Institutionalising Islamic Political Parties in Indonesia: 
A Study of Internal Fragmentation and Cohesion in 
the Post-Soeharto Era (1998-2008)

Submitted by Firman Noor to the University of Exeter 
as a thesis for the degree of 
Doctor Philosophy in Arab and Islamic studies 
In March 2012

This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that is copyright material 
and that no quotation take from the thesis without may be published without proper 
acknowledgement.

I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified 
and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a 
degree by this or any other University.

Signature:
Abstract

The thesis will address the question of why Islamic political parties, in the first decade of the reform era, suffer internal fragmentation and have failed to develop cohesion, while one Islamic party has been able to develop and consolidate. This thesis will explore and analyze factors and reasons behind the problem of the cohesion of the Islamic political parties by associating it with the existence of party institutionalization. For this purpose, this thesis would be a study of comparative institutionalization of Islamic political parties, particularly between the National Wakening Party (PKB) and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). PKB is a good exemplar for an Islamic party that experienced severely fragmented parties. In fact, this party has became the largest among Islamic political parties and including one of the worst fragmentations among all new political parties in Indonesia. Meanwhile, PKS has been able to maintain its internal discipline and unity, although factionalism and fragmentation have become commonplace during the first decade of the Reform Era. This thesis believes that the more a party have been institutionalized, which is indicated by the existence of procedural leadership in decision-making process, the effectiveness of internal conflict resolution mechanism, the continuation of systematic cadrerization and the commitment to the shared values, there is a bigger chance of the party to preserve its cohesion. On the other hand, the less a party have been institutionalized which is indicated by the ineffectiveness of procedural leadership, the failure of internal conflict resolution mechanism, the impediment of systematic cadrerization, and the failure to provide ideology as the guidance of policy and uniting values, there is more possibility for the party to be fragmented.
# List of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Contents</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables and Illustration</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I: Introduction</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Background</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Research Question</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Hypothesis</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Objectives</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Theoretical Framework</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1. Islamic Parties</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2. Fragmentation and Cohesion</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.1. Fragmentation</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.2. Cohesion</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3. Party Institutionalisation</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4. Party Institutionalisation and Fragmentation or Cohesion: Dimension</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.1. Procedural Leadership in Decision Making Process</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.2. Conflict Resolution Mechanism</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.3. Systematic Cadrerization</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.4. The Commitment to the Shared Values or Ideology</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Methodology</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Structure</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II: The Development of Islamic Political Parties: The Experience of Fragmentation and Cohesion in the Pre-Reform Era</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Pre-Independent Era</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Independent Era (1945-1998)</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Overview</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III: Political Biography of the PKB</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Background to the PKB’s Emergence</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The NU Tradition and the PKB’s Political Orientation</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Organisational Structure</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Political Activities</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Closing Remarks</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter IV: Political Biography of the PKS</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Background</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Foundation of Ideology and Political Orientations</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Organisational Structure</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Political Activities</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Closing Remarks</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter V: Procedural Leadership in Decision Making Process: The Case of PKB</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.4. Shared Values Infusion 340
2. Conclusion 342
   2.1. The Relation between Variables 342
   2.2. Suggestion for Further Research 350

Appendices 352
1. The Political Principles of PKB 352
2. The Declaration Script of PKB 354
3. The Declaration Charter of Justice Party 355
4. The Declaration of Prosperous Justice Party 358
5. The Central Managing Board of PKB 1999-2000 360
6. The Central Managing Board of PKB 2000-2005 362
7. The Central Managing Board of PKB-Matori 2002-2005 364
8. The Central Managing Board of PKB-Gus Dur/Alwi 2000-2005 366
9. The Central Managing Board of PKB-Semarang 2005-2010 369
10. The Central Managing Board of PKB-Ulama 2005-2010 372
11. The Central Managing Board of PKB-Parung 2008-2010 376
12. The Central Managing Board of PKB-Ancol 2008-2014 378
13. The Central Managing Board of PK 381
14. The Central Managing Board of PKS 2003-2005 384
15. The Central Managing Board of PKS 2005-2010 386
16. Table of Score 389

Glossary 390
Bibliography 395
List of Tables and Illustrations

Tables
Table 1: Comparison of Party Institutionalisation between PKB and PKS 16
Table 2: Dimension of Party Institutionalisation 37
Table 3: The 1971 Election Result 70
Table 4: The DPR Seats Proportion of Each Element in PPP 72
Table 5: The Top Three Provinces that Provides DPR Seats for PKB 86
Table 6: The 1999 Election Result 88
Table 7: Comparison of Results the 2004 Election and the 2009 Election 114
Table 8: The Result of the Election for the Chairperson of the MS in 2005 MMS 161
Table 9: PKS’ Membership Grades 254
Table 10: Membership Grades for Holding a Party Position at National, Provincial and District Level 256
Table 11: Comparison of the of the Procedural Leadership Conditions to the Decision Making Process Applied by PKB and PKS 332
Table 12: Comparison of the CRM Conditions Applied by PKB and PKS 336
Table 13: Comparison of the Conditions of Systematic Cadrerization Applied by PKB and PKS 339
Table 14: Comparison of the Shared Values Infusion Conditions Applied by PKB and PKS 342

Illustrations
Picture 1: The Orbit of Dakwah 96
Chart 1: Conflict Resolution Management in PKS 208
ABBREVIATIONS

AD: Anggaran Dasar (Statutes of Association).
ART: Anggaran Rumah Tangga (Rules of Association).
DPC: Dewan Pengurus Cabang (Branch Managing Board).
DPD: Dewan Pengurus Daerah (Local Managing Board).
DPP: Dewan Pengurus Pusat (Central Managing Board).
DPR: Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People’s Representative Council).
DPTP: Dewan Pimpinan Tinggi Partai (The Party High Executive Board).
DPW: Dewan Pengurus Wilayah (Regional Managing Board).
DS: Dewan Syariah (Islamic Law Council).
DSD: Dewan Syari'ah Daerah (Local Islamic Law Council).
DSP: Dewan Syari’ah Pusat (Central Islamic Law Council).
DSW: Dewan Syari’ah Wilayah (Regional Islamic Law Council).
BBM: Bahan Bakar Minyak (Petroleum, Fuel or Oil).
BPDO: Badan Penegak Disiplin Organisation (the Board for Organisational Discipline Enforcement).
CRM: Conflict Resolution Management
DDII: Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication).
FKP: Forum Kader Peduli (The Care Cadre Forum).
ICMI: Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Intellectual Muslim Association).
ISDV: Indische Social Deemocratiche Vereeneging (the Hindia Social Democracy Association).
KAMMI: Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union).
KPU: Komisi Pemilihan Umum (the Election Committee)
MLB: Muktamar Luar Biasa (Extraordinary Conference)
MMS: Musyawarah Majelis Syura (the Conference of Consultative Assembly)
MI: Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslimin)
MPP: Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat (Central Advisory Assembly)
MPR: Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly)
MS: Majelis Syura (Consultative Assembly or Consultative Council)
NU: Nahdlatul Ulama (Awakening of Islamic Scholars).
PAN: Partai Amanat Nasional (Party of National Mandate).
PK: Partai Keadilan (Justice Party).
PKB: Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party).
PKBN: Partai Kemakmuran Bangsa Nasional (National Party for Nation Prosperity).
PKD: Partai Kejayaan Demokrasi (Glorious Democracy Party).
PKI: Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesia Comunist Party).
PKNU: Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama (National Awakening of Islamic Scholars Party).
PKU: Partai Kebangkitan Ummat (Party of Ummat Awakening).
PMI: Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi) (Indonesia Muslims’ Party).
PBB: Partai Bulan Bintang (Party of Moon and Crescent).
PBU: Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama (the Central Board of Awakening of Islamic Scholars).
PD: Partai Demokrat (Democrat Party).
PDI: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party).
PDIP: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle).
PMII: Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Students Movement).
PNU: Partai Nahdlatul Ummat (Ummat Awakening Party).
PPP: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party).
PSII: Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (Party of Indonesia Islamic Association).
PSUNI: Partai Solidaritas Uni Nasional Indonesia (Indonesia National Union Solidarity Party)
SI MPR: Sidang Istimewa Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (the Special Meeting of Peoples’ Consultative Assembly).
SI: Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association).
TOP: Training Orientasi Partai (Party Orientation Training)
TRK: Taklim Rutin Kader (Cadre Routine Training)
TRM: Taklim Rutin Mingguan (Weekly Routine Training)
TRP: Taklim Rutin Party (Party Routing Training)
1. Background

The fall of Soeharto signified a new chapter in Indonesian political history. This new era provided substantial political freedom for all Indonesians that had not existed for decades. President Soeharto’s administration created a centralised and uncompromising government, which, in the end, profoundly restricted the rights of the people in the name of political stability, the condition that was believed to be the main prerequisite to accelerate national economic development. The 32-year existence of the New Order government (1966-1998) was popularly regarded as an era of political oppression, at least by the pro-democratic elements in Indonesia and it generated many setbacks in political life.

The Reform Era has brought a vast expansion to the freedom of expression. In the first years of the Reform Era, Indonesia underwent what O’Donnell and Schmitter have called a process of political democratisation. This was mainly indicated by the existence of government policies that loosened political control over the people and, on the other hand, gave people the opportunity to regain a role in the policy making process. President Bacharuddin J. Habibie appeared to be the key figure behind several democratising policies, including the release of many political prisoners, the freeing of the press and making possible the establishment of diverse political parties. This changed many aspects of political life in the country, supporting more broadly the emergence of democratic values in the nation.

It is in these circumstances that the awakening of the political parties became a reality in Indonesia. People enthusiastically responded to the government’s policy that allowed them to create a party based on their interests. The ensuing euphoria was illustrated by the emergence of more than a hundred new parties. During this

---

period, 184 political parties emerged of which 141 received legal status. This extraordinary phenomenon was commonly considered as a normal condition for a country which was undergoing a period of political transition as was the case of Indonesia. Of 141 political parties that had legal status, 60 were considered to be eligible to obtain verification and after validation by *Tim Sebelas*², only 48 parties were qualified to participate in the 1999 election³.

In their development the quality of the parties in performing their main duties, such as representing the people’s interest in the policy making process and managing daily organisational activities, did not automatically follow the presence of these parties. The previous government had provided a situation and conditions that to some extent impeded the parties from emerging as a solid and professional institution. The New Order Government paid little attention to the development of political parties and was not really concerned in supporting the people in the modernisation of the political parties so that these parties could function properly. On the contrary, the regime tended to restrict the evolvement of the parties. This attitude showed the political position of the regime in that it did not want to see the existence of parties that were able to take on their role as they should have done. Soeharto’s exclusive government did not really regard the parties as its partners in governing and with the exception of *Golongan Karya* (The Functional Group/Golkar) as the government's party, treated them simply as insignificant units in the political system. As a result, political parties merely played a minor role in the decision-making process. Their role was simply to legalise the policies of the government or as “a rubber stamp”.

Moreover, in terms of organisational matters, the restricted development had also terminated the opportunity for the parties to appropriately develop their internal management. The parties relied more on the favour of the government, for instance in terms of putting people in certain positions on the parties’ committee boards rather than on the aspirations of their own members, who had a better knowledge of the

---

² As a response to this situation, the Indonesian government subsequently made several efforts to rationalise the number of the parties. This was particularly effected by forming an independent committee (that consisted of 11 members and then was called the *Tim Sebelas* (the Team of Eleven) that held a series of verifications to mainly examine and stipulate the eligibility of the parties to join the 1999 election. This effort was important as not all parties were actually ready to join the election.

³ *Tim Sebelas* announced that 48 political parties were eligible to participate in the 1999 election. This announcement was declared in the Election Committee Head Quarters on 4th March 1999 and was confirmed by the Minister of Interior Decree, Number 31/1999.
quality of a number of their people. On the other hand, the government had an interest to intervene in the parties to maintain its influence on them. According to Sanit this government’s attitude was not only part of the strategy to seek who were exactly its enemies and the supporters of the government, but also to make the process of controlling the parties easier⁴. In essence, the parties in the New Order Era had not enjoyed their independence and in fact were effectively controlled by the government. This situation eventually created internal organisational problems such as those of management and cadrerization within the party.

Most people felt that the political parties were not really efficient in conducting their functions. Baswedan’s study on the political parties’ behaviour, for instance, indicates that most of the major parties were not actually present in the people’s day to day life, leaving people to deal with their own problems up to several days before the next election⁵. In general, people also considered that most of the parties were being deeply trapped into an elitist power game in struggling for public positions without making a significant positive impact for the people.

Another important phenomenon that occurred and became an important fact in the first decades of the Reform Era is the phenomenon of fragmentation in the political parties. Besides indicating a significant internal problem, at the practical level this phenomenon contributed to the decreasing role of the party in society⁶. This phenomenon encompassed almost all the major parties. From the secular camps, for instance, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle/PDIP) that had split into several new parties, Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan (the Freedom Bull National Party/PNBK) and Partai Demokrasi Pembaruan (the Renovation Democracy Party/PDP). Some of Golkar’s disappointed cadres, mainly after losing in the internal election, established several parties such as Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan (the United and Justice Party/PKP) and Partai Hati


Nurani Rakyat (the People’s Consciousness Party/Hanura). In the mean time, some unsatisfied cadres of Partai Demokrat (the Democrat Party/PD) left the party and established new parties such as Partai Barisan Nasional (the National Front Party/Barnas).

This phenomenon also occurred in the Islamic parties camp. In early July 2008, for instance, two rival leaders of Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (The National Awakening Party/PKB) at the same time presented themselves at the Indonesian Election Commission’s (KPU) official ballot to obtain their contestant number for the 2009 general elections, this being obligatory for each political party wishing to participate in the election. The first leader was Abdul Muhaimin Iskandar, the nephew of the former President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) and chairman of the so-called ‘Ancol’ version of PKB; the second was Zannuba Arifah Wahid (Yenny), the daughter of Wahid, who was the general secretary of the ‘Parung’ version of PKB which was led by her father. Before a hall full of bemused senior politicians, electoral officials and journalists, both Muhaimin and Yenny tried to claim the card announcing PKB’s contestant number to participate in the election. After the intervention of KPU officials, both eventually agreed to hold the numbered card together. This unseemly public incident demonstrated the depth of division within this party.

The emergence of two competing PKB boards, namely Muhaimin’s and Gus Dur’s, provided further evidence of the chronic internal fragmentation afflicting most Islamic community-based parties during the 10 years of the Reform Era. PKB had suffered debilitating splits since 2001 and more recently several of its disaffected cadres had formed two other rival parties, namely Partai Kejayaan Demokrasi (the Democracy Glorious Party/PKD) and Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama (National Awakening of Islamic Scholars Party/PKNU).

In addition to PKB, other Islamic parties, such as Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (the United Development Party/PPP), and Partai Amanat Nasional (the National Mandate Party/PAN) also experienced serious internal divisions leading to the creation of new parties or an exodus of members into other parties. In the case of PPP, it had two off-shoot parties: Partai Persatuan (the United Party/PP), and Partai Bintang Reformasi (the Reform Star Party/PBR). The dissident PAN cadres recently formed Partai Matahari Bangsa (the National Sun Party/PMB). The only major Islamic community-based party that had not experienced internal fragmentation was Partai Keadilan Sejahera (the Prosperous Justice Party/PKS). So
far, PKS had been able to manage its internal differences of opinion and aspiration and succeeded in consolidating the party.

The fragmentation trend observed in the Indonesian Islamic parties, to some extent should illustrate that Islam, as a political ideology, appears to be an important value, but at the same time it has not quite reliably worked as a uniting element for several of the Islamic parties. For most Indonesian Islamic parties, particularly at the beginning of the Reform Era, Islam, as a political foundation of existence, has not been really functioning in preventing these parties from being inflicted with destructive internal conflicts, where some of them eventually resulted in a party split. On the other hand, however, this is not the case for PKS. The PKS case shows how Islamic ideology can serve as an adhesive for an Islamic political party. As an Islamic party, which clearly cites Islam as being its foundation, so far this party is able to demonstrate the role of Islam as a political ideology in maintaining its internal harmony and cohesion. Both cases eventually infer that there were other factors that played a significant contribution to creating internal fragmentation, which, at the same time, could be considered as a positive contribution playing an important part in preventing Islamic parties from becoming fragmented.

The fragmentation of political parties, to certain extent, also indicated that the transition of democracy not only supported the establishment of political parties, but also created extended internal conflicts and disputes. These later sometimes became a stepping stone or trigger for the emergence of internal fragmentation. To some extent, fragmentation commonly occurred, since democracy basically tolerates the people’s free expression and struggle for its opinions and interests. The democratic transition, however, should not be considered as a final answer to all political phenomena and problems, which emerged after the fall of the old regime including the problem of internal fragmentation of the political parties. The existence of the democratic transition, which obviously generates many interesting and important political cases, ought to be reasonably regarded only as a political background or a pre-condition of the political context of certain phenomena. In this regard, one has to consider other aspects or relevant variables that provide a direct impact or correlation on specific political cases.

2. Research Question
The phenomenon of fragmentation is not something new to the Islamic political parties. It occurred, as will be explained in the following chapter, during almost all of the Indonesian political-history periods. The Reform Era has witnessed many serious fragmentations in the Islamic parties and, on the other hand, the ability of one of the largest Islamic parties to maintain its cohesion. My thesis will address the question of why Islamic political parties during the first decade of the Reform Era, suffered internal fragmentation and had failed to develop cohesion, while one Islamic party had been able to develop and consolidate. This thesis, therefore, will explore and analyse factors and reasons behind the problem of fragmentation and cohesion of the Islamic political parties by associating it with the existence of party institutionalisation during the first decade of the Reform Era (1998-2008).

It is, in essence, a study of comparative institutionalisation of Islamic political parties particularly between PKB and PKS. In the Reform Era, PKB had become an example as one of the severely fragmented parties. In one decade this party fragmented three times. In general, PKB’s fragmentation was the severest of the Islamic political parties and included one of the most serious fragmentations compared to those of the new Indonesian political parties. Meanwhile, PKS had been able to maintain its internal discipline and unity. PKS, at least up until today, is the only major Islamic party which is able to avoid a split, although in its first ten years, factionalism and fragmentation had particularly become commonplace in contemporary Indonesian politics. Moreover, as party fragmentation phenomenon even occurred before the Independence Era, this study will also provide a brief explanation on the party’s fragmentation and cohesion before the Reform Era.

3. Hypothesis

Fragmentation and cohesion are two of the many important phenomena in post-Soeharto Indonesian Politics. Such phenomena, as will be discussed in the section on the theoretical framework, have been scrutinised from many perspectives. This thesis argues that the rationale for the emergence of fragmentation and cohesion does not consist of one factor. The hypothesis of this thesis is that party unity and discipline are closely related to the ability of those parties to institutionalise themselves. In this case, the factors contributing to or associated with fragmentation or cohesion of the parties are: (1) The procedural leadership model in decision-making process, in which the party based itself through its constitution or its procedure for making policy, which was based on the organisation’s statutes (rules of
the game), (2) The existence of internal conflict resolution mechanisms, (3) The systematic and well-organized regeneration or training for recruiting new members and leaders (cadrerization), and (4) The presence of shared values as an identity provider and uniting factor. These are determinant variables influencing the fragmentation and cohesion of a party.

Table 1
Comparison of Party Institutionalisation between PKB and PKS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PKB</th>
<th>PKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Procedural Leadership in the Decision Making Process</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Resolution Mechanism</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systematic Cadrerization</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment to Shared Values</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:
- : Does Not Exist
+ : Exists

From the above explanation, the hypothesis of this thesis shall be that the more a party has been institutionalised (which is indicated by the existence of procedural leadership, the effectiveness of an internal conflict resolution mechanism, the systematic continuity in its cadrerization and the commitment towards shared values as the guidance of policy and uniting values), there is a larger opportunity for the party to preserve its cohesion. On the other hand, the less a party has been institutionalised (which is indicated by the ineffectiveness of its procedural leadership, the failure of its internal conflict resolution mechanism, the impediment of systematic cadrerization and the failure to provide an ideology to guide its policy and unite its values), there is a larger possibility that the party will be fragmented.

Pertaining to the objectives above, this thesis explores three important events, which occurred in PKB during the first decades of its existence that indicate internal fragmentation in this party. Three important main events are the first fragmentation in 2001, the second fragmentation in 2005 and the third fragmentation in 2008. They will be the main examples and topics of discussion in each chapter, where each dimension of party institutionalisation will be discussed. In this thesis, four dimensions of party institutionalisation in regard to these three events will be
discussed from four different angles. The exploration of these phenomena is important since they will prove the clear evidence of the failure of the implementation of institutionalisation in this party leading to party fragmentation.

Through the exploration on those different phenomena in PKB and PKS, this thesis will also include a discussion on the reasons behind the failure and the capability of each party to implement and maintain its institutionalisation. Therefore, in general, this thesis will provide an explanation on how and why fragmentation and cohesion occurred in a party, while at the same time revealing some factors that are driving the lack or the presence of institutionalisation.

4. Objectives

The phenomenon of fragmentation and cohesion of Islamic parties during the Indonesia Reform Era is important to study as it provides not only a measure of trends in political Islam but also an understanding of the political conditions in contemporary Indonesia and in particular of the development of Islamic political parties. Moreover, besides answering specific questions, which have been stated in the scope of research section, this thesis is also dedicated to the perspectives concerning the correlation between party institutionalisation and the phenomenon of fragmentation and cohesion of the party.

5. Theoretical Framework

The study of political parties has been one of the most important and tempting areas in political science. The relevance of this study is related by and large to the position of the party as power seeking and preserving machinery, where the power itself is one of the main cores of politics. The study of political parties has been developed by scholars since the third quarter of the nineteenth century. During that period, the studies of political parties were mainly a response to the rapid development of the role of a political party in governmental life. In the late nineteenth century and the


beginning of the twentieth century, new developments occurred when the study of political parties started to discuss parties as being extra-parliamentary organisations. The book of Ostrogorski discussing the modern political party, for instance, is one of the works which signify the beginning of this field of study in the modern era. It is followed by influential studies, for example, from Michels who focuses on the tendency of oligarchy in political parties. Coupled with the emergence of new approaches in political science, the study on political parties continues with various new focuses of study and provides more advanced theories developed by scholars, which discuss issues related to the development of political parties including their ideology, political culture, political development and democratisation, their relations to the political and party systems and institutionalisation.

Scholars have put forward a range of definitions of a ‘political party’. Thus, Sartori emphasises the role of the party as a mediator or “channelling organisation” between the interest of society and the state. Such a definition basically regards the party as an element of democratic government and tool of society in articulating its interest. More comprehensive definitions view a party as an institution comprising persons seeking governmental positions based on a particular interest or ideology through competition for popular support. In this definition, a party is related to its origin, main duties and the way it conducts its interests, which differ from other organisations such as the interest or pressure groups.

On the other hand, other scholars regard a party as a system. Eldersveld believes that a party is a “social organism and a miniature political system” at the same time. As a political system, a party according to him “has a representative process, an electoral system and sub-process for recruiting leaders, defining goals and resolving internal system conflict.” In a relatively similar pattern, Maor, while

---

exploring the scheme of a party definition, suggests that a party is an institution which has durable and recurring patterned ways of doing things. He believes that a political party is a system which has several unique internal tasks, including organising popular support, rewarding activists, modifying electoral strategy, producing a cohesive legislative party, ensuring party cohesion, extending electoral support and maintaining electoral strength. Maor’s perspective regards the studies on the internal problems of parties as the important way to understand the behaviour and goals of a political party.

This thesis will combine all of the above approaches by understanding the political parties as groups of people who are tied by a similar belief, interest and commitment, who promise to be united and who struggle for their ideals, providing an alternative policy for government and for occupying public and political positions in a constitutional manner; and as an organisation, which has to manage its internal interests as a response to internal and external needs.

The comparative study of political parties encompasses various parts of the world and eventually includes developing countries when people began to pay attention to politics outside the western world. In the context of the developing countries, the discourse on political parties basically mimics several “developed countries theories”. However, in its development, the study of political parties in such areas provides various important theories.

The studies on modern politics in Latin American and many post-colonial countries, for instance, have produced many essential conclusions including those on the role of the political party in the democratisation process and organisational development of political parties. In general, the political party studies in developing countries tend to be closely related to the discussions on specific matters such as democratisation, ideology and several new studies on party system and institutionalisation. Pertaining to these, the various studies of Randall and Svasand, Mainwaring and Timothy, Sachsenroder and Frings and Mainwaring

16 Randall and Svansand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies”.
to name a few, basically represent new concerns on party studies, particularly in the
new democratic states, where a political party tends to be regarded as an actor or a
system whose existence is mainly influenced by the capability to develop and
institutionalise itself as a proper response or answer to internal progress and external
expansion.

The study of political parties in contemporary Indonesia has been quite
influenced by the contemporary development of studies on such topics as those
above. However, many scholars had actually explored the study on these topics long
before such current influential studies emerged. The first generation of scholars
(1960s-1970s), who were concerned with Indonesian political parties, produced
much influential work, which inspired similar studies up until today. Their studies are
generally dominated by the topics on the origins of parties and party ideology; and
related to the existence of one particular party with one or more of four Indonesian
significant political episodes. In addition, these studies commonly relate the party to
the elections and political culture. In terms of the number of parties, the studies
range from discussing many different parties in a specific time-frame to only
examining one party in a particular period.

5.1. Islamic Parties

17 Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin

18 Wolfgang Sachsenroder and Ulrike E. Frings, eds., Political Party Systems and Democratic
Development in East and Southeast Asia: Volume I Southeast Asia, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing

19 Scott Mainwaring, “Political Parties and Democratization in Brazil and the Southern Cone”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Oct., 1988), pp. 91-120

20 Most Indonesian political experts agreed that there are four political episodes in the modern
Indonesian history, namely (1) Liberal Democracy (1945-1959), (2) Guided Democracy/ Old Order

21 William Liddle, Ethnicity, Party and National Integration: An Indonesian Case Study, (New Haven:
University, 1957).

22 Daniel S Lev, “Political Parties in Indonesia”, Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 8, No. 1,

23 Kenneth Ward, The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia, (Ithaca: Cornell University,
1970). Donald Hindley, The Indonesian Communist Party, 1951-1963, (Los Angeles: University of
One of the branches of political party study in Indonesia discusses Islamic political parties. Many observers consider the important role of Islamic parties not only in the pre-independence era but also in the current situation. The first political party ever to emerge in Indonesian history was an Islamic party, called *Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia* (the Party of Indonesia Islamic Association/PSII). While in India the oldest party is a secular party, the Congress Party, in the Indonesian context, the Islamic or religious party is the oldest one. In this position and for other reasons that will be explained in the next discussion, Islamic political parties therefore become one of the salient objects of study in Indonesian politics.

A number of scholars then produced definitions to describe and understand the existence of Islamic parties. According to some scholars, Islamic parties in Indonesia are divided into several types. The first is those that clearly state Islam as the foundation of their organisation. The second is those who use Islamic symbols or symbols that are closely associated or have been identified with Islam, such as the Crescent and Star, *Ka’bah*, or Arabic words, although their foundation is not purely based on Islam in which they use, combine or synthesise Islam and other ‘isms’, such as nationalism (*Pancasila*) or socialism as their ideology. The third is the Islamic mass based parties, which do not use Islamic symbols, do synthesise Islam and other ideologies as their foundation or orientation and yet rely mainly on, or could not be separated from the Islamic communities in order to be able to exist in national politics, particularly for the elections. The second and third types of Islamic parties were sometimes regarded as Islamic parties that put forward more values or substance of Islam as their objective, rather than trying to install Islamic *Syari’ah* into the national constitution. This situation actually shows a transformation in the life of Islamic parties.

Before 1983, the Indonesian Islamic parties had been identified with the parties that used Islam as their foundation. All Islamic parties clearly declared Islam as their foundation in their statutes, which is in line with the first type of the above categories. However, after 1983, when the New Order dictated the implementation of *Pancasila* as the foundation for all parties, it became common for Islamic parties to add or embrace other ‘isms’ as their foundation as well as Islam, on condition that

---

those ‘isms’ were still in line with the spirit of Islam. This included the use of Pancasila, which was then simply related to the spirit of nationalism, or a mix between Islam and Pancasila or, in the case of PBR, a mix between Islam and socialism25. This spirit is actually in line with the tendency to understand Islam as a more substantial manner in political life in a way that considers the essence of Islam in a wider perspective. The Islamic parties believed that the struggle to uphold Islamic values, as the focal point for an Islamic party, was not always related to the implementation of Islamic symbols together with stating that Islam was the foundation of the party. They argued that it is more important to present the essence of Islam to the people rather than its symbols. Moreover, this type of Islamic party was often open to allow non-Muslims to hold important positions in the party26. With regard to this condition, the Islamic parties could also be labelled as the parties that had a commitment to spread Islamic values, although these parties do not obviously state Islam as their foundation in their statutes.

Furthermore, in his research on Indonesian Islamic parties, Amir provided a relatively similar categorisation in analysing the contemporary Indonesian Islamic parties. He noted that a party could also be categorised as an Islamic party if it was dominated by Islamic figures and had tendencies to struggle for or to defend the interests of the Islamic communities27. Hence, he concluded that the Islamic parties fell into two camps. The first camp embraced the parties that were concerned with the use of Islamic symbols including adhering to Islam as their foundation and mainly in the position to support the interests of the Muslims. The second camp embraced the parties who did not use Islamic symbols and tended to combine Islamic values and other ideologies to create their foundation. They were not purely Islamic but were founded and dominated by Islamic figures in terms of party management, as well as having a tendency to maintain the interests of the Islamic communities and comprised the social bases in the Islamic groups.

This thesis is in line with the main argument of the current categorisation of the Islamic parties. The Islamic parties were a cover for those that had been founded by the Islamic figures or communities and this in order to struggle mainly for the

interests of the Muslim groups and Islamic values as well as national interests. In terms of the foundation of the party, Islam may have been used, or a mix between *Pancasila* and Islam as their foundation or ideology. It should also be noted that for some Islamic parties including PKB, even their understanding to embrace *Pancasila* as their foundation is based fundamentally on Islamic perspectives and they still regard themselves as Islamic Parties. Yusuf Muhammad, one of PKB’s important figures who initiated the establishment of this party, associated PKB as “a bus that would bring people to Mecca”. In this regard, this thesis shall consider both PKB and PKS as Islamic parties.

Scholars have explored the existence of Islamic parties in Indonesia covering various topics. In the context of the Reform Era, research on Islamic parties carried out by several scholars who were interested in bringing to the fore several phenomena such as the aspects of ideology and mission of the new Islamic parties, their political struggle in the Indonesian politics, constellation and plurality inside Islamic parties, internal conflict and party institutionalisation. In the meantime, many specific studies on some of the prominent Islamic parties in the Reform Era have also been carried out. For instance, Harahap conducted research on PPP.

---


PKB analysed by Choirie and discussed by several scholars who were all for and against. Choirie also explored the ideology of PKB by comparing it to that of the United Malay National Organization (UMNO).

With regard to PKS, several scholars researched into its background and its relation to the dakwah movement and the Hasan Al Banna teachings. Several scholars also provided discussions on PKS' ideology. Others developed a perspective to relate its presence with the global networking of the Islamic revivalist movements. Moreover, Waluyo explores the political strategy and concept of the party in dealing with the national political constellation during the Reform Era. In addition, Hurriyah analysed the aspects behind the concept and the implementation of the party's cadrerization. The current studies on PKS also discuss the political behaviour and movement of its elites and cadres and how they then influenced its internal dynamic.

36 A. Effendy Choirie, PKB Politik Jalan Tengah NU, (Jakarta: Pustaka Ciganjur, 2002).
40 Aay Muhammad Furkon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Ideologi dan Praktis Politik Kaum Muda Kontemporer, (Bandung: Teraju, 2004).
The study of the Islamic political parties produced many important works. Several of the eminent studies on the Islamic parties have influenced the present study. They include, for instance, work on party ideology\(^{46}\), the history of the emergence and the struggle of Islamic parties in national politics\(^{47}\) and the relations of Islamic political parties with the New Order regime\(^{48}\). However, what remains thin on the ground is research that directly discusses the phenomenon of fragmentation and cohesion let alone in relation to the political party institutionalisation.

5.2. **Fragmentation and Cohesion**

Many scholars have explored the issues of fragmentation and cohesion in a political party. There is no single explanation about the background of these issues. The following sub-section will discuss the background or factors behind the emergence of fragmentation and cohesion respectively. The exploration of these subjects implies the relation between the background of fragmentation and cohesion, where the factors that strongly encourage the development of cohesion became important points to avoid internal conflicts or fragmentation and vice-versa.

5.2.1. **Fragmentation**

The issue of fragmentation or cohesion of parties has been evaluated from many perspectives. In this thesis, fragmentation is applied to the situation where a party was split into several groups or camps, in which each group claims to be the authentic one and hence deserves to obtain all the assets and represent the aspirations of the previous party.

Certain scholars believe that the phenomenon of fragmentation of the political parties is the result of the situation where they failed to respond to the discontent among members through dialogue. According to Hirschman, when explaining the management of the state and enterprise as an organisation, the decision of a person or a group of persons to exit from an organisation is related to the awareness of the futility of dialogue. By contrast, the choice to be loyal reflects a belief in the prospect


of dialogue as an exercise to express interests and rebuild common understanding and commitment\textsuperscript{49}. In other words, in Hirschman’s view the degree of being heard and being proportionally accommodated by the party plays an important role in maintaining the cohesion of an organisation.

In the political party context, Lewis Fickett’s study on party fragmentation indicates that the differences in understanding party ideology and the presence of personal conflicts among elites are the main roots of fragmentation. Fickett points out that the fragmentation will remain an unsolved problem as long as these basic matters are not properly handled by the party\textsuperscript{50}. In general, his study underpins the role of cultural and personal variables in the development of internal fragmentation.

In relation to the role of ideology, Daniel Bell and Bernard Shaw state that although ideology sometimes conceals personal ambitions as the real problem of conflict, the cases of Social Democrat Parties in the Western Countries indicate the significant role of ideology behind disruption of party cohesion\textsuperscript{51}. Stephen Padgett in his study on the German Social Democratic Party also believes in the role of differences in understanding ideology in supporting fragmentation. He emphasises that the more a party tends to be an open organisation, the more internal pluralism will be more likely to occur which eventually will potentially weaken party unity\textsuperscript{52}.

Martin Bull on the other hand believed that the dispute on party orientation and the strategy to reach the goal are the factors that should be taken into account when discussing a party split. Moreover, he also concludes that a lack of discipline mechanism and the mass-based party’s model for recruitment tended to lessen the cadres’ discipline and provide the chance for the emergence of internal conflict\textsuperscript{53}. The above studies indicate the relation between the deficiency of ideological unity and the lack of organisational discipline and the deficiency of party’s unity.

\textsuperscript{49} Albert O Hirschman, \textit{Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to decline in Firms, Organisations and States}, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970).


\textsuperscript{51} David S. Bell and Eric Shaw, (eds), \textit{Conflict and Cohesion in Western European Social Democratic Parties}, (London: Pinter Publisher, 1994), p. 175.


In the Indonesian context, the discussion on party fragmentation is indirectly developed by scholars through the studies of internal conflict and the party management. One particular work which describes the phenomenon of fragmentation of several Islamic political parties during the Reform Era was written by Soebekti, Achmad and Hendrowinoto\textsuperscript{54} and depicts the phenomenon of fragmentation of Indonesian political parties in general, not specifically Islamic parties. This book indicates some factors which are related to party fragmentation in the Reform Era, namely the failure to create good leadership, the incapability to construct a fair internal system and the existence of pragmatic political elites.

Haris in his study on PPP in the New Order Era indicates various factors that have created serious problems in this party in handling internal conflicts\textsuperscript{55}. The first was the existence of an elitist and exclusive leadership, which did not value alternative opinions and differences. This situation created resistance and eventually disharmony among the party’s members and cadres. The second was the unfair distribution of strategic positions inside the party and the government were not proportionally spread. This unbalanced proportion created an uncomfortable atmosphere in the majority camp and became a continuous sensitive issue in this party.

The third was the irrational organisational structure with some branches having the right to make their independent policy, sometimes causing an overlap in the policy-making process and disintegration. The fourth factor was government intervention. This mainly occurred because of the inability to solve internal disputes and the tendency in particular of the minority group to invite the government as a political patron. This situation was actually in line with the interest of the New Order authoritarian regime to have access to the party in order to be able to control and eventually weaken the non-government political parties. The last is the fact that two main factions inside the party, that is Parmusi and NU, did not appreciate the existence of the party using the same line. The former tended to see PPP in a secular perspective and tended to be pragmatic in its political activities. Whereas NU


\textsuperscript{55} Haris, \textit{PPP dan Politik Orde Baru}.
regarded PPP as an Islamic party that had a main obligation to struggle for the interest of Islam in a stricter way.

In his study on internal conflict of PKB, Kamarudin reveals the causes behind the failure of PKB to avoid internal conflict that led to internal fragmentation\textsuperscript{56}. The first factor was the existence of the personalised leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid as the chair of Dewan Syura (the Consultative Board); supported by the constitution of the party that gives immense power to Dewan Syura, particularly in determining the direction of the party and its policy making process. The second factor was the unwillingness of each of the clashing groups to compromise their interests. The third was the inability to solve internal problems independently. This failure tended to draw in the external factors, which in the end tended to worsen rather than improve the conflict situation. For instance, the existence of an external factor such as the ambiguous judgment of Mahkamah Agung (the Supreme Court/MA) as to which group had the right to be in charge of PKB, had not only created the belief of each group to have a right to represent PKB, but also to influence the government to accommodate the existence of both groups. And finally the fourth, which was the failure of a cultural approach to solve internal conflict including islah (attempt to gather conflicted group in the Islamic tradition).

Moreover, Kamarudin believes that the case of internal conflict in PKB shows the growth of pragmatisme (the Indonesian term for ‘self-seeking behaviour’, quite different from the common English usage for ‘pragmatism’) among its members. This attitude according to Kamarudin strengthened conflict of interest on one hand and weakened the obedience of santri (the follower or the student) towards kyai (as a religious patron or scholar) on the other, which in the end dissolved the spirit of togetherness\textsuperscript{57}.

The above discussion indicates a number of common factors behind the phenomenon of internal fragmentation, namely the differences in understanding party ideology, the deficiency of shared values, the presence of personal conflicts among elites, the dispute on the party orientation and the strategy to reach the goal, a lack of discipline mechanism and the mass-based party model for recruitment, the failure to create good leadership, the incapability to construct fair internal system, and the

\textsuperscript{56} Kamarudin, Konflik Internal PKB, pp. 257-258.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid, pp. 261-162.
inability to solve the problems independently in a rational way, which invites third party intervention.

5.2.2. Cohesion
The term cohesion in a political academic context has been developed in several understandings and frameworks. Some scholars focussed their discussion on party cohesion by highlighting the voting behaviour of the party members in the parliaments. It talks mainly about how the party attempted to control the voting behaviour of its members in the delivery of the party’s voice or interests in the legislative body and the reasons behind the presence of a cohesive or un-cohesive party related to the members’ attitudes in the parliament.

This thesis does not follow the same direction as those studies in understanding cohesion. Rather, this thesis regards cohesion as the capability to preserve existence and unity. The presence of cohesion in the party as a system, therefore, will be related to the capacity to unite and maintain all sub-systems inside the party, ensuring that all elements are working together to reach the main objective. For this reason, the term cohesion will be used in the same manner as with the various terms such as unity, solidarity, harmony and homogeneity.

Hence, the term cohesion is used to describe the situation where the party could maintain its unity and work together to reach its goals. In this regard, the problem of maintaining solidarity, party coherence and the reduction of tension among the party’s elements are essential. As a system that consists of sub-systems, in the context of cohesion establishment, the party will play a role that is described by Parson as “integration”, where “the problem of maintaining solidarity in the relations between the units, in the interest of effective functioning”.

---


Some scholars have argued on the background of party cohesion. According to Mahendra Singh, in general, there are two factors explaining why the party is cohesive, namely the internal factors, which originate from within the party itself and the external factors, such as the socio-cultural situation and political system surrounding the party. Related to the first aspect, he believes that the party, which is based on ideology and not on pragmatic matters as a binding factor, tends to be able to preserve internal cohesion. It means that a totalitarian-ideological party would have more chance to be a cohesive party rather than a restricted-pragmatic party. Moreover, he also believes that the party that applies a close recruitment policy, with limited members, would be more cohesive rather than an open party.

Singh considers that the party that implements a branch party model tends to be more conducive to internal cohesion rather than to a caucus party, where the power tended to be decentralised. In the light of this situation, the centralised party, hence, is more favourable to be a cohesive party rather than a decentralised one. Singh also states that the party that clearly articulates its rules of the game, meaning to use them as guidance for all party activities, would have a better chance of preserving its cohesion compared to the party with a weak articulation that “does not lay down precise rules governing the internal structure of its basic elements and units and their integration with the party”.

As for the external aspect, Singh considers the presidential system as the element that would potentially weaken party cohesion. He also considers that the federal state and use of the district system for election would play a similar role. He also believes, however, that such claims really could not be entirely confirmed, since in fact the phenomenon of un-cohesion could also be found in the states that used a parliamentary system, unitary state and simple majority for the election. It means that the political system tended to play as a complementary element in creating cohesion.

However, Singh believes that a fragmented society would potentially bring a negative effect to cohesion development, particularly for the parties that try to stand out above all groups and represent them in it. Moreover, in the situation where intraparty competition is strong, the tendency to have a consciousness to hold unity.

---

61 Ibid, p. 16.
in order to be able to win the competition sometimes paved the way for the emergence of party cohesion. However, using the case of the Congress Party in Bihar, Singh also indicates that such a situation actually could also happen in the situation where a party faces no serious competitor in its district. In general, Singh confirms the relativity of external aspects as the only and important elements or source for party cohesion.

Other studies on political ideology suggest a correlation between ideologies and cohesion. Duverger’s study on party, for instance, suggests that left-wing ideology has more ability to discipline the party members, thus generating more consolidated parties. He believes that hierarchical parties, which are typically more to the left and centralised parties, are regarded as having a strong tendency to be a solid party. Furthermore, he argues that more extreme the ideology adhered to by the party, the more opportunity that party will have to avoid. In relation to the ideology, Kumar’s study on the Indian parties indicates the important role of ideology for party cohesion mainly as the uniting factor between factions and the variables that strengthen the party’s organisation.

Other scholars tended to see the role of party recruitment in the building of cohesion. In this case, Alan Ware suggests that solidity could more easily be maintained if the party is a ‘cadre party’, rather than a “mass-based party”, for the fact that a cadre party could guarantee more militancy and solidity among the cadres. On the other hand, Ozbudun reached a different conclusion with Ware, in saying that the mass party has some qualifications to be a supportive element to party cohesion, since this kind of party could guarantee financial independency and reduced patron-client relations in the party, which could endanger the cadres’ loyalty to the party.

Brass believes that the leader is the most important element due to his capability in uniting a group, based on his understanding of people’s problems, ability

---

62 Ibid, pp. 7-12.
63 See the discussion of Duverger’s opinion in Maor, Political Parties, and Party Systems, Comparative Approaches and The British Experience, p.137.
to solve conflict and knowing the art of manipulation, including providing goods to maintain the followers’ loyalty\(^{67}\). In line with this argument, according to Prasad, ideology plays a secondary role in maintaining cohesion, where the salient problem lies actually with the leader\(^{68}\). Such studies confirm the important role of the elite in securing the solidity of the party. Myron Weiner also believes in the role of leader in cohesion, particularly as the element that maintains a compromise between factional disputes, source of prestige to the members and main source of articulation of values\(^{69}\). Weiner also sees, however, other factors that play an important role in establishing party cohesion. He believes that other factors such as the tolerant attitude towards the existence of other factions and the presence of consensus or the crosscutting idealism similarity should be also taken into account when discussing party cohesion background\(^{70}\).

On the other hand, some scholars put forward the discussion on the party structure rather than on the existence of political culture or ideology that surround the party, as a variable that should be explored to seek the reason behind cohesion. Studies on the Western European social democratic parties indicate several situations behind the emergence of party cohesion\(^{71}\). These include the style of party organisation or organisational structure (where the centralised and disciplined party tends to be more conducive to party cohesion), the ideology (in this case social democracy) that united the party cadres and the followers of ideology, charismatic figures (particularly for the case of Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party), the presence of uniting values and external situations such as political system, national issues, the existence of rival parties.

The more specific study discussing the capability of Partai Keadilan (the Justice Party), PKS’ antecedent party, to preserve its solidity was conducted by Suhban Akbar. To some extent, this study is a closely-related study to the cohesion discussion. Akbar concludes that the phenomenon of party solidity is the result of the


\(^{70}\) *Ibid*, pp. 242-246.

\(^{71}\) Bell and Shaw, eds., *Conflict and Cohesion in Western European Social Democratic Parties*. 
party’s aptitude to have or to build a kind of uniting ideology with a leadership that put forward consultation and good cadrerization.\textsuperscript{72}

The study on the internal activity of PKS, particularly that on *Taklim Rutin Mingguan* (Weekly Routine Training) or *halaqah* (the meeting or the development unit) by Prabowo, indicates the relationship between the presence of the *halaqah* and the capability to find super-ordinate goals or a sort of uniting values for PKS members, who eventually supported the party in maintaining its cohesion. In general, Prabowo, concludes that the presence of an institutionalised activity like *halaqah* in the party would enable the party to maintain its solidity.\textsuperscript{73} The fact that *halaqah* is one of PKS cadrerization elements actually suggests that the presence of good cadrerization is a prerequisite for party cohesion.

The above discussion indicates, therefore, several important factors in the development of party cohesion, which, in general, consist of external and internal aspects. With regard to the external aspects, they mainly include the social and cultural conditions surrounding the parties, its life and the existence of a political system. The internal aspects comprise several factors such as organisation style, party ideology, the role of the figures or leaders and good cadrerization.

The above exploration points out that fragmentation and cohesion were the phenomena that have several rationales behind their presence, which seem exclusive. However, the study of these issues essentially infers and indicates that the capability to avoid fragmentation by having or operating certain variables or dimensions are, to some extent, an entry point into maintaining cohesion. This thesis believes that one could use quite the same material factors or parameters to measure or discuss the presence or the absence of fragmentation and cohesion. In the above discussions, some factors seem to be less compelling however, due to the fact that they were not supported by convincing data or a real situation at the practical level. Some factors appear to have a contradictory position. The problem of organisation style, for instance, tends to be fairly argued against since fragmentation could potentially happen in both the “cadre” and “mass” parties. Ozbudun and Ware’s


study, which gives a contradictory result from the relation between a cadre party and cohesion, represents that situation. Also the position of the leaders is quite debatable. To some, it is believed to be a supportive element for cohesion; but for the others, this situation has the potential to endanger the cohesion of the party.

On the other hand, it should also be noted that some of the comparative research findings reported above seem to be less relevant to this study. Thus, the relation between the left-wing ideology and the tendency to be able to maintain party cohesion and the correlation between the number of parties and the tendency of cohesion would seem to be irrelevant to the Indonesian case. For the former, this is because the terminology of the “left” and the “right” itself does not find its relevance in contemporary Indonesian politics, when the people tend to categorise the parties based on the degree of secularism or Islamism. And for the latter, the Indonesian case seems to contradict those comparative findings. Indonesia continually implements a multi-party system, but still faces the fragmentation phenomenon, even today in the extensive sense. In this context, the external system, although it cannot be entirely neglected, should be regarded as a supporting factor for party fragmentation, as the real problem is actually internal to the party. In other words, one should regard that in the case of Indonesian current politics as long as the parties can properly manage their internal matters, the party would tend to survive from fragmentation or a split.

What is quite omitted from these studies, however, is the explanation on the role of the absence or the presence of party institutionalisation in generating internal party fragmentation and cohesion, particularly in the Indonesian Islamic political context.

The existence of undemocratic leadership and the inability to solve internal problems independently, for instance, are basically related to the failure of the party to maintain the rules of the game and consistently follow their internal constitution. Moreover, the existence of the fragmented elite should also be considered as a product of the failure of the party to create good communication and trust among them. This condition is actually the result rather than the cause of unmanageable conflict. On the other hand, the capacity to maintain trust and loyalty should be

regarded as part of the success in maintaining cadrerization and enacting fairness and rules of the game. The capability to avoid the elites behaving as in the above constitution throughout the consistency in implementing and respecting the party’s constitution also played a salient role. The existence of a mechanism that could bring essential solutions to internal conflict also could not be neglected as an important background for creating internal cohesion. To sum up, this thesis will argue that the internal party situation leading to fragmentation or cohesion will be determined by the party’s capacity to maintain its institutionalisation.

5.3. Party Institutionalisation

This thesis will use the study of institutionalisation of the contemporary Indonesian Islamic parties. This field of study relates to the political study by Duverger\textsuperscript{75} which, according to Sartori, opened a new approach to the study of political parties by focusing on the issues of internal organisation and linking to the general area of organisation theory\textsuperscript{76}. Huntington was the first to offer a definition and criteria for institutionalisation: “the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability”\textsuperscript{77}.

Huntington then offers a number of criteria to measure the existence of party institutionalisation: the ability of the party to develop adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence. Adaptability is related to the degree of ability to survive in a political scheme. He believes that “the more adaptable an organisation or procedure, the more highly institutionalised it is”. This includes the ability to functional adaptation in the power relation context. Complexity is associated by the existence of several sub-units inside the party. This may also entail a multiplication of organisational subunits, hierarchically and functionally. He infers that there is a relation between the number of the variety of sub-units and the capability of the party to maintain the loyalties of its members. This situation, in the end, will contribute to the creation of internal stability within the party.

\textsuperscript{75} Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State, (London: Methuen, 1964).

\textsuperscript{76} Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, A Framework for Analysis, Volume 1, p. 71.

Autonomy refers to the level of differences and having clear boundaries with other groups. It means that the institutionalised party should be able to maintain its independence, both organisationally and procedurally, from the influences of other social groups, including non-political groups and methods of behaviour or expression of interests. Coherence is measured by the existence of an internal consensus including the ability to provide conflict resolution. He implies that the capacity to create unity, esprit, morale and discipline are crucial in party institutionalisation. 

Other scholars have developed alternative definitions and conditions of institutionalisation. Particularly valuable is the contribution of Panebianco, who defines institutionalisation as “the way the organisation solidifies”. This process is basically related to the ability of the party to preserve its autonomy vis-à-vis its environment and the level of ‘systemness’ or the degree of interdependence among its members. Thus, according to Panebianco, an institutionalised party is one that can enhance autonomy from the intervention of other groups and maintain interdependence among its internal actors and different sectors. He suggested that the early stage of a party development period will determine the ability of the party to reach the ideal type. In his opinion, a party that was developed through a centralised process rather than a diffused one and with limited “external supports” rather than depending on the “external legitimation” will most likely find autonomy easily and develop a high degree of interdependence among its elements.

Maor divides the understanding of institutionalisation into two categories. The first category refers to institutionalisation as a process, which include the studies from Duverger, Huntington and Panebianco. The focal point of this category is related to history and the attempt of a party to advance itself into the best form or into being institutionalised. In other words, party institutionalisation is related to the party development process. The second category sees institutionalisation as a property or state. In this perspective, according to Janda, the institutionalised party is “one that is reified in the public mind so that ‘the party’ exists as a social organisation apart from its momentary leaders and this organisation demonstrate recurring patterns of

80 Ibid, pp. 63-68
81 Maor, Political Parties and Party Systems, Comparative Approaches and the British Experience, pp. 66-76.
behaviour valued by those who identified with it. Maor’s categorisation regards institutionalisation, rightly, as both an internal process and as an attempt to exist in society.

However, though he concludes that there are advantages in both categories when dealing with part of the institutionalisation discussion and he also realises that there is some regression, which is mainly related to the tendency to overgeneralization and neglect several critical aspects. He then suggests discussing other matters, such as the structural features of the party (for instance, the number of members, number of paid staff); the way the party manages internal and external affairs (dealing with matters, for instance, political recruitment and mobilising people) and the party’s mode of government (the policy process) to reach a more comprehensive conclusion.

The most recent study on party institutionalisation is that by Randall and Svansand. They argue, in line with the above insight, that institutionalisation should be understood as “the process by which the party becomes established in terms both of their integrated patterns of behaviours and of attitudes, or culture”. They then distinguish the aspects of this process into the internal aspect referring to internal development; and the external aspect, related to relationship with the society. Based on this understanding they suggest four elements or dimensions to measure party institutionalisation: that is, systemness, value infusion, decisional autonomy and reification.

### Table 2
Dimension of party institutionalisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structural</strong></td>
<td>Systemness</td>
<td>Decisional autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attitudinal</strong></td>
<td>Value infusion</td>
<td>Reification</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---


It is meant here is that systemness is the regularity or routinisation of interactions among the members and between the regulation and the member inside the party. In this context systemness implies the development of “prevalent conventions” which guides the behaviour of the members. This rule, in the end, should be the base for any activities in the party. Value infusion is to do with the existence of distinct identity that makes the members and supporters acquire identification and similar commitment to the party. According to them, this refers to the extent to which the members and the supporters of the party identify each other and share commitment which is based on a similar belief. They also imply that this has to do with the ability to create a distinctive culture or value system, which eventually would potentially bring a positive impact to the context of party cohesion. Meanwhile, decisional autonomy refers to a certain degree of freedom in the internal decision-making process. This situation refers to the high autonomy vis a vis its environment. Lastly, reification implies the situation where the existence of the party has settled in the public mind. It refers to the condition where the party does not only exist in society, but more importantly has a special position in the people’s imagination as the result of a close relation between them.

In relation to the existence of value infusion, MacGuire suggests that value infusion has a certain causal primacy for party institutionalisation. MacGuire states that “value infusion helps an organization survive long enough to become taken for granted and both value infusion and taken-for-grantedness, enhance an organisation’s capacity to shape and constrain behaviour over an extended period of time”. The existence of value infusion is basically to do with the development of the values of identity or unique culture that identifies and differentiates one particular party from the others. It also infers the development of the common values, or according to Macguire as the taken-for-grantedness, which determine the conduct of the members and to some extent has also something to do with the development of the sense of togetherness among the cadres.

In relation to “value infusion”, Levitsky argued that institutionalisation should not be seen as merely a matter of consistency in implementing the party procedure. The development of the situation where the member values the existence of the party

---

also becomes an important element in institutionalisation. According to Levitsky, a party that is weak in terms of procedure implementation, but strong in terms of “value infusion” making the continuation of a party’s existence become possible, sometimes may occur and could not be judged as un-institutionalised. In this kind of situation, to some extent, the party actually became a value by itself, indicating the real dimension of party institutionalisation, described by Huntington as “the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability”. Levitsky argues hence that besides the “technical matters”, one should take into account the ability to create the commitment based on “non-technical elements” as part of institutionalisation. In this regard, the problems like values, ideology or shared values and others like commitment to those matters, which, as part of “value infusion”, has become relevant when discussing party institutionalisation.

In the Indonesian context, several researches have been conducted on party institutionalisation. Ufen’s comparative study on party institutionalisation in three South-East Asian Countries concludes the advanced position of Indonesian parties compared to those in the Philippines and Thailand in terms of party institutionalisation. Although an uneven situation occurs in which degradation of the quality of the party institutionalisation occurs he believes that Indonesian parties are better than those in the two other countries.

By using Levitsky’s approach to party institutionalisation that implements two dimensions of party institutionalisation, namely value infusion which is related to the capability to establish political roots in the civil society and behavioural routinisation, Ufen indicates that old parties, such as Golkar, PPP and PDI are the most institutionalised parties, particularly Golkar. However he also believes that the new parties such as PKB and PKS have also a fairly strong root in society, mainly in the rural, traditionalist Muslim domains and in urban areas respectively, indicating the presence of party institutionalisation. However, Ufen also recognises that over time, this situation became questionable and has been challenged by the current political situation of several parties. Several of the contemporary local elections and national election, for instance, confirm the weakness of value infusion, including that in PKB.


The failure of PKB’s candidate to win the 2008 Governor Election in the East Java Province\textsuperscript{89}, as one of the most important or “traditional” political pouches for PKB, became the very indication of the absence of value infusion for this party.

The Centre for Political Research, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (P2P LIPI) has developed so-called LIPI categories in examining party institutionalisation of several prominent political parties in the Indonesian Reform Era. These factors include the existence of internal democracy, party identity or value infusion, which is strongly related to party ideology, cohesive relationships among members of the party, financial autonomy, the systematic cadre development and good relationships with the public\textsuperscript{90}.

In terms of party ideology, the P2P LIPI research includes matters such as the existence of a political platform, the problem of understanding the political attitudes of the party, the commitment to the political aims and the existence of the sense of togetherness. Internal democracy has to do with problems such as the implementation of the rules of the game, the decentralisation of sources, the existence of an effective control and the procedure for leadership selection. Cohesion covers internal conflict resolution, consensus institutionalisation and the code of conduct. Financial autonomy includes the origin of the financial sources, the continuity and the management of the party funds. The systematic cadre development infers the existence of systematic recruitment, the membership management and the organising of data and information relevant to membership. Good relationship with the public is related to the implementation of mechanisms, specific and medium timeframe for building relationships.

This study concludes that almost all the important parties in the Indonesia experience had trouble with their institutionalisation, particularly in relation to these matters mentioned above. This study discusses ten major parties that were in existence before the 2009 election, namely PDIP, Golkar, PKB, PPP, PD, PKS, PAN, PBB, PBR and PDS. Of the ten parties measured, this study infers that only PKS can be categorised as an institutionalised party, while the others can be regarded as parties that are half way to be institutionalised and two of them, PDIP and PKB, are

\textsuperscript{89} The PKB’s candidate Achmady only gained 7\% of the total votes. The Election was won by Soekarwo who was supported by three main parties namely the PD, PAN and PKS.

\textsuperscript{90} Muchlis (ed.), Reformasi Kelembagaan Partai Politik Pasca-Orde Baru di Indonesia, pp. 18-19.
regarded as parties that suffer serious problems with institutionalisation. This interesting study has properly indicated issues that are related to the problems of party institutionalisation, although they are not quite complete in explaining many of the impacts, whether internal or external, of such conditions on the parties. This study is also in general not related to the problem of fragmentation tendency.

The discussion above shows that party institutionalisation has many interpretations of its definition and categories. In terms of categories, we can divide them into three main situations or categories. The first is a high degree of ‘systemness’, where the coherence between the rules of the game and their implementation exists. In this situation, the internal system becomes more prominent and influential than the individual or figure. These “internal categories” include the degree of systemness, autonomy, consistency in implementing internal regulation, coherence, systematic recruitment and cadrerization.

The second is related to “the value infusion”, or the preservation of shared values or identity that played a role as a guide or code of conduct and an element that supports the continuation of party existence. At the practical level, it is also related to the capability to establish adaptability in the new environment and the establishment of an effective connection with the social movements or communities having similar values. In this thesis, it is mainly related to how the values are transformed and developed. The third is the party’s capability to be consistently present in the political system and over time to be reified by the society. These “external categories” comprise the existence of decisional autonomy, adaptability and the development of established relations with society (reification) and the continuity to participate in elections. However, these categories are not directly related to the fragmentation and cohesion problems.

5.4. Party Institutionalisation and Fragmentation or Cohesion: Dimensions

To fill the gap, this thesis operationalise ‘party institutionalisation’ as an independent explanatory variable for party cohesion and fragmentation. To do so, this thesis will for practical purposes focus on the internal aspects of institutionalisation and value infusion; stepping aside from “external factors”, such as reification as defined in relation to society and the ability to continually participate in elections: these are,

91 Ibid.
arguably, dependent parts of institutionalisation. Moreover, in Indonesia, many important parties could continue to participate in the elections, several even gaining a considerable number of votes for their well-known existence, without having sufficient institutionalisation and even won the election 92.

By contrast, our focus on the internal elements is in line with the approach that views a party as “a miniature of political system”, according to Eldersveld, where one of its main functions is to maintain its existence through appropriate internal management93. Specifically this “internal dimension” is related to three factors, namely (1) procedural leadership in the decision-making process, (2) presence of conflict resolution mechanism and (3) systematic cadrerization for developing cadres and political recruitment. Pertaining to “value infusion”, as one of the dimensions of institutionalisation, it was related to the commitment towards shared values. Thus, in this thesis there will be four elements of institutionalisation which will be examined in relation to the fragmentation and cohesion of political parties. These factors are, where they exist, mutually interactive (they feed into each other and are mutually supportive), but are collectively independent.

5.4.1. Procedural Leadership in the Decision-Making Process
The first dimension is what has been called by Randall and Svasand as the degree of systemness, or in my perspective is called procedural leadership, particularly in the decision-making process. Procedural leadership in the decision-making process requires a consistent implementation of policy once a policy is passed by the members. According to Levitsky94, in his explanation of the real meaning of institutionalisation, it is the process by which rules and procedures become known, accepted and obeyed as the main element of the party institutionalisation.

The charismatic figures or leaders can be employed as a uniting symbol which, according to Panebianco, could bring a valuable impact to the party in some cases95. However they should not be put in a position above the law or the internal

93 Maor, Political Parties and Party Systems, Comparative Approaches and The British Experience, pp. 11-12.
rules of the game. The existence of procedural leadership in the end would preserve the sense of togetherness, since it basically ensures the implementation of the rules of the game, equality before the party constitution and the involvement in the decision-making process. In the case of Indian National Congress Party, “the politics of sycophancy” and the tendency to create party personification which undermines procedural mechanism, during the first years of Indira Gandhi leadership, appears to be the focal point for de-institutionalisation of the party which leads to a party split. Though as mentioned by Michels, the tendency of oligarchy is actually a part of party life, one should believe that the implementation of procedural leadership should be implemented, since it has a potential impact on avoiding distrust and fragmentation.

5.4.2. Conflict Resolution Mechanism

The second is the ability to develop the internal conflict resolution mechanisms (CRM). CRM is a mechanism that deals with the conflict terminating attempts and management. It is believed that the establishment of this mechanism should help the development of a win-win outcome that satisfies each conflicting group, or at least some of their needs. This mechanism to some extent is part of conflict management, in which according to Mial, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, relates to the attempts in handling conflict. Bennet implies, moreover, that the success of conflict management is a pre-condition for the success of CRM. In this regard, Maoz believed in the overlap between the role played by CRM and conflict management.

---

This thesis, hence, accounts for CRM as a mechanism that is related to or becomes part of conflict management. There are at least two levels of conflict resolution; namely (1) conflict prevention, before the conflict happens and (2) conflict termination, after the conflict took place. The institutionalised party is accordingly a party that has a capacity to prevent conflict potentials and to find a comprehensive solution in terminating the conflict.

The party should have clear rules of law to solve internal conflict and form a body (or sub-unit) to handle the problem of internal conflict. The existence of this mechanism, or the body that handles this function, is important since the party, as a system, has responsibility to ensure the implementation of the party functions, including the management of internal cohesion. In order to be able to effectively operate the function, such mechanism should have a distinct position, much the same as a judicative body in the context of the government system. The capable and respected figures should be part of this body and equipped with independent rights to stipulate policy and be free of any intervention.

With the potential ability to solve internal problems, the existence of this mechanism should also prevent the party from any external intervention; for instance, the intervention from the government apparatus that sees the unfinished internal conflict as an opportunity to run their agenda inside the party. According to Pirages, the third party intervention, particularly from the government, could not find a comprehensive solution. In fact, it does not help the party to solve its problems, since it tends to reduce preferences that might possibly be taken by the conflicting groups in terms of the bargaining position process as part of the conflict resolution method before intervention occurs. This situation tends eventually to prevent a win-win solution from being obtained based on the natural interests of each group.

In the Indonesian political cases, such external intervention sometimes occurs when one of the conflicting groups intentionally invites an external element to act as mediator to solve the conflict. But this external factor, mainly from the government apparatus in the New Order Era, tended to worsen the problem rather than to resolve

---

it. The reason was that the New Order government had a hidden agenda to weaken the unity of the opposition parties, rather than to solve the real problem\textsuperscript{104}.

In this circumstance, the existence of this mechanism could also become an instrument to maintain party autonomy. Furthermore, the existence of the internal conflict mechanism solution would possibly foster the sense among the members of being fairly treated. This is because it would protect them from any discrimination and unilateral action from the elite and other members. In addition, this mechanism could also support intraparty dialogue, since it provides a chance to share points of view and establish understanding, regarded to be important by Hirschman\textsuperscript{105}. To resume, the existence of such a mechanism together with its many positive consequences would potentially minimise the disappointment of the party members, including the tendency to divide the party.

5.4.3. Systematic Cadrerization.
This should cover the matters of holding fair recruitment, systematic evaluation of the cadres, systematic and gradual training in recruiting new members and elites and certainty of their career level. The substance of this activity should encompass a certain amount of basic information and orientation, including on (1) the ideology and the mission of the party, (2) the role of the cadre both as a member of the party and as member of the society, (3) the party’s management and other rules of the game and (4) the respective internal values that have to be properly conducted by all members. In relation to these functions, this process should be an effective media to transmit the fundamental values and attitudes of the party. This activity should be clearly written in the statutes of the party or on other official documents and conveyed to all of the members of the party, so that it could be collectively learnt. In this regard, the cadrerization process should also have clear parameters and be easy to comprehend by all the cadres. These transparent rules of the game would not only avoid any kind of unilateral and exclusive understanding, but also potentially prevent the elites from manipulating this activity for their personal interest. This situation could also minimise internal conflict potentials, since it could reduce any tension caused by an unfair mechanism and its implementation\textsuperscript{106}.


\textsuperscript{105} Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to decline in Firms, Organisations and States.

\textsuperscript{106} Hidayat, ed. Kerangka Penguatan Partai Politik di Indonesia, p. 50.
Furthermore, systematic cadrerization requires consistency and continuation in its implementation. It should not be terminated for any reason. This is a part of what many scholars said as a party’s “routinisation”, which is one of the indicators for the existence of party institutionalisation. The main reasons for this continuation are so that the party could guarantee the successive process and maintain regeneration based on the spirit of meritocracy. In other words, the result of the cadrerization process should eventually be the basic standard for party recruitment and selection. The recruitment includes legislative recruitment and candidate selection, which the “political party decides which of the persons is legally eligible to hold an elective office”\textsuperscript{107}. In addition, pertaining to some of the functions indicated above, it could be said that this process should be part of the attempts to maintain party coherence and to develop internal discipline for all members. Thus, the existence of systematic cadrerization would generally give a positive impact on party cohesion.

5.4. 4. The Commitment to the Shared Values or Ideology

The presence of a shared values commitment is an impact on the existence called by Selznick and Levitsky as “value infusion”, where the members are infused by certain values. The institutionalised party, therefore, is the party that is capable of developing its own and distinct values, which over time enable it to build its roots in the civil society domain and with the people who share similar values. On the other hand, as applied in this thesis, it also determines relations between the party and its members, where the values and the interests holding and maintaining them become the main foundation for such relations.

In the internal party context, which is the focus of this thesis, the presence of this commitment is indicated by the eagerness to implement the shared values as a guide or main consideration in its activities and movements. The presence of such commitment will also enhance collective identity and the spirit to preserve the continuation of the party. Levitsky said that the continuation of the party becomes more important rather than the objectives of the party, including the reasons behind the party establishment. In this case, the party tends to be more than merely a tool to meet specific aims or other technical matters. Rather, the party and its continuity become tools of personal satisfaction for the cadres\textsuperscript{108}. The presence of this


commitment also encourages the cadres to adjust their behaviour according to this value; in other words become a code of conduct. Eventually, the commitment to the shared values became “the ‘receptacle’ of group idealism”.

In Randall and Svasand’s perspectives, this situation, where the members of the party acquire an identification and commitment, is an important aspect of party cohesion. On the other hand, the lack of having this value will lead to the situation where the members could act freely based on their self-interest. This condition would potentially trigger negative impacts such as the difficulty to maintain consistent attitudes, the spread of self-seeking behaviour and the creation of uncompromised disputes among the members.

To have a more influential position in the party organisation, the party should preserve its ideology by developing an “apparatus ideology”. Such apparatus consists of the people who are committed and have a duty to maintain and develop the party ideology. This apparatus is part of the values infusion process and plays a salient role in the cadrerization and the socialisation of the party.

The meaning of shared values used in this thesis is a common belief, derived from matters such as platform, ideology, figure, interest, myth or struggle that gathers people and provides identity. In this thesis, since both discussed parties are using mainly their ideology as a basis for creating common belief and their main tools to gather people, ideology became an important shared value in both parties. In relation to this, ideology at heart provides a collective identity and binds the people who adhere to it. According to Volkens and Klingman, ideology provides the party not only with a core identity but also with a blue print for an alternative solution towards social problems and many other matters. Sani dan Sartori puts all these party roles into two domains namely “domain of identification”, when dealing with matters.

112 Arief Mudatsir Mandan, Krisis Ideologi, (Jakarta: Pustaka Indonesia Satu, 2009).
of creating relationships between electors and the party, including the elites, party members and voters; and “domain of competition”, in which ideology became the guide for the decision-making process and policy preference, which is rewarding when competing before all people. In other words, party ideology has both roles as a party vision and a unifying element or identity.

This thesis takes these four elements as the elements of party institutionalisation in order to explain the phenomenon of fragmentation and cohesion of Islamic political parties in Indonesia during the Reform Era.

6. Methodology

The samples for this research are taken from two Islamic political parties in Indonesia, namely PKB and PKS. The reasons to select these parties are their significant role in Indonesian politics, particularly in the early phases of the Reform Era. For instance, the first president in the Reform Era, Abdurrahman Wahid, popularly known as Gus Dur, was the prominent leader and the founder of PKB. On the other hand, the second General Chairperson of Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (the People’s Consultative Assembly/MPR), the highest body in the Indonesian political system, in the Reform Era was Dr. Hidayat Nur Wahid, who was also the Second President of PKS. In general, contrary to several ephemeral Islamic parties, both are likely to continue playing a significant role in the Indonesian political constellation in the future. They also represent two versions of the Islamic political mainstream in Indonesia. While PKB tended to be supported by and a representative of the traditionalist Muslims, who live mainly in the rural areas, PKS found its ideology roots in so-called Islamic neo-revivalism or “fundamentalism” which was mainly supported by the young, urban and educated Muslims.

Moreover, above all both parties are an excellent example of the failure and the success of party institutionalisation respectively in Indonesia, particularly in relation to the phenomenon of fragmentation and cohesion in Islamic political parties. By exploring these parties, this thesis should be properly able to provide correlations between dependent variables (the fragmentation or cohesion of political parties) and independent variables (party institutionalisation).

This research is descriptive-analytical and will employ qualitative methods. By implementing this method, the research will give flexibility in finding data and information and creating their interpretation based on experience during the research in order to be able to, what Denzin said as, “assemble image into montage”116. This thesis could also be categorised as explorative in the way that it will try to find original information from significant sources related to the problem of political party institutionalisation. The focus of the study is to provide an analytical explanation by describing and explaining the phenomena of party fragmentation and cohesion and examining this in the role played by specific elements of institutionalisation.

Data collecting for this research will be through in-depth interviews and documentary data exploration. The field research method is used to provide first-hand information and data pertaining to the research problems addressed and in order to support or falsify my hypothesis.

Interviews will be undertaken with a range of groups within PKB and PKS: the parties’ elites, including members of the each party’s managing board, members of the legislative body at a national or local level; and also activists, ordinary party members, who do not have organisational position in the party and do not have a governmental position at any governmental level and committee members of affiliated organisations. By researching these groups, I have aimed to analyse in detail the characteristic of thinking, motives and the actions of each party and its members and leadership. Interviews will also be carried out with some key figures who represent the different sides of groups in conflict within these parties in order to maintain a balance. In addition, a number of national intellectuals and political observers will also be interviewed.

Interviews will employ “open ended questions” and “informal probing techniques”117. Through these techniques, the respondents of this research will have the opportunity to freely state and convey their beliefs, information and interpretation on the particular issues, phenomena or problems. Nevertheless his method should provide an opportunity for the researcher to deeply elaborate many of the points

made by the respondents. For these reasons this research will conduct several limited discussions and personal interviews with some key figures and relevant respondents.

Documentary research – secondary sources apart – will cover all relevant references in the research such as books, newspapers, journals, magazines, tabloids and all other data related to the research question. This includes in particular party official documents, such as *Anggaran Dasar and Anggaran Rumah Tangga* (the statutes and rules of association/AD/ART), official publications and other kinds of documentation on party attitudes and views.

The research will be conducted mainly in four areas, namely Jakarta, (DKI Jakarta Province), Depok, Bekasi (West Java Province), Tangerang (Banten Province), and Rembang (Central Java Province). The reason for choosing Jakarta is not only because that is where the central headquarters of both parties are located, but also because this area is the place where several prominent figures of each party reside. It is also the place where many very prominent PKB figures, including former important cadres from many areas in Indonesia, including Surabaya, usually meet and discuss the various problems related to their party. Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi were chosen because these are potential areas for PKS, based on the results of the 2004 and 2009 elections, and where some potential interviewees including several elites cadres and activists of the party stay. Rembang is a replacement for Surabaya that initially was the place to conduct research. This replacement was in response to the situation where the writer had a chance to conduct interviews with almost all important respondents from Surabaya in Jakarta. Hence it was no longer of use to go to the Surabaya. The main reasons to choose Rembang are because of its historical role in the establishment process of PKB, where some prominent *ulama* met in this city to draft the constitution of the party. Rembang is also important for the existence of several prominent figures, including one of two founding fathers of PKB who were still alive when this research was conducted, namely A. Mustafa Bisri.

7. Structure

This thesis consists of thirteen chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter II will elaborate the phenomenon and growth of the Islamic-based political parties before the Reform Era. This chapter will mainly focus on the reasons behind the
phenomena of fragmentation and cohesion experienced by Islamic parties from the beginning of the twentieth century until the New Order period, in order to provide an illustration on the continuation of such phenomenon in the history of Indonesian Islamic political parties. Chapter III will discuss the socio-political background of PKB. This chapter will survey PKB’s ideology, organisational structure and activities. This will also enable us to present a number of facts relevant to institutionalisation, such as the influence of a political culture background, the history of the party, the rules of the game and the characteristics of its elite members’ relationships. Chapter IV will elaborate PKS through similar subjects of discussion and objectives as for the previous chapter.

Chapter V and Chapter VI will explain the existence of procedural leadership in both PKB and PKS. These chapters will explore the elements of this style of leadership and how does it correlate with party institutionalisation. The main discussion in these chapters is on how both PKB and PKS meet this element of procedural leadership and how these parties are affected. Chapter VII and Chapter VIII will detail the correlation between the existence of CRM as part of institutionalisation and the tendency to be a cohesive party. These chapters will explore several important issues related to the serious internal conflict, particularly in relation to the cases that explain the rights of the members to formally defend themselves and be treated fairly and equally and how both PKB and PKS handle these problems.

Chapter IX and Chapter X will elaborate the correlation between the existence of systematic cadrerization and the party fragmentation or cohesion. In this regard, these chapters will explore the real conditions of party cadrerization both in PKB and PKS and how it makes and impact on the parties. This comparison between both parties will be based on several cases that show the commitment of the party members in dealing with the unity of the party, which, in the end, presumably has to do with the conditions of party cadrerization. Chapter XI and Chapter XII will discuss the existence and the preservation of shared values in both PKB and PKS. The discussion will provide an explanation that correlates the problem of fragmentation and cohesion with the commitment to the shared values. The discussion also covers several topics such as the development of the shared values, how each party maintains them and how this commitment on the shared values finally influences party fragmentation and cohesion.
Chapter XIII will comprehensively compare the existence or non-existence of the elements of party institutionalisation in both parties. By comparing these elements, it is hoped that the relation between the element of institutionalisation and the phenomenon of party fragmentation in PKB or cohesion in the case of PKS, would be more clearly understood. The last part of this chapter is a conclusion that mainly discusses the relation between variables, namely party institutionalisation and fragmentation and cohesion of the Islamic political parties in Indonesia.
Chapter II
The Development of Islamic Political Parties:
The Experience of Fragmentation and Cohesion
in the Pre-Reform Era

1. The Pre-Independent Era

The phenomenon of the Islamic party's fragmentation is not something new in Indonesia's political history. It first occurred in *Sarekat Islam* (the Islamic Association/SI), originally a trade union called *Sarekat Dagang Islam* (the Islamic Commerce Association/SDI) established in 1905 by Samanhoedi, a Muslim entrepreneur, to pursue indigenous entrepreneurs' interests, an Islamic organisation that later became the first political channel for the interest of the people\(^{118}\). Initially, for more than a decade, SI, which in 1930 was transformed into PSII, became a political medium for indigenous Muslims. It united almost all Islamic organisations – including Muhammadiyah, the largest modernist Islamic organisation and NU, the famous representation for the traditionalist Muslims – and many important figures from different ideological backgrounds\(^{119}\). Indeed this party, under the leadership of Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto\(^{120}\), eventually represented the Muslims and the entrepreneurial groups, but also aristocrats, peasants, intellectuals, teachers, social activists, the poor, the puritans and even the *abangan* (the nominal Muslim)\(^{121}\).

---


\(^{119}\) Such as Agus Salim, Abdoel Moeis, Ahmad Dahlan, Sukiman (modernist Islam), KH Wahab Chasbullah, (traditionalist Islam), H.O.S Tjokroaminoto (socialist Islam), Ki Hajar Dewantara (javanism), Semaoen, Darsono (communism), Kartosoewiryono (advisor to the Islamic State establishment).


The first internal fragmentation took place when the members of PSII with communism orientation, popularly known as SI-Merah (Red-SI), left the party after enduring a long severe and unresolved dispute with non-communist members popularly known as SI-Putih (White-SI). Most of Red-SI sympathizers were actually also member of Indische Social Democratesche Vereenenging (the Hindia Social Democracy Association/ISDV), the first Marxist group in Indonesia, and had actually became cadres of Partai Komunis Hindia (the Hindia Communist Party/PKI) since 1920. The communist faction, led by Semaun, Alimin, Marco Kartodikromo and Darsono, the leaders of Semarang Branch SI\(^\text{122}\), popularly known among the first communist figures in Indonesia’s history, wanted SI to implement Marxism-Leninism as the foundation of its struggle. This offer triggered a massive rejection from the non-communist wing, which regarded such an opinion as offensive to the Islamic teachings as the very foundation of the party’s ideology and orientation. These two camps, over time, developed different thoughts and strategies on how to respond to the political situation at that time, including in dealing with the colonial government’s policies, which sometimes created severe disputes among cadres\(^\text{123}\).

However, a political manoeuvre of the White-SI camp during the 1921 National Congress terminated this situation. Led by Agus Salim, Abdoel Moeis and Soerjopranoto, the non-Communist camp successfully had a clause introduced into the constitution of SI regarding the prohibition to hold dual membership, which was opposed by the communist orientated cadres\(^\text{124}\). Consequently, the communist cadres in SI had to leave the party\(^\text{125}\). They subsequently founded Sarekat Rakyat (the People Union), which latter on became a backbone for the PKI’ establishment in many local areas.

The second fragmentation was related to a unilateral decision to remove some figures, including Soekiman and Soerjopranoto, who were regarded as being committed to the indirect humiliation of Tjokroaminoto, the highest leader of SI. This


\(^{123}\) Safrizal Rambe, Sarekat Islam. Pelopor Bangkitnya Nasionalisme Indonesia 1905-1942, (Jakarta: Yayasan Kebangkitan Insan Cendikia, 2010), pp. 111-137.


\(^{125}\) Ibid, p. 125.
was related to the financial mistreatment, as unveiled by a special team led by Soekiman, in one of the important indigenous organisations namely *Persatuan Pegawai Pegadaian Hindia* (the Hindia Pawnshop Employees Union/PPPH), where Tjokroaminoto was a member and seemed to be involved. This depiction resulted in the dismissal of Martodiredjo, the leader of PPPH. Although PPPH did not dismiss Tjokroaminoto, the work of Soekiman’s team very largely disgraced him. He then sought to punish them in revenge. For this reason, although this case actually was not related directly to SI, he accused the members of the team of violating SI’s internal procedure and its organisational ethics.

According to Tjokroaminoto, as member of SI, the central committee aught first to be informed and its approval obtained before making any judgements that would affect SI. The PSII central committee approved Tjokroaminoto’s intention and consequently dismissed Soekiman after initially giving him a chance to stay if he agreed to apologise for his action towards Tjokroaminoto and publish his acknowledgment in the newspaper, which was rejected by Soekiman. This policy disappointed some of the local branches, mainly those in Java that regarded such a policy as unfair and too severe on Soekiman. In response to his dismissal, after having been formally dismissed in 1933 in absentia, supported by some branches of PSII that disagreed with central committee’s decision to dismiss him, Soekiman established a new Islamic party called the *Partai Islam Indonesia* (the Indonesian Islamic Party/Partii) in the same year.

The split between PSII’s moderate wing and the rest of the party’s members led to the next fragmentation. The moderates, led by Agus Salim, the party’s prominent leader after the death of Tjokroaminoto, suggested that the party should carry out cooperative strategies to implement their interest against the Dutch colonial government. They considered that this choice was still in line with the basic teachings of SI and decided that non-cooperative ways would be an ineffective strategy. This offer was rejected by the majority of the members, who were still strongly committed to maintaining non-cooperative ways as the very characteristic of

---

126 *Ibid*, pp.139-140.


the organisation. It was actually a reflection of personal conflict between Salim, the old figure and former leader of this party, who was also the advisor for cooperative ways and Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, the new leader of this party, who represented the majority's interest. Once the Central Committee of PSII had formally rejected the cooperative proposal, the moderate group then created a faction inside the party. This faction, called Barisan Penyadar PSII (The Self-Realisation Front of the PSII) in 1936\textsuperscript{130}, as a part of the efforts to bring in to being Salim's interest and challenge the existence of Abikusno's leadership\textsuperscript{131}, created confusion among the members. As this clique became stronger, the Central Committee of PSII responded to this attempt by providing a policy that stated such an attempt as illegal and dismissed Salim and his followers\textsuperscript{132}. Salim and his followers then established a new party called Pergerakan Penyadar (the Self-Realisation Movement) in 1937\textsuperscript{133}.

The next fragmentation occurred when Sekarmadji M. Kartosuwiryo, one of the party's leaders with the support from eight branches of the party in Central Java, created Komite Pembela Keberanan PSII (The Defence Committee of Truth for PSII) in 1940 as a response to his dismissal. The KPK-PSII consisted of the followers of the PSII who regarded him as a victim of an unfair decision made by the party and believed in non-cooperative ways to reassure the implementation of the ideals of PSII. On the other hand, the central committee of PSII regarded Kartosuwiryo as a figure who had a hidden agenda to lead the party in another direction by introducing a new interpretation of its ideology, which was mainly related to mystical and militant teachings\textsuperscript{134}. In addition, the party concluded that the radical approaches established by Kartosuwiryo, including the rejection of PSII's attempts to join Gabungan Politik Indonesia (the Federation of Indonesian Political Parties/GAPI), a moderate political alliance seeking to establish the Indonesia parliament and establish the so called "the Islamic State", would potentially endanger the existence of PSII against the colonial government\textsuperscript{135}.

\textsuperscript{130} Rambe, Sarekat Islam. Pelopor Bangkitnya Nasionalisme Indonesia 1905-1942, pp. 259-260.
\textsuperscript{132} Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942, p. 146.
\textsuperscript{133} On the process of this party establishment see Suradi, H. Agus Salim Dan Konflik Politik Dalam Sarekat Islam, pp. 67-77.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid, pp. 148-149.
\textsuperscript{135} Rambe, Sarekat Islam. Pelopor Bangkitnya Nasionalisme Indonesia 1905-1942, p. 271.
The case of internal fragmentation of PSII suggests the inability of an ideology loosely comprehended by its members in its handling of the variety of backgrounds of political affiliation, idealism, and motives of the members. The fragmentation of PSII appears to be logical since the ideology, as a unifying value, was actually absent. It indicates also the absence of unifying values among the SI members, particularly in the first fragmentation case. This situation provided opportunities for members to continue embracing other values, becoming loyal to other groups and interpreting the PSII's ideology in an exclusive manner. The existence of a communist group, moderate wing and Kartosuwiryо's followers became the example of this case. Moreover, the fact that many members of this party held dual membership generated a deterioration of this situation, as the ensuing difficulty was to maintain loyalty. The existence of Semaun, Alimin and Darsono and their followers, for instance, shows a good example of the possibility of a cadre to join the cadrerization held by two different organizations that is in PSII and PKH\textsuperscript{136} at the same time. In this case, value infusion became an important process and accordingly was not implemented correctly.

Moreover, the fragmentation was also the impact of different strategies among the cadres. Different strategies held by Salim (cooperative leader) and Tjokrosujoso (non-cooperative leader), for instance, played a salient part in creating a third fragmentation in this party. Rambe mentions that the different strategies in this organisation to deal with the colonial government problem, over the time, had triggered conflicts among the cadres\textsuperscript{137}. In addition, PSII’s fragmentation also reflected the power of charismatic leaders who occasionally could act beyond the rules of the game to convince the members to attain their interests, which sometimes was made worse by the non-existence of a fair conflict resolution mechanism thus generating disappointment and a deterioration of party cohesion. The dismissal of Soekiman and his followers that had humiliated Tjokroaminoto, then generated the second fragmentation as shown by this case.


\textsuperscript{136} Before the establishment of PKH most of Red-SI activists were also the members of the \textit{Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereniging} (Indies Social Democratic Association or ISDV), a communist organisation established by Henk Sneevliet, which then became the backbone of the communist movement in Indonesia.

\textsuperscript{137} Rambe, \textit{Sarekat Islam. Pelopor Bangkitnya Nasionalisme Indonesia 1905-1942}, p. 248.
In the early years of the independent era (1945-1952), fragmentations reappeared. Partai Politik Islam Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (the Islamic Political Party of Consultative Assembly of Indonesian Muslim/Masyumi) became the first party to experience party fragmentation. In 1945 in Yogyakarta, the prominent Islamic figures and important organisations, including Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (the Awakening of Islamic Scholars/NU), the two largest Islamic organisations established Masyumi. Initially, this party was created to act as the sole Islamic party to represent all Indonesian Muslims. This objective was a reflection on the harmonious relationship among Islamic communities in the first years of the independent era. This situation was motivated by a similar idealism, such as to protect the country from foreign occupation and to preserve the interest of the Muslims\textsuperscript{138}. However, this ideal situation did not last long.

In 1947, some of the PSII’s ex-leaders left Masyumi and declared its independence. This was triggered by the proposal of Amir Sjarifuddin, as the formateur (designated-prime-minister) of a new government formed from Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesia Socialist Party/PSI), to those figures to join the coalition as the representative of the Islamic element in his government. Just before this offer was made, Masyumi had formally stated that it would not join Sjarifuddin. This was due to the other elements in the coalition, namely PSI, Partai Nasionalis Indonesia (Indonesia Nationalist Party/PNI) and Partai Buruh (Labour Party), did not accept the concerns of Masyumi to hold several of the strategic, ministerial posts and, in particular, those of prime minister and the minister of defence\textsuperscript{139}.

The ex-leaders of the PSII, Arudji Kartawinata and Wondoamiseno, considered the proposal as a chance to revitalize PSII and in particular, their position in national politics. For this reason, they confirmed the re-establishment of PSII as an independent party and joined the coalition\textsuperscript{140}. According to Deliar Noer, this situation

\textsuperscript{138} Furthermore, the organisational structure of Masyumi also contributed to preserve the harmony since it contained almost all the prominent Islamic figures and provided a proper and balanced position for them. The important figures from the traditionalist groups, mainly Islamic scholars from the NU such as Hasyim Asyhari and Wahab Chasbullah, mostly filled the Majelis Syura, which its main duty was to give direction and act as a legislative body for the party. Meanwhile, the politicians, professionals and many important figures from the modernist camps led the Dewan Tanfidziah, which was an executive body of the party, to implement the policy of the party.

\textsuperscript{139} Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Politik Islam, Perbandingan Partai Masyumi (Indonesia) dan Partai Jamaat-i-Islami (Pakistan), (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1999), p.130.

was actually in line with the interests of ex-PSII members to re-establish the party in some local areas, which afterwards, in 1943, the Japanese colonial government dissolved this party. They believed that the PSII reestablishment would enabled them to be more independent in conducting their interests and, most of all, to become one of the key political groups in the national political constellation.

Prior to the 1955 Election, the second fragmentation occurred in Masyumi. It took place when NU, as another main pillar of Masyumi and was one of Special Members of this party that was also the foremost representation of the traditionalist group in Indonesia, declared that it had left Masyumi in 1952. The core of the problem of this separation was based on at least three factors. The first, related to the different points of view vis-à-vis the role of ulama in the party’s organisational structure. This eventually became an ideological issue as for NU since it related to the position of ulama as being the most important element in its belief and existence. To NU, ulama should be elevated to the highest position in the party both as an advisor and as an executor, similar to what happened in Dewan Syuriah (the Board of Assembly) of NU. It would give ulama a holistic role in the organisation to guide the party along the best path.

