.\textsuperscript{18} It became the business of ASEAN from 1967 to create “a coherence” and then to build a ‘community’ upon it; eventually to reconcile conflict that was specific to the region.
There is a concurrent alternative history to the Cambridge History, but this is much more submissive to a fixed East Asia/Asia-Pacific regional concept, and associated with this it is written in a ‘realist’ great powers framework and offers no clear suggestion of a Southeast security framework. Yahuda does not write from recognition of Southeast Asia as an identifiable autonomous strategic area and security-defence region based on an analytic framework that might suggest these. This approach is also well represented by Paul Dibb. Asia-Pacific is taken by Yahuda as the base strategic area, much as the Middle East is taken for the Gulf in much of the literature. Southeast Asia seems to be less generously covered than the Gulf by published collections of writing focussing on security issues. Ikenberry and Mastanduno have edited a collected study of the wider Asia-Pacific in which a valuable chapter on Southeast Asia’s particular ‘socializing’ approach to regional relations is discussed. (See on this below.) There is also an interesting contribution in Ikenberry et al by David Kang in which the proposition is discussed that “hierarchy” rather than “hegemony” of power is more stabilizing in international relations: “The hierarchic world of ancient Asia” moderated the behaviour of Asian powers. “More important than whether a hierarchic system existed historically is whether such a system might be re-emerging today, and if so what might be the implications”. The question is followed through in regard to Asia-Pacific power and relations. China and Japan are challenging cases, but not wholly discountenancing cases. The conception of hierarchy versus hegemony might relate to Southeast Asia and its relative stability among powers of different weight (Vietnam, Indonesia, for example, and others), as this is promoted in ASEAN. Indonesia is pre-
eminent rather than hegemonic. It might also say something about the relative status of Saudi Arabia in the GCC, at least as the organization’s Charter would have it.  

Overall, Southeast Asia is well-served in the literature. A great deal of the literature is of local regional provenance and local authorship. Book length studies have not been the greatest resource for this study; those that have been used have been mentioned above (passim). Haas, Leifer, Funston and Severino have been useful references. Much of the recent literature focuses on particular events and episodes; as focussed, for example, on intra-state conflicts and the Vietnam War. But uncertainties about an autonomous Southeast Asian identity and its gradual consolidation from the late 1960s have, in a sense, ‘regionalised’ literary interest. Southeast Asia has been well-represented in the interest and literary output of the London International Institute for Strategic Studies in its Adelphi Papers (but not until the 1990s). The Institute’s literary interest in Southeast Asia is conveyed in the various forms; in the Military Balance, Survival and Strategic Dossiers, as was shown for the Gulf. The Shangri La Dialogue is based on Singapore. There are several Think Tanks in Southeast Asia that project a relatively strong regional perspective and also an Asia-Pacific interest concern as befits their functional linkage with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Prominent in its work is the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA). The SIIA was primarily instrumental in founding the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) which acts as a Track 2 vehicle in the ARF and in a diplomatic remit around the region. Generally the think tanks seek operational
independence, but there are degrees of closeness to officialdom. This is noticeable in the Tracks 1 and 2 systems, notably the ASEAN-ISIS, that offer information, research and consultation to the ARF through the Intersessional Group Meetings (IGMs) and Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) (see Figure 5).

(iv) Regional Security Complex: core aspect of the study
The concept of ‘Regional Security Complex’ is the central focus of the present study. This is also noted in considering the concept of ‘Regional Security Community’, and is implicit in much of the discussion of the ‘practicalities of defence and security’ in Chapter Six below. The study’s fuller understanding and interpretation of what regional security complexes are, is set out in Chapter Four (a) below. This is based largely on a critical following of Buzan, and Waever, Regions and Powers. The importance of Regions and Powers lies in its producing a radical new perspective on the nature of the international system. Getting away from a globalist “centre-periphery perspective”, Buzan et al say at the beginning of Regions and Powers: “The regionalist perspective is our chosen approach. We agree with Lake and Morgan that in the post-Cold War world ‘the regional level stands more clearly on its own as the locus of conflict and cooperation for states”. In this basic analytical part of the study reference is also made to Ayoob, Mohammed, The Third World Security Predicament. As the title suggests, Ayoob adapts regional security analysis to conditions in the post-colonial/imperial Third World. Buzan and Waever also generally accept this scenario as the generating context of regional security complexity. Ayoob’s text is important as it
pays attention in some detail to the particular circumstances of insecurity in different security complexes, as these were inherited from different conditions of colonial or imperial “overlay”, and differences in the groups’ conditions that were “overlaid”.

The present study shows how this is true in its focus on two regional security complexes: the Gulf and Southeast Asia. These conditions of insecurity developed as imperialism and colonialism were dismantled in the second half of the twentieth century. As Buzan et al say, conditions of colonialism “overlay” (made dormant) conditions of inter-territorial insecurity such that the affected territories can be identified as ‘proto complexes’ “when there is sufficient manifest security interdependence to delineate a region”....where ”regional security dynamics are still too thin and weak to think of the region as a fully fledged RSC”. Independence exposes regionally specific insecurities, which at best encourage regional joint policies for their constraints, or, less well, induce inter-state defensive (“securitizing”) activities. We have deliberately referred to “inter-territorial insecurity” for the status of ‘proto complex’ may obtain, pre-independence, among pre-state units as in parts of Africa, but among state systems in the Middle East. In some parts of the world independence created states; in others restored them. “But the status of “proto complex” may obtain after independence: “If we stay within the interstate frame.... West Africa is best defined as a proto-RSC (i.e., clearly formed, but with rather weak security inter- dependence)”. Of Southeast Asia Buzan et al say: “decolonisation produced a fairly typical postcolonial conflict formation.... (but later post-Cold War) penetration from the global
level was so strong, the indigenous regional security dynamics in Southeast Asia are difficult to differentiate, but nevertheless are present and significant”.

Post-Cold War conjoining of Indochina and Myanmar with the ASEAN-Six states created the dual aspects of security suggested above. Among the ASEAN-Six some members were concerned that Myanmar’s dependency on China and Vietnam’s hostile relations with China, and the ideological characteristics of both states threatened the integrity of ASEAN’s regional project.

At page twenty-two of Regions and Powers we are led to accept a “spectrum” of “postmodern, modern, and pre-modern” states... Since much of the focus in this book will be on the contemporary international system and its RSCs, we will use this scheme in comparing regions” (my emphasis). This advice worked adequately for the most part for us in our discussion, for discussing the careers of our two regions we are talking for the greater part of groups of states and the issues of security and strategic interests that arise in relations between states. Much uncertainty is neutralised by the terminological device of “unit/set of units”, for as the theory is developed it comes to take account of non-state, non-military sources and references of security. Nevertheless, Buzan et al remark: “The continued prominence of territoriality in the domains of security, whether in the form of states, nations, insurgency movements, or regions... security is a distinctive realm in which the logic of territoriality continues to operate strongly”.

Territoriality is the pre-eminent aspect of the state; its physical foundation and its integrity. But “it is reasonable to look out for non-territorial security.... The theory of security complexes is
organised around the relative importance of territorially coherent subsystems defined by interlocking patterns of securitisation, but non-territorial security constellations exist too....look out whether there are transnational, global, or subsystemic non-territorial securitisations that have been ignored”. 38 See also below Chapter Four (a) (viii).

Conditions of regional security may be recognised by states within the regional security complex and whose (individual/joint) responses are to meet security issues head-on; that is, as general security problems of inter-state defence, and with a probable ‘security dilemma’ consequence. Regional security complex theory brings a new focus on significantly autonomous localities of insecurity and securitizing activities. *Regional* security has two aspects: (i) patterns of threat and conflict within the region, (ii) conflict that may threaten the integrity of the region. These significantly autonomous localities of insecurity are defined as ‘regional security complexes’ within the terms of regional security complex theory (RSCT). It is important to understand that ‘regional security complex’ is an aspect of a general theory (RSCT) the usefulness (validity) of which is in its power to explain the existence of certain identifiable sets of states and their specific security circumstances and durable patterns of securitisation. Or put another way, the theory *defines* identifiable groups of states as ‘security complexes’ according as they show specific, regionally bounded inter-state and mutually affective intra-state security conditions and conduct.
Regional security complex theory does not necessarily view the international system differently from established neorealist understandings, except to identify a new level of inter-state relations characterized by dynamics in these relations which are specific at the regional level: “The formation of RSCs derives from the interplay between, on the one hand, the anarchic structure – which means that the RSC must be composed of two or more autonomous units – and its balance-of-power consequences, and on the other the pressures of local geographical proximity... many threats more easily over short distances than over long ones”.  

Power relations are a component of security complexes. Polarity, the distribution of power, will be part of the “essential structure” of an RSC. The theory also “has constructivist roots, because the formation and operation of RSCs hinge on patterns of amity and enmity among the units of the system, which makes regional systems dependent on the actions and interpretations of actors” These patterns of relations are an essential internal structure of an RSC. It is the internality of the essential structure, the four variables that define a regional security complex. (See Chapter 4 (vii) below.) Regional security dynamics are not all of a kind: “the security agenda is about different things in different regions”. We have viewed the security dynamics of ‘threat and conflict and counter-threat and conflict’, and ‘threat and conflict and counter-conflict avoidance’ as the prevalent security configurations respectively of the Gulf and Southeast Asia. State-centric security is of central interest and concern, but Buzan et al also account for non-territorial, non-military security issues and concerns. (See Chapter 4 (viii) below). “It will also be interesting to see whether many of the non-territorial security dynamics
do crystallise out as a new conceptualisation of the global level, or whether they get largely subsumed into the still dominant territorial framework”.44

\textbf{(v) Regional Security Communities: as superstructural within regional security complexes}

A second account of inter-state relations and security affairs at the regional level has been developed. This has been applied particularly to Southeast Asia. Account most also be taken here, however, of the community aspect in the Gulf. ‘Regional security community’ analysis is a development out of a tradition of peace studies and research in international relations that can be traced back to early twentieth century studies and which was enlivened in the aftermath of World War II. These studies tended to have a strong normative content, laying down imperatives for peace in a world perceived to be prone to conflict in an international system dominated by great powers.45 The present study considers how security communities relate to security complexes. They do so as a different pattern of response to a head-on defence response to threat and conflict.46 In this study we follow security community analysis as this is applied to Southeast Asia by Amitav Acharya, \textit{Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia}.47 \textit{Constructing a Security Community} is our mainstay in the discussion of Southeast Asia. The general response to regional insecurity in the security community approach is one of conflict avoidance and creative development of a community where conflict avoidance is the norm and the ambition is for conflict within the community to become unthinkable. Regional security
complexes and regional security communities may be co-existent, and it is
a part in this study to show how this might be so.48

The development of security community thinking is a substantial outcome
of previous analyses in political and social science in International
Relations (IR) which have taken understandings in IR beyond factors of
power and material interests as in neo-realism, but not to their total
exclusion. Karl Deutsch promoted ideas of community in international
relations from the 1950s, leading to suggestions that ‘transactions’
between societies and states could affect reciprocal perceptions and
dispositions among actors.49 Other thinkers such as Ernst Haas50 and
Joseph Nye51 improved on the ‘functionalist’ ideas of David Mittrany52 in a
neo-functionalist emphasis on the communitarian effects of participation
in shared institutions in the promotion of mutual ‘low political’ economic
and other benefits. Acharya traces these influences in the Introduction of
Constructing a Security Community and conducts a long roll-call of thinkers
in the development of non-neorealist theory in Note 9 of the Introduction.
Regional relations can be “socially constructed”: “The habit of war
avoidance found in security communities results from interactions,
socialisation, norm setting and identity building, rather than from forces
outside these processes”.53 In a discussion mentioned above, Alastair
Johnston challenges two prevailing ideas about how states’ behaviour is
changed in international institutions: first, through systems of rewards
and punishments that can affect their interests, through institution rules
and sanctions; second, through changes in domestic distributions of
power that can affect states’ preferences and interests: “The ASEAN Way
discourse explicitly challenges the ‘hegemony’ of these two processes in IR theory and practice. The discourse stresses that the way in which the social milieu is created inside formally weak institutions – the effects of familiarity, consensus building, consultation non-coercive argumentation, the avoidance of legalistic solutions to distribution problems, etc.”

The chapter penetrates the pros and cons of “institutions as social environments”, as in the ARF, and considers how the behaviour of China is influenced. We have followed these convictions in a later chapter where Acharya’s ideas on ‘regional security community’ creation in Southeast Asia are discussed. In Chapter Five (x)-(xii) ASEAN’s ambitions and activities directed to translating ‘community’ ideas into practice are examined. It is seen that the influences of these ideas are not always easily sustained. ‘Constructivism’ nevertheless encourages perceptions beyond, but not to the exclusion of, power and material interests.

Towards the end of Chapter Four of the present study, sections (xi) and (xii) bring the concepts of ‘regional security complex’ and ‘regional security community’ together in a comparative way. An important finding has been that the community structures and objectives in the Gulf and Southeast Asia relate in different ways to the underlying regional security complexities. The difference lies in the partial place of the community in the first case and regional inclusiveness in the second. There is a consequent difference in the regional securitizing roles. The Gulf Cooperation Council is the embodiment of community within the Gulf. The security dimension of this community is shown in its role of confronting the conditions of the regional insecurity complex. The non-security
dimensions of the community seek to bind the member states in cooperative and joint development goals. In Southeast Asia the community is region-wide and has the purpose *inter alia* of maintaining peace among the member states and to promote common development. Community objectives aside, in Chapter Six below it is shown that in both cases there are high levels of ‘defence’ activity (policy, mobilization, etc.): in the Gulf explained by the need to confront regional security conditions; in Southeast Asia explained by sovereign claims of member states and as these are upheld by community norms.55

In the absence of a systematic comparative study of the two regions we can mention Emirates Occasional Papers by K.S. Balakrishnan, V.K. Rajan, J.C. Parrenas, and K.R.Singh, Nehru University Gulf Studies Programme.56 These studies are all rather thin and do not work within any apparent analytic format. It is noticeable that they all view the GCC/Gulf and ASEAN/Southeast Asia linkage from an external perception and interest. An ASEAN and Gulf perspective has not been pursued.57 This present study may contribute to some reciprocal interest. In Balakrishnan’s paper *Asian* security is treated briefly but usefully. However, its treatment of “Lessons for the GCC”, its would-be focus, fails utterly for its one-page tabulation of points most of which is unhelpful because the Gulf is conflated with the wider Middle East with little substantial reference to the Gulf as such. Nevertheless, Indian academic interest in ASEAN and Southeast Asia is notable. There are several grounds for this. Insurgency and refugee infiltration along the Naga Hills border area with Myanmar creates a security interest.58 India shares with Southeast Asia anxieties
about Chinese regional influence and power. India’s alignment with the Soviet Union at the time of the Vietnam War, affected by its poor relations with China, has been prejudicial to its later relations with Southeast Asia, but shared interests in maritime security and in confidence building in East Asia have promoted amicable understandings. Response to an Indian wish to identify with ASEAN affairs has been mixed, but the country was admitted (later than most) as a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996.\textsuperscript{59}

\textbf{(vi) Security and securitization}

The concept ‘security’ has traditionally been understood in state-centric terms, greatly shaped according to Buzan and Waever by the Cold War.\textsuperscript{60} The Cold War was certainly the strategic context within which the two regions studied were of major significance, and Indochina the scene of one of the two ‘hot wars’ in the global conflict. Subsequently in the Gulf and Southeast Asia the security complexity of their regions became locally apparent and urgent. As the states of the regions became autonomous and divested of the burdens of external intervention, political leaders faced new scenarios of threat and instability. The patterns of insecurity came to be strongly region-specific and towards the end of the twentieth century the nature of insecurity increasingly complex. The states became so “interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another”.\textsuperscript{61} In the Gulf insecurity was predominantly the outcome of the particular distribution of power in the region; that is, of the polar status of three of the eight states (Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran), and the competitive and conflictive character of relations between them and their dispositions to project their power in
the region. For the remaining five small states, bound in the circumstance of regional security interdependence, they negotiate all of three options: (i) to ally with a regional great power (Saudi Arabia), (ii) enter security ties with an external power (the United States), and (iii) to equip themselves as far as they can for defence self-sufficiency. Thus the Gulf region is seemingly locked in a security configuration that has a dynamic of enmity above amity, of securitization which is difficult to hold stable, produces a high level of militarization, as indicated in Chapter Six below, and is driven by a region-wide ‘security dilemma’.

There is, however, within the Gulf a sub-regional level of security interdependence where enmity is constrained and amity encouraged. The Gulf Cooperation Council is a partial element in the securitisation system of the Gulf, but is to be counted as a major securitizing actor in the region - certainly in the view of Iran. Separately in the regional security complex the Council has been developing as a sub-regional community in which there is a dynamic of amity over enmity. The presence of stress and dispute within the GCC does not take away from its community character. What would take away from this would be failure or unwillingness to subdue or negotiate peaceably the stresses. Such needs are typically an element in the motivation behind working for communities in the first place. However, it has to be recognised that sovereign assertions among the states for independent security policy and strategic choices have hindered the drives to regional cooperation.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded in 1967 by the Bangkok Declaration to promote economic development among the then five non-communist states, and to secure relationships of security and peace among them. Inter-state relations were deeply prone to disputes and conflict, and adjacent Indochina was a war zone until the early 1990s. Territorial disputes were prevalent and threatened the integrity of newly independent states. The central conflict area was North Borneo (Sarawak and Sabah) on Kalimantan Island where the three main maritime nations (Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines) were in dispute. Provincial separatism plagued Indonesia and the Philippines, and Singapore had just (1965) broken away from Malaysia. Uncertainty over maritime boundaries enflamed disputes, especially as fishing, oil and other resources were at stake. Insurgencies that were ethnically, sectarian and ideologically inspired threatened the integrity of states and regimes. Southeast Asia has been subject to a high incidence of intra-state conflicts. Southeast Asia was a network of enmities that was extended as the Vietnam War was ended and Indochina was absorbed into the ASEAN system of cooperation in the 1990s. Southeast Asia generally conforms with Buzan and Waever’s “essential structure of an RSC”.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations is informed by conditions of insecurity that are regionally specific, such as are the grounds of a security complex. The Association is a security community in that it renounces a direct or confrontational approach in the management of security issues in the region. In the present study it is said that the security community is “superstructural” over the security complex. The Association seeks to
maintain a dynamic of amity over enmity in the region. The approach is essentially expressed in the commitment of the states to ‘norms’ of sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, non-use of force, and avoidance of conflict as these were enshrined in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. It might be expected that in a security community the level of states’ defence allocations would be less than in a region of clear threat and regional conflict. However, in Chapter Six (ii) below there are reasons and causes shown why such expectation is not well-founded. Over the course of forty years a succession of Agreements, institutional innovations and consultative processes has underwritten the peace and conflict avoidance basis of ASEAN, and also sought to extend the “ASEAN culture” beyond the regional boundary.

(vi) Conclusion
The Gulf and Southeast Asia became independent strategic areas as imperial overlay in the first case and colonialism and Cold War intervention were removed in the second. Recognition of the Gulf and Southeast Asia as autonomous security regions has had to overcome prevalent literary and analytical conventions which subsumed them in wider Middle East and Asia Pacific areas. Both regions are the subject of considerable writing and also in other sources, notably the activities of ‘think tanks’ and consultative ‘Dialogue’ and other forums. Writing has been commonly couched in terms of external strategic interests. Studies have been widely descriptive and topical and discuss regional security “without any coherent theoretical framework”, free of traditional realist
thinking. The Gulf and Southeast Asia should be viewed as areas of autonomous ‘security interdependence’ among member states that are activated through processes of regional securitizing dynamics. Increasingly however regional security complex theory has had to take account of non-state-centric, non-military forms of security.

Thus, the Gulf and Southeast Asia are seen as ‘regional security complexes’. The regional security complex is defined in terms of four internal variables: boundary, two or more units, distribution of power, patterns of ‘amity and enmity’. These ‘variables’ are discussed at length in Chapter four. Regional boundaries are also confirmed in external acceptance and do not exclude connections with external bodies. A second, but not alternative framework of understanding and regional description is the ‘regional security community’. This has been applied region-wide to Southeast Asia. Accounts of regional security complex and regional security community are about different regional actors’ approaches to the conditions of regional insecurity: in the one case directly confronting these conditions; in the second, seeking to manage these conditions in a conflict-avoidance way.

In the Gulf the Arabian States are joined in the Gulf Cooperation Council security community. This is internally a development/peace oriented association. At the regional level the GCC is a partial securitizing organization. In Southeast Asia the states are joined in the Association of Southeast Nations. This organization is governed by norms of good inter-state conduct, directed to development and maintenance of peace. At the
level of the Gulf security prioritizes enmity over amity; in Southeast Asia amity is prioritized over enmity. Evidence suggests, however, that ‘defence’ activity does not clearly correlate differentially between regional security complexes and regional security communities. There are causes to be found in the security conditions and claims to national resilience, and in reasons of association ‘norms’, or rules of association.
Notes  Chapter Three


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5. Abdul Khaleq Abdulla, ‘The Gulf Cooperation Council: Nature, Origin, and Process, in ed. Michael Hudson, Middle East Dilemma: the politics and economics of Arab integration, London, I.B. Taurus, 1999. “The GCC continues to contradict the implication of the realist perspective in international relations theory that attempts at voluntary cooperation and integration among sovereign states in the anarchical environment of world politics generally are doomed to failure.”, p. 153. Page 165 tells a little of inner workings. Chapter Five (ii) below shows the formal institutional system of the GCC. Koppers, Simon, Economic Analysis and Evaluation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang, 1995, p.195 draws attention to the “closed-door” character of GCC decision making and lack of publication. According to John Duke Anthony “its (GCC) secretariat has little more than 300 employees”, though he goes on to remark on the numerous sectoral functional bodies established by the GCC. Anthony also remarks that the member states have research and study centres. “Thus, a relatively under-reported strength of the GCC is the extent to which, for nearly a quarter century, it has tapped the talents and increasing expertise of a headquarters staff in Riyadh.” In what follows, the many functions and roles of the secretariat are set out; so numerous and vital to regional coherence and effectiveness that one is left to wonder how 300 staff can cope. Anthony’s observations tell us little of executive substance, but do indicate a wide scope for an in-house and/or external survey of the GCC organization as an executive and regional policy making and implementive body.

6. The following are virtual stock-in-trade for students of the region: Long, David E. And Christian Koch eds., Gulf Security in the Twenty-first Century, Abu Dhabi, ECSSR, 1997; Sick, Gary G. and Lawrence G. Potter eds., The Persian Gulf at the Millennium, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1997; Potter and Sick eds, Security in the Persian Gulf, N.Y., Palgrave, 2002; Al-Suwaidi, as in Note 2 above. What is common to these sources is that it is widely accepted that the Gulf can be understood and analysed as an autonomous strategic area, not so much by putting analysis explicitly within a ‘regional security complex’ frame work than by implication of the region as a security complex. The present study sets out to be explicit about the Gulf being a ‘security complex’.

7. The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research (ECSSR) is based in Abu Dhabi and the Gulf Research Center (GRC) is based in Dubai. Both Centres are independent. A Center for Strategic Studies is established in Bahrain, operationally independent, but with official sponsorship. In 2011 the GRC has had its ‘licence to operate’ withheld by the Department of Economic Development on account of “objections by the Dubai Government to various aspects of the GRC’s work.”

8. However, the independence of the GRC and ECSSR means that they are not built into regional consultative processes as is the Track 2 in the ARF, even of the independent bodies of Track 1 (see Figure 5 in Chapter Five).

9. In the Shangri La Dialogue, for example, China is drawn into open encounters. China is also drawn into the open processes of discussion and exchange in the ASEAN-ARF.


13. Asymmetric threat and conflict, inter-state and intra-state, are major aspects of security in the Gulf and Southeast Asia. See discussion in Chapter 4(viii) around the aspect of non-state and asymmetric security.


15. Ibid p. xi. Until a “regional approach” came to influence writing about Southeast Asia there was a considerable record of ‘country studies’, going back as far as the 1950s. These have tended to concentrate on such aspects as nation building, political institutions, development and the changing complexions of regimes. In his country studies collection Government and Politics in Southeast Asia, London, Zed Books, 2001, John Funston has sought to emphasise more the “core political science concerns over the nature of political systems”. The studies of the ten Southeast countries are set in a given format of political institutions and how they have been operated. The volume is a helpful resource in studying the region.

16. Ibid, p. xiii


18. Tarling op cit, p. xiii.


20. Dibb, Paul, Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia, Adelphi Paper 295, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 1995. The essential balance is seen to be among five powers across a widely conceived regional area: U.S., China, Japan, Russia and India, but Dibb remarks: “The conscious effort on the part of the ASEAN states to avoid the use of force in settling disputes, to a degree unprecedented for regional subsystems in the developing world, may well become a model for future regional order”, p. 41.


23. Historically and contemporaneously Iranian relations in the Gulf have been hegemonic in character. This is a major source of the overriding defensive character of security affairs in the Gulf. In this regard Iraq has lapsed, but could in time be renewed in hegemonic status.

24. This is well evidenced in the bibliographies, for example, in Tarling ed. Cambridge History and Acharya, Constructing.
25. Haas, Michael, *The ASEAN Way to Peace: A Study of Regional Cooperation*, N.Y., Praegar, 1989; Leifer, Michael, *ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia*, London, Routledge, 1989; Funston, John, *Government and Politics in Southeast Asia*, 2001; Severino, Rodolfo, *Southeast Asia in search of an ASEAN Community*. 2006. We have remarked earlier on Haas as a socio-philosophical source of communitarian ideas in international relations. Leifer is critical and not wholly detached from conventional realist thinking: “For ASEAN, a constructive regional order would ideally be based on the balancing military engagement of the United States.... The policy of balance of power was alien, in principle, to ASEAN’s security culture...”, p.19. Funston comprises ten ASEAN country studies. Severino was the first secretary of ASEAN. He writes from the perspective of a patron, more cautious and advisory than critical.

26. We have noted above the difficulties that Tarling suggested historians have had.


28. The Institute of Southeast Studies (ISEA), also based in Singapore, includes the recently formed ASEAN Studies Center (ASC) which holds an annual ‘Round Table’ and publishes a periodic Report Series the first of which of ‘ASEAN Community: unblocking the road blocks’, 2008. Report Series 12 was titled, ‘The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In 2009 the ASC published Rudolfo Severino’s study of Arf, *Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community*. Most of the original ASEAN-Five states have their own study centres. See Notes 5 and 6 Above.

29. *Regions and Powers* has grown out of earlier independent and cooperative work by the authors. “There are versions of RSCT going back to 1983, as well as a variety of applications of it to particular regions... The most authoritative version is to be found as one chapter (Chapter 5) in Buzan’s earlier *People, States and Fear*, Harlow, Pearson Longman, 1991”, Regions, p.41. There has also been much complementary, supportive and critical discussion in the journals around this theory of regional security complexity.

“and as the level of analysis for scholars seeking to explore contemporary security affairs”. Buzan et al: “we believe this to be true even though we use an understanding of security more open than their rather traditional, military one. The proviso is fundamental, as we see later, and is significant in accounting for ‘security community affairs’.

32. Regions, pp. 44 and glossary, p.491.
34. Regions, pp.128 and 134. Buzan et al find Southeast Asia complex and difficult. The ASEAN-Six states “managed to shelve the disputes among themselves, effectively forming a weak subregional security regime (see glossary) whose members agreed not to pursue their disagreements by force”, p.135 (cf Acharya, Creating a Security Community, p.20, Table 1.1). The present study attributes, post-Cold War 1989-1992 as Indochina is joined in ASEAN, regional security complexity to ASEAN-Ten. Indochina and ASEAN-Six/Indochina did not inherit a security regime, but rather security complexity. It is upon this that the creative processes of regional security community are got under way.
35. Acharya, Constructing, p. 122 and the two sections following.
36. The state is not the only possible “referent object” of security. See Regions, page 44 and Glossary for definition of regional security complex.
37. Ibid, pp. 11-12 and p. 461: “When we began this project in 1998, the two starting assumptions that structured it were that territoriality still remained an essential feature of international security dynamics, and that the regional level was generally necessary to any coherent understanding of international security”.
39. Ibid, p. 45, and at p. 53 where “the essential structure of an RSC embodies four variables” the first of which is a boundary: “Because RSCs are durable substructures with an important geographical component, they have both internal structures and external boundaries”.
40. Ibid, p. 53. The polarity system in the Gulf is very marked with three polar powers, but in Southeast Asia too this has to be negotiated between what Dibb has called ‘middle’ and ‘small’ powers.
41. Ibid, pp. 40. And p. 48: “Regional security complex is an analytical concept defined and applied by us, but these regions (RSCs) are socially constructed in the sense that they are contingent on the security practice of the actors”.
42. Regions, p. 86.
45. “For social constructivists socialization is a central concept.... (but) constructivists have tended to leave the microprocesses of socialization under-explained”, which Johnston seeks to correct in regard to ASEAN and ASEAN- ARF. These ideas
in Acharya are absorbed in a greater emphasis on the material factors of real institution building and the international relations of Southeast Asia.

46. See Chapter Four (xii) below. The regional response is compromised in Southeast Asia by state security ‘resilience’ underwritten by ASEAN norms of sovereignty and non-interference.


48. We speak of the security community as superstructural on the security complex. See further and Chapter Five.

49. Karl W. Deutsch was motivated by the post-World War II search for peaceful solutions to Europe’s historic record of continental conflict. *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, Princeton, Princeton University Press. This was followed by contributory pieces in edited volumes which developed the theme of international and regional organizational means for weaning states away from tendencies to conflict. Ibid, pp.11-12 and 462.


51. Joseph S Nye, ed. *International Regionalism*, Boston, Little Brown, 1968. Nye’s writing has subsequently, without losing interest in the tendencies to anarchy and power in international relations, been concerned with the projection of American power in the world and his interest in the application of ‘soft power’ in international relations. The general drift of his non-neo-realist thinking is shown in *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 4th Ed., London, Pearson, 2003.


53. Ibid, p.4. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory in International Politics*, Cambridge, CUP, 1999, p.20, may be quoted: “(The) conceptualization of structure may seem odd to a generation of IR scholars weaned on Neo-realism, but it is common in both sociology and anthropology... the intuition is straightforward: the character of international life is determined by the beliefs and expectations that states
have about each other, and these are constituted largely by social rather than material structure.”

55. These basic explanations cover more detailed causes and intentions that signal both difference and similarity between the regions as they deal with their particular security issues.


57. In Acharya we notice only one reference to the GCC (not to the Gulf): “The idea of collective security is based on a preponderance of physical force, where as security communities are based on shared norms concerning the non-use of force. Thus, while it will be difficult for coalitions of weak states, such as ASEAN, the Gulf Cooperation Council... to develop self-reliant collective security systems, collective military weakness need not prevent them from developing into viable security communities”, pp. 22-23. Buzan et al are a little more generous in their acknowledging ASEAN in two brief descriptive sections, but are dismissive: “As the IISS stated bluntly: ‘since the end of the Cold War, Southeast Asia has lost its utility as a strategic concept’ Strategic Survey, 1994-5”, p. 155.

58. Myanmar has similar ethnic refugee problems at the border with Thailand. Myanmar was also acceded to ASEAN in 1997. Myanmar’s status as an ‘insulator’, although “facing both ways” in Buzan et al, Regions and Powers, p.41, is questioned at p. 486.

59. See Acharya, pp. 213-214. ARF membership is shown in Henderson, Assessing, p. 68. But The Republic of Korea (North Korea) and Pakistan should be added. We have remarked elsewhere how a very wide and disparate membership can dilute effectiveness. On the other hand, enlargement brings erstwhile belligerent and authoritarian states into realms of consultation and understanding. “The ARF’s approach to regional security was derived from ASEAN’s security culture.” Henderson, p. 69.

60. Regions, p. 283.

61. Ibid, p. 44.

62. As Buzan et al say: “The theory (of RSC) has constructivist roots, because the formation and operation of RSCs hinge on patterns of amity and enmity among the units in the system, which makes regional systems dependent on the actions and interpretations of actors, not just a mechanical reflection of the distribution of power”, p. 40.

63. Al-Suwaidi suggests that the Gulf is infected with a region-wide security dilemma that is driven by intense reciprocal hostile rhetoric between Iran and the Arabian states, the security perceptions of the GCC states, the focussed hostility of the United States towards Iran, and Iran’s “nationalist quest” to be the sole

64. In Chapter 4(a)(xii) below attention is drawn to regional structural differences from the Southeast Asian community (ASEAN).


66. For example, it is remarked later that there variable tolerances towards Iran among the states, variable support of the United Arab Emirates in the ‘islands dispute’ with Iran, contacts with Israel, and differential claims to state security ‘resilience’. The relocation of states’ defence units in the Desert Shield Force to the states responded to states wishes to maintain control of their own forces.

67. Of the 29 disputes in East Asia listed in Dibb, *Adelphi Paper 295*, 1995, p. 51, 21 are located in Southeast Asia. New conflicts arise into the 2000s. Interestingly, disputes are not always subdued or resolved by internal regional resources: Indonesia-Malaysia and Malaysia-Singapore disputes were settled at the International Court of Justice (cf Bahrain-Qatar). See Acharya, *Constructing*, pp. 149-156.

68. Ayoob has observed that intra-state conflicts “also had an interstate dimension, thereby making them genuinely regional in character”. He was particularly focused on the security problems of early post-colonialism. Later, in both our regions, other forms of intra-state security; terrorism, political system hostility and regime identity have become prominent, and similarly trans-nationally infectious. Ayoob, Mohammed, *The Third World Security Predicament*, Boulder, Lynne Reiner, 1995, p. 49.

69. The ‘outreach’ of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) does not override the boundary of Southeast Asia since ARF has no competence in respect of the region’s internal security affairs. The distribution of power in the region does not entail the management of polarity since the region is comprised of ‘middle and small powers’; and as has been remarked, the pre-eminence of Indonesia and Vietnam is compromised by their internal problems and local border tensions respectively.

70. ‘Konfrontasi’ of Indonesia towards Malaysia (1963-1966) was the back-drop to forming ASEAN.

71. “Security communities are also marked by the absence of competitive military build-up or arms race involving their members. Within a security community, ‘war among the prospective partners comes to be considered illegitimate’.... *the attainment* of a security community can thus be tested operationally” (my emphasis). Acharya, p.19, quotes Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations*, 1988.


73. ASEAN’s Agreements, institutions and consultative processes are treated substantively and contextually throughout Acharya, *Constructing* and are best
Part 2

Chapter Four

Regions, Regional Security Complex Theory and Regional Security Communities

(i) Introduction
The purpose of the present chapter is to give a brief account of regionalism and Regional Security Complex Theory. In what follows immediately it will be clear that this account draws largely on Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*. Buzan and Waever and RSCT have not had a complete monopoly of the development of regional theory: there are other approaches to post-colonial, Cold War and post-Cold War international relations and the growth and development of regional formations. One such, as has been mentioned in Chapter 3, is Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia*. Remarking only on these: Buzan and Waever develop a general analysis of regional security within a global system framework of international relations. Acharya’s focus is clearly on the region, particularly on the Southeast Asia region, and is based on the history and characteristics of this region. Buzan et al exhibit no particular commitment to constructivism as Acharya does, in whose text this is expressed in clear sociological terms. However, a regional security complex does have “constructivist roots” (see below [vii]). The theory of regional security complexes has been developed as an
important innovation in academic International Relations (IR). It traces the presence of regional security complexes in the international system and accounts for them as distinct arenas of interstate relations and the conditions of securitization specific to them; or, security dynamics identifiable at the regional (sub-global) level. Acharya’s approach is more within ‘liberal’ understandings of International Relations. There are points of convergence and of divergence between the two approaches to regionalism and we shall observe these as we examine the two regions in due course.

As a framework of analysis in international relations the concept of regional security complex is not wholly without difficulties, but we have generally accepted the view of Buzan that: “it is a much bigger analytical error to have no systematic conception of regional security dynamics than it is to have a disputed one”¹: a concept that is not without difficulties is to be preferred to no concept at all for analysis. The present study is of the Gulf and Southeast Asia as regional security complexes. We also examine the undertaking in Southeast Asia of the creation of a ‘regional security community’. The usefulness of a particular approach to understanding and explanation must be tested in its application to the chosen areas of interest; in the case of this study to insecurity and conflict at the regional level. This study focuses on the security dynamics of two particular regions and their security complexity.

As no more than a very general observation at this stage we suggest the following: ‘Regional security complex theory’ highlights threat, conflict,
security and defence; ‘security community’ emphasises conflict avoidance and management, avoidance of war and assurance of peace, but not at neglect of latent threat and the presence of potential conflict. Security complexes are existential; security communities are ‘created’ and developed. Both approach the problem of security in regions, but each has a different perceptual basis and consequent security dynamics.

A useful starting point will be to set out the respective definitions taken straight from the region study texts:

A security complex is: a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot be reasonably analysed or resolved apart from one another...The central idea remains that substantial parts of the securitisation and desecuritisation processes in the international system will manifest themselves in regional clusters.\(^2\)

A security community is distinguished by a real assurance that the members will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes some other way....The ‘peace’ role, central to a security community refers to the potential of a regional organization, through its peacekeeping machinery and diplomatic techniques for controlling the forceful settlement of conflicts among its own members.\(^3\)

(ii) Disciplinary and practical significance of Regional security complex theory (RSCT) and Security community

Regional Complex Theory was a major intellectual response to actual changes that had been taking place in the world through the middle of the twentieth century. The fresh insight into the nature of international relations is attributable to Barry Buzan in People, People, States and Fear (1984). The date tells us that the response was to global conditions brought about by the dismantlement of imperial systems and the emergence of many new states, which in their new autonomy had to contend with urgent issues of national security and economic
development. The same historical conditions had provided the context for the development of the concept of ‘security community’ in managing the relations between the post-colonial new states. The effect of the Cold War had been widely to disguise and to impede this situation of new state emergence, particularly among the Indochina states. The end of the Cold War made possible an acceleration of this process. Intellectually, RSCT largely relieves International Relations (IR) of the neorealist hold on theory and its hitherto relatively unchallenged perceptions of the world and the distribution of power within it. The theory reinforces perceptions of the autonomy of new states by the intellectual integrity of a relevantly focused view of the restructuring of the global system.

This regionalism signals to outside powers that a shift has taken place from political dependency of states to autonomy of collectively enhanced actors and the growth of a raised level of diplomacy and exchange in the management of security. The dynamics of international relations were changing, and the dynamics of lower level regional relations are also changing.

Regional security complex theory circumvents the analytical and ineffectual inclusiveness of ‘the South’ in a bi-lateralised global system, thus adjusting focus to a more meaningful multi-regional level of actors’ perceptions and actions, policy and cooperation in approaching issues of security and development. For the weaker and poorer states in the world economies of both political and economic scales are envisioned. In the regions processes of activity and community are claimed to be embedded
in culturally-specific “ways” and at the same time these have to be negotiated to be compatible with the requirements for the pursuit of ‘modern’ collective and individual expectations and ambitions – analytically, making constructivism and rationalism work together in both the security complex and security community accounts.

It is the business of regional security complex theory to explain, describe and test these numerous shifts and changes in international relations. The security community approach takes a more descriptive and prescriptive account of the shifts and changes.

(iii) Change in the ‘realist’ international system.
Until the middle of the twentieth century the international system was generally viewed as made up of fifty-one independent sovereign states. Realist international relations theory (IR), the prevailing account of international relations of the time, held the international system to be a state-centred system which was dominated by a relatively small number of great powers. According to realist theory, the condition of relations among the states in the system was one of ‘anarchy’ whereby the system of relations was unstructured except by “what states make of it”.

Following the Second World War (1939-45) the global power structure was changed: first, by the war’s destructive effects on the economies of many of the old powers and the de-linking from the powers of their old imperial holdings, and second, by the emergence correlative of a smaller number of great powers. There was also set in train complex new views of
the world which were ideological in kind. The ideological impulses came from the new great powers, the Soviet Union and the United States (and latterly China), to be projected in a new protracted Cold War, and manifesting much of the ‘traditional’ realist drive of pre-eminent power in the international system. In the contemporary realms of academic interest new intellectual influences were spurred both by reinvigorated ‘liberal’ reactions, for example in ‘Peace Studies (for example at the Carnegie Centre in America and at Bradford University in the UK), to the scope and extreme malevolence of the World War, and in time to come these responded to the challenges of an expanding plurality of states in the world.

In the half century following World War II this new plurality of relatively weak and poor but now autonomous states was to be accommodated in a restructuring of the international system. The dynamics of international relations in the second half of the twentieth century were to be a complex interplay of these various influences.Intellectually, there was a shift from an exclusive, realist, state-centred understanding of the international system to the more structured understanding of neo-realism. Buzan et al take the shift further:

To look at structural perspectives other than the neo-realist one....by a rise in levels of absolute power sufficient to allow more and more actors to ignore the constraints of distance. 6

This makes possible Buzan and Waever’s emphasis on levels in the system, and so on regions. The outcomes in which we are most
interested in this study are the exposure of regional configurations of interest and power, and the focus is on two of these.

(iv) Regional security complexes after the removal of ‘overlaying’ conditions
This new modified global system which included regionalism generated intellectual responses, notable in which have been Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) and ‘constructivist’ accounts. The pre-Second World War system of international relations had been an ‘anarchy’ of many states in which relatively few great powers dominated. Their power was in their being virtual sole and dominating actors at the global system level and by that token their determining influence was on the status and action of powers and states at lower levels or global system sub-structures. Buzan and Waever remark that this, the realist account, is essentially a ‘top-down’ theory:

The (other) question is whether the international system constructs states. Do anarchic structures affect state identities and interests, or merely their behavior? Rationalist models assume that only behavior of states is affected by system structure, not their identities and interests.

The state-centric international system was radically modified to take account of a sub-system level of states and powers, great and small, emerging and acting with considerable autonomy within the terms and dynamics of specific areas of relations, internal to those areas. The greater plurality of states in the post-World War international arena was mostly brought about by the lifting of what Buzan has called the old imperial and colonial “overlay”. New states’ leaders were deeply conscious of this
circumstance and wary of its reality. Interestingly, appeals to ‘neo-colonialism’ common among third world post-colonial leaders seemed implicitly to accept the neo-realist view of the international system and of power in it, and its continuing influence as they saw it in international relations. Early Third World regionalism was ingrained with the conceptualism of realism. ‘Neo-colonialism’ was the perception of a trap of global power from which the new states’ leaders felt driven to release themselves. Perceptions about the Cold War were an additional aspect of this anxiety about subordination to outside great powers. Buzan and Waever speak interestingly of “the intersection of these two levels of security dynamics”, first:

There was a drawn-out transition period between widespread colonial control, and the arrival of conditions in which autonomous regional security dynamics could begin to operate.

and secondly:

Thus even while the Cold War was defining an intense bipolar security structure at the global level, much of the so-called third world was structuring itself into equally intense RSCs.¹⁰ Regionalism had to grow into a self-identity in the areas where it emerged and the internality of interests and security had to impact tangibly on the understandings of leaders.

Intra-state interactions also take place which are potentially influential in the pattern of inter-state relations at these sub-international system levels, for it is widely characteristic of states (Buzan’s ‘units’) at this level to exhibit conditions of tension and instability. The regions were areas of
‘anarchy’ based on the autonomy of the constituent states. The so-called ‘third world’ was widely unstable, largely on account of inter-state and intra-state disputes. This is the point where Buzan et al identify the critical change in the twentieth century:

The central idea in RSCT is that, since most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters. Processes of securitization and thus the degree of security interdependence are more intense between the actors inside such complexes than they are between actors inside the complex and those outside it.¹¹

Territory, sovereignty, power, competition for power and balance of power are principal among main motivations in international relations. These become apparent also at exposed lower levels in the global system. The same kinds of influence come to affect relations internal to the regions. Buzan et al again:

Within the structure of anarchy, the essential structure and character of RSCs are defined by two kinds of relations, power relations and patterns of amity and enmity. That power operates on a regional scale is well known from the concept of a regional balance of power, in which powers that are not directly linked to each other still take part in the same network of relations.¹²

A major aspect of regional security configurations is that regional leaders gain relative strategic autonomy, within the parameters of power in the region. Securitization becomes the outcomes of their perceptions, understandings and decisions about the security complexity of their regions. This study must take account of the structural (geo-political and strategic) aspects of the Gulf and Southeast Asia regions’ regional and inter-state relations. Regional leaders must manage and construct
relations and build confidence in their autonomous strategic management and devise possible resolution mechanisms in their security situations; within the likely inadequacies of material and human resources available to them. It is a significant aspect of regional securitization, however, that states’ leaders recognize their own state’s inadequacies, and those of their co-regional leaders, to manage their general security with complete autonomy and so they may attempt to give way to the perceived greater competence of wider frameworks and management capabilities at the regional level.

State-centred perceptions of security, however, seem persistently to affect what states are willing to compromise or surrender in their approaches to securitization. No matter what wider regional ambitions and expectations are expressed, the small print in any agreements is ‘national interest’. Political balancing between autonomy (sovereignty) on one hand and co-ordination in wider competences on the other affect the quality and the political acceptability of security pursuits. Such region-based securitization as may be devised will sometimes have to compromise with the real specificities of states’ own strategic issues and interests. This is an aspect of regional security dynamics noticeable, we shall come to see, in both the Gulf and Southeast Asian regions. Problems of security in the recent past or that are contemporary are not always circumstantial as they arise, or opportunist in their origin. Leaders have to be sensible to the dynamics of security as these have both deep (historical) regional security complex as well as immediate dimensions. The significance of the distribution of power within a regional security
complex will become an important point of discussion in a later chapter. This is a factor of great importance, for example, in the Gulf where there is a tri-polarity of great powers, and numerous small powers.

The idea of anarchy of the international setting was of an analytical framework in which international relations were said to be best viewed to take place. It was simply the absence of any overarching mechanism for control. Regions as actual (or “overlaid” or otherwise inert) security complexes exist in parallel with, or exist at a lower level within the international system. Analytically they subsist in a condition of anarchy among the members, prior to any arrangements made formally to manage them. “Security features at the level of regions are durable” they consist in an interior and defining pattern, and are not occasional as in the manner of some historically passing crisis. A region possesses “a security dynamic that would exist even if other actors did not impinge on it”.... The definition of RSCs is based on the security actions and concerns of actors: an RSC must contain dynamics of securitisation” (my emphasis).¹³

Securitizing conditions in the new regional formations have typically been the product of the political dispositions of the leaders of the constituent sovereign states of these regions, of the material circumstances of those states, and according to the shared concerns for their particular relations. The new post-imperial and later post-Cold War global system was one interposed by new regional formations faced by their own securitizing conditions in which nationalism and nation-building become demanding aspects in relations. Region-building, in cooperative security and conflict
constraint, appeared to new states’ leaders as urgent imperatives overlaying state and nation-building and, in hope, underpinning it. The regionalism of new states was a difficult attempt to reconcile policies of state and nation building. A new global political geography was in the making and has become part of the architecture of international relations.

(v) Regions as a distinct level in the international system.

Regions are identified as a distinct level of interstate relations within the international system. Interstate relations are structured specifically at this level and promote a dynamic of relations internal to it. The dynamic of relations at this regional level hinges on what conventionally most profoundly informs relations between states; that is, control and management of the sovereignty and political autonomy of the states. The regionalist goal and focus on regional security are features in the later part of the twentieth century world that constitute change in earlier neorealist global system understandings. “The fact that the regionalist approach features a distinct level of analysis located between the global and the local is what gives RSCT its analytic power” (emphasis in original.) Buzan and Waever quote Lake and Morgan approvingly:

> The regional level stands more clearly on its own as the locus of conflict and cooperation for states and as the level of analysis for scholars seeking to explore contemporary security affairs.

This statement has the merit of suggesting that a theory (and analysis) is meaningful to the extent that it connects with the empirical. Analysis at this level is validated if it leads to a fruitful view or line of examination of
‘the facts’. A theory should lead to clear or clearer understanding, and be one that is preferable to or advancing on another theory.

That the regional level stands more clearly on its own does not totally detach regions analytically or practically from the overall architecture of the international system. But the neo-realist model, a conception of an international hierarchy of powers and security, is inadequate in its response to what has gone on in the world. It consequently displays an impoverished sense of the dynamics of contemporary international relations. Its difficulty lies in substantial part in its emphasis on the total system to the neglect of lower levels of interaction and behaviour, where states and other actors “have their security environment shaped both by the regions within which they sit and by the international system that contains them”\(^\text{17}\).

Regional security complexes and regional security communities, are identifiable most significantly by their interior qualities; by their distinctive security dynamics. But, as Buzan et al say:

> ‘Regional security complex’ is not just a perspective that can be applied to any group of countries.... In order to qualify as an RSC, a group of states... must possess a degree of security interdependence sufficient both to establish (it) as a linked set and to differentiate (it) from surrounding security regions.\(^\text{18}\)

Regions also subsist in an anarchically structured international system and are thus identifiable differentially from this. “The easy part is that a region must obviously be less than the whole, and usually much less. The tricky bit is actually specifying what falls on which side of the boundary.”\(^\text{19}\) In
practice regions are confirmed and consolidated by the perceptions and on-going actions, securitizing actions, of a durable group of states, or the authoritative actors within the states. The states of the regional complex are the prevalent ‘referent objects’ in the securitizing conditions of the regions.

As Buzan et al have it, regional security complexes have ontological as well as analytic status. Their ontology must subsist in part in their material setting and thus have geographic boundaries which contain them and set them apart from an immediate neighbourhood. Regions must also be understood as a level, or locality, within the global system. “The problem is that the global level is an abstraction that can be defined in many different ways”. Buzan et al continue:

It (the global level) is not simply the whole system. In security analysis, as also more widely in IR theory, the global level is about macro-system structures that constrain and shape the behaviour of the units (states) in the system...How these structures are defined thus shapes the nature, even the possibility, of the regional level. For this reason it is easiest to approach the global regional boundary by starting from the top down.20

As conceptualization of the system is taken to a lower level specific regional structures are identified through the medium of constructivist understandings. That is, as security takes place issues arise that generally attract the concern of the states and elicit their responses as ‘referent objects’. The responsive behaviour of states, as central security actors, is in desecuritization at this lower level.
Buzan and Waever tell us that, “The regionalist perspective is our chosen approach”. Then:

What becomes clear from this consideration of the neorealist, globalist, and regionalist perspectives is that all of them encompass important elements that need to be kept in view when trying to understand the post-Cold War global security order.

This consideration of what has been called “the three principal theoretical perspectives” is taken further:

Underlying... is a central question about levels of analysis: are threats that get securitised located primarily at the domestic, the regional, or the system level? This question can be asked about any given time and place in the international system.

Threat, insecurity and securitization can occur over “the international system as a whole”. Security dynamics are systemic, but the “key to our approach is keeping the security dynamics at the global level analytically distinct from those at the regional level” (My emphasis). Buzan and Waever have already told us that:

Our regional focus and even more our use of a constructivist understanding of security place us outside the neorealist project. Our relationship with the globalist perspective is, on the face of it, necessarily less close. To the extent that globalists start from an assumption of deterritorialization, their approach is at the opposite end of the spectrum from ours.

The “chosen approach” advances understanding of the structure of international politics and security; by a clearer view of a distinct regional structural level and analysis of this. At this regional level analysis of security and securitization can be taken further by the probability of
identifying intra-state security issues and securitizing actors, while “keeping the state as the focus, as the only ‘referent object’”:

When distinguishing between referent objects and securitising actors, it becomes possible to formulate a general theory of the conditions under which an actor successfully ‘securitises’ some threat on behalf of a specific referent object.26

(vi) Regional security complex, security regime and security community compared

Regions, as they become security complexes are autonomous within the international system. Securitising actors (usually states’ leaders) may attempt to create mechanisms for constraint of the structural insecurities of the regions. Regional securitizing actors do not have to be fatalistic in face of the structurally defining insecurities of the regional security complex. Developments may be got under way and processes put in place to rein in circumstances and dispositions for dispute and conflict, based on a pragmatic acceptance that dispute and conflict (real and potential) are grounded in the pattern of relations in the region. A general fear of war rather than expectation of peace can induce attempts at cooperation in security. The behaviour of states (or that of their leaders) may incline them to avoidance of conflict as well as the decisions they take. A ‘security regime’ may emerge. Buzan et al describe this:

A pattern of security interdependence still shaped by fear of war and expectations of the use of violence in political relations, but where those fears and expectations are constrained by agreed sets of rules of conduct, and expectations that those rules will be observed.27

The security complex is still in place. A security regime is an on-going configuration of security. Its existence arises from the capacity of the region’s political leaders to confront their shared security concerns and to
deploy means of constraint among them. The success of the regime depends on the adherence of the member states of the region abiding by the agreed rules of conduct, and perhaps on the success of other forms of cooperation, as in economic development, in which habits of cooperation and shared interests are strengthened. But the security regime is neither conceptually nor necessarily practically a stage in progress towards overcoming dispute and conflict in a region.

A security regime is not based on a view or expectation of finality in matters of security when disputes and conflicts may be overcome in policies and practices for avoiding conflict and maintaining peace. Acharya, says:

A security regime normally describes a situation in which the interests of the actors ‘are neither wholly compatible nor wholly competitive’.\(^{28}\)

Avoiding conflict and maintaining peace is the part in the international relations of a region of the ‘security community’. According to Acharya:

Security communities emerge when a group of states collectively renounce violence as a means of resolving their differences with an attendant significant muting of disputes among them.\(^{29}\)

What characterises a security community is the development of processes of conflict avoidance. The distinction of the security community approach does not lie in any neglect of structural insecurity; it lies in an intellectual interest in dispositions among regionally grouped states towards mechanisms for constraint and management of insecurity. Acharya makes the point:
The key aim of a security community is to develop the common aim of actors in peace and stability, rather than to deter or balance a common threat. In this sense, a security community is the antithesis of a ‘security complex’ which may be characterised by an ‘interdependence of rivalry’ among a group of states as much as an interdependence of shared interests. (My emphasis)

The approach to the security community does not detach us entirely from security complex analysis; it takes us to distinct level of understanding how security can be managed. The ‘logic of regionalism’ is to extrude anarchy at this level, which in the absence of recognition and attention might drive the mode of relations towards enmity. This is the objective of the security community where enmity is foresworn and the ‘peace role’, "central to a security community", and in relations is more pronounced than the ‘security role’. The need for states to commit to the ‘avoidance of war’ implies acceptance that dispute might not cease among the member states. Success in community building in time will be seen in a regional condition when it becomes inconceivable that member states should take up arms against one another. The security community approach to regional relations is value-laden and optimistic. How its principles and aims are translated into policies, institutions and actions will be discussed in Chapter Six. Since in a security community we are not detached entirely from conditions of security complexity it seems reasonable to continue here in the security complex framework of discussion and to take up security community analysis more fully at a later more appropriate stage. [see Section (xi)] below.
(vii) Structural significance of ‘amity and enmity’ in a regional security complex

The distinctiveness in regional interstate relations lies in the quality of their relations, as these relations aid in structuring the regions and sustain them in a durable cohering way. The theory of regional security complex (RSCT) Buzan and Waever tell us:

> has constructivist roots, because the formation and operation of RSCs hinge on patterns of amity and enmity among the units of the system, which makes regional systems dependent on the actions and interpretations of actors, not just a mechanical reflection of the distribution of power.\(^{32}\)

Regional security complexes are made to persist by constraining antagonisms and conflicts that are specific among their member states and also by behaviour of states enhancing amity among them. Geo-physical closeness and historical and cultural affinities may also be contributing factors in regional amity. From one region to another there will be different shades of antagonism or conflict and affinity or friendship. These are generalized as ‘amity’ and ‘enmity’ in Buzan et al. A balance between them is durable, but changeable over time, and is interiorized within the region. The centrifugal and disruptive drives of antagonism are curtailed by dispositions to co-exist peaceably and by the recognition that common survival and prospects of greater well-being are promoted by this. Buzan et al continue:

> The pattern of amity and enmity is normally best understood by starting the analysis from the regional level, and extending it towards inclusion of the global actors on the one side and domestic factors on the other. The specific pattern of who fears or likes whom is generally not imported from the system level, but generated internally in the region by a mixture of history, politics and material conditions.\(^{33}\)
These patterns of amity and enmity are influenced by various background factors such as history, culture, religion, and geography, “but to a large extent they are path-dependent and thus become their own best explanation”. These variables “work as comfortably at the regional level as they do at the global one”.

The region, then, refers to the level where a group of states are so strongly linked in a pattern of amity and enmity that they constitute a unit: “whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot be reasonably analysed or resolved apart from one another.”

These dispositional attributes of amity or enmity may also connect in significant ways with the distribution of powers, as ‘great powers’ may be present within a regional security complex and which by virtue of their status are likely to relate to powers outside the region. Buzan et al speak of:

great power RSCs (which are) hybrids of the global and regional levels.... Where two or more great powers share a regional RSC, then the internal dynamics of that RSC, whether of amity or enmity, will be a significant factor in global level security dynamics.

Paraphrasing Buzan and Waever: regional security complex theory (RSCT) focuses on the political processes by which “a constellation” of (in)security gets constituted. The theory treats the distribution of power and patterns of behaviour, or interaction at the regional level as essentially independent variables, and so:
It is not enough to look at the distribution of power in order to predict the patterns of conflict. Historical hatreds and friendships, as well as specific issues that trigger conflict or cooperation, take part in the formation of an overall constellation of fears, threats, and friendships that define an RSC.\textsuperscript{37}

The balance between amity and enmity may not be one between two clear dispositional opposites [see Section (vii) below]. A regional aggregation of amity and enmity will be a balance of a \textit{pattern} of these dispositions among the member states. How these are prosecuted and managed, or compromised or reconciled may mark the difference between responses to the conditions of security complexity and a regional approach towards a security community. Territorial disputes, historical misunderstandings and cultural clashes may ill-dispose states towards each other, but growing recognition that enmities among them may hazard regional stability to common disadvantage and impede processes of development may incline the states to more peaceful dispositions. What works for peace is fear of war as much as amity.

\textbf{(viii) Security and securitization in a regional security complex}

A regional security complex is identified in durable conditions of amity and enmity among a group of states and which are specific to them. Regionally specific insecurities lead to a configuration of securitizing activity in which the states of the group are the main securitizing actors and ‘referent objects’ of security. Insecurity may occur in many ways; from regional cross-national tensions and domestic instabilities. In the post-Cold War world, as we shall see, a new scenario of non-state-centric
security threats has developed to challenge exclusive ‘national security’, and challenges security theory.

Shared perceptions of insecurity may lead to cooperative forms of securitization. These will be most noticeable among states that are for the most part severally small and weak, and who among them sense a necessity for collective securitization. Such perceptions are rational among those states that are conscious of past records and future potentials of stress and conflict between them, and as they may confront greater powers in the region. Agreement to come together is made possible on the one part and made necessary on the other. But as we shall come to observe later, there are forms of cooperative (institutionalised) securitization are non-confrontational and superstructural over underlying conditions of regional security complexity.

A balance of enmity and amity identifies the group and makes it distinctive within its international setting and generates in time a strategic presence between the global and the domestic levels. This is the structural aspect of enmity and amity; “because the formation and operation of RSCs hinge on patterns of amity and enmity among the units of the system” (Section vii above). Managing and exploiting respectively the balance of these oppositional or tensioned elements is the task of states’ leaders. Perceptions, drives and possible understandings and agreements are the groundings of management of an existent regional security complex. Drives and understandings, etc. among national leaders have themselves to be confirmed and fine-tuned to make the regional group a stable and
effective securitizing configuration. Binding the states together within the context of a tangible security complex transforms an analytical regional security complex into the prospect of a real and durable strategic entity, the alternative to which is ‘anarchy’. A Regional Security Complex exists where states are not necessarily bound together, except in their common insecurity, particularly observable where the balance of amity and enmity is weighted towards the latter.

