The Approach of NGOs and Civil Society Organisations to Turkish EU Membership with a Reference to the Helsinki Process: Constructive or Critical

Submitted by Huseyin Aslan, to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics, August 2011.

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I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University.

(Signature) .................................................................
THE APPROACH OF NGOs and CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS TO TURKISH EU MEMBERSHIP WITH A REFERENCE TO THE HELSINKI PROCESS: CONSTRUCTIVE or CRITICAL

PhD THESIS

Submitted By HÜSEYİN ASLAN

Supervisor: Prof. J.D. Armstrong

2011
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This thesis is dedicated to my wife Elif

who offered me unconditional love

and

support throughout the course of

this thesis
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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This could not have been written without Prof. J. D. Armstrong who not only served as my supervisor but also encouraged and challenged me throughout my academic program. He and the other faculty members patiently helped me through the process and I thank them all.

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I cannot end without thanking my family, particularly my Mum and Dad on those constant encouragement and love I have relied throughout my life.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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| ADD          | Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği  
The Association for Ataturkist Though |
| AGIK         | Avrupa Güvenlik ve İşbirliği Konfransı  
European Conference on Security and Cooperation |
| AKP          | Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Justice and Development Party |
| ANAP         | Anavatan Partisi, The Motherland Party |
| APRODEV      | Regrouping Protestant NGOs |
| BBC          | British Broadcasting Corporation |
| BDI          | The head of the German Industrialist Association |
| BİANET       | The Independent Communication Network |
| CEEC         | Central and Eastern European Countries |
| CEEC         | Central and Eastren European Contries |
| ÇEKÜL        | Çevre ve Kültür Değerlerini Koruma ve Tanıtma Vakfı,  
Foundations to Protect Enviromental and Cultural Wealth |
<p>| CEPB         | Center for European Politics Studies |
| CERIS        | Center of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Settlement |
| CGIL         | Italian General Confederation of Labor |
| CGS          | Chief of General Staff |
| CGT          | Confederation Generale du Travail |
| CHP          | Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Republican People’s Party |
| CIDSE        | Regrouping Catholic NGOs |
| CISL         | Confederation of Trade Unions Italy |
| CNN          | Cable News Network |
| COR          | Council of Representatives |</p>
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Committee of Permanent Representatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDC</td>
<td>Civil Society Development Center</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Civil Society Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>ÇYDD</td>
<td>Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği, The Association to Support Contemporary Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEIK</td>
<td>Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu, Foreign Economic Relations Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP</td>
<td>Demokrasi Emek Partisi, Democratic and Labor Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEV-GENÇ</td>
<td>Revolutionist Youths Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DİSK</td>
<td>Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Demokrat Parti, Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPT</td>
<td>Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, State Planning Authority –Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DYP</td>
<td>Doğru Yol Partisi, Right Path Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>ECAS</td>
<td>European Citizen Action Service</td>
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<td>ECJ</td>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EESC</td>
<td>European Economic and Social Committee</td>
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<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Association</td>
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<td>EGV</td>
<td>Eğitim Gönullüleri Vakfi, Foundations for Voluntaries for Education</td>
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<td>EIDHR</td>
<td>European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
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EPU European Payment Union
ETUC European Trade Unions Confederation
EU European Union
EUROCHAMBERS The Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry
FEANTSA European Federation of National Organizations
FTA Free Trade Area
GATT General Agreements of Traiffs and Trade
HABİTAT The United Nations Human Setlements Program
HAK-İŞ Hak İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, HAK-İŞ Trade Union Confederation
HELIOS II EU funds
ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ICNL International Center for Not-for-Profit
İHA Human Rights Association
İHD İnsan Hakları Derneği, Human Rights Association
İKV İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı, Economic Development Foundation
ILO Uluslararası Çalışma Örgütü, International Labor Organization
IMF International Monetary Found
INGO International Non-governmental Organizations
IRIS II EU funds
ISO İstanbul Sanayi Odası, Istanbul Chamber of Industry
ITC İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, Union and Progress Association
ITO İstanbul, Ticaret Odası, Istanbul Chamber of Commerce
JCC Joint Consultative Committee
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<td>KESK</td>
<td>Kamu Emekçileri Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, Public Servants Trade Union Confederation</td>
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<td>MAZLUMDER</td>
<td>İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar İçin Dayanışma Derneği, The Association for Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC</td>
<td>Nationalist Front, Milliyetçi Cephe</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDP</td>
<td>National Democracy Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>MGK</td>
<td>Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, Nationalist Movement Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNP</td>
<td>Milli Nizam Partisi, National Order Party</td>
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<td>MNP</td>
<td>National Salvation Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>MÜSİAD</td>
<td>Müstakil Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği, Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>Kuzey Atlantik Antlaşması Örgütü, North Atlantic Treaty</td>
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<td>NCS</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OEEC</td>
<td>Organization for European Economic Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>Greek Socialist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, Kurdistan Workers’ Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Refah Partisi, Welfare Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Association Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHP</td>
<td>Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>TESEV</td>
<td>Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etütler Vakfı, Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TESK</td>
<td>Türkiye Esnaf ve Sanatkarları Konfederasyonu, The Confederation of Turkish Tradesmen and Craftsmen Unions</td>
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<td>THİV</td>
<td>Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı, Human Rights Foundation of Turkey</td>
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<td>THKO</td>
<td>Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu, Turkish Folk Liberation Army</td>
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<td>THKP</td>
<td>Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi, Turkish Folk Liberation Party</td>
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<td>TIKKO</td>
<td>Türkiye İşçi Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu, Turkish Workers and Villagers Liberation Army</td>
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<td>TİP</td>
<td>Türkiye İşçi Partisi, Turkish Workers Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>TİSK</td>
<td>Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, The Confederation of Turkish Employers Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>TKP-ML</td>
<td>Türkiye Kominist Partisi / Markist Leninist, Turkish Communist Party Marxist/Leninist</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOBB</td>
<td>Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği, Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOHAV</td>
<td>Toplum ve Hukuk Araştırmaları Vakfı, Foundation for Society and Legal Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUC</td>
<td>The Trade Union Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TÜRK-İŞ</td>
<td>Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUSEV</td>
<td>Türkiye Üçüncü Sektör Vakfı, Third Sector Foundation of Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>TÜSİAD</td>
<td>Türk Sanayicileri ve İş Adamları Derneği, Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association</td>
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ABSTRACT

The title of this thesis is “The Approach of NGOs and Civil Society Organizations to Turkish Membership to EU with a Reference to the Helsinki Process: Constructive or Critical”. The main question of this study is to place the role of NGOs in Turkish society and understanding their contribution to Turkey’s democratization process in the EU accession period, especially after the Helsinki Summit. For this end, the study attempts to answer questions like how Turkey can manage to be European, whether it has a sufficiently strong civil society, how a country that has suffered from a lack of civil actors participating in the democratic process could be accepted into the EU, and whether, and how, the country has changed since its application decades ago.

In analyzing the role of Turkish civil society, this thesis establishes a general historical framework of Turkey’s relations with the European Union. This goes as far back as the European effect on the democratization efforts of the Ottoman Empire and continues through the early days of the Republic of Turkey.

The study examines the role of Turkish NGOs in the country’s accession process into the EU, with reference to the Helsinki process of dialogue. The NGOs selected are TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD and İKV as three employer organizations; and TÜRK-İŞ, HAK-İŞ and DISK as three worker confederations, which have been actively involved in Turkey’s membership to the EU. Choosing three organizations from each group aims at creating a fair balance between the employers and employees.
With the start of negotiations and the intensifying relations with the EU, civil society and pressure groups, such as İKV, TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD, TÜRK-İŞ, HAK-İŞ and DİSK increased public support throughout organizations relating to EU accession.

Words for Library Search: Turkey, European Union, Civil Society
INTRODUCTION

This thesis entitled “The Approach of NGOs and Civil Society Organizations to Turkish Membership to EU with a Reference to the Helsinki Process: Constructive or Critical” analyzes the role, approach and involvement of the NGO’s in the process of Turkish membership to EU in terms of being critical or constructive grounds.

Central Asian Turkish tribes continuously migrated westward until they settled in Anatolia in the 11th century. Today their path serves as a metaphor for the never-ending Turkish journey towards the West, one which seems incomplete without Turkey’s accession to the EU. Prominent Turkish leaders in history, from Mehmet the Conquerer to Atatürk, looked to the West for direction. Particularly since the late 17th and 18th centuries, Turks strived to take their place in the West and become a European country.

In many respects, Turkey’s integration efforts in Europe (first with the ECSC, then the EEC, the EC, and finally with the EU) entail exceptional properties. Turkey has remained part of the integration process despite half a century of efforts since 1959. In this time, important changes have occurred within Turkey as well as in the integration process; Turkey is no longer what it was in 1959, and neither is the integration process. Today, Habermas’ (2001, p.5) remark used to describe European integration “less than a federation but more than a confederation” is perhaps the best motto describing the EU. Heartfield’s (2007, pp.131–132) definition of the EU as “acting as a state even if it is not” accepts that it is supranational and in this sense has a sui generis integration structure. There have been many factors defining the relationship between Turkey and integration, some of which have undergone important transformations over time.
While, for example, Turkey’s integration relationship in the 1960s and 1970s was mostly concerned with economic and technical matters (Dağı, 1997), democracy and human rights came to the forefront in the 1980s. Çakmak points out two factors which were crucial in this change. Firstly, the EEC had now become the EC, and thereby strengthened integration’s political aspects in comparison to its economic features. As the second factor, Çakmak points out that with the breakup of the USSR, integration started to emphasize human rights over security-focused military and strategic relationships (Çakmak, 2003). The Copenhagen criteria clearly laid out the kind of union the EU would be, as well as the conditions candidate countries will have to fulfil to join it.

The Copenhagen European Council determined that newly joining countries would need to be politically and economically stable and should not further burden the Union ([Editorial], 2004). Additionally, predominant terms in the Copenhagen criteria such as democracy, market economy, the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces are undefined and controversial according to Grabbe. The Union’s inability to fully flesh out some of its terms causes disputes (Grabbe, 2002). Kubicek argues that the EU never extended Turkey the same tolerance as it did to the former Eastern and Central European candidates, now part of the Union, and that its organizations have continually decried Turkey’s democracy as lacking (Kubicek, 2005b). As Grabbe points out, the ambiguities on the Copenhagen criteria and criticism on the EU’s uneven approach to candidate countries shifted the focus from the integration process in Turkey and the EU. The discussions are no longer limited to the meaning and scope of the Copenhagen criteria. According to Giannakopoulos, questions pertaining to the
normative elements of a European political culture, and what they mean within the process of creating a European identity, remain to be fully answered (Giannakopoulos, 2004). According to Diaz, the EU’s integration model is different from anything preceding it, but still needs to decide who is in and who is out of its Union. If it does not, the question of what is “European” will continue to be asked (Diez, 2007).

Two different perspectives have lately come to the forefront in enlargement research and EU public sphere. According to Font, the EU’s enlargement is generally analyzed in rationalist and constructivist frameworks. To summarize, the rationalist approach argues that Union members go through a cost-benefit analysis in considering candidate states. While rationalists emphasize material gains, security concerns, institutional-economic and geopolitical motivations, constructivists take EU values and identity and historical factors as normative indicators (Font, 2005). While pointing out that Turkey cannot join the Union without solving its economic and political problems, McLaren adds that even if this were to be achieved, the country’s religion and culture would prove to be further hindrances (McLaren, 2000). Ayata notes that especially since September 11th, normative assertions against Turkey have become more significant. In a parallel development, she notes that Turkey’s Islamic leaning conservative camp is becoming more influential in the country’s internal EU debate (Ayata, 2003). According to Dixon, people in Turkey support democracy to the same extent as people in EU member and candidate states, but Turks are more supportive of religious and authoritarian rule and are less tolerant of minorities (Dixon, 2008). Arguing that Turkey’s EU membership should be discussed under specific factors, Baç observes that Turkey’s attitude towards membership grows increasingly negative (Müftüler-Baç, 2002).
Factors influencing Turkey’s membership process, such as economics, politics, the Cyprus issue, minority and human rights and factors relating to democracy, may vary over time. Others, such as population, culture or geography, are fixed. Using a mix of these factors is therefore necessary in assessing the future of Turkish-EU relations.

Turkey’s relationship with integration since 1959 has gone through occasional crises, but a pattern emerges nonetheless. It can be argued that talk of modernizing, economic growth, Westernization and democratization has won over a considerable part of Turkish society (Vardar, 2005). Turkey has made significant strides in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, especially after the Luxemburg summit of 1997, when Greece’s position on the Cyprus and Aegean issues and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s emphasis on the cultural difference disqualified it from candidate status. It should be noted that at this time, Turkey was far behind the Union’s standards as outlined in the Copenhagen criteria (Kütük, 2006). Upon Turkey’s acceptance as a candidate country in the Helsinki Summit of 1999, and the declaration of political criteria that it would have to fulfil (Hale, 2003), Turkey recorded considerable progress in democratization. After the 2001 economic crisis, Turkey was implementing a vigorous economic packet and trying to make up for its democratic shortcomings at the same time (Keyman & İçduygu, 2005). With the conformity packet accepted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Turkey took a significant step in the membership process and, opened a new chapter in its relations with the EU with the negotiations starting in 2005.

This process however, also brought with it new arguments. According to Baç, the question of Turkey’s accession lies beyond its ability to meet the accession criteria, and really depends on the EU’s internal dynamics and its readiness for Turkey (Müftüler-
Baç, 2008). Tarifa and Adams argue that although the Turkish government has shown a willingness to make major reforms, the human rights argument against Turkish membership remains a major stumbling block in negotiations. This is partly due to the impression of many Europeans that Turkey’s reforms are only skin-deep, and, once again, that Turkey’s cultural values are still not compatible with Europe’s values (Tarifa & Adams, 2007). Aybar states that despite Turkey’s capacity to develop high standards in the practice of democracy and establish the rule of law in economic and social life, the progress it has registered so far does not meet the criteria of the Union (Aybar, 2007). Redmon on the other hand, argues that the issues determining Turkey’s membership will not only be democratization and human rights, but also ones that are mentioned above as the “fixed factors”, such as religion, culture and geography (Redmon, 2007). Baç and McLaren believe that perceived cultural differences still carry importance (Müftüler-Baç & McLaren, 2003). Brewin on the other hand, believes that Turkey’s militarist, nationalist, pro-American, pro-NATO appearance will clash with the EU’s idea of monetary, political and military union, primarily represented by the Federalists (Brewin, 2003). Making a similar point, Pahre and Mangıtlı argue that in case Turkey joins the Union, it would join the peripheral coalition of the UK, Scandinavia and most central and Eastern countries (CEECs). These countries tend to be less internationalist than the original six, a distinction which overlaps with other policy areas such as the markets’ role, or the EU’s relationship with the United States (Pahre & Uçaray-Mangıtlı, 2009).

According to Kirişçi, the very admission of Turkey into the EU would be the litmus test of whether the EU is able live up to European values, as well as whether it can become a source of stability, capable of averting a “clash of civilizations” (Kirişçi, 2003). Bilgin
argues that an improvement in Turkey-EU relations might enable the European Union to present itself to its southern periphery as a truly multi-cultural entity, freeing itself of accusations of being anti-Muslim (Bilgin, 2004). Accession to the EU will benefit Turkey economically, without significantly effecting current member countries or Central and Eastern Europe (Lejour & de Mooij, 2005). The Economist magazine argues that Europe should not turn its back on Turkey, in which case, it warns, Turkey’s advances along the Copenhagen criteria during the 2000s would be in danger. The Economist also remarks that Turkey’s accession would serve as an example to other Muslim countries advancing along the path of democracy (The Economist, 2004).

The arguments for and against Turkey’s integration will last as long as Turkey’s peculiar relationship with integration continues. The developments resulting from the accession process in the past quarter century however, have contributed greatly to Turkish democracy. Especially in the past ten years, the membership process has changed Turkey’s political dynamic in very important ways. Civil society has been vital in this process and has changed itself considerably. According to Nas, Turkey’s efforts to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria has started an increase in civil society activity, weakening the state’s influence over society. With an increasingly stronger culture of civil society organization, society has become stronger in relation to the state (Nas, 2005).

Politically centralized and a stranger to citizen-centered approaches (Türkmen, 2008), Turkey’s political system is undergoing an important transformation. The Turkish political establishment, its bureaucrats, business circles and intellectuals, have mostly perceived the Association Agreement (the 1963 Ankara Agreement) simply as a seal of
approval for Turkey’s “European Identity” (Aral, 2005). This led to the neglect of Turkey’s economic, social and political problems. Only later was it realized that the state needs to undergo real transformation in order to be truly European. Civilian-military relations for example, were greatly divergent from EU expectations and the need for change was only recognised in the past five years (Aydınlı, 2009). According to Oğuzlu, as Turkey’s EU relations accelerated, and as the EU accession process eased the EU’s involvement in Turkey’s internal affairs, the so-called Sèvres syndrome has begun to haunt the traditional security elites in Ankara (Oğuzlu & Özpek, 2008). After the start of negotiations and the intensifying relations with the EU, certain groups in Turkey provided popular support for EU membership through nationalist and hawkish rhetoric (Aybet, 2006). Civil society and pressure groups however, such as İKV, TÜSİAD, TÜRK-İŞ and HAK-İŞ increased public support through organizations relating to EU accession. The willingness of these organizations to work towards accession without an expectation of financial profit made it easier for the government to enact controversial reforms (Macmillan, 2009).

A full understanding of Turkey-EU relations is not possible without an analysis of the role of civil society and pressure groups in the accession process. The meaning of NGOs in this process can be seen in two ways. NGOs, both, play a decisive role in Turkey’s internal dynamics and cause change in Turkey’s foreign politics. This study will take civil society’s role in Turkey’s membership process as its starting point.

Our main question in this study is trying to understand the role of Turkish NGOs and their contribution to Turkey’s democratization process in the EU accession period especially after the Helsinki Summit. To find the answer to this question we have to
examine many components of the issue in the study. First, we have to see the historical framework of the events by browsing through the last sixty years of Europe and Turkey and then we have to analyze the structure of these components like political parties and other NGOs.

Europe advocates a democracy that allows participation by all sections of society. Civil participation is an important part of European democracy. Individual freedoms and civil liberties are sacrosanct as they form what is Europe today. Thus, as a country shaken with periodic military coups approximately every ten years, reducing civil society to almost nothing and with its lack of democracy, can Turkey manage to be European? Does it have a sufficiently strong civil society? While the cultural contribution and participation of civil actors like NGOs in Europe are seen as vital, can a country that has suffered from a lack of civil actors’ participating in the democratic process be accepted into the EU? Is it still the same country that applied for membership four decades ago, or has it changed?

As a matter of fact both Europe and Turkey have changed a great deal since 1959. Europe has been through an unprecedented enlargement process by encompassing many of the Eastern European states. Likewise Turkey has established a more stable economic and political life particularly since the eighties. As a result of the changes Turkey finally managed to become an official candidate for EU membership at the Helsinki summit.

Turkey is witnessing dynamic social, economic and political changes underpinned by the forces of globalization, urbanization, EU accession and regional transformation. Also, Turkey is being shaped by global circumstances. Among the most important of
those circumstances were the decline of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall: seminal events greeted as the harbingers of a new, more open political era around the world. The watchwords were freedom, democracy, popular participation and a new ‘civil society’ in authoritarian societies. In the spirit of the time, several Middle Eastern regimes instituted political reforms and held parliamentary elections. The world witnessed the collapse of the Apartheid regime in South Africa. A sense of new possibilities and promise was in the air. Nevertheless, the wave of political liberalization did not herald the collapse of authoritarianism everywhere. Instead, at times, popular participation led to political polarisation and more political restrictions, as was amply demonstrated by the Balkan tragedy during the 1990s. In Turkey, the democratization process has continued albeit with some setbacks.

In recent decades, the Turkish economy, society and culture have undergone intense changes due to a number of influences. Turkey’s modern history is full of instability and continuing contradictions. Turkey has had a strong state tradition, from the Ottoman Empire to the present day; there has always been particular political elite, who acted in the name of the state. Previously, political elites have restricted the boundary of the political legitimacy of democracy and have defended the concept, which Heinz Kramer (2000) calls it “a republic with strong overtones of authoritarianism”. In this regard, the study questions to what extent the Turkish civil society was part and parcel of the EU democratization process in Turkey.

On 31 December 1995, the EU-Turkey Customs Union entered into force resulting in a positive impact as it was a starting point for bilateral economic integration predominantly in the areas of the free circulation of goods, trade policy, competition
and state aid. And also Turkey’s reform path began to be shaped by EU economic relations ensuring that the EU became more influential on Turkey’s socio-economic and political configuration. Following the Customs Union agreement, EU-Turkey relations deepened and speeded up significantly. In October 2001, Turkey amended 34 constitutional articles and paved the way for transforming secondary legislation relating to various human rights’ issues.

After the recognition of Turkey by the EU at the Helsinki Summit as a EU candidate country in 1999, Turkey implemented remarkable package of reforms in order to meet the ‘Copenhagen criteria’, which lays down the requirements for becoming a full member of the EU. Since then Turkey has embarked on a comprehensive programme of constitutional and legal reforms to widen minority rights, curb corruption, strengthen civilian authority over the military, and abolish the death penalty and security courts. Most significantly, reforms were undertaken to decrease the influence of the military in politics. Constitutional amendments were adopted to alter the National Security Council (NSC) –composed of senior military officers, the President, the Prime Minister, and the Defence and Foreign Ministers – from a policy making to an ‘advisory’ body chaired by a civilian administrator rather than military staff. Another major change on civilian-military relations was subjecting military expenditures to greater scrutiny and transparency. Reforms were also implemented to strengthen the fight against torture. All detained persons, regardless of their suspected offence, now have a formal right of access to a lawyer from the outset of their custody. Access to a lawyer and health checks are now guaranteed when detainees are taken to the police custody and out of prisons for interrogation. Some legal restrictions affecting religious minorities and the Kurds were eased. Constitutional changes allow private language courses in Kurdish as
well as enabling limited televisual broadcasting in Kurdish. Hence, the EU has provided a model as well as benchmarks for reform.

The European Union has a central place in the process of shaping and reshaping Turkish politics. It is believed that after the Cold-War, Turkey has experienced a new wave of change that for the first time in recent history fundamentally questions the established principles of the Kemalist state tradition (Kramer, 2000). The dramatic changes have taken place in recent times both in the nature of Turkish politics as well as the kind of benchmarks provided by the EU. These changes have helped to accelerate the momentum of economic and political reforms in Turkey facilitating the prospect of EU membership. It seems that the EU has strengthened Turkey’s democracy by requiring harmonization with the criteria for accession membership, i.e. the ‘Copenhagen criteria’. Therefore, it is the case that the EU shapes the orientation of political parties, human rights and citizenship in Turkey. It is suggested that the EU has played a crucial role in Turkey’s transformation from a state-centric polity into a more democratic one thereby contributing to embedding a more liberal and progressive system of democratic governance. The EU also contributed to the development of civil society and its influence on the process of developing Turkish democracy. Over the last decades due to the EU accession process, ordinary citizens, from the urban poor inspired by religious causes to the emancipated woman concerned about personal status rights, have been drawn into political life to an unprecedented degree and their engagement has been framed by the debate over civil society’s boundaries. It appears that the complex practice of accession to the EU did influence the democratization process in Turkey.
This study suggests that Turkey has come a long way in terms of democracy and human rights since the sixties. The rapid changes that took place in the late eighties and through to the nineties both socially and economically show that Turkey can achieve more to comply with the merits of the European economy and democracy. Compared to the past administrations that dealt with the issue of European membership without bothering to discuss the issue and its implications with any civil groups or organizations, today Turkey is a country that enjoys the contribution of a variety of NGOs and organizations as well as a pluralist political life. Thus, whilst the impact of the military on politics is in decline, the participation of non-governmental organizations and associations in the decision making process has increased to a great extent. Organizations and interest groups freely lobby for civil liberties as well as for EU membership and advice the government on the strategies that should be implemented. Having been affected directly by EU policies, business associations are particularly interested in the issue and interact with the Turkish government and other political parties to express their worries and expectations: such a thing would be unthinkable in the days of the heavily state controlled Turkey of the fifties, sixties and seventies. From being a heavily state controlled economy, Turkey’s economy has been transformed into a liberal market economy. For a country that had so little experience of modern non-governmental organizations’ joining debates about foreign policy, Turkey proved itself to be determined to reach the level of European civil society. Organizations like TÜSİAD (Türk İşadamları ve Sanayicileri Derneği – Turkish Businessmen and Industrialists’ Association) and İKV (İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı - Economic Development Foundation) have contributed a great deal and have been actively involved in the making of economic policies that would assist Turkey to join the EU. The self-conscious businessmen of the past who believed that they were not
able to compete with European companies and, therefore, were worried about joining the common market were replaced by confident Turkish businessmen desiring and working towards EU membership. Likewise, trade unions that once were under the heavy influence of a Soviet ideology realized that pluralist democracy and the welfare state model of the European Union would in fact benefit workers much more than a socialist economy. With their actions they provided a balance between the interests of big businesses and of ordinary people. During that time, economic development, prosperity, urbanization, the opening up of political life in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup, and the expansion of education and communication technologies enabled greater participatory politics and public debate. With the ever-increasing participation of civil groups in democracy, Turkey gets closer to EU standards everyday, to the extent that even if Turkey never joins the EU, these transformations have left an unprecedented legacy on the country.

Turkey’s civil society and NGOs have faced serious challenges since the foundation of the Republic. Pressure from government and a strong military presence in Turkish politics held back the growth of civil society. A series of reforms have been introduced by Turkish governments since 2000. They were mainly promulgated in order to meet the EU accession-related Copenhagen criteria, and have lessened restrictions on human rights’ advocates. However, it is arguable that officialdom has shown reluctance for their practical implementation. For decades, Turkish law enshrined the primacy of the state over individual rights, turning the country’s courts into tools of political and social control. However, Turkey’s EU-mandated reforms have helped change that, and it can be observed that the country is in a transition period.
This research embarks on a study of the conditions of civil society and NGOs in Turkey by investigating the extent to which civil society groups and organizations have grown and their potential for the future and also evaluating the critical role and engagement of EU with such organizations. The study addresses those issues by analyzing the nexus between external and domestic actors of democratization. It will further argue that the existing scholarship has not sufficiently considered the impact of EU reforms on civil society development and the role of civil society organizations in further underpinning those reforms and their crucial engagement with the EU. Scholars usually researching the subject in relation to the EU’s efforts seem to neglect how the domestic civil society groups promote, and in turn, are affected by the EU reforms and the ongoing democratization process. The research has an empirical dimension and a comprehensive reading of their publications and monitoring their activities.

Furthermore, this study analyses the impact of non-governmental organizations from various backgrounds in the European membership of Turkey. From business associations to trade unions and prominent civil society actors will be examined to explore Turkey’s changing face up to the Helsinki summit. NGOs will include TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD and İKV as three employer organizations, and TÜRK-İŞ, HAK-İŞ and DİSK as three worker confederations. This approach will create a fair balance between the employers and employees on the issue. The motivations of civil society organizations can vary in this context: organizations can limit their involvement to benefit their particular members, or they can work towards Turkey’s membership as a whole, hoping that their members will indirectly benefit.
Lobbying activities, and their contribution, will be examined in the framework of Turkish politics. The historic background of the relations will be discussed in order to clarify the changes that have occurred in domestic political conditions, as Turkey has become a more socially orientated country while moving away from a state-centric style of government. Political parties are chosen as a subject to demonstrate the journey towards a more pluralist society as they can be deemed to represent people’s demands from government, thus, forming civil society in a different dimension. The prominent business organizations and trade unions will be scrutinized as case studies to prove the level of their participation and the impact of their influence on governments both in the EU and in Turkey. Also a comparison will be made to the role of civil society in Europe in order to examine how compatible Turkey is with the EU in terms of tolerance and participation of NGOs in policy making and democracy.

This research is therefore centered on Turkish civil society developments, EU enlargement, evolutions in civil society groups and their approach to the EU accession process, civilian-military relations, human rights, and civil society in a global context.

In analyzing the role of Turkish civil society, this thesis establishes a general historical context of Turkey’s relations with the European Union. This goes as far back as the European effect on the democratization efforts of the Ottoman Empire and continues through the early days of the Republic of Turkey.

This thesis further investigates the extent to which globalization, the EU accession process, a strong tradition of secularism and liberal economic policies introduced in the 1980s have changed the Turkish political system. It provides a comprehensive study of historical and contemporary developments in Turkey in relation to EU accession. The focus is on Turkey and the EU accession process by integrating politics, international
relations, democracy theories and European studies, drawing on recent scholarship and current research. The research is designed to fill a gap in interdisciplinary work in European studies vis-à-vis Turkey.

The study employs a qualitative research method, as this allows for the systematic collection of relevant data and gives extensive space for interpretation by the researcher. Bearing in mind the inadequacy of using a single international relations theory to explain the complexities of foreign affairs, the study will benefit from a variety of international relations theories. A realist, as well as a constructivist analysis will be employed in order to explain matters of identity and culture affecting Turkey – EU relations.

This PhD research adapts a multi-method approach engulfing quantitative methods including secondary survey research and content analysis, text analysis and historical analysis as well as qualitative methods including interviews. Eleven different interviews were held, ten of them were workers and trade union representatives and one of them was human rights activists in five different provinces like Ankara, İstanbul, Kayseri, İzmir and Bursa. The interviews were chosen on the basis of representing three trade union confederations within the scope of the thesis. One interview was chosen from TOHAV, as a research organization on society. These interviews aim to reflect the views of mass organizations directly.

Following Pierce’s (2008, p. 43) framework, the research utilizes inductive analysis that is premised on discovering categories and is exploratory with open questions, rather than testing hypotheses through deduction. The research pursues a holistic perspective
that seeks to understand all phenomena and the complex interdependence of Turkish civil society. This is to demonstrate the sensitivity to context, as analysis is located in the social, historical and temporal context from which data has been gathered. In this PhD thesis qualitative and adaptive data collection is based on detailed description and depth. For example, direct quotations are analyzed to capture unique perspectives and experiences of civil society and NGOs in Turkey. Moreover, the PhD research process is not locked into rigid designs but is flexible and adaptable to changing situations. It does not shy away from pursuing new paths of discovery as they emerge. This process takes the form of a spiral that goes from data analysis and reduction, to data organization and interpretation of the data, and back to data collection, analysis, reduction, organization and interpretation until saturation has been achieved.

While benefiting from the wide range of academic books and journals written on the subject, Internet research is also used to provide up-to-date information. The official reports of the Turkish Grand National Parliament provide direct access to the discussion on the role of internal actors in Turkish politics. This study exploits these valuable resources as much as possible. Newspapers are also used as the subject has aroused considerable interest among columnists.

This methodology is specially designed to cater to the dual, interlocking aspects of the PhD research, namely the approach of NGOs and civil society organizations to Turkish EU membership and the EU democratization process. The investigation of societal developments in Turkey involved the examination of a variety of documents and literature, including articles, books, journals, speeches, newspapers, surveys and, published and unpublished works of prominent scholars. Other studies involved
documents, articles, books, journals and speeches from the libraries and archives of major institutions. Data from content analyses of daily newspapers, monthly journals and published works of prominent scholars, the available database by civil society organizations and NGOs covering a period from the early Turkish Republic to the present has also been useful. This includes news coverage, public statements, and the academic literature and policy documents of the EU and Turkish institutions and establishments encompassing political parties, universities, civil society entities, business associations and international organizations. Interviews have been conducted with civil society groups and NGOs who were given the opportunity to check their own transcripts and to retain a copy if desired.

Financial constraints have been a significant barrier to conducting comprehensive fieldwork in Turkey. Over the last ten years, there has been a proliferation of high quality research exploring the social and political dynamics shaping Turkey’s newly emerging identity. Preeminent academics undertook empirical and qualitative analysis on the issues covered in this PhD thesis, namely, the growth of civil society and its role in Turkey’s EU membership process. The Third Sector Foundation of Turkey organized the Civil Society

This PhD tackles very sensitive topics on Turkey in the context of the EU accession process. Given such sensitivity and, as of yet, suboptimal standards on academic freedom and openness in Turkey, the PhD author has had to provide an atmosphere of trust and confidentiality when interviewing various human rights’ organizations.
The organization of the research, together with the introductory chapter will include the following five chapters: chapter one will be on the historical background of Turkish-EU relations. This chapter provides a comprehensive background of the history of Turkey’s EU bid until the Helsinki summit, shedding light on the complexity of the membership negotiations. A historical evaluation is crucial in understanding recent developments in state-society relations, especially in analyzing changing dynamics in Turkey in conjunction with the recent EU reforms.

Chapter two will be on the developments of civil society in Europe and Turkey. This chapter will discuss the founding principles of the EU in a historical context. It will consider the development of civil society in Europe and Turkey with a comparison of both entities’ approaches to civil society.

Chapter three will be an appraisal of the strength of civil society in Turkey. The changing role of civil society will be analyzed.

Chapter four will sketch out Turkey’s main civil society groups and NGOs. It will examine the structures of three business groups and organizations: TÜSİAD, İKV and MÜSİAD, and comments of their high rank officers on the issue of European Union. The chapter will also reflect on the Turkish business sector’s approach to EU membership and the obligations that come with its process.

Chapter five will be on the worker unions in Turkey and their approach to the EU. This chapter scrutinizes the three major trade unions: DİŞK, HAK-İŞ and TÜRK-İŞ. The
first two maintained that joining the EU was the only certain way to improve the living and working standards of workers in Turkey. They claim that the problems of workers were interdependent with the global economy and competition. Türk-İş, on the other hand, expressed discomfort about EU policies towards Turkey but officially declared support for EU membership. Three of these unions are members of the European Trade Union Confederation.

This chapter on the summary and conclusions will emphasize that civil society organizations and NGOs played a constructive role in Turkey's EU membership process. It will argue that portraying a historically weak and fragile Turkish civil society in academic discourse is a straightjacket leading to an inaccurate socio-political understanding of Turkey. It will point out their limitations and also suggest what creative academic outlooks would be appropriate to evaluate Turkish societal developments within the milieu of the EU accession process.
CHAPTER 1

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURKISH-EU RELATIONS

This chapter examines the history of Turkey-EU relations including the Ottoman Period, the foundation of modern Turkey, Atatürk’s presidency, the post-second World War period and the period leading up to Turkey’s application to the European community.

1.1. Historical Context

Turkey – Europe relations have been affected by a number of historical events: the collapse of Ottoman Empire, the Independence War of Turkey, the Second World War and the Cold War, have all had a significant influence on the conduct of foreign relations today.

Key figures of Turkish leaders in history, from Mehmet the Conquerer to Atatürk, looked to the West for direction. Particularly from the late 17th and 18th centuries, Turks strived to take their place in the West and become a European country. Since the Tanzimat period (1839 – 1876), which is commonly taken as the starting point of official Westernization, relations with Europe have gone through many stages. One can argue however, that Turks set on the course of Europeanization long before the Tanzimat. Indeed, influential Sultans often looked towards Europe, such as Fatih Sultan Mehmet, the Conqueror of Istanbul, who had his portrait painted by Italian artists.
despite the religious opposition. Another example would be Suleiman the Magnificent, who was almost obsessed with Vienna (Akşin, 1990). In sum, from the long-running desire to be among the European civilizations, expressed from early Ottoman times, Turkey today has moved steadily closer, culminating with the Helsinki summit.

Since the mid-1980s, there was a noticeable growth of academic scholarship on Turkey and Turkey-EU relations for three primary reasons. Firstly, the number of Turkish university students conducting research on Turkey’s sociological character, political system, state institutions and economy has become more pronounced. Secondly, the research effort in a number of Turkish universities (especially the Middle East Technical University, the Political Science Faculties of Ankara University and Bosporus University) has generated new publications and had important effects on similar departments and faculties of other Turkish universities. Thirdly, the military coup in 1980, the economic liberalization programs that followed, the fragility of the democratization effort, the role of Islam in public and social life, Turkey’s treatment of minorities and the heated debate surrounding Turkey’s relations with the European Union have generated new scholarly works and interests.

There are some writers who see the EU as the central force shaping Turkish politics. They believe that after the Cold War Turkey has experienced a new wave of change that for the first time in recent history fundamentally questions the established principles of the Kemalist state tradition. They also emphasize the role of civil society in the emerging new foreign and security policy challenges. These include Uğur (1996), Özbudun (2000), Rumford (2000; 2002) Heinz Kramer (2000) and Öniş & Keyman (2003). They argue that important changes have taken place in the recent period, both in
the nature of Turkish politics and the kind of signals provided by the EU. These changes have helped to push the momentum of economic and political reforms in Turkey, thereby making EU membership a strong possibility. The EU has played a crucial role by inducing Turkey to transform its state-centric polity into a more democratic, economically stable and pluralist one. This role has affected positively the process of consolidating Turkish democracy. Recent improvements in Turkey’s democratic order would not have been conceivable without strong EU support. The EU has also contributed to the development of civil society and had impact on the process of liberalization of Turkish democracy.

On the other hand, there are those scholars who have a cynical view of EU membership, questioning the catalytic role of the accession process for further democracy and human rights in Turkey. Typical among this group is Evin (1994) who advocates the notion that during the Ottoman Turkish period, state elites in Turkey emphasized political leadership; following the transition to democracy in the mid-1940s, the situation was reversed and the stress was on political participation. Stone (2005) alternatively claims that the detailed and prescriptive corpus of EU rules and norms – known collectively as “acquis communautaire” (acquis) – will impose an enormous unnecessary burden on the Turkish state yielding little to no tangible benefits: “Can Turkey stand the unemployment, bureaucracy and taxation that the EU really portends? Up to the Turks. But there are those of us who might think that they can carry out the beneficial changes on their own and who might even say that, if they really want membership of the EU, they can have ours.” While, naturally, Evin and Stone, are not the only doubters of the positive externalities of Turkish accession, the mainstream skeptical view, notably articulated by Gündüz Aktan (European Rim Policy and Investment Council, 2003),
conditionally accepts the accession process as long as the Republican pillars of unitary nationalism, strict secularism and the pre-eminence of the military in politics are not compromised by the requirements of the Copenhagen political criteria on democracy, civil liberties, and human and minority rights.

Thus, in order to understand contemporary developments objectively and to comprehend the meanings of key concepts and approaches, it is essential to examine the historical background of Turkey – European relations thoroughly. For this reason we will look at the history of Turkey and Europe in the next three sections.

1.2. Late Ottoman Relations with Europe: Late Ottoman Times

Since the mass immigrations that took place in the early ages, Turks continued to walk towards the West until they settled in Anatolia. Their encounter with Europeans began much earlier and reached a peak in contemporary politics.

Studying the relations of all the states formed by the Turks in history would exceed the limits of this study. Therefore I will look only at the policies of the late Ottoman Empire, as the most recent and most powerful state of the Turks, for it is this that has left an unprecedented legacy on the Turkish Republic. The way the Ottomans dealt with the West demonstrates significant differences in the rising, declining and collapsing periods of the Empire. The first encounters with Europeans took place in the frontier wars, and the image that the Turks have today in Europe was shaped in the atmosphere of the endless wars between the two. In the period when the balance of power gave the
Turks the advantage, the rivalry between the two powers led to European crusades to be fought against the Turks, which many historians today continue to refer to as the reason Europe still regards Turkey as a threat.

The conquest of Constantinople (Istanbul) in 1453 symbolizes an important turning point for the relations between Turks and Europeans. During that period the Turks had a clear advantage over the Europeans. Due to its consequences, one of the most influential sociologists of Turkey, Emre Kongar, defines the conquest as the beginning of the history of Westernization in Turkey (Kongar, 1982). The policies and preferences of the conqueror demonstrated his clear admiration toward Europe. Fatih Sultan Mehmet (reigned between 1451 – 1481), the conqueror of Istanbul, who was accepted as a national hero, especially among religious groups, was in fact very keen on the arts and culture of Europe. The fact that he was the first Sultan to have his portrait painted in the Ottoman Empire, despite the religious ban on painting in Islam, clearly shows his fondness for European cultural norms. Fatih sent a request to the Pope asking him to send the best painter of the period to Istanbul. Upon his request, some well-known artists of the renaissance, Matteo di Pasti, Costanzo di Ferrar and Gentile Bellini arrived in Istanbul. They painted the Sultan and his close circles and designed their medallions. He also sent some artists from Istanbul to Rome to educate them in Western visual arts. This is more than a simple quest for the love of art. It symbolizes the policies of the most powerful Sultan of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle Ages. Some historians suggest that Fatih did not want to create a Turkish or Islamic Empire but he wanted to create a world empire and become Alexander the Great (Crowley, 2005).
The advantageous position the Turks enjoyed against Europeans reached its peak during
the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent in the fifteenth century. During this period the
Ottoman Empire gained new territories on almost every frontier it was fighting,
including Europe. Alongside what is today the Middle East, most of South East Europe
was taken under the control of the Ottoman Empire. The desire to conquer Vienna had a
similar meaning for Kanuni that conquering Istanbul had had for Fatih. Yet despite his
attempts and persistence the Sultan could not defeat the defense held by the emperor of
the Habsburg Empire in the second half of seventeenth century. With this defeat the
Ottomans were stopped at the front door of Europe for a second time and indeed,
forever.

During the subsequent periods of decline and collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Europe
took the advantage over the Turks. The discoveries of new territories and the formation
of colonies on these new lands, alongside technological and economic progression,
changed the way the Turks looked at Europe. Turks realized the superiority of their old
enemies very late. The Ottomans may have been far too confident to follow the
developments taking place in Europe. Having the control of all the prominent trade
routes, like the Silk Road, the Ottoman Empire did not seek alternative routes. On the
other hand Europeans were trying to find alternatives that would free them from using
the Ottoman controlled routes and being subject to the taxes the Ottomans imposed
(Uzunçarşılı, 1947). Thus, with the discovery of new trade routes Europe began to focus
on new territories and reduced its dependency on the Ottomans. However late, the
Ottoman Empire tried to catch up with the changes in Europe through the Tanzimat
period (1839 – 1876).
The Ottoman Empire for the first time began to establish permanent embassies in the various capitals of Europe: London, Vienna, Berlin and Paris (1793 - 1796). The staff and bureaucrats employed in these embassies were requested to follow and convey useful technological developments and other applications being developed in their various countries back to Turkey (Halle, 2000).

The Turks grew into a nation that craved to be like the Europeans who had attained superiority militarily, politically and economically. Some interior problems of the empire triggered the process of Europeanization of the empire. At 1833, appointed Egypt governor of the empire Mehmet Ali Pacha rebelled against the Ottoman government. Sultan Mahmoud II asked for help of French and British governments but couldn’t find support because of the close relations of these governments with Mehmet Ali. Ottoman government than turned its face to Russian Empire and made a military pact agreement, Hunkar Iskelesi (1833), which had heavy conditions for the Ottoman government. As a result of this agreement Russia helped the Ottoman government against Mehmet Ali but also increased its influence on Chirstian minorities at the territory of the empire. The British government discerned the risk of increasing Russian influence which was threatening British interests at the region and offered another military agreement that had more acceptable conditions but some preconditions for the Ottomans. One of the preconditions was regulating minority rights at the empire. The Tanzimat Declaration (3 November 1839) was a regulation providing these preconditions (Kili, 1982). The efforts spent in the Tanzimat period were therefore the first sign of the Turks accepting this superiority. The demands of the European states regarding the improvement of the legal rights of non-Muslim minorities in the Ottoman Empire were also a sign of this superiority. In that period Europeans managed to protect
the non-Muslim minority under Ottoman control and imposed their own laws and regulations on those minorities.

The process of being dependent on the West, which was pushed further by the 1838 Balta Limanı Treaty, continued with Islahat Fermanı, another reform package, declared after 18 years. With pressure from Western powers, the Sultan Abdülmecit declared the package in front of all the Muslim and non-Muslim leaders and bureaucrats, on February 18th, 1856 in the heart of Istanbul’s political life, Bab-ı Ali. This declaration and its content regarding minorities and trade rules were put in force without delay and Europe was informed about its progress (Karal, 2003). With the declaration of Islahat Fermanı, the process of controlling the Ottoman Empire economically and militarily took a new turn of political and legal control over the internal affairs of the Empire.

The reform package entailed improved rights for the non-Muslim minority who were given back the rights they enjoyed during the reign of Fatih Sultan Mehmet in the 15th century. However, this time, those rights increased the nationalist movements among minorities as the atmosphere was different in international politics, especially in Europe. The seeds of the nation-state were beginning to be sewn. While the Ottoman Empire was hoping to prevent the minorities from demanding independence, it brought totally contrary results. The minorities began to deal closely with their European counterparts and dreamt about being independent one day.

While non-Muslim minorities were gaining and enjoying the privileges and new rights thanks to European countries, Muslim Turks were suffering in poverty. Most trade business was controlled by the minorities whereas Muslims were dealing with harsh
agricultural works in rural areas, hardly earning enough to eat in the winter after hard work in the summer (Uzunçarşılı, 1947).

In the late 1800s the relationship between Germany and the Ottoman Empire improved greatly. Germany provided assistance to upgrade the Ottoman army and began trade dealings with her. During this period the Balkans were burning with a desire to become independent (Akşin, 1990). The Ottomans lost many territories in the area, and as a result of its close association with Germany, the Ottoman Empire entered into the First World War on the side of Germany. The war ended with tragic results for the Ottoman Empire. It ended in a treaty signed in the village of Mondres in 1918; a treaty prescribed the recipe of death for the Turks, as they would share the whole of Anatolia with the Allied powers, leaving only part of the Black sea region for the Turks; the United Kingdom occupied Bosporus region, the Greeks, Western Anatolia, the Italians occupied the Mediterranean shores and France, Southeast Anatolia. This created an uprising among the Turks, and despite the poor conditions of a country wrecked by continuous wars over the preceding decades, they managed to come together and took back Turkey, as it is today, from the European allied powers. At the end of the Independence War, a new agreement was signed between Europeans and Turkish authorities called the Lausanne agreement.

1.3. **After the Foundation of the Turkish Republic: The Atatürk Period**

Atatürk’s attitude was necessarily cautious in relation to foreign relations due to the internal problems the country was suffering. After two wars in quick succession,
Atatürk focused on domestic affairs. He radically changed the façade of the nation by bringing in Western laws and regulations to Turkey. He also followed a peaceful foreign policy and signed friendship agreements with some other countries. During the Atatürk period Turkey joined the League of Nations, and became part of the Balkans, Mediterranean and Sadabat Pacts. He personally attended those international gatherings and explained his ideas about how to keep the region free of war. Atatürk tried to stay neutral in his relations with other countries even in those cases where a country declared war on another. For example, when Italy invaded Ethiopia, Atatürk supported the League resolution condemning Italy’s action but at the same time signed the treaty ‘Respecting Mediterranean Status Quo’ with Italy a few months later in order not to distance Turkey from Italy.

His main aim therefore was to elevate Turkey to the level of a Western, contemporary civilized state. He once stated that “Turks always walked towards the West. We desire a Turkey that belongs to Europe, a European Turkey. All our efforts are to make Turkey a Western country, modern and contemporary. Is there a country on the earth who wished to be civilized, did not face towards the West?” (Sevim, 2006, p.579)

From the beginning of the Turkish Republic, the country, despite the wars and conflicts with Europe, chose to be a European country openly and accepted not only European technology but also the methods of Europe too. Yet it should be noted that Atatürk underlined the danger of sheer imitation and stated that Turkey wanted to adopt the universal civilization rules into its body (Sevim, 2006).
1.4. **Post-Second World War Period**

Turkey managed to remain neutral during the Second World War. After going through decades of war, it followed a tactical policy. For a country that endured wars in its recent history, the Turkish government acted wisely by not becoming involved in another war taking place next door (Akşin, 1990). Following World War II, the world was plunged into the Cold War where every country had to choose a side, either with the West or with the communist East. Being in the middle of both boundaries, Turkey could not afford to stay neutral at this time. In addition, being a neighbour to Soviet Russia, on the communist side, Turkey was in a fragile position. However, Turkey had chosen the West, a choice made centuries ago.

Through Marshall Aid Turkey grew closer to the USA in the 1940s. The government of the time was relying on America considerably and many thought Turkey would lose interest in Europe due to its close American ties. When the government changed in 1950, the often used motto of many politicians and bureaucrats was “Turkey will be a little America”. Joining NATO strengthened this thinking further (Akşin, 1990).

The 1950s were the years when Turkey began to take its place in the political and cultural organizations in Europe, which made for closer relations with Europe. Yet still the powerful state of America was the priority for the politicians. During these dealings between the USA and Turkey, Western Europe was trying to gather strength after WWII. In particular France and Germany realized the necessity of “a Europe gathered around economic interest for good” (Akşin, 1990, p.166). There was a strong determination to prevent another war from happening on the continent.
The immigration of Turkish workers into Europe also coincided with these years. Thousands of unqualified Turkish workers were heading for a new life in Europe. It was like a new world for them. People who were impoverished and neglected in rural regions of Turkey began to move mostly into Germany, France and Holland. When these workers returned to Turkey to visit relatives, they inevitably mentioned the life and experience they had in Europe. This created a myth in the minds of Turkish people who began to believe Europe was the answer to the problems they had endured for a long time. It may have been the first time ordinary people had begun to share the dream of being European, long held by the elite of Turkey only. The workers’ movement brought two Turks and Europeans together in daily life on a mass scale for the first time. People who had only encountered each other through wars and only heard about each other through the terrible stories of those wars were sharing the same buses, tubes and factories, living under the same roof. The expatriate culture quickly became a phenomenon in Turkey. The stories these people told when they visited their villages back in their hometown made Europe seem a somewhat unattainable level of life for many who remained impoverished in villages. However, many also felt lost. Having not even lived in a city in Turkey, most of these people ended up in the big cities of Europe, which brought inevitable culture shock, and some never felt at home even after generations of life there (İnal, 2007). Many movies have been devoted to the ironic tragedy of those people in Turkey today. Yet what is important is the impact of those people on the powerful image of Europe among ordinary people in Turkey. The rights and freedoms they enjoyed regarding their working life were somehow unimaginable in Turkey where employers’ not paying the national insurance for workers was a common occurrence. Since then, Turkish people have begun to believe that the country should
join the EU for the benefit of the people. Therefore, however much the government placed its hopes on America, the Turkish people had already became attracted to Europe. The life and culture of these people can easily be the subject of a study itself.

1.5. From the European Coal and Steel Community to the EU: The Perspective of Europe

In order to understand the relations of Turkey with the EU it is necessary to look at the reasons and background of the union in Europe and see where Turkey fits in to this union.

Following the Second World War, many attempts were made to establish a union among European countries and some were supported by Marshall Aid from the USA (Hogan, 1989; Çalış, 2000). However, attempts like the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) or the Council of Europe did not in fact achieve the desired unity due to their limited scope (Hallstein, 1962). Hallstein suggests that they were sacrificed to the real politics of the time and created a disappointment among pan-Europeanists.

The plans devised by Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister (1886 – 1963) and Jean Monnet, a French bureaucrat, revived the hopes for a united Europe once again in 1950. This plan was aimed at uniting the production of coal and steel in Germany and France under one authority, which would bring together two large European countries and control vital resources’ production to prevent a possible quarrel that could lead to
another war. Therefore the attempt focused on the potentially controversial region of Ruhr, bordering France and Germany. Ensuring the peace between these two was not that easy. However, the plan was devised very successfully and later was joined by the Benelux countries (derived from the syllables of Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg) and Italy. The union became official in 1951 with the Paris Treaty.

The Treaty content was both federalist and functional from the perspective of unionism, yet it was not federalist enough for the federalists or international enough for those who worried about their national sovereignty. However, whilst it may have seemed that the agreement was only focused on the limited area of operation, it was in fact the first successful attempt at forming a supernational organization equipped with a higher authority over the national decision making processes than each individual member.

Despite its seemingly practical way of dealing with the coal and steel issue, the treaty in fact gave signals of a further desire to extend the area of control of a higher establishment in Europe. This desire can clearly be seen in the foreword of the Treaty. Thus, this is not merely an interpretation in hindsight. Some expression in the preamble of the treaty text states the future expectations:

“Resolved to substitute for age old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; to create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the foundations for institutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforward shared,” (Safran, 2007)
Statements like “broader and deeper community among people” and “give direction to destiny …shared” should be seen as harbingers of the EU. The relative success of the ECSC compared to previous organizations encouraged European countries to take this economic unity further in the future. It can therefore be suggested that the ECSC paved the way for the Rome Treaties.

The six countries of the ECSC (France and Germany were later joined by Italy and Benelux countries) subsequently came together and founded the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community in 1957. In the preambles of these treaties one can once again trace the desire to be unified with stronger relations:

"- determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, resolved to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries by common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe, affirming as the essential objective of their efforts the constant improvements of the living and working conditions of their peoples…” (Europa, 2007b)

In ensuring high standards for all the people of Europe, there was a clear need for stronger economic cooperation. There was a clear way towards providing free movements of goods, services and labour. What is intriguing is that while it mentions the aim of economic unity, it only deals with political unity, which can be seen to be due to worries about national sovereignty. It refers to political unity by merely mentioning the aim of making European people closer than ever. In fact this aim was not that insignificant at all. Later P. Henri Spaak was to state that those who devised the treaty did not think only in economic terms, but as one step towards the political unity of Europe (Bozkurt, 2001a). They were expecting that this economic cooperation would
have a spillover effect and would create a route towards political unity without much pain.

