Title:

Sustaining power-sharing: the bureaucracy, the bureaucrat and conflict management

Declaration
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Karl John O’Connor...........................................................................................................
Ceasefire

I
Put in mind of his own father and moved to tears
Achilles took him by the hand and pushed the old king
Gently away, but Priam curled up at his feet and
Wept with him until their sadness filled the building.

II
Taking Hector's corpse into his own hands Achilles
Made sure it was washed and, for the old king's sake,
Laid out in uniform, ready for Priam to carry
Wrapped like a present home to Troy at daybreak.

III
When they had eaten together, it pleased them both
To stare at each other's beauty as lovers might,
Achilles built like a god, Priam good-looking still
And full of conversation, who earlier had sighed:

IV
'I get down on my knees and do what must be done
And kiss Achilles' hand, the killer of my son.'

Michael Longley, 1994
Abstract
The management of conflict has long been of concern to social scientists, urban planners and community-minded citizens. While differing mechanisms of managing ethno-national or ethno-linguistic tensions exist, few studies advance our understanding of how conflicts are actually managed – in other words, the study of ethnic peace. In this study I draw on the experiences of two differing examples of ethnic peace: Belfast and Brussels in the expectation that other contested cities such as Kirkuk, Jerusalem, Nicosia or Mostar, who may one day consider power-sharing as a form of governance, may learn from what have been categorised as sites of successful power-sharing. While there are few studies of ethnic peace, fewer studies again seek to understand the role of the elite level bureaucrat in sustaining this peace. This dissertation fills this gap in the literature, investigating the politician-bureaucrat relationship within the contested urban environment of two differing mechanisms of consociationalism. The dissertation ascertains the extent of discretion available to the bureaucratic elite and further, through determining core beliefs of interviewees, establishes how this discretion is employed. Methodologically, the dissertation draws on a multi-method approach, consisting of semi-structured interviews and a method well established in Psychology but relatively new to Political Science: Q Methodology. The empirical findings show that the bureaucratic elite influence the conflict management process. While bureaucrats are found to share a number of core governance beliefs, a number of categories of association can also be identified. These categories are not based on a primary identity, but a secondary learned identity. The findings therefore also propose that a professional or societal attachment can supersede a primary attachment within the public administration of a contested society. In a number of instances, bureaucrats are found to actively represent these secondary learned attachments over their primary identities. The findings define bureaucratic activity in two instances of ethnic peace, as well as contributing to the literature on active representation. Moreover, it is suggested that the role of the bureaucrat in the conflict management process requires much more scholarly attention if political level power-sharing agreements are to be sustainable.
Acknowledgements

This project seeks to explore the decision-making processes within the contested society, paying particular attention the role of the elite level bureaucrat. The project would not have been possible without the cooperative nature of the bureaucratic elite in both cities who gave their time so freely. While many different typologies of bureaucrat emerged, a common sense of purpose existed among all interviewees. In contradiction to popular stereotypes and ‘Yes Minister’ anecdotes, I found the elite level bureaucrat to possess extensive knowledge and passion for public service. Elite level bureaucrats are not simply cogs in the machine but are hard-working people, motivated by representing the needs of others. How each individual bureaucrat interprets these needs of course differs and gives rise to the typologies outlined in chapter six.

I must also thank my supervisor, Mick Dumper, for his guidance and support throughout the past three years. His valuable feedback on my written work has encouraged me to have confidence in my own ability. His ability to ask more macro questions maintained my focus on the purpose of the PhD. This research would not have been possible without the support of the ESRC and the wider Conflict in Cities team. A special thank you to all within the Conflict in Cities project, most especially to Kelsey Shanks and Craig Larkin. Researching within such a project has allowed me to contextualise my research in a manner otherwise impossible. Not only have I now an insight into the workings of other divided societies, but I have also gained an appreciation for a number of other lenses through which to view conflict management: architecture, sociology and education. Anita Bakshi, Giulia Carabelli, Lynda Rootamm, Monika Halkort and Konstantin Kastrissianakis have managed to broaden my horizons and interests and for that I am most grateful. Wendy Pullan introduced me to the concept of public space and how its governance and regulation influences conflict management. Liam O’Dowd, James Anderson, Lefkos Kyriacou and Max Gwiazda have also provided valuable comments at various stages of the research. Thanks also to Madeline Leonard, Martina Mcnight and Milena Komorova whose collective fear of Q methodology provided me with the determination to write a paper on the merits of the method and its possible contribution to other areas of political science.
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Acronyms

BCC Belfast City Council
BCR Brussels Capital Region
CCC Common Community Commission
CF Communauté Française (Responsible for provision of services via the French language in Wallonia and Brussels – French Linguistic Community and the Bi-Communal Region of Brussels Capital)
COCOF Commission Communautaire Française (Responsible for provision of some service via the French language within the Bi-Communal Region of Brussels Capital)
CUL Culture – Interviews conducted with members of selected cultural organisations in Brussels
EU European Union
FR French
LCD Lowest Common Denominator
NI Northern Ireland
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
POL Political – interviews conducted with selected political (Cabinet) level representatives in Brussels
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
US United States of America
VG Vlaamse Gemeenschap (Responsible for provision of services via the Dutch language in Flanders and Brussels – Dutch-speaking Linguistic Community and the Bi-Communal Region of Brussels Capital)
VGC Vlaamse Gemeenschapscommissie (Responsible for provision of some services via the Dutch language within the Bi-Communal Region of Brussels Capital)
Introduction

1

1.1 Overview
This dissertation relies on the theory of representative bureaucracy to investigate the role of the elite level bureaucrat in sustaining conflict management. I firstly investigate the extent to which elite level bureaucrats influence the policy process within two different mechanisms of successful consociational power-sharing. I then determine what motivates these bureaucrats to act in instances where they have discretion. The differing consociational models of Brussels and Belfast provide the empirical basis for the study. Despite the rise of the ethno-national state, over 90% of world states are comprised of at least one significant minority group (Smooha, 1978, Connor, 1973, Gurr, 1993). Understanding how differing ethnicities can peacefully coexist within a common state or society therefore remains a challenge for political scientists and practitioners alike. The challenge is even greater in instances where the authority and legitimacy of the state are themselves contested by these different ethno-political groups. While a multitude of lenses have been used to view and understand the contested society, few studies inform us of how these ethnically heterogeneous societies actually co-exist. As acknowledged by Stanfield (1996: 15), we know ‘virtually

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1 Within this dissertation Brussels refers to the territories governed by the sub-state actors the Brussels Capital Region and the Bilingual Region of Brussels Capital. Belfast refers to the Belfast Urban Area, not to be confused with the Belfast Metropolitan Urban Area. In each case I am not interested in the administration at the ward or commune level.

2 See Walker Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism," Journal of International Affairs, 27:1 (Summer 1973), pp. 1-21 in which the author states: "All but fourteen of today's states (of the 135 selected cases) contain at least one significant minority and half of the fourteen exceptions are characterized by that so-called irredentists situation in which the dominant ethnic groups extends beyond the state's border."

3 While various interpretations of the term 'ethnic' are debated, I do not address this debate in this research- for the purposes of this research Belfast and Brussels are considered ethno-political conflicts.
nothing’ about how ethnically differing peoples manage to coexist peacefully. Wake-Carroll and Carroll (2000:120) reiterate Stanfield’s assertion reminding us that ‘we need to know a great deal more about the ways in which diverse ethnic communities are sometimes able to coexist in relative harmony’. Further, in one of the seminal contributions to conflict management literature of the previous decade, Varshney (2002:6) reinforces this belief, maintaining that ‘until we study ethnic peace, we will not be able to have a good theory of ethnic conflict’. With the intention of learning from instances of ethnic peace, my research questions are therefore set within two (most different) examples of successful consociational power-sharing.

While few studies investigate ethnic peace, fewer studies again explain the role of the bureaucrat in sustaining conflict management mechanisms. Both Esman (1997: 528) and Brown (1999: 369) submit that the literature on ethnopolitics ignores the importance of public administration to the conflict management and development process. Further, Nachmias and Rosenbloom (1978:10) argue that ‘no political system is likely to flourish, or even survive if it fails to develop an effective administrative component’. Much of the conflict management research to date examines the barriers to conflict management, largely focusing on the effects of poor decision-making such as inadequate social inclusion policies, divisive construction or planning projects or unequal access to education or health resources for certain ethnic groups. Further studies examine political level cooperation within the contested society (Cfr. Chapter Two). Conflict management literature rarely identifies the bureaucracy as a dependent variable. Put differently, research tends to focus on what policies to implement or
implementation processes as opposed to the policy implementers themselves. Within both the developed and developing society, the bureaucracy has emerged as a principal partner in contemporary governance. This research within the uncontested society has found the bureaucrat to be central to the governance process (Niskanen, 1971). Brinkerhoff and Morgan (2010) highlight the important contribution of the bureaucrat to capacity development within the developing society. A large number of research briefs have consequentially investigated bureaucrat activity within these contexts. At the same time, the role of the bureaucracy in sustaining conflict management mechanisms is less understood. This may be due to the perceived inability of the bureaucrat within the contested society to influence policy outputs and outcomes. A contested society within a contested state is indeed distinctive, and a bureaucrat’s influence in the policy process may not be as substantial as their counterparts in more cohesive societies. The role of the bureaucrat in achieving the utopian goals of good governance has been documented within developing, and developed societies. How the bureaucrat ‘fits’ within the governance structures of a contested society is less understood.

The literature on good governance within the contested society is indeed abundant. This literature does not however consider the perspective of the bureaucrat in trying to understand how power-sharing actually works. Among others, research by Stanisevski and Miller (2009: 568/9) in Macedonia concludes that ‘the involvement of governmental organisations in managing intercultural tensions could assist in the

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4 See: Public Administration and Development Special Issue, 2010: 30 for more detailed analysis on developing capacity within developing environments.
stabilisation of the peace, resolution of conflicts and in enhancing the social inclusion of minority voices’. Little is known however about the role of the primary governmental organisation – the bureaucracy – in this process. If governmental organisations such as the public administration were to increase their involvement in the conflict management process as suggested, how would they behave? This can only be determined by going beyond existing research frameworks which are designed to measure governance structures or indicators. Establishing the motivations guiding bureaucrat role perceptions will develop a clearer understanding of the effects of bureaucrat actions on both conflict management and governance. To provide this insight, a different research approach to the conflict society is required. The public administration lens allows for a more complete understanding of the politician-bureaucrat relationship. Approaching conflict management from this public administration perspective we can document how power-sharing actually succeeds from the perspective of the bureaucrat. To do so, I rely on two well established fields of study from the public administration literature: representative bureaucracy theory and bureaucrat typology research. The reasons for adopting this approach are presented in the following paragraph. To summarise, ‘the relationship between politicians and administrators is the cornerstone to understanding the governance process and has always been highly debated in the public administration literature (Hansen and Ejersbo, 2002: 733). Scholarship has not however extended to studying this relationship under power-sharing conditions of governance. The role of the bureaucrat in sustaining conflict management mechanisms has not been adequately explored by public
administration or conflict management scholars. Within developing and developed societies, the bureaucrat is seen as a significant actor in the policy process. In this dissertation I am interested in determining the extent to which the elite level bureaucrat can influence the policy process within the power-sharing society and if so, what guides or motivates the bureaucrat’s actions. In other words, my interest is in determining the importance of the bureaucrat within the politico-administrative axis of consociational forms of governance.

The oft-applied policy-oriented governance approach to conflict management, while informative in describing what policies to implement, or identifying obstacles to conflict management/policy implementation, does not tell us how policies will be implemented. This research departs from this largely atheoretical and normative literature, viewing conflict management through the theoretical lens of representative bureaucracy. This theoretical approach provides a more robust insight into how bureaucratic structures are employed or exploited by the bureaucrat. It identifies if policy making can be skewed by the bureaucrat within the power-sharing society and if so, how it is so. This dissertation provides a contribution to understanding the role perceptions of the elite level bureaucrat within societies where differing ethnopolitical groups manage to peacefully coexist. This public policy approach to conflict management provides a more meaningful insight into the operating of consociational forms of governance.

Achieving good policy making, or good governance, within a power-sharing society is paramount to successful conflict management. In order to achieve the goal of
good governance, it is necessary to develop administrative capacity. While more normative prescriptive studies have approached good governance in terms of what policies to implement, the representative bureaucracy approach allows us to understand the behaviour of bureaucrats within the policy-making and conflict management process and hence determine the role of the public administration in sustaining conflict management. If the bureaucrat within the consociational society is found to possess similar levels of discretion to their counterparts within more cohesive societies, the factors guiding this discretion need to be understood. As will become evident throughout the dissertation, more importance needs to be attributed to how rules and policies are skewed by the bureaucrat, vis-à-vis the policies themselves. Within the contested society we cannot look at the role of the bureaucrat in the good governance process in isolation to the role of the bureaucrat in managing conflict. For example, questions of bureaucratic legitimacy, while present in uncontested societies, have greater repercussions within contested societies. Existing governance research does not tell us how the two related roles, conflict management and good governance, interplay. As alluded to above, perhaps the reason for the absence of scholarly interest is explained by the fact that the bureaucrat within contested societies does not significantly influence outputs and outcomes and therefore has only minimal involvement in the governance process. The research therefore pays close attention to determining the extent of discretion available to the bureaucratic elite.

Various mechanisms of governing contested societies exist, ranging from coercive domination or hegemonic control by one group over another on the one hand
to power-sharing\textsuperscript{5} (Lijphart, 1969) and power-dividing (Roeder and Rothchild, 2005) on the other. While hegemonic systems tend to rely on majoritarianism, both power-sharing and power-dividing rely on a willingness of differing ethno-national/ethno-linguistic groups to cooperate. The consequent complex administrative structures make analysis of administrative behaviour and administrative capacity complex. In this research I therefore limit the scope to consociational forms of power-sharing. Within consociationalism I draw on two most different examples. Comprehensive power-sharing, as is the case in Belfast, is most likely the more recognised approach – power is shared in all aspects of the governance process. In Belfast, one political and bureaucratic organisation governs the city. Alternatively however, the Brussels model demonstrates that power-sharing need not be comprehensive to be successful. The limited power-sharing in place in Brussels provides an example of successful ‘limited’ power-sharing, admittedly amidst a less successful national approach to power-sharing. Within the Brussels mechanism of power-sharing functions are divided and managed separately by each linguistic group with power only being shared in certain agreed policy areas – in other words power is shared at the lowest common denominator (LCD). Each linguistic community governs its own affairs in education, health and culture. Power is shared in policy areas such as economics, employment and transport. Four separate political and bureaucratic organisations operate exclusively within Brussels\textsuperscript{6}. Thus the research

\textsuperscript{6} Other governments have competency to provide services within Brussels but these are excluded from our research as they also have competencies within other Belgian Regions and Communities. I have also excluded municipal level actors from the research.
examines the role of the bureaucrat in sustaining conflict management under two most differing mechanisms of consociation.

In this first section I have outlined the necessity to understand the role of the bureaucrat in the policy process within the contested society. To date much of the governance research within the contested society has measured the bureaucracy by its perceived effects. While it is indeed most necessary to understand what policies to implement, it is also necessary to investigate how they will be implemented. A representative bureaucracy approach differs from the traditional more normative and atheoretical governance approach in that it can describe how bureaucrats actually behave within a particular set of institutional/governance structures. The public administration theoretical approach therefore allows us to determine if, and how, policy is skewed by the bureaucrat. Both Belfast and Brussels demonstrate two different structural mechanisms of consociational power-sharing. These two cases provide the empirical basis for investigating the role of the bureaucrat in sustaining ethnic peace.

1.2 The concepts – definitions, clarifications and limitations
While good governance is presented as a win-win pareto-efficient aspiration⁷, the constituent elements of good governance are less understood. Various international organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have their own good governance principles

⁷ There are no losers in good governance – in good governance there does not need to be a looser for there to be a winner. It is therefore difficult to be against ‘good’ governance.
and criteria\textsuperscript{8}; however this dissertation is not concerned with these definitions, how they are interpreted, nor indeed the merit attributed to them. I am more concerned with how these principles may actually be achieved. My concern in this dissertation is therefore with just one aspect of the good governance doctrine: developing administrative capacity; in other words, understanding the role perceptions and motivations of bureaucrats. This concept of developing administrative capacity however is noted by Brinkerhoff and Morgan (2010: 2) by its vagueness and multiplicity of definitions and approaches. They broadly define ‘capacity’ as: ‘being able to achieve a desired collective purpose’ and surmise five capabilities that contribute to ‘system capacity performance’ (Brinkerhoff and Morgan, 2010: 3). These include the capability to commit and engage, the capability to carry out technical service delivery and logistical tasks, the capability to relate and attract support, the capability to adapt and self-renew and finally the capability to balance diversity and coherence.\textsuperscript{9} Without developing administrative capacity, achieving the other aspirations of good governance remains improbable. In this dissertation I examine the importance of administrative capacity, not only to good governance but to successful conflict management.

Many definitions of the ‘administration’ or the ‘bureaucracy’ have been developed, however for the purpose of this research Meier and O’Toole’s (2006:1)\textsuperscript{10} simple definition will suffice: bureaucracies are ‘hierarchical institutions that provide capacity and expertise to accomplish social tasks’. (See Downs, 1967:2 for necessary

\textsuperscript{8} An excerpt from Weiss (2000) on various international organisations interpretations of ‘governance’ is included as annex 1.1

\textsuperscript{9} Brinkerhoff and Morgan’s interpretation of these concepts is included as Annex 1.2.

\textsuperscript{10} For more advanced definitions of bureaus see Weber, Essays in Sociology, ch. 8 Albrow Bureaucracy, pp44-5; See also Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, Boston, Little, Brown, 1967 p24
characteristics of a bureaucracy and p3/4 for necessary characteristics of a bureaucrat)
The focus of this dissertation is on the bureaucratic elite. While the role of the street level bureaucrat in the governance process has been well documented by Lipsky (1980) and others, the bureaucratic elite are also found to influence resource allocation (Nachmias and Rosenbloom, 1978, Knox and Carmichael, 2006, Carmichael, 2002). It is the role perceptions of the bureaucratic elite that are the focus of this study.

Investigating two most different mechanisms of ‘successful’ consociational power-sharing generates an understanding of the role of both the bureaucracy and the individual elite-level bureaucrat in sustaining conflict management mechanisms. Rather than focusing on identifiable reform projects or bureaucratic outputs, outcomes and effects on society, an analysis of conflict management from the perspective of the bureaucrat provides a more complete understanding of the role of the bureaucrat in sustaining conflict management mechanisms and in introducing governance reforms. By filling this gap in the literature, the dissertation can identify the importance of the bureaucrat to sustaining conflict management. Existing research acknowledges that developing administrative capacity is a precondition for good governance. If administrative capacity is to be developed within emerging power-sharing societies, what can be learned from bureaucracies and bureaucrats within existing power-sharing regimes? By presenting a comprehensive set of empirical analyses on the bureaucrat-politician dichotomy, this research presents data on how successful examples of consociational power-sharing actually work in practice. Accordingly it has two aims: (i) to determine the politico-administrative environment in which the bureaucrat works
within two most different mechanisms of consociationalism, and (ii) to subsequently determine what motivates bureaucrats in instances where they have discretion. I am not concerned with the city-state relationship, nor am I concerned with the differing legislative competencies of our two cases. My interest is in determining the relationship between the political level and the administrative level and how this relationship sustains conflict management. Further, I investigate this relationship from the perspective of the bureaucrat, paying close attention to how the bureaucrat perceives his/her role.

Other factors of course influence conflict management and governance. Bureaucrats themselves may potentially interact with community groups, national politicians, supranational politicians, world leaders and global and regional organisations such as the OECD, IMF or EU. While such interactions do influence the management of conflict, they are not the direct focus of this research. Where relevant, such interactions are however referred to; however the aim of the dissertation is to define the day to day management of the city, focusing on the bureaucrat-politician relationship. I examine this relationship through a public administration lens. The dissertation draws on two most different examples of consociational power-sharing. This approach provides an opportunity to investigate the influence of the power-sharing mechanism on bureaucrat behaviour and consequentially on conflict management. In other words it provides an opportunity to investigate if the type of conflict management mechanism can be an explanatory factor in determining bureaucrat behaviour. Overall, the primary added value of this research is that the reader will understand the role of the bureaucratic elite
in sustaining power-sharing mechanisms. Furthermore, the study provides an insight into how power-sharing actually works in practice from the viewpoint of the bureaucrat. Societies choosing consociationalism as a mechanism of conflict management will be able to learn from the experiences of these two different consociational experiences. The dissertation also applies representative bureaucracy theory, determining to what extent the bureaucratic elite actively represent a secondary identity over a primary identity. The contributions to the literature are developed in section 1.6.

1.3 Conceptual Framework: Representative bureaucracy

Nearly seventy years ago, Donald Kingsley (1944) first articulated the idea of representative bureaucracy. His thesis was based on the premise that the British bureaucracy was successful in implementing the policies of the political elite as they both shared similar norms and values, originating from their shared (primary) socio-economic backgrounds. As developed in chapters two, five and six, Kingsley’s thesis has been expanded upon by numerous scholars of public administration as a mechanism to understand what guides bureaucrat discretion within the bureaucracy. This in itself was for many years controversial, as in traditional Weberian doctrines of public administration the bureaucrat was supposed to serve, not represent. Nonetheless the appeal of representative bureaucracy grew. Within the developed uncontested society, bureaucratic discretion has been acknowledged to exist within the public administration. Mosher (1968) significantly advanced the theory differentiating between active and passive representation. Passive representation refers to the extent to which a group’s representation in society is reflected within the composition of the
bureaucracy. Active representation on the other hand refers to the extent to which the individual bureaucrat acts on behalf of this identity. Hannah Pitkin (1967) describes this as the difference between that which the bureaucrat is (passive) and that which the bureaucrat does (active). In the past much importance was attributed to the principal – agent theoretical approach to political control research. Of late representative bureaucracy has also provided insight into the balance of power within the politico-administrative axis. In one of the leading works on political control Meier and O’Toole (2006: 69) suggest that:

‘without understanding the values held by the bureaucracy relative to the values held by the political institutions, one cannot determine whether correlations between policy outputs and political actions are the result of political control or simply the result of administrative units doing what they would have done anyway. Because the theory of representative bureaucracy explicitly relies on bureaucratic values, it works well in determining the extent of political control.’

The theory of representative bureaucracy fits very well with the aims of this dissertation. Not only is the theory informative in establishing the power dichotomy between the political and bureaucratic level but it also seeks to explain the motivations of bureaucrats. As the role of the bureaucrat in both sustaining consociation mechanisms of conflict management and in the governance process is unknown, the dissertation seeks to further understand this power dichotomy. Within the uncontested society a substantial body of literature acknowledges that the bureaucrat possesses significant levels of discretion in the allocation of resources. The extent of bureaucrat discretion within the consociation society is less understood. Throughout the
dissertation I investigate the extent of discretion available to the bureaucratic elite within the consociational society.

I am also interested in how this discretion is employed. Literature from uncontested societies suggests that active representation exists within the public administration. Scholars differ however in their empirical findings as to what bureaucrats actually actively represent. Studies by Rehfuss (1986) indicate that an organisational identity supersedes a primary (gender and racial) identity within the workplace. As we will see later in the dissertation, (Cfr. Chapters Two/Six) he finds male and female bureaucrats to ‘share a management ideology’ (Rehfuss, 1986: 459). If this were the case within the contested society we would then expect bureaucrats to actively represent an institutional or organisational identity. However, others such as Keiser, Wilkins, Meier, and Holland, (2002), and Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2006) suggest that under certain circumstances bureaucrats actively represent their primary identities within the bureaucracy. If this were the case within the contested society, it would be expected that each minority would represent the interests of their counterparts in society; for example in the case of Kirkuk, Turkmen would represent Turkmen interests, Arabs would represent Arab interests and Kurds would represent Kurdish interests. What therefore causes bureaucrats to actively represent on behalf of a particular identity? Grissom, Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty (2009) find that it is not the institution that determines the extent to which a bureaucrat will actively represent his or her co-ethnics in society, but that the environment in which the institution is set plays a significant role. They find Blacks within southern American
states to represent Blacks in society more so than Blacks in northern states. Their findings would therefore tend to support the assertion that within the contested society we would expect bureaucrats to actively represent their primary identities. Further, in more vociferously contested societies such as Belfast, active representation on behalf of a primary identity should be more likely than in less vociferously contested societies such as Brussels. Lim (2006) too acknowledges that minority representation increases as their numbers increase within the bureaucracy. However, differing from his counterparts, (and building on Rehfuss, 1986) he submits that this is due to the traditional minority altering the norms of the traditional majority and not due to direct representation by the minority on behalf of their representatives in society. Despite disagreement among public administration scholars on what bureaucrats actively represent, and the causes of active representation, agreement exists that active representation exists, be this on behalf of institutional norms or primary identities. Further, whichever study one subscribes to, the belief that identity guides behaviour is accepted

In his seminal work on representative government Niskanen submits that ‘any theory of the behaviour of bureaus that does not incorporate the personal preferences of bureaucrats...will be relevant only in the most authoritarian of environments’ (1971: 5, emphasis added). Similar deductions can also be made from the literature within the contested society. The large majority of public administration research within the contested society concerns the numerical representativeness of various ethnicities

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11 As these concepts will be new to many readers, this representative bureaucracy literature is reintroduced and applied to the different research questions addressed in each of the relevant chapters.
within the various levels of the administration (passive representation – see chapter two). Dresang’s (1974) study of the 1970’s Zambian bureaucracy provides an exception, demonstrating that bureaucrats represent an organisational identity, not a personal identity, while a later normative study by Mengistu and Vogel (2006) suggests a national identity should replace a tribal identity within the Ethiopian bureaucracy. Both studies go beyond the study of passive representation, examining instead who bureaucrats actually represent. Most noteworthy however is that both studies (within conflict management research) validate the claim that identity is an important factor in guiding bureaucrat decision-making in instances where bureaucrats have discretion.

Thus far I have demonstrated that existing research within both public administration (representative bureaucracy) and conflict management supports the assumption that identity guides behaviour. Existing literature indicates that a bureaucrat may represent either an organisational or a personal identity/attachment. However if we further advance representative bureaucracy, merging representative bureaucracy research with bureaucrat typology research it becomes clear that bureaucrats may represent something other than either their primary identities or organisational identities. Reissman (1949), Downs (1967), Nachmias and Rosenbloom (1978) and Selden, Brewer and Brundy (1999) draw on different research methodologies to generate different ‘types’ of bureaucrat, based on bureaucrat role perceptions. Emerging from this literature we see that a number of bureaucrat typologies possess allegiances not to their primary identities or the organisation but to professional norms and values – attachments to a particular policy area or to a particular social objective.
These attachments can of course be more or less altruistic in nature, depending on their content. Merging these two research areas provides the theoretical basis for a bureaucrat to actively represent a professional set of norms and values. European integration researchers have established that epistemic communities, or communities of experts, may emerge at the European level (Haas, 1992; Mitrany, 1975). Radaelli and O’Connor (2009) find elite level bureaucrats from a variety of EU nation-states to possess shared governance beliefs. To what extent is this the case within the contested society? As further developed in chapter six, the bureaucrat may possess simultaneous attachments to his/her personal community, to the organisation, or to a professional set of values. Alternatively the bureaucrat could be completely responsive to the political level. While deductions from research within the uncontested society would lead us to believe that bureaucrats within the contested society represent their primary identities, this has yet to be tested. Findings from bureaucrat typology research indicate that alternative attachments may exist. In one of the only studies of active representation within the contested society, Mengistu and Vogel (2006) propose that a ‘national’ identity could supersede these primary identities in guiding resource allocation. This study finds no evidence of a shared national identity emerging among bureaucrats within our two contested societies. Relying on bureaucrat typology research the dissertation examines the extent to which a shared professional attachment or identity exists among bureaucrats.

To summarise, existing scholarship does not inform us of the role of the bureaucrat within the power-sharing society. Studies from the uncontested society
however have found identity, norms and values to determine how discretion is employed by the bureaucrat. Based on existing public administration and conflict management research, this study therefore assumes that identity guides behaviour. Representative bureaucracy research from the uncontested society submits that a bureaucrat may actively represent an organisational identity or a primary personal identity (usually race or gender). However findings from bureaucrat typology research indicate that the bureaucrat may also actively represent professional attachments. Within the consociational society, do the bureaucratic elite have similar discretion to their counterparts within the uncontested society and if so what guides this bureaucrat discretion? Looking at the bureaucratic elite within two most different models of consociationalism, this dissertation advances this understanding.

1.4 Research design
This comparative project seeks to add to our understanding of the differing mechanisms by which consociational power-sharing is governed. The case study draws upon document analysis, semi-structured elite interviews, surveys, and a mixed-methods technique, relatively new to political science but well established in psychology: Q methodology. These methodologies have been chosen as they have been systematically employed in the measurement of attitudes, norms and values and are particularly effective in:

(i) determining the nature of the politico-administrative axis and
(ii) determining what norms and values guide the bureaucratic elite in instances where they have competency to act
The primary phase of this research project combined both primary and secondary document analysis with some exploratory interviews with key personnel in each city. Collaboration with academics in Belfast and Brussels also proved an integral element to the research. Contact was also made with key players within both academia and the bureaucracy within two other cities – Nicosia and Beirut so as to gauge reaction to the type of research question guiding the research. This is important as it is hoped that other divided societies where divisions still manifest themselves as violence, may learn from the experiences of both Belfast and Brussels. As part of the fieldwork, I also made a point of travelling to every ward in each city, walking around observing daily life within the ward, the facilities available within the ward and casually talking with members of the community on how they perceived service provision within their community. As my intention was to determine how the bureaucracy affects conflict within these power-sharing structures, this aspect of the research contextualised the interviews. It allowed for a greater understanding of areas referred to in interviews and allowed the gathering of more nuanced information which otherwise could not have been communicated. The second phase of the research began in the early autumn of 2009, where 20 interviews with senior bureaucrats within Belfast City Council were conducted. During the spring of 2010, 21 interviews with the bureaucratic elite of Brussels’ four public administrations were conducted, together with a number of political and civil society representatives.

Kerr (WP.9 Conflict in Cities, 2009) provides a comprehensive ‘rough guide’ to elite interviewing within contested environments. In cases such as the bureaucratic

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12 In Belfast – Prof. James Anderson, Prof. Liam O’Dowd, Prof. Madeline Leonard and Dr. Milena Komarova and in Brussels Prof. Rudi Janssens, Dr. Joost Vaesen and Dr. Guy Baeten
elite, the population may be easily identified. A sample frame can be easily constructed, and a probability sample can be drawn. Similar to Selden et al (1999), Reissman (1949) and Rehfuss (1986), a multi-stage strategy to identify interviewees was pursued. First, the universe was established. Given the nature and scope of the project, interviews were targeted on the basis of seniority of position (ie. All of those at director level). In both Belfast and Brussels, a number of senior managers were also interviewed. Interviews with senior management were selected on the basis of two criteria. Firstly, Hindera (1993:421) submits that when measuring the bureaucracy, chosen departments must incorporate ‘measurable decision-making’ that is both ‘discretionary and allocative’. Secondly, following Meier and O’Toole (2006) and Keiser et al (2002) it is, they submit, also necessary to concentrate on areas that are important to the issue at hand, be this gender, religion, culture or language. These two criteria were drawn upon in selecting interviewees at this senior manager level.

In Brussels, contact was first made with the political level, through which access was gained to each of the four urban public administrations: the Brussels Capital Region (BCR), The Flemish Community Commission (VGC), The French Community Commission (COCOF) and the Common/Joint Community Commission (CCC). While there are indeed further public administrations operating within the city, they were not incorporated into the research as their competencies extended beyond the city boundaries and they were not exclusively responsive to Brussels political structures. In Brussels, 30 interviews took place, twenty-one with elite level bureaucrats. A sample of over 80% was attained from
the CCC, VGC and COCOF administrations\textsuperscript{13}. All of those targeted for interview within these administrations agreed to participate in the research. These interviews were with those at director level only. As a number of directors within one of the four administrations, the ‘Brussels Capital Region’ (BCR) administration, declined to participate a number of senior managers, or ‘attachés’\textsuperscript{14}, were also interviewed\textsuperscript{15} based on the criteria identified above.

In Belfast all directors, all heads of department and some managers in what were identified as areas ‘key’ to conflict management were targeted for interview: areas incorporating a potentially contentious aspect and also areas where the Council had the primary responsibility for service provision (the above criteria – eg. The Legal Services directorate of the Council was not targeted for interview). Of the entire bureaucratic elite (Directors, Heads of Service and Managers), 43\% were interviewed. However, only twenty-five of these forty-seven positions were targeted for interview. Of these twenty-five, twenty agreed to be interviewed (80\% response rate).

Core interview lists were developed prior to the research phase in each city. These were constructed on the basis of information available from Council minutes, personal contacts, research and professional literatures and interviews with key academic and political specialists in the area. To reiterate, interviews were targeted on the basis of position within the public administration – not perceived nationality,

\textsuperscript{13} A number of positions within the CCC and COCOF were vacant at the time of fieldwork.

\textsuperscript{14} Attachés are policy experts, one position under the director.

\textsuperscript{15} Q methodology is more concerned with who the interviewees are as opposed to their quantity. The Brussels Capital Region (BCR) figure is disappointing as six of those targeted for interview declined to participate. Nonetheless within the BCR, three directors agreed to partake in the research. This figure was supplemented with four senior managers (attachés).
gender, race or creed. Nonetheless, given that we are looking at a contested city, it is most important that the sample reflects, to some degree, the population. A description of the sample is included as table 1.1 in the annex.

Interviews concentrated on two key questions. Firstly I wanted to determine the politico-administrative dichotomy from the point of view of the senior bureaucrat. This would give some insight into how the political level controlled the bureaucracy within power-sharing structures. Did the bureaucratic level simply follow the direction of the political elite or were they involved in the promotion, advocation and implementation of particular policies. This led to the second key question. If the bureaucrat in question saw his or her role to provide advice to the committee or to promote key policies, I wanted to decipher what guided the bureaucrat in these situations (a primary or a secondary attachment). Thus, in addition to documenting the nature of the politico-administrative axis, I was also interested in what motivated the day to day activities of bureaucrats.

Focusing on the distortions, interpretations, ideological positions and the degrees of importance attributed to certain issues, I wanted to establish the norms and values that guided the decisions of the senior bureaucrats within power-sharing environments. The ‘in-person’ interview was chosen over other possible techniques as it allowed for a more in-depth analysis of what motivated the bureaucrat. This provides the interviewee with an opportunity to gain maximum input into the research, where the norms and values of the bureaucrat could be observed at first hand. However, given the nature of interviews, they can be criticised for ‘leading the interviewee’ in a particular direction or that subjective interpretations may be inappropriately
determined by the interviewer. Even though such pitfalls can be avoided with prudent planning and due care, it was decided to introduce two further safeguards. For this reason, each interview began with a method known as Q-methodology. Although relatively new to political science, this methodology has long since been employed within psychology research to gauge norms, values and core beliefs of individuals. In Q, interviewees are given a series of statements and asked to rank them in order of preference, ranging from ‘I agree’ to ‘I disagree’. This mixed-methods approach not only allows for the quantitative analysis of individual perceptions but allows the interviewee to look at each statement with reference to all the other statements and not simply as an entity in itself. For example in a traditional ‘degrees of attachment’ questionnaire an interviewee may indicate equal agreement with two independent statements, however in Q the interviewee sees both statements side by side and if s/he wishes can indicate more of a preference for one statement over another. This allows for a greater understanding of the individuals personal core beliefs and preferences rather than a simple Likert scale and tick box exercise. The Q methodology process is further explained and expanded upon in chapter six. Together with Q methodology, the remainder of the interview was guided by a semi-structured questionnaire. The first part of the questionnaire determined the personal profile of the candidate. The remainder of the questionnaire was divided into three sections examining identity, perceptions of governance and representation\textsuperscript{16}. Using Nvivo software, these three concepts were examined from three view points: firstly, examining the politico-administrative axis,

\textsuperscript{16} A sample of the questions asked are included as annex 1.3
secondly, the interaction within the department and finally, resource allocation. These categorisations identified where the bureaucrat sought recognition – from society, from a section of society, from his/her political masters or from his/her profession.

This general methodology section has identified how the data for this research was ascertained. Personal, one to one interviews have played a central role in garnering an understanding of individual perceptions among the bureaucratic elite. These traditional interviews and questionnaires were combined with more innovative research methods such as Q-methodology. This combination of methods provides a more comprehensive basis for ascertaining what guides bureaucrats in their daily work. Each of the chapters also includes a methodology section where the relevant methods employed are expanded upon. In the next section I introduce the two cases: Belfast and Brussels. The latter paragraphs identify the research aims.

1.5 Case selection and research questions – overview of Brussels and Belfast
Two hard cases, each possessing alternate mechanisms of consociational power-sharing, have been identified: Belfast and Brussels. Although suffering from the same condition, the symptoms and treatments at the political and bureaucratic level in each case differ remarkably. This ‘most different’ method seeks to ‘compare countries that do not share any common features apart from the political outcome to be explained and one or two of the explanatory factors seen to be important for that outcome’ (Landman 2003: 70). While both Belfast and Brussels manage conflict through consociationalism, this process differs remarkably in each case. Understanding the role of the bureaucrat in each case will allow for some general conclusions on the role of the bureaucrat more generally in
sustaining consociational power-sharing arrangements. There are many examples within public administration and conflict management research where this mechanism of research is used to generalise case study research findings. See Radaelli and O’Connor (2009) where two most different European policy areas were analysed in order to draw conclusions about the policy-making process within the European Council and Commission committees more generally. As mentioned at the outset, this dissertation is part of a large ESRC funded project designed to further understand mechanisms of conflict management: Conflict in Cities. The project concentrates on cities in and around Europe’s borders. This in turn has influenced the case selection of this dissertation. Of the European examples of contested cities within a contested state, Belfast and Brussels were deemed to be the most appropriate in extrapolating the lessons of ethnic peace. In section 1.6 I outline how this research contributes to the aims and objectives of the project. In this section however I situate my cases within the context of other contested cities and provide some background information for the reader unfamiliar with Belfast and Brussels.

Bollens’ (2007) continuum below (Fig. 1.4) sets the two cases of this research within a selection of global contested cities. The continuum serves to contextualise the research findings within the wider contested city literature and indeed the other cities within the Conflict in Cities project. Belfast and Brussels have been chosen as subjects for this research as, of the cities outlined below, they provide an opportunity to learn from instances of ‘ethnic peace’. The differing nature of the conflict management mechanisms assists in the generation of hypotheses, while at the same time a number
of similarities can be held constant. Selecting cities that are ‘moving towards peace’ or are ‘stable’ provides an opportunity for those cities further down the continuum to learn from these cases of ethnic-peace by consociationalism. The research can identify the obstacles facing existing power-sharing regimes, where societies considering power-sharing as a form of conflict management may be alerted to some of the potential difficulties in sustaining conflict management.

I have already established the most significant difference between the two cases – in Belfast conflict is regulated through the traditional consociation approach, while in Brussels power is shared at the lowest common denominator. There are however further significant differences between our cases which also need to be considered. The following paragraphs identify the different approaches to conflict management in each of our cases, looking firstly at how power-sharing is politically organised before

![Conflicts-Stability Continuum](image.png)

**Fig.1.4: CONFLICT—STABILITY CONTINUUM (Bollens, 2007)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[1]</th>
<th>[2]</th>
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<th>[4]</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACTIVE CONFLICT &gt;&gt; SUSPENSION OF &gt;&gt; MOVEMENT TOWARD PEACE &gt;&gt; STABILITY/NORMALCY</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>JERUSALEM</td>
<td>NICOSIA</td>
<td>BELFAST</td>
<td>JOHANNESBURG</td>
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<td>MOSTAR</td>
<td>SARAJEVO</td>
<td>BARCELONA</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIRKUK*</td>
<td>BASQUE COUNTRY</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRUSSELS*</td>
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***Defined by the degree that active inter-group conflict over *root political issues* has been effectively addressed***

*I have added Brussels and Kirkuk to the continuum, based on Bollens’ 2008 paper describing Brussels as sustainable, in the same category as Johannesburg; and Kirkuk he describes as combustible, in the same category as Jerusalem.*
concentrating on the public administration. The final paragraphs look at some sociological factors in each city. This section proves useful if we are to consider the cities and their institutional designs as explanatory variables for bureaucrat behaviour. In other words, to what extent do the cities themselves (external urban environment) or their choice of conflict management mechanism (LCD or comprehensive) determine the norms and values of the bureaucrat? Recall that the interest of the dissertation is in the politician-bureaucrat dichotomy: the decision-making process.

Taking firstly the political level, power-sharing within the Belfast City Council (BCC) has occurred as if by chance. Once the number of Irish-nationalists increased to more or less parity with their UK-unionist counterparts, the balance shifted in the traditionally unionist dominated Council chamber. Since 1997 the balance of power has been in the hands of the Alliance party, a party comprising of members of both communities. A mayoral rotation scheme has also been adopted. Since 1997, Belfast has had six nationalist mayors, including two members of Sinn Fein (a party linked with the IRA), five unionist mayors and three Alliance mayors. This ‘power-sharing’ in Belfast has happened informally over a number of years. BCC provides a good example of informal power-sharing, where cooperation is not grounded in law or statutes, but as a necessity for the city to function. Cooperative norms and values have developed over time and are now taken as given. There is no political opposition. Governance is by consensus.

Brussels, on the other hand, provides an example where power-sharing institutions have been formalised and cooperation is governed by strict top-down rules and procedures, rules which have been established by national level consensus. Since
1989 Brussels has held five successful parliamentary elections. Political representatives are elected from two lists, with each candidate standing for either the Dutch or French quota. The quotas are fixed, guaranteeing Dutch-speaking parties seventeen seats while their French counterparts fill the remaining seventy-two. This has the effect of creating a higher value for a vote for a Dutch speaking party than a vote for a French-speaking party. This however must be contextualised within the national power-sharing agreement where a French vote is worth more than a Dutch vote. Subsequent to the elections, a consociational government emerges representing a coalition of French-speaking parties and a coalition of Dutch-speaking parties. A Dutch-speaking and a French-speaking opposition also emerge. The Brussels political and administrative system is complex, yet effective in conflict management. I explain the institutional background of the Brussels solution in greater detail in chapter four.

Turning now to the administration we see that recruitment to the public sector in Belfast is governed solely by the merit principle – the most qualified person for the job should get it. There is a grievance redressal procedure in place where those who feel they have unfairly missed out on a job or promotion due to their community background may appeal. The effects of this policy are identified and expanded upon in chapter five. Meanwhile in Brussels, recruitment to the urban government is formalised along strict linguistic lines. Dutch-speaking candidates are guaranteed 30% of the positions while the remaining 70% are reserved for French-speaking candidates. At senior levels, there is a 50:50 split – if a department has a French-speaking director, the deputy director must automatically be Dutch-speaking. Thus, the merit principle is
compromised in favour of formally guaranteeing Dutch-speaking representation within
the public administration. Even if passive representation were achievable under the
merit system, this would not satisfy Dutch-speakers demands in Brussels. While they
comprise 10%-15% of the population, for reasons that will become apparent later in the
dissertation (Cfr. Chapter Four), Dutch-speaking politicians have successfully negotiated
a quota of 50% of the elite level bureaucrat positions (and 30% of remaining ‘street
level’ positions). Thus we can say that not only are two divergent mechanisms of power
sharing employed (LCD and comprehensive) but that further differences in terms of
political structure and administrative design are also present. A further distinguishing
characteristic of the Brussels public administration is the highly politicised nature of the
bureaucratic elite. As will be further developed in chapter four, members of the
bureaucratic elite may possess concurrent membership of political parties. This is not
the case in Belfast: as in the rest of the UK and Ireland, bureaucrats are expected to
have no political party affiliations. The following paragraphs contextualise the
environment in which these political and administrative institutions operate.\footnote{More
details on the political and public administration structure of Brussels are presented in chapter four.}

Given the relative non-violent past of Brussels and the corresponding perceived
less tension between communities, bureaucrats in Brussels would be presumed to
possess a more harmonised professional identity than their Belfast counterparts, hence
the haste by some to investigate exporting the model. In Belfast, where divisions have
been exasperated by thirty years of ‘Troubles’, it could be expected that divisions
between the communities would remain particularly strong. While parts of Belfast are
now considered ‘mixed areas’, many, predominantly working class, but also some middle and upper class areas still remain highly segregated. Today, two thirds of Belfast’s population continue to live in areas where over 81% of residents are of the same religion (Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006). Today, no district within the Brussels Capital Region could be described as being predominantly Dutch-speaking. Logie’s (1981) study had to use a threshold as low as 20% to identify clusters of Dutch-speakers within the Brussels municipality. Thus Brussels has a more ‘integrated’ feel. Society in Belfast lends itself to division, while that of Brussels lends itself to less division – harmonisation may be a little ambitious. This division within Belfast is also evidenced socially; for example, if one is a member of the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA), the probability would be that they would belong to the Roman Catholic and hence nationalist community. Similarly, supporters of Linfield Football Club would be assumed to be members of the Protestant, and hence unionist, community. Again, these are of course generalisations and exceptions do exist. On the other hand, research by Janssens (2008:6) in Brussels finds that ‘people with a different linguistic background are not only attending the same schools; club life is also increasingly reflecting this diversity’. He continues: ‘Associations in Brussels are no longer linguistically homogenous’ (Janssens, 2008:6). Thus we can conclude that societal interactions in both our cities tend to differ.

In addition, linguistic differences are not considered to be as robust as religious differences. It is common for many people all over the globe to possess a multitude of languages. It is possible to be both a Dutch and French speaker (bilingual) however it is more difficult to be both Catholic and Protestant (bi-religious) or to a lesser extent both
British and Irish (bi-national)\textsuperscript{18}. Some French parents in Brussels send their children to Dutch speaking schools, so they may attain a grasp of the Dutch language, thereby developing bilingualism. The fear of ‘the other’ does not get the same opportunity to develop as in religious conflicts. In Belfast parents largely choose to have their children educated through their own faith. Exceptions are indeed identifiable, especially in the more middle class, South Belfast suburbs. In these minority of cases where Catholic parents send their children to a Protestant school, this is generally because the school is either perceived to be a better school or more convenient, not generally to learn the merits of Protestantism. Further support for this assertion is provided by Lijphart (1979) and Reynal-Querol, (2002) where they find linguistic conflicts not to be as vociferous as conflicts grounded in religion or occupation\textsuperscript{19}. If bureaucrats were to mirror the cleavages of society, we would therefore expect Belfast bureaucrats to be more inclined to maintain their primary identities within the public administration. If the opposite is found, it would not mean that a relationship between the society and the active representation on behalf of that society did not exist, but simply that a vociferously contested or divided society would not correspondingly have to have an ethno-politically divided bureaucracy.

Belfast and Brussels also display a number of similarities which can be held constant to assist our investigation. Both are developed, North-European cities with a long tradition of contestation. Both possess a highly educated public service and both

\textsuperscript{18} Language identity and fluency in a language should not however be confused. Many French people are fluent in English but do not consider themselves as possessing an English or American identity.

\textsuperscript{19} Gurr (1993:317) however finds religion to be ‘at best a contributing factor in communal conflict and seldom the root cause’. This however does not influence the generation of hypotheses.
have seen a relative absence of violence over the past number of years. A proposal by Zartman (1993) and Lake and Rothchild (1996) is that of a zero-sum game existing at the political elite level. What is required, they submit, is that where it is in the political interests of both parties to support the institutions which regulate the conflict, conflict will be reduced. This however rests on the assumption of only one ‘political elite’ in each community – this of course is not the case in our two cases. Political parties from the same side of the community, but different parties, vie vigorously for votes, campaigning on any concessions or perceived weaknesses made by their coethno-political political rivals.

The politicisation of ethnicity is considered by many to be a primary escalator of conflict. ‘A well-developed civil society…consists of strong and autonomous secondary organisations based upon universalistic membership criteria’ (Wake Carroll and Carroll, 2000, 25-50; 2004: 335). Although much progress has taken place over the preceding decades, political group membership remains religiously/linguistically aligned in Belfast and Brussels. At the political level in Belfast, Protestants tend to vote for Unionist parties, while Catholics tend to vote for Nationalist parties. In contrast to states such as Mauritius where ‘each of the main political parties includes at least a few prominent politicians from ethnic groups other than those from which they draw their main support’, political leadership in Belfast and Brussels is highly segregated (Wake Carroll and Carroll, 2000: 127). Again, some exceptions do exist. In Belfast, the Alliance party does draw political leaders from both communities. Meanwhile, in Brussels, Dutch-

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20 As indicated in the city profiles, both cities have a different historical association with violence.
Speakers align themselves with the Dutch socialists/Dutch conservatives/Dutch greens parties etc... while French speakers align themselves with French socialists/ French conservatives or French green parties etc. Again however these are generalisations and French-speakers may vote (as an example) for the Dutch-speaking Green party as they may stand a greater chance of getting elected. However, in the main, both Belfast and Brussels possess leadership that is highly segregated along ethno-linguistic lines. Despite this, conflict is carefully regulated in each case.