‘Securitisation’ may be understood in an analytic mode, as we have remarked, observing conditions affective in a political group that are the ground for an active security complex. This will be seen particularly in a distinctive shared and durable apprehension of threats internal to the group, which national leaderships in a security complex articulate and respond to in a practical mode, and which can lead to active shared securitization. This secures threat management, control or resolution. Without this a regional security complex remains ‘anarchic’. Where there is management and control the balance of amity and enmity tends towards the former. Where there is accepted constraint an approach may be underway towards a security community. We noted above that Buzan et al believe that the theory of regional security complexity has constructivist roots. So as regionalist theory is taken a stage further by focusing on security: “The theory has constructivist roots…. which makes regional systems dependent on the actions and interpretations of actors, not just a mechanical reflection of the distribution of power.”38
The concept ‘security’ has traditionally been understood in state-centric terms, and as Buzan and Waever remark:

The concept of security as generally used (has been) greatly shaped by the Cold War. The usage of (national) security as a key concept was an early 1940s invention of the USA, but the institutionalisation of it... occurred early in the Cold War, as did its export first to allies and then to more or less everybody in the international system.\(^\text{39}\)

This would have been in accord with the neo-realist approach in general international relations (IR) at the time. The institutionalisation of national security was evidenced in enhanced status of political defence management and strategic decision making structures, intelligence and standing armies. As the twentieth century wore on more stable peace conditions set in, theatres of real conflict were unravelled (notably in Southeast Asia) in the nineteen seventies and eighties, and eventually the Cold War was closed down from 1989. As a global situation exhibiting the facts of virtual unchallengeable superpower had arisen, and as widely the costs of war and preparation for war became economically unsustainable among states, political heads were at this same time turned to emerging new scenarios of threat and instability, and the presence of non-military menaces. “For the Western states and their close associates at the core of the global political economy”, Buzan et al/ tell us:

The big impact was the sudden, and probably long-term, shift out of heavy military security concerns and into a much wider, more diverse, and less clearly understood set of mostly non-military security concerns.\(^\text{40}\)

Conditions of “widening” in the concept of security and the perceived facts of globalizing insecurity in the post-Cold War situation may not have
wholly superseded the state-centric and military approach to security, but non-military securitization has gained prevalence on a number of fronts, although variably through the international system. There are also issues where securitization is activated globally and appropriately responded to in linked ways across the levels of the international system, as in nuclear non-proliferation diplomacy and policy.

Consonant with the circumstances of their new-found sovereignty and autonomy in the international system, the new states of the late twentieth century have assumed strong state-defensive profiles. In their discussion of security Buzan et al say:

Our general assumption is that the post-Cold War security order will exhibit substantially higher levels of regional security autonomy than was the case during the Cold War. 41

Defence capabilities, or at least the hardware of these, are powerful, if costly, as symbolic of sovereignty. We will see that these new states are drawn into the shifting scenario of securitization, because of its inevadable regional dimensions. Nonetheless, the assumed needs of the states in the regions to independently furnish their statehood with military and defence capabilities, and the underlying interstate security concerns of initial regionalism, encourage state-centric perceptions of national security to feature strongly in the political judgments of national leaders in the regions. 42

The objectivism of ‘national security’ that characterises state-centric securitization increasingly loses its exclusive hold on ‘security’ in the post-
Cold War world. Buzan *et al* take up the study of security in the post-Cold War world and interestingly refer to this as “the wider agenda of *securitisation studies*” (my emphasis):

Along with many others we have in recent years found it increasingly necessary to include in security studies more than military-political security….Especially when working on ‘societal security’ we realised that this was problematic….. Once we had made this decisive move, it became clear that, although empirically most security action might be concentrated around states and nations, one could not analytically defend the exclusion of the possibility that other units or levels might establish themselves as referent objects for security (my emphasis).

In the shift from security studies towards securitization studies – a shift, not a change – a greater degree of analytical complexity is encountered. The analytic mode, as we suggested above, becomes substantially constructivist:

the potential harmony and synergy between it (neorealism) and the regionalist perspective are high, especially when states are the main actors… there is room for conflict when the security agenda moves to issue areas other than the military-political, to actors other than the state, and to theories of security other than materialist (bounded territoriality and distribution of power).

It is useful, first, to indicate the security “issues” of a non-military nature that are widely common and widely perceived and accepted as insecurities and as security policy-relevant at the state level, and that are long-term in their anticipated incidence. (Non-military does not mean always devoid of ‘hard’ defensive response, or always devoid of state-centricity in this. Indeed, states’ authorities frequently find the nature of threats and their authorship, or their generating source, to be of such
complexity as to be hard to define and so hard to devise appropriate non-
military responses. The following list is indicative and not in a prioritized order:

- terrorism – ideological, nationalist;
- proliferation of WMDs – nuclear, biological, etc;
- ‘rogue’ states and counter security stigmatism;
- regime challenge of interior and exterior generation;
- international organised crime;
- propagation and dispersal of drugs;
- global infections – life-style (AIDS), natural epidemic, etc;
- environment;
- spillover instabilities – migratory, insurgency.

The list is also not of assumed similar incidence or intensity among all states, or of similar priority. Differential global, regional and state securitization occurs among the items. The list, as it stands, has an appearance of largely US/Western-developed countries’ preoccupation. However, different states and different areas might have different security ‘portfolios’. These can sometimes be aspects of the security dynamics for everyone. The security dynamics of regions cannot be in all respects sealed in.

Many of these threats are commonly said to be aspects and consequences of ‘globalization’:

Securitisation processes can define threats as coming from the global level (financial instability, global warming, Americanisation), but the referent objects to be made secure may be either at the global level (the global economic regime, the planetary ecosystem, the norm of non-proliferation or at other levels (community, state, region).... The globalist discourse capture(s) the way in which global level causes can trigger consequences and responses on other levels.45
Late in the day, Buzan and Waever encounter difficulties with real-life claims to ‘globalization’ that are both analytically puzzling and appear to indicate resolution only in possible changes in the empirical dynamics of securitization where security is raised externally beyond the state and region.46

The ‘widened’ security scenario produces numerous possible “referent objects”; that is, subjects of security threat or menacing conditions other than the state (“across sectors, levels and diverse units”) as in traditional security theory. Correlatively, the new scenario produces (is created by) numerous securitizing instigating actors or conditions in the material environment. Analytically, a security state or situation must have a referent object: if not always the state, what might this or they be? Buzan et al come up with a generalised solution:

We eventually opened up the option of another referent object: in the societal sector, the referent object is any collectivity that defines its survival as threatened in terms of identity (typically, but not only, nations.... The case of societal security underlined the importance of distinguishing between referent objects (that which is to be secured) and securitising actors (those who make claims about this security).47

The distinction holds even when, as is typical, the state is that which is to be secured and is also the securitizing actor, acting to secure itself. Securitizing situations or conditions may not come directly from actors. They may come from unwanted conditions in the material environment (not of evident or immediate or focused human initiative; as for example, the Indonesian forest fires and ensuing regional haze in 1997) of the state, of the region, within the region. Such security issues to be securitized
must be presented by some securitizing actor, which may be the state presenting the issue to itself as referent object (as with the forest fires). The security source does not, in principle, necessarily affect the status of the state as the relevant referent object for securitization:

A security issue is posited (by a securitising actor) as a threat to the survival of some referent object (nation, state, the liberal international economic order, the rain forests), which is claimed to have a right to survive... securitisation is conceptualised as a performative act. (My emphasis)

As Buzan et al say, this definition of security has “turned constructivist”: it is not asked whether a certain issue is in and of itself a ‘threat’. The focus is on the questions of when and under what conditions who securitises what issue:

Leaders and peoples have considerable freedom to determine what they do and do not define as security threats...it is these definitions that underpin security policy and behaviour.

We have remarked above that state-centric securitisation has lost its exclusive hold on ‘security’, or as we should now say, on the definition of security threats. The latter is the point at which the theory becomes constructivist, and it is the point where a dual element in security may be in effect. We may call this a prescriptive element; defining a threat, where “leaders and people have freedom”, but where the state is the referent object of securitisation, of security policy and behaviour, or the region where in some way securitising authority has been conceded:
The very act of labelling something a security issue – or a threat – transforms this issue and it is therefore in the political process of securitisation that distinct security dynamics originate... the theory is not causal in a traditional sense, because securitisation is conceptualised as a performative act never exhaustively explained by its conditions.\textsuperscript{51}

It is not only national security that traditionally prevailed in security theory that has been “widened” in the post-Cold War world. Security analysis has been increasingly oriented towards societal threats. Security has also been widened towards liberalised sources of prescriptive security threat. New spaces seem to be opened up in security action of societal kinds. Thus, a liberalizing of security identification, no matter how cautiously or un-self-consciously, probably goes with a liberalizing civic society. That is, non-military security issues might gain objectivity that are not determined in a state-centric (national security) way. Buzan et al observe the issues here within a more directly regionalist approach:

Traditionally, RSCs were usually generated by bottom-up processes in which the fears and concerns generated within the region produced the RSC... the new definition intentionally opens the possibility of another kind of construction of RSCs that is increasingly relevant...: regions can be created as patterns within system level processes.\textsuperscript{52}

The shift towards new non-state security is potentially common through the international system and can indicate the translation of non-state definitions of security into “universal principles”. As Buzan et al put the matter: “It is possible to formulate a theory that is not dogmatically state-centric in its premises, but that is often somewhat state-centric in its findings.”\textsuperscript{53} The state in the final analysis is the securitizing referent object.
But, as this writer reads ‘Regions and Powers’ there is room for more understanding of the link between societal definition of security issues and state-centric securitization – “state-centric findings”. For example, by what political principles and processes does the state admit (or not admit) the definition of security issues by societal actors, and by what political processes do societal actors transmit, or have transmitted, their definitions of security issues to the state? Societal actors may not only define security issues, they may also hasten their securitization by the state where the state may well be slow in the up-take. There are widening political aspects of security brought about by the “widening” scenario of security. Analysis has to broaden its empirical reference.

Buzan and Waever identify another potential problem in the analysis:

> to judge when an instance qualifies as security, it is necessary to focus on the characteristic quality of a security issue, i.e., to have criteria by which to avoid the slippery slope of ‘everything is security’.54

There may be times when societal actors may be too quick on the up-take and state-centricity of securitization must be asserted; governed by “universal principles”, or by right of the states’ own authority. Whether or not, or how and when the considerations about security set out in this section arise in our two regions will appear later in the study.

(ix) The global system and powers and autonomous regional dynamics. Institutionalisation as analytically secondary
‘Regions and Powers’ locates regional security complexes structurally within the international system. The system, as this is understood in neo-realist analysis, where system structure is analytically important but not in neglect of states as the key actors, remains. Regions are identified as a level within this international system and conditions of securitization are identified as specific to the region.

‘The system’ is the term used by Buzan, and Waever as a generic reference to all levels of power and inter-states’ and regional relations, and sub-unit activity. The system is thus structural. It is characterised particularly nonetheless by the relations among global great powers. In the post-Cold War world the system has been under the influence, at all levels, of a superpower, the US. Difficulties begin, Buzan et al believe:

When one tries to position particular actors: should Russia be considered a global power or a regional one? And China? Traditional realism does not help because it tends to think in a global track, positioning states as great, middle, or small powers.  

Regional security complexes are also inter alia configurations of powers in which it is common that relative great powers are present. An active intra-regional configuration of great powers is a notable aspect of the Gulf. Saudi Arabia and Iran have stood out for more than half a century as able to project their interests and power. The ambiguity of Iraq’s status is unlikely to be permanent. This configuration of powers goes far in identifying the region as a security complex. In Southeast Asia the configuration of powers has been radically changing over the course of the second half of the twentieth century. This is a factor significant in the
security interaction that is internal to complexes. The twentieth century
has been marked by attempts to institutionalise order through global
relations. (See section (ii) above.) Nonetheless, regional security
complexes are not simply elements in a seamless international
architecture. In (familiar) “security analysis, as also more widely in IR
time, the global level is about macro-system structures that constrain
and shape the behaviour of the units in the system” But, Buzan et al
state:

It is incompatible with the extreme globalist idea that all levels
are dissolving into one… we think it is still a long way to go
before levels cease to be a salient feature in the dynamics of
international security.57

It is mistaken, then, to suggest that all regions and state units and their
securitization below the global system level are to be understood as sub-
 systemic from the global level. The region is a distinct largely autonomous
level and field of securitization. Buzan et al agree with Lake and Morgan:

The regional level stands more clearly on its own as the locus
of conflict and cooperation for states and as the level of
analysis for scholars seeking to explore contemporary security
affairs.58

This does not totally detach regions, analytically or empirically, from the
overall international architecture. But the neo-realist model, a conception
of an international hierarchy of power(s) and security, is inadequate in its
response to what has gone on in the world. It consequently displays an
impoverished sense of the dynamics of contemporary international
relations, and the history of it.
This approach bypasses our concern with powers that are structurally significant at the regional level... The problem is that the global level is an abstraction that can be defined in many different ways. It is not simply the whole system. In security analysis, as also more widely in IR theory, the global level is about macro-system structures that constrain and shape the behaviour of the units in the system.59

That is, the difficulty of the approach lies in substantial part in its emphasis on system and structure rather than on lower levels of interaction and behaviour. But “all of these state types” (those that would have fallen under the old rubric ‘third world’) “have their security environment shaped both by the regions within which they sit, and by the international system that contains them”60 The idea of a dynamics specific to regional relations is important to regionalists in International Relations (IR), but to Buzan et al, in the conceptualization of ‘security complexes’ it is basic.

The regions are not determined by institutionalization, for the peculiar dynamics of the relations among their constituents are present before any incorporation into formal arrangements for security and cooperation. This is the key to understanding the idea of ‘security complexes’. In other words, there can be a security complex without there being a regional organization articulating and encompassing it. There may even be no or only limited perception of the complex until conditions in the global system lead to its exposure as tangible and its release into autonomy. At this point regional securitisation falls to the remit of the region’s national leaders. The influences, pressures and tensions of their particular range of relations persuade political leaders to put these into a framework of control and management of (in)security.61 More ordinarily we might say
that it is just such understanding that in large part encourages regional state leaders to establish agreed joint arrangements around, and to manage, the peculiar dynamics of their local relations. When institutionalization does take place the effect is to clarify and articulate the underlying regional dynamics, which then come to be explicitly directed to diplomacy, decision making and securitizing activity at this level. It may also, however, be a feature of a regional institutionalizing process that this is provocative of response securitization – a non-military, or proto-military ‘security dilemma’.  

Regional institutionalisation will be examined in greater detail in Chapter Five. The processes, purposes and structures of institutionalisation in the two regions under study will come into view.

(x) Delineating RSC boundaries. States as principal actors in security dynamics of autonomous regions

There are basic material or geographic requirements for any group of states to be identifiable as subsisting together in a region. States may group in ways, or for reasons that do not constitute them together as a region; as, for example, they may do in alliances, functional and other associative formations. The essential difference is between states whose linkages are intentional and focussed in purpose-driven ways and states whose linkages are structurally set in some distinct characteristic, situation, or condition. As Buzan and Waever put it:
Regions, almost however defined, must be composed of geographically clustered sets of such units, and these clusters must be embedded in a larger system, which has a structure of its own. Regions have analytical, and even ontological, standing… Mostly, the differentiation of units and regions is fairly straightforward.63

Regions are placed as a level within the international system and share in its characteristic anarchic structure; that is, in the system and in the region itself. Regions are exposed and identified as patterns of relatively self-contained states’ interaction, of securitization and desecuritization. It is understood in this way that a region comes to be seen as a security complex. “What is important for security analysis overall is that some coherent sense of the regional security dynamics be interposed between the global and state levels.” Buzan, in People, States and Fear, goes on:

The main issue is recognizing that strong local security dynamics almost always exist in an anarchically structured international system. Once that point is accepted, and integrated into security analysis, disagreements about the location of boundaries within the seamless web are unlikely to result in major contradictions.64

Securitization is the most effective binding element in a region, and by which we come to observe it as a ‘regional security complex’:

The central idea in RSCT (regional security complex theory) is that, since most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters: security complexes.65

Regional Security Complex Theory is not a total departure from the neorealist system structure, where projection of power or national survival is the central purpose of the state, and the exercise of state power their main guarantor. RSCT identifies a distinct level of security dynamics
within this system: “Security complexes may well be extensively penetrated by the global powers, but their internal regional dynamics nonetheless have a substantial degree of autonomy”\(^{66}\), evidenced as we have earlier observed by a durable pattern of enmity and amity, and also a pattern of power interaction:

Regional security complex is an analytic concept… but these regions (RSCs) are socially constructed in the sense that they are contingent on the security practice (desecuritizing) of the actors.\(^{67}\)

Regions are existentially rooted in the interactive conduct of a set of states and other local actors. The analysis proceeds with considerable subtlety:

We study the security discourses and security practices of actors, not primarily their regional(ist) discourses and practices….This is an element of our analysis, but not the basis of it… The regionalist discourses of actors are part of their political struggle, and how they define the region has to be studied. ‘Regional security complex is our analytical term and therefore something is an RSC when it qualifies according to our criteria, not according to the criteria of practitioners.’\(^{68}\)

There is an important distinction being made here. On one side, regional security complexes subsist in the securitizing discourses (however in practice security relations are articulated) and in the practices (political-military security defence etc. conduct) interactively of actors in a complex. On one side, that is, we have associative, institutive discourse and action among the units in a complex in pursuit of shared security objectives. On the other side we have the practical undertakings of securitization; the largely instinctive-reflexive security conduct of units (states) in a complex.
This might, secondly, be (come to be) intentional security conduct of the units. Buzan et al tell us that:

According to our theory ‘security’ is what actors make it, and it is for the analyst to map these practices... [See section (vi) above.] Consequently, these two ways of understanding the definition of regions have to be kept separate.69

The distinction is important for we can now say that it is according to the first side of the distinction that the boundaries of a security complex are most clearly set. And in this we see a clear constructivist element in the theory.70 The analysis is taken further and distilled into what Buzan et al speak of as the essential structure (emphasis in the original) of four variables:

boundary, which differentiates the RSC from its neighbours;
anarchic structure... of autonomous units;
polarity, which covers the distribution of power;
social construction, which covers the pattern of amity and enmity among the units.71

The variables constitute the internal character and definition of a regional security complex. Institutionalizing regional complexity is the subject of a later chapter.

(xi) ‘Regional security complex’ and ‘Regional security community’: a brief ‘security’ cross-check.

The emphasis of the present chapter has been on Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) as the theory analyses regions as configurations of security which are specific to a region and patterns of state securitising behaviour in response to the conditions of security. The emphasis has been in respect of the theory’s development of regional security as an autonomous level of international politics and the notable presence of
insecurities that are specific to regions and consequent pursuits of security, securitization at this level. The intellectual occasion for this has been changes that have taken place in the international system from the middle of the twentieth century, from the end of the Cold War, and the continuing salience of inter-state relations at this level in the system. The theory has an historical grounding. The intellectual cause for the promotion of regionalism in International Relations (IR) is the identification of regional security scenarios and their particular dynamics. The concept of the global system has not been relinquished; but inter-state relations are not now viewed as wholly structural dependent variables from the global system. Regional security complex theory is a response particularly to the inadequacies of neo-realism in International Relations (IR), which encapsulates a common ‘seamless’, structured range of inter-state relations within the ‘anarchic’ distribution of power and activity through the system. State and inter-state centrality, territoriality and ‘anarchy’ are still subsumed within the analysis of regional level dynamics. At the core of regional security complex theory is the development of ‘regionalism’ as an essential aspect of, or part of the architecture of international relations. “Boundary(ies), which differentiate the RSC” is a variable within the essential structure of an RSC.72 The boundary is established by the regional internality of securitisation and the durable pattern of amity and enmity among the member states: behavioural rather than physical.

Regional security complexity appears more to be a presumptive element in the development of the concept of ‘regional security communities’. The
regional security community approach is not so much an alternative analysis to the regional security complex as taking this into a different stage of understanding and to correlative changes in state actor behaviour in regard to state and regional security. Acharya applies the regional community approach to a particular region, thus not generalising it as “part of the architecture of international relations”. Security community analysis is closely linked to the acceptance of the structural significance of the balance of amity and enmity in the region. Given a common basis in regionalism and preoccupying concerns with security, we do not see a critical theoretical separation, up to this point, between the two approaches to regional inter-state politics and security. Indeed, our point is to say that there is convergence as well as divergence between them.

So far we have referred to ‘regional security community’ analysis and application only in an abstract way in the earlier narrative [See Section (v)] to establish it as a major framework of analysis. This was inadequate as an appreciation of the significance of this approach to regional inter-state relations, especially as the analysis of it seeks to account for the contemporary inter-national politics and their dynamics in Southeast Asia.\(^7\) We have noted that regional security complex thinking was a response to changing realities in the global system, particularly in respect of the centrality of security at the regional level. We can now say that regional security community thinking is an interpretative and normative response to the realities of a particular regional setting. This study remains open to the possibility of extending the security community
approach beyond the setting that has been comprehensively studied by Acharya.\textsuperscript{74}

At the risk of simplification, the following will draw attention to factors that appear as convergence and those that appear as non-convergence. Notwithstanding what may be articulated as the purpose and intention at the founding of regional organizations, security in the regions is at the centre of what is undertaken [Section (x) above]. ‘Functional’ aspects of regional security - social and economic cooperation and development - may be broadly incidental or contingent and opportunistic in the overall round of regional concern, or these aspects may be integral in the design and evolution of security. Buzan and Waever speak of “social construction, which covers the patterns of amity and enmity among the units”, but “the specific pattern of who fears or likes whom (is disposed to enmity or amity) is generally generated from a mixture of history, politics and material conditions”, and the dispositional attributes of enmity and amity are connected significantly with the distribution of power.\textsuperscript{75} The (changeable) pattern of enmity and amity is analytically and structurally significant in the existence and definition of a security complex and in the on-going security disposition in a region. It is in the fabric of things: an essential variable. On the security community side, material forces and concerns remain important, but it is the inter-subjective factors that play a determining rather than secondary role. Acharya says of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), that:

It is not moulded exclusively by material conditions such as the balance of power or material considerations such as expected gains from economic interdependence. Its frameworks of
The concept of community is interpretative and normative. The changeable pattern of enmity and amity is purposefully created and creative in the security community. The security community is not simply an end-game, but is in the processes of building the community.

In the security complex, on the other hand, the pattern of enmity and amity is structural and configurative of the complex. The balance may change in time, but this will be in accordance with the conduct as securitising response of securitising (state) actors in the regional complex. Enmity is managed and counter-acted. Amity constrains (through cultural, diplomatic, ‘soft power’ and liberal influences, and non-official linkages, etc.). Adversarial relations and a propensity to conflict are more prone to be present and durable in the direct response to security complexity. ‘Defence’ is a characterising posture. Expectations of or apprehensions about conflict are usually high. Resolution of conflict is generally inhibited by ‘balance of power’ when there are two or more competitive powers and processes of mutual deterrence develop. Unstable and economically wasteful ‘security dilemmas’ occur.

In the security community the pattern of enmity and amity is constructive, active and ‘evolutionary’. It is constructive and changeable through creative processes of conceiving norms of conduct and building regional identities. “Security communities are founded upon norms, attitudes, practices and habits of cooperation which are multidimensional and
evolutionary”, and joint assurances not to fight to resolve disputes. The presence of disputes and conflicts (of varying degrees of immediacy or reality) are common, but with perceptions of ‘threat’ weighing differently between complexes and communities. The presence of disputes does not differentiate between them. The management of these is more likely to. The security community is not conflict-free, as this is clearly to be seen in Southeast Asia, but is marked by conflict avoidance.

The key aim of a security community is to develop the common interests of actors in peace and stability, rather than to deter or balance threat (within the community).

Enmity is foresworn. The ‘peace role’ rather than the ‘security role’ is cultivated in the security community. There is a long-term interest in the avoidance of war – with the implication that war (military engagement, combative confrontation, heightened threat) may not be entirely out of view. The hope is that beyond the short-term conflict between members of the security community will become inconceivable.

(xii) GCC and ASEAN communities structurally different in the regional security complexes
The presence of a security community in Southeast Asia cannot be taken wholly to differentiate the Gulf and Southeast Asia, for within the Gulf security complex we have the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) community based on Charter undertakings (Article Four) to develop cooperative economic development, common market and common currency, and cohering societal arrangements. (The ‘functional’ quality of the community for consolidating amity.) The economic aspects were first embodied in a separate Economic Agreement (Nov. 1981) and
subsequently revised in a treaty-based new Economic Agreement (Dec. 2001). A security community was not initially clearly publically articulated but it has proceeded pragmatically by various forms of strategic and military cooperation. This cooperation was made a firmer commitment by the Manama Declaration (Dec. 2000) and in turn has been embodied in the Joint Defence Agreement of 2001 (Dec. 2001). (See Chapter Five (vii) below.)

We must, however, observe a vital differentiation between the Southeast Asian Community and the GCC community within the Gulf. The differences are in scope and objective. The ASEAN Community is region-wide, intended to contain and eventually to eradicate threat and conflict and avoid war among all the states of the region. The community is progressively based on ‘norms’ of agreed behaviour and processes of consultation among the states, and development of a formal ‘ASEAN Community’. (See Chapter Six (xii) below.) The GCC community is comprised of six states, to the exclusion of two regional, and polar, states – Iraq and Iran. These two states are major integral securitising elements in the Gulf security configuration. The integrity of the GCC community lies in history and culture notwithstanding the presence of sources of dispute, and in believed advantages of material linkage specific to the group. However, the Gulf Cooperation Council group of states is a partial and active element in the securitisation system of the Gulf. In the ASEAN community region-wide inter-state conflict is acknowledged, even if not understood in an analytical ‘regional security complex’ sense. Community behaviour is encouraged in a programme of avoidance. In the GCC
community dispute is acknowledged and behaviour is encouraged in a programme of conflict avoidance. Trans-regionally, on the other hand, dispute and conflict are acknowledged and induce ‘defensive’ behaviour in the face of security conditions that identify the region as a security complex. The projection of ‘soft’ power is marginal. The difference between the Gulf and Southeast Asia is in the partial and inclusive character of the communities respectively, with the consequence of fundamentally different securitizing roles in the two complexes.

From these accounts of regional security systems there should follow judgments as to whether the respective approaches to regional security are effective, and perhaps even whether one is more effective than the other; and perhaps even further still, whether the practicalities of actual cases are as different as might seem. Such judgments are likely to need to account for differences in regional historical, cultural and material context, and recent experience – unless in either case of analysis, security complex or security community, there is a claim to general or universal application. These, however, are matters for later attention.

(xiii) Conclusion
In the earlier parts of this chapter a brief examination of ‘regional security complex theory’ has been undertaken. This survey has rested very largely on what we have understood to be the authoritative text in security complex theory – Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers. Along the way, where it has been thought there are problems or weaknesses in the theory or in its presentation addressing these has been attempted. We
have also discussed the concepts of ‘regional security regime’ ‘regional security community’. Three regional security frameworks were considered in the chapter: (i) regional security complex, (ii) regional security community and (iii) regional security regime. The first two were taken to be adequate in the analysis of security in the Gulf and Southeast Asia. Our study has suggested that the concept of ‘regional security regime’ does not contribute notably to what is analytically fundamental [see earlier and Note 63], and so we have shown particular regard for the concept of ‘regional security community’ and for Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia* as the most comprehensive theoretical treatment and application of this concept. Acharya applies this particularly to Southeast Asia [Sections (v) and (xi)]. Comparative description and analysis of ‘regional security complex’ and ‘regional security community’ are the relevant frameworks for understanding regional security in the Gulf and Southeast Asia. Discussions so far have led us to observe that there are convergences in security complex and security community analysis. Later discussion will consider the extent to which convergence may be found in practice.

Regionalism has been shown in the present chapter to have been a response to mid-twentieth century changes in the international system. These changes have arisen largely from the proliferation of new states and the development of new patterns of relations among them located in a distinct level of state interaction. As a distinct level in the system regions are existentially and analytically defined by patterns of ‘enmity and amity’ specific to them. Conditions of (in)security have regional roots, distinct
from the power-driven state-centricity of traditional realist understandings of the international system. The structural understandings of neo-realism do not convey the significance of autonomous regional security. In regional security analysis the state remains the central ‘referent object’ in conditions of regional insecurity and the principal actor of securitization. In the twenty/twenty-first centuries increasing security issues have non-state sources and are frequently prosecuted by non-state actors, but the regions’ states remain the ‘referent objects’ for securitisation. Institutionalism is not an essential defining element in regional complexity; it is basically superstructural, as can be seen in the development of a security community. This will be the focus of examination in the following Chapter Five.

In the final two sections of the chapter we have briefly considered the presence of security communities in the two regional security complexes. It was observed that the communities relate differently to the underlying security complexes.
Notes Chapter Four

2. Buzan et al, p.44.
4. As indicated by the original signatories of the United Nations Charter, June 1945.
6. Evans, ibid, pp.364-65. Buzan et al take the shift further: Regions, pp.6 and12. We shall observe this later. According to Wendt, “The real question is whether the fact of anarchy creates a tendency for all such interactions to realize a single logic at the macro-level.... I argue that only the Hobbesian structure is a truly self-help system, and as such there is no such thing as a ‘logic of anarchy’”. Social Theory, p.247. The ‘logic of regionalism’ is to extrude anarchy.
7. The idea of regional security complex was originally Buzan’s, but has been much worked on by Waever...”, p.xvii. See Ayoob, Mohammed, The Third World Security Predicament, Boulder, Lynne Reiner, 1995, Ch. Three (pp.47-70). Ayoob follows regional security analysis but much within a ‘third world’ framework. He remarks that Buzan’s ‘initial formulation appeared to describe ‘insecurity complexes’ the interdependence of rivalry as well as that of shared interests” (My emphasis). RSCT has developed much further in Buzan and Waever, and is tied less to third world analysis.
8. Buzan et al, p.28. See also Wendt, pp. 248-49: “The choice between Realism and Liberalism is often seen as one between ‘top-down’ vs ‘bottom-up’ theorizing, between the view that international politics contains a single logic which depends in no way on its elements, and the view that the logic of anarchy is reducible entirely to its elements.... Anarchy as such is an empty vessel and has no intrinsic logic; anarchies only acquire logics as a function of the structure of what we put inside them. This accommodates Liberalism’s emphasis on domestic politics, but within a structural approach to the international system”, a developmental more than security focus, but not neglectful of linkages between them.
9. Suppression by ‘overlay’ is more clearly evident in the case of the Gulf than in the case of Southeast Asia. In the latter case, however, much depends on whether one speaks of ‘ASEAN six’ or ‘ASEAN ten’. This will become clearer later. In either case the latency of a regional complex must be inferred from the nature of later regionalising events. The following text was brought to my attention by a colleague. I mention it only to show that ‘neo-colonialism’ was not only rhetoric, but a perception that was a real motivation in regional construction. Ake, Claude, *Social Science as Imperialism: The Theory of Political Development*, Ibadan, Ibadan University Press, 2nd ed., 1982.


11. Ibid p.4.

12. Ibid, p.49.

13. Ibid, pp.47 and 56. Analytically parallel, or existing at a lower level within the international system, an anarchy of relations which exists prior to any arrangements made formally to manage this system. Regional complexes have a prior existence. For Evans, Graham, *Dictionary*, realism is the most successful and perhaps the most compelling of the classical paradigms that shaped the development of the discipline; p.465. There is a need, this writer thinks, for some clarification in the use of terms here: ‘global’ refers to the ‘top’ level in the international system, of primary, power and influence throughout it; ‘system’ refers to the inclusive international system, what this is and how it works (e.g. as anarchy, the realist/neo-realist approach). ‘Globalisation’ refers to a shifting and developing of increasing non-state, ‘deterritorialized’ interactions across the system (e.g. economic, asymmetric securitisation). Buzan et al *Regions*, e.g. p.7. ‘Region’ refers to a lower level (within the global system), while ‘regionalisation’ and ‘regional security’ refer to what goes on and how it works at that level. Securitization refers to perceptions of threat and insecurity and responses and behaviour of actors – at the regional and global levels. These are the core terms in the conceptual framework. Attention must be paid to these differentiations if confusion is to be avoided. The obverse, or countervention, of securitization is desecuritization. That is, such policy and action as is directed towards deflation of insecurity, or the dominance of issues of security among and between states.

14. Buzan et al, p.24. We shall come to see how great power influence was peculiarly invasive and intense in Indochina. In that region the Cold War was made to be a very hot war indeed and for some forty years destabilized the states of this sub-region.

15. Buzan et al, p.50


17. Ibid, p.14

18. Ibid, p.47.

19. Ibid, p.27.

20. Ibid, p.28

25. Ibid, p.11 More on globalist/globalization, and territoriality as we proceed.
27. Ibid, p.491.
30. Acharya, ibid p.21. Acharya continues: “Although security communities may be constructed on the basis of shared interests and identities, rather than a common threat, their identities are usually defined in opposition to the identity of other actors.” The important proviso follows: “During the 1980s, ASEAN thrived by consciously emphasising the ideological, economic and political differences between its own members and the Indochinese states”, p.22. We seem to be taken away here from the crucial identifying importance of the *internal* characteristics of a security community. These were apparent in ASEAN-Six before the nineties and became apparent for ASEAN-Ten thereafter. These issues come to light in Ch.6 (b) following.
32. Ibid, p.40. The point emphasised in the quotation clearly relates to matters raised in Note 30 above.
33. Ibid, p.47. Time and place may be influential in this: for example, the Cold War generated from the global level was influential in injecting patterns of enmity at lower levels.
34. Ibid, p.50. “Social construction, which covers the patterns of amity and enmity among the units”, is one of the “four variables” that comprise the “essential structure of an RSC”, p. 53.
35. Ibid, p.44.
36. Ibid, p.59
37. Ibid, p.50.
40. Ibid, p.18.
41. Ibid, p.76. “The regions differ between those driven predominantly by military-political security (all of Asia, Middle East...) and those dominated by other sectors (the Americas, EU-Europe)”, p.75.
42. For example, even in the “military-political” context of security the political dimension can become more complex; beyond, that is, a representation of ‘the state’ to a referent object of regime, actors, and ideological referents.
43. Ibid, pp.70-71.
44. Op cit pp71-72.
45. Ibid, pp.26 and 71.
46. The problems raised appear in the Conclusions at Chapter 15, *Regions and Powers* between pages 463 and 467. “The regional level is often the most important, and overall ranks at least as high as the global and domestic levels.
‘Global’ here primarily means” (in current understandings and terminology) “securitization related to the main great powers (463)….Globalisation is securitised as a threat by a wide variety of actors from states through to a range of activist groups and NGOs… resistance to” (claims of) “globalisation often takes territorial forms, and therefore there is no contradiction in globalisation enhancing the territorial” (state or region) “propensity in security dynamics… Deregulation and liberalisation enable” (non-state transactions) “but this does not mean that actors target ‘globalisation’ or deregulation as the threat – more likely they concentrate their worries on the actor(s)…. This book is linked to globalisation without globalisation as such appearing directly as the securitised threat (464)… A few cases of securitised environmental” (for example) “issues are global or at least transnational… These are global in the sense that they are responded to by negotiations among all states where all becomes more or less dependent on each other (465)…. Thus we are – even with a possible trend towards increased securitisation along non-territorial lines – firmly within a situation where a largely territorial (and in practice often regional) structuration shapes most security affairs…. In the end it is an empirical question. Empirically such a shift to a dominantly deterritorialised dynamic of security does not seem likely to happen for some decades, if ever” (467). (My emphasis.) See also Dupont, Alan, The Environment and Security in Asia Pacific, Adelphi Paper 319, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998.

47. Ibid, p.71. "‘Universal’ principles are now beginning to take on some importance as referent objects...” - a new level of ‘objectification’. Religion (more clearly when this is not ‘established’), societal life styles, vulnerable health groups. Referent grouping is not a closed prospect. But Buzan et al do speak of the state as “the focus”, p. 70. Into the twenty-first century, against ideological-sectarian threats, the state as referent object must carry the burden of preserving the nation-state and its ‘way of life’ and culture, or ‘multi-culture’; interpreting its role philosophically as well as existentially.

48. New security issues and their definition seem to be spilling over into a liberalising impact on society, and a liberalising society might more readily define non-state-centric security issues.


50. Ibid, p.71. See also pages 75-76; “Another more serious problem is raised by having an open ontology allowing for post-sovereign, non-state focused situations, but largely telling state-centric stories…. We keep the state as the defining unit for locating things in this scheme”.


52. Ibid, p. 72.


54. Ibid.

55. Buzan et al, p.27. “Public debates show ambivalence, sometimes talking of Russia and China as regional powers (or regional superpowers), sometimes global ones”, p.28. But surely the important point is that although the world (the system) may configure globally in relatively durable ways, the sub-structural

56. The configuration of powers in Southeast Asia weighs strongly, as we shall see, in the development of this region as a ‘security community’.

57. Ibid, p.29-30.

58. Ibid, p.10.

59. Ibid, p.28.

60. Buzan et al, p.24, and p.4: “Security complexes may well be extensively penetrated by the global powers, but their regional dynamics nonetheless have a substantial degree of autonomy from the pattern set by the global powers.” See Ayoob, *The Third World Security*, Note seven above and p.58.

61. ‘Regional security complexes’ and no less ‘regional security communities’ in the processes of “construction “, Acharya.

62. Awareness of this might have been present among regional institution makers, for example, of the Gulf Cooperation Council and as sensitivity was shown at the foundation of ASEAN.

63. Buzan et al, p.27.

64. Buzan, People, States and Fear, p.200.


66. Ibid. At page 48, *Regions*, Buzan et al say that RSCs “define themselves as substructures of the international system by the relative intensity of security interdependence among a group of units”.


68. Ibid, p.48.

69. Buzan et al refer to Europe and South America, remarking their special characteristics: “Europe is a security community. Whereas the classical security community theory (Deutsch) envisaged that states would become gradually more confident in each other and thus a regional state-based order would stabilise in a non-war mode, the actual development in Europe contains two surprises. One is that the states establish a peaceful order at the same time as they start to blur, merge, and fade, and numerous non-state forms of securitisation enter. The other is that this security order does not take the form of a direct security system – like collective security – solving the security problems of the region”, pp. 375-376. ASEAN too does not take the form of “a direct security system”.

70. Ibid, p. 48.

71. Ibid, p. 53.

72. Ibid. The point is made again, more comprehensively at p.481: “In RSCT, regions are not given by geography or culture or patterns of current events, or the whims of analysts, or local discourses about regionalism. RSCs are socially constructed by their members, whether consciously or (more often)
unconsciously by the ways in which their processes of (de)securitisation interlock with each other.”

73. Constructivism is an integral element in the development of security community analysis, as this will become apparent as the study proceeds. Reference to Acharya, *Constructing* is obvious.

74. It is beyond the scope of this study to go into the socio-cultural-political anthropological background to community ideas in Southeast Asia (or Asia), beyond what has arisen in earlier chapters, particularly as these are represented in claims to an ‘Asian Way’. The details of this case would be interesting and perhaps revealing. But ‘ways’ are not unknown in the justificatory and self-identifying claims in other regional endeavours.

75. Whether functionalist ideas and principles explicitly informed the GCC at its initiation is difficult to say, but we can see how they might have done.

76. For example: joint exercises and training, communications systems and rapid defence capabilities.

77. The promotion of regional security is compromised by the community’s own norms of sovereignty and non-interference, and state defence resilience and non-use of force.

78. See Section (vi) above. Buzan and Waever in fact do not say much about cooperative and developmental aspects of security regionalism.


80. Ibid, p.23. Rather than, *founded on* norms, etc., this writer would prefer to say, informed by the hope of developing, etc. Acharya, p.21: “The key *aim* of a security community is to develop....”

81. See Section (iv) above and Note 14 above. In this sense, a security community is the antithesis of a ‘security complex’”, but, cautiously, “in its original formulation”
Chapter Five

The Gulf and Southeast Asia: regional security complexes and regional security communities

(i) Introduction

In Chapter Four regional security complex theory (RSCT) was critically examined and the concept of Regional Security Community discussed. In the present chapter we examine the circumstances in the two regions under study in which conditions of security specific to the regions become evident. The diminution of external influence and control over the later part of the twentieth century, what Buzan et al have called "overlay", arising from the collapse of the Soviet Union and so dispersal of Cold War conditions, reveals the presence and growth of conditions of enmity and amity. The circumstances of overlay were more complex in Indochina than in the Gulf since Cold War intervention fed on historic pre-imperial and imperial enmities in the sub-region. These signal differentiating conditions of regional security complexity in the two regions and the different approaches to these made in the two regions.

The ending of the Cold War constituted a set of circumstances with serious implications for global stability and peace. It lifted a long-lasting political and strategic impasse across Europe which was the initial source of the Cold War, and for the NATO (from 1949) states in general. In the Middle East there had been dispersed and limited direct impact of the Cold War. This made for a fundamental differentiation between the two regions. The Cold War was conducted in the Middle East and the Gulf
mainly by proxy on the part of the major Cold War combatants, by reciprocal processes of winning friends, frustrating the regional ambitions of opposition and supplying arms. At the close of the Cold War in the Middle East, and more particularly around the Gulf, erstwhile Moscow allies and friends lost economic and military supports. Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe tell us that:

The arena in which the two sides engaged in a battle of proxies is littered with the legacy of major arms races, client-patron relationships and uneasy alliances that ran counter to the national interest of many of the states in the region. While it is true that there were many other ‘battlefields’ in the cold war, the middle east, due to its oil and its strategic position, seems to have suffered most.¹

The states that had not previously been allied to Moscow, particularly the conservative states of the Gulf, were relieved of the immediate dangers of encirclement by Moscow through its ‘friendships’ and military supports; which, however, had been countered by their own involvement in America’s declared strategy of Soviet ‘encirclement’. The states not tied to Moscow continued their strategic association with their own erstwhile Cold War patron, the United States.

In Southeast Asia the end of the Cold War was played out in more immediate, extended and intricate ways than in the Gulf. The relations between the major Cold War powers had shifted over time as alliance between Moscow and Beijing on one side was broken in the 1970s and accommodation was developed between China and the United States from 1972.² The field of Cold War conflict had been strewn throughout Indochina and within the domestic political systems of the states of all of
Southeast Asia. The end of the Cold War in Southeast Asia brought about the occasion for a regional restoration by processes of integration of areas that the Cold War had effectively separated politically and strategically.

(ii) Identification of the Gulf as a regional security complex. A tri-polar regional security complex

As the Cold War was ending the configuration of security in and around the Gulf was being transformed. The Arabian Peninsula states had been freed from imperial impediments almost two decades before the end of the Cold War. However, the strategic importance the major Cold War combatants attached to the area created circumstances in which national autonomy in matters of defence and foreign affairs continued to be significantly subjected to external interests. Iraq was detached from the rest of the Gulf by its Ba’athist politics and friendship with Moscow. In Iran the Shah’s relative freedom of action, underwritten by generous military supports, was purchased by an alliance as a ‘pillar’, with Saudi Arabia, in the United States’ policy of ‘encirclement’ of the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War in 1989 the Gulf States were becoming disencumbered of some of the global embroilments into which they had been drawn and which had been beyond their political and strategic reaches.

The states and powers of the region were necessitated and enabled now to consider their strategic and security circumstances more clearly and self-regardingly. This was not a totally new departure in the Gulf because the treaties ending British control and ‘protection’ in 1981 had a similar effect, leading to a recalibration of the Arabian Gulf States’ dependency.
on external power. The formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 was an important incident in the recalibration. But Britain’s exit was a confirmation of America’s strengthening hegemonic influence in the region.\(^3\) Global aspects also continued to be salient in the Gulf’s international relations.

Oil alone tied the Gulf States into a complexity of political, economic and strategic connections. This affected their global status. The states nonetheless began to turn in on them and became more conscious of their respective weights and of the presence of local hegemonic dispositions within the region. ‘National interests’ featured more clearly in relations among the states. As Buzan and Waever have suggested generally of regional security complexes:

> They are substantially self-contained not in the sense of being totally free-standing, but rather in possessing a security dynamic that would exist even if other actors did not impinge on it. This relative autonomy was revealed by the ending of the Cold War, when enmities such as that between... Iraq and the Gulf Arab States, easily survived the demise of a superpower rivalry that had supported, but not generated, them.\(^4\)

The Arabian states, the great and the smaller, were confronted by an active trilateral configuration of regional great powers (Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia) which was to influence perceptions about the nature of the region and which was to compel related policies of national interests and, as we shall see, regional possibilities.

The ending of the Cold War did not mean, as we say, that the Arabian States could free themselves entirely from external supports and defence
dependency. In the post-Cold War period global concerns for the political and strategic stability and security of the Gulf also explain the persistent presence of an external securitizing interest. The interest and involvement of the United States had always been greater, as virtual sole outside power within the region, and more intense than that of the Soviet Union. The latter was mediated mainly through influence in Iraq and Iran. It had been US policy to ensure its influence should dominate. However, US hegemony has not been unequivocal and can present allies in the Gulf with unsettling ambiguities: “Many officials in the GCC states are unsure whether the lack of American consistency is one actually centered on the principal policy objectives or just regarding particular policy means.”

Karawan continues:

Is it a deliberate reflection of what former U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger hailed before as an exercise in “constructive ambiguity?” Put differently, does this American incoherence reflect a lack of policy consensus among American foreign-policy makers with regard to what is strategically desirable or differences regarding what is politically feasible in order to maximize U.S. interests?5

The US does not enjoy complete strategic freedom in the Gulf. On occasion it has needed and on occasion has failed to gain approval or acceptance of its intentions to act among its friends and allies. Its actions were restricted by the prospects of resistance by other powers in the region.6 Oil was a bargaining chip of potential strategic significance, as the 1973 boycott showed, but was a hazard in times of conflict, as the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the following war with Iraq showed. The ‘tanker war’ exposed a vulnerability to hostilities internal to the Gulf. America’s need for Gulf oil and guarantee of it as a global resource has ensured US
continuing strategic interest in the Gulf. US strategies of (Cold War) ‘twin pillars’ (1970s) and ‘dual containment’ (1990s) both rested on a recognition of issues and dynamics of security particular to the Gulf.

(iii) Cross-currents of Arab secular and religious radicalism in the wider Middle East. Protection of separate Gulf conservatism and from internal regional revolution

Protection from these influences was felt to be of vital importance for the Gulf, both internally by states’ leaders and external supporters. A number of factors have separated conflicts, and so securitization, in the Gulf from those that have occurred in the wider Middle East:

(i) National autonomy was secured later in the Gulf than among the North African Arab states. With the general exception of Saudi Arabia the Arabian Gulf territories languished under the ‘protection’ and so security ‘umbrella’ of Britain and an increasingly committed American role. Iran, until 1979, benefitted from the latter as a ‘pillar’ in American strategic interest.

(ii) Across North Africa the politics of secular leftist leadership and conflicting affiliations with outside powers and their ideologies challenged peace and stability from which, other than Iraq, the Gulf was held immune.

(iii) Arab Nationalism and the counter assertiveness of Muslim Brotherhood threatened regimes. A widespread drift of secularizing political culture emerged towards which the Gulf regimes in their later times of autonomy (from the 1970s-80s) were not well-inclined. The Arabian States embraced a deep and durable conservatism and monarchic political systems that
distinguished them clearly from the military-led and republican arrangements of the wider Arab World. These political leanings were, however, brought nearer to the Gulf in Syria, and in Iraq and Yemen.

(iv) The Gulf states had strategic and security concerns that drew their attentions northwards, eastward and to the south rather than toward the agitated and too often intrusive politics of the wider western Mashreq and North African areas. This does not imply that the Gulf is a wholly exclusive bubble of all securitisation, nor does any region have to be. The Gulf from 1979 was to be affected by an ideological challenge from the Islamic Republic of Iran, internal to the region.

(v) The global strategic resource of oil gave the Gulf a special status in the political economy of international relations. This attracted to the Gulf a mantle of protection by outside powers and massive injections of arms, notably to Saudi Arabia and Iran – which set them apart from the states of the wider Arab World and their independent dispositions in international affairs.

(vi) Oil also brought the promise of prosperity around the Gulf unmatched in most of the Arab world; excepting Libya and Algeria in North Africa in which area their relative great power status was exercised. Furthermore, the Arab states of North Africa had security and other political and economic transaction linkages with a wider south European area.

(vii) And last, the relative lateness of national autonomy in the Gulf brought this region into the arena of international politics just
as, into the seventies and eighties, the Cold War was apparently receding and the Gulf’s own security complexity was demonstrated in internal regional conflicts.

(iv) Gulf a regional security complex differentiated from the wider Middle East

That the most frequent incidents of political and militant conflicts have been in the wider Middle East matters for our understanding, for issues arise of whether occurrences of conflict, etc. at a distance bear significantly on an area or “sub-region” (for present argument’s sake the Gulf as shown in Map 5 in Buzan et al, p.189) and how these might affect perceptions, actions and policies at this suggested “sub-regional” level. Do influences ‘at a distance’, albeit in an area widely defined in shared post-imperial new state, cultural, linguistic and sectarian terms, necessarily or convincingly make for an inclusive regional complex? How, when and to what level of significance do occurrences of conflict, securitization, etc. in the wider Middle East bear on the Gulf and on the effective boundaries of perception, action and policy? Occurrences of conflict etc. at a distance may not have committal, (acceptable) imperative action and policy implications in the Gulf. We shall have to pay more attention to this point in a later chapter. Occurrences of distant conflict may not, bear significantly or directly, against the imperatives (of securitization) internal and particular to the Gulf. The issue is not just theoretical. It is practical, for a regional security complex is importantly a matter of perceptions and behaviour and the priorities and accepted imperatives for security policy and action among policy makers.
Such considerations may compel acceptances of the idea of the Gulf being differentially and substantively a regional security complex (RSC) rather than just a “subcomplex”; that is, where the strategically determining dynamics of conflict and securitization take place. It is interesting that at page 188 Buzan et al speak of “many... conflict dynamics of the (Middle East) region” without reference to the Gulf. What is at stake, we think, is what containment, intensity and durability of securitisation is necessary to identify a RSC. An important part of the answer here must be the dynamics of perceptions, behaviour and imperatives contained.\(^{12}\) Answers to these points we expect will later conclude that the Gulf is a substantive security complex (RSC).

Gulf self-reliance in maintaining security of the region was for long a favoured option. Where there was overt conflict in the Arab World it was generally conflict locally between states; as in the border disputes between Libya and Tunisia, and as in the Maghreb, for example, between Morocco and Mauritania about Western Sahara in the seventies and eighties – all of strategic indifference to the Gulf. Hardly a frontier along the extent of North Africa is free of dispute. In the Levant and Mashreq areas there have been conflicts recurrent and bloody, territorial and sectarian, involving Jordan and Syria (and Egypt), Lebanon and Syria, Syria and Iraq, Israel and all its neighbours and most notoriously Israel and Palestine. The Arabian Gulf region has its own record of conflicts no less violent and materially damaging than in the wider Middle East and as we seek to show, defining it as a substantive regional security complex (RSC).
Balances and shifts in amity and enmity in the Gulf. The impact of conflictual tri-polarity and hegemonism in the Gulf. The Gulf as a security complex

Until about the 1980s the Gulf had languished as what Buzan et al call a ‘proto-complex’: that is, “when there is sufficient manifest security interdependence to delineate a region and differentiate it from its neighbours” – but the circumstances among the states are such that “the regional security dynamics are still too thin and weak to think of the region as a fully fledged RSC”. To become a “fully-fledged” security complex the states of the Gulf had collectively to become and be widely recognized as autonomous at the regional level in their inter-state relations. The processes for this to happen might be traced back to times of primordial seasonal and other patterns of migration and exchange reinforced by traditions of dynastic and familial linkage. The critical moment came with modern state formation, with its identifying and exclusory state effects and the need to consolidate new forms and levels of interest and raised national locations of authority. The inevitable offshoot of these last was the emergence of different “unit” sizes and differential centres of power. Co-existence was aided by continuing primordial bonds and bonds of language and religion. The need for cooperation was indicated by new forms of ‘national’ economy and ‘national security’, particularly as political ambition comes as a structural feature of domestic polity and inter-national (inter-state) relations. Outside recognition comes as a bounded pattern of cohering conduct, and constrained and managed incoherence, of amity and enmity, become apparent and distinct from other such bounded patterns.
The crucial dynamics of the Gulf region hang most of all on the relations between the three great powers in the region; Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Relations with the smaller states and the particular vulnerabilities of these states and their conditions of security dependency are largely bound into their relations with Saudi Arabia and their security with all three greater powers and the relations between these. The balances between amity and enmity in a region vary and over time shift. A balance of amity and enmity will be a major feature of the dispositions of relations severally among states of a region. For example, among some states there may be seriously stressful issues of borders, disagreements over foreign relations, cultural clashes, public representations, and material misunderstandings in developmental arrangements. There may also be differences of tolerance towards perceived antagonists, as towards Iran among the smaller states of the Gulf – and even towards Israel. The balance of amity/enmity for the region will be some sort of aggregation of numerous balances among the states and a durable will and capacity to manage these where necessary at the regional level. Balance between amity and enmity identifies a regional complex, has structural significance and influences the dynamics of a security complex. ‘Amity/enmity’, as we have seen, is clearly an abbreviation for a range of deeply complex relations, and relations which are not static. As Buzan and Waever say:

Historical hatreds and friendships, as well as specific issues that trigger conflict or cooperation, take part in the formation of an overall constellation of fears, threats, and friendships that define a RSC.

Amity as a characteristic element in inter-state relations in a region acts as a will for constraint and resolution of enmity among the states, and as a
region may become cooperative through the establishment of institutional mechanisms.

Material conditions can have a formative influence in the configuration of a security complex. In recent times no single factor in identifying the Gulf as a strategic unity has been as influential as the development of the oil industry and associated deep unifying interests in the security of the navigable waters of the Gulf among all its littoral members. It took conditions of war within the region over the 1980s for this second common interest to be breached. Antagonism often has its source in common interest. Violation in war occasions a back-handed recognition of the importance of the common interest. And somewhere within the mid-range in Buzan et al’s “spectrum of amity/enmity” there have to be the binding effects of opportunism. Halliday shows, however, that they may be uncertain:

While oil producers were able to use their income and reserves to income and investment advantage, they were not able to do so for political ends... the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, following which Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were forced to call for international support, showed how little oil rent could be converted into military security.”

There are, however, recurring conflicts and stresses in the relations between the states of the Gulf and at the same time a widely shared but sometimes uncertain recognition of the need to constrain and resolve these to uphold stability and security in the Gulf. Part of the difficulty lay in the facts that: (i), one of the three great powers of the region (Iraq) has in recent history been detached from Arabian association by regime
hostility and inter-regional war of which it has been author; and (ii), another of the great powers (Iran) is detached by a general hostile disposition towards its Gulf neighbours in the wider region, especially since the Revolution of 1979. Two important aspects of the detachments of these two powers lie, (a) in exclusion from the GCC which is thus represented as a body of hostile intent, and (b) allegedly consequential reciprocal ‘defence’ policies seeming to drive conditions of ‘security dilemma’ around the Gulf. The regional security dynamics of these circumstances are the subject of much that follows.

In their more independent and heightened concentration on the affairs of the Gulf, the states were inevitably led to focus on the configuration of power in the Gulf. They had to consider what historic records and contemporary experience suggested about intentions, policies and projections of power in the Gulf. They had to consider what their sources are and correlatively how countervailing capacities to confront these might be aggregated. Without these resources of understanding and experience, or a significant degree of sense of them, and some defence capability, a more Hobbesian notion of ‘zone of conflict’, or traditional ‘anarchy’, and absorption into a wider global anarchic field of conflict and strategic interest, or overrun by external power, might better describe such a region. In the absence of any amity (no will to resolve, etc.) the hypothetical conditional ‘What if…. ‘ might invite speculation. Then we would probably not be identifying a region, as some sort of realm of inter-state cooperation, at all. In other words, amity has a constructive role. Realism clearly indicated that the main securitising focus of the six Arabian
states should be on the conduct of Iraq and Iran. The pretensions of these two states to hegemony in the Gulf were largely what were believed to drive the projection of power in the Gulf. However, we will also have to pay attention to the status and conduct of Saudi Arabia, for power in the Gulf is of a trilateral configuration and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is inevitably to some extent a Saudi hegemonic construct.

There are various ways to represent the strategic configuration of the Gulf. These can be presented as (i) 3 elements (Iran, Iraq and the Arabian states, GCC), (ii) 3 plus 5 elements (where the 3 are regional polar powers and 5 are lesser powers), or (iii) 3 plus 1 (Iran, Iraq, GCC plus the United States). Representations will depend on what analytic security focus is being followed. The last, for example, is that followed by Bill: ‘The Geometry of Instability – the Rectangle of Tension’. This writer inclines to support Legrenzi:

While the United States is an essential actor in the Gulf it cannot (yet) be considered a local actor. In spite of their (sic) intervention in Iraq, the United States does not interfere in the domestic politics of the GCC states and Iran as much as Britain used to do during its long spell as a hegemonic power.17

In spite of its duration (2003-2009) the US in presence Iraq has been one of intervention not integration as a regional actor.

The Gulf regional security complex is best identified by observing the durable polarity of power in the region. Buzan, People, States and Fear, first made the general point:
(The third) difficulty in identifying the boundaries of complexes is caused by situations in which two or more nodes of security interdependence exist within a group of states (in) which there are also grounds for thinking of as a single complex (my emphasis).\textsuperscript{18}

The issue is treated more discursively in Buzan and Waever:

Regional powers define the polarity of any given RSC... Their capabilities loom large in their regions, but do not register much in a broad spectrum way at the global level. Higher-level powers respond to them as if their influence and capability were mainly relevant to the securitization processes to a particular region.\textsuperscript{19}

Later on we find:

...regionally based clusters, where security interdependence is markedly more intense between the states inside (such) complexes than between states inside the complex and those outside it... The basic premise that security interdependence tends to be regionally focused is strongly mediated by the power of the units concerned.... At the other end of the power spectrum (from superpowers) are states whose limited capabilities largely confine their security interests and activities to their near neighbours.\textsuperscript{20}

And further again:

The standard form for an RSC is a pattern of rivalry, balance-of-power, and alliance patterns among the main powers within the region. Normally the pattern of conflict stems from factors indigenous to the region.\textsuperscript{21}

In the following examination of the Gulf we write from the presumption that relations in this region clearly exhibit “security interdependence” in a durable way between Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia. As Buzan et al say: “The specific pattern of who fears or likes whom is generally... generated
internally in the region by a mixture of history, politics, and material conditions.”

(vi) Iraq: an ambitious and fallen hegemon, lapsed from the tri-polar power system of the Gulf

In the following three sections the polar states of the Gulf will be looked at with some focus on relations between them as determining sources of security conditions in the Gulf. Iraq, at the time of writing constitutes a lapsed but slowly resurgent, putative party in a tripartite node of ‘security interdependence’. The adventurism of Iraq was shown in two military assaults on neighbour Gulf States; one on an interactive great Gulf polar power (Iran in 1980), the other a strategically located, oil-rich but lesser state (Kuwait in 1990). Iraq is the only Gulf power that has directly attacked a Gulf neighbour. It is notoriously the case that defeat or failed victory in war does not necessarily, or usually, permanently incapacitate a power to act aggressively. From the conclusion of the war against Iran in 1988 Iraq had been pursuing a crash programme of rearmament. The Arabian Gulf States, Iran and the international community were left in a state of uncertainty as to the magnitude of Iraq’s military build-up, the quality of it, and the regime’s intention to use its revitalized military forces. In the August 1990 to March 1991 Gulf War, Iraq’s attack on Kuwait and its occupation of the country clearly exposed the instability and insecurity of the Gulf, and the Gulf region’s internal strategic weakness and inadequacy to deal with these at a regional level.