However, in Masyumi, most of the ulama, particularly with NU background, were placed in Majelis Syuro (the Consultative Assembly), an advisory body and played merely as advisors for Dewan Pimpinan Pusat (the Central Executive Board). This position indeed limited their role in daily decision-making process and

---

141 Ibid, p.82.
142 Anggota Istimewa (Special Member) was a status given to the organisations, and not to individuals, that formally declared its political affiliation to the Masyumi. During the existence of the Masyumi there were eight organisations that were given this status namely the NU, Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam, Persatuan Umat Islam, Al-Irsyad, Jam’iyatul Wasliyah, Al-Ittihadiyah dan Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh (PUSA).Mahendra, op.cit, pp. 182-183.
143 Greg Fealy, Ijtihad Politik Ulama. Sejarah NU 1952-1967, (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2003), pp. 23-24. This was also to some extent regarded as an assault on the very foundation of the ideology of the NU that actually legitimizied the supreme position of the ulama, as a medium of socialization for values and Islamic teachings traditionally adhered to by this community from generation to generation. Hence the ulama is regarded as a chain of the propagation of the teaching of Islamic teachings which were taught and practiced by the four best friends of the prophet and the next generations of the followers afterwards.
144 Mahrus Irsyam, Ulama dan Partai Politik Upaya Mengatasi Krisis, (Jakarta: Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1984), p.84.
145 In relation to this, some scholars believe that the organisational structure change, stipulated in 1949 by the National Congers in Palembang, which transformed the position of the Majelis Syuro from a legislative body to be just an advisory body, had triggered disappointment among the NU’s people. See for example, Irsyam, Ulama dan Partai Politik Upaya Mengatasi Krisis, p.27. Noer Partai Islam di
activities in this party. The daily life of the party, including assessing political strategies matters, was determined mostly by the Central Executive Board, consisting predominantly the politicians and professional. The limited role of ulama, supported by the modernist wing that regards party management as something that to be maintained by the professionals regardless their religious background, was understood by NU as a clear tendency to underestimate the existence of ulama.

The second factor was related to the failure of the NU to hold the minister of religion’s post in the newly formed cabinet, named the Wilopo Cabinet (1952-1953). To NU, its eagerness to pursue such a position was not only related to the matter of simply gaining a political position, but also to part of the struggle to obtain fairness in the party. Indeed, in the previous governments, where the Masyumi was the leader or a part of the coalition, Muhammadiyah (the modernist Islamic organisation) cadres gained more positions compared to NU. For this reason, Wahab Chasbullah, the highest leader of NU who was also a member of Majelis Syuro of Masyumi, asked the Masyumi’s central committee to accommodate the interest of NU, as the largest Islamic organisation and element in Masyumi. Moreover, after having lost his patience, he eventually met Wilopo personally to discuss it without initially having a consultation with the party, regretted by many members of Masyumi. Masyumi eventually answered Chasbullah’s demand by holding an internal election to determine who would be the representative of the Masyumi for such a position. The result was far from NU’s hopes. Faqih Usman, one of the Muhammadiyah’s prominent figures, gained the majority of the votes and won the election.

---

146 Some people even labelled the Masyumi as “the party that disrespected the ulama”, Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional. Kisah dan Perkembangan Politik Indonesia, 1945-1965, p.86.

147 The NU regarded that since four of five positions of ministerial posts for the Masyumi in the new cabinet had been provided for other elements, it was sufficiently fair if the NU demanded to hold the last position in the cabinet.


151 Other candidates are Osman Raliby, Kasman Singodimedjo, Haji Ilyas Ja’cob, Ali Akbar, Zainal Abidin Ahmad, Masjkur and Fathurrahman (the last two persons were from the NU). Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional. Kisah dan Perkembangan Politik Indonesia 1945-1965, p.92.
The third factor was the development of the number of politicians in NU. In this regard, the existence of a new political medium to exercise their interests became important. Accordingly, the segregation from Masyumi was eventually regarded as a chance to manage their political organisation independently and advance the position of NU in the national political constellation, something that could not be attained, if it held the status merely of a “special member” in Masyumi. Furthermore, by gaining independence, they would also be more advanced in achieving economic advantages and a better political status. The existence of a charismatic ulama figure, particularly their most prominent leader, Chasbullah, became a supporting factor that inspired most of NU’s politicians and members by the importance of a new organisation that could serve their interests.

It was the exclusive commitment particularly that related to the exclusive preservation of political interest or the protection of leading positions in the government, which motivated PSII to leave Masyumi and became one of the main reasons behind each of two Masyumi fragmentations. On the other hand, the issues on the limited role of ulama, also touching essentially the ideological position of NU and contributing to worsen the situation. It was possible for this to happen since the value infusion and uniting values were absent. This situation not only led to the creation of a different level of understanding and lessened the sense of unity, but also eventually encouraged each element inside the party to put forward its interest first and overrule the interests of the party.

During this era, also popularly known as the Liberal Democracy Era (1945-1959), it was not only Masyumi party that experienced fragmentation. In 1956, the “new” PSII also experienced fragmentation. This party was divided into two camps, namely PSII Abikusno Tjokrosujoso (PSII-Abikusno) and PSII Arudji Kartawinata – Anwar Tjokroaminoto (PSII-Arudji/Anwar). This division began in 1953 with the suspension of Tjokrosujoso, the leader of the party in 1930s who was also the son of Tjokroaminoto. The party suspended him for his decision to take in secret the ministry of public services position in Ali Sastroamidjojo’s Government (1953-1955)


152 Mahendra, Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Politik Islam, Perbandingan Partai Masyumi (Indonesia) dan Partai Jamaat-i-Islami (Pakistan), pp. 150-151.

or without initially reporting to the party. As one of the most senior and highly respected members, mainly due to his service to the party, this decision disappointed him. In such a situation, Arudji, the initiator of PSII’s reestablishment and Anwar, the brother of Tjokroaminoto, then held the leadership of the party.

However, in 1955, due to his indispensable position in the party, the party released Tjokrosujoso from his punishment. Tjokrosujoso’s position in the party remained strong, even though he was non-active. In fact, many cadres hoped that he would be the leader of the party in the next year. He regarded this situation as a support for him to build a new committee that would be different from the previous one. In the 1956 National Congress, as predicted previously, Tjokrosujoso was elected to be the person to be in charge of setting up a new committee for PSII. By using this opportunity, he then tried to establish a central committee based on his own interests. It meant to reduce the influence of Arudji/Anwar and their followers who according to him and his supporters was “a clique of anti-SI” in PSII. 

However, Tjokrosujoso never achieved this objective. Political manoeuvres by his opponents, mainly from the previous committee that was worried about the internal radical change, made it impossible for him to establish a new committee. According to Tjokrosujoso, the opposing group had manipulated and sabotaged the process of forming a new committee in order to save their position in the party by cancelling the policies that he made. However, in the opinion of the Arudji-Anwar camp, the accused group, which then became a formal opinion of the PSII, Tjokrosujoso had tried to abuse the mechanism by regarding himself as the only formateur and discharging the role of four others, including Arudji and Anwar. They believed that such efforts were unacceptable and broke the law.

After that, each camp regarded itself as a legitimate group and then created a committee. Both committees then held their own activities including conducting national conferences and establishing local committees. In 1960, President Soekarno, however, under an authoritarian political system, only acknowledged the

156 “Ikhtisar Kongres-Kongres Syarikat Islam”, (1972), pp.19-20, *ibid*, p.84
existence of PSII-Arudji/Anwar. Consequently, PSII-Abikusno becoming formally illegitimate and terminated its activities.

The end of the democracy era, marked by the resolution to re-implement the 1945 Constitution signed by President Soekarno on July 5 1959, signified the termination of the Islamic party’s fragmentation for more than four decades. President Soekarno established a new political system called Demokrasi Terpimpin (the Guided Democracy), supported by the military group, where it became the centre for almost all the political activity in Indonesia\textsuperscript{157}. He limited the role of the political parties and disbanded many parties, including two influential parties namely Masyumi and PSI\textsuperscript{158}. The three other Islamic parties, namely NU, PSII and Persatuan Tarbiyah Indonesia (The Islamic Education Association/Perti), like other parties\textsuperscript{159}, that had been kept in existence by Soekarno\textsuperscript{160}, indeed became fundamentally powerless and ineffective to voice the interest of the people against the new regime.

In this situation, in essence, the party played no role. Affan Gaffar described the life of national politics as “the non-party system”\textsuperscript{161}. The parties' interest mainly

---

\textsuperscript{157} Harold Crouch, \textit{Militer dan Politik di Indonesia}, (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1986).

\textsuperscript{158} Both the Masyumi and the PSI were regarded as the main enemy of the new regime, particularly for their stubborn rejection of the new model of government. Ahmad Syafii Maarif, \textit{Islam dan Politik: Teori Belah Bambu, Masa Demokrasi Terpimpin, 1959-1965}, (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1996), p.61 and 70-75. Mahendra, \textit{op.cit}, p. 51. They became an architect in the establishment of \textit{Liga Demokrasi} (the Democracy League) as a symbol of their political position towards an authoritarian regime. As for the Masyumi, the involvement of some prominent figures, such as M. Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and Boerhanoeddin Harahap, in the anti-communist “rebellious movement” under \textit{Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia/Perjuangan Semesta} (the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia/Overall Struggle, PRRI/Permesta), became a formal reason for Soekarno to disband this party in 1960. To some, this movement, even though it involved military action, was close to a show of force movement rather than a real rebellious movement. The main objectives of this movement were to erase the influence of the communist group in Indonesia and to demand a better balance of power between the Java and non-Java representation in the national government, which at that time tended to be a “Javanese Government”. See R.Z Leirissa, \textit{PRRI Permesta: Startegi Membangun Indonesia tanpa Komunis}, (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafitti, 1997). Ahmad Syafii Maarif, \textit{Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan. Studi tentang Percaturan dalam Konstituante}, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985), pp. 189-191.

\textsuperscript{159} Except to some extent the PKI, that at that time was getting stronger and was regarded by the military as a serious rival.

\textsuperscript{160} Namely the \textit{Partai Nasionalis Indonesia} (Indonesia Nationalist Party/PNI), \textit{Partai Komunis Indonesia} (Indonesia Communist Party/TKI), \textit{Partai Katolik} (Catholic Party), \textit{Partai Kristen Indonesia} (Indonesia Christian Party/Parkindo), \textit{Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia} (Association of Indonesia’s Independence Supporter/IPKI), \textit{Partai Indonesia} (Party of Indonesia/Partindo), and \textit{Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak} (All People Conference/Murba).

\textsuperscript{161} Affan Gafar, “Sistem Kepartaian yang Hegemonik dan Terobosan Demokrasi Indonesia”, in Amir Effendi Siregar (dkk), “Percikan Pemikiran Fisipol UGM tentang Pembangunan”, (Yogyakarta:
was to preserve and to protect their existence, which was equal to becoming a loyalist to Soekarno. Their religious affiliation backgrounds of NU and Perti for the traditionalists and of PSII representing the modernists, provided difficulty in establishing trust and a strong alliance among themselves.

However, during Soekarno’s Guided Democracy Era (1959-1966), all Islamic parties were able to avoid internal fragmentation. The restriction on the number of political party policies held by Soekarno were to become essential, since an increased awareness grew among the members of the party of the negative effect of internal fragmentation, which would potentially endanger their fragile and limited existence in national politics. Moreover, there was no guarantee that each conflicting group would subsequently be approved by the president for them to continue to exist in the political world, similar to what occurred in the case of PSII-Abikusno. In other words, the external factor, namely Indonesia’s political system at that time, supported the creation of party cohesion. As for NU, the awareness to defend the interest of the traditionalist Muslims happened to be another focal point that fairly contributed to avoiding the party having an internal fragmentation.

In the New Order period (1966-1998), party fragmentation in the Islamic camp did not occur but internal conflict did. The new political system, established by the Soeharto Government only allowed one party to represent the interests of the Islamic communities. The new regime believed that political stability was a fundamental prerequisite for a rapid economic growth required tight control of any political institution. To the New Order, it meant to allow a little room for the political parties to manoeuvre, with the exception of Golkar as the government party that enjoyed free and direct access to the people. For this reason, this regime not only imposed Pancasila as the sole ideology to be adhered to by any of the organisations in Indonesia, but also provided a fusion policy for the political parties in 1973, which consequently reduced the number of parties from ten to three.


164 M. Rusli Karim, Perjalanan Partai-Partai Politik: Sebuah Potret Pasang Surut, (Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 1993). As for non-Islamic parties, they were merged into a new political party namely Indonesia Democratic Party (PDI). PNI, Catholic Party, Parkindo, IPKI, and Murba.
All the political parties with an Islamic ideological background, that is NU, PSII, Perti and Partai Muslimin Indonesia (the Indonesia Muslim Party/Parmusi), were merged into a new party called Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (the United Development Party/PPP). Once again, the Islamic party became a trans-ideological party, consisting both of modernist and traditionalist Islam wings. With this policy, the New Order party’s system model made fragmentation become impossible.

However, PPP, particularly towards the end of the 1970’s and the beginning of the 1980’s, experienced a prolonged internal conflict. It was mainly triggered by competition among the elements, particularly between NU representing the traditionalist group and Parmusi representing predominantly the modernist camp. Generally, both elements wanted to spread their influence inside the party and gain a possible maximum many of the political strategic positions in national politics and in particular gaining more seats in parliament. Although NU was the largest element in PPP, Parmusi, to some extent, was able to lead the party and made such NU’ conditions become less influential. After the implementation of several unfair policies supported by Parmusi, as will be mentioned in the next chapter, in 1982 NU then decided to leave PPP. However, NU still allowed its members as individuals to join PPP. In 1985 PPP, based on the new regulation enforced by the New Order, had to embrace the Pancasila as its ideological base and replaced the Ka’bah with the Star as its symbol. This situation essentially reduced its image as an Islamic party and gave Golkar the opportunity to be a serious competitor in attracting many Muslim voters. Over time, PPP’s role in national politics tended to be insignificant and merely secured this position as a complementary element in the national political system.

3. Overview

The development of the Islamic parties discussed above suggests that there were several aspects of internal fragmentation. The ideology factor was one of the reasons for the fragmentation. This included the dispute between the followers of two different ideologies inside a party and the disputes related to the different understanding and

---


166 Golkar’s efforts, for instance, were conducted by continually using regime-friendly ulama in approaching the voters and spreading religious jargon and agenda in its political campaigns and providing material aids for religious activities and development. On the role of Ulama ini Golkar see Heru Cahyono, Peran Ulama dan Golkar, 1971-1980, (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1992).
interpretation of one particular ideology. The severe contradiction between “the Red-SI” and “the White-SI” represents the first situation. The quarrel between the moderate wings and the rest of PSII’s members on the party’s strategy is a good example of the latter. The case of party fragmentation in the Pre-reform Era indicates that the existence of ideology had become an important element, which influenced the creation of unity and disunity inside the party. The dispute pertaining to the direction that the party should take to respond to the political situation, particularly between the moderate or cooperative and the radical or non-cooperative ways, had become the rationale behind party fragmentation. It is quite reasonable to conclude that since the ideology as had been believed by some scholars, should play a very basic role in giving the party direction and become a key element in uniting the members of the party, the absence of a solid ideology that brings unity among the members would potentially deteriorate party’ solidity.

Moreover, party fragmentation in the Pre-reform Era was more likely to happen in the situation where a party practised as a “federation body”, consisting Islamic groups with different background of political thoughts and interests. It happened to PSII (before the Independence Era) and to some extent to Masyumi. Generally, fragmentation was mainly related to the difficulty to create uniting values among the groups. This situation, according to Feith, infers that stringent membership criteria were actually absent during the party’s life. After some of the critical elements had left the party and “purification” took place, the party acted more exclusively as the representation of a certain group and solidity tended to occur. This indicates that when a party became a medium for one particular political ideology, the tendency to be fragmented was less likely to occur and vice versa. During the Reform Era, however, the situation was considerably different. Every single Islamic party had been dedicated to be the representative of one Islamic political stream and at least one main community. However, although they did not have any intention to act as a federation body, fragmentation still occurred. In other words, fragmentation also happened in the political parties who did not have any problems with their internal existence of other ideologies.

Furthermore, the dependency on party figures became another reason that aught to be taken into account as causing the party fragmentation. The patron-client

---

relationship still dominantly influenced the political culture, where people tended to entirely invest their political interest in the elites that made this happen. The fact that personal leadership\textsuperscript{168} rather than procedural leadership still played a salient role in these parties was a major example that showed the absence of party institutionalisation. Sometimes their special position could overtake the procedural mechanism that created controversy and became the focal point of dispute and disappointment. This type of situation also generated conflicts of interests among the elites who far too much dominated the life of the party. This occurred due to the power of the relations at that time which mainly embraced the elites' interests. The self-withdrawal of PSII from Masyumi in 1947 was related to its elites' attempts to gain a more powerful position in the government. A similar situation in 1952 became also one of the main reasons for NU leaving Masyumi, the split of PSII in 1956 and Soekim\textsuperscript{169}an's dismissal in 1933.

In addition to the above, the development of Islamic political parties indicates that the complexity of Islamic teachings provided the opportunity for a different understanding of them when the Muslims used them as the foundation for their political activities. The history of political Islam shows a deep and prolonged conflict among the Muslims, which occurred due to different understanding in conducting Islam as political ideology or as a basis for making a political strategy. The case of the Indonesian Islamic parties indicates that they are not an exception to this phenomenon. The different opinions on how to establish a political strategy, like in the case of the PSII for instance, had triggered fragmentation. In other words, beside the failure of upholding party institutionalisation dimensions, the different interpretations on Islam and to some extent the Islamic teachings themselves gave opportunity for every Muslims to establish their own understanding, which eventually played an important role in damaging party unity. This condition, then, sometimes was worsened by the existence of a “communal loyalty” that took time to evaporate when a cadre of an Islamic organisation became a party cadre. In such situation, the party cadres sometimes tried to defend or put forward the interest of their previous organisation, for instance in order to preserve or gain strategic positions inside the party. This attitude sometimes became the core problems of disharmonic relations between cadres with different Islamic organisations or affiliation backgrounds. The case of Masyumi split in 1962, when party members form the NU left the party and

\textsuperscript{168} In which the relatives of the founding fathers clan could play a salient role inside the party. Noer, \textit{Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional. Kisah dan Perkembangan Politik Indonesia, 1945-1965}, p.80.
the case of prolonged conflict between NU and Parmusi members inside PPP indicates the above situation.

In addition, the political system as an external factor determined the existence of the political parties and to some extent also played a role in creating the party’s fragmentation or cohesion. Indeed, the fragmentation in the Islamic political camps was absent in Indonesia during the authoritarian regimes, whereas two democratic periods became witnesses for party’ fragmentations. However, a democratic system actually did not really serve as a medium for party fragmentation. The fact that Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (The Prosperous Justice Party/PKS), in the first decade of the Reform Era, was able to maintain its cohesion; this indicates the possibility to avoid fragmentation in the era where freedom of action and expression, which at a practical level allows everybody to be different and independent, is entirely supported by the regime. On the other hand, the case of Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (the Indonesian Democratic Party/PDI), a tiny secular party, established by the New Order in 1973, was split into two groups in 1996, namely “PDI-Suryadi” and “PDI-Megawati” and on the edge of the New Order Era, indicates that fragmentation could happen in the Authoritarian Era. For this reason, the role of the political system as an external factor to party fragmentation is actually still debatable.

The above explanation also suggests the existence of many factors and not a single factor behind the phenomenon of fragmentation and cohesion, in which some of them relate to the problem of institutionalisation. In the Reform Era, some of these reasons re-emerge as the existence of a revitalised, democratic system.
Chapter III
Political Biography of PKB

1. Background to PKB’s Emergence

The establishment of PKB reflected the strong eagerness of the people of NU to have their own political party that could comprehensively strive for their interests. PKB was an answer towards the unhappy feeling of NU’s people on their place in politics, related to the fact that for decades, none of the existing political parties had fairly represented their interests. This included PPP as the party to which the majority of NU members channelled their votes and NU became its strongest supporter. The statement from Cholil Bisri, one of NU’s prominent figures, represents this feeling:

“Now is the time for NU to break the fast, after more that 32 years fasting from the political life which made its existence was torn to shreds… if we could associate the condition of the NU to one who was left behind and even spat after helping somebody whose car had broken down.”

Throughout Indonesia’s modern political history, NU was one of the most important parties. It was the largest Islamic party in Indonesia, particularly after the dismissal of Masyumi in 1960 and until the fusion of Islamic parties in 1973. During the political transformation era in the mid of 1960s, prior to the establishment of the New Order, NU played significant roles by not only giving a hand to eliminate

---

170 Masyumi was the largest Islamic political party, until Soekarno dissolved this party in December 1960. The Masyumi was established in November 1945 in Jogjakarta by prominent Islamic organisations namely Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, Sarekat Islam, Persatuan Umat Islam and Perikatan Umat Islam. It was projected as the only Islamic party for the Indonesian Muslims, but failed after the Sarekat Islam element left this party in 1947 and subsequently the NU in 1952. In the 1955 Election, the Masyumi attained 52 seats in the Majelis Konstituante (the Peoples’ Assembly) and together with the Partai Nasional Indonesia (the Indonesian National Party/PNI) became the largest faction in the parliament. In the meantime, the NU obtained 45 seats in the Peoples’ Assembly. On the Masyumi see Yusril Ihza Mahendra, *Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Politik Islam, Perbandingan Partai Masyumi (Indonesia) dan Partai Jamaat-i-Islami (Pakistan)*, (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1999).
communist groups, namely PKI and its affiliated organisations\textsuperscript{171}, but also contributing to legitimate and to support the existence of the new regime\textsuperscript{172}. Such contribution can be observed from the existence of prominent figures of NU, one of them being M. Subchan Z.E as one of the vice chairpersons\textsuperscript{173}, in the meetings of Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara (the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly/MPRS) in the late 1960s that provided a legal foundation for the establishment of the New Order.

In the early years of the New Order period, NU still could preserve its existence as the most important Islamic political party. This can be seen form the result of the 1971 Election, in which NU became the runner up and gained almost similar percentage of the vote with the 1955 Election (see table 3). Furthermore, based on the 1971 Election, NU became the biggest element inside PPP, the only Islamic party during the New Order. PPP was established in 1973, following fusi (the merging) of all Islamic parties\textsuperscript{174}.

\begin{table}[h!]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{PARTIES} & \textbf{VOTES} & \textbf{\%} & \textbf{SEATS} \\
\hline
Golkar & 34,348,673 & 62.82 & 236 \\
NU & 10,213,650 & 18.68 & 58 \\
Parmusi & 2,930,746 & 5.36 & 24 \\
PNI & 3,793,266 & 6.93 & 20 \\
PSII & 1,308,237 & 2.39 & 10 \\
Parkindo & 733,359 & 1.34 & 7 \\
Partai Katolik & 603,740 & 1.10 & 3 \\
Perti & 381,309 & 0.69 & 2 \\
IPKI & 338,403 & 0.61 & 0 \\
Murba & 48,126 & 0.08 & 0 \\
\hline
\textbf{Total} & \textbf{54,669,509} & \textbf{100.00} & \textbf{360} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{The 1971 Election Result}
\end{table}

Source: www.kpu.go.id


\textsuperscript{173} The Leadership of the MPRS (1967-1972) consisted of General Abdul Haris Nasution (Chairperson), H.M Subchan Z.E (Vice Chairperson), Osa Maliki (Vice Chairperso), M. Siregar (Vice Chairperson), Brigadier General Mashudi (Vice Chairperson).

\textsuperscript{174} Other Islamic parties that joined the merger were the Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesia Muslimin Party/Parmusi) that later on was popularly known as the Muslimin Indonesia (MI), PSII or Sarekat Islam (SI), and the Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Islamic Education United /Perti).
However, at the practical level, the fact that NU was the second biggest party in the 1971 Election was not matched by an equal role in the political world. At the party level, the role and existence of NU in PPP was continually marginalised by other elements in PPP particularly exponents of the Indonesian Muslimin (MI). Even though in the early years NU obtained three of four strategic positions in this party, namely the president of the party, the chairperson of party advisory assembly and the chairperson of legislative assembly, NU actually could not control the real activities of the party.

In reality, the role of the general chairperson, another important body held by MI element, became the most powerful and determining variable in PPP, which sometimes neglected the existence of other bodies and created oligarchy inside the party. The decision-making process mechanism in this party gave opportunity to the general chairperson to decide something independently. The lack of effective and decisive figures and the tendency of having disunity among NU’s cadres became another reason why in reality NU tended to lose and to follow the interest of other elements inside PPP. Moreover, the political support from the regime towards non-NU elements, which at that time tended to be cooperative to the regime, increased confidence among non-NU elements to stipulate internal policies based on their exclusive interests.

The implication of this situation was the emergence of many internal policies that worsened the position of NU. Worst was the elimination of many prominent figures of NU from the list of Member of Parliament candidate prior to the 1982 Election. This controversial decision was stipulated by the elites of PPP, particularly by Jaelani Naro as the General Chairperson of PPP, from MI element, and his inner circle, without initially having intense consultation with others in NU. This action was not only to strengthen the position of MI element in the party and parliament, but also to reduce conflict between the regime and the party by eliminating NU critical figures. The last objectives showed the close relation between Naro and the regime, which demonstrate his opportunist tendency. The political

---

176 Ibid, pp. 73-74.
situation of NU became worse after Naro, the new leader of the party, dissolved all those strategic positions obtained by NU before 1984. This weakened the position of NU and its figures almost entirely\textsuperscript{179}.

Moreover, the agreement on the proportion of the seats for each element in legislative body was continually violated. As the result, NU only gained 45 seats in the 1982 Election from 58 seats that were originally promised (see table 4). The number of important positions for NU in the legislative body also decreased. MI took over the position of the chairperson of the VII Commission, one of the more important commissions in the parliament that responsible to the matters of trade, financial and the central bank, without having permission from NU as the real owner of that position based on the previous internal party agreement. However, with the support of government groups, namely Fraksi Karya Pembangunan (the Functional Development Faction/FKP) and Fraksi Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (the Republic of Indonesia Armed Forces Faction/FABRI), in voting process to determine the chairperson for this commission, this expropriation became possible\textsuperscript{180}. At the executive branch, the political position of NU also deteriorated. NU was not only unable to hold the position of the Ministry of Religion, the position that was traditionally held by this organisation since the independence era, but also in general was not trusted by the New Order to hold any ministerial posts\textsuperscript{181}.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements</th>
<th>The 1971 Election</th>
<th>The 1977 Election</th>
<th>The 1982 Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NU</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSII</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perti</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{179} NU never had an opportunity to hold the position of general chairperson of PPP, until Hamzah Haz elected as the new leader of this party in the beginning of the Reform Era.

\textsuperscript{180} Haris,PPP dan Politik Orde Baru, pp. 67-68.

\textsuperscript{181} One of important reasons was NU’s lack of qualified human resources to deal with the many modern and contemporary technical matters. H. Rozikin Daman, Membidik NU Dilema Percaturan Politik NU Pasca Khittah, (Yogyakarta: Gama Media, 2001), p. 148.
This state of affairs eventually became the main reason for NU to leave PPP. The internal decision on the banner of the *Khittah* 1926 (return to the spirit of 1926) in the 27th Annual Congress of NU in Situbondo confirmed and legitimatised this political attitude. The *Khittah* policy itself encouraged NU to return to their fundamental interests, in which social, education and religious development matters once again should regain priority. But by concentrating only on such matters, the role of NU as an institution in PPP and generally in national politics effectively came to an end. In such circumstance, the bargaining position of the NU in real politics was weak.

Against this political background, it can be understood that the establishment of PKB related to the attempts to revive the role of the NU in politics. In that sense, PKB became a symbol of the awakening of NU in the national political arena, to struggle for the interests and political orientations of NU; although it is not the only party that represents the existence of NU communities during the first decade of the Reform Era.

The efforts to present PKB in the national politics came not long after the fall of Soeharto. NU people across the nation, particularly in Java, sent proposals to *Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama* (the Central Board of Islamic Scholars Awakening/PBNU) to establish a new party. The prominent figures of NU generally responded positively to this aspiration. In response, PBNU reacted carefully. This was because the policy of *Khittah* 1926, which decrees NU not to directly engage in political activities, is still the foundation of the organisation. Abdurrahman Wahid, the grandson of the founder of the NU Hasyim Asyari who latter on became the first president in the reform era and popularly known as “Gus Dur”, as the General

---


183 Although the PKB was set up mainly to represent the interests of the NU, as will be explained in the next section, at heart its followers realised that the role of the party should not exclusively be dedicated to the interests of the NU. In fact, they believed that the function of the PKB will go beyond the interests of the NU. This thinking became the reason behind the choice of PKB as the name of the party and not other names such as for instance: the *Partai Kebangkitan Ulama* or the *Partai Kebangkitan Ummat*.

184 Choirie, *PKB Politik Jalan Tengah NU*, p. 181-182. See also www.dpp-pkb.or.id

185 Of the proposals for the party’s establishment, was the draft from the *Lajnah Sebelas Rembang*, headed by M. Cholil Bisri and *Pengurus Wilayah Nahdlatul Ulama* (PWNU) West Java that were the most comprehensive proposals.
Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidziyah (the Executive Board) of PBNU initially rejected the possibility for PBNU to involve in the establishment of a party.

However, PBNU could no longer avoid the growing aspiration of its followers to have their own party that would serve their aspirations. Eventually PBNU agreed to facilitate the establishment of a party, without being a party itself. Based on this interest, PBNU held a join meeting on 3rd June 1998 that provided a decree to set up a committee, namely Tim Lima (the Team of Five) consisting of five people186, to handle party establishment aspirations. Subsequently PBNU formed Tim Asistensi (the assistance team) consisting of nine people187, whose main function was to assist Tim Lima to inventory and to review proposals on the party establishment and to support the party establishment. On 26th-28th June 1998, Tim Lima and Tim Asistensi held a meeting and provided five basic drafts: (1) the basic thought of NU about political reform, (2) Mabda Siyasi (the political principles); (3) the relationships between PBNU and political party; (4) AD/ART and (5) the script of declaration. They then socialised these drafts to NU communities in some forums.

After Tim Lima and Tim Asistensi accomplished their duty on July 21 1998, PBNU decided the D-day of declaration. On July 23 1998, in the residence of Wahid, the establishment of PKB was announced. This announcement was declared by five senior figures of ulama, namely Munasir Ali, M. Ilyas Ruchiyat, A. Muchith Muzadi, A. Mustofa Bisri, and Abdurrahman Wahid. Thousands of NU’s followers and santri (the disciples) witnessed this declaration. Some national figures, politicians, and intellectuals, who sympathised with the platform of the party, also attended this ceremony188.

This shows the important role of NU and its followers in facilitating the establishment of PKB. The role of prominent figures of NU, particularly Wahid, was significant and comprehensive. Arifin Junaidi says Wahid played immense roles in many things, including in determining the name of General Chairperson of Dewan

186 Makruf Amin (Rais Syuriah), M. Dawam Anwar (Katib Aam PBNU), Prof. Dr. Said Agil Siradj, MA (Wakil Katib PBNU), M Rozy Munir (Ketua PBNU), Ahmad Bagja (Sekjen PBNU).
188 Choirie, PKB Politik Jalan Tengah NU, pp. 193-200.
Tanfidz\textsuperscript{189}. At the local level, the development and establishment of PKB were also facilitated by NU. Hence, close relations between NU and PKB became inevitable. The establishment of PKB shows NU as an organisation with profound political awareness. Its role in the establishment of PKB suggests that the political instinct of NU and its followers was preserved.

In the end, this situation influences not only the organisational structure of the PKB, which is very similar to NU\textsuperscript{190}, but also the values, orientation and political culture of the party. Many phenomena inside the party can be fairly understood only by relating them to the culture of NU. Yet there were also aspects of the new party that did not derive from the culture of NU, and in fact in some sense had to overcome NU traditions.

2. **NU Tradition and the PKB’s Political Orientation**

As an organisation that had been facilitated by PBNU, headed by the prominent figures of NU and gains strong support from the people of NU, PKB had a tendency to follow the political orientation of NU. The General Chairperson of PBNU Hasyim Muzadi states that PKB is “one of NU’s tools of struggle”\textsuperscript{191}. Meanwhile PKB acknowledges, through the statutes of the party, that its existence is actually a result of a synthesis\textsuperscript{192} between the traditions of NU and *semangat reformasi* (the spirit of reform).

The existence of NU itself cannot be separated from the existence of *ulama* (Islamic Scholars) and *pesantren* (Islamic Scholars-led Islamic boarding school). NU was established on 31\textsuperscript{st} January 1926 in Surabaya, by prominent and charismatic *ulama*, who were the alumni and the owner of *pesantren*\textsuperscript{193}. It was basically a response to rapid development of Islamic modernism movements in Indonesia, which


\textsuperscript{190} Choirie, *PKB Politik Jalan Tengah NU*, p. 221.


\textsuperscript{192} In this document a metaphor is used “as a result of legal marriage”, in *Dokumentasi Hasil Muktamar II Parai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Semarang 16-19 April 2005*, (Jakarta: DPP PKB, without year), p. 17.

\textsuperscript{193} Some influential *ulama* who became the founding fathers of this organisation were Hasyim Azhari, A. Wahab Chasbullah, Bisri Saymsuri, R. Asnawi, Ridwan, R. Hambali, Nachrowi, Ndoro Muntaha, Nawawi.
was led by reformer organisations such as Muhammadiyah (literally, the Follower of Muhammad) and Persatuan Islam (the Islamic United/Persis) in the beginning of 20th century and to the new politico-religious situation in Hijaz (Saudi Arabia) where Wahabism became the main religious stream, adhered to by the new authority (the Al Saud)\(^\text{194}\). Both movements to some extent share similar values, in which purification of Islamic teachings is the core of their belief. This belief is opposite to the belief of NU that tends to be more moderate towards the existence the norms outside Islam. Such developments then were regarded by NU as a serious threat for their teachings and in the end their existence.

Scholars classify NU as part of traditionalist Islam movement, with some important characteristics, which fundamentally differentiate it with the modernist, such as the obligation to adhere deeply to the implementation of the teachings of the Islamic scholars, namely the experts of jurisprudence system who lived between 7th and 13th century\(^\text{195}\). They also believe that the gate of \textit{ijtihad} (interpretation through reasoning) had been closed and the duty of the Muslim should just follow the teachings provided by the middle ages scholars. In facing the contemporary situations, the main task of Muslim is to make adjustment of the teachings of such scholars with the context where they live. Furthermore, they also tended to be tolerant with the developed and living traditional values adhered by the society around. NU in reality performed some non-Islamic traditions in the society, such as \textit{kenduren} (feast to mark someone’s death) and \textit{ziarah kubur} (visit to a shrine or grave) after Islamising such tradition or at least legitimising it with Islamic interpretations\(^\text{196}\). The ‘modernists’ regard these kinds of practices as bid’ah (innovation not guided by Al-Qur’an)

Apart from the definitions labelled to this organisation, NU itself defines their Islamic orientation as the followers of \textit{ahlussunnah wal jama’ah}, the moderate stream that follows the teachings of the prophet and his four best friends. NU also believes that to hold all or at least one of four \textit{mazhabs} (schools of Islamic jurisprudential thought), namely Syafii, Hanafi, Hambali or Maliki, is necessary, even though in


\(^{196}\) Daman, \textit{Membidik NU Dilema Percaturan Politik NU Pasca Khittah}, p. 32.
reality they sometimes just follow and honour the interpretation of ulama in understanding and conducting something in Islam.\textsuperscript{197} They put fiqh (the system of jurisprudence) as a foundation for social activities\textsuperscript{198}, including in political life by using the thinking of Al-Mawardi and Al-Ghazali, which provides NU a tolerance and flexible approach\textsuperscript{199}. Based on this approach NU are popularly known as an organisation that are tolerant in facing different values and cultures in social realm and tend to be flexible in conducting their interest in political domain. The opponents of NU sometimes criticises its political flexibility as being commit to opportunism.

As for pesantren\textsuperscript{200}, this institution is an educational institution or boarding school in which ulama educate santri. Pesantren is part of the efforts from traditionalist ulama and the followers to preserve and to protect the tradition, culture and teachings of Islam given by the earliest generations of ulama in Indonesia. There was a time when pesantren became a medium of escapism from the western cultural penetration conducted by colonial regime and to some extent from the reformer thinking and movements hold by the modernist\textsuperscript{201}.

However, today many pesantren (i.e the Modern Pesantren of Gontor) have adopted the method of modern teachings derived from the western academic world. Pesantren does not only teach santri about the religious matters, but also teach them about problems of social life. This extended material of teaching in the end makes the students become also aware of and being in touch with the real problem of the people outside pesantren. The social functions of pesantren, eventually, develop into a part of the real function of pesantren. In such condition, the close relationship between pesantren and its social environment turns into inevitable, in which the charisma of ulama sometimes influences the life of the society.

\textsuperscript{197} NU also regards itself as a movement in which the fiqh context follows all or at least one of the Mazhab, particularly taught by Imam Syafii, in the terms of the tauhid follows the teachings of Imam Abu Hasan Al-Asyari and Imam Abu Mansur Al-Maturudi; and in the matters of the tassawuf implements the teachings of Imam Al-Ghazali and Imam Abu Qosim Al-Jinaid.


\textsuperscript{199} A. Effendy Choirie, Islam-Nasionalisme UMNO-PKB Studi Komparasi dan Diplomasi, (Jakarta: Pensil-234, 2008), pp. 129-134.

\textsuperscript{200} On Pesantren see Dhofier, Tradisi Pesantren: Studi Tentang Pandangan Hidup Kyai. Sukamto, Kepemimpinan Kiai dalam Pesantren, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1999).

\textsuperscript{201} Mahrus Irsyam, “Memahami Hakekat Nahdlatul Ulama”, Kompas, 22 November 1999.
Moreover, pesantren also creates internal culture, which influences the behaviour and the thinking of santri. The most important culture of pesantren is the unique and close relationship between ulama and santri, which in modern terms can be described as a patron-client relation\textsuperscript{202}. In this dyadic relationship, ulama is the patron or the superior who provides protection and wealth for santri. Santri, as a return for all the goodness that he or she gets, is a client, who obeys ulama and fully supports his existence. The very fundament of this relationship is not merely related to the material interests, but in fact is also strengthened by the spiritual matters, in which santri feels spiritually enlightened by ulama. In this context, the respect from santri towards ulama is a result of combination between the fulfilment of the material and spiritual needs. The central role of ulama, which differentiates this organisation with other Islamic organisation, particularly with the modernist, is not only because of their role in founding this organisation but also because of his traditional authority given by the society\textsuperscript{203}. Pesantren, in this situation, according to Dhofier, becomes "kerajaan kecil"(a little kingdom), where the ulama is the main source of authority for almost every matters\textsuperscript{204}.

This mode of relationship reveals the real position of ulama in NU’s world. Ulama conduct a role as a medium of socialisation for values and teachings that are traditionally adhered by this community from generation to generation. Ulama is then regarded as an important link of a chain of the propagation of the teaching of Islam\textsuperscript{205}. In this regard, NU’s people also consider ulama as the testator of the prophet and the continuer of the teachings of the prophet. All these kind of tributes provide ulama a source of legitimacy and an important position in NU’s communities\textsuperscript{206}.

In terms of organisation, based on this acknowledgment, the NU gives ulama a very significant and respectable position. The ulama-santri relationship is reflected

\textsuperscript{203} Daman, Membidik NU Dilema Percaturan Politik NU Pasca Khittah, pp. 46-47.
\textsuperscript{204} Dhofier, Tradisi Pesantren: Studi Tentang Pandangan Hidup Kyai, p.58.
\textsuperscript{205} According to NU, they are the followers of Islamic teachings that were taught and practiced by the four best friends of the prophet, tabiin (the second generation of Islam, who lived after Muhammad passed away), tabiit (the third generation of Islam who learned from the tabiin), and the next following generations.
by the existence of Dewan Syuriah (the Consultative Board), consisted of ulama, and Dewan Tanfidziyah Board (the Executive Board) consisted of mainly non-ulama, professional or politician figures represented santri. In such relationship, ulama in Dewan Syuriah played a comprehensive role as a advisor, controller and guider for the organisations established by NU. The withdrawal of the NU from Masyumi in 1952, for instance, reflected this attitude. According to NU, Masyumi had intentionally diminished the role of ulama in the organisation, by only giving the ulama position as advisor rather than determiner. This unacceptable situation became one of the reasons for NU to leave Masyumi207.

However, at the practical level, NU’s attitude to the ulama, in which the relationships model of patron-client becomes the main foundation, is not consistently conducted. The interest to find certainty in order to secure better political positions and to get political advantages becomes the causes behind the deterioration of santri’s attitude to ulama, particularly in the political world. In his exploration on the involvement of NU in politics, Irsyam concludes that the patron-client relationship will be broken down, if it is implemented in the political realm208. This appears to happen since in reality both ulama and santri could independently create their own political networking with many political actors and groups.

This situation eventually, on the one hand, could provide significant political sources for santri, which in the end gave them opportunity to be important and independent political actors. On the other hand, this situation could make ulama become relatively dependent to santri politically, or at least could not freely dictate their political interests to santri. In the NU political and organisational history, this situation also sometimes created a serious dispute and even conflict between these two bodies. The conflict between the General Chairperson of Dewan Syuriah Ali Maksum, which was considered as a representation of “idealist group”, and the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz Dr. Idham Chalid, who was regarded as the champion of “realist camps” and pragmatic politicians who had very good relation with the Soeharto regime in the 1980s, for instance, reflected this situation. In the end, this kind of political situation creates what Irsyam called as “hubungan simbiosis” (the symbiosis relationship) as an alternative to the patron-client


relationship. In this relationship, the close connection between ulama and santri could continually be preserved as far as they could provide advantages to each other\textsuperscript{209}.

Moreover, another contributory factor in weakening the patron-client relationship in NU is the emergence of new ulama figures in NU. These figures, who sometimes are regarded to have similar capability and contribution to NU, in reality challenge the position of others ulama figures. The new figures establish their new patron-client relationships that in the end sometimes decrease the loyalty of santri towards the old patron. This situation also becomes the reason for the phenomenon of loyalty transformation to the new patron\textsuperscript{210}. In accordance to the fact that the number of the first generation of ulama, who are commonly respected by most NU’s people and played as an uniting element, significantly decreased, this phenomenon appears to happen. This equal condition sometime creates a conflict as a consequence. In these circumstances, disloyalty and conflict at the practical level become also part of NU’s political tradition. As a political institution that inherits the political tradition and culture of NU, such conditions, including the problem of disloyalty, will potentially happen to PKB, which in the end influences their thought and activities.

In terms of political orientation, PKB believes in the role of Islamic teachings in the political realm. Thus, the role of PKB is to be part of the interest of the Muslims to protect their existence on the one side and to struggle for the goodness for all as the reflection of the spirit of rahmatan lil alamin (the mercy for the universe), on the other side. This thinking is actually in accordance to the political orientation of NU. During its existence in the national politics for almost four decades, NU regarded itself as the tools for Islamic values and laws implementation. Based on this PKB does not separate politics and Islam, in fact the elite and the member of this party regards PKB as the true Islamic party. Wahid said, “It is not necessary for PKB to have Islam as the foundation. The important thing is PKB is indeed Islamic party… PKB put forward the essence rather than the label”\textsuperscript{211}. In line with such opinion, Alwi Shihab regards that although some people has doubted it, PKB is a party that was

\textsuperscript{209} Ibid, p. 166.

\textsuperscript{210} Rauf, Konsensus Politik. Sebuah Penjajagan Teoritis, p.109.

\textsuperscript{211} Jawa Pos, 29 Mei 1999.
set up and erected based on the truth of Islamic teachings. According to Muhaimin Iskandar PKB as a party set up by ulama is an Islamic party.

However, PKB also regards that the very importance of their existence is actually related to the interests of Indonesian people. Therefore, PKB believes that their existence should be apart of the national movement in struggle for the interest of all. The fact that the vast proportion of Indonesian people is Muslim becomes a rationale for PKB to regard the interest of the Muslim as essentially the interest of the nation and vice versa. In this regard, beside the interest to establish the Islamic morality in politics, the commitment towards the values of nationalism is highly valued and becomes an important element in the political orientation of PKB. One of the main objectives of the party reflects the commitment of PKB towards nationalism that is to realise the ideals of the independence of the Republic of Indonesia.

As a reflection of such orientation, PKB believes in the spirit of pluralism, as one of the most important characteristics of Indonesia as a nation. Indeed, PKB came to stand out as one of those Islamic organisations with a very clear position in this regard. For some, PKB, particularly under the leadership of Wahid, became one of the real bastions of nationalism and pluralism. According to Iskandar, PKB has a commitment to integrate religious values and pluralism, as the core of Indonesian nationalism, as a realisation of Islamic teachings as a pity for the entire world. Accordingly, PKB in the statutes of the party declares Pancasila (the five basic pillars) in the spirit of ahlussunah wal jama’ah, as the foundational principle of the party. As a result, PKB subsequently had a legitimate foundation to become a “catch all” party, providing equal opportunity for all Indonesians to join, regardless their primordial backgrounds. In real life, PKB has shown no hesitation in building a good relationship with the secular nationalist and even Christian parties. Many

---

212 Republika, 30 Mei 1999.
215 Ibid, p.115
216 The 1998 AD of PKB Article 3; The 2000 AD of PKB Article 3; The 2002 AD of PKB Article 3; The 2005 AD of PKB Article 3; The 2008 AD of PKB Article 3.
217 The 1998 AD of PKB Article 4; The 2000 AD of PKB Article 4; The 2002 AD of PKB Article 4; The 2005 AD of PKB Article 4; The 2008 AD of PKB Article 4.
prominent figures of PKB have also close relations to the people from minority groups.

PKB has relatively institutionalised its political orientation, by means of putting it as part of political ideology of the party. The synthesis between Islam and nationalism can be observed in *Mabda Siyasi*, one of the central official documents of PKB. Most members of the party have accepted and implemented this standpoint, which also shapes their political behaviour. This attitude, to some extent, differentiates PKB from the others Islamic parties, which tend to identify themselves in Islamic terms. There is widespread recognition of the commitment of the party to the implementation of pluralism as a reflection of the realisation of PKB’s political ideology. According to Ratnawati, PKB has successfully made this orientation one of its main characteristics. In other words, PKB has relatively institutionalised one important aspect namely the values regarding the relation between religion and politics that has guided this party to be an inclusive Islamic party.

However, in terms of the role of ideology in the party, PKB actually does not provide the exact values that can be implemented as a foundation for preserving the cohesion of the party. Although it has a comprehensive value set which identifies the political positions of PKB in real politics, the party does not properly maintain unifying values or its ideology for its internal needs. The ideology of the party is merely focused on external matters, and cannot be used as a platform to establish the sense of togetherness and to reduce factionalism or exclusive political orientations. One could not find, for instance, a comprehensive understanding and explanation on this value and the way the party conduct it in PKB official documents. This situation, in a momentous situation, could move the members to change their stand and loyalty. Thus, in general besides having a tendency to conduct conflict and disloyalty, in the way proposing self-seeking orientation, as a legacy from NU, the value infusion process, in relation to the attempts to strengthen unifying values, became an unfinished business for PKB.

3. Organisational Structure

---

In terms of organisational structure, PKB in many ways duplicates the organisational structure of NU. The existence of two important and powerful boards, namely Dewan Syura (the Consultative Board) and Dewan Tanfidz (the Executive Board), as are implemented by NU, proves this influence. These boards exist at every level of party committee (from the national/state level to the sub-district level). At the national level, the join of these boards is called as Dewan Pengurus Pusat (the Central Managing Board/DPP).

Dewan Syura is officially the most powerful body and the holder of the highest command in PKB. It consists of mainly ulama and the experts. According to the statutes of PKB, the main functions of Dewan Syura are to preserve the purity of the struggle of the party, to provide and to promulgate the general policies of the party, to control the implementation of the policies conducted by Dewan Tanfidz and to give report to the party highest assembly forum, namely muktamar (conference) at the end of its period. At the practical level, this body can also veto the policies of Dewan Tanfidz, if such policies are not in line with the statutes and the spirit of the party. The members of the party committees who entitled to vote elect the general chairperson of Dewan Syura and the members of this body, which consist of no more than 17 people. The existence of this body represents the culture of NU in terms of honouring the role and position of ulama.

Dewan Tanfidz is the body that implements the basic policies and programs of the party. It has also an obligation to run daily organisation activities. At daily activities, this body can provide policies as a respond to the needs of organisational matters. The members of Dewan Tanfidz are elected for five years term of leadership, and have to give report and responsibility at the same forum. The general chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz is elected by the participants of conference, after getting agreement from the new elected general chairperson of Dewan Syura as

---

219 In each regional and local board there are also two main boards, namely the Dewan Syuriyah and the Dewan Tanfidziyah.

220 The 1998 ART of PKB Article 17 (1); The 2000 ART of PKB Article 18 (1); The 2002 ART of PKB Article 20 (1); The 2005 ART of PKB Article 20 (1).

221 The 1998 ART of PKB Article 17 (9.a.), (9.b), (9.c); The 2000 ART of PKB Article 18 (10.a.), (10.b), (10.c); The 2002 ART of PKB Article 20 (10.a.), (10.b), (10.c); The 2005 ART of PKB Article 20 (9.a.), (9.b), (9.c), (9.d); The 2008 ART of PKB Article 18 (10.a.), (10.b).

222 The 2000 ART of PKB Article 19 (2); The 2002 ART of PKB Article 21 (2); The 2005 ART of PKB Article 21 (2), 21 (10.d); The 2008 ART of PKB Article 22 (2).
one of the candidates prior to the election. The statute of party actually does not arrange in detail the mechanism of vote for both Dewan Syura and Dewan Tanfidz.

The organisational structure of PKB reflects the very huge role of DPP, particularly Dewan Syura, in determining the direction of the party. The undisputable role of Dewan Syura has a potential to create an oligarchy inside the party. In reality, as would be discuss latter on the subsequent chapters, Dewan Syura, under the leadership of Wahid, sometimes makes some important policies without initially having consultation with other elements of the party that should actually be involved. According to Notosusanto PKB under Wahid has been a party that experiences a personalisation of power, by giving the leader, particularly Wahid, wide and complicated authorities, which at practical level cannot be effectively controlled by the members of the party\textsuperscript{223}. However, the party’s constitution also indicates the spirit of musyawarah (consultation) as one of the main foundation in the decision-making process. In such matter, PKB, as would be explained more comprehensively in the fifth chapter, hence normatively encouraged collectivism and discouraged dictatorship in the party.

On the other hand, as has been mentioned before, the political precedent in the NU also gives a room for some elements in party, particularly Dewan Tanfidz, to oppose the decision made by Dewan Syura. It appears to happen since in reality each body could run their interest separately, in order to find a better political position or defend their position and idealism. The case of conflict between Wahid who represented the existence of Dewan Syura and Matori Abdul Jalil, Alwi Shihab, Saifullah Yusuf and Abdul Muhaimin Iskandar, who structurally represented the existence of Dewan Tanfidz signifies this condition. This situation in some cases also triggered conflict between those bodies or at least involving persons from those two bodies. It shows that PKB was actually suffering lack of sense of togetherness.

In terms of handling internal conflict, PKB, similar to NU\textsuperscript{224}, still face a serious problem. In reality, conflict resolution mechanism is not something that seriously discussed and developed by the party. PKB does not have a kind of arbitration body to resolve proportionally many internal disputes or conflicts. As a result, even the


General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz could experience the injustice decision. It makes insecurity and uncertainty, particularly during the leadership of Wahid, become something common to appear. These feeling in reality are spread out and are felt by the members. As mentioned by one of member of the local committees: “…there is no safety so far. I mean there is no peace. In political party life, we need harmony. In PKB, the members of committee could suddenly be dismissed by the party, even though they already do their best. There is a powerful authoritarian hand. There is subjective policy”.225 The existence of conflict mainly was approached by personal approaches not by the rule, while for the big cases PKB even needed a third party to solve it, which did actually not really end the rivalry between conflicting groups.

Generally, PKB needed to institutionalise many more aspects within the party. The problem that was faced by this party was not only related to how such decision was made, but also in terms of how such decision was stipulated. This condition eventually became one of main reasons for the emergence of unresolved internal conflicts, which eventually were resulted in the party fragmentation. Thus, the institutionalisation is necessary particularly in order to be able to reduce violation in the decision-making process and eventually to avoid the potential of internal fragmentation.

4. Political Activities

In the first decade of reformasi, PKB appeared to be one of the most important parties in Indonesia. The third position reached by this party in the 1999 Elections, with 13 millions votes, showed the real power of this party. PKB gained 51 seats in parliament that made this party became the fourth biggest group in the legislative body.

PKB gained the votes mostly from the Java Island. The main basis of PKB in the 1999 Election and the next two elections was pesantren communities in the East Java Province and the Central Java Province. Those provinces provided more than half of the seats of DPR for PKB (see Table 5). Even though NU also exists and relatively grows even not long after its establishment in some provinces such as

South Sumatra, South Kalimantan, and South Sulawesi, the votes for PKB in these regions were not significant. Such phenomenon strengthens the thesis that PKB actually grows only in Java\textsuperscript{226} and indicates that not all NU’s people regard PKB as their channel for interests\textsuperscript{227}.

### Table 5
The Top Three Provinces that Provides DPR Seats for PKB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>The 1999 Election</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Java</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Java</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Java</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>11*</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>8**</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>6***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note:
* : Lampung (2), North Sumatra (1), Riau (1), South Sumatra (1), DKI Jakarta (1), DI Yogyakarta (1), Bali (1), East Kalimantan (1), South Kalimantan (1), South Sulawesi (1).
** : Banten (2), Riau (1), Sumatera Selatan (1), Lampung (1), DI Yogyakarta (1), South Kalimantan (1), Papua (1).
*** : Riau (1), Lampung (1), DI Yogyakarta (1), East Kalimantan (1), Maluku (1), Papua (1).

The result of the 1999 Election on the other hand inferred the existence of relatively solid supports from NU’s ulama in both East Java Province and Central Java Province. Some influential ulama were present at PKB’s campaigns prior to the election to convey the programs of the party and asked the audience, which mainly are NU’s santri, to support PKB. This situation to some extent also revealed the existence and the effectiveness of patron-client relations in the politics of NU. Soon describes this phenomenon:

“In the 1999 election, the present of kyai (Muslim cleric) and ustaz (religious teacher) is really significant for the votes of PKB. There are approximately 3,917 kyai and 30,983 ulama. They influence santri and the people around pesantren to mobilise the supporter... including K.H Achmad Zarkasyi, K.H Chotib Umar, K.H Muchtith Muzadi, K.H Muhammad Subadar, K.H Hamzah Achmad, K.H Idris Marzuki, K.H Abdullah Sahal, K.H Abdullah Faqih, K.H


\textsuperscript{227} Amir, *Peta Islam Politik Pasca Soeharto*, p. 121
Masduki Mahfud, K.H Hasyim Muzadi...they (the senior kyai) directly come to PKB’s campaign. They are united in giving support to PKB by continually coming to the areas to get supports from the santri and the people around\(^{228}\).

In the 1999 Presidential Election, conducted by the DPR, PKB together with other Islamic parties, which were united in Poros Tengah (the middle axis)\(^{229}\), win the election, and successfully put Wahid as the first president in the reform era. The victory of Wahid made him to be the first president from NU, and provided an opportunity for NU’s cadres to gain important positions in the government, including the ministerial posts\(^{230}\). However, the period of President Wahid government was not long. Wahid had to give up his presidency before the time\(^{231}\). The member of parliaments, from many parties including from the exponent of the Middle Axis, used the cases of budget mismanagement in the Institute for Logistic Supply (the Bulog) and the charity of Sultan Brunei misuse, in which Wahid was presumably involved in, as entry point to shake the position of Wahid. Even though the legal status of these cases were still in the process, almost all of the members of DPR, except PKB Faction (FPKB) and the Faction of Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa (Nation Love


\(^{229}\) Middle Axis was a political faction in the DPR and composed of the Islamic Parties, including the PPP, PAN, PBB and PK. This faction was created in response to the existence of two strong presidential candidates, Megawati Soekarno Putri (PDIP) and former President BJ Habibie (Golkar), who according to this faction, were not in favour of the Muslim’s interests, since Megawati basically represented the secular and pro-Christian groups, while Habibie represented the old regime groups. The Middle Axis then produced an alternative option by promoting Wahid as a presidential candidate from the Muslim groups. Kamarudin, Partai Politik Islam di Pentas Reformasi. Refleksi Pemilu 1999 untuk Pemilu 2004, (Jakarta: Visi Publishing, 2003), pp.124-125.

\(^{230}\) Initially, Wahid did not include amongst his priorities the prerogative right of the president in determining the composition of his cabinet, since he was not from the largest party in the parliament and thus had to share some of the cabinet positions with his coalition members as a political concession. Many prominent political figures such as Prof. Dr. M. Amien Rais (the Chairperson of PAN), Akbar Tanjung (the Chairperson of Partai Golkar), and Dr. Hamzah Haz (the Chairperson of PPP) became key figures behind the formation of the cabinet. However, after some controversial cabinet reshuffles, Wahid eventually put his close colleagues in his cabinet.

\(^{231}\) This situation appeared to happen mainly as an impact of his controversial behaviour and statements, made during the time of his presidency. His decision to make some dispensable cabinet reshuffles, by dismissing some important figures from the coalition parties, including M. Jusuf Kalla, General (ret.) Wiranto, and Haz, were two of them. This decision politically created a serious rift between himself and his former supporters in parliament. In the mean time, people in general became dissatisfied with the performance of Wahid’s Government that, according to them, was not really making a significant acceleration for establishing prosperity for the nation. His controversial comments, such as to open diplomatic relations with Israel and to dissolve the policy on the prohibition of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism or Communism, deteriorated his relations with many Islamic parties, organisations and figures who actually were his main supporters. The idea that the government would be better without Wahid subsequently spread among the people and politicians.
Democracy Party/PDKB), agreed to propose impeachment for the president, since the president failed to provide proper answer for the questions from DPR around those cases before the impeachment\textsuperscript{232}.

\begin{table} 
\centering
\caption{The 1999 Election Result} 
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|} 
\hline
\textbf{NO} & \textbf{PARTIES} & \textbf{VOTE} & \textbf{SEAT} \\
\hline
1 & PDIP & 35,689,073 & 153 \\
2 & Golkar & 23,741,749 & 120 \\
3 & PKB & 13,336,982 & 51 \\
4 & PPP & 11,329,905 & 58 \\
5 & PAN & 7,528,956 & 34 \\
6 & PBB & 2,049,708 & 13 \\
7 & PK & 1,436,565 & 7 \\
8 & PKP & 1,065,686 & 4 \\
9 & PNU & 679,179 & 5 \\
10 & PDKB & 550,846 & 5 \\
11 & Other Parties & 8,292,463 & 12 \\
\hline
\textbf{TOTAL} & 105,786,661 & 462 \\
\hline
\end{tabular} 
\end{table}

Source: www.kpu.go.id

The PKB subsequently decided to suspend FPKB in parliament as a protest and to show the disagreement to the decision of MPR towards President Wahid\textsuperscript{233}. Consequently, FPKB would not attend Sidang Istimewa Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (the Special Meeting of People's Consultative Assembly/SI MPR) which would formally impeach the president. However, the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz Jalil individually chose to attend the meeting. Jalil stated that his present was in his capacity as one of the chairpersons of the MPR. His attendance was also in order to seek alternative ways to save the face of president\textsuperscript{234}. This decision became the main reason for PKB to dismiss Jalil from his position as the general chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz. The dismissal of Jalil, which was totally rejected by him and his supporters, eventually triggered internal conflict and subsequently became one of

\textsuperscript{232} Wahid then declared the dissolution of the parliament as a response to his impeachment. This extraordinary and unimaginable decision weakened his position. Mahkamah Agung (The Supreme Court or MA) assessed and stipulated that this decision made by President Wahid was unconstitutional. Parliament then voted President Wahid out for his commitment to corruption and the violation of the constitution.

\textsuperscript{233} After the dismissal of President Wahid, the PKB annulled its decision and returned to the DPR, based on the reason to struggle for the interest of the voters.

\textsuperscript{234} The Leadership of the MPR 1999-2002 consisted of M. Amien Rais (Chairperson), Ginandjar Karta Sasmita (Vice Chairperson), Kwik Kian Gie (Vice Chairperson), Husni Thamrin (Vice Chairperson), Matori Abdul Jalil (Vice Chairperson), Jusuf Amir Faisal (Vice Chairperson), Hari Sabarno (Vice Chairperson), H.A Nazri Adlani (Vice Chairperson).
reasons behind internal fragmentation of this party, creating two offshoot parties namely PKB-Matori, which was the Matori version’s PKB that also was popularly known as PKB-Batu Tulis\textsuperscript{235}, and PKB-Gus Dur/Alwi, popularly known also as PKB-Kuningan\textsuperscript{236}.

After the dismissal of Wahid from the position of president and the dismissal of Jalil as the General Chairperson of \textit{Dewan Tanfidz}, PKB suffered prolonged internal conflict. The focus of this party had more to do with the efforts to finish the internal conflict, in the way mainly to look for the real status of each conflicting group, rather than to comprehensively develop party institutionalisation and to maintain a close and good relation to the people. In terms of public relation, the PKB relied on the charisma and the popularity of Wahid and \textit{Ulama} to gain support from NU as the biggest Islamic community in Indonesia.

The fact that PKB was still able to achieve the third position at the national level and the first place in the East Java Province at the local level in the 2004 Election indicated the continuity of \textit{ulama}'s support for PKB, particularly in the East Java Province. It also inferred that the charisma of Wahid still works for the highest proportion of the people of NU. On the other hand, this situation also indicates that the figure or personal charisma still plays an important role in NU’s communities, in terms of determining political preference. In other words, the people of NU, particularly those who votes for PKB, were not really concerned with more some rational matters such as the political track record, the implementation of one’s political program or agenda, or the level of party institutionalisation, when making political decision.

Even though PKB successfully maintained its third position in terms of the number of votes, this party lost around 2 millions votes in the 2004 elections. In the parliament, PKB got one additional seats, but its position decreased from forth to the sixth rank. In this election also, PKB for the first time gained seats in some non-Muslim areas, including Papua. This was the result from the existence of Wahid, who consistently performed his friendly and accommodative attitudes towards minority

\textsuperscript{235} Batu Tulis was the name of the street in Jakarta where the central committee of the Matoris’s version PKB took place.

\textsuperscript{236} Kuningan was the name of an area in South Jakarta where the central committee of the PKB-Gus Dur/Alwi existed.
groups, rather than because of the performance of PKB\(^{237}\). In relation to the significant improvement of the vote of PKB in Ende, East Nusa of Southeast (NTT) Province, Hermawi Taslim a political figure from NTT who also the activist of PKB said that “the Gus Dur factor is more influential than the party. People choose PKB because of Gus Dur with his commitment towards pluralism and nationalism”\(^{238}\).

In 2004, for the first time, Indonesian political system implements presidential election in which the people can directly vote for their preferred candidate. Wahid and his close colleagues regarded this new mechanism as a good opportunity to be back to power. However, in reality not all NU’s influential \textit{ulama} supported the candidacy of Wahid. According to them group, which opposed the candidacy, beside the problem of physical condition\(^{239}\), the best position that Wahid should maintain after his dismissal is not to be president but as \textit{Guru Bangsa} (the teacher of the nation) like he used to be\(^{240}\). This position would give him many chances to develop intensively the culture of democracy, for the nation. The candidacy of Wahid itself eventually failed. The rules of the game, established by \textit{Komisi Pemilihan Umum} (the Election Commission/KPU), obligated a healthy condition as one of the requirements to be a candidate of president and vice president, in which Wahid was not able to fill it. General Dr. Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono won this first presidential election. President Yudhoyono, in order to respect the existence of NU and to gain support from NU people as a return, provided two ministerial posts to PKB, namely the coordinator ministry for the prosperity of the people held by Alwi Shihab and the ministry of the development of abandoned regions held by Syaifullah Yusuf.

In the mean time, PKB did not respond the failure to maintain the number of votes and the decline of its position in DPR properly. Not long after the 2004 election, which was actually not satisfactory for PKB, the very problematic internal conflict trapped this party once again. The trigger of the conflict was the dismissal of Shihab, and Yusuf, the general chairperson of \textit{Dewan Tanfidz} and the general secretary of \textit{Dewan Tanfidz} respectively, from their positions. The formal reason used by PKB to dismiss these two leaders was the matters of dual positions held by Shihab and Yusuf. According to Wahid, PKB clearly does not allow its member to have important


\(^{238}\) \textit{Ibid}, p. 87.


\(^{240}\) \textit{Gatra}, Edisi 51, Jumat 31 Oktober 2003.
position outside the party while holding a structural position in the party. On the other hand, beside the reason of dual position was weak, according to the supporter of Shihab and Yusuf the way that used by Wahid to dismiss Shihab and Yusuf was actually unconstitutional.

The dismissal of Shihab and Yusuf triggered dispute among the member of PKB and eventually created internal conflict for the second time, involved the supporter of the PKB-Gus Dur/Muhaimin and the PKB-Alwi (which also sometimes regards itself as the PKB-Ulama or PKB-Surabaya). Different from the case of Matori versus Wahid, this time conflict was involved more elements and big groups inside PKB and NU. Some influential ulama, who used to be strong supporter of Wahid in the first internal conflict, stated their support for Shihab-Yusuf. These ulama including those who were popularly called as ulama khos (very senior Islamic scholars in Java). This was the time when the disagreement between Wahid and some influential ulama, mainly from the East Java Province, reached the highest peak and appeared to be impossible to resolve. This situation also generated conflict between PKB-Gus Dur/Muhaimin and DPW PKB of East Java. It was an irony since this DPW in reality was the biggest vote getter machinery for PKB.

As happened in the first fragmentation, in the legal context Wahid won the second conflict. Wahid then pointed Iskandar as the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of PKB replacing Shihab. The 2005 Muktamar in Semarang confirmed PKB under the leadership of Wahid and Iskandar. On the other hand, the supporter of PKB-Alwi, backed by ulama khos created a new party namely PKNU, which wished to be more Islamic and honoring the very tradition of the NU. Other exponent of PKB-Alwi’s supporter preferred to join other Islamic parties, such as PPP.

One year prior to the 2009 Election, PKB experienced the third internal conflict. This time conflict involved Iskandar and Wahid. The trigger of the conflict was the issue of disloyalty of Iskandar towards Wahid, conveyed by Wahid. In a very limited forum, Wahid suggested the elite of the party to dismiss Iskandar from his position as the general chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz. In that forum, Wahid gave the participants choices, which inferred that if they did not agree to dismiss Iskandar, he would leave the party. Even though the issue of disloyalty was not yet proven, the majority of the participants agreed to dismiss Iskandar from his position. Iskandar totally rejected the decision, which according to him was based on the fake fact and unconstitutional process. Iskandar and his supporters then held MLB in February
2008 in Ancol, Jakarta, to confirm his leadership and to dismiss some figures who were identified by his special team as actors behind party disintegration. Wahid and his loyalists on the other hand also held MLB in Parung, Bogor, West Java, to confirm the new leadership of the party, in which Ali Masykur Musa is the new General Chairperson of *Dewan Tanfidz*, and to dismiss formally Iskandar from his position. This situation resulted in the existence of twin committees, namely PKB-Gus Dur, popularly also known as PKB-Parung; and PKB-Muhaimin or the PKB-Ancol.

Different from the two previous cases, this time the PKB-Wahid lost and the government only recognised the existence of PKB-Muhaimin. With such recognition, PKB-Muhaimin had right to be one of the participants in the 2009 Election. In the 2009 Election, the votes for PKB sharply decreased from around 13 millions of vote in the 1999 Election to around four millions of vote in the 2009 Election. The seats of PKB in parliament also considerably decrease from 52 to 27 seats. This condition shows significant negative impact of prolong internal fragmentation experienced by this party.

5. **Closing Remarks**

The explanation above showed that PKB was set up to be a political representative of NU’s community. The emergence of reform era provides an opportunity for NU’s people to have their own political machinery to struggle for their political agenda and interest. During its initial years, PKB seemed to be a promising party that could bring better situation for NU’s people. However, over time, PKB could not take role as a solid party in running its main idealism. Although it was established by a community that believe in tolerance and had its own unique tradition to solve conflict, PKB appeared to be party that could not escape from severe-prolonged internal conflict. For some, the cases of internal fragmentation experienced by PKB, as a party that believes in democracy, showed a paradox. On the one hand, PKB believes in democracy and has been popularly regarded as the defender of democracy and pluralism. One of the political objectives of this party is to preserve the existence of democracy. On the other hand, in internal reality democratic principles were not properly conducted PKB. Many factors were actually involved in PKB's internal fragmentation phenomenon. The following chapters will explain the background of such phenomenon.
Chapter IV
Political Biography of PKS

1. Background

In the reform era, PKS became one of the important Islamic political parties. An Islamic dakwah (propagation) group popularly known as Jamaah Tarbiyah (education group) became the backbone of its existence. After more than 20 years of being an underground group, the democratization momentum led this movement to enter national politics in 1998 by creating a political party. Contrary to some mainstream Islamic groups such as Muhammadiyah and NU, which had existed since the beginning of 20th century, Jamaah Tarbiyah came into being almost four decades after Indonesia independence.

The exact time of the establishment of this group is still uncertain, although many scholars believe it to be in the early 1980s. This was mainly related to the arrival of new Islamic scholars from some Middle East countries, namely Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who subsequently became prominent figures behind this group’s establishment. Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Predication Council/DDII), one of influential Islamic organizations established by M. Natsir, the former leader and central figure of Masyumi, came to play a salient role by providing a link for those scholars to the universities.

---


242 Namely Islamic University of Madinah Al-Munawarrah, Saudi Arabia; University of Ibnu Saud, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; University of Al-Azhar, Egypt.

243 Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia, (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2005), pp. 58-59. See also p.124.
One of the senior figures of this movement was Abdi Sumaiti (popularly known as Abu Ridha). He was a member of the DDII who then gained the opportunity to continue his study in Egypt. After returning to Indonesia and soon becoming involved in Jamaah Tarbiyah, he became one of the movement’s main ideologues. Other key figures are Hilmi Aminuddin, graduated form University of Medina and now the chairperson of Majelis Syura (the Consultative Assembly/MS), the most important body in PKS, and the late Rahmat Abdullah, one of the founding fathers of PKS, who before he died was honoured as a “syaikh at tarbiyah”. Sumaiti, Aminuddin, and Abdullah represented the first generation of tarbiyah activists who at the very early stage played a central role in the growth of Jamaah Tarbiyah 244.

Although not all of the seniors graduated form the Middle East 245, the role of the Middle East alumnus, particularly in the development of this movement and later on the party, is influential 246. Many of Jamaah Tarbiyah's prominent figures generally developed close relationship with Ikhwan Muslimin (the Islamic Brotherhood) networking during their educational period 247 or were inspired with its teaching through the books written by prominent figures of IM, such as Hasan Al-Banna, Said Qutb or Said Hawwa248. This situation eventually influenced and differentiated Jamaah Tarbiyah's characteristics with other mainstream groups, including from DDII as their first supporting institution.

Maintaining a new understanding of Islam 249, inspired mainly by the teachings of Hasan Al-Banna 250 and dakwah method of Ikhwan Muslimin as a

245 Rahmat Abdullah for instance was alumni of Perguruan Islam Assyafiiyah (The Islamic Institute of Assyafiiyah) Jakarta. Dr. Nurmahamudi Ismail, former the general chairperson of PK graduated from University A & M Texas. Tifatul Sembiring, the second president of the party, was an alumnus of Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Manajemen Informatika dan Komputer (STIv&K) Jakarta. (the Graduate School of Computer and Information Management Science), Jakarta. Anis Matta, General Secretary of National Managing Board of PKS, graduated from Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (the Islam and Arabic Institute of Science), Jakarta.
246 Machmudi, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Wajah baru Islam Politik Indonesia, p. 67.
249 This can be seen, for example, from the statement form Hilmi Aminuddin who stated, “This group is not referring to Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama nor to other Islamic groups”. Hilmi Aminuddin, Strategi Da’wah Gerakan Islam, (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 2003), pp.153-154.
model\textsuperscript{251}, tarbiyah activists entered dakwah arena in Indonesia mainly by creating active and limited cells in the civil society domain, particularly at the universities mosques\textsuperscript{252}. In its development, Jamaah Tarbiyah gained positive response and attracted many more students. In less then a decade, the presence of this group could be felt in almost all main universities in Indonesia, particularly in Java. Jamaah Tarbiyah became one of the most successful Islamic groups in secular campuses. Slowly but sure, this group also developed in non-campus communities, particularly in the urban areas attracting mainly young Muslim who were still in the process to find their identity. This acceptance in the end labelled PKS as the young-urban-intellectual-pious people’s party. In its development, however, PKS also attracted Muslims in the rural areas, mainly in Java.

In addition to these reasons, the existence and growth of Jamaah Tarbiyah in universities was actually in accordance to the gradual dakwah doctrine adhered to by this movement, which consisting of four phase. The first development focuses on the creation of a good individual. The second phase relates to the formation of a harmonious family. The third one is the expansion to the civil society to construct a better society. The fourth development is the establishment of state or civilisation based on the spirit of Islamic values (Picture 1).

\textsuperscript{250} Hasan Al-Banna and the Ikhwan Muslimin, known since the 1950s and influenced several Islamic groups. One of the Masyumi’s members K.H Bustami Darwis was taught by the Ikhwan Muslimin in 1930s. Sabili, No.3/IX, 1 Agustus 2001.

\textsuperscript{251} Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia, p. 98.

\textsuperscript{252} University mosques became ideal places, since there were relatively safe places to conduct alternative methods of dakwah and new understanding of Islam, in the era when any non-Pancasila ideologies propagations were regarded commonly as a threat. The New Order regime, with its Islamic-phobia tendency, had a strong suspicion of several Islamic groups and sometimes stigmatised them as “right extremist”. For this reason, the regime spread its apparatus to monitor targeted Islamic figures and groups. This situation at heart restricted dakwah activities in many ways. However, the regime did not count university’s mosques as a peril that would potentially endanger its position. The regime considered such mosques as merely places for students to worship and to discuss unworldly matters. Therefore, the university’s mosques were quite sterile from the government’s apparatus control networks. Moreover, the tarbiyah group found that some inactive Islamic student activist networking, created by previous Islamic student groups, as a potential medium to grow their existence. Jamaah Tarbiyah then took over this networking, provided it with new perspectives and in the end incorporated it including many Islamic dakwah activists in the movement. This movement mainly focused its activities on some prominent public universities, such as in Salman in Institute of Bandung Technology (ITB), Arief Rahman Hakim in University of Indonesia (UI), Al-Ghfari in Institute of Bogor Agriculture (IPB), and Salahuddin in Gajah Mada University (UGM) and Manarul Ilmi in Institute of Sepuluh November Technology (ITS).
This grand design was articulated in specific activities, in which their movement in campuses was a part of the creation of a good individual. These individuals were expected to have eventually a strong commitment to *dakwah* and become *dakwah* activists who ready to create an Islamic society. Latter on, in the beginning of 1990s, related to the second phase, *Jamaah Tarbiyah* started to establish its existence in society, particularly through the establishment of many social, economical, communications and educational institutions²⁵³.

In the late of 1990s, this movement considered entering a new phase of *dakwah* development by joining political world as a response to the current development in Indonesian politics²⁵⁴. The fall of the Soeharto Regime caused by economic and political system decay was regarded by this movement as the end of “Mecca period” where *dakwah* should be conducted silently and replaced by the

²⁵³ Some activists, particularly those of the first generation, then founded institutions such as magazines (*Sabili, Saksi, Ummi and Anida*), publishers (*Gema Insani Press, Era Intermedia, Robbani Press, Al-Kautsar, Tarbiyatuna and Assyamil*), study groups, (*Nurul Fikri and Studi dan Informasi Dunia Islam Kontemporer*), Islamic foundations for Islamic studies and boarding schools (*Yayasan Haramain and Al-Hikmah*).

²⁵⁴ The first direct political experience for the *tarbiyah* movement in the national political arena was in 1998 through Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (KAMMI). This organization was set up in the last months of the New Order, with main objective was to struggle for the interests of the people, which meant to replace Soeharto and bring about reform. Together with other reform elements, KAMMI eventually succeeded in bringing down President Soeharto from his power. On KAMMI and its activities, see Andi Rahmat and Mukhamad Najib, *Gerakan Perlawanan dari Masjid Kampus*, (Solo: Purimedia, 2001).
democracy era that brought a more conducive situation for *dakwah*. Most *tarbiyah* activist considered this situation as an opportunity to extend their movement, by emerging into public and spreading *dakwah* more openly to all Muslims.

This opinion triggered dispute, since for some activists the time has not yet arrived. They believed that the late of 1990s was not a perfect time for the *tarbiyah* to enter the political world. For this reason, they suggested to wait until all the elements of *tarbiyah* were ready to enter the political domain. Thus, the main issue was whether they had to accelerate *dakwah* development or not. Internal polling to observe the enthusiasm of *tarbiyah* activists to enter a new *dakwah* phase solved this polemic. The result of the polling showed that the majority of cadres agreed to the acceleration and were ready to appear into political sphere through the party establishment. This choice showed the very characteristic of this movement as an Islamic group with a strong political consciousness. On the other hand, it also illustrated a moderate characteristic reflected by the willingness to join “non-syari’ah-based political system”, which differentiates it form the “radical” camps, such as *Hizbut Tahrir of Indonesia* (HTI) or *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (the Indonesia Mujahidin Assembly/MMI) which tend to refute the existing political system let alone entering it.

Based on this conclusion, *tarbiyah* movement established a party, named *Partai Keadilan* (the Justice Party/PK), on 9th August 1998. The announcement of the

---

255 For this group, *tarbiyah* activists should be consistent with the previous programme, which stated that the next level would begin in the year 2010. This group also believed that internally the *tarbiyah* was not ready to struggle at the level of real politics, particularly due to a lack of human resources, political networking and financial capacity. This situation inevitably triggered internal arguments. Hidayat Nur Wahid, Anis Matta, Ihsan Tanjung were actually part of those who disagreed. On the other hand, Rahmat Abdullah was an advisor for the party establishment. Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, the Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005), the Chairperson of BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010; with Akmal Burhanuddin, 20 November 2005; interview with Kamarudin, 20 November 2005.

256 Of 6,000 questioners distributed by the seniors to the cadres, 5,800 questioners were returned and about 68% stated to agree to the party establishment and the rest preferred to establish non-governmental organization. Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia*, p. 229.

PK held in Al-Azhar Mosque, Jakarta and witnessed by some 50,000 people; most of them were *Tarbiyah* activists.\(^{258}\) This was a moment when all key figures of this movement appeared in a public sphere for the first time. PK was idealised to be a *dakwah* party, using the political arena as a medium for *dakwah* to give a greater Islamic impact on society and the government. Mutammimul Ula, one of the PK’s founding fathers, described this eagerness by stating that this party would use the parliament as “a podium for preaching”.\(^{259}\) Accordingly, the member of Jamaah *Tarbiyah* considered this party not only as power machinery to hold prestigious political positions and to be involved in the policy making process, but also as a tool for the moral development through *dakwah*.

This establishment signified the arrival of a new political stream in Islamic political thought, in particular, and in the Indonesian political system. In relation to the Islamic world, this also suggests the influence of new political thought from Middle East, particularly from Egypt. This situation proved the importance of the Islamic groups’ global network, particularly from the Middle East countries, which for decades has been a central source for Islamic movement in Indonesia. Yusuf Qardhawi, one of the international figures of Jamaah *Tarbiyah*, commented on the implementation of *dakwah* method of the IM in PK as being an effort of the latter to imitate the former, which in the end makes these organisations seem to be like twins.\(^{260}\) After five years of existence, due to new election regulation that disqualified it from joining the next election, in 2003 PK formally declared itself a part of PKS. As a new party for *tarbiyah* activists, PKS, which was declared on 20\(^{th}\) April 2003, was set up to be the continuation of PK with all vision and objectives.\(^{261}\)

### 2. The Foundation of Ideology and Political Orientations

The fundamental doctrine of PKS is basically a combination between totalism or perfection (*syumuliatul Islam*) and gradualism or moderatism. In relation to the

---

\(^{258}\) *Republika*, 10 August 1998. The thousands participants of this declaration wore mainly white dress for man and long white veil for all woman participants and even brought their children, which impressed many people at that time.


doctrine of perfection, this party believes Islam covers all aspects of human life. Islam is regarded as “a perfect life system, a comprehensive package-deal which will reconstruct the entire aspects of life of the Muslim community wherever they are”. It is stated that.

Islam is a universal system of living that entails all aspects of life. Islam is a state and homeland, government and community, moral and power, blessing and justice, culture and constitutions, science and judiciary, material and natural resources, efforts and prosperity, *jihad* and *dakwah*, soldiers and thoughts, beliefs and acts of devotion. Muslims have an obligation to implement such cores of Islamic teachings comprehensively together with their universality. Islam is a system of life that covers religion, politics state, and society.

Accordingly, the *syumuliah* doctrine regards Islam as the way of life and solution for civilisation; as a religion for all humankind, which is relevant to societal matters; and as a religion is concerned with profane and sacred matters. Consequently, every Muslim is obliged to the only source of values for their life. Al-Qur’an and Hadith then regarded both these comprehensive teachings, which according to Al-Jufri, “not only consists of “*peta dunia* (the map of the world)”, which secures humans from the cunning tricks of worldly life, but also “the map of eternity” which saves humans from torture in the hereafter”.

Hence, PKS does not believe in the secular doctrine that dichotomises state or politics and religion. For PKS, the political world is a medium to serve all


266 Salim Segaf Al-Jufri, “Pengantar”, *ibid*, p.15.
humankind as part of the implementation of Islamic teachings\(^\text{267}\). Muslims actually have an obligation to set up a political structure or civilisation based on Islamic values to renovate the thinking and personality of Muslims in order to transform every aspects of life based on the desires of God.\(^\text{268}\) In addition, this obligation is related to the need for a supporting system that could protect Muslims in conducting their duties perfectly. According to Ridha, only through an Islamic system every Muslim could properly conduct his deeds based on the God’s will\(^\text{269}\). Furthermore, this establishment would provide opportunity for Muslim to prove Islamic civilisation as useful for humankind. The life of the prophet Muhammad during its era in Seventh Century was a precedent that demonstrated such situation. The legacy of the life of the prophet, namely The Medina State, also proved the perfection of Islam at the practical level\(^\text{270}\) and has become guidance for the next Islamic generations to establish a civilisation. To sum up, the creation of an Islamic civilisation as a reflection and consequence of Islamic values is one of the ultimate objectives believed by PKS.

However, PKS also holds a gradualism perspective. This standpoint becomes a foundation for their moderate thought and attitudes, in striving for their objectives and commitments. *Syirah Nabawiyah* (the history of the prophet), which indicates the implementation of gradualism in creating a civilisation -- started from his family, best friends, to the closet communities, until the Medina State establishment – inspires this perspective\(^\text{271}\). PKS believes that the accomplishment of the prophet in erecting an Islamic civilisation was the result of the gradual method that upheld the evolutionary attempts from their simplest stage, namely individual to the more complex stage that is, the state. This party actually believes that: “every effort that is dedicated to separate political achievements from this principle (the gradual


mechanism) will break down and even could be categorised as a crime against humanity and the universe.\textsuperscript{272}

This bottom up and gradual strategy is implemented through a concept called as \textit{marhalah} (the phase). \textit{Marhalah} consists of four stages namely \textit{mihwar tanzhimi} (individual stage), \textit{mihwar syabyi} (society stage), \textit{mihwar mu’assasi} (entering political institutions stage) and \textit{mihwar daulah} (state or civilisation stage). The accomplishment of one stage becomes a sign to start the next stage. To Matta, in terms of political life, this concept is related to the development of a tenacious group, creating supportive elements in society, up to creating Islamic groups at the policy making level.\textsuperscript{273} The final objective of this “islamisation” is the establishment of a state or civilisation based on the spirit of Islamic law. The creation of the state (\textit{khilafah}), however, does not stop this process. This is because the main function of the state is to maintain the devoutness of the entire people. PKS believes that an ideal Islamic order should set up a political structure which is not only capable of managing public matters properly, but also capable comprehensively of enforcing devotion at the individual level.\textsuperscript{274}

The core of \textit{dakwah} is another reason for conducting a moderate attitude. To PKS, a \textit{dakwah} should be in line with the spirit of the epoch. It means that it has to be relevant and in accordance with the need of the people. In relation to this, Aminuddin stated that a good \textit{dakwah} requires an understandable language for the people and has to avoid exclusiveness, since flexibility and tolerance are part of its important spirit.\textsuperscript{275} Hence, the implementation of \textit{dakwah} cannot be in contradiction to the real situation, it should rely on the context and avoid exclusive approaches. This point of view legalises the party to develop an adaptable political strategy without necessarily sacrificing its idealism. This principle eventually becomes a foundation for PKS to put into practice peaceful and constitutional ways and to reject revolutionary and radical approaches.

Moreover, PKS implements the doctrine of “\textit{tsawabit wa mutghayyirat}” as another source of moderatism. This doctrine explains two aspects of Islamic

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{272} “Kebijakan Dasar PK“, in \textit{Buku Anggaran Dasar Partai Keadilan}, (Depok: Dewan Pimpinan Daerah Partai Keadilan Kota Depok), pp. 41-42.
\item \textsuperscript{273} Ridha, \textit{Negara dan Cita-Cita Politik}, p. 9-11.
\item \textsuperscript{274} Balda, Ridho and Wahono, \textit{Politik Da’wah Partai Keadilan}, p.19.
\item \textsuperscript{275} Aminuddin, \textit{Strategi Da’wah Gerakan Islam}, pp. 62.
\end{itemize}
teachings, namely tsawabit (the fundamental aspects) and mutghayyirat (the dynamic aspects). Tsawabit relates to the problems that have been clearly stated and arranged in Al-Quran and Hadith. Human interpretations are considered as irrelevant to this matter. This aspect relates actually to fix laws, which for this reason become absolute and eternal. On the other hand, mutghayyirat is related to the issues that are not comprehensively explained in Al-Quran and Hadith. This is theoretically known as furu’ (the branch matters). In such situation, PKS believes that every Muslim is allowed to develop a contextual approach in conducting his religion as a response to mutghayyirat matters including political activities. To PKS “there are matters in politics that should be adjusted to contemporary time and places in order to provide improvement for humankind”. Therefore, it is possible for PKS to adopt any political point of views as far as they do not contradict with the very foundation of Islamic teachings. This point of view provides this party with flexibility to accept modern political concepts, including using democracy as a mechanism to reach political goals.

The PKS thought model has attracted many attempts to obtain a scholarly comprehension. Some scholars regard PKS as a representation of the hard line groups and define it as “fundamentalist”, “islamist” or even “radical Islam”, more dangerous than the suspected terrorist group jamaah islamiyah. Other scholars concluded that PKS is a part of modernism movement and placed it at the same level with some Islamic parties with a modernist tendency, namely PPP and PBB. However, the mixture between a totalism and moderate attitude, which to some is understood as a combination between “radical” elements and “peaceful” ways, also became a focal point for other observers to understand the ideological background of this party. In this regard, some observers came up with other terms such as “a

---

276 Balda, Ridho and Wahono, Politik Da‘wah Partai Keadilan, p.75.
277 Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia, p.246.
279 Sadanand Dhume, “Indonesian Democracy’s Enemy Within, Radical Islamic party threatens Indonesia with ballots more than bullets”, YaleGlobal, 1 December 2005.

102
moderate alternative to radical Islamism281, moderate fundamentalism282 or “Islamist-Reformist”283. This situation indicates the complexity of PKS’ political ideology. Nevertheless, those criteria generally suggest the “right” or fundamentalist tendency of this party in terms of ideology that differentiates PKS to most other Indonesian Islamic parties.

This apart, the above foundations of thought have influenced the political orientation and behaviour of PKS ever since. The strong belief in the comprehensive role of Islam encourages the cadres to uphold a commitment to the creation of a good individual, high-quality society up to an Islamic civilisation. As a result, the cadres are driven by the similar devotion and see themselves as a tool of struggle for their commitment. For this commitment, also they sometimes call themselves guru bagi alam semesta (the teacher for the universe)284 that would bring people to such idealism. This commitment unites the cadres and at the same time preserves the sense of togetherness among them.

The belief that the perfection of Islam provides another implication, namely the notion that Islam is the solution for humanity. PKS believes that since Islam is relevant to all dimensions of humankind, it inherently has answers for all problems faced by the people285. In the end, this orientation becomes the rationale for the party to take part in non-political activities, such as humanitarian and social activities, in order to solve the practical problems of the people. At the very practical level, for instance, the existence of PKS cadres to help the victims in many disastrous areas is just one of them.

Regarding its belief in gradualism, the PKS examines the readiness of society for accepting an Islamic structure as this readiness is a major prerequisite before the creation of an Islamic state. Thus, as far as the “readiness” is still nonexistence, as

283 Rahmat, Ideologi Politik PKS. Dari Masjid Kampus ke Gedung Parlemen.
285 The spirit of Islam as a solution is also related to the belief that Islam improves all dimensions of life, from matters of state ideology, politics, law, economics, even through to the banking sector. Jufri, “Pengantar”, pp.18-22.
what happens in Indonesia today, the Muslims cannot force the implementation of Islamic law let alone the establishment of an Islamic civilisation. Accordingly, the main duty of the Muslim today is to ensure that the spirit of Islam grows in society and to help other Muslims and all humankind, to understand the advantage of Islamic teachings\textsuperscript{286}. PKS acknowledges Indonesia as a product of socio-historical reality, including many traditions, beliefs and hundreds of ethnic groups inside\textsuperscript{287}. According to PKS, the more important thing is to build a better political system, whatever the name, for all humankind, which is entirely fulfilled by the spirit of pluralism, democracy, and the rule of law\textsuperscript{288}; and more importantly, the implementation of Islam law for the Muslims, in which the \textit{Tauhid} becomes the foundation of their life\textsuperscript{289}. In recent years, the PKS used the term \textit{Masyarakat Madani} (the civil society) to describe such condition\textsuperscript{290}.