Both cities also possess stable (regional) governing regimes which are set within a similar, stable geographic region with constructive external support. It is important to note however the different contexts in which each power-sharing system functions. The compromises in Belfast did not emerge from the regional Good Friday Agreement but superseded it. In Brussels, the compromise is a direct result of the national Belgian compromise. Costs and benefits among communities in Brussels must therefore always be contextualised within the national compromise. This agglomeration of similarities and differences provides a comprehensive and structurally sound basis for investigating the role of the bureaucracy in stabilising conflict. Although both cities are experiencing a somewhat stable, peaceful coexistence, the structures and environments are sufficiently diverse to understand the role of the bureaucratic elite and power-sharing mechanisms in the stabilisation and normalisation of conflict. Of course it is also acknowledged that each contested society is unique in and of itself and one must be cautious not to overstate any perceived similarities. The aim therefore is not to compare Belfast and Brussels, by holding a number of factors constant in order to explain variance, but to
draw on the differing experiences of both cities in order to understand the role perceptions of the bureaucrat under these two differing mechanisms of conflict management.

The above paragraphs intend to provide a sufficient background to the similarities and differences between the two cases. For further information on the political and administrative contexts within which each of the urban structures are situated, see Knox and Carmichael 2006 and Birrell, 1978: Belfast; and Witte, Alen, Dumant, Vandernoot and de Groof (1999) and Deschouwer & Van Parijs 2009: Brussels.

In summary, Belfast and Brussels provide examples of two most different mechanisms of consociationalism. While I do deliberately draw on the two most different cases of consociationalism, the purpose of the dissertation is not to compare two cities, nor for that matter do I seek to compare the merits of two forms of power-sharing. The differences between contested societies are too numerous to be able to hold constant variable factors in order to determine causation. The most different cases method is used so as to understand how the bureaucrat behaves within two different power-sharing mechanisms. It also proves useful in probing some secondary hypotheses. These cannot be tested due to the sample size, but findings can form the basis for further research. For example, firstly, if the institution were to determine norms and values, (as advocated by Rehfuss, 1986 and Wilkins and Williams, 2008) we would expect bureaucrats within the BCR, the CCC and Belfast not to represent an ethno-national identity as these institutions consist of both communities and are designed to serve both communities. As the COCOF and VGC are designed to serve one community only,
bureaucrats may be expected to feel more representative of their primary identities. Alternatively, if societal factors were to determine norms and values, (as suggested by Grissom et al, 2009) we would expect bureaucrats in Belfast to represent their primary identities more so than their Brussels counterparts, as the conflict is more entrenched in Belfast – see Jansens (2008) studies and Bollens (2008), as outlined above. However these two hypotheses are secondary to our investigation and are simply alluded to as the basis for further research. The overarching hypothesis for the dissertation investigates if a professional attachment can supersede primary or institutional attachments within the consociational environment. While Mengistu and Vogel’s (2006) recommendation that bureaucrats should be encouraged to develop a common national identity may indeed be theoretically laudable, its possibility in practice is questioned by the findings of this research. As documented in chapter six, our bureaucrats within both cities have not developed shared nationalities. It is submitted that an alternative secondary attachment to either the institution or to professional learned values could potentially supersede active representation on behalf of a primary identity.

In sum, this section has outlined the rationale for choosing our two cases. It is again reiterated that the dissertation does not seek to appraise each of the cities, but instead draws on the differing experiences so that societies considering consociationalism as an option may be better placed to make more informed choices about administrative design. The purpose of the dissertation is not designed to appraise the efficacy of differing conflict management mechanisms (nonetheless some conclusions can be made), but to determine the role of the bureaucratic elite in
sustaining conflict management under two different mechanisms of power-sharing. The conceptual framework above (representative bureaucracy and bureaucrat typology) assists in determining this. Brussels and Belfast have embraced two alternate mechanisms of consociational power-sharing in order to attain the common goal of conflict management. Throughout the dissertation I investigate the role of the bureaucrat in sustaining conflict management in each city. The purpose of this dissertation therefore is to ascertain a greater understanding of how two differing mechanisms of governing power-sharing affect bureaucratic governance, and hence conflict management. It will establish the auspices under which ethnically differing peoples may co-govern within stable power-sharing administrations. A greater understanding of urban governance within these two cities will allow for more informed policy making which should not only contribute to conflict management in each of the identified cities but provide a platform for greater understanding of bureaucratic reform within other contested environments. As the role of the political elite in sustaining conflict management has been advanced by other researchers, this study is approached from the view point of the bureaucrat. I restrict the investigation to how the bureaucrat perceives his/her role and the effect this has on policy, and hence conflict management. I examine the role of individuals (bureaucrats) within one governance institution (the bureaucracy) in assisting to sustain conflict management in instances where differing ethnic groups manage to actually coexist.
1.6 Contributions to the Literature

The dissertation speaks to both practitioners and researchers in two literatures: firstly to conflict management research within the contested state and secondly to public administration research. The project to which this work is attributed, Conflict in Cities and the Contested State, seeks to better understand the ways heavily contested cities may become viable for all inhabitants. A team of researchers from three UK universities, Cambridge, Exeter and Queen’s Belfast, investigate the common subject of conflict management from a variety of different perspectives. The multi-disciplinary initiative includes: architecture, urban studies, politics, geography and sociology. These lenses are used to try and understand conflict management in a number of European and Middle Eastern cities: Jerusalem, Belfast, Brussels, Berlin, Mostar, Nicosia, Berlin, Beirut, Tripoli and Kirkuk. More specifically, the project seeks to understand how urban structures and institutions may strengthen cities to withstand state struggles, and establish to what extent cities may be transformed into effective and equitable sites for human settlement. In other words, the project is concerned with mechanisms for the confrontation and absorption of conflict as opposed to conflict resolution or solution21. This dissertation contributes directly to these objectives, disregarding the nature of the policies to be implemented but focusing instead on the policy implementation and design mechanisms and more importantly, the policy implementers and designers. Who are they and what guides them in their decision-making processes? The research contributes to an understudied aspect of conflict management research – the politician-

21 More detailed information about the project and the nature and scope of the various associated research projects can be found at www.conflictincities.org.
bureaucrat relationship. Much of the normative literature in conflict management focuses on what policies would best suit particular cases. Much of this literature also points to the public administration as one of the primary obstacles to effective public policy development. I provide an opportunity for bureaucrats themselves to contribute to the debate, outlining their role perceptions within the contested city. Further, I respond to research calls by Stanfield (1996) and Varshney (2002) that in order to manage ethnic conflict we must first understand instances of ethnic peace. Of the cities under investigation, Belfast and Brussels have adopted two different forms of consociationalism and provide an opportunity to learn from ethnic peace.

My second contribution is to public administration and European governance research. While this is a secondary contribution, I believe it to be of equal significance. As identified in the previous section I compare two systems of public administration within two mechanisms of consociationalism. To compare these bureaucracies I use the theoretical lens of representative bureaucracy. To date, representative bureaucracy has not been applied to European committee governance research. European governance research seeks to understand the decision-making mechanisms of the European Union, and other bodies such as the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. While there are many theoretical approaches to investigating the subject from multi-level governance, to intergovernmentalism to neo-functionalism, a large majority of empirical works emanating from these frameworks rely on the belief that norms, beliefs and values guide behaviour. Smith (2003) submits that the sociology of European Commissioners (political level) matters at the EU level, investigating the
causal relationship between previous career, national identity and portfolio and role perceptions. At the bureaucratic level, Egeberg (1999) analyses the role conceptions of national bureaucrats operating at the EU level. Checkel (2003) seeks to determine the mindset of bureaucrats on Council Committees, investigating the changing nature of their loyalties. Hooghe (2005) probes the norms, beliefs and values of permanent officials within the European Commission. In her literature review she submits that most research on socialisation examines states or governments, but that along with Checkel (2003) and Johnston (2001) her research focuses on the individual. There are also other more recent examples of such research (Gornitzka and Sverdrup, 2008; Trondal and Jeppesen, 2008; Lewis 2005; Fouilleux, Maillard and Smith, 2005; O’Connor and Radaelli 2009, among others). Thus it can be surmised that within European governance research, the motivations and role perceptions of the bureaucrat are viewed by a significant proportion of the literature as being central to the subsequent actions of the bureaucrat. Within this dissertation I assume a similar relationship. However, while much of this European governance research has adopted theoretical approaches from psychology, or used a psychological lens to view existing theories of European integration (Checkel, 2003 and Hooghe 2005 to name but two), research has rarely adopted methods from outside the realm of political science. While the ideas and concepts have travelled from psychology to political science, the research methodologies, in general, have not. Within this dissertation I draw on a methodology introduced to political science from psychology by researchers such as Selden and Brewer and Brundy (1999) known as Q Methodology. While European governance
research seeks to determine norms, beliefs and values of interviewees, its interviews are largely based on degrees of attachment surveys and semi-structured interviews, techniques designed to ascertain information. In this dissertation I suggest that Q methodology could be more helpful in ascertaining individual norms, beliefs and values.

1.7 Outline of the dissertation

Thus far I have framed the subject to be tackled in the dissertation in terms of attention to it from the perspective of both conflict management and public administration research. I have underlined the contribution the dissertation will make to both understanding the conflict management process and to the public administration process within the contested society. I have also situated the research questions within two most different types of consociationalism. The plan of the dissertation is as follows:

Chapter two provides a comprehensive review of the literature setting out the current state of research into bureaucrat activity within the contested society. It finds that while the role of the bureaucracy within the contested society is often referred to in conflict management and development studies research, it scarcely is analysed. In this chapter I pay close attention to bureaucratic legitimacy within the context of the contested society and I also underline the importance of understanding bureaucratic norms and values. It is not sufficient to understand governance structures or policy implementation processes, but to understand how these structures and processes could be skewed by the bureaucrat. To understand how such an understanding can be ascertained within the contested society, I draw on more advanced public
administration research within the uncontested society. However, if bureaucrat discretion matters, it firstly must exist. Relying on new interview data from Belfast, chapter three pays particular attention to extent to which bureaucratic discretion exists within the contested society.

Chapters three and four investigate the environment in which the bureaucrat acts in each of our cities. As our two cities are very different, more can be learnt about the environment in which the bureaucrat acts through designing two different research questions. Chapter three traces the changing role of the bureaucratic elite in policy-making since power-sharing has been established in Belfast. The bureaucratic elite are found not to significantly influence policy outcomes in high public interest, one-off decisions. However in day-to-day decisions, that often also incorporate a traditional sectarian element, the influence of the bureaucrat is found to trump that of the elected official. Hence developing administrative capacity is not only necessary for attaining the au courant goal of good governance but also for sustaining power-sharing agreements. Chapter four proceeds to investigate how the bureaucracy fits within the lowest common denominator mechanism of conflict management in Brussels. It is found that while there are many problems with the implementation of the Brussels model, Brussels provides evidence that this alternative form of power-sharing is not only theoretically plausible, but practically possible. The role of the bureaucrat in conflict management in Brussels differs from that of the bureaucrat in Belfast. While aspects of this difference in role perception are indeed found to be due to the conflict management mechanism, there is also evidence to support the conclusion that it is not the mechanisms
themselves that determine role perceptions, rather it is how the mechanisms are implemented. These chapters provide an understanding of the governance environment in which the bureaucrat role perceptions are generated. Put differently, chapters three and four determine the role of the (elite level) bureaucracy as an organisation under both conditions of conflict management, while at the same time developing our understanding of the environment in which the bureaucrat operates in each city.

In chapters five and six the emphasis shifts from examining the environment in which bureaucrats within both cases work, to determining the role perceptions of individual bureaucrats in each city. I am most interested in examining the motivations guiding elite level bureaucrats. As norms and values guide behaviour these two chapters concentrate on determining what these norms and values actually are – are the bureaucratic elite guided by their primary identities, organisational identities, professional identities, or are they responsive to the political level? One of the emerging findings from chapter two informs us that much of the research into public administration within the contested society concerns the proportion of each community represented at various levels within the bureaucracy. The debate largely polarises into two schools of thought – those perceiving bureaucratic legitimacy to be guaranteed through equity of access to employment within the bureaucracy, and those perceiving bureaucratic legitimacy to be guaranteed through equity of representation within the bureaucracy. A review of the representative bureaucracy literature also concludes that passive representation, or a critical mass, of the traditional out-group is a necessary condition for active representation. In Brussels this ‘critical mass’ of the traditional out-
group, Dutch-speakers, is guaranteed by quotas. No such quotas are in place in Belfast. Chapter five investigates whether or not the traditional out-group (Catholics) are represented within the Belfast bureaucracy, finding that in instances where equity of access to public administration is guaranteed, ceteris paribus, passive representation will follow. Quota systems of recruitment therefore need not be relied upon in order to achieve a passively representative bureaucracy. However, passive representation is not always sufficient in every society: as indicated above, the Brussels system is deliberately designed to significantly over represent the Dutch-speaking minority. Nonetheless, it is sufficient for our study to acknowledge that both our cities are found to possess a significant representation of the traditional out-group at the elite level. The necessary conditions for a bureaucrat to actively represent his/her own community therefore exist in both cities. The environment to disprove the central hypothesis exists. (ie. the conditions for a bureaucrat representing his/her primary identity are met in each city)

Chapter six then investigates the role perceptions of bureaucrats. Drawing on public administration and governance scholarship, a number of theoretically possible role perceptions are identified. Once contextualised within the findings of chapters three and four, individual bureaucrat role perceptions provide an insight into the motivations of bureaucrats and hence the politician-bureaucrat dichotomy. This in turn informs us how the conflict management mechanism works in practice.

While references to the conceptual framework are made throughout, chapter seven draws together the empirical findings of the research. It revisits the aims of the research: to determine the role of the bureaucratic elite in sustaining conflict
management and determine whether or not a secondary learned attachment can supersede a primary attachment in guiding resource allocation and decision-making. In doing so, this final chapter considers the implications for further research and identifies some recommendations for policy-makers.
2

Literature Review

The need for public administration research in contested societies: Finding the bureaucracy in conflict management research

2.1 Introduction

Conflict management literature misses valuable evidence from public administration research on the role of the bureaucracy and bureaucratic values, norms and identities in allocating resources. This review finds that the contribution of the bureaucracy to decision-making is regularly referred to but rarely analysed in conflict management research. If, as put forward by existing conflict management literature, the bureaucracy is portrayed as having a negative effect on governance, surely any progress toward good governance must begin with a comprehensive understanding of the role of the bureaucrat in the governance process within power-sharing arrangements. What follows is a review of existing empirical research useful for understanding the role of the bureaucracy in conflict management. It is expected that this chapter will inform the reader on the nature of existing bureaucratic governance research within contested environments, shedding light on potential avenues of further research and current problems facing professional administrators in ethnically and culturally divided societies. Incorporating both conflict management research and public administration research,
the need for a greater understanding of how bureaucratic mechanisms are exploited by the bureaucrat becomes more apparent.

This chapter identifies the absence of scholarly interest in determining the role of the bureaucrat in sustaining conflict management mechanisms. It finds that conflict management research has much to learn from public administration research within uncontested societies. It is not sufficient to understand what policies to implement, nor is it sufficient to understand the structures that are conducive to good governance: scholarship must also extend to understanding how elite level bureaucrats influence/skew policies and decision-making processes. There exist various mechanisms of conflict management, ranging from coercive domination (hegemonic) or oppression on the one hand to power-sharing on the other. Various actors determine the success of such mechanisms – the military, the political level, the bureaucratic level, non-governmental organisations, civil society organisations, international actors, interest groups etc. Each of these actors will of course exploit the rules of the game to achieve their own personal, societal, or organisational, objectives. Each actor therefore has a varying influence on the management of conflict. It is this realm of interaction that has now widely been considered by the generic term: ‘governance’. The concept of good governance is not new; however of late one cannot talk of public administration, organisational structure or policy implementation without being confronted with the term ‘governance’. The literature on governance is as vast as it is diverse, examining how best to run health and education trusts to entire bureaucracies and organisations. There is however a growing interest in examining the contribution of governance actors
to conflict management. It is found that the literature on governance in contested societies covers, in some detail, the roles of democracy, poverty and social exclusion, (Beall, Crankshaw, and Parnell, 2002) participatory budgeting (Koonings, 2004; Roussopoulos and Benello 1970, 2005), legitimacy (Carroll and Carroll, 1999) non-governmental organisations and civil society organisations, (Gerometta, Haussermann, and Longo, 2005, Byrne, 2001), the role of militia groups and state forces, (Nilsson, 2008; Glassmyer and Sambanis, 2008; Hoddie and Hartzell, 2003) political stability and economic growth (Jong-A-Pin, 2006) and electoral systems (Norris, 2005, 2008; Binningsbo, 2005; Riphenburg, 2007, Wolff, 2006). Broader research briefs take more encompassing approaches to conflict resolution, examining a variety of mechanisms leading to successful power-sharing22 (Lipjhart, 1969, 1977; Nordlinger, 1972; Lake and Rothchild, 1996; Kliot and Mansfield, 1999; Horowitz, 2000; McGarry and O’Leary, 2004; Roeder and Rothchild, 2005, Kerr, 2005; and Varshney, 2001; Norris, 2008; Wolff and Yakinthov, 2011). Studies by Carroll and Carroll (2000) and Stanfield (1996) look at how governance works in successfully managed plural societies. Persistently occasional however is research into the role of the bureaucracy in conflict management. This chapter is concerned exclusively with the role of the bureaucracy in the governance process of power-sharing societies. Binningsbø (2005) hypothesises a relationship between lasting peace and proportional representation, grand coalitions, segmental autonomy, number of power-sharing institutions and the size of the society. A strong

22 I regularly refer to ‘successful power-sharing’. I intend this to mean successful in managing conflict, not measuring quality of governance, quality of institutional design, administrative or political capacity or electoral processes etc...(Cfr. Bollens continuum Fig. 1.4)
stable bureaucracy however does not directly feature as an independent variable. Similarly Schneckener (2002) too investigates how power-sharing works. Despite acknowledging the dangers of poor decision-making, precedence is given to the ‘role of political elites in sustaining shared rule’, again avoiding any analysis of the bureaucracy (Schneckener, 2002: 203). Supporting this assertion, Bissessar (2009:4) finds that ‘there has been little attempt to date to investigate the challenges that will face senior public officers in developed countries and even less so in developing countries, more particularly plural societies’. Thier and Chopra (2002) set out the institutional challenges facing Afghanistan in the immediate aftermath of the war, however little is known about how bureaucrats would behave within such emerging institutional frameworks. A review of the most prominent journals in public administration/conflict management from the past ten years emphasises the lack of scholarly interest in developing our understanding of how the bureaucracy affects conflict management. Stanisevski and Miller (2009) suggest that government institutions can have a role in the normalisation and stabilisation process within the Macedonian context. While concurring with their thesis, a greater knowledge of the individual role perceptions of the bureaucrat in these environments will inform us how the bureaucracy is likely to behave in these circumstances.

One of the foremost reasons for attaining a greater understanding of the bureaucracy in a divided society originates from its failures, as highlighted by current empirical research on other aspects of divided governance. Bollens (2000: 318) finds policymaking in both Belfast and Jerusalem to be ‘associated with bias’. Beall et al
(2002: 200) question the capacity of municipal officials and politicians ‘to keep up with the extended responsibilities of government’. The executive director of UNCHS (Habitat) has called for ‘a sea change in the management approach of many city governments’ (Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, 2001). Whether perceived or actual, the bureaucracy is seen at best as disregarding conflict or at worst enhancing societal conflict through resource allocation. As ‘the public service has a major role to play in reconciling, reconstructing and developing society’ (Ncholo, 2000: 87); a more comprehensive understanding of the service is a necessity for conflict management.

Mistaking symptoms for cause, much of the governance research in divided societies has failed to acknowledge the importance of bureaucratic reform. Apart from a number of notable exceptions mentioned throughout the review, efforts are concentrated on the effects of poor public administration rather than investigating mechanisms of ameliorating administrative design within the contested society. Wimmer and Schetter (2003: 534) in their vision for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, propose that ‘establishing institutions that are able to perform the basic functions of modern states should represent the main strategic goal of the reconstruction programme’. Yet research has not identified how these institutions should be designed and managed. Studies by Jo Beall (2002) comprehensively examine the effect of inadequate governance on poverty and social exclusion. In *Uniting a Divided City* Beall et al (2002) empirically use the case of Johannesburg to outline in depth the affects of poor governance structures on social exclusion (See also Kearns and Forrest, 2000). This wealth of empirical data does not however extend to the bureaucracy itself.
Schneckener’s previously referred to study compares a variety of successful and failed mechanisms of conflict management in Europe, citing the pivotal role of political elites in managing conflict. Their behaviour however is ‘shaped by the institutional arrangements’ (Schneckener, 2002:203). It is these institutional arrangements that require further understanding. How can they be designed in a way that supports successful conflict management and how will the bureaucrat behave within these structures?

Political level decisions are indeed a prerequisite for the success of any power-sharing agreement, be these based on either consociationalism or centripetalism. Solutions however are also required at the executive, or policy, level. As the primary support tool of the executive arm of government, the bureaucracy directly affects symptoms of poor decision making. Any solution to the above symptoms of poverty, social exclusion and social cohesion needs to concentrate on the spheres of decision-making which affect these areas – the politico-administrative axis. While conflict management research has advanced on the political side of the axis, less is understood about the contribution of the public administration. The need for a greater understanding of the administrative design is further emphasised by El Zein and Sims (2004). They investigate the efforts of the Office of Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR) in Lebanon, following the civil war, with a view to the exportation of the model. Although they find OMSAR to have misinterpreted the political environment in which the administration is set, a significant proportion of responsibility is placed on the failure of OMSAR to work with the existing, indigenous public administration, as
opposed to working against it. The bureaucrat can be part of the solution, instead of perpetually being perceived as the problem, and needs to be understood completely if institutional structural change is to have any positive impact on conflict management. This dissertation proposes that the development of administrative capacity is as important in attaining the goal of conflict management as it is in attaining the goal of good governance.

Although public administration research in divided societies is sporadic to say the least, we are not starting from scratch. The following sections review the existing literature which analyses the bureaucracy in contested societies, also drawing on theoretical advances made in more cohesive environments. This next section will explore how these existing studies inform our understanding of how the bureaucracy affects conflict management. The remainder of the review is organised around four key points, specifically (i) existing research questions evidenced in the literature and theoretical approaches; (ii) representative bureaucracy in conflict management research, (iii) the wider representative bureaucracy debate and (iv) main findings and limitations.

2.2 Existing approaches

Before analysing the impact of the bureaucracy on conflict management, a clear understanding of the status quo is required. What are the existing research questions, how are these questions theoretically substantiated and how is the subsequent research designed? This section intends to shed some light on these broad discursive questions.
Reviewing the literature, three broad areas of investigation are identified: (i) the first category of research consists of empirically based studies of governance within the contested society that are theoretically grounded in public administration. This research is found to draw primarily on the theory of representative bureaucracy; (ii) Case study research. These studies of governance vary from investigations of various civil service reform agendas and normative arguments, to more theoretically substantial research approaches such as that of Bollens (2000). (iii) Finally, some larger-N quantitative studies incorporating a comparative element examining structural design across various territories, investigate the structural environments that are most conducive to good governance within contested societies. Beginning with studies grounded in representative bureaucracy, each of these three areas of scholarly research are considered in turn.

Firstly, studies with a theoretical foundation in public administration generally adopt the theory of representative bureaucracy\textsuperscript{23}. Kingsley’s representative bureaucracy (1944), further developed by Van Riper (1958: 552), supposes that decisions made by the bureaucracy should mirror the preferences, ‘ethos and attitudes’ of the society which they govern. Mosher (1968: 12) further develops the theory, differentiating between ‘that which the bureaucracy is’ and ‘that which the bureaucracy does’. According to Mosher, passive representativeness concerns the origin of individuals and the degree to which, collectively, they mirror society, while in active representation an

\textsuperscript{23} While I have previously defined active and passive representation (cfr. Chapter One), I have revisited the definitions here in order to situate the definitions within the wider representative bureaucracy/conflict management debate.
individual is expected to press for the interests of those he or she represents (Hindera, 1993: 417). Put differently, passive representation would simply concern itself with the number of Turkmen, Kurds and Arabs within the Kirkuk bureaucracy relative to the population of the city. Active representation on the other hand concerns itself with the actions of each group within the bureaucracy, attempting to determine if or when representation within the administration equates with the flow of benefits to that particular group. Active representation, it can therefore be said, delves deeper looking at who the individual bureaucrat actually represents within the bureaucracy. Today, research questions within a contested society tend to focus on determining how to achieve a bureaucracy that, in its composition, mirrors that of the society it supposedly represents – passive representation. Meanwhile studies in more cohesive societies have applied the advanced concept of active representation, thereby differentiating between the actions of the bureaucrat and the outward (primary) identity of the bureaucrat. In order to understand the role of the bureaucrat within the politico-administrative axis, power-sharing research must consider the concept of active representation, determining if and when bureaucrats actively represent. Further, it is important to understand what people, groups or ideas they would represent when they do actively represent.

In summary, the numerous literature reviews of representative bureaucracy highlight two aspects of empirical research: (i) passive representation, (Brown, 1999, Esman, 1999) and (ii) causes of, and restrictions to, active representation (Hindera, 1993; Keiser et al, 2002; Meier and Nicholson-Crotty, 2006; Wilkins and Williams, 2008;
Grissom et al, 2009; Meier and O’Toole, 2006; Kennedy, 2008) Apart from a few notable exceptions, most conflict management research concentrates on this first field of enquiry – passive representation, investigating how best to achieve a representative bureaucracy, the necessity of achieving a representative bureaucracy, or the cost and benefits of achieving a representative bureaucracy. Rarely is there any investigation into active representation (See Mengistu and Vogel, 2006 or Dresang\textsuperscript{24}, 1974 as exceptions). We now turn to the second and more substantial element of research into the bureaucracy within the contested society. These appraisals and analyses tackle a number of research questions, largely assessing the success of various civil service reform packages. Ncholo (2000) tracks the development of the South African civil service since apartheid indicating the challenges faced in attaining a representative bureaucracy. Derick Brinkerhoff (2010) edited an edition of \textit{Public Administration and Development} dedicated entirely to administrative capacity development. Lee (2009) examined how emerging democracies could build competent, politically neutral bureaucracies, while others have considered the success of various development agendas such as the incorporation of ex-combatants into the bureaucracy (Tessema and Soeters, 2006), the adoption of New Public Management (NPM) (Bissessar, 2009), and more general professionalisation objectives (Mengesha and Common, 2007; Jacobs, 2009). Scott Bollens (2000) too uses a process tracing approach, but through a more urban planning theoretical lens. Empirically situated in Belfast and Jerusalem, he

\textsuperscript{24} Although not grounded in representative bureaucracy theory, Dresang’s findings within the 1970s Zambian bureaucracy point to the greater role of institutional norms in curtailing active representation on behalf of one’s own community. He stresses that a passively representative bureaucracy is indeed necessary, not in terms of resource allocation, but in terms of public legitimacy.
investigates the hypothesis that urban policy is partisan in Jerusalem and neutral in Belfast. His analysis of the Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE) in providing social housing provides a most worthwhile foundation to understanding the role of the bureaucracy in conflict management. Models of urban policy strategy are theoretically identified and using this urban policy lens he explores their effect on territoriality, economic distribution, policy-making access and group identity. The changing nature of public administration in Northern Ireland is also analysed from devolution to direct rule by Birrell (1978) and direct rule back to devolution by Carmichael and Osborne (2003) while Knox and Carmichael, (2005, 2006) investigate reform efforts within the Northern Ireland civil service.

Finally, some larger-N studies look at the bureaucracy and governance indicators across a broad range of societies and can inform how we understand bureaucratic structures within contested environments. While these studies by organisations such as the World Bank are not set exclusively within conflict environments, they assist in understanding the various approaches to governance. Their alternative approach focuses on structural design, rather than how the structures themselves are exploited. Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) developed 31 different indicators of governance grouped into three clusters: rule of law, government effectiveness, and graft. Hyden, Court and Mease (2003) examine perceptions of the bureaucracy in sixteen developing countries, again establishing general conclusions on governance. Mehta (1998) adapts previously identified indicators pinpointing four categories of

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capacity: institutional, technical, administrative and political. Administrative good governance indicators include a grievance redressal system, personnel policy, flexible and decentralised decision-making and performance evaluation.

These quantifications of general trends of governance within the developing environment are indeed important and informative, and identify trends across divided and developing environments. They assist in the identification of structures that contribute to stabilisation and normalisation and the structures that prove as obstacles. Such large scale quantification studies and the development of performance indicators also assist in establishing the importance of the bureaucracy to the development process and the structures required for the establishment of a stable and professional bureaucracy. How these structures can be incorporated into the contested environment does indeed need to be understood. However these large studies, by their very nature, cannot take into account the intricate workings of individual bureaucracies. The rules and procedures of a bureaucracy can indeed create the environment necessary for good governance to take place, however it is how these rules and procedures are exploited by the professional administrator that will determine how good governance actually is. Indicators of best practice and good governance can determine the optimal environment for good decision-making, however, as put forward by Gusfield (1958) it is the norms and values of the civil servant that determine how these rules are employed/exploited and therefore how decisions are actually made. For this reason norms and values are central to our understanding of bureaucratic resource allocation and hence conflict management.
Put differently, it is suggested that both quantitative cross-national studies, and process tracing or existing policy appraisal approaches, can inform us about the use of governance structures, and can tell us what actors are involved at different stages of policy development – they cannot however tell us how administrators ‘skew’ policy to reflect their personal goals. To understand how these structures are ‘skewed’, we must indeed firstly determine where the bureaucrat has the capacity to influence policy, but secondly we must also consider the measurement of norms, values and behaviours in order to determine how bureaucrats direct policy. Chris Leeds (1997: 1) surmises: ‘Culture, values, beliefs [and] norms...influence perceptions, assumptions attitudes and eventually behaviour and traditional practices’. The theory of representative bureaucracy provides the most valuable, and most complete, lens for examining this experience. I therefore introduce representative bureaucracy theory to conflict management research.

2.3 Representative bureaucracy – a closer look

In the previous section, various existing mechanisms of researching the bureaucracy within conflict management research were identified: studies grounded in representative bureaucracy, appraisal of civil service reform programmes and some large-N comparative projects. While each of these categories could be further explored, the emphasis in this research is on representative bureaucracy. This section further develops the representative bureaucracy theoretical approach to understanding bureaucratic behaviour. The debate within the contested society is largely grounded in
the sphere of passive representation. As identified in the previous section, two schools of thought debate the costs and benefits of representative bureaucracy, both grounded in legitimacy. Those agreeing with Brown (1999) tend to prioritise the merit principle and present equity in opportunity as the means of creating legitimacy. The alternative position held by Esman (1999) is that, where necessary, in the short term the merit principle should be sacrificed so as to achieve a passively representative bureaucracy – thereby guaranteeing its legitimacy. In this section I explore in greater detail the arguments behind both these positions, finding that the debate within passive representation can only be solved through shifting the debate to the realm of active representation.

Brown (1999) emphasises the importance of employment in the public service as differing ethnicities ‘battle for resources’. Evidence from Trinidad and Guyana leads Brown to argue that recruitment by ethnic quota can actually contribute negatively to the conflict. He draws on the International Commission of Jurists (1965: 117) to support his position: ‘It is thought that preferential treatment...violates the merit principle and introduces an element of arbitrariness into the recruitment procedure’, generating worse friction than that which it sets out to eliminate. Further, he argues that this environment breeds suspicion and can cripple national development. It is Browns belief that it is not disproportionate representation or participation that is the problem; rather the problem is the ‘institutionalisation of procedures and practices that virtually guarantee disproportionate representation’ (Brown, 1999: 70). Roberts (1965) argues that if an ethnic group does not have a history of public service, it should not be
expected that they would be proportionately represented; or similarly if a social group resides predominantly in rural areas, it cannot be expected to occupy, to the same extent, urban positions such as the civil service. As evidence of this, Nachmias’ (1991) empirical study finds that sections of Israeli society without a tradition of education are not proportionately represented in the upper echelons of the Israeli bureaucracy. Brown (1999: 374) refers to the removal from office of public servants following the election of the former opposition to government in Guyana, ‘depleting the already small pool of skilled, qualified human resources available to government’. This has resulted in numerous vacancies which cannot be filled and the rendering ‘ineffective’ of the finance and public service ministries.

The central theme running through arguments against quota systems are concerned with the dilution of professionalism within the bureaucracy. The absence of professionalism sees a corresponding reduction in the quality of governance and hence perceived legitimacy. However as Mengistu and Vogel (2006: 207) remind us, ‘...the good governance principle of responsiveness requires the promotion of a professional civil service that is not only capable, but characteristically representative of the population’. Esman (1997) refers to examples in South Africa, Sri Lanka, Guatemala, Israel and Malaysia whereby civil servants within ethnically divided societies, often mirror the ethnicity of the political elite rather than society as a whole. He finds that ethnic groups ‘that dominate government, award positions in public administration exclusively or preferentially, formally or informally, to their own constituents’ (ibid:
In other words, quotas are necessary in some circumstances to prevent such occurrences.

Drawing on the Zambian experience of the 1970s, Dresang (1974: 1617) concludes that ‘an ethnic group cannot rely on representation in the bureaucracy as a resource for effectively pursuing group interests’. Thus his results evidence no tangible benefit to an ethnic group as a result of their representation within the bureaucracy. He argues that the ‘representative character of government, is more important as an issue of ethnic politics, than as a determinant of how administrators pursue economic development’ (Dresang, 1974: 1605). As bureaucrats are constrained by the organisation, their authority, policy conditions and criteria used to determine career advancement, they do not actively favour one ethnic group over another. Therefore, Dresang believes that as personal career advancement outweighs ethnic parochialism, resources are guided by technical rational criteria and underrepresented groups are not unfairly treated when it comes to resource allocation. However, from a stabilisation perspective he disagrees with Brown, viewing a representative bureaucracy as a requirement to engender the perception among all ethnic groups that the bureaucracy is a fair and equitable organisation. Like Esman, he therefore correlates actual representation with legitimacy. Thus disagreement exists on the origins of bureaucratic legitimacy: via equality of opportunity (Brown) or via equality of representation (Esman). While a public survey of perceptions would be of questionable value and pose practical difficulties to conduct, the extent to which ethno-national/ethno-political quotas are a necessity in attaining a passively representative bureaucracy would be of
value to our research and can be tested. This question is returned to in chapter five where I investigate whether or not a passively representative bureaucracy is a possibility without the requirement of ethno-national quotas.

Dresang’s findings however rely on the supposition that the norms and values guiding the bureaucrat are grounded in concepts of traditional importance within uncontested societies – such as personal career advancement etc... Within a contested society however, we must also ask: do allegiances to one’s own primary group trump these traditional loyalties? Secondary, organisational norms may not be as powerful as primary personal norms within the contested society. The conditions under which a bureaucrat will represent interests other than those of his personal community must therefore be understood.

To comprehensively understand the nature of the passive representation discussion, we need to delve deeper into the concept. Passive representation, at its heart, is concerned not with how resources are allocated but who the allocators are. To understand the effects of passive representation a clearer understanding of what guides bureaucratic behaviour is required. This key facet of representative bureaucracy, most important to conflict management research, is that of active representation and ‘bureaucratic values’ and has recently been acknowledged (within the conflict management literature) by Mengistu and Vogel (2006). Findings within uncontested societies prove inconclusive as to the extent to which a group’s representatives within the bureaucracy actively represent the interests of that particular group. Various studies of active representation have shown that minority bureaucrats (usually ethnic minorities
and women) actively represent their counterparts in society (Keiser et al., 2002). Conversely, Mladenka (1980) finds resource allocation to be a function of past decisions, population shifts and other technical rational criteria. John Rehfuss (1986: 459) too finds that women and minorities share a ‘management ideology’ with their white male counterparts, suggesting that the organisational environment restricts active representation on behalf of one’s primary identity.

Within contested societies, this hypothesis has not been sufficiently explored. In a passively representative bureaucracy we do not know if Hindus represent Hindus or if Shi’a Muslims within the bureaucracy would represent Shi’a Muslims in society – it has merely been assumed that this would be the case. In other words, the debate still focuses on the descriptive nature of the bureaucracy rather than on who the bureaucrat actively represents. Esman (1997: 529) suggests, that ‘under conditions of competitive ethnic mobilisation, the community that dominates the state bureaucracies will find ways to favour fellow ethnics even when rules of market allocation are formally adopted to satisfy international aid agencies’. Therefore for Esman, in the initial stages of conflict management descriptive representation, based on what the bureaucrat ‘is or is like’ directly correlates with what the bureaucrat does (For more on descriptive representation see Pitkin, 1967:61). Is this the case within the contested society? Do bureaucrats actively represent their descriptive identities? Similarly, for Brown, if a particular section of society feels discriminated against, this group will not contribute to the goal of national development. Contrary to Esman (1999: 369) however, he regards equality of opportunity as being more important than passive representation. We can
deduce from Browns writings that he perceives the bureaucracy to represent secondary learned professional or technocratic identities. These are the questions that guide this research.

To provide answers to the debate within passive representation, we must explore active representation. Who do ethnic minorities (and majorities) represent within the bureaucracy? Only when we understand the beliefs and norms that guide the decision-making of individual bureaucrats will we be able to determine whether or not bureaucrats skew decision-making in favour of their own ethnic groups. We will then garner a greater understanding of the conditions under which the benefits of compromising the merit principle may actually contribute to better decision-making. Apart from Mengistu and Vogel’s (2006) normative study, active representation within divided societies has not yet been explored. In sum, if bureaucrats were to actively represent their own communities within the administration then passive representation at all levels for all groups is indeed necessary. However if shared values emerge, the necessity for passive representation in every decision is reduced. Brown’s proposition of guaranteeing legitimacy through equality of opportunity/access therefore becomes a possibility. Clearly if shared values were to exist a certain number of the out-group would have to exist within the administration in order for values to be shared, or as put by Reissman (1949) the interpersonal workplace relationships can also contribute to the social role the bureaucrat fills.

In this section we have seen that bureaucratic legitimacy is central to conflict management. A somewhat passively representative bureaucracy is indeed
acknowledged as a prerequisite for bureaucratic legitimacy – be this for Dresang’s reasons of public perception or Esman’s reasons that the dominant group will always exploit the rules to their own advantage. A passively representative bureaucracy is less of a requirement however if one subscribes to Brown’s thesis. Brown’s thesis relies on a professional organisational identity emerging within the bureaucracy. However, research in uncontested societies submits that if one group dominates the bureaucracy, only the norms and values of that group can influence the norms and values of the organisation. A ‘critical mass’ of each group is therefore said to be required if the values of the traditional out-group are to influence the professional values of the organisation.

This section has found that two competing theses have emerged on passive representation within the contested society – Brown’s staunch defence of the merit principle is rejected by Esman who views equality of actual representation to be most important. Dresang finds no correlation between ethnicity and resource allocation, but submits that some level of passive representation is required for public legitimacy.

Chapter five develops this debate further, investigating whether or not community quotas are a necessity in attaining a critical mass of the out-group within the public administration.

Studies of passive representation however do not inform us how bureaucrats actually behave within the contested environment. To answer this question we need to shift the debate from passive representation to active representation and determine who bureaucrats within divided societies actually represent – their personal communities, their political masters, their professional community or do they simply
perceive themselves as cogs in the machine, guided by laws, constitutions and treaties? Existing research indicates that values guide behaviour. If the bureaucrat is found to have considerable discretion in the allocation of resources and provision of services, the values that guide bureaucratic decision-making therefore affect the success of power-sharing arrangements. To decide the best means of developing administrative capacity we need to look at how citizens can be represented in the bureaucracy – representative bureaucracy theory can guide us in this. Once we understand who and what bureaucrats represent within the bureaucracy, we will understand how governance reform structures will be either employed or exploited by the bureaucratic elite. The next section develops this question further.

2.4 Completing the picture: other aspects of representative bureaucracy research

The review of the literature thus far has identified a gap in our understanding of how the bureaucracy affects conflict. Debates in conflict management literature have to date concentrated on the extent to which passive representation within the bureaucracy legitimises the actions of the bureaucracy. The wider representative bureaucracy debate in more cohesive societies has identified the concept of active representation. In this section I look at the various mechanisms through which these studies of active representation can shed some light on how the bureaucrat operates within the governance structures of divided societies.

The divided society is a very unique entity, yet it can learn a great deal from studies in more cohesive states. Keiser et al (2002) investigate when passive
representation translates into active representation for women. Based on Pitkin’s (1967) research they ask when is a woman ‘standing for women’ and when would we expect women to ‘act for women’ (Keiser et al, 2002: 553). This distinction is important for the contested society as we need to know when certain groups simply physically resemble their counterparts in society and when they actively represent their interests. Lim (2006) looks at the factors that lead to active representation – why do minority bureaucrats produce benefits for their social group? Minority bureaucrats can benefit their own communities directly, but also indirectly through changing the behaviours of others. Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2006) find that an increase in female police officers corresponds with an increase in reported instances of rape. Is this due to the passive representation of women, now acting for women, or as Lim (2006) advocates, through changes women induce in their male counterparts? Lim (2006: 203) calls for much more research into the ‘direct and indirect sources of passive representation’s substantive effects’. Hindera (1993: 436) found that ‘the human condition tends to govern the allocation patterns of the agency to an even greater extent than does the environment’. Thus, if we are to understand the root causes of active representation, we need to understand this human condition – the attitudes, norms and values of civil servants – and look at how these are manifested and constrained.

Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2006) advance our understanding of when representative bureaucracy is likely to occur subconsciously, however, as they concede, their quantitative research design cannot inform us whether it is Lim’s indirect ‘socialised’ representation by men, or direct active representation by women, that has
caused an increase in active representation. Such a distinction would have to take into account Hindera’s (1993) appeal for an investigation into attitudinal research. If (as according to Lim, 2006) it is possible for men to represent women and Blacks to represent the interests of Hispanics, can it be expected therefore that a Walloon or a Hutu may represent something other than Walloon or Hutu interests? And if so, under what circumstances do they set aside these primary associations?

As bureaucracies reform, or are encouraged to reform, changes are ideally guided by bureaucratic values. If these values are not accounted for, tension arises between reform efforts and the bureaucrats (Mengistu and Vogel, 2006). As it is bureaucrats who make decisions, not institutions or structures, the norms and values that guide decision-making within these organisations are of particular interest. Fitzpatrick (2007) finds that an alignment of values promotes cooperation among different groups within an organisation. It is therefore necessary to understand these bureaucratic values before reform efforts take place. Mengistu and Vogel (2006) employ Kaufman’s three bureaucratic values that guide bureaucratic reform – authoritarian (executive) leadership, representativeness and bureaucratic neutrality. It is, Kaufman submits, the interaction of these three values that determine bureaucratic values. For Mengistu and Vogel (2006), national values are a prerequisite for stability and professional continuity. This however may not be the most successful of strategies. In an ethnically contested society, where state legitimacy is often contested and various ‘nations’ exist, common primary associations cannot be expected to develop easily. It is unrealistic, or at least improbable, for example to expect loyalists and republicans, in
the case of Belfast, or Israeli Arabs and Israeli Jews, in the case of Jerusalem, to unite around a common support for the state or nation. To further exemplify this with respect to our case study – a Northern Irish identity may indeed emerge in Northern Ireland (see chapter one: description of the data, table 1.1), however the opportunity for a Northern Irish identity to come into direct confrontation with either an Irish or British identity remains probable. Thus although an alignment of values is necessary to ensure bureaucratic structures are not routinely corruptly exploited, common values on support for the ‘nation’ or the ‘state’ should not be relied upon. Rather, if secondary associations, such as professional or technocratic values were to dominate the administration, weaker learned alignments along national or state criteria would not be a prerequisite for shared values. In chapter six I investigate the possibility of bureaucrats taking on a secondary learned identity.

Thus far in this section we have seen that the debate within the contested society must shift from passive to active representation, but must be broader in scope than our existing understanding of active representation from more cohesive societies. While most active representation research looks at the extent to which bureaucrats represent their primary beliefs (colour, religion, ethnicity, language, sex etc), in the divided society we must ask if it is possible for a secondary, socially constructed, association to trump these primary associations? Further research is required to establish the precise values that guide the behaviour of bureaucrats within plural societies. What guides bureaucrats of different ethnic origins in allocating resources: primary associations such as attachments along ethnic, gender or racial appearances; or
secondary, learned/socialised associations such as a professional or technocratic identity. These are the questions that will lead to a greater understanding of how the bureaucracy affects conflict.

However, for active representation to take place numerical sufficiency, or a ‘critical mass’, of each group is required (Keiser et al, 2002; Meier and O’Toole, 2006). For a Sephardi Jew to actively represent the interests of Sephardi Jews in Israeli society, a critical mass of Sephardi Jews is required within the bureaucracy – this does not necessarily have to mean direct proportionate representation. Nachmias and Rosenbloom (1973: 596) submit that:

‘whether civil servants conceive of themselves as being representative of the social groups in which they have their origins, or think that representation of such groups should be a part of their role, is likely to be partially dependent on the extent to which members of their groups and members of other, and perhaps competing groups, are found within an organisation’.

Keiser et al (2002) and Meier and O’Toole (2006) concur arguing that a ‘critical mass’ of passive representation is required for active representation to take place; or that a degree of passive representation is necessary for active representation. Therefore, in a contested society, where sufficient numbers of the secondary identity (eg. A professional attachment) exist within the bureaucracy, we must ask do bureaucrats actively represent their own personal (primary) identities, or are bureaucrats guided by secondary learned, socialised, norms? If so what are these secondary norms – attachment to ‘the national interest’ as advocated by Mengistu and Vogel (2006), or attachment to a professional idea or programme as suggested by this dissertation? These questions are the focus of chapter six.
Even though the human condition may be more important than the environment in determining resource allocation, we cannot simply ignore the evidence that structures affect the formulation of this human condition or behaviour. Just as bureaucratic behaviour affects the norms of the institution; it would be unreasonable to suggest that the bureaucrat remains unaffected by the institutional surroundings. It is therefore also necessary to understand what hinders the development of active representation on the part of a primary identity. Wilkins and Williams (2008) find that organisational socialisation can hinder the link between passive and active representation. Within the divided society, Dresang’s (1974) earlier study finds similarly, submitting that bureaucrats personal community interests are constrained by their personal professional ambitions to advance within the organisation. Keiser et al (2002), while finding a link between passive representation and active representation on the part of a primary identity, also acknowledge that the institutional context affects whether passive representation leads to active representation. In a contested city what/who do bureaucrats represent? Are the institutions strong enough to affect identity? As found by Rehfuss (1986), active representation on behalf of one’s primary identity can be restricted through socialisation in an uncontested society – can similar instances be found in the ethno-nationally contested society? Further, Grissom et al (2009) reinforce the belief that not only does the organisation matter but also that the environment in which the organisation is situated matters. They find that blacks in southern American states tend to actively represent their personal communities more so than black bureaucrats in northern America states. Thus institutional, political and
social environments all influence the existence of active representation. An understanding of aspects hindering the development of secondary identities in contested environments will contribute to our understanding of how these obstacles to a professional, efficient, equitable bureaucracy may be overcome. If we are to enhance administrative capacity in contested societies, we must understand the factors influencing bureaucratic behaviour – institutional, political and social. Are certain political arrangements more conducive to a professional bureaucracy? How does the contested nature of the society influence bureaucratic behaviour?

Meier and O’Toole (2006), highlight the role and power of bureaucratic values within US public education. Similarly Balla (1998) questions the ability of rules and procedures to enhance political control, thus leaving the professional administrator more scope within the decision-making process. Although organisations may have similar structures, it is how these structures are exploited that is of interest to this study. Sowa and Selden (2003: 707) reiterate the importance of norms and values in determining discretion submitting that in ‘empirical tests of the theory of representative bureaucracy, scholars must pay attention to the discretion assumed by administrators... as administrators’ perceptions of their discretion to act has now been shown to have a direct influence on the policy outcomes these individuals produce’. Therefore not only is the bureaucracy worthy of study but also the study must go beyond the rules and procedures of the bureaucracy and concentrate on the norms and values of individual bureaucrats. If the bureaucracy is found to have discretion within the contested society,
whether personal norms supersede institutional or professional norms in guiding bureaucratic resource allocation must be determined.

This section has drawn upon more advanced research within more cohesive societies in order to understand how similar problems of bureaucrat role perceptions and resource allocation have been studied. Within the contested society we need to understand who and what bureaucrats actively represent, when allocating resources and making decisions under various institutional and societal conditions. We will then know the importance of group representation at each decision-making level. We also need to understand what conditions affect the development of these behaviours – Are organisational structures, the social environment or political condition such that personal allegiances are replaced or superseded by bureaucratic or professional allegiances? Do merit based systems support the development of this secondary, more technocratic, mindset; thereby encouraging an institutional environment where representation of one’s personal identity is actively discouraged? Research within conflict management needs to draw on such questions to create a more complete picture of the conflict management process.