There were two notable inheritances from these events: first, the strengthened perception of the vulnerability of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait,
along the long open borders in the north and of the adjacent oil fields. A deployment of a large menacing Iraqi force at the Saudi border in 1994 provoked an increased positioning of United States forces in Saudi Arabia in October. Heightened Iranian anxieties about a U.S. and GCC alliance were an offshoot of these events. The quick and determined US military response was followed by a humbling official Iraqi agreement to uphold the existing Iraq-Kuwait border and recognition of Kuwait sovereignty. A heightened militarization of security in the Gulf was to have wider effects.

The second consequence of this short war was the deeper positioning around the Gulf of a large American military presence. The US was the primary military partner in the ‘Desert Shield’ forces deployment late in 1990. A brief military association with Egypt and Syria in the coalition against Iraq was deemed to be an inconvenient alliance. The strategic sense, however, of not following through with Desert Storm by removal of the Saddam regime in March 1991 was widely questioned afterwards. Leaving the aggressive regime intact was to leave the Gulf uncertain as to both Saddam’s intentions and his military capabilities for the next decade. Over the mid-1990s the smaller Gulf States signed bilateral defence cooperation agreements with the US, variously accepting joint military exercise programmes, access to strategic land, sea and air locations, and military prepositioning facilities. US-Saudi agreements were undertaken by means of less formal understandings. Active rearmament programmes were put underway. We shall see later that America’s military primacy has been for the Arabian states a political liability domestically and in the
Arab and Islamic worlds. But Saddam’s 1990 misadventure was the cause of a seminal revised securitization in the Gulf.

For twelve years after the Second Gulf War the international community, through the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA), the United States and its allies were engaged in a stand-off with the Iraqi regime. The US ‘doctrine’ of containment was adapted to new purposes (with new partners). Defeat by Desert Storm made the Iraq regime increasingly liable to active disaffection from the Kurds in the north and the Shi’a in the south. In the spring of 1991 both communities revolted. The US and allies determined to limit the regime’s capacity to engage in internal communal aggression by the imposition of ‘no-fly zones’ in the north and south of the country. This was a policy that was more than punitive or one to constrain a truculent regime. It was vital for the future stability of the Gulf that Iraq should not be dismembered or the unitary political system fall apart. This would have the effect of a radical reconfiguration of the balance of power in the region; one that would leave Iran as a virtual unchallengeable hegemon. Powers as such are not a problem for regions: they need to be balanced and powers themselves generally accept this. Saddam was peculiarly inept in this regard. In the Gulf balanced power is a major recurrent issue of securitization. In the period following the war the US was also diplomatically demanding in international and other circles for the exaction on Iraq of a severe and deeply punitive sanctions regime. This was to lead in time to growing discontent among the allies and around the Gulf about its adverse humanitarian effects. The imposition of a limitation of revenue-earning oil
exports had similar consequences, though intended to limit a capacity to rebuild military forces. Iraq was subjected to demanding inspections of its suspected programmes for the development of weapons of mass destruction. Saddam’s truculence and deceptions and allied frustration eventually converged in the outbreak of war and invasion of Iraq in 2003.25

The eventual collapse of the Iraqi state and occupation in 2003 was brought about by military defeat in ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’. This military operation, dubbed by the Americans as “shock and awe”, minimised the victors’ casualties and maximised destruction of the enemy’s war capability.26 The operation also brought about a greatly enlarged level of foreign involvement in Gulf conflict, and by this Iran was confronted with an element of paradox: its main antagonist in the Gulf was brought down, but by the enhancement of the presence of the foreign power it sought most to remove from the Gulf. The war was followed by a heightened level of internal ethnic and sectarian conflict in Iraq about which there was little apparent foresight and preparation. The shape of Iraq as a Gulf power and its strategic will must inevitably remain uncertain for some time to come. Saudi Arabia will confront a northerly neighbour still to be reckoned as the inevitable third Gulf power. Iraq’s future political and strategic relations with Iran would also remain uncertain and politically absorbing on both sides. Whether the border between them will be marked most by national identity or by unclear ethnic identity might be decided as much by Iran as by Iraq.
In their political and strategic conduct over many years the Baathist regime in Iraq, and Saddam Hussein in particular, had compromised any expectations of amicable cooperation around the region and violated the stability of the region in extreme incidents of enmity. The Iraqi regime’s political culture had been increasingly discordant with that which prevailed among the Arabian states and had always underscored anxieties about Iraqi pretensions to influence in the Gulf. However, as the coalition occupation was prolonged, ‘Iraq Neighbours Conferences’ and the caution of the Gulf states have led to the view that a restored and stable Iraq would be the best prospect for the region’s future stability.

(vii) Iran: assertive Gulf regional power. Iran’s convictions of collusive hostility against it and resentment at exclusion from the Gulf regional security system.

Both Iraq and Iran are natural great powers in the Gulf region. Both have been assertive in projecting their power within the region. This has been demonstrated in recurrent competition and conflict with each other throughout the last quarter of the twentieth century. These great power initiatives in conflict and major war had raised alarm around the Gulf about the regional balance of power and the projection of it. By virtue of its relative size in all strategic aspects among the states of the Gulf Iran alone is always liable to be perceived as threatening. On the other hand, an Iran that is internally unstable and externally unsure of its position must also be an uneasy neighbour. Strong or weak, Iran will always present an image of uncertain balance of enmity or amity for its neighbours in the regional setting. The ‘natural’ configuration of power in the Gulf was profoundly disturbed by the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in
Iran. This was the single most affective and lasting factor in the politics and relations of the Gulf region, for it has had every appearance of being deeply embedded in the fabric of power and so of relations in the region. Iran is seen by its Gulf neighbours and by international interests as the most potent element in Gulf regional security complexity. Driven by its revolution in 1979 and having been severely challenged in the field of war in the 1980s, from the 1990s Iran was to assert a harder and more penetrating ideological posture, and a growing strategic confidence which in turn were to hold the Gulf in a grip of security anxiety.

The possibility of a future durable balance was put on hold by the war in 2003 and its aftermath. ‘Normal’ relations between Iraq and Iran have appeared nearly always to be in a state of stand-off, agitated by border friction and mutual interference in internal affairs. Halliday suggests, for example, that this had been in part what had led Saddam to attack Iran in 1980:

> Responsibility for the deterioration of relations in the preceding year and a half was as much Iran’s as Iraq’s, as any reading of the radio broadcasts of both sides will show.\textsuperscript{27}

As Iran and Iraq are two of the three states in the trilateral configuration of power in the Gulf, relations between them must always be of potential or actual menacing consequences for the rest of the Gulf. Persistent Iraq-Iran hostility impacts specifically on the Arabian Gulf States; that is as a node of security interdependence, and shows the extreme and urgent security conditions of the Gulf. When you have the ingredients of power (physical size, numbers of people that can be mobilized, real or potential economic capacity) reinforced by incompatible ideological postures and
regime ambitions, you have a recipe for non-co-existence, enmity and disturbance in the neighbourhood. Relations between Iraq and Iran could never simply be ‘in the neighbourhood’ for the other states of the Gulf. This was shown, for example, during the 1980s war when a strategic preference among the other states was shown in favour of Iraq. The ingredients of power must have particular salience in the presence of another, third, power and for the security neighbourhood. Since the end of the Cold War security interdependence in the Gulf has been raised above being merely an existential structural feature of the regional security complex. It has been active as both Iraq and Iran have securitised relations in the Gulf. Each has been ‘referent object’ to the other, and Saudi Arabia to both.

For so long as post-Hussein Iraq has remained in a state of power-in-abeyance Iran has been uppermost as a factor of power in the power equation of the Gulf. However, Iraq’s long-standing condition of lost power can hardly be assumed to be a permanent infraction of the regional pattern of security interdependence. Tri-polarity is the natural state of affairs in the Gulf and is structurally embedded in the security complexity of the Gulf. History, cultural integrity, national interests and the focus of security in the Gulf region have been pre-eminent in the concerns of each of the three powers, because these factors are common and competitive among them, exhibiting a distinctive regional pattern of amity and enmity. Relations in the Gulf are marked by durable qualities of amity and enmity generally specific to themselves. In what follows later Iran appears to reside rather strongly at the enmity end of the amity/enmity spectrum.
Iran’s policy declarations and conduct feature strongly in its neighbours’ perceptions and then on its relations with the other smaller Gulf States. On the other hand, Iran’s declarations and actions show its apparent conviction of its primacy as the proper protector of the Gulf and actor in the maintenance of Gulf stability. There is a tension here that is felt in Iran-Arabian States’ relations. There seem always to be difficulties for understanding Iran however it presents itself. Its approach to the GCC states runs perpetually against its unrelenting hold on the Abu Musa and Tunb Islands. The islands issue is also a source of discomfort among the GCC states. There has been a lack of unanimity about how to take the matter to Iran, with options from continued dialogue between the interested parties to resort to international arbitration. Recourse to a unified policy under the GCC has been difficult to agree.\textsuperscript{28} The Islands issue prejudices desires to improve relations with Iran. Iran’s overtures about its natural shielding role in the Gulf run into a barrier of suspicion about its hegemonic pretensions, with its implied challenge to the strategic status of Saudi Arabia in the Gulf.\textsuperscript{29} Removal of the US security umbrella in the region is seen clearly, and has been stated clearly to be Iran’s strategic objective. This runs up against a general preference among the Arabian states for the US shield, even if over time it has had to be managed with increasing caution. Kuwaiti commentator al Jassem stated the preference in strong terms:

\begin{quote}
If America is a global military power which Iran fears, then Iran is also a regional military power which Gulf States fear…. Iran wants GCC states to abandon their alliance with America to subject them to its unchallenged hegemony….If we the Gulf Arabs had the freedom to choose between American protection and Iranian protection, would we choose the latter? Of course not.\textsuperscript{30}
\end{quote}
However, America in its own turn is confronted with difficulties. The point is well made by Kemp:

The political and sociological dimensions of Gulf security pose more complicated problems. Without GCC cooperation the US cannot protect the Gulf from major threats. Yet pushing such cooperation too far and too fast runs the risk of overloading the delicate political system and could play into the hands of those who bitterly oppose the GCC governments, including opposition groups within these states.  

Karawan writes of the “erosion of consensus” in the politics of the Gulf. Ambiguity and inconsistency are also present. They are visible features in Iranian political discourse. This is in part the outcome of electoral shifts in Iran between regime factions: for example, from Khatemi the reformer in 1999 to Ahmadinejad the conservative and revolutionary loose canon in 2009. Iran’s forthright views about the country’s standing in the Gulf are apparently indifferent as to whether conservatives or reformers are most prominent in Iranian government and decision making circles.

The widely shared view of Iran in Gulf and wider circles is of a power that is strongly inclined to truculence in its external affairs. Two elements appear to be pronounced in this: (i) motivation driven by the 1979 revolution of a strong ideological character and proselytizing ambition, and (ii) grievances about military and economic hostilities directed towards it. From a realist point of view a third element might be added; (iii) that it is ‘natural’ for a great power to flex its strategic muscle and to project its power when and where it has opportunity. Ambiguity and
inconsistency in Iranian policy arising from these elements is pointed to by al-Mani:

In post-Khomeini Iran there appears to be emerging a double-track foreign policy...The one favoured by the old Khomeini guards centers on a traditionalist-revolutionary thesis; the other is based on the traditional diplomatic approach of state-to-state relations. Revolutionary logic will still find an outlet on the regional level, which may at times impede traditional state policies. As the revolution ages such methods might gain subtlety.  

What follows is a simple inventory of events in recent history and Iranian perceptions relating to them which help to suggest an ‘action-response’ aspect of Iranian foreign relations:

(i) The watershed was the Islamic Revolution of 1979 which brought to an end a relationship that had supported the Pahlavi regime and protected the pursuit of American interests in the Gulf region;
(ii) The internal turmoil that followed the Revolution was not allowed to settle. In 1980 Iran was drawn into a protracted war until 1988. In the war the enemy, Iraq, received support from other states within the Gulf – on the pretext, known to Iran, that Iran was reckoned to be a power in the Gulf more to be feared than Iraq. The United States was party to this;
(iii) In 1981 the Arabian Gulf States formed the Gulf Cooperation Council in which the third Gulf polar power, Saudi Arabia, was prominent. Iran regarded this as collusion against itself: ‘protection’ of the Arabian Gulf equals hostility towards Iran;
(iv) Following the 1980-88 war, Iraq was relatively more able and determined to restore it military capability and used this to attack a Gulf neighbour, Kuwait in 1990. The point arising from this for Iran was the massive and successful gathering of Gulf and international force, Desert Storm, against Iraq, showing the nature of modern mass, rapid, technologically sophisticated warfare, and the conceivable future application of this in the Gulf. The lesson was not lost; that this was the way of modern security and foreign policy;
(v) An outcome that was important to Iran was the very large build-up of a US presence around the Gulf. A shield of military protection of American and Western interests was in place;
(vi) Two decades (the 1980s/1990s) of militarization in the Gulf in war and, in principle, preparations for war. A ‘security dilemma’ of arms build-up in which Iran felt itself to be the weaker side,
hampered by poor domestic economy, sanctions and difficulties in supplies;

(vii) A third decade of warfare focused in the 2003 ‘shock and awe’ demonstration of modern warfare and its blatant foreign intrusion character;

(viii) The ‘reduction’ of Iran as an inherently aggressive power in the international and Gulf media;

(ix) Domestic problems and security issues around its borders add to Iran’s sense of beleaguerment.

It would be wrong, however, to put a wholly excitable and irrational interpretation on Iran’s foreign policies and relations, even as these have developed in the aggravated circumstances of the Gulf. What can be viewed as a general disposition to hostility, placing Iran at the enmity end of the enmity/amity spectrum, has its roots also in grievance and interests. Iran is a self-conscious power and within the context of the conditions suggested, has sought to develop commensurately with the needs of a power and its desire to pursue an entirely independent foreign policy. Hence, Iran’s external affairs can be expected to be influenced by the three elements suggested earlier.

Iran has presented itself for more than two decades internationally and around the Middle East as a revolutionary state and Islamic champion. It has claimed to be non-aligned; as disposed for example, to oppose the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-92) and to demand Muslim freedoms in Russia and the new Central Asian States as it has opposed the projection of American and Western policies of social modernization and Western democracy into Iran and the Gulf region. These last are also issues about which there is some convergence with much official and
popular opinion among the Arabian states. Iran has qualified itself to speak across the Arab-Persian, Sunni-Shi’a divides. Saudi Arabia, as we shall come to see, has for long been a particular object of hostility for its alleged betrayal of Islamic values and for its anti-Islamic monachism, and most particularly for Saudi Arabia’s hosting of American military forces. There is a double edge to Iran’s hostility towards the US: its strategic military intrusion and its associated propagation of cultural influences destructive of Islamic values. There is a deeper perceptual dualism in Iran’s negative approach to the politics of the Gulf, that is, between Western presence as such and fear of its cultural influence. Islamic integrity rather than matters of power appears to be at the root of hostility particularly towards Saudi Arabia. The intensity of antagonism expressed around issues of ideological integrity is a ground from which rapprochement is made extremely difficult. Iran’s postures and its activities for spreading Shi’a Islam do not fit well with a general desire in the predominantly Sunni Arab world for stability in the Gulf and the wider region. Iran’s reach for influence and power extends beyond the Gulf. It is in the Gulf, however, that perceived Iranian ambitions are especially challenging and feared for their potential regional structural consequences.

More widely, the intensity of Iran’s anti-Israeli hostility has effects over a wider area of security. It feeds on a powerful conviction of a US-Zionist conspiracy of Israeli violence against Palestine. ‘Peace deals’ are rejected by Iran as they are part of this alleged conspiracy. The anti-Israel dimension in Iranian foreign policy brings, consequentially, the factor of
nuclear development. A nuclearized and belligerent Israel would seem to justify the nuclearization of Iran, though diplomatically the matter cannot be put overtly this way. It would fly in the face of ‘for peaceful purposes only’.\textsuperscript{37} Despite public assertions that Iran’s nuclear programme is ‘non-weaponizing’ – for peaceful generation of energy only – Iran’s nuclear programme, as the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States was reported to have declared in February 2006, “escalates the tensions, and brings about competition which is unneeded and unnecessary and uncalled for”.\textsuperscript{38} The Gulf States share with international opinion anxieties about the ‘dual purpose’ possibilities of such developments, even if they are not of immediate militarist intent, especially as Iran has held itself resistant to international monitoring. The more visible development of missile capability reinforces anxieties.

The disposition of the Iranian regime to project its interests and power beyond the confines of the Gulf in all manner of non-conventional threats and interventions (for example, in Gaza and Lebanon) also does little for the comfort of Iran’s Arabian Gulf neighbours. Since the subduing of Iraq as a military force in the Gulf in 2003 Iran has been free of fears of territorial attack – notwithstanding its alarms about Israeli and US intentions – and so free to pursue relatively uninhibited its own external policies. The authoritarian regime in Tehran needs to show that it stands tall in the region, and in the world to remonstrate its international status, thus also to sustain itself domestically. The regime has been following a broad spectrum of foreign policy aims, demonstrating a proclivity to give finance, arms and propagandist support to movements of state and
regime opposition; as among the Kurds of Iraq and Syria, its deep involvement in Hezbollah revolt in Lebanon and Hamas insurgency in Gaza. The whole gamut of Iranian antagonisms and hostilities present a security scenario that is both difficult and necessary to negotiate in Gulf inter-state relations.

Iranian foreign policy does not generally impact directly in the way of overt threat or military confrontation on the Gulf and is largely long-armed in external practice. The exception to this in Arabian judgments is the occupation of the Tunb and Abu Musa Islands. Iran displays its power and an enthusiasm (not always or necessarily ideologically-fired) to project this power. General state security postures and actions can be perceptually worrying among neighbours. They do not have to be focused on articulated threat and confrontation within the neighbourhood. This, and a common disruptive, covert and subversive character of practice, is unnerving to Arabian Gulf regimes that fear they are open to penetration. Anxieties of such kinds on their own, however, would not explain the conventional (realist) security and defence policies of the Arabian states. These will be examined later. What might be said is that fear of hostile ‘under the radar’ activities (real or suspected) are peculiarly subversive of amity aspects of relations and are prejudicial to normal relations.

Iran’s size and geographic spread link it with other regions beyond the Gulf in which it has political, strategic and material interests. The geo-strategic spread of Iran draws attention to difficulties in any idea of
institutional integration in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), or some other structural regional format. Furthermore, the idea of a common institutional linkage including Iran is suspect of this country’s ambitions. Nevertheless, it is in the Gulf that Iran’s core interests and its concerns lie. It is in the Gulf where its neighbours’ correlative interests and concerns lie. For Iran and the other Gulf parties these interests and concerns are historic and embedded in relations of enmity and amity. Of Iraq and Iran their regional securitizing conduct has shown the menacing conduct of former to have been up to 2003 the more pronounced. Since then Iran has been a (the) central element in the Gulf regional security complex. These conditions have been a clear manifestation of security complexity in the Gulf.

(viii) Saudi Arabia: a regional power and external ally. A disturbed ‘referent object’ of non-state-level securitization

Saudi Arabia faces the particular difficulties of having to navigate the developmental path of a modern nation-state that is deeply embedded in a global economy and trading system. The government is uniquely burdened with responsibilities for the preservation of the central institutions and values of Islamic global religious order. The regime has to fulfil world-wide expectations of ideological integrity and Islamic patronage. Saudi Arabia stands in the Gulf region as one of three polar powers and so has a prominent regional strategic and security profile. For all its wealth, prestige and ideological eminence, however, Saudi Arabia is beholden to an external power, and one whose political and ideological image is of a dissonant character. This relationship is calculated to
underwrite materially and logistically Saudi Arabia’s own security and its advanced role in the security of its smaller south Gulf neighbours. At the same time, according to the IISS Strategic Survey (2008): “the Saudi leadership considers Saudi Arabia a hegemon on the Arabian Peninsula, (and) one of several key players in the wider Middle East”. In its assumption of this standing on the Arabian Peninsula Saudi Arabia has played the leading role in the founding of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in May 1981 and the growth and development of the organization as an economic and security community.

Saudi Arabia is confronted with challenges: to its religious status, its regime security, and to its regional and domestic political credentials. The country’s friends and allies seem to come more from outside the realms of its core Islamic identities. Assailants seem to come more from those that are dissident and extreme within the realms of those identities. Much has been made in the literature of the ‘national security’ dimension in the Third World as being of lesser priority than ‘regime security’. As Gause III says:

Limiting a discussion of security to so narrow a definition (as national security), however, would miss much of the political dynamics behind decision making in both foreign and domestic policy in the Gulf states. In the Gulf and for Saudi Arabia in particular, for nearly three decades regime insecurity has been, in some part, of domestic generation, emanating from a regional power (Iran), or imported as Saudi or Gulf indigenes were cultivated abroad as hostile security actors. The foreign and regional aspects are the most vital, at least as the most difficult to
control or constrain. Iraq has had a complicated record of domestic regime vulnerability, violent self-protection and external assault. By comparison, as a regional (and extra-regional) security actor Iran’s regime insecurity profile is more domestic, less apparently imported, and very well guarded by ‘revolutionary’ forces.

Saudi Arabia’s historically short career as a nation state (as with other Gulf States) has been to navigate its own peculiar place in the spectrum of amity/enmity within the Gulf; in circumstances of confrontation by two regional powers, and to steer carefully its relations with the US. Circumstances and the country’s complex and ambiguous status have led Saudi Arabia to construct a special relationship with an outside power, the United States; a relationship which over recent time it has been urged gradually to deconstruct. Undoubtedly the presence of American forces in Saudi Arabia (and elsewhere in the Gulf) complicates relations with Tehran and a substantial redeployment (still within the Gulf) in 2003 sought to placate Tehran, and domestic opposition.

Since the Iraq-Kuwait war of 1990-1991, or from 1994, and Iraq’s subsequent ‘containment’, Iran became effectively the single largest state-level power confronting Saudi Arabia and its southerly Gulf allies, especially as account is taken of different modes of confrontation and security actions. A singular aspect of security relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia and its smaller allies in the Gulf is that these relations have not come in forms of direct military action or explicit state-level threat. Issues of security are raised, as we see, by non-state-level actors. These
security relations may be roughly gathered under two heads: (i) non-conventional conflict assaults and (ii) political-ideological assaults. The first are designed primarily to provoke instability in the political system; the second to harass and discredit the ruling regime. Iran’s Revolution of 1979 was followed very soon after by unrest among Saudi Arabia’s Shi’a’s in the eastern Hassa Province. In 1987 there were provocative disturbances among Iranian pilgrims during the Hajj at Mecca. “These disturbances are caused in part by differences in the symbolic meaning of al-hajj in the two states”, according to al-Mani:

Saudi Arabia, like Iran, has sought refuge in religion for its policies towards other Islamic states. In the case of Iran, it has sought to limit the total number of pilgrims in particular, to 55,000 per annum after their actual number increased from 74,963 in 1979 (the year after the revolution) to 157,395 in 1987.47

On the Arabian side of the Gulf anxiety has resided in the prospect of revolutionary import among Shi’a communities where there has been experience of disconnect with the ruling regime and the political system. However, there are evidences that national loyalties may countervail. Campbell et al take a quotation from Chubin and Tripp which shows a broader front of Iranian policy:

Iran retains its attraction as a revolutionary model... Unable to attract others by example or ideology, Iran can nonetheless tap into the discontent of other societies, eroding the legitimacy of their governments by alluding to their dependency, materialism and cultural contamination.48

From a train of regime-challenging events since the revolution the Saudi Arabian government has been confronted by a significant, continuous and escalating dimension in its security situation.
In the dynamics of Gulf regional security in recent times Saudi Arabia may be seen as having been less active than acted upon – a security ‘referent object’ more than a security actor or projector of power. However, this judgment must take account of the surrogacy of United States power exercised in a Saudi Arabian and Gulf security shielding role and Saudi Arabia’s own active arms build-up policy. Of the three significant powers in the Gulf region Saudi Arabia alone has not acted directly aggressively beyond its own borders, though this too must be conditioned with reference in particular to its coalition participation in the 2003 assault on Iraq. In one line of analysis Saudi Arabia might be said to be actively engaged in the altercations of a security dilemma in the regional security complex. Iran, the sole regional power Saudi Arabia has been confronted with since 2003, has been hostile towards the Gulf Cooperation Council because of its exclusory nature and its cooperative defence activities (see later). Saudi Arabia has been the most prominent and powerful member from the foundation of the GCC.49

More latterly Saudi Arabia has been prompted by events to become a more pro-active securitizing actor. At the end of 2009 at its southern border with Yemen, where Al Qaeda and Iranian influences are present, attacks from Houthi tribal elements provoked a need for military response. From 2010 resistances to unpopular, corrupt and dictatorial, secular regimes in the wider Arab region were working towards the, Western so-called, Arab Spring. This led to opportunities for Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states (diplomatically and financially) to influence events.
The interest was less to resist any direct strategic threats than to influence change in the political and ideological character of the wider region. As the Arab Spring came nearer to the Gulf from 2011, notably in Syria, it threatened more immediate security concerns, especially as it entered the Gulf itself in the late 2010 early 2011 (and continuing) protests in Bahrain. On 12th March 2011 Saudi military units crossed the Causeway, with other Gulf support, to relieve the government of danger to the regime from widespread social insurrection. The Peninsula Shield RDF was invoked. The Syrian-Bahraini protests had links in that they both gave opportunities to Iranian interests; in the one case to support its allied regime, in the other to undermine the regime and encourage the social dissidence. In both cases Sunni-Shi’ite enmity is at play, which engages the ‘revolutionary’ ambitions of Iran and alarms the Sunni GCC regimes which are security dependent on Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia is not seen by Iran as a passive element in the security dynamics of the Gulf, particularly having regard to the country’s military association with the United States. The power of a state is the sum of its own power plus the power of a state it may be in collusion with and it may be perceived to be as forward as its colluded state, the United States, is forward as a securitizing actor – a ‘guilt by association’ implication. Or, to put the point from the other side of the link less abstractly, the power of the United States, as it stands and has been exercised as a securitizing agent in the Gulf, has been its own commitment of power plus the power of the state it has been engaged with, that is Saudi Arabia. There is a reciprocal interdependence of power, supporting Gulf security needs and
U.S. interests. This might, for example, be conceived to have been the nature of Saudi Arabia’s implication in affording US armed forces a base on Saudi soil from which these forces were permitted to enter Iraq in 2003. Saudi Arabia’s alliance with the US has made it vulnerable to accusations of complicity in America’s explicit hostility towards Iran and the aggressive “anti-Islamic” war on terror. This, it might be supposed, has been a perception influential in Iran’s security thinking and so an aggravation in regional relations.

The redeployment of U.S. forces from mainland Saudi Arabia in 2003 was political and tactical rather than strategic. U.S. CentCom 5th. Fleet forces still lie off the Gulf in Indian Ocean and Oman Gulf waters, providing surveillance and operation-ready support for Gulf security. The Gulf is designated as an ‘Area of Responsibility’ by the U.S. In January 2012 a second aircraft carrier and support naval vessels were deployed within the Gulf in response to Iranian threats and naval activities. Iranian reaction to sanctions threats and U.S. determination to uphold global oil flows make a U.S.-Iranian stand-off a permanent feature of Gulf security.

The principal dimension of below-state-level assault and conflict came by way of internal attacks on the Saudi regime and probable damaging consequences for the political system. The societal effects were frequently indiscriminate as to injury or fatality among foreigners and Muslim nationals. These sub-state assaults were frequently prosecuted on one or another jihadi pretext, but there was also a strong focus on hostility towards the Saudi state and its ruling regime. On 25 June 1996
bombings had occurred at the American Khobar Towers in Dahran. For some time later over the turn of the century attacks were made on individual foreigners calculated to intimidate and to create confusion in the state. In 2004, all in the space of a few weeks, attacks took place in Riyadh in which foreigners were again targeted. Alleged intention of these incidents was to arouse fear with the consequent flight of foreigners, so to deprive the country of essential skilled workers, and so also to provoke politically dangerous harsh responses from the government. Campbell and Yetiv make much of the Saudi regime’s anxiety not to attract domestic antagonism for its hard responses to terrorist activities involving as these do its own nationals, and more generally Muslims. On the other hand, Meijer shows there is a much vaunted ability of the regime to put down such activities. Then, again, in later days the regime makes much of its rehabilitation policy among guilty returnees.

These facilities are devoted to rehabilitation and counseling, for which classrooms and lecture halls are included in the design. In addition to the in-prison programme there will be extended measures to prevent recidivism. These include employment assistance, housing and financial help, and support to families during detention. According to official data, these programmes have a high success rate. 51

A secondary effect of success in dealing with indigenous insurgency within Saudi Arabia has been a spillover into Kuwait and the prospect of a new base, that in its turn menaces the Kuwait regime.

On April 30, 2004 the oil and industrial town of Yanbu on the Red Sea was attacked and five foreign engineers were killed. This attack was an
independent initiative by four dissident nationals. A month later twenty-
two people (including three attackers) were killed at Khobar, and several
foreigners killed at Riyadh weeks later. The spread over place, time and
origin of such attacks puts the Saudi regime on constant distracting alert.
From 2003 to 2005 numerous attacks brought the regime’s competence to
contain terrorism into question and challenged its legitimacy. Inter-state
antagonisms that are pursued in covert and long-armed ways are
particularly difficult to handle, for explanation of their provenance may be
clear enough in the responsible offices of state, but on the street they
tend to float in suspicion and accusation and misrepresentation.
Disconnect between citizen and rule arises and a domestic dimension of
insecurity and securitization is created.

For the period following 2003 the Iraqi state has been discounted as an
independent military and security factor in the Gulf, though internally the
country continues to be a source of security concerns. As Iraq is restored
to full sovereignty the way its security and defence options are developed
will influence the future configuration and dynamics of Gulf regional
security. Saudi Arabia’s long-term calculations must be for an Iraqi
restoration that will not be challenging to the need for a workable balance
in the regional trilateral polarity. This could become extremely difficult if
Iran logs politically into the Shi’a community in Iraq and a regime of similar
bias. Meanwhile, during the allied occupation, 2003-09, Iraq in its
politically broken state has provided a platform from which dissident and
insurgent Afghanistan returnees (‘Saudi Afghans’) and Al Qa’ida elements
have penetrated Saudi Arabia. Such ‘returnees’ have commonly been
Saudi nationals (there are some other nationals) who in their political origin might have been home grown political, anti-regime and ideological malcontents. Some have been mujahids, nurtured in the anti-Russian conflict in Afghanistan of the 1980s, whose motivations to violence were later honed in the insurgencies in Iraq over the turn of the century, who later returned to Saudi Arabia to become active or suspect assailants against the ruling regime. As the IISS Strategic Survey has it:

Undoubtedly the most decisive common feature of these members (of the international jihad) is their experience in Afghanistan and their connection with Al-Qa’ida … Afghanistan has remained important even after 9/11, does stand out….The fear is that “the return of such jihadis could in future fuel further domestic instability, as those returning from Afghanistan did between 1997 and 2005”.

Involved or only suspect, they are treated as dangers to the state by their own acts of ‘terror’ or prior association with terrorism. Intentionally or consequentially they contribute to domestic instability by unnerving the authorities and inciting provocative responses. Local and active, dissident, revolutionary, or of focused violence, such persons or groups have a central place in the conditions of insecurity conditions and the securitizing dynamics of Saudi Arabia and of the Gulf. Dissident activity is infectious, as Kuwait experiences and about which other states are alerted. Through the occurrence of political and ideological assault Saudi Arabia is faced with the need to give primacy to regime protection, as this may be understood as two-fold: protection of the political system and protection of the ruling House of Saud.
Militant dissidence and the penetration of external hostility make the Arabian Gulf states generally keenly aware that inter-state security threat is not the only form, or even major manifestation of enmity that might challenge states and regional stability. The hostility to which Saudi Arabia has been subjected is a species of political Islam that is specific to the Gulf, albeit often trained and ideologically nurtured from outside. It has the effect of unifying perceptions of state and regime insecurity among region states. In form only is it different in the durable configuration of insecurity in the regional security complex. In Chapter Seven how attempts at unification of security are played out, and with what difficulty, success and failure will be followed. In this chapter so far only the three polar powers (Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia) have been considered as security actors in the Gulf. In Chapter Seven the smaller Arabian Gulf states will become more visible as actors in the security complex.

(ix) Identification of Southeast Asia as a region and as a regional security complex.

In the Cambridge History of Southeast Asia the editor suggests that:

Southeast Asia has long been seen as a whole... The title Southeast Asia, becoming current during World War II, has been accepted as recognizing the unity of the region... scholarly research and writing have shown that it is no mere geographical expression.\textsuperscript{53} Tarling, the editor, set out the problems he and his co-writers faced in basing the History (from World War II) on a convincing account of “identification and change”:

Were we right to chose a periodization that stressed to significance of the political changes brought about by the Pacific War?... Initially that seemed rather to echo the political
and military concerns that had popularized the concept ‘Southeast Asia’ during World War II. Now it (sic) became a part of the world which was contested in the Cold War... Even before that War came to an end, however, the newly independent countries in the region had seen the possibility of an unprecedented degree of cooperation among themselves, partly in order to limit the penetration of outside powers, and partly to enhance the economic prospects of the region. Now we may be asking ourselves whether or not the economic crisis that began in 1997 is marking of a new division in Southeast Asian history.\textsuperscript{54}

In the preface to the History it is acknowledged, however, that there are conceptual problems of identification and accounting for change that “may also lead us to question the regional concept”. There is a prior conceptual issue behind the History’s “accounting for identification and change”. That is, the region as perceived seems to be the ground for identification and change. Do the events described establish Southeast Asia as a region, or do they account for its development, etc., having presumed its existence? Interestingly, Yahuda says: (post- the Pacific War) “the region was still largely defined in terms of the international struggle for the balance of power”\textsuperscript{55}, suggesting that Southeast Asia was (up to then) a residual rather than a substantial grouping in a wider global or Pacific configuration. Part of the problem arises from the general ‘Pacific’ orientation of the literature and its geo-strategic focus rather than a focus on circumstances and conditions at inter-state levels and how these may be bounded differently. A region is most appropriately identified in political terms, and these are identified in terms of inter-state perceptions and relations, as these are strongly ‘internal’ to a group of states and largely exclusive of others in their impact (and others, as a rule, acknowledging these conditions). Telling us what happens to a group
does not tell us what a group is; that is, identified by the internality of some particularity(ies) in the relations between the member states. We may think of this here in terms of security particularities. It has been the contention of this writer that what critically establishes the existence of a ‘regional security complex’ (a particular set of circumstances in a region)\textsuperscript{56} is conditions and events – perceptions, actions and policies – \textit{within} an identified group of countries. The particularity of circumstances and events is in their capacity to destabilize and threaten group relations, or as analytically more adequately Buzan and Waever put the matter:

a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another.\textsuperscript{57}

The second half of the twentieth century was a period of unrelenting conflict and instability in Southeast Asia. Militarily forced subordination was inflicted by Japan in the Pacific War of the 1940s. Decolonization of the states over the 1950s-1960s from European powers who saw strategic value and economic wealth in the region, was long drawn out and violent. The outcome Buzan et al say was that:

In Southeast Asia, decolonization produced a fairly typical post-colonial conflict formation. It was almost entirely composed of weak states, but most of these had solid historical roots, a set of relatively durable modern states eventually emerged.\textsuperscript{58}

According to Yahuda:

It was not until after the Pacific War... that the local countries of the region acquired independence and began (or in some cases resumed) to assert their own identities and to develop patterns of conflict and cooperation among themselves, and the region began to be shaped by its variety of indigenous forces.\textsuperscript{59}
“But the region was still largely defined in terms of the international struggle for power”. The next major step in the development of the region, Yahuda goes on to say:

was its transformation from being an object of geopolitical interest to the great powers of global significance to one in which its constituent members as independent states sought to articulate an independent approach to international politics.\(^{60}\)

Other events located specifically (but not generated wholly) within Southeast Asia were later to play crucially in defining this region and in clarifying the conditions that make it a regional security complex. Cold War penetration in Southeast Asia was a continuation (under a modern ideological pretext) of a long historical experience of what Buzan et al call “overlay”. In the post-colonial period domestic conflicts were a major characteristic of security dynamics across the maritime states of Southeast Asia. Most of the newly independent states were affected by the growth of ethnic and sectarian insurgencies and irredentist movements. Subversive ideologically informed movements in the states were widely abetted and aided by conflicts promoted by the external Cold War powers, the Soviet Union, China and the United States. Communist elements in the states were strengthened in up-state areas by peasant discontents. Local nationalist elites sought external support and patronage. Thus, Ayuda says: “linkages were formed between external balance of power considerations and local conflicts that were defined primarily in terms of the Cold War”\(^{61}\). The Cold War in Indochina and its outcomes across the region are discussed in following sections.
Throughout Southeast Asia conditions of cross-national and states’ domestic enmities have been pronounced through the post-colonial period. These conditions have been severe enough to make states and regional efforts towards a more amity-affected security dynamics a major concern of internal and external policies for the individual states. From 1967 these conditions were to become a fundamental concern of the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN), to be projected through the conception of a conflict avoidance and peacemaking ‘regional security community’.

The profound political depth and influence of the factors discussed above have created a picture of instability and strategic uncertainty in Southeast Asia that clearly identifies the region as one of specific and internally determining strategic and security dynamics. In the last quarter of the twentieth century three conditions in the Southeast Asia region had to be resolved:

(i) The states had to secure their independence from the last territorial and dominating external intrusion by the Great Powers in the Cold War – and in time cast off the vestiges of its ideological underlay; (ii) Overcome the geo-structural bifurcation of the region between Indochina and the maritime states; (iii) Clarify for their own self-assurance the facts of regional identity and operationalize systems of regional cooperation, especially in acknowledgement of region-wide insecurities and region-wide responsibility for containing these.
That is, they had to undertake the processes of conversion from a proto complex to an overt and potential and sometimes actively securitizing security complex. The important point is that when security circumstances are specific to a region they generate specific regional security dynamics and the need for particular policy responses to these. These responses will be the subject of later chapters.

(x) Southeast Asia: Vietnam an Indochina power at the end of the Cold War. Vietnam in Cambodia and challenge to Thailand. ASEAN anxieties

The two major military campaigns of the Cold War were fought in the Asia-Pacific area including the direct on-the-ground conflict in the Indochina sub-region of Southeast Asia. Vietnam was the strategic centre of this conflict in Indochina and was the pivotal power in the conflict. Relations between the two global Cold War powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, were involved in hostile and combat engagements among three states of Indochina. China’s role was one of considerable ambivalence: sponsor of communist parties in the states of the region, hostile towards Vietnam, opposed to Soviet influence in the region and to counter this allied with America, patron of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, while pursuing its national interests in the South China Sea and cultivating its international standing (securing the China seat in the U.N. Security Council in 1971). Global power penetration in Indochina was of greatest impact in Vietnam, and also involved military and political involvements of Cambodia and Laos. This global Cold War penetration had also effectively detached Indochina (apart from Thailand) from the five maritime states of Southeast Asia, who meantime had been undertaking measures of
cooperation among them. ASEAN was formed in 1967. The Vietnam War (1961-1975) was brought to an end by the ignominious evacuation of United States forces at the fall of Saigon (April 1975) and the unification of North and South Vietnam. The Vietcong and the communist regime it entrenched became masters in the victory of communism in Indochina. Vietnam, by its reunification in 1976, was effectively reinstated as the major independent power in the sub-region.

For the Southeast Asia region as a whole the major effect of the Cold War and Vietnam’s dominance in Indochina had been the strategic separation of the ASEAN states and Indochina. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia on 25 December 1978 and twelve-year occupation was a major issue of regional security for the ASEAN states and an obstacle to hopes of developing Southeast Asian cooperation. Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia was unacceptable for three reasons: first, if it were to be made permanent it would boost Vietnam’s dominance over Indochina and magnify Vietnam as a regional power; second, it would constitute a threat to Thailand’s security; third, it would be in violation of ASEAN’s norms of national independence (of Cambodia) and non-interference in states’ internal affairs. In the event, into the nineteen-eighties Vietnamese military forces were deployed westwards to the discomfort of Thailand and drove pockets of Khmer Rouge resistance up to the Thailand border. This constituted a threat to an ASEAN member state and so a potential call on the association’s willingness to come to the defence of a threatened member. In effect this was hampered by a basic ‘norm’ of the association against military cooperation, as Yahuda points out:
Up to the time of the accession of the Indochina states to ASEAN in the 1990s and prior to the establishment of ARF in 1993 ‘non-military intervention’ was an agreed norm internal only to the ASEAN-Six states.\(^6^3\)

In Southeast Asia the principle of ‘non-interference’ (in the internal affairs of one another) in any form has been laid deep in the political culture of the region as this has been developed by ASEAN. Vietnam had been hostile towards ASEAN from its inauguration in 1976, castigating it as a front for Western imperialism. “During the Cold War, Hanoi had viewed the Association as a ‘tool’ of the US.”\(^6^4\) The somewhat benign terms of the formation document, the Bangkok Declaration of 1967, had been motivated to reassure Vietnam. In January 1979 the foreign ministers of ASEAN (the association’s principal representatives and decision makers) appealed strongly to all countries in the region to respect the sovereignty and political systems of all countries in the region.

The Bangkok Declaration had stated that “the Association is open for the participation to all States in the Southeast Asian region subscribing to the aims, principles and purposes” of the Association. In 1975 the Vietnam War was ended and the country’s north and south were brought under unified communist rule. The following year ASEAN held its first summit. Measures were taken to consolidate the association from a loose arrangement of consultation and meetings between the states to a structured body able to enter into commitments for cooperation. In the following two decades terms of coexistence needed to be developed with Indochina where Vietnam was asserting itself as the sub-regional power. The terms of co-existence on the part of Vietnam were determined by the
dynamics of converting military victory into the burdens and responsibilities of peaceful government and the withdrawal of external supports for this in 1989 from the Soviet Union.

The application at this time of the non-military intervention norm to Vietnam-Cambodia-Laos would have been in the manner of implied acceptance of the presence of a ‘regional security complex’, of security interdependence, analogously with the status of Iran and the Gulf, where similarly perceptions of threat and hostilities were more marked than attitudes of amity. According to Acharya:

After having unsuccessfully sought the co-option of Vietnam into a system of regional order founded on its norms, ASEAN presented the Vietnamese invasion as a gross violation of the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states as well as the principle of non-use of force in inter-state relations. 65

This appears to refer to principles in international law, which ASEAN’s norms largely replicate. Strictly, to be of any formal standing, these were the only principles that ASEAN could appeal to at the time. The Indochina states had yet to be drawn into the norm system that the then ASEAN-Six states were seeking to consolidate. ASEAN perforce presented its concerns about the Vietnam-Cambodia question in two ways: first, in terms that invoked the concerns of the international community and the United Nations; second, in terms that were specific to the ‘good neighbourliness’ of states of the region and of a budding ‘security community’ that recruited its present members around the conviction of good neighbourliness. 66 Later in the nineties, after the resolution of the
Vietnam-Cambodia problem in 1991 and the accession of the Indochina states (from 1995), the ‘non-intervention’ norm would apply within the terms of ASEAN and the conception of a developing ‘security community’ among its more numerous members. ASEAN’s sometimes uncertain, sometimes ambiguous option in the Cambodia crisis of a diplomatic course foreshadowed the later conditions.

(xi) Vietnam in Cambodia, ASEAN and the protection of Thailand. ASEAN States’ policy issues

Uncertainties and disagreements within the then ASEAN-Six turned the association’s considerations to possibilities of non-military aids to Thailand and to more diplomatic approaches to the Vietnamese assault on Cambodia. A regionalist approach was favoured by Indonesia and Malaysia who saw China as the long-term threat in the region and Vietnam a prospective barrier to this. Thailand with Singapore viewed Vietnam to be the major regional threat. A regionalist approach was obstructed by China which had its factional clients in Cambodia. Vietnam had successfully resisted a Chinese ‘punitive’ incursion at its northern border early in 1979. Factional struggles for power were a major factor in the Cambodia crisis, as Vietnam sought to emphasize.67 The Cambodian problem involved not only the conditions of inter-state hostilities, but also communist, nationalist and monarchist factions within Cambodia and their contrary offshoot external alliances. Factional disputes and insurgencies, we have seen, are also a persistent blight on all the political systems of Southeast Asian states and suggest that ‘community building’ is an issue at the state as well as regional level. In Cambodia, however, in the 1980s, such insecurities were a barrier to the establishment of a settled political
system and to stability in the Indochina sub-region. This was to be a determining factor in the final evacuation of Vietnamese forces in 1991.

For ASEAN the Vietnam invasion was the core issue: “If Vietnam’s action went unopposed politically, it could have created a dangerous precedent.” It is pointed out by Acharya that:

A related factor (ASEAN’s) suspicion that Hanoi would use any ASEAN-Indochina conference to divert attention from its occupation of Cambodia by raising the issue of China’s strategic ambitions and role in the region, an issue on which ASEAN remained divided. To this end, ASEAN was willing to rely on an international conference, rather than to settle for a diplomatic process consistent with its norm of regional autonomy.  

The stability and security of Thailand was a major issue for ASEAN. The ASEAN states, in the face of the improbable emergence of an ASEAN military alliance among its member states, had to choose what manner of support to offer Thailand. Thailand was confronted by instabilities within Cambodia and consequent refugee flows across its border and a strategic border threat from Vietnamese forces. ‘Aid’, logistical support and military provision were the options accepted among the states. What in particular an ASEAN state suggested it might do in the event of a Vietnamese attack on Thailand depended on its domestic political disposition and its economic and defence capacities. Singapore was best placed to offer logistical support and arms provision from its domestic defence industry. President Marcos of the Philippines was open to ASEAN-level cooperation, apparently on grounds of its anti-insurgency merit; a somewhat self-serving option. ASEAN leaders were reported as hinting “that any
contingency aid to Thailand could be provided on a bilateral, rather than multilateral basis”.

It is very hard to find a consistent unifying theme in ASEAN’s approach to the Vietnam-Cambodia crisis except to say that any military action was avoided and the hope of eventually breaking down the intra-regional duality was maintained. Acharya points out that: “While the norm against intra-ASEAN military cooperation survived, it paradoxically increased ASEAN’s dependence on external powers, thereby eroding the norm of regional autonomy”.

On the other hand, taking a broader and longer-term view; in its efforts to create a security community and also an Asia-Pacific zone of peace, ASEAN would become in the following years active in turning relations with outside powers from dependency to constructive associations. This initiative will be discussed in the next chapter. The prided principle of ‘regional solutions for regional problems’ was also at stake.


The immediate dangers and difficulties of what had become the Vietnam-Cambodia-Thailand problem, the pressures it created for the ASEAN-Six led to serious security review among the leaders. For the longer term the problem was to draw urgent attention to the need for post-Cold War understanding and settled relations across the whole Southeast Asia region. The Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia was a barrier to establishing a settled regime in Cambodia and an obstacle to the settlement of relations in Indochina and over the wider region. The ferment of affairs in Indochina, the opposing alignments of external powers and divisions among the ASEAN states, were assisted toward
resolution by the fortuity of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union suddenly ceased to be a major interventionist power in the region. Vietnam had pressing domestic economic concerns at this time and was weakened by the loss of material support from the Soviets. Loss of this support was a significant element in Vietnam’s eventual decision to withdraw from Cambodia in 1991. Domestic economic reforms had been got under way in 1986 by a policy of doi moi (renovation) in response to the intolerable costs of the Cambodia occupation. The communist regime came under further pressure in the 1990s to establish a viable modern more open economy attractive to external investment, and to create a related polity which would be compatible with good relations in the wider Southeast Asian region and future cooperation. Vietnam may have been weakened at the end of the 1980s but overtures and a state visit from Indonesia in 1990 promised valuable economic cooperation. Indonesia had already taken vital initiatives in the Cambodia issue. Other members of ASEAN were apprehensive about this regional greater power friendship but locking Vietnam into the Association would be an important gain. An integrated Vietnam would be a counter-weight to China’s influence in the area.

The vital turning-point was to be the resolution of the issue of Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia at the Paris Peace Agreement of 23 October 1991. Two years of active ASEAN lobbying and international diplomatic activity had played an important part in this. Acharya believes that:
ASEAN could claim an ability to manage regional order by virtue of its leadership role in steering the peace process that culminated in the Paris Peace Agreement on Cambodia in 1991.  

Indonesia played an important leading role by providing the venue for negotiations at the Jakarta Informal Meetings (1988-90) among the conflicting parties. Acharya goes on later to show that the Peace Agreement was “greeted by the ASEAN states with a strong sense of euphoria and self-congratulation”, though there had been tensions among the ASEAN states between, as Acharya put the matter:

- a desire to punish Vietnam so as to defend the sanctity of its norms of non-interference and non-use of force…and its desire to seek a peaceful settlement of the conflict so as to uphold its norms of peaceful settlement of disputes and regional solutions to regional problems.  

However, at the same time there was the paradoxical effect that “ASEAN was instrumental in raising the profile of the Cambodia issue in the international diplomatic arena”.  

There is some nuancing of views among commentators as to the merit and success of ASEAN’s contribution towards the Peace Agreement. But the great care with which ASEAN has needed to pursue its independent long-term diplomatic objectives of non-violence in regional affairs is clear. Jeannie Henderson shows this about what has been the Association’s severest test:

- On the one hand, the Association’s experience over Cambodia laid the foundations for the greater diplomatic role it would seek following the end of the Cold War. On the other, however, the Paris Accords, which were fashioned between the major powers, demonstrated that ASEAN’s claim to
manage regional order free from external interference had not been upheld. The remarks of Michael Leifer are more penetrating still:

The Cambodian conflict bestowed on ASEAN a unique regional and international role, albeit underpinned by Cold War diplomatic alignments that masked the Association’s limitations….The need for carefully coordinated diplomatic responses to the Cambodian conflict from 1978 enhanced ASEAN’s ability to generate a climate of mutual confidence among its partners in which to cope with bilateral tensions. On Cambodia, ASEAN demonstrated its quality of a diplomatic community, able to speak, most of the time, with one voice on matters of regional import.

The Peace Agreement did, importantly in pursuit of security community objectives, secure a pledge of non-interference in Cambodia on the part both of Thailand and Vietnam; the two countries having opposed security interests in Cambodia. Furthermore, as Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia the Chinese distanced themselves from the Khmer Rouge. This contributed to meeting ASEAN’s wish for the region to be free of foreign presence. The United Nations was to organize free elections. The elections produced a coalition of four groups drawn from communists, monarchists and nationalists. An ensuing violent civil war was eventually quelled by a United Nations operation (UNCTAC) over 1991-93. Cambodian affairs continued to be difficult. The election was boycotted by the Khmer Rouge, which fell into rebellion until the death of its leader Pol Pot in 1998. A coup in 1997 by Hun Sen, one of the joint prime ministers, was to trouble ASEAN about the maintenance of the norm of non-interference, as Cambodia was considered in 1998 for accession to the association. Hun Sen secured sole control of the country by election in 1999.
Yahuda says that despite the fact that “Laos was on the periphery of the Cold War...its proximity to Vietnam gave it strategic importance” for Vietnam in the war. The independence of this country was also subsequently important to Thailand as a buffer from Vietnam. The internal politics of Laos since the end of the Vietnam War have been chronically unstable: communistic, single party and authoritarian, and aggressively nationalistic. Laos is the smallest, poorest and economically most dependent of the Indochina states, although it too had been undertaking reforms from the mid-eighties. “Though often caught in the middle of regional strategic rivalry, Laos remains relatively isolated, and is perhaps Southeast Asia’s least understood state.” As Freeman puts the issue:

The recent history of Laos has arguably been one of trying to create a viable economic entity from the limited resources – particularly limited human and institutional resources – contained within its current territorial extent.....Most recently, the Vietnamese political and ideological hegemony of the period between 1975 and the late 1980s was gradually replaced by a degree of Thai economic and commercial influence.

It had been an important objective in ASEAN’s approach to the crisis to “ensure ASEAN’s leadership in the peace process so that the eventual settlement would protect ASEAN’s security interests and would not be completely dominated by outside powers”. A period of re-establishment of the separate independent states system in Indochina, gradual, halting and reluctant liberalization of regimes and economies and greater exchange with the rest of Southeast Asia was then made possible. The end
of the Cold War did not mean the demise of the communist parties in the sub-region since they had strong nationalist roots, but changing circumstances and economic needs mellowed the ideological edge of the regimes. Most important of all for Indochina and the Southeast Asia region as a whole was to be the conversion of Vietnam from a power of conquest among its neighbours to a compatible partner in a wider Southeast Asia security system. These processes were not entirely free of anxieties for the maritime states in ASEAN. Vietnam’s diplomatic skills were more clearly turned to balancing improving relations with China with the conflicting claims of the two countries in the South China Sea, where also, as we shall see, the maritime states had claims in competition with both Vietnam and China and sometimes among themselves.

(xiii) Post-Peace Agreement summit 1991. Enlargement of ASEAN. Developing an ASEAN security community

From the end of Cold War conflict in Indochina and intra-sub-regional conflicts, and with the restoration of the old independent state system there followed processes of drawing together mainland Indochina and maritime Southeast Asia. This was brought about in an evolving association of shared interests in economic development, political stability and common inter-state and regional security. The end of the Cold War brought about a situation in which there was perceived in ASEAN-Six circles a possibility for transforming the wider zone of conflict, in which enmities old and recent prevailed, into a ‘security community’ in which enmities could be managed according to accepted principles of non-intervention and renunciation of use of force in any disputes between states. There was in all of this, not theoretically articulated and
specifically analysed among the region’s leaders, an acceptance that
Southeast Asia contained internally to itself, conditions of security
complexity where enmities had abounded and where amity as a will to
peace was influential. In Chapter Seven it will be seen that amity was
perceived to be more than a prudential response to the enmity that
proliferated in the region.

There was an obverse side to these multiple processes of stabilizing the
region. The external powers that had driven the Cold War in the region
now had to reassess their own relations with the states. They had to
adjust their political sights towards engagements at a regional level in
Southeast Asia, and generally according to the same principles and
processes set by ASEAN. These will be the subject of the following chapter.
These are the processes that Acharya speaks of as “creating a security
community”.78 We earlier attached importance to the active, creative and
evolutionary aspects of this approach to ‘desecuritization’ in distinction
from the more historical and structural configuration of security in a
conscious ‘security complex’ approach. Across the Southeast Asia region,
official and popular perceptions of friendship and ‘neighbourliness’ had to
be generated and developed. At the end of the twentieth century there
were to be important shifts in the dynamics of international relations in
Southeast Asia, and in the wider Asia-Pacific.79

In January 1992 ASEAN held its first post-Paris Peace summit, at
Singapore. Proceedings were dominated by two broad ranges of issues:
first, reviewing relations among the members and with the other
Southeast Asian states now that they were coming to be disentangled from Cold War antagonisms; and second, strengthening the structures and processes of the Association. The Heads of State and Governments declared at the end of the summit that: “ASEAN shall forge a closer relationship based on friendship and cooperation with the Indochinese countries, following the settlement on Cambodia”. Clearly the recent experience of military conflict, ideologically obsessed communist regimes and political instability in Indochina would present the then six states of ASEAN with serious challenges (ideological and structural) in building new relationships of amity. The 1990s were a busy period in which the association spread its reconstructive relationships in the Southeast region and attended according to its principles to the nature of these relations. At the Singapore summit of 1992 it was declared that: “ASEAN will play an active part in international programmes for the reconstruction of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia”. Six months after the 1992 summit Vietnam and Laos signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) of 1976, thus indicating their willingness to come to amicable terms with the ASEAN states and to act in accordance with the principles of the association. Signing the treaty was to show earnest of good intent in relations with the other states of the region, essential to becoming a member of ASEAN at whatever time this may occur. Having met the conditions of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) by their formal agreements Vietnam was admitted to ASEAN in 1995, Myanmar and Laos followed in 1997. Laos had indicated its desire to join ASEAN in 1995. Cambodia had continued to be in a state of internal political unsettlement until the political coup in 1997
and then Hun Sen’s election as prime minister in 1998. These events were only temporarily to delay the country’s accession to ASEAN, 30 April 1999.

1995 was an active year in the development of ASEAN as an initiator and influence for stability in its own region and in the wider Asia-Pacific (but consciously not as an agent of pro-active peace-making or conflict resolution). The Bangkok summit of 1995 was the first at which all Southeast Asia states, excepting Myanmar, were present – in some status or other. Vietnam had gained accession to the association and Cambodia was present as an ‘observer’. Myanmar (as Burma became in 1989) benefited from the enlargement drive of the nineties and from ASEAN’s ‘constructive engagement’ resistance to Western punitive isolation of the regime. From the beginning of ASEAN in 1967 overtures had been made for Burma to join, but the ruling regime declined in order to maintain its autarchic ‘Burmese socialist’ standing and its non-alignment. Indonesia especially promoted Myanmar’s accession as a counterweight to China’s influence in the country. The question of the nature of Myanmar’s regime and the conduct of its leadership, and the unwillingness to reform puts a continuing stress on ASEAN’s norm-based will not to interfere in members’ internal affairs. This was shown starkly when Myanmar’s turn to chair the summit came in 2006 and the regime was with reluctance prevailed upon to forgo its right.\(^8\) \(^3\) Myanmar’s integration into the association highlighted several sub-state (non-military) security issues for its neighbours, notably Thailand, such as cross-border flows of refugees and insurgency and the proliferation of drugs.
Cambodia’s accession followed in 1999, the last in ASEAN-Ten, having been delayed by reaction in the association to the coup by Hun Sen in 1997. ASEAN had felt compelled to put pragmatism before its principle of non-interference by deploying a negotiating ‘troika’ of foreign ministers from Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia. The ASEAN troika was an ad hoc provision by means of which nominated foreign ministers could be deployed to address any matter of crisis or urgency that might touch on an issue of peace and stability in the region.84 Hun Sen rejected the troika on grounds of its violation of ‘non-interference’ in internal regime affairs.85

In 1998 Hanoi (Vietnam) hosted the ASEAN summit. Integration into the larger ASEAN offered the smaller states of Indochina equal partnership in the community and the loss of isolation in the international system. Enlargement strengthened Southeast Asia’s regional identity. ASEAN’s admission of four Indochina states was motivated to some extent by considerations of security in the region – a nervous response to the ideological rupture in the region and to the strategic instabilities of Indochina (rather as the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council had responded to the Iraq-Iran conflict in the eighties). From the beginning it too had been the ambition of ASEAN that there should be conditions of community, based on ties of economy, social welfare and culture, in the region that would cease to be a seed-ground for the interference of external powers.
“While membership expansion offered several benefits to ASEAN”, Acharya says:

It also posed a serious test of its norms… (it) committed them to a regional ‘code of conduct’ on territorial integrity and peaceful resolution of disputes. This commitment could facilitate intra-regional conflict management.\(^{86}\) This code of conduct makes “Vietnam’s differences with the ASEAN-Six, largely focused on interests in the South China Sea, become more manageable than when Vietnam was outside the ASEAN framework”.\(^{87}\) In 2002 China also agreed with ASEAN to a code of conduct in matters of the South China Sea. While taking on responsibilities for development support in Indochina, the maritime states of ASEAN benefited from the new relatively pacific state of the sub-region and better prospects for the management of security issues in that area. It was after Southeast Asian membership was completed that the creative processes of building an ASEAN-Community were got under way.