Indeed, this requirement featured adaptive approaches reflected by the acknowledgment of the existence of Indonesia’s nationalism, democracy, and \textit{Pancasila} as the foundation of the state. This attitude was institutionalised in the statutes and rules of association and the platform of the party.\textsuperscript{291} However, it does mean that PKS regards those values in a similar way to the secular camps. As a party that believes in the creation of Islamic civilisation, which, in the end, has a meaning the implementation of Islamic \textit{Syari'ah} in every aspects of human life, PKS actually sees all these values as just provisional ones at one particular stage of all the phase for total Islamisation\textsuperscript{292}.

The next orientation relates to the commitment to conduct a systematic and gradual formation of the cadres or \textit{kaderisasi} (the cadrerization). This process is

\textsuperscript{289} \textit{Ibid}, p.34.
\textsuperscript{290} \textit{Ibid}, p.72.
dedicated to the formation of zealous individuals who are ready to implement PKS' *dakwah* method. In order to implement this, PKS institutionalised cadrerization into the statutes of the party, by stating, for instance, that this process as one of the main duties of the Managing Board at every level of leadership. This party, through the Department of Cadrerization, also formally published their material used for cadrerization, in which materials used in *Jamaah Tarbiyah* became the main reference. Cadrerization eventually provided an important contribution to preserve the sense of togetherness, which horizontally is related to brotherhood spirit, mutual trust and the belief in their supreme goal. This situation, as will be explained in Chapter X, serves a crucial role in strengthening the ability of the party to maintain party cohesion and to avoid prolonged internal conflict.

3. **Organisational Structure**

In the PKS’ organisational structure, MS became the most important element. Before 2003, after the National Congress MS was the second important element in PKS. However, since the National Congress only met once a year, it was difficult to have an immediate response if the party still relied on this element. Moreover, the party eventually concluded that the congress should be a medium or forum in decision-making process and not as part of the party structure. MS holds position as *Ahlul Halii wal-Aqdi* of the party, which gives this body the supreme position. The members of this party consist of experts selected by *kader inti* (the main cadres), the most qualified members who possess the highest rank of cadres, through *pemilihan raya* (the election) for five year term. The existence of this body essentially reflects two important interests, namely to keep the party for being always proportional to the spirit of Islamic teachings and the aspiration of the members.

The main duty of this body is to make fundamental decisions for the party. This includes giving political directions to the party over the next five-year period, providing responses to actual and important cases, and determining figures that would hold important positions in high bodies of the party. These bodies are *Majelis*

---


294 The biggest proportion of the books used in this process are written by the prominent figures of IM or at least contain their ideals, see in Tim Departemen Kaderisasi PK-Sejahtera, *Manajemen Tarbiyah Anggota Pemula*, (Jakarta: DPP PKS Departemen Kaderisasi and PT Syaamil Cipta Media, 2005).

295 *The ART of PK Article 18; The 2002 AD of PKS Article 10 and 12; The 2005 AD of PKS Article 11*. 

105
Pertimbangan Pusat (the Central Advisory Assembly/MPP), DPP, and Dewan Syariah Pusat (the Central Islamic Law Council/DSP). MS has also a role to determine the candidates for presidential election and to confirm party’s political stance on cases related to the national government situation. Moreover, because its basic function as a consultative body with a high spirit of equality, in some cases, which will be explained in the next chapters, MS also acts as a medium for conflict resolution. These duties provide an executive role for MS, which actually makes MS become more than a legislative body.

Musyawarah Majelis Syura (The Conference of the Consultative Assembly/MMS) becomes the most important forum as it stipulates the very basic policies. This forum has must be held twice a year. Every member of PKS has to obey and to implement any policies produced by this forum. The second important forum is the National Conference of MS. This forum is held as a response to the current political development and involves elements outside MS. This meeting is held once in every five years to promulgate the statutes of the party, the policy direction of the party, the strategic plan of the party and to asses other important policies at the national level.

To date, MS has been chaired by two prominent figures of tarbiyah movement, namely Salim Segaf Al-Jufri and Aminuddin. Both are part of the first generation of the Jamaah Tarbiyah, popularly acknowledged as murrabbi (the teacher) for most of senior cadres in Jamaah Tarbiyah and PKS. To some extent, this situation reflects the continuation of Jamaah Tarbiyah in PKS. The position of both figures also indicates the important role of senior figures, particularly the teachers of the seniors, in the decision-making process in PKS. It shows the real chain of command inside the party where seniority and the quality of religious commitment become the legitimating values to hold the top positions in the party.

However, at the practical level, this situation does not necessarily endorse an authoritarian mechanism. The fact that the candidate of the chairperson and the majority of the members of this body elected democratically by the members (the last

296 At the very early stage, because of its strategic position, this forum held the highest body in the PKS’ organizational structure. However, eventually, partly because of the need to hold consistency, this forum becomes merely part of decision-making mechanism. Zainal Abidin Amir, Peta Islam Politik Pasca Soeharto, (Jakarta: LP3ES 2003), pp 94-96.

election involved around 30,000 participants), has relatively provided a very large opportunity for the establishment of a popular institution. Moreover, the existence of more than fifty people, which encourages more plural opinions, relatively reduces the possibility of one-man show or authoritarian leadership in this body. In addition, this party also provides a systematic mechanism to dismiss the general chairperson and the member of MS, which indicates the existence of internal control towards this body.

As a working committee of MS, the party forms Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat Pusat (the National Board of Directors/DPTP) chaired by the Chairperson of MS\(^{298}\). This institution has five members: the chairperson of MPP, the chairperson of DSP, the President of DPP, the general secretary of DPP, and the treasure of DPP. The main tasks of DPTP are implementing MS’ policies, recommending figures that will act as party’s representative at national institutions and very important occasions, providing recommendation to DPP on the dismissal of the managing board at the regional level, and assessing the performance of MPP, DSP and DPP. With all these responsibilities, this body holds a strategic position in the party, including as an influential group, particularly prior to decision-making process in MS. However, since this body is responsible to MS, DPTP actually cannot make any unilateral policies and actions without MS’ approval.

Another important institution is MPP\(^{299}\). The important duty of this body is to ensure that any policies produced by DPP and DSP are in line with MS’ decision and policies provided at the National Conference. Thus, the main objective of this body is to supervise and to give advice to any policy drafts drawn up by DPP and DSP. MPP also has duty to socialise pedoman partai (the guidance of the party) to all the members, in order to avoid disputes in understanding the statues of the party and other fundamental guidance. However, the existence of this body is important for avoiding personal or exclusive interpretations on the rules of the game of the party. MPP is responsible to MS and has five-year term to conduct its duties.

\(^{298}\) The 2005 AD of PKS Article 12.

\(^{299}\) The AD of PK Article 13 and 14; The ART of PK Article 20 and 21; The 2002 AD of PKS Article 13; The 2002 ART of PKS Article 8 and 9; The 2005 AD of PKS Article 13; The 2005 ART of PKS Article 15 and 16.
With regard to DSP\textsuperscript{300}, this body’s main functions are to provide \textit{fatwa} (the legal decision based on Islamic law) for all party policies. With this task, DSP becomes a reference by which all the members to identify the legal status of certain matters or cases before making a judgment or policies. All members of the party have to obey any decisions made by this body. DSP is set up as independent body in order to avoid any attempts of intervention from any elements and to ensure objectivity in the decision-making process. Besides that main function, according to the ART, DSP should also act as arbitrary institution that gives a final judgement on the legal status of a member in the party\textsuperscript{301}. Hence, this body is responsible for any matters related to the provisional dismissal or discharge of the members, where the accused members defend their position through this body. As it explained in the next chapter, this body plays a salient role and in particular, that related to the cases of dismissal and conflict resolution.

The fifth important body in PKS is DPP. The importance of this body is its position as the executive body that implements all policies made by MS. Even though the chairperson of this body is called the President of the Party, DPP is not the highest body in the party. In fact, according to the statues and rules of association of the party, DPP should submit a report to MS every six months as a part of control mechanism of this body. To date, compare to other parties, this strict mechanism relevant to DPP can only be found in PKS. The statutes of the party also mention that to hold systematic cadrerization and to implement the method of \textit{tarbiyah} are part of DPP’s main duties\textsuperscript{302}. For this reason, DPP supervises the Department of Cadrerization that holds a specific duty as a coordinator of cadrerization\textsuperscript{303}. Each Managing Board at every committee level has the obligation to carry out cadrerization.

DPP also has duty to set up Managing Board at the provincial and regency levels and for certain reasons it has the right to suspend these boards. This body

\textsuperscript{300} The AD of PK Article 19 and 20; The ART of PK Article 24,25,26,27 and 28; The 2002 AD of PKS Article 14, 15 and 16; The 2002 ART of PKS Article 10, 11,12 and 13; The 2005 AD of PKS Article 15; The 2005 ART of PKS Article 23, 24, 25 and 26.

\textsuperscript{301} The ART of PK Article 27 (3);The 2002 ART of PKS Article 12 (3); The 2005 ART of PKS Article 23 (2.c), Article 23 (2.f), Article 50.d.

\textsuperscript{302} The ART of PK Article 22 (15); The 2002 ART of PKS Article 17 (3); The 2005 AD of PKS Article 22 (c).

\textsuperscript{303} However, since every member of PKS also has an obligation to perform the method of \textit{tarbiyah} and to take actively part in the cadrerization, the Department of Cadrerization eventually tends to become a supervisor body.
also has the authority to make recommendations for dismissal as a reprimand for any member who has committed a major violation. Yet this process is not easy to conduct, since according to the statutes of the party, every member of the party has a legal right to be protected and to appeal against her or his dismissal. However, as described in the next chapters, some important cadres in the party actually have been discharged for their violations. It shows that the party is actually keen to hold a fair party discipline.

Regarding the local committees, they have a different organisational structure to the national committee. The committees of the party at the province (Dewan Pengurus Wilayah/DPW) and regency level (Dewan Pengurus Daerah/DPD) have only three bodies namely MPP, DSP and Managing Board. As for the committees at the sub-district level (Dewan Pengurus Cabang/DPC) and at the village, level (Dewan Pengurus Ranting/DPR) only has Managing Board. Each body at every level of committee has to report its responsibility to the same body at the higher level. This makes MPP, DSP and DP at the national level actually turns to be a centre of responsibility. However, each body at the same level develops a collegial relations and works under the spirit of equality, as according to the statutes of the party, they possess an equal position. Each level of committee is eligible to conduct conferences, which would become a reference for it.

4. Political Activities

Less than one year after its establishment, PKS joined the first election in the reform era. In the 1999 Election, PKS gained around 1.4 million votes, which made the party the fifth largest Islamic party in Indonesia. PKS subsequently became part of Fraksi Reformasi (the Reform Faction), together with PAN, which was chaired by the prominent figure of gerakan reformasi (the reform movement) Prof. Dr. M. Amien

---

304 PKS initially rejected the offer from minor parties, namely Partai Kebangkitan Ulama (the Ulama Awakening Party or PNU), Partai Kebangkitan Ummat (the Ummat Awakening Party or PKU), Partai Politik Islam Masyumi (the Indonesian Islamic Political Party Masyumi or PPII-Masyumi), Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Union Party or PSII), Partai Daulat Rakyat (the People Sovereign Party or PDR) to create a sort of Muslim Faction in the parliament. Even though the possibility to gain the chairperson position in such faction is considerably open, for the reason mentioned PKS preferred to join Reform Faction. These Islamic parties later on created their own faction namely Fraksi Daulah Ummat (Faction of Ummat Sovereignty). Noor, Moderate Islamic Fundamentalism in Indonesia: A Study of Political Thinking and Behaviour of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), 1998-2005, p. 96.
Rais. The decision to join PAN indicated the commitment of PKS to struggle for reform agendas, together with Rais.

In the President Wahid Cabinet, the first government in the Reform Era, the President of the party, Dr. Nur Mahmudi Ismail, held the position as the Minister of Forestry and Agriculture. This position was an important symbol for Jamaah Tarbiyah, which indicated the first success to be a part of the national political system after long time of having merely existed as an underground movement. Moreover, through the performance of Ismail that showed the eagerness to manage professionally the organization and to reduce corruption in one of the most corrupted departments, it also demonstrated an ability of Jamaah Tarbiyah to provide a positive contribution to the national government. However, Ismail happened to be one of ministers dismissed by President Wahid in the first reshuffle in 2001. He was replaced by Marzuki Usman, one of the president’s close friends, who tended to be a more moderate and cooperative figure.

However, the political behaviour of Ismail raised PKS’ image of an anti-corruption party. In relation to the anti-corruption movement, this party has become one of anti-corruption bastions in Indonesia. During the first years of reform, for instance, this party has saved the money belonging to government for an amount around Rp. 739.6 Millions\(^{305}\), from misused, bribery, and gratification. Later on, this image became identified with this party. Due to such commitment, Ricklefs, for instance, describes PKS as “the hope for the Indonesian people for an end to corruption and for greater competence and morality in government”.\(^{306}\) After the dismissal of President Wahid, the party focused its activities on internal improvement and kindly rejected joining President Megawati government.

In addition to these political achievements, in the first five years of the Reform Era, PKS appeared to be a non-exclusive Islamic party indicated by the eagerness to build strategic relationships with other national elements, including some important secular and Christian political groups. The willingness to create a coalition with Partai Damai Sejahtera (the Prosperous Peace Party/PDS), one of prominent Christian parties, during the first decade of the Reform Era, to win a local election in Papua,

\(^{305}\) *Bisnis Indonesia*, 29 April 2004.

one of the most Christian populated regions in Indonesia, for instance, was one case that illustrated this situation. In doing so, PKS believed that building strategic relations, which is considered as a part of *musyarakah* (the political participation) with other political groups in order to protect the interest of the Muslim\(^{307}\) and to prove Islam as a solution\(^{308}\), is not only allowed in Islam, but also actually become part of the jihad.\(^{309}\) This interpretation of jihad gave room for PKS to perform confidently moderate approaches in implementing political strategy.

During that time, PKS also demonstrated a commitment to take care of the humanitarian problems, for instance by independently taking the initiative to collect funds for the victims of disasters and sending the cadres to those areas. This commitment was also demonstrated by the establishment *pos kepedulian* (care centres) and social activities to help needy people in many areas\(^{310}\). In the global context, this party consistently performed demonstrations to show solidarity and concern towards the Muslims in the world particularly in conflicted areas such as Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan, which was then followed by fund rising to be donated to the people in these states. This social and humanitarian concern suggests that PKS did not limit its existence to the power game only nor did it merely acted as political machine\(^{311}\). Ideologically, these activities were in line with the doctrine of *syumuliatul* Islam, which regards Islam as a solution for humankind. Thus, it also related to the efforts to prove their existence as problem solver for social and humanitarian problems.

In the 2004 Election, with those positive images behind it and reflected by the slogan “Clean and Caring” as the main theme of its campaign, PKS was able to increase its number of votes seven times with a gain 8.3 millions of vote. This result was equal to 45 seats and made this party the sixth largest party of the 18 parties existing in DPR. This significant, political achievement subsequently followed by another success when Dr. Hidayat Nur Wahid, the second president of the party,  

\(^{307}\) Balda, Ridho and Wahono, *Politik Da’wah Partai Keadilan*, pp. 135-144.  
\(^{308}\) According to Hidayat Nur Wahid, jihad consists of the attitude of *muwajaha* (fighting against) as well as *musyarakah* (being involved with) in order to fight for Islamic ideals. See “Meneguhkan Trilogi Perjuangan”, *Saksi*, No.14/VI/12 May 2004.  
\(^{309}\) *ibid.*  
became the General Chairperson of MPR, which was at that time, one of the most prestigious positions in the Indonesia political system. Concerning the Presidential Election, PKS established a coalition. It joined forces with PD, the debutant party claiming to be advisor of nationalist-religious ideology, together with PBB, which was a modernist Islamic party known as the continuation of Masyumi, and Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia (Indonesia United and Justice Party/PKPI), a nationalist secular party formed by fraction group of Golkar Party during the second round of the election. This coalition nominated the Retired General Dr. Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Muhammad Jusuf Kala, former successful businessman who was also a Golkar Party cadre, for President and Vice-President. Yudhoyono won the election by a significant margin.

However, the 2004 Presidential Election indicated a new development in this party. It was for the first time an internal dispute emerged to the surface. This related to the presidential candidate nomination prior to the first round of the election. There were two camps with different options responding at this moment. One camp supported Rais, the former chairperson of Muhammadiyah. The main reason to nominate Rais, former and the “informal leader” of the reform movement in 1998, was his commitment to political reform, particularly to the establishment of a clean government, and the interest of Islamic communities. Another camp, however, preferred the Retired General Wiranto, former Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces during the Soeharto era who was nominated in that election by Golkar Party. The reasons behind this preference were in connection with the interest to establish a strong and effective government, by regarding Wiranto as the former top figure in the Armed Forces who had the ability to conduct this interest.

The existence of these two camps raised speculation on the internal fragmentation, considering the fact that both camps had their own rationales, which seemed difficult to resolve, and had conducted significant efforts to build strategic connections and political deals with each candidate. Although both camps actually based their choice on the interests of Islamic communities, the interpretation that described this quarrel as a dispute between “idealist camp” that supported Rais and “pragmatist camp” that preferred Wiranto cannot be neglected. However, after the MS democratically decided to vote for Rais, which will be discussed in the following chapters, the dispute among cadres was generally over. PKS then formally declared its support for Rais. In the first election, Rais, far from many predictions, finished in the fourth position.
In the second round of election, PKS became more solid and decided to vote for Yudhoyono. This choice did not raise any disputes. Yudhoyono was willing to sign *kontrak politik* (the political contract) between him and PKS, consisting of reform agendas such as to establish democratic and have a clean government. Moreover, Yudhoyono, who regarded himself and his party as the representative of the “nationalist-religious” standpoint, was more acceptable rather than former President Megawati Soekarno Putri who ideologically represented secular nationalism camp. PKS then gained three ministerial posts in the Yudhoyono Government\(^\text{312}\). Although PKS tried to be an objective partner and sometimes even criticised the Yudhoyono Government, PKS in general became one of important allies of this government and continued to be loyal until the end of its term. This term also witnessed the failure and the success of PKS’ efforts in local politics. Several cadres, for the first time, won local elections and in some areas held position as governors and regents or majors.

In the 2009 Election, PKS gained 8.2 millions of votes and became the fourth largest party in parliament, after three non-Islamic parties (see the Table 7). Prior to the 2009 Presidential Election, PKS together with PD, the winner of the 2009 election, and other Islamic parties, namely PAN, PPP and PKB, established a coalition, which nominated Yudhoyono and Prof. Dr. Boediono, former Governor of Bank of Indonesia (Indonesia’s central bank) popularly known as to have a pro-liberal economic approach. Yudhoyono then won the election for the second time. President Yudhoyono then awarded the PKS four ministerial posts in his cabinet\(^\text{313}\). This achievement indicates a continuation of the role of PKS in the national government.

PKS, particularly after the 2004 Election, tried to become an open party to confirm its commitment towards pluralism. This was regarded as a contextual *dakwah*. In 2008, PKS celebrated the 100 years of Indonesian nationalism. This celebration actually was also to commemorate the birth of *Boedi Oetomo*, (the High Endeavour/BO), established in Jakarta on 20 May 1908, a Javanese-Aristocrat group, which for decades was nationally acknowledged as the first organisation that struggled for and spread the sense of nationalism.

\(^{312}\) Namely the Ministry of Agriculture (Dr. Anton Apriantono), the Ministry of Housing (M. Yusuf Ansyari) and the State Ministry of Youth and Sport (Dr. Adyaksa Dault).

\(^{313}\) Namely the Ministry of Agriculture (Suswono), Ministry of Social Affairs (Salim Segaf Al-Jufri), Ministry of Research and Technology (Suharna Surapranata), and Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (Tifatul Sembiring).
To some, the involvement of PKS in such celebration was extraordinary. It meant that PKS not only acknowledged and celebrated nationalism itself, something that was not really welcomed by right wings Islamic groups, but also acknowledged the role of BO as an organisation actually having a tendency to be anti-Islamic and historically did not really have clear function in developing the sense of nationalism. For instance, this organization’s statutes mentioned that its existence was to struggle for only the interests of the Javanese and Maduranese people and not for all Indonesians. Based on these reasons, accordingly, PKS’ stance on such a celebration triggered negative responses from the people, mainly from fundamentalist wing of Islamic activists and some objective historians.

### Table 7
The Comparison of Results the 2004 Election and the 2009 Election (Big Ten of Parties)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>The 2004 Election</th>
<th>The 2009 Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PG</td>
<td>24,480,757</td>
<td>21,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDIP</td>
<td>21,026,629</td>
<td>18,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>11,989,564</td>
<td>10,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>9,248,764</td>
<td>8,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>8,455,225</td>
<td>7,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>8,325,020</td>
<td>7,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>7,303,324</td>
<td>6,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>2,970,487</td>
<td>2,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBR</td>
<td>2,764,998</td>
<td>2,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>2,414,254</td>
<td>2,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>8,021,758</td>
<td>7,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>113,462,414</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Indonesia Election Commission

Furthermore, during the 2008 National Conference held in Bali, this party opened the discourses to become open party. It meant to be more welcome to the non-Islamic elements for them to be involved and to participate in the activities of the party. To some, PKS has reached and properly maintained the image as clean

---

314 It was stated in the Statutes of BO Chapter 2, using Dutch and not Bahasa Indonesia, that de harmonische ontwikkeling van land en volk van Java en Madura (to advance the motherland and the nation of Java and Madura harmonically). By acknowledging BO, PKS on the other hand denied the role of Sarekat Islam, an Islamic organization that struggle for the interest of all pribumi (indigenous people) since the very beginning of its existence.

315 See R.B. Suryama M. Sastra, “Mukernas PKS 2008”, in images.suryama.multiply.com
and caring party. It is now time to prove this party as friendly political institution that can be used by all Indonesian people and in turns accelerate PKS’ integration with other national elements. However, after facing internal dispute, as a reflection of the un-readiness of the majority of tarbiyah activists to implement such political option, eventually this discourse was not formally declared. However, two years latter, at the 2010 MMS, the PKS declared itself as the opened-Islamic party, showing its readiness to run this agenda, which would give a chance for non-Muslim to become members of the party. According to Aminuddin, the Chair of MS, this policy was not merely a strategy to win the election. In fact, for Aminduddin, the attitude of openness in politics, based on the spirit of pluralism found its relevance in the Islamic teachings.

The attempts to build such moderate approaches generated different responses. Some people understand this attitude and related it to the process to reach ideological and organisational maturity, namely from an ideologically strict party to be a more realistic party. They also regarded it as a normal strategy for the party that seek more votes and to win the election in a state where most people still had an indifferent attitude towards Islamic values, particularly in politics. They also confirmed that such attitude was also backed up by its basic moderate ideology. However, to others, PKS’ political stance showed an inconsistency in carrying out its basic ideals. They also criticised PKS’ attitude as one of political opportunism that sacrifices Islamic agendas for merely temporary political victories.

Furthermore, some people criticised PKS in relation to its political strategies. Inconsistency in responding to the policy to reduce the government subsidy for petroleum became one of the cases. During the Megawati Government era, PKS appeared to be one of active elements that clearly rejected such policy, which was popularly regarded as an unfriendly policies mainly for the poor people. However, during the Yudhoyono era, when PKS was part of the government, this party slightly changed its attitude towards this policy. Although theoretically a reduction in the

subsidy was needed in order to restore financial efficiency, for the people at the
grass-root level this policy should be the last option. Most people at that time still
believed that if the government could reduce inefficiency in its financial management
and effectively decrease corruption, actually such a policy could be avoided
temporarily. This would provide them with more time to prepare to face such
unpopular policy.

In this regard, some idealist groups begun to be impatient with PKS political
actions, which they regard as insensitive. Some of them then raised the option to
leave the coalition\(^{320}\). However, PKS tended to avoid such a movement and chose to
intensify its personal approached in conveying people’s interests to the president.
This situation created an internal dispute and to some extent generated
disappointment for several cadres. In addition, the inability to create a significant
change in some local areas where PKS was the winner also became the object of
criticism. Although PKS actually did not become a majority group in all local
parliaments that were won by this party, even some localities became a common
enemy mainly due to the party’s strict and uncompromising attitude towards
corruption\(^{321}\), generally, the people still criticised PKS for its lack of endeavours to
create a significant reform where it is in power\(^{322}\).

People’s criticism became more open of this party, both in regard to the way
this party was making its interpretation of its ideology and in the way it conducted its
political strategies. These critiques included people who used to be party’s
supporters or even the cadres. The existence of Forum Kader Peduli (the Care Cadre Forum/FKP) and PKS Watch as medium to mediate the disappointed former
party’s supporters and members were the example of these people. To them,
“today’s PKS” was as a different party that implemented great bound in its approach
to understanding its basic ideology and in conducting political activities. They
concluded that this party was a victim of its own political interest. However, although
it gained many critics, PKS was able to maintain its existence properly. The internal
dispute that occurred in PKS as an inevitable phenomenon did not lead to the

\(^{320}\) The General Secretary of PKS Anis Matta and member of Parliament Mashadi became prominent
figures who supports of this option. On Matta’s opinion to opt out from the coalition, see “Tak Ada
Koalisi Tanpa Perubahan”, in Saksi, No.6/VIII/30 November 2005, pp.7-9. See also “Ini Politik Bos”,
Tempo, 16 October 2005.

\(^{321}\) Noor, Moderate Islamic Fundamentalism in Indonesia: A Study of Political Thinking and Behaviour of

creation of factions. In these circumstances, PKS enjoyed the opportunity to develop its existence in society. It can be seen, for instance, from time to time of the improvement of the number of cadres\textsuperscript{323}.

5. Closing Remarks

The explanation above suggests that PKS as a "dakwah party" has been a party that tried to combine Islamic universal ideals with moderate ways in politics. It appears to be not an easy task. Although this party has gained some positive images, namely anti-corruption and caring party, PKS cultivates many critics mainly due to its political strategy. The moderate ways developed by PKS sometime were regarded as opportunistic ways that sacrifices the party’s basic idealism. Accordingly, as an ideological party, internal dispute cannot be neglected due to this ideology interpretation and its related problems. Actually, the internal disputes might potentially lead to becoming the main reasons for prolonged conflict and even party fragmentation, as it happened in PSII in the years 1920-1930. Nevertheless, PKS still can considerably maintain its cohesion. Some aspects mentioned, such as internal values and cadrerization, contribute to this situation. The next chapters will explore the ability of this party to preserve its cohesion, which during the first decade of the Reform Era made PKS the only large Islamic party in Indonesia that could avoid internal fragmentation.

\textsuperscript{323} Rahmat, Ideologi Politik PKS. Dari Masjid Kampus ke Gedung Parlemen, pp. 39-41.
Chapter V
Procedural Leadership in Decision Making Process:
The Case of PKB

“The party management, which was far from modern, had provided a room for the party to overlook the rules of the game in the decision-making process, causing the factionalism between the group that were advantaged by the situation and they those were not” (Ali M. Musa)324

1. Introduction

This chapter will discuss one of the main elements of party institutionalisation, namely procedural leadership. Procedural leadership requires the implementation of the rules of the game in all decision-making process. It means that the party should not only be aware of its decisions' legal status and arrive at them transparently, but do so consistently as a matter of course. This implies consistency in making and implementing policies based on internal rules of the game. The chapter will specifically discuss the decision-making process, main actors or elements involved, the presence of any constitutional violations in the process and the effects that these may have, particularly in the case of cadre dismissals.

The dismissal cases are used to show a real situation on the decision-making process in PKB that eventually triggered the internal fragmentations. In other words, through the explanation of these cases, the relation between the existence of procedural leadership and the extent of party fragmentation will be examined, with the hypothesis being that absence of such leadership will enhance disappointment, reduce the trust among the members, and encourage resistance, thus in turn heightening the possibility of fragmentation.

2. Legal-Formal Aspect and Background

Decision-making process in the PKB consisted of two ways in stipulating a policy, namely by *musyawarah* and voting. The acknowledgment of consultation and voting indicated that the party put forward the popular based decision-making mechanism, where many people, not merely a faction let alone a person, joined to stipulate the decision. There were several forums for this process. Of 21 forums of *Musyawarah*, the forums that directly involve DPP in the decision-making process, namely *Muktamar, Muktamar Luar Biasa* (the Extraordinary Conference/MLB), *Musyawarah Kerja Nasional* (the National Working Conference/Mukernas) and *Musyawarah Pimpinan* (the Conference of the Heads/Muspim).

*Muktamar* was the highest forum in PKB, which represented the sovereignty of members of the party. This national congress was held every five years and attended by all members of DPP and representatives of *Dewan Pengurus Wilayah* (the Regional Managing Board/DPW) and *Dewan Pengurus Cabang* (the Branch Managing Board/DPC). *Muktamar* had many authorities, namely to evaluate the report of DPP, to promulgate and/or amend the AD/ART of the party, to promulgate the party platform for the next five years, to decree the basic programs of the party for the next five years, to elect and to stipulate the General Chairperson of *Dewan Syura* and to elect and to stipulate the General Chairperson of *Dewan Tanfidz*.

*MLB* was an extraordinary forum to decree urgent policies as a response to a very important and special situation. This forum was based on the demand of more that half of the numbers of the DPC and more than half of the numbers of the DPW across the nation. The participants of the MLB were similar to the *muktamar*. After 2005, the ART of PKB clearly stated that one of MLB’s functions was to dismiss permanently the General Chairperson of *Dewan Syura* and the General Chairperson of *Dewan Tanfidz*; and to select provisional General Chairperson for both positions.

---

325 *The 1998 AD of PKB Article 19 (1) - (2); The 2000 AD of PKB Article 19 (1) - (2); The 2002 AD of PKB Article 19; The 2005 AD of PKB Article 20 (1) - (2); The 2008 AD of PKB Article 20 (1) - (2).*

326 *The 2005 AD of PKB article 19 (1); The 2008 AD of PKB Article 19 (1).*

327 *The 2005 ART of PKB Article 40 (1.b) and 40 (1.c); The 2008 ART of PKB Article 42 (1.b) and 42 (1.c).*
Mukernas was a forum that should be held at least twice a year by the party. The functions of this forum were to assess the implementation of policies, to discuss other policies stipulated in muktamar and to put other relevant issues in debate. Participants to this meeting were the members of DPP and the representatives of DPW. The meeting will be legal to provide policies if attended by more than half of the participants. Muspim was a forum that could be held at any time necessary, mainly to discuss current development of the party and the national political situation, based on the proposal of at least five members of Dewan Syura. The participants of this forum were the members of DPP and the heads of DPW. Muspim could legally stipulate policy if attended by more than half of the participants.

The PKB also had Rapat Pleno DPP (the plenary meeting of DPP) and Rapat Gabungan DPP (the join session of DPP) to make some strategic decisions\textsuperscript{328}. The plenary meeting should be held at least once in every six month. The participants of this meeting were the elements of Dewan Syura and Dewan Tanfidz at national level. The join session was a limited forum where the members of Dewan Syura and Dewan Tanfidz at national level meet in order to conduct debates responding to current developments. Since these forums were very limited in terms of participants, the decision could not replace the policies that have been stated at the musyawarah level. On a more practical scale, however, these meetings took a crucial part in making some strategic policies, some of which became controversial policies, or triggered internal fragmentation.

The explanation above generally infers that every single decision, that is relevant nation-wide, has to involve DPP. The fundamental and very basic policies require considerable involvement from the members of the party, while some tactical and day-to-day policies can merely involve a limited group, as occur in the Muspim. The party’s statute also indicates that DPP is in hold of vast authorities, which manage almost all matters, including upholding the party discipline, to determine the nomination of members of parliament (MP) candidate and to manage party financial activities\textsuperscript{329}. This situation however is not balanced by the existence of an effective

\textsuperscript{328} The 1998 ART of PKB Article 63 (a); The 2000 ART of PKB Article 75 (a); The 2002 ART of PKB Article 79 (1.a) - (1.b); the 2005 ART of PKB Article 83 (1.a) - (1.b). The 2008 ART of PKB Article 86 (1.a) - (1.b).


120
control mechanism. Moreover, a decree in PKB would have a legal status and officially bind all members if signed by four elements namely the General Chairperson of Dewan Syura, General Secretary of Dewan Syura, General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz, and General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz.

In relation to the decision-making process, the statute of the party also managed members’ dismissal process. According to the party’s ART, the party could dismiss the party’s member if he was to commit actions against the party, for instance, breaking the rules of the party, intentionally not carrying his duty as a party’s member, violating the discipline of the party, and disgracing the party’s honour. Before dismissing a member, the party had to send a warning letter three times to the member, keeping in mind that there is a one week delay between a letter and the next one. If said member did not respond to the last warning letter, the party temporarily terminated the status of membership. If after one month had passed the member did not respond for his status, his party membership automatically ended. Each dismissed member had right to defend their position.

Besides above legal-formal situations, it is also important to understand PKB’s unique characteristic that will also influence the performance of this party in dealing with the decision-making process.

As the organisation that was developed and run by NU and its exponents, PKB eventually had a tendency to follow a similar pattern of NU in viewing and implementing the rules of the game. In the decision-making process context, it means, to some extent, to have a potential to uphold loosely its constitution. One of the main traditions of NU was to accommodate and implement the advices of ulama, mainly the very senior and respectable ones, in struggling for the interests of NU. In the situation where the interest of NU and the opinion of ulama became the prime agendas, the rules of the game sometimes appeared to be complementary elements. In several monumental decisions of NU, the elite or leaders, using limited forum, practically and essentially played a significant role in deciding the policies that sometimes disregard the AD/ART. In this regard, the interest of the respected

331 The 1998 ART of PKB Article 11 (2); The 2000 ART of PKB Article 11 (2); The 2002 ART of PKB Article 11 (2); The 2005 ART of PKB Article 11 (2); The 2008 ART of PKB Article 11 (2).
332 The decision to leave Masyumi in 1952 that influence the life of the NU in particular and Indonesian political constellation in general, for instance, was the result of the great effort of A. Wahab
figure sometimes was recognized as the interest of all or jamiyah (the organization or association). Eventually, in this circumstance, where supporting the interest of the elite was equal to supporting the interest of jamiyah, the rules of the game became less of an important element in the party. In this situation, Mustofa Bisri critically believed that NU was still not an entity of its own enough to be qualified as a solid organisation.

In its development, the dependency on the charismatic figure found its worst scenario since it relied on the fame figure, namely Wahid. As the former General Chairperson of PBNU, the initiator of PKB, and a charismatic figure, who was even believed to be a wali (person who has special gift from God) for some of his devotees, Wahid held an indispensable position that in the end tended to endorse power personification in this party. His important position in PKB also related to his historical role. According to Junaidi, Wahid was the most important figure that determined many important decisions related to PKB establishment including the name of the party and the name of General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz. In relation to this, the General Chairpersons of Dewan Tanfidz until 2008 were the figures who had personal support from Wahid to win their position.

Chasbullah, Rois Akbar (the Great leader) of NU, who eagerly wanted the NU to have its own party in order to struggle for its political agendas. Although the policy to leave Masyumi was decided in the 1952 Muktamar in Palembang, the muktamar itself essentially became a political tool of Chasbullah to attain his political agenda, since the main agenda of the muktamar set up by him was to decide “the most proper way to leave Masyumi” and not to decide “whether NU should leave Masyumi or not”. The similar situation occurred when some prominent figures of NU led by the General Chairperson of Dewan Syuriah NU K.H Ali Maksum and K.H Asa’ad Syamsul Arifin one of first generations of NU Ulama in a very limited forum dismissed the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidziyah NU Dr. Idham Chalid in 1982. The decision had triggered one of serious internal conflicts in NU. Chalid eventually declared that the attempts of those influential ulama to dismiss him was illegal and could not be followed since it contradicted the essence of AD/ART of NU. Greg Fealy, *Ijtihad Politik Ulama, Sejarah NU 1952-1967*, (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2003), p.119. On the process of the Chalid dismissal see Mahrus Irsyam, *Ulama dan Partai Politik, Upaya Mengatasi Krisis*, (Jakarta: Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1984), pp.122-132.


335 Jalil, the first General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz, was an experienced political activist who was asked by Wahid to hold such position. Although initially many NU’s sympathizers and even the PKB’s founding fathers rejected his decision, Wahid stubbornly insisted to give Jalil a chance to lead the party. Wahid even said that he would leave the PKB if the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz was not Jalil. In the first Muktamar of PKB, in 2000, Jalil was elected to be the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz with full support from Wahid. The second General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz was Prof. Shihhab. Even though he was not NU member, he became a popular figure in PKB and had good relationship with many important elements in the party, particularly with Wahid. His good relationship with Wahid had actually been developed long before he joined PKB, and happened to be more intense
The position of Wahid became more significant after gaining a position as the General Chairperson of Dewan Syura. Wahid and also his followers regard such position as a legitimate position to have a special status and a set of authorities in determining and conducting almost all strategic policies. In addition, Wahid regarded himself as a patron that should be followed by the santri. According to Rokhmad: “Gus Dur had regarded all party cadres and members of party committee as his santri and khadam (the servant) that owed sendika dhawuh (totally obey) and follow his will at any time”\(^{336}\). Such an attitude was equal with the opinion of majority of NU people that regarded him as a charismatic figure that deserve to follow.

In reality, over time, the leadership based on the charisma and patron-client relationship model, which was one of the main characteristics of NU\(^{337}\), became a key element in the decision-making process that provided a serous obstacle for PKB in conducting procedural leadership. Several procedures violations that would be discussed in the next part were motivated to defend or accommodate the political agendas of respected figures or the group where such respected people were in.

However, this very situation obviously was not representing the entire picture of PKB. The party actually still had some committed people who tried to respect and proportionally implement the rules of the game. These people consisted of those who had strived for such interest since the beginning of the party existence and disappointed cadres whom, after becoming the victim of the system, realised the after he became one of the chairpersons of the party. This close relationship strengthened trust and understanding between him and Wahid. For this reason, Wahid gave his support to Shihab for his nomination in the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz election in the 2002 MLB. Shihab won the election. Iskandar was the third the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz. He was Wahid’s nephew and used to be very loyal to his uncle. Iskandar demonstrated his loyalty in any circumstances, including when they both facing the strong resistance from Shihab, Yusuf and their followers. He appeared to be a person who did not have hesitation to justify his uncle movements and to implement Wahid’s wills, including the controversial and unconstitutional ones. His main part in suspending many local boards or discharging cadres that were alleged to be disloyal, including to those who backed up Shihab and Yusuf prior to the 2005 Semarang Muktamar, proved this commitment. This attitude strengthened his relationship to Gus Dur and provided him Gus Dur supports to reach the position of General Chairperson of the party.


weakness of their own party’s internal system, particularly the non-existence of a procedural leadership.

3. The Rule Implementation Condition and Tendencies

3.1. The Emergence of Unconstitutional Phenomena

Although PKB already had AD/ART to arrange many important matters, in PKB’s decision-making process, flexibility and inconsistency in implementing party procedures tended to occur. The violation of the party procedure in the case of the dismissal of Matori Abdul Jalil, the first General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz, signified one of the most important violations towards party’s procedure in the PKB.

The dismissal was triggered by Jalil’s decision to attend the 2001 SI MPR, of which the main agenda was to impeach President Wahid for his unconstitutional act to dismiss the MPR and the accusation of corruption. Jalil’s decision disappointed Wahid, who then asked the party to dismiss him from his position. Wahid’s proposal, discussed by only six people and shortly accepted by Dewan Syura, was created at the same day with the opening ceremony of the SI MPR on 21 July 2001. It means the process the dismissal process of Jalil took less than one day. Two weeks latter, rapat pleno of the PKB agreed this policy and on the 14 August 2001, Mukernas confirmed the dismissal of Jalil from his position as the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz.

According to Wahid’s camp, this decision was correct since Jalil proved his disloyalty by disregarding the party’s decision not to attend SI MPR, proposed by MPs from PKB in an internal meeting just one day before SI MPR was hold. On that meeting, Jalil actually had asked the party to permit him to attend the SI MPR, not as the member of the party but as one of the chairpersons of MPR\textsuperscript{338}. Jalil also stated

that his interests to attend SI MPR were related to the attempt to save the president’s face from the impeachment and to maintain good relations with other political groups in parliament\(^\text{339}\). However, the party never formally answered Jalil’s proposal.

Moreover, for many PKB’s members, the decision to dismiss spontaneously Jalil was reasonable since Wahid, as the General Chairperson of *Dewan Syura* who appointed Jalil to lead the party, had a right to dismiss Jalil directly. Choirie, for instance, said that the dismissal was permissible because Jalil was selected by Wahid, and not by direct election involving the attendees of *Muktamar*\(^\text{340}\).

However, the abrupt decision of Jalil’s dismissal as a response to *Dewan Syura*’s proposal appeared to be questionable since it was principally not in line with the ART. According to the ART, the process of dismissal of managing board’s member should involve the party’s managing board in which the member was registered. This board worked as an institution that would provide dismissal recommendation to be approved by the party managing board at the higher level\(^\text{341}\). In this process, moreover, according to the ART every members of party’s managing board had a right to defend their case\(^\text{342}\). This precondition indicates that a dismissal process takes a quite long time.

Moreover, the dismissal of the General Chairperson of *Dewan Tanfidz* who was elected in *muktamar* should be possible if it was conducted in the same occasion or in the MLB. The ART stated that the General Chairperson of *Dewan Tanfidz* who was elected in the forum of *muktamar* should report and take responsibility for all his decisions and works in such forum\(^\text{343}\). In addition, in any


\(^\text{340}\) Choirie, *PKB Politik Jalan Tengah NU*, p. 297. Interview with Tohadi, the Member of PKB (1998-2005) and the Vice Chairperson of PKNU DPP, in Jakarta, 6 October 2010.


\(^\text{343}\) *The 2000 ART of PKB Article 19 (2)*; *The 2002 ART of PKB Article 21 (2)*; *The 2005 ART of PKB Article 21 (2)*; *The 2008 ART of PKB Article 22 (2).*
circumstances, the party should give the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz, like other members of committees, the opportunity to defend his case.

The situation became worse for Jalil after the party withdrew his party membership 15 days after his attendance in the SI MPR. This decision also applied to the other members who refused his dismissal, such as Abdul Khaliq Ahmad and Agus Suflihat. In terms of organisational procedure, this decision infringed party’s constitution. It was because according to the ART the dismissal of the party’s member from the membership had to follow some stages, which actually needed around four months (around 120 days) to accomplish. The ART said that before the dismissal, the party must warn formally the member three times, in which the period between those warnings was one week. The membership would end automatically, if the member did not respond to her or his dismissal after three months from the last warning. Although several cadres at that time agreed with the party’s decision, these last situations indicated that during the process of a dismissal the party had actually broken several procedures and stages.

In 2004, not long after the Jalil's case, the procedural violation reoccurred in the dismissal cases of Alwi Shihab and Saifullah Yusuf, from their positions as the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz and General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz respectively. This case began with the limited meeting held by DPP on 21 September 2004 as a response to the possibility of some PKB’s cadres to hold ministers’ positions in the new elected government. The meeting concluded that in order to avoid any conflict of interests and preserve party’s independency, the party prohibited every member to have dual positions, including in the governmental domain. Not long after DPP took the decision, Shihab and Yusuf were appointed by President Yudhoyono to join his cabinet. Shihab became Coordinating Minister for Public Health and Yusuf stood his grounds as the Minister of State for Development of Disadvantaged Regions. Their acceptance of those ministerial posts became the main reason for DPP to dismiss them from their positions. This decision was promulgated through a DPP Plenary Meeting on 26 October 2004.

---

344 The 1998 ART of PKB Article 11 (1)-(5); The 2000 ART of PKB Article 11 (1)-(5); The 2002 ART of PKB Article 11 (1)-(5); The 2005 ART of PKB Article 11 (1)-(5); The 2008 ART of PKB Article 11 (1)-(5).

345 Kamarudin, Koflik Internal PKB, pp. 112-113.

For Yusuf, it was the second time a DPP’s decision caused him difficulty. The first was in 2003. It began when the party held a voting in Dewan Syura Meeting to decide his future. The party held such meeting to discuss findings from Tim Tiga (Team of Three) on negative rumours involving him. Based on the findings, Tim Tiga concluded that Yusuf’s mistakes were minor. However, although Tim Tiga suggested the meeting to give him only a warning, some participants, including Wahid, proposed a displacement for Yusuf. After a serious debate, all participants agreed to vote on two options: (1) to discharge or (2) to give a stern warning. Of sixteen participants, nine persons voted for the first option and the rest voted to give Yusuf a stern warning. Based on that result, the meeting decided to transfer Yusuf’s position from the General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz to be one of Chairpersons of Dewan Tanfidz. This decision would be effectively implemented after the 2004 Election.

However, the decision to dismiss Yusuf appeared to be unconstitutional since the party’s constitution had stipulated that a heavy violation, and not a minor one as concluded by Tim Tiga, was the only rationale to dismiss cadres from their position. In this sense, Yusuf and his supporters believed that such decision was unfair and unconstitutional. In addition, the fact that only nine of 16 participants, or less than 2/3 of the participants, agreed to displace Yusuf annulled such a decision’s legality, since according to the party’s constitution only the decision that was supported by at least 2/3 participants that can be stipulated as a legal policy.

The position of Yusuf as the member of managing board was entirely terminated after he joined President Yudhoyono’s cabinet. DPP insisted that the dismissal of Yusuf and also Shihab were legitimate. To DPP, the plenary meeting

---

347 The members of this team were Prof. M. Mahfud MD, A.S Hikam and K.H Nur Iskandar Al Barsany.

348 These included (1) the failure to build an effective communication among PKB MPs in Parliament that cost on the failure to impeach Akbar Tanjung, the General Chairperson of DPR from Golkar Party. Such an impeachment was projected by PKB to be a revenge for Wahid impeachment, (2) using money politics in the 2002 MLB, which enabled him to hold General Secretary position, and (3) rejecting to support Wahid as president candidate and endorsed Hasyim Muzadi, General Chairperson of PBNU, as vice president in in the 2004 presidential election. Kamarudin, Koflik Internal PKB, p. 120-121. See also Adhie M. Massardi, “Saifullah Yusuf, Kyai, dan PKB”, in Koran Tempo, 12 September 2003. Gatra 21 September 2002.

349 According to the team leader, Prof. Dr. M. Mahfud MD Saifullah’s mistakes “were not harmful for the organisation” see “Reposisi Subhat Cak Iful”, in Gatra, 13 September 2003, p.66.
had legal authority to dismiss them as the member of party committee\(^{350}\). Moreover, the DPP believed that this dismissal essentially was correctly applied, since both Shihab and Yusuf had broken party’s policy on the prohibition of having dual positions\(^{351}\). DPP also believed that it did not need to give a warning to them before discharging both, because their category of mistake did not make such warning necessary\(^{352}\).

The problem was that Shihab was the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz who had gained his position through MLB. He was elected by the attendees that representing hundreds of boards and thousands of participants around Indonesia in the highest forum for decision-making process. According to the ART a general chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz that was appointed in the forum of Muktamar or MLB, had to report his works in the same forum\(^{353}\). It means the right and legal forum to dismiss Shihab as the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz was Muktamar or MLB, and not a plenary meeting.

Another problem related to the absence of serial of warnings before DPP dismissed them. The ART stated that the party had to provide warning letters three times first before the dismissal took place. It indicated that the process of the member could not suddenly make\(^{354}\). However, DPP neglected consciously this procedure. The case of Shihab and Yusuf, hence, indicated the weak legal basis. It showed once again how the creation of important decision was not based on the legitimate procedure.

\(^{350}\) According to DPP “The dismissal of them was legitimate and legal, because it had filled all the provisions in the statutes of the party. The process was also democratic and constitutional, through a join meeting that was then confirmed in the plenary meeting. The plenary meeting indeed had an authority to dismiss the member of the party managing board, as had been mentioned above. From the party’s statutes perspective, therefore, there was no problem on the case of the dismissal of Alwi Shihab and Saifullah Yusuf...” Lukman Edy, et. al, “Kronologi Muktamar II PKB, Fakta Historis, Yuridis dan Politis”, (Jakarta: DPP PKB, 2005), pp. 29-30 in Kamarudin, Koflik Internal PKB, pp. 116-117.

\(^{351}\) Ibid, p. 118.

\(^{352}\) Ibid, p. 117.

\(^{353}\) The 2000 ART of PKB Article 19 (2); The 2002 ART of PKB Article 21 (2); The 2005 ART of PKB Article 21 (2) and 22 (3); The 2008 ART of PKB Article 22 (2) and 24 (3).

\(^{354}\) The 1998 ART of PKB Article 11 (1)-(7); The 2000 ART of PKB Article 11 (1)-(7); The 2002 ART of PKB Article 11 (1)-(7); The 2005 ART of PKB Article 11 (1)-(7); The 2008 ART of PKB Article 11 (1)-(7).
The violation of party procedure also occurred in the Muhaimin Iskandar’s dismissal. This time the dismissal process was conducted in the limited forum involving only members of Dewan Syura and Dewan Tanfidz. This forum, held on 26 March 2008, initially was even addressed to be a medium for only internal consolidation and a kind of “farewell party” for Prof. Muhammad Mahfud MD, one of the chairpersons of the PKB, which a couple days before was appointed by President Yudhoyono to be The Chief of Mahkamah Konstitusi (the Constitution Court/MK). This meeting, therefore, was not conducted to assess the works of Iskandar as General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz or to determine the continuation of his leadership\(^\text{355}\).

However, after the prime agenda finished, Wahid began to deliver a speech and suddenly expressed his disappointment towards Iskandar. Wahid said that based on some reports he found out that Iskandar had stated his readiness to fight any attempts that would bring him down from his position, including if he had to fight in the MLB\(^\text{356}\). Wahid considered that Iskandar’s statement was unacceptable, arrogant and most of all a challenge to his position.

Iskandar, who attended the meeting, denied that accusation and clearly stated that he never made such statement\(^\text{357}\). Although Iskandar had declared his objection, Wahid kept insisting to give him a stern punishment. In doing so, Wahid proposed a voting to the participants. The meeting participants, who most of them were Wahid’s followers, then approved Wahid’s proposal. The result was 20 of 30 meeting attendees agreed to dismiss Iskandar from his position\(^\text{358}\). On the 5th April


\(^{357}\) Mahfud said: “In responding to that allegation, The Chairperson of DPP Andi Muarli asked Muhaimin to testify proving that Wahid’s accusation was not true. Muhaimin responded that he was ready to testify and stated that those allegations were not true. However, Wahid stood still on his position”, “Rapat Berlangsung Tragis dan Pilu. Muhaimin dilengserkan dari Ketua Umum PKB”, http://hariansib.com/?p=28694, 28 March 2008.

\(^{358}\) According to Ratnawati three people agreed to the first option, three people chosen the second option, two persons abstained and one was broken. Ratnawati, “Beberapa Masalah Pelembagaan Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) dan Alternatif Solusi”, p. 103. Another version said five people agreed to the first option, three people chosen the last option and two persons abstained, while Wahid, Iskandar
2008 DPP formally discharged Iskandar and appointed Ali M. Musa, Vice General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz as the official in charge for General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz. As a response to that policy, Iskandar and his supporters maintained that DPP’s decision had violated party’s constitution. This was because the ART stated that a member of DPP who gained his position through the election in Muktamar, the party’s highest forum, could only be discharged from his position through the forum of MLB. It means the dismissal process would take a long time, as well as it would involve many participants, included hundreds of representatives of local managing boards around the country. Furthermore, the ART said that the dismissal was applied only to the member that committed to do heavy violation, proven by internal investigation. DPP then should give the member a warning and provide an opportunity to defend his case.

In the case of Iskandar, DPP not only had not given him a chance to defend his case properly, but also could not prove his wrongdoing. In addition, the meeting for Iskandar dismissal, according to Helmy Zaini did not reach a quorum, since only 30 of 62 members of DPP attended it. According to the ART, the forum would have a legal consequence if at least 2/3 of the members of DPP attend it, which was, to be said, 41 out of 62 members of DPP.

The violation of party procedure extended to the cadres and the managing boards at the local level. It mainly happened to them whom were accused to be disloyal or the supporters of the opponents. According to Choirul Anam, during 2005, for instance, Iskandar with Wahid’s back up had suspended 37 DPCs and 2 DPWs and fired number of members of managing boards. DPP sometimes conducted these attempts by avoiding democratic approaches and party procedure. Anam and Mahfud were not eligible to vote. See Taufik Al Mubarak, “Pemecatan di Tubuh PKB Bukti Superioritas Wahid”, Harian Aceh, 31 March 2008. “Rapat Berlangsung Tragis dan Pilu. Muhaimin dilengserkan dari ketua umum PKB”, http://hariansib.com/?p=28694, 28 March 2008.

360 The 2005 ART of PKB Article 22 (3); The 2008 ART of PKB Article 25 (3
361 The 1998 ART of PKB Article 19 (2); The 2000 ART of PKB Article 20 (2); The 2002 ART of PKB Article 22 (2); The 2005 ART of PKB Article 22 (2).
reported that the process of the dismissal happened to be quite outside the established procedure.

In the case of DPCs suspension and member dismissal in the East Java Province, for instance, DPP did not involve the East Java DPW in deciding the policies. According to Anam, DPP had never invited him, as the Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of the East Java DPW, to discuss and to take a role in decision-making process on this matter. This situation, to Anam, had violated the ART that mentioned the right and authority of DPW to propose recommendation to DPP on the establishment of new DPC and to legalise the structure of the new DPC. This authority also applied on the case of suspension and dismissal, where the DPP had to have recommendation from the DPW before concluding such policies.

As for individual cases, DPP had unjustly fired Erman Hernawan from his position as Vice General Secretary of the DPP. His dismissal actually based only on rumours about his alleged attempts to manipulate conference rules of the game in the Conference of Garda Bangsa (the Nation Guard), one of PKB’s subparts, in Banjarmasin. The violation of the rules of the game also happened in the case of Abdul K. Karding. As the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of the Central Java DPW who gained his position in Muswilub (the Special Regional Meeting), Karding had a right to report his leadership to the Munaslub. However, DPP took over Muswilub’s role and purged him from his position directly through DPP plenary meeting. This decision was not in line with the ART, since according to the ART, Karding should be released from his position through Muswilub. Moreover, DPP also immediately pointed Yusuf Chudlori to be Karding’s replacement. Based on the rules of the game, however, Chudlori’s installation process should involve the Central Java DPW. According to the ART, the role of DPP in such situation actually was only to legalise the recommendation made by the Central Java DPW and not directly in charge in such process. Thus, DPP’s acts to dismiss Karding and to point Chudlori

---


365 The 1998 ART of PKB Article 13 (2.b); The 2000 ART of PKB Article 13 (2.b); The 2002 ART of PKB Article 13 (2.b); The 2005 ART of PKB Article 13 (2.b); The 2008 ART of PKB Article 13 (2.b).

366 DPW PKB Jawa Timur, Data dan Fakta Pelanggaran AD/ART di Muktamar II Semarang, p. 1.

as Karding’s replacement, by passing the existence of Central Java DPW, were unconstitutional\textsuperscript{368}. Above situations shows a flexibility and inconsistency in implementing party procedure in PKB. In this regard, the position of the rules of the game became secondary.

3.2. Overshadowing Party’s Constitution: The Role of Wahid

Another phenomenon in the implementation of procedure in decision-making process was the tendency to rely on charismatic figures rather than on the rules of the game. It generally indicates the real position of the leader in PKB that to some extent could act quite freely above the party’s procedure. This situation shows one of the dimensions of the un-institutionalised party.

In PKB’s case, this special role had been taken by Wahid. His unique position in the eyes of many NU people had made him become influential in many aspects, particularly in decision-making process. According to Kristiadi “Gus Dur who his ray of charisma and influence was very dazzling for everyone in the PKB environment became very influential in determining the direction and the development of PKB. This situation also happened in terms of decision-making process”\textsuperscript{369}. The domination of Wahid in a meeting forum was unavoidable. Khoffifah Parawansa described that if there were ten people including Wahid attended a meeting forum, it was almost likely only Wahid did the meeting\textsuperscript{370}.

The main role of Wahid in the case of Jalil was related to his spontaneous reaction to propose a policy to purge Jalil. In this process, he approved the quick decision provided by Tim Enam (the Team of Six) led directly by him\textsuperscript{371}, working on behalf of the party, to purge the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz, without carefully considering Jalil’s rights as one of the elite of the party. The establishment of Tim Enam to accommodate the interest of Wahid was actually unconstitutional since it was not stated in the constitution. As an influential figure who realised his


\textsuperscript{369} J. Kristiadi, ” Pergulatan dan Tantangan PKB Memenuhi Harapan Bangsa”, in Wahid, Choirie, and Syeirazi, (eds), 9 Tahun PKB. Kritik dan Harapan, pp. 128-129.

\textsuperscript{370} Interview with Khoffifah Indar Parawansa, the State Minister for Women Empowerment (1999-2001), the Chairperson of the Institute for Election Winning of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{371} “Melawan Sang Patron”, Koran Tempo, 26 April 2005.
special position before his followers and the members of the party, Wahid also never gave his clear permission to conduct *islah* (the reconciliation or peaceful settlement of conflict) to deal with the Jalil’s camp. Consequently, a prolonged conflict between two conflicting camps became inevitable. On the other hand, the party’s inability to implement systematically and consistently its procedure paved the way for Wahid to continue his role and actions. The above case indicated that the Wahid’s could almost automatically become the party’s will. In this regard, it was not necessarily the Wahid’s characteristic that determined the backwardness of party institutionalisation, but also the party environment and poor institutionalisation that give an away for the emergence of such situation.

In the case of Yusuf, the interest of Wahid also played an important role. It related mainly to the interest to pay off Wahid’s disappointments towards Yusuf, whom according to Wahid had poorly performed his duties, particularly as a mediator to gain support from PDIP, Yusuf’s former party, as the largest group in the parliament, to save him from the 2001 impeachment. Wahid also believed that Yusuf had committed to do money politics in Semarang *Muktamar* that provided him general secretary position. For these reasons, Wahid did not want his nephew to hold continuously his current position. Wahid’s role in Yusuf’s dismissal related to the voting in the 2004 held in the plenary meeting to decide Yusuf’s future in the party. The voting essentially was not necessary, since according to *Tim Tiga* Yusuf mistake were not harmful. Wahid, on the contrary, advised to hold a voting. His supporter and anti-Yusuf elements in this party praised his action as the best way to eliminate Yusuf from his position. Cholil Bisri, one of *Dewan Syura* members and initiators of the PKB establishment, commented that the decision of reposition was indeed personal, since it was motivated mainly by Wahid’s distrust towards Yusuf.

The need to accommodate Wahid’s interest also triggered his loyalist to conduct negative political manoeuvres. The 2nd *Muktamar* in Semarang illustrated the situation. The forum that was initially hoped by many cadres to be a channel for reconciliation between his camp and Shihab-Yusuf’s group appeared to be merely means for the establishment of Wahid and his group’s interests. In that forum, the interest to save Wahid’s position and his interests became the violation’s cause.


Wahid was elected hastily to be General Chairperson of *Dewan Syura* by acclamation in the report session and not in the election session. The use of wrong session to elect Wahid clearly violated the rules of the game. The supporters of Wahid conducted it, in order to avoid the possibility to have a strong figure, namely Ma’ruf Amin, former General Chairperson of *Dewan Syura* (1998-1999) as an alterative for Wahid in the election session. The supporters of Shihab-Yusuf selected Amin to be a serious competitor for Wahid.

This forum also annulled the constitutional right of the East Java DPW and the Central Java DPW to get additional votes in *muktamar*, as a reward for their achievement in gaining around 80% of the votes and chairs for PKB in the 2004 Election. This right was stipulated in the ART as an appreciation for the local managing boards that gained a good achievement in the election. The ART stated that each local board had the right to have one additional vote for every five chairs they provided. Wahid’s supporters calculated that East Java DPW, most of DPCs from the East Java Province, the Central Java DPW, and several DPCs from the Central Java would use this right, which would effectively mean around 255 additional votes, to fight against Wahid and Iskandar in the election sessions. For this reason, the supporters of Wahid then eagerly annulled such right off.

Moreover, the Shihab-Yusuf faction also observed that many attendees of this *muktamar* were illegal. The East Java DPW reported that, for instance, when a name of participant was called to vote in the election session to elect the general chairperson of *Dewan Tanfidz*, someone who had a different name entered the election box and voted. They suspected that Wahid’s supporters invited these people to win Iskandar in the session of General Chairperson of *Dewan Tanfidz* election. On the contrary, this *muktamar* intentionally did not invite Shihab as an important figure who had right and obligation to report his works in this forum. As

---

374 This acclamation was hold by DPWs only and did not involved DPCs, other elements that had right to vote in the election, see "Muktamar dinilai tidak demokratis, Rekonsiliasi PKB makin sulit", *Kompas*, 20 April 2005.

375 “Ma’ruf Amin Saingi Wahid”, *Koran Tempo*, 16 April 2005.

376 It means the opposition was only need around 80 votes to secure the result from hundreds DPCs across the country. “Kubu saiful ingin Muktamar Tandingan”, *Koran Tempo*, 19 April 2005.


a response, the Shihab-Yusuf group considered this *muktamar* as full of transgression\textsuperscript{379}. Some elements, including NU's *ulama* expressed similar criticism\textsuperscript{380}.

Wahid’s significant role in the Iskandar case could be seen in the forum so called as “plenary meeting”. In that forum, Wahid proposed three options for the audience. The options were: (1) to hold MLB, (2) not to hold MLB, but Wahid would be the only person who controlled the party, (3) asking Iskandar to step down\textsuperscript{381}. Many cadres interpreted Wahid’s proposal as “follow me (Wahid) or Iskandar”. One of the NU figures commented:

“Many people from inside or outside PKB said that the dismissal of Iskandar was legally wrong. Whatever the reasons, a General Chairperson of the party who was elected by more than 400 local committees in *muktamar* could not be fiercely stepped down by a plenary meeting. Such statement derives from legal point of view. However, if we see it through political perspective, there are some differences. Muslim Abdurrahman said that if he had to choose Wahid or Iskandar, he would certainly choose Wahid. To him, it was because if Iskandar did not want to step down, Wahid would. Hence, almost all participants agreed to ask Iskandar to step down. This is a point of view based on the existence of Gus Dur as an important figure”\textsuperscript{382}.

Above statement illustrates cadres’ acknowledgment on the presence of constitutional violation in the Iskandar dismissal case. However, they arguably had little choice, since they believed that Wahid’s special position was important for the party. They also considered that people at the grass roots level would prefer Wahid rather than Iskandar. One of Wahid’s supporters said, “PKB without Wahid would have few numbers of supporters. This was because when people vote for PKB they actually vote for Wahid. Brother Imin (Iskandar) was nothing compared to Wahid”\textsuperscript{383}. As a leader, Wahid seemed to realise this advantage situation, which made him confident enough to perform his will. On the other hand, the formal mechanism seemed to be neglected by many cadres when dealing with Wahid’s desire. This

\textsuperscript{379} Mengenai pelanggaran konstitusional jalannya Muktamar lihat DPW PKB Jawa Timur, Data dan Fakta Pelanggaran AD/ART di Muktamar II Semarang, pp. 8-10.


\textsuperscript{381} As mentioned by Prof. M. Mahfud MD, in http://hariansib.com/?p=28694, 28 March 2008.


\textsuperscript{383} Ibid, p. 99
showed the situation where the internal mechanism essentially “served” Wahid’s command.

The previous discussion proved Wahid’s special position in decision-making process in PKB. In such situation, the voice of ordinary members in this process was limited. In addition, above conditions also reflected the absence of *musyawarah* as the main formula in decision-making process. According to Parawansa, “the decision-making posture in PKB was not based on the spirit of *musyawarah*. Each party took their own decisions. Such situation surely in the end became the trigger of the conflict” 384. These cases also indicate party’s inability to control Wahid’s manoeuvres. The lack of institutionalisation had paved the way for him to implement his will and made his individual interest appear to become collective interest. This situation also made his political manoeuvres easier. In general, it signified the lower degree of “systemness” level in this party, which prolonged the party’s dependence on the figure rather than system or the rules of the game.

4. **The Impact: Towards Fragmentation**

4.1. **The Emerge of Internal Resistance**

The unconstitutional decisions eventually raised disappointment for many cadres that led to a resistance. In the Jalil case, Wahid and his compradors’ unilateral and unconstitutional decision disappointed Jalis and his followers. To Jalil, as General Chairperson of *Dewan Tanfidz*, he could be discharged from his position legally only through the forum of *Muktamar* or MLB, where he would report all his actions 385. Therefore, other meetings beside those forums were not eligible to make any decision on his position.

Shortly after his dismissal, Jalil took a number of initiatives to show his resistance. On 30th July 2001, or nine days after his dismissal, he declared himself as still the true General Chairperson of PKB, who would report all his activities in the 2005 *Muktamar* or in the MLB 386. He also refused to attend any forum to judge his

---


performance as General Chairperson of *Dewan Syura*. Moreover, he discharged Wahid from his position as General Chairperson of *Dewan Syura*, and pointed Ibrahim Laconi as provisional replacement. At a time when Wahid was at the peak of his political career and was supported by almost all influential figures of NU, Jalil’s resistance was widely regarded as extraordinary. He also took an initiative to consolidate the party by establishing many *badan pelaksana* (the executive committees) in local committees. This attempt was part of his anticipations towards the possibility to have resistance from local managing boards that refused to acknowledge his command.

In the Shihab and Yusuf Case, their supporter believed that Wahid’s group had systematically broken party’s constitution. In responding his dismissal, Shihab stated “…the lower forum cannot annul the highest one. If someone said yes it can, he or she has to learn again the statues of the party. If then in the *Muktamar* I was dishonourably discharged, so please do it, I have to accept it. But if the decision in *Muktamar* is hampered in the plenary meeting, this has to be corrected in *Muktamar*.”

As for Yusuf’s case, the quick decision to end his position had shocked him and his supporters. He eventually rejected that decision since it was mistaken and essentially unconstitutional. Yusuf argued that the result of the voting could not be used as the foundation to dismiss him. According to the ART the decision of *Dewan Syura* should be legal if it was supported by 2/3 of the meeting participants. The fact there were only nine of 16 participants, or less than 2/3 of

---


388 However, some of Jalil’s decisions procedurally also broke the statute of the party. His decision to discharge Wahid was illegitimate, since he as General Chairperson of *Dewan Syura* could only be replaced through the highest forum of the party namely *muktamar*. Moreover, his action to establish executive committee was also not in line with on the rules of the game, because the ART did not mention and arrange the existence of such institution. Mohammad Muzamil, “Ke Arah Penyelesaian Konflik PKB”, *Kompas*, 17 November 2001.


391 *The 2002 ART of PKB Article 20 (11.a); The 2005 ART of PKB Article 20 (11.a); The 2008 ART of PKB Article 21 (12.a).*
the number of participants, that supported policy to displace him, made voting result did not have legal consequence.

The supporters of Shihab and Yusuf resisted not only the dismissal of their leader, but also on the idea of the dual position prohibition. According to Shihab, one of the main objectives for politicians to join political life was to hold public position, including ministerial posts. Hence, he felt that the decision to prohibit the members to hold dual positions went against this “natural law” and practically impeded the opportunity for the cadres to extend their careers and experiences in the political world.

According to Anam the decision to abandon dual position was essentially not in line with the spirit of the party's constitution. He said that the preamble of party statute of the party stated that “the party should support all cadres to dedicate their life inside or outside party as part of their service to the nation and the state”. It means, according to Anam, the constitution allowed party's members to gain a strategic position outside the party to give service to all people. And for that reason the members did not have to resign their position in the party committee. Moreover, the fact that during the Wahid presidency era PKB did not account the dual position as a problem, permitting Wahid to have dual positions as the president and the General Chairperson of Dewan Syura, the decision to prohibit every members to have dual positions happened to be inconsistence.

The improper forum that used to dismiss Shihab dan Yusuf then became one of the main points for Shihab and his supporters to summon the DPP of PKB to the court. They avoided Wahid and his supporters’ suggestion for not bringing internal problem to the court. As former Wahid’s close friend and disciple, Shihab and Wahid did not hesitate to voice their interest to find justice. Having similar reasons with Shihab, in 2005 Supreme Court won Shihab for the case of dismissal.

---

394 DPW PKB Jawa Timur, Data dan Fakta Pelanggaran AD/ART di Muktamar II Semarang, p. 4.
396 Kompas, 19 November 2005. This was stipulated in the MA Decision No. 1896 K/P.dt./2005 on 15 November 2005.
The similar situation also happened to Iskandar. After a short period of thinking, Iskandar and his loyal fellows decided to resist his dismissal policy, which opened the third heavy internal conflict in PKB. Initially, Iskandar’s response was trying to understand DPP’s decision. However, before long it became clear that he had objections to that decision. Iskandar considered that such decision as one-sided decision based on wrong information conveyed by his rivals in the party. He then formed Tim Kecil (the small team) to investigate on the actors behind this smear, which had successfully convinced Wahid. Iskandar then decided to fight back for his position supported by sympathizers. Together with his close-friends and the sympathizers, Iskandar established his version of party managing boards across the country. Not only that, Iskandar and his loyalist also attacked several figures, who had special relationship with Wahid, including Wahid’s daughter, as traitors. Iskandar camps considered them as a harmful factor, for their role in destroying the unity of party. Iskandar conveyed this message to all PKB’s cadres not only in order to defend his position, but also to provide a bad image on his enemy.

4.2. Factions Formation and Fragmentation

In its development, each conflicting group believed that that they represented “the real PKB”. The non-Wahid’s groups not long after the declaration of resistance obtained supports from many people, including from local committees and branches in almost all territories. In such situation, the presence of factionalism became inevitable. In fact, the establishment of dual committees was just a matter of time. According to Musa “the party management, which was far from modern, had provided a room for the party to overlook the rules of the game in the decision-

397 The members of this team were Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, Abdul Kadir Karding, and Helmy Faizal Zaini.

398 The team found seven persons who had potentially provided wrong information to Wahid on Iskandar. This team regarded them as had a bad intention to crack down PKB from inside. These persons were Sigid Haryo Wibisono (member of Dewan Syura), Hermawi F. Taslim (Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz), Zannuba Arifah Chafsoh (General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz), Ikhsan Abdullah (Vice General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz), Artalyta Suryani (Treasury), Aris Junaidi (Vice Treasury), and Moeslim Abdurrahman (The General Chairperson of DKI Jakarta Managing Board Committee). “Buntut Kisruh PKB, Gus Dur Bekukan 40 DPC dan DPW”, “www.hariansib.com”; in Ratnawati, “Beberapa Masalah Pelembagaan Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) dan Alternatif Solusi”, p. 104. “Ali Masykur Pelaksana Tugas Ketum”, Kompas, 6 April 2008. The existence of these people, some of them were actually new comers in the party, and their movements, that would be discussed in the seventh chapter, actually also reflects the real situation on ineffectiveness of cadrerization conducted by PKB.
making process, causing the factionalism between the group that were advantaged by the situation and they those were not.\textsuperscript{399}

Over time, factionalism paved the way to strengthening the conflict. It in fact entered the phase of formalisation, in which each conflicting group tried to legalise its group. This attempt was indicated mostly by the interest to conduct \textit{Muktamar} or \textit{MLB} as a highest forum that will decide many important things. However, such forums were designed primarily not as much to find a comprehensive answer on the internal fragmentation possibility with the spirit of win-win solution. Rather, each conflicting group conduct these forums as tools to defend their existence and undermine the opponents.

For “non-Wahid” groups this was a moment to formalise their disappointment and resistance towards Wahid as their “political guru”. The opponent of Wahid used MLB also as a forum to show that there were several serious mistakes in the party, committed by Wahid and his supporter, which should fix. On the contrary, for Wahid’s camp, organising MLB was a normal consequence for a committee reshuffle, particularly related to the presence of new General Chairperson of \textit{Dewan Tanfidz} and General Secretary. For Wahid’s camp the lack or presence of MLB will not change anything. However this kind of forum was needed to show that their decision was supported by many members of cadres, or at least was not something that unpopular in the cadres’ eyes.

As an manifestation on this interest, on 14\textsuperscript{th}–16\textsuperscript{th} January 2002, Jalil’s group then held an MLB in Jakarta, which confirmed his position and produced an alternative version of PKB, which latter on was popularly known as PKB-Matori or PKB-Batu Tulis. Jalil stated that PKB under his leadership would establish democratic mechanisms and end the feudalistic mentality. He stated, “we are determined to develop PKB to be a truly democratic party.”\textsuperscript{400} According to one of founding fathers of this party, the establishment of PKB-Matori in essence was to show the malfunction of the rules of the game in previous PKB\textsuperscript{401}. However, PKB-

\textsuperscript{399} Interview with Dr. Ali Masykur Musa, Vice Chairperson of \textit{Dewan Tanfidz} of PKB (2005-2010) and General Chairperson of \textit{Dewan Tanfidz} of “PKB-Gus Dur” (2008-2009), in Jakarta, 19 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{400} Nita Nawangwulan, “Muktamar PKB Matori: Menghancurkan Kultur Feodal”, in \textit{detikcom} 10 January 2002.

Matori failed to convince the court and lost its case. This condition accordingly then paved the way for the PKB-Kuningan to gain acknowledgment from the government. Prior to the 2004 Election, PKB-Matori changed its name to PKD.

On the other hand, as a consequence of Jalil’s dismissal, Wahid’s supporters conducted an MLB in Yogyakarta 17th-19th January 2002. The participants elected Shihab as the new General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz and confirmed the position of Wahid as General Chairperson of Dewan Syura during the period of 2002-2005. Also in this forum, Yusuf was approved by the participants as General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz. This MLB gained full support from very senior ulama who attended this forum. This also showed the ulama’s strong support for Wahid and Shihab version of PKB, which was henceforth popularly known as PKB-Gus Dur/Alwi or PKB-Kuningan. The existence of two versions of PKB represented the first fragmentation of this party.

In the Shihab and Yusuf case, the supporter of this group conducted Muktamar in 2005 called as “Muktamar yang Benar” (the True Conference) in Surabaya, as an alternative for Semarang Muktamar, conducted by Wahid’s supporter. In Surabaya Muktamar the supporters of Shihab and Yusuf, including “ulama khos”, declared a new committee of PKB, and appointed Abdurrahman Chudlori as the General Chairperson of Dewan Syura and Anam as the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz. This PKB version was sometimes called PKB-Ulama. Most of the exponents of this party later on became the figures behind the establishment of new party namely PKNU. One of the main aims for the establishment of this party was to mend the political party life of NU people that had been plunged to the hand of Wahid and his clique. As a reflection of such aim, PKNU established a Mustasyar (the Advisory Board), as the highest body in this party. To control the policy made by the General Chairperson of Dewan Syura was one of its functions.

The attempts to formalise its existence also occurred in the Iskandar camp. This camp organised a MLB in Mercure Hotel, Ancol, Jakarta, on 2nd-4th May 2008 that confirmed Iskandar leadership. This MLB also elected Azis Mansyur as the new General Chairperson of Dewan Syura. This PKB was then sometimes called as PKB-

---

402 These persons included Abdullah Faqih, Ma’ruf Amin, Abdurrahman Chudlori, Idris Marzuki, A. Warson Munawwir, Muhamimn Gunardo, Abdullah Schal, Soleh Qosim, Nurul Huda Dzajuli, Muhammad Subadar, Chairul Anam and Alwi Shihab.
Muhaimin or PKB-Ancol. On the other hand, Wahid’s camp held the MLB in Pesantren Ashiriyyah Nurul Iman, Parung, Bogor, West Java, on 30th April-1st May 2008. This forum confirmed the position of Wahid as The General Chairperson of Dewan Syura and Musa as the new General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz. This PKB then popularly known as the PKB-Parung. These two PKBs still exist when the 2009 Election was about to come, although eventually only PKB-Ancol was eligible to take part in the 2009 Election. In 2011, PKB-Gus Dur changed its name to Partai Kemakmuran Bangsa Nasional (The National Nation Prosperity Party/PKBN).

After the establishment of new committee, as one of the results of MLB, the existence of twin committees that indicates party fragmentation could not be avoided. This situation would most likely not happen if the party could manage the consistency to respect the rules of the game since the beginning and avoid providing any unconstitutional decision that opened opportunity for the establishment disappointment and devastate internal cohesion.

5. Overview

The above cases show how easy the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz could lose his position in PKB. It indicates in essence the low degree of systemness. On the other hand, personal leadership took priority in PKB. Wahid’s central role in this party, a phenomenon described by La Ode Ida as “power personification”, was inevitable. Such condition shows the lack of procedural leadership in PKB. On the contrary, this situation eventually preserved the personal leadership of Wahid. The combination of the low degree of systemness and the absence of procedural leadership over time had triggered resistance among cadres and eventually provided serious damage for internal harmony. The existence of MLB and the creation of alternative committees, as a manifestation of resistances, was an evidence of the disappearance of party unity. Through above discussion, PKB’s case proves the correlation between the weak institutionalisation, indicated by the low commitment to stick to the rules of the game, and the party fragmentation.

403 Through the Minister of Justice and Human Rights, the government finally stated a verdict to win Iskandar’s group on 24 July 2008.
Chapter VI

Procedural Leadership in Decision Making Process:
The Case of PKS

“In PKS, an extensive dialog precedes every single decision making process. Every member of Majelis Syura (the Consultative Board/MS) has large room to express their opinions. It is normal to do voting, if the conclusion could not be reached by acclamation”. (Mahfudz Siddiq)\(^{405}\).

1. Introduction

As the only big Islamic party that managed to avoid fragmentation, PKS featured a number of characteristics and policies that can help explain this outcome. I shall argue below that there was a strong and quite widespread belief among party members and cadres in the importance of party institutionalisation, particularly when it comes to follow the rules of the game. Here, I will focus in particular on two kinds of evidence: first, the commitment that could be observed among the key party figures and the cadres to the role of the MS, as the highest decision-making body in the party; and second, the implementation of *musyawarah* as the foundation of decision-making process. The following discussion of these matters will allow us to assess the party’s performance on the criterion of procedural leadership, as one of the elements of institutionalisation, and its relation to party cohesion. The discussions cover some topics namely legal-formal aspects in decision-making process, mostly related to the legal formal aspects and situations behind the decision making process, the situation of the implementation of the rules of the game and the spirit of *musyawarah*, and the impacts for the cohesiveness of the party.

2. Legal-Formal Aspects and Background

In the decision-making process, PKS stipulated *musyawarah* as the main mechanism for that purpose. The AD stated that the party implemented the principle of

\(^{405}\) Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010.
*musyawarah* for decision-making process\(^{406}\). By using this principle, every policy could not be decided by only single person or limited group. This principle became something fundamental put into the constitution consistently by PKS, even though the constitution itself had been amended a couple of times.

The principle of *musyawarah* derived essentially from the concept of *syura*\(^{407}\). In this regard, the Islamic principles and the opinion of the Islamic law experts were the primary source of decision-making process\(^{408}\). However, besides having acknowledged the importance of prime role of Islamic teachings as guidance in decision-making process, PKS also understood *musyawarah* as the way to carry out the spirit of togetherness and the extension of participation. With this regard, although PKS had a tendency to consider the experts’ evaluations as the main source to decide a policy rather than merely a “people’s voice”, the decision-making institution must not endorse the elimination of the people’s right to participate\(^{409}\). Hence, *musyawarah* played as a bridge between the need to accommodate the voice of the people (cadres) and to implement Islamic values in creating party’s policies\(^{410}\). Therefore, the commitment towards *musyawarah* was not only in line with the enthusiasm to implement the constitution of the party, but also as an implementing mechanism in order to avoid personal leadership.

---

\(^{406}\) *The AD of PK Article 8; The 2002 AD of PKS Article 22 (1), 22 (2); The 2005 AD of PKS Article 24.*


\(^{408}\) According to Matta: “The basic difference between secular democracy and the Islamic political concept is related to the perspective about the holder of sovereignty. Secular democracy renders the sovereignty to the people, and says that the sovereignty is in the hands of the people; they believe that the voice of the people is the voice of God. On the other hand, in the Islamic concept, sovereignty totally belongs completely to God; therefore, the voice of God must be the voice of the people. As a consequence, in secular democracy the law is a general agreement which is produced by constitution, while in Islam the law is given and the function of the constitution is to realise it”. Anis Matta, “Dakwah, Politik dan Strategi”, in *Saksi*, Number 11, Year III, 6 March 2001.

\(^{409}\) Abu Ridha stated that in the government of the Islamic state, particularly in the era of the four Caliphates, people still had an important position as they had the legitimate power to elect their leaders. See Abu Ridha, *Negara dan Cita-Cita Politik*, (Bandung: Syaamil Cipta Media, 2004), p.32.

Besides putting forward musyawarah, PKS also implemented acclamation and voting mechanism to decide a policy. This method was used mainly when the forum was difficult to find agreement or deadlock. PKS’ constitution inferred that the party should apply these principles, including in MS as the highest institution to decide strategic policies.

In 2002, the party stated MS to be the ahlul halii wal aqdi of the party. As a consequence, this body had a salient role in determining the direction of the party, including electing several chairpersons of party’s important bodies at the national level, and making fundamental policies. Before 2002, PKS considered Musyawarah Nasional (the National Conference/Munas) as the highest institution, which carried out several MS’ main functions. This party then amend such forum to be merely the party’s highest meeting, called as Musyawarah of MS (the Conference of Consultative Assembly/MMS). Some institutions were eligible to make policies, in particular related to their specific functions, but MS held the authority on strategic and fundamental ones.

Although MS played an important role and became the most important body, the party’s constitution guarantied the independence of Dewan Syariah (the Islamic Law Council/DS), at national (DSP) as well as at local level (DSW and DSD), in carrying out their functions as fatwa making institution and arbitration body, including as appeals committee. As fatwa making institution, DS gained a special freedom to provide advices and to contemplate problem solution within the framework of Islamic laws perspective for the party and the cadres. As an arbitration body, which the next chapter will explore comprehensively, DS played a role as the independent body to reconcile conflicting groups or people and to discharge the membership of party members. In this circumstance, MS would act as a supervisor for DS without an

---

411 The 2002 AD of PKS Article 21 (1); The 2005 AD of PKS Article 24 (2).
412 The ART of PK Article 18; The 2002 AD of PKS Article 10 and 12; The 2005 AD of PKS Article 11.
413 The AD of PK Article 9.
414 The DPP for instance had authority to manage the life of the party committee and in charge in creating and suspending local committees. The MPP had an obligation to convey and to socialise the result of MMS and other decisions made by MS. In fact this party implemented the separation of power by giving a set of authorities for DS to deal with the matters of fatwa making, and as an appeal body that could not be intervened by the MS.
415 The 2005 ART of PKS Article 14 (5).
authority to intervene. However, DS, similar to other institutions, had to report periodically its activities directly to MS\textsuperscript{416}.

For the fulfilment of members of MS – that would determine the composition of other high institutions leadership, including the President of the Party – PKS conducted an internal election, that involved the cadres that had reached a status as *kader inti*\textsuperscript{417}. In that occasion, the party provided opportunity for *kader inti* to determine directly the composition of MS. As for the member dismissal, the party appointed the DS, as an internal justice court, to provide a recommendation for cadre dismissal\textsuperscript{418}. Every cadre had a right to defend their case before DS and to be lawyer assisted in that occasion\textsuperscript{419}. In the case where a verdict stipulated by DS at district or provincial level was not satisfying for cadres, they could ask DS at the higher level to take over the case\textsuperscript{420}. DSP’s decision would be a final verdict. DPP then would publish a dismissal letter based on DS’ recommendation, and MS agreement for the case that involved in the MS members.

The above discussion inferred some principles in the PKS decision-making process. The first was *musyawarah*. It was the prime mechanism that should be implemented when making a decision. With the spirit of acknowledging the importance of participation, this party provided the opportunity for cadres to join the process directly or indirectly. It indicates that the party did not allow any kind of authoritarian tendencies in this process. The second was the absolute position of MS as a prime institution in decision-making process, where all of the party’s members should follow its decisions. The third was the acknowledgment of “power sharing” in terms of *fatwa* making, where DS had an independency to make a policy based on its valuation. The role of MS in this context was merely as an institution that legitimatised DS’ decisions.

\textsuperscript{416} The 2002 AD of PKS Article 12 (7); The 2005 AD of PKS Article 15 (2.a).
\textsuperscript{417} The 2002 AD of PKS Article 12 (1) and 12 (2); The 2005 AD of PKS Article 18 (1).
\textsuperscript{418} The ART of PK Article 12 (3), 12 (4) and 27 (2); The 2002 ART of PKS Article 13 (1), 13 (2); The 2005 ART of PKS Article 10 (3.b).
\textsuperscript{419} The ART of PK Article 10 (3.e); The 2002 ART of PKS Article 13 (1), 13 (2); The 2005 ART of PKS Article 6 (3.b.5).
\textsuperscript{420} The ART of PK Article 27 (2); The 2002 ART of PKS Article 11 (4), 12 (3); The 2005 AD of PKS Article 23 (2.c).
Until the first decade of its existence, PKS tried to be consistent in implementing its rules of the game when making a policy. The importance of creating a solid system along with all of its related matters, including preserving the rules of the game, became something that was highly regarded among PKS cadres. This consciousness derives from Islamic teachings that advises the Muslim to manage the organisation professionally, by putting forward a comprehensive plan and consultations\textsuperscript{421}. According to Kamarudin, the belief that God, prophets and pious people would witness every single good work provided by Muslim inspired the cadres to hold professionalism\textsuperscript{422}.

The consciousness of maintaining the rules of the game related also to party's metode perjuangan (the method of struggle) inspired mainly by Ikhwan Muslimin\textsuperscript{423}. In this method, the party encouraged the members to think and act systematically to reach the goal. To meet this purpose, the party provided a set of systematic code of conduct or guidance and instructions that the all of the members had to follow. The party also conveyed the relevant materials through various medium, including books, modules and training to preserve discipline and maintain systematic behaviour\textsuperscript{424}. In this circumstance, PKS cadres became familiar with the efforts to systemise their struggle. This includes the familiarisation with the set of the rules of the game that has to be obeyed\textsuperscript{425}. Since the early days of their membership, the cadres had been infused by the party to figure out the importance of the party

\textsuperscript{421} Interview with Amri Yusra, M.Si, the Chairperson of Depok DPD of PKS (2002-2004), Member of Parliament of Depok District, West Java, (2004-2009), and Lecturer at Political Sciences Department, Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010; with Dr. Kamarudin, Indonesian Islamic political party expert and Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010; and with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-2010), in Tangerang, 21 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{422} Interview with Dr. Kamarudin, Indonesian Islamic political party expert and Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{423} Interview with Dr. Kamarudin, the Expert of Indonesian Islamic Political Party and Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010.


\textsuperscript{425} Interview with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS (2002), and personal secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of PKS and The Chairperson of MPR of Republic of Indonesia), in Jakarta, 12 October 2010.
procedure as a part of their ideological tasks. One of the main impacts of this effort was the self-discipline development and the awareness to follow the instruction and the rules of the game.

Moreover, cadres were also infused by the commitment to value party's system. In this regard, PKS underpinned the importance to be consistent with the system and the rules of the game, rather than to rely on the individuals in managing and developing organisation. PKS considered itself as the party that free from dependency towards any particular person.

According to Sitaresmi, the party asked cadres to be always consistent in following party's procedure. She said that “we are advised to obey the rules of the game, to the institution, to Majelis Syura”. In addition, she said that Hilmi Aminuddin, as the party’s prominent figure, believed that the continuity of the party’s existence would more depend on the system rather than people. Aminuddin said that the party could not rely on any person that would someday leave the party or die. In this circumstance, according to Yusra, the cadres even could challenge or debate any important figures in the party including Aminuddin. Hence, the respected figures in this party were the individuals who maintained consistently the party

426 Interview with Untung Wahono, Head of Department of Research and Development of DPP of PK (2000-2003), Head of Department of Politics and Defence of DPP of PKS (2002-2005), and Chairperson of MPP of PKS (2010-2015), in Jakarta 27 October 2010; with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010.


428 Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010.

429 Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010.

430 Interview with Amri Yusra, M.Si, Chairperson of Depok DPD of PKS (2002-2004), Member of Parliament of Depok District, West Java, (2004-2009), and Lecturer at Political Sciences Department, Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010.
According to Machmudi, in fact some important figures such as Tifatul Sembiring or Anis Matta or the group that was suspected to be “the dominant group” led by Matta did not have privilege in decision-making process, since they only could influence the process and not determine the result.

3. The Implementation Situation and Tendencies

3.1. Majelis Syura as the Pre Eminent Body

During the first decade of reform era, PKS’ cadres agreed that MS was the only legal institution to create the regulation and policies that guided party’s programs and activities. The cadres also considered that MS should fulfil its role based on the procedure. In general, the cadres’ positive attitude towards MS, as a main body in the decision-making process, reflected party’s commitment on the procedural leadership.