The attempts of these six countries were closely followed by other countries in Europe. The countries that made the treaty open-ended were not against any other country joining them. This is why the treaties signed among them did not give definite borders for the treaty, instead using the term “European people”. Yet their unity did not prevent uneasiness among others because lifting economic boundaries between those six countries inevitably entailed a discrimination to be implemented on goods and services from other countries within Europe. Therefore these countries came together to examine the effects of the common market on their economies. In this respect, Britain, who wanted neither to join the union nor ignore it, began to work on another formula to break the union. Britain proposed forming a Free Trade Area (FTA) between the OEEC countries. However this attempt was doomed to fail as the real intention, of breaking the union, was obvious from the beginning. What they suggested was a bad copy of the EEC stripped of the transnational functions of EEC (Pinder, 1991). Britain received the biggest opposition from France as she did not want to lose the leadership to Britain. Also, besides worrying over the leadership, France was certain that Britain was trying to water the EEC down. Furthermore, other countries did not look at the actions of Britain sympathetically since Britain did not even bother to ask for their opinion while she was hastily trying to devise an alternative to the EEC. The EEC that wished to create a unified Europe initially divided the region into two groups: on the one side the six countries of EEC, on the other side the seven countries of OEEC. The latter subsequently established the EFTA (European Free Trade Association).
With this happening in Europe, Turkey faced a choice. Until then Turkey had seen Europe as one and wanted to be part of it whatever the cost. Now it had to choose between the EEC and the EFTA. Turkey chose the EEC but not without good reason.

Turkey was one of the co-founders of the OEEC. It was following all attempts in Europe with huge interest and did not want to be excluded from any organization. Turkey joined NATO and was invited into the Council of Europe. It was keen on the ECSC yet Turkey did not have any significant reserve of coal and steel to enable it to join the union. The new government that came to power in 1950, the Democrat Party, was determined to push the country closer to Europe. The Prime Minister therefore tried to exchange opinions with Turkish diplomats in Europe. These diplomats would later direct the country’s foreign policy regarding Europe. One such person was Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, the permanent representative of Turkey in NATO. He visited the Prime Minister often, and it was Zorlu who informed the government that joining the ECSC not only implied economic unity, but also a political unity in Europe. Zorlu became the foreign minister in 1957 (Çalış, 2002).

Turkey did not want to have to make up its mind between the EFTA and the EEC. Rather it chose to wait to see which would succeed, and it was the EEC that succeeded. Also, Turkey had stronger economic relations with the countries in the EEC compared to the EFTA. The presence of France and Germany in the EEC already made it a preference for Turkey whereas among EFTA countries Turkey only had strong ties with Britain.

Alongside Turkey, Greece was also aware of the fact that she had to jump onto one of the trains in Europe. When Greece took a step towards the EEC, Turkey felt it necessary
to quicken the process and make up its mind accordingly. Greece applied to the EEC on June 8th 1959, Turkey followed it by applying in the same year on July 31st.

This hastened attempt by Turkey was interpreted as Turkey rivaling Greece with blind eyes. However, although there was an element of that, when one looks at the national agenda of the time a different picture appears.

Therefore one of the most controversial topics is the real reason behind Turkey’s application to the EEC. Indeed, another common belief is that Turkey wanted to join the EEC for economic reasons. If we look into those assumptions closer, we will see neither of them was founded on very stable grounds.

By looking at the application paper Turkey submitted to the EEC, one can see that political reasons were the main ones. Many information papers published by the Turkish Foreign Ministry focused on the political reasons for wishing to join the EEC. Turks always perceived themselves as a part of Europe. In one document, written just before the last rounds of negotiation in 1963, the Foreign Ministry stated that Turkey had joined almost all of the organizations formed after the Second World War in Europe and surely was a European country (Turkish Foreign Ministry, 1963). In other words Turkey was trying to say why shouldn’t it also join this. Since Turkey had joined the previous ones without question, many in Turkey assumed that this application would be straightforward like the others. The paper stated that this was a national issue supported by all the different political ideologies of Turkey.

On the other hand, the argument defending the Greek factor in Turkey’s application is weakened by the following facts. The interpretation that the Turks applied only because Greece had done so is in fact an oversimplification of Turkish-Greek relations, which
were always thought to be based on hostility, rivalry and threat. This way of thinking ignores the similarity and geographical proximity between the two cultures and seems indeed an easy way out rather than a result of deep thinking. Indeed, the relations between the two countries were experiencing a revival during the Ataturk – Venizelos period (Çalış, 2001). The problem of Cyprus was not the most significant issue and outside of that Turkey and Greece were pursuing some kind of shared objective foreign policy in the region. This does not mean that Greece consulted or informed Ankara about the details of application as such, yet a month before they made their application the Prime Minister of Greece visited Ankara, when a common market was the top issue on the agenda. After the meeting, both leaders published a communiqué stating that both countries would establish a commission to follow economic topics and would follow a shared policy if necessary to pursue the benefits of both countries for the region (Milliyet Newspaper, 1959a).

The policy of Turkey regarding the EEC was mostly under the heavy influence of certain figures such as Fatin Rüştü Zorlu. When Greece applied for entry into the EEC, there was not a common panic or reaction among most politicians in Turkey. Only Zorlu interpreted the situation as an urgent one. The majority of bureaucrats, despite being politically certain about joining, also had some reservations about the economic consequences of joining the common market. In other words there was not such a hurry to jump on the wagon. However, Zorlu, an experienced diplomat, put all his weight behind acting immediately because he believed that:

“It is a political issue for us, not an economic one. If we let Greece join alone in such an association that would mean Turkey would be left out. In other words, the chance of Turkey to enter the union would be mostly dependent on the Greeks who are perceived
as the ‘golden child of Europe’, ‘the cradle of civilization’. When the Greeks start running, you should run alongside them without thinking. If they jump in a pool, you should jump too, even though it is an empty pool” (Birand, 1986, p.72).

What can be derived from his statement is not hostility or rivalry against Greece. Rather Zorlu was demonstrating his knowledge and experience about how Europe treated Greece. Zorlu was disturbed by the fact that Europe tends to favor Greece over Turkey under almost any circumstance. He was sure that if Europe accepts or invites Greece into something that means it would be a beneficial to follow. Therefore his words were in fact targeting the European favoritism of Greece, rather than dealing with Greece alone. As an experienced diplomat, Zorlu lived with the difficulties of joining any international organizations in Europe and began to feel that there was a clear discrimination when it came to choosing between Greece and Turkey. He was struggling with this, rather than Greece itself. Zorlu hoped for equal treatment from Europe.

Yet still one question remains unanswered: why didn’t Turkey apply for the EEC before Greece if it was really keen on being European? There are two reasons for this. First is the structure and efficiency of Turkey’s Foreign Ministry and the second is the internal instability of the country at the time.

Turkey’s Foreign Ministry establishment was far from efficient and suffered from a lack of trained staff, while Greece had a relatively efficient Foreign Ministry equipped with enough professional staff. The increasing move towards membership to various Western organizations brought an extra burden of work upon the Ministry. The Cold War was
also keeping the Ministry very busy as it had to deal with issues from defense to trade, even tourism, in addition to its conventional field of operation. Compared to the wide scope of the areas it dealt with, neither the number of staff nor the budget of the body was adequate to enable it to operate effectively. Obtaining simple statistics presented a huge challenge to the staff and took a lot of time. Under these circumstances there was nothing more normal than following the footsteps of Greece within Turkey.

There were of course economic reasons for Turkey to want to join the EEC besides political and historical ones. However, they were rather used to support the political and historical desire to join the EEC. In other words, the economic benefits were used to lure those who were not sure about joining the EEC. Before the application was made, there was not much awareness about the economic benefits or consequences of membership for Turkey. After the application, it may be said that many began to realize Turkey would be affected immensely. The application was not made merely on economic grounds but it did not contradict the economic policies of the government of the period either. The Democrat party was pursuing liberal economic policies in an environment that was heavily controlled by the state due to the previous governments. Contrary to the previous government led by the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – Republican Peoples Party), the DP tried to form a liberal economy and invite foreign capital into the country. This is why one of the first things the DP government did was to join the European Payments Union (Tekeli & İlkin, 2000).

Furthermore, if Turkey was attracted by the economic aid it would receive from the EU, one should remember that Turkey already had connections that would provide such aid from international resources. Turkey could use the IMF (International Monetary Fund),
the OEEC (Organization for European Economic Co-operation), the GATT (General Agreements of Tariffs and Trade) and the EPU (European Payment Union). Equally, neither of the Rome Treaties mentioned offer any promise of economic aid to the involved parties. What is interesting is that there was not any study done in Turkey at the time examining the economic consequences of membership. The first study, however shallow, appears in 1962, done by Prof Besim Ustunel, upon the request of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchange of Turkey. The study mentioned the few negative aspects of the common market but stated that, Turkey, wishing to be European had to adjust itself and adapt the economy if she wanted to be part of Europe in anyway (Ustunel, 1962). The lack of any publication during the 1950s onwards shows that there wasn’t much concern about the economic consequences of a common market and European membership. What one can derive from this is not that the economy was not an issue at all, but that economic plans were not the priority of the Turkish state and only explored later to support the other arguments for membership and convince those who had doubts.

1.6. Turkey’s Application Process to the EU

The process of application was triggered by Greece rather than the actual desire to join. As soon as the news of Greece’s application arrived to the Prime Minister’s quarters, the Foreign Minister Zorlu delegated staff to prepare the application. Everything was finished within a matter of a few weeks. One day before the application was submitted, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister explained to the committee, which consisted of the President and other ministers, why Turkey should apply. Nobody was opposed
except the Minister for Industrial Affairs, Samet Ağaoğlu, who believed that the Turkish economy needed some time before joining the common market, yet he wasn’t totally opposed to the idea. On July 31st 1959, the application was sent to Belgium (Çalış, 2002).

What is worth mentioning is that the application was not discussed in any other place publicly. It was treated more like a “high” issue that only elite bureaucrats of the state could deal with or understand. This is important for this study which tries to show the impact of non-governmental organizations on foreign policy regarding the EU. Many things have changed in Turkey since the 1950s and today NGOs are far more influential and no matter is left solely under the control of the state. From terror to foreign policy, today every civil organisation tries to participate in or at least express their opinions about certain issues of the nation. Yet in those days nobody even contemplated presenting their humble views about the matters of the state. Political parties, civil associations, and bureaucrats, except those who worked closely with the foreign minister, did not join the debate. Everything was run according to the official ideology of the country which had dominated since the beginning of the Turkish Republic. The ideology was that Turkey should take its place among civilized Western countries as Atatürk had stated in the 1920s. The real force behind the desire to join was this ideological mechanism; all the others were only secondary elements to this approach. The whole process was run by the Foreign Minister Zorlu. Even the Prime Minister did not involve himself so much and was only informed by the Foreign Minister. The ministers for trade, the economy, and industrial affairs were not involved as much as one would like to think. The mechanism meant that and the issue was brought to the committee of ministers only once and the parliament was neither consulted nor
informed. One should remember that this was not an uncommon practice in Turkey since the establishment of the Republic. It was run by a single party system during most of the first three decades and later on, even though more political parties were formed, the convention did not change dramatically. Whoever was in power could not move against the ideological elements of the mechanism. We will see later through the military coup what could happen for those who tried to do so.

The only thing we can see as a positive development regarding the involvement of civil actors in the process was the formation of a committee that consisted of public and private sector representatives. Yet it was not formed to consider the issue and present opinions but rather to inform those under its authority about the changes that would take place after the membership was realized (Birand, 1986). From this we can understand how sure Ankara was about its acceptance into the community.

The whole process of application from consideration to submission took place over two months. Thus the documents were not prepared perfectly. The short time also did not allow the public to be informed whatsoever. There wasn’t such an intention or plan. In those short two months there was almost no awareness and no mention of the application in the press. The important newspapers of the time Cumhuriyet, Akşam and Zafer had no news about the process or the debate taking place at the ministerial level. One paper mentioned the Greek application, yet did not have any comment on the Turkish process. The government clearly did not bother, or maybe did not want to inform the public deliberately until a positive outcome had been achieved. When the government wanted to learn the opinion of the USA, they started visiting the USA embassy. This created a little bit of curiosity in the press, yet, interestingly enough, just
one day before the application was made, the Prime Minister denied rumours that Turkey would apply for EEC membership (Zafer Newspaper, 1959). Three days later when the application was made, on 3rd August 1959, there was still not an official press release made by the government. Firstly, on 5 August 1959, the Cumhuriyet newspaper announced that Turkey had submitted the application for EEC membership (Milliyet Newspaper, 1959b). The foreign press began to evaluate the possibility of Greece and Turkey’s accession, suggesting whether countries with different economies and backgrounds could adapt to the community.

To sum up the main point, while even the foreign press was debating the issue, there wasn’t the slightest sign of public debate in Turkey. People did not have enough information to discuss the issue. Hence this vital decision was taken with an elitist and undemocratic approach, with no contribution or consultation from any other civil actors.

Turkey never expected a refusal, although it was anxiously waiting for the reply from Europe. The six countries of the EEC on the other hand were very pleased by the application. The EFTA was still on the table as an alternative to the EEC and every application to the EEC was increasing the popularity of the community against the rival EFTA (Birand, 1986). Given that both Turkey and Greece sided themselves on the side of the West during the Cold War and were both members of NATO from the beginning, the EEC gave Turkey a similar answer as it did to Greece. The decision was to start negotiations as soon as possible with Turkey.
The first meetings with the European Council occurred on September 28th 1959. While the whole process of the acceptance of Greece was completed in 2 years, Turkey would wait much longer and until the 1963 Ankara Agreement. There were several reasons for this. First, Turkey was going through one of the worst economic crises in its history. Moreover, political instability was at its peak. In this turmoil a military coup took place in 1960, which interrupted the process considerably. On the other hand the EEC, which was quite positive about Turkey’s membership due to political reasons, was starting to think from a more economically oriented position. These dates are important as the two sides began to understand each other much better. Europe was beginning to worry about Turkey’s fragile economy and politics. Optimism in Europe was about to fade when the real picture of Turkey eventually emerged. The military coup only fed the negative image of Turkey even further. Europe did not really push Turkey away for political and security reasons but preferred to sit on the fence regarding the economic problems of Turkey. In the negotiating talks Turkey was still stressing philosophical and political reasons to join the EEC while the community was mostly interested in the financial side of the picture. When the military coup occurred, despite the dramatic change to internal politics, the new administration expressed that they would not change their foreign policy regarding the EEC (Çelik, 1969). While this was happening the Athens Treaty that completed Greece’s application process was signed. This created a very pessimistic atmosphere in Turkey. They felt left out, and were pressing the community to accept Turkey as soon as possible. Turkey issued a memorandum to urge Europe to complete the process without looking at its internal problems whatsoever. However, Europe had already noticed the gap between the living standards of Turkish and European people. Turkey was a huge country with the majority of the population living in rural areas with extremely high levels of illiteracy. Europe was waiting eagerly to see whether Turkey
would achieve a smooth transition to democracy after the coup. France in particular was persistent in its opposition to Turkey’s accession and refused to start any talks before democracy reigned in Turkey. The executions of the former-Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, the ex-Foreign Minister Fatin Rüstü Zorlu and the ex-Minister of Economy, Hasan Poltakan unfortunately raised concerns about Turkish democracy even further. These executions remain a black stain on Turkey’s history. For France, this was the end to considering Turkey while Germany believed that if Europe did not help, an undemocratic country could spring up next to Europe (Birand, 1986). Later Turkey would try to change the opinion of the French President, De Gaulle.

Finally after long negotiations during 10 meetings between 1959 and 1963, the Ankara Agreement was signed between the EEC and Turkey on 12 September 1963. It wasn’t an accession treaty as it rather devised some kind of association between the two sides. It was a document that neither let Turkey in nor excluded it openly. Europe was not sure about the future of Turkey and it seems that it decided to keep her at the door until it had made its mind up. In addition, the USA was keen to keep Turkey close to the West due to strategic concerns.

The period up to the Ankara Treaty was in fact a very informative summary of Turkish – European relations which still today carries a similar character. Turkey always wanted to be part of Europe while Europe tended to see Turkey through the lens of security issues. This is why Europeans would become more distanced when they felt safe and in peace at the end of the Cold War.
From this perspective we can say that Europe’s attitude towards Turkey was shaped heavily by the Cold War. Thus when one examines the Treaty of Ankara it becomes clearer that Europe was using it to define the frame of future relations with Turkey.

The Ankara Agreement of 1963 did not give any certain promise for Turkey to join the EEC unlike the Athens Treaty with Greece. It was aiming to prepare Turkey for possible integration in the future but did not state that this would happen automatically. Before the accession to the common market, there would be 3 stages to prepare Turkey’s economy to the Customs Union. These were the preparation stage, the transition stage and the final stage (Çalış, 2002).

In the first stage Turkey was merely expected to tackle its economic problems and get itself up to the desired level so that the accession could start. That would take at least 4 years. It can be suggested that the Agreement of Ankara had little to offer, considering the great expectations that had existed in Turkey before it was signed. It can be deemed as a document that tried to compromise the expectations of Turkey with the conditions of Brussels, a characteristic of the relations which is still true today. Yet Ankara was behaving as if they had obtained what they had been wishing for for centuries. All the press had headlines suggesting Turkey was accepted as a part of Europe. It was a fact that the agreement was opening the way to Europe for Turkey, in reality however it was little more than a sign of good intentions on the side of Europe.

The start of the transition stage was not pain-free for Turkey either. The EC-Turkey Association Council, formed to observe and assess the progress Turkey made regarding the outlines of the Ankara Agreement, gathered on May 16th, 1967 for the fifth time.
Turkey expressed the view that it was ready for the second stage, yet the EEC was not thinking likewise. On April 5th 1968 Turkey put the matter on the table again just to receive the same feedback from Europe (The Foundation of Turkey-EU, 2011). It wasn’t until late 1971 that Turkey was allowed to go to the second phase of transition. With the Additional Protocol that devised the details of this transition, Turkey officially started the transition stage on January 1st, 1973 after the protocol was approved and signed by all participants. The protocol was governed by what had been set out in the Ankara Treaty of 1963. This long period of time between the Ankara Treaty and the second phase of transition period was also years of political instability for Turkey; left-right conflict, economic problems and intervention of the Turkish Military with a declaration (1971) to the Turkish politicians were some of the reasons that caused a suspicious approach from the Community with regards to the start of the second phase and made the waiting process longer.

There are two main characteristics of the second stage. The first is that one can observe that the social consensus was about to dissolve and many voices from political and civil society appeared as opposition to membership to the EEC. Until this stage there was a silent acceptance and agreement in the belief that Turkey belonged to the European Community. Yet, along with political and economic changes there were serious disagreements that occurred among politicians and society. Many politicians based their propaganda on their opposition to the EEC. Pessimism replaced the optimism that had reigned so long in the country.

Further important changes took place regarding the actors affecting the process of the membership application. Up to this point, foreign affairs had been run by those who
regarded themselves as representatives of state’s ‘high self’. There was a common belief that foreign affairs were far too serious and complicated for ordinary people or any other non-governmental actors to deal with. Statesmen did not bother to ask the opinions of influential civil groups or businessmen. Likewise, none of them had any compelling feeling that they should state their opinions and state how the possible future membership would affect them and their businesses or legal positions. Yet in the second stage, which is another name for the transition period determined by Ankara Agreement, one can observe a clear increase in the number of those who began to be involved and actively work for or against the membership through lobbying activities. Alongside the increase in the number of those who eagerly joined the debate, the quality and quantity of issues discussed in the public sphere also increased considerably. Alongside the conventional establishments like the Foreign Ministry, new establishments and organizations also joined the debate. The relatively free atmosphere that the 1960 constitution created caused different ideological schools to begin to question foreign affairs and the political system of Turkey. The appearance of leftist, religious conservative and nationalist movements emerged as serious critiques of the system that governed Turkey. The issue of European membership became a top issue they used to express their opinions. Just as rival political groups gathered around the issue of EC membership, those who had very different opinions regarding internal affairs came together in opposing joining the European Community. The extreme left and extreme right was suggesting virtually the same solutions. The involvement of employees and employers’ groups in discussion, lobbying and researching made a huge difference too. Suddenly the issue became an identity matter which opposed itself to the Turkish identity proposed by the elites, who categorically believed Turkey was a European
country. We will look at the influence and activities of the most influential groups in further chapters.

1.7. The Additional Protocol to the Partnership Agreement

The decade commencing with the pre-Additional Protocol and ending with the military coup of 1980 were the most turbulent years with respect to Turkey – EC relations. Any agreement on the issue of joining the EC was damaged considerably if not completely.

The debates started with the sudden application of a new government (led by Demirel) to the EC to start the transition period before the preparation period was over. Demirel brought it to the agenda in 1967, 4 years after the Ankara Treaty was signed. This policy was again the product of a few bureaucrats who loyally believed that Turkey should take its place in Europe without delay. Yet the EC did not feel that Turkey was ready for the second stage either economically or politically. The insistence of the Turkish side brought about negotiations on the conditions of an additional protocol devising what the two sides should do to help the smooth transition into the common market. While this was happening there was serious opposition beginning to flourish in Turkey. Those who believed that EC membership was an ideological necessity for Turkey were not aware of the strengthening opposition of some other actors in the state: people who looked at the matter from an economic point of view and deeply believed that it was the wrong time for accession into the common market, believing it could destroy an already fragile Turkish economy (Çalış, 2002).
The debates that took place between those two groups shaped EC-Turkey relations for decades and even today show their effect both in Europe and Turkey.

During this decade Turkey lived through an unprecedented instability in politics. 14 governments came and fell over ten years. What was worse was that they all had different policies towards accession. It was a decade when for the first time alternatives to the EC in the other parts of the world were seriously considered in Turkey. Suggestions to ally Turkey with other Muslim countries, with the Soviet Regime and other Third World countries that Turkey could lead were always on the table. We will look closely at the impact of civil actors during this period in the chapter on political parties.

In 1971, the Additional Protocol, which was vital for Turkey to progress in its relations with the EU following the Rome Agreement, was signed. Within the framework of the protocol, Europe was to reduce customs tax on imports from Turkey and on exports to Turkey from Europe. The negotiations regarding which sectors would be protected by Turkey following this tax reduction gave a clear picture regarding how Turkish – European community relations worked at that time. The period was characterized by tension between the State Planning Authority (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı – DPT) and the Forein Ministry. The first believed that there was a clear need to protect the Turkish economy from the free movement of goods and services that the common market would bring as the Turkish economy was yet to mature and be self-sufficient. Yet, the Foreign Ministry strongly advocated that Turkey should be an official part of European organizations and institutions to eliminate the threat Greece posed in the union against
Turkey. The 1970s were years in which anti-imperialist and anti-Western protective conservative policies ruled the country. Industrialists who depended heavily on the protective policies of the state and financial incentives provided by the state, as well as the leftist movement that identified itself against the imperialist policies and Islamist politicians all saw themselves as anti-Western and came out together against the European Union and the Customs Union (Çaş, 2002).

Since the pre-Ankara agreement period, the Foreign Ministry was the organization that insisted and longed to join the European Economic Community for ideological reasons. It worked toward the achievement of this goal wholeheartedly as it believed that it was necessary for a more secure Turkey on the world stage. The Foreign Ministry was eager to follow the route set by Atatürk decades ago. Being a part of Europe was perceived as the cure to the communist threat that seemed never ending in those days. It was after the 1970s, when economic interests began to shape Turkey’s quest to be a part of Europe that the unions, employers’ organizations and political parties began to give a real importance to matters relating to the EU (Eralp, 1997).

After the end of Cold War, the theory that Turkey was not important to European security as a result of the collapse of the Soviet threat was not welcome in Turkey among policy makers. Against this thesis, they suggested that Turkey was a key country for the West, who wanted to have a stake in influencing the newly formed ex-Soviet Republics to the east of Turkey (Eralp, 1997). The development of the Gulf War strengthened the importance of Turkey in the region and Turkey began to identify its new, post-Cold War, place in world politics. Another main thesis that the Turkish policy
makers based their ideas on was the belief that Turkey was a bridge between the East and the West due to her geopolitics and geo-cultural features.

The issue of security was never off the agenda in Turkey especially after the emergence of PKK terror in the east of the country in 1984\(^1\). Therefore security continued to be one of the most important parameters in the framework of Turkish foreign policy. The fact that European states allowed for the supporters of the PKK to seek refuge in Europe and furthermore allowed them to continue their political struggle lawfully without condemning any of the crimes they committed in Turkey became one of the most sensitive points of the Turkey-EU relationship.

Following the 1980 military coup another important period began in Turkish politics. Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party, ANAP) came to power after elections in 1983. The head of the party, Turgut Özal, would become the leader for a considerable length of time and would change the façade of Turkish politics and the economy. The ANAP was defending the liberal economy framed by conservative politics. Özal took the famous decision on January 24th 1980, which brought permanent changes in the country and was supported by the military too. He tried to transform the economy into an export-centered and competitive economy by reducing state protection policies. Encountering the difficulties over transforming the economy to a capitalist liberal one, the government led by Özal began to advocate joining the European Community, despite Özal’s opposition in his early career. The reason for Özal’s decision to change his opinion regarding the EU was purely economic. The government led by the ANAP

\(^1\) PKK is the organisation that advocates the rights of Kurdish people in the East of Turkey and claims some land for them. It is accepted illegal in Europe and the USA. For more information check the Webpage of The US State Department at http://www.state.gov/s/ci/rds/fs/37191.htm.
looked at the issues of Turkey through an economic point of view and believed that the political problems would be solved when economic growth was enjoyed thoroughly. However, to achieve the growth Turkey longed for, it was necessary to provide an environment for foreign investors to feel secure both politically and economically. Therefore, the stability in both fields was an absolute necessity and formed the main policy of the government (Tekeli & İlkin, 2000).

In the time of the ANAP, the relations of Turkey with the EU moved towards economic-centered policies rather than security centered policies. While Turkey was moving the goalpost towards economic achievement, the EU was planning to move its vision to politically centered policies and targeted the internal issues of Turkey in the framework of democracy and human rights. Therefore there was a clear difference and a-synchronization in the policies each side tried to exercise. Turkey was changing, but so was Europe (Cemal, 1989).

The application of Turkey for full membership of the EC was refused on the grounds that the European Community was not yet ready to have a new member as it was on the edge of a new era after the Cold War. The relationship between Turkey and the EEC took a negative turn when Greece, governed by PASOK which was known for its anti-Turkey policies, joined the EEC on January 1981. The period from 1980 to 1990 were the years when Turkey was extremely busy with the security problems at her borders posed by the PKK. During this decade many people from the extreme left and from Kurdish nationalists asked for political asylum in European countries and received financial and political support in accord with the International Refugee Convention. Many of those people managed to form public opinion in the countries they fled through
forming good relations with human rights organizations and related charities. Therefore, in those years there was very bad publicity about Turkey especially in Germany, Belgium, Holland and Sweden. The tension between Turks and Kurds living in Germany particularly attracted the attention of the German public to the matter more than other European countries (Barkey & Fuller, 1998). Most of the atrocities were better known outside the country than inside. It was a fact that there was a civil war going on in the eastern part of Turkey. However Turkey failed to explain her side of the story successfully as Turkish people felt offended by some of the comments made in Europe. All these strengthened the opinion of those who believed that the unity of Turkey would be prone to outside threats if she joined the EU (Dağı, 1997).

After 1987 Turkey’s bid for the EEC, which became the EU with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, became increasingly an internal policy matter. Following the refusal of Turkey’s application for full membership in 1987, relations became stagnant. During those days Turkey was undergoing some significant political changes as the political ban made during the 1980 coup was lifted on some political leaders. This resulted in the 8-year reign of the ANAP coming to an end. The elections held in 1991 brought a new coalition government of True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi - DYP) and Social Democrat People Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Parti – SHP) into power. The leader of the ANAP, Turgut Ozal, became the President and was followed by Suleyman Demirel, the leader of DYP, who became the President after Özal’s death. The new era began with the leadership of Tansu Çiller who became the Prime Minister and the leader of the DYP.
The new Prime Minister, Çiller, took a radical step and worked towards joining the Customs Union. With this step, relations between Turkey and the EU accelerated again. The matter of joining the Customs Union created an immense interest among businesses in Turkey (Manisalı, 2002). The Prime Minister tried to find solutions for the problems some sectors had due to the Customs Union. In this framework some industrial fields continued to be protected. These negotiations increased the dialogue between the government and civil organizations as such groups began to put a real effort into influencing the process for their benefit. Meanwhile, following the radical economic decision taken on the 24th January 1984 by Özal to create a stable capitalist economy in Turkey, private businesses in Turkey began to deal with foreign businesses and create partnerships. The arrival of foreign capital created new business opportunities for Turkish businesses and furthermore brought about a new culture of work from outside. Entrepreneurs who initially were very skeptical about the Customs Union began to realize that economic and political stability in the country was a necessity in order to develop and form business relationships with foreign partners. This was the turning point where Turkish businessmen began to gain confidence. Due to all these reasons, the post-1987 period witnessed increasing interest in the decision making process from the organizations of employers, unions, and other civil society associations. They tried to get more information on the issue of EU membership and formed research groups to publish reports which will be studied in further chapters. This interest increased even more following the Helsinki summit which made Turkey an official candidate for accession to the EU.

Decisions regarding the EEC, before the Customs Union, were taken only by state authorities who dealt with security matters and therefore only reflected security
concerns and therefore excluded civil actors. The negotiations between Turkey and the EEC/EC/EU took place with no contribution or consultation from any non-state actors. When the customs reduction which made European goods compatible with local items on the same price scale came on to the agenda as a result of the Additional Protocol, industrialists who had worries about their businesses, the politicians who had worries about imperialistic invasion of foreign capital and state offices planning economic development solely based on internal dynamic began to comment on the possible consequences of the Customs Union and its results on economy.

It can be suggested that Turkey-EU relations showed a-synchronic features. While Turkey was approaching the EU for economic development, the EU was moving away from the economic concerns which were its main reasons for working towards unity in Europe after the Second World War. Europe reached the desired level of stability and peace in the region by 1992 and turned its face towards a more political centered unity equipped with shared security and decision-making institutions.

When the Ankara Treaty was signed in 1963 the Turkish side was more interested in security matters but still placed a considerable degree of importance on the economic benefits. Following the Greek application the Turkish government, suffering from deep economic problems, wanted to follow. The application was followed by the military coup in 1961 and the new constitution dictated an economy based on substituting import goods within the country. These policies inevitably contradicted the demands of the common market that Turkey wanted to apply for. Thus one of the most important organizations regarding the economy, the DPT (State Planning Department) showed
resistance when the second phase of the Ankara Treaty, instructing how to enter the common market, came into force.

In 1992, after the Maastricht Treaty, Turkey was still far from achieving the economic growth needed for the Customs Union, common agriculture policies or the free movement of goods, services and capital. Instead it was dealing with terror in the east. The Customs Union was signed in 1996. However, the veto right of Greece meant that the aid, which Turkey should have received from the EU in order to compensate the loss she would suffer due to reduced customs duties, which cost Turkey 2.6 billion dollars, could be not realized. Turkey’s trade deficit rose from 5.783 billion dollars, before the Customs Union, to 10.851 billion dollars after. This figure was reduced to 7.086 billion dollars in 1999 (Şen, 2000). One economist, Faruk Şen, interpreted these figures as a good sign for the Customs Union in the long term as it would increase the strength of Turkey against the third party countries, mostly in the Middle East, trading with Europe (Şen, 2000).

In the ever-changing political atmosphere, Turkey was still worried about security matters, while Europe had concerns for softer security matters such as the environment and immigration.

Therefore it can be argued that the EU stated its relatively confident attitude towards security matters by not accepting the Turkey to the Union in a reasonable period of time. The cultural differences were put forward as the main reason for refusal by several countries. The role Turkey played in the Gulf War and its strategic alliance with the USA played an important role in changing this attitude which led to official candidacy
status for Turkey in 1999 at the Helsinki Summit. However, as we shall examine in this study, there were other dynamics within Turkey that affected the process considerably.

Despite the wishes of civil organizations, governments and other actors, policies that brought Turkey closer with Europe continued. These relations were far from smooth, mainly because of the late arrival of modernism and the consequences of this both culturally and economically. The relationships were characterized mostly by Samuel Huntington’s theory of the ‘clash of civilizations’ between East and West, and Christianity with Islam (Huntington, 1996). The extreme nationalist right wing and Christian Democrats in Europe can be deemed to base their arguments on this theory to various degrees. Christian Democrats believe it is useful to have good relations with Turkey with a certain distance preserved in principal (Bozkurt, 2001b).

This difference becomes clearer when we look at the candidacy process of other countries like Spain, Portugal, Greece, and some newly joined Eastern European countries. During the negotiation the main issues still focused on how to achieve integration even though some tough bargaining also occurred. Not many people suggested that there was incompatibility between these countries and the EU, yet there were and still are many people who believed there is cultural compatibility regarding Turkey and the EU.

Due to its neo-corporatist\(^2\) approach, the EU encourages non-state actors to be included in the membership process actively. In this respect, during the negotiations civil

\(^{2}\) The neo-corporatism is generally described as the role of business sector at the decision making process by lobbying or creating pressure on the government on other ways. In some cases it implies all major civic actors rather than corporations (Wikipedia, 2002).
organizations like TÜSİAD, İKV and other NGOs and unions together with political parties were taken account of phase by phase. Moreover, the EU commission also tried to include human rights organizations as well as ethnic and religious minority groups in the negotiation process.

The EU expects a great transformation from Turkey economically, politically and socially. Nevertheless the structure of political and social life in Turkey seems to have difficulty in grasping this expectation rationally and therefore adjust itself accordingly. The mentioned transformation has had significant political consequences and therefore it is not surprising that there has been conflict and a tough bargaining process throughout.

1.8 Conclusion

In conclusion, one cannot help but be astonished by the process from the Reform Decree to the National Program, which Turkey tries to implement today to comply with EU demands. Hence one of the milestones in Turkey’s Westernization efforts was the Islahat Fermanı (Reform Decree) of 1856, signed in Paris following the Crimean war. The Paris Treaty was in fact one of the first attempts to form an international project for an alliance in the region which entailed a debate as to which countries could be considered European. In a preparatory meeting in Vienna, the European states demanded Turkey improve the rights of non-Muslim minorities before the meeting in Vienna (Karal, 1999); a move that would be echoed a century and a half later at the Copenhagen summit. Some suggest that the real architect behind the reform package of
1856 was Britain and the British Ambassador to Istanbul, Stanford Canning. A month after an understanding was reached, the Paris conference took place and Turks were officially accepted as Europeans for the first time in their history. Sultan Abdulmecit’s response to the occasion still resonates: “I firmly hope that my ceaseless efforts towards the happiness of all my subjects shall be crowned with the hope for success and that my Empire, henceforth a member of the great family of Europe, will prove to the entire universe that it is worthy of a prominent place in the concert of civilized nations.” (Eldem, 2004)

By complying with the demands of Europeans through declaring the Reform Decree, the Sultan was indicating his intention to join the ‘Concert of Europe’. The allied powers of France, Britain and Piedmont accepted the Ottoman Empire’s pledge to the Concert, and guaranteed its territorial integrity although it was conditional on the implementation of the decree. Thus, the Ottoman Empire was admitted into Europe and agreed to comply with the standards of European civilization. These standards were not only related to how the empire conducted its foreign affairs, but also its domestic affairs. Debates concerning European identity back then presented eerie similarities to those of the 21st century: no official document provided an objective definition of the standards of civilization. James Joll’s theory helps to explain the complexity of this question. He suggests that there are “unspoken assumptions” in every society that define the rules of conduct which are known to everyone, yet never written down (Joll, 1972). These unspoken assumptions, Joll asserts, distinguish societies in cultural terms and define their unique identity, and thus, are as important as any official treaty or declaration.
Despite its countless attempts and reforms, the question of whether Turkey is a European country remains unanswered. We see in Hale’s 1963 account that, as the Ankara agreement was being signed, the president of the European Commission, Walter Hallstein, declared that “Turkey is part of Europe.” Similarly, at the time of the publication of the commission's opinion on Turkey's application for accession in December 1989, Commissioner Abel Matutes confirmed that “Turkey is eligible to become a member of the Community,” and pointed out the absence of a reference to religion in the opinion (Hale, 1994). What but Joll’s “unspoken assumptions” can explain the complexity of relations between Turkey and the EU? A country that was admitted into organizations like NATO and the Council of Europe has for centuries, struggled and failed to be seen as “European”.

Westernization and becoming part of Europe have been essential to Ottoman foreign policy ever since the Empire began losing influence, and are the most important inheritance of Turkish foreign policy today (Davison, 1996). With Atatürk’s rule, Westernization has taken a concrete form and continues to be fundamental to Turkish foreign policy (Lombardi, 2005), resulting in Turkey’s membership to nearly all post-war Western international institutions (Altunışık & Tür, 2004). The full realisation of Westernization however, still depends on Turkey’s accession to the European Union.

Turkey’s political parties, especially when in the opposition, try to gain the attention of skeptics by heavily criticising Turkey's accession process. The former Refah Party minister Abdullah Gül for example, stated in his 1995 speech that Turkey could never join the EU, calling it a Christian club (gaflet 2007, 2007). Gül’s position on the EU changed considerably in later years, when he served as prime minister, foreign minister
and president. The governments of the Refah Party and the Nationalist Movement Party displayed similar political trends. The AKP government also steered Turkey on its path of Westernization, despite concerns over its conservative stance (Robins, 2003). Turkey’s accession policy to the EU is therefore above party lines. Since the 1980s, the issue is not only one for the country’s political elites, parties and the foreign ministry, but also one hotly debated by all of Turkish society. The acceleration of the democratic process, especially with increasing popular demand, the economic crisis, the NGOs’ role and transnational effects, have occasionally been turbulent but have ultimately created a cumulative effect in politics (Ulusoy, 2007).

This being said, one does not need to resort to conspiracy theories to see that Europe is far more critical of Turkey than it has been of any previous candidate state. Some candidate states were admitted before they completely sorted out their democratic and economic problems and were even offered assistance through membership. Turkey, on the other hand, is expected to resolve all its problems before joining the EU. Moreover, these conditions are being used to question Turkey’s status as a candidate state. This critical approach may be interpreted as evidence that Europe does not believe that Turkey deserves to be included in the social system it has carved out over the decades. Hurdles such as the Ankara Agreement, the Additional Protocol, the Customs Union agreement, and finally the Helsinki summit, indicate that Turkey Europeans see Turkey unworthy of equal treatment. As pointed out in the European Commission’s report, some problems in implementation and practice should be acknowledged. In a general evaluation however, Turkey is performing admirably. As Polat states, Turkey is probably ahead of some of the member states in terms of a formal structure of democratic institutions and regulations (Ulusoy, 2007).
Europe’s prejudice against Turkey becomes clearer in the long run, as well as in times of crisis. Membership is a moving target for Turkey. The nature of Turkey-EU relations, as well as Turkey’s expectations from membership change constantly. Topics concerning identity however, remain, in Hale’s words “a semi-hidden agenda” (Hale & Avcı, 2001). Discussions in the Union also find resonance in Turkey.

Similarly, during the process which began in 1839 with the Tanzimat Fermanı (Imperial Edict of Reorganization) until the membership application to the EU, the debates taking place in Turkey show that there are serious identity issues that dominate the country. Identity and belonging never seem to get off the agenda, despite the efforts of the elitist foreign ministry bureaucracy. While Europe is enveloped in serious arguments regarding its common identity, Turkey also goes through similar ups and downs. While both sides want to find a way to get together, they do not really know what the other wants. From “unspoken assumptions” to “very spoken assumptions”, the debates seem to be at an impasse.

One could argue that since Turkey is making a demand, it should comply with the standards set out by the EU. This is something that both sides agree on, but there is disagreement regarding the progress made. Turkey believes that it has achieved a great deal, while Europe continues to have doubts about Turkey.

The history of change in Turkey could be traced back to the late 18th century long before the EU created. Yet the changes that took place in the thirties and forties should not be deemed mere reforms but a complete transformation, made in the name of
Westernization and Europeanization. Relations of Turkey with the EU today are the continuation of this transformation. Those who conducted the negotiations from 1959 to 1999 never had been questioned in this regard. The examination of backgrounds of the relations between Turkey and Europe demonstrates that each sub-period has it’s own dominant characteristics with new difficulties. The relations between Turkey and Europe has resembles with these historical relations occurred in the past. Europe sets the demands which Turkey is supposed to fulfil by making a significant transformation in the society.
CHAPTER 2
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN EUROPE AND TURKEY

Turkey has made great strides in democratization since it was accepted as an EU candidate country in the 1999 Helsinki Summit. But these efforts cannot only be evaluated by looking at the EU membership process. The influence of growing societal demands for reform, domestic actors’ ability to cajole the regime, transnational influences, as well as other factors such as the economic crisis and the ideological crisis of the regime in the 1980s and 1990s also played an important role in the democratization process (Ulusoy, 2007). The role of civil society in this process is especially worthy of our attention. To put it in Poggi’s terms, civil society is attempting to form a public opinion beyond its personal interests, in order to establish a public sphere which would have influence on the state (Poggi, 1978).

The culture of civil society in Turkey is a comparatively recent phenomenon, and carries different meanings than it does in the West. Firstly, civil society has remained weak in countries such as Turkey, where the state is powerful in comparison to the individual. Turkish civil society has traditionally been portrayed as weak, passive, and controlled, or channelled by the state through corporate structures. In the infamous stereotype, Turks looked towards the “devlet baba” (“father-state”) rather than to social self-organization, to provide leadership and essential services. There was little genuine grassroots mobilization to underpin Turkey’s unstable democratic institutions (Kubicek, 2005a). Whereas the concept of civil society was developed and used as an “analytical”
tool for understanding social and political life in the West, in post-1980 Turkey the concept was generally used by leftists and Islamists as a “tactic”, in concord with their own world views, to erode the despotic state tradition (Çaylak, 2008).

To make a more reasonable and understandable comparison between the perception of civil society in Europe and Turkey, we need to examine three basic issues: the concept of civil society itself, the civil society experience of Europe and the evolution of the civil society experience in Turkey. If we understand the role of civil society in Europe, we can easily track the membership demands Europe has of Turkey to the civil society front. On the other hand, if we are not aware of classical civil society organizations in Turkish history, such as foundations, it will be difficult to understand recent reactions of civil society in Turkey. In this chapter, I would like to examine the concept of civil society to understand the “ideal” civil society, and locate its historical and contemporary reflections in Europe and Turkey.

2.1. The Definition and Development of the Concept of Civil Society and NGO

To understand the role of NGOs in Turkey’s EU accession process, one should analyze their historical development, both in the EU and in Turkey. It is worth noting that the term NGO, as it is used in Europe, is translated into Turkish as “civil society organization”. Therefore, when we start to analyze the role of NGOs in Turkey, we are inevitably forced to discuss the developmental process of both definitions. Also, ‘non-governmental’ is assumed to define anything done by civil society outside of the government, and yet, as we shall see in further chapters, the relationship between the government and NGOs is a close one. Indeed, on some occasions it is not easy to discern whether an NGO is working independently of the government. Due to this difference in translation, sources in Turkish overwhelmingly start analyzing the concept
of civil society in order to discuss the definition of an NGO, whereas Western sources
directly discuss the scope and features of NGOs. A common definition of the concept of
‘non-governmental’ can be summarized as “organizations or activities that are not
controlled or shaped by government institutions or that don’t work explicitly for
government interests” although they may cooperate in some circumstances (Belge, 2003b, p.99).

The concept of civil society has been discussed by various intellectuals during the last
two centuries, and yet, many different approaches have appeared as it was still being
shaped in the recent decade. Today, one can see the basic framework of civil society
much clearer. In the 1990s, civil society became a buzzword for everyone from actors to
political scientists. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the idea of civil society
has been firmly linked to opposition and dissident movements in Eastern European
countries. The global trend toward democracy opened up space for civil society in
formerly authoritarian and oppressive countries. In these countries, civil society not
only facilitated the transition to democracy, but also played an important role in
political transformation in general. Social groups such as students, women’s groups,
NGOs, trade unions, religious groups, professional organizations, the media, think tanks
and human rights organizations are a crucial source of democratic change in the
transition to democracy (Diamond, 1994). In the United States and Western Europe, the
publics’ skepticism of political parties ignited interest in civil society as an alternative
means of influencing public policy. Particularly in the developing world, the weakness
of the state’s capacity to deliver services provided opportunities for intervention by civil
society. Additionally, the Internet revolution created a new tool for forging networks of
diverse activist groups and mobilizing action on contentious issues. In the post-Cold
War world, civil society surely played a vital role in the transition and consolidation to
democracy in many parts of the world (Mercer, 2002).
Correspondingly, a multidimensional and multifaceted process of transformation has begun to shape Turkey. As elaborated upon in the introduction, the liberal economic policies introduced in 1980s, namely, globalization, rapid urbanization and the pursuit of European Union membership have put intense pressure on the Turkish political system. Meanwhile, civil society has become an attractive field of study among Turkish academics in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, in parallel to its revival in the West. The extensive study of civil society is generally perceived as a necessity in the democratization process. In Turkish political discourse, civil society’s role of promoting democracy generates crucial areas of research.

I will start defining civil society in the terms of Western culture where it first appeared. In Turkey, the concept has developed in a very different way.

Civil society was first referred to by the Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle (384 – 322 BC) as ‘politike koinonia’ (political society/community) (Cohen, 1994). The meaning of this term has been modified many times before it evolved into the meaning that is widely accepted today: as social areas independent of the state but embraced by it, each containing many social and economic actors who play a role. According to Aristotle, civil society is established independently of individual interests. It operates based on set rules and works in the best interest of the state (Seçkinelgin, 2002). Cicero’s Societas Civilis is very similar to this. The meaning Aristotle and Cicero placed in this concept was subject to a great deal of debate until the Middle Ages; after the second half of the eighteenth century however, we can see its association with the state decrease. Civil society was now a separate entity, equal to the state. This was due to the growing
influence of the bourgeoisie, which held civil society separate from the political arena, and as a social space devoted to society’s privacy and market place. The concept of civil society was first used in Adam Ferguson’s 1767 publication entitled *An Essay on the History of the Civil Society* (Ferguson, 1995).

There is a direct relationship between the perception of social order in the West and development of the idea of civil society. As pointed out by Seligman, the general crises of the seventeenth century – the commercialization of land, labor, and capital; the growth of market economies; the age of discoveries; and the English and later North American and continental revolutions – all brought into question the existing models of social order and authority (Seligman, 1992).

Civil society began to be formed with the development of the bourgeoisie in the thriving cities of Europe during the late Middle Ages. Economic growth occurred in parallel to the development of cities, and wealth accumulation allowed this new class to protect their interests by making their ideas heard by their governments. The bourgeoisie carved out its own realm of action paving the way for the formation of civil society. This new movement became so influential that it can be said that the development of the bourgeoisie limited the power of the governing elites of city-states in that period (Aktay & Sunar, 2005).

The French Revolution was the cornerstone in the historical development of the contemporary concept of democracy, a concept which insists on the people’s sovereignty. The French people, aspiring to take charge of their own government, also posed an example of civil power. It is possible to trace the timeline of the development
of the civil society concept as follows: we start with J. Locke and T. Hobbes who completed the intellectual evolution to differentiate the responsibilities of state and civil society; JJ Rousseau defended the people’s equality; and GWF Hegel gave us the contemporary definition of civil society. Marx equated the term with the bourgeoisie, and finally, Gramsci made the connection between civil society and democracy (Belge, 2003b). Yet the roots of the contemporary meaning of the concept of civil society lie especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. There are many more names that can be mentioned to refer to the development of the concept, from ancient times until today, but I prefer to focus on the most significant ones only (Walzer, 1992).

2.1.1. Changing State and Society Relations

The idea of the modern state occupied an important place in ancient Greek philosophy, especially in the teachings of Plato and Aristotle (Strauss, 2006). Historically, the modern state was defined as the protector of social welfare and cultural and social life (Taylor, 1994), encompassing society and aiding the individual’s strive for perfection in communal living. Political rule has ever since been perceived as the protector of social values (Kološov & O’Loughlin, 1998). The Westphalian modern state was seen as society’s protective shield and geographic contextualizer (Hettne, 2000) and shaped the political and social life within its borders. According to Cederman and Girardin, the bond between state and society was strengthened by military technology, the collection of taxes, the birth of the market economy, the strengthening of central structures and a switch from indirect to direct rule (Cederman & Girardin, 2010). With this bond, the
relations in the public sphere (civil society) formed by citizens and the state began to be discussed.

Most of the thinkers who work on the question of state and society relations have referred to the idea of civil society. The classic idea about state and society relations is based on that between the ruler and the ruled. Some thinkers who are mentionned below have described another form of relation between these two actors. This relationship was at times closer to today’s idea of civil society. The main objective in comparing these ideas with today’s conception of civil society lies in their approach on the participation of ordinary citizens in the decision making process. Two main approaches stand out when examining the ideas of the thinkers; the first group of thinkers mention civil society as a facilitator between the state and society, whereas others present it as a power sharing mechanism between state and society.

2.1.2. Civil Society as a Facilitator or Between State and Society Relations

The ancient philosopher Aristotle referred to the concept of civil society as koinonia politike in his book, Politika. This term had two meanings:

- koinonia politike (civil society) was the goal to be reached through the help of a city-state
- koinonia politike covered all groups in a city state.

His definitions cover those groups which were lawfully formed by people and society as a whole. For Aristotle, the basic requirement for citizenship was to have status in the
legal system and to be a member of the administrating group, which clearly indicates his elitist approach. He believed that a citizen should not only select the administrators but should also contribute to lawmaking.

Science and philosophy developed rapidly in the 17th and 18th centuries. Alongside these changes, the idea of freedom for individuals also formed the principles of the modern state. According to Hobbes, the state was the unifying element for individuals who would otherwise fight constantly. He formed the hypothesis of natural circumstances while explaining his views on state and civil society. This hypothesis suggests that while all people are born as equals, granting them equal rights may cause chaos in their lives. The state is therefore established as an agreement to deal with this constant threat, and is given authority over the people. According to Hobbes, the main duty of a state is to provide security. The existence of civil society requires a peaceful and safe country, even if this is achieved through oppressive policies at times. The state should therefore always have authority over civil society. One can suggest that Hobbes’ theory of civil society differs from the meaning of the concept today, since his theory does not allow for the possibility of a civil action challenging state authority. Such organizations should be eliminated immediately according to Hobbes. Therefore, all civil society activities must take place within the limit of a permitted space defined by the state (Hobbes, 1981).

History and philosophy were developed in a dialectical process, according to the German idealist philosopher Hegel, who was influenced to a degree by the works of Aristotle and yet differs from him on many major concepts. Hegel saw the family as a fundamental moral institution and argued that ‘civil society’ had been developed as the
anti-thesis of the family. The concept of civil society was the focal point in Hegel’s political theory. He used the analogy between activities in a society and operations in a factory in which each individual makes a part but none of them can produce the complete product alone, which proves that individuals are not self-sufficient. Unity and cooperation in a civil society was, therefore, vital. That is why Hegel’s concept of civil society can be defined as a system of needs, a place in which each individual reconciles their private interests with social demands (Hegel, 1956). According to Hegel, there are three stages in the formation of civil society: a system of needs, the administration of justice, and public authority. It is a system where individuals seek to satisfy each other’s needs based on the division of labor.

Under the influence of events that took place in his period, Hegel introduced the concept of civil society to re-establish the legal, political, and most importantly, the moral values which had deteriorated to a degree after the French revolution. According to Hegel, civil society occurred as a result of the exercise of free will by each subject citizen, who acted in their own self-interest. Eventually, this self-interest of individuals, through education and experience, harmonized with the interests of the community as a whole. There were, therefore, two interests co-existing in society: the interest of the individual and the interest of society. Hegel suggested that these two interplay their roles rather than contradict each other, as the good of society would serve the good of individuals (Peddle, 2000). In other words, mutual dependence was the basis of Hegel’s civil society theory because he saw the bourgeoisie as the representatives of civil society. It may seem surprising to read how much importance Hegel attributed to the concept of civil society when one considers his ideas about the sanctity of the state which constitutes the main principle of his philosophy. According to Hegel, despite the
divinity of the state, civil society should be independent and autonomous since the state is an end in itself as the highest state of morality, while civil society is there to protect the individual interests of its members. Indeed, Hegel saw the state as the highest authority that should be served and protected, but saw civil society as something that should thrive as long as it served that state. It would, however, be unfair to think of Hegel as an absolute authoritarian. Hegel believed that without the existence of an organized body of state nobody would be able to enjoy the freedom or rights they have as it would create chaos. It may sound contradictory, but Hegel accepted the importance of civil society in a well-functioning state and therefore placed value in it (Doğan, 2002).

Marx considered the concept of civil society in reference to capitalism. Along with many other aspects, Marx saw civil society as the product of the bourgeoisie and gave it three defining characteristics:

- Civil society is the social infrastructure on which production activities take place.
- Civil society is associated with modern capitalistic production methods which are quite different from old techniques (Doğan, 2002).
- The bourgeoisie developed as a result of capitalistic production methods which create an environment that is dominated by the political state.

Marx states in his book, ‘The German Ideology’ that, ‘civil society embraces all materialistic relations of individuals at a certain stage of developing production powers. It covers all commercial and industrial life; it extends beyond the state and the nation,
although it defines itself as ‘national’ in the international relations and it should be organized as a state internally…’ (Keane, 1988)

In short, Marx did not have a positive approach to the concept of civil society, as he thought it merely served capitalism. However, one should remember that Marx evaluated all concepts in the framework of the bourgeoisie and capitalism. They could only be used to create the conditions to move one step closer to socialism. Therefore the power of civil society to influence state and public opinion might be precious but it does not, in Marx’s eyes, change the fact that it is a product of a capitalist society, for as he stated, ‘none of the so called rights of man goes behind its private interests and whims and separated from the community’.

