# The concept of Ananke in Greek Literature before 400 BCE

Submitted by Alison Clare Green to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Research in Classics, February 2012.



I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University.

Signed.....

# Abstract

This study seeks to explore the concept of ἀνάγκη (and the related terms ἀναγκαίος and ἀναγκαίως) in Greek literature written before 400 BCE. All passages containing these words from the time period were located, translated and analysed according to specific criteria concerning the usage and interpretation of the term. The resulting exploration was then split into five main sections: physical compulsion, moral compulsion, cosmology, circumstantial compulsion and the personification of compulsion. These sections were then examined according to both context and subtle differences in the meaning of ἀνάγκη terms within these contexts. The vast majority concerned some form of violence, physical force or fear of violent repercussions. Although the focus was on the interpretation of texts dating to before 400 BCE, owing to their fragmentary nature but considerable importance, the cosmological texts had to be examined in conjunction with later texts in order to shed more light on the meaning of ἀνάγκη in this context. Statistical analysis was performed on the 466 texts located and they were further analysed to track variations across time and genre-specific usages. Several types of usage were seen to develop only towards the end of the fifth century after 450 BCE including the notion of relative compulsions; the necessity for revenge and compelled alliances were seen to develop at this time. Recommendations were made with regards to the best and most appropriate translations; the majority of passages would require either the translation of coercion, constraint or compulsion for ἀνάγκη with the exception of the adjectival ἀναγκαίος which can mean blood relatives or similarly obligated individuals. The translation of necessity, although generally the given interpretation of ἀνάγκη was seldom appropriate since it did not grasp the entire meaning of the term in context.

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# (1) Introduction

## (i) Acknowledgements

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## (ii) Literature review

It is many years since a reasonably comprehensive study on the concept of Necessity (ἀνάγκη) has been undertaken. The most recent, that of Schreckenberg (*Ananke: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Wortgebrauchs* 1964) was wide-ranging, in that it encompassed mentions of ἀνάγκη from Homer right through to the late Roman period. Schreckenberg's study was also undertaken before technology allowed a thorough identification and analysis of ancient texts and focuses on a limited range of major authors from the canon. It also took a somewhat haphazard approach in that passages from wildly different time periods were compared. Since this time, Keyne Cheshire (1998) has deciphered a difference in usage between ἀνάγκη and ἀνάγκαιη, Rosaria Munson has explored ἀνάγκη in Herodotus (2001) and Martin Ostwald has produced a monograph on ἀνάγκη in Thucydides (1988) but a multi-genre study of *ananke* from this period has not been undertaken. Indeed Ostwald in his monograph (p.7) reports 'A fresh systematic treatment of ananke remains a desideratum, especially since its most recent full discussion in H. Schreckenberg...is seriously flawed in that it selects the ancient evidence to fit into a preconceived pattern.'

This study has taken full advantages of the searchable database TLG to provide a comprehensive study of all passages where ἀνάγκη is mentioned within a tight chronological framework. The timescale was chosen in order to assess sources prior to but not including Plato thereby gauging the usage and meaning of this concept/ deity within the early Classical and PreSocratic era. Considerable time and effort went into writing and compiling a database to include these passages that would be of benefit to many scholars with an interest in ancient thought and belief.

The scope of this study includes consideration of all areas of Greek life in which ἀνάγκη is seen to have an influence as dictated by the findings from the database.

## (iii) Why is ἀνάγκη important?

The importance of a study of this kind is that the tracking of word usage, particularly a conceptual term like necessity can give an insight into contemporary Greek thought. Since shifts in the usage of a conceptual term such as ananke reflect societal change, if we can track not only the changes but also potential reasons for these modifications it will inform us of Greek perception of the natural world around them and the society in which they live. Ἀνάγκη is such an important term because of the variety of ways in which it is used in Greek language and consciousness, and the cross-section of genres that it is found in. Examining a term which enables us to understand the driving forces (or ἀνάγκαι) that the Greeks believed motivated their actions and caused cosmic phenomena gives us an understanding of their world and what drove it that we would not otherwise be able to ascertain.

## (iv) What is the Etymology for ἀνάγκη

The etymological dictionaries establish some basic meanings for ἀνάγκη terms. Frisk (1960) gives the basic meanings as *compulsion*, *force* and *obligation* with compulsion and force being the most common. He considers the translations of *necessity* and *related by blood* as derivative of the core meaning of compulsion. Chantraine (2009) has followed Schreckenberg in giving a basic meaning of *constraint,* with *logical necessity* seen in Ionian-Attic texts. He establishes that the sense of ἀνάγκη as *Fate* is rare as is the personification which is only seen in philosophy or poetry and is not as divinity that is the object of a cult. With regard to the etymology, both Frisk and Chantraine cite attempts to link ἀνάγκη terms to Celtic words for necessity and the Hittite term 'hengan' meaning *inevitable death* but neither author is entirely convinced of a significant correlation indicating a common Indo-European root. Chantraine refers to Schreckenberg's theory that ἀνάγκη derives from the Semitic word 'chanak' meaning to choke or strangle (and linked to Semitic terms for slave chains) as 'une étymologie impossible' despite having been convinced by Schreckenberg's evidence for a primary meaning of constraint.

## (v) What are the primary questions to be asked about the concept of ἀνάγκη?

Primarily, the key questions concern the precise nature of ἀνάγκη itself rather than the context in which it is used (although sometimes the context can be a key to understanding the concept). Every use of ἀνάγκη indicates that a coercion or force of some kind was believed to be affecting the actions or behaviour of either people, beings or the world they inhabit; an important issue is the precise nature of this necessity. Is it a specific necessity or

general, and does it affect the human or non-human spheres in a physical or moral way? Perhaps the necessity is personified or presented as an interpersonal or impersonal force or supernatural in some way? The locus of control for the ἀνάγκη is also a key issue; is the necessity automatic (self-contained or self-motivated) or is it deployed by another as a kind of agent. If it is the latter, what is the nature of whomever or whatever is deploying the necessity; is it a person and if so, are they mortal or supernatural? Some necessities seem logical in their usage, but is this actually the case and if so when and why did this kind of usage arise?

## (vi) Methodology and rationale

To ensure that all references to ἀνάγκη in literature before 400BCE were located, a word search on Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (TLG Project) was undertaken with the stem 'ἀνάγκ-' and 'ἠνάγκ ' as the search parameter along with the date limits. Authors who were born in the fifth century but did not write works until the fourth were excluded, whereas authors who had written some of their work in the fifth century and others in the fourth were included but the works dateable outside the time period were excluded if the dating was secure. Some large works, such as Thucydides' History, were begun in the fifth century and completed in the fourth, and so were included in their entirety even though the final books lay outside the period. I did not include collective texts such as the Hippocratic or Pythagorean writings since only certain sections are potentially dateable to the time period with little of the dating secure.

Once I had extracted all the texts they were systematically translated. Once translated, they were entered onto a relational database (using Microsoft Access and Excel), which could be interrogated to assess common features (in meaning, religious or philosophical affiliation, sphere of influence etc.), dating and regional variation, genre distinctions, descriptive language and locus of control for ἀνάγκη.

Many categories of usage for ἀνάγκη were identified following the text identification and analysis. These categories then became the conceptual schema for the subdivisions in the textual commentary (section 2). In this study, I have attempted to analyse ἀνάγκη in a way which would make sense within the ancient world view rather than from a 21st century standpoint and therefore select categories which ancient authors would themselves understand.

## (vii) Schema for the subdivisions in the database

The database format did not act as a template for the structure of the thesis as the frequency of the various types of usage was not obvious until its completion. However, the primary and secondary categories used in the database were helpful on some of the organisational of the material into manageable sections and as criteria within the commentary which could offer useful comparisons between the texts.

## (a) Primary categories

The first breakdown of the data was to broadly identify the 'type' of *ἀνάγκη*; this typology could be associated either with motivational type and end result, actual personification or descriptive passages. To an extent these primary categories form the basis of the main sections of the thesis, although some were so large (in particular *Physical Compulsion*) that they were further divided.

- **Physical compulsion**
  - Usually an external force or compulsion (although on some occasions internal)
  - The end result is a physical action or situation
  - The cause is physical
  - Cause can be individual or many as can the thing or person acted upon
  - It is specific and applies to one situation at a given time
- **Moral compulsion**
  - Usually an internal force or compulsion (although on rare occasions external)
  - The end result can be physical or psychological
  - The cause is psychological (moral or divinely inspired)
  - It is specific in that it relates to a specific situation, but reflects generally held customs and beliefs
- **Personification**
  - This is not always easy to identify with certainty[1] but I have adopted the following criteria in categorising passages as personification:
    - The compulsion does not simply refer to an action performed by another but appears to be a self-contained entity (albeit an abstract idea) or person (including a force, being or deity)
    - This is signified through obvious conscious behaviour (it instigates actions), anthropomorphic description (such as having arms), invocation by humans

[1] The difficulties are outlined very clearly in Stafford (2000) pages 3 - 19

(as a deity)or the possession of other attributes that identify it as some kind of conscious being (emotions or capacity to reason)

- Cosmological and eschatological personification were identified as key categories that needed separate treatment
- Personification can be specific but is more usually general in that the personified compulsion is a consistent force (the latter is always the case in cosmology)
- Outside philosophy, personification is rare and does not appear to ever relate to a goddess with an associated cult

- **Circumstantial and logical necessity**
  - The circumstances (not physical or moral causes) necessitate an inevitable event or action
  - These can be real-life scenes, ideological or ontological (associated with the notion of phusis)
  - These can be both specific (true only at one time and location) and general (consistently true)
- **Imagery**
  - Effects are only described rather than given a function or purpose

Each of these was analysed further on the database to establish the locus of control or lack of agency for each of these categories.

## *Physical Necessity*

### Type 1: Impersonal

This is where the compulsion does not appear to be imposed on an individual or thing by another conscious being, but rather the environment dictates that the individual or thing must have a certain reaction. It was broken down into subcategories according to the examples identified: -

#### *1a. Impersonal on impersonal*

- A seemingly natural force (part of the cosmos) acts on something (not a being) which leads to an action or situation.
- Often related to discussions of natural phenomena.
- This is general rather than specific

### *1b. Impersonal on person (deity)*

- A seemingly natural force (part of the cosmos) acts on a person who is a deity
- It then causes a certain physical action in that individual
- This is a rare category
- The end result is of a physical nature.
- This is specific in nature

### *1c. Impersonal on person (human)*

- By far the largest number of impersonal references fall into this category
- A seemingly natural force (part of the cosmos) acts on a person (human) in order to bring about a certain physical action from that individual.
- They are often associated with natural phenomena, physically being human and the cosmos, in particular the survival instinct.
- This kind of compulsion is general

## Type 2: Interpersonal

### *2a. Interpersonal god on god*

- An individual (a god) is compelled to perform a physical action by another individual (also a god).
- The passages come from mythical scenarios and include violent actions and sexual acts.
- These are specific

### *2b. Interpersonal god on human*

- An individual (human) is compelled to perform a physical action by another individual (god).
- The passages come from mythical and non-mythical scenarios and include a wide range of actions.
- These are specific

### *2c. Interpersonal human on human*

- An individual (human) is compelled to perform a physical action by another individual (human)
- This is the most common in this category.
- Can be singular or plural for both parties.

- Many of these quotations are associated with war or slavery.
- These are specific

### Type 3: Deployment of Necessity as an independent force directed by an individual

#### *3a. Deployment by person (god) acting upon person (god)*

- ἀνάγκη is actually deployed by a person (a god), seeming to act as their agent.
- They then act upon another person (also a god) who is compelled to perform a physical action.
- This is specific

#### *3b. Deployment by person (god) acting upon person (human)*

- ἀνάγκη is deployed by a person (god) and influences the physical actions of a human.
- This is specific.

#### *3c. Deployment by person (human) acting upon person (human)*

- ἀνάγκη is deployed to act as an agent upon another human being to perform a physical action.
- This is specific

## *Moral Necessity*

The categories are identical to those used in the physical sphere but relate to moral issues rather than physical actions. In these cases, the actions are dictated by psychological factors including cultural protocols, social structures and ethics and are all concerned with action upon human beings. There are three categories, all of which could be considered general: -

### Impersonal:

- This usually refers to laws or customs.

### Interpersonal

- Many of these are associated with oaths and treaties or scenarios of war

### Deployment

- No instances of this category within the moral sphere have been identified.

### *Circumstantial and logical Necessity*

- This is when the compulsion is not an action or interaction, rather it is a set of conditions which indicate an inevitable event or conclusion
- It can be a physical set of circumstances, a sequence of events or a logical statement
- It is sometimes associated with the notion of phusis
- This is a general concept rather than specific since the notion must hold true consistently.

### *Imagery*

To be categorised in the imagery section, passages merely use words to describe *ἀνάγκη*; there is no action on anybody and there is no identification of *ἀνάγκη* as an individual, personal entity. Most descriptions focus on the destructive, devastating and inescapable nature of Necessity. Some passages with the primary category of physical, moral or personification also contain imagery and so this has been noted as a secondary category.

## (b) Secondary categories

After the initial assignment of ἀνάγκη to one of the above primary categories, secondary categories were selected following the analysis of the passages; they explore the actions of ἀνάγκη and the influence on various different aspects of life and the world. On the database every passage was assigned a yes/no tick box to aid data sorting, thereby excluding all irrelevant data at the initial analysis. Exploration of the secondary categories informed the subsections within the main chapters of the thesis.

### *Type 1: Customs, social structure and legal procedures*

This section includes all social or political conventions that mention ἀνάγκη as some kind of intrinsic force. Such conventions are categorised according to the world views of those living before and up to 400BCE; they are often very broad in their scope.

#### Religious and moral codes of behaviour

*Ritual*: any ritual that contains an element of compulsion or ἀνάγκη

*Moral*: commonly held ethical ideas that are governed by the restraints of ἀνάγκη.

*Human relationships with higher powers and deities*: this generally concerns a certain supernatural status quo in which everything fits into a particular hierarchy

*Religious observances*: in certain scenarios, certain religious protocols must be followed enforced by ἀνάγκη

### Social structure

*Family relationships, duties and laws*: this category includes many aspects of family life, not specifically associated with a particular religious protocol, in which certain codes of behaviour are obligatory, imposed under the power of ἀνάγκη.

*Gender-specific behaviour*: certain behavioural expectations are assigned to the different genders and are also enforced by ἀνάγκη.

*Personal status*: these examples indicate that a particular status dictates a particular type of behaviour or undergoing a specific experience.

### Political

*Political status*: here an individual holds a designated position within society in which they must keep to certain codes of behaviour under the jurisdiction of ἀνάγκη.

*Law*: here we are specifically referring to the laws of the land rather than religious or natural law.

*Oaths, treaties and tribute*: obviously these agreements would have been ratified by some kind of religious ritual; however, these examples are political in nature, any non-political oaths fall within the religious ritual or behaviour categories.

*War and torture*: many examples of ἀνάγκη in action are associated with the pitiless sphere of war, most with regard to the necessity of fighting in order to survive or the necessity of fleeing.

## *Type 2 - Natural laws*

These are not assessed according to contemporary twenty-first century ideas, but with the ancient Greek world in mind and are intended to reflect the way the world worked in the eyes of those living prior to 400BCE. All of these can be subdivided into two broad categories.

### Natural laws and humankind

*Human survival*: many examples are associated with various things that it is necessary to do in order to survive such as fighting or eating

*The human condition*: here ἀνάγκη is associated with what it means to be human such as the inevitability of death or the pain of childbirth

### Nature and the cosmos

*The natural world*: these passages concern the way the earth works and what must happen within it. Most are concerned with how things grow, survive or natural phenomena

*Cosmology*: these passages are associated with the origins of the cosmos or the way in which it works as a system. Many come from philosophical and mystical theorists. There are so many they form a separate section of the thesis.

## (c) Tertiary categories

Rather than offering further functions of ἀνάγκη, these categories further illustrate and describe the circumstances in which ἀνάγκη is seen to play a part with regard to further description of ἀνάγκη and also any accompanying powers.

### *Imagery*

There were several instances where ἀνάγκη was included under a primary category such as physical or moral but also had some manner of description applied to it. Such descriptions tended to fall into the following categories: -

- The strength of ἀνάγκη
  - The power of ἀνάγκη
  - The destructive nature of ἀνάγκη sometimes assimilated with a whirlwind
- The inescapability of ἀνάγκη
- The unpleasant nature of being subject to ἀνάγκη, frequently described as being a 'yoke'

## (d) The Author Database

Linked to the reference database, the author database enables information about the various authors studied to be measured against the information on ἀνάγκη from the reference database; for example a particular primary or secondary category of ἀνάγκη reference could be drawn up against the geographical location in which the work in which they appear was created to see if any correlation appears.

Possible search parameters on the author database include the following: -

- Author dates (as close as they can be reliably assigned)
- Genre (if associated with a particular genre of writing)

- Geographical location (including all the regions or cities we can reliably associate with a particular author)
- Religious affiliation (any information about the author's personal religious tendencies)
- Philosophical school (any link with a particular movement of ancient thought)

## (e) The works database

This catalogue of works is again relational to both the author and ἀνάγκη reference database. It would enable for example, a search to be drawn up to compare the date of composition of a given work or its genre and a particular aspect of the function of ἀνάγκη. The search parameters are; -

- Date of composition (as far as can reliably be assigned)
- Genre

## (f) The other related databases

Further databases were constructed to act as resources for the main ones listed above: -

- Geographical locations (region/ territory and cities were listed)
- Philosophical school (the most common broad categories were assigned e.g. Pythagorean, with further information added as supplementary notes)
- Religious affiliation

In general there were no significant correlations from the entries on this database.

## (viii) Practical implementation of the database in the thesis

The database was constructed to enable easy usage either (in complete form) on Microsoft Access or, in a more straightforward way (using the main reference database only) on Microsoft Excel through simple data sorting of the reference rows. The analysis of this database forms the basis of this thesis. In all, 466 passages were translated from 33 authors who originated from many parts of the Greek world and wrote in all of the genres of the period (Tragedy, Comedy, Epic, Iambic, Elegiac and Lyric Poetry, Philosophy, History and Rhetoric).

The primary categories of Physical, Moral, Circumstantial and Personification were deemed to be sensible chapter headings within the thesis; Cosmological Necessity was also added as a chapter heading owing to the large and varied selection of texts in this category.

Within each chapter, the secondary and tertiary categories were used as subdivisions in order to group and discuss similar texts sensibly. A commentary for each text is given followed by a discussion of how it contributes to our understanding of the concept of necessity. Some passages have lengthy discussion (notably those in the cosmology section) whereas others are dealt with more briefly; this is owing to the complexity of the various texts and the implications they have for new interpretations of necessity.

## (ix) Possible translations for ἀνάγκη

Throughout the body of the text, ἀνάγκη (and its variants) have been translated in a number of different ways. In some instances, the term *necessity* has been used; more often, however, *coercion, compulsion, constraint* or *by force* are more appropriate to the context. Other more unusual translations include *obligated individuals, blood relations* and*, torture*

# 2. Textual Commentary

# (i) Interpersonal physical ἀνάγκη

This type of ἀνάγκη is one of the most common, that of the necessity created by actual physical coercion or the threat of violence. Changes in human (or animal) behaviour are brought about by violent ἀνάγκη in a number of typical contexts; examination of the generic varieties of these instances can give us considerable insight into the precise meaning of ἀνάγκη.

## (a) Simple interpersonal coercion

Ἀνάγκη is frequently used to mean violent force and, although this is an unproblematic interpretation it is not used in every instance of violence in ancient texts, although this meaning occurs throughout the time period under consideration primarily in poetic works of most genres. There are several instances where ἀνάγκη is described as a specific force used interpersonally; when the instigator performs an action *'using necessity'* the necessity can be translated as some manner of physical aggression and creates a reaction which is not voluntary but coerced.

**Homer, *Iliad*, IX.427- 429 (same formula at IX.692)**

Φοῖνιξ δ᾽ αὖθι παρ᾽ ἄμμι μένων κατακοιμηθήτω,
ὄφρά μοι ἐν νήεσσι φίλην ἐς πατρίδ᾽ ἔπηται
αὔριον ἢν ἐθέλῃσιν: **ἀνάγκῃ** δ᾽ οὔ τί μιν ἄξω.

*Would that Phoinix sleep here remaining beside us, so that in the morning he might come with me in ships to our beloved fatherland if he would want to; but I will not lead him using* ***necessity****.*

As is common with this usage, the dative is used, indicating that ἀνάγκη is considered as some kind of force, used as an agent or instrument. The verb itself also carries some connotation of imposition of will over another, thus ἀνάγκη here is modifies the meaning of straightforward leading to leading by force. Achilles, in dealing with the embassy sent by Agamemnon, urges Phoinix to return with him to Phthia but is at pains to point out that this is the old horseman's decision; it will not be moulded by coercion and is thus voluntary. This usage can be seen again in Homer, when Odysseus forces his men to leave the Land of the

Lotus Eaters against their will (*Od.*IX, 98-99) and in XVIII, 76-77 where the beggar Irus is forcibly led to face Odysseus in combat.

**Herodotus, VII.136.1 – 3 (also discussed on page 80)**

Ἐνθεῦτεν δὲ ὡς ἀνέβησαν ἐς Σοῦσα καὶ βασιλέϊ ἐς ὄψιν
ἦλθον, πρῶτα μὲν τῶν δορυφόρων κελευόντων καὶ **ἀνάγκην**
σφι προσφερόντων προσκυνέειν βασιλέα προσπίπτοντας...

*From there they journeyed in this way to Susa and came before the eyes of the king, first when the guards commanded and carried a **necessity** to them to prostrate themselves before the king…*

In this instance (one of many in which 'necessity' refers to the violence and coercion inherent within the Persian regime[2]) the necessity is applied in addition to the verbal instruction and seems to indicate that some force is used. There is also, perhaps, an idea of such coercion as being customary[3]; within the Persian court one is simply expected to perform such an act or the consequences for non-compliance will be physical violence of some kind. This concept of necessity, as the use of force to implement the orders or wishes of a king or other authority figure, is further illustrated by the following passages in which an individual (a ruler) is being urged either to use ἀνάγκη as a coercive power or being begged not to.

**Euripides, *Suppliant Women*, 306-312**

νῦν δ᾽ ἴσθι σοί τε τοῦθ᾽ ὅσην τιμὴν φέρει,
κἀμοὶ παραινεῖν οὐ φόβον φέρει, τέκνον,
ἄνδρας βιαίους καὶ κατείργοντας νεκροὺς
τάφου τε μοίρας καὶ κτερισμάτων λαχεῖν
ἐς τήνδ᾽ **ἀνάγκην** σῇ καταστῆσαι χερί,
νόμιμά τε πάσης συγχέοντας Ἑλλάδος
παῦσαι:

*Aithra: Now my child, know how much honour this carries for you, and it holds no fear for me to urge you to bring the violent men who are depriving the corpses of funeral rites and*

[2] Other texts concerning Persian coercion are Aeschylus, *Persians*, 584-587; Herodotus, VI,25.6-8; VII,172.1-2; IX,17.4-5

[3] Further discussion on this matter is found on page 81.

*their allotted part of funeral gifts into this* ***compulsion*** *by your own hand and stop them confuting the laws of all Hellas.*

The unusual accusative case here suggests that ἀνάγκη is a thing that the 'violent men' can be brought under, in other words a poetic way to describe some form of physical coercion or threat of this; we might term it 'being brought under the cosh' or something similar. One would imagine that the forcing of his will (as in *Iliad* IX. 427 – 429) could involve the threat of force or the actual use of force in order to bring about a set of circumstances which cause an inevitable reaction. Theseus is, as ruler, entitled to exert leverage upon these men; indeed from Aithra's words it would seem that given their disregard of commonly held laws it is also his moral duty as ruler to follow this course of action. Thus, although ἀνάγκη is often depicted as a coercive force used in a negative or destructive way, there are scenarios where the exertion of ἀνάγκη could bring about a morally right conclusion; ἀνάγκη is not itself imbued with a sense of morality but is a tool that can be utilised for good or evil.

**Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus*, 1177 - 1178**

Οι.: ἔχθιστον, ὦναξ, φθέγμα τοῦθ' ἥκει πατρί
καὶ μή μ' **ἀνάγκῃ** προσβάλῃς τάδ' εἰκαθεῖν.

*Oed: Lord, this voice is that most hated that could come to this father. Don't drive me by* ***coercion*** *to yield to these things.*

Oedipus entreats the king (also Theseus) not to utilize necessity or violence towards him[4] to force him to speak to his son. Theseus suggests in the following lines (1179-1180) that the status of suppliant may also carry an idea of obligation on their part and uses the verb ἐξαναγκάζει. As this is a further argument put forward by Theseus to stress to Oedipus the necessity to communicate with the suppliant, it must be a separate necessity and in addition to the first type of compulsion. Thus the initial necessity seems to be one of constraining or restrictive violence that would compel Oedipus to an involuntary action of remaining to hear the words of his son against his will, whereas the second verbal clause is moral and relates to the constraints of religious and social custom[5].

[4] Sophocles and Euripides both portray the use of necessity to procure information elsewhere too: Sophocles, *Fragment* 757 (Radt); Euripides, *Hippolytus* 281-2**.** The related specific usage of ἀνάγκη as torture of slaves in the context of the lawcourt is discussed below page 33

[5] There is an indepth discussion of the necessity surrounding suppliancy on page 97.

Like the texts detailing coercion of an individual, the following Homeric passages all show groups of soldiers forced into a course of tactical action by the violently compelling or constraining actions of their opponents. Thus we can see that necessity or physical violence is described as being applied to individuals or collectively to bring about an involuntary consequential reaction.

**Homer, *Iliad*, XV, 343 -345**

...τόφρα δ' Ἀχαιοὶ
τάφρῳ καὶ σκολόπεσσιν ἐνιπλήξαντες ὀρυκτῇ
ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα φέβοντο, δύοντο δὲ τεῖχος **ἀνάγκῃ**.

*…Meanwhile the Achaeans were rushing to the ditch that had been dug and the impaling stakes this way and that in fear; they entered the rampart through **necessity**.*

**Homer, *Iliad*, XV, 655 - 656**

Ἀργεῖοι δὲ νεῶν μὲν ἐχώρησαν καὶ **ἀνάγκῃ**
τῶν πρωτέων, αὐτοῦ δὲ παρὰ κλισίῃσιν ἔμειναν
ἀθρόοι...

*The Argives withdrew to the first line of the ships through **necessity**, but they remained in crowds next to the huts…*

**Homer, *Iliad*, XVI, 303 - 305**

οὐ γάρ πώ τι Τρῶες ἀρηϊφίλων ὑπ' Ἀχαιῶν
προτροπάδην φοβέοντο μελαινάων ἀπὸ νηῶν,
ἀλλ' ἔτ' ἄρ' ἀνθίσταντο, νεῶν δ' ὑπόεικον **ἀνάγκῃ**.

*Not yet did the warlike Trojans turn in fearful flight away from the black ships at the hands of the Achaeans, but they still resisted, withdrawing from the ships through **coercion**.*

As with the cases of coercion of individuals from Homer discussed above (p.20ff), ἀνάγκῃ is used in the dative of instrument/agent thereby indicating that it is viewed as something that is employed by people to bring about a certain result. This dative is commonly employed at the end of a line in Homeric and other poetic texts and provides two emphatic vowel sounds surrounding a hard gutteral 'κ' possibly reminiscent of the violent clashes of battle.

In the Greek world, animals were lower down the ladder of status than humans, even slaves, and in several passages ἀνάγκη is used in relation to their coercion by humans. Since most of the literature from the period under consideration does not intentionally discuss the mundane, which one would imagine would describe treatment of farm animals, several of the texts use the imagery of animal coercion as an allegory for very human coercion.

**Semonides, *Fragment* 7.44**[6]

τὴν δ' ἔκ †τε σποδιῆς† καὶ παλιντριβ<έο>ς ὄνου,
ἣ σύν τ' **ἀνάγκηι** σύν τ' ἐνιπῆισιν μόγις
ἔστερξεν ὧν ἅπαντα κἀπονήσατο
ἀρεστά·
*Another (type of wife) is from an ash-coloured, hardened ass,*
*With **compulsion** and rebukes she acquiesces with difficulty*
*to everything, doing acceptable work.*

The usage of ἀνάγκη here in the dative must contrast with ἐνιπῆισιν (here translated as *rebukes*) as two separate strategies for the coercion of the ass-type wife. The latter term clearly implies a verbal coercion so it would seem that the coercion linked to ἀνάγκη is physical or certainly involves the threat of violence if the order is not followed[7]. Exactly what that physical action might involve is left to the imagination of the reader; Lloyd-Jones (1975 p.74) simply prefers to translate it as 'compulsion', leaving the exact form of this unclear.

In a similar vein, the following passage from Tyrtaeus also involves the coercion of an ass as imagery for the hardship imposed by one human on another (here Messenians enslaved by the Spartans)[8].

**Tyrtaeus, *Fragment*, 6.1-3**

ὥσπερ ὄνοι μεγάλοις ἄχθεσι τειρόμενοι,
δεσποσύνοισι φέροντες **ἀναγκαίης** ὕπο λυγρῆς
ἥμισυ πάνθ' ὅσσων καρπὸν ἄρουρα φέρει.

[6] Although dealing with a marriage relationship, I have chosen to include the Semonides text here rather than in the family section since the ἀνάγκη forms part of the animal metaphor used and involves straightforward coercion of the animal by a human.

[7] This would reflect the dative usage as employing violent means established in the Homeric texts as discussed above (p21ff.).

[8] West (1993) p.23 and West (1972) p.153

*Like asses hardened through great burdens, carrying to their masters through baneful **compulsion**, half of all the fruits that had been borne.*

The construction here uses the genitive to agree with ὕπο and is another common linguistic form along with the prevalence of the dative we have seen[9]. The detail of the necessity is not stipulated here, it probably entails either physical force or the threat of physical force. The adjective λυγρῆς certainly imparts a feeling of the misery associated with this enforced subservience and the potential for doom as a consequence of it resonating with the passages relating to slavery discussed below (p39ff.).

Both of these passages demonstrate that there was an acute awareness that certain human beings of particular status (here wives and slaves) could be treated in much the same way as pack animals, being completely subject to ἀνάγκη. The depressing imagery, however, does not seem to imply criticism of this situation, it is simply a description of how coercion falls on certain members of society.

Moving away from the allegory, the following text depicts a 'real' human subjugation of beasts of burden using ἀνάγκη as a coercive power, albeit a mythological example: Jason's taming of the fire-breathing oxen rather than asses.

**Pindar, *Pythian Ode* 4, 234-236**

σπασσάμενος δ᾽ ἄροτρον, βοέους δήσαις **ἀνάγκᾳ**[10]
ἔντεσιν αὐχένας ἐμβάλλων τ᾽ ἐριπλεύρῳ φυᾷ
κέντρον αἰανὲς βιατὰς ἐξεπόνης᾽ ἐπιτακτὸν ἀνὴρ
μέτρον.

*But, seizing the plough, having fettered the neck of the oxen using **necessity**, thrusting the irksome goad with some strength onto their sturdy sides of noble stature, the man finished the commanded task.*

The usage of fettering using necessity[11] has much in common with the way that ἀνάγκη is used in the context of slavery (see p39ff), particularly here in its association with yoking

[9] Other examples of this textual pattern can be seen elsewhere, including the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* 372-374 discussed on p37.

[10] This is the OCT version – there are variations in the case and form of ἀνάγκη in the manuscripts (Bowra 1935). The dative usage follows the established pattern frequently seen in poetry from the period, particularly when it falls as the last word in a line.

the beasts to the plough. This is obviously a physical action where the hero has to force the formidable bulls to plough the field, ἀνάγκη here underlining the fact that this was not a task easily performed but required some considerable effort. It forms part of a description that Burton (1962 p.165) believes really conveys 'the slow struggle of the man with the might of the bulls' and also demonstrates Jason's ultimate mastery of them; despite their supernatural powers, he is able to coerce them using the power usually wielded by masters or despots over their slaves or subjects.

## (b) Violent conquest

Whereas the texts already discussed refer to a specific incident in which interpersonal violence has occurred against people, the following passages come from historical and rhetorical works and concern a less specific definition of interpersonal violence. Although they involve the collective coercion of a group of people (town, city or race) by another group of people[12] the violence referred to is not a single incident within a battle or conflict but is continuous in nature.

**Herodotus VI, 25.6-8**

Μιλήτου δὲ ἁλούσης αὐτίκα Καρίην ἔσχον οἱ Πέρσαι, τὰς μὲν ἑθελοντὴν τῶν πολίων ὑποκυψάσας, τὰς δὲ **ἀνάγκῃ** προσηγάγοντο.

*The Persians, having conquered Miletus, immediately held Caria; they brought some of the towns in under the yoke willingly, others using **coercion**.*

Here, Herodotus describes the advance of the Persians in their conquest of Ionia and their strategy in the acquisition of territory. Although this necessity is obviously set against the backdrop of military occupation, Herodotus is not explicit as to what necessity exactly it is that the Persians employ (□□□□□□ is again in the dative): there are a number of possibilities – military occupation, threat of attack or threat of enslavement[13]. All of these are viable possibilities and this *necessity* certainly has violent overtones reflecting the Greek stereotypical view of the Persians as despotic and cruel barbarians. An alternative translation could be to contrast the ἑθελοντὴν in the first clause with □□□□□□ taken to mean *against their will,* but I feel that there is sufficient precedent for linking

[11] For a discussion of the term yoke and its association with ἀνάγκη as well as a list of yoke passages, see pages 43 and 114 (note 125).

[12] This idea is similar to the idea of the collective threat of violence (p.21) and enforced alliances and treaties (p.29 and p.104).

[13] Munson, 2001, p.37 believes it to either be military occupation or threat of attack but does not mention slavery

□□□□□- terms with violence to use the given translation of *coercion.* However, the Persians are not the only state shown using collective violence in historical texts. Thucydides uses the coercive force sense of □□□□□□ (dative case) in this way too with respect to several of the Greek states participating in the Peloponnesian Wars.

**Thucydides III, 82.2.7**

...ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἀγαθοῖς πράγμασιν αἵ τε πόλεις καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται ἀμείνους τὰς γνώμας ἔχουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ἀκουσίους **ἀνάγκας** πίπτειν:

*...but in peace the citizens and common people have better judgement for noble matters, because they do not fall into **necessities** against their will throughout.*

This reflective statement by Thucydides considering the nature of life in peace and war differentiates the two states using the plural accusative form ἀνάγκας as the distinguishing factor. As to what these necessities are, Thucydides does not expand, but we can safely say that these are necessities typical of wartime existence[14]; thus they could include actual violence, threat of violence or deprivation (food, water or other necessary supplies)[15].

Just such a threat to the entire populace of a city is referred to in Antiphon's speech on the Murder of Herodes dating to about ten years after the Mytilenean revolt[16].

**Antiphon the Orator, *Murder of Herodes* 79.1**

ἃ μὲν οὖν μετὰ τῆς πόλεως ὅλης **ἀνάγκῃ** μᾶλλον ἢ γνώμῃ ἔπραξεν, τούτων οὐ δίκαιός ἐστιν ὁ ἐμὸς πατὴρ ἰδίᾳ δίκην διδόναι.

*It is not right for my father to be punished as an individual for things which he did with the whole city under **necessity** rather than by choice.*

This passage is from a section in which Antiphon, speaking for Euxitheus, defends his father, who is in exile, and seeks to minimise his role in the Mytilenean revolt by absolving him of the moral responsibility. His father is depicted as acting under a necessity (again in the dative), the nature of which is not expanded upon. It is most likely to be violence or fear of violent consequences were he not to follow the rebellious leaders of Mytilene, a reflection of the state of mind outlined above by Thucydides (III.82.2) with the entire city

[14] As suggested by Ostwald, p. 17
[15] See discussion on p.56 for the necessity of food, drink and other supplies
[16] Gagarin and MacDowell (1998) p.48

behaving in this way, not just Euxitheus' father[17]. This idea of collective coercion – an ἀνάγκῃ applied to a city or group of people – is one that Thucydides also uses frequently[18]. The following example also exemplifies this idea but is more complex.

**Thucydides, I, 90.3.7-9**

ἀλλ᾽ ἐπισχεῖν μέχρι τοσούτου ἕως ἂν τὸ τεῖχος ἱκανὸν ἄρωσιν ὥστε ἀπομάχεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ ἀναγκαιοτάτου ὕψους:

*…but they were to hold on until they had built the wall as high as was absolutely **necessary**.*

This unusual usage implies the concept not only of physical attack, but that this violence is the most extreme that a people could be subjected to. Ostwald (1988 p.10) includes this instance within his category of 'minimum requirements' in which ἀνάγκη is the minimum military enterprise needed to preserve the Athenians and thus is expedient militarily. However, although this could be one aspect of ἀνάγκη here, it is also the extreme violence or threat of wartime attack. The use of a superlative adjectival form presses the 'make or break' aspect to this situation (the coercive violence will be extreme) and the 'belt and braces' attitude of Themistocles towards the construction of the wall (it must be as high as possible to withstand this level of attack thereby insuring those within it).

## (c) ἀνάγκη as the threat or promise of violence

### *i) Use of ἀνάγκη to force alliances, treaties and oaths*

As we have seen above, the typical Greek portrayal of the Persians depicts them as barbarians who generally use force to get what they want. Rather than the use of diplomacy, which would have been the preferable means of forming alliances or making treaties, they use ἀνάγκη to bring them about.

**Herodotus, VII, 172.1**

Θεσσαλοὶ δὲ ὑπὸ **ἀναγκαίης** τὸ πρῶτον ἐμήδισαν, ὡς διέδεξαν, ὅτι οὔ σφι ἤνδανε τὰ οἱ Ἀλευάδαι ἐμηχανῶντο.

*The Thessalians first sided with the Medes under **coercion**, as they revealed, because they were not happy withthe plans of the Aleuadai.*

[17] Edwards and Usher (1985) p.113

[18] Thucydides: III.40.3,1-3; III.82.2,5-7; IV.40.1.2-4; IV.60.1; 4.98.6; IV.120.3; VI.44.1;

Here, Herodotus seeks to explain why the Greek Thessalians supposedly disregarded their Hellenic blood to side with the Persians. By describing the Thessalians as Medising ὑπὸ ἀναγκαίης he firstly indicates that there is some coercive power at work here, the threat of physical strength and enslavement perhaps. Secondly, by using this term, he clearly removes the sense of traitorous behaviour by suggesting that the Thessalians were helpless and had no choice but this course of action if they wished to survive.

**Herodotus, VIII, 22.10 – 12**

εἰ δὲ μηδέτερον τούτων οἷόν τε γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπ' **ἀναγκαίης** μέζονος κατέζευχθε ἢ ὥστε

ἀπίστασθαι.

*…if neither of these two things can happen, and you are yoked together with a far greater **compulsion** so that you cannot be absent, we ask you in this task, whenever we come to blows to play the coward deliberately…*

A similar suggestion can be seen in this text from Themistocles' inscription on rocks for the Ionians, in which he suggests that the Ionians perhaps may not be able to revolt owing to the coercion of their Persian rulers. The Persian military might is the ἀναγκαίης μέζονος which might give the Ionians little option but to participate in conflict and he gives them another option despite the threat of Persian violence.

**Herodotus, VII, 10.39 - 41**

σὺ ὦν μὴ βούλεο ἐς κίνδυνον μηδένα τοιοῦτον ἀπικέσθαι μηδεμιῆς **ἀνάγκης** ἐούσης...

*Don't plan to get into any such danger, since there is not a **necessity** at all...*

In this Herodotus passage, there is a lack of necessity (there is no threat of violence)[19] and Artabanus seeks to dissuade Xerxes from pursuing an aggressive strategy. However, the Persians are more frequently the ones pressing necessity on others rather than vice versa and this speech does little to dissuade the Persian despot from his doomed aggression against the Greeks.

[19] The idea of a lack of coercion or necessity to prompt actions is also seen at: Herodotus VII,99.6; Sophocles, *Philoctetes* 72-74;

This kind of language was not only reserved for the Persians. One passage in Herodotus and many in Thucydides show the Athenians demonstrating despotic tendencies exemplified by their use of coercion in effecting treaties and alliances.

**Thucydides, III, 32.2.5**

...ἄνδρας διέφθειρεν οὔτε χεῖρας ἀνταιρομένους οὔτε πολεμίους, Ἀθηναίων δὲ ὑπὸ **ἀνάγκης** ξυμμάχους:

*…he destroyed people who neither raised their hand against him nor were enemies, but were allies of the Athenians under **necessity.***

Seeking to excuse these individuals for what could be perceived as switching allegiance, the genitive form ἀνάγκης with ὑπὸ has been utilised to show that those massacred had not been acting of their own volition but because of the actual military/political force or threat of force (ἀνάγκη) perceived from Athens. Again, it is unclear as to the actual nature of this ἀνάγκη but in order to pressurise the unwilling into alliances, it must have been critical – either immediately life threatening (threat of attack) or with longer lasting effects (threat to food/water supplies and trading relationships). The use of this terminology with reference to the Athenians (using the same bullying tactics as the Persians) at this point in Thucydides' account could well be perceived as critical of the Athenian regime[20].

**Thucydides, V, 89.18**

δίκαια μὲν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης **ἀνάγκης** κρίνεται, δυνατὰ δὲ οἱ προύχοντες πράσσουσι καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ξυγχωροῦσιν.

*…knowing that justice in the words of men is judged by equal **necessity**, those well-equipped do what sets them apart whereas those who are feeble make concessions.*[21]

In this passage, the term ἴσης ἀνάγκης means equally compelling. Justice can only truly be seen if both sides in a disagreement are equals but in the Melian dialogue (of which this text forms part), this is clearly not the case. This stark description of the plight of the smaller state (by implication Melos) as described by the imperialist Athenians (who have just sent a

[20] Ostwald (1988) p.40, sees the entire Melian dialogue as representative of imperial necessity

[21] Hornblower's translation (2010, p.235) although less literal, conveys the meaning of the text well: *we both know that in the discussion of human affairs justice enters only when there is a corresponding **power to enforce it**; but the powerful exact what they can, and the weak have to comply.*

massive force to annexe Melos) demonstrates how ἀνάγκη in the same sphere (political action) can mean one thing to one polis and another to a different state according to the military resources available to them. The ἀνάγκη affecting the Athenians is that prompted by military superiority by virtue of their larger fighting force, whereas that affecting the Melians is one of submission owing to the coercion of the Athenians; both necessities carry equal weight[22]. It certainly appears to remove the moral element from the decision-making process in rather a cynical way, perhaps shedding light on Thucydides' own viewpoint – this is the situation (the anankai have this effect) but it is not necessarily morally right[23].

### *ii)* Threat of violence

The threat of violence also seems to carry the idea of ἀνάγκη which modifies the behaviour of the threatened person.

***Odyssey* XIV.26-28**

τὸν δὲ τέταρτον ἀποπροέηκε πόλινδε
σῦν ἀγέμεν μνηστῆρσιν ὑπερφιάλοισιν **ἀνάγκῃ**,
ὄφρ' ἱερεύσαντες κρειῶν κορεσαίατο θυμόν.

*but the fourth he sent away to the city to lead a pig to the insolent suitors through* ***necessity*** *so that they might sacrifice it being satisfied in their heart.*

***Odyssey* XXII.330-331**

Τερπιάδης δ' ἔτ' ἀοιδὸς ἀλύσκανε κῆρα μέλαιναν,
Φήμιος, ὅς ῥ' ἤειδε μετὰ μνηστῆρσιν **ἀνάγκῃ**.

*Phemios, the son of Terpias, the singer, was still avoiding black death, who had been singing among the suitors through* ***necessity****.*

Homer wishes here to establish why the loyal servants Eumaeus and Phemius (respectively) took a course of action that could be considered both dishonourable to them and disrespectful to their true master Odysseus (through showing respect to those undeserving of it – the suitors). He uses the dative form □□□□□□ to indicate that they

[22] For further discussion on the different types of anankai in the war see Ostwald (1988) p. 18. He believes that Thucydides holds the various types of anankai responsible for the course of Athens' actions (1988) p.38.

[23] There are many examples of alliances and treaties brought about by means of ἀνάγκη: Herodotus VIII.111.6–8; Thucydides, I.32.5.5–6; I.61.3.1–5;IV.63.2.4–6;VII.57.1.3–5;VII.57.4.6–8;VII.57.5.3 – 4;VII.57.7.6;VII.57.11.1 – 3;VIII.2.3.2- 4.

are subject to a force that they cannot contend with, rather than having made a decision based on internal ethics[24]. In the first passage, the use ὑπερφιάλοισιν underlines the moral tenure of the suitors Eumaeus is attempting to please, reminding the audience that by providing these despicable individuals with a sacrificial victim, Eumaeus is at least attempting to ensure they fulfil their duty towards the gods. Similarly, Homer wishes to paint an honourable picture of his fellow bard Phemius; by presenting his predicament as one where he has no choice through fear of the actions the suitors may take, the poet excuses him of disloyalty.

**Thucydides, IV, 10.1**

Ἄνδρες οἱ ξυναράμενοι τοῦδε τοῦ κινδύνου, μηδεὶς ὑμῶν ἐν τῇ τοιᾷδε **ἀνάγκῃ** ξυνετὸς βουλέσθω δοκεῖν εἶναι…

*Men, we are all together in this danger, may none of you want to appear to be clever because of this **necessity**…*

This is one of a number of similar instances from Thucydides. Here, Demosthenes talks of the threat of a sea-borne attack using the term ἀνάγκῃ and does not want his men to behave rashly as a consequence[25]. Exactly the same usage can be seen later in a passage from the narrative of the Sicilian Expedition, VI.18.3, in which justification for undertaking the mission is given: the ἀνάγκη requiring a reaction is a threat to Athenian territory from the attack of Spartan allies. Thucidydes also employs this meaning in Book VIII.27.3 where Phrynichus cautions the strategoi that unless there is a πάνυ ἀνάγκῃ, here being the prospect of a serious attack, there is to be no offensive action.

## (d) Use of ἀνάγκη as torture of slave witnesses in legal cases

This very specific usage of ἀνάγκη predominantly occurs in legal speeches by Antiphon and means the routine torture of slaves in order to extricate reliable evidence from them. An earlier less systematic but similar usage is seen in Herodotus, where torture is used to procure a piece of evidence.

[24] See Segal (p.157) regarding the deliberate contrast between this compulsion felt by Phemios and the status of Demodokos in Phaiakia; the usage of ἀνάγκη is a clear indication of the differing value systems of the two palaces and their occupants

[25] See later discussion on page 224 for how this passage contributes to the suggestion that necessity does not always lead to necessary consequences

**Herodotus, I, 116.15 - 17**

Ἀστυάγης δέ μιν οὐκ εὖ βουλεύεσθαι
ἔφη ἐπιθυμέοντα ἐς **ἀνάγκας** μεγάλας ἀπικνέεσθαι, ἅμα τε
λέγων ταῦτα ἐσήμαινε τοῖσι δορυφόροισι λαμβάνειν αὐτόν.
Ὁ δὲ ἀγόμενος ἐς τὰς **ἀνάγκας** οὕτω δὴ ἔφαινε τὸν ἐόντα
λόγον.

*Astyages said that he was not well-advised if he had his heart set on **coercion** (**torture**), at the same time as saying this, he signalled to the guards to seize him. He then, as he was being led towards this **compulsion**, thus revealed the true story.*

In this passage, Herodotus uses ἀνάγκη to mean the torture of a slave, albeit not in a formal Athenian court situation, since the story related refers to a foreign monarchy. However, although Astyages does not eventually need to resort to torture to precipitate a truthful testimony this is obviously the meaning of ἀνάγκη here. It may well have been widespread to use this kind of coercion on household slaves and Gorgias' brief discussion (*Frag*. 11a 63-64) could allude to either this or the systematic torture of slaves as witnesses.

**Antiphon, *Murder of Herodes*, 40.1 & 40.4**

…ὁ ἀνὴρ μέχρι τῆς ἐσχάτης **ἀνάγκης** τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐχρῆτο καὶ ἀπέλυέ με τῆς αἰτίας: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν τροχὸν ἀνέβη, τῇ **ἀνάγκῃ** χρώμενος ἤδη κατεψεύδετό μου, βουλόμενος ἀπηλλάχθαι τῆς βασάνου.

*The man, until **uttermost necessity (torture**), proclaimed by means of the truth and cleared me of responsibility; but when he was put on the wheel, proclaiming by **coercion**, he testified falsely against me, wanting to be released from this torture.*

This text gives us some insight into the treatment of slaves as witnesses in trials – it was not considered immoral to subject them to torture (in this case the wheel or rack) in order to elicit evidence from them. Antiphon here uses ἀνάγκη to mean the practice of torture, a compulsion during which the slave must necessarily testify or suffer further agony. Exactly the same usage can be found in another passage from the same speech (42.6) and in the author's *Tetralogies* 2.2.1 and 2.2.4. This highly specific meaning clearly derives from the idea of compelling force or violence inherent within torture. It is not simply mindless violence, but violence with a specific purpose within a controlled environment or system, and this idea of purposeful physical compulsion is not dissimilar to scientific usage of ἀνάγκη in cosmological settings. However horrific this notion might seem to us today from

our contemporary moral standpoint, to the Greeks the ἀνάγκη itself is amoral; it is the system that reflects what was socially acceptable at the time.

## (e) The use of ἀνάγκη as a supernatural coercive force

All the examples discussed above obviously reflect physical violence of some description, whether this is threatened or an actual action. The following passages all concern some kind of nondescript coercion or compulsion enacted by a deity or supernatural being.

**Homer, *Odyssey* IV.556 – 558 (same formula at V.13-15 and XVII.142-144)**

τὸν δ᾽ ἴδον ἐν νήσῳ θαλερὸν κατὰ δάκρυ χέοντα,
νύμφης ἐν μεγάροισι Καλυψοῦς, ἥ μιν **ἀνάγκῃ**
ἴσχει: ὁ δ᾽ οὐ δύναται ἣν πατρίδα γαῖαν ἱκέσθαι:

*I saw him on an island shedding big tears, in the halls of the nymph Calypso, who restrains him using **necessity**; he was not able to reach his native land.*

**Homer, *Odyssey* V.154-155**

ἀλλ᾽ ἦ τοι νύκτας μὲν ἰαύεσκεν καὶ **ἀνάγκῃ**
ἐν σπέσσι γλαφυροῖσι παρ᾽ οὐκ ἐθέλων ἐθελούσῃ:

*he passed the night with her through **necessity** in hollow caves, unwillingly beside the willing.*

The first formulaic passage and *Odyssey* V.154 all contain ἀνάγκη in the dative case at the end of the line, a popular verse construction also found in later poetry (possibly following this Homeric precedent). Quite how Calypso is forcing Odysseus to remain in her halls, however, is not at all clear. Being a divine entity, there are various possibilities for the form that this ἀνάγκη could take. It could be physical force (the gods are usually thought of as stronger than mortals), perhaps simply a word of command that would bring dire consequences were it not heeded, or maybe some kind of erotic magic which bound Odysseus to the island (as he is to the palace of Circe to be discussed below). Whatever Homer had in mind, he does not see the need to elucidate the situation any further than merely using the term □□□□□□; this is probably owing to an acceptance by the audience that the gods simply have the means to dominate mortals. Such vagaries could also be seen to add to the mystery of the might of the divine forces encountered by the hero: he

is contending with divine will that cannot be understood or properly perceived by Homer's audience.

**Homer, *Odyssey*, X.432-434**

Κίρκης ἐς μέγαρον καταβήμεναι, ἥ κεν ἅπαντας
ἢ σῦς ἠὲ λύκους ποιήσεται ἠὲ λέοντας,
οἵ κέν οἱ μέγα δῶμα φυλάσσοιμεν καὶ **ἀνάγκῃ**,

*Why do you yearn for these misfortunes going down to the halls of Circe? She will surely make you all pigs or wolves or lions, which will guard her great house through **necessity**…*

In this instance (with □□□□□□ again at the end of a line and in the dative case) it is easier to gauge what kind of coercion would be employed by Circe – that of magical force. The powers of Calypso are not elucidated to the same degree as the magic-wielding of Circe; as a literary device, magic makes far more exciting reading than simple imposition of superior status, in this case – turning humans into pigs, wolves and lions to guard her house through her use of magical ἀνάγκη.

**Sophocles, *Women of Trachis*, 831 - 837**

Χο.: εἰ γάρ σφε Κενταύρου φονίᾳ νεφέλᾳ
χρίει δολοποιὸς **ἀνάγκα**
πλευρά, προστακέντος ἰοῦ,
ὃν τέκετο θάνατος, ἔτεκε δ' αἰόλος δράκων,
πῶς ὅδ' ἂν ἀέλιον ἕτερον ἢ τανῦν ἴδοι…

*Cho.: For, if the treacherous **compulsion** of the centaur smears his ribs with bloody mist, where the poison clings, which the dragon produced and itself produces death, how can he see another sunrise.*

This passage, concerning the application of poison refers to violence of a different kind. The blood of the centaur Nessos will kill Herakles through its poisonous qualities. However, although we could read the ἀνάγκα here in that way, it could also indicate the necessity of the centaur's plans for retribution and the consequent death of the hero. This example bears some resemblance to a passage from Euripides' *Medea* (803-806), in which the protagonist talks of her plans for the demise of the princess:

**Euripides, *Medea*, 803 - 806**

οὔτ᾽ ἐξ ἐμοῦ γὰρ παῖδας ὄψεταί ποτε
ζῶντας τὸ λοιπὸν οὔτε τῆς νεοζύγου
νύμφης τεκνώσει παῖδ᾽, ἐπεὶ κακὴν κακῶς
θανεῖν σφ᾽ **ἀνάγκη** τοῖς ἐμοῖσι φαρμάκοις.

*Me:And he will not ever see the children he had by me alive again and he will not breed children from his newly-yoked wife; since it is a **necessity** that the wretched girl dies evilly by my drugs.*

The language in this passage, however, is far less ambiguous, with ἀνάγκη relating to the Medea's intentions: events must unfold in a specific way according to the witch's plans[26]. This clarity is not present in the *Trachiniai* passage and I am inclined in this case to interpret necessity as referring to the violent act itself which is effected by the φονίᾳ νεφέλᾳ.

The previous passages concern supernatural coercion of mortals. Others consider the actions of immortals on each other. The violent coercion between immortals does not seem to be any less severe or potentially catastrophic than that experienced within the mortal sphere thus indicating their vulnerability and susceptibility to violent attacks. In the following passage from the Homeric Hymn, Hermes appears fearful of the considerable consequences (much necessity) Apollo threatens him with, hinting that his half brother has the capability of wielding this violent power over him.

***Homeric Hymn IV to Hermes* 372-374**

οὐδὲ θεῶν μακάρων ἄγε μάρτυρας οὐδὲ κατόπτας,
μηνύειν δ᾽ ἐκέλευεν **ἀναγκαίης** ὑπὸ πολλῆς[27],
πολλὰ δέ μ᾽ ἠπείλησε βαλεῖν ἐς Τάρταρον εὐρύν...

*…he (Apollo) did not lead any of the blessed gods nor eye witnesses, but ordered me (Hermes) to confess through much **necessity**; he threatened to throw me into broad Tartarus*.

Here, the ἀναγκαίη is an act of violence (to catapult Hermes to Tartarus and supposedly restrain him there) the force of this action is indicated by βαλεῖν[28]. This comes from what is,

[26] This passage is discussed further below in the context of the necessity of revenge p.137 and 226.

[27] One version (Matthiae) of the manuscript has **ἀναγκαίῃ** ὑπὸ πολλῃ (Allen and Sykes 1904 p.176)

in effect, Hermes' defence speech following the prosecution of Apollo over the theft of his cattle. Wily Hermes is attempting to persuade Zeus, sitting in judgement, of his innocence in the matter whilst incriminating Apollo. As indicated in the passages above, any action performed under the threat of an ἀναγκαίη[29] (here in the genitive with ὑπὸ), could imply despotism on the part of the individual imposing the coercion (unless of course we are talking of masters and their legitimate slaves).