The case of the 2004 Presidential Election illustrated the commitment to consider MS as the only legal institution to discuss and to decide strategic policies. Prior to the election the cadres were divided into two groups. One group believed that Wiranto was the best president candidate for PKS. Another group considered Rais as the proper candidate for the party. Wiranto’s supporters were mostly youth cadres.

431 Interview Subhan Akbar with Nur Mahmudi Ismail, the first president of PK, in Akbar, Partai Keadilan: Faktor-Faktor Penguat Soliditas, in attachment.

432 Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer in Indonesia, Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the cadres who signed PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 11 August 2009.

433 Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer in Indonesia, Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the cadres who signed PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 11 August 2009; with Amri Yusra, Amri Yusra, M.Si, Chairperson of Depok DPD of PKS (2002-2004), Member of Parliament of Depok District, West Java, (2004-2009), and Lecturer at Political Sciences Department, Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of Indonesia, by phone, 13 December 2009; with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010.

and local figures, mainly from eastern part of Indonesia, led by the General Secretary Anis Matta. They believed that the party had to support a candidate who had a better opportunity to win the election. They considered the Wiranto’s opportunity to win the election was reasonably open, since he would also be supported by Golkar Party that had just won the election. On the other hand, they saw Rais as the figure that had a less opportunity to win, hence would bring nothing to the party. Some of them even questioned Rais’ sincere commitment towards PKS. Moreover, they also regarded Wiranto as the figure that had sympathetic attitude towards dakwah interests. In fact, his daughters were the member of Jamaah Tarbiyah.

On the other hand, the Rais’ supporters, led by PKS President Hidayat Nur Wahid, regarded him as the most ideal candidate who would provide many advantages for the Muslims compared to other candidates. Rais was the former leader of Muhammadiyah and former member of the Expert Board of Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (the Indonesia Muslim Intellectual Association/ICMI) who had a close relationship to the Islamic communities. They also considered his strong commitment, as one of the reform movement’s prominent figures, to establish clean government, to enact social justice and to clean up militarism in politics. These agendas were in line with PKS political agendas. On the other hand, they regarded the candidate with military background such as Wiranto will provide a bad reputation for PKS and the dakwah movement. This mostly related to his infamous reputation.

436 Waluyo, Kebangkitan Politik Dakwah. Kosep dan Praktik Politik Partai Keadilan Sejahtera di Masa Transisi, p.213. On Matta’s support to Wiranto, see Tempo, 09, XXXIII, 26 April-02 Mei 2004. See also Kompas, 2 July 2004. In this case, as a popular and influential figure, Matta was supported by young figures, including Fachri Hamzah, Rama Pratama – two central figures of the 1998 student movement – and Dr. Zulkifliemansyah a young intellectual.
439 Defy Ruspiyandi, ”Menebak Arah Dukungan PKS”, Pikiran Rakyat, 21 June 2004. Supporters of Wiranto also pointed to the fact that this retired general was supported by Golkar as the strongest party in the recent election, with Solahuddin Wahid, an Islamic scholar and NU figure as candidate for the vice president.
440 Hidayat was supported by senior figures such as the late K.H Rahmat Abdullah and Tifatul Sembiring. This group established strategic relations to Rais’ other supporter groups and accompanied Rais to meet the people, to realise its purpose, see ibid, pp. 209-214.
441 Interview with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010.
during the Soeharto era as the highest leader of Indonesia armed forces. Both camps over time developed significant approaches to Wiranto and Rais.

However, although these two groups tried devotedly to win their candidate, they did not see such commitment as the reason to leave party’s procedure. In fact, they agreed to use party’s mechanism to solve this problem by handing in it to MS. This attitude was in proportion to the party’s statute, which stated that MS had an authority to stipulate the strategic policies, including the names of the president and vice-president candidate that would be officially supported by the party.

These two camps agreed to hold the MMS on 29th June 2004. After MS gave each group an opportunity to convey their arguments, MS subsequently made a decision. The decision was opposite to the will of Matta or Aminuddin, two important figures in this party. PKS formally recommended and asked all the cadres and sympathisers to support Rais in the election. After the final decision was declared by MS, the supporter of Wiranto committed to realise the result of the MMS.

Another case that showed the commitment towards MS related to the policy to remain in the President Yudhoyono Government coalition. Before the party stipulated a decision, many cadres actually wanted the party to leave the coalition. Some DPWs, such as in Jakarta and Yogyakarta, had stated the importance to leave

---

442 Interview with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010.
443 The 2002 AD of PKS Article 12 (1.d).
444 The 2005 AD of PKS Article 11 (2.l).
445 On the comprehensive considerations to recommend M. Amien Rais-Siswono Yudho Husodo as the candidate President-Vice President see R. Alex Sandi, Sikap Politik Partai Keadilan Sejahtera terhadap Pilpres 2004 dan Pemerintahan Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Studi Kasus Psikologi Politik Partai Dakwah, MA Thesis, (Depok: Islamic Studies and Psychology, Middle East and Islamic Studies Program, Post Graduate Program, University of Indonesia, 2006).
the coalition. For them, the party should perform this manoeuvre to prove its commitment as the defender of public interest. This discourse became more popular since the Secretary General Matta stated that the Yudhoyono Government had broken the political contract between him and the PKS, particularly in the point that he would not repeat any mistake committed by the previous government (the New Order Government) that had harmed the life of the people. In light to this situation, hence, for Matta, it was the appropriate time for PKS to leave coalition.

The political option to leave government coalition became one of the most important discourses in the PKS’ history. This option related to the government policy to raise the price of the Bahan Bakar Minyak (the Petroleum/BBM), as an impact of the reduction of government subsidy. For the government, this policy was inevitable, since the oil world price became higher, and continually increased. In President Yudhoyono and his economic team’s perspective, if the government provided continually oil subsidy to the people, the state’s financial would collapse soon.

Although the reason behind this policy, to some extent, was understandable, practical speaking, the policy to reduce BBM subsidy had created anxiety and tense among people. Besides the problem of the BBM price, that shook people’s lives, in general the performance of Yudhoyono economic team was still far from convincing. For many people, Yudhoyono government’s economic reform ran slowly. Several government policies still did not provide any good impacts for the people and were insignificant for increasing people’s prosperity. With this regard, the President of the Party Tifatul Sembiring agreed to withdraw PKS ministers from Yudhoyono government.

---

448 Interview with Dr. Kamarudin, Indonesian Islamic political party expert and Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok; with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 6 December 2005.

449 This was because for them the Memorandum of Understanding had actually been broken by SBY and they were worried PKS would potentially suffer, if PKS still engaged in the coalition. Interview with Dr. Kamarudin, Indonesian Islamic political party expert and Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok; with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 6 December 2005.

450 On Matta’s opinion to opt out from the coalition, see ’’Tak Ada Koalisi Tanpa Perubahan’’, in Saksi, No.6/VIII/30 November 2005, pp. 7-9.

The three ministers from PKS even had been warned by their party colleagues to leave their positions soon.

However, not all cadres agreed to the discourse to leave the coalition. For this camp, although the party indeed had to be critical towards the government, leaving the coalition was not urgent. They believed that PKS’ main duty as the partner of coalition was to provide solution and not to make a radical movement by leaving the coalition. In relation to this situation, cadres seemed to be fractured into two camps.

In facing this situation, cadres once again agreed to conduct the MMS to be the medium to solve the problem. Although in that time the endorsement to leave the coalition seemed getting stronger, and for some cadres became a correct decision, the party was not taken in by the situation. PKS chose to implement procedural mechanism in order to avoid abrupt and unconstitutional policy.

As a response to this, the MS held the MMS on 26th-27th November 2005. At that point, two opposite options were properly discussed. The final decision stated to win the choice to stay in the coalition. In order to avoid misunderstandings, PKS then held press conference to convey the information on its official position. PKS stated that although the party acknowledged the poor performance of Yudhoyono government's economic team and for that reason proposed a cabinet reshuffle, it was also its moral obligation to help the government to solve national problem, which would not be effectively conducted if PKS left the coalition. Therefore, the decision to stay in the coalition related to maintaining the access in government for the effectiveness in giving assistance to solve national problems.

Albeit it sometimes created dissatisfaction, the attitude to follow procedure as the way to reach the goals provided a good lesson for the cadres. A reasonable and popular idea in the end still had to be struggled through the constitutional ways in the party. This attitude did not make MS lost its credibility in the eye of the most cadres.

454 Syihabuddin, “Majelis Syura, Alternatif "Demokrasi-Islam”, dan Ketaatan Kader PKS”.
The cadres realised that MS was the only appropriate media to decide any strategic policies. In addition, this attitude also indicates party’s independency in making a policy. PKS happened to be a party that was able to overcome a pressure from its political environment, including from seeking popularity and accepting the intervention of the interests of individuals or certain groups, when carrying out decision-making process. This autonomy according to Randall and Svasand indicates the presence of party institutionalisation.

In relation to the party fragmentation, the cases of dismissal sometime also became the main problem that triggered such phenomenon. The phenomenon of dismissal also occurred in PKS. This involved cadres from all levels. However, this process did not raise tenses among cadres. In general, this happened because the party tried to implement the procedure reliably in order to preclude any intervention from figures or other institutions – including from the MS that could potentially agitate objectivity and created unfairness – and treated members equally. In this case, although MS was the most important body in the party, it could not intervene to other bodies work domain. In the case of internal court, that supposed to be the domain of DS, MS could not determine the result.

For instance, in the case of Syamsul Balda dismissal, one of party’s founding fathers and thinkers, and member of MS, DS carried out freely an investigation to inspect the accusation on him for having an affair with another cadre. After this process finished, DS gave Balda the opportunity to defend himself in a special forum held by this body. This forum should be an opportunity for Balda to prove his case. However, since Balda could not convincingly prove his case, DS eventually decided to dismiss him. During the process, MS kept its objectivity and did not order an exceptional treatment for Balda, although he was one of the MS members. The chairperson of MS also did not use his position to encourage or to obstruct the investigation process towards this one of famous cadres.

DS could also ask MS members to explain their political manoeuvres. It happened, for instance, to Matta, who was also the Party’s General Secretary.

---

457 Interview with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS (2002), and personal secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of PKS and Chairperson of MPR of Republic of Indonesia), in Jakarta, 12 October 2010; with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 October 2010.

Before DSP, Matta had to explain his moderate attitudes particularly in dealing with nationalism and pluralism issues that was in that time regarded as ideologically confusing and controversial by many cadres\(^{459}\). Ahmad Firman was also a member of MS when DS asked him to explain his decision to allow non-Muslims joining the party\(^{460}\). In those cases, MS again let the process carried out in line with the party procedure, in which DS had right to perform its function freely. DS eventually released Matta and Firman from the punishment after they could explain convincingly the reasons in conducting their political manoeuvres before the internal court.

In the case of Yusuf Supendi, another MS member, however, DS sentenced him with dismissal. He was dismissed from his position as a member of MS in 2006 after he rejected to implement MS sanction. His special position as a MS member, who also at the same time a Vice Chairperson of DS, and one of PKS founding fathers did not help him from the party’s sanction. This sanction was given for Supendi’s misconduct behaviours, mainly financial corruption, and denied the call of BPDO two times in June 2007 and October 2008\(^{461}\). After the party conducted some trials to asses his attitudes, the party dismissed him from the party in 2009. Three main reasons of his dismissal were (1) avoiding his obligation as MP to make financial contribution to the party, (2) his rejection to carry out party’s sanctions for his mistakes, and (3) his disloyalty, particularly unwillingness to preserve the image of the party and continuously provide negative rumours towards the leaders\(^{462}\). In this case, Aminuddin, Chairperson of the MS who had a personal relationship with Supendi rejected to provide him a special treatment\(^{463}\).

3.2. Musyawarah as the Main Way

Besides respecting the existence of MS, the attitude to value the party procedure was also reflected in the commitment to implement *musyawarah* consistently. This

---

\(^{459}\) Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of *Dakwah* Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010.

\(^{460}\) Interview with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, the Head of the III *Dakwah* Region (2002-2005), member of *Majelis Syura* PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 2010.

\(^{461}\) Interview with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, the Head of the III *Dakwah* Region (2002-2005), member of *Majelis Syura* PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 2010.

\(^{462}\) [http://www.pk-sejahtera.org/content/saksi-pks-bacakan-surat-pemecatan-yusuf-supendi](http://www.pk-sejahtera.org/content/saksi-pks-bacakan-surat-pemecatan-yusuf-supendi)

\(^{463}\) Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of *Dakwah* Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010; with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of *Dakwah* Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010. [http://www.pk-sejahtera.org/content/saksi-pks-bacakan-surat-pemecatan-yusuf-supendi](http://www.pk-sejahtera.org/content/saksi-pks-bacakan-surat-pemecatan-yusuf-supendi).
commitment created the spirit of collectivism in which the leadership of the party was not based on elitism or personal interest, but on the spirit of consultation. As mentioned by Machmudi, the party’s official policies were always the result of the consultation held by MS that involves all members of this institution.\textsuperscript{464}

In the decision-making process, all members of MS, which until 2008 consisted of 52 people, were treated equally. MS did not bestow special position for MS chairperson or some members who held the highest position in other institutions such as Chairperson of MPP, Chairperson of DSP, the Party President, the party’s General Secretary or the General Treasury. They could not force, individually or collectively, other members to follow their interest.\textsuperscript{465} The special right given to the chairperson of MS related to the voting process. This right was applied in the situation where each proposal of policy had similar number of vote. The proposal that was supported by MS chairperson should be the winner.\textsuperscript{466}

Moreover, the senior members or prominent figures did not exploit their position to push their interests, let alone to take individual advantages.\textsuperscript{467} These figures, regardless their past important contribution to develop Jamaah Tarbiyah and the party, in general respected the party constitution and were willing to build up a dialog. The behaviour of Aminuddin reflected this situation. According to several MS members, Aminuddin in his capacity as the Chairperson of MS had never committed to support a policy based on his personal interest.\textsuperscript{468} MS members sometimes even did not support his opinion easily in the decision-making process.

\textsuperscript{464} Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer in Indonesia, Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the cadres who signed PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 11 August 2009.

\textsuperscript{465} Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010; with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010; with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010; with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, the Head of the III Dakwah Region (2002-2005), member of Majelis Syura PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 2010; with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{466} The 2005 ART of PKS Article 13 (6).

\textsuperscript{467} Interview with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{468} Interview with Sigit Sosiantomo, the Regional Coordinator for East Java and Bali of PKS (2005-2009), in Jakarta, 25 October 2010; with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, the Head of the III Dakwah Region (2002-2005), member of Majelis Syura PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 2010; with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS (2002), and personal secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of PKS and The Chairperson of MPR of Republic of Indonesia), in Jakarta,
Moreover, the implementation of *musyawarah* also did not only enhance the spirit of consultation, but also practically sometimes made the process to stipulate a policy become difficult to do. MS had initially to pass a profound negotiation or hearing before concluding a policy. According to Mardani Sera, the situation of the MMS, led by Aminuddin, was dynamic and intense, where each member of MS had vast opportunity to convey their opinions and to provide contribution\textsuperscript{469}. In many cases, Aminuddin merely took a role as someone who guided the forum or as a moderator and not as an absolute determinant factor\textsuperscript{470}. Only in some delicate cases, particularly when the forum found a deadlock situation he would play as determiner\textsuperscript{471}.

In the case of 2004 election, the strategic position of Aminuddin and Matta could not have automatically brought victory. These two irreplaceable figures – that gained trust to hold their structural positions more than one time\textsuperscript{472} – could not push easily their interest to be a party’s policy. This situation showed symbolically the commitment to prioritise party’s procedure rather than a prominent figures’ opinion. Hence, the decision-making process also proves that the party was not directed or dictated by a limited group or a few persons and the fame was not everything in this party. Related to this situation, Aminuddin acknowledged that as the highest leader in this party he had no authority in determining the name of the supported candidate for the presidential elections. He clearly stated: “the decision about the presidential nomination is in the domain of *Majelis Syura*, not the Chairperson of *Majelis Syura*”\textsuperscript{473}. The case of the BBM indicates the same situation. In this case, the popular persons – such as President of the Party Sembiring and Secretary General

\textsuperscript{12} October 2010; with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former *tarbiyah* activist leader former *tarbiyah* activist leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{469} Interview with Dr. Mardani Ali Sera, Vice Chairperson of MPP PKS (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 6 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{470} Interview with Dr. Kamarudin, Indonesian Islamic political party expert and Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010; with Amri Yusra, former MP for DPRD Depok from PKS by phone, 13 December 2009.

\textsuperscript{471} Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{472} Hilmi Aminuddin, Chairperson of MS for 2005-2010 period was re-elected to hold his previous position in the 2010 MMS. Matta held this position since the establishment of PKS in 2002, and was re-elected for to hold the position of the secretary general in 2010 MMS.

Matta that brought popular opinion – were subjected to the procedure of the party. They could not force their opinion to be the party’s opinion, although many cadres disappointed by the government’s performance supported their ideas. This situation means that procedural leadership exists in this party, where the process was prioritised rather than popular interest or popularity.

The debate between two groups in the MMS on 1st July 2004 prior to the presidential election illustrates the situation where the decision-making process was not artificial. Each group, in fact, had a right to state their position and argument. According to “Suara Islam”, the meeting was intense where each camp eagerly tried to convince other camp based on factual findings. After the participants could not reach an agreement by consultation, they agreed on a vote. The result was the majority of MS members wanted the party to support Rais, which according to Wahid consist of around 70% of 44 participants.

Similar condition also occurred in the case of coalition with the Yudhoyono Government. The situation of MMS on this matter was pictured as sangat alot (very though). It was said that, “The meeting to decide the policy was very tough. The meeting was initially set up from 10.00 am to 16.00 pm. However, until 17.00 pm there were still no signs indicating that the meeting was about to finish. Not until one hour latter, the information about the party position on the continuation of the coalition was conveyed”. This situation proved the seriousness of the participants in conducting debate. In this situation, where each group had the same opportunity, the power of argument most likely would become more influential rather than the structural position. The fact that the latter was not always powerful, since not every options supported by the people who hold important position in the party – including the president of the party or the secretary general of the party – would easily come first.

The implementation of musyawarah was also reflected by the involvement of cadres in strategic policies making process. This implementation could be seen in the

475 Gatra, 2 July 2004.
event to select the person, representing the party in the national and local elections. The stipulation process on the candidate for local MP or the head of government would depend on the input or evaluation from the local cadres. For this reason, the party opened the opportunity for the cadres to participate in this process.

In the case of 2005 Depok Major Election, for instance, the Depok DPD provided an opportunity to kader inti and koordinator wilayah (the area coordinator/ Korwil), that coordinate the party at the village level, to participate in evaluating and determining the candidate for Major of Depok. The hundreds of kader inti were involved in selecting ten people from hundreds of names. The selection result (the ten names) then was conveyed and socialised by the DPD to Korwils to be evaluated. The comments of Korwils would determine the level of appropriateness of each candidate. The result of this process was subsequently evaluated at the DPD Depok level in the forum called as Syura of DPD, involved all members of committee. The result was a matrix on the quality of each name, which then became the main measurement to determine who would be the candidate of the Major of Depok representing PKS (See in Appendix 16). In this situation, the main functions of the Syura of DPD were merely to make criterion and to score based on that criterion of each candidate that had been selected and suggested by hundreds of kader inti and Korwils. This mechanism according to Yusra proved the existence of a real participative system and freedom of expression, which essentially shows the existence of internal democracy in the party.

The similar situation also occurred at the national level, particularly for the presidential election. In this occasion, the party held a national selection process to grasp aspiration from the cadres about the candidate to be proposed by PKS for the president. To reach a comprehensive result, PKS organised some internal polling, which result would became the basis for MS to make a decision in the forum MMS. PKS for instance conducted Jaring Capres Emas (the Golden President Candidate Selection) to seek the most wanted people in the eye of cadres and sympathisers to represent this party in the presidential election.

---


For this purpose, DPP set up some criteria to select the name. The criteria included the eagerness to protect *wong cilik* (the poor), the willingness to work with every elements of the nation and accepted by international community. The party then asked directly to the cadres and sympathisers by giving them formulir (the open questioner) organised by the DPW. In this process, party allowed the cadres to nominee any names to be party’s presidential candidate. As the result, several names mentioned in this polling, including figures from outside party such as M. Amien Rais (reform leader), Abdullah Gymanstyar (famous preacher from Bandung), Din Syamsudin (intellectual figure from *Muhammadiyah*), Wiranto and Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono. After around a week latter, these names were processed by the DPP based on the criteria afterwards. DPP subsequently would ask the selected person for his willingness to represent the party in the presidential election.

Prior to the 2004 election, the internal polling indicated Dr. Hidayat Nur Wahid as the most popular figure to be the next president and mentioned other names as proper figure for PKS, including Rais and Yudhoyono. However, since the party only reached around 7.4% of votes, PKS decided not to propose the candidate from its own cadres. This decision based on the internal agreement concluded by the MMS in January 2004. The agreement stated that the commitment to propose a cadre to be a president candidate from internal party would be conducted if the party could reach 20% of votes in the 2004 legislative election. Moreover, the party would consider joining the government, if the party could reach at least 3% of votes. Therefore, even though the former PKS President Wahid was the most wanted figure to be the president, the party eventually selected Rais as the president candidate from PKS in the 2004 presidential election.

The internal selections, to determine party leadership and to fill important positions, also indicated the significant involvement of cadres. As mentioned in the constitution of the party, the election of MS members involved all *kader inti*. In its development, the party’s constitution also mentioned a kind of guideline for this process. The first step of this process was to set up an election committee,

---

483 *The 2002 AD of PKS Article 11 (2); The 2005 AD of PKS Article 8 (1).*
conducted by DPTP, to select around 1,000 *kader ahli* (the expert-cadres) from across the country. The selection based on some criteria, mentioned in the AD, such as had been a member of the party for at least five years, and had experience in both structural and functional party management\(^484\). From this step, the election committee then decreed hundreds of eligible candidate to be elected as MS member. Around thirty thousands *kader inti*, subsequently elected these candidates to be the member of MS\(^485\).

The new elected members then held an internal meeting to select some experts to become member of MS. The member of the MS also conducted internal election to elect the chairperson of this body. In this process, every member of MS had an equal chance to be elected. The MMS, held on 26\(^{th}\)-29\(^{th}\) May 2005 in Jakarta, elected Aminuddin as the Chairperson of MS for five-year term. He was elected through closed-voting mechanism and gained 29 of 50 votes. (See Table 8).

**Table 8**
The Result of the Election for the Chairperson of the MS In 2005 MMS II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Candidates</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>K.H Hilmi Aminuddin</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.H Dr. Salim Segaf Al Jufri</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.H Dr. Surahman Hidayat</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.H Abdul Hasib</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The result indicates that although Aminuddin was sometimes regarded as “the godfather” in *Jamaah Tarbiyah* and the PKS, 21 members of MS or around 42% of total members did not vote for him. It shows to some extent a kind of freedom of expression in this party. Democracy in this party, which was supported by the rules of the game, revealed in the life of the party. As mentioned by one cadre, “I think internal situation in PKS was fairly democratic. We can see it from the succession of the party leaders from the national level to the local level”\(^486\).

4. **Impacts to the Party: The Preservation of Cohesion**

\(^{484}\) *The AD of PK Article 15; The 2002 ART of PKS Article 6 (1); The 2005 ART of PKS Article 7(1).*


\(^{486}\) Romli, “Model Pelembagaan Partai Politik di Indonesia: Studi Kasus Partai Keadilan Sejahtera”, p. 64.
4.1 The Development of Trust

The consistency in implementing the rules of the game in making policy and holding the distribution of authority enabled party to prevent distrust and internal conflict. Prihandoko believed that the turmoil could be avoided since the party could maintain its consistency in implementing party procedure over time. He stated that there were two important things in the eye of the PKS' cadres related to the decision-making process, namely the decision should be based on the procedure and was still in line with the party’s ideology. The situation would be potentially very chaotic in the PKS if the party was not able to prove its commitment to maintain party procedure and ideology when conducting decision-making process.

Some critical perspectives indicated the authoritarian tendencies of this party, by mostly establishing their argument on the superiority position of Aminudin, Chairperson of MS and Matta, Party’s General Secretary. For some critical persons, the role of Matta was very influential in the party, particularly in the decision-making process. They even said that the party was actually on his hand, provided no room for other elites and ordinary cadres to take a significant participation in the party. However, for many cadres the Matta's important position in decision-making process was normal. It was merely the result of his capability to convince other members of MS. They did not see it as the result of manipulation, since his opinion on strategic policies should be discussed first by all of the MS' members. In relation with this situation Prihandoko said that “there will be massive exoduses if Anis (Matta) or Ustadz Hilmi (Aminuddin) takes policies that were not in line with the party principles”.

Moreover, by proportionally using the mechanism of the MMS, MS was able to preserve the respect towards itself, which paved the way the preservation of

---

490 Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 October 2010.
respecting the party itself. Cadres over time witnessed the consistency of this body in upholding the rules of the game proportionally, including treating all the members of MS equally. The party still provide some privileges to its leaders, including in the decision making process. However, in general such privileges were still tolerable, in which they did provided a power for the leaders to overshadow the existence of the procedure in making policy.

Under such circumstance, the cadres also believed that the party will not take easily unilateral or unconstitutional actions that could endanger their future. Yusra stated that since the cadres believed that the party and the elites who were in charge in MS would use party mechanism as a mean of action consistently, they felt comfortable and secure491. In line with such opinion, Umar Basalamah stated that in PKS the cadres felt secure since no one could treat them unfairly including the elites492. Mustofa stated that consistency had preserved confidence for cadres at the grass root level that they will have an equal treatment if something happened to them493. Hence the establishment of trust in this party was not only a result of systematic cadrerization, which will be discussed in the Chapter X, but also as a consequence of consistency in conducting the rules of the game.

Besides trust, the consistency to implement procedure in decision-making process had satisfied a vast majority of the cadres. It related mainly to the opportunity to convey their opinion not only in terms of defending their case at the internal tribunal but also having a significant role in decision-making process. The opportunity to speak up, defend their opinion and even to colour party policies – by joining, for instance, the internal election in selecting the members of MS and MP candidates and having an opportunity to be heard in the local consultation -- made the cadres felt that their existence was in vain.

Although sometimes the party did not implement their opinions, which for some cadres became a very disappointing situation, the vast majority of the cadres

491 Interview with Amri Yusra, M.Si, Chairperson of Depok DPD of PKS (2002-2004), Member of Parliament of Depok District, West Java, (2004-2009), and Lecturer at Political Sciences Department, Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010.
492 Interview with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS (2002), and personal secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of PKS and The Chairperson of MPR of Republic of Indonesia), in Jakarta, 12 October 2010.
493 Interview with Mustofa, cadre of PKS and former reporter of Profetik Magazine, established by cadres of PKS, in Depok, 7 October 2010.
could understand it. For them at least the party had given the cadres opportunity to express their opinions. The opportunity to get involved and influence party’s policies, at the local level, through some local consultations and activities, was even wider. It happened since they have more direct access to the daily party’s activities, including in the policy making process.\footnote{Interview with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010.} Above opportunities actually had convinced PKS’ cadres that the party did not leave and underestimate them.

Furthermore, by having the opportunity to join the process of internal elections, to Matta, each cadre in essence would bear equal responsibility. They could not blame other cadres if the party faced a trouble caused by wrongdoing of their leaders.\footnote{“PKS Gelar Pemilihan Raya Majelis Syura”, \textit{Media Indonesia}, 22 Februari 2010.} Furthermore, this mechanism would also build up the sense of belonging among cadres. Matta said, “we intentionally use this model of election to implement internal democracy that involved all cadres. Therefore, the decision of MS was not centralised to some people, but belongs to all cadres.”\footnote{“PKS Gelar Pemilihan Raya Majelis Syura”, \textit{Media Indonesia}, 22 Februari 2010.} In addition, this process was also fundamentally a medium to control the leaders’ quality. Those who had not given significant contribution to the party would almost likely be avoided in this process. With these all of the situations, the existence of \textit{musyawarah} and internal election made the cadres felt engaged directly with the MS and the party’s committee, which eventually also contributed to the internal stability preservation.\footnote{Syihabuddin, “Majelis Syura, Alternatif ‘Demokrasi Islam’, dan Ketaatan Kader PKS”, p.7.}

\section*{4.2. Upholding Party Cohesion}

The existence of trust and satisfaction caused the consolidation of resistance towards party and elites or conflict formalisation among cadres became difficult to perform. The existence of trust made the negative rumours encounter difficulty to trigger cadres to do unproductive actions for the part solidity. Even when the conflict potential had existed, it did not automatically provoke the cadres to take unnecessary or extreme actions. The trust preserved the consciousness of making confirmation before taking actions.\footnote{Interview with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010.} In general, when conflict potential occurred, the cadres would report it almost automatically to the party apparatus with the confidence that
the party would handle it properly\textsuperscript{499}. In the situation where rumours could not easily provoke the cadres, the process of reducing conflict potential became easier.

This situation can be seen in the cases related to the national policy making-process, involving many elements with different points of view. Almost all cases ended without tracing a significant and permanent factionalisation, which terminated the destructive elements to appear. In the case of the 2004 Presidential Election, after the final decision was declared by the MS, different opinions on the president candidate ended. Matta commented that even though he initially was the supporter of Wiranto, but when the party decided to support Rais, he could not find any reasons to neglect the party’s instruction that had been stipulated procedurally. Hence, in its development, the “internal factionalism” was eventually ended as well as the conflict potential.

A similar situation happened in the case of BBM. Although tension among cadres was quite high particularly before the decision was made, it then gradually disappeared after the party, through MMS, decided to remain in the government coalition. In its development, by being able to preserve trust, the party so far could avoid the development of distrust that could endanger the unity of the party and terminate it. In the BBM’s case, that triggered a reaction to questioning the position of PKS in the government coalition, many cadres, in fact, changed their mind. The present of trust towards the leaders had encouraged cadres to support the decision to remain in the coalition\textsuperscript{500}. The existence of trust, which was followed by systematic socialisation\textsuperscript{501}, had successfully lessened negative assumptions towards party and other members. Party fragmentation could be avoided by PKS accordingly.

The case of dismissal also showed similar path. Until 2008, different with several other parties, the case of dismissal did not trigger any prolonged internal polemics. Although in some cases some critical persons criticised the way the party took the decision, it did not shake internal unity. In those cases, the cadres generally considered that the process taken by the party was still in line with the spirit of

\textsuperscript{499} Interview with Nooryanto, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Bekasi DPD of PKS, in Bekasi, 7 November 2010.

\textsuperscript{500} Prabowo, 	extit{Pengaruh Taklim Rutin Terhadap Prilaku Politik Kader Partai Keadilan Sejahtera dana Perspektif Teori Intergroup Relation}, pp. 47-49.

\textsuperscript{501} As mentioned by Tifatul Sembiring that after the meeting finished the members of MS travelled to their constituent and many local areas to socialise the policy and to explain reasons behind a decision, “PKS Tetap Mendukung SBY-JK”, 	extit{Republika}, 28 November 2005.
constitution, run through procedural approaches, and had legal justification. For this reason, after the party stipulated cadres’ dismissal PKS could avoid conflict escalation and maintain internal stability.

In 2011, however, Supendi, expelled by the party back in 2009, summoned PKS to the court. This phenomenon was unique and happened for the first time in the PKS’ history. Supendi accused some elites of the party for having committed a violation to the party procedure when dismissing him. The party denied such accusation. According to the party, the entire dismissal process had followed the party's procedure, including by joining DSP as the authoritative body in that process. The party then launched a statement mentioned that the party, based on the letter of decision number SK.DPP.No.115/skep/dpp-pks/1430, had formally dismissed him in 2009. Moreover, PKS President Luthfi H. Ishaq said that PKS would unveil such process in detail in the court. In February 2012, *Pengadilan Negeri Jakarta Selatan* (The South Jakarta District Court) refused Supendi’s lawsuit and stated that his dismissal was legal and in line with the party procedure.

A part of that, Supendi’s manoeuvre did not attract the greater cadres. Some people believed that such situation was a reflection of uncritical cadres, formed by PKS as a result of systematic indoctrinations. However this phenomenon was actually an indication that no significant procedural violation occurred in the Supendi’s case. As mentioned by Prihandoko, most of PKS cadres were critical personalities with high education backgrounds. In that situation, on the one hand, they would react if they found something odd in the implementation of the party procedure. On the other hand, they would not easily accept information without conducting verification. Although for some the case of Supendi could be regarded as a symptom of the imperfectness of procedure implementation in PKS, the case itself was still debatable. Therefore his case could not be used as a finding to generalise the real situation in this party. In fact this case was refused by The South Jakarta District Court.

---


5. **Overview**

The policy to consistently prioritise MS in policy-making process was an important characteristic of PKS. However, it did not make this institution enjoy a position above the law. The phenomenon of power personalisation, for instance, did not occur. In fact, MS respected other institution’s authorities and conducted power delegation. The commitment to implement procedural leadership had also been reflected by the attitude to prioritise *musyawarah*. This situation was in line with the party’s commitment to build a party based on the spirit of honouring the system rather than blindly following the will of the leaders’ interests. In light to this situation, the PKS did not recognise any special figures that could enjoy special treatments in the party\(^{507}\). During the first decade of its existence, the PKS was, overall, also able to preserve its consistency in implementing the rules of the game.

The presence of this commitment, although was not totally perfect, had saved the party from internal confrontation. Some objections indeed occurred and in fact became unavoidable. Nevertheless, it did not appeal cadres to use these moments to develop factions. This indicated that the party’s decision was actually understandable and acceptable for most cadres or at least was not something that totally contradictory with the rules of the game. The situation would be contra-productive if the party intentionally went to different direction in understanding and undergoing the constitution. The party’s members, who were continuously encouraged by the party to appreciate the internal system, would be very cautious with this matter\(^ {508}\). In short, the consistency in implementing the rules of the game had maintained the cadres’ trust towards the party, elites and other members, which eventually became one of the important capitals for PKS to preserve its cohesion.

---

\(^{507}\) Even, Dr. Hidayat Nur Wahid, ex-president of the party and the General Chairperson of the MPR who had a regional reputation, after finishing his duties, today became an ordinary member who has similar rights and duties with other members.

\(^{508}\) Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 October 2010; with Mustofa, cadre of PKS and former reporter of Profetik Magazine, established by cadres of PKS, in Depok, 7 October 2010.
Chapter VII
Conflict Resolution Mechanism: The Case of PKB

"I really believe that fragmentation would not come about if Badan Kehormatan (the Council of Honour) existed" (Agus Suflihat) 509.

1. Introduction

This and the following chapter will discuss the role of conflict resolution mechanism (CRM), as one of party institutionalisation elements, in the internal fragmentation or cohesion. This chapter talks about the situation of CRM in PKB, which indicates the absence of the CRM in this party. For such purpose this chapter will elaborate some aspects namely the condition of CRM, the development of the internal situations and the impact of those situations on the party. The failure of PKB in institutionalising CRM eventually contributes to disadvantageous for the creation of proper response to internal conflict and localising internal conflict, which diminished the party's ability to evade fragmentation. In addition, this and the next chapter implements the CRM as part of attempts that dealing with the conflict termination management and containment, which was reflected by the presence of relevant institutions and the set of the rules of the game. In this regard the conflict prevention, before the conflict happens; and the conflict termination, after the conflict took place were the main subjects of the discussion.

2. The Absence of Formal Conflict Resolution Mechanism (CRM)

One important thing that was overlooked by the founding fathers of PKB was the presence of any rules of the game that regulated conflict resolution. Although internal conflict tended to prolong, the interesting and crucial point of PKB in relation to CRM was that this party did not have clear and direct rules of the game for handling this matter. The constitution of the party used circa 1998-2005 did not contain texts that related directly to this problem. The constitution of the party only provided regulations

that were indirectly related to the conflict containment, namely, firstly, the mechanism and medium that could be used by the party’s cadres when facing a dismissal and secondly, the requirements for provisional dismissal of the member of DPP and relevant matters.

The ART stipulated that the dismissed members could approve a review of their case by a meeting of the highest forum at their committee level of committee, or to the board of the party’s committee at the higher level, where the plenary meeting of the board would decide the status of the cadre510. In the case of the member of DPP, the ART stated that the provisional dismissal could only be conducted in the forum of a Plenary Meeting of DPP. The decision should be based on strong reasons and not contradict the AD/ART, the decrees provided by party meeting forums and the party regulations511.

It was in 2005 that the party eventually mentioned in its constitution a Badan Kehormatan (Council of Honour/BK), as part of the party board for task forces that function as an arbitration body. It was mentioned in Chapter 33 (about other party apparatus) article (2) that “DPP creates Badan Kehormatan to conduct arbitration”512. Although it was most likely that it had not designed merely to solve the conflict, the BK seemed to have a large potential to be used as a medium for conflict resolution513.

However, although it clearly stipulated the existence of BK, the constitution of the party did not provide any detailed explanations about the specific duty of this body. Consequently, this body did not have a clear job domain, including its explicit role and function. The ART also did not arrange the membership and mentioned institutions that eligible to hold the body as the process of selection for that. The issue of independence in executing the policy was also not clearly mentioned. The constitution of PKB, then, was not significantly changed.

510 The 1998 ART of PKB Article 11 (7); The 2000 ART of PKB Article 11 (7); The 2002 ART of PKB Article 11 (7); The 2005 ART of PKB Article 11 (7); The 2008 ART of PKB Article 11 (7).
511 The 1998 ART of PKB Article 19 (2); The 2000 ART of PKB Article 20 (2); The 2002 ART of PKB Article 22 (2); 2005 ART of PKB Article 22 (2).
512 The 2005 AD/ART PKB Article 33 (2)
On the other hand, members of the party in most cases still recognise the forum of *Muktamar*, including MLB), and *Dewan Syura* as the party’s formal instruments for the resolution of internal conflict. Since *muktamar* or MLB was the highest forum for the decision-making process which can be used as the medium to conclude the best policies, including settling disagreements and deciding the results, it was the highest legitimate forum to formulate policies and solve conflicts. As for *Dewan Syura*, its relevance in CRM was mainly due to its strategic position as the highest institution in PKB and the position of *ulama* inside this body, which provided this body with a capacity to give direction and advice on conflict resolution matters. Kacung Maridjan mentioned that the existence of the *ulama* in *Dewan Syura* was hoped to be a significant element to solve a conflict and any related matters. In line with that opinion, according to HZ Arifin Junaidi and Agus Suflihat, *Dewan Syura* was the body that principally should solve problems related to conflict within the party.

However, the party did not explicitly provide both instruments with authority to deal with conflict resolution and related problems. In reality, *Muktamar*, as a national forum involving hundreds of people, could not also be a proper medium to resolve cases that required an immediate response, as not all cases of conflict could be solved in such a large forum. As for *Dewan Syura*, the serious problem concerned the absence of a proper and detailed mechanism and a credible person to contain and solve conflict and in particular when dealing in general with the judicial administration matters. This problem occurred because the body was not designed properly to deal with such subjects and did not require the ability to deal with conflict as a prerequisite skill for membership. Moreover, in some important cases of conflict, in fact, *Dewan Syura* was part of them as it was directly involved. The position of Abdurrahman Wahid, as the general chairperson of this body, created difficulty in creating a fair and objective decision, as in some important conflicts his function was

---

514 This thinking, for instance, became one of foundations for the cadres to reject some of the dismissal policies for the General Chairperson of *Dewan Tanfidz* that were conducted through limited forum.

515 Interview with Prof. Dr. Kacung Marijan, the NU policies’ observer and former member of Assistance Team of the proposal for the establishment of PKB (Rembang version), in Jakarta, 26 November 2010.

concerned. The situation appeared to be more discouraging since other members of this body tended to be just followers of Wahid's interests517.

This situation, to some extent, was a reflection of misguided expectations regarding the possibility of conflict development in this party. According to Maridjan, in the middle of 1998 euphoria situation, most NU members did not think that the party would contain conflict518. If there was conflict, they believed that it would be easily solved by the senior and charismatic ulama in the party, which traditionally plays an important role in conflict resolution through NU ways519. This abandonment of a legal mechanism like CRM was also supported by the situation where many NU people at that time, including PBNU, as the highest formal institution of NU, who projected this party as the main medium to struggle for their interests and agendas. Therefore, at that time, it seemed that the majority of NU people believed that there would not be other large agendas and interests, which potentially decreased the commitment of unity amongst them. The existence of very senior ulama and many important NU leaders, including Wahid, with their influence and ability to unite santri, also supported this assumption, which increased confidence on the solidity of the party520. These general assumptions and situations eventually overshadowed the importance of the creation of CRM or at least a body that would tackle conflict matters

In its development, significant progress in terms of establishing an advance rules of the game to answer internal conflict was still absent in PKB. Some people argued that this situation was an impact from difficult situations faced by the party

517 Khofifah Indar Parawansa described that there was actually Gus Dur who alone decided the result, although there were ten people in a meeting. Interview with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, State Minister for Women Empowerment (1999-2001), Chairperson of the Institute for Election Winning of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010.
518 Interview with Prof. Dr. Kacung Marijan, the NU policies’ observer and former member of the Assistance Team of the proposal for the establishment of the PKB (Rembang version), in Jakarta, 26 November 2010.
519 Interview with Prof. Dr. Kacung Marijan, the NU policies’ observer and former member of the Assistance Team of the proposal for the establishment of the PKB (Rembang version), in Jakarta, 26 November 2010, with Abdul Khalik Ahmad, Secretary of PKB Faction in DPR RI (1999-2001) and General Secretary of PKB- Jalil (2000-2005), in Jakarta, 11 October 2010.
during its first years of existence. This situation included defending President Wahid from his opponent’s political manoeuvres to overthrow him and facing continuous internal conflict, wasted the party energy and created an impediment to internal improvement efforts.

Furthermore, the absence of a formal CRM in PKB could not disassociate this party as it stood on NU traditions or cultures and that in the end considerably dominated the life of the party. In this case, many traditions in NU tended to be implemented in PKB, including the way this organisation solved its internal conflict. In its history, NU experienced internal disputes and conflicts several times but could escape from internal fragmentation, creating confidence among its cadres and followers on the ways this organisation deal with these problems.

NU, however, did not manage CRM comprehensively, since it did not develop any legal procedures to cope with this matter. In general, the organisational tradition in NU tends to avoid strict regulations and relies on the personal approach. According to Soon in the organisation life, NU tended to put forward the tradition and the figure rather than system or management. Consequently, when facing an internal conflict, this organisation implemented informal approach or tradisi (tradition) rather than using legal-formal aspects such as AD/ART.

Some “methods” were used in common in NU to address internal conflict. Firstly, it uses a personal approach. In this very common attitude, conflicting cadres meet each other informally, at home or at some other unofficial venues, to discuss the problems between them on a one-to-one basis to find a solution to their dispute. The reconciliation between Subchan Z.E, a prominent political figure, and Bisri Syansuri, one of NU’s founding fathers, for instance, happened after Subchan had

---

521 Interview with Ahmad Shodiq Noor, General Secretary of DKI Jakarta DPW of PKB, in Jakarta, 3 November 2010; with Abdul Khalik Ahmad, Secretary of PKB Faction in DPR RI (1999-2001) and General Secretary of PKB- Jilil (2000-2005), in Jakarta, 11 October 2010; with Marinah Hardy, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of Western Nusa Tenggara DPW of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010; with Muamir M. Syam, Chairperson of PKB (2005-2010), in Jakarta


asked for an *islah* with Syansuri in Syansuri’s *pesantren*\(^{524}\). Secondly, NU uses a third party. In this case, the conflicting cadres would find and ask the third party to mediate for them in handling their conflict. The third party is usually a figure that respected and agreed by both sides. The case of reconciliation, after experiencing prolonged antagonism between Wahid and his uncle Yusuf Hasyim, showed the role of the third party, namely Abdullah Faqih, a main figure in the group of *ulama khos*, in addressing conflict between those two important figures in NU\(^{525}\).

The third method is to retreat, a situation described by Hirschman as “exit action”. This mechanism includes (1) definitely ending the relationship with the opponent (*muffaraqah*), by making a clear statement of it and (2) leaving the organisation. This mechanism is used when the level of disappointment or the sense of being badly hurt reaches a peak or had become intolerable. The decision of Asa’ad Syamsul Arifin, one of the first generation NU figures, was to treat the *muffaraqah* Wahid, which is an example for the first mechanism. The case to leave the NU such as by Achmad Syaichu, son-in-law of Wahab Chasbullah, one of the NU’s founding fathers, is an example of the previous exit case. After being tricked by Idham Chalid in the election for the position of General Chairperson of *Dewan Tanfidzidiyah*, he left the NU and established the *Ittihadul Muballighin*\(^{526}\).

The fourth way is by using a *muktamar* forum. This forum is relevant to act as a medium for conflict resolution since it has authority to decide, based on participant opinion, which group or person is still acceptable and could continue to perform leadership in the organisation. As a kind of arbitrator, a *muktamar* therefore, could be used as a medium to reconcile all conflicting groups, although sometimes it does not really reduce the conflict potential. Several important conflicts were solved during this forum. These included the case of antagonism between Idham Chalid and Subhan

---


\(^{525}\) This situation shows the importance of seniority based on the religious expertise playing its role in conflict resolution. In addition, according to Choirul Anam in the past the NU had institutionalised this tradition by the existence of sort of an arbitration body called *Islahu Dzatilbain* consisting of *ulama*; that concern to protect the NU from prolonged conflict. However the NU never used this institution anymore, after many very NU senior *ulama* who were as pillar of this institution passed away. Such phenomenon showed that the role of a person is more important rather than the system in the NU. Interview with Choirul Anam, Chairperson of *Dewan Tanfidz* of Eastern Java DPW of PKB (1998-2005) and General Chairperson of *Dewan Tanfidz* of PKB-Alwi (2005-2007), in Jakarta, 13 October 2010.

ZE, two important figures with different opinions on the future of NU (in the 1970’s), or conflict between the “Cipete Camp” (political oriented group) led by Chalid and the “Situbondo Camp” (cultural oriented group) led by Assad Syamsul Arifin and Wahid (in 1982)\textsuperscript{527}.

These methods indicate the informality of NU in dealing with its internal conflict, as these methods were not stated explicitly in its constitution. A Muktamar is the only method written into the constitution, even though it is not directly set up to address internal conflict. Sometimes, the combination of these methods can be found as real examples. NU members then brought this tradition to PKB, which to some extent influences the attitude of PKB’s cadres to conflict resolution. As we will see later, the advice to use a personal approach, finding a third party, using a muktamar forum and even leaving the party became common suggestions that were proposed by the members of PKB in dealing with conflict. In general, the tradition to allow CRM to be less formal became one of NU’s traditions existing in PKB.

However, though it appeared to be a kind of PKB tradition, this situation did not necessarily always bring an advantage to the party. The important cases related to conflict, in fact, somehow showed the need to have formal methods in dealing with conflict, including having an authoritative institution that was directly in charge of such problems, which, unfortunately, the party could not provide during the first decade of its existence.

3. The Internal Dynamics

3.1. Inappropriate Responses to Conflict Potential

Due to the absence of an authoritative body or mechanism pertaining to finding a conflict resolution, having specific duties and a capable persons inside the party, it did not actually have a formal instrument that could legally “force” each conflicting group to meet and create a fair and binding decision for all. According to Junaidi internal conflict resolution became so difficult to reach due to the absence of an institution that legally played as a “sole interpreter” in understanding the

\textsuperscript{527} Ibid., pp. 244-252.
implementation of party constitution. When a crucial different point of view that had a potential conflict trigger occurred, the party could not control and become promptly involved to reduce tension. Consequently, this situation not only did not take into account the different opinions and rumours without the authoritative and honoured body providing a satisfactory explanation, but also encouraged people with different opinions to keep believing the truth of their stand and that it was something that must be defended and implemented.

When believing his presence in the 2001 Special Meeting (SI) as a legal political movement still in line with the interest of the party and as part of his efforts to defend President Wahid, for instance, Matori Abdul Jalil did not find any institutions that could voice and advocate his opinion and encourage the party to consider his opinion. On the contrary, the party simply disregarded his opinion and insisted on it being somewhat inappropriate. Most party elites, instead, tended to pressure Jalil directly or indirectly to accept it. They sometimes regarded Jalil as an opportunist that deserved to be punished.

A similar situation also occurred for Alwi Shihab when different opinions on the policy of larangan rangkap jabatan (the prohibition to have dual position) emerged in 2004. The critics, including Shihab, regarded this policy to be the opposite of the party’s basic policy on the cadres’ right to provide a positive contribution through the many roles or position they held, including the minister. This objection became one of Shihab’s reasons to defend his position. The party, however, did not allow the opportunity for Shihab and generally those who rejected this opinion, to have a proper medium to discuss their opinions. Following this

---


531 DPW PKB Jawa Timur, Data dan Fakta Pelanggaran AD/ART di Muktamar II Semarang, (DPW PKB Jawa Timur, 2005), pp.4-5.

attitude, instead, the party forced Shihab to resign from his position, and follow his preference to join President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s cabinet.

Muhaimin Iskandar also faced a similar situation. The party did not give him a proper chance to defend his position concerning any negative rumours that were circulating, including the accusation of his conspiracy to overthrow Wahid from his position. The party, particularly Wahid, as the General Chairperson of Dewan Syura, simply waived Iskandar’s right, not willing to look for a balanced assessment. Eventually Jalil, Shihab and Iskandar did not stop their efforts to find justice. This case showed the incapability of the party to eliminate the disappointed cadres to confirm and struggle for their opinion and position after stipulating the verdict.

On the other hand, the deficiency of CRM disabled the party in that it did not have a standard forum and mechanism to handle a potential conflict. In this regard, the party used some different forums to respond to similar problems, including determining the future of the cadre. Sometimes, these forums, established abruptly, were based on the suggestions of limited people or influential figures like Wahid. In some cases, the creation of the forum was simply to legalise the unilateral policy rather than to be a forum of discussion, since not all arguments from each side were properly presented in that forum.

In the case of Alwi Shihab-Saifullah Yusuf, for instance, the party conducted the process of discussing and stipulating their future in a plenary meeting without the presence of those people concerned. In the case of Iskandar, the party abruptly held limited and unscheduled forums to discuss urgent rumours concerning him. The result of such limited forums then became the decision of the party. Jalil faced even the worst case, for there was no legal forum of discussion, in determining his future in the party. Wahid stipulated the quick decision on Matori’s dismissal at the president palace when at the same time Matori was attending the 2001 SI of the MPR. This situation, hence, indicated that the absence of CRM provided an opportunity for the elite to be inconsistent or even manipulate the ‘rules of the game’ in responding conflict potential. In their development, such forums not only created controversial policies but also became one of the sources of the problem, which were questioned by the unjustly treated cadres.

533 Interview with Zannubah Ariffah Wahid, General Secretary of PKB- Gus Dur, In Jakarta, 20 October 2010.
Moreover, DPP and particularly *Dewan Syura* as elements hoped to be part of a solution, sometimes reacted defensively without balanced and comprehensive arguments and explanations on the objections made towards its controversial policies or on the development of the conflict. DPP in many important cases, including the cases of the dismissal of Jalil, Shihab and Iskandar, merely stated that the decision was already in line with the party’s constitution and had been agreed by the majority of the meeting participants through a legal medium and therefore could not be contested\(^534\).

In addition, the prejudice held by DPP towards the critics worsened the situation. The party sometimes regarded these critics as merely the representation of inferior, minority or peripheral groups. Sometimes, even Wahid himself stated that they were ‘*maling*’ (thief)\(^535\), a “*pengkhianat*” (traitor)\(^536\) or a *pembohong* (liar)\(^537\) to describe the critic or the opponent. With this attitude, it was most likely that DPP did not regard them as partners or friends who deserved to have good treatment, but as a rival or even an enemy. In short, the party tended to under-estimate their existence by disregarding the critical voices as something that deserved to be properly concerned. Instead, DPP sometimes considered them to be insignificant, thus at heart avoidable. This situation showed that the absence of a proper CRM had reduced the objectivity and the sense of respecting people with different opinions. In such environment, it was difficult to find effective ways to contain conflict in its early stages.

This entire situation thus tended to increase the potential of conflict rather than to decrease it. According to Kamarudin, in this circumstance, it can be understood that if many important figures in the party, whose aspiration was unfairly abandoned, thus became so disappointed\(^538\). Even though they had tried to prove

---


\(^{535}\) Interview with Zannuba Ariffah “Yenny” Wahid, the General Secretary of *Dewan Tanfidz* of PKB-Gus Dur (2008-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010.

\(^{536}\) Kamarudin, *Konflik Internal PKB*, p.103.


\(^{538}\) Interview with Dr. Kamarudin, Islamic Political Party Observer, Lecture at Department of Political Sciences, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010.
their arguments in a correct manner, the party did not offer the positive responses as a just internal court. Kamarudin said that it is understandable if people like Shihab, who had a deep concern to modernise the party, became so upset and angry with his party, since he found it to be managed so carelessly without consideration for the others. This situation, where the cadres could not easily channel their disappointment and aspiration, particularly on justice matters, was lamented by Khofifah Parawansa, saying that the situation as "the absence of the canal of conflict", where sufficient room for a rational conflict management existed in which every person shared the internal equal rights did not exist. This situation, finally instigated many cadres, as had been predicted by Hirschman, to leave the party.

3.2. The difficulty to Localise the Conflict

Another problem resulting from the lack of CRM was the inability to localise the conflict. The absence of the authoritative body brought self-assurance to many cadres to interpret unilaterally the rules of the game. In this situation, it was common if the dissatisfied cadres used their interpretation of the AD/ART to challenge DPP’s version of interpretation. For instance, Wahid’s supporters believed that the constitution granted authority to Wahid, as General Chairperson of Dewan Syura. He could dismiss the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz and this without necessarily having an initial discussion with the other members of the party as the existence of the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz was decided by him. On the other hand, the opponents believed that the constitution of the party implied certain steps that first must be taken before deciding the future of the cadres, let alone the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz. Therefore, an abrupt decision to dismiss the leader of the party was unconstitutional.

539 Interview with Dr. Kamarudin, Islamic Political Party Observer, Lecture at Department of Political Sciences, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010.

540 Interview with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, State Minister for Women Empowerment (1999-2001), Chairperson of the Institute for Election Winning of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010

541 Interview with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, State Minister for Women Empowerment (1999-2001), Chairperson of the Institute for Election Winning of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010; with Dr. Kamarudin, Islamic Political Party Observer, Lecture at Department of Political Sciences, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010.

542 This opinion usually became common for Wahid’s proponents after the dismissal process of General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz. Choirie, PKB Politik Jalan Tengah NU. Ekspertisasi Pemikiran Islam Inklusif dan Gerakan Kebangsaan Pasca Kembal ke Khitah 1926, p.297.

This situation provided the opportunity for any members of the party, not only to have their own understanding and interpretation on the core of the issues, but also to take part in solving the problem based on their interest. These roles should be limited only to authoritative bodies, such as BK, Dewan Syura or the muktamar in the case of PKB. Nevertheless, since those bodies for many were not sufficiently reliable, the phenomenon of “the distribution of authority”, involved many elements and figures, to interpret, decide and instigate an opinion eventually became inevitable. The role of personal or limited group points of view eventually challenged and surpassed the authoritative body’s opinion.

The next development was, due to the absence of authority that had a legitimate right to take control, each conflicting group felt that they were not only entitled to keep their interpretation but also had right to distribute it to all members of the party. Each group keenly wanted to extend their existence to the level of creating committees in all regions in order to establish and defend their interest. In doing so, each group revealed issues to discredit the opponent and to establish their stand.

The non-Wahid groups frequently conveyed information on the abuse of power, a phenomenon committed by the leader of the party and his companions in DPP, particularly about the way the party unjustly treated their cadres including the leader of Dewan Tanfidz. They also raised the issue on the existence of inner-circle groups popularly called “pembisik” (“the provocative whisperer”). Each dismissed leader of the party, namely Jalil, Shihab and Iskandar, had his own version about the “pembisik”544. Even though each of them had different persons called as “pembisik”, they used this issue as one of the main points to influence people. They attacked the “pembisik” as an exclusive group, providing false and manipulated information to the

---

544 The figures such as Shihab and HZ Arifin Junaidi, General Secretary of Dewan Syura were the pembisik that should be responsible for the negative development of the PKB according to Jalil’s camp. Jalil then put them as the accused in the court. On the Matori’s opinion about the existence of such group, see for instance, Ali and Nurhuda Y, eds., Pergerakan Membela yang Benar. Biografi Matori Abdul Djallil, p. 279, 287. Shihab’s group regarded Effendy Chorie and Muhamin Iskandar as pembisik behind the Wahid’s negative attitude towards pro-Shihab Ulama. See DPW PKB Jawa Timur, Data dan Fakta Pelanggaran AD/ART di Muktamar II Semarang, p.5-6. As for Iskandar, the team that was set up by him concluded ten persons as “pembisik” including Zannuba Wahid (Daughter of Wahid), Sigid Haryo Wibisono (Member of Dewan Syura), Artalita Suryani (General Treasury), Aris Junaidi (Treasury), Hermawi Taslim (Member of Dewan Tanfidz), Ikhsan Abdullah (Vice of Secretary General) and Moeslim Abdurrahman (DPP member). See http://www.inilah.com/berita/politik/2008/04/05/21476/investigasi-pkb-tunjuk-10-nama/
leader and ended with the creation of many false and unjust policies\textsuperscript{545}. Thus, they regarded it as one of the man problems in the party. On the other hand, DPP, or the Wahid group, sometimes used the issue on the necessity to punish untrustworthy elements, used by external powers to harm the party from the inside\textsuperscript{546}.

“The war of discourse” to deteriorate the opponent’s image became usual during this period. Since the lack of an arbitration body was evident, this kind of “campaign activity” continually happened and eventually appealing cadres made their own individual assessment and refuse their support to one of two conflicting groups\textsuperscript{547}. This situation in reality was in connection to the hope to have a better future for cadres, as each group, during “its campaign”, also offered something worth, including new better position in the party, besides unpleasant warnings such as dismissal. In this situation, sympathy and the rational choices became interconnected.

Eventually the split between the elite and the cadres then became unavoidable, and spread to local level. At the local level, each group was able to set up a network not long after controversial policies were stipulated by DPP. Approximately one week after Iskandar’s dismissal, for instance, there were at least 15 Chairpersons of DPWs, established \textit{Kaukus 15} (the Caucus of 15), to defend Iskandar’s objection\textsuperscript{548}. On the other hand, 32 DPWs, represented by their leaders, declared their support for the Iskandar dismissal\textsuperscript{549}. 


\textsuperscript{546} Interview with Zannuba Ariffah “Yenny” Wahid, General Secretary of \textit{Dewan Tanfidz} PKB-Wahid (2008-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010. Yenny seemed to believe that there was a kind of strategic relation between President Yudhoyono and Iskandar. See also for instance, Wahid’s opinion about the position of President Yudhoyono as the “boss” of Alwi Shihab, \textit{Dokumentasi Hasil Mukatamar II Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Semarang}, 16-19 April (Jakarta: DPP PKB, 2005), p. 14. Interview with Muamir M. Syam, Chairperson of PKB (2005-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{547} Interview with Anas Nashikin, General Secretary of \textit{Garda Bangsa}, one of PKB’s onderbows, in Jakarta, 26 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{548} They also support Iskandar to take any action necessary to save the party from instability as the result for the growing unjust dismissal and suspension taken by Wahid’s group in many local areas. “Konflik PKB Diyakini Tidak Akan Pengaruhi Konstituen”, \textit{Kompas}, 2 April 2008.

\textsuperscript{549} “Ali Masykur Pelaksana Tugas Ketum”, \textit{Kompas}, 6 April 2008.
Before formally joining one of the groups, local exponents sometimes voiced their opinion on each group, which indicated their tendency. The statement condemning the 2005 Muktamar and its results made by Choirul Anam, the Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of East Java DPW of the PKB, for instance, demonstrated his position and brought him to be part of the PKB-Alwi. A similar situation also occurred when the Chairperson of Central Java Dewan Tanfidz, M. Hanif Muslih made a statement asking the DPP to reinstate the position of Shihab and Yusuf. The involvement of local members showed the very case of inability to restrict the potential of the conflict in PKB. Above all, the party’s central board committee in the end could not prevent the party from a serious split or factionalisation, which, at heart, was the formalisation of the unresolved different points of view and disappointments.

4. The Impact: The Fragmentation Development

The above situation indicates the vulnerability of PKB to be shaken by internal conflict. The unresolved conflict potential cements internal antagonism and creates faction leading to the development of a fertile zone for fragmentation. The faction, gaining in strength, becomes the first link of a chain of a fragmentation crystallisation that appeared as an impact of the above situation.

4.1. Faction Strengthening: Towards Formal Fragmentation

The protracted conflict and the enlargement of faction escalating the potential of party fracture, bolstered the existence of each conflicted group. While at the early stage of conflict, factionalisation only involved limited individuals and networking, most of them were the elite in Jakarta, its upsurge being more complicated with more massive support from across the country prior to the fragmentation.

In its development, the faction establishment was dedicated to not only protecting the existence of a group at the internal level, but also as a legal entity or group that enabled them to stand at the same level as the other political parties at

550 DPW PKB Jawa Timur, Data dan Fakta Pelanggaran AD/ART di Muktamar II Semarang, (DPW PKB Jawa Timur, 2005).

national level. It means to create a very solid and massive institution. The strategy used then was almost similar to that when facing an election. Each group committed to approach certain groups at the local branches to consolidate its existence and to win the power. In this regard, they also valiantly set up many new committees and recruited new cadres in the opponent’s stronghold areas. In addition, to ensure the group was sterile from the opponents, members, each group did not hesitate to purge “reluctant” cadres. The phenomenon of dismissal became very common at this stage. Thus, one could regard that the first priority, after faction establishment, was to set up a complete committee across the country, to show the support and power they had. Parawansa regards this situation as an indication of the deterioration of the spirit of togetherness.

The next step after the faction informally existed was holding a *muktamar* or MLB to legalise and strengthen their existence. To some extent, a *muktamar* seemed to be a refuge for creating a solution for all conflict groups normatively believed by many cadres to be the solution. Nevertheless, in reality, the situation was far from the essence of reconciliation. It was created merely to defend and formalise the existence of one group devoid of the interest to address the core of the problem. Consequently, the interest to seek reconciliation was not a foundation of the main agenda of *muktamar*. Even though each group invited some members of an opponent group to attend *muktamar*, at heart it was just lip service.

The agenda and the direction of a *muktamar* had been set up by the organiser in order to have exclusive agendas, mainly to legalise their leaders and their existence. The 2005 *Muktamar* in Semarang demonstrated this situation. The pro-Wahid group, as the organiser, manipulated the agenda and the situation of *muktamar* to make this forum the only medium to legalise the leadership of Wahid-

---

552 Interview with Ahmad Shodiq Noor, General Secretary of DKI Jakarta DPW of PKB, in Jakarta, 3 November 2010; with Marinah Hardy, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of Western Nusa Tenggara DPW of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010; with K.H Damanhuri, Chairperson of Dewan Syura of Depok DPD of PKB (2002-2004), Member of Parliament of DPRD of Depok (2004-2009), in Depok, 31 October 2010.


Iskandar\textsuperscript{555}, intensifying the anger and disappointment of the Shihab’s group. Many legal cadres, including Shihab, indicated as the supporter of the opponent, were eliminated in that forum. In this forum, also the constitutional right of the East Java and Central Java DPWs, known as strong allies of Shihab, to have additional votes in the process election of the General Chairpersons of \textit{Dewan Syura} and \textit{Dewan Tanfidz}, were eliminated, in order to decrease the chance of the opponent’s candidate to win in that forum.

On the other hand, the 2005 Surabaya \textit{Muktamar} held by Shihab’s camp, as the alternative for the 2005 Semarang \textit{Muktamar}, came to be a similar situation. This \textit{muktamar}, attended mainly by Shihab’s supporters, fundamentally filled by the main spirit to fight the existence of PKB-Gus Dur/Muhaimin and to inaugurate the existence of PKB-Alwi. The same situation also occurred in the 2002 \textit{Muktamar} of PKB-Matori, which was held by Jalil’s supporters to legalise the leadership of Jalil and suspend the Wahid position\textsuperscript{556}. Also in this occasion, Jalil criticised the internal situation of PKB, informing the need to create a democratic leadership of PKB, as the anti-thesis for oligarchic leadership tendency in the previous PKB\textsuperscript{557}.

A similar situation also occurred in the 2008 MLB-Parung held by PKB-Gus Dur, when the main agenda of this \textit{Muktamar} was actually to confirm the position of Wahid and the dismissal of Iskandar. Accordingly, the participants did not give room for reconciliation and regarded this MLB only was legitimate to make any decision for the party. The similar situation occurred in the 2008 MLB-Ancol. This forum, attended only by the supporter of Iskandar, appeared to be mainly a medium to legalise the position of Iskandar and to establish PKB-Muhaimin. The participants rejected the five-year report of the General Chairperson of \textit{Dewan Syura}\textsuperscript{558}, even though Wahid, as the leader of \textit{Dewan Syura} and almost all the member of \textit{Dewan Syura},\textsuperscript{559} did not

\textsuperscript{555} DPW PKB Jawa Timur, \textit{Data dan Fakta Pelanggaran AD/ART di Muktamar II Semarang}, pp.7-10.


\textsuperscript{559} Of 24 members of the \textit{Dewan Syura}, only Prof. Dr. Cecep Syarifuddin who confessed to his presence in the MLB-Ancol. This confession was regarded by Zannuba Wahid as a lie, since she and her camp believed that Syarifuddin actually did not attend the MLB. In reality, the confession brought the
attend this MLB. The rejection signified the interest of this camp to remove Wahid from his previous position. The interesting thing about this MLB was that even though the spirit of this forum was to fight all of the important decisions made by Wahid, including Iskandar’s dismissal, the MLB decided to crate a consultation team consisting of seven ulama, to meet Wahid in NU Head Quarters on 3 May 2008 to offer “peaceful ways” for dispute settlement. As had been predicted before, Wahid rejected such an offer.

These situations indicated the failure of the implementation of CRM in all PKB muktamar or MLB forums during their first decade of existence. The main characteristic of muktamar and MLB is their position as an exclusive forum to accomplishing unilateral agendas of one group sometimes by manipulating the process created and so discouraging a situation where any attempts to find a conflict resolution. The fact that a muktamar in itself was the last shelter of the long process of one group to establish its existence and to some extent removing officially the opponent, it can be understood that if the sprit of legalisation rather than reconciliation became something common that motivated each group to hold it. However, since the constitution of the party did not clearly arrange this matter, the unproductive situation happening in MLB was predictable, for there was no institution that could legally stop each group from creating it. Hence, as the failure of Dewan Syura to be a haven of conflict resolution, due to its involvement in the conflict, reduced its ability to hold fairness, muktamar or MLB faced the similar situation since it was merely a political tool to defend the interests of one group.

4.2. The Disappearance of Constructive Dialogue: the Fragmentation Affirmation

opportunity for Syarifudin to join the election and became one of the MPs representing PKB-Muhaimin. Interview with Zannuba Arifiah “Yenny” Wahid, General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz PKB-Wahid (2008-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010.

560 Decree No: 3/MLB/PKB/V/2008 on Tim Utusan Muktamar Luar Biasa untuk Penyelesaian Perselisihan Politik PKB melalui Musyawarah (the Envoy Team of Special Conference for the Political Conflict Resolution through Consultation).

561 These ulama are Abdul Azis Mansyur, Syakir Chubaib, Abdussalam Mujib, Muqorrobin, Lukman Hakim, Mas Yazid Bustomi and Nidzom Tollah.

The next impact following the strengthening of factionalisation was the absence of constructive dialogue. In this situation, the reconciliation dialogues or *islah* became something difficult to carry out. Before *Muktamar* or MLB, some people voiced and encouraged each conflict group on the importance of reconciliation. In fact, after a bitter and painful *Muktamar* or MLB finished, there were people that still voiced for reconciliation and really hoped that it would happen. Some people still put their confidence in the possibility of the emergence of constructive dialogue between conflicting elements.

However, people soon realised that this kind of hope was not easy to realise. After *Muktamar* or MLB, the sense of confrontation tended to increase. The difficulty to bring together each conflict group to discuss indicated this. One group neglected the invitation from its opponent, sometimes by asking or criticising the legal matters of an invitation, including the legal status of the forum used, the discussion agenda or the legal position of the initiator. Jalil, for instance, regarded that he was not obliged to accept Wahid group’s invitation to discuss his position in the party, since for Jalil was the legal leader that should hold such a forum and decide on that matter. Each conflict group felt cautious of the motivation behind its opponent’s invitation. The supporters of Jalil considered that it would not be a good prospect to attend a meeting held by the opponent, including *ulama*’s tendency to support Wahid, since there was a possibility to use such a forum to be a unilateral court for judging Jalil.

These situations could have been avoided if the party had had a legal and binding regulation, implemented by an independent body, which could ensure that

---

563 Yusuf Hasim, one of the very senior figures in NU who also the son of Hasyim Asyhari, one of NU’s founding father, for instance, stated the need to have *islah* around three weeks before the 2005 Muktamar. “Pak Ud Sarankan DPP PKB Islah dengan Shihab”, *Media Indonesia*, 28 March 2005. “Jateng Minta Posisi Shihab Dikembalikan”, *Republika*, 22 March 2005. A similar spirit was also stated by Khoifiah Indar Parawansa, who suggested each conflicting group to undergo a meeting *dalam suasana kekeluargaan* (in spirit of the mutual cooperation) and ask one figure of *ulama* to be a mediator. “Persoalan Internal PKB Sebaiknya Libatkan Kiai”, *Media Indonesia*, 29 March 2005.

564 People like Andi M. Ramly Sunrawa, former Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of PKB-Gus Dur and the writer of *Mabda Siyasi*, for instance, endorsed to all PKB’s members to do reconciliation to solve the problem. After the 2005 Semarang *Muktamar*, he stated that each group should patient and put forward party’s interest as the main priority in order to be able to resolve the difficult situation. “Kubu yang Tak Puas Dianjurkan Islah”, *Republika*, 23 April 2005.

565 Interview with Abdul Khalik Ahmad, Secretary of PKB Faction in DPR RI (1999-2001) and General Secretary of PKB- Jalil (2000-2005), in Jakarta, 11 October 2010.

566 Interview with Abdul Khalik Ahmad, Secretary of PKB Faction in DPR RI (1999-2001) and General Secretary of PKB- Jalil (2000-2005), in Jakarta, 11 October 2010.
the presence of each conflict group was not only an obligation but also a key element of a fair reconciliation.

In its development, each group awkwardly voiced *islah*, stressing the possibility to open a chance for dialogue. However, in reality, this appeared to be a lip service statement. The political gesture of each conflict group, in many cases, did not reflect such an attempt. It can be seen, for instance, from the statement delivered by other members of each group that showed opposition for *islah* or at least inferred the impossibility to conduct an *islah*. Moreover, each group sometimes offered requirements that were impracticable to fulfil by the opponent in dealing with conflict resolution. Thus, in general, it was not easy to find a sincere attempt to hold *islah*, since the interest to reach a meaningful reconciliation was absent.

In the case of Jalil, Wahid required three unconditional prerequisites for Jalil before *islah*, namely (1) to acknowledge the existence of PKB-Alwi, (2) to dismiss his PKB, and (3) not to ask for any single position in the PKB-Alwi when joining that party. These kinds of unilateral and unfeasible requirements, particularly for Jalil, had ruined the possibility to have an *islah*. On the other hand, Jalil and his group maintained his early stand, that the *islah* would be possible if the Wahid’s group were willing to acknowledge the leadership of Matori and dissolve their existence. In this situation, some informal meetings held to find the ways to an *islah*, including informal meeting between him and Wahid in Singapore became ineffective.

The attempts to make an *islah* were also endorsed by Shihab’s group, including some influential ulama that backed him up. Initially, it seemed promising. Both sides agreed to meet to discuss the core of the problem. Several ulama pro-Shihab met Wahid, tabling their points of concern, including the proposal to review the decision of Yusuf’s replacement. However, in its development, Wahid abandoned such proposals and continued his policies, creating a big blow for the ulama. Afterwards, no meeting was held. There were some implorations from ulama suggesting the same points, which again were neglected by the Wahid group. Wahid took a more progressive manoeuvre by establishing *Majelis Silaturahmi Ulama*

---

568 Interview with Abdul Khalik Ahmad, Secretary of PKB Faction in DPR RI (1999-2001) and General Secretary of PKB-Matori (2000-2005), in Jakarta, 11 October 2010.
Rakyat (the Assembly of People’s Islamic Scholar Meeting/MASURA) forum, to show the critical position towards these ulama, which, according to him, had been driven by the interest of the political elite rather than the people\(^{571}\). After some failures to hold a constructive meeting, ulama stopped any efforts to approach Wahid. Consequently, islah became more difficult to carry out.

In fact, after the supporters of Shihab had successfully set up an alternative party committee for PKB, it was ulama’s turn to neglect some meetings initiated by Wahid’s group\(^{572}\). Abdullah Faqih, the informal leader of the senior ulama, for instance, rejected some invitations to gather him with Wahid, discussing any possibilities for an islah. He even refused to see Wahid when trying to visit him in hospital\(^{573}\). In addition, this group also developed a similar, impracticable requirement to having an islah in Wahid’s camp. According to Abdurrahman Chudlori, one of the senior ulama, their agreement to effect an islah depended on the willingness of Wahid to fulfill several requirements, of which one of them was “to acknowledge their defeat in the legal process and to follow all decisions made by the PKB-Surabaya”\(^{574}\). After facing a very difficult situation with Wahid, the ulama then took a more rigorous stand against him. They decided to end their relationship with the former “favourite son” in all cases, reducing the huge numbers of the respected persons left for Wahid. In that time, there were no more people whose voice was respected and heard by Wahid and could bridge the attempts for an islah.

In the Iskan dar case, the role of ulama sharply decreased. Only a small group of less influential ulama sent by Iskandar as an envoy to meet Wahid to discuss the possibility for an islah, which was rejected by Wahid. In the case of Iskandar, the attitude of Wahid was harder. Wahid tightly closed any attempts from Iskandar’s side to conduct an islah. To underscore his position, Wahid said that Iskandar was “a thief”, who has no right to ask for an islah. To Wahid, an islah, as a method to find a


\(^{573}\) Ibid.

\(^{574}\) Ibid.
middle way, is only possible between two groups at same level. The police and the thief of course could not attend an islah, he said, commenting his stand on Iskandar. In this case, Wahid appeared to be influenced deeply by several rumours concerning his nephew, establishing a very bad image in his mind about Iskandar. Iskandar’s decision to remove him from his position endorsed that thought. Such a decision also intensified his anger against Iskandar. On the other hand, Iskandar showed his stubborn determination. In this case, he did not only remove his uncle, but also keenly eliminated several very close figures of Wahid from the party, including Zannuba Wahid, the daughter of Wahid.

The policies then reflected an uncompromising attitude conducted by each group to dismiss and suspend suspected “enemy supporters” cadres or local committees. This attitude extended disappointment and a sense of rivalry. Sometimes, these polices were implemented in unconstitutional ways, involving only some people in the limited forum. Certain people believed that if each group could refrain from its stubborn attitude, the problem could be handled. However, this situation actually indicates the need for a more systematic and authoritative mechanism or a body that can not only proportionally solve the conflict since its formative stage, but also prevent the party being involved in a prolonged and unproductive rivalry between the cadres.

4.3. The Third-Party “Resolution”: the Fragmentation Strengthening

The situation above finally deepened distrust between the conflicting groups. To change the standpoint was something impossible to do for each conflict group, while the failure of traditional methods persisted. The difficulty to find neutral and capable medium internally and the non-existence of the spirit of true reconciliation worsened the situation. The need to have a third party eventually as an arbitrary body became unavoidable in PKB.

Jalil sent his claim against Wahid and Shihab to the South Jakarta District Court on 4th July 2002, almost one year after the party fired him from his position.


Jalil sued for his rehabilitation and asked the Court to suspend PKB-Gus Dur/Alwi. After the court at the District and Provincial level rejected his claim, Jalil continued his appeal to MA level, where he found the same verdict. However, before the MA stated its verdict, Jalil and his lawyers made a second plea to the South Jakarta District Court. Interestingly, even though using the same materials and only adding one more person, namely H.Z Arifin Junaidi, as the accused, the South Jakarta District Court this time accepted Jalil’s appeal, apparently upsetting Wahid and his group.

Jalil’s supporters regarded this second decision of the South Jakarta District Court as validation of their rightness. They used it as a medium to sustain their existence and to increase their confidence to defend their rights. After having learnt of his victory, Jalil then asked Wahid and his supporter to accept this verdict respectfully. He even sympathetically offered reconciliation and stated that he was still the pupil of Wahid whatsoever. However, after the MA rejected his claim, and asked the South Jakarta District Court to review and cancel its second verdict, Jalil’s group seemed to lay low its confrontation, even though they did not totally end it. For his supporter, this was part of Jalil’s fair attitude in respecting the verdict of the court.

Shihab and Yusuf also made a claim against Wahid with a similar reason and to some extent, situation. Shihab and Yusuf submitted their appeal to the court on 11th April 2005. About six months after their dismissal, on 27th October 2004, or 18 months for Yusuf’s reposition case, Shihab, Yusuf and their supporters eventually concluded that the party could not handle problem internally and needed a third party to handle it. Similar with Jalil’s case, it also had to be decided at the MA level.

582 Ibid.
583 Ibid.
584 Interview with Abdul Khalik Ahmad, Secretary of PKB Faction in DPR RI (1999-2001) and General Secretary of PKB- Jalil (2000-2005), in Jakarta, 11 October 2010.
585 On the reasons behind the appealed see “Shihab and Syaifullah akan Gugat DPP PKB”, Suara Karya, 28 March 2005.
Interestingly, this time the MA stipulated a sort of an ambiguous verdict, which created a double understanding.

On the one hand, MA decided that the policy to dismiss Shihab and Yusuf via a plenary session was against the law. This verdict then became a main source to defend their previous position and their group’s existence. In fact, this was a verdict that was expected by Yusuf and his supporters. On the other hand, however, MA rejected their appeal to rehabilitate their position. It means that MA did not allow them to hold their previous positions. The main reason was that the party had had new persons to hold these positions through the 2005 Muktamar in Semarang. Wahid’s group used this verdict to legitimise and continue its previous decision on Shihab. In addition, MA also indirectly suggested all groups conduct islah. This suggestion indicated that the best decision to solve the problem, according to MA, lay in the party itself.

However, all the MA’s verdicts appealed to each group to stay in their position, regarding their group as the only legal element that had a right to use PKB’s symbol, name, and all assets. Not until two years latter, no group was willing to surrender its stand. These conflicting groups remained party in the middle of antagonism and cementing fragmentation. However, after a prolonged and severe dispute, in November 2006, ulama and many elements on the Shihab side decided to leave PKB and established a new party namely PKNU. As there was some anticipation regarding a similar situation in PKB, PKNU established Dewan Muhtasyar (the Advisory Council), consisting of several senior ulama, as the highest body in this party, where one of its functions was to be an arbitration body to handle the conflict.

As a person who had experience in dealing with internal conflict, which involved Wahid, Iskandar seemed to have a better understanding of what he must do. His experience led him to make a quick conclusion to appeal the claim on Wahid before the court. This action was most likely to avoid a prolonged quarrel and to have a clear situation on his group’s future as soon as possible. On 14th April 2008, or 18 days after the party removed him from his position, Iskandar filed his case with the

---

586 According to Harifin A. Tumpa, one of the Judges in Supreme Court, said that in the end MA believed that “the decision was on their (conflicting group) hand”, Republika, 19 November 2005.

587 The AD of PKNU Article 17 (1).

588 The ART of PKNU Article 21 (16.c).
South Jakarta District Court as his attempt to find justice. Similar to two previous cases, MA became the last harbour to end the antagonism.

However, MA also created an ambiguous decision this time, establishing a multi interpretation of its verdict. MA declared that both PKB-Parung and PKB-Ancol, as the result of MLB-Parung and MLB-Ancol, were not attended by the whole members of the national committee, representing both Dewan Syura and Dewan Tanfidz were unconstitutional, hence illegal. According to MA, based on the situation, both camps had to return to the previous committee, set up after the 2005 Semarang Muktamar, where Wahid held the position of General Chairperson of Dewan Syura and Iskandar was the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz.

This decision should have been a gateway to reconciliation. However, instead of using this verdict as a tool to mediate the conflict, each group used it as the justification for its stand. For Wahid and his group, MA decision confirmed that the legal PKB was the one led by Wahid as the General Chairperson of Dewan Syura. In other words, the PKB led by other members was illegal. On the other hand, this opinion was also valid for Iskandar. His camp felt that MA had indirectly supported his existence by acknowledging Iskandar as the only legal General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of the PKB. They also regarded MA’s decision as the verification for illegality of the decision to remove Iskandar.

The role of the third party did not always provide a satisfying result. The justice process involving the court of justice always presented the opportunity for each group to defend its case and existence. In the case of PKB, this situation to some extent was predictable, since the result of the process still left a gap that could be exploited by each conflicting group to preserve its existence. Hence, the ambiguous decision of the court became another source of problem. This situation has been predicted by Ho-Wong Jeong who said, “Although their (court) verdict is supposed to be final, sometimes it continues to generate tension when one of the contending parties is reluctant to accept the verdicts.”

590 “Kasasi Wahid Ditolak”, Kompas, 18 Juli 2008
592 Ibid.
In addition, the insensitive decision due to lack of comprehensive understanding on the internal culture of a group, created a "value free" attitude, developed confusion and resistance among people, particularly the ulama, who had been culturally disappointed. In this regard, for ulama any decisions that obligated them to acknowledge the position of Wahid, the person that had upset them, were unacceptable. This situation according to Jeong makes the verdict established based on the facts and laws does not always become "suitable means to sort out emotional problems or incompatible values". This was the moment when the unity of the party could no longer be preserved.

The use of the court as the third party symbolised the deep distrust among the conflicting groups, indicating the summit of their antagonism. Hence, by letting the court decide, the fragmentation reached its final stage.

5. Overview

The presence of institution like Badan Kehormatan was not a guarantor for the establishment of the conflict resolution that could tackle all the problems at once. In most cases, other factors contributed to the development of the conflict impede such process and even worsened the internal fragmentation potentials. However, the existence of such a body as one of the forms of a CRM, at least, would bring more opportunities for the party to enhance its capability in relocating and answering conflict potential at a very early stage thus providing a worthwhile chance for the cadres to express their objections and opinion, which in the long period would help party to avoid the accumulation of disappointments. In addition, the existence of Badan Kehormatan, as an authoritative body would potentially assist the party to maintain proper behaviour through a set of code of conduct and ensures the assistance for them when facing internal turmoil. By the absence of this kind of body, PKB not only became incapable in handling conflict escalation, with deepening hatred, but also in avoiding factionalisation enhancement, which over time became main foundation for an internal fragmentation.

---

593 Ibid.
Chapter VIII

Conflict Resolution Mechanism: The Case of PKS

“With the existence of internal mechanism of tribunal (in PKS), party solidity and dignity could be protected” (Mahfudz Siddiq)\textsuperscript{594}

1. Introduction

This chapter will discuss the condition of the conflict resolution mechanism (CRM) in PKS. During the first decade of its existence, PKS could considerably manage CRM through the presence of the elements of CRM and the consistency during its implementation that brought a capability that could detect any conflict potential at a very early stage and localise it. Although PKS was still encountering some difficulties, it was able to build up a trust between the internal system and the weakening of the factionalisation potential in the party that became conducive to the preservation of the party’s cohesion.

2. The Elements of CRM

In PKS, some institutions had direct or indirect involvement in the conflict resolution matters. These institutions played relevant roles, such as an arbitration body, internal tribunal and an islah institution, which provided a set of important policies to end the conflict. The next discussion explores their presence and role in PKS, which had enabled party to avoid any serious internal conflict that could endanger the unity of the party. This capability to identify and to impede conflict potential was one of the indicators of the existence of CRM.

2.1. Dewan Syariah (DS) as the Main Institution

DS was the main constitutional institution that had special authority in conflict prevention or its resolution. It was, for the main part, related to one of the main

\textsuperscript{594} Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010.
functions of this body, namely as a judicial institution\textsuperscript{595}, which in its development, based on the 2005 AD/ART, were concurrently an arbitration body and reconciliation institution (at the district level)\textsuperscript{596}. These three main functions made this body the inevitable element in the conflict resolution and related matters in PKS. DS had a hierarchy consisting of three committee levels\textsuperscript{597}, namely DSP at national level, DSW at province or state level, and DSD at district or municipality district level. DS of each level had to report to DS at one level higher. It was hoped that DS at the province and the district level would be responsive in handling the potential of conflict at the local level so that the party could solve the problem immediately\textsuperscript{598}. However, DSP played a crucial role for its authority to be the final institution that could finalised a verdict.

DS had the privilege of being an independent body. Although the party had DPTP as a supervising body, no institution could intervene in DS, including DPTP, in its decision making process\textsuperscript{599}. DSP had an equal position with other higher institutions in the party, such as MPP and DPP. The DS’ verdict had to be submitted to MS as the highest body in PKS. DS had also to provide recommendations to MS on the subjects related to its scope of duties. In terms of the memberships, the constitution of the party required certain roles, which must be filled by members of DS, and have a deep understanding of Islamic and national law\textsuperscript{600}. Such requirements were relevant since the body would handle problems that related to certain theoretical and legal points. In this regard, specific competence was more important than a political background.

Initially, DS handled almost all the problems. However, after the establishment of \textit{Badan Penegak Disiplin Organisasi} (the Board for Organisational Discipline Enforcement/BPDO) in 2005, it had a partner or a supporting body when conducting its functions, particularly on matters that involved the cadres’

\textsuperscript{595} The ART of PK Article 27 (3); The 2002 ART of PKS Article 12 (3).
\textsuperscript{596} The 2005 ART of PKS Article 23 (2.c), Article 23 (2.f), Article 5 (d).
\textsuperscript{597} The ART of PK Article 22; The 2002 AD of PKS Article 15 and 16; The 2005 AD of PKS Article 15 (1.a), (1.b), (1.c); The 2005 ART of PKS Article 23.
\textsuperscript{598} Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadreization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010.
\textsuperscript{600} The ART of PK Article 23; The 2002 ART of PKS Article 10 (5),(6); The 2005 ART of PKS Article 25 (1.d), (1.e), (2.d), (2.e); Article 35 (2.a.4), (2.b.4); Article 48 (2.a.3), (3.a.3).
wrongdoings and disciplinary acts. Nevertheless, DS’ areas of duty as the internal court body, arbitration medium and an islah institution still covered various matters from personal ones such as divorce, moral abuse, financial problems and disputes on religious understanding, up to organisational matters such as the implementation of the rules of the game and constitutional violation. In its capacity as the internal court or arbitration body, DS held the authority to assess and decide the future of the cadres and to be the arbitrary for any conflict resolution. DS also had a duty to be the peacemaker in its capacity as the islah body, to respond on the different points of view and conflict potential among the cadres.

2.2. Other Supporting Institutions

Besides DS, PKS also had other institutions that had direct involvement in the prevention of matters of conflict and their resolution. MS was the supporting element for conflict containment and resolution, particularly at the policy-making process level, involving party elites at the national level. As the highest body having constitutional duties to discuss and decisions on national policies and political guidelines\(^{601}\), its role mainly related to bridge the different points of view and then determined the result, which bind all the elements of the party. MS also had a role of an arbitration body to find a resolution to delicate problems, including internal disputes at the elite level. The characteristic of MS as a consultative body consisted of elected prominent figures, which became a large opportunity for this body to be a proper forum where it would make the final decision thus ending the disagreement. On the other hand, the consultative mechanism that constitutionally was part of this institution where the members of MS had an equal chance to make their voice heard, opened an opportunity for the party to avoid a unilateral decision.

Another supporting institution was BPDO\(^{602}\). This body was designed fundamentally to be a part of the cadre supervision, particularly to monitor the cadres’ discipline in performing their duties and obligations\(^{603}\). Although the name of the body

---

\(^{601}\) The ART of PK Article 18; The 2002 AD of PKS Article 12 (1.d), The 2002 ART of PKS Article 7 (5), (6), (9); The 2005 AD of PKS Article 11 (2.c), (2.l).

\(^{602}\) This body established in 2005 by PKS as one of institutions at the party higher institution level. However, in 2010 this body became one of the DPP’s departments, led by Aus Hidayat Nur, one of the senior figures in tarbiyah movement. Lutfi Hasan Ishaq, who then became the fourth President of PKS for the period of 2010-2015, was the first leader of this institution.

\(^{603}\) Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dukwhah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010; with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of
was not stated clearly in the constitution, its presence and duty were relevant and related to it with indirect mention made of this body as the institution conducting justice and particularly related to a disciplinary problem and as the body providing recommendations to the MS before dismissing the cadre. In relation to this constitutional mandate, therefore, the main aim of the establishment of BPDO was to enhance the party’s ability in discipline enforcement and to make a recommendation to the MS on the actions that party should take in relation to the matters of party discipline. BPDO also had an arbitrary function to end the quarrel between cadres or between a cadre and the party that could harm the party.