2.5 Inferences from existing research

General findings concur that a crucial component of a stable democracy is the creation of a professional civil service (Brinkerhoff and Morgan, 2010; Lee, 2009; Menghesha and Common, 2007; Ncholo, 2000; Carroll and Carroll, 2000 among others). Underlining the importance of the ‘recruitment factor’, Esman (1997: 532) submits, ‘there is much to be
learned about the interface between public administration, ethnic conflict and economic development in related areas of participation in state bureaucracies...’.

However much of the governance research to date has centred on the economy, social and political representation, NGOs and public participation. Although references to the bureaucracy are numerous, bureaucrats themselves are rarely the focus of analysis. In many cases, the contribution of the bureaucracy has been ‘assumed’ by its perceived effects rather than ‘measured’ by its structures, norms and values. Even in mechanisms of conflict management that rely on the oppression of the ‘out-group’, it is unrealistic to put forward that bureaucrats are simply cogs in the machine with only minimal discretion. As William Niskanen (1971:5) reminds us: ‘any theory of the behaviour of bureaus that does not incorporate the personal preferences of bureaucrats...will be relevant only in the most rigidly authoritarian environments’. What is required is a comprehensive analysis of the bureaucracy, examining the extent to which bureaucrats in the contested society actually possess discretion, and if they do what are the norms and values that influence their decisions. These questions will lead to answers beyond the appraisal of governance mechanisms and instruments and explain how they are actually employed or exploited. The governance literature is pretty comprehensive in its analysis of where NGO’s, civil society organisations and politicians see the obstacles to good governance, but where do bureaucrats themselves see the obstacles? Kaufmann and his colleagues at the World Bank (1999), along with Hyden et al (2003), have conducted large-N studies incorporating numerous cities and countries, yet a deeper understanding of the impact of individual bureaucrat decisions on urban conflict is
necessary. Scott Bollens’ (2000) research, through an ‘urban planning’ lens in Belfast and Jerusalem, displays the value of case study analysis of the bureaucracy. The ‘public administration’ lens can contribute equally to this understanding. Public administration research has significantly developed over the past century; however these concepts, already employed within more cohesive societies and developing societies, need to be employed in ethno-nationally contested societies in order to understand how the bureaucracy contributes to conflict management.

The findings, in general, demonstrate an absence of scholarly interest in applying theories of public administration to contested environments. While studies in more cohesive societies have explored the nature of the bureaucrat’s actions, those studies drawing on public administration theory tend to investigate the attaining of an ethnically representative bureaucracy. If the debate is to be fully informed, a more comprehensive understanding of the concept of active representation is required. Alternative approaches tend to assess the success of various administrative reform processes and together with large scale studies aim at determining the structures necessary for developing administrative capacity. These indeed provide necessary analysis of public administration within the contested and developing society. Nonetheless, for a comprehensive understanding of how the bureaucracy affects conflict management, existing research will have to give greater prominence to well established public administration theory. One avenue of possible research would be to investigate the norms and values held by both minority and majority bureaucrats within contested environments.
Existing literature tends to view active representation as a minority activity; however in a society where primary associations are so strong, active representation is equally as likely among the majority group and must also be measured. Crighton and Mac Iver (1991) determine that identity driven fears are not simply reserved for ethnic minorities but can also motivate the majority of the population. Where personal allegiances traditionally outweigh allegiances to the state, it is also crucial to understand the factors that promote or inhibit the creation of a professional technocratic mentality. Jacobs (2009: 218) talks of generating ‘reform minded civil servants’. In her study Bissessar (2009) emphasises that a ‘change in attitudes and behaviour will be required’ among the bureaucratic elite, if New Public Management is to be implemented in countries such as Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana. If these attitudes and behaviours are to change they first must be understood. If attitudes and behaviours are simply ignored, even the most robust of structures will be manipulated and exploited in favour of either personal or group advantage. In sum, as both Esman (1997: 528) and Brown (1999: 369) establish, the literature on ethnopolitics ignores the importance of public administration to the conflict management and development process. Research is required to determine who bureaucrats represent and determine their core beliefs and values that in turn guide decision-making. Only then will we understand how the bureaucracy affects conflict management.
2.6 Concluding remarks

We have seen throughout the review that studies of governance in conflict management literature tend to refer to the bureaucracies structural weaknesses and negative effects on society without understanding how these structures are exploited/employed by bureaucrats. Although the bureaucracy alone will not bring peace to contested societies, its role does need to be acknowledged and understood. Solutions are indeed required at the political, social and judicial levels, but also at the public administration level. Solutions must be robust, durable and efficient. Evidence from existing conflict management literature tends to confirm a universal dissatisfaction with the contribution of the bureaucracy to conflict management. Academic research needs therefore to identify the role of the bureaucracy (and the bureaucrat) in sustaining power-sharing systems of governance. Two research questions emerge from this review of the literature. Firstly, do bureaucrats in the consociational environment have similar levels of discretion as their counterparts in more cohesive societies? Secondly, if they do so, what norms and values guide the bureaucrat in these instances of autonomy/discretion? An understanding of bureaucrat role perceptions and bureaucrat norms and values is therefore central to understanding the effects governance structures will have on conflict management and on development. While it is important to understand what governance structures to adopt, it is also important to understand how bureaucrats will interact with these structures, thereby influencing policy outcomes. If a secondary identity is found to guide bureaucrats’ interaction with governance structures, it is also important to determine the basis of this secondary
identity. Although this understanding is important to all developed and developing societies and cities, the role of resource allocators in a conflict environment can have more far reaching consequences.

In the next chapter I return to the first research question, looking at the role of the bureaucrat in decision-making within Belfast City Council. Professional administrators are found to possess significant influence in the rules and processes which affect the allocation of resources. It is not sufficient however to determine that senior bureaucrats influence resource allocation but we must also determine the instances in which they have influence. Drawing on three different decision typologies I explore the decision-making environment within Belfast City Council subsequent to power-sharing taking hold. I investigate the types of decision where the bureaucrat is most likely to be able to influence policy and the types of decision where the bureaucrat is seen to have little influence.
3

Belfast revisited: Colourful policy making in a contested environment

3.1 Introduction

A year before the much celebrated 1998 Good Friday Agreement; the Belfast electorate returned a hung Council to govern their city. The following years facilitated a transition from hegemonic or domination mechanisms of conflict management towards the traditionally more acceptable approach of power-sharing. Such a change provides us with an opportunity to understand the nature of public policy within an emerging power-sharing environment. Drawing on evidence from interviews with Belfast’s bureaucratic elite, this chapter investigates how power-sharing changes the nature of elite level bureaucrat responsibilities within a contested society.

For researchers and practitioners alike, power-sharing is often advocated as the conflict management mechanism of choice. Numerous literature reviews point to the pioneering works of Lijphart (1969), Nordlinger (1972), and McGarry and O’Leary (1993) in developing the most sympathetic environment for successful power-sharing. Along with more recent contributions (Schneider and Wiesehomeier, 2008; Wimmer and Schetter, 2003), these studies tend to prioritise consociation at the political level. Schneckener (2002) correlates bad rules and procedures, even in the presence of otherwise beneficial factors, with the failure of power-sharing. Although numerous, these references to decision-making refer primarily to political level decisions. The
bureaucracy does not feature as an independent variable (where the management of conflict is the dependent variable). While indeed the politico-administrative dichotomy has been the subject of much research within the uncontested society, this relationship within the contested society is less understood. Bollens’ (2000) research explores this dichotomy in the divided society through an urban planning lens. This study adds to Bollens (2000) research, outlining how the politician-bureaucrat dichotomy changes as a society progresses from a majoritarian, hegemonic-controlled divided society (as studied by Bollens) to a power-sharing society. Drawing on new evidence from Belfast, the study highlights the need to also incorporate a public administration approach into conflict management research. While examining the political influence on street level bureaucrat activity is indeed a necessity (Lipsky, 1980), attention is also required at the elite level (Nachmias and Rosenbloom, 1978). As previously outlined, my concern within this research is restricted to elite level bureaucrats. Taking three broadly defined ‘decision typologies’ in turn, this chapter finds the bureaucratic elite to play a pivotal role in decisions that affect conflict management. Administrative reform is generally acknowledged as a key tenet of achieving better governance (Zhang and Thomas, 2009, among others. Cfr. Literature Review). The empirical results propose that administrative reform is also a key tenet of conflict management as the role of the bureaucrat increases under power-sharing conditions. Given the opportunity of the bureaucracy to affect conflict management, a major goal of ethnopolitics must be to create an effective, efficient, yet fair and equitable public administration.
Fieldwork conducted by Scott Bollens during the winter of 1994/1995 provides what is probably one of the most formidable contributions to our understanding of how the bureaucracy operates within the contested society under the domination mechanism of conflict management. His study of Belfast identifies the negative and unintended effects of ‘colour-blind’ procedures. The disregard for the sectarian context by the bureaucratic elite, he believes, has the potential to prolong rather than manage conflict (Bollens, 2000: 258). This neutral strategy relies on technical rational data in resource allocation, distancing itself from issues of ethnic identity, power inequalities and political exclusion. As citizens are treated as individuals and not as being from a particular community, this gives rise to the term colour-blind. Bollens (2000: 230) wrote extensively on the need to contextualise technical decision-making concluding that Belfast evidences ‘greyness where colour matters’. Returning to Belfast ten/fifteen years later as a power-sharing society, this chapter investigates if there has been a change in policy making within this contested city. Do bureaucrats contextualise their evidence within the framework of a contested city or do they continue to follow neutral, colour-blind policies? As put forward in the introductory chapter, Stanfield (1996) proposes that we know very little about how different ethnicities coexist. Varshney (2002:6) reinforces the sentiment, maintaining that ‘until we study ethnic peace, we will not be able to have a good theory of ethnic conflict’; this study goes someway to understanding how differing ethnopolitical groups are collectively governed. Brinkerhoff

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26 The fieldwork for Bollens’ research was conducted shortly after the first IRA ceasefire in 1994 which ultimately paved the way for the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. Power-sharing has been the mode of governance within Belfast City Council since 1997. In 2007 the Council adopted a ‘committee’ governance structure.
(2010), Morgan, Baser and Morin (2010) and Lee (2009) too speak of the necessity to increase administrative ‘capacity’ within developing environments. The results of this investigation do not simply find bureaucrat role perceptions to change with power-sharing, but also demonstrate that developing administrative capacity is crucial, not simply for attaining the objective of good governance, but in the stabilisation and normalisation process.

Returning to Belfast in 2008, Bollens (2008: 2) categorised the Belfast peace process as ‘fragile’. I am most concerned with the role of the bureaucracy in sustaining the power-sharing agreement. Put differently, in 1997 Belfast ceased to be a Council where one community ‘dominated’ the other, adopting the traditionally more acceptable form of conflict management: power-sharing. It is necessary to investigate how this transition to power-sharing has affected the role of the bureaucratic elite in Belfast. While Bollens’ (2000) approach uses an urban planning lens to theoretically inform his process tracing approach, this research is grounded more firmly in public administration. The approach also differs from Bollens’ (2000) in that the entire bureaucratic elite of the City Council are taken as the target universe. Instead of examining two policy areas, as in Bollens (2000), and extrapolating the findings to describe policy-making more generally within the city, a cross-section of departments within the urban environment are examined. As outlined in the introduction, interviews are restricted to members of the bureaucratic elite – directors of departments, heads of

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27 I am most concerned with the politician-bureaucrat dichotomy. Of course it is acknowledged that factors external to urban governance influence this relationship (such as the Good Friday and St. Andrews Agreements, and also interactions with regional, national and supranational bodies etc). I am most interested however in determining the nature of the bureaucrat-politician relationship, not why it is so.
service, and in cases of particular interest to the contested city, senior departmental managers were also included. Bollens’ (2000) selection criteria are based on functionality, whereas the selection criteria employed here are grounded in institutionalism. This is so for one primary reason. Under direct rule much authority was removed from local politicians to diminish their discriminatory activities. Local councils were highly politicised. Now that the (urban) conflict management process is well established, the local council is gradually expanding its authority once again. Relying on institutionalism rather than functionalism, allows us to ascertain the type of organisation that would inherit any new responsibilities under any review of public administration. Twenty, in-person, semi-structured interviews were conducted between August and November of 2009, each interview averaging about an hour and a half in length. The questionnaire was designed so as to allow for maximum input from the interviewee, within the constraints of the research question. In conjunction with the qualitative data, results from the closed questions are also presented to enumerate the degree of sentiment surrounding certain themes. The sample size of twenty represents 43% of the forty-seven elite level staff. Twenty-five of this forty-seven were targeted for interview. Interviewees were selected solely by the occupational position they held, not by perceived religious affiliation, class, nationality or gender and were given on condition of anonymity. It transpired that eight Roman Catholics were interviewed together with seven Protestants, while five perceived themselves to belong to neither

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28 Five of those targeted either did not respond or were too busy to be interviewed.
community. Ten men and ten women completed the sample. Extracts from the interviews are included throughout the chapter and are numbered one to twenty.

Making use of Nvivo software, the qualitative aspects of these interviews were documented, coded and analysed. In order to categorise and subsequently analyse the data, I draw on a conceptual framework designed by Radaelli (1999). Radaelli (1999) submits that the decision-making process is determined by the complexity and salience of the policy. Based on his research, I coded any reference to how policy was formulated or to how decisions were made into three clusters of interest: Significance was firstly attributed to any mention of policy making in areas where existing public administration research would lead us to expect maximum bureaucratic influence over policy formulation, or in other words, the traditionally more mundane areas of service provision – areas of low technical complexity and low public interest (Category A decisions). Secondly, references to policy making in areas of low technical complexity and high political interest were coded. I subsequently further subdivided codes in this section. The first subcategory recorded decision making relating to large scale one-off projects. Sometimes these would be issues left over from the conflict – for example the redevelopment of a highly symbolic army barracks or police station, but would also include less contentious issues such as the building of a waste incinerator or a sports stadium (Category B decisions). The second sub category highlighted day-to-day decisions that attracted high levels of public interest. It is this latter section that I am most interested in – the day to day management of the city. The project through which this research has been funded, Conflict in Cities, seeks to establish the role of urban
institutions in regulating the everyday lives of people in urban conflict societies. This latter category provides an opportunity to understand the day-to-day management of a successfully managed contested city. Policies that would often be described as mundane in more cohesive societies often develop or maintain a controversial nature within a contested society. It is for this reason that significantly more attention is attributed to determining the politico-administrative dichotomy in such policy areas (Category C decisions). Dividing the research into these different policy types will provide a clearer picture of the policy-making process which in turn will generate a more nuanced understanding of how conflict is managed within the city. The following paragraphs provide an overview of both Belfast, and the governance structures of its City Council, while section three introduces some expectations and hypotheses. The next sections introduce the findings, taking each of the three broadly defined categorisations in turn, determining how the advent of power-sharing has changed the nature of the bureaucracy within this traditionally contested city. As just outlined, given the aims of the chapter, considerably more attention is given to the latter field of enquiry.

3.2 Background to the city

Until 1997, Belfast was a Unionist Council, representing only one community and even at that, Bollens (2000: 230) finds the interests of this community to have been poorly served with local politicians being more interested in the Anglo-Irish agreement than in the everyday lives of their constituents. In 1997, the people of Belfast returned 25
unionist Councillors, 20 nationalist or republican Councillors, leaving non-aligned Alliance holding the balance of power with six seats. The political level were forced to cooperate if the Council was to continue to function. Since 1997, power-sharing, relying on informal norms and practices, has governed the functioning of the City Council. Recall, it is the purpose of this chapter to understand how the bureaucracy has adapted to this change. Understanding if and how power-sharing has changed the nature of public policy formulation, will inform us of the need to take into account the role of the bureaucracy in any transition from domination mechanisms of conflict management to power-sharing mechanisms of conflict management.29

Bollens’ (2000) research suggests that policy making in Belfast before power-sharing (in 1994) was neutral or colourless. Bureaucrats, he finds, employed technical rational criteria in the allocation of resources, distancing themselves from the issues of ethnic identity, power inequalities and political exclusion. During the mid nineties, bureaucrats sought to depoliticise territorial issues, solving problems through professional and technical criteria. Neutral policy making has been widely criticised by Bollens (2000) and others (see Torgovnik, 1991; Forester, 1989; Nordlinger, 1972) for its social conservatism, over technical emphasis and its inability to address issues containing ethnic characteristics. Krishnarayan and Thomas (1993) also criticised it for being insensitive or dismissive of the different needs of minority citizens. Bollens’ (2000) research suggests that policy making in Belfast before power-sharing (in 1994) was neutral or colourless. Bureaucrats, he finds, employed technical rational criteria in the allocation of resources, distancing themselves from the issues of ethnic identity, power inequalities and political exclusion. During the mid nineties, bureaucrats sought to depoliticise territorial issues, solving problems through professional and technical criteria. Neutral policy making has been widely criticised by Bollens (2000) and others (see Torgovnik, 1991; Forester, 1989; Nordlinger, 1972) for its social conservatism, over technical emphasis and its inability to address issues containing ethnic characteristics. Krishnarayan and Thomas (1993) also criticised it for being insensitive or dismissive of the different needs of minority citizens. Bollens’ (2000)

29 While the environment within the City Council has indeed changed with power-sharing, changes in role perceptions must be contextualised within the larger Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement which was signed a year later and the subsequent increase in Council activities that this permitted. However, this chapter is concerned with the politician-bureaucrat relationship and space does not permit including national and supranational level variables. I am not so much interested in why the relationship has changed, but ‘if’ the relationship has changed, and if so ‘how’ has it changed.
analysis of the bureaucracy of the mid 1990s was overtly technocratic, existing solely to provide a service within the status quo. Conflict management was not a function of the bureaucracy. However, despite being ignored in government plans and blueprints, sectarianism was nonetheless acknowledged in policy formulation – ‘it was as if we were carrying out a plan for two cities that happened to overlap each other’; what Bollens terms ‘plural planning’ (Bollens, 2000: 233). While addressing the two colours of the city, blue and green, no effort was made to ‘disturb the volatile territoriality of the city’ (ibid: 233). Before power-sharing, sectarianism was ‘accepted as a characteristic of the urban setting’ (ibid: 233). The bureaucratic elite did not perceive it to be their role to challenge this status quo.

Bollens’ (2000) interview data also suggest a somewhat excessively cautious and meticulous atmosphere within the bureaucracy. The bureaucratic elite appeared to be more concerned with appearing neutral rather than suggesting solutions and reforming policies: ‘Policy makers and administrators amidst ethnic polarisation do not wish to be perceived as ‘social engineers’, viewing such a role as producing more harm than good’ (Bollens, 2000: 231). They did however acknowledge the environment in which they worked:

‘Traditionally we said “we’re blind”, this is an honourable position. However to carry out our responsibilities further, we must have an understanding of the two sides and their different needs’ (Bollens, 2000: 233/234).

Throughout Bollens’ Belfast interviews, this theme of neutrality takes precedence. Based on Bollens’ research I deduce the bureaucratic elite in 1994 to be responsive to society and politicians. The bureaucratic elite were not leaders nor were they actively
involved in conflict management. They did not set the agenda nor did they define the scope of research. Further, this period evidenced much contracting out of ‘research’, where ‘consultants would simply return with the result favoured by those commissioning the report’ (Interview 4).

Finally, if the decision-making environment had not changed since power-sharing, bureaucrat views of their political masters would also have remained constant. As previously alluded to, the politico-administrative axis has been found by Bollens to be overtly unproductive during the eighties and early nineties. Politicians, he describes as being: ‘among the greatest obstacles to effective urban planning...whose relative lack of power frees them to be extreme in their interactions with government’ (Bollens, 2000: 229). Interview evidence supports his claim that they ‘rant and rave at consultation meetings to show their communities that they care’, describing them as ‘leading from the back’ (ibid: 229). Local politicians are further described as ‘obstacles to the establishment of cross-community bridges’ (ibid: 229). One of Bollens’ interviewees goes so far as to describe monthly Council sessions as resembling ‘juveniles on a playground more than locally elected officials in a forum’ (ibid: 230). The sum of these factors created an environment within the bureaucracy that appears to have been very pressured, ‘under the gun and unable to promote the organisation proactively’ (ibid: 232). Hadfield (1992) found that direct rule in Belfast resulted in “an almost complete absence of representative participation and accountability” with the locally elected 51-member unionist majority Belfast City Council having severely constrained policymaking power’ (Bollens, 2001: 85). To summarise, policy before power-sharing, did indeed take
into account the two colours of the city, however only in so far as to preserve the status quo. Public servants did not rock the boat. They were in essence preservers of the status quo, while trying to make progress in their own particular policy areas. Morale was low and bureaucrats were lead as opposed to leading. Conflict management was most certainly not a function of the bureaucracy. Finally, the bureaucratic elite perceived the political level (Councillors) to be an obstacle to effective policy-making. Following the Good Friday Agreement, Councils across Northern Ireland slowly (re)expanded their competencies. The politician-bureaucrat dichotomy therefore necessitates closer examination in order to understand how policy today is actually formulated and to understand how conflict management is actually sustained.

3.3 Expectations

Let us start the exploration into how power-sharing has changed bureaucratic activity through an examination of how bureaucrats today perceive policy making. Recall the aim of this research is to determine if the politician-bureaucrat relationship has sufficiently changed since power-sharing became the status quo to warrant further research. The following paragraphs draw on three categories of decision-making where we can see how decision-making has changed as power-sharing has emerged. Firstly we turn to policy making in non-controversial policy areas (Decision type A). Typically, as demonstrated by the bureaucracy at the supranational level, where cultural differences also emerge, the bureaucracy can be expected to have maximum influence in areas of
low public and political interest (Radaelli, 1999). These areas of activity tend to be highly regulated. Similar findings are expected within the contested society.

Conversely it is also expected that in areas of high public interest and low complexity, political influence will be maximised (ibid: 767). By extension, in the contested city, we would expect the bureaucracy to have least influence in the decision-making process in areas of controversy. High public and political interest, combined with low levels of uncertainty and technical complexity are theoretically the traditional areas of maximum political influence on policy (Radaelli, 1999). In his pan-European study of power-sharing successes and failures, Ulrich Schneckener (2002) too points to the crucial role of political elites in sustaining shared rule. Therefore, in such cases it would be expected that the political level would have greater influence over policy outcomes and the decision-making processes than the bureaucrat. Adapting the framework to the contested urban environment, I have subdivided this category into one-off decisions that are of high public interest (Category B) and secondly decisions that could be described as ‘day-to-day decisions’ of high public interest (Category C). This third category of interest identified decision-making in areas that were of high public interest at the urban level, which were not technically complex. Given the physically divided nature of the city, these decisions often incorporated a potentially sectarian element. This category of decision making incorporated the majority of bureaucrat’s interaction with the political level. As these decisions involved low technical complexity and were of direct interest to the political level and their electorate, political level influence was also
assumed to trump bureaucrat influence on outcomes. To summarise it was expected that in:

- Decision type A, low public interest: maximum bureaucrat influence
- Decision type B, low technical complexity, high public interest one-off decisions: maximum politician influence
- Decision type C, low technical complexity, high (urban) public interest day-to-day decisions: maximum politician influence

### 3.4 Low public interest (Type A)

Returning now to what are perceived as the more mundane, non controversial decisions, where we expect public interest to be low and hence political interest to also be correspondingly low. Bureaucratic officials are expected to have maximum input into policy design and implementation. The Belfast results however indicate that thirteen members of the bureaucratic elite (65%) perceive the political level to have an interest in low public interest areas. Respondents were also similarly divided on the assertion that the political level only interests itself in issues directly affecting their own communities. More comprehensively however, only two respondents (10%) described the political level as being ‘fairly involved’ with their department, with the remainder responding ‘seldom involved’ or not ‘at all involved’. Interest therefore should not be confused with influence. Decisions at this level appear to be simply rubber stamped by the political level. In these areas, senior bureaucrats largely report to committee based on evidence and research conducted by the department or by external consultants, with one single option to proceed with. Amendments can be made to this option, but decisions falling into this category are generally accepted in their recommended form.

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30 Results from a questionnaire which formed the basis of the semi-structured interview
Feeling on the option is gauged before hand to anticipate political reaction: ‘An options paper will only be presented if the cuts are to be political...but even then a recommendation is always made’ (Interview 4). This recommendation is almost always carried, with or without alterations. Together with this, not all decisions made at these levels make it to Council. This is demonstrated by a number of interviewees: ‘once I have the money I don’t need to go to Council’ (Interview 19); ‘we filter a lot of information...there is incapacity at the political level to understand a lot of the technical stuff’ (Interview 2). Decisions in this category also appear to be heavily regulated, which in turn leaves less scope for the political skewing of resources or services. Bureaucrats on the other hand do have additional scope, being guided by the ‘professional judgement of risk’ (Interview 5). An example from one such area – food safety – indicates that politicians do occasionally try to influence what premises are assessed. However within the current power-sharing administration, the bureaucrat is strong enough to rely on the existing regulation to support his/her decision. Scientific reports, used to determine resource allocation, prevent skewing of resources by Councillors. While regulations generally do not leave much scope for interpretation, it is the view of the bureaucrat that interprets the regulation, not that of the politician. Other such examples in areas of waste service provision and cleansing evidence similar results.

In these areas, the political level is occasionally found to increase its involvement at the behest of either one or a collective of constituents. The bureaucratic elite prioritise these concerns, and where possible do allocate resources according to political level direction. This allocation is always grounded in technical criteria. In these non-
controversial policy areas such as the provision of specialist waste facilities or graffiti removal, the bureaucracy will give precedence to the Councillor’s query, and where possible will allocate resources accordingly: ‘Even though I don’t give them everything they want, I give them something’ (Interview 16). Bureaucrats ‘always keep some [money] for political interests’ (Interview 4). However, this is not always possible as it cannot be technically justified. One of the many examples was the provision of ‘brown bins’ for organic waste to an area of the city. Although researched by the department, facilities for dealing with the ‘brown bin’ waste were operating at full capacity and therefore the department could not grant the Councillor’s wishes to extend service provision to his area (Interview 14). Petitions in this category are rarely based on sectarian grounds, but more firmly rooted in the elected representative trying to get the maximum level of service for his constituents. ‘I have rarely experienced a situation whereby Councillors deliberately sought to not serve one community – rarely would a Councillor manipulate the evidence but it happens as if by default’\textsuperscript{31} (Interview 9).

Thus in areas of low public interest and high regulation, political level interest does exist, but as expected political influence in affecting resource allocation is low. There is nothing to suggest that this was not the case before power-sharing. Recall Bollens’ (2000) finding that urban politicians were more interested in the Anglo-Irish Agreement than conditions within the city. In areas of low public interest civil servants or bureaucrats will be guided by personal or organisational norms, seeking political

\textsuperscript{31} As there is a high degree of segregation in Belfast, politicians tend to represent only one community. Two thirds of Belfast’s population live in areas where over 81% of residents are of the same religion. Shirlow and Murtagh (2006)
guidance only where additional finances or capacity are required. The political level may bring a subject to the attention of the bureaucrat, the bureaucrat will in turn endeavour to respond, but is usually constrained in his/her response by regulation or limitations of technical capacity.

3.5 Low technical complexity, high public interest, one off decisions (Type B)

We now turn our attention to resource allocation in arenas of greater public interest. When an issue is expected to be controversial, bureaucrats have a variety of mechanisms of broaching the decision however the following quotation sums up the general approach:

‘When we know something is going to be contentious we involve the political level but otherwise we do it ourselves and just ask them to sign off at committee meeting. For divisive or potentially divisive issues we would meet with them very regularly and then bring something to committee that we hope will be signed off on’ (Interview 9)

Where political interest is high, we firstly look at decision-making in large scale projects, often regarded as one off decisions in areas perceived to be of political salience across Northern Ireland. Some of these issues would also attract high national public interest within more homogenous societies while others could be described as hangovers from the conflict. Recalling that in these areas it is expected that public interest would be high; and therefore political interest and influence would be correspondingly high. In other words, bureaucratic officials are expected to be primarily involved in the execution of political decisions, rather than being involved in proposing and shaping decisions. This indeed is found to be the case. Decisions in this category tend to have a
stronger political influence. Two recent examples demonstrating support for this conclusion are the rejection of the proposed North Belfast incinerator and the decision to spend Council funds drawing up plans for a proposed new Northern Ireland stadium. ‘Up until the decision with the incinerator, members agreed with everything we proposed. We always presented it as a win for them (Interview 2). ‘We gave them (the political level) numerous briefings, field trips, community surveys, etc but Councillors still rejected the incinerator proposals’ (Interview 8). There were similar findings with the Belfast stadium project where bureaucrats ‘advised against throwing money’ at the stadium (Interview 16, interview 7). The political level again disregarded this advice, continuing to support the locating of a sports stadium in Belfast.

In areas of high public interest, the political level is seen to have maximum influence. This is confirmed by the political rejection of the bureaucratic proposal to develop an incinerator plant in North Belfast. It is further supported by the determination of the political level not to heed the advice of Councillors and financially support feasibility studies for the development of a sports stadium within the city. Again following Radaelli (1999), this finding is not surprising. We should expect higher political involvement in non complex, high public interest areas such as this. Further, Flynn (2011: 383) in his case study research of decision-making at the Maze prison/Long Kesh finds that ‘many see plans for...the site [maze prison/Long Kesh] redevelopment as determined by party politics, as well as parochial interests’. While his research is not designed to specifically examine the politician-bureaucrat power dichotomy, (and not

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32 I am not so much concerned with why they rejected the idea, but with result that they went against the ‘expert’ advice of their bureaucrats.
set within the parameters of Belfast City Council) it is evident that in highly political, and
not technically complex decisions, politician influences trump the influences of the
bureaucratic elite. Similarly it would also be expected that it is the political level that
would control highly symbolic traditionally divisive issues such as the redevelopment of
the Crumlin Road Gaol (used until 1996 to house nationalist and loyalist prisoners) and
Girdwood Barracks (a former Army site and a symbol, in the eyes of nationalists of
British occupation; see O’Dowd and Komarova, (2010)).

Attention in the next section turns to the day-to-day decisions that are politically
salient at the urban level. These day-to-day decisions account for the majority of a
bureaucrat’s interaction with the political level. Is the public administrator’s role in the
policy-making process diminished further in these areas? Public and political interest
remains high, levels of technical complexity remain low and regulation tends to be less
explicit. Further, urban politicians (Councillors) are not bound to the same extent by
national political party stances as these policies tend not to have substantial national
implications. For example, while the national party may have a position on waste
incineration or the redevelopment of sites of particular importance to the conflict, the
location of a playground would not be a political priority for the national party. The
politician would therefore be expected to possess more discretion to reward supporters
and punish adversaries (Mladenka, 1980). As party membership largely correlates with
religious affiliation (with exception of the Alliance party), and day-to-day issues are
often distributive, we would expect political influence to be maximised in these areas.
Bollens’ study would also lead us to expect this finding: ‘Local politicians increase their
“leadership” role most easily by tapping into separate constituencies, not by seeking to span them’ (M. Fitzduff in interview with Bollens, 2000: 229).

3.6 Low technical complexity, high public interest, day-to-day decisions (Type C)

Resource allocation and service provision decisions within this category are not policy specific but emerge in numerous situations and departments. Since the Good Friday Agreement, Belfast City Council has seen its competence grow. As the Council becomes more involved in different policy fora, it is important to understand its day-to-day decision-making processes. Throughout this section a number of examples are drawn upon to demonstrate bureaucratic involvement in resource allocation and service provision. Recreational funding, which comprises much of the Council budget, has traditionally been a contentious issue. These resources are usually quite visible and therefore it is not difficult for one community to ‘evidence’ their supposed neglect. Similarly, issues involving personal security are very contentious as these involve the police – an organisation historically associated with the Unionist cultural identity. Policies that may appear non controversial or benign, such as employing community wardens or alley gating, tend to maintain their contentious nature, and hence high urban public interest, within the contested environment. Most decisions surrounding physical resource allocation can therefore be interpreted as ‘high public interest’ at the urban level, most especially in contested societies that are physically highly segregated. The opening paragraphs of this section consider the policy-making process in these
areas. The following paragraphs then turn to the withdrawal of public services which again, in a highly segregated society, is often controversial.

Contrary to what is expected, in these decisions of high public interest among the urban population, be these in terms of resource allocation, finance or service provision, we see much more bureaucratic leadership. While under Unionist hegemony bureaucrats were led, now they see themselves as leaders. They now considerably influence the framework of the debate in which decisions are made. There is a renewed awareness of the role of the bureaucrat. The elite level bureaucrat does not simply provide advice or a service, but now must frame this advice in a particular manner. Their purpose is not simply as a consultant, but to create an environment where the best decisions that are politically possible can be taken. This is demonstrated by numerous interviewees: ‘It is most important to frame the debate....at an informal evening I will ask Councillors what they want to see changed for the next year... you must do it right’ (Interview 19). ‘You must be thoughtful on how you write reports...you must be politically savvy...If something is contentious you do your work before committee’ (Interview 14). ‘My staff are very technocratic in the main... however you can have a great project plan based on technocratic criteria, but now you must show me the plan for implementing it...This is where you need to be politically astute’ (Interview 11). In controversial areas, bureaucrats ‘push forward the evidence’ (Interview 17, Interview 3); or ‘put decisions in a framework in which they [Councillors] can agree, (finding) an approach that is likely to find favour’ (Interview 9). Thus bureaucrats are found not to fulfil the role of simply advising the best ‘technical’ decision, but seek to find a decision
that is politically acceptable to all parties: ‘How proposals are couched is very important...One must take into account the political realities’ (Interview 7).

In traditionally contentious policy areas salient at the urban level, the bureaucratic elite see their roles as to ‘steer politicians in the right way’ (Interview 12). ‘Even though my policy hat says resources should be based only on need, the political need and environmental context must also be accounted for’ (Interview 15). These quotes make evident the changing role perceptions of the bureaucratic elite. Particularly recurrent are phrases such as ‘framing the debate’ and ‘couching proposals’. In each of the twenty interviews, senior bureaucrats perpetually referred to their involvement in framing the debate, particularly in these traditionally controversial areas. Recommendations are not based solely on technical criteria for politicians to negotiate and navigate a way forward. Resource allocation recommendations in traditionally divisive issues are ‘based on firstly cost, and secondly what is political saleable...what will I get through’ (Interview 7). ‘It depends on how you frame it – this is the art of a successful official’ (Interview 15). In traditionally controversial areas ‘the debate is framed – everybody gets something or everybody loses...It is all about ‘managing the process’ (Interview 17). While the views of the political level are indeed considered significant, these views are collated and restructured by the bureaucratic elite to find a way forward. In other councils in Northern Ireland Councillors are perceived to be very involved in setting targets. This is not the case in Belfast (Interview 3). Bureaucrats are

33 These characteristics also present themselves in Type B decisions; however such findings are more consequential in Type C decisions. In Type B decisions, the ‘couching’ and ‘framing’ of the bureaucratic elite is often trumped by the wishes of the political level.
involved in developing departmental and organisational goals. It may be the case that a Lord Mayor may have a particular attachment to a particular theme and that does become a target for the Council. Apart from this, Councillors would rarely be involved in setting targets (Interview 12). Fourteen respondents (70%) perceived the political level to be ‘not at all’ involved in the development of departmental targets, while only three respondents (15%) perceived the political level to be ‘fairly involved’. There is overwhelming evidence to suggest that in the traditionally controversial policy areas, it is the policy expert who frames the debate, shapes proposals and designs implementation strategies. Thus recommendations are found not to be solely technical but a compromise between the best technical decision and the decision that is expected to be most politically acceptable.

Bureaucrats also frame the structure of interaction with the political level. Whereas in Bollens’ 1994 research elected officials determined the nature of the relationship, today this coordination is managed by the bureaucrat (See section: background to the city). Not only therefore does the bureaucracy frame the debate, but they also frame the structure in which this debate takes place. Among the most common mechanisms is to invite the ‘key players’ from each political party to attend a meeting, either individually or as a collective (Interview 19). Alternatively, a bureaucrat may invite representatives of the affected area, again either individually or as a collective: ‘Each member represents his own area, not his own party…I bring in all Councillors from West Belfast if I am talking about their area, all from South Belfast when talking about South Belfast etc…not by party groups…I discuss issues in these new
groups’ (Interview 9). This approach is accepted by politicians as they then ‘do not have to talk about Catholic wards and Protestant wards...’ (Interview 7). On my committee ‘the budget is not allocated to the ward, it is city wide...nothing is done by area...it is always a citywide approach’ (Interview 15). Consistently, bureaucrats refer to ‘the city wide’ approach, and much of their interaction with Councillors is spent encouraging the development of a city wide mindset. A similar approach is taken to research.

Not only do bureaucrats recommendations and consultations take into account the contested nature of the city, but so too does their (bureaucrat) research. It is evident that the parameters of their research are not grounded solely in technocratic criteria, but again incorporate the political realities of the contested city. Taking for example issues like playgrounds: ‘if it ends up that you technically should provide three playgrounds in Nationalist areas, well you don’t look at playgrounds, you look at services for young people... We must understand why we are here. Everyone knows decisions must be fair...we frame the debate to make sure decisions are fair’ (Interview 15). ‘We keep our operational areas large – not at the super output area level...we steer the debate away from this...Members [Councillors] don’t want to go down to this level either’ (Interview 14). The bureaucratic elite therefore also now control the nature of the research to ensure Council reports do not aggravate sectarian differences. The bureaucratic elite feel that the political level do not want discussions to degenerate into a sectarian battleground so therefore they frame the research accordingly.

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34 Super output area – a geographical area used to improve the reporting of small area statistics across the UK.
Thus far we have seen that the bureaucratic elite influence the framing of the debate in terms of targets, structure of interaction and research. They are not simply consultants, but create an environment where the best decisions that are politically possible can be taken. We now turn our attention to the effects of this increased influence: in instances where the political level would request a service in their area, how then do policy officials allocate resources? To highlight the needs of one’s constituents is indeed a legitimate and necessary function of the urban politician.

‘It would often happen that a member [Councillor] would come to me and say: “I want this resource in my community”...I say fine, I will do a report and bring it to committee where other Councillors will want the same resource in their communities – is that okay?...Often the politician no longer wishes the review to be conducted’ (Interview 3)

In a more controversial case, an interviewee was asked to fund Ulster Scots\(^35\) in a part of the city. The bureaucrat indicated to the politician that a review would be conducted, but if the proposal were to make it through committee, the Irish language would also have to be included in the review. Once this was explained to the Councillor, the Councillor no longer wished for the review to be conducted (Interview 20). Within Belfast’s power-sharing political structures, the bureaucratic elite frame the debate and control the flow of information in traditionally contentious areas. The governance structure allows for this increased responsibility. Bureaucratic influence is further confirmed by the following two interviewees: If a Councillor comes to me and asks for resources in a particular area – I retreat to the evidence (Interview 19). If a member of the political level tries to say ‘you gave them this service, give it to us...I steer the debate

\(^{35}\) Predominantly a Unionist cultural identity
away from this’ (Interview 14). As we can see bureaucratic involvement is crucial to sustaining power-sharing within the city. To say however that the bureaucratic elite act with disregard for the political level would be disingenuous and erroneous. On the contrary, the bureaucratic elite actively encourage constructive political involvement in decision-making. What we see in Belfast however is that the bureaucratic elite have developed sufficient administrative capacity so that potential solutions are contextualised within the divided city environment.

The bureaucracy is now seen to stand up to sectarianism rather than, at best circumventing it, or at worst, facilitating it. ‘Now bureaucrats are freer to reject sectarianism...due to political dominance in previous eras this may not have been the case.’ (Interview 3) Bureaucrats can rely on legislation to retreat to the evidence: ‘there is now a legislative requirement that all our decisions carry equality impact assessments, so as to ensure that no community is discriminated against’ (Interview 2). However most often they rely on informal modes of governance. Bureaucrats frequently refer to the use of the committee\textsuperscript{36} in order to prevent politicians rewarding their electorate and punishing adversaries: ‘not even members of their own party would support resource allocation if it was only to one particular ward’ (Interview 9). This way, if a politician seeks reward for his electoral area, the bureaucrat simply agrees to take the proposal to committee where it will always be unsuccessful.

\textsuperscript{36} As previously described, governance in Belfast (since 2007) is by committee. Elected politicians are nominated to a committee which has responsibility for a particular subject area. Unless specifically provided for, decisions of committee are ratified by Council.
The role of the bureaucrat in divisive issues has increased dramatically. If the political level try to represent their electoral ward with sectarian bias the bureaucratic elite revert to the technical evidence to shape the debate. If a Councillor wanted increased service provision in his/her area, the bureaucracy responds that there is a ‘technical basis for frequency of service: “we conducted a study and this was acted upon”’ (Interview 14). Time and time again interview evidence shows that the administrative elite steer the debate along the central channel, occasionally being blown off course by the political level trying to over represent their electoral area. This however is rarely sectarian on the politician’s behalf – they are simply representing their area. In exceptional cases where the debate does degenerate into a sectarian contest, this usually involves the grant-making process.

Reiterating Bollens’ (2000) assertion, it is not sufficient for the bureaucratic elite to deal with Councillors simply in a non-sectarian manner, but they must also contextualise their professional advice within the framework of the divided society. Tensions do still emerge between certain politicians and the bureaucratic elite. This first quote comes from a policy maker with a Catholic background: ‘some politicians would know my personal background and would not look at me in the eye and would always check my homework...These are in the minority but it still does happen’ (Interview 7). This second quote comes from a bureaucrat from a Protestant background: ‘Sinn Fein may have the impression that as I am of the other community that I have an agenda’ (Interview 19). However, for the majority of cases, the bureaucratic elite are keen to stress the good working relationships they now have with Councillors: ‘The political level
have never questioned my decisions yet – I try to keep both sides happy’ (Interview 12). ‘Councillors really do represent the people and have played a huge part in getting us to where we are today’ (Interview 13). ‘The Council has been instrumental and influential in conflict management’ (Interview 10). ‘If it is the right thing it should get through...Councillors respect the city’ (Interview 15). Today the bureaucracy understands its responsibilities and is no longer afraid or inhibited to carry out its perceived duty. A much stronger bureaucracy now exists: ‘Sometimes the political level do try and deal with the department inappropriately...they need to be told “no”...two of the last three chief executives were sacked – suffering abuse by members’ (Interview 9).

A number of officials pointed to the unfortunate position of many of their colleagues in other non-power sharing councils: ‘Some councils have bureaucrats that have been beaten to a pulp; they have no more interest in public service any more, it’s just the political level guiding resource allocation’ (Interview 3). This is further supported by a survey conducted by the NIPSA public service union which found morale to be ‘low’ across the Councils of Northern Ireland (NIPSA, 2010) While a minority of interviewees did express frustration with the ineffectiveness of a number of social mobility programmes (Interview 6), these interviewees still remained passionate and committed to their work within the administration.

Bureaucrats now perceive their roles as actively managing conflict. While ‘in the past the primary value of the bureaucracy has been neutrality...Now with an increase in diversity, we should not now be neutral – we must promote diversity’ (Interview 8). Recommendations made by policy experts now take into account the divided nature of
the city. While before bureaucrats provided advice on the basis of two cities side by side, now they are actively managing conflict. Recommendations are not simply based on expertise, but incorporate political realities in which the city is set. It is seen that bureaucrats no longer shy away from involving themselves in the more colourful areas of policy making—while before they perceived this as ‘social engineering...producing more harm than good’ (Bollens, 2000:231), today, even managers in more technical policy areas evidence active involvement in conflict management: ‘It is my responsibility to encourage people to work together. This is a service delivery issue – North Belfast does not need two depots – if people could work together we could have a single depot and provide alternative services’ (Interview 14). Managers no longer see their roles as solely to provide a service within a contested city. The bureaucratic elite are now directly involved in the management of conflict. The bureaucratic elite have become quasi leaders or ‘co-producers’ (Interview 9). ‘You are either politically aware or not – if you are not politically aware you should not be head of service’ (Interview 18). The bureaucratic leadership perceive themselves to be ‘changing the status quo’ (Interview 7). In the areas of service delivery, resource allocation and budget cuts, the administrative elite lead the Council in developing, shaping and implementing policy. While previously the bureaucratic elite would have shied away from divisive issues, leaving these to the preserve of elected officials, today the bureaucratic elite see themselves as key actors in potentially contentious issues: ‘I often have to step in in a divided issue’ (Interview 12). The role of the bureaucracy in conflict management increases with the advent of power-sharing, while there is also a parallel increase in
challenges and responsibilities. Increasing bureaucratic capacity within fragile consociational environments is therefore a prerequisite, not simply for good governance but for conflict management.

Interviews returned numerous examples of the expansion of Council activity into new arenas: ‘We used to make equality returns to the Equality Commission but do nothing with them ourselves: now we use them to target areas in our outreach programme’ (Interview 18). ‘Community safety was deemed to be a priority for people in a survey conducted by Council...Council therefore took the lead in providing community safety’ (Interview 19). Now there is an environmental health officer – before this would have been an area that the Council would have shied away from. ‘If it was not a service that we had to expressly provide we did not provide it’ (Interview 12). This confidence in power-sharing is further evidenced by the expansion of Council responsibilities into what are traditionally controversial policy areas. In 2009, a number of Roma immigrants were racially abused in Belfast. Belfast City Council played a significant role in diffusing the tension: ‘Take the Roma example – not only was the Council involved but played a leadership role’ (Interview 19).

Alley gating is another recent policy, which through the closing off of back alleys in urban areas, has proven to reduce anti social behaviour\(^{37}\). This policy area however has a budget cap. If resources were to be allocated on the basis of greatest need, the service would be provided almost entirely in one section of the city. The resource

\(^{37}\) For a recent account of some of the problems associated within this policy area see: [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-12923647](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-12923647) “House is “gutted in east Belfast arson attack”” 31 March 2011. In this instance a house was burned down and the perpetrators gained access through a ‘back alley’.
therefore cannot be allocated simply by need. Based on political bargaining coordinated by the bureaucratic elite, financial resources were committed equally to each of the four parts of the city – North, South, East and West. Alley gating however was not a traditional function of the Council, but provides evidence of the Council taking the initiative to provide a service for its citizens. While under direct rule data was also fudged to manage the conflict (Bollens, 2000), the difference today is in the goal – while in the past bureaucrats and planners planned for two cities side by side, today they are planning for one city. In attaining this objective the role of the bureaucracy has altered considerably.

A further example is that of community wardens. Community wardens are allocated on the basis of crime analysis statistics. The resources are allocated to the areas of maximum need; however, this interpretation of need is again fudged to ensure that each area has some physical presence. This is probably the most remarkable evidence of bureaucratic activism into traditionally controversial areas (law and order), justified on the basis of a comprehensive survey of citizens where the people of Belfast identified community safety as a primary environmental health fear (Interview 19). While before the Council would have shied away from such sensitive areas, it now embraces the opportunity to involve itself in new challenges.

‘In 1999 there was no policy officer in this department. Now there is a policy unit. We are now building a strong policy evidence base...Before 1999 if we needed a decision, the department would employ consultants who would simply recommend the option favoured by their political masters’. (Interview 4)

The advent of power-sharing has correlated with an increased the influence of the bureaucratic elite on conflict management. Correspondingly, this had had three
notable affects on bureaucratic activity. Firstly, senior bureaucrats feel they can now stand up to sectarianism. Secondly, their working relationships with the political level have changed, as have their role perceptions. Thirdly, the Council and the bureaucracy have expanded their role into arenas traditionally avoided by the organisation. We see the bureaucracy interpreting their role in an all encompassing manner. If no one else is providing a service, the bureaucracy will find a way of responding. Before power-sharing, this was not the case. This expansion of Council competency is not simply in areas of resource allocation but also involves framing the debate on where resources are to be withdrawn. As the losses of Belfast City Council had always been underwritten, budget cuts never featured prominently in the day to day life of the bureaucrat. As the Council now must balance its own books, budget cuts are expected to take up more of the officials work load. To date, much of the cost has been underwritten through efficiency savings. Officials are unanimous in their agreement that this is becoming less and less possible and that cuts to direct services will have to be made. How direct services are cut is a potentially sensitive issue, yet once again, the nature and geographical area of the cuts is proposed at the bureaucrat level. This is further confirmed by the disinterest of the political level in these more macro issues: ‘We now have a downturn committee and we have trouble getting Councillors to attend’ (Interview 11).