Hermes is supposed to have been born the previous day (fully grown) and thus would be the younger half brother of Apollo who is therefore his senior in the world of the oikos[30] (were it a reflection of the human sphere). However, this would not automatically give Apollo the authority assigned to seniority enjoyed by the head of the oikos (in this situation Zeus) and thus presents Apollo not only as harbouring despotic tendencies, but also possibly disrespecting the authority of Zeus by seeking to inflict his will on his younger siblings.

There a number of passages where straightforward violent coercion does occur between the immortals or affects them. Two passages from the *Iliad* (XV. 132-133 and XX 141 – 143), in which the gods discuss what would happen to their fellow immortals were they to further intervene in the course of the war use the word ἀνάγκη to indicate the force with which they would be returned to Olympus by the powers that be (presumably Zeus).

***Homeric Hymn II to Demeter*, Line 69 – 73**

ἀλλὰ σὺ γὰρ δὴ πᾶσαν ἐπὶ χθόνα καὶ κατὰ πόντον
αἰθέρος ἐκ δίης καταδέρκεαι ἀκτίνεσσι,
νημερτέως μοι ἔνισπε φίλον τέκος εἴ που ὄπωπας
ὅς τις νόσφιν ἐμεῖο λαβὼν ἀέκουσαν **ἀνάγκῃ**
οἴχεται ἠὲ θεῶν ἢ καὶ θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων.

[28] There are similar examples concerning the violent restraint of Prometheus in Tartarus: Hesiod, *Theogony*, Lines 614 – 616 and Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound* 1050-1054. In the latter, ἀνάγκη is the personified agent of supernatural coercion. And thus is discussed at greater length in the reification section page 176ff.

[29] Cheshire (1998) has established that usually with Homer and Herodotus, the use of ἀναγκαίη as oppose to ἀνάγκη indicates a particular instance of a compulsion rather than being in the grip of ἀνάγκη as an overall state

[30] See section on Necessity and the Family page 71.

*But you (Helios) look down upon the earth and down onto the sea from the upper air with your beams,tell me unfailingly about my dear child, if you have seen her anywhere, if anyone either of the gods or mortal man has secretly taken her against her will and made off with her by* ***necessity****.*

In this passage from the *Homeric Hymn,* Demeter describes the possible abduction of Persephone, describing it as being effected by means of necessity. This must surely simply indicate the meaning taken by force and is similar to accounts of enslavement discussed below (page 39).

**Pindar, *Prosodia*, Fragment 93. 1 - 3**

ἀλλ᾽ οἷος ἄπλατον κεράϊζες θεῶν
Τυφῶνα ἑκατοντακάρανον **ἀνάγκᾳ** Ζεὺς πατήρ
ἐν Ἀρίμοις ποτέ.

*But Zeus father of all the gods killed the terrible hundred-headed Typhon through* ***necessity*** *when he was among the Arimoi.*

This example does not afford such a straightforward interpretation. Although ἀνάγκη here could mean that Zeus killed Typhon using violence, there are other possible meanings. On the one hand, it could be that Zeus' will or plan included the death of the monster and consequently it had to occur as a necessity of Zeus' own will. Alternatively, it could have been fated that this would happen, thus indicating the death of Typhon was circumstancially necessary because it had been preordained by Moira. It could be a simple necessity of circumstance in that without this action, Zeus would not be able to succeed. Without further context it is very difficult to decide which one of these meanings is applicable here.

**Hesiod, *Theogony*, 517 - 519**

Ἄτλας δ᾽ οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἔχει κρατερῆς ὑπ᾽ **ἀνάγκης**,
πείρασιν ἐν γαίης πρόπαρ᾽ Ἑσπερίδων λιγυφώνων
ἑστηώς, κεφαλῇ τε καὶ ἀκαμάτῃσι χέρεσσι·

*Atlas holds the wide heavens under a strong* ***compulsion*** *at the borders of the earth, standing before the clear-voiced Hesperides with unwearying head and arms.*

Similarly, this passage from Theogony gives another ambiguity in that it could either be the 'strong necessity' of some kind of supernatural compulsion that holds Atlas in place or

else it is the 'strong necessity' of his fate to be in this position. The former would imply that some kind of physical or magical force is in place to ensure he undertakes this task, whereas the latter reflects the view that all events must necessarily occur according to what is ordained by the Moirai. It could also indicate that both of these were in place; it is his fate or destiny to hold up the sky, but this is underpinned by a threat of some kind of supernatural violence if he sought to challenge this.

## (f) Slavery

There are several instances where ἀνάγκη is used with relation to the status of slavery but within this area of usage it is has several subtly different meanings.The first type relates to the coercion that results in enslavement. This is most obviously seen where female prisoners of war were subjugated by their male conquerors. Every example of the appearance of ἀνάγκη in these circumstances is within a poetic episode from Greek mythology and dates back to Homer (where a formula illustrates this usage). All relate to the tragedy of enslavement of the remaining women at the hands of male victors following the defeat of a city. However, is ἀνάγκη analogous to the force exerted over the subjugated women or does it describe the status of their situation? A formula which occurs twice in Odyssey appears to imply that a form of coercion is employed that uses ἀνάγκη as a means by which the slavery is imposed. This implies violent coercion or the threat of this and thus closely relates to passages discussed above page 21ff.

**Homer, *Odyssey* XIV. 271-272 (same formula at XVII.440-441)**

ἔνθ᾽ ἡμέων πολλοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτανον ὀξέϊ χαλκῷ,
τοὺς δ᾽ ἄναγον ζωούς, σφίσιν ἐργάζεσθαι **ἀνάγκῃ**.

*Then they killed many of us with sharp bronze, and leading others alive to work for them by **coercion**.*

Since there is no doubt that the dative in the first line χαλκῷ means that swords or spears were used as an instrument or tool for killing, one could then argue that the second use of the dative in the following line □□□□□□ would also indicate that some kind of instrument or agent is implied – a force that was employed to effect the action of leading the others away in slavery[31]. Of course one could simply say that the superior force is the ἀνάγκη; however, why then should the term ἀνάγκη be used at all if this is the case, surely

[31] As Jones points out (1988) p. 134 this process is very similar to that initiated by Odysseus and his men against the Kikones 9.40-61; however, in the Kikones episode, the term ἀνάγκη is not used.

βίῃ would be more apt? Thus we could say that necessity in this instance is not simple force but has specific meanings associated with compulsion, constraint or imprisonment here; necessity is violence that has a specific purpose, that is, to prompt a desired reaction from its object.

In the following lines from the Homeric Hymn II to Demeter, both □□□□□□ and βίῃ are mentioned as the means by which the slavery was enforced. As they are both utilised, this could indicate that they are thought to mean different things, that □□□□□□ cannot simply be translated as force here.

***Homeric Hymn II to Demeter*, 123-125**

νῦν αὖτε Κρήτηθεν ἐπ᾽ εὐρέα νῶτα θαλάσσης
ἤλυθον οὐκ ἐθέλουσα, βίῃ δ᾽ ἀέκουσαν **ἀνάγκῃ**
ἄνδρες ληιστῆρες ἀπήγαγον.

*Now I have come from Crete over the wide back of the sea unwillingly, plundering men (pirates) led me away against my will through strength and* ***necessity***

Again, both βίῃ and □□□□□□ are in the dative indicating they are the instrument by which the action is effected; it seems the poet must see some distinction between the two otherwise there would be no need to include both terms unless it is an instance of hendiadys. There is no indication in the scholarship that this is a technique used in the Homeric Hymns, although Richardson (1974, page 188) notes that there is a 'four-fold repetition of the notion *against my will, by force*' and hendiadys should not be dismissed out of hand. Although this forms part of a 'Cretan tale'[32] (very similar in design to that given above by Odysseus), in which lies sound like the truth, there is no reason for the usage here to be out of the ordinary; indeed, a believable everyday usage would make the tale all the more persuasive. The pattern of words follows typical Homeric usage[33] and the words ἀέκουσαν □□□□□□ as the final two on a line can also be found in line 72 of the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* discussed above page 39. The fact that it is a typical word usage, however, should not detract from the conclusions that can be drawn on meaning: it is possibly distinct from βία yet is a coercive force within the process of enslavement.

[32] Foley (1994) p.42
[33] Richardson (1974) p. 105 lists several similar passages: Il. 13.572; Il. 18.434; Il.430

That this notion of ἀνάγκη is associated with enslavement could also be extrapolated from the following words of Hektor. Yet again, however, it is very difficult to define exactly Hektor means by the term here.

**Homer, *Iliad*, VIII.55-57**

Τρῶες δ᾽ αὖθ᾽ ἑτέρωθεν ἀνὰ πτόλιν ὁπλίζοντο
παυρότεροι: μέμασαν δὲ καὶ ὧς ὑσμῖνι μάχεσθαι
χρειοῖ **ἀναγκαίῃ**, πρό τε παίδων καὶ πρὸ γυναικῶν.

*…the Trojans were arming from the other side…fewer men, yet even so they sought to fight in the conflict, it being a **compelling** need on behalf of their children and wives*

**Homer, *Iliad* XVI.834–836**

ἔγχεϊ δ᾽ αὐτὸς
Τρωσὶ φιλοπτολέμοισι μεταπρέπω, ὅ σφιν ἀμύνω
ἦμαρ **ἀναγκαῖον**:

*I am distinguished among the war-loving Trojans with my own spear, I who ward off from them the day of **necessity**.*

This term could have a number of meanings with the above translation being the most obvious. However, in the second passage, what does Hektor mean by this term *the day of necessity*? He could mean the day of enslavement, or the day when they will have no choice, or the day they will be coerced by others into a course or courses of action. Whichever meaning Homer has in mind here surely must be dictated by the context in which Hektor is speaking, he has just inflicted the killing blow to Patroklos. Hektor has described what he thinks Patroklos' aims were (l.830 – 832) – namely to sack Troy and take the women away (the occasion being ἦμαρ ἀπούρας) in the ships as slaves. That this description comes just before our passage stating that Hektor's intention is to protect his people from just such an occasion, his understanding of '*day of necessity*' must include connotations of slavery, at least for the women folk with perhaps the other meanings of coercion also intended as well. That we have two 'days', one most definitely associated with the removal by force of women, must surely associate the second with this idea too[34].

[34] Cunliffe (1924) p.181 lists other similar phrases involving ἦμαρ most common being ἦμαρ αἴσιμον (the fateful day) and the clearly stated ἦμαρ δούλιον (the day of slavery), obviously similar to the above term.

Further description of the process of enslavement gives us a more visual impression of the effects of ἀνάγκη. In Aeschylus, submission to slavery is described as taking on a yoke (metaphorical for the subjugation of a human to almost animal subservience); this status is brought about or perpetuated by ἀνάγκη.

**Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 1069 – 1071**

Χορός

ἐγὼ δ', ἐποικτίρω γάρ, οὐ θυμώσομαι.

0ἴθ', ὦ τάλαινα, τόνδ' ἐρημώσας' ὄχον,

εἴκους' **ἀνάγκῃ** τῇδε καίνισον ζυγόν.

*Chorus: For I pity her and am not angry in my heart. Come, unhappy one, to the ground from the chariot, giving way to the new yoke through **necessity.***

The dative of instrument is once again to be found here, indicating that ἀνάγκη has a key role in the process of enslavement. As discussed in the section on etymology p9, it has been suggested that the term ἀνάγκη literally derives from the Semitic word for fetter/ yoke (chanak), citing passages such as this as evidence for this hypothesis (Schreckenberg Chapter VI) thereby implying that is the yoke or fetter itself. Here, however, the terms clearly do not relate to the same thing (they are in different cases), thus it would be hard to argue that they are synonymous. The yoke is analogous to the slavery itself, whereas the ἀνάγκη is the violent means by which such a circumstance was brought about and maintainted.

**Sophocles, *Fragment* 591 (*Tereus*) (Radt)**

βόσκει δὲ τοὺς μὲν μοῖρα δυσαμερίας,

τοὺς δ' ὄλβος ἡμῶν, τοὺς δὲ δουλεί-

ας ζυγὸν ἔσχεν **ἀνάγκας**.

*While a fate of misfortune nourishes some,*

*Others of us are nourished by wealth, others the yoke of **necessity** holds in slavery.*

Here, necessity in the context of slavery is again linked with the imagery of the yoke. However, here the yoke is necessity itself which is some kind of agent in the process of slavery. This passage again seems to weaken the argument of Schreckenberg discussed with regard to the previous passage since the 'yoke of necessity' is merely imagery to illustrate

the hopelessness of the condition[35]. It is likely that the necessity being alluded to is coercion and compulsion inherent within enslavement as opposed to the slave's chains holding them there[36].

The process of enslavement is also referred to in terms of necessity in the following passage.

**Aeschylus, *Libation Bearers*, 75 - 77**

ἐμοὶ δ᾽ —**ἀνάγκαν** γὰρ ἀμφίπτολιν
θεοὶ προσήνεγκαν: （ἐκ γὰρ οἴκων
πατρῴων δούλιόν <μ᾽> ἐσᾶγον αἶσαν)

*For my part, the gods brought a city-encircling **necessity** (for they led me from my father's house to a destiny of slavery).*

Here, the gods bring the reified necessity to the home city of the slaves at Mycenae, resulting in their enslavement. Although the end result of this violent attack is clearly slavery, the necessity implicit in this passage must surely be not only this but also the violence of the attack[37] as well as perhaps an idea of destiny, given that the gods are said to have brought this menace to the women.

Thus we can confidently say ἀνάγκη appears to be an agent or instrument that is used to bring about the status of slavery; it appears to be distinct from βία and although used in conjunction with the imagery of ζυγόν is not identical to it.

Related to the above examples, but distinct in meaning, are instances where ἀνάγκη appears to be an abstract noun synonymous with the status of slavery. However, as in these cases the usage of the noun could also reflect use of superior force or power instrumental in the imposition of the status of slavery. In fact, the wording of the following passage from Homer clearly supports this second hypothesis, indicating that a force of some kind is felt to actually press down on an individual.

[35] For a discussion of other yoke passages see page 114 note 125

[36] The toil of enslavement or forced labour is referred to in terms of necessity in Pindar, *Partheneia*, Fragment 94a, 16-20. However, the lask of context make it very hard to develop any further discussion about this passage.

[37] As suggested by Sidgewick in his commentary (1900) p.10

**Homer, *Iliad* VI.456-458**

καί κεν ἐν Ἄργει ἐοῦσα πρὸς ἄλλης ἰστὸν ὑφαίνοις,
καί κεν ὕδωρ φορέοις Μεσσηΐδος ἢ Ὑπερείης
πόλλ᾽ ἀεκαζομένη, κρατερὴ δ᾽ ἐπικείσετ᾽ **ἀνάγκη:**

*And while being in Argos, you would weave before the loom of another and would carry water from the spring of Messeis or Hyparis, being very unwilling, but powerful would be the necessity that would press on you.*

The nominative form of the noun here along with the adjective κρατερὴ indicates that Homer is attempting to describe the feeling of slavery in a somewhat abstract way. Kirk (p. 222) feels the 'description of her role and feelings is abstract but curiously effective'[38]. The status of slavery as involving the feeling of a strong force pressing down on one is not dissimilar to the notion of the yoke, but considerably more abstract and thus unusual for this period of composition. Thus, although it describes the status of slavery, the process is still perceived as one in which ἀνάγκη is applied to an individual or inflicted upon them.

In the later passage from Euripides, cited below, one sees an even more abstract usage that seems to have far more in common with the ἀνάγκη that is a key mover in the *kosmoi* of the Presocratics.

**Euripides, *Trojan Women*, 614-617**

Ἀνδρομάχη
ἀγόμεθα λεία σὺν τέκνῳ: τὸ δ᾽ εὐγενὲς
ἐς δοῦλον ἥκει, μεταβολὰς τοσάσδ᾽ ἔχον.
Ἑκάβη
τὸ τῆς **ἀνάγκης** δεινόν:

*Andromache: I was brought as booty with the children; the well-born come to slavery which brings such a change of fortune.*

*Hecabe: This is the terror of **necessity***

The necessity here is one of being compelled against one's will to a status of slavery. The genitive form of the noun illustrates ἀνάγκη, endowing it with a quality albeit a dismal one; here it is τὸ δεινόν, a characteristic usually attributed to a concrete being or thing

[38] Kirk also feels this could be a formula, since it is very similar to *Odyssey* 10.273

(indicating the fact that the Greeks at this time viewed reified necessity as an entity of some kind – either personal or impersonal). Although in this case referring to slavery, Hecabe's exclamation could apply to any state when one has no choice, where one's will is immaterial and action is determined by an external factor. The sense of powerlessness against the ultimate power of necessity is reminiscent of language employed elsewhere in Euripides and by earlier writers[39]. This passage gives us an indication of the magnitude of the influence wielded by ἀνάγκη; however, it does not further enlighten us as to the nature of ἀνάγκη as an entity.

The discussion has focused on ἀνάγκη either as the violent action of enslavement or the coercion used to ensure the continued servitude of slaves and thus a term that describes slavery as a status. An additional meaning within the context of slavery is its use as a collective noun for the duties performed by slaves under the coercion of their masters.

**Euripides, *Andromache*, 130 – 133**

τί σοι
καιρὸς ἀτυζομένᾳ δέμας αἰκέλιον καταλείβειν
δεσποτᾶν **ἀνάγκαις**;

*What profit is it to you being distraught to shed tears shameful to your stature owing to the **necessities** of your master?*

Here, being in the dative plural ἀνάγκαις does not seem to indicate merely the status of slavery (otherwise one would presume it would be in the singular), rather it must refer to the various degrading compulsion imposed upon Andromache. That these necessities are supposedly tasks inflicted by the master, indicates to us that the noun can be used as a synonym for anything imposed by a stronger individual upon a weaker one (this idea is further developed in the discussion of coercion below). A similar sense is found in the Hecuba of Euripides and here is seen to refer to a specific task Polyxena imagines will be imposed upon her by a new master.

[39] Alcman *Frag*.102.11; Aesch., *P.V.* 103-105; Eur. *Alc.* 965 – 970; Eur. *Helen* 510-514; Soph. *Ajax* 485-486; Her. *Hist*. 7.17.215

**Euripides, *Hecuba*, 359 – 364**

ἔπειτ᾽ ἴσως ἂν δεσποτῶν ὠμῶν φρένας
τύχοιμ᾽ ἄν, ὅστις ἀργύρου μ᾽ ὠνήσεται,
τὴν Ἕκτορός τε χἀτέρων πολλῶν κάσιν,
προσθεὶς δ᾽ **ἀνάγκην** σιτοποιὸν ἐν δόμοις,
σαίρειν τε δῶμα κερκίσιν τ᾽ ἐφεστάναι
λυπρὰν ἄγουσαν ἡμέραν μ᾽ **ἀναγκάσει**:

*Pol: Then, perhaps I am destined for some master with a cruel mind, who will buy me for silver, me the sister of Hector and many others, and will impose upon me the **necessity** of baking bread in the house; he will **force** me to sweep the floors and tend the loom, enduring a daily grind.*

The accusative singular here does not imply some kind of disembodied force or agent, rather ἀνάγκη clearly means the duty or allotted task. It is used in conjunction with the verb ἀναγκάσει as well, giving an increased sense of the coercion imagined by Polyxena in application to the other jobs mentioned in addition to the baking of bread. Such tasks would have been typical for a Greek woman, but other than the weaving, would never have been performed by someone of Polyxena's status.

**Aristophanes, *Frogs*, 594 - 596**

εἰ δὲ παραληρῶν ἀλώσει
κἀκβάλῃς τι μαλθακόν
αὖθις αἴρεσθαί σ᾽ **ἀνάγκη**
᾽σται πάλιν τὰ στρώματα.

*…but if you're caught talking nonsense, or throwing out a cowardly sound, it will be a **necessity** for you to raise the couches back again.*

In this passage, the slave Xanthias is warned by the Chorus that if he does not perform as demanded, he will have to resume his slave's duties which would be a necessity. This usage could be interpreted in two ways. One is that the duty of lifting couches is the necessity and thus an aspect of slavery. Alternatively it could merely be a circumstantial necessity, if you behave in this manner, there are inevitable consequences. Like many other instances, the meaning seems likely to indicate both of these things are necessary occurrences and the ἀνάγκη is both that the action is a necessary action for a slave to perform and also that it has come to pass as a consequence of the behaviour.

As well as the noun seeming to apply to the various tasks performed by slaves, there is one instance where the adjective ἀναγκαῖοι could be translated as compelled or obligated people (maybe slaves themselves), in much the same way as it has later been translated elsewhere as relatives (i.e. those with a compelling obligation to another)[40].

**Homer, *Odyssey* XXIV, 208 – 210**

ἔνθα οἱ οἶκος ἔην, περὶ δὲ κλίσιον θέε πάντη,
ἐν τῷ σιτέσκοντο καὶ ἵζανον ἠδὲ ἴαυον
δμῶες **ἀναγκαῖοι**, τοί οἱ φίλα ἐργάζοντο.

*here was the household farmyard; all around it were placed buildings, in which those* ***compelled people*** *ate, sat and slept, those men who carried out his wishes (i.e. worked for him).*

This simple adjective in the nominative plural obviously indicates that these men have an obligation to Laertes in some way and feel compelled to work for him. However, it is not clear from this passage or elsewhere whether these men are slaves or whether their personal circumstances have led them to another's employ[41] and have the status of serfs or bonded labourers. The distinction between bonded labour and the status of slavery is one of ownership rather than obligation. These men are obliged to work for Laertes, but, as with many individuals in the *Odyssey*, it is not immediately apparent whether they are owned by him and are thus compelled to work for him owing to bondage or need to work for him to gain some kind of living in a reciprocal arrangement of circumstance. The conclusions we can come to securely then about necessity here is simply that it can be translated as a person who has a compelling obligation to another person.

[40] Andocides, *On the Mysteries*, 50; Antiphon, *Against the Stepmother*, 29.5 and 1.4; Antiphon, *On the Murder of Herodes*, 59.6

[41] Russo et al.383 are of the opinion that the men here are not slaves (they do not appear to have experienced the ἦμαρ ἀναγκαῖον *Iliad* XVI.836) in war, rather these are individuals who are in debt or have lost their *kleros.* This is a distinct possibility, since generally in war, the male defeated would have been put to the sword; however, it is also possible that there were male slaves or servants as in the house of Odysseus, who were obliged to serve the master of the house e.g. Phemius.

## (ii) Phusis and physical necessity

### (a) Physiological necessity

The following passages are concerned with physiological function and the necessities that govern that. Although the majority are concerned with human biology, others relate to animals. Some of these 'necessities', such as food and drink, are still deemed as vital to existence according to a scientific assessment of the needs of the human body. Others, however, like sexual appetite would not be considered today as an irresistible physical compulsion, as some of these texts indicate the typical Greek view was. Although the differences between now and then are of interest in a broader sense, a more important issue is to ascertain the Greek view on the relationship between ἀνάγκη and their bodies and seek to understand how this relationship was thought to work.

#### *i)* Necessity within the process of giving birth

**Euripides, *Bacchae*, 88-93**

ὅν
ποτ᾽ ἔχουσ᾽ ἐν ὠδίνων
λοχίαις **ἀνάγκαισι**
πταμένας Διὸς βροντᾶς νη-
δύος ἔκβολον μάτηρ
ἔτεκεν, λιποῦσ᾽ αἰῶ-
να κεραυνίῳ πληγᾷ:

*Once she was holding him with **ineluctable** birthing pains, and when the thunder of Zeua rushed towards her, his mother gave birth to him expelling him from her womb, leaving her life behind at the stroke of the thunderbolt*

This adjectival usage describes Semele's labour pains at the birth of Dionysus but its meaning is not obvious: one interpretation could be that, since she was being consumed by the thunderbolt of Zeus, these pains had to happen at that point but the term precedes the thunderbolt; therefore a more likely interpretation is that involuntary labour pains, caused

by physical contractions, compel the baby to birth[42]. In this case a translation of 'ineluctable' could be appropriately substituted for 'necessary' to give this sense of irresistibility to the phrase. This translation seems all the more likely given that Euripides' is generally sceptical about the gods in their traditional form. If the former interpretation was the intended meaning, then the necessity of fate appears to be involved; although a common idea in the tragedies of Sophocles, this is not generally a notion common in Euripidean drama[43].

Another passage in which a birth is considered to have happened under compulsion concerns the birth of Helen following the rape of Nemesis.

***Cypria*, Fragment 9, 3**

τοὺς δὲ μέτα τριτάτην Ἑλένην τέκε θαῦμα βροτοῖσι·
τήν ποτε καλλίκομος Νέμεσις φιλότητι μιγεῖσα
Ζηνὶ θεῶν βασιλῆϊ τέκε κρατερῆς ὑπ' **ἀνάγκης**·

*After these, she bore a third child, Helen, a wonder to mortals; once, rich-tressed Nemesis lying in love with Zeus, king of the gods, bore her under strong **necessity**.*

In the famous description of how Helen was conceived, she is considered to be the daughter of Nemesis who had been sexually violated by Zeus. However, the necessity here does not seem to apply to the assault itself, but rather the act of birth which is compelling the child to be born. Perhaps the compulsion of the birth is described as strong because this action was also preordained by fate and was thus inevitable. Both uses have a precedent elsewhere in contemporary, similar texts and both are possible meanings here and they could well both be intended to be taken in conjuction as interpretation.

## *ii)* Erotic necessity

There are a number of passages in which the sexual urge is considered to be a necessity or compulsion which must be acted upon. This theme is particularly prevalent in poetry some of which is celebratory of Aphrodite's 'gifts' with others more focused on negative aspects of this implying that the coercion is unwelcome.

[42] See Dodds p. 78 for further discussion of this passage
[43] See discussions on Necessity and Fate pages 199ff. and 224ff. for a broader consideration of this aspect of interpretation.

**Pindar, *Nemean Odes,* VIII.1-3**

ὥρα πότνια, κάρυξ Ἀφροδίτας ἀμβροσιᾶν φιλοτάτων,
ἅτε παρθενηΐοις παίδων τ᾽ ἐφίζοισα γλεφάροις,
τὸν μὲν ἀμέροις **ἀνάγκας** χερσὶ βαστάζεις, ἕτερον δ᾽ ἑτέραις.

*Lady season, herald to the ambrosial desires of Aphrodite, who settling upon the eyelids of maidens and boys, you carry one man up in the gentle hands of **compulsion** but handle another differently.*

The dual nature of erotic necessity is alluded to in this passage from Pindar. Here, the goddess of the season of spring marks the onset of sexual activity; ἀνάγκη is personified as the power that facilitates the culmination of this desire. With some of these young couples, this sexual coupling is irresistible but pleasant, whereas others find this compulsion to be an unpleasant coercion. Although the manner of this coupling varies from couple to couple, the involuntary sexual urge is one that cannot be resisted hence the use of ἀνάγκη. This text indicates that certain deities can use their own anankai as some kind of agent when they see fit[44], with Aphrodite being able to activate a particular kind of physical compulsion not associated with other deities.

The more pleasant aspects of this compulsion seem to be alluded to in another passage by Pindar from an encomium to Aphrodite and prostitutes in Corinth.

**Pindar, *Encomia*, Fragment 122.6-9,**

ὑμῖν ἄνευθ᾽ ἐπαγορίας ἔπορεν,
ὦ παῖδες, ἐρατειναῖς <ἐν> εὐναῖς
μαλθακᾶς ὥρας ἀπὸ καρπὸν δρέπεσθαι.
σὺν δ᾽ **ἀνάγκᾳ** πὰν καλόν ...
*** (9)

*To you, o children, she has assigned lovely marriage beds without any blame to gather the fruit of soft youth. All is beautiful with **necessity**…*

Although the last couple of lines are fragmentary, the poem seems to indicate that the compulsion of the sexual instinct is irresistible. Given that this is a hymn of praise to the goddess of love, it would be unlikely that any negative or unpleasant coercive overtones would be present (thus any idea of the prostitutes being slaves should be discounted).

[44] See also the chapter on ἀνάγκη as a personification page 216.

That this desire is irresistible is reiterated by the following fragment of Sophocles from the Tragedy Thyestes.

**Sophocles, *Fragment* 256** (*Thyestes*) (Radt)**

πρὸς τὴν **ἀνάγκην** οὐδ' Ἄρης ἀνθίσταται

*Against **compulsion** which not even Ares can stand against.*

Without any context, it is difficult to say a great deal about this fragment, but it indicates that sexual desire and the subsequent sexual urge is something that even drives the action of the gods. This isolated line was quoted within Plato's Symposium 196c, where Agathon discusses the necessity of love, obviously indicating that it is this compulsion that Ares is subject to[45]. It is difficult to apprehend exactly what is understood to be happening physiologically when necessity affects individuals in this way. It is obviously some kind of stimulus that initiates an inevitable reaction from the body resulting in sexual activity.

In Aristophanes' *Clouds*, Wrong Argument tries to persuade Strepsiades to side with him to get out of potential trouble caused by a transgression caused by a necessity of nature or sexual necessity.

**Aristophanes, *Clouds*, 1075**

πάρειμ' ἐντεῦθεν εἰς τὰς τῆς φύσεως **ἀνάγκας**.

*I now move from here to the **necessities** of nature.*

By referring to a sexual act as a φύσεως ἀνάγκας, the implication is that this action is automatic and the perpetrator has no control over his actions because of this compulsion. Indeed Wrong Argument goes on to explain that even Zeus is subject to this necessity and thus it could be used as a defence for illegal sexual acts in a courtroom.

***Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite*, 128-130**

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ δεῖξε καὶ ἔφρασεν ἥ τοι ὅ γ' αὖτις
ἀθανάτων μετὰ φῦλ' ἀπέβη κρατὺς Ἀργειφόντης·
αὐτὰρ ἐγώ σ' ἱκόμην, κρατερὴ δέ μοι ἔπλετ' **ἀνάγκη**.

[45] Mitscherling (1985) p.375

*But when he had shown the way and advised me, the strong Argeiphontes went back to the race of immortals, while I come to you, for strong **necessity** drives me.*

This interesting example comes from a section of the Hymn in which Aphrodite is pretending to be a mortal virgin who has been ordered by Hermes to become Anchises' wife. In fact she has been subjected to the power of Eros herself by Zeus and this story forms part of her deception so that she can satisfy her sexual desire for Anchises through a sexual act. In the story, the strong necessity that drives her is the will of the gods over mortals; a human could not contend with the power and strength of the immortals. The act which she says is a compulsion is that of marriage. However, in reality the act she feels compelled to do is actually the impulse to find sexual satisfaction in the arms of a mortal lover owing to the will of Zeus[46]. Although Aphrodite's tale is a falsehood, the real situation has some parity to the fabrication; she is an immortal being compelled to a course of sexual activity by a stronger being (Zeus) although she actually perceives this as the physical urge of her sexual appetite. Thus this passage is similar in meaning to those in which supernatural coercion occurs (page 35).

Some fragments are more concerned with the emotional aspects of love and don't view necessity as a physiological stimulus. Here, the emotional state of being in love automatically leads to an inevitable set of circumstances, in which case such instances are far more akin to the negative connotations of fate and destiny allotted to mortals[47].

**Gorgias, *Fragment* 11, 124 - 128**

ἦλθε γάρ, ὡς ἦλθε, τύχης ἀγρεύμασιν, οὐ γνώμης βουλεύμασιν, καὶ
ἔρωτος **ἀνάγκαις**, οὐ τέχνης παρασκευαῖς.
πῶς οὖν χρὴ δίκαιον ἡγήσασθαι τὸν τῆς Ἑλένης μῶμον, ἥτις
εἴτ' ἐρασθεῖσα εἴτε λόγωι πεισθεῖσα εἴτε βίαι ἁρπασθεῖσα εἴτε ὑπὸ θείας
**ἀνάγκης ἀναγκασθεῖσα** ἔπραξεν ἃ ἔπραξε, πάντως διαφεύγει τὴν αἰτίαν;

[46] As Parry (1986) points out (p.254) the link between the will of the gods and αἵσῃ ἀθανάτῃ (l.166) indicates that, rather than apportioning blame in a trivial way to Zeus, this text seems to imply some kind of cosmic necessity in which the gods merely play a part.

[47] See pages 199ff. and 224ff. on necessity and fate.

*For she came, as she did come, through the snares of Chance, not through the plans of Thought and through the **compulsions** of Love, not the devices of Art. How then must we deduce the blame of Helen as just, seeing as, whether she did what she did being made to love, or persuaded by words, or ravished by strength, or **compelled** by divine **necessity**, she is completely aquitted of the charge?*

That necessity is associated with the actions of lovers that may lead to tragic consequences or general misfortune is obvious in this passage in which Gorgias seeks to excuse Helen's actions and acquit her of any wrongdoing. He uses ἀνάγκη terms three times – twice as a noun and once as part of the verb ἀναγκασθεῖσα thereby seeking to persuade us that Helen is not going with Paris of her own volition. The first occasion (l.125) obviously refers to the necessities resulting from the state of being in love (Gorgias is not describing a sexual act here, more a state of mind or state of being). Thus we could say that Helen's actions are a quality of the phusis of being in love. This could, perhaps also be a function of what is decreed by the gods given by the second usage (l.128) and the verb accompanying it; here Gorgias refers to Helen as being compelled by divine necessity. Although this divine necessity could simply mean fate, being so close to the usage that clearly links to love, perhaps this also alludes to what is decreed by Aphrodite or Eros, but unlike the passages discussed above (Pindar and Sophocles page 49-50) it does indicate the sexual act itself, but the choices made as a consequence of being in love and where they lead[48].

The following passage is ambiguous and although involving sexual behaviour, the exact meaning intended by Semonides is not clear.

**Semonides, *Fragment*, VII.62-64**

**ἀνάγκηι** δ' ἄνδρα ποιεῖται φίλον·
λοῦται δὲ πάσης ἡμέρης ἄπο ῥύπον
δίς, ἄλλοτε τρίς...

*She makes love to a man by **compulsion**; she washes dirt from herself all day, twice, otherwise three times…*

This fragment comes from Semonides' well-known poem describing different types of women. The woman here (like a mare) appears somewhat particular about what she does

[48] Similar usage can be seen in Euripides *Fragment* 339 lines 3-6 and Aristarchus *Fragment* 2

and doesn't do: she is adorned with luxuries, is fastidiously well-groomed and will not do house work (getting everyone else to do household tasks) in order to keep away from anything that might taint her. There has been debate about the instigator of the compulsion as it is not clear from the single line of poetry; either the mare woman coerces the husband to couple with her through her alluring pampered appearance inducing irresistible desire or she is so concerned about the potential tainting of her body that she will only contemplate sex if coerced by her husband. Given the earlier discussion of the ass woman (p.25) in which coercion is needed to prompt her to do any work at all, it would seem unlikely that the mare woman would be able to coerce her husband to couple with her as is pointed out by Svarlien[49] in the notes accompanying her online translation. What we are confronted with here seems possibly to be more akin to rape within a domestic setting as a consequence of the husband's sexual frustration at his wife's obsession with cleanliness. The poem goes on to stress how beautiful this wife is to look at, which could be the reason why the husband might be so frustrated, but she does not appear to be desperate for sex (in the manner of the sea and weasel women) thereby adding further weight to the husband being the perpetrator of the coercion.

There are other instances where the necessity of sexual violence is an obvious interpretation.

**Aeschylus, *Suppliant Women*, 1030 - 1032**

ἐπίδοι δ᾽ Ἄρτεμις ἁγνὰ
στόλον οἰκτιζομένα, μηδ᾽ ὑπ᾽ **ἀνάγκας**
γάμος ἔλθοι Κυθερείας:

*May mild Artemis have pity on this group, and may marriage never come through the* ***necessity*** *of Aphrodite*

Here, the compulsion or necessity of Aphrodite also seems to refer to violent sexual acts or rape and enforced marriage. Danaus has previously talked of how desirable the girls will be since they are virgins (lines 1001-1005) and overwhelming desire might overtake men who hear of them (ἱμέρου νικώμενος). The notion that the power of the sexual urge is strong enough to conquer reason (and thus lead to sexual assault) is unfamiliar and unsavoury when considered today in an age when such actions would be illegal, abusive and not

[49] http://www.stoa.org/diotima/anthology/sem_7.shtml#11

socially acceptable despite still being offered as an excuse by rapists and perpetrators of such crimes. In antiquity such an idea is not necessarily a commonplace practice, but must be an urge that would have been realistically possible for it to have been mentioned in this manner.

### *iii)* Necessity that children are nursed correctly

The way that infants are brought up is also governed by certain compulsions; presumably these would be considered similar in concept to those discussed in the section on death aversion (page 122) and the texts describing nourishment as necessities (page 56).

**Aeschylus, *Libation Bearers*, 753-754**

τὸ μὴ φρονοῦν γὰρ ὡσπερεὶ βοτὸν
τρέφειν **ἀνάγκη**, πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
*Nurse: Isn't it **necessary** to nourish the unthinking (a baby) like a dumb animal?*

This passage underlines the fact that at birth, babies are completely helpless and do not have the capacity for independent thought. The necessity here, however, is not that of simply feeding the baby; it is the necessity to feed the baby as if it were a dumb animal given that its mind is not developed at this time. Thus it is the method of nurture rather than the nurture itself that is the necessity here. However, effectively they boil down to the same thing, in that the nurse is simply outlining the most sensible way to nurture the baby thereby ensuring its survival. This necessity, like many others of the natural world, is one of phusis in the nurse's mind; given that the baby is this age, this must be the necessary response to that set of circumstances.

### *iv)* Eating and Drinking

The following passages are of interest in that not only do they focus on the necessity of eating and drinking in order to stay alive, but they also go some way in informing us the way in which the Greeks viewed the way their bodies worked and how the power of ἀνάγκη worked as part of this aspect of their lives.

**Homer, *Odyssey,* VII.215-217**

ἀλλ᾽ ἐμὲ μὲν δορπῆσαι ἐάσατε κηδόμενόν περ:
οὐ γάρ τι στυγερῇ ἐπὶ γαστέρι κύντερον ἄλλο
ἔπλετο, ἥ τ᾽ ἐκέλευσεν ἔο μνήσασθαι **ἀνάγκῃ**
καὶ μάλα τειρόμενον καὶ ἐνὶ φρεσὶ πένθος ἔχοντα...

*For allow me to eat now although I am grieving, for what is not more hateful than a shameless belly in action; it orders through* ***necessity*** *that one is reminded of it…*

Here the stomach is personified as an individual entity within the body coercing Odysseus in an interpersonal conversational relationship. The physical necessity of hunger felt in the stomach then employs necessity as an agent to coerce the man to feed. Today we would understand that this process was more complex with hormones stimulating a craving sensation in the stomach inducing the feeling of hunger. Does Odysseus views his body as a system, however, with predictable actions and reactions in which ἀνάγκη was an integral part (a mini-cosmos with rules), or does he see it as random in its activity? From this passage, it is difficult to say but there are certainly similarities between the way in which ἀνάγκη acts on behalf of one part of a whole and the descriptions of ἀνάγκη within early cosmology (discussed below pages 142ff.). A similar idea is seen in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* (717-726) but without the seeming personification of the stomach seen in the previous passage.

**Aeschylus,** ***Agamemnon*****, 717 - 726.**

ἔθρεψεν δὲ λέοντος ἴ-
νιν δόμοις ἀγάλακτον οὔ-
τως ἀνὴρ φιλόμαστον,
ἐν βιότου προτελείοις
ἄμερον, εὐφιλόπαιδα,
καὶ γεραροῖς ἐπίχαρτον·
πολέα δ' ἔσχ' ἐν ἀγκάλαις
νεοτρόφου τέκνου δίκαν,
φαιδρωπὸς ποτὶ χεῖρα σαί-
νων τε γαστρὸς **ἀνάγκαις**.

*A man nourished a lion cub as a child in his house without milk even though it was still craving milk. Before the initiation of life and free from care, it was well-disposed to children and a delight to the old; many times he held it in his arms like a nursling child, its bright eye turned to the hand, in paying court to the* ***necessities*** *of its belly.*

Without the personification, the depersonalised body almost seems more systematic than the Homeric instance placing this text firmly into the mindset of the fifth century; although some contemporary cosmological and scientific writings imply the necessity of a stronger

urge overpowering a weaker one as we see in the Homeric example (page 54), they do not generally talk about parts of the body or elements of the cosmos in such human terms.

Other texts simply mention the necessity of extreme hunger or thirst; the drive that impels humans (and animals) to seek food and drink even when this contravenes convention and religious practice. Indeed, in Thucydides 1.2.2.6-7 the food itself is described as necessary (ἀναγκαίου τροφῆς) whereas others describe the deprivation of food as a constraint.

**Thucydides, II.70.1.5**

...ὅ τε σῖτος ἐπελελοίπει, καὶ ἄλλα τε πολλὰ ἐπεγεγένητο αὐτόθι ἤδη βρώσεως πέρι **ἀναγκαίας** καί τινες καὶ ἀλλήλων ἐγέγευντο...

*…the food had run out and amongst the many things which happened there in relation to the **constraint** for meat, some had even eaten one another.*

In this passage, there is no discussion of physiological necessity or where anatomically this compulsion might be perceived. Thucydides, although taking for granted that his readers will understand the normal sensation of hunger, perhaps uses ἀναγκαίας to indicate that this is not normal appetite but that the shocking behaviour of the citizens of Potidea is spurred on by starvation[50].

**Thucydides, IV.98.5**

ὕδωρ τε ἐν τῇ **ἀνάγκῃ** κινῆσαι, ἣν οὐκ αὐτοὶ ὕβρει προσθέσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνους προτέρους ἐπὶ τὴν σφετέραν ἐλθόντας ἀμυνόμενοι βιάζεσθαι χρῆσθαι.

*They had disturbed the water out of **necessity**, which they had not done out of lack of piety, they had been forced to use it in warding off those who had attacked them first.*

This situation occurred when some of the Athenians, hard-pressed by the Thebans at Delium in 424BCE were in retreat and had occupied the sacred site, having fortified it. The Boeotian herald (IV.97) has accused the Athenians of utilising sacred water for washing and general day to day use. The above quotation comes from the Athenian explanation. They assert that the water, although sacred, had been used by necessity, presumably as there was no other drinking water. This is similar to the above passages which refer to the necessity of

[50] There are numerous other passages which very straightforwardly use necessity phrases to describe extreme hunger and the desire for satiety *Odyssey* Homer XV.311-2; Ibid. XIX.73-4; Ibid. XII.329-334; *Peloponnesian War,* Thucydides, VII.27.4.4; Ibid. I.2.2.6

food. The use of this water is a physical compulsion which prevents death. In this discussion which is written in a very matter of fact manner, there is no implication of agency for ἀνάγκη as we find in Homer; the thirst is not described as utilising necessity to compel the men to drink. This seems more of a case of biological ἀνάγκη whereby there is a simple appetite that humanity cannot ignore, whatever their ethical standpoint[51].

### *v)* Other biological necessities

As well as eating and drinking, there are other instances which refer to human existence and the preservation of wellbeing.

**Homer, *Iliad*, XVIII, 112 -113**

ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν προτετύχθαι ἐάσομεν ἀχνύμενοί περ,
θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλον δαμάσαντες **ἀνάγκῃ**·
*but I will allow these things to be in the past despite grieving, overcoming the dear heart in my breast through* ***necessity.***

In this passage, the idea of coercion is translated into human psychology; Achilles talks in terms of forcing his heart to do his bidding. It is of course a poetic way of Achilles saying that he will force himself to get on with the matter in hand despite his grief, but here he uses terminology that is usually found in scenes of combat, coercion and cruelty.

In a similar vein, Sophocles describes the circumstances of Philoctetes as one who is forced to exist in a particular manner by his physical disability.

**Sophocles, *Philoctetes*, 202 – 218**

Χο.: βάλλει βάλλει μ᾽ ἐτύμα
φθογγά του στίβον κατ᾽ **ἀνάγ-**
**καν** ἕρποντος, οὐδέ με λά-
θει βαρεῖα τηλόθεν αὐ-
δὰ τρυσάνωρ· διάσημα θρηνεῖ....
...οὐ μολπὰν σύριγγος ἔχων,
ὡς ποιμὴν ἀγροβάτας,

[51] A similar passage from Thucydides II.17.2.2 outlines the cultivation of some land on which agriculture had been banned by a prophecy; here the necessity of hunger has led refugees in Athens to grow crops here; for another text stressing the necessity of clean water see Critias *Fragment* 34.7-14.

ἀλλ᾽ ἥ που πταίων ὑπ᾽ **ἀνάγ-**
**κας** βοᾷ τηλωπὸν ἰω-
άν, ἢ ναὸς ἄξενον αὐ-
γάζων ὅρμον·

*It strikes, it strikes me, the true sound of a man with a creeping gait by physical* ***constraint****, nor does the man-wearying sound escape me from afar, for he clearly laments...not having the ong of a flute, such as the shepherd pasturing his flock, but with cries that can be heard from afar, either from the* ***compulsion*** *to stumble or because he sees the harbour empty of ships*

The two occurrences of ἀνάγκη in lines 207 and 216 obviously refer to the physical disability of Philoctetes, his lameness. Because of the festering snake bite on his foot, he is unable to walk normally and has no choice but to drag his injured leg behind him. In terms of usage this shows the hero as being under the power of his injury; the wound imposes a necessity upon him that automatically results in his limp.

The final passage under consideration in this category concerns the toilet habits of the Egyptians and is found in Herodotus.

**Herodotus, II.35.13-16**

Εὐμαρείῃ χρέωνται ἐν τοῖσι οἴκοισι, ἐσθίουσι δὲ
ἔξω ἐν τῇσι ὁδοῖσι, ἐπιλέγοντες ὡς τὰ μὲν αἰσχρὰ **ἀναγκαῖα**
δὲ ἐν ἀποκρύφῳ ἐστὶ ποιέειν χρεόν, τὰ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρὰ ἀνα-
φανδόν.

*They must relieve themselves in their houses, but eat outside in the road, saying that* ***necessary*** *but shameful things they must do in private, those not shameful in public.*

Although it forms part of the discussion on customs and laws of the Egyptians, the necessity here is not that of adhering to these customs, rather it is the biological necessity of going to the toilet. It is related in usage to other biological urges and simply indicates that this is a natural function of a body which it must perform according to nature or phusis.

## *vi)* Poverty and other deficiencies

There are many instances involving the imposition of ἀνάγκη upon a person or people where the precise deficiency is not defined.

**Thucydides, VI.37.2.6**

ἦ πού γε δὴ ἐν πάσῃ πολεμίᾳ Σικελίᾳ （ξυστήσεται γάρ） στρατοπέδῳ τε ἐκ νεῶν ἱδρυθέντι καὶ ἐκ σκηνιδίων καὶ **ἀναγκαίας** παρασκευῆς οὐκ ἐπὶ πολὺ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἱππέων ἐξιόντες.

*... all Sicily will be at war and be united (against them), they being settled in an encampment from the ships composed of little tents and **necessities**, from which they could not go far owing to our cavalry.*

Taken from the speech of Athenagoras in Syracuse, the politician seeks to demonstrate that the Athenians are not in a strong position. They are described as being in a minimal fortification and the term ἀναγκαίας is not expanded upon. From the context, one could assume that it would refer to the bare essentials that would sustain the army such as food, drink and basic sanitation[52]. Here the term is not describing a force that compels them but rather it is the things themselves that they require to survive.

A common occurrence refers to the general deprivations of poverty and the measures humanity will feel compelled to adopt in order to survive in these conditions; the following two passages are typical.

**Theognis, *Elegies* 1.385-7**

τοὶ δ᾽ ἀπὸ δειλῶν
ἔργων ἴσχοντες θυμὸν ὅμως πενίην
μητέρ᾽ ἀμηχανίης ἔλαβον τὰ δίκαια φιλεῦντες,
ἤτ᾽ ἀνδρῶν παράγει θυμὸν ἐς ἀμπλακίην
βλάπτουσ᾽ ἐν στήθεσσι φρένας κρατερῆς ὑπ᾽ **ἀνάγκης**·

[52] Similar non-descript necessities can be seen in Antiphon, *Tetralogies*, III.1.2.4 and Thucydides, IV.40.1.2-4

*…but some, restraining the heart from wretched deeds nevertheless get poverty, the mother of helplessness, although they love just things. She gives a taste of doing ill to the heart of man and they are blinded in the heart of their thoughts by a strong **necessity**.*

**Thucydides, III,45.4.3**

ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν πενία **ἀνάγκῃ** τὴν τόλμαν παρέχουσα,

*…but while poverty brings about daring through **necessity**…*

The above two passages from disparate genres exemplify the same danger, that is the strictures of poverty, and the necessity this places upon the human being. In both authors, poverty is obviously serious enough to bring about drastic action and thus could well be deemed to be life-threatening. In the Mytilenian debate, Diodotus attempts to balance Cleon's plea for the death penalty and this line forms part of his explanation of actions within war. Perhaps, he posits, poverty forces people to be more daring than they should be and indeed would be were they not pushed to it by fear of death. It forms part of a very rational speech in which the necessity is not poverty but the fear for one's very life[53]. In the Theognidea the poet also outlines the desperate mindset of those afflicted by poverty, clearly describing that their normal morality is put to one side since their very existence is threatened. Those who would hitherto have been just and moral are pushed to immorality or antisocial behaviour by the necessity of inevitable death or unbearable hardship, were they not to act in these ways. These differ from Thucydides VI.37.2.6, because here, the necessity could really be described as the need that drives them rather than the commodities themselves.

There is also a less life-threatening course of action precipitated by the necessity of poverty. In addition to the restricted freedom for women imposed by the customary obligation of ἀνάγκη [54]there are accounts where men bewail their obligations to their family both in whom they may choose to marry and their subsequent wedded life; since, although the wife is obliged to obey her husband and male relatives, the bridegroom must marry who his father or the head of the household wishes. This was frequently a financial or political union rather than a love match, as Theognis cynically observes.

[53] A very similar usage without reference to poverty can be seen in Euripides *Fragment* 38.
[54] See the discussion of gender-related ἀνάγκη on page 80ff.

**Theognis, *Fragment* I.193-196**

Αὐτός τοι ταύτην εἰδὼς κακόπατριν ἐοῦσαν
εἰς οἴκους ἄγεται χρήμασι πειθόμενος
εὔδοξος κακόδοξον, ἐπεὶ κρατερή μιν **ἀνάγκη**
ἐντύνει, ἥτ' ἀνδρὸς τλήμονα θῆκε νόον

*He leads her to the house knowing her parents to be bad but persuaded by money; he has a good reputation, she a poor one, but when strong **necessity** urges, the mind of a man places strong endurance on him.*

In this instance, the bridegroom is forced to consider money above the goodness of the family of his bride. This illustrates Theognis' disapproval of what he views as a decline in morality in Megara – these kakoi (bad parents) having become newly rich and wielding ever more power in the city while the agathoi (noble citizens) were happy to marry into such lines to gain financially while lending the nouveaux riches credibility through their genos[55]. Conversely the quotation also illustrates how difficult things have become for the nobles of the city financially, and is not just indicating their moral decline. The bridegroom is under an obligation to undertake this marriage (hence the term necessity); this is either because the head of the oikos has ordained this course of action or because of his personal poverty. The choice has been made for the good of his own oikos and regardless of any moral reservations he may have, the bridegroom has no choice but to follow this course of action to ensure the continuation of the oikos and to ensure its future prosperity[56].

Euripides again frames a criticism of marriage; we have the text in the *Hippolytus*, but it is generally accepted that the lines have been interpolated from another play by Euripides[57] since they are somewhat incongruous not only with the character of Hippolytus (whom one would not expect to be thinking of the marriage bed) but also with the text of his speech where he is deriding women, not marriage.

[55] Figueira, 1985, p.163
[56] That this is the obligation of the male line in the oikos is discussed in Lacey, 1972, p.16
[57] Barrett, 1992, p.279

**Euripides, *Hippolytus*, 634-637**

[ἔχει δ' **ἀνάγκην**· ὥστε κηδεύσας καλῶς
γαμβροῖσι χαίρων σώιζεται πικρὸν λέχος,
ἢ χρηστὰ λέκτρα πενθεροὺς δ' ἀνωφελεῖς
λαβὼν πιέζει τἀγαθῶι τὸ δυστυχές.]

*There is a **necessity** that, just as one allies himself well, greeting the in-laws, he preserves a bitter marriage bed, or with a good marriage bed come useless in-laws...*

Putting the authenticity of the passage and its original location to one side, one can see as in the Theognis passage that marriage contained necessary consequences for the bridegroom as well as the bride. The rather cynical view of marriage presented is exaggerated by the term ἀνάγκη, indicating the inevitable and inescapable nature of his future married life. As previously mentioned, the wealth of the bride's family could well be of the utmost importance to the oikos' continuation and prosperity. This would make the first terrible outcome the more likely to occur within marriage, since the quality/ wealth of the in-laws would be a key factor in arranging a match. This passage also presents what is outlined as a necessary set of circumstances that cannot be avoided owing to the nature of society at that time. The situation of marriage will necessarily be difficult in one way or another; either emotionally or financially. According to this statement, if you get married, you will be compelled to one or the other eventuality. Clearly this is a perspective from one individual who is somewhat biased in his outlook and not a viewpoint generally accepted as normal by all Greek people. Thus this necessity of circumstance is true for one individual but does not necessarily have to be so for anyone else thereby giving an interesting quality to the power of necessity. Here it is a necessity of personal perspective rather than a universally accepted matter of fact.

**Euripides, *Helen*, 510 - 514**

κακῶν μὲν ἡμῖν ἔσχατον τοῖς ἀθλίοις,
ἄλλους τυράννους αὐτὸν ὄντα βασιλέα
βίον προσαιτεῖν: ἀλλ' **ἀναγκαίως** ἔχει.
λόγος γάρ ἐστιν οὐκ ἐμός, σοφὸν δ' ἔπος,
δεινῆς **ἀνάγκης** οὐδὲν ἰσχύειν πλέον.

*Menelaus. This is the worst evil for me in my miseries, to ask for sustenance from other kings being a king myself; but it is **necessarily** thus. For the saying is not mine, but these are words of the wise, there is nothing stronger than terrible **Necessity**.*

The hardship faced by Menelaus is similar to the devastation and deprivation caused by war, but in this case his desperate state is a consequence of natural phenomena – a shipwreck. Despite the social codes that Menelaus would normally adhere to (he would not normally beg for anything as a monarch), here the physical necessity of survival compels him to, otherwise he would die. Again, this seems to be a necessity of circumstance in which Menelaus has been put in a position whereby he has no choice. The necessity seems to be the desire to survive (in a basic sense of being compelled by the body to require food and water) and also the practical necessities of accommodation and means to travel home[58].

**Aristophanes, *Clouds*, Line 437 - 438**

δράσω ταῦθ' ὑμῖν πιστεύσας· ἡ γὰρ ἀνάγκη με πιέζει
διὰ τοὺς ἵππους τοὺς κοππατίας καὶ τὸν γάμον ὅς μ' ἐπέτριψεν.

*I will do these things putting faith in you, for **necessity** squeezes me tight, since the horses (branded with the kappa) and my wife are crushing me*

In Aristophanes' Clouds, 437-438, the protagonist, Strepsiades describes being squeezed tight by necessity (γὰρ ἀνάγκη με πιέζει). This seems to be a personification which represents the deprivation and poverty created by his son's addiction to race horses, a necessity which will force him to pay up or appear in the debtors' court. Personified necessity has been used to stress the coercive nature of the debt collectors (the force that will be used against about him) and his powerlessness within this situation (he is constrained by his finances). The dual nature of necessity in that it both compels a course of events and constrains individuals by circumstances beyond their control is particularly effective in this context.

## *vii)* The inevitability of Death

An obvious physical ἀνάγκη for all mankind is that of death, a situation lamented particularly in the tragedies of Euripides. This concept of impending doom, although suited to the genre of tragedy is one that is linked closely with the idea of mortal suffering in the Greek consciousness, whereas today we would view death as a foregone conclusion for all and suffering an unfortunate situation.