Its authority to hold investigations, as part of its tribunal and arbitrary function, gave BPDO a chance to know the core of the problem in its very early stage. Accordingly, the party projected BPDO could comprehend the background of the problem or the reasons behind the negative acts or behaviour of the cadres, including anti-discipline attitudes. The investigation results then would be used as the main reference for this body to decide if any further action was to be taken. It included the determination of the level of punishment, ranging from giving warning, demotion up to dismissal, at the same time hoping that BPDO’s investigation

---

604 The 2005 ART of PKS Article 6 (3 b. 5).
605 The 2005 ART of PKS Article 10 (3 b).
608 Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010; with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 22 October 210; with Amri Yusra, M.Si, Chairperson of Depok DPD of PKS (2002-2004), Member of Parliament of Depok District, West Java, (2004-2009), and Lecturer at Political Sciences Department, Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010; with Sitaesmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010; with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS (2002), and personal secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of PKS and Chairperson of MPR of Republic of Indonesia), in Jakarta, 12 October 2010.
would protect the party from false information or slander, which could potentially deteriorate the trust and jeopardise the unity of the party, protecting it from incorrect policies made and based on false information.

Besides those elements that had formal authority to hold a consultative forum, internal court and investigation, the party has also an institution that performed a less formal role in dealing with conflict resolution, namely *halaqah* or sometimes was also called as *liqo’*, which literally means meeting. In its development, this institution is also known as *unit pembinaan* (the development unit). *Halaqah* was setup as a meeting event to transmit party ideals to all cadres, through educational materials systematically established by the party. This event’s main aim was to develop a similar understanding of the party ideology and to establish standard behaviour and thinking of all the cadres. The cadres should conduct *halaqah* at least once every two weeks in a 2-3 hours meeting, where the participants (*mutarabbi*) were no more than 12 cadres with one senior as a supervisor or teacher (*murabbi*). The spirit of knowing each other (*ta’aruf*), understanding each other (*tafahum*) and helping each other (*tafakul*) were the spirits to be conducted and conveyed by the participants in *halaqah*. For PKS, as a cadre party, *halaqah* was one of main pillars in this party for its function as a medium for conducting cadrerization. PKS established the concept of *halaqah* based on the ideas and method that had developed by Egyptian *Ikhwan Muslimin*.

---


612 The party hopes that, not long after joining the *halaqah*, the *mutarabbi* could also be able to become a *murabbi* and set up their groups to help the party to develop new or sophomore cadres. The *murabbi* decide whether a *mutarabbi* could or could not yet establish a *halaqah*. Damanik, *Fenomen Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia*, p. 126.


The party’s constitution mentioned that every level of committee was obliged to conduct and evaluate halaqah, as a unit of cadre development. For PKS as a cadre party, the existence of halaqah, as a vanguard for cadre recruitment and development was necessary. The implementation of this obligation was carried out under the thorough supervision of Badan Kaderisasi (the Cadrerization Body), which existed at every level of the committee board (from Branch to Central Level). Therefore, in the structural context, halaqah was an element of the committee board.

Although it had a main function as the medium for cadre development, halaqah as a forum had to be attended by all the cadres and eventually became part of the cadre’s life, brought the spirit of consultation into the party. This entity enhanced personal relationships between the cadres and cemented the tradition of sharing in many ways, particularly for good advice and deeds among the cadres. Halaqah became a discussion forum, talking about many subjects, including personal matters, politics and the latest situation in the party. Such discussions, governed by the spirit of brother-hood, usually in the end, encouraged the participant to organise meeting points rather than establish differences among them and lessen the sense of holding self-seeking orientation.

In this situation, several delicate problems were solved thus reducing tension among the cadres or between a cadre and the party. Moreover, halaqah was also a place to develop certain values that advantaged the reduction of the conflict, such as insisting on them having positive thinking and belief in the leaders, avoid unnecessary conflict and protecting the spirit of Muslim brotherhood, all contributing

---

615 The ART of PK Article 22 (15); The 2002 ART of PKS Article 17 (3); The 2005 AD of PKS Article 14 (3.b), The 2005 ART Article 22 (c), Article 34 (c), Article 47 (c), Article 56 (h), Article 59 (h).

616 Prihandoko described this situation: “Halaqah became a sanctuary to express hope, worries and want. Place to talk many things. Place to clean yourself. Place to discuss. Place to absorb information. Place to evaluate the life and many things. The cadres made this place the most important thing in their lives”. Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 October 2010.


to the development of conflict potential reduction. In this way, the character building process in *halaqah* provided an indirect impact for conflict resolution.

The presence of these bodies indicated that this party is an advocate for the existence of CRM due to several reasons. Beside the practical aspects, such as conflict prevention and resolution, the creation of these institutions related to the efforts to protect their cadres, as a real asset of the organisation, from harmful actions and to protect the party from negative impacts. According to Yon Mahmudi, since its beginning, PKS had realised the importance of developing these bodies to protect the cadres from unjust and unilateral actions by the other cadres or the party. Moreover, by having these bodies, the party could also preserve its good image and reputation, since they enabled PKS to avoid endorsing a wrong person to hold a public position.

In addition, Siddiq reckoned that one of the important aspects of having these kinds of bodies in the party was to have a responsive conflict management that could serve as a comprehensive problem-solving tool, protecting the party from open conflict. Due to the existence of DS, BPDO and these bodies, according to Siddiq, “party solidity eventually could be protected.” According to Nur, the importance of these elements was to prevent the party from having a “pembangkangan massif” (“massive disobedience”), which could potentially deteriorate the unity of the party. From these thoughts, one can see that besides the practical reasons, the consciousness to protect the party’s solidity became one of the fundamental reasons for PKS to set up these justice institutions.

3. The Implementation of CRM

The party had its own pattern in conflict resolution. In general, there were two stages in the process involving all the mentioned institutions. This general stage became a

---

620 Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and *Tarbiyah* Movement observer, Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the cadres who signed PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010.

621 Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and *Tarbiyah* Movement observer, Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the cadres who signed PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010.

622 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010.

common pattern, creating its own "code of conduct" for the party in solving internal conflict problems and related matters.

3.1. The First Stage of Conflict Prevention

The first stage of conflict containment usually happened at the *halaqah* level\(^{624}\). With its function as a regular meeting forum for the cadres, *halaqah* became the party’s first tool to conduct conflict prevention before the party took further formal action. As mentioned by Selamat Nurdin “If there was a conflict, it could be expressed (by the cadres) in the development units (*halaqah*). If the cadres were not satisfied, their dissatisfaction could be channelled into the party’s structure. Even when the cadres found difficulty in adapting, the party gave them a chance to be non-active for a while. But if they committed to doing harm, they would face the BPDO”. \(^{625}\) In line with such a statement, Nur stated that *halaqah* was the premier body dealing with conflict resolution in the PKS\(^{626}\).

In *halaqah*, the role of *murabbi* (the mentor) became essential in CRM in order to grasp the anxiety and apprehensiveness of *mutarabbi* (the student)\(^{627}\), detecting the earliest signal of a possible conflict potential and to find some appropriate solutions. If there was a conflict between cadres, it was a duty of *murabbi* to terminate it, including calling upon a third party to assist with the reconciliation process. Based on his experience, Mahmudi said that it was common for *murabbi* to have somebody to help him in solving the dispute and even the cadres’

---

\(^{624}\) Interview with Kemal A. Stamboel, Head of Expert Advisory Body of PKS and Member of Parliament (2009-2014), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010; with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-2010), in Tangerang, 21 October 2010; with Mustofa, cadre of PKS and former reporter of Profetik Magazine, established by cadres of PKS, in Depok, 7 October 2010; with Amri Yusra, M.Si, Chairperson of Depok DPD of PKS (2002-2004), Member of Parliament of Depok District, West Java, (2004-2009), and Lecturer at Political Sciences Department, Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010; with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of *Dakwah* Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010; with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 October 2010; with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadreration Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010.

\(^{625}\) Interview with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former *tarbiyah* activist leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010.

\(^{626}\) Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II *Dakwah* Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010.

\(^{627}\) *Murabbi* sometimes could solve the problems at once, including on the critics towards the policy of the party or the problem emerged among cadres. Interview with Mustofa, cadre of PKS and former reporter of *Profetik* Magazine, established by cadres of PKS, in Depok, 7 October 2010.
disappointment. On the other hand, since all the participants of halaqah had a kind of moral obligation to share their feelings, to hear and to remind, every participant had a chance to convey his opinions freely to other members of halaqah and to gain input from them, as a response. Occasionally, in such situations, a potential conflict was discussed and the solution agreed.

Halaqah also became a medium to prevent its participants from receiving erroneous information or slander. This would eventually protect the party from having the same problem. Although in reality this situation was not always easy, the existence of the halaqah had justly helped the party to preserve its capacity to avoid such potential. The Members of Parliament of the Bekasi District, for instance, used halaqah as a medium to remind each other that a slander potential relating to the parliament’s tricky political activities could destroy the party’s image and unity. Accordingly, the institutionalisation of this tradition related to the essence of CRM, considering its ability to avoid conflict escalation at an early stage. In this situation, since halaqah was also part for the institutions that worked for ideology preservation, as discussed mainly in chapter twelve, the capability of conflict containment in PKS had a relation to the existence of shared values, filled by the spirit of unity, collectivism and solidarity, which was developed through halaqah.

The quality of their commitment and the loyalty of the cadres, including the level of dedication when performing their duties, could also be measured in a halaqah. This required murabbi to assess the cadres and report their situation to the party structure. Sometimes a halaqah even acted as an informal tribunal to solve the problem immediately, which sometimes ended in a dismissal recommendation. As mentioned by Kemal Stamboel, Member of the Expert Board and Member of Parliament, the dismissal advice sometimes came from the members of halaqah.

3.2. Advanced Mechanism of Conflict Prevention

---

628 Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer in Indonesia, Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the cadres who signed PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010.

629 Interview with Nooryanto, Chairperson of the Cadrerization Department of the Bekasi DPD of the PKS, in Bekasi, 7 November 2010.

630 Interview with Kemal A. Stamboel, Head of Expert Advisory Body of PKS and Member of Parliament (2009-2014), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010.
Nevertheless, not all the problems could be solved at the *halaqah* level. Many cases tended to carry more risky and were sensitive thus requiring further attention from the party. Many cases reported by *halaqah* required handling by the party’s structure and others mainly related to the party’s elite were reported or enquired into directly by MS and DPP. In this regard, the party would make an assessment on how to conclude on the gravity of the case and the institution that would handle it. DSP would play its role, either as an arbitration body or as an internal tribunal, where DPP (or MS for the problems related to the party’s elite at a national level) were asked to solve some of the cases. Some special cases were reported directly to DSP to be solved. In general, however, before a case was transferred to DSP, DSW or DSD as the institutions handled it first. In some cases, DSW or DSD would act once the local committees (DPW or DPD) had submitted some of the undecided delicate and complex cases to these bodies.

At DS forums, in order to be able to understand the background of the case and to have a comprehensive argumentation before making any conclusions, a comprehensive dialogue process was used. For this reason, the members of DS would give the cadres a set of questions about the reasons behind their actions. In the case of Syamsul Balda, PKS vice president (1998-2002), for instance, DSP, as the main institution that was directly involved in the Balda case due to his important position in the party, invited him to report and to defend his standpoint on the accusation made against him for committing inappropriate behaviour involving other cadre. After having a long discussion, including putting to him several options, DSP found him guilty and decided to recommend MS to remove him from the party. The main reason was not only that he was guilty but that he also refused to accept the DSP’s advice. This situation became a lesson for the cadres, particularly regarding the consistency of DSP in implementing its duty objectively for all party’s


632 Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of *Dakwah* Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010.

633 Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of *Dakwah* Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010.
members, including the vice president of the party. The case of Balda, which for some was supposed to be a personal affair, also demonstrated the range of the problems that should be handled by DSP.

A similar situation also occurred in the case of Yusuf Supendi, one of the party’s senior figures and among the more prominent figures of Jamaah Tarbiyah and a member of DSP. After a long internal process held by DSP, MS then decided to dismiss him from the party based on DSP’s recommendation. The main reason was his persistence to remove MS Chairperson, Hilmi Aminuddin and Secretary General of the Party Anis Matta for their misconduct and the violation of the party’s constitution without providing sufficient evidences. In the DSP’s opinion, Supendi’s appeal was impossible to be heard, since it was not backed up by convincing evidence. In addition, his dismissal was based on his attitude neglecting his obligation as a PKS Member of Parliament to make a financial contribution to the party and his denial to accept the party’s punishment for his mistakes, including paying off his financial debts. For some, the dismissal proved to be the anti-critic situation in the party. Nevertheless, for other cadres, due to the proper process behind the dismissal, it was something acceptable.

At the local level, the case of Saleh Matapermana demonstrated a similar process. Although Matapermana had known that PKS’ policy supported the former party president Nur Mahmudi Isma’il, in the local election for Mayor of Depok, Matapermana made his decision to vote for Badrul Kamal, the incumbent, and even nominated himself to be the Badrul’s Deputy Mayor. Before deciding on his dismissal, the party called Matapermana to explain his choice in the informal forum held by DPP. The party then conducted a formal forum led by DSD, after Matapermana ignored DPD’s convocation, to hear his explanation and ask him to change his mind. DPD then served him with three successive warning letters, which

---

634 Yusuf accused Hilmi to be committed to the constitutional violation for accepting the offer from the MMS to be the leader of the PKS for three times, which according to Yusuf was out of limit. He used “other materials” and his personal interpretations to prove his arguments. As for Matta, he accused him to have interest to bring the party to his own agenda. Interview with K.H Yusuf Supendi Lc, Member of DSP of PKS (2000-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2009), in Jakarta, 3 November 2010.

635 Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010.

636 [link](http://www.pk-sejahtera.org/content/saksi-pks-bacakan-surat-pemecatan-yusuf-supendi)

he again ignored. This situation called for and appealed to DPD to ask DSW to take a legal decision on this case. After having made an assessment and carried out an investigation, DSW stipulated that its recommendation to dismiss Matapermana from party membership should be upheld.

The *islah* institution, as the body having a constitutional commitment to mediate for conflicting cadres, thus acted as a medium to bridge the interim. According to Ahmad Yusuf, in *islah* forum, DS would confirm acts done by the guilty cadre, besides obliging them to acknowledge his mistakes. On the other hand, the cadre who files the case against another cadre had to accept a pardon from the accused and declare the end of conflict between them.

A similar mechanism and situation also occurred in BPDO. After 2005, every cadre suspected by the party of having committed or had a potential to be undisciplined or carried out misdeeds, would face BPDO. After receiving a report from MS, for the cases involving the elites in MS body, or DPP for the cases of indiscipline and other related matters, BPDO would conduct a meeting with several participants, including the accused cadre, to confirm the information and findings. In this case, BPDO would play as arbitrator to decide the future of the cadre. At local level, sometimes BPDO was required to help local committees to decode a punishment for famous public figures or very senior party persons in their domains. The case of the dismissal of Alwi Sahlan here below illustrates such a role.

The case of Sahlan, a high senior cadre who was also a famous local public figure, emerged when he resisted party policy. Sahlan, holding the position as Deputy Mayor of Banjarmasin City, insisted on running for Vice Governor of the South Kalimantan in the local election. According to Nur, Sahlan argued that as

---

638 Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 October 2010.


senior cadre of PKS, who helped the establishment of the party in South Kalimantan Province, he deserved to be promoted by the party to hold the governor position. However, the party had its own calculation. The party not only rejected the seniority argument but also in fact, was not really impressed by his job as the Banjarmasin Deputy Mayor. Hence, PKS decided to select another figure to run for that position.

Sahlan, however, kept insisting on running for that position, neglecting any attempts from the local board (DPW) and the informal meeting with the President of PKS Tifatul Sembiring to persuade him to follow the party’s policy. Concerned with this situation, the party asked BPDO to handle this case. After holding several discussions, BPDO then decided to ask Sahlan to leave the party due to his disobedience concerning the party’s policy. Eventually, Sahlan agreed this decision. In this case, BPDO’s role was not only to terminate the problem immediately and to remove the potential of having an internal clique, but also to help the party to preserve the trust of the local cadres by mainly blocking the sense of favouritism, which would possibly deteriorate if the party abandoned the case related to its senior figures.

BPDO’s role in conflict management is similar to that of DS, namely to prevent party from seeing its conflict potential escalate due to either being treated unfairly or to the lack of trust in the party. The prevention function was carried out by conducting an investigation and inviting the involved members to discuss before forming its conclusion. Moreover, the party, in general, tried to avoid making an abrupt decision for removing the cadres. Generally, the cadres’ right to have a protection was something familiar in the party. According to Umar Basalamah, there is no such unilateral decision made for the cadres without their being aware of it. In this mechanism, the cadre constitutionally should have protection for any unilateral decision from DS. This also gave both the party and the cadre the opportunity to hear and even take stock of the other’s opinion and sensibilities. According to Mahmudi

---

644 Interview with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS (2002), and personal secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of PKS and Chairperson of MPR of Republic of Indonesia), in Jakarta, 12 October 2010.
“the right to have self-defence had been comprehensively understood by the majority of the cadres” 645. This enhanced the cadres’ confidence in the party. They tended to believe that the party would avoid any kind of unilateral decision created and based only on the one-side interest.

In addition, BPDO could ask the *halaqah* to join the investigation process646. The aim of this action was to know the level of the cadres’ commitment in following party’s activities, including the commitment to *halaqah*. Sometimes the BPDO related the lack of ability to preserve the commitment to implement and follow the instruction of the party with their less commitment towards *halaqah*. The basic assumption was the cadres’ commitment to be consistent in *halaqah* would lead to discipline enhancement647. In some cases, those two variables met. According to Aus Hidayat “the mistake of the cadre could be seen through his commitment to *halaqah*. Hence, when punishing the cadre we would conclude that this person had failed to consistently join *halaqah*”648. However, in developing such an argument, BPDO did not try to generalise all cases applying with single perspective and conclusion. BPDO realised that other factors were involved in the disciplinary actions. For this reason, a comprehensive investigation remained relevant.

3.3. A Special Case of the National Policy Making Process

MS, as the highest body, became the institution that took responsibility to impede the possibility of conflict in the processes for the drafting of vital policies at the national level. MS followed the internal mechanism provided by the constitution to conclude the consultation process and stipulate the policy. In doing so, MS tried to accommodative, accepting many inputs from the cadres and provide a proportional opportunity for the meeting participants to speak and to be heard. Sometimes, MS

645 Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer, Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the cadres who signed PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010.


used voting to decide upon a policy. This was to make the policy became more acceptable and MS could avoid adopting controversial or unpopular ones. On the other hand, this was also to ignore the sense of discrimination in this process. Hence, since CRM was a method to meet a “win-win solution” for all, based on the interests of the participant, the consultative mechanism upheld by MS to bridge and accommodate the difference, was actually a way to implement that value at the elite level in PKS.

In the case of the 2004 Presidential Election, candidate preference was the source of the dispute. Those who rejected Amien Rais considered that he had a limited chance to be elected649, while for those who supported him, it emphasised his role in the initial reform process and his position as one of the Indonesian Islamic central figures650. The eternal meetings held by MS lasting almost two days to discuss this issue651, then had to be decided through voting so ended this dispute. The party decided to go with Rais.

In the case of BBM subsidy reduction, several of the Jakarta elites, including the Secretary General, Anis Matta652, was supported by several local committees. They proposed a policy to leave the coalition, resulting from the development of a negative feeling towards the government and, to some extent, the government’s failure to fulfil its promise to the party653. However, other cadres felt that the decision to reduce the BBM subsidy was unavoidable and having taken the national financial situation into consideration, challenged this idea. This camp believed that leaving the


651 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010.

652 On Matta’s opinion to opt out from the coalition, see “Tak Ada Koalisi Tanpa Perubahan”, in Saksi, No.6/VIII/30 November 2005, pp.7-9

653 Before coalition establishment, President Yudhoyono agreed to implement five points to have PKS’ support in turn. These points of agreement are: 1) to establish a clean, caring and professional government, 2) to protect the existence of the unitary state of Republic of Indonesia from any foreign interventions, 3) to avoid the establishment of military state, 4) to hold law enforcement and human rights, 4) to support the struggle for Palestinian independence and will not establish any diplomatic relations with Israel. Those who rejected the continuation of coalition with Yudhoyono established their argument by referring the first point, in which the government’s policy towards BBM had contradicted with the promise to establish a caring government.
government in this situation was not wise and would limit the party's chance to contribute something significant to the country from within the government. Therefore, the important action for PKS to take was to increase the quality of the coalition\textsuperscript{654}. The situation temporarily shook the cadres at grassroots level for quite some time and increased the dispute potential. However, afterwards, MS decided to stay in the coalition with its consultation mechanism\textsuperscript{655}, and socialise it through all the networks, as the dispute was terminated.

Chart 1
Conflict Resolution Mechanism in PKS

As for the case of an “open party” discourse, MS played a role in reducing the conflict potential by merely keeping it as a discourse\textsuperscript{656}. Although that discourse was regarded by several important figures as imperative to broaden people’s acceptance, the party considered that for some cadres the idea was still controversial to it being

\textsuperscript{654} http://www.suaramerdeka.com/harian/0511/28/nas03.htm
\textsuperscript{655} http://www.suaramerdeka.com/harian/0511/28/nas03.htm
\textsuperscript{656} See Bayan of PKS, 6 Februari 2008.
implemented\textsuperscript{657}. The discourse was one of the most delicate issues in the history of the party. Several cadres considered it as something that would potentially reduce the very character of PKS as an Islamic party. On the other hand, several cadres did not see Islam as an exclusive religion that prohibits Muslims to be open-minded and hold inclusive relations with other groups\textsuperscript{658}. For them, in fact, \textit{dakwah} itself required open-minded attitudes. This situation to some extent created tension among the cadres. In such circumstances, the decision of MS to hold this discourse until the majority of the cadres shared a similar perspective saved the party from a prolonged dispute\textsuperscript{659}.

As previously discussed in this chapter, the important role played by MS, in the main, was to be the one of an arbitration body. In this case, MS would create a final decision to bind all the cadres of the party and thus end disputes and any difference of points of view.

When the aspiration of any parties had the opportunity to be voiced through an internal CRM, like in PKS, it prevented the party from prolonged conflict. As mentioned by James H. Laue “when conflict resolution mechanism is working smoothly, all the parties with a stake have adequate representation in the forum and can create a win-win outcome…contributes to the ability of the system to resolve other conflict as they arise”\textsuperscript{660}.

However, this does not mean that everything always ran well in PKS. In reality, the party could not entirely escape from failure when dealing with such a situation. The case of Supendi was the example of the failure of the tribunal element to be an entire independent body. The long process in deciding the future of Supendi

\textsuperscript{657} Interview with Amri Yusra, M.Si, Chairperson of Depok DPD of PKS (2002-2004), Member of Parliament of Depok District, West Java, (2004-2009), and Lecturer at Political Sciences Department, Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of Indonesia, via telephone 13 December 2009.

\textsuperscript{658} See some statements supporting this idea in www.munaspk2010.org. See interview R Ferdian Andi R with the Genarl Chairperson of MS Hilmi Aminuddin in “Partai Terbuka Bukan Strategi PKS”, www.inilah.com. Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, observer of PKS and Tarbiyah Movement, Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the cadres who signed PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{659} However, in the 2010 National Consultation Forum, held in Jakarta, PKS decided to implement that idea, which was reflected in the possibility on non-Muslim to be member of the party. http://munaspks.info/

reflected this. The very close relationship between Supendi and Aminuddin, and the fact that Supendi was also a very senior figure in Jamaah Tarbiyah, whose last position as a member of DSP, created awkwardness. According to one of MS members, this was a difficult and exceptional case, which, to some extent, showed the inability of DSP to respond normally. This also indicated the existence of a sense of awkwardness in PKS when dealing with very senior and close figures, like Supendi. Even though the party finally removed Supendi for his insistent attitude that Aminuddin and Matta should be removed from the party, this particular case demonstrated that an awkwardness was not entirely unavoidable in PKS.

4. The Internal Situation

The existence of a safety net for conflict potential became one of the significant points resulting from the work of these institutions. The ability to reduce conflict potential related to its capacity to detect every single aspect of the problem at the grassroots or cadre level and to localise the conflict had become a characteristic that developed in the party as consequence result of above situation.

4.1. The Capability to Detect Conflict Potential.

The presence of CRM elements played an important role in supporting the ability to detect conflict potentials at an early stage. The very close position of these elements, DS as the main element and BPDO and halaqah as supporting elements, had for most activities or even the life of the cadres, covered issues such as morality, family, financial, political strategy, dismissal, and discipline, providing the occasion to know and anticipate any conflict potential at an early stage. In such a range of duties, almost all conflict potential and related matters were known and a way was found to terminate them.

In addition to the range of problems covered, the constitutional authorities owned by these elements had made it possible to monitor conflict development from its early stage. Halaqah, as the smallest unit of the party and for cadre development, became the main institution for this role, due to its ability to observe the situation of the thoughts, responses, and attitudes of the cadres. A communication network developed between the teacher and the students or among cadres and it obliged the elements of the party in halaqah to disclose their opinions and feelings, including their disappointment and hope. In such a circumstance, the internal networking
developed inside *halaqah* could thus grasp any vital signals from across the nation, which could be followed-up by any proper response.

The characteristic and the authority of *halaqah*, as the medium for cadre intensive development, made this institution an effective medium for discussing and detecting conflict potential. This institution also had a first-hand opportunity to seize the confusion. In some cases, the bewilderment appearing at the grassroots level encouraged the party to make internal policy adjustments as a response to the situation. The official announcement, conveyed by PKS through a public channel, to ask the Government formally to pay great attention to the government subsidy cuts compensation was part of the party’s response to any confusion at grassroots level\textsuperscript{661}.

At the other level, DS became the institution, which played the same role as the *halaqah* in terms of detecting conflict potential. Its existence in almost all the districts and municipalities in Indonesia enable it to be aware of and assess the development of conflict potential became possible. To some extent, DS played a more rigorous role compared to *halaqah*’s, since the conflict potential at its level tended to be more concrete, hence the party had to reply to it more seriously. Moreover, the existence of DS, up to the local level, could provide a significant assistance to the party to gain overall picture or map of the conflict potentials anatomy through its routine report. At the local level, the Tangerang DPW of PKS used reports and lessons learnt from the conflict containment process and involved DSD to develop economic assistance policy for some cadres as part of the conflict resolution. The party ran this policy due to the assessment of the source of the conflict in that area\textsuperscript{662}.

BPDO was still part of important party machinery to develop the ability to detect conflict potential, although it played only an indirect role in detecting conflict potential. In reality, this body sometimes gave the assistance and advice to a local committee in dealing with the conflict and any related matters\textsuperscript{663}. It became a haven

\textsuperscript{661} Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{662} Interview with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-2010), in Tangerang, 21 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{663} In the case of one of the areas in East Kutai District, for instance, such BPDO’s role was revealed. One of the public figures in that area who gained PKS’ support in election inclined to disregard several commitments, including enhancing the *dakwah* movements. Not only that, some cadres heard that this
for some cadres to consulate on delicate problems when facing difficulty. In its role, BPDO could support the party in detecting people who presumably had a potential to endanger the party’s unity and take an action on them to at the very early stage.

Another important factor in the ability to detect and to respond to conflict potential was the capacity to stop a long process by responding and solving a problem. Hence, it could quickly access the canalisation process in handling the conflict as one of the crucial elements in CRM. The failure of the party to obtain immediate action in handling conflict potentials would possibly intensify antagonism and eventually escalate the conflict to a dangerous level. Nevertheless, under the condition that the party was responsive, which occurred in PKS, conflict development there was a possibly to terminate it. This would be helpful for the development of CRM as the process that needed a comprehensive understanding of the problem core and offer proper responses to avoid conflict escalation by addressing and removing the deep-rooted source of conflict. According to Hidayat, by having the opportunity to table any claims, the process of conflict resolution and its containment with the possible solutions actually had been discussed and, hence, was about to halfway to completion. This situation was conducive to reduce the conflict, helped party to secure its potential to escalate.

4.2. The Capability to Localise the Conflict

The existence of CRM elements at the different level in the work domain and hierarchy made the party have a more complete and complicated networking for conflict resolution. The specialisation and specification of those elements, worked in the standardised rules of the game and spirit, provided an opportunity for any conflict localising efforts to be more effective and touchable. This diversity could be seen at

---


665 Interview with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-2010), in Tangerang, 21 October 2010.
the horizontal aspect (related to the topic of issues), and vertical aspect (related to the working hierarchy).

The horizontal aspect, the diversity or specialisation in handling conflict could be seen to be the domain of advanced conflict resolution, covering three main subjects of conflict. (1) morality, ethics, attitude and other aspects related to the implementation of Islamic laws handled by DSP; (2) the matters relating to discipline and obedience in implementing a party’s order, handled by BPDO (particularly after the implementation of the 2005 AD/ART); and (3) the policy making process for national issues, which was the domain of MS.

With this specialisation, each type of conflict potential and related matters would be handled by the appropriate institutions for it to be treated with precision. Such mechanisms, which became the code of conduct in the party, reduced the party’s dependence on one institution or even figures when dealing with potential conflict, creating more objective and effective policies. For this situation, it would be hard to find any central figure or group that could solve all the problems on their own and unilaterally.

As for the vertical aspect of the “division of labour”, enhanced by the implementation of the 2005 AD/ART, the presence of DS at the district level (DSD) reflected the situation. This development indicated the willingness of the party to be more responsive in handling conflict potential and able to contain it immediately at the local level. This not only assisted DSP in maintaining its duty as the tribunal body, but also helped it in localising conflict potential.

The delegation of authority did not appeal to the “distribution of authority” with its negative manner that could create uncertainty among cadres, since this delegation was conducted under DSP’s formal and centralised supervision. Although PKS did not entirely succeed in developing the quality of human resources at the local level and answering the problems properly, the existence of such a hierarchy mechanism and the institutions had pushed the party to have more power in terms of anticipating and localising the conflict.

The above situations made the escalation of the potential conflict and related matters became difficult. The presence of domains of conflict resolution scattered across the nation with relevant apparatus and networks strengthened PKS’ capability
to respond appropriately to the development of conflict potential. This led to the
limitation of harmful efforts from any elements to decrease party solidity. For
instance, in this atmosphere, PKS could limit the opportunity for the third party to
develop its solidarity inside the party that could obliterate party solidity. The
immediate response to several of the potential conflict problems happened to Sahlan
and Matapermana or those who had objections to the party, which prevented the
party from any efforts of intervention by the third party.

To some extent, the phenomenon of Forum Kader Peduli (the Caring Cadre
Forum/FKP) indicated the situation where such solidarity could gain support from
inside. This group led informally by some former prominent figures of Jamaah
Tarbiyah and party, such as Mashadi, attracted some cadres mainly from the Jakarta
Province. The mission of this group remained unclear, but mainly focussed on
criticising some of PKS elites leading a “hedonistic” way of life and their “moderate-
pragmatist” political approaches and movements.

In facing FKP, PKS in general did not develop a special treatment or policy.
PKS even saw the existence of such a community as a part of the auto-critics to be
more consistent in struggling for idealism. From this point, the conflict potential
was localised to be just a matter of interpretation differences between cadres and ex-
cadres in understanding the strategy to be put forward by the party, and to be
terminated at that level. Eventually, the situation did not create an extraordinary
situation, let alone a prolonged conflict. The party could control the situation and
continue to maintain good relations with FKP’s sympathisers.

5. The Impact: Party Cohesion Maintenance

The generally effective functioning of CRM encouraged the cadres to believe in the
system that they had in the party. Such belief or trust for instance was reflected by
the absence of efforts to find alternative mechanisms, which might potentially have
overshadowed the decision of the party, such as an alternative court to conduct
tribunal process that might have triggered dualism inside the party. In fact, the
homogeneity or consistency in implementing its duties appeared to persist in the

__________

666 Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5
October 2010.
party. DS, BPDO and MS had generally performed their tasks without giving much attention to the background of the cadre, such as the membership status or level of seniority. Although there were exceptional cases, in general, the level of punishment was based on the state of mistake and its potential to create internal destruction.

In reality, during its first decade of existence, DS had punished some party elites, including Balda, the first vice president of the party and one of the famous thinkers of the party and Supendi, one of the senior activists from the initial generation of the Indonesia Jamaah Tarbiyah and Member of Parliament (2004-2009). DS also had invited some elements from the elite group, including Anis Matta, the General Secretary of the Party, to explain their movements, behaviours, or thoughts, regarded by other cadres to be not in line with the party idealism, or creating a kind of upsets or upheaval at the grass root level.

Some objections indeed occurred and in fact were unavoidable, nevertheless it did not appeal to the cadres to use these moment to call the third party or court to intervene the conflict resolution process. This indicated that the party's decision was actually understandable and acceptable for most cadres or at least was not something that was entirely contradictory to the rules of the game. Moreover, under the above situation, the party could avoid any controversial decisions made by the third party, including the policies that essentially contradicted the tradition or norms of the party and which potentially created other controversies and prolonged the conflict. Therefore, the party could also avoid any intervention efforts that could reduce its autonomy and independence in determining further required actions.

667 Interview with Dr. Mardani Ali Sera, Vice Chairperson of MPP PKS (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 6 October 2010; with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 October 2010; with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-2010), in Tangerang, 21 October 2010; with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010; with Mustofa, the cadre of PKS and former reporter of Profetik Magazine, established by the cadres of the PKS, in Bekasi, 7 October 2010; with Nooryanto, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Bekasi DPD of PKS, in Bekasi, 7 November 2010; with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010; with Untung Wahono, Head of Department of Research and Development of DPP of PK (2000-2003), Head of Department of Politics and Defence of DPP of PKS (2002-2005), and Chairperson of MPP of PKS (2010-2015), in Jakarta 27 October 2010.

668 Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer, Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the cadres who signed the PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010; with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010; with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, Head of the III Dakwah Region (2002-2005), member of Majelis Syuro PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 2010.
relevant to the conflict resolution. This situation had protected PKS from the
emergence of alternative internal or external tribunals that could become a stepping-
stone in the enhancement of distrust and even a fertile zone for fragmentation.

By the presence of trust, the party could neglect any negative rumours that
had the potential to trigger huge reactions and endanger party solidity. The presence
of trust also preserved the cadres’ consciousness to seek valid information and
confirm negative issues before taking actions. In general, when a kind of conflict
potential occurred, the cadre would report or issue it to the party through their
murabbis or directly party structure with the confidence that the party would handle it
properly. In such situation, PKS had relatively been able to maintain its cohesion.

The capability to reduce factionalisation, or the development of some groups
with a tendency to resist against the party, was another result of the presence of
CRM that supported internal cohesion development. It became possible since the
development of solidarity or being part of a group, as the result of unfair treatments
or discrimination found their irrelevance. The prolonged unjust situation that could
provoke the cadres into have similar point of view on several of the prominent
figures, or the party, who continued to commit to the malfunctioning and wrongdoing,
was in general absent in PKS. Actually, there was not a significant result to convince
a large number of cadres on the tendency of the party to discriminate and prefer to
favouritism.

In addition, the fact that the internal justice and arbitration bodies were not set
up for protecting some people or groups, created confidence among the majority of
cadres on the merit of their party’s internal system. The system was created to be in
line with the interest of the party rather than to be the tool of the elite. Basalamah
said, “This situation preserves the confidence among the cadres that the party
leaders or other members would not treat them unfairly, which eventually helped the
party to rid itself of internal friction”\textsuperscript{669}. Although some people believed that the
system was implemented inconsistently and applied only to the cadres at the
grassroots level and to the critics\textsuperscript{670}, the majority of cadres did not see any clear

\textsuperscript{669} Interview with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS (2002), and personal
secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of PKS and The Chairperson of MPR of Republic of
Indonesia), in Jakarta, 12 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{670} Interview with K.H Yusuf Supendi Lc, Member of DSP of PKS (2000-2005) and Member of
attempts by the elite to use these bodies for illegal ends, exclusive or personal interests, including the removal of any critical persons\textsuperscript{671}. According to Nurdin, the fact was with the presence of such institutions, the elites could not take advantage of the ordinary cadres\textsuperscript{672}. Some critical cadres, considered collectively by the cadres could endanger the party’s image and unity, in fact, the critical cadres were removed using a mechanism that was acceptable in constitutional terms. In the situation where the number of unjustly treated cadres was very limited, the presence of a powerful opposition or resistance group representing an alternative for the party found it difficult to exist.

The reduction of factionalisation also became possible as the party could detect and remove the factionalisation supporting or potential elements from an early stage. In this case, \textit{halaqah} played a salient role. With its capability to influence cadres through intensive meetings and personal approach, this element of CRM played a role as “the filter of the conflict” and a reminder to the cadres on the importance to hold and preserve sense of togetherness.

Moreover, the capability to reduce factionalisation potential also related to the main role of the \textit{halaqah} as a medium to explain and socialise the ideological and strategic considerations behind a decision. Through that function, the party could provide the cadres with the logical explanations and considerations behind its actions and policies thus reducing curiosity and complaints. The potential tension between some cadres and the party at the issue of the BBM, for instance, could be reduced once \textit{halaqah} had played its role. Eventually, the presence and the work of \textit{halaqah} in almost all the regions limited the possibility of factionalisation and, on the other hand, preserved party’s cohesiveness. By the absence of a permanent factionalisation where there was a tendency to resist, there was a lesser possibility of fragmentation occurring in the party.

\textsuperscript{671} Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 October 2010; with Mustofa, cadre of PKS and former reporter of Profetik Magazine, established by cadres of PKS, in Depok, 7 October 2010; with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer, Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the cadres who signed the PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{672} Interview with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former \textit{tarbiyah} activist leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010.
The last situation that removed the possibility of internal fragmentation was the opportunity to voice an opinion and have it heard by the party. This situation was in line with the Hirschman’s opinion on the role of voice in maintaining loyalty. DS, BPDO, MS and mainly *halaqah* at the practical level, became the channel for the cadres to speak and voice their opinion and interests, including suggesting alternative thinking on topics and explaining their position. Although, in general some weakness could not be entirely neglected, the party had provided a sufficient access for all the cadres to be heard. The interest to support Rais was one of the cases. Moreover, the eagerness of several cadres to leave Government Coalition in 2005 had triggered the elites and the party to conduct an MMS. In other words, the party through those elements provided the cadres essentially with the facility to be protected from discrimination thus creating trust and certainty.

The CRM institutions were also not created to destroy differences, but to realign mistaken assumptions back on track and fostering common perceptions. For PKS, differences were something inevitable, especially in a party like PKS where most of the cadres came from the middle class and had had a higher education. As mentioned previously, the party could not escape from some delicate debates that could potentially lead the party to an internal conflict. The 2004 presidential election included these with the case of BBM and the decision to continue the coalition and the discourse on the importance to be an open party that allowed a non-Muslim to be party’s member. In these cases, the people could detect the differences between the *pros* and the *cons* camps.

However, these situations did not lead to a permanent factionalisation as each cadre realised that the party had given a proper chance to each group to voice its opinion without restraint. According to Siddiq, the institutionalisation of a *syura* in PKS, implemented as the elements of CRM and entire policy-making process, showed a collective model of leadership in the party, in which democratic mechanism became something common when stipulating a policy. He stated, “There is no policy unless (it) had been carried out through a process of using the ideas from many...”

---

people. Throughout such a mechanism, he believes that the sense of solidarity that led to the solidity of the party became strong because the process of the policy-making process was not dominated by the thought of one person.

If there was a kind of grouping in the party, it did not last long, let nor was it permanent. This tendency reflected the consciousness of most cadres on the real chance to voice their opinion. The negative efforts such as manipulation and discrimination were almost not founded on that process, since it was the process where the constitution and not personal ambition became the main reference. The internal mechanism of MS, for instance, provided an opportunity for people to struggle for their beliefs.

As for the grassroots level, similar to the elite level, the members and cadres or the sympathisers also had various opinions on these cases. Some critical elements conveyed their concern about the possibility of the collapse of the party image if the party committed to the wrong decisions or directions. This concern emerged mainly with the case of BBM and the continuity of the coalition with Yudhoyono’s government. Nevertheless, even in these delicate cases, strong factionalisation appeared to be absent in PKS. For some people, this situation indicates the symptom of an apathetic attitude among the cadres towards their own party. However, it could no be ignored that the party had a mechanism that influenced the absence of the tendency to factionalise.

6. Overview

The above discussion showed that PKS’ constitution had mentioned some institutions that were relevant to be elements of CRM. Those bodies had the authority, such as a reconciliation body, to conduct internal tribunals and investigations, or as the medium to find a resolution for any different points of view. The party also in reality had a standard pattern in dealing with conflict prevention and its resolution. The presence of theses bodies and the standard mechanism eventually made the party an authoritative guide and reference in dealing with conflict, even though it could not entirely escape some of its weaknesses. As the

---

675 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010.

676 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010.
result, PKS, over time, was able to detect the conflict potential and respond to it from an early stage. This party, hence, had the capability to contain the conflict practically immediately and prevent the party from prolonged disputes that potentially led to factionalisation, even though the presence of faction or factionalism itself is not totally a bad news for the party, since it sometimes provides a good competition that can develop the quality of the party. Some crucial and delicate moments that had a tendency to create internal conflict did not make prolong disputes and enhance conflicts. This situation maintained the trust and weakened the factionalisation tendency that eventually preserved the cohesiveness of the party. The discussion above indicates a very fundamental role of CRM as one of the indicators of party institutionalisation and mainly relates to the work of legal institutions in creating the ability to preserve party cohesiveness.
“Since we did not perform it (cadrerization) systematically, it was easy for turmoil to take root”. (A. Muhaimin Iskandar)\textsuperscript{677}.

1. Introduction

This chapter discusses another of the party’s institutionalisation elements, namely systematic cadrerization and its relation to PKB’s fragmentation. This and the following chapters regard systematic cadrerization as including the presence of systematic and gradual training, systematic evaluation of cadres, and fair recruitment in recruiting new members and elites. In other words, the result of the cadrerization process should eventually be the basic standard for party recruitment and selection.

A proper cadrerization should provide some basic information and orientation, including ones on the ideology and the mission of the party, the party’s management and other rules of the game and its respective internal values that have to be written clearly on the statute of the party or on other official documents and conveyed to all members of the party. The party at least should have a clear parameter that is easy for all the cadres to understand. Moreover, consistency and continuation in its implementation are the prerequisites of systematic cadrerization in order to maintain the quality of the recruitment process and regeneration. The importance of cadrerization is firstly to avoid any kind of unilateral and exclusive understanding, including towards party’s constitution, ideology, or values. Hence, it could avoid misinterpretation and prevent the elites from manipulating this activity for their personal interest. Secondly, it is to enhance the cadres’ loyalty towards the party. Thirdly, the significance of systematic cadrerization is to develop a spirit of meritocracy by which cadres would be evaluated based on their performance.

\textsuperscript{677} Interview with Interview with Abdul Muhaimin Iskandar, General Secretary of PKB (2000-2002), Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz (2002-2005), General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz (2005-2013) and Minister of Man Power and Transmigartion, in Jakarta, 13 October 2010.
Moreover, the presence of fairness and transparency in the recruitment process would boost the cadres’ respect toward the party’s rules of the game.

The following discussion explores the cadrerization situation in the PKB and its implication for the party’s cohesion. For this purpose, the discussion will cover four topics, namely (1) the legal-formal aspect, discussing legal formality related to cadrerization, (2) the implementation aspect, exploring the party’s efforts and failure to implement cadrerization, (3) the emergence of tendencies towards fragmentation as the impact created by the absence of systematic cadrerization within the party, and (4) the impact of those tendencies on party unity.

2. Cadrerization in Its Legal-Formal Aspect

In the party constitution, used before 2008, the cadrerization issues were not directly stated. In fact, the party did not clearly define the name of the body or institution that should handle this problem. However, after 2008, or one decade after the party’s establishment, the new party constitution created by PKB-Muhaimin started to mention cadrerization and its related matters. The ART Article 87 stated three things, namely (1) member recruitment was to be held through a gradual, structured and systematic system of cadrerization, (2) cadrerization was a main precondition for all members to gain promotion to a strategic position in the party or the government, and (3) cadrerization was an inseparable part of the evaluation process of the party committee board’s performance at every level of the committee. The article indicates what the party should do and maintain dealing with cadrerization.

Before 2008, however, cadrerization was regarded as a part of DPP duty or responsibility. The cadrerization institution, under the supervision of DPP, handled this matter. Although the constitution of the party did not clearly mentioned or arranged cadrerization, the party created some documents or guide books discussing the meaning, the purpose and the model of cadrerization. These documents also

---

678 The 2008 ART of PKB Article 87 (1), 87 (2) and 87 (3).
discuss the recruitment for a public position, including becoming a Member of Parliament (MP).

In PKB’s perspective, as mentioned in the first PKB’s Muktamar Document in 2000, cadrerization was “the totality of learning attempts that were conducted systematically, gradually and continually in order to develop the potential, attitude, dignity and prestige, insight and skill of the members so that they could become civilized, skilful, smart, loyal, brave, and capable people, who are also firm in running the party and attaining their objectives”680. The objective of the cadrerization was “to develop commitment/militancy, loyalty and dedication of the cadres towards the party”681. The objective of cadrerization was to develop loyal cadres who were not only understood the party’s vision, but had an ideological commitment and managerial skills; but also had a broad way of thinking, good behaviour and commitment to take a role in social life682. Moreover, PKB also realised that the success of having a good cadrerization would support the accomplishment of carrying out the party’s functions and programs, including providing a positive contribution to the state683. In addition, the party also realised that fair recruitment would prevent the party from internal conflict684.

PKB set up a Pengkaderan Formal Dasar (the Basic Formal Cadrerization) method consisting of different training programmes685, namely (1) Basic Level Training (PTD), that was set up for all member candidates, mainly as a medium to

---


685 “Sistem Kaderisasi PKB”, in Dokumen Muktamar I PKB. “Membangun Persaudaraan Sejati Antar Manusia Sebagai Esensi Rekonsiliasi Nasional”, pp. 129-130
introduce PKB, including its ideology and values; (2) Advanced Level Training (PTL), for cadres who had joined PTD. The aim of this training is to have a cadre with militancy and moral commitment and practical capability in conducting useful activities; (3) Expert Level Training. After joining this training, it was hoped that the cadres could take up a role as social workers and politicians having a strong ideological commitment. In addition to this training, the PKB also established a *Pengkaderan Formal Kejuruan* (the Vocational Formal Cadrerization) covering some practical training, such as training in democracy, training in labour, peasant and fisherman avocation, training in the social health service, training in legislative system, training in public relations and training in lobbying techniques.\(^{686}\)

PKB also underpinned the importance of cadrerization to be taken into account as part of the consideration for the selection of its Members of Parliament (MP)\(^{687}\). In terms of MP recruitment, PKB stated that the results of cadrerization became one of the main criteria. In this regard, ideally, only a cadre who had passed cadrerization could become a party representative in parliament. This situation also indicates that cadrerization was not something worthless for cadres' career development. However, the party also opened opportunity to public figures and professionals to be representatives of PKB in the election and run for MP positions represented this party.\(^{688}\) This opportunity was based on the consideration that a proper competence in dealing with the policy making process in parliament was not

\(^{686}\) *Ibid*, pp. 130-131

\(^{687}\) For this recruitment, the party set up a selection committee, called the Council for the Member of Parliament Candidate Fulfilment (MANTAP), consisting of the General Chairperson of Dewan Syura (Consultative Board), the Secretary of Dewan Syura, the General Chairperson of the Dewan Tanfidz (Executive Board), the General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz and women’s representation. This team existed at every level of the committee (DPP/State, DPW/Province and DPC/District). Its main duty was to conduct the selection of candidates, where the result of the selection would become the basis in drawing up the candidates of the MP list. Once the list finalised, the team then conveyed it to the society to have it evaluated or with input from them in return. After passing this process, the MANTAP team made a final evaluation, which would determine the formation of the Provisional List of Candidates (DCS). The team then submitted the DCS to the DPP to be clarified and legalised as the Permanent List of Candidates (DCT). The DPP returned this DCT to every local committee to be passed by each Local Election Commission.\(^{687}\) In the case of the national MPs, the DPP defined the DCT and submitted it to the Election Commission. In the selection process, MANTAP evaluated and scored each candidate based on several criteria, such as seniority, loyalty, behaviour, experience, level of popularity, education background, and political knowledge. The score then determined the rank of a candidate in the list.\(^{687}\) “Rekrutmen Caleg”, in *PKB dalam Pemilu 2004*, pp. 75-81. Interview Moch. Nurhasim with one of the Chairs of the PKB DPC in Sampang, December 2003, in Moch. Nurhasim, “Pengaruh dan Kekuatan Kyai dalam Rekrutmen Politik. Kasus Kabupaten Sampang dan Pasuruan”, in Syamsuddin Haris, ed, *Pemilu Langsung di Tengah Oligarki Partai. Proses Nominasi dan Seleksi Calon Legislasi Pemilu 2004*, (Jakarta: Gramedia, LIPI and IMD, 2005), p. 62.

\(^{688}\) “Rekrutmen Caleg”, in *PKB dalam Pemilu 2004*, p. 73.
something that had been attained evenly by all party’s cadres. The party realised that there were many persons outside the party, who deserved to be MPs, as they were capable to defend the people’s interest.

3. Implementation

3.1. Inconsistency in Conducting Cadrerization

Although the party had tried to develop a set of cadrerization methods, the implementation of a cadrerization process in the PKB during the first decade of the Reform Era was not in line with its own method. Sometimes, the implementation of formal cadrerization was overshadowed by the “informal” or indirect cadrerization, which were held by non-party institutions. The role of NU, as a socio-religious organization that had a salient role in establishing the PKB, played a very crucial role in the PKB’s cadre development, particularly during the first years of party’s existence.

NU cadres, who had joined and passed the NU’s cadrerization, could almost automatically transform their status to be cadres of PKB. PKB regarded individuals who had joined NU’s cadrerization or who had become cadres of NU as people who had understood the essence and the purpose of the PKB’s cadrerization and hence could attain status as party cadres. In the first years of the party’s existence, the majority of the PKB’s members of committees were former cadres of NU or its subparts, and they could reach their position in the party without passing by a tiered selection. In addition, it continually happened until the first decade of the PKB’s existence. The General Secretary of PKB-Gus Dur, Zannuba Wahid (Yenny) acknowledged that “the PKB cadrerization actually derives from the cadrerization in NU’s subparts”.

Over the first decade of its existence, the party seemed to feel comfortable to be in this situation. NU’s cadrerization in its development became an important part in PKB’s cadrerization continuation. The majority of the party’s committee members

---

689 Ibid, pp. 71-72.
and cadres regarded this situation to be in line with the NU people’s aspirations, who wanted to have a party that provided a strategic position for NU people in the party in order to guarantee the continuation of the struggle of the NU’s interests. Moreover, this situation was also supported by the lack of a constitutional role in this matter. The party’s constitution actually did not have the power to oblige the implementation of a proper cadrerization, as until 2008 it did not specifically arrange this process.

On the other hand, this situation also opened a chance for the patron-client relation, as one of the main characteristics in NU’s internal relationship, to reveal in this process. The special position of ulama or NU elites provided these figures the chance to influence the implementation of cadrerization. However, these figures sometimes ran this process using their own understanding and capacity, rather than using the standardized modules and curriculums\(^{692}\), which could be controlled and evaluated by the party and its apparatus. Eventually the cadrerization instruments and concepts could not be implemented correctly, since the dependency on the respectable ulama, rather than the system continued. The party could not guarantee the quality of cadres, since in reality it tended to depend on other organization’s cadrerization and informal figures\(^{693}\).

The party also could not establish a regular and fixed forum to conduct cadrerization. During the first decade of reform era, PKB’s cadrerization took place in informal forums. In local areas, PKB’s cadrerization depended on the NU’s activities, particularly in activities related to the Islamic days’ commemorations. On such occasions, the party’s political messages and agendas were conveyed and the consciousness to regard PKB as the only party that will struggle sincerely for NU peoples’ interests were recalled by ulama or party appurtenances to the participants, who usually were also PKB’s cadres or sympathizers. Such occasions were also used as a medium to gather the party’s cadres together. Even though the local committees in some local areas indeed held a cadrerization at least once or twice, in general they really depended on NU’s calendar of activities, which sometimes became the only chance for the implementation of cadrerization for local committees in other areas.

\(^{692}\) Interview with Khatibul Umam Wiranu, Vice General Secretary of PKB (1999-2005) and Member of Parliament (1998-2004), in Depok, 17 October 2010.

\(^{693}\) Interview with Zannuba Ariffah “Yenny” Wahid, General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz PKB-Wahid (2008-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010.
Marinah Hardy observed that during his five years as chairperson of the Western Southeast Nusa (NTB) DPW of PKB only conducted cadrerization less than four times, which used religious celebration momentous as the medium. According to Damanhuri, the PKB actually never did any kind of systematic and structured cadrerization. He said, “A structured cadrerization had never taken place in the PKB from the beginning until today, never.” By having this situation, where the intensity of the cadre meeting was very low, one can understand if the cadre’s loyalty and ideology comprehension was not properly developed.

Besides having a problem with the appropriate forum to conduct cadrerization, the continuity of cadrerization was another significant problem. According to Hardy “cadrerization was not conducted on the routine basis…the party at the national level conducts programs, such as educations, trainings and assignments…but over time these processes vanished gradually.” Some cadres, including Hardy, believed that at the local level the financial difficulty hardened this situation. In many remote areas, where the presence of transportation facilities became the main issue to hold party activities, the condition of party’s finance, which was not handled correctly, had provided the very obstacle for the existence of routine cadrerization. The cadrerization over time also lost its objectivity and tended to serve one particular group’s interest in the party. According to Sulistyo “…the education forums and training for the party’s cadres grew when the party had just been established. But internal education over time became more exclusive and

---

694 Interview with Marinah Hardy, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of Western Nusa Tenggara DPW of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010.
696 Interview with Marinah Hardy, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of Western Nusa Tenggara DPW of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010.
697 Interview with Marinah Hardy, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of Western Nusa Tenggara DPW of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010.
even implicitly worked as a medium for factionalism strengthening in the PKB’s body” 700.

In such a situation, comprehensive cadre development actually became something difficult to establish, since the exclusive motives to enhance groups or elites’ interest sometimes took over the purpose of cadrerization itself. According to Kristadi “the party also failed to play a role as the medium for political education, since political practices inside the party did not provided an ideal education for the cadres that is in line with the party’s principles” 701.

3.2 Party Recruitment and Subjectivism

In an ideal condition, cadrerization was an important element that played a significant part in the recruitment process for internal or public posts. However, in PKB, party recruitment was not determined directly by the result of cadrerization.

Some phenomena in PKB’s internal position on recruitment indicate the absence of systematic and objective recruitment. The first was that recruitment was based partially on heredity and nepotism. In this case, someone who was the relative of charismatic ulama had more chance to hold a strategic position in the party, even though he or she actually had never been involved in the cadrerization process. At the national level, the case of Yenny, the daughter of Wahid who could attain strategic positions as the Vice General Secretary and then the General Secretary in a short time, without having sufficient experience in the party’s cadrerization, was the example of this case. The case of Saifullah Yusuf, the nephew of Wahid, also indicated a similar pattern. Yusuf, who was a former member and a MP from PDIP (1998-2001), in the 2001 MLB, could be one of the candidates for the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz, although he never joined the party’s cadrerization and just terminated his PDIP membership a couple weeks before the MLB. On that occasion, Yusuf, who just became a member of the PKB for one week eventually succeeding to be PKB’s new secretary general702.


701 J. Kristadi, “Pergulatan dan Tantangan PKB Memenuhi Harapan Bangsa”, in ibid, p. 129.

A similar condition also happened at local level, where several relatives of influential ulama or NU’s founding fathers could easily become party elite. Some grandchildren and close relatives of the late Bisri Syamsuri, one of NU’s founding fathers, for instance, became the holder of a strategic position in several local committees, including Jombang and Jakarta. Musa believed that the heredity or collegial role was still very crucial in his party. He concluded satirically that the condition in his party with three “N”s, saying, “In the PKB nisab (the asset) or nasab (the descent) was needed to meet nasib (the destiny)”.

The party also had serious trouble with the party or NU elites’ attitudes in promoting their colleagues or close friends to the recruitment process, which occasionally side stepped cadrerization. The pattern of recruitment based on the elite’s collusion was the second phenomenon that happened in this party. In the earlier years of PKB’s existence, this kind of recruitment mechanism was commonly understood to be a normal procedure, since cadrerization was still in its initial process. However, over time, such mechanism happened constantly. It reached its peak during the post 2005 Semarang Conference, when party’s elites, including Wahid, plotted some unpopular or even strange names to hold several strategic positions in PKB. These figures included Sigid Wibisono, former member of the Golkar Party, and Artalyta Suryani, a businesswoman who was an unknown figure.

703 This including Iskandar and his relatives. Interview with Khoififah Indar Parawansa, State Minister for Women Empowerment (1999-2001), Chairperson of the Institute for Election Winning of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010.

704 Interview with Dr. Ali Masykur Musa, Vice Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz PKB (2005-2010) and General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz PKB-Versi Parung (2008-2009), in Jakarta, 19 October 2010.


706 Wibisono, former member of Golkar Party, was set up to hold one of members of Dewan Syura in the 2005-2010 Party Committee. His position in the party was based on Yenny’s recommendation, agreed by Wahid. However according to Yenny, it was Iskandar the figure behind the scenes, who introduced and recommended Wibisono to her father. Asides the different opinions around the introducer, many cadres believed that Wibisono was actually still a member of Golkar Party when joining PKB. Interview with Zannuba Arifiah “Yenny” Wahid, General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz PKB-Gus Dur (2008-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010; with Andi M. Ramly, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz (2002-2010), Secretary of Dewan Syura PKB-Muhammadin (2008-2010) and writer of “Mabda Syiyasi PKB”, in Jakarta, 15 October 2010; with Ahmad Shodiq Noor, General Secretary of DKI Jakarta DPW of PKB, in Jakarta, 3 November 2010.

707 Suryani was one of important Indonesia businesswomen, who was the owners of many important enterprises in Jakarta and Lampung. She was introduced by Aris Junaidi, party’s treasury, to Wahid to hold the new Party’s General Treasury. Although Wahid did not really know her, he agreed Junaidi’s recommendation to plot Suryani, a strange figure for most of PKB’s cadres, to hold such important position. This exclusive agreement had successfully placed Suryani’s name in the 2005-2010 party managing board. The name of Suryani was still recorded in Lembar Negara (the State Document), an official document and the authentic and fixed document from the party, legally acknowledged by the government. In addition, some people believed that the party had put her name as a new General Secretary.
to the majority of PKB’s cadres; and Muslim Abdurrahman\textsuperscript{708}, prominent figure of the Muhammadiyah for the Jakarta DPW of PKB.

At the local level, the political advices of \textit{ulama} or NU key figures, rather than internal party discussion, also played a salient role in the establishment of the local board management. These \textit{ulama} and figures usually asked the party committee to consider their students, colleagues or family members to be put in strategic positions in the party’s management, as the representation of their interest and support for the party\textsuperscript{709}. In this regard, Nurhasim believed that PKB did not have real stages of cadrerization that could be used as a fair parameter in the formation of the party structure. He said that “By the absence of the cadre stages, it becomes possible for even new cadres to hold positions in the party executive committee, if they have a close relation with the party’s chair”\textsuperscript{710}.

The third was the recruitment based on the possession of NU background. In this case, someone with NU background, mainly having experience in the NU as a committee member, would have a better chance to hold strategic positions in PKB. The party that clearly claimed to be an open party, not only for the NU people and this situation indicates inconsistency. In doing so, PKB sometimes did not use a clear and objective parameter when selecting the persons to hold important positions. The candidates’ background then became a main priority rather than their capacity. At the national level, several key figures of PBNU became members of the PKB DPP almost automatically. Several prominent figures in PBNU such as Ma’ruf Amien, Ahmad Bagja and H.Z Arifin to name a few, held important positions in the PKB as the General Chairperson of \textit{Dewan Syura}, the Chairperson of \textit{Dewan Syura} and Secretary of \textit{Dewan Syura} respectively. In its development, PKB constantly practised such patterns of recruitment.

\textsuperscript{708} Abdurrahman was the member of Muhammadiyah, a modernist Islamic organization, who also one of Wahid’s very close friends. As prominent figures of the NU and Muhammadiyah, Wahid and Abdurrahman had similar visions and shared liberal perspective on Islam which tightened their relationships. Even though he was not NU’s cadres, and had never joined PKB’s cadrerization, his relation with Wahid paved Abdurrahman a way to be one of the chairpersons in the Jakarta DPW of PKB.

\textsuperscript{709} Interview with Muamir M. Syam, Chairperson of PKB (2005-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{710} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 49.
At the local level, this pattern of recruitment also worked. Many PKB leaders could obtain the important positions in the PKB because of their influential position in NU. Hardy, for instance, was General Secretary of the NTB DPW of NU, which then held an important position in the NTB DPW of PKB as the General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz. He could reach his strategic position in the PKB simply because of his previous position in NU. Damanhuri, a charismatic ulama and the owner of pesantren in Depok, was a member of Dewan Syuriah in the Depok DPC of the NU. Although he used to belong to the PPP, zealous activist in the Soeharto era and was not really active in the PKB’s initial establishment in Depok, in the 2004, mainly due to his position in the NU community, he was selected to be the Depok DPC of the PKB Chairperson of Dewan Syura.

However, the existence of such patterns did not really close the opportunity for common people and people with a non-NU background to join the party and hold a strategic position. The existence of some important figures, including Imam Nachrawi, one of the chairpersons in PKB-Muhaimin DPP who reached his position based on his quality, proved that the chance was still open. At the local level, similar situations also happened. In some non-NU areas, such as in East Southeast Nusa or Papua, the people without NU background indeed could lead. However, the proportion of these areas was limited compared to the total number of PKB committees around the country, which mainly were concentrated in the NU basis areas, where the role of NU background and heredity aspects still play a salient role.

Having the above situations, some elites realized that the party actually still faced a very complicated situation in performing cadrerization. Muhaimin Iskandar, for instance, acknowledged that almost one decade after its establishment the PKB’s cadrerization was still not systematic and on the track. The party failed to abandon the role of the NU’s ulama and their networking, including NU management and pesantren in the cadrerization and the recruitment process. A privileged position of ulama sometimes became very influential in those processes.

711 Nachrawi states proudly that his existence shows that cadrerization in the PKB was not totally in vain. Interview with Imam Nachrawi, the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of East Java DPW of PKB (2005-2007) and the Member of Parliament (2009-2014), in Jakarta, 25 October 2010.

Above situation corresponded to Angelo Panebianco’s opinion on the one of the characteristics of a weak institutionalized party. According to Panebianco “In weakly institutionalised parties, on the other hand, few “careers” of this type exist; there is greater discontinuity at all levels; and while there are few “conventional” careers, in the strict sense, there are many rapid careers involving immediate entry to the middle-high ranks…In weakly institutionalized organizations, on the other hand, there is a “horizontal integration” of elites: people enter the party at high levels from the outside environments in which they already occupy positions”713. Since people could relatively attain a strategic position in the PKB simply because of their NU background, in particular as the members of the NU’s board, the PKB actually experienced such a “horizontal integration” phenomenon. Someone that had become elite in NU or even just a son of the famous NU ulama could be an important person in the PKB without passing an objective cadrerization or tiered selection714. In short, those people could occupy important positions in the PKB because of their status and activities outside the party.

4. **The Emergence of Supporting Tendencies for Fragmentation**

The lack of establishing systematic cadrerization results in three inclinations in this party, which, over time, cemented fragmentation establishment. These three tendencies are (1) the failure to preserve common understanding on the rules of the game, (2) esprit de corps weakening or the decreasing sense of togetherness, and (3) the fail to maintain cadre’s respect towards the rules of the game.

4.1. **The Failure to Preserve Common Understanding on The Rules of The Game**

The discontinuity of cadrerization that indicated the absence of systematic cadrerization provided diversity and incompleteness in the knowledge transfer of the party’s values and the rules of the game to all cadres. This condition led to the emergence of multi-interpretations of the rules of the game and values.

---


Khatibul Wiranu, former General Secretary of the Party, believes that a proper cadrerization would bring solid interpretation among cadres. He said, “if the cadrerization ran well in PKB, I think the differences in understanding rules of the game would be minimal”. However, in the PKB, he believes, such situation was not the case.

The debate on the proportion of the General Chairperson of Dewan Syura’s role in the dismissal process of the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz, for instance, continued during the first decade of PKB’s existence. Even though the party constitution had mentioned this matter, over time a common understanding on that issue did not strongly occur among cadres. In dealing with such issue, several cadres believe that it was the right of Dewan Syura to dismiss the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz. Thus, dismissals could be conducted in many forums and not only in Muktamar, on condition that the Chairperson of Dewan Syura had agreed it. On the other hand, many cadres believed that Muktamar or the MLB was the only eligible forum for the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz impeachment process. Over time, there was no solid and one interpretation on this matters that could be used as final reference, which was transmitted or socialised by the party to all cadres. Until the end of the first decade of reform era such difference still exist among the cadres. To some extent, this situation also indicates the different perspectives on the real role of Muktamar.

A difference also occurred in terms of understanding the party ideology, particularly on the implementation of pluralism as one of important values in this party. Some people believe that the party should implement a kind of restricted pluralism by providing more opportunity for NU members and the teachings of ahlussunah wal jamaah to develop. This camp believed that the party should be a protector for the development of traditionalist Muslim people’s teaching and interests. They also championed for the rights of the NU people to become involved in the party’s structure and activities.


On the other hand, many members believe that the party should provide pure equality towards all Indonesian people. They agreed for instance that the party should provide the significant chance for the non-NU members, even the non-Muslim ones, to be active in the party.

The absence of cadrerization impeded the party to develop and maintain common understanding on such basic issue. Maridjan considers that the unsystematic cadrerization had weakened the ideological socialization, which eventually weakened the PKB cadres’ understanding on the essence of the party ideology\(^7\). In line with such an opinion, Wiranu acknowledges that the failure in creating a systematic cadrerization had pushed the cadres to individually find the meaning of party ideology, which over time provided the very chance for different interpretations of this matter among them\(^8\).

In its development, the sole interpretation of those problems had gradually vanished in this party, which paved the way to the continuation of different interpretations. This situation not only indicated the absence of common understanding on party’s constitution but also became eventually one of the main triggers to three large conflicts that led to internal fragmentations. In this regard, Kristiadi concludes that in almost one decade of its existence, different interpretations had generated important conflict in this party\(^9\).

4.2. The Weakening of Esprit de Corps

Since cadrerization relied on many institutions, mainly pesantren and NU’s sub-groups, cadres became scattered into the hands of many patrons without effective control from the party’s apparatus. In this atmosphere, the party could not maintain esprit de corps properly, since the cadres tended to belong to one particular institution or patron. The party could not cut such unique and to some extent effective

---

\(^7\) Interview with Prof. Dr. Kacung Marijan, NU policies’ observer and former member of Assistance Team of the proposal for the establishment of PKB (Rembang version), in Jakarta, 26 November 2010.

\(^8\) Interview with Khatibul Umam Wiranu, Vice General Secretary of PKB (1999-2005) and Member of Parliament (1998-2004), in Depok, 17 October 2010.

The cadres, as the result, did not really feel a sense of togetherness among or an obligation to prioritize the unity of the party. Rather, in this situation, many cadres sometimes preferred to follow their ulama. Sometimes they respect the statements or follow the instruction of their patron or ulama more than the party’s statement or instruction.

In this situation, the decision of a patron became a kind of obligation to do and was followed sincerely by the cadres. The decision of Fawaid Syamsul Arifin, charismatic ulama in Situbondo who was also a former the General of Dewan Syura Situbondo DPC of PKB, to leave the party which was then followed by thousand of PKB cadres in 2003, for instance, indicated such a phenomenon. Staquf considers santri loyalty towards Arifin as their patron was the main reason for the santri to perform such political manoeuvre. Arifin’s decision indeed eventually created heavy lost for the party in 2004 Election in Situbondo. However, the Situbondo case according to Staquf was not unique or exceptional in PKB.

Furthermore, in such circumstance it was possible that in PKB, cadres follow their “direct patron” in a particular issue without initially trying to understand the real situation. The cadres would still follow their ulama without any reservation, even though it meant they had to fight with other cadres. Parawansa describes this situation as the readiness to abolish (meniadakan) each other. They even sometime expressed their loyalty by treating their patrons’ opponents as enemy rather than as their fellows who simply had different opinion with them. The presence of such loyalty indicates that the role of ulama or patron of PKB’s cadres to

723 Interview with Yahya Cholil Staquf, Vice of General Secretary of PKB (1998-2005) and President Abdurrahman Wahid Spokesperson (2001), in Rembang, 11 November 2010.
725 Interview with Yahya Cholil Staquf, Vice of General Secretary of PKB (1998-2005) and President Abdurrahman Wahid Spokesperson (2001), in Rembang, 11 November 2010.
a certain extent was still significant. The fact was the sense of being tied to their respected ulama could not be easily replaced by the party\textsuperscript{729}.

This situation was boosted by the fact that the party also became a medium to perpetuate the power of groups and a channel for power transaction between elites in PKB and NU and their followers. In this regard, nepotism was something that could not be effectively avoided by PKB, which highlighted the role of mutualism symbiosis between those actors rather than cadrerization in the process of recruitment. According to Koirudin at the local level, NU's elites still became the real power\textsuperscript{730}. This kind of relation maintained the loyalty of santri as the party's cadres towards their ulama as patron. Cadres hence tended to look beyond groups or elites, who had provided them with real advantages, as the main source of legitimate power and put their loyalty in them, rather than strictly in the party with the result that dual loyalty could not be effectively avoided.

In this atmosphere, many cadres, particularly at senior and elite levels, had a deep sense that their success story in politics had nothing to do with the party rather was mainly due to their important position in NU or society. This situation, according to Wiranu, had strengthened the sense of independence among the vast majority of the ulama or local elites towards the party, to the extent that the party eventually could not entirely and effectively direct and control their tendencies or activities\textsuperscript{731}. Staquf stated that one of the consequences was if they felt mismatched with Jakarta, they would easily leave the party\textsuperscript{732}. Staquf describes this situation as being “the party consisting of several independent pouches. It was like a puzzle in which each of the pieces was relatively established and self-governing”\textsuperscript{733}. The absence of systematic cadrerization had fertilized and cemented such a situation rather than deteriorated it.

4.3. The Loose Attitude towards Party’s Rules of the Game

\textsuperscript{729} Interview with Khatibul Umam Wiranu, Vice General Secretary of PKB (1999-2005) and Member of Parliament (1998-2004), in Depok, 17 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{730} Koirudin, \textit{Menuju Partai Advokasi}, p. 185.

\textsuperscript{731} Interview with Khatibul Umam Wiranu, Vice General Secretary of PKB (1999-2005) and Member of Parliament (1998-2004), in Depok, 17 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{732} Interview with Yahya Cholil Staquf, Vice of General Secretary of PKB (1998-2005) and President Abdurrahman Wahid Spokesperson (2001), in Rembang, 11 November 2010.

\textsuperscript{733} Interview with Yahya Cholil Staquf, Vice of General Secretary of PKB (1998-2005) and President Abdurrahman Wahid Spokesperson (2001), in Rembang, 11 November 2010.
The absence of systematic cadrerization also caused the party lost its capability to manage cadres' discipline on the rules of the game. The party could not avoid the fact that many of the cadres had undervalued the rules of the game. According to Wiranu, “over time the administration discipline in this party had vanished. The members of committees tended to put forward a subjective approach rather than being consistent with the party constitution or AD/ART.” In general, he believes that the absence of systematic cadrerization had championed personal approach in managing the party, since basically the party’s members did not respect internal rules any longer.

Nepotism, for instance, has been a common phenomenon in the process of filling strategic positions inside the party at all level of committee. Parawansa stated that the very foundation of the party structure was still determined mainly by heredity rather than by objective achievements. Parawansa acknowledged that “PKB was the most frequent party that put forward the family aspects in the party structure of committee without a gradual process.” Moreover, the presence of new faces in the PKB in the DPP structure, which was simply due to their closeness to some of the important figures in the party, showed another aspect of the failure of the merit system. The presence of people like Wibisono, Suryani and Abdurrahman was the very example of this situation, where unknown people in PKB, mainly cadres at the middle and grass root level, could hold several strategic posts in this party.

On the other hand, it was also easy for the party to dismiss members even though there was a lack of evidence to support it. Under such circumstance, many cadres also felt insecure because their positions could easily be lost due to subjective judgment. Gradually many cadres did not really see that their achievement in cadrerization and other formal events would bring positive

---

734 Interview with Khatibul Umam Wiranu, Vice General Secretary of the PKB (1999-2005) and Member of Parliament (1998-2004), in Depok, 17 October 2010.
735 Interview with Khatibul Umam Wiranu, Vice General Secretary of the PKB (1999-2005) and Member of Parliament (1998-2004), in Depok, 17 October 2010.
737 Interview with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, the State Minister for Women Empowerment (1999-2001), Chairperson of the Institute for Election Winning of the PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010.
implications for their career development. The Chair of Dewan Tanfidz of the Central Sulawesi DPW of PKB Samsudin Pay said that such a situation made the PKB unable to guarantee a political insurance for their cadres, including himself.

Also in this situation, ordinary cadres that had performed their best eventually thought that the situation in the party was not favourable for them, since they sometimes had to give way to blue-blooded persons and their colleagues to lead and regarded this circumstance as a normal situation. Such atmosphere provided a serious impact for the cadres to have the opportunity to attain higher stages in their career development. According to Choirie, “the tradition of honouring “Gus”, as a kind of “the highest caste” and “the main race” in the NU’s body with their all privileges, had sometimes disabled the cadrerization system based on a meritocracy spirit and therefore hampered the “common NU people” cadres to enjoy the vertical mobility. This situation also obstructed the cadres’ motivation to sincerely perform their duties in this party and follow the rules of the game, since fairness was not the important measurement for career development.

In the end, this situation discouraged most of the cadres and made them disrespect to the party system. This situation, on the other hand, also supported the freedom of actions among cadres to secure their exclusive interests, including protecting the interest of their political patron. This situation also pushed them towards building relations with powerful figures based on the exclusive with a self-seeking interest. The situation generally taught cadres that being loyal to figures that could bring those advantages to them rather than to follow the system, was a reasonable choice in order to survive.

739 Interview with Ahmad Shodiq Noor, General Secretary of the DKI Jakarta DPW of PKB, in Jakarta, 3 November 2010.
741 Interview with Muhammad Tohadi, Member of PKB (1998-2005) and Vice Chairperson of PKNU DPP, in Jakarta, 6 October 2010.
742 Choirie, “Menjadikan PKB Partai Nasional dan Terbuka”, p.204.
743 Interview with Dr. A. Effendy Choirie, Member of Parliament from PKB (1998-2011) and Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz PKB-Versi Parung (2008-2009), in Jakarta, 19 October 2010.
744 Interview with Prof. Dr. Kacung Marijan, NU policies’ observer and former member of Assistance Team of the proposal for the establishment of PKB (Rembang version), in Jakarta, 26 November 2010; with Khatibul Umam Wiranu, Vice General Secretary of PKB (1999-2005) and Member of Parliament (1998-2004), in Depok, 17 October 2010.
In general, the absence of a merit system and the failure of cadrerization discouraged the cadres to value the rules related to the party recruitment. In this regard, cadres did not really see a strict correlation between joining cadrerization and attaining a better position in the party, which made them feel free to accept a proposal from conflicting groups to hold strategic positions in the party. The important thing for the cadres therefore was about how far such political manoeuvre could bring significant advantages for them. In this situation, it was common if the supporters of conflicting groups could easily ask any persons that they liked to join the party, and a cadre to accept such a proposal.

5. **The Impact of the Above Tendencies towards Party**

The above three tendencies namely the failure to preserve common understanding mainly towards the rules of the game, the weakening of the esprit de corps and the loose attitude towards party’s constitution contributed to the emergence of three time fragmentations.

5.1. **The First Fragmentation**

In the 2001 the different perceptions, particularly on the appropriate basis to stipulate the dismissal policy towards the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz, had become one of the backgrounds for party fragmentation. In this matter, Matori Abdul Jalil and his supporters believed that the role of Wahid should be limited. The only eligible forum to decide the future of Jalil, in their opinion, was a Muktamar or MLB which was attended by all committees’ representatives across the country. In this regard, hence, Jalil dismissal according to Jalil was unconstitutional. On the other hand, Wahid and his followers believed that it was the authority of Wahid, as the General Chairperson of Dewan Syura, to dismiss the General Chairpersons of Dewan Tanfidz, since Jalil could only be the general chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz after having Wahid’s permission. Therefore, the dismissal process could actually be held...

---

745 Interview with Prof. Dr. Kacung Marijan, NU policies’ observer and former member of the Assistance Team of the proposal for the establishment of the PKB (Rembang version), in Jakarta, 26 November 2010; with Anas Nashikin, General Secretary of the Garda Bangsa, one of the PKB’s onderbows, in Jakarta, 26 October 2010; with H.Z Arifin Junaidi, General Secretary of Dewan Syura of PKB (2002-2005) and Chairperson of the Dewan Syura of PKB (2005-2010), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010

in many forums, as long as it had been authorised by the general chairperson of Dewan Syura.

Each conflicting group over time preferred to hold their perspective rather than to compromise it, let alone be willing to follow the opponent’s opinion. They believe in the correctness of their opinion. Such an unbridgeable difference hampered any attempts for reconciliation and tended to be a source of a prolonged conflict and eventually fragmentation.

On the other hand, the lack of esprit de corps also caused problem for internal unity preservation. Cadres tended to be easily spread about because they tended to follow one particular patron or institution. Several cadres, particularly those who attained important positions during Jalil 1998-2001 leadership, supported Jalil.747 On the other hand, many more cadres decided to defend Wahid, who was not only the former leader of NU but also at that time still supported by many prominent and highly respected figures of the NU’s ulama. The absence of esprit de corps raised the sense of detestation between the supporters of each conflicting group. The cadres regarded their fellows in opposite groups as an enemy who should be removed. This attitude was reflected by the desire to sack each other, or to make negative statements or accusation publicly sometimes by using mass media, towards the opposition. However, many cadres regarded their patron’s position or order as the main consideration before making any political actions.

Their loyalty towards certain ulama played a significant role. In this situation, cadres became some kind of easy targets to be mobilised to support one of the groups that was in the middle of conflict. The presence of thousands cadres who were also actually santri of certain ulama in the MLB indicated their eagerness to express their support and defence towards the group supported by their patron. Each conflicting group exploited such a phenomenon to gain support in establishing party committee and the MLB. Jalil for instance stated that the presence of thousands of santri in his MLB would not be possible if the ulama did not instruct them to attend the MLB748. Jalil also used his close relation with Dimyati Rais, one of the charismatic ulama, to back up his group existence.

747 Interview with Abdul Khalik Ahmad, Secretary of PKB Faction in DPR RI (1999-2001) and General Secretary of the PKB- Jalil (2000-2005), in Jakarta, 11 October 2010.
In terms of the lack of respect towards the system, it facilitated the creation of supporting groups of each conflicting group including hundreds of local party committees. During the intense quarrel and prior to the “fragmentation formalisation” through the MLB in 2002, held by each conflicting group, each camp could create party committees across the country. The creation of such party committees was mainly to show the public and the competitors that all of the legal cadres from the top to grass-roots level supported their presence. Jalil and his supporters could set up those committees not long after his dismissal. The result was that a hundred delegations from 29 DPWs and 307 DPCs attended MLB held by the PKB-Matori on 14th-16th January 2002 in Jakarta. While Jalil could prove his party’s existence in all provinces and more than three hundreds districts, Wahid’s version of the PKB existed in 33 provinces and in 330 DPCs. These committees attended the MLB of PKB-Gus Dur/Alwi on 17th-19th January 2002 in Yogyakarta.

With such large creation of committees in a very short period, the violation of the rules of cadrerization rules or recruitment became possible. In fact, each conflicting group accused its opponent to be committed to manipulate the recruitment rules. Wahid’s camp for instance accused that the person that represents East Java DPW of the PKB who attended the PKB-Matori’s Muktamar held dual membership, since he was actually still a member of Partai Umat Muslim Indonesia (the Party of Indonesia Muslim Ummah/PUMI) at that time. They also noticed that many important and legal members actually did not participate in Jalil’s muktamar and preferred to join the Wahid camp.

Jalil clearly rejected this opinion stating that the participants of his MLB were pure cadres that had been members of committees for a long time. Jalil then attacked the Wahid camp as being unconstitutional for its policy to provide a chance

---

749 Jalil’s capability to establish such complete committees was a surprise, since the influence of Wahid was still at its peak with most of the NU people or committees and the fact that the most influential ulama were still on Wahid’s side. Dudung Abdul Muslim, “Meneropong Masa Depan PKB”, Suara Merdeka, 14 November 2001.

750 Choirie for instance stated that one of the representations of the East Java DPW of the PKB-Matori, namely Nico Ainul Yakin was still a member of the Party of Indonesia Muslim Ummah (UMI). See footnote in Choirie, PKB Politik Jalan Tengah NU, p. 300. This accusation was also indicated by Wahid in his speech during the opening ceremony of the 2002 PKB-Gus Dur/Shihab MLB see K.H Abdurrahman Wahid, “Sambutan Pembukaan Muktamar Luar Biasa Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa 17-19 January 2002”, in AD/ART Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, (Jakarta: Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, 2002), p. XIV.

for unknown person or newcomer such as M.A.S Hikam to be active participants in PKB-Matori. Hikam, a newcomer, was then elected to be one of the chairpersons of PKB-Gus Dur/Alwi. In responding Wahid’s accusation, the General Secretary of PKB-Matori, Abdul Ahmad stated that all participants in the PKB-Matori MLB were legal members, which were still loyal and put their hope in Jalil752.

The presence of the rapidly formed groups tended to deteriorate the situation, since it raised the confidence of each group that a massive and organized people had given their support to them. They also believed that the cadres supported them and hence were already on the track to fight for the truth and to continue the objectives of the party.753 This situation eventually made a compromise become more difficult to achieve. Instead of reaching a conflict resolution, over time, each conflicting group with their hundreds of committees and thousands of members across the country preferred to legalize their presence through MLB, which then played the formal occasion for internal fragmentation in this party.

5.2. The Second Fragmentation

In the case of second fragmentation in 2005, the dissimilarities in understanding the rules of the game also became a kind of a catalyst that fostered internal conflict, which led to party fragmentation754. In terms of deciding on a proper medium to dismiss the general chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz, similar with the previous case that has been mentioned above, the conflicting groups held diametrical opinions755.

Alwi Shihab and the cadres that follow him believed that Muktamar or MLB was the only appropriate and legal medium to discuss and evaluate the achievement and the future of the general chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz. Moreover, since a

752 Interview with Abdul Khalik Ahmad, Secretary of the PKB Faction in DPR RI (1999-2001) and General Secretary of PKB- Jalil (2000-2005), in Jakarta, 11 October 2010.
755 The first opinion believed that the muktamar was the exact medium to conduct such interest. The non-Wahid groups held this populist opinion and did not see any other way as an alternative. On the other hand, Wahid’s supporter believed in a more exclusive perspective. In their opinion, the party could use any kind of forum to dismiss the general chairperson of the Dewan Tanfidz, as long as the dismissal proposal had been agreed by the General Chairperson of the Dewan Syura. The position of Wahid therefore was important.
general chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz was elected in Muktamar involving many participants across the country, then it was also Muktamar, and not an exclusive forum that should be the eligible forum to dismiss the general chairperson. On the other hand, the Wahid camp believes on the prerogative right of Wahid in the dismissal of General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz. Both Wahid’s camp and its opponents believed that they were the party’s elements that fought for the truth.

In this second case of fragmentation, the difference between both camps also touches ideological matter. It was related to the way the party should deal with pluralism as one of important values in this party. Several cadres, mainly from Wahid camp, wanted the party to implement this idea totally and constantly. Consequently, the party should open a greater opportunity for non-NU or even non-Muslim elements to take part in the party committee. In addition, the party should sincerely be the protector of the minority.

On the other hand, other cadres, mainly who eventually supported the existence of PKB-Ulama still believed in the historical rights of NU people in PKB. It meant that the party had to put NU people as the priority in the party activities and management, including the party management formation. They worried that the non-NU people would have the opportunity to build their influence in the party in the name of pluralism and eventually once again stepped aside and reduced the role of NU people in the party, similar to what happened in the Masyumi and the PPP. Moreover, they were also afraid that the eagerness to protect pluralism would decrease the ahlul sunnah wal jamah (Aswaja) values in the PKB. Some figures were concerned that PKB over time tended to be purely a secular party rather than a party based on Islamic standards.

---


757 Interview with Andi M. Ramly, The Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz (2002-2010), Secretary of Dewan Syura “PKB- Muhaimin” (2008-2010) and writer of “Mabda Siyasi PKB”, in Jakarta, 15 October 2010; with Ahmad Shodiq Noor, General Secretary of DKI Jakarta DPW of PKB, in Jakarta, 3 November 2010.


760 Interview with Marinah Hardy, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of Western Nusa Tenggara DPW of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010; with Muhammad Tohadi, Member of PKB (1998-2005) and Vice Chairperson of PKNU DPP, in Jakarta, 6 October 2010.
Even though this issue was not the main reason for the internal conflict, it had enhanced the difference and the antagonism between the conflicting groups. The proponents of the second opinion used this opinion to criticize the Wahid group as the group that had betrayed the interest of the NU people, the *ulama* and *Aswaja* values. As a supporter of Shihab, this group legitimizd themselves as the group that would consistently proceed and implement the real ideology of the PKB. According to Kamarudin, the possibility of enduring a prolonged conflict was open in the case of 2005 internal conflict since from an early stage, each faction had developed and held different understandings. Both groups regarded their position as constitutional and should be implemented by the party’s cadres.

The absence of an esprit de corps had preserved cadres’ dependency to their patron. In this circumstance the existence of “local hegemony” on PKB cadres could not easily be replaced by the party. In facing an internal conflict, as consequence, the cadres who were also the followers of the *ulama* at the same time could be instructed to back up the patron’s interest, including supporting one of the conflicting groups to set up a committee. The cadres could be easily motivated to follow any instructions of their *ulama* without being critical.

According to Staquf, the cadres at the grass-roots level were easy to be motivated to support one group if their patron or respected figures were in that group. By using words like “in the name of Gus Dur” the Wahid’s camp could easily motivate the cadres to act. It also occurred in other groups. Staquf believes that over time each conflicting group used this situation to establish their existence, including establishing a committee prior to the MLB. On the other hand as a group that really depended on the charismatic figure of the *ulama*, the Shihab’ camp was not free from the patron-client mechanism rather than using just cadrerization in building committees. The presence of charismatic *ulama* – active in supporting every movement that should be taken to win the conflict – in the Shihab front made the creation of committees in a very short time possible. Using their position, some

---

761 Interview with Marinah Hardy, Chairperson of *Dewan Tanfidz* of the Western Nusa Tenggara DPW of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010.
762 Interview with Yahya Cholil Staquf, Vice General Secretary of PKB (1998-2005) and President Abdurrahman Wahid Spokesperson (2001), in Rembang, 11 November 2010.
763 Interview with Yahya Cholil Staquf, Vice General Secretary of the PKB (1998-2005) and President Abdurrahman Wahid Spokesperson (2001), in Rembang, 11 November 2010.
764 Interview with Yahya Cholil Staquf, Vice General Secretary of the PKB (1998-2005) and President Abdurrahman Wahid Spokesperson (2001), in Rembang, 11 November 2010.
charismatic ulama, including those who joined the Kyai Langitan Group, had motivated their santri and people to support their camp.\textsuperscript{765}

The above attitudes eventually hampered any attempts to seek an objective solution for all parties, since the elites or prominent figures decision became something to follow by all cadres and individuals that felt close to or respected such figures. Cadres on the other hand believed that they were on track because the fact that their act was supported by respected figures. According to Latif, the dependency on the ulama figures on cadrerization eventually weakened the organization’s competence in managing contestation and conflict through the institutionalized procedure\textsuperscript{766}. In such situation, the compromise became somewhat difficult to be concluded, since the interest of charismatic figures became prominent rather than an objective, conflict resolution mechanism.

The absence of the respect towards party’s rules of the game enabled each conflicting groups to act freely in protecting their supporters and establishing networks across the country. They could easily clean local party committees from opponent elements and set up local committees. In such situation, the establishment or the dismissal of a committee sometimes was conducted by passing the rules of the game\textsuperscript{767}.

By having a chance to develop the group in the situation where respect towards party’s system and consciousness to preserve unity were low, each conflicting group over time was able to establish a committee quickly. In this regard, each group could rapidly create committees in almost all of the provinces and more than three hundred districts prior to 2005 Muktamar. Shihab group could set up committees in 31 provinces and 350 districts, not long after Shihab’s dismissal, before the Muktamar of PKB-Alwi held on 1\textsuperscript{st}-2\textsuperscript{nd} October 2005 in Surabaya. On the other hand, Wahid’s camp existed in 33 provinces and 394 districts, claimed as the only legal PKB committee in the country, held 2005 Muktamar 16\textsuperscript{th}-19\textsuperscript{th} April 2005 in Semarang.


\textsuperscript{766} Yudi Latif, “Transformasi PKB: Dari Jaringan Kulturan Ke Jaringan Fungsional”, in 9 Tahun PKB. Kritik dan Harapan, p. 148.

\textsuperscript{767} Interview with Khatibul Umam Wiranu, Vice General Secretary of the PKB (1999-2005) and Member of Parliament (1998-2004), in Depok, 17 October 2010.
The presence of those Muktamars attended by complete party committees and thousand cadres across the country motivated each conflicting group to continue their objectives. Similar to the previous case, Muktamar had become an entry point for the legalization of the existence of each conflicting group, which essentially formalized internal fragmentation in this party.