2.1.3. Civil Society as a Power Sharing Mechanism

Locke also focused on an arrangement where each individual gives up some of their rights in order to enter into a social contract that guarantees their remaining rights and security. However, he put forward the idea that the state is there for the people, not the other way around. In other words, his model did not exalt the state in all circumstances, and society in his theory depended on wisdom.

Locke’s description of the relationship between citizens and the government starts with ‘representation’. According to Locke, people determine the responsibilities of the government and that government is obliged to act in accordance with these
responsibilities. People also select lawmakers to establish their responsibilities. The state should not be allowed to have absolute power, according to Locke.

Locke asserts that civil society is formed at the point where a contract ended “pre-societal” natural circumstances. When people create social unity, rather than see themselves as a random gathering of individuals, society emerges. However, there must be functioning rules and defined limits in a society, which Rousseau refers to as a social contract. Citizens accept the limitation of their rights to achieve the security of a set of contracted rights, thereby forming civil society. The state depends on law and the constitution, which construct the two basic principles of a modern society and provide the separation of powers. Locke opened a new era in the development of the concept of civil society by defending the protection of a citizen’s right to life and the separation of the legislative, judicial and executive powers of the state structure and the parliamentary system in which citizens can contribute to the decision making process. In Locke’s state of nature, men are free and equal and the government is there to protect this. Locke, in fact, had very progressive ideas for his time. He openly suggested that, if a state failed to protect the basic rights of its citizens, it was legitimate for citizens to strip the state of its power (Hanratty, 1995).

2.1.4 Contemporary Conceptualization of Civil Society

Recent years have seen flourishing debate and literature on the concept of civil society. Yet a lack of consensus on defining the term causes much confusion, debate and
disagreement. While various prominent writers recognize its complexity, they are incapable of agreeing on a definition.

Nevertheless, there is agreement that civil society is autonomous from and independent of the state. Beyond this basic agreement, the discordance on articulating a precise and common definition intensifies markedly, as vividly portrayed in a number of publications (Keane [1998]; Van Rooy [1998]). This chapter concentrates on the status and nature of civil society organizations operating in Turkey.

Theoretical foundations of civil society allocate incalculable attention on coordinated human activity without the participation of government. Naturally the starting point is the early writing of Thomas Paine in *Rights of Man*, Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right* and Adam Fergusson’s *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*. More recently, Ernest Gellner’s infectious exuberance on civil society was portrayed in *Conditions of Liberty* (Gellner, 1994). Havel (1992, pp-32-40) defines the role of civil society as an expression “of a political desire for greater civility in social relations” in a “period of rising political animosities and mistrust”. However, Gellner (1994, p.28) warns that “not every set of autonomous groups creates a civil society, civil society must depend upon the ability to break away from any particular enclosure; membership of autonomous groups needs to be both voluntary and overlapping if society is to become civil. Individualism is the core of component of civil society”.

This section focuses on the literature questioning the applicability of contemporary expositions of civil society to the social processes underway in developing countries. The question here is: to what extent are civil society ideals meaningful and
institutionally realizable outside the developed world? Instead of a comprehensive analysis of civil society literature, this section will be an attempt at taxonomy, to highlight prevalent areas of convergence among scholars.

Within the framework exclusive to developed countries, Hall (1998, pp. 20-26) states that: “Civil society is thus a complex balance of consensus and conflict, the valuation of as much difference as is compatible with the bare minimum of consensus necessary for settled existence”. He further asserts his starting point that “civil society is a particular form of society, appreciating social diversity and able to limit the depredations of political power, that was born in Europe”. Hall links civil society exclusively to Europe. In a similar vein, Perez-Diaz (1993, p.80) argues that “civil society refers to an attempt to theorize about specific historical experience: an ongoing, uninterrupted tradition of a core of socio-economic and political institutions…… in some North Atlantic nations dating back at least two to three centuries. Other nations, notably in continental Europe, have joined recently…”.

Gellner (1994, p.169) stresses that “[c]ivil society…reflects not only a particular stage of historical development in the West but the particular conditions that obtained there and not necessarily in other parts of the world”. In a similar manner, he also asserts that civil society “is a Western dream, a historical aspiration”. Mardin claims that civil society was not simply an ideological convention but the product of an assembly of social and political forces emanating from the European concepts of secularism and the rule of law. Furthermore, Islam and Islamic societies have become the focal point of academics who believe that the socio-political context in developed countries favoring civil society cannot be replicated in Muslim-majority countries. For Gellner (1994,
Islamic societies “exemplify a social order which seems to lack much capacity to provide political countervailing, which is atomized without much individualism, and operates effectively without intellectual pluralism”. Although Muslim societies might have many voluntary organizations and associations, Gellner says, they are “total, many-stranded, underwritten by ritual and made stable through being linked to a whole inside set of relationships”. Mardin (1995, p. 278) concludes that since Muslim societies are beneficiaries of a “collective memory of a total culture which once provided a ‘civilized’ life of a tone different from that of the West” the nucleus of that culture is not based on individualism and self-reliance. A similar view was shared by Hefner (2000, p. vii), who argues that “Islamic civilization…does not value intermediary institutions between the government and the people, thus precluding the emergence of civil society, and is based on a legal culture of rigidity, thus placing a premium on obedience and social conformity rather than on critical inquiry and individual initiative”.

To summarize, the main arguments of this school of thought are that civil society is an outcome of a particular processes, exclusive to the developed world and almost irreproducible elsewhere. It is a unique contraption of a specific conjuncture in Western social and cultural history. Also, the values that have laid the foundations for civil society in developed countries are absent in the developing world. It should be understood that those scholars have been grouped together for ease of reference despite some differences in their opinions.

It appears that the concept of civil society cannot easily be relegated to having limited meaning outside its origins in developed countries, nor can it simply be imposed by
external forces to nurture good governance in countries with developing institutions. Recent socio-economic and political developments in Turkey suggest the possible emergence of an indigenous path of democratic change. However, the interpretations of European and American scholars on civil society and the role of Islam have left little room for the recognition of the diverse and complex developments in Turkish society. Defining Islam as incompatible with modernity fails to recognize the potential in the developing Turkish society, with its cultural and historical elements and particularities. While theorists like Norton (2001), Gellner (1994) and Mardin (1995) advocate that civil society emerged as a by-product of industrial capitalism, it can be observed that in Turkey, civil society takes on a variety of forms, emphasizing the interconnections between different beliefs and ideas. Perhaps the role of civil society in developed society and literature is to secure individual freedom and democracy against state incursions. In Turkey’s case, however, civil society has a role in promoting broader participation and involvement in all aspects of life. Civil society organizations generally focus on building the conditions in which civic organizations can develop and enhance inter-locking social, economic and political structures. Unlike Western interpretations that portray a civil society in terms of clear-cut, institutionalised, ‘modern’ organizations and associations, Turkey offers civil society as an arena in which traditional associations function alongside “modern” ones.

However, there are those who would like to address the concept in a “third world” or non-Western context. Some critics of Western-style democracy and culture have warned that the promotion of civil society would disseminate a culture of self-centered individualism around the world. But the usages to which civil ideals and moral standards were put revealed no such consistency in meaning. It seems that the concept
was assigned widely different meanings and employed in contradictory political actions (White et al. [1996]; Sampson [1996]; Buchowski [1996]). The central claim is that the contexts in which civil society was invoked varied a great deal between various countries including those in the north and the south (Özerdem & Jacob, 2005). They further claim that the idea of civil society was not entirely singular in its implications in the history of Western thought. These claims have therefore raised considerable questions on whether non-Western cultures share the same ideas and knowledge of civil society as their Western counterparts. Thomas Metzger (1998, pp.204–230), for example, argues that:

“Chinese modern political thought has not turned toward a non-utopian, bottom up approach. Based on the traditional optimism about political practicability, it still reflects the traditional paradigm of a morally and intellectually enlightened elite working with a corrigible political center morally to transform society, instead of emphasising the organizational efforts of free but fallible citizens forming a civil society with which to monitor an incorrigible political center”.

In contrast, Sami Zubaida assesses civil society groups in the Middle East. Zubaida (2001) emphasizes non-state institutions and groupings as the basis of civil society, containing sources of social autonomy and generating powers which may eventually counter-balance state powers. According to Kamali (1998, p. 249) “the term civil society was not exclusively Western, although the definitions and meanings certainly varied. Islamic civil society was based on diversity”. Kamali further outlines that early Islamic community was described as “al-mujatama’ al madani—translated as civil society in Arabic—” a civil society “with civil here indicating the establishment of the city that was composed of Muslim segments allied on tribal and geographic lines, as
well as Jews and others who were allied on similar lines”. Non-Western conceptualizations of civil society have contributed a great deal to the growing literature on this topic. As Kaviraj and Khilnani (2001, p. 323) rightly put it:

“It is in the nature of the problem that debates about civil society remain inconclusive; but these are not, for that reason, fruitless. After all, these debates form parts of a collective reflection on the nature of the conditions which political democracy requires to take root and flourish. Precisely because of its elusiveness and intractability the idea of civil society in the Third World forces us to think about the social terrain behind the explicit political institutions and to try to explicate what happens in that essential but relatively dark analytical space”.

Furthermore, although the concept of civil society is generally associated with the free market economy and liberalism, Roger Owen (1994, pp. 183-199) advised that “there is no necessary or direct connection between capitalism and democracy, as an autonomous capitalism can be an important condition for democracy”. Some thinkers focused more on the state-civil society relationship. During the 1980s anti-communist protests in Eastern Europe, civil society “represented and championed its autonomy from the state” (Kadioğlu, 2005, pp. 23-41).

There are various understandings of the concept of civil society. It was sometimes employed by liberals to refer specifically to the market as the primary private sphere of social interaction, distinct from the public sphere of state action. However it seems that the present usage draws not only on a growing body of contemporary civil society literature as noted earlier, but also associates civil society with the plethora of private “associations”. Consequently, it is recognized that, in recent history, the idea of civil
society has been strongly linked with opposition movements in Eastern European countries. In this context, civil society refers to closing the gap between the state and society through the participation of activists and other advocates of change.

There is growing scholarly debate regarding the extent to which civil society can exist outside of national borders. The notion of a global civil society became popular in the 1990s, sparked by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of communism and the need to comprehend the New World Order, advancements in communication technology, alarming global environmental issues, the rise of neo-liberalism, and the growing presence of civil society in politics and international relations underpinned by the process of globalization.

The idea has been considered from various perspectives ranging from the cosmopolitan (Held, 1995) to the Communitarian (Walzer [1996]; Frost [2002]). Their debates aimed to expand the notion of commitment to one’s fellow beings beyond the state. One of the key proponents of global civil society was Young (1995, pp. 527-546), who calls it “a project to be realised”. In addition, Scholte (2002, ppp. 211-233) argues that global civil society consists of civil activity which “is global in scope, establishes trans-border communications, encourages supranational solidarity, leads to society beyond nation state and it addresses transworld issues such as global warming, nuclear weapons, AIDS and disaster relief”.

Kaldor (2003a, p. 30) emphasizes the intermediary role of society and believes that “[g]lobal civil society does provide a way to supplement traditional democracy. It is a medium through which individuals can, in principle, participate in global political
debates; it offers the possibility for the voices of the victims of globalization to be heard if not the votes. And it creates new forums for deliberation on the complex issues of the contemporary world”. However, she further cautions that “there is not one global civil society but many, affecting a range of issues-human rights, environment and so on”. She argues that “it is not democratic - there are no processes of election, nor could there be at a global level, since that would require a world state. And such a state, even if democratically elected, would be totalitarian. It is also uneven and North-dominated” (Kaldor, 2003a, pp. 103-114). On the other hand, John Keane (1998, pp. 34-52) characterizes global civil society as “an implied logical and institutional precondition of the survival and flourishing of a genuine plurality of different ideals and forms of life”. Keane is cautious when assessing global civil society as a homogeneous movement. He believes, instead, that global civil society is not a single, unified domain. According to Keane, a new form of governmental power is emerging in the world today, which he calls “cosmocracy”. He calls “cosmocracy” the “first-ever-world polity” and “a world wide web of independence”. For Keane “the essence of cosmocracy is conglomeration of interlocking and overlapping sub-state, state and supra-state institutions and process that have political and social effects on a global scale”. In support of global civil society, he underlies the need for new democratic ways of living, resulting from the challenges of international terrorism, the rising feelings of xenophobia and environmental crises. Keane acknowledges that “global civil society is still an evolving, open ended civic sphere whose importance will depend on its ability to become more democratic, better integrated into governance institutions and invested with universal values”.
David Chandler (2004) aims to arrive at a coherent and critical understanding of the term “global civil society”. In his book, Chandler delineates the “emerging” global civil society as an “imagined” concept. Chandler notes the increasing influence of NGOs over international policy, combined with the movement towards a more ethical foreign policy, as well as the convergence of social movements and civic activism at an international level. However, he maintains that “global civil society has largely been fashioned by elites, who have constructed their progressive orientations largely in their own interests” (Chandler, 2004, pp. 44-46). For Chandler, this is evident at both “the empirical level, where NGOs have largely been used to facilitate state-policy” and “morality is shaped in the interests of the powerful, and at the normative level, where cosmopolitans seek to develop ‘good governance’ on their own terms” (Chandler, 2004, pp. 190-194). Chandler’s powerful critique supplies an alternative stance on the term and demonstrates that the current literature on global civil society might simplify the role of non-state actors such as NGOs in global politics, especially of those who focus on progressive societal transformation.

It seems that the global civil society represents an emerging phenomenon that is not notable for its raw power of influencing events and policies, but for its distinctiveness from the assumed characteristics of the traditional state system. It can be said that globalization is a dynamic process, resulting not only from technological developments but also from the choices and activities of a variety of actors. These actors include states, international organizations, corporations and millions of global and local citizens affiliated with a rich tapestry of social movements and NGOs. Assessing the nature of relationships among these actors has been an overwhelming, but essential, theoretical challenge.
2.1.5 The Concept of NGO

As it was mentioned above, the term used in Europe to name civil organizations does not neatly translate into Turkish. It would therefore be helpful to look at how the concept of non-governmental organizations developed in Europe, in order to understand the semantic difference between these two concepts which are used to refer to the same mechanism.

The concept of a non-governmental organization (NGO) came in to use when the United Nations decided to create a space for organizations that were not part of the decision making process, yet represented neither governments nor member states (Martens, 2002). Article 71 of the United Nations gives the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) the right to consult NGOs when it sees fit. This was an attempt to prevent the likely criticism that the UN could only act according to the interests of powerful states rather than for the interest of the entire world. In the dynamics of the Cold War, however, the ECOSOC split non-governmental organizations into three categories with resolution 1296, on May 23rd 1968, which was designed to limit their participation in the UN (Otto, 1996). Organizations of the first group were allowed to propose for agendas in the Economic and Social Council, and send observers who could make suggestions to the council. Organizations of the second group could not propose agendas but observe and make suggestions. All other listed organizations were to be occasionally consulted for their views, but were otherwise unable to participate (Pazarç, 1998).

Despite the existence of different approaches and definitions, it is widely accepted that these are organizations that pursue activities to relive suffering, promote the interests of
the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services, and undertake community development (Cleary, 1997). Yet some other definitions focus on its other features that come as the fruits of democracy in many societies.

One may ask why the term “non-governmental” was chosen to name these organizations. Another question should be raised that analyzes why there is a general tendency to see NGOs as organizations that deal with the disadvantaged people of societies, for indeed, there are many examples of organizations acting purely for political reasons to express their thoughts freely under the roof of organizations whose existence is justified by the freedom of association.

To answer the first question above, the word “non-governmental” needs to be focused on. This term can be interpreted as the activities taking place outside the state circle, completely planned by people who are not solely and directly working in the interest of the state. According to Michael Walzer, civil society is “an area in which human groups can move freely without being compelled by any kind of force’ and where they ‘can freely define themselves’” (Walzer, 1992). Looking at this definition, it seems natural to discuss the concept of civil society in the framework of democracy and human rights.

2.2. The Civil Society in the EU

2.2.1. The Impact of Interest Groups in Europe

EU countries (states) are established (founded) on the principles of democracy and pluralism. Therefore interest groups and non-governmental organizations have a special
position in Europe compared to those operating in Turkey. In Europe these establishments are perceived as an inalienable part of the democratic system. In such societies these organizations have the role of conveying the demands and opinions of the people to the governing elite. In Europe such associations can exercise their right to organize demonstrations, parades, boycotts, and strikes in order to impose their influence on the state. This is also true for the EU as an independent entity. Such groups can also participate in lobbying activities, targeting EU institutions as well those within their own countries. Many NGOs in Europe have an office in Brussels for this reason.

The Economic and Social Committee formed under the EU institution provides effective communication between the Union and these small interest groups. Many important decisions affecting ordinary people in Europe are today taken in Brussels. Therefore these interest groups and organizations try to find a way to influence the decision making process in the EU. The aims of NGOs and interest groups are defined in the study published by the Economic and Social Committee as follows:

- Informing the EU about the demands of their members
- Informing the members of the committee about the activities of the Union
- Providing integration into the EC-EU
- Assisting to devise shared policies that would bring together different demands of interests groups
- Influencing EC institutions (Europa, 2007a)

The members of the Economic and Social committee are classified in 3 groups, which are, employers, employees and various interest groups.
The employers group is “drawn from private and public sectors of industry, small businesses, chambers of commerce, wholesale and real trade, banking and insurance, transport and agriculture from the 27 Member States of the EU. In contact with daily realities on the ground, these women and men involved in business life put their experience at the service of the European construction.” (Europa, 2007a) The goal of the group is “to promote European integration by supporting the development of our enterprises, as the key actors in the prosperity of our societies and in employment creation.” (Europa, 2007a)

The employees group, on the other hand, consists of “members with a background in national trade union organizations, both confederations and sectoral federations” (Europa, 2007a). The goal of the employees group is stated as “to contribute to improving the living and working conditions of all workers, promoting civil and human progress for all citizens of the European Union, and putting into effect its full commitment to the workers and people of other continents.” (Europa, 2007a)

Finally the third group, the various interest groups, consists of different groups working for different interests, and “[t]he unique feature which forges Group III's identity is the wide range of categories represented within its ranks: its members are drawn from farmers' organizations, small businesses, the crafts sector, the professions, cooperatives and non-profit associations, consumer organizations, environmental organizations, associations representing the family, persons with disabilities, the scientific and academic community and non-governmental organizations.” The group shares a common goal with the others, which is “to achieve real economic and social democracy in the EU.”
These groups interact not only with the committee but also at a national level. Their lobbying activities within the union can be categorized as follows:

- Annual meetings with committee members and groups leaders
- The relations formed between the interest groups’ general secretaries and related departments of the committee
- The relations formed between ministers of the European Council and interest groups
- Relations with the European Parliament as it has limited power on budget distribution

Among these three groups, the employers group can be regarded as the most influential.

2.2.2. The Employers Association and the European Union

Employers have shown a keen interest in the activities of any organization in Europe since the Second World War. They have actively watched and analyzed the outcomes of these activities and their possible impact on their businesses. In a pluralist Europe, it was not that challenging for them. Europe was, in the end, established as a result of a bourgeoisie movement. Therefore business owners were already used to a culture of being involved in the decision making process. Europe was determined to recover both politically and economically after World War II. Therefore politicians and bureaucrats were also keen to listen to employers groups in order to achieve economic success in a short time. They therefore encouraged employers to establish a confederation that would
assist in forming industrial and economic policies that could be applied in the whole region (Walzer, 1992).

According to a study done by AJ Moques Mendes, the integration brought positive economic changes for the Benelux countries and Italy while affecting France and Germany negatively in the period from 1961 to 1972 (Monques Mendes, 1986). Yet Germany and France did manage to increase their export share in the market. A decade later all eight members of the community enjoyed positive growth except for Denmark. The numbers were gradually working for the benefit of those who joined the Union. Within the community, the trade capacity increased by 724% between 1958 and 1972 and from 6.8 billion dollars to 56 billion dollars. Today, the European Union constitutes one of the world’s biggest markets with 374 million consumers (Eurostat, 2006).

Table I below shows the comparative size of leading markets of the world among the developed countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>GNP (billion dollar)</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>7.593</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>7.813</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>3.404</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table I - Source: Eurostat Yearbook 2000

In such a union where the economies of member countries are so interdependent, it is not surprising to see that the employers group has the greatest lobbying power over the
decision making process compared to the other interest groups. Employers realized that in order to continue to grow they needed to be actively involved in policy making not only in their own countries but also in the international areas of decision making. Therefore the employers group in Europe has tools to keep in touch with several authorities in the Union including the parliament. Besides this, they also interact with the European Commission, representatives of member states, embassies of member countries, Economic and Social committee, European Trade Federations and of course the media. Many big businesses or employers organizations opened big and luxurious offices in Brussels in order to be able to follow the changes closely. Until the mid 1980s there were up to 500 interest groups with offices in Brussels (Butt Philip, 1985), but this number had trebled by the mid 1990s and reached 2309 in 2001 (Greenwood, 2003).

The employers’ interest resulted in the establishment of an influential federation, the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederation of Europe (UNICE), which was formed in 1958. The UNICE was involved in almost every economic decision in Europe. For example it gave a memorandum to the EC authorities to urge them to make law to facilitate international unification among industrialists in 1965. Later it supported the EC regarding the Customs Union within the region. In 1968, after Europe began to implement the Customs Union within its borders the then general secretary of the UNICE, Hilde Claessons, suggested that the Customs Union was not a big step to provide real economic growth. Harmonization of tariffs, elimination of the technical obstacles and some other regulations that would allow the transnational authority to operate more freely also needed to be done according to the UNICE (Friedrich, 1969). Therefore, while politicians were worrying over issues of national sovereignty and acting more cautiously, businesses in Europe already foresaw a better unified Europe on
the horizon and acted accordingly. In other words the UNICE was very positive about creating a united Europe right from the beginning. The UNICE believed that a more powerful international authority in Europe would be able provide a better environment for businesses than the national authorities.

Other employers associations that supported the development towards a united Europe were the Confederazione Internazionale Della Communita Europe, the European Insurance Committee and Motor Agents Association, the European Federation of Equipment leasing Company Association, and the European Community Mortgage Federation.

Yet Europe did not reach the level of international decision making overnight. Problems occurred due to the differing opinions of countries, and disagreements followed, which pushed the employers groups to focus on their own national authorities for lobbying. For example, in Germany, the most powerful country in Europe economically, the employers associations were very keen on transferring the decision making power of the national government to the community. The head of the German Industrialist Association (BDI) stated that German industrialists were in favor of a liberal and free market, not a protective and closed market in their own country. They openly suggested that the European Parliament should be equipped with more powers and Europe should get more connected. France, with its state centered economy, was the country which had greatest reservations about increasing the power of international authorities at the expense of the French government. Although this can be partly explained by the nationalist policies of De Gaulle, the relatively weak state of French industry may well be the reason behind this slightly protective argument. Yet even in France, French
businessmen and industrialists did not allow this approach to reign and gradually France also came to the point of the Customs Union. On the other hand, surprisingly, British entrepreneurs put up considerable resistance towards the Customs Union and a more united Europe. This could be due to the British policy of founding an alternative establishment within Europe like the EFTA. When that failed, British business began to suggest that a full integration would be necessary in order to benefit from the European Market. The UK chose to leave it in 1973 to join the EEC/EU, a decision that was supported at the time by all the main political parties. The majority of the original EFTA members have now left and also joined the EU (EuroMove, 2011)

Italians were also supportive of the Customs Union and unified economic policies in Europe despite their relatively weak industrial sector compared to other big countries in Europe.

In short, almost all the entrepreneurs of Europe supported a united Europe both economically and politically long before the politicians began to talk about it explicitly. The demands of employers from the community prepared a base for the common market gradually. Among those were:

- Elimination of the customs desks in the borders within Europe
- Harmonization of fiscal laws within the region
- Standardization of industrial requirements
- Regulation of the European competition law
- Creation of the concept of a European company and the regulations regarding it.

All these demands would in fact be a target of the common market within the coming decades in Europe.
2.2.3. The Employers’ Group and the Common Market

However, the enthusiasm about instigating an economically integrated Europe was interrupted during the 1970s when the oil crisis hit the world. European states tended to become more protective over their national industry. Some even tried to find a way to reverse the impact of the Customs Union.

One must note the eagerness of these industrialists and compare it with the Turkish industrialists who, in the beginning, were particularly opposed to the Customs Union as they believed it would destroy their businesses. From this point of view, the difference in the level of confidence is worth noting between European and Turkish businesses. Turkish industrialists came to the same point much later and yet now they wish to be part of the Union more than anybody else in Turkey. That alone shows that Turkey has come a long way both economically and emotionally.

The recession and economic worries in Europe were eased by 1985 when French J Delors became President of the Commission in Europe. He initiated a study analyzing the possible advantages and disadvantages of a common market in Europe. The study was known as the Cecchini Report. The obstacles in front of the free movement of goods and services in Europe were costing them a lot. The European Commission summarized these as follows:

- Increasing cost of different bureaucratic applications in different countries
- Increasing cost of transportation due to border controls
- Increasing cost due to different standards for the goods and services
The high cost of unregulated competition law in the region (Europe Without Frontiers, 1987)

Based on these observations Europeans began to believe more economic integration was needed in order to reduce the cost of political and economic barriers between EU countries.

Therefore the Cecchini Report suggested that Europe was losing a considerable amount of money due to not applying a common market in the region. The total amount was put forward as 200 billion dollars in 1988. The beginning of the common market application was of course something that businesses were longing for. With the commencement of the common market with the Single European Act (1987), European businesses began to plan strategies to cope with increased competition and take advantage of wider market availability. Thus many companies began to merge to expand their market. The number of merging companies reached about 4000 in 1980s. Furthermore it started with 7000 M&As in 1993, and more than doubled by 2000 (Martynova & Renneboog, 2006).

Businesses in Europe have been lobbying to find a way that would provide a European company independent status. This of course needs to take a lot of issues into consideration. National governments are much more reluctant to give up their national sovereignty by passing more power to the Commission. However, the demands of businesses have in fact brought Europe to what it is today economically. The common market can be deemed as a result of a spillover due to increased interaction among companies in Europe. The idea of a common market in the end was not something to be explored solely by politicians. Employers’ groups such as the chambers of commerce
and other professional business organizations continuously put more economic issues on the agenda. UNICE, for example, followed the agenda very closely and lobbied for it actively. On December 13, 1988 UNICE put forward a declaration supporting a common market application in the region. The declaration stated that employers would

- Work towards achieving common market targets
- Work to increase cooperation among companies in different countries
- Visit the various businesses and companies and related organizations to convince them of the benefits of a common market

UNICE also organized national lobbying activities to quicken the process at the international level. German industrialists were the most enthusiastic among European businesses. Germany holds the biggest financial market in Europe. It has got the biggest export share in the region and almost half of its export are from within the region (Mendel, 1974).

Italy was another enthusiastic country about the common market and a united Europe. Italian corporations were quick to merge with other companies in Europe. For example Italian giant, the owner of Olivetti, Carlo de Benedetti bought Societe Generale, which controlled 2/3 of Belgium’s economy. Among the 68 company merges that took place in Europe in 1987, 28 of them were performed by Italian companies (Attikkan, 1988).

Only France acted cautiously regarding the progression towards a common market. France had always had a more protective and state controlled economy compared to other European countries. Mandel suggests that the real reason behind the French veto against the British application to enter the Union was to do with worries about the
economy and the common market as France was not confident that they would be able to cope with the competition (Mendel, 1974). As a country that favored state control more than any other EU country, it is not surprising that the French government had a cautious attitude towards the single market. Yet despite the French government’s reservations, 76% of businesses favored the single market in France at 1998 (Sullivan, 1988).

In conclusion, European businesses contributed to the common market goal considerably, and long before any political action was taken they were aiming to create one Europe in the region. The effect of economic growth would of course bring a spillover effect and assist the action towards a politically integrated Europe also.

2.2.4. Trade Unions and the EU

With its strong history of unions, Europe has always paid attention to trade unions. Thus trade unions in Europe constitute an important group of interest groups. They usually have millions of members and hold a high potential voting power in their respective countries. In addition, their financial resources are more than adequate to allow them to be actively involved in lobbying activities both on the national and international level.

Due to their power, it is not easy for politicians to ignore the demands of trade unions before they commit to any kind of economic policy in the union. Likewise, trade unions have not remained distanced from the market unification attempts made in the European community and were actively involved in the lobbying process.
Yet due to their ideological background it is difficult to suggest that there has been agreement among trade unions regarding the common market and a more united Europe. There are three mainstream ideological backgrounds among the trade unions in Europe: those who come from Marxist backgrounds, those who have a Christian thinking background, and finally those who have more moderate ones. Those three have different approaches to the attempts made in the region regarding the common market and other political unifications.

During the preparation sessions preceding the signing of the Rome Treaty that established the European Community, Christian unions were very supportive. Others also were in favor of a political union but acted more cautiously (Bouvard, 1972). As the Rome Treaty was pushed forward, the improvement in the living standards of the people of Europe was one of the aims, giving unions an inevitable role in the procedure. With their demands, unions played a balancing role with the demands of businesses in Europe. Among the aims of trade unions in Europe the following can be seen:

- Democratization of the economy in the region
- Providing fair conditions regarding capital flow and income
- Improving working conditions
- Providing equality between men and women
- Implementing policies that protect the environment
- Implementing a system that would monitor the operations of big companies
- Adjusting a fair taxation system
- Implementing a regional development program in order to assist the relatively underdeveloped areas in the region.
While the mainstream trade unions supported the EC, the radical ones were strongly against the idea of an economically and politically united Europe. The Confédération Générale du Travail of France, one of the most radical trade unions, for example, opposed any attempt to form a community within Europe as it claimed this would only help capitalist and exploitative businesses in Europe. They even refused to take place in any of the institutions of the community initially, but later when they began to see the economic benefits of the common market and political interdependency, they began to attend meetings and other activities (Kirchner, 1977).

Trade unions were hoping to form a socially united Europe. Following the Rome Treaty some criticized and stated their disappointment as the Rome Treaty was foreseeing a Europe for businessmen, not for people (Kökten, 1997).

Another strong opposition to the EC came from British trade unions. The Trade Union Congress (TUC), which is an umbrella organization for trade unions in Britain and highly connected to the Labor Party, did not trust the policies of the Union regarding the common market and free competition. They were also very influential in Britain’s negative approach, advocated by the Labor Party, particularly towards the EEC in the beginning. After 1979 the TUC began a campaign against the EEC triggered by the common agricultural policies which they opposed vigorously. The TUC General Council opposed the Conservative government’s decision to take Britain into the Common Market. The TUC even went as far as calling for withdrawal from the EEC altogether which found support from the other unions in the EU (TUC History Online, 2007) The Labor leader, Harold Wilson, asked for a referendum in the country
regarding EEC membership and when the outcome turned out to be quite positive about the membership the TUC accepted the result pragmatically and ceased their opposition to the common market.

When we look at Italian trade unions, we see further different approaches from the rest of the EEC. Trade unionism occurred relatively late in Italy due to late industrialization compared to other countries in Europe. In Italy, trade unions with moderate ideological backgrounds were in favor of a union in Europe while radical ones initially opposed it. The Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL – Italian General Confederation of Labor), established in 1944, included Christian democrat and socialist trade unions and the CISL (Confederation of Trade Unions in Italy Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori), which traditionally aligned with the Roman Catholic Church, supported the Italian process to join the EC. In 1950, socialists and Christian democrats left the Confederation. On the other hand, Italian Workers Union (ULI), which has a radical background, opposed any attempt to unify the region by claiming it would merely serve capitalist interests (Kirchner, 1977).

In Belgium on the other hand, where trade unionism and membership among the population is very high, trade unions were very supportive of the whole EC project both economically and politically. The picture is more or less the same in the other countries of Europe where most trade unions supported the EC on the condition of creating a social Europe. Their wish to balance the demands of employers was also a motive for trade unions to participate in the Commission’s work in Brussels.
At the international level in Europe one important organization gathered all the European trade unions under its umbrella: ETUC (European Trade Unions Confederation). Formed in 1973, ETUC has since maintained a close relationship with bureaucrats in Brussels. The ETUC members constitute a third of the Economic and Social Committee in Europe. By joining various committees and study groups ETUC tries to influence the work of the EU in general. ETUC was a very keen supporter of the idea of transforming the supremacy over to the European parliament from national parliaments (Kirchner, 1977).

As the Rome Treaty put improving the living standards of people of Europe as a goal, trade unions did not have much difficulty in accessing the decision making process because governments were eager to listen to them. Yet what is worth mentioning is that they never enjoyed the same level of impact as the employers’ groups in the EU. This created some negative feeling among trade unions towards Brussels (Wallace, 1983).

The idea of the common market had an immense impact on not only business owners but also workers. Thus, trade unions in Europe were very interested in the process of transforming the region into a common market. One of the most important changes the common market ensured was regarding employment opportunities. According to the Cecchini Report, the most credited study analyzing the problems and benefits of the single market done in 1988, the common market would provide 2 million new jobs and this could increase to 5 million new opportunities if the forecast worked out positively (Commission of European Communities, 1988). The difference in payments and salaries in different member states had an effect on the cost of goods and services. In the southern part of the region, where the employees were relatively low paid, they
recognized that business might flow into these areas and provide opportunities. However, the northern part of the region, where payments were higher and the rights of employees better, was much more cautious about the consequences of the single market. Trade unions in the north were worried about the consequences of the single market on the rights that were earned as a result of long struggles. Trade unions in the south expected a rise in the level of employment and therefore a parallel increase in their power to bargain with governments. There were those who thought that unemployment would increase due to the single market since many small businesses would have to close down because of high competition. All the worries of unions found some comfort in the words of the 8th president of European Commission, Jacques Delors, in 1988 regarding the status of employees in Europe. He stressed three points as follows:

- Creating a superior working standard than the conditions suggested in the International Labor Organization (ILO) in Europe
- Creating the concept of a European Company to prevent companies from abusing differences in the regions
- Improving dialogue and participation of ordinary people in the decision making process, thus, developing an industrial democracy (Hutsebaut, 1988)

Yet the high ranking officials of the commission were so keen on a single market that they did not place as much importance on the social side of developments as the trade unions would have liked to have seen. The majority of trade unions nevertheless supported single market plans in the region, with the condition of social improvement in Europe alongside economic development. Even the most radical trade union of Europe, the CGT, eventually supported the position of the ETUC with respect to the single market. The ETUC likewise proposed laws and regulations that would protect the rights
of workers and consumers as an act of balance as opposed to the ever increasing influence of corporations (ETUC, 1988).

2.2.5. Recent Developments in European Civil Society Groups

Alexis de Tocqueville was one of the first philosophers who emphasized the significance and the social preconditions of associations in modernity, about 150 years ago. To understand the structure of European civil dialogue, the social basis of politics should be conceived of in detail. In basic terms, civil dialogue aims to increase the participation of citizens in decision making through organizations. Civil dialogue in the EU context has three main components:

1. Dialogue between civil society organizations themselves on the future direction of the EU and its policies
2. Regular and structured dialogue between these organizations
3. The EU and sectoral dialogue between the organizations and their negotiating partners within executive and legislative powers (Lampl, 2007)

The cleavage model of politics suggests that political divisions derive from critical junctures (Lipset – Rokkan Model) in the development of a political system in the EU (Hix, 1999). This model gave as its example the democratic revolution of the 18th and 19th century in Europe which produced a conflict between the church and the state, and the industrial revolution of the 19th century that raised workers against capitalists (socialists vs conservatives). According to the Lipset – Rokkan model there are two main cleavages in the EU (Hix, 1999). Firstly, the combination of a common territory, historical myths, a mass culture and a national economy constitutes a powerful force for
individual attachment to the nation state. As a result of this situation the EU as a community of states is segmented along national lines. Secondly, on certain issues in the EU agenda, a group of citizens in one nation state will share more in common with a similar group in another nation state. For example, German and French farmers who have collective interests defend the Common Agricultural Policy against French and German consumers. This transnational cleavage can also emerge around recent issue divisions such as the environment and human rights education, which has an increasingly important impact on the EU agenda.

The origins of European civil dialogue formation dates back to the 1940s. The United European Movement (UEM), created in 1948, can be considered as one of the first examples characterizing this process. One of the major achievements of the UEM was the creation of the European Council (European Movement, 2005). By setting up think tanks and a network of mobilization in democratic countries, it played a pivotal role in the process of European integration.

In the 1960s, European labor parties, trade unions and organizations of trade played important roles in creating further collective action. One of the most important types of collective civil action was the action of students. There were two novel features of the 1960s student movement (Therborn, 1996). Firstly, the thrust of the movement was internationalist and often anti-nationalist. Events such as the Vietnam War and the colonial war in Algeria provided the catalyst for protest movements. Secondly, the 1960s student movement also established a new type of collective action. The action was directly against state and university authorities but the main meaning of it was a general message to be relayed and amplified by the mass media. As we mentioned
before, the years between 1960 and 1980s were also the golden years of the labor movement.

Student movements triggered another important issue which was short lived but characterized the European civil movement of the 1970s. The feminist movement had an important effect on the collective action of women’s organizations. It has given rise in hard conditions to new associations and led to the dissolution of earlier women’s associations such as the UDI (Unione Donne Italiane) in Italy (Therborn, 1996). Even though this movement is young it has had more concrete and effective consequences, such as abortion rights which have become legal almost everywhere, and the improvement of the social rights of working women especially during the mid 1960s. As a result it can be said that the intellectual heritage of the feminist protest is very well developed especially in the Anglo-Saxon world and in Nordic countries (Therborn, 1996).

Among the new movements, environmentalism, which began in the USA, and the issue of disarmament, and pacifist movements, became popular in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. Two concerns have made environmentalism a focus point of mass action. One has been the opposition to nuclear energy and the other is autonomous electoral mobilization. These environmental issues played an important role in the beginning of new protests and led to the emergence of green parties. Characteristic of the bipolar system was a new threat - the ‘threat of nuclear war’ - which triggered the largest protest meetings around Europe.
In the 1980s the European right wing made an important contribution to the world without intending. The rise of the right wing vote in various parts of Europe like Austria and Germany alarmed the EU to the point that they felt they had to deal with the issue of xenophobia. Due to this development Europe has made xenophobia a current issue which has also created a divergence in public support for European integration through various projects involving intercultural interactions (ie Comenius projects). Easton’s theory of affective and utilitarian support can explain the main reason for this duality: according to Easton’s theory affective support is an ideological or non-material belief that the system promotes individual economic or political interests. Pursuant to the treaties of Paris and Rome some of the authors such as Lindberg and Scheingold argued that there was a permissive consensus amongst the European public in favor of European integration (Hix, 1999). In order to measure and compare the attitudes of citizens towards European integration, the European Commission has undertaken European opinion polls every six months. These polls have become a guide for all the European institutions to evaluate the level of support or opposition to the European integration process. Years when public support for European integration is observed, it can be said that the permissive consensus which was mentioned before disappeared in the 1980s. Support for European integration rose due to the project of completing the single European market, reflecting the utilitarian support for a unified Europe.

However, support for the EC decreased with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the level of opposition continued unabated in the 1994 referendums. On the other hand, when European interest group activities are observed, it can be said that the

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3 Comenius Projects are European Commission funded projects which are aiming to develop understanding of diversity of European cultures, languages, and values by education of young generation at the schools. See more at http://ec.europa.eu/education/lifelong-learning-program/doc84_en.htm [Accessed 9 August 2008]. Also see Hix (1999).
volume of private individuals and groups seeking to influence the EU policy process increased towards the end of the 1980s. Until the mid 1980s it was possible to identify between 400 and 500 interest groups with offices in Brussels, and this number tripled by the mid 1990s. Individual companies made up the majority of interest groups, secondly there were European interest associations (such as trade unions), whilst interest groups and international organizations also played important roles. Lobbying activities of the private sector were made at the national level in the 1970s and 1980s but the completion of the European single market (removing barriers to the free movement of goods, services and capital) necessitated European standards and created its own civil society to come together around common aims (ie The Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry – EUROCHAMBERS, UNICE). Business associations have played the most important role in influencing the creation of the single market (Hix, 1999).

However in today’s world, international policies are not determined on the basis of economic interests only. The threat of terrorism forces countries to cooperate at every level - economically, culturally, politically and socially - as terrorists choose underdeveloped and unstable countries as a base for themselves. One of the ways to prevent terror is to bring societies closer culturally and socially or at least try to establish some ways of understanding each other’s resentments to end the possible support among ordinary people belonging to different cultures. Therefore there is a clear need for cultural interaction to prevent terror all together among societies. In line with this outlook, Europe seems to eliminate any resentment or hostility among their countries. To achieve it obviously needs a lot of work to be done. There are many European Union projects aiming to encourage cultural dialogue among European countries and member countries too.
Concrete steps have been taken: The Cotonou agreement between Afro-Caribbean and Pacific countries and the European Union can be considered as one of the first international treaties which refers to civil society. It makes a distinction between non-state actors such as the private sector, economic and social partners and civil society organizations (Global Policy Forum, 2010).

At the European Union level the founding of treaties began to underline the necessity of social dialogue beside political dialogue. The draft of the European Constitution emphasized the importance of civil dialogue in articles 1-46, 1-47, 1-48, embodying in the charter the fundamental rights of the EU to reflect the actual situation of civil dialogue at the European level (Global Policy Forum, 2010). The first article mentioned the principle of representative democracy. The importance of this article is to emphasize that every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union and decisions shall be taken as openly as possible. Article 47 determined the relations with the institutions and civil dialogue by mentioning that the institutions shall give citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union actions and maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with the representative associations. Finally, article 48 underlines the importance of social partners and autonomous social dialogue.
2.2.6. The Role of European Institutions in Civil Dialogue

As is examined above, in the coordination of the engagement with non-governmental organizations, and in the funding of their activities, European institutions have a significant role. Even during the 1990s when opposition to European integration increased during the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, many European citizens expressed their mistrust of EU institutions more than their own national institutions at that time. Thus, the concept of European integration has changed since the mid 1980s and developed in 1990s and new areas such as environment, health, justice and home affairs have arrived on the European agenda. This situation has had three important consequences for interest groups (Cini, 2003). First, the number of groups which are operating at the European level has increased and interest group coverage in the EU has become much more diverse. Also, because interest organizations have found it difficult to predict short-term political developments in the EU, they have had to devote resources to monitoring EU developments. In this process, European level institutions have to play an important role in influencing the interest group structure, shaping their role and activities. Today there are many uncertainties about these institutions (Cram, 1999).

Firstly, it is not clear that there has been a major shift in power to the EU in the area of social policy and also there is nothing binding in EU legislation in the area of poverty, homelessness and family policy in which national governments continue to preserve their national prerogatives. Secondly, there is only limited evidence of the spontaneous development of Euro groups and Euro interest activity in EU social policy without funding or support from EU institutions. Also, the costs of working at the European
level such as diverse traditions, language problems and different mentalities, make cooperation extremely difficult. Thirdly, it is not clear whether the most important motivating factor is the desire to influence the EU social policy process.

The proliferation of NGO activity at the level of European institutions is like the US system. EU institutions more actively promote NGO activities rather than some individual EU member states by funding them or encouraging partnerships all over the Europe. The promotion of such activity usually takes the form of coordination and the funding of NGO activities. Giampiero Alhadeff and Simon Wilson, in order to make the relation between NGOs and European institutions clear, specify three categories of associations operating at the European level (Ramesh, 2006): firstly there are those that were set up with the Commission, secondly networks which were created or moved to Brussels due to the increased importance of the EU and with the desire of influencing EU affairs, and a third group that includes national and international NGOs which decided to open a representation office in Brussels.

In the first category, the Liaison Committee of the Development, which is known by its French acronym CLONG, can be mentioned. This association, entirely funded by the Commission, played a significant role in creating a common European view amongst its 900 member organizations across the 15 member states. The second category includes the organizations which have insufficient resources compared with the first category but have a larger number of members. These are groups such APRODEV (regrouping Protestant NGOs), CIDSE (regrouping Catholic NGOs). As the third category has an international aspect, it includes the offices of Amnesty International, the World Wide Fund for Nature, and Greenpeace (Ramesh, 2006).
In the beginning, EU institutions had contradictory feelings about civil society. There was no legal basis obliging EU institutions to engage in dialogue with the NGOs but there were concrete efforts to officially regulate these relations (EU Constitution Draft). In the absence of a legal basis, the role of EU institutions, especially the EU Commission and the EU Parliament, cannot be denied. The EU Commission has the catalyst role in the structuring of the European civil movement.

The commission’s monopoly over policy initiation entitles the Commission to a crucial role in agenda setting and policy formulation. It also has a crucial role to play in monitoring compliance with community laws by member states and non state actors (Cini, 2003). In this process the interest groups try to maintain relations with one or more commission departments and with the General Directorate. Some of the other activities of the European commission in the process are (Cram, 1999):

- There are some networks initiated by the European Commission but coordinated by other organizations such as the network on elderly people living in poverty or the network of elderly workers.
- There are independent organizations established on the initiative of the European Commission which includes the European Women’s Lobby.
- There are a number of organizations which have developed because of European Commission funded initiatives such as FEANTSA (European Federation of National Organizations working with the homeless).
- The European Commission operates also in some social programs such as the HELIOS II, IRIS II poverty program. It also funds a number of observatories to
investigate the issues of social exclusion, unemployment, homelessness and it has established a number of forums in which Euro groups may jointly participate in the EU policy process.

The European Commission is not the only institution which has encouraged the development of the European civil movement. As the European Parliament is more open to national pressures, its influence varies according to the issue and the decision making procedure that applies. In the EU parliament the heads of the Standing Committees and the rapporteurs\(^4\) responsible for a particular dossier constitute the most important addresses for interest groups’ demands (Cini, 2003). Although the European Council and European Court of Justice are not as active as the European Commission and Parliament, their involvement in this process cannot be underestimated (Cini, 2003). The European Council can be considered as a relevant contact for interest groups. But the Council and its administrative machinery, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the Council working groups are rarely lobbied directly. Rather the domestic interest groups prefer to address their concerns to the particular government departments.

The European Court of Justice monitors compliance and interprets EU laws. As a consequence, the preliminary ruling procedures offer a channel for national courts to refer questions about European law to the ECJ and allow interest groups to challenge the compatibility of domestic and EU law.

\(^4\) Rapporteur is the person who is appointed for preparing an independent and critical report on issues determined by an organization or a commission at europa.eu.int/comm/codecision/stepbystep/glossary_en.htm and wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn [Accessed 13 May 2009].
Observing the role of Europe, the importance of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) should be underlined. The EESC is the organ which has the aim of providing a forum for the representation of social and economic interests at the EU level. EESC is one of the two consultative committees of the European Union (the other one is Committee of Regions). The European Parliament and the European Commission have to ask the EESC’s opinion prior to making any legal arrangements in the subjects that are stated in the founding treaty of the EU. Also if it is necessary, they can ask for advice on these subjects. In the EESC structure there are three different groups: the first one includes employer organizations and unions of employers, the second one includes employees, and the third one includes NGOs and other independent organizations. The EESC has Joint Consultative Committees (JCC) in candidate countries. The first of these committees was established in Turkey in 1995 on Turkey’s demand. Following Turkey JCC (Joint Consultation Committee)\(^5\), JCCs for ten new European member states and Bulgaria and Romania have been established. TİSK-DİSK-HAK-İŞ, TOBB, İKV and TÜSİAD are Turkey’s JCC participants. In the work program of the new EESC President the relationship between the Constitution and civil dialogue and the Committee’s position within the institutional framework has been emphasized in 2007. The draft constitution and its provisions on participatory democracy and civil dialogue have given the Committee every opportunity to cast itself in the image of a bridge to civil society. This situation will enable the Committee to play a key role in promoting and structuring European civil dialogue in the future. On the other hand, one of the Committee’s goals is to conclude cooperation with the Council and optimize relations with the Council of Representatives (COR).

\(^5\) Established in 1995 to improve civil dialogue between Europe and Turkey
As the development of the civil society has progressed in the past ten years, NGOs have endeavored to organize themselves and regulate their activities to influence the EU. It has been understood that positive change within the EU can only be realized through collective action, enhanced participation and consistent dialogue. In order to realize these aims NGOs are trying to work effectively, support each other, and cooperate with EU institutions. A structured civil dialogue cannot be formed without the support of the European Union. The inclusion of the articles 46, 47, 48 within the principle of participatory democracy in the draft treaty constitute a concrete victory of NGOs efforts (Friedrich, 1969).

As in the formative years of any long-term process, many problems exist at the European level regarding civil movements and collective action. According to a recent report entitled ‘Lobbying in the European Union: Current Rules and Practices’, more than 70 percent of EU lobbyists work for shared interests, only 20 percent represent non-governmental organizations such as trade unions, health, poverty, etc., and the remaining 10 percent are business lobby groups. In October 2004, 50 NGOs wrote an open letter to the European Commission warning of the excessive influence of corporate lobby groups over EU policy making. Despite these problems EU interest groups are much more involved than national groups in policy making at the EU level.

The involvement of NGOs in EU policy making, and the interaction at the EU level between EU institutions, national governmental and non-governmental organizations give rise to the ‘Europeanization’ of civil action.
2.2.7. The Concept of Europeanization

At the end of the 1980s, especially after the Maastricht Treaty period, EU circles witnessed the rise of a new concept, ‘Europeanization’. This can be considered as a process of structural change or an adaptation of the cultural, political and economic policies towards the European Union. According to different points of views many definitions can be made to clarify this new concept. First, it can be explained as the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance which creates networks specializing in the establishment of the legal regulations of EU, namely, acquis comminique (Cowles et al., 2001). Second, it helps to understand the current transformation which is taking place on the European continent and that can also be considered as a structural change affecting actors, institutions, ideas and interests. In a structural sense this involves predominating attributes identified with Europe (Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003). Even the usage of the term Europeanization has increased in recent years making it increasingly hard to give it a common definition. Many authors have used this term emphasizing every time one of its different characteristics. Identifying these different uses will help to understand the concept in detail. First of all Europeanization is (Cini, 2003):

- Changes in external territorial boundaries,
- The development of institutions at the European level and penetration of a European level institution system into national systems of governance,
- A political project supporting a unified and strong Europe.

Secondly, Europeanization is (Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003):
- A historic phenomenon,
- An increasing trans-nationalism, and finally,
- The export of European policies, institutional and political organization beyond Europe. One of the key points of this thesis is to understand the impact of EU policies, instruments (funds, programs etc.) in Turkey.

Europeanization in relation to the changes in external boundaries has a geographical aspect, which means that transformations are not limited to the EU. The EU through various mechanisms such as free trade agreements, association agreements, financial aid and assistance programs can influence governance, contribute to norm-building and affect relations between political and societal actors in neighboring countries. The specific role that the EU has assumed after the Cold War implies a responsibility to Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC); EU enlargement and EU policy towards the Balkan countries can be considered as an example of this.

In order to develop common norms, ideas and understanding and to implement European policies at a common European level, institutions became a necessity. In order to create solidarity among its citizens and justify its existence the EU needs its own institutions. On the other hand, the existence of European level institutions creates a fusion and influences national institutions. It is also identified with the adaptation of other institutional actors in the domestic political process.

From the beginning the principal aim of the EU was to prevent war between European countries and create a unified Europe in which internal borders would be weakened and external borders would be strengthened.
Europeanization is increasing trans-nationalism due to the diffusion of cultural norms, identities, ideas and patterns of behavior on a cross national basis. It affects social activities, citizenship, culture and ideology. In this respect, the EU, in order to instill its values like democracy, equality, the rule of law, freedom, human rights, which are characterized by pluralism, justice, solidarity, uses its own instruments (funds and projects), which are important to determine the nature of the relationship with the candidate countries.

2.2.8. The Evolution of Turkish NGOs

Scholars generally portray a historically weak civil society in Turkey rather than an engaging and proactive one. They usually rely on several factors. One justification is the long-established Turkish political culture. For example Inglehart (1997, p. 349) argues that “Turkish political culture remains largely ‘traditional’”. In this perspective, democracy has been trivial, a top-down project, imposed from above by Kemalist elites upon a passive society. Citizenship, citizen empowerment and participation are downplayed while respect for authority and the state is over emphasized. In a similar vein, Heper (1985) claims that the Turkish Republic continued traditions of patrimonialism, meaning state elites typically distrusted civil society and perceived it in Hegelian terms, a “sphere of universal ego” that if left uncontrolled would produce social divisions. Heper further maintains that Turkey still lacks autonomous civil society groups of any strength or confidence vis-à-vis the state. Essentially, it seems
Turkey never had a civil society, which may be defined in Hegelian fashion as a powerful assemblage of independent associations, institutions and communities. In fact, the negative overtones of Heper’s standpoint on Turkish civil society are widely shared by many prominent Turkish academics. For instance Karaman and Aras (2000, pp. 39-58) write: “Our central thesis here is that – notwithstanding the fact that Turkey does [appear to] have a civil society on a superficial level without any restrictions whatsoever – civil society remains underdeveloped and still constrained, to some extent, by the state. The Turkish state, with its almost ‘transcendental,’ coercive nature still reflects, or is reflected by, an official ideology. This official ideology serves to impede the development of a civil society that could function with complete freedom”.