[58] The second mention of necessity in this passage δεινῆς **ἀνάγκης** οὐδὲν ἰσχύειν πλέον is discussed further in the section on Necessity as a personification or deity page 201ff.

**Euripides, *Hippolytus*, 1385-8**

τί φῶ; πῶς ἀπαλλά-
ξω βιοτὰν ἐμὰν
τοῦδ᾽ ἀνάλγητον πάθους;
εἴθε με κοιμάσειε τὸν
δυσδαίμον᾽ Ἅιδα μέλαι-
να νύκτερός τ᾽ **ἀνάγκα.**

*Hip: What will I say? How will I release my life without pain from this suffering? If only Hades' **Necessity** of black night would lay me, the ill-fated one, to rest.*

This passage from the last scene of the Hippolytus comes from the final stasimon of the protagonist's soliloquy and as he is mortally wounded, they form part of his lament for his own death. Here, Hippolytus wishes for death, presumably because he is in so much pain. Death itself is described as Ἅιδα...ἀνάγκα. His desire for this indicates that there is no escape from death as soon as one ceases to be under the control of the Olympians and become subject to Hades' jurisdiction[59]. The necessity and inevitability of death is also the theme for the choral ode to necessity in Alcestis, discussed on pages 207-211.

## (b) Necessity and phusis of the natural world

There are a number of passages which are concerned with the way the natural world works; these concern a variety of phenomena that we would generally class to be scientific, ranging from fertility of the land to meteorology.

**Aristophanes, *Wasps*, Line 260 - 261**

κοὐκ ἔσθ᾽ ὅπως οὐχ ἡμερῶν τεττάρων τὸ πλεῖστον
ὕδωρ **ἀναγκαίως** ἔχει τὸν θεὸν ποιῆσαι.

*...surely it is **necessary** that the god will make it rain for at least four days.*

In this passage, the natural world is predictable (albeit in a somewhat bizarre manner – the snuff of the lamp wick) and is described as being under the control of god (Zeus). This demonstrates that some things in the natural world were not thought to be completely random and the adverbial usage of necessity is designed to show some kind of inherent order. However, this order is still being perceived as under the control of a deity rather than being mechanistic. This seems a midpoint between traditional belief systems and those

[59] A similar text with the same rather depressing connotations can be found in Euripides *Alcestis* 416-419.

hypothesised by the cosmological philosophers like Demokritus or Heraklitus who use necessity type terms to describe the systems in the cosmos.

**Euripides, *Cyclops*, 332 - 333**

ἡ γῆ δ᾽ **ἀνάγκῃ**, κἂν θέλῃ κἂν μὴ θέλῃ,
τίκτουσα ποίαν τἀμὰ πιαίνει βοτά.
*Earth by means of **necessity**, were I to wish it or not, brings forth grass which at the same time fattens my flocks.*

This necessity is certainly a physical one and could be considered one of coercion. Polyphemus, speaking about his environment, describes the way he is sustained. In an earlier text, we may have expected the miracle of plant growth to be credited to the supernatural workings of a god, but here the Earth uses ἀνάγκη to make the grass grow**.** Thus we can view Earth as the instigator using ἀνάγκη as an agent to compel the vegetation to grow which does not imply any divine intervention. As discussed in Seaford (1988, p.167), this reflects both the arrogance and atheism of the Cyclops (his disrespect for the influence and power of the gods) as well as the contemporary intellectual innovations of the Presocratics, Sophists and other authors[60]. In this respect it resonates with the concerns of the late fifth century which are discussed further in the chapter on Necessity and the concept of the divine (page 201ff.) namely whether the traditional gods, as they have been described by poets like Homer, exist and if they do, whether they are worthy of worship.

**Herodotus II,22.10-13**

δεύτερον δὲ ὅτι ἄνομβρος ἡ χώρη καὶ ἀκρύσταλλος διατελέει ἐοῦσα, ἐπὶ δὲ χιόνι πεσούσῃ πᾶσα **ἀνάγκη** ἐστὶ ὗσαι ἐν πέντε ἡμέρῃσι, ὥστε, εἰ ἐχιόνιζε, ὕετο ἂν ταῦτα τὰ χωρία:
*Secondly, the land is without rain and without frost formation; after the falling of snow, there is every **necessity** for it to rain in five days, so that if it were to snow in the region it would then rain too*

Like the example from *The Cyclops*, this description appears to indicate that the author portrays a natural world that works in a particular way without any divine influence. It works this way because there is πᾶσα ἀνάγκη there. Herodotus, keen to explain the environment

[60] Notably in Aristophanes' *Clouds* where Socrates replaces Zeus with Necessity in the form of a vortex (367,377,405) to explain the weather, much in the manner of the Atomists and Empedocles.

as the locations for the events he goes on to describe, cannot find the words to describe this in any other way thereby indicating that he does not necessarily see events in nature to be caused by the gods. Whereas Euripides' Cyclops was an individual who does not respect divine authority and thus may be deliberately portrayed denying supernatural influence on the world, Herodotus cannot be viewed as having such an agenda. His perspective must surely reflect the progressive attitudes of the Ionian cosmologists. He portrays the weather as a self-regulating system with some inherent compulsion that governs the sequence of events which, like the Cyclops' island above, seems similar to the cosmological mechanisation of the Atomist universe[61].

There are also a number of passages that treat the weather as a compulsion itself that has the power to mould and alter human behaviour; this is obviously an interpretation that we can relate to today. Thus this is a physical occurrence that develops naturally and imposes a physical compulsion on mankind.

**Euripides, *Hecuba*, Lines 898 - 901**

Αγ.: ἔσται τάδ' οὕτω· καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὲν ἦν στρατῶι
πλοῦς, οὐκ ἂν εἶχον τήνδε σοι δοῦναι χάριν·
νῦν δ', οὐ γὰρ ἵησ' οὐρίους πνοὰς θεός,
μένειν **ἀνάγκη** πλοῦν ὁρῶντας ἡσύχους.

*Ag.: So it will be this way, yet if it were for the army to sail, I would not have given this grace to you. Now, for the god does not send a fair wind, it is **necessary** for us to remain looking for a calm voyage.*

This passage presents (as in Aristophanes *Wasps* 260-261) a cosmos in which the gods control the weather, in this particular instance the wind. It is the weather which compels the ships to harbour rather than beginning their journey but this is under divine control. In itself, this passage does not provide compelling evidence for a widespread understanding of this kind of compulsion. However, the following texts support this notion, showing voyages moulded by the weather and also do not allocate any divine aspect to the compulsion experienced.

[61] A similar Herodotean example can be seen at I.67.15 – 17, II.22.17-19

**Herodotus, II, 152.14 - 16**

Χρόνου δὲ οὐ πολλοῦ διελθόντος **ἀναγ-**
**καίη** κατέλαβε Ἴωνάς τε καὶ Κᾶρας ἄνδρας κατὰ ληίην
ἐκπλώσαντας ἀπενειχθῆναι ἐς Αἴγυπτον...

*after a short time, necessity took Ionians and Carians to Egypt by **force** (bad weather), men who had sailed out in search of booty...*

**Antiphon, *On the Murder of Herodes*, 22.4 - 6**

οὔτ᾽ αὖ ἐγὼ ἄνευ προφάσεως ἱκανῆς φαίνομαι τὸν πλοῦν ποιησάμενος εἰς τὴν Αἶνον... ἀλλ᾽ **ἀνάγκῃ** χρησάμενοι...οὐδ᾽ ἀπάτῃ, ἀλλ᾽ **ἀνάγκῃ** καὶ τοῦτο ἐγίγνετο.

*And I am not without sufficient reason for making the journey to Aenus….it resulted from **necessity** (storm)...it was in no way deceptive but happened out of **necessity** (heavy rain so deck shelter was needed hence boat change)*

In both these cases, storms force a change in plan to a voyage. This is a very physical coercion in which the natural world compels humans to alter their journeys. There is no mention of any divine hand in these situations; it is simply seen as an act of nature rather than an act of god. However, it is not suggested here that there is any inherent mechanism or system which ensures that it rains at a specific time or in a particular place. Similarly, the following passage concerns geographical necessity; the topography compels a particular course to be taken.

**Herodotus, IV, 43.11 - 12**

Λιβύην γάρ οἱ **ἀνάγκην** ἔσεσθαι περιπλέειν, ἐς ὃ ἂν
ἀπίκηται περιπλέων αὐτὴν ἐς τὸν Ἀράβιον κόλπον.

*...for they would be circumnavigating Libya through **necessity** until they arrived at the Arabian Gulf, having sailed around it.*

This is circumstantial necessity which is caused by a physical situation. The necessity here has connotations of both constraint and compulsion in that the boat is compelled to travel a specific route but the route is constrained by the landscape.

All these necessities of the natural world describe coercion inherent within the cosmos which affects mortals. None of these passages come from the early texts but date to the fifth century and the widening usage of ἀνάγκη terms in this period. The range of

compulsion reflects the variety of viewpoints that are held by authors at this time; some are simple and just extend the idea of interpersonal physical force implying an action initiated by nature is akin to a violent threat or action between people. Other passages illustrate the progressive attitudes of thinkers at this time embodying an idea of phusis and a predictable universe that, although it may or may not be commanded by gods, repeats the same actions at certain times in a set pattern of behaviour, the necessity being the compulsion to keep to this set pattern.

## (c) Prophecy

In this section the focus is not of the fulfilment of prophecy or its implications (this is discussed on pages 195ff and 219ff), rather it is the physical effects of prophecy upon the prophetess.

**Euripides, *Iphigeneia at Aulis*, 757-761**

Χορός

…τὰν Κασάνδραν ἴν' ἀκούω
ῥίπτειν ξανθοὺς πλοκάμους
χλωροκόμῳ στεφάνῳ δάφνας
κοσμηθεῖσαν, ὅταν θεοῦ
μαντόσυνοι πνεύσως' **ἀνάγκαι**.

*Ch: …I hear Cassandra adorned with a crown of green-leafed laurel who throws her blonde hair whenever she might breathe in the oracular **necessities** of the god.*

Cassandra, compelled to prophesy for Apollo is described here during the prophetic process. The ἀνάγκαι are the breaths of Apollo or 'prophetic pneuma' which take over the prophetess[62]. Although in a religious context, the very real physical effects would be viewed by many Greeks as a genuine interaction with the supernatural; Cassandra would have a tangible interaction with an aspect of a deity. Thus we can understand this in the manner of any other physical compulsion; however, the context of man being acted upon by deity in such a direct way is unusual.

[62] Cavander (1973) p.123

# (iii) Interpersonal moral ἀνάγκη

This section is concerned with rules and laws which governed the way the Greeks lived. There are numerous ways in which these interconnected systems and customs could be arranged, but I have chosen to begin with those rules concerning the family, progressing to customs and religious rules, then exploring the world of fifth century politics (the legal system and interstate treaties) before finally moving to the more abstract world of fate and divine dictates. This approach follows societal development across time with the earliest moral codes concerning family relationships being dealt with first. However, although some customs and moral laws, such as those affecting family for example, although having their origins earlier than the more sophisticated protocols of Athenian lawcourts, were still in place at the same time as Thucydides was writing in the late fifth century and thus cross the entire time period under consideration. I have chosen to deal with the more supernatural realms of fate and the gods separately at the end of this discussion of rules; the themes that run through these two aspects of ἀνάγκη are related to some of those detailed above but have their own set of linguistic protocols and ethical issues which need to be examined in a slightly different light.

## (a) Kinship

There are several texts where ἀνάγκη affects people's actions within their kinship relationships, when certain behaviour patterns are seen as compulsions as opposed to a matter of choice. However, use of the term ἀνάγκη is restricted to a few specific relationships within the functioning of the family unit, seeming to isolate these as particularly inviolable customs or obligations.

### *i)* Kinship and duty of care to the living

There are a number of passages relating to family members feeling compelled to care for a relative. In some instances ἀνάγκη seems to represent an aspect of natural law and in others seems to be force or coercion employed by members of the family on other family members.

There were particular obligations with regard to nursing of parents; as we can see from Herodotus who points out that in Egypt, practices were different to those at home.

**Herodotus, II.35.13 – II.36.1**

τρέφειν τοὺς τοκέας τοῖσι μὲν παισὶ οὐδεμία **ἀνάγκη** μὴ βουλομένοισι, τῇσι δὲ θυγατράσι πᾶσα **ἀνάγκη** καὶ μὴ βουλομένῃσι.

*there is no **necessity** for sons to care for their parents if they don't want to, but there is every **necessity** for daughters to do so even if they don't want to.*

In this passage, the word ἀνάγκη is used twice as Herodotus compares the social customs of the Egyptians with those of the Greeks. It is his surprise at the customs of the Egyptians that reflects the compulsions affecting the Greeks in the care of their parents. In Egypt, the sons are apparently not legally responsible for nursing the parents (although may wish to show their moral calibre by doing so), while the daughters are: both these assertions are corroborated by contemporary Egyptian Wisdom Texts (Lloyd, (1976), p.150). In Greece, the situation is different and the sons are legally responsible for care of elderly parents (as indicated by the late source of Plutarch, detailing the laws of Solon (22.1) where he states that the son must care for both parents and it is the son's duties to arrange the funeral rites[63]).

Another late source, Diogenes Laertius (I.7, 55), hints that punishment for not adhering to this social duty is severe, with sons losing their citizen rights. Hence, we need to ask whether the ἀνάγκη involved here is a compulsion controlled by a feeling of moral duty or one of citizenship (civic law). Even reproaching an aged parent is offensive to Zeus, indicating an unwritten compulsion of duty (Hesiod *Works and Days* 330-335). Perhaps we could see then a protocol of custom and natural law underwritten by Zeus, ending up in the formal legislation of the city states when it was set down in writing. The compulsion is thus both a familial duty and an adherence to civic law.

### *ii)* Duty of Obedience

As far back as Homer, there is an obvious understanding that there is an ἀνάγκη of obedience to one's parents, with a divine role model represented in the family of Zeus.

***Iliad* XV.197-199**

θυγατέρεσσιν γάρ τε καὶ υἱάσι βέλτερον εἴη
ἐκπάγλοις ἐπέεσσιν ἐνισσέμεν οὓς τέκεν αὐτός,
οἵ ἑθεν ὀτρύνοντος ἀκούσονται καὶ **ἀνάγκῃ**.

[63] Lacey, (1972), 116ff; Harrison I (1971) p. 77

*"It would be better for him to keep for his daughters and sons whom he begot himself these terrible things and reproaches, for they will listen to whatever urges them on through **necessity**."*

This passage, from the retort given by Poseidon to Iris following her instructions dictated by Zeus to desist from fighting, gives a clear indication that sons and daughters have an obligation to obey their father's instruction. There is an obvious distinction between the obligations towards an elder brother and that towards a father indicating that although as we saw above there was a duty of care to all relatives, obedience is only owed to your father. The requirement of obedience is reflected in the law codes of Athens[64] where there is a stipulation that the father has authority over his sons until they are eighteen and daughters until they are married (Demosthenes 18.259). At this time, however, it appears that this authority, indicated by the term κύριος (commander) for father, is not valid after the age of eighteen in contrast to the necessity in Homer where Zeus' offspring are considerably older than this (indeed they are immortal).

This long-standing rule is clearly stated in a fragment from Euripides' play Archelaus:

**Euripides, *Fragment* 234 (*Archelaus*) (identical to *Fragment* 8)**

πατρὸς δ' **ἀνάγκη** παισὶ πείθεσθαι λόγῳ.

*It is **necessary** for children to obey the words of their father.*

It is difficult from this short passage to get any context at all, since there is only this one line, however, in Collard and Cropp (2008) p. 243, it is suggested that here Archelaus is reacting to his father's advice, possibly that given in *Fragment* 233[65]. There is, though, no hint as to what he feels may befall him were he not to adhere to this rule or, indeed, if he feels this is a rule that offers any option at all. The use of ἀνάγκη would seem to imply that he feels there is no choice in this regard. Another fragment of Euripides also seems to refer to the necessity of obedience to parents.

[64] Strauss (1993), p.62

[65] Euripides *Fragment* 233: σοὶ δ' εἶπον, ὦ παῖ, τὰς τύχας ἐκ τῶν πόνων
θηρᾶν ὁρᾷς γὰρ πατέρα σὸν τιμώμενον.
*I tell you, boy, seek your fortunes from hard work; for you see your father is honoured...*

**Euripides, *Fragment* 819 line 5 (*Phrixos)***

ᾗ δ' ἦλθ' **ἀνάγκῃ** πεδία Φοινίκης λιπών,

λέγοιμ' ἄν.

*He came, by **necessity** leaving the land of Phoenicia, I will tell you about it.*

Cadmos has been instructed by his father Agenor to search for Europa which has led to the necessary journey. We must thus presume that the necessity mentioned is the order given by a person he cannot disobey. There is a possibility that this could refer to the necessity of fate in that Cadmos must found Thebes, but given that it is the earler part of his journey referred to, his leaving Phoenicia on his father's instruction, fate seems a less likely option.

### *iii)* Blood relations who have duties and obligations

It seems to be fairly common practice to translate the noun ἀναγκαίοι as blood relations[66] in particular this seems to be the case in a legal context.

**Andocides, *On the Mysteries* 50**

εἰ ἤκουσάς τι τούτου τοῦ πράγματος τοῦ γενομένου, εἰπέ, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν σεαυτὸν σῷσον, εἶτα δὲ τὸν πατέρα, ὃν εἰκός ἐστί σε μάλιστα φιλεῖν, εἶτα δὲ τὸν κηδεστὴν ὃς ἔχει σου τὴν ἀδελφὴν ἥπερ σοι μόνη ἐστίν, ἔπειτα δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους συγγενεῖς καὶ **ἀναγκαίους** τοσούτους ὄντας, ἔτι δὲ ἐμέ, ὃς ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ βίῳ ἡνίασα μέν σε οὐδὲν πώποτε, προθυμότατος δὲ εἰς σὲ καὶ τὰ σὰ πράγματά εἰμι, ὅ τι ἂν δέῃ ποιεῖν.

*If you have heard anything of this matter that has taken place, say so and save first yourself, then your father, whom you love most of all, then your brother-in-law, who is the husband of your only sister, next all your other relations and **kinsmen**, and finally me, who in all my life have never done you any harm but am always devoted to you and your interests, whatever needs to be done.*

In this passage Andocides repeats the request made to him by Charmides to present evidence in court. Charmides uses persuasive language firstly singling out close members of Andocides' family that are affected by this litigation in a hierarchy of obligatory importance with the father foremost. After the mention of the husband of Andocides' only sister, the ἀναγκαίοι are mentioned following another term (συγγενεῖς) translated here as relations. To mention both indicates there must be a distinction between these two terms; one could

[66] Janko (1992), p.248

perhaps refer to the oikos with another possibly meaning the wider kinship group (*genos*) or perhaps the phratry. As Jebb points out[67], τὰ ἀναγκαῖα are the things that one cannot do without, thus he posits that the συγγενεῖς are those with a looser family tie whereas the ἀναγκαίοι are those who have the closest kinship ties which would entail the strongest obligation[68] . They could conversely be anyone to whom he is compelled (by moral custom) to have an obligation to; they might not be a blood relation possibly also including the wider members of the household or employees.

Such obligations could include testifying on behalf of family members as we can see from Antiphon's oratory.

**Antiphon, *Against the Stepmother*, 29.5**

τότε δέ, ἐὰν μὲν δύνωνται καὶ φθάνωσι πρὶν ἀποθανεῖν, καὶ φίλους καὶ **ἀναγκαίους** τοὺς σφετέρους <αὐτῶν> καλοῦσι καὶ μαρτύρονται...

*Then, if they are able to before they are overtaken by death, they summon their friends and those with **strong obligations** to them (relatives) as witnesses.*

**Antiphon, *On the Murder of Herodes*, Section 59 line 6**

καὶ πολὺ ἂν δικαιότερον ἁλοίης σὺ φόνου ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμοὶ προσηκόντων, ἢ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ σοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐκείνου **ἀναγκαίων**.

*...and you could more justly be convicted of my murder if you kill me than I could by you and those with a **strong obligation** (relatives) to that man (Herodes).*

In these passages, Antiphon displays antipathy towards the witnesses from the opposing side, which could explain his usage of ἀναγκαίοι rather than other terms for relatives. By using this term, he is perhaps implying that these witnesses are testifying out of compulsion (owing to familial obligation) rather than their concern for the truth.

This same sense of familial obligation within the lawcourt is described at the beginning of *Against the Stepmother* when Antiphon outlines the reason for taking the case to court.

[67] Sir Richard C. Jebb, 1888 on Perseus URL: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0017%3Aspeech%3D1%3Asection%3D50

[68] MacDowell (1998) p.116 translates ἀναγκαίοι as *members of the family.*

**Antiphon, *Against the Stepmother*, 1.4**

...τοῦτο δὲ εἰ ἐπεξιόντι **ἀναγκαίως** ἔχει οἷς ἥκιστα ἐχρῆν ἐν διαφορᾷ καταστῆναι

*I am **forced** to quarrel with people who should, least of all, be my opponents*

In this legal case, the young man presenting has been ordered by his father (from his deathbed) to prosecute the stepmother for causing his death by means of poison. Thus the term ἀναγκαίως does not refer to the stepmother and her relations; rather it concerns the son's obligation to obey his father with whom he has a far closer blood relationship.

The usage of the term ἀναγκαίος as blood relative is indicative of the high importance placed on familial duties in Greek society, particularly in a legal context. If the father dies, this sense of obligation would then be transferred to the oldest living close male relative as we can see in Aeschylus, where Electra converses with her long lost brother Orestes.

**Aeschylus, *Libation Bearers,* 239 – 241**

προσαυδᾶν δ᾽ ἐστ᾽ **ἀναγκαίως** ἔχον
πατέρα τε,
καὶ τὸ μητρὸς ἐς σέ μοι ῥέπει
στέργηθρον:

*It is of **necessity** I am addressing you as father and the affection of the mother flows to you from me.*

From the above passage, one could infer that Electra's status as a woman seems to necessitate her deference to a male relative who can act in society on her behalf. However, the mother's role, here associated with affection, does not seem to be governed by the rigours of necessity in the same manner despite the same circumstances causing both of the changes to the siblings' responsibilities. You could obviously view this simply as a necessity of circumstance (Electra address her brothers because she cannot speak to her dead father), however, the fact that she addresses Orestes as father indicates that there is a compulsion for her to do so since she is obliged by moral norms to do so.

## *iv)* Constraints and coercion concerning marriage

The following passages all relate to the context of marriage. There is an argument that an element of the coercion or constraint experienced to forcibly marry or within marriage is physical violence or the threat of this and thus these selections would be better positioned under the Physical section of the thesis. However, given that this is not overtly obvious in

the majority of the texts and that there may be a social or moral overtone to the necessity in addition to the physical aspect, they have been positioned here.

Since women were thought of as being under the control of a male relative or their husband, it would hardly seem surprising to us today that female characters in drama might speak of their discontent with their lack of power. However, Greek women in tragedy often seem content if they are fulfilling their expected duties and functions and they seldom bewail their lot as wives or daughters. However, the foreign witch Medea is not at all satisfied with the compulsion she must face as a Greek wife.

**Euripides, *Medea*, 244-247**

ἀνὴρ δ', ὅταν τοῖς ἔνδον ἄχθηται ξυνών,
ἔξω μολὼν ἔπαυσε καρδίαν ἄσης
[ἢ πρὸς φίλον τιν' ἢ πρὸς ἥλικα τραπείς]·
ἡμῖν δ' **ἀνάγκη** πρὸς μίαν ψυχὴν βλέπειν.

*A man, however, whenever he is tired of the marriage yoke at home, may go out and stop the heartache, either he turns to companions or to people of a similar age, but it is a* ***necessity*** *that we look at one soul alone.*

Euripides' Medea is not portrayed as a respectable Greek woman, accepting of her position of subservience; rather she is an outsider, a magic-wielding barbarian who has brought death through underhand trickery to males in the past. That this woman complains of the necessity coercing her to look to one man is not out of character, neither is it intended to reflect the opinions of the dutiful women idealised in other tragedies (such as Alcestis, Ismene or Hecuba). However, it is not inconceivable that Euripides may be voicing the views of real life Greek women utilising an acceptable non-Greek vehicle thereby provoking some consideration of this among the male audience. This ἀνάγκη is a moral ideal and obligation since it is concerned with correct codes of behaviour; however, it is highly likely that were a woman to transgress this 'duty' there would be reprisal of both a legal and physical nature and thus the ἀνάγκη could be considered in addition to be interpersonal and physical in nature.

That women without a man to represent them were legitimate targets for the sexual predation of men (including forced marriage) is also alluded to in tragedy thereby evoking a good deal of pathos for the helpless females. This compulsion could either be sociological

(simply a necessity of societal custom) or one solely related to the superior physical force possessed by men.

**Euripides, *Phoenician Women*, 1673-1675**

{Αν.} ἦ γὰρ γαμοῦμαι ζῶσα παιδὶ σῶι ποτε;

{Κρ.} πολλή σ' **ἀνάγκη**· ποῖ γὰρ ἐκφεύξηι λέχος;

{Αν.} νὺξ ἆρ' ἐκείνη Δαναΐδων μ' ἕξει μίαν.

*Ant.: For would I marry your son while I am living?*

*Kr.: There is great **necessity**; for how will you escape his bed?*

*Ant.: Then that night I will find in myself another of the Danaids.*

Here, Antigone although thwarted in her attempt to bury her brother by Kreon, states that she will not marry Haemon while she is living. However, her intention is to kill her bridegroom if she is compelled to marry him[69]. Kreon reminds her of the necessity she is under in this regard, but it is not clear whether or not this refers to the social protocol of obedience to a man or the necessity of submitting to one physically stronger than oneself, possibly both. Antigone's response to this is to associate her future actions with those of the Danaids who murdered their enforced husbands on their wedding night. Regardless of whether the necessity Kreon is referring to is physical or one of protocol, it is obvious that Antigone has no rights in this regard since Kreon is now the eldest male relative she has and she is under obligation to obey him[70]. The only other alternative is either to kill herself or to kill Haemon to negate her obligation to this necessity. In the Sophoclean version (Antigone 903ff), Antigone talks of wedding herself to death; the use of such vocabulary would presumably imply a shift away from her obligation of obedience to her male relatives towards her own plan of suicide.

That difficulty is inevitable in marriage is reiterated by Antiphon the Sophist, but he uses the analogy of a contest for his evaluation of relationships.

[69] Mastronarde, 1994, p.619

[70] The numerous passages concerning obedience to the head of the oikos have been discussed above pages pages 72ff.

**Antiphon the Sophist, *Fragment* 49.19-20** (Stobaeus, 4.22[b].66; c.f. 3.6.45 (4.521-23; 3.296 Waschmuth-Hense))

τιμαὶ γάρ, ἆθλα, δελέατα, ἃ ὁ θεὸς ἔδωκεν ἀνθρώποις,
μεγάλων πόνων καὶ ἱδρώτων εἰς **ἀνάγκας** καθιστᾶσιν.

*For, honours, prizes, traps that god gives to men, place them under the **necessities** of great toil and sweat.*

This forms a small part of a lengthy passage in which Antiphon discusses the pleasure and pain of marriage, in the main, focusing on the latter. It appears to come from a lengthier treatise offering advice on life, not unlike Hesiod's *Works and Days*, seeming to focus on the concept of toil bringing honour and ultimate rewards[71]. In other words, he is pointing out that marriage, which seems tempting, is always going to necessitate hard work and effort and that this will be involuntary, a necessary consequence of their status as married. The terminology adopted, that of toil and sweat, although associated with contests (as alluded to here) also has connotations of another status which is often discussed with relation to ἀνάγκη – that of slavery[72]. It seems highly likely that Antiphon could well have this in mind, especially as marriage is described as an enticement given by god, some kind of entrapment that is inescapable once entered into even though it appears honourable initially.

The idea that marriage could be similar to slavery, especially for the woman is made explicit in the following Pindar passage.

**Pindar, *Pythian Ode* 12, lines 13 - 15**

ἤτοι τό τε θεσπέσιον Φόρκοι᾽ ἀμαύρωσεν γένος,
λυγ᾽ρόν τ᾽ ἔρανον Πολυδέκτᾳ θῆκε ματρός τ᾽ ἔμπεδον
δουλοσύναν τό τ᾽ **ἀναγκαῖον** λέχος,
εὐπαράου κρᾶτα συλάσαις Μεδοίσας

*Indeed he (Perseus) made the divine race of Phorkos dark, and placing a dismal feast before Polydektes for having made his mother a slave to his bed by **necessity**, he deprived of her head Medusa of the beautiful cheeks.*

[71] Pendrick (2002) places it in the second section of the treatise in which the hardships of a successful marriage are contemplated (p 381)

[72] See page 39ff. for the discussion on slavery

Perseus left with King Polydektes his mother Danaë, who has been forced into a marriage-like arrangement with him with ἀναγκαῖον stressing that this has been brought about by either violence or threat of violence. A fragmentary passage from Pindar's Dithyramb 70d, lines 14-16 seems to have a similar theme referring to the λέχεά τ' ἀνα[γ]ḳαῖα. That compulsion is necessary indicates that these women are being forced into marriage or the sexual act against their will; although the situation is deplored by Perseus and depicted as tragic within the poem, there is nothing to indicate that such actions contravened the laws of the land.

## (b) Gender

There are some obvious references to the enforced obedience expected from women in the *Odyssey*.

**Homer, *Odyssey*, II.110**

ὣς τὸ μὲν ἐξετέλεσσε καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλουσ', ὑπ' **ἀνάγκης**·

*So she finished it (the weaving) unwillingly, according to **necessity**.*

(see also XIX.156 and XXIV.146 that are both very similar to this one line formula).

Here, Penelope is completing the shroud for Laertes under what is described as a necessity or compulsion. This could again have dual meaning: on the one hand, there appears to be a necessity to obey these older men who are taking the role of head of the oikos, on the other it may also allude to a potential threat of violence owing to the superior force possessed by the suitors and their entourage whether this is only threatened or actually used to compel her. Despite her status as mistress of the house, she is under a necessity to follow the directions of free Greek men of similar social standing. It is safe to conclude that as a woman Penelope is not only physically weaker and also deemed socially inferior to the suitors[73]. The compulsion then seems to have dual implications and it is impossible to say whether Penelope's involuntary completion of the tapestry is owing to a sense of moral obligation or threat of violent repercussions.

Similarly, although Telemachus is not keen to direct his mother's behaviour by force, the following comment indicates that he is aware that this would be acceptable within the moral code of his environment.

[73] Finley (1965) p. 87-88.

**Homer, *Odyssey*, XX.343-4**

αἰδέομαι δ᾽ ἀέκουσαν ἀπὸ μεγάροιο δίεσθαι
μύθῳ **ἀναγκαίῳ**· μὴ τοῦτο θεὸς τελέσειεν.

*I am ashamed to press her on from the palace against her will with a word of **necessity**; may god never bring this to pass.*

Here, Telemachus responds to his father's instructions to be conveyed to Penelope regarding the suitors. It seems in this instance, Telemachus has the power to direct the actions of his mother[74] in the absence of his father and she would be obliged to obey. This indicates that the necessity of female obedience is not governed by relative age between the male and female family members, only by gender and closeness of familial bond.

## (c) Despotic or Tyrannical dictates rulership – necessity of obedience

The following passages all depict a different kind of necessary obedience, that which is expected in response to the dictate of a leader or king. Most have overtones of tyranny or despotism alluding to the obligation potentially being underpinned by force or threat of force; thus these are not situations in which there is any choice in the matter.

**Herodotus, VII. 136, 1-4 (for text see page 22)**

Discussed briefly on page 22 with relation to interpersonal physical coercion, here we can see an obvious illustration of the almost godlike command of respect exercised by the Persian monarchs (or at least the Greek interpretation of this). ἀνάγκη is the object of the participle προσφερόντων, implying that it is something inflicted upon the Spartans Sperthias and Boulis by Xerxes' royal bodyguard at Susa, not unlike the yoke of slavery described above. That these two Spartans attempt to resist such coercion is lauded by Herodotus (136) since they are in effect attempting to stand against the power of irresistible necessity[75]. Ἀνάγκη in this passage is obviously not a force employed by a moral leader, rather it is a characteristic of an immoral one who displays a certain hubris in his godlike pretensions. This does not make necessity an immoral force in and of itself but its use for certain ends characterises an immoral ruler. Equally it is not fair to say that every individual who uses ἀνάγκη as a coercive force would be described as a despot either; rather it is the end result of the coercion that results in this definition.

[74] Finley (1965) p.88
[75] See Munson's discussion of this and similar passages (2001) p.36-7

A similar usage of an overarching despotic power wielding ἀνάγκη is described by the tragic chorus in Aeschylus' *Persians;* in addition to the prostration described above, the compulsion of tribute is also referred to.

**Aeschylus, *Persae*, 584-90**

Χορός
τοὶ δ᾽ ἀνὰ γᾶν Ἀσίαν δὴν
οὐκέτι περσονομοῦνται,
οὐδ᾽ ἔτι δασμοφοροῦσιν
δεσποσύνοισιν **ἀνάγκαις**,
οὐδ᾽ ἐς γᾶν προπίτνοντες
ἄζονται: βασιλεία
γὰρ διόλωλεν ἰσχύς.

*Those up and down the land are no longer ruled by Persian laws, nor still do they pay tribute according to the **necessities** of despotic power, nor do they prostrate themselves on the ground in awe, for the royal strength has been destroyed.*

The dual compulsions of tribute and prostration are indicated by the dative plural (a form also seen in *Phoenician Women* 1763 and *Andromache* 132 (Broadhead, 1960, p.156)). As Hall (1997) points out (p.149), it seems certain that tribute was demanded by the Persian monarchs, since relief sculptures from Persepolis depict tribute bearers from all over the empire[76]. These must obviously be taken in context: the frieze is the propaganda of a Persian Great King whereas the Greek account (in both Aeschylus and Herodotus) is a critical observation of an enemy's idealised despotism. The financial tribute alluded to here is further detailed in Herodotus (III.92) and comprises a massive taxation revenue; another reflection of the ostentatious greed and display of the Persian monarch which seems so unpalatable to the Greek mind. As with the Herodotus passage above, here in Aeschylus, the nature of the ἀνάγκη is not really defined and, like the *Odyssey* II.110, XIX.156 and XX.343-344 concerning the coercion of Penelope discussed above (page 80ff) there seems to be an element of both physical and moral compulsion owing to the relative power of the two parties. Rather, the use of such an irresistible power for such dishonourable methods creates a damning indictment of the moral character of the perpetrator of the dictates enforced by necessity's power. The text could be translated in a number of ways:

[76] Described Burns, (1984), 314

δεσποσύνοισιν ἀνάγκαις could be 'coercive despotic actions' or 'despotic coercions'. Either translation would effectively have the same implication, however: the Persians are both despotic and use coercion[77].

Similarly in the mythological drama of Euripides, Lycus is depicted as a cruel and despotic ruler, who aims to murder the family of Herakles by means of cruel orders. These dictates employ the power of ἀνάγκη as a coercive force, but as with the Persian despots, it is the acts that are intended which characterise Lycus as despotic and immoral not just the employment of ἀνάγκη.

**Euripides, *Herakles*, lines 707 - 711**

Ἀμφιτρύων
ἄναξ, διώκεις μ᾽ ἀθλίως πεπραγότα
ὕβριν θ᾽ ὑβρίζεις ἐπὶ θανοῦσι τοῖς ἐμοῖς:
ἃ χρῆν σε μετρίως, κεἰ κρατεῖς, σπουδὴν ἔχειν.
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ **ἀνάγκην** προστίθης ἡμῖν θανεῖν,
στέργειν **ἀνάγκη**: δραστέον δ᾽ ἃ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

*Amphitryon: Lord, you persecute me having defeated me in competition and offer insult in your actions even though my own family have died; although you are a ruler, you must measure your zeal, since you place a **necessity** on us to die, it is **necessary** for us to give in; what you say must be done.*

The use of ἀνάγκη in two successive lines clearly states the seeming inevitability of Lycus' desires to murder Amphitryon and Megara; obviously the subsequent murder of Lycus indicates this inevitability is not as inviolable as the despotic ruler considers it to be. However, the end result does not inform us as to the implications of the dual usage in this passage. The accusative case (line 710) indicates ἀνάγκη to be the subject of the verb – it is something placed (προστίθης) on people (ἡμῖν) by a ruler. This has echoes of the yoke of slavery discussed above, obviously here with the rather more extreme consequence of death. The second usage (line 711) finds ἀνάγκη in the nominative, the subject of the sentence and a statement of situation. Thus the dual usage here seems to show two different aspects of ἀνάγκη: it is a tool/agent that can be utilised and it is a situation or

[77]Forced alliances with the Persians can also be seen in the following two Herodotus passages: IX, 16.23 –24; IX, 17.4 – 5.

circumstance; Herakles' family have no choice but to submit, either because of the threat of force or that they cannot disobey a ruler as discussed above[78].

Another Euripidean drama depicting a king exhibiting despotic behaviour tinged with *hubris* is *Andromache*: in the following passage, Menelaus outlines his orders and those of Hermione (his daughter) for Andromache and Molossos.

**Euripides, *Andromache*, 515 - 519**

Με.: ἴθ' ὑποχθόνιοι· καὶ γὰρ ἀπ' ἐχθρῶν
ἥκετε πύργων, δύο δ' ἐκ δισσαῖν
θνήισκετ' **ἀνάγκαιν**· σὲ μὲν ἡμετέρα
ψῆφος ἀναιρεῖ, παῖδα δ' ἐμὴ παῖς
τόνδ' Ἑρμιόνη.

Men.: *Go to the depths of the earth; for you are from enemy towers. But you die with a double **necessity**: while I lifted the voting pebble for you, my daughter Hermione did so for your son.*

There is no doubt that Menelaus is depicted in a poor light, displaying similarities in his use of barbaric dictates to the Persian despots depicted above; this implication is only heightened by his supposed self-awareness of his cruelty through his choice of the term ἀνάγκαιν. It is likely that this characterisation is in part intentional; since he is king of Sparta and Euripides would have been writing for Athenians during the Peloponnesian Wars (estimated date for this play is between 425 and 422 BCE and it has a TPQ of 230 BCE at the earliest (Stevens, 1971, p.16ff). Whatever Euripides' attitude is towards the war and contemporary events (Stevens, 1971, p.17 is sceptical that there is a large influence), bringing the legendary Spartan leader into disrepute through dishonourable behaviour would, no doubt, have been a popular notion amongst the audience.

[78] A similar usage can be seen in **Euripides, *Suppliant Women*, 253 – 257;**

οὔτοι δικαστήν <ς'> εἰλόμην ἐμῶν κακῶν
οὐδ', εἴ τι πράξας μὴ καλῶς εὑρίσκομαι,
τούτων κολαστὴν κἀπιτιμητήν, ἄναξ,
ἀλλ' ὡς ὀναίμην. εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλῃ τάδε,
στέργειν **ἀνάγκη** τοῖσι σοῖς: τί γὰρ πάθω;

*I did not grasp you to judge my evils…not as a punisher or chastiser of my deeds, o lord, but for help. If you will not do this, it is **necessary** to love your words; for this is what I suffer*

Similarly in his *Orestes* (208BCE), Euripides shows another Spartan monarch, Tyndareus, laying down laws which fly against what has been ordained for Orestes by the gods and the moral code of duty to those in your own *oikos*.

**Euripides, *Orestes*, 485 - 488**

Τυνδάρεως: βεβαρβάρωσαι, χρόνιος ὢν ἐν βαρβάροις.

Μενέλαος: Ἑλληνικόν τοι τὸν ὁμόθεν τιμᾶν ἀεί.

Τυνδάρεως: καὶ τῶν νόμων γε μὴ πρότερον εἶναι θέλειν.

Μενέλαος: πᾶν τοὐξ **ἀνάγκης** δοῦλόν ἐστ᾽ ἐν τοῖς σοφοῖς.

*Tyn: You were made a barbarian, being among barbarians for some time.*

*Me: Always to honour those from the same origin as you [kinsmen] is a Greek tradition.*

*Tyn: And also not to wish to be above the laws.*

*Men: To the wise, anything deriving from **coercion** is to be a slave.*

This passage of stichomythia forms part of a debate between Tyndareus and Menelaus on the nature of justice. As in Sophocles' *Antigone*, the debate concerns an issue where a choice must be made between the laws of the land and family ties. As we have seen (page 74ff.), certain obligations were owed 'of necessity' to blood relatives. Tyndareos is advocating adherence to the laws of the land, whereas Menelaus is looking back to the older custom of assisting members of one's own oikos. Menelaus, shown in a somewhat better light than he is in *Andromache,* infers in line 488 that the regime of Tyndareus is coercive, giving him an air of despotism in his fanaticism for the death penalty despite the divine sanction for Orestes' actions and the family connection between them[79].

In Euripides' *Bacchae*, the supposedly civilised king of Thebes, Pentheus, devises a policy in which followers of Dionysus are imprisoned.

[79] In West's discussion (1987) p.216, he posits that Tyndareos represents the idea that the basis of Greek culture is a community-based system of law whereas Menelaus feels his family obligations are just as important. West cites the following contemporary texts that seem to support Menelaus' point of view: Democritus DK 68 B181; Critias TrGF 43 F 11, 19.5ff; Plato *Gorgias*, 483b ff; *Republic* 338e ff.; Xenophon *Mem*. 1.2.40-6. However, Tyndareos' opinions seem firmly rooted in his own opinions rather than the consensus point of view in a community-based framework.

**Euripides, *Bacchae*, 550-552**

ἐσορᾷς τάδ', ὦ Διὸς παῖ
Διόνυσε, σοὺς προφήτας
ἐν ἀμίλλαισιν **ἀνάγκας**;

*Ch. Do you see these things, Dionysus son of Zeus: those who witness for you are in **coerced** struggles?*

This adjectival use indicates that the struggles of Dionysiac followers have been forced upon them by what is portrayed as the cruel and unjust regime of Pentheus. In a similar vein to the passages above, the Thebans were allied with the Spartans against Athens in the Peloponnesian Wars and thus, although this passage is set within a mythical context, it could reflect contemporary Athenian prejudice and propaganda. Within this verse, the chorus are at pains to put Pentheus into context, describing his monstrous chthonic dragon ancestor and likening him to the barbaric giants; this must surely be a hint at implied violence and tyranny in his regime as opposed to a civilised polis.

Obedience to despotic dictates is not only reserved for those given by individuals, rather there is also an instance when, in the Melian dialogue, the Athenians talk about their own regime as having necessity or compulsion.

**Thucydides, V.99.1.4-5**

ΑΘ.
...ὥσπερ ὑμᾶς, καὶ τοὺς ἤδη τῆς ἀρχῆς τῷ **ἀναγκαίῳ** παροξυνομένους.

*..it is those who are like you, those embittered already by the **necessity** of our rulership.*

From the mouth of the Athenian delegation in the Melian dialogue comes the admission that demands are placed by the empire on subject allied states which they fear may compel the native population of the weaker party, Melos, to take risks[80]. This demand for allegiance under some kind of ἀνάγκη (probably threat of force) is very similar to the ostentatious dictates of the Persian monarchs described above and seems deliberately worded to appear thus, implying 'bully-boy' tactics from the Athenians in their pursuit of great power. Although written at a similar time to the *Andromache* (discussed above), the use of

[80] This is framed in the same terms that Thucydides uses elsewhere (III,45,4) about the consequences of poverty and hunger and the necessities they precipitate. See Gomm, Andrews & Dover (1970) p.101

ἀναγκαίῳ here is certainly intended to show the Athenians in a poor light, particularly because the phrase is self-referential and thus a brazen admission of tyrannical actions (as was the speech of the Spartan Menelaus in *Andromache*).

## *i)* Rulership

These necessities affect the behaviour expected for the ruler (or king) and thus are, like many of those regarding the family, concerned with a code of expected behaviour.

**Euripides, *Hecuba*, 1240-1242**

ἀχθεινὰ μέν μοι τἀλλότρια κρίνειν κακά,
ὅμως δ᾽ **ἀνάγκη:** καὶ γὰρ αἰσχύνην φέρει,
πρᾶγμ᾽ ἐς χέρας λαβόντ᾽ ἀπώσασθαι τόδε.

*Ag. While it is wearisome to me to judge evils that belong to another, it is surely a* ***necessity****; for to take this matter in hand - to push it away is shameful.*

In this instance, Agamemnon is expected to make a decision regarding Polymestor's claim, as he is in the position of head of the Achaean troops despite the fact that acting as judge is not personally appealing to him. ἀνάγκη in the nominative here is a statement of status and what that entails: there is a necessity or compulsion for the basileus to dispense justice. The status (basileus) that requires this duty to dispense justice would generally be considered to be kingship. Therefore in the context of this passage, Agamemnon has a compulsion to act as judge since he is the top ruler; this obligation, like that of the head of the oikos to dispense justice to his household was one held by the most senior noble present. The rhetorical and litigious language used in this play reflects the sphere of contemporary (Fifth-Century) justice which has evolved from being simply the oikos to the city state as a whole; the leader of the state as dispenser of justice is implicit in this text regardless of Agamemnon's mythical Bronze Age roots, this is not Agamemnon giving orders to his household or troops. It reflects the altered sense of cultural identity within the era of the city states, in which, although the oikos is undoubtedly important and central to the sense of self, there is a wider sense of belonging to the polis and its identity. Hecuba as a prisoner of war would have become part of a different oikos and polis; however, she is not judged by Menelaus the head of her future oikos, the ἀνάγκη falls on Agamemnon, the leader of the Greeks. Although the notion of a single ruler would have been anathema to democratic Athens, the notion of the state as representing justice would have been not only

familiar but also appealing to supporters of the democratic system. Ironically, Agamemnon's speech is framed in a manner typical of Athenian legal rhetoric familiar in the courtrooms of the democratic state[81] thereby implying that the judgement would be fair, particularly since, leading up to these lines, both parties have stated their case following the protocols for a fair trial in Athens. However, justice is only dispensed condemning Polymestor, implying that perhaps this ruler, although charged with deciding legal cases does not have the moral fortitude to do so fairly[82]. Perhaps the necessity for an immoral leader (Agamemnon) as an agent for justice only seeks to add to the tragic element of the play and the concept that a set of unpalatable, immoral events have been set in motion and cannot be stopped. This situation also demonstrates that ἀνάγκη itself is amoral in its application: the necessity for an unjust man to act as an agent of nomos. This in turn could be extrapolated to reflect that the mechanisms of democratic rule as experienced in Athens in the late fifth century do not in turn mean that this rule will by nature be just.

In Euripides' *Children of Herakles*, we see the ἀνάγκη of kinship ties given as a reason for Demophon to assist the suppliant children of Herakles; the kinship connection is outlined by Iolaus.

**Euripides, *Children of Herakles*, 205 – 213**

σοὶ δ᾽ ὡς **ἀνάγκη** τούσδε βούλομαι φράσαι
σώζειν, ἐπείπερ τῆσδε προστατεῖς χθονός.
Πιτθεὺς μέν ἐστι Πέλοπος, ἐκ δὲ Πιτθέως
Αἴθρα, πατὴρ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆσδε γεννᾶται σέθεν
Θησεύς. πάλιν δὲ τῶνδ᾽ ἄνειμί σοι γένος.
Ἡρακλέης ἦν Ζηνὸς Ἀλκμήνης τε παῖς,
κείνη δὲ Πέλοπος θυγατρός. αὐτανεψίων
πατὴρ ἂν εἴη σός τε χὠ τούτων γεγώς.
γένους μὲν ἥκεις ὧδε τοῖσδε, Δημοφῶν:

*I would like to advise you that it is a **necessity** to save these children, seeing that you rule this land. Pittheus is the son of Pelops, and from Pittheus came Aithra, and from her was born your father Theseus. Next I will trace back for you the race of these children. Herakles was the son of Zeus and Alkmene, and she was born to the daughter of Pelops. Your father*

[81] Tierney (1979) p.130
[82] Collard, (1991) p.24

*and theirs are thus the children of cousins. This is how you are related to them by race, Demophon.*

This passage comes from the apologia of Iolaus, the cousin of the Herakleidai, entreating Demophon to grant the children refuge in Attica from the aggression of Eurystheus' henchman Kopreus. Having first praised the reputation of Attica for justice, Iolaus gives a number of reasons why Demophon should assist the children. ἀνάγκη is associated with the appeal to Demophon as ruler of the land and thus it his obligation to assist by virtue of this. The bond of kinship between the rulers of Attica and the descendents of Herakles further strengthens this obligation. That Iolaus wishes to accentuate this to the recipient of this appeal is indicated by the prominent location of σοὶ as the opening word of 205, followed by compulsion itself ὡς ἀνάγκη. Although this necessity at first seems to be only associated with the governership of the land and obligations of kingship (206), it is also linked to a familial relationship with the line of Pelops through Aithra, otherwise the lengthy genealogy (207-211) would not be needed and thus the assistance is a compulsion for two reasons. Although there are instances where ἀνάγκη is associated with supplication and the protocols for the treatment of suppliants (Eur. *Supp.* 36-40, 163-167), this again can be discounted here by reason of the given genealogy.

Other obligations are given later in the speech providing additional reasons why Demophon should aid the children; Theseus was assisted by Iolaus to Theseus in the quest for Hippolyta's girdle[83] while Herakles released Pittheus and Theseus from Hades in the course of his twelfth labour[84]. This speech is finished by an explicit demonstration of his status as a suppliant (226) but the request made is that Demophon γενοῦ δὲ τοῖσδε συγγενής, which could imply that the tie of kinship would provide a more binding obligation than the others mentioned.

[83] The obligation to one's fellow comrades in battle – Mendelsohn, 2002, p.70

[84] The obligation to one's hetairoi – Mendelsohn, 2002, p.70.

**Demophon's initial response lines 236-242**

τρισσαί μ᾽ **ἀναγκάζουσι** συννοίας ὁδοί,
Ἰόλαε, τοὺς σοὺς μὴ παρώσασθαι λόγους:
τὸ μὲν μέγιστον Ζεὺς ἐφ᾽ οὗ σὺ βώμιος
θακεῖς νεοσσῶν τήνδ᾽ ἔχων πανήγυριν:
τὸ συγγενές τε καὶ τὸ προυφείλειν καλῶς
πράσσειν παρ᾽ ἡμῶν τούσδε πατρῴαν χάριν:
τό τ᾽ αἰσχρόν, οὗπερ δεῖ μάλιστα φροντίσαι:

*Three paths of anxiety **force** me, Iolaus, not to push your words aside. Most important is Zeus, at whose altar you sit with this assembly of fledglings; second, kinship and the debt long-standing that these children should for their father's sake be well treated at our hands; and last, fear of disgrace, the thing I must be most concerned about*[85].

Demophon, in his response to the appeal of Iolaus indicates that he feels under the power of compulsion (ἀναγκάζουσι) created by three concerns[86]. However, rather than isolating the ties of kinship as the most compelling, he places this second (line 240) after his reverence for Zeus Agoraios, the god of the sanctuary (as opposed to Zeus Hikesios, Xenios or Soter more usually associated with supplication[87]) and the third the worry of dishonour through not governing a free country in which suppliants are treated well. The last consideration would reflect on his kingship poorly; as monarch, he is the only one who can make the decision to assist the children of Herakles and this action will, given the other considerations, define him as a morally good king.

Within the context of the Peloponnesian war, such ethical questions would be only too familiar to the Athenian audience in the theatre of Dionysus in 424BCE[88]. Indeed, Thucydides reflects this; one passage seems to suggest that not only rulers themselves, but also the act of ruling has its own compulsions independent of the ruler. In the Corinthian speech to the Spartans, in which they are criticised for their old-fashioned outlook, the Corinthian delegate suggests that there is a necessity for the politics in and of themselves to move with the times.

[85] Translation adapted from that of David Kovacs on the Perseus Digital Library accessed on 1/1/12 http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0103%3Acard%3D232

[86] Also noted by Mendelsohn, 2002, p.71

[87] Allen (2001), 48

[88] Meltzer (2006) chptr 3

**Thucydides I.71.3.1**

νῦν δ', ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐδηλώσαμεν, ἀρχαιότροπα ὑμῶν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα πρὸς αὐτούς ἐστιν. **ἀνάγκη** δὲ ὥσπερ τέχνης αἰεὶ τὰ ἐπιγιγνόμενα κρατεῖν:

*Now, as have just recently shown, your way of life is totally obsolete when compared to theirs. And it is a **necessity** always in ruling, just as any art, that such innovations will come to be.*

This complex assertion could have a number of meanings and far-reaching implications were it the case that there was some abstract ideal to which governing should necessarily conform. Like the Hecuba passage discussed previously, an aspect of the compulsion is not only concerned with what is necessary by virtue of simply being in charge but also what would be most expedient to those in charge at the time; thus the necessity although itself amoral is one that pushes the ruler or rulers towards sensible and good leadership. This passage goes further than the Hecuba text since although, as Ostwald contends (p.18), the initial interpretation is that politics should necessarily champion the modern and innovation as a route to success, the overriding slant here must surely be that this necessity is a specific one rather than a general observation. The Corinthians are clearly concerned about the rise of Athenian power and their expansionist strategies and what Sparta's response should be and this recommendation reflects such concerns about the threat of a developed military power. The necessity here then, although concerned with political innovation as an ideal (it is necessary that 'politics' must innovate within its contemporary political environment), it also reflects a compulsion to prevent enslavement or coercion by another state by taking up what is politically expedient at the time[89]. Edmunds contends that 'Athenian restlessness and technical innovation menace the Spartan peacefulness'[90], a clear statement that innovation is a political necessity for their freedom and independence from Athenian rule rather than an abstract ideal.

## (d) Cultural taboos and Religious Customs

There are several passages in which necessity appears to govern the personal and religious lives of the Greeks and those they come into contact with. Herodotus is particularly interested in the rituals and habits of those people he describes in his Histories yet only uses

[89] There is further discussion of the necessity of political expediency on pages 120ff.
[90] Edmunds, (1975), p.92

ἀνάγκη for some of their habits and customs. It is not clear, however, whether this is because he sees a distinction between the rules that are governed by ἀνάγκη and those that aren't. It is possible that these rules have an aspect of violence, actual or threatened, in their enforcement; this would seem to be an appropriate interpretation given the meaning of ἀνάγκη in other aspects of life.

**Herodotus, II, 65.21-22**

Ὃς δ' ἂν ἶβιν ἢ ἴρηκα ἀποκτείνῃ, ἤν τε ἑκὼν ἤν
τε ἀέκων, τεθνάναι **ἀνάγκη**.

*For whoever kills an ibis or a falcon, whether on purpose or by accident, it is a **necessity** for him to die.*

This passage comes from a long list of rules governing the treatment of animals in Egypt, with this one imposing capital punishment, a more extreme penalty than the others listed, in that although the law dictates that anyone who deliberately kills any sacred animal will face death, in the case of these species, execution is necessary even if it was not a deliberate act. The fact that this sentence would have to involve violence to a person in some way, either by forced suicide or physical assault, would back up the assertion that rules involving ἀνάγκη involve an aspect of violence[91]. Thus this legal or religious necessity is not only compelling as a moral obligation but also incorporates a real threat of violence if not adhered to.

Another violent action is also contemplated in the following passage in which retribution against the Persians is discussed for the destruction of Athenian temples of the gods.

**Herodotus, VIII, 144.10 - 13**

πρῶτα μὲν καὶ μέγιστα τῶν θεῶν τὰ ἀγάλματα καὶ τὰ οἰκήματα ἐμπεπρησμένα τε καὶ συγκεχωσμένα, τοῖσι ἡμέας **ἀναγκαίως** ἔχει τιμωρέειν ἐς τὰ μέγιστα μᾶλλον ἤ περ ὁμολογέειν τῷ ταῦτα ἐργασαμένῳ·

*First and foremost, the burning and destruction of the honoured objects and houses of our gods, for which there is a **necessity** for us to take revenge to the utmost rather than agreeing to work with the one who has done these things.*

[91] The use of capital punishment in this context is backed up in Cic. *Tusc.* v. 27, 78 (notes by How & Wells from Perseus Tufts http://www.perseus.tufts.edu)

This passage presents us with the unusual necessity for revenge only seen rarely elsewhere[92]. It is unclear what compulsion spurs the Athenians on to revenge themselves upon the barbarians in this specific situation but they believe that they have no choice but to exact revenge upon the Persians for this outrage. It could be that the desecration of the holy places is an insult and that the necessity is one of honour (the Athenians need to seek vengeance for this slight to their civic pride) or perhaps that the Athenians fear divine retribution for this disrespect. If it is the former, it would appear to be an internally imposed necessity through a commonly held set of values, whereas if it is the latter, it would be an external compulsion albeit also one that depends upon a commonly held belief. Just such a fear of the gods' retribution may well lie behind the custom outlined by Herodotus in the first book of the Histories.