5.3. The Third Fragmentation

In 2008, when the party experienced fragmentation for the third time, the different opinions of the medium and the process of dismissal reappeared and generated factionalism among party’s members. The Wahid group, including the elites and seniors cadres took the same position with Wahid in supporting the use of an unscheduled forum that was named later as a “plenary meeting” to dismiss Iskandar. Although the forum used to decide such a dismissal was not proposed initially to discuss Iskandar’s leadership performance, this limited forum later on became a trial for Iskandar.

However, besides having different interpretation on the rules of the game, another problem that had motivated Iskandar and his followers to be involved in the intense opposition to the Wahid group was the violation of the recruitment process. They believed that unfair recruitment that open an opportunity for unknown persons to attain important position in the party would endanger the party’s life. This because under exclusive or personal mechanism of recruitment the party could not systematically measured the motivation and the commitment of those unknown persons. According to them the fall of Iskandar, for instance, which then generated severe tension among the cadres, was the result of negative rumours about him, questioning Iskandar’s loyalty to Wahid, which was conveyed by unknown newcomers, such as Wibisono or Abdurrahman.

---

768 Dokumentasi Hasil Mukatamar II Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Semarang, 16-19 April (Jakarta: DPP PKB, 2005).
769 Ibid, pp. 97-98
On the other hand, the Wahid camp did not see the presence of those people as a major problem, regarding it as still acceptable and in accordance with the party’s constitution. The policy to keep newcomers at the top of the party’s structure was the very evidence on this position that also indicated a significant different opinion between the Wahid camp and Iskandar group on the way the party should perform cadrerization and recruitment. This situation once again proved that an unbridgeable perspective among conflicting groups existed. Moreover, the absence of meritocracy, which had triggered disappointment, also became an issue for attacking the Wahid’s position and had motivated critical and disadvantaged cadres to make hard corrections to the party’s policies. This situation generally confirmed that the failure to have cadrerization and the establishment of meritocracy had eventually raised tension among the cadres.

The absence of esprit de corps on the other hand caused chasm between groups with different views. Each conflicting group forced their opinion on each other and was not willing to build common perception. Rather they prefer to consolidate a group to protect and voice their interests. Not long after Iskandar’s dismissal, a group called Kaukus 15 (the Caucus of 15) consisting of 15 DPW leaders, declared its support to Iskandar and claimed that his dismissal was unconstitutional. Only just after the establishment of such as caucus, several persons claimed to be the representative of 32 DPWs declared their support to Wahid’s decision. Both camps then regarded themselves as the right and constitutional group. Instead of solving the problem, the presence of such groups tended to stimulate the factionalisation strengthening among cadres. Each group tried to convince other cadres and tried to gain support from them. Over time, the presence of those kinds of groups hampered any attempts to create internal reconciliation between Wahid and the Iskandar group.

---


772 They also supported Iskandar to take any actions necessary to save the party from instability as the result for the growing unjust dismissal and suspension taken by Wahid’s group in many local areas. “Konflik PKB Diyakini Tidak Akan Pengaruhi Konstituen”, Kompas, 2 April 2008.

During its development each conflicting group conducted unilateral dismissal towards cadres who oppose their idea, in order to secure their position and weakened the enemy position. Both Wahid and the Iskandar group claimed that their group were the only legal one, hence deserved to have support from all the cadres. On the other hand, they also set up many news committees across the country or re-established committees that had been dissolved by the opposing group, to support their existence. However, many people believe that all those activities were conducted under unconstitutional ways, where each conflicting group tended to set aside party procedures\textsuperscript{774}. This situation not only impeded the preservation of party unity but also eventually paved the way for the internal fragmentation establishment.

Moreover, similar to the previous situation, the establishment of the factions happened fast. This time Wahid’s PKB had fewer committees than the opponent, namely PKB-Muhaimin, led by Iskandar. MLB Parung, held on 29\textsuperscript{th} April-1\textsuperscript{st} May 2008 attended by delegations representing 30 DPWs and 396 DPCs. On the other hand, Iskandar’s group could hold MLB called the MLB Ancol that was attended by delegations from 32 DPWs and 429 DPCs.

The Wahid camp accused many participants in PKB-Muhaimin MLB as illegal, which had come to that occasion without having any legal \textit{surat keterangan pengangkatan} (the official letter of appointment/SK). Yenny believed that “the MLB Ancol was illegal, since it was attended by illegal DPW and DPC members. The number of legal members of committees in that occasion was less than 5%. The other 95% were false. The people that attended the MLB were appointed, not elected, and were abruptly given the SK. The SK itself was valid for only one year and signed only by Iskandar and Lukman Eddy. Actually the SK should be signed by four people, like we do”\textsuperscript{775}.

However, although Yenny had claimed that their SK had been signed by four people, Iskandar and Edy as the General Chairperson and General Secretary of the party who should sign these SK were not amongst these four people. Consequently, the SK of Yenny’s camp was actually also still problematic legally.


\textsuperscript{775} Interview with Zannuba Arifah “Yenny” Wahid, General Secretary of the \textit{Dewan Tanfidz} PKB-Wahid (2008-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010.
In relation to the capability of each conflicting group to have committees from across the country that attended each muktamar or MLB, some cadres believed that it was also a result of the manipulating policy of several local committees in responding to the invitation to attend muktamar or MLB from both conflicting groups776. They believed that several key elites in local committees agreed to send an envoy to attend each muktamar and MLB. These elites then ordered different members of committees to be present at each muktamar or MLB. They hoped that by doing such manoeuvre the existence of their committees will be safe, no matter who would win the conflict. According to some interviewees this phenomenon happened not only in the case of MLB Parung versus MLB Ancol, but in all muktamars or MLBs777. Although, Nashikin believed that not all local committees committed to such initiative, he believed that such phenomenon could not be neglected778. This phenomenon confirmed the situation where loyalty to the exclusive interest could exceed the loyalty to the party. This also indicates the presence of authority manipulation that reflects the very fact of how the member could easily underestimate and disrespect the party system. Junaidi believed that the above phenomenon was a result of the failure of cadrerization779.

The above dispute on legality indicates how the violation of the rules became something common in this party. Even though each conflicting group claimed to be consistent in following the standard mechanism in attaining their purpose, the absence of proper cadrerization, that indicating the absence of party institutionalisation, over time had lessened the commitment to put forward party constitution.

776 Interview with H.Z Arifin Junaidi, General Secretary of Dewan Syura of PKB (2002-2005) and Chairperson of Dewan Syuor of PKB (2005-2010), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010; with Ahmad Shodiq Noor, General Secretary of DKI Jakarta DPW of PKB, in Jakarta, 3 November 2010; with Anas Nashikin, General Secretary of Garda Bangsa, one of PKB’s onderbows, in Jakarta, 26 October 2010.

777 Interview with H.Z Arifin Junaidi, General Secretary of Dewan Syura of PKB (2002-2005) and Chairperson of Dewan Syuor of PKB (2005-2010), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010; with Ahmad Shodiq Noor, General Secretary of DKI Jakarta DPW of PKB, in Jakarta, 3 November 2010; with Anas Nashikin, General Secretary of Garda Bangsa, one of PKB’s onderbows, in Jakarta, 26 October 2010.

778 Interview with Anas Nashikin, General Secretary of Garda Bangsa, one of PKB’s onderbows, in Jakarta, 26 October 2010.

Moreover, similar to the previous ones, the presence of the 2008 MLB, attended by local committees across the country, had paved the way for each conflicting group to claim its existence\textsuperscript{780}. The creation of MLB which was basically not designed to be a medium for reconciliation, as has been discussed also in Chapter VII, had become a legal forum to discredit the opponent and as consequence, strengthen internal fragmentation. In other words, the rapid grouping of factions prior to MLB had eventually accelerated the emergence of fragmentation.

6. Overview

The systematic cadrerization should be a key for the development of loyalty, perception synchronisation and meritocracy. However, that was not the case for PKB. The absence of systematic cadrerization during the first decade of its existence failed the party to build a common and solid perception. Instead, the dissimilarity in interpreting the party’s constitution and to some extent its vision spread out among the elites and cadres. The party also failed directly and exclusively to maintain cadres’ loyalty towards the party, since the continuation of patron-client relations in the cadre development could not effectively be terminated. It reduced internal esprit de corps that played as a catalyst for emerging the spirit of disunity. Moreover, PKB was also far from being successful in building meritocracy, thus creating disappointment and disrespect towards the rules of the game. These situations that is, the failure to preserve a common understanding of the party’s constitution, the weakening of the esprit de corps and the failure of the meritocracy, eventually became the main foundation for the emergence of internal conflict, resistance and later on, factionalisation, which not only had paved the way for the decline of the sense of togetherness and raised tension among conflicting groups, but eventually also fragmentation. The presence of MLB as a medium to legalize the committee restoration indicated the fall of party cohesion. In short, PKB’s case indicates a correlation between the decay of cadrerization and the emergence of fragmentation.

Chapter X
Systematic Cadrerization: The Case of PKS

“We believe that a solid cadrerization is the most important prerequisite for the organization’s solidity” (Mahfudz Siddiq)\textsuperscript{781}.

1. Introduction

This chapter discusses PKS’ efforts to implement systematic cadrerization and its relation to the party cohesion. As a part of the party’s institutionalisation, the systematic cadrerization in PKS’ case has a salient role in helping the party to establish party solidity. This chapter will firstly explore the legal-formal aspects of this process, in which the party’s constitution and other relevant rules of the game are discussed to show mainly the complexity and coherence of the process. The following discussion examines the implementation of cadrerization in PKS, describing the commitment to conduct cadrerization and fair recruitment in this party. This discussion also examines the important position of the rules of the game in this process. The next part talks about several important tendencies occurring in the above situations within the party, namely the existence of loyalty, the preservation of common understanding of the rules of the game and the development of trust. The last part of this chapter will discuss the impact of those tendencies on the preservation of the party’s cohesion.

2. Legal-Formal Situation

As a party that acknowledges the importance of cadrerization, the PKS’ constitution indicates the party’s commitment to this matter. It can be seen from the existence of the party’s instruction to provide a cadre development or cadrerization at every level of the party’s committees, from DPP at the national level to the Sub-Branch Committee (DPRa) as the lowest party structure. The ART of PK and the 2002 ART of PKS stated that one of the main obligations of the DPP was \textit{mempersiapkan} (to

\textsuperscript{781} Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010.
prepare) the cadres, which in the 2005 ART the words “to prepare cadres” were transformed to *kaderisasi* (cadrerization)\(^{782}\). In the 2005 Constitution the cadrerization became officially stronger than before. This constitution clearly stated that “to hold cadrerization for party’s members” as a duty that has to be performed by each level of committee\(^{783}\). The 2005 ART of PKS stated that every DPRa had to have *Bidang unit Pembinaan kader* (the Development Board), which one of its main duties was to be cadrerization organiser\(^{784}\).

PKS cadrerization objective was to create individuals who had a strong Islamic personality and consciousness and who had a commitment to realise Islamic visions and values in life\(^{785}\). In this regard, cadrerization was also regarded as a process to form an Islamic personality (*takwin asy syakhysiyyah al islamiyah*) that would be played as a foundation for civilisation\(^{786}\). It happens to be relevant since the creation of an alternative civilization needs committed people with a strong militant character. This process is dedicated also to the formation of individuals who are ready to implement PKS’ *dakwah* method\(^{787}\). Moreover, this process was eventually related also to the cadres’ duty to protect their faith and righteous behaviour, to strengthen brotherhood and to give advice to each other\(^{788}\).

The commitment to cadrerization related also to PKS’ beliefs in the strategic position of the cadre as one of the important sources of the success in developing *dakwah* and for the revivalism of Muslims\(^{789}\). According to Mahfudz Siddiq" the cadre

\(^{782}\) *The ART of PK Article 20; The 2002 ART of PKS Article 17.*

\(^{783}\) *The 2005 ART of PKS Articles 22 (c), 34 (c), 47 (c), 56 (h), and 59 (h)*

\(^{784}\) *The 2005 ART of PKS Article 57 (1.d.1)*


\(^{789}\) This opinion to some extent becomes one of important aspects that differentiate this party with other Islamic movements, since such an opinion infers the importance to build individuals (cadres) before establishing the Islamic system or *syariah*. In some Islamic movements, including for instance Hizbut Tahrir, the establishment of an Islamic system (*syariah*) is a prime objective that should be prioritized
is the secret of life and the revival of many ummats. The history of the ummat is the history of militant cadres who have a strong spirit and determination. The strength or weakness of an ummat could be measured by its productivity to provide cadres with the characteristic of mujahid (the Islamic warrior). This opinion indicates that cadrerization was actually part of efforts to create militant individuals who were committed to develop Islamic civilization. Such ideological commitment, namely to develop a civilization influencing the development of the cadres was the main reason to set up cadrerization in the PKS. The party hoped that through these activities the cadres could deepen their understanding of party ideology and values, party management, and political insight, and could strengthen their consciousness of the creation of solidity and meaning when joining the party. Hence, besides being a medium to strengthen organization management, such tiered cadrerization was designed also to obtain qualified cadres and capable leaders.

PKS’ cadrerization had two main functions, firstly to perform cadre development and secondly to perform cadre development and to be the basis for recruitment for internal party positions and MP in which the implementation of these functions was very open through all the party’s infrastructures and institutions. The party realised that the main strength of the party depended on the growth of the cadres, both in terms of quality and quantity.

As part of the implementation of the party’s commitment to cadrerization, PKS developed a selective cadre development method. According to the party’s constitution there are six levels of cadrerization, namely (1) Anggota Pemula (the Beginner), (2) Anggota Muda (the Junior), (3) Anggota Madya (the Intermediate Member), (4) Anggota Dewasa (the Advanced Member), (5) Anggota Ahli (the

in any conditions. They believed that the development of individuals will automatically follow the success of the syariah installment in the state constitution.


792 Ibid, pp. 223-226.


Expert), and (6) Anggota Purna (the Elder) (see Table 9). The PKS gave both the
Beginner and the Junior the title of kader pendukung (the supporting cadre) and the
four following levels of cadre as kader inti. The PKS also stipulated that there would
be an Anggota Kehormatan (the Honorary Cadre). The Honorary Cadres were
people who had significantly contributed to the party, although they were not always
party cadres. A special committee consisted of members of MS which selected the
persons who deserved to hold this kind of membership.\footnote{The ART of PK Article 8.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Type of Member</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beginner</td>
<td>The cadres who requested to be a party member and had were registered by the DPC after passing the TOP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior</td>
<td>The cadres registered by the DPD as members who passed the First Basic Training (TL-I).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>The cadres who registered by the DPD as party members who passed the Second Basic Training (TL-II).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced</td>
<td>The cadres registered by the DPW as party members who passed the training at the advanced level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>The cadres registered by the DPP as party members who passed the training at the higher level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elder</td>
<td>The cadres registered by the DPP as party members who passed the training at the expert level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honour</td>
<td>The people who had provided a significant service to the party and were confirmed by the MPP.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Table 9}

PKS’ Membership Grades

In order to be able to hold a higher rank, or formally have his membership
status upgraded, a cadre must join and pass several different levels of trainings and
activities. The party’s constitution stated that every cadre had to join the party
development process, education, and trainings programmes and pass them.\footnote{The 2005 ART of PKS Article 5 (2).} As for
the member candidates, the party obliged them to join the Party Orientation Training
(TOP) held every three months to upgrade their status to be Beginners. Beginners

\footnote{The ART of PK Article 8.}
\footnote{The 2005 ART of PKS Article 5 (2).}
have to join the First-Basic Training (TD-I), to reach Junior Level. Juniors had to join the Second-Basic Training (TD-II) to hold Intermediate status. The Intermediate Members attended the party’s Advanced Training-I (TL-I) which was used as a base for the evaluation and selection of the Intermediate cadres to become Advanced Members.

The TL-II was an advanced level of training and selection for Advanced Members to upgrade their status to be an Expert Member. For the Expert Members the PKS conducted Management and Social Leadership Training (TMKS), used as a base for the evaluation and selection of the Expert Members to become Elder/Senior Members. Honorary Members candidates underwent a process carried out by the party called Analysis for Capacity and Personal Integrity (AKIP) where it investigated and examined their background, personal attitude and political potential. The party also conducted Party and Figure Orientation (OPT) for the Honorary Candidates as a type of catalyst to introduce the party.

In addition to these trainings courses, it was compulsory for the cadres to join other formal party activities, namely: (1) Party Routine Training (TRP), held monthly, (2) Cadre Routine Training (TRK) that was conducted at least once a week, (3) Party Training (PPK) held at any time needed, (4) Social and Political Science Studies (KISP), conducted by the cadres at least once at every level of their membership and (5) Member Internal Activities (KIA)798. For Beginners who had passed the TOP evaluation process, the party introduced them to the halaqah activities and mechanisms, in which at the practical level was a main institution of the PKS cadrerization. The halaqah implemented some informal activities including daurah (intensive study), rihlah (physical activity), mabit (night activity to improve spiritual capacity), joining seminars and reading books as part of cadrerization799.

These activities, as a part of tradition in Jamaah tarbiyah, were supporting activities that must be joined by the cadres. This tradition was based on the concept of cadrerization that was related strongly to or part of the PKS’ history of development as a continuation of Jamaah Tarbiyah model of cadrerization developed by this group since the 1980s. The transformation of this movement into a party did

not change the characteristics of the cadrerization model of Jamaah Tarbiyah, inspired mainly by Egyptian Ikhwan Muslimin\textsuperscript{800}.

In the above trainings programme and activities, the party implemented the curriculum established by the Department of Cadrerization, which consisted of subjects such as the basic knowledge on Islam, dakwah, social knowledge, administration and technical skills\textsuperscript{801}.

In terms of internal recruitment, PKS used the cadrerization results as a guide. The party’s constitution had mentioned the lowest status must be held by the cadres to be eligible to hold strategic positions in this party (See Table 10). It shows that the cadres’ status played a salient role in the recruitment process and indicates that only senior and qualified cadres could hold strategic and important positions in the party.

PKS holds internal elections to appoint the MS’ members\textsuperscript{802}. All kader inti had the right to vote\textsuperscript{803}. However, only a member that had been an expert member for at least 5 years was eligible to be a member of MS. MS members decide the other important positions in the party, such as the member of MPP, President of the Party, member of DS. However, to fill the strategic positions in the local committees, such as the Chairperson of DPW, DPC and DPRa, the party held internal elections involving the main cadres at each level\textsuperscript{804}.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITIONS</th>
<th>MEMBER GRADE</th>
<th>DURATION OF THE LAST MEMBER GRADE (Minimum No.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership Grades for Holding a Party Position At National, Provincial and District Level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{801} Departemen Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Manajemen Tarbiyah Anggota Pemula, (Bandung: Penerbit Asy-Syaamil, 2004), pp. 22-23.

\textsuperscript{802} The AD of PK Article 11; The 2002 AD of PKS Article 2; The 2005 ART of PKS Article 8 (1).

\textsuperscript{803} The 2002 AD of PKS Article 2; The 2005 ART of PKS Article 8 (1).

\textsuperscript{804} The 2005 ART of PKS Articles 30 (5), 42 (5), 53 (3), 57 (2).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position and Members</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATIONAL LEVEL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chair of MS</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Member of MS</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chair and Secretary of MPP</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chairpersons in MPP's Commissions</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President, General Secretary and Treasury of DPP</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Positions and Members of DPP</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chairperson of DSP and Secretary of DSP</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chairpersons of Lajnah and DSP Members of DSP</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROVINCIAL LEVEL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chairperson of MPP, Secretary of MPP and The Chairpersons in MPP's Commissions</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Chairperson, General Secretary, General Treasury, The Chair of Development and the Deputy of Cadrerization</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chairperson of DSW and the Secretary of DSW</td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chair of Departments, Vice General Secretary and Vice General Treasury.</td>
<td>Advanced</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Positions and the Members of DPW</td>
<td>Advanced</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Members of MPP</td>
<td>Advanced</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chairpersons of Lajnah of DSW</td>
<td>Advanced</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other positions in DSW</td>
<td>Advanced</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DISTRICT LEVEL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chairperson of MPP, Secretary of MPP and The Chairpersons in MPP's Commissions</td>
<td>Advanced</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Chairperson, General Secretary, General Treasury, The Chair of Development and the Deputy of Cadrerization</td>
<td>Advanced</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chair of Departments, Vice General Secretary and Vice General Treasury.</td>
<td>Advanced</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chairpersons of Lajnah of DSD</td>
<td>Advanced</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chairperson of DSD and The Secretary of DSD</td>
<td>Advanced</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Positions and the Members of DPD</td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other positions in DSD</td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *the 2005 ART of PKS*

The Member of Parliament (MP) recruitment process consists of five stages\(^805\). (1) The first stage was a screening process. In this stage, the party evaluated the candidates’ personal integrity, including their record of accomplishment and productivity. (2) The second one was the evaluation process on the candidates’ political ability and knowledge, which was followed by (3) the third, in which the special capabilities of the candidate relevant to their duty as a MP were evaluated. 

assessed. Those who had passed this stage then faced (4) the fourth stage, where the small team called a “projection team” scrutinised the prospect of a candidate for the party. If this team considered the party still needed the candidate to remain in the party, this candidate could not proceed to the next stage. (5) The last stage was an election where all the cadres participated. Only the cadres who gained the highest votes could represent the party in the national election. In general, PKS’ recruitment mechanism opened up the opportunity for every cadre to be elected based on their capability, which was acknowledged by the other cadres (election) who were not only from the party’s elite (selection).

3. Implementation

3.1 Cadrerization: Halaqah and Cadres Maintenance

The PKS’ DPP through the Cadrerization Board provides curriculum and general practical guidance for the implementation organisation of this process, communicated to all the cadrerization boards and departments in Indonesia, which was conducted through several trainings programmes and activities held in all branches. According to PKS President (2005-2010), Tifatul Sembiring, every cadre had to join the programmes and activities. Of the many events that should be joined by the cadres was halaqah (sometimes called formally TRK). In this compulsory weekly training, attended by a maximum of 12 cadres, the cadres were infused, instructed and socialised using standard materials by the murabbi. Halaqah mainly constituted the focus of each activity in the party, founding its root in Jamaah Tarbiyah. It was formed by tarbiyah activists as the continuation of halaqah model before PKS’ establishment in 1998.

The party tried to preserve the continuation of halaqah, as one of the main cadrerization institutions. The Department of Cadrerization in every local committee had to guarantee the continuation of halaqah. Sometimes cadres at the municipal

---

806 Interview with Tifatul Sembiring, President of PKS (2005-2008), in “PKS Masih Seperti yang Dulu”, Koran Seputar Indonesia, 10 December 2007.

807 Interview with Hurriyah MA, cadrerization of PKS observer and Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 29 October 2010.

808 For this purpose, the party obliged the cadres to hold this meeting once in every week. However, in the areas where the number of the cadres were very low and faced geographical problems, such as in several very remote areas in the Papua Province and the Moluccas Province, the party lessened the
level must help the enforcement of *halaqah* at the village level to ensure the continuity of this activity in particular and cadrerization in general. This high commitment to this weekly meeting then became a trademark of this party, which also differentiated PKS to other Islamic parties in Indonesia.

In *halaqah*, the cadres were given information pertaining to the party’s policies on contemporary political development, including the reasons behind such policies. The party provided an opportunity for the cadres to obtain official information related to the party’s policies. *Murabbi* communicated the party’s tendencies and its rationales to the cadres, in the hope that the cadres would understand and have similar tendencies. In this regard, this meeting acted as a medium of socialisation and clarification of the party’s political choices.

The next section of this meeting related to ideology maintenance, which delivered and recalled the party’s ideology to the cadres, including the vision and mission of *dakwah*. Also in this part, *murabbi* reminded the cadres about the party’s code of conduct, including the concept of loyalty and trust to the party and its leaders, where the spirit of loyalty was upheld. Moreover, the party also provided

---

809 Interview with Untung Wahono, Head of Department of Research and Development of DPP of PK (2000-2003), Head of Department of Politics and Defence of DPP of PKS (2002-2005), and Chairperson of MPP of PKS (2010-2015), in Jakarta 27 October 2010; with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010.

810 Interview with Hurriyah MA, cadrerization of PKS observer and Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 29 October 2010.

811 Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and *Tarbiyah* Movement observer, Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the cadres who signed PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 29 October 2010.

812 Interview with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS (2002), and personal secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of PKS and Chairperson of MPR of Republic of Indonesia), in Jakarta, 12 October 2010; with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010; with Nooryanto, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Bekasi DPD of PKS, in Bekasi, 7 November 2010; with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-2010), in Tangerang, 21 October 2010.

813 Interview with Mustofa, cadre of PKS and former reporter of Profetik Magazine, established by cadres of PKS, in Depok, 7 October 2010.
materials for individual development, as part of the attempts to help the cadres to improve their character and behaviour and to be a high-qualified cadre. The last section of this activity related to the attempts to increase the spirit of brotherhood and togetherness. During this moment, each cadre was asked to share his knowledge, experiences, aspirations and even difficulties, not only in terms of party matters but also as personal issues. Through this activity, it was hoped that the relation between the cadres would became stronger\textsuperscript{814}. In this regard, halaqah played a role not only as political institution, but also as a medium to enhance the spirit of brotherhood, touching on some personal aspects of each cadre. According to Sembiring, halaqah was something that had been implemented since the party’s establishment, by each party committee across the country and had preserved the cadres’ spirit\textsuperscript{815}.

However, some critiques concluded that, although halaqah was a political party institution, religious subjects and agendas dominated the discussion in this institution, endangering the cadre’s quality of understanding and capability in politics\textsuperscript{816}. Apart from such a conclusion, the party, through cadrerization institutions, continually controlled and evaluated the existence of halaqah, including the materials conveyed by murabbis.

In order to maintain the quality of cadres, the party establish cadre evaluation in halaqah. Each halaqah, through murabbi\textsuperscript{817}, reported the development of their cadres to the Department of Cadrerization. In this case, murabbi had a special evaluation note or form on the cadres’ activities. This note reported the progress of the cadres in their religious qualities and the commitment towards the party’s

\textsuperscript{814} Interview with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010; with Akmal Burhanuddin, former tarbiyah activist and student in Egypt who joined PKS after finishing his study, in Jakarta, 24 October 2010; with Nooryanto, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Bekasi DPD of PKS, in Bekasi, 7 November 2010; with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-2010), in Tangerang, 21 October 2010. "Presiden Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Tifatul Sembiring: Tarbiyah, Menjaga Moral dan Semangat Berpartai”, Kompas, 25 June 2005.


\textsuperscript{816} Hurriyah, Sistem Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (1998-2003), p.237. Interview with Hurriyah MA, cadrerization of PKS observer and Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 29 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{817} Those who were selected to hold the Chair of Cadrerization Department usually were the most respected murabbisi in a region of committee. The murabbi were the top rank cadres that were trusted by the party to bring the mission of the PKS as a party apparatus. In the hierarchical context, the murabbi at the lower level, for instance at the DPRa level, was a mutarabbi (supervised cadres) of the murabbi at the higher level, at the DPC level.
activities, had to be reported periodically, at least once a month. PKS called the party evaluation forum as a *taqwim*, of which the spirit of honesty, objectivity, balance and accuracy became the essence of evaluation. In some areas, the result of evaluation was compiled and recorded into a “report book”. All the party’s branches then reported their evaluation to DPP, where all information and data was complied.

The evaluation conditions made *halaqah* to some extent operate as a school, in which it had an obligation to periodically report on the progress of students. In having this systematic evaluation, the party was able to supervise all cadres’ development, including the cadres’ capacity to absorb cadrerization subjects through *murabbi* as the party apparatus.

In this transparent situation, where the rules of the game was revealed and measured openly, the cadres had an equal opportunity to develop their careers fairly. The future of cadres in PKS was determined mainly by their own hard work and was not due to their close relations with the elites. However, Anis Matta believed, in general, that it was not merely career development that motivated the cadres in *halaqah*, but also the improvement of their personal qualities.

In terms of other party formal trainings, such as TOP, TD I-II, TL I-II, and TKSM, the implementation intensity of such trainings programmes had increased.

---

818 Interview with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010; with Akmal Burhanuddin, former *tarbiyah* activist and student in Egypt who joined PKS after finishing his study, in Jakarta, 24 October 2010; with Nooryanto, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Bekasi DPD of PKS, in Bekasi, 7 November 2010; with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS (2002), and personal secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of PKS and The Chairperson of MPR of Republic of Indonesia), in Jakarta, 12 October 2010. Hurriyah, *Sistem Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (1998-2003)*, pp. 206-207.


820 Interview with Nooryanto, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Bekasi DPD of PKS, in Bekasi, 7 November 2010.

821 Interview with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS (2002), and personal secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of PKS and The Chairperson of MPR of Republic of Indonesia), in Jakarta, 12 October 2010; with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010.

822 Interview with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former *tarbiyah* activist leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010.

823 Interview Aay Muhammad Furkon with Anis Matta, in Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Ideologi dan Praktis Politik Kaum Muda Kontemporer*, p.212.
after the 2004 Election and in line with the growth of the number of the party’s cadres. In these programmes, the party assembled eligible cadres in a predefined place for one or two days and trained them in several subjects, based on the party’s standardised curriculum. As well as being a means of education, the training programmes also became a basis for the evaluation of the cadres’ understanding of the party curricula. Moreover, the cadres’ membership grade was also determined in this process, in which murabbi’s advice, as a figure who directly supervises the cadres, played an important role. The result of this process became a sort of party formal acknowledgement of each cadre’s commitment and his new status.

### 3.2 Recruitment: Finding The Proper Cadres

Membership status became a main benchmark for the party in the process of recruitment. In this regard, new cadres with insufficient or a low grade of membership could not hold strategic positions in PKS. The party tried to be consistent in implementing this mechanism. In the terms of MS member composition, it was decided through internal election. The existence of internal elections provided an exact opportunity for popular cadres with good reputation to be elected. In this circumstance, the party actually preserved an internal control to maintain the quality of MS members. Furthermore, candidates could not depend on exclusive relations with the elites; rather they had to prove their personal capability before all kader inti.

At the local level, the party, through a small team, consisting of seniors and murabbi, monitored cadres with the potential to hold strategic positions in the party’s local committee. Murabbi, as the person who was in charge of the monitoring

---


825 Interview with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010.


process, could advise the team, based on his opinion on the quality of the cadres. The small team then discussed that opinion and checked the cadre’s weekly report to evaluate the cadres’ level of quality. After informal discussion, the minor conference, which consisted of seniors, the representatives of the cadrerization department and the murabbis, was held in order to list the names of potential cadres. The party then conveyed the selected names to all of the cadres, followed by the internal election to elect one person who deserved to lead the party. The result of such an election would be one of the important points for candidates. The elites then held a conference once again to determine the composition of the party committee, using the result of the election as one of the criteria. In this situation, the opportunity to have the best cadres to lead the party was quite possible, as only qualified cadres could join the election and passed the other seniors’ judgments. In general, figures that held the elite positions such as those in MPP, the top figures of DPP and DPS, in PKS were cadres with a high level of commitment and capability and consequently pre-eminent cadres.

A similar situation would also occur in the case of MP recruitment. In deciding which person would represent the party in the election, PKS made several stages of evaluation, scrutinising the personal and political capability of the candidate, to determine those eligible. The party also held an internal election as part of process to decide on MP candidate. Through such a transparent process involving many people, the party could relatively protect this process from collusion and nepotism tendencies. Elites could not solely determine the result since they have to involve and consider thousands of kader inti’s opinions. Until 2008, there was no serious objection from the cadres regarding this process.

Besides proposing its own cadres to be the MP, the party also opened an opportunity for outsiders, mainly experts or public figures, to represent PKS in the legislative body. For this type of recruitment, the party would establish a team that

828 Interview with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010.
829 Interview with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010.
831 “Caleg PKS Ditentukan Melalui Pemilu Internal”, Republika, 30 December 2003.
monitored and checked the personal quality and the Islamic commitment of the figures that had a potential to be the MP candidate. After a formal discussion to decide the name of the candidates, the party then would develop a personal approach to those candidates to convince them and to establish an agreement between them and the party. For those candidates who eventually succeeded in the election, the party then asked them to join, or at least contribute to the party's agendas and activities, including joining halaqah.

4. Internal Supporting Tendencies for the Party Cohesion

4.1. Preserving a Common Approach and Understanding

The implementation of cadrerization, as a vital medium to introduce the rules of the game, affected the establishment of a common understanding of the way in which the party system should work and similar perception and understanding towards the AD/ART. This situation eventually prevented the serious gap on these matters between the cadres or between the elite and the cadres from happening.

In terms of terminating internal disputes or establishing conflict resolutions, for instance, the cadres would refer them to DS as the main institution in charge of such matters. The cadres did not take such problems to other bodies in the party or

---


834 The party also published some books related to the cadrerization, so that the cadres and the people could properly understand the whole process of the cadrerization. Through the Department of Cadrerization, the PKS also published cadrerization teaching materials for the cadres and society. These materials mainly explained the concept, the objective, the curricula of cadrerization. By providing the society these books, the PKS actually not only tried to disprove the misunderstanding around the cadrerization, but also to show its readiness in managing systematic cadrerization. These books including Tim Departemen Kaderisasi PK-Sejahtera, Manajemen Tarbiyah Anggota Pemula, (Jakarta: DPP PKS Departemen Kaderisasi and PT Syaamil Cipta Media, 2005). Tim Departemen Kaderisasi PKS, Profil Kader Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, (Bandung: Syaamil Cipta Media, 2004). Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat PK sejahtera, Memperjuangkan Masyarakat Madani. Falsafah Dasar Perjuangan dan Platform Kebijakan Pembangunan PK Sejahtera, (Jakarta, 2008). Bidang Kewenitaan Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Rakornas Bidang Kewenitaan Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, (Jakarta: 2001). Dr. Ahmad Satori et. Al Taujihat Ri’ayah Ma’nawiyah Kader PKS Sejahtera, (Jakarta: Departemen Kaderisasi DPP PKS, 2003).
to external institutions to find a solution. In the decision-making process, the cadres believed that this process should be based on a consultation mechanism and therefore could not be an individual policy. As for strategic policies at the national level, they understood that MS should be the main institution to decide and decided collectively.

Besides having unity in understanding the rules of the game, the cadres also shared any similar understanding of their ideology. The intensive internalisation of the party’s ideology and its values had preserved the cadres’ ideological consciousness. The idea of being “a tool of dakwah” or as “a dakwah soldier” that committed to establish Islamic interests and not personal interest through political life was understood quite evenly among the cadres. It was reflected in the absence of significant differences on the basis and the objective of the party during the first decade of the party’s existence. Mardani A. Sera believed that such a situation was a result from the solidity of the ideological understanding among the cadres.

The above situation eventually pushed the cadres to becoming aware of the role of the rules of the game and the ideology in daily activities. On the one hand, this situation had reduced the possibility for the elites to make a unilateral interpretation of those matters. Prihandoko said that there would be a massive exodus if the elite

---

835 In 2011, Yusuf Supendi one of party’s senior figures, appealed against ten party seniors including Hilmi Aminuddin, and Anis Matta, to the court on the accusation of party’s mistreatment on him. However, the party actually had dismissed him in 2009; hence the official status of Supendi was no longer a PKS cadre when taking such legal action. It was interesting to note that Supendi not long after submitting his case to the court, asked those seniors to reconcile, which was rejected by those seniors. “Alasan Yusuf Supendi Laporkan Petinggi PKS ke KPK”, Republika, 21 March 2011. “Pemecatana Bikin Istri Stroke. Yusuf Supendi Gugat 10 Petinggi PKS 42,7 Miliar”, Republika, 2 May 2011. See also “Sikap Resmi PKS atas Tuduhan Mantan Kader”, pkspiyungan.blogspot.com, 18 March 2011.

836 Interview with Amri Yusra, M.Si, Chairperson of Depok DPD of PKS (2002-2004), Member of Parliament of Depok District, West Java, (2004-2009), and Lecturer at Political Sciences Department, Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010; with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010; with Sitaesmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010; with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-2010), in Tangerang, 21 October 2010.

837 Interview with Dr. Mardani Ali Sera, Vice Chairperson of MPP PKS (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 6 October 2010.

838 The differences among cadres were most likely to happen since the aim of the caderization was not to create a solid similarity at the level of detailed policy implementation strategy. In fact, the party provided an opportunity for cadres to develop their creativity. The party realized that a very strict guidance or homogeneity would bring disadvantages for cadres to implement the policies properly, since at the practical level the cadres will face very different and plural context and situation. With this regard, the opportunity to have different interpretations and understandings in attaining the objective of a policy among cadres was still open and sometimes brought debates among cadres. However, during
conducted an exclusive interpretation or understanding of the rules of the game or ideology, which contradicted with the real essence and objective interpretation of these matters. On the other hand, with this awareness the cadres would not be attracted easily by external or internal elements, using the rules of the game or ideology interpretation as reasons to fight each other. Cadres could not be moved easily to resist or defect from a party’s decision or their commitment to its ideology.

4.2. Preserving Loyalty

The presence of the systematic cadrerization also implanted the sense of loyalty for the cadres. Through halaqah and other training subjects, which also discussed loyalty issues, the development of loyalty was conducted gradually. Loyalty to the party was based on the belief that the function of the party was to realise Islamic idealism and not to serve as personal tools. Musa Abdillah stated that the party told the cadres that in the end the party was a path to realise our religious dream.

The code of conduct to obey the party’s leaders became another developed instrument that supported the strengthening of mono-loyalty. In this case, the party developed a tradition to regard the leaders’ decision as the best policy for all, since the leaders were the best cadres who had a better knowledge and commitment. The decisions made by the elites become a kind of fatwa (religious command) that must be implemented by all the cadres. Sembiring emphasised that the enjoyment of being a party cadre will not exist without obedience.

In this situation and to a certain extent and it happened in many developed parties, the cadres tended to put the elites and the party as the main decision makers who have to be followed. It closed the possibility for the development of dual loyalty in the party. The party could maintain its position as the only authoritative institution that was solely in charge of all aspects, assisted by the party apparatus, which

the first decade of its existence, the difference among cadres on the strategy, let alone ideology actually was quite rare. Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, the Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 October 2010. Interview with Dr. Mardani Ali Sera, Vice Chairperson of MPP PKS (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 6 October 2010.

839 Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 October 2010.

840 Interview with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010.

should be respected by the cadres. During the first decade of its existence, this situation also enabled PKS to maintain the chain of command for discipline. On the other hand, this situation was supported also by the elites’ attitude to honour their position by trying to do their best in fulfilling their duties towards the party procedure and its ideology. The control among the elites and cadres through halaqah had helped the elites to meet this commitment.

Hence, although murabbis played a central role in cadrerization, it did not appeal to them to act above the party’s procedure. The murabbis realised that their presence was merely a representation or a party apparatus that the party controlled and evaluated continually. Hence, they regarded themselves as persons who could not escape from the party’s standards and rules. On the other hand, the cadres also did not regard murabbi as an independent person, but as part of the party’s system. To ensure the healthy relations between the cadres and murabbi and to avoid deep dependency among them, even the party sometimes transferred murabbi to other halaqah.

In addition, the party recruitment based on the objective process strengthened the cadres’ dependency on the system and the party rather than on the individual. This situation, over time, secured the cadres’ loyalty to the party. The cadres believed that their individual efforts would be more influential in determining their career promotion rather than an elite’s exclusive recommendation. In this situation, the cadres did not feel that they should depend upon certain figures but on the objective mechanism. The merit system in place had assisted the party to develop professionalism and reduced personal or like-dislike situations, which eventually strengthened the cadre’s work to be orientated only towards the party.

4.3. The Development of Trust

Another important tendency of the intensive cadrerization was the development of tsiqoh (trust) towards the party and the leaders. Through the weekly meeting of the halaqah, this attitude was gradually developed by murabbi to a level where the

---

842 In the hierarchical context, the murabbi at the lowest level was a mutarabbi at the higher level, which had to follow and implement the task and instruction of his or her murabbi.

843 Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer, Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the cadres who signed PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010.
cadres could share their personal problems with murabbī and other cadres without hesitation\textsuperscript{844}. Overall, the cadres regarded murabbī, who was a party apparatus, more as a teacher but also sometimes as an elder brother or even a parent. This attitude indicated the level of trust towards the leaders and the party through murabbī. Moreover, halaqah also raised the spirit of brotherhood between the cadres and strengthened the spirit of trusting each other. The President of PKS (2001-2005) Hidayat Nur Wahid said, “In the party there is cadrerization, both formal and individual. There is a common understating among the cadres that we must be a good and professional person. It makes us meet, remind and strengthen each other”\textsuperscript{845}. In such situations, halaqah, eventually did not only reinforce the relations between the elites and the cadres, but also maintained relations between the cadres by providing the spirit of brotherhood, which supported the development of trust in the party. Under such circumstance, the cadres tended to build similarities instead of difference with other party members\textsuperscript{846}.

Furthermore, through the recruitment process, the cadres witnessed a good commitment and hard work, which became the main tools to have a better rank and position in the party. In this situation, the cadres believed that only the best people could lead the party, regardless of their background, which in the long term contributed to cementing the trust in the party’s system.

The case of Matta, the General Secretary of PKS for three periods demonstrated such values. Although he was not part of the first or the second generation of the tarbiyah movement\textsuperscript{847}, also popularly known as a “kader baru” (new cadre)\textsuperscript{848}, the core element of PKS, he attained one of the most prestigious positions in the party. For some, it was the result of his close relations with Hilmi Aminuddin, one of the main leaders and founding fathers of the tarbiyah movement. However many cadres regarded Matta as deserving to hold such a position for his exceptional

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{844} Interview with Hurriyah MA, cadrerization of PKS observer and Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 29 October 2010; with Noviyanti Utaminingsing, cadre of PKS, in Jakarta, 9 October 2010.
\item \textsuperscript{846} Interview with K.H Yusruf Supendi Lc, Member of DSP of PKS (2000-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2009), in Jakarta, 3 November 2010.
\item \textsuperscript{847} Interview with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010.
\item \textsuperscript{848} Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
capability and large commitment to the party. Prihandoko said that although he acknowledged himself as one of the people who was not always in line with Matta's opinions, he considered Matta as was one of the best cadres in PKS who deserve to be one of party's elites. In line with this opinion,Aus Hidayat Nur, one of the senior cadres of Jamaah Tarbiyah, said that although he was a new cadre, Matta was a clever cadre with a brilliant vision, strong idealism and a significant contribution to the PKS. For such reasons, elected members of the MS agreed to select Matta, one of the young, brightest cadres to be the general secretary. In other words, the phenomenon of Matta was an indication of the presence of a merit system in the party.

The gradual recruitment combining the elites’ evaluations, included the murabbi’s opinion and the internal election involving many cadres, was a unique pattern of recruitment in PKS that maintained the quality of the party’s representation. This mechanism ensured its objectivity, where the individual quality and not the closeness to the elites played a key role. This had not only continued the existence of the merit system that satisfied the cadres’ sense of justice and made them feel secure, but also preserved the cadres’ trust of the system and their respect for it as the guidance for party daily life.

5. The Impact of the above Tendencies on the Party Cohesion

The above situations eventually served as a crucial role in strengthening the capability to avoid prolonged internal conflict and to maintain party cohesion. Although during its first decade of existence this party could not entirely escape form serious internal disputes, some of them having the potential to trigger fragmentation, PKS could still maintain its cohesion.

849 Interview with K.H Yusuf Supendi Lc, Member of DSP of PKS (2000-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2009), in Jakarta, 3 November 2010.
850 Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 October 2010.
852 Interview with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010; with Mustofa, cadre of PKS and former reporter of Profetik Magazine, established by cadres of PKS, in Depok, 7 October 2010.
853 Interview with Dr. Mardani Ali Sera, Vice Chairperson of MPP PKS (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 6 October 2010.
In several crucial cases, the impact of the cadrerization system, namely the establishment loyalty, common approach and understanding; and trust had saved the party from prolonged conflict and faction creations. The delicate dispute to determine the presidential candidate in the 2004 Presidential Election did not become an entry point for internal fragmentation. The dispute ended well when all the cadres eventually agreed to recommend all party sympathizers and people to support Rais as the next president. This situation could be attained since the cadres had a similar perception of the mechanism and the forum that they should use to decide on this process, which had been in accordance with the party constitution. They avoided unilateral actions and put problems into MS’ hands. Accordingly, the party was able to avoid one-sided decisions and the issue of unconstitutionality in the process, which could potentially trigger the cadres’ resistance.

Moreover, the strong commitment to preserve loyalty brought the cadres to respect the result of MS. They had the opportunity to express their opinion freely. Once the leaders had decided a policy, the cadres should follow it completely. This code of conduct came into being in the case of the 2004 Presidential Election. All the cadres accepted the decision of the party leaders to support Rais. Even Matta, the proponent of Wiranto, agreed to follow entirely such a decision. No cadres rejected this decision although at heart they did not agree.

In terms of having a deep trust between each other, the cadres in both groups trusted each other regardless of the fact they had two different options. They actually still shared a similar main interest and commitment to the success of *dakwah* struggle. They did not see that such options were designated to facilitate any individual or group’s interests. Over time, the consciousness to believe that they still shared the same ideological interest encouraged cadres to easily establish the reconciliation easily between pro-Wiranto group and pro-Amien group.

855 Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 October 2010.
In 2005, two contradictive opinions on the policy whether or not the party should respond to the controversial and unpopular policy of President Yudhoyono’s Government to reduce BBM subsidy, triggering massive protests across the country and had created tension among the cadres. Some cadres believed that leaving the coalition was the best way to save the party face\textsuperscript{857}. On the other hand, several cadres wanted the party to continue in the coalition because they thought that it was still the effective medium to influence government policy in the future\textsuperscript{858}. However, this tension did not lead to a prolonged dispute or conflict.

The strong attitude to trust the party leaders, finally deciding to stay as a coalition, had helped the party to avoid a prolonged internal dispute. At the practical level, the cadres followed the party’s decision without creating any tension. The functioning halaqah, as a medium of cadrerization also played a salient role in socialising the party’s decision to remain in the government, had successfully convinced the cadres to understand and support the party’s choice. Murabbi, with the assistance from other cadres who agreed with this policy through halaqah, succeeded in convincing the other cadres on the brighter sides of remaining in the government\textsuperscript{859}. According to Nooryanto, in facing this delicate situation, cadrerization bridged any misunderstanding between the elites and the cadres, which could have generated a serious conflict\textsuperscript{860}. In line with this opinion, Prabowo believed that the consciousness to obey leaders or a party decision after the party decided to stay in the coalition and to preserve unity as the key factors to avoid fragmentation was one of the main results of cadrerization, particularly the existence of halaqah\textsuperscript{861}.

\textsuperscript{857} According to Kamarudin and Prihandoko, there were at least two Provincial Boards (in DKI Jakarta, DI Yogyakarta) and one Branch of PKS (in Solo) that wanted PKS to leave the government coalition, they were worried PKS would potentially suffer, if PKS was still engaged in the coalition Interview with Dr. Kamarudin, Indonesian Islamic political party expert and Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 30 November 2005; with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok,, 6 December 2005. On Matta’s opinion to opt out from the coalition, see“Tak Ada Koalisi Tanpa Perubahan”, in Saksi, No.6/VIII/30 November 2005, pp.7-9. “Ini Politik Bos”, Tempo, 16 October 2005.

\textsuperscript{858} Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{859} Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{860} Interview with Nooryanto, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Bekasi DPD of PKS, in Bekasi, 7 November 2010.

This situation was also supported by the commitment of preserving loyalty to the party. Although the case had created a split opinion among the elites and cadres, it did not become the entry point for the establishment of factionalism. This type of conflict of opinion was regarded mostly as a normal situation. The disappointment that may have occurred with some of the cadres did not lead them to resist the decision, let alone try to develop an alternative faction or block. The critical elites also could not convince the vast proportion of the cadres to follow their exclusive opinion.

In 2008, the party faced once again a serious dispute among its cadres, after some important figures announced the idea on PKS as being “an open Islamic party”. This idea, which at the practical level provided the opportunity for non-Muslims to be members and even join the party committee occurred as a response to the unique development in some non-Muslim areas, such as in Papua, where some non-Muslims proposed themselves to be members of the party in their area. At that time, several cadres, mainly those in DPP and some elites at the DPW level, believed that this idea was understandable and did not betray the principles of dakwah. Save for the vast majority of the cadres, this idea was still beyond imagination. For several cadres this issue was still unacceptable and even had even created a certain degree of anxiety.

Despite the fact that this idea had triggered an internal dispute, it did not force the party into fragmentation. The systematic cadrerization, creating a similar perception of the party’s rules of the game, had pushed the cadres to put forward party’s mechanism in dealing with the issue rather than individual's opinion. At the very early stage, they believed that such important idea should be discussed first at the MS level where several elites, who had different opinions, would voice their opinions or perspectives of that matter.

---


863 Interview with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, Head of the III Dakwah Region (2002-2005), member of Majelis Syuro PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 2010.

864 Interview with Amri Yusra, M.Si, Chairperson of Depok DPD of PKS (2002-2004), Member of Parliament of Depok District, West Java, (2004-2009), and Lecturer at Political Sciences Department, Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010.
Moreover, in this delicate case, the trust in the party was reflected by the eagerness to listen and follow the reasons of the leaders about such ideas. Most cadres held the initiative to ask the elites of such issues. In respecting the chain of command, the cadres used *halaqah* as a medium to have the party committee’s confirmation and explanation on the development of this issue\textsuperscript{865}. Some local committees even invited competent party elites to explain this issue to prevent misperception and an unproductive collective response to that idea. The Bekasi DPD of PKS, for instance, held a discussion with important and relevant prominent leaders to give a comprehensive explanation of such an open party idea\textsuperscript{866}. Such an attitude would logically disappear if trust was missing in this party. By having this understanding, the cadres could not be influenced easily by any negative rumours relating to the way this idea was perceived. The cadres also did not take any unconstitutional or extraordinary movements to respond to such a “controversial” idea.

Eventually, through effective communication, a common understanding between the pros and cons on such issue could be developed and it preserved solidity among them. In the end, the party understood the main problem and postponed this idea, waiting for the cadres’ readiness to accept this idea\textsuperscript{867}.

However, the fact that the party was not free from disputes, over time, several people indicated a symptom of “factionalisation” in the PKS. They then built a perspective on the PKS’ “factionalisation”\textsuperscript{868}, even fragmentation, by indicating the emergence of two contradictory factions that were named as “the justice group” and “the prosperous group”\textsuperscript{869}. They regarded the previous group to be more idealistic

\textsuperscript{865} Interview with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010; with Nooryanto, the Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Bekasi DPD of PKS, in Bekasi, 7 November 2010.

\textsuperscript{866} Interview with Nooryanto, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Bekasi DPD of PKS, in Bekasi, 7 November 2010.

\textsuperscript{867} Such open party idea eventually was formally stipulated by the party almost two years latter in 2010, after all MS members agreed to support it.


\textsuperscript{869} On this discussion see for instance “Sabit Kembar di Simpang Jalan”, *Monitor*, 37\textsuperscript{th} Edition, Year 1/11-17 March 2009. Interview with Mahfuz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010.
with the tendencies to be puritan in pursuing the party’s goal, while the latter, as a group with tendencies of pragmatism and moderation in developing the party’s influence in national politics. This kind of categorization emerged particularly after the 2004 Presidential Election, when two different opinions of the presidential candidates occurred among cadres.

Yet PKS and its members had never formally claimed the presence of such categorisation870. Sembiring, who rejected the presence of faction in the PKS, stated “there is no such A’s group or B’s. There were no factions, neither Justice Faction nor Prosperous Faction”871. In line with such an opinion, Wahid, the President of the PKS (2002-2005), said that the factions, whether between young and old factions or prosperous and justice factions, did not exist in his party. He concluded, “PKS is one. There is no faction inside”872. Some members indeed indicated different approaches that were used by members in evaluating the political situation and actions; nevertheless they did not see this as the symptom of faction establishment. Nurdin acknowledged that the “factionalisation” in terms of thinking, to some extent, might occur, but not on in terms of grouping873. In fact, there was no single group or faction that declared itself as a distinct group inside the party that had a different objective and vision to the rest of the members on certain fundamental matters, such as ideological interpretation, similar to what usually happened in certain British parties874.

The grouping among cadres was temporal and flexible, which was mainly determined by specific issues. They could, for instance, be in a different group on the issue of Wiranto versus Rais in 2004, but had a similar tendency in the case of BBM and the continuation of coalition with the Yudhoyono government in 2005. Such a situation occurred in the case of Matta, labelled as the representative of “the

870 Some observers believed that internal dispute and division existed. The study conducted by Munandar, for instance, indicates an acknowledgement of some cadres on internal division. However, in general, the PKS’ cadres and the majority of the interviewees see such differences as something normal and that should led to permanent division let alone internal fragmentation. See Munandar, Antara Jemaah dan Partai Politik Dinamika Habitus Kader Partai Keadilan Sejahtera dalam Arena Politik Indonesia Pasca Pemilu 2004.


873 Interview with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010.

prosperous group", versus Mashadi, one of the so-called main figures in “the justice group”. In general, the situation in PKS was close to the tendencies created\(^{875}\) rather than faction establishment. In this case, the grouping was far from solid and not dedicated to be a separate group inside the party. In the situation where the tendencies rather than factionalism which tended to occur, the party eventually had a better opportunity to restore the unity.

During the first decade of PKS’ existence, however, there were indeed very critical persons that quite constantly articulated different opinions and approaches, such as Abdhi Sumaiti (Abu Ridha), Daud Rasyid, Mashadi or Yusuf Supendi. However, they could not develop their opinions in the party, let alone gain a massive support from the cadres. Their presence in the end was simply representing individual interests or a small critical group’s concerns. Until today, they could not initiate the emergence of faction in PKS. Eventually they tended to be a kind of “inactive member” like Sumaiti, or preferred to leave, or be dismissed by the party like Rasyid, Mashadi and Supendi. However, to a certain extent, their critical opinions of PKS were not entirely insignificant and had triggered awareness among many cadres on the way the party should perform its political manoeuvres.

Those persons’ difficulty in gaining support from the vast majority of cadres was also evidence of the cadres’ maturity in facing differences and rumours by not believing easily negative rumours about the party or the leaders. The systematic cadrerization had developed a consciousness among the cadres to develop intensive consultation constantly with the party’s apparatuses, through *murabbi*, the cadrerization department, or other institutions, before taking any action\(^{876}\). Therefore, generally speaking, the cadres could not be influenced easily by a third party to implant its opinions or movements inside the party. In this atmosphere, through its own cadres, PKS actually could maintain an effective resistance to any interventions or harmful influences that could destroy the party’s unity.

\(^{875}\) See the discussion on the differences between factions and tendencies in R. Rose, ‘Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain’, *Political Studies*, 12(1): 33-46.

\(^{876}\) Interview with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010; with Nooryanto, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Bekasi DPD of PKS, in Bekasi, 7 November 2010; with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II *Dakwah* Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010; with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former *tarbiyah* activist leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-2004), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010; with Mustofa, PKS cadre and former reporter of *Profetik* Magazine, established by cadres of PKS, in Depok, 7 October 2010.
Furthermore, the existence of the brotherhood spirit and loyalty, as other results of systematic cadrerization, had encouraged the cadres to maintain unity among themselves as a family. They preferred to terminate the conflict and reunite as soon as possible. The differences in understanding and proposing political options did not motivate them to stop their interactions with the party or other members. When facing disagreement with party’s policy, the cadres tended to keep trying to understand the reasons behind them and maintain togetherness with the apparatus. Tsiqoh maintained through halaqah, became an effective tool in this situation, preserving trust and containment of conflict with the leaders. In this situation, it was normal in PKS when the cadres followed the party decision even if they did not totally agree with it. Those who could not support their differences with the party would generally leave the party in a good manner.

There were several cadres, who became very critical and showed an open resistance mainly to the party’s elites. In fact, some of them also created a kind of “resistance group” called FKP. For them, PKS had violated the main idealism and objective of dakwah, by not only taking a pragmatic and compromised policies but also had left its main duty as a dakwah tool by letting the party be a political machinery merely seeking power and public positions. However, this kind of resistance had never become a major movement in PKS. Even in Jakarta Province, as the centre of FKP movement, this forum had only attracted around less than 5 percent of the total of the cadres and over time, the number decreased gradually.

---


878 Ibid.


880 Interview with Hurriyah MA, cadrerization of PKS observer and Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 29 October 2010.

881 Interview with Hurriyah MA, cadrerization of PKS observer and Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 29 October 2010; with K.H Yusuf Supendi Lc, Member of DSP of PKS (2000-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2009), in Jakarta, 3 November 2010.

882 Interview with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS (2002), and personal secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of PKS and The Chairperson of MPR of Republic of Indonesia), in Jakarta, 12 October 2010; with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010.
Out side Jakarta, the percentage of the supporter was much lower. In the Bekasi District, for instance, FKP could only attract around 4-5 cadres from approximately 10,000 cadres. In Tangerang City, the number of the exponents of this group was insignificant. They "could be counted on the fingers" according to Hidayat. Outside Java Island, the supporters of this movement were almost none.

In spite of having a significant success in containing internal factionalisation and the development of critical groups with dissident tendencies, the above conditions also proved that PKS’ cadrerization was not perfect. Although, to certain extent, differences among cadre were normal phenomena and, in fact, inevitable, the emergence of resistance indicated that the gap of understanding between the party and certain cadres could still not be handled entirely by the cadrerization. The main issue on this problem was to convince the cadres that the political dynamic outside the party required a set of adjustments, in which the moderation of thought and attitudes, including being more integrated with the people and their contextual reality, were required as a foundation for these adjustments.

In addition to this situation, however, the presence of systematic cadrerization, in general, had provided safety nets for the party, namely its strong ideological commitment, the loyalty to the party and its idealism, the preservation of the sense of brotherhood and the understanding unity of the values that third parties could not influence easily. Through the presence of these matters during the first decade of its existence, PKS was able to avoid internal fragmentation.

6. Overview

The systematic cadrerization, which related to the institutionalisation of cadre development and recruitment, was one of the crucial elements for the development of party cohesiveness. The above discussion explores how the situation of systematic cadrerization in PKS, which had been part of the party’s life, had provided a

---

883 Interview with Nooryanto, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Bekasi DPD of PKS, in Bekasi, 7 November 2010.

884 Interview with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-2010), in Tangerang, 21 October 2010.

885 Interview with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS (2002), and personal secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of PKS and The Chairperson of MPR of Republic of Indonesia), in Jakarta, 12 October 2010; with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and the Chairperson of BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010.
significant contribution for the development of mono-loyalty, trust and the unity in understanding the ideology and the rules of the game. These basic capitals enabled PKS to avoid sharp differences of perception, the emergence of antagonistic grouping, the rules of the game and vision violation that could generate disappointment and resistance. By having those capabilities during the first decade of its existence, PKS could maintain its unity and in the long term save its cohesion.
Chapter XI
The Commitment to Shared Values: The Case of PKB

“Actually there is no ideology in PKB...the only thing that united the cadres was the ulama or patrons... which made the “phenomenon of federalism” became unavoidable in this party” (Yahya Staquf)\(^886\).

1. Introduction

Chapter XI and Chapter XII discuss the correlation between the commitment to shared values as one of the elements of the institutionalisation and the phenomenon of the party's fragmentation and cohesion. Chapter XI explores the limited role of shared values in PKB and its implications in the difficulty to maintain party cohesiveness. Chapter XII, on the other hand, discusses the extensive position of shared values in PKS and its role in preserving the party cohesiveness. The discussion in both chapters explores the role of shared values that exist in the party's ideology on the development of identity, code of conduct and uniformity of thought and action of the cadres.

This concerns what has been called the “value infusion” process where a party is infused by “value beyond technical requirement of the task at hand”\(^887\) that eventually provides, not only a commitment and the sense of taken for granted, but also guidance for the cadres to act coherently based on the interest of the party. In this regard, the cadres would see the party not merely as a dispensable tool but as part of their “valued personal satisfaction". The chapters apply these insights from the literature relevant to the cases of PKB and PKS.

---

886 Interview with Yahya Cholil Staquf, Vice of General Secretary of PKB (1998-2005) and President Abdurrahman Wahid Spokesperson (2001), in Rembang, 11 November 2010

Each chapter covers several subjects. Firstly, there is a discussion on the existence of shared values in each party, the reason behind the absence or presence of such shared values in the party and the state of the ‘value infusion,’ including the party’s ways to preserve its shared values as this will influence the quality of loyalty to the ideals or existence of the party. A second section examines the impact of the presence or absence of the shared value and value infusion of the internal life of the party. The last section discusses the relation between the shared values and the party’s fragmentation and its cohesion. The following chapter undertakes this exercise for the case of PKB.

2. Shared Values and their ‘infusion’ in PKB

2.1. Nationalism, Aswaja and their limitations as factors of cohesion

The constitution of PKB stated that the basis of the party was Pancasila (Five Pillars)\(^{888}\), as the very foundation of Indonesia nationalism, which indicated its commitment to a nation state and not an Islamic/religious state. This party also stated that one of its main characteristics was nationalism\(^{889}\). Nationalism in this context relates to the consciousness to acknowledge Indonesia as a nation united by its common history and general will of the people, regardless of their ethnics and beliefs, to create prosperity for all in the spirit of togetherness and humanity\(^{890}\). For PKB, Indonesia as a plural country was the reality that the Muslims could not neglect.

The characteristic of the country that allows and protects Muslims to implement their religion freely and acknowledges the principle of one God, is stated

\(^{888}\) The 1998 AD of PKB Article 3; The 2000 AD of PKB Article 3; The 2002 AD of PKB Article 3; The 2005 AD of PKB Article 3; The 2008 AD of PKB Article 3.

\(^{889}\) The 1998 AD of PKB Article 5; The 2000 AD of PKB Article 5; The 2002 AD of PKB Article 5; The 2005 AD of PKB Article 5; The 2008 AD of PKB Article 5.

as the first pillar of Indonesia’s national ideology, Pancasila indicates that the very essence of the country was in line with the spirit of Islamic teachings, namely *Tawhid* (theology of the oneness of God). Hence, although Indonesia is not an Islamic State for Islamic traditionalist people in general and including NU and PKB, the existence of Indonesia as a nation state and Pancasila as national ideology was final. For PKB, nationalism was the foundation of a struggle for the party that should be held eternally. In this regard, PKB believed also that the nation would not reach its objective if the people abandoned the spirit of nationalism.

Using nationalism, however, as the foundation of the party did not mean that PKB abandoned the Islamic values in its purpose and as being purely a secular party. In fact, the party had a concern to implement and enact Islam in the spirit of *Aswaja* values in the political life. The AD Article 4, stated, “The principle of struggle of the party is to serve God, to hold the truth and honesty, to enact justice, to preserve unity, to develop brotherhood and togetherness based on the values of *Ahlul Sunnah wal Jamaah* (Aswaja).”

Islam, in the light of the *Aswaja* spirit, itself was the main identity of the NU. The establishment of NU was, for the main part, motivated by the interest to defend this teaching. *Aswaja* literally means group of Muslims that understands and practices Islam and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad by following the path, rule, method or tradition which had been established by *jamaah*, namely first the generation of the close-friends (*sahabah* and *tabiin*) to the next generations of the followers, represented by *ulama*. In the Islamic world context, *Aswaja*, or sometimes also called as Sunni, was established by Islamic scholars such as Abu Hasan Al-

---


893 *The 1998 AD of PKB Article 4; The 2000 AD of PKB Article 4; The 2002 AD of PKB Article 4; The 2005 AD of PKB Article 4; The 2008 AD of PKB Article 4.*

894 Choirul Anam, *Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan NU*, (Solo: PT Duta Aksara Mulia, 2010), p. xvii

Asy’ari and Imam Al-Maturidi\textsuperscript{896}. This Islamic stream acknowledges the main role of syariah (text) besides the rational reasons, in which the rational reasons is inferior to syariah, to found the answer of a problem and generally in implementing Islamic teachings. Aswaja also acknowledges the existence of four important sahabahs of Prophet Muhammad, namely Abu Bakr as-Shiddiq, Umar Ibn al-Khathab, Usman ibn Affan and Ali ibn Abi Thalib as the Muslim leaders and follows their teachings and habits.

In the Indonesian context, although most of the Muslims were Sunni, NU sometimes claimed itself as the real representation of Aswaja. Over time, NU established its own understanding of Aswaja. It then tended to reduce the understanding of Aswaja by mainly insisting on the importance to follow at least one of the four mazhabs (schools of thought) that were developed by the medieval age jurists namely Hanafi, Syafii, Maliki and Hambali\textsuperscript{897}. In reality, although welcomed all Muslims with different mazhabs to join NU, almost all NU’s members are actually the followers of Syafii. As an implementation of that understanding, NU then became a pioneer of the Islamic community in Indonesia that suggested Muslims follow a mazhab. NU’s constitution stated that one of the main aims of the establishment of the organization was to devote itself to one of the four schools of thought\textsuperscript{898}.

Thus, the meaning of “based on values of Aswaja” in the constitution of the party was close to “the interest of NU”. Hence, the presence of Aswaja as one of the main elements in the PKB’s ideology indicated the influence of the NU in the PKB’s vision. In political life, Aswaja’s characteristics were moderation, honouring pluralism and prioritizing political stability\textsuperscript{899}. The Aswajan regarded its moderate attitude as a proper medium to gain objectives peacefully. In this regard, the Aswajan tended to follow the political mainstream or system and rejected any kind of extremism. Aswaja’s characteristic to honour social and cultural context was the entry point for this organisation to accept Indonesia as a plural country. Thus, Aswaja and nationalism were values that supported each other.

\textsuperscript{898} “Anggaran Dasar NU 1926, Article 2”, in “Attachments”, ibid, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{899} Choirie, Islam-Nasionalisme, UMNO-PKB, Studi Komparasi dan Diplomasi, p. 144.
Nationalism and Islam in the Aswaja’ perspective took a salient position in the PKB’s ideology. According to Kacung Marijan, one of the earliest drafters of the party constitution, the ideology of the PKB at heart was a synthesis between nationalism and the spirit of Aswaja. Choirie, one of the senior cadres, concluded that nationalism and Islamic Aswaja is an “identitas ganda” (“the dual identity”) of PKB. In such a situation, both values became shared values acknowledged by the party and its members.

However, the development of nationalist ideas in the realm of religion did not only belong to NU or PKB. The majority of Islamic organizations and political parties, including those that had an Islamic traditionalist mind-set, acknowledged the inextricable relationship between Islam and nationalism. Some important Islamic traditionalist parties such as Partai Kebangkitan Ummat (the Party of Islamic Community Awakening/PKU), Partai Nahdlatul Ummat (the Islamic Awakening Party/PNU), Partai Solidaritas Uni Nasional Indonesia (Indonesia National Union Solidarity Party/ Partai SUNI) and PKNU hold the same thinking or idealism on that matter.

Since the idea was acceptable to the other groups, the situation provided a chance for the traditionalists to install this value in many parties and organisations. It inspired NU people to believe that PKB was not the only channel through which they could express the value of nationalism. This situation eventually created a “sense of relativism” among the NU members where PKB’s supporters could not claim their party as the only user of these values. In a critical situation, this situation provided them with an opportunity and the freedom to implement and channel its nationalism aspiration to other organizations or parties.

Moreover, although the Aswaja was the norm that had an important role in PKB and, in particular, showed that the NU’s community established this party but this value had been less relevant in the day-to-day party’s internal activities. A similar situation occurred also in nationalism, since this value mainly related to the problems

---

900 Interview with Prof. Dr. Kacung Marijan, NU policies’ observer and former member of Assistance Team of the proposal for the establishment of PKB (the Rembang version), in Jakarta, 26 November 2010.

901 Choirie, Islam-Nasionalisme, UMNO-PKB, Studi Komparasi dan Diplomasi, p. 147.

902 On the ideology of Partai SUNI, PNU and PKU see Tim Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kompas, Partai-Partai Politik Indonesia, Ideologi dan Program, (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas), pp. 385-387, 441-443, 529-532. On the Ideology of PKNU, see the AD of PKNU Article 3 and Article 4.
on how the party dealt with the existence of Indonesia as a nation state and all related matters. The position of these values in PKB, to some extent, opened an opportunity for the emergence of a “situation without norms” phenomenon in the internal life of the party. In other words, although PKB had a vision on the relation between the state and religion and matters related to pluralism and democracy, this party was a party with limited shared values to deal with its daily activities.

Ali M. Musa, General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of PKB-Gus Dur (2008-2009), described the core problems related to the shared values or ideology in PKB, namely the gap between the role of ideology as a guide for external matters and internal matters. He said, “In this situation, PKB had been regarded as solid for external matters, but this party could not implement solidarity among its cadres”903.

2.2. The Limited Efforts towards Shared Values’ Development

The generality problem was one that could be properly handled by the party. However, until the first decade of the PKB’s existence, the proportion activities related to value development and infusion, particularly to simplify the shared value, was limited. Comprehensive studies that discussed the implementation of these values at the internal organisational level including the discussion on the code of conduct development and the management of the organisation and the cadres’ behaviour was also not easy to find.

Some forums, which studied and simplified the shared values, were held mainly during the PKB’s first years of existence. In 1999, for instance, PKB discussed the *Mabda’ Siyasi*. The result of the discussions was the book entitled “*Garis Perjuangan Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*” (the Lines of Struggle of the PKB/GPP) that became the party’s platform, which talked mainly about the vision and mission of the party and matters related to the Indonesian political reform and democracy904. The interpretation of the party’s shared values focused mainly on explaining the ideological position of PKB in its relation to other groups and the state and to defend

---

903 Interview with Andi M. Ramly, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz (2002-2010), Secretary of Dewan Syura PKB-Muhaimin (2008-2010) and writer of the “*Mabda Siyasi PKB*”, in Jakarta, 15 October 2010.

the policies taken by this party\textsuperscript{905}. With this “outward-looking orientation”, a comprehensive standard and evaluation for the implementation of these values for internal matters was still absent.

Most cadres believed, however, that this situation was a result of insufficient time to handle and manage the problem of shared values\textsuperscript{906}. Not long after its establishment, PKB had to face an immediate election, which pushed the party into devoting most of its activities to win the people’s vote, rather than to its internal organisation development. After the 1999 Election, PKB’s political orientation focused mainly on practical matters, which were on the protection of President Wahid’s position from his opponents’ political manoeuvres\textsuperscript{907}. Hence, party attention dedicated most of its effort to defend and support President Wahid’s political movements. After the fall of President Wahid, a series of internal conflicts worsened the party’s internal situation, since they reduced the party’s energy and time to deal with the conflict rather than to broaden the scope of the role of shared values\textsuperscript{908}.

In its development, the party tried to improve this type of situation by the creation of several modules relating to the party’s ideology\textsuperscript{909}. The party also held a


\textsuperscript{906} Interview with Abdul Khalik Ahmad, Secretary of PKB Faction in DPR RI (1999-2001) and General Secretary of PKB-Matori (2000-2005), in Jakarta, 11 October 2010; with Agus Suflihat, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz PKB (1998-2001) and Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz PKB (1998-2001), via telephone, Jakarta-Bandung, 11 October 2010; with Prof. Dr. Kacung Marijan, NU policies’ observer and former member of Assistance Team of the proposal for the establishment of the PKB (Rembang version), in Jakarta, 26 November 2010. See also the acknowledgement of the party on the election as the main focus of party activities during the first two years, Ketua Dewan Syuro DPP PKB, “Pidato Pertanggungjwaban Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Masa Bakti 1998-2000” in Dokumen Muktamar I PKB. Membangun Persaudaraan Sejati Antar Manusia Sebagai Esensi Rekonsiliasi Nasional, (Jakarta: DPP PKB, 2000), p. 18.


\textsuperscript{908} Interview with Prof. Dr. Kacung Marijan, NU policies’ observer and former member of the Assistance Team of the proposal for the establishment of the PKB (Rembang version), in Jakarta, 26 November 2010; with Tohadi, the member of PKB (1998-2005) and Vice Chairperson of PKNU, in Jakarta, 6 October 2010; with Agus Suflihat, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz PKB (1998-2001) and Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz PKB (1998-2001), via telephone, Jakarta-Bandung, 11 October 2010.

forum in 2007, called as Workshop for the Strengthening of Party System and Management for the 2009 Election. In this forum, the PKB discussed the background of NU Establishment, the Dynasty of Hasyimiah (where Wahid was part on it) and *Mabda Siyasi* as the values of party platform that to be held by all cadres in their daily political activities\(^{910}\). Again, the essence of the elements was the exploration of the spirit of *Aswaja* and nationalism in relation to developing a political guide for the PKB in dealing with national political matters. However, such efforts could not entirely affect wide-ranging discussions to specify and simplify the shared values then to apply to their internal affairs. In addition, these efforts were not followed-up by the creation and development of the institution or rules of the game that could preserve the continuation of these efforts and endorse a strong commitment to consistently implementing them.

Apart from the limited efforts to simplify the shared values, the process of shared values for socialization or transformation also found difficulty in its application. For example, the main medium of shared values infusion and maintenance of cadre development or cadrerization was not correctly developed. In this type of forum, discussions mostly related to the strategy to win the election (including local elections), the development of the understanding of nationalism and the establishment of good relations with others\(^{911}\), which eventually overshadowed the discussion on the shared values’ implementation, including the development of the code of conduct. The proportion of the teaching and training in this particular forum on value infusion became limited compared to the discussion on external problems. It is difficult to find, for instance, the real schedule and systemic process on the cadre development and including the value infusion process\(^{912}\). Many leaders of the party

---


911 Interview with Andi M. Ramly, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz (2002-2010), Secretary of Dewan Syura PKB-Muhaimin (2008-2010) and writer of “*Mabda Syiyyasi PKB*”, in Jakarta, 15 October 2010.

912 Interview with Marinah Hardy, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of Western Nusa Tenggara DPW of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010; with Damanhuri, Chairperson of Dewan Syura of...
acknowledged that the party did not smoothly implement the cadrerization\textsuperscript{913}. The financial problem became one of the most important reasons behind this situation, since the party still, in general, lacked formulating fund raising and was less disciplined in collecting its members' contributions\textsuperscript{914}.

On the other hand, at the practical level, the party and the elites tended to eventually submit this process to each cadre on an individual basis\textsuperscript{915}. It means the party simply used many NU onderbows as main “providers” for the party’s cadres\textsuperscript{916}. In such situation, PKB regarded and treated members who had a background as a member of NU, including NU onderbows, such as Gerakan Pemuda Anshor (Youth Movement of Anshor/ GP Anshor) and Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (Indonesia Islamic Student Movement/PMII), as people who had been developed with similar orientation hence, they already understood the norms or shared values in the party. As a result, the attitude of “take-for-grantedness” now appeared in this party. The assumption behind this attitude most probably related to the “homogeneity” between NU and PKB in which these organisations had similar shared values.


\textsuperscript{914} Interview with Marinah Hardy, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz of Western Nusa Tenggara DPW of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010; with DAMAHNURI, Chairperson of Dewan Syura of Depok DPD of PKB (2002-2004), the Member of Parliament of DPRD of Depok (2004-2009), in Depok, 31 October 2010.


This assumption overlooked the fact that there were significant differences between NU as the socio-religious organisation and PKB as the political machinery\(^{917}\). In NU, the main motivation for people to join was to serve the people through a non-power approach. On the contrary, in PKB, members were motivated to be someone in power and use it to reach the goal. In these two different worlds, each organisation should develop its own tradition in order to meet its own objective.

Over time, this situation created another problem. Many actors were involved in this process and in particular the *ulama* in their capacity as the leaders of the NU and the owners of *pesantren*. They played a salient role as a prime mover in conveying and socialising the ideology of the party to their *santri* (students) and the people\(^{918}\). Soon described, for instance, that in 1999 there were approximately 3,917 *kiai* and 30,983 *ustadz* who actively introduced the party to *santris* and the people and influenced their political preference\(^{919}\). In this case, they also acted as a mediator in giving understanding on shared values of the party. In this situation, the party was not the only institution that was in charge and maintained value infusion. In its development, such situation became the main cause for the failure of the loyalty establishment.

On the other hand, the capability of *ulama* in understanding the shared values and conducting their implementation, however, was not homogenous, as they were determined mainly through their unique experience and environment. This situation also opened the opportunity to table various understandings and interpretations on the party’s shared values. According to Khatibul U. Wiranu, the numbers of members or party apparatus that had the best skills in performing value infusion decreased continuously, particularly after the 2005 internal conflict\(^{920}\), when many of the best *ulama* in PKB, including Ma’ruf Amin, the first General Chairperson of *Dewan Syariah* (1999-2000), left the party and established a new party.


\(^{918}\) Interview with Yahya Cholil Staquf, Vice of General Secretary of PKB (1998-2005) and President Abdurrahman Wahid Spokesperson (2001), in Rembang, 11 November 2010.


\(^{920}\) Interview with Khatibul Umam Wiranu, Vice General Secretary of PKB (1999-2005) and Member of Parliament form PKB (1998-2004), in Depok, 17 October 2010.
In addition, the process of value infusion gradually became inconsistent, as there was neither a clear concept and proportional training, nor the comprehensive control that could push the ulama to be consistent in conducting it. In these situations, the process of implementation and assessment of the value infusion, including the development of the understanding of shared values, became less systematic. Thus, in general, the cadres did not have sufficient tools to understand and have a similar vision on the ideology. Moreover, the prolonged conflict that occurred in the party fundamentally contradicting the moderate spirit of Aswaja and the nationalist spirit of brotherhood destroyed the trust in the importance of the shared value development. It made the development and institutionalisation of these values become less appealing for not only the NU people but also to the cadres. According to Damanhuri, since the party became unattractive due to internal conflict and having a lesser contribution to their lives, NU members then had a greater interest to develop the shared values in the context of socio-religious matters (in NU) rather than in politics (in PKB)921.

From the above situations, it can be seen that the problem of PKB related to value infusion was not only that this party still had a problem with the development of values, but also the fact that the value infusion itself was not something that had been comprehensively developed by this party.

3. **The Failure of “Value Infusion” and the Absence of Commitment.**

The above conditions, namely the general level of shared values and the relatively poor condition of shared value development instigated the limitation of the ability of the party in developing and conveying the shared values of the party. This situation generated some adverse conditions for the development of the role of shared values and the unity of the party. In the institutionalised party, as has been discussed in the theoretical framework, the attitude of the members was mainly determined by the shared values or ideology in which the relationship between the cadres tended to be less instrumental and more ideological. The cadres also had a deep commitment to make the party more adaptable and to preserve the continuity of the party. In addition, the cadres would evaluate the party as the medium to enact the party’s

---

idealism and not their individual interests. In the first decade of its existence, however, the PKB tended to undergo an opposite situation.

3.1. Prominent Figures as a Driving Force

In this atmosphere, where the party could not properly develop and maintain its shared values, the cadres became motivated more easily by other things. In the PKB’s case, to defend exclusive interests of figures was more appealing than implementing the ideology of the party.

This situation grew in this party since the party’s ideology was not something practical. The patrons with their unique rules had been important figures in the daily lives of most of the cadres. In fact, ulama continued to remain the main driving factor that determined the behaviour of the cadres and undervalued the existence of the party and its values accordingly. Choirul Anam, the General Chairperson of PKB East Java, for instance stated, “If somebody said that PKB in the future does not need ulama, it was unhistorical and a non-sense opinion”922.

The role of ulama figures eventually overshadowed the cadres’ dependency on their party. In this regard, sometimes the cadres preferred to follow their closest patrons rather than the party, let alone its shared values. “Dual-loyalty” found its place and influenced the internal party situation. The presence of several strong and charismatic figures that held exceptional positions among cadres was a common phenomenon in the PKB. At the national level, Wahid and ulama in the Kyai of Langitan Forum could mobilise the cadres and encourage them to defend and implement their political interests. Those figures, with their own interest, played a momentous role during the conflict between Wahid and Shihab episode, which determined the direction and the “quality” of the conflict923. In that conflict, their different opinion had rented the cadres’ tendencies and opinions.

At the local level, some charismatic figures of PKB could determine the political behaviour of the cadres and even influence the result of the election. For instance, in the Situbondo District, one of the strongest political pockets of PKB in the


Eastern Java Province, the existence of a charismatic figure, namely Fawaid Syamsul Arifin, confirmed this situation. The charisma of Arifin could bring thousands of votes for the PKB in the 1999 election. This made PPP, the closest rival party in that area that used to be NU people’s party, lost all its seats and suffered heavy losses for the first time in that area since 1977. However, in the 2004 Election, Arifin, this time as the member of PPP, after PKB dismissed him in 2003, could provide significant votes for PPP and increased its number of seats considerably in the local parliament from zero to 12 seats.

This situation proved that the party was not valued for itself by the members. The ease with which they changed political preferences and leave the party was a very indication of the lack of value infusion in a party, according to Selznick, where the members should feel loss when something negative happened to the party. This situation also indicated the phenomenon of patron-client relationship where the cadres tended to follow the ulama rather than the party ideology, which according to Surbakti, also confirmed the under-institutionalised condition in this party.

Moreover, the loyalty towards a group or a prominent figure also reduced the spirit of togetherness in the party, which made the obedience and loyalty on a group or faction, became a kind of “code of conduct” that determined the future of cadres. This situation encouraged the cadres to defend their interest more rigorously from other cadres. It then motivated the cadres in each conflicting group to abolish the other group and regarded its supporters as eliminated. The phenomenon of disbanding each other occurred during the first decade of PKB’s existence, which sometimes was effected through evading democratic ways and party procedure. Generally, the rationale for these policies were personal or subjective reasons, in

---

928 According to Anam, during 2005, Iskandar with Wahid’s back up had suspended or established 37 DPCs and 2 DPWs; and fired number of members of committee. Prior to the dismissal of Iskandar in 2008 the party disbanded 14 DPWs and 67 DPCs, mostly were related to the disloyalty issues. Kompas, 7 April 2008, “Muhaimin Didukung, Muslim Kukuhkan Muktamar Semarang”. Tri Ratnawati, “Beberapa Masalah Pelembagaan Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) dan Alternatif Solusi”, in Lili Romli, ed., Pelembagaan Partai Politik Pasca Orde Baru Studi Kasus Partai Golak, PKB, PBB, PBR dan PD, (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Politik, Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, 2008).
which power maintenance particularly to guarantee cadres’ loyalty and the preservation of the patron’s position became one of the main reasons\textsuperscript{929}. Some people then called PKB as \textit{Partai Kulkas Besar} (the Big Freezer Party/PKB) for the fact that many of its local committees had been “frozen” or halted by the party\textsuperscript{930}.

In PKB, the commitment to figures’ interest and not the shared values also made \textit{santris}, as the disciples of \textit{ulama}, willing to oppose other \textit{ulama} who were regarded as the “common enemy” by their \textit{ulama} or group. For some, it showed the very gradation of the \textit{santri} culture, particularly the culture of NU\textsuperscript{931}. The dismissal of several influential \textit{ulama} at the national and local levels by Wahid’s followers also indicated this phenomenon. The Wahid-Iskandar group, for instance, had no hesitation in removing \textit{ulama} that had different points of view without a fair and comprehensive trial. It happened, for instance, to Warson Munawir, an important \textit{ulama} figure in Yogyakarta who was also the General Chairperson of the \textit{Dewan Syura} of the Yogyakarta DPW of the PKB, who was removed by the supporter of the Wahid-Iskandar without a fair trial\textsuperscript{932}.

Slander and condemnation of some of the very senior \textit{ulama} also occurred. Choirie, for instance criticised \textit{ulama} gathered in the Langitan Forum, several of whom were his former teachers by saying that those \textit{ulama} were political tools of the anti-Wahid people. Choirie underestimated the sincere enthusiasm of the \textit{ulama} that showed their commitment to help the party and considered them merely as the victims of a political manipulation by several irresponsible figures that were a part of the Shihab group\textsuperscript{933}. On the other hand, the enthusiasm of the Wahid rivals to remove Wahid from the party, including those who regarded themselves as the disciples of Wahid, indicated a similar situation.


\textsuperscript{931} However, this situation actually was not something new for NU. The study on the NU political behaviour conducted by Irsyam in 1980s indicates similar situation. In this regard, although generally the \textit{ulama} still gained respect from the \textit{santri} or politicians, they were challengeable. Mahrus Irsyam, \textit{Ulama dan Partai Politik. Upaya Mengatasi Krisis}, (Jakarta: Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1984)

\textsuperscript{932} DPW PKB Jawa Timur, \textit{Data dan Fakta Pelanggaran AD/ART di Muktamar II Semarang}, p.3

\textsuperscript{933} \textit{Ibid}, p.5-6
This situation also indicates that the cadres or groups tended to abandon each other when they could not reach an agreement. The opponent was seen as an enemy that had an absolute different agenda and interest. A zero sum game tended to happen where the eagerness to discard other cadres existed, when a conflict of interest occurred among them. Parawansa said, “Above all, the thing that makes me feel not at home was the attitude to regard friends as enemies. For me, we should keep supporting each other and go hand in hand, even though we have conflict of interest. We should not neglect each other. But the fact was we neglected each other.”

3.2 Value Free and Expendable Tools Phenomenon

Another problem was the attitude of the cadres who tended to consider political struggles as “value free” matters. Musa said, “In the end, ideology plays a very limited role and even is absent entirely in the power sharing context.” This appealed to the cadres to conduct a free interpretation of the ideology to in turn legalise their actions. For some cadres, the shared values or ideology in fact had been irrelevant. In this regard, shared values eventually could not act as determining variables that could influence, unify and manage the perception and behaviour of the cadres when dealing with the real political situation. Parawansa said, “When cadres face the real political life, they put ideology in their pocket.”

This situation influenced the relations between the cadres, where mutual symbiosis based on self-seeking interests became apparent. In this case, the party became merely an expendable tool where the relationships were mainly determined by the ability of each group or person to preserve the shared benefit. This is seen, for instance, from the political movement of Dimyati Rais, General Chairperson of Dewan Syura of PKB-Matori (2002-2005). In 2005, he changed his political position.

---

935 Interview with Dr. Ali Masykur Musa, Vice Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz PKB (2005-2010) and General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz PKB-Gus Dur (2008-2009), in Jakarta, 19 October 2010.
from being Matori’s protector to be a Shihab supporter, Matori’s rival, and became a member of *Dewan Syura* of the PKB-Alwi. However, in 2008, after Iskandar left Wahid and established his alternative party, Rais, charismatic *ulama* from Kaliwungu, joined Iskandar who was actually one of the main figures in the PKB that opposed Alwi and Matori. In the Iskandar camp, he became one of the candidates for the General Chairperson of *Dewan Syura*. The attitude to join three different camps in one decade reflected an opportunist tendency, since such a movement would practically promote Rais to be part of the more promising group rather than the previous ones.

Ali M. Musa, General Chairperson of *Dewan Tanfidz* of the PKB-Gus Dur (2008-2009) showed also a similar attitude, when in 2009 he accepted the condition to be loyal to Iskandar, who was the “main enemy” of the party that he led. This meant acknowledging the existence of PKB-Muhaimin as it held an important position in one of the national prestigious institutions *Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan* (State Audit Bureau/BPK) as compensation. In the meantime, A. Effendy Choirie, one of Wahid’s main supporters and a member of central managing board of PKB-Gus Dur, indicated a similar gesture. In 2009, he agreed to cooperate with Iskandar and worked under the PKB-Muhaimin prior to the 2009 Election. PKB-Muhaimin then provided him the opportunity to join the election and became a member of parliament (2009-2014) representing the Iskandar camp.

On the other hand, after the 2009 Election, the relationship between Iskandar and his former main ally and Secretary General of PKB, Lukman Edy, became worse. Some people believed that the relationship between the two had reached the situation where they did not want to talk each other anymore. It happened after Iskandar, as the leader of the party, recommended one of his very close friends,

---


940 Interview with Andi M. Ramly, Chairperson of *Dewan Tanfidz* (2002-2010), Secretary of *Dewan Syura* PKB-Muhaimin (2008-2010) and writer of “*Mabda’ Siyasi* PKB”, in Jakarta, 15 October 2010.

Hilmy Faisal, to President Yudhoyono to hold the position as State Minister for the Accelerated Development of Disadvantaged Regions, rather than Edy, who had previously held this position. According to Yenny Wahid, such phenomenon demonstrated that as long as the leader of the camp could sustain the needs of the followers, the solidity of that group would persist. However, the situation would be different if the leader could not continually satisfy the interests of the followers\textsuperscript{942}.

In relation to this, Parawansa believed that shared values were not the main basis that motivated cadres in conducting their behaviour. Parawansa said that: “I do not see that ideology is something that guides the political behaviour of my colleagues in the PKB”\textsuperscript{943}. This situation implied that the party could not develop and persuade the cadres to regard the shared values as a main parameter to conduct their behaviour and to see the party as the tools of the shared values. In this sense, shared values tended to lose their relevance in the daily life, which increased the spirit of self-seeking behaviour, and regarded the party as merely what Selznick calls as “expandable tools”, and decreased the spirit of togetherness. Above all, these situations reflected the failure to develop commitment to the shared values in this party.

4. The Impact: From Defending Leader’s Interests towards Fragmentation

The above problems – the inclination to hold the figures’ interest and treat the party as an expandable tool – eventually encouraged the leaders and their followers to act freely based on their exclusive and self-seeking interest, which over time cemented differences and even contradiction. These situations became pillars in each internal conflict episode in PKB that in the end paved the way for the emergence of internal fragmentation.