As happened in the nineties, when resources are being cut, they are done so in light of the sectarian realities of the city: ‘If I had to cut leisure centres I would have to cut one in North, one in the South, one in the East and one in the West. There is no
other way’ (Interview 7). When services are being cut, ‘you have to do your homework before the meeting...I know who the Councillors are who will have issue with particular things’ (Interview 19). However the building of new replacement Council facilities marks a departure from ‘planning for two cities’ (Bollens, 2000). When buildings in communities come to the end of their financial life, a new combined one is built. Massive consultation is required. These projects are always initiated by the bureaucracy but ultimate authority is with the political level (Interview 12).

While sectarianism is often not addressed by official Council documents, it has been incorporated informally into the modus operandi of Council decision-making. Departing from the years of hegemonic rule, Belfast no longer plans for two cities, but actively plans for a contested society. There is no doubt that the bureaucratic elite perceive themselves to considerably frame the debate in contentious issues. This is how policy making works: ‘we take into account the perspectives of the political level at department level and work with how we think/expect to progress’ (Interview 9). Particularly recurrent throughout the interviews was the reference to the high percentage of unanimity achieved at Council decisions. The process which allows for this unanimity is most important – the bureaucracy firmly control the nature of the debate in which decisions are made. It is they that bring recommendations to Council, and it is they who control the nature of the research and flow of information.
3.7 Concluding remarks

In decision type C the role of the bureaucrat in both policy-making and conflict management is found to be substantial. However the role of the bureaucrat in sustaining the status quo has not changed. In 1994 when Bollens conducted his research bureaucrats were found to be preservers of the status quo. Today, bureaucrats role perceptions have changed. They perceive themselves to represent the needs of the city and to be partners in the policy process. Nonetheless, they still behave as preservers of the status quo. In order to sustain the status quo of a power-sharing governance structure however, the bureaucrat is required to become actively involved, not only in the policy-making process, but also in the wider urban governance process. Put differently, when Bollens conducted his research in 1994/5 bureaucrats were indeed extensively involved in the policy making process of the city, however they deliberately were not involved in the conflict management process. This was perceived as an exclusively political level competence. Since power-sharing, the bureaucracy has developed a substantial role in managing the political process. The bureaucrat is not simply an adviser or a policy expert, but is actively engaged in the stabilisation and normalisation process. While under hegemonic conditions sectarian realities were, ‘known to but avoided by, town planning and housing allocation administrators’ (Bollens, 2000: 240); this research finds that the bureaucratic elite within the Council no longer shy away from these issues. We now see the bureaucracy incorporating physical sectarian realities into policy making. Bollens’ evidence indicates that this was not the case before power-sharing. Bureaucrats today confront sectarian differences and have
expanded the competencies of the City Council, justifying this both through attaining efficiency savings and through citizen demand. The overtly technocratic attitude of the 1980s which guided planning for two cities side by side, has been replaced with a highly motivated, committed workforce that contextualises expert advice within the changed political reality. Today, within the day-to-day decision-making category, the administration frames the debate, sets the agenda, pushes forward policies, and questions policies that run counter to what they perceive to be the interests of the entire city. As the environment in which the bureaucrat acts has changed, so too has the role of the bureaucrat. In this article I have not established definitive causes for the change in bureaucrat behaviour, nor do I identify the dynamic nature of bureaucrat role perceptions. The findings serve however to demonstrate that the bureaucratic elite have a significant role to play in sustaining power-sharing arrangements. Societies adopting a comprehensive consociationalism model akin to that of Belfast need to be aware of the significance of the bureaucrat (and hence developing administrative capacity) in sustaining the political structures. While much has been written on potential political solutions in Jerusalem, Nicosia or Mostar, how would the public administration be designed and tailored to each circumstance?

Developing administrative capacity is found to be a necessary condition not solely for good governance but also for successful power-sharing and conflict management. The important role of the bureaucrat in decision-making has been extensively analysed in public administration literature; bureaucrat role perceptions within the contested society are however less understood. Table 3.1 conveys that in
Belfast, where the political level have decided to share authority, the bureaucracy have a substantial role to play within the governance of the city. While public administration research in less contested societies would lead us to expect the results for decisions in categories A and B, existing research tells us little about the role of the bureaucratic elite in the day-to-day management of the contested society. In this chapter I find, converse to hypothesised expectations, that the bureaucrat significantly influences the day-to-day decision making process within the city. At the same time, the bureaucratic elite are not found to act completely independent of the political level, but instead are found to work in conjunction with the political level, seeing themselves as co-producers. Meier and O’Toole (2006) define political control as a bureaucrat acting in ways s/he otherwise would not. Drawing on this definition of political control, it is evident that political control exists in type B decisions. The bureaucrat may try to influence policy outcomes but is not usually successful. The bureaucrat-politician relationship differs in type C decisions: while the process of achieving an intended bureaucratic outcome takes into account the contested nature of the city and the political power-sharing structure, outcomes in these type C policy areas are rarely converse to the original policy proposals of the bureaucrat. Nonetheless, these bureaucratic objectives are contextualised and constrained by the contested environment of the city. Thus, the term discretion is used with caution. The bureaucrat does not behave in isolation to his/her political surroundings. Following power-sharing, the argument can be made that contestation decreases and that the legitimacy of the political institutions correspondingly increases; this does not necessarily cause bureaucrats to possess
increased discretion. However, evidence from Belfast suggests that the role of the bureaucrat expands from a policy-specific role to a broader governance role. How individual bureaucrats perceive their roles within this form of governance will be returned to in chapter six.

Table 3.1: Summary of research findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision Type A: Low public interest</th>
<th>Decision Type B: High public interest one off decisions</th>
<th>Decision Type C: High (urban) public interest, day-to-day decisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actor with most influence on the decision-making process</strong></td>
<td>Bureaucratic elite. Bureaucrat relies on regulation and the law to inform decision making.</td>
<td>Political level. Bureaucratic elite can influence process but this is trumped by that of the political level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actor with most influence on agenda setting</strong></td>
<td>Bureaucratic elite with occasional influence from individual Councillors</td>
<td>Both political and bureaucratic elite involved in setting the agenda. If bureaucratic elite set agenda this is usually due to a statutory requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actor with most influence on outcomes</strong></td>
<td>Bureaucratic elite. Where possible bureaucrats will keep some money for Councillor’s wishes but this money is allocated at bureaucrat’s discretion</td>
<td>While the bureaucratic elite try and influence outcomes, the political level make the bureaucratic elite act in ways they otherwise would not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary guidance in decision-making</strong></td>
<td>Technical criteria and regulation</td>
<td>Political criteria. Bureaucrat tries to influence but often unsuccessful</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The bureaucratic elite have learned how to manage the political environment in which they work. The nature of the bureaucrat-politician relationship has changed since
1994. It is the bureaucratic elite that facilitate the political-level solution of power-sharing. It is the bureaucratic elite who frame the debate, the bureaucratic elite who set the agenda and the bureaucratic elite who push certain policies forward and question policies that run counter to the general public interest. The research has shown that in some decision typologies the bureaucrat is more successful in this process than others. The research serves as evidence of a widely held, but little evidenced, assertion that the public administration affects not only the successes of good governance (which is well discussed in the literature) but also influences the success of power-sharing itself. As Brinkerhoff and Morgan (2010) have demonstrated, developing administrative capacity is indeed necessary for good governance; it is also noteworthy that lessons from Belfast indicate that developing administrative capacity is also a necessary condition for successful power-sharing.

This chapter has been concerned with the politico-administrative relationship. Within Belfast City Council, elite level bureaucrats possess significant discretion. This chapter has not sought to determine what guides this discretion, however the findings suggest that such a study is indeed required. While there is an extensive body of literature examining bureaucrat preferences and role perceptions within the United States bureaucracy, apart from studies by Mengistu and Vogel (2006) and Dresang (1974), little is known about the preferences of bureaucrats within post-conflict environments. Further research is required to determine who the bureaucracy are (passive representation) and what interests they represent (active representation). To develop a comprehensive understanding of what makes the administration of power-
sharing systems work, a closer look at the norms and values that guide bureaucratic behaviour is essential. I return to such questions in chapter six. An understanding of both bureaucratic role perception and the structural mechanisms influencing these norms needs to be clarified if we are to truly understand what makes power-sharing systems of government work. If power-sharing forms of governance in cities such as Kirkuk, Nicosia, Beirut or Jerusalem are to be successful, attention to developing administrative capacity is necessary, not simply for good governance, but for conflict management itself.

To summarise; as the mechanism of conflict management changed from majoritarian or hegemonic control to power-sharing, the environment in which the bureaucrat operates has also fundamentally changed. The bureaucrat has become a co-producer in the policy and conflict management process. Directors and Heads of Service are no longer afraid to target funding where they perceive the need is. Funding is not based solely on political direction. Nor are the needs of the city simply defined in purely technocratic terms but also incorporate the contested nature of the city. Conflict management is a function of the bureaucracy. The mechanisms through which the bureaucracy within the power-sharing society works need to be greater understood. Further research is necessary to establish bureaucratic role perceptions, to determine the bureaucratic structures conducive to good decision making and investigate recruitment policies within contested societies. What guides bureaucrat behaviour? How important are the values of efficiency, impartiality and fairness? How can a non-sectarian professional administration be achieved? The research presented in this
chapter has shown that the bureaucracy in power-sharing environments affects conflict management, playing an integral role in policy formulation and decision-making in areas crucial to the conflict. Power-sharing research needs to discover the importance of the bureaucracy and bureaucratic structures in managing conflict. Although political institutions and compromises are necessary for initially developing successful power-sharing, this research documents the pivotal role of the bureaucracy in sustaining power-sharing agreements. Developing bureaucratic capacity is essential if power-sharing is to succeed.
Power-sharing ‘light’: bureaucrat perceptions of power-sharing at the lowest common denominator

4.1 Introduction

For managing plural societies, power-sharing arrangements are often put forward as providing the most appropriate solutions. Unlike more comprehensive mechanisms of power-sharing, the Brussels experience differentiates itself in that, where as much as is possible, decisions relating to the conflict are administered separately by each language group. This therefore leaves only a minority of traditionally controversial issues to joint decision-making. Authority is shared in the arenas of economics, employment, infrastructure and transport, largely removing policy areas such as culture, education and health from power-sharing. The endurance of the Brussels institutions amidst numerous national crises can inform us how conflict can be managed through power-sharing at the lowest common denominator. While impressively serving their purpose as mechanisms of conflict management, this chapter finds that it is these same structures that have prevented the governing institutions from adapting to the changing urban realities of a power-sharing society. Today Brussels is widely considered as an example of ‘ethnic peace’. Consequentially, conflict management is no longer a primary concern of the urban government – attention has shifted to priorities that also present themselves in more cohesive societies – those of delivering quality, coherent governance.
The central tenet of power-sharing is that former adversaries have agreed to joint authority and to take decisions based on consensus (Schneckener, 2002). The degree to which ethno-political communities share this power can vary from comprehensive power-sharing, as is the case in Belfast, to the lowest common denominator method (LCD) of power-sharing, as employed in Brussels. Once power-sharing has been sustained for a number of years, conflict management is generally no longer the primary concern of a majority of the urban population. Conflict management concerns are superseded by concerns for the amelioration of governance conditions. Put differently, in the initial phase of power-sharing, conflict management is indeed the primary concern of the emerging government. As the process succeeds however, the quality of governance outputs, outcomes and decisions supersede conflict management as the major urban concern. In the case of Brussels, Dutch-speakers no longer feel threatened by the traditional French-speaking majority (Janssens, 2008). Since 1989, the power-sharing structures within Brussels have contributed to the stabilisation and reversing of tensions between both linguistic communities. Drawing on existing data and over thirty interviews with bureaucratic and political actors, I find that while the Brussels conflict management mechanism has indeed proven itself successful in conflict management, it has found difficulty adapting to the new urban demands of good

38 A greater problem, which on occasion causes national (Belgian) paralysis, is the plight of the French speakers residing in the neighbouring Flemish Region. This problem is outside the scope of this particular study as I am confining my research to examining the implementation of the conceptual solution of power-sharing at the lowest common denominator within the Bilingual Region of the Brussels-Capital/Brussels Region. The 1989 agreement fits into a national compromise. The emergent structures will be presented later in the chapter.
This in turn frustrates the conflict management to conflict resolution process. While chapter three contextualised the working environment of the Belfast bureaucratic elite, this chapter focuses on the environment in which the Brussels bureaucratic elite operate. I ask: where do the bureaucratic elite see the obstacles to both good governance and conflict resolution within the version of power-sharing employed in Brussels.

I find however that while the mechanism of conflict management employed in Brussels, has indeed contributed to normalisation and stabilisation within the city, a number of implementation deficits in the conflict management mechanism prevent the transition from what is considered good governance within a contested society, to that which is acceptable within an established power-sharing society. In other words, the governance problems in Brussels are not associated with the principle of conflict management at the lowest common denominator, but how the mechanism has been executed. This study finds that failures in the electoral design and structure of public administration have prevented further rapprochement between the two ‘traditional’ Brussels communities. Coherency in policy-making is not only necessary for good governance but in order to move from the short term goal of conflict management to the longer term goal of conflict resolution. While the chapter does not intend to address the conceptual merits of power-sharing at the lowest common denominator, it does

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39 While ‘good governance’ in Belgium may be perceived as a right-wing nationalist policy, no such meaning is intended in this dissertation. (Cfr. Introductory Chapter)
40 ‘City’ throughout this chapter refers to the territory of the Brussels Capital Region and the Bilingual Region of Brussels Capital, not to the municipality of Brussels which is one of the nineteen communes and also the capital of Belgium
address the extent to which power-sharing at the lowest common denominator is a realistic alternative to traditional comprehensive mechanisms of power-sharing.\footnote{The conceptual level debate surrounding types of conflict management mechanism – consociationalism (Lijphart, 1969), power-dividing (Roeder and Rothchild (2005), etc... is outside the scope of this study. I am concerned with the effect of these theoretical solutions on the politician-bureaucratic relationship.}

The study also has broader implications, providing an insight into how deeply divided societies may consider limited power-sharing as an alternative to total separation. Michael Dumper (2010: 26) outlines a two-state plus model for Jerusalem where, given the existent urban demographic realities, ‘a range of highly coordinated joint frameworks’ would be necessary to govern the city. Virginia Tilley (2005:1) goes further claiming that the Two State Solution between Israelis and Palestinians ‘has been eliminated as a practical solution’. Regardless of the political resolution in Jerusalem, or other similarly contested cities, the governing framework of the contested city will have to account for the existing ethno-national/ethno-linguistic demographic realities. Cities can often be the focal point of ethnonational conflicts and generally contain a concentration of each ethnopolitical group. Ethnopolitical autonomy along territorial lines within an urban environment is not always possible – in cities such as Kirkuk, Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen do not congregate in their own areas of the city but are dispersed throughout the city. Similarly, no district within the Brussels Capital Region could be described as being predominantly Dutch-speaking.\footnote{Logie (1981) used a threshold as low as 20% to identify clusters of Dutch-speakers within the Brussels municipality.} Drawing on governance practices and structures within the Brussels example of ‘ethnic peace’, I examine if this alternate form of governance is worth considering in contested societies such as Kirkuk.
4.2 Power-sharing in Brussels

Traditional approaches to power-sharing generally require power-sharing across all aspects of governance. A study of Brussels’ power-sharing structures provides an example of an alternate mechanism of consociationalism. Over the past number of years, a number of researchers have explored the idea of exporting this Brussels model to other contested societies (Van Damme, 2003; Demant, 1997, Stroschein 2003). Van Damme describes the ‘complex politico-institutional arrangements [as] keeping the communities in the capital together’ (2003:49). Bollens too categorises Brussels as being ‘most politically stable because power-sharing structures and forms of transitional democratisation have effectively stabilised the local state’ (2008:5, emphases added). The Brussels model has indeed proven itself to be stable, remaining steadfast amidst numerous national political crises. While Bollens (2008) quite correctly describes the Brussels solution as ‘sustainable’, I argue that the institutional design, while successful in conflict management, impedes the normalisation process within the city. Before further consideration is given to the exportation of the Brussels model, a greater understanding of the mechanisms and workings of the Brussels model must be attained.

I therefore focus on just one aspect (most relevant to the research question) of the Brussels model: how the public administration works within the LCD mechanism of conflict management. Before exportation of the model is considered, further studies through different lenses will of course also be necessary. Using the public administration lens I find that while the various political actors within Brussels may ‘talk’ to each other, the various public administrations do not. As demonstrated in chapter three the public
administration supports, and operates within, the status quo. The status quo in Brussels means that four separate administrations have responsibility for public policy exclusively within the city. If these Brussels public administrations are to cooperate, this will have to be led by the political level. Such an initiative is found to be unlikely given the Brussels electoral system. Institutional design has been highlighted as an integral component of consociation success (Reynolds, 2002). Various aspects of institutional design have been considered and analysed – the extent of federalism (De Villiers, 1994), the merits of presidential rule (Shugart and Carey, 1992), public administration, (Bollens, 2008; Esman, 1997, 1999; Brown, 1999) and electoral systems (Pilet, 2005; de Silva, 1998; Deschouwer and Van Parijs, 2009; Norris, 2005, 2008). While other contributors have looked at improving the Brussels solution through overhauling the institutional and jurisdictional structures to better serve the Brussels/Belgian population (Maskens, Lagasse and Nieuwenhove, 2008), this research takes an alternative approach identifying the primary bureaucracy-level problems that have arisen in implementing this type of power-sharing. Societies considering consociationalism as a mechanism of conflict management will consequentially be more aware of the potential (public administration level) pitfalls in implementing consociationalism at the lowest common denominator. While the Brussels system is in need of reform, it is important to correctly distinguish between the causes of poor governance and the symptoms of poor governance. I explore not only the institutional design within the Brussels solution, but also the effects of this design on coherent governance and conflict management. The research question for this chapter asks: where do the bureaucratic elite see the
obstacles to both good governance and to conflict resolution within the LCD mechanism of conflict management as employed in Brussels? This question will generate an understanding of the environment in which the Brussels bureaucrat operates.

To summarise, I am most concerned with how the institutional model works and where the implementation deficits are. Bollens (2008) describes the Brussels solution as ‘sustainable’. I therefore examine what precisely the Brussels solution is in terms of the public administration, and determine the problems in its implementation from the perspective of the elite level bureaucrat. This should shed some light on how power can be shared in some policy areas, without requiring ‘comprehensive’ power-sharing in all aspects of governance. The research within this chapter contributes to both conflict management and public administration literature documenting the administrative structures of Brussels, and outlining an alternative solution to how a public service can be designed within a system where two communities share one geographical space. I acknowledge that the Brussels institutional solution is a product of its environment and that state and municipal level institutions also influence the conflict management process. It is however the concept of limited power-sharing that I am interested in. Brussels is indeed stable, but what does the Brussels solution teach us from a public administration perspective? I do not go into advanced detail describing the political and administrative structures at the municipal and national level. While these levels of course influence the city to a great extent, this research concentrates on the sub-state institutions that operate exclusively at the community/regional level (linguistic and territorial) in Brussels. Recall I am not interested in the city-state relationship but in
determining if and how the elite level bureaucrat influences the conflict management process.

4.3 Outline of the chapter

The Brussels compromise is a complex mesh of devolved responsibility which first must be understood before prospects for its adoption elsewhere are considered. Federalism is highly advanced in Belgium, with significant functional autonomy at both the regional and municipal levels. The most noteworthy aspect of the next section (4.4) is to emphasise that at both national and regional levels, areas of cultural sensitivity are not under joint responsibility. Apart from a number of sites of predetermined cooperation, issues of health, education and culture are administered by two separate linguistic bodies. Power-sharing is, in the main, restricted to the economic sphere. After this brief contextualisation section I proceed to investigate the problems of inter-institutional cooperation. It is found that the various institutions are not responsive to citizen demands while they also lack the structural ability to develop coherent governance. These problems are further compounded by a failure in the electoral design to present an environment where such inefficiencies may be overcome. These problems with the electoral design are presented in the final section. It is found that while trying to overcome the problems of conflict management, further problems have been inadvertently institutionalised. While in the initial stages of power-sharing these

43 In section 4.4 I describe the politico-administrative solution as it exists today. Space does not permit a description of HOW these institutions emerged, but a comprehensive description (in French) can be found in Witte et al (eds.) 1999 – Bruxelles et son Statut.
inefficiencies may be accepted as the ‘price for peace’, the institutionalisation of these inefficiencies allows for the stagnation of the ‘grander’ conflict resolution process.

The findings propose that while the Brussels institutions are well equipped to deal with the problems of conflict management; as the collective goals of the urban population change with the onset of stability and normalisation, the institutions are less able to realise the demand for quality urban governance. The first finding proposes that although the concept may suggest an amicable and transferable solution for other contested societies, its implementation in Brussels urges caution. The formalised institutional design of Brussels fails to incorporate new and emerging urban realities into the governance process. The objective of conflict management must also include a commitment to both good governance and conflict resolution. The second finding indicates that bureaucrats in Brussels do not have the same level of interaction with the policy-making process as their Belfast counterparts. It is put forward however that this distance from the policy making process is not due to the conflict management mechanism but grounded in how the mechanism has been implemented.

4.4 The Brussels Solution: Power-sharing at the LCD.

The conflict in Belgium is often put forward as a linguistic conflict. While language has emerged as the most visual manifestation of the conflict, further differences have also been present throughout the country’s recent history. Traditionally, the largely Catholic north opposed the largely socialist/liberal south. During the 1960s, traditionally a Walloon identity was centred around social-economic emancipation and an open
attitude to other cultures and anti-racism (Van Dam, 1996; Billet, Maddens and Beerten, 2003). On the other hand the Flemish identity was centred around a cultural heritage (Billet et al, 2003). These differing cleavages have shaped federalism in Belgium. French-speaking Walloons have traditionally advocated for the federalisation of economic and social policy. Conversely, Dutch-speakers in Flanders traditionally advocated greater federalisation of cultural and heritage competencies. In addition, unlike the Belfast compromise, the Brussels compromise is inherently linked with the national compromise. This was not an indigenous solution at the urban level but a product of state level agreements. By default of the national compromise, power in Brussels is shared in the economic sphere but not in the personal sphere. What has emerged is a solution resembling power-sharing at the lowest common denominator, however this is not to suggest that the politicians of Brussels agreed to share power in certain areas while deciding to manage their own affairs where they could not find agreement. The Brussels solution provides the opportunity to learn about how power sharing can work in instances where not all aspects of public policy are subject to the power-sharing arrangement. This in turn provides an opportunity for other contested societies to consider the Brussels mechanism of conflict management as an alternative to traditional comprehensive mechanisms of consociationalism.

While traditionally a Dutch-speaking city, over the past century, Brussels has transformed into a predominantly French-speaking city, completely encircled by the
largely Dutch speaking Flemish Region\textsuperscript{44}. Today it consists of nineteen communes, or electoral wards, each with a high degree of autonomy. Together the territory of these wards form the Brussels Region; a sub-state tier of government with responsibility for economics, employment, emergency services etc\textsuperscript{45}. These wards are also within the Bilingual Region of Brussels-Capital which has competence for services related the person such as education, health and culture. Brussels therefore has two spectrums of authority – a personal community authority (education health and culture) and what is referred to as a territory authority (economics, employment, transport etc). Power is shared in the ‘territory’ policies while, where as much as is possible, each linguistic community manages its own affairs in the former category.

The focus in this section is on the institutional design. As put forward in the literature review, institutional structures themselves do not lead to conflict management. Rather, it is more important to establish how bureaucrats engage with these structures. While I acknowledge that it is how structures are exploited that matters, not the structures themselves, an understanding of the institutional solution is still required. Further, the focus of this chapter is narrowed to concentrate on the institutional structures that govern Brussels at the sub-state level. As is to be expected such a governance mechanism involves a complex set of institutional structures. While

\textsuperscript{44} The Flemish language is a variation of Dutch. In general the term ‘Flemish’ is associated more with territory, while the term ‘Dutch’ is associated more with language. For example, while one may identify themselves as a Dutch-speaker, it does not necessarily follow that they are Flemish – they may identify with Brussels to a greater degree than with the Flemish Region (Flanders).

\textsuperscript{45} In 1963 it was agreed that French ‘language facilities’ be provided in 6 neighbouring communes in Flanders – language facilities allow French-speakers to deal with government institutions through French. In return, the boundaries of Brussels were to be permanently fixed at 19 communes so as to prevent the further expansion of Brussels into the Flanders region.
indeed confusing, this in itself should not preclude the adoption of the structures elsewhere. Federalism is highly advanced in Belgium, so much so that sub-state authorities hold comparable authority to the national level. In other words, authority in Belgium cannot be depicted on a pyramid, with the national level at the top and the municipal or local level at the bottom: national level authority does not always supersede the authority of sub-state actors. Belgium is divided into three territorial regions: The Flemish Region, commonly referred to as Flanders, where the majority speak Dutch; The Walloon Region, also known as Wallonia, where the majority speak French; and the Brussels Region which is bilingual. This is depicted in Fig. 4.1.

*Fig. 4.1 The Regions of Belgium*

These regions each have a regional parliament and government and have authority exclusively within each of their respective territories for all activities connected with territory – economics, water, employment, environment, foreign trade etc. During the federalisation negotiations, federalisation of these activities was advocated predominantly by French-speakers. The bilingual region of Brussels is the focus of this research. The only sub-state actor with competence for territory activities within this bilingual region is the Brussels Capital Region. (Neither the Flemish Region nor the Walloon Region have competence within the Brussels Region.) It consists of a power-
sharing parliament where Dutch-speakers are guaranteed 17 seats and French-speaking candidates are guaranteed 72 seats. For elections to the BCR, candidates appear on monolingual lists: voters must first choose which language group they would like to vote in and subsequently must vote for the party list of their choice. Of these 89 parliamentarians, one is chosen to lead the Brussels Capital Region government. In theory, the Minister-President is language-neutral, while in practice the Minister President is a Francophone who is also competent in Dutch. The Minister-President is supported by two Dutch-speaking and two French-speaking Ministers. The government also includes three junior ministers, at least one of whom must be Dutch speaking. Each minister is supported by a cabinet, appointed by his/her political party. These cabinets do not formally exist in the legislature but usually consist of about 40 people and are usually members of the Ministers political party appointed for the term of the government. The political level is supported by a permanent administration. The service provided by the Brussels Capital Region is bilingual, its bureaucrats are not. 70% of positions are reserved for French-speakers while 30% of positions are reserved for Dutch-speakers. At the elite level positions are allocated 50:50. Thus the bureaucracy is bilingual, not the bureaucrat\(^46\).

While Francophones advocated the federalisation of economic activities, Dutch-speakers aspired to greater cultural autonomy. Hence, further sub-state institutions were designed to govern areas such as health, education and culture. Belgium has four

\(^{46}\) At the Commune level, the bureaucrat is in theory expected to be bilingual. Thus in each case a bilingual service is to be provided. In the BCR, this is via two sets of theoretically monolingual bureaucrats, while at the commune level this is via bilingual bureaucrats.
language communities, each with a sub-state actor with responsibility for the provision of services related to the person: The French-speaking community (CF), the Dutch-speaking community (VG) the German speaking community and the Bilingual Region of the Brussels-Capital. The CF has competence for the provision of services to French-speakers in Wallonia and the Bilingual Region of Brussels-Capital. The VG has competence for the provision of services in Flanders and the Bilingual Region of Brussels-Capital. The German-speaking Community has responsibility for service provision in the German-speaking region. The French Community Commission (COCOF) and the Flemish Community Commission (VGC) have competence only within the Bilingual Region of Brussels-Capital. A Common Community Commission (CCC) also has competence only within the Bilingual Region of Brussels-Capital. Thus, as depicted in Fig. 4.2 (below), in Belgium, there are three regions and four linguistic community governments in Belgium. Note: The bilingual region government consists of two (French and Dutch) communities existing alongside each other, not a bilingual community.

Fig. 4.2 The Regional Governments and Linguistic Communities of Belgium

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS</th>
<th>LINGUISTIC COMMUNITIES/REGIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brussels Region</td>
<td>French-speaking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flanders Region</td>
<td>Dutch-speaking</td>
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<tr>
<td>Walloon Region</td>
<td>Bilingual Region of Brussels-Capital</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>German-speaking</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

47 The Flanders region and the Dutch-speaking community (VG) governments have merged.
In figures 4.3 and 4.4 the relationship between the regions and their governments as relevant to Brussels is identified. As shown in the diagram, reference to the Brussels Capital Region refers to the sub-state actors with responsibility for territory services. On the other hand, reference to the Bilingual Region of Brussels-Capital refers to linguistic governments: those with responsibility for personal services. The CF and the VG operate in their respective regions but also in the Bilingual Region of Brussels-Capital. The CCC, COCOF and VGC operate only within the Bilingual Region of Brussels-Capital\(^{48}\).

*Fig. 4.3 The relationship between the regions/communities and their governments*

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\(^{48}\) Both The Brussels Capital Region and the Bilingual Region of Brussels Capital cover the same geographic territory – the nineteen communes of Brussels.
Given the aims of the chapter, I limit the scope of this research to those institutions that operate exclusively in Brussels: The government of the Brussels Capital Region (BCR) which has responsibility for territory activities and three of the linguistic governments: The Common Community Commission (CCC), the French Community Commission (COCOF) and the Flemish Community Commission (VGC). While the CF and the VG also have competence within the Bilingual Region of Brussels-Capital, they also have competence in other language territories. Their inclusion would add to the study, however time and resources have limited the ability to extend to six the number of governments examined. A further dynamic would also be introduced – the relationship between the Bilingual Region of Brussels-Capital and the two dominant linguistic communities: The Dutch-speaking region (VG) and the French-speaking region (CF). Such an investigation is outside the scope of this research (which is concerned with the politician-bureaucrat relationship) but an understanding of these tensions would explore the relationship between within the city and the state/region. Researching this question would advance both urban studies and conflict management literature documenting the differing identities that emerge post power-sharing, in turn highlighting how these emerging identities influence both the traditional conflict and the city’s relationship with the state. While these research questions are important, they remain outside the scope of this research. The following paragraphs provide some more background information to the Linguistic Community institutions selected for further study, beginning firstly with the VGC.
The Flemish Community Commission provides services through the medium of Dutch\(^49\) in Brussels. The government of the VGC derives from the Dutch-speaking ministers within the BCR government. In turn they are supported by their political cabinets and the permanent administration: the Flemish Community Commission administration (VGC). An overarching secretary general is assisted by six directors, predominantly in the areas of Culture, Education and Health. The French Community Commission which politically governs the French-speaking community consists of the French-speaking ministers from the Brussels Capital Region elections and is supported by politically appointed cabinets. In turn, the political levels are supported by the permanent administration: The French Community Commission administration (COCOF). It consists of eight directors, again with responsibilities in areas directly related to the person. Each of these administrations is staffed by members of each individual community. Both the Communauté Française (CF) and the Vlaamse Gemeenschap (VG) also operate within the capital but usually via or in cooperation with the VGC or COCOF. The COCOF and VGC differ slightly in that the COCOF has legislative power while the VGC does not. Authority was transferred from the CF (which has competence within Brussels) to the Walloon Regional Government in certain policy areas; however the Walloon Regional Government does not have competence within Brussels. Authority could not be given to the Brussels Capital Region government as it is bilingual – it could however be given to the COCOF. Hence, COCOF has a degree of legislative

\(^{49}\) Note – services are not provided solely to one community – they are provided through one language only, but each individual has the right to choose his or her language group. Further, this choice does not have to be consistent across public services – a resident can choose a French-speaking school for one child and a Dutch-speaking school for another. Further, a child may have been born in a French-speaking hospital but may attend a Dutch-speaking school.
independence while the VGC does not. The Common Community Commission (Culture, Education and other ‘personal’ services) and the Brussels Capital Region (Economics and Employment etc) administrations provide administrative support to their political cabinets and ministers.  

*Fig. 4.4 The political organisation of Brussels*

As previously indicated I have excluded analysis of the municipal level from the scope of this research. It is important to note that each of the 19 communes maintains a high degree of autonomy. Further discussion on the evolution of the institutional design can be found in Rihoux (2003), while a broader examination, which contextualises Brussels within the Belgian system, can be found in Deschouwer & Van Parijs (2009), while Witte et al (2003) contextualise the development of the nineteen communes of Brussels since 1989.

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50 A further tier of government also exists where a number of communes have cooperated to jointly provide local police forces etc...These are outside the focus of my research.

51 Further, it is also noteworthy that the governments of these communes are in theory bilingual. While within the BCR and the CCC, a bureaucrat must be competent in either Dutch or French, a bureaucrat at the municipal level is in theory expected to be competent in both languages.
To summarise, it is sufficient to acknowledge that four institutions have exclusive competence in Brussels: two are linguistically homogenous and govern areas related to the person (VGC and COCOF); and the remaining two administrations are linguistically heterogeneous governing areas largely in economics and employment but also include some health competencies such as bilingual retirement homes and bilingual hospitals etc (BCR and CCC). Two further sub-state actors have influence in Brussels: the CF and the VG. These two actors are outside the scope of this research as the dynamics of these organisations differs from the organisations identified. As previously indicated, further research is required to identify the internal tensions within these two sub-state actors – the divide between the Brussels politicians and bureaucrats and those from the Dutch-speaking and Francophone Linguistic Communities. This would generate a greater understanding of the dynamics of the city’s relationship with both its hinterland and the state. Such an investigation is outside the scope of this chapter.

With the institutional design established, I now proceed to delve a little deeper, developing our understanding of how this institutional design works in practice from the perspective of the elite level bureaucrat. At the political cabinet level, semi-structured interviews were conducted with six directors from four ministerial cabinets. At the administrative level, interviews were conducted with six directors within the VGC, four directors within the COCOF, four directors within the Joint Community Commission and three directors within the Brussels Capital Region. As indicated in the dissertation introduction, a number of directors within the BCR declined to participate in the research. Four BCR attachés were therefore also interviewed. While responses from the
Capital Region administration were disappointing, the sample is highly representative of the other three administrations, in each case representing over 80% of the positions filled\textsuperscript{52}. Interviews were also conducted with three of the primary stakeholders involved in the development of the Brussels Cultural Plan (2007)\textsuperscript{53}. Interviews were conducted on condition of anonymity and have been numbered here one to thirty\textsuperscript{54}. Fieldwork took place between March and May 2010. The ideas or structures presented in the following sections are not new in and of themselves; the problems faced in the implementation of such a solution however are less understood. Drawing on thirty interviews with members of the political and bureaucratic elite, together with representatives of the cultural sector in Brussels, the findings provide an insight into the difficulties of implementing power-sharing at the lowest common denominator. While there are numerous references to the cooperative nature and ethos in Brussels, this should not be mistaken for the success of the political institutions. As Pilet (2005) reminds us, societies with a tradition of compromise are most likely to be conducive to stability. Drawing on evidence from the interviews investigating how the institutional arrangements in Brussels actually function, I find that normalisation and stabilisation in Brussels would be further advanced had the concept been more thoughtfully implemented.

\textsuperscript{52} Recall from the introduction that a number of Director positions are vacant within the administrations in Brussels
\textsuperscript{53} Plan Culturel pour Bruxelles/Cultuur Plan voor Brussel
\textsuperscript{54} Political interviewees are identified as ‘Interview X POL’. Culture interviewees are indentified as ‘Interviewee X CUL’, where X refers to the randomly generated number attributed to each interviewee. Interviewees in each of the administrations are similarly referenced using their standard acronyms.
4.5 The Findings

Beginning firstly with the problems associated with multiple administrations the results, presented below in the first subsection, demonstrate that although sharing power at the lowest common denominator is a viable alternative for contested societies, its application should not prohibit the coherent governance of the city. It is found that the administrative structures are unable to respond to the changing urban realities of the city (a post conflict society). The following sections further exemplify the unintended consequences associated with the Brussels electoral system. The electoral system, it is found, does not encourage politicians to represent those outside their language groups, nor is it found to be representative of all groups within the urban environment. Also, despite the longevity of the capital government, the entire process can be held hostage by small radical parties. While indeed these electoral problems are not necessarily particular to Brussels, the Brussels institutional design relies to a greater extent on political support for coherent public policy. Under the traditional ‘comprehensive’ mechanism of power-sharing bureaucrats can, to an extent, formulate inter-departmental policy. In Brussels the various administrations do not speak to each other. Ideas cannot therefore be shared, which in turn hampers the development of coherent policy-making within the city. Given that bureaucracies by their very nature support the status quo (see Chapter three), without political support for such meetings, cooperation on policies will not happen. Given the existing electoral design, such support is not expected to be forthcoming. The problems of dysfunctional policy-making look set to remain.
4.5.1 Public procurement and policy coherence

Similar to most global capitals, the Brussels urban area has expanded in recent years and as a consequence, much of its workforce now resides outside its municipal boundaries. Kesteloot and Saey (2002) cite firstly, the delimitation of the region’s boundaries, and secondly the fragmented administrative structures of Brussels as the primary reasons for Brussels’ failure to develop a strategy for dealing with the problems of a divided city. I now look at each of these factors in turn through a conflict management lens. Urban sprawl is not a unique problem but experienced in most developed and developing cities. In response, cities such as Berlin have increased cooperation with the encircling Brandenburg Lander, while the actual geographical competence of the Lille urban administration has grown across international borders. Such progressions have not been possible in Brussels as in 1962/3 Dutch-speakers secured a deal to ensure the authority of Brussels would be geographically limited to the territory of the nineteen communes, preventing the further erosion of Flemish territory by the majority French-speaking Brussels. As taxes are levied at place of residence, not at place of employment, the urban administration in Brussels suffers financially from its incapacity to expand. Finances are however transferred from national government to the four Brussels governments in an attempt to negate this deficit. The following examples demonstrate the negative effect that this current financing arrangement has on governance and conflict management.

The cause for concern arises in the funding of cultural and educational initiatives. In these areas, funding largely derives from transfers from the Linguistic sub-state
actors: the French and Dutch-speaking Community governments (CF and VG). Financing from these organisations to Brussels based organisations and administrations, always has a linguistic flavour, actively discouraging cooperation across the linguistic boundaries. As one interviewee put it: ‘money speaks a language’ (Interview 23 CUL).

Again recall that these sub-state actors are tasked with providing services exclusively through the medium of Dutch or French. Put differently, finances within the city are stretched and attaining financial support for cultural or educational projects requires financial support from the Linguistic sub-state governments. As these governments largely operate in unilingual (community) regions, and contain a majority of elected representatives from unilingual districts, the funding of cross-community projects is actively discouraged in Brussels. The provision of services through both Dutch and French is not contested, nor is the promotion of Walloon and French speaking cultures or Flemish and Dutch-speaking cultures – this being a core principle of the conflict management mechanism. However, such a mechanism must also serve the growing population identifying, not with the Flemish Community (or The Flemish Region) or the French Community (or The Walloon Region), but with bilingual Brussels.

Circumventing these legalities, the regional power-sharing institution (BCR) does try to fund cross-cultural activities, involving itself in a number of cross-cultural projects\(^{55}\). As the region has no competency in the promotion of culture, these projects are often financed from an ‘image building’ budget of the External Affairs Ministry designed to promote Brussels: *Rayonnement International*. These usually take the form

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\(^{55}\) According to the Flemish Minister for Brussels, Bert Anciaux, (2007) this amounts to some 250 million euro per year. (Vaesen, 2008)
of street festivals or other large scale projects that can be designed to promote Brussels culture with the aim of enhancing trade and financing opportunities. Regional funding can also be directed towards cultural infrastructure, but not cultural activities. These funding opportunities nevertheless occur outside the legal competences of the Capital Region Government. A similar situation exists in education. Based on census data, there is expected to be a shortage of school places in Brussels. As many of the would-be attendees are considered neither French nor Dutch-speaking, neither of these community governments has been forthcoming in providing extra school places. The Capital Region is stepping in and providing the infrastructure for these new schools, again acting ‘technically illegally’ and expanding its competencies.

Yet in spite of these difficulties, a common cultural plan for Brussels has been developed, reaching across the linguistic divide. Supported by the King Baudouin Foundation (www.kbs-frb.be), the cultural plan was an exogenous process developing from the grassroots of the cultural sector. Frustrated with the lack of leadership at the political-administrative level, two umbrella cultural organisations – the BKO (Dutch-speaking) and RAB (French-speaking), developed a 34 point plan for the promotion of a coherent approach to the cultural development of the capital. A common cultural plan within a contested society is not an easy accomplishment, however very few disagreements emerged in its design. The plan focuses its attention on organisational coherence, good management and respecting diversity. Its purpose is not to homogenise culture in Brussels, but to facilitate the coherent cultural development of the city. While receiving commendation from the political level on the concept of
working across the language divide, politicians were more cautious in their support for the content (Interview 23 CUL). Following a number of critical reviews in the French-speaking daily ‘Le Soir’, the plan was depicted as a ‘Flemish plan’, comparable to the wooden horse of Troy. In one Brussels municipality, a French mayor has recently signalled his intention to develop a cultural plan for his commune – advocating a real cultural plan for the people – not a Dutch-speaking plan (Interview 24 CUL).

The failure of the cultural plan to attract political support is a symptom of a greater problem experienced within the capital. Communicating to the political level is the biggest hurdle for those involved in cross-cultural projects. As the linguistically divided political level control the allocation of funding, the difficulty in committing Ministers to prioritise cross-cultural funding is the primary limitation in implementing any cross-cultural policy (Interview 23 CUL). Although not opposing cross-cultural programmes or initiatives, Ministers do not prioritise such programmes. Until taken on board by both political communities, more coherencies in policy development seem unlikely. While the development of the cultural plan did not include representatives of the political or administrative level, four working-groups were established after the presentation of the plan. Members of the bureaucratic elite do comprise a number of positions on these groups but do so in a personal capacity, highlighting the gulf between personal support for such a plan and institutional scepticism or at best, indifference. One of the primary ambitions of the plan has been to set an example to the political and administrative levels – the fear of constructively working together should be reduced as
the text provides evidence of citizen-level support for such cooperation (Interview 24 CUL). It is to this aspect of coherency that the latter part of this subsection will address.

Thus far, it is seen in Brussels that as institutions are financed largely from linguistically homogenous bodies, existing solely to promote one culture; bilingual and new cultures experience difficulty in serving their communities. The development of a common cultural plan demonstrates the necessity to not only consider the two traditional communities but to also facilitate cross-cultural and emerging culture initiatives. As financing of projects from the CF and VG is outside the control of the population of Brussels, the people of the city (the Brussels electorate) have little control over how money in cultural or education matters is spent. While there are instances where the Capital Region administration (BCR) has responded to citizen demands, expanding its competency to circumvent these restrictions (building of schools and supporting cultural initiatives through a trade budget and developing cultural infrastructure), the majority of funding encourages the development of two separate cultural identities within the city. Despite this, a collective of cultural organisations developed a common cultural plan outside the formal structures of the region, indicating the gulf between civil society and the institutional structures governing the financing of civil society.

Returning now to Kesteloot and Saey’s (2002) other concern, I explore in greater detail a more apparent problem with power-sharing at the lowest common denominator: as competencies are highly dispersed, there is a corresponding increase in institutions, with each community looking out for their own affairs. Traditional
differences are correspondingly institutionalised and prolonged, but are also controlled. Coherence of governance is the obvious primary problem in such a situation. While politicians and their cabinets do cumulate their political party manifestos after an election, governance in Brussels remains disjointed and unresponsive to the demands of large sections of the urban population. As power-sharing evolves, if communities were allowed to cooperate in areas they saw as necessary, or at least not discouraged from cooperating, coherent governance could develop, while at the same time respecting each community's right to govern their own community. The following paragraphs draw on evidence from education policy where cooperation between linguistic communities is actively discouraged by institutional design. The dangers of this lack of coordination are then demonstrated with reference to other policy areas. Again, it is reiterated: the segregation of service provision is not questioned by this study, segregated service provision does not however have to equate with haphazard, inefficient and ineffective service provision. While informal practices of coordination between institutions may exist at the political and cabinet levels (Vaesen, 2008), this study finds no such coordination to occur at the public administration level.

Education plays a pivotal role in a multilingual society. Brussels is in the unusual position as the majority culture (French) are interested in learning the Dutch language. 91.3% of non-Dutch speakers see mixed language classes as an enrichment of Brussels society (Janssens, 2008: 6). However, ‘only a minority are satisfied with language education’ in Brussels (ibid: 9). While not contesting the right of each community to self-govern, the service provider must respond to citizen demands. As established by the
following paragraphs, the existing institutional framework does not allow for such responsiveness.

De Bleyser, Housen, Mettewie and Pierrard (2001) present data evidencing a growing proportion of students from a homogenous French-speaking background attending Dutch schools (27.7%). Similarly Deprez and Wynants (1989) draw on a much earlier 1979 study which indicates more children from a homogenous Dutch speaking background attending a French-speaking school. Although these studies are now dated, the trends identified in each study are interesting. More recent findings by Janssens (2008) have highlighted the upward trend in French students attending Dutch schools, but also point to the increasingly successful Dutch courses for adults. As these education initiatives increase in popularity, so too will the bilingual population. The growing importance attributed to bilingualism among the Brussels population is unquestionable, yet the educational structures do not cater for this bilingual demand. It is not simply the schools that are segregated, but so too are the administrations and political bodies that administer these schools. While this is a necessary condition of the lowest common denominator mechanism of conflict management, absence of voluntary cooperation is not. Janssens (2008) observes with pity the situation where a substantive element of society (bilinguals) are disregarded by the education system, suggesting that it would be more beneficial for traditional Dutch speakers to teach Dutch to Francophones and more beneficial for traditional Francophones to teach French to the Dutch-speakers – this however he admits is unlikely given the current institutional frameworks.
While education is governed by both community institutions, language tuition encounters numerous logistical problems. COCOF and the Communauté Francaise (French Speakers) indeed have attempted to teach their French-speaking pupils Dutch by allowing Dutch-speaking teachers to work in French-speaking schools. This initiative is frustrated however as the Dutch-speaking government prioritises teacher remuneration more so than the French-speaking government. Dutch-speaking teachers are therefore unlikely to choose a position in a French-speaking school as a first option. While the French linguistic government intention may have been noble, lack of coordination among institutions has frustrated its implementation.

Similar problems arise in other policy areas. For example, a social worker within the Dutch-speaking government of the city has a higher salary than a social worker within the bilingual government (CCC), who in turn has a higher salary than the French-speaking social worker. Similar problems arise in the regulation of the private provision of public services. If a regulatory disparity were to exist between the three community governments (VGC, CCC, COCOF) with responsibility for, say, nursing homes, private sector providers would opt to provide the service under the regulation of the community with the least stringent regulations. Without cooperation between each of the respective governments (both at the political and administration level), such an environment could lead to a race to the bottom in terms of regulatory quality.

The effects of this lack of coordination are felt in numerous aspects of culture, health and education policy. The failure of the governments and their administrations to deal with immigration may not have a tangible effect on the conflict; however it has a
greater effect on the city, especially in the medium term. The bureaucratic elite across
the city described immigration as the most pressing problem for the medium term.
These concerns are supported by the 2001 census where it was found that Brussels had
45 different nationalities that numbered over 1000 people each. Deboosere, Eggerickx,
Van Hecke and Wayens (2009:11) submit that it is this demographic reality within the
Capital Region that ‘presents a great challenge’ to both the city and the country.
However, once again differing approaches to the ‘problem’ frustrate any effective
solution. Dutch-speakers prefer an Anglo-Saxon approach (multiculturalism), while
French-speakers prefer an approach based on the French experience (assimilation). An
absence of inter-institutional cooperation has led to a sense of chaos where in a small
urban area, no coherent plan for dealing with what all acknowledge to be a primary
problem facing the city can emerge, providing further evidence that the current
institutional framework, while serving to manage the Dutch-French linguistic conflict,
fails to appropriately manage what have become more pressing problems facing the
city.

While Vaesen (2008) found informal cooperation to exist among politicians,
evidence from interviews supports the above conclusions that very little inter-
institutional dialogue takes place at the public administration level. A director within the
VGC admitted to having contacts with both the ‘new Brussels people (immigrants) and
French-speakers, but never with COCOF’ (Interview 3 VGC). A CCC director replied, ‘I
have not got a clue who my counterparts in the VGC or COCOF are...we met twenty
years ago at the division of Brabant and that was it’ (Interview 14 CCC). ‘My department has no contact with CCC or COCOF’, was the response from another VGC director (Interview 5). Each director was asked the extent of their contact with their counter-parts in the other two administrations. Of the 21, only 4 indicated that they met with other Brussels administrations about once a year. Where instances of contact do emerge these tended to be at international fora: ‘we have very little contact with other administrations but we are involved in a European project called “Health Cities” where we meet’ (Interview 7, COCOF). Contact with the sub-state community bodies – the French-Speaking Community (CF) and Dutch-Speaking Community (VG) was slightly higher: ‘we have contact with the national Flemish and French-speaking communities but not the VGC or COCOF’ (interview 12, CCC) ‘I have no contact with VGC or CCC but have some contact with the federal and regional levels so we can send one person to represent Belgium internationally – there has been international pressure to have just one Belgian representative’ (Interview 9, COCOF). However, these bodies represent language communities throughout the country of Belgium. There was no significant contact with the other urban level administrations. The effects of this failure to communicate are evident in the haphazard governance of the city. While cooperation with international and national bodies demonstrates an ability to cooperate and work with other cultures and bodies, no interviewee referred to any significant policy coordination among the urban administrations. The following quotation from a director within the Brussels Capital Region summarises appropriately the contact between urban

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56 Division of Brabant: The St. Michel’s Agreement, Sept. 1992 approved the division of Brabant into two provinces: Flemish Brabant and Walloon Brabant. The provinces formally split in January 1995.
administrations: ‘at present when we work with the VGC/COCOF/CCC it is entirely a bureaucratic relationship...it is not in any way proactive...if a file did come to the wrong department I would forward it to the right administration...it is more of a paper relationship’ (Interview 21 BCR).