(xiv) Conclusion

In this part of Chapter Four account has been taken of the two regions, the Gulf and Southeast Asia. They have very different historical backgrounds and their recent Cold War experiences have bequeathed them very different security circumstances. The differences test the extent to which each of the regions may be characterized in the terms of a common regional security complex framework. Both regions have been found to be areas of recurrent conflict and insecurity. The general patterns of insecurity are specific to the two regions. Enmity is a prevailing factor and is the principal contributory to the conditions of
regional security complexity. At the same time there are in both regions sources of ‘amity’; in history, culture and common interests to balance against (or vary, as Buzan et al would say, on a spectrum of enmity/amity) the facts of ‘enmities’ among and within the states of the regions. These aspects of amity aid in binding the regions together in durable security configurations. Regional security community thinking suggests that the element of enmity in a regional security complex can be mollified, and perhaps substantially overcome, by the cultivation of norms of conflict avoidance among the states of a region. However, attention was drawn to difference in the way the concept of community applies in the two regions (see Note 37).

The dynamics of insecurity among the three main regional powers of the Gulf (Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia) have been traced. These are the main factors in the overall regional security configuration. However, the particular contemporary circumstances of Iraq have affected this overall security configuration. Iraq is a polar power in abeyance. By its close alliance with an external power (the U.S.) Saudi Arabia has influenced the dynamics of security in the Gulf. It influences also by its leading role in the Gulf Cooperation Council. Saudi Arabia has been the ‘referent object’ of increasing non-state projections of power and securitisation in the Gulf. Iran is perceived to be actively participant in this. Iran has been viewed as the principal threat to regional security post-2003, but account was given of Iran’s own strategic perceptions. Securitisation in the Gulf is mainly seen as reciprocal responses among the regional state actors to the underlying terms of regional security complexity.
In Southeast Asia the major issue of regional security that has been faced has been to bring about a (re)construction of the regional security configuration. This has been accomplished by restoring political and economic links between the maritime and Indochina sub-regions. These had been disjoined by four decades of Cold War and external intervention. Vietnam has been the salient factor in these processes of peace-making and reconstruction in the Indochina sub-region. Securitisation responds since the early 1990s to the security complexity of the whole region. The regional state actors assume the possibility of managing viable processes of maintaining peace and conflict avoidance and common development. Security community building is the driving objective in these processes. Security as ‘defence’ and security as ‘conflict avoidance’ are the prevailing modes of securitization respectively in the Gulf and Southeast Asia. These will come under review in the following chapter through examination of programmes of regional security institution building and security policy.
Notes Chapter Five

1. Milton-Edwards, Beverley and Peter Hinchcliffe, *Conflicts in the Middle East since 1945*, London, Routledge, 2001, p.35. Chapter 3 of this text gives a good overview of the Cold War and its conclusion in the Middle East. In the light of our interest also in Southeast Asia/Indochina we feel the idea that the Middle East “suffered most” to be contentious. In Europe too erstwhile ‘satellite states’ were cast aside from their strategic bearings in the Soviet dominated ‘communist community’ and were needful now to find refuge with new friends and in alignments and for recourse to support of economic redirection. The NATO states took on opportunities to extend their influence eastwards and the West European Union took on responsibilities for the assistance of numerous new members. The implications of the end of the Cold War in Europe continue to be worked out two decades after the event. This time-scale is resembled more in Southeast Asia than in the Gulf. ASEAN, we shall see, had to consider issues in the adherence of smaller and poorer states in Indochina in the 1990s.


3. As far back as World War II US air and naval presence was established, notably in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain respectively. From that same time the US also promoted a close strategic relationship, with strong support of the Pahlevi regime in Persia (Iran). Washington’s perception of events in and around the Gulf was largely filtered through Riyadh and Tehran – until relations with Iran were ruptured by the Islamic Revolution of 1979.


6. See Hinnebusch, Raymond, *The International Politics of the Middle East*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2003, p.234. Iran after the Islamic Revolution and Iraq were both designated as ‘pariah (rogue) states’ for their perceived trouble making and threats in the Gulf region – as North Korea was similarly designated for its trouble making in the Northwest Pacific region. On ‘dual containment’, from an Iranian perspective see Khajehpour-Khoei, Bijan, ‘Mutual Perceptions in the Persian Gulf Region’ in Potter, Lawrence and Garry Sick, *Security in the Persian Gulf*, p.246. Also Buzan et al, *Regions and Powers*, p.205. The former policy was embodied in President Nixon’s ‘Doctrine’ of arms-length ‘policing’. Peterson, J.E., ‘Historical Pattern of Gulf Security’ in Potter et al. The policies were brought into the region, and both generated particular problems of securitization within the Gulf.

7. Piscatori, James, *Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis*, Chicago, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991. Saudi Arabia was a principal claimant to leadership in the Gulf, but its claim was on a different ideological wavelength
from those both of Iraq and Iran. Politically Saudi Arabia was preoccupied with the Gulf arena. A somewhat paradoxical factor has been that it must engage in the popular rhetoric of anti-Israel, pro-Palestine agitation which feeds into an ethos of political discontent that it must affect to share, to uphold its Arab, Gulf and domestic legitimacy, but nevertheless with circumspection.


9. What do we mean by ‘distance’, for this is not merely geographic but also historic, cultural and ideological – the first may be compensated by the latter, which are widely believed to be basic to a meaningful, real imperative wider Middle East, and so might be of weight in considerations of region and securitization and security complex. What we are suggesting is that distance may be established in a reciprocal way significantly by internal factors of perception, action and policy (and possible other qualities) in a sub-region distanced from the wider region also exhibiting factors specific to it. Distance may be intersubjective.

10. That is, leading to analytical issues of identifying ‘region’, and so then to issues of securitization and security complex. There lie in this, issues of intellectual perspective. (If there are issues of generalization so also there might be of an excessive particularization. For example, identifying (categorizing) ‘region’, or a felt necessity to break up the application of the concept. This might be to accommodate occurrences apparently specific to different areas, and so challenge the idea of a wider application and so securitization and security complex, as might be so in Buzan et al. Is a theory weakened by diluting it to work at different levels?

11. “Our operationalisation of RSCT is founded on a disciplined separation not only of the global level from the regional one, but also of each RSC from all the others. The reason for doing this is to cast maximum light on the distinctiveness of security dynamics at each level and within each RSC, so that the interplay between levels and among regions can itself be investigated as a distinct subject. If this approach generates anomalies or difficulties, then those are what should be explained.” Buzan et al, p.82. This open and cautious approach is right, including the prospect that within a RSC as proposed (see Map 5, p.189) there may be lower levels, intra-region levels, of such securitisation that at this level there may be a practical reason for identifying a separate RSC.

12. These do not have to be active at any particular time, for circumstances may hedge them with caution and delay. Interestingly, at page 48 Regions it is said that “Within the terms of RSCT, RSCs define themselves as substructures of the international system by the relative intensity of security interdependence among a group of units”.


14. How difficult this can sometimes be will become apparent in much that follows. A similar comment might equally well be made for Southeast Asia, as a ‘security community’ Even a ‘security community’ of advanced peaceful disposition is unlikely to be wholly free of the need for such management.
16. See further, Halliday, Fred, *The Middle East in International Relations*, Cambridge, CUP, 2005, pp.274-75: “Those states, notably Saudi Arabia, which sought to use their oil wealth to win influence in the Arab world found this to be a dubious weapon…. Despite much alarm in the west at Arab ‘blackmail’ this concerted action” (the 1973 boycott) “achieved nothing…. after 1973, the ‘Oil Weapon’ itself was never used or seriously contemplated again.”
20. Ibid, p.46.
22. Ibid. And relations in the Gulf region are notably affected by how the “security interdependence” of the major powers impacts on the smaller states who have “limited capabilities”. The greater distribution of ‘middle powers’ in the Southeast Asia regional security complex produces a different pattern of “security interdependence”.
24. The allies were increasingly to be put at odds with their senior partner by their more accommodating approach to Iraq. The U.S. and its allies tended also to be at odds in regard to the question of the severity and humanitarian effects of sanctions against Iraq.
25. This has been an episode that in its turn has been beset by misunderstandings and deception.
26. The military reduction of Iraq was accomplished by means of ‘modern warfare’. About this we shall have more to say later. The political reduction of Iraq has had the consequence of a porous and poorly controlled northern Saudi-Iraq border.
that has been extensively used as a pathway for migrants who are actively hostile towards the Saudi regime. We shall remark on this later.

27. Halliday, *The Middle East*, p.180-81. “When Saddam launched the war against Iran...he also repudiated the Algiers Agreement, including stipulations concerning the division of the Shatt-al-Arab waterway; but it was not the frontier issue as such, so much as broader political calculations – the threat which the Iranian revolution posed to Iraq on the one hand, the opportunity for Iraq to assert itself in the Gulf and the Middle East as a whole – would appear to have determined his course of action... responsibility for the deterioration of relations in the preceding year and a half was as much Iran’s as Iraq’s, as any reading of the radio broadcasts of both sides will show.”

28. The underlying point is that the situation in the Gulf is one of an Iran whose stance is generally hard-headed (realist) and which confronts states who have to tread lightly. A commentator of Iranian origin pointedly remarks: “the fact that the meeting of GCC foreign ministers in June 1999 and the GCC summit meeting in Muscat in April 2000 did not back the UAEs claims, suggests that Khatemi’s foreign policy is advancing toward a regional solution...Although the GCC summit in Bahrain in December 2000 did maintain that the islands belonged to the UAE, this only demonstrates that an immediate solution appears improbable.” Roshandel, Jalil, ‘On the Persian Gulf Islands: an Iranian Perspective’, in Potter and Sick, *Security in the Persian Gulf*, p.150. Oman and Bahrain, for example, have their own reasons and interests for contrary views. We remarked earlier of possible varying tolerance towards an antagonist.

29. Such overtures look even more ominous in the absence of an Iraqi countervailing role and in its disregard of this. There is more than theoretical merit in the existence of tri-lateral rather than bi-lateral polarity in the Gulf.


32. Note 5 above. “The election of Khatemi as president is an expression of a desire to move the revolution to a mature stage, but Iranians found themselves in a new situation dealing with two governments and two rulers....The conflict between them will continue until the ‘country’ and the ‘revolution’ separate. What is unclear and unforeseen is the cost of this separation.”, quoting Omran Salman, Akhbar al-Khaleej, July 1999.


34. In the early post-1980-88 War years a widely friendless Iran has generally “sought in Russia a military and diplomatic partner”. This Moscow-Tehran relationship, something short of an alliance, but pragmatically resilient, alarmed the USA which feared Russia was providing Iran with nuclear materials and
technology. Halliday, *The Middle East* p.137. An ideologically-heavy Iran was quite able to pursue a pragmatic course of national interest. And a post-USSR Russia was open to this relationship and its economically beneficial sale of arms. Freedoms for Muslims were something of a *quid pro quo*.

35. Kemp, ‘The Impact’, suggests a similar view: “Many American observers of Iranian politics believe that what the radicals fear is not so much American military power but rather America itself as the leader of Western secularism and the generator of a global culture that threatens the very essence of the revolution”, p.134. It is part of the difficulty in US-Iran relations that they are so ‘noisy’, on both sides. See Campbell, Evan and Steve A.Yetiv in Covarrubias, Jack and Tom Lansford, *Strategic Interests in the Middle East*, Chapter nine, pp.146-49. See also Hinnebusch, *The International Politics*, pp.194-95. Apart from the ideological Islamic claims, ‘export of the revolution’ also needed to appeal to poorer states and peoples (as in Gaza and Lebanon) and to poorer communities (as in the Gulf States) in mundane anti-poverty, anti-corruption language. The revolution had to be material as well as spiritual.

36. Anti-American, anti-Israel policies and actions play well on wider Arab and on Arabian streets, but disturbances and popular pressures on state decision making are not always welcome.

37. With the presence of nuclear-capable, and mutually hostile, powers in South Asia, India and Pakistan, a nuclear Iran would spread the cloud of nuclear threat over a wider area. This represents, as Buzan et al would say, a globalist threat that has its roots in territorial security policies.

38. Covarrubias, *Strategic Interests*, p.150. See the IISS Strategic Dossier *Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East*, Chapter two. Iran’s nuclear programme has been a stimulant considerations among other Gulf States about the merit or necessity to take up ‘the nuclear option’.

39. Iran is itself a multi-ethnic country with dissident communities that contribute to domestic vulnerabilities and security concerns. At the time of writing (May 2009) an interesting indication of this came from the alleged and challenged distribution of voting in the presidential election. This showed the most notable oppositional votes occurred in North West and Southern provinces where ethnic dissidence is strongest.

40. This security issue becomes clearer in the discussion of Saudi Arabia following.

41. On the last this will be shown in a later chapter. See Strategic Survey 2008, p.235. An excellent broader brush of security in the Gulf and the American position in this, see *The GCC and Gulf Security*, IISS Strategic Comments, Vol.11 Issue 9, November 2005.

42. In later chapters the idea of ‘community’ as this applies to the Arabian Gulf and to Southeast Asia will return. Our remark here is limited to this: that while the growth and development of communities in the two areas are *inter alia* responses to regional security conditions, in the case of the Arabian Gulf/GCC this is (by definition) a sub-regional response, while in the case of Southeast Asia the response is at the regional level to regional security conditions. We remark
elsewhere, however, that the communities (systems, structures) are both superstructural over the regional security complexities (RSCs).

43. Gause III, F. Gregory, ‘The Political Economy of National Security’, in ed. Sick, Gary G. and Lawrence G. Potter, The Persian Gulf at the Millenium, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1997, pp.62-3. Also, Ayoob, Mohammed, The Third World Security Predicament, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1995, 61-3. Gause continues: “The focus of understanding how policy makers confront choices in the Gulf is not some Platonic notion of ‘national’ security or a limited understanding of purely military security….In most Third World countries, the most serious threats to the security of ruling regimes (with some notable exceptions, like Kuwait) emanate from within the countries’ borders….In formulating their security strategies, the rulers of the GCC states have to face both the possibility of foreign attack and the need to maintain their domestic positions. Though I contend that the likelihood of conventional military attack from their neighbours is now” (pre-2003) “relatively low…..” This writer suspects there are little-discussed complexities in the linkages between regime and state security and their mutual dependencies. Much might depend on the influence of national adherence in an event of regime fracture.

44. It has been acidly remarked that “Saudi Arabia only has a modern history”. The Kingdom’s most unnerving antagonists are its own nationals, domestic and ‘returnee’ become-dissident. Domestic intelligence and security are always politically sensitive for a regime.

45. Complexity and ambiguity lie in the needs to preserve tradition and religion and to manage modern statehood and change – and to manage its association of convenience with the United States.


47. Al-Mani ‘The Ideological Dimension, p.167, goes on: “Some of Iran’s pilgrims had already become troublesome for the Saudi security authorities and a nuisance to pilgrims from other parts of the Islamic world.” A “major point of contention between Iran and Saudi Arabia is the annual pilgrimage to Mecca... Beginning in the 1980s, however, the mulla regime in Tehran began to use it as a platform for revolution and thus enhance its own international Islamic appeal”. Campbell and Yetiv in Covarrubius op cit, p.148.

49. Bilateralism is the general pattern of defence associations, including with the United States, among the Gulf states – with the consequence of poor defence coordination. This last will be an important element in later discussion.

50. Regional securitization is not solely about power; its distribution, whose power and its projection. It is also about perceptions and their reciprocations among security actors in the region. Perceptions are the motivators in securitization. With respect to Saddam’s regime being put down from 2003, there is at most an apparent paradox in Iran’s hostility: in spite of Iran’s enmity towards Iraq the US is a power in the Gulf more to be reviled than the traditional Iraqi enemy. Post-2003 events have only underscored this perception of things. Of course, the Iraq issue is much bigger and more complicated than this suggests.


54. Ibid, p.xiii.


56. There may be other circumstances; such as economic compatibilities and/or prospective group advantages.

57. Buzan et al, Regions and Powers, p. 44. It is the “internality” that matters, even if this is disguised, as Buzan et al say, by some form of external “overlay”.

58. Ibid, p. 128.

59. Here is a historian putting his finger on a security complex, or proto complex, but failing to see it for what it really is. Rather differently from the Gulf, the processes of removing “overlay” in Southeast Asia were staggered over a long period, until the 1990s.

60. Ayuda, The International Politics, pp. 6, 7.


62. The conversion was not total since, as we have remarked, Cold War conflict was sometimes latched onto traditional, local and national conflicts.


64. Henderson, Jennie, Reassessing ASEAN, Adelphi Paper 328, Oxford, IISS, 1999, p.34. The somewhat benign terms of the original Bangkok Declaration of 1976 had been motivated to reassure Vietnam.

65. Acharya, Amitav, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, 2nd ed., Abingdon, Routledge, 2009, p.116. There seems to be two different, but possibly related, accounts for Vietnam’s attack on Cambodia: “Cross border attacks by the ultra-nationalist Khmer Rouge into Vietnam in part eventually caused the latter
to attack Cambodia and impose by force a regime to its liking”, Yahuda, op cit. p. 177, and “The military action taken by Vietnam to overthrow Pol Pot’s regime and install a puppet alternative (also) violated ASEAN’s doctrine of non-interference and non-use of force in interstate relations”, Acharya, op cit, p.99.

66. The discussion in Acharya under the title ‘Norms, identity and ASEAN in the Cambodia conflict’, pp.115-118, shows the considerable complexities and paradoxes in policy for ASEAN and the stresses for the organization. Anthony Smith believed “Indonesia played a crucial role in organizing United Nations-supervised elections and normalizing relations with both Cambodia and Vietnam”, ‘Indonesia’s Role in ASEAN: The End of Leadership?’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 21, Number 2, 1999. Notwithstanding this appraisal, the article surveys the difficulties and obstacles Indonesia faced over the 1990s in the management of its economy and the maintenance of its territorial integrity.

67. We shall come to see later China’s general disinclination towards regionalist approaches to issues in East Asia. We observed in Note 37 above how the preoccupation with regime security has for long been part of the conventional wisdom in developing country studies. Ayuda points to the relevance of such ideas also to Southeast Asia: “At the local level, security tended to be defined, especially in the first two or three decades after the Second World War, less in terms of conventional military threats than in terms of the survival of the ruling elites and the socio-economic systems that sustained them….These domestic insecurities have had regional and international dimensions first because competing elites have sought support from beyond their own states and external powers have in turn competed for regional influence by supporting them.” The International Politics, p. 10.

68. Acharya, Constructing, pp. 102 and 103.

69. Ibid, p.108, quoting Straits Times, 27 June 1979. There was a commonly felt reality of threat among the leaders, but the divisions among the states are made clear in Chapter three of Acharya.


71. Ibid, pp. 6, 101.

72. Ibid, pp. 115-16.

73. Henderson, Jeannie, Reassessing, p. 20.

74. Leifer, Michael, The ASEAN Regional Forum, Adelphi Paper 302, Oxford, IISS, 1996, p. 16. Leifer goes on: “Moreover, the cardinal rule of international society – the sanctity of national sovereignty – violated by Vietnam’s invasion, was at the heart of ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.” (My emphasis) See Acharya, Note 49 above.

75. Yahuda, The International Politics, pp.64-5 for a brief account of the complexities of ethnic and communitarian relations in Indochina. Details of relations, structures and activities of ASEAN will be discussed in the next chapter.

77. Acharya, *Constructing*, p.100.

78. See Ch. 6(a) above. We can refer here in particular to Acharya, pp.18-23, “Defining security communities” where various possible security configurations are outlined. It is notable that the only direct reference to Buzan and others on ‘security complex’ comes in a Note 18 (p.47). In the ‘Framework’ at p. 20, Table 1.1, of four security configurations ‘security regime’ appears nearest (only) to ‘security complex’ where “the interests of actors in peace are not fundamental, unambiguous or long-term in nature” and in the security regime where “the absence of war may be due to short-term factors and considerations...”. However, the ‘constructive’ influences of amity/enmity might more finely tune the contingencies over time of an alternative framework to Acharya’s security community. At p.23 “… security communities are founded upon norms, attitudes, practices and habits of cooperation which are multidimensional and evolutionary.” (My emphasis) The distinction between “the peace role” and “the security role” (p.21) has resonance in the comparison between the Gulf and Southeast Asia being explored in this study.

79. Yahuda, op cit, pp 212-16 reviews a consequential strategic “repositioning of the major powers in the (wider Asian) region.... Thus a new pattern has emerged in which the great powers of Asia conscious of the unlikelihood of war between them, given the scale of American pre-eminence, seek to emphasise their cooperator relations, while quietly continuing to compete for influence.”


81. Ibid, Section 3.

82. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation was adopted at ASEAN’s first summit at Bali in 1976. A main article of the treaty was the principle of “non-interference in the internal affairs of one another” among the member states. Henderson, *Reassessing*, p.33. A Declaration of Concord was also adopted at Bali stipulating inter alia ‘member states shall vigorously develop a strong ASEAN community...in accordance with the principle of “non-interference in the internal affairs of nations”’. Acharya, *Constructing*, p. 71.


84. Resemblances between the Troika and the GCC’s Commission for the Settlement of Disputes (CSD) will be considered in the next chapter.

85. Henderson, op cit, pp. 39-40 this writer finds is the best brief treatment of the difficult issue of the troika at this time for ASEAN. Acharya, p.191, Note 152 accounts for the formal aspects of this provision.

86. Acharya, op cit pp. 139-40. See pages 139 to 143 for the many anxieties and challenges the older members felt, as summed up: “expansion both enhanced and eroded ASEAN’s progress towards a security community...several of its key norms faced new tests.... ASEAN’s sense of collective identity, a crucial aspect of security communities, was strengthened somewhat, but its extent remained...
uncertain and its overall impact problematic”, p.143. The challenging course towards a security community is a subject for later discussion.

Chapter Six

Security Complexity: ‘defence’ and ‘conflict-avoidance’ and their institutionalization in the Gulf and Southeast Asia

(i) Introduction
Having first examined ‘regional security complex’ theory (RSCT) and the concept of ‘regional security community’ in Chapter 4, our main purpose in Chapter 5 was to trace the political and strategic conditions in the Gulf and Southeast Asia in the Cold War and the period that followed from the end of the Cold War. The effects of the ending of the Cold War were to make clear the underlying regional security complexities and autonomy of these in the regions. The previous chapter showed that regional security complexes existed in the two regions. This chapter traces the responses to these. These responses will be shown largely in policies of conventional ‘defence’ as response to security conditions in the Gulf and ‘conflict avoidance’ in accordance with security community principles in Southeast Asia. The suggested distinction between the two regions is not absolute for the Gulf Cooperation Council is in all relevant (security and other economic etc.) respects a sub-regional security community (not in denial of internal stresses but in hope of their constraint). However this sub-regional ‘community’ is motivated by the need to confront the region-wide conditions of insecurity. The chapter will examine the institutionalising efforts pursued to promote these regional policies.
We have seen in the last chapter that in the 1980s and 1990s and into the following decade events have taken place in the Gulf region that have been strategically menacing to the whole Gulf and threatening to the security of the states within it. In the newness of their states’ independence and sovereignty, from the early 1970s there had not been much to relieve the Gulf States of concerns about the stability of their immediate regional setting and their local relations. At the end of the Cold War (1989) the basic internal regional security configuration remained intact. The Gulf was distinctive in much that identifies it as a security complex: notably in the tri-polarity of power and its activity in the region, and in the balance and dynamics of enmity and amity among the member states. ²

In Southeast Asia the core events in the Soviet Union that brought the end of the global Cold War were of direct and dramatic effect in this region. As the military conflicts of the Cold War were dispelled regional-specific disputes and conflicts became more exposed; both within Indochina and across the Indochina-Maritime sub-regional divide. It became possible, however, to open up processes of political reconfiguration and internalization of stable relations across the region.

The purpose of the present chapter will be to examine the institutional developments that have been undertaken in the two regions and the responses to events that have taken place within the institutional frameworks developed. These will be seen to represent the respective understandings of the security conditions in the two regions. In the
previous chapter events were shown to have taken place in the later part of the twentieth century in both regions that were threats to regional stability, were violations of states’ independence and integrity, and were interventions in the internal affairs and security of the states. That these events were virtually exclusively endogenous to the regions confirmed the existential status of both as security complexes. The particular focus, then, in examining the structural and institutional developments in the regions will be as these relate most clearly and directly to matters of security in the regions, and to how these matters are perceived and acted upon by securitizing authorities in the regions.3

Institutional developments in the regions are undertaken in recognition of the underlying security complexity in the regions. Institutional development may be undertaken as a means towards effective management of defence; that is, as a framework within which defence policy may be devised and pursued, where defence has priority over other approaches to national security.4 A regional security community approach is about the reduction of the belligerent aspects of security complexity, or the dispositions for enmity in a region. In practice regional security community building is a project based on convictions that the conduct of actors (states and their leaders) in the security realm may be effectively influenced by constructivist principles of non-belligerence. Anticipating the later discussion, we suggest that security institutionalisation in the two regions is very largely founded respectively on the different approaches indicated here. Institutionalization is superstructural; a response to the security complexity of a region and an approach to its
management. It may involve attempts to affect the dynamics of a region’s security complexity, so that, for example, the Association of Southeast Asians (ASEAN) seeks to overcome historic Indochina-Maritime stresses rather than adopt a broad defence policy of confrontation towards them. Institutional devices are primarily the outcome of the political perceptions of states’ leaders and decision makers and of their policies relating to cooperative or collective security, or to collective conflict avoidance. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are two associations formed to manage development and security in their regions.

States, on the other hand, may concurrently pursue security policies of their own, which may raise issues of replication, compatibility or conflict with projects of regional security and the way and means of their pursuit. That is, there may be a disposition among states to pursue a ‘region hands-off’ approach to security. In matters of security there is some aptitude among states’ leaders and policy makers to ride two horses. The pursuit of regional security and policy is a process which over time has to respond to states’ emphases on state sovereignty and autonomy as well as to potentials for conflict among them and it is also a process through which in time a primacy (in effectiveness and assurance) may be ceded to the regional level. Within regional security configurations neorealist enticements have to be contended with and perhaps be overcome. In Chapter Nine below we discuss another, neglected, aspect of state-region relations in the context of regionalization of defence; that is, in stresses
that may arise in the regional allocation of military forces. Regional security policies are typically a dialogue between states and region.

(ii) The Gulf Cooperation Council: general institutional system and management of defence and security

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are seen in this chapter as structural commitments to the management of security in the regions. Judgments have to be made about the effectiveness of the organizations to the extent that their roles are defined in this way. The study examines how the security roles of the GCC and ASEAN are evolving and being cautiously developed, largely in the face of alternative states’ commitments to autonomous national security and defence.

The member states of the GCC are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. A more expanded membership was resisted at the time; for example, that of Jordan. Yemeni membership has been persistently evaded, but has become a prospect in recent radically changed circumstances. Practical matters can shift constitutive preferences.

Whether the GCC was constructed in 1981 as an association for cooperative economic and social development or as an alliance for the defence of the region and of its members or for both, is an issue that has run frequently among commentators. The suggestion is common that the foundation of the GCC was a reaction to the destabilizing effects for the Gulf of the outbreak of war between Iraq and Iran in 1980. The war itself
was of course of great concern. Given that it was a conflict between the two major powers within the region, its outcome could be a major disturbance in the balance of power in the Gulf region.\textsuperscript{9} The GCC Secretariat has stated that “the decision was not a product of the moment.”\textsuperscript{10} The issue of intentions in 1981 at the outset of the GCC is something of a non-issue. While there may have been no mention of security or defence in the statement of objectives in the foundation Charter of the organization (see Article Four) evidence of such security concerns and intentions is clear in concurrent (1981) and succeeding events and activities. In the foundation Charter, from a formal point of view, defence and security might appear admissible as an objective of the GCC by the apparent permissive Article 4(i): “To effect coordination, integration and inter-connection between Member States \textit{in all fields} in order to achieve unity between them” (my emphasis).\textsuperscript{11} It is most commonly observed that the setting up of the Gulf Cooperation Council was a response to the outbreak of war between Iraq and Iran and anxieties about the wider destabilizing effects for the region. This was also the time when Marxist South Yemen was presenting a danger to Oman and later in 1981 a coup attempt took place in Bahrain. Defence and security threats had combined in the estimates of all the Arabian states.

Following a round of consultations in the Arabian States by the Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs a meeting of States’ Ministers of Foreign Affairs was convened. The following initiatives led to the foundation of the Gulf Cooperation Council:
25th May 1981, at Abu Dhabi – meeting of Heads of State. (1st. summit of Supreme Council). A working Paper presented led to instruction for the formation of five Standing Committees – all in non-defence, non-security (economic, trade, oil and social) policy areas. States’ Chiefs of General Staff were instructed by the Supreme Council to meet.

21st. September, at Riyadh, first meeting of Chiefs of General Staff.


11 November, a Unified Economic Agreement was signed. This had the status of a constitutive instrument of the association.

28 January, 1982, first meeting of the States’ Defence Ministers, from which emerged a proposal to the Supreme Council for a joint military force.

From these events it might be construed that defence/security was a prominent if not a priority consideration at the foundation. Weighing the alternative interpretations of what was behind the foundation of the Gulf Cooperation Council an extended and critical “debate” developed which has been described by Rana Al Khalifa:

> regarding the founding and purposes of the organization the contention (is) dividing those who apparently think the organization was predominantly motivated by and directed towards strategic/defence and security concerns and those who maintain the organization was based on and driven by economic/developmental, and social/cultural interests.\(^1\)

The debate has not led to any firm conclusion one way or the other, except to show that opinions mostly tended to be on the side of the association being motivated towards defence and security.\(^13/14\) The salience of intra-regional security and securitization responses in recent Gulf history is clear, as Chapter Six (b) above has shown. It would surely
have been implausible for considerations of defence and security not to feature highly in projections for regional cooperation.

The level at which we are interested is where the Gulf Cooperation Council collectively and the member states severally, and other security complex state actors, exhibit concern about security in the Gulf and follow policies and strategies of securitization. Are perceived threats recurring and continuous and how are they responded to? What are the distributions between states’ and regional responses? Much of what is suggested here will be the subject of the following chapter where what the GCC Secretariat has spoken of as “a practical answer to the challenges of security... in the area” is viewed. In that chapter matters of what the region’s states and the sub-regional GCC association do to provision their policies for defence and security will be examined. Policies for defence and security are the products of political decision makers, institutions and processes.

When a group of states agree to the identification of regional issues and problems and they agree to the prospective advantage of treating them at the regional level they can do one of two things: (i) attend to the problems on a piecemeal and ad hoc basis, or (ii) establish a corporate vehicle of comprehensive competence for the management of regional affairs, covering such areas of objective they may agree upon either at the time of establishment or as agreements may evolve among the states. The Gulf Cooperation Council matches with the second option. Given, as suggested above, that defence and security were identified as problems (with
others) of regional significance, the GCC is agreed appropriately to be a vehicle of decision and action at the regional level. Our main interest is in the GCC as a defence-oriented body. Whether the competence of such a body is exercised successfully or not the principle remains that agreed problems at an agreed regional level among a group of states implies the need for a body of regional competence.

The general institutional structure gives the GCC existential standing and a framework by which to exercise its given competence. The Gulf Cooperation Council has an overall structure for decision making, consultation and implementation. This is based on a small number of primary bodies. At the apex of the system are:

(i) The *Supreme Council*, “the highest authority” consisting of the Heads of State (the traditional Rulers); in this way replicating the form of authority within the states. The basic functions of the Council are to endorse policies for the association, instruct through the Ministerial Council (below) implementation of agreed policies, and to elicit consultations for the development of cooperation in the region. Two constitutive support bodies are attached to the Supreme Council: the *Consultative Commission* and the *Commission for the Settlement of Disputes*. (ii) The *Ministerial Council* consisting of the States’ foreign ministers. The Council is empowered to initiate policies for Supreme Council consideration (at the summits for which the Foreign Ministers prepare the agendas) and secure due activation in the States of existing policies passed from the Supreme Council. The Ministerial
Council has Technical Committees attached to it and may on its own authority appoint *ad hoc* committees.

This Council is effectively the executive head in the association. Councils of Ministers from the States, according to their policy areas, may also be convened in association with the Ministerial Council.

A corporate body for policy and decision-making and implementation must have operating supports. The executive and administrative functions of the GCC are invested in a General Secretariat at the head of which is the Secretary-General (of ministerial status). This officer is directly responsible to the Supreme and Ministerial Councils and oversees, with the Ministerial Council, the implementation of policies agreed and decisions made. (Fig. 1) Assistant Secretaries-General oversee five policy areas and related research and implementation within these areas. The five specified policy areas are:

- Economic and Social Planning
- Finance, Economic and Trade Cooperation
- Industrial Cooperation
- The Oil Committee
- Social and Cultural Services.

Defence and Security are not included. However, we have seen above that initiatives in this area were taken at the time of formation. Figure 2 below shows the provision of a Military Committee under the General Secretariat (within the remit of one of the five Assistant Secretaries-General). We have noted the permissive effect of Clause 4(i) in the Charter.
Directors-General have control and management in a wide-ranging bureaucracy responsible for conducting non-policy making functions in the system including legal, follow-up and implementation, finance and audit, information and representation. There are many ‘units’ in the administrative structure that support the overall executive roles by specialist and basic functions in research, secretarial, communications and technical supports (Fig.2). Something of a pyramidal structure has a wide base. To facilitate reference of regional policies and secure implementation in the states there is a general parallelism of structure between the two, the region and the states. The GCC has a more regulative and state-centric approach than in ASEAN in its structure of relations. The GCC in the states is in the ‘desks’ of government and in whatever points of action and implementation in the states’ ministries and other political branches are constitutionally and executively provided. The states are the essential action-points of regional policy. In the regional body the principle of rotation of leadership and of venues for summits and meetings is used. Equality among the states in appointments and in the distribution of offices and the location of ‘derived bodies’, is generally applied. Amity among the member states has to be sustained in all sorts of ways. In the matter of personnel, appointees of the GCC (or delegates from the States) are servants of the regional body and owe their status and terms of service, and accountability, to that body alone. These same principles, we shall see, are applied in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, where their imperative might be thought to be particularly strong in the light of the overriding conception of the regional community. On
the other hand, the application of these principles in the GCC might be taken to suggest that this organization has some communitarian aspects to it as well – sub-regional security communitisation within a wider security complex! For the GCC, as we have seen, is *inter alia* a vehicle of defence and security policy and action specific to the Arabian
Fig.1 The Gulf Cooperation Council - basic structure

(i) Consultative Commission
(ii) Assistant Secretaries-General
(iii) Five Standing Committees
Fig. 2 GCC secretariat-general
Gulf states, and thus may be viewed in the wider Gulf security complex as corporately a securitising actor. Depending on its forms, its breath and its evolution, institutionalisation (of structures, professionalism, region-specific professionalism, regional camaraderie, etc.) – and the cultivation of public interest (for which the Secretariat has a responsibility) – the GCC can in time generate cohering degrees of regional culture. In the realms of defence and security, albeit in a possible view of “a common enemy”, this may seem too optimistic; for at this level the state (and its cohorts) is the predominant ‘referent object’ and is more inclined to ‘realist’ considerations and to protectionism about its sovereign status and interests.

Having traced the general institutional system of the Gulf Cooperation Council and drawn attention to the military-defence aspects of this we shall later focus more clearly on the latter.

(iii) **Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): general institutional system**

The membership of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations is made up of the states of two sub-regions: the first, Maritime Southeast Asia, consists of five states; Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore; the second, the Indochina landmass of five states - Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam.

We shall now attempt to trace the general institutional system of ASEAN. It is important throughout this to bear in mind that in ASEAN formal
institutionalism, corporate association is not its preferred approach to regional association. The underlying presumption in its ‘creative’ way forward is the constructivist preference, or priority, for process over form.

In ASEAN the Secretariat-General is much less a gathering together of instituted offices and designated areas of responsibility than in the Gulf Cooperation Council. The difference is not so much in the responsibilities undertaken and work done as in how these are structurally and operationally embedded. For example, the Figure 3 below shows the duties of three deputy secretaries-general lie outside the working remit of the secretary-general. Figure 2 above shows how in the GCC five policy areas are allocated to the offices of five assistant secretaries-general, and these have considerable levels of bureaucratic, legal and technical support below them. The weaker formalism and greater dispersal of roles in ASEAN will come to be seen to arise from ASEAN’s much weaker penchant for institutionalization, which it speaks of as the ‘ASEAN Way’:

The Charter, although not an insignificant political commitment to advancing ASEAN’s institutional trajectory, makes a small break from the grouping’s traditional preference for soft institutionalism, with its rules lacking in automaticity and subject ultimately not to an inviolable regional rule of law, but to political considerations and calculations (my emphasis).\(^{23}\)

The ASEAN Charter is a latter-day innovation and will be examined later in section (XII). Over the years from its foundation in 1967 ASEAN has shown uncertainty as to what its structural arrangements should be. This, however, arises from a number of factors: the work of the organization has grown with the need for appropriate changes in decision-making and
implementation back-up, the organization was greatly expanded in the 1990s from the initial ASEAN-Six to the final ASEAN-Ten, adding states that are politically weaker and which are poorer.\textsuperscript{24} ASEAN has also done much to extend its security, economic and other sights beyond its particular regional bounds, at times making concession without surrendering its regional autonomy [(see in Section (x) below). Whilst it is true that “institutionalization involves a degree of bureaucratization and resort to formal procedures and mechanisms” we might also say that ‘function drives structure’.

These ideas may be exemplified in the record of change and revision of the functions of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat and the increasing changes projected into the twenty-first century.

1976, at the time of the first ASEAN Summit the ASEAN Secretariat was established by the ‘Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat’. This was to “provide for greater efficiency in the coordination of ASEAN organs and for more effective implementation of ASEAN projects and activities”. The functions of the Secretary-General within this structure were largely ones of communication between the myriad of ASEAN bodies (e.g. the Standing Committee), committees, groups and meetings. Such “powers” vested in the office related to functions of the office, with no discretions or initiatives beyond this. The Secretariat was composed of the Secretary-General, three Bureau Directors, a Foreign Trade and Economic Relations Officer, an Administrative Officer, a Public Information Officer, and an Assistant Secretary General.

1982 recommendations to strengthen the secretariat were rejected by the ministers in 1984. The so-called Standing Committee (which had to be reconstituted each year, and was later to become the Coordinating Committee) was composed of the foreign ministers plus resident ambassadors and high commissioners. The Secretary-General was accountable to this Committee.
In 1985 the tenure of office of the Secretary-General was increased from two to three years, and four years later (1989) the office of Deputy Secretary-General and posts of nine Assistant Directors were established.

Up to this point ASEAN-Six of the maritime states was completed with the accession of Brunei. Major territorial disputes among the states were acknowledged to threaten the stability of the association. These were settled, especially those relating to Sabah in North Borneo. But Indochina had been in a threatening state of conflict (Cambodia was freed of Vietnamese occupation in 1989) and represented “the defining features of (the sub-region’s) security environment”. Southeast Asia had been polarized between two sub-regions: “ASEAN members and hence (its) claim to be a regional security community owed much to common concerns over the domestic threat from communism” Acharya continues:

If ASEAN had developed the attributes of a ‘community’ towards the end of the Cold War, then its scope was clearly less than ‘regional’, with membership limited to only one – ideologically ‘like-minded – segment of Southeast Asia.”

The Cold War came to an end in 1989 and the overriding issue for ASEAN-Six now was how to draw a conflict-riven Indochina into a peace-oriented Southeast Asia; thus to bring about a comprehensive desecuritisation of the sub-region and a more settled region. In the 1990s revisions to the ASEAN system, more numerous and sweeping, were responsive to the opportunities and burdens of enlargement in Indochina, and to increasing regionalizing activities. The 1990s were to be a transformative decade. If Indochina was to be pacified it had also to be more prosperous and in line
with the wider region. Its four states had also to be given equal standing in the association.

The ASEAN Summit at Singapore in 1992 agreed to a restructuring of the association’s system. It did so more comprehensively than had been done hitherto. It abolished the existing five economic committees and instituted the Senior Economic Officials Meeting (SEOM). A Council for AFTA was set up. Economic and Finance Ministers’ Meetings (AEM and AFM) were in place. The Secretary-General gained increased status as ‘Secretary-General of ASEAN’ with an increased mandate of duties and responsibilities: “to initiate, advise, coordinate and implement ASEAN activities” The Secretariat was to be strengthened by open recruitment and improved professionalism of personnel.

The Manila Protocol following the Singapore summit implemented the Summit decisions and increased the Secretary-General’s tenure from three to five years.

In 1997 an additional Deputy Secretary-General position strengthened the Secretariat.

The ASEAN 6th. Summit in 1998, at Hanoi, Vietnam, instructed a review of the total structure of the association, having in view enlargement in membership. The functions of the Secretariat were again reviewed to address the association’s increasing regional activities and to support the Hanoi Plan of Action.27 (This summit was the first to be held in Indochina.) In earnest of ASEAN’s ambitions at this time a Special Working Group was convened to ‘Review the Role and Functions of the Secretariat’ and to underline this intent the ASEAN Standing Committee (See Figure 3) commissioned the consultants PriceWaterHouse Coopers of London to report on the review (Report, April 1999). The two Deputy Secretaries-General were assigned chief of operations and chief of staff roles respectively designed to strengthen the corporate functions of the Secretariat and focus it more strongly on “substantive matters”.

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In 2005 the Summit appointed an Eminent Persons Group\textsuperscript{28} to guide the consultative processes towards an ASEAN Charter. Since its establishment in 1967 ASEAN had had no formal institutional basis. Its prided mode of operation had been of ad hoc groups, ‘Meetings’ and ministerial bodies.

This step forward in a Charter for the structural development and ambitions of ASEAN came on December 2007 as the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting approved the Charter and as this was brought into force a year later on December 15\textsuperscript{th}. 2008. Its aim was to “transform ASEAN from being a non-binding political association to becoming an international organisation with a legal personality and a rule-based organisation (a form in effect attributed with weakened substance) with an effective and efficient organizational structure”.\textsuperscript{29}

All the ten ASEAN States had ratified the Charter by 15 November 2008, according to their internal constitutional requirements, thereby legally binding them to its terms. “ASEAN as an inter-governmental organisation, is hereby conferred legal personality” (Ch. II, Art 3). An important departure was taken from the underlying principle of informality of the association, though in its face-to-face encounters in the numerous and multi-level ‘meetings’ of the association its ‘ASEAN-style’ may be sustained.\textsuperscript{30} The Charter:

will also be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations, pursuant to Article 102, Paragraph I of the Charter of the United Nations…. A High Level Legal Experts Group (HLEG), appointed at the 41\textsuperscript{st}. AMM in Singapore…is looking into all legal issues arising from the Charter…. HLEG is addressing three key issue areas (i) legal personality of ASEAN (ii) dispute settlement (iii) privileges and immunities.\textsuperscript{31}

But the texture of commitments and expectations must change, especially as these are now embodied in the concept of the ASEAN Community. This
later-day transformation of ASEAN will be discussed in the final section XIII.
Fig. 3 Association of Southeast Asian Nations – basic structure
(iv) GCC: development of security and defence in the Gulf sub-region.

From the time of the sub-regional organization’s foundation in 1981, defence and security have received, as we shall see, quite constant attention. This, however, has not led over the course of thirty years to coordination or even cooperation to a wholly convincing level, especially in the area of defence. We shall see this below, particularly in respect of the much vaunted Peninsula Shield Force. The limitations in defence cooperation may be in substantial part attributed to failure in a constant progressive, linear, commitment to coordinated defence, which should be governed only by such considerations as finance and supply resources and of military technicalities such as weapons choice, interoperability and training – and the necessity to respond collectively to changes in strategic challenges whether partially or wholly at the regional level.32 Outsider pundits and insider critics have widely pointed to the precedence given to politics and to particular sovereign strategic concerns among the states over what are believed to be rational regional strategic considerations.

Numerous factors might be suggested that inhibit constant agreement and commitment in areas of defence, even where inter-state, regional, coordination and cooperation are apparently most rationally indicated for policy and in military terms:

(a) The inevitable concessionary nature of regional inter-state commitments and activities intrudes in the domain of sovereignty and independence of the cooperating states. Even in associations where cooperation has been taken far forward, as in Europe, this has been arduous over many years
and is still incomplete. Europe also has the benefit of the separate NATO defence pact and the built-in US guarantee. The latter, of sorts, comes at political cost in the Gulf.

(b) Sovereign, independent budgetary control. The Gulf States have limited fiscal capability (largely having been determined by historic ‘rentier’ practice in the states and their economies), but need to cope with the capital-intensity of modern defence requirements. Defence expenditures are largely drawn on yearly variable and medium-term estimates of oil revenues. Two of the six states, Bahrain and Oman, have been partially dependent of other-state support, notably from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, while still spending on defence domestically at a high level.33

(c) There are unequal capabilities among the states to meet defence demands in the face of pressures to do this. These demands are increasingly in the terms of modern warfare requirements, and so intensify the need to balance domestic security needs and regional calls. In the next chapter we discuss defence expenditures and the effects of the introduction of modern defence infrastructure (RMA). Where regional defence is based on the agreed principle of ‘attack on one is an attack on all’ the idea of economy of scale should be most meaningful for partners least able to bear the burden of defence.

(d) Defence commitments, domestic and regional, are not only costly in budgetary terms, but also incur ‘opportunity costs’ on the domestic, or social front. Domestic demographic pressures on social spending – on education, health and employment – and popular expectations about these, present increasingly difficult choices for decision makers in the states. Such considerations are essential as context in defence policy making.

(e) Independent preferences among the states for bilateral weapons supply agreements, and related technical and strategic commitments, inhibit possible more economic and
efficient region-level opportunities. Capital-intensive, high-technological defence strategies are intended to compensate for military forces of relative small numbers. But ‘boots on the ground’ can never be completely discounted, and a regional approach is the only way to approach adequacy.\textsuperscript{34} We shall discuss related changes in the Peninsula Shield Force as we proceed.

(f) Varying strategic locations around the Gulf underscore varying threat perceptions and defence priorities. And variable tolerances towards security subjects – notably Iran and hitherto Iraq – underscore stresses in defence perceptions and priorities among the states. Kuwait and Oman, for example, have different strategic profiles, although in principle they figure rationally in a regional security strategy. Omani opposition to a Peninsula Shield deployment in the southwest, as well as the stationing in the northeast, from anxiety that this could provoke Iran, can be understood in this way. See again later on Peninsula Shield. The Islands issue seems to unify little beyond the level of regional rhetoric, which is not to say that it is clear what action beyond the rhetoric of diplomacy might resolve the issue between the UAE and Iran.\textsuperscript{35}

(g) Finally in this discussion of factors that inhibit agreements among the states, there is the issue of the configuration of power in the Gulf. The restricted security complexity of the Gulf area is bipolar following the defeat of Iraq. Within this area Saudi Arabia has pronounced hegemonic status in the Arabian sub-regional group. The more inclusive six-plus-two security complex of the Gulf is one of tri-polar configuration. The balance of power in the Gulf must figure in the political and security estimates of the smaller states and cannot be absolutely foresworn by the present cooperative relationships. At least to this extent there is ground of some defence reasonableness for the small states to be mindful of their own individual securities.
According to Gause III the point of his paper is: “to highlight how the choices the GCC rulers face in the security realm, broadly understood, interact with each other”:

None of the issues that they face – military security, fiscal problems, economic development, demographic growth, political demands – can be seen in isolation from the other issues. The choices made in one area will directly affect the regimes’ ability to deal with other areas. More money for weapons purchases means less money for domestic social and economic purposes.36

To anticipate the discussion a little, we might say that the policy battle-line within the Gulf has tended to be to achieve defence/security before politics. In many ways it has singularly failed in this. A notable correlative to this in the Gulf has been a high level of assured external support and protection. In Southeast Asia, on the other hand, the policy battle-line is to ensure politics before defence. Herein lies the difference between, on the one hand a security complex, and on the other a security community.

The record of the Gulf Cooperation Council has largely been to pursue this general approach: assumed security threat and necessary defensive response to the national security of its member states. The tri-polarity of the Gulf complex is active and of proven aggressive potential. Regional policy has been a dual one, based on strategies for defence of the states and for internal state security. According as threats are presented, the one or the other, defence or security, might gain precedence in state and regional assessments. The processes for activating GCC intentions are multi-layered and ultra-cautious. Typically an issue is subject to referral (from the Supreme Council which meets once a year), consultation,
ministerial, etc. signature, summit approval (earliest one year later) and signature or ratification in the states, further hedged by consensus by the Six. Agreements under the auspices of the Cooperation Council have produced a latter day GCC Joint Defense Agreement (signed by the Joint Defense Council and approved at the Manama summit in 2000)\(^{37}\) and an earlier Comprehensive Security Agreement (signed at Riyadh by the Ministers of Interior and approved by the Summit in 1994).

(v) Security challenges and security policy in the GCC

Security cooperation since the formation of the GCC in 1981 has been pursued with apparent more vigour than cooperation in the field of defence, despite the issue of defence having been raised at the highest non-military and military levels at that time. It might be suggested that this has been because security cooperation impinges less on considerations of sovereign interest and has been a matter of greater urgency among the states. This latter has accelerated in recent times, particularly in respect of the occurrence of insurgent terrorist activities. Nevertheless, agreements to cooperate in internal security matters have on occasion run into difficulties. Kuwait, for example, has been singularly vulnerable to internal threats of anti-regime and terrorist kinds, but has been protective of its relatively open political system. Until Kuwait accepted the terms of the Comprehensive Security Strategy in 1987 other states fell back on bilateral arrangements among them. Urgency has not been uniformly felt among the member states. Kuwait and Qatar were reluctant to sign up for the later Security Agreement in 1994. Kuwait was particularly concerned at the prospect of any right of ‘hot pursuit’ across
its borders. At the turn of the century national defence and internal security concerns have increasingly run together as internal intervention activities have had strongly suspected aggressive external sovereign backing. We saw in Chapter 6(b)(vi) above that Saudi Arabia has been particularly susceptible to political and sectarian dissident attacks. The dynamics of security complexity change continuously – the growing threat of nuclearization in the Gulf is another factor in this continuous change.

In the field of security the principal agency of cooperation are the states’ ministries of interior (Fig.4). GCC cooperation in this field was initiated by the ministers of interior in 1982. The principles of collective security and non-interference were spelled out as basic to an understanding of legitimate internal security policy. In the Gulf the principle of ‘non-interference’ is applied in reference to hostile activity from beyond the GCC states and to unwanted intrusions internal to the GCC. With regard to the first the particular reference has been to hostile state proxy and dissident activities that challenge regimes and states. Non-interference is a principle common to the two regions under study. The Gulf States are not wholly immune from concerns for non-interference also amongst them, but ‘non-interference’ does not have the basic norm status it has in the ASEAN, and it might be said, such a need for this constraint. Much insecurity is derived from the activities of non-state actors, and while not directed against the state is of sufficient threat to social well-being as to involve the state as the essential securitizing actor. [See Chapter 6(a)(viii) above]. The merit of the principle of collective security lies in the element
of cross-state contagion of many threats to security and the ‘economy’ of joint action.

At the initiative of the GCC states’ ministries of interior in 1982 a draft agenda was prepared by ministry experts and a number of specialist committees (covering such areas as crime, drugs and immigration) were formed. These committees were to meet before annual meetings of the ministers, which would review reports and recommendations. It would be the responsibility of the ministers to report, advise and recommend necessary measures to the summit, and undertake whatever instructions were passed back to them. This initial approach to security cooperation nonetheless urged the need for a Comprehensive Security Agreement. This was a conviction articulated in the affirmation that “GCC security is an integral whole” and the declaration that “the interference by any entity whatsoever in the internal affairs of any Member State means an intervention in the internal affairs of all Member States”. It was to take twelve years more for an agreement to be approved, and then it was not unanimously. Cooperative security activity was generally to proceed through the acceptance of ‘strategies’ often directed at particular areas of security, but not governed by legally binding agreements. In the early years of the organization, when regional cooperation in areas that touched on autonomy of the states such ‘strategies’ were more likely to gain acceptance and would be more consonant with the ways and expertise of ministries.\(^\text{39}\) This approach was set down from the beginning in February 1982.
Since 1982 there have been several occasions when approaches have been made towards comprehensive treatment of the questions of internal security in the states. The two outstanding instances are first, the Comprehensive Security Strategy (CSS) of 1987 and second, the GCC Security Agreement of 1994. In 2007 the interior ministers instructed a committee of experts to review and up-date the 1987 CSS. Internal security among the states of the region had been affected by numerous challenges, and also by new opportunities over the course of twenty years. The opportunities for security revision and up-dating have been largely determined by changes and progress on the wider front of GCC cooperation as these are set out in the section ‘Facilitation of Movement and Flow of Goods’ in the proposed draft. Benefits of new formalized regional citizen identity and free movement around the states, and unifying economic rights and opportunities for all GCC nationals, and unimpeded flows of regional trade – the regional common market and customs union – and necessary protections are covered in this section, and one on ‘Facilitation of Intra-GCC Movement of GCC Citizens (assured by the possession of a region ‘smart card’). Border controls, sea port and airports control, immigration controls and beneficial citizen passage are covered in the first very detailed and complex section – in what this writer has counted 19 articles. As social and economic regionalisation has evolved among the GCC states the need for collective security has become more evident.

There are other issues of more direct and ‘conventional’ kinds of security threat, which have intensified over the two decades since 1982. They are
commonly threats that emanate from outside the states or region, but have a capacity to generate intensifying levels of political disturbance and social danger within the states. Particular attention is given to terrorism - violence in society and against state and regime - which may have its motivation in extremist ideas. The latter then becomes a menace all of its own. Reference is made in the proposed new Comprehensive Security Strategy to the Muscat Declaration on Terrorism issued by the GCC interior ministers at their 21st meeting, in 2002. At this it was declared that “work is currently underway to draft a security pact to combat terrorism within the GCC”. Two years later, May 2004, the states’ ministers of interior signed the GCC Counter-Terrorism Agreement, the objective of which was to establish coordination and shared intelligence. The GCC leaders were particularly agitated at this time by the terrorist attacks that had taken place in Saudi Arabia. Even more recently, in January 2005, Kuwait was confronted internally by incidents of violence by militants, some of whom were Saudis suspected of being in flight from counter-terrorism measures taken in Saudi Arabia. The 2004 agreement was followed in 2006 with the formation of a Permanent Anti-Terrorism Committee which would meet annually in the capacity of a specialized security body (See Fig.4). The committee’s membership was to consist of experts from all the states and to have terms of reference including the possibility of establishing an Interpol-type center.

With an obvious, but unmentioned, view of the development of nuclear capacities around the wider region, the draft new Comprehensive Security Strategy has a section on ‘Cooperation Against Nuclear and Radioactive
Risks’ with provisions to protect GCC countries and citizens from nuclear and radioactive disasters. The somewhat oblique reference to “disasters” here disguises a present concern about political-strategic threats of nuclear proliferation both within and without the Gulf region. A (existing) ‘GCC Common Reference Plan’ is mentioned to “unify anti-nuclear practices” and to “interlink Special Operation Rooms in the states”. The provision: “formulating and disseminating preventive programs at the national and Gulf levels about the risks of radioactive and nuclear radiation” suggests attention to the prospects of development of nuclear capacities – for peaceful power purposes - within the GCC.\textsuperscript{46}

Another section is given over to ‘Cooperation in the Field of Civil Defense’. The ministers of interior have approved reference laws covering recruitment and training of Civil Defense Volunteers and provision for simulated emergency exercises. Three new committees are to be established to support working practices in this area of internal security; without any suggestion, however, of what emergencies are envisaged as possible. These it might be supposed could occur in realms of natural disaster and the consequences of hostile actions.

An existing ‘Standard Model Legislation on Drug Control and Psychotropic Substances’ attends to supply side issues of smuggling and dealing and demand side issues of prevention and treatment. Application of the model legislation is extended until 2010. This high level ministerial attention to the problems in society of drugs demonstrates awareness that the Gulf States are not immune from a world-wide problem of drugs
trafficking and a growing drugs culture. Other criminal forms are covered by a separate section of the new Comprehensive Security Strategy titled ‘Cooperation in the Field of Criminal Investigations and Inquiries’. New forms of economic activity and new forms of their perversion require new means of investigative and pursuit policing. Increasing finance and information economy around the Gulf, and its international linkages, widens opportunity for corrupt and criminal activity, as recognized in the ‘Uniform Reference Law for Prevention of Crimes and Monitoring of Suspects’ 2006. The need for official and private cooperation, between the ministries of interior and banking and monetary agencies is particularly remarked. A responsibility is directed to the Secretariat-General of the GCC to produce a periodical of material on movements in criminal methods.

Finally, this brief overview shows that internal security is multi-faceted; not exclusively domestic in its generation and its manifestations, the dynamics of which are of susceptibility to rapid change, changing characteristics, increasing sophistication in incidence and challenges to state stability and societal order. Securitizing these internal security challenges calls on a wide range of technical skills for their management and control, and on sophisticated social understanding.

(vi) GCC Peninsula Shield Force (Al-Jazeera Shield Forces)
This section sets out with the common assumption that the Gulf is a security complex, of Gulf ‘security interdependence’ – within a wider Middle East “conflict formation” – as this is defined by Buzan et al:
“centred on a triangular rivalry among Iraq, Iran and the Gulf Arab states led by Saudi Arabia”:

A security complex is a set of units (states) whose major processes of securitization, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot be reasonably analysed or resolved apart from one another.47

The Gulf complex is one, then, of six plus two states, the processes of security, etc. among which are premised on generally perceived threat conditions in a setting of tri-polarity. In practical terms this tripolarity has been aggravated by recurrent threat and conflicts among Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia together with its smaller Arabian state allies. The joint standing of the smaller states is remarked on account that they are perceived to be constituent within the GCC as a collective securitising actor. Furthermore, the smaller states have been subject to direct threat from Iran in the event that Iran’s nuclear facilities are attacked. The three greater powers are, however, all independently hegemons in the Gulf; invested by virtue of size and resources with potential for and arguably with claims to political ascendancy in the Gulf.

This configuration is not unambiguous, and how it may be represented will depend on who is viewing it and how at any time the pattern of Gulf-wide ‘security interdependency’ is seen. Since 2003 Iraq has been a political and strategic power in suspension, temporarily lapsed from the tri-polar power system in the Gulf. Iran, on the other hand, stands independently as a strategic power. While Iran has gained strategic status in the Gulf by virtue of Iraq’s lapse, Iran’s apparent view of its standing is one of confronted separateness. This view is hardened by the perception of a
hostile presence of an outside power, the United States, in league with the Arabian GCC. See at Chapter 5 (v) above. The five relatively small Arabian states are in strategic association with Saudi Arabia, in a state of security interdependency. This is a circumstance that can be a source of uneasiness on both sides. It is an impediment to the willingness of the smaller states to accept an integrated Gulf defence force in which Saudi Arabia must inevitably be the strongest element. Yet anxiety, or resentment, about Saudi pre-eminence might underscore dependence on the US, and fuel Iranian confidence. On the Arabian side, Iraq has been one of the two greater powers of the regional complex. It is likely to come to be a polar element again in the foreseeable future, reintroducing its own internal stresses into the Gulf complex. Iran clearly is the other of the two greater powers, and has interests and pretensions that put it in confrontation with the Arab states of the Gulf. The dynamics of this skeletal representation of the Gulf regional security complex were the subject of Chapter 5 above and are the setting in which the Arabian Gulf states and the Gulf Cooperation Council have sought to develop a general collective defence strategy for the sub-region.