Likewise, Amyn Sajoo (2001) claims that “[t]he Turkish state has acquired historically the image of a massive omnipotent mechanism-not necessarily a Leviathan that harasses society, but a fearsome tool in the hands of the center that ordinary citizens would do well to avoid at most times”. Basing his work on the lack of interpersonal trust among the Turkish populous and harsh attitudes of the bureaucrats Sajoo affirms that “what we find is a fragmented civil society, with only a small minority of the population taking part” although acknowledging that “there seems to be one voluntary association per 540 people”. Sajoo concludes that “the relationship of the state with civil society in Turkey is one of aloofness and disinterest”. These claims will be further dealt while examining the role of civil society groups’ efforts to put pressure on the Turkish state in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria (quoted in Kalaycıoğlu (2001)). Clearly, the strong state tradition is normally cited as the principal barrier to Turkish civil society, whereby the Islamist “rejection” of Kemalism and the latter’s statist orientation prevented grass roots, bottom-up civil activism and movements to surface.
Intriguingly, Goran Therborn attributes the weakness of civil society less to culture than to structural and historical factors bound up with contemporary state formation. According to Therborn (1995) there are four routes to modernity. Firstly, there is the “European gate” of revolution or reform. Secondly, modernity may enter at the time of national independence, a characteristic of the “New World”. Thirdly, modernity appears as an external threat to a society unreceptive to global cultural influences. Finally, modernity arrives by means of conquest and occupation. Therborn places Turkey in the third category because modernity consisted of “external threats and selective imports”. Rights “typically granted from above as an instrument of strengthening a regime under acute external pressure, and a good deal of resistance to modernising change came from below, from large sections of the people itself”.

Furthermore, Keyman and Içduygu (2003) while accepting the role of civil society in the process of democratization, challenge the essentialist discourses about citizenship and identity. They argue that it would be wrong to attribute a perfunctory “positivity” role to the civil society since it also involves not only democratic discourses, but also essentialist identity claims, stipulated by religious and ethnic fundamentalism, which argue for renovating the state-society relations on a communitarian basis. Although they recognize the role of civil society in the democratization process as an indispensable actor, they also argue that it is “not a sufficient condition, in so far as it contains both democratic and essentialist discourses about citizenship and identity”. They highlight the necessity to analyze the actors of civil society in terms of their discourses and strategies. They suggest that civil society in Turkey has a serious “boundary problem”, since it is not only a sphere for democratization, but also an important situate where anti-democratic groups put their identities in practice.
Informed by Jurgen Habermas’ conceptualization of civil society which synthesizes the liberal and Marxist traditions, Nilüfer Göle (1996) proffers this conceptualization to fit Turkey. In her study of Turkey, Göle includes Islamists in her broader conceptualization of civil society. Although she rightly captures the economic underpinnings of civil society, initiated in the mid 1980s, she further underlines Turkey’s post-Kemalist dilemma, “an embedded tension between secularism and democracy” (Göle, 1996, p. 19).

Additionally, Sefa Şimşek (2004, pp. 46-74) establishes that “liberal aspects of western democracy and its correlation with civil society and NGOs have yielded unexpected results in non-western settings”. Şimşek further claims that “although Turkey has elements of civil society in abundance, their qualitative impact on political life is relatively trivial”. In terms of membership, funding and inter-personal trust, Ersin Kalaycıoğlu (1998) argues that Turkish civil society was “frail”, less developed than that of advanced industrialized states. Acknowledging that “civil society has opened channels to contest the authority of state institutions”, Sinem Gurbay (2006) affirms that “the lack of a mediating sphere between the state and society coupled with the absence of a weak collective identity stands in the way of the state consolidation of democracy in Turkey”. Similarly, Sozen & Shaw p.475-486 (2002) maintain that “one of the central factors of Turkish life is the state dominance over civil society, including the private sector”. Navaro-Yashin (1998) goes further than that and criticizes the “use and abuse” of the term “civil society” by both intellectuals and public officials in Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s. Particularly, she critically assesses what she calls “post-Kemalist” social scientists for positively creating an allegory of a new democratic and
“rationalized” public sphere of social movement groups and actors of various political beliefs engaging with each other amicably, while concurrently taking no notice of the effect of the Turkish state’s destructive war against the PKK insurgency in southern-eastern Turkey on the Turkish political system. Navaro-Yashin at the same time questions whether it is empirically possible to separate state and society into distinct domains due to repressive and manipulative presence of the state in the public sphere. Navaro-Yashin argues that attempts by statesmen and politicians to align themselves with the social sphere are really just historically contingent changes in the discourse and practice of state power rather than “an autonomous rise of a civil society”.

Navaro-Yashin (2002, pp. 136-137), while examining the Turkish state’s sociological contraction of the term, argues that: “…Turkish (state) officials appropriated the term ‘civil society’ ideology, in realising that the state, after martial law, could legitimise itself only if it could demonstrate that there is a separate realm of society unperturbed by it. So, Turkish officials began to employ an abstract notion of society in their discourse”. She further claims that “the construction ‘state-versus society’ as used by social scientists, forms the basis of new ideologies of power in Turkey in struggle with one another for influence over the state”. She stresses that “discourse of civil society became instrumental in claims for legitimate ownership of state power”. Navaro-Yashin (1998) strongly advises against the use of the term “civil society” in the Turkish context, since in her view, the state and society have merged so completely that empirically it is no longer possible to identify and differentiate “spontaneous expressions of civil society from discourses of state power, and vice versa”. She indicates the need for establishing new analytical concepts and terminology for
exploring the complex power-laden relationships that have bridged the two spheres together.

Navaro-Yashin and other noted scholars might be accurate in indicating that civil society cannot be a completely autonomous space of citizen action given the omnipresence of the state in civic life. However, the public domain could also be a place where state policies and the social groups that support them can be challenged and limited by the other social groups and external actors. Essentially, according to the scholars mentioned previously, the statist nature of the Kemalist project suppressed opportunities for the creation of independent social and civil movements. The state elites had a messianic, civilising self-appointed mission to install European “modernity” on a society subjected to religious “superstition” and cultural fragmentation at the hands of the dissolved Ottoman Empire. Such a mission was implemented zealously at all levels of the state – military, government bureaucracy, education and mass media – and society to such an extent that any non-state movements had no choice but to either subscribe wholeheartedly to modernism or else face total marginalisation. However, it has been suggested that this way of conceptualizing contemporary civil society in Turkey needs to go beyond noted perspectives. It has been argued that civil society’s formation requires a historical evaluation in order to understand state-society relations and also there is a need to further analyze changing dynamics in Turkey in conjunction with the recent EU reforms.

The modern Turkish Republic was established over a small portion of the ruins of the six-century-old Ottoman Empire. For this reason, the social roots of Turkish society should be looked for in Ottoman Culture when researching for social change and
continuity in Turkish society. The period between 1839 and 1876 is called the ‘Tanzimat period’ in Ottoman history. Many political reforms were achieved in this period. Western societies were taken as the model for these reforms. The history of Turkish NGOs is also assumed to start with Tanzimat because they were initiated after Ottoman society turned its face to modern Europe. Therefore more attention should be given to the period after Tanzimat while studying the history of Turkish NGOs.\(^6\)

### 2.3.1. Civil Society in Europe and in the Ottoman Empire Prior to Tanzimat

Traditionally the Ottoman government was the only power to organize and manage the economy, agriculture and industry of the Empire. The preponderance of the state in economic and social life worked against the strengthening of civil society. The state’s administrators did not let any other social power to be developed because they thought it would lessen their own powers and would lead to anarchy in the country. There was a big difference between Europe and the Ottoman Empire in the idea of organized society. In Europe, trading between various cities was developed after the 11\(^{th}\) century and ideas about free ideas started to develop parallel to these developments. From the late 11\(^{th}\) century to the early 14\(^{th}\) centuries, Europe experienced economic development on an impressive scale; the population expanded, commerce and handicraft were developed in volume and techniques, capital began to accumulate and there was a widespread improvement in living standards of at least some people (Kaya, 2004).

\(^6\) To find a general framework on the development of the civil society in Turkey and its relation with politics see Yücekök (1998, pp. 1-13).
As a result of such commercial developments, merchants who were seeking to operate with more freedom against the feudal authorities started to organize, and established guilds. These craft guilds assumed political power. By the 15th century the original communes had developed into oligarchies dominated by groups of leading families and power had gravitated from the general assembly to small councils. On the other hand, Church activities, such as establishing policies and the declaration of wars to protect its power can be recognized as another element in the establishment of civil organization. Later on, reactions against the Church’s authority can also be considered as civil movements.

With the accumulation of wealth, the demand for changing some, if not all, established principles in politics, science and religion, began to appear among those who had achieved financially better than the others. Reform and Renaissance movements in the Europe of Middle Ages can be considered one of the most influential civil society movements despite lacking the democratic principles in today’s norm like equality of citizens regardless of their financial success. This civil movement was the result of the natural conditions that emerged after the financial success of the bourgeoisie who through their new status began to make political demands. Slowly but decisively Europe moved towards the Enlightenment period through the dark corridors of the Middle Ages. As we mentioned, the Enlightenment was the result of the critical thinking of intellectuals, who were members of civil society, not the servants of kings or queens. Liberalism, for instance, was the product of the Enlightenment alongside humanism, rationalism, and skepticism, all of which contributed to the establishment of the modern society of today’s world to different degrees.
In contrast to a commercially changing Europe, economic and social order in the Ottoman Empire did not lend itself to the accumulation of wealth by individuals and the establishment of a capitalistic trade and production system. However, there were examples of civil organizations in the Ottoman Empire, one of these, Akhism (an organized brotherhood originating in Anatolia related to trade guilds), was a kind of Tariqa\(^7\), they were usually led by those Sheiks that managed trade guilds with the guidance of the central authority. According to some Turkish historians, during this period the state was against any kind of organization which was independent of state authority in order to protect the bureaucratic power of the Palace (Yücekök et al., 1998). Yet one can challenge this view at least to a degree. The traditional view of the state in Turkish society is, and has always been, different when compared to Europe. It can be said that there wasn’t a real need for the governing power to be oppressive as there wasn’t a real demand to form interest groups within the parameters of today’s concepts. The only organizations were mainly religious gatherings that based their philosophy on a certain view of Islam. Being or working against state power was not something a Turkish person could envisage easily in those days. There was a strong Hegelian belief that the state was there to protect basic rights and that endangering it would endanger everything else. Even today many intellectuals believe that the character of Turkish society does not allow for people to rise against the state collectively\(^8\). The historical difference between Europe and Turkey therefore needs to be examined in Turkey in order to understand the reasons for the dissimilarity between the two cultures. The lack

\(^7\) The word Tariqa means ‘way’ in Arabic. In Islamic world it is used to refer the way and the system of belief that would help a person to find God through the guidance of a wise person, the leader or sheik. There are hundreds of different tariqas in Islamic world, all based on slightly different interpretation of Islam but shares the main principles usually, except in some extreme cases.

\(^8\) Turkish proverbs that have been used for centuries widely in the Turkish society can give an idea about state perception of Turkish people. “Ya devlet başa ya kuzgun leşe” (Either state governs or vulture seeks carcass), “Dirlik nerede Devlet orada” (Where is state, there is order) are some of examples on the issue (Sertel, 2006).
of class struggle and the sudden appearance of a bourgeoisie in Turkish society caused ordinary people to refrain from demanding more rights and power in relation to the governance of the country. The movements and the demands that occurred were mainly inspired by outside developments and led by people who were educated in Europe. This deep gap between intellectuals and ordinary people, not in terms of knowledge but mainly regarding political perspectives, is still sensible according to many leading writers in Turkey\(^9\).

2.3.2. Ottoman and European Civil Societies during the Tanzimat Period

The Imperial edict, which was called Tanzimat and aimed to bring a new order to the community, was declared on November 3, 1839. It was declared in a meeting with Muslim leaders and leaders of other religions; the sultan gave up some of his power with this Imperial edict and granted more freedom to his people. The First National Assembly of the Ottoman Empire was also promised, but it was not until 1876 before it happened. After this declaration, Ottoman society became more open to various intellectual and cultural influences from Europe. Independent public opinion was formed under the effect of intellectual currents flowing from Europe. Cemiyet-i Tibbîyeyi Şahane (an organization established by medical students at Istanbul University), which was established in 1856 with its written regulations, can be considered the first effective Turkish NGO (Mardin, 1983) in forming public opinion. Mustafa Reşit Paşa, who was the Minister of State during the previous Sultan Mahmut

\(^9\) Şerif Mardin, a leading social scientist in Turkish academia, who works on the social and political structure of Turkish society explains this relationship as a “center – periphery” relation. His article on the issue was first published in 1973. For an updated and expanded version see Mardin (1992).
II, was sent to Great Britain where he was very impressed by the modernization movement he observed there. He prepared the Imperial Edict and some new laws, within which the Emperor, Sultan Mahmut II, was required to limit his power voluntarily without need of any external pressure or event. Therefore it can be said that it was Mustafa Reşit Pasha who started the modernization period.

In Europe, scientific organizations began to be formed at the beginning of the 17th century (Yücekök et al., 1998). They evolved from informal meetings to autonomous organizations. The first of these organizations was known as ‘Academia dei Lincei’, which was established by Federico Cesi, the son of the Duke of Acquasparta, in 1603 in Italy. The organization had famous members like Galileo and Valeria. The academy was closed down with the death of Cesi and refounded later, in 1745. Later on, in 1657, Meddicie established the ‘Accademia del Cimento’ by collecting ex-Galileo students together. The research of this group led to many inventions such as thermometers, barometers and microscopes.

The London Royal Society also started with informal meetings in 1645 when they published their first scientific magazine, ‘Philosophical Transaction’, in which the results of their scientific experiments were declared. These kinds of scientific organizations started to be established in most European countries. It was relatively easier to form autonomous establishments in Britain because civil movements started in the mid thirteenth century and also because the British political center could not transform itself into an all-encompassing state due to the fact that civil initiatives proved capable of governing themselves (Kaldor, 2003b).
The first Ottoman NGO was to be established about two hundred years later than those in Europe. This indicates the difference between Europe and Turkey regarding the development of NGOs. Due to historical conditions, European kings were obliged to concede rights and privileges to such organizations whereas in the Ottoman Empire this need was never really strong enough to change the structure of society. The first European NGOs were mostly scientific in nature whereas the ones in the Ottoman Empire were mostly aimed toward social and cultural developments. Among these were non-Muslim organizations which aimed to provide social aid to their districts in Istanbul (Yücekök et al., 1998). Women’s rights, status and role in the community were also an important issue during this period. There was a conflict of views between those who wanted to directly import Western ideas and conservative Muslims. Both groups agreed on the need for modernization but they had completely different views regarding how far Western ideas should be implemented. Conservative Muslims were defending the transfer of Western technology but the following of traditional way of life for women and all. However, Western oriented people were looking for a modernization process with its all aspects (Yücekök et al., 1998).

The Ottoman press also started during the Tanzimat period with ideological works that helped to promote the Ottoman Empire’s political, economical and cultural developments. These were published in the newspaper (Tasvir-I Efkar) which was published by Şinasi, a great Ottoman intellectual in the 1860s. Şinasi had been a writer in another newspaper (Tercüman-I Ahval), but found his new ideas were against the policy of the paper and so he had to resign and establish his own paper. Here, together with Ali Suavi and Namık Kemal, he tried to shape public opinion in favor of freedom and modernization; but they realized that it was impossible to put the ideas into action
without an organization. They organized a fake picnic in Belgarade Forest on the 7th June 1865 and established their organization (Yurtseverler Birliği – Unions of Patriots) (Çavdar, 2004). Later on the name of this organization was changed to Yeni Osmanlılar (New Ottomans) (Yücekök et al., 1998).

The New Ottomans movement, which was started in 1865, developed very fast; and before long new concepts like parliament, freedom, nation and people started to be discussed; these developments led to the preparation of a constitution. However, in this constitution the right of establishing associations was not mentioned. In the 1870’s self-employed groups started to establish their own associations, one of which was ‘Societe du Barreau de Constantinople’ which was formed by foreigners and non-Muslim Ottoman lawyers. Also many new immigrants who came from Bulgaria and Romania to Istanbul during the Ottoman – Russian War had many problems in adapting to their new surroundings. As a response to these problems Hilal-i Ahmer (Red Crescent) was established with the guidance and leadership of the Sultan, which sought to help these new immigrants. The establishment later changed its name to Kızılay, the equivalent of the Red Crescent. The Turkish Compassionate Fund was established in England to help those emigrants who preferred to settle in England, a branch of this charity also opened in Istanbul (Yücekök et al., 1998).

2.4. Historical Developments after Tanzimat

2.4.1. The Period of Abdulhamit II
Sultan Abdulhamit II came to the throne in 1876 with the declaration of I.Meşrutiyet, the first attempt to install constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire. Through the Kanun-I Esasi, the name of the first constitution, the Ottoman Empire became a parliamentarian monarchy.

Most Ottoman NGOs established by the mid 19th century were philanthropic and cultural associations. Most of them were not involved in politics and did not purport to meddle with state affairs. Thus it was understandable under these circumstances that there was no reaction from civil society when Sultan Abdulhamit II abrogated the parliament under the pretext of the Russian war. Until that time most of the organizations that had been formed were legal. There were virtually no underground organizations by that time and those that did exist were very weak and ineffective. However, although Abdulhamit II ruled the country with absolute despotism for 33 years and limited the freedoms and censored the press, there were still new ideas blooming among intellectuals. Academic standards were improved and new universities and academies were opened. Well-educated youngsters who would be the nightmare of the Sultan in the future formed associations in these schools. Developments in literature were impressive; many works of the European intellectuals were translated into Turkish during this period: these translations helped to bring new ideas and concepts to the country (Hatemi, 1983).

Also, the despotic regime of Abdulhamit II (1876 – 1908) created fertile grounds for the formation of underground organizations. Various intellectual currents became effective among the educated elite in the Ottoman Empire and the influence of democratic and liberal ideas could not be stifled by the absolutism of the Sultan. The first underground
organization, which was composed of small cells, was formed in the military school of medicine. They gathered together with the proposed aim to translate medical terms from French to Turkish, and yet, as with most other organizations in those days, they also had the ambition to change the Sultan and replace him with someone from the Royal family who would be more willing to accept opposition views. This organization grew very fast; they made contact with students of other important schools of the time and similar cell organizations were formed in the military, navy, engineering, veterinary medicine and gunnery schools (Çavdar, 2004).

There was not much progress in the establishment of associations in the next ten years: only 33 new associations were established. Istanbul’s Chamber of Commerce (Yücekök et al., 1998) and some football clubs were the important ones. Although Sultan Abdulhamit II was despotic and did not allow the establishment of political associations, he was tolerant to the ones in which politics was not involved; for example in a book about administrative law it was mentioned that the Sultan had allowed the establishment of clubs, associations for literature, music and clergy, some of which would have been seen as harmful to society even in Europe (Yücekök et al., 1998).

It is worth noting that until the declaration of the second parliamentary term in 1908, there wasn’t a clear regulation for establishing a NGO or any civil organization in the Ottoman Empire. The first constitution of the Ottoman Empire, Kanun-i Esasi, had no article referring to the law regarding the establishment of autonomous organizations. There were of course organizations and guilds running for centuries but these traditional organizations were in fact running on unwritten rules of tradition. Interestingly there wasn’t any similar regulation in French law from which the Young Turks and
supporters of Westernization could benefit (Hatemi, 1988). The concept of a NGO had not evolved completely yet, and therefore, nobody made the distinction between NGOs, unions and political parties. This particularly increased the suspicion towards anybody who attempted to form any kind of organization.

2.4.2. The Second Parliamentary Period

As a result of the activities of the political party, Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Union and Progress Association: in short ‘ITC’), which was greatly affected by the French revolution, the Sultan had to accept the re-opening of parliament in July 1908. During their governing term, the law for the first time regulated the formation of civil organizations; benefiting from the regulations in French law of 1901 (Hatemi, 1988). It was called the Cemiyetler Kanunu (Law of Organizations) of 1909. This law inspired subsequent regulations regarding the formation of an NGO. According to this regulation, there was no need to ask permission to form any kind of organization unless it was dealing with illegal or obscene affairs, but founders had to inform the government after it was established (Yücekök et al., 1998). Since ITC came to power in the name of increasing civil liberties, it wouldn’t be very appropriate for them to limit the right to form organizations. Therefore, there was a visible increase in the number of organizations established after the second parliamentary term. 78 new associations were established during the first five months after the declaration of the new constitution. Most of the newly established organizations were political and stemmed from military schools. This movement continued into the next year until the uprising of radical religious groups on March 31, 1909. After this failed uprising, the establishment of new
associations was done only under the tight control of authorities who were decisive in eliminating all the opposition to their ideology (Tunaya, 1988).

The first concrete results of the freedom of this new somewhat democratic period were the strikes and women movements. Workers went on a countrywide strike to get a rise in their incomes to compensate for price increases during the six months in 1909. The government panicked and by obtaining the consent of the ITC enacted a law to limit workers’ rights. Halide Edip Adıvar, a leading woman writer and novelist, was one of the leaders of the women’s rights movement. Adıvar and some other writers like Selahattin Asım started writing about the rights and freedoms of women. They even suggested that the reason for the situation of the country was the treatment of women (Zürcher, 1995).

The activities of underground organizations and social associations attracted more attention before the second parliamentary period. The government supported the establishment of associations in the second parliamentary period to prevent underground activities from flourishing and so they could take control of them in an open space. Therefore, more political parties and social organizations were established during this period.

Members of the NGOs of that time were mostly intellectuals who had been active in the process of the quasi-revolution that forced the Sultan to reopen parliament. They were also close to the existing government, which put their independence as NGOs in doubt.
The number of NGOs increased quicker than the number of political parties, but this increase slowed down after the uprising of the radical religious group, which called itself Muhammetçi Ittifak (Union for Mohammed), that aimed to end the reign of the ITC in government. During the second parliamentary term, there was an environment of freedom of expression in the press after long years of suppression. The paper supporting the ITC were in a verbal war with the opposition who accused the ITC of not achieving what they promised before they came to power. Among the intrigues of the power game, some soldiers rebelled claiming the country was being forced to Westernize and was being pushed away from its traditional and religious values. This rebellion took place on the 13\textsuperscript{th} of April 1909 according to the European calendar, yet it is called the 31 Mart Vakası (the event of 31\textsuperscript{st} March) as the Ottomans used the Rumi calendar\textsuperscript{10} in those days. In conclusion, this event was a landmark in Turkish history as the rebellion was one that wanted to go backwards, and the rebellion symbolized the never-ending danger posed by reactionaries in Turkey.

As we mentioned earlier, guilds were the oldest originations in the empire and the ITC also appreciated their importance and wanted to form a national economy and national bourgeoisie by organizing the guilds. Yusuf Akçura (1876 – 1935), a prominent historian and a supporter of the Young Turks movement of the Late Ottoman Empire period was someone who pronounced this clearly: “The Foundation of the modern state is bourgeoisie: contemporary states exist on the shoulders of the bourgeoisie, businessmen and bankers. National awakening in turkey is the start of the birth of Turkish bourgeoisie” (Ahmad, 1993, p 59).

\textsuperscript{10} It is calendar based on Julien sun calender, yet there are 13 days different between Julien sun calender and Rumi calender of Otoman. Rumi calender was used only for fiscal affairs.
Other important associations were ones with a nationalistic identity, such as Turkish, Albanian or Armenian associations, Free Mason associations and paramilitary organizations supported by the ITC. All these groups helped the Anatolian resistance to start during the First World War and during the Independence War (1920) afterwards, but their number decreased considerably as the authorities were far more controlling and suspicious of people in the fragile environment of the post-war period and in the newly-established republic (Yücekök et al., 1998).

2.4.3. The Early Turkish Republic

Although the population decreased, the number of associations started to increase in the period between the end of the Independence War and the declaration of the Turkish Republic. The associations that formed in this period made a great contribution to the foundation of the Republic. The most important of these associations was the Müdafa-I Hukuk Cemiyeti (The Defenders of Law Association) established by members of the Anatolian resistance before the Independence War. Later on it was renamed as Halk Fırkası (People’s Party) (Koçak, 2000).

Parliament issued many laws to establish a secular society after the declaration of the Republic: the most important of these was the law that abrogated the Caliphate. Ottoman Sultans bore the title of Caliph and they were the leaders of the Muslim world for more than four centuries. The Ottoman Empire was led by the rules of the Sharia (Islamic law based on the Kuran) and a great majority of the population of Turkey were devoted Muslims. For this reason the community had difficulties in accepting the new
laws easily and as a reaction to secularization and westernizing reforms, the first opinion party which was called Terakkiperter Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Progressivist Republican Party) was formed in parliament, but this movement failed because of the strong resistance of the majority. New rules were issued for the establishment of associations after the declaration of the republic, and republican governments aimed at controlling professional and craft guilds.

The priority of the newly founded republic was to control those movements that could form a resistance to the new regime. The immediate targets were religious orders and Kurdish associations (Kürt Terakki Cemiyeti, Roji Kürt, Hatebek Kürt), which were established during the Kurdish freedom movement and provoked many uprisings. As a counter-measure, parliament issued a law (Takrir-i Sükun – Expounding Tranquility), which prohibited all opposition movements and limited the freedom of the press (Yücekök et al., 1998).

The new government also closed all political associations and gathered all political forces under the umbrella of Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası (Republican Peoples Party – CHP in short) in order not to disperse the power of the supporters of the revolution. Another significant association of the period was Türk Ocakları (Turkish Hearth Associations) (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2012), a kind of club formed by pan-Turkists which had a great contribution to the formation of the new society. This club was closed later in 1931 and most of its members joined the CHP. The Turkish Teachers Association was established to support modern trends after the declaration of the republic, but it was also banned and integrated into the CHP for the same reasons. In 1930 the second opposition party was established in the bigger districts of the cities with the support of the
government. The aim of these establishments was to train the illiterate and teach them the new values of the Republic (Yücekök et al., 1998).

One of the most significant decisions of the republican government was the introduction of the Latin alphabet in place of Arabic letters. A campaign was started to teach the new letters and to obtain the acceptance of the people. It was successful in big cities, but failed in the countryside because landlords did not want peasants to be illuminated and start asking for the new rights. Also, it was difficult to find teachers willing to go into small villages and literacy levels therefore remained low. Atatürk ordered that a commission be formed to overcome this difficulty; the opinion of the commission was that young villagers should not be trained in the big cities where they probably would lose their traditional values and degenerate, but rather they should be trained locally and useful practical information should be included in their education. The government, after studying the commissions report, decided to establish Köy Ensititüleri (Institute for Peasants) which was very effective in the development of the countryside in the 1940s (Ahmad, 1993).

2.4.4. The Multi party period

After WWII Turkey’s transition to a multi-party system began with the decision of President İnönü who decided to abandon the power monopoly of the CHP. The multi-party system experienced difficulties and was interrupted three times in 1960, 1971 and 1980 by the interventions of the armed forces. President İnönü, who both wanted to democratize the young republic and receive the support of the Western world, prepared
the public opinion with his statements and encouraged the parliament for the legal arrangements of the multi-party system. The San Francisco Conference in 1945 which is the founding conference for the UN played an impulsive role to accelerate the process of democratization (Kalaycıoğlu & Sarıbay, 2000). In January 1946, three famous defectors from CHP - Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes and Fuat Köprülü - left CHP and established a strong opposition party namely Democratic Party (DP). A difficult period during WWII caused the CHP to lose prestige and the public began to look for a change. However, the CHP won the elections that were held in 1946. There were not many democratic improvements during the period of the new government which was formed after the elections, but the new law for associations which was issued in 1946 formed a legal basis for a free and pluralistic society. Social opposition against the CHP administration increased from 1946 to 1950.

There were many other reasons for this strong opposition besides the difficult times during WWII. Pressures of the single party administration on freedom of thought, belief, lifestyle and the exploitation of poor farmers by powerful landlords in the countryside were very effective in boosting opposition to the CHP administration. Workers and government officials did not have any social rights, they were not allowed to go on strike and protect their rights. A new wealth tax law also set merchants and industrialists up against the CHP. The combined impact of all these factors brought social opposition to the point of explosion and the 27 year old CHP government came to an end in elections held on May 14, 1950 when the DP won the elections with a great majority (Koçak, 2000).
As was mentioned before, the 1946 law for associations formed the legal base for new, free establishments, but it did not accelerate the formation of new associations. The majority of the newly established associations were sport clubs (41.6 %), cultural associations, charitable associations and guilds. Social and economic lassitude prevented the accumulation of capital and the establishment of corporations such as supermarkets and cooperatives. For this reason small scale retailers were important, and their guilds were supported by the government. As mentioned earlier, workers’ unions were very weak and unions of the government acted more like charitable organizations. There were practically no farmer’s associations. The formation of NGOs started to accelerate after the elections on May 14th, 1950 (Çavdar, 2004).

After the first legitimate two-party elections Celal Bayar was elected as the third President of the Turkish Republic and Adnan Menderes became the Prime Minister. The application of a liberal economy was one of the prime objectives of the new government. This period was characterized by large but uncoordinated investments in agriculture, regional infrastructure and primarily state-owned industries (Jung & Piccoli, 2001). One important characteristic of this period is the influence of foreign policy on domestic decisions and for this reason the international relations of the period must be studied in order to be able to understand domestic affairs. This period is the cornerstone of relations between Turkey and the USA. The world was divided in two by the iron curtain; Turkey was left alone against the growing Soviet threat. The first support to Turkey came from the USA, and Turkey took its place near her. Turkey received economic and military aid in accordance with the Truman doctrine and later on in accordance with the Marshall Plan. It was at this time that a pro-American Turkish foreign policy began to be applied. It was against this backdrop that leftist movements
were banned and many intellectuals who probably had leftist tendencies started to be held under scrutiny. Köy Enstitüleri, which was thought to be the source of the communist youth, lost its popularity and became ineffective. Leaders of the Komünizm ile Mücadele Derneği (Association to Combat communism) and the Milliyetçiler Derneği (Association of Nationalists) were welcomed by the DP administration. In the same period, the government decided to send troops (4500 soldiers) to the Korean War, which later led to Turkey joining NATO. The most serious objection to sending troops to Korea came from the Barış severler Derneği (Associations of Peace lovers) established by leftist intellectuals (Çavdar, 2004).

The PM Menderes increased his and his party’s support in the 1954 elections: he had fulfilled all of his promises and received support, especially among the population in rural areas. Support for the DP began to wane during the following years. The DP had promised a more liberal environment before they assumed power but they took steps to control and put pressure on the press and universities after they took control of the government. In 1954 with a new legal regulation including heavy financial punishment for the newspapers, DP government put new restrictions on the media (Tuncay et al., 1997). The government started to apply disciplinary punishments to university professors and intimidate government officials and judges who exploited religious sentiments for political gains. This attitude caused a big reaction among intellectual groups and the armed forces. Coupled with economic problems these developments resulted in the economic and social crisis that set in motion the conditions for the military takeover on May 27th 1960.
During the ten years when the DP was in power (May 14 1950 – May 27 1960) the number of charitable associations increased to compensate for the impoverishing effects of the Wealth Tax. During the peak of economic growth a class, which some prefer to call the bourgeoisie in Turkey, was the leading group in forming NGOs (Yücekök et al., 1998). However, the number of workers’ unions and associations decreased during this period. DP was a right wing party and primarily addressed itself to the more religious sections of Turkish society. To some extent they collected the vote of those who resented the Westernization process and the aggressive secularism that the authorities attempted to apply. As one Turkish writer, İsmet Özel, who is an influential thinker and poet, explains plainly “Turkish people may not know whom to vote for, but they know very well whom to send away” (İ. Özel, 1985). In other words, as frequently happens in Turkish political history, any political party that comes into power with a majority vote usually receives the protest vote of others. One must understand the harsh rules of secularism that were applied in Turkey in the decades after the republic was born in 1923 to understand today’s politics.

DP was, as mentioned earlier, surviving on the wrongdoings of others before it, which the people of Turkey had never forgotten. To some extent, therefore, it was acting very haphazardly and subsequently upset the opposition. Since the DP based its support on the religious sections of society, they gave support to the activities of religious sects of society. As a result, the number of religious associations, like charity buildings and mosques increased. Students’ associations like the Türk Talebe Federasyonu (Federation of Turkish Students) and Milli Türk Talebe Birliği (National Turkish Student’s Union) were especially active regarding the Cyprus problem. Many politicians today have a background in one of these organizations. They organized
countrywide meetings to publicize the Cyprus issue and protested against the pro-American policies of the government. DP, in an effort to rally the support of society, organized Vatan Cephesi (Motherland Frontier) in villages, town and cities. The aim of these civil associations was to demonstrate the strength of the party and to protect its ever decreasing popularity (Akşin, 1990).

The DP period, which came to an end with the 1960 military coup, can be considered as a missed opportunity to establish real democracy in the country. Although DP came to power in the first democratic, multi-party elections in the country, they failed to keep the promises which were presented to the public before the elections. It failed to remove the anti-democratic laws it had criticized before the elections and tried to establish a more despotic administration. It also tried to restrict the activities of the opposition parties toward the end of the 1950s. DP’s anti-democratic policies can be listed as follows (Çavdar, 2004):

- Pro-American policies led DP to implement restrictive measures towards leftist movements and intellectuals, such as the closing down of associations, the banning of literary works and press censorship. Political parties, associations, organizations, and press establishments which were assumed to have leftist tendencies had a very difficult time.

- It was almost impossible to mention the freedom to organize. The administration allowed and controlled the only two previous student organizations: these were the Türkiye Talebe Federasyonu and Milli Türk Talebe Birliği.
- Workers and labor groups were also put under pressure: the only positive step in this area was the foundation of the TÜRK-İŞ Konfederasyonu (Confederation of Labor Unions).

- Dependency on foreign sources in every aspect, from the economy to the military, increased in this period (Çavdar, 2004).

The period between 1950 to 1960 was a step toward democracy and it was supposed to bring more freedom to the community; first of all there was more than one party in the political arena, and secondly, the political party which was in power had been elected with real democratic elections; but the political culture of those in power had not improved to tolerate the criticism of the opposition, and of the public. As the criticisms got tougher, the reaction of the government also got tougher; this increased the pressure on freedoms which finally led to the military takeover. Therefore the elections in 1950 were a good step towards democracy, but failed to bring more freedom to the people. However, it can still be considered as a stage in the democratic adventure of Turkish political life (Özdemir, 2000a).

2.4.5. The 1960-1980 Period

After the military coup d’etat, a new constitution, which was prepared in a very short time, was presented to the public and was approved by a big majority in the referendum of 1961. The new constitution was a progressive and liberal document in comparison with the previous constitution. The structure of the state had changed, the senate was abolished from the parliamentary system, and fundamental freedoms were improved.
The new constitution altered the rules on the formation of associations. Different laws were issued for the formation and management of labor unions, parties and civil associations which had been considered the same up till that time (Tunaya, 1988). The number of religious associations increased during this period due to the increased number of associations to build mosques. In Turkey, foundations aiming to finance mosque building are considered religious organizations and it is a kind of tradition that people come together and finance the mosque in their local area. Most of the mosques in Turkey were built this way. It may seem rather a normal issue to the foreign eye, yet in Turkey it symbolizes the distinction between religious and secular people. This increase, it can be said, is an indication of the reaction against the aggressive secularism that had governed Turkey since the beginning of the new republic. For the first time, voters found a channel to express themselves as the DP was addressing their feelings. The DP was clearly playing for the religious side of people and promoting religious activities. Inevitably this contributed to an increase in the number of religious NGOs. Therefore the number of those kinds of organizations has been long used to measure how religious a region is. There was a corresponding decrease in the number of other associations, while the number of newly formed sporting clubs stayed the same. Later, the State Planning Institute suggested that the number of other associations should be leveled with the ratio of religious associations (Tunaya, 1988). The importance of the guilds decreased, which indicates the decreasing importance of the small bourgeoisie. The number of labor unions and civil servants’ associations increased in this period and continued to increase until the end of the 1960s. The conservative segments of the community were also involved in establishing religious organizations and NGOs until the end of the 1960s. Later on the formation of mutually-antagonistic organizations and
associations would lead to an important struggle between conservatives and leftist
groups in the second half of the 1970s.

As mentioned before, the foreign policy of the government influenced the internal
policy; the USA’s intervention in the Cyprus crises caused a countrywide reaction
against the USA in 1963. Following attacks on Turkish Cypriots it was thought that the
government should send troops to the island in order to protect them. However,
President Johnson’s famous letter to the Turkish Prime Minister, İnönü, which said that
Turkey’s invasion of the island would necessitate US intervention in turn ended the
government’s pro-American policy, and divided the population into two blocks: pro-
American and anti-American (Ahmad, 1993).

Adalet Partisi (Justice Party – AP), which was established in 1961, under the leadership
of a retired general, received the support of the high ranking commanding officers
(leaders of the coup) and won the elections. After the death of the general, Süleyman
Demirel, who was the least objected leader, became the chairman of the party. AP,
under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel, was very successful in the elections held in
1965, but later with his associations with an American company, he became the symbol
of American connections and capitalism. He then became the target of all blocks,
leftists, neo-Kemalists\textsuperscript{11} and the religious groups who claimed that he was a member of

\textsuperscript{11} Kemalism, deriving its name from the name of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, is used to refer to the modern
and revolutionary principles of Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkish Republic. According to the
Turkish constitution, every citizen has to be a Kemalist or Ataturkist (art 2) and from time to time
criticising Atatürk was banned in Turkey under the “crimes against Atatürk” law no 5816 enacted in
1951. Kemalism though later was interpreted differently by various fractions. Yet the CHP, the party
formed by Atatürk, has always been the main advocate of his principles sometimes aggressively. There
are 6 principles that Atatürk meant by Kemalism: Republicanism, Secularism, Statism, Nationalism,
Reformism, and Populism (meaning people – oriented policies). Kemalist is a common noun use for the
defender of this ideology. Neo-kemalist refers to the people that argue a need of reviaval of this ideology
after 1990’s.
a Masonic Lodge (Ahmad, 1993). So he lost the prestige he enjoyed towards the end of the 1960s. Still he managed to win a marginal victory in the elections of 1969, although AP lost many seats in the parliament. This encouraged the leaders of other movements on the right of the political system and new political parties started to be established. One of these leaders was Necmettin Erbakan who established Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party – MNP) to represent religious groups in the parliament. Alparslan Türkeş, a powerful colonel of the 1960 coup, had been banned (because he was an extreme nationalist) and was sent to India as a military attaché. Later on he came back to Turkey and joined a small party, which he became the leader of before changing the name to Milli Hareket Partisi (National Movement Party – MHP). The young militants of this party were called Bozkurtlar (grey wolves, which were symbols in ancient Turkish mythology). They had a long fight with the leftist groups. They also exerted pressure on the leftist students, teachers and writers (Zürcher, 1995).

As it was outlined before, leftist movements, created by intellectuals, were very effective in Turkey as in other parts of the world. The ‘Opinion Clubs’, which represented the left, were very popular in all universities. The most important of these clubs was one in the Political Science Faculty in Ankara University. Students who were the members of Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Turkish Workers Party – TİP) dominated all of these opinion clubs. A federation of these opinion clubs transformed themselves into the well-known Devrimci Gençlik Teşkilatı (Revolutionist Youths Association – DEV-GENÇ). Other underground left wing associations like the Türkiye Komünist Partisi Marksist / Leninist (Turkish Communist Party Marxist / Leninist – TKP-ML), the Türkiye İşçi Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu (Turkish Workers and Villagers Liberation Army – TIKKO), the Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu (Turkish Folk Liberation Army – THKO)
and the Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi Cephesi (Turkish Folk Liberation Party – THKP-C) took up their positions against right wing organizations, and city guerilla fights broke out in the streets. The fights became more intensive and weakened Suleyman Demirel’s government. As a result of this, the first period of the AP government ended with the military intervention of March 12th 1971 (Zürcher, 1995).

The military intervention of 1971 was aimed at bringing stability and order to the regime. However, the political repression of the 1971 coup by communiqué depoliticized the student unrest and delivered a crushing blow to the leftist movement. The political turmoil soon resumed and in the second half of the 1970s clashes between left and right wing militants increased into a wave of terror and urban guerilla warfare in which 4500 Turks lost their lives (Jung & Piccoli, 2001).

Military intervention received negative reactions from politicians: Demirel’s government resigned and opposition leader İnönü took his position against the coup, but in the end they reached an agreement. Nihat Erim, who was from the right of the CHP, became Prime Minister in March 1971. His program included re-establishing public order and introducing a reform program to protect Turkish industry from outside effects. At the end of April, bombings in different cities rose and the government declared martial law in eleven cities. Underground militant groups, which were supported by the government, were called counter-guerilla and they played an important role in suppressing the leftist movement (Zürcher, 1995).

The CHP, under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit, obtained the highest number of seats in parliamentary elections held in 1973. But Mr. Ecevit, who was considered the leader of
the leftist group, had to form a coalition government with Mr. Erbakan’s conservative Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party), which was an extension of the MNP. Ecevit ordered the armed forces to save Turkish Cypriots from the attacks of Greek Cypriots in July 1974 and Turkish armed forces conducted the so called ‘Peace Operation’ and invaded one third of the island (the northern part of the island where Turkish Cypriots were concentrated); Mr Ecevit became a national hero after the peace operation.

Erbakan, who was afraid of the increased popularity of Ecevit, drew back his support from the government, and Ecevit therefore had to resign. Following the resignation of Prime Minister Ecevit, the first and the second National Front governments (Milliyetçi Cephe 1 and 2 – MC) were formed under the leadership of Demirel. The main aims of the MC government was to prevent the CHP from assuming power and gaining superiority over the left by grouping all the right wing parties together under the AP flag (Tuncay et al., 1997). Many weak coalition governments with a short life span were formed either by Demirel or Ecevit until the military took over the government in 1980. Ecevit’s government had to resign after the senate elections in 1979 and Demirel formed a minority government. Political violence was at its highest level and fights between the leftist and rightist groups continued. Due to extremist organizations on the left fighting with the Bozkurtlar (grey wolves) of the MHP and the Akıncılar (raiders) of the MSP (radical religious group), 25-30 people were killed everyday from each group; police organizations were almost completely under the command of the MHP (Tuncay et al., 1997).
At the same time the national economy hit rock bottom, long queues at gas stations and even at grocery stores were not uncommon. The oil price shock in 1973 and 1974, and economic depression in Europe had a bad influence in Turkey’s state controlled economy whose industrial sector was based on foreign reserves and technical support. In the period of 1970 – 1980 political struggle between right and left transformed to armed conflict and many people were killed because of their political views. The insecure environment created a security vacuum. In the midst of this political turmoil, came the collapse of the Turkish economic system which began to prepare conditions for a calibrated coup d’État which was coded by generals as ‘operation flag’ (Jung & Piccoli, 2001). The Turkish Armed forces intervened for the third time since 1960 on September 12th, 1980.

The leader of the coup, General Kenan Evren and the Milli Güvenlik Konseyi (National Security Council) took over power. All political parties were closed, leaders of the parties were taken into custody and the activities of the two radical labor union federations were banned. Martial law was exercised in the country. General Kenan Evren became President and the National Security Council assumed most of the power. High-ranking officers of the local armed forces in cities and in villages were assigned as the mayors of those locations; they also started to control the press, universities, labor unions, chambers of commerce and the police force. Leaders of the militant organizations, and some news reporters and writers were taken into custody. Political discussion was prohibited (Zürcher, 1995) and political fights and killings stopped suddenly.
Activities of most of the new associations established between the 1970 - 1980 period reflected the political polarization in the general political community. The 1961 constitution, which encouraged the establishment of such organizations, was annulled after the coup. The new rules put some constraint on the associations, limited the rights of government officials' unions, and individual freedoms were also limited (Yücekök et al., 1998). The military government that was established after the coup blocked governmental financial aid to the associations; financial supports to the pro-governmental associations had been provided to ensure their continued support and to encourage other people to establish such organizations since the Ottoman period. An example of such an association was the ‘Association to Combat communism’.

Transition to democracy took three years. A committee under the leadership of Prof. Orhan Aldıkaçtı prepared a draft of the constitution and as a result of the chaotic environment of the preceding years the new constitution included some limitations on freedoms: many intellectuals campaigned against it but it was approved by the majority of people in a democratic referendum held in 1982.

There were no political parties at that time because all of them had been banned after the coup. The government lifted the ban on political parties in May 1983, but the leaders and board members of the old political parties, and also teachers, government officials and students were prohibited from membership of the new parties. The new political parties were not allowed to establish youth and women’s organizations or to develop relations with labor unions. 15 political parties were established but the military backed government did not allow some of the parties to join the elections and some of the candidates were eliminated. Most of the parties could not fulfill the requirements to join
the elections and finally only 3 parties contested in the elections held in 1983 (Ahmad, 1993). One of these was the Milliyeçi Demokrasi Partisi (National Democracy Party – MDP) led by Turgut Sunalp, a retired general and the commanding officer of the Cyprus peace operation. MDP was supported by the military but people wanted an end to military interference, so they lost the elections. The second of these parties was the Republican Peoples Party (CHP), which was on the left of the political spectrum with links to traditional state bureaucracy. Turgut Özal led that third party and it was called the Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party – ANAP). Özal had been the head of the State Planning Office and he was the undersecretary of the Prime Minister before the elections; he had prepared an austerity program known as the January 24th 1980 decisions to cure the ailing economy. He was known for his liberal thinking and it was he who became the Prime Minister.

2.4.6. 1980 – 1991 The Özal Era

ANAP commanded a majority in parliament from 1983 to 1991: Turgut Özal continued his economic reforms after he became Prime Minister. He reduced the overpowering influence of the bureaucracy and intervention of the public sector in the growing and increasingly competitive and export-oriented economy. Exports from Turkey increased ten fold in his period.

Özal was elected as President in 1989 and Yıldırım Akbulut from the same party background was chosen as Prime Minister, yet Akbulut was always considered as lacking the wisdom and capability to be a leader and therefore became the target of
humorous jokes that still survive. During his time, there was a fear of military intervention due to significant terrorist attacks that targeted some writers and columnists by Islamists. After somewhat difficult times, Demirel came back to power as a result of his party, DYP, winning the highest number of seats in the parliament of 1991. He formed a coalition with the social democrats (Özdemir, 2000b).

The ANAP (Anavatan Partisi – the Motherland Party) - although fiercely criticized for charges of corruption, mismanagement and nepotism- had an important effect in dispersing liberal ideas in Turkey in 1980s. The Ottoman mentality of ‘people for the state’ had been widely accepted in society before the ANAP came into power. The ANAP also tried to privatize the economy and free it from bureaucratic control. However, economic liberalization did not go hand in hand with political liberalization. The ANAP did not completely understand the main needs of civil society. It was thought that a ‘free market economy’ was the only interest of the community (Çalış, 2002).

As mentioned before, the ANAP continued to apply restructuring and stability programs that had been started by Özal when he was undersecretary. These programs caused rapid developments in the Turkish economy: exports and national income increased and unemployment decreased. These developments had three impacts on the expansion of civil associations (Yücekök et al., 1998):

- Those major companies which wanted to get bigger shares from public procurement contracts and those which wanted to develop better public relations established associations to support social activities.
The number of well-trained, young professionals who were open to the outside world increased, they were accepted and taken as a model by the public. This created many potential leaders for future associations.

Increasing incomes encouraged them to become a member of a club or an association.

The concept of an NGO was considered as a symbol of demands for more democracy which was hampered by political struggles until the end of 1980s (Tekeli, 2002).

President Özal’s export oriented liberal economic model opened Turkish society up to the outside world and many young entrepreneurs with Western ideas emerged and the ideology of liberalism was promoted. However, the 1982 constitution and the old laws did not allow personal and social freedoms to reach the level of Europe. NGOs faced more restrictions than they had before 1980, and there were practically no improvements in the field of human rights.

2.4.7. 1992 to Present

Following President Özal’s death, in 1992, Demirel was elected as President while Tansu Çiller became the first woman Prime Minister of Turkey. She formed a coalition government with the theocratic Refah Partisi (Welfare Party RP). The RP was known for its theocratic ideology and was representing the religious section of Turkish society.
Meanwhile changes in the world were also having an impact in Turkish politics. The end of communism weakened the leftist movement in Turkey. The US became the only power in the world and its obvious support for Israel caused reactions in Islamic countries and increased the strength of religious groups in Turkey. Besides these international changes, the reign of right wing parties in the era following the 1980 coup also contributed to the rise of religious politics in Turkey.

The Turkish military, which took the responsibility of how the country was run upon themselves, again began to interfere in politics but this time with a different manner, later called the post-modern coup. On February 28th 1997 some decisions were taken within the military unanimously to warn the government, and some remedies were suggested that sought to prevent the activities of religious groups from flourishing any further. Yet the real reason behind this unusual quasi-coup was to stop religiously conservative companies from growing and taking their share in the market. Since these activities were nothing new, and much more radical movements had taken place in the past, these decisions led to the separation of the RP into two groups of radical and conservative democrats, the latter of which formed today’s governing party of the AKP.

New elections were held in 1998 which brought another unstable coalition government to power in the country. In the four-year period of time, starting from 1998 to 2002, three coalition governments ruled the country, which depicted an unstable picture for the country. Therefore, Turkish society unsurprisingly was looking for new faces that were not tried and therefore not stained by political failure. The story of the AKP would exceed the limit of this study as we deal with the Turkey – EU relations up to 1999,
besides, it alone would constitute a research subject. However we have to note that there is a positive development on NGOs’ influence on government during this period.

2.4.8. Recent Activities of NGOs in the Turkey

After 1990s, there were some developments which displayed the growing strength of activism in civil society. One of the most significant of these was the movement that evolved as a result of a scandal showing the clear links between the state and the mafia that was uncovered following a traffic accident on 3 November 1996 in Susurluk, an area in the west of Turkey. The case is known as the Susurluk Scandal, a so-called state gang scandal. Through this accident the public heard about those underground organizations that were supported by high ranking civil servants and some members of parliament as well as some high-ranking army personnel. After the accident, the police and rescue team discovered guns and fake documents at the scene, which were later disclosed as evidence of the complex relationship between gangs and the state. Later on, a more complicated investigation and trial process begun. The deeper the investigators dug, the more prominent names and complex relations began to appear. One year later a commission was formed to investigate the scandal and the trial that ensued took 4 years to conclude. As a consequence of the outrage felt by the general public a campaign to protest against the complicated relations of state officials with illegitimate organizations


\[\text{Susurluk case was a proof of the claims done many years suggesting there are gangs in the state and there is a deeper state in the state that controls everything through illegal activities taken inside a secret organization. Thus, Susurluk case is an important milestone between the citizens and state’s relations as the first manifested its distrust to the latter. There are many books, articles and reports written about Susurluk case. For further information: (Anon, 1997). http://www.belgenet.com/rapor/mumcurapor_07.html is a valuable source for direct resources [Accessed 26 July 2008].}\]
was started by some NGOs during the trial period. Among them were İHD (İnsan Hakları Derneği – Human Rights Association), trade unions (KESK, DİSK, HAK-İŞ), and many other small organizations. The motto of the campaign was the ‘one moment of darkness for permanent brightness’ which invited people to turn off their lights for one minute exactly at 9 pm every evening. This campaign received big support from the public, an indication of the growing consciousness of society towards civil action, as well as an increased demand to be part of a representative democracy (Hiçyılmaz, 1997).

Another good example of the solidarity of civil society also occurred following the deadly earthquake that happened in 1999, costing 20,000 lives according to the official statistics. This deteriorated the already fragile economy of Turkey and the failure of the administration to deal with the disaster caused another outcry among the general population. According to the report, written by the World Bank on the 1999 Marmara Earthquake, the malfunction of the authorities in Turkey to respond to the disaster was one of the biggest failures in the world (Jalali, 2002). The public again expressed its frustration with problems in the delivery of emergency relief by public bodies. The traditional image of a “strong state” was demolished in the minds of the Turkish people. In the highly distressing environment of the aftermath of the earthquake, NGOs provided an alternative source of relief and assistance and filled the vacuum created by the inefficiencies of some public agencies. The financial and physical contributions of NGOs to heal the wounds of the earthquake victims were very effective, indicating the changing role of Turkish NGOs and identifying the fact that NGOs could provide help and solutions to the problems of ordinary people that could not be handled by the state alone (Keyman & Içduygu, 2003). The earthquake and its social consequences in fact
support the theory of Fred Cunny, a disaster expert, who suggests that natural disasters can bring changes in the politics of a country. According to Cunny, disasters provide a collective consciousness directed to the main problems of a society, thus, affecting the politics deeply (Kubicek, 2002).

Thus, the Marmara Earthquake showed people that there was a real need for alternative organizations. Although it would be an exaggeration to suggest these NGOs solved all the problems the earthquake brought, it is fair to suggest that this experience contributed to the emergence of human rights and civil liberties as it pushed society to question the individual’s relationship with the state (Sozen & Shaw, 2003).

Relations between Turkey and the EU had an enhanced effect on the democratization process in Turkey (Uğur & Canefe, 2004). But Turkey’s relations with the EU has been changing; Turkey didn’t apply for full membership in the 1970s because of economic reasons and because the EU had frozen its relations with Turkey after the military takeover in 1980. President Özal had done a great deal to heal relations with the EU and in 1987 Turkey applied for full membership. Later, Turkey joined the Customs Union in 1996, which should be considered the first serious step towards permanent membership to the EU. The deficiencies in Turkish democracy, violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms put a strain on the relationship between the two sides. The EU authorities frequently criticized Turkey on account of problems in the functioning of democracy, and limitation and abuse of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Conservative and nationalistic groups in Turkey viewed these criticisms as an intrusion into domestic affairs and expressed their indignation and resentment toward them. Progressive and reformist groups in Turkey, on the other hand, used the EU as their ally
in their struggle to enhance democracy and human rights in Turkey (Diez et al., 2005). In that sense closer relations with the EU meant that Turkey had to reform its democracy and lift the limitations and sanctions that deterred civil society and NGOs from functioning effectively. It also meant that the EU and its policy towards Turkey had a supporting influence on reformist and democratic forces in Turkish society (European Societies Commission, 2005).