Despite this absence of contact, the bureaucratic elite of both communities would welcome greater cooperation. A VGC director spoke of instances of cooperation at a school premises within the Capital Region. Following the division of the province of Brabant in 1995, competency for administering schools in Brussels was also divided within the Capital – the VGC and COCOF becoming responsible for the running of ‘town schools’; The Linguistic sub-state actors, CF and VG administering state schools and Catholics administering Catholic schools. This left schools such as Ceria-Coovi in Anderlecht with a French and Dutch speaking school on the same site. While cooperation exists between both the VGC and COCOF, this is ‘only on business...in the restaurant we still have Dutch-speaking tomatoes and French-speaking tomatoes’ (Interview 6, VGC). The Dutch-speaking interviewee lamented ‘we work with Thailand and Italy but not children and teachers in the same building’, reflecting the ‘regrettable Belgian paradox’ cited by Van Wynsberghe(2007: 9): ‘it is often easier to cooperate with another country than with the other Belgian Community or Region. Meanwhile, a French-speaking director expressed his wish ‘that every child in Walloon Brabant would do an exchange with every child in Flemish Brabant’ so they may learn the language (Interview 8, COCOF).
Further evidence from interviews indicates that most senior bureaucrats would welcome the opportunity for enhanced cooperation: ‘I have a unity view for Brussels between the different parties – VGC and COCOF (Interview 12, CCC)...‘the only way to succeed is through collaboration’ (Interview 2, VGC). ‘If we did things together it would be better’ (Interview 4 VGC). ‘We don’t have enough contact with the VGC and COCOF – it would be great if we could meet every two months’ (Interview 13, CCC). I never have any contact with other administrations...I would love to have joint projects. I regret there is not more collaboration. Our Dutch-speaking colleagues have the same problems...I would be very interested in cooperating with them’ (Interview 8, COCOF). ‘We can learn a lot from COCOF/CCC – they understand the Brussels situation too – they know what procedures work best in our context’ (Interview 5, VGC).

A number of solutions have been presented to surmount this type of problem – the most obvious of which is to increase the competencies of the joint community commission – CCC, or to transfer the authority of the CCC to the BCR, thereby giving the region both territory and person (community) competencies. A VGC director, frustrated with the absence of coherence within the capital, commented ‘do we really need to have all three institutions – VGC, COCOF and CCC?’ (Interview 5) This was further supported by a CCC director: ‘to improve Brussels we need less administration...we have three commissions in Brussels doing the same job...even building hospitals’ (Interview 14). This however poses a number of problems as it involves two powerful linguistic-based institutions willingly sacrificing authority. While such a solution is possible, the CCC is already a mutually suspect organisation which ‘often falls short of the mark when
it comes to wielding its powers’ (Lagasse, 2008: 8) and to give it greater competency at the expense of both language groups could cause further tension. It also puts undue pressure on one organisation to succeed. Those in opposition to a bilingual solution would be able to channel their energies into frustrating the operation of this one organisation, increasing the possibility of failure. Similar problems would arise if competencies were to be transferred from the CCC to the BCR. The opportunity for direct confrontation with the COCOF and VGC could also negatively impact the current workings of the BCR. It also would incorrectly define the cause of the failure. Rather than being a problem rooted in the LCD mechanism, as we are beginning to see the problem lies in the implementation of the concept. Neither the COCOF nor the VGC (nor for that matter the BCR or CCC) are in themselves problematic; it is simply the lack of coordination between the bodies that leads to haphazard governance which can lead to poor decision-making.

A more productive and realistic alternative would therefore be to encourage greater cooperation between all four governments at the public administration level. To encourage more joined up governance among the various administrations must become a function of the political elite. As indicated above, the public administrations operating in Brussels do not constructively cooperate. The role of the Joint Commission is not to promote and develop bilingual services but to provide bilingual services in a minority of policy areas that were agreed in 1989. At present, the public administrations do not talk
to each other\textsuperscript{57}. One director within the BCR administration put forward that much of his interaction with the political level focused on where they had the competency to act. An example of a Minister within the Capital Region wanting to financially support a cinema was given: As responsibility for cinemas rested with community administrations, not the regional administration, the policy was not further considered. The bureaucrat perceived it as his role to inform the Minister of his competency boundaries, not to become involved in cross-institutional policy making. Instead of taking the ideas further through cooperation with other administrations, ideas such as this tend not to be taken forward as directors and Ministers do not seek to implement policy through cooperation with other administrations and departments. Despite this, the results demonstrate that community administrations want to cooperate and formulate common solutions to common problems. The institutional design however prevents any significant level of cooperation. While increasing the role and capacity of the CCC involves the unlikely scenario of both communities voluntarily transferring authority and also misappropriates the causes of failure; a more realistic and immediate approach, not requiring any legislative changes, would be to facilitate inter-institutional cooperation, or at the very least not to discourage it. This way norms of policy-making could develop, relying on constructive cooperation, yet each community maintains their own politico-administrative independence. Coordination of cultural education and health funding policies can only work to the benefit of the entire urban population. If cooperation

\textsuperscript{57} Exploratory evidence also suggests that political cabinets rarely cooperate across the language divide. A cabinet director within a newly elected Dutch-speaking party recalled the surprise that greeted him when he introduced himself to his French-speaking counterpart who worked in the same building. (Interview 25, POL)
between the Brussels institutions is to materialise the controlling relationship between the linguistic community authorities, the VG and CF, and their Brussels based VGC and COCOF counterparts will need to be redressed. Further research briefs should pay particular attention to this city-state/region relationship. A further recommendation, requiring a more substantive change would be to remove the influence of the CF and the VG from Brussels\textsuperscript{58}. While the control of Brussels policies relating to the person such as education, health and culture rests with the interests of those in Flanders and Wallonia, closer cooperation seems unlikely. Further research briefs should investigate the VGC-VG relationship and the COCOF-CF relationship at the political and administrative levels. Future research questions should pay close attention to the perceptions of Brussels based bureaucrats and those based within each of the Community governments. Els Witte (2008) provides a valuable starting point, presenting an overview of the development of the VGC as it seeks to find its place within the Brussels compromise.

Ethnically divided societies can indeed draw from the Brussels experience – the Brussels mechanism has proven itself as an effective conflict management mechanism. However careful consideration of financing options is necessary. While respecting the right of each linguistic community to govern itself, governing does not have to be conducted in isolation to reality. In Brussels, cross community cooperation is actively discouraged. As demonstrated by the strong indigenous support for the cultural plan, together with Rudi Janssens study (2008), it is evident that policy formulation in these

\textsuperscript{58} Further research should look at the VGC – VG dynamic investigating how the Brussels based Dutch-speakers ‘fit’ with VG.
areas represents the electorate of Wallonia and Flanders, not that of Brussels. As conflict management becomes less of a priority for the city, this failure becomes more and more pronounced. Mechanisms of conflict management, while attributing importance to the four existing cultural identities (French-speaking and Dutch-speaking or Walloon and Flemish), must also be responsive to the emerging urban identity that will materialise in a shared space. The urban institutional design has to be able to adapt to the changing urban realities.

Closer cooperation between existing community institutions would provide an opportunity for more coherent and responsive governance. While this cooperation relies on expertise and proficiency at the bureaucratic level, political support is also a prerequisite. As realised with the cultural plan, citizen proposals can only go so far before requiring political support. There is a physical gap between the administrative level and the elected political level, filled by politically appointed cabinets. Cabinet directors are generally policy experts. While many have previously worked with a public administration, they are no longer involved in the day-to-day administration; or as one bureaucrat summed up: The administration turns like a bicycle wheel; if cabinet (political advisers) wish to make changes to the public service, it will have an effect elsewhere within the system and if it is not done correctly, the wheel will stop turning: ‘Cabinet are not aware of the complexity of implementing policy’ (Interview 9, COCOF)

59. Put differently, the Minister receives advice from a policy expert perspective, which

59 It is noteworthy that many cabinet appointees are on temporary secondment from the bureaucracy. While this should assist in bringing an administrative perspective to the political level, the evidence presented here finds that this representation is not sufficient to generate coherent policies within the urban governments: BCR, VGC, COCOF and CCC.
often fails to understand the administrative realities. While administrators may wish to work closer together to implement more coherent long term policies, this remains a distant prospect if the political levels do not understand the necessity to cooperate. The organisational priorities of the administration appear to become lost in the policy priorities of the cabinet; neither priority however can be successfully realised without more coherency between the ministers, the cabinets and the various administrations.

The following section identifies how such progress is frustrated by the existing electoral system. To summarise, this section finds that financing at present does not encourage cooperation in policy areas to do with the person; conversely it is found to actively discourage cross-cultural cooperation. The various public administrations need to cooperate and coordinate, not simply for good governance but also if Brussels is to move from conflict management to conflict resolution. Such lack of coordination between the administrations frustrates coherent policy development. The findings from this section also indicate that the CF and VG, while representing the electorate of Flanders and Wallonia in terms of services to the person, do not represent the electorate of Brussels. The tensions between the urban VGC and COCOF and their parent governments the CF and VG requires further scholarly attention. It is unlikely that increased cooperation among the institutions will occur while the VGC and COCOF are restricted by the CF and VG, where Brussels politicians do not have control over policy within the Bilingual Region of Brussels Capital. Rather the majority of the CF and VG is comprised of politicians from outside the Bilingual Region of Brussels Capital. While the French-speaking Community (CF) has decentralised a number of
competencies to the COCOF, the Dutch-speaking VGC is subject to more monitoring and cannot act as autonomously. Sufficient consideration should be given to the decentralisation of such responsibilities.

4.5.2 The electoral system

While not a problem directly related with the lowest common denominator method, the electoral design in Brussels incorporates a number of unintended consequences. Of course these problems also present themselves under other mechanisms of conflict management. The electoral design within Brussels serves to perpetuate the administrative problems outlined in the previous section: without political leadership, coherent governance at the policy implementation stage appears unlikely. Drawing on two contrasting schools of conflict management, Horowitz (power dividing) and Lijphart (consociationalism), this section highlights the failures of the electoral design and the subsequent effect on policy-making. Since 2004, Dutch speakers have been guaranteed seventeen representatives in the Brussels Regional Parliament, while the remaining seventy-two representatives belong to the French-speaking community.

Following the Horowitz school of conflict management, it is generally accepted that electoral procedures should aim to promote moderate results ‘by giving politicians in ethnically divided societies reasons to seek electoral support from groups beyond their own community’ (Reilly, 2001:6). This is not the case at the sub-state level in
Although the electorate within Brussels do vote tactically, the electoral system actively discourages voting for parties of the other community. Deschouwer and Van Parijs (2009:11) find that due to the Belgian electoral process, not ‘one single politician formally represents voters outside his or her language group’. While political representation outside the language group may not happen, this does not preclude voting across the linguistic divide. For example if a Dutch-speaking person feels a greater attachment to ‘green’ issues than his linguistic community, he or she may decide to vote for a French-speaking Green party, if it is perceived that that candidate stands a greater chance of electoral success. Ironically, the right wing and separatist Flemish nationalist party, Vlaams Blok (now Vlaams Belang) increased their support in the 1999 election through an appeal to French-speaking voters on issues such as immigration, thereby pulling the right-wing rather than the linguistic vote (Coffe, 2006). In subsequent elections, Dutch political leaders also encouraged French speakers to vote for moderate Dutch speaking parties so as to minimise any Vlaams Blok/Belang support.

While indeed the electoral system does allow political parties to seek votes from outside their own communities, political representatives do not actively represent the views of those outside their language communities. This is also a problem at the national level and various national level solutions have been put forward. One contribution is that of the Pavia Group where Deschouwer and Van Parijs (2009) seek a number of electoral reforms to encourage politicians to reach out to the electorate as a whole rather than

\[\text{It is the case at commune level where Liste du Burgomasres (electoral candidates of the mayor) are presented bridging the linguistic and political party divide. These lists include candidates from a broad spectrum of middle ground parties from both language communities. Bilinguals however are not represented to a greater extent by these coalitions, as individual councillors remain part of their traditional mono-lingual political parties – a marriage of convenience so to speak.}\]
simply one community. It is evident that the electoral system in Brussels actively discourages political parties from constructively seeking votes and representing views beyond their language group – a principle that scholars such as Horowitz (2009: 27) and Reilly (2001: 7) find to negatively affect conflict management.

If the political level are not to constructively seek votes and represent the views of those in other language groups, an alternative criterion grounded in Lijphart’s consociationalism, advocates that it is vital that each group be actually represented by its own members and not simply by the moderates of another group. At first glance the Brussels system appears to fit this principle. On closer inspection however a significant weakness emerges. While bilinguals and immigrants are members of political parties in Brussels, the Brussels/Belgian electoral system does not have a single party that prioritises the interests of indigenous bilinguals and immigrant minorities. It is to this weakness I now turn.

The Brussels Capital Region is an agglomeration of minorities. In 2001, 49.8% of the Brussels population had been born in Brussels. 31.7% were born outside Belgium, while 8.4% and 10.1% originated in Flanders and Wallonia respectively. Studies by the socio-linguist Rudi Janssens (2008:4) have found that those with both French and Dutch as their home languages now comprise 9.9% of the Brussels population: ‘This tendency is mainly accounted for by the born and raised Bruxellois’. A position further supported by Louckx (1978) and Treffers-Daller (1994), both finding that indigenous Bruxellois not to consider themselves as either Walloon or Flemish. Given that only 50% of Brussels inhabitants were born in Brussels, (see Deboosere et al, 2009) this number of bilinguals
represents a considerable proportion (~20%) of those who had the natural opportunity to develop both French and Dutch as primary first languages. If linguistic identity is to restrict how the electorate vote, where do these traditional Bruxellois vote? A multilingual list does not exist at the sub-state level, nor for that matter does a multi-lingual political party\textsuperscript{61}.

In modern Brussels, ‘people do not live in a monolingual environment...and in both personal relations and their daily public life they are constantly reminded of their multilingual environment’ (Janssens, 2008: 12). ‘Associations in Brussels are no longer linguistically homogenous...club life has evolved from a strict separation based on language background to a meeting place for all the people’ (ibid: 6). 97.4% of Dutch speakers and 75.3% of French speakers find bilingualism an essential component of Brussels identity (ibid: 12). Despite the large majority of Bruxellois seeing this multilingual environment as a major asset, multilinguals are not served by the electoral system. The emphasis here is not to rid Dutch and French speakers of their minority/majority representation, but to point out that a significant and growing collective of the urban population are not represented in the urban government. This unrepresentativeness is further substantiated by Treffers-Daller (2002:56) where she finds that ‘in mainstream Belgian politics it would be hard to find any defendants of the ideal of a bilingual Brussels in which French and Dutch would live together harmoniously.

\textsuperscript{61} Recall multilingual lists are however presented at Commune level.
As indicated by Murphy (2002), Brussels population patterns are extremely unpredictable. Not simply in terms of language identity as suggested above, but also add to the concoction the wealthy migrant of the EU institution employees and the less well off migrant workers from Europe’s periphery. The 2001 census found that over 30% of the Brussels population were born abroad; thus although this 30% may speak French (or Dutch), they could not be described as members of the French-speaking community in cultural terms. This 30% of the Brussels population are forced to polarise into either the French or Dutch-speaking electoral category. To summarise, as only unilingual lists can be presented, the electorate must choose between a French-speaking list and a Flemish-speaking list. Immigrants and indigenous bilinguals are not represented by their communities within the Brussels system and, contrary to Lijphart’s recommendation, are instead represented by the moderates of each of the culturally defined groups. I demonstrate in the following paragraphs the effects of the existing system which unintentionally facilitate the electoral preferences of a small group of right-wing nationalists, yet as just established, fails to represent EU and non-EU immigrants and indigenous bilinguals.

Such a formalised electoral system also allows for manipulation by those in power for what they perceive to be the greater good. Brussels demonstrates this particularly clearly in the gerrymandering of the system so as to exclude Vlaams Blok/Belang from partaking in government. The 1999 Brussels Capital Region elections confirmed the vulnerability of the Brussels institutional system. Until the 2004 Brussels elections, the number of Dutch-speaking candidates was proportionate to the votes cast
for those parties. In 1999, Vlaams Blok secured 4 of the then 11 Dutch-language seats becoming the largest Dutch-speaking party, which was almost enough to produce an institutional stalemate in the Capital Region. As no French-speaking party would enter government with Vlaams Blok/Belang, their realisation of a further two seats would have deadlocked the system. The electoral system was changed to guarantee Dutch-speaking candidates a fixed 17 seats in the parliament, making it improbable that Vlaams Blok would be able to block the system\textsuperscript{62}.

The boundaries between guaranteeing minority Dutch-speaking representation and electoral engineering so as to exclude parties whose interests are against the functioning of the power-sharing system, have become blurred in Brussels. Jacobs and Swyngedouw (2003: 138) highlight the dangers of this precedence, and demonstrate how the Brussels electoral approach may be manipulated by collective ‘in groups’ if adopted in other divided societies: ‘of course it cannot be ruled out that the new arrangement could also be used as a normal political instrument against other political parties’.

This vulnerability triggers knee-jerk reactions from the political establishment, blurring the lines between guaranteeing minority representation and gerrymandering. This underlines a significant flaw in the Brussels model. Such vulnerability within a well developed, European contested society, with a history of democracy and non-violence, may startle and concern commentators and researchers; however such vulnerable

\textsuperscript{62}See Jacobs and Swyngedouw (2003: 136/7) for a comprehensive description of the institutional changes designed to keep Vlaams Blok out of the political system: The number of Dutch speaking seats was 11 (1989), 10 (1995) and 11 (1999). An extra ‘protective device’ was agreed upon in the Lombard Agreement and used for the first time in 2004: the number of seats for Dutch speakers was fixed at 17, while the total number of seats in the regional Parliament was raised to 89 (also giving more seats to French-speakers).
institutional design within an underdeveloped, violent-prone conflict environment would have much more dangerous consequences. The electoral design of Brussels therefore intensifies the problems of destructive financing and incoherent governance identified in the previous section. The political level are elected to represent only two linguistic communities, neglecting any sense of proportion to the actual composition of the city. While there may be merit in the lowest common denominator method of power-sharing, Brussels demonstrates a number of implementation deficits. The existing institutional framework is poorly equipped to respond to the demands for coherent governance within a power-sharing society. Further the existing electoral system fails to encourage politicians to reach across the traditional divide at the sub-state level, nor does it represent all major groups within the city, and finally, an electoral system that could be deadlocked by a party receiving a little over 5% of the total vote could cause further problems within a more violently contested society. Janssens (2008) study highlights the gulf between the dynamic nature of society in Brussels and the rigid electoral system, serving solely to institutionalise differences and ignore completely those identifying with Brussels over Flanders and Wallonia. While similar occurrences are evident in other mechanisms of power-sharing, this research finds that where conflict management is highly regulated, special attention to the unintentional consequences of electoral design is required. Wolff (2006:4) submits that what is ‘particularly important in societies underpinned by power-sharing is that electoral systems and institutional designs actually “match” in the sense that electoral systems
generate outcomes that enable political institutions to function’. This cannot be said of the Brussels Capital Region.

The weaknesses of the electoral system are substantiated by Deschouwer and Van Parijs (2009) who identify the failures of the 2007 federal election as being grounded in ‘a major defect in the system’, not the failings of the individuals. In the same publication De Briey (2009) finds the Belgian electoral system to promote two competing public spaces, and to stimulate the radicalisation of political and public opinions. Throughout this section I have demonstrated that such an electoral system excludes migrant workers and bilinguals and over represents immigrants from Flanders and Wallonia. The system is open to manipulation by those in power and does not encourage politicians to reach beyond their own communities. Given that ‘electoral systems design is a key mechanism in the broader institutional design approach to the resolution of conflict in multi-ethnic societies’, this is a significant failure within the Brussels governance design (Wolff, 2006: 35). While a constructive electoral system is indeed a prerequisite for coherent governance, so too is an effective bureaucracy (See chapter 3 or Brinkerhoff, 2010). Administrative capacity is a crucial component of successful governance. The capacity for good governance at the lowest common denominator is being constrained by the failure of the various administrations to cooperate to achieve the needs of the entire urban public: A failure that the elected government of the city must recognise. Given the combined problems of the electoral design and the lack of bureaucratic involvement in the policy design process such recognition remains unlikely.
4.6 Inferences from the findings and concluding remarks

This chapter has contextualised the working environment of the bureaucrat in Brussels. Power-sharing at the lowest common denominator can work. The problem originates in the implementation of the concept, not the concept itself. Societies considering adopting the LCD mechanism of conflict management have much to learn from the Brussels experience. Primarily, as the governance process succeeds, community governments should not be discouraged from cooperating. Two inter-related problems are associated with this lack of cooperation. The first problem concerns good governance while the second concerns conflict management. Firstly, policy development needs to be responsive to the wishes of the urban population. Once concerns about the traditional conflict are superseded by other governance concerns, the priorities of the urban population are seen to change. In Brussels the urban demographic realities have changed as Dutch-speakers no longer felt threatened by the French-speaking majority (Janssens, 2008). The governance process needs to be responsive to this change. In Brussels, policy initiatives are not responsive to bilinguals within the city. Secondly, the process should not prohibit the progression from conflict management to conflict resolution. The actions of the governance institutions are seen to preserve divisions between Dutch and French speakers rather than responding to a substantial proportion of inhabitants who see themselves as neither French nor Dutch speaking. This in turn can prolong the conflict. While such problems also posit themselves in more comprehensive power-sharing mechanisms, the fragmented institutional structure, inherent within the LCD mechanism, also institutionalises a
number of unintended consequences. In Brussels, the various public administrations do not coordinate policy, which negatively affects both the quality of governance and the progression from conflict management to conflict resolution. A new urban association with the city has emerged, independent of a Dutch speaking or French speaking identity. The administration has not been able to respond to this new urban reality. The consequential administrative efficiency deficit has become most apparent, as demonstrated throughout the chapter in cultural, social, health and immigration arenas. The failure of the political and bureaucratic level to prioritise organisational coherency in these areas has frustrated the implementation of political policies for the region. Until this coherency deficit is addressed, political policy initiatives cannot realise their full potential. Instead of the political level being told that their policies cannot be implemented as they are outside their competency, cooperation and coordination with other political and administrative levels should be encouraged.

Bollens (2008) correctly describes Brussels as ‘sustainable’, however this is in spite of how its form of power-sharing has been implemented, not because of it. While separate community governance is indeed a central tenet of the LCD mechanism of conflict management, this should not preclude cooperation between the various public administrations. If the quality of governance within Brussels is to be improved, closer coordination between the administrations is a necessity. Secondly, financing should not actively discourage cultural cooperation. While funding should of course be made available for Dutch-speaking and French-speaking community cultural projects, similar funding should be available for the growing population identifying with Brussels vis-à-vis
the traditional communities. While the BCR government circumvents legal obstacles to support such programmes, support for cross-community cooperation should not depend on the willingness of an institution to consistently act outside its legal remit. Financing the Community governance institutions needs to be reviewed. As funds derive from agencies responsible for the promotion of only one particular culture, (CF or VG), cross-community projects tend to find it difficult to secure financing. These governance problems negatively affect the conflict management to conflict resolution process.

Any solution to the above problems is frustrated by the design of the electoral system. It is also suggested that the physical distance between the public administration and elected representatives, filled by politically appointed cabinets, prevents a more coordinated approach to policy making as bureaucrats cannot relay their concerns about policy implementations to Ministers at an early stage in the policy design process. Future research briefs should consider the influence of these advisory cabinets on policy, on conflict and on the bureaucracy. Eichbaum and Shaw (2010) present an edited volume of case studies examining the role of political appointees in the policy process. Their work could act as a valuable reference point. Cooperation is further frustrated as the VGC and COCOF remain controlled by their regional counterparts, the VG and CF. While the COCOF and VGC are tasked with the provision of services within the Bilingual Region of Brussels Capital, their actions, to a large extent, are subject to the directions of the VG and CF. If the institutions in Brussels are to be responsive to the Brussels population, they should not be controlled by influences from Flanders and Wallonia. As indicated throughout the research, further research briefs concentrating on the city-
state relationship should examine the VGC-VG/COCOF-CF tensions. Cooperation, both vertical, meaning between the elected official and the bureaucrat, and horizontal, meaning between the various public administrations needs to be enhanced if the Brussels solution is to be successful. If other societies were to consider adopting the lowest common denominator mechanism of conflict management, sufficient consideration of the longer term goals of conflict resolution would be required. By facilitating inter-institutional dialogue and incorporating a more carefully designed electoral system the Brussels model could indeed provide an alternate solution to either the traditional comprehensive power-sharing approach or indeed to societies considering total separation.

From both its successes and failures, the Brussels ‘lowest common denominator’ model has much to teach us about how two ethno-linguistic groups can govern a single territory. Power-sharing need not be comprehensive to be successful. Above all, the Brussels solution has indeed demonstrated that such a proposition is not just theoretically plausible, but practically possible. Amidst national chaos, conflict has been successfully managed within the Bilingual Region of Brussels-Capital and within the Brussels Capital Region; the institutional solution has played its part in creating the status quo. It is unfortunate however that it is this same institutional design that serves today to preserve linguistic divisions, despite the population of the city evidencing its readiness to progress. Rather than seeing this as being a problem with the concept, this chapter finds the problem to be rooted within the implementation of the model. If bureaucrats were allowed to cooperate (both vertically and horizontally) in the policy-
making process, while still maintaining their institutional independence, such problems could be overcome. For this to occur, it is suggested that future research briefs consider the city-state/region relationship – ie. the relationship between the VG and VGC and the CF and COCOF. Indicative findings suggest however that the VGC and the COCOF will require greater financial and legislative autonomy from their parent organisations, the VG and the CF.

Whether it is the Turkmen, Kurds and Arabs of Kirkuk, or the Turkish and Greek Cypriots of Nicosia, the Brussels model of power-sharing at the lowest common denominator does suggest an alternative to total separation, domination, or comprehensive consociation mechanisms of conflict management. The evidence from Brussels urges caution in any attempt to export the LCD governance model. As it is currently implemented the Brussels model incorporates a number of dangerous attributes that if incorporated into a more violently contested society could serve to exasperate rather than reconcile tensions. Devolving authority among numerous actors within the same physical territory can succeed. The Brussels example has demonstrated that this division of responsibility should not preclude communities from working together. The short-term goal of conflict management should not inhibit the longer term goals of conflict resolution and good governance.

This chapter has contextualised the working environment of the Brussels bureaucratic elite. It is clear that bureaucrats in Brussels operate in a very different environment from their Belfast counterparts. This background to the environment in which the bureaucrat works provides sufficient contextualisation to the findings in
chapter six which aim to ascertain the core beliefs and values of the bureaucratic elite. Chapter five however returns to one of the necessary conditions for active representation – a critical mass. Recall from the literature review that without a numerical sufficiency within the administration, bureaucrats cannot be expected to represent their correspondents in society. In order to test the hypothesis that a bureaucrat can actively represent a professional mindset the conditions to disprove the hypothesis must also be met – these include the conditions under which a bureaucrat would be expected to respond to the preferences respond to the preferences of his/her own community: i.e. comprise a critical mass within the public administration. As quotas guarantee a critical mass of Dutch-speaking bureaucrats in Brussels, chapter five turns to Belfast where no such quotas exist – have the traditional out-group (Catholics) managed to ascertain a critical mass within the Belfast bureaucracy where quotas do not exist?
5

Throwing the champagne out with the cork: the merit principle in representative bureaucracy

5.1 Introduction
A review of the literature on public administration within the contested society in chapter two indicated two emergent schools of thought on the concept of passive representation. Both schools concur on the necessity for the bureaucracy to possess legitimacy – for one however this is derived from actual representation within the bureaucracy, for the other legitimacy is derived from equity of opportunity. Drawing on research in uncontested societies it was further found that a group’s representativeness within the bureaucracy needed to be sufficient in order for benefits to flow to that group – be this directly through active representation or indirectly through contribution to the overall norms and values of the organisation. If the argument that passive representation equates with active representation on behalf of a primary identity is accepted, should emerging power-sharing societies therefore introduce community recruitment quotas to guarantee a substantial representation of the tradition out-group? This chapter applies the theory of representative bureaucracy to elite level bureaucrats in Belfast. The theory proposes that the demographic composition of the administration should mirror, to some extent, the composition of the society it supposedly represents. Traditionally, power-sharing societies have tended to introduce quotas to ensure the proportional representation of minority citizens within the state bureaucracy. Belfast however has instead maintained and strengthened the merit
principle. The results demonstrate that the traditional minority has achieved passive representation within the Belfast bureaucracy without the necessity for quotas. Arguments advocating the use of ethnopolitical quotas to attain a passively representative bureaucracy are therefore rejected by this research. The study offers a detailed breakdown of policy leaders in Belfast by creed and nationality. The findings show that both Protestants and Catholics are passively represented among the bureaucratic elite, while those possessing a Northern Irish identity are over-represented. The results empirically reinforce the view that a representative bureaucracy can be achieved within a contested society without sacrificing the merit principle. The conditions for a bureaucrat to actively represent a primary identity are therefore satisfied in each of our cases: A critical mass of the traditional out-group exists in both Belfast and Brussels.

Although far from being the norm in practice, power-sharing has convinced a significant majority of researchers of its merits as a mechanism of conflict management. The opening chapters of this research demonstrate that the bureaucratic elite influence decision-making within the contested society. In these next two chapters, attention is turned to developing an understanding of individual bureaucrat role perceptions, for as found in the literature review, it is not simply the bureaucratic structures that concern us, but how bureaucrats perceive their roles within these structures that determines policy-making. Drawing on the theory of representative bureaucracy such role perceptions are measured using Q Methodology. However, in order to comprehensively examine the concept of active representation we must first look at the concept of
passive representation. Recall that a necessary condition for active representation is passive representation (Chapter two). In other words if a group within the bureaucracy are to actively represent their counterparts in society, they need to comprise a significant proportion of the bureaucracy. As recruitment quotas are in place to guarantee out-group representation in Brussels (thereby ensuring representation of the traditional out-group), this chapter focuses on Belfast, investigating if a significant proportion of the out-group can be attained without sacrificing the merit principle.

As already established in chapter two, a variety of studies to date have examined the advantages of various electoral systems, political and institutional arrangements and the role of civil society in the reconstruction process. Esman (1997: 528) and Brown (1999: 369) however draw our attention to the fact that the literature on ethnopolitics ignores the importance of public administration in the conflict management and development process. Schneckeener (2002:203) underlines the importance of getting decision-making mechanisms right: if ‘bad...rules and procedures prevail, then even the presence of comparatively beneficial factors will probably not avoid failure’. In Afghanistan, Wimmer and Schetter (2003: 534) too recommend that ‘establishing institutions that are able to perform the basic functions of modern states should represent the main strategic goal of the reconstruction programme’. Thier and Chopra (2002) investigate the shape these institutions in Afghanistan should take. In his recent research, Brinkerhoff (2010: 76) reasserts that ‘competent capacity developers’ are a key component of capacity development, while Lee (2009) investigates how a politically neutral bureaucracy can develop within an emerging democracy. The design of
bureaucratic institutions is therefore fundamental to conflict management, yet we know very little about how a bureaucracy within a contested society should look. Starting at the most rudimentary level this chapter explores one of the simplest, yet crucial questions in the establishment of a functioning state: who should staff the organisation that is tasked with both providing services to the people, and supporting the political level.

Reforms in bureaucratic recruitment are found to be essential for staffing the public sector (Hanson, 1995). As alluded to by Brinkerhoff and Morgan (2010), an organisation’s recruitment policy is central to successful capacity development. Each of the ‘capabilities’ that (they submit) are required for administrative capacity development rely not only on a legitimate administration, but also on a high level of expertise within the administration. Drawing on the experience of Belfast, one of the most heavily contested cities in Europe, merit based recruitment is found to be integral to the design of the administration and need not be sacrificed in the name of achieving a passively representative bureaucracy. Developing administrative capacity (expertise) and the attainment of a passively representative bureaucracy (representation) need not therefore be contradictory ambitions.

The following paragraphs depart from traditional power-sharing research focusing instead on how to get the composition of the public administration ‘right’ within these contested environments. The chapter investigates the research question:

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63 Reiterating the five core capabilities required for capacity development: the capability to commit and engage with other actors and mechanisms, to carry out technical tasks, attract support from stakeholders and society, adapt and reform and finally the capability to balance diversity and coherence. From Baser and Morgan (2008) and Brinkerhoff and Morgan (2010)
are community quotas necessary to guarantee minority representation within the public administration of a contested society? The chapter begins with a (re)introduction to the theory of representative bureaucracy. After a brief contextualisation section to situate the theory within the Belfast context, I outline the research design for the investigation and then present the findings. The implications of the findings are then discussed in the closing section.

5.2 The theory of representative bureaucracy

Interest in recruitment to the public administration is not new and can be found in the classic writings of Hegel and Weber, but it is Kingsley’s representative bureaucracy (1944) that guides this research. Kingsley perceived the British bureaucracy to work for the interests of its composite class – in his case, the middle class. Recruitment in less contested societies has since aimed at increasing diversification, developing various mechanisms for attaining a more ‘representative bureaucracy’ – guaranteed interview schemes, outreach programmes, equal opportunity legislation etc. In contested societies a mechanism often employed to achieve such a result is that of community quotas (See Belgium, Nigeria and Lebanon as examples). The merit principle is often the first sacrifice of power-sharing arrangements, being replaced with simple quota systems of recruitment. The former out-group feels this to be a necessary requirement to guarantee sufficient representation within the bureaucracy. In this chapter this assumption is challenged, investigating the hypothesis that proportional (passive)
representation within the administration can be attained without forgoing the merit principle.

Recall that passive representation occurs when the bureaucratic representative resembles the represented along one or more primary dimensions (race, gender, religion etc), while active representation occurs when the representative acts in the interests of those he perceives himself to represent (Mosher, 1982; Meier and O'Toole, 2006). Passive representation is therefore concerned simply with what the bureaucrat is or is like, not what the bureaucrat does (Pitkin, 1967). Therefore, in the case of Jerusalem, passive representation would concern itself simply with the number of Jews, Muslims and Christians within the administration, measuring this against the composition of society. Similarly in Kirkuk, passive representation is concerned with the number of Turkmen, Arabs and Kurds within the urban administration. Active representation on the other hand delves deeper examining who, or what interests, the bureaucrat represents, and in what circumstances they are represented. For example, under what circumstances would a Kurd within the Kirkuk administration represent the interests of Kurds in society? Or when does a Palestinian within the Jerusalem public administration actively represent the interests of Palestinians in society? This in itself is controversial as in traditional doctrines of public administration the bureaucrat is to serve, not represent. However this is not always the case within the contested environment: the bureaucratic elite can be involved in the shaping, designing and implementation of policy, particularly in areas relevant to conflict management (Chapter Three). While active representation is indeed of greater importance to the governance
and conflict management processes, this chapter limits its concern to the former field of enquiry: passive representation.

A small number of studies within contested societies refer to passive representation within the bureaucracy. Nachmias’ (1991) study of the Israeli bureaucracy documents the absence of women, Sephardim and Israeli Arabs from the bureaucratic elite. Scholarship of the principle is much more advanced however in more homogenous societies. While the debate within more cohesive societies has progressed to analysing the extent to which minority bureaucrats actively represent their own personal communities (Meier, 1993; Keiser et al, 2002; Mansbridge, 1999) or the environments that encourage/restrict minorities to actively represent their own communities (Rehfuss, 1986; Sowa and Selden, 2003; Wilkins and Williams, 2008), discussions within the divided society largely remain at the passive representation phase. How necessary is a passively representative bureaucracy (Brown, 1999) and how is this best achieved (Esman, 1999) are the most predominant questions addressed within our conflict management literature.

While undoubtedly active representation is more crucial in terms of policy formulation and development, numerical concentration, or what is termed a ‘critical mass’ is required in order for the minority to potentially act on behalf of their counterparts in society (Keiser et al, 2002; Meier and O’Toole, 2006). This prerequisite for a ‘critical mass’ indicates that a significant concentration of the out-group is required within the administration before out-group administrators begin to press for the interests of their counterparts in society or alternatively as Lim (2006) would suggest,
before the out-group can affect or alter the norms of the traditional in-group. Scholars and practitioners alike are divided as to the importance of this ‘critical mass’ within the contested society. Scholars such as Milton J. Esman (1997, 1999) attribute such importance to achieving passive representation, that although reluctant to accept the sacrificing of the merit principle, believe that where the process cannot yield equitable representation, then this representation should be guaranteed by formal procedures (such as the introduction of community quotas). For Esman (1999), a prerequisite for peace and stability is societal perception of a legitimate bureaucracy. This legitimacy derives from actual community representation within the state bureaucracy. It is his belief that the benefits of a representative bureaucracy outweigh any potential costs – loss of efficiency and effectiveness in the public service or resentment among the traditional majority, etc: ‘The costs of illegitimate government resulting from patently unrepresentative administration are likely to exceed the grievances provoked in ethnically divided societies when the merit system is abridged’ (Esman, 1999: 365). To summarise: legitimacy is guaranteed through representation, therefore passive representation matters.

On the other hand, Brown (1999) takes a different view, being grounded more firmly in the Weberian belief that legitimacy is to be found in the principles of efficiency and impartiality. For Brown (1999), legitimacy is not guaranteed through representation but through guaranteeing equity of access to representation. As not all communities possess the same tradition of public service or tradition of education, those communities will always be under-represented within the bureaucracy – what is most
important however is that these communities perceive the bureaucracy to possess legitimacy: this is derived from an efficient, effective, accessible civil service. Evidence from Trinidad and Guyana leads Brown (1999) to argue that recruitment by ethnic quota can actually contribute negatively to the conflict management process. The legitimacy of the bureaucracy is guaranteed by equality of access, and a neutral, impartial and professional ethos among public officials (Brown, 1999: 377). Passive representation is therefore less of a concern for Brown. Raunch and Evans (2000: 49) too base their research on the premise that: ‘Meritocratic recruitment is the most important structural feature for improving bureaucratic performance’. As legitimacy is derived from the principles of fairness and efficiency, this in turn decreases the necessity for each ethnicity to be passively represented. An earlier study by Dresang (1974) found ethnic groups within the 1970s Zambian bureaucracy not to have simply represented their corresponding ethnics within society; but instead found the personal ambitions to succeed within the organisation to neutralise these preferences. However, Dresang (1974) also cautions that a passively representative bureaucracy, while not necessary for equitable resource allocation, may be a necessity for bureaucratic legitimacy.

If public administration research which finds bureaucrats to actively represent their primary identities is accepted, (studies by Keiser et al, 2002; Meier and O’Toole, 2006 etc) a passively representative bureaucracy is indeed a necessity for resources to flow to that group. Similarly, in terms of conflict management literature, if Esman’s (1999) and Dresang’s (1974) assertions are true, passive representation is also a necessity for bureaucratic legitimacy. This combination of public administration and
conflict management research provides the strongest theoretical argument in favour of attaining the goal of a passively representative bureaucracy. Thus if passive representation (or a critical mass) of the traditional out-group is required for benefits to flow to that group, and also for bureaucratic legitimacy, we must ask: can the use of community quotas in recruitment, and the corresponding sacrifice of the merit principle in bureaucratic recruitment, be justified in order to attain the theoretically justifiable goal of passive representation?

By holding constant other factors that influence minority representation, such as education (Roberts, 1965; Brown, 1999), legitimacy, (Esman, 1999; Dresang 1974) and accessibility (Rauch and Evans, 2000), we can determine whether or not quotas are indeed required to bring about passive representation in these extraordinary circumstances. Competent capacity developers are a prerequisite for successful capacity development (Brinkerhoff and Morgan, 2010). If indeed passive representation is required for bureaucratic legitimacy, and for resource allocation purposes, does this provide a valid argument for the introduction of quotas and concurrent reduction in the capabilities of the administration? This research finds no necessity for community quotas for the attainment of a passively representative bureaucracy. Solutions to the problem of an absence of passive representation within the administration must address the cause of the problem, which in turn will increase the robustness and quality of governance of the bureaucracy. Community quotas, it can therefore be said, treat the symptom, masking the cause of unrepresentative bureaucracy, while at the same time potentially generating poorer governance capacity. Quotas are not always necessary to
attain a passively representative bureaucracy in a contested environment. Brown’s suggestion that passive representation is not a necessary condition for successful governance is not tested by this research; however evidence is put forward to support the maintenance of the merit principle: a passively representative bureaucracy has been attained within the bureaucracy of one of Europe’s most deeply divided cities without sacrificing the merit principle.

To summarise, two schools of representative bureaucracy theory have emerged in governance research: one in which secondary, organisational norms supersede primary norms in resource allocation and a second where primary ethno-national identities guide resource allocation. Similarly, we have also seen two divergent strands in conflict management research, each attributing differing importance to passive representation (and the derivation of legitimacy) within the bureaucracy. Accepting the arguments of both schools which support the goal of passive representation\textsuperscript{64}, the research question (of the chapter) begins to develop: where education in both communities can be held constant, and where accessibility, and legitimacy can also be held constant, has a passively representative bureaucracy emerged in Belfast without the need for affirmative action? As it is found that passive representation has emerged without the use of community quotas, the findings suggest that community quotas are not necessary in achieving a passively representative bureaucracy. While not investigating the merits of passive representation, such a finding suggests that if passive representation is a goal of the traditional out group, community quotas are not

\textsuperscript{64} I.e. Primary identity guides resource allocation and legitimacy is achieved through actual numerical representation (passive representation) within the bureaucracy.
necessary. If the cause of the problem is mis-defined, solutions cannot be appropriately
designed, hence the problem perpetuates. Such a misdiagnosis of the problem in turn
lends support to Brown’s (1999) thesis which submits that quotas can further
deteriorate the legitimacy of the administration among the traditional in-group, while at
the same time potentially decreasing the capacity for professional governance.

The next section (re)introduces the case of Belfast City Council, providing some
contextual background to the research presented within this chapter. The following
section then elaborates on the research design, explaining how, for the purposes of this
chapter, ‘representativeness’ is gauged. The penultimate section then introduces the
findings, based on statistics for the entire bureaucratic elite. The latter part of this
section then takes a representative sample of 42% of these bureaucratic elite delving
deeper into their characteristics, ascertaining their representativeness of society. The
final section then discusses these results and their implications for recruitment within
power-sharing societies.

5.3 Case study: Belfast City Council and the merit principle

Belfast exhibits a prime example where division has long since existed between two
communities. Since 1997, Belfast City Council has adopted a mechanism of ‘involuntary
power-sharing’. Politicians share power, not on the basis of a formal agreement to
stabilise the city, but on the basis of necessity. In 1997, the Belfast electorate returned a
hung Council, forcing the political level into cooperation. Despite the ensuing political
compromises, there was no sacrifice of the merit principle in recruitment to the
bureaucracy – the most suitable candidate, regardless of personal background, was still to get the job. There was no statutory change to the existing recruitment by merit. The following year, section 75 of the 1998 Northern Ireland Act obliged the City Council to conduct an Equality Impact Assessment where statistics indicating the community background of individual bureaucrats were now collated.\footnote{Section 75 was a consequent of power-sharing at the NI level, not the regional (city council) level} A grievance redressal procedure also strengthens the merit principle. Therefore, instead of compromising the merit principle, Belfast provides an example of a case where the merit principle was strengthened following power-sharing. Research by Gusfield (1958: 541) has found that, ‘Recruitment, although frequently couched in language of technical efficiency, in reality proceeds on less formal and abstract assumptions...The process of bureaucratization is a human process, with purposes engendered by human values and interests.’ It is therefore the exploitation/employment of the rules that determine recruitment and not solely the rules themselves. Thus we expect that the merit principle is not the obstacle to greater out-group representation; rather the obstacle rests with how these rules and procedures are employed, and the subsequent attributable lack of institutional legitimacy. Grievance redressal systems provide a forum for those feeling discriminated against, while the publication of community data allows for the measurement of outcomes of procedures rather than simply measuring institutional outputs, procedures, or instruments themselves. Thus in Belfast, while no statutory changes were made to the recruitment process, the grievance redressal system and publication of data had the potential to alter how the rules were implemented, without actually changing the rules.
Belfast therefore provides an appropriate background in which to conduct our research: the merit principle remains constant, reliable data are available, both communities have a tradition of education; however the robustness of the recruitment process, and consequently accessibility of top positions, is enhanced following power-sharing. This research does not seek to empirically determine the causes of passive representation, but simply to investigate if a passively representative bureaucracy is possible within the contested society, without the necessity for community quotas.\textsuperscript{66}

5.4 Research design
Following Riccucci and Saidel (1997) this chapter departs from traditional research and examines the bureaucratic elite, as opposed to entire bureaucracies or street level bureaucrats. The bureaucratic elite are defined as those occupying the top three tiers of local government: department directors, heads of service and senior managers. While significant discretion is available to say, parking attendants, policemen or health inspectors, (Lipsky, 1980), the bureaucratic elite within Belfast’s contested environment also have considerable discretion, and do affect the management of conflict (Chapter Three). Passive representation therefore is equally as important at the elite level as it is at the street level. This is further supported by Nachmias’ (1991) study which submits that governance in democratic political systems can no longer be understood without examining the dominant position of bureaucratic elites.

\textsuperscript{66}Nor am I concerned with the city-state relationship. My concern is grounded in public administration research: I seek to determine if a passively representative bureaucracy can emerge within a contested society without the need for recruitment quotas.
The religious backgrounds of all forty-seven top decision makers within Belfast City Council were attained. Of these twenty were interviewed at length. Interviews were targeted not on the basis of race, gender or creed, but on the basis of job description within the Council and were conducted in one wave. Interviews determined the bureaucrats' religious background, nationality, original social class, and education. On condition of anonymity, the remainder of the interview explored the interviewees' norms, values and mechanisms of approaching decision making within the conflict environment; aspects not directly relevant to our research question within this chapter. Some quotations from these interviews are included here to support the quantitative findings. All interviewees described themselves as ethnically 'white'. All interviewees possessed a high level of formal education. Eight held either a degree or a postgraduate diploma while twelve had either a Masters or a Ph.D. The interview sample represents 43% of the targeted universe (entire bureaucratic elite). Where N=47 (entire bureaucratic elite), the ratio of Catholics to Protestants is 1:1.14. In this N=20 sample the ratio of Catholics to Protestants is 1:1.04. Thus in terms of religion, our sample is as representative of the population as can be expected. Women are over represented in our sample as are those perceiving themselves to be of neither community.

This study follows the three ratios employed by Riccucci and Saidel (1997) as a means of describing the representativeness of the bureaucracy. These are depicted in figure 5.1 below. The traditional baseline measure compares a community's representation within the entire organisation with their corresponding representation in society. The stratification measure as employed by Cayer and Singelman (1980) and
Dometrius (1984), compares a group's composition in society with their composition within the bureaucratic elite. This stratification measure is the measure we are most interested in from a passive representation perspective — to what extent do the bureaucratic elite within a power-sharing environment, where the merit principle has not been sacrificed, passively resemble the society they work for. Finally the Riccucci and Saidel measure (New Aggregate measure) averages a community's proportion of the total workforce (ratio 1) and a community's representation among upper level appointments (ratio 2). This integration, they maintain, 'summarises the representativeness of an entire bureaucratic system and permits comparison across systems' (Riccucci and Saidel, 1997: 426). Riccucci and Saidel's methods however have been criticised by Guyot (1998); the new aggregate measure, he finds, can 'obscure important information', and may actually 'overstate the representativeness of bureaucracies'; he also finds further contextualisation of the ratios is also required to achieve the intended comprehensiveness of analysis (Guyot, 1998: 376). These shortcomings are however refuted by Riccucci and Saidel (1999). Nonetheless, in an attempt to ensure such important information is not obscured, this study departs from existing definitions of 'top level bureaucrats'. SOC1, the traditional term for bureaucrats at the top level, in 2004 consisted of 254 people in Belfast (approx top 10%) (BCC, Annual Monitoring Return, 2004). Representation for minorities and traditional out-groups can be easily increased to 'improve the statistics' by allocating a number of junior management positions to applicants from these communities. In order to prevent possibility for such skewing of the data, this research draws only on the top 47
bureaucrats in Belfast – all directors, heads of service and senior managers. The top three tiers so to speak. Greene, Selden and Brewer (2001) build on Riccucci and Saidel’s ratios adding an additional level of analysis investigating a group’s composition within the bureaucratic hierarchy. Given the aims of the chapter and the data available, the rudimentary Riccucci and Saidel method was found to be most appropriate for this study; nonetheless it is also important to be aware of some limitations of the research tools. For a fuller discussion on the various mechanisms of gauging representativeness see the comprehensive literature review in Riccucci and Saidel (1997: 425).