**Herodotus, I,89.10–13**

κάτισον τῶν δορυφόρων ἐπὶ πάσῃσι τῇσι πύλῃσι φυλάκους, οἳ λεγόντων πρὸς τοὺς ἐκφέροντας τὰ χρήματα ἀπαιρεόμενοι ὥς σφεα **ἀναγκαίως** ἔχει δεκατευθῆναι τῷ Διί.

*Set guards from your bodyguard at all the gates, who are to take the goods away from those carrying out the goods saying that a tenth part is to be given of **necessity** to Zeus.*

This forms part of Croesus' plan that will allow Cyrus to plunder his city without making any of his men so rich that they might have designs on the throne; for it to be plausible there must have been some kind of precedent in this allocation of a tithe to the gods[93]. This must presumably be seen as a necessary obligation towards the god considered responsible for granting the victory from which the spoils come. Given the '*do ut des*' nature of Greek religion, this fits in with the reciprocal arrangement that the Greeks considered their relationship with the gods to be. Thus, although it is a necessity of custom and religious belief, it is also one that could have been considered to be unwritten by the threat of violence or actual retribution if the human part of the deal was not adhered to.

[92] Other texts exemplifying revenge in wartime are: Thuc.I.244.3.1; IV.10.1.5-7; IV.20.1.2-3 while the personal revenge of Medea upon Jason is framed in these terms too: Eur. *Medea* 803-806; 1012-1013; 1040-1041; 1062-1063; 1242-1243)

[93] That this could occur in other instances (notably in Xenophon) is attested in the Perseus Tufts commentary on Her. VII.132.2 by How and Wells: URL http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0126%3Abook%3D7%3Achapter%3D132%3Asection%3D2

**Phrynichus, *Fragment* 70 (*The Muses?)* (Kock) (same as *Fragment* 14 Play IFF (Meineke))**

ἃ δ' **ἀνάγκα** 'σθ' ἱερεῦσιν καθαρεύειν φράσομεν.

*All that priests must be unstained by, we will tell you if you like*[94].

Similarly, this fragment forms part of the rules priests must follow in order to ensure purity, presumably for ritual purposes to ensure there is no offence to the deities involved. As to the reasons for these rules or what they might be, it is impossible to discern from this fragment. It is also hard to interpret how serious these are intended to be and if they are commonplace, how widely they might be applied without more storyline context[95].

## *i)* Burial Rituals and the duty of care

The first passages are from Herodotus' ethnographic observations of the various civilisations he encounters in his Histories.

**Herodotus, II, 90.3-4**

...κατ' ἣν ἂν πόλιν ἐξενειχθῇ, τούτους πᾶσα **ἀνάγκη** ἐστὶ ταριχεύσαντας αὐτὸν καὶ περιστείλαντας ὡς κάλλιστα

*...those from whatever city it* (the corpse of a person killed by a crocodile) *is carried to, there is a strong **necessity** for them to embalm them and lay out the corpse as beautifully as possible and to bury them in a sacred tomb.*

Here the Egyptian rules are outlined for the treatment of the corpses of those drowned or killed by crocodiles (whether native or foreigners); the care to be taken with the embalming process indicates the importance of mortuary ritual in this context. However, what is it the compulsion or necessity that the Egyptians perceive in order to behave in this way? The most likely possibilities are either that they are in fear of divine retribution (a fear of the threat of supernatural reprisal – a physical necessity) or wish to express a sense of honour for the dead man who has met his death at the hands of the zoomorphic personification of a powerful deity (following some kind of internal ethical code). Underlying this practice must be a belief in divine purpose, possibly associated with the crocodile god Sobek who was not only thought to be apotropaic during the journey of dead man to the afterlife but also to protect the fertility of the Nile valley. In Herodotus' view, performing the correct rituals in

[94] Translation adapted from Edmonds, 1957, p.471

[95] A religious law from fifth century Athens to assuage blood guilt from Antiphon's *On the Chorus Boy* is discussed below p102

response to potential divinely initiated acts in order to preserve wellbeing either in life (fertility) or after death was viewed as a necessity by the Egyptians.

**Herodotus, VI, 58.5 - 7**

Ἐπεὰν ὦν τοῦτο γίνηται τοιοῦτο, **ἀνάγκη** ἐξ οἰκίης ἑκάστης ἐλευθέρους δύο καταμιαίνεσθαι, ἄνδρα τε καὶ γυναῖκα·

*Whenever something like this happened, it was **necessary** for two free people from each house to wear mourning clothes - a man and a woman;*

Another burial custom is described during Herodotus' discussion of Sparta outlining the behaviour expected from households upon the death of a king. In this instance, it is more difficult to discern what manner the compulsion might be thought to take by the Spartan populace. If two free people (one male, one female) from each household are supposed to don mourning clothes, what is compelling them or what might they believe would happen to them if they didn't? Presumably, much like the Egyptian example described above, a concern for correct ritual would guard against angering the gods and, in this instance, might ensure that the spirit of the dead king is correctly despatched to Hades. Moreover, it may also form an important part of a concern to show the power and control of the kings in Sparta; if their death elicits such an obvious response from every household, then the visual representation of respect and reverence for authority is maintained and serves as an example to all. Given that Herodotus goes on to mention that the households will be subjected to a fine if this is not enacted, there is also an aspect of state power (coercion) to this necessity as well as ritual practice.

The following passage moves away from the necessities of aspects of burial ritual to the necessity of burial itself.

**Euripides, *Suppliant Women*, 64-70**

ὁσίως οὔχ, ὑπ' **ἀνάγκας** δὲ προπίπτουσα προσαιτοῦσ'
ἕμολον δεξιπύρους θεῶν θυμέλας·
ἔχομεν δ' ἔνδικα, καὶ σοί τι πάρεστι σθένος ὥστ' εὐ-
τεκνίαι δυστυχίαν τὰν παρ' ἐμοὶ
καθελεῖν· οἰκτρὰ δὲ πάσχουσ' ἱκετεύω σὸν ἐμοὶ παῖ-
δα ταλαίναι 'ν χερὶ θεῖναι νέκυν, ἀμ-
φιβαλεῖν λυγρὰ μέλη παιδὸς ἐμοῦ.

*Not being in reverence but of **necessity** do I come, falling and demanding before the fire-receiving altars of the gods; we have righteous claims and you, being present blessed by children have the power to heal my unhappiness; in my pitiful suffering, I supplicate you that your living son place a corpse in my hands so that I might enfold the mournful limbs of my child.*

The Chorus members made up from the mothers of the dead heroes from the Seven Against Thebes beg Aithra, the mother of Theseus, for the right to bury their dead. Aithra is celebrating the festival of *Proerosia* at Eleusis; it could possibly be viewed as sacrilegious to interrupt the carefully choreographed ritual, part of one of the most important cults of the time, unless there was to be a greater compulsion underwritten by some kind of divine dictate. The Chorus here seem to use the term ἀνάγκη to legitimise their presence at such a solemn occasion for reasons other than to participate in the ritual[96].

The statement in the opening lines of this stanza puts the compulsive nature of the women's situation in a prominent position in this stage of their persuasive parodos in a similar form to a funeral dirge. The women have not chosen the role of suppliant on a whim, rather it is a status they are compelled to take up according to what is right. This ἀνάγκη involves the observance of νόμος or universal law which Zuntz outlines as something 'human life must subordinate itself to if it is to prosper'[97]; in this case, correct ritual for the dead and aversion of pollution. This νόμος is later referred to as νόμος παλαιὸς δαιμόνων *the ancient ordinances of the gods* (l.563) and νόμους βροτῶν *laws of all humanity* (l.378); thus it would seem to be particularly binding and therefore compelling to all god-fearing Greeks. Indeed Aithra (311) and Theseus (526 and 671) mention the τὸν Πανελλήνων νόμον adding weight to the idea of a universally acknowledged ἀνάγκη.

A further dimension of necessity is added to the presence of the Chorus at a sanctuary during a ritual unpurified; this seems to form part of the leverage they wish to impose in order to achieve their goal. Eleusis was surrounded by many laws concerning purity, like all sanctuaries; the impurity and pollution of the suppliant women, their 'unholy' nature, caused by the unburied bodies of their sons, would only be allowed at a sanctuary if there was a sound reason,[98,] hence their use of ἀνάγκη. Pollution associated with an unburied

[96] Collard (1975) p.124
[97] Zuntz, 1955, p.10
[98] Adkins, 1960, p.136

corpse was considered to have serious implications, affecting family and community, an issue explored most explicitly in Sophocles' Antigone, while Thucydides reflects the horror and offensive nature of the lack of correct burial rites for the plague victims (ii. 52ff). Thus the compulsion the Chorus feel not only reflects customary behaviour, that women perform burial rituals, but also that the more serious threat of pollution must be averted. Such pollution thus seems to be potentially more catastrophic with regard to offences to the gods for the Athenian community than the interruption of the sacred rites of Demeter[99].

Although the women compelled by necessity attempt to force the course of the action by appealing to a woman (Aithra) at a sanctuary of female deities, a political male-orientated solution is found[100]. The problem of the unburied bodies is resolved, in that they are ritually prepared and buried according to custom. However, the women who have so clearly stated the ἀνάγκη they are pressed by to perform this act do not undertake the process, rather Theseus takes on this ritual action thereby taking on the role of a woman[101]. Thus, the ἀνάγκη affecting the women is removed from them by another. In Athenian law, it was the responsibility of the eldest male to organise family funerals under law[102]; in the absence of this male figure, Theseus appears to be fulfilling his civic as well as his moral duty in this act thereby removing the compulsion felt by the women in this case.

### *iv)* Supplication

Like burials, supplication was a ritualised action commonly accepted in the Greek world as a situation, and giving refuge to a suppliant a necessity since they were deemed to be under the protection of Zeus Hiketesios, the guardian of suppliants.

**Aeschylus, *Suppliant Women*, 478 -479**

ὅμως δ᾽ **ἀνάγκη** Ζηνὸς αἰδεῖσθαι κότον

ἱκτῆρος: ὕψιστος γὰρ ἐν βροτοῖς φόβος.

*Surely it is a **necessity** to stand in awe of the wrath of Zeus of the suppliants, for he is the highest fear for mortals*

---

[99] The loss of a child is reflected divinely in the myth of Demeter and Persephone; in the Homeric Hymn a child is lost then the problem is resolved with the reuniting of mother and child. In this regard, Demeter could be sympathetic to the emotions felt by the suppliants and understand the compulsion from a purely maternal level. Ironically, however, the reuniting of the suppliant women and their sons will never be as joyous as that between Kore and Demeter, since their sons are dead and will only be reunited for burial rituals to take place before a final separation.

[100] Foley, 1993, p.118

[101] Mendelsohn, 2002, p.186

[102] Lacey, 1972, p.147: burial of the dead was one of the οἱ προσήκοντες demanded under Athenian law

This, the earliest of the passages under consideration to mention the context of suppliancy in relation to a necessity, clearly states the need felt by the Greeks at this time to honour Zeus in this capacity and not to incur his wrath. It comes in response to the king's statement about his personal dilemma about the necessary course of his actions in lines 439-441[103]. Pelasgus feels that he is facing a necessity of choice; he must either take up a war against one side or another. His necessity is one of circumstance whereas the Danaids' statement in the above passage clearly indicates that in their view, there is no choice in the matter. In fact the ἀνάγκη statement is the culmination of a number of choral odes in which the power of Zeus is outlined, with a focus upon his role in the guardianship of suppliants[104] and the potential catastrophic might of his vengeance were he not to be honoured.

The *Suppliant Women* of Euripides presents another group of women petitioning a member of the royal family in order to force a course of action.

**Euripides, *Suppliant Women*, 36-40**

οἴχεται δέ μοι
κῆρυξ πρὸς ἄστυ δεῦρο Θησέα καλῶν,
ὡς ἢ τὸ τούτων λυπρὸν ἐξέλῃ χθονός,
ἢ τάσδ' **ἀνάγκας** ἱκεσίους λύσῃ, θεοὺς
ὅσιόν τι δράσας:

*Aith: My herald has gone to the city to call Theseus here, so that either he may take these wretched ones out of the land, or he might free the suppliants of this **necessity**, doing something holy before the gods.*

The necessity to ensure that Zeus is respected seems to be implied here, as in the Aeschylus text above, but it is not framed in such emotive and extreme language. In this passage, the necessity that is referred to is not the compulsion of Theseus to assist the suppliants, rather it is that he will be able to change their circumstances and enable them to bury their children thus removing from them the need to be suppliants (hence the use of the genitive

[103] καὶ δὴ πέφρασμαι. δεῦρο δ' ἐξοκέλλεται.
ἢ τοῖσιν ἢ τοῖς πόλεμον αἴρεσθαι μέγαν
πᾶσ' ἔστ' ἀνάγκη, καὶ γεγόμφωται σκάφος
στρέβλαισι ναυτικαῖσιν ὡς προσηγμένον.

[104] The initial choral ode (1 – 175) contains many references to Zeus, his power and might and his connection with the Danaids; the potential anger of Zeus of the suppliants to those who dishonour him is alluded to in the choral exchange between Pelasgus and the Danaids beginning line 346 which goes on to include the ἀνάγκη passage discussed above.

form of ἀνάγκη in line 39). Thus Euripides seems to be presenting us with a situation in which suppliancy was the only viable option for the women to pursue in order to press for influence over a king, given that in general, apart from in these circumstances, women would not normally have been able to exert any such influence.

The necessity of suppliancy is also alluded to in another passage from Euripides' Suppliant Women in which Adrastos explains the circumstances which have led him, a king, to the knees of another monarch.

**Euripides, *Suppliant Women*, 163-167**

...ἐν μὲν αἰσχύναις ἔχω
πίτνων πρὸς οὗδας γόνυ σὸν ἀμπίσχειν χερί,
πολιὸς ἀνὴρ τύραννος εὐδαίμων πάρος:
ὅμως δ' **ἀνάγκη** συμφοραῖς εἴκειν ἐμαῖς.

*…I come in disfigurement, falling down before you, clasping your knee with my hand, a grey-haired man, formerly a fortunate king; nevertheless it is a **necessity** to yield to my circumstances.*

Again, the suppliancy is a necessity for Adrastos because without this strategy for exerting influence over Theseus, he felt powerless given his circumstances. Thus the necessity of suppliancy within this play seems to be presented as a very human necessity rather than one which concerns the immortals. The misfortunes of Adrastos and the gender of the Argive women are very real disadvantages that would have been all too familiar in the context of the 10th year of the Peloponesian War (421BCE). In this play, we are not given reminders of the power of Zeus of the suppliants throughout or the need to honour him; rather we are shown suppliancy as the last necessary resort for those who are facing self-inflicted disaster.

## (e) Necessity of the law

One would generally have thought that pride in the Athenian constitution would facilitate many instances where Law was thought of as a necessary aspect of the polis, where ἀνάγκη might be a quality assigned to the entire legal system as the underpinning of the state. Surprisingly, ἀνάγκη is hardly found used in this sense, with the few examples not reflecting Athenian ideals necessarily, but a more authoritarian and coercive aspect of the legal system.

**Euripides, *Iphigeneia among the Taurians*, 1188-1191**

Θόας: τί δῆτα δρῶμεν, φράζε, τοῖν ξένοιν πέρι;

Ἰφιγένεια: τὸν νόμον **ἀνάγκη** τὸν προκείμενον σέβειν.

*Th: Point out then what we are to do about these two foreigners.*

*Iph: It is a **necessity** that we revere the previously established law.*

Here, context is vital to the understanding of ἀνάγκη, which in the case of this passage is ambiguous. On the one hand, one could see Iphigeneia's usage of such a strong nominative noun as a statement of the power of the law in and of itself. However, the ἀνάγκη could also reflect reprisal likely to manifest in physical coercion, which despite the context of 'laws of the land', is really little different from those instances describing the rulership of tyrants discussed above (pages 81ff. and 87ff.). Furthermore, that these laws are simply the manifestation of a tyrannical regime within an uncivilised society (the land of the Taurians, a wild place, on the fringes of the known world on the coast of the Black Sea) and therefore not representative of a democratic constitution is supported by the role Iphigeneia herself is taking at this time. In this passage of stichomythia in which she is engaging with Thoas, her intent is to persuade him that she will sacrifice the Greek strangers (Pylades and Orestes) according to the ancient laws of the Taurians. This deception, rather than resulting in savage sacrifice, was intended to trick the Taurians in order that she might bring the image of Artemis to Greece, thereby saving Orestes from the Furies.

Is the land of the Taurians, however, so uncivilised in comparison with the Greece we find in the context of Iphigeneia's own story? Should we then recategorise this ἀνάγκη as simply a veiled allusion to the coercive power of a barbaric regime? Although at first glance (as Wright (2005) points out p.175, 177ff and 191), it seems that she is the civilised Greek feigning blind adherence to uncivilised barbaric laws, these laws actually occur within a polis which has citizens despite having a monarch: such a system could well be deemed civilised and is not described like the despotic Persian regime (see p29). As Thoas, the priest, is waiting for instruction from Iphigeneia (l.1188), her reply outlines the coercion inherent within the power of this law with herself as the agent for following this code of behaviour, since she must bring it to pass. It also seems that there is no general understanding of the universality of the law (Wright (2005), p. 199) since Iphigeneia has to make a persuasive speech to enforce it. Obviously, her speech must convey the idea that her intentions cannot be questioned, otherwise her ruse will not be successful. Therefore, this use of necessity is also a clever device in the debate, intending to indicate she is fixed on her goal of following

the laws and underwriting them with the supposed seal of inevitability. As Hall posits (1991, p.122), by using the term ἀνάγκη, Iphigeneia is creating a scenario in which Thoas cannot question her, since her actions are governed by the law and its ἀνάγκη rather than his orders. Thus rather than necessity reflecting the cruelty of the regime or the universality of the law, it seems more likely to be indicative of the rhetorical skills of Iphigeneia, here presenting a violent act as something that must occur in order to bring about a cunningly contrived sequence of events. Although on the surface, the law appears to be the inviolable institution, it would be more apt here to define ἀνάγκη in this instance as a legal tool rather than an ideological term.

In Thucydides, we are also presented with what appears to be a transparent notion of the necessity of a democratic constitution; does this, however, mean what we might think today or, coming from the mouth of Alcibiades presenting a speech at Sparta, as this does, is there another meaning that could be assigned to ἀνάγκη more akin to coercion?

**Thucydides, VI, 89.5.1**

ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῆς πόλεως δημοκρατουμένης τὰ πολλὰ **ἀνάγκη** ἦν τοῖς παροῦσιν ἕπεσθαι.

*Besides, because the multitude of the city was ruled by a democracy, there was a* ***necessity*** *for those there to follow (the established system)*[105].

Again in the nominative, this strong noun is used as a rhetorical means by which Alcibiades is attempting to show that he had no other choice whilst attempting to gain favour in Sparta. Ostwald ((1988) p.49) is clear in his analysis of this passage where, far from presenting the protocol of the law universally accepted as inviolable, it 'appears only to give a self-serving explanation of Alcibiades' defection'. Once again, a coercive overtone colours the rule of law, which is linked to the usage of ἀνάγκη as physical compulsion (or threat of violence) on an interpersonal level (pages 20ff). Alcibiades can thus excuse any actions on his part as a compulsion to follow the law within the democratic system, but as to whether

[105] Gomme, Andrewes & Dover (1970) p. 362 suggest the alternative translation whereby τὰ πολλὰ is taken with what follows rather than what precedes it: '*as the city was a democracy, it was necessary in most ways we should adapt ourselves to the situation*.' However this would seem to detract from the excuse that Alcibiades is seeking to make for his action – if it were only '*in most ways*' then a question could be asked about his choices since they would not appear to be so tightly governed by ananke.

this would actually have been the case or was a commonly held view is certainly not elucidated by any passages examined that include the term ἀνάγκη.

In the following examples taken from legal oratory, we can see the compelling effect of the law, even if the coercion itself is only imagined. Interestingly, this text also implies fear of pollution, forming part of the framework of religious beliefs and necessity discussed elsewhere (pages 91ff.).

**Antiphon, *On the Chorus Boy,* 4.5**

τοσαύτην γὰρ **ἀνάγκην** ὁ νόμος ἔχει, ὥστε καὶ ἄν τις κτείνῃ τινὰ ὧν αὐτὸς κρατεῖ καὶ μὴ ἔστιν ὁ τιμωρήσων, τὸ νομιζόμενον καὶ τὸ θεῖον δεδιὼς ἁγνεύει τε ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἀφέξεται ὧν εἴρηται ἐν τῷ νόμῳ, ἐλπίζων οὕτως ἂν ἄριστα πρᾶξαι.

*For the law has such great **necessity**, that even if anyone kills someone under his power [his slave] and there is no-one to avenge [this death], he, fearing the law and the gods, purifies himself and avoids the places mentioned in the law, hoping thus to do the right thing.*

Appearing as part of the proemium, the language here is formal and ancient (use of κτείνω echoes Draco's language rather than the more normal ἀποκτείνω[106]) as one would expect in a legal exhortation. However, as with the passages discussed above, this is not a vision of the law as a necessary ideal of civilised society; rather this usage of ἀνάγκη is indicative of the ineluctability of the law and has coercive overtones in that the law would be backed up by physical violence or imprisonment for noncompliance as opposed to forming part of a system[107].

The alleged unfairness of the legal institution is called into question in the following passage about the defendant's powerlessness in the face of the system regardless of the morality of the decision.

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[106] Gagarin 1997, p.227

[107] An identical meaning with regard to the force of the law can be found in Antiphon the Orator *On the Murder of Herodes* 87.3 : ...ἀνάγκη γὰρ, ἐὰν ὑμεῖς μου καταψηφίσησθε, καὶ μὴ ὄντα φονέα μηδ' ἔνοχον τῷ ἔργῳ χρῆσθαι τῇ δίκῃ καὶ τῷ νόμῳ …it is a **necessity** for me to submit to justice and the law even if you convict me and I am not guilty nor responsible for the crime. The same lines appear in *On the Chorus Boy* 4.1. As exactly the same phrase appears in another speech, it could be that it is a standard phrase used widely to describe the defendant's position.

**Antiphon, *On the Murder of Herodes*, 87.8**

φόνου γὰρ δίκη καὶ μὴ ὀρθῶς γνωσθεῖσα ἰσχυρότερον τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐστιν: **ἀνάγκη** γὰρ, ἐὰν ὑμεῖς μου καταψηφίσησθε, καὶ μὴ ὄντα φονέα μηδ' ἔνοχον τῷ ἔργῳ χρῆσθαι τῇ δίκῃ καὶ τῷ νόμῳ: ...**ἀνάγκη** δὲ τῆς <τε> δίκης νικᾶσθαι παρὰ τὸ ἀληθές, αὐτοῦ τε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐὰν μὴ ᾖ ὁ τιμωρήσων.

*In a trial for murder, even an incorrect ruling prevails over justice and the truth. It is a **necessity**, if you condemn me, even if I am not a murderer nor guilty of the crime, that I submit to your verdict and the law...It is a **necessity** that one is conquered by justice against the truth...*[108]

The binding nature of the rule of law is stated unequivocally here as two uses of the nominative form of ἀνάγκη are used to show its force. The passive infinitive νικᾶσθαι further illustrates the imagery of combat and implied force even though the context is the supposedly civilised court of law. The law has its own coercive force but this ἀνάγκη is not linked to any notion of morality[109]; it works in a particular way regardless of any notion of right and wrong. This is similar to ἀνάγκη in the Atomist universe, where there is no notion of morality, merely a set process which must inevitably follow a given course[110].

These individuals are not moved by a moral ideal, but by fear of an external coercion. This creates an interesting usage of ἀνάγκη which is not simply interpersonal coercion, but the coercion faced from a social construct: the law and the gods[111]. As we have seen, one early category of usage focuses on the head of the oikos as lawgiver imposing ἀνάγκη on junior family members. This more abstract coercion, where the law (or its enforcers) apply the compulsive impetus follows this idea but adapts it to the institution of the city state and this context.

The following Aristophanes fragment found in Pollux' Onomasticon could possibly move away from the relative power dynamics of the people involved in the legal process and refer

[108] Same lines appear in *On the Chorus Boy* 5.8

[109] That the ananke of the legal process does not always attempt to reach the truth is implicit in another passage by Antiphon: On the Chorus Boy 18.7 ὁπόσα μὲν γὰρ λάθρᾳ πράττεται καὶ ἐπὶ θανάτῳ βουλευθέντα, ὧν μή εἰσι μάρτυρες, ἀνάγκη περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν λόγων τῶν τε τοῦ κατηγόρου καὶ τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου τὴν διάγνωσιν ποιεῖσθαι, *Indeed in the instance of a deliberately planned murder, there being no witnesses,* it *is necessary to reach a verdict on the words of the prosecutor and defendant alone...*

[110] See chapter on Cosmology pages 142ff.

[111] See discussion below pages 199ff. for its religious significance

to the mechanics of the system[112]. Although having little context to go on, it seems to indicate that if the correct process is followed, the law has a compulsion in and of itself.

**Aristophanes, *Fragment* 584**

οὐκ εἶ λαβὼν θύραζε τὰ ψηφίσματα
καὶ τὴν **ἀνάγκην** ἐς κόρακας ἐντευθενί;
*..why don't you take the votes to the door and take **compulsion** out of here to hell*

Pollux (writing about six hundred years after Aristophanes) believes ἀνάγκη in this passage to be coercion (the torture applied to slaves[113]) but it is difficult without any context or even any certainty of its place within the corpus of Aristophanic works whether this is or is not a likely inference. Hesychius, however, writing even later, defines ἀνάγκη as the klepsydra used in the law courts to time proceedings[114] and cites this fragment as evidence for the assertion. Certainly the former idea would fit into a pattern of usage for ἀνάγκη discussed above (p.33) where ἀνάγκη is simply another term for coercive torture. The latter would represent the only occasion where ἀνάγκη might be used as a metaphorical term for the restriction of a piece of equipment not associated with physical coercion but the restriction of time. Here the voting tokens must be taken to the door, presumably for counting in order for the law to have any teeth or power and perhaps the line indicates that rather than those in the courtroom or assembly being under pressure, once the voting has occurred this pressure would be applied elsewhere.

## (f) Oaths and Treaties as Binding Necessities

When considering the coercion of the oaths themselves within international relations, when ἀνάγκη is used there is also usually a sense of the threat of violent sanctions if the treaty is broken rather than the oath being an inviolable institution. In the following passage, the Spartans point out that treaties are not likely to last if they are unfairly drawn up following military humiliation as in this instance at Sphacteria[115].

[112] Edmonds (1957) p. 733 suggests a date of 414 concluding that the fragment comes from Daedalus. This conclusion is reached in a belief that the fragment relates to torture on citizens and the law passed by Peisander at the enquiry into the violation of the Mysteries
[113] *Onomasticon* 8.17
[114] Hesych. α 4234
[115] Ostwald, 1988, p.13

**Thucydides, IV, 19.2.2-4**

...τις καὶ ἐπικρατήσας τὰ πλείω τοῦ πολέμου κατ᾽**ἀνάγκην** ὅρκοις ἐγκαταλαμβάνων μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ξυμβῇ

*…when one side gets the upper hand in war and ensnares its opponent using **compulsion** by means of oaths to agree unequeal terms…*

Therefore, although oaths or treaties should themselves be binding, Thucydides focuses here on where they are utilised during instability to force a certain course of action in conjunction with military superiority. From the text the ἀνάγκη is ambiguous; it could either refer to compulsion used to force the signing of the oaths or the force inherent within the oaths. Given the balance of power in this hypothetical scenario, the superior military power could well be the intended meaning here. Either way, the weaker party would feel constrained by the oaths, having been pushed into a course of involuntary action.

**Thucydides, IV, 87.1.2 - 5**

καὶ οὐκ ἂν μείζω πρὸς
τοῖς ὅρκοις βεβαίωσιν λάβοιτε ἢ οἷς τὰ ἔργα ἐκ τῶν λόγων
ἀναθρούμενα δόκησιν **ἀναγκαίαν** παρέχεται ὡς καὶ ξυμφέρει
ὁμοίως ὡς εἶπον.

*and you could grasp nothing greater than the established oaths taken , or the close observance of our deeds compared to our words; this provides **compulsion** to behave the same way as we say.*

This passage from later on in Book 4 comes from Brasidas' speech in which he attempts to persuade the Thracians of Spartan good conduct, suggesting that in addition to their actions, the oaths they have sworn should act as some kind of necessary guarantee of their future good behaviour (he is of course also backed by a large military force). In this case, although there is an element of superior force involved, the oaths themselves are deemd to have their own sense of compulsion over and above the physical force. However, the Thracians are prompted to examine conduct as evidence for this compulsion, perhaps indicative that, although he says that the oaths are binding, this reason alone is not sufficiently persuasive for the Thracians.

We can see from what occurs in the course of the Peloponnesian Wars that such treaties and oaths were not often seen as binding and were frequently as transient as some of the short-lived regimes that ratified them[116].

**Pindar, *Pythian Ode*, 1. 50-52**

νῦν γε μὰν τὰν Φιλοκτήταο δίκαν ἐφέπων
ἐστρατεύθη: σὺν δ᾽ **ἀνάγκᾳ** νιν φίλον
καί τις ἐὼν μεγαλάνωρ ἔσανεν.

*But now, indeed, he (Hieron) has taken the field just like Philoctetes; for although being a proud man, he of **necessity** fawned upon him for certain friendship.*

ἀνάγκη here is the coercive power behind political alliances; the individual[117] who must look for 'friendship' to Hieron has no choice but to seek his favour. This indicates something about the extent of power and influence exercised by Hieron and could indicate an idea of physical threat were the individual not to find favour. Since this is roughly contemporary with the texts associated with the Persians concerning despotic ἀνάγκη (discussed on pages 81ff), one cannot entirely discount the idea that this might be the situation here too. In which case, the scenario might be that his ally is in fear of the necessity placed upon him by Hieron and must comply in seeking an unprofitable alliance. However, since Pindar has been commissioned by Hieron to compose a victory ode, the assumption could well be that the poet would not wish to imply tyrannical tendencies in his patron. The context forms part of a general encomium of Hieron as well as the ideal of athletics as a civic virtue[118]; therefore it would be more likely that the necessity imposed on Hieron's potential ally is an indication of the patron's greatness, not evidence for his cruelty. The syntax does not prove that Hieron himself has placed this ἀνάγκη on the would-be ally; it could simply be a necessity of circumstance since it is only apparent upon whom the necessity is acting, not who (if anyone) is applying it.

The oaths discussed above have ἀνάγκαι associated with them that involves connotations of military supremacy as extra leverage as well as religious compulsion.

[116] See Bolmarcich in Sommerstein, 2007, p 26-38

[117] Morrison (p.101) believes the identity is left deliberately vague so that further performances of the poem can be given without the worry of changed allegiances in the Sicilian political sphere.

[118] Hornblower and Morgan (p.224) believe there is a clearly intended link here between prowess in athletics and Hieron's military success

Others present a necessity which exemplifies a different form of additional coercion. In this earlier text by Herodotus, an extra ἀνάγκη is thought to make the oath more binding.

**Herodotus, I, 74.18-20**

Ἀλυάττεα γὰρ ἔγνωσαν δοῦναι τὴν θυγατέρα Ἀρύηνιν Ἀστυάγεϊ τῷ Κυαξάρεω παιδί: ἄνευ γὰρ **ἀναγκαίης** ἰσχυρῆς συμβάσιες ἰσχυραὶ οὐκ ἐθέλουσι συμμένειν.

*...for they decided that Alyattes was to give his daughter Aryenis to Astyages, son of Cyaxeres; for without a strong **necessity**, lasting treaties don't tend to keep together*

In this instance, the extra ἀναγκαίης ἰσχυρῆς is a marriage between Alyattes' daughter and Astyages[119]. Thus we get a clear sense that although military force or family connections could lend further force to oaths; international treaties alone do not necessarily form a very strong ἀνάγκη. Even when such social protocols are reflected in the philosophical cosmology of Empedokles (DK31 B115), the Oracle of Necessity is ratified by broad oaths voted for by the gods; even they can transgress these oaths. In this cosmological view, however, there are predictable repercussions for those who break the oaths. In the sphere of international politics it is not so clear cut.

Kinship ties which are not so close also hold a necessity or compulsion when it comes to treaties as we can see from the following passage of Herodotus.

**Thucydides, V, 104.1.6-7**

...**ἀνάγκην** ἔχουσαν, καὶ εἰ μή του ἄλλου, τῆς γε ξυγγενείας ἕνεκα καὶ αἰσχύνῃ βοηθεῖν. καὶ οὐ παντάπασιν οὕτως ἀλόγως θρασυνόμεθα.

*...they are **compelled** by shame to help us, for no other reason than because they are of the same family.*

In this section of the Melian dialogue, the Melians consider reasons why the Spartans should come to their aid; they feel that a compelling reason for the desired military support is the existence of a kinship relationship between them and this should force an alliance. The fact that this is not a universally acknowledged compulsion is borne out by the fact that the longed-for support is not given by the Spartans; this indicates not all necessities are deemed necessities by all parties. Coming very late in the period under consideration, Thucydides is

[119] It is interesting to note that here, Herodotus uses the form ἀναγκαίη which can translate as blood relation as we have seen above pages 74ff.

perhaps highlighting the fact that in war, previously established customs that would have precipitated a necessary response are no longer adhered to by the parties involved in this war of attrition. Ostwald (p.41-2) is of the opinion that such terminology is utilised because Thucydides wishes to demonstrate the greater power of imperial ἀνάγκη that is wielded by the Athenians in this situation, brushing a previous 'universal order sanctioned by nature' aside and the unassailable force that this represents. It is certainly the case that the Melian desire for a previous value system in which kinship ties had a compelling power holds no sway with the two battling superpowers of the day.

## (g) Prophecy and divine dictates

This section has been included here since the religion of the Greeks and their subsequent understanding of their world would be understood today as a set of actions and reactions firmly placed within a moral framework. To the Greeks, however, it would arguably not be seen as such a concrete categorisation; much like those necessities that do not directly use force and are associated with obedience to laws and rulers, the examples discussed below would have carried an ἀνάγκη because of the fear of divine reprisals, which would have entailed a physical consequence for the individuals concerned, whether this was destruction, illness, poverty or infertility of land, animals and humans. Some passages which might have been included here but refer to ἀνάγκη as an agent of deity or as a deity can be found in the section on reification pages 197ff.

### *i)* Necessity that prophecies are fulfilled

There are a number of passages that describe situations in which the events predicted by a prophecy must inevitably happen.

**Sophocles, *Philoctetes*, 1337-1342**

Ἕλενος ἀριστόμαντις, ὃς λέγει σαφῶς
ὡς δεῖ γενέσθαι ταῦτα:
καὶ πρὸς τοῖσδ' ἔτι
ὡς ἔστ' **ἀνάγκη** τοῦ παρεστῶτος θέρους
Τροίαν ἁλῶναι πᾶσαν:

*The master prophet Helenus says clearly these things which must come to be: it is **necessary** for all Troy to be captured this present summer…*

Towards the climax of the play, Neoptolemus finally reveals to Philoctetes the pressing reason why he has visited the island which is to persuade the old hero to return to Troy. Upon his return Philoctetes will help to defeat the Trojans using his bow and will be healed from his affliction by the gods. The prophecy has been given by Helenus, a Trojan prisoner who Neoptolemus is at pains to tell us is the best prophet; the audience and, indeed Philoctetes, might at this point doubt the truth of the prophecy given that Helenus is a prisoner of war and it would be unlikely that he would tell the Greeks the secret of how they might defeat his people. Nevertheless, the fact that Neoptolemus is there along with Odysseus is testament to their (or Agamemnon's) faith in the prophecy. As part of his persuasive argument, Philoctetes is clear that the prophecy will only come to pass if a certain set of circumstances occur; thus it forms part of a conditional argument[120]. Through his use of ἀνάγκη as part of the oracle, Neoptolemus implies that these things must happen (presumably he is referring to the compulsion of fate or the will of the gods); yet without the compliance of the characters in the narrative this compulsion will not occur. A similar scenario is found in another passage by Sophocles.

**Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus*, lines 604 - 606**

Θησεύς
ποῖον πάθος δείσαντας ἐκ χρηστηρίων;
Οἰδίπους
ὅτι σφ᾽ **ἀνάγκη** τῇδε πληγῆναι χθονί.
Θησεύς
καὶ πῶς γένοιτ᾽ ἂν τἀμὰ κἀκείνων πικρά;
Th*: What suffering do they fear from oracles?*
Oed*: That it is a **necessity** for them to be smitten in this land.*
Th*: And how would this bitter event happen among my people?*

Here, Oedipus gives Theseus clues to the oracle which he feels is in play at this point in the play. Like the *Philoctetes* passage, these lines form evidence in a dialogue that attempts to persuade Theseus to a course of action. Oedipus alludes to the defeat of the Thebans who have come to Athens to force his return to his homeland. Again, this formula is one of circumstance; a set of events will lead to a necessary consequence – the demise of the

[120] Chase-Green (p.165) is clear that the oracle is of a conditional character implying that there is no definitive fate; the necessity of the oracle to come to pass will only be enforced if the characters in the play are successful and persuade Philoctetes to return to Troy willingly.

Thebans at the hands of the Athenians because of their actions. The oracle outlines a sequence of events that will inevitably lead to a result if they come to pass; the ἀνάγκη is not the driving force of the actions; however, all come to pass through the volition of the characters in the play and their choice of actions[121]. The necessity only comes into force within a certain set of circumstances, which is a standard formula for myth, fairy story and the like that if certain things fall in to place it is destiny that something will come to place. Such 'conditional' oracles are not solely found in tragedy; Herodotus gives details of an aetiological oracle to explain the potential construction of Greek cities.

**Herodotus, IV, 179.17-18**

...ἐπεὰν τὸν τρίποδα κομίσηται τῶν ἐκγόνων τις τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀργοῖ συμπλεόντων, τότε ἑκατὸν πόλιας οἰκῆσαι περὶ τὴν Τριτωνίδα λίμνην Ἑλληνίδας πᾶσαν εἶναι **ἀνάγκην.**

*...when a descendant of the Argo's crew should carry off a tripod, there was a **necessity** to build 100 Greek cities around the shores of Lake Tritonis.*

In part of his descriptions of the peoples of Libya, Herodotus explains how one area, the homeland of the Machlyes, is linked to Jason and his descendants. According to a prophecy given by Triton, the local river god, he would show Jason the way out of the lagoon if he left a tripod there. Were this tripod to be removed from the temple by one of the descendents of the Argonauts, it would be a necessity for a hundred cities to be built by the Spartans. Like the Sophocles passages, this seems to be a conditional or circumstantial oracular necessity that depends upon a human action. This compulsion of the will of the gods is not triggered because the local tribespeople have hidden the tripod and thus it has become impossible for it to be fulfilled. As Munson points out (p32) there is no obvious moral error which leads to the misfortune, simply a set of circumstances.

**Euripides, *Hecuba*, 1274-1276**

Πολυμήστωρ: καὶ σήν γ᾽ **ἀνάγκη** παῖδα Κασάνδραν θανεῖν.

Ἑκάβη: ἀπέπτυς᾽: αὐτῷ ταῦτα σοὶ δίδωμ᾽ ἔχειν.

*Pol. It is **necessary** that your daughter Cassandra dies.*

*Hec. I scorn the prophecy! I give such things to you to have for yourself.*

[121] Chase-Green (p.166) points out that the opposing necessities of the oracle which forbids Oedipus' return to Thebes and the oracle which could urge this course of action are only really dealt with at the beginning and end of the play whereas the core action of the drama focuses on the contrast of the characters and ethics of the three kings, Oedipus, Theseus and Creon.

This prophecy occurs at the end of the play when the blinded Polymestor seeks to gain some revenge on Hecabe following her scandalous acts towards him and his family. The necessity for Cassandra to die is only one thing in a series of events foretold by the prophet Dionysus, according to Polymestor's account, intended to bring misery to Hecuba as she hears of her impending doom and the demise of her daughter. Unlike the previous prophetic texts discussed, there does not appear to be a sequence of events or set circumstances necessary for the foretold death to occur in this instance. The prophecy merely outlines the imminent disasters with a simple necessity that Cassandra will die at Clytaemnestra's hands along with Agamemnon. What is not clear is whether this necessity is one of the will of the gods or is associated with the curse of the house of Atreus. Whichever it is, however, no reason given here which explains why this event must happen and this does not seem to concern Euripides, he only wishes to stress the reversal of Hecuba's fortune and the utter destruction of her family following the war. Thus we can view this necessity as one of dispassionate Fate or the will of the gods fitting in well with the common Euripidean theme of suffering of mortals regardless of their virtue.

## *ii)* Necessity of fate and divine dictates

Very much akin to the prophetic necessities outlined in the above section are those which relate to Fate, Destiny, Chance or the will of the gods. Key issues in these texts are discovering any clues to how ἀνάγκη fitted into a system that the Greeks thought controlled their world, whether they believed in a compelling force that acted independently or one that was an agent of other divine powers (Fate, Chance or the gods). Another important question is whether such necessities really are unavoidable or are there instances where they are conditional or avoidable. Given that this usage of ἀνάγκη family of words is so common, a representative sample has been selected to illustrate all facets of the topic under consideration.

### *The existence of Compulsion or Necessity in divine dictates, Fate and Chance*

The first texts under consideration are simple statements of the fact that there is a compulsion (ἀνάγκη) inherent in the command of the gods, Moira or Tyche. The earliest expression of this idea is in Hesiod.

**Hesiod, *Theogony*, 517-519**

Ἄτλας δ᾽ οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἔχει κρατερῆς ὑπ᾽ **ἀνάγκης**,
πείρασιν ἐν γαίης πρόπαρ᾽ Ἑσπερίδων λιγυφώνων
ἑστηώς, κεφαλῇ τε καὶ ἀκαμάτῃσι χέρεσσι·

*Atlas holds the wide heavens through a strong **necessity** at the borders of the earth, standing before the clear-voiced Hesperides with unwearying head and arms.*

This passage gives no indication of the method by which Atlas is compelled to hold the heavens; it is simply '*by a strong necessity'* in a section describing dictates of Zeus. This would most likely be interpreted in much the same way as actions prompted by a mortal monarch; it is likely that severe punishment would ensue were he to disregard orders[122].

Euripides gives more information on how this might be understood by mortals albeit in a mythical context and from the mouth of a deity.

**Euripides, *Electra*, 1244–1248**

σοφὸς δ᾽ ὢν οὐκ ἔχρησέ σοι σοφά.
αἰνεῖν δ᾽ **ἀνάγκη** ταῦτα· τἀντεῦθεν δὲ χρὴ
πράσσειν ἃ Μοῖρα Ζεύς τ᾽ ἔκρανε σοῦ πέρι.

*Although he is wise, his dealings with you were not wise. It is a **necessity** that you are content with these matters. Henceforth it is necessary to do what Moira and Zeus have ordained for you*

In these lines, the *deus ex machina* Kastor has appeared and is explaining the implications of what has happened to the Chorus, Elektra and Orestes. He is clear that although Apollo's oracle was not the best moral choice, it has set in motion a series of necessary events that these perpetrators of matricide must deal with. The subsequent phrase refers to the consequential events that have been put in place for them to endure by Moira and Zeus, with Moira signifying what is allotted to them (their fate) and Zeus as perhaps the judge or enforcer of this[123]. However, there is no personification of ἀνάγκη in this passage, and so the phrase is simply a circumstantial necessity because of the need for mortals to accept the actions of the gods even if deities act wrongly.

[122] There are many similar references; these are predominantly in other Greek poetry, particularly Tragedy: Aeschylus *P.V.* 12-17 and 70-72; *Ag*. 1040-1044 and Agathon *Frag*.8. The prose passages allude to the subjects of mythology (Gorgias *Encomium of Helen* 31-33 and 126-128).

[123] Cropp p.183

## *The Necessity of divine dictates, Fate and Chance compel mankind to suffer*

A common theme of necessary suffering that derives from divine dictates runs across the period under consideration. The focus in these passages is not the compulsion to adhere to divine dictates but rather the inevitable suffering precipitated by such directives.

**Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 14-16**

ἣ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμόν τε κακὸν καὶ δῆριν ὀφέλλει,
σχετλίη· οὔ τις τήν γε φιλεῖ βροτός, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπ᾽ **ἀνάγκης**
ἀθανάτων βουλῇσιν Ἔριν τιμῶσι βαρεῖαν.

*For she, being abominable, strengthens evil war and battle; no mortal loves her, but under the **necessity** of the wishes of the immortals, they honour oppressive Strife.*

In the opening section of *Works and Days*, Hesiod outlines why mankind have hardships to endure and differentiates between two kinds of strife in a change from what he described in Theogony (225)[124]. The type of Strife here is one which causes conflict between mortals and this is the one deemed as a necessity or compulsion; in other words this goddess has been forced upon the mortal race according to the will of the gods. The divine motive behind this imposition of conflict upon the human race is not made clear by Hesiod, only that this is what was designed. Thus this necessity could be viewed as a precursor to the cosmological necessities in which certain things had to happen in a particular way (see pages 142ff.); the world must necessarily contain the element of strife but this necessity is not yet one of *phusis* but one imposed by a framework of rules and customs created by the gods.

The idea of suffering at the whim of the immortals is lamented in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter in two variations of the same ἀνάγκη phrase.

***Homeric Hymn to Demeter*, 147 - 148**

Μαῖα θεῶν μὲν δῶρα καὶ ἀχνύμενοί περ **ἀνάγκῃ**
τέτλαμεν ἄνθρωποι· δὴ γὰρ πολὺ φέρτεροί εἰσιν.

*Mother, we mortals bear the gifts of the gods, grieving, through **necessity**; for they are much stronger.*

***Homeric Hymn to Demeter,* 216 - 217**

ἀλλὰ θεῶν μὲν δῶρα καὶ ἀχνύμενοί περ **ἀνάγκῃ**
τέτλαμεν ἄνθρωποι· ἐπὶ γὰρ ζυγὸς αὐχένι κεῖται.

[124] West (1988) p 75

*But we mortals bear the gifts of the gods grieving, through **necessity**; for the yoke is placed on our neck.*

The two variations demonstrate the helplessness felt by mortals when compared to what is perceived as the will of the gods. Both are spoken to Demeter by mortal women (Kallidike and Metaneira respectively) and appear, like many formulae, without direct connection to the narrative although they convey the general powerlessness of humanity before the sheer power of the gods. The first directly explains why this compulsion carries a necessity; the gods are much stronger than mortals. The second emphasises how this necessity is perceived by mortals; it is a yoke placed onto their neck thus echoing the idea of ἀνάγκη as some kind of constraint denoting the slave-like relationship between men and gods[125]. This is the earliest passage where a yoke is mentioned in conjunction with ἀνάγκη which could mean that all the subsequent usages have modelled themselves upon the *Homeric Hymn*. Whatever the case, the visual imagery of human beings being like oxen whilst the immortals drive them where they will is a potent one. These passages do not convey an impression of a consistent world with a predictable nature like the later cosmologies of the Atomists; rather the ἀνάγκη seems more akin to fortune since it occurs at the whim of the gods rather within a regular system.

The concept that the only predictable thing about divine necessity is its devastating effect on humanity is prevalent in literature, with the impotence of mortals to control their fate particularly lamented. Euripides uses this terminology in a number of places.

**Euripides, *Phoenician Women*, 1762-1763**

ἀλλὰ γὰρ τί ταῦτα θρηνῶ καὶ μάτην ὀδύρομαι;
τὰς γὰρ ἐκ θεῶν **ἀνάγκας** θνητὸν ὄντα δεῖ φέρειν.

*Oed: But why do I lament and bewail the problem? Being mortal one must bear the **necessities** of the gods.*

[125] There are several instances where ἀνάγκη or its effects are described as a yoke: Aesch. Ag. 218, 1071; Bacchylides *Epinicia* 11.46; Eur. *Frag* 475, *Heracleidae* 886, *Or*. 1330; Her. 8.22.11; *Hom. Hymn to Demeter* 216; Pind. *Frag* 94a. 18 and Soph. *Frag* 591 .6

This passage from the final few lines of *Phoenician Women*[126] is typical of many by Euripides and simply outlines the impotent nature of mortality. The necessity of divine dictates is such that Oedipus does not even feel it is worth complaining about them, this necessity must just be dealt with like any other and is thus far from unusual. He is not explicit about what form this necessity takes or how mortals are compelled to this suffering, only that they are[127].

Unsurprisingly, the Euripides play perhaps most concerned with suffering, *Alcestis,* contains several references to ἀνάγκη and its association with the difficulties mortals must endure.

**Euripides, *Alcestis,* 416-9**

Χορός

Ἄδμητ', **ἀνάγκη** τάσδε συμφορὰς φέρειν:
οὐ γάρ τι πρῶτος οὐδὲ λοίσθιος βροτῶν
γυναικὸς ἐσθλῆς ἅμπλακες: γίγνωσκε δὲ
ὡς πᾶσιν ἡμῖν κατθανεῖν ὀφείλεται.

*Admetus, it is **necessary** to carry these sufferings, for you are neither the first nor last of mortals that has lost a noble wife, know that it is owed to all of us to die below.*

**Euripides, *Alcestis*, 614-7**

ἥκω κακοῖσι σοῖσι συγκάμνων, τέκνον:
ἐσθλῆς γάρ, οὐδεὶς ἀντερεῖ, καὶ σώφρονος
γυναικὸς ἡμάρτηκας. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν
φέρειν **ἀνάγκη** καίπερ ὄντα δύσφορα.

*Phe. I have come, child, to sympathise with your evils. For you are deprived of a noble, modest wife, it cannot be denied. But it is **necessary** to bear these things although they are unbearable.*

These two passages indicate that human existence necessarily includes the loss of loved ones and also that it is the lot of mortals to suffer these misfortunes. These sentiments fit well with the somewhat hopeless moral picture Euripides often presents in his tragedies, where the gods are ruthless and those who should be admired (heroes) behave less than

[126] I have included this passage although there is some debate over the authorship of this play; I feel it is relevant to the discussion and fully reflects the style and thought of Euripides towards the end of his career.

[127] There are several other passages by Euripides that describe the same kinds of necessity: *Iph. Taur*. 1118, *Hec*. 584 and 1295, *Or*. 1330, *Iph. Aul*. 511, *Heracles* 1262, F*rag*. 757 line 5, *Frag.* 965 line 1

admirably. The famous choral ode to deified Necessity (lines 962-972 see discussion on pages 203-206) only serves to underline the hopelessness of man at the whim of a faceless divine force according to the wishes of a plethora of deities controlling every aspect of their lives.

A similar attitude towards such divine dictates is also found in Pericles' funeral speech as outlined by Thucydides.

**Thucydides, II, 64.2.1- 2**

φέρειν δὲ χρὴ τά τε
δαιμόνια **ἀναγκαίως** τά τε ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀνδρείως·
*One must bear heavenly matters **necessarily** and those of the enemy bravely.*

This instruction from Pericles to the people of Athens concerns their reaction to the plague. In this text the adverbial form ἀναγκαίως is used not to describe the necessity of the 'act of god' which inflicted the plague upon the Athenians, rather the necessity concerns what Pericles feels their reaction should be to it; they must cope with it because they have no other option. This a related notion to the Euripidean idea that the necessity of divine dictates bring suffering but is expressed in a far less religious manner in that the compulsion is not seen as originating from the gods but is a reaction that is suggested by a mortal to his fellow men. Thus the necessity is expressed in a far more human way without emphasis on the mystery of the supernatural; Ostwald (p.17) considers this passage to illustrate a type of Thucydidean usage which indicates that 'the human condition is subject to ἀνάγκαι'.

## *Necessity of Zeus*

This unusual passage presents a situation whereby Zeus (presumably the other gods too) is seen as the necessity which moulds the world and humanity itself.

**Euripides, *Trojan Women*, 884-888**

Εκ.: ὦ γῆς ὄχημα κἀπὶ γῆς ἔχων ἕδραν,
ὅστις ποτ' εἶ σύ, δυστόπαστος εἰδέναι,
Ζεύς, εἴτ' **ἀνάγκη** φύσεος εἴτε νοῦς βροτῶν,
προσηυξάμην σε·

*Hec.: O you supporting the earth and having a seat on the earth, whoever you are, you are hard to know, Zeus, whether you are* ***necessity*** *of nature or of the mind of mortals, I pray to you;*

This passage frames a prayer to Zeus with some interesting logical surmising in an either or statement. Zeus, Hecuba suggests, is either necessity of *phusis* (natural necessity of the cosmos) or *nous*. Although framed in a traditional form[128], this profound and almost heretical statement implies a very different understanding of the cosmos to that generally put forward in the great mythological cycles, a point noted by Menelaus' response to this (τί δ' ἔστιν; εὐχὰς ὡς ἐκαίνισας θεῶν. *What is this? You offer strange new prayers to the gods*.) There are a number of potential meanings for the prayer, as pointed out by Morwood 2000 (p.141) and Barlow (1986) p.209, in that it could allude to a variety of philosophical or sophistic views, in particular that of Herakleitos and Anaxagoras respectively. However, our interest is in the usage of necessity rather than the overarching meaning of a pretty impenetrable brief text. Initially Zeus is natural necessity, the force that compels things to be as they are in the world and then also the force which moulds the very thoughts of mankind. This is a statement that shows the powerlessness of mortals in the face of overwhelming necessary divine power in stark terms. The external and internal world experienced by man is compelled to be a particular way by Zeus and humanity seems to have no choice but to accept his lot in life.

## *Man as participant in supernatural ἀνάγκη*

The passages discussed above give the impression of human helplessness at the hands of the gods. However, in another passage in which ἀνάγκη is linked to the notion of the yoke, Aeschylus indicates that this powerlessness at the hands of divine dictates is one which men may take up of their own volition.

**Aeschylus ,** ***Agamemnon,*** **218-224**

ἐπεὶ δ' **ἀνάγκας** ἔδυ λέπαδνον
φρενὸς πνέων δυσσεβῆ τροπαίαν
ἄναγνον ἀνίερον, τόθεν
τὸ παντότολμον φρονεῖν μετέγνω·
βροτοὺς θρασύνει γὰρ αἰσχρόμητις
τάλαινα παρακοπὰ πρωτοπήμων·

[128] Barlow (1986) p. 209

*When he took up the yoke of **necessity**, his turning spirit sent out the ungodly, defiled and unholy; from that point he resolved a shameless deed that was beyond knowing.*

This famous passage from the parodos of *Agamamnon*, describes in dramatic terms the point at which Agamemnon resolves to sacrifice his daughter to Artemis. Here the yoke is something that Agamemnon chooses to put on; a decision that will lead to a series of tragic and horrific events[129]. The effect of necessity is a binding one, described here as a yoke, a relatively common motif sen elsewhere in poetry and drama[130] stressing the constraint of such circumstances and alluding to an additional sense of coercion. It seems that the necessity is fixed once Agamemnon chose to take a course of action; this choice could be governed by his ambitious and unstable character which seeks to win glory in Troy, the same hubris that will directly lead to his death later in the play.