The scope and effectiveness of Turkish NGOs as well as their numbers increased in the 1990s with the help of improved democratic rights in the country (Scedilimscedilek, 2004). Many new associations to deal with subjects such as women’s rights, human rights, and environment and consumer protection were established. These developments ran parallel to developments in other parts of the world. The Rio conference, HABITAT meetings and AGIK (Avrupa Güvenlik ve İşbirliği Konferansı – European Conference on Security and Cooperation) can be seen as an example of these changes in a world that had become more interdependent and global (Tekeli, 2002). All these global events and partnerships changed the agenda of country towards the issues named above. For instance, the HABITAT conference was held in Istanbul in 1996, and the conference discussed contemporary issues in Turkey.

Charity organizations, associations, clubs and guilds which were established after 1980 had a great deal of autonomy when compared with the ones which had been established earlier. The growth in the number and variety of NGOs went hand in hand with a positive development in the relative position of NGOs within Turkish society. The main reason for this improvement was a change of mentality that resulted from shifting state-society relations. Democratic improvements in the country led to a more conciliatory
approach of state authorities towards NGOs (Yücekök et al., 1998). The main aim of most NGOs that were established before 1980 was to provide services to the community: services that were supposed to be provided by the state (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002). The rise of the private sector and increasing incomes caused stronger and better organized NGOs to be established. Increased economic activities helped the accumulation of funds which could be used by charitable organizations and in other social associations, leading to financially autonomous NGOs. These NGOs did not need public funds and therefore did not succumb to waiting for the state’s leadership to provide services (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002). As mentioned above, the campaign, ‘One moment of darkness for permanent brightness’ indicates the change of mentality of civil society, and also proves the effectiveness and power of the NGOs.

As mentioned earlier, Turkish society also experienced the flourishing of religious associations in the post-1982 period under the effect of the strengthened Islamic ideology. A number of religious associations increased especially during the DYP-RP coalition period. As a reaction to the Islamification of society, secular groups also formed associations to fight off encroaching religious influence. The Association for Ataturkist Thought (Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği) and the Association to Support Contemporary Life (Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği) were established in 1989; the main activities of these two associations were to spread the Kemalists philosophy that can be described as expanding M. Kemal Atatürk’s ideas and ideals in the country. They introduced this new dimension onto the agenda of Turkish society, aiming to strengthen the idea of Kemalism as opposed to flourishing religious fundamentalism (Kalaycıoğlu, 2007).
The Pentagonal Initiative which was formed by the Union of Turkish Guilds and Stock Exchanges (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği – TOBB), the Federation of Turkish Labor Unions (TÜRK-İŞ), the Confederation of Turkish Tradesmen and Craftsmen Unions (Türkiye Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar Dernekleri Konfederasyonu – TESK), the Confederation of Turkish Employers Unions (Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu – TİSK) and the Confederation of Revolutionist Labor Unions (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu – DISK) supported the National Security Council’s declaration on 28th of February 1997 (Tekeli, 2002); they were very effective in the acceptance of the Council’s decision by the majority of the community through their member networks.

2.4.9. Post-Helsinki Period: Lifting Restrictions

Following the recognition of Turkey by the EU at the Helsinki Summit as a EU candidate country in 1999, Turkey has implemented remarkable reforms in order to match the ‘Copenhagen criteria’, which lays down the requirements for becoming a full member of the EU. In 1993, the Copenhagen European Council set out that ‘the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities’ as the sine qua non political condition of EU accession. In December 2002 the European Council of Heads of State and Government agreed to launch EU accession negotiations with Turkey “without delay” provided that it sufficiently – as opposed to fully – complied with the Copenhagen political criteria by December 2004. These criteria specify that a Candidate State is obliged to satisfy strict
conditions on democracy and human rights in line with EU norms and standards (Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey, 2008d).

Following the Council’s decision, Turkey embarked on an ambitious program of constitutional and legal reforms (Kaliber & Tocci, 2010) to widen minority rights, curb corruption, strengthen civilian authority over the military, and abolish the death penalty and security courts. Most significantly, reforms were undertaken to decrease the influence of the military in politics. Constitutional amendments were adopted to alter the NSC – composed of senior military officers, the President, the Prime Minister, and the Defence and Foreign Ministers – from a policy making to an ‘advisory’ body chaired by a civilian administrator rather than military staff. The extended executive and supervisory powers of the NSC were abolished and other provisions authorizing unlimited access of the NSC to any civilian agency were abrogated. The frequency of NSC meetings was modified to convene every two months instead of once a month. Provisions relating to obtaining NSC views when determining the languages to be taught in Turkey were also abolished. Military representation on educational and televizual regulatory bodies was eliminated. Another major change on civilian-military relations was subjecting military expenditures to greater scrutiny and transparency. Parliament may request the Court of Auditors to audit accounts and transactions of all types of organizations including those concerning the state properties owned by the armed forces. Similarly, these expenditures were no longer exempt from being audited for reasons of secrecy and confidentiality.

The Public Finance and Controlling Law of 10 December 2003 brought extra-budgetary funds into the overall state budget. More detailed information and documents must be
provided in the budget proposals to be submitted to the parliamentary committees and parliament. It also requires longer periods of debate on the defence budget proposals. This law also established a method of budgeting based on performance by requiring performance reports to be submitted to the parliament and related institutions, enhancing parliamentary control on military spending. “Turkey's Court of Auditors is empowered to undertake ‘value-for-money’ inquiries, which improves the mechanisms of internal control” (Aydın & Keyman, 2004, p.20).

Reforms were also undertaken to strengthen the fight against torture (Keyman & İçduygu, 2003). All detained persons, regardless of their suspected offence, now had a formal right of access to a lawyer from the outset of their custody. Articles 234 (torture) and 245 (ill-treatment) of the Penal Code were amended to prevent sentences for torture and ill-treatment from being suspended or converted into fines. Prosecutors no longer needed permission from superiors in order to open investigations on cases of torture and ill treatment. Access to a lawyer and health checks were now guaranteed when detainees were taken out of prisons for interrogation.

“A judicial decision is required before permission is granted to take individuals from prisons and detention houses” (Keyman & İçduygu, 2003, p. 20). All exceptions to the right to have a relative notified without delay of one’s custody have been removed. Initial custody periods by the police and gendarmerie (military police) were reduced to one month while the investigation and prosecution of torture cases were classified as “urgent matters”. Police officer training was extended from nine months to two years, with a compulsory human rights course. Both the EU and the Council of Europe funded training programs for the police forces. Sweeping amendments touched the areas of
freedoms of expression, association and peaceful assembly. Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law (propaganda against the indivisible unity of the state) was repealed with the sixth reform package (Özbudun & Yaziçi, 2007). This reform was crucial, as it was a very broad clause that was most commonly referred to in prosecutions. The Press Law was amended to repeal prison sentences for criminal offences connected to the press, thereby extending the freedom of expression. A sanction of depriving a political party from state financial resources was introduced alongside dissolution. Dissolution decisions that necessitated a simple majority of the Constitutional Court now require three-fifths majority, making it more difficult to close down political parties. “Civil society institutions (foundations, associations and trade unions) have been empowered to organize meetings and demonstrations that fall outside of their field of activity” (Aydın & Keyman, 2004, p.28).

Some legal restrictions affecting religious minorities and the Kurds were eased. At present, the Foundations Law is being amended to enable greater restoration of confiscated properties to community foundations while legal amendments now permit places of worship to be built by all religions and faiths in the country. Constitutional changes allow private language courses in Kurdish as well as enabling limited televisual broadcasting in Kurdish (Torosa, 2007). The EU has provided a model and set out benchmarks for transformation.

2.5. Foundations

We shall also examine the concept of Vakıf, foundation, in order to understand the development of civil society and the NGO concept in Turkey, as foundations had a long
history and tradition in the country. They are widely acknowledged as the predecessors of civil society organizations in Turkey. In the Ottoman Empire they played an important role and helped people to connect. In fact the word foundation may not meet the meaning of vakıf in Turkish. Yet many dictionaries offer foundation as the most appropriate translation. In most basic terms, vakıfs are religious or charitable foundations. In the Ottoman Empire they had a long history and had important roles in developing local areas in terms of infrastructure. Many of the schools, hospitals and roads that were built by vakıfs survive today.

Religious foundations had special rights in Ottoman society as their autonomous position was accepted by the Sultans. The importance of these foundations was not because of their religious background but because they were maintaining and managing the caravanserais and inns on the trade roads connecting the East to the West (Zincir, 2004). The autonomy of these foundations was abolished by the Ottoman Sultan during the last years of the Empire and religious foundations were taken under the state’s protective umbrella after the declaration of the Republic. In 1967 a new law which allowed an ordinary person to establish a foundation was accepted by the parliament (Zincir, 2004). Foundations had some advantages in being able to receive charitable contributions and they had more freedom in their expenses. The number of foundations increased rapidly after 1967. Foundations to Protect Environmental and Cultural Wealth (Çevre ve Kültür Varlıklarını Koruma Vakfı – ÇEKÜL) and the Foundation for Voluntaries for Education (Eğitim Gönüllüleri Vakfı – EGV) are good examples of contemporary foundations in Turkey.
2.6 Conclusion

Elites in Turkey who pursued a European agenda never thought that transformation was impossible to achieve. During the time when relations were dealt with by the elite bureaucrats of the Turkish state and were seen as exclusive matters for the Foreign Ministry, it was assumed that the long demanded transformation would not run counter to the ideology and governing style of the elites in Turkey. Only a handful of people knew of Turkey’s application for membership to the European Economic Community on July 30th 1959. Not the Media, the public, nor political parties or NGOs were informed of the application process. As Çalış put it, this was founded on an ideological decision making mechanism of Westernising by becoming one with the West (Çalış, 2002). Yet, whenever other civil actors appeared and affected relations, quarrels sprang up in the country. Moreover, when elites realized that the very transformation that Europe required was endangering the roots of their existence, the issue took a different turn. Europe, with its strong tradition of pluralism and civil society participation, not only allowed, but encouraged the participation of interest groups in the decision making process and began to call upon the elites to create a system where they would have to allow civil actors to freely participate in the regime in the form of political parties and non-governmental organizations. Ironically, the elite who sacrificed so much to Europeanize the country came face to face with the bitter reality of the European pluralist democracy. They began to worry about losing their status and thought that democracy had gone too far. Civil actors did not allow this to change the direction of their struggle, which had by now gone on for four decades. This strengthened pluralism and allowed some opposition groups to speak up against the EU on grounds of national sovereignty, the protection of Turkish identity and territorial integrity. Eventually,
however, they lost: the voices of EU supporters had convinced the Turkish people. Analysis shows that opposition to EC/EU membership was mostly done to score political points. There were also those who opposed the idea for ideological reasons, but they too, in the long run, lost society’s support. Having tasted the pluralism and relative economic prosperity of liberal policies, Turkish society chose to be in the EU.

After the turbulent years of opposition in the sixties and seventies, the Turks were once again unified around their common goal of entering the EU. Whereas the previous so-called agreement was restricted to a circle of elites, this time the public, civil and political actors managed to generate overwhelming support. Civil society has been developing in Turkey, civil society organisations have been increasing and evolving in Turkey. NGO’s, employers, trade unions, political parties have been increasing their attention to the Turkish membership to European Union and involving more insistingly in this process by playing a role and making their contribution to this membership target.
CHAPTER 3
AN APPRAISAL OF THE CAPABILITY AND STRENGTH OF
CIVIL SOCIETY IN TURKEY

This chapter covers an appraisal of strength of civil society in Turkey. This appraisal includes the EU approach to civil society in Turkey and the shifting and development of civil society in Turkey. In addition, EU Civil Society Development Program, various NGOs like TOHAV, TIHV, HCA, MAZLUM-DER, TUSEV and TESEV are given reference.

Turkey has a long-standing aspiration to become a full member of the EU and that has given the EU a noteworthy leverage over Turkey’s domestic political system. This sway of influence as noted by Meltem Müftüler-Baç (1997, pp. 63-65) “has been useful in pushing forward agendas of both democratization and economic liberalization in Turkey since the 1950s”. Likewise, Keyder (2004, p. 77) asserts that “perhaps the major determinant of the domestic political scene in recent years has been Turkey’s candidacy for the European Union”. There are wide ranging opinions on the role of the EU as an external player in Turkish politics in promoting civil society. However, there seems to be a lack of understanding the impact of EU reforms and development of civil society in Turkey and the conscientiousness of civil society organizations in further underpinning those reforms. The issue at stake here is to examine to what extent the EU accession process has prompted the reforms as an external force initiating domestic change. Or, the issue is whether the domestic socio-economic and political change lead by indigenous actors has been strengthened by the EU anchor. It has been argued that
without external pressure, it is highly doubtful that such reforms would have been adopted. Şimşek (2004, p. 44) claims that “civil society is more of a slogan than an important reality and that the impact of these groups, for various reasons remains ‘trivial’”. Hence, it was the “political discipline provided by the EU prospect” that has transformed the social and political dynamics to enhance pro-reform civil society groups, whose agenda has enjoyed much more success since 1999 (Göksel & Güneş, 2005). Moreover, Kubicek (2005a) claims that “[w]ith all due respect to actors in Turkish civil society activists, we are not witnessing a revolution from below”. Kubicek (2005a, p. 25) further argues that “the EU is a central – even towering – figure in the Turkish reforms process. The timing of the reforms-as well as their content – speaks to the power of the EU as a ‘trigger’ for the ‘reforms’”. Likewise, Diez et al. examine the “policy Europeanization” in Turkey and claim that the reforms were conducted in relation to areas of particular concern to the EU. However, one could observe that the EU accession process was rather a catalyst to pre-existing democratic and social changes originating in the 1980s through globalization and market economics. In other words, if there is no appetite for reform in Turkey, the EU accession carrot engenders minimal stimuli to buttress the reform momentum encouraged by the ruling elites and the supporters of a European anchor. The Turkish state has shown to be susceptible to the promotion of democracy and allowing social movements to influence the democratization process, evident in its willingness and ability to let the EU and civil society organizations affect its political system, as noted by Tocci (2005, p. 80) who detects that it has been a “process of change largely driven by endogenous factors”. In order to fully analyze this schism, this section will embark on a demarcation of the EU policy framework for the development of civil society and then analyze to what extent civil society organizations have the potential to play in the democratization process and
the implementing of EU reforms. Concerning the latter, due to the lack of sufficient empirical research, the analysis will rely on interviews with the employees of several civil society organizations and extensive reading of their publications and the scrutiny of their activities. Moreover, the progress on civil society legislation will also be explored in order to assess the reinforcement of the legal framework for civil society and NGOs in Turkey.

3.1. EU-Civil Society ‘Dialogue’

Due to the failure to inform and prepare the citizens during the enlargement, the European Commission has set out a policy framework for the development of a civil society dialogue and provided a ‘communication’ to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee of the Regions on 28 June 2005 in relation to civil society dialogue and candidate countries (European Societies Commission, 2005). With that communication the Commission aimed to build up a civil society dialogue particularly with Croatia and Turkey through enhancing interactions and connections, and increasing reciprocated and shared consciousness and understanding. In that context the EU is providing funds for programs relating to the growth of civil society organizations and NGOs in Turkey, by the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Moreover, the EU is/was enhancing mutual ties with social partners and civil society organizations in various fields such as labor law and gender. Furthermore, the EU via education and training programs such as Socrates, Leonardo de Vinci, and Youth, intends to increase Turkish students’ participation and integration.
It seems that the development of civil society has become a priority and a tangible objective for the EU and Turkey. The crucial role of civil society has been highlighted in four fundamental documents. First, there is the “Accession Partnership Document 2001” (Europa, 2008) which aims to “strengthen legal and constitutional guarantees of the right to freedom of association and peaceful assembly and encourage development of civil society”. Second, there exists “Accession Partnership Document 2003” which draws Turkey’s attention to “pursue and implement reforms concerning freedom of association and peaceful assembly. Lift legal restrictions in line with the European Convention on Human Rights including for trade unions, (Articles 11, 17 and 18) and encourage the development of civil society” (The Council of The European Union, 2003). The third is the “National program for the adoption of the Acquis Communautaire-Turkey” dated 19 March 2001 (Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Secretariat General for EU Affairs, 2001). In this manuscript under the heading of “Freedom of Association and Peaceful Assembly, and Civil Society”, the development of civil society has been further underpinned as: “Encouraging the further development of the civil society is a priority for the Turkish government. Strengthening the civil society will contribute to the development of democracy in Turkey. Enhancement of freedom of association and peaceful assembly is expected to encourage individuals to become more actively involved in social issues”. Finally, these ideas were further maintained in the “National program for the adoption of the Acquis Communautaire-Turkey” dated 23 June 2003 (Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Secretariat General for EU Affairs, 2003). Within this program Turkey affirms that “the government will continue to support the development of the civil society and its participation in democratic life. In this vein, the relevant legislation will continue to be reviewed in the
light of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, especially with regard to compliance with the letter and spirit of Articles 11, 17 and 18”.

These documents have prioritised and also set out a framework for development of civil society during the EU membership process. Moreover, it can be observed that many rudiments of the acquis communautaire – the body of common rights and obligations, which bind all the member states together within the EU – are based on the existence of a functioning civil society. For example the EU-Turkey “Civil Society Dialogue” generates expertise and discussions between civil societies both in Turkey and the EU member states through their incorporation into the process of Turkey’s EU accession. Although the “Civil Society Dialogue”, established in 2004, has recently been included within the framework of budgetary programming, it can be seen that Turkish civil society organizations have shown willingness to take part in projects.

Furthermore, several activities and projects have been accomplished. In 2005, the “Greek-Turkish civil dialogue” was initiated under which Greek and Turkish civil society organizations greatly benefited. In order to generate and promote long-term cooperation and exchange of knowledge amongst civil society groups and institutions of both Turkey and EU member and candidate states four new grant schemes were launched in 2006. The first grant scheme was called “Civil Society Dialogue-Towns and Municipalities Grant Scheme”, which was related to improving the conditions of local government and municipalities in Turkey and also forging close communications with EU member/candidate states. The second grant scheme was “Civil Society Dialogue- Professional Organizations Grant Scheme”, associated with connecting professional organizations working on social and health polices, and rural development.
The third was “Civil Society Dialogue- Universities Grant Scheme” in which universities and other research institutions can collaborate and work in partnership with each other. The final scheme was the “Youth Initiatives for Dialogue” promoting cooperation among Turkish and European youth organizations. Previously smaller projects were successfully launched and now are in the implementation process such as “Strengthening Civil Society Dialogue: Participation in NGO events in the EU”. The Commission representative to Turkey stated that in 2007 €29.5 million was dedicated to the support of the civil society dialogue between Turkey and the EU (Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey, 2008a).

Another EU funded project equally indispensable is the “Strengthening Social Dialogue for Innovation and Change in Turkey Project” (ITC-ILO & DeLeeuw International, 2008). It aims to enhance the living and working conditions in Turkey by establishing a platform for dialogue among civil society organizations, employers and trade unions. The primary task of this project is to provide adequate expertise, information and guidance for relevant Turkish ministries and social organizations on issues relating to economic and social policies in order to boost their capability and wherewithal. And also it aims to generate a genuine engagement in order to promote a multilevel public dialogue. Since 2006, the Commission has contributed funding for joint exchange projects involving counterparts from the EU and from Turkey, under the existing pre-accession assistance programs for candidate countries. Approximately € 40 million has been allocated to projects launched in 2006 targeting towns and local communities, professional organizations, universities and youth organizations. It appears that the Commission’s proposal sets out a general framework and template, while project details and relevant funding are decided on a yearly basis during the future programming
exercises. No doubt that the civil society dialogue is a long-term *modus operandi* and it seems that it might progress in accordance with the requirements and suggestions articulated by civil society.

The key foundation which embodies major representatives of civil society organizations both from EU and Turkey is the “EU-Turkey Joint Consultative Committee” (JCC) (European Economic and Social Committee, 2008). Established on 16 November 1995 JCC has a diverse and rich representation of various social and interest groups which comprises 18 members from the European Economic and Social Committee and 18 members representing civil society groups in Turkey. Activities of the JCC have been closely followed and their representatives have been received by the highest echelons of Turkish government. The JCC aims to bring in civil society into the negotiation process and also monitor and investigate the end-results of adopting EU related social and economic policies. The JCC’s contribution covered a wide-range of areas relating to Turkey’s EU reforms and their implementation, and also the JCC has developed contacts and exchanges between civil society in the EU and Turkey.

Drawing upon the framework of the EU’s political strategy towards ‘Western Balkans-the Stabilisation and Association process’ (SAP), Turkey has been included into the project entitled “Connecting the EU and Neighbourhood civil society: Information, Training and Scholarship Program” (European Citizen Action Service, 2008). This two year long project commenced on April 2007 under the supervision of the European Citizen Action Service (ECAS). Through this project the ECAS offers assistance to countries, including Turkey, which are taking part in that project on matters such as dealing with the new instruments of EU assistance, funding and improving dialogue
with public authorities. Initially, countries will receive €11.5 million in a seven year period in order to enhance their civil society groups and their representation at European level and increase the awareness regarding European citizenship and governance.

Prior to this influx of funds and efforts the Turkish Parliament adopted a new Law on Associations on 9 November 2004. Although following the parliament’s approval of the Law, which was vetoed by former Turkish President Sezer and returned to Parliament for further consideration, it remains clearly a cornerstone in creating a legal framework for enhancing civil society in Turkey in accordance with European standards freedom of association. President’s veto and subsequent procedure have created an obstacle, however the new law noticeably symbolises a noteworthy augmentation for the development of civil society and its further fortification it in accordance with European standards of freedom of association. Finally, the new Law on Foundations was implemented on 16 November 2006 (NTVMSNBC, 2006).

During the preparation of the new law, the Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (TUSEV) and the International Center for Not-for-Profit (ICNL) jointly submitted their responses to the parliament. TUSEV was founded in 1993 as a network organization and has had a great deal of contribution to the development of civil society and sponsorship of research in the field. TUSEV will be further analyzed in the following section. TUSEV and ICNL teamed up in order to provide a series of comparative reports for auxiliary reforms to revise the laws regarding foundations and associations in Turkey. It appears that the majority of the provisions that were proposed by TUSEV and ICNL were incorporated and integrated into the final draft law which were then approved by Parliamentary commissions. Under the new law some provisions are due
to affect civil society regarding establishment, board membership, foreign foundations and grants, property and assets and taxation. According to the new law associations are no longer required to acquire prior authorisation to form foreign affiliation or partnerships. In the past associations such as Helsinki Citizens Assembly had struggled to obtain government authorization to partner with foreign organizations and receive external funding. Whereas student associations operated under tight legal restrictions, with the new law, restrictions and limitations on student associations were removed. Previously government officials had the right to attend associations’ annual meetings; the new law envisages that associations do not need to inform local government officials of the date or whereabouts of their annual or general meetings nor are they required to invite government officials to their meetings. Moreover, the new law will provide government funds for NGO and civil society organization projects and also the organizations will be able to buy and sell immovable property and possessions. It seems that with the new law pending to be finalised as a legal framework for Turkish civil society it can be argued that Turkish civil society is undergoing a significant change.

Overall, it appears that EU sponsorship of civil society groupings in Turkey is a vital pipeline of professional and monetary support for a number of influential academic, business and humans rights’ organizations: TÜSİAD, Economic Development Foundation (İKV), Human Rights Association (İHA), Turkish History Foundation, TUSEV and Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly. At a broader scale, one hundred and seventy-five NGOs formed a consortium, the European Movement in 2002, and İKV launched ‘The Turkey Platform’, encompassing 269 NGOs by 2004 that engaged with the Turkish government and public to generate a reform momentum supportive of EU membership (Economic Development Foundation, 2008). European Documentation
Centers – depositories of information on the EU – were set up in 13 universities (Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey, 2008c).

Facilitation of links and networks of NGOs lies at the core of the European agenda on Turkish accession. The EU’s Civil Society Development Program (CSDP) endeavours to “develop capacity for citizen’s initiatives and dialogue, domestically and abroad, and to help establish a more balanced relationship between citizens and the state, thereby contributing to the maturing of democratic practice”. Its programming ranges from funding projects with apolitical aims such as a bird watching program, to those with politically and culturally sensitive objectives such as the Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Association, an Alevi group (Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey, 2008b).

Other EU programs emphasize human rights development and education. In June 2003 the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights funded micro-projects on issues of torture, anti-discrimination and good governance. In 2004, the EU launched another project to improve civil society-public sector cooperation subsequent to the founding of a department at the Ministry of Interior in 2003 for outreach to civic institutions.

### 3.2. Shifting Civil Society Groups

It appears that the Turkish political culture and system have begun to be shaped and influenced by global and internal factors and processes. It is generally accepted that
Civil society in Turkey has undergone substantial transformation due to a series of decisive events. It was not a rapid change but a period that reflected the transformation in Turkey and external factors that influenced and shaped the orientation of Turkish political culture. According to research conducted by TUSEV there has been a series of critical events that led to the transformation of civil society in Turkey in recent years. The first of those series of events was the Habitat Forum in 1996, an international meeting held in Turkey which addressed the increasing role of civil society. That event had rallied substantial number of Turkish civil society organizations and encouraged them to work on new subjects. The second event was the devastating earthquake of 1999. That event had increased the awareness of Turkish citizens to the shortcomings of the state in dealing with such a disaster. And also the Turkish population witnessed the response of civil society organizations by organizing hundreds of volunteers and donations to assist the needs of the victims. The study further observes that the landmark for the development of Turkish civil society was the EU accession process and mainly the attempt to meet the Copenhagen criteria. The report suggests that the reforms that were introduced between 2001 and 2005 in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria have created more space for civil society to manoeuvre in Turkey. Also it concludes that the growth of market economy, privatisation and changing of the government’s approach, were the additional factors for shaping the civil society in Turkey. Therefore it seems that there is not a weak civil society but a strong civil society in the making. There is a great deal of evidence indicating that NGOs and civil society organizations have strengthened a growing civil political culture. For example, the number of organizations themselves is growing and also their membership is on the rise. Moreover, they are increasingly receiving attention from international and national
media since Turkey is under intense scrutiny due to the EU accession process and the war in Iraq (Bikmen, 2006).

It has been suggested that the numbers of civil society organizations have grown dramatically in recent years. There is a good deal of literature written on some well-known and established civil society organizations and think tanks in Turkey. All these organizations mentioned and investigated earlier have been influential in mobilizing Turkey’s drive to join the EU and putting pressure on current and previous governments to introduce the required reforms. This has been done by providing reports on specific issues, conducting public opinion surveys, organizing seminars and funding research projects, and forming lobby groups in Brussels to advocate Turkey’s EU membership. It should be noted that the concept of think tanks and conducting research based on public opinion surveys are new phenomena in Turkey. However, research conducted recently by the European Stability Initiative on Kayseri has become a classic reference to analyze Turkey’s rising Anatolian business. More recently the previous Chief of General Staff (CGS) Yaşar Büyükanıt attacked sharply TESEV’s “Almanac Turkey 2005 Security Sector and Democratic Oversight”. It was surprising to observe former General Büyükanıt devoting one-third of his opening ceremony speech to launch an assault on TESEV. However that move has made TESEV more visible in the public eye and increased Turkish people’s awareness of such institutions.

In the following part the emphasis will be on the in-depth interviews with the employees of various effective civil society organizations and NGOs, a comprehensive reading of their publications, observation of their activities and analysis of the discourse
and strategies of different civil society organizations, since these are directly involved in the democratization process as promoters of civil and human rights.

At the core of much of the current enthusiasm about civil society is a fascination with NGOs, especially advocacy groups devoted to public interest causes: the environment, human rights, women’s issues, election monitoring and anticorruption. Such groups have been multiplying exponentially in recent years, particularly in countries undertaking democratic transitions. NGOs play important and growing roles in developed and developing countries since they shape policy by exerting pressure on governments and also by furnishing technical expertise to policymakers. They generally foster citizen participation and civic education. They provide leadership training for young people who want to engage in civic life but are uninterested in working through political parties. In some countries, however, NGOs are outweighed by more traditional parts of civil society. Religious organizations, labor unions and other groups often have a genuine base in population and secure domestic sources of funding; features that advocacy groups usually lack, especially the scores of new NGOs in democratizing countries. Therefore any research regarding civil society in Turkey should put the NGOs at the heart of civil society together with other social movements.

One of the central organizations is the Civil Society Development Center (CSDC). Its main aim is to assist civil organizations to improve their work through specific studies and actions designed to fill in their gaps in information, material means and assertiveness. It publicises the activities of civil organizations via mass media and conducts lobby activities to encourage initiative taking in the social sphere and build awareness. It is an advisory organization primarily supported and funded by the
European Commission. It has been supporting existing networks to build capacity in targeted NGOs, engage in communication and cooperation, both within the country and abroad among themselves as well as the state and local governments. For that purpose they have held two advisory meetings with the participation of 88 representatives from various NGOs working in several different subjects. The CSDC also organized meetings between local NGOs and local government representatives under the name of ‘Local Government-NGO Cooperation in Participatory Democracy’ in April 2006. Those meetings had participants from various municipalities such as Mardin, Eskişehir, Nevşehir, Samsun and Izmir. If the CSDC’s work continues to be successful we may witness emergence of an umbrella civil society organization funded by the European Commission which is profoundly needed in Turkey.

Recognising the lack of laws and international coordination regarding civil society in Turkey, TUSEV (Third Sector Foundation of Turkey) was established in 1993. TUSEV is a highly active and influential umbrella organization encompassing more than a hundred trustee organizations. TUSEV has coordinated many essential projects and produced reports on improving civil society laws aiming to strengthen legal and operational capability of civil society in Turkey. TUSEV disseminates its research findings and later on assembles its trustees, cooperating with organizations both nationally and internationally in order to generate a momentum for the advancement of civil society.

Another distinct project is the Independent Communication Network (BIANET, 2009). It is a countrywide network in Turkey for monitoring and covering media freedom and independent journalism. It is also known as the BIA2 project and was established in
November 2003 derived from the first BIA project experiences. Both the BIA and BIA2 projects are primarily funded by the “European Union’s Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights”. The project has brought together more than one hundred local newspapers and radio and television stations. It has established a website to promote itself. The project aims to promote cooperation of the local media on a productive basis and establish a new channel for communication. It also promotes and supports the quality and coverage of human rights, women’s rights and children’s rights. It monitors and reports violations of freedom of expression, and also the coverage of the Turkish media regarding human, women’s and children’s rights issues. It also provides free consultation and guidance for the local media. In order to achieve this, the BIA has organized several seminars and provided training for the local media. Those seminars and trainings included reporters from media companies, radios, televisions, educators from various provinces in Turkey. It seems that the BIA will foster a new, unfettered journalism. Since the BIA is offering legal assistance, economic assistance, training in pursuit of independent journalism to reporters from small newspapers and TV and radio stations, it is building up from below and may create a space where external influences such as the EU and Internet might push further the dynamism in Turkish society.

An equally important organization in Turkey is the Helsinki Citizen’s Assembly Turkey (HCA). HCA-Turkey organizes projects and campaigns on minority rights, human rights, strengthening of local democracy and civil society, and EU integration. In order to increase awareness on those issues it has held several conferences, meetings, seminars and panels. It has conducted many activities such as symposiums and conferences on multiculturalism in Turkey, modernisation and pluralism, freedom of
speech and the EU adjustment reforms, and has also distributed many leaflets and booklets on various issues concerned with Turkish citizens’ political and social life.

Another less known organization in Turkey is the Foundation for Societal and Legal Studies (TOHAV). It was founded in 1994 by 46 lawyers, currently 120, who are members of various Bar associations in Turkey. TOHAV provides assistance to the victims of human rights free of charge regardless of their background or political opinion. It aims to observe and monitor the human rights violations in all regions of Turkey. For that aim TOHAV has organized a number of projects and training seminars for the lawyers and health personnel who are involved in the human rights field. Overall we could observe that the primary goal of TOHAV is to contribute to the prevention of torture and ill treatment practices in Turkey through creating legal tactics and effective prevention methods with the collaboration of lawyers, health personnel and NGOs. TOHAV has been trying to raise awareness of the public and civil society organizations on torture and its consequences by publishing a guide for alternative draft reports to be submitted to international bodies such as the Committee Against Torture. Furthermore, TOHAV has established “TOHAV EU Institution” and that institution has organized EU seminars open to the public in order to improve the legal system in Turkey and conduct research to increase awareness of EU Law and to ensure the irreversibility of political reforms in Turkey via bringing together national and international experts and related actors.

By supporting the development of civil society in Turkey the EU accession process has strengthened Turkey’s full harmonization to the Copenhagen political criteria. As we can observe the number and the scope of civil society organizations are growing. It has
also been noted that there is an increase in membership and local branches of human rights organizations, and the creation of a network of volunteers by TOHAV is a good example. The organization was founded by volunteer medical experts, such as physicians, psychologists and social workers, who provided free medical and psychological support for survivors of torture. Their activities grew to such an extent that TOHAV began to receive funds from the United Nations, the European Commission and the Swedish Red Cross. During interviews TOHAV Lawyer, Hakan Goksu in Istanbul explained about their efforts to establish a reliable, concrete, volunteer network that maintains a close cooperation between the organization and individual volunteers who work with and outside TOHAV (Appendix A). TOHAV staff stated that they regularly visit doctors, physicians and psychiatrists to persuade and encourage them to give free treatment to torture victims. As a result of those efforts today, Istanbul and other TOHAV branches have a wide range of volunteers assisting torture victims. TOHAV organizes regular meetings with volunteers and invites them to human rights events sponsored by the organization or any other international organization. That is another good example demonstrating the contribution of civil society organizations to the development of human rights in Turkey. For example a convention for forensic doctors across Turkey was held in 2004 and a wide network of Turkish doctors and lawyers was established to assist the needs of survivors of torture.

There is an increase in the number of branches of human rights organizations. Today the Human Rights Association has 33 local branches, MAZLUMDER has seventeen and THV has five and planning to open more soon. Starting with 46 lawyers TOHAV now
has reached 120\textsuperscript{13}. The BIA project now covers 125 print media companies, 28 radios, 25 television channels, 14 news agencies and 38 NGOs who are working on human rights, women’s rights and children’s rights.

Furthermore, it was reported by several participants from civil society organizations that there is growing attention by the national and international media and public to their activities. One worker, Ahmet Celik mentioned that Turkish journalists and writers recently visited their office for interviews about human rights issues in general and some other international media such as the BBC and CNN came to their office for various issues such as the headscarf issue and the persecution of well-known writers (Appendix A). This development was crucial since the organization received attention for the first time from the international media.

Another interviewee Tarık Koc stated that the media coverage regarding human rights is growing (Appendix A). It seems that the Turkish media is now writing about human rights issues more often than in the past. Consequently not only the media but also the general public has begun to pay more attention to human rights issues. This inclination was acknowledged by a lawyer Hakan Goksu from TOHAV and some other workers as activists (Yıldırım Z., Gunay M., Demircan M.). It was revealed that there is a dramatic increase in the use of TOHAV’s documentation center by university students. They all suggested that professors were giving students assignments that required them to research a subject on human rights. Moreover, the publication of reports has played an important role for those organizations since their activities - i.e. demonstrations, meetings, and fundraising - have been restricted by the state in the past. Many

\textsuperscript{13} Interview by author, Istanbul, 22 August 2009
professionals both inside and outside of Turkey trust the reports by civil society organizations, noting that they receive many requests from major-policy makers, which include officials from the EU and the foreign representatives in Ankara.

It is recognized that efforts to educate the public on human rights, supporting EU membership, increasing awareness of the rule of law and civic participation are priorities for today’s civil society organizations. Besides TOHAV and the regional offices of THV, whose main duty is to offer legal support and medical care for survivors of torture, almost all the organizations have successfully carried out programs to raise awareness of human rights issues among citizens. Most organizations have hosted human rights seminars to encourage discussion of the issue among local communities.

In Turkey, civil society is reflective of the gradual, but ever present, concoction of a new consensus on political and socio-economic orientations based on the values of societal empowerment, secularism, Islam and nationalism. This social transformation is reinforced by the EU accession process. Undoubtedly, Turkish civil society is becoming a more effective by employing EU accession as a tool to push the boundaries of civil liberty, democracy and self-reliance. Moreover, civil society has recently played a major role in EU-Turkey relations as they were the main facilitators in influencing the public of the compatibility of the EU-required reforms with Turkey’s norms and standards. In so doing, they facilitated the adoption by the Parliament of reformist legislative changes. Those groups have indefatigably worked on increasing the awareness and understanding of the Turkish public regarding the possibility and implementation of EU reforms and their impact on daily life, and have been
instrumental in galvanising support for those reforms. They have become progressively better organized and strident in their demands for systemic and structural change despite the indecisiveness and, sometimes, active opposition of the government. The EU provided them with financial resources and technical know-how to exercise greater pressure on the government’s policy agenda. This represented an unprecedented stage in Turkey’s modernization, a stage in which civil society was increasingly becoming a participant rather than a passive onlooker. This reality was recognized by EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn. In his speech of 10 December 2004 entitled “EU and Turkey: ahead of a historical decision” he remarked that: “Civil society has played a crucial role in changing the political climate in Turkey. Civil society unanimously supported Turkey’s entry bid. By and large, industrialists, trade unions, farmers, academics, media-representatives, non-governmental organizations and individuals supported the goal of a democratic, transparent and secular state, based on the rule of law and a strong and stable economy” (Rehn, 2004).

Çağlar Keyder offers a good explanation for the role of civil society in that process. Keyder (2004, p. 77) notes that the “candidacy to the European Union became a crucial card to play at this juncture. Aware that they had neither the resources not the ability to mobilize social forces to defeat the state, opposition groups came to see the candidacy as the only way of winning support for greater democracy, rule of law and expanded pluralism as depicted in the Copenhagen criteria”. Linking civil society to European agenda in Turkey, Keyder (2004, p. 78) argues that “the moderate wings of Islamic and Kurdish movements had joined the ranks of civil society and human rights activists advocating rapid fulfilment of the conditions required by Brussels”. Keyder (2004, p. 80) observes that “while the EU had initially been a state project for Turkey’s elite, now
it had become a platform for those who wanted to rein in the elite authoritarianism of Ankara”. These remarks indicate that the Turkish civil society has embraced the desire for change in order to comply with the political and social requirements of the EU membership process.

In general, civil actors from different ideological backgrounds, ranging from liberals and Islamists to communists, greatly contributed to EU relations, unified around the single aim of entering the EU. Their considerable area of activity stands testament to the change Turkey achieved. Even those who sat on the extreme sides of the political spectrum contributed to the discussion, and their opposition taught Turkey to deal with pluralism without resorting to anti-democratic policies. However extreme their argument may be, almost nobody approves of military intervention in the country any longer. Anti-democratic institutions like the army are losing influence every day. Turkey seems to have realized that the existence of extremism is something that can be tolerated as long as it is within the law. Today there are many people who hold extreme thoughts or prejudices against others in pluralist Europe. Judging Europe based on their discourse would certainly be unfair, as would be judging Turkey’s will to transform on the basis of those who hold negative attitudes towards the EU such as Islamists or nationalists. The majority of Turks today support the process.

### 3.3 Conclusion

This appraisal of strength of civil society in Turkey shows that civil society has been improving in Turkey. Examples of this can be seen in the shifting and development of
civil society in various NGOs like TOHAV, TIHV, HCA, MAZLUM-DER, TUSEV and TESEV. In the development of civil society in Turkey the European Union has been contributing a lot within the framework of harmonization of Turkey with the European Union. In this connection, European Union has been implementing a comprehensive program called as EU Civil Society Development Program in order to develop civil society, NGOs and their capacities in Turkey. Despite the development of civil society in Turkey there are many problems, deficiencies and obstacles encountered by NGOs in Turkey.
CHAPTER 4

EMPLOYER ORGANIZATIONS OF TURKEY AND THE EU

This chapter analyzes the structures of three employer organizations - TÜSİAD, İKV and MÜSİAD - and the comments of their high rank officers on the issue of the European Union. These three business organizations are the main employer NGOs playing a key and leading role in Turkish membership to the European Union. This analysis will help to underline the main approaches of the Turkish business sector to the EU membership and the obligations that come with the membership process. These three organizations are examined individually and compared with each other in terms of their approaches vis-a-vis the concepts of “constructive”, “critical”, “rethoric”, “activity”, “changing attitude” and “general” as given in the table I.

4.1. TÜSİAD

TÜSİAD represents the significant businessmen and investors in Turkey. It stands for The Turkish Businessman and Industrialists Association, in Turkish. It can be said that TÜSİAD started to gain interest in the policy of the Turkish Government within the EU in the 1970s when the reduction in customs duties took place by the requirement of the Additional Protocol. Until then business was operating in a heavily state-protected market and was in fact not yet ready for competition with the foreign market. The main uneasiness stemmed from the fact that nobody consulted private enterprises about the benefits and possible harmful consequences of signing the Additional Protocol.
After the Customs Union brought significant changes[^14] to the customs tariff, businessmen in Turkey felt that they should have been consulted regarding matters that affected the business environment directly. At that time TÜSİAD opposed the EEC (European Economic Community) due to a fear that unfair competition could destroy the economic interests of the business elite that owed its prosperity to the state protected economy that had been applied since the establishment of the Republic. It was only in the 1980s that TÜSİAD began to change its stance towards any partnership with Europeans.

TÜSİAD today is not comfortable with the structure of politics and a democratic system that doesn’t properly work. With detailed and well-prepared reports and studies, TÜSİAD openly states its opinions about democratic matters in Turkey[^15]. TÜSİAD, thinking that the problems of Turkey would only be solved by EU membership, therefore started lobbying activities in order to put pressure on Turkish politicians and subsequently established offices both in Brussels and Ankara[^16].

Between 1997 and 2000 it can be said that TÜSİAD had a very significant impact both on the policies of the EU towards Turkey and on Turkey’s policies regarding the EU. This is partly due to TÜSİAD’s relatively long history, and the fact that it is a member of the UNICE (Union of Industrialists and Employer’s Confederations of Europe). In

[^14]: There are different views on the effects of the Customs Union in Turkey. But the prevailing opinion in business is that the Customs Union brought positive changes to the Turkish economy. The share of Turkey in export and import with Europe has increased steadily since the Customs Union. Besides, the choices and rights of consumers also improved due to the increased competition among companies. There are a number of other benefits mentioned on the website of Delegation of European Commission To Turkey (http://www.deltur.cec.eu.int/Default.asp?lang=1 [Accessed 26 April 2007])

[^15]: For a general evaluation of TÜSİAD point of view and activities please see (Uğur, 1999).

[^16]: To see the reports of TÜSİAD in detail, you can visit http://www.TÜSİAD.org/rapor.htm [Accessed 25 April 2007].
this chapter, the impact of TÜSİAD on Turkish foreign policy and on EU policies will be studied closely.

4.1.1. The Appearance of a National Bourgeoisie in Turkey

In contrast to European history where independent entrepreneurs and businessmen had a changing impact on politics, in Turkey, businessmen never had this role in the country’s politics. The industrialization and capitalization that transformed civil society dramatically in the West had been watched eagerly by the Ottomans. Those who couldn’t manage to create this kind of transformation inside tried to construct it artificially and directly by the state. This however, instead of stimulating the creation of an independent and confident bourgeoisie, formed a class of businessmen who were entirely dependent on the state and fed by the state. These distorted so-called businessmen were more like the spoilt children of the country rather than an independent and successful class. Therefore they never gained their autonomy or a reputation that would enable them to become an influential part of society.

We need to look into the late Ottoman times in order to understand that the Turkey of today is a young republic which was inherited from the Ottoman Empire\textsuperscript{17}. The economy of the Ottoman Empire was formed on the principle of provisionalism while its political structure was based on the principle of ummah,\textsuperscript{18} the solidarity of Muslim

\textsuperscript{17} We will use Ottoman to refer to the Otoman Empire that lived for over 600 years and left the inheritance for Turks both politicaaly and economically.

\textsuperscript{18} Ummah is used to express the union of all Muslims in the world regardless of their races and background. Here it is used to refer to the Otoman Empire’s principle of uniting all the Muslims under its rule.
subjects. However, when the Ottoman Empire began to lose its power, both economically and militarily, the opportunities for non-Muslim minorities began to flourish with the help of emerging, economically able, Western business partners. However, there still wasn’t a class of businessmen who could dramatically exercise their power on political affairs (Buğra, 1994).

The end of the 19th century was a hard time for the Empire because of the wars on the Balkans and Russia front. The Young Turks appeared as a new hope to reverse the suffering of the old empire. They thought that implementing liberal policies both economically and politically would change the course of the Empire. In light of these thoughts, policies that encouraged private entrepreneurship and foreign investment were employed (Toprak, 1982). The opening of a parliament in the late 19th century that consisted of Muslims and non-Muslims was expected to eliminate the pressure of nationalist winds coming in particular from the Balkans. With this parliament, the Ottoman elite also thought that the concept of an Ottoman ‘people’ would prevail. However, it failed to stop nationalist wishes among other ethnic groups living in Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, liberal policies increased the strength of the non-Muslim capital combined with foreign capital. When these positive changes took place for non-Muslims and foreign investors, the Muslim section of the Empire suffered under harsh competition and many people lost their jobs. Despite all the efforts and hopes, liberal policies in economic and political areas did not bring the changes the Empire looked for. Implementing economic liberalism in the existing system paralyzed the economy. The changes these policies brought benefited only non-Muslims who acted more like an extension of Western countries rather than as part of the Ottoman Empire.
Furthermore, they fed the ideas of separation from the empire. This was because the Turks felt resentment towards the non-Muslim minority that consisted of mainly Christian orthodox Armenians and Greek Cypriots as they achieved better financially and did not remain loyal to the Empire they lived in. Subsequent separation attempts in the Balkans fed this resentment even more.

Following the First World War this tendency against liberalism instigated the nationalist economic model that lifted the privileges given to foreign investors in the past bilaterally in order to form a protective economy. In this period, foreign trade and foreign currency exchange dealings were done under the strict control of commissions, responsible directly to state offices. The same policy led to national economic dealings too. Therefore the state-centered economy was established in all areas of economic life. Moreover, following the independence war, an attempted total nationalization of the economy was initiated through corporations that were formed in order to transfer trade from non-Muslims to Muslims (Berkes, 1978).

“With the aim of stopping the dependency of the economy onto foreign powers and forming the long waiting desire to accumulate capital following the 1908 coup de etat, Ittihat ve Terakki always followed economic policies that favored the Muslim middle class. They encouraged the Muslims to take on trade instead of being dependent on the state. The policies implemented during and after the independence war gave the suitable environment to these sects of society and eventually eliminated the non-Muslim actors from trade and other profitable sects of economy.” (Berkes, 1978, p. 20)

19 The empire witnesses secessions within the next decades, in Balkans and the Middle East. For more details please look at Balkan Wars, WWI. The division plan brought by allies after the defeat in WWI was a declaration of these separation plans of the non-Muslim minorities.
Nationalist economic measures combined with the First World War’s deadly consequences created an environment whereby the middle class suffered, non-Muslims were left with unfair conditions to compete in and Turk and Muslim classes were deliberately supported. As a result, a class, named the ‘riches of the war’ class (even today) was formed. In this environment, military personnel, state officers and some other sects of society with a regular income became poorer and poorer. On the other hand traders and producers of market goods, landowners and the close circle of the Ittihat ve Terakki emerged richer from the war.

Following the establishment of the Republic, the protective policies of the state continued. Moreover, the state was directly arranging the market and other important issues of the economy without letting free competition determine losers and winners. The success of any businessman was completely dependent on how close he was to the governing elite and their policies. This situation cannot be explained merely with nepotism. A businessman had to convince the governing elite that he could serve the state once he obtained financial wealth. Businessmen also needed to choose a field that the state wanted to improve. In short, the future of these entrepreneurs depended on the role they wished to play in the development policies of the state (Berkes, 1978).

During the first years of the Republic, the policies of Ittihat ve Terakki to create a native bourgeoisie continued to be implemented. According to Buğra, the implementation of an asset tax was one of the most extreme and cruel of these policies, to such an extent that Buğra describes these policies as a violation of law and ethics in every respect. With the carrot and stick policy the state finally managed to create the long awaited
class of private entrepreneurs. Buğra suggests that this caused newborn businessmen to lack the necessary skills to cope with any violation of law or ethics, as they completely owed their very existence to these anti-democratic and unfair conditions (Buğra, 2002). To this day, forthcoming businessmen in Turkey have failed to stand alone by themselves and have never gained respected stature within society. According to a study showing the degree of dependency of private entrepreneurship on state support, in developed regions the percentage of state financial help accounted for up to 67.6% of all the investment costs and 58.2% of current costs. In regions where development policies were a particular focus these numbers go up to 96.6% and 95.2% (Koyunlu, 1987), indicating the dependency of entrepreneurs that limit their impact within society. Therefore they couldn’t justify their wealth with their ability or background or the capital they invested. Their wealth always received suspicious comments from the majority of the population. Even today there are claims that the earnings of those businessmen who are close to politicians are unjustified, and these claims overshadow the credibility of both businessmen and politicians. The corruption issue, therefore, can be traced back to the nationalist policies of the early years of the Republic in Turkey.

As mentioned before, the policy of creating a class of native entrepreneurs was inherited from the İttihat and Terakki party. During the first years of the Republic the political elite was also inclined to support this class of artificially created businessman regardless of their economic ability.

In 1923, the İzmir Economic Congress was an important decision making event to determine the principles of the young republic’s economy. The congress was attended by prominent industrialists and businessmen alongside workers and farmers. As a result
of the congress, a clear message was sent out that new economic rules would base themselves on free entrepreneurship and a liberal economy. In light of these principles, the decision was made to form the necessary establishments to provide an environment for liberal policies and a free market. However, contrary to the demand for liberal conditions, the decision to protect local production and the economy with heavy customs duties on imports was also taken. Therefore the much wanted and discussed matter of creating a national bourgeoisie based on free competition had stalled at the beginning. In other words, the hopes for a modern economy were stillborn (Kurmuş, 1977).

The period between 1923 and 1929 is characterized by efforts to transform the dead economy of the Empire into a free market economy, yet foreign debt inherited from the Ottoman Empire, the lack of capital and of entrepreneurs that could invest in the vital field to save the economy, the global 1929 economic depression and the unstable environment of pre-Second World War meant that all hopes and efforts to create a free market economy were abandoned. Following this period of 1930 to 1946, the impact of nationalist winds across the world dominated Turkish politics and the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party) that governed the country followed an authoritarian policy in every aspect of the country’s politics. In this period, statism began to sink into every field of politics from the economy to security.

After World War II, attempts to form a free market economy based on liberal policies appeared again from 1946 to 1960. Between the years of 1960 and 1980, the main feature of the Turkish economy was that there were solid plans to apply. Following decisions taken on the 24th January 1980, Turkish politics witnessed a third attempt to liberate its economy alongside changes in the world arena (Tekeli & Ilkin, 2000).
The attitude of the CHP during the period between 1930 and 1946 is worth analyzing deeply as it has left irrecoverable damages both to the economy and to society. The CHP had various policies towards private enterprise. On the one hand some thought that these enterprising businessmen were opportunist traitors, enemies that were exploitative, and many thought that the state should invest in fields where private enterprise couldn’t. Among these contradictory policies the success of a businessman was determined by the impact of the faction he or she associated himself with. The wealth tax, established by the government in those years, for example, was an unfortunate illustration of how statesmen were affected by German ideas about foreign elements in a country. Anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and a desire to punish those who came and damaged the country of natives was a dominant theme of German state politics in those days, and however difficult it is to accept by many in Turkey today, the wealth tax, as it destroyed the non-Muslim community, willingly or unwillingly, was as a result of common xenophobic feelings of ‘it was all them’\footnote{This is not a quotation, it is rather an analysis of the period. Further details can be found in Berkes (1978).}. It wasn’t of course as systematic as it was in Germany and there are some academics who have stated that the wealth tax aimed to punish the ‘riches of the war’ class that mostly consisted of a non-Muslim minority of the Empire (those who somehow took advantage of extremely harsh conditions during the Independence War and got rich unfairly) of which there were inevitably some Turks. So by imposing heavy taxes on them, the state aimed to reverse this situation, and yet the result was that non-Muslims, mostly Armenians, were forced to leave their homes and every belonging, as they couldn’t pay the tax. ‘The tax of assets’ was in most cases more than the asset’s value itself. Those who couldn’t manage
to pay the tax were exiled to the Aşkale town of Erzurum province (Tekeli & İlkin, 2000).

The end of WWII, alongside the ideas it promoted, had a large impact on Turkey too. Nationalism and xenophobic policies were replaced with admiration and loyalty to American policies that became popular due to the Marshall Plan that was introduced to develop the wreckage of Europe after the War and promote anti-Soviet policies in the world. Turkey had chosen to stand by American rather than Soviet policies, and therefore introduced America-centered policies (Kuruç, 1963).