Relations in the Gulf have generally been characterized among the states by common concerns for security among the states and for the Gulf as a whole. Yet from the 1970s (the time of emergent regional security complexity) the region has been beset by outright aggression and war for periods of twelve years, two or three years of military intervention and violent occupation, low-level inter-state conflicts, and latterly sub- and non-state actor violence. Whilst external sources of aggression and
violence must not be disregarded, instability and insecurity in the Gulf have been predominantly intra-regional phenomena. Thus the Gulf has been unremittingly a region of active insecurity interdependence. Defence has been a pronounced policy preoccupation among all the states shown in clear, if sometimes ambiguous and contentious, defensive projections.

‘Defence’, however, is analytically an ambiguous idea and its ambiguity can be exploited in the rhetoric of state-level dispute. States may possess such forces as do not equip them for offensive purposes, being minimal requirements to sustain and symbolize their independence and sovereignty. Neutrality, also, in a world of anarchy is never totally disarmed. Beyond such minimal and rare conditions the defence of states may vary in a range from ‘non-offensive defence’ to ‘offensive defence’. The propensity of states, individually or in association, is to represent their policies and provisions for defence as non-offensive. The validity for any such claim must lie in a mix of history, political posture, apparent willingness to treat dispute outside of non-peaceful preparation; in the quality and quantity of military-defence weaponry, the conscription or not of military personnel, the quality, frequency and visibility of military exercise, and so on. The elements of ‘defence’ are very many and can be political as well as material, and can be greatly manipulated. A factor in the propensity of a state to represent its defence as non-offensive can be its perception of the positioning of ‘the other side’. There is always the factor of intent (ambition, etc.), which may not necessarily be revealed in defence provision. Defence policy is inevitably a matter of professional
military assessment and careful political judgment. In most systems where the military have not entrenched themselves, in the final analysis defence decision-making is political.⁵⁰

At any particular time defence judgments and consequent policies will be threat-related. It can be part of the burden of hegemonic status that this status is itself perceived as threatening and so persuasive in the defence policies of others.⁵¹ In this sense threat may be an element in the permanent security fabric of a regional complex. In principle, however, this may be compensated by convincing non-offensive military-political postures. Perception of threat is the ultimate explanation and justification of an active non-offensive defence policy. Where any such perception is not genuine it may still be used to explain and justify an active offensive defence policy. Negotiating the defence circumstances of the state – its complexities, its shifts in configuration, possible deceits and misunderstandings – belongs in the generally inaccessible and often secretive counsels of force commanders and political decision makers.⁵²

From May 1981 to the second GCC summit in Manama 1982 the processes of proposal, referral, consultation and final approval were got under way that led to the establishment of the Arabian Gulf’s first joint military force.⁵³ At the request of the Ministerial Council the first joint meeting of the states’ Chiefs of General Staff was held in September 1981. At their second summit in November the GCC leaders instructed the states’ Ministers of Defence to meet (January 1982) to consider the recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff. On the basis of these the
Peninsula Shield Force was launched. The Force was *formally* established on 10 October, 1982. It is less clear when it was *effectively* set up, if only because the logistics of concentrating a force drawn from dispersed force sources in the states were not accomplished immediately. But sometime in 1986 seems most likely. As we shall come to see later, the logistical tasks were somewhat reversed by the Defence Agreement of 2000 and following agreement at the behest of King Abdullah in 2005 to overhaul and strengthen the force structure. It was at the time of deciding to set up the Peninsula Force that a Military Committee (Fig.2) was also established within the GCC Secretariat General, thus signaling the centrality of defence matters in the GCC. Peninsula Shield has undergone an uncertain course of growth and development. At the outset, the force was to be of two brigades, one armoured infantry brigade provided by Saudi Arabia and one comprised of military elements drawn from the five other states’ forces, together a force of about 10,000 personnel. The strength of the force was not constant over the two decades leading to the recent revision; though the two-brigade structure remained. Being based at Hafr al Batin, Saudi Arabia also provided air cover and command of the Peninsula Shield. Commitment to unified defence of the region was brought into doubt in 1991 when Peninsula Shield failed to come to Kuwait’s protection as a single unit. Kuwait secured further commitments from the US and Britain and accepted the prepositioning of US military resources on Kuwaiti territory.

The Peninsula Shield force has nonetheless been the core element in the aspired independent pursuit of defence and management of security
interdependence among the six states of the GCC until the present. \(^{57}\) Two other significant aspects in the pursuit of security in the Gulf have to be acknowledged. The first, the sovereign and bilateral defence activities among the states; notable, for example, in equipping independent defence forces with weaponry and engaging separately with defence associates for training and exercises. At the same time, mutual defence support has taken place among the Gulf States in the 1980s and 1990s: the wealthier states, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait supported the development of Bahrain’s air capability and Oman’s defence capability at the Hormuz Straight in the early years of cooperative defence. Saudi Arabia’s AWACS have provided an umbrella of advance warning over the Gulf. This has later been improved on by the Cooperation Belt Project – the first phase completed in 2001 and completion expected by 2008-09. This GCC-wide project installs exclusive defence and security telecommunications and radar networks, at a combined cost of $158m. \(^{58}\) The second aspect, the collateral (and largely independent) Gulf security activities of the non-Gulf forces of the United States under the umbrella of CENTCOM and the 5\(^{th}\) naval fleet. While the GCC states have generally welcomed a strong US presence around the Gulf, where it is land-based it is increasingly resented and so constitutes a risk in itself, and is a risk greater still if a projection of US power were to be threatened in the region. French and British forces also had significant presence in the Gulf. \(^{59}\) British forces, for example have maintained a defence-sustaining role in Oman. France has become increasingly active in providing maritime defence support, especially for the United Arab Emirates. \(^{60}\)
The Peninsula Shield Force never aspired to be an independent force, though relatively a free-standing force, for the defence of the Gulf. The limited presentation of GCC forces against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991 has attracted much comment. Only separate state contingents were deployed. After the war Peninsula Shield was strengthened, joint exercises were conducted and defence agreements made among the states. The annual GCC summit was held in Kuwait in December 1991. Oman proposed increasing Peninsula Shield to a force of 100,000, which plan was ‘set aside’. At the time the Force was said to be increased to 15,000, but, given this number, it was radically reduced by the time of the Defence Agreement 2000 and the later decision to reconstruct the Force when 9,000 military personnel were returned to their home bases. The Force has also been frequently manned below strength. At best Peninsula Shield’s capability has been deterrent and convincing enough in this to persuade the Gulf’s allies to support it. The Peninsula Shield has never been intended to be a vehicle for the projection of power, and has not in fact convincingly been intended even in defence of its own members. Whatever drives it forward this is constrained by the objective to demonstrate a will for non-offensive defence. This, as we have remarked earlier, is a posture difficult to uphold before an adversary.


In what follows we shall trace briefly the institutions of defence as these have been developed in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) since 1981.
The course of this development has been affected by uncertainties as to whether this should be about cooperative defence or coordinated defence, and by the troublesome implications of this in the evolution of a realistic defence capability in the Gulf. Notwithstanding the establishment in 1994 of a Higher Military Committee overseeing Peninsula Shield land forces, which comprises membership of the GCC Defence Ministers, Chiefs of Staff and the Head of the Military Committee in the Secretariat-General, what seems to be clear is that there has been a growing dissatisfaction with the status and performance of the Gulf Peninsula Force. The Higher Committee met for the first time in April 1994. Its discussions were preliminary to development of the Gulf air surveillance system as this had been referred to the Committee by the Riyadh summit in 1993. Five years later, at the 1999 summit, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia still had to urge the GCC states to work towards an effective joint force. At the Manama 21st. Summit of the following year Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia declared that developing an efficient capability to deter any possible attack:

requires all GCC countries to move decisively toward improving their collective defense capabilities to enable them to confront current and potential challenges.... it was absurd to talk about a unified military front in the absence of a unified and cohesive political front... it is imperative to adhere fully to standard (?agreed) policies and not to be content with statements or remarks or decisions that do not find their way to implementation (my emphases).  

The dissatisfaction of the time had been bolstered by challenges to the states and regimes by insurgencies and terrorism, by strategic instability around the Gulf largely emanating from Iraq before, and then after 2003.
The long-armed covert provocations from Iran and the menace of its missile development, marine offence capability and nuclearization were also a cause of alarm among the GCC states. Threats have frequently been located within Gulf societies, but the states have been for the most part the obvious ‘referent objects’ of security.

At the Manama Summit, 30-31 December 2000 the leaders of the member states approved Joint Defense Agreement, the intention of which was to formalize their commitment to collective defence, binding them more firmly to their traditional pledge that attack on any one would be regarded as an attack on all. The terms of the agreement had been the subject of discussions by the ministers of defence throughout the previous year based on sequences of consultation and negotiation among the military experts, chiefs of staff and the military committee of the Secretariat. In all matters of security, defence and strategic interest among the states the greatest caution is exercised in securing agreement.\textsuperscript{67} Research, advice and consultation with relevant experts are pursued, typically followed by a series of reference and recommendation from service commanders, chiefs of staff, the Secretariat-General and ministers of defence before passing through the Ministerial Council (of foreign ministers) to the Summit leaders.\textsuperscript{68} What is notable about the 2001 Defence Agreement is that it apparently gives up the effectively largely discretionary commitment to cooperative defence hitherto, and also the member states’ reticence about not agitating their stronger neighbours. Common defence was made a clearly stated goal of the regional organization in this agreement, and tentative cession made of sovereignty in matters of defence.
Before the Agreement could become effective it had to be ratified, treaty-wise, by each of the member states. One year later only Bahrain had done so. The terms of the Agreement put no time limit on this. At the end of the Summit a ‘Manama Declaration’ was read as a public statement by the Secretary-General. This stressed the importance of implementation of a range of economic policies and development, but affirmed first of all:

Consolidating the principle of common security among GCC member states by boosting cooperation and coordination to protect regional as well as national security and territorial integrity of each within the framework of adherence to the principles of their joint defense agreement.

The member states have seemingly made themselves more prepared to support the joint Peninsula Shield force than before. The developing surveillance and early warning systems were an aid to this. Whether in the event of threat or crisis an automatic trigger for joint engagement would arise is not clear – contrary to the response in 1991. The Defense Agreement is compatible with continued unilateralism in national defence, and bilateralism among the states and with their external agreements. Undertakings are made in the Agreement for more routine joint military and combined services exercises, and ambitions are declared for the establishment of defence industry (with private sector participation) in the region. Exchange education and training across the states’ military colleges was to be promoted. The Agreement was a declaration of firmer intention on the part of all the states, which would only be verified by practical outcomes. A broader perspective on the Defence Agreement of 2001 might see it as easing the way to the more radical and practical
decisions to reform the Peninsula Shield Force that were to take place from 2005.

In the intervening years many events took place in and around the Gulf region that would heighten senses among the states of threats to their individual and collective security and defence. Following soon after the Defense Agreement and the Manama Declaration an event of global security alarm took place: the 9/11 terrorist attack in the United States. In 2003 Iraq was invaded and the domestic system collapsed. Insurgent penetration from there into the Gulf, notably into Saudi Arabia, grew and the projection of Iranian intervention around the wider region and its developments of missile and nuclear technology added to an atmosphere of alarm. Instability in Yemen and border problems with Saudi Arabia added to regional unsettlement. At the same time there were also counsels and decisions taking place within the Gulf Cooperation Council itself that indicated the need for more active concern for the region’s security and defence. Decisions about the Common Tariff and Unified Customs Duty, a customs union and common market were coming to fruition, the anticipated free trade agreement with the European Union was edging nearer. Such had need, for both regional and foreign traders’ and investors’ confidence, to be reinforced by secure air corridors and sea-lane accesses, secure passage through the Strait of Hormuz and safe port facilities. UAE-France maritime defence and exercise relations were developing. This was within the context of increasing Iranian maritime defence developments and activities. The Iraq crisis was coming to a
head. Peninsula Shield deployments, including the despatch of two ships, were made in support of the protection of Kuwait in February 2003.\textsuperscript{72}

A proposal emanating from the Manama Summit for the creation of a joint defence council was considered and recommended by the GCC Chiefs of General Staff and finally approved by the Ministers of Defense in November 2002. At the Muscat Summit in December the leaders decided to establish the Joint Defense Council (See Fig.4). As the GCC Secretary-General Al-Hujailan said: “The establishment of a joint defence council reflects activation of Article 9 of the agreement signed at the 21\textsuperscript{st}. Summit”. The immediate role of the Council was to oversee the implementation of the 2000 Defence Agreement. The new council was ‘joint’ not just as between the member states, but as between the land, air and sea defence services of the states. From this time there is increasing formal structural participation of high level military personnel in decision making processes.\textsuperscript{73}

The next and most recent significant innovation in the Gulf Cooperation’s system for regional defence was to come after 2005 when a proposal for change in the Peninsula Shield Force was brought by King Abdullah to the Supreme Council at its 26\textsuperscript{th} meeting at Abu Dhabi. The proposal was for a radical \textit{structural} change in the force. This later proposal was in continuity with the Defence Agreement of 2000 and establishment of the Joint Defence Council of 2002. It was referred to the Joint Defence Council. The next and most recent significant innovation in the Gulf Cooperation’s system for regional defence was to come after 2005 when a proposal for
change in the Peninsula Shield Force was brought by King Abdullah to the Supreme Council at its 26th summit at Abu Dhabi. A proposal for expansion of the Force from its current strength of 9,000 to 22,000 had been under consideration for some time, but was unlikely without some greater commitment to joint defence and reconfiguration of the Force. The proposal was referred to the Joint Defence Council at its forth-coming fifth meeting in 2006. The Joint Defence Council appears by this time to be acquiring some pre-eminence in the formulation of defence policy. It was at this time the point of first reference from the Supreme Council. The Defence Council only would be able to report back to the Supreme Council on the strength of a great deal of consultation, advice and recommendation from prior levels of services command. The proposal brought to the Joint Defense Council was for expansion of the Peninsula Shield and for its increased numbers to be deployed in the member states, no longer to be based at Hafr Al-Batin as a combined unit. Thus the Force was to become a Rapid Deployment Force. In keeping with the principle of the defence of all being in the defence of each the RDF would deploy from the states to wherever a crisis might arise. Command and control would be based at the Secretariat-General in Riyadh.

The structural implications were many and discussions of them were under the authority of the Joint Defence Council. Through 2006 military experts, chiefs and ministers of defence were to discuss questions of coordination of forces dispersed among six states and of the various defence services. With the inclusion of all military services, land, air, air defence and sea, coordination also involved matters of complementarity
of states’ contributions in a joint defence situation. Airlift capabilities would be new feature of the joint defense forces. Naval forces would gain greater prominence owing to the Gulf coastal vulnerabilities of the states (Fig.4). Off-shore and on land oil installations, and water desalination plants, ports, finance and commercial institutions, and major urban centres lie on the coast-line.\(^7\)

Whilst the new innovative activities in relation to joint defence were not specifically articulated in terms of defence against Iran, it is clear from summit statements that cognizance is taken of Iran’s developing missile, marine capabilities and nuclear developments.\(^7\) The Gulf states are particularly affected by a lack of strategic depth.\(^8\) Owing to their differing national strategic needs the states may offer differing defence capabilities – in response to particular potential strategic threats. Recognizing this, the new Peninsula Force system is intended to be supported by intensified joint training and routine (twice, thrice annually) exercises on single and joint service bases. Exercise would also test the central command and control systems. The air surveillance and early warning systems are an essential element in the development of joint defence.

The Joint Defense Council submitted its report on the expert and military studies of the Abdullah proposal to the Supreme Council in December 2006. The Council endorsed the report’s findings and instructed the Secretariat-General to follow-up these findings and the regulatory structure suggested. Particular importance was assigned to the regularity of joint exercises.\(^7\) It was at this summit that it was decided that states’
units, presently based at Hafr Al-Batin, should be repatriated to their home states. Although there is this dispersal of the states’ units in Peninsula Shield, it would seem to be essential to the Abdullah scheme that the force should be in principle and practice a coordinated joint force, not a composite six-forces structure. The coordinating character is embedded in the primary features of central command and control, routine joint exercise, and the overseeing Joint Defense Council. These need to be underscored by practical elements such as shared officer training and command practices, compatible (common sourced) interoperable equipment, a common training manual to secure common integrative training, practice and procedures. The innovative nature of the projected new Rapid Deployment Force is deep and comprehensive. If followed through it would mark a new level of commitment among the states. The demands of it will take time to be fulfilled.
Fig. 4 GCC military/security organization and projected new (2006 -) Peninsula Shield RDF
Figure 7 shows the political and military connections and security links, and the location of ultimate authority in the summit. The ministerial council (of the states’ foreign ministers) is the conduit through which the product of consultations and decisions are normally passed to the summit of the states’ rulers. Defence and security decision making is suggested. The figure is drawn according to rational and probable organizational and force decision and operational links. Peninsula shield is predominantly a land force, but latest reorganization appears to give greater importance to inter-service links and coordination. And as we shall see, with the post-2006 agreed redeployment to member states of their peninsula shield units logistical and communications factors achieve greater significance. “the ideas proposed for restructuring were based on the principle of centrality of command and decentralization of force deployment.”

We now turn to Southeast Asia and to responses to security conditions in the region.

(viii) ASEAN responds to regional security circumstances.
ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, was founded in Bangkok on August 8th. 1967 by agreement among five nations in the southeast of the eastern Pacific area: Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined in 1984 and made itself party to the principles and norms of the association as hitherto agreed. At later dates in the 1990s four further countries were incorporated into the association: Vietnam (1995), Laos (1997), Myanmar (1997), and Cambodia (1999). The enlargement of the Asian association was occasioned largely by the end of the Cold War in Asia. It was the prospect of this that informed the openness of the association from the beginning. The openness of the Southeast Asian association is further evidenced by the
projected admission of East Timor (Timor Leste), following its troubled occupation by Indonesia. ASEAN was founded as an ‘open organization’; that is, not with a designated closed or final membership. In this the Association is distinguished from the Gulf which is an association of the “Arab states of the Gulf” (but excluding Iraq).

ASEAN was to be the vehicle of independence and collective (later community) development, notwithstanding that agreed principles had at times to bend to practicalities and existing external security commitments among the states. Rather oddly, Henderson says: “Ostensibly, ASEAN avoided a defence pact on the grounds that it would be provocative to those countries, implicitly, Vietnam, which would be excluded”. 83 Vietnam was hostile towards ASEAN from the beginning 84 and within ASEAN-Five management of domestic insecurities was jealously guarded. The nearest the founding Bangkok Declaration comes to any reference at all, in a very brief document, to defence is: “they (the States) are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference”. 85 Acharya suggests that reluctance to enter into explicit defence cooperation has a pragmatic and principled basis:

> ASEAN states *continue* to see threat-oriented cooperation as normatively undesirable and unduly provocative to potential adversaries (Vietnam in the past, China now). This does not preclude collective action against external or internal threats in time of need (My emphasis). 86

Similar avoidance can be observed in the founding Charter of the Gulf Cooperation Council. But in the Gulf, cooperative defence has been
developed clearly in response to the dynamics of Gulf regional security complexity, or to enduring conditions of insecurity.

We have seen earlier that in the Gulf tri-polar setting security policies are oriented generally according to perceptions of power and threat (potential or real) and have a (latent) confrontational bearing. In the complexities and dynamics of inter-state relations in the Southeast Asian region there is a backdrop of the stresses and conflicts, of enmities and amity that characterize a security complex. In response, however, the guiding perception and driving concern is of Southeast Asia as the securitizing unit and in time ASEAN as the embodiment of a distinct and inclusive vehicle “to promote regional peace and stability”.87

The initial ‘ASEAN-Six’ states of Southeast Asia had to navigate their ways through two major regional crises from the early 1960s to the end of the twentieth century. One was the states of the region being cast adrift from colonial ties and protection as the old global imperial order was dismantled. Recent experience in the World War was to confirm them in their uncertainties and anxieties, not least because the main belligerent had been an Asian-Pacific power, Japan. The second regional crisis was the long-drawn conflict in Indochina and its land-based conflict involving great powers, its destabilizing communist spillovers in the region and the eventual challenges of pacification and regional integration of the Indochina states. The challenge before the states was to assess how best to secure themselves in a world still driven by the competitive interests of great powers.88 No agencies beyond themselves were available to protect
the relatively small and poor new states, and anyway, any such prospect was incompatible with the determination of these states to uphold their sovereign independence. There were no polar powers in the Southeast Asia region. Indonesia was by far the greatest state, with a population consistently around 40% of the regional total. It was however, a strong proponent of the principle of regional and states’ ‘resilience’ and the norms of non-interference and non-use of force. Acharya remarks that “Indonesia’s decision to renounce Konfrontasi (August 1966) served as a model for its neighbours”:

ASEAN’s guiding principles bore the strong imprint of Indonesia…. (its) approach was encapsulated in the Indonesian concept of ‘regional resilience’, which would stem from ‘national’ resilience based on political and economic development, and on national defence (My emphasis).

The second regional crisis the ASEAN-Six states faced was the presence of an extremely volatile and hostile Indochina sub-region. Through the 1960s and into the 1970s Indochina was a violent armed conflict zone in which major external powers were engaged. Central to the conflict was its communist basis which threw up the interests of two external opposed communist powers, China and the Soviet Union and the concerns of major Western anti-communist powers. The conflict was as deep as it was because the critical ideological affiliations were also local in the sub-regional states. This increased the danger for the non-communist maritime Southeast Asian states which first, were generally Western oriented and attempting development on an open and capitalistic course, and second, had their own indigenous communist movements and insurgencies.
The danger was that Indochinese communism and its external conflicting patrons could spread and become a prevailing influence among the non-communist states, to the danger of their developing social and political systems and their regimes. Vietnam had a prominent standing in this scenario; the more so on account of its traditional hostility towards Thailand and its special geo-strategic position in the wider maritime Southeast Asian region.

The final end of the Cold War in Indochina came at the turn of the 1980s-1990s as the Soviet Union withdrew its support of Vietnam and evacuated its air and naval base at Cam Ranh Bay, with the effect of encouraging a reduction of America’s commitments to safeguard the South China Sea navigation lanes and its security cover in the Pacific. The prospect then of competitive external intervention in Southeast Asia was diminished, but with the new anxiety for the ASEAN states about a power vacuum in the region into which a prominent Chinese naval presence in the maritime area might develop. There was additional anxiety and some conflict of perceptions among the ASEAN States about the opening of the wider Pacific as a strategic space into which other projections of interest and power could take place. Of immediate and urgent concern for the ASEAN States was the re-emergence of Vietnam as a free Indochina and Southeast Asia power. This concern was heightened by Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia through the 1980s and its stubborn resistance to ending the occupation. In 1991 Vietnam was left with an economy severely weakened and in need for the country to be more open to the
region and its opportunities. The end of the Cold War transformed the Southeast region from an active conflict zone to a potential security order. At the end of the twentieth century the immediate security issue for the ASEAN States was how to bring about the stability and voluntary incorporation of the Indochina states into a region of politically compatible and socially and economically mutually supportive states. Thailand-Vietnam relations were problematic and Myanmar, non-communist but thoroughly autocratic, is equally problematic in regional stability terms. The benchmark for such changes would be the standards and aspirations of the existing ASEAN-Six. In accomplishing this, or at least opening a shared prospect of it, the second crisis was brought to an end.

ASEAN was now faced with a scenario of triple-sided strategic uncertainty – in Indochina, the Pacific and within Southeast Asia. Indochina did not represent a direct threat in a conventional inter-state territorial sense, but it menaced as a source of cross-state intervention and subversion. The other south east states were themselves at the core of this scenario with their own security and social stresses, which generally required their most urgent attention. “That they should make non-interference the central tenet of intra-regional relations, therefore, was hardly surprising.” Acharya continues:

ASEAN’s doctrine of non-interference was, in important part an expression of a collective commitment to the survival of its non-communist regimes against the threat of communist subversion.

They had on the other hand, to pursue a course to embrace Indochina in the one case and to constrain possible ambitions in the Pacific on the
ASEAN was in time to present an ‘out-reach’ aspect, developed in enterprises of its own initiative, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and in others of wider security and non-security exchanges in an external Asian environment. In Southeast Asia ASEAN has been set by its members on an ‘evolutionary’ course of non-confrontation in its external Pacific surround and towards the powers within it, developing and working according to norms of engagement of its own device; to persuade constraint and to promote cooperative security (and other) relations – the so-called ASEAN-Way. It should be observed that within the relatively narrow time-band of the second crisis we have elaborated that ASEAN was establishing itself and working out its intentions and ambitions. Its first summit was in 1967 and its second not until 1976, and only from then did it set about seriously to define itself as an operational regional system in line with its aims and objectives. The emphasis in what follows will be a critical description of ASEAN as an evolutionary and creative approach towards a political-security community. Within this course, aware of intra-regional sources of conflict and dispute, systems were built to orient defence provisions towards consultative processes and avoidance of conflict.

(ix) ‘Defence’ and regional peace orientation. ASEAN: principles, norms and declarations

ASEAN’s approaches to regional inter-state relations and to the external wider region are such that it is difficult to identify regional-level defence policies in any distinct and separate ways as it has been possible to show with relative clarity in the Gulf. However, internal system and regime security issues among the states have been and are much more prominent
in Southeast Asia than in the Gulf, although regime threats have latterly 
taken on some prominence in the Gulf. The relative difficulty in 
identifying distinct regional defence policies is in large part because of the 
regional peace and community disposition adopted by Southeast Asia’s 
leaders. Intra-ASEAN ‘defence’ is decried and conflict avoidance 
promoted. And yet we must take cognisance of the seeming paradox of 
states pledged to non-conflict among them and to a region of peace being 
nevertheless engaged in energetic defence programmes, arms 
procurements and exercises.\textsuperscript{97} This will be a major subject of discussion in 
Chapter Eight.

ASEAN’s continuing ambition is to embed a security community 
permanently in Southeast Asia. ASEAN claims to be founded on 
community norms that are typical of the region. These norms are typical 
of Southeast Asian societies and it is supposed that they may be 
extrapolated to relations between the region’s nations and societies. They 
are the so-called ‘ASEAN Way’ of relations. The norms are elements in 
Southeast Asian culture, and as they inform community behaviour and 
terrelations they are believed to create a unique regional collective 
identity. Acharya quotes Singapore’s foreign minister in the middle years 
of ASEAN: “The ASEAN Way stresses informality, organization minimalism, 
inclusiveness, intensive consultation leading to consensus and peaceful 
resolution of disputes.”\textsuperscript{98} Here the socio-cultural principles are put 
together. They allude to processes of interaction rather than to rule- 
bound and legally formulated procedures (and extending into evolutionary 
processes rather than legally formatted collective development of
The rationalizing reference, frequently made among leaders, is to traditional ways of contact and accommodation; musyawarah and mufakat drawn from Javanese customs of consultation and decision-making which lead to consensus (as opposed to ‘Western’ majority decision making procedures). So assured of the veracity of the cultural norms among ASEAN’s leaders and their endeavours to live by them, we might speak of them as the ‘constitutive principles’ of the association; that is, the ideational basis from which it obtains its identity and upholds its integrity. Socio-cultural norms may characterize society, but (as is common to all normative systems) they must be nurtured and confirmed in socialization processes of communication, contact, education and commitment to shared objectives.

Southeast Asia has in recent times been a deeply fractured community. Furthermore, there is contest and dispute among its national units and within them. Until the end of the Cold War, Indochina and particularly Vietnam were a source of threat to the ASEAN-Six, and “coming to terms with Thailand’s ‘frontline’ status became the focal point of ASEAN’s dilemma concerning security collaboration”. Following the Cold War, intra-regional and internal state instabilities have been the major security concerns. Where the association and the states perceive tensions in the regional surrounds ASEAN seeks, where it has initiative, to modulate its relations with its neighbours by encouraging their application of its own norms – as we shall see in such regional innovations as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). At the political and inter-state level ASEAN’s task has been to act as a cohering agent and to incorporate members across
lines of fracture as it did with Indochina. This is the creative business of building a regional security community, and sometimes consolidating it in its own identity. The states of regional security complexes and security communities are not isolated from their neighbourhoods (or by definition from their constructed contacts); they have to live with these. But the regional security complex is existentially and effectively governed by the terms of its specific security configuration.

The foundation act of ASEAN was the Bangkok Declaration of 1967. Its determinations were of its being:

Mindful of the existence of mutual interests and common problems among countries of South-East Asia and convinced of the need to strengthen further the existing bonds of regional solidarity and cooperation....Desiring to establish a firm foundation for common action to promote regional cooperation....Conscious that in an increasingly interdependent world, the cherished ideals of peace, freedom, social justice and economic well-being....respect for justice and the rule of law and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter.102

Here we have a statement which is typical of mid-twentieth century post-colonial regionalism in its articulation of material and security interests. ASEAN’s first statement of the normative foundations of the association came ten years later at the first substantive Summit at Bali in 1976 where the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation was agreed and signed by the original ASEAN six states declaring that:

The High Contracting Parties (the member states): solemnly agree.... In their relations with one another...shall be guided by the following fundamental principles:
a) Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations;
b) The right of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion;
c) Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;
d) Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;
e) Renunciation of the threat or use of force;
f) Effective cooperation among themselves.

Principles c), d), and e) are legal-rational principles and items in what might be called the fabric of imperatives in the established normative system in international relations. So too are two further principles laid down in the ASEAN normative system: Regional autonomy – regional solutions to regional problems, and No Military Pacts. In their early post-World War years the Southeast Asian states’ security was served by associations with powers outside the region. – Malaysia and Singapore with the United Kingdom and Thailand and Philippines with the United States. Indonesia was more detached; in its links with the Non-Aligned Movement, its anti-Westernism and by greater confidence in its own ‘resilience’. But as the claims of regional association took hold so did those of regional autonomy, meaning non-reliance on outside powers for security. This was to run uncertainly against the persistence of just such associations among the states, and against any idea of dependence on other Pacific and Asian powers – so that overtures from Korea and Japan for wider associations were rejected. Upholding a “proprietary role in managing regional order”, as Leifer put the matter, would, it was thought, insulate the Southeast Asian states from competitive interests among the powers in their security.
The principle of rejection of military pacts goes back to rejection of such treaties as SEATO and CENTO in the 1950s. But the declaration in the founding Bangkok Declaration (1967) that:

All foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of states in the area... (My emphases),

sought to overcome the contention that arose from the more recent MAPHILINDO agreement between Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia. The greatest violation of the principle that in Southeast Asia there should be ‘no military pacts’ had been in the conduct of the Cold War in Indochina. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978 continued the spectre of great power involvement in the region and was compounded by the resultant confrontation with Thailand. The principle was conceived, however, to apply within the Southeast region and for some time the objects of disquiet were the provisions of military facilities to the U.S. by the Philippines and Singapore. ASEAN’s early experiences confirmed it in the conviction that a commitment to the non-use of force should govern relations between the states of the region. The norms of ‘regional autonomy’, ‘no foreign bases and no military pacts, and ‘renunciation of the use of force’ were meant to secure internal peace and stability for Southeast Asia.

The principle of non-interference is said by Acharya to be “arguably the single most important principle underpinning ASEAN”.

Non-Interference has been the most persistently problematic in decision
making and response in the twists and turns in the affairs of member states and relations between them.\textsuperscript{107} Whilst these principles may all be traced in other sources, notably in the normative aspects of international law, the interpretation of each of them is adapted for its relevance and application to the perceived needs and acceptances of the states of Southeast Asia. Non-interference has obvious application in respect of relations with outside powers, but it is intended to apply particularly to intra-regional relations, having clear relevance in a region of disparate political ideologies and regimes. As Acharya says:

As new political entities with ‘weak’ state structures (e.g. lack of a close congruence between ethnic groups and territorial boundaries) and an equally problematic lack of strong regime legitimacy, the primary sources of threat to the national security of the ASEAN states were not external, but internal.\textsuperscript{108}

It is in relation to such problems that ‘non-interference’ has raised most contention and misgiving. How this is so is seen as we continue. So commanding in the ambitions of ASEAN and so perceived to be essential to its existence and development, we might speak of these principles that are meant to uphold regional autonomy, peace and stability, as the basic ‘operational principles’ of the association.\textsuperscript{109}

In the section that follows the difficulties in navigating the principles set out become apparent, particularly as we see they run up against each other. We shall turn now to a brief examination of the means in declarations, understandings, agreements and treaties by which ASEAN has evolved as a regional security community, and as in the twenty-first
century it has moved towards an ASEAN Security Community in a formalized Charter.\textsuperscript{110}

(x) ASEAN: declarations, understandings, agreements and treaties: towards a regional security community.

ASEAN has been prolific in the generation of instruments of regional cooperation, through its consultative and decision making processes, as undertaken by its Summits, ASEAN Ministerial Meetings (AMM), Sectoral Ministerial Meetings and bodies of diplomatic authority. This writer has tracked these through the internet site ‘Table of ASEAN Treaties/Agreements and Ratification’.\textsuperscript{111} This records three hundred and twenty five such instruments over the period from the foundation instrument of Bangkok, August 1967 to April 2010. Of these we have identified some three dozen which bear fairly clearly or directly on matters of security. However, the analytic difficulty is present that in the nature of security community understandings, defence and security are more blurred and vaguely defined notions than in security complex theory. Very roughly; ‘security through the promotion of peace’ is much less clear than ‘defence in the face of threat’. (Section (ix) above). In what follows we shall account briefly for the main declarations, treaties and agreements that identify ASEAN and which lay down its normative basis and purposes. Some implications and difficulties that follow from them will be considered.

For the first nine years after 1967 ASEAN was mainly preoccupied with the inner informal workings of a communicating and consulting organization among the states (then ASEAN-Five), with little to advance them as a
coherent regional body. However, in November 1971 the foreign ministers meeting in Kuala Lumpur, in the ‘Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration’ (ZOPFAN) declared their conviction:

that the time is propitious for joint action to give effective expression to the deeply felt desire of the peoples of South East Asia to ensure the conditions of peace and stability indispensable to their independence and their economic and social well-being;

Do Hereby State (in one of two-sentence substance of the declaration) that (the then five states):

are determined to exert initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition of, and respect for, South East Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers.

The declaration was negotiating a context of lively discussion among the states about the wisdom or the possibility of neutrality as a formula for autonomy, peace and freedom from interference in the region. A year before the declaration Malaysia had proposed that Southeast Asia should be ‘neutralized’ under the guarantee of the major powers. Other states were opposed; Indonesia on grounds that neutralization would require rights to uphold it among the powers, and Singapore, Philippines and Thailand that neutralization would incur legal prohibitions against foreign bases and alliances, on which they were reliant at the time. Singapore, not convinced that all major powers in the Pacific region would abide by the terms of ZOPFAN, believed that U.S. presence was all the more necessary. Non-interference and regional autonomy were at stake. Henderson suggests that “given the differing views of neutrality’s merits, no programme of implementation for ZOPFAN was developed”.
The idea of Southeast Asia as a nuclear weapons-free zone was mooted in the preamble of ZOPFAN and was more elaborately set out in the later Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ). The treaty ran up against divisions among the ASEAN states about its geographic coverage and uncertainties about its technical provisions. But the political divisions were more trying: the United States was hostile for the restrictions that the treaty would place on its strategic movements in the area and the states – Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore – were placed awkwardly on account of their benefit of U.S. strategic cover. Indonesia and Malaysia affirmed their preference for a non-aligned and power-free regional security framework. As Acharya summed up the situation: “the political costs of SEANWFZ would outweigh its potential benefits for regional security”. Such was the nature of the nuclear security dimension that problems of prohibition of nuclear-born activities, and of “verification and compliance” that trans-region cooperation would be essential. “This meant accepting a dilution of its (ASEAN’s) existing norm of regional autonomy”. The Treaty after much delay was eventually signed in December 1995 and would later be affirmed in the ASEAN Charter.

ASEAN held its first Summit in 1976 at Bali, Indonesia and brought to an end a period of some diffidence as to what ASEAN really meant. This summit is most notable for its promulgation of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in which for the first time the norms (or “fundamental principles”) guiding the Association were formally set out, Article 3 (see above). In the proper manner of a treaty the signatories
were referred to as the High Contracting Parties signalling the solemnity of the undertaking.

The point was one of note since accession to the treaty was to become a condition for joining ASEAN. This was important at the time when in the 1990s the states of Indochina were to join.\textsuperscript{120} By amendment to the treaty non-ASEAN states were also invited to accede – to a treaty whose general provisions were ones of peaceful intent and cooperation. However, in Chapter IV provision is made for “Pacific Settlement of Disputes” by means of a High Council of states’ representatives at ministerial level as a “continuing body... to take cognizance of the existence of disputes or situations likely to disturb regional peace and harmony”.\textsuperscript{121} The High Council has never been convened. One is reminded of the similar ineffectiveness of the Commission for the Settlement of Disputes (CSD) in the Gulf Cooperation Council. We have noted that states have been inclined to put disputes on hold to avoid aggravation and instability or to secure settlement by other means such as resort to the International Court. Acharya remarks that as late as 1994 and 1997 territorial disputes between Singapore and Malaysia and between Malaysia and Indonesia respectively were referred to the ICJ. Whatever the case, the norm of non-use of force is maintained. In 1999 (post-Indochina accessions and post-Cambodia) ASEAN sought to devise another mechanism for the dissolution of crises. The ‘troika’ was to be an \textit{ad hoc} commission of three foreign ministers to “support and assist” in crisis situations and to activate to circumvent suspicions of intervention in the internal affairs of a state. Application of the provision in the situation
of the Hun Sen coup in 1997 in Cambodia failed. Free elections were accomplished by other means.\textsuperscript{122}

Concurrently with TAC the summit of 1976 made a Declaration of ASEAN Concord (otherwise referred to as Bali Concord 1). The general drift of the declaration is to reiterate and clarify the general cooperative ambitions of ASEAN in the fields of economy and development and in social and cultural cooperation. These ambitions are set out, in three separate parts of the declaration, in a way that was to foresee the more conclusive design for an ASEAN Community in the second Concord of 2003 (below). However, in hope more than in expectation:

> Member states, individually and collectively, shall take active steps for the early establishment of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality…. (giving) Immediate consideration of initial steps towards recognition of and respect for the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality wherever possible

in the second part as an article in the Political programme of the anticipated ASEAN Community – including signing of the TAC. The Community idea is specifically mentioned in item 4 of the Declaration: “Member states shall vigorously develop an awareness of \textit{regional identity} and exert all efforts to create a strong ASEAN Community” (my emphasis).\textsuperscript{123}

\textbf{(xi) ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF): major outreach endeavour and conflict avoidance principles}

At ASEAN’s second summit (1977) in Kuala Lumpur the leaders decided to establish a ‘dialogue’ arrangement with outside partners in their mutual economic relations. The first non-ASEAN partners were Australia, New
Zealand and Japan. The dialogues were held at Post-Ministerial Conference level; from 1978 every year. It was ASEAN’s expectation that these contacts would be held within the forms of the Association’s ways of non-formalized contact and consultation. The dialogue formula was a way of contact that declined articulation in strong postures and upheld the regional priority given to peace. In 1992 the leaders decided that the dialogue system should be amended to include political and security matters.\textsuperscript{124} By the mid-1990s it included all the major Asian powers. In 1977 it had brought in the only non-state member, the United Nations Development Programme.

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) established in 1994 is the most elaborate and security-specific entity in all ASEAN’s roster of instruments in the organization’s institutional development. With the end of the Cold War and prospects coming in view for the integration of the Indochina states into the Southeast Asian regional association, ASEAN’s security perspectives were necessarily widened.

The ARF is the major ‘outreach’ aspect of ASEAN and of the ASEAN Security Community as this was to be developed (below). Hitherto, the Southeast Asian states’ essential security concerns were intra-mural. In building a security community they seek to rule out war among them. But in principle they cannot do this externally, especially as jealously they continue to uphold their states’ autonomy in matters of defence. The hope of the ASEAN states was apparently that the means to avoid war, based on the norms that worked among themselves, “could be extended
to relations between the community and outside actors”. Acharya goes on:

(The) concerns of ASEAN members confirm that states facing a common security challenge, in this case strategic uncertainty rather than the emergence of a commonly perceived threat, could encourage a new multilateralism, including a security community.  

Following agreement at the ASEAN summit in 1992 that dialogue should be extended, the Ministerial meeting of July 1993 convened an informal meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers and those of eight other wider region states. The outcome of this meeting was a special preparatory meeting of Senior Officials (to become ARF SOM) for the first ARF Ministerial Meeting in July 1994. According to Leifer:

In endorsing a new multilateral process of cooperative security, the ASEAN-PMC senior officials meeting in May 1993 had addressed non-military means only.... ‘There was a convergence of views on the need to find means for consultations on regional political and security issues’

(See Figure 6 for these and the operational developments of ARF.) Thenceforth there were to be annual meetings of ASEAN foreign ministers to be followed by a Post-Ministerial Conference of ASEAN dialogue partners. The ARF was an ASEAN initiative and thus pointedly called the ASEAN Regional Forum and is conceived to be a forum indicating its essential discussion and consultation format, rather than an approach to conflict management and control. This is held jealously in keeping with ASEAN’s normative disposition; and reflects also its own internal way of dispute management. However, as Acharya says:
By anchoring the ARF, ASEAN sought to create a regional order based not only on its own norms, but on the relatively new norm of inclusiveness, which is central to the idea of cooperative security.\(^{128}\)

According to Yahuda:

ASEAN members in particular wanted China to participate.... The Chinese foreign minister who attended as an ‘observer’ reflected his country’s suspicion of multilateral security institutions, of which it had little experience, by insisting that the new organization should not have the powers to take action or to make decisions.\(^{129}\)

It became clear that any suggestion of conflict management would put China beyond ARF’s reach.\(^{130}\) Henderson makes the point: “For an association of predominantly small and medium-sized developing countries, ASEAN’s capacity to engage the interest and cooperation of major powers is striking”.\(^{131}\)

At the second ARF Ministerial Meeting (AMM) at Brunei in August 1995, a paper titled ‘ARF Concept Paper’ was tabled and adopted by the ministers. The Paper was meant to be a blueprint for ARF, but contention over certain of its provisions have proved contentious, notably preventative diplomacy, and so obstructed its adoption in entirety. The Paper asserts that the main challenge of ARF is to “sustain and enhance this peace and prosperity... for the first time in a century or more, the guns are virtually silent…. although the region has a residue of unresolved territorial and other differences.” The paper accepts that “habits of cooperation are not deep-seated in some parts of the region”. “Although ASEAN has undertaken the obligation to be the primary driving force of the ARF”, in seeking peace and stability in Southeast Asia and the wider region:
A successful ARF requires the active participation and cooperation of all participants. ASEAN must always be sensitive to and take into account the interests and concerns of all ARF participants. The ARF should recognize and accept the different approaches to peace and security and try to forge a consensual approach to security issues.132

Hence, “a gradual evolutionary approach is required”. This evolutionary approach is then said to take place in three broadly sequential stages:

Stage 1: Promotion of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)
Stage 2: Development of Preventive Diplomacy Mechanisms
Stage 3: Development of Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms.

Stage 1 consists of four long paragraphs two of which express confidence in the efficacy of ZOPFAN, SEANWFZ and TAC and the consultative and consensual norms by which they operate. The third paragraph refers to confidence-building measures suggested after “extensive consultations” among ARF participants. These are spelled out in two Annexes, for the immediate and longer terms. For the immediate future:

Given the delicate nature of many of the subjects being considered by the ARF, there is merit in moving the ARF process along two tracks. Track One activities will be carried out by governments. Track Two activities will be carried out by strategic institutes and non-government organizations in the region, such as ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP.133

Track One activities consist of intergovernmental meetings largely integral to the ARF structure such as the ARF Ministerial Meetings, Senior Official Meetings (SOMs), Inter-Sessional Meetings and Inter-Sessional Groups (convened in respect of particular issues such as confidence). See Figure 6 for these and the Track Two elements in ARF.
ASEAN-ISIS (ASEAN Institutes of International and Strategic Studies) is a gathering of academic and think-tank bodies in the Southeast Asia region, either created or supported by their governments, and is central in the Track Two approach to cooperative management of security. ISIS is prominent in the discussion and consultation processes backing ARF. It had suggested measures to promote confidence in the region even before the formation of ARF and provided the impetus for the establishment of ARF. CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific) is an offshoot from ISIS and has a membership drawn from think tanks and academic bodies in the wider region from as far afield as Canada, South Korea and Australia. The Concept Paper concludes its observations on Stage 2 optimistically: “Over time, these Track Two activities should result in the creation of a sense of community among participants of those activities”.

There remains a residue of unresolved territorial and other disputes: “Over time, the ARF must develop its own mechanisms to carry preventive diplomacy and conflict-resolution”, thus moving to Stage II. “Preventive Diplomacy would be a natural follow-up to confidence-building measures”. Preventive diplomacy (PD) is conceived as “consensual diplomatic and political action with the aim of preventing disputes and conflicts from escalating into armed conflict”. Difficulties over what meanings were to be put on ‘preventive diplomacy’ were raised by China in 2000. Diplomatic actions were, for China, to be restricted to sovereign states directly involved – foreclosing on more multilateral approaches and intra-state disputes and conflicts – and restricted to armed conflicts rather
than to “preventing disputes and conflicts”. This last was on grounds that “conflicts usually refer to armed actions, hence are not at the same level with disputes, disputes cannot be prevented from arising, and including disputes would render the ARF’s mandate too ambitious”. In 2001 The ARF Ministerial Meeting adopted a paper ‘ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy’ which presented a pared-back definition of PD, since it has “proven to be controversial”, apparently to give some way to China’s objections. Eight principles of Preventive Diplomacy are laid out:

- It is about diplomacy.
- It is non-coercive.
- It should be timely
- It requires trust and confidence.
- It operates on the basis of consultation and consensus.
- It is voluntary.
- It applies to conflicts between and among states.
- It is conducted in accordance with universally recognized basic principles of international law and inter-state relations.

Getting to Preventive Diplomacy proved problematic and in 2003 the ARF annual meeting agreed to continue work on confidence-building measures while noting that ARF had “initiated exploratory work on preventive diplomacy”. “China has remained cautious, arguing that confidence building should remain the primary function of the ARF.” By this time ASEAN and the ARF were coming to be preoccupied with the problems of transnational crime and international terrorism and less, but not excluding, more country and regional-specific security issues. Maritime security was a heightened concern, about which it was natural that Singapore would have a special interest. In 2003 an Inter-sessional
Group (ISG) on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime was formed and two years later an Inter-Sessional Meeting (ISM) on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime agreed on sharing intelligence. (See Fig.5.)
Fig. 5  ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
In the years post-9/11 ASEAN raised its level of defence concerns. Acharya remarks:

The 9/11 terrorist attacks led the ARF to shift its focus from conventional inter-state confidence-building issues to cooperation against transnational issues.... The ARF also formed an Inter-Sessional Group (ISG) on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (co-chaired by Malaysia and the U.S.)

At Brunei’s initiative in 2002 a proposal accepting military and defence officials as members in the ARF system led to a first meeting in the same year. This in turn led from 2003 to twice annual meetings of the ‘ARF defence officials’ dialogue’, convened prior to the meetings of ARF Senior Officials (SOM) and ARF Defence Officials meetings preceding ASEAN Ministerial Meetings (AMM). ASEAN Defence Ministers were to meet in 2006 for the first time since the formation of ASEAN. This was vigorously denied to be a move towards a military alliance or common foreign policy. States’ sovereignty and bilateral relations were still the rule.

Stage III in the ARF Concept Paper is given up to the future:

It is not envisaged that the ARF would establish mechanisms (on) conflict resolution in the immediate future. The establishment of such mechanisms is an eventual goal that ARF participants should pursue.

The paper concludes on an admonitory note to participants, who “should not assume that the success of ARF can be taken for granted”, because “the ARF must be accepted as a ‘sui generis’ organization”, with no precedents to follow.
From Bali Concord I to Bali Concord II and comprehensive security. ASEAN Security Community (ASC)

In 2003 ASEAN refocused on the affairs of Southeast Asia. The initiative for this was taken by Indonesia as it assumed Chairmanship at the Bali ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and the following Summit in October 2003. ASEAN had languished following the frustrations of the economic crisis of 1997-98. Two factors prompted the revitalization: firstly, the event of 9/11 had particular resonance in Southeast Asia with its susceptibility to Islamic extremism and insurgency, secondly, Indonesia was aware that under the rule of rotation of Chairmanship of the association its opportunity to exercise its leadership in shaping security in the region, if not taken in 2003 would have to wait for another ten years (according to the convention of rotation among the states). Initiative was taken in presenting a paper; the ‘Deplu Paper on ASEAN Security Community’, proposing renewal of the principles of non-use of force and non-interference as these had been embodied in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and as these principles acquired new significance in the current circumstances of threat and insecurity in the region. The intention was to “sharpen ASEAN cooperation in human security and defence cooperation, for building national and regional capacity in dealing with internal conflicts, and for building a more integrated security and defence institution”. To this purpose a number of tangible proposals were offered, for an ASEAN Police and Defence Ministers Meeting, a Centre for Cooperation on Non-Conventional Issues, an ASEAN Center for Combating Terrorism, and a Centre for Peace Keeping Training. An additional proposal had been made for an ASEAN Maritime Surveillance Centre.
Whatever strategic and practical merit these ideas may have been granted they also evoked scepticism among the other ASEAN states. The initiative coming from Indonesia was understandable enough, but the smaller states were wary of the greater states’ influence and thrust in the affairs on the region. What a “more integrated political and security” arrangement would entail was unclear. A ‘common security perception stemming from a collective sense of security’ was an idea troublesome among states whose security perceptions and needs were different according to their varied security orientations. Malaysia and Singapore were the more conservative among the states in their view of what regional security should involve; most of all, they were insistent that this should not mean the creation of a military alliance: “Our focus for the ASEAN Security Community is on coming up with a caring society and human security.” Indonesia was careful to change the description of an ASEAN Security Community to “a more integrated security cooperation”; as this was to enter the terms of Bali Concord II in October 2003. The general principles of cooperative and comprehensive security were acceptable, but should exclude any ideas of or ties in defence pacts and military alliances, or common foreign policies. Comprehensive security was widely perceived among the states to be founded on defence as a national prerogative with renunciation of threat or use of force, and on state and common capacities to combat transnational crimes such as terrorism and human trafficking. The growth of economic and social security across the region would be grounded in comprehensive security. This was implicit in the inclusive idea of an ASEAN Community.
The outcome of the ASEAN leaders’ attempt to achieve a concept of a Security Community was the ‘Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II). After nearly forty years the states were bringing Bali Concord I into consonance with the conditions of the twenty-first century. They were doing so in the circumstances of a very different community of states. The final text of Concord II was a very long document, largely acclaiming prevailing norms and ideas and endorsing (in three explanatory parts) the institution of ASEAN Security, Economic and Socio-Cultural Communities. In Part A the ASEAN Security Community is said to:

bring ASEAN’s political and security cooperation to a higher plane....recognizing the sovereign right of the member countries to pursue their individual foreign policies and defence arrangements and taking into account the strong interconnections among political, economic and social realities.

The High Council of TAC gets particular mention as it “shall be the important component in the ASEAN Security Community since it reflects ASEAN’s commitment to resolve all differences, disputes and conflicts peacefully”147. Making clear that the Security Community intends to be a mechanism to deal with contemporary security issues, Concord II determines that:

The ASEAN Security Community shall fully utilize the existing institutions and mechanisms within ASEAN with a view to strengthening national and regional capacities to counter terrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking in persons and other transnational crimes; and shall work to ensure that the Southeast Asian Region remains free of all weapons of mass destruction. It shall enable ASEAN to demonstrate a greater capacity and responsibility of being the primary driving force of the ARF.
Indonesia was asked to produce a plan of action to implement the Security Community. Many suggestions were made for new mechanisms of cooperation, among which that for a peacekeeping force proved especially controversial. There were practical issues such as differences in military doctrines, levels of military capability, and standards of weaponry. The main obstacle was that a peacekeeping force would not fit with the vital norm of non-interference. Of the very many innovative suggestions, Acharya quotes a local source: Indonesia’s “fellow ASEAN members wonder as much about their sheer number as their content”. An important proposal that found its way into the final approved Plan of Action (2004) was that for an annual ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM – Fig.6), first convened in May 2006, whose remit includes non-traditional security threats such as transnational crimes and terrorism as well as maritime security and disaster relief efforts. Finalising the ‘ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action’ took an unusual number of meetings alternating between foreign ministers and senior officials. The Plan was endorsed by the foreign ministers (AMM) in July 2004 and finally approved at the Vientiane Summit in November. Hence it comes to be recorded as the Vientiane Plan of Action. The Political-Security Community was eventually to be implanted as a major aspect of the ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN Community.
Fig. 6 ASEAN Political–Security Community (ASC)
ASEAN Charter: GCC and ASEAN Charters compared. Community development compared.

ASEAN’s transformation from a regional association of six states to one of ten (ASEAN-Ten) politically and economically different states was a clear enough occasion for review of the organization’s structure. Its developmental progress so far was a ground for greater ambition.

In December 2005 an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) was formed following the Kuala Lumpur summit of that year. The group was tasked to “provide the ASEAN leaders with broad policy guidelines on the drafting of an ASEAN Charter.” The leaders had already declared a view of achieving an ASEAN community in 1997 in the Vision 2020 statement. This was carried further in Bali Concord II in 2003 and at the Cebu, Philippines summit of January 2007 the plan for an ASEAN Security Community was accelerated to 2015. In November of the same year the leaders approved and signed the ASIAN Charter. A year later the ten states had ratified it. Ministers and officials were tasked to draft an ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) Blueprint to provide a roadmap and timetable for establishing the APSC. The Blueprint, approved in 2009, required member states to “integrate the programmes and activities of the Blueprint into their respective national development plans…. progress shall be reported annually by the Secretary-General to the annual ASEAN Summit through the APSC Council”, which was to be under the direction of a designated Deputy Secretary-General.

The Charter consists of a document of forty-four detailed institution-building articles, making it strikingly different from the more open and
pragmatic Charter of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which was more a statement of rules of association and its operation and vague appeals to principle and ambition. The GCC has grown in a more pragmatic fashion, measure-by-measure in the fields of economy, society and culture, towards a community. In the GCC a community has been conceived less as an end-goal and more as an outcome of cooperation, but also from stealthful integration as such projects of common market and single currency demand. In the realm of defence and security we have observed progress by response to circumstance slowed by reluctance to coordinate. A GCC community comes less than ASEAN’s as a grand conception, and with less fanfare. ASEAN’s historical beginning was in the Bangkok Declaration of 1967; a typical third world declaration of independence and shared responsibility to maintain this. ASEAN’s genesis as an effective community building association was in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) which affirmed the norms of association and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord (Bali Concord I) which stipulated that “Member states shall vigorously develop a strong ASEAN community” from which “ASEAN evolved as a sort of ‘imagined community’”, in accordance with upholding the conditions of national sovereignty, both of 1976.

The ASEAN Charter, by means of its forty-four articles creates a legal personality and formally binds its members to implementation of its terms. It is the end and consummation of thirty years of creative community building. The articles of the Charter consist of a mix of Purposes (Article 1) and Principles (Art.2), many reaffirming what was
already in place. Article Nine is of particular interest as it sets out the conditions for pursuing the ambition for an ASEAN Community – embodied in the ‘Three Pillars’: the Political-Security, Economic and Socio-Cultural Communities (see Figures 6 and 7). An important structural response in the Charter to the comprehensive Community ambitions of the association was the increase from two to four of Deputy Secretaries-General and allocation of three of these to oversight of the three Communities and their developments. Each of the ASEAN Community Councils is to have the support of relevant Senior Officials (and Secretariat staff) and shall be the main focus of activity of the Sectoral Ministerial Bodies and the Committee of Permanent Representatives from the states (Fig. 7). Parallel bodies in the states such as National ASEAN Secretariats may also be placed in external third countries. There are other linkages with the total system, notably with the Summit (Art. 7,2[c] and the Secretary-General and Secretariat (Art. 11,2[c]). The system is a somewhat mesmerizing network of linkages of responsibilities and communications (Fig. 7).154 The three Communities are the subject of Annex 1 of the Charter. In the Annex roles, functions, reports and implementation for each Council are set out.

The most forward-looking and ambitious aspects of the Charter are those that seek to redefine the Association of Southeast Asian Nations into a Southeast Asian Community encapsulating the three Community Councils for Economics, Society and Security. This last, the Political and Security Community, is critical for ASEAN for it is the earnest of member states to live free of the threat of war among them, and in the medium and long
term the assurance of stability within which the other communities and the whole may develop. This has been essential in the character of the association as it has evolved, as Leifer suggests:

ASEAN has never explicitly declared or articulated a formal model of regional security.... (it) has promoted an exclusively political approach to problems of regional security....and makes no provision for the institutional enforcement characteristic of models of collective security....Over time, it became clear that ASEAN was not about formal dispute settlement or conflict resolution per se, but rather about creating a milieu in which such problems either did not arise or could be readily managed and contained.155

ASEAN has not been conceived as a collective security arrangement. It has at most been an arrangement for cooperative security. How far this is taken will be looked at in the next chapter. Later in the 1990s as ASEAN was to draw in the wider Pacific region into peace and security contacts it was clear that collective security was not a likely proposition.

Leifer’s now dated and qualified understanding of ASEAN is challenged by the institutional innovations of the following decade. The difficulties with China over the treatment of disputes and conflicts were increasingly not carried into the internal affairs of ASEAN as the organization sought more binding effects among its members. The ten ASEAN States will be challenged in their fulfilment of these as the organization seeks to institutionalize the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) in 2015. As Singapore’s ambassador, Tommy Koh, put things at the time: the Charter
Fig. 7 ASEAN Charter: the economic, socio-cultural and political-security communities
would “grow a new culture of taking obligations more seriously”. The Charter was “a work in progress”\(^{156}\). And as Acharya remarks: “It is subject to review after five years” (from December 2008).

Whatever cautionary notes one might see about the capacity and commitment in ASEAN to realize its increasing ambitions, from an academic perspective at least they do exemplify the creative and on-going nature of regional community building. This is an essentially socio-political dynamic – reinforced by and not determined by new legal characteristics.

(xiv) Conclusion

This chapter first briefly showed how the two regional organizations under study, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN), set out to establish themselves existentially, in terms of their particular identities, by reference to historical and cultural characteristics and in terms of agreed modes of operation and basic purposes. In both cases existence is explained by inter-state decisions at the regional level and justified in terms of economic and social objectives. But as the chapter proceeds it is clear that purposes of defence and security were regarded as crucial in the regions, even as initially they were not clearly articulated. Decisions and purposes and the institutional forms built around these are made the primary focus of the chapter. The general working institutional arrangements made in the regions are examined. This is justified on grounds that where regional purposes are agreed there must be some form of competence to pursue
them in regional level agreement, decision making and implementation mechanisms. (Figures 1, 2 and 3 and surrounding text.)