4.1. Leaders’ Interests as “Legitimate Sources” to Act

In the situation where the party could not properly maintain its ideology, the awareness to hold the party leaders’ interests became more crucial than the

\textsuperscript{942} Interview with Zannuba Ariffah “Yenny” Wahid, General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz PKB-Gus Dur (2008-2010), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{943} Interview with Khofifah Indar Parawansa, State Minister for Women Empowerment (1999-2001), Chairperson of the Institute for Election Winning of the PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 20 October 2010.
ideological calculations. This situation can be seen in the main dismissal cases that then triggered party fragmentation three times, where the leaders’ interest, which to some extent was nuanced by their exclusive political interest and calculation rather than ideological consideration, became the crucial point. The dismissal often overlooked the importance of maintaining consistency in holding the shared values to avoid a personal and subjective decision.

The abrupt dismissal of Matori, for instance, was under Wahid’s influence and own interest to have Matori removed from the party due to Matori’s willingness to attend the 2001 MPR Special Meeting. The problem of disloyalty became the main issue behind Jalil’s dismissal and not for his lack of commitment to the shared values. In fact, Jalil actually had made his own calculation, which was ideological, behind his decision to join the SI that and not given a hearing by Wahid and his supporters’. For Jalil, the decision to come to the 2001 SI MPR motivated by his commitment to PKB’s ideology, namely nationalism and the spirit of Aswaja. He stated, for instance, that his presence in the 2001 Special Meeting of the MPR was also mainly to block or fight the influence of the so-called “fundamentalist groups” in the parliament that tried to push “Islamic agendas”, which could jeopardise the existence of the nation-state through the dismissal of President Wahid\textsuperscript{944}. This paradoxical situation, in which the party in fact dismissed to some extent an “ideological loyalist”, indicates the lesser commitment among the cadres who were mainly Wahid’s supporters wanting to put forward ideology in the shared values when making an important decision.

The case of the dismissal of Alwi Shihab and Saifullah Yusuf also reflected on the one hand the very fragile relation among the cadres due to the absence of “shared values” and on the other hand proved the strong position of Wahid’s interest by many cadres. Although the interest to maintain the rules of the game was the formal reason for this policy, the eagerness to remove them as the figures accused of being disloyal to Wahid and being too close to the external power, namely President Yudhoyono, could not be neglected. In this case, again the problem of disloyalty towards Wahid became the main issue.

In the case of Iskandar, the rumours of his disloyalty to Wahid also became the foundation for his dismissal. The limited forum eventually decided unilaterally to dismiss Iskandar based on the accusation of being arrogant and disloyal to Wahid. In this case, again the policy to decide the future of the cadres was not determined by their commitment to struggle for and to preserve the shared values but his loyalty to the leader. Over time, those cases had also cemented the image of Wahid as a figure that deeply influenced the situation in the party rather than the party’s shared values.

Moreover, the absence of standardised shared values enabled Wahid and any dismissed figures to be free when making an interpretation of a problem. The above situation infers that Wahid, as the leader, had a large opportunity to decide what the party should do. On the other hand, the attitude of Jalil to attend the 2001 SI MPR rather than joining the party and to reject such an occasion indicated the freedom of action within PKB. There was no uniting value that could stop him making such a “controversial decision”. Jalil, in this case, followed at most his political instinct and personal calculation rather than a certain code of conduct that could suggest him effecting appropriate actions according to the majority of the cadres945.

As for Shihab and Yusuf, as the leaders of Dewan Tanfidz, their decision to join President Yudhoyono’s cabinet without having permission from Dewan Syura indicated the lack of communication between these two bodies, indicating a different political calculation and commitment between the leaders. The fact that both Shihab and Yusuf and their followers had a different understanding with the Wahid camp on the concept of rangkap jabatan (dual position) as the main basis for their dismissal where the Shihab camp tended to be less strict, also signified the unfinished process as having a solid understanding of the rules of the game. However, this situation to some extent was unavoidable, as a strict code of conduct did not exist for all the members to abide to.

The absence of shared values also encouraged each conflicting group to preserve their position as part of the commitment to defend their leader’s interests, which eventually made the differences among them tended to persist and even escalate. As a reflection of this situation, they did not feel hesitate to make unfriendly

statements in the public media about the opponent. The non-Wahid groups usually raised the issues of mismanagement, unfairness and the authoritarian tendency committed by Wahid and his supporters. Equal access to the power and justice also became prime issues to convey. They heavily criticized Wahid’s party as a “big family party” or “the party based on genetics”.

On the other hand, the Wahid group stressed the “pragmatic” tendency of their opponents. In this regard, Wahid and his supporters occasionally conveyed the message on the role of external powers behind the resistance of the opponents. For this reason, they sometimes labelled their opponents as “the tools of external power”. They also pointed out that the background of the opponents: Jalil, Shihab, Yusuf and Iskandar, to show the great role of Wahid in their political careers. The importance of such an issue was to underline the real meaning of being a traitor and disloyal to the party. Particularly for Iskandar, this supporter of Wahid sometimes attacked his attitude as “the real traitor” for the fact that he was Wahid’s nephew who had been protected and even lived with Wahid’s family for several years. This situation became the background of Shinta Nuriah, Wahid’s wife, who instructed her daughter Yenny Wahid to avoid any possibilities of having a meeting to discuss reconciliation with Iskandar. This kind of quarrel eventually pushed the party to encounter more difficult moments where the spirit of togetherness tended to decrease sharply. In fact, each conflicting group preferred to hold a MLB as a medium to solve the problem.

4.2. Instrumentalist Group Formation in the Absence of Shared Values

Besides giving an opportunity to the leaders to implement their interests, the lack of commitment to the shared values allowed the political deals based on something that eliminated the existence of shared values to be easily established. The absence of the role of ideology at the more practical level prevented the cadres from making a

---


948 Interview with Ahmad Shodiq Noor, General Secretary of DKI Jakarta DPW of PKB, in Jakarta, 3 November 2010.
comprehensive assessment on whether the elites’ offers and their acceptance were in-line with the party’s ideology or its values. In the end, the cadres preferred merely to follow their direct patron, mainly the ulama, as an influential element in the party for securing their daily life and political career. All conflicting groups used this situation as a chance to spread their influence and to foster their camp.

This atmosphere provided the opportunity for Jalil to gain support from the cadres and santri. The presence of Dimyati Rois, one of the senior and influential NU ulamas from Salatiga, Central Java and Maksum Jauhari⁹⁴⁹, in the Jakarta MLB, was a vital source to the political encouragement of Matori’s group, legalising the sense of NU on the board led by Matori. Matori told the public that the presence of the party cadres coming from many areas and that most of them were actually also santri, indicated the direct or indirect support of the ulama for him, since a santri could not attend without the permission of his kyai.⁹⁵⁰

A similar situation also occurred in the PKB-Alwi. The support from the charismatic ulama that gathered in the Langitan Forum, for instance, encouraged the fast grouping and establishment of the PKB-Alwi. The gathering of thousands of santri, particularly the disciples of Kyai Langitan in the MLB held by Shihab’s supporters to oppose the existence of the PKB-Gus Dur/Muhaimin indicates such a unique relation between ulama and their disciples. Anam said after Abdullah Faqih – one of the most respectable ulama in Langitan Forum – gave his permission to hold a MLB, all the supporters and santri showed their courage to attend the MLB, including the committee members of 350 DPCs and 31 DPWs⁹⁵¹.

As for the Iskandar Camp, Yusuf Chudlori and Abdul Azis Mansyur–two charismatic ulama from Central Java and East Java–had played a similar role. Their presence legitimised the leadership of Iskandar in the eyes of their santri and PKB cadres. The presence of Yusuf Chudlori in this group was also culturally important

---


since his father Chudlori was Wahid’s teacher. With the support of those influential ulama, Iskandar succeed in holding the MLB in Jakarta to secure his position in the party.

On the other hand, the existence of Wahid’s camp also depended on Wahid as a figure. In the Semarang MLB, that legitimised the existence of PKB Gus Dur/Muhaimin, for instance, the protection of Wahid’s interest was clearly expressed by his loyalists. On that occasion, they strictly protected crucial agendas, namely to elect Iskandar as the new leader of the Dewan Tanfidz and to preserve the position of Wahid in the Dewan Syura. Any attempts to challenge Wahid were stopped from the beginning by not allowing the MLB to hold a fair election. Even Wahid was elected by acclamation in the section that should only be a forum for delegates to respond to the DPP’s five-term report. Also in the Semarang MLB forum, Shihab, as the member of the party and according to many, was still the real leader of the party but not allowed by the committee to enter the forum. These situations outraged and disappointed several Chairpersons of Dewan Tanfidz who were also senior figures of the party, including Prof. M. Mahfud MD and Parawansa who eventually preferred to leave the party.

From above situation, it can be understood, if in the conflict situation, where each conflicting group needed to have support, the elites in each group focused their activities on establishing close relations with the patrons, rather than to put forward party idealism based on the shared values. It indicates the low position of shared values before the party member.

Furthermore, this situation also showed that each ulama or group of ulama had their own political calculations and interests, which were not only diverse but also not easily united. The independence of ulama in making their own policies was intact even when they joined the party. Their privilege continued and even determined the situation in the party. It showed the inability of the party to equalise the rights of each


\[953\] DPW PKB Jawa Timur, Data dan Fakta Pelanggaran AD/ART di Muktamar II Semarang, p. 9.

member in following the rules or the code of conduct and to harmonise them into one direction. This situation raised critics on ulama who had joined political activities and had greatly dedicated their life to power relationships. They were accused of sharpening internal conflicts in PKB’s and NU’s communities. However, the main problem actually was not necessarily their political activities, but the absence of the role of the shared values and the code of conduct that could control their behaviour and treatment towards the santri and their ulama fellows.

In addition, the presence of Mukhtamar or MLB, supported by the ulama and their santri, became an indication of the existence of internal fragmentation. This forum accommodated the agenda to develop and protect the interest of each group, crystallised their existence and was a medium to attack other groups. In such a forum, each conflicting group claimed to be a legitimate party that represented the real PKB. In short, the establishment of MLB that was supported by the instrumentalist grouping was a medium that decreased the cohesion of the party.

4.3. The Conflict Continuation and the Trial of Commitment

PKB’s cadres’ attitude after the MLB also showed the absence of commitment to the shared values. They preferred to use the third party, namely the court, as an external element to be an arbiter to decide the future of the party, rather than using their own tradition or method to solve the problems. This indicated the absence of the spirit of self-maintenance as, according to Selznick, is one of the important pieces of evidence of the existence of “value infusion”.

Both the non-Wahid groups and the Wahid camp wanted their opponent dissolved formally by the court, as the main prerequisite to there being any possibility of holding the next steps to peace. It showed that the main spirit of this action was not to restore the unity of the party through a win-win solution approach, but to discredit the other groups and strengthen each group’s position. After the court had reached its decision, no significant actions proved that there was a spirit of reconciliation. Each conflicting group remained a separate group with its own beliefs.

---


and agendas. Each non-Wahid group and most of its followers, for instance, never acknowledged their “mistake” or the legalisation of Wahid group. They preferred to establish their own parties. On the other hand, the Wahid group never had any sincere intention to invite the “disloyal” cadres to return to the party, let alone acknowledge their existence. In addition, to strengthen its position, each conflicting group was willing to dismiss the cadres who had different points of view and being supporters of the other groups.

After the third party decided which group should be in charge in the party, the other camp eventually committed to creating new parties. Matori, for instance, eventually preferred to build a new party, namely the PKD, prior to the 2004 Election. This party was mainly set up to accommodate and establish more democratic values and nationalism. Shihab and the Kyai Langitan Forum also took similar action. They established the PKNU in 2006, which one of the aims was to establish the true party of the Aswajan people.

Some important cadres, on the other hand, took a different direction. They preferred to join other parties to establish their interest, most of them after the conflict. These included M.A.S Hikam (former Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz, who joined the Hanura Party in 2008), Wiranu (former Vice General Secretary of Dewan Tanfidz, who joined the PD in 2008) and Rieke Dyah Pitaloka (former Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz, who joined the PDIP in 2007), to name just a few.

According to Steven Levitsky, an institutionalised party was a party that could maintain and preserve its existence during difficult situations. “Value infusion” had encouraged the cadres to commit and dedicate their life to the continuity of the life of the party. Using Partido Justicialista (Justice Party/PJ), founded in 1947 by Juan Peron, as the case study, he observed that even when Peron has passed away, the party still existed and became an important party in Argentina although several internal adjustments could not be avoided. The commitment of the cadres was still high as so was the spirit to save the life of the party. In this case, the party was “valued for itself by its members”957.

The case of PKB, however, showed a different situation. Its own cadres had fragmented the party three times during its first decade of existence and created four parties, where two of them used a different name and represented quite different values. The establishment of new parties in the short period and exit actions that were conducted by some important cadres, had indicated the failure of value infusion since the commitment to preserve party continuity was very low.

5. Overview

PKB most likely could have avoided fragmentation if the party had properly developed and simplified its shared values. These situations almost would certainly have provided a facilitative environment for the development of the cadres’ respect towards their own shared values, ideology and ideals that had been developed by the party, rather than to the interests of factions led by charismatic figures with their exclusive objectives. The case of PKB showed that the absence of those conditions eventually decreased the sense of togetherness and provoked factionalism. It then pushed the party into a delicate situation where the cadres felt that there were almost no barriers to their political behaviour, including a factor that would endanger the unity of the party. The evidence surveyed above illustrates the correlation between the failure to develop commitment to shared values, which in this case was the ideology, as one indicator of institutionalisation, and party fragmentation.
Chapter XII
The Commitment to Shared Values:
The Case of PKS

“The Islamic values that become ideology are guidance or code of conduct in building relationships and interactions…the way of PKS cadre talks and thinks about Islam in Depok (West Java), in Aceh, in Irian (Papua) is more or less the same”. (Amri Yusra)958.

1. Introduction

This chapter explores the commitment towards shared values and the maintenance of value infusion in PKS, whose case will be shown to be qualitatively different from that of PKB. In the case of PKS, “the commitment to hold and spread dakwah” became a fundamental shared value, which not only became an identity for the members, but also a focal characteristic that created sentiment, commitment, a guide to behaviour and the thinking of the cadres. The party transformed this shared value through a standardized mechanism, which eventually was able to protect and maintain the unity of understanding of dakwah among the cadres.

This chapter thus covers three topics of discussion, paralleling that in the previous chapter. The first, I examined the essence of dakwah as the party’s main shared value and the situation of shared value maintenance in PKS. The second discusses the situation of shared value commitment in this party and the level of “value infusion”. The third discusses the ability to hinder fragmentation as the result of the above conditions.

2. The Existence of Shared Values

2.1. The Dakwah Struggle as a Central Value

958 Interview with Amri Yusra, M.Si, Chairperson of Depok DPD of PKS (2002-2004), Member of Parliament of Depok District, West Java, (2004-2009), and Lecturer at Political Sciences Department, Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010
Since the beginning of its existence, PKS has consistently declared itself as a *Partai Dakwah* (the *Dakwah Party*) \(^{959}\) that believed in and implemented the struggle for the *dakwah* as a central value in the movement and life of the party and its cadres. It believed that the existence of the party was part of *dakwah* efforts\(^ {960}\). The preamble of the party’s constitution stated that the party was created to carry out *dakwah* messages\(^ {961}\).

The main aim of *dakwah* is to create a civilization built on the spirit of respecting morality, rules of law and people sovereignty, in which the people plays a salient role in establishing and controlling the government. According to Anis Matta, Islamic civilization is a part of *dakwah*’s mission that in essence is “…to reconstruct the thinking and personality of Muslims, to be able to think, feel and act in line with the wishes of God and based on Islamic references. Then to bring these new Muslims, with their new awareness, back to reality in order to make the transformation in every aspect of life – including culture, social system, laws and institutions – to be based on the will of God.” \(^ {962}\)

To meet such conditions, PKS developed several fundamental values that were projected and to be held by the party and the cadres. The first main value was the belief that the main aim of their existence was to be a tool of *dakwah*, seeking for God’s will (*ridha Allah*) or desire. In the spirit of being “a tool of *dakwah*” private or individual interests became something that must be avoided. Conversely, all activities undertaken by the party and the cadres should be a medium to maintain *dakwah* and the development of Islamic values. The logical implication in this situation was that the cadres should be willing to leave private ambition aside for the establishment of more important matters, namely God’s will\(^ {963}\). The inclination to seek merely God’s

---


\(^ {961}\) *The Muqadimmah of The 2005 AD of PKS.*


\(^ {963}\) Interview with Amri Yusra, M.Si, Chairperson of the Depok DPD of PKS (2002-2004), Member of Parliament of the Depok District, West Java, (2004-2009), and Lecturer at Political Sciences Department, Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010; with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II *Dakwah* Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of the BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010; with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of the Tangerang District (2005-2010), in Tangerang, 21 October 2010; with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and *Tarbiyah* Movement observer, Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political...
will became a foremost objective of the party, which eventually developed the sense of militancy among the cadres and some of the cadres even named themselves as “jundi” (the soldier).

Most cadres regarded themselves as part of an institution that had a strong commitment to hold such religious aims. “To make the objectives of dakwah come into being as the main interest” was a “common language” collectively understood by the cadres. Although in its development a small number of cadres had failed to follow this obligation, for instance by leading a worldly life style, in general, such failures did not erase the spirit to hold such commitment. It created solidity in a sense that the cadres were willing to stick together as a group holding a similar spirit. According to Kemal Stamboel, this tendency had made the party relatively clean from exclusive motives, including external interventions that could potentially destroy the very characteristics of the party964.

Moreover, as a dakwah group that believed in politics to meet its objective, PKS endorses teachings that stressed the importance of holding the spirit of togetherness or berjamaah (to gather together), as part of preserving ukhuwah (brotherhood), to reach their ideals. For PKS cadres, it was a major prerequisite or a foundation for the success of the struggle to maintain Islamic values. The party’s official documents stated that the jamaah had a special position in PKS for its role as a uniting element of the ummat, where the absence of this value would be the main cause of any setback to the establishment of Islamic interests965. For PKS, dakwah was something to be conducted in the spirit of berjamaah966.

The party’s document also mentioned that some of the Islamic teachings reminding the Muslims of the correlation between the weak condition of jamaah (group) and the emergence of internal friction that could led to a drawback situation967. Mahfudz Siddiq stated that PKS underlined the value that: “It is

964 Interview with Kemal A. Stamboel, Head of Expert Advisory Body of PKS, Member of Parliament (2009-2014), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010.
967 Balda, Ridho, Wahono, Politik Da’wah Partai Keadilan, p. 29.
impossible to enact Islam and truth in society if it is conducted outside the *jamaah* without having any organisation"968. Furthermore, the cadres also believed that only through a solid group that the benefit or “God’s blessing” for being part of the struggle for the establishment of Islamic values would exist969. In this regard, the spirit of togetherness and brotherhood became other derivative values that were developed by the party and infused into the cadres.

Under the ideal of being a “tool of *dakwah*”, the spirit of *ta’at* (obedience) towards *qiyadah* (the leaders) also appeared. PKS regarded obedience as always existing in *dakwah*970. PKS also believed that only the existence of perfect obedience, any *dakwah* goals could be reached. In this regard, the decisions made by the elites became a kind of *fatwa* (religious command) that must be implemented by all of the cadres. Such obedience became an important pillar that nuanced the very relation between leaders or elites and the cadres or ordinary members. The cadres at a higher level, the level of obedience to the leader was more demanding as part of a more total commitment that they should undertake for the party971. It created a type of obedience, which at the practical level helped the party to mobilize its cadres easily when fulfilling any duties and obligations. It was also the main reason behind PKS' ability to make several important adjustments as a response to the current political situations.

The obedience attitude took its foundation literally from the Al-Qur’an (4:59), stating that: “Obey the God, and obey the Messenger of God, and those of you who are in authority...”.972 The last term was translated by PKS together with other leaders of the party. To strengthen cadres’ understanding of the importance of obeying the leader the party also propagated readings and training materials for cadres under the topic “*Qiyadah wal Jundiyah*” (the leader and the soldier/the follower).

---

968 Interview with Mahfudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010.

969 Interview with Nooryanto, Chair of Cadrerization Department of Bekasi DPD of PKS, in Bekasi, 7 November 2010.


971 *Ibid*, p. 117.

972 Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and the *Tarbiyah* Movement observer, Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the cadres who signed the PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010.
However, the obedience tradition developed in the party was not a sort of “blind obedience”; it was only relevant to the extent that it followed the rules of the game973. A leader of this concept could effectively dictate and be obeyed by the cadres if he had a strong commitment to maintain the constitution of the party. In this regard, the order to follow and obey the leader should be complied with as far as the leaders' policies did not relate to negative deeds. As mentioned by Mushthafa Masyhur, “the obedience towards Amir (the leader) and his leadership for subjects that were not of maksiyat (unfaithfulness) could be regarded as being a similar obedience to God”974. Thus, obedience could not be used as a foundation for establishing blind obedience to a figure. Hence, obedience in PKS was essentially not a one-way and blind commitment but two-way and with conditions975.

On the other hand, PKS believed that the core of dakwah required a gradual process and moderate approach, which dakwah activists and institutions could not neglect or underestimate the context where dakwah was developed976. Moderatism became an important concept in PKS' dakwah. This attitude to some extent also differentiated this party from other new Islamic movements in Indonesia, which tended to be excessive in conducting dakwah by suggesting for instance, the immediate implementation of Islamic Syariah and ignored if the people were ready977.

973 Interview with Untung Wahono, Head of PK, Department of Research and Development of the DPP of the PK (2000-2003), Head of Department of Politics and Defence of DPP of PKS (2002-2005), and Chairperson of MPP of PKS (2010-2015), in Jakarta 27 October 2010; with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of the PK DPP (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010; with Aus Hidayat Nur and Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010; with Sigit Sosiantomo, PKS Regional Coordinator for East Java and Bali (2005-2009), in Jakarta, 25 October 2010; with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, Head of the III Dakwah Region (2002-2005), member of Majelis Syuro PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 2010; with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer, Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the cadres who signed the PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010; with Mustofa, PKS cadre and former reporter of Profetik Magazine, established by PKS cadres in Depok, 7 October 2010.


975 Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of the PK DPP (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010.


One of the reflections of these values was the tendency to avoid direct discussions on delicate issues such as the state ideology or matters related to the relation between religion and the state. PKS preferred to be more active in discussing and being involved in “practical” matters, such as fighting corruption and increasing the people’s prosperity through social and humanitarian programmes or helping civil society flourish. For PKS, the Muslims would demand that Islam be implemented more comprehensively including at state’ ideological level, if they had already seen the greatness of Islam at the practical level. Many scholars had portrayed this commitment as one of the important characteristics or identities of this party in Indonesian contemporary political life, which became one of the main characteristics of PKS in conducting its political attitude, actions and policies.

From the discussion above, it can be seen that *dakwah* as the main shared value had many important derivative values, such as being a tool of God, living in a group or collectivism, obedience and moderateness. Many of these values, as can be seen in the following section, were relevant to some aspects in the life of the party, in terms of both external affairs and for the most part at the internal level.

2. 2. *Shared Values Maintenance*

In order to preserve its shared values, *halaqah* became one of the important media for shared value infusion in PKS. On this occasion, the shared values were introduced and developed on a continuous basis for the cadres under the supervision of *murabbi* playing the role of an ideology apparatus. Attended only by between 5-12 cadres, the ideology transformation process tended to be effective in which the cadres had more time to discuss many issues related to ideology. This process, as being part of *halaqah*, was normatively implemented for it to be continuously

---


309
conducted by the cadres. Although cadres had held important public positions, such as members of parliament, governors, ministers, or the highest positions in the party, including the General Chairperson of MS.\footnote{Interview with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010.}

To support the quality of this value infusion activity, the party standardized and systemised the materials used in the halaqah. Materials that discussed topics on obedience, mainly under the theme of Qiyadah wal Jundiyah; the importance of togetherness and the politics of the dakwah, for instance, were subjects that must be understood by all cadres as well as other topics such as ahlaq (manner), aqidah (belief). For this reason, PKS had published several books that discussed the halaqah, both to inform ordinary people on the essence of this process and to give guidance on the process and topics, including materials that should be discussed in this process by all the cadres.\footnote{Tim Departemen Kaderisasi DPP PK Sejahtera, Manajemen Tarbiyah Anggota Pemula, (Jakarta: DPP PK Sejahtera and PT Syaamil Cipta Media, 2004). Tim Departemen Kaderisasi PKS, Profil Kader Partai Keadilan Sejahtera. H. Hilmi Aminuddin, Strategi Dakwah Gerakan Islam, Serial Fiquh Da’wah, (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 2003). Departemen Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Manhaj Kaderisasi Anggota Partai Keadilan, unpublished, (Jakarta: Departemen Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Jakarta, 2004). DPP Partai Keadilan, Risalah Am Jumahiri 1423, Seri Dokumentasi Partai, (Jakarta: DPP Partai Keadilan). Ahmad Satori, (et.al). Taujihat R’ayah Ma’nawiyah Kader PK Sejahtera, (Jakarta: Departemen Kaderisasi DPP Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, 2003). Tim Bidang PSDM PK Sejahtera, Mobilitas Kader Da’wah: Arah Kebijakan Da’wah dalam Pemberdayaan Sumber Daya Manusia, unpublished, (Jakarta: DPP Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Jakarta, 2003). Tim Kerja Penyusunan Kurikulum, Satuan Acara Pembelajaran Tarbiyah Islamiyah: Buku 1, unpublished. Tim Kerja Penyusunan Kurikulum, Satuan Acara Pembelajaran Tarbiyah Islamiyah: Buku 2, unpublished. Tim Kerja Penyusunan Kurikulum, Satuan Acara Pembelajaran Tarbiyah Islamiyah: Buku 3, unpublished.}

The party also held some additional activities in this process, mainly religious propagation, conducted monthly, six monthly and yearly, where the topics were to recall and strengthen the shared values and maintain the spirit of unity.\footnote{Interview with Nooryanto, Chair of Cadreerization Department of Bekasi DPD of PKS, in Bekasi, 7 November 2010.} The party also conducted an evaluation of the cadres.\footnote{Interview with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010. In some areas this process became very hard, like in Bekasi one of important pouches for PKS. In that area, the local committee tightly controlled the quality of the cadres in religious activities, including memorizing Al-Quran and the commitment to join the party’s political activities, triggered the cadres to be more focussed on their moral obligations and duties as a party member. Interview with Nooryanto, the Chair of Cadreerization Department of Bekasi DPD of PKS, in Bekasi, 7 November 2010.} The results of evaluation were then reported regularly by murabbi to the Cadre Development Body (BPK) as a formal
institution in the party that handled and supervised *halaqah*. The party used the report as one of the references in evaluating and determining the future of the cadres.

Furthermore, in order to enhance the commitment of the cadres to the shared values, the party also set up BPDO. As the body in charge of disciplinary matters, BPDO also had a role as the main instrument to control the commitment of the cadres to implement the party’s mission including the shared value. This body would play a role in evaluating a cadre who had been accused by other cadres or by the party to be less committed to consistently performing the shared values when performing his duty. BPDO maintained usually that the problems related to this inconsistency following *halaqah*’s activities were generally the main reason behind being committed to contradict the party’s values. It inferred BPDO’s acknowledgement of the significant role of value infusion through *halaqah* in preserving consistency and developing the behaviour of the cadres.

The above situation indicates that the process for maintaining shared values was not something that out of direction. PKS had centralised this process quite systematically through *halaqah*’s networking to guarantee the unity of the process. For the critical elements, *halaqah* had strictly brought about uniformity of all the cadres and eventually had effectively suppressed their freedom to act and think thus decreasing the spirit of democracy in this party. As mentioned by Masdar Hilmy “the lack of autonomy among PKS activists is to a large degree inspired also by the cell system (*usroh*) inherited from the *tarbiyah* method, which relies heavily on collective action". 

This situation to some extent, however, indicated the effectiveness of value maintenance in PKS where the party could considerably ensure the transformation of the shared values in the party to all cadres. In his research on the behaviour of seven large political parties in contemporary Indonesia, Ignas Kleden concluded that PKS was one of the parties in Indonesia that had successfully developed its value

---


This situation, according to Randall, indicated the presence of institutionalisation where the party could create “its own value system or culture”.

3. **Internal Situation: The Existence of Collective Commitment**

In PKS, the commitment towards shared values was reflected in two main areas. The first, shared values were used as the main guidance for the party’s daily activities. The important point in this situation was the development to promote party idealism in many aspects of the party’s life and its relation to the members. The second was the spirit to maintain the spirit of *berjamaah*, which encouraged the members to value the unity of the party. The following section will discuss those important aspects, involving the ideal characteristics of the impact of the presence of shared value infusion in a party, as a reflection of the collective commitment.

3.1. **The Party as ‘Receptacle’ of Group Idealism**

According to Selznick, one of the indications of an institutionalised party was when the institution became “the receptacle of group idealism”\(^987\). PKS to some extent met this situation. The implementation of shared value infusion in the party had fairly maintained the commitment to its ideology.

The realisation of the commitment to *dakwah* as a shared value in PKS existed in the party’s platform that, in general, indicated the commitment of the party to *dakwah*. PKS understood its platform “as a set of values, hope and conceptual objectives derived from the result of interaction and internalisation between *dakwah* institution and its long history and experience in the life of the nation. With the platform, each cadre as a *da’i* (Islamic preacher) could understand the movement, attitude and direction of *dakwah* institution”\(^988\).

According to Hilmi Aminuddin, the platform was a document that united and guided all *dakwah* activities, in which *dakwah* itself should eventually nuance the life

---


of the society and the state. Suharna Surapranata, one of Jamaah Tarbiyah senior cadres, said for PKS the platform of the party, which played a role as guidance for the policy-making process and a code of conduct for cadres, reflected the very characteristic of Dakwah Party not only focusing on the power struggle and related matters but also on the development of community and civilization. In this regard, the platform was a set of obligations that should be implemented by the cadres, where the interest was to develop Islamic values and the quality of dakwah became the focal point in it.

The commitment to dakwah can also be seen in sumpah kader (the cadre’s oath), which obliged loyalty to dakwah’s values and willingness to establish Islamic values. According to Ahmad Yusuf, there are at least three important points in the cadres’ oath: (1) to establish Islamic syariah, (2) to consistently fulfil the obligations as a member of the party, including obeying and being loyal to the leaders, and (3) to implement the objectives of dakwah. In this regard, the level of understanding and commitment of the shared values became one of the indicators that determined the position of a cadre in the party. The "seniority" or the acknowledgement of the cadre’s ideology’ maturity was determined mostly by his commitment and understanding of the party’s ideology. For the cadres, this situation was something normal and acceptable. They acknowledged that as a party that was driven by ideological motivation, the quality of understanding of the ideology had to be a parameter for decisions and this including the future of the cadres.

In such circumstance, cadres considered the members of MS, the highest institution in the party, as the best cadres in PKS. The internal election to fill the membership of MS then tended to be merely a “formal acknowledgement” of their commitment to the ideology and the party. In reality, since cadres, who were eligible to vote, were reasonably well informed and had an opportunity to assess the

---

989 Ibid, p. iii
990 Ibid, p. xiii.
991 The 2005 ART of PKS Article 6.
992 Interview with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, Head of the III Dakwah Region (2002-2005), member of Majelis Syuro PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 2010.
993 Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer, Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the cadres who signed the PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010; with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010.
candidates for the membership of MS, only the best cadres in each province across the country had the potential to be elected\textsuperscript{994}.

Moreover, the consciousness to seek God’s will, as part of the ideological commitment developed a spirit of avoiding self-interest. In this case, the political orientation and calculation of the cadres were dedicated to the glory of the party as a tool for \textit{dakwah}\textsuperscript{995}. In relation to this, the spirit of sincerity became a working ethos in the party. The importance of sincerity is exemplified in this extract of a speech made to the cadres by Sembiring: “The enjoyment of being a party cadre will not exist without loyalty, the enjoyment of loyalty will not exist without obedience, the enjoyment of obedience will not exist without sacrifice and the enjoyment of sacrifice will not exist without \textit{keikhlasan} (sincerity)”.\textsuperscript{996} In this regard, the party also kept reminding the cadres to be sincere and patient in the struggle and to see it as part of the attempts to find God’s will\textsuperscript{997}.

For this reason, even discussing matters related to important positions outside the relevant forums tended to be a taboo in PKS\textsuperscript{998}. When the party noticed that a cadre was very ambitious to hold a position, it would be contra-productive for his career development in PKS\textsuperscript{999}. This situation also encouraged the cadres to avoid having any discussions on their position in the party. In fact, the attitude to support someone else rather than to promote himself to hold important positions in the party became a tradition in the party. For many cadres, holding a position as a supporting

\textsuperscript{994} Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and \textit{Tarbiyah} Movement observer, Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the cadres who signed the PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010

\textsuperscript{995} Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II \textit{Dakwah} Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010; with Musa Abdillah, the Chairperson of Cadreization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010; with Dr. Kamarudin, Indonesian Islamic political party expert and Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010.


\textsuperscript{997} Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II \textit{Dakwah} Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{998} Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of \textit{Dakwah} Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{999} Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of \textit{Dakwah} Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010.
element in the party was more enjoyable and preferable rather than to be someone who led or held a key position in the party.1000

In some cases, the party also took a pragmatic approach, for instance, by providing some allowances to temporarily support the life of very needy cadres or by supporting the cadres’ business through financial aid so that the cadres could attain a minimum standard of living.1001 However, it was conducted very strictly and was limited. In general, the party wanted to develop an ideological relationship between the elites and the cadres, where the ideology became a common language and interest.

Sometimes the party gave the background of a case and its political strategy to explain the rationale behind the decision. However, the party’s answers would only satisfy cadres if they did not see a difference between the normative (ideological) aspects and the facts (the implementation of the ideology).1002 When the cadres viewed the party’s policies to be removed from the party’s ideal, they would eagerly ask the party mainly through murabbi to explain the reasons. In some cases, many cadres asked the party elites directly when they had a chance to meet them.1003 In facing critics from the cadres, the party implemented an ideological approach in response. In this regard, the party would commonly convey the “message” “for the sake of dakwah interest and the continuity of the implementation of Islamic values” as a base to the answer or response to the cadres.

Although it seemed naïve to entirely believe that an ideological commitment was the only factor that motivated the elites or party to act, in the case of PKS, the party could not deviate from its ideology when establishing political movement or making any policies. The party eventually had to be able to always provide “rationalisation” for its policies, which was basically a set of ideological

1000 Almost all interviewees indicated this attitude. The writer also sensed this attitude when attending and observing a local annual meeting to select a new leader at the occasion of “Musyawarah Daerah III DPD PKS Depok” (“the III Local Meeting of Depok DPD of PKS”), in Sawangan, Depok, West Java 28 November 2010.

1001 Interview with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-2010), in Tangerang, 21 October 2010.


1003 Personal experience when attending the PKS’ cadres meeting after the government reduced the oil subsidy in 2005.
considerations\textsuperscript{1004}, to legalise or back up any decisions taken by the party. According to Prihandoko, by having such a background, the situation would be very contra-productive for the development of trust in the party if the party failed to do so\textsuperscript{1005}. As long as the rationalisation was logical and still in line with the party’s idealism in the cadres’ perspective, they would sincerely obey and implement it. The party members’ consciousness to be merely a tool of \textit{dakwah} had relatively been able to obstruct the escalation of exclusive interests. It made their political opinions and movements or even objections not motivated by pragmatism, but were still in the corridor of \textit{dakwah}. This situation made pragmatic or self-seeking behaviour become difficult to develop in this party.

In addition, the above conditions indicated that the relation between the party and the cadres had transcended from material things where the ideology or shared values became the main motivation of the cadres to join and remain in the party, which according to Randall, Svasand and Surbakti indicated the dimension of the party’s institutionalisation. The above commitment, to some extent, also indicated the position of the party for the cadres as an institution that was more than a mere tool for filling a set of handed duties, but as a part of their personal life. Hence, the party became something more than an expandable tool.

However, in line with the growth of the party, new phenomena appeared in the party. Some of the cadres tended to be more expressive in conveying their opinions and including criticising the leaders. A cadre even had the courage to criticize severely through newspapers on the way the leader dealt with national issues that sometimes confused and discouraged the cadres at grass roots level\textsuperscript{1006}. In the past this attitude was something unusual. Some of the cadres tended also to be less committed to follow the instructions of the leaders. Making excuses, they tended to avoid some of their duties. In one of the areas in East Jakarta, it triggered the local party committee to renew the commitment by submitting a form of

\textsuperscript{1004} Interview with Sigit Sosiantomo, Regional Coordinator for East Java and Bali of PKS (2005-2009), in Jakarta, 25 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{1005} Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{1006} Sapto Waluyo was one of the cadres who criticized the political behaviour of the party leaders that sometimes confused the members by providing different opinions about some sensitive cases, including establishing a coalition with President Yudhoyono prior to 2009 Presidential Election. See his opinion in Sapto Waluyo, “Komunikasi Politik PKS”, in \textit{Republika} 1 May 2009.
declaration that had be signed by the cadres to ensure that they were still willing to join and follow the instruction of the party\textsuperscript{1007}.

Some people believed that such a “disobedience phenomenon” was related mainly to the effects of boredom after years of belonging to political activities. Others believed that this phenomenon was a result of uninspiring murabbi who eventually discouraged the cadres from maintaining their commitment to the party\textsuperscript{1008}. For some, it was the result of the lack of commitment to being consistently active in halaqah\textsuperscript{1009}. Although this phenomenon did not shake the existence of the party and occurred in a very small proportion, during its development PKS did face several difficulties in controlling the cadres. However, besides these negative aspects, the party in general was capable of building the spirit of anti-pragmatism and the idealism to hold shared values that protected the party from self-seeking behaviour and exclusive orientations. This internal situation became an important capital for the development of the party’s cohesion.

3.2. The Emergence of the Spirit of Collectivism

Another situation that occurred in PKS was the emergence of the consciousness to strengthen the corps and to believe that only through berjamaah could any ideals and some added values be reached. The consciousness of berjamaah demanded that the cadres sacrifice their self-interests and put forward the party’s interests. The spirit of scarification was reflected, for instance, by joining party activities in a difficult situation\textsuperscript{1010}, giving financial assistance to the party’s activities\textsuperscript{1011} and even their life.

\textsuperscript{1007} Interview with Umar Salim Basalamah, Vice General Secretary of PKS (2002), and personal secretary of Hidayat Nur Wahid (former President of PKS and Chairperson of MPR of Republic of Indonesia), in Jakarta, 12 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{1008} Interview with Akmal Burhanuddin, former tarbiyah activist and student in Egypt who joined the PKS after finishing his study, in Jakarta, 24 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{1009} Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{1010} Solikhin Abu Izzudin, Quantum Tarbiyah, (Solo: Bina Insani, 2006). Interview with Kemal A. Stamboel, Head of Expert Advisory Body of PKS and Member of Parliament (2009-2014), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{1011} Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer, Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the cadres who signed the PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010; with Kemal A. Stamboel, Head of Expert Advisory Body of PKS and Member of Parliament (2009-2014), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010.
in helping the party to hold some important activities\textsuperscript{1012}. In Aceh, for instance, a pregnant cadre was willing to join party’s activities in a neighbouring village around 70 Km from her home by going there alone on her motorcycle\textsuperscript{1013}. In such a situation, self-seeking behaviour tended to become something irrelevant in this party. In general, the cadres regarded themselves and their fellows as the tool of dakwah struggle, which then encouraged them to put forward the interest of the party above their personal interest.

The spirit to put forward the interest and the existence of jamaah also encouraged the cadres to do their best to bring something that jamaah would be proud of, which means glorifying the name of the party. Sitaresmi explained that the cadres would feel good inside if they could contribute to the grandeur of the party through the achievements that they had gained\textsuperscript{1014}. She described, for instance, the success in the academic world would also be dedicated to the party in the hope that such an achievement would increase the prestige of the party before the people. She emphasised that the thing that made the cadres feel at home was due to the spirit to preserve the sense of togetherness, where pride was felt by all and all the goodness was enjoyed collectively\textsuperscript{1015}.

On the contrary, the cadres would be disappointed and regret it if they troubled or destroyed the positive image of the party. In some cases a cadre preferred to leave the party after committing something inappropriate, such as attending a massage club\textsuperscript{1016} that, according to that cadre, would potentially have provided a bad image for the party, although the party had not yet decided on his future\textsuperscript{1017}. In the Jambi Province, Zulhalmi Al Hamidi, a cadre, preferred to leave the party after the press mentioned him as one of several people who attended panti pijat (massage clinic). Although it was not a crime, in fact the main reason for him to go to

\textsuperscript{1012} Interview with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-2010), in Tangerang, 21 October 2010.


\textsuperscript{1014} Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{1015} Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010.

\textsuperscript{1016} “Kader PKS Jambi Tertangkap di Panti Pijat”, www.antaranews.com

\textsuperscript{1017} Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010.
such a place was due to his illness, the existence of a negative sense towards the massage clinic, as a place sometimes used to cover illegal prostitution, pushed that cadre to leave the party to save the party’s face\textsuperscript{1018}. The party accepted his decision, even though \textit{panti pijat} visited by him was actually legal and nothing to do with prostitution\textsuperscript{1019}. These kinds of attitude only became possible if the cadres had a deep sense of belonging to the party or what Huntington said as “valued for itself”, that also indicated the presence of party institutionalisation\textsuperscript{1020}. For many of cadres, being part of the party provided a kind of religious satisfaction, mainly in the belief that they worked for the institution, which had a strong commitment to struggle for Islamic interests.

Another point was the willingness to sacrifice or put aside personal opinion when facing the party or leaders’ rationalities or opinions. The party developed this attitude at the level where the cadres were deeply consciousness of considering that their opinions were not sufficiently comprehensive compared to the thoughts of the leaders. Hence, it was common in PKS if the cadres were eventually willing to follow the vision of the leaders since their vision was beyond comparison. If they still saw some worth in their opinion, they tended to keep it to themselves and kept it personal. Most of the party members were not interested in conveying this to the other cadres, mainly in order to maintain the party’s unity. Some cadres might \textit{ngedumel} (grumble silently), but they were still willing to implement the decisions of the party. The statement from Sumiyanto, a party cadre, represented this situation: “I am disappointed, but as a cadre I have to obey the decision”\textsuperscript{1021}.

This value of colegialism also provided an impact on the decision-making process, in which any decisions made were the result of the consultation process and not a result of a personal or unilateral decision. \textit{Musyawarah} or consultation was a main mechanism in the party that reflected the spirit of \textit{berjamaah}. In \textit{musyawarah}, every problem was discussed together or collegially, where members of the decision-making forums had equal rights. In these forums, the cadres were motivated to be

\textsuperscript{1018} http://www.inilah.com/read/detail/81234/anggota-dprd-pks-pijat-mundur/

\textsuperscript{1019} Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of \textit{Dakwah} Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010


able to convince other members by having clear arguments and not putting forward other matters such as seniority, physical force or money, in order to have their argument accepted. In the light of such a spirit, the existence of respected figures that usually held the position as the chair of the forum, did not hamper the right of the other members including junior cadres, to speak on behalf of their ideas1022.

Moreover, the spirit to hold jamaah created the sense of a permanent dependence to be always in the group and eventually enhanced the spirit of collectivism as one community, united as holding similar beliefs. This situation also became the foundation for the spirit of sharing and understanding each other. The relation between the cadres became more than merely as professionals holding the objectives of the institution but tended to be members of a family. It indicates the institutionalisation situation described by Selznick where the party became a tool of personal satisfaction1023. In this circumstance, the party could relatively maintain the culture of consultation as a consequence, which enhanced the process to hold a common identity. It also supported the conflict resolution process since every cadre had a chance to convey his arguments and be treated as a brother rather than as an enemy.

However, this situation did not affect all cadres in the same way. Some cadres preferred to step aside from the jamaah and became merely a supporter of the party, since they regarded themselves as not being suitable in the political domain and activities1024. Some disappointed cadres even decided to entirely leave the party, where some of them even became very critical about the party1025. A part from this situation, since the party generally had became a medium for personal satisfaction and collective idealism for most part of cadres, internal factionalisation tended to have some difficulty in emerging. On the other hand, it preserved the spirit

1022 Interview with Sigit Sosiantomo, Regional Coordinator for East Java and Bali of PKS (2005-2009), in Jakarta, 25 October 2010; with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer, Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the cadres who signed the PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010; with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, Head of the III Dakwah Region (2002-2005), member of Majelis Syuro PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 2010.


1024 Interview with Noviyanti Utaminingsing, cadre of the PKS, in Jakarta, 9 October 2010.

1025 Interview with Hurriyah MA, cadrerization of PKS observer and Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 29 October 2010.
of togetherness, which supported the preservation of party cohesion. The following chapter discusses the effects of the above situation.

4. Preserving Internal Cohesion

The presence of a collective commitment to the shared values provided two advantageous dimensions for the preservation of party cohesion. The first was that the party became the tool of idealism for the cadres. There were still some weaknesses but the cadres believed that they were in the right political vehicle to reach their main goal of *dakwah*, namely to carry out the spirit of *dakwah*. Moreover, since the ideology or shared values played a real parameter in guiding the thinking and behaviour of the cadres, the existence of people who offered alternative ideologies, let alone materials advantages, would not easily attract the cadres to develop faction or camps inside the party. It also protected the party from the presence of figures who could easily take over the process of understanding and interpreting the ideology or the leadership of the party in the name of improving the party’s situation. This condition eventually made the creation of alternative camps or parties within PKS not an easy one.

The second was the commitment to the unity of the party that encouraged the cadres to promote party harmony rather than personal ambition. The commitment to the unity of the party created the belief of the importance of being part of one group. This commitment became the reason for many of PKS’ cadres to remain in the group or at least avoid doing something that could be harmful to the unity of the party as the medium to struggle for *dakwah*. The existence of such a commitment prevented the cadres from also taking careless abrupt decisions or forming sudden conclusions when responding to delicate situations inside the party. In most cases, as long as the cadres did not see any evidence showing the real violation of the shared values or ideology, they would see it as something acceptable.

In some sensitive cases, where there was the potential for fragmentation inside the party, it could avoid prolonged conflict. Since the party had quite successfully built and preserved its shared values, potential conflict would hardly be relevant in the domain of the policy-making process and not as something that essentially related to the fundamental matters such as party ideology. PKS and its cadres then regarded the strategic matters as *furu‘* (a branch problem). Mardani Ali Sera associated this situation with “choosing the best vehicle after agreeing the place
to go”1026. In this situation, the cadres valued conflict as part of a consequence emanating from the efforts to find the best way to implement party ideology. The cadres also believed that the main motivation of the “conflicting cadres” was for the glory of the party. Under this circumstance, any differences existing mainly at the technical or strategic level were not crucial to party’s cohesion. The situation became easier since it was supported by the willingness to maintain the unity of the party by obeying the decisions of the leaders.

In the 2004 election, there were differences in the perspectives used by each group in assessing the presidential candidates and the future of dakwah movement. To the Rais proponents in the PKS, the figure of Rais was strategic for his position as the leader of the Reformasi movement and as an Islamic modernist figure. Thus, a combination of a leader of reformers and Islamic communities was perfect in that it would attract many people who were committed to reform and many Muslim communities. As the religious leader, Rais would provide a significant opportunity and access for PKS to enhance its dakwah movement as a concession to its support1027.

However, for the supporters of Wiranto, they considered that Rais was only popular with the modernists, intellectual groups and professionals in urban areas, which represented a very limited percentage of the total population. The Wiranto proponents, who mainly were the leaders of the party at local level, considered that the Wiranto’s popularity was better than Rais’ at the grass roots level or remote areas1028. Furthermore, with the support from Golkar Party, as the winner of the 2004 Parliament Election, Wiranto seemed to have a more promising situation. Hence, for them it was worth for dakwah if PKS would support the candidate who would have a better potential to win the election. Moreover, they also saw Wiranto as the figure that was sympathetic to dakwah movement1029. Although he was a military figure, who

1026 Interview with Dr. Mardani Ali Sera, Vice Chairperson of MPP PKS (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 6 October 2010.
1029 Defy Ruspiyandi, “Menebak Arah Dukungan PKS”, Pikiran Rakyat, 21 June 2004
stigmatised the proponent of the “nationalistic tendencies camp” that opposed the military officers with religious tendencies, he did not have such a bad track-record showing his resistance to the development of an Islamic dakwa. In fact, his two daughters were members of PKS' tarbiyah.\(^{1030}\)

The above case indicates that the continuation of dakwah prospect was the main issue that held by each group. It means that behind their different actions and strategic reasons, they shared a similar interest showing that their commitment was not dedicated to other aspects but to the development of dakwah. This situation was sufficiently encouraging to maintain relations between cadres in the different camps running well and to find a resolution to the difference. Eventually, all the cadres who supported Wiranto could accept the party’s decision to recommend that all the people and PKS’ members should support Rais in the 2004 Election. Some important figures form both sides appeared together before the press to confirm and convey the decision of MS. This situation showed that the party was still able to maintain its solidity after facing one of the most and first serious debates among the cadres of the party.

In the case of BBM, another delicate case, the commitment to preserve the unity of the party became an important element. In this case, the attitude to obey the leader and the readiness to put aside personal interest became the main reasons for most of the cadres to accept the decision of the leaders to continue to remain in the coalition of President Yudhoyono’s Cabinet, after a government controversial decision to cut the oil subsidy in 2005. Although many cadres expressed their disappointment with this governmental decision before the party had concluded its decision and where several others even proposed that the party should leave the government,\(^{1031}\) most of the cadres eventually could accept the party’s policy to remain in the coalition. This was not only because the government had agreed to provide compensation to the people as demanded by their party, but also because the leader of the party had decided on that policy.

---


\(^{1031}\) This people including the General Secretary Anis Matta and Mashadi, Member of Parliament for the PKS, two Provincial Boards (in DKI Jakarta, DI Yogyakarta) and one Branch of the PKS (in Solo). “Tak Ada Koalisi Tanpa Perubahan”, in *Saksi*, No.6/VIII/30 November 2005, pp.7-9. “Ini Politik Bos”, *Tempo*, 16 October 2005.
In relation to this, for Trianto Prabowo, the capability to find and to preserve the ultimate goals as the basis of the spirit of togetherness and to some extent the attitude to believe in the leaders became main factors that influenced the cadres to accept the decision to remain in the coalition. Of the cadres who initially disagreed with this decision, many of them eventually changed their minds and agreed to support party policy. According to Prabowo, approximately 73% of the cadres who initially disagreed on that policy changed their preference. As for the rest, they were still consistent with their initial choice. However, although their opinion was not in line with party policies, they agreed to accept the party’s decision. They kept this decision as an individual preference. As for the cadres who had changed their opinion, they believed that trustworthy people in DPP had made the decision and had more understanding and a better comprehensive vision than they did. Hence, it was logical if they followed their leaders’ decision. This condition reflected the capability of the party to preserve its unity through its cadres’ commitment to their shared values.

As for the case of being an “open party” in 2008, the consciousness of being a tool of idealism and the importance to hold unity took a role in securing the willingness of the cadres to follow the leaders’ instructions. In this regard, the party leaders tried to develop a more overt and inclusive approach mainly in order to have a better chance to win the election so increasing the possibility for the ideals of the party to be enacted in Indonesia as a plural country. For this understanding, the party then proposed a new policy to give a chance to the non-Muslims to join the party and become members. The leaders then conducted socialisation and revealed the considerations taken into account behind the policies. They tried to convince the cadres that their work was also attached to the interest to develop dakwah. In this case, the leader conveyed the need to gain further political votes to obtain a political position giving more access and power to support dakwah.

Although the leaders had tried to rationalise their policy, the potential for disagreement was still high. It could happen, as many of the cadres did not yet have a similar understanding on this issue. For those against this, such a decision was a

---

1033 Ibid, p. 49.
1034 Ibid, p. 54, 60, 69.
kind of “great leap or jump”, even an indication of the failure to maintain the very characteristic of the party. They also assumed that this decision was a symbol of pragmatism, in which party idealism was sacrificed merely to gain more support as compensation. Some of the cadres who constantly resisted the moderation of the party, however, even regarded such a policy as intolerable. Some of them then decided to set up a forum named FKP to criticise this policy. Later, they extended the issues by criticising the way of life of PKS’ elites.

On the other hand, those in favour of this believed that the party needed such a policy in order both to be more acceptable to the plural Indonesian societies and to be more influential on the life of the people. The party could not be influential if it was not accepted. Also for those in favour, the policy to be more inclusive was not something that contradicted dakwah. According to them, the very characteristic of dakwah was the flexibility of the way to gain the attention of the people and afterwards convey the message.

However, the differences of opinion among the cadres did not lead to fragmentation. The spirit of obedience prevented the party from serious precariousness. Although in that case the potential to have prolonged debates between supporters was quite open on the subject of the presence of the commitment to the unity of the party, PKS could eventually manage the cohesion of the party not long after this policy was implemented. After the party decided to be more overt in recruiting cadres, most of the cadres were willing to end the debate, which minimised the intensity of this quarrel.

Most of them preferred to understand the leaders’ instructions and implement them. Although some ex-cadres had heavily criticised such policies, until today, many of PKS cadres did not complain about such a political adjustment, let alone use it to attack the party. The consciousness to maintain party unity kept emerging in difficult situations and made the solidity of the party become less problematic to maintain.

---

1035 Interview with K.H Yusuf Supendi Lc, Member of the PKS DSP (2000-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2009), in Jakarta, 3 November 2010.

1036 Interview with Amri Yusra, M.Si, Chairperson of Depok DPD of PKS (2002-2004), Member of Parliament of Depok District, West Java, (2004-2009), and Lecturer at Political Sciences Department, Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010. Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer, Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia and one of the cadres who signed the PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010. Interview with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-2010), in Tangerang, 21 October 2010.
Most of the cadres also refused to follow FKP, which then became a limited and “liquid” forum, attended mainly by the disappointed cadres and people who wanted to discuss the “negative sides” of the leaders of PKS, some wrongdoings of this party and how far this party had deviated from its initial idealism. Most importantly, there was not any group who used the same name, flag and constitution, which clearly claimed as an alternative for tarbiyah cadres after this decision.

In recent development, some of the cadres who left the party decided to return to it. This proved, according to some interviewees, that their heart was still in jamaah. In this case, the party had become valuable to the cadres and provided personal satisfaction that was not easy to replace. Some political adjustments did not change the general situation in PKS where the commitment of many cadres was still high. This situation indicated that the continuity of the existence of the party was valuable to the cadres, and also indicated the ability of the party to adapt.

However, other ex-cadres preferred to be very critical of their former party. One of them was Yusuf Supendi, the former vice chairperson of DSP removed by the party in 2009 and who publicly accused the leaders of the party of committing corruption. Supendi expressed his resistance through the mass media and attacked the leaders of the party directly. The interesting point was that he did not attack the party for deviating from its ideology; instead, he accused the two leaders of the party, Luthfi H. Ishaaq and Matta, for committing improper behaviour namely making personal attacks towards him and corruption, denied by Ishaaq and Matta. He then also accused ten PKS leaders for violating the rules of the game when dismissing him from the party.

---

1037 Interview with Sitaresmi S, M.Psy, Member of Dakwah Department of DPP of PK (2000-2003), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010; with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and Chairperson of BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010; with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010.

1038 Interview with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010.

1039 Interview with Hurriyah MA, cadrerization of PKS observer and Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 29 October 2010.

1040 “Presiden PKS Dilaporkan ke BK DPR”, Republika, 17 March 2011.

However, this situation did still not provide a serious impact on the cadres and the solidity of the party. Supendi’s movement to use public media to attack his former fellows in the party also showed that he did not find sufficient support from inside it. According to Sembiring, all PKS’ cadres in all regions of the country were still solid and were not influenced by Supendi’s political manoeuvres. It showed that any attempt to influence the cadres to follow a person or a group of people was not easy to do, let alone to make faction in the party. Above all, it proved that the presence of shared values and their maintenance were indeed relevant to the preservation of party cohesion.

The discussions above show that the commitment to preserve shared values and simplify them as the code of conduct had provided a positive impact on the cohesion of the party. It prevented the party from having an emergence of factionalisation from within. Even when some critical founding fathers and important figures who had then entirely left it or had been removed by the party for their disobedience or resistance attitude and were still in the party, they were not able to influence most of the cadres to follow their opinions.

5. Overview

PKS has shown a relatively greater ability to find, preserve and develop dakwah as the main value to be used as the main reference in the party that also brought a unique identity to it. The party also did not find any difficulty in implementing value infusion through the halaqah. The identity as a jundi, which had a main duty to struggle for God’s will, had reached most of the cadres and become an identity that created commitment to preserve the ideals of the party and regarded such ideals as their priority. Such commitment also reduced the attitude to regard the party merely as a “disposable tool”, for material compensation, and exclusive advantages. Even though several weaknesses were still in evidence, the commitment to obey the leaders to maintain the spirit of togetherness and be part of dakwah membership still existed in this party. Some delicate moments that occurred in this party could potentially have shaken the unity of the members. However, thanks to the positive situation regarding shared values infusion, PKS was relatively able to avoid serious or prolonged conflicts and in general was capable to maintain its cohesion.

Chapter XIII
Comparison and Conclusion

1. Comparison

The main aim of this thesis is to show the role of party institutionalisation as the key, independent variable determining the likely emergence of whether a party exhibits fragmentation or cohesion. There are four dimensions of party institutionalisation that are discussed comprehensively, indicating the important factors that should be considered when studying this issue in the context of the Indonesian Islamic political parties. These factors are (1) the decision making process based on legitimate the rules of the game, (2) systematic cadrerization as a medium for cadre development and career, (3) the presence of a conflict resolution mechanism (CRM) to handle and terminate the conflict and potential and (4) the development of commitment to shared values through value infusion.

From previous discussions, it can be considered that PKB and PKS experienced quite different situations in the dimensions that eventually provided distinct consequences on their internal conditions, particularly on the appearance of fragmentation in PKB and cohesion in PKS. The following discussion will summarise the main points of comparison and difference between the records of the two parties with regard to the four dimensions and the impact that occurred during the first decade of their existence in the Indonesian Reform Era.

1.1. Procedural Leadership

An institutionalized party is the party that could consistently apply its mechanism or rules in the decision making process. In this case, the party procedure becomes the only guidance in such process, which proves that the leadership of the party is controlled and dictated by the legitimate rules when making policies. On the contrary, an un-institutionalised party tends to neglect its constitution or procedures when making policies. This type of party sometimes relied on the will of the leading
figures to run this process and used the procedure merely as an accessory to be immediately modify or freely understood to legalise the leader’s wish.

The discussion of legal-formal aspects concerning procedural leadership in PKB and PKS have indicated that each party developed decision-making processes, including some basic and important aspects about policy making mechanism and the level of authority of many forums in the decision-making process. PKB and PKS also had also underpinned the importance of musyawarah to be conducted in their party. Although some observers believed that the party’s constitution had permitted a large and wide authority to Dewan Syura relevant to many aspects and including the decision making process, there was actually no single chapter in the constitution that really permitted Dewan Syura to decide unilaterally on policies, let alone individually. The legal-formal normative situation in PKS also indicates to some extent a similar condition. In PKS, musyawarah became the main way and core of the spirit of this process. The party, for instance, did not put forward the leader of MS to be the sole element that could decide on a policy.

Although both parties, in their written regulations and constitutions, had put forward the spirit of consultation and had described the decision-making process in detail, each party followed different paths in terms of implementing the rules of the game, which differentiate their quality of party institutionalisation and eventually the internal cohesiveness.

Based mainly on the case of the dismissal of the General Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz and other relevant cases in PKB, this thesis shows PKB’s inconsistency in implementing its constitution when making a policy, which also indicates that in practice, the influence of the personal leadership played a role. The personal leadership discussed in this thesis is understood as the leadership that tended to avoid the existence of party’ procedures.

The forms of procedure infringement include the medium that was used to decide the dismissal policy, the period that was taken to handle and stipulate the policy and the reasons or substance behind the dismissal. In terms of the medium, the procedural violation was related to the DPP’s attitude that refused to organise Muktamar or MLB as a legal forum to evaluate the performance of the General Chairpersons of Dewan Tanfidz before formally deciding on their future status. Matori Abdul Jalil was dismissed by a quick decision made by Dewan Syura on the same
day he attended the 2001 SI MPR. Alwi Shihab and Syaifullah Yusuf were also discharged by the PKB in a very limited forum called as a preliminary meeting, which was actually not attended by Shihab as the General Chairperson of *Dewan Tanfidz*. In the Muhaimin Iskandar case, the party even dismissed him during the forum so called as a “joint meeting”, which was not initially addressed to discuss his position as the General Chairperson of *Dewan Tanfidz*.

In relation to time, the abruptly decided dismissal indicated the violation of procedure. The party did not implement a gradual process leading to finally stipulating the dismissal, although the ART had stressed such a process to be applied. In fact the process only took a few hours for Jalil and Iskandar’s case. As for the substance, some ostensible reasons became the foundation for dismissal without initially having undergone a proper inspection. Jalil was discharged for being disloyal to the party’s decision. However, although he was dismissed due to his appearance in the 2001 SI MPR, a forum considered illegal by PKB, this party eventually decided to re-join the MPR not long after Wahid’s impeachment, which was seen by the people as an indirect acknowledgment of the MPR’s existence and its entire policies including the SI MPR.

Shihab case was questionable since the main reason for dismissing him was because he held a dual position. According to some, including Shihab, this policy potentially obstructed the opportunity for members to take on more roles in political life, which was not in line with the spirit of the party’s constitution and which in fact, encouraged each cadre to take as many roles as possible in society. As for the Iskandar and Yusuf cases, the party could not clearly prove the substantial reasons for their dismissal. Even though the party eventually continued their policy to dismiss Iskandar and Yusuf from their positions, the party actually could not convincingly demonstrate professional mistakes committed by these persons in these cases. Moreover, the local cases indicated a similar situation in which the dismissal decision or suspension was not based on the party procedure but on political interest.

These cases to some extent also indicate the salient role of Wahid in the dismissal process, which in many ways had overshadowed the party’s procedure. The PKB case demonstrates basically that the failure of establishing commitment towards the party’s constitution had eventually paved the way leaving it open for the prominent figures to influence and even determine the party’s policies, or, at least put forward their considerations as something that should be run by the party. In facing
this situation, A. Mustafa Bisri, one of the prominent figures in the PKB establishment said that Wahid as the General Chairperson of Dewan Syura had acted as “a special institution” in PKB\textsuperscript{1043}.

PKS operated in a different way. Although some people criticised the implementation of the decision making process as seeming to give some of the elites or people surrounding Hilmi Aminuddin, the Chairperson of MS, the opportunity to unilaterally dictate the result, the above discussion indicated that during the first decade of its existence, in general, PKS was not trapped into abandoning or ignoring the procedure and the spirit of musyawarah in its decision-making process. The role of the Aminuddin, as one of the founding fathers of Jamaah Tarbiyah in Indonesia, in this institution was of little importance. However, it did not obstruct the party from implementing musyawarah and respect the rules of the game, which made both musyawarah and MS became institutionalized in this party. In some important cases, Aminuddin trusted the floor to decide and even found his opinion not to be taken into account.

In general, MS could maintain the spirit of collectivism and avoid the nuance of authoritarianism. However not all of the MS’ decisions satisfied the majority of the cadres. Often people blamed the centralised and elitist mechanism in PKS that gave too large a concession to the untouchable figures in MS when deciding party policies. However, the above discussion showed that unpopular policies were still the result of the musyawarah process and not based on the wish of several people in MS. Most cadres believed that since all the policies had their rationale and were decided through a fair and legal mechanism applied by the trustworthy cadres, there was no reason for them to oppose the result.

The inconsistency in implementing party procedures in the decision-making process raised resistance among the disappointed cadres. It then motivated them to continually criticise such inconsistency but also in the long term, to establish factions inside the party. The above discussion indicates that the factions’ establishment was not dedicated to facilitate reconciliation. Rather, they were mainly created to secure just each conflicting group’s interest. Hence, in its development, the presence of factions tended to impede any attempts to build reconciliation. Over time, the absence of a real reconciliation among factions became uncontrollable and ended

with the realisation of *Muktamar* or MLB that cemented factions and in turn legalised fragmentation.

PKS’ consistency in implementing the rules of the game in the decision-making process had enabled the party to maintain the system running proportionally. This condition motivated the cadres to believe that consistency in implementing the procedure was important and highly appreciated in this party, which, over time, encouraged the cadres to also value the system. Furthermore, by having the opportunity to be heard as one of several consequences emanating from the implementation of the party’s procedure in the decision-making process, the cadres felt that their presence was meaningful. It enhanced the sense of belonging with their fellow cadres to their party, which eventually helped the party to underpin its capability to avoid the presence of worthless factionalism that could endanger the unity of the party and preserve its internal cohesion.

The above studies confirmed that a party’s incapability or capability to implement the rules of the game in the decision-making process, as one of the dimensions of the party institutionalisation, influenced the presence of fragmentation or cohesion in the party.

### Table 11
Comparison of the of the Procedural Leadership Conditions to the Decision Making Process Applied by PKB and PKS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Matters</th>
<th>National Awakening Party (PKB)</th>
<th>Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal Formal Aspect</td>
<td>♦ Decision Making Process: The Acknowledgment of Consultation</td>
<td>♦ A commitment towards Consultation and the Consultative Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>♦ The Emergence of Unconstitutional Phenomena</td>
<td>♦ MS as the Pre Eminent Body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>♦ Overshadowing Party’s Constitution: The Role of Wahid</td>
<td>♦ <em>Musyawarah</em> as the main way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Tendencies</td>
<td>♦ Procedure Violation</td>
<td>♦ Procedure maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>♦ Following the Patrons’ interests</td>
<td>♦ Respecting the System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Effects on the Party</td>
<td>♦ The Emergence of Internal Resistance</td>
<td>♦ The development of Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>♦ The Emergence of Factions Formation and Fragmentation</td>
<td>♦ The Preservation of Cohesion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. 2. Conflict Resolution Mechanism
Another dimension of party institutionalisation is the presence of a conflict resolution mechanism (CRM) which functioned. This dimension is actually related to the level of systemness where conflict, as something that commonly occurs in any institution including a political party and its related matters and their impact, can be solved through a standard mechanism or institutional approach and not based on any personal decision. An un-institutionalised party, hence, is a party that puts the conflict resolution to a non-standard or subjective mechanism, involving incapable persons and an illegal medium.

In the case of PKB, the presence of this dimension is low. PKB did not have a comprehensive CRM and up until 2005, did not have any institutions that were competent in to these matters. The main reason for the absence of a comprehensive CRM was that PKB and its supporters quite believed that internal conflicts would not easily lead to fragmentation since members of this party were united by a similar affiliation of their religious background and of the same objectives, namely to struggle for NU people’s interests. They also believed that their islah tradition was quite effective in solving internal conflicts in NU and could therefore effectively work in PKB.

This situation created a lack of legitimate bodies in the party who legally held the authority to act and required acknowledgement from all the elements for handling conflict resolutions. Several institutions were projected by many to be the medium to solve the conflict and relevant matters, namely Muktamar and Dewan Syura, in reality, could not play their role, which was mainly due to the difficulty to maintain the objective and an impartial attitude. Instead, these institutions were used to some extent by the conflicting groups to serve their own interest.

In the situation where the mechanism for conflict management was absent, several important decisions on this matter were practically dependent on the will of personal opinion and consideration. Most of the cadres presumed that Dewan Syura was the institution handling this matter and managing the problem fairly and objectively, but its inability to do so just made the situation worse. The absence of a competent body to take care of this problem caused repeated imprecision in managing the conflict and also rendered the decision prone to result from exclusively from political concerns, which were sometimes nuanced by the prominent figure’s will, rather than it being based on a legal opinion. Gradually over time, PKB was subject to disadvantageous situations and it often fell short in detecting and localising
the conflict and in general, it could not respond to this situation correctly, which eventually paved the way for conflict escalation.

The dismissals of the elites and the cadres indicated clearly the fact that there was no CRM in place thus creating a void and allowed the disappointed cadres to use it for their complaints and voice their opinions and interests so increasing conflict potential and degrading any inter-groups’ relationships who held different opinions. The disappointed cadres or “dissident cadres” were fiercely pushed by the authority to follow the will of the party. The lack of a medium in order that the cadres would receive fair treatment made any attempt to terminate the conflict become difficult to attain, as the party’s decisions would be most likely to continue to disappoint for those cadres in question.

Constructive dialogues that could be a proper catalyst were replaced by an eagerness to resolve the differences. The absence of a CRM encouraged each conflicting group to hold their position firmly, either as the victim or the ones that believed that they were already on the right track and consistently struggled for their interest. Factionalism could not the be neglected and was expressed mainly through the presence of *Muktamar* or MLB that legalised the position of each conflicting group in front of their supporters, although in essence, the legalisation was unitarily conducted.

In its development, the absence of the CRM had eventually provided an opportunity for the court, to act the third party, to take role in this problem. However, the above study showed that the presence of the third party could did not ensure a comprehensive reconciliation and termination of the conflict. Rather, by providing a confusing decision that appealed many interpretations, the third party in PKB case had preserved the enthusiasm of each conflicting group to struggle for their case. In the end, the presence of the third party also became worthless.

Regarding PKS, the party constitution mentioned that certain institutions were competent to be elements of CRM. These bodies, namely DS, BPDO and *halaqah* had the authority for example to be a reconciliation body, to conduct internal tribunals and investigations, or as the medium, to find a resolution for any different points of view. The party also in reality had a standard pattern in dealing with conflict prevention and resolution. Although PKS could not entirely escape from certain limitations, the presence of these bodies and a standard mechanism enabled the
party to have an authoritative guidance and proper reference in dealing with conflict, which in the end helped the party to enact with trust and avoid conflict escalation.

Contrary to PKB’s condition, PKS was able to detect the conflict potential and respond at a very early stage. This was because *halaqah*, as one of CRM institutions in PKS, could undertake to act as an effective medium for the supervision of the quality of the cadres’ development and occasionally their personal life, which also gave the opportunity for the party’s apparatus to supervise and note the cadres’ feelings, *desiderata*, aspirations and anxieties. On the other hand, the presence of DS exemplified the existence of an authoritative body, composed of competent persons, who, when taking a decision, were respected by the cadres. Moreover, BPDO, another element in CRM, had also enabled the party to handle several delicate cases related mainly to discipline and loyalty issues which, if the party could not immediately correctly solve them, this situation could potentially generate prolonged disputes and conflict among the cadres, or between the party and the cadres. Through these several instruments, PKS, hence, had the capacity to contain the conflict practically immediately and prevent the party from prolonged disputes that potentially led to factionalisation.

Some crucial and delicate moments with an internal conflict potential did not prolong disputes and enhance conflict. PKS could convince the cadres that the rules of the game were a significant foundation on which to base their attempt to resolve a conflict, which, over time, satisfied most of the cadres where the work of the party system was concerned and decreased any disappointment that may have ensued from it. During the first decade of the Reform Era, PKS could avoid any unilateral movements, terminating conflicts by constantly providing an opportunity for the cadres to communicate their opinions and defend their case before facing internal judgment. This situation maintained trust and weakened factionalism tendencies, which eventually enabled PKS to secure its cohesion.

Although the party could undertake these positive tendencies however, not all cases, of course, could be handled properly by the party. In some very rare and delicate cases, the party tended to be sluggish in deciding its verdict. The historical situation of the cadre sometimes made the entire process difficult, which for some showed inconsistency. Whereas this type of situation might occur in PKS, in general the party could constitutionally process the case. The above discussion indicates a very fundamental role of the CRM as one of the indicators of party institutionalisation,
which is relates mainly to the work of judicial institutions, in creating an ability to preserve party cohesion.

### Table 12
Comparison of the CRM Conditions Applied by PKB and PKS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Matters</th>
<th>National Awakening Party (PKB)</th>
<th>Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal Formal Aspect</td>
<td>• The non-existence of a relevant rules of the game and institutions on CRM</td>
<td>• The presence of the rules of the game and relevant institutions on CRM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>• Mainly based on personal opinion and interest rather than institutional perspective</td>
<td>• Conducted through authoritative institutions and mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The tendencies</td>
<td>• Difficulty in preventing and terminating the conflict</td>
<td>• Capability to detect conflict potential at very early stage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Having trouble in localising the conflict</td>
<td>• Capability to localise the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Effects</td>
<td>• Conflict escalation and factionalisation enhancement</td>
<td>• The preservation of trust towards internal system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Disappearance of constructive dialogue</td>
<td>• The Weakening of factionalisation Potential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The third party’s “resolution”.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.3. **Systematic Cadreization**

The systemic cadreization is another dimension of an institutionalized party. The institutionalized party is the party that develops its cadres using a standardized and transparent mechanism. The objective of this process is not only to have cadres with certain commitments that are in line with the mission of the party, but also to determine the future of the cadres, using the cadre status as the basic pre-request for holding a position inside the party or as a public officer.

In the legal-formal context, PKB asserted a set of rules for maintaining cadreization and the recruitment process. In general, however, the party’s constitution did not clearly contain a complete and comprehensive regulation on cadreization and the recruitment process and the institutions to deal with their procedures neither the steps to be taken pertaining to the cadres’ career development. The party constitution only implicitly claimed that cadreization would be Executive Board’s domain. Even though the party possessed the cadres training models and a guide to recruitment, in general, these areas were stagnant and in fact depended on other institutions, such as NU and *pesantren*. Gradually this situation
cemented PKB’s dependency on NU and its supporting elements. PKB failed to implement cadre discipline within the party and for the leaders.

In terms of the recruitment process, the influence of prominent figures in the party and NU was more powerful than the standard mechanism and objective assessment in determining the future of the potential cadres or members. The above studies indicated several recruitment models that substantially weakened the role of the rules of the game and its objectivity, which eventually also diminished the cadres’ respect towards the party apparatus.

Inconsistency in implementing cadrerization and the presence of many elements, which had taken part in this process, paved the way for the “phenomenon of federalism”, in which the party was not the only authoritative body that should provide an official interpretation and teaching of the ideology and the rules of the game. Eventually many cadres tended to put forward their direct patron’s understanding and interest as something worthy to follow, which again indicated the cadres’ independency from those figures rather than the party apparatus.

The absence of a solid and final interpretation of the rules of the game and to certain extent ideology provided the opportunity for anybody to develop and make his own interpretation. Each conflicting group had its own understanding of the implementation of the rules of the game and which sometimes contradicted each other. In the dismissal cases, the difference in understanding the constitution had become something that also increased the tension and made it difficult to solve. The difference in implementing spirit of pluralism as one of the main aspects in party ideology was also one of the reflection of the failure of establishing common understanding on the party’s ideology to all party members.

At the practical level, these differences provided each conflicting group with reasons to legitimize their existence and confront the opponent’s opinion at the same time. It increased the fragmentation potentiality, as it was the differences among the conflicting cadres rather than their similarities, which were more apparent rather than they disappearing. In addition, the above discussion also indicated a rapid formation of groups as another effect of the failure of a systematic cadrerization. It was an internal phenomenon that exacerbated the fragmentation potential in PKB. Having the capacity to set up a complete party committee in a short time, each conflicting group claimed to have significant supporters who demanded the realisation of their
rights and this encouraged the sense of fighting each other. The establishment of *Muktamar* or MLB then followed in order to provide a legitimate right to their existence that diminished the unity of the party.

On the other hand, cadrerization had been an important matter, sometimes called “the real spirit” in PKS. The party had managed this tool systematically. Since 2005, PKS had clearly mentioned in its constitution that one of the main functions of DPP was to conduct cadrerization. Modules taken from the constitution and other official cadrerization modules that were published as a complement, the cadres or cadre candidates could see the entire picture of this process, including the cadrerization levels and the materials.

Besides having clear rules of the game, the party’s solidity was also supported by the consistency of at implementation level. *Halaqah*, as the main institution for cadrerization in PKS, was functioning as an effective medium for socializing and seeding the party’s ideology and all related organisational matters to the cadres. Under the supervision of the party’s cadre institutions, *murabbi*, the people in charge in each *halaqah*, had an obligation to conduct a set of rules to handle the cadres’ development. *Halaqah* at the practical level was moving hand in hand with other forums of cadrerization, such as TOP, TD, TL, TMKS and the AKIP, created by the party to cement the sense of solidarity and establish militant cadres. It also provided significant aid to bring qualified cadres into the party to fill any needed positions inside or outside the party. Regarding recruitment, PKS was consistent in making this process a collective process that involved several elements and stages to reach its conclusion. The party allowed eligible cadres to determine the process, which avoided the possibility that a limited group or a single person could unilaterally conclude the result of the process.

The presence of systematic cadrerization run by a committed apparatus had supported the party to not only preserve the unity in understanding the party’s values and objective, but also loyalty towards the party. The systematic indoctrination was also supported by a consistency in implementing the rules of the game, had developed a consciousness by the cadres to respect the existence of the party and to put forward the party’s interests before their individual interests. These tendencies eventually enabled the party to avoid a prolonged conflict and worthless factionalisms that could jeopardize the unity of the party.
Whereas some people believed that factionalism happened in PKS, it did not threaten the unity of the party. Moreover, what happened in PKS was actually close to the situation where different opinions could not be avoided. Tendencies of having different opinions emerged time after time since the party, to some extent, allowed the cadres to form their own opinions before the party released an official policy. However, it did not necessarily become a source of the establishment of a faction, similar to what occurred when a certain and distinct group was formed inside the party. In fact, during the first decade of PKS’s existence, there was no group that considered itself as a faction in this party with its own distinct characteristics, leadership and supporters. So far, if it was related to the real and active cadres, the factionalism happened to be a very limited case in this party.

Moreover, the systematic cadrerization also motivated the cadres to put forward similarities rather than differences and discouraged worthless factionalisms let alone resistance. A few former cadres had indeed taken some unusual moves to show their resistance to the policies or the general current conditions of the party. However they were never able to convince the vast majority of the cadres to follow. Hence, in general, the party could relatively maintain the unity of the party. This situation was in line with the spirit of cohesion, namely to avoid any possibilities for the emergence of fractures among the members of an institution. However, it is also fair to say that the existence of those “dissident cadres” reflects some weaknesses in PKS’ cadrerization, particularly in terms of providing more comprehensive thinking that could be implemented, as a foundation to build strategies in facing new political dynamics which could be understood and followed by all the cadres, including those with “radical” tendencies.

The cases of PKB and PKS show how party institutionalisation, reflected by the presence of systematic cadrerization, had influenced the internal situation and solidity of the party. The absence of systemic cadrerization had pushed PKB to fragmentation. On the other hand, PKS’ capability to maintain its cohesion during its first decade of existence was supported by the presence of a systematic cadrerization.

Table 13
Comparison of the Conditions of Systematic Cadrerization
Applied by PKB and PKS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Matters</th>
<th>National Awakening Party</th>
<th>Prosperous Justice Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

339
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Formal Aspect</th>
<th>(PKB)</th>
<th>(PKS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The partial rules of the game and undeclared institutions</td>
<td>• The presence of the rules of the game and relevant institutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementation</th>
<th>(PKB)</th>
<th>(PKS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Inconsistency in Conducting Cadrerization</td>
<td>• Cadrerization: Halaqah and Cadres Maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Party Recruitment and Subjectivism</td>
<td>• Recruitment: Finding Best Cadres</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Tendencies</th>
<th>(PKB)</th>
<th>(PKS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Development on Different Interpretation</td>
<td>• Preserving a Common Approach an Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Weakening of Esprit de Corps</td>
<td>• Preserving Loyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Loose Attitude towards Rules of the Game</td>
<td>• The Development of Trust</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Effects</th>
<th>(PKB)</th>
<th>(PKS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Prolongation of the differences</td>
<td>• Saving the party from the conflict prolongation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Emergence of Resistance</td>
<td>• Reducing factionalisation tendencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Quick Grouping to Maintain Faction’s Interest</td>
<td>• Commitment to the party unity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. 4. Shared Values Infusion

The above discussion indicates several significant differences in both of the Islamic parties in dealing with their commitment to the subject of shared values. PKB already shared values, namely nationalism and Aswaja, which normatively could be implemented as a unifying element. However, the generality of these values provided some basic problems. This situation not only had put PKB in a position where it could not develop its distinct identity among the Islamic parties established by NU communities, but where at the practical level where it made the presence of shared values become less effective in playing the role as an internal code of conduct including the cadres’ orientation and behaviour. The party eventually became a party lacking values, orientation and guidance.

Besides having a problem with the essence of the shared values, PKB also had one with value infusion. The orientation of the party which was still mainly focused on the external problems, made value infusion and its related matters including giving standard schedules, materials and evaluation, become largely futile. The fact that the party did not effectively control the implementation of value infusion worsened the situation. Eventually, PKB could not effectively avoid the role of several informal leaders who took over this process. Thus, the phenomenon of “federation” as was mentioned by Yahya Staquf happened. In addition, the party could not escape from multi-loyalties and the attitude to step aside from internal shared values,
since the future of the cadres, in most cases, actually depended on their good relationship with the prominent figures rather than on their commitment to the shared values.

On the other hand, PKS had shown a relatively greater ability to find, preserve and develop the *dakwah* as the principal value used as the main reference in the party. The values of collectivism being the tools of *dakwah*’s struggle appeared to be the shared values, which, over time, became invaluable to cadres. Such shared values also became the foundation for the party’s code of conduct, namely putting forward consultation, understanding and protecting each other, loyalty to the leaders and to the community, trust and discipline, which dictated the behaviour of the cadres. Although grades were accredited on the way the cadres understood and implemented these values, the presence of these values enabled PKS to preserve its identity. In addition, PKS did not find any difficulty in implementing value infusion. The identity as a *jundi*, for which the main duty was to struggle for God’s will, had been conveyed mainly through *halaqah* to the cadres and became an identity that created commitment to preserve the ideals of the party and they regarded such ideals as their priority. Such commitment also reduced the attitude to regard the party merely as a “disposable tool. In general, although some weaknesses were still in evidence, the commitment to follow the leaders, to maintain the spirit of togetherness and belonging to *dakwah* still existed in this party.

In all the above tendencies, PKB tended to be vulnerable, as any conflict tended to be difficult to terminate and it troubled internal cohesion. The discussions in the previous chapters indicate how the conflict could easily increase and attract many cadres to develop factions, which then legalised the presence of parallel committees of PKB. Accordingly, the absence of the shared values commitment, which in its development deteriorated the spirit of togetherness, made the fragmentation tendency became obvious in PKB.

On the other hand, PKS experienced a different situation. By having a commitment to the shared values and its infusion, PKS was relatively able to avoid serious or prolonged conflicts and was capable to maintain its cohesion. This does not mean that the party did not have any serious problems. Some delicate moments, including during the 2004 presidential election, the BBM case and the issue of an open party that occurred in this party could indeed potentially jeopardize the party’s
unity. However, the presence of the shared values had underpinned the party’s aptitude to maintain solidarity and the sense of togetherness among its cadres.

This comparison confirms the hypothesis that the capability to develop a commitment to the shared values makes a party capable of maintaining cohesion. On the other hand, the failure to implement and preserve the shared values, which also means preserving the commitment to the party’s ideals and shared identity, brings disadvantages to party cohesion.

### Table 14
**Comparison of the Shared Values Infusion Conditions Applied by PKB and PKS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Matters</th>
<th>National Awakening Party (PKB)</th>
<th>Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal Formal Aspect</td>
<td>• Nationalism and <em>Aswaja</em> as a potential values</td>
<td>• <em>Dakwah</em> Struggle as a Central Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Limited Efforts towards Shared Values Development</td>
<td>• Shared Values Maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>• Mainly based on personal opinion and interest rather than institutionalised perspective</td>
<td>• Conducted through authoritative institutions and mechanism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Tendencies</td>
<td>• Prominent Figures as a Driving Force</td>
<td>• Party as ‘receptacle’ of group idealism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Value Free and Expendable Tools Phenomenon</td>
<td>• The Emergence of the Spirit of Collectivism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Effects</td>
<td>• Leaders’ Interests as “Legitimate Sources” to Act</td>
<td>• Party as the tools of idealism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Instrumentalist group formation in the absence of shared values</td>
<td>• The commitment to put forward harmony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Conflict Continuation and the Trial of Commitment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. **Conclusion**

2.1. **The Relation between Variables**

The case of PKB demonstrated that the violation of the rules of the game in the decision-making process had generated resistance from the disadvantaged and critical cadres. It indicated the crucial effect of the absence of procedural leadership in this process towards party internal fragmentation. This situation could actually have been avoided if the party, since the very early stage, could properly manage this type of process constitutionally, by following all the processes and stages carefully. The absence of the medium for conflict reconciliation had worsened the
situation by paving the way for the creation of prolonged disputes. In the main, it occurred as the party did not have an authoritative and fair medium to terminate the conflict comprehensively, which was respected by all cadres. It then persuaded the conflicting groups to uphold their beliefs, which gradually over time deteriorated the trust and solidarity among the cadres.

This situation was exacerbated by the vagueness to build unity based on the shared values, which in its development deteriorated the quality or relationship between the cadres, particularly between those whose opinion was different. They saw the other cadres in different groups simply as an enemy who had to be finished off rather than as a partner of dialogue in seeking the truth. The weakness of value infusion and the absence of the code of conduct had also limited the cadres in their development of a full awareness to regard their party more than as an exponible tool. On the other hand, the absence of systematic cadrerization, which in essence lessened loyalty towards the party and a respect of the party procedures, had made the rapid formation of groups become possible. These groups which were legalised through MLB, made any attempts, for reconciliation to be in vain.

The absence of proper cadre development underpinned the potential fragmentation in this party, since the cadres could not maintain their loyalty to the party and preserve a similar understanding of the party's rules of the game. In these circumstances, the cadres tended to follow the perceptions of their direct patrons, which were influenced by subjectivity or the interests of their patrons. In short, to uphold a different understanding on the implementation of the constitution was quite possible in PKB. Moreover, the above situation also created a larger opportunity for the cadres and elites to establish factions to support and legalise their will, which was reflected by the rapid formation of groups after the conflicting groups failed to reach formal agreement. This trend happened continuously in PKB giving negative effects due to the absence of a systematic cadrerization. In its development, the failure to maintain the coherence, the presence of prominent elite figures who could act above the law and the increase of disappointment, which indicated the un-institutionalized party, provided a significant impact for the emergence of party fragmentation. Hence, the absence of procedural leadership, systematic cadrerization, CRM and shared values that should have united all of the cadres, in the long term caused party fragmentation.
On the other hand, PKS’ competence to establish the four dimensions of party institutionalisation brought the party to establish its cohesion. The party could avoid fragmentation, as PKS, at its very early stages, could properly manage the decision-making process by leaving aside any actions that could deteriorate the cadre’s trust in the system. In fact, PKS, during the first decade of its existence, was consistently able to put forward MS as a collective institution for the decision-making process, particularly where major issues were concerned and implemented *musyawarah* as the main medium to take decisions at all levels.

This situation became a main asset for PKS, as it was able to continue to protect the honour of the leaders before the cadres. Consistency in implementing *musyawarah* as the main principle of the decision-making process had eventually increased the cadres’ sense of belonging towards their party due to their involvement in several important events. At the end of the day, this tradition made the cadres tend to be more dependent on the system rather than on the prominent figures. In fact such a situation made it possible, even for the prominent figures including the vice-president of the party or the members of DS to be surpassed by the system. The unity of PKS resulted from of the strong solidarity that was established through the systematic cadrerization and fair recruitment, consisting of a spirit of mono-understanding, mono-loyalty and trust in the system, which was a kind of synthesis between systematic indoctrination and fair practices.

This solidarity had prevented the cadres from being easily provoked by dissident figures to follow their beliefs including established factions. PKS was also capable of developing a CRM with some internal institutions to surmount any conflict potential in this party, even though it was not entirely successful. Having this mechanism, PKS was able to solve delicate cases, bring the conflicting groups or cadres before the authoritative institution and maintain its supervision of the conflict potentialities. On the other hand, the work of value infusion that infused the party by the shared values derived from the party’s ideology played a salient role in forcing unity among the cadres. It cemented the purpose of the cadres in the party together with their sense of solidarity and identity among themselves.

The party avoided several cases having the potential to bring about internal conflicts due to a proper and constitutional response, the presence of a medium to accommodate opinion, a strong ideological networking and cadre solidarity and loyalty. The case of PKS indicated that the fourth discussed dimension, hence,
provided a significant contribution to the establishment of its very foundation for cohesion.

Concerning the reason behind the failure of PKB to hold party institutionalisation, the above discussion indicates that in general, it was caused by its deep commitment to traditions. Over time, it is fair to say that PKB had been trapped by its own traditions. First of all, it gave a large role to the charismatic figures for determining the direction of the organisation and it very much relied on personal and the members' loyalty. Secondly, the flexibility with which the members regarded the system and the rules of game reflected their choice to settle any problems informally. The third, members embraced the identity of communal values in their political lives without first having a detailed study and rationality.