Alongside these changes in world politics, around the 1950s, the Democrat Party came to power. With their arrival, the perspective of the state towards businessmen changed dramatically. In June 1950, quite distinctively, the Minister of Economic Affairs declared in a meeting held with businessmen, that all decisions regarding business and the economy would be taken together with the business world and that they would be part of the decision making process. This was evidence of a major departure from the state-centered, egoistic and authoritarian discourse of CHP in previous governments. Regardless of how much it was actually implemented, the discourse itself, compensated for the failures in the aftermath of the DP term in some businessmen’s eye. Yet, despite the positive statements, the DP government put the business world in a difficult situation with the formation of shallow and confusing, pragmatic and ill-devised policies. Ayşe Buğra describes this as the paradox of Turkish liberalism and states that this was a process where the government limited market conditions through extremely complicated intervention policies which brought new changes almost everyday and confused the business world:
“in such an environment the relation between love and hate gains an unprecedented importance. On the one hand some businessmen make fortune from very dubious sources, on the other hand, the ever-changing policies of governments bring never-ending changes that create a constant unknown atmosphere in the economy. Therefore, while businessmen constantly criticize the government for this obvious reason, they still do not wish any changes in government. The reason for that is not only that these uncertain policies bring some chance to hit the fortunate but also for the first time the government employs a liberal discourse that increases the reputation of businessmen in society.” (Buğra, 1994, p. 176)

Between 1950 and 1960 when the Democrat Party reigned, the government employed policies that, far from being strategically designed and systematic were extremely interventionist, and yet it was also a time where getting rich fast was a growing trend, something which reflects the preoccupation of society in those years. It was a kind of distorted version of the American dream, and inevitably the already unstable economy was hit by the profiteering and speculations of the period. To make the matter worse, the government tried to punish those opportunistic businessmen profiteering at the expense of the general good. Therefore a kind of interventionist liberalism was born (Buğra, 1994).

Yet, the possible consequences of these policies were delayed by the benefits brought as a result of Turkey sending troops to Korea to support the West during the Cold War. There was some revival in the economy thanks to the economic aid Turkey was granted
by showing its support. Yet as the prime economic policies were wrong, these short-term benefits melted away quickly. All the rescue attempts were made in a panic according to Buğra. This therefore just made the conditions even worse and more irreversible. At the same time the country was politically unstable. The DP government tried to create a group of businessmen who would support them by doing favors for some of them unfairly, keeping their mouths full as long as they supported the government. The DP used bids of state works to correct and punish the private sector. According to Buğra many construction firms like Enka, Tekfen, Doğuş, Alarko were born as a result of wealth accumulation gained through this unfair backing by the government (Buğra, 1994).

This liberal period led by the Democrat Party ended with the 1960 military coup. The most important feature of this period for businessmen was an uncertainty in economic policies and unplanned pragmatic daily strategies that overrode the general good. This period reinforced the image of businessmen as a group who profited at the expense of ordinary people. With the military coup the period of planned development started. At the end of the day, the coup was mainly ignited by the unwise use of the resources of the government and a clear neglect of public workers in terms of wages.

Despite all the good intentions to correct the wrongdoings of the Democrat Party government, plans made were not successfully implemented. 1960 to 1980 saw three military coups, two more attempted military coups, eight short-lived coalition governments, ministerial crises, and ongoing political violence that peaked at the end of the 1970s. Under these circumstances different economic policies were employed. The economy was structured upon principles that would encourage national production. To
achieve this, heavy duties for imported goods were introduced. Through this policy the aim was to establish an environment that was not disempowered by foreign competition. Despite the continuing disadvantages and political instability, these policies bore fruit, and a class of national producers and entrepreneurs finally formed. The private sector reached the unimaginable strength that had for so long been elusive. At the beginning of the 1980s there was finally a private sector producing most consumer products that are worth mentioning. In this period the distance between small businesses and big ones increased and big business leaders began to make macro plans alongside the micro interests they already had. Finally they reached a level where they could focus on economic strategies for long-term investments. With these thoughts in mind, they realized that the organizations and chambers they belonged to did not meet with their demands and so they formed TÜSİAD in 1971 (Keyder, 1989).

The year 1980 was an important year in Turkish politics. The economic decisions taken on 24th January 1980 were a real departure from the fully state-centered and controlled economy towards a liberal and foreign investment centered economy. This can be deemed the continuation of the trend led by Reagan and Thatcher. Metin Aydoğan suggests that there was a real need for the system to be shaken up in order to apply the policies of IMF, because the decisions required privatization, the lifting of subventions and subsidies and a minimum price for local agricultural products etc. All these changes were quite radical for that time and brought uneasiness within society (Aydoğan, 2005). With the September 12th military coup, in 1980, the nationalist and statist policies in the economy were abandoned, or at least plans to transform the economy to liberal values were established. The period was distinctive in its features as there were relatively free foreign exchange and trade policies, and attempts were made to open the
Turkish market up to the world. Although these made a considerable difference to the economy, the drowsiness of the state-centered economy was still felt. The role of the state as entrepreneur, industrialist, decision-maker of who gets which bid, giver of low-interest loans, and most importantly the ruler, continued heavily. Due to the relative success of liberal policies the business world began to be less dependent on state loans and instead established private banks as part of the holdings they had, therefore reducing their cash needs from state banks. According to economists these were all the signs of a transformation of the Turkish economy to a free market economy. The latest step to actualize this transformation was taken by Özal, who aimed to sell off public enterprises, yet, it didn’t happen to the desired level (Tekeli & İlkin, 2000).

Among all the different economic phrases Turkey has endured, there was one shared feature, the determining power of businessmen-state relations on the success of concerned businessmen. The political elite gave advantages to those who closely associated themselves with the governing elite and those who were ready to take any step required to groom the favor of the governing party. Businessmen had mixed feelings towards this situation as they enjoyed the privilege they were offered yet from time to time the possibility of the winds changing direction disturbed them. Via TÜSİAD, businessmen were able to point out wrong economic policies and compared to other pressure groups they had considerably heavy influence that meant the governing elite listened to them. In an environment, created by Özal, where the wealthy were given importance and praised most businesses flourished. The more they benefited from the liberal economy that aimed to open to the world market, the more confident and influential they became.
4.1.2. The Membership of TÜSİAD

As it is mentioned above, TÜSİAD was established to meet the demands of big business owners who thought that their interests were not served by commerce and industry chambers which mainly worked for smaller scale businesses. The membership of TÜSİAD was on a voluntary basis.

It can be said that the policy of membership to TÜSİAD was an extremely selective process. At least two referees are required to be a member of the organization. Also, to keep access relatively difficult, TÜSİAD introduced a very high membership fee paid regularly. Through this, the door of TÜSİAD was kept closed to those who could not afford the high economic cost. Along with the economic strength and scale of the applicant, TÜSİAD also expected the loyalty of the applicant to the mission and vision of TÜSİAD. Still today most of the members are from the industrial center of the Marmara region, while there are a considerable number from the Ankara and Izmir region. The reason for this is that TÜSİAD was formed by those who benefited from the policies of the early Republic and who were based in Istanbul originally. One should also know the fact that the region of Marmara is the economic heart of Turkey and most big businesses are based in Istanbul. Yet, TÜSİAD is a nationwide organization, and the other regions of Turkey began to produce big businessmen who would like to be part of TÜSİAD too.

The foundation principles of TÜSİAD are declared as follows in the charter (Özakat, 2008). Purpose Article 2:
a) Committed to the universal principles of democracy and human rights, together with the freedoms of enterprise, belief and opinion, TÜSİAD seeks to promote the development of a social structure which conforms to Atatürk’s principles and reforms, and strives to fortify the concept of a democratic civil society and a secular state of law in Turkey. TÜSİAD believes that industrialists and business people perform a leading role in Turkish society and acts on this conviction.

b) TÜSİAD aims to establish the legal and institutional framework of a market economy and ensures the application of internationally accepted business ethics.

c) TÜSİAD believes in and works for the idea of integration within the international economic system, by increasing the competitiveness of the Turkish industrial and service sectors, thereby assuring itself of a well-defined and permanent place in the economic arena.

d) TÜSİAD supports all policies aimed at the establishment of a liberal economic system which uses human and natural resources more efficiently by means of the latest technological innovations and which tries to create proper conditions for a permanent increase in productivity and quality, thus enhancing competitiveness.

e) TÜSİAD, in accordance with its mission and in the context of its activities, initiates public debate by communicating its position supported by professional research directly to the parliment, the government, the media, international organizations and other states (Özakat, 2008).

Over the years, except the mission of protecting the principles of Atatürk, the main economic outlook of TÜSİAD changed in the late 1990s, affected by changes taking place in the world economy. It replaced its discourse with one about the free market economy and left the mixed economy discourse by defending a state that focuses on its
main social duties. In other words, the discourse of the best of both, statism and liberalism, has been left behind and a completely free market demand has become the agenda instead. This came as a result of Turkish businessmen gaining increased confidence in the world market (Sabancı, 2007).

4.1.3. The Impact of TÜSİAD on Turkish Foreign Policy

As a non-governmental organization, TÜSİAD is very concerned both with the internal and foreign policies of Turkey and states its opinions about such matters openly. Many of the members of TÜSİAD have business relations abroad. After the 1980s, relations with foreign partners increased. Therefore the foreign policy of the country began to influence the interests of TÜSİAD’s members. TÜSİAD, as a result, tried to employ a strategy that would defend all members’ interests and tried to avoid following just VIP members’ interests in order to keep its neutrality.

One of the best articles to analyze TÜSİAD’s foreign policy discourse can be found in Görüş (Private View), the monthly magazine published by TÜSİAD. The then chairman of the board of TÜSİAD Muharrem Kayhan wrote about the organization’s view of foreign policy. In his article on multi-voice democracy published in Görüş magazine in July 1998 he mainly suggests that political problems are rooted in economic problems. That is the new world order, according to Kayhan, that was structured in this century. The main principles of foreign policy for years were of security and defense, but these have been replaced with economic diplomacy. According to Kayhan, Turkey could not confine herself to a foreign policy that only focused on geo-strategic matters that had
shaped the country’s politics for centuries. Gaining a wider perspective of international issues and gaining the role of shaping them rather than merely watching and responding them should be the aim of a dynamic country. As politics and the economy become increasingly interdependent, it is time, Kayhan suggests, to transform the strength of Turkey into economic benefits and vice versa. TÜSİAD made this the mission of businessmen in Turkey; that to reach this level in the world arena all the organizations in Turkey, both governmental and non-governmental should work towards this aim (Kayhan, 1998b).

TÜSİAD, alongside the changing role of NGOs in shaping the policies of the country, has taken this mission upon itself, recognizing that NGOs can put forward alternative views to the states’ official policies. In the ever changing roles of NGOs in the world, TÜSİAD is the flagship of this transformation in Turkey by managing to free itself from the state as much as possible. TÜSİAD had to become engaged in the social issues of the country due to its belief in economic diplomacy. Declaring businessmen as the ambassadors of the country, willingly or unwillingly, it found itself searching and creating alternative policies to the issues in Turkey because according to TÜSİAD: businessmen are the face of the country and representatives of Turkey outside (Öğütçü, 1998).

In the text where TÜSİAD defines the mission of the organization one can also see the main principles that TÜSİAD is founded on:
“to increase the strength of Turkish industrialists and traders for international competition and work for gaining an important place in world trade and economic diplomacy” (TÜSİAD, 2007a)

4.1.4. TÜSİAD Perspective on the EU Membership

The beginning of TÜSİAD’s interests in foreign policy can be traced back to the 1994 economic crisis which happened due to the economic failure of the government of the time. Kayhan states that these failures of the government and entry to the Customs Union, alongside problems Turkey was having with its neighbors, persuaded TÜSİAD to closely associate itself with foreign policy (Kayhan, 1998b).

TÜSİAD was disturbed by the fact that all the decisions were taken in Brussels with no proper representation of Turkish business interests. As a result of this TÜSİAD decided to open an office in Brussels in 1996. With the opening of the Brussels office TÜSİAD stated that with this office the ever needed two way communication and information exchange would be possible and finally Turkish business would be able to influence the decision making process in the EU (TÜSİAD, 1996a).

The second international office was opened in Washington, USA by TÜSİAD in 1998. Following WWII, Turkey began to form a solid relationship with the USA and acted as its supporter. Turkey’s relations with the USA, in its role as the world power, affected its other international positions. Indeed, the USA holds the power in world finance via the IMF and the World Bank, and Turkey had depended on these organizations
following the war. Therefore TÜSİAD realized the importance of relations with the USA which could open the USA market to Turkish businesses. Through these offices TÜSİAD managed to establish good relations not only with bureaucrats and politicians but also with businesses in those regions. This alone demonstrates the confidence and willingness of Turkish businessmen to open up to the world and represent their country directly instead of leaving the destiny of Turkey to the comments of newspaper columnists alone (Turgut, 1991).

Quite interestingly TÜSİAD opened its Ankara office much later than Brussels and Washington offices. Towards the end of 1999, TÜSİAD decided to open its Ankara office in order to show support for EU membership. According to the EU and most other commentators the biggest obstacle in front of EU membership was the anti-democratic laws and practices that Turkey has been suffering from for years. With its Ankara office TÜSİAD aimed to create a pressure group on governments to encourage democratic changes to take place. Through this office TÜSİAD actively began to follow the law making process and submitted numerous reports to parliament to show its opinions on various matters ranging from the Kurdish issue to Islamist structures in Turkey. It also plans to serve as a guide and source of information to implement the necessary changes when membership is acquired by Turkey.

TÜSİAD in fact has shown tremendous progress in its original views on both the Customs Union and EU membership. Considering the fact that the founders of the organization were those who benefited from the nationalist and statist\textsuperscript{21} economy employed during the early years of the Republic, its stance towards international matters

\textsuperscript{21} Statism / statist is used to refer to a governing system where state authorities determine the rules for economy and social matters (interventionism)
are worth relating to the change in Turkey as a whole. Despite the past and still continuing concerns about the Customs Union that suggest it would ruin local businesses that do not have the strength to cope with competition from the developed world, TÜSİAD began to support the Customs Union during the early 1990s. It also took criticism from the EU about Turkish democracy very seriously and began to study these issues in order to provide effective information and views. Certainly, Turkish politicians struggled to detach themselves from the election centered daily politics. Whatever seemed to be popular was followed by the governing elite in order to secure another election victory. On the other hand TÜSİAD was busy with organizing seminars and sponsoring research on the issues that the EU pointed out. These studies certainly had an unprecedented impact on both bureaucrats and society (TÜSİAD, 2008). Furthermore, TÜSİAD took a step to recover the much-damaged relations with Greece. According to the academic Karin Varhoff, this was more than a romantic peace movement. Varhoff suggests that this step was taken as a result of the fact that Greece was blocking the economic aid that Turkey would receive from the EU. This made TÜSİAD aware of the importance of relations with every EU country however small it may be (Varhoff, 2000 p. 322).

Equipped with the economic diplomacy discourse, TÜSİAD sees and interprets everything from the economic perspective. According to TÜSİAD, anti-democratic practices and the violation of human rights could isolate Turkey in the international arena and would reduce the competitive strength of Turkey in the world market. Yet, it
has always been maintained that the reason for its interest in matters like the Kurdish issue, democracy and human rights was purely ethical (Varhoff, 2000).22

TÜSİAD has a department that deals with foreign relations and policies. Prominent academics and experts work for TÜSİAD to assess the situations and create proper discourse to support TÜSİAD’s official stance. To understand the role of the foreign relations department more clearly one can look at the studies it did during the Customs Union integration process. In 1995 the department invited all those businessmen who were members of the organization to communicate with their business partners in Europe and ask them to contact their local MPs and European Parliamentary MPs in order to obtain the desired results from the Customs Union that would benefit both Turkey and Europe. These business partners in Europe were persuaded to put a case to bureaucrats in their country in favor of Turkey. Besides this, TÜSİAD sent a letter to all MPs in the European Parliament stating the drawbacks if Turkey’s integration into the Customs Union was delayed any further. After integration was achieved, TÜSİAD did not stop and continued to inform Turkish businesses about the new process and how to comply with it properly (TÜSİAD, 1996a). Through its relations with UNICE (Union of Industries of the European Community) TÜSİAD demonstrated a strong and systematic strategy to conform to the Customs Union and successfully ran lobbying activities that proved to be very effective. The number of meetings and seminars during 1995 was over one hundred, which indicates the dedication of TÜSİAD to its mission (TÜSİAD, 1996a).

22 Also look at for detailed study at TÜSİAD website (TÜSİAD, 2007b).
It is as a result of these intense communication efforts with European businesses and bureaucrats that, one may argue, the chairman of TÜSİAD Halis Komili, one of the most prominent businessmen in Turkey, was chosen to be the vice chairman of UNICE. He was the first and only person from outside the EU to reach such a position in UNICE. TÜSİAD gives utmost attention to its role and place in the UNICE as it is the only organization representing the interests of European businesses established after the Maastricht Agreement. The European Parliament and other official organizations of the EU consult with UNICE in decisions that would affect businesses and the economy as it is vital to keeping the European economy alive and running smoothly, and this can be achieved only by ensuring that the basic needs of business are met. Therefore by being a member of UNICE, TÜSİAD and TİSK (Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations) gained an important representation in Europe for themselves. For TÜSİAD the appointment of Halis Komili as vice chairman is a sign of the confidence of Turkish businesses in Europe, and is therefore regarded as a prestigious event (TÜSİAD, 1996a).

TÜSİAD tried to increase its influence on European organizations through its Brussels office. One of the activities of TÜSİAD’s Brussels office can be said to have been organizing of regular meetings with the Presidents of the EU to exchange views about Turkey’s relations with the EU, meeting with European Delegations in Turkey to discuss matters and developments, and keeping business from both Europe and the countries worldwide updated and informed about the Turkish accession process into the EU. TÜSİAD also informed the Turkish side about changes and developments taking place in Europe. Alongside informing official people in Turkey, TÜSİAD also informed
businessmen about the practical difficulties and issues they would encounter when trading with Europe (Kaleağası, 1996).

The Foreign Relations Department of TÜSİAD followed a systematic information gathering and dissemination strategy addressing European and Turkish authorities, businesses and the public about the changing responsibilities and rights of the two sides (TÜSİAD, 1996b).

4.1.5. TÜSİAD’s Activities toward EU Membership – 1997-2000

In 1997 TÜSİAD worked more efficiently towards EU membership following the opening of its office in Brussels. TÜSİAD’s Parliamentary Affairs Committee prepared a report that pointed out how to raise democratic standards in Turkey by its research commission which consisted of prominent academics and university professors. They prepared a total of 5 reports each focusing on the issues effecting Turkey and suggesting alternatives to these problems. The titles of the 5 reports published under the series entitled ‘Raising the Democratic Standards’ were as follows: The law of political parties, elections, the parliament and systems of governing, local authorities, judiciary and state of law and human rights²³

Through these reports TÜSİAD showed that it does not only support the economic policy of Europe but also agrees to the changes that the EU expects from Turkey to

²³ Reports are available online at TÜSİAD website, www.TÜSİAD.org/rapor.htm [Accessed 25 April 2007].
access membership. It is worth noticing that the stance of TÜSİAD differed from mainstream politicians who planned their strategies on regaining the governing position, playing the patriotism card by opposing the EU. These reports were presented to the chairman of the Turkish parliament, Mustafa Kalemli, directly by the chairman of TÜSİAD, Halis Komili. Following this presentation Halis Komili in his statement declared the mission of TÜSİAD and why it is important to listen to the views it presents as a NGO:

“TÜSİAD has no ambition to gain any governing position as opposed to the political parties that inevitably act on this instinct. Therefore these reports were prepared away from any overshadowing interests or propaganda and stand in equal distance to every political fraction with its neutrality. No opportunist approach or no concerns are let to influence the reports unfairly apart from the real concern for our country’s situation in Europe. We do not only criticize but also offer solutions to the major problems of our country” (TÜSİAD, 1997a, pp.3–4)

TÜSİAD effects extremely an well-organized and successful influence over the decision making authorities both in Turkey and Europe. An example would be when TÜSİAD orchestrated a united action that took place following the meeting of the Christian Democrat Party leaders in Brussels. The conclusion of the meeting was that Turkey was different from Europe due to its religious and historical background. This conclusion was enunciated by German Prime Minster Helmut Kohl who stated impossibility of Turkey’s EU membership24. TÜSİAD immediately reacted to these statements by organizing all the Turkish originated businessmen in Europe, through the European

Turkish Businessmen Association and the other business affiliations they formed, and sent a letter of protest to the German Prime Minster (Kadak, 1997).

On 20 March 1997, TÜSİAD attended a dinner meeting with members of the European Parliament Socialist Group to exchange views and discuss matters affecting Turkish membership of the EU (TÜSİAD, 1997a). These informal events had a significant impact, as they helped to form personal relationships and reduce the formality of view exchanges. They also eliminated prejudice on both sides by allowing each group to share personal accounts and experiences. Thus the relationships formed through these kinds of meetings are in fact far more productive than the formal seminars that NGOs organize.

On 16-18 April 1997 TÜSİAD took another step to intensify its EU lobbying activities. The members of the association met with prominent figures of business and politics in Europe, which was called the ‘Brussels Landing’. This was the most significant step in making valuable contacts taken by any NGO in Turkey to date. TÜSİAD met the European Union Foreign Relations Commissioner Hans Van Den Broek and the Vice Chairman of European Parliament Helena Hoff. Later TÜSİAD interpreted these meetings as the most important step in overcoming the distanced relations between Turkey and the EU. Despite cold winds coming from politicians in Turkey, TÜSİAD tried to express its opinion regarding EU membership to its European counterparts and once more stressed the importance of Turkey for the EU and vice versa. The publications of TÜSİAD reach over 1500 people and are therefore consistent efforts to explain the promises of EU membership. On the eve of the EU Presidency of
Luxembourg, TÜSİAD also began to establish relations with the ambassador of Luxembourg (TÜSİAD, 1997c).

TÜSİAD’s High Advisory Council had a meeting on the 20th September 1997 in order to show how to promote EU membership. TÜSİAD was determined not to leave the EU membership issue to the mercy of politicians who tended to make opportunist plans. In the meeting mentioned above, the chairman of TÜSİAD, Muharrem Kayhan stated that the responsibilities of Turkey towards the accession should not be subject to any bargaining with the EU. This view is based on the thought that the changes the EU requires from Turkey to render are in fact the changes that should take place under any circumstance in order to ensure that Turkey finds herself in a respectable position on the world stage. Hence these changes should be applied for the sake of themselves not for the sake of the EU. Making them subject to bargain, according to Kayhan, would delay the application and the essential changes in Turkey (TÜSİAD, 1997b).

In September 1997 TÜSİAD increased its lobbying activities towards EU membership. In accord with these efforts, Muharrem Kayhan attended some important meetings. One of them was the meeting organized by the EC-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee titled as ‘The Future of Democracy in Turkey and the EU’. The panel was attended also by TÜRK-İŞ, DİSK, TESK, and TİSK, important organizations in Turkey. In the panel Kayhan stated that because the people of Turkey are keen to be a member of the EU, democratic progress in Turkey could be measured by the achievement of such an objective (TÜSİAD, 1997a). This liberal approach of TÜSİAD is inspired by their strong commitment to economic liberalism. According to TÜSİAD, if any other interest or political group were not allowed to express themselves freely, this natural law would
be threatened whereas if they were given freedom to express themselves, Turkish society would find its balance inevitably, because in the end all societies are searching for peace instead of clashes.

Another important event that TÜSİAD attended was with Center for European Politics Studies (CEPS) where they discussed TÜSİAD-EU relations. Here again TÜSİAD stressed its support but also suggested that the stance of Europe towards Turkey should be more structural rather than critical if they really wanted to get positive results from the policies they have pursued regarding Turkish membership for over the last 40 years. On the 5th of December in 1997, TÜSİAD asked UNICE to organize its members to pressurize EU officials into showing support to the membership of Turkey into the EU (TÜSİAD, 1998d).

However, despite all the efforts and intensive lobbying activities, the outcome of the Luxembourg Summit of the EU was not what either TÜSİAD or Turkish politicians could have expected. Far from talking about the conditions for membership, the commission of the Summit came out with the conditions of candidacy on the agenda still, keeping Turkey a nominee for a candidate rather than a member. This created a very strong response in Turkey and even TÜSİAD, that had always sustained a cool approach, advised the government to show a strong reaction towards the EU.

The chairman of TÜSİAD, Kayhan, stated in one of the articles he wrote about the consequences of the summit that the EU took this decision under the influence of a few countries that were strongly opposed to Turkish membership in principle. Kayhan openly expressed that this situation had humiliated Turkey. Instead of remaining neutral
to the problems between Turkey and Greece, Kayhan continues, the EU took a side and therefore, carried these problems inside the EU which made them more difficult to solve. Therefore, TÜSİAD suggested that the Turkish government should withdraw from EU talks and declare that Turkey would not attend to the subsequent European Conference. TÜSİAD maintained that this was the only way to stop the weakness of the European Union harming Turkey irreversibly. Kayhan advised that this response should be put forward calmly and decisively if Turkey wanted any result, as a rational reaction, rather than an impulsive one. Therefore, any unplanned reactions like economic sanctions or withdrawal from the Customs Union were opposed strongly by TÜSİAD. However, Kayhan believes that by involving more EU mechanisms, Turkey will be more integrated to the EU and a mutual interdependency will create an irreversible process of membership. Depending on this argument, he defends some undesirable situations for Turkey, can not be able to affect Turkey’s EU process fundamentally (TÜSİAD, 1998d). If anyone wanted to see the positive side of this summit and the aftermath developments it was enough to look at the efforts the EU countries made to soften the reaction of Turkey, which demonstrated how the EU in fact saw Turkey. Therefore TÜSİAD decided to take a step by step approach by focusing on the economic aid promised to Turkey following the Customs Union regardless of the veto of Greece (Kayhan, 1998a).

Following the summit, TÜSİAD presented a report to the government and ministers in Turkey. The report was called ‘An Assessment of Turkish Foreign Policy’ (TÜSİAD, 1998c). This also shows that TÜSİAD was early playing the role as an NGO to convey its arguments to the authorized people as well as ordinary people in order to foster public support. These reports always got significant attention from the press and even
when the government didn’t like them from time to time, they certainly took TÜSİAD reports into account before they made a significant move\textsuperscript{25}.

In the first quarter of 1998 TÜSİAD began its economic diplomacy tours starting with an important visit to the USA. During this visit TÜSİAD stated that they supported the government as long as they were ready to deal with privatization, taxation and social security issues, and most importantly, if they tackled the problem of inflation in Turkey. With this statement TÜSİAD made it clear what kind of policy they would be supporting rather than supporting certain names just for the sake of loyalty. Of course the support of TÜSİAD means a lot in Turkey as they form the significant portion of big businesses (TÜSİAD, 1998b).

This stance of TÜSİAD signifies a significant departure from the traditional relations between businessmen and the state in Turkey. For the first time businessmen stood on their own two feet, and began to point out objective facts regarding the government’s policies. The politicians began to ask for their support instead of businessmen trying to receive favor from the politicians. The businessmen proved that they could survive purely based on their achievements, which also benefited the country in general.

To sum up the stance of TÜSİAD, following the Luxembourg summit, it can be said that TÜSİAD advised the government to act calmly and not to give in to these setbacks.

\textsuperscript{25} After the publishing of TÜSİAD reports, TV channels and columnists evaluate or write their opinions about the report. Many time after the publication of the political reports, politicians need to answer for the report if there is any issue related to their party. The most popular of them can be shown as TÜSİAD – MHP debate on EU issue. Please see details: \url{http://www.nethaber.com/Haber/53695/TUSIAD-MHP-ILE-KAVGAYA-GIRDI} [Accessed 26 August 2008].
The statement of Bülent Eczacıbaşı, the head of the TÜSİAD High Advisory Council, put it very clearly:

“Turkey achieved the position she has today despite Europe, therefore, to give up now will only help those who tried to reverse Turkey’s European membership from the beginning” (TÜSİAD, 1998a, p.12)

Before the Helsinki summit, TÜSİAD planned some visits to increase its lobbying capability in order to pursue a membership candidacy to be announced officially. TÜSİAD organized meetings and seminars in Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Finland, Italy, France, Denmark, Holland, and finally Greece. All these visits took place between May 1999 and November 1999. Of course, among these visits the last has a special importance, which we will deal with later on.

In Germany, TÜSİAD had a meeting with German Industrialists Federation (BDI), and gained the support of Germany in Turkey’s bid to European membership. Germany showed its support at the Köln summit in 1999, which could be seen as a significant change for the Schröder government.

In the Belgium visit, the Private Businesses Association of Belgium declared its support for Turkey. But one of the coalition member parties of the then ruling Flaman Socialist Party stated its concerns over the Kurdish issue and the cultural differences that might cause a problem both for Turkey and Europe if the membership was realized (TÜSİAD, 1999).
The other visits yielded similar results, with private business associations declaring their support as governments continued to take a slightly more cautious approach in referring to the democratic problems of Turkey.

The final visit was to Greece, a country that had traditionally worked against Turkey’s interests in the EU. Here again, TÜSİAD, with private business representatives, supported Turkish membership policies stating that political problems could only be solved with economic development and cooperation (TÜSİAD, 1999). Yet, the meeting with the Foreign Minister of Greece revealed that the Greek people were not ready to hear that Greece could support Turkey’s membership into the EU (TÜSİAD, 1999).

Following these country visits, TÜSİAD held a meeting with UNICE again at the end of 1999. The UNICE Leaders Council meets every six months to discuss the progress made in the EU and review the reports and other related publications and finally states its view on the main issues. In this meeting, as a result of TÜSİAD’s efforts, UNICE declared its support for Turkey’s membership one more time (TÜSİAD, 1999).

TÜSİAD ended the pre-Helsinki efforts by organizing another meeting in Ankara. The Foreign Minister of Turkey, İsmail Cem, attended the meeting with some other MPs and TÜSİAD stated its view once again to the government. Here Ismail Cem said that Turkey would do everything she could and that whether with Europe or without Europe, Turkey had begun an irreversible journey in terms of democracy, human rights and other social issues to improve the quality of people’s lives (TÜSİAD, 1999).
After the Helsinki summit, TÜSİAD continued to contribute to the process by establishing a committee for EU harmonization rules. The harmonization process required by the EU would certainly affect private businesses, and therefore, businesses in Turkey needed guidance to correct applications in order to get in line with European procedures. The main aims of this committee for harmonization were stated as following: Reviewing the effects of harmonization on Turkish business, creating working groups that are parallel to the Turkish government’s working groups, conveying the progress to EU-Ankara officials and informing the public about the progress (TÜSİAD, 2000)

4.1.6. Conclusion

In conclusion, TÜSİAD is an organization that aims to influence the decisions of government to protect business interests. Through TÜSİAD Turkish businessmen took a step to be active in decision making rather than just waiting for favors from government officials as they had in the past. Therefore TÜSİAD can be seen as the modern face of Turkey where the relations between government and businessmen became professional instead of personal.

TÜSİAD has immense resources to finance any scientific or political study it wants due to heavy membership fees. With these resources TÜSİAD put forward a professional and scientific stance to the problems of Turkey because it did not only speak from a personal view but also made comprehensive studies to support the ideas it supported. This is one of the important reasons why TÜSİAD’s reports create considerable interest
both in the government and in the press. It should be pointed out that TÜSİAD doesn’t always have smooth relations with the government. TÜSİAD President, Umit Boyner, indicated that it was natural for them to have a different viewpoint to politicians, but that they did not have the luxury of argument and would be willing to collaborate in every way (Bugün Newspaper, 2011). The economic demands of TÜSİAD are paid more attention than its political demands. Hence, its political influence is limited compared to its economic influence.

Yet, the efforts of TÜSİAD towards EU membership are worth paying attention to as it continuously worked for that without withdrawing or changing any policy since the beginning of the 1990s. Almost all TÜSİAD members have a kind of business relation with Europe. This helped TÜSİAD considerably in its lobbying activities in Europe.

TÜSİAD employed policies to work together with likeminded Turkish politicians. However, as can be seen following the Luxembourg summit, it also managed to deal with those who were opposed to Turkey’s EU membership dream by suggesting that Turkey should act calmly and therefore not damage the country’s honor. TÜSİAD sees the EU as a tool to bring Turkey to the level of democratic, Western countries. This is why TÜSİAD shares the criticism of the EU regarding Turkey’s problems about democracy and human rights. Through the EU, external dynamics could play a positive role in the already changing country according to TÜSİAD.

However, all these efforts shouldn’t give the reader the impression that it has got the power to deal with all the issues of Turkey. TÜSİAD itself is aware of the fact that it cannot bring Turkey to the desired level only by using the internal dynamics of the
country. This is why TÜSİAD insists on EU membership as it will bring the needed external dynamics to quicken Turkey’s journey to become a real democratic and stable country with a system that doesn’t marginalize any group, however radical they may be. TÜSİAD believes that Turkey should behave more calmly and confidently in order to eliminate radical groups in the country. By pushing them out of the legitimate arena, the state gives them a justified reason to carry out extreme acts.

Through its relationship with the UNICE, TÜSİAD declares that Turkey is already in the EU in terms of its business relations. Therefore for any future predictions, this relationship should be followed well, as it will be helpful in making substantial assumptions for EU-Turkish relations.

TÜSİAD is one of the best examples of a NGOs influence in Turkey. Its background, though, may make some readers question its neutrality. Business associations are not the first ones to be remembered when one talks about NGOs in the world. But still, TÜSİAD is an organization that acts freely and is not dependent on the government in its policies, and that is alone a good enough reason to regard it as the most important NGO in Turkey today.

**4.2. Economic Development Foundation (İKV)**

The İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı (İKV) can be translated into English as the Economic Development Foundation. The İKV is an NGO foundation established to inform Turkish businesses and the public about the process of European Union membership.
through two chambers: the İstanbul Chamber of Commerce (İstanbul Ticaret Odası – İTO) and the İstanbul Chamber of Industry (İstanbul Sanayi Odası – İSO) in 1965. It differs from TÜSİAD as it is comparatively less business oriented. Yet, it can be seen as representative of a wider spectrum in Turkey due to the structure and profile of its members. The İKV receives support nationwide from almost all the chambers of commerce across the country from Edirne to Van. Considering that local businesses are members of their provincial chamber of commerce, the İKV in fact represents the wider view of society, not merely the big businesses of the Istanbul region, although it should be noted that TÜSİAD is also a member of the İKV.

The İKV brought together 70 other NGOs in Turkey in August 2002 to support EU membership. This was at a time when the government was trying to cut expenditure and hesitated to go through the harmonization law required by the EU. This is also perhaps the best example demonstrating its lobbying activities towards Turkish EU membership.

4.2.1. The İKV and its Activities – The Preparation of Small and Medium Size Enterprises for the EU

As has been mentioned above, the İKV was founded by the partnership of various chambers representing small and medium size enterprises in 1965. In general it could be said that the İKV had good relations with governments as its agenda is focused on foreign relations rather than home politics.
In the previous chapter about TÜSİAD, the development of a business class in Turkey was explained in detail. Therefore we need not go into detail here about the environment that the İKV was formed in. The İKV was formed by businessmen and therefore the relationship between businessmen and the state also played a role here. However, the İKV only deals with European relations and therefore does not have any conflict with the government. Buğra suggests that the state perceives the İKV as a quasi-public organization that would contribute to the EU policy of the Turkish state. In other words, Buğra adds that the state does not see the İKV as any threat to its policies so far (Buğra, 1994).

The chambers of trade and industry in Turkey found a channel to convey their support for the EU through the İKV by gathering around it. They managed to pursue an agenda for supporting Turkish membership into the EU steadily. In accordance with the aim of its foundation, the İKV published four different declarations suggesting that Turkey should apply for full membership as soon as possible in September 1979, July 1980 and August 1981. In the last declaration the İKV stated that:

“Turkish private enterprises are aware of the fact that joining the EEC will not be easy and straightforward, on the contrary, it would need a lot of effort and sacrifice. With this in mind, they still wish to be a member of EEC and bear whatever the consequences are. There are no better or other alternatives for Turkey and her national interests…. Turkish private entrepreneurs fully support the full application of Turkey as a member of the EEC.” (Bozkurt, 1997, p.300)
During the period of Turgut Özal, the Prime Minister in 1987, Turkey applied for full membership of the EC. Following this, there was a question of who would represent the private entrepreneurs in Turkey. Until the application of Turkey, the İKV was the only representative body for private businesses. With this privilege the İKV opened an office in Brussels and a prominent businessman, Josef Kamhi, became the chairman of the İKV. Yet, after the application for full membership, TÜSİAD also started playing an important role for representing the business world in Turkey. In those days TÜSİAD applied to be a member of the İKV as well as for the UNICE. TÜSİAD became the second Turkish body to be accepted for UNICE after the TİSK (Turkish Employers Union). The Union of Turkish Chambers (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği-TOBB) also wanted to be a member of UNICE, yet its application was rejected on the grounds that it was a public body requiring obligatory registration instead of voluntary membership.

Following the membership of TÜSİAD in the İKV, the TOBB began to worry about the fact that it may influence the İKV too much. In those days the leadership of the TOBB was carried out by a conservative group led by Ali Coşkun, who held a more cautious approach to membership of the EU. The İKV was the only Turkish body that was accepted as the real member of the Eurochamber, however, the TOBB was trying to obtain this vital role in order to be more powerful in issues relating to the EC. Yet the government prevented this power game by choosing the İKV as the representative of Turkish private businesses. Following this, İKV appeared as the most influential body in relations with the European Community (Tekeli & İlkin, 2000).
As mentioned above, the İKV supported the government when Özal applied for full membership of the EC in 1987. Following the European Commission’s negative comments on the application the İKV prepared a declaration and sent it to the foreign ministers of the European Community member states. In the declaration, the İKV criticized the stance of the Commission and stated that the Commission dealt with the application of Turkey differently from other states, which violated the rule of law. In other words, İKV accused the EC of discrimination. It also advised the commission to reassess Turkey’s conditions and offer a date to start negotiations. The aim of the İKV with this declaration was to influence the highest decision body of the EC, the European Community Council (Tekeli & İlkin, 2000), which would discuss the report of the commission on Turkey.

Before the meeting, in which the EC council would assess the report, the chairman of the İKV, Kamhi along with some other businessmen, visited France, Italy and Belgium. They had meetings with the foreign ministers of these countries alongside other EC officials in order to change the outcome of the meeting. Despite all efforts the negative outcome of the EC did not change. Kamhi described this as a big mistake (Tekeli & İlkin, 2000).

After the EC refused the full-membership application of Turkey, the relations between the two were mostly dependent on the Matutes Plan, which was designed to enhance future relations between Turkey and the EC and offered a series of programs to be applied in Turkey. This plan was revealed by one of the members of the Commission, Abel Matutes. It basically stated that:
“Turkey is in fact an eligible country for joining the EC, yet, due to economic, political and social reasons, neither Turkey nor the community is ready for this accession. The Commission will re-consider Turkey’s application after 1993.” (Kılıç, 2005)

The İKV prepared a suggestion pack before the Council that concluded its opinion on Turkey. In this pack the İKV suggested what should be done during the transition period to help Turkey reach the level required by the EC. These points can be summarized as follows: Ensuring that cooperation works two ways, especially regarding financial aid promised to Turkey, creating a mechanism which would consult Turkey regarding matters relating to Turkey and her neighboring regions, paying the financial aid that was given to Spain and Portugal and updating any aspect of this aid to Turkey’s circumstances, involving Turkey with common policies of the EC alongside with some common bodies and funds, providing a mechanism that would enable Turkey to raise its agricultural standards to EC level and pay financial help if necessary and forming an insurance fund to secure foreign investments come to Turkey (Tekeli & İlkin, 2000).

The document submitted was for the purpose of influencing the decision of the council. Accompanying visits by the chairman and a few other prominent business figures of Turkey to Germany and other EC countries did not bring the result that was long desired by the İKV and Turkey. Chairman Kamhi was so furious about this he suggested that Turkey should seek justice as it has been wronged by the EC. Yet, this suggestion did not find an echo in Turkey or in the EC (Tekeli & İlkin, 2000).
4.2.2. The İKV During the Process of Joining the Customs Union

After the refusal that shook the country, another important issue entered the agenda of Turkey: the Customs Union. Although the Commission did not endorse EU membership, it also brought together a series of programs to quicken the process of Turkish entry. The Matutes Plan advised Turkey to join the Customs Union by 1995. Not surprisingly for politics at that time, the financial aid point of the Matutes Plan was vetoed by Greece and therefore only cooperation on economic issues and the Customs Union remained as an attainable goal for Turkey.

Quite differently from the stance of TÜSİAD, the İKV interpreted this situation of joining the Customs Union with no financial aid to compensate for any transitional costs as a real loss. Chairman Kamhi warned the government against the Customs Union and stated that this would be an unnecessary sacrifice, as it would not bring any benefit to Turkey. Likewise, one of the board members of İKV, Sedat Aloğlu, who became the chairman later, made the analogy of a blind lover and a professional flirt between Turkey and Europe (Tekeli & İlkin, 2000).

On 9 November 1992 the Turkey – EC Association Council had its 33rd meeting. In the meeting the importance of the Customs Union was stressed again. After the meeting, the foreign minister of the term, Hikmet Çetin, stated that Turkey was approaching the Customs Union fast.

In the first instance, both TÜSİAD and İKV resented the idea of the Customs Union without guaranteed membership for the near future. This was going to give all the cards
to the EC with no benefit to Turkey. In fact, TÜSİAD was rather reflecting the worries of the big conglomerates against the problems to be created by the Customs Union.

There were various reactions to the Customs Union by private entrepreneurs in Turkey. Being afraid that their businesses would be damaged due to the Customs Union, some businessmen were furiously against it, while others saw it as a step closer to the EC. During these hot debates, Yalım Erez, a member of TÜSİAD, resigned due to TÜSİAD’s opposition to the Customs Union. Erez, who became a prominent political figure later, stated that TÜSİAD put its own interests before the interests of the nation. Erez’s resignation was followed with the departure of Kamhi as the chairman of the İKV. Sedat Aloğlu became the new chairman of the İKV. Aloğlu interpreted the Customs Union as a sign of the good-will of the EC towards Turkey (Tekeli & İlkin, 2000).

4.2.3. Efficiency of the İKV during the Customs Union Integration Process

When it became clear that the negotiations for the Customs Union would take place immediately, the Turkish business circle decided to put pressure on the process in order to ensure they would get the most of out of it. This was surely a more logical approach compared to being totally isolated from the process even if they were opposing it.

On 3 May 1993, a summit was held by prominent business organizations including the TOBB, the TİSK and the DEİK. The press hailed this summit as “the negotiation summit”. During the summit, the consequences of the Customs Union for the private
sector were discussed. The reality that Turkey would join the Customs Union with Europe was beginning to sink in. As a result, private enterprises sought ways to reduce the possible setbacks it would bring to business in Turkey. Therefore they started to discuss how to form a support system that would protect businesses from the Customs Union’s negative consequences. This of course was not easy for the Turkish bourgeoisie that flourished under the heavy subsidies of the state and had never had to compete with outside economies. The heavy customs tariffs made foreign consumer products unattractive for Turkish consumers as their prices were far higher than locally produced goods. One should remember Turkey was a country that celebrated locally produced products and to encourage this there was even a special day allocated for it. All schools and state offices joined in this celebration every year. Every child growing up in those days has memories about that day26. It was laid somewhere between near-fascist nationalism and just naïve encouragement of local productivity.

In the summit it was decided that the İKV should have represented the private sector’s interests in negotiations between the EC and Turkey regarding the Customs Union. In some ways, the summit produced a very positive result and even though they had considerable worries over the Customs Union, the private sector decided to support the İKV and the Customs Union with the condition of influencing it as much as possible (Özkök, 1996 cited in Tekeli & İlkin, 2000).

We can see the influence of the İKV as an NGO when we look at the discussions that took place after Demirel, who was then the Prime Minister, became the President of Turkey. The Chairman of the İKV gave a description about how the new Prime Minister

26 It is called Yerli Malları Haftası ‘the week of local goods’, celebrating the national productivity (12-18 December, every year)
should be. The Chairman of the İKV, Aloğlu, indicated that the new Prime Minister should be knowledgeable about economics and foreign relations. He was in fact supporting Tansu Çiller, who became the leader of the DYP (Doğruyol Partisi, the right-wing party).

While these heated debates were taking place regarding politics and the Customs Union, the İKV managed to find itself permanent grounds for the policies it supported. One should remember that there were still very contradictory opinions about the Customs Union with Europe in Turkey. Some were suggesting it would take Turkey to the new millennium while others said it was just making Turkey an open market for foreigners to exploit (Uzun & Özen, 2004). The İKV decided to support the inevitable process Turkey was going through. The argument the İKV put forward had two main points. First was regarding the date for the Customs Union. According to the İKV, the date should have been set for 1 January 1996. When some politicians and bureaucrats suggested 1 January 1995, the chairman of İKV disagreed strongly by stating that this should have happened in a reasonable length of time (Tekeli & İkin, 2000). The second point the İKV made was to form a ministry that only dealt with the relations with the EC.

On 18 June 1993, the private sector had a meeting with bureaucrats who were dealing with the EC behind closed doors. In that meeting two points made by the İKV found wide support among other prominent organizations, like the TOBB (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği – The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey) and TÜSİAD. Besides these points, the outcome of the meeting was decisive support for the Customs Union solely because it would push Turkey closer to the EC. For those
businessmen, the Customs Union was in fact a compromise. Therefore they wanted to make sure that Turkey would get what she wanted in exchange, however long she might have to wait. They also pointed out the financial aid that Turkey should have received in order to adjust its fragile economy to the Customs Union. This was necessary to prevent the negative effects of the Customs Union on employment and the foreign currency balance. All the issues discussed in the meeting were gathered in a report and presented to the government. As a final request, the private sector wanted the government not to act without initially consulting the private sector (Tekeli & İlkin, 2000). Due to these reasons, the private sector aimed to make the Customs Union the most important issue on the Turkish political agenda.

Following this meeting and in accordance with keeping the Customs Union on the agenda, the İKV published detailed research about the impacts of the Customs Union on the Turkish economy. In a nutshell the research gave a comprehensive account of the political and social dimensions of the Customs Union. The research suggested that in the short-term, the Union might have negative impacts on employment, state revenues and the balance of payments. The report also suggested that Turkey should take her place in the globalization process, as this was the present reality the country was in. However, in this transition, it was suggested, there must be precautions to reduce the damage as much as possible. By forming an economic and social council to deal with matters, İKV suggested, Turkey could foresee the impact the Customs Union would have on the country (İKV, 1994).

Another activity the İKV carried out was to attempt to list the vulnerable sectors that would have endured the deteriorating effects of the Customs Union. The aim was to
determine these sectors and take a stance accordingly during the Customs Union negotiations. However this study caused some accusations towards the government, suggesting that some sectors were treated differently than others. The idea of subsiding vulnerable industries created resentment among other business owners. These accusations and the tensions they created were eliminated when Tansu Çiller, the Prime Minister, stated that there would be no subsidies or any other protection for any sector at all including the automotive industry. However, after intense lobbying the automotive industry successfully persuaded the government to prevent import of used cars from European countries.

Of course another important matter Turkey was expected solve was the issue of human rights and democracy in Turkey. The European Union was expecting Turkey to take a step towards improving the standards of human rights in the country. The pressure was immense as European Parliament was the highest body to confirm the Customs Union with Turkey. During these debates the İKV published a report on the Kurdish issue in Turkey. Although it attracted some criticism from the TOBB and some board members of the İKV, it was published in the bulletin of the İKV. The report took the matter completely differently from the official stance that had prevailed for a long time, which even claimed that there was no such race as the Kurds. The account of the official policy was examined in detail in the book written by Fikret Başkaya, Paradigmanın İflası (The End of Paradigm). Not surprisingly the book was banned in Turkey (Başkaya, 1991). The famous explanation made by the military books for Kurds is worth mentioning here in order to see clearly the way Turkey has progressed. This will also help the reader to appreciate the report of the İKV and its departure from the official attitude towards the matter in southeast Turkey. According to an explanation
given by state authorities, there was no such thing as a Kurd. It was merely onomatopoeia of the sound created when one walks on the snow covered ground in the mountains, then this sound transformed into Kurd which began to be used to name the Turks living in the mountains around the southeast of Turkey. Likewise the Kurdish language was also ignored and deemed to not exist in Turkey as a result of this rather too nationalistic view\textsuperscript{27}. The Kurdish language had been seen as a somewhat eroded version of Turkish compounded with Persian and Arabic. Even the linguists denied the existence of Kurdish and forced Kurdish people to speak Turkish in the east. Therefore, the İKV’s acceptance of Kurds as a reality of Turkey was a milestone step taken in the country. The İKV’s report suggested that the issue should not be seen as being a problem by letting ethnically different people express and define their identities. The report was trying to deemphasize the worry that allowing these ethnic differences would be damaging for the unity of the country. Such things as permitting broadcasting in Kurdish were perceived as a freedom. Yet deeming Kurdish as part of education or an official language in the region was thought of as dangerous for Turkey. However, offering it as an option lesson was seen acceptable. Another point made in the report was the economic underdevelopment of the region. The İKV suggested that it was necessary to direct financial aid from the EU to the region in order to cope with the unemployment and poverty that had caused people to rebel. In the final part of report, the İKV proposed a series of constitutional changes, a kind of reform pack. It was stated in the report that:

\textbf{“Within this frame, the regulations that would be performed in order to be in compliance with today’s conditions regarding issues like terror, political parties,}

\textsuperscript{27} For more details of the official policy and definition regarding Kurds, refer at the source above.
societies, election codes and similarly essential subjects will strengthen Turkey and assist her to eliminate criticism outside” (Başkaya, 1991, p.36).

The report was mainly addressed to the EU and the European Parliament and became the principle report in the lobbying activities of the İKV towards joining the EU.

The Customs Union agreement was approved by the European Council and sent for the consideration by the European Parliament. The next step was to ask the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Commission to prepare a report about the agreement. The reporter who was responsible for this job was Carlos Carnera. During his visit to Turkey, Carnera stated that the agreement might not find sufficient support in parliament due to Turkey’s record on human rights and democracy. Subsequently he suggested a series of steps to be taken such as some constitutional changes to increase civil liberties and human rights, the release of DEP’s (Demokrasi Partisi – Democrat Party) arrested MPs and the cancellation of Article 8 of the Anti-Terrorism Law. According to Carnera, without these changes, it would be unrealistic to expect the parliament to approve the Customs Union agreement. Yet Carnera did not get the response he wanted from Turkish officials: DEP MPs stayed at the prison. As a result of the Turkish attitude, Carnera proposed postponing the voting for the agreement in parliament for six months or one year at least. This deadlock created anxiety among NGOs, such as the İKV, TÜSİAD and some other prominent business organizations, who longed for the Customs Union to be realized. Therefore these NGOs decided to intensify their lobbying activities immediately as they did not want Turkey to endure economic loss due to the rigid attitudes of authorities (Çalış, 2002).
Following these events, the Turkish Parliament did take steps to achieve some changes in the constitution, albeit limited. Two of the MPs of the DEP were released while the other four were kept behind bars. Article 8 of the Anti-Terrorism Law was also changed as Carnera suggested.

The İKV did not wait for these changes to take place to increase its activities within Europe and Turkey. As well as advertising in some European papers, they also organized other important gatherings involving big private business NGOs. As a result of these gatherings a declaration was published. This declaration aimed to reassure the European Parliament that Turkish business actors were determined to do anything to achieve the necessary changes in Turkey. The İKV also published a report to express the opinions of Turkish businesses regarding the DEP case and the general political party law in Turkey. One should always remember that the case of the DEP and the PKK was a sensitive topic in Turkey and being democratic about these issues did not find any sympathy among ordinary people. On the contrary, these were deeply unpopular issues to deal with. These companies expressed their worries about the possible rejection of the Customs Union agreement and the economic loss it would bring. In the end, the European Parliament approved the Customs Union agreement.

4.2.4. The Performance of İKV in the Period Between Luxembourg and Helsinki Summits

The İKV continued to work hard for EU membership after the agreement of the Customs Union. The most important achievement the İKV did was to provide financial
aid for the project ‘Information Dissemination Web’, drawn by the İKV to assist small and medium-sized companies to conform to the new regulations without difficulty. The project had three main aims that can be summarized as follows: providing information about the EU, the single market and the Customs Union from various resources, studying this information and making it easier to understand for ordinary people and updating this information circle every 15 days and presenting this facility to small and medium-sized enterprises free of charge (Industrial Chamber of Denizli Province, 2007).

To enable this project to run smoothly İKV educated and trained some personnel on the EU, the single market and the Customs Union subjects and their implications for Turkish businesses. The İKV thought that there was a real need for educated staff on the subject of European Union for the improvements it would bring along. Achieving this project was a positive step for the İKV. Another aim of the project was to help small and medium-sized enterprises compete adequately with foreign companies after the Customs Union. This successful project was not that difficult for the İKV to achieve, after all, it had the main trade chambers for various districts of Turkey among its board members. The information gathered was to be conveyed to small businesses through these chambers located in different parts of Turkey (Industrial Chamber of Denizli Province, 2007).

During 1996, the İKV organized two visits to Brussels with the companionship of its chairman, Meral Gezgin Ermiş. These visits gave the opportunity to follow the developments first hand for the İKV. The İKV was trying to prove that private businesses, whether small or big, could contribute and affect political developments in
both Europe and Turkey, which was an important development for the role of NGOs in Turkey. They visited some chambers and European officials to stress what delaying the membership of Turkey would cost to both Turkish and European businesses.

The complex relationship with the EU highlighted the importance of Greece whenever Greece attempted to veto any benefit for Turkey. The İKV also realized this point very much and decided to improve relationships with Greece. In 1996 a few visits were made to Greek private businesses organizations.

Another important job the İKV undertook was to explain to the public the impact of the Customs Union. The year of 1996 was the year that the Customs Union was put into force. The İKV conducted nationwide research to measure the affected business fields. There were panels and seminars organized to make the results known in the country. Three fields were chosen as case studies to examine the impact of the Customs Union. These were the steel, chemical, and agricultural industries (Bozkurt, 2001b).