However, the interpretation of and approach towards defence and security are significantly different between the two regions. The GCC is a closed inclusive body and so structurally exclusive within the whole Gulf region. To the extent that the GCC has developed internal community aspects, in non-defence as well as defence aspects, so over time the effect is to weaken prospects for wider regional inclusiveness. The GCC is basically founded on a threat-related perception of relations in the Gulf. This is based on prevalent perceptions of and priority given to regional security complexity conditions. The Gulf Cooperation Council in matters of defence and security is the more directly responsive to regional security dynamics and to circumstances and changes in these. The GCC’s defence orientation is shown in the concentration on formal structural security and defence operational forms, informed by principles of and preparations for defence. It is consequently a regional corporate securitizing actor and is regarded in this way in the wider region, and is thus itself a major aspect of the region’s security complexity. This is made clear by its major partner, Saudi Arabia, being an element in the, numerous troubled, tri-polar configuration of the region. The GCC has been innovative in developing a regional Peninsula Shield Force defence system, but not over the years in a steady and consistent way, nor convincingly in face of member states’ determinations to prioritize their own national defences.
The states of Southeast Asia, through ASEAN, have sought to progress on a peace maintenance approach where conflict avoidance prevails. But it is accepted that there are propensities among the member states for dispute and conflict. The GCC has a mechanism for conflict settlement in the Commission for the Settlement of Disputes, but this has been non-operative and avoided by the states. ASEAN, more deliberately, seeks cooperation among the states through conflict avoidance, and norm-informed mechanisms supervening the challenges of the region’s security complexity. It has refused to adopt an explicit regional defence cooperation position. The position as Acharya has said, is both “pragmatic and principled”: non-provocative (for example, towards Indochina during the Cold War and towards the wider region) and compatible in its conflict avoidance position. The Southeast Asia region is not affected by a configuration of polar states, notwithstanding that Indonesia and Vietnam stand out as influential relative great powers in the region. Indonesia’s pre-eminence was of positive effect in the resolution of the Vietnam-Cambodia problem in the 1990s peace process. The Association of Southeast Nations is a relatively looser body than the GCC. It is a more open and changing body. This has been a major feature of the region’s security dynamics, especially since the end of the Cold War. The loose and open characteristic of ASEAN is explained as it is founded in constructivist preference for process over form in intra-regional relations, its reliance on ‘norms’ perceived to be drawn from regional culture, of acceptable conduct above formal commitments, its developing commitment to community building, and an historic opportunity to incorporate Indochina into an inclusive region.
The chapter has been led to feel its way through the complexities of the two active defence and conflict avoidance approaches, and in the course of doing so has noted points of similarity and convergence. In both regions hesitance has been shown among the states in accepting the needs for more collective commitments in their defence policies and activities. In the GCC this has been expressed notably in resistance to regional demands and in Southeast Asia in regional demands being foregone. In the GCC, states’ defence autonomy is a fact that has to be negotiated. In Section (iv) of the chapter seven explanations were suggested for resistance to regional demands. In ASEAN, on the other hand, states’ autonomy is a norm-based acceptance. Bi-lateralism intra-regionally and extra-regionally, is a widely accepted aspect of states’ policies in both regions. Intra-region vulnerabilities and states’ preferences, and the strategic presence of an external power contribute to this in both regions. A concept of national ‘resilience’ is influential in ASEAN. The governance of norms in the inter-state relations of Southeast Asia, confirmed in a long succession of instruments, is shown to be frequently put under strain. ‘Non-interference’ is a significant restraint in all potentials for regional initiatives.

Both regions have been involved in something of a surge around the turn of the century in defence and security concerns, and in innovatory responses to these. In the later days of defence developments senior military personnel have gained increasing but cautious participation in regional defence counsels. The primacy of political authority remains,
however, and in Southeast Asia the primacy of social-political principles and community goals. At the turn of the century, (when regional, domestic and international insecurities were enlivened) the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council have shown a more active appreciation of the necessity for coordinated defence. In 2000 a GCC Joint Defence Agreement was approved, a Joint Defence Council (and greater armed forces personnel in consultation) was established in 2002, and the development of Peninsula Shield capabilities put in train from 2005. (Fig.4) These developments, their structural and strategic implications, and problems relating to them are discussed at some length in Section vii of the chapter. About the same time (post-Cold War, of 1990s ASEAN enlargement, transnational insecurities, and global disturbance) ASEAN embarked on a new outreaching initiative of consultation, ‘dialogue’ and conflict avoidance. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), founded in 1994, was to be a mechanism to discuss and monitor potentials for threat and insecurity, intra-regional and beyond “where habits of consultation are not deep-seated”, and founded on “a new norm of inclusiveness”. The ARF is an elaborate construction of exchange and discussion that is security-specific, bringing together political, defence and security and non-state parties (in two ‘track’ processes) based on ASEAN’s own norms of good relations between states. In 2002, at Brunei’s instance, military and defence officials were brought into the processes, but bound into the overriding business of keeping and promoting peace. (Fig.5)

Indonesia’s chairmanship in 2003 (on the 10 year rotational basis) was the occasion for responding to the more volatile security circumstances of the
21st Century in Southeast Asia and to restate and strengthen the principles of Bali Concord I and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) of 1976. The outcome in Bali Concord II (2003) was an ASEAN Security Community (ASC) proposal for integrated security *cooperation* (conceived in non-defence terms) in which states’ prerogatives in matters of national defence were upheld, but regional responsibility for trans-regional insecurities; terrorism, human protection, crime and environmental issues promoted. Regional security was to be a tandem aspect in the evolution of the regional community. The idea of regional security community (ASC) was soon after to be worked into the more comprehensive concept of the ‘ASEAN Community’ of three ‘Pillars’: Political-Security, Economic and Social-Cultural Communities as this concept was agreed in 2007, brought into force by ratification in 2008, and was embodied in the ASEAN Charter. Of fifteen purposes laid down the first states “To...enhance peace, security and stability and further strengthen peace-oriented values in the region”. The Charter establishes “the legal and institutional framework of ASEAN”. The grand community objective is conceded to depend on more than the cultivation of and non-formalised adherence to ‘norms’ of Asian cultural origin. The Charter was to be developed, “as a work in progress”, for a review of action taken in five years.

Graphic representations are always abbreviations, but the seven Figures introduced in the chapter were intended to clarify where innovation and development is complex and multi-faceted, and to show, as is said in the chapter, that as function increases growth in structure follows – and as structure follows so also does formality tend to increase. Structure and
formality is more in the character of the Gulf Cooperation Council. As ASEAN’s community ambitions have got nearer to fulfilment a more integrated institutional system has come to be needed. The ASEAN Charter lays down a framework to achieve this.

The next chapter will look at some of the more detailed and specific tangible aspects of defence policy and activity. The hard facts and demands of defence and security are in evidence in both the defence-oriented and peace-oriented regional scenarios.
Notes Chapter Six

1. 1989 is commonly spoken of as if it was some sort of cut-off point. Ash, Timothy Garton, in ‘1989!’, The New York Review of Books, October 2009 writes interestingly: “If we extend ‘1989’ to include the unification of Germany and disunification of the Soviet Union in 1990-1991, we should more accurately say the three years that ended the decade.....I come away dreaming of another book: the synthetic history of 1989 that remains to be written....‘Tiananmen Square’ happened in Europe, too, in the sense that both opposition and reform communist leaders saw what could happen if it came to a violent confrontation, and redoubled their efforts to avoid it.” In this otherwise very perceptive article Ash makes no mention of the end of the Cold War in Vietnam and Southeast Asia, or in East Asia, which surely would have to feature in any “synthetic history”. Vietnam was the most important belligerent power in the global Cold War and its conversion from wartime power to peacetime government in the decade after the end of the Cold War was vital to a Southeast Asian settlement – part of the “synthetic history” of the non-European Cold War.

2. See in Note 1 in Chapter 6(b) (iii).

3. We do not overlook in this the distinction examined towards the end of Section (ix) in Chapter 6(a).

4. There is, of course, a more general sense of institutions according to which having a defence policy and means to pursue it is institutionalisation: defence policy-making bodies, ‘foreign affairs’, armies, defence industries, etc. are institutions. But there is a ‘second order’ of institutions at which these are put together as ‘defence’, where securitisation responds to general security conditions and represents the overall conception of these. There are conceptual difficulties in this area of discussion and some of these arise later in Chapter Eight.

5. See Chapter 6(a)(xi) above.

6. These are aspects of security in a region that may be closely linked.

7. The region is the progeny of anarchy in the international system, and the security interdependence of regional security is an outcome, a dynamic outcome, of enmity as well as of amity. It is also in all probability based on some polarity of power which will have its own enticements to neorealist dispositions. See pages 45 and 51-55 in Buzan et al, Regions and Powers.

8. There is some awkwardness in the subject as to how and when the term ‘security’ is used. ‘Strategic/defence’ (issues) generally apply to the state; ‘security’ generally applies to threats and violations internal to states. Defence policy and agency, for example, are to the state in its relations with other states; security policy and agency are to the internal, or domestic, affairs within states. We have ministries of defence and ministries of security. But in regional security complex theory we talk of actors that bring security issues to the state as ‘referent object’ and the processes of state securitization. Asymmetrically, we
do not apply ‘defence’ to threats and violations internal to states. In discussion, context must determine appropriateness.

9. We observed in the previous chapter a general policy disposition among the Arabian States of the west Gulf to support Iraq in this conflict.

10. The Secretariat statement goes on:“the GCC is a continuation, evolution and institutionalization of old prevailing realities” (without saying what these ‘realities’ have been) “it is, on the other hand, a practical answer to the challenges of security and economic development in the area”. www.GCC- sg.org/eng/index. The GCC website is clearly a useful source of information, subject, however, to awareness of its general declaratory and even acclamatory tone.

11. As to the objectives it might serve the GCC has been a notably open association.


13. The writer’s primary interest was in the processes of decision making and implementation in the GCC, and as shown in the work in areas of economic and social policy.


15. These policies will come to the supreme Council from the Ministerial Council as the end product of long-drawn and convoluted processes of referral, consultation, advice, legal advice, agreement at various political/administrative levels in the States and in the GCC system, and then back through the States’ systems to points of implementation. These long-drawn processes often attract criticism of the GCC for being slow moving. But these processes are also designed to secure acceptance at all levels and so ensure implementation.

16. The Consultative Commission is attached to the Supreme Council. Its discussions (‘instructions to study’) are wholly within the discretion of the Supreme Council and over ten years have been directed to economic and social matters. In 2004 the Consultative Commission was instructed “to study the phenomenon of terrorism”. Conclusions and recommendations are passed to relevant ministerial committees. Any impact on policy is difficult to judge from evidence available.

17. The Commission for the Settlement of Disputes is to all intents and purposes defunct. It has never been convened. States have preferred alternative resorts, even to the extent of carrying dispute for settlement out of the region (Bahrain-Qatar territorial dispute). Bilateralism with intra-region third party facilitation is common. Similar events have taken place in Southeast Asia. The problematics of dispute resolution within ASEAN are similar.
18. Similar principles of organization and process are expected to be found to apply in Southeast Asia, but in more difficult circumstances.

19. In ASEAN there are arrangements whereby the activities of the association are implanted in the member states, beyond the more diplomatic means of consultation and implementation of inter-governmentalism – see later.

20. This conceptual prospect in relation to the GCC will be considered again later.

21. In the survey of Iran in the previous chapter this seemed to be the view of Iran. The increasing movement towards defence, as this is examined later, could be taken to confirm this view. At the same time, tensions between states and region are a feature of regional evolution.

22. This will become clearer later on. And in other realms of economic and social policy the GCC displays communitising intent and activity.


24. Apart from issues of political and economic compatibility, capacity to undertake the representative aspects of ASEAN membership are more difficult for some of the Indochina states. The ideological (communist) character of some of these states becomes less incompatible as they ‘liberalize’. The rigid authoritarianism of Myanmar taxes ASEAN’s more open regimen and its binding principle of ‘non-interference’.

25. Acharya, op cit, p.121. Vietnam had been opposed to ASEAN from its inception and the communist Indochina states had refused to join ZOPFAN. Acharya at pp.121-22 is a good brief account of the difficulties the ASEAN-Six saw to enlargement at the time, and differences among them, as to its wisdom.

26. The Secretary-General’s and Secretariat’s ‘Mandates’ are set out in considerable detail up to changes put in place 1999 in a document entitled ‘ASEAN Secretariat Basic Mandate’ (nd). This is our primary source up to this point.

27. The Hanoi Plan arose from the informal summit of the previous year which had adopted the ASEAN Vision 2020 outlining ambitions for a more integrative region in economic and social terms. The Plan, at great length, set out the details of this Vision.

28. The Eminent Persons Group is one of ASEAN’s numerous occasionally convened non-institutionalized ‘Meeting’ formats (see below).

29. Legal Personality is spelled out in a one-line statement: “ASEAN, as an inter-governmental organization, is hereby conferred with legally personality”. The legal grounds and implications of this are spelled out in the Fact Sheet ‘Significance of the ASEAN Charter’ issued by the Public Affairs Office of the ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta.

30. Even before the new commitments of the Charter the reckoning has been that over 250 meetings a year were held in ASEAN. ‘Meetings’ have been conceived as process in preference to institution. See note 23 above. Under the Charter “more ASEAN meetings” are proudly announced. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers (AMM) and the Secretary-General are given more roles – and so more meetings.
The number and dispersal of meetings in the region have been observed to place particular burdens on the weaker (Indochina) states, who nonetheless gain diplomatic and functional accesses they did not enjoy before. See page 2 of the Fact Sheet.

31. Charter and Fact Sheet pp.1, 2. ASEAN is an international organization: “The term ‘international organization’ is usually used to describe an organization set up by agreement between two or more states.... When lawyers say that an entity is a legal person, or that it is a subject of the law they mean that it has a capacity to enter into legal relations and to have legal rights and duties.... The central issues of which have been primarily related to the capacity to bring claims arising from the violation of international law, to conclude valid international agreements, and to enjoy privileges and immunities from national jurisdictions.” Malanczuk, Peter, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th. ed. London, Routledge, 1997, pp.91-92.

32. These are considerations that will be very much the subject of Chapter eight.

33. Bahrain and Oman. Budget levels, expenditure tracking do not necessarily emerge from year-by-year (annual) national budget statements. We point to issues here rather than resolve them. See Cordesman, Anthony H., The Military Balance in the Middle East, Westpoint and Washington, Praegar and Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004, p.10: “The data on military spending as a percentage of gross national product (GNP) and national budgets are a morass of partial reporting and definitional and comparability problems....” We shall nonetheless feel bound to refer to these estimates later in the last chapter.

34. However, in terms of conventional territorial combat Arabian Gulf forces would likely not match a full-scale assault from its greater neighbours. Political wisdom, even if reluctant, suggests for the foreseeable future the need for troops drawn from outside – a troublesome element in the overall strategic condition.

35. Meanwhile, the issue is divisive as much as unifying among the GCC states.


37. Writing in 2002 at the end of the Muscat summit, John Duke Anthony was observing “But as of now, not everyone has signed the pact that was officially declared at last year’s summit in Bahrain... This is an additional reason why no specific linkage between the prospects for enhancing member states’ material welfare...and the prospects for building a sound pan-GCC system of deterrence and defence was mentioned either in the meetings in Muscat or in most of the previous summits.” ‘The GCC’S 22nd. Summit: Security and Defense Issues”, www.ncusar.org/publications. Figure 4 (see also Fig.2) gives a partial descriptive indication of these processes. As our narrative proceeds we shall see that a few years after the Defense Agreement the GCC was still conducting a radical review of its principal Defence structure, Peninsula Shield, and at the behest of its largest partner.

38. Matters of internal security (of internality of source, or not) touch on senses of state autonomy and competence. Furthermore, ‘interference’ can be caught up in the general tone of relations between states. In recent times objections to Qatar’s links with Israel have been resisted as interference. Contrariwise, Qatar
has had to respond to Saudi resentment of Al-Jazeera comment. But the concept of ‘interference’ is mostly about the state-centric impact of actions not authored by the state and the necessity to protect the state.

39. The ministries of interior would already have some experience and systems in their areas of responsibility, inherited from previous ‘protection’, which would be much less likely for ministries of defence – excepting to some extent in the case of Saudi Arabia.

40. ‘Comprehensive’ in this context may be taken to carry two meanings: that it applies to all the participating states and that it covers a wide range of issues around security as these are perceived by the states.

41. These have been set out most completely in a draft proposal for approval at the 2009 summit in Muscat. www.GCCsg.org/eng/index.

42. The deeper interest in this is the ambition to create a Gulf community, and the necessity this brings with it to control and protect it.

43. We referred to terrorism and associated extremism, particularly in Saudi Arabia, in Chapter 6(b) above. But all the states are affected by terrorism and provocations to state and regime stability. This is sufficient reason for subsuming terrorism and extremism in a common strategy.

44. The lesson drawn was that terrorism in the Gulf could have cross-state aspects. We shall see later that the early years of the twenty-first century were also a time of heightened concerns in the field of defence, and also of new regional policies.

45. See Koch, Christian, in Yearbook 2005-2006, Dubai, 2006.’ Iran has signed security agreements with several GCC (and other) states, most recently with Bahrain. How much more than ‘diplomatic’ or token these agreements might be is hard to say.

46. References to existing provisions in the new Comprehensive Security Strategy suggest that it is an exercise in consolidation as well as up-dating.

47. Buzan et al, Regions and Powers, p.44. (See beginning of Chapter 6(a). The section is not premised on there being an absolute distinction in practice between security and defence, and where there is conjunction this will be remarked.

48. In this snapshot we have taken account of the Iran-Iraq War of the eighties, the Iraq invasion of and eviction from Kuwait of the early nineties, inter-state territorial disputes, and sub-state (and alleged state-proxy) insurgencies and terrorism from the nineties. The Cold War, up to the end of the eighties, was a context of external conflict which generated no significant intra-regional conflict.

49. A complete manual of defence would need to be a political as well as military document.

50. In general combat circumstances the balance in political-military decision making may shift and assertion of political authority can be unhelpful and unwelcome. In what follows we shall notice the sequence in processes of consultation, recommendation and decision. See Figure 4.

51. An apparent point of anxiety and tension in the ambition for coordinated defence in the GCC.
52. This obstructs research, or better said, marks the line beyond which research stops and guesswork and speculation begin. For example, see Figure 2 in the text we see the presence of a Military Committee in the Secretariat-General and indications of its functions. This resource may well be very dated. Attempts to find out more are met with reluctant and unknowing response. Coming nearer to date, we have John Duke Anthony’s report on the GCC 22nd. summit at which the setting up of a new ‘Supreme Defence Council’ (‘Joint’ or ‘Common’ Defence Council) was approved. However, Anthony (who seems to have enjoyed considerable confidence in GCC circles) says: “In keeping with almost all previous summit decisions related to defense issues, no details about the new council’s frames of reference, or anything about its composition, were provided.” He goes on to “surmise and speculate” about the Council’s composition and roles. Anthony’s surmises about the composition are probably about right. See www.ncusar.org. The Secretariat-General reports of the Doha Summit, 2003: “the Supreme Council examined the outcome of the 21st. meeting of the Defense Ministers and the first meeting of the Common Defense Council in which the byelaws for the Common Defense Council and internal procedures of the Council were adopted and the remaining recommendations related to regulating its procedures verified.” We shall come back to this institutional development later.

53. At the end of the May 1981 summit in Abu Dhabi Sultan Qaboos had apparently made an impassioned speech in favour of a committed joint defence on the rational ground of the reciprocal dynamic between defence and security and the economic development of the region, which latter was the declared objective of Gulf cooperation. Such understandings have widened in the years following’ See Long, David E. and Christian Koch, *Gulf Security in the Twenty-First Century*, Abu Dhabi, ECSSR, 1997, p.1. In its status as one of the poorer among the Gulf States and in light of the country’s difficulties with Yemen at the time, Oman clearly had a special interest in joint action among the states. See Anthony report on the 22nd. Summit, 2002.

54. In taking account of such events one needs always to be cautious about when decisions are made and when decisions are implemented. The separation can be practical one, or it can be one of failure – which in commentary is a common observation. Comment on the decisions of the Summits is often highly acclamatory in tone and represent them as successes. But the decisions are preliminary to implementation, where success is properly registered.

55. It has, however, been difficult to establish exactly what the composition of the committee is and what its functions, and also its lines of accountability.

56. A brigade is conventionally a field command and combat and support force of three-to-five thousand men. It is reported that by 2006 the strength of the Force was reduced to about 7,000 personnel. Total US forces in the region have been about 20,000, or twice that of the Gulf force at its strongest.

57. There is, however, an inevitable ambivalence about this, faced as the Gulf States are by the built-in imbalance of size of the present and prospective polar threats in the Gulf. The non-permanence of present limitations (Iraq’s present state and
Iran’s own difficulties) must have a part in GCC strategic estimates – in the shorter rather than the longer term.

58. Discussions to set up a joint air surveillance system over the Gulf were begun at the Riyadh Summit in 1993.

59. The US has not been in an absolute monopoly position in this regard, since in the event of evicting the Iraqis from Kuwait in 1991 calls were made on Arab support from outside the region. Furthermore, short-lived as it was in the event, the Damascus Accord with Egypt and Syria (1991) was at the time a self-perceived acceptance of the GCC’s limited capability to defend itself.


61. This was to be changed under King Abdullah’s later proposals.

62. The apparent uncertain commitment among the states was grist to King Abdullah’s dissatisfaction.

63. In a recent interview the new US Defence Secretary remarked: “The more that our Arab friends and allies can strengthen their security capabilities, the more they can strengthen their cooperation, both with each other and with us.” Interview with Al-Jazeera, 7 September 2009 (My emphasis).

64. This will be considered more in the following chapter.

65. See note 61 above.

66. The impression is difficult to avoid that Saudi Arabia provided the motor behind the discontents at the time and the drive to overcome them. This was a role that perhaps it would have been impossible for one of the smaller states to undertake.

67. Convolution of discussion and negotiation was anyway much generally in the way of proceeding in the GCC.

68. The Supreme Council has often been called a rubber stamp among critics, but the stamp is well inked before it gets to the point of final acceptance and decision. Nothing is more likely to induce non-implementation among the states if the careful processes described are not followed. What is more, reference back from the Supreme Council is not unknown.

69. Treaty making among the states had not been the accepted manner of things in the Cooperation Council from the beginning. But in this and many aspects of the economic and development spheres binding agreements had become essential.

70. Growth and development of joint training and exercises are traced in the annual reports of Brig (retd) Musa H. Al-Qallab in the Gulf Yearbooks, Dubai, Gulf Research Centre. By the mid-2000s various joint exercises are reported, some with reference to the Joint Defence Agreement. Exercises are conducted at joint-state, joint-service and combined (land, air and naval) service. In February 2007 the first large-scale combined services exercise was conducted. Ambiguity is not entirely eradicated as to what is intended for Al-Jazeera Shield Forces. Brig. Al-Qallab reports that the plan to reorganize Al-Jazeera in 2005 is not to disband it, but increase its efficiency: “troops present in the country itself (will) “come to an annual exercise (in Saudi Arabia) conducted once or twice a year”. In 2007
apparently the Chiefs of Staff were to discuss “developing the Al-Jazeera Shield Force to include a land, navy and air force of its own”. For Southeast Asia, Acharya shows a list of numerous bilateral exercises”, almost entirely of air and naval forces. Constructing pp. 171-175. Land force cooperation is less frequent; unwillingness of states is reported to expose themselves to familiarity with their particular terrains, ibid p.171. Participation in the annual US-Thailand Cobra Gold exercise has been gradually widened in the participation of other states. Ibid p.222. “The Indochinese states were drawn into the web of bilateral defence cooperation with ASEAN, and Vietnam established links with the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand”, Ibid p.175; “ASEAN members allowed and encouraged participation of students from other ASEAN countries in military education and officer training programmes at their national institutions ....The Philippines has offered training facilities for Vietnamese officers at its military academy”, pp. 172, 175..

71. There was sufficient contextual reason at the time for the GCC states to think hard about the adequacy and effectiveness of their defence arrangements.


74. Reports on the current strength of the Peninsula Shield Force vary (and have done so throughout its career). An alternative estimate has been of 7,000. Whatever the number, it falls below that set in 1981 of a two-brigade force of 1,000, and also Saudi Arabia provides the greater part of it. The Peninsula Shield has suffered from mixed media attention, sometimes poor according to the critical interests of commentators. At this time of writing I have a report ‘GCC Leaders to Disband Peninsula Shield’: “The Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) decision to send Peninsula Shield units back to their home countries will likely put an end to the 20-year-old joint standing military force”. www.imra.org.il. Sami Faraj of Kuwait believed that: “The decision to reform the Peninsula Shield is nothing more than the first step towards the gradual dismantling of this force” Such commentary neglects the 2000 Defence Agreement and the setting up of the Joint Defense Council in 2002. There is continuity between the events of 2000 on, and also in them as responses to deepening insecurity in the Gulf at the time.

75. Senior Service personnel were now acquiring greater influence in the processes of final decision-making in matters of regional defence.


77. It should be recalled (see above in text) that this was also a time when the Gulf States were drawn into heightened activity in matters of Security.

78. Oman, Saudi Arabia and Yemen all have long out-of-Gulf coasts, lying alongside important sea-lanes, which are currently vulnerable to maritime hi-jacking activities.

approved provisions of 2006 for more, and more routine, inter-services training and exercises. Detailed accounts of exercises (joint and bilateral) at Services and combined Services levels and joint with non-Gulf forces are given in annual reports by Brig. Musa Hamad Al-Qallab in the Gulf Yearbook of the Gulf Research Center, Dubai, U.A.E. A wide range of military and specialist training is given in state schools, colleges and institutes at state and exchange levels, up to command and staff level.

80. It is unclear to this writer from reports and commentaries in the public domain whether the now home-based units would be differentiated Peninsula Shield units, or whether, as they might be needed for joint service or exercise, they would be drawn from states’ defense forces. What force, what force units, would be typically deployed in joint exercises in the future, would give some indication here. It does seem clear, however, that it is a mistake to take the repatriation of states’ units as evidence of an intent or likelihood that this should lead to the dismantling of the Force. See Note 77.

81. What could, perhaps, be called Peninsula Shield II.


83. Henderson, Jeannie, Reassessing ASEAN, Adelphi Paper 328, London, IISS, 1999, p.17. Why “ostensibly”? ASEAN members were quite explicit about “avoidance of a defence pact”. Furthermore, they showed anxiety not to appear provocative, particularly towards Vietnam.

84. Ibid, p.34.

85. The ‘ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration)’, Thailand, 8 August 1967. www.ASEANsec.org.

86. Acharya, Constructing, p.175. In this sort of security setting, according clearly to the ‘regional security complex’ concept, states are faced with a choice between presenting an offensive defence or non-offensive defence security posture. We shall say more on this later. For a Gulf-related study see Moller, Bjorn, Resolving the Security Dilemma in the Gulf Region, Emirate Occasional Paper 9, Abu Dhabi, ECSSR, 1997.

87. Bangkok Declaration. The management of peace is conceptually quite different from non-offensive defence. It does not neglect the presence or potential for dispute and conflict. But, as we shall see, it runs into difficulties with the norm of non-interference and the prospect of dispute resolution.

88. The United Nations Organization was itself caught up in the current framework of competitive Cold War powers in the world, and offered no more than its universal political and legal standards of good behaviour among states.

89. We shall come to see later that this has been a significant informing element in ASEAN’s conception of community development.

90. Acharya, Constructing, p.58, and pp.54-59 for the negotiating context at the founding of ASEAN. Indonesia was a state, at the time, of some two hundred million people and so large, even by global measures. But its vast archipelagic character and social diversity made the advantage of size vulnerable to challenge.
– as shown, for example, in the break-aways of Aceh, East Timor, and small islands ethnically and politically detached. Nevertheless, in size Indonesia is several times larger than the whole Arabian Gulf. Its relative great size within Southeast Asia also contributes to its leadership status in the region, but also to its potential negative influence, as in the 1997-98 economic crisis.

91. As early as November 1971 the ASEAN foreign ministers had sought to establish a “zone of peace” in Southeast Asia. A matter of peace can be a matter of dispute, as shown in the highly contentious debates around the proposal for a ‘Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality’. See text Note 115 below.

92. Connecting with their particular strategic interests, Indonesia and Malaysia were more concerned about China, and Singapore more about withdrawal of US restraints and Japan’s remilitarization and competitive trading ambitions.

93. Thailand’s relations with Vietnam were traditionally antagonistic (resistant to Vietnamese hegemonism in the sub-region) and enjoyed America’s continued protection as a buffer to Chinese penetration and against Burmese instability.


95. Sometimes articulated in ‘codes of conduct’.

96. We should also take cognisance of ASEAN states out-living a recent history of active inter-state and sub-regional conflict. Anticipating the discussion a little; there is much in what ASEAN envisions and does that involves an implicit functionalism in linking interdependently socio-political objectives and security that goes beyond any mere contingent linkage. The ASEAN Charter comes to make this clear. The GCC has also been strongly influenced by the conviction that secure regimes, stable societies and prosperous economies are essential foundations for national security and defence. Regional non-military cooperation – social and economic community – enhances this and interlocks the states increasingly.

98. See Chapter 6a(x) above. In this writer’s reading about Southeast Asia and ASEAN the impression gained is that commentary and study is preoccupied with the fact that ASEAN was formed and has developed and scant attention has been paid to reasons why it was formed. But see the general analytic discussion at Acharya, Constructing, pp.36-37 where alternative ‘triggers’ (material and ideational) are posited. But constructivism suggests that security communities are ‘constructed’ – evolve in creative processes – that are later than what Adler and Barnett call the “nascent stage”, after the ‘triggering mechanisms’ that follow leaders’ calculations of prospective benefits. Even ‘Asian-Way/ASEAN-Way thinking rationalizes ex post-facto regional formation rather than explains (though it motivates too), and in any case represented a common drift of thought in the ‘third world’ of the time. The United Nations too was a party in the current ‘re-think’, though in its practice it was compromised.

99. Acharya, Constructing, p.78. In regard to the latter in particular, instating and developing ASEAN has (necessarily) taken on increasingly formalized modes and forms, particularly in stages towards the ASEAN Charter, 2007. Extrapolating
from village to state, to regional relations is at least an arguable matter, and this seems to be borne out in practice.

100. Javanese customs within Indonesia, within Southeast Asia. Not to be out-done, Malaysia’s foreign minister claimed in 1997: “our common cultural heritage, especially the kampong (village) spirit of ‘togetherness’, not only was a key factor behind secret Malaysia-Indonesia negotiations to end Konfrontasi, but also formed the basis of the establishment of ASEAN”. Quoted Acharya, p.78. (Might not ‘secrecy’ have been a non-traditional mode of encounter – in a non-traditional setting?)


102. Compare Article Four of the Charter of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

103. Chapter One, Purposes and Principles, Article 2. The treaty is commonly referred to by its acronym, TAC. Acharya refers back to the Bandung Non-Aligned Conference of 1955 and the United Nations Charter: “ASEAN’s adoption of these norms therefore was not so much a matter of conceptual invention, but of their incorporation into a socialization process to redefine the regional political and security environment”; Constructing, p.55. Chapter IV, Art.14 of TAC makes an important provision for a High Council whose remit is to “take cognizance of the existence of disputes or situations likely to disturb regional peace and harmony”. We shall refer to this body later.

104. Acharya, pp.62-70: “While ASEAN countries were keen about the principle of regional autonomy they were pragmatic enough to realize that complete self-reliance was not feasible, under the present circumstances.” The principle would come under contention in other ways, as we shall see.

105. The ASEAN (Bangkok Declaration) 1967, as affirmed in the preliminary statements. This statement is noticeably made in the indicative manner rather than in the normative mode.

106. Henderson, Assessing, gives three reasons why non-interference became “a guiding tenet for ASEAN”: fear of communist insurgencies by external infiltration and subversion, widespread ethnic and ideological differences among the states
should not be cause for intervention, vital attachment to national sovereignty of each state is resistant to interference – and is a barrier to supranationality in the development of ASEAN. We have noted that sovereignty is noted as a “fundamental principle” in the TAC. We shall return to Henderson’s interesting ‘Debating Non-Interference’, pp.48-55, later.

107. In a recent paper given at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies of Singapore, Rudolfo Severino (the first secretary of ASEAN) strikes a cautious and critical note on the influence of ASEAN’s principles as these are restated in the Bali Concord II (9th ASEAN Summit, October 2003. The fundamental principles were reaffirmed and were intended to take ASEAN towards a new ASEAN Security Community.) BCII in projecting a new ASEAN Security Community (more on this later) is meant “to bring ASEAN’s political and security cooperation to a higher plane”. “This has first”, Severino says:

“to do with nurturing ‘common values’ and developing ‘a set of socio-political values and principles’. The leaders, of course, do not specify the nature and content of the values that are to be nurtured and developed; it is up to ministers and officials to do that. If in doing so the ministers and officials merely reiterate the old shibboleths about national sovereignty, non-interference, the non-use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and even the comprehensive nature of security, they will not be advancing the development of ASEAN Security Community…”

The paper is a long survey of ASEAN of the time and of the changing security issues it faces, and signals clearly the persistence of the organization’s norms, and also the need to clarify their meaning and application in these circumstances. Severino, Rudolfo, ‘Towards an ASEAN Security Community’, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004, pp. 9-10.


109. Interestingly, Acharya speaks of the obligations under ‘non-interference’ as being understood in “operational terms”. p.72.

110. Refer to Section (iii) above.

111. Table of ASEAN Treaties/Agreements and Ratification as of April 2010. The source is not given.

112. The founding document of 1967 had established two lasting and influential offices; those of the ASEAN Ministers (the states’ foreign ministers) (AMM) and the Standing Committee (later, the Coordinating Committee).

113. Preamble and Article 1 (of 2). The source of this is, and will usually be for other instruments, www.ASEANsec.org.

114. Henderson, Assessing, p. 18. Malaysia had particular worries at the time about China’s possible concerns for its numerous ethnic brethren in the country.

115. Ibid. Acharya, Constructing, pp.66-70 gives a fuller account of the animated debates around ZOPFAN and neutrality. A number of the states believed this must be secured in formal regional neutralization. Others believed this would
necessarily involve external Great Power guarantees. Eventually ZOPFAN ended up as a declaratory instrument, and as part of the unchallenged fabric of ASEAN.

116. ZOPFAN had justified its interest in a nuclear weapons-free zone in Southeast Asia on the ground that it would take part in “the significant trend” for such zones in other non-power regions. SEANWFZ was explained by reference back to ZOPFAN and to the authority and effectiveness the International Non-Proliferation Treaty and safeguard of the IAEA (Art.4, 2 (d)).

117. Acharya, Constructing, pp.70 and 199.

118. Charter, Chapter 1, Art.1(3).

119. A very useful note on the history, principles, accessions and provisions of the TAC can be found on Wikipedia.

120. Provision comes in time, by amendment to the treaty, to be made for states outside of ASEAN to accede, thus attempting to conjoin such states in the peaceful endeavours of ASEAN. As of July 2009, when the U.S. finally signed, twenty-seven states had signed. China is not a signatory.

121. A provision objectionable to the Chinese for its implications of monitoring activities in the South China Sea.

122. Acharya, Constructing, p.191 (note 152) and Henderson, Assessing, pp.39-40 where she discusses the Hun Sen case.

123. This comes to be a reference point in later instruments. The final item in the Concord suggests the “Study of the desirability of a new constitutional framework for ASEAN”.


126. Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum, p.27.

127. The Post-Ministerial Conferences of dialogue partners are important for the access to the wider counsels of East Asia they afford for the smaller states, particularly of Indochina.

128. Acharya, op cit, p.199.


130. China in fact made this clear if it was to be a participant. From its initial 18, ARF’s participants were in time increased to 27, including the major powers: the United States, China, Russia and Japan. Rather extraordinarily, in a ten-year declaration by the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, June 1993, it was stated that “Efforts must be made to control the number of participants to a manageable level to ensure the effectiveness of the ARF”. www.ASEANregionalforum.org, by the ARF Unit established in the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, 2004 (See Figure 6.).

131. Henderson, Assessing, p.11. ARF took place in a wider ‘outreach’ going on in East Asia In 1989 the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) was established and in 1996 the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was initiated. “ASEAN’s role in ASEM fell between its formal position as the ARF’s ‘driving force’, and its minimal institutional presence in APEC. It has nonetheless steered the Asian side of the ASEM process.” Ibid p.29. See Johnston, Alastair Iain, ‘Socialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Way and International Relations Theory’ in
eds. Ikenberry and Mastanduno, *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, N.Y., Columbia University Press, 2003. This analyses in depth the ways “the ASEAN Way” is of influence – in a collection of twelve papers the rest of which are very much in the Asia-Pacific great powers relations approach.


133. Para 11 of the Concept Paper.

134. It is inevitable that one should draw on the detailed and deeply penetrative knowledge of Acharya, *Constructing*. For the beginnings and membership of ASEAN-ISIS see p.272 and Note 109 in the section ‘Towards participatory regionalism’, pp271-275. Track II processes are a distinctive aspect of ASEAN, the ARF. Are the research and discussion processes undertaken by the Gulf Research Center (GRC) and the Emirates Research Center (ECSSR) approaches in this direction in the Gulf? There is no information available that might indicate influence from the Centers on the GCC, and certainly no structured linkage. However, both Centers claim to provide research and consultancy to official departments in the states.

135. Particular attention is suggested to pages 198 and associated Notes 20 and 21, and the section ‘Towards participatory regionalism’ at pp.271-75.

136. See Acharya, the long and detailed Note 46 at page 135 for an account of the strenuous efforts made in 1999 in the Track Two body, the Council for Security and Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), and ARF-ISG to agree on a definition of Preventive Diplomacy. It was here that China raised its objection to disputes and conflicts ‘between and within states’.

137. [www.ASEANsec](http://www.ASEANsec).

138. This part of the text has been heavily dependent on Acharya, pp.201-05.

139. The enormous significance of Singapore Port as a potential terrorist target is considered in an interview with Anthony Davis, ‘Singapore Port Terror Attack Could be Worse than Lehman’s Collapse’, reviewing *Terrorism and the Maritime Transport System*. Singapore lies at the narrow exit/entry point of the Strait of Malacca – a ‘World oil chokepoint’. The port handles about 20% of global maritime containers; i.e. global commerce traffic.

140. To recall: Inter-Sessional Meetings enjoin all ARF representatives, following the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings (AMM).


142. Keeping track of ARF meetings is a bewildering business. Acharya provides something of a guide at page 206. Even more bewildering is keeping track of the full range (security, economic, social/cultural) of ASEAN meetings. This is said to put a serious burden on the smaller and weaker (Indochina) states’ personnel and financial resources. Speaking of 1995, Henderson that “the essentially consultative nature of much of ASEAN’s functional cooperation...continued to expand, with 250 meetings held annually...In 1992, the ASEAN Secretariat was given additional resources.” *Assessing*, p.23.

143. Acharya, pp. 266-67.
144. The paper makes reference to all the previous declarations and treaties embodying the norms and commitments of ASEAN such as TAC, The Bali Concord I, Zopfan and SEANWFZ.
145. The many proposals and the discussions and controversies around them can be followed over pages 262-65.
146. Acharya, Constructing, p. 265. We have remarked similar apprehensions in the Gulf, at Note 51.
147. No apparent aversions to the problems China raised in the ARF.
148. Acharya, op cit, p.263.
149. Acharya, p. 265.
150. Whether this has entered perceptions of things in the Gulf it is likely that the closer a community develops among the GCC states the more difficult it could become to widen it on a regional level – the tighter inclusion the stronger exclusion.
152. State and regional autonomy, equality of member states, non-interference, peaceful resolution of disputes, non-use of force and avoidance of conflict.
153. Acharya, pp. 71 and 286. The TAC has henceforth been the reference for the norms of the association and serves as the necessary benchmark for membership (accession to which formally made the admission of the Indochina states in the 1990s possible). ASEAN’s knack of turning its integral terms to wider purposes can be seen in China and Japan’s accessions to TAC in 2003 and 2004 as earnest of their good relations with ASEAN. ‘Codes of conduct’ are preferred to formal undertakings on both sides.
154. We have suggested earlier that as objectives and functions grow structural arrangements must follow. For ASEAN its principle of informalism is strained. The national ASEAN Secretariats are located in the states’ foreign ministries, but are ASEAN bodies and not in the conventional way ministry ‘desks’. They are communicating and coordinating bodies.
155. Leifer, The Asian Regional Forum, pp. 4,16. The complex ways of desecuritizing diplomacy in Southeast Asia, and indeed by extension in Asia-Pacific, the so-called ASEAN Way, have been followed earlier in the section on the ARF. In the way of constructing “the institutional enforcement characteristic of models of collective security” the GCC goes further than ASEAN, but with continuing difficulty.
156. Ambassador Koh had remarked that ASEAN had only secured about 30% implementation of its agreements. In fact this is probably not a disastrous level of achievement as regional bodies go, bearing in mind that there is always substantial ‘drag’ between decision and implementation, and bearing in mind ASEAN’s non-compulsive consensual ways. Ambassador Koh’s optimism in 1995, “Over time, our region’s interconnectedness will be as dense as Europe’s. And we will grow closer together as a community.” Quoted, Henderson, Assessing, p. 24. The ASEAN Charter is the hoped-for framework for this.
Chapter Seven

Practicalities of defence and security and their implications

(i) Introduction
In previous chapters we have remarked a general distinction between our two regions in their approaches to issues of defence and security. This reflects a practical difference between in the one case, the Gulf, accepting the circumstances of the Gulf region’s security complexity and so a disposition towards ‘enmity’ (suspicion, perceptions of hostility, wariness and defence preparedness) in regional inter-state relations; with, however, a wish to subjugate this disposition among a regional sub-group, the Gulf Cooperation Council the better to confront the perceived hostility of the two polar powers Iraq and Iran.\(^1\) In the other case, Southeast Asia, there is recognition of conditions of regional security complexity and so inter-state suspicion and state-centric preparedness, but seeking through regional association to supervene at regional level over these insecurity conditions in policy and activity pursuits of conflict avoidance, non-use of force and peace maintenance in the manner of security community building. From the closure of the Cold War in Indochina and resolution of the Vietnam-Cambodia issue Southeast Asia has avoided the deep fracture that obtains in the Gulf and so acquired a basis from which a common defence (or peace-making) strategy is conceivable.
In what follows in this chapter there will be some observations about practical defence and security policies and remarks on how these appear to be active in the two regions.\(^2\) It does not take a discussion of security and defence of states or regions very far if it does not cover the hard means or material wherewithal of actual security and defence; that is, of war and preparation for war and security of political systems. Means and wherewithal applied to defence are a register of the practical meaningfulness of judgments of security circumstances in a security complex and of the institutionalisation of their management. In respect of both regions the defence practicalities discussed highlight the security complexes of the regions and the concerns of the states severally, and their conduct relating to their defence and security within these security complexes. This is a principal subject of the chapter. The question arises and will be discussed as to whether the pursuit of a regional security community in Southeast Asia makes a notable difference in defence and security behaviour as measured by the material preparation for conflict in the region as compared with the conduct of regional defence in the Gulf. Around the turn of the millennium instances of conflict in the Gulf occurred in which scenarios of the application of radical new military technology took place, providing what Freedman says was “a useful starting point” in understanding “the transformation” in military affairs.\(^3\) This will be discussed as the application of the means of ‘modern warfare’ have become influential in the two regions.
(ii) Defence policy: location in states. Military mobilizations and expenditures

Basic understandings about sovereignty and defence and security autonomy of the member states in the two regions are conditions against which the potential strategic rationality of regional level defence has to contend. Once states, or their leaders, confront their relations to states around them, as unavoidably they must, they must come to some settled view of the dynamics of these relations and formulate an appropriate and sustainable policy approach. Apart from any will there may be for amity, there must be some judgment of potential or real, distant or imminent threat, to their national security and state stability. Governments must always assess policy against the measure of its capacity and capability to furnish its policy. Regionalism of defence, where it may be developed, creates another level of capability judgments or options by which a state judges the relative merits of self-sufficient, unilateral or ‘resilient’ defence, or cooperative, coordinated or integrated defence with other states. The conditions of regional security complexity do not necessarily determine any particular pattern of defence response to these conditions – the states may be variously rational or successful in their approaches to their situations in a regional security complex. Defence is an aspect of sovereignty. Its promotion is the prerogative of the state and is widely jealously guarded by governments. There is evidence for this in both our regions where initiatives in defence policy and action are only very reluctantly given over to the regional level, even in latter day innovations: in the Gulf, for example in the 2000 Joint Defence Agreement and the Peninsula Shield restructuring as a rapid deployment force that followed. The proportion of national defence forces pledged to Peninsula Shield is
small and these are relocated in the states. In Southeast Asia there are processes agreed among the states of dialogue and consultation which are protective of norms of sovereignty and non-interference and procedures of ‘moving at a pace comfortable to all’. The states weigh their own strategic interests, not only against regional interests but also with regard to the prospects of securing peace and conflict avoidance. ‘Bi-lateralism’ pulls more strongly in matters of choice of defence partners than intra-regional coordination, and in defence procurements multiple bi-lateralism’ of suppliers is preferred to coordination. For both regional associations any notion of there being a ‘defence alliance’ is vigorously foresworn, leaving it free for prospective antagonists to judge for themselves what degree of other joint military capability they could encounter in their own defence.

The critical initiatives in deciding defence policy lie in the political realm. The domestic economy is the basic source of defence resources. Resource allocation is the harder face of defence dispositions. How effective a state may be in its defence and security is basically dependent on the resources it is able and willing to allocate to these, including appropriately trained military personnel. These resources may, in practice, be augmented by the promissory resources of allies (in a regional arrangement – an attack on one is an attack on all), or the recruitment of some external partner. The basic defence resources are recruited military personnel, and equipment and operational hardware (and their distribution between the three services). The tables that follow (Tables A and B) are sourced mainly from The Military Balance, IISS, 2003 to 2009
with additional reference to Cordesman, The Military Balance in the Middle East

Conventional three services military personnel numbers tend to be fairly stable and respond less freely to changes in available military resources, except as defence crises occur. Allocations to military arms and equipment respond more freely to such factors as economic conditions,

Table A  Defence, Security personnel - Gulf (population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Air</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Other forces</th>
</tr>
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<td>18,000</td>
<td>*incl.Air Defence,15,000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>52,000e</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>RGC (Pasdaran) 120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>52,000e</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>Basij 300,000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>RGC 125,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003*</td>
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<td>20,000e</td>
<td>2,000e</td>
<td>*Pre-war.AirDef.17,000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Paramil.42-44,000 ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
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<td>1,200*</td>
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<td>*Security Forces 33,100e</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>186,957*</td>
<td>1,887*</td>
<td>1,900*</td>
<td>* &quot; &quot; &quot; 386,312e</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sao 27.6</td>
<td>2003</td>
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<td>18,000</td>
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<td>National Guard 75,000</td>
</tr>
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<td>13,500</td>
<td>Paramilitary 15,000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Air Defence 4,000</td>
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<td>(PeninsulaShield 9-10,000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bahrain 0.8</td>
<td>2003</td>
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<td>1,500</td>
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<td>Paramilitary 10,160 incl.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>National Guard, Coast Guard.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2007</td>
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<td>700</td>
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<td>Kuwait 2.8</td>
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<td>11,000</td>
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<td>Reserve 23,000</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>2,500e</td>
<td>2,000e</td>
<td>Paramilitary6,600e</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>2,500e</td>
<td>2,500e</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; 6,600e</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>11,000</td>
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<td>2,500e</td>
<td>Reserve 23,700</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Paramilitary 7,100e</td>
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<td>Oman</td>
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<td>4,200</td>
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<td>25,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>1,800e</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8,500</td>
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<td>1,800</td>
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<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.A.E.</td>
<td>44,000*</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>2,500e</td>
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<tr>
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<td>44,000</td>
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<td>2,500e</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>4,500**</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,500e</td>
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Paramilitary 4,400
Royal Hse.Guard 6,400
Tribal Home Guard 4,000

** Air Def. Coastguard,
*Incl. Dubai 15,000
### Table B  Defence, Security personnel – Southeast Asia (population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Air</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Other forces</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Paramilitary – Gurkha reserve, 2000+e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Paramilitary, 2,500 – Gurkha reserve 400-500</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cambodia</strong></td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>75,000e</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>3,000e</td>
<td>Provincial forces 45,000</td>
</tr>
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<td>75,000e</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>2,800e</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>75,000e</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>2,800e</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>75,000e</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>2,800e</td>
<td></td>
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<td><strong>Indonesia</strong></td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>230,000e</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>45,000e *</td>
<td>*two fleets. Reserves 400,000</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>230,000e</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>45,000e</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>230,000e</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>45,000e</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>230,000e</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>45,000e</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Laos</strong></td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>25,600</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td></td>
<td>Paramilitary 100,000 – for Local defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>25,600</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>2008</td>
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<td>3,500</td>
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<td>80,000*</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>*to be 60,000-70,000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>80,000</td>
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<td>15,000</td>
<td>Paramilitary 20,100</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>80,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td></td>
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<td><strong>Myanmar</strong></td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>350,000e</td>
<td>15,000e</td>
<td>16,000e</td>
<td>Paramilitary 107,000</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>350,000e</td>
<td>15,000e</td>
<td>13,000e</td>
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<td>15,000e</td>
<td>16,000e</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Philippines</strong></td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>66,000</td>
<td>16,000e</td>
<td>24,000e</td>
<td>Paramilitary 44,000, Reserves 131,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>66,000</td>
<td>16,000e</td>
<td>24,000e</td>
<td>40,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>66,000</td>
<td>16,000e</td>
<td>24,000e</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>16,000e</td>
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<td>50,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
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<td>190,000</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>190,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>412,000e</td>
<td>412,000e</td>
<td>412,000e</td>
<td>412,000e</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*incl. Air Defence Paramil. 96,300 " 93,800 " 800 paramilitary Gurkha unit " Reserves 312,500

changes in perceived threat, inter-state competitive procurement (the security dilemma), innovation and invention in military equipment and changes in strategic visions. Military force numbers are deceptive in the absence of taking into consideration many other factors. As Cordesman says: “Like all analytic tools, numbers have inherent limitations”, but military force personnel are important as they are viewed (for the greater number among them) as ‘bearers of arms’:

Force numbers can be particularly valuable when they show the full range of major combat weapons, and show the different force mixes involved in different countries. Simple counts of total manpower ...often disguise as much as they reveal.⁹ Qualitative aspects of military forces are important and this will be evident when we discuss ‘technology of war’ in Section (iv) below.
From Table A we see that the present two major non-GCC powers in the Gulf mobilize high levels of land-force personnel. However, Iraq’s removal by defeat at war in 2003 brought about a fundamental change in the balance of power in the Gulf. In due course, Iraq is likely to be restored to an overall military profile comparable to and competitive with that of Iran, but as yet there are too many factors of socio-political uncertainty to venture strong predictions.  

As Iraq is fully restored to sovereign initiative and capability over its defence and security normal regional polarity in the Gulf will come to be reinstated, but with possible ethnic-sectarian aggravations and instabilities at the Iraq-Iran and Iraq-Saudi-Kuwait borders. Iran’s conventional forces number about one-half million, of which some two-fifths are conscripted and of limited training and combat readiness. Included in these forces is the Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) about which Cordesman says: (it) “plays a major role in internal security (and is close to central political power). Nevertheless, it seems best to treat the IRGC primarily as a military land force that parallels the Iranian regular army”. The third Gulf regional power, Saudi Arabia, has land forces matching those of its GCC allies together, fewer than those of its primary antagonist Iran, but wields predominant ‘modern war’ capabilities of early warning, air defence and surveillance. The smaller states of the Gulf have limited national personnel pools and are increasingly inclined to military technology effectiveness. They are in principle bound into the qualitative requirements of ‘modern war’ and the rational needs of sub-regional defence coordination. All the states (in both regions) have various
reserve, auxiliary and parallel armed formations which perform special
defence (for example, air defence), internal security and regime protective
roles.

In Southeast Asia high levels of land-force mobilization are present in
Indochina (Table B). Vietnam’s difficult relations with China, and perhaps
some difficulty in winding down old Cold War combat formations, account
for the country’s high level of mobilization. Since the country’s
incorporation into ASEAN Vietnam is no longer in a state of confrontation
with maritime Southeast Asia, nor with Indonesia, and anyway no longer
has the benefit of a major power’s patronage, although Russia is reviving
its arms supply links. In the case of Myanmar the nature of the ruling
regime and chronic ethnic and separatist problems largely account for the
country’s disproportionately high level of mobilization. The military
benefits from its control of the political system, and from Chinese
patronage. Thailand has to manoeuvre between the instabilities of its
Myanmar neighbour and the country’s historically stressed relations with
Vietnam. Thailand has internal security problems and an ethnic-separatist
issue at its border with Malaysia. The Thai army has been politically
interventionist and supportive of the monarchy. In 2006 it removed prime
minister Thaksin Shinawatra. After Indonesia and Myanmar, Malaysia has
a high level of conventional forces, largely explained by domestic security,
border issues and defence of its territory on Sabah. On the maritime-
insular state side of the Southeast Asia region Indonesia’s sheer size and
widely dispersed geostrategic character – and the country’s record of
military pre-eminence in the political system – account for an overall high
level of mobilization. Large naval and paramilitary forces attend to the security issues of a country of widely dispersed insular character. The Philippines have substantial armed forces, but defence has been constrained by difficult economic circumstances. A US umbrella of protection had, politically, to be relocated at a distance. Southeast Asia is not beset by the problems of intra-regional aggressive polarity as is the Gulf, but general high levels of armed force maintenance and deployment are accounted for by numerous problems of inter-state defence and domestic security. The greater Asia region is widely nuclearized and ASEAN has sought by its diplomatic and treaty means to contain this against ‘fall-out’ from non-Southeast Asia incidents.¹²

Force numbers not analysed for contextual factors (land-force ratios, sustainability, conventional and asymmetric threat, etc), comparisons of force strengths, leadership, armed services ratios, and personnel qualitative characteristics ”often disguise as much as they reveal”. Force numbers are nonetheless the basic element in a country’s defence, combat capability and combat readiness. As Cordesman says: “Total manpower numbers provide a rough picture of the level of effort given nations devote to their military forces.”¹³ They also provide a rough picture of nations’ responses to the dynamics of insecurity in the region around them. But the combat capability of ‘boots on the ground’ depends on the combat hardware they are provided with.
(iii) Defence Expenditures: conventional and an increasing range of asymmetric threats. Emphasis on ‘modern war’ capabilities

The measurements of national financial commitments to defence for the Gulf and Southeast Asia, as shown in Tables E and F below, are conventional, but they offer little help in forming clear comparative judgments between our two regions. One way it seems we can do this is to take defence expenditures and percentage GDP averaged among the states for a number of years. The point of doing this is to see if a significant aggregate difference is observable between the two regions and whether this might be attributable to any regional differences in approach to defence and security. We have, however, indicated that the evidence suggests that there is common response to conditions of security complexity between the two regions. The apparent difference in approach to defence and security is in Southeast Asia in the regional efforts towards creating a security community intended to supervene over the basic security complex conditions of this region; by agreed norms of non-use of force and conflict avoidance. In a less heightened articulated and institutionalised way, a more pragmatic way, conflict avoidance also informs relations among the GCC states and may be seen as an element in sustaining these states against a perceived common antagonist. This approach to conflict avoidance, however, is not region-wide. We have remarked earlier that the one instrument established by the GCC, the Commission for the Settlement of Disputes, has lain dormant and the settlement of disputes is pursued by other means, sometimes diplomatically within the GCC and sometimes by external processes of adjudication.
Table C  Av. States’ defence. expenditures - Gulf and Southeast Asia. And av. % GDP

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Table C appears to show a lower level of response to regional security in Southeast Asia than in the Gulf. But this does not necessarily mean a low level of such response. What could be suggested is that the regional security response in the Gulf is at a high level; explained, for example, by the historic record of major conflict in the Gulf and current perceptions of immediate threat. In Southeast Asia major conflict has been stilled since the end of the Cold War. The Gulf has turned a greater economic resource base to defence, and Southeast Asia a lower base. The different average expenditures as percentage of GDP are striking, even though by world standards this measure is high also in Southeast Asia. What is suggested from this is that the security community aspects of regionalism in Southeast Asia are not evident from this comparison and this might be because the security community in Southeast Asia is in the making, not in present reality. Short of a finer analysis the result here is inevitably impressionistic. Whilst Table C above might at first glance have appeared to uphold an impression that a security community perception might make a notable difference to practice, when we look at Southeast Asia (below) we find there is a discordance between perception, principle and
practice, and why this is so. A more direct approach to defence expenditures of the states and the circumstances relating to these will be more illuminating. Tables such as E and F following need to be contextualised as to, for example, political and strategic circumstances and budgetary capabilities.

Both regions have big revenue earners and big defence spenders. Saudi Arabia ranks high on both scores. Gulf (including GCC states) defence expenditures draw on a high oil revenue base. This is notably true of the three polar powers.\textsuperscript{15} Kuwait, U.A.E. and Oman spend high proportions of their GDP. With its new high level gas-derived revenues the small state of Qatar is becoming a more energetic defence spender. According to SIPRI: “Almost all the Gulf states consistently spend a greater share of their GDP on the military than the global average” – of 2.3-2.5%.
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In Southeast Asia Myanmar is something of a maverick case, being a relative low earner at the same time as being a big spender. This, we have suggested, is attributable to the nature of the regime and the country's particular security issues. Indonesia is a big spender relative to the general levels of the region, but commensurate with its population (which far exceeds the rest of the region together) and the geostrategic expanse and problems of the country. Malaysia and Thailand are relative big spenders. The latter has a politically demanding military force. However, only Brunei and Singapore spend consistently more than the global average.
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Notes, tables E and F:
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
*SIPRI cautions that figures for Laos are “uncertain”.
** Myanmar figures in local currency owing to extreme variations in dollar/kyat exchange rates.

GCC states’ procurements are mainly directed to perceived trans-GCC-Gulf threats, hence the increasing relevant possibilities of new defence and strategic forms which emphasise pre-strike surveillance, early warning, air-to-land and air defence and anti-missile capabilities. (See following section.) Maritime protection is a growing emphasis, extending into the Gulf of Oman, against various asymmetric security and criminal threats. The littoral position of most principal urban centres and potential strategic targets gives cause to develop maritime defence capabilities – fast armed patrol boats for protection in the shallow off-shore waters, land-to-air and ship-to-ship missile capabilities, mine clearance vessels, anti-submarine helicopters and larger marine attack platforms.16 However, intra-GCC coordination and networking of states’ capabilities are limited and the ambitions of Peninsula Shield II have still to be proven.

Naval development has been a growing emphasis in recent years. Saudi Arabia has moved into increasing large and medium surface vessels for deep water capabilities. To meet terrorist, piracy and criminal threats the U.A.E. has developed a fleet of fast interception vessels. The GCC Defence Agreement of 2000 included intentions to undertake regular combined naval exercises including cooperation with the US 5th Fleet, which has large naval and air operations facilities in Bahrain and port and support facilities in the U.A.E. and Oman. Since the Agreement there have been
annual ‘Eagle Resolve’ operations, which recently have focused on chain-of-command, communications and air and missile defence. Saudi Arabia has a monopoly of airborne surveillance and warning systems and proposes to increase the number of AWACS which provide vital coverage over the Gulf. Early warning is vital for states with limited strategic depth. GCC Air Forces are notably privileged in the levels of expenditure and procurement. Armed helicopter strength is favoured, particularly by the U.A.E., but air attack aircraft also feature strongly in defence provision. Saudi Arabia over the years has built an air force far-exceeding in number and quality the forces of the other states and spends much on up-dating by ‘new generation’ purchasing of aircraft. But internal and southern states’ air force mixes lose in their combat capability for want of integration in a communications and command system and interoperability. Land-based air defence systems figure growingly in the GCC states acquisitions. Saudi Arabia has taken this further in a modern warfare (RMA) configuration. Cumulative ground force numbers and their armoured assets of tanks and armoured vehicles remain dominant in defence provision among the states. Their battle effectiveness depends on improved combined operations, which in turn depends on more uniform force mixes to achieve essential interoperability.

Iran is the GCC’s threat assessment focus. Given the apparent, if not freely spoken, defence and security focus on Iran among the GCC states, comparative defence expenditures and procurements are significant. Iran has been subject to severe revenue and budget constraints and to rising socio-economic opportunity costs in the face of a growing population.
Sanctions by Western states have been effective – just recently Russia declined to deliver on a missile system because of Iran’s defiant nuclear development policy. Iran seeks to develop its major national defence industry.