There has been a good deal of scholarly debate[131] regarding the nature of the ἀνάγκη 'donned' by the unfortunate king and whether it is possible to disentangle the part played by the necessity to obey the two gods involved, Zeus Xenios and Artemis with that of the Curse of the House of Atreus. The two most recent scholars, Williams and Nussbaum have reached related but different conclusions. Williams, (1993) p. 133ff and (1965) p. 111 feels that it is a supernatural (and thus external) necessity (an amalgamation of duty to the two gods and the curse), which Agamemnon then makes his own (in the action of putting on the harness or yoke) thereby also causing it to be internal. Nussbaum, (2001) page 33 – 36 feels that the description (lines 186-8) of Agamemnon's situation as one where he 'blows together with the winds of luck' shows an 'unnatural cooperation of internal and external forces' and that by his lines (214-7) describing his desire to sacrifice his daughter as being 'with exceedingly impassioned passion' there is a clear indication that there is an internal necessity, exacerbated by his temper, which is also directing him towards what he feels is right. It is this internal necessity that she believes the Chorus are describing in the lines under consideration; particularly as in their eyes, it is from this temper that his guilt stems.
It is impossible to define the nature of these necessities any further than these scholars have already; it is both a supernatural (external) necessity (which would indicate that it is some

[129] Lesky (p. 74) considers that the passage shows 'the interplay between the forces of destiny and personal will'.

[130] See list of yoke passages note 123 page 114

[131] Lloyd-Jones (1962) *The Guilt of Agamemnon;* Lesky (1966) *Decision and Responsibility in the Tragedy of Aeschylus;* Williams (1965) *Ethical Consistency;* Williams (1993) Shame and Necessity p.130 – 136; Nussbaum (2001) *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy* p.33 - 36

kind of personification) and a personal (internal) necessity (which does not appear to be personified) informed by Agamemnon's concept of what is right (*themis*) to do given the impossible 'choice' he has. The divine dictate of Artemis that his daughter must die and the possible offence to Zeus Horkios were he to transgress his oath create two independent constraining compulsions and like the situation of Gyges (Her. I.11.15-16), either choice will inevitably lead to disrespect of a deity and the potential for supernatural reprisal. Thus, the king's 'choice' is not necessarily a choice at all; he is subject to many powers which are beyond his personal control (divine dictates and his personal fate as dictated by the curse). The words of the Chorus here are telling, however: they do not simply say that the necessity affecting him is terrible; rather he chooses to follow this path (that incurring the blood guilt of kin murder) and suffers the constraints of this choice. Although there is a general sense of inevitability about the term ἀνάγκη, there are instances of prophecy discussed above (Soph. *Phil*. 1337-1342; *O.C.* 604-606 and Her. IV.179.16-18 p108ff.), where things foretold do not come to pass since the prerequisite circumstances are not fulfilled. If this idea is what Aeschylus has in mind, then Agamemnon has created the required conditions for this potential destiny to come to pass and thus the necessity is internal.

# (iv) Circumstance, expediency and personal necessity

This section is varied and contains passages from across genres, time periods and contexts. What all of these have in common is that ἀνάγκη signifies what must happen if a certain set of circumstances present themselves. Some passages are also concerned with making the best choice for a particular party within a set of circumstances; these are most commonly within the context of politics or military ventures.

## (a) Inevitability of certain events and behaviour

The following passages are not all concerned with the same context, but all use ἀνάγκη in a similar way: that if a set of circumstances are present, something must inevitably follow. The passages are easily categorised into two types; one is a unique set of circumstances found on one occasion, whereas the other type is a generic or typical set of circumstances which is thought of as repeatable.

**Aristophanes, *Lysistrata*, 471-472**

Ἀλλ', ὦ μέλ', οὐ χρὴ προσφέρειν τοῖς πλησίοισιν εἰκῇ
τὴν χεῖρ'· ἐὰν δὲ τοῦτο δρᾷς, κυλοιδιᾶν **ἀνάγκη**.

*But, it is not necessary (chre) to raise your hand against your neighbours at random; if you do this, a black eye would be a **necessity**.*

These lines from the female chorus in argument with the male chorus justifying their treatment of the advancing men (they were drenched for getting too close to the women's stronghold at the Acropolis). If unnecessary violence is used against one's neighbours there will be inevitable violent reprisals. The necessity here does not represent the violence but the compulsion of the circumstances to force a particular course of events, in this case, the necessity of retaliation.

**Euripides, *Orestes*, 1576-1578**

Ορ.: πότερον ἐρωτᾶν ἢ κλύειν ἐμοῦ θέλεις;
Με.: οὐδέτερ'· **ἀνάγκη** δ' ὡς ἔοικέ σου κλύειν.
Ορ.: μέλλω κτανεῖν σου θυγατέρ', εἰ βούλῃ μαθεῖν.

*Or.: Would you wish to question or rather hear me out?*

*Men.: Neither, but it is **necessary** being thus to hear you out.*

*Or.: I am about to kill your daughter, if you want to know.*

Similarly, this passage presents the participants as being within a particular set of circumstances which leave no choice but to pursue a particular course of conversation. Here the violent actions of Orestes and his potential future violence towards Menelaus and his daughter (Orestes threatens to shatter Menelaus' skull with a stone from the wall while Hermione is held at sword point in front of him). Because of what he can see and hear, Menelaus is compelled to listen to what Orestes has to say. In logical terms it is a case of '*if x then y is necessary*' and '*if not x then y is not necessary*'[132] whilst in practical terms the necessity is caused by the threat of violence.

The final passage in this section comes from a very well known story in Herodotus and presents a necessity of circumstance in which Gyges must make a choice between one evil and another. Like Hippolytus' statement above, this necessity is linked (as the necessity of Fate discussed on p199) to the concept of inevitable negative events that seem to be commonplace for certain mortals.

**Herodotus I, 11.15-16**

Ὁ δὲ Γύγης τέως μὲν ἀπεθώμαζε τὰ
λεγόμενα, μετὰ δὲ ἱκέτευε μή μιν **ἀναγκαίῃ** ἐνδέειν διακρῖναι
τοιαύτην αἵρεσιν. Οὐκ ὦν δὴ ἔπειθε, ἀλλ' ὥρα **ἀναγκαίην**
ἀληθέως προκειμένην ἢ τὸν δεσπότην ἀπολλύναι ἢ αὐτὸν
ὑπ' ἄλλων ἀπόλλυσθαι·

*Finally Gyges, marvelling at what was said, afterwards supplicated her not to bind him with a **necessity** to decide on such a choice, but she was not persuaded, soon he was truly laid before **necessity** - either he would kill his master or be killed by others.*

This is a variation on the other necessities of circumstance in that it allows for an element of free will and choice albeit an impossible choice. Both usages include two types of compulsion; one is that of the coercion faced by Gyges which compels him to take this impossible choice (the threat of violence that would potentially lead to his demise). The

[132] There are many similar passages which have been included in the Physical Necessity section under 'Threat of Violence' see pages 32ff.

other is the constraining necessity of circumstance in which his options are limited since he must make a choice between two options, both of which involve violence. In this instance, the desire to live and the compulsion to survive proves to be more powerful than his sense of selfless loyalty to his master, in much the same way as it won out over the religious necessity of the prophecy (Thuc. II, 17.2.1-5) discussed pages 61,122 and 224.

## (b) The desire to preserve life and ward off death

A common usage is ἀνάγκη as the compulsion to live and avert death in any way possible[133]; this idea is very commonly found across the time period under consideration but is concentrated in predominantly three authors: Homer, Herodotus and Thucydides. This is hardly surprising, since the desire to avert death and awareness that this is an issue frequently occurs in the context of war.

### *i)* The necessity to survive in certain circumstances

### *Necessities of wartime*

**Homer, *Iliad*, XII, 178 - 9**

πάντῃ γὰρ περὶ τεῖχος ὀρώρει θεσπιδαὲς πῦρ
λάϊνον: Ἀργεῖοι δὲ καὶ ἀχνύμενοί περ **ἀνάγκῃ**
νηῶν ἠμύνοντο:
*And the Argives, though grieving, defended the ships through **necessity***

This passage from the Iliad illustrates a very common usage of necessity in the battlefield. Hard-pressed by the Trojans, the Achaians must defend the ships otherwise they would be trapped on the beach and die. Here, there is no implication that compulsion has been employed as an agent, it seems to be the inbuilt desire for survival that drives the Greeks to fight. One could argue that they have a moral duty to fight in this way, being warriors in Homeric society and that there is also a moral necessity pressing on them to take this course of action. However, if this were the case, one would surely get a description of how the warriors were inspired to do this and what was driving them. The simple use of ἀνάγκῃ is more likely to indicate the force of the basic desire to survive. There are many more examples of this same idea from Homer, Thucydides and Herodotus[134]

[133] Some related examples are discussed in the section on Biological Necessity pages 56ff.

[134] *Iliad*, IV.299-300, VI.83 – 5, XIV.128; *Odyssey*, XXIV.498-9; Herodotus, VII, 233.1-3; Thucydides, I, 137.4; I, 144.3; III, 58.3; IV, 10.1; VI, 68.4. 1-3.

Whereas the passage discussed above and those listed in note 134 illustrate instances where necessity dictates it is more prudent to stand and fight if one is to avoid dying, the following passages show the necessity to preserve life by prompting those under threat to run away.

**Homer*, Iliad*, XI, 150-1**

πεζοὶ μὲν πεζοὺς ὄλεκον φεύγοντας **ἀνάγκῃ**,

ἱππεῖς δ᾽ ἱππῆας:

*While those on foot killed the foot soldiers who were fleeing through **necessity**, those on horses killed the riders.*

This passage from the midst of a turbulent battle scene, the Achaeans under Agamemnon make gains by killing the retreating Trojans. Here the necessity for the Trojans to flee was obviously ill-judged, thus indicating that although they felt that there was a compulsion upon them to take this course of action, it does not invariably culminate in a fortunate set of consequences. There are fewer instances where those in battle feel a necessity to retreat than those occasions when they fight for their lives. The disparity in these occurrences could indicate that fleeing (even if the seemingly prudent choice) would not have appeared to be the honourable or appropriate choice for Greeks in battle. The other examples of this kind of usage are listed below[135].

Other texts are concerned with military strategy devised because of the threat of violence, rather than at the point of a violent act.

**Herodotus, VII, 139.9-13**

καὶ πολλοὶ τειχέων κιθῶνες ἦσαν ἐληλαμένοι διὰ τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ Πελοποννησίοισι, ... οὐκ ἑκόντων ἀλλ᾽ ὑπ᾽ **ἀναγκαίης**, κατὰ πόλις ἁλισκομένων ὑπὸ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ στρατοῦ τοῦ βαρβάρου...

*and many of lines of walls were driven across the isthmus to the Peloponnese …not through wish but through **Necessity**, lest each city would be conquered by the naval barbarian fleet…*

[135] *Iliad*, XV,343-5 and XV.655-7, Solon, *Fragment* 36, lines 8 - 12

Here, the walls are constructed in order to preserve life because of this ἀνάγκη; that is the threat of invasion. If the walls across the isthmus were not constructed, doom would have been a necessity to those living in the vicinity. Similar strategic decision-making processes can be seen in further examples below[136]

Wartime strategic decisions are not only military ones, in the following lines from Thucydides, we see that a circumstancial necessity to cater for displaced Athenian citizenry is deemed more important than the previously established necessity of religious belief.

**Thucydides, II.17.1**

τό τε Πελαργικὸν καλούμενον τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, ὃ καὶ ἐπάρατόν τε ἦν μὴ οἰκεῖν καί τι καὶ Πυθικοῦ μαντείου ἀκροτελεύτιον τοιόνδε διεκώλυε, λέγον ὡς 'τὸ Πελαργικὸν ἀργὸν ἄμεινον,' ὅμως ὑπὸ τῆς παραχρῆμα ἀνάγκης ἐξῳκήθη.

Below the Acropolis, there was some ground called 'the Pelasgian district', which was under a curse that it would not built upon and a fragment of a Pythian prophecy prohibited anything like this, saying 'it is better that the Pelasgian quarter lies fallow.' However owing to the present **necessity**, it was completely populated.

**Thucydides, II.17.2**

ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἡ **ἀνάγκη** τῆς οἰκήσεως...

*it was on account of the war that there was a **necessity** for the settlement*

These passages refer to the decision to settle a district of Athens owing to the ravages of the war, whereby some citizens were compelled to move within the city walls as the countryside was no longer a viable place to live. They live in new buildings constructed on a site that had been previously fallow in accordance with a Delphic prophecy (given in the first of the two passages). Here, Thucydides demonstrates the serious risk that the Athenians faced: they were so fearful of their lives that they even built upon a location forbidden by the gods. He comments in the lines preceding the second passage that although the prophecy did not foresee the war, it reflects that if Athens were to need to occupy this area it would be at a hard-pressed time and that the ἀνάγκη precipitating this was the war[137].

[136] Herodotus, VII.139.9 – 13 and IX, 15.8-12, Thucydides, II.89.8 and VII.6.1

[137] Further undesirable decisions forced by *anankai* associated with the war are found elsewhere in Thucydides: IV.63.2, IV.87.3, *V.*17.1 and *V.*90.1.

The secular necessity of the Athenians' wartime pressures is deemed more pressing than the religious necessity of the Delphic prophecy.

The option to flee, which is often not thought of as honourable however prudent it may seem, is set within a context of optional reactions to necessity.

**Thucydides, II, 61.1.2-3**

εἰ δ' **ἀναγκαῖον** ἦν ἢ εἴξαντας εὐθὺς τοῖς πέλας ὑπακοῦσαι ἢ κινδυνεύσαντας περιγενέσθαι, ὁ φυγὼν τὸν κίνδυνον τοῦ ὑποστάντος μεμπτότερος.

*what if there was a great **necessity** either to immediately yield and submit to those coming or by doing a dangerous thing to survive; I prefer the one who stands up to danger to the one running away.*

Pericles' words clearly demonstrate that if faced with necessity (whether this is impending death or enslavement), the Athenians ought to face this rather than flee from it. We can also infer from this that there is a notion within Thucydides' viewpoint that necessity does not automatically lead to a foregone conclusion; there is an element of choice. What may be thought of as a necessity by the people (to submit) and therefore inevitable is not viewed as such by Pericles, who states that there is an alternative course of action to be taken[138].

## *Issues of human survival outside wartime*

A necessity to preserve the life of another person is presented in the following passages from Andocides.

**Andocides, *On his Return,* VII**

ὥστ' **ἀνάγκην** μοι γενέσθαι δυοῖν κακοῖν τοῖν μεγίστοιν θάτερον ἑλέσθαι… ὅπερ **ἀνάγκη** παθεῖν ἦν αὐτῷ, εἰ ἐγὼ μὴ ἐβουλόμην ταῦτα ποιῆσαι…

*…so that there was a **necessity** to seize either of two greatest evils…there was a **necessity** on him to suffer if I did not want to do these things…*

[138] Further discussion of the extent to which necessity is inevitable is found in the conclusion pages 224ff.

**Andocides, *On his Return*, X**

καίτοι ἐγὼ τότ᾽ αὐτὸς γνοὺς τὰς ἐμαυτοῦ συμφορὰς...τὰ μὲν παρανοίᾳ τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ, τὰ δ᾽ **ἀνάγκῃ** τῶν παρόντων πραγμάτων,

*I did not need anyone to remind me of my sufferings... (created) partly through my own madness, and partly through the **necessity** of the present matters…*

Here, the advocate must appear in court against his friends or his father will be condemned to death. The text is straightforward and unambiguous, perhaps reflecting the logical framework of the law. The law imposes only two choices (the two great evils) alluded to above. The appellant must either choose to side with his father or his friends; his father would die according to the law were he to side with his friends and not reveal the perpetrators of the crime. Thus the appellant is constrained by his circumstances and this compulsion to take a choice from two unpalatable options is the necessity affecting him. The perplexity in which the speaker finds himself is foremost one in which his choice will mean life or death for his own father. The speaker feels compelled to do his duty to preserve life which surely must have an even greater importance to him owing to his relationship to the condemned man thereby being a more compelling reason for his appearance despite the lack of loyalty to his friends. Like Gyges (Her. I.11.15-16 discussed pages 119, 121, 126 and 226), when pressed by a circumstantial necessity to choose between loyalty and the preservation of life, the appellant here sees the life as more important and thus a greater necessity than the obligation of loyalty.

Whereas the above defendant above feels he has no choice but to come to court, there is an example of the opposite too, where the defendant has no such compulsion, stating that there is no ἀνάγκη that controls his actions, rather he is present voluntarily[139]. A similar circumstantial necessity can be seen in the *Odyssey* (X.270-3), where Odysseus sets off to save his men from Circe's magic.

**Homer, *Odyssey*, X.270–3**

Εὐρύλοχ᾽, ἦ τοι μὲν σὺ μέν᾽ αὐτοῦ τῷδ᾽ ἐνὶ χώρῳ
ἔσθων καὶ πίνων κοίλῃ παρὰ νηὶ μελαίνῃ:
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν εἶμι, κρατερὴ δέ μοι ἕπλετ᾽ **ἀνάγκη**.᾽

[139] **Andocides *On the Mysteries* 2** …ἐγὼ ἥκω οὐδεμιᾶς μοι **ἀνάγκης** οὔσης παραμεῖναι, οὔτ᾽ ἐγγυητὰς καταστήσας οὔθ᾽ ὑπὸ δεσμῶν ἀναγκασθείς... …*I have now come here being in no way under **necessity** to stand trial…*Here there is no family member facing death, nor is the apellant; he has not been imprisoned and thus is free from such coercion (ἀνάγκη).

*…Eurylochus, by all means stay here in this place eating and drinking next to the hollow black ship, but I will go; strong **necessity** is on me.*

Athough they are not his blood relations, Odysseus feels compelled to help his crew as he is their master and thus has an obligation towards them. As in the legal use of the term ἀνάγκαιοι for blood relatives (discussed above pages 74ff.), this compulsion is probably directed by a moral code which directs Odysseus within this set of circumstances to safeguard the lives of his men who although not his blood kin were in a way part of his current *oikos* as his followers.

## (c) Necessities of circumstance in the lawcourt

The section on phusis (p.49ff.) and non-philosophical cosmology (p177ff.) primarily focus on aspects of the natural world, but there are also human organisations which, because of their legal administration must necessarily be predictable and systematic in the way they behave. Thus, in the following texts, the legal system is presented as predictable and must thus always present the same organisational system and have its own necessity because of this, which is, in a way, its phusis.

The following passage from Andocides concerns the relative position of the prosecution and the defence within legal proceedings.

**Andocides, *On the Mysteries,* 6**

…**ἀνάγκη** τὸν ἀπολογούμενον ἔλαττον ἔχειν.

*…there is a **necessity** for the defendant to have a worse time…*

This unambiguous text indicates the defendant's belief that the legal system itself as instituted in Athens at this time has a systematic bias towards the prosecutor, who creates a climate of fear, danger and which produces circumstantial prejudice against the defendant[140]. Thus this ἀνάγκη is presented as a consequence of the imbalance of power inherent within the system.

However, this is a highly subjective opinion which may well not be that held by the prosecution. This supposed imbalance is also alluded to in the following passage where, the

[140] Gagarin (1997) p.102

circumstantial ἀνάγκη is one in which the defendant must behave in a particular way because of the power wielded by the prosecution.

**Antiphon, *On the Murder of Herodes* 3.5**

ἀνάγκη οὖν, ὅταν τις ἄπειρος ᾖ τοῦ ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν κατηγόρων λόγοις εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἔργοις καὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῶν πραγμάτων.

*And so it is **necessary** for someone inexperienced in legal contests to address themselves to the words of the prosecution rather than the actual events and the truth of what happened*

Here, as part of the proemium, Antiphon offers a self-effacing pretence that Euxitheus is such an inexperienced man and is therefore compelled to address the words of the prosecution not the facts of the events[141] owing to the process of the legal system, in an attempt to invoke the pity of the jury. Using the term ἀνάγκη gives legitimacy to the approach taken. It could also stress the conjectural nature of prosecution's case[142].Prior to this passage, the rhetoric states that the skilful man can persuade the truth with lies or the inexperienced tell truth unconvincingly[143], which then leads to this supposed ἀνάγκη. Rather than an absolute ἀνάγκη, here it seems to be conditional: if the appellant wants success, this must be the approach he takes [144].

Although not taken from a legal text, the necessity to plead is also referred to by Hippolytus within Euripides' play during the agon section towards the end of the play.

**Euripides, *Hippolytus,* 990-1**

ὅμως δ᾽ **ἀνάγκη**, ξυμφορᾶς ἀφιγμένης,
γλῶσσάν μ᾽ ἀφεῖναι.
*Surely, disaster having arrived, there is a **necessity** to set free my tongue.*

At this stage in the drama, Hippolytus realises that he must behave as a defendant in court and there is a compulsion for him to make a defence speech as should be his right. The

[141] Gagarin, 1997, p. 178
[142] Gagarin, 1997, p.`175
[143] 3.1-4
[144] The necessity imposed on the various parties within the legal system is outlined in a fragment of Antiphon the Sophist: *Fragment* 44c1.16 Ox. Pap. Xv120 (Pap 1797) Col I: *It is **necessary** that he who bears witness, even if his evidence is truthful, will surely be unjust to another.*

speech he gives follows a recognisable oratorical form mimicking the style in vogue of the 'show-pieces' of great attic oratory. Thus, this compulsion to 'set free his tongue' is not a compulsion for speaking freely, rather it demands of him a carefully-crafted piece of rhetoric. Even within a mythological setting, the conventions of Athenian litigation are adhered to rigidly with ἀνάγκη as a coercive force to ensure the correct pattern is followed.

## (d) Rhetorical and Historical Necessity

The following passages are similar to those discussed in the legal situation in that someone is prompted by what they perceive as a necessity to speak in a particular manner or about a specific thing in a certain way. However these scenarios are far less predictable and objective than the legal examples discussed above, rather they are dependent upon a particular set of circumstances present at a singular point in time (usually political) and the characters involved. They are also presented in this manner by historical authors to infer a kind of inevitability through the use of necessity terminology; thus this type of ἀνάγκη could also be termed as a historical necessity, rhetorical necessity or political expediency.

**Herodotus, III, 75.8-10**

...φάμενος πρότερον μὲν κρύπτειν (οὐ γάρ οἱ εἶναι
ἀσφαλὲς λέγειν τὰ γενόμενα), ἐν δὲ τῷ παρεόντι **ἀναγκαίην**
μιν καταλαμβάνειν φαίνειν·

*saying that previously he had hidden this (for it was not safe for him to say what had happened), now **necessity** was there to seize him to bring it to light.*

In this instance, the obligation to speak seems to be prompted from a moral necessity to do the right thing. Prexaspes had been bribed by the Magi to relate falsehoods, but felt he had to speak the truth before he died since he knows this to be the right thing to do[145]. This seems to be good example of subjective necessity, whereby the internal moral code of a person compels them to comply with a set of values. Knowing that his death is imminent, any other constraints or compulsions imposed upon him by other people appear to become less powerful than his internal moral code.

The reason for speaking at length in the following Herodotean passage is dependent upon a complex set of political circumstances at that time which, by virtue of their complexity, need explaining at length.

[145] Described as a voluntary rather than a forced action by Munson (2001) p.44.

**Herodotus, VII, 51.3-4**

**ἀναγκαίως** γὰρ ἔχει περὶ πολλῶν πρηγμάτων πλέονα λόγον
ἐκτεῖναι.

*...when there are so many matters, it is **necessary** to use many words.*

At this point, Artabanus is keen to ensure that his advice to Xerxes is as effective since it needs to take a range of issues into account. A basic interpretation of this is that compex issues require a longer explanation, thus this is a case of rhetorical expediency; the nature of the speech must vary according to what needs to be presented within it. Munson (2001, p. 46) feels that this 'rhetorical necessity is identical with the moral obligation to speak out'; this would imply that Artabanus feels an additional necessity to advise Xerxes as thoroughly as he might, through the use of more words in his advice speech. This additional layer of necessity is not implicitly spelled out in these words, but it is appealing to infer this when we take into account the moralistic context Herodotus often employs in his History in order to apportion blame or praise.

The following passages fall into a category that Munson (2001, p.46) entitles metanarratives; instances where Herodotus comments on his own decisions as to what should be included in his book or *logos*.

**Herodotus, II, 65.7-8**

τὰ δὲ καὶ εἴρηκα αὐτῶν
ἐπιφαύσας, **ἀναγκαίῃ** καταλαμβανόμενος εἶπον.

*And I said these things touching on them superficially; I spoke, having been seized upon by **necessity** (of his story to tell of religious practices)*

**Herodotus, VII, 96.5-6**

[αὐτῶν] ἐπῆσαν ἑκάστοισι ἐπιχώριοι ἡγεμόνες, τῶν ἐγώ, οὐ
γὰρ **ἀναγκαίῃ** ἐξέργομαι ἐς ἱστορίης λόγον, οὐ παραμέ-
μνημαι·

*...each was accompanied by a leader of their own race, whose names I do not mention as I don't consider it **necessary** for the account in my history.*

**Herodotus, VII, 139, 1-3**

ἐνθαῦτα **ἀναγκαίῃ** ἐξέργομαι γνώμην ἀποδέξασθαι ἐπίφθονον μὲν πρὸς τῶν πλεόνων ἀνθρώπων, ὅμως δὲ τῇ γέ μοι φαίνεται εἶναι ἀληθὲς οὐκ ἐπισχήσω.

*At this point I am constrained by **necessity** to express an opinion which the majority of men will hate, but since it seems true to me, I will not hinder it.*

In each of these passages, Herodotus explains why he has constructed his account the way he has[146]. He wishes to explain to the reader why his historical method has compelled him to present information in the following way, possibly since he would foresee objections in the mind of his audience upon reading these sections. The first of these concerns the treatment of Egyptian religion, which could be deemed potentially offensive to the Greeks owing to the zoomorphic nature of its deities[147]. Some readers may have deemed it be irrelevant to his discussion of the Persian Wars, however, Herodotus's need to be thorough compels him to discuss this element of Egyptian life. Munson considers (p.46) that Herodotus must explain his motivations, since his *logos* conflicts with a commonly held *nomos* concerning what was considered to be decent and appropriate. He is also at pains to point out that he has only touched upon these superficially (ἐπιφαύσας) perhaps to assure his reader that he has only covered what was absolutely necessary and his intention is not to shock or upset them.

His decision to omit the names of the leaders in the second passage is slightly more difficult to read; it could be that he does not feel at this point it is necessary to go into this much detail, or perhaps he has not actually managed to research all the names and feels it would be improper to present an incomplete list. The lines following, however, indicate that it is more likely that he felt they were not worth mentioning; their status was that of subjugated minions and they did not perform any deeds worthy of note. Munson (2001, p. 47) posits that Herodotus would feel that this status makes them unworthy of treatment by Herodotus, since he is himself a free man. The compulsion Herodotus feels to present moral examples is certainly one that is found throughout the Histories and thus this interpretation would seem to fit with this model.

The final passage of the three has more similarities to the first one, in that Herodotus wishes to explain his methodology in including discussion which may be offensive to or upset those

[146] Munson (2001, p. 46) identifies two further passages that utilise ἀνάγκ... terms in variations of the verbal form: II.3.2 and VII.99.1

[147] Munson 2001 p. 47

reading. He is about to sketch out what would have occurred if the Athenians had not chosen to launch a naval initiative against Xerxes. His conclusions present a dim view of the prospects for the Greeks; the Peloponnesians would have been compelled to surrender, apart from the Spartans who would have died heroically whilst the walls across the isthmus would have performed little function regardless of their height. As Munson points out (2001, P. 48), this scenario effectively heralds the opinion that the Athenians were the saviours of Greece, an opinion that would herald significant problems for all in the Greek world in the near future. Herodotus deems this analysis accurate in its evaluation and thus to be a necessary inclusion in his History.

It is interesting and important to observe the similar yet different ways that Thucydides treats similar historical or rhetorical necessities. There are no examples when Thucydides himself creates a metanarrative in his History, however, his focus on human nature puts statements of intention and perceptions of personal necessity regarding the content of the text into the mouths of those giving the numerous speeches in his work.

**Thucydides, I, 32.5.5-6**

...καὶ ἅμα μέγας ὁ κίνδυνος εἰ ἐσόμεθα ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῖς,
**ἀνάγκη** καὶ ὑμῶν καὶ ἄλλου παντὸς ἐπικουρίας δεῖσθαι...
*…the magnitude of the danger which would exist if we were to be under their power, so there is a **necessity** for us to ask for help from you and all the others…*

In these lines taken from the Corcyrean debate, a number of issues combine (as detailed in the preceeding lines) and have led to the necessity to request assistance mentioned in line6[148]: firstly the inferior size of their fleet, secondly their relative isolation and weakness and also the fear of subjugation to Corinth. Although on surface level this is a circumstancial compulsion to speak out, like the legal examples described above (pages 127ff.) it is also a necessity of survival. If they do not get the aid they seek, they will either be killed or forcibly subjugated and thus be subject to a more direct physical necessity. At this time, although the necessity could potentially culminate in physical form, it is conceptual in nature (an idea is prompting their action) albeit a concept derived from a physical reality.

[148] As discussed by Ostwald (1988) p. 26

A simple example from Thucydides describes Alcibiades explaining why there is a necessity for him to defend himself.

**Thucydides, VI, 16.1.2-3**

(**ἀνάγκη** γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν ἄρξασθαι, ἐπειδή μου Νικίας καθήψατο)

*( for there is a **necessity** (for me) to begin from here, since Nikias has attacked me)*

Here, he has been criticised by Nicias and feels it is necessary for him to construct a defence and speak about it or at least, that is the reason given by Thucydides by means of Alciniades' reported words for the occurrence of this speech in his account at this point. In some ways this is similar to the Herodotean examples of metanarrative in that the author is providing a reason for the inclusion of the speech from the mouth of the speaker. However, Thucydides does not use his own voice in this to comment creating an internal necessity for the character in his History. Alcibiades is portrayed as feeling that there is a necessity to present a defence explains the inclusion of the speech within the narrative which is also constitutes a politically expedient necessity for the speaker. The necessity also serves as a literary device that enables Thucydides to include what he deems necessary for his account in the form of a personal compulsion for the historical character depicted within it.

The following passage from Thucydides occurs when the Athenian Euphemus responds to the speech of Hermocrates at an assembly of the Camarinaeans in the context of the justification for the Sicilian Expedition.

**Thucydides, VI,82.1.2**

'ἀφικόμεθα μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς πρότερον οὔσης ξυμμαχίας ἀνανεώσει, τοῦ δὲ Συρακοσίου καθαψαμένου **ἀνάγκη** καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς εἰπεῖν ὡς εἰκότως ἔχομεν.

*'While we arrived for a renewal of a previous alliance, following the oppression by the Syracusans we also thus have a **necessity** to talk of the empire.'*

Here, the semantics of Euphemus may imply that the Syracusans have imperialistic expansionist intentions; however, the framing of the sentence, with the nominative case for □□□□□□, reflects a less emotive and more political usage which is then used as a

reason for making the speech in the vein that he does[149]. The compulsion is a circumstantial one, and thus both internal in that it supposedly relates to Euphemus' personal feelings and external in that he feels compelled by the content of the previous speech and thus there is also an external interpersonal aspect to the necessity as well. This 'necessity' provides the Athenians with an opportunity to legitimise their behaviour and thus the speech, like Alcibiades' speech above, is politically expedient for them. However, this text also conveys the idea that the issue of empire is a necessary topic as events and circumstances have now rendered it unavoidable; they are constrained by what has happened and forced to a topic of discussion.

The following passage comes from later in Euphemus' speech and details his prediction of what will necessarily occur if the smaller city states form an alliance with Syracuse.

**Thucydides, VI, 85.3.5-8**

ἀρχῆς γὰρ

ἐφίενται ὑμῶν καὶ βούλονται ἐπὶ τῷ ἡμετέρῳ ξυστήσαντες ὑμᾶς ὑπόπτῳ, βίᾳ ἢ καὶ κατ᾽ ἐρημίαν, ἀπράκτων ἡμῶν ἀπελθόντων, αὐτοὶ ἄρξαι τῆς Σικελίας. **ἀνάγκη** δέ, ἢν ξυστῆτε πρὸς αὐτούς·οὔτε γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔτι ἔσται ἰσχὺς τοσαύτη ἐς ἓν ξυστᾶσα εὐμεταχείριστος, οὔθ᾽ οἵδ᾽ ἀσθενεῖς ἂν ἡμῶν μὴ παρόντων πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἶεν.

*For they (the Syracusans) are aiming to rule over you and using suspicion of our attemps to unite you and, when we have gone away without success, they are planning to become masters of Sicily, by force or because of your isolation. If you become their allies, this is* ***inevitable****: since it will no longer be easy for us to master so great a united force and you would be weak before them if we were not present.*

The necessity here is, like many circumstantial necessities, one where a prediction of the future is given with some certainty using a necessity phrase. Within the context of a speech, this lends an air of authority to the words of Euphemus and adds inevitability to what is actually surmising. Rather than being a necessity of military expedience, although having a backdrop of a wartime speech, this necessity is hypothetical supporting the political aims of one of the Athenians. However, although there is an implication that physical force will be involved in this alliance, the necessity itself is not framed as a physical compulsion despite

[149] Ostwald (1988) p.10, cites this is an example of a necessity to reply in a speech to a point made by another (as at I.37.1; V. 90.1; VI. 16.1)

the fact that military might would definitely underpin any Syracusan desire for pre-eminence. The sentence is structured in a pseudo-logical manner '*if x occurs* (you make an alliance with the Syracusans) *y* (the Syracusans' move towards imperialism) *will automatically follow*.' However, given the biased nature of the evidence to support this, this necessity is not necessarily a necessity[150].

The following passage implies that the political situation has now forced a necessary decision; that the most expedient decision is to vote for war.

**Thucydides, I, 124.1.3-2.3**

μὴ μέλλετε Ποτειδεάταις τε ποιεῖσθαι τιμωρίαν οὖσι Δωριεῦσι καὶ ὑπὸ Ἰώνων πολιορκουμένοις, οὗ πρότερον ἦν τοὐναντίον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μετελθεῖν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ὡς οὐκέτι ἐνδέχεται περιμένοντας τοὺς μὲν ἤδη βλάπτεσθαι, τοὺς δ', εἰ γνωσθησόμεθα ξυνελθόντες μέν, ἀμύνεσθαι δὲ οὐ τολμῶντες, μὴ πολὺ ὕστερον τὸ αὐτὸ πάσχειν: ἀλλὰ νομίσαντες ἐς **ἀνάγκην** ἀφῖχθαι, ὦ ἄνδρες ξύμμαχοι, καὶ ἅμα τάδε ἄριστα λέγεσθαι, ψηφίσασθε τὸν πόλεμον μὴ φοβηθέντες τὸ αὐτίκα δεινόν, τῆς δ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ διὰ πλείονος εἰρήνης ἐπιθυμήσαντες:

*Don't hesitate to give assistanceto Potidaea, who are Dorians under siege from Ionians, which is the opposite situation to what has occurred previously, and don't hesitate to seek freedom for the others. Waiting any longer is impossible while some are already being attacked, and if it becomes known that, having met in conference we do not dare to defend ourselves, the rest of us will suffer in the same way later. But recognising the* ***necessity*** *that has arrived, fellow allies, and at the same time that the things we have said are the best possible, you must vote for the war without fearing the immediate terrors, but set your heart on the greater peace that there will be because of it.*

Taken from the Second Lacedaemonian Congress, this passage finds the Corinthians attempting to persuade their allies to decide on war. Ἀνάγκη here could be translated here as 'pressing circumstances' and the implication is that a course of action must occur (vote for war) because of the events in Potidea.[151] Ostwald views this as part of Thucydides' wider 'ἀνάγκη' narrative that begins at I.23.6 in which (apart from his accounts of past events) he

[150] See Conclusion pages 212ff.

[151] Similar political decisions and alliances are seen on numerous other occasions owing to the necessity of a wartime situation; notable are Herodotus, IX.17.5 and Thucydides, I.32.5

relates the ἀνάγκαι which ultimately led directly to the war[152]. The aspect the Corinthians are alluding to as an ἀνάγκη is the rapid increase of Athenian imperialism which is forcing a reaction. This ἀνάγκη terminology could well stem from Thucydides' desire to portray the conflict as an inevitable war (Ostwald, 1987, p31) as well as reflecting the common ἀνάγκη usage of being constrained by circumstance.

## (e) The necessity of poetic composition

These passages, all from Aristophanes seem to indicate an idea that poetry must reflect the nature of the author.

The following passage from the first act of *Women at the Thesmophoria* portrays Agathon debating with Mnesilochus in order to explain his flamboyant effeminate clothing.

**Aristophanes, *Women at the Thesmophoria*, 166–167 and 171-172**

Ἀγάθων

διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἄρ᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ κάλ᾽ ἦν τὰ δράματα.

Ὅμοια γὰρ ποεῖν **ἀνάγκη** τῇ φύσει...

Μνησίλοχος

ταῦτ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ὁ Φιλοκλέης αἰσχρὸς ὢν αἰσχρῶς ποιεῖ,

ὁ δ᾽ αὖ Ξενοκλέης ὢν κακὸς κακῶς ποιεῖ,

ὁ δ᾽ αὖ Θέογνις ψυχρὸς ὢν ψυχρῶς ποιεῖ.

Ἀγάθων

Ἅπασ᾽ **ἀνάγκη**. Ταῦτα γάρ τοι γνοὺς ἐγὼ

ἐμαυτὸν ἐθεράπευσα.

Agathon

*Because of these things, his plays were beautiful. For it is **necessary** to make them the same in nature...*

Mnesilochus

*So in this way Philocles being disgraceful, creates shamefully, whereas Xenocles, being wicked makes wicked ones and Theognis being cold-hearted creates cold-hearted ones.*

Agathon

*There is all **necessity** and, because I perceived this, I have looked after myself.*

[152] Ostwald (1987) p.31

These four lines from Agathon in debate with Mnesilochus fall either side of examples given by the latter to illustrate the former's point that the personality traits of the writer will automatically dictate the nature of their work. Agathon's theory appears pseudoscientific and to be a logical statement of inevitable circumstance: X must necessarily result in Y thus mimicking cosmological 'rules' which must be in place by necessity. This theory is of course an absurd assertion and intended to give an impression of Agathon as a ridiculous pseudointellectual with latent passive homosexual leanings[153]. Aristophanes has adopted the language of cosmology to create a pseudophusis for poetry for humorous ends; this would imply that many of the audience would have been familiar with this kind of usage and it is also similar in nature to much of the humour in the *Clouds* (produced several years earlier) discussed in the cosmology section (pages 176ff.)[154].

## (f) The necessity of personal intention and revenge

The notion of individual subjective necessity perceived as an internal force is not commonly found in Greek literature, thus those few occasions that it is found are particularly interesting.

The following passage could be considered to be just such an instance: Orestes' decision to kill his mother Clytaemnestra. However, the intended meaning of the text is not obvious and could or could not be the necessity of revenge.

**Aeschylus, *Eumenides*, 424 - 426**

Χο: φονεὺς γὰρ εἶναι μητρὸς ἠξιώσατο.

Αθ: ἀλλ' ἢ 'ξ **ἀνάγκης**, ἤ τινος τρέων κότον;

Χο: πο□ γ□ρ τοσο□το κέντρον □ς μητροκτονε□ν;

*Ch. Because he thought he was the righteous slayer of his mother.*

*Ath. According to **compulsion**, or fleeing from the wrath of a certain person.*

*Ch. Where is there such a goad to cause matricide?*

This passage comes from the trial section of Eumenides in which Athena, like a good lawyer, is trying to investigate the circumstances surrounding the death of Clytaemnestra. She does

[153] MacDowell (1995) p 256-7; that Agathon subscribed to the paederastic idea of male, homoerotic relationships is also attested by Halperin (1990, p113) in his discussion of Plato's *Symposium* a dialogue which takes place at Agathon's house.

[154] A very similar usage is found in Aristophanes, *Frogs* 1058-1059.

not dispute that Orestes has killed his mother but suggests that there could be a compulsion which would lead to this course of action. However, she does not give details of what this compulsion might entail other than it is not the threat of anger from another person (possibly the anger of Apollo who gave him the order to kill his mother through an oracle). We then have to consider whether Athena is referring to an internal or external necessity that forces the matricide. Thus there are several options for what this force might be: firstly there are the workings of Fate (and the associated curse of the House of Atreus) or perhaps the divine instructions from Apollo which could carry their own compulsion (for who would want to incur the wrath of a god through disobedience?) Alternatively it could be Orestes' personal desire for revenge. It may be that the actions of Orestes might be explained in terms of both divine coercion (Fate, Apollo's prophecy and the curse), in that this would be regarded as the over-riding force that controls the entire cycle of events, as well as Orestes' personal motivation, which would manifest as an internal desire for revenge completely without any consciousness of the hand of Fate in the matter even if it were to be a predestined event.

The following passages from *Medea* are less ambiguous than the Eumenides text. All come from the mouth of the protagonist as she outlines her plans for the death of Creusa and her children and seem to clearly indicate a necessity for Medea to have revenge.

**Euripides, *Medea*, 803 – 806**

οὔτ' ἐξ ἐμοῦ γὰρ παῖδας ὄψεταί ποτε
ζῶντας τὸ λοιπὸν οὔτε τῆς νεοζύγου
νύμφης τεκνώσει παῖδ', ἐπεὶ κακὴν κακῶς
θανεῖν σφ' **ἀνάγκη** τοῖς ἐμοῖσι φαρμάκοις.

*And he will not ever see the children he had by me alive again and he will not breed children from his newly-yoked wife, since it is a **necessity** that the wretched girl dies in an evil way through my drugs.*

**Lines 1012 - 1014**

{Πα.} τί δαὶ κατηφὲς ὄμμα καὶ δακρυρροεῖς;
{Μη.} πολλή μ' **ἀνάγκη**, πρέσβυ· ταῦτα γὰρ θεοὶ
κἀγὼ κακῶς φρονοῦσ' ἐμηχανησάμην.

*Paid: Why are you weeping with downcast eyes?*

*Med: There is a great **necessity** (for me to weep), old man, for the gods and my own evil plotting prepared these things.*

**Lines (1062 – 1063) and 1240 - 1241**[155]

πάντως σφ᾽ **ἀνάγκη** κατθανεῖν· ἐπεὶ δὲ χρή,
ἡμεῖς κτενοῦμεν οἵπερ ἐξεφύσαμεν.

*Med: It is **necessary** above all for them to die; since it is necessary, I will kill those whom I gave birth to.*

**Lines 1242 - 1243**

τί μέλλομεν
τὰ δεινὰ κ**ἀναγκαῖα** μὴ πράσσειν κακά;

*Med: Why do I delay the terrible **necessary** evil?*

All the passages deal with Medea's horrific plan to kill Creusa and her children in order to exact revenge on Jason for his behaviour towards her. She is entirely focused on what she has initially decided to be appropriate, seeming to believe that once initially resolved upon, it cannot be rethought or modified. Her plan has been set in place and the sequence of events appears to be unstoppable once begun. This in some ways akin to the passages about prophecy and fate discussed in which a certain set of events will automatically follow when particular circumstances occur as has been laid down in some manner of divine dictate, prophecy or fate. However, rather than Medea being at the mercy of an external supernatural power, this is her own dictate, her own prophecy for what is destined to occur. Why then does she feel that it is necessary if there is not any external force compelling her to this course of action? Should we then view this necessity either as one of revenge[156] or as one of personal intention as a response to a set of circumstances or is it something else entirely?

Medea mentions the gods in line 1013, but it seems that in this passage it is the tears which are necessary rather than the course of events she refers to[157]. The circumstances that she finds herself in which are in some ways down to the contrivances of the gods and in others

[155] Mossman (2011) p. 326 considers the first occurrence of these lines to be erroneous and that they should only be read at 1240-41.

[156] See discussion of wartime revenge pages 137ff.

[157] This is reminiscent of a one word fragment of Aeschylus (*fragment* 372) where he uses ἀναγκόδακρυς (shedding forced tears).

down to her plans are so dreadful that she has no choice but to weep. Mossman (2011 p. 313) considers this necessity to be one of tragic imperative, in that which would indeed support the necessity of tears rather than the necessity for Medea to exact revenge. As seen throughout this thesis, although necessity terms appear to have an air of rationality and logic about them, necessity is frequently not a necessity we would recognise as inevitable but is a necessity only if a particular set of events or moral attitudes occur. Here, there is an additional sense of irony, given that the tragic events responsible for causing the weeping are to a large extent being instigated by Medea and thus the concept of being compelled to this emotional state is to a large extent a self-imposed situation. The gods are, of course, instrumental too in bringing about this set of events and Mossman (2011 p.313) points out that Medea could perhaps view herself as an agent of divine revenge upon Jason but that it is actually the case that Medea invokes the gods to assist her plan for revenge rather than the other way around.

The other passages do not refer to any other cause for the unfolding necessity apart from the protagonist herself, Medea, and her intentions. This usage is novel and unparalleled from the period. In the sense of physical compulsion, people (human and divine) are shown imposing force upon others, but here we do not get the sense that Medea is thinking of necessity in a physical way despite the obvious physical consequences of her actions. This is not a physical necessity, rather it is a circumstantial necessity created neither by the gods and fate nor a specific set of environmental factors. Rather it is the necessity of personal intention and desire, in particular her need for revenge upon Jason. Euripides is a progressive thinker and here has set Medea outside the normal rules of society: she has her own plan that compels the course of events and is not subject to the normal laws of the gods. Her personal desire for revenge is stronger than her necessity to nurture and preserve life (see pages 122ff.), her regard for the laws of xenia and also those of obedience to her husband (see page 80). He has broken marriage oaths towards her which should itself necessitate consequences for Jason, but rather than leaving Zeus to bring retribution for this, she sees herself as the agent for revenge[158]. This makes her different to previous dramatic revenge protagonists like Orestes, who are generally moved to their course of

[158] That this she should be viewed as an agent of revenge rather than subject to the principle of divine punishment is supported in Burnett (1973) p.1-24, which adds another level to moral dilemma presented in the play, since the protagonist is a criminal herself.

action by means of a divine plan, fate or a curse rather than initiating it themselves[159]. In historical prose, there are 'real-life' instances in which revenge is enacted (see p.226 for discussion). However, although some of the language used to describe them includes necessity phrases, they are not described in this way in the manner of a prophecy or divine dictate, rather as a necessity intrinsic to the context of war. Thus it is not the necessity for revenge that is unusual, rather it is the manner in which Medea views herself as subject to her own self-imposed destiny and the intended actions therein.

[159] For further discussion of the notion of personally instigated necessity see the Conclusion page 226ff.

# (v) Cosmological necessity

There are many different authors from many different philosophical schools that use the term ἀνάγκη in a cosmological context. Necessity is generally found either reified or else as a circumstantial necessity of phusis; according to the cosmological viewpoint of the author, the cosmos must behave in a particular necessary way. The texts have been approached in a roughly chronological order, although there are instances where I have deviated from this so that the argument and discussion is more logical.

## (a) Necessity as a goddess of Cosmic Order in Orphic Theogony

Given the importance of the Orphic texts to the development of our understanding of ἀνάγκη in fifth-century theogony and cosmology, they will be discussed here. Some scholars have expressed reservations about the dating of the cosmology but West's persuasive arguments give sufficient reason for their inclusion[160].

**Damascius, *de principia* 123, DK B54 (Bernabé Orph Fr 76-77)**

> ...τὴν δὲ τρίτην ἀρχὴν μετὰ τὰς δύο γεννηθῆναι μὲν ἐκ τούτων,
> ὕδατός φημι καὶ γῆς, δράκοντα δὲ εἶναι κεφαλὰς ἔχοντα προσπ-
> εφυκυίας ταύρου καὶ λέοντος, ἐν μέσῳ δὲ θεοῦ πρόσωπον, ἔχειν δὲ καὶ
> ἐπὶ τῶν ὤμων πτερά, ὠνομάσθαι δὲ Χρόνον ἀγήραον καὶ Ἡρα-
> κλῆα τὸν αὐτόν· συνεῖναι δὲ αὐτῷ τὴν **Ἀνάγκην**, φύσιν οὖσαν
> τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ Ἀδράστειαν ἀσώματον διωργυιωμένην ἐν παντὶ
> τῷ κόσμῳ, τῶν περάτων αὐτοῦ ἐφαπτομένην.

[160] There is a good deal of debate about the dating of the original version of this text. West (1983, p.108) dates a 'Protogonos theogony' to the fifth century and draws parallels between the usage of *ananke* here and in other fifth century texts: Emped. *fr*.107 and *fr*. 109; Aesch. *Prom*. 514Ff; Eur. *Alc*. 965ff. Bernabe (2004 p.87) disagrees with this assertion but does not offer an alternative date. West also links the Protogonos theogony to the Derveni text (below pages 150ff.) in form and structure despite there being differences between these two theogonies and that of Pherecydes of Syros. Given this similarity in usage, I am inclined to support West's dating to within the time period of this thesis.

*The third principle after the two was engendered by these – water and earth as I say – and was a serpent with extra heads growing upon it of a bull and a lion, and a god's countenance in the middle; it had wings upon its shoulders, and its name was Chronos and also Herakles. United with it was* ***Ananke****, being of the same nature and form, and Adrasteia, incorporeal, her arms extended throughout the universe and touching its extremities.*[161]

This complex and mystical text is obscure in meaning and there are a number of ambiguities relating to Ananke within it. Firstly there is the question of the relationship between Ananke and Chronos where Chronos/Herakles is described as being συνεῖναι with Ananke but the form of union is not entirely made clear. The verb can have many meanings including simply coming together, meeting in battle, consulting, sexual union or a conjunction of stars/ heavenly bodies (LSJ). As West points out in a lengthy discussion[162], there is a considerable precedent for divine coupling in serpentine form, particularly within the body of myths relating to the mysteries and Orphic texts, notably Zeus and Kore. If taking the verb to mean 'meeting in battle', then a cosmogonic parallel could also be seen in the myth of Zeus and Typhoeus (who had a thousand snake heads coming out of his shoulders). Here Zeus defeats Typhoeus with thunder and lightning (Hesiod, *Theogony* 820ff) although in the Homeric Hymn to Apollo, the monster is dispatched by Apollo using arrows. There is also an argument that a conjunction of heavenly bodies could also be meant here (discussed below p.145). Another possibility is that several meanings could be understood by those who were initiated, thereby giving a mythological sexual union or divine conflict a hidden cosmological sense too.

Secondly in the text, the form of personified ἀνάγκη is obscure: φύσιν οὖσαν τὴν αὐτὴν seems to specifically mean in snake form (δράκοντα), a form more normally associated with chthonic deities such as the Erinyes, as was implied in the discussion of snake copulation above. It is not clear whether Ananke is also thought to have the other bestial attributes assigned to Chronos/ Herakles (namely the bull and lion extra heads and wings) but serpentine form seems fairly secure.

The connection between Ananke and Adrasteia (see p.183ff.) is also not clarified here; are they different aspects of the same force or separate and if separate, what is their

[161] Translation by West, 1998, p. 178 with a slight modification (καὶ in the fourth line has been translated as 'and' rather than West's 'or').

[162] West, 1998, p97 ff

relationship? Definitely Adrasteia and possibly Ananke too, however, are described as ἀσώματον διωργυιωμένην ἐν παντὶ τῷ κόσμῳ, τῶν περάτων αὐτοῦ ἐφαπτομένην. Again, it is difficult to discern with any certainty what this theogony envisages by this phrase. If something or someone is ἀσώματον it is impossible for them to be διωργυιωμένην unless these are purely metaphorical arms, simply implying influence on a cosmic basis (τῶν περάτων αὐτοῦ ἐφαπτομένην).

These textual obscurities make concrete assertions about the form of Ananke from this text alone unlikely, but it could be a possibility that this cosmology originates from outside the Greek world. Thus discovering its origin might shed some light on these uncertainties. The elemental associations (ὕδατός...καὶ γῆς) could link the Orphic Cosmologies to the mythology of the Near East[163] and also possibly then to early Ionian cosmology but there are no deities here that would correlate precisely to the divine personification of compulsion. There are also parallels with the cosmology of Egypt. In that tradition Thoth, the god of time is consort to Ma'at, the goddess of cosmic order which is a similar notion to the divine union of Chronos and Ananke. In nature, however, Ma'at seems more akin in some respects to the personification of Dike in the form of cosmic order rather than raw compulsion. Herodotus attests that there were supposed links between Egypt and the Pythagoreans/ Orphics[164] but the historian does not enter into detail with regard to the nature of the connection. Thus we cannot link the two theogonies with any certainty simply on the basis of that reference, but we can also not rule out that there is some kind of connection.

The serpentine form could alternatively (as discussed p.143) or additionally be symbolic within chthonic cult and mysticism (since snakes have long been associated with chthonic deity, hero cult, mystical rebirth and continuity[165]) or a genuine description of a mystical revelation. If one is persuaded by the arguments for a shamanistic element of Orphic practice[166], it is possible that such a vision could be experienced in a shamanic 'journey' to the 'otherworld'. Otherwise, it could simply be envisaged as a sexual union in zoomorphic form. Proceeding from this coupling, possibly through union with itself, was produced an egg (from Herakles) which comprised of Ouranos, Ge and a double-bodied god (Athenagoras *pro Christianis* 18, p. 20 DK1B13).

The idea of the possible universality of Ananke is a key issue for all the cosmological

163 As pointed out by West, 1998, p.99ff

164 Herodotus II.81

165 Harrison, 1912, 265ff

166 See Dodds 1951, p.140 ff.

authors under consideration: is she located in one place or does her essence permeate the whole world? This passage implies one specific mystical union which in a normal vision would occur in one place and time thus indicating Ananke is in one location. However Adrasteia, who is incorporeal, is thought of as permeating the entire cosmos and there is a question mark over the extent to which Ananke is identified as amalgamated with her or linked in some way, in which case Ananke would also be omnipresent. The description of the physical form of Ananke/Adrasteia as snake-like and at the same time incorporeal[167] seems to be nonsensical or at the very least rather obscure, like the snake-form Chronos/Herakles with Bull and Lion heads with wings as is typical of mystical texts. One possibility could be that it represents the night sky in some way. The constellation Serpens can be seen in close proximity to that of Hercules (mentioned in this passage as identified with Chronos). There is obvious potential here for the mystical metaphor of the text to relate to real planetary movements in the form of aspects and conjuctions between these two obviously-defined constellations and the planet Saturn (Chronos), thus the theogony is itself a cosmic riddle. Since Orphism was veiled in secrecy, it is impossible to know whether this relationship represented a key element in their cosmological theory. Nearby constellations include Aquila the eagle (hence wings possibly of the bird of Zeus) and Ophiuchus the serpent handler, later associated with Asclepius and Apollo in Ptolemy (both deities that are important within Orphic texts and appear to have influenced the religious environment of Empedokles and Parmenides), while Taurus (bull) and Leo (lion) would also have significant roles in the symbolism of the night sky, particularly in the marking of periods of time.

If this is the case, personified Orphic Ananke is a cosmic deity whose function within this cosmology, although represented in the night sky, is obscure. The notion of cosmic divine compulsion would make more sense if the deity was permeated throughout the universe and if the deity is represented by one constellation, this would not seem to be the case. However, given the mystical nature of Orphic cult, this difficulty could be explained elsewhere in the Orphic texts which have not survived. It is likely that this section of the cosmology needs to explain two aspects of the cosmos, namely physical change and the passage of time. By introducing the forces of Time and Compulsion, these two difficult phenomena are explained albeit in an obscure and mystical manner. Thus this text sits between the need for divine mysticism and the understanding of physical phenomena in a more systematic scientific manner (the isolation of specific causality within the cosmos in a

[167] West, 1998, p.194

more abstract form than Olympian cult).