PKB’s failure to uphold procedural leadership was due to the party’s tradition to give a larger role to the party’s leaders in the decision making process. Wahid was one of these, who could work without an effective control and sometimes overshadowed the rules of the game. The elite’s unique and special position in the party’s tradition made PKB more dependent on personal figures for making decisions than on the system. In the context of a CRM, the absence of CRM’s tools and rules of the game were the root cause of the party’s failure to build conflict management. The above study shows that there was a belief among the party members and elites that PKB would never experience deep and prolonged conflicts because they share the same traditions and interests. There was also a belief that the strength of NU tradition in dealing with conflicts generates confidence among PKB’s members and elites that they could contain any emerging conflicts. In addition, it was believed that the existence of the old and respectable ulama would effectively restrain conflicts. These beliefs are the real trap behind the absence of an operational CRM in this party, since the party tended to rely on informal approaches or traditions in dealing with conflict than trying to develop a comprehensive CRM.

In terms of cadrerization, this party dependency on the tools of the cadrerization of NU, pesantren, and ulama was the main reason behind PKB’s failure to centralize cadrerization and above all create systematic cadrerization. The tradition to highly regard ulama and “royal bloods” slowly undermined the effort to carry out objectively an organised and regular cadrerization. As for PKB’s failure to institutionalize value infusion, it was because the party regarded no urgency in developing, internalizing and preserving these values to cadres and other members.
at practical levels. The party believed that through NU’s cadrerization that had been received by the party cadres they had naturally understood the party’s traditions and values. In general, the tradition to do things informally had put aside any attempts to systemise and channel PKB values. The above study, hence, signifies that various traditions among the Muslim traditionalists, which became the foundation of PKB’s political culture, could not any longer be relied upon to support PKB’s institutionalisation.

With regard to PKS, the capability of the party to preserve institutionalisation was mainly related to its commitment to uphold Islamic teachings in every aspect of people’s daily lives, including in political activities. Specifically, this ideological belief itself covers several values. The first is that Islam manages every aspect of the human life, the second is the need to build a comprehensive system, gradually starting with individuals (cadres) in order to reach the Islamic ideals, and the third is the importance of committed leadership and the cadres’ loyalty based on shared values. These are values developed in this party, which are supported by a systematic method. In the long term, ideology and its implementation become inseparable.

In terms of procedural leadership, PKS’ success in upholding this dimension was due to the commitment of this party to put forward a system rather than a person. Members of the party, whether leaders or cadres, were perceived as parts of the system and elements to ensure that the system would work well. While the commitment to uphold CRM emerged as a part of the effort to uphold internal rules for all cadres, which was based on Islamic principles. CRM, also created as an effort to ensure the obedience of all members to the rules of game and the existing party’s system and as a media to empower and protect the party’s cadres. PKS’s commitment to cadre institutionalisation was deeply related to the party’s ideology that perceived the cadres as the main core of this party permitting it to reach its goals. The commitment to build civilization, which starts with individuals, motivated this party to develop and empower the cadres’ comprehension so that they can be committed to bring the party’s idealism to fruition. For this reason, a comprehensive curriculum was put into place and the institution that implements this curriculum, obliging every cadre to follow and implement it.

Related to value infusion, PKS’ success in upholding this dimension was related to the establishment of existing values. This establishment emerged due to
the commitment to develop ideology and Islamic methods seriously and comprehensively. These two elements were meant to be the daily guidance of cadres. The success to uphold this particular dimension was also related to their commitment to build a system that can transmit ideology continuously and systematically. This commitment was preserved through the *halaqah*. In general, the above study infers that PKS’ success in developing an institutionalisation dimension was linked to this party’s commitment to uphold its ideology. In other words, the case of PKS shows how a party having a huge commitment to uphold ideology is compatible with its effort to uphold its institutionalisation.

The above explanation indicates that the Islamic parties are not monolithic in terms of handling their organisational life or the institutionalisation of their party. The case of PKB and PKS, the two most important Islamic parties in Indonesia during the first decade of the Reform Era, indicates that the fragmentation or cohesion of the party was not determined by merely Islamic factors, but by the capability of the Islamic parties to institutionalise themselves, providing four important dimensions of institutionalisation in the party’s life to protect their solidity. One should not neglect the background of the party in discussing this topic. However, in general, the presence of the four dimensions of the party’s institutionalisation played a salient role in contributing to, or, even to some extent, determining the situation of cohesion or fragmentation.

The case of PKB reveals similar dimensions that used to be reasons behind the fragmentation of the Islamic parties before the Reform Era. These factors including the existence of strong and charismatic persons who could act above the law, caused damage to the procedural implementation, very similar to what had happened in the case of the split between PSII and Partii. The inability to set up and preserve shared values was also the reason for the split between the pro-communist cadres and the anti-communist cadres in PSII; and to some extent, between the cadres with a NU background and with a non-NU background in Masyumi and the split between *Barisan Penyadaran*-PSII and PSII. These phenomena showed the continuation of aspects which, from time to time, appeared to be the rationales for the failure of the Islamic parties to maintain their cohesion. In the light of this situation, it can be said that there was a kind of stagnation in the life of the Islamic party.

On the other hand, the case of PKS indicated another situation in the Islamic party. The capability of this party to maintain its cohesion for more than a decade in
the Indonesian reformasi was an example of a success story of the party based on Islam to bring institutionalisation dimensions into its life. The party, in some other perspectives, had indeed held some qualities to be a cohesion party. This, included as a cadre (non-catch all) party and an ideological (non-pragmatic) party; but the fact that this party could preserve its consistency to build a system, value it and be consistent in implementing it, played a more salient role in the way that this party uphold its cohesion. The case of PKS was exceptional in Indonesia’s Islamic political history.

This thesis focuses on the discussion on the relation of party institutionalisation and its effect on its fragmentation and cohesion. Although emphasis is placed on the role of the institution or party as an organisation, the thesis also covers some of the party’s non-institutional aspects such as the role of individuals in shaping the real situation in the party. However, the thesis regards the role of the individual as an impact on the situation of party institutionalisation, rather than as the real determinate variable on its fragmentation or cohesion. In this regard, this thesis tends to see the role of the individual as complementary.

However, some people would most likely argue and highlight the role of the individual as the main factor that influenced the real situation in both parties. They argue, for instance, that Wahid and his opponents would secure power as the main factor behind the PKB’s fragmentation and the Aminuddin’s commitment to maintain the system that paved the way for cohesion in the PKS. Although it is naïve to neglect individual or group interest, the above cases indicate that the resistance in PKB was triggered mainly by the violation of party’ procedure, rather than merely due to the presence of individual interest in seeking power. The opponents of Wahid state that the commitment to maintain the party’s constitution consistently and its internal democracy was the main objective of their resistance. Hence, it was not the tendency to seek power to actually trigger resistance to Wahid, which over time became the commencing point of the party’s split.

On the other hand, Wahid had generated several controversial policies, endangering the unity of the party and which made him popularly known as a “controversial figure”. However, if we scrutinise the case of PKB carefully, it would become clear that this situation occurred because the party was not sufficiently ready to treat Wahid’s ideas, agendas or hopes through a systematic and standardised procedure. The lack of institutionalisation, hence, had opened an opportunity for
Wahid to easily uphold his opinion and interests. In other words, fragmentation would be likely to occur, with or without the presence of “controversial but a charismatic figure” like Wahid as long as the party continued to be weak in establishing a fair procedure, to not be supported by an effective CRM, could not convince its cadres to see the party more than as a dispensable tool, and failed to establish fair and objective cadrerization and recruitment.

Moreover, this thesis did not see the relevance of “reification” towards the emergence of party fragmentation or cohesion. “Reification” as an external dimension of party institutionalisation, may relate mostly to the impact of the relationship between the party and society to the party, but it is less relevant to the discussion of party fragmentation or cohesion. The case of PKB clearly indicates that the main problem of internal fragmentation was inside the party. The case of PKS also shows that internal factors played a salient role in preserving party cohesion.

This thesis also excludes the study of the role of the political system as an external factor for fragmentation and cohesion. The case of PKS indicates that the open political system was not automatically a medium for internal fragmentation. In fact, after more than one decade the fragmentation had never occurred in this party. Of course, one may say that one decade could not portray the real situation of the party. Some important European socialist parties, such as SPD and PSI, enjoyed more than one decade of cohesion before eventually experiencing fragmentation. However, the studies of these socialist parties actually indicate that fragmentation resulted from ideological disputes and personal conflicts at the elite level rather than as the direct impact of the political system. The above discussion also indicates that the relation between the presidential system and the tendency to fragment, which was believed by several scholars, does not really have any relevance in the case of the Indonesian Islamic parties. However, the fact that factionalism tended to grow in PKS after the Indonesian political system had implemented a direct presidential election, is an interesting phenomenon to study.

This thesis contends the role of institutionalisation dimensions plays a more significant role in establishing cohesion rather than the role of several aspects that were supposed to be supporting elements for party cohesion, such as the political system or social and cultural conditions. In other words, in the end, cohesion was determined more by the internal situation rather than by external factors such as the political system or cultural background in which the party lived. In addition, one could
not totally neglect the existence of the party’s internal culture that to some extent explains the behaviour of the members of the party, which gave nuance to the presence or the absence of the party’s institutionalisation dimensions.

On the other hand, this thesis shows that the role of the organisation model and the development of cohesion are related, where the capability to establish certain managerial functions, including a functioning discipline and the rules of the game, became apparent for such development. In terms of fragmentation, there is a tendency to confirm the opinion on the crucial role of ideology in the solidity of the party. In several cases factionalisms based on ideological tendencies or orientations tend to be potentially crucial factors in the creation of internal fragmentation. In the case of PKB, however, fragmentation occurred, which was not really due to ideological conflict but to the consequences of a situation where ideology had lost its relevance and had been freely understood by the cadres becoming less significant to the cadres’ unification of values.

2.2. Suggestion for Further Research

I realize, however, that there are some other important aspects that should be explored, but due to my limitations, they could not be covered in this thesis. One of them is the exploration of other Islamic parties. In their development, some of them have survived until today whereas many of them had failed. Of those that could continue their presence in Indonesian politics until today, are PPP and PAN, which during the first decade of the reform era, also experienced internal fragmentation. The studies of these parties must be challenging. I hope that the ground covered in this thesis contributes to a useful perspective and a preliminary assumption to discuss the phenomenon of fragmentation in these parties and perhaps other Islamic parties in Indonesia.

In addition, the period after 2008 of the party’s development is also an interesting period to study. Both parties experienced some internal dynamics. After obtaining a permit from the Election Commission, PKB-Muhaimin joined the 2009 Election and faced a bitter reality due to PKB number of votes plunging to around four million compared to 13 million in the 1999 Election. This situation indicates the real damage that fragmentation may create. After the death of Wahid in December 2010, each of the conflicting groups, PKB-Muhaimin, PKB-Gus Dur and PKNU, remain separate groups. In the 2011, the PKB-Gus Dur led by Yenny Wahid changed
its name to PKBN, leaving PKB-Muhaimin as the only group including the name of PKB.

Fragmentation occurred three times, which seemed to provide good lessons for PKB, particularly PKB-Muhaimin and push this party to be more aware of institutionalisation. Some prominent figures of this party had stated the importance of establishing institutionalisation. This awareness was shown by the emergence of new internal arrangements and regulations, for instance, by creating a more serious cadrerization mechanism and creating a body to handle CRM. This new condition, to certain extent over time, had helped PKB-Muhaimin to preserve a party cohesion. Such developments are interesting subjects to study. However, a more detailed study is required to explain the current situation in PKB.

After the 2009 Election, PKS became the largest Islamic party in Indonesia, though it remains a mediocre party in terms of the number of votes. Although it was still capable of holding its cohesion, the party faced some new and crucial experiences. Some critics and ex-cadres had more courage to express their opinion and resistance to the leaders of the party. The legal action to cancel the dismissal taken by Yusuf Supendi through the court was one of the important examples. This situation was important and seemed to have seriously damaged tradition in PKS. Moreover, some people believed that this party had suffered a more serious internal factionalism, which influenced the internal dynamics in this party. The critical elements tended to grow, but found difficulty to establish themselves in this party. Furthermore, some people have also questioned the quality of cadrerization, since the quantity of these party activities at the grass roots level are tending to decrease. These PKS’ current developments are interesting subjects to discuss through the institutionalisation approach. The study in this thesis of institutionalisation in PKS may provide a perspective to discuss the latest situation of PKS. However, a comprehensive and detailed research to discuss the latest development in this party after 2008 is of course required to attain such an objective.
Mabda’ Siyasi PKB
(The Political Principles of PKB)

1. Cita-cita proklamasi kemerdekaan bangsa Indonesia adalah terwujudnya suatu bangsa yang merdeka, bersatu, adil dan makmur sejahtera lahir dan batin, bermartabat dan sederajat dengan bangsa-bangsa lain di dunia, serta mampu mewujudkan suatu pemerintahan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia menuju tercapainya kesejahteraan umum, mencerdaskan kehidupan bangsa, keadilan sosial dan menjamin terpenuhinya hak asasi manusia serta ikut melaksanakan ketertiban dunia.


3. Penjabaran dari misi yang diemban guna mencapai terwujudnya masyarakat yang dicintakan tersebut tidak bisa tidak harus dicapai melalui keterlibatan penetapan kebijakan publik. Jalur kekuasaan menjadi amat penting ditempuh dalam proses pemengaruhi pembuatan kebijakan publik melalui perjuangan pemerdayaan kepada masyarakat lemah, terpinggirkan dan tertindas, memberikan rasa aman, tenang dan terlindungi terhadap kelompok masyarakat minoritas dan membongkar sitem politik, ekonomi, hukum dan sosial budaya yang memasung kedaulatan rakyat. Bagi Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, upaya mengartikulasikan garis perjuangan politiknya dalam jalur kekuasaan menjadi hal yang niscaya dan dapat dipertanggungjawabkan.

5. Dalam kaitan dengan kehidupan bermasyarakat, berbangsa dan bernegara, kekuasaan yang bersifat demikian itu harus dapat dikelola dengan sebaik-baiknya dalam rangka menegakkan nilai-nilai agama yang mampu menebarkan rahmat, kedamaian dan kemaslahatan bagi semesta. Manifestasi kekuasaan itu harus dipergunakan untuk memperbaiki pemberdayaan rakyat agar mampu menyesuaikan persoalan hidupnya dengan lebih maslahat. Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa berketetapan bahwa kekuasaan yang hakekatnya adalah amanat itu haruslah dapat dipertanggungjawabkan di hadapan Tuhan dan dapat dikontrol pengelolaannya oleh rakyat. Kontrol terhadap kekuasaan itu hanya mungkin dilakukan manakala kekuasaan itu tidak tak terbatas dan tidak memusat disatu tangan, serta berada pada mekanisme sistem yang institusionalistik, bukan bertumpu pada kekuasaan individu, harus selalu dibuka ruang untuk melakukan kompetisi kekuasaan dengan perimbangan kekuasaan sebagai arena mengasah ide-ide perbaikan kualitas bangsa dalam arti yang sesungguhnya. Pemahaman atas hal ini tidak hanya berlaku saat memandang kekuasaan dalam tatanan kenegaraan, melainkan juga harus terefleksikan dalam tubuh internal partai.


7. Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa bercirikan humanisme religius (insaniyah diniyah), amat peduli dengan nilai-nilai kemanusiaan yang agamis, yang berwawasan kebangsaan. Menjaga dan melestarikan tradisi yang baik serta mengambil hal-hal yang baru yang lebih baik untuk ditradisikan menjadi corak perjuangan yang ditempuh dengan cara-cara yang santun dan akhlak karimah. Partai adalah ladang persemaian untuk mewujudkan masyarakat beradab yang dicitakan, serta menjadi sarana dan wahana sekaligus sebagai wadah kaderisasi kepemimpinan bangsa. Partai dalam posisi ini berkehendak untuk menyerap, menampung, merumuskan, menyampaikan dan memperjuangkan aspirasi rakyat guna menegakkan hak-hak rakyat dan memajukan pelaksanaan ketatanegaraan yang jujur, adil dan demokratis.

8. Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa adalah partai terbuka dalam pengertian lintas agama, suku, ras, dan lintas golongan yang dimanifestasikan dalam bentuk visi, misi, program perjuangan, keanggotaan dan kepemimpinan. Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa bersifat independen dalam pengertian menolak segala bentuk kekuasaan dari pihak manapun yang bertentangan dengan tujuan didirikannya partai.
Bismillahirrahmanirrahim

Bahwa cita-cita proklamasi kemerdekaan bangsa Indonesia adalah terwujudnya suatu bangsa yang merdeka, bersatu, adil dan makmur, serta untuk mewujudkan pemerintahan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia yang melindungi segenap bangsa Indonesia dan untuk memajukan kesejahteraan umum, mencerdasan kehidupan bangsa, serta ikut melaksanakan ketertiban dunia yang berdasarkan kemerdekaan, perdamaian abadi dan keadilan sosial.

Bahwa wujud dari bangsa yang dicita-citakan itu adalah masyarakat beradab dan sejahtera, yang mengejawantahkan nilai-nilai kejujuran, kebenaran, kesungguhan dan keterbukaan yang bersumber dari hati nurani; bisa dipercaya, setia dan tepat janji serta mampu memecahkan masalah sosial yang bertumpu pada kekuatan sendiri; bersikap dan bertindak adil dalam segala situasi; tolong menolong dalam kebajikan; serta konsisten menjalankan garis/ketentuan yang telah disepakati bersama. Bahwa dalam kurun tiga dasawarsa terakhir ini, perjuangan bangsa mencapai cita-cita tersebut terasa semakin jauh dari yang diharapkan. Pembangunan politik, ekonomi, sosial dan budaya telah mengabaikan faktor rakyat sebagai pemegang kedaulatan, pengingkaran terhadap nilai-nilai dan prinsip-prinsip tersebut telah melahirkan praktik kekuasaan tidak terbatas dan tidak terkendali, yang mengakibatkan kesengsaraan rakyat.

Bahwa untuk mewujudkan nilai-nilai dan prinsip tersebut serta mencegah terulangnya kesalahan serupa di masa mendatang, diperlukan tatanan kehidupan bermasyarakat, berbangsa dan bernegara yang demokratis. Di dalam tatanan kehidupan yang demokratis itu warga Jam’iyah Nahdlatul Ulama sebagai bagian dari bangsa Indonesia bertekad untuk bersama komponen bangsa lain mewujudkan masyarakat Indonesia yang adil, makmur, berakhlak mulia dan bermartabat melalui suatu wadah partai politik.

Maka dengan memohon rahmat, taufiq, hidayah, dan inayah Allah Swt, serta didorong oleh semangat keagamaan, kebangsaan dan demokrasi, kami warga Jam’iyah Nahdlatul Ulama dengan ini menyatakan berdirinya partai politik yang bersifat kejuangan, kebangsaan, terbuka dan demokratis yang diberi nama Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa.


Para Deklarator
MUNASIR ALI A. MUSTOFA BISRI
ILYAS RUCHIYAT A. MUCHIT MUZADI
ABDURRAHMAN WAHID
Appendix 3

PIAGAM DEKLARASI
PARTAI KEADILAN
(The Declaration Charter of Justice Party)

Bahwa sesungguhnya Bangsa Indonesia telah melintasi gelombang pasang naik dan pasang surut, menghela beban berat penjajahan, penindasan dan pengkhianatan. Tahap demi tahap perjuangan panjang mengantarkan bangsa ini ke gerbang kemerdekaan dan kedaulatan, yang pada mulanya diciptakan untuk mewujudkan Negara yang melindungi segenap bangsa Indonesia dan seluruh tumpah darah Indonesia untuk memajukan kesejahteraan umum, mencerdaskan kehidupan bangsa, dan ikut melaksanakan ketertiban dunia yang berdasarkan kemerdekaan, perdamaian abadi dan keadilan sosial, sesuai dengan semangat Proklamasi 1945. Namun selama lima dekade berikutnya, garis sejarah itu mengalami berbagai penyimpangan, sehingga cita-cita besar bangsa menjadi kabur.

Kejatuhan rejim Orde Lama, diikuti dengan keruntuhan rejim Orde Baru, merupakan tragedi yang seharusnya menyadarkan kembali bangsa ini akan cita-cita luarnya semula. Seluruh kekuatan bangsa wajib bergandeng tangan dengan landasan persaudaraan, keadilan, dan berpacu dalam kebaikan, seraya meninggalkan permusuhan, kedhaliman, dan pertikaian antar kelompok.

Gerakan mahasiswa, yang disokong penuh rakyat Indonesia, telah mengobarkan "Reformasi Mei 1998" sebagai peretas jalan bagi terbentuknya "Orde Reformasi"; orde yang diikat dengan nilai-nilai fitri kemanusiaan berupa keimanan, moralitas, kemerdekaan, persamaan, kedamaian, dan keadilan. Berkat rahmat Allah SWT, kemudian dipicu semangat reformasi, tercetuslah momentum untuk membangun kembali negeri yang besar ini, dalam cara pandang yang benar dan meninggalkan segala bentuk kesalahan generasi terdahulu. Mari bersatu dalam kebenaran untuk mengisi lembaran sejarah baru agar bangsa Indonesia senantiasa berdiri tegak dan berperan serta dalam mewujudkan masyarakat international yang berperadaban.


Demi mewujudkan cita-cita sejati Proklamasi, mengisi kemerdekaan, mempertahankan kedaulatan dan pe rsatuan, serta berbekal semangat reformasi dan dukungan umat dari berbagai daerah, kami selaku anak bangsa dengan ini mendeklarasikan berdirinya PARTAI KEADIL AN.

Semoga Allah Yang Maha Kuasa membimbing dan memberi kekuatan untuk menegakkan keadilan, mewujudkan keberkahan dan kemakmuran bagi seluruh bangsa Indonesia.

"... Berbuat adillah, karena adil itu lebih dekat kepada taqwa ..." (Al-Qur-an, Surah Al-Maidah: 8)
Dinyatakan di Jakarta
Ahad, 15 Rabi‘ul Tsani 1419 / 9 Agustus 1998

**Dewan Pendiri**
PARTAI KEADILAN

Dr. M. Hidayat Nurwahid, M.A.
Ketua

Luthfi Hasan Ishaq, M.A.
Sekretaris

Anggota

Dr. Salim Segaf Aljufri, M.A.
Dr. Mulyanto, M.Eng.
Dr. Ir. H. Nur Mahmudi Isma’iil, M.Sc.
Drs. Abu Ridho, A.S.
Mutammimul Ula, S.H.
K.H. Abdul Hasib, Lc.
Fahri Hamzah, S.E.
Dr. Daud Rasyid Sitorus, M.A.
Dr. Agus Nurhadi
Igo Ilham, Ak.
Chin Kun Min (al-Hafizh)
Drs. Arifinto
Nursanita Nasution, S.E., M.E.
H. Rahmat Abdullah
Dr. Ahmad Satori Ismail
Ir. Untung Wahono
Ir. Suswono
Mashadi
Dra. Sri Utami
Nurmansyah Lubis, S.E., Ak., M.M.
dr. Naharus Surur
Drs. Muhroni
Drs. H. Suharna S., M.S.
H.M. Ihsan Arlansyah Tanjung
H. Aus Hidayat
Ir. H. Tifatul Sembiring
Drs. Al Muzammil Yusuf
Drs. Mukhlis Abdi
Maddu Mallu, S.E., M.B.A.
H.M. Nasir Zein, M.A.
K.H. Acep Abdus Syakur
Dr. Ahzami Samiun Jazuli, M.A.
K.H. Yusuf Supendi, Lc.
Hj. Yoyoh Yusroh
M. Anis Matta, Lc.
Ahmad Zainuddin, Lc.
Dra. Zirlirosa Jamil
Syamsul Balda, S.E., M.M.
Habib Aboe Bakar Al-Habsyi
Sunmanjaya Rukmandis, S.H.
Ahmad Heriawan, Lc.
Drs. Erlangga Masdiana, M.Si.
Didik Akhmadi, Ak. Mcom.
K.H. Abdur Roqib, Lc.
Ahmad Hatta, M.A., Ph.D.
Makmur Hasanuddin, M.A.
Dra. Siti Zainab
Appendix 4

DEKLARASI
PARTAI KEADILAN SEJAHTERA
(Prosperous Justice Party Declaration)

Bismillahirrahmaanirrahiim


Pada tanggal 21 Mei 1998 bangsa Indonesia mengukir kembali harapannya untuk hidup dalam suasana yang mampu memberi harapan ke depan dengan digulirkannya Reformasi Nasional yang didorong oleh perjuangan mahasiswa dan rakyat. Reformasi Nasional pada hakekatnya adalah sebuah kelanjutan dari upaya mencapai kemerdekaan, keadilan dan kesejahteraan bagi bangsa Indonesia dari perjuangan panjang yang telah ditempuh selama berabad-abad.


Semoga Allah SWT memberikan hidayah dan inayah-Nya kepada kita, mengikatkan hati diantara para pengikut agama-Nya dan menolong perjuangan mereka dimana pun mereka berada. Amin.

Jakarta, 20 April 2002

Atas Nama Pendiri Partai Keadilan Sejahtera

(Drs. Almuzzammil Yusuf)
Ketua

(Drs. Haryo Setyoko)
Sekretaris Jenderal
DAFTAR NAMA PENDIRI
PARTAI KEADILAN SEJAHTERA
Abdullah
Achyar Eldine, SE
Ahmad Yani, Drs.
Ahmadi Sukarno, Lc., MA
Ahzami Samiun Jazuli, MA, DR
Ali Akhmadi, MA
Arlin Salim, Ir
Bali Pranowo, Drs
Budi Setiadi, SKH
Bukhori Yusuf, MA
Eddy Zanur, Ir, MSAE
Eman Sukirman, SE
Ferry Noor, SSi
H. Abdul Jabbar Madjid MA
H.M Ridwan
H.M. Nasir Zein, MA
Harjani Hefni, Lc
Haryo Setyoko, Drs
Herawati Noor, Dra
Herlini Amran, MA
Imron Zabidi, Mphil
Kaliman Iman Sasmita
M. Iskan Qolba Lubis, MA
M. Martri Agoeng
Muttaqin
Mahfudz Abdurrahman
Martarizal, DR
Mohammad Idris Abdus Somad, MA, DR
Muhammad Aniq S, Lc.
Muhammad Budi Setiawan, Drs
Muslim Abdullah, MA
Musoli, MSc, Drs
Musyafa Ahmad Rahim, Lc
Nizamuddin Hasan, Lc
P. Edy Kuncoro, SE, Ak
Ruly Tisnayuliansyah, Ir
Rusdi Muchtar
Sarah Handayani, SKM
Susanti
Suswono, Ir
Syamsu Hilal, Ir
Umar Salim Basalamah, SIP
Usman Effendi, Drs
Wahidah R Bulan, Dra
Wirianingsih, Dra
Yon Mahmudi, MA
Yusuf Dardiri, Ir
Zaenal Arifin
Zufar Bawazier, Lc
Zulkieflimansyah, DR.
Appendix 5


Dewan Syura

Ketua : K.H. Ma’ruf Amin
Wakil Ketua : K.H. M. Cholil Bisri

Sekretaris : K.H. M. Dawam Anwar
Anggota : K.H. Dimyati Rais
            K.H. Hasyim Latief
            Dr K.H. Nahrawi A. Salam
            K.H. M. Mukeri Gawith, MA
            K.H. Yusuf Muhammad, MA
            Brigjen TNI (Ret) Sullam Syamsun
            Hj. Sariana Thaha Ma’ruf
            TGH Turmudzi Badruddin

Dewan Tanfidz

Ketua Umum : H. Matori Abdul Djalil
Ketua : Dr. H. Alwi Shihab
            Dra. Hj Umrah M Tolchah Mansoer
            H. Agus Suflihat Mahmud
            H. Amru Mu’tashim, SH
            KH. Imam Buchari
            Drs. Yafi Thahir
            Dra. Khififah Indar Parawansa

Sekertaris Jenderal : Drs. A. Muhaimin Iskandar
Wakil Sekjen : Drs. Amin Said Husni
H. Aris Azhari Siagian
H. Yahya Cholil Staquf

Bendahara : H. Imam Churmein
Wakil Bendahara : H. Ali Mubarak
H. Safrin Romas, MBA
Appendix 6

The Central Managing Board of National Awakening Party (PKB)
Period of 2000-2005

Dewan Syura

Ketua : K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid
Wakil Ketua : K.H. M. Cholil Bisri

Sekretaris : H. Z. Arifin Junaidi
Anggota : K.H. Dawam Anwar
           K.H. Dimayati Rais
           K.H. Yusuf Muhammad, MA
           Najib Abdurrahman
           Azidin
           dr. Sugiat
           TGH Turmudzi Badruddin
           Habib Chirzin
           Imam Mansyur Burhan
           Prof. Jon Wumu
           Kamaludin Lubis
           Cholilul Rahman
           K.H. Fuad Amin Imron
           Ahmad Rofi

Dewan Tanfidz

Ketua Umum : H. Matori Abdul Djalil
Ketua : Dr. H. Alwi Shihab
          Dra. Hj Umrah M Tolchah Mansoer
Taufikurrahman Saleh
Shofwan Chudori
Imam Mawardi Sanjaya
Lalu Misbah
Zainal Mahmud

Sekertaris Jenderal : Drs. A. Muhaimin Iskandar
Wakil Sekjen : H. Yahya Cholil Staquf
Drs. Amin Said Husni
Lilis Nurul Husna
Chotibul Umam Wiranu

Bendahara : Munif Basuni
Wakil Bendahara : Nurdin Hasibuan
Nico Krisnanto
Erman Suparno

**Dewan Pertimbangan:** K.H. Ilyas Ruchiyat
K.H. Munasir Ali
K.H. Muchit Muzadi
K.H. A. Mustofa Bisri
K.H. Ma’ruf Amin
Khofifah Indar Parawansa
Imam Churmein
Muhtar Muda Nasution
Basofi Sudirman
Appendix 7

The Central Managing Board
National Awakening Party – Matori or Batu Tulis
Period of 2002-2005

Dewan Syura

Ketua : K.H. Dimyati Rais
Wakil Ketua : K.H. Maksum Jauhari

Sekretaris : Drs. K.H. Masyhuri Malik
Wakil Sekretaris : K.H. An’im Falahuddin Machrus
Anggota : K.H. Mahfud Ridwan
           Dr. K.H. Haib Wahab Hasbullah
           Prof. Dr. K.H. Ahmadi Isa, MA
           Drs. K.H.M Sholeh Harun
           H. Mahyuddin Nawawi
           K.H. Umar Anshori Khusnan
           Drs. H. Imam Sofwan
           H. Jacob Siga
           H. Habib A.Gudban
           H. Anshori Anwar
           H.R. Edy Wardoyo, SH.MH

Dewan Tanfidz

Ketua Umum : H. Matori Abdul Djalil
Ketua : K.H. Musthofa Qudbi Badri, MA
           Drs. M. Anshori Ishak
           Drs. H. Agus Suflihat Machmud
           Dr. Nadiroh Suherland, M.Pd
           Dr. H. Marwoto Mintohardjo, SE, MM
H.M. Basuni BN  
Daud Ali Lukman  
Drs. Arvin Hakim Thoha  
H. Irham Abdurrahim  
H. Ibrahim Laconi, SH  
K.H. Syarif Utsman Yahya  
H. Tan Gatot Mahawisnu  
H. Daud Nadjuri, MBA  
Dra. Marhamah Mudjib  
Drs. Isa Muchsin  
H. Amru Almu’tashim, SH, MM  
Moh. Asyikin Kaharuddien, SmHK  
Drs. H. Ahmad Syatibi  
Ir. Yusuf Dali

Sekertaris Jenderal : Drs. Abdul Khaliq Ahmad  
Wakil Sekjen : Francis Wanandi  
Suwanto DVM  
T. Aminova  
Drs. Roisuddin Ilyas  
Drs. Ridwan Balia  
Dra. Desriana Elfah  
N. Syamsuddin Ch. Haesy  
Sukarman Dj. Soemarno  
Jimmy Walewangko  
Drs. Wiwid Wizyanto

Bendahara : Nico Cristanto  
Wakil Bendahara : Ade Kardiman  
Baningsih Tedjo Kartono  
Ir. M. Yazid Bustomi  
Widi Atmaja
Appendix 8

The Central Managing Board of
National Awakening Party (PKB) – Gus Dur/Alwi or Kuningan
Period of 2000-2005

Dewan Syura

Ketua : K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid
Wakil Ketua : K.H. Moh. Cholil Bisri
   K.H. Idris Marzuki
   K.H. Irfan Zidni

Sekretaris : H. Z. Arifin Junaidi
Wakil Sekretaris : K.H. Nurhadi Iskandar Albarsani
   Drs. H. Habib Chirzin

Anggota : K.H. Yusuf Muhammad, Lc
   K.H. Drs. M. Dawan Anwar
   Hj. Asmah Syahroni
   Dra. Hj Umrah M Tolchah Mansoer
   K.H. Ma’shum Jauhari
   TGH Turmudzi Badruddin
   K.H. R. Imang Mansur Burhan
   Saggaf Aljufri
   K.H. Mutawakil Alallah
   dr. Sugiat AS, SKM
   K.H. Ahmad Rawi
   K.H. Humaidi Dahlan
   K.H. Ahmad Shoddiq
   Prof. John Wumu, SE
   H.M. Rusli
   Pedande Puni Atmaja
   K.H. Husein Muhammad

366
Dewan Tanfidz

Ketua Umum : Dr. H. Alwi Shihab
Wakil Ketua Umum : Dr. H. Moh. Mahfid MD
Ketua : Dr. H. Muhammad AS. Hikam, MA. APU
          Dr. H. Lalu Misbah Hidayat, SE, M.Si
          Drs. H. Ali Masykur Musa
          H. Taufikurrahman Saleh, SH. M.Si
          Arizna Agustina, SE
          H. Andy Muawiyah Ramly, M.Pd
          H. A. Muhaimin Iskandar, M.Si

Sekertaris Jenderal : H. Saifullah Yusuf, S.Sos*
Wakil Sekjen : H. Yahya Cholil Staquf
Drs. Amin Said Husni
Zunnatul Mafruhah, SH
Hermawi Fransiskus Taslim, SH
Dra. Hj. Gefarina Johan, MA
Ahmad Anas Yahya
Abdullah Azwar Anas, S.Pd

Bendahara Umum : H.A. Munif Basuni
Bendahara : H. Ir. Erman Soeparno
          H. Ali Mubarak
          Saleh Abdul Malik
          Bambang Sungkono
          Ir. Arya Witoelar
          Tony Wardoyo

* Replaced by H. A. Muhaimin Iskandar, M.Si in 2004

Dewan Pertimbangan: K.H. Ma’ruf Amin
                          K.H. Abdullah Faqih
K.H. Ilyas Ruchiyat
K.H. Muchit Muzadi
K.H. A. Mustofa Bisri
K.H. Abdullah Abbas
K.H. Abdullah Schaal
K.H. Zainuddin Jazuli
K.H. Sullam Samsun
Syekh Muchtar Muda Nasution
Hj. Nur Zaenab
K.H. Ahmad Sofyan
K.H. Chotib Umar
H. Imam Churmein
Appendix 9

The Central Managing Board of
National Awakening Party (PKB)-Semarang
Period of 2005-2010

Dewan Syura

Ketua Umum : K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid
Ketua : H.Z. Arifin Junaidi
   Drs. K.H. Hamdun Ahmad, M.Ag
   dr. H. Sugiat Ahmad Sumadi, SKM
   Prof. Drs. K.H. Cecep Syarifuddin, M.Pd

Sekretaris : H. Muhyidin Arubusman
Wakil Sekretaris : Dra. Hj. Badriyah Fayumi
   Dra. Hj. Anisah Mahfudz

Anggota : TGH. Turmudzi Badruddin
   Dr. K.H. Manarul Hidayat
   Prof. H. John Wumu, S.E.
   Ratu Krisna Bagus Oka
   Dr. Nur Rofi’ah
   Drs. H. Ali Hanafiyah
   Drs. H. Ahmad Rawi
   Drs. H. Amiruddin Nahrowi
   Dra. Hj. Umi Chusnul Chotimah, MA
   Buntoro
   K.H. Muzakki
   K.H. A. Razaq Safawi
   H. M. Hasyim Karim
   Drs. K.H. Dadang Za’im Affandi, M.Si
K.H. Hanif Ismail, Lc
Hj. Salis Mahrus
Dr. K.H. A. Akrom Malibary, LAS, MA
Drs. K.H. Q. Ahmad Syahid
Hj. Ma’mullah Harun, M.Si
Drs. H. Mochamad Zein, M.B.A
H. Ishomuddin M.
K.H. Maman Imanulhaq Faqieh, MA
Sigid Haryo Wibisono, S.E
K.H. Nurbasyah Junaidi
Dr. Muslim Abdurrahman
K.H. Ibnu Ubaidillah

Dewan Tanfidz

Ketua Umum : H. A. Muhamin Iskandar, M.Si
Wakil Ketua Umum : H. Ali Maskyur Musa, M.Si.
        Dr. H. Lalu Misbah Hidayat, SE. M.Si.
        Drs. H. Andi Muawiyah Ramly, M.Pd, Dipl.M
        H. A. Effendy Choirie, M.Ag. M.H.
        Hermawi Fransiskus Taslim, SH.
        Dra. Hj. Maria Ulfah Anshor, M.A.
        Muamir Mu’in Syam
        Maria Pakpahan, M.A., M.Sc.
        Dr. Moh. Mahfud MD
        Drs. Hendi Kariawan, M.Sc.
        Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, S.H
        Drs. H. Ahmad Ni’am Salim
        H. Abdul Kadir Karding, S.Pi

Sekertaris Jenderal : Zannuba A.C. Wahid
Wasekjen : Ir. H. A. Helmy Faishal Zaini
        Dra. Hj. Ida Fauziyah
        Anak Agung Ngurah Agung, S.E.
Drs. Alexius Gregorius Plate
Drs. H. Abdul Khobir
Moch. Munib Huda
Munyati Sullam, S.H. M.A
H. Ikhsan Abdullah, S.H, M.H
Abdul Muis, M.Si

Bendahara Umum : H. Aris Junadi, S.E
Wakil Bendahara : H. Bachrudin Nashori, S.Si, MM
Drs. H. A. Nashihin, MBA, AAAIJ
Hj. Nur Hasanah AJ
Appendix 10

The Central Managing Board of
National Awakening Party (PKB)-Ulama or Surabaya
Period of 2005-2010

Dewan Syura

Ketua : K.H. Abdurrahman Chudlori
Wakil Ketua : K.H. Ahmad Warson Munawwir
   K.H. Anwar Iskandar
   K.H. Chumaidi Dahlan, Lc.
   K.H. Ubaiddilah Faqih
   K.H. M. Thohir Syarkawi

Sekretaris : Prof. Dr. H. Alwi Shihab
Wakil Sekretaris : Drs. K.H. Ali As’ad
   K.H. Nur Muhammad Iskandar S.Q
   Hj. Mufidah Rozi Munir

Anggota : K.H. R. Muhammad Cholil As’ad
   K.H. Sholeh Qosim
   K.H. Hasan Amiruddin
   K.H. Muchtar Amin
   K.H. Machrus
   K.H. Abdul Haq
   K.H. Sulthon Daeng Rowa
   K.H. Amir Asyikin
   K.H. Abdul Latif Faqih
   K.H. Aniq Muhammedun
   K.H. Amin Siradj
   K.H. Habib Anis Al-Hinduwan
   Hj. Nur Hayati Agil Siradj

372
Dewan Tanfidz

Ketua Umum : Drs. H. Choirul Anam
Wakil Ketua Umum : Drs. H. Yahya Cholil Staquf
Ketua : Drs. H. Habib Syarif Muhammad
H. Aris Azhari Siagian, SH
R. Saleh Abdul Malik
Drs. H. Fathurrosyid, M.Si
Imam Anshori Saleh, Msi
Dr. H. Heflin Frinces
H. Rodjil Ghufron, SH
Hj. Ariza Agustina, SE
H. Mohamad Said
M. Murhadi, M.Si
Drs. H. Ahmad Taqiyuddin Mansur
H. Ibrahim Tambaru, SH. MH

Sekretaris Jenderal : H. Idham Cholied
Wakil Sekjend : Mohammad Tohadi, SH, M.Si
Ir. Aria Witular
Andi Najmi Fuadi, SH
Drs. H. Nur Hasan, M.Si
H. Syaifullah Adnawi, SH, MBA
Drs. Muhammad AL Khadziq
Ir. Galih Fachrudin Qurbany
Dra. Hj. Ulha Soraya
Imam Marsudi, M.Si
Zainal Abidin Amir, SIP, S.Ag
Drs. Syamsu Alam
Ir. Riswan Muflihudin
M. Ghozi Al-Fatih
Bendahara : Harry Danardoyo
Wakil Bendahara : Dipo Nusantara Pua Upa, SH
H.A. Faried Gafar, MBA
Dra. Farichatul Aini, M.Si
H. Saidul Khudri
Drs. Erwan Cik Murod
Bambang Sungkono
H. Abdul Halim
Ahmad Anas Yahya
Muhammad Prayitno

Mustasyar

Ketua : K.H. Abudllah Faqih
Wakil Ketua : K.H. Ma’ruf Amin
Anggota : K.H. A. Mustofa Bisri
K.H. Idris Marzuki
K.H. Muhammim Gunardo
K.H. Muhammad Mas Subadar
K.H. Ahmad Basyir AS
K.H. Manshur Sholeh
K.H. Idris Abdul Hamid
K.H. Ahmad Sufyan Miftahul Arifin
K.H. Zainuddin Djazuli
K.H. Abdul Djalil Ma’ruf
K.H. Zainal Abidin Munawwir
Habib Syaqaf Al-Jufri, MA
K.H. Nurul Huda Djazuli
K.H. Hasan Syarif
K.H. Hasbullah Badawi
K.H. Afif Astari

374
K.H. Khoiruddin Rais
K.H. Abdurrahman
K.H. A. Damiri
K.H. Ahmad Basyir
K.H. Abdul Azis Affandi
K.H. Ahya Al-Anshori
Hj. Nihayah Ahmad Siddiq
Hj. Umroh Tolhah Mansur
Hj. Nur Zaenab Nur
Appendix 11

The Central Managing Board of
National Awakening Party (PKB) -Parung
Period of 2008-2010

Dewan Syura

Ketua Umum : K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid
Ketua : H.Z. Arifin Junaidi
Drs. K.H. Hamdun Ahmad, M.Ag
dr. H. Sugiat Ahmad Sumadi, SKM
Prof. Drs. K.H. Cecep Syarifuddin, M.Pd
Sekretaris : Drs. H. Muhyidin Arubusman
Wakil Sekretaris : Dra. Hj. Badriyah Fayumi
Dra. Hj. Anisah Mahfudz
Anggota : TGH. Turmudzi Badruddin
Dr. K.H. Manarul Hidayat
Prof. H. John Wumu, S.E.
Ratu Krisna Bagus Oka
Dr. Nur Rofi’ah
Drs. H. Ali Hanafiyah
Drs. H. Ahmad Rawi
Drs. H. Amiruddin Nahrowi
Dra. Hj. Umi Chusnul Chotimah, MA
Buntoro
K.H. Muzakki
K.H. A. Razaq Safawi
H. M. Hasyim Karim
K.H. Dadang Za’im Affandi, Lc., M.Si
K.H. Hanif Ismail, Lc
Hj. Salis Mahrus
Dr. K.H. A. Akrom Malibari, LAS, MA
Drs. K.H. Q. Ahmad Syahid
Hj. Ma’mullah Harun, M.Si
Drs. H. Mochamad Zein, M.B.A
H. Ishomuddin Muchtar
K.H. Maman Imanul Haq, MA
K.H. Nur Basar Juned
Dr. Moeslim Abdurrahman
K.H. Ubaidillah Syathori
K.H. Nadlir Muhammad
Assyekh Habib Saggaf Bin Mahdi

**Dewan Tanfidz**

Ketua Umum : DR. H. Ali Masykur Musa, M.Si
Wakil Ketua Umum : DR. H. A. Effendy Choirie, M.Ag. M.H.
                    Dr. H. Lalu Misbah Hidayat, SE. M.Si.
                    Hermawi Fransiskus Taslim, SH.
                    Dra. Hj. Maria Ulfah Anshor, M.A.
                    Ir. Muamir Mu’in Syam
                    Dr. Maria Pakpahan, M.A., M.Sc.
                    Abdullah Azwar Anas, M.Si

Sekertaris Jenderal : Zannuba Arifah Chafsoh, MPA
Wasekjen : H. Ikhsan Abdullah, SH, MH
           Munyati Sullam, S.H. M.A
           Anak Agung Ngurah Agung, S.E.
           Drs. Alexius Gregorius Plate
           Drs. H. Abdul Khobir
           Moch. Munib Huda
           Haryanto Ogie
           Abdul Muis, M.Si

Bendahara Umum : Choirul Sholeh Rosyid, SE
Wakil Bendahara : Ali Mubarak, Amd. Par
                   Drs. H. A. Nashihin, MBA
                   Hj. Nur Hasanah AJ
                   H. Aris Junadi, S.E
Appendix 12

The Central Managing Board of
National Awakening Party (PKB)-Ancol
Period of 2008-2014

Dewan Syura

Ketua : KH. Abd. Aziz Manshur
Wakil Ketua : KH. Mafudh Ridwan
    : H. Muhyidin Arubusman
    : KH. Ali Maschan Moesa
    : KH. Munif Zuhri
    : KH. Abd. Hayyi Na’im
    : KH. Saifuddin Amsir
    : KH. Abd. Aziz Afandi

Sekretaris : H. Andi M Ramly
Wakil Sekretaris : KH. Abd. Ghafur
    : KH. Mufid Busyairi
    : KH. Mujib Chudlori

Anggota : KH. Dimyati Rois
    : KH. Subhan Ma’mun
    : Hj. Nurhayati Said Aqil Siraj
    : KH. Mukhlas Dimyati
    : KH. Najib Abd. Qodir
    : KH. Usfuri
    : KH. Maman Imanul Haq
    : Hj. Lily Rozi Munir
    : Hj. Fatimah Toyyib
    : Hj. Ida Kholidad Ilyas Rukhiyat
Dewan Tanfidz

Ketua Umum : H. A. Muhaimin Iskandar
Wakil Ketua Umum : Hj. Nursyahbani Katjasungkana
Ketua : H. Moh Lukman Edy
: H. A Helmi Faisal Zaini
: H. Abd. Kadir Karding
: H. Marwan Ja’far
: Muh. Hanif Dhakiri
: Hj. Ida Fauziyah
: Muamir Muin Syam
: H. Syaiful Bahri Anshori
: H. Ni’am Salim
: H. Saifullah Maksum
: Eko Putro S
: Hj. Anna Muawanah
: H. Abd. Wahid Maktub
: H. Agus Sulistiono
: Antonius Doni Dihen
: H. Yanuar Prihatin
: H. Amir Mahmud
: Marwan Dasopang

Sekretaris Jenderal : H. Imam Nahrawi
Wakil Sekertaris : Jazilul Fawaid
: H. Fathan Subchi
: H. M. Yusuf Mujenih
: H. Samsudin Pay
: Faisol Reza
: Luluk Nur Hamidah
: Anggia Ermarini

379
Bendahara Umum : H. Bachrudin Nasori
Wakil Bendahara : H. Arvin Hakim Thoha
: Daniel Johan
: Siti Mukarromah
: H. Arif Rahman
: Miranti Dewaningsih
: Bambang Susanto
: Dini Suhardiany
: Erni Sugiyanti
Appendix 13

The Central Managing Board of Justice Party

**Majelis Pertimbangan Partai**
- Ketua : Dr. H.M Hidayat Nurwahid, MA
- Wakil Ketua : Drs. H. Abu Ridho Abdi Sumaiti
- Sekretaris : H. Luthfi Hasan Ishaaq, MA
- Anggota : Drs. Arifinto
  - K.H Abdul Hasib
  - H. Abdul said Baharamus, Lc
  - Dr. Agus Nurhadi
  - Dr. H. Ahmad Satori Ismail, MA
  - Mashadi
  - H.M. Ihsan Arlansyah Tanjung
  - Drs. H. Suharna, MT

**Dewan Syari’ah**
- Ketua : Dr. H. Salim Segaf Aljufri, MA
- Wakil Ketua : Dr. H. Daud Rasyid Sitorus, MA
- Ketua Pelaksana : H. Setiawan Budi Utomo, Lc, MM, MBA
- Sekretaris : Imam Santoso, Lc
- Anggota : H. Aunur Rafiq Saleh Tamhid, Lc
  - Dr. H. Muslih Abdul Karim, MA
  - K.H Yusuf Supendi, Lc
  - H. Buchari Yusuf, MA
  - H. Asnin Syaf’uuddin, Lc
  - H. Ridwan Yahya
  - H. Thalhah Nuhin, Lc

**Dewan Pimpinan Pusat**
- Presiden : Dr. Ir. H. Nur Mahmudi Isma’il, MSc
- Wakil Presiden : H. Syamsul Balda, SE, MM, MBA, MSc
- Sekretaris Jenderal : H.M. Anis Matta Lc.
- Wakil Sekjen : Ir. H. Suswono, MMA.
- Bendahara Umum : Nurmasyah Lubis, AK, MM
- Wakil Bendahara : Edy Kuncoro

Departemen Kaderisasi
- Ketua : K.H Rahmat Abdullah
- Anggota : Dr. H.Ahzami Samiun Jazuli, MA
  - Navis Murbianto
  - H. Abdul Muiz, Lc
  - H. Raihan A. Iskandar, Lc
  - Ir. Fajar Rahmat Saleh
  - Drs. D.H. Al Yusni
  - H. A. Madani, Lc
  - Drs. Mahfudz Sidik
Departemen Riset dan Pengembangan
Ketua : Ir. H. Untung Wahono
Anggota : H Budi Darmawan
          Hermanto, SE

Departemen Pendidikan
Ketua : R.B. Suryama MS, Psy
Anggota : H. Fahmy Abdul Kadir Alaydrus, PSy
          H. Abdul Jabbar, MA
          Drs. H. M. Idris Abdussomad, MA

Departemen Ekonomi
Ketua : Dr. H. Ahmad Hatta, MA
Anggota : Didik Ahmadi, Ak, MCom
          Agus Puji Raharjo, SE, Ak
          H. Maddu Mallu, MBA
          Saymsul Falah, MSc
          Ir. Eddy Zanur, MSAE
          Ir. Ruly Tisna Yuliansa
          Drs. Matri Agung

Departemen Politik dan Hukum
Ketua : H. Mutamimul Ula, SH
Anggota : H. Amang Syafrudin, Lc
          Fauzul A. Abror, SH
          Drs. Al Muzzamil Yusuf
          Iman Nugraha, SH

Departemen Ilmu Pengetahuan, Teknologi dan Lingkungan Hidup
Ketua : Ir. M. Sohibul Iman, MEng
Anggota : Dr. Warsito, MEng
          Ir. Budiarto, MEng
          Ir. Purwadi, Meng

Departemen Sosial dan Kesehatan
Ketua : dr. H. Naharus Surur
Anggota : drg. H. Hardiono, Sp.B.M
          dr. Helda
          Drs. Bali Pranowo
          Ahmad Firman Yusuf
          H. Burhanuddin, Lc

Departemen Dakwah
Ketua : Drs. H. Mukhlis Abdi
Anggota : H.M. Nasir Zein, MA
          Drs. H. Ahmad Yani

382
H. A. Jazuli Juaini, Lc
Drs. Agus Wahid Rahman
Habibullah, Lc
Dra. Sitaresmi
Hj. Emma Ruchaema

Departemen Pembinaan dan Pengembangan Wilayah
Ketua : H. Abdul Raqib, Lc
Anggota : H. Ahmad Chudori
          H. Aus Hidayat Nur
          Drs. Muhroni
          Drs. Muhammad Syahfan
          Drs. Chairul Anwar, Apt
          H. Ahmad Zainuddin, Lc
          Muhammad Ferous

Departemen Seni dan Budaya
Ketua : Igo Ilham, Ak
Anggota : H. Muhammad Ridwan
          Tri Aru Wiranto
          Sidik Cahyo Kusumo
          Zack Sorga
          Halimi
          Ahmad Mabruri
          Barata, S.Si
          Yose Rizal

Departemen Kepeloporan Pemuda
Ketua : Mustafa Kamal
Anggota : Abdul Azis Muhtadi
          Agus Priatna, SPd
          Selamat Nurdin, SSos
          Dwi Septiawati, SPd
          Dra. Kingkin Anida

Departemen Penerangan dan Humas
Ketua : Ir. H. Tifatul Sembiring
Anggota : H. Aboe Bakar Al Habsy
          M. Lili Nur Aulia
          Komaruddin
          Reza Syarif, Dipl.Pn
          H. Taufiq Kiemas
          Hj. Pujiastitu, SH

Departemen Kewanitaan
Ketua : Hj. Yoyoh Yusroh
Anggota : Dra. Zirly Rosa Jamil
          Dra. Hj. Siti Zainab
          Dra. Sri Utami
          Nursanita Nasution, SE, ME

383
Appendix 14

The Central Managing Board of Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)
Period of 2003-2005

Majelis Syuro
Ketua : K.H. Hilmi Aminuddin

Majelis Pertimbangan Partai
Ketua : K.H. Rahmat Abdullah
Anggota : Drs. H. Abu Ridho Abdi Sumaiti
Drs. H. Arifinto
Mashadi
Drs. Mukhroni
H. Abdul Said Baharamus, Lc
Drs. HM Muhammad Yusuf
Hj. Yoyoh Yusroh
H. Tb. Soenmandjaja
H. Maddu Mallu, SE, MM
Dra. Hj. Aan Rohana

Dewan Syari’ah
Ketua : Dr. H. Salim Segaf Aljufri, MA
Anggota : K.H Syauqi, Lc
H. Aunur Rafiq Saleh Tamhid, Lc
Dr. H. Muslih Abdul Karim, MA
K.H Yusuf Supendi, Lc
H. Buchari Yusuf, MA
Imam Santoso, Lc
H. Bakrun Syafi’i,MA
K.H. Tadjuddin Noor
H. Raqib Abdul Kadir, Lc

Dewan Pimpinan Pusat
Presiden : Dr. H.M Hidayat Nur Wahid
Wakil Ketua Umum : Dr. H. Surahman Hidyat
Drs. H. Almuazzamimil Yusuf

Sekertaris Jenderal : H.M. Anis Matta, Lc
Wakil Sekjen : Ir. H. Suswono, MMA.
Riko Desendra, S.Si
H. Fahri Hamzah, SE
H. Abu Bakar Al Habsyi
Drs. Haryo Setyoko

Bendahara Umum : H. Luthfii Hassan Ishaaq, MA
Wakil Bendum : Edy Kuncoro, AK
Irsyal Ismail, AK
H.Mahfudz Abdurrahman, SE

Ketua Wilayah Dakwah I : Ir. H. Tifatul Sembiring
Ketua Wilayah Dakwah II : H. Aus Hidayat
Ketua Wilayah Dakwah III : Ahmad Firman Yusuf
Ketua Wilayah Dakwah IV : Ahmad Zainuddin, Lc

Ketua Lajnah Pemenangan Pemilu : M. Razikun, Msi, Ak
Ketua Biro Luar Negeri : Dipl. Eng. H. Priyatna Suryawijaya
Ketua Bidang Pembinaan Kader : H. Abdul Hasib Jassan, Lc
Ketua Departemen Kaderisasi : Drs. H. Mahfudz Siddiq, M.Si
Ketua Departemen Dakwah : Drs. H. Ahmad Yani
Ketua Dep. Kepeloporan Pemuda : Mustafa Kamal, SS
Ketua Dep. Olahraga dan Kepanduan : Ir. Ahmad Faradis

Ketua Bid. Pembinaan SDM : Drs. H. Suharna Surapranata, MT
Ketua Dep. Pembinaan Organisasi : H. Budi Dharmawan
Ketua Departemen Pendidikan : Drs. H. Musholli
Ketua Bidang Kebijakan Publik : Dr. H. Iwan Prayitno
Ketua Dep. Politik dan Hankam : Ir. H. Untung Wahono, M.Si

Ketua Departemen Hukum dan HAM : H. Mutamimul Ula, SH
Ketua Dep. Komunikasi dan Jaringan: RB Suryama Psi
Ketua Departemen Seni dan Budaya : H. Muhammad Ridwan
Ketua Bidang Kewenitaan : Hj. Nursanita Nasution
Ketua Dep. Pemberdayaan Wanita : Hj. Herlini Amran, MA
Ketua Bidang Ekonomi : Didik Ahmadi, AK, M.Com
Ketua Dep. Pemberdayaan Ekonomi : Ir. H. Rulli Tisna Yuliansa
Ketua Dep. Kebijakan Ekonomi : Dr. Zulkiflimansyah
Ketua Dep. Buruh, Tani dan Nelayan: H.M. Martri Agoeng
The Central Managing Board of Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)
Period of 2005-2010

Majelis Syuro

Badan Pertimbangan Tugas dan Jabatan : ex officio
Ketua : Drs. H. Suharna Supranata, MT.

Badan Penagak Disiplin Organisasi : ex officio
Ketua : H. Luthfi Hasan Ishaq, MA

Dewan Pimpinan Pusat
Presiden Partai : Ir. H. Tifatul Sembiring
Sekretaris Jenderal : H.M. Anis Matta Lc.
Wakil Sekjen I : Ir. H. Suswono, MMA.
Wakil Sekjen II : Ir. Ade Barkah
Wakil Sekjen III : Ir. Aboe Bakar Alhabsy
Wakil Sekjen IV : Dr. Mardani
Wakil Sekjen V : H. Fahri Hamzah, SE.
Wakil Sekjen VI : Nurhasan Zaidi, S.Sos.I
Wakil Sekjen VII : Riko Desendra : SSI.
Bendahara Umum : H. Mahfud Abdurrahman
Bendahara I : P. Edy Kuncoro
Bendahara II : Masfuri, Ak.
Bendahara III : Taruna Wiyasa
Bendahara IV : H. Kiemas Taufik
Bendahara V : H. Didin Amaruddin, Ak.

Bidang Pembinaan Kader : Ahmad Zainuddin, Lc
Departemen Kaderisasi : Abdul Muiz, MA
Departemen Dakwah : Thahhah Nuhin, Lc.
Departemen MDI : Samin Barkah, Lc
Bidang Pembinaan Wilayah : H. Aus Hidayat Nur
Departemen Wilda Sumbagsel : Drs. M. Syahfan Badri
Dep. Wilda Banten, Jakarta, Jabar : Ir. Syamsu Hilal
Dep. Wilda Jateng dan Jogyakarta : Zubéir Syafawi, SH.I
Dep. Wilda Jatim dan Bali : Ir. Sigit Sosiantomo
Dep. Wilda Kalimantan : Abdurrohman Amin
Dep. Wilda Maluku, Malut, Irian : Ahmad Zaki, Ak.
Departemen Wilda NTB, NTT : Triono, SH.

Bidang Kewanitaan : Ledia Hanifa, MS
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Departemen Kajian Wanita</th>
<th>dra. Sri Utami, MM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dep. Jaringan Lembaga Wanita</td>
<td>Netti Prasetyani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departemen Pemberdayaan Wanita</td>
<td>Dwi Septiawati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat</td>
<td>drs. H. Musholi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departemen Kesehatan dan Sosial</td>
<td>dr. H. Agoes Koos Hartoro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departemen Kemahasiswaan</td>
<td>Ahmad Ariyandra, Ak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departemen Seni dan Budaya</td>
<td>H. M. Ridwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bidang Polhukam</td>
<td>Ir. H. Untung Wahono, Msi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departemen Politik dan Hankam</td>
<td>drs. H. Almuzammil Yusuf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departemen Hukum dan HAM</td>
<td>Fitra Arsil, SH, MH.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departemen Pemerintahan dan Otda</td>
<td>Achyar Eldine, SE,MM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bidang Euintek</td>
<td>DR. Mohammad Sohibul Iman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep.Ekonomi, Keuangan, Perbankan</td>
<td>Sigit Pramono, SE, MSE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departemen Pembinaan UKM</td>
<td>Ir. H. Ruly Tsina Yuliansyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departemen Teknologi, Industri, LH</td>
<td>DR. Edi Syukur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departemen Buruh Tani, Nelayan</td>
<td>Eddy Zannur, MSAE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bidang Pembinaan Pemuda</td>
<td>Ir. Ahmad Faradis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departemen Kepeloporan Pemuda</td>
<td>Slamet Nurdin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departemen Kepanduan</td>
<td>Cahya Zailani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departemen Olahraga</td>
<td>Unggul Wibawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badan-Badan di Bawah DPP</td>
<td>H.M. Razikun, Ak, MS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badan Pemenangan Pemilu</td>
<td>Hermanto, SE, MM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badan Legislatif</td>
<td>dhrs. H. Mahfudz Siddiq, MSE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badan Litbang</td>
<td>H. Lutfi Hasan Ishaq, MA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Dewan Syariah Pusat**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ketua</th>
<th>Dr. H. Surahman Hidayat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amin Maktab</td>
<td>H. Bukhari Yusuf, MA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amin Mali</td>
<td>H. Kastiri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laznah Qadha</td>
<td>drs. Muhroni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amin Lajnah</td>
<td>DR. H. Muslih A. Karim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anggota</td>
<td>Dr. H. Mu’inuddin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H. Abdul Hasyib Hasan, Lc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H. Amang Syarifuddin, Lc, Msi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lajnah Tahqiq</td>
<td>H. Iskan Qolban Lubis, MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koordinator</td>
<td>DR. H. Idris Abdu Shamad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anggota</td>
<td>H. Aunurafiq Saleh Tamhid, Lc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hj. Herlini Amran, MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dra. Suzy Mardiani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lajnah Ifta</td>
<td>Harjani Hefni, MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amin Lajnah</td>
<td>Dr. H. Muslih Abdul Karim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anggota</td>
<td>Dr. H. Muiduddin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H. Abdul Hasib Hasan, Lc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H. Abdul Aziz Arbi, MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H. Abdul Ghani Kasuba, Lc</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Lajnah Tabrib
Amin Lajnah : H. Abdul Raqib, Lc
Anggota : A. Zairofi, Lc,
        drs. H. Amad Yani
Staf Sekretariat/Teknologi Informasi : Ridho Kurniawan

Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat
Ketua : Drs. H. Suharna Surya Pranata, MT.
Sekretaris : Drs H. Arifinto
Komisi Organisasi dan Kewilayahan
Ketua : Ir. Memed Sosiawan
Anggota : Najib Subroto, SE, H. Refrizal
Komisi Pembinaan Kader dan Kewanitaan
Ketua : Drs. H. Abdi Sumaithi
Anggota : Mustafa Kamal
        Hj. Aan Rohana, Mag
        H. Yoyoh Yusroh, Sag.
Komisi Kebijakan Publik
Ketua : H. TB. Sunmandjaja
Anggota : Hj. Nursanita Nasution, SE, ME
        Didik Akhmadi, Ak.,M.Com.
        Mutammimul Ula, SH.
Komisi Kajian Strategis
Ketua : H. Ahmad Firman Yusuf
Anggota : H. Suripto, SH,
        H. Ahmad Relyadi.
Dewan Pakar
Ketua : H. Suripto, SH.
## Appendix 16

### The Table of Score of the Candidate of Major for Depok

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Marketable</th>
<th>Acceptable</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Experience</th>
<th>Understanding Depok</th>
<th>Scoring</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Significance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Scoring</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. Nur Mahmudi Ismail</td>
<td>14 5 0 1</td>
<td>12 6 1 1</td>
<td>9 7 2 0</td>
<td>15 3 2 1</td>
<td>1 4 12 3</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>66.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17 4.5 0 0.3</td>
<td>12 4.5 0.5</td>
<td>0.3 7.2 4.2</td>
<td>0.8 0.9 1.4</td>
<td>0.6 0.2 0.4</td>
<td>1.2 2.4 0.3</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>66.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amang Syafrudin</td>
<td>7 8 5 0</td>
<td>7 8 5 1</td>
<td>1 6 9 5</td>
<td>3 8 6 3</td>
<td>8 10 2 1</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>57.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.4 7.2 3 0</td>
<td>7 6 2.5 0.3</td>
<td>0.8 3.6 3.6</td>
<td>1 1.8 3.6</td>
<td>1.8 0.5 3.2</td>
<td>3 0.4 0.1</td>
<td>11 14.6 16.1 4.6</td>
<td>46.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saleh Martapermana</td>
<td>2 8 8 2</td>
<td>2 2 10 6</td>
<td>1 2 9 8</td>
<td>3 7 7 4</td>
<td>10 5 3 3</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>57.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.4 7.2 4.8 0.6</td>
<td>2 1 5 5.1</td>
<td>0.8 1.2 3.6</td>
<td>1.6 1.8 3.2</td>
<td>2.1 0.6</td>
<td>4 1.5 0.6 0.3</td>
<td>11 14.6 16.1 4.6</td>
<td>46.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yunus Daud</td>
<td>0 2 8 10</td>
<td>0 3 8 9</td>
<td>2 4 9 5</td>
<td>0 6 8 6</td>
<td>1 4 8 7</td>
<td>2 10.4</td>
<td>16.4  7.85 36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.1 1.8 4.8 3</td>
<td>0 2.3 4 2.3</td>
<td>1.6 2.4 3.6</td>
<td>1 0.2 2.7</td>
<td>2.4 0.9</td>
<td>0.4 1.2 1.6 0.7</td>
<td>2 10.4</td>
<td>16.4 7.85 36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muslih Abd. Karim</td>
<td>8 6 6 1</td>
<td>7 5 8 1</td>
<td>2 3 11 5</td>
<td>0 5 14 2</td>
<td>1 8 10 2</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>54.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.6 5.4 3.6 0.3</td>
<td>7 3.8 4 0.3</td>
<td>1.6 1.8 4.4</td>
<td>1 0.2 2.3</td>
<td>4.2 0.3</td>
<td>0.4 2.4 2 0.2</td>
<td>18.6 15.6 18.2 2.05</td>
<td>54.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Musholli</td>
<td>3 5 8 3</td>
<td>3 6 9 2</td>
<td>5 5 7 3</td>
<td>3 8 6 2</td>
<td>3 3 12 2</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.6 4.5 4.8 0.9</td>
<td>3 4.5 4.5 0.5</td>
<td>4 3.2 2.8</td>
<td>0.6 1.8 3.6</td>
<td>1.8 0.3</td>
<td>1.2 0.9 2.4 0.2</td>
<td>13.6 16.5 16.3 2.5</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bahrun Syah</td>
<td>0 4 14 2</td>
<td>1 4 14 1</td>
<td>2 5 11 3</td>
<td>1 8 10 1</td>
<td>1 6 13 1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 3.6 8.4 0.6</td>
<td>1 3 7 0.3</td>
<td>1.6 3.4 4.4</td>
<td>0.6 0.6 3.6</td>
<td>3 0.2</td>
<td>0.4 1.8 2.6 1</td>
<td>3.6 15 25.4 1.7</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abd. Muaz</td>
<td>1 7 10 3</td>
<td>0 7 10 3</td>
<td>0.3 3 12 6</td>
<td>0 7 10 4</td>
<td>3 3 9 9 1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2 6.3 6.9 0.8</td>
<td>0 5.3 5 0.8</td>
<td>0 1.8 4.8 1.2</td>
<td>0 3.2 3</td>
<td>0.6 1.2 27 1.8 0.1</td>
<td>2.4 19.2 20.6 3.55</td>
<td>45.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ihsan Tanjung</td>
<td>6 9 4 2</td>
<td>5 5 9 2</td>
<td>2 5 8 5</td>
<td>1 4 10 5</td>
<td>0 2 14 6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.2 8.1 2.4 0.6</td>
<td>5 3.8 4.5 0.5</td>
<td>1.6 3 3.2 1</td>
<td>0.6 1.8 3</td>
<td>0.8 0.6 2.8 0.6</td>
<td>17.3 15.9 3.45 51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. Prihandoko</td>
<td>0 4 12 5</td>
<td>2 3 12 3</td>
<td>4 10 6 1</td>
<td>2 7 9 3</td>
<td>0 4 9 8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 3.6 7.2 1.5</td>
<td>2 2.3 6 0.8</td>
<td>3.2 6.4 2.4</td>
<td>0.2 1.2 3.2</td>
<td>2.7 0.5</td>
<td>0 1.2 1.8 0.8</td>
<td>1 6.4 20.1 3.7</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Glossary

**Ahlu al-halli wa al-'aqdi**: A group of Islamic scholars or experts that has a power to decide the grand design of party's political agendas and policies.

**Ahlu sunnah wal jamaah**: group of Muslims that understands and practices Islam and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad by following the path, rule, method or tradition which had been established by the *jamaah*, namely first the generation of the Prophet Muhammad's close-friends (*sahabah* and *tabiin*) to the next generations of the followers, represented by the *ulama*. (Aswaja)

**Al-Qur'an**: Muslim Holy book.

**Anggaran Dasar and Anggaran Rumah Tangga**: The Statutes and Rules of Association of a Party (AD/ART) or party's constitution.

**Aqidah**: Faith.

**Badan Kehormatan**: Council of Honour.

**Badan Pekerja**: Executive Committee.

**Badan Penegak Disiplin Organisation**: Board for Organisational Discipline Enforcement. A body that was established to be in charge of disciplinary matters and to control the commitment of the cadres in implementing the party's mission including the shared values.

**Barisan Penyadar PSII**: Self-Realisation Front of PSII.

**Berjamaah**: to gather together.

**Dakwah**: Islamic Predication or propagation.

**Daurah**: Training.

**Demokrasi Terpimpin**: Guided Democracy. An era of authoritarian government (1959-1965), led by the President Soekarno, who believes in the unique type of Indonesian democracy.

**Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia**: Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication (DDII). An Islamic missionary organisation founded in 1967 by Mohammad Natsir, a former leader of Masyumi.

**Dewan Muhtasyar**: Advisory Council

**Dewan Syura**: Consultative Board

**Dewan Syuriah**: Consultative Board

**Dewan Tanfidz**: Executive Board

**Dewan Tanfidziyah**: Executive Board

**Fikrah**: Idea, thought.

**Fiqh**: System of Jurisprudence

**Forum Kader Peduli**: The Care Cadre Forum (FKP). A group that was set up by ex-PKS' cadres as an informal medium to criticize the existence of the party and mainly its leader.
**Forum Langitan:** A forum of very special and senior NU’s Islamic scholars led by Abdullah Faqih that usually takes place in the Pesantern Langitan, Tuban City, East Java Province.

**Garda Bangsa:** Nation Guard. A semi military organization and subpart of PKB.

**Gerakan Pemuda Anshor:** Youth Movement of Anshor (GP Anshor).

**Gerakan Tarbiyah:** Education Movement, a movement which flourishes in 1980s mainly in campus mosques and becomes an embryo of PKS.

**Golkar:** Golongan Karya. (Functional Group). A political party founded by the regime of Soeharto.

**Hadith:** the saying of the Prophet Muhammad.

**Halaqah:** Circle or Development Unit. An obligation activity for PKS' cadres, conducted in a small group with around 5-12 members.

**Hizbut Tahrir:** A trans-national movement, founded by Taqiyyuddin al-Nabhani in Jordan which has promoted the establishment of an international caliph.

**Ijithad:** interpretation through reasoning.

**Ikhwan Muslimin:** The Muslim Brothers founded by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928.

**Imam:** Leader.

**Islah:** Reconciliation or peaceful settlement of conflict.

**Jamiiyah:** Organization or association.

**Jaring Capres Emas:** Golden President Candidate Selection (Jaring Emas). A selection method for president candidate set up by PKS prior to the 2004 President Election.

**Jemaah/Jamaah:** Group or Congregation.

**Jundiyah:** Soldier or Follower.

**Kader inti:** Main Cadres.

**Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia:** Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union. An extra campus organization founded by activist of Jemaah Tarbiyah in secular campuses in 1998.

**Komite Pembela Kebenaran PSII:** The Defence Committee of Truth for PSII

**Korwil:** Area Coordinator. A party’s apparatus which its main function is to coordinate several managing boards at the village level.

**Kyai:** Muslim Cleric

**Mabda Siyasi:** Political Principles

**Mabit:** Night activity to improve spiritual capacity

**Mahkamah Agung:** Supreme Court (MA)

**Majelis Syura:** Consultative Assembly or Consultative Council

**Masura:** Majelis Silaturahmi Ulama Rakyat (the Assembly of Peoples’ Islamic Scholar Meeting). A forum established by Wahid and his followers to challenge the existence of several very-seniors Ulama who are mainly the members of the Langitan Forum.
**Masyumi, Partai Politik Islam**: Majlis Syura Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Assembly of Indonesian Muslim), Islamic Political Party. The largest Indonesia Islamic political party (1945-960), established by several important Islamic organizations, including NU and Muhammadiyah, in Yogyakarta in 1945.

**Mazhab**: School of Islamic jurisprudential thought.

**Mihwar**: Stage.

**Moderen**: Modern. It refers to a modernist Muslim group.

**Modernist Islam**: A reformed wing of Islam that has attempted to remove local and historical beliefs from the Islamic orthodoxy unique to Indonesia; and concerned with the purification of Islamic teachings.

**Muffaraqah**: definitely ending the relationship with the opponent.

**Muhammadiyah**: A modernist group association influenced by the ideas of Muhammad Abduh in Egypt founded in 1912.

**Mukernas**: Musyawarah Kerja Nasional (National Working Conference).

**Muktamar**: Conference.

**Munas**: Musyawarah Nasional (National Conference).

**Murabbi**: Teacher, mentor.

**Muspim**: Musyawarah Pimpinan (the Conference of the Heads).

**Musyarakah**: Political participation or Cooperation.

**Musyawarah**: Consultation.

**Mutirabbi**: Pupil or student.

**Nahdlatul Ulama**: Awakening of Islamic Scholars. An Islamic organisation associated to traditionalist group founded in 1926 in Surabaya to counter increasing modernist influence and to defend the interest of traditional/orthodox Muslims.

**Pancasila**: The Five state-endorsed principles. The principles are: belief in one God, nationalism, humanitarianism, democracy and social justice.

**Parmusi**: Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslims Party), formed in 1968 by government approval to represent modernist Islamic interest.

**Partai Dakwah**: Dakwah Party. A party that is fulfilled mainly by the spirit to propagate Islamic teachings to every single Muslim, entire society and the state.

**Partai Islam Indonesia**: Indonesian Islamic Party. A party founded by Sukiman, one of ex SI leaders.

**Partai Kader**: Cadre Party. A party that believe in the quality of the cadres rather than their quantity.

**Partai Keadilan**: Justice Party. A party established by members of Jemaah Tarbiyah in 1998 and changed its name into Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or (Prosperous Justice Party/PKS) in 2002.

**Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi)**: Indonesia Muslims’ Party. The party aimed to continue the struggle of Masyumi after it failed to be revived.

**Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia**: Party of Indonesia Islamic Association. A Muslim trader based association became the first political medium for indigenous Muslims and Indonesian in general.

**Pengkaderan Formal Dasar**: Basic Formal Cadrerization.
**Pengkaderan Formal Kejuruan**: Vocational Formal Cadrerization.

**Perti**: *Persatuhan Tarbiyah Islamiyah* (Islamic Education Association). Traditionalist organisation based in West Sumatra.

**Pesantren**: Ulama led Islamic boarding school.

**Pragmatisme**: the Indonesian term for ‘self-seeking behaviour’ – quite different from the common English usage for ‘pragmatism’.

**Qiyadah**: The Leaders.

**Rapat Gabungan**: Join session.

**Rapat Pleno**: Plenary Meeting.

**Riilah**: Physical activity or Recreation.

**Santri**: Devout Muslim or (Kyai’s) disciples.

**Sarekat Dagang Islam**: (Islamic Commerce Association). An organization of Javanese batik traders founded by Samanhudi in 1905.

**Syabi**: Society, community or socialisation.

**Syariah**: Islamic Law.

**Syura**: Consultation.

**SI-Merah**: the Red SI. A faction inside *Sarekat Islam* (Islamic Association) with the Marxist orientation

**SI-Putih**: the White SI. A non-Communist camp inside Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association) led by Agus Salim, Abdoel Moeis and Soerjopranoto.

**Ta’aruf**: Introduction or knowing each other.

**Ta’at**: Obedience.

**Tafakul**: Assistance, insurance or helping each other.

**Taklim Rutin Mingguan**: Weekly Routine Meeting.

**Tanzim**: Organisation.

**Tarbiyah**: Education or training model of Jemaah Tarbiyah in disseminating its ideas developed by Egyptian Ikhwan Muslimin and adopted by Jemaah Tarbiyah activist as cadrerization system in PKS.

**Tawhid**: Theology of the oneness of God.

**Tim Sebelas** an independent committee (that consisted of 11 members) that held a series of verification, for mainly examining and stipulating the eligibility of the parties to join the 1999 election. This effort was important since not all parties were actually ready to join the election.

**Tim Tiga**: Team of Three. A team that was established by DPP of PKB to confirm negative rumours, involving Party’s General Secretary Syaifulah Yusuf. The members of this team are Prof. M Mahfud MD, Dr. A.S Hikam and Nur Iskandar Al-Barsany.

**Tsiqoh**: Trust.

**Ulama Khos**: Very senior or special Islamic Scholars.

**Ulama**: Islamic scholars, jurists.
**Ummah**: Society, community and nation.

**Usrah**: Family, Group or Cell System.

**Ustadz**: Religious Teacher.
A. Primary Sources

1. Interview with National Awakening Party Leaders and Cadres.

   Interview with Abdul Khalik Ahmad, Secretary of PKB Faction in DPR RI (1999-2001) and General Secretary of PKB- Jalil (2000-2005), in Jakarta, 11 October 2010.


   Interview with Ahmad Shodiq Noor, General Secretary of DKI Jakarta DPW of PKB, in Jakarta, 3 November 2010.


   Interview with Anas Nashikin, General Secretary of Garda Bangsa, one of PKB’s onderbows, in Jakarta, 26 October 2010.

   Interview with Andi M. Ramly, Chairperson of Dewan Tanfidz (2002-2010), Secretary of Dewan Syuro “PKB- Muhaimin” (2008-2010) and the writer of “Mabda Syiyasi PKB”, in Jakarta, 15 October 2010.


   Interview with Dr. Kamarudin, Islamic Political Party Observer, Lecture at Department of Political Sciences, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010.


   Interview with Ida Fauziyah, Member of Parliament of PKB (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 14 October 2010.


Interview with Marinah Hardy, Chairperson of *Dewan Tanfidz* of Western Nusa Tenggara DPW of PKB (2002-2005), in Jakarta, 28 October 2010.


Interview with Prof. Dr. Kacung Marijan, NU policies’ observer and former member of Assistance Team of the proposal for the establishment of PKB (Rembang version), in Jakarta, 26 November 2010.


Interview with Tohadi, Member of PKB (1998-2005) and Vice Chairperson of PKNU DPP, in Jakarta, 6 October 2010.

Interview with Yahya Cholil Staquf, Vice of General Secretary of PKB (1998-2005) and President Abdurrahman Wahid Spokesperson (2001), in Rembang, 11 November 2010.


Interview with Khatibul Umam Wiranu, Vice General Secretary of PKB (1999-2005), and Member of Parliament (1998-2004), in Depok, 17 October 2010.

Interview with Dr. A. Effendy Choirie, Member of Parliament from PKB (1998-2011) and The Chairperson of *Dewan Tanfidz* PKB-Versi Parung (2008-2009), in Jakarta, 19 October 2010.

Interview with Abdul Muhaimin Iskandar, General Secretary of PKB (2000-2002), Chairperson of *Dewan Tanfidz* (2002-2005), General Chairperson of *Dewan Tanfidz* (2005-2013) and Minister of Man Power and Transmigartion, in Jakarta, 13 October 2010.

Interview with Munib Huda Abdullah, Vice General Secretary of PKB (2008-2010) Abdurrahman Wahid personal's Secretary, in Jakarta, 26 October 2010.

Interview with A. Mustafa Bisri, One of PKB’s Founding Fathers, in Rembang, 11 November 2010.

2. Interview with Prosperous Justice Party Leaders and Cadres.

Interview with Ahmad Feri Firman Yusuf, the Head of the III Dakwah Region (2002-2005), member of Majelis Syuro PKS (2002-2010), in Jakarta, 2 November 2010.

Interview with Akmal Burhanuddin, former *tarbiyah* activist and student in Egypt who joined PKS after finishing his study, in Jakarta, 24 October 2010.

Interview with Amri Yusra, M.Si, Chairperson of Depok DPD of PKS (2002-2004), Member of Parliament of Depok District, West Java, (2004-2009), and Lecturer at Political Sciences Department, Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010.
Interview with Aus Hidayat Nur, Head of the II Dakwah Region (2002-2005) and the Chairperson of BPDO (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 15 October 2010.

Interview with Dr. Kamarudin, Indonesian Islamic political party expert and Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 7 October 2010.

Interview with Dr. Prihandoko, Chairperson of Depok DPP of PKS (2004-2007) in Depok, 5 October 2010.

Interview with Dr. Yon Mahmudi, PKS and Tarbiyah Movement observer, Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, and one of the cadres who signed PKS establishment declaration, in Depok, 6 October 2010.

Interview with Hidayat, MM, Member of Parliament of Tangerang District (2005-2010), in Tangerang, 21 October 2010.

Interview with K.H Yusuf Supendi Lc, Member of DSP of PKS (2000-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2009), in Jakarta, 3 November 2010.

Interview with Kemal A. Stamboel, Head of Expert Advisory Body of PKS and Member of Parliament (2009-2014), in Jakarta, 8 October 2010.

Interview with Mahfrudz Siddiq, Head of Cadrerization Department of DPP of PKS (2002-2005) and Member of Parliament (2004-2014), in Jakarta, 27 October 2010.

Interview with Musa Abdillah, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Kelapa Dua DPC of PKS, in Jakarta, 23 October 2010.

Interview with Mustofa, cadre of PKS and former reporter of Profetik Magazine, established by cadres of PKS, in Depok, 7 October 2010.

Interview with Nooryanto, Chairperson of Cadrerization Department of Bekasi DPD of PKS, in Bekasi, 7 November 2010.

Interview with Selamat Nurdin, MM, former tarbiyah activist leader in University of Indonesia, Member of Parliament of DKI Jakarta Province (2004-20014), in Jakarta, 22 October 2010.

Interview with Untung Wahono, Head of Department of Research and Development of DPP of PK (2000-2003), Head of Department of Politics and Defence of DPP of PKS (2002-2005), and Chairperson of MPP of PKS (2010-2015), in Jakarta 27 October 2010.
Interview with Dr. Mardani Ali Sera, Vice Chairperson of MPP PKS (2010-2015), in Jakarta, 6 October 2010.

Interview with Hurriyah MA, cadreization of PKS observer and Lecturer at Political Science Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia, in Depok, 29 October 2010.

Interview with Noviyanti Utaminingsing, cadre of PKS, in Jakarta, 9 October 2010.

I also conducted several interviews with other members of the National Awakening Party and the Prosperous Justice Party but for some reason they did not want their name to be cited in this thesis.

2. Official Documentations

2.1. The National Awakening Party (PKB)


Decree No: 3/MLB/PKB/V/2008 on Tim Utusan Muktamar Luar Biasa untuk Penyelesaian Perselisihan Politik PKB melalui Musyawarah (the Envoy Team of Special Conference for the Political Conflict Resolution through Consultation).


Dokumentasi Hasil Mukatamar II Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Semarang, 16-19 April (Jakarta: DPP PKB, 2005).


DPW PKB Jawa Timur, Data dan Fakta Pelanggaran AD/ART di Muktamar II Semarang, (DPW PKB Jawa Timur, 2005).


The 1998 Anggaran Dasar (AD) of PKB.
The 1998 Anggaran Rumah Tangga (ART) of PKB.

The 2000 Anggaran Dasar (AD) of PKB.

The 2000 Anggaran Rumah Tangga (ART) of PKB.

The 2002 Anggaran Dasar (AD) of PKB.

The 2002 Anggaran Rumah Tangga (ART) of PKB.

The 2005 Anggaran Dasar (AD) of PKB.

The 2005 Anggaran Rumah Tangga (ART) of PKB.

The 2008 Anggaran Dasar (AD) of PKB.

The 2008 Anggaran Rumah Tangga (ART) of PKB.

The Anggaran Dasar (AD) of Partai Kebangkitan Nahdlatul Ulama (PKNU).

The Anggaran Rumah Tangga (ART) of Partai Kebangkitan Nahdlatul Ulama (PKNU).


2.2. The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)


Bayan of PKS, 6 Februari 2008.


[http://munaspks.info/](http://munaspks.info/)


*The 2002 Anggaran Dasar (AD) of PKS.*

*The 2002 Anggaran Rumah Tangga (ART) of PKS.*

*The 2005 Anggaran Dasar (AD) of PKS.*

*The 2005 Anggaran Rumah Tangga (ART) of PKS*

*The Anggaran Dasar (AD) of Partai Keadilan.*

*The Anggaran Rumah Tangga (ART) of Partai Keadilan.*

*The Muqadimmah of The 2005 AD of PKS.*


Tim Kerja Penyusunan Kurikulum, Satuan Acara Pembelajaran Tarbiyah Islamiyah: Buku 2, unpublished.

Tim Kerja Penyusunan Kurikulum, Satuan Acara Pembelajaran Tarbiyah Islamiyah: Buku 3, unpublished

B. Secondary Sources

1. Books and Journals


Anam, Choirul, *Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan NU*, (Solo: PT Duta Aksara Mulia, 2010).


Bell, David S, and Eric Shaw, (eds), *Conflict and Cohesion in Western European Social Democratic Parties*, (London: Pinter Publisher, 1994).


Tarbiyah di Indonesia, (Bandung: Teraju, 2002).


Dhume, Sadanand, “Indonesian Democracy’s Enemy Within, Radical Islamic party threatens Indonesia with ballots more than bullets”, *YaleGlobal*, 1 December 2005.


Hilmy, Masdar, *Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia Piety and Pragmatism*, (Singapore: Institute of South East Asia Studies, 2010).


Dinamika, (Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, 2007).

Institute of History Department of General Affairs PSII, Short History of PSII, (1960).


Martin F. Bull, “Social Democracies’ Newest Recruit?: Conflict and Cohesion in the Italian Democratic Party of the Left”, in David S. Bell, and Eric Shaw, (eds),
Conflict and Cohesion in Western European Social Democratic Parties, (London: Pinter Publisher, 1994).


Noer, Deliar, Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia 1900-1942, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982).


Padgett, Stephen, “The German Social Democratic Party: Between Old and New Left”, in David S. Bell, and Eric Shaw, (eds), Conflict and Cohesion in Western European Social Democratic Parties, (London: Pinter Publisher, 1994).


Pirage, Dennis C, Stabilitas Politik dan Pengelolaan Konflik, (Jakarta: FIS-UI, 1982).


Sukamto, Kepemimpinan Kiai dalam Pesantren, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1999).


Tocqueville, Alexis de, Democracy in America, (New York: George Adelard, 1839).


2. Articles in Newspaper, Magazines or Internet


“Caleg PKS Ditentukan Melalui Pemilu Internal”, Republika, 30 December 2003.


“DPP PKB Dinilai Langgar AD/ART”, Media Indonesia, 15 April 2005.


“Kasasi Wahid Ditolak”, Kompas, 18 Juli 2008


“Kubu yang Tak Puas Dianjurkan Islah”, Republika, 23 April 2005.

“Ma’ruf Amin Saingi Wahid”, Koran Tempo, 16 April 2005.


“Sanksi Alwi tergantung DPP PKS”, *http://sijaka.wordpress.com/2010/02/12/sanksi-alwi-tergantung-dpp-pks/*

“Sejarah PK Sejahtera”, *www.pk-sejahtera.org*.


“Sikap Resmi PKS atas Tuduhan Mantan Kader”, pkspiyungan.blogspot.com, 18 March 2011


Collins, Elizabeth Fuller, "Islam is the Solution, Dakwah and Democracy in Indonesia", in http://www.classics.ohio.edu/faculty/collins/islamsolution.pdf.


http://www.inilah.com/berita/politik/2008/04/05/21476/investigasi-pkb-tunjuk-10-nama/


http://www.pk-sejahtera.org/content/saksi-pks-bacakan-surat-pemecatan-yusuf-supendi


http://www.suaramerdeka.com/harian/0511/28/nas03.htm

Ida, Laode, "PKB dalam Jebakan 'Wahidisme'", Media Indonesia, 19 April 2005.


Matta, Anis, "Dakwah, Politik dan Startegi", in Saksi, Number 11, Year III, 6 March 2001


Siddiq, Mahfudz, “Posisi Tarbiyah dalam Dakwah Partai Keadilan Sejahtera”, Saksi, No. 20, IV, 4 August 2004


3. Newspapers, Magazines and other Publications

Bisnis Indonesia, 29 April 2004.

Detik.com, 10 January 2001.


Gatra, 2 July 2004.


http://munaspks.info/

Kompas, 19 November 2005.

Kompas, 2 July 2004.

Republika, 10 August 1998.

Republika, 19 November 2005.

Republika, 30 Mei 1999.


Tempo, 09, XXXIII, 26 April-02 Mei 2004.

www.pk-sejahtera.org

www.dpp-pkb.or.id

4. Unpublished Materials


East and Islamic Studies Program, Post Graduate Program, University of Indonesia, 2006).


Soon, Kang Young, Antara Tradisi dan Konflik: Kepolitikan Nahdlatul Ulama, Ph.D Thesis, (Jakarta: Post Graduate Program, Department of Political Science, University of Indonesia, 2008).

Subhan Akbar, Partai Keadilan: Faktor-Faktor Penguat Soliditas, B.A Thesis, unpublished (Depok: Extension Program, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Indonesia, 2004).