<table>
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<th>Table G. Iran Def. Expend as % of total GCC Def. Expenditure.</th>
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Iran’s total defence forces deployments are comparatively large and also complex (Table A). Its weaponry is widely subject to obsolescence and improvements hampered by sanctions. The armed forces have also to be deployed against additional substantial non-Gulf strategic and security needs. Artillery is towed and of limited manœuvrevability, as is much air defence. Iran has developed a comparative strength in theatre and long-range rocket launchers and has substantial air defence holdings and reported modern versions of long-range surface-to-air missiles in the supply lines. A missile programme of increasing range is being aggressively pursued, coupled it is feared, with nuclear payload developments. Iran’s ballistic missiles cover a range from 150 kilometres to 5,500 km thus representing a regional threat/deterrence capability and an ‘existential’ threat to Israel. But like the GCC, Iran is limited by poor systems integration. Iran deploys a large navy in the Gulf, though this is confronted by Saudi Arabian naval forces with larger and more modern vessels. Iran deploys numerous mini-submarines in the Gulf waters, some
of which are self-produced. Iran also has a substantial deployment of fast patrol boats equipped with ship-to-ship missiles. Forays into external and regional low-level asymmetric forms of conflict and aggression, largely undertaken by the Revolutionary Guard Corps, feature highly in the country’s strategic policy. These intensify perceptions of Iran’s hostile strategic profile.

Southeast Asia’s geo-strategic setting presents a unique security configuration. It has been suggested earlier that there is an acknowledged security complexity in Southeast Asia and that the evolution of a security community under the aegis of the Association of Southeast States is superstructural upon that. The association seeks to constrain rather than to enter into the dynamics of the region’s security complexity. This understanding is likely to be borne out as we examine briefly the national defence and security policies, spending (tables C and F) and procurements of the ASEAN States. State’s defence and security autonomy and resilience are jealously upheld.

In the decade or so before the East Asian economic crisis of 1997 the states of Southeast Asia had been building up their independent defence capabilities. Acharya remark how the trend in defence spending over the period 1984-1994 showing a growth of defence spending in absolute terms, although this spending showed declines as percentages of GDP. It is important to remember that this is the period when maritime ASEAN (as it then was) was still in uncertain relationships with the Indochina states. Vietnam was still flexing its military muscles over Cambodia, and defence
spending was largely affected by these relationships of general hostility and uncertainty.

From the middle of the 1990s two factors were to affect ASEAN states’ defence spending: Indochina was gradually integrating into ASEAN and the economic crisis of 1997/1998 occurred. For four years or so in the immediate aftermath of the crisis state revenues were reduced and defence procurements were stopped or put on hold. Singapore alone maintained a course of continuous spending growth. Singapore’s spending has in part been drawn on its own defence industry and been boosted as the country has been a modern weapons (RMA) spender. As economic conditions in Southeast Asia changed pre-crisis spending growth was resumed and programmes of enhancement of military capacities were taken up again. Arms procurements had been showing “a clear shift towards conventional warfare capabilities in contrast to the counter-insurgent orientation of the past”\textsuperscript{18} As Huxley and Willett say:

\begin{quote}
East Asian governments and most academics argue that regional states have simply ‘modernised’ their armed forces, implying mere upgrading or replacement of existing equipment. But many have in fact developed new capabilities which go far beyond simple modernization by seeking to increase mobility firepower and the ability to locate targets.\textsuperscript{19}
\end{quote}

The latter argument would seem on the basis of the evidence to be the more realistic. ASEAN (maritime) states are no less inclined to buy into new modernising military hardware than GCC states. They are constrained more by less generous budgetary circumstances. We shall follow the evidence. Procurements picked up again from 2000, in part under the
influence of aggressive supplier conditions: shows and demonstrations, transfers of technology, training and offsets. Russia had dropped out of the area from the end of the Cold War, but now re-emerged as a major arms supplier of combat aircraft, attack helicopters, marine craft and AirLand systems. Contact was restored with its old client Vietnam. Major weapons supply industries from North America and Europe, as well as Russia, seeking to compensate for lost old Cold War markets in the West were active in promoting sales in modern military hardware and defence systems in other world markets. The trend of pre-crisis growth, crisis downturn, and post-crisis renewed growth in defence and security procurements and systems developments in Southeast Asia showed a notable sensitivity to economic conditions.

A calculus of present and foreseeable strategic and security needs and national affordability is the supposed rational basis of policy and provision. Threat assessments may be important, but not exclusively so. The processes of decision making are not always simple and straightforward. In Southeast Asia, the military have been to varying degrees prominent in the political systems and influential in setting levels of defence spending and sometimes able to furnish themselves with weaponry. For decades in Indonesia the military accumulated power under Sukarno and Suharto, held sway in territorial commands, and conducted themselves as economic powers. From 2006 government budgetry allocations to defence were increasing to compensate for constraints on military non-budgetry incomes and expenditures. In Thailand the military periodically intervened, banned political parties,
upheld the monarchy – and in 2006 overthrew the prime minister and accelerated defence spending. It was observed in the Military Balance:

Corruption influenced the decision-making process…

Thailand armed forces were until recently in a ‘make do and mend phase’… Thaksin Shinawatra’s governments kept spending down, though budgets rose after the September 2006 military coup.22

Most notoriously, the military have captured and manipulated the political system in Myanmar. (See Table F.)23 Inter-service rivalries also influence the magnitudes and distributions of procurements.

Domestic defence industries in Southeast Asia have also played some part in ambitions to promote national development and to bolster national self-reliance and prestige. Defence industries in Southeast Asia have received government support, notably in Malaysia and Indonesia. Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand have such industries and Indonesia has been able to develop aircraft production. But there is dependence on parts and technological transfers from external suppliers. Only in Singapore has defence industry been “developed primarily for strategic reasons stemming from the country’s vulnerability… mainly supplying the needs of its own armed forces”, up-grading military equipment and producing small and medium-sized naval vessels, artillery and army vehicles.24 Expansion into a regional resource is discouraged by the wariness of other states.25

It is important to observe the particular geo-strategic characteristics of Southeast Asia, particularly of the maritime-insular states. Maritime defence and security are prominent in the policies of these states and all
of them have urgent strategic and economic concerns for the freedom and safety of the major sea lanes that pass through or by the states. And the issue of stability in the South China Sea is the major strategic interface between China and the littoral states of ASEAN. The states of maritime Southeast Asia are also competitive among them in the Sea. States have adapted combat aircraft or purchased specific capabilities for maritime strike operations with anti-ship missile power. Brunei and the Philippines have large patrol vessels with missile placements. Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia have, or have on order, large maritime platforms,
corvettes and frigates, while Indonesia and Singapore have had the region’s first submarines. The purchase of submarines is active in the present decade. Malaysia, Vietnam (six Russian Submarines) and Thailand are ‘in the market’ for submarines. “Vietnam became Russia’s biggest arms client in 2009, having ordered six diesel-electric submarines and 12 SU-30 fighter jets... This is Russia’s second biggest contract for submarines in the post-Soviet period, after a contract with China for eight submarines.”

Maritime surveillance aircraft and radars, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), “Eye in the Sky”, are deployed by Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, as the principal littoral states, in their coordinated protection of the Straits of Malacca where piracy is a common and
persistent hazard to commercial and oil shipping. This is the only trilateral arrangement among ASEAN states, secured by treaty among the three states in 2005.

Early warning capabilities (AEWs) are becoming common military currency around the region, as are air-to-ground and anti-ship missile capabilities. Indonesia and the Philippines have acquired international recognition under the Law of the Sea as ‘archipelagic states’ which accredits them with rights and responsibilities, from their own resources, to protect the Straits and Seas around their widely dispersed island territories. Map 3 above shows that the peculiar maritime geography of Southeast Asia produces a complexity of maritime ‘choke points’. The Gulf’s single maritime ‘choke point’ at the Strait of Hormuz is one of global critical strategic significance. Indonesia is acquiring modern military technology for this as well as for its territorial security needs. The Philippines’ preoccupation has been counter-insurgency. The economic crisis and collapse of the peso radically reduced the country’s military purchasing power. The country has since had a ‘Capabilities Up-grade Programme (CUP) underway, strengthening the army and renewing an air force which has been at a low operational state. In substitution for the US evacuation of the Clark air and Subic Bay bases in 1991 the military link with the US is restored by the 1999 Visiting Forces Agreement which provides for joint military exercises. Across the region modern weaponry in states’ arsenals includes air-to-air, air-to-ground and air defence equipped with precision-guided missiles.
Apart from its prominent place in the region’s efforts to secure the seas in Southeast Asia, Singapore’s distinctive geo-strategic character, as a very small island of 639 km² – very slightly more than Bahrain – and so devoid of strategic hinterland, and located closely between greater powers of the region (Malaysia and Indonesia) with whom relations have been strained, compels the country to take up a military policy heavily reliant on the benefits of modern technology. Paul Dibb remarked in 1995: “vibrant economies sustain defence expenditures”. In 2007 Singapore was approximately equal highest defence spender in Southeast Asia with Myanmar, but with one-tenth of the population. Singapore’s defence spending is more strategic oriented than Myanmar’s which is taken up largely in regime, border and counter-insurgent issues. Military Balance (2008) estimates that compared with its relatively prosperous neighbour, Malaysia, Singapore spent (2006) 1,407 US$ per capita nearly ten times more than Malaysia which spent US$ 131 per capita and Indonesia US$ 16 per capita. As The Military Balance has described these circumstances:

The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) are ahead of their Southeast Asian counterparts in terms of their doctrinal and organisational response to new military technologies and new security challenges. The ‘3G’ (Third Generation) SAF concept emphasizes the development of network-centric forces with greatly improved firepower as a way of compensating for Singapore’s lack of geographical hinterland and relatively small population. Air Defence and Operations Command – the air force’s ‘high readiness core’ that will oversee peacetime operational commitments – became operational in January 2007, and UAV Command stood up in May.

Regarding a technology-based (RMA-based) national defence strategy, and relatively speaking, Singapore is able to sustain this, but strategic conditions also determine this. Southeast Asian military spending is in the
RMA realm of modern military technology, but not convincingly into the systems and coordinative implications of this. Some states, however, are more advanced in regard to surveillance and communications against asymmetric security threats such as piracy, smuggling and people trafficking. As Huxley et al say:

To some extent, relevant doctrine is passed on with military equipment through training arrangements with suppliers.... To benefit from the RMA, armed forces must undergo fundamental doctrinal, logistical and organisational changes, as well as acquiring relevant equipment.... Too little attention has been paid to integrated logistical support or systems integration, and joint-force doctrine and organization are underdeveloped.35

There is some familiarity about these problems, looking back on the issues that confront the development of Peninsula Shield as an integrated rapid deployment force in the Gulf. But there are issues also that are more specific to Southeast Asia which make the prospect, indeed the possibility, of integrated defence very unlikely, and so the level of effective regionally defence inherently poor. The fundamental point to make is that the core regional structure which relates in any way to issues of military-defence purposes is the ARF. The purpose of ARF is conflict avoidance and maintenance of peace.36 Furthermore, the ARF has a strong outreach orientation. The conventional roles of defence and security, the maintenance of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, belong to the states. States’ autonomy, resilient, defence and regional security community building are largely parallel scenarios, and of unclear relevance to questions of ASEAN-specific defence and security. The precedence of the states is protected by the norms of the regional association, ASEAN: notably the principle of sovereignty and the norm of non-interference,
bolstered by the prided concept of ‘resilience’. There is no declared commitment, Gulf-like, to ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’, and one can only guess what the response would be if it happened.\textsuperscript{37} Events since 1995 seem not to have changed from Dibb’s judgment:

The trend towards self-reliance in defence also means that a range of much more advanced conventional weapons is being acquired and that while some of these are defensive (such as intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and command-and-control systems, mine countermeasure forces and patrol vessels) others are more evidently offensive (for example, maritime strike aircraft, submarines and stand-off tactical missiles).\textsuperscript{38}

It should be said here that Dibb neglects to remark the doctrinal, systemic and logistical implications of RMA in the effective use of modern weapons - both internally to a ‘resilient’ purchaser and externally in a rationally conceived regional arrangement of common and joint defence. The general disposition of the ASEAN states to ‘go-it-alone’, uncoordinated among them, notably in the spread of their procurements, renders their collective defence capabilities of command and control, communications and early warning largely non-interoperable.\textsuperscript{39}

Part of the explanation of the apparent non-rational cross-regional states’ procurement independence and lack of a developed defence and security configuration in Southeast Asia, is that possession of modern weapons is the product of a global military culture.\textsuperscript{40} Modern weaponry is ‘the way it is done’. This is encouraged by the blandishments and pressures of arms suppliers. Our overview of recent Military Balance shows that there are some twelve competitive suppliers, including some major suppliers, of
modern as well as more conventional weaponry active in the Southeast Asia ‘market’. In this study we have had impression that there are two particularly strong drivers of military procurements: a large and/or improving economic base, and the increasing development of new weapons systems and supplier pressures (the widely remarked ‘glitter factor’).

(iv) Technology of war: ‘intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance’ (ISR) and ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA)

The nature of ‘modern’ warfare can be considered in two ways: first, warfare as a projection of states’ capabilities to fight; and second, the forms of combat armed forces and security forces of state may deploy and be confronted by. Both regions under study, the Gulf and Southeast Asia, have in recent times been major theatres of war. They have been scenes in which conventional war as the typical or predominant form of combat has been challenged and where the means of waging war have undergone radical innovation. Furthermore, the regions have been scenes in which new forms of war have emerged. Future historians could well be forgiven for thinking that the regions have been testing grounds for new means and ways to conduct war. Modern military affairs are highly technological in character. The production and use of military hardware obtains close by the current state of scientific knowledge and its technological advances. And from where this advanced knowledge is developed the military is subjected to pressures to innovate.
Over the period of late twentieth century into the twenty-first century the Gulf has been a major scene in which what is known as the ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA) has been applied in real-life combat. From Desert Storm in 1991 to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 states of the Gulf experienced major combat operations involving radical changes in the ways of modern warfare. These were brought in and demonstrated by American and allied strategic force and battle management resources of a high level of magnitude and technical sophistication. Freedman says that:

Up to this point the operational possibilities of improvements in sensors, smart weapons and systems integration were untested hypotheses.... The pre-Desert Storm debate in the US featured many worries about the effects of sand and desert sun on equipment....

The ways of conventional war were fast falling from exclusive command over military thinking and practice. Military thinking in the 1980s was, Freedman says, about:

how warfare might be rescued from the terrible consequences of attrition, in which victory required staying power above all else, as the opposing forces slogged it out, with casualties accumulating, treasury reserves depleted, industry pushed to full stretch, and society becoming more fragile.

Of this, the Gulf had been well-acquainted in the dreadful Iraq-Iran war of 1980 to 1988. In 1991 new concepts of ‘AirLand Battle’, combining army combat power and precedent air surveillance and destruction, were deployed. An enemy with massive mobilization of manpower and conventional weaponry was overcome by a campaign projected by well-trained personnel with highly mobile combined arms and operations capability. So-called ‘smart bombs’, ‘deep strike’, and new missile and
guided delivery systems, and combined force distance projection of attack were showing new possibilities of effectiveness, lethality, and prospects for casualty reduction. This last was seen as of particular merit in military thinking, and also in civil-political thinking for the casualty reduction effects on public opinion. The on-coming war was prided as an operation in “Shock and Awe”.\textsuperscript{48} For Freedman:

This was the origin of the RMA” (Revolution in Military Affairs... This assumed a technological dynamic that promised the eventual domination of the ‘information environment’ and thereby the ‘battlespace’, a term upgraded from the earlier ‘battlefield’ to capture the idea of combat in three dimensions. The RMA would involve a marriage of information and communications systems with those that apply military force.\textsuperscript{49}

Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), speed, distance and precision, involving combination of the land, air and maritime services, were key elements in this innovatory dynamic. The distance projection of military power: naval-based power, ‘out-of-sight’, over the horizon, long-range guided missile capability was now possible.\textsuperscript{50} As the American Undersecretary of State was reported to say in March 2010: ISR is “the glue that binds all operations and all theatres of war and air based ISR is by far the most critical tool for ground command on current operations”. From 2003 this capability has served the political purpose of removing American land-based forces from Saudi Arabia where they were stationed in a Combined Air Operations Center and Special Operations Force H.Q. with command elements for air and army force. These facilities were largely repositioned in Qatar to host the forward H.Q. of CENTCOM and provide large U.S. preposition facilities. The U.S. 5\textsuperscript{th} Fleet is based in
Bahrain and the UAE hosts at Al Dhafra a large airbase as an intelligence, surveillance and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) facility.\textsuperscript{51}

For all its effectiveness in the Gulf wars the revolution in military affairs is not evidently a total prescription for defence in the Gulf. Much may be speculated as to how RMA may be applied in a Gulf ‘doctrine’ of military affairs and how it might be applied to a variety of military missions. RMA was first applied predominantly by an external power more greatly endowed in resources and technological capability than in any comparable indigenous capability, at least for the foreseeable future. The resource requirements of RMA are costly, not only financially, but also in terms of the educational and ‘culture’ requirements of new innovative military hardware - communications and weapons systems.\textsuperscript{52} In turning to RMA defence systems a state must attend to the matter of balance with conventional military means for, for example, ‘boots on the ground’ warfare will always be an essential component in defence. However, a greatly shifted balance of military personnel towards use and control of new military technology, such as intelligence, communications and new weapons, and training in systems sustainability. New skills and a new culture within the military have to be cultivated. The manpower pools of smaller states do not fully crew and support existing weapons pools. New emphases on air power, air defence and naval defence are demanding in terms of numbers and skill levels. If the highly innovatory and technological character of the armed services were to predominate a degree of and commitment to coordinated and integrated (indeed, integration beyond coordination) defence structures would be required.
such that the Gulf States have not yet shown a will for.\textsuperscript{53} It would remain to be seen how far, notwithstanding the defence restructuring indicated in the 2000 Defence Agreement and new Peninsula Rapid Deployment Force (Chap. 7(vii) above), GCC sub-regional defence might adapt to RMA.

RMA does not attend to \textit{post-bellum} issues such as internal security in a occupied state, the restoration of civil order and reconstruction, which more conventional land-based forces undertake. Would RMA, it might be asked, intensify a security dilemma (a systems race rather than an arms race) in favour of the greater polar powers of the Gulf – and raise the reciprocal thermal feel of nations’ defence arrangements?\textsuperscript{54} Possibly the hi-tech ways of RMA can be developed in convincingly non-offensive defence and deterrence only ways, though missile capability of theatre and long-range and heavy pay-load capacity change appearances. Intelligence and communications have dual purpose significance in security against ‘below the radar’ asymmetric threats. How these capabilities appear would depend on how they ‘fit’ in a generally visible and comprehensive ‘grand strategy’. Last, would RMA \textit{necessarily} build-in on a long-term basis the compatible resources of an allied external power?\textsuperscript{55} What would seem to be implied in the changes in defence systems is a seriously thought-out \textit{shared} military doctrine among the Gulf/GCC states.

\textbf{(v) Conclusion}

It was remarked early in Chapter 6 that it does not take the discussion of defence responses to conditions of regional security complexity far if
account is not taken of the hard means and wherewithal of defence that states engage in. Conditions of regional security complexity do not determine any particular pattern of defence and security response. The primary location of defence policy and conduct in the states of a region was discussed in Section (ii). The traditional conception of defence as an aspect of sovereignty is guarded in both the Gulf and Southeast Asian regions. Regionalism of defence creates a new level of defence options and capabilities of states where they must judge the relative merits, for their defence interests, of unilateral, cooperative or coordinated defence with regional partners. That is, the critical initiatives lie in the political realms of the states. The states may be variously rational or successful in assessing where their advantages lie. It is observed that in both Gulf and Southeast Asian regions there is reluctance to give over matters of defence to the region-level. The basic factor of states' recruitment of military personnel is shown in the first of the chapter's comparative tables. Cordesman's advice about the “deceptiveness” of numbers is noted.

In the following Section (iii) an attempt is made to get an aggregated impression of difference between the two regions on account of the security community approach to defence in Southeast Asia. The evidence of Table C on defence expenditures as a proportion of GDP (based on three recent years; Tables E and F are more comprehensive) and discussion around this does not produce clear evidence of difference on this account. Defence expenditures in Southeast Asia are generally lower than in the Gulf, but they are not low. The smallest spenders are the weak
states of Cambodia and Laos and the rich but miniscule state of Brunei. There are contextual reasons why defence expenditures should be higher in the Gulf, but both regions show defence expenditures as a proportion of GDP well in excess of global levels. Discussion proceeds by taking into account the specific strategic defence perceptions of the regions. In the Gulf these are of present reciprocal direct trans-Gulf threat; the major active feature in Gulf regional security complexity. Iran is the GCC’s threat assessment focus. Table G indicates a lower level of Iranian defence capability than of the GCC. But Iran exhibits progressive capability improvements and an active strategic doctrine of asymmetric conflict that intensifies security judgments across the Gulf. Pre-strike – early warning, surveillance, communications, air defence are growing features of defence provisions. But ‘modern warfare’ necessities of coordination, net working and interoperability have far to go in the GCC. The impact of ‘revolution in military affairs (RMA) is the main subject of the next section. On both sides of the Gulf there is a growing emphasis on maritime security.

Southeast Asia’s geo-strategic setting presents a unique security configuration. ASEAN seeks to constrain rather than to enter into the dynamics of regional security complexity. Security complexity is acknowledged, but protected by the norms of the association. The states of Southeast Asia retain initiative and priority in matters of defence, at the cost of virtually any meaningful approach at the regional level. One is led to see states’ defence and security behaviour as based on widespread potential for inter-state antagonisms, central to security complexity in this region. Defence is maintained on the basis of the states own provisions.
and in a web of bilateral agreements among the states and to a cautious extent in occasional long-arm assurances by the United States. Southeast Asian defence expenditures have been particularly susceptible to changes in the region’s economic circumstances and an economic level less generous than in the Gulf. But into the current decade defence procurements, both in magnitude and kind, have grown – except in the case of Thailand which has been affected by change in the internal political-military balance. Modern warfare provisions are a growing feature of defence procurements. Singapore has been relatively advanced in this owing to the country’s specific security situation, and backed by its economic capacity to be the region’s largest defence spender (see Table F). Southeast Asia is even less apt than the GCC to develop a coordinated RMA configuration of regional security owing to its insistent state-based defence pattern. But security in the Malacca Strait and around the chokepoints through Indonesia, the South China Sea and the Philippines has led to inter-state protection of strategic sea lanes.

The growing attractions of modern warfare equipment and systems (RMA) – and of ‘new generation’ conventional weaponry – have led to consideration in the final Section (iv) of the advanced training and doctrinal understandings that sustain the military in their post-conventional professional activities. But ‘boots on the ground’ necessities in all combat are recognized, as is the weakness of exaggerated RMA in the need to handle *post-bellum* conditions. The logistical, communications and coordination implications of RMA indicate the wisdom of firmer commitments to defence regionalism. Rational
commitments at regional levels have far to go in both regions. Some more abstract issues relating to this will be the subject of the following final chapter.

The obstacles to regional defence are more profound in Southeast Asia than in the Gulf. The common claim to the primacy of state sovereignty is reinforced in Southeast Asia by the norms of ASEAN. Southeast Asia has for many years been pursuing a constructive course of conflict avoidance and ‘defence community’ building. The chapter has, however, sharpened the understanding that underlying this there are still conditions of security complexity.
Notes Chapter Seven

1. We have already acknowledged the current (2000s) special circumstances of Iraq and the wisdom of regarding Iraq as a putative revived regional polar power.
2. The wide spectrum of conditions of defence and security in the two regions were the subject of Chapter six (b).
4. ‘Resilience’: a much favoured notion in Southeast Asia expressing beliefs in state self-sufficiency and expectations of non-interference.
5. States seek competitive advantage and surety of supply in spreading their procurement options.
6. External partner: this will be familiar in what has been said before about the U.S. security umbrella in the Gulf – and its reflective security liability. In Southeast Asia a similar partnership has generally been long-arm and out of sight.
7. On the understanding that in principle strategic decision-making is undertaken politically and operational decision is the responsibility of the military. However, latter day defence structural changes in both the Gulf and ASEAN (see Figures 4 and 5 and 6 respectively in Chapter 7) suggest that dividing lines don’t hold fast and are amenable to adjustment.
8. *The Military Balance*, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London, Routledge, Vols. October 2004 to January 2009. Cordesman, Anthony, *The Military Balance in the Middle East*, with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, Westport, Praeger, 2004. Reference was also made to parallel editions of the Gulf Yearbook, which, however, draws on the first source. Expenditures are based on budget estimates rather than on actual expenditures. Financial resource allocations as shown would be more illuminating were it possible to factor in gross state revenues and defence expenditures as a percentage of these.
10. Iraq has considerable military hardware in virtual cold storage. Cordesmann estimates 2000 main battle tanks and 316 combat aircraft. But these will have undergone a degree of obsolescence since 2003, largely by way of the advances in military technology, to which the southern Gulf States will have taken resort. According to SIPRI: “Iraq is rebuilding its armed forces from scratch and plans to buy a wide range of major conventional weapons from a variety of countries.” SIPRI Factsheet, October 2010.

12. Since its early days ASEAN has sought regional security and nuclear immunity by its treaties Zone of Peace, Friendship and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ).


14. ASEAN clearly recognises Southeast Asia to be a zone of conflict potentialities and over the years has expressed its ambition to translate this into a community of peace. Reference goes back to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (1976) and the distillation, yet elaborate expression of this ambition in Section B2 of the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint and Chapter Eight of the ASEAN Charter. It seems never to be quite clear how ASEAN envisages the difference between the management of regional peace and the creation of a culture of peace.

15. One must always be reminded of Iraq’s special circumstances. But the country is being restored a competitive oil revenue earner.

16. For a ‘nuts and bolts’ inventory of Gulf acquisitions Cordesman is valuable, though unavoidably liable to dating. The Military Balance, IISS is an essential means to keeping up-to-date (and is a major source for Cordesman).

17. See Table 5.2 at p.162 which gives figures for absolute and % GDP from 1995 to 2007. Compare our Tables C and D above. While the figures are noticeably different – they are drawn from different sources – the trends are similar.

18. Acharya, Constructing, p.161. It is unclear how a clear distinction can be drawn between conventional and counter-insurgent combatant defence provisions. Indonesia, for example, deployed a highly militaristic force against separatism in Aceh and East Timor: “Indonesia maintains a rapid deployable army division and an armoured brigade; this had in the past been used primarily for internal security missions in East Timor and Aceh”. Ibid, p.162. As with many insurgent situations, these missions were eventually concluded by concessionary agreements. Malaysia also deploys a RDF consisting of land, amphibious, air and marine units to secure its Sabah territory. Malaysia’s submarines are based in Sabah which lies off the South China Sea.


22. Military Balance 2009, p.370. Acharya quotes a Thai newspaper: “There is a whole nexus from the rank of lieutenant colonel up to the generals who have mastered the art of earning private revenues together with the arms procurers, the agents and the suppliers.”


25. A similar wariness is alleged in the GCC regarding the possibility of a central regional defence industry in Saudi Arabia. Availability of relevant skilled manpower could be a barrier.

26. See also Note 56 in Chapter 5 above. Laos is the only ASEAN state that is land-locked. IISS Strategic Comments, *Southeast Asia’s disputed waters*, Vol.14, Issue10, December 2008 reviews these disputes with some detail and is interesting for showing that the maritime areas in dispute are not limited to the South China Sea and Pacific waters. The Gulf of Thailand is scene of dispute between Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam. And to the west Myanmar has overlapping maritime interests with Bangladesh in the Andaman Sea.

27. On the 4th November 2002 ASEAN states’ ministers of foreign affairs and the Chinese special envoy signed a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (Code of Conduct. Two years earlier Jane’s Intelligence published ‘A Code of Conduct for the South China Sea’ a critical account (and recommendation) of the historical and present diplomatic scenario around the Sea. Present-day explorations are aggravating relations. Thailand is not a direct South China Sea claimant, but it does have its own, competitive, interests (with Cambodia and Vietnam) in the Gulf of Thailand: “Submarines in particular are a ‘necessity’ to strengthen Thailand’s economy, insists Thai navy chief Adm. Kamthorn Pumhirun. They will protect natural resources, fisheries and oil exploration, he said in a statement on Jan. 1”; quoted; Boot, William, ‘What’s Behind ASEAN’s Arms Race’, The Irrawaddy, www.irrawaddy.org.


29. The International Chambers of Commerce produce an annual report on global maritime piracy and other crimes: www.icc-ccs.org. Eric Frecon, Inst. Of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, on Defence iQ is informative. Koo, Eric, ‘Terror on the High Seas, Pt.3, Strategies for Maritime Security’, Asia Times, October 21, 2004; a good critical article; advises “Speed and detection are of the essence in maritime security patrolling. State navies should seek to acquire fast gunboats or patrol-boat-class ships with helicopter platforms for long-range patrols and reconnaissance…. Submarines should not be deployed for naval patrolling, as they may prove to be more of a liability than an asset... its activities are regarded most often as being suspect of espionage. Since any cooperative effort among the Southeast Asian nations requires trust and openly implemented measures, the use of submarines becomes irrelevant in this context.” See also Kang, Harnit, ‘South-East Asia: A Beacon of Maritime Collaboration?’ Mainstream, Vol. xlvii, 7 November, 2009. ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Statement on Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to Security, 17 June 2003. This is useful for its reference to relevant laws and conventions. ARF ran an important conference, Regional Co-operation in Maritime Security, March 2005 and in January 2007 a ‘Maritime Security Shore Exercise’, at Singapore. Lloyds (international insurance)
of London has designated the Strait of Malacca a “War Risk Area”. We noted in the previous chapter, Note 138, the special security position of Singapore Port: Anthony Davis, 'Singapore Terrorist Attack', on Defence iQ, May 2010. Much of the reporting, conferencing and writing run issues of piracy, maritime terrorism and crime together.

30. Recognition of the rights of the states was consequent on American contest of its right of free passage. The comparative global strategic significance of the ‘choke point’ at the Gulf is shown in the more direct and active American ‘protection’ of it and the stand-off with Iran over it. The Strait of Hormuz chokepoint, speaking from a global strategic view, might be second only to the Suez Canal.


32. Singapore also has a population six times as great as Bahrain’s. The country is relatively highly developed as a modern economy and commercial centre and so is dependent on a secure position in the flow of international trade. Its economy includes a substantial element of defence industry, which caters only marginally, however, to the country’s particular overall defence requirements.


34. Military Balance 2008, p.363. Further on: “During the current decade, the changing international and regional security environment has forced Singapore’s army to adapt to a wider array of potential challenges and it has stressed its role alongside the police force (which includes the 1,800-strong paramilitary Singapore Gurkha Contingent [see Table B] in counter-terrorism and the protection of critical national infrastructure, such as the Jurong Island petrochemical complex and Changi international airport.” P.364.

35. Huxley et al, Arming, p. 65.

36. See also the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint. There is much ambiguity in this document.

37. In defence policy, unilateralism; in defence practice, generally bi-lateralism. The ‘all-for-one’ commitment in the Gulf acquired some proof in the Iraq-Kuwait episode - within massive external coverage. It is less clear whether Peninsula Shield II could show sufficient independent ‘resilience’ in the event, say, of an assault on the U.A.E. or Bahrain. The strategic web in Southeast Asia is more complex and strategic options more multi-directional. Notwithstanding the general ‘go-it-alone’ conduct of military affairs in Southeast Asia, there is limited combined exercise activity. In Southeast Asia military exercises occur through a ‘web’ of bilateral agreements. The U.S. engages in joint arrangements with the Philippines under the 1999 Visiting Forces Agreement (following the closure of the air and naval bases). Singapore shares facilities for training and exercise which it is unable to accommodate domestically with other regional and with non-regional states. Thailand and the U.S. undertake annual ‘Cobra Gold’ exercises, which have been enlarged year on year to include other regional states and South Pacific partners. Region-based military activities are more constrained than in the Gulf, as might be expected from ASEAN’s differently oriented military outlook – of sovereign-based defence and regional conflict avoidance.

39. Dibb draws attention to a potentially long discussion that needs a place in a
different narrative. It might, however, be briefly remarked that deterrence is the
display of a capacity to exact negative sanctions, not necessarily to assert a
substantive will to do so. Weapons are not absolutely brand marked ‘offensive’
or ‘defensive’. Deterrence is in part in the nature of the weaponry, more in the
perception and intention of its possessor and the (suspicious or sceptical)
perceptions of putative antagonists. The measure of deterrence is political and
psychological. On the other hand, if particular weaponry can, in some particular
circumstances (heightened antagonism, geo-strategic placement), be judged to
represent per se aggressive intent of a suspect antagonist this might be
accomplished by removal of the ‘offensive’ weaponry – in other words, entry
into the political minefield of ‘disarmament’; removal of intentional threat and
the hardware for it. ASEAN: the structural edifice of ARF and the Political-
Security Community, might be viewed as an elaborate superstructural approach
to neutralizing the threat-deterrence aspects of state-upon-state relations in
Southeast Asia and Asia-Pacific, and building a supportive ‘community’ around
this. See Evans, Graham, Dictionary of International Relations, London, Penguin
also a broader-based discussion in relation to the Gulf in Moller, Bjorn,
Resolving the Security Dilemma in the Gulf Region, Occasional Paper Number 9,
Abu Dhabi, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1997. Other
aspects could be considered. For example, the part that ‘confidence building
measures’ can play a part in meliorating relations between potential antagonists.
See the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Concept Paper (Para 6) 1995 which sets out
a staged “gradual evolutionary approach to confidence building, preventive
diplomacy and conflict resolution mechanisms” (directed mainly to ASEAN-wider
region relations). And see also ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint
(Section B.1.1) 2008 which sets out CBMs for the Southeast Asia community. In
this regard, it is interesting to note that Dr Mohammed Ghaffar, advisor to the
King of Bahrain on Diplomatic Affairs, remarked at the 2009 Manama Dialogue
on the need in the region for “increased transparency, dialogue information
sharing, and confidence building on military and security matters.” The
distinction between ‘offensive’ and ‘non-offensive’ weaponry could be taken
further than our late remarks on Dibb.

40. We remarked earlier in connection with the Gulf that new weapons systems
(RMA) require the development of new relevant cultures within the military.
New national military cultures might be thought of as sub-cultures within an
increasingly influential global RMA culture.

41. Seven of the twelve are European, plus America, three Asian and Israel.
Singapore’s biennial Army Open House (AOH) and the national parades of other
states are welcome military-fashion exhibitions to would-be suppliers, though
none so attractive as the Dubai Air Show in the Gulf. An early comprehensive
supply/procurement treatment of arms in the Middle East is a good critical
reference: Anthony, Ian and Peter Jones, ‘International Arms Transfers and the
Middle East’, ESCR CR Occasional Paper 21, Abu Dhabi, 1998. We have shown
earlier that Military Technology MILTECH and DefenseNews, both on-line are generous sources of information and arms business commentary.

42. These have had to be written, or need to be written, into military doctrines of national armed forces.

43. Technological innovation often has ‘dual purpose’ potentiality. Hence, for example, current scares about the transfer of alleged means of civil nuclear capability to Iran into nuclear weaponry. It is notoriously the case that modern as well as conventional military hardware is a hard-sell market and the pace of innovation so quick and radical that ‘new generation’ arms, and the effect of obsolescence in existing holdings, increase procurement pressures. See DefenseNews.com, 12 November 2009, Dubai Preview. “The UAE Air Force is understood to be looking to acquire the most advanced version of the Rafales. But first, France must help the UAE dispose of the present fleet of Mirage 2000-9s to make room for the Rafales.”

44. “Saudi-U.S. military cooperation was key to the quick coalition victory in the Gulf War…. U.S.-Saudi cooperation was much closer in the Iraq War in 2003, however, than is generally apparent.” Cordesman, Anthony, ‘Conventional Armed Forces in the Gulf’, Saudi-US Relations Information Service (SUSRIS) Aug.23, 2008. A doctrinal element of combining modern war capabilities gains importance.


46. For a good basic definition of RMA see Huxley et al, Arming, Chapter 4, Note 1 at p. 94.

47. Ibid, p.12. Iran nonetheless has observed the attrition advantages in its operational doctrine of asymmetric conflict. This is remarked in the next chapter.

48. In global terms the alternative to conventional warfare of attrition had been nuclear deterrence. In the twenty-first century, and in the Gulf, nuclear capacity is becoming a possible alternative to the inefficacy of conventional projection of power and RMA the prospective counter-resort – the new deterrent, forestalling or foiling a ‘first strike’.


50. Missile development features highly in Iran’s defence programmes. The Shahab 3 missile programme is completed with a reported 2,500 klm projection capability and possible up to 1000kg warhead load, and bringing Israel within range. In 2007 Iran threatened a “missile blitz against the Gulf States” if the U.S. attacks its nuclear facilities. Michael Smith, Sunday Times, 10 June 2007. Currently, warnings of serious retaliation are made by Iran against U.N. and E.U. enhanced sanctions, Guardian, 26 July 2010.

51. Military Technology. Miltech, November 2009, p.39, suggests that the UAE is in the market for Advanced HAWKEYE, Boeing AEW&C and Saab ERIEYE. Other storage and prepositioning facilities have long been located in Oman. The UAE,
as we have seen, is the big defence spender after Saudi Arabia, most of all on Air Combat capacity and maritime littoral surveillance and port security.

52. Previous defence hardware may be ‘lost’ by substitution for new systems and lost in obsolescence. See note 43 above.

53. In the next chapter some more abstract but fundamental aspects of this will be discussed.

54. Gulf defence profiles are markedly, we have seen, in conformity with military threat analysis and so basically with security complex understandings.

55. Under the heading ‘Technology Vulnerabilities of Less Advanced Powers’ (among Middle East, not just Gulf states) Cordesman, The Military Balance, pp.21-24, reviews this as of the present only. RMA exists and is an ‘optional’ that states severally or in conjunction might consider in their defence appraisals. For a more technical and deeply strategic review of RMA: Davis, Jacquelyn and Charles M. Perry and Jamal S. Al-Suwaidi, Air/Missile Defense, Counterproliferation and Security Policy Planning, Abu Dhabi, The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, ECSSR, 1999. In a more academic review article of Max Boot, War Made New and Frederick Kagan, Finding the Target Thomas McNaught considers their relative historical and conceptual understandings. Boot believes that ideas of ‘revolution in military affairs’ can be traced in technological innovations in means of warfare preceding those of contemporary RMA. Kagan takes a cautionary view of current notions of military ‘transformation’. The latter neglects the military wisdom of a more inclusive view of warfare which takes account of continuing differences in military circumstances, opportunities and consequences. The latter is portrayed particularly in the exaggerated ‘transformative’ view of RMA held by Ronald Rumsfeld, which as McNaught says; “made it relatively easy for the United States to get into Iraq but very hard to get out”. Thomas L. McNaught, ‘The Real Meaning of Military Transformation: Rethinking the Revolution’, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2007.
Chapter Eight

Grand strategy, Military doctrine and Military culture: state and regional effects

(i) Introduction

In Chapter Seven the material aspects of defence and security (budgets, defence hardware, weapons procurements, application of ‘modern warfare’/RMA capabilities) and the extent to which these indicated the relevance of responses to regional security conditions were discussed. Discussion in the present chapter will be pursued on a more abstract course. We shall first briefly discuss the concept of ‘grand strategy’ in the formulation of a state’s general strategic and defence vision, and issues about how this might be developed towards formulating a regional strategic vision. This will be followed in later sections by discussion of the concepts of ‘military doctrine’ and ‘military culture’ and of issues that arise in the evolution of these concepts in the context of the regionalization of defence. There are in these issues significant questions of state-military relations.

(ii) Grand strategy: traditionally state-centric concept. Its influence at the regional level

In principle the military operate within the terms of nations’ political leaders’ strategic visions. These are what in the annals of political and military history have been called ‘grand strategy’\textsuperscript{1}: what national ideals, purposes and interests are the military expected to serve? And in response, what military capacities are needed and can be made available. Grand strategy, in the traditional and conventional way, involves political
assessments of who and what targets are possible or likely to be the ‘referent objects’ of a nation’s projection of its defence capabilities. Judgment might be made of what would be the objectives of any prospective military engagements, assessment made of the balance between what is needed and what can be afforded (against other goals and alternative calls on national resources), and in contemporary times judgment of the “higher claims of justice and righteousness” over power in the nation’s external affairs. It is in respect of such understandings that appropriate military response must be conceptualized and capability judgments made.

It is in the political realm that the critical informing perceptions of states’ strategic environments are formed. From these states’ grand strategies are derived. Perceptions of real or potential threat are most commonly what are influential in the formulation of defence policy. Grand strategies are analytically prior to ‘military doctrine’. Where a nation’s strategic vision reflects defence and security conditions of a region in which it is situated, regional security complexity, its grand strategy will involve some balance between what it sees as its security interests best served at the national or alternatively at the regional level. In a regional security complex this balance will be affected also by what a nation sees how other members of the security complex balance their security responses. Within the Gulf (the GCC states) and in Southeast Asia we have seen uncertain balances between state and regional security options. A grand strategy, a nation’s strategic vision, does not have to be totally infused with belligerence and thoughts of probable conflict and
war. A nation, or association of nations, may conceive their interests, their security and stability to be best attempted by non-military means. Such is the ambition, as we see in Southeast Asia, in security community thinking. But in the real Southeast Asian world this is prudently tempered by recognition of the existence of security complex conditions: of intra-region, inter-state and intra-state insecurities. Security community building seeks to manage regional conflicts by conflict avoidance processes, and so implicitly avoidance of a specific regional military role based on related military doctrine and operational doctrine. Security community building confines this role to its several members and pursues an eventual ambition to make this role irrelevant and obsolescent. It is a separate layer, but one in the meantime not more commanding than the grand strategies of the states, which are generally to uphold their own capabilities to secure their borders and to maintain internal stability. In practice these are held to be consistent with cooperation in dealing with inherently inter-state issues such as the tri-lateral protection of the Malacca Strait, inter-state security threats and regional criminal activities.⁶

A regional grand strategy comes at the point when it is accepted by states’ leaders that their states’ security is best (economically and effectively) served or enhanced in a configuration of regional defence and security; that there is gain not concession of security. But such acceptance must be backed by regional security being actually made to work. Calculation and vision are both involved. There is as yet in Southeast Asia no conceptual hold on the idea of a regional basis of defence such as to be a ground to regional grand strategy. This must in part be put down to the relative lack
of geo-political coherence of the region. So far as it is possible to speak of an ASEAN regional grand strategy its main tenets are to *uphold the peace* among the states, to avoid war rather than confront conflicts, being aware of historic and present points of conflict and claims among them, and to uphold the integrity of the Southeast Asian region. In the Gulf the GCC’s grand strategy is to maintain a clear understanding of present regional threats and to protect the cultural identity of the Arabian sub-region and the sovereignty of its states, their political systems and established regimes. The tentative and guarded moves towards regional defence in the Arabian Peninsula, where geo-political coherence is more evident than in Southeast Asia, do not show definitively that the states are informed by such a strategy, though we have seen in Chapter Seven above that there are cautious moves in this direction. But then, region-based defence is as much a creative business as is community building; it too needs a lot of trial and experience, and confidence building. The critical distinguishing factor between the two regions is that in the Gulf there is a marked intra-region defence confrontation that directly threatens the stability of the whole region, Iran versus the rest, whereas in Southeast Asia – at least since the end of the Cold War – there is a cross-cutting web of possible conflicts, defence within the region rather than regional defence. Regional defence strategy among the states is the vital ground from which regional defence doctrines can develop. Later discussion will be around the questions of need and possibility of shared military doctrine and culture.
The general rule will be that the active commitment to defence and security by a nation’s armed forces will be by reference to political authority. It is in political authorities and processes of political decision making that the scope to decide and manage matters of defence and security resides.\textsuperscript{8} In Southeast Asia, however, it has been common for political and military authority to be merged. In the Gulf and in Southeast Asia where regional configurations of political authority (the GCC and ASEAN) have become established, responses to the security complexities of the regions have become acknowledged, though actual responses are uncertain. These responses can be state-based, or some combined or regional basis for defence be developed. There is a case for presuming that the development of region-based defence supposes shared regional strategic vision as well as region-based policy response and consequent connected practical armed forces commitment.\textsuperscript{9} Our earlier discussions have shown, for both regions, that projects towards regional defence have been compromised by a persistent adherence to the primacy and real priority accorded to state-based defence and security. In matters of regionalizing defence the processes are complicated because they involve the coalescing of several states’ decision-making, made potentially more difficult by the necessity to accommodate diverse national strategic visions, claims to autonomy (resilience) and the autonomous and progressive development of separate states’ armed forces. It is usual for states to make only partial concessions of their military forces to combined or regional military arrangements, retaining a primacy of sovereign defence (and foreign policy) capability.\textsuperscript{10} It has been the experience hitherto in the GCC that regional engagements have been held
to be residual to states’ defence policies, even as can still be seen in the recent Peninsula Shield II (RDF) developments; and in Southeast Asia defence autonomy of the states is enshrined in norms of the regional association.

(iii) Military doctrine: self-image of Armed Forces, State’s images of military – balance of civilian-military authority
National armed forces are generally informed by basic ‘doctrines’ that are defined in terms set down by national military authorities, expressing “the central idea of an army”,¹¹ which in turn is distilled into, for example, a general statement to the effect that:

Doctrine is a body of knowledge and thought that provides direction and aids understanding... fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application. It embraces wisdom in the areas of problem solving, decision making and planning... It represents the distilled insights and wisdom gained from experience. Doctrine is developed in the context of contemporary and emerging factors.... A sound doctrinal framework provides the basis for operations and training, guides commanders and helps individuals to think more clearly in the fog of war.¹²

The major military agencies of a state’s defence; land, air and sea forces, will typically have basic conceptions of themselves as corporate and professional bodies. The supremacy of the political realm is widely acknowledged. The military’s self-image by convention goes by the title ‘military doctrine’. The core element in any doctrine will be that ‘soldiers must do what soldiers do’, that is fight, whether this is dressed in the notions of national defence and security or in projection of power; that is, at any period of time and within politically decided national strategic
parameters. In this section an analytic difficulty is encountered in that what is frequently referred to as ‘military doctrine’ is in fact ‘operational doctrine’; that which is assessed by political and military authorities as relevant to security conditions at some particular period of time. It is not at all clear sometimes what image the military has of itself or whether it has any such corporate image at all. This might even be politically discouraged. The influence of non-indigenous military education and training, we shall see later, may also blur the growth of an independent self-image. We shall also see later, that the militaries in some parts of the world, for example Southeast Asia, are moulded by the special characteristics of their origins and dominant experiences in insurgent conflicts and revolution. These lead to self-images of social attachment rather than professional detachment that are clearly unlike the so-called ‘normal’ conventions of the military in the Western world.

The analytic scope of military doctrine is widely lodged in historical preconceptions of the nature of warfare and as this is “developed in the context of contemporary and emerging factors”. The idea of the army as the premier military force continues to be implied in much military thinking. Military doctrine is analytically prior to operational military doctrine. The distinction is not always clearly recognised in discussion. But the conditions of modern warfare, for example, indicate an increasing need for integrative relationship between the three main armed services and therefore more joined-up operational doctrinal thinking about the current and developing nature of conflict, the mirror doctrinal thinking of
potential adversaries, and character and conduct of adversaries who engage in non-conventional, asymmetric, hostilities.

Where states’ military forces are given over to some level of commitments to regional defence, complexities arise from the need to negotiate differences among joint forces of military experience and ‘doctrine’, and also the practical difficulties of configuring new levels and locations of force leadership and command, communications and interoperability of force capabilities. These last are increasingly indicated by ‘modern warfare’ requirements. The basic principle of political primacy remains.¹³ Political authorities may be short-sighted or unsuccessful, lacking in unity of vision and purpose, but the determination to regionalize defence is political. In our earlier discussions of the GCC/Peninsula Shield Force and ASEAN/ARF/Security Community, for example, we see that political decision is primary, though the military may be drawn into processes of advice and consultation.¹⁴ Operationalizing regional defence is military; as this is influenced by the military’s codes of conduct and judgments of force effectiveness written into military doctrine; and also influenced by judgments of operational effectiveness at any particular period of time.

We have observed in Note 4 that conceptions of national grand strategies and military doctrines are apt mostly to be articulated by states that are identifiable as polar or great powers. This reflects their views of their standings in the world or in regions of security complexity, and it may also reflect the influence they bring to bear on the military doctrines of other states – through military education and training programmes and joint
exercise programmes. Overseas military academy programmes, conferences and senior personnel exchanges are common, and are vehicles for promoting conceptions of military professionalism and strategic studies among higher ranking military officers. Doctrinal traditions and the military cultures and strategic understandings of host military institutions vary and so are inclined to convey different conceptions of the military as corporate bodies. We shall observe this in the discussion of military culture below.

The predominant host countries and military institutions in the modern world are the U.S, Britain and Russia. They present different grand strategies and military doctrines. American military doctrine is typically stated in strongly operational doctrine terms; with its sources in the grand, global scans of American strategic interests, engagements in global conflicts in modern times, a strong domestic scientific culture and American pre-eminence in the technological aspects of war. Military doctrine of the United Kingdom has about it a tone set in the history of the country and its normative culture. “The warfighting ethos signifies and embodies the ideals and duties of military service, and unifies those who serve in the Armed Forces.” Under a section-heading ‘British Armed Forces into the Future’ it is stated:

The British Armed Forces “promote the ideals of integrity, discipline, professionalism, service and excellence, and also embody much tradition, which helps to promote a sense of regional and national identity, stability and cohesion.... corporate memory, national character and heritage.... Within a democracy, the armed forces reflect both the aspirations and expectations of the nation that they represent and defend...the Armed Forces’ values should represent the aspirations of society.”
Soviet military doctrine was expressed in strikingly ideological terms of global ‘two camp’ communist/capitalist conflict. This has been succeeded from the end of the Cold War by a strongly nationalistic doctrine in the Russian Federation confronting its lost republics in Central Asia. Russian military doctrine is articulated as confronting ever-present threat:

Changing through the past few years the situation in the world has set new challenges before the national security and brand new missions - whereby the Russian Federation can restore itself as a major influence in the world.\(^{18}\)

We remarked above that clearly articulated grand strategies and military doctrines are the styles of greater and/or polar powers. In the Gulf and Southeast Asian regions states that have traditions of military closeness with the political systems, or have usurped these, or have been allied with strong external powers show some aptness towards clarified military self-conceptions. However, it is often difficult to find independent and authentic defining statements of military doctrine among the states of our two regions. Military doctrines are to be found more by processes of inference from the historic standing and independence of the military, or the military’s closeness to and special role in upholding the identity of the political system, or the military as civil guide and guardian, as we will see in Southeast Asia. Military doctrines are generally conveyed, as we have suggested, in commentary as ‘operational doctrine’ (the pragmatics of conflict and fighting at some particular time); that is, as declared understandings of states’ present and potential strategic environments and assessed appropriate military responses to these. References along these lines are common. In respect of the Gulf, Cordesman (various
sources) is most freely available, but in keeping with his apparent intellectual orientation his comments are generally on states’ operational doctrines and the ‘nuts and bolts’ of their defence: “Iran’s military doctrine places heavy emphasis on asymmetric warfare”, is a rare reference to the concept. Iran’s armed forces, and especially the Revolutionary Guard Corp, are integral supports of the ideological tenets and revolutionary ambitions of the political and sectarian regime. Connell suggests the evolution of military doctrine to be in revolutionary doctrine:

The basis of Iranian military doctrine was developed during Iran’s long and traumatic war with Iraq (1980-1988). Most senior officers are veterans of the ‘imposed war’, which has had a major influence on Iranian strategic thinking. Concepts such as self-reliance, ‘holy defense’, and export of the revolution first entered the military lexicon during the Iran-Iraq War and were codified as doctrine in the early 1990s.

“The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) (is) the branch of the Iranian military tasked with protecting the Islamic revolution”.

Writing of Saudi Arabia, Cordesman says: “A combination of outdated paternalism, exaggerated secrecy, and treating defense as a virtually (sic) fiefdom of the ruling elite is the rule in the region and not the exception....It is beginning to produce its second generation of ranks with modern military training.” The intricacies of military forces of Saudi Arabia – their linkages with the regime (and factions within it) and the relative significance of the main defence forces – are great and need to be traced historically; which enterprise would show a general more significant part in national defence given to and played by the National Guard (SANG) relative to the regular army and defence forces. There is a broad division between, on the one hand, protection of the regime and
the Saud dynasty within it and the ideology which gives the whole national system its integrity, and on the other hand, defence of the sovereign territory and its strategic neighbourhood. Saudi Arabia provides the greater part of the drive and forces in the GCC Peninsula Shield Force in defence of its realm as judged to be served in a regional security arrangement. By severe reduction this division between protection of regime and defence of realm might be drawn from a comment by Nonneman:

The traditional support for and alliance with the Al Sa’ud...extends beyond the elites into the tribes at large, as many of them were part and parcel of Abd al-Aziz’s state-building exercise... This is reflected among other things in the National Guard. *These forces have generally been supportive and do not have a direct voice in foreign policy issues.* (My emphasis).  

Similarly, and drawing on Cordesman, Glosemeyer says: “Unlike the regular army, whose task is to protect the country from an external enemy, the SANG safeguards sensitive domains like the oil installations and the royal family”. Cordesmann spelled out the Guard’s “missions” more fully in five elements (to):

Maintain security and stability within the kingdom; Defend vital facilities (religious sites, oil fields); Provide security and a screening force for the kingdom’s borders; Provide a combat ready internal security force for operations throughout the kingdom; Provide for security for Crown Prince (King) Abdullah and the royal family.  

In an uncommon speculative moment Cordesman suggests: “The National Guard is sometimes viewed as a counterweight to any threat from the regular military forces, and a counterbalance within the royal family to Sudairi control over the regular armed forces.” The suggestion here and the earlier remarks are significant for they indicate the pre-eminence of the National Guard in matters of defence and security; the central mission
it has as guarantor of the historic regime and the ideological integrity political system. Saudi Arabia’s military forces have in several parts the roles of upholding traditional identities and pursuing modern state interests. The Saudi Arabia National Guard exercises a role close to the political/ruling system; its self-concept will be founded in the values of that system.²⁵

Moving now to Southeast Asia, we shall comment briefly on Indonesia, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines and the defence experiences of these states which suggest that their militaries may have evolved particular military doctrines. Indonesia’s absolute size and relative size in the Southeast Asia region, and the archipelagic character of the state are probable grounds for the state defence forces (the Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) to be a prominent part in the dynamics of statehood and so to encourage a self-conception of the defence forces as a corporate professional body. Indonesia presents an example where the military have an articulated military doctrine which is drawn from long experience of threatened unity of the state and which combines with a socio-political relationship and accepted responsibility in society. Bradford sums up the complex character of the TNI:

The TNI’s social responsibility is clearly enshrined in ideology, doctrine, and propaganda. Unlike officers in the professional militaries of the West, whose burdens are limited to the management of violence in order to guarantee security, TNI doctrine clearly gives its members the additional responsibility of serving the nation as a manager and guide with regard to socio-political affairs.²⁶

The origin of this self-image of dual responsibility of the military was in the national guerrilla resistance to colonial authority of the 1950s. As the
civilian leaders failed, Smith says: “The military argued that it had two roles: security and socio-political. (This) effectively gave the TNI the rationale for a role in domestic affairs.”27 Since then the military maintained a prominent role for half a century within the political system, as guide and guardian of the nation’s unity (in the Pancasila state of ‘unity in diversity’). The TNI has maintained its commitment to be a professional armed force defending the state (from any external threat and from internal threats).28 It declares itself to be protector of the patriotic foundations of the national system, which has been sustained in large part by its participation in the political system. This linkage has evolved over the years in favour of a rebalance of military-political relations and a relaxed grasp of the military on the political system; from, as Bradford says, not government/not military regime but a force among and responsible to the people, becoming a “dual function” body of military and social-political force. From the late 1990s a “new paradigm” of the political-military relationship redefined the military as apolitical by removing it from any proprietary hold on institutions of the state and party politics.29 Old habits, old self-images and opportunities for assertiveness die hard and the TNI stays close to the people in the way of the presence of territorial commanders in the provinces and control of local tensions, and in the exercise of developmental roles and continuance of its business interests. There is much evidence to show that the TNI has not always in practice been true to its doctrinal principles of social guidance and support and its development as an effective military body, but it maintains the principles as articles of its corporate integrity - and as expectations of the state.
Origins and later experiences in insurgency, dissidence and ethnic conflicts have been widespread features of insecurity among other states of Southeast Asia, and so have been prominent elements in the enmities that in considerable part constitute the security complexity of the region. These instabilities also add to the intensities of border conflicts among the states. For four decades in the Indochina sub-region militant revolutionary communism dominated the security scenario, and by infection influenced security in the maritime area of the region. There were numerous factors of instability and insecurity that explained and provided rationale for prominent roles of the armed forces.

In Vietnam the domestic growth of the Communist Party (from 1930) led to the transformation of the anti-colonial resistance of the Viet Minh into revolutionary warfare and instilled into the military leadership of the Vietnamese People’s Army (VPA) the doctrine of ‘people’s war’. The indigenous Indochinese Cold War and its exclusion of indigenous independent civilian authority for nearly half a century reinforced the claim of the military on a total hold on national security and political authority. There was no doctrinal dichotomy between influence over civilian society and military control in the nation. People’s war meant that every citizen was potentially (according to circumstances and how these were viewed by the Communist Party) members of the armed forces of the nation. Since the withdrawal of the VPA from Cambodia in 1989 and the coming into effect of the 1992 constitution with its confirmation of doi moi (pluralism in the political system) “the VPA’s role has shifted from
focusing mainly on national reunification and defence, to maintaining domestic political stability under party rule and promotion of economic development.” Vasavakul goes on:

Growing VPA participation in domestic security affairs and its increasing role in the economy have reinforced interlocking ties between the military, party and state. Greater openness under doi moi has not led to further differentiation between military and civil affairs. In keeping with conventional communist party supremacy in the state system the People’s army continues in its role as the mobilising agent of national defence and of civil stability, and receives its doctrinal legitimacy from the party. But from the early 1990s and membership of ASEAN in 1995 Vietnam has undertaken difficult and cautious system change at home and normalisation of external relations. It now shares more openly and cooperatively with its neighbours the many regional security issues and concerns.