Damascius' citation of this mystical text, following the precedent of Hesiod and other cosmogonic mythology (Greek, Judaic, Babylonian and Egyptian) gives details of the various deities involved with the cosmogonic process. Here, Ananke can be identified with some conviction as a cosmological primordial deity, rather than an impersonal force within the cosmos. She is conjoined with Time (Chronos), possibly as a consort, with the presence of ἀνάγκη permeating the entire cosmos. As Damascius says, the arms of Ananke '*extend throughout the universe'*. This implies omnipresence and possibly governance by the reference to 'touching its extremities' perhaps with some guiding role. The Orphic mystical text does not stress the controlling or restricting focus implicit elsewhere (such as Parmenides), but could well be an influence on later sources that stress the seeming universality of Ananke. That Ananke is conceived as a key figure cannot be in question, however, and her status as a cosmogonic deity could be seen to be established here as long as the dating of this element of the passage can be positioned in the fifth century as I believe.

## (b) Ananke in Philolaus and early Pythagoreanism

The Pythagoreans also cause considerable difficulties for the scholar wishing to assess precise dating for various aspects of their teaching, since much of their belief system must be pieced together from later writings (largely Plato and Aristotle). However, the two key cosmological passages of Philolaus under consideration can be accurately dated to the fifth century[168]. As with many thinkers originating from Magna Graecia in this period, it is difficult to assign Philolaus to a particular philosophical school with any confidence, particularly since many of these ideological divisions were set up by later theorists rather than being the authors' own philosophical position. Although seeming to veer from the later definitions of Pythagoreanism in some respects, Philolaus is usually classed as Pythagorean and certainly taught in Thebes in a Pythagorean 'school' or 'society' (sunedria)[169].

**Philolaus, DK *Fragment* 44B2 lines 2 – 3 (STOB. Ecl. I 21, 7 a [p. 187, 14 Wachsm.])**

**ἀνάγκα** τὰ ἐόντα εἶμεν πάντα ἢ περαί-

[168] That the fragments discussed here are authentic and date to the fifth century is attested by Huffman p. 101 and 124; Burkert, cites the repeated stress on the concepts limited and unlimited along with kosmos and harmony as reasons to approach them as authentic, Burkert, 1972, p.252

[169] Kirk, Raven and Schofield (1983), p.323

νοντα ἢ ἄπειρα ἢ περαίνοντά τε καὶ ἄπειρα·

*It is **necessity** that everything which exists should be either limited or unlimited or both limited and unlimited.*

The language here is relatively straightforward and can be read, like Gorgias (pages 176ff.) as a simple logical statement albeit one that necessitates a particular world view. ἀνάγκα τὰ ἐόντα seems to define the status quo in Philolaus' cosmos rather than implying a cosmological entity. It is concerned with the ideas of limiters, unlimiteds and harmony, that were all assigned by Aristotle to fifth century Pythagoreans[170] thereby indicating the likely authenticity of the passage (the use of plurals as opposed to the Platonic or Aristotelian singulars adds further weight to this). However, rather than simply being logical necessity, it is possible that this text could utilise the term ἀνάγκα as meaning some kind of force within this universe[171] that is universally applied or that everything that exists is necessary by its phusis. If this is the case, then in order to further analyse this force, one must assess the nature of the object on which the compulsion described by Philolaus is placed (that is τὰ ἐόντα (what exists), which must be limited, unlimited or a combination). If we are to aim for understanding of the role of compulsion, it would aid our quest to have a broad understanding of the cosmological entities it is associated with (limiters and unlimiteds). Kirk Raven and Schofield view this sentence as an important aspect to Philolaus' doctrine of limiters and unlimiteds[172] as does Huffman[173]. As to what limiters and unlimiteds actually were, is not at all clear from this or related fragments although it is illuminated in other authors[174]. Two key theories concerning this have arisen: Barnes posits that limiters are shapes and unlimiteds stuffs[175] thereby presenting Philolaus as a forerunner to Aristotle's theory of matter. Kirk, Raven and Schofield suggest that limiters are odd numbers and unlimiteds are evens while the compounds are products of the two[176], an idea supported by references in Aristotle. The idea of a cosmos based on a numerical premise would certainly fit in well with what we know of the early Pythagoreans. Necessity here seems to be some kind of compelling force that ensures that the cosmos conforms to the requirements of their vision.

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[170] Huffman (1993) p.101

[171] This would align this fragment with the thinking of certain other Presocratic thinkers, notably Leucippus (B2), Democritus (A66 – Arist. Gen.An 789b2) and Parmenides (B8.30)

[172] Kirk, Raven and Schofield (1983), p. 325

[173] Huffman (1993) p. 107

[174] Aristotle Met. A5, 985b23 (DK58 B4 and 5)

[175] Barnes (1979) p.387

[176] Kirk, Raven and Schofield (1983), p.325

The second quotation under consideration is also cosmological, giving more details of Philolaus's discussion about nature of the cosmos, definitions of its component parts and their various relationships.

**Philolaus, DK *Fragment* 44B6, lines 12 – 15 (Stobaeus *Ecl*. I 21, 7d)**

τὰ δὲ ἀνόμοια

μηδὲ ὁμόφυλα μηδὲ ἰσοταγῆ **ἀνάγκα** τᾶι τοιαύται ἁρ-
μονίαι συγκεκλεῖσθαι, οἵαι μέλλοντι ἐν κόσμωι κατέ-
χεσθαι.

*On the one hand, things which are the same and of the same nature have no need of harmony, but on the other, with dissimilar things that are not of the same nature nor evenly matched, it is **necessity** that such things are held together by harmony, if they are to be held together in the cosmos/ an order.*

**Ἀνάγκα** in this passage is treated in a very similar way to the passage above. It could be read as an ontological necessity (this is the phusis of how things are). Conversely, it could be understood as a compulsion or force that ensures that Harmony (a separate entity) holds the dissimilar together. Ἀνάγκη itself is not the bonding agent however, but Harmony has to bind dissimilar unequal things together according to how things must be. This idea could be related to the Atomist notion of ἀνάγκη although here the idea of necessary separation and disunity which is inherent in the Atomist cosmos[177] is not envisaged in Philolaus's system. In addition, here it seems far more likely that necessity is concerned with the phusis of his cosmos rather than being a force within it. The system that Philolaus portrays must exist in a particular state, and there must be necessary relationships between its component parts.

The terminology of these fragments ties Philolaus in with the language of Fifth-Century cosmology and early logicians such as Zeno. The debate as to whether the universe was limited or unlimited was a central concern to early cosmologists – Anaximander clearly envisaging the universe as ἀπείρον while Parmenides conceived of definite binding limits (πείρατα). Within Philolaus's cosmos, although necessity could be a logical construct there is no if x then y statement simply a statement of what is. Philolaus does not write as if ἀνάγκη is a goddess with physical form as in the earlier mystical Orphic text, but certainly implies that the influence must extend throughout the cosmos (as it does in Damascius) since it

[177] Aristotle on Democritus *Simplicium de Caelo* 295, 9

would apply to τὰ ἐόντα πάντα. It is simply a statement of how things are.

A later passage clearly citing a function of Necessity in Pythagorean cosmology is also worth considering at this point simply because, from an ideological point of view, it ties in with the usage of ἀνάγκη already discussed and possibly sheds further light upon the Pythagorean vision of the role of ἀνάγκη in the cosmos.

### Stobaeus, *Anthology,* I.4.7

### Aetius, *De placitis reliquiae,* 321.5

Πυθαγόρας **ἀνάγκην** ἔφη περι-

κεῖσθαι τῷ κόσμῳ

Pythagoras said

***Necessity*** *is laid around the cosmos*[178]

Both Pseudo-Plutarch and Stobaeus contain this quotation (Aetius himself is generally thought to have lived in the 1st or 2nd Century BCE). The passage comes from a chapter outlining ἀνάγκη in the work of various thinkers and since it is framed with the words *Pythagoras said* it is possible that these words form a direct quotation just as the Leukippos passage in the same chapter in Stobaeus' version (Ecl.1.4.10-14) is taken to be. The word περικεῖσθαι (the perfect passive of περιτίθημι) can be translated in various different ways: to lie round about, to lie with arms around something, that something is positioned around or to be worn[179].

Here the positioning of Ananke throughout the universe reflects the nature of ἀνάγκη in the Orphic cosmogony (where her *'arms extend to the ends of the universe'* – see above p.142). However, the Pythagorean excerpt has connotations of surrounding the universe rather than simply moving through it (as the Orphic cosmogony appears to). The idea relates well to the Parmenidean fragment B8.30 (to be examined further below); in particular the notion of an external necessity that lays fetters around the cosmos. The Pythagorean description could refer to a physical force known as necessity. This would imply a separate entity called ἀνάγκη that either encircles the cosmos or is permeated throughout – a kind of

[178] Translation from Burkert in Laks and Most, 1997, p.172. Another translation was given in an earlier publication by Burkert (1972) p.75: ***Necessity*** *hedges the world about*

[179] LSJ

universal quality. The use of the word περικεῖσθαι means that it is unlikely to have a more simple logical/scientific meaning that we find elsewhere since a conception of a 'being' of some description is obviously implied. Although the cosmos may have certain predictable patterns of behaviour (similar to Leukippos B2, where the cosmos is seen to be rationally explicable), the Pythagorean passage does not utilise the more logical and abstract language found in the Philolaus passages and does not establish any proof for this.

**Damon, DK *Fragment* B6, line 2**

καὶ τὰς ὠιδὰς καὶ τὰς ὀρχήσεις **ἀνάγκη** γίνεσθαι κινου-
μένης πως τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ αἱ μὲν ἐλευθέριοι καὶ καλαὶ ποιοῦσι τοιαύ-
τας, αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι τὰς ἐναντίας.

*It is a **necessity** that song and dance arise when there is a movement of the soul and the ones (songs) which are liberal and beautiful create similar (souls) and those which are the opposite create an opposite kind of soul.*

This passage has many similarities both to the Gorgias passage (pages 178ff.) and the Philolaus texts (pages 146ff.) in its approach to ἀνάγκη. Given the phusis of the cosmos (as understood within the Pythagorean teachings) things must behave in a predictable specific way (an ontological *'if x then y'* statement). It is not reification but does perhaps embody an idea of divine compulsion or a harmonious universe compelled to behave in a specific way[180].

## (c) The function of Necessity in the Derveni cosmogony

The finding of the Derveni Papyrus and the cosmogonic commentary presented within it has had a significant impact on the study of cosmogony in the later Pre-Platonic period. In col. xxv l.7-8 of the papyrus, personified ἀνάγκη is described by the commentator as playing a key role in cosmogony.

**Derveni Papyrus Col. xxv. 7-8**

αἰωρεῖται δ'αὐτῶν ἕκαστα ἐν **ἀνάγκηι**, ὡς ἂμ μὴ συνὶηι

[180] Similar phraseology can be seen in Alcmaeon, *Fragment* 4,7-9 and Anaximenes, *Fragment* 3, line 5

πρὸς ἄλληλα.

*Each of them is floating in **necessity**, so that they may not come together with one another.*

This passage comes from a larger discussion on heavenly bodies, namely the sun and moon and their origin. The diakosmesis is described in its earlier stages in Column XXI (lines 1-5) where all the particles are described moving through the governing element of air. Like the atomist atoms in the void, they are seen to move, collide and unite within the air (Greek needed), with their actions governed by the deities Aphrodite, Zeus, Peitho and Harmonia. Following this process, stability was then gained and the author then goes on to describe this stable cosmos. Column XXV (in which ἀνάγκη is mentioned) is largely concerned with the role of the sun in the cosmos followed by the role of the moon and stars. The lines under consideration form part of the discussion on stars, namely how they maintain their position. According to the law of 'like to like' presented in the Derveni cosmology (lines 8-9), the stars should amalgamate to form a rival sun but they are prevented from doing so by floating in ἀνάγκη.

The verb αἰωρεῖται is unproblematic, and should be translated as being lifted up, suspended or floating. It is trickier to establish the meaning of ἐν ἀνάγκηι**.** A correct translation is simply '*in'* or '*within*', however, further meaning may be implied such as '*in the hands of*' or '*within the influence of*'. It is by no means clear as to what the author perceives ἀνάγκη is or exactly what he envisaged physically in this statement. The overarching meaning is made clear from lines 8-9 where the problem of the law like-to-like is raised and the function of ἀνάγκη is defined – it prevents the stars from joining together (ὡς ἂμ μὴ συνὶηι πρὸς ἄλληλα).

Taking this action performed by ἀνάγκη into account (that it prevents the stars from amalgamating), possible translations or interpretations of this passage could then be '*floating in a substance known as necessity'*; '*floating within the influence of necessity'*; '*floating under the jurisdiction of necessity'*. It seems likely, particularly given the subsequent clause outlining the function of ἀνάγκη that the second option is nearest to the intended meaning of the author. Ἀνάγκη could be seen as a kind of 'counter –force' that opposes the

natural tendency drawing like-to-like[181]. Necessity here has a restricting, limiting function (as has been seen in other cosmologies such as Parmenides) and is clearly external to the stars, rather forming them than being an intrinsic part of them.

Since the Derveni author describes his cosmos as arranged according to the desire of the god (column XXV line 10), it seems likely that this desire should extend to the deployment of ἀνάγκη even if this is not explicit in the text. Perhaps the author intends the god to be seen to 'deploy' ἀνάγκη to effect his wishes. The author recognises that the like-to-like rule would necessitate a further force in this cosmos that would explain the separate nature of stars[182] and he terms this force ἀνάγκη.

The Derveni cosmos is similar in some respects to several other Presocratic visions, as is the role of necessity within it. The idea of like-to-like echoes the hypothesis of Philolaus outlined above where ἀνάγκη compels Harmonia to hold together dissimilar items, here it restricts in a different manner, holding similar things apart. There are also echoes of the atomist cosmology, where necessity controls the movement, amalgamation, conglomeration and separation of the atoms: 'a greater Necessity' can force a change of manifestation in any of these respects (as described by Aristotle in an extant fragment on Democritus 68A37 DK). Whereas 'Necessity' in Atomism can clearly be seen to be both a creative and destructive force acting in a mechanical way rather than directed by another, in the Derveni cosmogony ἀνάγκη seems to be only a restrictive force, neither creative or destructive (possibly an agent acting according to the mind of god) that prevents the stars from amalgamating to form a second sun. This function of enforcing the status quo, constraint and preventing change is further developed and accentuated in Parmenides and echoes the earlier usage of ἀνάγκη as implying the status of slavery.

[181] Betegh p.268 outlines various important issues with the phrase ἐν ἀνάγκηι, firstly establishing that it is not common prior to the Hellenistic era. He posits that it is potentially air that exerts this Ananke and that the two could be seen as the same entity particularly given that air is the 'ruling element'. However, although the stars are certainly in the air and ananke, there is nothing in the passage that would suggest that Ananke and air were the same thing.

[182] Betegh p. 272 sees this as a potential amendment to the original hypothesis in line with the way that modern scientists work on theories and modify these.

## (d) Ἀνάγκη in Parmenides

Parmenides' cosmology utilises ἀνάγκη in a number of passages in both the Way of Truth and the Way of Seeming. These have been approached here in fragment order initially for textual commentary and then thematically and/or conceptually to reach conclusions about ἀνάγκη in Parmenidean thought.

### *i) Analysis of Parmenides' texts*

**Parmenides, *Fragment* 28DKB8, 13-18 (I 236, 9)**

τοῦ εἵνεκεν οὔτε γενέσθαι
οὔτ' ὄλλυσθαι ἀνῆκε Δίκη χαλάσασα πέδησιν
ἀλλ' ἔχει· ἡ δὲ κρίσις περὶ τούτων ἐν τῶιδ' ἔστιν·
ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· κέκριται δ' οὖν, ὥσπερ **ἀνάγκη**,
τὴν μὲν ἐᾶν ἀνόητον ἀνώνυμον (οὐ γὰρ ἀληθής
ἔστιν ὁδός), τὴν δ' ὥστε πέλειν καὶ ἐτήτυμον εἶναι

*Because of this, becoming and destroying are fettered, Justice, holding back their release, clutches them. The decision about these matters lies in this: it is or is not. And so it has been decided, just as was **necessary**, to leave on the one hand the un-thought and un-named (which is the untrue road), and on the other the one that is and is genuine.*

These lines come from the lengthy *fragment* 8 that forms part of Parmenides' discussion on the nature of the cosmos. Here he outlines how the cosmos is in stasis, held or at least not released by Dike. He also begins to outline the two ways of understanding the cosmos. Consideration of these is deemed necessary to his cosmological theory.

These lines offer several difficulties for the translator. Line 16 begins a new phrase that relates to the context of the previous clause. Firstly, if we examine the role of Dike, she does not release becoming and destroying, but holds them (lines 13-15). The passage then states that a decision has been made – in other words seemingly made by a being other than Dike (line 15), it is unclear who makes this judgement. The subsequent phrase '*and so it has been decided*' could also be without an agent, some other power, or could imply the agency of Necessity if one links it to the following phrase '*just as was necessary*'. If it is the latter, we need to examine the precise meaning of the phrase. For the former suggestion to make sense, we could translate ὥσπερ ἀνάγκη as '*just as it is necessary*' or '*just as was necessary*' despite the fact that we are confronted by the noun rather than the adjective

ἀναγκαῖος/α[183]. However, this phrase could be translated as '*just as Necessity would have'* or '*just as Necessity judges'*. The latter version would suggest a link between Necessity and Justice with some form of personification for Necessity or at the very least existence as a cognitive being. If one takes this as the definitive text, it does not seem plausible, given the text, to translate the passage 'just as by necessity' (or similar variants) since ἀνάγκη is clearly in the nominative and not the dative and therefore must be the subject of this phrase. However, it is also possible that an iota subscript has been omitted thereby giving an additional potential interpretation with the dative of agency rendering ἀνάγκη as a reified agent with a meaning of '*by means of necessity'* or '*using necessity'*. This would imply that some kind of compulsion was used to maintain the concept of the two ways, an idea that is in line with the use of personified ἀνάγκη seen later in DK B8 (lines 29-32).

**Parmenides, *Fragment* DK 28B8, 29 - 32 (I 237, 10)**

ταὐτόν τ' ἐν ταὐτῶι τε μένον καθ' ἑαυτό τε κεῖται
χοὕτως ἔμπεδον αὖθι μένει· κρατερὴ γὰρ **Ἀνάγκη**
πείρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἔχει, τό μιν ἀμφὶς ἐέργει,
οὕνεκεν οὐκ ἀτελεύτητον τὸ ἐὸν θέμις εἶναι·

*For it is laid down in itself and thus stands fast, remaining the same and stays fixed there; for powerful **Necessity** holds it in the fetters of a limit, which she binds all around,*
*Because it is not right for what is to be incomplete.*

This text, from the same fragment as the first text of Parmenides discussed above, forms a further development of the nature of the cosmos, describing how it is fixed in its unmoving, unchanging state. This situation is brought about by ἀνάγκη. Ἀνάγκη restrains or binds reality using πείρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν, but what exactly is Parmenides envisaging using this terminology? The term πείραρ usually refers to the ends or limits of a thing and is frequently thought of as a spatial restriction. Guthrie points out (1965, p. 38) that there is a strong indication that this restriction has a notion of encirclement given that it was often applied to Okeanos and there is no reason to dismiss this imagery. Δεσμός was an everyday term often used to describe a yoke or halter in farming terms, a mooring cable for seafarers or simply bonds or fetters. Guthrie points out (1965, p.37) that Parmenides seems to use the terms πείρατα and δεσμοὶ interchangeably and does not distinguish between them.

[183] This is the preferred translation of Coxon p.65

The two verbs that govern the subject of ἀνάγκη (ἔχει and ἐέργει) indicate a physical action, particularly in connection with the use of δεσμοῖσιν that is anthropomorphic. We can of course also consider these verbs in the context of a non-anthropomorphic, more abstract action, particularly when we use them in a scientific manner today: for example 'gravity holds us to the earth's surface' or 'magnetism binds iron filings to a magnet'. It is important, however, not to stray too far away from the world of Parmenides. Elsewhere in the Way of Truth, he refers to two other divine beings effecting the same action – Dike (Fr 8.14) and Moira (Fr 8.37). Nowhere in the text do we get an idea that Parmenides is advocating an abstract world of strange disembodied forces, rather he presents us a concrete physical world (perceived according to λόγος or νοῦς rather than the senses) which he is keen to establish as unchanging and timeless. This stasis is maintained by divine powers, personifications who are described to a certain extent in anthropomorphic terms.

As Guthrie points out, Parmenides' style here is reminiscent of Homer, with the ending of line 31 lifted directly from *Iliad* 13.706 and 22.5 where Fate (Moira) fetters individuals, rendering them motionless[184]. The use of these terms for binding (δεσμοὶand πείρατα) also has a precedent in the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* l.129, although this passage is concerned with the liberation from bonds as oppose to the fettering of an individual[185]. This adds weight to his account by using language with the pedigree of these esteemed authors. The introduction of three such powerful cosmic deities (Dike, Ananke and Moira) would obviously have an impact too, since their combined powers provide a compelling and divine underpinning of this cosmological viewpoint.

**Parmenides, *Fragment* DK 28B10, 14(I 241, 17)**

...εἰδήσεις δὲ καὶ οὐρανὸν ἀμφὶς ἔχοντα

ἔνθεν [μὲν γὰρ] ἔφυ τε καὶ ὥς μιν ἄγουσ(α) ἐπέδησεν **Ἀνάγκη**

πείρατ᾽ ἔχειν ἄστρων.

*...and you will know too the surrounding heavens from where it (the moon) grew and also how **Necessity**, guiding, fettered it (the heavens) to hold the limits of the stars.*

[184] Guthrie, (1965), p.35

[185] Guthrie (1965) p.35

This passage from the second half of Parmenides' poem, *The Way of Seeming*, forms part of a fragmentary cosmology along more typical Presocratic lines than that outlined in the Way of Truth[186]. This section concerns the heavens and heavenly bodies – notably the moon and stars and in that respect is similar to the passage examined from the Derveni papyrus.

Necessity here in the nominative (as line 30) is associated with three actions: ἄγουσ(α) leading/ guiding (l.6), ἐπέδησεν she fetters/ binds (l.6) and ἔχειν to have/ hold (l.7). This indicates again that ἀνάγκη is a restricting or binding personified cosmic force and she also seems to be controlling the action (ἄγουσ(α)). It is not evident from this fragment, however, whether she is under the direction of another cosmic deity. The cosmos in the *Doxa* has fire as its dominant element and a goddess at its centre who '*steers all things*', if this goddess directs everything, that must include ἀνάγκη, however, this relationship and its nature cannot be discerned from this fragment. There is even an argument that the goddess who steers all things could be ἀνάγκη herself given her pivotal role in this instance.

The use of language is very similar to that employed in Passage 2 (Fr. 8. 30), and similar points regarding the physicality of the action and the noun πείρατα should be noted. Necessity is restraining the cosmos, thereby compelling it to behave in a particular manner, here ensuring the stars follow a particular course, previously (Fr.8.30) to remain in stasis. Schreckenberg has suggested that this is rather like the kind of restriction placed upon a gang of slaves by a neck chain or fetter[187] and certainly the overarching power wielded by Necessity in this regard is as devastating. However, it is by no means apparent that Parmenides views ἀνάγκη in this way, since there is no indication that he imagines the universe literally chained together. The relationship between the two paths of truth and seeming is a complex one but there are parallels between the two, the presence of ἀνάγκη being one of them and indeed the way her actions are described. In this regard, it seems safe to say that Parmenides does not think it logically viable even in the *Way of Seeming* to conceive of a cosmos without ἀνάγκη. Ἀνάγκη seems to hold the universe to its course or stasis and is a necessary component in both the *Aletheia* and *Doxa*.

[186] This fragment has also been assigned to the end of the Proem following line 32 Bicknell p.629-31 an assertion largely based on the future tenses of the verbs.

[187] Schreckenberg note 85

### *ii) The location of necessity in Parmenides*

The location of reified ἀνάγκη is not easy to discern: the question as to whether she is transcendent or immanent is not explicitly answered in Parmenides. In the *Aletheia* (DK B8, 29 – 32) the logic of the cosmos would imply that nothing can exist outside what is and thus the location of ἀνάγκη must be within the cosmos. However, ἀνάγκη is described as holding the limits of 'what is' (τά ἔοντα) thereby suggesting that she is outside *being* itself. This in itself seems to present an unresolvable contradiction within Parmenides' cosmology. However, he could envisage that the *phusis* of *being* includes a boundary or limit of which a necessary aspect is the necessity that holds it in place. If viewed in this way, ἀνάγκη would be a deity without individual concrete form that restricts the cosmos, in much the same way that necessity seems to form an integral part of the Atomist world. Although described as holding the limits or boundaries of the cosmos, Necessity would surely also have to be within the universe to restrict change inside the cosmos too. If an omnipresent constraining force in the cosmos is part of Parmenidean cosmological theory is not explicitly described, however, and thus the exact location of Necessity is ambiguous. The *Doxa* (DK B10, 6) envisions ἀνάγκη as immanent within the cosmos, forming part of the celestial system (like the Derveni and Orphic systems). Although similar vocabulary to f8.30 is employed, ἀνάγκη is not described as being outside the cosmos but as the constraining force that restricts the movements of the stars to that which is ordained. Thus in the Way of Truth and the Way of Seeming, there is an idea that the universe has to be limited. This idea is expressed in both sections using ἀνάγκη phrases.

### *iii) Personified Necessity in the fragments of Parmenides*

The issue of agency and personification is an important one (see the introduction p.11 for the criteria that justify a categorisation of personification). Does Parmenides always use ἀνάγκη as an active agent within his cosmology or are there other uses too? DK 28B8, 13-18 does not seem to use personification[188], rather necessity forms part of a logical statement describing the phusis of Parmenides' cosmos. As a consequence of the argument concerning what is and what is not, Parmenides concludes that it is necessary that what is '*unthought and unmade'* cannot exist and that this, as well as being logical also relates to the phusis of his static world. The road in which there is potential for things to come to be from what is not named or what does not exist at that time is not a true road according to the laws of the cosmos he has outlined.

[188] Unless there is an iota subscript missing from the text

The other fragments, DK 28B8, 29 - 32 and DK 28B10, 6 show a personified ἀνάγκη. This being does display some human attributes: she is described holding fetters in both passages. However, although being given human skills, this does not necessarily represent an anthropomorphic deity in the mind of Parmenides and could merely be poetic language. What is clear is that this being (and there is no doubt a separate being is implied here) has very definite powers of control, coercion and constraint.

If we consider the personified passages as depicting a goddess, ἀνάγκη appears to exist as part of a group of deities that determine the workings of being (Aletheia) or the cosmos (Doxa). In the proem, the author is seen to travel with a number of female deities (the daughters of the Sun), encounters Dike who holds the key to the gates of night and day and then journeys on to the unnamed goddess who will teach him the cosmological visions outlined in the remainder of the poem. In the Aletheia, three cosmic female deities are mentioned: Dike (line 14), Ananke (line 30) and Moira (line 37). All three are controlling or restricting being by means of some kind of limit or fetter. In the Doxa, there are fewer mentions of female controlling deities in the text we have, however, this could simply be down to the fragmentary text, since far less of this portion of the poem survives. Exactly where ἀνάγκη lies within this system with regard to relative power within a hierarchy is hard to discern, as mentioned above, she could indeed be the ruling female deity herself.

Given that the cosmological deities in the Aletheia all perform the same task, an important question is whether Parmenides sees them as separate entities or uses these names to refer to one power. Moira is the most ancient cosmological force, featuring in Homer and Hesiod on numerous occasions, Dike is a figure who develops later and seems more at home than Moira does in the world of the late sixth and fifth centuries BCE. Moira's function derives from the notion of sharing out allotted parts and is linked to the notion of order based on predestination. The notion that being's allotted part is to remain static is perhaps one aspect of its fettering – the other two deities perhaps provide reasons why this is the case. Dike represents an inherent idea of cosmic justice, that there is an inherent 'rightness' to the way that the cosmos is arranged. Ἀνάγκη, on the other hand represents an inherent need – the universe must be this way because it has a compulsion to be so; it cannot resist the need which is part of its fabric of being. By distinguishing these three divine

powers, Parmenides is offering three separate but related divine powers achieving the same end and pre-empting any criticism of his theory by covering all bases.

As to who or what controls these divinities, again a close reading of the text does not offer a concrete solution. *Fragment* 28B8.16 suggests that something or some being is judging the correct cosmological form. As we saw above (p.153), this passive verb (κέκριται) has no named agent, so it is left to the reader to assign the maintaining of stasis. Since the judgement has been performed ὥσπερ ἀνάγκη it could be inferred that ἀνάγκη governed this action. However, there is no other evidence for this arrangement; the remainder of Fragment 8 seems to point (as discussed above) to ἀνάγκη being one of three forces/ beings that control being, with none of them appearing to be pre-eminent. Indeed in the Doxa ἀνάγκη is certainly described as working in one part of the cosmos (the heavens) and performing an action (maintaining the position of the stars). Everything in the universe is done under the jurisdiction of 'the goddess who steers all things'. Unless ἀνάγκη herself is this goddess which, as has been mentioned, cannot be totally eliminated, she appears to be an agent working within a set of rules ordained by another.

Upon examination of the actions ἀνάγκη performs, there is a striking similarity to accounts by other authors and her consistent role within Parmenides. In this poem, ἀνάγκη clearly restricts movement and creates stasis. In *Fr*.8.30, this is the restriction and compulsion to stasis of *Being*, whereas in *Fr*.28B10.6, it is the restriction and compulsion to stasis of the stars in the heavens. In the latter example, one is reminded of the Derveni cosmology where ἀνάγκη performs a very similar action. Both passages show a universe with very clear πείρατα in contrast to Anaximander's ἄπειρον.

### *iv) Possible conclusions for Parmenidean ἀνάγκη*

The poem has provoked a good deal of debate, not least as to the actual categorising of the text. Should it be classed as philosophical doctrine, quasi-religious mysticism or perhaps an amalgamation of both? There is a school of thought that the poem should be viewed as a spiritual or mystical journey or possibly as an account of a shamanic experience. Much of this discussion is related to the proem in which the querent (Parmenides) is taken on a journey by chariot to a goddess who divulges the mysteries of the cosmos to him. Framed in these terms, the poem certainly has several characteristics one would normally associate with initiation into a mystery religion, cult or secret society; namely a journey framed in the

terms darkness into light and the revelation of secret knowledge[189]. There is also good evidence that there were communities in Magna Graecia that might be described as Orphic or Pythagorean who used mystical texts as an inherent part of their religious beliefs. Such texts may have been influential to Parmenides.

Burkert argues compellingly that the Proem is to be taken at face value rather than as an allegorical text[190], citing various aspects of Parmenides' own life and other related issues as evidence. The Pythagoreans and Orphics, certainly used the written word as a medium for the transference of 'secret' knowledge. Some of this knowledge is thought to have had an eschatological function, in particular the gold lamellae[191], and some consideration must be given to whether the journey outlined by Parmenides could be eschatological in nature and is a symbolic journey to the next world. If this is the case, what part does personified ἀνάγκη play?

Bearing this context in mind, one could view ἀνάγκη as a powerful cosmic goddess within the surreal and mystical world fostered in this theological environment. It is possible that all the female divine entities that Parmenides mentions throughout the poem – the unnamed goddess in the Proem, Dike, Ananke, Moira and the goddess in the *Doxa* – were different faces of one divine force, like Anaxagoras's Nous. Such a goddess would be easier to understand and relate to if split down into different personal entities with different foci of power and control. The mention of ἀνάγκη in both cosmological parts of the poem indicates that aspect of the divine power to be particularly significant in this field (cosmology and cosmogony) with specific influence upon control, constraint and compulsion.

The understanding of this and its magnitude are similar to claims regarding the revelations experienced by initiates into mystery cults such as Orphism. It is impossible to know whether the text of Parmenides is intended to be used or was used in this way, possibly in conjunction with some kind of ritual as an initiatory tool into the Parmenidean School. However, it is not beyond the realms of possibility, given the geographical location of the author and the philosophical context of Orphic/Pythagorean thought. This is of course

[189] Burkert, Das Proömium des Parmenides und die Katabasis des Pythagoras, *Phronesis* 14 (1969) 1-30

[190] Ibid.

[191] Although some gold leaves contained magical formulae, the earlier examples are generally thought to be eschatological in form. Zuntz, 1971, 275 ff.

not intended to denigrate the advances in logical argument pioneered by Parmenides in the *Aletheia*; these revelations could form an integral part of the journey into knowledge of the initiate mirrored in the chariot journey in the proem with ἀνάγκη as the personification of deductive argument. If this is the case, personified ἀνάγκη would represent an intellectual initiation framed using mystical terminology.

An alternative possibility is to deny the mystical nature of the text and view it as a non-religious rationally explicable account of the universe. This hypothesis could posit that the text is only framed in a mystical manner in order for it to be taken seriously, suggesting that all fifth century cosmology had to be written in this way. Parmenides could be using the language of mysticism to make a philosophical point detached from deity similar to the universe posited by the Atomists. If this were to be the case, where would ἀνάγκη lie within this cosmos bereft of deity and how would the role and function of ἀνάγκη be defined? It could simply be a personification of divine constraint, a force within the universe that needs to be there within the logical framework of the cosmology for the stasis to be maintained.

If we view the proem as a simple allegory for enlightenment, it could be that any of the cosmic deities mentioned by Parmenides should be understood as physical but disembodied 'forces' rather than divine entities. Taking the *Aletheia* first, it is somewhat easier to view *Ananke* as such a force than it is for *Dike* and *Moira*. It is easier today to conceive of a force that compels simply in and of itself (like magnetism or gravity) than a force of ‘rightness’ or random destiny, which are rather more alien to contemporary reasoning. If we take this road, the route of philosophical rationalism, we can define ἀνάγκη as an intrinsic and extrinsic force in the *Aletheia*, that constrains ‘what is’ to stasis. The actions of ἀνάγκη are related to the power of Dike or what ‘ought to happen’ and also that of Moira, ‘what must happen’. However, it is the action of ἀνάγκη that seems to physically act on the cosmos thereby compelling it to remain in its spherical stasis. It is very difficult so ascertain why Parmenides would need to mention Dike and Moira at all if he were simply viewing the universe in this way.

In the *Doxa*, the view of ἀνάγκη is a little different to that presented in the *Aletheia*. ἀνάγκη could be governed by an overarching force personified as a female deity that Parmenides does not name. This does not fit well with the rationally explicable viewpoint, indeed, why would the *Way of Seeming* need to be there at all, were this Parmenides'

objective, since he outlines in the *Proem* that the *Doxa* is not to be believed and represents that view trusted by the unenlightened? Is this second description of Necessity completely fictitious therefore and not to be trusted?

The allegorical or non-allegorical roads both offer plausible readings of Necessity in Parmenides. The former has far more in common with Pythagoreans, Orphics and the Derveni Cosmology whereas the latter is more akin to the vision of the Atomists (a force of constraint though as opposed to a whirlwind-like force of compulsion). At first glance then, it would appear impossible to establish with any certainty which (if indeed either does), adequately describes Parmenides' own beliefs. It could be that the poem should be read in both ways, the author thus ensuring that he was conversing with philosophers who either had mystical leanings or those with a more physical outlook. By leaving it deliberately open yet obscure, it would provide satisfaction to those who believed they had 'cracked' the code as it were and also provide a multitude of different interpretations that could all be right to the interpreter. For any interpretation, the differing forces at play within the two cosmological avenues, like Necessity, must be understood by the reader in a uniform way. The fact that ἀνάγκη had been viewed as a cosmological deity in Orphism and Pythagoreanism, both of which predate Parmenides, is evidence for this idea: a concept that would be understood if one were to read the text non-allegorically or if you were taking the mystical elements at face value.

## (e) Necessity in the Atomist world view – a step towards a purely mechanistic universe?

### *The sources*

A significant difficulty in the examination of ἀνάγκη in Atomist cosmology is the very small number of original quotations from the early Atomists themselves. The most important passage is Leukippos DK67B2 (Aetius I, 25, 4 (D321) in which the author seems to consider ἀνάγκη to be a central force within cosmology: -

**AËT. I 25, 4 (D. 321) DK67B2**

Λεύκιππος πάντα κατ' ἀνάγκην, τὴν (1)
δ' αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν εἱμαρμένην. λέγει γὰρ ἐν τῶι Περὶ νοῦ·
οὐδὲν χρῆμα μάτην γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ λόγου τε
καὶ ὑπ' **ἀνάγκης**.

*Leukippos – everything is according to Necessity, which is the same as what is brought into being according to what is allotted/ decreed by Fate, for he says in 'Concerning Mind' -* ***"Nothing happens at random, but everything is rationally explicable and due to Necessity."***

This fragment has been widely discussed[192], largely owing to the obscurity of its precise meaning. In addition to the numerous translations possible for the Greek, the lack of context and the possible agenda of the doxographer Aetius both add to the possibilities for its interpretation, particularly since we know very little about Aetius himself.

## *i) Leukippos Fragment 2, the philological debate*

My discussion begins with the issue of the correct translation of μάτην in the first half of the fragment. This word could be translated in a number of ways, each choice transforming the overall meaning of the fragment. μάτην could be translated as 'in vain' (not achieving the aim aspired to), 'at random' (lacking order and structure), 'causelessly'[193] (lacking a cause) or 'aimlessly'[194] (lacking a purpose). As we can see, if one were to take the options 'in vain' or 'aimlessly' as translations for μάτην here, there would be a notion of a teleological cosmos. However, this does seem to be a translation that would be rather difficult to defend given the evidence provided by later critics of Atomism, in particular Aristotle and his school. Aristotle is at great pains to discredit the Atomist cosmos for being purposeless and random and governed either by *necessity* (*Gen.An*.789b2 DK A66) or *chance and spontaneity* (Phys.196a). It therefore seems to be inappropriate and illogical to translate μάτην in this way since it would contradict the other evidence we have with regard to Leukippos' theory. 'Causelessly' has a quite different implication for the cosmological vision of Leukippos, in that it does not indicate purpose, but does seem to demonstrate some kind of process and system within the cosmos. With this meaning, everything that occurs does so because there is some cause or other that makes it perform in this way. If this were the case, it would be a progressive vision, since the notion of 'causes', although possibly implied by earlier thinkers, was not explicitly explored until Aristotle, unless it was of concern to Leukippos (which it is impossible to know given the evidence available). This notion of 'causelessly' could be seen

[192] Key attempts to decipher the meaning of this short piece of text have been offered by Bailey (1928) p.90, Guthrie (1965) p.414-419, Edmonds (1972) and more recently twice by Barnes (1979) p.110-124 and (1984).

[193] Guthrie 415; Liddell & Scott 1996 p.1084

[194] Barnes (p.149-150) provides a lengthy philological analysis of the precedents and also the prior scholarship on the matter, drawing the conclusion that perhaps the best conclusion is that it should be translated as 'aimlessly'. This does seem to point towards the conclusion that 'things have and achieve ends and goals' (Barnes p.151), therefore indicating a purpose within the cosmos of Leukippos and therefore possibly a kind of teleology.

to tie in to a certain extent with the final possible translation of 'at random', in that both seem to promote order within the cosmos, some kind of set arrangement into which things necessarily fall. However, 'at random' could also equally apply to the previously discussed meaning 'in vain' or 'aimlessly', and is therefore a more versatile translation which implies that Leukippos is providing us with neither a teleological world view nor one that is focused on causation in particular. It simply indicates that Leukippos is proposing a cosmos that has some kind of inherent organisation and structure to it rather than one in which occurrences are utterly haphazard and accidental.

The second part of the fragment presents us with further interpretational dilemmas. Firstly, it is critical yet difficult to ascertain the context and hence the meaning of λόγου while secondly it is vital for my study to get to grips with the relationship of λόγου to ἀνάγκης. A central issue in deciding the best translation is assessing the meaning and juxtaposition of the two prepositions in this part of the fragment 'ἐκ' and 'ὑπ'' as well as the linkage of the two nouns with 'τε καὶ' as well as the best translations of the nouns themselves.

When considering Leukippos's use of λόγου it is essential to consider what precedents had been set by earlier or contemporary cosmologists in order to see if there is a relationship in context and therefore usage. Herakleitos used the term in his exploration of cosmology in a number of ways[195]. In Leukippos, it could mean simply 'word', 'story' or 'what is said' (Burnet p.133), but this seems inappropriately simplistic. Elsewhere, there has been a translation of proportion, measure, calculation or right reckoning[196]. However, the predominant reading is to see the λόγου as a description of the inherent order of the cosmos being rationally understandable. With this notion, λόγου is not seen as any kind of over-riding governing force, simply that the cosmos can be understood in a logical and systematic way – there is a predictable sequence of events.

Alternatively, one could take Leukippos's λόγου as related to the Anaxagorean concept of *nous* (a ruling intelligence) as the governing force within the universe. As this work of Leukippos is supposedly called Περὶ νοῦ, one hypothesis could be that ἐκ λόγου could be translated as 'by reason' or 'by means of reason[197]. The *logos* would then be an intelligent

[195] Kirk (1954 p.37ff
[196] Hussey in Long (1999) p.91
[197] Barnes p.153

entity rather than a quality of the universe and we would get a notion of a controlling intelligence. Hence this translation would clearly support a teleological viewpoint, thereby making Aristotle's criticisms of the Atomist cosmology appear bizarre and nonsensical.

However, from the context of this fragment, it is equally possible that Leukippos simply means 'reason' as 'rationally explicable'. In other words, in a mechanistic universe there is a logical system that appears to be governed by some kind of Necessity (a notion we will explore a little further shortly). Everything that occurs can be consistently explained as part of this system. The cosmos just works in a particular way with its characteristics defined using *logos* or reason, describing the system which is arranged necessarily in a particular way.

The exact meaning of ἀνάγκη is also crucial to our understanding of its function within Atomist cosmology. The usage of ἀνάγκη certainly indicates an imperative with regard to events in the cosmos. The issue is, however, not as simple as the Atomists using ἀνάγκη as a catch all explanation for how the cosmos must be. We must try to discern something of the nature of this ἀνάγκη from this and other fragments and what it was supposed to bring about in the cosmological process. Questions to be considered include whether ἀνάγκη is extraneous or immanent, self-motivated or regulated by an external agent, governed by teleological purpose or simply part of a mechanistic universe, a physical entity or an abstract idea, a supernatural force or a scientific paradigm? However, given the theoretical context lacking in this fragment, we must look elsewhere for answers.

### *ii) Democritus Fragment 144*

Leukippos' follower and the leading Pre-Socratic proponent of the Atomist school was Demokritos. Although we have a far larger number of fragments from Demokritos than we do from Leukippos, nearly all those that contain the word ἀνάγκη belong to his ethical maxims and are not concerned with cosmology. There is only one, on the subject of music, which has been considered to have some bearing on his cosmology[198].

[198] Edmunds (1972)

**Democritus, *Fragment* DK68B144 (Philodemus - *de music*. Δ 31 p. 108, 29 Kemke)**

Δ. μὲν τοίνυν, ἀνὴρ
οὐ φυσιολογώτατος μόνον τῶν ἀρχαίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἱστορουμένων
οὐδενὸς ἧττον πολυπράγμων, μουσικήν φησι νεωτέραν εἶναι
καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀποδίδωσι λέγων μὴ ἀποκρῖναι **τἀναγκαῖον**,
ἀλλὰ ἐκ τοῦ περιεῦντος ἤδη γενέσθαι.

*Demokritos, however, was a man who was not only the most proficient at physics of the men of old, but also there was nobody who was so busy asking many things of those who were enquiring as he was, he said that* ***'music was younger'*** *and he outlines the cause saying:* ***'Necessity was not separate (from it), but that it (music) came to be from that which was moving around already.'***

This passage has certain difficulties with regard to translation: in particular the section μὴ ἀποκρῖναι τἀναγκαῖον where the meaning is not clear. We see the phrase as meaning *'saying Necessity was not separate'* which could either imply that there is a certain Necessity in the creation of music or that Necessity is itself a material substance. I consider that this means that music developed within the atoms and their kinesis caused by Necessity within the Atomist cosmos. This is why music is described as νεωτέραν since it comes to be within the vortex rather than being there of its own right at the origin of the cosmos. Demokritos then goes on to explain how Music came to be (γενέσθαι); that it came to be from what was already around and moving ἐκ τοῦ περιεῦντος ἤδη, presumably the vortex and atoms within that.

Since Philodemus's Epicurean background is unlikely to put him at odds with Democritus from a philosophical point of view, we can assume that he would not be trying to discredit him. The quotation appears in a general discussion on the composition of poetry and the context seems to indicate that like any art, music is produced by Necessity. This is likely to mean that the necessity which is inherent within the movement of atoms is also the cause here[199].

As we can see, there is little in this passage that actually sheds light on the form of Necessity or its nature. However, it is clear that Demokritos believes ἀνάγκη is within the

[199] Some discussion concerning the ambiguity of this passage is put forward by David Armstrong in his chapter *The Impossibility of Metathesis* (Obbink 1995 p.213) in which he claims that there are hidden meanings and allegory within it. However, I have looked pragmatically at this passage and it seems to be self-explanatory.

matter of the universe. This means that it is intrinsic to the stuff of the cosmos, yet also seems to cause particular entities to come into being, thereby being some kind of integral causational agent.

### *iii) Aristotle*

Aristotle sheds some light on the Atomist cosmological view, since he discusses and evaluates it in some depth. In the main he wishes to take issue with it as anti-teleological and therefore as being at odds with his core teachings. Despite this agenda, however, it is still possible to build up a reasonably good picture of the position and function of ἀνάγκη in the Atomist teachings that Aristotle had access to and to see how it fits into wider Atomist theory.

There is an extended analysis of causation in Physics IV, where Aristotle, having previously established his hypothesis of the four causes, goes on to take issue with those who have an alternative understanding of the universe. One of those he chooses to isolate allocates the responsibility for ordering events in the cosmos to τὸ αὐτόματον and appears to apply to Atomic theory. However, this is not explicit since he does not refer to them by name.

**Aristotle, *Physics* 196a, lines 1 - 3**

ἔνιοι γὰρ καὶ εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μὴ ἀποροῦσιν·
οὐδὲν γὰρ δὴ γίγνεσθαι ἀπὸ τύχης φασίν, ἀλλὰ πάντων εἶναί
τι αἴτιον ὡρισμένον ὅσα λέγομεν ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου γίγνεσθαι
ἢ τύχης.

*For those within this school are perplexed as to whether these (spontaneity and chance) exist or not; for they say nothing comes to be from chance, but that there is a cause for everything being set down, in such instances where we say it comes to be from the spontaneous or by means of chance.*

**Aristotle, *Physics* 196(a) 24-28**

εἰσὶ δέ τινες
οἳ καὶ τοὐρανοῦ τοῦδε καὶ τῶν κόσμων πάντων αἰτιῶνται τὸ
αὐτόματον· ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου γὰρ γενέσθαι τὴν δίνην καὶ
τὴν κίνησιν τὴν διακρίνασαν καὶ καταστήσασαν εἰς ταύτην
τὴν τάξιν τὸ πᾶν.

*There are certain men who make the spontaneous the cause of the heavens and all the worlds; for they say the whirl, the movement, the setting apart and the setting up of the placement of this and everything all come to be from the spontaneous.*

Since Aristotle refers to τὴν δίνην καὶ τὴν κίνησιν as being an intrinsic part of the theory he is outlining in the above passages, this tends to indicate that he is considering the Atomist school. Here he assigns the position of guiding power within the universe to chance or spontaneity. If the above does apply to Demokritos as is generally accepted, Aristotle appears to contradict himself elsewhere where he identifies ἀνάγκη as the guiding force in the Atomist universe.

**Aristotle, *Gen. An.,* 789b, lines 2-4 (DK 67A66)**

Δημόκρι-
τος δὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκεν ἀφεὶς λέγειν πάντα ἀνάγει εἰς **ἀνάγκην**
οἷς χρῆται ἡ φύσις

*Demokritos omits to mention the final cause, he points towards **Necessity** for everything that nature needs.*

In this key text Aristotle, naming Demokritos in his discussion, criticises his non-teleological cosmological view describing ἀνάγκη as the directive force in the world. This assigns to ἀνάγκη a directive role within the cosmos taking the place of Aristotle's final cause, an idea that Aristotle would find absurd and illogical. Aristotle's assessment of guiding powers within Atomist cosmology outlined above also appears to indicate that Chance and Necessity are interchangeable notions; they are both used in the same way in similar contexts. However, since Aristotle's cosmological and physical theory is firmly rooted in his theory of the four causes and in particular the final cause, it is fair to predict that he is not going to be overly beneficent in his assessment of rival theories such as that of the Atomists! Perhaps he is assimilating Chance and Necessity in order to reduce the system that the Atomists had proposed to absurdity.

### *iv) Diogenes Laertius*

Diogenes Laertius explicitly refers to the fact that both Demokritos and Leukippos see ἀνάγκη as central to their world view. For Leukippos we can see that ἀνάγκη is not only central to the origin of the cosmos, but also forms part of its working mechanism.

**Diogenes Laertius IX.33.14, DK67A1.34**

εἶναί τε ὥσπερ γενέσεις κόσμου, οὕτω καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ φθίσεις
καὶ φθοράς, κατά τινα **ἀνάγκην**, ἣν ὁποία ἐστὶν <οὐ> διασαφεῖ.

*Just as the origin of the universe, so is its growths, decays and ruins, according to a particular **necessity**; of which kind this is, he does not make clear.*

Here Diogenes is not clear as to the precise role of ἀνάγκη and its nature which could either indicate that he is not aware of it or confused by it. Although this clearly indicates that the Atomists saw this ἀνάγκη as central to the entire process of their atomic universe, it does not really shed light on how this process was envisaged.

Similarly, Diogenes' account of the life of Demokritos mentions ἀνάγκη as being a key part of the cosmological process but is not at all clear on the exact role that it plays or, indeed, the precise nature of this ἀνάγκη. However, it does refer to ἀνάγκη being identical to the δίνη which forms a vital part of the atomic universe.

**Diogenes Laertius IX 45.1, DK67A1**

Πάντα τε κατ' **ἀνάγκην** γίνεσθαι, τῆς δίνης αἰτίας οὔσης τῆς
γενέσεως πάντων, ἣν **ἀνάγκην** λέγει.

*Everything comes to being according to **Necessity**, the cause of the creation of all being a vortex, which he says is **Necessity**.*

This passage can be interpreted in two ways: either the vortex itself is actually the embodiment of ἀνάγκη or the entire process is governed or controlled by Necessity. Diogenes Laertius is a late source whose primary goal is biography and not necessarily to set down an accurate account of the philosophical doctrines of his subjects, although he would doubtless wish for this to be as accurate as possible. However, the meaning of this text could add to our understanding of the form and function of ἀνάγκη and therefore needs to be interpreted in relation to other evidence about the vortex and Necessity. Owing to its ambiguous nature it is impossible to use this text alone to explore this question.

## *v) Other sources*

The ancient commentators themselves complain that the nature of Necessity in Atomist cosmology is obscure (D.L. 2.71.20-21; Hippolytus 2.74.26-29).

The later doxographic tradition entertained further opinions on the role of ἀνάγκη within Atomist cosmology, but the references are tantalisingly vague and often create more questions than they answer[200].

**Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Mathematicos*, IX.111.3 - IX.112.2 (DK68A83)**

ὅτι
γὰρ κινεῖται ὁ κόσμος... ἤτοι οὖν ὑπὸ φύσεως κινεῖται ἢ ὑπὸ
προαιρέσεως ἢ ὑπὸ δίνης καὶ κατ' **ἀνάγκην**. ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μὲν δί-
νης καὶ κατ' **ἀνάγκην** οὐκ εὔλογον.

*For the cosmos is in motion…and it might move either by nature or by purpose or by vortex and by **necessity**. But of its being down to the whirl and according to **necessity** it is not sensible.*

This passage comes from a lengthy passage in which the Stoics, in particular Zeno, are criticised. In this section, Sextus jumps between the Stoic concept of the cosmos and that of Democritus and the atomists, seeming to add atomism to the end of the discussion on Stoic cosmology. Sextus is vague about the mechanisms of the Atomist cosmos and does not see an inherent logic to it. He finds the concept of the vortex and Necessity irrational or at the very least not properly thought through (οὐκ εὔλογον) and goes on in the following lines to give a logical explanation[201] which form the interim lines between this passage and the one below. Sextus' discussion does not, however, inform us in any more detail how exactly the

[200] Methodologically of course I have in other areas restricted myself solely to usage of the word Ananke that definitely occurred before the date of 400BCE. In this instance, I have considered references with a distinct bearing upon our earlier sources since I do not consider that they would insert the word Ananke unless it were used by the Atomists themselves in the lost works. It is referred to with such frequency that it is unlikely to be a creation of the doxographers and, given the irrefutable usage of the word by our earliest Atomist Leukippos, it is clearly a concept that was referred to in this context by the Atomists themselves.

[201] ἤτοι γὰρ ἄτακτός ἐστιν
ἢ διατεταγμένη ἡ δίνη. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄτακτος, οὐκ ἂν δυνη-
θείη τεταγμένως τι κινεῖν· εἰ δὲ μετὰ τάξεώς τι κινεῖ
καὶ συμφωνίας, θεία τις ἔσται καὶ δαιμόνιος· οὐ γὰρ ἄν
ποτε τεταγμένως καὶ σωτηρίως τὸ ὅλον ἐκίνει μὴ νοερὰ
καὶ θεία καθεστῶσα. τοιαύτη δὲ οὖσα οὐκέτι ἂν εἴη δίνη·
ἄτακτον γάρ ἐστιν αὕτη καὶ ὀλιγοχρόνιον.

atomists viewed these two features of the cosmos. We can say with certainty, however, that necessity is a force within the atomist cosmos which is involved somehow with the movement of the vortex.

**Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Mathematicos*, IX. 113. 4 – IX.114.1 (DK68A83)**

ὥστε κατ᾽ ἀνάγ-
κην μὲν καὶ ὑπὸ δίνης, ὡς ἔλεγον οἱ περὶ τὸν Δημόκρι-
τον, οὐκ ἂν κινοῖτο ὁ κόσμος.

*Thus the universe would not move according to **necessity** and through the vortex as the followers of Democritus said.*

This second quotation merely re-iterates some of what was stated in the first and does not give us any further information on the nature of Necessity.

**Epicurus, *Epistula ad Pythoclem*, 90. 1-54-6; (Diog. X 88ff) Aetius I 4,1 ff (DK67 A24)**

οὐ γὰρ ἀθροισμὸν δεῖ μόνον γε-
νέσθαι οὐδὲ δῖνον ἐν ᾧ ἐνδέχεται κόσμον γίνεσθαι κενῷ κατὰ
τὸ δοξαζόμενον ἐξ **ἀνάγκης**, αὔξεσθαί τε ἕως ἂν ἐτέρῳ προσ-
κρούσῃ, καθάπερ τῶν φυσικῶν καλουμένων φησί τις. τοῦτο γὰρ
μαχόμενόν ἐστι τοῖς φαινομένοις

*For it is not necessary for an aggregation alone to come to be nor a vortex in empty space in which a cosmos is allowed to come to be, according to those who believe in **necessity** (**compulsion**),and to increase by means of collisions, as one of the physicists says. This conflicts with the senses.*

Here Epicurus identifies a group of physicists who see necessity as a cause but he does not enlighten us as to the nature of necessity. It is somehow involved with the mechanism of the atomist cosmos: the collisions of the atoms and the function of the vortex. However, as he disagrees with this hypothesis, he does not go into it further presuming that the reader (Pythocles) will have a good understanding of their teachings. The Physicists he refers to are not named but the general description of the cosmos including the vortex would place them before Aristotle amongst the circle of Leukippos and Demokritos.

### *vi) The Form of Atomist ἀνάγκη*

Bringing the evidence of the direct quotations and the doxographers together, we must try to piece together what we can about the nature of ἀνάγκη in the atomists. A good starting point is the form of Necessity – what did it look like and where was it if, indeed, it is a physical entity at all?

A vital question to ask regarding ἀνάγκη is whether the Atomists view it as a physical entity or an abstract idea. If it were to be a physical entity, it would surely have some kind of form that was tangible and discernible. If this is the case, then one would expect there to be some kind of discussion of this form within the Atomist writings themselves or, supposing that such passages were lost, in those writers commentating upon them.