During 1996 the İKV also managed to publish two more important studies that private businesses appreciated very much. One was a study about the other impediments besides customs in trading with Europe. With this study the İKV was trying to change the belief that customs were the only obstruction in trading within Europe as there were many regulations and laws that should be conformed to. The second study was an informative paper about how CE marking quality standards worked. The CE mark was introduced by the European Commission and meant that a certain product meets all the health and safety requirements. The letters CE do not stand for anything special but rather helps traders to recognize approved items. Many goods and products needed to
have the quality assured certification of CE in order to be freely marketed in Europe. The İKV listed the places where Turkish businesses could get this certificate and some other practical information about the not very much heard about but very important matters like CE marking (İKV, 1997).

The İKV also had consultant status for Europartenariat and Medpartenariat programs devised by the EU. Both were organized to stimulate development in regions where economic activities had declined or were underdeveloped for any reason within Europe and its neighbors. Initially the main aim was to encourage regional development. First, the idea started only within Europe with Europartenariat, but with success it was extended to the other countries around the European Union and with the start of Medpartenariat, some Mediterranean countries also joined in these meetings. The İKV had a consultative status for these programs and, according to reports it published, Turkish companies were increasingly interested in these programs and managed to gain solid benefits. The İKV pointed out in its bulletin that Turkey took its place among the most influential and successful top three countries by participating in these programs (Tekeli & İlkin, 2000).

In the annual report of the İKV in 1996, there was an assessment of the relationship between Turkey and Europe. There was some serious criticism of the government and attitudes of officials towards some issues regarding the EU. The İKV accused the government of delaying the implementation of agreed changes and failing to obtain the whole benefit the Customs Union offered. The report stressed the fact that delaying any changes only hurt Turkey. The İKV pointed out in the report that the unwillingness of the government to take action on the issue of human rights and the problems in
southeastern Turkey and Cyprus prevented Turkey from obtaining the full benefits in a normal length of time. Moreover, the reluctant behavior of the government caused the EU to take a cautious approach towards Turkey when they saw not-so-eager officials deal with the vital issues of democracy. At the end of the report the İKV proposed to form a commission to deal with European relations consisting of representatives from political parties, universities, media, chambers, unions and business organizations. Most of the criticisms targeted the DYP- RP (Right Way Party – Welfare Party) coalition government. The discourse of the RP was especially disturbing for the İKV. The RP was employing an anti-European Union discourse and suggesting forming close relations with Muslim countries instead. These policies created suspicion in the EU. Before the Customs Union agreement was signed, Tansu Çiller, the leader of the DYP, established her argument over preventing an Islamic party from coming to power during an election. However, after the election she formed a coalition government with the very Islamic party of the RP and therefore created serious disappointment in Europe.

One can see from the discourse in the İKV report that the organization wanted to employ a pluralistic voice and represent the majority of people in Turkey. The suggestion to form a nationwide commission was another example of the İKV’s pluralistic, popular politics as compared to the more elite TÜSİAD.

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28 Murat Belge, a well-known leftist and pro-democracy journalist write in Radikal newspaper examine issue in many dimensions. See Belge (2003a, pp.46–51).
4.2.4.1. 1997 – The Critical Year

The project of forming a council to deal with EU - Turkey relations in Turkey was actualized with the partnership of members from the EU - Turkey Joint Parliamentary Commission and the Turkish Parliament. It was named the Turkey – EU National Consultation Council. On 21 March 1997, the council met with the chairmen of national NGOs with the aim of making the EU membership a nationwide issue to be interested in. In the meeting, a declaration was published to express public opinion in Turkey addressed to Europe stating that the people of Turkey were aware of the fact that the improvement of democracy and human rights, providing peace within the region and benefiting from the free market economy could only be achieved through the EU. This declaration was translated into the official languages of the EU and sent to every related authority and 2500 different addresses in Europe (İKV, 1998).

In March 1997 İKV organized a meeting involving another 41 countries’ chambers of commerce and industry including the Northern Cyprus Republic of Turks. The seminar was called ‘Keyword for Sustainable Growth: Regional Cooperation’ and the cost of the organization was met by the TOBB (Turkish Chambers of Commerce and Industry). This indicates the close relationship between the İKV and the TOBB, which was represented by the İKV at Eurochambers.

The year 1997 was a difficult year for Turkey in her relations with the EU due to human rights and democratic issues. The reluctance of Turkish officials to take serious steps in those issues was making Turkey unreliable in the eyes of Europeans. The İKV, which was interested in every aspect of EU matters, was keen to resolve the problems in a
pragmatic way with businessmen who were also putting an enormous amount of effort onto the Turkish human rights issue. Alongside this interest, the İKV prepared a report called ‘Democracy and Human Rights’ and presented it to the then Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz and the chairman of parliament Hikmet Çetin. The report attempted to set out universal standards for human rights and democracy though a comparative study of international treaties. It took the standards of three European countries, Spain, Portugal and Greece, which had anti-democratic regimes before joining the EU, as a base for the study and these were studied in order to analyze the circumstances of Turkey and the possible strategies to recover from this stand-by situation (İKV, 1997).

The aim of the İKV in publishing these kinds of reports was only to put the issue forward clearly before stating any bold conclusions. The chairman of the İKV in 1997, Meral Gezgin Ermiş, opposed the idea of this report, which was somehow a reminder of TÜSİAD’s reports and stated that the İKV only tried to identify the problems of Turkey that the authorities could not or did not choose to solve (Öztürk & Erüs, 1997). With this attitude, the İKV was trying to destroy the prejudice and the belief of the Turkish authorities that Turkey was under pressure and not being treated fairly by both Europeans and other Turkish organizations wishing to join the EU. Therefore the İKV employed a much milder discourse towards the government and did not want to look like a mere supporter of EU policies. This was clearly stated in the aforementioned report where it was stated that the report was merely showing the international standards of democracy and human rights.

The İKV initiated its first information program following the Customs Union agreement put into force in 1997, which was coordinated by the EU commission and the İKV. In
the framework of the program there were a few seminars to educate the members of chambers of commerce and industry about the changes the Customs Union brought. Among these were seminars which took place at CERIS ULB (Center of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Settlement, Université Libre de Bruxelles) on 27 April – 4 May 1997, *Contact Point* organized by College d’Europe in Brugge, Belgium. Two education programs inside Turkey also were organized by professionals from the EU and Turkey. One of them targeted technical matters and the certification of origin regulations relating to business in the framework of the Customs Union. This seminar consisted of two parts and was held in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir separately. The technical regulations regarding the Customs Union was dealt with by Claus Jensen, the head of the technical field of the European Commission Industrial Department and Tamer Dizioğlu, the vice-president of Standardization in Foreign Trade. The second seminar was about the matters regarding competition after the Customs Union agreement. All these worked with other smaller scaled information programs and helped the İKV increase its credibility and prestige. Through the information project financed by the EU and Turkey, the İKV obtained the privilege of representing Turkish businesses both in the eyes of the Turkish government and the EU.\(^{29}\)

The İKV often made visits to European capitals in order to keep in touch and follow developments closely. In May 1997 the chairman of the İKV together with the vice-chairman and secretary general, visited Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium. The visit to Germany took place with the companionship of TÜSİAD and the group had meetings with several political party leaders, the Secretary of the Foreign Ministry and the head of the Association of German Businessmen and Industrialists. During these

\(^{29}\) Later discussions on representation and coordination of the business sector can be a proof of this privileged situation. We will focus this issue at the coming pages of the study.
meetings the clear message from Germany was to state that Turkey-EU relations were not perceived as foreign affairs but also as internal affairs due to the number of Turkish immigrants living in Germany.

The visit to the Netherlands was run under the guidance of the Turkish ambassador to the Netherlands, Baki İlgin. A meeting with the Confederation of Industrialists and Employers of Holland was arranged by the ambassador. Following this meeting the Turkish group visited the officials from the Foreign Ministry. In this meeting Dutch authorities stated that any thoughts they might have against Turkey’s membership of the EU stemmed from the fact that Turkey did not have an adequate record of human rights and Holland was not prepared to accept any historical or cultural differences as an excuse for this problem. The Kurdish issue was put forward by Dutch politicians as one of the most important matters and Turkey was advised not to underestimate the impact of Kurdish policies applied in Turkey on Turkey-EU relations. The other two big problems for the EU were identified as Cyprus and the disagreements between Turkey and Greece. Turkey was strongly advised to make improvements in those problematic areas in order to improve relations with the EU (Kazamias, 2006; Joseph, 2006).

Finally in the visit to Belgium, the Turkish group had meetings with the director of the European Commission Turkey Desk, Catherine Day, and the person responsible for the European Union Foreign Affairs, Hans Van den Broek. In these meetings, officials stated their appreciation for the works of the İKV and confirmed its prestige in Europe. Belgian authorities also pointed out the success of the Turkish economy in adjusting to the Customs Union despite the lack of financial aid from the EU due to the veto by Greece. Yet they also mentioned the disappointment of the EU regarding Turkish
human rights issues that did not show any improvements after the Customs Union, which was expected by the EU to be actualized as a positive response from Turkey. Broek also answered Turkish criticisms that Turkey did not receive equal treatment to the Eastern European countries with similar economies. According to Broek, the problems Turkey suffered from were nowhere near the problems occurring in Eastern European countries. These countries did not have any serious uprisings in their lands similar to the Kurdish issue in Turkey. None of them invaded the territories of other countries like Turkey did in Cyprus and finally there were no serious conflicts between any members of the EU and the countries who wanted to join the EU. Therefore Broek suggested that these problems were particular to Turkey and this was the reason for taking a different attitude towards Turkey in Europe. Turkey’s insistence on membership while dealing with such important problems, therefore, was a real disappointment for the EU (Tekeli & İlkin, 2000). In a way, the words of Broek were the harbinger of the result of the approaching Luxembourg summit. The attempt to prepare a reflection paper for Turkey’s addition to Agenda 2000 by the European Commission also gave the hint that Turkey was going to face the formula of 11+1 (a special status of membership for Turkey, different from the other 11 candidates).

The İKV paid special attention to building good relationships with the countries that ran the European Community Presidency. During the presidency of Luxembourg, the İKV visited the country and held meetings with EU officials. In these meetings the İKV got the impression that Luxembourg was trying to devise a formula that would not treat Turkey differently from the other candidate countries. Having visited the French EU officials in Brussels after Luxembourg, the Turkish group received similar signals from French officials too. According to the chairman of the İKV, France was seriously trying
to come up with a formula that would work to keep Turkey in line with other candidate countries. Visits to British officials created similar impressions on the İKV representatives. The following quotation from the board report by the İKV summarizes these points:

“All the meetings clearly indicated that Turkey showed a great performance regarding the economic cooperation that took place after the Customs Union. The obstacles in front of Turkey for full membership were identified as Turkey-Greece relations, the Cyprus issue, and democracy and human rights in Turkey. The outcome of these visits showed that the EU will not deal with Turkey, which has the bigger population than all other candidate countries put together, the same way it dealt with other candidate countries, but also will not give up on Turkey easily either.” (Tekeli & İlkin, 2000 p.93-114).

It seemed that in the period before the Luxembourg Summit, the EU countries clarified the main problematic areas about how to deal with Turkey’s membership application. The İKV perceived the attitudes of these countries as understandable and acceptable. In other words the İKV was not surprised at the outcome of the Luxembourg Summit as it got a similar message during its visits into various countries. In this framework, the İKV gave the same message to the Turkish government that without making improvements on the issues outlined by the EU, Turkey would not be able to join the EU fully. Despite giving the same message as Europe, the İKV continued to employ the official demand for the equal treatment of Turkey by the EU as the government did (Tekeli & İlkin, 2000).
The year of 1998 was a rather dim year for the relationships between Turkey and the EU. The uncertainty the future held made the relations even more strained. When one looked into the activities of the İKV in 1998, it could be said that the İKV also was affected negatively by this atmosphere. The İKV continued its routine activities of informing small enterprises and holding seminars and conferences during the year. In one of the press meetings it held on 26th March 1998 the İKV pointed out the changing policies of the EU towards Turkey and the lack of alternative strategies that Turkey must employ to get over this difficult period. The chairman of the İKV Meral Gezgin Eriş stated that seeing the outcome of the Luxembourg Summit as a defeat and the end of Turkey’s European journey would be a great mistake. Moreover, producing policies based on this defeat would increase the problems of Turkey both inside and outside. Eriş suggested that instead of mourning over this outcome, Turkey should see this as an opportunity to renovate herself in accordance with international standards. In the report, ‘EU Strategies for Turkey’, prepared by the European Commission and given to Turkey, Eriş proposed economic and political suggestions for Turkey to quicken the journey to the EU and therefore receive the attention it deserves. Eriş added that:

“Today is the day to make dialogue. The EU is preparing to employ a new strategy that would ease the discomfort the Luxembourg Summit created and promote the positive sides of the summit. Turkey should approach the matter positively too” (Milliyet, 1998)
This discourse of İKV found resonance in the press and was appreciated in general due to its constructive nature. The famous columnist in Milliyet (a Turkish newspaper), Sami Kohen, once stated in his column that in the post-Luxembourg period, the İKV was one of the few bodies to deal constructively with the outcome of the summit and find ways to keep it on the agenda while most people including the government did not work to develop new strategies to tackle post-summit issues and did not take any steps to improve any of the issues raised by the EU during the summit (Kohen, 1998).

In summary, in the post-summit environment, the İKV insisted on applying sensible strategies instead of policies that would widen the gap between the EU and Turkey. It was, in fact, not easy to stay cool in an atmosphere where suspicious and revengeful discourses were promoted for quick political gains by political leaders. This rather too nationalist talk might have found a crowd that was easy to please; yet for long-term serious foreign politics, this might have proven rather harmful. In Turkey, this kind of discourse has been used as a guarantee to bring applause instead of putting serious efforts into creating solid policies.

4.2.5. A New Period for the EU-Turkey: 1999

The year of 1999 witnessed the efforts of the EU to heal the relationship with Turkey after the Luxembourg Summit. The European Presidency was held by Germany and in fact Germany paid special attention to the mater. At the end of the presidential term, Germany tried to declare Turkey as the 13th candidate country alongside others, but this also was held up by the Greek veto.
Turkey suffered from the hugely destructive earthquake in the summer of 1999. After the earthquake there was a clear closeness that occurred between Turkey and Greece. Belonging to a similar geographic region, Greek people really sympathised and provided an enormous amount of help to Turkish victims. This situation set a solid base to form good relations with Greece at last (Kazamias, 2006).

During 1999 the İKV tried to keep the EU on top of the agenda as relations were unusually quiet and static. For this reason most of the activities of the İKV in 1999 focused on rescuing relations with the EU from stagnation.

After the general election of 1999, the İKV expected that a more stable government would make EU negotiations run more smoothly. Straight after the election, therefore, the İKV started working to develop close relationships with the new government and the new Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit.

Despite the negative atmosphere created by the Luxembourg Summit, the İKV only focused on positive developments and consistently promoted EU membership. Especially in July 1999, following the visit to Germany to meet Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, the İKV began to believe that Germany and France were far more optimistic about Turkey’s future. The belief was so strong that the İKV expected that these positive changes would be reflected in the Helsinki Summit that would take place at the end of 1999 (Mercan, 2000).
The İKV Board Report in 1999 stated that the stagnation in Turkey-EU relationships was beginning to disappear. In order to maintain the momentum the İKV organized important visits to European officials, like the president of the European Commission Romano Prodi and the commissioner responsible for EU enlargement Günther Verhaugen. Moreover, the chairman of İKV, Meral Gezgin Eriş, also gave a talk at the European Policy Center, a body seen as an important forum in Europe regarding Turkey-EU relations.

Finally, Turkey heard what she wanted in the Helsinki Summit. In the second regular report on Turkey published in October 1999 the EU Commission recommended giving Turkey a membership perspective. After a long wait Turkey gained the status of a candidate country for EU membership.

The EU Council decision at Helsinki read:

“The Council welcomes the recent positive developments in Turkey and Turkey’s willingness to continue its reforms in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey is a candidate country on the road to joining the Union based on the same criteria applied to the other candidate countries.” The decision taken at Helsinki is a turning point in EU-Turkey relations. Following the Helsinki Summit, Turkey, like the other candidate states, started to benefit from a pre-accession strategy directed towards encouraging and supporting reforms (Delegation for European Commission to Turkey, 2007).

Following this achievement the İKV organized seminars to talk about the Helsinki summit. In one of these meetings the chairman Eriş stated that the outcome of the Helsinki summit showed how unfounded it was to think that Turkey did not have a ‘European identity’, as was put forward in Europe by various Europeans leaders over a
long period. By granting Turkey the status of candidacy the EU also proved that it treated Turkey equally with other candidate countries (Eriş, 2000).

In the period before the Helsinki Summit TÜSİAD also intensified its activities and lobbying. This caused some kind of competition between the İKV and TÜSİAD regarding who would represent the private business interests. TÜSİAD was the club of big businessmen while the İKV represented a wider range of businesses. With the anxiety this situation caused, the İKV wanted to ensure its position and called upon Ismail Cem, the Foreign Minister, to confirm this in a meeting. Cem gave the responsibility to coordinate relations between the private and the public sector to the İKV, which reassured the İKV (Hürriyet Newspaper, 2000).

Despite this rivalry with TÜSİAD, the İKV strongly believed there was a need for an umbrella organization to provide coordination between various organizations that supported EU membership. The İKV insisted that the private businesses should join the decision making process as well as lobbying independently. Some other important bodies for businesses also thought the same as the TOBB. There was a clear demand to form a coordination center, which would save time and money by compounding the efforts of different bodies. Although every organization wanted to form a center for these activities, they all wanted it to happen under their own leadership and guidance. This disagreement caused a conflict between the İKV and the TOBB. Being very passionate about the EU, the İKV believed it was the only possible choice for such leadership. TÜSİAD on the other hand stayed away from all these debates and clearly stated that it preferred to run its own activities and did not want to be told what to do (Kadak, 2000)
4.2.6. Conclusion

The İKV is an NGO that has had an important function in EU-Turkey relations. It was established by the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce and Istanbul Chambers of Industry and later received support from many other business organizations as well. The İKV coordinated private business – government relations and provided a useful information service to small and middle-sized enterprises in Turkey, especially after the Customs Union.

It is a well-known fact that joining the EU would affect businesses immensely. Being part of the common market, with the arrival of the Customs Union, brought many new changes in regulations and laws regarding trade and industry. Furthermore, the Turkish state pays attention to its relations with private businesses as it took a long time to create a bourgeoisie in Turkey since the late Ottoman times. This privileged treatment stems from the policy of the Turkish state towards private businesses that were looked after well in order to create a national economy. Yet, the Turkish government is not so eager to allow private enterprises into further decision making processes and wants to keep them within the limits set by the state.

However the İKV, with its intense lobbying activities, managed to obtain the status of a representative for private business interests in the EU negotiations. The calm stance of the İKV towards the government played an important role in its success. Despite the competition with TÜSİAD, the İKV obtained the privilege of acting on behalf of thousands of private businesses.
Although there are some big organizations that were members of the İKV, it usually reflects the structural features of the chambers that formed it. The facts that most of its budget comes from the TOBB makes it look like a sub-committee of the TOBB specializing in EU matters. This has always caused conflict between TÜSİAD and the İKV. For this reason TÜSİAD, which gained prestige in Europe through its Brussels office and UNICE membership, often has not included the İKV in its activities. TÜSİAD has had greater fund sources and for this reason it has chosen to be independent on many occasions. The İKV has always felt threatened by TÜSİAD and very often demanded reassurance from government officials about its representative status.

The İKV is paid special attention by those EU organizations dealing with small and medium-sized organizations. In this framework the İKV was granted the right to use funding resources for its information projects, despite Greece’s veto regarding any EU funding for Turkey following the Customs Union.

The decision of the İKV to support the Customs Union despite the losses it might cause was the main step for the organization to set itself up as innovative. This preference meant that the private sector gave up all the privileges it had enjoyed to that point which showed the real need for extending the economy beyond the borders. This need became so strong that the private sector had to deal with the political issues of Turkey as they seemed to hold Turkey back from full membership. In this framework the İKV also began to be concerned with the problems of democracy and human rights. The organization believed that if those issues prevented Turkey from being a full member then they needed to be tackled with as smoothly as possible. Yet the İKV mainly chose
to define the problem rather than imposing or suggesting any solutions. This policy of the İKV kept its relations with the state fairly close compared to TÜSİAD. Although it never accepted this openly, the İKV believed that the criticism of the EU on the issues of human rights and democracy was not unfounded and that Turkey could not solve the problems with internal dynamics only.

Although the İKV was given the status of representing business interests in EU relations, and most of the time had a consultation status for the government, the reader should understand that Turkish governments usually look down on civil society and their representative NGOs. The traditional Turkish belief that the state is superior and always knows best, once again, was demonstrating its powerful impact. Yet, in Turkey, an ever-changing country, this also began to change with the help of professional NGOs like the İKV that proved themselves to the government and to their members with the achievements they made.

4.3. MÜSİAD

The 1980 military coup brought the stern face of the state to the fore in Turkey once again. The state was everywhere with its systematic policy of the depoliticization of society. Thus the country, being extremely politically polarized, was pushed towards the other end of depoliticization by the army. The post 1980 coup period in fact is worth examining as a subject of a thesis itself. Almost no politics were allowed, the style of music and movie called arabesque flourished with its completely empty content offering no message whatsoever either politically or artistically. Versions of Bollywood-type
movies served to offer an escape from post-coup regulations. Karin Vorhoff explains this period as the time when Turkish society realized the need and potential of NGOs and other civil solidarity platforms. Therefore many civil associations and NGOs appeared in the late eighties.

With the help of the liberal policies applied by Özal, a new class of businessmen began to appear in Anatolia. There was a need to represent the interests of those relatively new businessmen, but TÜSİAD was the only association and was far away from representing businesses nationwide for two reasons. Firstly, TÜSİAD had an elitist approach to accepting new members. The extremely high membership fees justified for its big scale lobbying activities were also serving them to differentiate the “really rich” from the “just rich”. Secondly, being very rich was also not enough to be a member of TÜSİAD as it had its own ethical and life-style expectations of its members. Therefore, TÜSİAD was in fact never willing to embrace the whole country; on the contrary, they preferred to remain an exclusive club for those on the top of the pyramid. As a result of TÜSİAD’s stance, many local and smaller scale business associations began to be formed across the country.

MÜSİAD (Müstakil İşadamları ve Sanayicileri Derneği – Independent Businessmen and Industrialists Association) appeared as one of the most interesting business interest groups from a sociological point of view due to the identity of its members. Because it is a relatively young organization there is not much written about MÜSİAD to date. It was founded on May 5th, 1990, by twelve businessmen in Istanbul. While TÜSİAD

30. As there is not much research available about MÜSİAD, researcher tried to read statements written by MÜSİAD or people who were associated with MÜSİAD like Mustafa Özel. Also see the book consisting of his articles: (Özel, 1997).
represents the modern, Westernized, secular and elite businessmen, MÜSİAD’s identity reflects the religious values of Sunni Islam and the conservative people of rural Anatolia. MÜSİAD follows a completely different policy towards membership compared to TÜSİAD, despite the fact that its first chairman who remained in that position for 10 years, Erol Yarar, was the son of one of the founders of TÜSİAD.

MÜSİAD has tried to embrace much more diverse members, so far as is possible. All kinds of businesses and industries of any scale are accepted. Yet MÜSİAD also has selective criteria for membership. A candidate needs three references from other members and the association then carries out research about the candidate’s reputation and business ethics in the area it operates. However it’s not as tiresome a process as TÜSİAD’s member acceptance policy. The number of members in MÜSİAD across the country exceeded 3000 in 1999. The newly developed cities in Anatolia like Bursa, Konya, Denizli, and Gaziantep provided a fertile ground for MÜSİAD to flourish, which has differentiated it from TÜSİAD, too, as TÜSİAD’s members tend to concentrate in Istanbul and its surrounding area. According to MÜSİAD’s president Mr Omer Cihat Vardan’s statement, it has over 40 international representations today. In addition, MÜSİAD opened branches in Europe where Turkish migrant workers have considerable numbers, like Germany and France. There are some affiliations in the Muslim countries of East Asia too. (TRT, 2010)

The name MÜSİAD may not have much meaning for a foreign reader yet the name itself is a subject of controversy in Turkey. The similarity between the names of TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD probably strike one’s curiosity, yet there is more to the story than mere similarity. Although the letters in MÜSİAD officially stand for Independent
Industrialist and Businessman Association, they are known for their inclination to the traditional values and referred to as the “Muslim Businessmen and Industrialist Association”. If TÜSİAD represents the secularists and Kemalist side of businesses in Turkey, MÜSİAD represents the Islamists ideology among businessmen. Therefore they are strongly related to political parties with an Islamic point of view.

MÜSİAD describes itself, in terms of its mission, on its website as being “equipped with advanced technology and developed financially without compromising the cultural and religious values, sharing the profit with people without being greedy, contributing to the peace in the country and working for a Turkey that is respected on the world stage”. Its motto can be summarized as “high virtues, high technology” (Yarar, 1996).

With its explanation of its mission, MÜSİAD stresses the flaws of economic development achieved in capitalist countries. According to MÜSİAD, values of family and religion were sacrificed and an unjust society model occurred for the sake of more profit. This is a very important manifesto because MÜSİAD tries to change the commonly accepted idea of “good Muslims cannot be rich”. It suggests that it’s not the money that brings the problems but it’s the people who misuse it. According to MÜSİAD, capitalism alone cannot be blamed for the unfairness and the social problems of Western countries, but the materialistic view of the world that many Western secular societies hold is to blame for the lack of affection and solidarity in those countries (MÜSİAD, 1998).

They may initially be perceived as successfully bringing together Islam and capitalism in spite of Islam’s anti-capitalistic spirit, or at least can be credited with bringing in the
local industrialists of rural Anatolia. Despite their Islamic identity, members follow advanced technology closely with their gadgets and modern offices, which are similar to those of the members of TÜSİAD in appearance. Yet they still have their prayer mats on the office floor and religious art on their office walls. According to Mustafa Özel (2005) “MÜSİAD was founded not just to empower Anatolia or Muslims but to remove the barriers for all humanity”\footnote{Mustafa Ozel who is a consultant of MÜSİAD is periodically writes in the daily paper of Yeni Şafak, all of these references can be seen frequently. For further information visit \url{www.yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar} [Accessed 28 September 2009].} . Ironically though while they criticize the materialistic way of life and consumerism of the West, members continue to open and promote supermarket chains and mega shopping centers across the country, ignoring the contribution of those to the consumerism and materialism they vigorously criticize.

However, MÜSİAD believes that the majority of society has not benefited from the modernization project which began with Atatürk due to the fact that the policies devised created only an elite class who felt ideologically associated with Western philosophy. The state neglected the small entrepreneurs scattered around Anatolia as it saw them as not modern and rich enough. This discrimination created a gap between the elite who mostly lived in and around the Istanbul area and the other ordinary people who lived in the rural areas of Anatolia. Therefore, MÜSİAD sees itself as the savior of the neglected and long forgotten class of society in Anatolia. In this respect MÜSİAD was founded as a result of reaction to the unequal treatment the state has employed since the late Ottoman times. Therefore MÜSİAD defines itself as the ‘other’ of TÜSİAD. What TÜSİAD is not is represented by MÜSİAD, to put it clearly. One of the former heads of MÜSİAD, Erol Yarar, stated the MÜSİAD opinion about capitalism as follows:

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31 Mustafa Ozel who is a consultant of MÜSİAD is periodically writes in the daily paper of Yeni Şafak, all of these references can be seen frequently. For further information visit \url{www.yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar} [Accessed 28 September 2009].
“The So-called rationalist philosophy of Descartes refused and got rid of every value and concept that can’t be measured and calculated, and therefore brought chaos to the life of individuals and society. By destroying the religious and moral values, they transformed ‘homo sapiens’ into ‘homo brutalis’.” (Buğra, 2002, pp. 187-204)

This in fact is not merely a criticism of capitalism but a serious condemnation of modernism and Western values. That is what makes MÜSİAD worth mentioning in this study as it represents an alternative way of thinking which has always caused tensions to remain high in Turkey.

MÜSİAD chooses its members carefully as it has an ideological background. This in fact is true also of TÜSİAD, as it would not embrace a member who has deep concerns about capitalism and the Western way of life. MÜSİAD informally requires its members to follow a relatively religious life. It defines its own identity on its website as follows:

“MÜSİAD is a “Businessmen’s Association” founded on May 5, 1990, in Istanbul, Turkey, by concerned businessmen dedicated to the realization of a Turkey where human rights and supremacy of the law, justice and equality, peace and security and the welfare and happiness of the people are guaranteed; where community and universal values that are adopted historically by the people are protected; and where the country is effective in the region and respected in the world.” (MÜSİAD, 2007b)

One can notice this definition does not mention religious values explicitly yet the concepts of community and universal values should be interpreted as referring to the religion of Turkey, which creates the biggest difference with the rest of Europe. Understanding local politics in Turkey is necessary to read the signs for its relation to
Islamist thinking. MÜSİAD maintains that moral and local values contribute immensely to being a trusted and honest businessman.

Yet it is somehow ironic to suggest that MÜSİAD refuses capitalism, even though it tries to identify itself through anti-Western thinking. Most of MÜSİAD’s members flourished from the relatively free market conditions created by Özal in the 1980s. Özal was a determined supporter of capitalism and he, in fact, tried to join the trend led by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in the two leading liberal countries of the world, the USA and the UK. Therefore, whether they accept it or not, they are themselves the product of capitalism. However, it should be mentioned that the economy many Islamists describe and the economy that Islam requires is something between capitalism and socialism. In other words it would not be fair to blame MÜSİAD for supporting the free market as Islamic scholars also would advocate this. The main difference they try to establish is the role of charity that is encouraged if not enforced by the state to ensure the weak and poor are protected. Regarding this way of thinking MÜSİAD looks to East Asian, countries especially Malaysia and Indonesia, as an example to follow and not their European counterparts. MÜSİAD suggests that countries in East Asia have proved that remaining loyal to community and family values is not an obstruction to achieving success economically. One should refrain from thinking that MÜSİAD offers a protective economy. On the contrary, as we mentioned above, MÜSİAD strongly believes that privatization should be carried out in every aspect of state service and the running of those services that were traditionally run by state departments should be given to smaller scale business enterprises across the country, instead of feeding an already rich Istanbul and its surrounding area. Therefore from the economic point of view MÜSİAD is not much different from other capitalist and liberal business factions.
in Turkey. In one way an analogy can be made between MÜSİAD and the puritans of America as they both justify the wealth as it is earned to be used for the good of society.

Most MÜSİAD members are mid-size business owners who flourished after the liberal policies of Özal period in late eighties and early nineties. Inspired by the concept of “Asian Tigers”, MÜSİAD’s members are called “Anatolian tigers” by many, which is quickly turned around and changed to “Anatolian Lions” by MÜSİAD, as lions represent more controlled power and are not perceived as aggressive as tigers in the animal kingdom.

Although MÜSİAD’s members are mostly mid-size businesses, one practice, or maybe it can be called an invention, of MÜSİAD’s members is worth mentioning in order to understand the position MÜSİAD has in Turkish society. The big corporate members of MÜSİAD are formed as a result of the merger between small and mid-size businesses in Anatolia. Many small businesses encounter capital problems for investment and further development in Turkey as interest rates are far too high for small businesses to afford.

Some members of MÜSİAD found a new way to raise the capital they need in order to get bigger: asking for it from the Turkish migrants workers in Europe. Indeed it was a fact that many Turkish workers in Europe were religious people and wanted to use their money the way Islam approves. MÜSİAD capitalized on this successfully and convinced many workers to invest their money in the businesses in Anatolia and receive their share of the profit in the end. This was truly providing an interest-free profit opportunity for those who were worrying over interest since Islam prohibits any profit made out of interest.

Over the past decade, these Islamic-minded business owners from Turkey's conservative Anatolia region have emerged as a counterweight to the country's established secular
elite. These people with their traditional way of life and religious values surprisingly have become a significant force behind the country’s Westward push. Despite the paradox that their anti-Western thoughts pose, they are embracing the Ottoman’s European dream while holding onto their Muslim identity and way of life. It is in fact a synthesis. A decade ago the “Islamic bourgeoisie was suspicious of joining the EU but now the hearts and minds have changed” says Nilüfer Narlı, a sociologist at Istanbul’s Kadir Has University (Schleifer, 2004).

Narlı argues that "they are for progress and modernization but with a big difference - they want to conserve their traditional life in the family and with their acquaintances," she adds. "They really want to adopt European norms, but there are some areas, like gender relations, where it won't be easy for them to do that."

However MÜSİAD still supports the formation of strong relations with other Muslim countries in the world, while also desiring EU membership for many different reasons. According to Suat Kınıklıoğlu, director of the Ankara Center for Turkish Policy Studies "A lot of them are pragmatic, and they have a government that is telling them that EU membership will mean more religious freedom and reduce the power of the military and the arch secular establishment," Kınıklıoğlu further argues that "they also see that EU membership may provide a lot of opportunities," he adds. "Turkey is integrated into the global system, but EU membership would deepen that integration." (Schleifer, 2004)

In other words MÜSİAD needs to be examined in order to understand the impact and extent of Islamic thinking in Turkey. What governs Turkey today has been fed by those like-minded people of MÜSİAD. When one examines their desire to be in the EU one can see the ideological expectations that would lift the heavy control of the Turkish state.
on the religious section of society. For example the headscarf ban and other financial glass ceilings for ordinary people that they claim exist.

Like TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD also publishes regular reports to present its opinions about the developments and changes taking place. While TÜSİAD represents the thoughts of a powerful and small group of elites, MÜSİAD represents the wider range of society scattered across the country. MÜSİAD also pays attention to the other countries’ economies in the third world. There are reports published for example on Iran, Algeria, and Argentina. Besides this, MÜSİAD has initiated many relationships through industrial fairs with countries other than just European ones. Delegations from Pakistan, Malaysia, Iran, South Korea, and Russia have come and visited MÜSİAD in the last few years. Thus it doesn’t only look towards the West but also tries to strengthen trade relations with other countries (MÜSİAD, 2007a).

Due to its association with Islamic values and its members’ religious identity, MÜSİAD was labeled as “green capital” by the military, the word “green” referring to the Islam. In the warnings issued by the National Security Council – formed by various members from government, bureaucracy but chaired and dominated by the army officials – on 28th February 1997, MÜSİAD was accused of supporting “religious reactionism” in the country. Some members of MÜSİAD and its then chairman Erol Yarar were taken to court due to their alleged support for an Islamic system (Vorhoff, 2000). The manifestations of the association and some money transfers were taken under investigation under the Article 312 of Turkish Penal Code\(^\text{32}\). At the end of the trials some charges were dropped while some were accepted, but the penalty for them was postponed. Yet MÜSİAD was not closed down as initially intended.

\(^{32}\) Article 312 is controversial law as it allows interpretation. It was perceived as an obstacle in front of “freedom of speech” by democratic associations and writers.
MÜSİAD runs projects funded by the EU. Educating qualified staff among underprivileged youth in parts of Istanbul on the subject of hydraulic technician was one of those projects that ran successfully (MÜSİAD, 2007c).

4.3. 1 Conclusion

MÜSİAD appears as one of the most interesting business interest groups from the sociological point of view due to the discussions on the identity of its members. While TÜSİAD represents the modern, westernized, secular and elite businessmen, MÜSİAD’s identity reflects the religious values of Sunni Islam and the conservative people of rural Anatolia. However it is a relatively young organization there is not much written about MÜSİAD to date.

MÜSİAD follows a completely different policy towards membership compared to TÜSİAD despite the fact that its first chairman who remained in that position for 10 years, Erol Yarar, was the son of one of the founders of TÜSİAD. MÜSİAD tried to embrace much more diverse members, so far as was possible. All kinds of businesses and industries of any scale were accepted. Yet MÜSİAD also has selective criteria for membership as a candidate needs three references from other members and the association then carries out research about the candidate’s reputation and business ethics in the area it operates.

Although the letters in the name of “MÜSİAD” officially stand for Independent Industrialist and Businessman Association, they are known with their inclination to the
traditional values and called Muslim businessmen and industrialist association. If TÜSİAD represents the secularists and Kemalist side of businesses in Turkey, MÜSİAD represents the Islamists ideology among businessmen, strongly relating to political parties with an Islamic point of view.

MÜSİAD describes itself in its mission as being “equipped with advanced technology and developed financially without compromising the cultural and religious values, sharing the profit with people without being greedy, contributing to the peace in the country and working for a Turkey that is respected on the world stage”. Its motto can be summarized as “high virtues, high technology”. Many of its members identify themselves as “Muslim, Turk and Eastern”. Ironically though while they criticized the materialistic way of life and consumerism of the West, members continued to open and promote supermarket chains and mega shopping centers across the country, ignoring the contribution of those to the consumerism and materialism they vigorously criticized. However, MÜSİAD believes that the majority of society has not benefited from the modernization project which began with Atatürk due to the fact that the policies devised created only an elite class who felt ideologically associated with Western philosophy. MÜSİAD in fact is not merely making a criticism of capitalism but a serious condemnation of modernism and Western values.

Despite such criticisms made by MUSİAD it desired Turkish EU membership for many reasons considering that EU membership would provide a lot of opportunities for Turkey. For MUSİAD Turkey should be integrated in to the global system as EU membership would deepen that integration.
4.4 General Conclusion

Business organizations like TÜSİAD, İKV and MÜSİAD analysed in this chapter made unprecedented contributions to the EU accession effort. Having realised the economic benefits of the EU, Turkish businessmen, who were once afraid of losing out to EU companies, began to advocate full membership and compliance with its standards. Comprehensive projects were carried out to inform the public and small businesses about the regulations that would change in accordance with EU standards. They opened offices in Brussels and tried to change the image of Turkey in Europe and formed personal bonds with their European counterparts. As shown in the table, prominent business organizations like TÜSİAD, the İKV and MÜSİAD went to great lengths to combat negative Turkish perceptions in the EU. They commissioned comprehensive studies and research by respectable academics to demonstrate the benefits of membership and proposed necessary strategies.

Table I: The Approach of Civil Society in Summary

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<th>Institution</th>
<th>Constructive</th>
<th>Critical</th>
<th>Rhetoric</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Changing Attitude</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TÜSİAD</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not exactly</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İKV</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Always clear as pro Europe</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MÜSİAD</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sometimes yes</td>
<td>Confusing</td>
<td>Not exactly</td>
<td>Yes, from skeptical to pro</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 5

WORKER UNIONS IN TURKEY AND THE EU

This chapter analyzes the approach of three existing trade union confederations like TÜRK-İŞ, DİSK and HAK-İŞ. These three confederations are the only confederations to represent workers in Turkey.

We will examine the three big unions in this chapter: DİSK, HAK-İŞ and TÜRK-İŞ. The first two have believed that joining the EU was the only certain way to improve the living and working standards of workers. They were aware of the fact that the problems of workers were interdependent with the global economy and competition. TÜRK-İŞ, on the other hand, has declared its support for EU membership, and yet, has been openly uncomfortable about the policies of the EU towards Turkey. Three of these unions are members of the European Trade Union Confederation. These three confederations have 3 232 679 member workers according to the latest statistics released by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. The Ministry has released union statistics twice a year. However since July 2009, it has not been releasing them claiming to change the system.
Table II: Comparison of confederations by statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confederation</th>
<th>JULY'2008</th>
<th>JANUARY'2009</th>
<th>JULY'2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TÜRK-İŞ (33 Unions)</td>
<td>2,216,825</td>
<td>2,230,015</td>
<td>2,239,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAK-İŞ (12 Unions)</td>
<td>420,741</td>
<td>429,091</td>
<td>441,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DİSK (19 Unions)</td>
<td>419,021</td>
<td>422,785</td>
<td>426,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, Independent (45 Unions)</td>
<td>122,923</td>
<td>123,771</td>
<td>125,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,179,510</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,205,662</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,232,679</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.csgb.gov.tr

According to these statistics, TÜRKiŞ Confederation is the biggest confederation with 2,239,341 member workers, HAK-İŞ Confederation is the second biggest confederation with 441,917 workers members and DİSK Confederation is the third confederation with 426,232 workers members. These statistics of the confederations are provided for comparison in Table II.

Unions have tried to be influential on politics by using their power of representation of workers. However, as it was also put forward by the prominent union figures in the ETUC conference held in Istanbul in 1994, workers unions in Turkey have in fact never reached the level of influence as their counterparts in Europe (ETUC, 1994). They were severely handicapped by the military coup, particularly the 1980 coup that punished the unions and did not allow them to operate freely. As they were deemed to be agents of communism before the coup, workers unions were viewed with suspicion by the state.

According to Mustafa Özberk, the president of Turk-Metal, a union for metal workers, the social formation and formation of labor unions in Turkey is not yet complete ( Özberk, 1994 cited in ETUC İstanbul, 1994). While workers unions still struggle to...
find the place they deserve, they also complain about the lack of government attention to their demands. At the ETUC conference almost all the union leaders mentioned the lack of a consultative status of workers unions regarding EU and domestic matters. Thus, the Conference showed that there is a big discontent among unionists in Turkey regarding their position and influence on foreign affairs. Almost all speakers dwelled on the wish to reach the level of their EU counterparts and it would seem that the EU at least would bring that for the unions. Trade unions in Turkey being effective during the 1970s lost their power after the 1980 military coup. The new constitutions enacted after the coup placed considerable limits on union activities.

Despite this, the confederations have been involving in the process of Turkish membership to the European Union. Their approaches in this process are examined below. These three organizations are examined individually and compared with each other in terms of their approaches vis-a-vis the concepts of “constructive”, “critical”, “rehoric”, “activity”, “changing attitude” and “general” as given in Table III. This chapter also includes another table of comparison of these three unions and three employer organizations altogether as given in Table IV.

5.1. The History of Unionism in Turkey

As with most other organizations and establishments, the roots of unionism can be found in Ottoman history. Unions appeared in the Empire alongside the development of industrialism. With the arrival of industrialism the concept of a wage entered into economic life through the door that was opened by foreign capital in the late Ottoman
Empire. Industrialization first started in the Istanbul and the European side of the Empire. Building railways between Anatolia and Baghdad with the help of foreign investment also introduced a class of people who worked on a wage basis. In the Ottoman Empire the majority of the population made their living from agriculture or craft, working for themselves, not for a company. The concept of “working for a company” developed much later in Turkish society compared to Europe. Therefore it may be possible to mention the existence of a working class in the Ottoman Empire from the second half of the 19th century. Then, it was almost unthinkable to expect such a low number of workers to create a union and make demands of the government in such a monarchical and centralized state as the Ottoman one. The right to establish organizations was mentioned for the first time in the constitution accepted with the declaration of the second constitutional monarchy in 1908. One may predict that the right to organize might include the right to form unions so that existing laws could have been used to form a union. Another law enacted in 1909 also allowed the formation of unions by workers. Yet most of the economic enterprises belonged to foreign companies, and therefore these laws disturbed those businessmen a lot. In accordance with their uneasiness a law that limited the right of unions to strike was enacted in the summer of 1909 (Tatil-i Eşgal Kanunu) (Güzel, 1993).

Not only did workers for private companies emerge relatively late, but also the class of public workers appeared late in the 19th century in the Ottoman Empire. This was the result of the late arrival of a capitalist and modern economy in the Empire. If one makes a comparison between the workers and public workers, it can be said that the modern capitalist economy developed quicker than the modern state; therefore, the number of public officials remained much lower during the late period of the Empire. Due to the
failure to create a modern bureaucracy alongside economic development, the small numbers of existing public officers were loyal to the Sultan more than the government. In those days the Sultan and the government were in constant conflict and despite being the head of the state, the Sultan was not free to change the government due to the social and political changes that had begun to shape the Empire. Both the small numbers of workers and public officers diminished the possibility to form a successful union (Quartet, 1994).

The first time the roles of unions were mentioned was in an article published on September 9th, 1884, which stated that the main role of a union is to increase the number of similar organizations and establish libraries and education facilities to benefit (Baydar, 1969). However it is worth noting that being organized seems to have a different and wider meaning than what the modern union meant. On May 28th 1890 an article published in the La Turquie paper stated the need to establish help funds for more workers around the country (Baydar, 1969). In other words, unions or being organized was seen more like a philanthropic act for societal good rather than an opportunity to revolt against the state. The fund formed for Anatolian Railways workers was one of them. These kinds of establishments can be seen as a primitive version of the unions that would occur later. Many earlier organizations evolved into unions much later. The first direct organization that addressed the problems of workers was Amele-i Osmani Cemiyeti, established secretly in 1895 by the workers at the factories in Tophane. Under the strict rules of Abdulhamit II, the union survived only for a year. The organizers were arrested and sent into exile. The organizers tried to re-unite the workers a few years later but again failed. Yet these efforts bore fruit in 1908 when an
organization called Osmanlı Terakki-I Sanayi Cemiyeti, which was accepted as a continuation of the former one but with a legal framework, was formed (Baydar, 1969).

Another pre-union organization formed in the Ottoman Empire was the Association of Workers and Officers of Anatolian – Baghdad Railways (Anadolu Bağdat Demiryolları Memurin ve Müstahdemin Cemiyet-I Uhuvvetrarisi) in 1908. This was the first union to bring together public and private workers. As it was the first serious union formed, it would be useful to look at it closely.

The company, Anatolian-Baghdad Railways, included non-Muslim minority workers as well as Muslim ones. Workers were forced to work in very bad conditions with a very low wage. Workers who thought the problems they suffered from would be solved only through a union came together on 13th August 1908 and formed the association. Shortly after being established, the union wanted the company to recognize it and listen to the issues it raised. Otherwise it threatened to go on strike and in a month, upon not getting the result they wished, the workers did go on strike on September 14th, 1908. The workers working on the Haydarpaşa-Ankara, Eskişehir, Konya, Bulgurlu routes started the strike and strike committees were formed to organize it. The strike ended on September 17th. However while the strike brought important improvements for the qualified non-Muslim minority workers, the situation for the unqualified native workers remained pretty much the same. Some suggested that this was because of the structure of the association that was dominated by Christians. This significantly shook the trust of others in the union, consequently causing divisions (Baydar, 1969). Thus the strike that started due to the very low wages and bad working conditions including the long working hours unfortunately left a scar by reducing the trust of Muslim workers since
the company, which was owned initially by the British and later by Germans, took care of its non-Muslim workers while neglecting the others (Baydar, 1969).

The railways became the location where many strikes and organizations took place as they were the biggest companies with the highest number of workers. Besides railway companies, there were some other strikes and organizations in the fields of communication and transportation. The strikes in 1908 in various parts of the country created the principles of unionism that would be better established in the future.

The strikes of 1908 forced the government to make some improvements but the government also tried to curb the rights of unions. Through the law of strikes (Tatil-I Eşgali) of 1909 prohibiting the right to form unions, the government tried to stop any conscious organization among workers. However, organizing among workers continued to appear without the existence of a proper union (Faydalı, 2007). The 1909 Law of Associations (Cemiyetler Kanunu) allowed the formation of associations, in the form of today’s civil charities, which provided a gap in the system for unions to appear under tight regulations. Therefore, despite the new laws that sought to curb the law that would let unions develop, workers managed to get around it by using the laws that allowed associations. It is worth mentioning that the activities of joint associations, which carried the features of unions, only appeared under different names due to the legal limitations mentioned above. They gathered private workers and state officers under the same roof with no ideological conflict and were entirely different from the structure of unions in Europe. In countries like France, workers unions and associations did not like the idea of forming joint unions that would invite state officers to join, as state officers were perceived as spies of the government and people who supported the ideology of
government. This, the unionists thought, would have a negative impact on the class struggle they wanted to create. As a result, until the post-WWII era, unions like CGT (Confédération Générale du Travail, the French national trade union center) employed strict rules not to accept any state officers or public workers as they did not regard them as “struggling workers” but rather supporters of government policies into their organizations (Türk Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998).

In conclusion, unionism in the Ottoman Empire went through different phases and structures due to the low numbers of workers and the lack of an established capitalist economy compared with unionism in Europe. The joint action and solidarity between workers of private and public industry occurred as they chose to come together around the similar problems they suffered from.

5.1.1. Unionism in the Early Days of the Turkish Republic

Following the Independence War and the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the new constitution was put into force in 1924. In accordance with the democratic system adopted, this constitution recognized the right to form organizations and unions. The most important unions to run in those days were the Türkiye İşçi Derneği (Association of Workers of Turkey) and the Istanbul Amele Birliği (Association of Workers of Istanbul). All the active unions joined the Izmir Economic Congress, organized by the new authorities to draw up the plan for economic development for the young republic. In congress, it was decided to declare May 1st Workers’ Day, and enact laws to improve the conditions for workers, and protect the right to form unions. Yet this positive
environment did not last long as the notorious law of Takrir-i Sükun, which can be translated into English as the “Law of Silence”, came into force in 1925 and remained until 1929. This period was one of the most undemocratic periods of Turkish politics. It destroyed the relatively pluralist environment entirely. The law allowed the government to close down and arrest anybody whose activities threatened to destroy the social order and security without a court warrant. All the opposition was silenced in this period and many organizations were closed down at the whim of government officials. The one party system was established and the country surrendered to one voice politics. In this environment all kinds of workers’ movements were banned and unions were closed (Akşin, 1990).

Establishing a society with no class and privileged groups was the main ideological aim in the period between 1925 and 1946. Therefore, in this period, unions that were perceived as the supporters of a class society were not allowed to operate. Instead the government encouraged charity and solidarity organizations mainly focused on those who were retired and those who could be supported individually by financial means. The names and operational fields of such organizations formed by 1947 gave a clear sign about the scope of activity that those associations carried (Güzel, 1982).

Following WWII, the hopes for democracy in the world began to have an impact on Turkey, and the ban on the workers’ movements and unions was lifted once again. After this, unions began to operate intensively and a productive period started for unionism. Unions began to organize freely and spread the ideology of socialism and the necessity of unions for a democratic society. They played an important role introducing Turkish society to ideas such as the minimum wage, working standards, collective bargaining,
and compensation for work-related accidents. They prepared studies and presented their opinions to the government. Taking the union movements under the control of the state was the biggest worry of unionists in those relatively free years. However this did not last long either since the military ordered unions to close once again until the law of unions enacted in 1947 curbed the rights of unions considerably by banning the right to strike (Koç, 1992). In 1947 there were 49 unions consisting of 33,000 workers. One year later in 1948 the number rose to 70 and for the first time a confederation of unions was established, Istanbul İşçi Sendikaları Birliği (Confederation of Istanbul Workers Unions), which later became effective in the establishment of TÜRK-İŞ (Koç, 1992).

By 1958 the number of unions was at 248 with 130,000 workers as members. Private industry was not yet strong in those days, and TÜRK-İŞ’s strength stemmed largely from public workers. This feature of TÜRK-İŞ would be effective to form of a state-sponsored unionism in the near future (Baydar, 1999).

The right to belong to a union was guaranteed in 1963 with the arrival of a new constitution, which caused a great increase in the number and activities of unions as the spirit of the constitution was more democratic compared to the past and in fact is still considered as one of the most individual-freedom-friendly constitutions in Turkey despite the fact that it arrived following a military coup (Akşin, 1990). The number of unions reached 611. 101 of these were based in Istanbul, 76 were around İzmir. The rest was scattered around the other parts of the country.

With the development of private businesses, more and more activities were shaped around them. As a result of the unionist movements, some different approaches to
unionism developed with a separation from TÜRK-İŞ, and the DİSK (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu – Confederation of Revolutionist Workers’ Union) was established in 1967.

With the establishment of the DİSK, the rivalry between unions increased. TÜRK-İŞ, which was organized around state workers, felt the need to be more active against the DİSK, which adopted the class struggle argument and obtained more benefits for the workers it represented. This was the main reason for the increase in the number of strikes in that period. The DİSK was more aggressive and went as far as occupying factories and organizing quite violent strikes. This pushed the government to curb the law to limit the activities of the DİSK. Yet this caused protests around the country involving thousands of workers. Many arrests were made during these violent demonstrations. Thousands of people lost their jobs and civil unrest began to become more prevalent. In the end, martial law was declared and shortly after the military took power on March 12th, 1971. Until the democratic process started again in 1974 the activities of unions were limited (Baydar, 1999).

Between 1970 and 1980 the workers’ movement increased immensely and caused more unrest in the already fragile political environment. The nature of this activity in this period was more militant compared to the past. Many workers who thought the DİSK was more effective joined it. As a response to this, the leftist union movement developed more conservative sects and established their own union: HAK-İŞ.

This rivalry between the unions caused more conflict and created the atmosphere for another military intervention into politics in the eighties. Everyday people were being
assassinated for political reasons as the ideological conflict reached a peak in the polarized society. The chairman of the DİSK, Kemal Türler, was also killed. There were violent clashes everywhere around the country. As a result of the strong union movement the wages for workers increased yet this caused a financial deficit to grow even larger in the budget of the country. In a way this suggests that the 1980 military coup was carried out in order to create a new environment where it was possible to take the major economic measures demanded by private enterprises, which would bring severe conditions due to the sudden implementation of liberal market rules in a not yet matured Turkish economy. There was a real need to stop the development of the workers unions going further to allow capitalism to flourish.

Following the coup, all the unions under the umbrella of the DİSK were closed down. The new laws brought about heavy restrictions and requirements to union formation. To establish a union, the number of members had to exceed 10% of population nationwide and 50% at work places as a minimum. With these high barriers, the union movement faded fast (Baydar, 1999).