On the western side of the Indochinese landmass there are two countries – the largest in the sub-region and mutually antagonistic – in which the militaries are of strongly political interventionist dispositions. In Thailand the military have intervened intermittently against the social and economic inadequacies of civilian administrations which were either excessively conservative or democratic, but uniformly affected by high-level of corruption. Funston tells us:

The military has been at the forefront of Thai politics since the 1932 coup against absolute monarchy. Most of the time it has seized power, or reinforced its power, by the use or threat of force. There have been 22 successful or attempted coups to date (2001).
In seventy years since the monarchy was made constitutional and the political system was put on a modernising parliamentary and bureaucratic course, both the politicians and the military have been in control for very brief spells (averaging two or three years each). Throughout, however, the military have been participant in politics, often holding the highest political offices. Funston goes on:

Past constitutions were often crafted to allow the military an open political role.... All such dispensations have been removed from the 1997 constitution. No active servicemen remained in parliament... (although) retired generals are often welcomed into political parties.\(^{37}\)

The military’s own legitimacy is based on loyalty to the ancient monarchy, which it has been generally careful to cultivate. However it has been impeded in developing a self-image and doctrine by circumstances in the field which gave it an unclear identity as an armed force. Its counterinsurgency role receded as Chinese support for this was withdrawn and Cold War conflict at the borders ended. The military fell back on greater emphasis on nation-building, narcotics control and civic action. The armed forces operated largely in small local units, effectively but to the neglect of a national defence mission and development of forces logistics, training and command. Thailand’s place in the configuration of regional security complexity is dominated by the border difficulties in the one case and with disputes with its strong neighbours, Myanmar and Vietnam. As Jennifer Taw put the matter: the military operates at “both extremes of the operational continuum without the benefit of up-to-date doctrine to guide it”.\(^{38}\) There are aspects of dysfunction about the Thai military: its continuing localism of deployment which offers opportunities for public support and pursuit of economic
interests. Internal factionalism is rife. Latter-day approaches to professionalism by the recruitment and training of younger more educated personnel are limited by the growth of a military class, or caste higher officer culture, often motivated by ambition for the advantages of old opportunities.\textsuperscript{39}

The Burmese army was established under the tutelage of the Japanese in World War II. Its identity as the instrument of patriotic nationalism followed from the resistance to the Japanese (unlike the Thais who collaborated) and revolt in 1945. From this time the Burmese state was subjected to persistent insurgency. The major threat was first from communist challenges to state security and more persistently from domestic ethnic insurgencies and rebellions. Army (Tamadaw) training at the country’s training schools emphasises counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare – ‘total people’s war’ – as a response to any violation of the territorial integrity of the state. Armed forces personnel are entirely volunteers. Officer training is founded in an insistence on corporate loyalty and solidarity. The self-image of the military goes beyond a view of itself as corrective of dysfunctional politics. It is the embodiment of Burmese patriotism.\textsuperscript{40} The forms of defence were judged to be both the most relevant to the security needs of the state and to be appropriate in respect to its limited capacity to equip its forces with the means for more conventional modern warfare. According to Maung Than:

\begin{quote}
The Army’s pre-eminence by virtue of the command structure as well as its vanguard role in overcoming the security challenges posed by multiple insurgencies has been accepted by all concerned parties. The limited nature of counterinsurgency warfare as well as resource constraints –
\end{quote}
that has precluded the acquisition of expensive weapons systems – relegated the other services to a supporting role.\textsuperscript{41} Thailand has been less inhibited about the procurement of conventional and modern weaponry. (See Tables D and F) Thailand has traditionally been Myanmar’s principal external antagonist and insurgency and refugee migration at their common border is as disturbing as any such insecurity in the whole Southeast Asia region.\textsuperscript{42}

The pre-eminence of the Burmese army as a power in the country’s political system can be traced back to the coup by army officers in 1962. The generals subsequently frequently intervened in government affairs until they claimed total \textit{dominance} of the military from September 1988 when the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) was installed as the exclusive political authority and institution of state security and order. Adoption of socialism as the national ideology and an interlude of one-party politics and government (headed by military officers) in the 1970s were scant relief of the development of a state military culture, as this has been consolidated since 1988. Maung Than believes:

SLORC envisaged a political configuration which would institutionalize the military’s role in “national politics” as a solution to the problem of dysfunctional “party politics”. Under proposals (by a national convention) the military would enjoy complete autonomy with its C-in-C designated as the supreme commander. (There is) provision for the supreme commander to assume state power in a national emergency.\textsuperscript{43}

“The government-controlled media refers to a ‘Tamadaw Government’”. Myanmar has every appearance of a military which rules from a self-image and conviction that it rules as the sole guarantor of national stability and patriotism. Occasional promises the military make of civilian transfer have never been allowed to take root.
In Malaysia security and defence have been a pronounced national concern, which is reflected in the regionally comparative high allocation of resources to security and defence forces. Table D in Chapter Eight showed that Malaysia has the third highest level among the ASEAN states of gross domestic product, from which the third highest allocation to security and defence is made (Table F). The country has needed to contend with continuous domestic insurgency – ideological, ethnic and racial. Singapore was a major incident in 1963 of (enforced) separation, and separatist pressures from Thailand are a continuous security threat. Malaysia is a federal outcome of Malayan expansion into the Borneo (Kalimantan) island and has presented the country with territorial security concerns in Sarawak and Sabah, and so with disputes with Indonesia and the Philippines. This expansion was the subject of Indonesia’s konfrontasi 1963-1966. As Funston says:

Sabah and Sarawak, separated by the South China Sea, have different histories and ethnic mixes. Incorporating these states has been a major challenge of political integration. Malaysia is centrally located in Southeast Asia (and is) the only country to share boundaries with all members (of maritime ASEAN).44 Notwithstanding Malaysia’s heightened levels of security and the defence threats it has perceived at times, the military have not gained a relative strong balance of authority against the political in the system, as is common in most other ASEAN states, and have never had, or taken, a direct political role.45 Civilian authority predominates over the military and executive defence offices have consistently been held by civilians. Civilian control over security is also maintained significantly by division of military and police powers, the latter of which are firmly under
parliamentary authority. Interestingly, however, Funston suggests that: “the military do play a silent political role. Malaysian governments have taken the view that a strong military serves to enhance the credibility of government”; explained, Funston seems to suggest, by the high levels of allocated resources to the military and police.

The Malaysian Army has not enjoyed a consistently predominant status in the national armed forces (MAF). The country’s particular geostrategic configuration and out-reached territorial interests have given the navy an important defence status. According to Mak: “Following the end of the internal insurgency and the end of the Cold War, the MAF became focused on the need to project maritime power”. Mak goes on:

In reaction to the rising strength of the navy, the Malaysian army restructured itself, abandoning its emphasis on counter-insurgency... it is unlikely that the navy will displace the army as the dominant service in the MAF, as land forces remain the decisive factor in the defence of the realm from a political point of view.... The combined strength of its maritime and conventional operations will mean that Malaysia will acquire a new degree of regional power projection capability.46

With the combination of inter-service challenge and the primacy of civilian control in matters of defence and security it is far from clear how the army (or the MAF) might develop a strong self-image that promotes independence and confident superiority. This writer has found no evidence of an articulated military doctrine in the manner of the more assertive forces of Myanmar, Thailand and Indonesia. Assertiveness of tone appears much more to be the manner of politics in Malaysia. Operational doctrine (geostrategic and threat assessment, appropriate resource allocation and military response) are active national concerns. Modernization of the armed forces was undertaken from the 1990s,
including advanced conventional weapons and, beyond up-grading, aspects of ‘modern warfare’ resources (RMA). Balakrishnan says there has been: “a shift in emphasis by the MAF away from procurement of traditional platform-centric equipment toward information technology – and network-based systems”:

The shift from conventional threats to more non-conventional security concerns, such as piracy, drug and human trafficking, border control and illegal immigration, has necessitated platforms and weapons that could cater to these challenges. .... (and) have necessitated increased interoperability between the various types of equipment available, as well as between the air, naval and ground forces of the Malaysian military.47

It is interesting that the reference here to interoperability is to the capabilities within the Malaysian forces and not to interoperability with other ASEAN state forces. There is, as we have seen, a regional institutional unwillingness towards defence integration, but Malaysia’s defence and security postures must also be understood together with its cool strategic relations with Singapore – and with Indonesia.

Singapore is a particular focus of defence concern on the part of Malaysia and even more so, reciprocally on the part of Singapore towards Malaysia. Singapore shares much of the same geostrategic setting as Malaysia, but as a small island state closely adjacent to Malaysia whose disposition to amity is constrained, having virtually no strategic depth, Singapore is subject to ‘the tyranny of geography’. The national strategic outlook is deterrence-based, being the most rational judgment of the country’s limited capability for a forward offensive operational doctrine. Analyst Huxley refers to this as “a forward-defence military doctrine”48, or national operational military doctrine, which is based on substantial (RMA)
inputs of communications, surveillance and intelligence, preventive diplomacy and the maintenance of a ‘technical edge’ against would-be aggressors.

Singapore has developed a successful industrial-based economy. Its gross domestic product is the third highest in the region, after Indonesia and Thailand. This has allowed it to allocate a high percentage of GDP to the country’s armed forces (SAF)\textsuperscript{49} – and to the growth of a domestic defence industry, which absorbs up to fifty percent of military expenditure.\textsuperscript{50} Military officers are trained at the Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute and government provides scholarships for outstanding students to study abroad at prestigious universities. The small corps of professional soldiers is supported by a ‘citizen army’ of compulsory national service of about two years from age eighteen. A local analyst says that: “the most striking feature of the Singapore scene is the undisputed predominance of the civilian sector over the military”. The SAF Code of Conduct emphasises a strictly professional role for the armed forces.\textsuperscript{51} Several factors, as in Malaysia, make it unlikely that the SAF can develop an independent self-image. It is significant that these two states (Malaysia and Singapore) are based on a political philosophy of constitutional and parliamentary democracy; neither has been subject to challenge by the military.\textsuperscript{52}

Three factors have impeded the development of the Philippines armed forces (AFP): first, the defence umbrella provided by treaty and the presence of United States forces, notably in the Subic Bay naval base and the Clark air base until 1991\textsuperscript{53}, and second, the poor national economic
base from which such military development might have been advanced. A third more fundamental factor lies in the country’s constitution which holds that: “The Philippines is a democratic and republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.” The principle is declared that ‘Civilian authority is supreme over the military, whose role is confined to protecting the people and defending the country’s sovereignty’. Civic influences have been stronger than military influence in upholding the principles of the constitution.

In the Philippines civilian-political-military relations have been varied over time. The military role in the state was prominent for two decades under President Marcos (1965-1986), and compliant with the president in the support of his undemocratic regime and in performance of a dominant domestic security role. On the two occasions when elected presidents were removed – Marcos in 1986 and Joseph Estrada in 2000 – military participation backed popular and civic revolt. Marcos was succeeded by Corazon Aquino who, during her term of office (1986-1992), was challenged by seven coup attempts. Each was repulsed, and over the following two decades no serious challenge has been made to the civilian order. The Philippines have never experienced a successful military coup. In 1990 the powers of the military and police and paramilitary constabulary were separated and put under the authority of two government departments. In 1992 president Aquino was followed by the election of Gen. Fidel Ramos, who before then, however, had served in a civilian capacity as Secretary for Defence. In the economic up-turn
following the economic crisis of the late 1990s the Philippine government has put an Armed Forces Modernization Plan in place. This is intended to make the three armed forces more effective in their national defence capabilities, by equipping them more adequately with modern weapons systems. The 1998 Defense Policy Paper states its conviction that; “In general, the national security environment has improved significantly and national defense and security planning is now shifting to a more confident and externally focused policy”. The Philippines is among the more committed to ASEAN among the Southeast Asian states and in particular to the ASEAN Forum (ARF). The “third more fundamental factor” mentioned above has been the post-Marcos development of the civilian-political order and institutions, repulsing unprofessional military ambitions, and the growth of confident political primacy in all affairs of state

Military doctrines are not, perhaps cannot be, unaffected by the ideological and public moral ethos of the country they serve. Military doctrine aims at prescribing the normative as well as material manner in which an armed force will fight. The state of the armed forces and their vision of themselves are contingent on how historically they have been groomed, in education and in action, by a perception of themselves as a corporate organization, the objectives to which they are committed (by their political masters), the technology of warfare available to them, the quality of the personnel they attract and depend on, the geographic settings in which typically they could be called upon to fight, and what
they know of the capabilities of potential adversaries. None of these conditions is fixed. The military has to be flexible over time and adaptable to current circumstances – and so must their political masters be.

In this section we have found that identifying the self-images of military forces can be difficult, perhaps because of external influences that impede these. Political authorities may be wary of excessive military self-awareness of its corporate identity, and political leaders may be assertive of the primacy of the political realm. Western traditions of autonomous professionalism of the military are not easily taken on board in different cultural settings and historical experience, and may be diluted in societal functions allocated to the military, or that they may assume in times of revolution or active counterinsurgency. In whatever capacity, the military in both Gulf and Southeast Asian regions are persistently active in combating the conditions of insecurity that identify the regions as security complexes. The discussion followed shows that the balance of authority in relations between the political-civilian and military realms can be of great importance, depending largely on how the culture of political primacy has evolved and been developed.

(iv) Military culture: aspect of cross-military relations. Importance in projecting and effecting regionalisation of defence

Political acceptance of the regionalisation of defence depends on the general compatibility of the forces, as potential joint combat actors, that are intended to be brought together as well as on the interoperability of the weaponry they bring to cooperative, joint or integrated regional defence activities. This will involve compatibility of doctrines, either as
these may be extant at the time regionalising defence is projected or as they may be negotiated in processes of consultation and reconciliation of doctrines.\textsuperscript{56} Joint, etc. military activities will also involve understanding and tolerance, or reconciliation of culture differences among regional partners. Culture in this context is of the general - ‘liberal’ or traditionalist/conservative, political, religious or secular, etc. - culture of participating states, and the culture and value systems of the military as these will be largely derived from or influenced by the general culture and value systems of the participating states.\textsuperscript{57} The perspectives military forces bring to any activities they may be called upon to engage in will reflect the general cultures of the nations they are representative of. This aspect of any such situation is prior to and wider than the image the militaries may have of themselves\textsuperscript{58} and prior to the political choices that are made to order and govern the military.\textsuperscript{59}

In a critical review article Mansoor says:

\begin{quotation}
Culture’s relationship to armed conflict has been an important focus in war studies in the post-Cold War period.... Just as culture affects how a given military organization conducts its internal affairs, it also influences its relations with allies... cultural variances (sic) among militaries can inhibit the effectiveness of coalitions during war.\textsuperscript{60}
\end{quotation}

Attention is drawn here to two scenarios where culture is of influence: internal military and combat allies (which latter might include deterrent coalitions\textsuperscript{61}). Military forces may, further, be brought into educational, training and exercise, and other operational contact, in circumstances of military development. Most importantly, military forces may be tied into projects for forms of joint and regional defence. Military cross-cultures become a matter requiring attention in the building of regional defence
arrangements, for neglect of them can inhibit the prospect of states accepting such arrangements in the first place and make them needlessly abrasive when these arrangements are under way. Military culture may also be affective in the attitudes it encourages towards adversaries and towards their cultures. Issues arise of putting variations in outlooks acquired in education and training, principles and practice of leadership (hierarchy and command) systems, norms of combat conduct and post-bellum attitudes, together in regionalising contexts. Cultures do not have to be entirely homogenised; there might be general amicable understanding, tolerance, or reconciliation towards much variation (pragmatically recommended or culturally inclined) – cultivated, for example, in frequency of meeting of military leadership personnel as is common in the GCC and is much encouraged in the ASEAN-ARF.

In developing and modernising militaries it is common for personnel to be sent to the military schools and advanced military academies of overseas allies or ‘friends’. Such academies are not necessarily attuned to the presence of dissonant cultural perspectives and to their own doctrinal and cultural foundations, or more affectively are programmed to propagate a specific cultural-ideological perspective and doctrine. National militaries are the outcomes of different historical and evolving narratives. The concept of ‘narratives’ is discussed by Freedman:

Narratives are about the ways that issues are framed and responses suggested. They are not necessarily analytical and, when not grounded in evidence or experience, may rely on appeals to emotion, or on suspect metaphors and dubious historical analogies.
Academy programmes may also be strongly directed to war, strategic and operational doctrinal studies – with ‘hidden’ elements of host culture.\textsuperscript{64} When military personnel of the states of the regions return to the responsibilities of homeland defence and security they face the issue of translating their training into their own narratives and the realities of their own defence and security situations. The questions of understanding and cultural ‘empathy’ across-military systems, across allies and regional partners, across friend \textit{and} adversary cultures are wide-ranging.\textsuperscript{65} Mansoor makes the important point that:

\begin{quote}
(Culture) underpins military effectiveness and the ability to create operational military doctrine.... Culture is also important because it helps to explain the worldview and motivations of one’s potential adversaries.\textsuperscript{66}
\end{quote}

In the two regions under study the military ‘ethos’ frequently comes as an aspect of a package of military doctrine, but which is culturally specific both as to the original national/societal source, and as to the relative armed force capabilities of host and client. The receiving national personnel must then apply the received doctrine to their own specific conceptual milieu and defensive obligations. The ‘cultural’ issue may arise, then, where several national military forces are influenced by different military doctrines (and even personnel within a single military force may be so influenced by variant education and training). The issue can become particularly acute when a number of national armed forces are drawn together in endeavours towards regional defence.\textsuperscript{67} Remedies may be found at state and regional levels in the establishment and development of indigenous training institutions and approved military academies and promotion of exchanges among these.\textsuperscript{68} Opportunities for and occasions of shared training and joint exercises help most in joint
military relations where socio-cultural sensitivities among partners are relatively easy, as they are among the GCC states. Their effect is in improving empathy between or correspondence of regional military cultures. The evolution of shared ‘military culture’ as this is experienced in shared education and training, exercises, and in joint combat campaigns arises among friends and allies. A greater degree of deliberation becomes necessary among would-be partners whose narratives are discordant and amity more to be proven. Experience in the fusing of military cultures will probably be predicated on the presence of some degree of pre-existing ‘amity’ among the regionalising partners. Supports in amity and culture are essential grounds for regionalising military systems and effective regional-level defence. Within the spectrum of enmity and amity that defines a regional security complex the militaries have a place. Where that place is and to where it can be moved are matters of doctrine and culture.

Finally, where militaries are related in cultural understanding this must also be worked into an understanding of trusted political-military relationships in the homelands of participants in a regional military enterprise. This was remarked above to be an element in military doctrine. The military must live and work well together, but not too well. Shared corporate self-image, cultural understanding and confidence must not corrode political acceptance and confidence.
Conclusion

In earlier chapters we observed conditions of regional security in the Gulf and Southeast Asia, states’ recognition of these, and the different ways by which the states have sought to secure appropriate military responses to the conditions of regional security. The elements of these enquiries have been essentially structural and material. The concern of the present chapter has been more analytic; seeking to tease out immaterial factors of principles and norms and culture that lie behind and are of influence on the more surface aspects of regional defence and the relations this generates. The focus has been on the military, seeking to observe them as bearers of identities and values. The military are not simply pieces to be deployed chess-like by leaders around the national or regional boards of defence and security.

Military forces are primary actors in regional defence and security. They are not faceless actors. They have perspectives on their field of activity that link to their calling, and in whatever range of their activity and demands made upon them the military have self-images and express norms and values they draw down from their societies and which they also cultivate among themselves. The military, that is, also have “cultural or cognitive screens that shape their world views”. The military need to be understood as more than subordinate instruments of state interest. The military need to be understood in terms of how they relate to the states for which they exist and act as instruments for defence and security. The generally accepted rule is that the military operate within the terms of state grand strategies: who and what are potential challenges
to state security interests and the measure of its capability to meet such challenges. Development of regional grand strategy, among states broadly amicably disposed towards each other, comes at the point when joined defence in some form is judged to be economic and effective and likely to work.

When the state assigns its military forces to defensive responsibilities beyond those specific to its particular national defence, in forms of joint action with other militaries, new relationships need to be recognised and understood. For example, new shared command structures external to those of participating states will need to be agreed. Each state must feel that its sovereign integrity is not at risk. These new relationships will be worked out largely in terms of structural/institutional forms by which state-to-state and states-to-militaries and militaries-to-militaries relations are established, as in the GCC in the Gulf and ASEAN in Southeast Asia.

Among these new relations will be those between the military forces that have been to some degree brought together in defensive roles at the regional level. The military have identities that are internal and specific to themselves, which inform their relations with the state and with their counterpart militaries. Militaries cultivate internal identities of force loyalty and solidarity. These identities are conceptualised as ‘military doctrine’. Military doctrine (distinguished from ‘operational doctrine’) is the image the military has of itself and is what binds it as a corporate body. Militaries must be reasonably compatible in their conceptions of what they are as corporate bodies beyond ‘doing what soldiers do, fight’ –
whether they be revolutionary, constitutional, regime guarantor, socially attached or professionally detached. Military self-images are the outcomes of specific experiences and historical narratives. These have been briefly traced in the chapter, while accepting that in some cases doctrine must be inferred from conduct. Southeast Asia is more issue-prone than the Gulf in regard to doctrinal differences. This is a likely element in its greater regionalising reticence. Remedy can be found in joint education and training, exercise, and staff and command confidence building exchanges.

Viability of regionalisation of defence depends on the general compatibility of the military forces brought to it, particularly as they become potential joint combat actors. Their cultures are also aspects of them as they bring norms and values to whatever they do. Neglect of military cross-culture can inhibit acceptance of joint military endeavours or make them needlessly abrasive when they are underway. The culture and value systems of the militaries will be largely derived from the political and social cultures and value systems of their parent states. A general ‘liberal’ culture will influence military perspectives and motivations differently from a ‘conservative’ or authoritarian culture. The variant modern social-political and military cultures of Southeast Asia present obstacles to regional defence organization that are more evident than those in the more uniform cultures in the Gulf. But we have said that cultures do not have to be homogenised. Amicable understanding, tolerance, or reconciliation among military cultures can be cultivated. Among developing and modernizing militaries received cultural influences
need to be translated into ‘home’ conceptual and normative milieu, or be moderated by developing indigenous education and training. Mansoor says that culture “underpins military effectiveness and the ability to create operational military doctrine.... it (also) helps to explain the worldview and motivations of one’s potential adversaries”. The values, motivations and attitudes that constitute the cultures of military forces are influential in the conduct and resolution of combat in the heat and fog of war and what follows it.
Notes Chapter Eight


2. At any particular time, a state may not have in view any particular potential ‘referent object’. Its strategic vision may have more to do with its (historic) conception of its standing in the world, or in its particular strategic environment.

3. “Grand strategy is the art of reconciling ends and means. It involves purposive action – towards what leaders think and want. Such action is constrained by factors leaders explicitly recognize (for instance, budget constraints and the limitations inherent in the tools of statecraft) and by those they might only implicitly feel (cultural or cognitive screens that shape world views).” Feaver, Peter, ‘What is grand strategy and why do we need it?’, Foreign Policy, April 2009. On ‘grand strategy’ more expansively see Freedman, *The Transformation*. A constrained historical view is first set out in pages 27-29. Then the idea of strategic interest is developed in following sections. In this area of interest it is important to recognize the distinction between grand strategy (as political) and operational, field strategy (as military). Grand strategies are analytically prior to ‘military doctrine’.

4. Freedman, ibid, p.27. But a state may also have ambitions that are basically served by its military and its will and capacity to project power. Of this post-colonial Indonesia would be a clear case. Political leaderships may have high or low militaristic dispositions – high or low inclinations towards enmity. Polar powers, as for example, Iraq previously and Iran currently in the Gulf, are prone to attract suspicions of this. Historically, grand strategies were the visions of those states that were powers within the international system, expressing their perceptions of their places within that system. Unsurprisingly, in the literature grand strategy ideas are located mostly in or most clearly articulated in such polities as the US, the Soviet Union/Russia, the United Kingdom and revolutionary Iran. These states are also apt most to clearly articulate their military doctrines (see below in text). One of the difficulties with Iran is that it can be hard to decipher the lines of authority between the political and the military and other combat agencies. A state of strong ideological disposition might transmit this to its military forces.

5. The Peninsula Shield Force has been such a balancing act. ASEAN has generally balanced in favour of states’ resilience and non-interference.

6. ‘Defence in the region’ rather than ‘regional defence’, is a ‘web’ of bilateral agreements among the states, and one tri-lateral arrangement for security in the Malacca Strait.

7. The Arabian sub-region is not entirely free of such conflicts, but seeks to subdue them.
8. At the time of writing this passage the British government was, for example, undertaking a ‘defence review’. This overviews the nation’s prospective foreign interests and national defence requirements in the foreseeable future, its present commitments, its current resources, the country’s likely affordability and the demands of current and future military technology. Professional military, and economic and social assessments enter into such a review, but final conclusions and decisions are political.

9. The connected forces commitment is itself a matter of analytic interest. See under Military Doctrine and Culture later.

10. This can also be seen in the most advanced and institutionalised regional defence arrangements such as NATO and the European Union.

11. J.F.C. Fuller, *The Nine Principles of War*, 1923, still much referred to in discussions. Fuller was an early enthusiast in the development of mechanised warfare.

12. This quotation is drawn from the Canadian statement of military doctrine. [www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military-doctrine](http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military-doctrine) offers a brief and useful survey of the subject. Military doctrines articulate an organizational self-image, but they all seek to find some universal principles of corporate professional and effective military conduct in situations of armed conflict.

13. There might be some cession of political primacy in regionalised defence configurations. The constitutive possibilities are open – NATO being only one. What is clear, however, is that in the GCC political primacy is held pretty tightly in a regional organization that is state-bound in its decision making.

14. Two things can be said here: first, in practice the military are always engaged in advisory and consultative roles to service appropriate defence policy. In the previous chapter it was shown that in the Gulf under the Higher Military Committee (1994) and consultations leading up to the Joint Defence Agreement of 2000 and followed by the Joint Defense Council of 2002 there are processes by which senior military personnel are drawn into high level consultative roles (Section vii). The Assistant Secretary-General for Military Affairs in the GCC Secretariat plays an on-going coordinating and report function in the latter. Under ASEAN, for example, ARF military consultative roles are structured in (Sections ix and xi)in 2002 and in 2009 annual Defence Ministers Meetings (ADMM) were instated with remit against terrorism and transnational crime.

15. Command and Staff and other senior military personnel are the actors most prone to imbibe the more abstract grand strategic and military doctrine aspects of armed forces, and to be the agents to dispense these influences through the ranks, through wide-ranging exercise and training provisions.

16. "Modern military doctrine is markedly technocratic in character. This is a reflection of the enormous influence that technological systems exert on the
conduct of war, and also of the belief that doctrine itself should have a scientific basis.” Richard Holmes ed., Oxford Companion to Military History: Military Doctrine, Oxford, OUP, 2001. The U.S, The New Military Doctrine, Joint Forces Command, 2008 states: “the military forces are supposed to continue playing the central role in pursuing national interests and state security.”

17. British Defence Doctrine, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, promulgated as directed by the Chiefs of Staff, 2008. The publication goes on: A warfighting ethos, as distinct from a purely professional one, is absolutely fundamental....The warfighting ethos signifies and embodies the ideals and duties of military services, and unifies those who serve in the Armed Forces. The wider context of this section deals more with operational aspects of doctrine.

18. “Restructuring of the military organization of the state began in the middle of the 1990s”, from 2003. See GlobalSecurity.org, John Pike, 2008. See also ‘European Security and Defence Assembly: assembly of the Western European Union. Report.’ 5 June 2008. These evidences are really of ‘operational doctrine’. There is some likelihood that Russian military doctrinal thinking is still constrained by recent subordination to the ruling (communist) party.


20. Interestingly a similar remark is made of the U.S. military by Luft, Gal, ‘Beer, Bacon and Bullets’, 2010, “As the U.S. military selects its next generation of senior leaders, it would do well to keep in mind T.E.Lawrence’s contention that ‘irregular war is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge”. In ‘Saudi Military Forces and Development Challenges and Reform’, Cordesman suggests “there are a number of high level Saudis, including some junior members of the royal family, who hope that future new equipment buys will be reduced and streamlined in order to concentrate on military effectiveness”, and interestingly, “Although Saudi Arabia needs to reshape its priorities, in general the planning and management of the National Guard has been significantly better than that of the different armed services of the Ministry of Defense.” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2006.


24. Ibid. Cordesman has singularly little to say about the standing of the military in its relations with the political system, which are generally specific to particular
politics. State-military relationships have their own dynamics and these will in part be expressed in the military’s core doctrine. This issue will be remarked on later in respect of the military being given a regional defence role.

25. There is a certain superficial similarity between the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Force and the Saudi National Guard in their having regime-linked roles. But the similarity ends clearly at the point where it is seen that the IRGC exercises a strongly external defence role whereas the SANG have a strong internal security role – with “no direct voice in foreign policy issues”. There is a yet broader point that can be made: that (obviously many differences aside) the military in Iran and Saudi Arabia, and in the smaller states, alongside the ‘western’ systems, are ‘estates’ of the realm – part of the dynamics of statehood.


28. Of the former, external threats, there have been none except the self-imposed konfrontasi with Malaysia in the 1960s. External pressures were brought to bear in the processes of liberating East Timor. Of the latter, there have been many in the way of separation threats at Aceh, Timor and Irian Jaya and Ambon; and at different times, communist insurrection and sectarian and other dissidence. In whatever form, the basic state principle of Pancasila is held by the military to be violated.

29. Smith op cit, pp.93-95. There have been recent moves in the direction of the primacy of politics.

30. “‘The military doctrine of ‘people’s war and all peoples national defence’ was rooted in Vietnam’s centuries-long military traditions combined with doctrine acquired in Chinese and Soviet academies as well as the experience gained by commanders in wartime in guerrilla and mobile warfare””. Thayer, Carlyle, *Vietnam People’s Army: Modernization and Development*, Armed Forces Lecture Paper Series No.4, Brunei, Inst. Of Defence and Strategic Studies, n.d.

31. According to one unnamed source, the declaration that “the people as a whole participate in national defense” is enshrined in the constitution of Cambodia.


33. The doi moi principle has effectively been extended in the autonomy of the hitherto largely client regimes of Cambodia and Laos. Laos, however, maintains a strict regime in which there are “extremely close links between the army and the LPRP (Liberation People’s Revolutionary Party) - to the point where drawing a clear line of distinction becomes rather difficult” : Freeman, Nick J., ‘Laos: Timid Transition’ in ed. Funston op cit, Ch. 4, p.139. In Vietnam, Thayer reckoned in 1994 that 70% of VPA officers were members of the Vietnam Communist Party. A number of factors had contributed to the predominant influence of Vietnam over the smaller Marxist states (Cambodia and Laos), or Viet claim to this, until the dissolution of the Cold War and enforced retrenchment of Vietnamese control in
the late 1980s: first Party influence over the smaller parties – transmitted in part through Soviet support and education; traditional Vietnamese hegemony in the sub-region; the logistical demands of Cold War combat – which the Ho Chi Minh trail exemplified; and the objective to hold back the hostile Thais at the shared border with Cambodia and Laos.

34. Vasavakul op cit, pp.406-408.
35. Reciprocally, the military itself from time to time would lose its hold on political power on account of popular resistance to its own corruption.
39. Taw, ibid. A more optimistic view is presented in ‘The Thai Military in the New Era’ by Panitan Wattanayagorn, Conference Paper, National Assembly of the Kingdom of Thailand with the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Phuket, 2006: “These officers are generally committed to reform and modernize their organization more than the previous generation. If this new generation of officers is further promoted, the Thai military should become more professional in the future.” The ambition seems to be for a more Western-type professional military.
40. Than, Tin Maung Maung, ‘Military in Charge’, in ed. Funston, op cit Ch.6, p.249 note 27: “This theme is present in almost all speeches made by military leaders in their addresses at graduation ceremonies for military cadets....”. At p. 222 we are told that “Tamadaw has portrayed itself as the most disciplined, cohesive and enduring institution in Myanmar – a unique patriotic volunteer organization”.
41. Ibid p.223.
42. Acharya reckons there is an influx of about a million refugees from Myanmar into Thailand. *Constructing*, p.177. Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, p.103 identify Burma (apparently not catching up yet with ‘Myanmar) as an ‘insulator state’; for the South Asian RSC. At p.486 we are told that: “Burma has traditionally been a case of a state existing in relative isolation from the security dynamics on either side, but this has begun to change somewhat.... Functionally, it remains an insulator between the South Asian RSC and the Southeast Asian subcomplex. (my emphasis) But Chinese penetration into Burma has made it increasingly a point of linkage between China and India and consequently it has become a member of ASEAN (1999). (my emphasis) Burma’s role as insulator looks increasingly like succumbing to the dynamics of the Asian supercomplex”, or the Southeast Asian ‘subcomplex’. This last would seem to this writer to be a better understanding. Buzan et al say: “there might no longer be any full illustrations of this form of insulator”.
43. SLORC convened a national convention in 1993. Since 1992 the offices of the country’s Head of State and Commander-in-Chief, (and prime minister and defence minister) have been held by the army’s senior general. Government is based on a cabal of senior army officers.

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45. Excepting only in the 1969 Emergency (1969-1971) when government was by decree under the National Operations Council (NOC) in which the military and police held leading positions. At the height of its military initiatives in the 1980s Vietnam presented a territorial threat.


49. As does Brunei, which is also a small state among the greater powers of the region and also a prosperous economy. Quah, Jon S.T., ‘Singapore: Meritocratic City-State’ in ed. Funston, Government and Politics, suggests an even higher 7 percentage of GDP.

50. Acharya, Constructing, p.172, suggests that Singapore’s defence manufacturing success may have a negative impact of the prospects for such activities at the ASEAN level: “lingering political suspicions affected the prospect for greater cooperation in defence production. For example, the fear that an ASEAN arms manufacturing scheme might create a leading role for Singapore, which would in turn give the island republic undue leverage over its neighbours, may have been a constraining factor in intra-ASEAN cooperation in defence production”. In the GCC Joint Defense Agreement of 2001 the establishment of a joint defence industry was projected (with private investment), but regardless of its probable logistical merits, any suggestion that this could be located in Saudi Arabia was not received well among the smaller states from the same sort of fear of “undue leverage” in the Singapore case.


52. This is not to say that norm and practice always match.

53. This security comfort was subsequently formally renewed by the Visiting Forces Agreement.


55. Ibid, p. 269. Governorships and military commands in the local government units and autonomous regions of Mindanao and Cordillera are constrained in the opportunities they might offer for ambitions away from the centre. Provincialism is an inevitable feature of administration in the larger archipelagic states of Southeast Asia (Indonesia and the Philippines) and presents an important dimension of internal security. See Acharya, Amitav, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, Abingdon, Routledge, 2009, p.265.
Acharya shows how care is taken to secure help in the management of centre-periphery affairs within ASEAN bilaterally without involving unacceptable ASEAN multilateral peacekeeping.

56. At the level of the Gulf (GCC plus Iran) it is not foreseeable that this might become an issue – between the GCC states and Iran, except as maximum knowledge of an adversary is a wise precaution. At the level of the GCC alone there are no evident insurmountable difficulties. In Southeast Asia compatibility of doctrines arises not at the foresworn regional level of defence, but at the level of the web of bilateral cooperative and joint defence and security activities. The point of such activities may be in part the reconciling of doctrines.

57. Phrases such as the Saudi National Guard and regular army, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp, for example; the Indonesian National Military and Vietnamese People’s Army are inclusive of such meaning, and implicit with potential misunderstandings in joint or opposed encounters with other forces.

58. A deeper study of this than can be offered here would explore the social and psychological links between military doctrine and the societal culture within which the military is embedded. A general ‘liberal’ culture will influence military perspectives differently from a ‘conservative or authoritarian culture. Possible influences and effects are theoretically open and indefinite. They will be case-bound. ‘Military culture’ is a complex concept. Beside the professional and operational aspects of the military, the military must be founded in identifiable normative qualities, its relations with the political system to which it relates, and its relative claims in processes of deciding defence policy. In the context of regionalising defence this is another area in which there must be a notable degree of ‘fit’ and in which the GCC states are generally comfortable.

59. Political choices, from whatever system authority to make them, will also be culture-influenced.

60. Mansoor, Peter R., ‘The Softer Side of War’: Exploring the Influence of Culture on Military Doctrine, Review Essay, New York, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2011. The focus of this essay is primarily on relations between allies in shared combat situations. “Senior military figures need to work with their foreign counterparts rather than to attempt to impose their ways on them by fiat....Military training and education also played a role in bettering relations between the allies (in the Iraq War). The Saudi military commander, General Khaled bin Sultan, attended the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the Air War College”. The example is interesting, but not the best chosen to make the more general point about culture. In education and training culture is transmitted more numerous and frequently through middle/lower ranking personnel, and by them throughout the military. It used to be said that the most important soldier in the army is the sergeant major!

61. As took place against Saddam Hussein’s border threat with Saudi Arabia.

62. It was remarked earlier that the Soviet Union had hosted Southeast Asian military personnel in the ideologically oriented training programme typical of the
time. It must also be acknowledged that Western programmes, even more generously dispersed, are culturally oriented even if not as dogmatically so.


64. Western military academies are embedded in strong techno-scientific cultures whose influences have to be absorbed when transferred through trained personnel (perhaps as part of a procurement contract).

65. Culture arises in the need to have a common understanding of potential adversaries. This can be a sticking point where there is a lack of ‘fit’ between participating states’ strategic situations, with consequent selectivity and priority of potential adversaries. The Arabian/GCC states are not wholly free of such considerations, but not to an extent that regional defence cooperation is unviable.


67. Southeast Asia according to the Rand Corporation, in *ASEAN Defense Policies and Expenditures, monographs and reports*, nd, Ch.5, pp.45-46, offers a much less optimistic prospect: “Despite the limited progress in expanding ASEAN military cooperation, without a major shift in strategic perspectives and deeply engrained habits of thinking, prospects are dim in the short to medium term that ASEAN will evolve into an effective regional collective security or defence organization with coordinated doctrine, training exercises, planning, procurement, weapons production, and interoperability.” The “engrained habits” of the military of the region may be particularly affective where numerous ‘historical narratives’ and cultural variants are present.

68. See Note 70 in Chapter Seven above.

69. States find ways of modifying holistic transfers of forces and command. The point is they feel the need to do so. The military have their own concerns about such transfers. Constitutional (political primacy) relations between the state and the military are basically sustained in the money raising and distribution powers of the state. From time-to-time and place-to-place this principle is compromised by exercise of the power of the gun, as in Southeast Asia. Balance between the political and the military depends on mutual interest and trust, and on the historical narratives that strengthen habits of coexistence.

70. We noticed various scenarios of contact between states’ military forces (allies and coalitions in war and so on), but forms of regional relationships are of greatest interest as they raise serious issues of state-military and military-military relationships (on prospectively durable bases) and the ways they are conceived. The more stand-off approach to regional defence of the states of Southeast Asia does not take away from the issues of military doctrine and culture, as discussion in the chapter shows.

71. Within a broad force identity there may be lower-level identities through the ranking system.

72. See Note 58 above.

73. Themselves social-cultural derivatives, but which can be driven by necessity.
Chapter Nine

Conclusion

The main dimension of analysis in this study has been comparative at the level of regions, particularly in respect of security conditions and responses to these. At this regional level the focus has been on two regions: the Arabian Gulf and Southeast Asia. The main analytical framework for this examination has been ‘regional security complex theory’ (RSCT). This has been accompanied by examination of the ‘regional security community’ approach to defence and security. It is observed in the narrative that ‘regional security complex’ and ‘regional security community’ are not theoretical alternatives. While the former theory is developed as an understanding of states’ “security interdependence” and actor responses to security conditions at the regional level, the second represents a regional policy approach to inter-state relations that is superstructural upon the same conditions of regional security complex. While the conditions of security complex are common to the two regions, security communities are policy-determined, “interventionist” as Buzan and Waever say, among the regional member states and accordingly configure differently between the two regions:

International relations

| Regional level/entities
| Security complex | Security community |
| Security and defence

International relations

| Regional level/entities
| Security complex | Security community |
| Security and defence

|
It has been necessary first to establish that the Gulf and Southeast Asia can be viewed as autonomous regions and so as regional security complexes. This is a view that appears not to fit the widely held conventions of study of the regions which have held the Gulf to be sub-regional within the Middle East and Southeast Asia sub-regional within Asia-Pacific (East Asia).¹ Regionalism is not the product of all possible relations. A temptation to think otherwise might arise from the fact that “Studies of regional security usually take place without any coherent theoretical framework....”² The Middle East, for example, is a wide area of shared and common identities (language, religion, culture and material transactions³), but this does not preclude narrower focused relations, identities and inter-dependencies. Regions, and regional security complexes, do not in practice, or analytically, have to be absolute bounded units. The issue is particularly significant within the terms of the focus on matters of inter-state security and responses to security conditions. Two aspects of this are raised (i) actual conditions of security and how they are predominantly configured regionally. (ii) Analytically, how do these conditions fit into the terms of regional security complex. In respect of the first it has been argued in Chapter 5 that Middle East (Maghreb, Levant) conflicts and security are ‘distant’⁴ from the Gulf and do not typically impose imperatives of ‘security interdependence’ for the Gulf. Distance weakens ‘security interdependence’. It is the intensity and persistence of security concerns and actual securitisation that marks off a regional security complex. ‘Constructivist’ aspects of “perception, action and policy”, the views regional actors take of their security conditions, the actions they take and the policies they develop, are considered.⁵ The
regions are not simply analytic constructs but have, as Buzan and Waever say, ontological (empirical) status. This means that they can be autonomously identified; identified in terms of the realities of inter-state relations, particularly as these relations are active within the regions. The specificity of these relations is both structural and behavioural, as regional security complex theory seeks to show.

In respect to the second aspect of inter-state relations and security, the security autonomy of the Gulf and of Southeast Asia is confirmed within the terms of ‘regional security complex’, in particular as we view the regions through the prism of what Buzan and Waever call the “essential structure of a RSC” of four variables: boundaries, anarchic structure, polarity and social construction. The basic aspect of the “essential structure” is the regional internality of the variables.

The boundary of a regional security complex is not set geographically. “The formation of RSCs derives (from) the pressures of local geographic proximity. Simple physical adjacency tends to generate more security interaction among neighbours than among states located in different areas.... many threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones.” The boundary of a RSC is configured by strong and persistent interrelations among a set of states that are not shared with states beyond the regional neighbourhood. In the Gulf where a sub-set of cooperation (the GCC) is established the positive or negative inclination of states in the region differs as between the sub-set and the inclusive region. It is the necessity for securitisation that is a major factor in what
locates the regional states in a complex, together with some element of a will to subdue hostility.\(^8\) The lasting integrity of a regional complex, we suggest, is also sustained by its acceptance by states, or powers, beyond its own membership. This is less definitional of a RSC than an implicit practical support of it. Iran believes that the U.S. violates the boundary of the Gulf complex. In Southeast Asia there is anxiety that China might act in the way of the realist mode of a great power.\(^9\) A RSC is not absolutely bounded. The Gulf region states engage in wider commercial transactions\(^10\), and those of the GCC also engage in strategic linkages and seek corporate regional transactions. Through ASEAN the states of Southeast Asia accept the presence of regional stresses and intra-state insecurities that can threaten regional stability, and rather than confront these with regional ‘defensive’ mechanisms they approach them with agreed avoidance mechanisms. Through ASEAN the states also reach out beyond the complex border, in this way securing acceptance and influence in the wider strategic neighbourhood.

The ‘anarchic structure’ of a regional security complex is composed of two or more states that are autonomous. At the regional level inter-state relations are not governed by overarching rules. In this there is convergence with conventional neo-realist theory. ‘Regional security complexity’ is a restatement of this reality. However, as relations between states are set within the boundaries of regions relations are transformed into power configurations that are specific to the regions and security dynamics that are also specific. These dynamics are affected as states within the regions seek to confront or to manage the prevailing security
conditions. Regional securitisation presents opportunities to restructure anarchic conditions. The states in a region become actors and ‘referent objects’ in a transformed system of ‘security interdependence’. The boundaries of RSCs can change; for example, by inclusion of new units or by changes in outer-regional security conditions. Inclusion of the Yemen in the Gulf Cooperation Council produces a changed sub-set and regional interior insecurity and new boundary volatility. Iran’s suggestion of its replacement of the U.S. as guarantor of the Gulf region’s security raises fear of a deepened hegemony. Iran has its own boundary issues, which by extension could change the pattern of Gulf regional ‘security interdependence’. In Southeast Asia the regional security complex was itself ‘secured’ by the major act of trans-regional inclusion of Indochina. The states composition of the Southeast Asian region organization has also been extended by inclusion of Myanmar, Timor Leste and Irian Jaya, effectively representing a shifted perception of the configuration of ‘security interdependence’ in the regional security complex.

The *distribution of power* in a region is critical in establishing the dynamics of security and the pattern of securitisation. Polarity is a fundamental aspect of this. The configuration of states’ powers in the Gulf and in the Southeast Asian security complexes is fundamentally different, largely by virtue of the existence of tri-polarity in the one case and the absence of polarity among the states in the other. As Iraq’s strategic status in the Gulf since 2003 has been one of a “power in abeyance” the Gulf’s power structure has been bi-polar. This has brought about an increased focus on Iranian-Saudi Arabian relations. The presence of two, potentially three,
polar powers in the Gulf determines the dynamics of security and encourages what Buzan et al suggest is “a predominantly military-political security agenda”. Existence alone of a great power in the regional complex is menacing and an incitement to military protective response which might be exaggerated with the consequence of generating a ‘security dilemma’. Where there are more than one great power regional stability might be maintained by the dynamics of ‘balance of power’. Attempts to aggregate security responses among smaller states can take place. In the Gulf such an aggregative response is strengthened in the Gulf Cooperation Council by attachment of the region’s small states with a countervailing polar power, Saudi Arabia, perceivable by Iran as a balancing threat of hostile intent. The development of GCC security cooperation and of the Peninsula Shield (RDF) establishes the GCC as a primary securitising actor in the regional security complex. An element of external power has been a feature in the configuration of power in the Gulf. Not indigenous, nor incorporated in any formal way into the security system of the Gulf, the will and capacity of the United States has, however, been closely coalesced into the effective balance of power in the Gulf.\textsuperscript{14} The configuration of power within a region is shown in the Gulf not to be permanent in any particular shape, though the underlying security dynamics of the regional complex, largely polar-driven, are defining and durable. It is the sense that this is so that would seem to be behind Arabian Gulf resistance to Iranian overtures for the full indigenization of power in the Gulf. Halliday expresses the point better: “unity serves as a means of asserting a claim, not of fraternity but of hegemony, over the other state(s)”.\textsuperscript{15}
Southeast Asia is a regional security complex without polarity. The region is not marked by a polarization of power, or by any claim among the states to regional hegemony. There is no one or more power such that if its interests were threatened, or if the assertion by it of its interests were defied, it could act with or threaten a level of aggression towards a neighbour that would upset stability and security across the region.\textsuperscript{16} The region is made up of medium and small states. The region’s basic character is one of the presence of several middle ranking powers.\textsuperscript{17} ‘Middle powers’ are distributed across the region following the end of the Cold War in Indochina: two in Indochina and three in the maritime area. Singapore is a significant example of an ostensible small state that has accumulated security capacity and strategic influence in the region that suggests middle ranking. Southeast Asia has a record for its medium powers to stand up to each other. ASEAN was at its foundation a response to the ‘konfrontasi’ between Indonesia and Malaysia (1963-1966).\textsuperscript{18} With some cross-cutting of stresses and ‘friendships’ a balance is generally maintained. The region’s middle powers tend also to be curtailed in their power by preoccupations with security conditions within the states and circumstances of low-level economic performance and poor social cohesion. There is no aggregation of power among the smaller states. The distribution of power in the region lends itself to the conflict avoidance and peace orientation promoted by ASEAN.

\textit{Amity and enmity} are defining structural aspects of regional complexity. Threats, perceptions of threat, competition and overlap of interests, the
grounds of ‘enmity’ do not, on their own, identify a regional complex. However, only to the extent that conflict (actual, perceived and potential) is persistent among a group of states and is historically interior within the group might we think of a regional security complex. But, “RSCs are durable rather than permanent patterns”.19 Defining fields of persistent conflict or potential for conflict are present in both the Gulf and Southeast Asia. But as Buzan and Waever say, regional security complexes are significantly explained in ‘constructivist’ terms. They hinge on patterns of ‘amity and enmity’, making them “dependent on the actions and interpretations of actors, not just a mechanical reflection of the distribution of power”20, which has more to do with the dynamics of a regional security complex than with any regionalist or political intervention.21 What most drives and holds a group of states together is shared perceptions of insecurity. The centrifugal and disruptive drives of enmity are constrained by needs and dispositions of actors to co-exist.

In Chapter Five (vii) above it was remarked: “The distinctiveness in regional inter-state relations lies in the quality of the states’ relations, as these relations aid in structuring the regions and sustain them in a durable cohering way”.22 Patterns of amity and enmity lie deep in the geography, history, culture and religion of regions. These patterns are the outcome of how deeply internalised these influences are (by coercion, interest and by belief in legitimacy). “The specific pattern of who fears or likes whom is generally generated internally in the region... Historical hatreds and friendships, as well as specific issues that trigger conflict or cooperation,
take part in the formation of an overall constellation of fears, threats and friendships that define a RSC”. 23

Their patterns of enmity and amity distinguish the Gulf and Southeast Asia regional security complexes. In the one case, the Gulf region, the pattern is one of a general confrontational disposition in relations between states across the region. Confrontation is often measured less in open declared hostility and explicit directed threat than in low-level or low-visibility hostile activity. 24 The confrontational character of political and security relations across the Gulf are not a total barrier to trading and cultural relations; yet these are a sign of no great official will for amity. The Gulf Cooperation Council is an endeavour to create a community, but this is partial within the regional security complex and the securitizing pattern across the region. In its creative endeavours towards a ‘security community’ ASEAN engages resources of amity among the states to supersede the deterministic nature of the underlying security complex. 25 Potential for dispute and conflict is a presumption of ASEAN. 26 Regional security community thinking is not an analytic alternative to regional security complex theory. A regional security community does not take the place of a security complex. Understandings can be raised above the dynamics of the regional complex, not to override or extinguish them. The effort in Southeast Asia is to desecuritize; by the creative process of security community development. There is a persistently reiterated determination to maintain peace and to uphold a regional regime of conflict avoidance. This is articulated in a series of declarations, norms and principles, from the original Bali Accord to the ambitious ‘ASEAN security community (ASC)’ and the Charter of 2009. 27
Enmity is existential as the underlying dynamic of security complexity. Amity can be cultivated. The psychologies of enmity and amity are different from each other: enmity is reactive towards conditions of security; amity is accommodative and creative. Understandings may be raised above the complex dynamics of the regional system. That is, understandings that stability and states’ well-being can best be promoted when antagonisms are subdued. It is suggested in Chapter Four (vii) above that, “what works for peace is fear of war as much as amity”. But amity is deeply prudential. Amity’ is about friendship only as a security community is developed. This is the optimistic presumption of ASEAN in its security and comprehensive community building.

In both the Gulf and Southeast Asia there are security communities in the making. Both regional organizations, the GCC and ASEAN, are interventionist in the dynamics of regional security. The conditions of regional security are the structural determinants of securitization in a region. States are the dominant agents of securitization, setting the main on-going formats of defence and security policies and action. However, as much of our account of the regions has suggested, there are important differences between the two regions. These can be explained in terms of the willingness and capability of actors (political leaders) to intervene in the dynamics of regional security. The main dimension of intervention is in the building of ‘security communities’. In the Gulf the general mode of response to conditions of regional security is within the basic terms of security complexity. The general tone of security and defence at the states
level in the Gulf is confrontational, or as Buzan et al put it, “military-political”. The Gulf security community, the GCC, is internally comprehensive, but within the framework of regional security it is partial and effectively a principal (corporate) securitizing actor, and in principle a potential ‘referent object’. The GCC perceives itself to be so in so far as it attempts to collectivise its defence activities. Its lack of a convincing record in matters of regional coordination in defence led to the efforts for firmer commitments since 2000 and to the subsequent Peninsula Shield II (RDF). The presence of a regional polar power in the GCC security community emphasises its securitizing status. The non-inclusiveness of the GCC is a critical structural aspect of the Gulf security complex. In Southeast Asia regional security conditions are analytically similar, being structured in terms of regional security complexity. In Southeast Asia intervention is through the auspices of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and is comprehensive and region-wide. ASEAN is an organizational superstructure over the underlying regional security complex in Southeast Asia. It is not a super-ordinate body and has no powers of direction, control or enforcement of implementation beyond discussion and consultation, exaltation and encouragement. ASEAN’s preference is for informality and process. In Southeast Asia defence policies and activities, securitization, are informed by notions of national resilience and are reinforced by community norms of sovereignty and non-interference. But ASEAN seeks to break the mould of ‘anarchy’ and displace a conventional realist propensity of states for autonomous defensive responses to their conditions of security by managing them through collective processes of conflict avoidance and peace. Viewing the two regional security
communities together we see important structural differences: the one being sub-regional; the other being region-wide. The behavioural aspect of this is differences in securitizing status in the regions, and associated differences in security imperatives.

Observing these differences in security imperatives could lead us to expect significantly different levels of defence policy and securitization between the two regions. The study has shown, however, high levels of mobilization of resources for defence and security in both regions. In Chapter Six a number of tables were developed in an attempt to find if the different approaches to defence and security led to significant differences in human and material ‘defence’ resource allocations and thus to different intensities of securitization. The evidence drawn is impressionistic rather than definitive in any way and does not measure up significantly to expectations. One reason for this must be that expectation of difference was itself largely misplaced. The besetting danger in this scenario is a state-level pattern of action of ‘threat-action-defensive response’ character, leading to the paradox of ‘security dilemma’ where states seek to confirm their security by enhancing their defensive capabilities with the effect of making a potential antagonist feel less secure and threatened. Virtual self-generating processes of military enlargement and arms accumulation can get under way and claims about ‘deterrence’ gain increasing plausibility. Such processes may be aggravated in circumstances of radical technical changes in military affairs, the so-called ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA). Qualitative change in military hardware has to be kept up with to remain defensively effective. In the two regions studied
the approach to defence among the states has been at most one of reticent regionalization where states do not easily compromise their national autonomy and ‘resilience’.

In Chapter Seven of the study issues of state-military relations were considered. These do not obviously fit into regional security complex analysis. They might, however, be thought to be implied by this analysis. Regional security in the real world suggests organizational region-level response to regional security conditions, and thus becomes a legitimate aspect of study with regional security complex theory. Its apparent oversight or neglect might be explained by a belief that such study belongs to ‘politics’ rather than to ‘security studies’: “understanding of what separated ‘security’ from routine politics”.

Analytically the Gulf and Southeast Asia conform to the criteria (“essential structure”) of regional security complexes. The study of security in the Gulf and Southeast Asia can usefully take place within this “coherent theoretical framework”. However, the study also shows that in reality regional security complexes are not all of a kind and must be understood in terms of their particular structures, circumstances and the drivers behind securitizing activities. The study shows that regional state actors are able to “intervene” to influence the impact of regional security conditions. Regional security community building is a major exercise in this. Buzan has said that politics is an untidy subject. Regional security studies are untidy and certainly complex.
Notes Conclusion

1. It is not argued that the two regions do not have wider identities, but that narrower legitimate and effective identities and concerns may have stronger imperative force. This has been argued in the literature review and in Chapter 4(b) (iv) and (ix).

2. Other than “borrowed from the system level notions of balance of power and interdependence”, which RSCT seeks to replace. Buzan and Waever, Regions, p. 42.

3. All of which have their limitations and separate attachments.


6. This is spelled out in Regions, p. 53.

7. This states obversely the point made earlier that ‘distance’, in a wider than geographic sense, “weakens security interaction”.

8. Buzan et al speak of a “spectrum of enmity and amity”. See following.

9. Traditional hostility persists between China and Vietnam, and China pursues its territorial wishes in disputed areas of the South China Sea.

10. Within the regional level such transactions are still weakly developed.

11. A regional polar power, as also an outer great power, could doubly affect the pattern of regional security interdependence.

12. The inclusion of Myanmar has extended the boundary of the RSC. It has been noted that the GCC is a closed sub-system. Any extension (not easily imagined in the foreseeable state of regional security) would most likely radically alter the impact of polarity in the region. ASEAN, on the other hand, is an open regional system. Together with the ‘outreaching’ activities of the ARF ASEAN has displayed a more border-tolerance approach to regionalism. But this is probably as far as it can be taken.

13. However it is shown in Chapter 4(b) (viii) above that Iranian-Saudi relations have been in a hostile mode for longer than the turn of 2003 and have been projected more complicatedly than in ‘military-political’ forms.

14. So much so that one analyst writes of the US being one of four “corner actors in the rectangular system... of tension” in the Gulf. Bill, James A., ‘The Geometry of Instability in the Gulf: The Rectangle of Tension’. The presence of the US can be affected by indigenous influences, as shown in the circumstances of its withdrawal from Saudi Arabia. The non-rigidity of the power system in the Gulf is also remarked in anxiety about the post-occupation condition of southern Iraq.

15. Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations, p.64. It is Iran’s pretensions to regional hegemony that are of concern. These concerns are reinforced as Iran adopts status claims within the international system – also reinforcing deep suspicions about the regime’s nuclear intentions.

16. However, in the context of ASEAN’s ‘norms’ to which member states are committed, acts of aggression within the region would threaten the fabric of acceptable relations on which the association is built.

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17. Paul Dibb, *Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia*: “One of the defining characteristics of a middle (or medium) power... is that it will seek to have a credible minimum of defence autonomy or self-reliance.... Most middle powers in Asia have developed a strategy of defence self-reliance and are building up their armed forces.” Dibb discusses great, middle and small powers within the context of the global system, but middle and small powers are the parameters of security at the Southeast Asian regional level.

18. Vietnam is the principal power in Indochina, but counter-weighted by Thailand and in the maritime area by Indonesia. Indonesia is the principal power in the maritime area, but must account for the weight of Malaysia and Vietnam. These powers are constrained by a complex web of countervailing interests and security concerns.


21. At this point RSCT appears to be open to ‘constructivist’ possibilities of security-community building activity - to influence the dynamics of security complexity.

22. See above Chapter 4(a) (vii).


24. A complexity of menaces to state and social stability to which the state must produce appropriate security responses which do not necessarily take conventional military forms. See the ‘indicative list’ only in Chapter Four (a) (xiii) above. States in the twenty-first century are confronted with increasingly difficult response choices, and need to judge carefully the consequences of what they do.

25. Notably the norms of sovereignty, renunciation of the use of force and non-interference.

26. The effort in Southeast Asia is to desecuritize, by the creative process of security community development. As Acharys says, *Constructing a Security Community*, p. 18: “It is an ability to manage conflicts within the group peacefully, rather than the absence of conflict per se, which distinguishes a security community from other types of security relationships”.

27. The Charter lays down provisions for a comprehensive ASEAN Community, compounded of Economic, Social and Cultural, and Political-Security Communities (Figure 7).

28. Sometimes amity has to be purchased: regional community must be worthwhile to its would-be members.

29. It is sometimes remarked in response to suggestions of ASEAN’s ineffectiveness that since the organization’s foundation there has been no major conflict in the region. The Concept Paper which underwrites the ARF declares “For the first time in a century or more, the guns are virtually silent... though habits of cooperation are not deep-seated in some parts of the region”. In the Gulf threats are part the stuff of polarized power. in Southeast Asia there is a different order of power. Threats might be particularly damaging in a developing regional culture of restraint and peace.

30. The security community might be threatened by attack on one or more of it state parts – ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’, depending on its solidarity.
Our statistical tables in Chapter Six would need to be taken forward and be made more cognisant of the effects and influences of the different security scenarios of the two regions. Cold statistics need context to be meaningful. Such aggregate numbers as those for armed forces personnel (Tables A and B) do at least indicate the realism (or not) of state notions of resilience in defence of the state and of social stability. In Chapter Six (iv) it was remarked that available personnel levels do not crew up, in numbers and skills, to existing pools of weaponry. Defence expenditure figures in the tables could be strengthened in their significance if they were (or if they could be) developed beyond percentages of GDP (Table D) to account for averages per head of population, percentages of per capita incomes, government revenues as percentages of GDP and defence expenditures as percentages of government revenues. Information of these kinds lead more clearly to impressions of the urgency (or extravagance) governments attach to issues of defence and security. They lead also to measures of the opportunity costs of defence that governments are willing to impose on their peoples, or their peoples can be induced to accept, or the military leaders can contend with. Statistical refinements of these kinds would be rich in their significance for comparative purposes.

Buzan and Waever, Regions, p. xvi. Approaching the subject of state-military relations in this study is largely explained by the writer’s professional interest. The subject, properly and adequately considered, would exceed the scope of this study.
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