In Diogenes Laertius IX 45.1, necessity is actually identified as being the vortex or whirl. If this were to be the case, then our questions regarding the form of ἀνάγκη would be answered. If it were the vortex, we could also infer that in view of the Atomist teaching, it is immanent and is part of the mechanistic system that makes up the Atomist cosmological world view. This does appear to be rather a simplistic solution to what had seemed a complex set of questions, yet ἀνάγκη has indeed been described as a whirlwind in Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound* (1050-1054) and perhaps this idea could form part of the standard imagery associated with the concept. In the Aeschylus passage, ἀνάγκη (in the genitive ἀνάγκης) is described as possessing, controlling or being in the form of στερραῖς δίναις (relentless whirlwinds) which could be a real physical phenomenon or a metaphorical usage. Such a force of nature might descend upon humankind wreaking havoc and destruction while man is powerless to do anything about it.

Linked with this identification, one must consider Schreckenberg's identification of ἀνάγκη as defined by its function as a bonding agent.[202] In his account, (following his semasiological analysis in which he considers the etymology of ἀνάγκη discussed on p.9) he links it to Greek words associated with physical bondage. He concludes in light of this that the vortex is a mechanism for bonding atoms together, either with the bonding power of ἀνάγκη driving this action or that the vortex is itself a physical embodiment of ἀνάγκη.

[202] Schreckenberg (1964) p.115-6 *: Wenn nun einerseits das Wesen von ἀνάγκη Bindung ist und anderseits Verflechtung immer auch Bindung meint, wird deutlich fuer die Atomisten gerade ἀνάγκη die letzte Ursache der Atomflechtung ist.*

He takes as further evidence for this Demokritos' reported description of the vortex as a sieve or waves beating upon the shore (Sextus Empiricus adv. math. 7.117 DK B164). This widely discussed passage, however, not only implies that the vortex is necessary but also appears to imply that movement is a Necessity too (again not that this *kinesis* is the form of Necessity itself)[203]. Here, both the separation and arrangement of the particles are actions performed by both the vortex as well as the inherent motion of the atoms. This movement of the atoms does seem to be part of their intrinsic nature,[204] and according to this world view the vortex could not be created without this necessary movement. This clearly undermines Schreckenberg's hypothesis that Necessity must be the bonding action of the vortex, and he does have to concede that Atomist Necessity seems to take on the role of both the binding *Love* and separating *Strife* from Empedoclean cosmology.

Necessity not only governs generation (i.e. the bonding process, like *love*) but also corruption or disintegration (just like *strife*)[205]. Moreover, this simple conclusion that ἀνάγκη is the vortex, although tempting, cannot be the case if we take all the other pieces of information into account. ἀνάγκη is frequently mentioned without the vortex and is not always identified with it[206].

From this analysis of the sources it is clearly impossible to describe the form of ἀνάγκη given the sources that we have. Diogenes' quotation that implies a physical form for Necessity is clearly not a correct interpretation of Atomist theory.

### *vii) The debate concerning whether Atomist Necessity is extraneous or immanent*

The question of whether Necessity lies within or without the cosmos is a difficult one, made even trickier by the idea put forward by the Atomists that there are numerous cosmoi, each one coming to be and ceasing to be.[207] Certain scholars, notably Guthrie[208], view the Atomist Necessity as an 'internal cause' – a force that moves behaviour of the atoms within

[203] As has been pointed out by Edmunds (1972)
[204] Edmunds (1972) and Guthrie (1965) p. 414-9
[205] This is highlighted in Wooley's review of Schreckenberg (1967) as a weakness in his approach
[206] This view is clearly supported by Edmunds (1972)
[207] Hippolytus DK A10
[208] Guthrie (1965) p.414-9

the cosmos. However, to define it so simply ignores the dilemma of numerous universes and their creation. If Necessity is an intrinsic part of their creation then surely it could lie both within and without the cosmos in a similar way to the Christian notion of the Holy Spirit as a cosmologically intrinsic aspect of divine power that is also an extraneous creative one. The only glimpse that we can obtain of an Atomist description of this is Demokritos DKB144. Here necessity is described as an intrinsic part of what was moving around already (i.e. the atoms in the vortex) but is also responsible for the creation of music.

Aristotle's analysis seems to present Necessity as intrinsically linked to the vortex, the kinesis and the atoms, and so you could summarise this view as Necessity being immanent. This view has clearly been of some interest to Guthrie, but as previously mentioned, it does not take account of the notion of separate universes. The doxographic texts similarly shed little light on the 'location' or 'position' of Necessity as on the whole, there is no sense of place in their discussion at all. However, there is no doubt that it is thought to be present in everything, perhaps having more similarities to a force or quality rather than a concrete locatable object.

### *viii) The Function of Atomist Necessity*

We can see that the physical form of Necessity is almost impossible to pin down. It does not even appear that the Atomists themselves thought this to be an important consideration or else they did not have the verbal means to adequately describe this obscure concept. Its function (what it does), on the other hand, can be more easily discerned. It is clearly linked with all the workings of the Atomist cosmos: the vortex, the atoms and their kinesis as well as their conglomerations, amalgamations and breaking apart from one another. We need to consider, however, whether there is some kind of reason or law guiding this process. Is Necessity following a set of rules laid down by another being or force or is it simply doing what Necessity does? There is a clear precedent in other early cosmologists to link such actions with an external directive force that is usually personified in some way. It is essential in our assessment of Necessity therefore to consider whether this is the case or not within the Atomist cosmology.

The Eleatics, in particular Parmenides, certainly saw Necessity as playing a key role in the mechanism of the cosmos like Necessity does in the Atomist cosmos. Parmenides identified ἀνάγκη with δίκη, both concepts clearly being viewed as female deities. However, Parmenidean ἀνάγκη is obviously extraneous to the universe, since it appears to 'bind' the

world into its various forms using its fetters. In being motionless, which he claims is ordained by Necessity (B8.30), Parmenides' universe is unlike the cosmos of the Atomists and therefore no cause is needed. This is clearly at odds with the ever-moving Atomist world and there are no similarities between the way that the action of Necessity is described in Atomism and the teaching of the Eleatic school apart from that of control.

Empedokles sees Necessity as key within his vision of the cosmos. Rather than static, however, he sees the cosmos as moving in a set sequence or process. He sees within this the four roots or elements whose behaviour is then governed by *love* (conjunction) and *strife* (separation) as part of a process which is governed by a 'mighty oath' and ἀνάγκη. This idea of a moving cosmos with attraction and repulsion does have some similarities to that of the Atomists. However, in Atomism, there is no idea of a 'mighty oath' that might dictate the behaviour of Necessity, it is simply seen to behave in a particular way because that is what it does by its very nature. Like Empedokles, Anaxagoras had a supernatural directive force that governed his cosmos: the concept of *nous*. This indicates rationality and causation in the cosmos. This brings us back to Leukippos DKB2. The inherent dilemma concerning its translation and whether or not it implies that the Atomist universe is mechanistic or teleological.

As mentioned above, Aristotle goes to great pains to discredit the cosmological view of the Atomist school. Since he is teleological in his standpoint, most clearly outlined in his discussion of causation in the *Physics* (196a), one can surely assume that Necessity and Atomist cosmology as a whole are mechanistic. There is nothing in the summary of the form and function of Necessity outlined above and deduced from the original sources that would indicate otherwise. This would have been a shocking idea to most individuals in the ancient world, even those of the most philosophical nature. In a world dominated by supernatural beings, a cosmos that ran itself according to intrinsic 'scientific' necessity would have been virtually incomprehensible, while to us today a world that worked in any way other than being governed by scientific rules would appear to be absurd and random. In order to get a closer understanding of Necessity within the Atomist cosmos, it is beneficial to examine the correlation with such modern scientific understanding, in particular forces.

## *ix)* Is Atomist Necessity Supernatural or Scientific?

If we are to examine the relationship between Necessity in ancient Atomism and compulsion in modern science, some unexpected yet undeniable similarities present themselves. Certain atoms have an intrinsic compelling need to join with other atoms[209]. You could almost say that there is a Necessity upon them. This family of atoms, for example Nitrogen, will actively seek to complete their outer shell by forming a covalent[210] bond with another Nitrogen atom (although some covalent bonds are formed between different elements). This type of bond produces a substance similar to the conglomerates described within ancient Atomism. This covalent bond is formed by the two atoms sharing an electron by means of a 'cloud' of electrons which forms much the same function as the vortex in early Atomism. Another type of bond, the ionic bond forms when an element, still having an intrinsic compulsion to complete its shell with electrons will perform this by 'stealing' an electron from another element, such as *NaCl* – sodium chloride. The two elements are now attracted to each other since one has a negative charge and the other a positive. However, this bond is easier to break than the covalent bond. Such substances are aggregates, just like those within the Atomist cosmology. Bonds between atoms can be broken through a number of means - sufficient energy such as high heat levels, the 'bullet' method whereby either high energy electrons or photons are 'fired' at the bonded atoms, or simply that a substance that is more irresistibly attractive to one or other of the bonded atoms. This is in no way dissimilar to the concept of a 'stronger Necessity'[211] being imposed upon the atoms as was envisaged by the early Atomists.

This all sounds persuasively scientific, and according to this analysis, the Atomists seem to have been truly ahead of their time. They have posited a 'law' (that the action of Necessity upon atoms is a necessary and intrinsic part of the cosmos) which appears to work in the same way as, for example, the laws of gravity or magnetism. Bailey explains this as 'everything follows the law of its own being'[212] (in other words, ontological phusis). However, Newton's *Law of Gravitation* was established through strict mathematical

[209] I was assisted in this part of the chapter through discussions with two Chemists: Dr A. Curtis, Plymouth University and Dr Angela Hawker, Plymouth College

[210] A covalent chemical bond between two atoms occurs when electrons in the outer shell of each atom are shared to create stability between the attractive and repulsive forces inherent within each atom.

[211] Simplicius ἕως ἰσχυροτέρα τις ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἀνάγκη (2.93.37-38) [Plut.] *Strom*. 7 (2.94.22-23)

[212] Bailey, 1928, p.139

formulae and observation of replicable processes through the scientific method of experimentation. The Atomists' 'scientific' law of universal Necessity is not really what we could call a 'law' of physics but is an unprovable theory based on an inherited set of ideas that are equally unprovable. So is a modern law of physics any more provable? To some extent, even today certain common forces, such as gravity or magnetism, about which there are many theories, are barely understood from the standpoint of what they actually are and why they behave in the way that they do, much like the Necessity in Atomism. The effects of these 'modern' laws can, however, be observed, measured and potential effects on materials calculated to the extent that such forces or causes can be counteracted, unlike ancient Necessity.

That aside, it is a true scientific advance to consider the world as a system bereft of supernatural yet personal controlling powers. We could, as many have previously, term this as mechanistic. However, viewing the cosmos as a well-oiled machine, does in my mind take something away from the inexorable power of Necessity to conjoin and separate atoms within the apparent chance world of the vortex. There is certain inevitability about events in this cosmos, yet equally a 'random' element for any particular atom. Although there are a limited number of predictable actions that can happen to it no prescriptive time or sequence for these actions is given. Obviously, this does not offer a completely random selection of processes for this one atom to be subject to, but it is also not entirely predestined either. Despite Leukippos saying that nothing happened at random, it does seem to be impossible to predict the exact course of processes a particular atom might participate in, as is the case in particle Physics today. If Leukippos' ἀνάγκη was a response to Anaxagoras' cosmological world view, it is clear that by removing *nous* from the equation, he has conceived of a world view that looks forward to Newtonian physics and the modern scientific method.

## (f) Non-personified reification in biological and cosmological passages

There are many cosmological texts or those about the world of nature which reify necessity but do not specify the form of the reification; rather the focus is on the effect of the influence of necessity. As these have been discussed at length in the Cosmology section (pages 142ff.) there is no need to repeat this textual commentary. However, within the consideration of personification in more abstract terms, one must recall that philosophical groups like the Atomists gave the name necessity to a non-descript entity that acted within the cosmos without feeling the need to explain its form. This kind of usage (where necessity is identified as a specific thing because of observable consequences of its physical actions)

becomes more prevalent towards the end of the fifth century and can be found in a variety of authors (including Herodotus I.67.15-17, II.152.14-16, Aristophanes, *Clouds,* 376-378 and 1075, Leucippus, *Frag*.2, Philolaus, *Frag*.6.12-15 and Euripides, *Cyclops,* 332-333).

## (g) 'Logical' Necessity in Cosmology and Pseudocosmology

The following examples are concerned with cosmology or pseudocosmological scenarios and imply that there is some kind of predictable basis or phusis to the universe. They contain circumstances framed in terms of a logical statement which could be phrased as *if x then y*. This kind of necessity phrase is also noted in a number of other contexts which pertain to one off situations; but here the passages are more abstract in nature and presented as universal truisms rather than a one off circumstance.

Within the realm of philosophical cosmology, logical necessity statements of phusis are seen in writers like Philolaus (see pages 146ff.) and later on within the Eleatic school. Although within the same school, Parmenidean necessity is personified and does not form an '*if...*' hypothetical statement; the following passages, from Melissus and Zeno are good examples of this kind of construction.

**Zeno, *Fragment* DK29B1 lines 2 - 4**

εἰ δὲ ἔστιν, **ἀνάγκη** ἕκαστον μέγεθός τι ἔχειν
καὶ πάχος καὶ ἀπέχειν αὐτοῦ τὸ ἕτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑτέ-
ρου.'

*If it exists, it is **necessary** for each to have magnitude and thickness, and for one part of it to be away from the other.*

**Zeno, *Fragment* DK29B1 line 10**

οὕτως εἰ πολλά ἐστιν, **ἀνάγκη** αὐτὰ μικρά τε
εἶναι καὶ μεγάλα· μικρὰ μὲν ὥστε μὴ ἔχειν μέγεθος,
μεγάλα δὲ ὥστε ἄπειρα εἶναι.

*Thus if many things exist, it is a **necessity** that they are both small and large; so small so as not to have magnitude, largeness as to be unlimited.*

**Zeno, *Fragment* DK29B3 line 5**

εἰ πολλά ἐστιν, **ἀνάγκη** τοσαῦτα εἶναι ὅσα ἐστὶ καὶ
οὔτε πλείονα αὐτῶν οὔτε ἐλάττονα.

*If many things exist, it is **necessary** for them to be as many as they are and neither more nor less than this.*

All three of these fragments reported in Simplicius come from Zeno's refutation of those who challenge Parmenides' fundamental teaching against plurality. His dialectic approach, written in prose (unlike that of his teacher), presents a series of 'proofs' which are presented as a series of a hypothetical claims, many of which include necessity statements in the form of '*if x ... then y is necessary'*. The argument is outlined and analysed by Guthrie (1978), p.88ff and since the way in which necessity is used is not particularly complex, there is no need at this point to discuss the logical implications of his hypothesis or its inadequacies as they have no bearing on the usage of necessity. It is interesting to note, however, that despite any ambiguities in the logical process, the use of a hypothetical logical necessity adds weight and authority to Zeno's refutation, presenting a situation that appears to be concrete factually. As we will see later in this discussion, the potential for proving the ridiculous by using this method can be seen in the work of Gorgias in his attempt at pseudocosmology.

**Melissus, *Fragment* DK30B1**

ἀεὶ ἦν ὅ τι ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται.
εἰ γὰρ ἐγένετο, **ἀναγκαῖόν** ἐστι πρὶν γενέσθαι εἶναι
μηδέν· εἰ τοίνυν μηδὲν ἦν, οὐδαμὰ ἂν γένοιτο οὐδὲν.

*It always was what it was and always will be. For if it came to be, it is **necessary** that before it came to be, it was nothing; now if it was nothing, it would in no way come to be as nothing comes from nothing.*

**Melissus, *Fragment* DK30B7, lines 4 - 8**

καὶ οὔτ' ἂν ἀπόλοιτο οὔτε μεῖζον
γίνοιτο οὔτε μετακοσμέοιτο οὔτε ἀλγεῖ οὔτε ἀνιᾶται·
εἰ γάρ τι τούτων πάσχοι, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἓν εἴη. εἰ γὰρ
ἑτεροιοῦται, **ἀνάγκη** τὸ ἐὸν μὴ ὁμοῖον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ
ἀπόλλυσθαι τὸ πρόσθεν ἐόν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐὸν γίνεσθαι.

*And it will be neither destroyed nor increase nor change its composition, nor suffer pain or anguish; for it were to suffer any of these it would not still be one. For if it were to alter, it*

*is **necessary** that what exists would not be the same, but for what previously existed to perish and what did not exist to come into being.*

**Melissus, *Fragment* DK30B7, lines 34 - 35**

**ἀνάγκη** τοίνυν πλέων εἶναι, εἰ
κενὸν μὴ ἔστιν. εἰ τοίνυν πλέων ἐστίν, οὐ κινεῖται.
*It is a **necessity** now that it is full, if it is not empty. If it is now full, it does not move.*

Like Zeno, Melissus makes use of logical necessity statements to support his argument for the Parmenidean idea of unity and against plurality. These passages form part of a *reductio ad absurdum* of plurality[213] which is underpinned by these necessity constructions.

Such a usage is also employed by the Sophist Gorgias in a pseudocosmology that has been devised to demonstrate that the inclusion of such constructions although sounding impressive and authoritative can also lead to ridiculous conclusions.

**Gorgias, *Fragment* DK82B3 line 38**

τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὂν
οὐδὲ γεννῆσαί τι δύναται διὰ τὸ ἐξ **ἀνάγκης** ὀφείλειν ὑπάρξεως μετ-
έχειν τὸ γεννητικόν τινος.
*(for the non-existent cannot generate anything) because it ought, out of **necessity** to partake in a certain productive existence.*

**Gorgias, *Fragment* DK82B3 line 70**

ὥσπερ γὰρ εἰ τοῖς φρονουμένοις συμβέβηκεν εἶναι λευκοῖς, κἂν
συμβεβήκει τοῖς λευκοῖς φρονεῖσθαι, οὕτως εἰ τοῖς φρονουμένοις
συμβέβηκεν μὴ εἶναι οὖσι, κατ' **ἀνάγκην** συμβήσεται τοῖς οὖσι μὴ
φρονεῖσθαι.
*If white were a possible attribute of what is considered, "being considered" would also have been an attribute of what is white; similarly if "not to be existent" were a possible attribute of what is being considered, **necessarily** "not to be considered" will be a possible attribute of what is existent.*

[213] Guthrie (1978) p.105

The logical language used: *if...., then....* and *necessarily* provide a phrase that has far more in common with the dialectic pioneered by Zeno than the majority of texts from the fifth century. Even the cosmological texts discussed earlier (pages 142ff.) depend upon a belief system that underpins any necessity within them. The more logical of these, such as Melissus or Philolaus, still use a given premise within their belief system to underpin the reasoning behind the compulsions referred to despite the logical construction of the necessity phrases. Gorgias' statement is not dependent upon a religious premise; rather he constructs a linguistic necessity which is true because of the sense of the words rather than a subjective ontology. It is likely that this logical framework is intended to be a parody of just such earlier thinkers, particularly since through such reasoning he arrives at the opposite conclusion to that of Parmenides[214]. Whatever the intention of Gorgias, his use of necessity indicates that it formed a vital aspect and standard form of early logical reasoning.

Another pseudocosmology is presented in an obviously humorous manner by Aristophanes in the *Clouds*. There are a number of necessity phrases included in the description of this surreal Cosmos ruled by the divine Clouds.

**Aristophanes, *Clouds*, 376 -378**

ὅταν ἐμπλησθῶσ' ὕδατος πολλοῦ κἀναγκασθῶσι φέρεσθαι
κατακριμνάμεναι πλήρεις ὄμβρου δι' **ἀνάγκην**, εἶτα βαρεῖαι
εἰς ἀλλήλας ἐμπίπτουσαι ῥήγνυνται καὶ παταγοῦσιν.

*whenever they are quite full of much water, they are compelled to be carried, by **necessity** they precipitate when filled with rain, then they fall heavily into each other and shudder and clash*

**Aristophanes, *Clouds*, 404-407**

ὅταν εἰς ταύτας ἄνεμος ξηρὸς μετεωρισθεὶς κατακλεισθῇ,
ἔνδοθεν αὐτὰς ὥσπερ κύστιν φυσᾷ, κἄπειθ' ὑπ' **ἀνάγκης**
ῥήξας αὐτὰς ἔξω φέρεται σοβαρὸς διὰ τὴν πυκνότητα,
ὑπὸ τοῦ ῥοίβδου καὶ τῆς ῥύμης αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν κατακάων.

*when a dry wind has been raised and is enclosed (by the clouds) it inflates from within, just like a bladder, thereupon according to **necessity**, having burst it is carried out with vehemence because of its density, burning itself completely because of its rushing and force.*

[214] Guthrie (1971) p.194

These two passages come from Socrates' alternative explanation of the cosmos and the nature of the divine Clouds as he addresses Strepsiades. He adopts the language of the Atomist cosmologists (pages 162ff.) to explain some of the workings of this surreal and ludicrous universe. These are cases of an 'if x then y' ontological necessity of phusis. In the first passage concerning the creation rain (lines 376–8) the cosmos is set in motion mechanistically by some kind of compulsion or necessity that is described as a whirl in the sky (ἥκιστ᾽ ἀλλ᾽ αἰθέριος Δῖνος (380)). The second passage of pseudocosmology concerns a 'scientific' explanation of the thunderbolt that does not involve Zeus (lines 404–7) but necessity instead. In this text, the terminology is deliberately similar to that employed by cosmologists; the course of events is carried along by compulsion or necessity. In neither of these texts are we given much information about the nature of this compulsion apart from that it could be in the form of a whirl or vortex (as the Atomists believed), perhaps this could be considered a reification but it is by no means definitely the case.

# (vi) Eschatological Necessity

Eschatological necessity is related to the idea of divine compulsion in cosmology but it is a distinct category. This section explores the relationship between ἀνάγκη and other underworld deities; particularly pertinent is the Orphic Cosmology of Damascius (pages 142ff.), which suggests there are links between the cosmological aspect of ἀνάγκη as has been explored thus far and the role Necessity might play in eschatology. Interesting evidence for the role of Necessity in the judgement process the Underworld can also be seen on vase paintings, particularly those from S. Italy.

The two key literary sources for this topic are Empedokles and Pindar, who both have personified necessity in the underworld as an active participant in the process whereby souls journey through to the next stage in their existence.

## (a) ἀνάγκη and other underworld deities

In the Orphic cosmology DK1B13, ἀνάγκη is identified or associated with the goddess Adrasteia. Damascius is not explicit about the way in which the two goddesses are connected: it could be that they are both present and separate from each other, or they could both be joined with Chronos/Herakles, or there could be an implication that they are two names for the same entity in a similar way to their male counterparts. There are distinct similarities between the ancient concepts of ἀνάγκη and Adrasteia. Adrasteia the 'inescapable' or 'inevitable' has obvious similarities to that of necessity in that both compulsion and inescapability imply actions that cannot be avoided. Although the names of the two deities have a clear etymology, their roles in the belief systems of the Greeks are more obscure. Adrasteia is sometimes described as an Orphic goddess but this tells us little about her function within that doctrine and it is not necessarily a viewpoint held in antiquity. It is also possible that there are links between Ananke and Nemesis, since Adrasteia has been viewed as identical to Nemesis in the period under discussion (West, 1998, p.194).

Ἀνάγκη in her cosmological function has also been associated with Dike (Parmenides see pages 153ff.), the embodiment of divine law and is a popular component of fifth century cosmologies. If there is an idea of irresistible compulsion inextricably linked to cosmic justice, surely this is almost inseparable from one aspect of cosmic vengeance or at the very least ideologically associated with it. Therefore, the identification of Adrasteia with Nemesis at the earlier date and later on with ἀνάγκη need not cause significant conceptual problems. The fact that there seems to be come conflation or identification of the two

deities underlines the inescapability of the power of ἀνάγκη power, possibly also alluding to the consequences for anything attempting to act in a contrary manner. That Necessity is deployed by an unnamed judge in the process of judgement in the underworld is also a plausible scenario, given evidence from other passages in which Necessity is an agent performing tasks of compulsion or constraint deployed by other deities[215].

It has been suggested[216] that ἀνάγκη became involved with the soul's destiny at a later date thereby taking on the eschatological functions of Adrasteia and Nemesis; much like Lachesis, her daughter, in Plato *Rep* 617d, or Chrysippus' assertions that Fate = Atropos and Adrastea and Ananke and Pepromene. However, as the last part of this chapter explores, eschatological ἀνάγκη can be seen as early as Pindar, thereby indicating that Plato's depiction of ἀνάγκη could derive from earlier accounts.

## (b) Vase paintings of ἀνάγκη

Although the scope of this thesis is primarily based on literature, there are a few vase paintings that could shed light on the literature and elucidate some of the obscurities, particularly in the eschatological texts. These are detailed by Erika Simon LIMC (pages 757-758) and I will deal with them in a roughly chronological order.

There is only one vase that falls within the time period under consideration, an Attic red figure lekythos (Moscow II B117 in the Pushkin Museum). Only identified relatively recently, the vase depicts Ἀνάγκη (inscribed) with wings and a torch in the manner of the Furies[217] dating to circa 460 BCE (Simon (1981) p.758). Although there is no context for the figure, the association with the Furies is obvious and must be viewed in context with the texts to be discussed.

[215] Numerous examples can be viewed including Eur. *Hec*. 583-4, Hom. *Od*. 4.556-8 and Aesch. *P.V.* 103-5

[216] West, 1998, p.194

[217] (Pushkin Museum, Moskow, published in Die griechische Vase. Wiss. Ztschr. Univ. Rostock 16, 1967, 481-482)


Plate 1: Moscow II1B117[218]

Later vases from late Fourth-Century Magna Graecia, however, give further clues to roles for Ἀνάγκη in the underworld[219] and although falling outside the time period provide valuable iconographic evidence and thus warrant discussion.

The first, a volute krater (Naples H3222) previously discussed by Guthrie[220] and Harrison[221], depicts an eschatological scene in which ἀνάγκη is positioned above Sisyphus holding a rhabdos (stick for beating). The krater is Apulian and has been attributed to the Darius Painter. Although the vase has been extensively and in some places badly restored, the name ἀνάγκη can be securely assigned[222].

Her clothing (buskins and a short long-sleeved chiton) is very similar to the typical depiction of a Fury in vase painting[223], indeed there is literary evidence from within our period that suggests that ἀνάγκη was viewed among the Furies, along with Tyche, Nemesis and Moira (Eur. *fr*. 1022). In addition, as we saw above (pages 142ff.), there appeared to be some kind of identification or conflation of Ananke with Adrasteia, who in turn had been identified with Nemesis.

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218 This image is taken from http://www.theoi.com/Gallery/N2.1.html
219 Simon (1981) p. 758 Basel 1421 circa 330BCE and Naples H322 circa 330 BCE
220 Guthrie (1993) p.189
221 Harrison (1922), p. 602ff
222 Harrison (1922), p.605
223 Aellen (1994) p.32-33

Plate 2: Naples H322[224]

Ἀνάγκη (whose identity is confirmed by an inscription) is similarly attired in a Paestan Lekane (Basel 1421 Plate 3) depicting Cadmos and the Dragon attributed to Asteas . In this vase (not eschatological in subject) ἀνάγκη is seen to emerge from the ground (in the centre of the illustration) and gestures towards Cadmos, perhaps having been deployed by the gods to ensure the outcome of the fight and the subsequent foundation of Thebes[225]. Simon (ibid.) takes the view that in this context one could also read in a further connection to later Orphic-Pythagoreanism and the κύκλος Ἀνάγκης (circle of rebirth).

Plate 3: Basel 1421[226]

[224] Image from http://www.iconiclimc.ch

[225] Aellen, 1994, p. 42-43

[226] Image from http://www.iconiclimc.ch

Taken along with the literary evidence, such vases clearly demonstrate that an understanding of ἀνάγκη as a personal deity potentially in an underworld context existed in Magna Graecia and Attica at that time. The geographical location of the two later vases also demonstrates that in the Fourth Century in Southern Italy, Ἀνάγκη was probably viewed as an underworld deity.

## (c) Eschatological texts

Arguably the most obvious eschatological text including Ananke is Plato's Myth of Er, which falls outside the period of time under consideration (composed 380 BCE). However, Plato may well have been influenced by the thought of late Fifth-Century philosophers and mystical writings in his depiction of the goddess Ananke who possesses a spindle which supposedly represents the cosmos. This spindle is controlled by the divine Ananke and her daughters the Moirai, a depiction that bears some relationship to a passage from Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound* (lines 511-518) discussed on p.201ff. In other passages, Necessity seems to be deployed by humans and deities in a number of scenarios[227], notably there are parallels with Necessity's deployment in the arena of the underworld (Eur. *Hipp*. 1385-1388 page 66). Similar concepts can be seen in the eschatological views of two citizens of Acragas – Theron (to whom Pindar dedicates his second *Olympian Ode*) and Empedokles (*Fr*. 115, 116 and *Strasbourg Papyrus* Ensemble D) which predate the Platonic text and fall within the scope of this thesis.

### *i)* ἀνάγκη in Pindar's *Olympian Ode* II

The latter part of the poem, written some time after the famous victory of 476BCE in the chariot race at Olympia of Theron, tyrant of Acragas[228] takes the form of an unusual eschatology somewhat removed from the better known Hesiodic view in content but not in style, and similar in sentiment to that found in Pindar *fragments* 129-31 and 133. It seems to represent the personal beliefs of certain citizens from the area, including the subject to whom the ode is dedicated, and clearly indicates a belief in reincarnation not dissimilar to that professed in Orphic cult or Pythagoreanism. This process is not one of divine justice despite the reference to judging here; it seems to be more associated with a complex sequence of ritual and moral behaviour that will lead to stages of metempsychosis. The

[227] Examples include Eur. *Hec*. 583-4, Hom. *Od*. 4.556-8 and Aesch. *P.V*. 103-5
[228] Woodbury p.597

presence of ἀνάγκη within this process could link it to the cycle of life mentioned above – such a sequence is a necessary and must happen.

**Pindar *Olympian Ode* II 56-60**

θανόντων μὲν ἐν-
θάδ' αὐτίκ' ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες
ποινὰς ἔτεισαν—τὰ δ' ἐν τᾷδε Διὸς ἀρχᾷ
ἀλιτρὰ κατὰ γᾶς δικάζει τις ἐχθρᾷ
λόγον φράσαις **ἀνάγκᾳ**·

*Those of the dead that are lawless in mind pay the penalty straight away here [sc. on earth] – but the sins committed in this realm of Zeus are judged below the earth by one who pronounces sentence using/ by means of hostile **necessity**.*

In this passage, there are issues with the translation of several words. The sins (ἀλιτρά) are judged below the earth (κατὰ γᾶς). However, it is unclear who is passing the judgement at this point as δικάζει has no obvious subject. Since this judgement is associated with ἐχθρᾷ... ἀνάγκᾳ, it would be helpful to discern who is passing judgement and λόγον φράσαις. Various scholars have put forward suggestions; in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the '*dread indefiniteness*' (Gildersleeve 1885) or '*solemn uncertainty*' (Donaldson 1868) were praised, thus negating the need for a name for this judge. Indeed Farnell (1932) felt the uncertainty to be more impressive than a concrete name. Garrod (1907), on the other hand, would have the ἀλιτρά themselves as the subject, taking δικάζει to mean '*pleads cause*', but this has not generally been accepted. However, there is also a real sense that ἀνάγκη herself is involved in the process. If we take the dative as requiring an agent, then ἀνάγκη could be employed or deployed by the one judging to ensure the sentence is carried out. Since Persephone had a strong cult following in Sicily, it could be that she may be the intended judge but is not mentioned possibly owing to the secret mystical nature of her cult. Another possibility is that ἀνάγκη (or in this case 'Ananka') was originally in the nominative, thereby making far more sense of the phrase. On the other hand, when considering the role of Necessity in this eschatological vision, one could simply translate the above passage with a general meaning that judgement in the underworld is binding and compelled to be a particular way, without implying the presence of another entity in the process at all. This would entail perceiving ἀνάγκη not as a personification, merely a force that is imposed within a process during the soul's eschatological experience. However, Empedokles' text is clearer with regards to a personification of ἀνάγκη.

## *ii)* Empedokles

The relationship between ritual purification, metempsychosis and ἀνάγκη is further illustrated in a more explicit way by Empedokles's *Fragments* B115, B116 and Ensemble D from the *Strasbourg Papyrus*.

The original format of Empedokles's work has been subject to a good deal of debate in recent years. The context for the passages included in our study of ἀνάγκη would thus be subject to change which could have implications for our interpretation of the text. Until recently, the account of Diogenes Laertius which stipulates that Empedokles was the author of two main philosophical works *Peri Phuseos* and *Katharmoi* (Diogenes Laertius, VIII, 77 DK 31 A1) extending to 5000 lines, has been taken literally, with no major scholar questioning the two work theory. However, recent scholars, including Catherine Osborne, Brad Inwood and Simon Trépanier have questioned this assertion, citing the lack of any earlier evidence for this and putting forward the single work hypothesis. Kingsley, on the other hand in his article *Empedocles' Two Poems* (1996) provides very good evidence for the two book model unconvinced by the single volume hypothesis. If a single work is accepted, as opposed to the two works that formed the basis for two influential discussions, those of Wright (1982) and Guthrie (1965), the location of the fragments within the work has to be revised and consequently our interpretation of them. In this discussion, I have taken both opinions into account with the context appraised for either textual format and pointed out where the positioning would have an impact upon any conclusions about ἀνάγκη.

**Empedokles *Fragment* DK B115**

ἔστιν **Ἀνάγκης** χρῆμα, θεῶν ψήφισμα παλαιόν,
ἀίδιον, πλατέεσσι κατεσφρηγισμένον ὅρκοις·
εὖτέ τις ἀμπλακίησι φόνωι φίλα γυῖα μιήνηι,
<νείκεΐ θ'> ὅς κ(ε) ἐπίορκον ἁμαρτήσας ἑπομόσσηι,
δαίμονες οἵτε μακραίωνος λελάχασι βίοιο,
τρίς μιν μυρίας ὥρας ἀπὸ μακάρων ἀλάλησθαι,
φυομένους παντοῖα διὰ χρόνου εἴδεα θνητῶν
ἀργαλέας βιότοιο μεταλλάσσοντα κελεύθους.

(Hippolytus Ref. VII, 29,14 (ll. 1-2, 4-8) and Plutarch de exilio 17, 607c (lines 1,3,5,6)

*There is an edict of **Necessity**, an ancient decree of the gods, eternal, sealed with broad oaths: when anyone sins and pollutes his own limbs with bloodshed, who, by his error makes false the oath he swore – spirits whose portion is long life – for thrice ten thousand years he wanders apart from the blessed, being born throughout that time in all manner of forms of mortal things, exchanging one form of life for another.*

(Translation adapted from Kirk, Raven and Schofield)

This passage is found in three ancient sources with various line orderings. Thus there is some dispute as to the correct arrangement of the fragment. Inwood presents a comprehensive outline of the context in the authors (Inwood (2001) p. 86) which can be summarised thus: Plutarch, *De Exil.* 607 c-d gives us the first line but then omits the second and jumps to the third, fifth, sixth and thirteenth. Porphyry at Stob. 2.8.42, p.169, 3-8 only gives us the second half of line one θεῶν ψήφισμα παλαιόν and line 2. Hipp. Ref. 7.29.9-7.30.4 gives lines one and two as presented above. Since Porphyry and Hippolytus give us the continuity between these two lines and both Plutarch and Hippolytus line one in its entirety, it is reasonably secure to take the above rendition as correct.

The word χρῆμα has clear etymology from the verb χράομαι and is usually translated as something one needs or uses, hence in the plural goods or money (LSJ). Therefore the χρῆμα referred to here should translate as a 'need' or necessity – something that must occur. It is also related etymologically to the term τό χρεών , also usually translated as 'necessity' or 'what must be' (LSJ) and a term used in the work of earlier philosophers Anaximader (*Fr*. 1) and Heraklitos (*Fr*. 80). There is a precedent for the verbs χράομαι and χράω to have been used in the context of religious activity (E. *Ph*.954; *Od*.10.492,565; Hdt. I.47,53,157), in particular the consultation of oracles which must lead the suggested translation for χρῆμα as 'oracle'. However, when one examines the other vocabulary in the passage, particularly the term ψήφισμα and the framing of the term within a cosmological system (despite its mystical nature), the word oracle does not seem as apt as the idea of decree or edict. A decree conveys a notion of anonymous compulsion that even the gods must adhere to as opposed to the more 'unsystematic' utterance of an oracle, thereby indicating some kind of organisation possibly governed by set laws.

The idea of an edict is clearly supported since ψήφισμα is something ratified by a vote (LSJ), which can satisfactorily be translated as a decree. If it is then a decree θεῶν, however, are these specific gods and if so which ones and how do they relate to ἀνάγκη? In Empedokles, the gods are only mentioned by name when referring to the various forces

within the Cosmos either the four roots or elements (Zeus, Hera, Nestis, Aidoneus) or the pairing of Love (attraction) and Strife (repulsion). It seems then that these physical manifestations of divine powers that play a distinct role in the Cosmos under the influence of various 'forces' have voted to abide by this edict of ἀνάγκη and thus behave in a predictable manner.

The πλατέεσσι...ὅρκοις have frequently been noted to echo *fragment* B30.3 (Wright (1981) p.272). *Fragment* B30 forms part of an account regarding the alternating predominance of Love and Strife. Equally binding is the regulation of individual daimons in *Fragment* B115 and their passage through the various stages leading to apotheosis. On both occasions the 'broad oaths' are seen at times when strife predominates, possibly highlighting the unpalatable nature of this phase of being. However unpleasant or disturbing, it is governed by an edict of Necessity, and cannot therefore be challenged or avoided even by the cosmic forces themselves.

This fragment, previously thought to have been located in Katharmoi owing to its eschatological nature has been repositioned by Inwood as fragment 11, forming part of the extensive proem he posits for the poem. Sedley[229], supporting the two work hypothesis, places it in the Peri Phuseos, positioning it in the proem of that poem, a conclusion that Trépanier (p.80) would take issue with not only owing to his support for the one work hypothesis, but also the view that Sedley's reasoning is not sound in viewing B115 and B112 as incompatible within the same poem in respect to Empedokles's assertion of the various stages of the journey of the daimon/ god he claims to be. In Plutarch's quotation of this fragment (in which he cites only some of the lines without indicating omissions), he clearly states that it can be found at the beginning of Empedokles's philosophy, hence the positioning of the fragment in the proem. This seems to be a sensible conclusion to reach, but with so many lines of the original poem missing, it can't be viewed as totally concrete. The edict mentioned would seem to have a bearing on the entirety of Empedokles's cosmological system in that the decree governs the entire cycle of being. The vital nature of this concept within the cosmology is another compelling reason for an early placement for the fragment.

[229] Sedley (1989)

**Empedokles *Fragment* DK B116**

ὁ δὲ

Πλάτων ἄτοπος, ταῖς μὲν ἀιδίοις καὶ θείαις περιφοραῖς
ἀντὶ τῶν Μουσῶν τὰς Σειρῆνας ἐνιδρύων, οὐ πάνυ φιλ-
ανθρώπους οὐδὲ χρηστὰς δαίμονας, τὰς δὲ Μούσας ἢ
παραλείπων παντάπασιν ἢ τοῖς τῶν Μοιρῶν ὀνόμασι προσ-
αγορεύων καὶ καλῶν θυγατέρας Ἀνάγκης· ἄμουσον γὰρ ἡ
Ἀνάγκη μουσικὸν δ' ἡ Πειθώ, καὶ Μούσαις † φιλοδα-
(D.) μοῦσα πολὺ μᾶλλον οἶμαι τῆς Ἐμπεδοκλέους (fr. 116)
Χάριτος 'στυγέει δύστλητον **Ἀνάγκην'**

Plutarch Table Talk 745 c-d (B116)

Plato (acts) strangely - either leaving out the Muses altogether, or addressing them by the names of the Fates and calling them the daughters of Necessity. For Necessity is outside the sphere of the Muses, whereas Persuasion is 'of the muses', and I think is beloved to the Muses, and much more than Empedokles's Charis:

*Hates **Necessity** difficult to bear.*

This tiny fragment is difficult to assess, given its lack of context and the fact that Plutarch is not intending a commentary on Empedokles here, merely using a quotation from Empedokles to illustrate some Platonic ideas. Plutarch mentions Charis as a deity/force in Empedokles's work before assigning to her the reaction to necessity given in the quotation. It is generally accepted that Charis is identical to Love, which would make far more sense in the Empedoclean framework, indeed the Charites and Aphrodite are so closely related that Charis is identified as wife to Hephaestus (*Il.*18.382) or the Charites are attendants to the goddess of love (*Il.*5.338; Hes. *Op.* 73, *h.Ven.*61). Given the edict described in the passage above, the reaction of Charis to ἀνάγκη (στυγέει would make sense; despite the pre-eminence of Love in Empedokles's cosmos, Love is still subject to the edict of ἀνάγκη which periodically ushers in the dominance of Strife (as discussed above).

The expression δύστλητον has echoes in many other passages of early Greek literature (*Iliad* VI.83-5; *Iliad* VI.456-458; *Homeric Hymn to Demeter.* 216-217; Alcman 102.1.1; Pindar. *Olympian Ode.*2.56).This sentiment has parallels in the fairly common correlation of the term yoke and/or the status of slavery with ἀνάγκη (Aesch. *Agamemnon*. 218-224; 1069-1071; Eur. *Heracleidae* 885-887*; Orestes* 1328-1330; Sophocles *Philoctetes* 1025-1028;

Pindar *Partheneia* 94a16-21 to name just a few)[230]. It underlines the binding nature of the edict from fragment 115, however unpleasant its consequences might be.

### Empedokles *Strasbourg Papyrus* Ensemble D

[ἀ'ν]διχ' ἀπ' ἀλλήλω[ν] ̣πεσε̣'[ει]̣ν καὶ ̣π[ότ]̣μον ἐπισπε̣ῖν
[πό] λλ' ἀεκαζομέν[ο]ισιν **ἀ[να]γκα[ίης** ὐ'] ̣πο λυγρῆς
[ση]πο[μ] ένοις:

*To fall and to meet their fate apart from one another, very unwillingly, and because of bitter* ***Necessity****, rotting;*

The find of the Strasbourg papyrus and its publication in 1999 by Alain Martin and Oliver Primavesi has provided us with a reasonably secure further direct quotation including ἀνάγκη in an eschatological setting. As can be seen from the published text above, certain letters are suspect, but the sense is logical and not incongruous with the edict of Necessity to be found in B115, in fact it could be seen to refer to it.

The location of ἀ[να]γκα[ίης means that necessity could either be governing just [ση]πο[μ]ένοις or also the first two actions in the phrase, the falling and meeting their fate apart from one another. The passage includes some of B139[231] and therefore falls within what seems to be a discussion of the miasma of flesh eating and subsequent horrific 'punishment' of the daimon through various flesh-clothed incarnations. According to the first passage and possibly the second, ἀνάγκη must have controlling influence over all actions; in B115 it explains the pre-eminence of Strife at times and therefore the action of separation (as indicated here). Although present in a different context, here an eschatological ἀνάγκη affecting the fate of souls, there is a clear parallel with the action of necessity on atoms in the Atomist cosmology where it dictates amalgamations, conglomerations and destructions of these in the Atomist cosmos (pages 162ff.).

## Conclusions about ἀνάγκη in Empedokles

It is difficult to assign a physical location to ἀνάγκη in Empedokles since she is not described using any terminology that gives any clue to her placement. Therefore it is impossible to place her as either immanent or extraneous to Empedokles' cosmos. The underworld vases indicate that this could be Hades, but Empedokles appears to assign a far

[230] See pages 39ff. for further discussion of necessity and slavery
[231] Inwood p.19

more wide-reaching role for ἀνάγκη than that in Pindar or seen on the vases. ἀνάγκη appears to control both actions of union and also acts of separation with particular reference to the fate of the soul through its cycle of rebirth. This makes the process concrete; there is no idea of 'sometimes', the system works mechanically despite its mystical nature. The extant passages do seem to show a particular focus on one type of judgement. In two of the extant passages (B115 and *Strasbourg Papyrus*) we see an association with the miasma of bloodshed and its consequences for the soul in association and ἀνάγκη. However, no alternative agent of compulsion is discussed elsewhere, thus there is no suggestion that the consequences of this miasma provide the only sphere of the influence of ἀνάγκη. Perhaps given that this element of the eschatological cycle would be one of the more difficult things for mortals to accept owing to its harsh nature, the reminder that it is an edict of ἀνάγκη governing the process could be an attempt to make it more bearable.

ἀνάγκη seems to be personified in some senses here (possibly as the embodiment of divine compulsion) to the extent that she possesses consciousness (demonstrated in her understanding of the edict). However, there is no reference to any kind of physical manifestation, and she certainly does not seem to control physically the world through her own personal actions. This seems to be the function of the four roots and Love and Strife seeming to work within the system that is devised according to the edict. There is no talk of 'arms' metaphorical or not holding any fetters or encircling the universe as we see elsewhere.

ἀνάγκη does not appear to be deployed by another deity; indeed she appears to govern the other deities who are subject to her edict, and is thus a dominant force. She also does not seem to be subject to any external laws but does seem to behave in a uniform and predictable manner (thus she seems to have some kind of internal regulating system). She enforces the laws which the other deities then ratify with an edict. The processes and their timing within the Empedoklean cosmos have been decided by her, however unpleasant they may be for the deities to enact.

## *iii)* Eschatological and theological belief in Magna Graecia and its relationship to ἀνάγκη in Empedoklean thought

That ἀνάγκη is intrinsically linked to the destiny of the human soul in Hades is a common thread to all the eschatological instances discussed above. In Pindar, she is concerned with the judging process of souls. On Vase Naples H3222 the transgressor Sisyphus, who attempted to cheat death, is held to his eternal cycle of punishment by ἀνάγκη. In Empedokles, the entire cycle of katharmoi and rebirth is governed by an edict of ἀνάγκη. There is no clear notion of universality of destiny in Pindar – we are given the idea that each is judged individually. On two vases, ἀνάγκη is seen to affect two particular individuals. However, in Empedokles she appears to govern a system that is universally applicable to all and is triggered by a particular set of events.

Two of the passages of Empedokles that we have relate to the spilling of blood. It seems reasonably secure that the bloodshed triggering the cycle of rebirths governed by ἀνάγκη is the consumption of meat, perhaps through sacrifice. This would transgress the katharmos of vegetarianism (B136, B137) outlined by Empedokles. However, the Pindar passage does not specify the ἁλιτρά of the transgressors, it merely that they are judged. Therefore, it is fair to say that there is no common vision as to the application of the eschatological role of ἀνάγκη (the individuals it would affect) between the three sources despite the common belief in reincarnation shared by the authors.

There was certainly a widespread belief in Orphic mysteries and Pythagoreanism in Magna Graecia and Sicily. The numerous finds of gold lamellae variously described as Orphic, Bacchic or Pythagorean in the region are testament to alternative eschatological beliefs bearing some relationship with those found in Empedokles and Pindar[232]. Although (like the Naples Krater H3222) they date to the Fourth Century[233], they provide an important insight into the eschatological views in the area. The aspiration for apotheosis through purity and the divine essence of certain initiated mortals seems to be a common theme in certain of these lamellae (Thurii L9; Thurii L 10a – b (two with the same text) all contain the line καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼν | ὑμῶν γένος ὄλβιον εὔχομαι | εἶμεν *Since I, too,boast that I belong to your blessed race* (addressed to Chthonic deities), Entella (L 2) has the similar line αὐτὰρ ἐ[μοὶ γένος οὐράνιον· *But my race is heavenly* [234]). Parallels can also be drawn between the

[232] Bernabé and Jiménez (2008) p.173; Graf and Iles Johnston (2007) p.118 and 205n37
[233] Bernabé and Jiménez (2008) p.10 and p.100
[234] Translation from Bernabé and Jiménez (2008) p.10 and p.100.

manner in which Empedokles addresses the citizens of Akragas (B112) and Thurii 2.4, Thurii 3.9[235] as a god, no longer mortal; there is certainly similarity in style of language if not actual belief here[236]. This would link well to the decree ratified by the gods in B115; if Empedokles had himself achieved apotheosis then he would be party to the edict of ἀνάγκη and understand its implications.

That the desire for apotheosis as a hero, just as Herakles from his pyre is taken to Olympos, is central to Empedoklean thought is reiterated throughout Kingsley (1995) and could be viewed as a compulsion (in and of itself) as governed by the edict of ἀνάγκη. The binding nature of the oaths governing the decree and the edict reflect the binding nature of necessity, which in turn relates to the binding nature of sequence of metempsychosis discussed by Empedokles. Apotheosis is a necessary consequence of the daimon completing certain ritual acts and adhering to rules thereby completing its passage through the elements.

As mentioned above, (p187), a combination of eschatological and cosmological functions of Necessity can be seen in Plato's thought (*Republic* X 616C and 617B-C); here we see ἀνάγκη as a cosmic deity controlling a spindle in the form of a vortex (like the universe of the Atomists) with her daughters, the Moirai (Lachesis, Clotho and Atropos) who must determine the cycle of mortal souls and the new life the souls must lead in their next incarnation. This picture is not given in any of the extant texts within the time period under consideration. However, given the significant influence of Pythagorean mystical thought on the work of Plato, it is not beyond the realms of possibility that such a picture could be envisaged by earlier philosophers also associated with or influenced by this tradition, in particular Empedokles.

[235] Bernabé and Jiménez (2008) p.173
[236] Guthrie (1965) p.246

# (vii) Non-cosmological personification of necessity

The following texts have been split into two groups; those in which personified necessity appears to be divine and those where there is no evidence for a deity. Many of the passages already discussed could be described as reification – indeed any of the examples when ἀνάγκη is a specific rather than an abstract noun would fit into this category. This could apply whether ἀνάγκη is a term for compulsion as a specific thing, torture or blood relatives. However, the examples to be discussed in this section differ from these as ἀνάγκη seems to have attributes, often human and sometimes also divine. The precise criteria were outlined in the introduction p9.

## (a) Non-divine personified and reified necessity

The identification of personified or reified ἀνάγκη has been decided on the basis of attributes that would normally be used to describe a person or being with consciousness. However, these texts do not give sufficient evidence to assign divinity to the personification even if this is a possibility from the context. The texts have been approached in an author-by-author fashion rather than contextually as this provided a more consistent understanding. The first author does not present ἀνάγκη as a personified force in the strict sense but as a reification representing several irresistible forces.

**Bacchylides, *Epinicia*, Ode 11 line 42 - 46**

τὰς ἐξ ἐρατῶν ἐφόβησε<ν>
παγκρατὴς Ἥρα μελάθρων
Προίτου, παραπλῆγι φρένας
καρτερᾷ ζεύξασ' **ἀνάγκᾳ**·

*All powerful Hera put to flight these daughters of Proetus from their charming chambers, their mind being held in the yoke of mighty **necessity**.*

**Bacchylides, *Epinicia*, Ode 11 line 69 - 72**

Λίσσοντο δὲ παῖδας Ἄβαν-
τος γᾶν πολύκριθον λαχόντας
Τίρυνθα τὸν ὀπλότερον
κτίζειν, πρὶν ἐς ἀργαλέαν πεσεῖν **ἀνάγκαν**·

*but they entreated the sons of Abas to settle the barley-rich land by lot with the younger (ruling) Tiryns, before they fell into grievous **necessity**.*

**Bacchylides, *Encomia*, Fragment 2, lines 18 - 20**

ἀλλά ῾[ιν] χρόνος
[ἐδά]μασσε κρατερά τ᾽ ἔκ-
[δικος ο]ὐ θέλοντ᾽ **ἀνάγκη**.

*But time overpowered him, the mighty one and lawless **necessity**, himself being unwilling.*

In these texts, there is no obvious personification in as much as there is no idea of consciousness; however, the adjectives describing necessity (or compulsion) imply reification at the very least. Necessity or compulsion is an entity which has specific characteristics. The first passage (*Epinician Ode* 11, 42-26), one of many in which use the metaphorical term of yoke to allude the psychological weight experienced by someone suffering the effects of necessity, also describes necessity as mighty (καρτερᾷ); this compulsion is the madness sent by Hera on the daughters of Proetus.The second passage from the same ode describes necessity as grievous (ἀργαλέαν), also accentuating the awful consequences of being compelled to a course of action against your will. In this case, the compulsion no longer appears to be the madness of Hera, rather the necessity of misfortune in civil unrest and infighting, in which case the necessity is circumstantial, rather than physical compulsion.

In the third Bacchylides passage, necessity possesses the human quality of lawlessness[237], which accentuates its unpredictable nature. Here the context is more obscure than the passages from *Ode* 11 since the text is fragmentary and in part reconstructed. Given that this is the only passage in which the adjective ἔκδικος is used to describe necessity, it is by no means to be regarded as typical associated vocabulary, but nevertheless accentuates the human vulnerability and helplessness when faced with such an irresistible yet unpredictable force.

The force of impersonal necessity is often described metaphorically as a yoke that weighs down on people (Aesch.*Ag*. 218-224, Bacchylides *Ep. Ode* 11 42-46, Eur. *Frag* 475, Eur.

[237] Note the reconstruction of the text to form the word ἔκδικος.

*Heracleidae* 885-887, Eur. *Orestes* 1328-1330, Her. VIII.22.10-12). The context for all of these passages indicates that the yoke of necessity is generally thought of as a metaphor for some kind of irresistible impersonal power, usually experienced as a consequence of divine dictate or owing to Fate; thus we could describe this power as a reification since it helps to project an abstract impersonal force as a more concrete reality. Similar to these is a passage in which necessities encircle the chorus (Eur. *Hecuba* 639 ἀνάγκαι... κυκλοῦνται). The fact that this is in the plural could well allude to there being several issues pressing on the women at that time (Gregory (1999) p.124), not least that of impending slavery.

Another constraint metaphor is found in *Iphiginia at Aulis* where necessity is described as having bonds.

**Euripides, *Iphigenia at Aulis*, Line 440 – 445**

Αγ.: ἐπήινεσ', ἀλλὰ στεῖχε δωμάτων ἔσω·
τὰ δ' ἄλλ' ἰούσης τῆς τύχης ἔσται καλῶς.
οἴμοι, τί φῶ δύστηνος; ἄρξωμαι πόθεν;
ἐς οἷ' **ἀνάγκης** ζεύγματ' ἐμπεπτώκαμεν.

*Ag: I applaud you, but go inside the house now. Fortune will move on its course, and what will come shall be well. Alas! What will I, being wretched, say? From where will I begin? We have fallen into the bonds of* ***Necessity****.*

This text is typical in its reification of abstract Necessity since by using the term *bonds* (a real physical object) Euripides makes the metaphor of feeling constrained appear more concrete. ἀνάγκη is described as possessing bonds which entrap or restrict humanity; the power of the gods' intention cannot be avoided and mortality is helpless in the face of such irresistible divine compulsion.

## (b) Necessity and the notion of fate or destiny

There are a number of texts in which necessity is linked to the idea of destiny or fate. However, it is hard to go as far to say they are either one and the same, or that necessity is a specific and distinct force deployed by Fate in order to bring a certain course of events to pass. All the texts to be discussed also show necessity reified as a metaphor for the catastrophe that can befall individuals when subject to the ravages of their destiny.

Two passages from Sophocles' *Ajax* focus on the negative effects of the Necessity of Chance or the compelling power of fortune. As this phrase only occurs within this play, it is possible that this is not a typical term from the period especially since the couplet fits the metre at the end of the line well and so could be a formulaic phrase rather than having a special significance. Nevertheless the usage warrants consideration since it sheds light onto possible reified usage.