**Fig.5.1 Representativeness ratios**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional Baseline Measure:</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a group's % of the gov't workforce</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a group's % of the population</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stratification Measure:</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a group's % of upper-level appointments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a group's % of the population</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Aggregate Measure:</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a group's % of the gov't workforce</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>a group's % of the population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ a group's % of upper-level appointments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a group's % of the population</td>
<td></td>
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<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.5 The findings

Table 5.1 (below) summarises the descriptive data which includes all 47 members of the bureaucratic elite within the urban administration, together with the data for the total workforce of 2518

67 (November, 2009). Of the total workforce (N=2518) Catholics

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67 Figure includes permanent and casual staff. See also Monitoring Report No. 19; ‘A profile of the Monitored Northern Ireland Workforce Summary of Monitoring Returns 2008’ Appendix 2, section 1. For 2008 figures. [http://www.equalityni.org/archive/pdf/MonitoringReportNo19_FINAL_081209.pdf](http://www.equalityni.org/archive/pdf/MonitoringReportNo19_FINAL_081209.pdf) Using 2008 figures, no substantial difference is recorded; representation of Catholics is marginally greater.
comprise 42.7% while Protestants comprise 53.3%. Of the bureaucratic elite, (N=47) Catholics account for 48.9%, while Protestants account for 46.8%. 4.5% of the bureaucracy, and 4.3% of the bureaucratic elite, consider themselves as belonging to neither community\(^6\).

Table 5.1 Overview of the descriptive data, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total urban population</th>
<th>BCC – all employees</th>
<th>BCC elite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither community</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2 displays baseline, stratified and aggregated representative ratios for religion within the Council. The aggregate measure, which Riccucci and Saidel (1997) describe as giving the most accurate comprehensive view of the representativeness of the bureaucracy, demonstrates the representative nature of the bureaucracy in terms of religion. Catholics, Protestants and those perceiving themselves to be of neither community, are all passively represented within the bureaucracy. Breaking the figures down further, Catholics tend to be slightly over represented at the elite level (stratification measure), while Protestants tend to be over represented within the administration as a whole. The differences are not significant although the trend is interesting and will be returned to in the discussion\(^6\).

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\(^6\) The ‘Total Urban Population’ figure is derived from the 2001 census for Belfast Urban Area, not Belfast Metropolitan Urban Area. (NINIS)

\(^6\) The Baseline figures for 2008 are as follows: Catholic: 0.95 Protestant: 1.05; Not determined: 1.07
Table 5.2 Baseline, stratified and aggregate measure ratios, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Baseline 2009</th>
<th>Stratified 2009</th>
<th>Aggregate Measure 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not determined</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>.97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A large part of the Northern Ireland conflict however is grounded, not in religion, but in nationality. O’Leary and McGarry (1996: 278) in their seminal work on power-sharing in Northern Ireland see the national question as ‘ultimately’ most important. Turning to the interview data, the following paragraphs delve deeper into the figures, creating a clearer picture of the Belfast bureaucratic elite with reference to nationality, socio-economic background, and education. Data on nationality are not collected by the employers in Northern Ireland. Given that the question of sovereignty is as fundamental to the conflict as religion, table 5.3 below goes beyond the figures presented above, detailing the extent to which British, Irish and Northern Irish identities are represented within our sample of the bureaucratic elite. Seven interviewees perceived themselves as British in the first instance, five perceived themselves as Irish in the first instance, while eight described themselves as being Northern Irish in the first instance. For the purpose of the ratios, the societal figure for nationality was attained from a 2008 ‘NI Times and Life survey’ asking the same question as was asked to our sample. It is found that both British and Irish nationalities are marginally underrepresented within the bureaucratic elite.

70 The NI Life and Times survey figure represents nationality in order of preference within Northern Ireland.
elite. Those in society perceiving themselves as Northern Irish are however over represented in these ‘top decision’ positions (N=47).

Table 5.3 stratified measure ratios: nationality, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stratified measure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Irish</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nachmias’ (1991) study of the Israeli bureaucratic elite found social structure to be central to role convergence within the state bureaucracy as most senior civil servants and politicians were recruited from the higher stratum of society. Our Belfast sample indicates a broad spectrum of class backgrounds. Socio-economic background was measured determining the father’s occupation of the interviewee. Eight interviewees came from a farming or skilled manual background, eight came from either civil service or professional occupations, while three were from unskilled or elementary occupation backgrounds (N=19). Notably underrepresented are those from the ‘unskilled’ background. Brown (1999) reminds us that it is unrealistic to expect that those without a tradition of public service or education to be represented within the administration. Attaining representation of the traditional working classes within the bureaucratic elite however is not a problem exclusive to contested societies and is at the very heart of the original theory of representative bureaucracy as put forward by Kingsley (1944). In sum
our findings indicate both British and Irish nationalities to be equally underrepresented
within the bureaucratic elite, with those perceiving themselves as Northern Irish being considerably over represented.

5.6 Discussion
As previously outlined, the costs of sacrificing the merit principle outlined by Esman (1999) include loss of efficiency and effectiveness of the public service and resentment among the traditional majority. Adding to this Brown highlights the possibility of loss of confidence in the system as the majority feel they are the victims of discrimination, decreasing morale and consequently the quality of work. This in turn can have negative consequences for public sector performance and questions the legitimacy of the regime, further destabilising opportunities for reconciliation (Brown: 1999: 369). As we saw in the second section, both researchers disagree on the necessity for a passively representative bureaucracy. Esman (1999) perceives the costs of disproportional representation to be significantly greater than the costs of guaranteeing representation by community quota while Brown (1999) holds the opposite belief. Both authors have supported their opinions with case studies from around the world. Instead of pitching both scenarios against each other, or rehashing the debate, this chapter has drawn on public administration (representative bureaucracy) and conflict management research, generating a conceptual framework most conducive to the introduction of community quotas. This research framework outlined a theoretical justification for achieving a representative bureaucracy based on the belief that bureaucrats represent their primary identities when allocating resources and secondly that equity of representation was
more important than equity of opportunity in terms of bureaucratic legitimacy. Accepting this theoretical position (for the sake of the study), passive representation was deemed a necessity. It was then possible to test to see how necessary quotas were in achieving this goal of passive representation. Even if this theoretical framework is accepted, that which is most in favour of a representative bureaucracy, it is found that community quotas are not required to attain this goal. These findings demonstrate that in one of Europe’s most deeply divided societies, a passively representative bureaucracy is possible without sacrificing the merit principle. Sacrificing the merit principle to bolster minority figures treats the symptom while ignoring the cause of the problem. In Belfast education, access and legislation can be held constant. As a patently unrepresentative bureaucracy existed before power-sharing, this suggests that the cause of the problem derives either from the society – lack of organisational legitimacy, or alternatively from the organisation – an absence of robust recruitment practices.

In 1990, seven years before power-sharing in Belfast, Catholics comprised only 30.6% (Good Relations Document, 22.02.2004) of the BCC workforce. This increased to 35.6% (Policy and Resources Committee, 08.12.2005) by the 1st of January 1998. By 2001, the figure had increased further to 37.3%. (Good Relations Document, 22.02.2004) By 2004, this had risen to 38.7% (Policy and Resources Committee, 08.12.2005). This figure in 2009 stands at 44.6%. At the elite level Catholics occupied 34.2% of the top 254 positions in 2002 (Human Resources BCC, 08.2004). The results from 2009 document that Catholics are found to be passively represented among the

\[ \text{Figures obtained for this study} \]

71
top 47 elite level positions. In 2002, the aggregate measure ratio based on the top 254 positions highlights that Catholics were significantly underrepresented at .74. Protestants were over-represented 1.22. The stratification measure for 2002 (which measures the representativeness of the bureaucratic elite) was: Catholics: .72 (Recall the 2009 stratification measure for Catholics: 1.04.) and Protestants: 1.21. (2009 stratification measure for Protestants: .96) Notable also was the overrepresentation of non-determined: 1.69. Positions are not reserved for Catholics, yet their proportion of the bureaucracy has reached parity with their Protestant counterparts. This has happened without sacrificing the merit principle. It also happened over a considerably short period of time.

Application rates to the entire bureaucracy among Catholics had reached 43% by 2001 (Human Resources BCC, 08.2004). By 2009 this figure had marginally increased to 45%. However more significant changes exist at the elite level. Applications rates among Catholics to the elite level were 43.9% by 2001 (Human Resources BCC, 08.2004). By 2009 this figure stood at just under 55%. Application rates among Catholics at the elite level are seen to have substantially increased. Before power-sharing at least one tenet of the equation was missing, arising in a patently unrepresentative bureaucracy where one community dominated. These figures suggest that either the legitimacy attributed to the administration or the recruitment practices changed (causation is not tested by this research). A passively representative bureaucracy subsequently emerged without the need for community recruitment quotas. The findings demonstrate that the merit

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72 Generated using data from the BCC Annual Monitoring Return 2002
73 Figures obtained for this research
principle need not be sacrificed in order to guarantee passive representativeness at the elite level.

Interviewees in Belfast, both Catholic and Protestant, evidenced a large amount of support for the merit principle. In each case interviewees perceived the merit principle to be integral to successful policy making: ‘Once you sacrifice the merit principle, you are stuffed’ one Catholic interviewee responded. The only concerns interviewees had about the compromising of the merit principle in Belfast were that ‘office politics’ sometimes played a role in promotion and advancement within the service. This would sometimes mean that the best person may not always get the job. This office politics however was never based on religious affiliation or perceived nationality. Councillors are not involved in low level recruitment within the service. They are involved however in the choosing of candidates to fulfil the elite positions. Councillors’ involvement in the recruitment of new directors is also viewed in a positive light: ‘Councillors know better than to advocate on the part of any particular person…the most important thing to Councillors is if the candidate can deliver’. There is a strong commitment to a passively representative bureaucracy within the human resources (HR) department of the Council: ‘you need to be as representative as possible of the community you serve’. There has also been a notable change in the ethos, norms and values of the department: ‘Equality is now so mainstream: ten years ago these questions were relevant’. We see here that the values guiding recruitment are firmly

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74 Interview transcript: Director within BCC
75 Interview transcript: Member of the bureaucratic elite within the Human Resources department of BCC
76 Interview transcript: Member of the bureaucratic elite within the Human Resources department of BCC
rooted in meritocracy and that there is no support, political or otherwise, for compromising it.

Drawing on his study of the Israeli bureaucracy, Nachmias (1991: 414) found the Israeli bureaucracy to be ‘extremely unrepresentative of women’ and to be ‘exclusively Jewish’. His findings evidence the fears expressed by Esman (1999: 354) that the majority will ‘resort to formal or informal practices that exclude outsiders or provide preferential access for their members’. This argument lends support to Gusfield’s (1958) assertion that it is not the rules themselves that guide recruitment but how the rules are exploited. Surrendering the merit principle for the greater good is however a misnomer. Indeed if its sacrifice increased the likelihood of more legitimate governance, these costs may be acceptable. Further studies of passive representation within power-sharing environments where the merit principle has been sacrificed are required to investigate the extent to which quota systems contribute positively to conflict management. Mustapha (2009) argues that affirmative action is an important aspect of governance in a divided society. The findings presented by this research indicate that it need not be. This research has shown that given the robust implementation of recruitment by merit, the bureaucracy can mirror society, in terms of the ethno-national divide, without the need to sacrifice efficiency, effectiveness, or alienating the traditional majority community. This new data has demonstrated that the problem is not with the appointing people on merit, but that unrepresentativeness within the bureaucratic elite is a symptom of a greater problem: lack of access or lack of perceived institutional legitimacy. Esman’s (1999) path, relying where necessary on quotas, is not necessary to
bolster passive representation. Community quotas are not a prerequisite for a passively representative bureaucracy within an ethno-politically contested society.

This research adds new data to the domain of representative bureaucracy within the divided society. Most importantly however, the study not only argued, but evidenced, that the merit principle need not be sacrificed in order to achieve a passively representative bureaucracy. Indeed, further studies under differing mechanisms of public sector recruitment are required to ascertain a fuller understanding of passive representation. Further understandings of the causes of passive representation are also necessary – the role of political support for the institutions, education levels among the minority, legitimacy of the organisation or recruitment procedures etc. Findings within administrations where quota systems govern candidate selection would also develop our understanding of passive representation. How are these systems employed? Do they achieve the intended outcomes? What about instances where the traditional out-group demand greater representation than their composition in society. Cases such as Brussels where the Flemish population comprise 10-15% of the population but are reserved 50% of elite positions cannot be referred to as passive representation and need to be investigated independently.

5.7 Concluding remarks

Although each society, and each conflict, is unique in and of itself, the empirical evidence presented in this chapter should inform how problems of passive representation can be addressed in developing plural societies such as Kirkuk, Kabul,
Beirut or Mostar. If power-sharing in these societies is to be politically successful, developing administrative capacity through a legitimate, effective and efficient civil service is a prerequisite. The first step in attaining Brinkerhoff and Morgan’s (2010) five capabilities required for capacity development is to recruit the ‘right’ people. While Esman (1999) believed that in instances where the power-sharing process does not yield equitable representation, representation should be guaranteed by formal procedures, this research argues and evidences that forgoing the merit principle is simply treating the symptom and ignoring the cause of disproportionate representation. The Belfast experience has shown that in little over ten years a significant change in the composition of the administration has taken place, without sacrificing the merit principle. The research does not inform us whether it was a change in legitimacy attributed to the organisation or a change in how the rules of recruitment were implemented, that caused passive representation. However it is demonstrated that quotas are not required to create a passively representative bureaucracy.

As submitted in the introduction and literature review, for a group to actively represent their counterparts in society, they must comprise a sufficient proportion (or critical mass) of the bureaucracy. In Brussels, this critical mass has been achieved through quotas. In Belfast, this chapter demonstrates that the traditional out-group do comprise a critical mass of the bureaucracy. The conditions for active representation on behalf of a primary identity are therefore present in each city. Chapter six proceeds to investigate to what extent these groups within the bureaucracy actively represent their counterparts in society. As Keiser et al (2002) suggest, it would be expected that these
bureaucrats would represent the interests of their own communities in matters of importance to the demographic issue in question. However as Wilkins and Williams (2008) and Rehfuss (1986) suggest, any active representation may be curtailed by the socio-geographic and organisational environment in which the bureaucrat works. This research has found that Belfast has managed to achieve the passive representation of both its communities within the bureaucracy without sacrificing the merit principle. However the research has not made any claims on active representation. Do Catholics in the administration represent Catholics in society or have bureaucrats been socialised by institutional norms? What effect has recruitment based on merit alone had on the bureaucratic values, resource allocation, norms and identity? In order to answer these questions the study of the bureaucracy within the contested society needs to lend more emphasis to the importance of active representation. Drawing on the experience of Belfast, this research has unpacked just one tenet of Brinkerhoff’s (2010) prerequisites for increased capacity development. If the bureaucracy is to be regarded as fundamental to good governance, competent bureaucrats are indeed the first step toward achieving better governance. While a passively representative bureaucracy may be a legitimate demand of the traditional out-group, this does not have to mean the introduction of community quotas.
6

Active representation within the power-sharing society: the values guiding administrative decision-making in Belfast and Brussels

6.1 Introduction
To date much of the research into active representation has measured how bureaucrats actively represent their own personal communities within the bureaucracy, with a number of studies also looking at potential restrictions to, and causes of, the development of active representation. Drawing on the theory of representative bureaucracy, and Reissman’s (1949) and Downs’ (1967) bureaucrat typologies, this chapter develops a conceptual framework for gaining an understanding of existent core governance beliefs and representation perceptions among bureaucrats within the contested environment. Are bureaucrats in power-sharing environments guided by the elected political leaders of the city, by political leaders within their own community, by professional norms and values, or do they possess values of neutrality? Delving deeper, how do they see the role of government in society, and how do they feel when confronted with questions of equity over efficiency? Which bureaucrats are most likely to actively represent and what will they actively represent when they do so? Using Q methodology to investigate bureaucrat role perceptions, five bureaucrat typologies are identified – two in Belfast and three in Brussels. These typologies provide a more comprehensive understanding of bureaucrat role perceptions within the power-sharing society.
In chapters three and four the role of the bureaucracy as an organisation within the policy process was identified. In this chapter attention shifts to the role of individual bureaucrats within the public bureaucracy. Drawing on a method relatively new to political science, but well established in psychology: Q Methodology, this chapter identifies the core governance beliefs and representation perceptions of a sample of elite level bureaucrats in both Belfast and Brussels. Recall that a critical mass or a sufficient concentration of the traditional out-group is a precondition for members of that group to actively represent their corresponding communities in society. In chapter five we saw that a critical mass of both Catholics and Protestants are passively represented at the elite level in Belfast. In Brussels, a critical mass of the traditional out-group (Dutch-speakers) has been guaranteed by ethno-linguistic quotas. The conditions for active representation on behalf of an ethno-national/ethno-linguistic identity are therefore satisfied in each case (See Kaiser et al, 2002 and Meier and O’Toole, 2006). However as will be demonstrated in the conceptual framework, a professional attachment or identity can also exist. I then investigate (i) the extent to which active representation does exist, (ii) what is actively represented and (iii) if those sharing particular beliefs also share primary identities. The chapter investigates the research question: Can a professional attachment supersede an attachment to an ethno-political attachment among the bureaucratic elite of a contested society.

As we have seen in previous chapters, resource allocation and decision-making are not simply activities for the political level: the bureaucracy too influences the allocation of resources. Identity perceptions which guide bureaucratic decision-making
are in turn central to our understanding of how power-sharing is managed. As we saw in the literature review, conflict and post-conflict societies exhibit numerous examples of policy failures – in social cohesion, urban planning and education to name but a few. While it is indeed necessary to understand what policies to implement, it is also necessary to understand the mechanism through which they may be implemented. Without an effective mechanism of policy implementation, even the most well considered policies will not avoid failure. The policy outcome, or effect, is directly related to administrative outputs and the mechanism through which they emerge. This mechanism, through which policies are proposed and implemented therefore, plays a pivotal role in the success of any policy. The bureaucracy is a primary partner in this governance process whose role has hitherto been underestimated in conflict management research. Drawing on the two examples of power-sharing, this chapter examines the role perceptions and core governance beliefs of those traditionally faceless bureaucrats who contribute not only to governance, but also to conflict management, within the city. Scott Bollens (2008: 2) in his influential study of conflict through an urban planning lens identifies Belfast as ‘moving towards peace’ and Brussels as ‘stable’. Power-sharing is a relatively new form of governance in each city. A study of bureaucratic role perceptions in these two cases of ethnic peace can inform our understanding of how the administration can develop within the emerging power-sharing society. Contested societies considering power-sharing as a form of governance will then be in a position to learn from the Belfast and Brussels experiences.
Bureaucratic discretion in policy making has ‘forced scholars to grapple with problems of bureaucratic accountability, responsibility and responsiveness’ (Selden et al 1999: 179). A greater understanding of how this discretion is employed will therefore enhance our understanding of how the bureaucracy contributes to the success of power-sharing. In her study of conflict within organisations, Fitzpatrick (2007: 281) submits that ‘value alignment is necessary for effective collaboration’. How well aligned are bureaucratic values within the contested city? Robert Dahl (1970) submits that the primary controls on the behaviour of bureaucrats are those values held by the bureaucrat. Research within uncontested societies has in recent years given greater weight to individual values that guide decision-making (Sabatier, Loomis and McCarthy, 1995; Meier and O’Toole, 2006; Hooghe, 2005; Beyers, 2005, among others). As norms and values guide behaviour, and behaviour affects resource allocation, a comprehensive understanding of bureaucratic norms and values will inform us of the role perceptions and core governance beliefs of the senior bureaucrat. If administrative reform agendas are to succeed they rely on the accurate identification of the existing problem. While much is known about the structures of public administration, less is known about how these structures are exploited. To develop this understanding, I draw on representative bureaucracy research and bureaucrat typology research to generate a conceptual framework. Methodologically, I rely on an inversion of factor analysis, known as Q methodology, which is adept at identifying different typologies of perceptions among a population. These perceptions are assumed to guide behaviour, and hence resource allocation. While scholars such as Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman (1981), Guy Peters
(1987) and James Suara (1985, 1990) look for general theories of politician-bureaucrat relations, typologies allow us to examine if different bureaucrats interact differently with the political level. This approach fits closer with the aims of the dissertation. The generation of bureaucrat typologies therefore can be said to deepen our understanding of the politician-bureaucrat dichotomy within the contested society. Further, Nachmias and Rosenbloom (1978: 173) submit that typologies are ‘not only useful as an analytical tool, but also for the selection of public administrators’. Typologies also serve as tools to ‘predict bureaucrat’s attitudes and the nature of bureaucratic behaviour’ (ibid: 173, see also Meier and O’Toole, 2006). Typologies therefore inform how policies are implemented, and can be implemented, in a power-sharing society. Typologies give an indication of what we can expect from the administration within an emerging power-sharing society. Identity, for the purposes of this chapter, refers to each individual’s unique combination of both individual and group identity. This may reflect broad associations such as woman or man, Protestant or Sunni or narrower associations such as one’s family (Kriesberg, 2003). For a more comprehensive exploration of identity see Seul (1999) where individual and group identities are explained against a conflict management background.

Drawing on the theory of representative bureaucracy, and existing scholarship on ‘bureaucrat typologies’, the following two sections determine the theoretical possibility for attachments to primary identities, such as race colour or creed; and the generation of secondary identities, such as attachment to an organisation or profession. The following section identifies the most appropriate methodology for measuring these
theoretically defined characteristics – Q methodology. The findings are then presented independently for each city, followed by two sections which seek to bring the findings together.

6.2 Representative bureaucracy

Studies of representative bureaucracy have shown that not only do the norms and values of the organisation affect those of the individual, but that the norms and values of the individual also affect those of the organisation. A collective ‘organisational’ identity is therefore said to emerge. It is for this reason that the bureaucracy should be diverse in its composition, representing to some extent the composition of society. However, a number of studies have found bureaucrats not to be influenced by these secondary organisational attachments but to remain loyal to their primary identities. Hindera (1993) defines two types of association: primary associations as those into which we are born such as gender, race, ethnicity etc, while secondary associations on the other hand are those which we generate, or socially construct – attachment to an organisation or football club for example. However in a contested society, what type of associations are we to expect from our administrators? Recall that identity guides behaviour, which in turn guides resource allocation in instances where the bureaucracy is regarded to have discretion. Kingsley’s representative bureaucracy (1944), further developed by Van Riper (1958: 552), supposes that decisions made by the bureaucracy mirror the preferences, ‘ethos and attitudes’ of the society which they govern. Kingsley therefore argued that the administration would always represent the interests of its composite class – the middle class. Mosher (1968: 12) further developed the theory,
differentiating between “that which the bureaucracy is” and “that which the bureaucracy does”. According to Mosher, passive representativeness concerns the origin of individuals and the degree to which, collectively, they mirror society, while in active representation an individual is expected to press for the interests of those with whom an identity, or personal affinity, is shared (Hindera, 1993: 417). The question now is to determine who or what the bureaucrat actually represents – a primary or a secondary identity?

Some studies have shown that blacks and women portray evidence of active representation as minorities within a bureaucracy – ie. that women would support the interests of women within the bureaucracy and members of the black community similarly advocate the interests of the wider black population (Mansbridge, 1999; Keiser et al, 2002; Meier and Nicholson-Crotty, 2006). By extension, within a contested society one would expect French-speakers, in the case of Brussels, to represent French-speaking interests, and Dutch-speaking bureaucrats to represent Dutch-speaking interests, or in the case of Belfast, that Catholics would represent Catholic interests and Protestants would represent Protestant interests. However another body of research finds incorporating qualified professionals into a bureaucracy also incorporates their professional values into the bureaucracy (March and Olsen, 2004). Organisations depersonalise relationships which allows for a technocratic mentality to develop (Ferguson, 1984; Radaelli and O’Connor, 2009). This incorporation of professional values into the bureaucracy will lead the bureaucracy to develop its own set of values and norms, which through socialisation, could potentially supersede traditional norms. John
Rehfuss (1986: 459) not only found that women and minorities differed little from their white male counterparts within the administration, but that they appeared to share a ‘management ideology’. Thus instead of French-speakers representing French-speaking interests and Dutch-speakers representing Dutch-speaking interests, we would expect to find both Dutch and French-speaking bureaucratic elites to represent common professional, technocratic interests; likewise for the republicans, nationalists, loyalists and unionists in Northern Ireland.

Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2006) are able to show that an increase in female police officers corresponds with an increase in instances of rape actually reported to the police. They conclude that a passively representative bureaucracy is beneficial: is this because female police officers take forward the cases of female victims, or, because female norms and values have been adopted by those males working closely with their female counterparts, thereby changing the norms of the organisation? If the latter is the case, through socialisation with women men can now represent the interests of women, the norms of the bureaucracy are now more representative of those in society at large. As also indicated by John Rehfuss (1986) above, one therefore does not have to ‘passively represent’ to ‘actively represent’. Brandy Kennedy (2008) strengthens this argument referring to those providing services to the mentally and physically disabled – of course one does not actually have to be disabled to represent the interests of those who are. In the divided society context, this is witnessed most poignantly in Israel, where some Jewish Israelis actively represent issues such as Palestinian human rights. Within a divided city, do the bureaucratic elite possess these secondary, learned/socially
constructed associations or do they attach themselves to a primary, ethnic, personal
association? As Reissman (1949: 305) puts forward, the formal structure, interpersonal
relationships and the surrounding social milieu all contribute to the ‘social role the
bureaucrat fills’. Within the ethno-nationally contested society are identities within the
administration as fluid as within the uncontested society? Can we expect bureaucrats to
represent anything other than their primary identities?

Meier and O’Toole (2006) ascertain that a critical mass is required for the
formulation of an actively representative bureaucracy. Thus a department would
require numerical sufficiency of a particular ethnicity (or set of values) for benefits to
begin to flow to that ethnicity, (or to those in society holding those values). Put

“If professionals who see advocacy for a particular group as their role dominate a
bureaucracy, we should expect bureaucratic outputs to be distributed to benefit
that group.”

Therefore, the argument goes, if Catholics are numerically sufficient within the Belfast
bureaucracy, benefits should correspondingly flow to that group. Similarly if Dutch-
speakers are sufficiently present within the Brussels administration, benefits should
begin to flow to that group. In an attempt to avert bureaucrats from representing their
primary ethno-national identities, Mengistu and Vogel (2006) submit that a national
Ethiopian identity could potentially supersede primary tribal identities. In countries such
as Ethiopia, which comprise of over eighty different ethnicities, obtaining a critical mass
of each tribal group, so that benefits would flow to each group, would be an absurdity. A
national Ethiopian identity, they submit, would supersede tribal identities, thereby
ensuring that ethnic groups are not simply representing their tribal positions within the bureaucracy. To surmise their argument: for benefits to flow throughout the entire population, a national identity should supersede a tribal identity among bureaucrats. However, in ethnically contested societies, different ethnicities or communities attribute different importance to the concept of state nationality. In some cases the legitimacy of the state is even contested. Unlike uncontested societies where identity with the nation and the state usually exists simultaneously as a primary identity, within the contested society identification with the governing state is often in a secondary, or learned, capacity. Since the traditionally disadvantaged ethnic communities are not prone to the acceptance of state authority, such allegiances would be difficult to form as they would be in direct contrast to their primary ‘national’ (ethnic/community/tribal) identities. Mengistu and Vogel’s (2006) suggestion relies on the secondary ‘state identity’ superseding the ‘national’ primary identity. While it is possible that a secondary, learned, nation-state identity could supersede a primary tribal identity, in an environment where resources are finite and demand is high, the opportunity for a direct confrontation between both identities is increased. Would the bureaucrat always represent the national interest or in cases of demographic importance would the bureaucrat, as Keiser et al (2002) suggest, represent their primary tribal or community identity?

This chapter submits that a more likely and stronger bond between civil servants in a divided society would therefore be identification with professional or technical norms and values – therefore it would be more plausible to expect a greater
commonality of viewpoints around professional or technical issues such as ‘a commitment to regulatory reform’ or ‘a commitment to poverty alleviation’ than around politically constructed concepts such as nationality. A secondary identity of ‘achieving social cohesion’ is less likely to be in conflict with one’s nationality, or primary identity. Studies at the EU level have shown that bureaucratic elites from different traditions can form common attachments based on professional technocratic norms (Radaelli and O’Connor, 2008). This does not necessarily have to be a European identity, nor do bureaucrats have to agree on all aspects of the topic. What matters however is that bureaucrats feel attached to the policy area. Is it too farfetched to expect such attachments within contested societies? Can policy goals, social goals, or organisational objectives supersede an ethno-political attachment in all aspects of a bureaucrat’s professional activity?

Hindera’s (1993) categorisation of associations into the primary and secondary are central to this research. It is this conflict between a personal, primary and a secondary, learned attachment that is our concern – which guides decision-making in arenas particular to the conflict, be this guidance conscious or subconscious. The research question of the chapter therefore begins to develop: can secondary norms and values supersede a primary identity in guiding the allocation of resources within the divided urban environment? Can bureaucrats within a contested environment take on a new learned or socially constructed identity that supersedes their own personal ethnic identity? If a professional identity is to supersede a personal identity, we would expect bureaucrats to identify themselves around technical professional norms and values vis-
à-vis personal, primary norms and values. Active representation most definitely exists within all bureaucracies; however before international organisations consider administrative reform strategies, it is necessary to understand what values precisely bureaucratic elites actively represent.

Failure to account for norms and values can lead to the failure of administrative reform. In Lebanon, a significant proportion of responsibility for the failure of bureaucratic reform is placed on the failure of The Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR) to work with the existing, indigenous public administration, as opposed to working against it (El Zain and Sims, 2004). Despite the good intentions of OMSAR, its disregard for the existing individual bureaucratic norms and values, contributed to the projects failure. How does each community within the bureaucracy perceive the bureaucracy and their role within it? Without this understanding, structural change will be manipulated by the unknown human condition, generating unintended consequences. Exploring how the bureaucratic elite behave in our two existing power-sharing societies can inform our expectations of bureaucratic behaviour in emerging power-sharing conditions, and hence demonstrate how structural change will be exploited by one of the most influential actors within the governance process.

Do bureaucrats within a divided urban environment actually represent their personal community backgrounds or have they, through education, time, socialisation etc developed a professional administrative mentality which supersedes their ethnic identities? A professional identity is not to mean that a bureaucrat is professional in
his/her job but rather that he/she is attached to a professional set of values such as free trade, tax harmonisation or regulatory impact assessments. We have seen thus far that representative bureaucracy theory allows for the formulation of two broadly defined categories of administrative representation – active representation of professional norms (attachment to a policy area or professional mechanisms) and secondly the active representation of personal norms (attachment based on race, gender, ethnicity etc). Thus our conceptual framework begins to develop with a representation continuum. (fig. 6.1)

Recapitulating, representative bureaucracy literature acknowledges that organisational alignment through socialisation can influence bureaucrat preferences. However, there is also evidence in the literature to suggest that a bureaucrat may also align him/herself with his/her primary identity in certain circumstances. In the contested society can a secondary (professional or organisational) association trump a primary ethnic identity? Existing studies of bureaucrat typologies can shed some light on what characteristics and values we should expect among bureaucrats where the above continuum can be further developed. The study can then proceed to determine how universal certain characteristics are among the bureaucratic elite in power-sharing societies and hence give us a greater understanding of how, and to what end, they employ or exploit administrative structures.
6.3 Typologies

What does existing public administration literature tell us about bureaucrat typologies? How do these typologies lend themselves to the identification of professional and technocratic norms? Reissman (1949) found that bureaucrats exhibited allegiances, not only to their job and government but also to the ‘professional organisations’ and ‘social constellations’ to which they were attributed. In the contested city, how does this ‘surrounding social milieu’ affect the norms, governance beliefs, and values of the bureaucratic elite? Turning to existing research into bureaucrat typologies a number of theoretically existent traits among the bureaucratic elite can be identified. These in turn may emerge among bureaucrats within the contested environment. Among others, Reissman (1949) and Downs (1967) have attempted to define various ‘typologies’ of bureaucrats. Although generalist in their approaches, their theoretical frameworks contribute markedly to our understanding of bureaucratic norms. These typologies are seen as what Stephenson (1935) would have termed *clusters of subjectivity*. The following paragraphs identify the traits and characteristics that can be expected within the bureaucracy.

Anthony Downs (1967) categorises two general types of bureaucrat, purely self-interested bureaucrats and mixed-motive officials, breaking these down further into five categories. Purely self-interested officials (two types) are seen to be loyal to their own personal goals. I do not test for these characteristics within my sample. I am more interested in his second collective category, mixed-motive officials of which there are three types: Zealots are loyal to a narrow set of policies, advocates are loyal to a
broader set of policies, while statesmen are loyal to the ‘nation or society as a whole’. These categorisations, although beneficial in an uncontented environment, do not in their present form distinguish between variant representations within a contested society. For example, in a contested society, a zealot is not a particularly informative categorisation as, although one may be loyal to a narrow set of policies, it is the precise policies that the zealot is pursuing which are of interest. Alleviating the problems of the urban poor through the implementation of a particular reform could be seen as a positive professional attachment, while alleviating the problems of the poor in one’s own ethnopolitical community could be considered a less amiable quality. Similarly, statesmen are purportedly loyal to the nation or society as a whole – in a contested society, these concepts can be very unstable, where in some cases many different ‘nations’ contest the one space. Psychological motivations, structural factors and loyalties are used to define Downs’ classifications. Reissman’s (1949) categorisations are more firmly rooted in sociological norms and may be more appropriate for explicating the individual norms of the bureaucrat within a contested society. We find that three of his typologies lend themselves to the development of a professional identity (functional, job and specialist), whereby a bureaucrat perceives his/her role in a professional manner. He identifies bureaucrats who are motivated by professional and institutional norms, be this for personal or altruistic reward, as ‘job bureaucrats’; while the functional bureaucrats are further submerged in the policy area. The specialist

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77 Indeed each of these researchers explores in detail the characteristics of each ‘typology’. There is not the need, nor the space, to reproduce their detailed findings here but those interested should refer to the original texts.
bureaucrat, although professionally leaning, is meticulous about rules and regulations, remaining safely within these limits. The service bureaucrat meanwhile, he identifies as seeking recognition from a particular group outside the civil service. While in the uncontested society, this could be perceived as a more benign association, such as representing the under-privileged or children, in the contested society context we restrict the interpretation to acting on behalf of one’s primary identity. Thus, for the purpose of our study the service bureaucrat is regarded as one who maintains his primary ethnic or community identity when making decisions.

Similarly, Nachmias and Rosenbloom (1978) also develop a number of typologies, drawing on two broad dimensions: importance attributed to the obtaining of a position within the bureaucracy and personal motives for seeking such a post. These categories generate four typologies with similar characteristics to those of Downs and Reissman. Selden et al (1999) too generate typologies grounded in the value orientation of the bureaucrat. Balancing the values of managerial efficiency, social equity, political responsiveness, pro-active administration and neutrality, Selden et al (1999) generated five typologies using Q methodology. As expected however, as their conceptual framework was designed to be tested within an uncontested society, their categorisations are not particularly informative in answering our research question. For example, typologies such as ‘stewards of the public interest’ may represent a gallant typology within an uncontested city while within a divided city; the same category can be less than appealing pending on how ‘the public interest’ is defined. I therefore draw on their research experiences and approaches, together with those of Reissman (1944),
Downs (1967), and Nachmias and Rosenbloom (1978) to develop a conceptual framework suitable for the contested society.

As identity is such a critical aspect of conflict, value alignment will play a central role in the generation of the typologies within the contested city. Kaufman’s (1956) theory of bureaucratic values (1956), as employed by Mengistu and Vogel, (2006) provides a foundation for bridging the gap between public administration research within uncontested and contested societies. They explore the ‘inherent conflict between a civil service grounded in the values of bureaucratic neutrality, representativeness, or executive leadership’ within a government structured on the basis of ethnicity (Mengistu and Vogel, 2006: 205). Any study of bureaucratic values must incorporate Kaufman’s values where he submits that over the course of time, the balance of these three values have determined the nature of public administration (in the United States).

From the representative bureaucracy literature we know that a professional identity or association can exist within a bureaucracy. Reissman’s (1949) and Downs’ (1967) typologies further distinguish degrees of professional and personal identification. Based on existing typologies, theoretically we can differentiate between a professional bureaucrat (Job bureaucrat, functional bureaucrat etc) and a personal bureaucrat (Service bureaucrat, purely self interested bureaucrat) and a neutrality bureaucrat, prioritising the values of the organisation (specialist). Downs’ zealot or advocate may be conducive to the creation of either identity, pending on the attachment. Downs’ (1967) study builds these typologies along a single continuum. Given that we have established that a bureaucrat may deviate from the Weberian ‘ideal type’ to the oft referred to
personal representation but may also deviate towards professional representation, the contested city continuum needs reflect this.

Fig 6.2 Representation continuum II

This representation continuum measures that what a bureaucrat represents when making decisions. As Downs’ (1967) typologies in their original form are not conducive to constructive analysis in contested cities, the continuum is broken in the centre – A bureaucrat can be an advocate or zealot for either a narrow or broad set of policies that are faithful to his/her primary identity, or equally to his secondary identity. Thus the continuum allows for two types of zealot and advocate. This also incorporates Reissman’s (1949) typologies: A service bureaucrat being represented by the continuum to the right of neutral (ie. representing his personal associations), a specialist at neutral (representing the organisation), a job bureaucrat, close to advocate on the left continuum (towards the professional association) and a functional bureaucrat to the extreme left of the continuum (ie. representing professional associations). Kaufman’s (1956) three bureaucratic values are also therefore represented in the diagram: by neutrality (along with specialists), representation along both representation continua while executive leadership can also be identified at the polar end of each continuum (ie. the bureaucrat may have carved out sufficient discretion to represent either personal or professional attachments).
This continuum however fails to incorporate the factor of political responsiveness. ‘The political responsiveness of public bureaucracies [is]... also of great importance to the development of bureaucratic culture (Nachmias and Rosenbloom, 1978: 19). A bureaucrat may deviate from the Weberian ‘ideal type’, being instead responsive to the political elite. As Meier and O’Toole (2006:29) put forward in their seminal research into political influence: ‘measuring bureaucratic values...is essential to resolving the issue of how much political control is available or possible, and under what conditions.’ Following Selden et al (1999), the additional factor of political responsiveness is therefore included, generating a new representation web, gauging individual preferences against four key theoretical sites of responsiveness – Does a bureaucrat represent a professional mindset and allocate resources accordingly (Professional responsiveness)? Or is the bureaucrat guided by the political leaders within his/her own community (Personal community responsiveness)? Or does the bureaucrat follow closely the direction given by the elected government of the city (Political responsiveness)? The bureaucrat could also (theoretically) possess completely neutral Weberian-style values, akin to Reissman’s ‘specialist’ bureaucrat. These neutrality attributes differ markedly from those responsive to the political level – Bureaucrats with neutrality values give prominence to legislation and treaties, not the political policies of the minister, they maintain a neutral position on potentially divisive decisions and find that they represent the integrity of the organisation as opposed to serving the minister.
The representation web or network however only tells part of the role perception story – we must delve deeper to understand the core governance beliefs. To this end, a further set of continua are required, measuring individual perceptions of equity and efficiency and measuring bureaucrat perceptions of state involvement in public service provision – the traditional right/left divide. This will allow for the generation of more informative typologies, useful in the contested environment. Relating characteristics used to generate existing typologies on a representation web, together with a mechanism for determining core governance beliefs, grounded in representative bureaucracy, provides the most comprehensive and informative framework for use within the contested society. Measuring individual bureaucrat attitudes within this framework will provide a detailed understanding of how the bureaucracy acts in a contested urban environment. Drawing on the theory of representative bureaucracy and numerous bureaucrat typology studies, our possible representation variables are mapped on the webbed ‘representation’ diagram above. The graph below further incorporates respondent values, generating a greater understanding of the core governance beliefs of our sample.
Definition and categorisation of these characteristics adds a further level of complexity. Previous typology scholarship in less contested societies gives an indication of key aspects of these categories. Kaufman (1956) relies on bureaucratic values as the basis for informing our understanding of public administration. Downs’ typologies are grounded in individual psychological predispositions and the extent to which the environment provides the bureaucrat with the opportunity to maximise his utility. Selden et al (1999) and Reissman (1949) both rely on a more sociological approach drawing on role perception to generate their typologies while Nachmias and Rosenbloom (1978) use recruitment and motivation for organisation membership to inform their categorisations. The experience of these researchers gives an indication of how research within the contested society can be designed. What attributes of the characteristics identified above are relevant to the contested city? Focusing on concepts such as legitimacy, representation, role perception, identity, scope of governance and motivation, 46 statements (or questions) were formulated; each statement relating to a
point on either the representation or ‘core governance beliefs’ graphs. Eight statements were attributed to each point on the representation web, five statements to each equity and efficiency and two statements to each public and private sector service provision. Classification of statements can be found in annex 6.6 in the appendix. These statements were then put to the bureaucratic elite within our contested cities, where ‘clusters of subjectivity’ could be identified (Stephenson, 1935).

To summarise, the conceptual framework suggests that it is theoretically possible for a bureaucrat to actively represent both a primary and a secondary identity. While most studies of active representation investigate the extent to which a bureaucrat represents his/her primary identity, this study also investigates the possibility of a bureaucrat actively representing a secondary socially constructed, learned identity. This may take the form of a professional identity, an organisational identity or alternatively the bureaucrat may not be involved in active representation at all, thereby being completely responsive to the political elite. Two further dimensions are added to the framework to try and ascertain core governance beliefs, measuring perceptions of state involvement in public service provision and the equity-efficiency trade off. In the following section, an overview of the most appropriate mechanism for measuring such a framework is outlined.

78 Of course some statements contain elements of two of these theoretically defined characteristics. Classifications are of course subjective. While the classification of the statement may be disputed, as statements are interpreted with reference to the position of all other statements, classification does not have a significant effect on findings.
6.4 Q Methodology: measuring bureaucratic values

This short section is devoted to outlining the merits of Q methodology in determining bureaucrat preferences and the process by which Q research is conducted. Given that we are in search of core personal beliefs, the methodology used to extrapolate this information is of paramount importance. Selden et al (1999) borrow from psychology a noteworthy methodological approach: Q-methodology. Q methodology, they submit, provides the most appropriate basis for measuring individual norms and values. Q is an inverted factor analysis. In traditional research, the respondents are subjects and the questions are variables. In Q subjects and variables are inverted. The statements or questions put to the interviewee are the subjects and the respondents themselves are the variables. Q method therefore does not seek to answer questions such as: do elite level bureaucrats who represent their own communities correspondingly advocate for the division of the city? Rather, in Q we seek to determine if the positioning of the statements (questions) by a respondent is related to the positioning of the statements by another respondent. Individual respondents that have placed the statements in a similar fashion are then said to share perspectives. The Q process, while involving some simple computation, relies extensively on the knowledge of the researcher, and is therefore termed a mixed methods approach.

Following Selden et al (1999), Steelman and Maguire (1999), Callahan and Olshfski (2006), Q methodology is accepted to be the most appropriate method for measuring subjectivity among the bureaucratic elite. Developed by Stephenson (1935), Q methodology allows candidates to categorise their preferences over numerous
statements according to how strongly they disagree or agree with each statement (See also Brown, 1980; Durning, 1999). Q methodology allows public administrators to reveal their subjective point of view (Smith, 2001) or their personal profiles (Brouwer, 1999). While much of social science research draws on survey data to characterise individual opinions toward an issue, Q methodology produces a comprehensive observation of an individual’s attitude (Brown and Ungs, 1970). Q methodology has not been designed to discover the truth or establish facts but to collate the variety of accounts people construct (Kitziger, 1987). Nor is Q methodology concerned with population statistics: it doesn’t seek to establish the proportion of the population weighing significantly on a particular set of preferences. Q Methodology serves to elucidate the range of views on a given topic – not the extent to which they are subscribed to among the wider population. That said, while Q methodology measures individual perceptions and not those of entire populations, some cautious inferences, akin to those of Selden et al (1999), can be made.

Unlike Likert scales or the Semantic Differential method, Q methodology provides an opportunity for the interviewee to identify preferences against competing statements. Put differently, in a questionnaire, the response to each statement or question is made independently of the previous statement or question. In Q the placement of each statement influences the placement of the other statements, generating a greater understanding of individual attitudes and perspectives. In my research, Q methodology has been used to consider and evaluate simultaneously theoretically established bureaucratic norms and values in terms of both representation and core governance
beliefs. As was the case in Anthony Downs’ (1967) bureaucrat typologies research, bureaucrats are acknowledged to possess mixed motives. Thus, as in reality, the method provides for the respondent to prioritise values that are simultaneously in conflict with each other. Concerns have been raised about the possibility for generalisation from Q studies, replicability being the primary factor of concern. Thomas and Baas (1992) have conducted a study to allay any fears in this regard. Respondents in Q methodology are not random. As in all methods of elite interviewing, they are carefully targeted, based on their relevance to the research design. As submitted by Brown (1978) Q methodology is less concerned with the number of persons, rather focusing on who the interviewees (P sample) are.

In summary, Q has been designed to determine core beliefs and individual perceptions. Unlike traditional interviews or degrees of attachment questionnaires, interviewees compare statements against each other as opposed to viewing statements as separate entities. It is therefore the interviewee that determines the importance to be attributed to each statement, not the researcher. While Q has its limitations, it is well suited to measuring norms and values of small numbers of people, and is specifically designed to address the questions posed in this chapter.

6.4.1 The Q process

In Q, two sets are identified – the Questions set (Q set) and the Respondents or Person set (P set). Respondents (P) are requested to rank a series of statements into five categories, from agree to disagree. This differs from traditional survey ‘degrees of attachment’ questions in that the interviewee must categorise the degree of their
agreement with each statement, in light of all of the other statements. As norms and values, and hence their interpretation, are particular to each individual, definitive exclusive groups cannot be created. We can however, as submitted by Stephenson (1935) create *clusters of subjectivity*, whereby individual perceptions can be collated and analysed. Risdon (2003) describes Q as a method of studying a population of view points, as opposed to a population of people. Walker Connor (1997: 33) submits that ‘identity does not draw its sustenance from facts but from perceptions, perceptions are as important or more than reality when it comes to ethnic issues’. Therefore, we need a methodology specifically designed to measure perceptions and preferences, not facts.

The Q sample derives from a broad review of the literature. Akin to the design of a questionnaire, a literature review is conducted, where about 500 - 800 questions usually emerge. These can be whittled down to about 100 – 150 as many questions are found to be either repeated or seek the same information. The research then subjectively identifies between 30 and 50 statements that are considered to be most relevant to the research question, just as would be done in a questionnaire. These statements do not have to emerge from a conceptual framework, but usually do have some theoretical rationale. Recall figs 6.3/6.4 which present the conceptual framework for this research: a respondent could theoretically define themselves according to one, or a number, of the theoretically existent representation perspectives outlined on these figures. The concourse for this research has been established around these theoretically existent characteristics.

79 Alternatively, if resources permit, the researcher could conduct a focus group or preliminary interviews with a sample of the population and use statements emerging from this process to formulate the concourse.
The next step is to print each of the statements on a separate piece of card and attribute each card a random number. These statements are now ready to be presented to the interviewee. One of the subtle differences between the questionnaire and the Q method should now be evident. The respondent will be able to see all of the statements (questions) that are attached to each of the theoretically derived positions simultaneously. The next step is to define the P-set (person set). The P set is usually numerically smaller than the Q set. The aim is to have four or five respondents agreeing with the same statements. Recall, we are more concerned with WHO the interviewees (P-set) are, than the quantity of interviewees. The next step is to define the distribution (See Fig. 6.5 below). Before conducting the interview, the researcher must decide on the range of the distribution of responses. This determines how differentiated the researcher wishes the responses to be. In some instances this can range from +5 to –5; (in my research I used a range of +3 to –3 as I felt a range of 7 points provided sufficient opportunity for respondents to satisfactorily differentiate themselves.) One final decision before conducting the interview must be taken: the researcher must also determine how many statements a respondent can place in each category. This does not have to be fixed but was in my research in order to guarantee a normal distribution. Brown (1980) found this restriction to have hardly any bearing on the results. As van Exel and de Graff (2005) submit – this is a practical, but not necessary, step. The Q sheet, Fig. 6.5, is now printed and ready to be presented to the interviewee together with the printed Q cards.
Once the Q-sample and the P-set have been identified, the interview process may begin. Interviewees are handed the Q cards and requested to place the cards into three categories – statements they tend to agree with, statements they tend to disagree with and finally statements they feel ambivalent towards. Interviewees may talk through their reasoning for putting a card in a selected category or refer to specific examples which aid the researcher in the data analysis phase. Once the interviewee has placed all of the cards into one of the three categories (agree, ambivalent, disagree), s/he then is asked to further sub-divide the cards into the seven categories as identified in Fig. 6.5. In the case of my sample s/he was asked to identify the four cards s/he most agreed with followed by the following six. The interviewee was then asked to do likewise with the disagree pile – identify the four statements s/he most disagreed with, followed by the following six. The interviewee is then asked to complete the remaining boxes, identifying a further eight statements that they find some way agreeable, and eight statements that they find in some way disagreeable, leaving ten statements in the...
neutral pile. The Q-sort is now completed. A semi structured interview followed where the interviewee were asked to reflect on certain choices. This process was supplemented with a simple Questionnaire in order to determine the primary (factual) characteristics of the interviewee – eg. Age range, gender, nationality, length of service, regularity of attendance at inter-departmental committee meetings, extent of contact with other officials etc...