The wind of changes stemmed from the Reagan – Thatcher policies showed their effects in Turkey too during and after the 1980’s. Workers lost many of the benefits they gained in the 1960s. The number of workers with unions decreased sharply. Unions delayed finding new strategies to overcome these difficulties. The pressure on the unionist workers increased. As a result, unionism lost its power with the arrival of the capitalist ideas of America by way of Özal, the Prime Minister who transformed the closed economy into a free market economy during his leadership.
The DİSK was not allowed to operate until the beginning of the 1990s. TÜRK-İŞ was virtually the only union to operate. The DİSK was taken to court, accused of illegal activities and of causing disorder by provoking workers. There was almost a political lynch-like operation against the DİSK. Prominent figures of the DİSK were arrested and tried in the court where the prosecution demanded capital punishment for those 52 people involved in the DİSK’s activities. The total number of people tried in the notorious DİSK case was 1477. The number of files completed by prosecution against the DİSK alone was 160. The DİSK trial took a long 5 years to conclude and many people received jail sentences as a result in 1986. The union appealed against the decision of closure and this appeal took another long 5 years to be completed. The DİSK was finally cleared of all the accusations in 1991 (İşeri, 2006). The DİSK started to be active after it was acquitted from this court case.

The number of unions in 1998 was recorded as 111 whereas in the 1980s the number of unions had been more than 800. This shows that the laws designed to curb unionism had been effective. In the 1960s the number of workers per union on average was about 650 while it rose to 4000 in the 1980s. However, Turkey was undergoing big changes in the 1980s. There were mass migrations from rural areas to the cities. This created a class of workers who did not leave their culture completely and could not adopt the city culture either. These people were mostly unqualified workers with no education, and therefore, were not interested in unions. With the increase of the factories that produced goods for export many people arrived in the cities with the hope of transforming their lives. The collapse of the Soviet Union also resulted in the idea of class struggle, and everything related to socialism, losing credability among the majority of people. By 2000, it can be
seen that unions hadn’t found their strategies for the new millennium in the neo-
capitalist economy in Turkey and in the world.

The interest of businesses and unions in the European Union began with the application
for full membership by Özal’s government in 1987 and was intensified with the
realization of the Customs Union in 1995 by the DYP-SHP coalition government. Since
these three big unions were already members of ETUC (European Trade Union
Confederation), they often found themselves in a position to take a stance regarding the
issues relating to Turkey on the European platform. This pushed them further to carry
out research and establish policies regarding the EU. Besides being on the international
platform they also had to review their traditional unionist approach and strategies.

In 1997 when Turkey wasn’t declared as a candidate country the interests of unions in
the EU increased even more and they began lobbying more eagerly. We will look into
three big unions more closely below.

5.2. TÜRK-İŞ (Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions)

TÜRK-İŞ was established in 1952 with the efforts of unions established before. TÜRK-
İŞ carried a “nationalist” character and tried to implement an “above parties and
classes” approach to unionism by aiming to put a distance from the existing political
trends, which Baydar defines as “American style” unionism due to its efforts to
disassociate itself from the political parties (Baydar, 1999). Its stance towards “class
arguments,” which in fact constituted a base for all the union movements inspired by
Marxist philosophy, put TÜRK-İŞ somehow in a different position compared to other unions in Turkey. Yet instead of achieving an independent and respectable position, it is mostly regarded as an agent of the official ideology of Turkey with its openly good relations with the anti-democratic institutions of the state like the military (Koç, 2003b). Thus it has always been perceived as under the control and protection of the state. Some even go as far as accusing the unions in general, particularly TÜRK-İŞ, of being formed to axe real unionism in Turkey. One prominent critic, Fikret Başkaya severely criticized the founding principles of the Turkish state and the official ideology in his book *Paradigmann İflası* (1991 pp 2-15) , which was therefore banned in the country. He was jailed for 20 months charged under anti-terrorism laws, after suggesting that unionists and leaders of unions were deliberately trained by the state to ensure they operated within the limits of a military-fascist ideology. According to Başkaya, the unions in the first decades operated with no right to strike and only received it when the authorities finally got convinced that they would not use it for the real reasons in 1963. Therefore a very *Turkish style* unionism appeared in Turkey which differed significantly from the union movement in the wider world, especially in Europe. In Turkey unions received their dues from their members in such a way, Başkaya suggests, that it caused them to be alienated from the workers and made them a bureaucratic tool of the state as their dues were automatically taken from the wages of workers who belonged to a union. Therefore unions did not in fact need to interact with the workers but instead

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The controversial book of Fikret Başkaya was a detailed criticism of the ideology of the Turkish Republic. His sharp comments on the role and mission of the army as an obstacle to democracy particulary recieved anger among the top figures of the state. Başkaya revealed the official stance of the state towards Kurds, for example, by using documents prepared by the military itself, where the existence of Kurds as a different ethnicity was openly refused. Başkaya, as a leftist, believes that Turkey is governed by the “state” which casts a shadow on any civil movement and lets them operate only when they are taught to tune in to their discourse. His book is a must-read for anyone who wants to see Turkey from the different angle.
received their revenues through state channels, which rendered them an institution of the state rather than independent civil organizations (Başkaya, 2007).

TÜRK-İŞ always approached EU matters cautiously as it carried a nationalist and semi-state organ character. Trying to distance itself from all political parties, TÜRK-İŞ was organized mostly around public workers and was always associated with state ideology. It received help, both financial and organizational, from American unions as it was formed in the 1950s during the years of the Cold War (Sülker, 1987). Baydar, in parallel to Başkaya, also claims that TÜRK-İŞ was an extension of the state in the working class. Its support for the 1980 military coup also indicates its alliance with state authorities, after which TÜRK-İŞ lost the membership of the ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions). This is because in those days the notorious DİSK trials were taking place and members of the DİSK made numerous claims of torture and illegal arrests, and yet, as a union, TÜRK-İŞ chose to ally itself and declared its open support and praise for the generals who initiated the coup. Its stance against democracy cost TÜRK-İŞ its ICFTU membership and it was suspended for an uncertain length of time (TUC History Online, 2007).

In 1992 TÜRK-İŞ went through important changes in its administration office. In the general board meetings TÜRK-İŞ tried to find a strategy for the increasing trend of privatization in the state sponsored sectors of the economy, which caused significant failures for the unions dealing with state workers in general. Many unions under the umbrella of the TÜRK-İŞ confederation accused it of being passive and failing to develop new strategies to fight the privatization of vital fields of the economy (Baydar, 1999).
5.3. TÜRK-İŞ and the European Union

Despite putting forward many reservations about the EU, TÜRK-İŞ declared its support for the EU in general. Former chairman of TÜRK-İŞ, Bayram Meral, put it as follows:

“We wish to join the EU but not with paying out the heavy bill that Europe wants us to pay. We want to be treated like the other candidates and members are treated. Waiting for the EU to solve the problems of our country is not the right thing to do. We should be able to use our own resources and dynamics to solve them as it seems being a member of the EU may take much longer than anybody expected. By entering into the Customs Unions with the EU we already gave what Europe wanted from us, therefore, there is no reason for Europe to hurry anymore.” (Meral, 2001)

As Meral suggested, TÜRK-İŞ had serious doubts about EU membership which many other political actors shared in Turkish politics. Furthermore, the vice chairman of TÜRK-İŞ, Yıldırım Koç, went as far as suggesting that the demands of the EU threatened the unity of the Turkish state. According to Yıldırım Koç, meeting these demands would destroy the country and create a new Yugoslavia in the region. Koç argued that Turkey would not get stronger with EU membership, on the contrary, she would obtain membership after she got strong and therefore, Turkey should concentrate on solving her issues with internal dynamics first (Koç, 2003b). As a significant figure in TÜRK-İŞ, Koç’s analysis is worth examining to understand the real stance of TÜRK-İŞ towards the EU. It shared the same worries as the military about the unity of the country and perceived the democratic requirements of the EU as a threat most of the
time. The approach of the EU to the Kurdish issue in the east and Armenian genocide claims - both were national issues of the state and targeted the very existence of the official stance of the Turkish state - disturbed TÜRK-İŞ deeply. For example, Yıldırım Koç accused those who lobbied for the EU membership as being enemies of the Turkish republic who tried to separate the country, serving the interests of big businesses only (Koç, 2003a). The Customs Union brought a series of disadvantages as it forced businesses to become more cost effective and not be tolerant of unions and workers’ rights as they couldn’t afford this anymore in the free economy market. Therefore, according to TÜRK-İŞ, the Turkish public supported TÜRK-İŞ in greater numbers than those who supported the EU (Koç, 2003a).

TÜRK-İŞ believed that the membership of the EU wouldn’t bring more benefits for workers as most of the rights workers enjoyed in the EU stemmed from national backgrounds and law, not from EU regulations. For example worker member of TÜRK-İŞ, Tarık Koç claims that Turkey will not benefit from European Union in the field of social rights and policies. Hence It should be Turkey develop social right and policies itself (Appendix A). Similarly another worker member of Turkish Kemal Solmaz was also cautious but optimistic about Euroean Union. Solmaz believes that here should be cooperation between Turkey and Eurpean Union to improve social rights in Turkey. (Appendix A). Moreover, according to TÜRK-İŞ, the International Labor Organization, of which Turkey approved, offered much better prospects compared to the EU.

Therefore according to the statements of top TÜRK-İŞ officials, we can say that TÜRK-İŞ regarded the EU with suspicion and did not believe that membership would bring workers in Turkey any benefit. The nationalist stance it took shaped their opinions
about foreign relations, too. TÜRK-İŞ always identified itself with the official ideology of the state and took the side of militaristic interventions whenever they occurred. From this perspective, it can be easily said that TÜRK-İŞ was far from democratic despite being a union. This is a good example of how complicated politics are in Turkey. In many places unions will have conflicts with the state. Yet in Turkey one of the biggest union confederations can act like an official organ of the state. The claim that workers in Turkey did not want to join the EU does not seem to have any credible foundation as the political parties who supported liberal economic policies and tried to integrate Turkey into the EU always received considerable support in elections compared to the limited support of parties who associated themselves with a state-controlled and protectionist economy\(^{34}\). Stuck in the early static policies of the past and adopting only the extreme state-centered part of socialism, TÜRK-İŞ claimed that a free market economy would harm workers as it defended state control over everything from the economy to civil liberties, but used this argument as it suited its position as a union.

One should be aware of the fact that socialists in Turkey saw Kemalism, the ideas of Atatürk, as a step towards the formation of socialism in Turkey, yet, this argument never actually managed to get over Kemalism and ended up defending state favored policies\(^{35}\).

The TÜRK-İŞ confederation mostly consisted of unions that represent the workers of state economic enterprises, therefore the pressure from the EU and the IMF to privatize

\(^{34}\) Further analysis of the success of right-wing liberal parties such as the DP and the ANAP was made in the first chapter of this study. The vote explosion of Menderes’s and Özal’s parties over the CHP, defending the state-controlled economy policies, illustrates this clearly.

\(^{35}\) This can be seen as the reason for the lack of successful left wing politics in Turkey as they never seem to advance a step further beyond Kemalism. For further analysis look at the official website of İşçi Partisi (Turkish Workers Party) [http://www.ip.org.tr/lib/pages/detay.asp?goster=sscevap&idsoru=5](http://www.ip.org.tr/lib/pages/detay.asp?goster=sscevap&idsoru=5) [Accessed 3 December 2007].
those establishments caused TÜRK-İŞ to be xenophobic in many senses. Since the application of liberal economic policies that started in the 1980s, TÜRK-İŞ couldn’t seem to find a way to renew itself to stop losing more and more benefits of workers. On the other hand, many thought that state economic enterprises were merely a burden on the Turkish economy and offered benefits to its workers that no private company employees enjoyed. In a way, two different worlds co-existed in Turkey. On the one side, public workers with facilities and benefits were offered two days of holiday in a week, health insurance and sporting and leisure facilities in the factory or establishment they worked for, whilst on the other side were people who worked 6.5 days a week with no insurance, and were offered no facilities whatsoever. This caused resentment in society especially from those who could not obtain a job in state factories. In the harshly competitive environment it was of course obvious that so-called state sponsored factories were becoming more costly institutions. Many of them were making losses every year, yet, they were maintained purely for ideological reasons. With all these bad working conditions and economic difficulties also being argued in the country, TÜRK-İŞ created a discourse which seemed to support the EU but only if the benefits mentioned would be guaranteed for Turkey as it was worried that Turkey would accept every unfair rule to avoid the prospect of not being a member, and that this would damage the country economically and politically. Of course some of the discourses employed by the Christian Democrats and conservative parties of European countries also triggered this nationalistic view of TÜRK-İŞ. If one wants to be fair, the negative attitude of those factions in Europe towards Turkey, seeing her as an underdeveloped and inadequate economy and not suitable culturally, fed those anti-European sentiments in the country for a long time.
5.3. **DİSK (Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Union)**

After the military intervention on May 27th, 1960, the leftist movement in Turkey accelerated at an immense rate and opposition emerged in the TÜRK-İŞ confederation. The chairmen of Lastik-İş (Union of Workers in Petrol, Chemistry and Rubber Industry in Turkey - Türkiye Petrol, Kimya ve Lastik Sanayi İşçileri Sendikası) and Maden-İş (Türkiye Maden İşçileri Sendikası – Turkey Miners’ Union) came together in 1967 and formed the DİSK. They were uncomfortable about the close relations of TÜRK-İŞ with the authorities and accused it of being far too passive in defending workers’ rights. Besides, TÜRK-İŞ was not aiming to establish a strategy based on the argument of class struggle, which was the main principle of the socialist ideas. Therefore the DİSK was seen as necessary to fill the gap of what was being demanded by contemporary politics.

The DİSK adopted a unionism that was based on a class society, and until its closure in the 1980 military coup it behaved more like a political entity using unionism merely as a tool to obtain political gains based on a socialist ideology. Before the DİSK was formed, a political party of leftist ideas was established, the TİP (Türkiye İşçi Partisi – Turkey Workers’ Party), in 1961. This party became the base of the extreme left for a long time in Turkey and led the leftist socialist movement in Turkey during the Cold War years. The DİSK was formed by the same people who formed the TİP in 1967.

The DİSK was particularly active between 1970 and 1980 and had more than 500 000 members. In 1980 the DİSK was closed and the prosecution demanded capital punishment for the charges brought against the DİSK. During the trials the DİSK received financial and political support from the funds that were contributed by the
ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions) and the ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation) mainly. The executives of these organizations came to Turkey to watch the trials closely and visited the officers of the DİSK at Metris Prison. The ETUC in fact considered the membership application of the DİSK in 1985 and accepted it as a member. Furthermore, they chose Kemal Baştürk, the head of DİSK, to be a member of the board of the ETUC (Pekin, 1995). The case against the DİSK fell through in 1991 and in 1992 the DİSK began to operate again. Yet many things had been changed by the 1990s, and the environment was not suitable for acting like militant unionists anymore. Membership of the DİSK however remained relatively high, exceeding 300,000 at times. There were 26 unions under the umbrella of the DİSK. According to the official paper of the state the DİSK had 22 unions with 343,718 workers (Baydar, 1999).

5.3.1. DİSK and the EU

The DİSK today perceives the EU as a positive step for Turkey in general and directs its activities to supporting integration. According to the DİSK the EU is not merely a rich club but a union that would bring serious political change to Turkey. The comments of a representative of the DİSK in Brussels, Yücel Top, give a plain explanation of the reasons why the DİSK supports the EU membership process. According to Top, Turkey, as a country that is integrated with the European Union, will have to deepen cooperation on a macroeconomic basis, and also realize social integration. Full integration with the European Union will no doubt make economic contributions to Turkey in the medium-term, enabling the economy to expand considerably.
Top stresses that this political will, which is based on a legal frame in the European Union, will reflect on Turkey in terms of legal acquis during the integration process, and will transform into acquired rights for employees.

Top argues the fact that there is a lowest common denominator in Europe that guarantees the rights of workers to a certain extent; however they may vary among the different states within Europe. Europe differs from other rich nations like the USA and Japan as social security is more substantially developed compared to other countries. Therefore according to the DİSK, Turkey will gain a considerable level of commitment to social security systems. Moreover, Top suggests that it was an obligation for Turkey to access this perception about social rights and benefits:

“This is the very reason why we have been promoting membership to the European Union for a long time. We are not trying to keep up with the times. The Continental Europe is the place where not only political rights but also union rights emerged and progressed. Our will to integrate into the European Union is a natural concomitant in terms of both our history and our targets set for social and union rights.” (Top, 1999)

The words of Top summarize not only the perception of the DİSK, but many other organizations and people who think that membership of the EU would bring many benefits. DİSK members support this approach. For example, worker member of DİSK, Ali Kaya calims that despite it is a neo-liberal economic model, the EU is a social projects which has an important social model of which Turkey could benefit a great
Due to its approach, the DİSK played an important supportive role during the Customs Union. Before the Customs Union was voted for in the European Parliament, the chief of the DİSK, Rıdvan Budak, went to Strasbourg to meet with socialist members of the parliament and ask for their support.

The DİSK finds the social model of Europe very close to the model that the DİSK wished to establish. The former head of the DİSK, Budak, believes that the European social model is based on a class democracy formed as a result of class struggle in recent history. Human rights and social justice, therefore, became the core concepts of the European social model. (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 2002). To some extent Europe was perceived as a hope against the disappointment over the malfunction of international organizations like the UN and the ILO, which failed to monitor effectively whether rights and freedoms were applied appropriately. Many principles of the ILO or the UN came to life in the treaties of the EU. The DİSK, in supporting these principles, put its trust in the monitoring system of the EU. Furthermore, the DİSK did not perceive the EU as a single block, rather it focused on NGOs and unions within the EU that advocated the same ideas and principles as the DİSK. Therefore, according to the DİSK there was no ideological conflict between being a union and supporting the EU process. On the contrary the DİSK hoped that many lessons could be learned from the struggle of the workers in Europe over the years, which could provide solutions to the problems of Turkish workers.

In October 1997 in the annual meeting of the ETUC the common view of the representatives in general was that Turkey needed to wait more for EU access while the other five candidates were supported despite the democratic and economic shortcomings
in their systems. Turkey was considered as having serious problems with democracy, human rights and governmental policies. Upset with this situation the DİSK requested a meeting with the ETUC on December 4th, 1997 to discuss its views about Turkey. The head of the DİSK of the time, Rıdvan Budak, delivered a speech criticizing the attitude of the ETUC severely and added that this prevailing view of the ETUC about Turkey rendered the membership of various unions in the ETUC meaningless (DİSK, 1997). Together with the Brussels representative Budak expressed the view that this policy could easily be interpreted as an example of double standards, which many other EU countries had demonstrated at various times. This step taken by the DİSK brought a positive result out of the ETUC. Consequently, despite the negative outcome of the Luxembourg summit of the EU, the ETUC expressed its support and continued to invite Turkey to events as a candidate country alongside other candidates. This overall can be seen as a success of the DİSK’s lobbying in Europe.

While exercising influence in Europe, the DİSK was far from effective in Turkey. Alongside its unionist activities, the DİSK committed itself to the other important role of establishing a committee that was similar to the European Economic and Social Committee in Turkey, which would function to provide an exchange of ideas among civil organizations and governments and would devise policies regarding the EU policy of Turkey. Through this committee the DİSK was hoping to increase the influence of NGOs in Turkey, which was far less when compared to those in Europe. Allowing civil dynamics to play a role in the integration into Europe was a must according to the DİSK. Yet who would be in the committee was a matter of discussion. The DİSK suggested that the Economic and Social Committee should consist of employee – employer organizations and other interest groups and the aim of the committee should
be to express the opinion of various interrelated civil groups to the government, to influence the government’s policies. Therefore it was important not to allow the government to have a strong influence in the committee. Yet the domination of the government in the committee existed right from the beginning, contrary to the initial intentions. Today the committee has 38 members, 14 of them are government related personalities, like ministers and bureaucrats. On one occasion the DİSK protested during the meeting of the committee due to its structure which allowed the government to dictate most of the issues on the agenda. The head of the DİSK in 1998, Rıdvan Budak, told the press afterwards that unless the mechanism of the committee was changed the DİSK wouldn’t attend the meeting of the committee. He added that the government was planning to reduce the wages of public workers due to inflation and the heads of the then government, Ecevit and Yılmaz, had asked the DİSK to support this draft, which was unacceptable. This proved that the committee was unable to bring any dialogue as the government behaved as the chief of the committee. This attitude towards the committee changed when Budak was offered candidacy as a member of parliament by Ecevit, then the head of the coalition government, in 1999 elections. This improved the relationship between the government and the DİSK, which meant that the DİSK attended subsequent meetings of the council. However debates over the structure of the council continued for a while. The chief executive of the DİSK, after Budak, Süleyman Çelebi, also had a quarrel about how to form the council with one of the government ministers during efforts to draft a structure for the council. Finally the DİSK withdrew its support from the council completely as it believed the council was designed merely to serve the state (NTV-MSNBC, 2006).
To sum up, the DİSK is an organization that clearly believes and expresses the view that EU membership would improve the standards for ordinary people in Turkey. The DİSK has never seen the EU as a club for the wealthy, despite its close association with a socialist ideology, and still does not. The DİSK also seems to be aware of social changes that would come along with the EU and demonstrates a mature attitude towards hot issues like foreign workers. For example Süleyman Çelebi, the chief of the DİSK, mentioned at the opening speech of a conference on March 2001 the changes that would affect not only daily life at a social level but also would tremendously transform unionism as Turkey would be prone to immigration from other countries, especially Eastern European ones (Çelebi, 2001). Çelebi stressed the need to think in a more European-centered way in order to meet the challenges of the near future. Çelebi made more remarks that are worth examining to clarify the attitude of the DİSK to the EU. In his speech given in “The Full Membership to the EU and Social Dimension” (2001) he stressed the changes that had taken place at a global level and suggested that Turkish workers have two options, either watch without playing a role, or take part in the most practical way. The changes in the world economy in fact bring inevitable consequences for every country in the world. Almost every individual gets affected by this new world order where capital and work flows are directed in different ways. From this point of view, the DİSK seemed to grasp the power of global economics compared to many radical left wing organizations in Turkey who have been advocating a system similar to the ex-Soviet socialist economy. This is one reason for the inevitable losses of the left in Turkey as they were left behind in the contemporary socio-economic circumstances and seen by ordinary people to have a symbolic struggle. Çelebi explains this clearly:
“We all know that the challenges that globalization brings would increase and they can be dealt with only through international solidarity. The workers of our country should participate in the ongoing trend in order to make an impact instead of watching it pass by. The economic crisis today can affect a wide area in one night. Therefore we have to adopt new ways to cope with this new phenomenon. Within the EU there are many efforts being made in order to improve the rights and freedoms of ordinary people. Workers in Turkey have to start perceiving this European trend, which was ignored by us for far too long. Now we have to start working together with other nations’ workers and unions to gain the rights and freedoms they enjoy outside their own countries. Unionism has to be international and unions have to bring solutions for the international as well as national issues that workers deal with” (NTV-MSNBC, 2006).

Consequently the DİSK was very aware of the benefits that the EU would bring to Turkey and Turkish unions. Through establishing good relations with unions in Europe the DİSK have managed to provide positive results for Turkey with the lobbying activities it engaged in over the last decade since its re-formation in 1991.

5.4. HAK-İŞ (Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions)

HAK-İŞ was formed in 1976, when the workers’ movement and unionism was on the rise, by those who were associated with Islamist discourse. This policies were strongly underlined by Osman Yıldız, principle advisor of HAK-İŞ, stating that HAK-İŞ formed its policy to fight against ideologies that were rooted outside the country like communism, fascism, and zionism and claimed to improve the relations between the
employers and employees in Turkey by adopting constructive policies (Appendix A). Representing merely the religious section of society, HAK-İŞ didn’t have any impact on unionism until the beginning of 1980s. After a short time of closure following the military coup in 1980, HAK-İŞ began to operate again in 1981. Following this period, HAK-İŞ became much more influential for several reasons. Among them we can suggest the failure of TÜRK-İŞ to represent workers effectively, due to the close relations it formed with the government and the economic environment created after the new policies of the government that caused unemployment and inflation, which damaged wages considerably. All these helped HAK-İŞ to become more important in Turkish unionism in those fragile days. HAK-İŞ was known for its close association with the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party), which represented the religious section of society. One of the first chief executives of HAK-İŞ, Necati Çelik, became a member of parliament for the Welfare Party and subsequently became the Minister for Social Security and Employment.

The application of HAK-İŞ for the membership of the ETUC and the ICFTU in 1993 was refused but later in 1997 HAK-İŞ became a member of these two important organizations. Zaman, the newspaper of the religious section of society, suggested that the main reason for the initial refusal of membership application was the veto of TÜRK-İŞ, which was already a member of these organizations. It was said that the committee for these organizations decided not to accept the application of HAK-İŞ unless it mentioned the concepts of secularism, democracy and the Republic in its charter (Koç, 1995). In fact we can say that there was a visible rivalry between TÜRK-İŞ and HAK-İŞ based on an ideological difference.

36 Zaman Gazetesi (Economy Section) 27.04.1997 p 5
5.5. HAK-İŞ and EU

As for the general approach of HAK-İŞ, it can be said that it supports the EU process for Turkey. Salim Uslu, the chief executive of HAK-İŞ, stated in the annual meeting of 1999 that HAK-İŞ strongly supports the journey of Turkey into the European Union. While he said that complying with the Copenhagen criteria was an obligation for Turkey, he made the reservation that any double standard in this process is not acceptable for the Turkish society (Appendix A).

“HAK-İŞ wishes that Turkey would be given a status that would bring full membership at the Helsinki Summit in 1999…. HAK-İŞ also wishes Turkey to follow the foreign policies that would serve this aim and adjust its constitution accordingly” (HAK-İŞ, 1999)

HAK-İŞ, compared to its relatively unsuccessful beginning, made an important impact on Turkish-European relations. It presented a significant profile regarding Turkey’s European dream. It was involved in several projects in the EU. One of them worth mentioning was “Immigration: Turkish Migration to Europe” (Uslu & Cassina, 1999). The report provides an in-depth analysis of Turkish workers’ situation in Europe. Salim Uslu, who prepared part of the report, suggests that the workers who went to Europe consisted not only of the undereducated and unqualified, but also those with investment opportunities who sought to benefit from the cultural and social aspects of European life. Thus Uslu believes that the image of Turkish workers in Europe has changed
considerably and deserves a reanalysis in terms of the Turks’ suitability for the EU (Uslu & Cassina, 1999).

HAK-İŞ also tried to establish a good relationship with the European unions in order to pursue Turkey’s membership within Europe. Before the Helsinki summit in 1999, HAK-İŞ increased its lobbying activities by accelerating the meetings with other European workers’ movements.

It can be said that HAK-İŞ has gone through similar phases as the main Islamic political units in Turkey. It also hopes that being in the EU would improve the rights of workers as well as provide religious liberties. It therefore expresses its support for membership explicitly.

In general, when we look at the workers’ movement and unionism in Turkey in the framework of the EU membership, we see that unions see the EU as a solution to the problems that capitalism caused. The unions that were organized at the national level first, later tried to be part of international workers’ movements due to the inevitable consequences the capitalist economy had on the world.

However, due to the historical difference in the evaluation of unions in developing countries, they never enjoyed the same amount of influence as their counterparts in developed countries. During the struggle to become industrialist economies, workers in developed countries somehow obtained the rights they wanted although they were not acquired easily. Yet in developing countries, before becoming an industrialist country they had to take the burden of the ever-changing economy of the world. People who
could hardly find a job would be reluctant to endanger their jobs by joining a workers’ movement.

In Turkey, transformation from a rural economy to an urban economy has yet to be concluded, hence, industrialism is not achieved equally across the whole country. The mass migrations to several big cities, particularly Istanbul, created a mass of unqualified workers with no consciousness of rights and freedoms. Furthermore, due to the sudden change of the environment for many workers, they did not cultivate ideas of political movements either. Therefore it is not surprising to see that unions in Turkey do not have an influence in politics to a desired level. Yet still they exercise a considerable level of lobbying in the EU process.

Two of the big three unions support the EU membership of Turkey: the DİSK and HAK-İŞ. On the other hand, TÜRK-İŞ has not shown a clear perspective on EU matters for Turkey. It employed the approach of focusing on national security and unity, which was similar to the approach of the military. This was in fact the main reason for TÜRK-İŞ’ failure to appear as a union that made democracy and workers’ rights a priority as it tried to stick to officials more than to protect the interests of workers in Turkey. TÜRK-İŞ believed that the Copenhagen criteria set for Turkey would make the country vulnerable and may cause some degree of secessions by Kurds in the eastern part of the country to occur. Furthermore, due to its rather nationalistic approach, TÜRK-İŞ never believed that Turkey would be accepted even it performed every requested change, so for TÜRK-İŞ, it was wasting time and effort to no avail.
The DİSK and HAK-İŞ on the other hand put considerable efforts and faith in the EU. In this framework they tried to establish strong relations with the ETUC. Particularly the success of the DİSK to persuade the ETUC to support Turkey’s membership for the EU before the Luxembourg summit was evidence of their commitment to the EU process. The involvement of HAK-İŞ in various research programs led by the ETUC also increased the profile of Turkish unions in Europe.

These three unions are able to communicate effectively with their European counterparts. The DİSK has a permanent representative in Brussels to organize lobbying activities. HAK-İŞ tries to attend regular meetings with ETUC to maintain the relationship. TÜRK-İŞ on the other hand reflected its nationalist and conservative attitude in its dealings with the EU. For example in a speech by the chief executive of TÜRK-İŞ, Bayram Meral, on one occasion in an ETUC meeting, mentioned his worries about Turkey’s national unity and independence if she became a member of the EU. From this perspective we can easily assume from the policies of TÜRK-İŞ that TÜRK-İŞ was more like an alternative force of the state to break the possible popularity of unions by acting like a Trojan horse in unionism.

It would be worth mentioning one of the famous sayings of Atatürk when he commented on the need to establish a communist party at the beginning of the Republic: “If there will be a communist party, we will be the one to do it”. This approach played an important role in Turkey and caused some rather shambolic organizations or associations to appear just to fill the space that existed. Therefore TÜRK-İŞ was doomed to fail as a union as the reason for its existence was never based on defending
workers’ rights. This may be the reason that TÜRK-İŞ was withdrawn from one of the meetings held by the ETUC in Ankara in 1998.

NGOs are very important components of the EU mechanism in Europe, including the unions. Yet unions in Turkey never really enjoyed the same level of recognition and success as their counterparts in Europe. Furthermore they were never really taken as seriously as the employers’ and businesses’ associations like TÜSİAD or the İKV in Turkey. The government was always more in line with big guys’ clubs. Also, the rather late development of capitalism and the arrival of neo-liberal policies before Turkey had been absorbed into capitalism and industrialism rendered the unions less effective.

The EU process may be the only issue the unions and the government in Turkey have ever agreed upon. Therefore, the governments also supported the lobbying activities of the unions in the EU. The then Foreign Minister, İsmail Cem, explains this point very clearly in a speech delivered at a meeting held by the ETUC in 1999:

“It is a fact that in Turkey the capital holders were unified before the workers’ achieved any kind of unification. This may cause further dilemmas in the Turkish economy in the future regarding social rights” 37

Cem also suggested that the transnational tools of capital render the national course of actions employed by the unions useless and ineffective.

37 Cem İ (1999) Cumhuriyet Gazetesi (Republican newspaper) 25.05.1999. p 3
The seminar titled “Unions, Turkey and the EU relations” summarizes the attitudes of Turkish and European unions to each other and the matter of the EU process. While the unions in Turkey focused on the unclear policies of the European Union, the unions of Europe focused on the fact that although they believe that Turkey should join the EU, she also had to deal with the social and human rights problems as soon as possible. Emilio Gabaglio, the head of ETUC, said that the restrictions applied following the military coup in 1980 should be lifted and minority rights should be extended. These were similar to the points raised by the EU authorities too. Gabaglio stated that EU membership should not be the target itself, as the real target is to improve the rights for people in the country.  

The unionist movement in Turkey is aware of the difficulty of defending and improving the social rights of workers in a century where capital, goods and services move freely. The same is valid for the unions in Europe but the difficulty is somewhat reduced thanks to the freedom and movement of labor. Workers can move in line with capital and therefore can create new areas and opportunities for themselves. Yet in Turkey while capital, goods and services freely move in and out, labor cannot enjoy freedom of movement. Therefore Turkish workers are somehow caught in this dilemma, which can be overcome either by the cancellation of free movement of capital and goods through the Customs Union, as TÜRK-İŞ and other like minded people have suggested, or by granting the freedom of movement to workers as was suggested by the pro-European Union lobby in Turkey. Turkish unions have continued to lose power and influence since the military coup of 1980 which curbed their activity considerably. Their

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38 Cumhuriyet Gazetesi (Republican newspaper) 25.05.1999. p 3
influence quotient is far lower than business associations regarding in particular the foreign policy of Turkey.

Table III: The Approach of Civil Society in Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Constructive</th>
<th>Critical</th>
<th>RHETORIC</th>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>CHANGING ATTITUDE</th>
<th>GENERAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sometimes for policies</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes from skeptical to pro</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TÜRK-İŞ</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Mostly yes</td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Yes from pro to critical</td>
<td>Hardly Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DİSK</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sometimes for ideology</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not exactly</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.6 Conclusion

Worker unions in Turkey have taken similar steps to contribute to Turkey - EU relations in the belief that EU membership would give them more rights. As shown in the table in the conclusion they formed close relationships with European workers unions, and were impressed by the level of importance and influence their counterparts enjoyed in the decision making process. In the years that followed, Europe pushed the Turkish state to listen to its unions. This was a part of the democratization process which gives civil society a part in the decision making mechanism. Unions, especially in economic issues, became more active in making economic decisions, and their role helped to balance the
demands of businesses and the rights of employees in Turkey. Bickering between employers and employees turned into negotiations.

Table IV: The Approach of Civil Society in Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Constructive</th>
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<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>CHANGING ATTITUDE</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not exactly</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>İKV</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Always clear as pro-Europe</td>
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<td>Confusing</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes from skeptical to pro</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>HAK-İŞ</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sometimes forpolicies</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes from skeptical to pro</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TÜRK-İŞ</td>
<td>Not exactly</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Mostlyyes</td>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>Yes from pro to critical</td>
<td>Hardly Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DİSK</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sometimes forideology</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</table>
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This thesis, entitled “The Approach of NGOs and Civil Society Organizations to Turkish Membership to EU with a Reference to the Helsinki Process: Constructive or Critical”, has attempted to trace Turkey’s transformation from the EU membership perspective in the crucial fields of civil society development, building on past research but breaking with it.

The main question in this study was to understand the role of Turkish NGOs and their contribution to Turkey’s democratization process in the EU accession period, especially after the Helsinki Summit. To this end the study tried to answer the questions like how Turkey could manage to be European, whether it had a sufficiently strong civil society, how a country that has suffered from a lack of civil actors participating in the democratic process could be accepted into the EU and whether, and how, the country in question has changed over decades after application.

The NGOs selected for the study were TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD and İKV as three employer organizations and TÜRK-İŞ, HAK-İŞ and DİSK as three worker confederations, which have been actively involved in the Turkey’s membership to the EU. Choosing three organizations from each group aimed at creating a fair balance between the employers and employees.

After the start of negotiations and the intensifying relations with the EU, certain groups in Turkey provided popular support for EU membership through nationalist and hawkish rhetoric. Civil society and pressure groups, such as İKV, TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD,
TÜRK-İŞ, HAK-İŞ and DİSK, however, increased public support through organizations relating to EU accession. The willingness of these organizations to work towards accession without an expectation of financial profit made it easier for the government to enact controversial reforms.

A full understanding of Turkey-EU relations is not possible without an analysis of the role of civil society and pressure groups in the accession process. The meaning of NGOs in this process can be seen in two ways. NGOs play a decisive role in Turkey’s internal dynamics and change Turkey’s foreign policy at the same time.

The thesis examined the subject under five main chapters, starting with an exploration of the historical background of Turkish-EU relations. This chapter provided a comprehensive background of the history of Turkey’s EU bid until the Helsinki summit, shedding light on the complexity of the membership negotiations. Understanding state-society relations requires a historical perspective which is imperative in an analysis of Turkey in conjunction with the recent EU reforms.

The second chapter has been an overview of the development of civil society in Europe and Turkey. It discussed the founding principles of the EU and the government’s approach to civil society in Europe and Turkey.

The third chapter investigated the strength of civil society in Turkey. Chapter four sketched out the main civil society groups and NGOs. It investigated the structures of three business groups and organizations, TÜSİAD, the İKV and MÜSİAD, and considered the attitudes of their high-ranking officers on European Union accession.
This chapter reflected the approaches of the Turkish business sector to EU membership and the obligations that come with the membership process.

Chapter five evaluated worker unions in Turkey and their approach to the EU. This chapter scrutinized the three major trade unions: DİSK, HAK-İŞ and TÜRK-İŞ. The first two claimed that joining the EU was the only certain way to improve the living and working standards of workers in Turkey. They stated that the problems of workers did not stem from global competition. However, TÜRK-İŞ was uncomfortable with the EU’s policies towards Turkey. All three unions are members of the European Trade Union Confederation.

The last chapter assessed the strength of civil society in Turkey and its effect on the EU accession process. Due to the lack of previous empirical research, this analysis relied on interviews with the employees of several civil society organizations and an extensive reading of their publications and their activities. Civil society legislation was also examined in order to assess the legal framework for civil society and NGOs in Turkey.

The study demonstrates that Turkey’s integration efforts in Europe are unprecedented. Turkey has remained part of the integration process despite half a century of efforts since 1959. In this time, important changes have occurred within Turkey as well as in the integration process; Turkey is no longer what it was in 1959, and neither is the integration process. Upon Turkey’s acceptance as a candidate country in the Helsinki Summit of 1999, and the declaration of political criteria for accession, Turkey recorded considerable progress in democratization as well as in other fields like the economy. Indeed, before EU-Turkey relations, Turkey – Europe relations were affected by a
number of historical events like the collapse of Ottoman Empire, the Independence War of Turkey, the Second World War and the Cold War, all of which have a significant influence on the conduct of foreign relations today. Indeed, Turks migrated westwards until they settled in Anatolia in the 11th century. This historic fact today serves as a metaphor to explain the never ending Turkish journey to the West since leaving their ancestral lands in Central Asia, a transformation which seems incomplete without their accession to the EU. Prominent Turkish leaders in history, from Mehmet the Conquerer to Atatürk, looked to the West for direction. Particularly since the late 17th and 18th centuries, the Turks have strived to take their place in the West and become a European country. This history of reform can be traced to the late 18th century. Yet the changes that took place in the thirties and forties should not be deemed mere reforms but a complete transformation, made in the name of Westernization and Europeanization. Relations with the EU today are the continuation of this transformation. Those who conducted the negotiations from 1959 to 1999 never considered their relations with the EU from this angle.

Since the Tanzimat period (1839 – 1876), which is commonly accepted as the starting point of official Westernization, relations with Europe have not always been close. European states demanded that Turkey improve the rights of non-Muslim minorities before the Vienna conference, a move that would be echoed a century and a half later at the Copenhagen summit. The reform, declared at the Paris conference for the first time, stated that the Turks were officially accepted as being Europeans. By accepting the demands of Europeans in declaring the Reform Decree, the Ottoman Empire accepted to join the ‘Concert of Europe,’ thereby complying with the standards of European civilization. There were, however, no official documents providing an objective
definition of these standards which were not only related to the Empire’s foreign affairs, but also its domestic ones. So in some ways, the debate between Turkey and Europe has not changed much. Despite its countless attempts and reforms, the question of whether Turkey is a European country remains unanswered.

Westernization and becoming part of Europe have been essential to Ottoman foreign policy ever since the Empire began losing influence, and are the most important inheritance of Turkish foreign policy today. With Atatürk’s rule, Westernization has taken a concrete form and continues to be fundamental to Turkish foreign policy, resulting in Turkey’s membership to nearly all Western post-war international institutions. The full realisation of Westernization, however, still depends on Turkey’s accession to the European Union.

Although Atatürk was cautious in his relations with foreign countries, he radically changed the face of the nation by introducing Western laws and regulations in Turkey. Due to its proximity to Soviet Russia, Turkey chose to side with the West right after the Second World War by applying to the European Communities in 1959. Turkey became a member of the Custom Union of the EU in 1996 and was granted candidate status in the 1999 Helsinki Summit. The EU negotiations, since 2004, have yet to be concluded.

In analyzing the role of Turkish civil society, this thesis has established a general historical context of Turkey’s relations with the European Union. This goes as far back as the European influence on the democratization efforts of the Ottoman Empire and continues through the early days of the Republic of Turkey.
The discussion on civil society is taking place in diverse social circumstances and various regions of the world, though it seems that Western scholarship is dominating this discussion. The long disagreement upon the definition of civil society puts into question its usefulness for explaining vibrant and dynamic societies and social processes. The inconsistent definition of the concept leads to misunderstandings in scholarship but has also made it into a cause célèbre for intellectuals. The absence of a clear understanding of the distinct forms of civil society actors and activities in non-Western contexts requires research which links local realities with emerging global events.

It appears that the concept of civil society cannot easily be relegated as having limited meaning outside its Western origins, nor can it simply be imposed by external forces to nurture good governance in countries with developing institutions. The global transformation of contemporary societies calls for structures capable of coping with changes in the international system. International organizations, actors, and multinational companies have an increasing influence over the global decision making process which affects people worldwide. It seems that global civil society emerged as a response to this new global political movement.

Taking this into account, recent socioeconomic and political developments in Turkey suggest the possible emergence of indigenous democratic change. However, the Western interpretations of civil society and the role of Islam have left little room for the recognition of complex developments in Turkish society. Defining Islam as incompatible with modernity fails to recognize the potential for socio-economic enhancement and civil society advancement in Turkey’s vibrant form of secular and
modern Islam. While Western exceptionalist theorists such as Gellner and Mardin advocate that civil society emerged as a by-product of industrial capitalism, Turkish civil society is considered to be a meeting place for various ideological beliefs and cultures.

Perhaps, the role of civil society in Western culture is to secure individual freedoms and democracy against state incursions. In Turkey’s case however, civil society promotes broader participation and involvement in all aspects of life. These organizations generally focus on building the conditions in which civic organizations can develop and enhance interlocking social, economic and political structures. Unlike Western interpretations that portray civil society in terms of clear-cut institutionalised “modern” organizations, Turkey’s civil society is an arena in which traditional associations function alongside “modern” ones.

Keane, Chandler and Scholte presume the existence of a “global civil society” which mobilizes on key issues such as the environment and globalization. In reality, this loosely connected movement, whether genuinely grass-roots (Keane and Scholte) or a device for elites (Chandler), is a weak presence in Turkey due to differing priorities between Western and Turkish civil society. While the former is concerned with post-industrial matters of environmentalism and social justice, the latter devotes its energies to the issues of human rights and gender equality in countries experiencing socially disorienting democratization, technological innovation and a communication revolution.
In Turkey, one can observe that the diffusion of political power has undermined the Kemalist elite’s monopoly over state and civic institutions. Also, non-state actors such as civil society organizations, the EU and other transnational institutions and corporations have an increasingly crucial role in Turkey’s political decision making process. It is also true that Turkey has been influenced by growing democratization, increasing global integration, convergence between secularism and Islam, the spreading of values and proliferation of international organizations and institutions.

It appears that international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Greenpeace play a significant role in global civil society and their impact on global politics is powerful. They endorse deeper democratization, good governance, wider participation in public policy making and greater awareness of critical global problems. There is some kind of cross-national resemblance in the legal regulation and definition of INGOs and other non-state actors within the Western world. However, it seems that this framework may leave out other types of organizations and settings where civil society groups are not necessarily clear-cut and institutionalized, in countries such as Turkey where there are small-scale community associations and civil society organizations. Some of them solely rely on EU funding but provide educational services to local recipients. EU accession may ultimately close the gap between Turkish and Western civil society by liberalizing the Turkish state, extending freedoms and civil liberties and furthering the culture of political participation.

Although non-state actors and INGOs now reach beyond state borders and contribute to the extension of the traditional civil society to the global sphere in the “northern
hemisphere”, Turkey’s civil society has yet to forge those connections and project its discourse beyond national frontiers. Contemporary characteristics and notions of global civil society as advocated by Kaldor and Keane, such as cross-national citizenship and participatory governance, through both cooperation and confrontation with different global actors, are not prevalent in the discussions of Turkish civil society. These have yet to build alliances with their foreign counterparts through global forums at which civil society groups develop shared ideas and agendas. Theorising and conceptualizing civil society in Turkey from a global perspective should not be divorced from the country’s history and traditions.

That does not mean that civil society in Turkey does not share the universal ideals of popular governance which may complement or conflict with the state. Some of these are democratization, unhindered access to information, transparency in decision making, equality of opportunity, redistributive justice, and cultural and ideological pluralism. Moreover, interviews done for this study with civil society organizations revealed that the Turkish state should embrace EU reforms wholeheartedly to guarantee a secure environment in terms of adequate social welfare provision and human rights. Instead of associating civil society with such notions as local, global or regional, it is more accurate to analyze civil society, particularly in Turkey, as a forum for civic participation and a vehicle for addressing national and international issues.

Furthermore, the rationalist and constructivist theories advocating an autonomous civil society as a prerequisite for the emergence of active civic citizenship might be inadequate to explain Turkish civil society’s constructive role in the EU accession process. Turkey is rapidly transforming from a managed authoritarian form of political
pluralism to a Western-style democratic society. Civil society is a critical ingredient for the opening of independent channels of discourse and debate with the state establishment, whether in a cooperative or confrontational manner. Put differently, the civic community assumed the role of intermediary and interlocutor between marginalized groups of society and the state, acting as the consciousness of the underprivileged and disempowered. As Turkey nurtures the principles of democracy and transparency in the EU membership process, civil society reinforces, and is reinforced by multi-party politics. Considering the distinctive characteristics and historical precedents of the Turkish political paradigm, existing theories failed to capture the unique realities governing the indigenous environment of civil society in Turkey. Unless and until social and political theories explicate the nature of the civil society phenomena in Turkey, particularly regarding the role of external actors, these theories will continue to embody serious shortcomings vis-à-vis Turkey.

Exploring the progression of civil society organizations in Turkey demonstrates a gradual but visible transition from state domination to greater intensity of autonomy and self-reliance. Following the establishment of modern Turkey in 1923, Kemalist state elites set a vigorous and restrained agenda on a narrowly defined path of overtly strict secularism, inflexible nationalism and state-centric republicanism. This stifled the non-governmental actors espousing goals and objectives not aligned with the Kemalist project. In the 1980s, Turgut Özal initiated political liberalization and economic globalization that unleashed the expansion of vakıfs (foundations) and independent action across Turkey. This has challenged the underpinnings of the Kemalist projection by encouraging grassroots action for political as well as non-political endeavours ranging from human rights, the rise of the Anatolian capitalist class to the associations
handling the Kurdish issue. Consequently, effective actors have entered the field of active citizenship previously monopolised by officialdom.

At the turn of 21\textsuperscript{st} century, Turkey embarked on a heightened path of reform and liberalization under the aegis of EU accession, leading to wide-scale transformation in constitutional freedoms and the maturation of democracy. This transmogrification, albeit halting at times, evinces that Navorro Yashin’s formulation of a non-existent civil society sector and individual enterprise, perhaps an accurate description for much of contemporary Turkish history, is increasingly less applicable if not, grossly inaccurate, in the modern circumstances of Turkey. This transformation has provided the existing and greater space for new civil society groups to flourish. It also contributed to the recognition of the concept of civil society changing from state-centric civil society to a civil society contributing to democratic culture.

Turkey’s social transformation is also further reinforced by the EU accession process. It seems that Turkish civil society is becoming more effective by employing EU accession as a tool to push the boundaries of civil liberty, democracy and self-reliance. For example, civil society played a major role in strengthening EU-Turkey relations. They were the key actors in informing the public of the compatibility of the EU-required reforms with Turkey’s norms and standards, thus facilitating the parliamentary adoption of reformist legislative changes. Civil society and pressure groups under examination increased public support through organizations relating to EU accession. The willingness of these organizations to work towards accession without an expectation of financial profit made it easier for the government to enact controversial reforms. Hence they gradually became better organized and vocal in their demands for systemic and
structural changes. The EU provided them with additional resources to exercise pressure on the government’s policy agenda, which represented an unprecedented stage in Turkey’s modernization, a stage in which civil society was becoming increasingly active. Likewise, TUSEV’s “Civicus Civil Society Index” reveals that vibrancy of civil society despite their lack of resources and know-how. According to the index, Turkey’s democratization process has created a better environment for civil society. It illustrates the ever-increasing progression of civil society initiatives influencing the decision making processes.

Furthermore, the EU accession process has been the catalyst, though not a creator, of preexisting democratic and social changes originating in the 1980s. In other words, if there were no desire and enthusiasm for reform in Turkey, the EU accession incentive would engender minimal stimuli to buttress the reform momentum initiated by the ruling elites and the supporters of the European anchor. The EU provides organized, comprehensive and verifiable benchmarks – subject to intrusive scrutiny by EU institutions – on democratic governance and human rights, renewal of social policy and the nurturing of a competitive market economy.

Civil society in Turkey can thus be identified as a critical actor in Turkey’s democratization process. Recently, civil society has become more visible and active, and more willing to enter dialogue with the government. Of critical importance is the fact that the overall picture of the state of civil society in Turkey portends a more constructive engagement with the state actors and EU institutions on issues of human rights and civil liberties.
Nevertheless, there is no “scientific” law mandating that civil society will continue to grow and shape political and social change for an indeterminate duration. In the absence of the EU accession process, it is quite foreseeable that the recent proliferation of civil society organizations would most likely never have come to be. Ipso facto, the collapse of Turkey’s accession journey may bode ill to its civil society movement, or at a minimum, possibly slow down the further maturation of a still fragile platform of civic and communal solidarity.

In conclusion, this researcher strongly believes that Turkey has entered an unprecedented process of indelible transformation. The increasing participation of civil society and NGOs under examination of this study will continue to assist the winds of pluralist democracy to reach the widening segments of Turkey. Civil society now realizes that EU membership would benefit them immensely, both politically and economically, and that this cannot be left to a few elitists from the bureaucracy. Times have changed since elites took such matters exclusively in their own hands. Thus whether “unspoken assumptions” regarding Turkey’s cultural identity win over or not, Turkey has already begun to benefit from the transformation taking place politically, economically, socially and culturally. The demand in society regarding individual freedoms and democracy cannot be reversed now. It has reached the point that even if the EU does not admit Turkey for any reason, Turkey will attain the level of civilization that it has been seeking for centuries.

This study has analyzed the impact of non-governmental organizations from various backgrounds in the EU membership of Turkey. Business associations to trade unions were examined to explore Turkey’s changing face up to the Helsinki summit. Turkey’s
civil society and NGOs have faced serious challenges and improvements since the foundation of the Republic. Turkey itself has been witnessing very dynamic social, economic and political changes underpinned by the forces of globalization, urbanization, EU accession and regional transformation. With the ever-increasing participation of civil groups in democracy, Turkey gets closer to EU standards every day. Even if Turkey never joins the EU, these transformations have left a never before seen mark on the country.

Having tasted the pluralism and relative economic prosperity of liberal policies, Turkish society chose to be in the EU. After the turbulent years of opposition in the sixties and seventies, Turks once again unified around their common goal of entering the EU. Whereas the previous so-called agreement was restricted to a circle of elites, this time the public, civil and political actors managed to generate overwhelming support. Civil actors from different ideological backgrounds, ranging from liberals and Islamists to communists, greatly contributed to EU relations as they have been unified around the single aim of entering the EU. Their considerable area of activity stands testament to the change Turkey achieved. Even those who sat on the extreme sides of the political spectrum contributed to the discussion, and their opposition taught Turkey to deal with pluralism without resorting to anti-democratic policies. However extreme their argument may be, almost nobody approves of military intervention any longer. Anti-democratic institutions like the army are losing influence every day. Turkey seems to have realized that the existence of extremism is something that can be tolerated as long as it is within the law. Today there are many people who hold extreme thoughts or prejudices against others in pluralist Europe. Judging Europe based on their discourse would certainly be unfair, as would be judging Turkey’s will to transform on the basis
of those who hold negative attitudes towards the EU such as Islamists or nationalists. The majority of Turks today support the EU accession process.

Business organizations made unprecedented contributions to the EU accession effort. Having realised the economic benefits of the EU, Turkish businessmen who were once afraid of losing out to EU companies began to advocate full membership and compliance with its standards. Comprehensive projects were carried out to inform the public and small businesses about the regulations that would change in accordance with EU standards. They opened offices in Brussels and tried to change Turkey’s image in Europe and formed personal bonds with their European counterparts. Prominent business organizations like TÜSİAD, İKV and MÜSİAD went to great lengths to combat negative Turkish perceptions in the EU. They commissioned comprehensive studies and research by respectable academics to demonstrate the benefits of membership and proposed necessary strategies.

Worker unions have taken similar steps to contribute to relations in the belief that EU membership would give them more rights. They formed close relationships with European workers unions, and were impressed by the level of importance and influence their counterparts enjoyed in the decision making process. In the years that followed, Europe pushed the Turkish state to listen to its unions. This was a part of the democratization process which gave civil society a part in the decision making mechanism. Unions, especially in economic issues, became more active in making economic decisions, and their role helped to balance the demands of businesses and the rights of employees in Turkey. Bickering between employers and employees turned into negotiations.
More specifically, the civil society organizations whose policies were examined in this study, such as TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD, İKV, TÜRK-İŞ, HAK-İŞ, and DİSK, all rhetorically support EU membership and Turkey’s democratic transformation. It should be noted that there have been changing attitudes from these organizations. TÜSİAD and HAK-İŞ went from being skeptical to pro-EU and TÜRK-İŞ from pro-EU to Euroskeptic, though they remain positive in general. The strong rhetoric of these organizations is not supported by action.

It can be concluded that Turkish civil society organizations have been a constructive force in Turkey’s membership to the EU. This does not exclude their occasional criticism, in a variety of subjects and events.
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