**Sophocles, *Ajax*, Lines 485 - 486**

Τεκ.: ὦ δέσποτ' Αἴας, τῆς **ἀναγκαίας** τύχης
οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν μεῖζον ἀνθρώποις κακόν.
*Tek.: Lord Ajax, there is no evil greater for men than **compelling** Chance.*

**Sophocles, *Ajax*, Lines 803 - 806**

Τεκ.: οἳ 'γώ, φίλοι, πρόστητ' **ἀναγκαίας** τύχης,
καὶ σπεύσαθ' οἱ μὲν Τεῦκρον ἐν τάχει μολεῖν,
οἱ δ' ἑσπέρους ἀγκῶνας, οἱ δ' ἀντηλίους
ζητεῖτ' ἰόντες τἀνδρὸς ἔξοδον κακήν.
*Tek: Oh my friends, ward off **compelling** Chance, and hurry to quicken Teucer's arrival here, some search the western lands, others the east looking for where my unhappy husband has gone to.*

The usage here of 'compelling chance' reflects the inevitability inherent within Sophoclean tragedy with the idea of Destiny being akin to Fate. The adjectival usage here ascribes the quality of forceful compulsion to Tyche but Ananke is not itself personified. This is, however, in effect saying that there is a quality 'compulsion' that Tyche possesses which is arguably similar to that demonstrated by other deities in specific circumstances under their jurisdiction[238]. Thus we could view the meaning of this adjectival usage as symbolising events that you are compelled to experience since that is the nature of destiny.

Another Sophoclean reference to Necessity as linked to personal fate can be seen in Oedipus the King; here, it is not explicitly linked to Fate, rather there is a sense that if someone fulfils the criteria outlined, in that they display *hubris*, their inevitable destiny will be disastrous.

[238] This is well illustrated in the context of sexual desire being described as the compulsion of Aphrodite discussed on pages 50ff.

**Sophocles, *Oedipus the King*, Line 873 - 879**

ὕβρις, εἰ
πολλῶν ὑπερπλησθῇ μάταν,
ἃ μὴ ᾽πίκαιρα μηδὲ συμφέροντα,
ἀκρότατα γεῖσ᾽ ἀναβᾶσ᾽
ἀπότομον ὥρουσεν εἰς **ἀνάγκαν**
ἔνθ᾽ οὐ ποδὶ χρησίμῳ
χρῆται.

*Ch: Insolence breeds the tyrant; insolence, if overfilled with wealth that is neither useful nor beneficial will, when it has climbed the highest wall, rushes to a precipitous **necessity**, where one's feet cannot serve them to good advantage.*

Necessity here appears to mean the compulsion to reach disaster or catastrophe, in that the individual exhibiting hubris will inevitably reach a bad or unlucky future. Apart from the adjective ἀπότομον, which simply accentuates the catastrophic nature of the fall from glory, no other description of necessity is offered that might provide clarification of what the Chorus have in mind here. The metaphorical climb to the heights of power and the subsequent fall from grace does not require further elaboration for its meaning to be perceived and thus does not help us to envisage what, if anything, necessity was conceived as.

## (c) Divine personified necessity

To securely assign divinity to a personification is difficult, as Stafford points out (p.9 ff); there is no differentiation in the earliest Greek texts through the use of capital letters or specific terminology and it is hard to distinguish between an abstract noun and a personification in many cases. The passages discussed below all come from Tragedy, and in this genre, there is the additional challenge of identifying those which reflect actual religious belief and those which use the terminology of religious belief to emphasise a point, emotion or to bring poignancy or irony through such imagery. Thus the categorisation of a passage as depicting true divine necessity is tricky to establish without doubt. Even more challenging is to see any kind of cult practice associated with ἀνάγκη from the passages in which a divine personification seems likely. Nevertheless, I will examine each passage (approaching with caution) and assess authorial motives, genre and social context.

**Euripides, *Electra*, Lines 1298 - 1302**

Χο.: πῶς ὄντε θεὼ τῆσδέ τ᾽ ἀδελφὼ
τῆς καπφθιμένης οὐκ ἠρκέσατον
Κῆρας μελάθροις;
Κα.: μοῖρά τ᾽ **ἀνάγκη** τ᾽ ἦγ᾽ ἐς τὸ χρεὼν
Φοίβου τ᾽ ἄσοφοι γλώσσης ἐνοπαί.

*Ch. Why being both gods and brother of the woman who has died away did you not ward off the Keres from these roofs?*

*Cas. Fate and **necessity** led to what must be and the unwise cries of the tongue of Phoebus.*

This passage seems to give a personification of necessity at first glance and also demonstrates that there is a difference between Fate and Necessity, which are mentioned separately and must thus be two different entities or concepts. But in this instance, the personification of necessity, along with a misleading prophecy (also alluded to in the text), seems a poetic device to describe the compulsion or force which brough the present situation about in addition to the element of predestination. Cropp (1988, p.189-190) is clear that this should be read as personification and views Necessity as a personified associate of Destiny that represents the outcome of the power of Destiny (the physical force or compulsion to perform the action). However, it is not appropriate or indeed possible to infer an actual goddess from this text that is universally revered, rather it merely accentuates the powerlessness of humanity in the face of forces beyond their control.

A similar, ambiguous text by Agathon appears to personify both necessity and chance.

**Agathon – Fragment 8**[239]

καὶ μὴν τὰ μέν γε χρὴ τέχνῃ πράσσειν, τὰ δέ
ἡμῖν **ἀνάγκῃ** καὶ τύχῃ προσγίγνεται
*While we must do some things through design,*
*others are thrust on us by **necessity** and chance.*

This two line fragment has no context at all since the passage only consists of these two lines. Here, necessity is paired with chance as an agent for the enforcement of unwished for

[239] This comes from a selection of fragments that although assigned to Agathon are not definitely by the playwright and thus needs to be treated with caution.

actions. However, although here the personification is likely, it is by no means a definite interpretation; the speaker could simply mean that some things happen by chance (similar to fate) whereas in other involuntary events, we are forced circumstantially into a course of action by coercion or some similar force. Without more extant text from this passage, it is impossible to say with surety which of these is the more likely.

Personifications of necessity in the *Prometheus Bound* and the famous choral ode to ἀνάγκη in *Alcestis* seem more secure as divine entities. However, the extent to which these personifications can be viewed as a real goddess with an associated cult is also open to question.

The text of *Prometheus Bound* which is generally attributed to Aeschylus (although there is some debate on the matter[240], the date of authorship has been securely positioned within the scope of this enquiry) has two key personifications of necessity.

**Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound*, lines 103 – 108**

τὴν πεπρωμένην δὲ χρὴ
αἶσαν φέρειν ὡς ῥᾷστα, γιγνώσκονθ᾽ ὅτι
τὸ τῆς **ἀνάγκης** ἔστ᾽ ἀδήριτον σθένος.
ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε σιγᾶν οὔτε μὴ σιγᾶν τύχας
οἷόν τέ μοι τάσδ᾽ ἐστί. θνητοῖς γὰρ γέρα
πορὼν **ἀνάγκαις** ταῖσδ᾽ ἐνέζευγμαι τάλας.

*I must bear this as easily as I can, knowing that the power of **Ananke** is unconquerable.*
*But I can neither speak nor be silent about my fortunes*
*Such as they are: for in giving gifts to mortals*
*I have been en-yoked unhappily by these **necessities**.*

Although the first use of ἀνάγκη (line 105) in the soliloquy of Prometheus is a personification of some kind, possibly divine, the second (line 108) is plural and seems more likely to be a description of his bonds rather than a personification. Both phrases focus on the helplessness and the personal sense of injustice he has about his current situation. In line 105, the power of necessity is referred to in terms which indicate that is is a being that

[240] For discussion of this see *The Author of the Prometheus Bound* by Herington, 1970, University of Texas and Griffith, Mark. *The Authenticity of the Prometheus Bound*. Cambridge, 1977

possesses certain power (σθένος). Necessity seems to be linked to his personal fate and could well be the personification of divine compulsion; a vivid way to describe being subject to fate and her whims and the futility of any struggle against it. Alternatively, Necessity could also be an agent for fate that physically compels gods and mortals to comply with what is ordained. Both of these ideas, that of personification and that of agency, complement each other with one not automatically precluding the truth of the other and it could well be that the terminology is deliberately ambiguous so that both ideas can be inferred.

Prometheus' situation following the action of the power of necessity is that he has been ἐνέζευγμαι, common imagery used about the restrictive compulsion of necessity (see Thomson (1932) p.141). However, in his case, rather than the yoke or bonds being metaphorical for the helplessness he feels, he has actual bonds which pin him to the rock[241]. It is impossible to gain details from this passage, however, on the relationship between Fate and Necessity; how they work in tandem to achieve this devastating effect and if they are controlled by a third party. At this point, Prometheus focuses on the part Zeus has played in his situation, and it could be understood that since Zeus' order is binding, he is controlling necessity. The relationship between Necessity and these deities is further elaborated later in the play.

**Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound*, lines 511-518**

Προμηθεύς: οὐ ταῦτα ταύτῃ Μοῖρά πω τελεσφόρος
κρᾶναι πέπρωται, μυρίαις δὲ πημοναῖς
δύαις τε καμφθεὶς ὧδε δεσμὰ φυγγάνω:
τέχνη δ᾽ **ἀνάγκης** ἀσθενεστέρα μακρῷ.
Χορός: τίς οὖν **ἀνάγκης** ἐστὶν οἰακοστρόφος;
Προμηθεύς: Μοῖραι τρίμορφοι μνήμονές τ᾽ Ἐρινύες
Χορός: τούτων ἄρα Ζεύς ἐστιν ἀσθενέστερος;
Προμηθεύς: οὔκουν ἂν ἐκφύγοι γε τὴν πεπρωμένην.

[241] Griffith (1983) p. 108

*Prom:* *Moira, who brings all things to completion, was not yet fated to bring these things to course, but only by being bent double by many miseries and anguishes in this way will I flee these bonds. Cunning is far more feeble than* ***Necessity****.*

*Chor:* *Who is it that steers* ***Necessity****?*

*Prom:* *The triple Moirai and the ever-mindful Furies*

*Chor:* *Is Zeus weaker than these?*

*Prom:* *Indeed, he would not escape what was foretold.*

This passage provides one of the clearest examples of personification, but like lines 103 - 108 it is tricky to decipher what exactly is being personified. In this play, Κράτος and Βία are personified in the opening scene, appearing on stage. This clearly indicates that abstract personifications are used within the play and thus a personification here is not inconsistent. From Thomson (1932, p.87 and p.159) the personification has been generally accepted and, as Podlecki (2005, p.178) points out, reflects contemporary cosmological philosophy, like that of Parmenides (discussed p.153ff.). It is the nature of this Necessity that is more difficult to grasp than the idea that it is a personification. One option is to simply view necessity as the embodiment of divine constraint in the form of the unbreakable bonds; in other words Prometheus would be saying that the divine power is too great to resist even with the help of his clever intellect. A similar idea would be that he views Necessity as the divine compulsion which has driven the course of his entire life and present situation. However, Prometheus is at pains to give more information than this in the stichomythic passage after prompting from the Chorus which lends weight to the idea of a less abstract deity. Initially he states that Necessity is more powerful than cunning. This could be a mere statement of fact: no matter how clever your ideas, if a being stronger than you has physically constrained you, you cannot use cunning alone to break free[242]. The Chorus enquire about who steers necessity, thus we can deduce that it is directed by another's instructions rather than having its own self-direction and motivation. This would support the idea that Necessity is an amoral agent of the gods who does not possess an internal sense of cosmic justice or code of laws but is directed by another party. Prometheus is specific also about the fact that the Necessity he is subjected to is controlled specifically by the Fates and Furies, who are the only ones who direct it with even Zeus subject to their wishes as compelled by Necessity. It is not obvious whether Prometheus is referring to every kind of necessity. If this is an idea of

[242] Griffiths (1983) p. 179 – 180 feels that this illustrates a polarity explored throughout the play that of Prometheus as the personification of cunning and Zeus as brute strength

universal necessity, this seems to contradict other passages, such as the sexual necessity of Aphrodite (pages 50ff.) where other deities impose their own necessity. However, Prometheus, himself divine, is subject to Fate like Zeus, thus although seemingly inflicted by a specific deity, this text seems to indicate that all divine compulsion is directly or indirectly steered by the triple Fates and the Furies[243].

Like the instances of prophetic necessity, we discover later in the play that the necessity of the Fates that would impact upon Zeus were he to couple with Thetis can be averted if he does not set this chain of events in motion[244]. Thus although apparently the power of Necessity is ἀδήριτον (105) and is far stronger than any τέχνη (514) it only swings into action if certain predetermined criteria are met.

**Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound*, 1050 - 1054**

εἴς τε κελαινὸν
Τάρταρον ἄρδην ῥίψειε δέμας
τοὐμὸν **ἀνάγκης** στερραῖς δίναις:
πάντως ἐμέ γ᾽ οὐ θανατώσει.

*Pr. To gloomy Tartarus may he hurl my living body from on high using the harsh whirlwinds of **Necessity**. Out of everyone, I am not destined to die.*

This passage ties into the other passages that focus on encircling necessity and also the violent coercive power of divine compulsion that forces anyone (even the gods) into a course of action. It seems sensible to assume personification here (or at the very least reification of a supernatural force), since the action described indicates that some kind of force (ἀνάγκη) in the form of a whirlwind could be used to hurl Prometheus into Tartarus. Podlecki (2005, p.154) translates this as *Necessity's harsh vortex*, thereby potentially linking the phrase to ideas of a physical swirling force through more cosmological language rather than it being a poetic metaphor for destruction. Although Prometheus is bound whilst talking, this Necessity is not constraining coercion seen in the discussion of slavery (pages 39ff.) or Parmenides (pages 153ff.). Here it is spinning and thus akin to the Atomists (who use the whirl (δίνη) in their cosmology pages 162ff.) or to the Spindle of Necessity described by Plato in the *Myth of Er* as well as all the other passages likening a situation to the

[243] See pages 184ff. for the discussion of the similarities between the depiction of Ananke and the Furies on vase painting.

[244] Conacher p. 53

necessary devastation of a whirlwind[245]. But this is not a random act; here the whirlwinds reflect the destruction and personal tragedy brought about by the action of necessity than its sudden and arbitrary qualities.

Here, Prometheus places this course of action and its implementation using divine compulsion in Hermes' hand, even though he himself is following the orders of Zeus who we know is also subject to further necessities of Fate. It is perhaps not right then to talk of a single deity called necessity within the Prometheus Bound despite the compelling evidence for this in lines 511-518. Personified necessity seems to represent any divine compulsion instigated by a deity. However, there does seem to be a hierarchy in which the compulsion utilised by the Fates is stronger than that available to Zeus. Elsewhere we see other deities wielding their own form of compulsion too such as Aphrodite with physical and emotional drive; not only is the concept of irresistible sexual desire found in lyric poetry, it is also found in Aeschylus' *SuppliantWomen* (discussed in the section on erotic necessity pages 49ff.), indicating that the idea of deity specific compulsion could be consistent within the author's concept of the supernatural. In these lines from the *Prometheus Bound*, the necessity to be used by Hermes under Zeus' orders is that associated with Zeus' role, that is, his function as divine judge and law giver but is less powerful than the personified necessity described earlier in the play (line 511ff.). It is not clear whether Prometheus sees these necessities as aspects of the same force or separate entities that are similar in nature or indeed whether the necessity of Zeus is an entity at all. What is consistent in the play is the overwhelmeing power of necessity and the utter helplessness felt by Prometheus in the face of such a force despite his considerable personal resources.

**The Choral Ode to Necessity in Euripides' *Alcestis***

The devastating picture of the power of necessity we see in *Prometheus Bound* is also alluded to in this choral ode of *Alcestis* in what is the most obvious divine personification from this time period.

[245] This is perhaps related to the Atomist notion of the whirl in their cosmology and its links with necessity

***Alcestis*, Euripides, lines 962 - 972**

ἐγὼ καὶ διὰ μούσας
καὶ μετάρσιος ᾖξα, καὶ
πλείστων ἀψάμενος λόγων
κρεῖσσον οὐδὲν **Ἀνάγκας**
ηὗρον οὐδέ τι φάρμακον
Θρῄσσαις ἐν σανίσιν, τὰς
Ὀρφεία κατέγραψεν
γῆρυς, οὐδ᾽ ὅσα Φοῖβος Ἀ-
σκληπιάδαις ἔδωκε
φάρμακα πολυπόνοις
ἀντιτεμὼν βροτοῖσιν.
μόνας δ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ βωμοὺς
ἐλθεῖν οὔτε βρέτας θεᾶς
ἔστιν, οὐ σφαγίων κλύει.
μή μοι, πότνια, μείζων
ἔλθοις ἢ τὸ πρὶν ἐν βίῳ.
καὶ γὰρ Ζεὺς ὅ τι νεύσῃ
σὺν σοὶ τοῦτο τελευτᾷ.
καὶ τὸν ἐν Χαλύβοις δαμά-
ζεις σὺ βίᾳ σίδαρον,
οὐδέ τις ἀποτόμου
λήματός ἐστιν αἰδώς.
καὶ σ᾽ ἐν ἀφύκτοισι χερῶν εἶλε θεὰ δεσμοῖς.

*I have shot to the heavens through song and, engaging in the greatest ideas, I have found nothing stronger than **Necessity**, nor is there any cure for it in the Thracian writing tablets inscribed by the voice of Orpheus nor in the drugs which Phoebus gave to the sons of Asclepius as a remedy for much suffering mortals.*

*Of that goddess alone there are no altars to come to, nor wooden effigies, nor does she give ear to slaughtering. Don't come, lady, any greater than previously into my life. For Zeus, in conjunction with you brings everything to completion to which he inclines. You also overpower the iron of the Chalybes by force, and there is there any pity in your precipitous regard for others.*

*You also, Admetus, have been caught in the goddess's ineluctable chains.*

This choral ode forms the longest passage solely concerned with a personification of necessity. The first strophe explores the power of ἀνάγκη in relation to the mystical power of the secret teachings of Orpheus on tablets from Thrace and the more 'scientific' medicines as imparted to the followers of Asclepius by the teachings of Apollo. The Chorus (having stated their position as well-read in a range of high literature and thus to be speaking from a position of authority) seem to be systematically examining what can be done to help with the most potent contemporary solutions available; from the spiritual approach of an incantation of magical divinely inspired words to the herbal drugs used by medical professionals. However, the Chorus have no doubt that neither of these 'cures' will affect Necessity or the result of its actions, which in this case will be the death of Alcestis. They seem sure of this despite the fact that Orpheus' poetry supposedly held magical secrets or formulae which could potentially 'cheat' the normal death process[246]. The reason for Zeus killing Asclepius, the son of Apollo (events outlined in Apollo's prologos) was that he had sufficient medical skill to 'cure' death but perhaps his 'sons' do not have that potency even with the drugs. It could be that this inevitability is because this particular set of events is not a natural death, but has been set in motion by the events preceding this point in the play since Apollo's discussion with the Fates came to this conclusion and must thus run its course.

The first antistrophe further explores the power of Necessity through the address as if she is a normal goddess which brings the true helplessness of the Chorus to the fore. Necessity is described as θεᾶς and addressed as πότνια, indicating that this ode obviously refers to a goddess. Furthermore, we are given a number of details of how this deity differs from all other goddesses: she has no altar, no cult statue and is not persuaded to a course of action through sacrifice. This accentuates any helplessness in the face of her power since there is no way to propitiate her and thus persuade her to be more benevolent. She is said to work with Zeus in order to fulfil his wishes, which lends some weight to the idea that she is perhaps some kind of agent employed by other deities. This is in some ways reminiscent of *Prometheus Bound* lines 1050-1054 (see p.206), since in both texts Zeus fulfils his will in conjunction with ἀνάγκη.

This ode focuses on the devastation that necessity can cause and the futility of any struggle against her. This is an elaboration of an established theme in Greek poetry, that of the

[246] See Graf and Iles (2007) p.165 ff.

futility of any struggle against Necessity with the new twist that the Chorus are not wishing to enter conflict but to offer sacrifice or prayers before a cult statue. The end result would, however, be the same; this faceless goddess cannot be prevented from completing a course of action set down by the deity she acts for. In this instance, she is not associated with Fate, but with the dictates of Zeus and is depicted as an agent who brings his desires to fulfilment and could here refer to the necessity of death[247] since Alcestis must die, or at least it seems thus at this point of the drama. That this course of action is now seen as one of Zeus rather than the Fates could be because of Zeus' key role in bringing about Apollo's actions as a response to the thunderbolt annihilation of Asclepius.

Further typical language concerning Necessity can be seen in the opening line of the second Strophe with Admetus described as being ἐν ἀφύκτοισι χερῶν εἶλε θεὰ δεσμοῖς. Depicting the actions of Necessity as the personification of divine coercive constraint acting upon mankind is very common and builds further evidence towards the Chorus' conclusion that the death of Alcestis cannot be averted since it is compelled by divine wish to be thus.

However, the remainder of the play and its reversal of fortune with Heracles' defeat of Death and the return of Alcestis prove these assertions about the power of ἀνάγκη to be false. What then can we make of this Choral ode and what is Euripides' purpose in including it here[248]? Firstly we must understand how the necessity of death was defeated or cured. It is by a means not proffered by the Chorus as a potential solution; Heracles wrestles Death itself and forces him to retreat and rescind his claim to the life of Alcestis. Peculiarly the violent strength from a drunken demi-god, himself the son of Zeus, inspired by the impeccable morals of his host seems to have overcome the mechanism by which the Fates bring about the course of events prompted by the judgement of Zeus on Asclepius. Death is clear in the prologos that the life of Alcestis is owed to him at this time and that this is the law to which he adheres. This ruling, which was brought into action because of the deal brokered by Apollo with Fate, is described by the above Chorus as implemented by Zeus and his agent Necessity (line 978-9). Euripides would seem to be implying that this rule of divine law is not incontrovertible and can be affected by a physical intervention inspired by the moral goodness of Admetus and Alcestis. In some way, the reward due to those who have lived a morally virtuous existence somehow creates a greater necessity than that imposed by Zeus to whom the Chorus address their ode. This brings to mind the language used by the

[247] Parker (2007) p.247
[248] Chase Greene (1944) p.194 – 197 outlines the complexity of the situation at this point.

Atomists (see p.162) whose predictable atoms fuse together according to necessity but whose bonds can be broken by a greater necessity. In this tragic-comedy, the sceptic Euripides provides a message about the importance of morally good behaviour and the rewards it bestows upon pious individuals; such 'right' actions carry more necessity or compulsion than the random and primitive necessity of the vengeance of the gods.

# (3) Conclusions

Given the nature of this study, the topics and texts have been numerous and varied crossing a time period spanning over 300 years. It is also difficult to come to any absolute certainties about all instances of ἀνάγκη and associated termionology since there are many different conclusions that have been drawn throughout the study in the various areas of usage defined. Very specific conclusions have already been outlined in each section of examination and the questions posed at the outset have already been dealt with throughout the ongoing discussion at each of its stages.

Nevertheless, conclusions can be reached; I have attempted to draw together the most obvious questions about the meaning of ἀνάγκη, whilst also investigating some of the more intriguing and valuable issues. In assessing this initially, I have investigated interpretations of the word that are consistent throughout the period under consideration to arrive at appropriate translations in the differing contexts in which the word is used. It is predominantly associated with coercion in the form of either compulsion or constraint and these strands have been tracked through time with a view to see how these basic ideas develop as well as seeking reasons for their development. Secondly, I have explored the issue of relativity between necessities and assessed how and why they are not always required to come into effect. The third key question concerns the nature of necessity and its effects; what is thought to be occurring to individuals when their behaviour is modified by necessity? Lastly, if ἀνάγκη is a power that affects the individual, is it a subjective or objective experience, and is there a sense of a truly personal necessity?

## (i) How should ἀνάγκη be translated?

There are many contexts in which necessity is used, but they fall into obvious groupings. Although the commentary on each passage has specific analysis of the translation, here I will attempt to give broader segmentation for potential translation of ἀνάγκη based on the full body of research undertaken on all extant texts containing the word.

## (a) Interpersonal physical necessity

In all texts concerning interpersonal physical necessity there is an element of force involved; the majority of texts are interpersonal and violent or carry the threat of violence. They are also specific in that these are not rules or ideas but individual instances where force is employed in a particular situation, however typical such a situation might be. In all such texts, ἀνάγκη is not usually best translated as necessity, rather depending on the specific instance: compulsion, coercion, constraint, enslavement or torture are all appropriate and fitting interpretations. Of the texts examined, 35% (162 passages) were specific examples associated with physical violence (this also includes supernatural instances of coercion), forming by far the largest group within the 466 texts examined. These texts also span the entire period under consideration (from Homer to the end of the fifth century across genres). Thus it seems that this concept of ἀνάγκη is consistently held and is a core meaning of the term, perhaps the original meaning.

## (b) Biological necessity

There are 48 texts (10% of the total) which might loosely be termed biological in that they are concerned with the way that people work physically and the needs or impulses they might experience owing to the limits of their physical selves. This category is strongly linked to the idea of violent compulsion inherent within forceful ἀνάγκη on an interpersonal level and, like those concerned with interpersonal force, these passages are spread across all time periods and genres indicating that this is an early meaning for the term. Translations of compulsion and coercion are also valid for many of the passages such as those concerned with sex drive. Others carry more of an idea of constraint, in particular the ones that deal with hunger, thirst and other deprivations (see p.56ff.) for discussion of these passages).

## (c) Moral necessity

This broad-ranging set of texts is relatively small in number (36 passages, 8% of the total) and varied in topic. It encompasses concepts of kinship, restrictions owing to gender, social rules and customs and anything loosely thought of as ethical rather than physical. There is a fair spread of dates for these texts with seven from poetry before the fifth century and the bulk of them in the fifth century, with a peak towards the end the period in line with the total range of texts. These texts seem at first to be spread across genres, in that they are found in poetry, rhetoric and history, but the texts from rhetoric and history are concerned with two aspects of ἀνάγκη; the use of the adjectival form to mean blood relations (usually in a legal context discussed on p.74) or texts concerned with social customs (primarily from

Herodotus' ethnographic observations p.91ff.). Translations of this kind of necessity vary widely according to context and in some cases the affected individuals seem to feel a compulsion akin to interpersonal physical force, albeit as some part of an internal mental process involving different drives and influences upon them at any given time. In many of these cases, however, although an internal process is taking place in that a decision is taking place to perform a certain action in a particular way, there would often be a real physical consequence for the decision maker if they did not behave in the accepted manner.

## (d) Circumstantial necessity

This very varied group of texts is concerned with physical and moral contexts where no choice is perceived because of the restrictive manner of the current situation; thus it is linked to the idea of constraint conceived in interpersonal physical examples. It can often be translated as necessary or necessity in these instances. This category is a large group (19% of all texts, 86 passages) and ranges from the physical circumstances of geography through to the protocols of the lawcourt. Despite the large number of texts nearly all of them (76 of the 86) date to the last fifty years of the fifth century, with only three (all from Homer[249]) predating the fifth century at all. Although these texts are usually specific in nature in that they refer to a particular moment in time, the necessity that they refer to is usually a more general concept that would hold true in all similar cases were they to occur. This more systematic view of the world linked to the predictability of the environment, human behaviour and customs has far more in common with thought in the late fifth century than the more random world of the early epic and lyric poems. For this kind of necessity to make sense, it requires the idea of 'repeatability'; this needs to be inherent in a world where there are concepts such as phusis and nomos which have defined rules and characteristics.

## (e) Fate, destiny and divine dictates

This type of ἀνάγκη is also concerned with circumstance, compulsion and restriction but that of a more specific nature than circumstantial. This usage is almost entirely restricted to tragedy and lyric or epic poetry with only one passage (Thuc. 2.64.2.1-2) falling outside. All of these passages have the overall meaning that the current situation is necessarily the way it is either owing to divine dictate, the personal fate or destiny of those involved, or it has been prophesied and is thus inevitable. In such passages the translation of *necessity* or *inevitability* is possible as is *compulsion* as long as they are qualified as divinely caused. Although many of these passages fall towards the end of the time period (78% of them),

[249] *Iliad* XI.150-151; XII.178-179; *Odyssey* XXIV.498-499

there are far more texts from this late period (70% of all ἀνάγκη passages), and so this is not a significance in this case given the spread across the other time periods.

## (f) Cosmological, eschatological and logical necessity

This type of necessity falls almost entirely within the fifth century, with only one text by Anaximenes just before this in the late sixth century and largely concerns philosophical texts (35 of the 40 texts). Of those not classed as Philosophy, four are from Satyr plays and Comedy, and reflect the philosophical writings familiar to the audience in a satirical manner. It is very hard to get a realistic sense of how frequently this kind of necessity was used in a philosophical context given the fragmentary nature of available texts and the relatively small number of extant fragments in comparison to the lost writings of this genre. Much of the analysis on the usage of ἀνάγκη in early cosmology has to be through extrapolation from later writers' comments. In general ἀνάγκη is used in several ways in these texts. Firstly, personified necessity appears as a constraining or compelling force and can be translated as either Constraint or Compulsion (as appropriate) in these instances; Necessity although also a correct translation does not fully encapsulate the full sense intended here. In the statements of logical necessity, there is a close relationship to the idea of circumstantial necessity; if a set of prerequisites are the case then there are inevitable consequences. Thus necessity is a good translation in these instances even if the sense has derived from an idea of compulsion or constraint.

## (g) Treaties and military expediency

All texts concerning these two concepts (30 in number) are found in the last fifty years of the fifth century and fall entirely within the genre of Historiography. This is in part to do with the more militaristic focus within this time period following the Persian Wars and during the Peloponnesian conflict and their documentation in the form of historical records. As inter-polis politics became ever more complex, new vocabulary was required to describe novel situations and the concepts of compulsion and constraint would have been very apt for the mentality of civil war. Most treaties discussed whether within the Persian or Peloponnesian wars have an undercurrent of coercion associated with them in that they were only agreed upon under threat of violence; hence necessity can often be translated as *coercion* in these contexts. The idea of military and personal expediency is more complex and relies not only upon the explicit threat of violence but also upon the idea of advantage (sometimes collective and sometimes personal). Nineteen of the twenty-one texts presenting military expediency come from Thucydides indicating that this usage is not only late in the period but increases towards the end of it. This kind of necessity is usually circumstantial and specific

but with a sense of the general since the implication is that most people given the same set of circumstances would make the same decision. In these cases, as in moral necessity, there is a compulsion of some kind implied which prompts the decision maker to a particular course of action. The idea of advantage associated with these decisions will usually be a situation which will result in the fewest casualties or better conditions for citizens or individuals. All such benefits are usually balanced, like the treaties, against a severe threat of physical violence and thus these necessity phrases also have a sense of interpersonal physical violence or at the very least a threat of such.

### (h) Personification

Like the personifications from cosmological contexts, non-philosophical examples (9 texts) all carry the idea of supernatural compulsion or constraint and present instances where mortals feel powerless in the face of forces beyond their control. As discussed above (p.197ff.), it is by no means clear that this personification is persuasive evidence for there being an actual deity called Necessity who was worshipped in the normal way. Like many personifications of abstract forces such personifications represent the idea of mortals being subject to what is perceived as powers too great for them to contend with. In the case of ἀνάγκη this is best translated as *divine compulsion, coercion or constraint*.

## (ii) Does the use of ἀνάγκη change across time?

### (a) Coercion

Although touched upon in the notes on translation, a more in-depth survey of changes across time was necessary. In order to explore this issue, the two key ideas underlying the concept of necessity, those of necessity as coercion leading to compulsion or constraint, have been explored in their various manifestations chronologically.

There is a basic idea of coercion underlying most of the interpretations of ἀνάγκη. Although the associated meanings are varied, there is a perceptible journey from this a basic specific physical sense in the earlier texts to more sophisticated concepts towards the end of the fifth century. The meaning effectively broadens to encompass more concepts in the late Fifth Century. When interpreting ἀνάγκη as coercion, there is in many cases a distinction between compulsive ἀνάγκη (that which forces something to happen) and constraining ἀνάγκη (that which prevents something from happening). Taking each of these two strands, their development across time, geography and genre has been mapped to see how the meaning of ἀνάγκη widened and came to mean so much more than simple coercion.

## (i) Compulsion: What is the basic meaning?

A precise definition of the earliest examples of ἀνάγκη as compulsion is the application or use of a tangible interpersonal physical or supernatural force to prompt a course of action[250]. The ἀνάγκη phrase usually requires one person or a group of people having to perform an action because they have been forced to by another person or people. The necessity (ἀνάγκη) is usually a way of describing the force itself and requires such translations as: '*by coercion*', '*by means of coercion*' or '*using coercion*' and can either take physical form of brute force or be supernatural in nature. It can also only be threatened rather than actual force which means that an idea or concept of a necessity is prompting an action as opposed to a purely physical interaction. Most ἀνάγκη situations of this kind give a sense of inbalance of power; one party is weaker or less powerful than the other at the time that the compulsion is applied by the stronger or more powerful party. Because this type of ἀνάγκη is interpersonal and specific, its application is elective in that a person or group of people will choose to utilise force of some kind or another rather than it occurring naturally or automatically.

## Early developments

There are a number of other related interpretations of ἀνάγκη that date to the earliest texts under consideration. For example, the personification of body parts described by Odysseus in very human terms where the belly is seen to force a man to eat[251] obviously has connotations of compulsion. This usage is not common, but does also occur in Aeschylus, *Agamemnon*, 717-726 where the lion cub in the famous allegory is compelled by its belly to murder its keeper.

Another early usage is that of sexual violence and erotic compulsion. In these cases either a forced sexual act is described using ἀνάγκη, in much the same way as the compulsion described above, or the erotic urge itself is described as a compulsion (like the personification of the belly) which drives a person to the supposed necessity of the sexual act. In the passages considered, the former occurs only once, in the *Cypria*, whereas the latter idea of erotic compulsion occurs most frequently in Lyric Poetry and continues into the fifth century in Tragedy, with one example in display oratory (Gorgias *Fr*. 11, 124-5). This development demonstrates an abstraction of the notion of necessity from an interpersonal

[250] For discussion on passages concerned with compulsive force see pages 21ff.
[251] Passages concerned with eating and drinking are found on pages 56ff.

physical or supernatural power or agent to an impersonal aspect of the self that, although described in interpersonal terms is internal and thus perhaps more subjective.

## Later developments

In the later part of the period, Greek societies became more integrated and larger groups of people who were unrelated began living together, the protocols of social existence became far more complex. As well as the random physical compulsion encountered in military conflict or the other interpersonal occasions discussed above, the word develops a far wider range of meanings which increase towards the end of the fifth century.

The idea of necessity as physical assault is certainly not novel in the later time period; however, it is seen in a new context with a specific meaning: that of the torture of slaves to procure evidence in legal cases. There is nothing new about the physical assault of slaves; as early as Herodotus, we see household slaves threatened with violence in ἀνάγκη terms. However, the systematic procurement of legal evidence from slaves is a twist on this. Usually the necessity is either described as being the torture itself; evidence was given 'by' or 'using necessity' meaning torture. In other places necessity actually means the wheel or other mechanism of torture itself (pages 33ff.).

The potential impact of poverty or other deprivation could lead to citizens transgressing established laws of the polis or making unethical choices. One way in which the motivation for such law breaking is described uses the personification of poverty as *penia*, and then creates an interpersonal scenario in which *penia* places a necessity upon a person or people which compels them to employ undesirable strategies. This type of language is first employed by Theognis but is also found in Thucydides.

A related but different use of ἀνάγκη sees resources that are needed for subsistence such as food and drink described as necessities themselves. Previously the state of hunger had been portrayed as an interpersonal compulsive power play between body parts, such as the belly; now the body is viewed more as a system that has minimum requirements for existence. These minimum requirements are viewed as necessities, giving a far more mechanistic or systematic view of the body, with anakai as set inputs which are required for life. This impersonal idea of necessity takes us a long way from an interpersonal relationship seen frequently in the earlier texts and is far from elective but a necessity of nature.

Whereas the condition of slavery and the process of being enslaved are constraining necessities (see below p.39), the tasks performed by a slave are also described as necessities (p.47) in much the same way as the food and drink above. However, it is obvious that such tasks are not necessities in the same manner; the slave does not need to perform these tasks in order to survive. However, if they did not perform such tasks they might be subjected to punishment of some description. We might also provide a summary of this usage along these lines '*x is a slave, slaves in this situation are compelled to do y, therefore an aspect of being x is that in this situation, x must do y'*. Although the reason the slave may have originally have had to do the tasks was through fear of punishment, at this stage, the direct connection to actual punishment is not a necessity, the idea is sufficient to form this definition of a household female slave and their necessary function.

As previously mentioned, another type of usage that is closely related to the increasing sense of *phusis* in the late fifth century is cosmological necessity. Within non-philosophical texts such as Herodotus, we see an idea that the natural world has repetitive phenomena which weren't viewed as systematic in the modern idea of ecosystems, but were thought of as predictable. This predictability was sometimes explained using necessity terms; these are usually impersonal and in the form of '*it was a necessity that'*... or that something happened '*by necessity'* or '*by means of necessity'*. The two distinct uses demonstrate a different idea; the first is simply a circumstantial necessity with no cause stipulated, only observable phenomena. The second indicates that the power of necessity (whatever that may be) compelled certain things to happen in the natural world. This necessity is to some extent reified but the texts are largely impersonal and the compulsion seems to be an automatic feature of the *phusis* of the natural environment.

An even more abstract but similar notion is found in atomist texts. In this instance, there does appear to be some kind of system, a mechanistic universe, in which necessity acts as a compulsive agent[252]. This necessity has no personal features, thus this process cannot be described as interpersonal; there is also no concept of agency, in that necessity is not put into the universe by any controlling power. The extent to which the atomist idea is a system is debatable; to some extent it can be viewed as a picture of the *phusis* of the universe. However, there are component parts, causes, albeit described in somewhat vague terms, and effects; necessity is a cause in this cosmos (as is chance). The atomists needed an idea of

[252] See extensive discussions above on the interpretations of atomist texts pages 162ff.

abstract compulsion since their universe is constantly moving; the term necessity, although more commonly used in interpersonal situations, is usually used to convey the meaning of forcing or compelling actions to occur, therefore it was the ideal term to convey the action they envisaged.

## *ii)* Constraint: what is the basic meaning?

This aspect of coercion is concerned with forced constraint of some description; this is often literal, with a meaning of actual bondage, imprisonment or slavery. It is usually interpersonal with one person (god or mortal) preventing another person from doing something by means of a necessity or constraint or deprives them of freedom to do what they wish to. Necessity in this sense is usually the means by which the constraint or restriction is effected, so can be physical force or the bonds by which someone is held (such bonds can be real (actual fetters of some description) or metaphorical (restrictions caused by fate for example).

### Early developments

A common early usage, found as far back as Homer is the relationship of ἀνάγκη terms to the condition of slavery and the process of enslavement; specifically, ἀνάγκη can be found to mean the measures used to enslave a person or people (in which case physical force would be the obvious intended meaning) and the situation of being a slave (in which case the threat of violence were a slave to attempt to gain freedom would be the meaning). That this is a common usage is hardly surprising, since slavery is one of the most obvious instances of a coercion that constrains previously free individuals and ensures they keep to their allotted tasks.

Family duties, such as the duty of obedience, are rules that would have limited (or restricted) the behaviour of all of the oikos. These obligations, framed using ἀνάγκη phrases appear as early as Homer thus indicating that this must have been one of the first adaptations of the meaning of constraint. Long before there would have been any sense of belonging to a city or other settlement, the family and wider clan group was the focus of individuals. The rule giver was the head of the *oikos* and thus there was a sense of government within extended family groups, with codes of behaviour to ensure harmonious communal life. Presumably such rules would have been enforced using violence, the threat of violence or the deprivation of privileges and this could well be the root of such an early adaptation. At this early stage, this type of necessity is not expressed in an abstract way, nor

is it commonly used, there is simply a statement that obeying parents is something children must do according to the divine precedent (*Iliad* XV.197-199).

## Later developments

The idea of constraint becomes increasingly abstract during the latter part of the period under consideration and restrictive necessity can be applied to many more aspects of an increasingly complex civic existence.

In early texts coercive constraint was more likely to be associated with interpersonal power dynamics between individuals unless in the context of slavery. In later texts necessity is applied to entire cities or peoples by leaders in a more general sense of subjugation. This type of necessity is interpersonal and, although elective, is not systematically applied, since it is at the behest of a despot or polis with expansionist tendencies and is subject to many considerations.

Although the necessity of subjugation is often simply a case of the application of violence, it is sometimes more complex with the addition of the necessity of treaties and oaths. An increasing discussion of alliances forged in this way using ἀνάγκη terms is found in Herodotus (I.74.18-20, VII.233.5-10, VIII.22.10-12) and Thucydides (I.49.7.5-7, I.61.3.1-5, III.32.2.4-5, IV.19.2.2-4, VI.10.2.5-7). Some of these oaths and treaties are associated with ἀνάγκη terms because they have been forced by military might, others are described as having their own ἀνάγκη[253]. Although seeming abstract and concerned with the idea of the force of legal agreements, it is important to understand that such necessity may also be viewed as being underwritten by force but in this case, the supernatural force of *Zeus Horkios*, the protector of oaths and the deity who will revenge himself against oath or treaty breakers. Similar religious obligations are found in Herodotus (pages 91ff.) where certain codes of behaviour are adopted in order not to enrage specific deities. Thus it is questionable whether in necessity terms we can really talk of a personal internal ethical necessity since seemingly moral decisions are actually based on the necessity of the threat of divine force.

Pre-existing constraining necessities become more specific during the fifth century; thus the new usage of the adjectival form *anankaioi* as family witnesses in the law court (p.174). This is obviously a development of the necessity of obedience discussed above (p.72) and the

[253] See discussion on pages 104ff.

instance from *Odyssey* 24.208-219 (discussed p.48) where the word *anankaioi* carries a meaning of *obligated people*. At this point, the term only occurs in legal texts, where members of the family are obliged to witness in favour of family members as an aspect of their familial duties to the head of the *oikos*. To what extent this coercion is physical, in that there is a threat of violence or punishment if those obligated do not perform their duty is not clear. It could also be argued that the necessity shows some sense of personal morality, in that, because the adjectival form is used, indicating that these family members are imbued with a necessity, there does not appear on the surface to be any interpersonal use of force or pressure[254].

An unusual type of constraining necessity is only found in one play, the Philoctetes, and concerns the effect of Philoctetes' wound on his movement. His damaged body is constrained in its movement and it is described as having to move in a restricted manner because of his disability (p.58). This plot line requires the depiction of such an affliction whereas people with physical disabilities do not commonly feature in writing from this period; thus although it is easy to see how the term necessity could easily have been modified from the interpersonal physical exchanges envisaged in the context of hunger (p.56) to a less fortunate scenario, whether this was widespread or not is impossible to know.

Two situations that appear to be reasonably commonplace in the fifth century are the need either to act in accordance with political expediency or to make sensible strategic decisions in battle. The latter has its roots in the poetry of Homer and simple physical compulsion or constraint. However, in the writings of Herodotus and Thucydides (pages 120ff.) it is clear that there is not only a military might to contend with in most situations. There is a complex combination of necessities, some concerned with actual physical attack but made ever more intricate through treaties, alliances and the personal ambition (or those of a polis for empire status) of some parties involved. An aspect of this, the idea of making decisions because of the necessity of political expediency, again brings us into the realm of personal ethical choice and will be discussed below in more depth. Thucydides' imagery of the individuals engaged in decision making in the Peloponnesian War when pressed by necessity often seems to raise the question whether the 'necessity' is really the reason for the action or

[254] For further discussion of personal necessity see pages 137ff.

whether it is a pretext to sanction unethical behaviour (see further discussion on whether a necessity is always a necessity).

The ultimate constraining necessity is that described in the cosmology of Parmenides and his fellow Eleatics, Zeno and Melissus. Parmenides posits a world that does not and cannot move or alter in any way, giving the cause of this stasis as necessity, who is said to hold the fetters of the universe (DK B8, 29-32). There are also several other necessities described in his cosmology (not in the same personified manner) which all point towards this sole existence of what is and prohibit all change. This physical force of constraint is depicted as personal on the impersonal, with personified necessity holding the whole cosmos in its place. However, despite the personification, which perhaps reflects the grand poetic tradition in which Parmenides attempts to compose, his cosmology appears to posit an impersonal *phusis* of existence and an automatic universe.

A more difficult idea to grasp is why mathematical philosophers such as Philolaus used the term to explain mathematical systems. It prompts questions about the Pythagorean theory of number; what did they believe the number system to be, and why are they using terms like necessity to explain why it behaves in a particular way when necessity usually describes a tangible compulsion on the physical plane? Did they then believe numbers to be concrete realities subject to the same forces that we encounter in the physical realm, or is this a new idea altogether when hypothetical forces act on abstract concepts? The language of logic employs necessity in a less concrete constraining role but nevertheless a binding one. In the writings of Philolaus (*Frag* 2.2-3; *Frag* 6.12-15), Melissus (*frags*. 1-3) and Gorgias (Frag.3, lines 38 and 70) for example, necessity fulfils a linguistic function in hypothetical claims or logical statements. By using it in 'if x then y is necessary' phrases, the implication is that the result is compelled to constraint; it will inevitably only manifest in one way given those circumstances. This pattern of argument is also used in counterclaims by Zeno to disprove any alternative world view (*Frags*.1.2-4; 1.10; 3.5).

Thus we can see that although the same basic necessity themes of compulsion and constraint continue throughout the period under consideration, they are moulded and adapted in numerous ways to fit many genres, reflecting the era in which the texts are written.

## (iii) Necessity as a relative concept

Are some necessities more necessary than others or are some necessities more important to some people than they are to others? These questions are complex and difficult to answer given the limited number and type of texts extant. Like many issues raised in this analysis, it is not possible to give a definitive answer but some aspects of this question can be addressed in some contexts.

An obvious place to start is with hypothetical statements where the necessity unsurprisingly is also hypothetical and only comes into force when the 'if' clause of the claim comes into effect. As discussed in the prophecy section (pages 108ff.), many predictions never come to pass as certain criteria are never fulfilled. Similarly in the language of rhetoric and philosophy, necessity phrases are often used in statements of phusis and circumstance to support the authority of claims but the 'necessity' will only happen in the exact set of circumstances required by the statement. This is frequently the case in statements of cosmology; a necessity is defined but it is only a necessity within the cosmological or physical theory under consideration. Doubtless the ancient scholars who subscribed to those particular viewpoints would like to think of such necessities not as hypothetical but as inevitable albeit an unproveable reality in most cases.

Such statements frequently fit a set pattern of reasoning. However, there are other necessity statements which are not hypothetical but physical; nevertheless the compulsion can stimulate different responses. The following passage from Thucydides shows a situation where the necessity is a threat of violence.

**Thucydides IV.10.1. 1-7**

ἄνδρες οἱ ξυναράμενοι τοῦδε τοῦ κινδύνου, μηδεὶς ὑμῶν ἐν τῇ τοιᾷδε **ἀνάγκῃ** ξυνετὸς βουλέσθω δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐκλογιζόμενος ἅπαν τὸ περιεστὸς ἡμᾶς δεινόν, μᾶλλον ἢ ἀπερισκέπτως εὔελπις ὁμόσε χωρῆσαι τοῖς ἐναντίοις καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἂν περιγενόμενος. ὅσα γὰρ ἐς **ἀνάγκην** ἀφῖκται ὥσπερ τάδε, λογισμὸν ἥκιστα ἐνδεχόμενα κινδύνου τοῦ ταχίστου προσδεῖται.

*Men, we are all together in this danger, may none of you seem to be reckoning our perils in this* ***necessity****, rather hurry to close down the enemy without calculating the odds because you see this as the safest thing to do. For when it comes to a situation like this, one of* ***necessity****, reckoning the danger is the worst thing that is possible - there is a need for speedy actions.*

In this motivational speech to the troops by Demosthenes, the necessity or compulsion is obviously the danger presented by war which could supposedly result in death or injury. The speech indicates that this compulsion can result in two different courses of action; one is that the men will fight without thought of their own safety (the preferred option for Demosthenes) whereas the other he envisages is that the men could stop to consider whether it is more prudent to flee. As discussed above, in a military context when necessity threatened, the correct way to respond is generally either one thing or the other; here Thucydides presents a more human situation that these men may face a dilemma in how to react in such necessary situations. A similar situation is described in Thuc. II.61.1.2, where two options are outlined in response to a military threat and is also alluded to in Thuc. IV.10.1. We can thus deduce that if we translate ἀνάγκη as compulsion here, an automatic response to this will differ from person to person and is thus subjective not automatic. This idea is far more frequently seen towards the end of the period under consideration.

Another related development seen for the first time in the fifth century is the concept that some necessities take precedence over others in a kind of hierarchy or that one necessity is greater than another. In the story of Gyges and Candaules (Her.I.11.15-16), Gyges is placed under an idea of necessity or compulsion through circumstance in which his own survival over-rides the moral duty of obedience and loyalty to his master. Similarly, in the more secular world that is assumed in Thucydides' history, the need for physical sustenance is considered a more important necessity than that of religion (like those described by Herodotus pages 91ff.). As discussed above (pages 58ff.) (Thuc.II.17.1.9-II.17.2.5), the settlement of the Pelasgian quarter in Athens to accommodate displaced citizens was considered more important than the previous religious necessity in place owing to a prophecy. Likewise the need to move sacred water from Apollo's temple at Delium for subsistence was a greater compulsion than that of duty towards the god (Thuc.IV.98.5.1). A similar idea is present in atomist cosmology where atoms are joined together by a necessity (or compulsion) but the bond will be broken if subjected to a greater necessity (see pages

162ff. 63A37DK).). In these instances it seems more appropriate to translate ἀνάγκη as compulsion rather than necessity.

Thus in certain situations a necessity is not always a necessity. This is largely because the term sometimes differs in meaning to today; often it has more of a sense of a meaning of compulsion rather than inevitability. Like today, the later Greeks had an idea of a hierarchy of needs in which various necessities were considered and, although such passages are unusual, survival is the generally considered the highest priority in such circumstances.

As to the question of whether the same necessity situation can mean different things to different people, the most obvious example also comes from Thucydides (V.89.1.7-8) in the Melian dialogue (discussed page 30). This complex text is a good example of relative necessity in that what is considered a compulsion by one side in the conflict is different to the coercion experienced by the weaker party. In this case, the Athenians speak from what they consider to be a position of strength and feel they can exact whatever they desire from the Melians who have no choice but to comply.

## (iv) Does a sense of personal or individual necessity develop over the time period?

Towards the end of the period, characters are presented as being self-motivated rather than being subject to the powers of Fate and the gods. Agamemnon presents a classic example of someone who is compelled to a dreadful series of events once he has made a choice (Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 218-224). However, in the last fifty years of the fifth century in the works of Herodotus, Euripides and Thucydides, decisions represented as possessing necessity are depicted as far more dependent upon a personal vision not necessarily forced upon them but an internally motivated impulse based on their perception of their own circumstances.

A relatively common concept is that of the personal necessity of a character within a narrative who expresses a personal compulsion to speak. Although such necessities are circumstantial, they are subjective and restricted to the specific instance in which the individual finds themself each is also determined by the personal nature or character of that person. Many of these examples occur when someone feels they need to justify their own position (Her.IX.27.4-8; Thuc.I.37.1.1; I.73.2.2-4; VI.82.1.1-3; Eur.Hipp.990-991). They feel an internal compulsion to provide their side of the argument or their version of events.

Interestingly two of the Thucydides passages (I.73.2.2-4 and VI.82.1.1-3) are concerned with the Athenians feeling that it is necessary to defend the existence of their empire implying that its foundation was a necessary reaction to the circumstances at that time. This is presented in the same way that contemporaries might discuss an aspect of cosmological necessity implying that rather than it being a conscious decision for expansionist policies being taken owing to ambition and greed, the creation of the empire was a necessity.

Other examples found in the genre of History are concerned with the necessities of the narrative in that certain observations must be made in order to fulfil the phusis of the work being created. Such metanarratives are only found in Herodotus where he explains his literary purpose in an interruption to the narrative (VII.51.3-4; VII.96.5-6; VII.139.1-3)[255]. These provide a unique opportunity to get a glimpse into the personal necessities felt by the author and his creative method.

Personal opinions are also presented in a number of historical texts where a subjective desire for revenge is presented as a necessity. The first time this is seen is in Herodotus (VIII.144.10-13 page 92) where revenge is sought on the Persians to pay them back for the desecration of the temples in Athens. Previously in wartime scenarios presented frequently in the Homeric texts for example, there is a physical act of violence which then prompts an immediate reaction, usually in order to preserve the lives of those involved (page 122ff.). Here there is no threat of immediate danger; in fact seeking military revenge upon the Persians is more likely to cause further Greek deaths than no retaliation. Thus this necessity is a new impulse not described in accounts of legendary conflict but one reserved for real wartime with genuine human nature laid bare rather than the idealised heroes of Homer. In the Iliad, Achilles does seek revenge upon Hector for the death of Patroclus, but this revenge is never described as a necessity. Thucydides also includes several accounts of speeches in which a desire for revenge is put forward using necessity terms (I.144.3.1; IV.10.1.5-7; IV.20.1.3-4). In presenting such revenge as necessary much like the justification of empire (I.73.2.2-4 and VI.82.1.1-3) the various counterattacks can be justified as inevitable consequences of circumstance rather than political desire for power, wealth and territory.

There are a number of passages which are concerned more with personal ambition or desire than representative of a city state's stance. There are two such passages from

[255] See also discussion pages 129ff.

Historiography (Her.III.65.25-27 and Thuc.VI.16.1.2-3). The first passage forms part of Cambyses' deathbed speech; he expresses his personal desire to bring his deeds to fruition as a necessity given the circumstances he finds himself in. In the latter Alcibiades outlines the reasons why he should lead the Sicilian Expedition. He describes this proposition as necessary since he has been personally attacked by Nicias and therefore is the best person to be in charge. This rhetorical construct using a pseudological format gives the impression of being logically sound owing to its implementation of a necessity term despite the fact that this reason is far from compelling in the choice of a general.

The only other personal desires or plans outlined using necessity terms come from Euripides and are both from the mouths of heroines. Hecuba demands that she die along with her daughter in a stichomythic confrontation with Menelaus (*Hec*.394-397). There is no reason other than her personal wishes to give this demand the compulsion inherent within the terminology. Far more shocking than Hecuba's revelations about her personal theology is the plotting of Euripides' most infamous heroine Medea. In several passages (803-806; 1012-1013; 1062-1063; 1240-1243 discussed on p36, 137 and 138) towards the end of the play, when discussing her plan to murder Glaucë, Creon and her children, Medea describes these intentions as a necessity. She feels compelled to carry through the series of events she has plotted and sees them as inevitable. Clearly such inflexibility presents a far more scary character, almost possessed by her desire for revenge. It also presents an individual voice, a woman who has created her own destiny along with that of her family and the royal family; she is certainly not subject to external necessities of Fate or morality. Although Medea uses the language of rhetoric elsewhere in her lengthy soliloquy presented as an internal debate of conscience, the necessity statements are not framed as hypothetical statements within this to shore up the integrity of her reasoning. They simply describe the inevitability of the revenge she has devised against Jason. There is no divine retribution for her scandalous actions and thus the notion of personal necessity seems validated by the fact she gets away with multiple homicides and more shockingly, the infanticide of her own sons. With the multitude of religious and philosophical points of view at the end of the fifth century, it is hardly surprising to see a non-Greek working to a different set of ethics and compulsions. However, this shocking alternative set of rules (governed by their own necessity) is placed firmly within a scenario that could be familiar to the audience (divorce and remarriage) and in reaction to the actions of a hero who has contravened the moral necessities of family duty (pages 71ff.). Thus we see a new necessity, a personally devised compulsion that has been

caused by Jason's lack of adherence to ancient moral codes. We could therefore deduce that although this is the the strategy of a barbarian woman, this new personal necessity is set into action by the behaviour of a Greek man who is not acting in the morally necessary way.

## (v) Overall observations

In all, it is difficult to reach a perfect definition for every time that ἀνάγκη is used because of the vast number of contexts involved. In general it is fair to say that there is usually an idea of compulsion, coercion and constraint that often has overtones of violence or threat of violence. Although necessity terms are used in non-violent contexts, such as cosmology, there is still an idea of very strong physical force which either causes movement or prevents it.

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