The next phase is the data analysis phase. As previously outlined, Q Methodology can be described as an inverted factor analysis. This data analysis phase is assisted through a freely available software package: PQ Method. The correlation matrix of all Q-sorts is calculated (ie. The relationship between all of the responses). Principal Component Analysis is the most common factor analysis method. Factors are then rotated according to Varimax criteria (a statistical principle)\(^\text{80}\). Rotation does not distort the consistency in sentiment but shifts the perspective from which they are observed (van Exel and de Graff, 2005). A numerical representation of how closely each individual’s statements relate to the make-up of each factor is then determined (Factor scores). People with similar views weigh on the same factor. Factors in Q are collectives of respondents who share the same viewpoints. Those who possess similar views are said to belong to a factor. The word factor can be substituted with ‘typology’, ‘group’ or ‘cluster’, whichever the researcher finds most appropriate for the discipline. The meaning remains unchanged: a collection of individuals who placed the cards in a similar fashion and are therefore assumed to hold similar perspectives on a subject.

\(^{80}\) Factors can also be rotated manually.
A further qualitative element is now introduced into the research. The researcher must determine the Q sorts (individual’s perceptions) that weigh significantly on each factor. This is normally a straightforward process. Based on the factor analysis, the research determines what numbers are significant and what numbers are not in the make-up of that factor, paying close attention to negative scores as well as positive scores. The number of factors is then subjectively determined by the researcher. In my research two factors emerged in Belfast, while three emerged in Brussels. This means that in Belfast I perceived two distinct groups of individuals to emerge while in Brussels I perceived three distinct groups to emerge. A number of criteria for determining how many factors to proceed with have been suggested by Webler, Danielson and Tuler (2009: 31) and are reproduced here.

Table 6.1 Criteria for determining how many factors to proceed with

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<table>
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<tr>
<td>1. <strong>Simplicity:</strong> All else being equal, fewer factors is better, as it makes the viewpoints at issue easier to understand. Of course, simplicity should not be taken so far that you lose important and interesting information about differences in people’s views.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. <strong>Clarity:</strong> The best factor solution is one in which each sorter loads highly on one, and only one, factor. You should try to minimize the number of “confounders” (people who load on multiple factors) and “non-loaders” (people who do not load on any factor). If a few confounders persist, that indicates that those people have truly hybrid views.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. <strong>Distinctness:</strong> Lower correlations between factors are better, as highly correlated factors are saying similar things. Nevertheless, it is not necessarily bad to have high correlations, as long as the factor is otherwise satisfactory. It may be that two factors agree on many issues, but their points of disagreement are particularly important (e.g. if they disagree about a remedy that is being proposed as the next step at your site).</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. <strong>Stability:</strong> As you compare the results of using different numbers of factors, you will notice certain groups of people tend to cluster together. This is an indicator that those individuals really do think similarly. A good set of factors will preserve as many as possible of these stable clusters.</td>
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Once the number of factors or groups of respondents has been identified, the make-up of these groups can then be analysed. We can then see the individuals that share similar perceptions and more importantly, what these perceptions are. Thus the next phase is factor interpretation. Brown, Durning, and Selden (1998) suggest a threefold approach to interpret the factors. First, examine the composite Q-sort for each factor focusing on the statements individuals agreed and disagreed with most strongly (in my case, statements assigned the +3, +2, −3, −2 scores). Second, identify the common theme(s) underlying the distribution. Third, compare and contrast the factor with other factors revealed in the analysis (Selden et al, 1999).

To summarise, emerging from the Q method, researchers should pay particular attention to three aspects. All three aspects are numerically represented in the output sheet of PQ method. Firstly, the relationship between individual respondents and the typology: how closely aligned is each respondent to the typology. Secondly, how divergent (in terms of distance) are the typologies: in other words, how many statements do the factors disagree on. Finally, close attention should be paid to the nature of the statements that the respondents disagree on: while two factors may be statistically fairly similar, they may be divergent on one important aspect.

In this final paragraph I describe in greater detail some of the methodological processes particular to this research which should assist in the interpretation of the findings in the next section. As in Q the interviewees are now the variables and statements are the subjects, it is still important to have more subjects than variables: therefore the number of statements should exceed the number of Q participants. In this
study I present the results of 21 members of the Brussels bureaucratic elite and 19 members of the Belfast bureaucratic elite. (One of the Belfast interviews had to be discarded as I was not convinced the interviewee had given full attention to the process). I draw on 46 statements, or subjects. These are presented in table 6.6 in the annex, in the order they were presented to the participant. A descriptive overview of the personal characteristics of the interview sample is referred to in Chapter One (see Annex table 1.1). Suffice to acknowledge here that interviews were targeted on the basis of seniority of position, not perceived language, religious or national affiliation. As it transpired, eight Catholics, seven Protestants, and five of neither background were interviewed in Belfast. Seven identified themselves as British, five as Irish and eight as Northern Irish\(^{81}\). In Brussels, ten Dutch-speaking, eight French-speaking candidates and two bilinguals responded. Ten perceived themselves as Belgian in the first instance, three as Flemish, three as French-speakers, one as Dutch-speaking, one as Bruxellois and two with the EU. These national identities reaffirm that the bureaucratic elite possess very different nationalities in each city. A shared identity based on a nationality (Mengistu and Vogel, 2006) does not appear to have been achieved within these two contested environments. (The reasons why no such common national identity emerged is not investigated by this research.) As with references to interviewees throughout the dissertation, each interviewee was assigned a random number and is referenced accordingly.

\(^{81}\) I have maintained the N=20 for the (factual) descriptive data.
6.5 The findings

Are bureaucrats guided by elected political leaders of the city, by political leaders within their own community, by professional norms and values or are they entirely neutral? How do they see the role of government in society, and how do they feel when confronted with questions of equity over efficiency? Which bureaucrats are most likely to actively represent and what will they actively represent when they do so? Our conceptual framework and methodology have been inspired by these questions. To investigate responses to these questions, each city is examined in turn. The Q analysis has been conducted separately for each city to prevent city-specific factors skewing the results. This also provides a basis for further independent studies to be conducted in other contested environments. In each case the Q-sorts were entered into the software: PQ method, subject to Principal Component Analysis where the emerging matrix was then rotated using Varimax criteria (as previously outlined), revealing two factors in Belfast and three factors in Brussels.

Attention is first turned to Belfast where two fairly similar factors (F) emerged, indicating a high degree of cohesiveness and harmonisation of values within the administration. In Brussels, three quite distinct factors emerge. Each factor represents a conceptual template originating from where each respondent categorised the statements. Recall, factors are simply interviewees who share similar beliefs about a given subject. The diversity of the groups is represented in tables 6.2 and 6.3 below.
In Annex 6.4 (Belfast) and 6.5 (Brussels), the respondent is identified in the left hand column, while the remaining columns indicate how heavily each respondent weighs on each factor. Participants loading significantly on a particular factor placed the Q cards in a similar fashion and are now assumed to share similar norms and values. Recall that these perspectives that emerge are generalizations of attitudes held by individuals. They therefore permit direct comparisons of attitudes irrespective of the number of people who subscribe to them (McKeown and Thomas, 1988). It is indeed acknowledged that some respondents will be closer to this new central axis than others – i.e. that their loading on each factor differs. Factor weights are merged with the raw data to generate each of the factors identified in tables 6.4/6.5. The X denotes that the individual’s responses contributed to the composition of that factor. Put differently, the respondent of course shares some attributes of each category, however the respondent has more in common with one group than the other groups. How that same individual relates to each of the other factors can also be understood by looking at the other figures in the row.

Annex 6.6 identifies where each factor (or group of interviewees) placed the statements. We can see the prominence attributed to each statement by each group. For example, statement 17 indicates that factor one placed the Q-card in column three, or the ‘strongly agree’ category, while factor two placed it in column 0, or the ‘neutral’
category. In sum, tables 6.4 and 6.5 explain how each respondent contributes to the
definition/make-up of each of the factors (or how they come into being), while table 6.6
identifies the characteristics of each of our five factors. It is to these factors or ‘clusters’
or ‘groups’ or ‘typologies’ that we now turn. In order to cluster like-minded individuals
together, bureaucrats loading on a particular factor are now assumed to hold similar
beliefs, values and role perceptions. As eight statements correspond to each of our
representation points, this allows for cross comparison of representation statements.
Only five statements are attributed to each equity and efficiency and two to each side of
the ‘role of the state’ debate. Each factor is presented below in turn. At the beginning of
each factor definition a number of ‘key statements’ are presented. A graphical depiction
of the results is also presented in the annex. These are only intended as visual aids; for a
more complete understanding, and a comprehensive list of factor preferences,
reference should always be made to table 6.6. Throughout the findings section
reference is made to various statements presented in table 6.6 (statement number is
indicated in brackets), together with evidence from the interviews (Interviewee number
is identified as ‘Interview X’. For the following section it may be useful to have a copy of
table 6.6 from the annex to hand.

6.5.1 Belfast

Following rotation and analysis of various factor returns, two closely related factors
emerged from the Belfast results, indicating a high level of coherency in opinions, norms
and values within the administration (See table 6.2 above). It is found that eleven
respondents contribute to the make-up of factor one, while eight contribute to the make-up of factor two. While both factors share many views, let us first consider what differentiates them.

6.5.1a Factor One (Belfast)

Table 6.7: Key agree statements for factor one (See corresponding graphs 6.7a, 6.7b and 6.7c in appendix)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrators are not neutral. They should be committed to good management and social equity as values</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I recommend positions that I perceive represent the needs and interests of the entire urban public</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As I am involved in policy-making, it is my role to advance the needs of those less well off in society, regardless of their background</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I take initiative in proposing policies, mobilising support for these policies and questioning policies that may run counter to the general public interest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The best way to ensure efficient public service to the entire urban public is through public sector reform so that services may be provided equitably and efficiently by the public sector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In my daily work I value the views of international organisations such as the OECD, EU, World Bank, Policy-specific think tanks and NGOs etc</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Factor one have a good working relationship with the political actors within the city. While they do not substitute their own political values with those of the political elite (42), they perceive their actions to be legitimate as the political level agrees with their decisions and recommendations (22, 26). This factor however does not believe that resources should be allocated according to the wishes of the political level regardless of their opinions (7). Their role is not simply to advise the Minister (10) but to actively pursue positions they perceive to represent the interests of the entire urban public (11). When differences do emerge, they maintain their expert beliefs for as long as politically possible (40). While they do attribute importance to the neutrality of the bureaucracy, (28) neutrality is interpreted to mean that all urban citizens are represented by the
administration. This factor does not follow the rules of the administration under all circumstances (8). They are not overtly technocratic, accounting for political factors when making decisions (19). Administrators should not be neutral, but prioritise good management and social equity (17). They take the initiative in proposing policies, mobilising support for them and question policies that may run counter to the general interest of the urban population (36). The views of think tanks and international organisations such as the OECD and EU are held in high regard by this factor (41). Those weighing significantly on this factor actively advocate in favour of policy positions that they perceive represent the needs of the entire urban public (11), being the only factor to actively advocate in favour of policy positions that address the needs of minority citizens (3). Conflict management is a function for this factor – where differences exist, they see it as their role to mediate and determine a course of action that satisfies everyone (14).

This factor is not overly attached to a particular policy area (44), but instead represents a broader vision for the city. Equity commitments trump policy specific commitments among those weighing on this factor, (1, 31) particularly as they operate within a contested city (6). Equity between ethnic groups however should not be a determinant in resource allocation – just because one community is given a resource, this should not be a reason to give the other community the resource (20). This factor also possesses a concurrent commitment to efficiency (21, 2).

The legitimacy of their actions is derived from their responsibility to attain an equitable, fair and prosperous society – not the law, political direction, or their expert
beliefs. As indicated by the positioning of statements 38, 33, 18, 32, this factor believe in the public provision of state services and are open and committed to public sector reform. This factor disagrees most strongly with the idea of representing one’s community within the bureaucracy (24, 30, 35, 39, 43, 45, 46). A further noteworthy finding is the irrelevance the factor attributes to recruitment statements (2, 15). The following quotations from the informal interview with Q participants weighing significantly on this factor gives a further insight into the motivations, norms and values of this factor.

‘It is only when we bring things to the attention of the political level that they have influence’ (Interview 1)
‘There is an incapacity at the political level to deal with the more technical stuff’ (Interview 2)
‘I only present an options paper when cuts are to be political’ (Interview 4)
‘My area is quite technical…the political level rubber stamp my decisions’ (Interview 5)
‘I view my role as a coordinator…I put things in a framework in which they can agree’ (Interview 9)
‘My role is to steer them [political level] in the right way’ (Interview 12)
‘I have a broader view for the city, as opposed to a political view’ (Interview 15)
‘My role is to manage the decision-making process’ (Interview 17)
‘You have to do your homework before Council meetings…I build a relationship with Councillors so they may have confidence in me’ (Interview 19)

Those aligning themselves along this factor come from both communities in Northern Ireland. Three were from the Protestant community, while five had a Catholic community background. Three identified with neither community. Two felt British, Four Irish and Five Northern Irish. Five respondents had a degree and six held a Masters or higher qualification. Four were fairly attached to their religion; four were not attached, while a further three described themselves as not at all attached.
6.5.1b Factor Two (Belfast)

Table 6.8: Key agreement statements of factor 2 (See corresponding graph 6.8a, 6.8b and 6.8c in appendix)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In my daily work, I represent the elected government of the city</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My role is to carry out the wishes of the urban government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My decisions are legitimate as I follow procedures established by law and/or secondary legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracies should be staffed by professionally trained, technically competent individuals. The most qualified person should always get the job.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When there is a conflict of interest arises between the wishes of the urban government and my own expert beliefs, I automatically and unquestionably follow the wishes of the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I recommend or actively activate in favour of policy positions that I perceive represent the needs of the entire urban public.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Those aligning with factor two see themselves as representing government and see their role as to carry out the wishes of the urban government. Overall they are a more technocratic factor and are inclined to retreat to the evidence in order to persuade the political level to cooperate. Unlike factor one, when there is a conflict of interest between their personal, expert beliefs and those of the political level, they are more inclined to follow those of the political level (25). They are also the most likely factor to suppress their own values in favour of those of the political level (42). Similar to factor one however, they are rarely pressurised by elected officials to alter their expert recommendations or decisions (26). They see their role as to carry out the wishes of urban government (5, 12). While this factor is highly responsive to the political level, they do not simply provide advice to the political level (10). They aim for government that works better and costs less (21). They are against private sector provision of state services (8, 18), but are also less enthusiastic about public sector reform (38) and less concerned with directly representing the interests of citizens than factor one (33). They
are also attached to professional norms and values (11, 36, 40), however this factor possess simultaneous attachments to the political level.

While factor one actively pursue broader societal objectives, factor two are more technocratic. They attribute significant importance to their policy area (44). They tend to prioritise the goal of efficiency, providing technically feasible and efficient solutions to the political level (27). This is not to mean that they allocate resources according to technical criteria only (4). Political factors also need to be considered when taking decisions and making recommendations (19). While they disagree with affirmative action (2, 15), this factor are aware of the contested nature of the environment in which they work and like factor one involve themselves in conflict management, mediating between political differences (14). Unlike factor one however, as they operate within a contested city, resources should balance technical and demographic criteria (20). Efficiency is not always a priority (1). In terms of equity, they do not disproportionately represent minority groups (3). Neutrality is highly regarded by this factor (28). Unlike factor one, neutrality is seen more traditionally, being grounded in the law (13) and technocracy (2).

Together with factor one, factor two possesses a strong commitment to public service. They are however more rule bound; viewing public service in a supporting capacity to the political level rather than in an active capacity. Factor two similarly reject any possibility of actively representing their personal communities; their primary concern being to develop an efficient administration so as to be responsive to the wishes of the urban government (2, 21, 12, 5, 25). However, while they are responsive
to the political level, they also expect the political level to be responsive to them (7, 9, 40).

On our representation continua, factor two, while incorporating a commitment to professional ideas, can be found closer to the ‘political responsiveness’ and ‘neutral’ axes. Whilst taking into account the equity concerns of a contested city, this factor’s values lean more towards efficiency concerns. In sum, this factor are less likely to actively represent broader societal goals, and are more interested in actively developing a more efficient administration to carry out the wishes of the urban government. They are however significant stakeholders in the policy design process and significantly influence the outcome of public policy. Similar to factor one they can be described as ‘co-producers’, however they are more likely to seek out and represent the policy goals of the political level rather than broader societal goals. The following quotes from the informal interview support these findings:

‘If ABC is good for the economy but not a priority for the political level, I adjust it’ (Interview 20)
‘I meet with the political level to determine what their priorities are or knowing where they are at...I need to know what tactic to deploy’ (Interview 20)
‘When Councillors disagree I retreat to the evidence’ (Interview 18)
‘provided I show rational for decisions, I have no problems with Councillors’ (Interview 16)
‘Generally I like to give a recommendation to Councillors, if there are a number of options I will discuss it with individual Councillors before hand’ (Interview 16)
‘I keep the debate technical’ (Interview 14)
‘Our role is to inform, not to take decisions’ (Interview 7)
‘My role is to make sure they take a fully informed decision’ (Interview 8)
‘Primary value of the administration is neutrality’ (Interview 8)
‘There is always a technical basis for decisions’ (Interview 14)
‘Equity is so mainstream today, it is no longer a major concern’ (Interview 18)
‘We come up with a policy, test it and the political level endorse it’ (Interview 3)
Four Protestants, two Catholics and two from identifying with neither community weighed significantly on this factor. Four possessed a British identity, one an Irish identity and three possessed a Northern Irish identity. One held a degree while seven had a Masters degree or higher. Again four were fairly attached to their religion, while four described themselves as ‘not at all attached’. Once again we can see that a shared identity around a ‘nationality’ seems unachievable. As identified in table 6.3, both Belfast factors share many beliefs and perceptions of governance. Factor one however are motivated by their own personal goals and objectives, grounded in their technocratic expertise or broader social objectives. Factor two, while still actively involved in the policy-making process, try and ascertain and implement the goals of the political elite.

6.5.2 Brussels

Following rotation and factor analysis, three distinct factors emerged in our Brussels sample. Factors three and five, while evidencing similar ‘neutral’ characteristics, differ markedly in their role perceptions. Factor three are most likely to actively represent the organisation, factor five are the most politically responsive of all of our factors while factor four emerges as the most likely Brussels factor to actively represent a professional attachment. Nationality or language does not determine typology composition. However, as will become apparent, Brussels factors tend to be more open to representing their ‘co-ethnics’ in society.
Table 6.9: Key agree statements for factor 3. (See corresponding graph 6.9a, 6.9b and 6.9c in appendix)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>When a conflict of interest arises between the wishes of the political level and my personal expert beliefs, I pursue my expert beliefs for as long as politically possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public employees should aim for governance that works better and costs less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My decisions are legitimate as I follow procedures established by law and/or secondary legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My decisions are legitimate on the basis of my technical expertise and by the fact that I provide technically feasible solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I know what is legal, not what is right. I stick to what is legal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In contemporary social and economic affairs, technical considerations should be given more weight than political factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I represent the elected government of the city</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This factor can be described as the most ‘technocratic’ of all our factors. They are the staunchest defenders of the organisation. The rules of the bureaucracy are paramount in their daily work. This does not mean that resources should be allocated according to the wishes of the political elite (7), but that the law should guide resource allocation (13). In instances where there is a conflict between their considered expert (technical) position and that of the political level, they will not unquestionably follow the wishes of the political point of view, maintaining their expert opinion for as long as possible (40, 25). Their expert point of view is grounded in the rules of the bureaucracy. Decisions made are legitimised through law (13), and through their personal expertise (29), not through the political level (9, 22). They are the only factor to consider technical considerations more important than political factors in contemporary social and economic affairs (19), and define their roles accordingly (27). While indeed the most closely related factor to the Weberian ideal-type, they are also aware of the
consequences of their actions and will not follow the rules of the bureaucracy under all circumstances (8).

Driven by the goal of seeking public sector efficiency (21), this factor places most importance on maintaining the rules of the administration. Much of their focus is on ensuring the political level stay within their competencies and within the law. They are willing to stand against decisions made by the political level (40) if they believe them to be contrary to the law. This is their role as a bureaucrat. They stick to what is legal, not what is right (37). In line with the Weberian ideal-type, they do not represent their personal communities (24, 35, 45), nor are they concerned with equity considerations (1, 20, 31). However, as will become apparent, it is found that the Brussels factors disagree to a lesser extent with the idea of representing their own personal communities than their Belfast counterparts. In terms of our representation continua, this factor embodies a commitment to professionalism and to the neutrality of the bureaucracy. Efficiency takes precedence over equity. Efficiency is a necessary mechanism through which to better represent the public through a more effective organisation. The organisation, through its rules and procedures, serves the public. This factor could not be described as policy makers but are closer to ‘functionaries’. They are involved in policy implementation, and are not attached to a particular policy or social agenda.

To summarise, factor three are the most rule bound public servants: the law is given priority. There are no goals outside this. It is the job of the political level to have goals – correspondingly it is the job of the administration to ensure that all actors
involved in the governance process do so within the law. This group, while neutral, have no problem in questioning the political level if they perceive them to be acting outside their competencies. Considering our equity-efficiency continuum, factor one are firmly on the efficiency segment (1, 2, 4, 27). The following quotations from this group elucidate the primary values of this factor.

‘Sometimes the political level want us to act outside our domain of competence...they need to be told no’ (Interview 39)
‘I must make sure all subsidies are legal’ (Interview 37)
‘When a problem arises I let the political level know of all of the possible legal solutions and their consequences’ (Interview 36)
‘Political cabinets usually ask me to find a way to make it legal to give a subsidy to a person or business’ (Interview 34)
‘Sometimes political cabinets only think on behalf of third parties to which they are related...they need to be reminded of the law’ (Interview 34)
‘The administration must get the job done legally...we still only propose solutions...it is for the political level to take decisions’ (Interview 33)
‘I would often say to the political level, if you want me to do that change the law and I will do it then’ (Interview 33)
‘Neutrality is impossible...and even then it is probably not a good idea’ (Interview 37)
‘Politicians don’t know the rules...we must translate good ideas into practice’ (Interview 36)
‘As an expert I must also serve society [as well as the political level]’ (Interview 34)

Three French speakers and three Dutch speakers aligned themselves with this factor, two describing their nationality as French-speakers, two as Dutch-speakers (but not Flemish) while one respondent possessed an EU and another a Belgian identity in the first instance. Most noteworthy, each respondent was aligned with a cross-community administration. Two respondents were within the CCC while four were from the BCR administration. Five members of factor one have held their positions for over ten years.
Two felt very attached to their language group, three fairly attached and one was not at all attached.

6.5.2b Factor Four (Brussels)

Table 6.10 Key agree statements for factor 4 (See corresponding graph 6.10a, 6.10b and 6.10c in appendix)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
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<tr>
<td>Administrators are not neutral: they should be committed to good management and social equity as values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I recommend, or actively advocate, in favour of positions that I perceive represent the needs and interests of the entire urban public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I take the initiative in proposing policies, mobilising support for them and questioning policies that may run counter to the general public interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When a conflict of interest arises between the wishes of the political level and my personal expert beliefs, I pursue my expert beliefs for as long as politically possible.</td>
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</table>

Factor four possesses similar concerns about the influence of the political level. Akin to factor three, resources should not be allocated according to the wishes of the political level (7, 22). While factor three (above) also question the authority of the political level, they do so on the basis of the legality of the decision, not on the potential effects of the decision. Those weighing on factor four however are less concerned with the rules of the bureaucracy (8, 13, 37), and pay more attention to the effects of public policy on social cohesion (17, 31). Their relationship with the political level is the most difficult of all our factors (26), as politicians regularly disagree with their expert opinions. While their role is to carry out the wishes of urban government (5, 12), resources should not be allocated according to the wishes of the political elite, regardless of their [bureaucratic level] opinions (7). When a conflict arises between the bureaucratic and political level, they too will maintain their expert position for as long as politically possible.
possible (40), the important difference being this factors commitment to representing larger societal goals. Factor four is the only factor not to regard neutrality as a primary value within the bureaucracy (28). Similar to factor one in Belfast they are most likely to take the initiative in proposing policies, mobilising support for them and questioning policies that run counter to the general public interest (36). Their role is not to simply provide advice to the political level (10) but to actively advocate in favour of policy positions that they perceive represent the wishes of the entire urban public (11). This factor devises solutions that are technically feasible and efficient (27), seeking government that works better and costs less (21). Factor four is the only Brussels factor to indicate a willingness to involve itself in conflict management (14) and similar to factor one in Belfast, is influenced by think tanks and international organisations such as the OECD and EU (41). This factor agrees with more efficiency statements than equity statements. However, both equity and efficiency are both held in high regard (1, 6, 31, 17). However demographics or ethnicity should not be the basis for resource allocation (15, 20). As with all of the Brussels typologies, factor four are against any form of affirmative action (15, 2).

Factor four are further removed from the policy making process than they would like. Active representation of societal goals by the bureaucratic elite is therefore more difficult in Brussels than in Belfast. Those aligning themselves with this factor have a professional identity, and are driven by equity concerns. They try to involve themselves in the policy making process and see their primary role as to advance the needs of those less well of in society, regardless of background (31). Most noteworthy, this factor is not
averse to representing the wishes of the political representatives of their own personal communities (39, 45), nor are they averse to advancing procedures that would give their community greater access to public services (16, 30). In sum, this factor possesses a commitment to administrative efficiency but this is trumped by equity concerns. In terms of representativeness, they possess a strong professional identity; however of all our factors they are most likely to represent their own personal communities when necessary. The quotes below further describe the views of those weighing on factor two.

‘I don’t let the political level get involved with my administration without knowing about it first…I must know of any contact’ (Interview 21)
‘At the moment I have proposed four policies and they have all been accepted – this is unusual, my Minister has never been in power before’ (Interview 21)
‘the politicisation of the administration is often a problem, but always workable’ (Interview 24)
In the past it was a problem that the cabinet would contact my department without me knowing…it could happen again of the cabinet changed but at the moment it works well’ (Interview 25)
‘At the moment there is more experience in the administration than in the cabinet’ (Interview 25)
‘Their [political level] ideas are good but it is not possible to translate their ideas into practice’ (Interview 26)
‘Too many people have too many personal objectives...there is no teamwork’ (Interview 27)

One respondent identified with each a Brussels, Dutch-speaking and French-speaking ‘nationality’ respectively, while the remaining two saw themselves as Belgian in the first instance. Two had held their position for more than ten years while four held their position for less than ten years. Three felt ‘very attached’ to their language group while two described themselves as ‘fairly attached’.
6.5.2c Factor Five (Brussels)

Table 6.11: Key agree statements for factor 5 (See corresponding graph 6.11a, 6.11b and 6.11c in appendix)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I know what is legal, not what is right, I stick to what is legal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracies should be staffed by professionally trained, technically competent individuals. The most qualified person should always get the job.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My role is to carry out the wishes of the urban government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I believe that citizens needs are best advanced through directly putting their needs first</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When a conflict of interest arises between the wishes of the urban government and my own technical beliefs, I automatically and unquestionably follow the wishes of government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My role is to follow the rules of the bureaucracy no matter what the circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When a conflict of interests arises between the wishes of the political level and my personal expert beliefs, I pursue my expert beliefs for as long as politically possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources should be allocated according to the will of the political elite, regardless of my opinions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Those weighing significantly on factor five are more distant from the policy process than any of our other factors. While factor three possesses a professional identity which is grounded in the rules of the bureaucracy and factor four possesses a professional identity grounded in a commitment to social equity, factor five is the category least likely to actively involve themselves in the policy process (36, 11). Neutrality is perceived to be the primary value of the administration (28, 37, 23). Similar to factor three, they are guided by what is legal, not what is right (37), yet factor five go further being the only group to agree with statement 8: my role is to follow the rules of the bureaucracy no matter what the circumstances.

Contrary to the other factors however, those relying on factor three are most willing to accept the decisions of the political level – resources should be allocated according to their [political level] wishes and when there is a conflict of interests, they follow the direction of the political level (25, 7, 10). Statements 40 and 22 do indicate
some attachment to a professional identity; however our interest is in the outcome of situations where the political level and bureaucrat disagree. While factor five do act without political direction, when their decisions come into conflict with political level goals, factor five is most likely to follow the political level direction. This factor also differs from factor two (Belfast). While factor two see themselves as part of the decision making structures of the Council, this is not the case for factor five (12, 36). Factor five is also less inclined to involve itself in mediating political differences (14, 20), and are more grounded in the law (37). While equity in decision-making receives some consideration (1, 31), policy-making should be guided by efficiency concerns (2, 4, 15, 17, 27). As with the other Brussels factors, the use of quotas in recruitment is rejected (15) as this impedes the efficiency of the public provision of service (33, 38; 32, 18). This is the Brussels factor that rejects most strongly the belief that they should represent the interests of their own communities (16, 24, 30 35, 43, 46, 39, 45). The level of disagreement with these statements however is greater in both Belfast factors.

In sum, factor five possess more theoretically neutral attributes than factor three and are more responsive to the political level than factor three. While factor three will question the political level if they feel them to be acting outside the law, factor five is less inclined to question the political level. Factor five is closer to the efficiency axis than to the equity axis. They are closest to the political responsiveness and neutral quadrants of the representation web. This is not to say that these bureaucrats do not act independently of the political level. However returning to Meier and O’Toole’s (2006) use of the traditional definition for political control, this group are most likely to act in
ways that they otherwise would have done due to political level actions. The following quotes support this assertion.

‘Our minister has time for us...he has doubled our effectiveness’ (Interview 35)
‘My work concerns the application of the law’ (Interview 32)
‘We are functionaries; we do not involve ourselves in political questions’ (Interview 32)
‘In principle we prepare dossiers – we don’t govern, this is a political role’ (Interview 29) (response in reference to statement 21)
‘I have no political decisions to take’ (Interview 29)
‘Ministers today put less importance on the administration...they speak of good governance but never with us’ (Interview 28)
‘We empathise with the political level, if we think it wont pass we try and manipulate it so it will pass’ (Interview 22)
‘Decisions are only legitimate when you follow the law’ (Interview 22)
As no regional money is implicated in what we do in this department, I have a more scope than many of my colleagues...if the political level ask me to check an area I will’ (Interview 40)

Six of those lying on factor five described themselves as Belgian while the remaining respondent identified with the EU in the first instance. Three were French-speakers, two were Dutch-speakers and two described themselves as belonging to both linguistic communities. Two originated in the COCOF, two in the CCC, two in the BCR and one in the VGC. Three had held their positions for more than ten years, while four held their positions for less than ten years. This factor, in the questionnaire, described themselves as being ‘not attached’ to their linguistic communities.

6.6 Towards a convergence in role perceptions?

While five distinguishable typologies do emerge from our study, a number of core governance beliefs were held by all the respondents in each city. In Belfast two closely related factors emerge. We see that both factors agree with the principle that equity is
more important than efficiency (1, 6), however as outlined above, there is a marginal
difference in how equity is interpreted. Both factors have a strong commitment to good
governance (21). They are not willing to follow the rules of the bureaucracy under all
circumstances (8, 37); nor do they perceive their role as simply to provide input with
their expertise or to provide advice (10). Both factors see themselves as co-producers
within the policy process, providing technically feasible and efficient solutions (27). Both
factors also involve themselves in conflict management decisions, and consider
mediation between differing political viewpoints as a function (14). Neutrality and
impartiality are of paramount importance (27), but both factors differ on how the
concept is interpreted (17). In summary, while both factors are equally active in the
management of conflict, factor two are more likely to pursue the goals of the political
elite, while factor one are more likely to pursue their perceptions of societal or
professional/technocratic goals.

In Brussels, three distinct factors emerge, however once again some
commonalities of beliefs emerge. Contrary to Belfast, Brussels factors interpret their
role in a more technical manner (27). While some Brussels factors are more involved in
the policy making process than others (Factor 4), the generally held perception is that
bureaucrats provide advice and expertise to the political level – they do not make policy.
They are unanimous in their belief that the legitimacy of their actions does not come
from the political level (22). Factors differ however on why they perceive their decisions
to be legitimate. Factors in Brussels are more inclined to represent their own
communities than factors in Belfast (who completely reject the idea) (39, 45). Factors in
Brussels also unanimously disagree with the privatisation of public services (18) and are committed to public sector reform (38).

In summary, the Belfast factors are closer aligned than the Brussels factors. It is evident that bureaucrats in each city differ in their role perceptions – bureaucrats in Brussels interpret their roles in a more technocratic manner, they are more inclined to represent their own communities and are generally less ‘actively’ involved in the conflict management and policy-making process. In each of the factor descriptions we have seen that bureaucrats do actively represent. The Brussels bureaucrat does not completely reject the idea of representing his or her own community, however does possess a greater attachment to other preferences as indicated by the discussion of factors three, four and five. The aim of this chapter has been to determine the values guiding decision-making within the public administration so as to predict bureaucrat behaviour and understand conflict management\textsuperscript{82}. The typologies identified above provide an insight into the motivations of bureaucrats within two different consociational mechanisms of power-sharing and present a description of bureaucrat’s governance and representation perceptions. Nonetheless, the data allows for some cautious inferences to be made about typology composition. In other words, what bureaucrats possess these similar norms and role perceptions? As bureaucrats in Belfast and Brussels differ, does the conflict management mechanism cause this difference? In the following section I firstly provide a brief summary of the chapter findings and then proceed to examine the extent to which the conflict management mechanism determines these differences in

\textsuperscript{82} Further inferences can be made from the Q findings however I have limited the interpretation of the findings to answering the research questions as posed in Chapter One.
role perceptions. Can it be deduced that bureaucrats in more comprehensive forms of power-sharing have greater influence in the policy-making process than those in LCD mechanisms?

6.7 Inferences from the findings

This chapter has explored the attitudes and role perceptions dominating the politico-administrative axis for ‘without knowledge of the values held by the bureaucracy, it is futile to attempt any full determination of the degree of political control’ (Meier and O’Toole, 2006:29). It is this politico-administrative axis that most concerns our investigation into how conflict is regulated. As power-sharing emerges, the political-administration dichotomy is the primary determinant in the policy-making process. Our typologies give an insight into this dynamic process. While Meier and O’Toole (2006) investigate the bureaucracy-democracy relationship, my focus has been on the bureaucracy-conflict management relationship. Recall I put forward that typologies are the most conducive mechanism of explicating the existent dynamic relationships as they do not assume bureaucrats as a collective to behave in a particular manner. Consequentially, the different modes of bureaucrat-politician interaction can be identified and documented. The questions posed at the outset of this chapter were designed to help understand what bureaucrats will actively represent in instances where they have discretion. Recall I asked: are bureaucrats in power-sharing environments guided by the elected political leaders of the city, by political leaders within their own community, by professional norms and values, or are they guided by values of bureaucratic neutrality? How do bureaucrats see the role of government in
society, and how do they feel when confronted with questions of equity over efficiency? The research in this chapter has uncovered a number of important findings. First and foremost it has given an insight into how the public administration within two different types of power-sharing works. The traditionally faceless bureaucrat has been given an opportunity to convey the role of the bureaucracy in regulating conflict. While much has been assumed about the role of the bureaucracy, the bureaucrat rarely gets the opportunity to contribute to the debate. Secondly, active representation on behalf of a secondary learned identity can emerge in a contested society. Drawing on Meier and O’Toole’s (2006) research it is accepted that values affect behaviour. Akin to Meier and O’Toole (2006:93), the dissertation finds that certain groups within the ‘bureaucracy [are] acting consistently with [their] own values rather than being directed by electoral institutions’. However, their own values are not necessarily their primary identities. While indeed our factors are found to be involved in active representation, this active representation is grounded not necessarily in primary identities but active representation is found to exist on behalf of a secondary learned identity. The results also demonstrate that not all bureaucrats are inclined to actively represent. Two of our typologies indicated high levels of political responsiveness. Factors one and four are most likely to actively represent, and when they do so they represent what they perceive as the interests of society. Factor three was also seen to actively represent but instead of actively representing groups or ideals outside the bureaucracy, they were identified as actively representing the organisation. Thus active representation definitely exists within the contested society and that which is actively represented
varies between bureaucrats. In response to the second research question outlined in the introduction – a professional attachment can supersede a primary attachment and therefore guide bureaucrat behaviour within consociational forms of governance, be these bureaucrats operating within the lowest common denominator mechanism or within the more traditional comprehensive mechanism. It is also clear that a shared national identity has not emerged in our two cases; furthermore bureaucrats who do share an identity (in other words, weigh on same factor) do not share primary identities. However this finding begs the question: why do certain bureaucrats possess a secondary learned attachment? As the type of attachment varies in each of our two ‘most different cases’ of consociationalism, can the two different types of conflict management mechanism employed explain these variances? Quantitative correlations are not possible for such a small number of responses; however some indicative findings are presented by the research. While Q methodology measures individual perceptions and not those of entire populations, some inferences akin to those of Selden et al (1999) are suggested in the paragraphs below.

Approaching the typologies through both the analytical lenses of public administration and conflict management two interrelated themes emerge. What do the typology descriptions tell us firstly about policy-making and secondly about conflict management in each of our cases? Beginning firstly with our public administration lens, bureaucrats in Brussels have generally less of an involvement in the policy process than their Belfast counterparts. In Belfast both factors play an active role in policy-making. Factor one is found to actively propose policies that they personally feel attached to.
This is most often a professional attachment to either social equity or a policy area such as environmental management. Factor two also has a significant role to play in the policy process. While the goals of factor one come from their own personal attachments, those closest to factor two try and determine the goals of the political elite and try to implement them. In both Belfast factors the bureaucrat has more influence on policy making than their counter-parts in Brussels. When the Brussels results are contextualised within the findings of chapter four – Power-sharing ‘light’ – the reason for this difference is found not to be related to the conflict management mechanism. Power-sharing at the lowest common denominator should not influence the degree of bureaucrat involvement in the policy-making process. A more likely explanation is the gap between the elected representative and bureaucratic level filled by political ‘advisory’ cabinets. In Belfast five respondents met with the political level at least once a month, while in fifteen cases this was at least once a week. In Brussels however, contact with the Minister was usually a bi-annual or quarterly occurrence. Most interaction with the Minister was via the political cabinets which, as demonstrated in chapter four, reduced the ability of the bureaucratic elite to influence policy. Thus, this difference between our typologies, while explained by city-level variables, is not a result of the conflict management mechanism but more to do with how the mechanism is employed.

Our typologies also demonstrate a difference in their approach to conflict management. The Belfast factors identify mediating political level differences as one of

83 As identified in chapter four, these advisory cabinets consist of about 40 people directly appointed by the minister’s political party for the term of the government.
their primary roles. This is not seen as a role in Brussels. Contextualising these results within the findings of chapters three and four, a clearer picture of the two bureaucratic systems emerges. Bureaucrats in Belfast not only shape policy at every stage, but when they do so they consider the contested nature of the city, recommending policies accordingly. When looking at the role of bureaucrats through the conflict management lens in Brussels, bureaucrats are found to view their roles in a different light, perceiving themselves as implementers of policy. Conflict management is not directly a function of the bureaucrat. The bureaucrat does not take into account the contested nature of the city when providing advice – this is the prerogative of the political level. Again however this difference may not be due to the conflict management mechanism but due to the reduced ability of the bureaucrat to influence the decision-making process. This being said, the role of the bureaucracy in maintaining the power-sharing regime must not be underestimated. In Belfast this is done actively through the bureaucrat directly influencing policy. In Brussels the bureaucrat is strong enough to stand up to the political level when they act outside their competencies. Bureaucrats in Brussels are often cajoled by political cabinets to allocate funding to particular constituencies. While they do not have the same influence over the policy process, they are strong enough to rely on the law to stand up to the political level if they feel the political level to be acting outside their competencies. In a post conflict society, this is an important function. Almost every bureaucrat in Brussels referred to ‘ensuring the political level operated within the law’ as a primary function. Thus the bureaucrat in Brussels is found to be involved in the management of conflict, not through influencing policy but by ensuring
the political level operate within the legal power-sharing framework which they created. Thus far we have seen that bureaucrats operate differently in each city, both in terms of conflict management and public administration. The mechanism of conflict management in each city however is found not to explain these differences in role perceptions. Closer attention should also be paid to the role of recruitment mechanisms and typology alignment in future research. While chapter five found sacrificing the merit principle to attain passive representation to be unnecessary, no firm conclusions were made on the hypothesis that recruitment by ethno-linguistic quota assisted in the maintenance of primary identities. The evidence presented would suggest support for this hypothesis, however further studies are required to validate this assertion.

However policy level variables may not explain typology alignment; this could be explained by more sociological variables. As the Belfast typologies are similar, does this suggest the emergence or re-emergence of an underlying common identity among the population of Northern Ireland? Has the Good Friday Agreement provided the opportunity for this common identity to be more profoundly exposed? Further research briefs should take account of the research question ‘why do bureaucrats belong to particular typologies’? Such a study would need to be much larger in scale than this project.

6.8 Concluding Remarks

This chapter provides an insight into how governance structures are exploited and employed by the elite level bureaucrat. While numerous inferences have been made
from the research in the previous section it is important not to lose sight of the primary findings. Firstly, the bureaucrat may develop a secondary learned attachment to his/her profession, be this as a purveyor of social justice, a guardian of the laws or as an advocate of certain policies. These socially constructed attachments supersede primary attachments in both cities. By how much, and when, these primary attachments are superseded by secondary attachments differs in each city. Secondly, the bureaucrat in each city possesses a different relationship with the policy-making process. This is found to have more to do with the distance of the bureaucratic elite from the policy-making process than the governance or conflict management mechanisms employed.

It is not sufficient to examine bureaucratic structures but we must understand how these structures are exploited. Measuring norms and values of bureaucrats to predict bureaucrat behaviour has been acknowledged as a necessity by both qualitative and quantitative researchers. The innovative mixed methods approach adopted in this chapter departs from existing research, providing an insight into how bureaucrats behave within two types of power-sharing society. There is no need for bureaucrats to develop ‘national’ identities in order for them to possess shared beliefs or attachments. Indeed the study has highlighted the vastly different nationalities held by our respondents. Common governance and representation beliefs and perceptions can supersede, not replace, a primary attachment within the contested society.

Chapters three and four investigated the influence of the bureaucracy on conflict management and policy making in each of our cities. The focus of this chapter has been to identify the differing role perceptions of bureaucrats in both Belfast and Brussels,
adding to our understanding of how the bureaucrat perceives his or her role within the power-sharing society. The chapter has also developed a theoretical framework as well as applying an innovative methodology for investigating this research question. While the ability of the bureaucrat in Brussels to influence policy is less than that of the Belfast bureaucrat, the Brussels bureaucrat does possess a significant conflict management role. Further, contrary to expectations, bureaucrats in Belfast are less likely to represent their primary identities than those in Brussels. The dynamic nature of the political-administrative relationship within the power-sharing society has been highlighted. While much is assumed about the role of the bureaucracy within the conflict society, this chapter has given an insight into actual role perceptions within the power-sharing society: what happens after the political agreement so to speak. Bureaucrats within the power-sharing city are indeed a divergent cohort, yet preconceived images of the bureaucrat are challenged by this research. The findings suggest the emergence of three general types of bureaucrat-politician relationship across our two most different cases—one that is politically responsive, a second that represents the rules of the organisation, and a third group that seeks to advance their own social and economic visions of society.

This study is set within two successful power-sharing regimes. Doing so advances our understanding of how societies of different ethno-national/ethno-linguistic groups can coexist. The importance of the bureaucracy in maintaining power-sharing regimes is underlined. In each of our five typologies we have seen how different collectives of bureaucrats respond to their political elite, to the leaders of their own perceived ethno-
national/ethno-linguistic communities, to social and professional values and to other questions of governance such as equity and efficiency or the provision of services. The bureaucracy influences conflict management. While the bureaucracy does possess some common core governance beliefs, bureaucrats possess different role perceptions and therefore each bureaucrat cannot be expected to respond to a given set of circumstances in the same manner. In developing and understanding bureaucrat typologies we gain a greater insight into bureaucrat behaviour which in turn can assist in developing our understanding of how conflict is managed.
Conclusion: The bureaucracy, the bureaucrat and conflict management

7.1 Introduction

Does the bureaucrat have a role in sustaining power-sharing arrangements; and if the bureaucrat has a role, what guides or motivates the bureaucrat in instances of discretion? These questions are fundamental if we are to understand how conflict is regulated. Having explored in depth bureaucrat’s role and governance perceptions, and contextualised these preferences within the two distinct cases of consociational power-sharing, this chapter draws together some of the important findings from the research. Recall the purpose of this dissertation has been to examine the role of the bureaucratic elite in assisting to sustain conflict management in instances where differing ethnic groups manage to actually coexist. The findings therefore contribute to our understanding of how societies considering consociation as a form of power-sharing could function. Drawing together two areas of scholarly research within political science and public administration – political control literature and bureaucratic values literature – a more comprehensive picture of the bureaucracy within the power-sharing society has been created. This public administration/political science lens has highlighted the importance of developing administrative capacity to the conflict management process. This lens has been used to view two different conflict management strategies. In response to the two primary research questions, it is found that the bureaucrat
influences the success of power-sharing and that the bureaucrat can possess significant levels of discretion within the policy making process. Further, how a bureaucrat employs this discretion is not necessarily determined by his or her primary ethno-political background. In arriving at this conclusion six substantive findings important for conflict management research emerge from the study. In addition to these conflict management findings, it is also proposed that the findings and methodologies employed throughout this research should provide indicative for hypothesis generation and research design within two further bodies of literature: comparative European public administration and urban governance research. Before expounding upon these findings let us first contextualise the present study within the wider conflict management research referred to throughout the dissertation.

7.2 Overview of the findings

Divided cities are indeed unique entities. Not only are these contested societies distinct from more cohesive societies, but contested societies also differ from each other. The physical separation of Nicosia differs from the more psychological divide in Mostar. The national/linguistic contestation in Kirkuk differs from the largely sectarian contestation in Beirut. Contested societies also differ in that many are at different stages of conflict; Scott Bollens (2008) describes Jerusalem and Kirkuk as being combustible, Belfast and Sarajevo as fragile, while Brussels and Johannesburg are described as sustainable. These categorisations, together with a similar continuum he presents earlier in 200784, (see

84 See Bollens (2007) which describes Belfast as ‘moving towards peace’.
Fig. 1.4) provide a valuable starting point for exploring the more macro questions of divided cities and societies – why are some cities in the combustible category and others not? This dissertation has investigated how cities can manage to stay within the sustainable category, or as Varshney (2002) terms it – learning from ethnic peace. A brief examination of the cities in the more successful categories indicates that no two conflict management solutions are completely identical. In addition, the system of conflict management adopted in each society does not determine how successful conflict management will be. Greater emphasis needs to be placed on how the conflict management mechanisms are actually employed. Further research into the design of governance structures is indeed required, however it is equally as important to determine how bureaucrats within each city will respond to a set of given structures. The results presented above demonstrate that even in instances where the governance structures are similar, their effects on bureaucrat behaviour, and subsequently on conflict management, are different. Closer attention to how these conflict management mechanisms are actually employed is required. Evidence of this is provided in chapter four. A city’s categorisation as successful does not mean its governance structures are conducive to conflict management. While indeed Brussels may be (accurately) described by Bollens (2008) as sustainable, it is in spite of how the conflict management mechanism has been implemented, not because of it.

At the outset of the dissertation it was submitted that conflict management mechanisms range from the domination mechanism, as was the case in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, to various forms of power-sharing which may further be broken down
into various forms of consociationalism, as in the two cases presented here. No matter what political design consociationalism takes, political level decisions need to be implemented. This is the traditional role of the public bureaucracy. Research within the uncontested society leads us to believe that the bureaucratic elite are not simply ‘implementers’, but are actively involved in the policy process – what is the case within the consociational society? While the bureaucrat may not have a significant role under domination or authoritarian mechanisms of conflict management, this research has demonstrated that the bureaucrat has an important role in sustaining power-sharing mechanisms of conflict management. While the extent of this influence is in part determined by how the conflict management mechanism is implemented, evidence from the two cases suggests that a robust bureaucracy is a necessity if power-sharing systems are to be sustained. If cities such as Kirkuk and Mostar are to choose the consociation mechanism of conflict management, they will need to get the design of the public administration right. While they may choose alternate forms of power-sharing with alternate governance structures, the findings demonstrate that in both Belfast and Brussels the bureaucrat has played an important role in managing the conflict. The principles of good governance remain more or less steadfast across contested societies, however the research has identified that bureaucrats possess differing role perceptions and in turn interpret these principles differently. Every one of the bureaucrats interviewed as part of this project demonstrated a passion for public service. How they translated this passion differed within each administration and within each city. While no concrete conclusions have been put forward as to why certain bureaucrats share
governance and representation perceptions, it is evident that primary identities do not determine typology alignment. Further, while bureaucrats working within an administration often share numerous role and representation perceptions, these similarities are not sufficient to support the hypothesis that institutional structures determine behaviour.

In summary, if we are to understand why some societies manage to peacefully coexist and others do not, we need to work on establishing causation – what causes power-sharing arrangements to succeed? Indeed politicians, the judiciary and law enforcement agencies all contribute to the sustaining of power-sharing arrangements. The results of this research demonstrate that those involved in designing solutions within the contested society, need also however to attribute greater importance to developing administrative capacity, paying closer attention to the bureaucrat rather than simply focusing on bureaucracy structures. Developing administrative capacity is not simply a condition for good governance once political power-sharing has been established – it is also a key tenet of the conflict management process. Both the academic and practitioner alike can learn a lot from the governance experiences of Brussels and Belfast. Put differently, the argument that emerges from this research is that the bureaucracy in the power-sharing society influences not only the quality of governance but also the conflict management process. Elite level bureaucrats within the power-sharing society are found to possess (various levels of) discretion. The research has also investigated how this discretion is exercised. It is found that bureaucrats develop secondary, learned attachments and in some cases these are actively
represented. What is actively represented differs among bureaucrats. Primary background does not influence typology alignment. Further there is no concrete evidence to confirm a correlation between the level of involvement of the bureaucrat within the policy process and the institution or the conflict management mechanism. As outlined in chapter six, bureaucrats in Belfast are more involved in the policy process, this however is not determined by the conflict management mechanism but by how the mechanism has been employed. The conflict management mechanism may however explain the bureaucrat’s representation perspectives.

The research has responded to calls in the literature to seek to explain conflict management through the study of ethnic peace rather than perpetually studying ethnic conflict. Chapter two provided a comprehensive review of the state of the art of academic research into the role of the elite level bureaucrat within the contested society. A number of research questions emerged from this literature review. Chapters three and four drew on these emerging research questions, outlining the environment in which the bureaucrat acted within two instances of ethnic peace. Chapter five insured that the conditions for disproving the hypothesis were met in each city – ie. that the traditional out group comprised a sufficient proportion of the bureaucracy in order to potentially actively represent their primary identities. To investigate this, the chapter addressed an often debated issue in conflict management research – the physical appearance of the bureaucracy within the power-sharing society – passive representation. The chapter found that a passively representative bureaucracy could be achieved within a contested society without the need for community quotas. However it
was also argued in the literature review that passive representation itself was not a necessary condition for active representation. Do bureaucrats really represent their primary identities, or have they through time, education, social and work experiences developed greater secondary attachments? Chapter six therefore investigated the second of the primary research questions – how is bureaucratic discretion employed within the contested society? What attachments or identities are actively represented by elite level bureaucrats? The motivations and role perceptions of bureaucrats in both cases found it possible that bureaucrats would adopt, and in some cases actively represent, a secondary learned attachment.

*Key finding one: The bureaucracy is understudied in conflict management literature. Representative bureaucracy is a useful approach in understanding how bureaucracies work.* While the importance of the bureaucracy in enhancing the quality of governance is well researched within the literature, the contribution of bureaucratic structures and the role of bureaucrats themselves in sustaining the conflict management process remain understudied. Attention within the conflict management literature is often focused on the effects of poor governance, leaving the role of the bureaucracy in sustaining conflict management less understood. While many academics have suggested increasing the role of government agencies in conflict management, little is known about how the bureaucracy would behave under such circumstances. It is the bureaucracy that either provides or facilitates public service provision within the modern state. How the bureaucracy functions under consociation conditions is of great importance if we are to understand how the process actually succeeds. Approaching
conflict management from a public administration perspective advances this understanding. It is not only important to understand what governance structures are theoretically most conducive to conflict management; an understanding of how these structures will be manipulated by the bureaucrat will provide for a more accurate prediction of bureaucrat behaviour.

Representative bureaucracy is a useful lens through which to examine how the bureaucratic elite will employ/exploit governance structures. While there have been numerous approaches to developing an understanding of administrative reform within both contested and uncontested societies, the theory of representative bureaucracy provides the most useful lens through which to predict bureaucrat behaviour. As identity guides behaviour, bureaucrat role perceptions determine how governance structures actually function. Recall it is not the structures themselves that determine how conflict is managed, but how these structures are employed. Since being pioneered by Kingsley in 1944, the theory of representative bureaucracy has developed considerably. Studies of public administration within the contested society must not only examine passive representation, but also must determine who bureaucrats actively represent. Passive representation does not always equate with active representation. A bureaucrat may develop secondary socially constructed norms, which in turn may supersede a primary identity. Only when we understand bureaucratic behaviour and motivations will we gain an understanding of governance within the power-sharing society.
The methodology designed to investigate core beliefs and individual motivations is therefore central to this type of research question. Standard questionnaires, while informative in ascertaining information, are less robust in determining motivations and values. For this reason, a method was introduced to conflict management and comparative public administration research from psychology. The dissertation has argued that Q methodology is more successful in determining and describing norms and values than more traditional methodologies such as Likert scales or the semantic differential method. Recall that Q allows for the generation of various typologies of bureaucrat-politician interaction that actually exist. Typologies are more useful in understanding the workings of an organisation as they do not suggest one model of interaction but allow for a number of interaction models to simultaneously exist within an organisation. These in turn are more reflective of real world relationships. The argument in favour of Q methodology is also targeted at comparative public administration and European integration research where much of the research relies on norms and values to determine bureaucrat allegiances to say the Council, Commission, a policy area or a nation-state. Q methodology could be used in such circumstances to investigate the motivations of bureaucrats. To summarise, the role of the bureaucrat in the conflict management process is under researched. The theory of representative bureaucracy and Q methodology both provide appropriate conceptual and methodological approaches for furthering academic research into the contribution of the bureaucrat to the governance process and subsequently to conflict management.
Key finding two: The bureaucracy and the bureaucrat influence the policy-making and conflict management processes. This extent of this influence differs in each city but is not explained by the conflict management mechanism. The bureaucrat is found to influence resource allocation, decision-making and conflict management – however indicative findings suggest the extent to which the bureaucrat is involved in the policy making process is not explained by type of conflict management mechanism (Belfast: comprehensive and Brussels: LCD) or institution variables (Belfast, VGC, COCOF, CCC, BCR). Let us firstly take the type of conflict management mechanism as the explanatory variable. In Belfast, the bureaucracy is found to influence the decision-making process, particularly in traditionally divisive policy areas. Contextualising both Belfast typologies within the research of chapter three we see that the bureaucrat in Belfast has a significant mediating role. The bureaucrat is also involved in proposing policies, suggesting reforms and questioning policies that run counter to the general public interest. The bureaucrat in Belfast is actively involved in policy-making and plays an active role in the management of conflict. Bureaucrats, relying on the law and operational norms, influence the policy process. To claim that bureaucrats behave completely independent of the political elite however would be erroneous. They do not act with complete independence of the political level. While the bureaucrat controls the process, the bureaucrat operates within a power-sharing political agreement and behaves accordingly. The bureaucrat under domination mechanisms of conflict management acted as a preserver of the status quo, the bureaucrat under power-sharing too remains a preserver of the status quo. Preserving power-sharing in Belfast
however requires much greater bureaucratic activity than preserving domination/hegemonic mechanisms of conflict management. Conflict management is therefore a function of the Belfast bureaucracy. This involves mediating political level interests. The bureaucrat controls the policy-making/decision-making process, but does so within the existing political realities. A symbiotic relationship therefore exists between the political and bureaucratic level in Belfast. Once the political level agreed that they wished to work together, the role of the bureaucratic elite in Belfast increased in order to facilitate the political level cooperation. While both Belfast typologies differ in their motivations, they are both found to significantly influence both the policy-making and conflict management process.

In chapter six, three typologies emerged in Brussels. Contextualising these typologies within the findings of chapter four we find that the bureaucrat in Brussels is not as involved in the policy-making process as the Belfast bureaucrat. This however is not a direct result of the conflict management mechanism but due to bureaucrat’s distance from the policy-making process. Typically, bureaucrats in Brussels would meet with their Minister binaurally or quarterly. The role of supporting the Minister is not filled by the bureaucracy but with politically appointed cabinets. Bureaucrats in Brussels possess a more ‘functionaire’ identity and view their roles accordingly. Conflict management is generally not a function of Brussels bureaucrats. The bureaucrat however has an implicit role in the management of conflict. In general the bureaucrat in Brussels attributes a lot of importance to the law in their daily work. While the trait is strongest in factor three, it is not absent in other factors. The bureaucrat prevents the
political level from allocating resources outside the legal framework. While this function may be taken as given within the uncontested society, within the contested society, the absence of such role perceptions would have greater ramifications. Without such role perceptions resources could be allocated according to the political level over representing their electorate, which within the contested society usually means along ethno-political lines. This in turn can have a negative effect on conflict management. Hence a bureaucracy that is strong enough to stand up to the political level exists in Brussels, which in turn ensures that resources are allocated according to legislative criteria. As summarised by one Brussels interviewee: Politicians have the power to change the law – if they want to allocate resources in a way that is currently illegal – they should change the law! (Interview 33) While bureaucrats in Brussels differ from those in Belfast in terms of the nature and level of involvement in the policy-making and conflict management process, neither the city nor the type of conflict management mechanism are the sole causes of this difference in role perceptions. Contextualising the findings of chapter six (the typologies) within chapters three and four, this difference is explained by how the conflict management mechanism has been implemented and the corresponding distance between the bureaucrat and the politician.

Turning now to the institutional explanation for typology formulation, indicative findings suggest that bureaucrats belonging to the same institution possess some similar representation and core governance perceptions, but this is not necessarily to mean an attachment to the institution. As also found in chapter six, both Belfast typologies shared a large number of characteristics (measured by table 6.2, quantifying the
differences between both factors). Despite the large degree of shared perceptions among Belfast respondents, bureaucrats in Belfast differed in their motivations. In Brussels, most bureaucrats belonging to factor four belonged to the VGC, while the bureaucrats in the other factors belonged to the three remaining institutions. However, bureaucrats within the VGC also shared a number of role and governance perceptions with factor one in Belfast. While further conflict management research should consider the influence of the institution on bureaucrat norms and values, this research does not find adequate support for the institution determines typology alignment hypothesis. In summary, it is found that the bureaucrat in each of the cases actively contributes to the sustaining of the conflict management process. However the role and behaviour of the bureaucrat within each city and in each institution differs considerably.

Key finding three: Active representation on behalf of a ‘professional attachment’ or ‘professional mentality’ can supersede primary attachments within the bureaucracy of a contested city. The research finds that a number of bureaucrats in both cities are motivated by secondary, socially constructed norms and values. This is termed a professional attachment or mentality. Recall from chapter six that a professional attachment is not to mean that a bureaucrat is professional in his/her job but rather that he/she is attached to a professional set of values such as free trade, tax harmonisation, green policies or particular social policies. While primary attachments are stronger in Brussels than in Belfast, these primary attachments are nonetheless superseded by professional norms and values in both cases. Thus within the power-sharing society active representation does indeed exist, however this is not necessarily
on behalf of a primary ethno-national/ethno-linguistic identity but, among certain
bureaucrats, on behalf of a learned professional identity. Further, active representation
is not exclusively a minority activity – it is as likely to exist among the majority
population within the contested society.

While it has been suggested in the literature that a common ‘national’ identity
could supersede these tribal affiliations, this dissertation has argued that in an
environment where demand is high and resources are limited, instances where both the
national and the ethnic/tribal identity could collide would be frequent. Following Meier
and O’Toole (2006) and Keiser et al (2002), under such circumstances, the bureaucrat
would then be expected to revert to his/her primary tribal identity. The results from this
research found bureaucrats within each city not to share a nationality (see Fig.1.1). The
research has demonstrated that a secondary learned professional attachment can
supersede a primary identity and it is put forward that attachments along professional
lines should be more sustainable than those built along the dubious notion of
nationality. The opportunity for an attachment to a professional set of principles to
directly conflict with one’s primary identity is less likely. While a mutual existence of a
national and tribal identity would be difficult, attachment to regulatory reform
principles or to improving social cohesion or to poverty alleviation should not directly
conflict with a primary (ethno-linguistic/national) attachment. Capacity building should
therefore not require nation building or a national identity among bureaucrats in order
for shared values to emerge.
While a collective attachment has emerged, this is not to suggest the emergence of epistemic communities (communities of experts). While bureaucrats in factors one and four are ‘experts’ in their policy areas and are motivated accordingly, there is no evidence to suggest this expertise causes them to share an identity. These attachments need not necessarily be the same – ie. a bureaucrat who sees his primary function to advance green issues and a bureaucrat who sees his primary function to advance the quality of social integration are both motivated by secondary professional ideas; both therefore weigh on the same typology (recall F1 Belfast and F4 Brussels were the two typologies most likely to actively represent professional attachments from outside the civil service). For this reason, the research does not demonstrate the emergence of communities of experts.

This professional attachment is strongest in factors one and four. Bureaucrats weighing on factor three also actively represent but they are found to actively represent the bureaucracy (institution) itself. Factor five are the most acquiescent to the wishes of the political level of all our factors. However, factor four and three in Brussels possess a latent attachment to their primary identities. This may in part be explained by the conflict management mechanism. While factor three do disagree with representing their primary identities, they do not do so as much as their Belfast counterparts. This suggests that in instances of ethno-linguistic importance bureaucrats in typologies F3 and F4 could potentially revert to representing their primary ethno-linguistic identities. While these attachments are indeed superseded by professional attachments, a significant number of Brussels bureaucrats maintain a primary attachment within the
workplace. The conflict management mechanism may explain the maintenance of this primary identity: In Brussels two of the four institutions are designed specifically to provide service through one language only. Recruitment within the remaining two institutions is by ethno-linguistic quota. These features may influence bureaucrat representation perceptions. The Brussels conflict management mechanism may be found to encourage the maintenance of a primary identity at a subliminal level.

In summary, I find that secondary learned attachments, not necessarily to the institution but to other social and professional objectives, to supersede a primary ethno-political attachment among a number of bureaucrat elite in both cities. This is strongest in factors one and four, but not absent on other factors. Bureaucrats in Belfast however are more likely to reject the idea of representing their personal communities than their Brussels counterparts. This finding therefore rejects the hypothesis that the external environment causes increased representation on behalf of a primary identity and tends to accept the hypothesis that the model of power-sharing in Brussels, while successful, serves to maintain latent primary identities.

**Key finding four:** Power-sharing at the lowest common denominator is a viable alternative for societies considering total separation or comprehensive power-sharing as forms of conflict management. While the traditional comprehensive mechanism of power-sharing may be more familiar, an alternative mechanism of consociationalism has nonetheless been successful in Brussels. The lowest common denominator mechanism provides a viable alternative to the more common comprehensive mechanism of conflict management. While there is much to be learned from the
Brussels experience, chapter four demonstrates that power-sharing at the LCD is not just theoretically plausible, but practically possible. The problem identified in Brussels is not with the mechanism of power-sharing, but with how the mechanism has been implemented. Greater consideration to how various conflict management mechanisms are to be implemented is required, especially if highly regulated mechanisms such as the LCD are to be employed. Mechanisms to ensure joined-up governance, even within such conflict management solutions, must be established. If conflict management processes are to be successful they rely on the quality of governance decisions. Quality decision-making is not possible if bureaucrats do not make decisions within the context of the contested society. Greater cooperation among the Brussels bureaucratic elite is therefore required if the conflict management mechanism is to be successful as a long term governance solution.

**Key finding five: Quotas are not necessary for a passively representative bureaucracy.** In addition, passive representation does not cause active representation. If bureaucratic elites are seen to be either motivated by social equity or administrative efficiency concerns, or are politically responsive, does this make the question of passive representation redundant? The findings support no such assertion. To once again paraphrase Reissman (1949), it is the surrounding social milieu and the social constellations to which we belong, that affect individual norms, beliefs and values. (Recall we cannot determine what social constellations have most influence in determining typology alignment). The surrounding social milieu of the bureaucrat in Belfast and both the CCC and BCR in Brussels is multi-religious/multi-lingual/multi-
‘national’. While an ethno-political’s group may, under certain circumstances, be represented by members of that group in Brussels, this cannot be said of Belfast. Bureaucrats in Brussels (most specifically factor four) therefore lends support to Meier and O’Toole’s (2006) research where it is found that ethnics within the bureaucracy are more likely to represent their co-ethnics in society in instances of ethno-political importance. However as later found by Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2006) an increase in the number of female police officers also corresponds with instances of reported rape by women. They were not able to establish whether this was because women were directly advancing the concerns of women; or if through socialisation with their female counterparts, male norms, values and attitudes had changed which meant that men also took forward such cases. At the same time, Lim (2006) found that the representation of minorities and women increased with passive representation as minorities and women changed the norms and values of their white male counterparts, and hence the entire organisation. In the case of Belfast (most specifically factor one), Lim’s (2006) findings are supported by this research: I find that it is not Catholics who represent the interests of Catholics; nor do Protestants represent the interests of Protestants, but that attitudes, norms and values are shared. The findings therefore indicate that passive representation can increase representativeness of the traditional minority, not through direct representation but through the emergence of shared values among the bureaucratic elite. However the results presented above demonstrate that there is no causal relationship between passive and active representation. Passive representation
will not lead to active representation on behalf of a primary identity, or for that matter a professional or organisational identity/attachment.

Taking this finding further, Grissom et al (2009) found that context matters: Blacks in Southern (American) states were more likely to actively represent their counterparts in society than Blacks working in Northern (American) states. If this were to be true in our cases we would expect representation of a primary identity in Belfast to be greater than that of Brussels, due to the more hostile environment in which the bureaucracy is set. However the antithesis is the case. Hence within our two cases of consociationalism, the external environment has not encouraged increased active representation on behalf of a primary identity. In both cases, for a group’s interests to be represented, (be this directly by ones co-ethnics or indirectly by the development of shared norms) that group needs to be represented at the elite level. It must therefore comprise at least part of the surrounding social milieu in order to influence it.

Despite the necessity for passive representation, chapter five found that within a heavily contested society, a passively representative bureaucracy can emerge without the necessity for quotas. Policy makers and advisers would therefore do better to treat the reason as to why the bureaucracy was patently unrepresentative vis-à-vis treating the symptom. Quotas are not necessary in order to achieve a passively representative bureaucracy. The merit principle need not be sacrificed in the name of achieving significant representation of the out-group. However it must be reiterated that passive representation is not a sufficient aspiration in all circumstances. In cases such as

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85 As supported by Bollens in his description of Belfast as ‘fragile’ (2008) and ‘moving towards peace’ (2007) vs. Brussels as ‘sustainable’ (2008)
Brussels, the traditional out-group (Dutch-speakers) requires disproportionate representation. In such circumstances, quotas may indeed be required. While chapter five finds no evidence against quota systems of recruitment, it does find that quotas are not a necessity in order to attain passive representation, should this be a sufficient objective.

**Key finding six:** Bureaucrats differ in their interactions with the same structures and the primary background of the bureaucrat does not determine typology alignment. The study has found bureaucrats to interpret their roles differently and that they have differing perspectives on governance and representation. Thus any aspects of the Belfast or Brussels institutional/structural design that are to be transposed to other societies, will be in turn employed/exploited according the norms and values of the bureaucrat within the host state/society (as is well documented in policy transfer/learning literature). Further, within this host society, bureaucrats will differ in their role perceptions and how they operate within the governance structures. While it is necessary to understand the structures that assist differing ethno-political groups to peacefully coexist, this research has demonstrated that bureaucrats possessing similar primary identities interact with governance structures and interpret their roles differently. This difference in role perception has no correlation with the primary background of the bureaucrat.

**Theoretical and empirical contributions: summary of the findings:** This dissertation contributes to four bodies of literature. While the majority of the findings speak to conflict management and public administration research, the findings also have
implications for European governance and urban governance research. In terms of conflict management literature, the role of the bureaucrat in maintaining the power-sharing process is substantial. Evidence from Belfast indicates that the bureaucrat emerges as a primary regulator in the conflict management process of the city. The bureaucrat is also involved in conflict management in Brussels, but the role is less prominent. While the bureaucracy did not instigate the change in governance mechanism, the administration contributes significantly to sustaining the power-sharing process. The role of the bureaucrat has hitherto been underestimated in conflict management research. It is found that within emerging power-sharing societies, there is no need to sacrifice the merit principle in order to attain a passively representative bureaucracy. While scholars may still disagree on the necessity of passive representation within the contested society, if it is deemed a necessity, this dissertation has demonstrated that it need not be at the expense of the merit principle. Nonetheless, in some societies such as Brussels, passive representation is not sufficient for the traditional out-group. In these cases quotas may still be required to guarantee a disproportionate representation of the traditional minority. Finally, chapter four demonstrated that power-sharing need not be comprehensive to be successful. While there are many public administration problems within the Brussels system of conflict management, these problems are with the implementation of the power-sharing system. The problems identified in this analysis do not relate to the system itself. Societies considering total separation or federalisation may still consider the Brussels example as an alternate solution (in terms of administrative design).
Secondly, the dissertation contributes to public administration literature. As demonstrated in Chapter three (Belfast) and supported by Chapter four (Brussels) the bureaucracy will always support the status quo. The bureaucracy is not the instigator of change. This occurs at the political level. However, for the bureaucrat to support the status quo within power-sharing societies, the bureaucrat becomes more involved in the policy and political process. Further, the dissertation contributes to the body of ‘representative bureaucracy research’ within public administration literature. While active representation on behalf of a primary ethno-national (or racial or gender) identity is acknowledged to exist in representative bureaucracy research, active representation on behalf of a secondary learned identity is less so. While certain studies have examined the emergence of a management ideology and shared values among bureaucrats, testing these questions within a contested society provides a robust case study. Within a contested society, primary attachments are presumed to be at their strongest. Hypotheses on bureaucrat attachments are therefore most robust and clear enough to be proven wrong within these contexts (Sabatier, 2000: 138). Within the two case studies bureaucrats primary attachments were superseded by secondary attachments. While Brussels respondents were more inclined to maintain primary identities, these identities were superseded, not replaced, by professional attachments. However in line with Meier and O’Toole’s (2006) and Keiser et al’s (2002) criteria for measuring a bureaucrats representation activities, the case must involve the contested issue – ie in Brussels it is the actions of the bureaucrat within issues pertaining to policies incorporating a linguistic dimension. In the case of Brussels, bureaucrats show a greater
propensity for representing their primary identities in these situations. Contrary to hypothesised expectations, in Belfast bureaucrats clearly disassociated themselves with the idea of representing their primary identities and have developed secondary professional attachments. It would be expected that in Belfast, in such circumstances the bureaucrat would not represent his or her primary identity.

Contributing to European governance literature, I suggest that Q Methodology is a useful tool in comparative public administration, especially for the large body of research focused on determining the core values of European Commission and Council officials as a mechanism of predicting behaviour and determining policy-making processes. While the development of a technocratic mentality (Radaelli and O’Connor, 2009) has already been researched within European integration and comparative public administration research, the use of Q-methodology has not yet been employed in investigating such research questions. Further research questions designed by Checkel (2003) and Hooghe (2005) are designed specifically to determine bureaucrat role perceptions. Q methodology can assist in this process. The methodology is well suited to measuring bureaucrat perceptions on given subjects and is adept at clustering like minded respondents together. Gornitzka and Sverdrup’s (2008) and Beyers’ (2005) research investigates where bureaucrats get their cues: from the national or European level. Q methodology would be particularly adept in answering such questions.

The findings may also be of interest to urban governance researchers. Belfast and Brussels, while contested, are growing urban societies. Belfast and Brussels face the same problems of urbicide, urban sprawl, unemployment and infrastructure capacity as
non-contested cities. This public administration lens used to view the workings of two urban administrations identifies the balance between the politician and the bureaucrat within these two cases. The findings also provide a foundation for hypothesis generation in other urban administrations such as those in Bristol, Paris or London. How are decisions made within these administrations, do bureaucrats in hung Councils such as Bristol possess similar influences into the policy-making processes as those within contested societies, or how much influence do bureaucrats possess within mayoral systems of governance such as is the case in London and Paris. This research may therefore prove helpful in the research design process and may also prove indicative in hypothesis formulation within broader urban governance research.

7.3 Conflict in cities and the contested state

The project to which this dissertation contributes, Conflict in Cities and the Contested State, seeks to understand how contested urban environments can absorb, resist and potentially play a role in transforming the territorial conflicts in which they are situated. Further the project seeks to advance an understanding as to how heavily contested societies may become viable cities for all inhabitants and how structures and institutions may bolster cities to withstand state struggles. It is to this aim that this dissertation seeks to contribute – I explore how institutions actually work in practice within the contested urban society. The dissertation has taken one of the core project cities, Belfast and introduced a new city to the project, Brussels. The aims of the dissertation are very clearly defined in that I do not seek to analyse Brussels or Belfast, nor do I
target the research at academics and practitioners in these cities. My aim has been to advance a more common understanding of how conflicts can be managed in the longer term and determine the role of the bureaucrat in this process. Thus my project, while drawing on Belfast and Brussels, does not seek to directly contribute to the conflict management processes of these cities. Rather, my intention has been to look at the concept of public administration and through the theoretical lens of public administration take a fresh approach at the problem of conflict management. I therefore am less concerned with the city-state relationship or with the role of national and international institutions and their interactions with the city. While much is known about what policies to implement in places such as Afghanistan, Iraq or the Balkans, little is known about how these policies may be implemented. It is this research deficit that this dissertation is aimed. Each of my chosen cities has adopted a different conflict management strategy and each city provides for learning from ethnic peace as opposed to perpetually focusing on instances of ethnic conflict. This dissertation argues and evidences that the bureaucracy is an integral player in sustaining conflict management. I have consciously limited my focus to just one of the institutions involved in the governance process of the city: the bureaucracy. Further, I have concentrated on the role of the bureaucracy in the conflict management process from the perspective of the elite level bureaucrat. This has allowed me to document the role perceptions and motivations of bureaucrats within two recently formed cases of power-sharing. If other heavily contested societies are to successfully manage ethno-political differences, sufficient consideration to the design and operation of the public bureaucracy is a
precondition. Further, it is reiterated that developing bureaucratic structures alone is not sufficient; careful consideration to how these structures are employed/exploited by the bureaucrat is also a necessity. There is no transferrable handbook for successful power-sharing; however a stable, effective and representative bureaucracy is a necessary condition if conflict is to be managed in the longer term. The Conflict in Cities project has contributed to a variety of aspects of conflict management and has approached conflict management through a variety of lenses ranging from architecture and archaeology to sociology, geography, and political science. In this dissertation I focus not on explaining the problems of the violently contested society, nor do I focus on what policies would improve the successful management of conflict. Instead I have concerned myself with the policy process of the successfully managed contested society and the role of the bureaucrat within it.

7.4 Limitations and opportunities for further research

This research has been conducted with a significant sample of bureaucratic elites in both cities. It must however be reemphasised that responses from the Brussels Capital Region administration are not as comprehensive as in the other four administrations. The findings emphasise the important contribution of the public administration not only to good governance but to conflict management under consociation regimes. The public administration within the contested society receives very little scholarly attention. Further research is required to understand how administrative capacity can be developed within other contested societies. While the subject of conflict management
receives much scholarly attention, the conceptual findings from this research should assist in developing research questions within other contested societies. While there has been much investigation into political level cooperation between Turkish and Greek Cypriots in Nicosia, how would the public administration look in a shared unified city? If, as advocated by the EU and UN, Nicosia is reunified and the political levels agree to cooperate, how will the supporting public administration function? In the two separate administrations that currently govern the city what guides and motivates bureaucrats to behave in the way they do? Such an understanding would provide the basis for planning a unified public administration should a political level agreement emerge.

In cities recently emerging from civil war such as Mostar and Beirut, how should supporting governance institutions be designed? What individuals or ethno-political cleavages do bureaucrats in these cities represent? What are their core governance beliefs, and are these shared by bureaucrats across the traditional divide? This research has demonstrated that bureaucrats within both cases possess varying levels of discretion, what is the case within other emerging power-sharing societies? In cities still experiencing violent confrontations such as Kirkuk, how can a stable public administration be designed and then implemented? What administrative structures would be best suited to its long term needs? While these questions are often surpassed by interest in determining political level arrangements, this research has demonstrated the importance of the public administration to sustaining conflict management mechanisms. While it is indeed necessary to establish political and judicial level
agreements, the evidence from this research demonstrates that the public administration within the contested city needs also to be considered.

It is hoped that the lessons from these two developed, successfully managed, contested societies may be able to provide some answers for other emerging power-sharing societies. Caution however must always be exercised in cases of policy learning. While the principles of good governance remain constant across societies and the various possible types of governance institution remain limited, contested societies are unique entities. The dissertation has found that it is not the conflict management mechanism that determines the success of power-sharing but how the ‘solution’ is implemented. Closer attention to implementation processes is required as opposed to concentrating solely on the types of conflict management solution. The study has, for the first time, given a picture of how the administration within a power-sharing society can look within ten/fifteen years of a power-sharing agreement. Pre power-sharing the administration in Belfast was described by Bollens (2000: xvi) as ‘neutral’, this being ‘insufficient in a city of dysfunctional sectarian territoriality...’. Today the norms and values guiding resource allocation have changed. Belgium too has seen its linguistic divisions leave it without political leadership for much of 2007 and 2010/11. Brussels Halle Vilvoorde is bitterly divided along linguistic lines at the political level. Despite this national turmoil, the sub-state political institutions within the Brussels region (BCR, CCC, COCOF, VGC) have, since 1989, maintained four successive full term governments. While the Brussels model maintains a number of flaws as outlined in chapter four, it works amidst an environment that doesn’t. These cities make evident therefore that
administrative reform is not impossible within a short timeframe, even in violently contested societies such as Belfast, and unfavourable national influences as in Brussels.

Predicting behaviours is one of the principal aims of sociology and political science. An understanding of the politico-administrative axis also provides indications of how an administration may act in particular circumstances. This study provides an indication of how bureaucrats in each of the cases operate within the governance structures, which in turn assists in predicting policy outcomes. In summary, the bureaucracy within the contested society is indeed unique. Evidence from these two cases demonstrates that the bureaucratic elite play a significant role in the normalisation and stabilisation process. Further, the design of governance institutions within which the bureaucratic elite act, must not prevent the progression from conflict management to conflict resolution. As the conflict management process succeeds, the structures must be able to respond to the emerging demands for good governance. Developing institutional capacity is a priority for any post conflict society. The bureaucrat, and the bureaucrats’ interaction with the governance structures are identified as pivotal to the successful management of ethnopolitical conflict.
Appendices

CHAPTER ONE

Annex 1.1

Principles of good governance


World Bank: Governance is defined as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources. The World Bank has identified three distinct aspects of governance: (i) the form of political regime; (ii) the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development; and (iii) the capacity of governments to design, formulate, and implement policies and discharge functions.

UNDP: Governance is viewed as the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences.

OECD: The concept of governance denotes the use of political authority and exercise of control in a society in relation to the management of its resources for social and economic development. This broad definition encompasses the role of public authorities in establishing the environment in which economic operators function and in determining the distribution of benefits as well as the nature of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled.

Institute of Governance, Ottawa: Governance comprises the institutions, processes and conventions in a society which determine how power is exercised, how important decisions affecting society are made and how various interests are accorded a place in such decisions.

Commission on Global Governance: Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest.
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan: Good governance is ensuring respect for human rights and the rule of law; strengthening democracy; promoting transparency and capacity in public administration. Governance refers to the process whereby elements in society wield power and authority, and influence and enact policies and decisions concerning public life, and economic and social development. Governance is a broader notion than government. Governance involves interaction between these formal institutions and those of civil society.

Tokyo Institute of Technology: The concept of governance refers to the complex set of values, norms, processes and institutions by which society manages its development and resolves conflict, formally and informally.

THOMAS G WEISS: It involves the state, but also the civil society (economic and social actors, community-based institutions and unstructured groups, the media, etc) at the local, national, regional and global levels.

Annex 1.2

Five Capabilities that contribute to system capacity performance from Brinkerhoff and Morgan, 2010

1. **The capability to commit and engage.** Actors are able to: mobilize resources (financial, human, organizational); create space and autonomy for independent action; motivate unwilling or unresponsive partners; plan, decide, and engage collectively to exercise their other capabilities.

2. **The capability to carry out technical, service delivery, and logistical tasks.** Actors are able to: produce acceptable levels of performance; generate substantive outputs and outcomes (e.g., health or education services, employment opportunities, justice, and rule of law); sustain production over time; and add value for their clients, beneficiaries, citizens, etc.

3. **The capability to relate and attract support.** Actors can: establish and manage linkages, alliances, and/or partnerships with others to leverage resources and actions; build legitimacy in the eyes of key stakeholders; deal effectively with competition, politics, and power differentials.

4. **The capability to adapt and self-renew.** Actors are able to: adapt and modify plans and operations based on monitoring of progress and outcomes; proactively anticipate change and new challenges; learn by doing; cope with changing contexts and develop resiliency.

5. **The capability to balance diversity and coherence.** Actors can: develop shared short- and long-term strategies and visions; balance control, flexibility, and consistency; integrate and harmonize plans and actions in complex, multi-actor settings; and cope with cycles of stability and change.
Annex 1.3
Questionnaire Sample

How frequently in your professional activity are you in contact with the political actors of the city government?

- At least once a week
- At least once every three months
- At least once a month
- At least once a year
- Less often

How would you describe the atmosphere at these meetings when discussing resource allocation?

- Evidenced based (technocratic)
- Consensus based
- Conflictual
- Chaotic and Unstructured

When conflict does arise in your personal interactions with the department, it is generally based on:

- Language/religious differences
- Territorial Interests
- Expert/technical/scientific differences
- Social/cultural differences
- Differences in interpreting information
- Political differences

Please state how readily you agree with the following statements:

I trust and have confidence in my Minister and his cabinet
- I Agree
- I Agree with Reservation
- I am indifferent
- I Disagree
- I Disagree with reservation

I trust and have confidence in the decisions taken by the bureaucratic elite within the urban government
- I Agree
- I Agree with Reservation
- I am indifferent
- I Disagree
- I Disagree with reservation

I trust and have confidence in the decisions taken by my colleagues
- I Agree
- I Agree with Reservation
- I am indifferent
- I Disagree
- I Disagree with reservation
People feel different degrees of attachment to linguistic, social, political or religious communities. How about you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>fairly attached</td>
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<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>not at all attached</td>
</tr>
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<table>
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<th>b. to your Religious Community? (Belfast)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>not very attached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>not at all attached</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>c. to your Ethnic group?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>not at all attached</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>d. to your Social class?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>fairly attached</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>not very attached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>not at all attached</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>e. to your Political party?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>fairly attached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>not very attached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>not at all attached</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>f. to your Urban government?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>fairly attached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>not very attached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>not at all attached</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In your opinion, to what extent does the political level influence the output of resources in their own personal community?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complete Influence</th>
<th>Considerable Influence</th>
<th>Some Influence</th>
<th>Not Much Influence</th>
<th>No Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How would you interpret the interaction within this department?

- Evidenced based (technocratic) ....
- Consensus based ....
- Conflictual ....
- Chaotic and Unstructured ....

When conflict does arise in your personal interactions with the department, it is generally based on:

- Language/religious differences ....
- Territorial Interests ....
- Expert/technical/scientific differences ....
- Social/cultural differences ....
- Differences in interpreting information ....
- Political differences ....

Please rank (1,2,3…) these organisations concerning their ability to affect the urban bureaucratic decision-making processes:

- Brussels government ....
- Brussels Parliament ....
- Belgian bureaucracy ....
- Individual Politicians ....
- National-level business ....
- Urban-level business(private sector) ....
- Linguistically aligned interest groups ....
- OECD/World Bank/IMF/EU ....
- Policy based interest groups ....
- The media ....

Other: ________________________________

Which of the previous organisations has increased its role in urban governance over the last five years or so? Please list a maximum of two

1. ____________________________
2. ____________________________
### Annex 1.4 Table 1.1

**Descriptive sample of interviewees**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Male: Female</th>
<th>NO.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Belfast:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male: Female</td>
<td>10:10</td>
<td></td>
<td>50:50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British: Irish: Northern Irish</td>
<td>7:5:8</td>
<td></td>
<td>35:25:40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant: Catholic: Neither</td>
<td>7:8:5</td>
<td></td>
<td>35:40:25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social origins (by father’s profession)</td>
<td>11:4:4</td>
<td></td>
<td>55:20:20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brussels</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male: Female</td>
<td>16:4</td>
<td></td>
<td>80:20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language Dutch: French: Bilingual</td>
<td>10: 8: 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>50: 40: 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education High school: Degree: Masters</td>
<td>1: 14: 5</td>
<td></td>
<td>5: 70: 25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### CHAPTER SIX

#### Annex/Table 6.4: The relationship between Belfast interviewees and factors

This table describes how closely each (Belfast) interviewee (p) weighs on each factor. In other words to what extent each interviewee fits into each group. For example, interviewee no. 2 is .69 in factor 1 and .29 in factor 2. The X denotes that the respondent’s answers contributed to the make-up of that particular factors general perceptions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>P</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4410X</td>
<td>0.3984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6900X</td>
<td>0.2930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.3180</td>
<td>0.5756X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.8255X</td>
<td>0.2930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.6809X</td>
<td>0.3334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.7835X</td>
<td>0.2523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.4800</td>
<td>0.5878X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.4110</td>
<td>0.7521X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.6292X</td>
<td>0.4703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.1563</td>
<td>0.7290X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.6994X</td>
<td>0.2474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.6736X</td>
<td>0.4321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.5054</td>
<td>0.5914X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.7865X</td>
<td>0.1306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.4047</td>
<td>0.5140X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.5679X</td>
<td>0.4553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.4586</td>
<td>0.6509X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.7391X</td>
<td>0.3806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.0951</td>
<td>0.8344X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex/Table 6.5 The relationship between Brussels interviewees and factors

Once again, in the table below we see how the Brussels factors are generated. For example, interviewee No.1 is .67 in factor 2 and .43 in factor 3 and only .06 in factor 1. The figures relate to how heavily each respondent relates to the factor’s viewpoint.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>P</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>Administration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0626</td>
<td>0.6742</td>
<td>0.4374</td>
<td>VGC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.1113</td>
<td>0.3594</td>
<td>0.5905</td>
<td>VGC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.1284</td>
<td>0.7302</td>
<td>0.1218</td>
<td>VGC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.4973</td>
<td>0.5922</td>
<td>-0.0382</td>
<td>VGC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.0426</td>
<td>0.6485</td>
<td>0.3246</td>
<td>VGC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.1418</td>
<td>0.6160</td>
<td>-0.3364</td>
<td>VGC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.5117</td>
<td>0.5966</td>
<td>0.1975</td>
<td>COCOF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.1461</td>
<td>0.3503</td>
<td>0.4405</td>
<td>COCOF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>-0.1539</td>
<td>0.0409</td>
<td>0.6259</td>
<td>COCOF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.3582</td>
<td>0.4061</td>
<td>0.3804</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.5336</td>
<td>0.0057</td>
<td>0.5846</td>
<td>CCC</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.4738</td>
<td>0.0047</td>
<td>0.5818</td>
<td>CCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.7614</td>
<td>-0.0071</td>
<td>0.1717</td>
<td>CCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.5983</td>
<td>0.3344</td>
<td>0.0652</td>
<td>CCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.4720</td>
<td>0.0686</td>
<td>0.5905</td>
<td>BCR</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.4988</td>
<td>0.2967</td>
<td>0.1354</td>
<td>BCR</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>0.5614</td>
<td>0.3372</td>
<td>0.1297</td>
<td>BCR</td>
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<td>0.1990</td>
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<td>0.0474</td>
<td>0.5901</td>
<td>BCR</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.4330</td>
<td>0.2719</td>
<td>0.4673</td>
<td>BCR</td>
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</table>
Annex 6.6: Factor Arrays

In the table below, the relationship between each factor (or group of individuals) and each statement is identified. In other words, the table identifies where each collective of individuals placed the Q statements. (eg. statement one would have been placed in the -1 category by interviewees in factors 1, 2 and 5. Factor 3 would have placed it in the +1 category and Factor four would have placed it in the -4 category)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Belfast Factor number</th>
<th>Brussels Factor number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>If a government employee is forced to choose between the most efficient policy and the most equitable policy, the most efficient alternative should be chosen</td>
<td>-1 -1</td>
<td>1 -3 -1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Bureaucracies should be staffed by professionally trained, technically competent individuals. The most qualified person should always get the job</td>
<td>0 2</td>
<td>3 2 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>I recommend or actively advocate in favour of policy positions that address the needs and concerns of minority citizens</td>
<td>-1 -1</td>
<td>0 0 -1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>I advocate the allocation of resources according to technical criteria only – those who need the service should get it</td>
<td>0 -1</td>
<td>1 -1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>My role is to carry out the wishes of urban government</td>
<td>1 3</td>
<td>0 1 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Given the cultural diversity within my city, equity and fairness between various ethnicities is more important than efficiency</td>
<td>1 0</td>
<td>0 0 -1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Resources should be allocated according to the wishes of the political elite, regardless of my opinions</td>
<td>-1 0</td>
<td>-3 -2 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>My role is to follow the rules of the bureaucracy at all times no matter what the circumstances</td>
<td>-2 -1</td>
<td>-2 -2 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>I value the views of the urban political elite, and those positively influence my personal opinions</td>
<td>0 -1</td>
<td>-1 0 -1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>My role is to serve as an expert within my policy area, serving ONLY to provide advice to my Minister/Council Committee</td>
<td>-1 -1</td>
<td>0 -1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Statement</td>
<td>Score</td>
<td>Strength</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>I recommend or actively advocate in favour of policy positions that I perceive represent the needs and interests of the entire urban public</td>
<td>3 2 1 3 1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>In my daily work I represent the elected government of the city</td>
<td>1 3 2 1 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>My decisions are legitimate as I follow procedures established by law and/or secondary legislation</td>
<td>0 3 2 0 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>My role is to mediate conflicting interests and find a course of action that satisfies everyone.</td>
<td>2 2 0 1 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Given the cultural diversity of my city, a prerequisite for good governance would be recruitment from all sectors of the community, even if this means that the best person does not always get the job. On the job training can correct this imbalance.</td>
<td>0 -2 -1 -3 -3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>I actively encourage procedures that give my community the greater access to the public services that the deserve</td>
<td>-2 -3 0 1 -1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>Administrators are not neutral. They should be committed to good management and social equity as values</td>
<td>3 0 1 3 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Pro-state facilitation of services</td>
<td>I believe that by putting the interests of business first, benefits will flow to citizens</td>
<td>-1 -2 -3 -3 -3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>In contemporary social and economic affairs it is essential that technical considerations be given more weight than political factors</td>
<td>-1 -1 2 -2 -1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Given that I operate within a contested city, resource allocation should balance technical criteria (those who need it get it) and demographic criteria (if one community gets a resource, the other should get it too – regardless of necessity)</td>
<td>-1 1 -1 -1 -3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Public employees should aim for governance that works better and costs less</td>
<td>3 2 2 2 2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>My decisions are legitimate as I only follow the decisions of the political level</td>
<td>1 0 -2 -3 -3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>In my daily work I represent my department and the wider civil service</td>
<td>1 1 1 2 2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>In my daily work I value the views of community interest groups with whom I share a personal political affinity</td>
<td>-2 -2 -2 -1 -2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>When a conflict of interests arises between the wishes of the urban government and my own</td>
<td>0 2 -3 0 1</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
technical beliefs or the wishes of the political leaders of my personal community, I automatically and unquestionably follow the wishes of the government.

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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>Elected officials rarely pressurise me to alter my personal expert decisions</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>I see my role as to devise solutions that are technically feasible and efficient</td>
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<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Neutrality</td>
<td>I believe that neutrality and impartiality should be the primary values within a bureaucracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Neutrality</td>
<td>My decisions are legitimate on the basis of my technical expertise and by the fact that I provide technically feasible solutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>My role is to achieve the goals of the elected political representatives of my own community</td>
<td>-3</td>
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<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>As I am involved in the policy making process, I ought to do so in a manner that advances the interests of those less well off in society, regardless of their background</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Pro-state facilitation of services</td>
<td>The best way to ensure efficient public service to the entire urban community is to facilitate the private sector in service provision</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Pro-state provision of services</td>
<td>I believe that citizens needs are best advanced through directly putting their needs first</td>
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<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>I am reluctant to assume a leadership role in divisive policy issues. This is the prerogative of elected officials</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>My decisions are legitimate as I represent the interests of my community</td>
<td>-3</td>
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<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>I take the initiative in proposing policies, mobilising support for them, and questioning policies that may run counter to the general public interest</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>I know what is legal, not what is right. I stick to what is legal</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Pro-state provision of services</td>
<td>The best way to ensure efficient public service to the entire urban population is through public sector reform so that services may be provided equitably and efficiently by the public sector</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>Given the recent history of the city, I can of course empathise with the needs of my community – My loyalty is to them and I work for their interests within the legal constraints of the</td>
<td>-3</td>
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<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>When a conflict of interest arises between the wishes of the political level and my personal expert beliefs, I pursue my expert beliefs for as long as politically possible</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>In my daily work I value the views of international and specialised organisations such as the IMF, World Bank, EU, OECD, Policy specific think tanks and NGOs.</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>In my work I try to substitute my own political values with those of the political elite</td>
<td>-2</td>
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<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>My community pay taxes; it is my duty to represent them within the bureaucracy. Other bureaucrats advocate the allocation of resources for their communities, it is my duty to provide resources for my community</td>
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<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>My loyalty is first and foremost with the policy area, then to my department</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>Although it is rarely necessary, when needs be I do stand up for the rights and interests of my personal community</td>
<td>-2</td>
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<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>I find it easier to relate to Councillors/Ministers from my own personal community. It is only logical – we share a common background</td>
<td>-2</td>
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Annex 6.7a: Where Factor One fit with the conceptual framework

Annex 6.7b Where Factor One fit with the conceptual framework
Annex 6.7c: Agree/Disagree statements factor one

Annex 6.8a: Where Factor Two fit with the conceptual framework
Annex 6.8b: Where Factor Two fit with the conceptual framework

Annex 6.8c Where Agree/Disagree statements factor two

2

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<th>Pro Market</th>
<th>Pro state</th>
<th>Professional</th>
<th>Personal</th>
<th>Neutrality</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
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<td>2.44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.32</td>
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<td>-1.43</td>
<td>-0.97</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>-1.31</td>
<td>3.61</td>
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Z Scores: -15, -10, -5, 0, 5, 10
Annex 6.9a: Where Factor Three fit with the conceptual framework

Factor 3:
Representation
Web

Political responsiveness

Professional representation

Neutrality values

Annex 6.9b: Where Factor Three fit with the conceptual framework

Core Governance Beliefs: 3b

State provision of services
equity

efficiency

State facilitation of services
Annex 6.9c: Agree/Disagree statements factor three

Annex 6.10a: Where Factor Four fit with the conceptual framework
Annex 6.10b: Where Factor Four fit with the conceptual framework

State provision of services

equity

efficiency

State facilitation of services

Core Governance Beliefs: 4b

Annex 6.10c: Agree/Disagree statements factor four

Factor Four

Pro Market
Pro state
Professional
Personal
Neutrality
Political
Efficiency
Equity

Z Scores

4
Annex 6.11a: Where Factor Five fit with the conceptual framework

Factor 5: Representation Web

Political responsiveness

Professional representation

Neutrality values

Graph 6.11b: Where Factor Five fit with the conceptual framework

Core Governance Beliefs: 5b

State provision of services

equity

efficiency

State facilitation of services
Graph 6.11c: Agree/Disagree statements factor five

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<th>Category</th>
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<td>Pro Market</td>
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<td>Equity</td>
<td>-3.86</td>
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Z Scores
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